



TIMOR LESTE DISTRICT-LEVEL EMERGENCY FOOD SECURITY ASSESSMENT (EFSA)



August-September 2006

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Executive summary

Overview

An Emergency Food Security Assessment (EFSA) was carried out in August-September 2006 in 12 of Timor Leste's 13 districts to assess the impact of the political crisis triggered by the dismissal of almost 600 military personnel on 28 April 2006. The mass dismissal prompted anti-government protests, which subsequently degenerated into fighting between heavily armed groups, including the military, police and rebel factions. A state of emergency was declared by the President on 30 May for thirty days. Ministries, schools and private homes were looted despite the deployment of international forces. Some 150,000 people became internally displaced and more than 30 lost their lives.

The district-level assessment followed an EFSA in Dili in June 2006 and a Rapid Joint Assessment in July which highlighted a worsening of the food security situation in the country as a result of the crisis.

The general objectives of the EFSA were to:

- Assess the impact of the current violence and insecurity on livelihoods at the district level.
- Identify needs for food and non-food assistance in the next 3 to 8 months.

1,669 households were sampled using one stage random sampling based on GPS coordinates from the 2004 nationwide population census. Key informant interviews were also conducted in all districts at the village level as well as a market assessment involving interviews with small traders. Large traders were subsequently interviewed in Dili.

Timor Leste is a chronically food insecure country with poor economic, agricultural and nutritional indicators.

Key findings

The EFSA showed that nearly 20% of the sampled households had IDPs living with them in the past three months. Significantly, families hosting IDPs ('host families') were not found to be any more food insecure than those without IDPs. For example, there was no difference between the two in either the level of food stocks or in the coping strategies adopted to deal with food shortages; their food consumption scores were also the same. It should be noted, however, that households with IDPs have been receiving regular food aid since August.

72% of all households said that they had 50% less food stocks than normal and the remaining claimed that their stocks were at normal levels. Of those who had fewer food stocks, the main reasons given included post harvest and storage losses, lower yields than in previous years, and having more mouths to feed.

While 20% of the respondents indicated that there had been a change in the importance of activities for their household's income since the crisis, changes in expenditure were also noted. Food accounts for 66% of household expenditure, of which 43% is on rice. The WFP Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis in December 2005-January 2006 showed food accounting for 55% of total household expenditure, 24% of which was on rice.

There has been a large increase in market prices which is strongly correlated with the increase in international fuel prices in May that coincided with the political crisis. The largest increase in the price of rice compared to the same time last year has been in Ainaro district, with a 48% jump. Ainaro produces very little rice of its own and is thus dependent on imported rice that needs to be transported from Dili to the district capital. On the other hand, Dili and Aileu districts have hardly seen any increase over the corresponding period. The main reason could be the humanitarian assistance in the form of emergency food rations distributed since May to all IDPs, which has contributed to a stabilisation of market prices in Dili and also in Baucau.

The volume of goods sold now compared to the same time last year has for the large majority of traders not changed. The EFSA found that overall, 11% of traders sell more now while 68% sell the same volume of goods as at the same time last year. 14% sell less but not a lot less than last year.

Relying on less preferred and less expensive food was reported to be the main coping strategy at the time of this assessment's data collection. This is a normal strategy used during the lean season. The second most common strategy used by almost a fifth of the households is restricting the number of meals for the adults in the family. There are some interesting differences between the districts in terms of coping strategies reported by the households: in Covalima all coping strategies included are used by more than 10% of the population, while none of the coping strategies were used by more than 10% of the population in Ainaro. Of those IDPs who are living with host families, a quarter of them rely on the host, while the others plan to produce more, commute to Dili for work, sell some assets and or move somewhere else.

In 26% of district households with IDPs, the first member of the IDP family who intends to return to Dili will do so sometime in the next 6 months, while the first returnee will not return for at least 1 year or more in over 32% of households.

A seven day recall was included with slightly different food items than the CFSVA. However, a comparison is possible and shows that the percentage of households with poor food consumption has increased since 2005, but only marginally from 24% to 27%. The proportion of households having borderline consumption is very similar to last year. There is a slight decrease in the percentage of households that have a fairly good diet and those with good food consumption: this group has reduced from 40% to 35%. Baucau and Lautem are the districts with the highest percentage of households with poor food consumption; Ainaro and Manufahi have the best food intake.

Recommendations

IDPs in the districts – and thus indirectly their hosts – should receive support until the coming harvest in March 2007. Efforts should be made to have a timely and regular general food distribution.

Due to the much lesser food stocks than normal amongst a large proportion of households, there should be a focus on interventions that assist vulnerable groups in need of supplementary support – regardless of whether they are IDPs or not. WFP should continue expanding ongoing programmes aimed at assisting children under the age of 5, pregnant/lactating women and primary school children. WFP has already speeded up the expansion of these programmes and the government has also made a commitment to make food-for-education a national programme.

With the current uncertain political situation, WFP should carefully explore the possibility of starting food-for-work (FFW) and/or food-for-training (FFT) projects in select districts based on food insecurity and areas where they have the potential to succeed. FFW/T activities could focus on improving agricultural sustainability (irrigation projects, crop storage facilities to reduce crop losses, etc.) or on health and hygiene (latrine construction) through projects identified by the local communities. Community self-targeting could be used to select participating households and activities could also be linked to ongoing safety net programmes.

Efforts should also be made to strengthen long term development projects that existed prior to the crisis, in collaboration with FAO, UNDP and other stakeholders.

WFP should endeavour to support the Government of Timor Leste with seed protection rations (food-for-seed) if the need to protect seed stocks from being consumed in the next planting season arises. Projects aimed at reducing post harvest losses should also be introduced as they would help increase the amount of available crops at the household level each year. The period of time each year during which families face food shortages would likewise reduce significantly.

1. Objectives and methodology

The Emergency Food Security Assessment (EFSA) in the districts was carried out in August-September 2006 after recommendations made in the Dili EFSA in June and findings from the Rapid Joint Assessment (July) that clearly identified food security as a major concern in the wake of the crisis that broke in April.

1.1. Objectives

The general objectives of the EFSA are to:

- Assess the impact of the current crisis and insecurity on livelihoods at the district level.
- Identify needs for food and non-food assistance in the next 3 to 8 months.

The specific objectives are to:

- Describe and assess the current food security situation and livelihoods, especially with regards to possible impact of the political unrest on households/communities in the districts in terms of food availability, access and usage.
- Determine how different groups are coping with the situation and what plans have been made by households, communities, the Government of Timor Leste (GoTL), to re-establish their livelihoods when the immediate crisis is over.
- Estimate the number of people in need of food aid, the type of assistance they should be provided and the time frame for this.
- Identify the need for non-food assistance that may have been lost since the political crisis.

1.2. Methodology

The assessment was based mainly on primary data collected by 13 teams in all 12 districts outside the capital, Dili, plus the island of Atauro. 1,669 households were sampled using one stage random sampling based on GPS coordinates from the population census carried out in 2004. Key informant interviews were also conducted in all districts at the village level as well as a market assessment involving interviews of small traders. Large traders were subsequently interviewed in Dili.

The sampling size was calculated with a 90% confidence interval and a 7.5% margin of error. Each district was selected including an extra cluster to cover the IDP camps. The results are therefore – with 90% confidence – statistically representative for the districts.

Data on 1,384 households was finally analysed using SPSS computer software. The data was then compared with pre-crisis information collected during the CFSVA. The analysis assigned weights to districts based on the proportional sample size.

Table 1 - Households surveyed by district

District	Population ¹	EFSA Surveyed
Aileu	32,169	113
Ainaro	43,116	115
Baucau	87,524	112
Bobonaro	69,461	102
Covalima	44,437	101
Ermera	93,813	110
Lautem	49,368	111
Liquica	47,508	97
Manatuto	28,704	109
Manufahi	37,689	114
Oecussi	54,641	114
Viqueque	56,979	90
Atauro (Dili)	9,000	96
Total	654,409	1,384

¹ Census 2004

A total of 49 enumerators were engaged in the data collection. Of these, 27 enumerators provided by the GoTL (Ministry of Statistics) from the districts were trained by WFP for two days prior to the assessment, including GPS training and field testing of the questionnaires. An additional 22 staff selected by implementing partners assisted with the interviews in the districts where they usually work. These 22 were not directly trained by WFP but briefed by the 27 WFP-trained enumerators. The teams were supervised by one international staff during the first week of data entry and were in contact with the supervisor each evening by telephone to discuss problems and seek clarifications.

Secondary data has been drawn from a variety of sources including surveys, government statistics and informal conversations with key informants. This data is included throughout the report to add complementary information related to food security and the current situation in Timor Leste as a whole. The specific data sources are cited in footnotes.

1.3. Limitations

The training period for enumerators was brief but the overall timeframe did not allow for a longer session. Moreover, the 22 people selected by the implementing partners did not receive any formal training, but were instead guided by the 27 enumerators who had been trained by WFP. Their level of experience and training could be a limiting factor in the overall results. The market questionnaire was not included in the training and was thus interpreted by each enumerator according to his or her understanding. Some of the results should be interpreted with caution due to difficulties experienced during the data collection, data entry and cleaning of the data.

In addition, there were some difficulties with the translation to Bahasa Indonesia. For example, there are four words for rice in Bahasa Indonesia whereas in English there is only one.

Due to the EFSA taking place at a different time of the year (August-September) from the CFSVA (December-January), seasonal differences may have to be taken into account in considering households' responses. Moreover, some households were no longer living at the GPS coordinate that was recorded in 2004 when the population census was done. The closest household to the coordinate was selected instead.

Due to the security situation, the enumerators were occasionally stopped by the police in Covalima, Baucau and Bobonaro and informed that it was too dangerous to go to a selected household. In such instances, the enumerators had been trained to select the closest secure household as an alternative.

2. Socio-economic background – Pre-crisis conditions

2.1. Population and Health indicators

The population of Timor Leste is approximately 1 million. The capital Dili has a population of approximately 167,000 people. 43% of the population is under the age of fifteen and 17% is under the age of five. It is thus a very young population.

Table 2 - Key health indicators²

Indicator	Timor Leste	Urban	Rural East	Rural Central	Rural West
Total fertility rate (births/woman)	7.8	7.4	7.7	8.0	7.7
Under 5 mortality rate (per 1000 live births)	107	86	103	117	122
Births delivered in a health facility (%)	9.8	27	6.2	4.0	4.3
Children 12-23 months fully vaccinated (%)	17.8	19.4	21.9	18.4	8.9
Children exclusively breastfed <6months (%)	30.7	29.9	26.8	40.1	14.0
% Women with low BMI (<18.5)	37.7	31.5	35.3	39	46.7

Indicators from the rural western districts indicate a worse health situation in terms of both practices (breast feeding) and direct health implications such as malnutrition rates.

Figure 1 - Distribution of global stunting and wasting by region




Figure 1 shows the chronic and acute malnutrition situation in children under five in 2003. Since then, a number of anthropometric surveys have been carried out in different districts with different methodologies and at different times of the year. However, all assessments report a serious nutritional situation in Timor Leste with a combination of food, health and medical care-related underlying causes.

Table 3 - Past nutrition survey results

Past nutrition surveys' results				
Date	Organization	Area covered	Global Acute Malnutrition	Global Chronic Malnutrition
Aug.02	UNICEF - MICS	Countrywide	12%	47%
Dec.03	GTZ	Baucau, Viqueque	18.7%	54.1%
May.04	Oxfam Australia	Oecussi	17.8%	58%
Aug.04	Care Australia	Liquica, Covalima, Bobonaro	14.5% 12.9%	52.8% 58.9%
May.05	Care Australia	Covalima	16.6%	55.1

² DHS 2004 (Demographic Health Survey)

2.2. Socio-Economic background

Timor Leste is ranked 140 out of 175 countries in the UNDP Human Development Index and is the lowest ranking country in South East Asia. 40% of the population is estimated to live under the poverty line. In most countries this is set at US\$ 1 per day but in Timor Leste the level is set at US\$ 0.55 per day.³ The GDP per capita in 2001 was US\$ 466 and was steadily declining. In 2004 it had reached less than US\$ 400 and was ranked at the bottom of list (233/233)⁴. In terms of income earning abilities, large differences were found between Dili and district households.

In 2004, the adult literacy rate was only 50% (56.3% for males and 43.9% for females). Between 10% and 30% of primary school-age children are not in school – particularly those from the poorest families. Even when they do enroll, pupils tend to do so late and then have to repeat or drop out; fewer than half of the children entering primary school complete six years of education. There is also very little education outside normal school ages and few adults attend literacy classes, whether organized by the government or NGOs.⁵


Coffee is the major export of Timor Leste and the main source of cash income for a large proportion of the population.

Before recent events, the outlook for 2006 pointed to some acceleration in activity that would have raised non-oil economic growth to some 4-5 percent. Once security is re-established, the main economic policy challenge will be how best to use the new oil/gas wealth to lift the non-oil economy onto a higher growth path, reduce poverty and strengthen human development – given the still limited capacity. The authorities' basic strategy includes stepped up public investment, adherence to a sound and transparent oil/gas saving policy with the Petroleum Fund, continued macro-economic stability, and creation of a friendly environment for private investment. Progress on the strategy has been stronger on some fronts than on others and even before the recent crisis non-oil growth was still expected to fall short of that needed to significantly reduce poverty over the near and medium term

2.3. Livelihoods and vulnerability

82% of the workforce is said to be employed in the agricultural sector, 14% in the service sector and 4% in industry. In reality, combinations of activities are conducted by families in order to secure food for the family. The figure below shows the combination of livelihood activities that were recorded as most important in December 2005 when WFP conducted the CFSVA.

Figure 2 - Distribution of livelihood groups



³ UNDP Human development Report Timor Leste 2005

⁴ CIA World Fact Book.

⁵ UNDP Human development Report Timor Leste 2005

In the same assessment, it was found that nationally, 20% of households are considered to be food insecure, 23% to be highly vulnerable, 21% to be moderately vulnerable, and 36% to be food secure.

To define the Food Security and Vulnerability level, WFP ranked each household in terms of its food consumption and access rate to obtain a *Food Security Score* (1–4). The same cut-off points were used to divide the sampled households into 4 groups, ranking them as Food Insecure, Very Vulnerable, Moderately Vulnerable and Food Secure. Those cut-off points were: below/equal 1.50, between 1.51 and 2.50, between 2.51 and 3.50, above 3.51 (CFSVA December 2005-January 2006).


Based on the methodology described above, the four Food Security groups are detailed below:

Table 4 - Food security groups

Food Security groups			
Food Security category		% of the sample (weighted)	Ranking cut-off points
Food Insecure: households with generally poor or borderline food consumption and very weak food access; or households with weak or very weak access and poor consumption.		20%	Below/equal 1.50
Highly vulnerable: food-access and/or food-consumption are so insufficient that these households are close to being food insecure.		23%	1.51 – 2.50
Moderately vulnerable: food-access and/ or consumption are not good enough to categorize them as food secure.		21%	2.51 – 3.50
Food Secure: in general, fairly good to good food consumption and medium to good food access, includes also “good access + borderline consumption” and “good consumption + weak access”.		36%	Above 3.51
Total		100%	

These results are illustrated in the next map that shows the percentages of households vulnerable to food insecurity in different geographical zones of the country.

Map 1 - Food Insecure and Highly Vulnerable Population groups across Timor Leste



2.4. Market

Since independence, agricultural markets and trade have undergone significant changes in Timor Leste. Centralized collection and distribution systems regulated by a national logistics system (BULOG) during Indonesian rule were replaced by a free trade system. Strict enforcement of imports was replaced by a policy of very low tariffs for major agricultural products. Since then, there has been limited government involvement in agricultural marketing and trade. Farmers no longer enjoy subsidized agricultural inputs such as fertilizer or a guaranteed government purchase price. The government strategic grain reserve/stock has ceased to operate.

Timor Leste has been a rice importer for many years. The annual rice import from 2000 to 2002 is estimated at 35,000 to 40,000 MT, which increased to 55,831 MT in 2004. Rice has mainly been imported from Vietnam and Thailand in recent years. The country's cereal import dependence increased from 20% in 1990 to some 30% currently. Under the new system, private traders have gradually replaced the BULOG functions and perform well in rice imports and domestic distribution in the markets of Dili and all districts and sub-districts in the country. Marketing of imported rice at the sub-district level is done through many small traders who buy rice directly from importers in Dili and then sell to local consumers. Rice prices in domestic markets are determined mainly by international prices and international and domestic transportation costs.

Free trade has increased food availability during the lean season and during the year when there is significant domestic production failure due to natural disasters. Cereal market prices were quite stable in markets at all levels despite severe droughts and a significant reduction in local production in 2005. This reflected the availability of imported rice – although purchasing power is typically reduced in such situations.

However, free trade with low tariffs for rice imports has depressed the prices of domestically produced rice and maize and has diminished the large gap between domestic and world prices for cereals. Although good for the urban poor, free trade and the associated cheap imported rice has negatively impacted the food security of farmers, who account for over 90% of the rural population. As subsistence farmers, they produce for their own consumption but must sell a portion of their crops to meet cash needs for purchasing necessary family goods and to pay medical and school fees⁶.

2.5. Political history

Timor Leste is the 2nd youngest nation in the world and officially became independent from Indonesia on 20 May 2002, after four and a half centuries under Portuguese colonial rule and 24 years of Indonesian control. The way to independence was marked by widespread violence in 1999 which had immediate and wide ranging impacts on the socio-economic status of the country: almost 90% of the infrastructure was destroyed; electricity and communication lines were damaged; 80% of schools and clinics were closed; livestock was lost; and most agricultural assets, including all stocks of grain, were ruined⁷.

It was recognised at independence that a transition phase was needed in order to build up the country for self governance. A UN mission, UNMISET, was therefore established with 100 so-called "critical" civilian advisory positions and a further 200 "development positions" were created to provide additional advisory support during a period of four years. In addition, donors and other development partners put in place sizeable development programmes in many areas to support the development process.

3. General and demographic impact

The recent political strife began with anti-government protests over the dismissal of almost 600 military personnel on 28 April 2006, which led to fighting between heavily armed groups, including the military, police and rebel factions. A state of emergency was declared by the President on 30 May for thirty days. Ministries, schools and private homes were looted despite the deployment of international forces. Calm largely returned after Mr. Jose Ramos-Horta formed a new

⁶ Timor Leste Market Profile Report, May 2005

⁷ Asian development Bank, (Aug 2004-Jan 2005) *Gender and Nation Building in Timor-Leste: Country Gender Assessment*, , pg 12

government, replacing Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri, and the arrival of an Australian-led peacekeeping force.

3.1. Underlying causes of current crisis

As the August 2006 report of the UN Secretary General pointed out, while the primary underlying causes of the current crisis are political and institutional, poverty and its associated deprivations, including high urban unemployment and the absence of any prospect of meaningful involvement and employment opportunities in the foreseeable future, especially for young people, have also contributed to the crisis⁸. After two years of growth in 2000-2001, which was not strong enough to compensate for the estimated decline of the GDP by 38.5% in 1999, the non-oil economy has stagnated. Non-oil GDP per capita has contracted in each year since, and is expected to continue declining through 2007. Social indicators also remain poor: the population growth rate is the highest in the region, the number of people in absolute poverty has increased, and the incidence of infant mortality, while improved, remains high in relation to other countries in the region.

Transparency and accountability are other issues that were not adequately addressed from the beginning. Perception of increased corruption in the public administration and its negative impact on development is a matter of increasing concern among not only development partners, but also and more importantly, among the Timorese population. Furthermore, state institutions have become more vulnerable to charges of favouritism and collusion⁹.

3.2. Humanitarian impact

An EFSA took place in June in Dili sucos and IDP camps. At the time, over 63,000 people were displaced and lived in IDP sites within Dili, while a further 78,000 people had sought refuge in the districts outside the capital, living mainly with relatives but also in sites in three districts. 57% of the assessed population indicated that they had ceased their primary income or livelihood activity. Compared to the CFSVA of December 2005-January 2006, the number of households in Dili with a poor quality diet had increased from 15% to 48%.

Prices of food commodities increased significantly, particularly rice and vegetables. The availability of goods was severely reduced as the three main food markets and most traders had either closed or operated at limited capacity. The import of goods and rice from Indonesia had also come to an almost complete stop. 70% of respondents reported significant losses of household assets such as stored food, poultry, pigs, money and other goods (e.g. radios, TVs and stoves). The unrest had a large impact on housing with more than 30% of the assessed households reporting their homes looted or torched¹⁰.

As soon as the security situation allowed it, a multi-sectoral Rapid Joint Assessment was carried out of the IDPs living outside of Dili with participants from the GoTL, UN agencies and NGO partners. The assessment showed that all of the displaced in the districts had fled from Dili, most of them during the first week of unrest. The assessment further revealed that 96% of IDPs in the districts were living with host families. The main concern identified by the assessment was worsening food insecurity due to the sudden increase in the population. Limited food stocks and purchasing power meant that the regular lean season would most likely arrive earlier and be more severe than during a normal year. General health conditions of the IDPs were not found to have deteriorated as a result of their displacement, however. Although primary education had continued almost uninterrupted, people had difficulties paying fees and some IDPs did not want to be enrolled in school; university students also missed the semester and their exams¹¹.

The overall livelihood and security situation in September-October has unfortunately not changed much since the outbreak of civil unrest in April. The international armed forces (Australia, New Zealand and Malaysia) that arrived in May have significantly reduced in number and primary policing duties have been taken over by a rapidly deploying UN police force. It is believed that police patrolling is needed to bring stability back to neighbourhoods in Dili and an estimated 800 UN police will be in place by the end of September; this number will go up to 1,600 personnel by early 2007. The UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) has an initial six-month mandate to assist in elections due in May next year and strengthen the police and justice system.

⁸ Secretary General's Report on Timor Leste, August 2006

⁹ UN Multi-Disciplinary Assessment Mission to Timor Leste

¹⁰ EFSA-Dili, WFP June 2006

¹¹ Joint Rapid Assessment, June 2006


A large number of people remain in camps or with host families. There has not been a head count of IDPs and thus their true number is unknown. Food that is not distributed in camps in Dili is brought back which indicates that the number has reduced. It has been agreed that the Site Liaison Support (SLS) should estimate the number of people currently living in camps in order to get a better picture but this has not yet been done. In August, WFP distributed food to 69,000 people in Dili camps, a reduction of approximately 4,000 people since June. Some of these have returned home and some have moved to the districts and thus remain internally displaced. As of September 2006, some 103,000 IDPs were estimated to be in the districts.

This assessment does indicate that 20% of the households are currently hosting IDPs or have done so in the past three months. The majority of those have seen their family size increase by more than 6 persons. Interestingly though, more than 50% of households who have or had IDPs staying with them in the past 3 months have had some members of IDP families move back to Dili or to other households.

In 26% of district households with IDPs, the first member of the IDP family who intends to return to Dili will do so sometime in the next 6 months, while in over 32% of households the first returnee will not return for at least 1 year or more.

Map 2 below shows the resident IDP population vis-à-vis the total population in each district (2004 census figures). By far, the largest concentrations of IDPs are in Dili and Baucau districts.

Map 2 - Total population in relation to total IDPs by district



Of the randomly selected households, the next table shows the percentage of enumerated households hosting IDPs. This could account for some of the differences in results seen at the district level.

Table 5 - Percentage of households with IDPs

District	Total households	Number of households with IDPs	Percentage of households with IDPs
Aileu	113	6	5.3%
Ainaro	115	9	7.8%
Baucau	112	54	48.2%
Bobonaro	102	29	28.4%
Covalima	101	1	1.0%
Ermera	110	3	2.7%
Lautem	111	31	27.9%
Liquica	97	4	4.1%
Manatuto	109	27	24.8%
Manufahi	114	32	28.1%
Oecussi	113	22	19.5%
Viqueque	90	23	25.6%
Atauro (Dili)	96	16	16.7%
Total	1,383	257	18.6%

3.3. WFP response to date

Since the crisis began in April, WFP has increased the School Feeding programme's coverage from 19,000 students to over 54,000 in its Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO) that runs until November 2007. There is a plan to expand the programme steadily through to November 2007 when 107,000 school children will be covered (see annex 9 for a detailed breakdown). This programme has the full support of the GoTL, which has made a commitment to make food-for-education a national programme.

The Maternal and Child Health (MCH) programme has also grown substantially after the crisis in order to address food insecurity and malnutrition in the districts. There were seven districts identified in the PRRO document and thus MCH programmes are already in place in Liquica, Ainaro, Bobonaro, Covalima, Oecussi and Baucau. In September 2006, some 24,000 beneficiaries, including pregnant/lactating women and malnourished children under the age of 5 were being reached which will increase to 30,800 in December and 45,000 by November 2007. The targeting criteria is according to the GoTL i.e. pregnant and lactating mothers with a MUAC (mid upper arm circumference) less than 23 cm and children less than 5 years old with a weight-for-age less than 80% of median.

In collaboration with the GoTL, IDPs in Dili and the districts are receiving food assistance. The GoTL has until October delivered rice to IDPs in Dili, Lautem, Baucau, Viqueque, Aileu, Ermera, Liquica and Bobonaro. In these districts, WFP has supplemented government rice with beans and oil. In the remaining five districts, WFP has distributed a full food basket, including rice. As of October, GoTL will hand over the distribution of rice to IDPs in the districts to WFP. In November, rice distribution to IDPs in Dili will also be handed over to WFP. The GoTL will then focus on other vulnerable groups such as elderly, orphans, single-female headed households, veterans etc.

In total, the estimated beneficiary number covered by WFP in September is 149,633¹² plus School Feeding and MCH programmes.

3.4 Other organizations' food security response

FAO is currently concerned about the coming maize planting season and reports indicate that seeds were consumed during the peak of the unrest in May and June when the markets were closed. The plan is to provide maize seeds to 20,000 farming households with access to more than 0.5 Ha of land each.

UNDP launched a cash-for-work project through the Flash Appeal in June for Dili in response to the crisis for 6,500 people. This project is fully funded and is running well with 45% female participation and 55% by youth. Each person works for two weeks and is paid US\$ 2/day. 85% of

¹² WFP-Dili, Sept-06

participants were previously unemployed, indicating a well suited self-targeting. Participation by IDPs in Dili is as low as 6% which might be due to the fact that they don't feel comfortable and/or safe working around town. The plan is to expand this to all 13 districts for a period of 6 months if funding can be secured.

UNDP's pre-crisis development projects are in principle functioning again after having stopped for a few weeks in May and June.

In addition to UN Agencies, a number of NGO activities focus on food security, including supplementary feeding. Concern and CARE conduct supplementary feeding programmes targeting pregnant women, lactating mothers and children under five. OXFAM's supplementary feeding programme is in Oecussi and supports under five in remote areas, which complements WFP activities in the health posts.

OXFAM's Food Security programmes focus on seed storage, seed distribution, vulnerability assessment, community-based disaster management, seed trials and land quality assessment in Oecussi and Covalima.


OXFAM, Concern and Care are also engaged in limited local procurement and local production of a maize-mung bean blend. In the case of Oxfam, a micro nutrient mix is added as well.

4. Food availability and markets

4.1. Agriculture

Figure 3 shows the different types of agriculture that are practiced in the assessed aldeias. There are very few major rice producing districts: only Baucau and Manatuto are two areas where rice production accounts for approximately 50% of the total agricultural production. Aileu is mainly bush land, while coffee plantations are found in Ainaro, Ermera, Liquica and Manufahi. The large majority of aldeias throughout the districts are engaged in a mixed maize and rice production.

Figure 3 - Agricultural types



Despite residual effects of the poor harvest in the previous two consecutive agricultural seasons, cereal production in the 2005-2006 season improved due to a combination of factors, including rainfall patterns favouring larger areas of the country¹³.


There has, however, been a reduction in production in Bobonaro, Ainaro and Viqueque, while in Aileu it has remained the same. As has been stated in many reports, Timor Leste is a food deficit country and figure 4 shows the individual deficit by district based on population figures. It is only Lautem that has a slight surplus in production, but it is not a stable surplus as they broke even in last year's harvest. As mentioned earlier, even in a good year the food balance is supplied by imported cereal grain for retail sale aid namely rice, wheat based noodles, and vegetable oils and government and international food aid.

¹³ FAO

Two main scenarios were explored when developing figure 4 below. The cereal (maize and rice) production data provided by FAO of 43,473 MT of milled rice and 107,510 MT of maize has been calculated on a yield per hectare harvested and an estimated area planted basis. Cassava yields have been provided on the same basis and have been converted into cereal equivalents as this provides a large portion of the energy needs of the rural populations of Timor Leste. The production data of cassava is 16,832 MT¹⁴. This provides an overall Cereal Equivalent production of 167,815 MT for the country. A second scenario takes into account post-harvest losses as well as areas that were affected by natural disasters suggesting a more pessimistic national Cereal Equivalent production figure of 132,009 MT.

Given that the population of Timor Leste has a cereal requirement of 142,226 MT (rice and maize) and other energy food requirements of 74,856 MT, the current production levels leave a 2006 deficit of 49,267 MT in the optimistic FAO data scenario or a deficit of 85,073 MT in the pessimistic scenario, taking into account post-harvest and isolated crop losses in the districts.

Figure 4 - Comparing the 2005 and 2006 harvests



source: FAO

93% of the key informants interviewed say that the harvest was not affected by the political crisis.

Several limitations to the production systems ensure consistent low yields throughout the country and distinguish farming practices in Timor Leste from those prevalent in most other Asian countries. If the household food requirements are not met, an income source to supplement this food production will be required to purchase extra food. The limitations include:

Geology: Food security, production and subsequent income generation from agricultural production are primarily limited by the geology of the landscape. The primary base of marine sediments and the lack of volcanic activity when the island nation was formed have led to soil formations with low nutrient content. Consequent destruction of forest and native ground cover, along with the effects of a tropical climate, has led to soil organic matter levels declining, rendering the soils inherently low in fertility.

Farmland: Poor access to adequate farmland, particularly irrigated land, can limit food availability at the household level. Water storage for irrigation is not part of the community infrastructure or

¹⁴ Cassava has a 32% cereal equivalent to rice and maize.

household culture. Total rainfall is generally adequate for agriculture, however deforestation, erosion, and lack of soil and water management ensure excessive water runoff down the short but rapid flowing, sediment-filled rivers.

Farmland is limited by soil type, soil depth, slope and water retention ability. Only 8.2% of Timor Leste has arable land while 4.6% of the country is covered with permanent food or commercial plantations. Farming techniques are often not suited to the soil or its improvement, hence yields have been declining; moreover, most farmers practice 'slash and burn' techniques.

While the average farm size is small (average 1.2 ha; source Timor Leste Living Standards Survey), it is the proportion utilised that is problematic. Farming is limited by the amount of 'work' (manpower, seed, time) that is required rather than by population pressure. As a result of small farmlands and lack of manpower, a household does not cultivate more than 1 hectare/year and rarely yield 1 tonne of cereal or carbohydrate equivalents/hectare, thereby ensuring that food requirements are rarely met from production.

Other factors influencing land utilisation rates include: (i) shifting cultivation practices with a short 'resting phase', most often exploited by soil depleting weeds as the primary colonisers; (ii) declining soil fertility; (iii) land tenure; (iv) lack of pre-harvest labour saving technology such as weeding and cultivation; (v) lack of harvesting and post harvest technology such as milling and storage; (vi) a trend towards young adults migrating to Dili; and (vii) a limited ability to employ workers. These variables limit the ability of district populations to significantly increase production levels to cater for regular needs as well as increased needs caused by the current crisis.

Weeds: Weed control is limited only to reducing competition to the maize or rice crops rather than to enhancing soil fertility. Often, hand weeding occurs too late in the growth of the crop thereby reducing the maximum potential yield. Purposeful mulching or composting of weeds is not common. Weeding practices, as determined by available human resources and technology, are the main factor preventing cultivation of extra land. They also contribute to limiting crop growth by competing for limited soil water and nutrients.


Seed: The quality, variety and availability of seeds limit food production. While seed varieties used are often locally adapted, they are low yielding and prone to crop losses. Rice seeds are prone to shattering at the grain maturing stage and vulnerable to seed loss the grain is easily dislodged off the panicle at harvest. Similarly, local maize varieties have inherently low yields.

Pre-harvest and post-harvest losses: Pests including stem, root and seed destroying insects, grasshoppers and rats cause significant damage to standing crops. The EFSA monitoring mission discovered that although crops grew well for most of the 2006 season, significant losses by seed-destroying insects and rats possibly meant that reported yields were over-estimated.

Post-harvest losses are significant and are estimated at approximately 25% for maize, 50% for paddy rice yields and 10% for cassava. This is due to: (i) weevils, borers, rats, and birds; (ii) drying, milling and food preparation techniques; and (iii) delayed harvesting, drying, milling and storage.

Crop losses are a great problem and the main causes as reported by the key informants in this assessment are presented below. These have not changed with the current crisis and thus are chronic issues. Deforestation is of serious concern which directly and indirectly contributes to a worsening effect by floods and wind.

Figure 5 - Causes of crop losses



* Note that these are terms used by farmers in the districts and do not comply with any strict definitions of drought, flood or wind caused crop losses. Drought can be described as a period (in excess 2-3 weeks without a rainfall event in excess of 10 mm/day) in the maize growing season that limits the growth of the crop. Heavy rain and wind can be physically damaging to crops and soil, however the health of the plant (stalk thickness, leaf vigour and root strength) are the primary cause of the damage arising from heavy rain or wind events.

75% of the farmers get their seeds from their own production, 17% purchase seeds and 7% say that seeds are provided to them.

4.2. Markets

The most frequently used mode of transport is by foot (78% of the population) and buses are used by 21%. 63% percent of the villages included in the assessment have their own regular village market, while 37% have no market but walk to other villages.

4.2.1. Prices

The prices reported by traders and key informants are higher than pre-crisis levels (before April) but lower than the highest price during the peak of the political unrest.

Table 6 - Rice prices by district 2005-2006

	Oct-05	Mar-06	Change in percentage since Oct-05	Jun-06	Sep-06	Change in percentage since Oct-05
Dili	11.75	12	2%	13	12.25	4%
Lautem	13.5	16	19%	20	17.5	30%
Viqueque	15	14.9	-1%	17.75	16.5	10%
Ainaro	14.5	14.15	-2%	21.15	21.43	48%
Bobonaro	13	15.15	17%	18	15.86	22%
Baucau	13	13.2	2%	14.3	14	8%
Ermera	14	13.9	-1%	17.3	15.7	12%
Covalima	14	15.15	8%	17.3	18.9	35%
Oecussi	15.5	16.2	5%	18.3	17.85	15%
Aileu	12.5	13	4%	15	13	4%

Source: Market Profile report and key informants

As seen in table 6, the price of rice in Lautem and Bobonaro had already increased significantly before the crisis and has further increased since. The largest increase in the price of rice compared to the same time last year is in Ainaro with a 48% increase. Ainaro produces very little rice of its own and thus is dependent on imported rice that needs to be transported there from the port in Dili. The highest mountain in Timor Leste is situated in the district of Ainaro and the

relatively good road goes only to the district town; after that a small bus transports goods further on a weekly basis and thus can explain the high price of imported goods.

Dili and Aileu on the other hand have hardly seen any increase at all. The main reason could be the large amount of humanitarian aid in emergency food rations distributed since May to all IDPs which have managed to stabilise the market prices in Dili and Baucau. These districts have also limited need for transportation.

The price of other food items like poultry has also increased but this would not have been affected by transport and fuel costs as it is produced locally. It could thus be demand and supply driven.


Table 7 - Poultry prices

Price of Poultry				
	March -06	June-06	Sept-06	% difference
Lautem	2	3	2.5	25%
Viqueque	2.90	3.50	2.90	0%
Ainaro	3.90	6.30	6.60	70%
Bobonaro	3	5.25	3.5	17%
Baucau	2.10	2.25	2.25	7%
Ermera	4.60	7.30	6.70	47%
Manufahi	2.80	2.80	3	8%
Oecussi	2.30	2.20	2.15	-5%
Aileu	1.50	3	2.50	67%

During the same period, fuel prices increased by 28%, explaining some of the market price increases. The petrol price fluctuated slightly over the year but increased substantially in May, coinciding with the crisis. The price has remained at US\$1 in Dili and is caused by a combination of an increase in the international price and profit making. As many as 84% of the interviewed traders in the districts reported that the increased price of transport was the main factor for their increased market prices as well as a current reduction in transport availability.

Figure 6 confirms that the fuel price increase is significantly transmitted to the price of rice at the district level. By calculating the correlations, it shows that the price of rice in Aileu has a slightly lower correlation as compared to other districts.

Figure 6 - Petrol prices and the district price of rice




4.2.2 Small traders

79 small traders were interviewed in the districts in August and September (53% male and 47% female traders). 61% operate in markets that function daily whilst 37% are weekly markets. Only 3% of the markets in the villages included in the trader's questionnaire are open fortnightly.

There has hardly been any change in the type of items sold now compared to the same time last year, thus the political crisis has not affected traders in terms of access to certain goods nor have they taken the opportunity afforded by the crisis to sell other items. Demand aspects do not seem to have shifted to, for example, cheaper staples.


Figure 7 - Items sold by traders in the districts



The volume of items sold now compared to the same time last year has for the large majority of traders not changed. Some traders claim that they sell less cassava and meat but nearly the same number of traders report that they sell more, hence there is no real pattern linked to the change. Overall, 11% of traders sell more now whilst 68% sell the same volume of goods as at the same time last year. 14% sell less but not a lot less than last year.

The large majority said yes to the question whether the trader could supply more products if there were enough costumers.

Figure 8 - Sources of goods



The sources of goods have not changed much since the crisis but there is a clear shift from using a middleman to going straight to the wholesaler. There is also a small but important increase in selling goods from the local area. This is most likely a result of people not wanting to travel to Dili for security reasons.

Buying on credit is not a common practice in Timor Leste and this has not changed with the crisis but rather reinforced it. Most traders do not buy goods on credit (90%)

and they do not generally give credit to customers. However, some 20% of the traders do occasionally give credit.

On the question regarding level of activity in the market, nearly two-thirds of the interviewed traders report it as being either active or calm while a third report it as being slow. This is similar to normal conditions.

4.2.3. Wholesaler

The wholesalers of rice in Dili that were interviewed report that port costs have increased from US\$ 1500 to US\$ 2000/day and whilst before it took on average 2-3 days to offload a ship, since

the crisis it takes on average a full week leading to an extra total cost of \$10,000 per ship. This converts to an increased cost of 0.76 cents/bag. This is due to a large reduction in the number of staff according to the port authorities. The port had 25 workers before the crisis and now 7 remain, the others have either fled to the districts or are afraid to work in the port which has an IDP camp just in front of it. Before the crisis the port was operational also at night time but this is no longer the case due to security concerns.

The majority of the rice currently traded is from Vietnam. The amount of imported rice has reduced by 50% compared to before the political crisis. In Dili sales of rice have reduced by 30-50%, due to humanitarian distributions and thus reduced demand. However, it is recognised that even though the market could provide sufficient quantities, people's purchasing power has greatly reduced in Dili.

4.2.4. Cash crops

Coffee, as mentioned earlier, is the main source of cash income for a large proportion of the population. It contributes yearly with approximately US\$ 8 million to the economy. The political crisis in May could not have happened at a worse time. This is the time when the coffee beans have to be picked, stored and transported but due to the crisis beans were not picked in time and instead fell on the ground and hence regarded as trash coffee. Simultaneously, due to security concerns, transportation in May and June was greatly reduced and thus coffee growers could not transport the coffee to Dili. According to Co-operativa Café Timor (CCT), a quarter to a third of the low altitude coffee was lost due to the crisis.


For vanilla the timing of the crisis was also the worst possible and 50% of a predicted harvest of 4 MT was lost. Farmers were too afraid to travel to Dili, transportation was limited as mentioned earlier and by the time they were able to transport the vanilla to Dili, it was spoiled.

5. Livelihoods and households' access to food

5.1. Income sources


Sampled households were asked to identify the relative contribution of 9 potential income sources to their livelihood (food and income) using proportional piling with 100 seeds. As several sets of activities constitute the income portfolio of surveyed households, it is necessary, for the purposes of analysis, to determine which types of combinations are common across the sample. Using the information gathered on the relative contribution of the 9 potential income sources, a cluster analysis was run, resulting in seven livelihood profiles. Timorese are largely subsistence farmers and thus produce most of their own needs.

Figure 9 - Distribution of livelihood groups



The representation of livelihood groups by district is presented in the figure below. There are key differences between subsistence farmers in the various districts. Ainaro and Baucau have a large proportion of farmers engaged in trade. Aileu farmers are to a very large extent engaged in selling agricultural produce – this being mainly vegetables to Dili – and also have some employment. Manatuto and Liquica on the other hand are more engaged in producing/gathering non-food items that they later sell. The majority of the farmers in Ermera, Lautem and Atauro are pure subsistence farmers with little involvement in other income-generating activities.

Figure 10 - Livelihood groups by district



Only 20% indicated that there had been a change in the importance of the activity for the household's livelihood since after the crisis, whilst 81% of the households indicated a change in the proportion of the main activity, which had reduced after the crisis.

The assessment asked households if the number of small animals they owned had changed with the political conflict. Only some 40% of the households replied and of those, 24% had sold some animals to get money. Only some 9% had slaughtered an animal for their own consumption and the same percentage said that the number of animals had changed, but this was due to the death of the animal.

72% of all households said that they had 50% less food stocks than normal and the remaining claimed that their stocks were normal. Of those who had less stock, the main reason given for this were post harvest and storage losses and having received lower yields than in previous years.

There has been speculation regarding the consumption of seeds and this assessment can confirm that this has been done to some degree by 32% of the households. The large majority did not respond to the question, however. In order to improve next year's yield, as many as 59% will plant more land; 42% will purchase improved seeds; 18% will use fertilisers; 14% insecticides; and some 13% plan to plant new crops. The large majority of households report that these plans did not differ from those prior to the crisis.

Table 8 shows food stocks by households with and without IDPs living with them. There is no evidence indicating that households with IDPs are worse off than those not supporting IDPs. However, of those households who had less than half of normal stocks, 23% reported that this was caused by having more mouths to feed, which could be an indication of the impact of IDPs on host households in the initial months of the crisis prior to the regular delivery of food assistance in the districts.

Table 8 - More or less food stored than last year

More or less food stored than last year at the same time (weighted values)				
	About 50% less than normal	Around normal	About 50% more than normal	Total
Percentage of HHs without IDPs	71.8%	27.1%	0.6%	100.0%
Percentage of HHs with IDPs	74.2%	24.7%	1.1%	100.0%
Total	72.3%	26.6%	0.7%	100.0%

5.2. Expenditures

The two figures below show the expenditure results from this assessment (figure 11) and December 2005 (figure 12). In the pre-crisis CFSVA conducted in December 2005-January 2006, a similar question was asked which showed that 55% of the monthly expenditures was allocated to food. A statistical comparison cannot be made as the items in both assessments were not the same. In this assessment the proportion spent on food has increased to 65%. The important change is the allocation spent on rice that is now nearly 43% whilst in 2005 it was 24% and the differences are most likely caused by increased prices. Nevertheless, 65% is still not an alarming proportion.

Figure 11 - Breakdown of household expenditure






Figure 12 - Food and non-food expenditure




There are some clear differences between the districts in terms of expenditure. Whilst rice requests are the biggest expenditure items in all districts, Aileu has by far the largest at 80%. This is puzzling as rice prices in Aileu have not increased since the crisis. They normally rely completely on the market for rice as Aileu is not a rice producing district. Only 5% of the households interviewed in Aileu were hosting IDPs so the large expenditure proportion is not linked to IDP pressure. Ainaro and Baucau are spending almost as much money on clothes as on rice (29% versus 25% in Ainaro and 30% versus 20% in Baucau). Bobonaro spends 17% of its total expenditure on fuel while Covalima spends 19% on others.

Figure 13 - Household expenditures by district




The same information is presented in the map below where it visibly shows that the districts with the most expenditure on food are Aileu and Ermera, whilst Covalima and Ainaro spends less than 50% on food.

Map 3 - Household expenditures by district



Interestingly, according to figure 14 only 20% of the households in Aileu have increased their expenditure on food, indicating that households in this district under normal circumstances spend a very large proportion of their income on food. Bobonaro has increased both expenditure on food and essential items to the same degree.


Figure 14 - Changes in expenditure by district



5.3. Coping strategies

The main coping strategy reported by households is relying on less preferred and less expensive food. This is a normal strategy used annually during the lean season. However, it should be noted that the lean season – and thus these coping strategies – does not normally begin until December for most households. The second most common strategy, used by almost a fifth of the households, is restricting the number of meals for the adults in the family. A similar number of assessed households report consumption of seed stock as a coping strategy.


Figure 15 - Coping strategies



There is no difference in coping strategies between host families and those not hosting IDPs.

The coping strategies of those living with host families are presented in the figure below. More than a quarter of them rely on the host family (26.8%), while others plan to produce more (14.4%), commute to Dili for work (12.1%), sell some assets (17%) and/or move somewhere else (9.3%).


Figure 16 - Coping strategies of IDPs living with host families



There are some interesting differences between the districts in terms of coping strategies reported by households. In Covalima, all coping strategies included on the list are used by more than 10% of the population, where relying on less preferred foods (69%), consuming seed stocks (50%), borrowing food (47%), reducing the proportion of meals (47%), and reducing the number of meals (45%) are the most common ones. In Aileu, however, none of the coping strategies are used by more than 10% of the population.


The maps below show the coping strategies divided in four different categories: dietary change, change to households' food availability, rationing of available food and selling of assets. As mentioned before, households in Covalima are using all categories, while those in Aileu are using mainly dietary changes but not the selling asset strategies nor the rationing of food. Households in Bobonaro are really only using one strategy and that is relying on less preferred food.

Map 4 - Coping strategies – dietary change




In Oecussi, there are only two strategies that are used by more than 10%: buying food on credit and borrowing food. This finding should be approached with caution though and could be a data collection error.

Map 5 - Coping strategies – change in short-term household food availability




Rationing of available food is done to some extent on Atauro and to a large extent in Covalima.

Map 6 - Coping strategy – rationing of available food



Map 7 shows the districts where some households have started to sell off assets. These were mainly poultry and small animals, and it is only in Covalima where household articles have been sold by a number of households. A small number of households in Atauro, Liquica and Ermera have also sold household articles.

Map 7 - Coping strategy – selling assets



5.4. Seasonality

The main maize harvest season occurs from February to April and this will relieve some of the food deficits being faced in district communities. Similarly, the rice harvest will begin in around April to June. Daily labour opportunities in the agricultural sector will increase with the harvest of maize and will be required as a large majority have reported plans to increase the surface for planting this year. At the same time, daily labouring is not an activity that the population says it is engaged in. However, this should be regarded as a possible livelihood option for IDPs staying in the districts. The economy of much of Timor Leste is dependent on the coffee harvest which begins in May through to July. In the districts, most vegetable trading is in line with the increased incomes of coffee farmers.

6. Food consumption, utilization, nutritional and health status

6.1. Health

The impact on people's health from the current political unrest is not fully known but is believed to have been minor. IDPs in the districts are covered by the existing health facilities and there has not been any serious increase in demands for medication, for example. The small increase in demand has been covered by increased supplies. IDP camps in Dili were well covered by special health clinics that were temporarily established by the GoTL together with the humanitarian community during the first month as health centres in Dili were closed due to missing staff or security problems.

The districts have had as policy for some years to employ staff from that particular area and thus they did not face the same problem with missing staff as was the case in Dili. The assessment shows that the proportion of children who have received neither deworming tablets nor vitamin A is much larger in the poor food consumption group than in the other three respective groups (23% versus 5%).

6.2. Nutrition

The nutritional impact of the crisis is not known as there is no nutritional surveillance and no nutritional survey has been carried out since the displacement of people.

6.3. Dietary diversity/frequency

A seven day recall was included with slightly different food items than the CFSVA. However a comparison is possible and shows that the percentage of households with poor food consumption has somewhat increased since 2005 from 24% to 27%. The households having borderline consumption is very similar to last year. There is a slight decrease in the percentage of households that have a fairly good diet and households who had good food consumption. This sector has reduced from 40% to 35%.

Baucau and Lautem are the districts with the highest percentage of households with poor food consumption. Ainaro and Manufahi have the best food intake. Aileu has been excluded from this analysis due to questionable data quality.

48% of the sample from Baucau had IDPs and it is believed that this has influenced the food consumption results. Prices have not gone up so much in Baucau and IDPs have to a great extent received food rations but even so, the purchasing power of people has reduced. A large majority of the people are reportedly traders with some subsistence farming and thus it is the trade that has been affected.

The sample in Lautem, like in Baucau, had a large number of households hosting IDPs. However, data in table 9 shows that there is no difference in food consumption between host families and those not hosting IDPs. Lautem is not producing much rice but mainly maize and they are predominantly subsistence farmers with very few other activities. The rice prices in Lautem have also increased by 30% which puts further pressure on households that have more mouths to feed.


Table 9 - Percentage of households falling into the four food consumption groups (weighted values)

	Poor food consumption	Borderline	Fairly good	Good
Percentage of HHs without IDPs	31.1	36.0	29.9	3.0
Percentage of HHs with IDPs	29.6	36.9	27.4	6.2
Total	30.8	36.1	29.4	3.7

Ainaro has seen the largest price increases and at the same time they have one of the better food consumption scores and are hardly using any coping strategies at all. This is possibly explained by the fact that Ainaro is a coffee producing district. As previously mentioned in this report, it was mainly the low altitude coffee that was affected and not the high altitude variety. Even if the coffee farmers received less income than in previous years, it would not show as yet as people have cash in their pockets. Interestingly, almost the same proportion of their expenditure is spent on clothes as on rice indicating that they currently have strong purchasing power. There are also not many IDPs in the district.


Manufahi on the other hand has more host families included in the sample. They do not produce much rice but maize and mixed cropping. With no lucrative coffee production, households in the district adopt very few coping strategies and still have the second best food consumption in the country. They are spending more money now on food than before but it is possible that the IDPs have not been much of an additional burden if they brought assets with them from Dili. The subsistence farming system may have also functioned well in supplying what they needed until now.

Figure 17 - Food consumption groups



The same information is presented in the map on the next page.

Map 8 - Food consumption groups



Average daily consumption of food items in the past 7 days is shown in table 10.

Table 10 - Average daily food consumption in the past 7 days

Food item	Days consumed in the past 7 days			
	0-1 day	2-3 days	4-5 days	6-7 days
Rice			4.4	
Maize		3.4		
Cassava		3.3		
Other roots and tubers		2.3		
Flour / CSB / bread	0.7			
Pulses / legumes	1.0			
Non-leafy vegetables		1.9		
Green leafy vegetables			4.0	
Pork	0.4			
Red meat - goat, sheep	0.1			
Red meat - beef, buffalo	0.3			
Fish	0.5			
White meat - poultry	0.2			
Eggs	0.4			
Cooking oil			4.2	
Fresh fruits	0.7			
Sugar / salt			5.0	
Milk products	0.1			
Wild foods	0.8			

Figures 18 and 19 show the differences in consumption between the different food groups. The group with good food consumption is not included here. There is little difference between the food consumption groups for the other food items apart from cooking oil and sugar.

The borderline and fairly good groups consumed pulses on average about once in the past 7 days. The poor group consumed on average less than once in the last 7 days.

The poor and borderline group on average consumed hardly any fruits in the last 7 days. Animal protein was consumed very little by all three consumption groups (all averages less than once a week, with the poor group having the smallest averages indicating almost no consumption of animal protein in this group). There is almost no consumption of milk by all three consumption groups

Figure 18 - Consumption of staple foods





Figure 19 - Consumption of vegetables



Sugar and salt is clearly consumed more by the fairly good and borderline group (on average 5-6 days in the last 7 days) than by the poor group (on average 3 days in the last 7 days).

Cooking oil was consumed almost daily by the fairly good group (on average more than 6 days in the last 7 days), about every other day by the borderline groups (on average 4 days in the last 7 days) and hardly by the poor group (on average about once in the last 7 days).

Figure 20 - Consumption of sugar and salt




Figure 21 - Consumption of oil





Figure 22 - Food consumption between host and non-host families



There is no difference in food consumption between those who are hosting IDPs and those who are not as demonstrated in the figure on the left.

The majority of the consumption groups eat three times a day. 40% in the poor food consumption group consume less than 3 meals/day, 35% in the borderline, and 25% in the fairly good group. There is very little difference between the groups when looking at the number of meals consumed by children under five. Approximately 10% or less

consumed two meals per day.

34% of the households say that there is a difference in their meal pattern compared to normal practices this time of the year whilst for the large majority this has not changed. 78% of those reporting a change gave less access to food as the reason. 22% reported it being caused by spending more time in the field and thus having less time to eat.

7. Current and future problems and risks for food security and livelihoods

Timor Leste is a chronically food insecure country with poor economic, agricultural and nutritional indicators. There is not much evidence indicating that the crisis itself has exacerbated the situation for the large majority of people who are subsistence farmers, however. What seems to be of more importance is the fuel increase that happened simultaneously but not linked to the conflict. The coping strategies adopted by some households do not indicate great stress but are normal strategies during a lean period. It seems to indicate that the Timorese are more resilient to crisis from previous hardships than anticipated, however the early start to the lean season as mentioned below remains of concern.

There is no evidence indicating that hosting IDPs would have negatively affected households' food security situation. Results showed no difference in remaining stocks between families hosting IDPs and those without IDPs and there is no difference in food consumption either. This, taken together with other indicators, would indicate that hosting IDPs has not impacted negatively on the households as was previously thought, but whether a household is more food insecure now seems to be more linked with their livelihood, the dependency on the market, and thus affected purchasing power. Despite this, the role of food aid also needs to be considered as additional free food has been provided to IDP households as a measure to offset the potential impact.

What is a bit surprising is that Oecussi does not stand out as being more affected. Oecussi was one of the districts that had the worst indicators in the CFSVA. The food consumption is average; households in the district have not adopted many coping strategies; they have not changed their expenditure much; and prices have not increased as much as other districts. The overall situation in Oecussi could be attributed to a fair amount of attention from humanitarian actors and thus could have been much worse had they not received the level of priority that they did.

Covalima should be looked at a bit more carefully where a large majority of households have adopted a vast range of coping strategies but at the same time are spending the least on food of all the districts.

The market and thus availability has not been disrupted by the crisis apart from the immediate weeks after the conflict started. The fact remains that Timor Leste is dependent on imports and traders have the capacity to increase imports when the need arises. Little indicates however that this should be needed at the present time.

The livelihood groups that seem to have been most affected are the subsistence farmers who are selling agricultural produce i.e. in districts such as Aileu and Baucau that have many traders.

It is well understood that the lean season has started earlier this year as per reported lesser stocks by the majority of households. It is not well understood how households will cope until the next harvest in February-April, however. What is known is that most households are using normal strategies, albeit earlier than normal, and that food consumption has slightly changed and thus monitoring of the situation is necessary to prevent livelihoods from adopting negative strategies to survive.

There are reports from the districts claiming that there are problems between IDPs receiving humanitarian assistance and host families that are not. There are also district representatives who report that the general food distribution to IDPs creates dependency and is not a fair targeting mechanism. However, as stated previously and based on findings, there is not much support for assisting host families as a targeting category.

8. Response and targeting options

IDPs in the districts and thus indirectly their hosts should receive support until the coming harvest in March. Phasing out of the general food distribution to, for example, food-for-work projects should be considered where possible, and especially in the districts where the distribution is creating conflicts. However, assistance should continue to be provided to IDPs in the short-term.

Due to the much lesser food stocks than normal amongst a large proportion of households, there should be a focus on interventions that assist vulnerable groups in need of supplementary support – regardless of whether they are IDPs or not. WFP should continue expanding ongoing programmes aimed at assisting children under 5, pregnant/lactating women and school children. WFP has already speeded up the expansion of these programmes (see annex 9) and the government has also made a commitment to make food-for-education a national programme.

With the continuing uncertain political situation, and the current problems between IDPs and host families mentioned above, WFP should carefully explore the possibility of starting food-for-work projects in select districts where they have the potential to succeed. These could be either agriculture- or health-related activities, including latrine constructions, irrigation projects, crop storage facilities to reduce crop losses, etc. Community self-targeting could further be used to select participating households.

Efforts should also be made to strengthen long term development projects that existed prior to the crisis, in collaboration with FAO, UNDP and other stakeholders.

WFP should endeavour to support the GoTL with seed protection rations (food-for-seed) if the need to protect seed stocks from being consumed in the next planting season arises. Projects aimed at reducing post harvest losses should also be introduced as they would help increase the amount of available crops at the household level each year. The period of time each year during which families face food shortages would likewise reduce significantly.

9. Recommendations

- General Food Distribution to more than 100,000 IDPs in the districts should continue until the next harvest.
- The MCH programme (WFP/Ministry of Health) should be expanded to all districts outside Dili in order to support nutritionally vulnerable groups, to reach 48,200.
- Food-for-education should be expanded as per PRRO plan, to reach 55,000 by December 2006.
- Food-for-work should be carefully explored and complement UNDP's cash-for-work schemes.
- WFP should support FAO wherever possible with common goals.
- Stimulate local production and local transport capacity through contract farming by the GoTL, WFP and/or other stakeholders where feasible.
- Promote increased productivity through increasing areas of land cultivated and/or school/community gardens,
- A national nutritional assessment or surveillance is recommended to fully understand the situation and the full impact of the current political crisis.
- A follow-up assessment is recommended in 6 months time, coinciding with the harvest but after the national elections.
- It is recommended that further monitoring of the situation is done monthly especially of Aileu, Covalima and Baucau districts.

Annex 1 - EFSA team members

Team leader: Chris Walsh

Assistant: Carsiliano Oliveira

Mapping Support and GPS training: Tinago Chikoto, OCHA

Enumerators

1. Antonio dos Santos Pereira
2. Mariazinha Martins
3. Paulo Pereira Martins
4. Delfina Pereira
5. Jose Venancio de Deus
6. Livia Natalia Maria Guterres Babo
7. Hermenegildo do Rosario Guterres
8. Emilita M.V. do Rosario Guterres
9. Armando da Costa
10. Terezinha da Costa Lopes
11. Natalino Leonel D.C.M Pereira
12. Tereza Cardoso Alves
13. Pedro Almeida
14. Maria Cardoso Costa Xavier
15. Domingos Guterres
16. Tereza da Silva Monteiro
17. Domingos do Rosario da C.G. Ximenes
18. Sebastiana Eliza Sarmento
19. Rui Roberto Martins
20. Modesta Soares Guterres
21. Inacio Jose dos Santos
22. Lucracia de Jesus Sousa
23. Manuel Ribeiro
24. Paula Fernandes Neves
25. Carsiliano Oliveria
26. Batista Leo
27. Florentina Bobo
28. Lorencio Freitas
29. Odete Ximenes
30. Tertiliano Sarmento
31. Jaime Diaz Fernandes
32. Jose Artur Lopez
33. Januario Jacinto de Jesus Sousa
34. Bendito Amaral Mascarinhas
35. Domingos da Costa
36. Agapito Soares
37. Agustinho Soares
38. Deonísio and Lorencio
39. Helio da Costa
40. Angelina
41. Leandro
42. January Perreira Martins
43. Filomeno Martins
44. Moises Sarmento da Costa
45. Florinda Bobo
46. Abilio de Jesus Bobo
47. Juao Coi
48. Armenio Perreira Bareto
49. Mariano C. Soares

Organisation

- [illegible]

Annex 2 - Weighted values assigned to the districts

The values at the national level are weighted values. Weights assigned to the districts were calculated as follows:

Proportional sample size: If the total sample is 1384 surveys, the proportional sample size would be a district's population share in the total population of the districts in the sampling frame * the total number of surveys (1384).

Assigned weight: The weight determines how many times to repeat or use a fraction of each survey to have a proportionate overall sample. The assigned weight is calculated as a district's proportional sample size divided by the district's actual number of surveys.

District	Actual number of surveys	Population (according to census)	District's population share in the total population of the districts in the sampling frame	Proportional sample size	Assigned weight
Aileu	113	32,169	4.9%	68.0	0.6
Ainaro	115	43,116	6.6%	91.2	0.8
Baucau	112	87,524	13.4%	185.1	1.7
Bobonaro	102	69,461	10.6%	146.9	1.4
Covalima	101	44,437	6.8%	94.0	0.9
Ermera	110	93,813	14.3%	198.4	1.8
Lautem	111	49,368	7.5%	104.4	0.9
Liquica	97	47,508	7.3%	100.5	1.0
Manatuto	109	28,704	4.4%	60.7	0.6
Manufahi	114	37,689	5.8%	79.7	0.7
Oecussi	114	54,641	8.3%	115.6	1.0
Viqueque	90	56,979	8.7%	120.5	1.3
Atauro (Dili)	96	9,000	1.4%	19.0	0.2
Total	1384	654,409	100.0%	1384	

Annex 3 - Location of sampled households

Location of households	Percentage of households													
	Total EFSA (weighted)	Aileu	Ainaro	Baucau	Bobonaro	Covalima	Ermera	Lautem	Liquica	Manatuto	Manufahi	Oecussi	Viqueque	Atauro (Dili)
District Capital	7.6%	3.5%	9.6%	4.5%	22.5%	13.9%	1.8%	2.7%	3.1%	14.7%	4.4%	4.4%	11.1%	0.0%
Sub-district Capital	18.7%	15.0%	6.1%	41.1%	13.7%	16.8%	14.5%	11.7%	14.4%	22.9%	15.8%	8.8%	28.9%	14.6%
Rural	73.3%	79.6%	84.3%	54.5%	63.7%	69.3%	82.7%	84.7%	82.5%	62.4%	78.9%	86.8%	60.0%	85.4%
Missing	0.3%	1.8%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.9%	0.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Number of sampled households		113	115	112	102	101	110	111	97	109	114	114	90	96

Annex 4 - General characteristics of the sampled households' surroundings

Characteristics of the households' surroundings	Percentage of households													
	Total EFSA (weighted)	Aileu	Ainaro	Baucau	Bobonaro	Covalima	Ermera	Lautem	Liquica	Manatuto	Manufahi	Oecussi	Viqueque	Atauro (Dili)
Household in mountains	32.08%	12.4%	39.1%	28.6%	17.6%	32.7%	50.0%	9.9%	51.5%	35.8%	29.8%	46.5%	15.6%	51.0%
Household in plains - flat land	33.77%	23.9%	16.5%	54.5%	31.4%	54.5%	17.3%	30.6%	25.8%	57.8%	41.2%	17.5%	44.4%	11.5%
Household close to river or stream	8.49%	8.0%	11.3%	6.3%	12.7%	1.0%	9.1%	3.6%	12.4%	0.9%	7.0%	8.8%	10.0%	43.8%
House on top of mountain with farming land in valley below	8.76%	7.1%	18.3%	1.8%	12.7%	22.8%	0.9%	10.8%	13.4%	0.0%	1.8%	7.9%	16.7%	5.2%
Household in small rural village	20.50%	45.1%	7.8%	2.7%	39.2%	11.9%	18.2%	43.2%	27.8%	3.7%	9.6%	14.0%	30.0%	24.0%
Household in city or urban surrounds	8.38%	4.4%	7.8%	7.1%	20.6%	15.8%	4.5%	3.6%	6.2%	0.9%	7.0%	6.1%	12.2%	7.3%
Number of sampled households		113	115	112	102	101	110	111	97	109	114	114	90	96

Annex 5 - Livelihood groups by district

Livelihood group	Aileu	Ainaro	Baucau	Bobonaro	Covalima	Ermera	Lautem	Liquica	Manatuto	Manufahi	Oecussi	Viqueque	Atauro (Dili)
Subsistence farmers	1%	28%	25%	59%	48%	74%	76%	24%	2%	42%	46%	48%	75%
Subsistence farmers, also producing/gathering food to sell	18%	50%	50%	27%	39%	18%	12%	34%	36%	33%	12%	33%	17%
Subsistence farmers, also producing/gathering non-food items to sell	11%	11%	5%	2%	7%	3%	1%	35%	50%	14%	12%	7%	1%
Subsistence farmers, also producing/gathering food to sell and employed	67%	3%	10%	0%	4%	4%	5%	0%	5%	2%	16%	1%	2%
Traders, also engaged in subsistence farming	3%	8%	4%	7%	0%	1%	4%	5%	6%	4%	9%	6%	3%
Wage employed, also engaged in subsistence farming	1%	0%	5%	5%	3%	1%	2%	2%	2%	4%	4%	6%	2%
Other	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of enumerated households	113	115	112	102	101	110	110	97	109	114	114	90	96

Annex 6 - Household expenditures by district (as percentage of total expenditures)

Item	Aileu	Ainaro	Baucau	Bobonaro	Covalima	Ermera	Lautem	Liquica	Manatuto	Manufahi	Oecussi	Viqueque	Atauro (Dili)
Rice	80.3%	29.5%	30.3%	37.3%	24.0%	55.9%	46.0%	43.1%	37.5%	41.0%	44.1%	47.5%	42.2%
Staples	2.8%	2.3%	5.6%	7.0%	7.4%	7.0%	10.1%	8.4%	4.9%	14.5%	12.9%	5.4%	7.6%
Vegetables, Meat, Fruit	1.2%	12.9%	3.4%	6.1%	4.2%	3.6%	2.8%	5.7%	2.2%	5.3%	5.5%	4.0%	2.6%
Sugar/Salt/Spices	1.1%	7.1%	4.3%	7.7%	3.9%	7.1%	8.5%	8.3%	8.7%	7.5%	2.7%	10.4%	9.4%
Cooking oil	0.4%	1.0%	4.8%	4.1%	3.9%	10.1%	5.3%	6.9%	8.6%	0.4%	2.5%	3.2%	3.3%
Alcohol	3.1%	0.1%	0.2%	0.1%	1.7%	0.4%	0.6%	0.5%	1.3%	1.8%	1.2%	1.3%	0.1%
Tobacco	4.8%	1.6%	1.2%	5.7%	2.6%	1.1%	3.6%	1.9%	5.4%	3.8%	4.5%	4.7%	1.7%
Soap	3.8%	8.4%	3.7%	6.2%	3.2%	4.5%	8.8%	5.9%	6.7%	5.1%	3.5%	9.1%	10.7%
Transport	1.3%	3.6%	8.8%	0.0%	6.5%	0.6%	7.1%	2.8%	2.5%	4.2%	3.5%	1.1%	0.8%
Fuel	0.1%	4.7%	0.7%	17.3%	4.7%	1.9%	5.0%	4.8%	11.3%	3.2%	4.1%	3.9%	6.7%
Equipment	0.1%	0.7%	7.6%	0.3%	5.5%	0.4%	0.3%	1.7%	0.5%	3.0%	0.3%	0.6%	2.4%
Clothing	1.0%	24.7%	20.1%	5.1%	13.0%	0.3%	1.8%	4.6%	10.4%	9.3%	5.5%	3.0%	7.5%
Others	0.0%	3.4%	9.3%	3.2%	19.4%	7.2%	0.1%	5.1%	0.0%	1.1%	9.9%	5.6%	4.8%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Annex 7 - Changes in expenditures by district

	Aileu	Ainaro	Baucau	Bobonaro	Covalima	Ermera	Lautem	Liquica	Manatuto	Manufahi	Oecussi	Viqueque	Atauro (Dili)
Number of households	113	115	112	102	101	110	111	97	109	114	114	90	96
Changes in food purchases													
Unknown	49.6%	62.6%	42.9%	33.3%	54.5%	95.5%	44.1%	17.5%	29.4%	5.3%	63.2%	42.2%	46.9%
Decreased	30.1%	0.0%	7.1%	2.9%	5.9%	0.9%	8.1%	32.0%	10.1%	37.7%	1.8%	11.1%	12.5%
Increased	20.4%	37.4%	50.0%	63.7%	39.6%	3.6%	47.7%	50.5%	60.6%	57.0%	35.1%	46.7%	40.6%
Changes in non-food basic needs													
Unknown	49.6%	62.6%	52.7%	35.3%	50.5%	95.5%	45.9%	20.6%	37.6%	36.8%	64.9%	50.0%	55.2%
Decreased	41.6%	3.5%	13.4%	0.0%	29.7%	2.7%	32.4%	32.0%	12.8%	62.3%	6.1%	11.1%	19.8%
Increased	8.8%	33.9%	33.9%	64.7%	19.8%	1.8%	21.6%	47.4%	49.5%	0.9%	28.9%	38.9%	25.0%
Changes in other household goods													
Unknown	50.4%	72.2%	80.4%	90.2%	50.5%	97.3%	77.5%	86.6%	82.6%	73.7%	79.8%	84.4%	64.6%
Decreased	38.1%	24.3%	14.3%	1.0%	44.6%	2.7%	20.7%	3.1%	15.6%	26.3%	20.2%	7.8%	25.0%
Increased	11.5%	3.5%	5.4%	8.8%	5.0%	0.0%	1.8%	10.3%	1.8%	0.0%	0.0%	7.8%	10.4%
Changes in small household economy													
Unknown	53.1%	93.0%	96.4%	92.2%	51.5%	96.4%	72.1%	93.8%	79.8%	79.8%	78.9%	83.3%	70.8%
Decreased	38.1%	6.1%	3.6%	4.9%	44.6%	2.7%	24.3%	3.1%	14.7%	20.2%	13.2%	7.8%	20.8%
Increased	8.8%	0.9%	0.0%	2.9%	4.0%	0.9%	3.6%	3.1%	5.5%	0.0%	7.9%	8.9%	8.3%
Changes in house expansion													
Unknown	55.8%	100.0%	98.2%	99.0%	58.4%	97.3%	86.5%	91.8%	84.4%	80.7%	79.8%	80.0%	77.1%
Decreased	33.6%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	37.6%	0.9%	11.7%	1.0%	15.6%	19.3%	17.5%	7.8%	15.6%
Increased	10.6%	0.0%	1.8%	1.0%	4.0%	1.8%	1.8%	7.2%	0.0%	0.0%	2.6%	12.2%	7.3%

Annex 8 - Coping strategies by district

	Percentage of households which adopted the strategy since April (one household could adopt more than one strategy)												
	Aileu	Ainaro	Baucau	Bobonaro	Covalima	Ermera	Lautem	Liquica	Manatuto	Manufahi	Oecussi	Viqueque	Atauro (Dili)
Rely on less preferred, expensive food	99.1%	5.2%	5.4%	83.3%	69.3%	72.7%	42.3%	59.8%	1.8%	40.4%	5.3%	48.9%	45.8%
Borrow food, helped by relatives	6.2%	2.6%	7.1%	9.8%	47.5%	30.9%	7.2%	9.3%	0.9%	1.8%	12.3%	7.8%	12.5%
Purchased food on credit	3.5%	2.6%	0.9%	11.8%	10.9%	3.6%	2.7%	5.2%	15.6%	6.1%	4.4%	12.2%	7.3%
Consumed seed stock held for next season	46.0%	0.9%	0.0%	4.9%	50.5%	36.4%	22.5%	30.9%	9.2%	5.3%	2.6%	8.9%	43.8%
Reduced the proportions of the meals	62.8%	6.1%	1.8%	2.0%	47.5%	16.4%	27.0%	11.3%	7.3%	24.6%	4.4%	20.0%	35.4%
Reduced number of meals per day	18.6%	5.2%	3.6%	2.0%	44.6%	21.8%	24.3%	16.5%	21.1%	21.1%	1.8%	18.9%	31.3%
Skipped days without eating	14.2%	3.5%	0.0%	0.0%	37.6%	1.8%	5.4%	1.0%	21.1%	7.0%	0.9%	6.7%	12.5%
Restricted consumption for adults so that children have enough	70.8%	4.3%	2.7%	1.0%	39.6%	19.1%	21.6%	28.9%	23.9%	28.1%	4.4%	21.1%	50.0%
Sent children to live with relatives	5.3%	1.7%	0.0%	0.0%	13.9%	1.8%	2.7%	2.1%	0.9%	1.8%	0.9%	2.2%	6.3%
Barter food or food aid rations to buy more staple food	0.0%	1.7%	1.8%	1.0%	30.7%	17.3%	4.5%	17.5%	5.5%	2.6%	0.9%	6.7%	7.3%
Using savings	0.0%	0.9%	0.9%	0.0%	42.6%	0.0%	1.8%	2.1%	0.9%	1.8%	0.0%	1.1%	6.3%
Reduced health and education expenditures	0.9%	0.9%	0.0%	2.9%	31.7%	4.5%	4.5%	5.2%	0.0%	0.9%	3.5%	1.1%	28.1%
Borrowed money from relatives/neighbors	0.0%	1.7%	6.3%	7.8%	39.6%	10.9%	10.8%	11.3%	4.6%	4.4%	14.9%	7.8%	14.6%
Sold household poultry	0.0%	0.9%	8.9%	27.5%	42.6%	9.1%	1.8%	32.0%	22.9%	4.4%	4.4%	21.1%	28.1%
Sold household articles	0.0%	1.7%	0.9%	2.9%	29.7%	7.3%	0.9%	8.2%	4.6%	3.5%	7.0%	1.1%	7.3%
Sold small animals	0.0%	0.9%	13.4%	23.5%	38.6%	20.9%	0.0%	12.4%	8.3%	4.4%	5.3%	10.0%	13.5%
Sold agricultural tools, seeds	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.9%	14.9%	0.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.9%	0.0%	0.9%	0.0%	2.1%

Annex 9 – WFP-assisted School Feeding expansion schedule

Nov 2005-July 2006					
		# Students Covered			
No.	District	# Schools Covered	Boys	Girls	Total
1	Dili-Atauro	10	866	865	1,731
2	Ainaro	22	2,071	1,939	4,010
3	Liquica	38	4,851	4,209	9,060
4	Oecussi	17	2,201	2,072	4,273
Total		87	9,989	9,085	19,074

Sep 2006-Dec 2006					
		# Students Covered			
No.	District	# Schools Covered	Boys	Girls	Total
1	Atauro	10	866	865	1,731
2	Ainaro	49	5,063	4,458	9,521
3	Bobonaro	39	4,179	3,988	8,167
4	Covalima	72	6,561	6,293	12,854
5	Liquica	39	4,975	4,381	9,356
6	Oecussi	25	2,879	2,839	5,718
7	Baucau	29	3,913	3,558	7,471
Total		263	28,436	26,382	54,818

January - March 2007					
		# Schools Covered	# Students Covered		
No.	District		Boys	Girls	Total
1	Atauro	10	866	865	1,731
2	Ainaro	49	5,063	4,458	9,521
3	Bobonaro	53	5,065	4,751	9,816
4	Covalima	72	6,561	6,293	12,854
5	Liquica	48	6,040	5,296	11,336
6	Oecussi	43	4,432	4,480	8,912
7	Ermera	24	2,971	3,601	6,572
8	Baucau	56	7,502	7,502	15,004
Total		355	38,500	37,246	75,746
April-November 2007					
		# Schools Covered	# Students Covered		
No.	District		Boys	Girls	Total
1	Atauro	10	866	865	1,731
2	Ainaro	49	5,063	4,458	9,521
3	Bobonaro	96	8,357	7,851	16,208
4	Covalima	72	6,561	6,293	12,854
5	Liquica	48	6,040	5,296	11,336
6	Oecussi	43	4,432	4,480	8,912
7	Ermera	64	9,456	8,210	17,666
8	Baucau	78	10,463	10,108	20,571
9	Manufahi	43	4,242	3,893	8,135
Total		503	55,480	51,454	106,934

Annex 10 - Food consumption by district

Food item	Aileu				Ainaro			
	0-1 day	2-3 days	4-5 days	6-7 days	0-1 day	2-3 days	4-5 days	6-7 days
Rice		3.0					3.5	
Maize		1.6						5.4
Cassava			4.0					5.2
Other roots and tubers			3.8					6.2
Flour / CSB / bread	0.1				0.7			
Pulses / legumes		1.7			0.9			
Non-leafy vegetables	0.2					1.3		
Green leafy vegetables	0.2							5.7
Pork	0.0				0.7			
Red meat - goat, sheep	0.0				0.0			
Red meat - beef, buffalo	0.0				0.3			
Fish	0.1				0.1			
White meat - poultry	0.0				0.6			
Eggs	0.0				0.6			
Cooking oil	0.0							6.6
Fresh fruits	0.0				0.1			
Sugar / salt	0.0							6.9
Milk products	0.0				0.0			
Wild foods	0.0				0.0			

Food item	Baucau				Bobonaro			
	0-1 day	2-3 days	4-5 days	6-7 days	0-1 day	2-3 days	4-5 days	6-7 days
Rice				6.4			4.4	
Maize		1.9					4.1	
Cassava		1.7					3.1	
Other roots and tubers	0.8					1.1		
Flour / CSB / bread	0.2					1.0		
Pulses / legumes	0.9				0.5			
Non-leafy vegetables		1.6				1.6		
Green leafy vegetables			3.0				4.7	
Pork	0.2				0.6			
Red meat - goat, sheep	0.1				0.0			
Red meat - beef, buffalo	0.2				0.3			
Fish	0.5				0.9			
White meat - poultry	0.2				0.2			
Eggs	0.3				0.2			
Cooking oil			3.5				4.3	
Fresh fruits	0.3				0.7			
Sugar / salt			4.6					5.2
Milk products	0.0				0.1			
Wild foods	0.0				0.1			

Food item	Covalima				Ermera			
	0-1 day	2-3 days	4-5 days	6-7days	0-1 day	2-3 days	4-5 days	6-7days
Rice		2.7					3.8	
Maize				5.2			3.1	
Cassava				5.1		2.4		
Other roots and tubers			4.1				3.6	
Flour / CSB / bread		1.0			0.1			
Pulses / legumes			3.3		0.8			
Non-leafy vegetables			3.8			1.0		
Green leafy vegetables				5.5			3.8	
Pork	0.5				0.3			
Red meat - goat, sheep	0.2				0.1			
Red meat - beef, buffalo	0.5				0.4			
Fish	1.0				0.1			
White meat - poultry	0.5				0.1			
Eggs	0.7				0.5			
Cooking oil		3.0					4.0	
Fresh fruits	0.5				0.5			
Sugar / salt			3.7					5.2
Milk products	0.2				0.1			
Wild foods				5.7	0.0			

Food item	Lautem				Liquica			
	0-1 day	2-3 days	4-5 days	6-7days	0-1 day	2-3 days	4-5 days	6-7days
Rice			3.7				4.8	
Maize			3.9				3.9	
Cassava		2.8					4.0	
Other roots and tubers	0.4					1.9		
Flour / CSB / bread	0.7					1.8		
Pulses / legumes	0.2					1.5		
Non-leafy vegetables		1.5				1.8		
Green leafy vegetables			3.9				3.7	
Pork	0.2				0.4			
Red meat - goat, sheep	0.1				0.1			
Red meat - beef, buffalo	0.1				0.2			
Fish	0.5					1.1		
White meat - poultry	0.1				0.3			
Eggs	0.5				0.3			
Cooking oil			4.3					5.3
Fresh fruits	0.5				0.6			
Sugar / salt			5.0					5.4
Milk products	0.4				0.1			
Wild foods		2.2			0.6			

Food item	Manatuto					Manufahi			
	0-1 day	2-3 days	4-5 days	6-7days		0-1 day	2-3 days	4-5 days	6-7days
Rice			4.7					4.9	
Maize		1.8						4.8	
Cassava			4.4					3.2	
Other roots and tubers			3.7				1.8		
Flour / CSB / bread	0.6						1.2		
Pulses / legumes	0.7					0.4			
Non-leafy vegetables			4.1				2.6		
Green leafy vegetables			4.3					4.4	
Pork	0.2					0.5			
Red meat - goat, sheep	0.1					0.1			
Red meat - beef, buffalo	0.2					0.4			
Fish	0.7					0.8			
White meat - poultry	0.3					0.2			
Eggs	0.3					0.9			
Cooking oil			4.9						5.6
Fresh fruits		1.4					1.8		
Sugar / salt				5.8					6.2
Milk products	0.0					0.5			
Wild foods	0.0						1.1		

Food item	Oecussi					Viqueque			
	0-1 day	2-3 days	4-5 days	6-7days		0-1 day	2-3 days	4-5 days	6-7days
Rice			4.6						5.3
Maize			3.3					3.1	
Cassava		1.6						4.8	
Other roots and tubers		1.1					1.9		
Flour / CSB / bread	0.9						1.3		
Pulses / legumes		1.2				1.0			
Non-leafy vegetables		1.6						3.5	
Green leafy vegetables			3.7					4.8	
Pork	0.5					0.4			
Red meat - goat, sheep	0.2					0.1			
Red meat - beef, buffalo	0.3					0.3			
Fish	0.4					0.2			
White meat - poultry	0.2					0.2			
Eggs	0.3					0.5			
Cooking oil			4.6					4.5	
Fresh fruits	0.9						1.3		
Sugar / salt			4.4						6.2
Milk products	0.2					0.3			
Wild foods	0.1						1.4		

Food item	Atauro (Dili)			
	0-1 day	2-3 days	4-5 days	6-7 days
Rice		2.7		
Maize			3.6	
Cassava		2.9		
Other roots and tubers	0.7			
Flour / CSB / bread		1.1		
Pulses / legumes		1.9		
Non-leafy vegetables	0.8			
Green leafy vegetables		2.8		
Pork	0.2			
Red meat - goat, sheep	0.3			
Red meat - beef, buffalo	0.2			
Fish		3.0		
White meat - poultry	0.5			
Eggs	0.8			
Cooking oil		2.3		
Fresh fruits		1.3		
Sugar / salt		2.9		
Milk products	0.2			
Wild foods		1.7		