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Evaluation Reports

**For consideration**

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## **Annual Evaluation Report, 2016**

### **Executive Summary**

This is the first Annual Evaluation Report produced under the Evaluation Policy (2016–2021).

Part 1 presents synthesized findings and lessons from evaluation reports in three sections: the first synthesis covers evaluations of Level 3 corporate emergency responses to severe, large-scale humanitarian crises. Most of the evidence is derived from the reports of WFP's Office of Evaluation, but it is set against the backdrop of findings from two other major 2016 synthesis reports from across the wider humanitarian system.

Reflecting the importance of capacity development in the global dialogue around the Sustainable Development Goals and the Zero Hunger Challenge, the second synthesis highlights findings from a global evaluation of the Policy on Capacity Development and evidence relating to this theme from country-specific evaluations.

The third synthesis, of country-specific evaluations of WFP's work in diverse contexts, draws other lessons that are particularly relevant to the Integrated Road Map, WFP's internal transformation launched in 2017.

Part 2 reports on developments in WFP's evaluation function and performance against the policy outcomes.

Part 3 presents an outlook for the evaluation function in relation to current opportunities and challenges.

### **Overarching Lessons from Part 1**

Building on WFP's strengths is increasingly important in the era of the 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals. Drawing from all the synthesized evaluations presented in Part 1, the summary below highlights overarching lessons for consideration by senior management.

Once again, the evaluations confirmed WFP's strengths in emergency response, which continued to form the bulk of programme expenditures. The evaluations confirmed WFP's ability to respond rapidly to large-scale, sudden-onset emergencies, including the ability to transition rapidly from developmental programming to emergency response, often in extremely challenging contexts. The value of a clear

*In line with the Evaluation Policy (2016–2021) (WFP/EB.2/2015/4-A/Rev.1), to respect the integrity and independence of evaluation findings some language contained in this report may not be standard WFP terminology; please direct any requests for clarification to the WFP Director of Evaluation.*

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strategic framework in all contexts and the importance of planning for flexibility were clearly evidenced – both in cases where these were present and in those where they were not.

Whereas previous evaluations assessed progress in WFP's ongoing shift from implementer to enabler – as set out in the Strategic Plan (2014–2017) – the 2016 evaluations provided insights into the evolution of WFP's ability to move fluidly between implementing and enabling, using a range of activities and transfer modalities to respond to shocks in countries where development and humanitarian needs are constantly shifting. This appears to affirm WFP's strategic reorientation under the Strategic Plan (2017–2021). However, it is clear that highly demanding emergency responses take precedence over all other work. Some evaluations reported this prioritization as positive, while in other cases it was reported as having had negative consequences on work to address chronic and protracted needs. There is room for better integration of emergency response with approaches that contribute to sustainable hand-over strategies, but have slower returns.

This challenge was noted prominently in the policy evaluation of the Capacity Development Policy Update, which provided a timely assessment of progress in supporting national capacity development in WFP's areas of proven expertise. The relevance of WFP initiatives in this area is mixed. The evaluation emphasized the need for a more coherent corporate strategy and associated tools, with a time-bound transition team to manage WFP's evolution in this area of critical importance for the SDG era. The policy evaluation findings were largely corroborated by country-level evaluations.

The 2030 Agenda emphasizes the importance of partnerships to achieve progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals. Evaluations showed that overall, WFP's work in partnerships appears to be improving, but they revealed a mixed picture regarding collaboration and synergy among United Nations agencies, and relationships with a range of other actors. On the other hand, WFP's valued role in providing a platform for common services<sup>1</sup> in humanitarian response is strongly evident. The response to the Ebola crisis generated valuable new insights regarding the potential for partnerships across sectors, and the possibilities for and limitations to adapting WFP's tools and systems to respond to a major health crisis in collaboration with health system actors, while trying to meet food security needs.

Needs assessments emerged as an area for serious attention at both extremes of the spectrum: targeting in acute emergencies; and assessment of longer-term institutional capacity needs. Weaknesses in the evidence base for programme design were also signalled more broadly in a significant number of country-level evaluations. Findings on gender remained mixed, ranging from gender-blindness to evidence of transformative gains in five evaluations. Positive effects of the 2015 Gender Policy and associated tools were becoming visible in some countries.

The 2016 cohort of evaluations highlighted the deep, systemic organizational challenges that WFP's transformative Integrated Road Map has been designed to address, including the ability to: i) measure the achievement of outcomes and causal linkages from activities up the results chain to impact, alongside other actors – monitoring and evaluation systems; ii) promote sustainability of the effects of WFP's work and hand-over strategies; and iii) balance WFP's funding model and short-term programme financing.

WFP's staff underpin the potential for success through the Integrated Road Map. Two years after approval of the WFP People Strategy, evaluations highlighted continuing challenges in: i) rapid deployment and continuity of WFP staffing in volatile, insecure contexts; and ii) enhancing WFP's internal capacity to support and facilitate national capacity development in core areas, including emergency preparedness. Significant shortcomings in these areas had negative effects on operational efficiency and strengthening of emergency rosters and rapid deployment systems. Longer-term investments in mobilizing and developing national staff capacity for emergency response, supported by well-integrated knowledge management systems, should remain a priority.

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<sup>1</sup> The common services platform was introduced to enhance air transport capacity, emergency telecommunications and urgently required logistics support.

## **WFP's Evaluation Function – Part 2**

WFP's Evaluation Policy (2016–2021) aims to strengthen WFP's contribution to ending global hunger by making evaluation an integral part of all WFP's work. Progress was made throughout 2016 in establishing a highly integrated model of centralized evaluation and demand-led decentralized evaluation.

The Corporate Evaluation Strategy and Charter were finalized, completing the foundational documents for the phased evolution of the evaluation function. The normative framework for decentralized evaluations and quality assurance systems were completed and launched. Evaluation planning and resourcing are embedded in WFP's Strategic Plan, Policy on Country Strategic Plans, Financial Framework and Corporate Results Framework. Under the leadership of the Chief of Staff, an Evaluation Function Steering Group was established comprising senior management from throughout WFP. Six regional evaluation officers were recruited and WFP's community of practice for evaluation was expanded.

An initial set of key performance indicators was established to measure progress towards Evaluation Policy outcomes. These indicate that evaluation coverage is as expected in the first year of policy implementation, and in view of the commitment to increasing resourcing through to 2021. Indicators of evaluation use are already reasonably high, reflecting solid scores on post-hoc quality assessment. Further indicators will be added during 2017.

## **Evaluation Outlook – Part 3**

Overall, the new evaluation function is well positioned to generate better evidence and contribute to learning at all levels to meet Member States' expectations and the commitment of WFP leadership to enhancing evidence-based decision-making.

In this major transition period for WFP's evaluation function, the Integrated Road Map presents important opportunities to strengthen evaluation coverage and use. Close attention will be required to ensure that WFP is working consistently towards coverage norms and provisions for resourcing, accountabilities and impartiality; and making progress in fostering and embedding an evaluation culture into decision-making and practice at all levels of WFP.

## **Draft decision\***

The Board takes note of “Annual Evaluation Report, 2016” (WFP/EB.A/2017/7-A\*) and the management response in WFP/EB.A/2017/7-A/Add.1, and encourages further action on the recommendations, taking into account considerations raised by the Board during its discussion.

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\* This is a draft decision. For the final decision adopted by the Board, please refer to the Decisions and Recommendations document issued at the end of the session.

## Part 1: Findings and Lessons Learned from Evaluations

### 1.1 Introduction

1. Part 1 of this Annual Evaluation Report presents synthesized findings and lessons from evaluation reports in three sections (Table 1). Overarching lessons drawn from all three sections are presented in the Executive Summary.
2. In 2016, humanitarian actors renewed resolve to create transformative change and more than a dozen new partnerships and initiatives were formed to this end. The lessons from the following syntheses may contribute to broader learning in light of this intent (Table 1).

**TABLE 1: EVALUATIONS INCLUDED IN THE SYNTHESSES**

Evaluation type	Evaluation title	Reference period
Country portfolio evaluations (CPE)	Iraq	2010–2015
	Sri Lanka	2011–2015
	Mauritania	2011–2015
	Burundi	2011–2015
Policy	Capacity Development Policy Update	2009–2015
Level 3 emergency response	WFP’s Ebola Crisis Response: Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone	2013–2015
Evaluation synthesis	Syria Coordinated Accountability and Lesson Learning (CALL)	2011–2015
	Synthesis of findings of inter-agency humanitarian evaluations (IAHEs) of Level 3 responses in the Central African Republic, in South Sudan and to Typhoon Haiyan	2013–2015
Synthesis of year-3 operation evaluations (mid-2015 to mid-2016)	Afghanistan protracted relief and recovery operation (PRRO) 200447	2014–2016
	Bhutan development project (DEV) 200300	2014–2018
	Côte d’Ivoire DEV 200465	2014–2016
	Egypt country programme (CP) 200238	2013–2017
	Ethiopia PRRO 200700	2015–2018
	Gambia PRRO 200557	2013–2015
	Lesotho CP 200369	2013–2016
	Liberia PRRO 200550	2013–2016
	Nicaragua CP 200434	2013–2016
	Niger PRRO 200583	2014–2016
	Regional – El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua – PRRO 200490	2014–2016
	Rwanda PRRO 200744	2015–2016
	São Tomé and Príncipe DEV 200295	2012–2016
Senegal CP 200249	2012–2016	
Ukraine emergency programme (EMOP) 200765	2014–2016	

3. Section 1.2 presents a synthesis of 2016 evaluations of Level 3 corporate emergency responses covering some of the world's most severe humanitarian crises. It complements the 2015 Annual Evaluation Report synthesis on WFP's strategic and operational emergency preparedness and response work. Most of the evidence is from the reports of WFP's Office of Evaluation (OEV), but it is set against the backdrop of findings from two other major 2016 synthesis reports covering evaluations from across the wider humanitarian system, some of which were completed earlier.<sup>2</sup>
4. Reflecting the importance of capacity development in the global dialogue around the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the Zero Hunger Challenge, Section 1.3 highlights findings from a global evaluation of WFP's Capacity Development Policy Update and relevant evidence from country-specific evaluations.
5. Section 1.4 synthesizes country-specific evaluations of WFP's work in diverse contexts and draws other lessons that are particularly relevant to the Integrated Road Map, launched in 2017 to provide the tools for WFP to demonstrate its commitment to achieving the SDGs and ending global hunger.

## **1.2 Level 3 Emergency Responses**

### ***Background***

6. In 2016, WFP's performance in two of six Level 3 emergency responses was evaluated. The crises were very different.
7. In Iraq, an escalation of instability and violence resulted in 10 million people needing humanitarian assistance in 2016.<sup>3</sup> WFP's Iraq country portfolio, which had focused on capacity development in a middle-income setting, was adapted to prioritize food assistance for internally displaced persons.
8. The Ebola crisis that hit parts of West Africa in 2014 and 2015 triggered WFP's first large-scale engagement in a public health-driven emergency. Following the World Health Organization's (WHO's) declaration of an international health emergency, WFP issued its own Level 3 emergency declaration and response, providing food assistance to infected and affected households and communities, and a platform for common services for the United Nations system and other actors.
9. Also in 2016, two major syntheses of evidence from humanitarian evaluations, beyond but including WFP's work, were published. As a backdrop to the WFP evaluation reports included in this Annual Evaluation Report, these syntheses help to frame WFP's performance in wider responses to some of the world's most severe humanitarian crises. The synthesis of findings from IAHEs brought together lessons from three system-wide evaluations of Level 3 responses to Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines (2014), the crisis in the Central African Republic (2016) and the South Sudan emergency (2015). The second synthesis – the "Syria CALL synthesis"<sup>4</sup> – covered evaluative material related to the Syrian regional crisis and included a gap analysis.

### ***Activation***

10. Overall, international Level 3 declarations have helped to raise the profile of major crises and supported the swift mobilization of human and financial resources. WFP's evaluations assessed its Level 3 responses in Iraq and in Ebola-affected parts of West Africa as timely and successful.

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<sup>2</sup> The Syria CALL synthesis and the synthesis of findings from IAHEs of Level 3 emergency responses.

<sup>3</sup> 2016 Humanitarian Response Plan.

<sup>4</sup> The Syria Coordinated Accountability and Lesson Learning (CALL) Synthesis and Gap Analysis.

11. The response to the Ebola crisis generated some important learning: corporate guidelines and procedures were for the most part adequate, relevant and flexible enough to be adapted effectively to a health crisis; the need for a clear operational chain of command and related reporting lines was signalled; and the evaluation noted that WFP's Risk Appetite Statement (2016) had been revised in response to the crisis, institutionalizing clearer roles and responsibilities at all levels.

### *Speed of response*

12. While system-wide international action sometimes experienced delays, WFP's rapid response once a system-wide Level 3 emergency was activated was praised in both the Syria CALL synthesis and the OEV evaluation of the Ebola crisis. In both cases, rapid response was linked to the corporate risk appetite and willingness to engage. WFP's management of risks was described as "exceptional" during the Ebola crisis response. WFP's supply chain capacity procured an unprecedented extensive portfolio of goods and services rapidly, at scale and while implementing food-assistance activities, including in high-risk contamination areas. In Iraq, delays and pipeline breaks were experienced in all components, but the rapid-response mechanism was valued for its immediate effects.

### *Strategic positioning*

13. In evaluations of its responses to the Iraq and Ebola crises WFP was commended for taking the necessary strategic decisions – despite limited reliable and up-to-date evidence – when scaling up rapidly from relatively small-scale operations to Level 3 emergencies. In Iraq, WFP successfully realigned its portfolio to respond to immediate humanitarian needs while introducing more flexible support modalities. WFP's response to the Ebola crisis was equally flexible and also required a mind-shift from a food-insecurity entry point to a health-driven response. WFP's "care, contain and protect" framework was found to be highly effective and proved fundamental to successful scale-up and later scale-down.

### *Partnerships and coordination<sup>5</sup>*

14. The IAHE synthesis pointed out that an inter-agency response constitutes a set of distinct organizational actions that are harmonized and coordinated to varying degrees. While the United Nations response to Typhoon Haiyan (2013–2014) was relatively well coordinated, harmonization was much weaker in the Central African Republic (2013–2015) and South Sudan (2014). The Syria CALL synthesis found that United Nations agencies in the Syrian regional response focused mainly on their own operational responses.
15. Generally, the evaluations found WFP's partnerships with United Nations agencies in emergency responses to have worked well, including the new partnership with WHO in the Ebola crisis. In that case, WFP's leadership of the logistics cluster was "exemplary", with its professionalism, cooperation and willingness to seek solutions widely praised. At the same time, WFP made significant contributions towards the United Nations Delivering as One initiative, with the regional bureau providing leadership and coordination that helped to define the overall response architecture and facilitate the regionally coordinated response. In Iraq, despite shortcomings in United Nations system-wide coordination, WFP aligned its strategies with those of with agencies such as the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA).
16. Partnerships with cooperating partners were more mixed. While WFP's flexibility, diversity and agility for engaging in new and non-traditional partnerships during the Ebola crisis were praised, the need for a more participatory and inclusive approach – for example to making changes to rations – was noted in Iraq.

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<sup>5</sup> The evaluation of WFP's Corporate Partnership Strategy (2014–2017) will be presented at EB.A/2017.

### *Aligning with national responses*

17. Evaluations found that WFP formed strong partnerships with governments in its responses to crises in Iraq and countries affected by the Ebola outbreak. The Ebola response was fully integrated into national response structures.
18. By contrast, inter-agency syntheses point to variable alignment of United Nations emergency responses with national efforts. In the Philippines, the United Nations initially tended to by-pass national systems and it took time for parallel systems to converge. Engagement with governments in both the Central African Republic and South Sudan was limited because of governance and capacity deficits.
19. Evaluations highlighted potential tensions related to maintaining close alignment with governments, especially in conflict-related emergencies. The evaluation of WFP's response in Iraq and the Syria CALL synthesis, which includes the evaluation of WFP's response to the Syrian regional crisis, emphasize the challenges of balancing acquiring access, which often requires close alignment with government, with ensuring operational independence.

### *Human resources*

20. Both inter-agency syntheses found challenges in ensuring adequate human resources for Level 3 responses to five concurrent crises, noting staffing gaps in certain key roles and a heavy reliance on internal and external surge deployments. The IAHE synthesis pointed to an apparent lack of dedicated, flexibly deployable standing capacity for emergency response in some of the largest United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations.
21. WFP's own evaluations in 2016 reflected these constraints. Despite activation of the Emergency Response Roster, timely and consistent mobilization of staff with the right experience and skills was challenging in both Iraq and the Ebola response.
22. In Iraq, the lack of essential staff in vulnerability analysis and mapping (VAM) and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) positions limited the country office's capacities in these areas. Staffing gaps negatively affected operational efficiency, contributing to inconsistent approaches and decision-making and reducing operational momentum.
23. Early implementation of the Ebola Deployment Task Force aimed to achieve flexible and rapid deployment of staff in areas affected by the epidemic, but the health measures needed to protect staff also impeded swift deployment. Fear was also a major disincentive for staff.

### *Evidence gaps and monitoring*

24. Evidence gaps were a recurring feature of the syntheses and evaluations. A lack of information about the humanitarian needs of refugees and host communities was noted in the Syria CALL synthesis and mentioned in WFP's 2015 evaluation of its response to the Syrian regional crisis. WFP's evaluations of the Ebola and Iraq responses found similar gaps. In Iraq, neither a comprehensive assessment of national vulnerability nor an in-depth food security or household economic survey of displaced people had been conducted since the start of major urban displacements in late 2014. Because of the nature of the Ebola crisis, WFP decided to rely on data provided by health actors to identify beneficiaries of the "care and contain" component of the response, but there were limitations on the usefulness of these data for the purposes of food assistance. Gender analysis was lacking in both responses.
25. Both inter-agency syntheses pointed to the challenges of generating monitoring data during emergencies. Difficulties included access limitations, weak data management systems, and human resource constraints. WFP evaluations reflected these findings; in Iraq, a lack of monitoring data constrained the evidence base for programming. During the Ebola crisis, M&E systems at the country and regional levels improved, but they lacked integration with resource management information – impeding the real-time overview of WFP's food assistance and logistics services by staff or management.

### ***Results***

26. Results recorded in the evaluations included significant contributions to containing the Ebola epidemic, meeting the needs of quarantined urban populations virtually overnight and establishing and facilitating the humanitarian response through the provision of common services to the humanitarian community. The common services platform was used by 77 organizations to deliver results and achieve efficiency gains and cost savings.
27. In Iraq, under highly challenging operating conditions, WFP's EMOPs reached more affected people than planned, stabilizing food consumption among targeted internally displaced persons, as also in WFP's Syrian regional crisis response.
28. Four evaluations assess accountability to affected populations, particularly as regards consultation with beneficiaries and complaints mechanisms. Efforts were made to consult communities on issues such as targeting and new delivery modalities in Burundi and in five of the WFP operations evaluated. Complaints mechanisms were established in Burundi, in operations in Rwanda and in four countries in Central America. Improvements were noted during the Ebola crisis, following the inclusion of entitlements on ration cards and the use of banners at distribution sites. However, food availability/entitlements were inadequately communicated in Iraq and in five operations.

### ***Cost-efficiency***

29. The challenges of assessing cost-efficiency in the absence of robust data were highlighted in both the syntheses and WFP evaluations. Nonetheless, the costs incurred by the Iraq and Ebola responses were assessed by evaluations as appropriate under highly challenging operating conditions; the costs of the Ebola response were in line with WFP averages. WFP also increased cost-efficiency for the United Nations system, particularly through the common services platform.

### ***Scale-down and transition***

30. Both inter-agency syntheses stressed the importance of shifting from relief to recovery in a timely manner while continuing to meet basic needs. The evaluation of WFP's Ebola response found that the scale-down and transition out of emergency and into post-Ebola programming could have been faster. Links to existing development-focused country operations could have been confirmed earlier, and the transition process to a non-emergency reporting framework could have been defined better to enable measurement of results related to resilience and non-life-saving assistance.
31. Similarly in Iraq, the evaluation emphasized the need to formulate a long-term exit strategy to transfer responsibility for assistance from WFP-supported EMOPs to the Government's social protection and safety net programmes.



### Main lessons for Level 3 emergency response

- i. *Adopt a strong strategic approach.* The advantages of a strong and conceptually sophisticated strategic framework and context-specific approach – not only for WFP but also for the wider United Nations response – are illustrated by WFP’s “care, contain and protect” approach during the Ebola crisis. This approach is replicable and can be learned from.
- ii. *Ensure more systematic conduct and use of needs assessments.* Evaluations concur that deeper knowledge of humanitarian needs is required to ensure that responses are tailored to the situation and priorities of affected populations. To achieve this, the gender and other dimensions of exclusion require attention.
- iii. *Build staff capacity.* Building of staff capacity for emergency preparedness – particularly in critical areas such as VAM, M&E and programme support – needs to take place “from the ground” up to ensure a sufficient cohort of trained staff at all levels, particularly junior and mid-level staff. This also ensures that staff currently working in vulnerable countries have the skills to scale up and scale down as appropriate.
- iv. *Plan for transition.* All evaluations found a need for earlier and more clearly defined preparation for transition and exit from emergency, with firmer links to country programme activities, where they exist, built in from the start.
- v. *Utilize humanitarian principles.* Clear context-specific definitions and more clearly articulated positions on system-wide adherence to the humanitarian principles – particularly independence and impartiality – would help to clarify choices on issues such as targeting.

## 1.3 Capacity Development

32. Capacity strengthening features strongly in the 2030 Agenda. SDG 17 target 17.9 emphasizes the need to “enhance international support for implementing effective and targeted capacity-building in developing countries and to support national plans to implement the sustainable development goals”. In addition, the 2016 other fora reaffirmed the need to strengthen national capacities, including those of first responders, to build local abilities to prepare for and respond to future risks.

### *Evaluation of WFP’s Policy on Capacity Development:<sup>6</sup> An Update on Implementation (2009)*

33. WFP’s first Policy on Capacity Development was approved in 2004. The Policy Update issued in 2009 included a comprehensive policy framework with a vision, overarching objectives, outcomes and outputs at three levels: the enabling environment, and institutional and individual capacities. The Update was followed by the development of many guidelines and tools, including an action plan to contribute to implementation of the WFP Strategic Plan (2008–2013).
34. WFP’s 2016 evaluation of the Policy Update found it to be relevant to contemporary thinking on capacity development and to remain so in 2016. The Policy Update’s original objective of supporting nationally owned, sustainable hunger solutions is in line with SDG 2. Its focus on capacity development processes and results is also broadly aligned with SDG 17. The conceptual and technical guidance developed as part of the Policy Update has the potential to position WFP well to address these SDGs and help build national capacities in partner countries.
35. However, the evaluation also found that the Policy Update is not well known within WFP. The guidance and tools developed to accompany it were technically sophisticated, but had little uptake – partly because of weak dissemination but also because of weak corporate commitment to and accountability for the issue. Financial resources were limited to a USD 4 million trust fund, and attempts to strengthen staff capacities for capacity development were incomplete. Roles and responsibilities for capacity development were also unclear.

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<sup>6</sup> The evaluation covered the Policy on Capacity Development (2004) and the Policy Update (2009). This original terminology is therefore retained here. However, WFP’s Strategic Plan (2017–2021) refers to “capacity strengthening”.

36. Despite these gaps, the evaluation found that WFP's interventions had helped to strengthen capacities at the three levels covered by the Policy Update. Results had been generated across thematic areas and in different contexts. However, the evaluation could not discern firm connections from results to implementation of the Policy Update. With very few exceptions, therefore, results were achieved despite the limited ownership and dissemination of the policy.
37. Factors affecting the achievement of results included: i) limited corporate support for policy dissemination and implementation; ii) WFP's funding model, which focused on the short and medium terms and were therefore not conducive to capacity strengthening, which requires predictable and dedicated long-term commitments; iii) a lack of clear roles and responsibilities for the capacity strengthening function in WFP's organizational structure; iv) corporate monitoring and reporting systems and tools that did not capture WFP's contributions to results, leading to considerable underreporting; and v) WFP's corporate staffing approach and procedures, which do not prioritize capacity strengthening.

### ***Findings from country-level evaluations***

38. Capacity development-related findings from 2016 country portfolio and operation evaluations corroborated the findings of the policy evaluation, which itself applied evidence from field and desk studies in 12 countries.
39. *Capacity needs assessments.* The Policy Update evaluation found that capacity needs assessments had not been consistently conducted by WFP country offices; however, where present, they had informed activity design. Country portfolio and operation evaluations in 2016 found more limited use of underlying analysis to define WFP's intended approach to capacity development. In Iraq and Sri Lanka, where capacity strengthening was a significant part of the country portfolio, analysis focused on technical food security and vulnerability issues at the cost of assessing government ownership and ability to engage in capacity-strengthening processes. The operation evaluation synthesis for 2016 found that limited analysis led, in some cases, to overly optimistic views of national capacities.
40. *Strategic objectives and frameworks.* Despite the lack of underlying analysis, CPEs found generally strong intentions for capacity strengthening in country strategies. Those in Iraq – as originally formulated – Burundi and Mauritania explicitly identified capacity strengthening as an objective in keeping with WFP's transition towards a more enabling role. In Burundi for example, capacity development was one of three main priorities of the country strategy. However, the synthesis of operations evaluations from 15 operations found few clear objectives, intended targets or results for capacity strengthening.
41. Strategic frameworks for capacity development have not always been sufficiently rigorous. The country strategy in Iraq provided a broadly coherent approach to the issue, but it was not firmly needs-based and there were weaknesses in planning (Box 1). The frameworks for capacity development were less clearly defined in Burundi and Mauritania – as also found in operation evaluations. In Sri Lanka, although the need to shift from implementer to enabler was recognized, no country strategy was formalized, and capacity development efforts therefore lacked a coherent strategic framework.

#### **Box 1: Iraq – Necessary conditions for successful capacity strengthening**

The Iraq CPE cited the conditions needed for successful capacity strengthening: “full government commitment towards reform, a detailed work plan, donor support, plus the availability of experienced staff with a range of expertise”. The evaluation found that none of these conditions were in place for reform, resulting in country strategy objectives that proved unrealistic and ineffective.

42. *Implementation.* Implementation did not always match WFP's original intentions for capacity development at the programme design stage, particularly in changing conditions. WFP's plans for capacity development activities in Iraq and Mauritania had to be adapted when crises occurred, with EMOPs taking precedence.
43. The shift in Iraq was given a positive assessment, with the advent of a Level 3 emergency in the summer of 2014 requiring more operational decision-making. The evaluation found this choice to be "flexible and solution-focused". However, in Mauritania, where WFP's portfolio was adapted to respond to the 2011–2012 drought and the large-scale arrival of refugees from Mali in 2012, WFP was considered to have "lost sight of" some of the original strategic intentions set out in the country strategy. It is important to note that when emergency responses interrupt capacity development activities, corporate objectives for capacity strengthening need to be retained in view.
44. The weak strategic frameworks referred to in paragraphs 40 and 41 affected implementation. In Burundi, Mauritania and the operations evaluated, capacity development activities were implemented in an ad-hoc and piecemeal manner, and were not guided by a common central framework.
45. *Relevance and appropriateness of activities.* The evaluation of the Capacity Development Policy Update found that activities were generally relevant to national needs. In some countries, WFP has taken steps to avoid one-off events and ensure more comprehensive, longer-term engagement. Country portfolio and operation evaluations found more variable degrees of relevance. Capacity development activities were assessed as generally appropriate in Burundi, Mauritania – as far as they were implemented – and Sri Lanka, but interventions in Iraq were not adequately thought through. Operation evaluations found targeting of individual units or sectors rather than a system-wide approach. Activities were also often narrowly defined as "training"<sup>7</sup> and were on a limited scale in relation to needs.
46. *Partnerships and coordination.* The 2030 Agenda emphasizes the role of partnerships, but the Policy Update evaluation found a lack of specific guidance to facilitate WFP's partnerships for supporting joint capacity development initiatives. Capacity-strengthening work occurred "in parallel" with other United Nations actors rather than as truly joint initiatives; this finding was reflected in all three CPEs.
47. *Coordination with governments.* The evaluation of the Capacity Development Policy Update reported that government institutions have been the main recipients of capacity development activities. This echoes the finding from the synthesis of 2016 operation evaluations that WFP acts broadly as an "enabling partner" to governments. Similarly, capacity development in Sri Lanka was found to be "hard-wired" into the partnership agreement between Government and WFP. In Burundi, the evaluation noted that synergies with government partners depended to a significant extent on the capacity of national partners.
48. *Human and financial resourcing.* Findings from the evaluation of the Capacity Development Policy Update regarding resourcing challenges were borne out by the 2016 CPEs. In Burundi, the lack of a dedicated programme officer constrained results despite capacity strengthening being an important priority in the country strategy. WFP's financial resources for capacity development were particularly limited in the two middle-income countries assessed in the 2016 CPEs. The capacity development elements of the Iraq portfolio received only 12 percent of intended funding, and Sri Lanka's graduation to middle-income country status created challenges for WFP in securing adequate resources. The reversion to EMOPs in Iraq and Mauritania also meant that capacity development objectives were no longer priorities for donor funding.

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<sup>7</sup> The Evaluation of WFP's response to the Ebola crisis also found that "the Evaluation Team considers WFP's capacity development approaches narrowly focused and not oriented to partner broader expectations or needs" (p. 19).

<b>Main lessons for capacity development</b>	
Lessons from the evaluation of the Capacity Development Policy Update are reflected in the six evaluation recommendations.	
<b>Recommendations</b>	<b>Management response<sup>8</sup></b>
1. Create a time-bound transition management team to articulate WFP's vision and strategy for capacity strengthening in the context of the new Strategic Plan (2017–2021).	Partially agreed
2. Support country offices to carry out capacity-strengthening activities through the provision of relevant, concrete and practical guidance.	Agreed
3. Enhance WFP's own internal capacities to support and facilitate national capacity strengthening.	Agreed
4. Strengthen provisions for monitoring and reporting to capture quantitative and qualitative information on WFP's contributions to capacity-strengthening results.	Agreed
5. Ensure that WFP's internal and external communications reflect capacity strengthening as a core organizational function.	Partially agreed
6. Leave the 2009 Policy Update in place for the moment, but update the document or develop a new policy to align with and support implementation of the Strategic Plan (2017–2021).	Agreed

## 1.4 Country-Specific Evaluations

49. This section of the Annual Evaluation Report provides additional findings and lessons synthesized from country-specific evaluations completed in 2016. The 19 evaluations<sup>9</sup> were implemented in a diverse range of contexts, including situations of sudden instability in a middle-income country in Iraq; large-scale arrivals of refugees and internally displaced persons in Burundi, Mauritania and Ukraine; and protracted refugee situations in Ethiopia, Liberia and Rwanda. WFP also undertook development-oriented programming in middle-income countries such as Nicaragua and Sri Lanka.
50. Country portfolios and operations were of widely varying scales: in the Niger, a single operation had requirements of USD 1 billion to serve almost 7 million beneficiaries. The largest country portfolio evaluated in 2016, Mauritania, had a budget of USD 553 million.

<sup>8</sup> Details in WFP/EB.1/2017/6-A/Add.1 1. Management's reservations related to the context of the multiple resource needs for implementation of the Integrated Road Map rather than the substance of the recommendations.

<sup>9</sup> Including four CPEs and 15 operation evaluations from those included in the year 3 operation evaluation synthesis. Operation evaluations completed later in 2016 were not included.

### ***Quality and relevance of strategic frameworks***

51. The evaluations found country strategies to be mostly aligned with national priorities at the time of design and generally appropriate to contexts. However, sometimes the intentions set out in a country strategy were overtaken by events such as emergencies in Iraq and Mauritania. By contrast, in Burundi, the 2011–2014 country strategy took a far-sighted but realistic view of the context, including an emergency response component, despite stability at the time. This proved highly valuable when a political crisis occurred in 2015.
52. Evaluations found that the absence of a country strategy negatively affected the coherence of WFP's portfolio of activities, as in Sri Lanka, where the portfolio was more a collection of inherited activities and obligations than a coherent expression of a proactive strategy. The synthesis of operation evaluations found that even where country strategies were present, they did not consistently inform operational design.

### ***Relevance of design to humanitarian needs***

53. All the evaluations found that WFP's broad country-level objectives were generally relevant to needs and that WFP's swift reorientation when conditions changed, as in Iraq, supported this relevance. However, five operation evaluations questioned the ambitious scale of planned coverage, with some designs failing to produce contingency plans or use budget revisions when refugee caseloads were lower than expected.

### ***Evidence base for design***

54. Reflecting findings on the evidence gap in needs assessment in emergencies, country portfolio and operation evaluations continued to signal a weak or inconsistent evidence base underlying design. For example, 6 out of 15 operation evaluations found shallow or incomplete analysis of needs – sometimes of particular vulnerable groups. CPEs found similarly mixed performance; while in Burundi and the Niger, interventions were based on detailed analyses of the context, including the political, security and socio-economic dimensions in Burundi. The global Food Security Cluster led by WFP in Iraq did not undertake an emergency food security assessment. In Mauritania, despite WFP's generally strong engagement in food security and vulnerability analysis, specific dimensions of food security were insufficiently examined.
55. A weak evidence base also led to some untested assumptions underlying design. Eight of the 15 operation evaluations found that the premise for operation design and/or choice of programmatic options was assumed rather than explicitly tested. For example, general food distribution was implemented as “continuous relief” for refugees in Liberia. The Sri Lanka country portfolio evaluation identified a range of assumptions about food assistance for assets and mother-and-child health and nutrition, which were not consistently addressed by programme design.
56. Gender analysis was limited in the design of all the country portfolios and operations evaluated. Of the 15 operations evaluated, only two – in Egypt and the Niger – explicitly applied gender analysis to inform design. Gender analysis was also weak in country strategy and portfolio designs in Burundi, Iraq, Mauritania and Sri Lanka. However, all four CPEs found recent efforts to expand gender analysis and increase attention to gender during implementation, linked to implementation of WFP's Gender Policy (2015–2020).

### ***From food aid to food assistance***

57. Continuing its transition from food aid to food assistance provision, WFP has sought to shift from an implementing to an enabling role; move from purely in-kind delivery to a broader range of modalities; apply programme-level approaches; and work more closely in partnerships. Evaluations overall reflect this transition, with diverse roles, transfer modalities and programmatic approaches adopted.
58. Country strategies in Burundi, Iraq and Mauritania were geared to enabling roles, although WFP had the foresight to retain capacity for direct implementation in Burundi. While no country

strategy was formalized in Sri Lanka, WFP's role evolved from providing direct transfers to combining food assistance with technical analysis and support. Six of the operations evaluated were geared to assisting the development of national policy frameworks, with some nutrition and school feeding activities delivered directly through national programmes.

59. Specific roles adopted by WFP and identified in operation evaluations included undertaking advocacy for food security and nutrition; convening multi-sectoral dialogue on food security, nutrition and disaster preparedness; brokering knowledge; modelling replicable approaches; supplying detailed information on food security and nutrition; and pilot testing innovations.
60. Seven of the 15 operation evaluations identified weaknesses in targeting, mostly arising from limited analysis at the design stage. The CPEs in Burundi, Mauritania and Sri Lanka also raised the issue of WFP being "too thinly spread" across the country, with activities insufficiently concentrated in the face of resource constraints. On the positive side targeting approaches often evolved during implementation: in Sri Lanka, blanket general food distribution was eventually replaced by needs-based targeting. In Mauritania, food assistance for assets changed from demand-led targeting to participatory identification of target communities. However, In Iraq, a needs-based targeting approach with a clear rationale should have been implemented earlier.
61. Transfer modalities reflected the shift from food aid to food assistance signalled by the Strategic Plan (2014–2017). In Iraq, a shift from in-kind support towards cash-based interventions during the evaluation period was appreciated by the Government and United Nations partners. In Burundi, WFP used transfer modalities, such as cash, vouchers and food parcels, flexibly across the portfolio, with the introduction of electronic vouchers being especially appreciated by refugees and implementing partners. However, in both Mauritania and Sri Lanka, evaluations found scope for greater use of cash. The 2016 operation evaluations synthesis highlighted the restrictions on choice of modality that WFP may face. In Afghanistan, in-kind donations were supplied despite the Government's preference for cash-based assistance; in Nicaragua, national authorities restricted WFP to in-kind transfers despite successful piloting of cash-based transfers.

### ***Partnerships and coordination***

62. Alignment of country portfolio and operational designs with partners' intentions was assessed as positive in country-level evaluations in 2016. In Burundi for example, the country strategy was coherent with the priorities of a wide range of national and United Nations partners and donors. However, operation and country portfolio evaluations consistently identified scope for stronger operational coordination with United Nations partners.
63. Relationships with cooperating partners were generally characterized as positive, but country portfolio and some operation evaluations pointed to difficulties with short-term administrative arrangements and bureaucratic and communication delays.

### ***Internal synergies***

64. The internal coherence of WFP's portfolios and multi-component operations is a necessary feature of the shift from food aid to food assistance, but evaluations revealed continued weakness. The Sri Lanka portfolio's internal synergies arose from its geographic focus, common analytical work and the need to adapt food assistance approaches to different contexts. Few if any interlinkages were apparent in the Burundi and Mauritania portfolios. In Burundi, activities were separated from each other with missed opportunities for inter-connections. Of the 11 multi-component operations evaluated, only those in Ethiopia and the Niger were well integrated, both being supported by wider United Nations coherence efforts. Seven operations missed opportunities to make internal connections.

### ***Performance and results***

65. Across the country portfolio and operation evaluations, progress was most evident towards WFP's strategic commitments to saving lives and protecting livelihoods in emergencies,

supporting or restoring food security and nutrition, and establishing or rebuilding livelihoods in fragile settings and following emergencies.

66. Gender results were mixed in 2016, with weaknesses linked mostly to poor gender sensitivity in programme design or limited attention to gender in implementation. Of 15 operations evaluated, six adopted a mainly quantitative “including women” perspective while two were essentially gender-blind. Consequently, few tangible gender results from WFP interventions emerged, although improvements in women’s participation in decision-making were noted in Mauritania, and five operation evaluations found transformative gains emerging. The risks of inadequate analysis of the cultural dimensions of gender are reflected in unintended effects in at least three operations and the Burundi CPE.
67. *Sustainability and hand-over.* A recurring theme of evaluations in 2016 was limited attention to sustainability or hand-over in intervention design. None of the four CPEs found clear strategies for sustainability being implemented, or significant progress towards hand-over, where relevant. Some activities for refugees and internally displaced persons, such as in Burundi, did not make sufficient links to resilience or livelihood approaches. Most of the operations evaluated lacked fully integrated approaches to sustainability or were inadequately prepared for hand-over.

#### Main lessons from country-specific evaluations

- i. *Develop informed designs.* Evaluations in 2016 highlighted the need for a rigorous approach to the design of country strategies and operations. An evidence-based approach can ensure that designs are well tailored to contexts. The risk of assumptions in design – which often require later course correction – can be avoided by investing time in analysis at an early stage.
- ii. *Plan and prepare.* WFP’s transition from implementer to enabler is well under way, but the need to plan for flexibility is illustrated by findings from the evaluations in Burundi and Iraq. Building relationships and the capacity of national partners at all levels for programme planning and delivery will support WFP’s ability to deliver if emergency response is needed.
- iii. *Strengthen systems for results.* Although monitoring systems are improving, almost all the evaluations stressed the need for WFP to improve its outcome-level data. Doing so will support learning about what is working and what is not in WFP interventions, and help improve external confidence.
- iv. *Give attention to partnerships.* Partnerships still a work in progress, particularly regarding the inconsistent relationships with United Nations agencies. Positioning itself firmly as part of the country-level cooperation partnership, even where relationships are challenging, will enable WFP to better support efforts to realize the SDGs.
- v. *Be realistic.* WFP’s ambition has sometimes outstripped its ability to raise funds for its activities and operations. Funding constraints need to be identified and planned for in advance, with contingency plans for increasing and decreasing beneficiary needs built into operation design from the outset.

## Part 2: WFP's Evaluation Function

### 2.1 Major Developments in the Evaluation Function

68. This report covers the first year of implementation of WFP's Evaluation Policy (2016–2021).<sup>10</sup> Responding to WFP's current internal and external contexts, the policy aims to strengthen WFP's contribution to ending global hunger by: i) embedding evaluation into a culture of accountability and learning; ii) ensuring that credible, independent and high-quality evaluations are systematically planned; and iii) comprehensively incorporating evaluation evidence into all WFP policies and programmes.
69. The policy establishes a highly integrated model of centralized evaluation, augmented by demand-led decentralized evaluation that meets United Nations evaluation norms and standards.
70. Early in 2016, OEV prepared complementary foundational documents comprising the WFP Evaluation Charter<sup>11</sup> and the Corporate Evaluation Strategy (2016–2021)<sup>12</sup> (Figure 1). Together, these documents position evaluation as an integral part of all WFP's work.
71. Building on the policy's theory of change (Annex I) and normative framework, and the Evaluation Charter's institutional arrangements, the Corporate Evaluation Strategy sets a phased plan of activities for policy implementation. The transition started with a number of decentralized evaluations conducted in 2016 under the Evaluation Policy using guidance and support systems developed in 2015. At the same time, OEV has started to phase out the series of operation evaluations started in 2013. This series is managed centrally as a temporary measure to ensure accountability while demand-led decentralized evaluation is embedded throughout WFP.
72. The evaluation function is fully aligned with the significant reform of WFP's strategic approach to delivering results through the Integrated Road Map. It is embedded as a strategic organizational function in WFP's Strategic Plan (2017–2021)<sup>13</sup> and included as a requirement in the new Policy on Country Strategic Plans (CSPs)<sup>14</sup> while resourcing for evaluation is structurally incorporated into the new Financial Framework.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Approved 2015, WFP/EB.2/2015/4-A/Rev.1.

<sup>11</sup> OED2016-007, WFP Evaluation Charter.


<sup>12</sup> Endorsed by WFP's Executive Management Group, April 2016.

<sup>13</sup> WFP/EB.2/2016/4-A/1/Rev.2.

<sup>14</sup> WFP/EB.2/2016/4-C/1/Rev.1.

<sup>15</sup> WFP/EB.2/2016/5-B/1/Rev.1.



**Figure 1: WFP's evaluation function foundational documents**

73. In June 2016, an Evaluation Function Steering Group (EFSG) was established under the leadership of the Chief of Staff and comprising regional directors and directors of all stakeholder divisions in WFP. During 2016, the EFSG activated the Contingency Evaluation Fund (see Section 2.3); facilitated the recruitment of six regional evaluation officers; and endorsed the framework for a new reporting system for the expanded evaluation function, including a set of key performance indicators (KPIs) to support oversight of WFP's evaluation function by the Board and senior management.
74. To the extent possible, the KPIs have been aligned with the Corporate Results Framework (2017–2021)<sup>16</sup> and the Financial Framework Review. The KPIs focus on measuring policy outcomes to indicate progress in addressing core questions for governance: i) to what extent is evaluation covering WFP's work? ii) what is the quality of these evaluations? iii) what is the cost? and iv) what are the effects?
75. The first and baseline year for reporting on the evaluation function at outcome level was 2016. Consistent with the phased implementation of the policy, 2016 was also a transition year; some of the KPIs for centralized evaluation only will be complemented by information on decentralized evaluation as of 2017. The 2016 results for each KPI are presented and explained in the following sections. Annex II shows a draft of the KPI dashboard that is under development.
76. The second Annual Global Evaluation Meeting took place in November 2016 with the aim of consolidating and expanding WFP's community of practice for evaluation. Participants developed the concept of an online evaluation community to be launched in 2017 to embed planning and use of evaluation and further stimulate and support a learning culture in WFP.

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<sup>16</sup> WFP/EB.2/2016/4-B/1/Rev.1.

## 2.2 Evaluation Coverage: Centralized and Decentralized Evaluations

77. One of the four intended outcomes of the policy is the application of evaluation coverage norms to WFP's policies, strategies and programmes.<sup>17</sup> Recognizing that it is neither feasible nor desirable to evaluate all of WFP's activities and interventions, the Evaluation Policy (2016–2021) sets minimum coverage norms to be attained through a phased approach within the life of the policy – i.e. by 2021, as shown in Table 2.

<b>TABLE 2: MINIMUM EVALUATION COVERAGE NORMS</b>	
<b>Centralized evaluation</b>	<b>Decentralized evaluation</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Strategic evaluations providing balanced coverage of WFP's core planning instruments, including Strategic Plan elements and related strategies</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Evaluation of at least 50% of each country office's portfolio of activities<sup>18</sup> within a 3-year period<sup>19</sup></li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Evaluation of policies 4–6 years after implementation starts<sup>20</sup></li> </ul>	Recommended: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>before scale-up of pilots, innovations, and prototypes;</li> <li>for high-risk<sup>21</sup> interventions; and</li> <li>before third repeat of an intervention of similar type and scope</li> </ul>
Country portfolio evaluations: <sup>22</sup> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>every 5 years for the 10 largest country offices (2 per year)</li> <li>every 10–12 years for all other country offices (7 per year)</li> </ul>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Evaluation of all corporate emergency responses, sometimes jointly with Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC)</li> </ul>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Centrally managed operation evaluations providing balanced coverage</li> </ul>	
All country programmes	

78. After the Corporate Evaluation Strategy was issued in April 2016, planning for both centralized and decentralized evaluations was aligned with coverage norms via a phased approach, and a KPI was developed for each coverage norm. Figures 2 to 7 summarize the level of achievement of each coverage norm in 2016.
79. Full coverage is not expected until 2021. Targets for each year are being set in 2017, assuming a phased increase in resources allocated to the evaluation function to meet the policy target of 0.8 percent of WFP's total contribution income by the end of the life of this Evaluation Policy (see Section 2.4).

<sup>17</sup> See WFP Evaluation Policy (2016–2021), para. 11 (WFP/EB.2/2015/4-A/Rev.1).

<sup>18</sup> In terms of USD value of resourced requirements and implemented through operations or trust funds.

<sup>19</sup> In countries with only one development project or country programme, evaluations can be every five years.

<sup>20</sup> WFP/EB.A/2011/5-B.

<sup>21</sup> WFP/EB.A/2015/5-B.

<sup>22</sup> Norm increased by WFP Policy on Country Strategic Plans (WFP/EB.2/2016/4-C/1/Rev.1) (see para. 83 below).

80. *Policy evaluations.* The WFP policy formulation document<sup>23</sup> approved by the Board in 2011 states that every WFP policy should be evaluated within four to six years of the start of implementation; this is echoed in the Evaluation Policy. Strict application of this coverage norm – taking into consideration only the five policies that started implementation in 2011 and 2012,<sup>24</sup> and only those evaluations completed within the four- to six-year window after that – results in an achievement rate of zero. This is because the one policy evaluation completed in 2016 concerned a policy that was older than six years – the Policy on Capacity Development: An Update on Implementation<sup>25</sup> Evidence from this evaluation was nevertheless considered highly relevant to preparation of the Integrated Road Map.<sup>26</sup> In addition, at the Board’s request, the WFP Nutrition Policy was evaluated early<sup>27</sup> and three other evaluations are ongoing or planned for later<sup>28</sup> in 2017, 2018 or 2019 (Figure 2 and Annex III).

**Figure 2: KPI – percentage of active WFP policies evaluated within four to six years of implementation**



81. When considering the intent rather than the letter of this coverage norm, the picture is more positive, given the backlog in policy evaluations previously noted. Of 12 current WFP policies listed in the Compendium of Policies Relating to the Strategic Plan<sup>29</sup> that were due or overdue for evaluation,<sup>30</sup> two had been evaluated by the end of 2016<sup>31</sup> and evaluations of three more had started.<sup>32</sup> Over the life of the Evaluation Policy, OEV aims to reduce the remaining backlog and align with evaluation coverage norms.

<sup>23</sup> WFP/EB.A/2011/5-B.

<sup>24</sup> These policies were approved in earlier years.

<sup>25</sup> WFP/EB.2/2009/4-B.

<sup>26</sup> As per Evaluability Assessment of WFP’s Strategic Plan.

<sup>27</sup> WFP/EB.2/2015/6-A.


<sup>28</sup> HIV/AIDS and Safety Nets Update, and Humanitarian Protection.

<sup>29</sup> WFP/EB.1/2017/4-D.

<sup>30</sup> These were approved earlier than 2010.

<sup>31</sup> WFP/EB.1/2017/6-A/Rev.1 and WFP/EB.1/2015/5-A.

<sup>32</sup> Policy on Humanitarian Protection; Policy on Humanitarian Principles; and Policy on Humanitarian Access and its Implications for WFP.

**Figure 3: Country-level evaluation coverage (evaluations completed in 2016)**

Source: OEV.

82. *Country portfolio evaluations.* CPEs are commissioned and managed by OEV. These complex evaluations assess WFP's strategic positioning in a country, the quality of strategic decision-making and the performance and results of the entire portfolio of WFP's work over a multi-year period.
83. WFP's Policy on CSPs, approved in November 2016, increases the coverage norm for CPEs. It requires that all CSPs – other than interim CSPs – will undergo a CPE towards the end of their implementation period. The Evaluation Policy norm (Table 2 above) will apply until the first CSPs are due for evaluation and to interim CSPs.
84. Figure 4 shows that 35 percent of the ten largest country offices<sup>33</sup> were covered by a CPE during 2012–2016. The bar chart shows which of these country offices were covered by a CPE in the last five years: Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, the Niger, Somalia and the Sudan.

**Figure 4: KPI – percentage of WFP's ten largest country offices that have been covered by a CPE between 2012 and 2016**

<sup>33</sup> In terms of the planned programme of work through operations and trust funds. Source: WFP Project Budget and Programming Service; Management Plan (2017–2019) (WFP/EB.2/2016/5-A/1/Rev.2). The total number of country offices is 81 and the total number of country offices among the top ten in the last five years is 17.

85. Figure 5 presents the results achieved in meeting the coverage norms on all other country portfolios,<sup>34</sup> which should be evaluated every 10–12 years. From 2007 to 2016, 31 percent of these were covered by a CPE.<sup>35</sup>

**Figure 5: KPI – percentage of WFP country offices (excluding the ten largest) that have been covered by a CPE between 2007 and 2016**



86. *Evaluations of corporate emergency responses.* The Evaluation Policy requires that all corporate emergency responses be evaluated, either through the IASC mechanism or by OEV in an evaluation of only WFP's response. Figure 6 shows that of the six corporate Level 3 emergencies ongoing in 2016 – in Iraq, Nigeria, South Sudan, Southern Africa, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen – three were evaluated.<sup>36</sup> An evaluation of WFP's response to the Ebola crisis (2014–2015) was also completed by OEV in 2016.

**Figure 6: KPI – percentage of corporate emergency responses ongoing in 2016 that have been evaluated between 2014 and 2016**



87. *Country programmes.* The Evaluation Policy requires that all country programmes ending in 2016 be evaluated through either a centralized or a decentralized evaluation. Figure 7 shows that in 2016, only one – the United Republic of Tanzania – out of five country programmes<sup>37</sup> met the norm. Two decentralized evaluations covering specific components of country programme in Ethiopia were initiated in 2016, but not completed.

**Figure 7: KPI – percentage of country programmes that ended in 2016 for which a final evaluation was completed in 2015 or 2016**



<sup>34</sup> In countries where WFP has a presence with an official country office or operational activity.


<sup>35</sup> Burundi, Chad, the Congo, Haiti, Indonesia, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Nepal, the State of Palestine, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, Timor-Leste, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

<sup>36</sup> South Sudan (IAHE 2015), the Syrian regional response (2015), and Iraq with a CPE covering internally displaced persons (2016). The regional response to the Syrian crisis, partly covering Iraq operations, was evaluated in 2015.

<sup>37</sup> Country programmes in the Central African Republic, Indonesia and Sierra Leone were not covered in 2016, but a CPE of the Central African Republic covering its country programme is planned for 2017.

88. *Decentralized evaluations.* In the demand-led decentralized evaluation function, commissioning units have the flexibility to select topics, interventions and timings in line with their programmes of work and stakeholders’ needs. As part of the phased application of the coverage norms set by the Corporate Evaluation Strategy, the minimum coverage norm for decentralized evaluations will be phased in during 2017 and 2018, by which time each country office should have completed at least one decentralized evaluation within the previous two years. Figure 8 shows that in the baseline year 2016, 20 percent of country offices had completed a decentralized evaluation within the last three years.<sup>38</sup> Seven decentralized evaluations were completed and 15 initiated by decentralized evaluation commissioners at Headquarters, regional bureaux and country offices.

**Figure 8: KPI – percentage of country offices that have completed at least one decentralized evaluation between 2014 and 2016**



89. *OEV’s performance to plan and centralized evaluation coverage.* As described in the OEV work plan for 2016,<sup>39</sup> the programme of centralized evaluations and synthesis reports was selected in line with the phased application of coverage norms, priority evidence needs, absorption capacity and resource availability, to maximize relevance to WFP’s dynamic policy and programming context and generate independent evidence for accountability and learning. Table 3 shows performance rates. As many evaluations start in one year and are completed in the next, “starts” and “completions”<sup>40</sup> are reported separately.

<sup>38</sup> Including 2014 and 2015. Note that decentralized evaluations completed in this period did not benefit from the guidance and other support established under the new Evaluation Policy.

<sup>39</sup> Annex V to WFP Management Plan (2016–2018) (WFP/EB.2/2015/5-A/1/Rev.1).

<sup>40</sup> An evaluation starts when budget expenditure commences. Completion occurs when the final evaluation report is approved by the Director of Evaluation. Reports approved at the end of the calendar year are usually presented at the first Board session of the following year.

**TABLE 3: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 2016 EVALUATION WORK PLAN**

		Country portfolio evaluations	Policy evaluations	Corporate emergency responses	Syntheses	Subtotal evaluations (core programme)	Single operation evaluations (temporary series)	Total evaluations
<b>Completions</b>	Planned to complete 2016	3	1	0	2	6	21	27
	<b>Actual completions 2016</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>31</b>
	Completion rate					<b>133%</b>	<b>110%</b>	<b>115%</b>
<b>Starts</b>	Planned to start 2016	2	3	1	2	8	15	23
	<b>Total actual starts 2016</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>23</b>
	Start rate					<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>

Source: OEV.

90. OEV completed 31 centralized evaluations against 27 originally planned for completion in 2016, bringing the overall completion rate to 115 percent. This over-achievement compared with plan resulted from the completion of: i) two more operation evaluations than planned, bringing the total to 15; and ii) the Sri Lanka CPE and the evaluation of the Level 3 Ebola response, which were originally planned for completion in 2017.
91. In 2016, the overall start rate was 100 percent. Adjustments were made to maximize the benefits of a common approach for collective accountability and learning in the wider context of the United Nations and the SDGs, and to ensure the timely generation of evidence for country decision-making. Influenced by external events and adjustments in the United Nations Development Assistance Framework, the Cameroon CPE was postponed and substituted by a CPE for South Sudan.
92. In addition, OEV participated in the production of two inter-agency evaluation syntheses not foreseen in the 2016 work plan. These covered: i) findings and lessons from all evaluations of multiple agencies posted in the Syria CALL portal, with an evidence gap analysis; and ii) major findings of the 2015 IAHEs of the international response to Level 3 emergencies in the Central African Republic (2016), the Philippines (Typhoon Haiyan, 2015) and South Sudan (2015).
93. The multi-country series of impact evaluations of programmes to address moderate acute malnutrition started in 2015 through a strategic global partnership with the International Initiative for Impact Evaluation, continued in 2016. The series will be completed in 2017, culminating in a synthesis of policy and programmatic lessons from the series.

### 2.3 Strengthening WFP's Evaluation Function

94. Independent, credible and useful evaluations constitute outcome 1 of the Evaluation Policy. The KPI for this outcome is the percentage of WFP evaluations that are externally assessed as reaching the standard of fully meeting or exceeding requirements against WFP's quality standards, which are in turn based on international and United Nations norms and standards, including the gender standards of the United Nations System-wide Action Plan.

95. In 2016, a system for post-hoc quality assessment (PHQA) was designed, commissioned and applied to all 2016 evaluation reports. In this baseline year, 100 percent of centralized evaluations were assessed as meeting or exceeding requirements, along with 33 percent of decentralized evaluations<sup>41</sup> (see Annex II).
96. The PHQA system incorporates the gender requirements set by the United Nations System-wide Action Plan. WFP's evaluations overall were externally assessed as fully meeting these standards.
97. Underpinning the quality of WFP's evaluation function are several mechanisms and institutional arrangements. In line with the Corporate Evaluation Strategy and OEV's 2016 work plan, the following were strengthened:
- i) *Contingency Evaluation Fund.* This is part of the sustainable financing mechanism that is expected to facilitate the progressive achievement of the Evaluation Policy's target of dedicating 0.8 percent of WFP's total contribution income to the evaluation function. Endorsed in December 2016 by EFSG, the fund became operational in 2017, enabling regional directors to support country offices in conducting planned and budgeted evaluations in under-funded situations.
  - ii) *Quality assurance system.* Adherence to WFP's Centralized Evaluation Quality Assurance System (CEQAS) and Decentralized Evaluation Quality Assurance System (DEQAS) is one of the primary means of ensuring the credibility and quality of WFP evaluations. In 2016, DEQAS was developed and piloted in seven countries. Based on feedback from the pilot phase and in line with the updated norms and standards of the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG), issued in 2016, DEQAS will be finalized in 2017. Work has also begun on enhancing the gender standards in both CEQAS and DEQAS.
  - iii) *Outsourced quality support service for decentralized evaluations.* Identified in the Evaluation Policy as a mechanism that contributes to the impartiality and quality of decentralized evaluations, this mandatory outsourced service became operational in June 2016. It provides managers of decentralized evaluations with impartial, constructive and actionable feedback, and advice on draft evaluation deliverables.
  - iv) *OEV's decentralized evaluation help desk.* OEV also established an internal help desk to support the decentralized evaluation function. The use of help desk services increased progressively during 2016 as country offices and regional bureaux became aware of its availability.
  - v) *Evaluation expertise.* Under the Evaluation Policy outcome 3 – enhanced capacities for evaluation across WFP – access to evaluators with appropriate expertise to conduct independent, credible and useful evaluations (outcome 1) was enhanced. Thirteen of the 15 long-term agreements with consultancy firms and research institutions to provide services for centralized evaluations were extended to provide decentralized evaluation services as well. In addition, an interim roster of evaluation consultants was established to increase access to qualified independent evaluation consultants pending the establishment of a permanent roster.
  - vi) *Enhancing the evaluation capacity of WFP staff.* As part of the wider organizational strengthening process, a comprehensive evaluation learning programme to support the decentralized evaluation function was designed in collaboration with the Human Resources Division. Roll-out to the first cohort of trainees is scheduled for 2017 using the new human resources learning system, in line with WFP's People Strategy. In addition, five of six regional evaluation officers were selected through international competition and will assume their positions in 2017.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> Of the small sample of seven decentralized evaluations completed in 2016, six were assessed as part of the pilot phase of the PHQA; the remaining decentralized evaluation formed part of the first batch in 2017.

<sup>42</sup> The sixth regional evaluation officer was selected early in 2017.



- vii) *Reporting on the evaluation function.* Designed in collaboration with relevant WFP divisions, KPIs were established for two reporting levels: the Board and EFSG. The third level of reporting concerns management performance indicators for OEV and dedicated evaluation staff in regional bureaux.

## 2.4 Promoting the Learning From and Use of Evaluation

98. OEV contributes to WFP's culture of learning and accountability by supporting active use of evaluations in policy and programme design and approval. In 2016, evaluation was embedded in Integrated Road Map documents and guidance.
99. As part of the phased approach to policy implementation, OEV aims to report systematically on the extent to which evaluation evidence is adequately used in the design of CSPs by 2018. In the interim, OEV has reviewed the use of evidence and the forward planning of evaluations, and provided summaries of evaluation evidence and recommendations from relevant evaluations as part of an analysis of almost 80 percent of the draft project documents and CSP concept notes submitted to the strategic programme review process (Figure 9). OEV also reviewed the pilot CSPs of Bangladesh and Zimbabwe through the electronic programme review process and will continue to review all CSPs, interim CSPs and transitional interim CSPs through both the strategic programme review and electronic programme review processes.
100. A new evaluation topic page and related pages were launched on WFP's intranet with increased focus on user needs, allowing enhanced accessibility to key content such as evaluation reports, briefs, tools and guidance throughout WFP. "New look" evaluation pages on WFP's internet were prepared in 2016, placing evaluation firmly in WFP's programme and learning cycle and enhancing navigation to core content for a wider external audience.
101. OEV also reviewed draft WFP policies for appropriate use of evaluation evidence and produced a synthesis of the top ten lessons from evaluations on good policy quality.

**Figure 9: KPI – percentage of strategic programme review documents on which OEV provided comments**



102. Figure 10 presents an overview of the implementation of evaluation recommendations from the 31 centralized evaluations completed in 2016, ranging from policy to country portfolio and operation evaluations. The implementation categories are:
- implemented – action completed by 31 December 2016;
  - in progress – action not completed by 31 December 2016; and
  - to start – action not yet implemented.
103. Of 1,019 evaluation recommendations, 66 percent of those due for completion were implemented while 24 percent were in progress and 11 percent were not yet implemented.<sup>43</sup>

<sup>43</sup> Percentages do not total 100 because of rounding.


**Figure 10: KPI – percentage of evaluation recommendations due for implementation that have been completed**



## 2.5 Engaging in the International Evaluation System

104. During 2016, OEV engaged in the international evaluation system through system-wide evaluations, partnerships and networks.<sup>44</sup> OEV played a leading role in the evaluation of humanitarian action, especially in defining and communicating the lessons from humanitarian evaluations of various types across the United Nations system and professional networks (see Section 2.2), and organizing learning exchanges on the practice of evaluating humanitarian action.
105. OEV participated in the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit. As convenor of the UNEG Humanitarian Evaluation Interest Group, led a study to facilitate better understanding of how an organization's application of the humanitarian principles is evaluated.
106. In the UNEG, OEV was also Vice Chair of UNEG work on system-wide evaluation issues and was active in work groups to renew the UNEG norms and standards for evaluation and improve practices on decentralized evaluation, professionalization, peer review, knowledge management and use of evaluation, partnership, and development of evaluation capacity. WFP coordinated preparation of a UNEG working paper on evaluation in the SDG era.<sup>45</sup>
107. In 2016, planning started for joint evaluation work at the country level with the other Rome-based agencies, to be completed in 2017.
108. Figure 11 presents the number and status of joint and inter-agency evaluations in which WFP participated in 2016. OEV contributed to completion of the inter-agency humanitarian evaluation of the response to the crisis in Central African Republic. Of 15 ongoing decentralized evaluations in 2016, three were conducted jointly with other agencies.

**Figure 11: KPI – Number of joint and inter-agency humanitarian evaluations in which WFP participated in 2016**




<sup>44</sup> Such as the Active Learning Network on Accountability and Performance.

<sup>45</sup> UNEG. 2016. *Evaluation in the SDG Era: Lessons, Challenges and Opportunities for UNEG*. Available at: <http://www.uneval.org/document/detail/1912>

## 2.6. Resources for Evaluation

109. WFP is committed to assigning 0.8 percent of its total contribution income to resourcing the evaluation function – both centralized and decentralized – by 2021. As WFP’s management information system cannot yet produce an aggregated report on all resources dedicated to evaluations at the decentralized level, this section reports on financial resources available to OEV only. It covers all the work on the centralized evaluation function reported in preceding sections, and OEV’s role in supporting the decentralized evaluation function.
110. In future, the country portfolio budgets introduced through the Integrated Road Map will be designed to enable planning and reporting on all evaluations as a separate item. Pending complete roll-out of the Integrated Road Map, interim measures are in place for reporting on the entire evaluation function from 2017 onwards.
111. In 2016, the total resources available to OEV from all funding sources for the entire work plan totalled USD 9 million, the same as in 2015, constituting 0.18 percent of total contribution income.

**Figure 12: KPI – expenditure on evaluation as a percentage of WFP’s total contribution income**




### Part 3. Evaluation Outlook

112. Overall, WFP's evaluation function is well positioned to generate better evidence and contribute to learning at all levels to meet the expectations of Member States and the commitment of WFP's leadership to strengthening evidence-based decision-making.
113. Reflecting the thrust of the 2030 Agenda, the evaluation function: i) enables WFP to account for results at the country level; and ii) underpins WFP's partnerships and contributions to national policies, systems and capacities. Following approval of the Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review, it will be important in the year ahead to reflect on the review's implications, including those for WFP's engagement in the international evaluation system at the global, regional and country levels.
114. Both 2016 and 2017 represent major transition points for WFP's evaluation function. Leadership of the EFSG is particularly important in ensuring a successful transition, supporting the Executive Director in promoting and safeguarding the Evaluation Policy's provisions.
115. Close attention will be required to ensure that WFP is working towards coverage norms, resourcing, accountabilities and impartiality provisions, and making progress in embedding the evaluation culture into decision-making and practice at all levels of WFP.
116. Looking ahead, there are a number of areas for attention related to the coverage of centralized and decentralized evaluations:
  - i) The planned review of WFP's current policies, as set out in the 2017 Policy Compendium in light of the new Strategic Plan (2017–2021), presents an opportunity to streamline and focus the planning and selection of *policy evaluations* to meet accountability and learning needs.
  - ii) Maintenance of coverage levels for the *evaluation of corporate emergencies* poses challenges for OEV resources in light of the number of continuing protracted emergencies, such as in Iraq, South Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen; new and ongoing emergencies, such as in northern Nigeria; and the ongoing review of the IASC/IAHE evaluation mechanism.
  - iii) In the Integrated Road Map process, it will be critical to ensure *learning* from experience of embedding planning of decentralized evaluation in CSPs; and that *evidence* from evaluations is reflected in the analytical base for CSPs.
  - iv) The quality and use of the Corporate Results Framework will be a significant determinant of the extent to which WFP is able to measure results and progress towards its goals.

## ANNEX I

## Theory of change of the Evaluation Policy



1. The evaluation policy sets the vision representing WFP's desired long-term change to embed evaluative thinking, behaviour and systems into a culture of accountability and learning by 2021, enhancing WFP's contribution to ending global hunger.
2. The policy also establishes the purpose of evaluation in WFP's current internal and external contexts. It will be implemented through a phased approach to attain the four distinct and interrelated policy outcomes shown.
3. The drivers of change provide the organizational framework and the means for WFP to perform its evaluative role. The critical assumptions represent what must be in place for the outcomes to be realized.

ANNEX II

## Key Performance Indicator (KPI) Dashboard

### Application of coverage norms

In 2016, the six coverage norms included in the evaluation policy were met up to 35%.

1. KPI – Percentage of active WFP policies evaluated within four to six years of implementation



2. KPI – Percentage of WFP's ten largest country offices that have been covered by a CPE between 2012 and 2016



3. KPI – Percentage of WFP country offices (excluding the ten largest) that have been covered by a CPE between 2007 and 2016



4. KPI – Percentage of corporate emergency responses ongoing in 2016 that have been evaluated between 2014 and 2016



5. KPI – Percentage of country programmes that ended in 2016 for which a final evaluation was completed in 2015 or 2016



6. KPI – Percentage of country offices that have completed at least one decentralized evaluation between 2014 and 2016




- Evaluated before four years
- Evaluated
- Evaluation ongoing or planned 2017–2019
- Not evaluated

### Funding

In 2016, centralized evaluation expenditures accounted for 0.18% of WFP total contribution income.

5. Expenditure on evaluation as percentage of WFP total contribution income



### Use of Evaluation

OEV has commented on 79% of the strategic programme review documents submitted in 2016.

6. KPI – Percentage of strategic programme review documents on which OEV provided comments



- Commented by OEV
- Not commented by OEV

66% of the evaluation recommendations due for implementation as of December 2016 have been completed.

7. KPI – Percentage of evaluation recommendations due for implementation that have been completed\*




- Implemented
- In Progress
- To Start

\*Percentages do not total 100 due to rounding.

### Partnerships

In 2016, WFP participated in four joint and inter-agency humanitarian evaluations, three of which are decentralized and still ongoing.

8. KPI – Number of joint and inter-agency humanitarian evaluations in which WFP participated in 2016



## ANNEX III

Overview of WFP policies current in 2016 and evaluation coverage<sup>1</sup>

2002	Urban Food Insecurity: Strategies for WFP. Food Assistance to Urban Areas <i>A new policy on urban food insecurity will be presented during EB.A/2017 reflecting the latest research, WFP's experience in urban disasters and the outcome of the Third United Nations Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development (HABITAT III) in October 2016.</i>
2003	Food Aid and Livelihoods in Emergencies: Strategies for WFP <i>A synthesis of the joint impact evaluations by WFP and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on the contribution of food assistance to durable solutions in protracted refugee situations was presented at EB.1/2013 (WFP/EB.1/2013/6-C).</i>
2004	Emergency Needs Assessments <i>Progress on the implementation of this policy was reported at EB.2/2005 and EB.2/2006 (WFP/EB.2/2005/4-E and WFP/EB.2/2006/4-B/Rev.1). The summary evaluation report was presented in 2007 (WFP/EB.2/2007/6-A). A final progress report on the implementation plan and next steps was submitted in 2007 (WFP/EB.2/2007/4-C).</i>
2004	Humanitarian Principles <i>An evaluation of this and related policies concerning humanitarian principles and access will be undertaken in 2017.</i>
2005	Definition of Emergencies
2005	Exiting Emergencies
2006	Targeting in Emergencies
2006	Humanitarian Access and its Implications for WFP <i>An evaluation of this and related policies concerning humanitarian principles and access will be undertaken in 2017.</i>
2006	Food Procurement in Developing Countries <i>The Report of the External Auditor on Food Procurement in WFP was presented at EB.A/2014 (WFP/EB.A/2014/6-G/1).</i>
2006	The Role and Application of Economic Analysis in WFP
2008	Vouchers and Cash Transfers as Food Assistance Instruments: Opportunities and Challenges <i>An update on the implementation of this policy was presented at EB.A/2011 (WFP/EB.A/2011/5-A/Rev.1). The Report of the External Auditor on Use of Cash and Vouchers was presented at EB.A/2013 (WFP/EB.A/2013/6-G/1). The evaluation of the policy was presented at EB.1/2015 (WFP/EB.1/2015/5-A).</i>
2009	WFP Policy on Capacity Development <i>An evaluation of this policy is under way; the summary evaluation report was presented during EB.1/2017.</i>

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<sup>1</sup> Extract from WFP/EB.1/2017/4-D.

2010	WFP HIV and AIDS Policy <i>An update on WFP's response to HIV and AIDS was presented at EB.A/2015 (WFP/EB.A/2015/5-F). An evaluation of the policy is planned for 2019.</i>
2011	WFP Policy on Disaster Risk Reduction and Management
2012	WFP Nutrition Policy <i>A new nutrition policy will be presented at EB.1/2017 reflecting the latest evidence and WFP's commitment to preventing all forms of malnutrition in its support to governments in achieving the SDGs.</i>
2012	Humanitarian Protection Policy <i>An update on the implementation of this policy was presented at EB.A/2014 (WFP/EB.A/2014/5-F). An evaluation of the policy is planned for 2017.</i>
2012	Update of WFP's Safety Nets Policy – The Role of Food Assistance in Social Protection <i>An evaluation of this policy is planned for 2018. The policy will be revised for 2018–2021 to expand the scope from safety nets to social protection, and incorporate the findings of the WFP position paper on social protection and the 2018 evaluation.</i>
2013	WFP's Role in Peacebuilding in Transition Settings <i>An update on the implementation of this policy was presented at EB.2/2014 (WFP/EB.2/2014/4-D). An evaluation of the updated policy is planned for 2018.</i>
2013	Revised School Feeding Policy <i>The policy will be updated for 2018–2021 to reflect developments in the approach of WFP and partners to school meal programmes. An evaluation of the revised policy is planned for 2018.</i>
2014	WFP Corporate Partnership Strategy (2014–2017)
2014	WFP People Strategy – People Management Framework for Achieving WFP's Strategic Plan (2014–2017)
2015	Gender Policy <i>The policy was approved at EB.A/2015 (WFP/EB.A/2015/5-A), when an Update on the Implementation of the WFP Gender Mainstreaming Accountability Framework (WFP/EB.A/2015/5-G) was also presented.</i>
2015	Enterprise Risk Management Policy
2015	Policy on Building Resilience for Food Security and Nutrition
2015	South–South and Triangular Cooperation Policy
2015	Anti-Fraud and Anti-Corruption Policy
2015	WFP Evaluation Policy (2016–2021)
2017	Environment Policy <i>An update of the 1998 WFP and the Environment policy was presented at EB.1/2017.</i>
2017	Climate Change Policy <i>This policy was presented at EB.1/2017.</i>

### Legend

	<b>Not evaluated</b>
	<b>Evaluation planned 2017–2019</b>
	<b>Evaluated before 4 years</b>
	<b>Evaluation ongoing</b>



## Acronyms Used in the Document

CALL	Coordinated Accountability and Lesson Learning
CEQAS	Centralized Evaluation Quality Assurance System
CP	country programme
CPE	country portfolio evaluation
CSP	country strategic plan
DEQAS	Decentralized Evaluation Quality Assurance System
DEV	development project
EFSG	Evaluation Function Steering Group
EMOP	emergency operation
IAHE	inter-agency humanitarian evaluation
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
KPI	key performance indicator
M&E	monitoring and evaluation
OEV	Office of Evaluation
PHQA	post-hoc quality assessment
PRRO	protracted relief and recovery operation
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
UNEG	United Nations Evaluation Group
VAM	vulnerability analysis and mapping
WHO	World Health Organization