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**Executive Board  
Second Regular Session**

**Rome, 12–14 November 2012**

# EVALUATION REPORTS

Agenda item 6

*For consideration*



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## SUMMARY EVALUATION REPORT – SOMALIA COUNTRY PORTFOLIO

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## NOTE TO THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

**This document is submitted to the Executive Board for consideration**

The Secretariat invites members of the Board who may have questions of a technical nature with regard to this document to contact the WFP staff focal points indicated below, preferably well in advance of the Board's meeting.

Director, OE\*:                      Ms H. Wedgwood                      tel.: 066513-2030

Evaluation Officer, OE:      Mr R. Smith                      tel.: 066513-3941

Should you have any questions regarding availability of documentation for the Executive Board, please contact Ms I. Carpitella, Senior Administrative Assistant, Conference Servicing Unit (tel.: 066513-2645).

\* Office of Evaluation

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Somalia country portfolio evaluation covered the period from 2006 to 2011.<sup>1</sup> It focused on three key evaluation questions: i) the alignment and strategic positioning of WFP's operations in Somalia, given the particularly challenging humanitarian situation and the complex geopolitical context, especially in south and central Somalia; ii) the factors that have driven WFP's strategic decision-making; and iii) the performance and results of WFP operations over the portfolio period. The evaluation serves the dual objectives of accountability and learning and was timed to provide lessons learned and recommendations for development of the next Somalia operation in 2013.

The WFP portfolio underwent significant change over the evaluation period, with 2009–2010 seeing increased insecurity, WFP's withdrawal and subsequent banning from southern Somalia, and several strategy and management changes.

The evaluation found that the alignment and strategic positioning of WFP's approach and collaborative work improved from late 2010. Prior to this there were many instances of unilateral decision-making and limited cooperation with other actors in Somalia. Recent work to improve the portfolio's responsiveness to local contexts within Somalia, and strategic planning with local authorities were found to be very positive developments. A major external challenge for WFP has been the lack of clarity between the political and humanitarian agendas of the United Nations. There has been explicit United Nations political backing for the Transitional Federal Government, but the principal humanitarian response was needed in areas outside the Transitional Federal Government's control.

WFP's decision-making made good use of data and analysis from the inter-agency Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit, but WFP faces many of the same data limitations in Somalia as other actors face. There is weak understanding of market dynamics within different regions of Somalia and of the impact of food assistance on different livelihood groups. Partially as a result of this, there is a gap in response analysis, affecting WFP and other actors and posing considerable risks to operational responsiveness in times of humanitarian crisis.

The evaluation found that WFP could have done more to understand and mitigate the contextual and reputational risks associated with its strategy to scale up food aid in 2008–2009. One consequence of WFP's loss of access to southern Somalia in 2010–2011 was to put already food-insecure populations at increased risk of crisis.


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<sup>1</sup> Up to the official declaration of famine in mid-2011.

The performance and results of the portfolio were measured primarily by output-level data, which showed a heavy emphasis on general food distribution. The evaluation fieldwork found general food distribution to be the most problematic intervention regarding accountability and beneficiary value. Recent food-for-assets and nutrition interventions were found to be more rigorous, demonstrated better results – although at very small scales – and were better received by beneficiary populations.

The evaluation makes five main recommendations with nine sub-recommendations to assist implementation. The recommendations seek to improve WFP’s area-based strategies, its understanding of the impact of food assistance on different livelihood groups and the approach to capacity development of both staff and counterparts. They suggest continuing recent initiatives to improve communication, outreach and cluster coordination.

## DRAFT DECISION\*



The Board takes note of “Summary Evaluation Report – Somalia Country Portfolio” (WFP/EB.2/2012/6-C) and the management response in WFP/EB.2/2012/6-C/Add.1 and encourages further action on the recommendations, taking into account considerations raised by the Board during its discussion.

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\* This is a draft decision. For the final decision adopted by the Board, please refer to the Decisions and Recommendations document issued at the end of the session.

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## INTRODUCTION

### Evaluation Features

1. The Somalia country portfolio evaluation (CPE) was conducted between September 2011 and May 2012 and covered the 2006–2011<sup>1</sup> portfolio period. It focused on three key evaluation questions: i) the alignment and strategic positioning of WFP's operations in Somalia, given the particularly challenging humanitarian situation and the complex geopolitical context, especially in south and central Somalia; ii) the factors that have driven WFP's strategic decision-making; and iii) the performance and results of WFP operations over the portfolio period. The evaluation serves the dual objectives of accountability and learning and was timed to provide lessons learned and recommendations for the development of the next Somalia operation in 2013.

### Context

2. Somalia is the most enduring case of the collapse of a modern state. Internal conflict has prevailed across most of southern and central Somalia for more than 20 years, exacerbated by both regional and global political agendas. A Transitional Federal Government (TFG), in place since 2004, has taken different forms and has the explicit support of neighbouring Ethiopia and the broader international community. However, the TFG lacks the capacity and resources to achieve its mandate, although it has established itself in the capital, Mogadishu, since August 2011. Much of the rest of southern Somalia remains under the control of *al-Shabaab*, a militant Islamic movement with an element of popular support. In the north, Somaliland is a self-declared independent entity and Puntland a semi-autonomous region; both regions have established governance and administrative structures that ensure relative peace and security, although border areas between the two remain contested.
3. The conflict in southern and central Somalia is the main factor in the country's positioning as one of the poorest and most food-insecure in the world. The collapse of basic services, particularly health and education, has mainly affected women and children. In recent years, multi-agency assessments have estimated that about 25 percent of the population of 7.5 million people<sup>2</sup> does not have access to sufficient food and therefore requires emergency food assistance.<sup>3</sup>
4. The situation is exacerbated by frequent and severe droughts,<sup>4</sup> rising global prices for food and fuel, and a significant reduction in the humanitarian space since 2008. Escalation of the conflict has made Somalia a particularly dangerous environment for aid workers, some of whom have been killed and kidnapped, and threats have been made against some aid agencies. Some organizations have left and others have been banned by *al-Shabaab*, which is suspicious of their intentions.

### WFP's Portfolio in Somalia

5. WFP is a leading agency in the overall humanitarian response in Somalia and is the single largest recipient of humanitarian funding, related to the level of food assistance

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<sup>2</sup> Population estimates vary from 7.5 million (Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP), 2011) to 9.1 million people (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2011); a figure of 7.5 million is used in most current United Nations documents.

<sup>3</sup> A large percentage of these people are internally displaced persons (IDPs) with disrupted livelihoods, who rely on external assistance.

<sup>4</sup> Most recently in 2005–2006, 2009 and 2011.

required across the country. During the portfolio period, WFP had direct expenses<sup>5</sup> of US\$825 million;<sup>6</sup> in 2009 it spent almost 60 percent of the entire United Nations budget in Somalia.<sup>7</sup> Between 2008 and 2011, WFP's requests for food assistance accounted for an average of 44 percent of the total CAP for Somalia (see Table below).

SOMALIA CAP 2006–2011						
Year	Principal factors	Target population	CAP total required (revised) (US\$)	WFP required (revised) (US\$)	WFP's % of total (food only)	No. of agencies
2006	Conflict; drought	2 100 000	326 718 040*	73 235 000	22.4	33
2007	Conflict; and floods	1 000 000	262 354 615**	57 794 749	22.0	47
2008	Conflict; chronic food insecurity	1 500 000	641 097 679	247 564 995	38.6	75
2009	Conflict; rising food costs; chronic food insecurity	3 200 000	918 844 550	449 541 386	53.3	100
2010	Conflict; drought; global recession	3 640 000	596 124 332	283 307 968	47.5	89
2011	Conflict; chronic food insecurity	2 000 000	561 469 946	191 605 662	34.1	109

\* CAP revised from US\$174,116,815; 83 percent of the increase was for additional food needs.

\*\* CAP revised from US\$237,112,824, for additional projects.

6. Two food assistance operations dominated the evaluation period: protracted relief and recovery operation 101911 from mid-2006, with 2.16 million beneficiaries; and emergency operation 108120 from mid-2009, which scaled up to cover 3.5 million beneficiaries including 1 million previously covered by the Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE).<sup>8</sup> The scale-up served the escalating numbers of people displaced by conflict, and the urban poor affected by high food prices and hyperinflation. The portfolio's emphasis was on emergency relief; recovery and livelihood support were not prominent until 2010.
7. During the evaluation period, CARE (in 2009) and WFP (in January 2010) suspended activities in *al-Shabaab*-controlled areas for security reasons and were then subsequently banned by *al-Shabaab*. This significantly affected the delivery of food assistance to critical areas of southern and central Somalia, including those areas affected by the 2011 famine. In 2009–2010, in both the media and the UNMG report of March 2010, allegations of food aid diversion were made against WFP staff and partners, undermining donor

<sup>5</sup> These exclude Programme Support and Administrative costs.


<sup>6</sup> WFP Annual Performance Reports 2006–2011. Rome.

<sup>7</sup> United Nations Monitoring Group (UNMG) on Somalia. 2010. Report of the United Nations Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1853 (2008), March. Available at [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/2010/91](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2010/91).

<sup>8</sup> The CPE focused principally on food assistance operations and not the special operations.

confidence in WFP. These factors resulted in a drastic fall in donor cash and in-kind contributions to WFP's operations in Somalia in 2010; contributions recovered only after the declaration of famine in July 2011 (see Figure 1).

**Figure 1: Total donor contributions 2006–2011  
for WFP operations in Somalia**



Source: WFP Government Donor Relations Division

## FINDINGS

### Alignment and Strategic Positioning

8. Multi-agency seasonal assessments, facilitated and reported by the Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit – Somalia (FSNAU), provide the principal reference point for aligning WFP's operations with the humanitarian and development needs of Somalia. The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) is an integral tool of the assessment and identifies the different phases of food insecurity and crisis across the country. The IPC is not a response analysis, but remains the principal reference for planning humanitarian interventions. This reflects a weakness within the humanitarian coordination system for Somalia, where there is insufficient debate or analysis of the relevance of different modalities of assistance.
9. Over the evaluation period, WFP has responded effectively to the FSNAU phase classification, targeting areas of food insecurity and crisis with commensurate food assistance, mainly through general food distribution (GFD),<sup>9</sup> with a more nutrition-focused approach through a targeted supplementary food (TSF) programme since 2010. However, the evaluation found limited evidence and understanding of the extent to which the food assistance delivered met the needs of the most vulnerable sectors of the target population and was relevant to the different livelihood zones of Somalia, including pastoralist households. Donated food entered the market system because beneficiaries often chose to sell part of what they received.

<sup>9</sup> Ninety percent of beneficiaries received GFD in 2008–2009.

10. Since 2010, the country office has developed operational strategies that better support communities in transition, enabling them to recover livelihoods and household assets and thus ensuring better coping capacity in future crises. This strategy has been a positive development and WFP should place greater emphasis on this area during the next major Somalia operation.
11. Regarding WFP's alignment with international good practice in humanitarian response (see Box), from 2011, WFP has considerably improved its accountability to donors, through regular meetings in Nairobi, and to functioning state authorities, through field-based regional allocation planning meetings. However, the evaluation found that this was not replicated to the same extent with cooperating partners and beneficiaries at the community level.
12. From 2006 to 2009, WFP played a central role in responding to increased food insecurity and assumed responsibility for CARE's area of operations after CARE's expulsion by *al-Shabaab*. However, the situation changed dramatically after WFP's own expulsion in January 2010 and release of the UNMG report in March 2010. The Somalia country office effectively became a closed shop during intense consultations between the country office and Headquarters in the first six months of 2010. WFP expected that its ban from key operational areas would be lifted, but this did not happen, and the country office demonstrated insufficient leadership to explore alternative ways of working or to advocate for other organizations to assume WFP's role in providing food assistance. Since late 2010, WFP has demonstrated strong institutional commitment to broader planning mechanisms such as the United Nations Somalia Assistance Strategy (UNSAS) 2011–2015 and the Horn of Africa Plan of Action.
13. The evaluation found that the Somalia food assistance cluster was dominated by WFP and its close partners, with insufficient debate on the relevance of different modalities of food assistance or an overall strategy for Somalia. At the start of 2010, there was no discussion of the implications of WFP's withdrawal from *al-Shabaab*-controlled areas. Since the famine declaration in July 2011, the Food Assistance Cluster has assumed a more strategic role, embracing the full range of humanitarian response options and considering the most appropriate role of food aid, vouchers, cash transfers and other interventions in ensuring an effective response.
14. WFP's operational base depends on working through international and local non-governmental organizations (NGOs),<sup>10</sup> but the country office's consultation and communication with cooperating partners regarding programme planning and operational decisions have been poor. The evaluation fieldwork revealed that this weakness has had

**Ten principles for good international engagement in fragile states and situations**

1. Take context as the starting point.
2. Do no harm.
3. Focus on state-building as the central objective.
4. Prioritize prevention.
5. Recognize the links between political security and development objectives.
6. Promote non-discrimination as the basis for inclusive and stable societies.
7. Align with local priorities in different ways in different contexts.
8. Agree on practical coordination mechanisms among international actors.
9. Act fast, but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance.
10. Avoid pockets of exclusion.

Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. OECD. 2007. *Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations*. Paris,

<sup>10</sup> At the end of 2009, the Somalia country office had field-level agreements with 181 NGOs.



many practical and political implications for NGOs delivering projects at the field level, leading to tensions between WFP and some major partners as recently as the 2011 famine response. WFP has recently introduced a closer liaison process with NGO partners at the field level.

15. A main challenge for WFP was the blurring of boundaries between the United Nations political and humanitarian agendas. There was explicit United Nations political backing for the TFG during this period, but the principal humanitarian response was needed in areas outside the TFG's control. This situation made it very important to ensure alignment with international good practices in conflict and fragile states, particularly given the scale of WFP operations. The evaluation noted that WFP's neutrality was brought into question over the selection of contractors<sup>7</sup> and that WFP gave inadequate consideration to the implications of delivering food aid in areas controlled by *al-Shabaab*, which was openly challenging such interventions in 2009.
16. In responding to humanitarian emergencies, WFP had very few opportunities to engage and align strategies with state actors, because the actors had limited capacity and had themselves been engaged in the conflict, such as the TFG in the south. There was some alignment in more stable northern areas, where WFP engaged with the health and education ministries. WFP's contribution to the Somali Nutrition Strategy 2011–2013 is an excellent example of inter-agency collaboration in support of the principal state authorities in Somalia.
17. The most strategic initiative with local authorities has been the decentralization of WFP's six-monthly allocation planning for food assistance – in Somaliland, Puntland and Central regions – since early 2011. This has facilitated the participation of government staff and ensured that interventions comply with local authorities' priorities and plans. The evaluation found this area-based approach to allocation planning and capacity development to be an important component of increasing WFP's responsiveness to local contexts. The evaluation suggests that developing area-based strategies will be crucial to continuing this work in the future.
18. In the absence of government-driven coordination mechanisms at the national level, it is particularly important that WFP – as a major humanitarian actor in Somalia – ensures coherence with its humanitarian partners. This has mainly been achieved through the sharing of information and planning undertaken by the Food Assistance Cluster and the multi-sectoral CAP, which focuses on the emergency response in a given year. The United Nations Transition Plan 2008–2010 and the UNSAS 2011–2015, with which WFP is engaged, provide the framework for prioritizing recovery and development programmes across the United Nations system.
19. WFP's relationship with other actors in the United Nations country team was problematic until 2010. This was partly because WFP was concerned with how the United Nations political agenda influenced humanitarian priorities in Somalia, while others in the United Nations perceived WFP as unilaterally determining its own plans and strategies to suit its food aid agenda. This conflict of views worsened when WFP withdrew from *al-Shabaab*-controlled areas without the prior knowledge of the United Nations country team. Since then, WFP has worked to improve these relations: WFP and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) signed a Joint Plan of Action with better definitions of roles and responsibilities in nutrition interventions; and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), UNICEF and WFP have started work on a joint strategy for building resilience to shocks in the Somalia context.

## Factors Driving WFP's Strategic Decision-Making

20. The country office's vulnerability analysis and mapping (VAM) unit is responsible for analysing national hunger, food security and nutrition issues. The unit is small for the scale and complexity of WFP operations in Somalia and relies considerably on FSNAU data and analysis. The VAM unit participates in fieldwork and analysis for FSNAU's biannual assessments and undertakes its own mapping, assessments, analysis and allocation planning. This level of collaboration and consensus on needs assessments is unique. The food security and vulnerability assessments allow a more accurate understanding of the underlying causes of food insecurity. However, the evaluation found insufficient analysis of the impact of food aid on local agricultural production and markets, and analysis undertaken by WFP's VAM unit was not widely shared with other agencies.
21. A review of how well WFP's analysis, based on FSNAU's figures for populations in crisis, translated into operations during the evaluation period indicated that actual beneficiary figures partially exceeded planned – which were consistent with FSNAU figures – until WFP's withdrawal from *al-Shabaab*-controlled areas in south-central Somalia, resulting in significant disparities from mid-2009. The analysis used by WFP appeared to correlate reasonably well with delivery on the ground; beneficiary numbers matched needs assessments unless external factors such as access issues and significant reductions in donor funding, as occurred later in 2009, constrained operational implementation.
22. Principal issues in the analysis relate to outdated and unreliable population figures, which are a concern across the humanitarian community, limited understanding of power relations and clan issues within target communities, and the need for more attention to urban poverty rather than just IDPs. The evaluation found gaps in WFP's response analysis and suggests that WFP do more to promote appropriate response analysis at the inter-agency level.
23. Since 2008, the country office has developed a more rigorous approach to monitoring and evaluation (M&E), with the requisite capacity at the field and country office levels to generate monthly reporting. Monthly reports provide updates on implementation quality, compliance and issues raised by beneficiaries or partners. The rigour of the reporting is considered a best practice within WFP. The target coverage for site monitoring by each area office is between 30 and 40 percent of all active food distribution points, which is well above monitoring targets for WFP elsewhere.
24. The M&E system is principally designed to capture diversion and non-compliance issues. It is strong on process and output indicators, but weak on outcomes, so does not provide a measure of the impact of food assistance on targeted individuals, communities and local markets. A consistent finding from the evaluation fieldwork was that beneficiaries felt they had inadequate direct consultation with WFP and insufficient feedback on what little consultation occurred. Their principal point of contact with WFP was through the field monitor visits. An issue-tracking database and beneficiary hotline were introduced in 2010. In 2011, 587 issues were recorded by the tracking system, but follow-up was cumbersome and slow; very few beneficiaries used the hotline.<sup>11</sup>
25. The contextual, programmatic and operational risks in Somalia have made it particularly challenging for WFP to ensure appropriate risk management. With respect to context, the evaluation concluded that WFP adopted a high-risk strategy from early 2009, when it

<sup>11</sup> With an average of only 2.5 calls per month between July 2011 and 2012, probably owing to lack of awareness.

became the only major food aid operator in *al-Shabaab*-controlled areas and significantly scaled up levels of food aid, in conflict with *al-Shabaab*'s agenda of agricultural self-sufficiency. There was no contingency planning for possible withdrawal, and insufficient consideration of the consequences of donor policy changes<sup>12</sup> and the increased risks to vulnerable populations from the withdrawal of WFP food aid in southern Somalia in early 2010.

26. Insufficient measures were taken to avoid reputational risk. During the 2007–2010 period, WFP adopted unilateral and internal working methods – engaging only with partners with which it was closely associated – and had a poor record on communications. This was exacerbated by WFP's corporate silence following the various allegations in 2009, and the lack of consultation with partners prior to its withdrawal from *al-Shabaab*-controlled areas in January 2010. The evaluation found a notable absence of a pro-active role on the part of the regional bureau and Headquarters, in limiting institutional risk during this period.
27. The operational risks in south-central Somalia have been very high. WFP was very exposed to these risks and has lost 14 staff members and contractors since 2006. National staff members, especially field monitors, spend long periods in the field and are the main interface between the beneficiaries and WFP. The evaluation suggests increasing staff capacity at the field level<sup>13</sup> as the existing situation presented a significant risk factor for monitoring, oversight and beneficiary engagement.


## Portfolio Performance and Results

28. WFP's operations grew substantially during the evaluation period, from 1.47 million beneficiaries in 2006, to 3.20 million – nearly half the population of Somalia – in 2009 (see Figure 2). This increase was driven by deterioration in the security situation in south-central Somalia, successive droughts and high food prices. Emergency relief, particularly GFD, predominated, with more than 300,000 mt distributed in 2009 (see Figure 2). From late 2010, TSF was introduced in preference to GFD, to reduce high inclusion errors. The proportion of nutrition interventions in total WFP activities consequently increased. Other elements of the new strategy were ceasing the provision of special assistance to long-standing IDPs and increasing the use of food for work (FFW) in emergencies, as a targeted alternative to GFD. These have been positive developments that should reduce the food aid dependency associated with certain areas of southern Somalia. Wet feeding is a self-targeting approach that has been operating in urban areas of Mogadishu since 2007.

<sup>12</sup> Until 2010, 60 percent of funding for WFP operations in Somalia came from United States government sources.

<sup>13</sup> WFP uses third-party programme assistance teams, but many stakeholders felt that although sometimes necessary in insecure locations, these were not a good replacement for field staff.

**Figure 2: Total beneficiaries and tonnage, Somalia 2006–2011**



Source: Somalia country office records.

29. In the framework of the Somalia country office's new emergency response strategy, the evaluation found particular groups that may be excluded from TSF: families with no children, the elderly, the disabled and the urban poor. In addition, there are opportunities for introducing other modalities such as food vouchers<sup>14</sup> – already being piloted in Burao in February 2012 – and conditional or unconditional cash transfers, which have logistic and access advantages over food aid.
30. Based on improved analysis of the food and nutrition security situation, the nutrition component of WFP's portfolio was significantly scaled up from 2010, with a range of activities including blanket supplementary feeding (BSF) for children in vulnerable situations, TSF for acutely malnourished children and pregnant and lactating women, and take-home rations for all children and mothers attending mother-and-child health (MCH) centres. Stakeholders, including state authorities, saw this nutrition focus as an appropriate response in preventing malnutrition and promoting MCH care. The approach is flexible and can be scaled up or down in response to needs and seasons.
31. While attendance at MCH centres increased significantly as a result of the interventions, there remains concern that the TSF programme's dependence on static centres could exclude some children in remote areas; there is therefore need for WFP to scale up a mobile programme in conjunction with UNICEF's Outpatient Therapeutic Programme (OTP), to ensure continuity of treatment and improved outreach. There is evidence that aligning the family ration with TSF has increased recovery rates, but also evidence that in some cases beneficiaries might maintain a child's low weight to ensure continuation of the ration. There is also potential for overlap between TSF and MCH.
32. Blanket supplementary feeding can provide only a temporary solution, especially in pastoralist areas of the north, as it does not address underlying causes of food insecurity. Food support to tuberculosis (TB) and HIV patients has proven highly effective in attracting people for screening and ensuring compliance with treatment regimes, leading to

<sup>14</sup> In collaboration with the Democratic Republic of the Congo country office, the Somalia country office began piloting food vouchers as a household ration under TSF, in Burao, Somaliland from February 2012.

a high cure rate for TB. However, as in several nutrition interventions, the supply of food has not always been consistent.

33. Activities under food security response included FFW, food for assets (FFA) and food for training (FFT). These represented only a very small fraction of the portfolio;<sup>15</sup> it took time for the country office to develop an institutional commitment to FFA. The projects require significant preparation, have been implemented in a piecemeal fashion and achieved relatively small gains. They have been particularly affected by pipeline breaks and their short-term nature is not compatible with training needs. The limited reach and technical competence of local NGO partners has been a major challenge. More strategic partnerships are needed for FFA to be implemented on a larger scale and to achieve greater impact.
34. The number of primary schools assisted through emergency school feeding increased from 118 in 2006 to 319 in 2009, when it peaked prior to WFP's withdrawal from south central Somalia. WFP supports about 10 percent of operational schools in areas where it has access. Recent results from an internal evaluation show that schools assisted by WFP attained the target 10 percent annual increase in enrolment in Somaliland, but not Puntland. Both areas demonstrated improvements in the proportion of girls enrolled.
35. Neither Somaliland nor Puntland has a central database for schools, so WFP depended on information generated by other United Nations agencies, which may have been at odds with regional education authorities. Attempts to engage ministries in assuming partial responsibility for monitoring have not been very successful, and are still principally driven by WFP. The emergency school feeding programme is still concentrated around major urban centres, with insufficient attention accorded to the far more food-insecure areas across the north.

## CONCLUSIONS

36. Some hard lessons have been learned from WFP's experience in Somalia from 2006 to 2010, the point at which WFP lost much of its credibility in the international humanitarian community. Since 2010, much has been achieved to restore WFP's reputation in Somalia and to make the operational priorities more relevant to the challenging context. However, although WFP draws upon the broad base of food and nutrition security analysis in Somalia, there is still insufficient understanding in the field of important clan dynamics and the appropriateness of alternative response options in different livelihood zones. WFP's weak coherence with state authorities and other humanitarian actors contributed to its loss of credibility during 2009–2010; now WFP is demonstrating greater inclusion of principal stakeholders in its planning processes, but needs to take better account of their complementary strategies with which it can engage.
37. Until 2010, WFP and CARE ensured sufficient coverage of food assistance interventions in Somalia; a lack of adequate planning meant that WFP's withdrawal from significant parts of southern and central Somalia had major implications because no alternative arrangements were sufficiently considered, even within the appropriate coordination mechanism. The issue was forced by the build-up to the declaration of famine in July 2011. The connectedness between emergency and transition in programme operations received more attention from 2010–2011, as WFP focused on more stable areas where there are opportunities to improve resilience in households and communities.

<sup>15</sup> Accounting for less than 1 percent of WFP food resource allocations in 2009 and 2010.

38. From 2006 to 2009, the Somalia country office demonstrated that it has the requisite capacity and skills to deliver emergency food aid efficiently, by exceeding planned outputs in a very challenging environment. The 2009–2010 allegations of diversions completely undermined both internal and external confidence in WFP, which justifiably focused its attention on strengthening compliance measures. Since 2010, WFP has made significant progress in improving effectiveness by focusing on nutrition in emergency response. Better use is being made of limited resources, and WFP has engaged more strategically with some principal humanitarian partners. There are, however, still important areas to be addressed, especially improved accountability to beneficiaries, better evidence of the impacts that different food assistance interventions have on food and nutrition-insecure households, and – for future sustainability – the need to build more effective capacity in viable state institutions concerned with disaster risk management and sector planning for education and health.

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## RECOMMENDATIONS

### Food Security Analysis

39. **Main recommendation 1:** The VAM Unit in the Somalia country office should be strengthened to provide food and nutrition security information that complements the assessments and analysis undertaken by FSNAU, the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) and other contributors. The information should mainly support WFP's capacity to make relevant and decisive strategic programme decisions, but should also contribute to improving the knowledge of both state actors and other humanitarian partners in planning and responding effectively. Specifically:

- 1a) Carry out independent studies with technical support from the regional bureau and Headquarters, to determine: i) the benefits that households of different compositions, wealth groups and livelihood zones derive from food assistance; ii) the impacts of food assistance on local agricultural and pastoralist economies, including the effect on labour markets within Somalia; and iii) the situation of the urban poor, as opposed to traditional IDP communities, with particular reference to gender and clan affiliation, to inform WFP's future targeting strategy. *(by mid-2013)*
- 1b) Improve the collection and analysis of data on food market economics in Somalia with technical support from the regional bureau and Headquarters, focusing on markets' capacity to respond to changes in demand through market-based responses, such as cash and vouchers, and the implications of cross-border trade flows on household access to essential food commodities, in collaboration with FEWS NET and FSNAU. *(by end 2013)*

## Strategy Development

40. **Main recommendation 2:** WFP should base the country strategy – developed within the framework of the overarching UNSAS strategy – on area-level strategies that take into account: i) the different political and security contexts of each area; ii) the diversity of livelihood zones; iii) the different emphases across the relief-development continuum, including contingency planning, emergency preparedness and response, recovery and transition; iv) alternative transfer modalities for food assistance – food-based, voucher-based and cash-based – that can be applied in different rural and urban situations; and v) the variable capacities of state authorities, institutions and humanitarian partners. Specifically:

- 2a) Where feasible, WFP area-level strategies should concentrate more on addressing the underlying causes of malnutrition through collaboration with principal partners – FAO, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the International Labour Organization (ILO) and UNICEF – that offer different and complementary expertise and competencies, thus ensuring: i) a concerted approach to building household and community resilience to shocks in the most vulnerable areas of Somalia; ii) better programming synergies and more effective use of resources, such as by integrating FFA into broader agricultural and pastoral development projects, and integrating TSF into the OTP; and iii) prioritizing interventions such as school feeding in areas of higher food and nutrition-insecurity where coverage is low. (*by end 2013*)

## Monitoring and Evaluation

41. **Main recommendation 3:** There should be a paradigm shift within WFP, increasing the emphasis on and incentives for measuring results. Information and analysis generated by the M&E Unit should be more than a compliance tool; it should more effectively inform and support WFP programming by providing first-hand information on the relevance and impacts of different interventions on different socio-economic groups, and should rely less on relatively weak secondary data. Specifically:

- 3a) Realistic and measurable outcome indicators should be developed with technical support from the regional bureau and Headquarters. The indicators should be directly attributable to different WFP programme interventions – especially innovative approaches such as TSF – incorporated into the M&E system and reported in Standardized Project Reports (SPRs) in addition to output data. (*for incorporation into the SPR 2013*)
- 3b) An outreach strategy must be developed that articulates how issues and concerns raised by beneficiaries and their communities, through field monitoring, will be taken into account and inform programme planning and design. (*by mid-2013*)

## Capacity Development

42. **Main recommendation 4:** WFP must have the requisite skills and resources for enhanced field monitoring and more effective capacity development of state authorities and cooperating partners in supporting assessments and implementing and reporting on WFP programme interventions, with close reference to other capacity development efforts of the United Nations system. Specifically:
- 4a) WFP should develop area offices' capacity to generate and analyse output and outcome information within their zones, supported by more trained field monitors with better understanding of the nutrition and food security objectives incorporated in WFP programming. *(by mid-2013)*
  - 4b) WFP should support capacity development objectives in the area-level strategies more effectively, focusing on the requisite capacity of government institutions mandated to fulfil emergency preparedness and disaster risk management – such as the National Environment Research and Disaster Preparedness and Management Authority in Somaliland and the Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management Agency in Puntland – and on planning departments in the education and health sectors. Capacity development should allow government offices to assume increased responsibility for information collection, monitoring and technical support to training, school feeding and nutrition interventions. *(by end-2013)*

## Communications and Coordination

43. **Main recommendation 5:** WFP must considerably improve its external consultations on and communication of analysis, programme planning and decision-making to ensure better transparency and greater accountability to its principal stakeholders. Specifically:
- 5a) WFP should build on recent initiatives in liaising regularly with donors and cooperating partners, at the country and area office levels respectively, by defining a communications and partnership strategy that identifies activities through which partners are regularly informed of programme developments and related issues, with technical support from the regional bureau and Headquarters. *(by mid-2013)*
  - 5b) As co-lead – with FAO – of the newly established food security cluster in Nairobi and at the field level, WFP should: i) facilitate consideration of a range of short- to long-term response options based on the food and nutrition security analysis available from FSNAU, FEWS NET and WFP; ii) define the roles that WFP, FAO and other partners can play in these responses; iii) share analysis, implementation plans, progress reports and M&E related to its food assistance programme with other principal actors; and iv) use the cluster as a forum for advocacy on alternative strategies in the event that a principal actor such as WFP cannot gain access to specific areas. *(by mid-2013)*



## ACRONYMS USED IN THE DOCUMENT

BSF	blanket supplementary feeding
CAP	Consolidated Appeals Process
CARE	Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere
CPE	country portfolio evaluation
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FEWS NET	Famine Early Warning Systems Network
FFA	food for assets
FFT	food for training
FFW	food for work
FSNAU	Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit – Somalia
GFD	general food distribution
HIV	human immunodeficiency virus
IDP	internally displaced person
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
ILO	International Labour Organization
IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
M&E	monitoring and evaluation
MCH	mother-and-child health
NGO	non-governmental organization
OTP	Outpatient Therapeutic Programme
SPR	Standardized Project Report
TB	tuberculosis
TFG	Transitional Federal Government (Somalia)
TSF	targeted supplementary feeding
UNICEF	United Nations Children’s Fund
UNMG	United Nations Monitoring Group
UNSAS	United Nations Somalia Assistance Strategy
VAM	vulnerability analysis and mapping