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SUMMARY REPORT OF THE EVALUATION OF WFP'S RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS IN NIGER IN 2005

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NOTE TO THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

This document is submitted to the Executive Board for consideration.

The Secretariat invites members of the Board who may have questions of a technical nature with regard to this document to contact the WFP staff focal points indicated below, preferably well in advance of the Board's meeting.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report presents the conclusions of the evaluation commissioned by the Office of Evaluation of WFP's response to the Niger crisis. It distinguishes between the period before the humanitarian crisis (harvest 2004 to July 2005) and the acute phase of the crisis and how this was managed up to December 2005.

The Niger crisis challenges the traditional view of Sahelian crises and removes the line traditionally drawn between structural and short-term crises. A permanent emergency such as Niger's underlines the lack of effective solutions to its underlying structural elements — weak sectoral policies and low levels of investments and development aid.

The assessment in late 2004 by all stakeholders, including WFP, was essentially based on the amount of food available and failed to take sufficient account of the large body of knowledge existing about the complex nature of agriculture and food economies and about the integration dynamics in West African markets. The result was an emergency plan followed by an emergency operation, neither of which was very relevant to the unfolding crisis in terms of food access and malnutrition. Amid growing signs that the crisis was deteriorating, no reorientation of interventions took place until July 2005. This raises questions about what indicators should be followed — incomes, markets, nutritional data — and more specifically about the means of analysis and interpretation available to assess the nature of a crisis and where necessary modify the mechanisms used in response.

Until July 2005, the intervention implemented by WFP in response to the crisis was constrained by a number of factors. The resources available to the country office, which was operating in a context characterized by limited institutional capacities, were insufficient and the office found it impossible to fulfil all the many tasks required of it such as implementation of operations, monitoring the situation as it evolved, political dialogue, mobilization, communications and supplies. Whereas the decentralized system enabled the country office to obtain support from the regional bureau and Headquarters on request, such support came through separately and compartmentalized with everyone acting within the strict framework of their prerogatives. There was no system for monitoring the ongoing situation and how the response was being implemented. The country office had to make do without any integrated and regular technical support until July 2005 when a task force was set up.


During the same period, communications and resource mobilization activities were relatively limited and donors were slow to react. This puts a question mark over the management of those aspects in a crisis-mitigation context. WFP's response was characterized by a lack of initiative in obtaining supplies on a rapidly evolving regional market. All that had a negative effect on WFP's capacity to intervene rapidly to prevent/mitigate the crisis.

Following the failure of the prevention/mitigation strategy, WFP's strategic reorientation in July 2005 was fully relevant, even though it was late. WFP assumed responsibility for changing strategies on its own, but it was quickly followed by the Government and other



stakeholders. Implementation of the new strategy succeeded as a result of advances provided through the Immediate Response Account, obtaining press and media exposure, the mobilization of donors, initiatives taken to secure supplies and efficient distribution.

DRAFT DECISION*



The Board takes note of the information and recommendations set out in “Summary Report of the Evaluation of WFP’s Response to the crisis in Niger in 2005” (WFP/EB.A/2006/7-A/4) and of the management response, and invites WFP to follow up the recommendation, taking into account issues raised by Board members during the discussion.

* This is a draft decision. For the final decision adopted by the Board, please refer to the Decisions and Recommendations (document WFP/EB.A/2006/16) issued at the end of the session.



INTRODUCTION

Scope of the Evaluation

1. The purpose of this evaluation is to draw the lessons from WFP's response before the crisis in the framework of its 2004–2005 emergency plan, its strategy reorientation of July 2005 and its implementation thereof up to December of the same year. The evaluation follows the after-action review of November 2005, a workshop jointly held by WFP and the Government of Niger to analyse the crisis, and uses the analyses and conclusions of previous evaluations, studies and investigations,¹ in particular the external evaluation of the National Mechanism for Preventing and Managing Food Crises (DNP-GCA; *Dispositif national de prévention et de gestion des crises alimentaires*).² It also uses data and information that were not available during the period under review and that make possible analyses and conclusions that would have been impossible at the time.

Methodology

2. The approach is based on the evaluation criteria defined by the Development Aid Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The evaluation is based on three sources of information: bibliography, interviews³ and field observations⁴ undertaken in the four regions of Tahoua, Tillabéri, Maradi and Zinder.
3. The evaluation began with a preparatory mission early in 2006, followed by talks at Headquarters. The main mission ended with three debriefing sessions, two of them held in Niger (WFP and stakeholders) and one in Rome. After the comments on the draft report became available, a workshop was organized on its conclusions and recommendations before the report was finalized.
4. Among the main difficulties encountered during the evaluation the following should be noted: (i) collection of quantitative data to analyse the response results and costs; (ii) unrepresentative field observations partially compensated by available studies; and (iii) the time allowed for the evaluation, which was too short in view of the complexity of the crisis, the number of stakeholders and the amount of documentation available.

¹ Including the real-time evaluation of the response by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF); the inter-organization evaluation of crisis response on the part of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the studies and investigations conducted by WFP, including *Emergency Food Security Assessments (EFSAs)*, *In-depth Evaluation of Food Security and Vulnerability* and market studies.

² Undertaken by the Institute for Research on and Application of Development Methods (IRAM — *Institut de recherches et d'applications des méthodes de développement*).

³ Organized with WFP — Headquarters, regional office, country office and sub-offices — the Permanent Inter-State Committee for the Fight against Drought in the Sahel (CILSS; *Comité permanent inter-États de lutte contre la sécheresse au Sahel*) and the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA; *Union économique et monétaire ouest-africaine*) and in Niger with Government authorities, United Nations organizations, donors, NGOs, civil society and beneficiaries.

⁴ With the aim of collecting quantitative data from populations, NGOs and local authorities on their perceptions of the food crisis and WFP's interventions.



CONTEXT AND NATURE OF THE CRISIS

5. With a population of 12.5 million and an average per capita income of US\$232 per annum, Niger is one of the world's poorest countries, where over 60 percent of inhabitants live on less than US\$ a day. Very low social development indicators, soaring population growth and sharp gender disparities make the situation worse — they all put Niger at the bottom of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 2005 Human Development Index. Populations concentrated in the southern agro-pastoral belt live mainly by agriculture; 85 percent of the population is rural. The country's economy is at the mercy of the weather and dependent on the regional context. Nigeria plays a major role in the country's economic and social dynamics as the main market for Niger's exports, the main supplier of imported food products and the main host country for Niger's emigrants. The area on the border with Nigeria is one of the most densely-populated regions in Africa.

DNPGCA

Reports to the Prime Minister's Office; it groups the Government and donors — France and the European Union are the main donors in terms of resources provided — with WFP as lead agency. A framework agreement between the partners provides for consultations and coordination. Currently, DNPGCA favours interventions based on early warning and crisis mitigation. Free food aid is considered an instrument of last resort. DNPGCA should normally have 50,000 mt of physical reserves and a financial reserve equivalent to 60,000 mt.

6. The constant weakening of agro-pastoral systems and the consequent growing role of markets in meeting food needs, the absence of structural economic reforms and increasing impoverishment all have a serious effect on vulnerable populations and make food security a structural problem.
7. Niger is also affected by a structural nutritional crisis with some of the highest rates in the world for prevalence of acute malnutrition and infant-youth mortality. The food, health, economic and socio-cultural situations are the underlying causes.
8. Against this fragile social background, Niger is regularly struck by food crises of varying intensities. To deal with them, the country has a crisis prevention and management strategy implemented by DNPGCA. In the absence of a contingency plan defining the modalities of crisis response, the Government and donors rely on early-warning and crisis-mitigation methods and consider free food aid a last resort. A certain reluctance⁵ is thus evident with regard to that instrument.
9. The present crisis is not a classic production crisis and was not caused by any major external shock. It is diffuse and complex, combining a series of short-term and structural factors.

⁵ It should be noted, however, that the Letter of Understanding between the Government and WFP on the emergency operation (EMOP) explicitly mentioned the possibility of resorting to general, free distributions if the situation required it.



10. The 2004 harvest was hit by locusts and drought, resulting in a rise in cereal prices, which, combined with a drop in supplies of fodder, led to a deterioration in the cereals/livestock terms of trade. In addition, fears of scarcity triggered by some disappointing harvests⁶ started to spread at the regional level and led to borders being unofficially closed at several points. Structural factors were therefore compounded by short-term factors. The combined effect was a food crisis determined by food access problems and a deterioration of the nutritional crisis, aggravated by the structural crisis linked among other things to the food crisis.
11. Two other important elements impacted on the crisis and the response strategy. One was the excessive level of media exposure which, although it amplified differences on the nature and scale of the crisis, nonetheless contributed to mobilizing a high level of humanitarian aid. The other was the national context, with the elections of December 2004 which undoubtedly affected the Government's appreciation of the scale and nature of the crisis and consequently influenced the political dialogue with donors.

The Niger crisis challenges the traditional view of Sahelian crises and obscures the distinction between structural and short-term crises. This kind of "permanent emergency" underlines the lack of effective solutions to the structural problems underlying the crisis.

CONCLUSIONS REGARDING WFP'S INITIAL RESPONSE: HARVEST 2004 — JULY 2005

Relevance

12. The calculation of the cereals balance after the 2004 harvest⁷ has given rise to some controversy. The joint mission by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), WFP, CILSS, EWS⁸ and the Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources assessed a cereals deficit of 278,350 mt and a forage deficit of 5 million mt⁹. WFP and FAO were instrumental in getting the Government, which was initially reluctant address the potential risks arising from the food deficit, to acknowledge a cereals deficit of 223,488 mt (7.5 percent of needs) and a forage deficit of 4.6 million mt of dry matter (36 percent of needs).
13. WFP, like other stakeholders, diagnosed a crisis based on local production deficits. Data that were often contradictory and a lack of clear trends made it impossible to refine the

⁶ Particularly in coastal countries and in northern Nigeria. The monthly Famine Early-Warning System Network (FEWS-NET) bulletin for November 2004 noted the mediocre level of production in northern Nigeria, particularly for millet.

⁷ Various assessment of the cereals balance showed deficits varying from 20,000 mt to 280,000.

⁸ Early-Warning System.

⁹ In presenting its findings in October 2004, the mission identified 1.6 million vulnerable people and called for the supply of agricultural inputs, complementary animal feed and crop seeds. When the report was published on 21 December 2004, after publication of the emergency plan, the mission increased the number of vulnerable individuals to 2.4 million and warned that targeted food aid was required as a matter of extreme urgency.



analysis and identify a crisis dominated by problems of access to food — sharp increases in cereal prices and low purchasing power. The analysis failed to take sufficient account of the body of knowledge accumulated on the complexity of agricultural and food economies and on the integration of markets in West Africa. Identification of vulnerable areas suffered from the same weakness because it was largely based on cereals deficits at village level. Pastoral areas historically affected by fodder deficits were only marginally selected.

DNPGCA Emergency Plan

November 2004

The plan aimed to supply 35 percent (78,100 mt) of the expected deficit through subsidized cereals sales (60,000 mt) and provided for a crisis mitigation programme (CMP) including cereal banks (10,000 mt) and highly labour-intensive activities (8,100 mt), plus financial support to DNGCPA amounting to 540 million CFA francs.

14. To analyse the nutritional situation more accurately, WFP carried out a survey in collaboration with the NGO Hellen Keller International in September 2004. By April 2005, this showed an alarming situation with regard to children aged between 6 months and 5 years in the Maradi and Zinder areas¹⁰ — paradoxically producer regions, which underlines the many factors involved in Niger's chronic malnutrition¹¹ — reflecting the existence of a nutritional crisis that previous surveys had reported for years.¹²
15. The results of other surveys conducted by WFP — *In-Depth Evaluation of Food Security and Vulnerability*, market studies and EFSAAs — only became available in the summer of 2005. There was therefore little data to hand before July to determine how the situation was evolving.
16. In November 2004, DNPGCA prepared an emergency plan. The Government issued an appeal for assistance and launched subsidized sales and mitigation initiatives. At that point, WFP and the other donors knew that DNPGCA had problems,¹³ having only 17,000 mt of reserve stocks and the equivalent of 20,000 mt as financial reserves to implement the plan.
17. WFP's response was integrated with the emergency plan. It provided for the preparation of an EMOP and an acceleration of the country programme (CP).
18. Like the emergency plan, the EMOP suffered from: (i) failure to consider the situation affecting herders; (ii) underestimation of the problem of access to food; (iii) inadequate appreciation of the ability to obtain supplies at the regional level; and (iv) lack of sufficient attention to the nutritional situation.

¹⁰ Situation was confirmed a few days later by the NGO *Médecins sans frontières* (MSF).

¹¹ In 2005, the country office received a grant to establish a model for the causes of malnutrition in Niger, in collaboration with a number of partners.

¹² Including the UNICEF multiple-indicator cluster survey in 2000.

¹³ With the agreement of all parties, it had contributed to financing the anti-locust operation.



Emergency Operation

February 2005

Strategic Priority 2: protecting means of subsistence in crisis situations and strengthening resistance to shocks.

Beneficiaries: 400,000 people affected by drought and locust infestations in 2004.

Quantity of food products expected: 6,562 mt

Duration: 6 months

Total cost: US\$2.9 million

Activities: Food for work (FFW), food for training (FFT), cereal banks and, on request, free and general food distributions.

19. Although the EMOP supported the crisis mitigation plan and distanced itself from subsidized food sales, there is no evidence that the options contained in the emergency plan were called into question before July 2005,¹⁴ either by donors or by WFP. No close monitoring system was implemented for the emergency plan.

The assessment, essentially based on the availability of food supplies, resulted in an emergency plan that had little relevance to the developing situation. WFP and other players failed to anticipate the growing crisis. WFP's response did not support subsidized food sales, but there is no evidence that questions were raised about the emergency plan before July.

Effectiveness

20. Implementation of the EMOP only began in June, thanks to a loan from the CP, with food distribution to the families of malnourished children in nutritional centres and to a number of herders. Otherwise, none of the activities planned by the EMOP — cereal banks, FFT and FFW — were implemented. The failure was only partly compensated by the acceleration of the CP which, by July had implemented almost 80 percent of its cereals banks, FFW and FFT activities (10,500 mt) in vulnerable areas.

The effectiveness of WFP's response was limited and the EMOP got off to a hesitant start in June.

Efficiency

21. The first donor only came forward on 17 May, three months after the start of an operation due to end in August. The explanation lies in the fact that the international community was focused on the tsunami and Darfur catastrophes and that there were differences of opinion as to the seriousness of the crisis and the intervention modalities to

¹⁴ The minutes of the DNPSCA meetings amended and formally approved by all participants make no mention of any reservations about the strategy adopted in the emergency plan.



be adopted. Other factors included the modest dimensions of the EMOP, the relative lack of appeal of crisis prevention/mitigation operations and the initial absence of any real communication or resource-mobilization strategy.

Role of the Immediate Response Account (IRA)

The IRA allows WFP to react immediately to sudden humanitarian needs while the process of decision, negotiation and confirmation is carried on with donors.

22. Conscious of the need to intervene rapidly, WFP resorted to the IRA¹⁵ before the EMOP was even approved, releasing US\$1.4 million on 3 February to ensure that food was available in the country from April. In line with the Government's request that no local purchases be made, WFP turned to the regional market — Nigeria. But the food intended for the EMOP only became available in June/July, for a number of reasons: (i) delays in concluding the first purchase contract drawn up in the framework of the EMOP despite the fact that funds were available;¹⁶ (ii) delivery delays related to logistics arrangements;¹⁷ (iii) no change in purchasing policy before July in order to turn to the international market in view of the problems encountered in the region, including the unofficial decision of a number of countries to close their borders to transactions.

Implementation of WFP's response was characterized by a degree of inertia and of delays that was incompatible with the idea of an emergency. This raises the question of adequate institutional support to a country office limited in its ability to respond to the tasks required implementation of operations, monitoring and evaluation of data on food security, political dialogue, purchasing and resources mobilization.

JULY 2005: DETERIORATING CRISIS AND CHANGING STRATEGY

23. It is well known in the Sahel that any poor or below-average harvest poses serious risks of the food situation worsening in the following months. In Niger an emergency plan – the framework for the EMOP – had already been formulated and an appeal launched as early as November 2004. Nonetheless, for the means of intervention selected (subsidized food sales) to have any chance of preventing the crisis from deteriorating, the quantities of commodities had to be large enough to increase supply and cause prices to fall. But DNP-GCA had a limited amount of starting stocks and ran into the same purchasing and resource-mobilization problems as WFP. In April 2005, only 27 percent of the subsidized

¹⁵ Presentation of the IRA in OD Directive 2005/005 "Policies and Procedures for the Use of the Immediate Response Account".

¹⁶ The first contract was signed on 7 April, two months after the funds became available, for 3,700 mt of sorghum with Nigeria's Strategic Grain Reserve Department; but it was only honoured between mid-June and 27 July. The food was only distributed in August.

¹⁷ Responsibility for transport was left to the contractor, despite negative past experiences. At the time, WFP did not have the capacity to carry out such transport operations in Niger and had no office in Nigeria. A number of logistics experts from the regional bureau were being redeployed to other major emergencies in the world.



sales programme had been implemented and the EMOP only really started in August with general distributions.

24. In the meantime, signs of the deepening crisis were growing, with rising cereals prices, deteriorating cereal/livestock terms of trade, people resorting to emergency survival strategies and all the indications of a serious nutritional crisis.
25. There was little contact with the media during the first few months, but a press release from MSF on the nutritional situation at the end of April focused media attention on the crisis, and this culminated in July with the BBC reports.¹⁸ The positive side of being in the media spotlight was that donor mobilization increased rapidly. But it also led to greater confusion among stakeholders as to the particular aspects of the crisis and on the appropriate way of responding. That led to disagreements¹⁹ at a time when it was crucial to act in unison.
26. In the first semester of 2005, the relevance of the emergency plan in relation to the developing situation and the weaknesses in its implementation failed to produce any real dialogue. Such a dialogue at the highest level would have made it possible, if not to convince, at least to raise the awareness of governments and donors about the looming humanitarian crisis and the need eventually to adopt different means of response. Consequently, when WFP reoriented its intervention strategy it was perceived as taking an independent line even though the Government was quick to adopt a similar position.
27. The absence of a finely-tuned system to monitor the evolving situation and the implementation of the EMOP doubtless accounted in part for some of the delays. It is clear that information was exchanged on a regular basis between the various services — Headquarters, the regional bureau and country offices — but support was fragmented and compartmentalized. There was no mechanism for overall monitoring and evaluation of the situation as it developed.

Beset by procurement and mobilization problems and handicapped by a the absence of a monitoring and evaluation system tracking the changing situation on a regular basis, WFP was unable to prevent the onset of a humanitarian crisis. Also missing was any timely, cogent or high-level dialogue with the Government and partners on the limitations of the emergency plan at the assessment and implementation levels. Management of the crisis was complicated by the Government's and certain donors' reluctance to use free, generalized aid to fight the crisis.

CONCLUSIONS REGARDING WFP'S SUBSEQUENT RESPONSE: JULY -DECEMBER 2005

28. WFP finally reviewed its intervention strategy in July, emphasizing Strategic Priority 1: saving human lives. At first — budget revision 3 of 14 July — it was decided to initiate free, targeted food distributions accompanied by complementary feeding and nutritional

¹⁸ On the basis of WFP videos.

¹⁹ During the regional meeting from 7–9 June 2005, the CILSS disputed the estimates made of free food aid requirements.



recovery activities for 1.2 million people with a budget of US\$16 million. The review was undertaken in the framework of the emergency plan, which was now targeting 2.5 million people. Anticipating difficulties in implementing the emergency plan — the Prime Minister had told WFP's Regional Director that the food ordered by DNGPCA would be delivered late and that the Government had no means to transport it — WFP assumed responsibility for providing for the entire population considered vulnerable and again reviewed its response — budget revision of 7 August — resorting to general distributions until the end of the lean period. The EMOP finally went through nine budget revisions.

Emergency Operation

(Budget revision of 3 August 2005)

Strategic Priorities 1, saving human lives; and 2, protecting means of subsistence in crisis situations and strengthening resistance to shocks.

Beneficiaries: 2.5 million very vulnerable people according to EWS criteria

Quantity of food products required: almost 73,000 mt

Duration: 10 months, to December 2005

Total cost: US\$57.6 million dollars.

Activities: general free food distributions, complementary feeding, FFW and post-crisis activities.

Relevance

29. The strategy adopted by WFP in July was fully relevant with respect to the situation at the time. Enlarging the objectives of the EMOP to Strategic Priority 1 — Saving human lives was completely appropriate, especially for malnourished children in nutritional recovery centres. Retaining Strategic Priority 2 — Preserving survival mechanisms was also appropriate for the overwhelming majority of vulnerable people.

Although it was late, WFP's strategic reorientation was relevant.


Effectiveness

30. As the crisis deepened in August 2005, there was no alternative but to resort to general distributions, the most effective instrument when large-scale rapid intervention is required, as before the October harvest. The first phase of general distribution began at just the right time at the height of the lean period, when survival strategies were becoming exhausted. There can be no doubt it contributed to limiting consumption of unripe cereals, to preventing harvests being sold off early and to keeping workers needed for the harvest on the land. It focused particularly on populations living in the most vulnerable areas identified by the EWS. The second general distribution was organized to cover villages which had been "forgotten" during the first phase and to concentrate aid on the most vulnerable areas. Results here appear less complete. A number of beneficiary villages had already been covered during the first distribution and by other actors; it could be asked, as some partners have done, whether part of the quantities distributed might not have been set aside for subsequent activities, with improved targeting to ensure they reached households



that were still vulnerable after the general distribution and the new harvest.²⁰ This last comment does not detract from the remarkable success of the general distributions, a success recognized by most partners.

Emergency Operation: Activities and Implementing Period



Source: WFP 2006

31. At the nutritional level, WFP intervened on behalf of children and of pregnant and lactating women, supplying them with complementary rations through the Intensive Nutritional Recovery Centres and the Nutritional Recovery Day Centres (CRENI/CRENA²¹) in collaboration with organizations such as the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). An evaluation of the intervention showed positive results, with a 92.36 percent short-term recovery rate.²²
32. The country programme continued, especially in November/December, with renewed FFW activities. More than 67,000 mt of food was distributed, 54,000 mt under the EMOP.

²⁰ According to the EFSA carried out between 15 September and 2 October 2005, after the 2005 harvest 60 percent of rural households had only four months of food stocks and food security was precarious for 2006.

²¹ *Centres de récupération nutritionnelle intensifs et ambulatoires* (intensive nutritional recovery centres).

²² Real-time evaluation by UNICEF.




In August, general distributions became unavoidable. Despite their reluctance to admit the need for emergency aid, the Government and donors soon turned to that mechanism. But this raises a fundamental question as to what room for manoeuvre United Nations organizations have in case of differences of opinion with governments on how to intervene in humanitarian crises.

Generally efficient distribution of 45,000 mt of food in two months had positive effects on populations in vulnerable areas and on malnourished children.

Efficiency

33. As soon as it was decided to reorient the strategy, WFP made massive use of the IRA — four advances between 20 July and 5 August totalling US\$19 million — to purchase, transport and distribute the food before harvest. Once the decision was taken to turn to the international market, WFP purchased 33,000 mt of cereals in a few weeks.²³

Amount of External and IRA Contributions to the Needs of the EMOP



Source: WFP– Donor Relations Division (FDD) — 2006.

34. The switch to emergency aid and growing media attention rapidly mobilized donors, who produced US\$20 million in less than a month. It should, however, be noted that in the final analysis only 63 percent of the EMOP was financed and that as of 31 December 2005 a US\$12 million dollar deficit remained on the amount advanced by the IRA.
35. Once the crisis had been raised to the institutional level, measures were taken to strengthen the country office. A task force²⁴ was set up on July 22 to coordinate WFP's response, and a coordinator was sent to Niger. The sudden influx of human resources caused some problems, but they were quickly resolved. After a brief period when the


²³ Mainly rice in bonded warehouses in Lomé or stocked aboard ships off the coast of West Africa, making it possible to move the food quickly to Niger.

²⁴ The task force consisted of senior Headquarters representatives and officials from the regional bureau and country office, meeting twice a week by videoconference.



DNGPCA was marginalized, dialogue resumed in the framework of weekly meetings of the Enlarged Monitoring Committee — there were more NGOs in particular — established by DNGPCA at WFP's suggestion.

Increase in WFP Human Resources in Niger in 2005



Source: WFP, Niger, 2006

36. The delay in switching strategies inevitably brought extra financial costs, which the evaluation was unable to calculate but which a financial audit could quantify. It is also clear that intervening a few weeks earlier would have strengthened capacities upstream and improved the organization of targeting, beneficiary participation and the training of operators in order to harmonize interventions.

Implementation of the EMOP — thanks to media exposure, the IRA advances, mobilization of donors, purchasing initiatives and well implemented distributions — was successfully conducted, despite difficulties arising from the short time available.

CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES

Capacities, Decentralization and Supervision

37. The country office's resources are well below requirements,²⁵ particularly given the risk of crises recurring, the limited resources available to the Government and the limited level of development of civil society. According to the logic of decentralization, the country office may, on request, obtain support from the regional bureau and Headquarters. It is obvious that the various levels involved keep in regular contact, but the support provided by the various services is fragmented and compartmentalized, with everyone acting in the

²⁵ Three international staff up to July 2005 and some support personnel performing duties for which they had not been trained, such as purchasing.




strict framework of their duties. What is missing is a monitoring mechanism providing an overall view of the situation, especially in the context of an EMOP. In short, the country office had no integrated regular technical support until July 2005, when the task force was set up.

Communication, Media and Resources Mobilization

38. The media had a major impact on the level of donor mobilization. The EMOP was at first modest in scale and was based on a strategy of crisis prevention/mitigation. Communication and resources mobilization was therefore limited. But once it had been recognized that a humanitarian crisis was in progress, media attention grew and resource mobilization increased as a result, which illustrates how the mobilization of donors depends on media exposure rather than any analysis of needs, especially with regard to crisis prevention.

Requirements and Resource Mobilization (in mt), and WFP Communication



Source: WFP — FDD — 2006

39. Communication must not only give objective information, but also support resources mobilization. It has to arouse media interest while keeping abreast of the situation, which was not always the case with Niger.²⁶

Outbreak of the Nutritional Crisis

40. The 2005 crisis reflected a structural nutritional crisis with multiple causes²⁷ and promoted collaboration between WFP, UNICEF, the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Ministry of Health aimed at ensuring that the matter was no longer ignored and that it obtained an appropriate response.

²⁶ When issuing press statements, attention should be given to possible repercussions on the ground. For example, the press statement of 23 November 2005 called for mobilization of complementary resources when, at the same time, a consultation with the Government and all partners on food aid needs was in progress in Niger.

²⁷ The causes of malnutrition are a matter of controversy, as are their impacts.



Emergency Aid and Development

41. In countries where the demarcation line between endemic poverty and crisis is blurred, there is clearly debate as to whether interventions should use emergency or development aid instruments. This shows the extent to which all stakeholders should take account of the correlation between development and crisis prevention. The situation calls for a systematic and simultaneous combination of development strategies and long-term programmes with EMOPs.

Crisis and Regional Context

42. Niger's economy is closely integrated with that of the region. Given the high variability in the amount of food it produces, its neighbours play an essential buffer role in ensuring the country's food security. Increased cereal flows to the coastal countries because of their stronger purchasing power causes marked increases in demand and prices and exacerbates the problem of access. This renders obsolete the approach to food security based on the availability of cereals. Niger's experience shows how important it is to reinforce political dialogue with specialized organizations such as CILSS and with regional integration institutions such as the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA — *Union Économique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine*) and the Economic Community of West African States (CEDEAO — *Communauté économique des États de l'Afrique de l'Ouest*) to encourage increased regional solidarity and agreements on free movement as well as to reflect anew on the approach to food security in the Sahel.

Quality and Credibility of Information Systems

43. A complex arrangement of information systems at the national, regional and international levels produces data which, had they been analysed in a more integrated fashion, would doubtless have made it possible to anticipate the impending crisis earlier. It must also be noted that information systems attach disproportionate importance to the aspect of food availability as against markets, access and utilization/nutrition. A review is needed to measure correctly the dimensions of food security as a whole and the interaction of the various aspects involved in the Sahel.

MAIN LESSONS LEARNED

44. The humanitarian aid operation was organized remarkably well, but it was carried out in a difficult context and concluded with results that were far from negligible. But the same cannot be said of the ability to identify the nature of the crisis, to anticipate its deterioration and to provide an appropriate response in good time. It was a collective failure. The responsibility is WFP's as lead agency among the donors in DNP-GCA, the Government's because of its initial lack of flexibility concerning the intervention instruments to be used, and regional institutions' because they failed to contribute sufficiently to evaluating the situation correctly and to bringing about regional solidarity. Also to blame are the donors, who had different priorities and who are generally not much inclined to invest in anticipating crises, NGOs, which played a crucial role in the success of general distributions but some of whose positions fuelled antagonism, and the media, which sometimes prevented a proper understanding of the crisis and of the most appropriate way of responding to it.



45. The crisis challenges the traditional view of crises in the Sahel, blurring the difference between structural and short-term crises. The phenomenon of “permanent emergencies” is evidence of a lack of fundamental response to the structural elements of the crisis. These include the weakness of development policies on agriculture and animal resources, the limitations of social policies — health, education, access to drinking water — the lack of nutritional policy and, generally speaking, the weakness of investments and development aid.
46. The crisis shows up the inadequacy of the indicators normally used in assessment, the weakness of crisis-prevention capacity and how few responses are available to address crises. There is therefore good reason to redefine the information and early-warning mechanisms used by WFP and others so that they can take account of all the components of food security — food availability, animal resources, markets, access, level of purchasing power, migration and nutritional tracking. Prevention capacities should also be strengthened through a combination of long-term development actions and strategies and emergency actions. Lastly, it is vital to improve and revitalize the systems used to monitor/evaluate activities in order to make them more effective. As far as WFP is concerned, it could mean setting up a close-monitoring mechanism to track crisis situations typically encountered in EMOPs. This is all the more necessary in view of the decentralized nature of the system, which is characterized by a significant transfer of responsibility to regional and country offices even though they may not have the capacity to exercise those responsibilities effectively.
47. The principal recommendations and the response of WFP management and the measures taken are annexed to the present document.



ANNEX I

MANAGEMENT RESPONSE TO THE 2005 NIGER CRISIS EVALUATION

1. Because there are a number of fundamental issues that were not reflected in the summary report that will go to the Board, OD felt the following comments should be presented to Board members together with the document.
2. Lessons from the 2005 Niger crisis have been drawn by management and are available in a separate document, available on request.

CONTEXT AND STRUCTURAL DIMENSION OF THE CRISIS

3. The difficult context in which WFP operates in Niger is not outlined in the report; in 2005 in particular, the difficulties encountered in trying to establish a consensus on the humanitarian situation ultimately impacted the quality and timing of the overall response for all sectors, with direct consequences particularly on the food security and malnutrition situations of the populations.
4. This context, in which food aid is often characterized as a problem rather than part of an integrated response, seriously hampered WFP's ability to design a strategy and put in place an operation to respond to the 2005 crisis.
5. The evaluation's lack of appropriate emphasis on this issue is a major shortcoming of the report and does not put WFP's accomplishments in the proper context.
6. Another aspect of the context that is not given sufficient treatment, notably in the summary report, is the very high (among the highest in the world) acute child malnutrition rates; in Niger, the average malnutrition rates (according to the 2000 MICS¹) are around 14.1 percent and at the end of 2005, the global acute malnutrition rate among children under 5 was 15.3 percent (according to WHO, when the prevalence of acute malnutrition in children 6-59 months old is > 10 percent the nutrition situation of children should be considered as serious; when it is > 15 percent the nutrition situation of children should be considered critical). These issues, at the heart of the difficulties facing Niger, should be mentioned in the report.

EARLY WARNING

7. One of the conclusions of the upstream period was that WFP was not able to interpret in time the alert signals and hence was not able to initiate a dialogue with the government and the partners. This conclusion is out of context if one does not point out the environment in which WFP was operating, as mentioned earlier under I. Context.
8. The complexity of the context where WFP is working with institutions such as CILSS and FEWS NET is not always well explained, and in spite of efforts from WFP, donor decisions in the Sahel are still very much focused on cereal balance (FAO/CILSS missions).

¹ Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey.



9. The report does not address the fact that WFP initiated a (long and difficult) process two years ago to work with Governments/CILSS/donors and Systèmes d'Alerte Précoce (SAPs — Early Warning Systems) to broaden assessments by incorporating various food security indicators, including nutrition, into routine assessments, to ensure that assessments would go beyond agricultural production and cereal balance sheets.
10. Moreover WFP is often perceived as not being neutral towards food security issues as there is a feeling that WFP's intention is to distribute food at all costs. For the sake of transparency, WFP tries to work through the existing systems/structures such as CILSS and SAPs which each have their own mandates, objectives, donors, etc.
11. Consensus on the nature and degree of the 2005 crisis was elusive from the time of the initial joint assessment, as reflected in the reluctance of key partners to elaborate a "Plan d'Urgence" in the first place.
12. The evaluation could have made a recommendation on the value of the WFP contribution in joint missions with FAO and CILSS, and could have highlighted the need to conduct household assessments or other independent assessments to evaluate geographic and social vulnerability in parallel to food production verification figures.

WFP'S ADVOCACY FOR EARLY CHANGE IN STRATEGY

13. The statement in the box after paragraph 19 of the short report "Even if the WFP response did not support subsidized sales, there is no evidence that the emergency plan was questioned before July" is inexact.
14. WFP repeatedly voiced its firm opposition to subsidized sales in favour of interventions that target the most vulnerable populations such as food for work or general distributions. This opposition is well documented in the external evaluation of the DNGPCA and is mentioned in this document as a key area of conflict within the "Dispositif" in 2005. In fact, this debate is continuing even today, with WFP opposing the implementation of the subsidized sales component of the 2006 DNGPCA action plan.
15. One example of this is that in March 2005, WFP voiced its concerns regarding the established strategy and alerted donors on 17 March 2005, giving them a presentation on the seriousness of the situation in Niger for rural and food insecure populations.

ASSESSMENTS

16. The EMOP evaluation report makes a timid reference (in a footnote) to WFP's Emergency Food Security Assessment (EFSA) in September/October 2005. This assessment, which took place just after the peak of the general distributions, should be analyzed in the report to give a snapshot of the food security situation in the country at that point in time.
17. Instead, at the end of paragraph 30 of the summary report, the evaluation questions whether the second round of the general distributions was in fact necessary. Rather than speculating on this question, the evaluation should use all the documentation available in order to base the report's conclusions on something concrete.
18. In fact, the EFSA, conducted during this period, showed that 1.2 million people in Niger were severely food insecure – defined as having zero to three months of stocks, no animals left and little to no coping mechanisms – and another 2 million were moderately food



insecure. This serious picture is even more striking when one considers that this assessment was conducted right after large-scale general distributions across the country reaching over three million people with over 120,000 mt of food (including WFP, DNP/GCA and NGO pipelines). Based on this information, it is not understood how the evaluation could question the need for the second round of distributions.

DONOR RESPONSE

19. The evaluation should have put more emphasis on the years of under-funding for development activities in Niger. In fact, the 2005 crisis, in many ways is evidence of the consequences of lack of support for long-term development funding in the country.
20. The EMOP evaluation fails to put proper emphasis on the responsibility of donors for the delayed response to the crisis – not only for their delay in confirming contributions, but also for the reluctance of local donor representatives to recognize the seriousness of the crisis and the scale of response needed. The fact that Niger has highest/unacceptable levels of poverty and malnutrition and yet receives very limited donor support certainly needs to be mentioned.
21. To this day, many still abide by the view that the levels of malnutrition, food insecurity and poverty in Niger are “normal” because they are structural. Many parties continue to see humanitarian response as harmful to development activities. The evaluation report’s failure to address this issue is a strategic error and a missed opportunity. The evaluation should have come out clearly with better guidance to governments and donors on the need to provide humanitarian food assistance without conditions, in times of food crisis, including timely general food distribution maintained as long as the situation warrants.

CONCLUSION

22. The recommendations of the report are too general; they should be more specific in order to be constructive.
23. The evaluation, as it stands now, is a missed opportunity to flag fundamental issues of regional and corporate relevance. The evaluation could have been an opportunity:
 - to advocate for food aid as a necessary safety net in a context of increasing endemic poverty and for the WFP development portfolio in the entire Sahel;
 - to look into the implications of WFP being only one among many players in the food aid deliveries; WFP’s share in Niger ranges on average from 30 percent to 35 percent of total aid deliveries;
 - to discuss the issues of declining food aid flows in the Sahel and the related adverse perception of food aid; food aid is demonized in the Sahel; in Niger food aid accounts, on average, for only 1 percent to 2 percent in the aggregate availability of all food and 5 percent of all imports;
 - to analyse the likely consequences of the profound changes in the cereal market of the entire West Africa region; and
 - to identify the implications for design of Poverty Reduction Strategies and of sectoral strategies, of the presence of a structural emergency.



**ANNEX II: EVALUATION RECOMMENDATIONS AND MANAGEMENT RESPONSE MATRIX—
EVALUATION OF WPF'S RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS IN NIGER IN 2005**

Recommendations	Action by	Management response and actions taken
1. Information and early warning systems		
1.1 Redefine all the indicators needed to make a full assessment of food security in Niger and in West Africa as a whole – availability of food, local and regional markets, livestock, sources of income and purchasing power, nutrition, etc.	Regional bureau in consultation with ODA and country office	<p>OD: This recommendation refers to an ongoing initiative, the harmonized framework that began two years ago – at WFP's initiative – to integrate the various indicators used in evaluation missions conducted by CILSS.</p> <p>ODAV: the regional bureau is planning to set up a food security surveillance system in Niger and neighbouring countries. It will be supported by ODAV and SENAC. The first task will be to identify key indicators. Areas covered should be production, commercial flows, storage and compensation strategies at household level.</p>
1.2 Ensure that all the indicators identified are collected on a regular basis by existing data- collection systems at either the regional, country or WFP level.	Regional bureau in consultation with country office	<p>OD: That is precisely what the harmonized framework aims at. Work is ongoing with partners. It should be noted that while waiting for the harmonized framework to become operational, WFP has started working with FEWS-NET and national systems to integrate the various indicators, thanks to the VAM specialists, used in countries such as Mali, Mauritania and Niger.</p> <p>ODAV: The surveillance system will collect key indicators on a regular basis. The database will serve to manage, record and ensure the primary analysis produced by the indicators.</p>
1.3 Produce regular and integrated analyses of changing food security situations.	Regional bureau and country office with ODA support	<p>OD: Noted. Being done in countries where VAM units exist. It ties in with the initiative described above; for example Chad and Niger produce a joint bulletin with FEWS-NET and the regional bureau is planning to publish quarterly "situation summaries".</p> <p>ODAV: A committee on food security grouping local partners – the Government, NGOs, bilateral and international organizations – will be charged with interpreting the analyses and regular preparation and circulation of a bulletin.</p>



**ANNEX II: EVALUATION RECOMMENDATIONS AND MANAGEMENT RESPONSE MATRIX—
EVALUATION OF WFP'S RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS IN NIGER IN 2005**

Recommendations	Action by	Management response and actions taken
1.4 Distinguish between analysis and programming in order to improve the credibility of analysis and its dissemination and to ensure that assessment is taken into account in the process of intervention design.	ODA, regional bureau and country offices	OD: This recommendation could be more specific. It should, however, be noted that the aim of the SENAC initiative has for the past year and half been to make analysis independent of programming. ODAV: Partnership in the committee should ensure improved credibility and that analyses are independent of the views of participating organizations.
2. Crisis prevention and development		
2.1 Strengthen WFP's role in the formulation of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and development policies, with the emphasis on crisis prevention in general and in Niger in particular.	Regional bureau and country offices with PDP	OD: Noted
2.2 Encourage donors to give increased support to WFP's development activities, especially in countries of the Sahel that face structural food crises, particularly Niger.	FDD and OD	OD: Given the current trend, the recommendation should be presented differently, in such as way as to encourage donors to consider structural situations with alarming malnutrition rates as priority interventions. FDD: WFP regularly informs donors of its double mandate and looks for the financing required to implement its development activities. In 2004, the Board approved a strategy aimed at broadening the donor basis so as to include all member states, government organizations and the private sector to mobilize supplementary resources to respond to the needs of all approved programmes and operations (WFP/EB.3/2004/4-C). The strategy has already made it possible to increase the financial contributions of regular donors, both public and private, to encourage occasional donors to become regular ones and to attract new donors. FDD is working regularly with the regional bureau on implementing a strategy for West Africa. This translates into a sub-regional approach for the Sahel countries faced by the common recurrent problems of structural food crises and malnutrition. WFP is also seeking financial contributions to ensure food supplies for school feeding in the framework of the Alliance for the Sahel.



**ANNEX II: EVALUATION RECOMMENDATIONS AND MANAGEMENT RESPONSE MATRIX—
EVALUATION OF WFP'S RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS IN NIGER IN 2005**

Recommendations	Action by	Management response and actions taken
3. Nature of the crisis and instruments at hand		
3.1 Re-examine the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of the instruments WFP has at hand to respond to structural and short-term crises according to the nature of the crisis, the local conditions and the objectives they aim to reach.	OD	OD: A more specific recommendation would have been more useful. Guidelines on the implementation of WFP's possible modes of intervention are to be found in the <i>Programme Guidance Manual</i> and the <i>Manual on Food Security in Emergency Situations</i> (ESASU, <i>Évaluation de la sécurité alimentaire en situation d'urgence</i>). All operational directives concerning EMOPs have been examined and updated and feature in the current <i>Programme Guidance Manual</i> . All directives on programming policies and principles are systematically and regularly reviewed, and updated if necessary.
3.2 Design EMOPs on the basis of identified needs and not according to the resources that may potentially be mobilized, and set a limit on the number of small-scale operations because they obscure the notion of emergency.	OD	OD: This is not the case. Operations are designed on the basis of beneficiary needs and never in the light of potential resources.
4. Resources mobilization and communication		
4.1 Design and implement a communication and resources-mobilization strategy that is adapted to interventions aimed at preventing/mitigating "forgotten" crises.	FDC/FDD and OD	<p>FDD: In order to mitigate the lack of resources for various "forgotten" operations, WFP is seeking contributions offering greater flexibility and enabling funds to be allocated to under-funded projects. In this connection, the Board approved a strategy (WFP/EB.2/2005/5-B) at the 2005 Annual Session aimed at optimizing the effectiveness of gifts. It is accordingly arguing for greater flexibility – contributions tied to fewer restrictions – increased dependability – financial pledges covering several years at a time – and inviting contributions in cash. WFP would also like to use contributions more rationally in line with "Business Process Review: Working-Capital Financing" (WFP/EB.1/2005/5-C). To that end, the Board approved the creation of a pre-financing fund guaranteeing continuity to project financing pending confirmation of contributions due.</p> <p>WFP has also launched a new initiative to obtain additional financing for targeted beneficiaries who cannot receive assistance for reasons such as lack of resources, late contributions or reduced rations.</p>



**ANNEX II: EVALUATION RECOMMENDATIONS AND MANAGEMENT RESPONSE MATRIX—
EVALUATION OF WFP'S RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS IN NIGER IN 2005**

Recommendations	Action by	Management response and actions taken
4.2 Strengthen donor interest in the IRA as a tool for preventing crises from deteriorating and for speeding up the implementation of emergency interventions.	FDD and OD	FDD: The mechanisms and means used to raise donors' awareness and secure their contributions include: (i) alert bulletins, situation reports, operational information and appeals; (ii) advocacy during Board meetings or meetings with government delegations; and (iii) informal consultations. In May 2006, WFP issued an appeal to donors for gifts to the CII signed by WFP and OCHA.
5. Procurement		
5.1 Ensure that personnel in the country offices concerned have undergone appropriate training.	HR and OD	ODTP: Already implemented. Training sessions on purchasing are helping to build capacities in this field. Personnel responsible for buying in all country offices in West Africa will receive appropriate new training next May.
5.2 In collaboration with partners, make a regular, detailed analysis of price movements in markets and how they react to local purchases.	Regional bureau and country offices with ODA support	OD: Should be clarified. ODTP: This is what WFP constantly does to decide whether or not it is worthwhile to purchase locally. ODAV: The food security surveillance system will include collection and analysis of the principal commodities prices in markets inside and outside the country.
5.3 Continuing to give preference to local and regional purchases, but ensure that there is room for manoeuvre to turn to the international market if the situation requires it.	ODTP, regional bureau and country office	ODTP: Already implemented. Constantly done by WFP. OD: Already implemented.
5.4 Give preference to FOB purchases and avoid buying from unfamiliar sources in emergency situations.	ODTP	ODTP: WFP does this as a matter of course. For emergencies, WFP prefers to buy FOB, with WFP organizing the transport, rather than having the supplier do it. During the initial phase of an emergency, WFP's logistics capacities in the region may be somewhat limited. Already implemented. WFP's normal practice is to avoid having to buy from unfamiliar suppliers during emergencies. In this case the supplier, SGRD Nigeria, was known to WFP.



**ANNEX II: EVALUATION RECOMMENDATIONS AND MANAGEMENT RESPONSE MATRIX—
EVALUATION OF WFP'S RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS IN NIGER IN 2005**

Recommendations	Action by	Management response and actions taken
6. Capacity building		
<p>6.1 Consider the possibility of setting up a team in the regional bureau to specialize in food security in the Sahel countries. Its functions should include (i) strengthening dialogue with regional authorities responsible for food security and with regional integration organizations, (ii) foster and advance dialogue on the renewal of the framework used to analyse the food crises in the Sahel and (iii) give strong support to regional and country offices.</p>	Regional bureau and OD	<p>OD: Given the regional bureau's limited PSA resources it cannot afford to maintain a team in every sub-region – Sahel, Mano River district, etc.</p> <p>The following officers deal with these questions as part of their tasks : a VAM specialist, VAM team, two specialists charged with evaluating emergency needs, a principal programmes counsellor in the regional bureau.</p>
<p>6.2 Strengthen the capacity of WFP offices in countries subject to recurrent crises, like those in the Sahel. In Niger, priority should be given to early warning, evaluation of needs, nutrition and monitoring/evaluation.</p>	Country office, regional bureau and OD	<p>OD: Noted, but there are significant financial implications and neither the regional bureau nor the country office has the budget to strengthen the country office's capacities in that way.</p> <p>In 2006-2008, the regional bureau received an IS (DFID) fund allocation to strengthen the country office's capacities in emergency readiness, early warning, food security monitoring, monitoring and evaluation, etc.</p>
<p>6.3 Ensure that personnel assigned to country offices are given training to allow them to carry out their duties effectively – other than purchasing – and that they receive training on food security issues in the Sahel.</p>	HR, regional bureau and country office	<p>OD: This is a good recommendation. ESASU training sessions in particular are organized to build capacities in this sector.</p>
7. Decentralization and decision-making		
<p>7.1 Clarify the different levels of responsibility between Headquarters and regional bureaux and country offices and strengthen their effectiveness, especially with regard to food purchasing, mobilization of resources and communication, including approval procedures.</p>	OD and FD	<p>OD: WFP recently undertook an in-depth analysis of its emergency readiness, its capacities and its various modes of intervention on the basis of recent experiences, including Niger. This led to a clearer allocation of management and support responsibilities in the event of major crises. This was followed by the drafting of an official protocol on the declaration of major emergencies requiring Headquarters support and the creation of the post of emergency coordinator reporting to the Deputy Executive Director.</p> <p>FDD: Resources mobilization is a collective responsibility. FDD works in collaboration with regional bureaux and country offices on these matters. Nonetheless, as more information and advice is needed, FDD has embarked on a normative guidance process to focus on the main issues involved in resources mobilization. The process has already begun; its conclusions should be available in</p>



**ANNEX II: EVALUATION RECOMMENDATIONS AND MANAGEMENT RESPONSE MATRIX—
EVALUATION OF WFP'S RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS IN NIGER IN 2005**

Recommendations	Action by	Management response and actions taken
		March 2007.
7.2 In crisis prevention/mitigation situations, as soon as an EMOP is approved set up a mechanism to monitor the food security situation and implementation of the intervention at the regional bureau level or at the Operations Department.	Regional bureau and OD	OD: This is a lesson drawn from the Niger crisis. In fact, Niger is an example in this case, with the country director and the regional director playing exemplary roles.
8. More specifically for Niger (further to the foregoing)		
8.1 Maintain and develop WFP's role in DNGPCA in the framework of the reform proposed by the recent evaluation of the mechanism.	Country office	OD: Noted, in progress.
8.2 Promote DNGPCA's enlargement to include development partners, NGOs, civil society organizations and village organizations.	Country office	OD: Noted, in progress.
8.3. Contribute to drawing up a National Emergency Plan preceded by in-depth consultations on the choice of instruments most appropriate to the various types of crises and their magnitude (relevance of each instrument).	Country office	OD: Noted, in progress.
8.4 Strengthening political dialogue with the Government, ensuring that debate is transparent, using established arguments, while integrating the Government's measures into the joint approach of the United Nations system in the country.	Country office	OD: WFP has always acted this way.
8.5 If necessary, re-examine WFP's strategy in Niger to strengthen nutritional issues in the framework of the recent agreement with UNICEF on the subject.	Country office	OD: This is one of the lessons drawn from the 2005 crisis. Partnership with UNICEF was also strengthened at regional level. The new PRRO in fact moves in that direction



ANNEX III

TABLE 1. EMOP BUDGET AND BUDGET REVISIONS (BRs)					
Action	Date	Tonnage	Cost (US\$)	Beneficiaries	Objective/motive
EMOP	17.02.05	6 562	2 974 420	400 000	Government's request November 4
BR 1	11.05.05		3 566 978		Increased cost of supplies
BR 2	10.06.05	7 727	4 213 060	465 240	Increased tonnage to beneficiaries because of the deteriorating situation
BR 3	13.07.05	23 287	16 000 072	1 113 913	Deterioration of the situation and extension of the intervention to 31.12.05
BR 4	25.07.05	23 838			Increase in tonnage from the United States
BR 5	27.07.05	25 483			Increase in tonnage
BR 6	29.07.05	34 823			Increase in tonnage
BR 7	02.08.05	72 931	57 627 342	2 500 000	Worsening situation Change in intervention strategy
BR 8	06.09.05		57 622 449		Technical adjustment: substitution of products
BR 9	11.05		59 252 221		Extension to 31.03.06 Substitution between products and increased cost of supplies


Sources: After action review, analysis conducted in November 2005 and budget revisions.

TABLE 2. BUDGET, CONTRIBUTIONS AND COSTS FOR NIGER EMOP IN 2005	
	Amounts in US\$
Total budget	59 252 211
Total contributions	49 532 438
Contributions (extra IRA)	37 514 265
Balance advanced IRA	12 008 173
Cost	39 617 074

Source: Standard project report on the EMOP in Niger in 2005, and WINGS.




Graph. Breakdown of Costs (2005)



Source: Normalized report on EMOP in Niger, 2005



ANNEX IV: ESTIMATED POPULATION IN NEED OF FOOD AID (SAP-WFP JULY 2005)



The designations employed and the presentation of material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the World Food Programme (WFP) concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its frontiers or boundaries.

ACRONYMS USED IN THE DOCUMENT

BR	budget revision
CEDEAO	Economic Community of West African States (<i>Communauté économique des États de l'Afrique de l'Ouest</i>)
CILSS	Permanent Committee for the Fight against Drought in the Sahel (<i>Comité permanent inter-États de lutte contre la sécheresse au Sahel</i>)
CMP	Crisis Mitigation Programme
CRENA	Nutritional Recovery Day Centre (<i>Centre de récupération nutritionnelle ambulatoire</i>)
CRENI	Intensive Nutritional Recovery Centre (<i>Centre de récupération nutritionnelle intensif</i>)
DAC	Development Aid Committee
DNPGCA	National Mechanism for Prevention and Managing Food Crises (<i>Dispositif national de prévention et de gestion des crises alimentaires</i>)
ESASU	Evaluation of Food Security in Emergency Situations (<i>Evaluation de la sécurité alimentaire en situation d'urgence</i>)
EWS	early-warning system
FDD	Donor Relations Division
FFT	food for training
FFW	food for work
IRA	Immediate Response Account
IRAM	Institute for Research on and Application of Development Methods (<i>Institut de recherches et d'applications des méthodes de développement</i>)
ITSH	internal transport, storage and handling
MSF	<i>Médecins sans frontières</i>
NGO	non-governmental organization
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OEDE	Office of Evaluation
UEMOA	West African Economic and Monetary Union (<i>Union économique et monétaire ouest-africaine</i>)
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
WHO	World Health Organization
WINGS	WFP Information Network and Global System