

WFP DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO SPECIAL OPERATION SO 200864

| Country: | Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) |
|--------------------|---|
| Type of project: | Special Operation |
| Title: | Emergency Road Infrastructure Repairs in Support of WFP Operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo |
| Total cost (US\$): | US\$ 22,762,717 |
| Duration: | 24 months (1 August 2015 – 31 July 2017) |

Executive Summary

- \geq This Special Operation 200864 seeks to promote the timely, efficient, reliable and cost-effective delivery of much-needed WFP food and other humanitarian assistance across DRC. This Special Operation will rehabilitate a planned 110km of rural roads and other key infrastructure along these routes, and build local maintenance capacities, for a period of 24 months from 1 August 2015 to 31 July 2017. In doing so, the operation aims to concurrently improve access and travel times to and from agricultural production areas, further linking farmers to markets and providing economic incentives to increase production. It is expected that the rehabilitated roads will stimulate greater competition amongst economic traders to collect and transport food, which in turn will increase the farm-gate value of crops and encourage subsistence farmers to grow surplus for sale. Through consultations between WFP, the Logistics Cluster and major stakeholders, approximately 500km of roads have been identified for urgent repair and rehabilitation. 200km of the 500km roads were considered as highest priority in need of the most urgent rehabilitation valued at US\$ 36.7 million. This operation, valued at US\$ 22.8 million, will focus on the rehabilitation of 110km of the 200km roads. If donors show interest in this Special Operation and WFP is successful is resourcing the US\$ 22.8 million; a Budget Revision will be undertaken to adjust upwards and rehabilitate the remaining 90km of high priority roads.
- Humanitarian needs in DRC are considerable. Despite the return of a number of Internally Displaced People (IDPs) to their areas of origin in recent months, significant population displacement continues amid ongoing violence in the east and south of the country, and following a cessation of joint efforts by the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in DRC (MONUSCO) and the Congolese army (FARDC) to demobilize and disarm armed groups.

- The 2015 Humanitarian Action Plan (HAP) defines the lack of humanitarian access in the country as a key obstacle to the implementation of humanitarian efforts.¹ The delivery of humanitarian assistance remains a major logistical challenge for WFP and its counterparts. Most areas of operation are characterized by rugged terrain, limited infrastructure and poor quality road networks. The deterioration of road conditions during the rainy season, and the presence of armed militias, the Congolese Police and the FARDC demanding fees along roads in the two Kivu provinces and Katanga, further complicate the execution of humanitarian programmes. Not only do these conditions prevent or limit access to populations in need, they also delay humanitarian deliveries and drive up costs.
- This Special Operation will complement and support WFP's existing food assistance activities in DRC, currently implemented through Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO) 200540 (1 July 2013 – 31 December 2015), Regional Emergency Operation (EMOP) 200799 (1 January 2015 – 31 December 2015) and the DRC Purchase for Progress (P4P) programme (1 January 2015 – 31 December 2017), as well as the work of partner humanitarian organizations in the country. The operation will be implemented in collaboration with the newly established Access Working Group of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), DRC provincial road authorities, and other Logistics Cluster² partners as relevant.

Project Background

1. Humanitarian needs in DRC remain considerable, as ongoing violence in eastern and southern parts of the country, subsequent instability and recurrent population displacements compound already widespread poverty.³ The Eastern Provinces and Katanga in particular, where a large number of armed groups, militia and rebels are active and where government military operations continue, have experienced an increasing number of IDPs in 2015 thus far, reaching more than 2.7 million to date.⁴

¹ <u>http://www.humanitarianresponse.info/programme-cycle/space/document/rdc-aper%C3%A7u-des-besoins-humanitaires-2015</u>

² WFP is the lead agency of the Logistics Cluster operating in DRC, and is responsible for identifying and addressing logistics bottlenecks, while providing coordination of the overall humanitarian logistics response in eastern and southern DRC, including for any emergencies that may occur throughout the country. WFP Logistics Cluster activities are covered under Special Operation 200747.

³ According to the most recent Human Development Report (2013) 87 percent of the population lives below the poverty line of US\$1.25/day.

- 2. Despite various efforts to bring peace to these provinces through stabilization programmes such as the Plan de stabilisation et de restauration des régions affectées par les conflits (STAREC) and the International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (ISSSS) initiated in 2009, insecurity continues to be a pervasive reality.
- 3. With the movement of populations and lengthy travel times as a result of poor, impassable, or even non-existent roads, agricultural production and the export of agricultural products have significantly declined.⁵ This situation leads to an increase in imported agricultural commodities, resulting in high costs for the rural poor, ultimately affecting the nutrition status of those in agricultural areas.
- 4. DRC's existing road network spans 152,400 km.⁶ A majority of this infrastructure was developed during the colonial period leading up to the 1950s. Since then, maintenance and modernisation have been the responsibility of state organisations at the central and provincial levels, and of the private sector and religious institutions. However, amid a deterioration in the political and social situation in the country over the past two decades, the Congolese administration has been unable to provide sufficient investment to maintain the network.
- 5. As a result, DRC's roads have fallen into a state of serious disrepair. It is estimated that just 42 percent of the country's roads are currently able to support freight transport. The World Bank estimates that repairs and maintenance will require roughly US\$ 400 million per year.⁷ While some national and provincial axis roads have been rehabilitated with the support of MONUSCO and international NGOs, the work of WFP and humanitarian partners is greatly hampered by the poor condition of secondary roads used to reach isolated and vulnerable communities.
- 6. Since 2011, Logistics Cluster partners have undertaken emergency road repairs in DRC. Over this period, an average of approximately 1,000km of provincial and agricultural feeder roads are repaired annually using high intensity labour methods (HIMO). The use of labour-based methods provides additional income to some families, mostly farmers. These methods, however, are only adequate in

⁴ OCHA, Plan de réponse humanitaire 2015

⁵ FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations). 2003. *World agriculture towards* 2015/2030: An FAO perspective. FAO and EarthScan. Rome: FAO

⁶ DRC total road network of 152,400km; of which 58,000 km are national and provincial roads under the responsibility of the *Office des Routes;* 87,000 km are agricultural roads under the responsibility of the *Direction des Voies de Desserte Agricole;* and 7,400 km are urban roads under the responsibility of the *Office des Voiries et Drainage* (Office des Routes, Rapport Annuel d'Activités, Exercice 2013).

⁷ World Bank, Rapport Suivi de la Situation économique et Financière 2014

the short-term to enable seasonal access and are not suitable for a sustainable road rehabilitation project. Based on WFPs lessons learned from previous road rehabilitation projects, this intervention will use heavy machinery with the aim of achieving more sustainable results.

Project Justification

- 7. As defined by the 2015 HAP, access is a major barrier to the delivery of humanitarian assistance in DRC. The repair and maintenance of roads to improve humanitarian access and thereby contribute to efforts to address food insecurity in DRC is a key element of WFP's strategy for the country. The areas served by this Special Operation overlap with other WFP interventions and a significant proportion of WFPs target population (700,000) are expected to benefit directly or indirectly from the improved access. Poor infrastructure also contributes to relatively high transportation rates, which in turn drive up the cost of food items in the country, and of WFP food deliveries.⁸
- 8. WFP and the Government of DRC are in agreement that to achieve long-term economic stability, attention must be given to measures that will expand food production, increase market access and simultaneously create opportunities for rural income generation. One way to achieve this is through connecting rural households, producers and the private sector to markets.
- 9. Experience from the P4P programme in DRC to date has highlighted that poor infrastructure is one of the major constraints to successfully link smallholder farmers to markets. It is also a key obstacle in the processing and post-harvest handling phases of the supply chain which enhance differentiation and add value to raw produce. Some 48,000 farmer households are expected to benefit from WFP's P4P programme in DRC over the next three years. At least half of these will benefit from the rehabilitation of roads undertaken by this Special Operation. This figure is expected to increase over the course of implementation. Already, WFP has supported marketing by organising communities appropriately, providing technical guidance, establishing collection points, reinforcing the sector and monitoring food prices. This Special Operation will link to and complement these efforts.

⁸ As of June 2015, the LTSH rate for WFP PRRO is US\$ 455.24/mt and US\$ 931.50/mt for Regional EMOP 200799

- 10. Through the construction and maintenance of key rural roads, WFP aims to improve access to areas ready for agricultural development. The Dirt Road Rehabilitation and Maintenance Programme in Congo (PREPICO), carried out by the Belgian Development Agency, demonstrates the value of road infrastructure development in DRC. This project drastically increased commercial transportation within Kalemie and Nyunzu, with vehicle traffic multiplied fourfold.⁹ The construction and maintenance of key rural roads will also, where possible, complement investments made in improving the marketing of agricultural produce through P4P and local purchases, where poor or non-existent infrastructure represents a major bottleneck.
- 11. The activities proposed under this Special Operation will be linked to and coordinated with ongoing programmes and official policies promoted by the Government of DRC to strengthen agriculture, improve rural economies and enhance the livelihoods of rural farmers. A recent study by the World Bank highlights the availability of quality road infrastructure in DRC as a key factor in efforts to promote better standards of living.¹⁰ Other studies have shown the correlation between better rural roads and the cost of agricultural inputs such as fertilizers, seeds, and extension services in lowering food prices and reducing dependence on food imports.¹¹ Through the PREPICO project, the purchasing power of local communities increased alongside the increased traffic of basic necessities and agricultural products in areas formerly isolated from commercial traffic. Additionally, surveys of farmers in affected areas found increases in arable land per household, which catalyzed an upward shift in farm production.¹²

Project Objective(s)

12. The primary objectives of this Special Operation are to:

i. Facilitate the timely and efficient delivery of food assistance in DRC, by reducing transportation costs and lead times currently associated with WFP food deliveries; and

⁹ From 2009-2012, commercial transportation volume increased from 22 mt/wk. to 100 mt/wk. in development areas: vehicle traffic multiplied by four times, and bicycle traffic by ten times. *Case Study, Belgian Development Agency, 2013*

¹⁰ World Bank, Rapport Suivi de la Situation économique et Financière 2014

¹¹ Infrastructure and poverty reduction – What is the connection? Economic and Research Department (ERD) Policy Brief Series No. 13. Manila, Asian Development Bank

¹² From 2009-2012, the arable land per household increased from 500 to 3000SQM in project regions. *Case Study, Belgian Development Agency, 2013*

ii. Contribute to improved food security by linking areas of agricultural production to urban centers and markets.

Project Implementation

- 13. WFP plans to achieve the above objectives through the rehabilitation of 110km of rural roads and other key infrastructure along selected routes, including bridges and retaining walls. Rather than rehabilitating these roads through HIMO, WFP will utilize a "Spot Improvement" approach. This approach allows for easier follow-on maintenance and has the potential to improve the quality and durability of road rehabilitation. These construction works involve heavy machinery and it is likely that these works will be subcontracted to the private sector.
- 14. The short-term implementation strategy for this Special Operation will consist of acquiring funding, prioritizing and selecting individual roads for rehabilitation based on available funding and technical inputs, and initiating construction contracts through competitive tendering. Expert private companies using local manpower will implement the rehabilitation works. As these contracts are established, the medium-term strategy will establish capacity building projects and trainings, and maintain completed works using local capacities.
- 15. Approximately 500km of roads have been identified by the Logistics Cluster as in urgent need of repair and rehabilitation. 200km of these roads, valued at US\$ 36.7 million are considered highest priority. These strategic sections of road are mainly located in remote and isolated areas and are in urgent need of emergency spot repair in order to allow for the delivery of WFP and other humanitarian supplies. Under this Special Operation, WFP plans to rehabilitate 110km of the 200km highest priority roads (and including bridges, retaining walls and/or other infrastructure along selected routes) at a cost of US\$ 22.8 million, and to maintain the same in partnership with local communities (see Annex I). If donors show interest in this Special Operation and WFP is successful is resourcing the US\$ 22.8 million; a Budget Revision will be undertaken to adjust upwards and rehabilitate the remaining 90km of high priority roads.
- 16. In collaboration with humanitarian partners, the Access Working Group and DRC provincial road authorities, WFP will provide targeted trainings to local communities on the management and financing of road maintenance,

implemented by a technical expert. One of the roles of the expert will be to centralize information and capitalize experiences on the issues of maintenance.

- 17. As lead agency of the Logistics Cluster, WFP will collaborate with its humanitarian partners, the Access Working Group and DRC provincial road authorities, to prioritize and select individual roads for rehabilitation using the following targeting criteria:
 - a. Areas in which WFP and other humanitarian actors are operational;
 - b. Routes linking areas identified as agriculturally productive;
 - c. Areas with the potential to develop local capacity and with a presence of provincial state agencies to be trained in road maintenance; and
 - d. Consistent and participatory support from local authorities and communities.
- 18. Successful implementation of this operation will be dependent upon overall security conditions in DRC. It may reasonably be expected that volatility, insecurity, localized fighting and natural disasters will continue across the country at varying scales for the duration of this operation. Close consultation with the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS), WFP Security and the Government will be maintained throughout, in order to inform decision-making and minimise disruption to the works undertaken by this Special Operation.

Project Management

19. The Country Director will be the fund manager for this Special Operation and the Head of Supply Chain and Common Services will be the Project Manager. The Head of Finance will be the Allotment Manager. In order to strengthen organizational capabilities, the CO will further employ seven dedicated personnel for this project. These include a Lead Engineer with project management experience and a Procurement Officer to supplement the subcontracting activities necessary to carry out the rehabilitation works. In addition, the Logistics Cluster Coordinator will support the management of partner expectations. Four field Engineers will be responsible for field oversight and implementation.




Figure 1. Project Management structure for Special Operation 200864

- 20. A contingency of US\$ 1,500,000 has been built into the budget of this Special Operation. Forty five percent of this is expected to be allocated for WFP to respond rapidly to critical logistics bottlenecks in areas outside the scope of this operation (such as obstructed transport routes and collapsed bridges). Five percent is planned for Government capacity building activities for long-term maintenance. Fifty percent of this sum will be allocated to infrastructure maintenance Of existing roads in areas beyond the scope of this operation and during the period of implementation.
- 21. In order to implement this Special Operation, WFP will engage local communities through awareness campaigns on local maintenance systems. Road safety briefings will be given to communities to ensure they are aware of the increased traffic hazards resulting from road improvements. WFP will also engage the technical support of expert engineers and government agencies, such as the Office des Routes (OR) and Direction Voie de Desserte Agricole (DVDA), under the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development.

Project Cost and Benefits

22. The cost to WFP of this Special Operation amounts to a total of US\$ 22,762,717, including an ISC cost of US\$ 1,489,150. WFP will seek the inputs of humanitarian partners and the Government of DRC on project implementation, and specifically with regard to road selection and project monitoring. Financial support from the Government of DRC will also be encouraged.

- 23. The rehabilitation of roads and other infrastructure undertaken under this Special Operation will benefit WFP, its humanitarian counterparts, commercial actors and local communities in the following ways:
 - a. Improved physical access across several provinces in the country;
 - b. Reduced transportation costs;
 - c. Reduced travel and delivery times; and
 - d. Lower price and increased range of goods in local markets.
- 24. This Special Operation will also benefit the P4P programme where possible. Improved and more affordable transportation will increase access to markets by smallholder farmers.
- 25. The general development of DRC is expected to benefit over time from the construction of rural roads. Increased access will facilitate and ease the implementation of a range of developments projects, across agriculture, health, education and other essential basic service sectors.

Monitoring and Evaluation

- 26. A joint monitoring plan will be established in collaboration with relevant Government counterparts, and will focus on planned project outputs. WFP Standard Project Reports (SPR) will be produced in line with usual donor requirements.
- 27. Baseline studies for each rehabilitated road will be conducted under this Special Operation and commissioned through the Logistics Cluster. These studies will examine traffic counts, average travel times and speeds, and socioeconomic indicators such as cost of goods and public transport access.
- 28. General Key Performance Indicators (KPI's) to be monitored are:
 - a. Cost-benefit of emergency infrastructure repair/rehabilitation (increased speed/improved efficiency of deliveries to beneficiaries). Target: transport cost reduced by 20 percent along the route.
 - b. Kilometers of damaged road partially rehabilitated. Target: 110 km of roads.
 - c. Number of metallic and/or wooden bridges rehabilitated. Target: 20.

- d. Erection of retaining walls following landslides on strategic roads. Target: 30.
- e. Travel time between production areas and major towns. Target: reduction of 1 hour.
- f. Number of community trainings conducted. Target: 10

Exit Strategy

- 29. This Special Operation will be implemented from 1 August 2015 30 June 2017. All targets are expected to be achieved upon completion of the project.
- 30. Governmental responsibility for maintaining national infrastructure is decentralised at the provincial level. Following the completion of WFP emergency repairs to roads and bridges in selected provinces, it is the responsibility of appropriate governmental institutions to use existing local systems for on-going maintenance. In this regard, WFP will work to develop the capacities of both government personnel and local communities via advocacy and awareness-raising efforts, in order to ensure adequate long-term maintenance of the roads rehabilitated by this Special Operation. WFP may continue to provide expert technical advice thereafter.
- 31. Through the Logistics Cluster and Access Working Group, WFP will continue to participate in dialogue and planning processes related to infrastructural development in DRC. It is expected that emergency road access will remain an important part of WFP's response in DRC. Based on the success and lessons learned from this Special Operation, a second phase may be considered.

Recommendation

32. This Special Operation covering the period 1 August 2015 to 31 July 2017 at a total cost to WFP of US\$ 22,762,717 is recommended for approval by the Executive Director with the budget provided.

APPROVAL

Ertharin Cousin Executive Director

ANNEX I

