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REAL-TIME EVALUATION OF WFP'S RESPONSE TO THE INDIAN OCEAN TSUNAMI— DECEMBER 2004–JUNE 2005

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On 26 December 2004 an earthquake of magnitude 9.1 off north-western Sumatra set off tidal waves (tsunami) that devastated coastal areas of India, the Maldives, Sri Lanka, Sumatra and Thailand; Myanmar and Somalia were affected to a lesser extent. An estimated 260,000 people were killed or missing and the lives and livelihoods of 2 million people were seriously affected.¹

WFP responded rapidly to the emergency: by early January 2005, Emergency Operation 10405.0 had been approved for an initial six months to the end of June, supported by two special operations; a third special operation was approved to establish a United Nations Joint Logistics Centre.

The two objectives of the emergency operation were:

- to save lives by preventing deterioration of the nutritional status of vulnerable children and mothers; and
- to promote the rehabilitation of housing, community infrastructure and livelihoods.

WFP food aid made a major contribution to achieving the first objective: few deaths were reported from malnutrition or disease. The second objective was more difficult to achieve in the optimistic timescale foreseen; multisectoral rehabilitation has been slower than expected, but food aid has provided a safety net for people in need and an income transfer for displaced people.

General food distributions were continued in Indonesia and Sri Lanka for longer than envisaged for the reasons mentioned above. In Sri Lanka, more people have been assisted than planned because WFP has worked through a government assistance programme that was more generous than foreseen in WFP's initial emergency needs assessment.

In Indonesia, the emergency needs assessment team estimated 790,000 people in need, including 700,000 displaced, for an initial three months. In fact it took several months for the caseload to grow towards this figure; WFP was reaching 590,570 people at the end of March 2005, which was to have been the end of the initial three-month emergency phase.

Security constraints, remoteness, damaged infrastructure and lack of staff on the ground were serious obstacles in the initial months in Aceh, where long-term malnutrition was exacerbated by the tsunami. In Sri Lanka, the prevalence of underweight children was higher than the national average in almost all affected areas. The importance of building up targeted programmes for vulnerable groups using micronutrient fortified foods has to be emphasized for both countries.

In terms of gender, there is evidence that the tsunami had a greater impact on women than on

¹ Recent figures estimate 176,630 dead, 49,778 missing and 1.9 million affected. Source: Brussels/Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters, July 2005.



men. Women need to be brought into consultation and decision-making, and their needs considered in all aspects of relief, rehabilitation and recovery.


In this operation, WFP was stronger in logistics than programming, and stronger in assessment than monitoring. Weaknesses in programming and monitoring were linked to difficulties in mobilizing sufficient experienced staff for field offices and sub-offices and to the short duration of some assignments. Rapid rotation of temporary international staff was a problem in terms of loss of institutional memory, building up relationships and maintaining accountability.

The WFP Emergency Response Roster did not work as foreseen and should be reviewed as a matter of urgency. Security regulations hampered the response and need to be reviewed across the United Nations system for this kind of emergency. There were delays in mobilizing the United Nations Humanitarian Air Service, partly because the Indonesia Users' Group was undecided as to its requirements.

A positive aspect of the operation is the large amount of cash available from donors that enabled WFP to purchase food locally or regionally, for example rice in Indonesia and Sri Lanka, which helps farmers.²

This summary report and the accompanying full report describe areas where WFP can improve its emergency response. WFP reacted promptly and effectively to this disaster, and staff are to be commended for their commitment in difficult circumstances.

DRAFT DECISION*



The Board notes the information and recommendations in "Real-Time Evaluation of WFP's Response to the Indian Ocean Tsunami" (WFP/EB.2/2005/6-C/Rev.1), and encourages further action on the recommendations, taking into account considerations raised during its discussion.

² Some initial rice distributions were from a diverted shipment (Indonesia) or existing in-country PRRO stocks (Sri Lanka).

* This is a draft decision. For the final decision adopted by the Board, please refer to the Decisions and Recommendations document issued at the end of the session.



INTRODUCTION

1. The magnitude 9.1 earthquake off Aceh province in northwestern Sumatra on 26 December 2004 set off tidal waves (tsunami) that devastated Banda Aceh and the west coast Sumatra and caused major damage in coastal areas of Thailand, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, India, the Maldives and Somalia. An estimated 260,000 people were killed or missing; more recent estimates are somewhat lower. The highest number of victims was recorded in Indonesia. An estimated 2 million survivors were displaced or lost their homes and livelihoods.
2. The real-time evaluation (RTE) mission focused on WFP's response at the regional level and in Indonesia and Sri Lanka. A separate mini-RTE examined the response in Somalia.³

METHODOLOGY

3. The team, led by an independent consultant, included a nutritionist and health consultant evaluator, a logistics specialist and the Office of Evaluation (OEDE) Chief Evaluation Officer, who was also the evaluation manager.⁴
4. Methods used to gather data included extensive pre-mission background research and individual interviews with participants, in particular WFP staff, members of the governments of Indonesia and Sri Lanka, other United Nations agencies and international and national non-governmental organizations (NGOs), supplemented with interviews and informal group discussions with people who suffered the disaster and local officials and leaders.⁵ A two-week preparatory visit to the region by two team members took place in February; the full evaluation took place over four weeks in May/June 2005.

THE CONTEXT AND ORIGINS OF THE EMERGENCY

5. The scale of the tsunami was beyond the experience of the countries it struck. In contrast to many of WFP's emergency operations (EMOPs), the disaster occurred in a region with strong government mechanisms to manage the immediate response. Nevertheless, the international community faced significant challenges in its initial relief effort in remote Aceh, where damage to physical and human infrastructure required a sustained assistance programme.

³ The full report of the RTE contains an annex on the mini-RTE of WFP's response in Somalia and another annex which gives a description of WFP's response in the four countries not covered by the evaluation – i.e. India, the Maldives, Myanmar and Thailand. WFP's response in three of the four countries was relatively modest. In India and Thailand the governments took the lead in responding to the crisis, with significant support from domestic contributions, while in Myanmar the needs were limited. WFP's response in the Maldives was more substantial and was covering 14% of the population in May 2005 (i.e. some 42,000 people out of a population of almost 300,000).

⁴ The OEDE manager participated in the daily task force meetings either in person or by telephone link from mid-January onwards.

⁵ The nutrition consultant on the team spoke fluent Bahasa Indonesian. This facilitated interviews with beneficiaries, in particular female beneficiaries, in Aceh.



6. The areas of Indonesia and Sri Lanka worst affected are or have recently been conflict areas; the military initially played a significant role in the response, particularly in Indonesia, where international military units also assisted in the first weeks.
7. In Sumatra, the greatest loss of life was on the west coast; the east coast was also damaged and had to deal with a major influx of internally displaced people (IDPs).

WFP'S RESPONSE

8. The United Nations appeal launched in Jakarta by the Secretary-General in January 2005 was for US\$977 million to fund emergency operations over six months by 40 humanitarian partners including United Nations agencies and NGOs.
9. As part of this, WFP's Regional EMOP 10405.0,⁶ approved on 3/4 January 2005 by the WFP Executive Director and the Director-General of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), aimed to assist 2 million people for six months from January to June 2005. Its objectives, which form the basis for this evaluation, were to:
 - save lives by preventing a deterioration in the nutritional status of vulnerable children and mothers, which could lay them open to disease;⁷ and
 - promote the rehabilitation of housing, community infrastructure and livelihoods.
10. WFP planned to deliver 169,315 mt of food at a cost, including overheads, of US\$185.46 million. The EMOP was supported by two special operations (SOs) on logistics and air services; WFP took the lead in establishing the United Nations Joint Logistics Centre (UNJLC) for inter-agency logistics coordination, covered by a third SO.⁸ Total WFP support for the relief operations amounted to US\$256 million over six months.⁹

WFP'S RESPONSE IN INDONESIA

11. WFP had an established programme in Indonesia,¹⁰ but it had limited logistical capacity of its own. For the first few weeks, its private-sector partner TNT arranged trucks and got food supplies moving along the eastern coastal road from Medan to Banda Aceh. Airlifts from the hub at Subang in Malaysia, set up by WFP/UNJLC, and coastal shipping augmented deliveries to the island and remote communities on the west coast.
12. Despite WFP's strong initial response, it took some months to develop a systematic food-distribution programme because of programming and human resources constraints –

⁶ EMOP 10405: "Assistance to Tsunami Victims in Sri Lanka, Indonesia, the Maldives and other Countries in the Indian Ocean Region".

⁷ Given problems of attribution, measuring the results of this objective is often difficult. In the case of the tsunami it might have been more appropriate to include the whole population, including adult males, in the objective.

⁸ SO 10406.0 "Logistics augmentation in support of WFP Indian Ocean tsunami EMOP 10405.0", valued at US\$24.37 million; SO 10407.0 "WFP Air support for humanitarian relief operations in response to the Indian Ocean tsunami", valued at US\$42.42 million; and SO 10408.0 "Establishment of United Nations Joint Logistics Centre for the Indian Ocean tsunami", valued at US\$3.92 million.

⁹ A budget revision in April 2005 to increase the EMOP value and extend it to the end of 2005 adjusted the land-side transport, storage and handling (LTSH) regional rate downwards significantly; direct support costs (DSC) were increased to cover costs associated with the Nias earthquake of March 2005.

¹⁰ At the time of the tsunami WFP had no operations or presence in Aceh.



analysed in the full report – and the capacity limitations of some implementing partners (IPs).

13. WFP undertook an initial post-tsunami emergency needs assessment (ENA) in January 2005, which produced a useful document, but the country office felt that it was not as involved as it should have been.
14. This ENA estimated that 790,000 people required relief food aid for an initial three months, including 700,000 IDPs without adequate food, 60,000 people whose livelihoods had been disrupted and 30,000 who lived in isolated areas on the west coast. The team recommended distribution of full rations to all IDPs for an initial three months and an assistance package when they returned home to assist in recovery of livelihoods.
15. Initial assessments of beneficiary numbers in Indonesia and Sri Lanka were high, and optimistic assessments were made as to the speed of recovery. There were “inclusion errors”, probably because people registered in IDP camps in the hope of receiving relief items but did not continue to live in them. A further unknown was the extent to which survivors might be assisted by money from relatives overseas or by food and non-food assistance from other organizations.
16. It took longer than expected to reach the estimated 790,000 people identified by the ENA. WFP was still building up its caseload at the end of March 2005, when it had been anticipated that the initial emergency phase would be over.
17. General food distributions (GFDs) provided a safety net and income transfer for people in need, but they made targeted programmes such as food for work (FFW) more difficult to implement because there was less incentive for people to work or for IPs to divert resources to design and supervise FFW programmes.¹¹ Cash-for-work (CFW) interventions have started on a modest scale and are appreciated;¹² they can be a viable alternative to FFW in Aceh because markets are functioning in most places, but at the time of the RTE they covered only about 15 percent of beneficiaries assisted by GFDs. Given the uncertainties about longer-term shelter and livelihood issues, GFDs are valued as a reliable safety net and should continue for the time being.
18. Monitoring was not as strong as it should have been. The tsunami affected some areas of Aceh more severely than others, so needs vary considerably. WFP found that monitoring was difficult, because only one of its traditional NGO partners had a prior presence in Aceh and because all IPs, like WFP, faced problems such as difficulties in recruiting and retaining qualified staff.
19. The Government of Indonesia was expected to take the lead in issuing ration cards to IDPs, but no ration cards had been distributed in Aceh at the time of the mission’s visit, making it difficult for food aid monitors to track assistance. Awareness of rations improved with each distribution, but beneficiaries were generally uncertain as to how long GFDs would continue. WFP and its local partners could have made a greater effort to ensure that beneficiaries were informed about their entitlements, the timing of distributions and the proposed duration of assistance.
20. Supplementary feeding programmes were identified early as necessary for nutritionally vulnerable groups in some areas, but they took a long time to establish and were only starting at the time of the mission’s visit.

¹¹ FFW is not a traditional concept in Aceh.

¹² UNDP and Oxfam are implementing CFW programmes in Aceh; their importance is expected to increase.



21. In Aceh, transition from initial airlifts by foreign forces to normal WFP distribution operations by road and sea occurred within about a month. WFP was slow to adjust staffing to meet the needs of this second-phase operation.
22. WFP's capacity to deliver on-shore in the early weeks outstripped its ability to distribute to beneficiaries. Logistics staff were initially unable to hand over food to programming staff in remote locations because of lack of such staff on the ground. These initial problems had little discernible impact on survivors, however; the overall relief operation, in which WFP played a major role, was successful in preventing a decline in nutrition and health levels.
23. The UNJLC employed senior ex-military staff to establish links with the Indonesian military for the humanitarian system after an early period in which communication proved difficult. There seems to have been effective logistics coordination between civil-military coordination officers from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and those from UNJLC, but clear definition of their roles is needed to avoid duplication and possible confusion.
24. Surveys after the tsunami showed relatively high rates of malnutrition, particularly anemia and under-nutrition¹³ among children, but they suggested that most of these problems pre-dated the tsunami. Good coverage of vulnerable groups with food and nutrition interventions through GFDs had alleviated the potentially negative effects of the emergency on acute malnutrition. The WFP food ration was nutritionally adequate in terms of energy but limited in protein and micronutrients.

WFP'S RESPONSE IN SRI LANKA

25. It was easier to make a rapid response in Sri Lanka than in Indonesia, because there was less damage to infrastructures. WFP had a protracted relief and recovery operation (PRRO) in place in the north and east, areas of which were badly affected by the tsunami. WFP diverted 6,000 mt of food from the PRRO to the emergency response in the first few days.
26. WFP's initial assessment found that access to food was a problem for 650,000 people, but concluded that a third would be able to recover their livelihoods relatively quickly. It recommended that general distributions of full rations should cease after three months at the end of March 2005, with only targeted distributions after that date. The Government of Sri Lanka proposed a higher figure of 900,000 people for GFDs, however, using its network of multi-purpose cooperative societies. There is consensus that this figure is too high, because it includes everyone living in or near the areas hit by the tsunami, including people who were only marginally affected.
27. WFP reacted quickly and effectively to the emergency. Once WFP had decided to support the Government's food-distribution system, however, it could not unilaterally adjust the relief operation to meet changing needs. In May 2005, the Government and WFP agreed to continue GFDs until July and to implement a more targeted system from August onwards to achieve a significant reduction in the beneficiary caseload during the second half of the year.
28. Given that the relief operation is primarily managed by the Government, it is a question whether the scale of WFP equipment is the most efficient use of resources. WFP's initial

¹³ Wasting, underweight and stunting.



response was appropriate and rapid, but it might have been useful at the end of the first few months to consider whether continued expansion of WFP infrastructure was warranted.

29. Malnutrition rates, which have always been high in Sri Lanka, were not much affected by the tsunami, nor were there many recorded outbreaks of disease, despite cramped living conditions in the IDP camps.
30. Wheat flour milled locally from imported grain provided 50 percent of the cereals portion of the food ration. Rice is the staple of most people, and some interviewed beneficiaries expressed resistance to a half-rice/half-wheat flour ration. People in the Tamil areas of the north expressed a strong preference for local “red” rice varieties. There was insufficient supplementary feeding for many of the children at the time of the mission’s visit; about 250,000 children were benefiting from school feeding programmes, however.

COORDINATION AND INTER-AGENCY ISSUES

31. Coordination will be the topic of an inter-agency evaluation being organized by the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC),¹⁴ in which WFP’s Office of Evaluation participates.
32. The present evaluation identified an urgent need for WFP to clarify the role of the UNJLC and its relationship with WFP. Currently there is ambiguity over the extent to which the common services for which WFP takes responsibility are really “common” to the United Nations system and the humanitarian community; there is suspicion – not usually justified – in other United Nations agencies that when WFP controls these services its own staff and consultants are priority users.
33. For various reasons the United Nations Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) was slow to provide aircraft in Aceh. This is now being reviewed by one of the main donors to UNHAS.

SECURITY, LOGISTICS AND COMMUNICATION ISSUES

34. All staff need to be aware of security issues, but security regulations impeded the emergency response; an excessive number of security rules meant that staff could sometimes only work effectively by ignoring them. WFP should advocate a review of the implementation of security measures across the United Nations system in sudden-onset emergencies.
35. WFP’s Commodity Movement Processing and Analysis System (COMPAS) has recently been upgraded to COMPAS 2, but WFP appears to need a simple standard spreadsheet that can be used before COMPAS 2 system is set up, which takes time. Given the importance of commodity tracking, COMPAS requires continued management priority.
36. Communications were rapidly and impressively set up, but they faced similar human resources constraints as other parts of the response; the Information and Communications Technology Division (ADI) needs to develop mobile satellite-based systems for sub-offices in emergencies.

¹⁴ TEC, a coalition of donors, United Nations agencies, NGOs and others, is supported by the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance (ALNAP) based in London. See www.alnap.org for details.



37. A good deal of corporate investment has gone into producing manuals on all aspects of emergency preparedness and response, but field staff need simpler standard operating procedures during a fast-moving emergency.
38. WFP should also develop an “office in a box” with the equipment and stationery to set up an operation of this type.

HUMAN RESOURCES AND MANAGEMENT ISSUES

39. The Emergency Response Roster (ERR) of WFP stand-by staff for emergencies did not work because not enough suitable staff were available. As a result, the relief operation was sometimes run at the field level by short-term international staff and inexperienced national staff, which had a negative impact on implementation and monitoring. Staff from WFP’s stand-by partners partially filled the gaps, but most had a logistics background and could not meet the need for experienced management, programming and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) staff.
40. Senior staff tended to spend disproportionate amounts of time on procedural issues, leaving little time for strategic and programming activities such as planning, monitoring and building relationships with external stakeholders.
41. WFP urgently needs to review the allocation of staff to different locations. In this operation, there were too many staff in country offices in capital cities and too few with sufficient experience and seniority at field offices and sub-offices. The decision to deploy high-quality staff initially, with resulting high turnover, resulted in loss of institutional memory, difficulties in maintaining external relationships and dilution of accountability. So many international staff were deployed in a short time that most received little or no induction on local culture.¹⁵
42. To improve response to large-scale emergencies, WFP should establish a senior emergencies coordinator post at Headquarters by realigning existing posts and responsibilities. Such a coordinator would be responsible for deploying human, financial and material assets in a large-scale emergency and for following best practices; this cannot be left to regional directors because rapid decisions about deployment of assets have to be made. The post should carry the authority of a Senior Deputy Executive Director.¹⁶

RESOURCES AND FINANCE

43. Huge public interest made the EMOP largely “self-resourcing” and needing no major fundraising: within a month, WFP had confirmed contributions to cover 100 percent of core EMOP needs of US\$185 million, including a single first-time cash donation of US\$50 million from the American Red Cross. WFP had received US\$267.5 million in confirmed contributions by early May 2005 against needs of US\$271 million for the EMOP and SOs, 30 percent of which had been spent in the first three months according to a WFP report to OCHA for the financial tracking system.

¹⁵ There was also a problem of misinterpretation regarding temporary duty status (TDY) procedures between sending and receiving offices that led to considerable misunderstandings. The procedures have since been re-drafted more clearly.

¹⁶ Such a recommendation had already been made at an internal meeting of senior WFP staff in April 2005. At least one regional director expressed reservations about the proposal, apparently fearing that it may signal a shift of authority and control back to Headquarters.



44. The operation was also notable for the assistance from private-sector partners: the amounts given were a small percentage of requirements, but the speed with which services and facilities were provided magnified the value of the contributions.
45. The decision to adopt a regional rather than a country-level approach to the EMOP meant that some country offices did not have a full picture of their DSC budgets in the first months. This did not affect country office decision-making, but it did present problems for country-specific reporting, primarily to OCHA. In general, the flexibility of the regional approach outweighed the disadvantages.¹⁷
46. Despite efforts by country offices to improve cash management and cash flow there were problems at field offices and sub-offices, particularly in Aceh where banking facilities were partly destroyed, resulting in delays in paying staff, partners, labourers and contractors. In spite of excellent support from OEDB, current financial systems appear to be inappropriate for efficient cash flow in emergencies and should be reviewed.

FOOD PIPELINE AND LOCAL PROCUREMENT

47. A reasonably secure food pipeline was established from the first weeks of the operation because large amounts of cash were available for local and regional procurement; rice was available in Indonesia from BULOG stocks¹⁸ and in Sri Lanka from WFP's PRRO stocks and a WFP shipment of 12,000 mt of rice was diverted to Medan in Sumatra. The situation regarding food stocks and distributions to date is not yet clear in Indonesia and Sri Lanka, but the pipeline for both countries appears to be assured for the rest of the year.¹⁹
48. The regional food pipeline appeared healthy, but the food basket was sometimes incomplete in the first months of the operation because commodities were lacking as a result of procurement and shipment delays.
49. Given the high level of cash donations, WFP purchased many of the commodities needed for the first six months locally and regionally. Of the 127,689 mt estimated regional requirements for February–July 2005, WFP had purchased 57 percent — 72,491 mt of food worth US\$29.3 million — by the end of February.
50. In Indonesia, WFP is planning to purchase locally the remaining 80,000 mt of rice required for 2005, equal to 0.2 percent of national production, which should have no effects on prices and national rice supply. Rice comprises 80 percent of the WFP basic food basket.
51. High-protein biscuits and noodles and some vegetable oil are also purchased in Indonesia; most of the oil is purchased regionally. Canned fish has been purchased in China and Thailand. Only a small part of WFP supplies in Indonesia have been donated in-kind.
52. Local procurement has been on a smaller scale in Sri Lanka. An initial purchase of 2,000 mt of rice was made in May; a further purchase of 8,000 mt is planned. WFP had purchased 6,600 mt of wheat flour locally up to May 2005; no wheat is grown locally.²⁰

¹⁷ Two of the five countries covered by the tsunami EMOP did not have WINGS connectivity and relied on the Regional Bureau to provide all their financial reports.

¹⁸ BULOG is the Indonesian parastatal logistics agency, inter alia responsible for national rice procurement.

¹⁹ The EMOP having been extended from six months to one year through a budget revision made in April 2005.

²⁰ Sri Lanka imports up to 1 million mt of wheat a year.



Small amounts of oil, pulses and sugar have been purchased in Sri Lanka, but the country is a net importer of oil and pulses so local purchases of these commodities may be limited.

GENDER AND PROTECTION ISSUES

53. The tsunami had a greater impact on women than on men. In Sri Lanka and Aceh, data consistently indicate that many more women than men were killed. Problems related to the ensuing gender imbalance were emerging at the time of the evaluation. Relief agencies were clear that action was needed to prevent negative short-term impacts from developing into long-term problems.
54. Women are frequently excluded from decision-making. In Aceh, for example, the structures debating the plan for reconstructing the province are almost entirely men; women's organisations are struggling to take part in consultations. The needs of women and men must be addressed, and the disproportionate impact on women must be taken into consideration in all aspects of relief, rehabilitation and recovery.
55. For most people, returning home and economic self-sufficiency were the most important short-term objectives, but often only men were considered for income-generating activities, free distributions of equipment, vocational training and allocations of land and houses. Slow progress in rehabilitating housing, which forces many IDPs to remain in overcrowded, isolated and inadequate shelters, was a major cause of vulnerability among women.



**ANNEX: EVALUATION RECOMMENDATIONS AND MANAGEMENT RESPONSE SUMMARY—
REAL-TIME EVALUATION OF WFP'S RESPONSE TO THE INDIAN OCEAN TSUNAMI—DECEMBER 2004–JUNE 2005**

Main recommendations from the Indian Ocean tsunami real-time evaluation (July 2005).	Action by	Management response
<p>1. Technical support: In Indonesia and Sri Lanka, as GFDs are phased down and targeted food aid programmes scaled up, WFP should ensure that technical support is provided to government and implementing partner (IP) service providers.</p>	<p>Regional Bureau, in consultation with country offices.</p>	<p><i>Indonesia:</i> Technical support to government agencies and IPs will continue for the remainder of the EMOP.</p> <p><i>Sri Lanka:</i> This is under way with various initiatives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Training for stakeholders, from central government to the local level, and mother-and-child nutrition (MCN) and school staff; ➤ joint Ministry of Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconciliation/WFP initiative of the district monitoring units (DMUs) at the <i>kachcheri</i> (district secretariat) level to oversee implementation and monitoring of WFP programmes; ➤ capacity support by providing computers, motorcycles, bicycles etc.; and ➤ mentoring, either through WFP-seconded staff (e.g. in the Project Management Unit of the Ministry of Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconciliation) or joint visits at all levels facilitated by the expansion of SOs into most tsunami-affected districts.
<p>2. Sharing of lessons: A forum for discussion for the tsunami relief operation should be developed at the national and local levels to identify best practices, review challenges and identify lessons for future emergencies. Local and national fora could contribute to a regional centre for disasters that would encompass staffing, medicines and medical equipment, food stockpiling and micronutrients. WFP should contribute to this forum at all levels.</p>	<p>Regional Bureau, in consultation with Indonesia and Sri Lanka country offices</p>	<p><i>Indonesia:</i> The country office will contribute to any regional initiatives, drawing on its experience with the tsunami EMOP.</p> <p><i>Sri Lanka:</i> The country office had one such workshop in July with the Ministry of Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconciliation government agents and other stakeholders, who agreed that it was a valuable exercise; there is an intention to repeat it. There are also United Nations and inter-agency initiatives looking at good practices, lessons learned, coordination and future planning with a cross-sectoral mandate.</p>
<p>3. Micronutrient deficiencies and related issues: In view of the high prevalence of anaemia and chronic malnutrition in Sumatra, limited diversity in many people's diet and delays in government plans for IDPs to be resettled in the near future, interventions to address and prevent micronutrient deficiencies will be needed, including improved sanitation, hygiene and water supply, deworming and nutrition education.</p>	<p>Country office, Indonesia.</p>	<p>WFP is working in cooperation with the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) on school feeding to address issues related to water and sanitation and to implement deworming in schools. At the start of the EMOP, school feeding was of an emergency nature, but nutrition education is to become a central part of the programme. There are concerns about the mineral composition of the biscuit pre-mix, which does not provide enough iron to reduce anaemia; the country office will address this.</p>
<p>4. Nutrition and food security monitoring: As recommended in the rapid needs assessment, the international community should support government efforts to continue monitoring nutritional and food security status to identify changes through the National Food and Nutrition Surveillance System (NFNSS). Growth monitoring and promotion, a critical component of NFNSS, is included in the government Primary Health Centres' "Minimum Standards of Service".</p>	<p>Country Office, Indonesia.</p>	<p>WFP is working with UNICEF and the Ministry of Health on a nutritional surveillance system; the country office is discussing with NFNSS its expansion to five districts of Aceh, aiming to cover the whole province. In the long term, synchronization between the Post Disaster Surveillance System and the NFNSS is intended where feasible.</p>



**ANNEX: EVALUATION RECOMMENDATIONS AND MANAGEMENT RESPONSE SUMMARY—
REAL-TIME EVALUATION OF WFP'S RESPONSE TO THE INDIAN OCEAN TSUNAMI—DECEMBER 2004–JUNE 2005**

Main recommendations from the Indian Ocean tsunami real-time evaluation (July 2005).	Action by	Management response
<p>5. General distributions and targeted food aid in Indonesia: GFDs and targeted food aid under the current EMOP (mother-and-child nutrition [MCN] programmes and school feeding) should be continued. Indicators for ending food aid could include return to permanent housing and regular income-generation for GFDs and adequate nutritional status for vulnerable individuals; at least acceptable levels of nutrition across the population.</p>	<p>Country office, Indonesia.</p>	<p>Discussions between WFP, the Government, cooperating partners and other stakeholders led to the same conclusion about GFDs. For supplementary feeding, NFSS tracks levels of malnutrition and informs programming decisions.</p>
<p>6. General distributions in Sri Lanka: In view of the nutrition issues facing infants, young children, school-aged children and pregnant and lactating women, particularly in conflict zones, GFDs should continue, but with better targeting to reach the most vulnerable people.</p>	<p>Country office, Sri Lanka.</p>	<p>The MCN and FFE programmes are on-going in conflict and tsunami-affected areas and will continue in areas of need under the PRRO in 2006 as a result of a budget revision. GFDs or targeted food distributions for vulnerable tsunami-affected households are planned for the rest of 2005 with limited scope to continue for a small number of particularly vulnerable households during 2006–2007.</p> <p>One potential complication is a government decision that beneficiaries may receive assistance under one scheme only. The full impact of this will only be understood later this year.</p>
<p>7. MCN programmes in Sri Lanka: MCN and school feeding should be expanded to reach those in need.</p>	<p>Country office, Sri Lanka.</p>	<p>This expansion and consolidation is under way. The recent PRRO budget revision allows for an increase in caseload of 20,000 women and 42,000 children in 2006 under the MCN programme and an additional 35,000 children under FFE.</p>
<p>8. Security: WFP should seek reformulation of MOSS compliance to ensure that security regulations do not impede emergency responses.</p>	<p>Management Services Division (ADM).</p>	<p>ADM has worked with the Inter-Agency Security Management Network (IASMN) to adopt the following mission statement: "The goal of the United Nations security management system is to enable the effective and efficient conduct of activities while ensuring the security, safety and well-being of staff as a high priority."</p> <p>ADM has obtained IASMN concurrence that MOSS be country-specific.</p> <p>ADM will ensure that WFP field security officers (FSOs) going into emergency response operations will communicate instances of MOSS non-compliance so that they can be addressed.</p>



**ANNEX: EVALUATION RECOMMENDATIONS AND MANAGEMENT RESPONSE SUMMARY—
REAL-TIME EVALUATION OF WFP'S RESPONSE TO THE INDIAN OCEAN TSUNAMI—DECEMBER 2004–JUNE 2005**

Main recommendations from the Indian Ocean tsunami real-time evaluation (July 2005).	Action by	Management response
9. Responsiveness of UNHAS: UNHAS should identify all factors that impede responsiveness in emergencies.	ODT/ODTL (for WFP-UNHAS).	A UNHAS review has been undertaken by an independent consultant on behalf of a major donor to UNHAS. It is being considered by ODT.
10. Private-sector model for logistics: WFP should further develop the private-sector model for logistics support, as exemplified by the TNT partnership in Indonesia. The value of local knowledge and existing operational infrastructure was significant and may suggest a model for WFP presence through a network of private-sector logistics partners rather than a large infrastructure in countries with minimal programmes. (Note: This may be easier in Asia than in other regions.)	ODT/ODTL in consultation with the Private Sector Fundraising Service (FDP).	<p>Private-sector support was unprecedented. The newness of WFP's private-sector fundraising efforts and its limited capacity at Headquarters and in the region meant that WFP had to learn how to handle some private donations, particularly gifts-in-kind, often while policies and modalities were being developed. Since then, many modalities, such as assigning a realistic financial value to a private-sector contribution, have been established; others are being established. WFP is negotiating with a corporate donor to help to coordinate private-sector response in emergencies.</p> <p>OTL, through bureau logistics officers, is establishing contacts with private-sector partners to build logistics partnerships. In West Africa, for example, as part of OTL's world-wide pre-positioning of strategic stocks, WFP is investigating a regional depot that would serve as a staging point for emergencies, with TNT's support. TNT would provide warehousing space, office equipment and assistance in airport handling. WFP has begun discussions with other private-sector partners such as Citigroup to determine how to capitalize on the assets brought.</p>
11. SOPs: Redevelop SOPs to cover routine emergency responses. They would automatically deploy standardized support equipment, waybills and office-in-a-box systems.	ODT, in consultation with ODA.	ODT is devising SOPs to cover the initial 90 days of an emergency, addressing functions normally assigned to the Logistics Unit, to include port operations, customs clearing, warehousing, transport to EDPs and FDPs, and quality control such as LTSH funds management, managing implementing partners and food and non-food item accounting. The SOPs will consolidate all available information, which will be supplied as part of the logistics officers' emergency kits.
12. Telecommunications support: ICT/FITTEST should review what services it wishes to provide to the common system.	ADI in consultation with FITTEST.	The ICT package that can be provided to an inter-agency emergency telecoms (IAET) project must be negotiated case by case in consultation with OCHA and the United Nations community in any country should WFP be designated as the telecommunications coordinating agency (TCA). There is no standard formula; feasibility of installation depends on the context. The IAET services mandate should be endorsed by the Senior Deputy Executive Director/OD and the Deputy Executive Director/AD to ensure that inter-agency protocols are complied with and that the parties involved are coordinated and participate in the planning. It is important that country directors do not commit corporate resources that may not be available.



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13. ICT: Reconsider pre-installation of communications equipment in vehicles in cases of customs sensitivity. Avoid packaging sensitive communications equipment with other items.	ADI in consultation with FITTEST.	Importing equipment tends to be easier in the first days/weeks of an EMOP; maximum use should be made of this. Care must be taken to separate telecoms equipment, which is usually checked by governments, from less sensitive IT equipment. It may be difficult to task first-wave ICT staff with vehicle radio installation when they are preoccupied with infrastructure building. Driving vehicles without radios is not MOSS-compliant. WFP must decide on a process whereby imported vehicles are outfitted with standard WFP radios before arrival in-country.
14. COMPAS: Prioritize development of a simple standard spreadsheet for commodity tracking for pre-COMPAS and non-COMPAS locations to provide a minimum of information in the early days of an emergency.	ODTF.	In collaboration with ODAN, ODTF is preparing a template to capture commodity movement data for pre-COMPAS and non-COMPAS locations. The spreadsheet will be used in phases preceding full COMPAS installation. When this is done, data will be entered in the corporate commodity tracking system.
15. Human resources (HR): WFP should review the HR response to the tsunami crisis, involving the Human Resources Division (ADH), operational managers and HR officers in the field to improve deployment and management of staff during the next major emergency operation. This should be led by a non-HR senior staff member with extensive field experience or an external HR consultant before the end of 2005. It could be combined with the proposed "After Action Review" (AAR).	Human Resources Division (ADH) in consultation with ODB.	ADH is preparing a combined submission for additional funding to conduct a review of HR procedures during an emergency, as recommended above. The focus will be on HR management during an emergency and on best practices from emergency operations. The expected output will be a "toolkit" that includes HR procedures, HR standard templates and on-line tools. Deployment of staff is addressed under recommendation 16.
16. ERR: WFP should review the Emergency Response Roster along the lines suggested in Box 9 of the full report.	Operations Department (ODO) in consultation with ADH.	A study of WFP's emergency-response capacity prepared recently by a senior WFP staff member with extensive field experience has been endorsed by the Executive Director. A working group of senior staff concerned with ERR has been set up to ensure implementation of the recommendations.
17. Corporate management of emergencies: WFP should appoint an experienced senior staff member to work as the Senior Emergency Manager in Rome to ensure rapid and disciplined deployment of WFP assets in a major emergency, oversee preparedness and follow up implementation of actions derived from lessons learned. This could be achieved by rationalizing senior staff responsibilities rather than creating a new post.	ODO in consultation with ADH.	The director of ODM or the director of the regional bureau affected by a major emergency will be appointed Senior Emergency Response Manager in case of a corporate emergency. The Director ODM is responsible for implementation of the recommendations outlined in the emergency response study by Khaled Adly, endorsed by the Executive Director on 21 July 2005.



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<p>18. Cash management and cash flow: During the proposed September 2005 internal audit mission to Bangkok, Indonesia and Sri Lanka, the audit mission may look into financial regulations, delegations and cash flow and make proposals for improving cash management for future emergency operations.</p>	<p>OSDA in consultation with AD and ODB.</p>	<p>Regional bureau: A study of WFP's current cash management and cash-flow procedures aiming to improve future emergency operations would be welcomed; ODB would wish to participate.</p> <p>Office of internal Audit: Cash-management controls will be evaluated on the basis of OSDA's risk assessment for the planned audit of WFP's response to the tsunami and consultations with ODB in planning the audit during the audit mission; recommendations will be made to strengthen internal controls.</p>
<p>19. Gender: WFP should deploy gender experts early in an emergency to work with those from agencies and the health, food security and nutrition, water and sanitation sectors.</p>	<p>PDPG in consultation with ADH.</p>	<p>PDPG strongly agrees. Requests for gender programme advice should be made by the regional bureau to PDP.</p>
<p>20. Gender: WFP should establish benchmarks for ensuring women's participation in GFDs, specialized feeding programmes and activities to support sustainable livelihoods, addressing the dominance of men in leadership and achieving a shift in mind-set from perceiving women as vulnerable victims to recognizing their skills and rights.</p>	<p>PDPG.</p>	<p>Being implemented. One of the central tenets of the WFP Gender Policy is that households and societies gain when women are better nourished, better educated, participate more equally in economic activities and have a stronger voice in decision-making. The Enhanced Commitments to Women codify benchmarks for women's participation in programme design, implementation and review.</p>
<p>21. Gender: WFP should view protection of women from sexual violence and exploitation as a priority and establish and monitor mechanisms to minimize risk during food distributions. WFP should contribute to systems to protect women and report and address incidents of abuse or violence. It should finance training for security personnel and IDP camp managers to ensure that women are protected and that incidents of harassment, abuse and assault related to food and other distributions are quickly reported and addressed.</p>	<p>PDPG in consultation with ODB and Indonesia and Sri Lanka country offices.</p>	<p>Agree. WFP and its cooperating partners monitor and seek to minimize gender-based violence and exploitation during its programmes. WFP has a zero-tolerance policy on abuse by staff of beneficiaries.</p> <p>In Sri Lanka, monitoring results indicated that most recipients of WFP food are women, who felt safe at distributions and when returning with their food. The figures were lower in Colombo region. Concern for women's safety in IDP camps seems to have more justification. Implementation of protection activities would involve a change in approach and should probably be done in partnership with other agencies.</p>
<p>22. Support to livelihoods: Ensure that viable income-earning and learning opportunities are available to men and women as soon as possible after an emergency, whether in CFW or FFW programmes or other more sustainable livelihood and FFT activities. WFP should support initiatives to resolve problems such as FFT to train counsellors to provide psychological support to people traumatised by the tsunami.</p>	<p>PDPG in consultation with the regional bureau and Indonesia and Sri Lanka country offices.</p>	<p>Agree. The WFP Gender Policy sets benchmarks for women's participation in FFT and benefit from FFW activities, with the objectives of developing women's human capital, promoting the value of women's work and productivity and increasing women's access to capital, employment and productive resources.</p> <p>In Aceh, CFW programmes have not helped to build long-term livelihoods; they are mostly an income transfer to beneficiaries. FFW is a foreign concept in this environment. WFP is nevertheless exploring opportunities to support CFW and FFW with Oxfam and the World Bank and is moving into a partnership with the American Red Cross to introduce psycho-social support in schools as a complementary activity to school feeding.</p>



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		<p>In Sri Lanka, with the resumption of PRRO activities, 102 FFW projects have been approved in tsunami-affected areas to start by the end of August; 56 projects are pending approval; FFT and other livelihood initiatives are becoming operational. Planned beneficiary figures for 2006 have been increased to include tsunami victims in need of assistance to regain their livelihoods. The PRRO also has a component for psychosocial counselling that can target people traumatized by the tsunami.</p>



ACRONYMS USED IN THE DOCUMENT

AAR	After Action Review
AD	Administration Department
ADH	Human Resources Division
ADI	Information and Communication Technology Division
ALNAP	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance
BULOG	Indonesian logistics procurement agency
CFW	cash for work
COMPAS	Commodity Movement Processing and Analysis System
DSC	direct support costs
EMOP	emergency operation
ENA	emergency needs assessment
ERR	Emergency Response Roster
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FFW	food for work
FSO	field security officer
GFD	general food distribution
HR	human resources
IASMN	Inter-Agency Security-Management Network
IDP	internally displaced person
IP	implementing partner
LTSH	landside transport, storage and handling
M&E	monitoring and evaluation
MCN	mother-and-child nutrition
MOSS	Minimum Operating Security Standards
NFNSS	National Food and Nutrition Surveillance System
NGO	non-governmental organization
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance
OD	Operations Department
ODA	Analysis, Assessment and Preparedness Service
ODB	Asia Regional Bureau
ODM	Programme Management Division
ODT	Transport and Procurement Division
ODTL	Logistics Service



OEDB	Office of Budget
OEDE	Office of Evaluation
PRRO	protracted relief and recovery operation
RTE	real-time evaluation
SO	special operation
TDY	temporary duty status/travel duty
TEC	Tsunami Evaluation Coalition
TNT	Thomas Nationwide Transport
UNHAS	United Nations Humanitarian Air Service
UNJLC	United Nations Joint Logistics Centre

