



World Food Programme

A Report from the Office of Evaluation

*Full Report of the Evaluation of the Regional
EMOP Kosovo 6040 - "Food Assistance to
Kosovar Internally Displaced Persons and
Refugees in the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, Albania and the Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia"*

(25 October - 19 November 1999)

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1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Terms of Reference and Activities

In October 1998, the project document for the Kosovo Regional Emergency Operation 6040 was signed. The overall goal of the EMOP 6040 was to prevent hunger and malnutrition among the displaced ethnic Albanians and other ethnic groups fleeing violence that has erupted in Kosovo, by meeting the food needs of up to 420,000 beneficiaries for the period September - December 1998 with a two months winter safety net covering January and February 1999; and, through food assistance, to help reduce further population displacement.

Budget revisions have subsequently been approved to expand the scope of this operation:

- In early April 1999, to meet the food requirements of an additional 650,000 ethnic Albanian Kosovar refugees and IDPs created by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia "security operations" which succeeded the commencement of the NATO air campaign on 23 March, 1999;
- In mid April, to meet the food requirements of refugees without cooking facilities through provision of humanitarian daily rations (HDRs), high protein biscuits (HPBs), canned foods and the establishment of mobile baking units;
- In late April, to meet the food requirements of an additional 300,000 refugees in Albania, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYRoM) and Montenegro.

In summer 1999, when the Programme terminated, WFP decided to undertake an evaluation of this extraordinary emergency operation. The evaluation includes an assessment of WFP's state of preparedness in 1998/99, its response to the crisis, the effectiveness of the intervention and co-ordination mechanisms.

Certain elements of the operations were unusual in the Programme's emergency experience. The evaluation has looked into some of the issues, such as the

- staffing of key posts in the early stages of the operation
- contingency planning in the first and second phases
- role of the Emergency Management Group in Tirana and arrangements made with the military
- support provided by the governments
- communication set-up and the so-called Deep Field Mailing System
- assistance provided through bread baking
- role of WFP information officers.

The evaluation was undertaken by an external consultant supported by a Senior Evaluation Officer of WFP, OEDE. The evaluation comprised one week of preparation and review of reports, briefing and debriefing at headquarters Rome, three weeks of field work in Albania, FYRoM and Kosovo and ten days for the preparation of a draft report (see TOR and Time-Table in Annex). The basic methodology of the complex evaluation comprised:

- Review of documents at headquarters and the field
- Structured interviews with main role players at different levels , such as:
 - WFP senior staff (at headquarters, country and sub-office level),
 - Senior staff of international NGOs
 - Representatives at government level (EMG)
 - Representatives of donor organisations (ECHO, EU, USAID)
 - Representatives of international organisations (ICRC, FAO, UNDP).
- Group interviews and discussions with former target groups, such as:
 - refugees/returnees, who were accommodated in tented camps, in collective centres or with host families (private houses)
 - formerly internally displaced people in Kosovo

- vulnerable groups, ethnic minorities and others
- refugees remaining in country of asylum
- families which hosted refugees
- Field visits in Kosovo, FYRoM and Albania

A questionnaire, operationalising some of the main questions, was prepared and sent to the county offices of WFP in order to prepare field staff and other role players on the issue (the Questionnaire is included in the Annex).

During the evaluation the consultant had contacts and undertook interviews with about 50 –70 resource persons. In Kosovo intensive group interviews were undertaken with former beneficiaries. Other target groups were interviewed in FYRoM and Albania. During field trips to campsites, collective centres, warehouses and distribution point numerous individual interviews were undertaken with representatives of the various role players. A full list of people met has been annexed.

1.2 Comments

The TORs were very ambitious. Some of the issues raised in the TOR are highly related to internal, organisational matters of WFP and have basically to be dealt with by the organisation itself (such as internal personnel matters of rapid deployment of staff to emergency situations, financial rules and regulations during emergency situations; etc). The evaluation tried to assist in assessing some of these issues. Another part of special issues will require in-depth-studies as they relate to very special issues and require specialised experts. The evaluation tried to highlight some of these issues without pretending to provide complete answers.

It is obvious that each operation of this magnitude and intensity has its own components to learn from. In fact, some workshops have already been undertaken and working papers on lessons learnt formulated.

The evaluation shows that responses on what lessons can be learnt from the EMOP 6040 have not been uniform. On one side, quite some enthusiasm about the way WFP handled the operation has been observed. On the other side, views have been formulated describing the operations as WFP's normal mandate, and arguing that WFP often handles operations much bigger than the Kosovo one. The evaluation tried to expose some of the different views and to assess how representative the operation was for the formulation of general recommendations.

The questionnaire technique was very helpful but should be prepared and submitted in advance. The difficulties in evaluating the Programme can also be found in the lack of specific objectives and assumptions formulated, as well as in the lack of proper indicators to measure achievements and assess the assumptions. A regional Programme covering different target areas and groups has to be broken down to specific objectives and results which should to be defined through objectively verifiable indicators and sources of verification. If a programme is continuously revised it is difficult to evaluate it in the classical sense (ex-post). It appears through its reports as a set of snapshots rather than a film. Maybe real-time evaluations could be more appropriate, particularly for emergency programmes with dynamic conditions and variable assumptions.

Evaluation exercises should be composed of an organizational part, such as personnel and management aspects, and a specific part, which refers to explicit objectives and expected results of the programme. The mission team should be composed of external and internal members: operations expert, logistics expert and another one related to the specific technical and regional aspects of the programme

2 THE PLANNING

2.1 The Original EMOP 6040

2.1.1 Background

The world's attention was focused on Kosovo in early 1998 when a Serb offensive left 80 people dead, the overwhelming majority of them civilian ethnic Albanians. Since then violence continued in Kosovo, leading to large population movements.

In preparation for an emergency intervention, WFP undertook assessment missions conducted in northern Albania, Montenegro, FYROM and Kosovo. In June 1998, the violence escalated and food stocks were transported to Albania to meet the immediate needs of up to 10,000 refugees accommodated near the border. In Montenegro food was propositioned for ready distribution.

The initial response to the crisis was covered under the ongoing former Yugoslavia (FMY) operation - EMOP 5142.05. The assistance to refugees and IDPs from the Kosovo crisis was in addition to the existing EMOP 5142.05. The purpose of the Kosovo regional EMOP was to have a single, integrated approach to the crisis, meeting the food aid needs of IDPs in Kosovo and Montenegro, refugees in Albania, and potential refugees in FYRoM.

WFP's immediate response has been part of a UN inter-agency response. In the initial Flash UN Appeal for Kosovo (June/August 1998), WFP requested 1.9 million dollars (2,801 tons of mixed commodities) to meet the food aid requirements of refugees in Albania and IDPs in Kosovo and Montenegro, plus a potential influx into FYRoM. An extension to the Flash Appeal was launched soon after to cover the remaining months of 1998 and the need for the winter. WFP requested 18.65 million dollars to meet the needs of up to 420,000 beneficiaries for the period September-December 1998 with a two-month winter safety net covering January and February 1999.

On 30 October 1998, the WFP Executive Director and the FAO Director General jointly approved the "**Kosovo Regional Emergency Operation 6040: Food Assistance to Kosovar Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia**". The EMOP covered initially the period 1 September 1998 to 28 February 1999. In step with the spiralling deterioration of the humanitarian situation, 11 budget revisions have subsequently been approved to extend the life and expand the scope of this operation.

2.1.2 Objective

An emergency feeding operation was recommended for six months to assist an estimated 420,000 refugees and IDPs of the Kosovo crisis, through the provision of 37,800 tons of food aid during a six months period. It was hoped that during this food aid intervention there would be a de-escalation of the crisis and that the emergency operation would contribute to a stabilisation, most notably to help the conflict-affected people overcome the harsh winter months. Although the overall aim of the emergency was more or less the same for all the countries of intervention, the political and security conditions were very different.

2.1.3 Assumptions

The basic assumptions formulated in the EMOP 6040 document were that the conflict would continue for the foreseeable future at varying levels of intensity through the winter and into spring 1999. Even if the crisis subsided, a general food shortage in Kosovo was expected for 1999 since the fighting seriously disrupted the planting season and harvesting.

Significant negative impacts were expected if the conflict escalated beyond the boundaries of Kosovo province, particularly into FYRoM and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Therefore, apart from securing a basic nutritional standard, it was also expected that the Programme would help to reduce further population displacement.

2.1.4 Target Groups

According to WFP/UNHCR estimates, a total of 440,000 people were expected to require humanitarian assistance according to WFP/UNHCR estimates, of which 420,000 were supposed to receive WFP food aid. The table below outlines the planning figures by country/region.

Planned WFP beneficiary caseload in September 1998:

Refugees in Albania	30,000
IDPs in Kosovo	300,000
Refugees in FYRoM	20,000
IDPs in Montenegro	40,000
IDPs in Serbia	30,000
TOTAL	420,000

In all cases, priority was to be given to female-headed households. All efforts would be made to ensure that priority was given to destitute female-headed households with children. It would be WFP's policy to distribute first to this category that has been identified as the most vulnerable and at risk. Local distribution would be set up to encourage women to collect food for their families. The number of female-headed households will be reported separately.

2.1.5 Strategies

One of the assumptions of the programme was: Considering the fluidity of the situation and the potential for escalation of violence, the programme intended a flexible response strategy reflecting the developments in and around Kosovo. The greatest needs for humanitarian assistance were considered for the internally displaced within Kosovo.

Flexibility in the response was further stressed in the project document:

"The provision of food assistance by WFP will be in close co-ordination with other agencies providing assistance. It needs to be flexible and responsive to shifting needs. Planning is based on fairly reliable data available in the country and inputs from agencies such as the Mother Teresa Society. However, in the evolution of the crisis, needs may shift. Therefore, resources will be allocated to affected areas as they arise in any of the countries or regions affected by the conflict. If needs persist, the food aid strategy will be adapted to incorporate a more durable style of assistance."

2.1.6 Monitoring and Evaluation

Monitoring and evaluation of food aid was supposed to be jointly done with implementing partners. Indicators to measure the performance of the programme included:

- quantity of food received and timing,
- family food stocks before/after,
- food received from other sources,
- size and composition of the family,
- women's involvement in food aid management and distribution, and
- percentage of women recipients.

The sources of verification would be interviews with beneficiaries and key informants. Health and nutrition indicators would be established when and if the conditions permitted. Tracking of food commodities was also considered important, to ensure that food would not be diverted to combatants during the crisis.

2.1.7 Food Basket

The food basket was set at the same level as that of refugees in FRY catered for under the existing EMOP 5142.05. The joint WFP/UNHCR Food Aid Assessment Mission to FRY determined the food basket in February 1998, with the following monthly ration per beneficiary:

<u>Commodity Ration</u>	<u>(kg)</u>
Wheat flour	12
Vegetable oil	1
Pulses	1
Sugar	1

The composition of the ration takes account of the availability of cooking facilities and fuel in the areas of displacement. It was assumed that IDPs either had their own cookers or received them on loan from host families or from aid agencies.

The ration was the same as that of the FRY refugee operation, in order to prevent “competition for aid” and population movements in search of better aid conditions between refugees from the 1992-95 Bosnia war and IDPs from the Kosovo crisis. The ration provided 1,935 kcal per person per day and contained 11 percent protein and 18 percent fat. The objective of the food assistance was to provide basic food items to cover the main energy and protein needs of target groups in an environment where the beneficiaries do have some limited access to foods. The ration was agreed with UNHCR.

High-energy biscuits (HEBs), if available, would be distributed as a supplementary food to children under the age of seven. They were not budgeted under EMOP 6040. Extra donations of canned fish and cheese would also be accepted in the food basket but not budgeted for under the EMOP.

2.1.8 The Resources

The response to the appeals was overwhelming. In October 1999, the total volume of donations to EMOP 6040 was about 87,965,595 dollars, corresponding to almost 97,000 tons of food.

Main donors responding to the two appeals were the US, the European Commission, Japan and Germany. In total about 30 governments and organisations contributed in cash and kind to the programme, including non-traditional donors like Croatia.

EMOP 6040 (including budget revisions)	Operation Requirements			
	Dollars		Tons	
		% of total		% of total
Donor	Confirmed Contributions			
Argentina	\$ 1,000,000	1.13%	2,078	2.20%
Australia	\$ 628,931	0.71%	1,476	1.56%
Belgium	\$ 1,575,588	1.78%	3,650	3.87%
Canada	\$ 1,859,137	2.11%	372	0.39%
Croatia	\$ 1,160,000	1.31%	5,172	5.48%
Denmark	\$ 1,287,893	1.46%	1,162	1.23%
European Commission (DGD)	\$ 10,471,204	11.86%	13,165	13.94%
European Commission (ECHO)	\$ 616,952	0.70%	-	0.00%
France	\$ 1,489,862	1.69%	3,000	3.18%
Germany	\$ 4,678,866	5.30%	9,921	10.51%
Ireland	\$ 340,599	0.39%	246	0.26%
Italy	\$ 2,228,151	2.52%	3,000	3.18%
Japan	\$ 8,861,344	10.03%	11,977	12.68%
Morocco	\$ 469,573	0.53%	584	0.62%
Netherlands	\$ 3,290,565	3.73%	3,796	4.02%
New Zealand	\$ 111,111	0.13%	82	0.09%
Norway	\$ 2,105,226	2.38%	1,393	1.48%
Poland	\$ 15,000	0.02%	43	0.05%
Portugal	\$ 100,000	0.11%	266	0.28%
Rissho Kosei-Kai Fund for Peace	\$ 24,925	0.03%	-	0.00%
Spain	\$ 886,525	1.00%	2,081	2.20%
Sweden	\$ 250,000	0.28%	497	0.53%
UK	\$ 2,426,084	2.75%	24	0.03%
USA	\$ 32,527,549	36.84%	35,645	37.75%
WFP Multilateral	\$ 1,141,226	1.29%	100	0.11%
Total Received	\$ 79,546,311		99,730	

The generous response of donors reflected the great political interest of the international donor community including some of the neighboring countries in a solution of the conflicts in the Balkan region and also the fear that the conflict might spill over to other countries of the region. European countries affected by illegal immigration of ethnic Albanians had a particular interest to control this influx. However, it may also be interpreted as a proof of the confidence of the international community in the capacity of WFP to respond quickly and efficiently to the crisis.

2.2 Revisions

After the approval of the original EMOP 6040, there have been dramatic changes in the scenarios and 11 revisions had to be done to adapt to the evolving situation and caseload. Although most of these revisions refer to financial procedures, food transfers and substitutions of food items there have been three major increases in the total food supply and two extensions in time, reflecting the major military/political changes and resources provided by the donors. The following table shows the changes in the operation:

"Kosovo Regional Emergency Operation 6040: Food Assistance to Kosovar Internally Displaced Persons And Refugees in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia"

Signed	Wef	Duration	Tons	Food Cost US \$	WFP Cost	Benefic.
Original Emop: Signed 3-Nov-98	3-Nov-98	01-Sep -98 - 28-Feb-99	37,800	10,249,360	19,400,388	420,000
B/R001-extension in time, addition	1-Mar-99	01-Sep -98 - 30-Jun-99	37,900	10,336,360	20,363,769	420,000
B/R002- addition (transfers)	4-Mar-99	01-Sep -98 - 30-Jun-99	43,386	11,292,300	22,533,222	420,000
B/R003 -addition / change in ITSH	6-Apr-99	01-Sep -98 - 30-Jun-99	76,086	22,238,150	46,608,523	650,000
B/R004-addition	15-Apr-99	01-Sep -98 - 30-Jun-99	79,761	29,106,925	62,056,396	650,000
B/R005-addition	23-Apr-99	01-Sep -98 - 30-Jun-99	98,421	43,501,735	86,202,846	950,000
B/R006-Addition / Substitution	4-May-99	01-Sep -98 - 30-Jun-99	95,811	43,551,284	86,098,776	950,000
B/R007-Addition	27-May-99	01-Sep -98 - 30-Jun-99	96,356	43,551,284	87,016,628	950,000
B/R008-increase in DSC	11-Jun-99	01-Sep -98 - 30-Jun-99	96,356	44,339,406	95,016,628	950,000
B/R009-Substitution	18-Jun-99	01-Sep -98 - 30-Jun-99	96,634	44,339,391	94,596,491	950,000
B/R010-Extension in Time De-earmarking	13-Sep-99	01-Sep -98 - 30-Sept-99	97,658	44,148,188	88,305,349	950,000
B/R011-Substitution	20-Sep-99	01-Sep -98 - 30-Sept-99	96,929	40,148,165	87,965,595	950,000

2.3 Objectives

The objectives of the full programme including revisions comprised:

- to meet the needs of up to 420,000 beneficiaries arising from the Kosovo crisis for the period September - December 1998 with a two months winter safety net covering January and February 1999;
- to prevent hunger and malnutrition among the displaced ethnic Albanians and other ethnic groups fleeing violence that has erupted in Kosovo;
- to meet the food aid requirements of refugees in Albania and IDPs in Kosovo and Montenegro, plus a potential influx into FYRoM;
- through food assistance, to help reduce further population displacement.

Subsequent budget revisions added the following objectives:

- in early April 1999 , to meet the food requirements of an additional 650,000 ethnic Albanian Kosovar refugees and IDPs created by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia "security operations" which succeeded the commencement of the NATO air campaign on 23 March, 1999;
- in mid April, to meet the food requirements of refugees without cooking facilities through provision of humanitarian daily rations (HDRs), high protein biscuits (HPBs), canned foods and the establishment of mobile baking units;
- in late April, to meet the food requirements of an additional 300,000 refugees in Albania, FYRoM and Montenegro.

3 THE OPERATIONS

During the lifetime of the EMOP 6040 the programme had to cope with various heterogeneous situations and conditions of different countries: Kosovo, Albania, FYRoM and Montenegro. The infrastructure conditions and political framework of these countries varied significantly.

The problems faced by the various target groups varied considerably during the time of the operation. In fact, considering the different military, political, infrastructure and economic conditions the programme had to address at least five different main scenarios of intervention:

- The situation of displaced people in Kosovo before the air campaign.
- The situation of refugees in Albania during the bombing.
- The situation of refugees in FYRoM during the air campaign.
- The situation of IDPs in Montenegro during the bombing.
- The situation during the return of the refugees.

Emergency Scenarios of EMOP 6040			
	Before NATO intervention	During NATO intervention	After NATO intervention
	Phase 1	Phase 2	Phase 3
Kosovo	IDPs in host families or without any accommodation have limited access to food	WFP not directly active	Large numbers of returnees with limited or no access to food
Albania	Small numbers require food assistance	Large numbers of refugees in camps, collective centers and host families in need of food	Small numbers of refugees below intervention level. Start of new food Programme for vulnerable groups
FYRoM	Only limited number of refugees, mainly accommodated in host families	Large numbers of refugees in camps, collective centers and host families in need of food	Small number of old and new refugees in collective centers and with host families
Montenegro	Small numbers of IDPs in collective centers and host families in need of food. Old caseload refugees	Relatively large numbers of IDPs in camps, collective centers and host families in need of food. Old caseload refugees and vulnerable groups	Limited number of "old" IDPs and increasing numbers of new caseloads in collective centers and in host families. Old caseload refugees and vulnerable groups in need of food

3.1 Target Groups

Considering the different types of accommodation for the displaced people (such as accommodation in host families, camps and collective centres) and other characteristics of the target groups, the complexity of these scenarios increase. The whole programme had to deal with at least 10 types of target groups with different socio-economic characteristics:

Target Groups

Target Group 1 (refugees accommodated in tented camps)
Target Group 2 (refugees accommodated in collective centers)
Target Group 3 (refugee accommodated in private houses)
Target Group 4 (families which hosted refugees)
Target Group 5 (internally displaced people in Kosovo)
Target Group 6 (families which hosted refugees in Kosovo)
Target Group 7 (internally displaced people in Montenegro and Serbia)
Target Group 8 (local population impacted by IDPs and refugees)
Target Group 9 (most vulnerable groups, female-headed household with kids and others)
Target Group 10 (refugees remaining in country of asylum)

Although the overall objective of the programme, to prevent hunger and malnutrition among the displaced ethnic Albanians and other ethnic groups fleeing the violence in Kosovo remained the same, the specific objectives, operational conditions and type of target groups changed according to conditions and situations. In fact the programme can be divided into three phases: **Phase I**, covering the period September 1998 to March 1999; **Phase II**, covering March to end of June 1999; **Phase III**, covering the return of the refugees in June/September.

3.2 Phase I: The Period September 1998 to March 1999

3.2.1 Focus on Kosovo and IDPs

The first phase covers the period from September 1998 to March 1999, before the air campaign started. During this period WFP operations centered on internally displaced people in Kosovo, providing them with the necessary food support. The main target groups were ethnic Albanians, who had to leave their homes in Kosovo due to violence, seeking shelter and support with host families. Host families in need of food were also part of the target population of EMOP 6040.

In order to manage the food inputs properly, WFP expanded its staffing levels in the region. Initial staffing requirements were met through the ongoing emergency operation to the former Yugoslavia. In total, eleven international staff members were asked for in the original EMOP 6040 document, for which standby facilities of donors were to be utilised. In addition to staff, additional resources for communications and transportation were requested.

The objective was not only to prevent hunger and malnutrition, but also to prevent further displacement of people within and out of Kosovo. The programme also planned for the provision of a two-month winter safety net covering January and February 1999.

The original EMOP 6040 was built around this objective. Total costs were estimated at about 20 million dollars, to provide for the food needs of about 420,000 people. WFP was only one of the food suppliers. ICRC, CRS and MCI maintained their own pipelines. In almost all cases, the Mother Theresa Society was in charge of final distribution to the target groups.

The main part of the EMOP was intended for Kosovo (300,000). While the operations in Albania slowly built up, those in FYRoM and Montenegro were of minor importance. The main part of the food was requested for the internally displaced people inside Kosovo.

During phase one of the Programme, WFP played a small role in the provision of food to Kosovo. While in October/September 1998 WFP did not cover more than 10 % of all food distributed, the share climbed up to 25% in February/March 1999 when significant quantities of food were distributed. The task of targeting and final distribution was eased by the involvement of the Mother Theresa Society playing a substantial role in reaching the target groups and distributing food.

The food delivery into Kosovo was weak due to constraints affecting the transport from Bar to Kosovo. From September to December 1998, the Programme faced great difficulties in bringing food to the target group of 300,000 people in Kosovo and to provide a safety net for the winter. Only a small part of the food arrived and was distributed. By March 1999, only 5,000 tons of food had been distributed to the beneficiaries. The main bulk of 37,000 tons remained in the port of Bar or the WFP warehouses in Montenegro.

From our interviews:

“From September to December 1998 we had a very difficult time to supply the 420,000. The implementing partners had limited capacity; WFP logistics was not robust enough in the region to deal with difficult ports, difficult customs, bad roads, etc. I do not remember any two-month winter stock.”

The second objective, that of preventing further displacement has not been achieved, and could probably not be achieved, as people were moving at the point of a gun.

From our interviews:

“These people (IDPs in Kosovo) in 1998 and 1999 were moving at the point of a gun. Very few people moved or did not move due to food assistance. I am sure it did “reduce movement” but how much is questionable. On the other hand many people moved because they did not have food due to Serb aggression. And moved to areas where WFP could operate. So it could be said that food supply did cause some people to displace themselves, but in a positive fashion.”

That there was never a severe food shortage on the beneficiaries side can also be contributed to the provision of food by others and by the IDPs themselves. Considering the difficult and dangerous period, when ethnic cleansing was on full speed, the work of WFP staff was nevertheless remarkable in mobilising food convoys and reaching the EDPs in remote villages.

The mission concluded that the reason why IDPs survived and maintained an acceptable level of nutrition during the displacement was that families helped each other and enough food was stored. The WFP food supply as well as that of others contributed to replenish family food stocks. These stocks helped to keep acceptable nutritional standards of the remainees during the period of air campaign (March-June) and, together with the food carried over by the returnees in June-July, provided a buffer stock until the full restart of food distribution in July-August. This was confirmed in the interviews with former beneficiaries.

Ironically, the food which did not arrive in Kosovo then became available for the beginning of the second phase, in Albania. It was shipped from Bar to the northern focal points of refugee influx. In other words, the food coming too late for Kosovo became a contingency stock for the large number of refugees entering Albania in March/April.

3.2.2 Kosovo:

Before the recent crisis the population of Kosovo was estimated at two million with ethnic Albanians comprising 90 percent. Under the 1974 Constitution, Kosovo was granted autonomy. In 1989, that autonomy was revoked by the central government. The frustration resulting from the loss of autonomy and widespread discrimination against Albanian Kosovars started the conflict that by the summer of 1998 engulfed the entire province. This conflict created the first wave of IDPs seeking shelter in safer parts of Kosovo and in the FRY Republics of Serbia and Montenegro.

Fighting continued until a cease-fire was negotiated in October 1998. The cease-fire held for approximately two months. The last week of December 1998 and the beginning of 1999 were

characterised by periodic outbreaks of violence which led to new displacement of the population. In February 1999, peace talks were held in Rambouillet, France, but ended inconclusively.

During this period, the Serb authorities in Belgrade did not request food aid for Kosovo, but local authorities were partly co-operative in assisting WFP/UNHCR food convoys to reach areas previously inaccessible.

An escalation of violence in Kosovo and large-scale expulsion and exodus of ethnic Albanian Kosovars followed this impasse. Many sought refuge in Albania, FYRoM, Montenegro and BiH. Some have received asylum in more distant countries under the Humanitarian Evacuee Programme. And many others were or are still internally displaced.

A major offensive in late July forced up to 70,000 people to flee to the mountains in Kosovo. More people were displaced in mid-August. The local NGO, Mother Theresa Society (MTS) reported more than 300,000 IDPs scattered throughout the country. UNHCR and WFP accepted the figure as a planning figure. The international NGO Mercy Corps International (MCI), CRS and the MTS were considered viable implementing partners for the food distribution.

The MTS has branches throughout the Kosovo. The organisation was and still is the most important NGO for the distribution of food and other items and services in Kosovo. It continued operating before, during and after the bombing. While WFP and the larger international NGOs brought in the food, MTS was responsible for distribution to the beneficiaries.

Distributions were to be on short cycles to allow adjustments to the constantly changing situation and the movements of the target groups. Whilst the conflict continued, ad hoc convoys would make immediate deliveries of food to areas in acute need.

3.2.3 Albania

In Albania, the government food stocks were still limited after the internal crisis of 1997, precipitated by the collapse of the so-called pyramid schemes. The government was very co-operative but wanted to relocate the refugees as soon as possible away from the northern border.

In May 1998, food was delivered to Albania from WFP stocks in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Ploce port (Croatia). A joint WFP/UNHCR assessment mission to northern Albania in early June 1998 defined basic and supplementary food needs of the refugees arriving in the area. While refugees' immediate needs were met by other humanitarian organisations, their stocks were rapidly depleted, and WFP took on the main responsibility for providing food aid.

In Albania, it was estimated that about 20,000 Kosovars had crossed the border into Albania since May 1998. The influx slowed down significantly when the border was closed on the Kosovo side. Border crossings picked up again in mid-August. In view of the potential for further influxes, UNHCR and WFP agreed on a planning figure of 50,000 refugees. WFP assistance was for 30,000 refugees only, with 20,000 taken care of by other agencies.

WFP had an office in Tirana and established a satellite office in northern Albania, where the refugees were concentrated. The offices were equipped with radios, some vehicles and office equipment, re-deployed from ongoing and previous operations in the region.

WFP divided the beneficiary population with the IFRC, to ensure proper distribution of food and to avoid duplication. Further implementing arrangements with NGOs were worked out together with UNHCR. WFP managed and monitored the food aid in co-operation with the implementing partners.

Food was trucked by commercial transports from the port of Durres to distribution points in northern Albania. This commercial modality was successful and economical and continued to be applied over the next period. No food was to be stored in the refugee affected areas of the North because of the unstable security situation. As recipients of the food delivery, NGOs were responsible for ensuring that food was not diverted to combatants in the surrounding area.

Finally, Albania accepted the largest number of Kosovar refugees amounting to over 450,000 in June 1999.

3.2.4 Macedonia (FYRoM)

In January 1999, out of a refugee population of some 5,000 persons located in FYRoM, only 880 refugees had been registered. Two assessment missions in 1998 concluded that there was no need for food aid. The escalation of the conflict in Kosovo in late March 1999 saw a dramatic increase in the number of refugees with some 250,000 entering FYRoM.

FYRoM, in the beginning, did not acknowledge the arrival of Kosovar refugees in the country. Kosovars with correct documentation could travel to FYROM for a limited stay. Reports indicated the relocation of many women, children and elderly people from Pristina and southern towns in Kosovo to FYRoM to escape the fighting. The people stayed on tourist visas and were not yet registered with the local authorities for assistance.

Although the government denied the existence of Kosovar refugees in FYRoM, there were strong indications that the country might become an important escape route for Kosovars from the southern areas of Kosovo. On the basis of these considerations, UNHCR and WFP agreed to a planning figure of 20,000 refugees. A WFP office was, however, not opened immediately.

As and when food assistance to Kosovar refugees in FYRoM would become necessary, WFP would deliver it to the UNHCR warehouse in Skopje. Thereafter, WFP and its implementing partners, such as CRS, would be responsible for the management and control of the food. Distributions would be carried out through UNHCR and the Macedonian Red Cross.

3.2.5 Montenegro (FRY)

In Montenegro, the government made a request for international assistance on 23 June 1998. WFP food from contingency stocks was delivered at the same time as the government released some 125 tons of mixed commodities from their own supplies. The government maintained an open door policy towards the arrival of IDPs.

There are two types of food aid beneficiaries in Montenegro:

- Serb refugees from the conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia, and
- IDPs from Kosovo since the summer of 1998. The later include ethnic Albanian Kosovars, and more recently Serb IDPs.

With a deteriorating economic situation and growing instability within the Republic of Montenegro, there was a continued need to provide food assistance to IDPs, refugees and to those war-affected people who have lost the means to support themselves.

In Montenegro, the influx of IDPs from Kosovo continued. In October there had been more than 30,000 IDPs in Montenegro. With average daily arrivals of approximately 200 people, the IDP population increased steadily. UNHCR and WFP agreed on a planning figure of 40,000 beneficiaries in Montenegro.

Distributions were going through the Montenegrin Red Cross (MRC) in conjunction with the Montenegrin Commissioner for Refugees. WFP staff members based in Podgorica were responsible for the management of the food aid as well as monitoring. Distributions were on a monthly basis and WFP Montenegro remained responsive to the ever-increasing IDP caseload.

Vehicles as well as communication and office equipment were provided. For the secondary distribution, WFP used trucks (20.5 tons each), donated by the US Government. The trucks were particularly suitable for use in difficult terrain. A fleet manager was seconded as a contribution from a donor's standby facility.

3.3 Phase II : The Refugee Crisis in April 1999 – June 1999

In March 1999, an escalation of civil unrest in the Kosovo Province of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the beginning of NATO air attacks, led to a large scale exodus of refugees into neighbouring countries, and the internal displacement of large parts of the remaining population. By early June 1999, about 750,000 refugees had fled the Province, 150,000 had been displaced to other parts of Serbia and Montenegro, and 600,000 people were displaced from their homes but remained within the provinces. Altogether about 1.5 million people had been displaced.

The second phase of the EMOP 6040 covers the dramatic three-month period from March to end of June and concerns refugees and IDPs in Albania, FYRoM and Montenegro respectively. This phase became the main stage of the programme and most of its resources have been allocated to this period. It is characterised by the unexpected fast influx of huge numbers of refugees during a very short period and the immediate, spontaneous return of these refugees, also within a very short period. In this phase the WFP programme had to deal decisively with challenges of logistics, deployment of the right staff, and food policies and co-ordination.

The programme reached its peak with a total budget of about 90 million dollars. The overall target figure was 950,000 refugees, displaced persons and other vulnerable people affected by the conflict.

The overall objective remained the same, with the difference that the refugees were to be supported until they could return to Kosovo. Additional complex tasks were added and new target groups included: refugees in camps and in collective centres, refugees in Albanian host families, needy host families and other vulnerable groups.

The distribution of food to the different target groups became more complex. Various bilateral and other donors provided food. Within this group of food providers WFP became the main supplier and food co-ordinator. For final food distribution WFP entered into an agreement with UNHCR and a number of international NGOs which, in most cases, took over the final distribution to the target groups.

While there were some WFP contingency arrangements, WFP, like other emergency organisations, was taken by surprise when relatively large numbers of refugees entered into Albania, FYRoM and Montenegro in March/April. During these weeks the aid organisations worked hard to get food to the refugees. WFP responded with the immediate deployment of most experienced staff and the provision of sophisticated communication and logistics technology in Albania and FYRoM, actions that turned out to be key elements for the success of the programme.

In particular the distribution of bread in combination with canned meat or fish turned out to be a great success in terms of nutrition. It also avoided a massive distribution of cooking facilities and utensils.

3.3.1 Albania

In the first few weeks after the NATO intervention, there was a steady influx of refugees into Albania, initially with some 30,000 arrivals daily. Before the strikes, there were about 20,000 ethnic Albanian refugees from Kosovo in Albania; half of them were assisted by WFP. By end

June, there were almost half a million refugees in Albania, a country with a population of only 3.2 million.

Albania is one of the poorest countries in Europe with a weak economic performance and deficient infrastructure. The road system is poor all over the country, as are other essential infrastructure services like water supply, power, transportation, communication systems, airports and ports. The agriculture is generating more than half of the GDP. Following an impressive transition and economic growth between 1992 and 1996, Albania descended nearly into anarchy in 1997, triggered by the collapse of the so-called pyramid scheme. While the recovery of the economy was going on, the next crisis occurred: the refugee crisis of 1999.

Albania accommodated the largest number of refugees in the three main categories: camps, collective centres and private housing. In the beginning of June 1999, at the peak of the Kosovo refugee crisis, 460,000 refugees arrived in the country. Almost two thirds of the refugees found accommodation with host families or in rented flats, while the rest were temporarily placed in collective centres and tented camps. The heavy influx added over 12 percent to Albania's population.

The establishment of an **Emergency Management Group (EMG)** was an example of collaboration between the Government of Albania and the different role players of the international community. The Group was entrusted with the task of providing information and management support to the humanitarian community. Its valuable role as a focal point and mechanism of co-ordination during the crisis has been acknowledged. WFP, heading the food co-ordination desk, provided a valuable contribution to the Group.

When the refugees arrived they were often spontaneously invited by Albanian **host families** to stay, sometimes without paying rent. With the continuation of the stay, refugee families who could afford it started to pay rent. It is believed that families' savings and remittances from relatives and friends abroad helped to meet the costs. Refugees who did not want or could not pay moved to collective centres or camps. The fact that the overwhelming majority of refugees had been seeking accommodation in private houses was also typical for the other areas of major refugee influx (FYRoM and Montenegro). It highlights a special feature of the refugee crisis including the food aspects: a large part of the refugees and IDPs had resources, which were used in the emergency situation. These resources also helped to overcome dry spells of food distribution.

The second largest group of refugees was accommodated in so-called **collective centres**. Such centres included different types of large buildings and building complexes rented from private owners or given for free by the State, the municipalities, local communities and other owners. The buildings used were hotels, large private houses, former factories, huge grain store complexes, technical schools and dormitories, sports and other complexes. The condition of the buildings differed significantly. They were repaired and made suitable to accommodate large numbers of refugees.

Only some 83,000 refugees were accommodated in **tented camps**, erected and managed by various bilateral and international organisations. NATO and other troops also participated in the rapid construction, operation and maintenance of the camps. The camp capacities often reached 5,000 and more people. Camps were provided with basic services including water, health services, community services, and in some cases educational services. Two third of all refugees in tented camps were placed in Kukes (31,000), Durres (13,000) and Tirana (13,000), the rest distributed over the other provinces.

At the end of the crisis almost all refugee returned spontaneously to Kosovo, with marginal external logistics support. It can be considered one of the most amazing returnee movements in the history of refugee events.

WFP has a clear **exit strategy** for refugee food aid. With the total numbers of refugees below the established number for which WFP would take the responsibility, UNHCR becomes responsible for the provision of food aid to the small numbers of refugees, which will stay over winter in Albania.

Due to the Kosovo crisis, Albania was suddenly placed at the centre of world news. The solidarity of its population has been underlined repeatedly. It appears that the duration of the crisis was too short to create a strong negative impact on Albania. On the contrary, the mobilisation of external and internal resources and the energising effect of the massive presence of various international organisations contributed to a change of national attitudes and strengthening of the political system. The generous support to the refugees and international community helped to improve the image of Albania.

3.3.2 Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYRoM)

Before the air campaign about 10,000 Kosovars were in FYRoM. By 31 March 1999, UNHCR estimated that up to 65,000 persons had fled Kosovo and were living in 'no man's land' at the Blace border crossing. The influx continued until early June, by which time there were an estimated 254,100 refugees in FYRoM accommodated in emergency shelters or with host families. The largest number of refugees were, like in Albania, living with host families, relatives or friends.

By mid-June, there were eight refugee camps, one more under construction and one collective centre. To these camps, WFP basic rations were distributed and NGOs provided complementary foods. Some of the camps had no cooking facilities at all and so the focus remained on the distribution of WFP ready-to-eat food. Distribution to refugees in host families was carried out through the Macedonian Red Cross (MRC) in co-ordination with IFRC. In co-operation with UNHCR and CRS, WFP helped to expand the MRC distribution network to accommodate the large increase in beneficiaries in host families, which reached 170,000 in June before spontaneous repatriation began.

Refugees began to return as soon as British KFOR troops entered Kosovo on 12 June. Camps were being closed and carry-over food stocks in the camps re-directed. In July, four of the eight camps had closed, and a fifth closed in early August. Carry-over stocks were transported to the Skopje warehouse, after which 5,000 tons were sent on to Kosovo by the end of September. Many NGOs have followed the refugees to Kosovo. Six NGOs remain alongside three Red Cross organisations that are distributing food.

Simultaneously to the outflow there was a new influx of refugees, namely Roma and Serbs from Kosovo, and ethnic Albanians from southern Serbia. Monthly distributions of WFP food continued.

Throughout the crisis, WFP has been responsible for food aid to the refugees; CRS has provided support for host families.

3.3.3 Montenegro

Montenegro hosted some 34,000 IDPs before the NATO air strikes, a number which increased to 83,000 during the course of the air campaign. Like the refugees in Albania and FYRoM, IDPs in Montenegro began returning to Kosovo as soon as KFOR entered Kosovo. Within a short period, about 43,000 IDPs returned to Kosovo. While Albanian Kosovars returned, many Serbs and Roma living in Kosovo felt threatened and fled. By the end of June, more than 20,000 Serbs and Roma (new caseload) had arrived in Montenegro.

Altogether WFP has been assisting four types of target groups in Montenegro:

- "old caseload" refugees from the break-up of former Yugoslavia
- IDPs from the Kosovo crises
- new arrivals (Serbs and Roma from Kosovo)

- social cases (such as pensioners)

During the air strikes, the Government approached WFP requesting food assistance to social cases. In August, WFP began distributions to 20,000 pensioners who had been identified by the Ministry of Social Affairs.

During the bombing, distributions continued to all caseloads. Food assistance was highly co-ordinated with UNHCR, CRS, MCI and ICRC to determine allocations, carryover stocks and food available by agency.

In addition to the food aid provided by WFP, CRS, MCI and ICRC to old caseload refugees and IDPs, two bilateral donations were directed towards vulnerable groups: One donation was received from USAID for 200,000 social cases including people made unemployed by the air strikes. Distribution was completed in August. The second, a donation of 4,700 tons from the Italian government was also intended for social cases.

In early 1999, WFP was milling wheat grain in Podgorica. Since July 1999, the mill is again working for WFP and the consignment of more than 3,000 tons of wheat grain donated to Kosovo is being milled and sent to Kosovo. The flour provides a stable pipeline into western Kosovo.

The office in Bar, in charge of one of the two main corridors for food delivery, was never closed during the air strikes. It handles import, clearance and dispatch of food to Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo.

3.4 Phase III: The Return to Kosovo

Events rapidly turned after 10 June, when a Military Technical Agreement was reached between the Government of the FRY and NATO, allowing the first Kosovo Force (KFOR) peacekeeping troop deployments into the Kosovo to begin. UN humanitarian workers and convoys of relief supplies entered Kosovo shortly after. The turn of events inspired large-scale spontaneous returns of refugees beginning 14 June. In the first two weeks, over 415,000 Kosovo refugees returned by their own means and others through arranging buses from their camps. By late July, the total number of refugees who had returned to the Province stood at about 700,000.

The UN Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June authorised the immediate establishment of an international civil presence in Kosovo, the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), in order to provide an interim administration for the Province. Under the umbrella of the UNMIK, many UN agencies are now involved according to their areas of specialisation.

The **third phase** covers the return of the refugees at the end of June and the beginning of July, a short period during which refugees and internally displaced people returned spontaneously, and in most cases by their own means, to Kosovo. It also embraces the winding up and phasing out of activities particularly in Albania and in FYRoM.

Having learned from phase two, a contingency and returnee plan was worked out by WFP two weeks before the end of the air campaign in June. This preparedness provided the basis for a rapid return to Kosovo and the availability of sufficient food for the distribution to returnees at the main border points like Kukes in Albania. The strategy did not only plan for a re-entry but also included phase-out arrangements.

While the overall objective remained the same, there was a major shift in the immediate objectives. The intention was to provide as much food as possible to the returning refugees on their departure in order to build up stocks in Kosovo which would also help internally displaced people and others without food until the WFP programme would become fully operational again.

3.4.1 Albania

Organised repatriation did not begin until July, after KFOR secured the whole of Kosovo. Despite the potential security risks, the refugees began returning spontaneously on 13 June; the first day KFOR troops entered Kosovo from Albania. By the end of June, more than 250,000 refugees had already returned from Albania to Kosovo.

WFP supported the spontaneous return with family rations on the road from Kukes to Kosovo. Humanitarian daily rations and canned food were also distributed for the journey itself. Other agencies supplied water and various non-food items to support the journey and the immediate period after return to Kosovo. In July, the distribution of one-month family rations in Kukes continued. In addition, WFP began to distribute bread at departure points in the southern prefectures of Albania.

Great work was done by WFP in downsizing the operation in Albania from over 100 international staff and eight offices, to eight staff and two offices. Excess food stocks and equipment and material were trucked and flown into Kosovo.

As the rate of refugee return was extremely intense and spontaneous, the figures for the refugee population were difficult to determine. The discrepancy between UN and government figures compelled WFP to stop distributing food until a proper registration was completed. When the registration process was completed in mid-September, only 4,000 refugees remained. Under the global Memorandum of Understanding with UNHCR, UNHCR is responsible for the food aid needs for refugee populations of less than 5,000. Therefore, WFP is no longer serving the refugee population in Albania.

WFP now has a focus on vulnerable target groups, such as pensioners, orphans and homeless, people affected by disasters and other as most vulnerable people. Various programmes were assessed during the summer for which WFP provides food through NGO (ADRA, MCI, CRS and CARE) projects. These projects are intended to increase household food security of about 75,000 persons. The social assistance projects are scheduled to run until the end of 1999, after which a one-year Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation will become effective. Food-for-work initiatives are also considered.

WFP continues to work with the Emergency Management Group (EMG), which has shifted its emphasis from relief to rehabilitation and developmental operations.

3.4.2 Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYRoM)

After the returns in July, food aid was distributed to social cases by US, German and French Red Cross organisations in co-ordination with MCI, CRS and InterSoS. The government provided a list of 75,000 families (approximately 300,000 individuals) who would be recipients. The programme has a three-month planning cycle.

The refugee population was steadily decreasing. In September, the total caseload was 21,000, with about 5,000 in camps and the remainder with host families or in collective centres. This population is comprised of people who cannot or do not want to go back, including new caseloads (Roma, ethnic Serb Kosovars). Nevertheless, by the end of September, approximately 200 refugees were returning weekly to Kosovo.

WFP continues to address the food needs of the refugees, and the issue of winterisation was addressed. Refugees are supposed to move from tents to host families or to a collective centre. They are supplied with a one-month family package of food and non-food items, including mattresses and blankets. The most important document for refugees in host families is the green card issued by the government and which entitles them to receive all humanitarian aid and local services. More recent arrivals (after the end of the air strikes) receive white cards, which do not qualify for local social assistance, although WFP provides them with food rations.

3.4.3 Montenegro

Within a few days, about 43,000 IDPs returned to Kosovo. While Albanian Kosovars returned, many Serbs and Roma living in Kosovo felt threatened and fled to Montenegro.

During the period July-September 1999, WFP was responsible for 50 percent of the food requirements for the IDPs. The number of IDPs decreased after the bombing stopped and the composition of IDPs changed. Originally made up primarily of Albanians, the majority is now composed of Serbs, Montenegrins and Roma from Kosovo, with only 7,000-8,000 Albanians. The latter are expected to return to Kosovo once the security situation improves. The future of the others is more precarious.

The refugee (old caseload) population has remained stable, while the IDP's situation is still fluid. There is still a risk of further crises in Montenegro. The Republic is suffering from severe inflation, price increases (more than 20 percent on many foodstuffs) and shortages. There is a ban on the transport of cereals, oil, sugar and meat to Montenegro from Serbia. The political situation is still tenuous as the Montenegrin government tries to redefine its political relationship with Serbia. Therefore, contingency planning is a priority in the coming months, and strong co-ordination is necessary.

3.4.4 EMOP 6136

As from 1 July 1999, WFP's activities in the Balkan Region are integrated within one single operation. EMOP 6136.00 provides support to victims of the Kosovo crisis and earlier conflicts. The primary objective of WFP assistance is to meet the immediate food needs of refugees, internally displaced persons and other vulnerable groups affected by conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina and, more recently, in Kosovo. The regional approach to the Balkans would ensure that assistance reaches those in need. The following table reflects WFP's food aid requirements from July 1999 to December 1999.

EMOP 6136.00 Food assistance to refugees, internal displaced persons and social cases in the Balkans			Duration: 6 Months 1 July to 31 Dec. 99		
Total Cost: US\$ 105,135,815		Beneficiaries: 1,755,000 (Jul.-Aug.)			
Food Commitment: 158,993 metric tonnes		Beneficiaries: 1,455,000 (Sep.-Dec.)			
EMOP 6136.00 Beneficiaries	Post-Dayton	Kosovo Crisis			Total
	Refugees from Bosnia & Croatia	Social Cases	IDPs outside Kosovo	Returnees and IDPs in Kosovo¹	
Location					
F.R.Y. – Kosovo <u>July-August</u>				900 000	900 000
<u>September-December</u>				600 000	600 000
F.R.Y. – Serbia	350 000	300 000	120 000		770 000
F.R.Y. – Montenegro	15 000	20 000	20 000		55 000
Albania		30 000			30 000
Total <u>July-August</u>	365 000	350 000	140 000	900 000	1 755 000
<u>September-December</u>				600 000	1 455 000

4 ACHIEVEMENTS

4.1 General Conclusions

EMOP 6040 is part of the WFP continuous contribution to mitigate the humanitarian problems of countries and geographic areas in the Balkan Region. This engagement extends over almost ten years. Its main focus was the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina and its respective repercussions in the neighbouring countries. In 1998 the focus shifted further south towards the Kosovo.

EMOP 6040 has to be seen in this context. The enormous efforts undertaken between June 1998 and June 1999 are linked with the previous operations in the region. This effort continues within

the present programme which now comprises the whole region, including Kosovo, Albania, FYRoM, Montenegro, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, etc.

Under EMOP 6040, WFP's task was to co-ordinate the distribution of 100,000 tons of food to 950,000 victims of the conflict in Kosovo, at a cost of 80 million dollars. This operation ended on 30 June 1999. At the same time, EMOP 5142.05 provided support to victims of the earlier conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. This operation also terminated on 30 June 1999. As from 1 July 1999, WFP's activities in the Balkan Region are all integrated within one single operation EMOP 6136.

EMOP 6040 was not a homogeneous programme but represented a continuum that linked previous operations with a new framework. In fact, during the brief span of EMOP 6040 (13 months) there have been 11 revisions of the original programme.

These revisions reflect not only budget corrections but also the changing situations of the crisis from the initial assistance to displaced people in Kosovo to targeted refugee food aid in Albania, FYRoM and Montenegro, and finally to blanket food distribution to returnees and remainees. Although the overall objective remained the same, the specific objectives changed. These changes were not properly reflected in the documents.

The programme had abundant resources available. At each stage the programme obtained the necessary funding. Although this basically echoes the international political environment and the coverage of the crisis by the international media, it also reflects the donor's trust into WFP's capacity. In this sense the programme was strongly donor driven and closely followed by the international media.

4.2 Achievements

The overall goal of the EMOP 6040 was to prevent hunger and malnutrition among the displaced ethnic Albanians and other ethnic groups fleeing the violence that has erupted in Kosovo. This goal has been achieved. Evidence of this has already been documented in numerous reports and evaluations. Objectively measurable indicators for the success of the programme, like nutritional level of refugees and death rates, indicate that figures have never surpassed normal levels. In key refugee areas like Kukes (Albania) the nutritional level never went below the international minimum standard. In no cases have higher death rates in refugee areas been reported.

From our interviews:

"I worked in Kosovo and Kukes. The demand for food was massive and WFP generally met the demand. Two large-scale and very professional nutrition surveys showed less than 2 % malnutrition, and one girl was sick. WFP took part in these surveys and was impressed."

This result can be contributed to the generous provision of more or less timely and adequate food to the target groups by WFP and other major food providers. Like in other major refugee crises, refugees and displaced persons themselves as well as the affected local population, make the first and main contribution to the survival and wellbeing of the affected people, particularly in the first period of an emergency. The reasons that severe hunger and malnutrition could be avoided can be contributed to a large part to the following two main coping mechanisms:

- Refugees, internally displaced persons and other vulnerable groups had their own contingency plans, emergency food stocks and resources to overcome periods of dislocation from their homes.
- The generous help provided by extended family members in- and outside Kosovo helped refugees and internally displaced people to overcome "dry spells" of external aid. This refers to the provision of food and shelter as well as to remittances from abroad.

The fact that there was scarcely any suffering from a lack of food has been clearly confirmed by the interviews undertaken with former target groups of the EMOP 6049 during the evaluation exercise. Almost all former beneficiaries interviewed remember the food aid received as good, sufficient and adequate.

The evaluation was also concerned with a number of complex **issues**, with the aim of drawing lessons from them. It is obvious that each operation of this intensity, magnitude and publicity has its own components to learn from. In fact, some workshops on lessons learnt have already been undertaken and recommendations made.

However, the evaluation shows that responses on what lessons can be learned from EMOP 6040 are not uniform. On the one side, quite some enthusiasm about the way WFP handled the operation has been expressed. On the other side, arguments have been put forward describing the operation as WFP's normal mandate, arguing that WFP often handles emergency cases much bigger than the Kosovo operation. The mission has tried to summarize some of the different views and to assess how representative the operation was for the formulation of general recommendations.

5 ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Between April and June 1999, WFP had to build up three large-scale emergency operations in Albania, FYRoM and Kosovo essentially. The operations involved over 160 international staff, and some 500 newly recruited local staff. The special feature of the situation was not so much the magnitude of the caseload of about one million refugees, IDPs, and other groups affected by the conflict, but much more the timeframe and circumstances of the events. Within less than 100 days, the organisation had to set up a large emergency machinery, dismantle it, and set up another one in Kosovo. Furthermore, the emergency programme was undertaken in a highly political context and under intensive coverage of the media.

During these three months, a number of particular issues came up which were unusual in the WFP's emergency experience. Some findings extracted from reviewing the data, and the interviews made, may help to further assess these issues and to reach some conclusions and recommendations.

It should be mentioned that different WFP headquarters units and the Regional Office have already made some efforts to analyse those elements and to present lessons learnt from the operation. The report will refer to some of those sources.

5.1 Contingency Planning and Exit Strategies

Contingency planning had been started in the region in 1995 with plans updated by WFP annually. The question is, 'How did it work in the Kosovo context?' At two junctures in the operation - the commencement of the NATO bombing campaign in March 1999 and the signing of the military agreement and the sudden return of the refugees in June - July of that year, WFP was confronted with new demands and programme priorities.

5.1.1 Assumptions and Contingency Planning

The evaluation of preparedness and contingency planning of WFP's Kosovo Operation is difficult to answer, as there are no standards. Staying with our base model of the three different phases of the operation, there have been two crucial points in the whole programme. First, the provision of sufficient and adequate food to hundreds of thousands of refugees entering Albania and FYRoM at the beginning of phase two. Second, the provision of sufficient food stocks during the dramatic,

spontaneous return of almost all refugees and displaced people to Kosovo within a few weeks, and the restart of the operations in Kosovo.

EMOP 6040 was part of the WFP continuous contribution to mitigate the humanitarian problems of countries in the Balkan Region. This engagement of WFP has been lasting already over eight years. The main focus was the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina and its repercussions in the neighbouring countries. In 1998 the focus shifted further south towards the Kosovo. The contingency planning under EMOP 6040 has to be looked at: within this regional context: emergency operations did not start in an organisational vacuum; it could build on some work already prepared in the region and concerned countries.

Some WFP contingency planning was undertaken already in March 1998, when a WFP/FAO Joint Food Aid Needs Assessment Mission was fielded. In a certain sense, EMOP 6040 itself was a form of preparedness and contingency planning for the Kosovo crisis. The main assumption of EMOP 6040 was that the caseload was expected in the Kosovo itself (IDPs). In fact, the events continued to produce large numbers of IDPs within Kosovo itself. However, WFP could not provide food directly to these IDPs after the bombing started in March 1999. On the other hand, the political and military events resulted in an unforeseen massive movement of almost one million people into the neighbouring countries within a few weeks.

One of the WFP staff perceives this period somewhat differently:

"It was very obvious from what we saw daily in the first days in Kosovo (July 1998). There were tanks firing on villages, full armoured attacks on civilians, mass torture and execution, all in central Europe. This was obviously "the next big thing". Possibly the programme should have developed a larger infrastructure earlier, including propositioning of large amounts of food and having more staff involved"

Although the whole concept of the original EMOP 6040 was focussed on Kosovo as the main stage of the drama, preparations had been undertaken to store some food in Albania and to prepare for a moderate influx into FYRoM. While WFP had some presence in Albania from the civil conflict of 1997, it had little experience in FYRoM.

WFP, like other emergency organisations, was also taken by surprise about the magnitude of refugees entering Albania, FYRoM and Montenegro within a very short period in March/April 1999. During these few weeks the aid organisations worked hard to get food to the refugees.

WFP's response with the immediate deployment of its most experienced staff and implementation of sophisticated communication and logistics technology in Albania and FYRoM turned out to be the key elements for the success of the programme. All this was done during a relatively short period. However, as it is pointed out in the assessment by the WFP Regional Office:

" WFP food was not immediately available for distribution. IRA facility was not sufficient to meet urgent food requirements as the procurement takes too much time."

Beside the initial shortage in food, delays occurred also in the supply of essential equipment, such as rub-halls, which seriously hampered storage for two months. Vehicles that arrived without any registration were held up in the airport for up to two months.

Stand-by agreements and other arrangements compensated for most of these shortcomings, with international and bilateral organisations providing complementary logistics staff and equipment. Also the collaboration with the military (NATO) was essential during the first part of the influx. The rapid set-up of air operations with planes and helicopters also supported effectively the humanitarian efforts and contributed to the high visibility of WFP.

Having learned from phase two, a contingency and returnee plan was worked out by WFP two weeks before the end of the bombing in June. The contingency plans for the re-entry into Kosovo

have been laid down in a document. The planning document provided the basis for a rapid return to Kosovo, and the distribution of sufficient food to the large numbers of spontaneous returnees at the main border points like Kukes in Albania at the end of June 1999. The strategy did not only cover the re-entry but also included phase-out arrangements.

WFP was one of the first aid organisations returning to Kosovo. The previous WFP structures of phase one and experience in Kosovo facilitated the restart of blanket food distribution. Existing food stocks in Kukes and Durres in Albania, in Skopje (FYRoM) and Thessaloniki (Greece) as well as Bar (Montenegro) contributed to WFP assuming fast the leading role in the provision and management of food distribution. A clear territorial separation of responsibilities of implementing partners also added to the quick start of food distribution and reorientation towards imminent rehabilitation and reconstruction tasks. At this point again, MTS played a crucial role in the targeting of beneficiaries and final distribution of food.

With the words of a WFP staff:

“Contingency plans? I was not aware of the contingency plans at the commencement of the bombing. But I was aware of them before return to Kosovo. And the latter were quite good.

Perhaps more efforts in late 1998 could have been put towards more contingencies planning, but when one is drowning (in work) it is hard to look far into the future. Possibly one international officer could have come in late 1998 to conduct this task. Or at least pull us out of our day to day focused activity to say, “stand back for one minute and look at the future”.

The planning for the return was rather complete. I moved into Kosovo very soon, Serbs were still shooting people on the street. Actually in some ways we moved too fast. The telecommunication people (from WFP) arrived so quickly; I did not even have a warehouse or office yet.

On the grand scale, the return to Kosovo in June 1999 was well planned. On a smaller scale many things, like maps and GPS, were not given out, so all the new staff flooding in did not know the area as they could have. In the next planning exercise have 1:25,000 or 1:50,000 military grid maps available for the area for all staff and vehicles. A need for maps, and a GPS to go with it, should not come as a surprise.

Also the radio networks in FYRoM, Albania and Kosovo were different. So, when I arrived in Kosovo we had a tough time communicating with the teams coming from FYRoM. And during the first few days communications was very important. Vehicles were arriving quite quickly but most without radios, a big security and operations deficit.”

5.1.2 Exit Strategies

The problem of an emergency operation is not only to get in, but also to get out. It is known fact that emergency organisations often very reluctantly withdraw from their operations, particular in post-conflict situations related to refugees and returnees. The tendency of over-stretching mandates and overestimating refugee numbers in need of protracted emergency assistance has been observed in the past and donors have shown reluctance in funding such over-extended operations. Governments of affected countries often support this tendency in expectation of some benefits for their country. It is quite understandable that organisations, including NGOs, having built up expensive aid machinery and deployed staff, hesitate to stop their activities when a crisis abruptly ceases.

Similar phenomena could be observed in *status nascendi* when the bombing stopped and winterisation programme for remainees were discussed in Albania and FYRoM. However, WFP established a clear exit strategy in Albania and FYRoM at the end of phase two and developed a clear phasing down and exit strategy for phase three in Kosovo. Joint *WFP/FAO Food Aid Needs*

and Crop and Food Supply Assessments contributed to developing these strategies. WFP has undertaken a number of such assessment in co-operation with FAO and other agencies in the Balkan during the past year¹.

In Albania, WFP food assistance to refugees stopped when the refugees returned to Kosovo. The new programme focuses on socially vulnerable groups such as pensioners, and some food for work rehabilitation projects requested by the Government. In FYRoM there is still a limited number of old and new caseload refugees supported by WFP. In Kosovo a clear strategy has been established to replace blanket food distribution with targeted food aid and, depending on the harvests next year, to eventually phase out in 2000.

As quickly as WFP built up the operations in the beginning, it phased down its activities and staff when the refugees returned to Kosovo. While a lot of equipment and some international staff were transferred to Kosovo and other offices of the region, a large number of national staff was laid off.

5.1.3 Conclusions

Although the refugee flight from Kosovo in March 1999 caught WFP and other organisations off-guard, the organisation had enough contingency preparation and was able to respond to the emergency situation. In one way or another, the organisation could cope with the food required. The problem was the magnitude of the undertaking and the fast development of the situation.

WFP has been active in the Balkan Region since 1992. Contingency planning for larger food needs in the context of the Kosovo crisis was undertaken in 1998. The food needs were assumed to be most critical within Kosovo. A food needs assessment was jointly undertaken with FAO in early 1998 and appeals launched to obtain the necessary resources in time.

When almost one million refugees crossed the border of Kosovo in a couple of weeks, WFP, through a dynamic response, could handle the situation. By re-routing food resources originally intended for IDPs in Kosovo, by mobilising standby agreements for logistics support and equipment, as well as by rapid deployment of experienced WFP staff from around the world, the organisation could cope with the crisis and assume its role as food co-ordinator.

The direct preparation for the re-entry into Kosovo during phase three was more pronounced. It was also easier than the planning for phase two, because conditions and target groups were known. Unclear was the date and speed of re-entry.

The merit of WFP at this point was that WFP's senior field staff understood early the strong and unconditioned will of refugees to return immediately when the bombing stopped. While large parts of the international community still hesitated to give the green light because of logistics concerns and the fear of mines, the WFP management supported strongly the spontaneous return with massive blanket food distribution on the border points like Kukes. This was the right way to quickly bring more food stocks into Kosovo and to help displaced and other vulnerable groups having remained in Kosovo.

Recommendations: It appears that WFP still has no established mechanisms for Early Warning, Preparedness, and Response (EWPR). The establishment of a standard framework for EWPR applying the lessons learnt from the Kosovo crisis would be useful. The Regional Office in its

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- ◇ WFP Food Economy Assessment of Kosovo Province - 14 November 1999
- ◇ FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to the Kosovo province of the FRY - 30 August 1999
- ◇ Joint WFP/UNHCR Food Aid Needs Assessment FRY (Excluding Kosovo) - July 1999
- ◇ FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to Albania - 7 July 1999
- ◇ FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to the FYR of Macedonia - 7 July 1999
- ◇ WFP/FAO Joint Food Aid Needs Assessment Mission Report (Excerpt) - 5-13 March 1998

assessment proposes the development of a standard format for contingency planning spelling out:

- Potential scenarios/ assumptions;
- Beneficiary figures and locations;
- Organisational structure for response, staff functions and staffing plans;
- Identification of implementing partners;
- Food requirements;
- TC/IT and other equipment requirements;
- Military liaison needs, etc.

Further recommendations have been:

- the establishment of contingency stocks for food ready for airlifting; and
- to establish strategic stocks of essential logistics, communications, office and security equipment.

Facilities and tools available to WFP, such as COMPAS, which cannot only register WFP food in a region but also food data of other food aid organisations, could be used as a powerful contingency planning instrument to identify available surplus food stock in stores or in the pipeline in a region. These could then be channelled rapidly to emergency zones.

Contingency planning needs to be continuously looked at. One aspect is the co-ordination with other main role players, such as UNHCR and UNICEF, which have own strong sources of funding. A kind of Joint Contingency Planning could be useful to augment disaster preparedness.

In the words of a staff member with wide experience in WFP emergency operations:

“Regular consultations with UNHCR and UNICEF on potential emergency situations and status of resources available could increase the level of information and improve contingency planning: UNHCR has for sure more knowledge about the refugee situation than WFP, and UNHCR has no knowledge about available food resources in a region etc., while UNICEF has knowledge about vulnerable groups and other needs to be taken care in an emergency situation. To establish focal points and have regular consultations would already be a start.”

WFP will need to plan strategies to exit from emergency operations. Assets may not always be transferable to other operations like in Kosovo. Remaining equipment could be strategically placed as contingency stocks. International staff placement has to be planned ahead, including termination of contracts.

WFP has become very credit worthy because of their professional approach in assessing the food situation and defining clear exit strategies. These strategies also provide linkages towards sustainable development efforts. It is recommended to continue these approaches as it increases the credibility to donors and provides a bridge to sustainable development.

WFP/FAO food and nutrition assessments at the beginning of an emergency operation should remain a standard practice. The results should be shared with donors, implementing partners, and other main role players at an early stage in order to reinforce a common strategy.

5.2 Staffing of Key Posts

The staffing of key posts in the early stages of the operation was frequently accomplished by determining who of WFP’s staff world-wide was most suitable, and then plucking them from their current assignments for temporary duty in the Balkan, often with very little advance notice. While

this had been done before for individual posts in some emergencies, it became the modus operandi in the Kosovo operation.

One of the key decisions of the WFP management was the deployment of experienced senior staff. This sounds simple, but it is not. Other organisations were not able to do so. Most of the staff interviewed were positive about the approach but feared that the same people would then be deployed to any emergency situation coming up. The other question repeatedly raised was, what happened to the projects from which key staff were taken away?

The issue of staffing in an emergency situation has been discussed within WFP. The Regional Office in Pristina has made a number of suggestions and recommendations in a working paper on "lessons learned". The working paper outlines some of the main problems also raised in this evaluation. As the staffing issue is largely an internal management and organisational matter of WFP, we would like to cite the most essential ones from the working paper of the Regional Office:

- *Only five consultants and one SBA personnel were working in Kosovo **during phase one**. While their actual work was highly commended, there were some weaknesses in linking with Headquarters and understanding of WFP policy and procedures. There was clearly a lack of career WFP staff in an emergency operation of this magnitude.*
- *During the staff deployment in **phase two** (to Albania and FYRoM) the approach was to send in voluntary staff and let their roles and the structures be determined once the staff got there. Duplication of functions and confusion of reporting lines added to the stress.*
- *A corporate policy, roster and system for emergency staff deployment do not exist in WFP.*
- *Thanks to the good will of many staff, WFP was able to deploy a full-mix of operational staff to Albania and FYRoM. The result was later praised as "A-team Approach" implying successful deployment of experienced staff.*
- *For **phase three** the contingency plan for Kosovo predetermined the staff functions required and specified names of staff proposed to fill each post. OD/HR implemented this approach, enabling Kosovo operation to start off with full staffing of over 50 international staff.*
- *Emergency operations **require varied skill** sets of staff to make it run, particularly in the start-up phase. WFP human resources policy does not sufficiently recognise this reality and maintains the old Unified Service type profile as the favoured "core" profile.*
- *The current roster system does not identify the required skills for emergency operations.*
- *Many TDY staff raised concern over their status in their home posts and being inadvertently penalised for volunteering.*
- *Managers hesitate to release international staff (for emergency operations) due to minimal staffing in HQ and COs.*
- *Other problems and constraints related to unclear R&R policy, DSA/MSA and other entitlements of international staff related to contractual status and support to families left behind.*
- *With regard to local staff: WFP has neither proper contractual tools nor administrative capacity to manage local staff. The limitation of SSAs places WFP in disadvantage in attracting local staff. Even where UNDP does exist to offer other types of contract, it is no longer realistic to rely on UNDP services where WFP local staff out-numbers UNDP staff by hundreds.*

Recommendations:

- *Establish a policy that strategically places career staff in emergency operations, and reduce heavy dependency on consultants. WFP career staff will need to augment their emergency experience and management skill.*
- *Establish a corporate policy on emergency staff deployment so that all WFP staff is ready in principle to participate. A template reflecting staff functions required for a typical emergency start-up phase should be developed.*
- *WFP should consider a rotation system for rapid deployment. Core team should consist of staff with different skill sets. To avoid dependency on the same staff, the team should*

include both experienced and in experienced staff so that the number of experienced staff would gradually increase.

- *The pros and cons of staffing approach taken for Kosovo re-entry should be carefully studied and developed into a rapid staff deployment system for WFP.*
- *Establish HR contractual policies which caters more equitably for the people with different type of skill sets required in running emergency operations*
- *Establish TDY policy fair to all staff and ensure system that does not penalise staff for going on TDY.*
- *Support back filling of those posts (possibly locally recruited internationals) to replace staff on TDY to facilitate release of staff.*
- *Staff entitlement should be clarified as soon as possible.*
- *Develop alternatives to SSA contracts which could be administered by WFP locally (like UNHCR and UNICEF)."*

As already said, the human resources policy aspect in emergency situations seem to be a key point. The conditions and environment of emergency situations normally differ significantly and it is often difficult to apply pre-programmed mechanisms. Emergency situations require full management competence on the spot to react fast. It is obvious that emergency operations require experienced and skilled staff to run the operations, particularly at the beginning and there is normally no time for on-the-job training as may be possible in other types of projects. More so, in a crisis which has the full attention of the media and involves the military as a partner for humanitarian operations. Senior staff are required to co-ordinate the operations with military authorities. As it is formulated in the conclusions of the Regional Office working paper:

"Human resource is the key element to a successful operation. Placing experienced dedicated and creative staff in the right functions allows the operations to move by itself. This includes staff in headquarters playing the crucial support functions. People you need from the day one of the operations are not necessarily the standard WFP " Unified Service" profile person. Examples are:

- *Military Liaison Officer to negotiate operational requirements with NATO;*
- *HR Officer to issue out 200 local staff contracts in two weeks.*
- *Procurement Officer to handle large purchase of non-food items for start-up equipment;*
- *TC/IT Officers to ensure connectivity between sub-offices;*
- *Building Contract and Maintenance Officer to secure office and warehouse space with running water and power;*
- *Finance Officer to manage payroll and large financial transactions without any banking facilities;*
- *Air-operations Officer to manage airports an heli-pads;*
- *Security Officer to look after staff safety;*
- *Light Vehicle Manager, Radio Operator, Convoy Leader, Press Officer, International Secretary, etc.*

WFP's business is changing. Human resources requirements are different from the time WFP primarily dealt with development. To enhance WFP's preparedness and rapid response capacity for emergencies, our policies and tools for managing resources must adapt to new realities. Likewise, WFP staff must also understand the changing environment, and be prepared to participate in these operations when called on."

The evaluation concurs with many of above assessments and proposals; however, during our interviews a staff member raised a crucial question:

"Why are questions about contingency planning and related staffing policy only now discussed. Since many years WFP has been handling emergency operations all around the world, and WFPs budget has shifted from the original 80 % for development to almost 80% for emergency programmes. What have been the constraints that these issues are raised only now?"

5.3 Regional Office

Regional offices were promulgated as part of the WFP change process. In the Kosovo operation, however, such an office was established in the middle of a major emergency operation. What effects did this have on decision-making and internal co-ordination/communication?

These rather complex management questions has to be dealt with by the organisation itself. From the interviews undertaken it appears that there have been initially some problems with the communication and the command structure, but in general it was not seen as a major problem. One of the persons interviewed put it that way:

It was a little confusing at the start; I was dispatched from Albania with instructions from there. When I arrived in Kosovo I was given orders from Pristina, at that time Albania/Kukes was more established than Pristina, but Pristina was clearly in charge. It appeared to me that Tirana and Pristina were not communicating well, pulling new offices in different directions. Part of the problem was lack of communications in Pristina. Sure it made things initially confusing (the establishment of a regional office) but very rapidly the Pristina office established a leadership role.

5.4 Co-ordination of military and humanitarian matters

For a good portion of the project period, NATO's AFOR (Albanian Force) was assisting with the humanitarian operation. To co-ordinate military and humanitarian matters, an Emergency Management Group was established in Tirana. Similar initiatives were taken in Skopje. How did this work generally, what was the extent and quality of WFP's co-operation with military forces in the region?

The collaboration with NATO was essential in the whole emergency operation. The military was particularly indispensable for the rapid construction of refugee camps and centres. It also provided valuable and essential support to food logistics and the provision of emergency food (such as HDRs and other food from military stocks) in the beginning of phase two, particularly in FYRoM and Albania.

WFP successfully negotiated with NATO the following support:

- Arrangements for air slots and landing zones;
- Fuel for aircraft, vehicles, generators;
- Transport of WFP cargo on NATO vehicles;
- Securing overland convoy slots;
- Installation of repeaters and communication equipment;
- Security (mine) information;
- Assistance for medical evacuations, etc

The magnitude of the co-operation between humanitarian organisations and the military is not new in the history of emergency operations. However, in the case of Kosovo, it appears that the intensity and magnitude of collaboration reached a new level. The improvement of this co-operation in emergency situations is an exiting challenge for the future and will required adaptation processes on both sides.

While good collaboration was achieved, the military did not always understand operational principles of humanitarian organisations. In our interviews with other role players of the humanitarian operations complaints were expressed concerning the authoritarian way in which certain decisions on pure refugee matters were taken by the military and promises withdrawn at the last minute of important operations.

In future, the collaboration between humanitarian agencies and the military is likely to increase. The following suggestions have been made to improve the capability of WFP in this field:

- To intensify training for military liaison in WFP;
- Investigate possibilities for sending WFP officers to strategic and tactical courses run by military;
- Consider formal secondment of military personnel to WFP operations to enhance their understanding of humanitarian operations.

Interview with Mr Islami, Head of the IMG, Albania:

The role of the military? The military has the potential to respond to an emergency and to manage it. The soldiers are trained for that. On the other side you have the Humanitarian Organisations which have also experienced but not like the military.

In the very first moments of an emergency situation, when 30 000 refugees came over the border per day, neither NGOs nor the UNHCR could respond properly. The participation of the military was essential. Without the military it would have been impossible to build shelter for 120,000 refugees in a couple of days.

The military should fill gaps in the crisis, not lead the operations. They have their place in the first phase. In the second, when things become more stable, humanitarian organisations can play their full role.

5.4.1 Emergency Management Group

The establishment of an Emergency Management Group (EMG) was an example of effective collaboration between the different role players in the crisis. The EMG, lead by the Government of Albania, was headed by a former Vice-Prime Minister, Mr. Islami. The Group was entrusted with the task of providing information and management support to the humanitarian community, including the International Organisations, donor countries and NGOs but also the military (AFOR). Its valuable role as a focal point and mechanism of co-ordination during the crisis has been acknowledged.

In the EMG different “sector desks” like shelter, logistics, health and food helped to co-ordinate the emergency efforts. WFP was successfully chairing the food desk and in charge of the overall co-ordination of food aid to the refugees.

As refugees have moved back to Kosovo, the crisis for which it was established does no longer exist. However, following an evaluation of the EMG’s potential role, it has been decided that the Group will remain in function for some more months to promote a smooth transition from emergency to post-crisis rehabilitation and reconstruction. The EMG will focus on the creation of mechanisms to bridge the gap and to maintain international attention on the needs of the country and to maintain the momentum of management spirit and capacity of joint actions with so many, different role players.

The EMG played an important and valuable role in the implementation and management of food aid. The recommended programme of transition should make use of already established, effective implementation models and structures, in particular those, which integrate national and international NGOs, as well as those of the UN.

According to the Head of the EMG, Mr. Islami:

“The dynamics of the events were very strong, and there was little time to really plan. We had no standards to judge what was the best way to do. WFP was very active and strong in the EMG from the beginning. It chaired the food desk. UNHCR hesitated to participate, but we urged them, and then they took over responsibilities and chaired the shelter desk. WHO was responsible for health co-ordination and the AFOR was in charge of overall logistics.

One great advantage to work with WFP was that the staff was permanent and did not change, like in other organisations, which changed staff every three to four weeks. Also the network of WFP was good. However, WFP's mandate is very clear and simple: to provide food. UNHCR's task is much more complex, so they have more difficulties.

One case was difficult with WFP. It was the questions about providing food parcels to Albanian families hosting refugees and the involvement of the Red Cross. Finally we agreed on this matter. The bakeries were OK. There was always fresh bread for the refugees. Quarrels we had about the composition of the food basket; but we could not provide a different standard.

Why was the EMG so successful? Our function was to co-ordinate, suggest, provide guidelines, we did not command, that was not our mandate. We had the support of the Albania Government, the main donors, the international agencies and the military, which played a big role in co-ordination.”

5.5 Co-ordination of Food Aid

As in previous emergency operations, WFP participated in a variety of inter-agency co-ordination mechanisms, at all levels. In the Kosovo operation, a Task Force was appointed by the Secretary-General in New York to effect overall co-ordination. In the field, UNHCR served as lead agency, while WFP generally chaired the meetings and fora which co-ordinated food matters. How well did this work? In this context the evaluation will also assess to what extent the general Memorandum of Understanding between UNHCR and WFP has enhanced or hindered the effectiveness of the operation.

5.5.1 Food Co-ordination and Strategies

In Albania, WFP assumed the formal role of food-co-ordination within the EMG and chaired successfully the food desk. In FYRoM, WFP quickly moved into the role of food co-ordinator, receiving and distribution also non-WFP food. It co-operated with NATO and hosted weekly food co-ordination meetings.

Assuming the role of food co-ordination is not easy when there is no own food to distribute, particular in the first days of an emergency. The lead role of WFP as the main food co-ordinator in emergency situations can only be maintained when WFP has of sufficient stocks, mobilised in the initial phase.

Split food pipelines and donor conditions complicated to a certain degree food co-ordination and the establishment of a common food policy.

International NGOs, ICRC and IFRC brought their own food into the crisis area. The policies, food baskets and rations often differed from WFP's concept. This led in some cases to problems with the target groups.

Despite the efforts of the WFP Management to convince the US Government, as the main food donator, to provide all food aid through WFP, the USA provided almost 75 % of its commodities through two US based NGOs and the remaining part through WFP.

Other donors conditioned their food contributions, such as the limitation of US commodities to be used in Serbia, and the German and French contributions only to be used in areas of Kosovo (during phase three) which were controlled by their respective troops.

This has complicated the overall food aid strategies and to a certain degree food co-ordination. Demands have been made to further develop a corporate strategy to discourage donors to use split food aid pipelines and conditionalities on food distribution in humanitarian crises:

“Donors would need to understand, that if every donor pledged with split pipelines and similar conditionalities, co-ordination in the field would become impossible”

5.5.2 Conclusions

WFP has been one of the main food providers during the Kosovo crisis, and its share of all emergency food distributed was provably even below fifty percent in some instances, but the Programme chaired regular food co-ordination meetings and led policy discussions regarding food aid. The food recommendations of WFP were in principle respected, although not always followed by all food providers. In this respect, the Mission believes that to large extend WFP has fulfilled its role as a food-co-ordinator.

WFP should continue improving its strategies as lead organisation for food co-ordination and food policy in emergency situations and continue to base its own strategies on professional food and nutrition assessments involving specialised UN and other organisations. The strategies should include exit strategies, which should be developed at an early stage and shared with the main role players in the field. This exit strategy should not only show the way out of food emergency operations but also build the link with sustainable development processes.

Regarding split pipelines and conditionalities, the Mission believes that it is an illusion to expect that major donors would give all their emergency food aid to WFP. This contradicts all previous experience and underestimates the political dimension of food aid as spelled out in WFP’s “Thematic Study of Recurring Challenges in the Provision of Food Assistance in Complex Emergencies”. Of course, having control of all food donated would facilitate food co-ordination and distribution.

The Mission believes that the function of food co-ordination and policy formulation can be performed satisfactorily without commanding the entire food aid. Necessary would be:

- WFP as the lead organisation should have immediate command over sufficient **contingency food and equipment** to react fast in an emergency situation: to *set the flag as the first*.
- The most important point is that the organisation develops well-prepared food strategy and targeting of beneficiaries based on professional assessments, including clear exit strategies. The approach stresses more the quality and competence and less the quantities.
- The quantity of WFP **food** should have a **critical mass**, enough to present an example for other role players, and to get the necessary respect for the Programme’s food policy recommendations.

5.6 Political Support and Infrastructure Conditions

Political factors, such as the level of support provided by the authorities, and the status of existing infrastructure had a strong influence on the logistics of the provision of food to Kosovar refugees.

The political as well as infrastructure conditions have heavily influenced the performance and logistics of the operations. In Albania there was a heavy political support by the central Government and the population from the beginning because the refugees belonged to the same ethnic groups. On the local Government level, however, there was not much support as their resources were extremely limited. The country was still suffering from the events of the social unrest after the fall of the pyramid schemes in 1997.

The Albanian infrastructure, as already said, was weak and in many respects near a collapse. In this respect the operations, particularly in the north, were very difficult. The international community often supported or rehabilitated those structures utilised by the refugees.

A main problem was security and the lack of proper law reinforcement in general. However, the massive presence of international organisations, military etc. reduced partly the existing vacuum. Security became again a problem during the period of the refugees' return. Looting took place when the camps and collective centres were dismantled. Stores were also raided.

To summarize, it can be said that Albania strongly supported the WFP operations and the international community politically.

The situation was different in FYRoM, where the local infrastructure and economy was much more developed, facilitating the emergency operations. While in Albania refugees almost freely moved back and forward, in FYRoM they have been controlled from the beginning. The political conditions there have been less favourable for the operations than in Albania. The Government was worried that the influx could increase permanently the presence of ethnic Albanians, thereby changing the existing fragile ethnic balance.

In Montenegro the political situation was also not easy, as Montenegro continued to be a Province of FRY with all its political implications before, during and after the bombing. Despite some difficulties in clearing of shipments, authorising transport and other bureaucratic issues the Montenegro authorities always kept a positive attitude towards WFP and internally displaced people.

5.7 Deep Field Mailing System

In the Kosovo operation as in recent major emergency programmes, an effort was made to link sub-offices with each other and with the country office (and the rest of the world) using an HF radio link to the Internet - what has become known in WFP as the Deep Field Mailing System.

The WFP Telecommunication and Information Technology staff of WFP (TC&IT) provided tremendous support to the operations. At the earliest stage, they installed successfully a HF and VHF radio network, the so-called Deep Field Mailing System, the land cellular and satellite telephone system, and the computer network.

The TC&IT team has been contributing to the success of the operation and WFP managed to set up its telecommunication system faster than other role players.

As communication is a crucial element in each emergency operation, WFP should continue to support this service and augment its rapid response capacity.

5.8 Food without cooking

5.8.1 HDRs

One specific objective of the programme was: to meet the food requirements of refugees without cooking facilities through provision of humanitarian daily rations (HDRs), high protein biscuits (HPBs), canned foods and the establishment of mobile baking units.

One major problem of phase two was that in particular those refugees and displaced people who had to be accommodated in camps and also often in collective centres had no cooking facilities. At a later stage NGOs and other organisations provided some collective and individual cooking facilities and refugees tried to organise some individual cooking. So, the problem was to provide food that did not need cooking.

The objective was achieved. In particular the distribution of bread in combination with canned meat or fish turned out to be a great success in terms of nutrition. The approach made the massive distribution of cooking facilities and utensils unnecessary. This was particularly important in the FYRoM, where the Government was reluctant to accept anything which would point at an extended stay of the refugees, ethnic Albanians, who were already a politically significant group in the country.

Interview with staff member:

“By mid April (1999) there were some breaks in the HDR pipeline as all areas were screaming for more. Many did not like the HDRs. More teaching must be done to refugees about the HDRs as the people are used to eating a limited variety of foods and do not seem willing to change to HDRs so easily. Many were very suspicious of the food, as they were not well versed on the precautions formulated by the manufactures of the HDRs.

The idea of canned meat/fish is very good, together with the bread. Mobile bakery units were not in Kukes by mid-April but were set up too far south making the fresh bread pipeline too long.”

5.8.2 Bread Baking

Bread baking was a key element in the WFP food strategy. In fact, when the system was established each refugee in Albania and FYRoM got 0.5 Kg of fresh bread daily. The system was set up and contracts designed with the assistance of a Dutch bread research institute.

The system in FYRoM was sound and simple. It worked through contracts with three or four big bakeries which transported the fresh bread every morning to the respective distribution points. The principle was to exchange bread for WFP wheat flour.

In Albania, bread production and distribution were more complex. Besides the four or five mobile bakeries (provided by a donor), bread was baked by more than one hundred small bakeries, all over the country. The contracts were similar to those in FYRoM. In some cases a cash supplement was added to the flour to cover distribution costs.

From the interviews undertaken it appears that the target groups almost always had bread available. This, however, does not exclude specific cases and circumstances where shortages or other shortcomings occurred. No major constraints or deficiencies have been observed regarding the arrangements with the bakeries, while some of the mobile bakeries faced a few problems during the start-up period.

From our interviews:

“I learned baking and delivering bread is a job for experts. It really is not easy to have “on the job training” in the bread business, due to its perishable, complex and dynamic nature. Unlike a stockpile of commodities in a warehouse that can be rushed in, stored, etc., this cannot, nor can the beneficiary store bread. You must distribute all the stock, to everyone, everyday, exactly, think about that... It is a big difference from everyone once a month to everyone a day, thirty times the work.

Mobile bakeries are not so mobile. They require clean water, a lot of fuel or electricity, experienced staff, very good storage space, a big compound, strong security (nice smell attracts hungry people!), a lot of vehicles to pick up ingredients, etc. Ingredients like, yeast, salt, and other additives are not easy to come by. It took about three to four weeks for the War Child Bakery to get going in Kukes. The distribution of bread can be a nightmare.

The demand for bread was massive and WFP generally met the demand. Due to the nature of bread a very exact distribution network must be in place and a standby system of almost

24 hours a day. Few organisations are ready for this. In Albania the travel time to the WFP bakery was 14 hours each way. This is unworkable for many reasons. Bread occasionally arrives mouldy. Support of local bread production is the only option; or of NGOs that specialise in mobile bakeries, which needs support and is more expensive than one might imagine. The best and cheapest solution: production through local bakeries.”

5.9 Media and WFP Information Officers

*The Kosovo operation attracted an inordinate amount of **media** attention, not all of it positive. Generally, the refugee protection aspects were covered critically and the food assistance aspects positively which created some problems for field staff.*

WFP enjoyed great visibility of its activities during phase two and three, which helped the programme to receive the necessary funds. The deployment of WFP information officers obviously contributed to the positive coverage of WFP's operations. This has been reflected in the interviews made with WFP field staff:

“The WFP information officers I met definitely got the word out to the world on the unfolding events. It took a tremendous burden from my shoulder knowing these persons were dealing with the press and could do my job. Another role they played was on-the-job-training, training of staff in dealing with the media.

Generally the Information Officers I met were excellent. The one I have in mind stood out from the crowd. As he spent time on the “front line” with the programme staff, the press quickly picked up on this and chased him down for stories and accepted his word without questions. He was able to give first hand information, detailed, no nonsense information.”

The task of UNHCR during phase two was much more complex. UNHCR had a hard time to get the necessary funding and to oversee the refugee camps being erected by the military, a field which is normally part of UNHCR's mandate. Although it received negative press coverage this had, according to our interviews, no negative impact on the relationship with WFP field staff.

From our interviews with WFP staff:

“In Kukes and the return to Kosovo we made many press interviews. A vast majority was positive and done by a sympathetic press corps. They obviously liked us. This was great, getting to tell good WFP stories. In the field it did not affect our collaboration with other agencies, the HCR who got slammed in Kukes were too professional to let the difference bother them, we had no problems with this.”

TERMS OF REFERENCE

EVALUATION OF PROJECT KOSOVO 6040 IN THE PERIOD SEPTEMBER 1998 - JUNE 1999

Scope of the Evaluation

As the security situation deteriorated in Kosovo in the latter half of 1998 and the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees in Macedonia and Albania continued to rise, WFP drew upon remaining resources from two ongoing emergency operations, namely 5142/05 for Former Yugoslavia and 6030, a small, three months targeted intervention for Albania, in order to meet urgent needs.

On 30 October 1998, the WFP Executive Director and the FAO Director General jointly approved the "Kosovo Regional Emergency Operation 6040: Food Assistance to Kosovar Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia", covering the period 1 September 1998 to 28 February 1999. In step with the spiralling deterioration of the humanitarian situation, nine budget revisions have subsequently been approved to extend the life and expand the scope of this operation up to the present date.

The purpose of the evaluation is to assess WFP's state of preparedness for and response to the emerging crisis and the effectiveness of the Programme's interventions. The evaluation will determine the effectiveness of established co-ordination mechanisms and also document lessons learned for future reference.

Objectives

1. Assess the accuracy of early assumptions regarding the evolving crisis and the usefulness of the Programme's contingency planning in preparing a response.
2. Determine the efficiency and effectiveness of the operation in relation to the objectives of WFP assistance as set forth in the project document.
3. Analyse significant decisions and events during the operation in terms of their impact on the overall direction of the project.
4. Assess the appropriateness and efficiency of established co-ordination mechanisms.
5. Drawing heavily on WFP's "Thematic Study of Recurring Challenges in the Provision of Food Assistance in Complex Emergencies" to identify similar emergency operations, distil lessons learned with significance for similar future refugee/conflict emergency operations.

The "Kosovo Regional Emergency Operation 6040" signed in October, but retroactively covering assistance back to 1 September 1998, listed *inter alia* the following activities:

- to prevent hunger and malnutrition among the displaced ethnic Albanians and other ethnic groups fleeing violence that has erupted in Kosovo;
- to meet the food aid requirements of refugees in Albania and IDPs in Kosovo and Montenegro, plus a potential influx into Macedonia;
- to meet the needs of up to 420,000 beneficiaries arising from the Kosovo crisis for the period September - December 1998 with a two months winter safety net covering January and February 1999;
- through food assistance, to help reduce further population displacement.

Subsequent budget revisions to Kosovo emergency operation 6040 included additional objectives:

- in early April, to meet the food requirements of an additional 650,000 ethnic Albanian Kosovar refugees and IDPs created by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia “security operations” which succeeded the commencement of the NATO bombing campaign on 23 March, 1999;
- in mid April, to meet the food requirements of refugees without cooking facilities through provision of humanitarian daily rations (HDRs), high protein biscuits (HPBs), canned foods and the establishment of mobile baking units;
- in late April, to meet the food requirements of an additional 300,000 refugees in Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro.

An important part of the evaluation will be to determine the effectiveness and efficiency with which the above project objectives were achieved.

Key Issues to Be Examined

Certain elements of the WFP operations in the Balkan crisis generally and in Kosovo 6040 specifically were unusual if not unique in the Programme’s emergency experience, and will be the focus of particular attention in the evaluation. Among these were:

- the staffing of key posts in the early stages of the operation was frequently accomplished by determining who of WFP’s staff world-wide was most suitable, and then plucking them from their current assignments for temporary duty in the Balkan, often with very little advance notice. While this had been done before for individual posts in some emergencies, it became the *modus operandi* in the Kosovo operation.
- contingency planning had been started in the region in 1995 with plans updated by WFP annually. The question is, ‘How did it work in the Kosovo context?’ At two junctures in the operation - the commencement of the NATO bombing campaign in March 1999 and the signing of the military agreement and the sudden return of the refugees in June - July of that year, WFP was confronted with new demands and programme priorities. Was the planning useful in preparing and implementing responses in a timely manner? Was it possible for WFP to make preparations for a refugee exodus into neighbouring countries?
- regional offices were promulgated as part of the WFP change process. In the Kosovo operation, however, such an office was established in the middle of a major emergency operation. What effects did this have on decision-making and internal co-ordination/communication? What in general was the quality of internal communication; at headquarters, regional, country office and sub-office levels? How effectively was the support role of the Bureau and other headquarters units implemented?
- for a good portion of the project period, NATO’s AFOR ((Albanian Force) was both planning and preparing for a full-scale ground assault into Kosovo, and assisting with the humanitarian operation. To co-ordinate military and humanitarian matters, an Emergency Management Group was established in Tirana. Similar initiatives were taken in Skopje. How did this work generally, what was the extent and quality of WFP’s co-operation with military forces in the region? In this connection, the evaluation may also look into the arrangements with the UN Peace Keeping Force for using their facilities and for procurement of assets.
- as in previous emergency operations, WFP participated in a variety of inter-agency co-ordinations mechanisms, at all levels. In the Kosovo operation, a Task Force was appointed by the Secretary -General in New York to effect overall co-ordination. In the field, UNHCR served as lead agency, while WFP generally chaired the meetings and fora which co-ordinated food matters. How well did this work? In this context the evaluation will also assess to what extent the general Memorandum of Understanding between UNHCR and WFP has enhanced or hindered the effectiveness of the operation
- political factors, such as the level of support provided by the authorities, and the status of existing infrastructure had a strong influence on the logistics of the provision of food to Kosovar

refugees. The evaluation should compare food logistics arrangements in various countries of the region, including also an assessment of received bilateral support in receiving, storing and distributing donations.

- a commodity tracking system was installed in the region (Tirana and Skopje). Also, joint logistics centres were planned, with one established in Skopje. The evaluation should see what lessons can be learned from these initiatives.
- in addition to the transport of food, WFP established an air bridge ferrying passengers between Skopje, Tirana and Rome (later extended also to Kosovo) and a helo service for Kukes. In the latter case, the two WFP helicopters operated in parallel with several others managed by UNHCR. Lessons may also be drawn from a review of experiences related to co-ordination and monitoring of cargo air operations.
- in the Kosovo operation as in recent major emergency programmes, an effort was made to link sub-offices with each other and with the country office (and the rest of the world) using an HF radio link to the Internet - what has become known in WFP as the Deep Field Mailing System. The evaluation will assess this experience.
- the resourcing of the Kosovo operation was carried out in a charged political/military atmosphere. As in most previous emergency operations, not all sectors or agencies were equally well funded. Earmarking of contributions was common. Some commodity donations were more appropriate than others. The evaluation will address these issues.
- Bread baking and delivery became a key element in the WFP operation. The evaluation will assess the impact of this particular activity separately.
- various standby arrangements with donors were activated in the Kosovo operation. The evaluation will examine the effectiveness of such arrangements (deployment of staff, provision of base support modules, etc.).
- the Kosovo operation attracted an inordinate amount of media attention, not all of it positive. Generally, the refugee protection aspects were covered critically and the food assistance aspects positively which created some problems for field staff. The role of deployed WFP information officers should be assessed for possible conclusions/lessons.

Methodology

A consultant will undertake the evaluation under the supervision of an OEDE evaluation officer. The following methods will be used:

- review of documents at the headquarters, regional, country and sub-office levels;
- individual interviews of key WFP and other informants, in person and by phone and email;
- facilitated consultations with WFP and other informants.

In spite of the fact that many of the key concerns focus upon internal WFP issues, particular efforts will be made to seek out material and interview persons from partner organisations, including other UN agencies, the Red Cross and NGOs, NATO, local government officials and members of the media, as well as WFP staff, in order to obtain a broad spectrum of information and observations.

Work plan

24 Sept.:	finalisation of the Terms of Reference
24 Sept.:	selection of the consultant
4-8 Oct.:	briefing of the consultant in Rome
11-22 Oct.:	review of material and phone/email interviews
25 Oct.-19 Nov.:	field visit to the Balkans
22-26 Nov.:	debriefing in Rome, presentation of key findings and recommendations
6 Dec.:	submission of the draft full report
6-20 Dec.:	circulation of the draft full report
13 Dec.:	submission of the draft summary report for the Executive Board
13-30 Dec.:	circulation of the draft summary report
End January 2000:	finalisation of both the full report and the summary report
May 2000:	presentation of the summary report to the Executive Board

Products and Implementation

In addition to the full report (available to the Executive Board on request) and the summary report for the Executive Board, the consultant will produce a schedule for implementation of the report's major recommendations, linking specific recommendations to particular internal or inter-agency meetings, fora or review processes where action can be taken.

In part this will be based upon suggestions from the Executive Staff. Before the summary report is finalised, members of the Executive Staff will be invited to suggest appropriate meetings/fora/review processes for recommendations in their specific sectors.

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR KEY ROLE PLAYERS IN KOSOVO, ALBANIA AND MACEDONIA

INTRODUCTION

In October 1998, the "Kosovo Regional Emergency Operation 6040 was approved: Food Assistance to Kosovar Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia". Revisions have subsequently been approved to expand the scope of this operation up to the present date.

WFP has decided to undertake an evaluation of this large emergency operation. The main objectives of the evaluation are, to

- assess WFP's state of preparedness in 98/99 to cope with the emerging crises,
- assess WFP's response to the crisis
- assess the effectiveness of the intervention
- assess effectiveness of co-ordination mechanisms established and
- make recommendations (lessons learned).

We would kindly ask you to support this evaluation in order to learn from the past and to develop new and eventually more effective mechanisms and procedures. The questions are intended to stimulate a process of reflection and critical arguments. In this sense the evaluation tries to involve the main role players of the operation in a participatory way. Please try to include the positive and the negative experiences you made with this programme, as best as you can.

The questions and issues raised are addressed to a large number of different stakeholders of the Emergency Operation. Some of the issues may have been less of your concern others more. Please try to comment on those issues which you feel have been of relevance to you.

We would be pleased if you could provide us with your written answers and brief comments. During the evaluation a WFP consultant will contact you to review with you the questions and the comments.

QUESTIONS TO MAIN ROLE PLAYERS²

- **The broad objective of the programme was:**
"to prevent hunger and malnutrition among the displaced ethnic Albanians and other ethnic groups fleeing violence that has erupted in Kosovo".

In your opinion, has this objective been achieved: Yes, more or less, no.

ANSWER:

COMMENTS

- **One broad objective of the programme was:**
"through food assistance, to help reduce further population displacement."

In your opinion, has the operation achieved this objective: Yes, more or less, no.

ANSWER:

COMMENTS

² See separate list (structure) of main role players to be interviewed

- Immediate objectives **of the programme were:**

- (a) *“to meet the food aid requirements of refugees in Albania and IDPs in Kosovo and Montenegro, plus a potential influx into Macedonia”*
- (b) *“to meet the needs of up to 420,000 beneficiaries arising from the Kosovo crisis for the period September - December 1998 with a two months winter safety net covering January and February 1999.*
- (c) *in early April, to meet the food requirements of an additional 650,000 ethnic Albanian Kosovar refugees and IDPs created by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia “security operations” which succeeded the commencement of the NATO bombing campaign on 23 March, 1999;*
- (d) *“in late April, to meet the food requirements of an additional 300,000 refugees in Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro.*

In your opinion, has the operation achieved this objectives: Yes, more ore less, no.

ANSWER:

COMMENTS

- **One specific objective (result) of the programme was:**

*“in mid April, to meet the food requirements of refugees **without cooking facilities** through provision of humanitarian daily rations (HDRs), high protein biscuits (HPBs), canned foods and the establishment of mobile baking units;”*

In your opinion, has the operation achieved this result: Yes, more ore less, no:

ANSWER:

COMMENTS

- **Bread Baking**

Bread baking and delivery became a key element in the WFP operation.

Was this output important and useful for achieving the objectives? Do you have made some particular experiences (lessons learnt)?

ANSWER

COMMENTS

- **Assumptions**

In your opinion, the early **assumptions** made by WFP in 98 regarding the evolving crisis, have they been: correct, more or less correct, not correct.

ANSWER:

COMMENTS

- **Contingency planning**

Contingency planning had been started in the region in 1995 with plans updated by WFP annually. How did it work in at two junctures in the operation - the commencement of the NATO bombing campaign in March 1999 and the signing of the military agreement and the sudden return of the refugees in June - July 1999.

What do you think, has the **contingency planning** of WFP (to respond to the emerging crisis) been: appropriate, more or less appropriate, not appropriate.

ANSWER:

COMMENTS

Certain elements of the WFP operations in the Balkan crisis generally and in Kosovo 6040 specifically were unusual if not unique in the Programme's emergency experience. We would like to highlight some of these **issues** and ask for your opinion and comments:

- **Staffing**

The staffing of key posts was frequently accomplished by determining who of WFP's staff world-wide was most suitable, and then transferring them directly for temporary duty in the Balkan, often with very little advance notice. While this had been done before for individual posts in some emergencies, it became the modus operandi in the Kosovo operation.

What is your opinion or experience with this procedure? Do you think it has contributed to a successful operation or created harm and problems?

ANSWER:

COMMENTS

- **Regional Offices**

Regional offices were promulgated as part of the WFP change process. In the Kosovo operation, however, such an office was established in the middle of a major emergency operation.

What effects did this have on decision-making and internal co-ordination/communication?

ANSWER:

COMMENTS

- **Co-operation with NATO Forces**

For a good portion of the project period, NATO's AFOR ((Albanian Force) was assisting with the humanitarian operation. To co-ordinate military and humanitarian matters, an Emergency Management Group was established in Tirana. Similar initiatives were taken in Skopje.

How did this work generally? What was the extent and quality of WFP's co-operation with military forces in the region (such as the use of military facilities, procurement of assets, etc)?

ANSWER:

COMMENTS

- **Co-ordination Mechanisms**

As in previous emergency operations, WFP participated in a variety of inter-agency co-ordination mechanisms. In the Kosovo operation, a Task Force was appointed by the Secretary-General in New York to effect overall co-ordination. In the field, UNHCR served as lead agency, while WFP generally chaired the meetings and committees which co-ordinated food matters.

Did this mechanism work smoothly at the field level? What relevance had the general Memorandum of Understanding between UNHCR and WFP?

ANSWER:

COMMENTS

- **LOGISTICS: Local Support and Infrastructure**

The level of support (political and other) provided by the authorities, and the status of existing infrastructure had a strong influence on the logistics of the provision of food to Kosovar refugees.

Have the particular features of food logistics arrangements been different compared with other cases? Can you comment on that?

ANSWER:

COMMENTS

- **LOGISTICS: Bilateral support**

What bilateral support was provided for receiving, storing and distributing food?

ANSWER:

COMMENTS

- **LOGISTICS: Commodity tracking system and joint logistics centre**

A commodity tracking system was installed in the region (Tirana and Skopje). Also, joint logistics centres were planned, with one established in Skopje.

Can you comment on the system and centre? Do you have made some particular experiences (lessons learnt)?

COMMENTS

- **LOGISTICS: Air bridges**

In addition to the transport of food, WFP established an air bridge ferrying passengers between Skopje, Tirana and Rome (later extended also to Kosovo) and a helo service for Kukes. In the latter case, the two WFP helicopters operated in parallel with several others managed by UNHCR.

Were the services useful? Do you have made some particular experiences (lessons learnt)?

ANSWER

COMMENTS

- **TELECOMMUNICATION**

In the Kosovo operation an effort was made to link sub-offices with each other and with the country office (and the rest of the world) using an HF radio link to the Internet - what has become known in WFP as the Deep Field Mailing System.

Were the services useful? Do you have made some particular experiences (lessons learnt)?

ANSWER

COMMENTS

- **Resourcing**

The resourcing of the Kosovo operation was carried out in a charged political/military atmosphere. As in most previous emergency operations, not all sectors or agencies were equally well funded. Earmarking of contributions was common. Some commodity donations were more appropriate than others.

Did you observe any problems (for the target groups), or frictions between the agencies involved, related to the unequal funding of different agencies and components.

ANSWER

COMMENTS

- **Standby arrangements**

various standby arrangements with donors were activated in the Kosovo operation (deployment of staff, provision of base support modules, etc.).

What is your experience, have these arrangements been effective? Which cases do you know? Please comment.

ANSWER

COMMENTS

- **INFORMATION: Media**

The Kosovo operation attracted an inordinate amount of media attention, not all of it positive. Generally, the refugee protection aspects were covered critically and the food assistance aspects positively which created some problems.

What is your experience? Can you comment on this?

ANSWER

COMMENTS

- **INFORMATION: WFP Information Officers**

Which role played the deployed WFP information officers? What lessons can be learnt?

ANSWER

COMMENTS

- **General Lessons Learned**

Finally, what do you think, what general lessons can be learned from the Kosovo Emergency Operations with significance for similar future refugee/conflict emergency operations:

GENERAL LESSONS LEARNED

METHODOLOGY

1 STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS WITH MAIN ROLE PLAYERS

(Sample size: about 50 persons)

1.1 WFP

1.1.1 WFP SENIOR MANAGEMENT STAFF

1.1.1.1 At headquarters (Rome)

Regional Bureau: *Person:*

Logistics: *Person:*

Procurement: *Person:*

Resources: *Person:*

1.1.1.2 At country and regional office level

Kosovo: *Person(s):*

Albania: *Person(s):*

Macedonia: *Person(s):*

1.1.2 WFP FIELD STAFF

1.1.2.1 At sub-office level

Kosovo: Sub-office 1. *Person:*

Sub-office 2. *Person:*

Albania: Sub-office 1. *Person:*

Sub-office 2. *Person:*

Macedonia: Sub-office 1. *Person:*

Sub-office 2. *Person:*

1.2 IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS

1.2.1 UNHCR

1.2.1.1 Senior management staff at national level

Kosovo: *Person:*

Albania: *Person:*

Macedonia: *Person:*

1.2.1.2 Field staff at sub-office level

Kosovo: Sub-office 1: *Person:*

Sub-office 2.: *Person:*

Albania: Sub-office 1: *Person:*

Sub-office 2.: *Person:*

Macedonia: Sub-office 1: *Person:*

Sub-office 2.: *Person:*

1.2.2 NGOs

Senior management staff at national level

Kosovo: NGO 1: *Person:*

NGO 2: *Person:*

Albania: NGO 1: *Person:*

NGO 2: *Person:*

Macedonia: NGO 1: *Person*:
NGO 2: *Person*:

1.3 GOVERNMENT

Kosovo: UNMIK: *Person*:
Informal Representation: *Person*:
Albania: Government: *Person*:
IMG: *Person*:
Macedonia: Government: *Person*:
Other: *Person*:

1.4 DONORS

Kosovo: EC: *Person*:
US: *Person*:
Albania: EC: *Person*:
US: *Person*:
Macedonia: EC: *Person*:
US: *Person*:

1.5 OTHERS

Key and, resource persons, groups, international and bilateral organisations with own founding sources, such as ICRC, FAO, USAID, etc.)

1.6 INTERVIEWS WITH TARGET GROUPS

Target groups would be addressed in groups of five to eight people (as far as possible): Most of the groups will have to be traced in Kosovo with the help of NGOs and UNHCR. A different questionnaire will be applied for this purpose.

Sample size: 15 groups with 5 people each.

Basic Target groups

Target Group 1 (*refugees which were accommodated in tented camps*)
Target Group 2 (*refugees which were accommodated in collective centers*)
Target Group 3 (*refugees which were accommodated in private houses*)
Target Group 4 (*formerly internally displaced people*)
Target Group 5 (*local population: internally displaced rural population*)
Target Group 6 (*local groups: most vulnerable groups, female-headed household with kids and others*)
Target Group 7 (*returnees: most vulnerable groups, female-headed household with kids, ethnic minorities and others*)
Target Group 8 (*winterized refugees remaining in country of asylum:*)
Target Group 9 (*families which hosted refugees*)

2 PARTICIPATORY OBSERVATIONS AND RAPID APPRAISALS

- Field visits
- Group discussion with target groups
- Informal interviews

3 ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTS

- Review of documents at the headquarters, regional, country and sub-office levels.
- Review of concept paper: “Thematic Study of Recurring Challenges in the Provision of Food Assistance in Complex Emergencies”
- Analysis of budgets and budget revision
- Review of field reports

4 MEETINGS

- Briefings at Headquarters
- Rounding up meetings at Country level
- Expert consultations at headquarters and country level

CALENDAR OF THE MISSION

Evaluation of EMOP 6040

NO	DAY	DATE	COUNTRY	ACTIVITIES
1	Thu	14 Oct	Home	Study documents, preparation evaluation
2	Fri	15	Home	Study documents, preparation evaluation
3	Sat	16	Home	Study documents, preparation evaluation
4	Sun	17	Home	Study documents, preparation evaluation
5	Mon	18	Home	Study documents, preparation evaluation
6	Tue	19	Home	Study documents, preparation evaluation
7	Wed	20	Italy Rome	07.00 Travel Spoleto- Rome 09.00 –18.00 Meetings WFP <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Wilkinson, OEDE, Head of Evaluation • Rolf Huss, OEDE, Chief Evaluation Officer • S. Green, OEDE, Evaluation Officer • S.Malik, OAE, Head Regional Bureau • N. Tremblay, OAE, Officer Regional Bureau • P. Erhardy, OAE, Officer Regional Bureau • R. Michiels, Personnel Officer • Thompson-Flores, Personnel Officer • F. Samoura, OTL, Logistics Officer
8	Thu	21	Italy Rome	09.00 – 19.00 Meetings WFP <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • W. Hart, MSPT, Head Food Procurement • P. Pedre, MS, Security Operations Officer • K.E. Svahn, FSI, Telecommunications • J. Arnold, FSI, Telecommunications • E. Lorenzi, FSI, Telecommunications • C. Von Roehl, REE, Senior Resources Officer • M. Ward, REE, Resources Officer • T. Rowe, REP, Public Affairs Officer • B. Hadj-Chikh, REP, Public Affairs Officer
9	Fri	22	Italy Rome	08.30 follow-up , finalisation questionnaire, 13.00 study documents, 15.00 other meetings
10	Sat	23	Italy Rome	Preparation guidelines for Group interviews of target groups
11	Sun	24	Kosovo Pristina	09.00 WFP flight Rome- Pristina 11.30 arrival Pristina 15.00 meeting Mr. Kenro Ashidari
12	Mon	25	Kosovo Pristina	09.00 meeting WFP Mick Lorentzon 11.00 Dale Skorc 15.00 meeting David Riley, Head of Office, UNHCR

13	Thu	26		09.00 meeting Laura 10.00 meeting Mick , Dale (preparation for second part of Kosovo visit) 11.00 departure to Skopje by car 14.00 meeting with <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Monique Thormann, WFP Programme Officer • Vlado Jovcev, WFP, COMPAS • Gzime Hasani, WFP Field Assistant • Adnan Rexhepi, WFP Field Assistant
			Skopje Macedonia	
14	Wed	27		09.00 John Prout, WFP, Officer in Charge 10.00 Alfred Hasenohrl, ICRC, Relief Co-ordinator 11.00 Nick Ford, CRS, Head of Office 12.30 Eric Baudet, ECHO, Operational Co-ordinator 14.00 Nепresteno Refugee Camp 15.00 Caroline Davis, IRC, Camp Manager and Teresa Kornegay, IRC, Field Manger 16.00 Interviews with refugees (being transferred to collective centres)
			Skopje Macedonia	
15	Thu	28		08.30 WFP office 09.00 visit bakeries Zito Lux and Musli bakeries Interview with bakery managers 11.00 Stenkovecc II camp site Interview with CARE camp manager 12.30 Interview with refugees (Roma) 14.30 Suzanna Tuneva- Paunovska, Macedonian Red Cross (MRC), Relief Consultant 16.00 Kim Murray , CARE, Head of Office 18.00 Michael Nuboer, WFP, Head Logistics
			Skopje Macedonia	
16	Fri	29		09.00 visit MRC distribution site, 10.00 interviews with refugees in private accomodation, ICRC monitors 11.30 meeting with representative MRC branch 14.30 Amin Awad, UNHCR, Representative 16.00 Jennifer Jordan, MCI, Emergency Programme Officer
			Skopje Macedonia	
17	Sat	30		09.00 Nilolaj Boesen, WFP Port Manager (Thesssaloniki) 10.00 Visit Radusa Collective Centre 10.30 meetings <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Center Manager (Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare) • Anton Rijdsdijk, UNHCR 11.00 Gazi Baba Collective Centre 11.30 meeting with MRC Center Managers 12.00 interviews with refugees transferred to centre 17.00 Wrap-up meeting with John Prout
			Albania Tirana	
18	Sun	31		08.00 Travel to Tirana by car 17.00 Arrival Tirana
			Albania Tirana	
19	Mon	1 Oct		08.30 Anne Murphy, WFP, Admin. Assistant 11.00 Jerry Bailey , WFP, Head Programming Unit 16.00 meeting EU <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Arben Iliriani, Programme Manager
			Albania Tirana	

20	Tue	2	Albania Tirana	<p>09.00 meeting ADRA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Donaldo Sicalo, Country Director • Michael Schadler, Programme Director • Peter E. Howell, Senior Grants Administrator <p>14.00 h meeting MCI</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Renee Vendetti, Country Director <p>15.00 meeting UNHCR</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Zakaria Kawi, Senior Legal Officer • Mr. Papaphilippou, Head of Programming <p>16.00 meeting EMG</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Kastriot Islami, Special Co-ordinator
21	Wed	3	Albania Tirana	<p>00.90 h Simon Springett , ACF</p> <p>10.30 h Phillip Oldham, CRS</p> <p>12.00 h Visit Logistics Centre Durres</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mads Veilstrupp, WFP, Warehouse Manager <p>14.00 h visit warehouse</p> <p>16.00 h COMPASS</p>
22	Thu	4	Albania Tirana	<p>09.00 field trip to Skhodra</p> <p>11.00 meeting MCI Skhodra</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ian Schneider, Country Director <p>12.00 Interview with beneficiaries (pensioners)</p> <p>15.00 return to Tirana</p>
23	Fri	5	Albania Tirana	<p>09.00 meeting</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Jerry Bailey, WFP • Tomi Papadhopuli , Logistics Assistant, WFP <p>11.00 meeting UNDP</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Parviz Fartash, Deputy Resident Representative
24	Sat	6	Albania Tirana	<p>10.00 wrap-up meeting WFP</p>
25	Sun	7	Albania Tirana	<p>Review Reports</p>
26	Mon	8	Kosovo Pristina (Rolf Huss joining Eval. Mission)	<p>Travel to Pristina by commercial flight</p> <p>13.00 Briefing Rolf Huss</p> <p>16. 00 Dale Skoric, WFP</p>
27	Tue	9	Kosovo Pristina	<p>09.00 WFP review documents</p> <p>09.30 Robin Ellis, UNHCR</p> <p>14.00 Kimerlay A. Maynard, DART Team Leader</p> <p>15.30 Terry Heselius, MCI, Country Director</p> <p>16.30 Diane Gaell, Representative, ACF</p>

28	Wed	10	Kosovo Pristina Gjakova	08.00 h field trip Gjakova 11.00 h meeting with Keith, Head Sub-Office Keith 11.30 h meeting with former target groups <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • in camps • in collective centres • with host families 16.30 h Josianne Pusterta, Solidarité 18.00 h Francis Teoh, Head of Sub-Office Overnight in Gjakova
29	Thu	11	Kosovo Pristina Mitrovica	08.00 Keith 09.00 group interviews <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • target group: former IDPs 12.00 travel to Mitrovica 14.00 meetings WFP <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Benoit Thiry ,Head of Sub-Office officer • Jennevier Wills, Programme Officer 15.00 group interviews with IDPs 16.00 return to Pristina
30	Fri	12	Kosovo Pristina	09.00 Gilles Gassier, ECHO, Head of Office 10.00 Daniele Donati, FAO, Emergency Coordinator 12.30 round-up meeting with Kenro Oshidari 16.00 Alain Kelly, ICRC, Head of Mission
31	Sat	13	Italy Rome	09.00 Laura Linkenback, WFP, Program Officer 10.00 B. Sokoli, WFP, COMPAS Manager 12.00 Departure to Rome 16.00 Review of documents
32	Sun	14	Italy Rome	Review of documents
33	Mon	15	Italy Rome	09.00 Meeting WFP OEDE 10.00 Review data 15.00 Greene, OEDE
34	Tue	16	Home	Review documents
35	Wed	17	Home	Review documents
36/ 40	Thu Mon	18 to 22	Home	Report writing
41	Tue	23	Italy Rome	Debriefing in Rome Headquarters
42	Wed	24	Home	Return to Spoleto
43	Thu	25	Home	Report writing
44	Fri	26	Home	Report writing
45	Sat	27	Home	Submit first draft to WFP

LIST OF PERSONS MET

Name	Organization	Function	Location
Macedonia			
John Prout	WFP	Head of Office	Macedonia
Monique Thormann	WFP	Programme Officer	Macedonia
Michael Nuboer	WFP	Head Logistics	Macedonia
Vlado Jovcev	WFP	COMPAS	Macedonia
Gzime Hasani	WFP	Field Assistant	Macedonia
Imran Aliu	WFP	Field Assistant	Macedonia
Nilolaj Boesen	WFP	Port Manager	Thessaloniki
Suzanna Tuneva-Paunovska	MRC	Relief Consultant	Macedonia
Alfred Hasenoehrl	ICRC	Relief Co-ordinator	Macedonia
Nick Ford	CRS	Representative	Macedonia
Eric Baudet	ECHO	Program Manager	Macedonia
Caroline Davis	IRC	Camp Manager	Macedonia
Teresa Kornegay	IRC	Field Manager	Macedonia
Kim Murray	CARE	Head of Office	Macedonia
Amin Awad	UNHCR	Representative	Macedonia
Anton Rijdsdijk	UNHCR	Water Co-ordinator	Macedonia
Jennifer Jordan	MCI	Emergency Programme Officer	Macedonia
Albania			
Jerry Bailey	WFP	Head of Programming Unit	Albania
Anne Murphey	WFP	Admin. Assistant	Albania
Mads Veilstrupp	WFP	Warehouse Manager	Albania
Tomi Papadhopuli	WFP	Logistics Assistant	Albania
Donaldo Sicalo	ADRA	Country Director	Albania
Michael Schadler	ADRA	Programme Director	Albania
Peter E. Howell	ADRA	Senior Grants Administrator	Albania
Zakaria Kawi	UNHCR	Senior Legal Officer	Albania
Mr. Papaphilippou	UNHCR	Head of Programming	Albania
Kastriot Islami	EMG	Special Co-ordinator	Albania
Arben Iliriani,	EU	Programme Manager	Albania
Simon Springett	ACF		Albania
Phillip Oldham	CRS	Deputy Regional Director	Albania
Renee Vendetti	MCI	Country Director	Albania
Ian Schneider	MCI	Country Director	Albania
Parviz Fartash	UNDP	Deputy Resident Representative	Albania
Kosovo			
Kenro Oshidari	WFP	Regional Manager/Special Representative	Kosovo
Mick Lorentzen	WFP	Emergency Co-ordinator	Kosovo
Dale Skoric	WFP	Logistics Officer	Kosovo
Laura Linkenbach	WFP	Head Sub-Office Pristina	Kosovo
Bujar Sokoli	WFP	COMPAS Manager	Kosovo
Benoit Thiry	WFP	Head of Sub-Office, Mitrovica	Kosovo
Jennevier Wills	WFP	Programme Officer, Mitrovica	Kosovo
Keith Ursel	WFP	Head of Sub- Office, Gjakova	Kosovo
David Riley	UNHCR	Head of Office	Kosovo
Francis Teoh	UNHCR	Head of Sub-Office, Gjakova	Kosovo
Robin Ellis	UNHCR	Program Officer	Kosovo
Kimberlay A. Maynard	DART	Team Leader	Kosovo
Terry Heselius	MCI	Country Director	Kosovo
N.N.	ACF	Representative	Kosovo
Josianne Pusterta	Solidarit�	Head of Sub-Office, Gjakova	Kosovo
Gilles Gassier	ECHO	Head of Office	Kosovo
Daniele Donati	FAO	Emergency Co-ordinator	Kosovo
Alain Kelly	ICRC	Head of Mission	Kosovo

			WFP HQ
A. Wilkinson	WFP/OEDE	Head of Evaluation	WFP HQ
Rolf Huss	WFP/OEDE	Chief Evaluation Officer	WFP HQ
S. Green	WFP/OEDE	Evaluation Officer	WFP HQ
S.Malik	WFP/OAE	Head Regional Bureau	WFP HQ
N. Tremblay	WFP/OAE	Officer Regional Bureau	WFP HQ
P. Erhardy	WFP/OAE	Officer Regional Bureau	WFP HQ
R. Michiels	WFP/HR		WFP HQ
A. Thompson-Flores	WFP/HR		WFP HQ
F. Samoura	WFP/OTL	Logistics Officer	WFP HQ
W. Hart	WFP/MSPT	Head Food Commodity Procurement	WFP HQ
P. Pedre	WFP/MS	Security Operations Officer	
K.E. Svahn	WFP/FSI	Telecommunication	WFP HQ
J. Arnold	WFP/FSI		WFP HQ
E. Lorenzi	WFP/FSI		WFP HQ
C. Von Roehl	WFP/REE	Senior Resources Officer	WFP HQ
M. Ward	WFP/REE	Resources Officer	WFP HQ
T. Rowe	WFP/REP	Public Affairs Officer	WFP HQ
B. Hadj-Chikh	WFP/REP	Public Affairs Officer	WFP HQ

DOCUMENTS CONSULTED

APPEALS

- 2000 United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for The Southeastern Europe Humanitarian Operations - January/December 2000
- United Nations Inter-Agency Donor Alert for Urgent Needs Related to the Kosovo crisis - 1 April - 30 June 1999
- 1999 United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Albania - January/December 1999 - 7 December 1998

SITUATION REPORTS

- WFP Balkan Operations Progress Report No. 1 - September 1999
- WFP and the Kosovo crisis No. 2 - 10 January 1999
- WFP and the Kosovo crisis No. 1 - 10 October 1998
- WFP in Former Yugoslavia - Situation Report No. 28 - February/April 1998

ASSESSMENTS

- WFP Food Economy Assessment of Kosovo Province - 14 November 1999
- FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to the Kosovo province of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia - 30 August 1999
- Joint WFP/UNHCR Food Aid Needs Assessment Federal Republic Of Yugoslavia (Excluding Kosovo) - July 1999
- FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to Albania - 7 July 1999
- FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia - 7 July 1999
- WFP/FAO Joint Food Aid Needs Assessment Mission Report (Excerpt) - 5-13 March 1998
- UNHCR/WFP joint evaluation of emergency food assistance to returnees, refugees, displaced persons and other war-affected populations in Bosnia and Herzegovina (WFP/EB.2/98/3/1)

DOCUMENTS

- BALKAN REGION EMOP 6136 - "Food assistance to refugees, internally displaced and war-affected persons in the Balkan region - 1 July - 31 December 1999"
- BALKAN REGION EMOP 6136.01 - "Emergency food assistance in the Balkan Region (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Albania and Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) - 1 January to 31 December 2000"
- Kosovo EMOP 6040 - "Food Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Albania and Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" - September 1998 - February 1999
- Former Yugoslavia 5142.05 - "Emergency food assistance to returnees, refugees, displaced persons and other war-affected populations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" - January 1997 - June 1999
- WFP's First Response to the Kosovo Crisis - 8 July 1998
- WFP Assistance in Former Yugoslavia - 8 July 1998