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**Executive Board
First Regular Session**

Rome, 4–6 February 2008

EVALUATION REPORTS

Agenda item 7

For consideration



Distribution: GENERAL
WFP/EB.1/2008/7-B
20 December 2007
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

SUMMARY EVALUATION REPORT COLOMBIA PRRO 10366.0

Assistance to Persons Displaced by Violence

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NOTE TO THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

This document is submitted to the Executive Board for consideration.

The Secretariat invites members of the Board who may have questions of a technical nature with regard to this document to contact the WFP staff focal points indicated below, preferably well in advance of the Board's meeting.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report summarizes an independent mid-term evaluation of Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO) 10366.0 in Colombia, approved in May 2005 and extended to March 2008. The evaluation mission was carried out in February and March 2007; its findings are meant to assist the country office in formulating a follow-on PRRO.

Colombia has the second-largest population of internally displaced people in the world, with more than 3.5 million people displaced over 20 years. The goal of the PRRO is to protect and stabilize livelihoods of internally displaced people and enhance resilience to shocks — WFP Strategic Objective 2 — through relief and recovery activities, which receive 38 and 62 percent of resources, respectively.

The relief component appeared to be relevant, efficient and effective in providing food support for sufficient time to enable internally displaced families to start getting back on their feet.

In recovery activities, school feeding appeared relevant and efficient in fostering internally displaced children's reintegration into society, but there were questions about the component's full effectiveness. The efficiency and effectiveness of pre-school feeding depended on the quality of the implementing partner. The component for pregnant and lactating women and children at risk was relevant to needs, but its effectiveness was limited by inadequate implementation modalities. Food for work and food for training were judged relevant and effective in supporting a wide range of activities and providing significant food resources to internally displaced families.

In all but one component, the numbers of internally displaced people benefiting from the PRRO in 18 months exceeded targets, achieving 129 percent of the overall target in spite of having only 68 percent of the budgeted food resources. Data suggested that food resources may have been stretched to include more beneficiaries than they were meant to cover.

The PRRO demonstrated substantial accomplishments in the cross-cutting areas of needs and vulnerability assessments, and improved monitoring, logistics and partnerships. It had also achieved a number of operational innovations. There was room for improvement of outcome measurement.

One of the most important recommendations for the new PRRO was to add nutrition and education goals to livelihood ones. WFP should ensure that beneficiaries receive all that has been programmed for them, eliminating the tendency to economize on rations to reach more beneficiaries. Other recommendations concerned budget allocations for specific target groups and the balance between relief and recovery. The evaluation proposed operational improvements to the nutritional support activities and encouraged the expansion of current activities, perhaps to as much as 100,000 metric tons. It recommended developing a plan for the gradual transfer of responsibility for specific programme components to the Government.



DRAFT DECISION^{*}



The Board takes note of “Summary Evaluation Report Colombia PRRO 10366.0” (WFP/EB.1/2008/7-B) and encourages further action on the recommendations, taking into account considerations raised by the Board during its discussion.

^{*} This is a draft decision. For the final decision adopted by the Board, please refer to the Decisions and Recommendations document (WFP/EB.1/2008/15) issued at the end of the session.



BACKGROUND

1. Over the past 20 years, the civilian population of Colombia has been exposed to — and fled from — a stand-off primarily between the Colombia armed forces and illegal armed groups. Much of the displacement is a response to the efforts of illegal armed groups to further their own economic interests. The number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) during those 20 years is estimated at more than 3.5 million; figures for 2005 ranged from the official figure of 170,000 to the figure of 310,000 provided by non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Although these numbers reflect an improvement over previous years, the situation is deteriorating in some areas: in Nariño, one NGO reported a 50 percent increase in IDPs for the first semester of 2006. At the time of writing, Colombia had the second-largest population of IDPs in the world, surpassed only by the Sudan. Most interviewees did not expect the situation to improve in the foreseeable future.
2. IDP needs are acute. A WFP survey in 2003 found average IDP households of six people each, with a dependency ratio of almost 31 percent; 50 percent of the displaced population was under 15 years old. Because IDP households purchased 80 percent of their food, a stable and sufficient income was critical, but their earnings averaged only 61 percent of the minimum wage. Some 70 percent of IDP households were deficient in two or more basic needs, compared with 10 percent in the poorest quintile of the population. A separate survey¹ found high malnutrition among IDP children under 5: 22.6 percent chronic and 5.5 percent acute, compared with 17.2 and 3.9 percent, respectively, among the lowest population quintile. It also found that children from displaced households were far more likely to suffer from diarrhoea, acute respiratory infections and skin infections.
3. The goal of the PRRO was to protect and stabilize the livelihoods of IDPs and enhance their resilience to shocks, through two complementary strategies. The **relief** component, at 38 percent of the budget, provided assistance through general food distributions to newly displaced IDPs, longer-term IDPs identified as food-insecure, confined and blockaded communities, and non-registered IDPs, who were not reached by other major donors. The **recovery** component, at 62 percent of the budget, assisted: primary schoolchildren and pre-school children aged 3 to 6 through school and pre-school feeding; pregnant and lactating women, their children under 2 years and children at nutritional risk, through targeted supplementary feeding as take-home rations; and other vulnerable communities in need of rebuilding their livelihoods, through food for work (FFW) and food for training (FFT).
4. This mid-term evaluation was carried out in February and March 2007. During a three-week mission, 6 departments and 53 projects were visited, 10 meetings were held with implementing partners and WFP staff, and more than 25 key informants were interviewed in Bogotá. The evaluation team was composed of four external consultants² and supported by a WFP evaluation officer.

¹ WFP/ECHO/PAHO. *Estado Nutricional, de Alimentación y Condiciones de Salud de la Población Desplazada por la Violencia en Seis Subregiones de Colombia (Informe Completo)*, Bogota, December 2005.

² An agricultural consultant, as team leader; a Ph.D. economist trained at the University of Quebec; a research officer, teacher and editor at the Refugee Studies Centre, Oxford, United Kingdom; and a Ph.D. professor of sociology and economics at the *Universidad Nacional de Colombia*.



RELEVANCE

5. Overall, the protracted relief and recovery operation (PRRO) was highly relevant to the needs of Colombia's IDPs. The relief component offered immediate assistance in the aftermath of IDP displacement and the recovery component offered a flexible response to evolving IDP needs in the months following displacement. Activities were designed well and generally carried out appropriately.
6. Needs assessments were conducted through four comprehensive nutritional and socio-economic surveys that showed IDPs were an appropriate target group. The PRRO directed 70 percent of its resources to recent IDPs and 30 percent to other vulnerable populations, which the evaluation found appropriate. The inclusion of non-registered IDPs as a special target group was an excellent innovation. The PRRO was an important mechanism through which the Government of Colombia and international donors could target *at-risk communities* — “blockaded, confined, in resistance, fumigated” — that were otherwise beyond the reach of assistance. Afro-Colombians and indigenous populations were also particularly appropriate beneficiaries of the PRRO.
7. Each programme component was found appropriate in varying degrees and for different reasons:
 - Relief was highly relevant in proposing appropriate programme modalities to address the needs of IDPs when they were at their most vulnerable. Given WFP's corporate mandate, the evaluators regarded the fulfilment of relief as a priority.
 - School feeding was appropriate in helping IDP children to reintegrate into society. It constituted a suitable follow-on activity for the relief-to-recovery continuum.
 - Pre-school feeding was appropriate in providing support as IDP children moved beyond immediate post-displacement. This component may have been handicapped by a lack of clarity as to whether its objectives were educational, nutritional or both.
 - The vulnerable group feeding components — assisting pregnant and lactating women, their children under 2 and children at risk of malnutrition — was relevant to the particular needs of these target groups.
 - FFW and FFT provided an appropriate response to evolving IDP needs in a wide variety of livelihood recovery activities.

PERFORMANCE OF THE PRRO

8. The Strategic Objective formulation of the PRRO was directed exclusively to livelihoods. This was not fully appropriate in current Colombian conditions, in which nutrition and education goals could also have been included. Although the formulation was developed with full concurrence from the regional bureau and WFP headquarters, it did not appear to represent an appropriately comprehensive goal.
9. Shortcomings in the design of the logical framework limited its usefulness in helping the country office recognize which programme components to prioritize and which to scale down or focus differently.
10. The PRRO had added operations in six new departments. Given the rising needs in these areas, this was an appropriate decision, even though they entailed substantially higher operational costs compared with the previous operation.



11. Reports suggested that in some departments only one third of total registered IDPs received assistance through government institutions, and that there were likely to be as many non-registered IDPs as registered ones. The widespread need among recently displaced and historically poor populations caused some implementing partners to use vulnerability as their main targeting criterion, making displacement secondary.
12. The distribution of PRRO resources between relief (at 38 percent of the budget) and recovery (at 62 percent) was generally achieved as planned. However, in current conditions, the evaluation team suggested that the needs of relief programming be fulfilled first, based on the value added by food assistance to this relevant component. In the new PRRO, the distribution of resources should continue to be monitored and adjusted according to evolving needs, which may vary from region to region.
13. The System for the Identification and Monitoring of Food Vulnerability (SIMVA) was designed by the country office as a comprehensive package with good manuals and training tools, and was offered as technical assistance to partners and government counterparts. Numerous partners were trained in its use and it allowed comprehensive reports on the food security situation to be produced in several parts of the country. SIMVA's use had been limited, however, by its high cost and complexity and by a conceptual confusion as to whether it should be used as a baseline/monitoring tool or as an instrument to assess the food insecurity of IDPs and other vulnerable groups over time.
14. The PRRO gave prominent attention to women's issues: 55 percent of beneficiaries were women and a reported 80 percent of leadership roles in village food oversight committees were held by women. Several examples of women's empowerment were seen during field visits.
15. The current PRRO made important operational improvements on the previous one. The entire logistics operation seemed to be running efficiently: food losses were nearly eliminated, in spite of the real danger of delivering food in many areas; and local food purchases were an important programme innovation. However, a significant pipeline break in late 2006, caused by a funding default, resulted in major disruption to beneficiaries, implementing partners and sub-office operations.
16. In project management, personnel demonstrated competence and commitment, and were well-informed of the context and specifics of most projects. The heavy demands on field staff may have explained a reported high turnover. The procedures manual was a solid document that was widely available to implementing partners, creating a good operational base.
17. Regarding partnerships, the PRRO demonstrated joint ownership between WFP and government agencies. The introduction of a mechanism to provide recommendations on project proposals, based on a tripartite regional committee, was a good innovation. Implementing and community-based partners appeared to work well with WFP, but had uneven capacities for quality performance. Although the benefits of local interaction between WFP and its implementing partners were recognized, there was concern regarding the high number of partners. This stretched the country office's supervision capacity, thus increasing the risk of political influence affecting some projects.
18. The current PRRO had strengthened the monitoring function, notably by appointing a dedicated programme officer, and project monitoring was being performed well. Reporting tracked mainly *output* and *processes*, however, and the PRRO conducted little *outcome*-level measurement, although a number of implementing partners were undertaking outcome monitoring on their own. WFP had attempted to measure the effect of relief, FFW and FFT projects on food expenditures and dietary diversity, in line with



corporate guidance, through case studies. This represented a considerable investment for the country office, but the evaluation questioned the methodological basis used for them.

19. Operational supervision at the sub-office level was still only sporadic, and improvements were needed to create a culture of continuous quality improvement between one project visit and the next.

CONNECTEDNESS

20. The PRRO was consonant with longer-term needs identified by the Government of Colombia, international organizations, local and international NGOs and beneficiaries:
 - There was an obvious connection to improved livelihoods for those receiving relief assistance that enabled them to begin a new life, although the country office did not track information on this topic.
 - For needy IDPs who continued to receive support to make the transition to their new lives through the recovery components, there was a clear connection between relief and recovery. The evaluation team inferred that this was especially the case in FFW, FFT, school feeding and those pre-school feeding with strong institutional partners.
 - The connection between relief and recovery was harder to discern in other components. Pre-school feeding projects with weaker institutional partners were unlikely to achieve longer-term recovery results — as were the supplementary feeding for pregnant and lactating women and children at risk components, which suffered from a lack of clarity about their overall purpose.
21. WFP's strong links with government counterparts fostered the latter's assumption of larger roles in responding to the IDP crisis. However, even assuming that the Government could take full financial and implementation responsibility for a US\$50 million IDP programme, political realities implied that there were large segments of the IDP population that would not be reached. One of the objectives of the next operations might be to create a management model for a PRRO that could be run by the Government and executed by implementing partners within a set time. Developing a time-bound and specific exit strategy was not necessarily relevant in Colombia, where the IDP situation was likely to deteriorate in the foreseeable future.

RESULTS

22. The effectiveness of component activities varied, but overall they exceeded target numbers. Relief beneficiaries were 122 percent of the 18-month target; school feeding reached 100 percent of the two-year target; pre-school feeding reached 113 percent of the target; pregnant and lactating women, 135 percent; FFW, 155 percent; and FFT, 156 percent. Only children at risk reached less than target, at 94 percent. Substantial over-accomplishment in all but one component and 129 percent accomplishment of the overall PRRO goal, compared with only 68 percent of budgeted food resources, suggested that the ration was being "economized" by distributing fewer months of food to reach more beneficiaries than called for in the programme design.
23. The relief component was particularly effective, reaching 293,625 people in 18 months. It responded to the needs of a large IDP population each year, offering effective assistance to the most vulnerable groups apparently without creating dependency. It was directed to different groups of IDPs, meeting them "where they were" – whether blockaded, confined



or fumigated communities, small towns or peri-urban neighbourhoods. Data on how effective the component had been in increasing beneficiaries' access to a greater diversity of foods had not been collected.

24. School feeding appeared to be an effective intervention for 224,195 children. IDP children were guaranteed one full meal a day. Beneficiary children exhibited high energy levels; improved attention spans were widely reported; and schools offering school feeding seemed to achieve higher attendance rates.
25. The effectiveness of pre-school feeding for 59,526 children appeared to depend on the quality of the implementing partner. Where the partner was institutionally strong, not only were additional resources leveraged, educational objectives were also achieved, and hard-to-reach nutritional outcomes became possible. Where project leadership was less holistic, which often applied to projects led by community groups, it was difficult to distinguish pre-school support from generalized under-5 feeding.
26. Because of small ration size, dilution throughout the family and lack of focus on nutritional objectives, the pregnant and lactating women component, directed to 56,513 women, and the children at risk component, for 70,532 children, were ineffective in achieving nutritional improvement, except when run by strong institutional partners that used the nutritional inputs as part of a more holistic approach. These projects were likely to have a positive effect in improving beneficiaries' health status.
27. FFW and FFT each benefited more than 131,000 people and were effective programme components, especially when embedded in wider development initiatives. This was because of the ration sizes, the wide array of recovery activities supported and the components' potential to restore livelihoods, build human capital and create assets. Agriculture, housing, water and sanitation, and creation of professional skills seemed to be areas of particular synergy.
28. Other important effects were observed. Several communities in the most dangerous areas spoke of WFP's presence enhancing their sense of physical protection; this was especially the case for communities at risk. PRRO-supported community-based activities had probably created and enhanced social cohesion – a particularly noteworthy result following the psycho-social disintegration caused by displacement. There were reports of unanticipated psychological benefits accruing to programme beneficiaries because of implementing partners' integrated, holistic programming. There was widespread recognition that WFP efforts had contributed to raising awareness about IDP issues at the national level. At the local level, key informants noted that the PRRO indirectly contributed to "creating a *humanitarian space* ceded by the armed groups", which did not exist prior to WFP's arrival in the zone.

FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS

29. The current PRRO was fully appropriate to the humanitarian situation in Colombia, and according to most interviewees the IDP focus would likely remain valid for the foreseeable future of five to ten years. Regarding whether WFP should engage in higher-profile advocacy, real trade-offs must be carefully weighed. A more politicized discourse at the national level could compromise the collaborative relationships seen in the field and the current recognition of WFP as a neutral party. This could have a negative impact on WFP's secure access to needy populations. In addition, it seemed likely that the prospects for lasting peace were not good in the medium term, so only a limited number of additional activities could be taken on without over-burdening the programme.



30. The evaluation touched on the following policy questions: (i) Regarding the role of WFP in supporting the Government of Colombia's efforts to improve IDP lives, how much of the programme should be assumed by the Government? (ii) Regarding a rapid, timely response to IDPs, and in view of the actions taken so far, to what extent could the Government be expected to improve its efficiency? and (iii) What is the value added by food aid compared with other possible modalities of support for non-relief interventions? Answers to these questions will involve complex policy discussions between WFP and the Government of Colombia while the next PRRO is prepared.

RECOMMENDATIONS

31. The recommendations offered regarded aspects of strategic orientations, operational design or implementation. They pointed both to a need to preserve acknowledged good practices and to weaker areas where changes in practice were encouraged.

ANNEX: RECOMMENDATION MATRIX AND MANAGEMENT RESPONSE

Recommendations	Action by	Management response
<p>1. The Strategic Objective references of the next PRRO should incorporate nutrition and education (Strategic Objectives 3 and 4).</p>	<p>Country office Operation/programme support Nutrition Service School Feeding Service</p>	<p>Agreed. The new PRRO draft project document takes into account this recommendation, and incorporates Strategic Objective 2 (livelihoods), Strategic Objectives 3 and 4 outcomes and other related indicators.</p>
<p>2. In the new PRRO, operational design should set out nutritional objectives, particularly regarding assistance to pregnant and lactating women, children at risk and, perhaps, school and pre-school feeding. Criteria should be developed to determine whether some geographic areas of IDP concentration are more nutritionally needy.</p>	<p>Country office Operation/programme support Nutrition Service</p>	<p>Partially agreed. Nutritional objectives and corresponding indicators have been formulated in the new PRRO for mother-and-child health (MCH) and children-at-risk activities. For primary and pre-school feeding the new PRRO focuses on educational objectives and transition to government formal education and supplementary feeding programmes, and not on nutritional objectives, which are difficult to measure unless focused on micronutrient deficiency.</p> <p>Criteria for geographical targeting in the new PRRO are based on nutrition, food security, IDP concentration, gaps in assistance and institutional capacity variables.</p>
<p>3. To comply with a results-based approach and to measure achievements beyond distributed outputs, the new operation should formulate realistic outcomes relating to each activity and should set up a system to track these.</p>	<p>Country office Regional bureau Operation/programme support</p>	<p>Agreed. The new PRRO takes into account this recommendation in the logical framework, as per WFP corporate guidelines and data collection tools/mechanisms.</p>
<p>4. The expertise of a nutritionist may be necessary for designing an appropriate system for monitoring outcomes of nutrition-focused activities. Necessary measurement tools (such as scales) should be made available to implementing partners.</p>	<p>Country office Nutrition Service</p>	<p>The country office currently has a nutritional expert in its main office and two nutritionists at the field level. In the new PRRO, the country office proposes carrying out an outsourced baseline and follow-up to monitor the outcome of nutrition and health activities. Other nutrition output and process indicators will be incorporated into the routine monitoring system. Should funds for measurement tools be available from the Government or donors, WFP will distribute them to implementing partners as part of an integral package with training and other complementary actions.</p> <p>Headquarters will support the country office in monitoring the nutritional outcomes as necessary.</p>





ANNEX: RECOMMENDATION MATRIX AND MANAGEMENT RESPONSE

Recommendations	Action by	Management response
5. If the vulnerable group feeding component has as an immediate objective improvement of the correlation with health programmes, the country office should develop indicators to measure this outcome.	Country office Nutrition Service	Agreed. The new PRRO will measure graduation into government health programmes for the vulnerable group feeding component.
6. The PRRO should articulate specific and measurable outcome indicators for assistance to livelihoods through FFW and FFT. Among the potential immediate outcomes to track are: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ asset creation through housing improvements; ➤ livelihood restoration through agricultural projects; ➤ improved health through water and sanitation projects; and ➤ employment creation through skills development. 	Country office Regional bureau	<p>The proposed immediate outcomes are not corporate outcome indicators. However, the country office will capture information from case studies to measure some FFW/FFT-related immediate outcomes, which still need to be identified.</p> <p>Through its output monitoring system, the PRRO already tracks assets created, as observed in the PRRO's standardized project reports.</p> <p>Proposed outcome indicators for employment creation through skills development do not seem to be measurable. Perhaps changes in the employment status of participants in FFT for skills development could be measured.</p> <p>The regional bureau will support the country office in developing and monitoring outcome indicators and will consult a results-based management (RBM) expert concerning which existing WFP global outcome indicators to use.</p>
7. The country office should make capable institutional implementing partners responsible for the effective tracking of outcome measurement.	Country office	The country office proposes targeting a select group of partners to support outcome measurement.
8. The country office should continue to reflect on the relief/recovery distribution and adjust its programming as appropriate, possibly establishing a mechanism to revise the allocation to each component annually, based on evolving needs.	Country office	Noted. The country office has a structure that adjusts country office planning figures to demands and needs. The relief/recovery distribution has varied for each year of the PRRO according to evolving needs: [in percentages] 2005: 23/77; 2006: 40/60; 2007: 47/53.

ANNEX: RECOMMENDATION MATRIX AND MANAGEMENT RESPONSE

Recommendations	Action by	Management response
<p>9. Specific needy groups should remain priority targets for operational resources:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Significant resources should be directed to Afro-Colombian and indigenous populations, identified as the neediest and most affected by the current violence. ➤ Non-registered IDPs and communities at risk (blockaded, confined, communities-in-peace, etc.) should continue to capture significant budget support in the next PRRO. 	Country office	<p>Noted. The country office has been increasing the resources directed to these ethnic groups from 8 to 20 percent of beneficiaries in the last two and a half years. New PRRO resources will be directed to those most in need. The new PRRO will respond to the growing needs of these groups. According to government data, 30 percent of all IDPs are Afro-Colombian and indigenous.</p> <p>The country office has also increased the number of beneficiaries in the non-registered IDPs and communities-at-risk categories, as highlighted in the evaluation mission's technical report. They will be main beneficiary groups of the new PRRO because they have high levels of food insecurity and have little access to government programmes.</p>
<p>10. Attention should be given to ensuring that implementing partners improve their understanding and interiorization of WFP targeting criteria and outcome goals via refresher training events.</p>	Country office	<p>Partially agreed. The country office already provides training to all implementing partners in the current PRRO at least once during the project cycle. WFP has set aside additional funding in the new PRRO to ensure training and follow-up.</p>
<p>11. The tendency to stretch food supplies to reach a larger number of beneficiaries should be avoided in order to ensure that beneficiaries receive full rations.</p>	Country office	<p>Partially agreed. Owing to the specific context of displacement in Colombia (involving families, rather than the mass displacements seen in other parts of the world), numbers of IDPs have grown over recent years. Although beneficiaries received full rations in all modalities, including the <i>Bienestarina</i> (a fortified wheat blend) that was provisioned by the Government, in some cases the duration of food assistance was reduced to ensure that those most in need were assisted.</p> <p>The country office recognized the additional numbers and regularized assistance through internal operational procedures, but this did not solve the issue of assistance, as resources to this operation have always been below-planned amounts.</p>
<p>12. The country office should consider providing family rations for pregnant and lactating women and children at risk to avoid the dilution of the intervention's expected nutritional benefits.</p>	Country office Nutrition Service	<p>In the new PRRO, individual ration sizes have been increased to account for the dilution factor. Commodities with higher mineral and vitamin contents have been recommended to fill the gaps in iron and other micronutrients in beneficiary groups, as per nutritional assessments.</p>





ANNEX: RECOMMENDATION MATRIX AND MANAGEMENT RESPONSE

Recommendations	Action by	Management response
13. The country office and WFP headquarters should do everything possible to ensure that the new PRRO receives full funding, to avoid a repeat of the pipeline break that occurred in 2006.	Country office	The country office will maintain its excellent relations with the international community, which has supported the PRRO. It will seek advice from headquarters on how to increase its donor base.
14. Resources should be allocated to country office staff training in key programme topics, as a means of career enrichment and to improve performance, possibly compensating for high staff turnover.	Country office Regional bureau	Agreed. Individual field and programme staff have benefited from training locally, in the region and at international events (gender, emergency food security assessment, vulnerability analysis and mapping, food for education/supplementary feeding, HIV, standardized project reports, RBM, nutrition, the WFP Information Network and Global System and management plans). The recommendation has been taken into account in the new PRRO budget, but depends on donor support and the availability of resources.
15. An increase of programme size to respond to high needs is recommended. This should not entail any major increase in operational costs and should reflect additional programme and financial commitments from the Government and WFP.	Country office Regional bureau	<p>The size of the operation is determined by needs assessments and formulation missions. In the new PRRO, the size has been increased according to needs assessments carried out by WFP. Operational costs have been determined based on strengthening country office capacity to respond to the new strategic orientations that put the PRRO at a higher level of accountability on graduation to government programmes and outcome measurements.</p> <p>Additional government support for monitoring and evaluation activities and for non-food items for IDPs will be sought.</p>
16. The new PRRO should ensure that WFP's role does not replace the Government's responsibility to IDPs. Transfer of responsibility to the Government should be developed in the new PRRO.	Country office Regional bureau	<p>The country office is fully aware that PRRO activities are a complement to government actions. The new PRRO stresses the need for government commitment to, and take-over of, all components.</p> <p>A hand-over strategy has been outlined in the PRRO. WFP's main strategy is to facilitate the transition from short-term relief/recovery activities to medium-to-longer-term solutions for IDPs. This transition requires policy and programme actions at the macro and micro levels, respectively. If carefully implemented, coordinated and monitored, the PRRO has the potential to increase IDPs' awareness of government services and can allow WFP to work with the Government to ensure that services at the municipal, departmental and national levels are made available to displaced populations.</p>

ACRONYMS USED IN THE DOCUMENT

FFT	food for training
FFW	food for work
IDP	internally displaced people
NGO	non-governmental organization
PRRO	protracted relief and recovery operation
RBM	results-based management
SIMVA	System for the Identification and Monitoring of Food Vulnerability (<i>Sistema para la Identificación y Monitoreo de Vulnerabilidad Alimentaria</i>)