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**Executive Board  
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## **EVALUATION REPORTS**

**Agenda item 6**

*For consideration*

# **E**

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## **SUMMARY EVALUATION REPORT – HAITI COUNTRY PORTFOLIO**

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## NOTE TO THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

**This document is submitted to the Executive Board for consideration**

The Secretariat invites members of the Board who may have questions of a technical nature with regard to this document to contact the WFP staff focal points indicated below, preferably well in advance of the Board's meeting.

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\* Office of Evaluation

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The country portfolio evaluation of Haiti covers the 14 WFP operations active between May 2005 and December 2010; 9 were food assistance operations and 5 were special operations.


The Haiti country office had some remarkable successes given the extraordinarily challenging operating environment in Haiti during the evaluation period, which included civil and political unrest from 2005 to 2008 and the food, fuel and financial crises of 2007/08, in addition to recurring natural disasters. Operating within an integrated mission added to the complexity of the work, and the period also coincided with the launch of a new WFP Strategic Plan. The country office made great strides in partnering with the Government and in meeting the changing needs of the Haitian people during the phases of response, recovery and development.

Activities in all operations in the country portfolio had to adapt to the recurring shifts from a development context to emergency and back to development. WFP's strengths over the period of evaluation were in its ability to respond quickly and effectively to emergencies.

While many advances have recently been made in strategic partnerships with the Government, the country office's planning and coordination with government counterparts was not always fully coordinated nor Government-led throughout the evaluation period. WFP's participation in the cluster system, especially its leadership in the logistics and food clusters, has been much appreciated by the humanitarian community and provides an example of WFP applying its core competencies when working as partner with other United Nations agencies and with non-governmental organizations to increase impact. There are many opportunities for more collaborative programming and synergies with development partners. Given the nature of the Haiti country portfolio, WFP's role in relation to Strategic Objective 1 has been of primary importance and is the area where WFP is strongest. In more targeted activities WFP faces the challenge of balancing corporate and government priorities, especially in a volatile post-emergency context.

The primary drivers of change to WFP's activities across the Haiti portfolio were the 2008 and 2010 emergencies. Within this context of emergency response, the country office also faced corresponding changes in the capacities and priorities of government, donor and cooperating partners, as well as changing corporate priorities that influenced its strategic choices. Through the vulnerability analysis and mapping unit and the logistics cluster, WFP provides a valuable service to the development community in Haiti, particularly in the areas of food security analysis and logistics support. However, the evaluation team found that WFP's ability to base its strategic choices on these analytical data is often constrained. Systems are needed to improve communications, programme monitoring, evaluation and reporting. Standards are needed to provide more consistent programming, improved monitoring – including post-distribution monitoring – and better reporting from partners, to facilitate the country office's ability to make more informed decisions.

## DRAFT DECISION\*



The Board takes note of “Summary Evaluation Report — Haiti Country Portfolio” (WFP/EB.2/2011/6-C) and the management response in WFP/EB.2/2011/6-C/Add.1 and encourages further action on the recommendations, taking into account considerations raised by the Board during its discussion.

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\* This is a draft decision. For the final decision adopted by the Board, please refer to the Decisions and Recommendations document issued at the end of the session.

## BACKGROUND

### Evaluation Features

1. The Haiti country portfolio evaluation (CPE) encompasses the 14 WFP operations that were active between May 2005 and December 2010: 9 food assistance operations and 5 special operations. The 2005–2010 period was marked by severe natural disasters and other crises in Haiti, which significantly changed the size and scope of the WFP country portfolio. This evaluation period was chosen to provide a tool for the country office to develop lessons learned from a challenging and evolving food security environment, for use in the development of programmes for post-earthquake recovery. Rather than evaluating the 14 operations individually, the CPE looks across operational divides to assess the relevance and coherence of the WFP portfolio as a whole, its evolution over time, its performance and WFP's strategic role in Haiti.

### Context

2. With the highest poverty rate in Latin America and the Caribbean, Haiti ranks 145<sup>th</sup> out of 169 countries on the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) human development index. A series of natural disasters such as flooding, hurricanes and the 2010 earthquake exacerbated conditions in a country that was already struggling with high levels of food insecurity and poverty. As Haiti is a net importer of food, the food, fuel and financial crises of 2007–2008 added to its economic insecurity. These disasters – combined with environmental degradation, endemic poverty, and weakened survival mechanisms because of the political, socio-economic and climatic shocks suffered over the past few decades – make the country particularly vulnerable.
3. Social services remain inconsistent and insufficient to meet demand. Approximately 40 percent of the population has no access to basic health care, and infant and maternal mortality are the highest in the region and among the highest in the world. Food insecurity, these poor health conditions and insufficient health services hamper the country's ability to address crises such as malnutrition and HIV/AIDS. The generally poor education system is characterized by very low academic performance and high drop-out and repeat rates, resulting in 57 percent illiteracy, the highest in the Caribbean.

### WFP Portfolio in Haiti

4. WFP assistance increased dramatically from 2005 to 2010; total direct expenses grew from US\$21.5 million in 2005, to US\$72.6 million in 2009 and nearly US\$300 million in 2010. WFP opened six new sub-offices during the period, and staff strength increased tenfold for international staff and fivefold for national. The country portfolio was dominated by the response to the January 2010 earthquake. Emergency operation (EMOP) 200110 and the supporting special operations 200108 and 200109, which addressed the most urgent needs of the 3.5 million earthquake victims, represent approximately 65 percent of the total country portfolio over the evaluation period. In addition to providing general food distribution (GFD) in response to emergencies, in Haiti WFP has also been focusing on recovery activities, mainly school feeding, support to people living with HIV and tuberculosis (TB), mother-and-child health and nutrition, food for work (FFW) and significant new cash-for-work (CFW) programmes. The country office has also contributed significantly to analytical resources, with solid assessment and analytical capacity, particularly in the vulnerability analysis and mapping (VAM) unit and through the logistics cluster.

5. A large percentage of funding for WFP activities in Haiti from 2005 to 2010 were from government donors, notably the United States of America, Canada and the European Commission, while contributions from private donors comprised 20 percent of the funding in 2010.

## EVALUATION FINDINGS

### Alignment and Strategic Positioning

6. The evaluation team found WFP planning and implementation to be generally well integrated with Government of Haiti policies and priorities overall, thanks partly to recent improvements to the coordination mechanisms in sectors such as FFW/CFW and nutrition. Over the evaluation period, this alignment was often more passive than active, with WFP-led initiatives submitted to relevant government partners for approval. Although individual activities in each of the food assistance operations may fit the Government's main policies and strategy, the levels of engagement, advocacy and dialogue required for fuller alignment were sometimes weak. A volatile operating environment and insufficient government resources, especially after the earthquake, contributed to these challenges.
7. Regarding disaster response, WFP was able to respond immediately to the Government's request for assistance for responding to the storms and floods in 2008 and the earthquake in 2010, despite suffering many institutional losses of its own. Other targeted programmes, such as education, nutrition, HIV/TB and FFW/CFW, were planned jointly with the relevant ministries.
8. Through the cluster system, the country office provides strong leadership and collaboration, adding particular value in clusters where it is the lead agency – the food, the logistics and the emergency telecommunications clusters. WFP is also an active participant in the nutrition and education clusters.
9. With WFP's work in Haiti expanding rapidly over a larger geographic area during the evaluation period, the country office faced many new coordination challenges. At times, WFP's expansion of interventions into new geographic areas where other partners had formerly been dominant created confusion regarding coordination. On the other hand, its increasingly proactive engagement through the logistics cluster was universally appreciated by the development community.
10. Although there are examples of strong synergies and partnerships with other United Nations agencies – such as UNDP, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) – and non-governmental organization (NGO) partners, such as Agro Action Allemande, the evaluation team concluded that there were opportunities for more effective linking of WFP's core competencies in relief and recovery with the longer-term objectives of other agencies or partners, for increased development impact.
11. Although the period under review covers more than one WFP Strategic Plan, the evaluation analysed the extent to which the portfolio matches the priorities outlined in the current WFP Strategic Plan (2008–2013). The country portfolio in Haiti covers all five of the current Strategic Objectives; in terms of beneficiaries reached, 70 percent of portfolio activities are aligned with Strategic Objective 1.
12. At the policy level, WFP's activities are generally aligned with sector-specific corporate guidance, but there are some gaps in this guidance. For example, during the evaluation period, the country office often had to respond to rapid-onset emergencies. However,

up-to-date corporate guidance to support the transition from a period of relative stability, to emergency support and back to recovery was not always available. In addition, new initiatives such as CFW – which has been implemented on a very large scale in Haiti – were not supported at the corporate level by clear operational directives regarding financial and technical procedures.

13. The evaluation also found that there are sometimes gaps in the country office's ability to implement corporate policies, because of either a lack of capacity or a failure to prioritize activities in relation to those policies.

### **Making Strategic Choices**

14. The country office has done an impressive amount of analytical work to increase its understanding of national hunger and food security issues so it can guide internal WFP programming and operational decisions. The VAM unit provides leadership and technical capacity for undertaking assessments with partners, to set baselines and provide updated analysis when shocks occur. In this, WFP is both a major contributor of analytical information, helping to place food security issues on the government and international development agenda, and a strategic partner to the Government, in developing local capacity to continue this work in the future. In a complex environment with a volatile political landscape and repeated shocks, programming decisions were based on factors such as feasibility, capacity, policies and strategic frameworks or other situational contexts – rather than on food security assessments alone, whose recommendations were not always practicable or appropriate.
15. In food assistance operations, the country office's ability to plan activities in accordance with the level of need is often hampered by the capacity of cooperating partners. The most food-insecure areas are hard to reach and remote, which reduces the number of potential partners and forces the country office to make difficult decisions with a limited budget – a trade-off between reaching a larger number of beneficiaries and reaching fewer people in greater need.
16. Operational decisions regarding the type of food assistance within activities – such as ration composition and modality selection – were based on a variety of factors, including responses to recommendations from evaluation or formulation missions, and changes in funding availability or WFP corporate or joint United Nations directives. Strategic choices about which modalities to employ in response to emergencies did not necessarily result in the most appropriate interventions for a quick-response activity with limited duration. School feeding programme design is an example: not only was the design not optimal for an emergency intervention, but it will also create challenges for WFP as it scales down activities while Haiti moves out of an emergency context. Efficiencies associated with capitalizing on complementary distribution channels and partners across activities were implemented in some instances, but other potential synergies and opportunities were not exploited.
17. WFP's monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system during the evaluation period was weak, providing limited data for assessing impact and improving programmes. The focus was on collecting and reporting output indicators such as numbers of tons delivered and beneficiaries reached, which do not provide the full picture of programme performance and results. The huge number of cooperating partners at any time, and their varying reporting capabilities, make outcome-level data difficult if not impossible to assess. More robust quantitative and qualitative data about which activities proved to be the most successful and why could help drive more strategic decision-making for the future.

## Performance and Results

18. Between 2005 and 2010, the country office's outreach changed dramatically, from assisting 600,000 beneficiaries in 2005, to 3.1 million in 2008, and more than 4 million in 2010, as shown in Figure 1.

For most operations, the level of funding was generally satisfactory, and operations were implemented quickly and efficiently in the face of natural disasters and political unrest.

19. With the exception of the immediate-response EMOP 10785, the requirements set out in project documents and budget revisions have generally been well funded at rates of 63 to 83 percent. Although the funding rate for special operations was slightly lower, averaging 65 percent, this did not prove a major impediment. There were periods when PRRO 10674 was underfunded, which put stress on operations.


20. WFP assistance often exceeded initial annual beneficiary projections, and did not drop below 74 percent of planned numbers in any year. However, in terms of tonnage of food distributed, operations generally fell short, with only two reaching a distribution level of at least 75 percent of planned.

21. The Haiti country portfolio was dominated by the GFD emergency response to the 2008 hurricanes and the high food price crisis, and the 2010 response to the earthquake. Despite suffering many human, institutional and infrastructure losses, WFP was able to mobilize an unprecedented amount of resources quickly and distribute them to beneficiaries where assistance was most needed. In the scope of this evaluation, WFP was at its best when leading large-scale GFD operations.

22. School feeding and CFW/FFW were consistent priorities for WFP, representing averages of 36 and 25 percent, respectively, of the beneficiaries reached under the targeted food distribution portfolio. Mother-and-child health and nutrition (MCHN) was also a priority, but decreased significantly in relative importance in 2009 and 2010, dropping from an average of approximately 40 percent of the targeted food distribution portfolio from 2005 to 2008 to only 10 percent in 2009 and 15 percent in 2010. HIV/TB activities were significantly less of a focus, accounting for an average of 8 percent of targeted food distribution over the period.

23. The intended outputs and outcomes of successive operations vary significantly across years and programme categories. For the outputs that were measured – beneficiaries and food tonnage – there was also variability between actual results relative to planned, especially in more recent years.

**Figure 1: Planned versus Actual Beneficiaries and Tonnage, 2005–2010**



Source: WFP Haiti project document

24. In many sectors, performance indicators linked to objectives were generally not systematically collected and/or compiled during the CPE period. This is a result of diverse factors, including delays and weaknesses in the reports transmitted by cooperating partners. The evaluation team was able to measure indicators in some activities, such as recovery rate for MCHN activities, which was 50 percent in 2005 and 59 percent in 2009; the community asset score for CFW and FFW programmes; and qualitative beneficiary data regarding households' improved ability to cope with shocks through WFP food assistance.
25. While each sector may have faced individual challenges for the achievement of performance and results, common factors across activities include the following.
- **Changing development needs.** Recurring disasters in Haiti, along with changes in government policies, new donor priorities or updated information about the food security situation, can force WFP to change course, challenging its ability to achieve objectives outlined during programme design.
  - **Evolving corporate policy framework.** Changing WFP corporate policies and objectives can have an impact on programme design and implementation at the country level. It is challenging for long-term WFP staff to develop the expertise in specific protocols and modalities necessary for quick shifts to new developments in corporate priorities.
  - **Insufficient procedures and systems.** Corporate systems that are designed to ensure quality control and automation may in fact hamper efficiency in Haiti, given the country office's need to ramp up operations quickly. Introduction of the new WFP Information Network and Global System II (WINGS II), aimed at simplifying payment procedures, has done little to provide sub-offices with control over the processing of invoices before final payments are processed in Port-au-Prince. The processes for obtaining cheques for the payment of simple services are unnecessarily cumbersome. The multiplicity of delays and bottlenecks require in-depth analysis by system experts. The evaluation team also found that while country office staff are generally very aware of the funding available for different programme components, relatively little attention is devoted to understanding or controlling implementation costs. Information on implementation costs is generally communicated to only a few senior staff members, resulting in cost control not being perceived or promoted as a collective responsibility. WFP's challenge in this area is both systemic and operational. In the absence of an analytical accounting system it is difficult to determine the true costs of activities and operations with no food aid content. There is also little accountability for cost control at the programme management level.
  - **Reliance on cooperating partners.** The country office's ability to implement and monitor its activities depends on the strength of its network of cooperating partners across sectors. Many of the challenges WFP faces in achieving results are due to bottlenecks at the cooperating partner level — gaps in technical capacity, contractual backlogs or geographic dispersion, for example.

## CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### Overall Assessment

26. The Haiti country office had some remarkable successes given the extraordinarily challenging operating environment in Haiti during the evaluation period, which included civil and political unrest from 2005 to 2008 and the food, fuel and financial crises of

2007/08, in addition to recurring natural disasters. Operating within an integrated mission added to the complexity of the work, and the period also coincided with the launch of a new WFP Strategic Plan. The country office made great strides in partnering with the Government and in meeting the changing needs of the Haitian people during the phases of response, recovery and development. Activities in all operations in the country portfolio had to adapt to the recurring shifts from a development context to emergency and back to development. WFP's strengths over the period of evaluation were in its ability to respond quickly and effectively to emergencies.

⇒ *Alignment and strategic positioning*

27. While many advances have recently been made in strategic partnerships with the Government, the country office's planning and coordination with government counterparts was not always fully coordinated nor Government-led throughout the evaluation period. WFP's participation in the cluster system, especially its leadership in the logistics and food clusters, has been much appreciated by the humanitarian community and provides an example of WFP applying its core competencies when working as partner with other United Nations agencies and with NGOs to increase impact. There are many opportunities for more collaborative programming and synergies with development partners. Given the nature of the Haiti country portfolio, WFP's role in relation to Strategic Objective 1 has been of primary importance and is the area where WFP is strongest. In more targeted activities WFP faces the challenge of balancing corporate and government priorities, especially in a volatile post-emergency context.

⇒ *Making strategic choices*

28. The primary drivers of change to WFP's activities across the Haiti portfolio were the 2008 and 2010 emergencies. Within this context of emergency response, the country office also faced corresponding changes in the capacities and priorities of government, donor and cooperating partners, as well as changing corporate priorities that influenced its strategic choices. Through the VAM unit and the logistics cluster, WFP provides a valuable service to the development community in Haiti, particularly in the areas of food security analysis and logistics support. However, the evaluation team found that WFP's ability to base its strategic choices on these analytical data is often constrained. Systems are needed to improve communications, programme monitoring, M&E and reporting. Standards are needed to provide more consistent programming, improved monitoring, including post-distribution monitoring, and better reporting from partners, to facilitate the country office's ability to make more informed decisions.

⇒ *Portfolio performance and results*

29. The evaluation team aimed to evaluate WFP's performance in relation to the beneficiaries reached and the assistance provided, the objectives attained, the portfolio's contribution to national humanitarian and development changes, and the factors explaining results. This analysis can be summarized in terms of the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability of WFP's activities across operations, as discussed in the following paragraphs.

## Relevance

30. Over the 2005–2010 period, the WFP portfolio in Haiti consisted of activities in school feeding, MCHN, HIV/TB, CFW/FFW and GFD. While the size of the portfolio grew more than 20-fold, and the percentages of beneficiaries receiving assistance under each of these interventions changed in response to evolving development needs, all five

activities existed throughout the evaluation period, in line with development challenges in Haiti and with WFP's five Strategic Objectives. All WFP programme activities were relevant and appropriate given the levels of poverty and need in Haiti. Beneficiaries visited in all parts of the country expressed their appreciation of the assistance they received. Especially in the days and weeks following the earthquake, support to urban and peri-urban populations around Port-au-Prince clearly saved lives.

## **Effectiveness and Efficiency**

31. In a volatile environment such as Haiti, achieving objectives effectively and efficiently is a challenge, given not only the recurring natural disasters, but also the accompanying changes in national and international development priorities and WFP's corporate policy framework, insufficient processes and systems for this context, and very heavy reliance on the capacity of cooperating partners. The evaluation team observed consistent discrepancies between the planned beneficiary targets and the actual beneficiaries reached, across all sectors. This inconsistency seems to result largely from both deficiencies in the planning process and a lack of accountability for results. In addition, the shifts between a development and an emergency context, and the associated changes in funding levels and priorities have been challenges for the country office, from both a programme design and a systems perspective.
32. From a logistics perspective, the country office has proven capacity to react quickly to emergency situations. Thanks in large part to the high quality of logistics operations, the required volumes of food aid were procured, transported, stored and delivered in a timely manner in accordance with programme requests. WFP is at its best when it leads large-scale GFD operations. Even in response to the severe disasters Haiti has faced in the last few years, and its own significant organizational losses, WFP has been able to distribute an unprecedented amount of food aid quickly and efficiently. Generally satisfactory funding levels facilitated the continuation and relatively orderly implementation of activities in Haiti during the evaluation period. At times the operations suffered from the effects of less-regular contributions, but WFP took measures to mitigate those effects. When possible WFP made good use of the funding facilities provided under the Central Emergency Response Fund, the Immediate Response Account and the Working Capital Facility to overcome the difficulties created by resourcing gaps. It also made good use of borrowing food among projects. Procurement was able to take advantage of in-kind donations, transfers and loans of food among operations, and limited opportunities for local purchase, to ensure efficient food distribution.

## **Impact**

33. While it was clear that WFP was able to reach an enormous number of beneficiaries with both general and targeted distributions throughout the evaluation period, measuring the real impact of WFP activities is severely constrained by deficiencies in the M&E system. Other than conclusions that may be assumed from national indicators pointing to improved trends in the sectors where WFP works, and evidence of short-term benefits such as asset creation, there is very little potential for impact analysis. Currently, WFP's M&E system in Haiti measures inputs to its programmes – commodities and contributions received – effectively. WFP also tracks basic output data – amount of food/cash distributed and number of beneficiaries — but even basic beneficiary data are variable and inconsistent regarding baseline assumptions, such as individual versus family, and disaggregation. The many challenges to data collection include poor systems, insufficient institutional capacity for compilation or analysis, and unrealistic/inappropriate indicators in the programme documents for Haiti. Efforts to measure outcomes and development impact or to carry out

historical comparisons of the results of investments over time and space have proved inadequate. The lack of reliable data, and inconsistency in reporting, are frustrating to donors and partners and could hamper future funding for WFP. Inability to show the relative impact of WFP's interventions in such a competitive donor landscape is a critical disadvantage.

## **Sustainability**

34. In Haiti, nearly half of the total beneficiaries reached since 2005 have benefited from GFD initiatives in response to severe humanitarian crises. Although there have been efforts to build the Department of Civil Protection's capacity to deal with emergencies, it is unlikely that emergency food distribution activities can be handed over to the Government or local cooperating partners in the near future, without substantial additional resources and increased capacity development. Progress has been made towards hand-over of other targeted distribution interventions, but overwhelming food insecurity, weakened government capacity after the earthquake and recent political changes may impede further progress towards these goals. Regarding WFP's role in generating analytical information, significant efforts have been made to transfer capacity to local organizations such as the Haiti National Geographic Center and the National Food Security Coordination.

## **Issues for the Future**

35. One significant limiting factor is that the country portfolio has been viewed and managed as a set of discrete food assistance activities and operations, not as an integrated portfolio. Given the operations, logistics, procurement and cost structure, this approach is typical for WFP, but its influence on the staffing structure, resource allocation and programme decisions has resulted in a fragmented country portfolio. Understanding this challenge is crucial as WFP enters a post-emergency period of contraction.
36. The country office will have to track current political developments in Haiti carefully. There will likely be new government counterparts, which may necessitate increased dialogue and partnership efforts with the new political leadership. Changes in key interlocutors for the programme may emerge, and the country office will have to establish the same relationships of confidence and trust it currently has with the highest levels of the Government.
37. Given the importance of new initiatives such as CFW and local purchase to the political agenda and the international donor community in Haiti, the country office should explore new opportunities in these areas and prioritize the establishment of appropriate systems and processes, soliciting support from the regional bureau and Headquarters as needed.
38. WFP's activities in Haiti would benefit from more deliberate cross-sectoral alignment with the country's strategic vision for improving food security and nutrition. The tasks are enormous, and include supporting national policies, streamlining food and nutrition interventions within WFP, aligning them with WFP guidelines, and reinforcing complementary interventions. The Government's National Food and Nutrition Security Plan has been developed in accordance with the four pillars of availability, access, utilization and stability. For future country portfolio planning, the evaluation team recommends that WFP also envision its activities within this framework.

## Recommendations

39. **Recommendation 1:** The country office should improve its M&E systems to increase the consistency and reliability of data and to measure the impact of its operations. For an M&E system to be sustainable and scalable, a uniform coordinated system should be developed, but with responsibility for management of data decentralized to the sub-offices and programme divisions. This decentralization should be combined with supportive supervision and on-the-job training to ensure systematic collection of reliable quality data. There should also be a clear feedback loop for reporting to cooperating partners, donors and the Government that reinforces participation and partnership. A regular reporting function will also help WFP to make adjustments to mid-course programme design and improve future programming efforts.
40. **Recommendation 2:** The country office should ensure that logistics cluster activities continue to be funded and staff retained, to ensure the continuation of invaluable emergency preparedness and response activities. Logistics cluster activities are funded under special operation 200108, which is scheduled to end in December 2011; logistics capacity should be maintained under the PRRO 10844.
41. **Recommendation 3:** At the corporate level, WFP should conduct an in-depth review of its management and operational systems to identify the causes of the systemic procurement and processing problems that arise when operations shift from GFD programmes to more targeted food aid and cash transfer programmes. The complex monitoring and processing system for field-level agreements, and strong centralized payment processing structures under WINGS II, prevent WFP from achieving its objectives.
42. The evaluation identified that beyond a certain threshold WFP encounters difficulties in making operational and financial systems function smoothly and in maintaining the capacity and efficiency required to continue to deliver the volumes of food aid and cash planned in the project documents. This issue is considered beyond the reach of the Haiti country office and is therefore best addressed at corporate level.
43. **Recommendation 4:** The country office should improve its planning process in order to develop more realistic targets that can be better aligned with the realities of implementation. WFP should develop targets that take into account demographic data such as malnutrition levels and patients receiving anti-retroviral therapy along with past portfolio performance. Justifying the targets set forth in programme documents would help to explain any deviation from these targets and would improve programme planning, potentially increasing WFP's ability to mobilize funding.
44. **Recommendation 5:** The country office should explore the potential for integration across activities and with other partners, such as through a model school programme, to multiply impact and ensure that its efforts are achieving maximum results.
45. The school feeding, nutrition, HIV/TB and CFW/FFW activities should be reviewed to see how synergies could be achieved in future operations. It is recommended that a formal review of the scope, content and potential for integration within and across activities be conducted, with support from the regional bureau and Headquarters. WFP should also explore synergies and new avenues of collaboration with other United Nations agencies and partners.
46. **Recommendation 6:** Country office staff's awareness of the true costs of the various components of operations should be enhanced. Staff at all levels are aware of project funding and budget issues, but should also be involved in a permanent drive to save costs in the day-to-day running of operations.

47. **Recommendation 7:** The country office should take advantage of more ambitious and longer-term capacity development projects in emergency preparedness. Given the likelihood of recurring natural disasters in Haiti, it is important that the Government, through its emergency response agency, set up a dedicated network of warehouses where food reserves and equipment can be stored over longer periods. Such a project would align with the capacity development policy of WFP, lead the way towards a hand-over strategy for WFP and enhance Haiti's resilience to emergencies.
48. **Recommendation 8:** The country office should develop strategic partnerships with cooperating partners for rapid deployment in emergency and recovery operations. To reduce the contracting burden of managing so many cooperating partners and field-level agreements, the country office should explore tiered partnerships with selected partners across sectors. This would allow working with partners that provide supplementary services – such as nutritional training and capacity development – and contracting more quickly to move resources after an emergency; and would alleviate the management burden of working with many small partners.

# ANNEX



The designations employed and the presentation of material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the World Food Programme (WFP) concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its frontiers or boundaries.

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## ACRONYMS USED IN THE DOCUMENT

CFW	cash for work
CPE	country portfolio evaluation
EMOP	emergency operation
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FFW	food for work
GFD	general food distribution
M&E	monitoring and evaluation
MCHN	mother-and-child health and nutrition
NGO	non-governmental organization
TB	tuberculosis
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
VAM	vulnerability analysis and mapping
WINGS II	WFP Information Network and Global System II