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SUMMARY EVALUATION REPORT OF KENYA EMERGENCY OPERATION 10374.0 AND COUNTRY PROGRAMME 10264.0 (2004–2008)

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NOTE TO THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

This document is submitted to the Executive Board for consideration.

The Secretariat invites members of the Board who may have questions of a technical nature with regard to this document to contact the WFP staff focal points indicated below, preferably well in advance of the Board's meeting.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This evaluation covers Kenya emergency operation 10374.0 and country programme 10264.0, both of which began in 2004. It was carried out in March 2007.

The emergency operation is the largest that WFP has had in Kenya, and there is no doubt that without WFP's assistance there could have been a massive humanitarian disaster. In response to a series of natural disasters, food was distributed in over 2,000 remote locations identified by the Government's early-warning system. The widely dispersed distribution points enabled drought-affected people to receive WFP rations without having to migrate to relief camps. WFP assistance also helped them to retain their remaining assets, rather than disposing of them to feed their families.

The success of this complex relief programme depended largely on a massive and well-coordinated logistics operation, managed by WFP. The deployment of emergency operation teams in ten sub-offices gave WFP a very effective field presence in Kenya. Also critical to the operation's success was the strong Kenyan ownership at all levels. The Government's substantial cereal contributions enabled relief distributions to start quickly, and encouraged donors to support the operation to an unusually high degree. The Government's flexibility in the timing of its contributions also prevented major pipeline breaks.


The evaluation of the country programme focused on the regular school feeding programme, which accounts for 82 percent of the country programme's resources. The school feeding activity has enabled hundreds of thousands of poor young Kenyans to receive some or all of a primary education and to benefit from improved nutrition. In most districts where school feeding is implemented there has been a general increase in enrolment rates. However, it is difficult to attribute these increases to school feeding alone, given the national policy of free primary education being implemented simultaneously and other factors.

The evaluation team concluded that WFP's regular school feeding programme in Kenya has been running for too long without an in-depth stock-taking and revision, and that there is no visible exit strategy. After 25 years of school feeding activities in the country, successes and failures need to be reviewed in order to enable full, effective hand-over of ownership to the Government.

Both the emergency operation and the country programme are highly ambitious and complex programmes. The sheer logistics of supplying WFP commodities to over 544,000 children at 4,200 schools in 26 districts under the extended school feeding programme within the emergency operation, and to 1.1 million children under the country programme, are astounding. In general the team felt that the programmes were impressive in terms of scope, logistical arrangements and timeliness. However, the country office tended to concentrate almost exclusively on the emergency operation, resulting in a culture of individual programme management and little consultation and coordination between the emergency operation and country programme staff. The team concluded that WFP's interventions in Kenya could benefit from better coordination and coherence.



DRAFT DECISION*



The Board takes note of “Summary Evaluation Report of Kenya Emergency Operation 10374.0 and Country Programme 10264.0 (2004–2008)” (WFP/EB.1/2008/7-C) and encourages further action on the recommendations, taking into account considerations raised by the Board during its discussion.

* This is a draft decision. For the final decision adopted by the Board, please refer to the Decisions and Recommendations document (WFP/EB.1/2008/15) issued at the end of the session.



INTRODUCTION

Country Context

1. Kenya has experienced unprecedented shocks to its food security over the past five years as a result of successive years of drought followed by flooding. Together these shocks greatly reduced food and fodder availability, seriously compromising the food security of many Kenyan households, particularly those living in northern and eastern pastoral areas and in the south-eastern agricultural lowlands. The livestock that many Kenyan families in these regions depend on for food and income died in large numbers, households found their livelihood options seriously constrained or at risk of disappearing completely, and children's health and nutrition deteriorated precipitously.
2. Food insecurity is highest in urban slums and among pastoralists and marginal agriculturalists in remote, arid and semi-arid lands (ASALs), which comprise 80 percent of Kenya's land mass. Many households in these areas are chronically poor, and there are persistently high chronic malnutrition rates among children under 5. The drought-prone and semi-arid lands have the lowest primary school enrolment and completion rates.
3. In western Kenya and the Nairobi slums, HIV/AIDS is devastating communities through illness, reduced capacity to earn a livelihood and large numbers of orphans and other vulnerable children who are living in extremely impoverished households that cannot meet their basic food needs.
4. WFP has had an open-ended basic agreement with the Government of Kenya since March 1980, when WFP started providing lunches to schoolchildren in drought-prone areas. WFP's present operations in Kenya support the Government's efforts in implementing programmes to achieve the Millennium Development Goals, support school feeding and communities devastated by HIV/AIDS, and provide emergency assistance to drought- and flood-affected areas. In 2006, up to 3 million people a month received food assistance under the Programme's ongoing emergency operation. In addition, 535,000 children received school meals under WFP's Expanded School Feeding Programme (ESFP) in the worst drought-affected areas not already covered by the regular school feeding of the Country Programme (CP).

Scope and Purpose of the Evaluation

5. The evaluation covered WFP assistance to Kenya under emergency operation (EMOP) 10374.0 between August 2004 and December 2006, and Country Programme 10264.0 over the period January 2004–December 2006. Both the EMOP and the CP started in 2004. The EMOP was due to end in June 2007, while the CP cycle continues until December 2008.
6. The purpose of the evaluation was: to examine whether work has been conducted in accordance with agreed rules and standards; to provide the WFP country office with an external view of progress towards expected results which may contribute to improvements in the current operations, particularly with respect to strategic decisions; and to assist WFP in identifying and disseminating lessons learned to support improved programming and organizational learning across operational areas.
7. The evaluation was managed by the WFP Evaluation Service in Headquarters and undertaken by a team of five consultants. Fieldwork was conducted from 1 March to 28 March 2007. The team visited sites in Nairobi, Eldoret, Busia, Machakos, Mombasa, Kilifi and Narok as well as Mandera and Garissa districts. It held meetings with WFP staff,



government ministers and officials, non-governmental organization (NGO) and United Nations partners, donors and beneficiaries to assess performance and draw lessons. The findings aimed to identify strategic and operational changes that could improve the performance and impact of the second half of the CP and any further humanitarian assistance. The evaluation team applied a mix of internationally agreed evaluation criteria: relevance/appropriateness; effectiveness; efficiency; coherence/connectedness; sustainability; and impact.

FINDINGS

Emergency Operation (EMOP 10374.0)

8. In August 2004 WFP initiated emergency assistance to Kenya under EMOP 10374.0. The initial intervention aimed to target 166,000 mt of food aid to 2,323,000 beneficiaries for a period of six months at an estimated total cost of US\$81.3 million. The modalities selected included general food distribution (GFD), supplementary feeding (SF), food for work (FFW) and an expanded school feeding programme (ESFP).
9. A series of budget revisions took place over the next two years, bringing the overall level of EMOP 10374.0 to 3.4 million beneficiaries at the peak of the drought in 2006, requiring 636,898 mt of food at a cost of US\$354.3 million. At its height in 2006, 3 million people were receiving food assistance through 2,000 distribution centres. It was the largest and most complex WFP emergency operation ever in Kenya, and it quickly overshadowed all regular WFP activities in the country. At its height, in 2006, it was WFP's second-largest EMOP after Sudan. The planning figures for each modality are shown in the table below.

EMOP PLANNING FIGURES AUGUST 2004–FEBRUARY 2007				
Period	Planned number of beneficiaries			
	GFD	FFW	ESFP	SF
August 2004–January 2005	1 778 000	278 000	544 000	365 000
March 2005–August 2005	1 011 000	676 000	420 000*	178 000
September 2005–February 2006	775 000	250 000	200 000	152 000
March 2006–February 2007	2 900 000	–	535 000	381 000

N.B. In all cases SF beneficiaries are also counted in GFD.

*The ESFP caseload was assumed to be included under either GFD or FFW.

⇒ *General food distribution*

10. GFD was by far the largest component of the EMOP. Dramatic effects of drought, especially in pastoral areas, meant that not only was there no time to organize typical FFW activities, but the resources to support such labour-intensive work in so many communities were not available. The evaluation team believed that WFP's decision to focus its attention on GFD was quite appropriate.
11. The ultimate aim of WFP's GFD activities is to save lives. In the absence of clear nutritional indicators, it was impossible for the evaluation team to assess the exact nutritional impact of the operation. However, it noted that the complex logistics operation



was managed by WFP with remarkable efficiency, major pipeline breaks had been avoided, relief supplies had reached drought- or flood-stricken populations at over 2,000 distribution centres, and there had been no reports of large-scale population migration or human deaths. In the words of a major donor, “The operation managed to stay ahead of the problem.” Following a series of natural disasters in the ASALs, which caused the loss of over 35 percent of the pastoral livestock herds, there can be little doubt that the GFD prevented what could have become a massive humanitarian disaster, although data were inadequate to objectively quantify lives saved by the operation.

12. WFP’s approved planning figures anticipated GFD programming for 2.9 million beneficiaries across 25 districts, requiring 341,000 mt for the period March 2006 to February 2007. At the time of the evaluation WFP and its partners had delivered 263,179 mt of food aid through GFD, or 77 percent of the planned level. The evaluation team found no significant discrepancies in distribution of food to targeted beneficiaries by geographic or socio-economic criteria.
13. WFP had established excellent working relations with government officials, and there was a strong sense of Kenyan ownership of GFD at all levels. WFP underpinned the Government effectively in a number of ways. WFP assisted the Government in starting relief operations in 26 remote districts with extremely poor road and communication connections. It assisted the district steering groups (DSGs) in identifying and selecting NGOs to serve as cooperating partners and negotiating contracts and budgets with them. WFP trained DSGs, cooperating partners, village relief committees (RCs) and other stakeholders in applying community-based targeting and distribution (CBTD). The deployment of EMOP teams in ten sub-offices throughout the drought-affected area gave WFP the strongest field presence of the United Nations system and enabled it to provide direct material and technical support to local government counterparts.
14. An important consideration in the efficiency of WFP’s GFD activities has been the Government’s decision to continue the practice adopted in the previous EMOP of insisting on a single pipeline of food commodities. The single pipeline approach under WFP auspices prevented agencies from competing against each other on the requisition of transport, storage and related logistics services and furthermore ensured that WFP was the main entity managing relations with cooperating partners before and during the implementation of this extensive operation. These are important lessons for future operations.
15. The team endorsed the “common basket” approach. By requiring all responding agencies to adhere to the same food basket and agreed distribution norms and practices, the Government ensured orderly standards of humanitarian assistance to the disaster-affected communities throughout the country and effectively mitigated the proliferation and diversity of commodities and ration scales that often typify emergency interventions.
16. The Government further contributed to the success and efficiency of WFP operations through generous and timely in-kind contributions of food commodities. Such strategic participation by the Government allowed the emergency operation to begin earlier, avoided critical breaks in the pipeline and mobilized a high level of complementary support from the donor community.
17. The evaluation team particularly noted the key role played at all levels by WFP’s very dedicated staff, their effective contribution to needs assessment and targeting efforts in Kenya as implemented by the Kenya Food Security Meeting (KFSM) and their support to the Government in the overall management of this successful operation. WFP fulfilled its commitment to ensure that geographical targeting identified the neediest areas of the country through continuous data collection and vulnerability analysis. However, concerns



were raised on two issues: bureaucratic delays in releasing the results of the bi-annual needs assessments; and by continuing to co-chair the KFSM, WFP may be inadvertently influencing the KFSM activities to remain very food-driven.

18. Generally the team concluded that, while there are still some shortcomings in the implementation of CBTD under this EMOP, CBTD is a very appropriate method of targeting aid resources to the neediest households. Given the size of the programme, the geographical reach of the projects and the difficulty of matching limited resources to large demands, CBTD is an appropriate system and should continue. Improvements could be made to the CBTD to ensure that the distribution process targets intended beneficiaries. The size of EMOP-covered territories and the number of RCs (some 2,000 at the peak of the operation), with targeting and selection of RCs happening simultaneously, initially hampered WFP efforts to ensure adequate monitoring of RC selection and subsequent community targeting.
19. WFP is making progress toward fulfilling its promises under distribution monitoring and post-distribution monitoring (PDM), yet it still has some way to go; its information feedback on the distribution process is not as effective as it should be. PDM processes are more complicated than they should be, the time required to implement them is much greater than originally estimated, the information collected is not sufficient to inform key decision-making needs, and WFP and partner staff are not always sufficiently trained to carry them out correctly.
20. One significant weakness was the absence of more systematic monitoring of the targeting process, which made it difficult to determine how well the system was meeting its goals. Generally, it is believed by all stakeholders that in terms of district targeting, the coverage rate has been good, with possibly 95 percent of vulnerable districts being included in the relief operation. There is less certainty at the division and sub-divisional levels that the targeting is accurate. The current PDM is not supplying this information in sufficient detail and needs improving.
21. The distribution and PDM systems were not in place from the onset of the emergency. Monitoring the input of food aid is an essential aspect of effective food management. The emergency was not sudden and the monitoring systems should have been established during the 2000 EMOP and then replicated for the current emergency.
22. The contents of the ration baskets is reasonable, with WFP providing in the GFD either 75 percent or 50 percent of daily caloric needs to the beneficiaries, assuming that some amount of the food intake can be met by the household itself.
23. Corn-soya blend (CSB) was provided to children under 5 and pregnant and lactating women in 2004/05 through a blanket supplementary feeding attached to the GFD. It was not added to the general ration (for the whole household) until 2006 and was given for only five months. Generally the SF distributions were the primary method for targeting this micronutrient-rich food, which is unfortunate because none of the other foods in the general food basket are considered appropriate for children under the age of 2. Further, there was high risk of micronutrient deficiencies amongst the arid-lands populations given the lack of fresh fruits and vegetables coupled by the decimation of livestock during the drought, which greatly reduced access to fresh milk and meat.
24. Another problem was the omission of iodized salt for many months of the EMOP, which is a concern given the projected high rates of iodine deficiency disease in parts of northern Kenya. Overall, salt was consistently provided in the pastoralist areas beginning in late 2005/early 2006 when 2,000 mt were purchased.



25. It is generally agreed that the GFD activity was successful in preventing loss of human life from starvation following the successive droughts in 2004 and 2005 and floods in 2006. Nevertheless, the limitations of emergency food relief, by itself and in isolation, are fully recognized.

⇒ *Supplementary feeding*

26. During the EMOP phases, WFP targeted 26 percent of the total beneficiaries, 20 percent of which were under 5 years and 6 percent pregnant and lactating women, with a ration of 300g/pp/day of CSB. Pipeline breaks were dealt with by skipping distributions or reducing rations.

27. In 2004, 1,162 mt (10 percent) were distributed against a planned 12,000 mt. In 2005, 6,400 mt (37 percent) were distributed against a planned 17,459 mt. In 2006, 22,448 mt (87 percent) were distributed against a planned 25,416 mt¹, primarily because beginning in May CSB was distributed as part of the general ration. Initial problems with the CSB pipeline were overcome and in 2006 there was sufficient CSB to run the programme.

28. While CSB pipeline issues contributed to the low levels of SF distribution, a far larger constraint was the lack of capacity of the local government, local Ministry of Health (MoH) and specialized agencies to target, manage and distribute the SF food items.

29. SF was an appropriate component of the emergency response. However, the impact of SF is based on the provision of an adequate general ration and on the presence of adequate water, sanitation and health care for the same vulnerable populations. While WFP succeeded in its primary role to resource and deliver the SF food inputs, the absence of critical complementary health inputs meant that the impact fell short of the component's goals.

30. Despite persistently high rates of malnutrition, as evidenced by the various area-based surveys in the last three years, there is not a functioning nutritional monitoring and surveillance system in Kenya and it is not, therefore, possible to accurately determine the malnutrition rate in each district, or to obtain accurate trend data on the seasonal and yearly changes in nutritional status of the population.

⇒ *Food-for-work activities*

31. FFW activities were included as part of the relief strategy in the EMOP. In practice, however, FFW activities are particularly difficult to implement during a major relief operation because of time-consuming demands to identify labour-intensive projects, organize community participation and, most importantly, provide tools, technical supplies and supervision. This was indeed the case in Kenya, where only a small number of the anticipated 950 FFW activities originally intended under this component of the EMOP were realized.

32. Some programme activities were implemented as part of the phase-out strategy of the GFD under the EMOP. In May 2005 a total of 136 projects ranging from water dams, pans, soil and water conservation, irrigation schemes, roads and spring protection were implemented in Laikipia, Isiolo, Narok, Machakos, Malindi and Mwingi districts. Water-based activities were more popular with communities (40 percent), followed by soil conservation (32 percent), roads (21 percent) and agriculture (7 percent).

¹ There really was no officially planned figure in 2006 because distributions were based on the evolving situation.



33. Technical support from the Government line ministries was rarely forthcoming, and WFP staff were generally too busy trying to manage a complex, life-saving relief operation to make any practical contributions to the FFW activities envisaged in the project document. In the cases where adequate non-food inputs and technical support were available, such as from German Agro Action in Machakos, the FFW was effective and indeed even preferred to GFD by the recipient community.
34. The evaluation team concluded that FFW is not an appropriate activity under a wide-scale emergency of this nature unless adequate technical and non-food support can be guaranteed. However, some communities preferred FFW activities to GFD.

⇒ *Expanded school feeding programme*

35. The ESFP component of EMOP 10374.0 was designed to offset the negative impact of drought on schooling (possible increased drop-out rates and decrease in attendance) in pockets of the semi-arid areas affected by drought and not covered by WFP's regular school feeding activities.
36. According to the original project document, the ESFP was to cover 544,000 children (250,000 girls and 294,000 boys) in 1,378 pre-primary and primary schools. Data collected in the 15 districts covered by the ESFP show that during the emergency period, enrolment and attendance rates at school actually increased. At the end of the third term of 2006 school year, a total of 563,854 children (275,171 girls and 288,683 boys) attended the targeted schools. The ESFP not only succeeded in preventing drop-out rates and kept children at school but also provided incentives for additional new enrolments.
37. However, schools benefiting from WFP food aid under the ESFP have to fulfil the same criteria as schools supported by the SFP. This includes provision of an adequate kitchen and storage and the commitment of the school management committee to supply cooks, firewood, water, etc. The appropriateness of an emergency intervention (whose duration is, by nature, limited to a few months, with modalities established to meet the requirements of a long-term development activity) is thus somewhat questionable.
38. The team believes that negative outcomes could be avoided through other intervention modalities that would help households face an emergency situation without creating long-term expectations and dependency. One example is the temporary provision of family take-home rations associated with food-for-assets (FFA)/FFW activities in support of recovery initiatives.
39. It is necessary to make a distinction between FFW as a general issue regarding the EMOP and FFW as associated to the school feeding activities. FFW in conjunction with school feeding was initiated with limited implementation (7,806 adult beneficiaries in 2004 and 14,175 in 2005). WFP and the Ministry of Education (MoE) jointly developed specific FFW guidelines for school feeding.² (These guidelines had not been circulated at the time of the evaluation.) The efforts by the country office to carry out the complementary FFW are in line with the "Thematic Evaluation of School Feeding in Emergency Situations" submitted to the Executive Board during the 2007 Annual Session, which recommends, "Where minimum conditions for ESF do not exist, WFP should prioritize actions to ensure that infrastructure will be put in place, for example through FFW or FFT."³

² Food for Work (FFW) Guidelines for the Implementation of School Feeding Infrastructure and Sustainability Project, January 2007.

³ WFP/EB.A/2007/7-A, 27 April 2007.



40. There will be many problems in realistically achieving a smooth exit strategy when WFP assistance to the ESFP ends. The team concluded that ESFP as implemented in Kenya is merely a “temporary feeding programme in the school”.

Development Activities – Country Programme 10264.0 (2004–2008)

41. Kenya CP 10264.0, endorsed by the Executive Board in October 2002, covers the period 2004–2008. The goal of the CP is to strengthen the capacity of hungry, poor households (especially those headed by women and children) to meet their food and nutrition needs on a sustainable basis and withstand external economic shocks and natural disasters, focussing on two main outcomes:
- improved access to food, health and nutrition practices and increased capacity of communities to rehabilitate/create and maintain assets that provide secure and sustainable livelihoods; and
 - enhanced sustainability of livelihoods for children (especially girls and orphans) of poor, food-insecure households through improved access to basic education and skills training.
42. WFP assistance under CP 10264.0 aims to assist an estimated 1,156,840 beneficiaries annually over the five-year period at an estimated total cost of US\$83.2 million. It focuses on increasing access to basic education for all (especially girls and orphans); improving the nutritional and health status of HIV/AIDS-affected households; and contributing to the achievement of sustainable livelihoods and reduced vulnerability to disasters and food insecurity of communities in the ASALs. The three activities of CP 10264.0 are in fact all carry-overs from the previous CP, although, as the 2002 Country Programme Evaluation noted, of the original three components in the 1999–2003 country programme only the SFP component had been active.
43. Activities are intended to concentrate in those areas of Kenya with chronic food insecurity, high rates of malnutrition and high prevalence of HIV/AIDS. In line with WFP’s Enhanced Commitments to Women, at least half of all primary schoolchildren assisted under the CP should be girls, 50 percent of benefits from food-for-asset activities should benefit women, and at least half of the members on food-distribution and asset-creation committees should be women.
44. The current CP has operational requirements of US\$96,515,858, but at the time of the evaluation only 61 percent of requirements had been pledged. This included an in-kind contribution from the Government of US\$9,915,000, or 10.3 percent of the total requirements.

⇒ Regular school feeding programme

45. The SFP has been the flagship of WFP assistance in Kenya since the 1980s. It is the largest WFP-supported SFP in the world, with over 1.1 million beneficiaries in 3,800 schools, accounting for 82 percent of the total CP resources. In addition, food aid is provided to 500 primary schools per year to undertake the improvement of facilities and school feeding sustainability initiatives. Malnourished children under 5 at early childhood development (ECD) centres supported by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) are also entitled to support from WFP; a deworming component is also being carried out in selected districts. The SFP was expected to empower parents by helping them build viable institutional mechanisms at the community level and become motivated and capable of continuing to send their children to school.



46. The achievements of the three immediate objectives of SFP are in line with one major conclusion of the CP mid-term evaluation: “There is little doubt that the school feeding activity has enabled hundreds of thousands of young Kenyans from extremely poor households in the ASAL areas of Kenya and in selected slum areas of Nairobi to receive some or all of a primary education and to benefit from improved nutritional intake.” Data from the assessment report prepared by WFP in 2007 indicate that in most districts where the SFP is implemented there has been a general increase in both gross enrolment rates (GER) and net enrolment rates (NER).
47. However, it is difficult to attribute this improvement to SFP alone because of both the effect of the national free primary education policy being implemented⁴ alongside SFP, and the impact of drought on nomadic populations. Therefore, appraisal of outcomes in this area is based upon the anecdotal perceptions of teachers, who almost always claim to have observed a positive change in the pupils’ attentiveness in class and pupils’ cognitive and learning abilities.
48. Until now, data collected on education indicators (mainly student enrolment and attendance) have not led to any in-depth analysis or impact assessment by either WFP or the MoE. The March 2007 assessment report for the regular SFP⁵ presents raw data that have not yet been conclusively analysed. Neither the MoE nor WFP has undertaken a comparative study of educational outcomes in WFP-supported versus non-supported schools. This is clear evidence of the weakness of both WFP and the MoE in the monitoring and evaluation area and of the need for capacity-building of staff in both.
49. In March 2007, the country office development unit produced an “Analysis of Key Education Indicators (2004–2006)” that presented raw data collected in 29 districts. In the absence of precise information some indicators (GER, NER) had not been calculated specifically for WFP-assisted schools but had been established on the basis of national figures produced by the MoE. Gender parity was calculated through comparing enrolment ratio based on enrolment numbers provided by the MoE, with monthly attendance data provided by district education offices. Data were incomplete and unreliable, particularly regarding the evolution of trends. Increase in completion rate is highly questionable; it is based on the assumption that a better capacity to concentrate and learn will be reflected in improved performance, but many other factors also affect performance. To be significant, such an exercise should be done for WFP-assisted schools compared to non-assisted schools in the same district. It is difficult to rely on quantitative indicators to assess the correlation between food aid and an improved capacity to concentrate and learn among boys and girls in WFP-assisted schools; appraisal of outcome in this area is based upon the subjective perceptions of teachers.
50. According to the CP document, appraisals should have been carried out for each CP activity to assess feasibility; ensure coherence, sustainability and linkages among the activities; and prepare activity summaries. Detailed operational plans should have been negotiated with the parties involved. These appraisals have not been conducted and the detailed activity summaries and operational plans promised in the approved CP project document have been replaced by a single overall Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP) for the period 2004–2008, signed by WFP and the Ministry of Finance (5 February 2004). As a result, there is widespread confusion among implementing staff regarding mutual

⁴ The Government of Kenya introduced free primary education (FPE) in January 2003, which saw national enrolment increase from 5.4 to 7.5 million children.

⁵ Kenya Country Programme. 2007. Analysis of Key Education Indicators (2004–2006), Regular School Feeding Programme in 29 Districts of Kenya (March).



obligations, durations, objectives and expected outcomes and the coherence of WFP's activities with other agencies' interventions has suffered.

51. Two years separated the approval of the CPAP and the issue of a draft *School Feeding Handbook* intended to provide detailed guidelines to carry out the implementation strategy. This draft handbook had not been finalized or circulated to the field and includes important changes to the document formally approved by WFP. The evaluation team appreciated the effort by the country office, which partly fills a gap created by the absence of a detailed activity summary.
52. Current SFP unit staffing does not meet the obligations agreed to by the Government as set out in the CPAP.⁶ Current staff is overextended and challenged by the complex transfer of so much food aid, submission of monthly stock movement reports and monitoring the programme. MoE has attributed staff shortage to the general civil service recruitment embargo in force since 1997.
53. WFP's monitoring of regular school feeding activities has not lived up to commitments elaborated in the CP planning documents. However, the team recognized that timely data collection in the ASAL districts is difficult because of distances, poor roads and the recent emergencies and insecurity situation. Many districts where WFP operates are remote and difficult to access, particularly during the rainy seasons. Security in the pastoral districts is volatile, requiring police escort for United Nations staff under the minimum operating security standards requirements. Only four development field monitors have been recently (October 2006) appointed by WFP to specifically monitor the implementation of SFP.
54. Considering the vast area covered by SFP and the huge number of WFP-supported schools to monitor (3,800), direct support costs (DSC) should fund more than the current six WFP field monitors. A recommendation from the "Thematic Evaluation of School Feeding in Emergencies" states: "Where possible, WFP should increase the number of field monitors to improve monitoring-related tasks, including data analysis."³
55. The team noted a general consensus among stakeholders that the regular SFP has been running without an in-depth revision for too long (more than 25 years). Only in some cases does the SFP address the most vulnerable populations; coverage has not significantly changed since the beginning of the programme. In order to be in accordance with findings from the most recent vulnerability analysis and mapping (VAM) survey and with the most recent data from the MoE statistics unit, the geographical targeting should have been revised.
56. The team also noted almost unanimous concern among stakeholders about the lack of an exit strategy in WFP's SFP activities. The team concurs there is reason for concern about achieving a smooth exit strategy and believes that, in recognition of the incompleteness of food assistance as stand-alone support to education, strong partnerships must be established now to ensure a sustainable phase-out.

⇒ *Nutrition and care of people affected by HIV/AIDS*

57. The CP operates five HIV/AIDS projects: the Transport Sector Initiative; the Academic Model for the Prevention and Treatment of HIV/AIDS (AMPATH); Busia District HIV/AIDS Infected Persons Assistance Programme; the Junior Farmer Fields and Life Schools in Bondo District; and Lea Toto Project for HIV-Positive Children in the Nairobi Slums. The five HIV/AIDS projects all use WFP food aid to support affected vulnerable

⁶ See Country Programme Action Plan 2004–2008, paragraph 85, page 21.



groups, specifically those HIV-affected households with orphans, elderly caregivers or people living with HIV/AIDS currently in a treatment programme who are acutely food-insecure. In the transport project WFP uses other direct operational costs (ODOC) funds for HIV/AIDS awareness training, helping WFP-contracted transport companies develop policies and programmes.

58. The impact of WFP food is tremendous, and allows for some degree of recovery for both those on anti-retroviral therapy (ART) and those not under treatment. Testimonies were heard from people who had been fully bedridden but after receiving food support were able to regain their livelihood activities and become productive. In some instances this was true even in the absence of complementary ART.
59. Despite the demonstrably successful impact of WFP assistance, this activity was seriously under-resourced by donors: fewer than 52,700 of the anticipated 112,460 beneficiaries had been reached. The AMPATH programme required substantial financial resources and therefore not all aspects of that programme may be replicable.
60. One serious criticism of the current HIV/AIDS programme is the lack of coordination with other United Nations agencies and government partners. Both the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) are actively involved in HIV/AIDS and could offer expertise, guidance and possibly joint funding if WFP activities were coordinated with these groups. There is some coordination with the Government, but the relationships could be strengthened to improve government buy-in. WFP must encourage enhanced government ownership and United Nations partnerships. Improved linkages between WFP and the Kenya Transporters Association on the transport sector activity could also strengthen the programme and contribute to a clear government policy on the issue.
61. There is no real sustainability or exit strategy built into these programmes. Each of the five will require a different type of transition strategy, and given the complicated nature of HIV/AIDS programming, clear benchmarks need to be established and strong partnerships created that will allow WFP to end direct food assistance.
62. It is important that the partners in the four food assistance programmes follow standard guidelines that take into account protein, energy and micronutrient needs of HIV/AIDS-affected people. This includes prevention of mother-to-child transmission (PMTCT) policy regulations regarding the distribution and use of breastmilk substitutes in WFP-supported programmes. The team found that the food basket given to groups supported by different cooperating partners varied widely, even if a standard version existed on paper. The Kenya national guidelines on HIV/AIDS and nutrition have just been revised and will guide future operations.
63. The evaluation concludes that assistance to people affected by HIV/AIDS is one of the most appropriate uses of WFP's resources in Kenya. This activity should no longer be a pilot component, but should instead become a major component of WFP interventions. While WFP should strive wherever possible to combine food aid with other inputs (treatment, social support, labour opportunities, and livelihood support) it should not refrain from providing assistance to HIV/AIDS-affected households or communities when other inputs are not available. Given the current resourcing environment, the WFP country office should sit with the National Alliance for Change and UNHIV/AIDS sector leaders to determine priorities and areas for collaboration and shared budgeting.



⇒ *Food-for-work activities/disaster preparedness facility*

64. This activity was designed to enable poor families in ten of the most vulnerable ASAL districts who depend on degraded natural resources for their food security to improve their food-security status and mitigate shocks of natural disasters through gaining and protecting assets and shifting to more sustainable livelihoods.
65. Disaster Preparedness Facility (DPF) activities were put on hold and the resources re-deployed for launching the EMOP in all the districts that had been initially identified for implementation of the DPF. The EMOP operation was massive in scope and its implementation called on all the resources that had been programmed for use under the DPF. This included the country office staff that were seconded to support EMOP implementation. For this reason, the team could not carry out an in-depth evaluation of this component of the CP and focused its efforts instead on the principle and design of the component.
66. Limited technical involvement of key ministries such as Agriculture and Livestock Development, and key United Nations partners such as FAO, has been a major weakness in the CP FFW component. The technical review committee, which already includes FAO, should be reactivated. Technical support is necessary to provide advice on viability of activities and on the environmental impact of the projects.
67. The team recommends that FFW and FFA activities suspended under EMOP be resumed, albeit with improved attention to critical complementary inputs. Appropriate technical support in terms of site selection and construction needs to be included; adequate tools and resources need to be given; and gender implications of proposed projects need to be addressed to ensure appropriate work conditions and project outcomes.

Cross-Cutting Issues

⇒ *Nutrition*

68. Nutrition is clearly a central aspect of both the CP and EMOP in terms of determining impact and meeting objectives. It is therefore critical that WFP be able to monitor the nutritional situation of the targeted population in order to assist in the analysis of programming goals and support targeting mechanisms.
69. WFP is in an unenviable situation of requiring nutrition information to analyse and support programming, but having to rely on other agencies to provide this information. WFP must develop ways to obtain the nutritional monitoring information needed to inform food aid programming. There was better collaboration between UNICEF and WFP in the spring of 2007, which could improve the flow and use of nutritional data.
70. Nutrition information is an essential piece of the puzzle to determine the impact of food aid. The analysis of high global acute malnutrition (GAM) rates in Kenya has tended to over-emphasize the absence of food, and thus the response tends to be overwhelmingly food-related, ignoring all of the associated factors that contribute to high malnutrition rates including water, sanitation, infant and child feeding practices, access to health services and child-care activities. Water is the top priority for many communities.
71. Although acceptance of commodities is requested in the PDM, there is very little known about the household use of the food. On average the CSB lasted one to two weeks, the oil three weeks, the pulses two weeks and the cereals between 15 and 28 days, depending on the amount of sharing that took place.



⇒ *Gender*

72. In 2004, a self-assessment phase of a survey on the Enhanced Commitments to Women (ECW) outlined changes the CP and EMOP needed to improve compliance with gender-based goals. It appears that very little progress has been made in the intervening two years, particularly in the areas of nutrition, FFW, women's control over relief food distribution, women's participation in decision-making and mainstreaming gender in human resources.⁷
73. One important gap was the lack of a gender focal person in recent months; the new focal point person had been waiting for terms of reference and a hand-over briefing. This gap had limited gender advocacy and planning.
74. The team found that while there was a commitment to number quotas, there was not a clear understanding of why the ECW improve programming outcomes and support for the beneficiary households. A detailed list of improvements still to be made may be found in the full technical report.

⇒ *Partnership*

75. The team found the country office to have generally very good relationships with its partners. Cooperating partners raised several issues regarding their relationship with WFP, including the dilemma they face in ensuring coverage of their fixed costs when WFP's payments to them rise and fall according to tonnages available for programming. For smaller NGOs without substantive budgets, lower-than-expected tonnages and unexpected delays in delivery can pose serious financial challenges. In accordance with operational directives governing the preparation of cooperating partner budgets, the country office has negotiated with a number of NGOs a compensation package to offset the impact of under-resourcing.
76. Another issue raised by several groups was that their relationship with WFP was not a true partnership, and there was not sufficient room to exchange ideas and programme goals. The Kenya country office is attempting to create a discussion forum to ensure the needs, issues and ideas of its partners are properly addressed.
77. With cooperating partner staff already overworked, agencies questioned the practicality, purpose and relevance of the PDM. While the PDM activity should be tightened, WFP has not done enough to convince its partners of the importance of the PDM and of its utility in also meeting partner reporting purposes.
78. WFP did not systematically evaluate the performance of its partners until 2007, when it completed the first EMOP partners' performance evaluation; it is difficult to understand why it was not undertaken earlier in the EMOP cycle.

⁷ See the full technical report of this evaluation for details.



⇒ *Connectedness of WFP development, emergency and recovery activities*

79. The team concluded that the three activities in the CP have no inter-connecting theme(s) and have been implemented without cross-cutting strategies. This lack of internal coherence continued even when the EMOP became operational in August 2004. There has since been a tendency by the country office to concentrate on the emergency to the detriment of certain CP objectives.
80. The ESFP under the EMOP has not been an integral part of the regular SFP. Arrangements in WFP for the simultaneous ESFP and SFP activities were managed independently of each other. Likewise, the School Feeding Unit within the MoE was not closely associated with the ESFP; its principal contribution consisted only of providing lists of schools in the divisions identified by the Kenya Food Security Steering Group (KFSSG) as vulnerable and food-insecure.
81. While WFP covers all landside transport, storage and handling (LTSH) costs under the ESFP, the Government is required to cover half of them under the regular SFP. It is uncertain whether the Government will have the budgetary capacity to take over schools covered by the ESFP once the EMOP is over.
82. The SFP Unit informed the team that it was not directly involved in the selection of schools under ESFP and was not monitoring education outcomes. It is thus not in a position to provide an education impact assessment of the ESFP. The WFP EMOP Unit attempts to assess the impact of the ESFP through monitoring school enrolment and attendance indicators.
83. A distinct culture of individual programme management has developed so that there is little consultation and coordination between the EMOP staff and the CP staff at either the country office or sub-office level. A more integrated programme would have systematic joint monitoring of all WFP programme activities in each district by all out-posted sub-office staff. It is a weakness of the staffing structures of the country office that WFP programme activities are not considered to be the concern of all staff members.

CONCLUSIONS

84. The evaluation team was very favourably impressed by the dedication and efficiency of WFP staff, the effective management of widespread and recurrent natural disasters in the ASALs, the close and mutually supportive working relations with the Government at all levels and the design and implementation of the CP. There is an overwhelming need to continue WFP support to Kenya, particularly to the communities devastated by natural disasters and, equally importantly, to those affected by HIV. At the same time there is an urgent need to consider exit strategies for the well-established SFP.
85. WFP is reliant on agencies such as UNICEF and specialist NGOs to provide nutrition information and technical expertise to assess the needs of food-insecure populations and the nutritional impact of food aid upon them. If this information is not available, WFP is not able to target its resources most effectively nor demonstrate the impact of its interventions. The country office and the evaluation team have been asked to confirm nutrition-based outcomes in the absence of data necessary to prove them.
86. Under EMOP 10374.0, WFP was generally very successful in securing and distributing large amounts of food aid, contributing to the stabilization of nutritional status for most and preventing a catastrophic loss of human life. Without this assistance, the impact on household livelihoods and food security from huge livestock losses could have led to a



massive humanitarian disaster. Over 2,000 widely-dispersed distribution points enabled drought-affected people to weather these shocks in their home villages, keeping other social structures intact, without the need to migrate to relief camps. Food assistance also helped many households to retain their remaining assets.

87. The lack of stronger partnerships especially within the United Nations community is generally recognized as the weakest aspect of the long-term effectiveness and sustainability of WFP projects in Kenya. WFP and partners need to recognize the limitations of the impact of the food aid if it is not complemented with appropriate support in health, water, sanitation, and infrastructure sectors.
88. Operations under the first two basic development components of the CP activities had been generally successful in reaching their respective objectives. The regular school feeding activity had enabled huge numbers of young Kenyans from extremely poor households to receive at least some primary education and to benefit from improved nutritional intake. WFP's HIV/AIDS programming in Kenya was extremely relevant and one of the most appropriate uses of WFP's resources. Finally, although disaster preparedness activities were put on hold to prioritize immediate life-saving activities, the conceptual design of the DPF was relevant to current needs, and should recommence immediately.
89. The current CP is a collection of project activities carried over from the previous CP. The disjointed nature of WFP's regular (SFP) and extended (ESFP) school feeding activities and possible negative effects of this strategy were causes of concern. In the absence of long-term planning and global vision, the termination of the present EMOP will once again result in the interruption of school feeding for vulnerable children with no other alternatives. Such important challenges should be taken into consideration for follow-on WFP intervention.
90. This should lead to an in-depth reflection for WFP on the effective role and goal of school feeding programmes in emergencies, which require a participatory approach involving WFP, MoE, other government departments, parents and cooperating partners.
91. Government leadership and coordination is crucial to the success of developmental, relief and recovery programming. WFP must look towards developing a programme plan that both supports development activities and assists the Government in preparing for future emergencies. Continued WFP participation is necessary in policy dialogue, the development of vulnerability and needs assessment methods and CBTD, and in training to improve the Government's logistics capacities to manage future emergencies.
92. There is a strong need for better coordination among United Nations agencies in Kenya. The previous CP evaluation in 2002 drew attention to the difficulties of improving partnerships and coordinating relief and development programmes in Kenya. As one donor told the team, "We talk about partnerships, but don't do it". The present evaluation must report the same conclusion.



ANNEX: RECOMMENDATION MATRIX AND MANAGEMENT RESPONSE

Recommendations	Action by	Management response and action taken
EMERGENCY OPERATION (EMOP 10374.0)		
1. The Evaluation Team supports the country office's intention to continue providing relief and recovery assistance and encourages the country office to re-establish the DPF component of the CP as quickly as possible.	Country office	The country office is preparing a PRRO expected to start in mid-2008 that includes relief assistance in the ASAL areas recovering from drought and recovery assistance through asset creation to increase households' resilience to shocks. These activities will build on the efforts of the DPF.
General food distribution		
2. The country office and its cooperating partners should encourage and assist the Government to streamline procedures for releasing results of bi-annual needs assessments.	Country office	WFP/VAM has worked with KFSSG to streamline the assessment process to two months – the minimum possible given the nature and scope of assessment and the need for consensus on findings. The country office and Government are considering extending emergency relief cycles by a month to avoid breaks in distributions.
3. To reduce the food aid focus of KFSM programming and ensure its continued credibility and effectiveness, the country office should relinquish its responsibilities as co-chair while remaining an active participant in all relevant technical activities of the group.	Country office	WFP and OCHA funded a Government/KFSM Review that arrived at the same conclusion. The country office concurs and is awaiting endorsement by the Government.
4. The country office should support the inclusion of nutritional information in needs assessments to better inform the targeting of food aid. Objective information on the impact of shocks on educational activities should also be collected in order to better inform WFP targeting.	Country office	The country office participates in KFSSG's health and nutrition sector and has helped formulate guidelines on health and nutrition for assessments aimed at ensuring the collection and use of nutrition data; nutrition data was used in the long rains assessment. The country office will continue work via the KFSSG and the Education Working Group to encourage the use of nutrition data to inform decisions on educational programming.
5. The country office should continue to employ and develop CBTD, improving procedures for the selection of relief committee members, the development of registration lists, and the fair, transparent handling of beneficiary grievances.	Country office	Agreed. CBTD has been an effective tool, but improvements in its application are possible. Dealing with 2,000 food distribution points and an equal number of relief committees requires vigilance and sensitization by WFP, with support of cooperating partners.



ANNEX: RECOMMENDATION MATRIX AND MANAGEMENT RESPONSE

Recommendations	Action by	Management response and action taken
6. The country office should continue efforts underway to strengthen distribution and post-distribution monitoring processes, including prioritizing information needs, simplifying data collection and reporting processes, improving and maintaining capacities and sensitizing partners to the importance of such monitoring in order to improve programming.	Country office	Agreed. The country office has examined the PDM tools and will simplify processes to make tools more practical, thereby economizing on resources and staff time. Sample size and data collected will be reduced and household welfare information will be collected twice per year. A slimmer PDM is expected to provide sufficient and reliable information. PDM tools will be harmonized with CP monitoring tools to facilitate exchange of information.
7. Given the potential of micronutrient deficiencies in the arid regions of Kenya, CSB should be included in all of the food baskets that cater to women and young children, including the GFD, FFW, and ECD.	Country office	CSB is in the current food basket distributed in arid districts under the EMOP. It is also provided to children in ECD centres in five arid districts under the regular SFP and to children under 5, pregnant/lactating women and sick members of HIV/AIDS-affected households. In the proposed PRRO, CSB will be included for the arid districts in three components (GFD, FFA and SF).
8. The country office should ensure that iodized salt is provided in ration baskets wherever possible.	Country office	Agreed. The country office is working to ensure that iodized salt is provided in the ration basket. Under the proposed PRRO it is included in all rations provided in arid areas (GFD and FFA).
9. The country office should revise its targeting practices to account for intra- and inter-household sharing wherever they are prevalent. Consideration should be given to “blanket targeting of GFD” in the most vulnerable communities to support all households (and household members) equally and reduce the dilution of rations through sharing.	Country office	The country office participates in semi-annual assessments and has helped define and improve CBTD. However, it believes that blanket distributions go against the principles of CBTD and would undermine the credibility of stakeholders. Instead it will endeavour to reduce humanitarian risks to vulnerable households by mobilizing sufficient resources and will work through partnerships to increase the impact of food assistance.
Supplementary feeding		
10. WFP should support capacity-building efforts among the Government and partner agencies to ensure that they can appropriately implement SF programmes.	Country office	UNICEF has the lead mandate on nutrition issues. The country office will continue to provide food and logistic support while UNICEF provides training and equipment to MoH. The MoH, with support from UNICEF, will identify vulnerable areas for extended outreach, in order to maximize coverage under SF. The country office will continue to support regular food security assessments that identify the most food-insecure areas for GFD and inform geographic targeting of SF.
11. WFP should promote and support SF programmes in areas of need as indicated by regular assessments.		
Expanded school feeding programme		
12. WFP should ensure follow-on school feeding activities until a general reassessment and re-targeting of regular school feeding assistance in Kenya can be completed.	Country office	ESFP targets schools in districts where household food security is particularly impacted by climatic shocks; ESFP activities are scaled down when food security conditions in these districts normalizes. Regular school feeding activities are targeted at chronic food insecurity. The country office will re-assess enrolment and attendance rates following ESFP phase-out in selected districts as part of the regular monitoring of the school feeding activities. Regular school feeding assistance will be re-targeted under the next CP (2009-2013).



ANNEX: RECOMMENDATION MATRIX AND MANAGEMENT RESPONSE

Recommendations	Action by	Management response and action taken
DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES – COUNTRY PROGRAMME 10264.0 (2004–2008)		
Regular school feeding programme		
13. WFP and MoE must reassess the eligibility of all schools and retarget regular SFP to ensure adequate targeting.	Country office	Agreed. The country office will work with the Government to agree retargeting objectives and criteria. Resources will be mobilized to carry out a re-targeting exercise before commencement of the next CP in 2009, in the ASAL districts and selected urban unplanned settlements.
14. To improve the performance of the Government SFP Unit, WFP and the MoE should review and agree on the duties of the Unit, assess its present capacity to perform these duties and undertake critical resourcing, staffing and capacity-building activities. In particular, data collection and analysis to inform monitoring and evaluation (M&E) should be improved, possibly with the participation of the statistics division within MoE.	Country office	The Government is committed to increasing budget allocations to SFP in 2008/09. The Ministry and the country office have identified capacity constraints in areas of programme management, logistics, monitoring and reporting; the MoE is considering recruiting three additional officers for the SFP Unit. The country office has prepared training programmes to implement in 2008 and will work with the MoE to integrate SFP data collection within the Education Management Information System (EMIS).
15. The MoE and WFP should review and clarify SFP agreements on coordination, institutional arrangements, project duration and exit strategies. 16. The country office and MoE should strive to reactivate the Activity Steering Committee and finalize and distribute <i>The School Feeding Handbook</i> without further delay.	Country office	In preparation for the next CP, the country office and MoE have renewed discussions on strategic and operational issues, including exit strategies. These issues include the need for increased government budgetary allocations, school sustainability initiatives, community participation in school feeding, home grown approaches and increased involvement of the private sector. Other fora coordinating education activities include the Kenya Education Sector Support Programme (KESSP), of which WFP is a member, and a programme review committee that meets quarterly. An activity steering committee risks duplicating efforts and failing to make food aid an integrated part of the sector, counter to efforts to address recommendation 17 (below). The handbook is expected to be produced by the Kenya Institute of Education in December 2007 and provided to schools in January 2008.
17. WFP should work with those partners supporting education sector development to ensure that food aid becomes a fully integrated part of any sector development programme and provides a valuable contribution to improved educational attainments.	Country office	The country office is working within the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and is part of the KESSP. WFP also works on joint programmes with UNICEF, MoE, MoH, the World Health Organization (WHO) and private-sector partners to implement health, hygiene and nutrition activities in targeted schools.



ANNEX: RECOMMENDATION MATRIX AND MANAGEMENT RESPONSE

Recommendations	Action by	Management response and action taken
Nutrition and care of people affected by HIV/AIDS		
18. WFP should make HIV/AIDS programming a major component of its programme in Kenya. It is important that scale-up be targeted to food-insecure individuals or households, especially those receiving ART.	Country office	The country office and the Government are working to expand food support to ART patients identified as food-insecure. The next CP will include an integrated programme of care, nutrition support and strengthening of livelihoods for targeted households. The country office will continue to advocate for the resources necessary and to increase awareness of the importance of household rations for food-insecure households affected by HIV/AIDS.
CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES		
Nutritional monitoring		
19. WFP should redouble efforts to ensure the availability of the basic nutritional information required for effective food aid programming.	Country office	The country office had a highly qualified nutritionist from 2005 until 2007; a successor was recruited in June 2007. WFP is working with UNICEF, MoH and NASCOP to implement its food aid programmes, which include collection of nutrition information for monitoring and planning. These partnerships include: a) MoH/WFP/UNICEF partnership to implement SFPs in arid areas targeting children under 5 and pregnant and lactating women; and b) proposed MoH/WFP/NASCOP partnership to implement nutrition support programme for HIV/AIDS patients in HIV high-prevalence areas.
Gender		
20. The country office should redouble efforts to meet ECW commitments, especially those weaknesses identified in the 2004 ECW survey that have not been effectively addressed to date.	Country office	The country office continues to educate communities on the importance of women's involvement in relief committees, and their equal participation regarding food aid decisions at the community and household levels. EMOP PDM reports in 2006 and 2007 confirm high levels of women's participation in decision-making and their lead role in household food aid management. The CP HIV/AIDS monitoring reports show that women occupy 76% of leadership positions in all food management committees in the home-based care project.



ANNEX: RECOMMENDATION MATRIX AND MANAGEMENT RESPONSE

Recommendations	Action by	Management response and action taken
Partnership and coherence		
21. The country office should re-examine the internal and external coherence of its activities in Kenya, identify insufficiencies and elaborate a practical plan for improving coherence.	Country office	The short-term nature of the EMOP hampered harmonization of the programmes. The country office is now in transition from the EMOP to the proposed PRRO and is preparing a new CP to start in 2009. A plan is being developed to achieve connectedness and coherence at Nairobi level and in the field. The PRRO and CP are consistent with the UNDAF and government policies. For internal coherence, the PRRO will be guided by WFP's policy "From Crisis to Recovery" and the CP will be guided by WFP's policy "Enabling Development". Components in the PRRO and CP will be distinct from each other but linkages will be sought to create synergy.
22. The country office should continue to monitor the performance and compliance of its cooperating partners and take action where deficiencies exist. It should welcome partners' participation in this process.	Country office	Agreed. The country office produced a joint tool for all programmes, piloted by the EMOP in March, which includes qualitative and quantitative indicators of the cooperating partners' performance. The programmes agreed to evaluate their partners at the end of each phase of the programme, or twice a year. The tool has been shared with all partners and response has been positive; the CP has used the tools to evaluate HIV/AIDS partners. The country office will analyse the findings of the evaluation; issues identified will be discussed during programme coordination meetings between partners and the Department of Social Services.



ACRONYMS USED IN THE DOCUMENT

ALRMP	Arid Lands Resource Management Programme
AMPATH	Academic Model for the Prevention and Treatment of HIV/AIDS
ART	anti-retroviral therapy
ASAL	arid and semi-arid land
CBTD	community-based targeting and distribution
CP	country programme
CPAP	Country Programme Action Plan
CSB	corn-soya blend
DFID	Department for International Development (United Kingdom)
DPF	Disaster Preparedness Facility
DSC	direct support costs
DSG	district steering groups
ECD	early childhood development
ECW	Enhanced Commitments to Women
EMIS	Education Management Information System
EMOP	emergency operation
ESFP	expanded school feeding programme
FFA	food for assets
FFW	food for work
GAM	global acute malnutrition
GER	gross enrolment rates
GFD	general food distribution
KESSP	Kenya Education Sector Support Programme
KFSM	Kenya Food Security Meeting
KFSSG	Kenya Food Security Steering Group
LTSH	landside transport, storage and handling
MoE	Ministry of Education
MoH	Ministry of Health
MUAC	mid-upper arm circumference
NASCOP	National AIDS and STI Control Programme
NER	net enrolment rates
NGO	non-governmental organization
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs



ODOC	other direct operational costs
PDM	post-distribution monitoring
PMTCT	prevention of mother-to-child transmission
PRRO	protracted relief and recovery operation
RC	relief committee
SF	supplementary feeding
SFP	school feeding programme
UNAIDS	Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
VAM	vulnerability analysis and mapping
WHO	World Health Organization