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of the GHANA Country Programme
(1998 – 2002)*

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Responsibility for the opinions expressed in this report rests solely with the authors. Publication of this document does not imply endorsement by WFP of the opinions expressed.

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Acronyms

| | |
|--------|----------------------------------------------------------|
| AAGDS | Accelerated Agricultural Growth and Development Strategy |
| AfDB | African Development Bank |
| AfDF | African Development Fund |
| AgSSIP | Agricultural Services Sector Investment Program |
| CCA | Common Country Assessment |
| CDF | Comprehensive Development Framework |
| CEPA | Centre for Policy Analysis |
| CIDA | Canadian International Development Agency |
| CO | Country Office |
| CP | Country Programme |
| CRS | Catholic Relief Services |
| CSN | Country Strategy Note |
| CSO | Country Strategy Outline |
| CY | Calendar Year |
| DSC | Direct Support Costs |
| EA | Enumeration Area |
| EMOP | Emergency Operation |
| ERP | Economic Recovery Programme |
| FAO | Food and Agriculture Organization |
| FY | Fiscal Year |
| GES | Ghana Education Service |
| GLSS | Ghana Living Standards Survey |
| GOG | Government of Ghana |
| GPSFS | Ghana Programme for Sustainable Food Security |
| GSS | Ghana Statistical Service |
| GTZ | Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit |
| HIPC | Heavily Indebted Poor Country |
| IDA | Irrigation Development Authority |
| IFAD | International Fund for Agricultural Development |

| | |
|---------|----------------------------------------------------------------|
| ILO | International Labour Organization |
| IPSRP | Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper |
| JCGP | Joint Consultative Group on Policy |
| JICA | Japan International Cooperation Agency |
| JSS | Junior Secondary School |
| LIFD | Low Income Food Deficit |
| MDAs | Ministries, Directorates and Agencies |
| MOFA | Ministry of Food and Agriculture |
| MT | Metric Tonnes |
| NDPF | National Development Policy Framework |
| NPPE | National Programme for Poverty Eradication |
| PAMSCAD | Programme of Action to Mitigate the Social Costs of Adjustment |
| PIP | Public Investment Programme |
| PRRO | Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation |
| PRSP | Poverty Reduction Strategy Programme (or Paper) |
| PSA | Programme Support Budget |
| RAM | Resource Allocation Model |
| RIDP | Rural Infrastructure Development Project |
| RLTF | Resourcing and Long-Term Finance |
| SAP | Structural Adjustment Program |
| SAP | Systems, Applications and Products |
| SCG | Sector Coordinating Group |
| SPFS | Special Programme for Food Security |
| UNDAF | United Nations Development Assistance Framework |
| UNU | United Nations University |
| USAID | United States Agency for International Development |
| WFP | World Food Programme |
| WSFI | World School Feeding Initiative |

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Executive Summary

This evaluation is intended to provide insight into and analysis of the utility of the WFP country programming approach for the design and implementation of the present 1998-2002 country programme in Ghana. The results of the evaluation will, it is hoped, be of value both to WFP/headquarters generally and to the WFP/Ghana specifically. As the Country Office (CO) has been tasked with preparing a new Country Programme (CP) for the period 2001-2005, to dovetail with the timing of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and the next phase of Government's own long-term development strategy, this Evaluation Report is also intended to be helpful in that exercise.

The Report contains 15 conclusions grouped into two categories: i) those related more to the present 1998-2002 programme; and ii) those of use primarily for the new 2001-2005 programme. It also contains 15 recommendations for actions by either the country office in Accra, WFP headquarters staff in Rome, or both. These recommendations are briefly summarized at the end of this Executive Summary.

In general, the 1998-2002 Ghana Country Programme (CP) was only modestly impacted by the guidance contained in WFP's new country programming approach, in part because the CO had prepared an earlier CSO in 1991 based on similar guidance, and in part because the programme in Ghana had, for more than a decade, been tightly structured within a multi-donor Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) framework for Ghana. Thus, much of the programmatic rigor which was intended to result from the 1995 CSO/CP guidance had already been achieved in the Ghana programme.

The CP *was* significantly affected, however, by the outcomes of the headquarters reviews of the CSO and CP which, in effect, resulted in the approval of two variant strategies for the Ghana programme – one, the CSO strategy, emphasizing activities intended to spur agricultural production and the other, the CP presentation of a Ghana strategy, emphasizing gender and human resources development. While both strategies are of probably equal importance over the longer term for Ghanaian development, the only two activities – out of five proposed in the CP – which are active are both focused on gender related human resource development. These are Girls' Education in the Northern Savannah and Supplementary Feeding, and Health and Nutrition Education (also focused on the northern savannah). The other activities, which had been accorded a lower priority in the WFP review of the CP, are intended to focus on natural resource development and physical asset creation. These activities had been accorded top priority in the original CSO. They have yet to start (for a variety of reasons explained in the body of the Report). Given the recent downturn in the rate of Ghana's economic growth – particularly in the agriculture sector, there may be need to rethink the relative importance of these two strategic approaches in the new Country Programme exercise.

The economic development setting in Ghana is presently in a state of considerable uncertainty. As a consequence, the results of a recent (1998) survey and its just-published analysis of the state of poverty in Ghana may already be outdated by preliminary data reflecting recent macroeconomic trends. These data seem to be showing: i) a lack of fundamental development progress in the productive sectors in recent years; ii) a reduction in the rate of economic growth during these years; and iii) an apparent increase in the numbers of Ghanaians who have fallen below the poverty line. There is urgent need for VAM-type analysis to determine the true state of poverty and the likelihood that recent adverse trends and outcomes will continue. This is essential analysis for the new CP.

WFP policy requires that country programmes focus food aid resources on those in the poorest areas of the country who clearly have need of food and who can make use of it to better their own economic and social conditions. The Ghana programme does exactly that. It focuses on the northern savannah regions – the poorest geographic area of Ghana – and it focuses largely on girls, women and infants who are disproportionately impoverished. That said, the two activities presently underway need to seek partners – “sequential” partners in both instances – able to assist these women further enabling progress made under WFP auspices to be expanded and extended over time by others. In the case of the Girls’ Education activity this implies further skills training for girls who have successfully completed Junior Secondary School and, possibly, primary school. In the Supplementary Feeding activity, this would mean providing the women who have received basic nutritional and health training in community health centres with additional resources enabling them to grow more of the foods they have learned are important for improved nutrition of their children and themselves.

WFP in Ghana operates in the context of a well-developed UN structure characterized by cooperation in programme development and implementation. The present WFP programme was thoroughly vetted by the UN group and the other major donors before being submitted to Rome. The then-prevailing CCA and UNDAF were not major factors in shaping the programme, but the next CCA and UNDAF documents – now being prepared (with substantial WFP involvement) – will be significant.

A number of problems presently beset WFP/Ghana. These include a confusing recent history in terms of programmatic relationships with WFP headquarters and the regional cluster office in Abidjan. This has been caused, in part, by Ghana not having been identified (until quite recently) as one of the country programmes supported by the Abidjan office during a time when there was a nearly total staff turn-over in Accra. In addition, there has been a large assortment of WFP policy changes, new directions and new guidance. WFP has clearly not placed the Ghana development programme on the “front burner” in terms of support and this has had an adverse impact on the pace of programme development.

If the poverty situation in Ghana is worsening, as data on some recent trends suggest, and, given that Ghana, in fact, meets the requirements for LCD status, WFP should re-think its strategy for Ghana as well as its operational modalities. The country may be more deserving of food aid – in the form of an expanded programme – than many in WFP/headquarters realize. Ghana *is* impoverished and has great difficulty meeting WFP’s counterpart requirements. These requirements should be minimized, given the present state of the economy and of limits on government resource availability, and on government expenditure levels imposed by the IMF.

Ghana has a sizeable food gap – particularly in cereals – that has been projected to grow in the years ahead. Food prices have leaped in the past year or more and are also expected to

continue to rise. A larger percentage of the Ghanaian population is having difficulty accessing needed amounts of food than was the case as recently as two years ago.

The next CP should increase the focus of its food resources, in collaboration with other donors (including international and Ghanaian NGOs), on efforts to increase productivity in the food and agriculture sector as a matter of urgency. As a first step the two as-yet-not-started activities in the 1998-2002 programme should be made operational as soon as possible. It has been difficult to do so, thus far, in part because of the difficulties that the Government of Ghana has had in achieving loan effectiveness with the primary donors such as the World Bank and AfDB.

The principal recommendations contained in this evaluation are:

- WFP should clarify the relationship between the CSO as a statement of approved WFP strategy in a country and the CP as the programme approved to carry out that strategy.
- WFP needs to ensure that country strategies are based primarily on solid, in-country economic, political, and social analysis rather than being, at their core, local applications of prescriptive policies received from headquarters.
- There is need to clarify how WFP handles a case where UNCTAD has determined that a country (Ghana, in this case) qualifies as an LDC but the country's government refuses to be so designated.
- WFP should consider adding a monetization element to the new programme in Ghana.
- There is need to maintain the international professional staff in Ghana at the present level of two (plus a UNV) and to increase the Ghanaian professional staff from two to three officers. These are minimal levels, based on the workloads required by the development of a new CP, a needed contingency plan, greater participation in the PRSP process and heightened collaboration with government agencies, other donor programmes and the international and Ghanaian NGO community.
- WFP should provide an annual DSC budget sufficient to undertake the WFP programmes required in Ghana. If funds are not likely to be adequate, this should add weight to the argument for a monetization component.
- WFP should establish a VAM unit in Ghana and assign to it the task not only of gathering and analysing data about vulnerability to poverty and food insecurity but also to train a Ghanaian unit to take over this task and to seek other donor support for financing this effort.
- WFP/Ghana should assist the government to prepare emergency operations contingency plans as soon as possible.
- There is a related need for WFP to elevate the lack of adequate contingency planning in Ghana to the mini-CG and for WFP/Ghana to lead an effort to develop a strategy for introducing that capacity in Ghana as a component of the CSO/CP and the UNDAF and PRSP exercises.
- WFP/Ghana needs to step up the level of its active participation in the PRSP process.
- WFP needs, particularly in the gender programme, to focus on indicators of progress at the "objectives" level (e.g., improvement in women's incomes, evidence of improved

status of women in project areas, households increasingly willing to send their daughters to school without food payments) rather than primarily at the output level (e.g., how many girls are attending school; how many women and children are being fed).

- There is need to focus food aid resources on activities that lead to institutional changes (i.e., changes in those “traditional mindsets” among populations which inhibit improvements in quality of life and economic successes) and capacity-building (e.g., strengthening the ability of recipients over time to identify problems and to develop community-based associations which demonstrate sustainable effectiveness in combating the causes of these problems) at the community level using, wherever possible, international and Ghanaian NGOs as intermediaries.
- There is need for policy clarification of the “Enabling Development” concept of programme “coherence.” It should be interpreted as coherence within a multi-donor strategy where all resources are ‘coherently’ concerted against priority constraints within the framework of that mutually-agreed strategy, not coherence defined as among or between only the various WFP resources or activities in a given country. The former *must* be viewed as a much more appropriate definition.
- The Ghana office should “push the boundaries” of WFP’s Enabling Development Policy, using it as an opportunity rather than as a constraint. Allowing Enabling Development to be adapted to local situations where it can be field tested against locally-identified constraints can ensure that the policy matures realistically to be truly “enabling” of achievement of local objectives in real world local situations.

I. INTRODUCTION

1. This evaluation of the WFP Country Programme (CP) in Ghana – one of several the World Food Programme is conducting worldwide – is intended to help WFP determine the efficacy of its country programming approach in increasing the integration, coherence, focus and flexibility of food aid resources in reducing food insecurity and poverty in the world's poorest countries. A four-person Evaluation Team ("Team")¹ conducted this evaluation during October, 2000 and drafted this final evaluation report ("Report") during November, 2000. While in Ghana, the Team met with numerous senior officers of the Government of Ghana in Accra and in two of the three northernmost regions of the country where the majority of WFP's programmes are implemented. In addition, Team members interviewed representatives of the donor community, international and Ghanaian NGOs and Ghanaian development professionals in the private sector. The Team is indebted to these many individuals who gave freely of their time and who willingly shared their views and experience.

2. The Terms of Reference (TOR) established six objectives for the evaluation:

- Determining the extent of influence of the country programme approach on WFP's current development activities in Ghana: Do they constitute a recognizable CP?
- Determining whether, and to what extent, WFP's procedures for programme and project identification, design, budgeting, resourcing and implementation at both headquarters and field levels have enhanced or impeded the CP approach;
- Determining the effectiveness of the CP approach in Ghana in enhancing WFP's contribution to both development and relief activities;
- Determining whether the ongoing activities have been designed to contribute directly to the objectives of the Country Programme;
- Determining the extent to which the individual WFP activities represent recognized 'good practice' in food aid, particularly as laid out in WFP's "Enabling Development" policy framework;
- Providing recommendations useful in future CP exercises and for consideration by WFP in other ways.

3. There are additional considerations related to the WFP programme in Ghana. WFP has decided to undertake the immediate preparation of a new CSO/CP because the present 1998-2002 CP timeframe is inconsistent with the timing of the UN's Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for Ghana (2001-2005) and the government's timeframe for the second phase (2001-2005) of its "Ghana-Vision 2020" long-term development plan. This Evaluation Report is intended to provide suggestions useful for the immediate preparation of a new Ghana CSO and subsequent CP. There are also questions to be explored involving the interface between WFP's global policy agenda and Ghana's country-specific development problems and the appropriate level, role and modalities of food assistance for confronting those problems. These, too, are addressed in this evaluation.

4. Section II below describes the evolution of the economic context for food aid in Ghana during the 1990s, and in 2000, and beyond. It notes growing evidence that the image of Ghana as a Structural Adjustment success story may have been, in part, illusory and that the reality in 2000 may be that of a Ghana making inadequate progress in addressing the development needs of its poor majority. This discussion is of particular importance to WFP as it attempts to determine the objectives, nature and magnitude of its 2001-2005 CP. Section III describes WFP's role in Ghanaian development prior to the drafting of the present CSO/CP. It then describes the programmes contained in the CSO and CP themselves. It notes that the approved programme contained in the CP is not fully consistent with that

¹ The Team was abetted by a WFP/Rome Senior Evaluation Officer for the first week. See Annex 1 for Team composition and Annex 2 for a listing of people interviewed.

proposed in the approved CSO. Section IV discusses the reasons for the appearance of inconsistency and attempts to relate CP objectives and proposed activities to WFP/Rome policy interests and to Ghana's particular requirements for overcoming poverty in ways that reduce food insecurity.

5. Section V reviews the net impact of WFP's supporting systems, policies, and procedures on the Ghana programme during the review and approval of the CSO/CP and during the 1998-2000 implementation period. It highlights the need for consistency between what is approved in the CSO and in the CP. It also discusses the difficulties created for the Ghana programme by (among other things): i) the fact that UNCTAD does not classify Ghana as an LDC; ii) WFP's protracted decentralization process; iii) and the nature of the process for determining "FAAD compliance" as viewed from the WFP/Ghana perspective. Section VI focuses on the role of the WFP programme process in Ghana in the context of the UN and Ghanaian government planning/programming cycles and the analyses underpinning the determination of development priorities and resource requirements. Section VII discusses present WFP activities in Ghana and their likely contribution to reducing poverty and improving food security. There is discussion of the utility of these activities being continued in the 2001-2005 CP and how their effectiveness might be enhanced.

6. Section VIII looks specifically at the contribution of the country programme in improving the situation for girls and women in Ghana. It discusses the distinction between gender activities largely focused on achieving outputs (e.g., numbers of additional girls in school, or of mothers attending nutrition training sessions) and those targeted on reducing the most important causes of the inequality in status and opportunity for these girls and women (e.g., changing cultural mindsets regarding the usefulness of girls' education) and reviews the WFP focus on gender in Ghana in this light. A similar review of the Supplementary Feeding activity follows. Section IX discusses the present and future utility of WFP's "Enabling Development" policy agenda for Ghana and the extent of implementation of the enabling development agenda in the Ghana programme to date and likely implementation issues for the future.

7. Section X presents the Conclusions, Recommendations and Lessons respectively. Conclusions are grouped into those focused on past performance and those intended to guide the next phase of WFP programming in Ghana. Recommendations are identified at appropriate places in the text of the Report and summarized in the concluding sections of the Report.

II. THE NATIONAL CONTEXT OF WFP FOOD AID

8. If there is a theme emerging from the Evaluation Team's review of the country context, it is the apparent divergence between the popular perception of the status and determinants of poverty in Ghana and the reality.² The size and nature of the present WFP programme, as is largely true for all donor development activities in Ghana, was designed within the context of what most observers believed to have been nearly two decades of solid economic growth, as measured by improvement in both income and non-income indicators of poverty in Ghana. There was a sense, as the 1998-2002 WFP Country Programme was being designed and approved, that most Ghanaians were emerging from abject poverty and that the country was on its way toward its self-proclaimed goal of middle income status by 2020.

9. It is increasingly apparent that the present reality is significantly different from the generally-accepted view of the Ghanaian development situation held as recently as 1999. There is increasing evidence that the macroeconomic achievements of the 1980s and early 1990s were not, in fact, sustainable without more fundamental improvements in the major productive sectors of the economy and in the efficiency of production. Overall economic growth slowed perceptibly in the 1990s and macroeconomic targets were, by and large, not achieved during that period (Aryeetey, et al. 29). Ghana's labour markets have been characterized by falling formal sector employment in which the private sector

² See, for example, the recently published *Economic Reforms in Ghana: The Miracle and the Mirage* Aryeetey, Ernest, Jane Harrigan and Machiko Nissanke, eds.(2000: Africa World Press, Inc., Trenton, N.J.)

has been unable to absorb redundant public sector employees despite considerably lower real wage levels (ibid. 240). Growth in the industrial sector declined during the 1990s and growth in agricultural production – particularly in the food and livestock sub-sector which accounts for 60 percent of agricultural output – has fluctuated widely from year to year, generally falling below targets during the period.

10. The purchasing power of incomes is much reduced in 2000 from the levels of the mid-1990s. The number of Ghanaians living below the poverty line is quite probably higher in 2000 than in 1998 in both absolute and percentage of population terms. Present data suggest the continuation of these trends into at least the proximate future. While the most recent (1997/98) comparative health and nutritional indicators show steady improvement over the 1980-1997/8 period, these are lagging indicators and would not reflect any downturn in health/nutrition status (or in the factors that determine that status) for some period of time afterwards.

11. The remainder of this section of the Report first paints the picture of the Ghanaian economy as it was when the present WFP Country Strategy Outline (CSO) and Country Programme (CP) were developed. It then describes changes in the intervening years which have led to the Team's assertions that: i) poverty in Ghana is now deeper than at any time in the past decade; ii) it seems likely to worsen in the immediate future; and iii) WFP will need to take these changing circumstances into account while developing the next CSO and CP.

A. The Economic Situation

12. Ghana is a low income, food deficit country of approximately 19 million³ people heavily dependent, as are most African countries, upon smallholder agriculture for employment and a large share of its export earnings. GNP per capita is estimated at the equivalent of US\$ 390 per person, somewhat above the average for Sub-Saharan Africa but well below the US\$ 988 per person average GNP for all low income countries.

13. Agricultural production is largely rainfed and labour intensive with minimal availability of fertilizer and other inputs. Only 0.2 percent of cropland is irrigated and the rate of fertilizer use in Ghanaian agriculture is among the lowest in Africa, itself the lowest user of fertilizer, per capita, in the world. Table 1 summarizes the present values of select indicators reflecting the state of Ghanaian economic development.

³ Different views exist regarding the size of the population. The most recent government estimate is 18.5 million as of mid-2000. Some donors believe the figure to be closer to 20 million. The U.S. Bureau of the Census estimated Ghana's 1996 population at just under 18 million, casting some doubt on the 18.5 million figure for 2000.

Table 1: Selected Indicators of Ghana's Economic Situation in 1999, Compared with Sub-Saharan Africa and All Low Income Countries

| Indicator | Ghana | Sub-Saharan Africa | Low Income Countries |
|------------------------------------------------------------|-------|--------------------|----------------------|
| Population density (people/square km) | 83 | 27 | 73 |
| Urban population (% of total population) | 38 | 31 | 34 |
| GNP per capita (US\$) | 390 | 321 | 988 |
| GDP growth (avg. annual % growth) ¹ | 4.3 | 2.4 | 2.4 |
| Gross Domestic Savings (as % of GDP) | 4.0 | 14.0 | 19.0 |
| Female illiteracy (% of population >14 years) ² | 38 | 49 | 49 |
| Infant mortality (per 1000 live births) ² | 65 | 92 | 68 |
| mortality rate for under-5s (per 1000) ² | 96 | 151 | 107 |
| Total fertility rate (births per woman) | 4.8 | 5.4 | 3.1 |
| Agriculture (value added as % of GDP) | 36 | 18 | 27 |
| Irrigated land (percent of crop land) ³ | 0.2 | 4.2 | 25.5 |
| Arable land (hectares per capita) | 0.16 | 0.25 | 0.19 |

Source: World Bank: World Development Report (WDR) 2000/2001

¹1990-99 data; ²1998 data; ³1995-97 data; ⁴1990-95 data.

The Economic Recovery Programme and the Structural Adjustment Programmes.

14. During the period 1972-1982, per capita income in Ghana fell by 30 percent, real wages by 80 percent, the volume of exports by 50 percent, and imports by 60 percent. The ratio of domestic savings to GDP fell from 12 percent to 4 percent and investment from 14 percent of GDP to 2 percent (Rimmer, from World Bank data, p.133). Five changes of government occurred during this time – a period characterized by fragmented, often counterproductive, economic and development policies. The 1973 oil crisis and problems with Ghana's leading exports created severe downward pressure on the Ghanaian currency – the cedi – which, in turn, reduced the purchasing power of the salaried public workforce, greatly increasing absenteeism. Because of deteriorating roads and lack of vehicle spare parts during this period, an estimated 70 percent of all farmers in 1977 were "...having to head-load their crops to market..." (Stryker, p.112).

15. The low point of Ghana's economic history was reached in 1983 when, as a result of the 'bursting of the oil bubble' in Nigeria, more than a million Ghanaian workers were expelled to Ghana at a time of nation-wide drought (causing an estimated loss of 40 percent in food production). This occurred in an economic environment weakened by a decade of economic malaise, an inflation rate that had reached 100 percent per year in 1983, chronic shortages of imported capital goods – all resulting in increased deprivation experienced by the poorer segments of the population.

16. At the government's request, the IMF, World Bank, African Development Bank (AfDB) and major bilateral donors embarked on an Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) aimed at helping fundamentally restructure the economy – and the government's role in it. The objective was to reach and maintain an economic growth rate in real terms of greater than 5 percent per year by substantial reforms in monetary and fiscal policies and the structure of the foreign trade regime. The actual steps undertaken in the ERP (and the two subsequent Structural Adjustment Programmes) involved a series of devaluations of the cedi, reductions in government subsidy programmes, retrenchment of civil servants, divestitures of state-owned enterprises, and decreases in the number of government development programmes to only those deemed absolutely essential. All the major donors – including WFP – supported a series of structural reform programmes during the 1983-1995 period which have been widely hailed as major successes. However, starting early in the 1990s, and emerging quite visibly in 1999-2000, is countervailing evidence in the minds of some researchers that the ERP has faltered and that, if anything, the numbers of the poorest in Ghana have been growing not shrinking as a result.

B. The Development Process

17. The objectives and the process of economic development in Ghana are guided by the government's 25-year development strategy, "Ghana-Vision 2020," which established the achievement of middle income status by 2020 as Ghana's overall development goal. The aim of the government's economic development programme contained in the Vision 2020 document is the evolution of a balanced, middle income economy for the next generation of Ghanaians. This would be signalled by a doubling in the growth rate of national production to eight percent per year, equitable distribution of the benefits of economic growth across all population groups, increased economic and social choices for all Ghanaians, continuing reduction in the rate of population growth, improved – and increasingly decentralized – governance, and expanded access to education, health, water, sanitation and family planning services. The process of achieving middle income status would, along the way, engender reduced levels of poverty, strengthened capabilities of the poor and vulnerable to earn adequate levels of income, reduced disparities in livelihood security between the genders and among the regions and an overall improvement in the productivity of the Ghanaian population.

18. The agricultural sector employs some 60 percent of Ghana's population and also accounts for about half of annual GDP. The growth in urbanization, however, is becoming an increasingly important aspect of life in Ghana. While today an estimated 38 percent of the population live in urban areas, in less than 15 years, the figure will exceed 50 percent of a then national population of 30 million. The rate of urban population growth now exceeds four percent while rural population growth has been closer to two percent (Adlakha, 1996; Maxwell, et al. 2000).

19. Ghana has made impressive progress in improving the way in which it is governed. Much of the development-related agenda has been decentralized to the district level where 110 District Assemblies and District Administrators are engaged in day-to-day implementation of development programmes with financial and technical assistance from donors and NGOs. Both the press and the judiciary are free and unfettered. As this evaluation is written, campaigning is underway for the December, 2000 election in which the President will not run for re-election, as he has now served his constitutionally-mandated two full terms.⁴

20. Government expenditures in social sectors such as education and health have been substantial over the past decade. Public expenditure on education equalled 4.2 percent of GNP in 1997 compared with 3.1 percent in 1991. This was significantly above comparable figures for Sub-Saharan Africa and all low-income countries. For the period 1990-98, Ghana's public expenditures in health averaged 1.8 percent of GNP per year, again significantly above the averages for African and low income countries of 1.3 and 1.5 percent respectively. As of 1998/99, approximately two-thirds of all Ghanaians in rural areas have access to potable water compared to about 54 percent in 1991/92.⁵

21. School enrolment rates have also shown substantial improvement over the 1990s for both boys and girls in all localities and across all income groups. Boys enrolment in 1998/99 averages about 4-5 percentage points higher than girls' enrolment. In the rural savannah, 67 percent of age-eligible boys were enrolled in primary school, up from 51 percent in 1991/92 and 62 percent of girls were enrolled, up from 46 percent in 1991/92. By comparison boys' enrolment in Accra was 94 percent and that of girls was 88 percent. Figures for secondary school were sharply lower. Between 1991/92 and 1998/99 girls' secondary school enrolment in the rural savannah grew only from 22 percent to 25 percent of school age children and that of boys in this northern part of Ghana only grew from 26 to 28 percent, according to Ghana Living Standards Survey Round 4 (GLSS4) survey data.

⁴ In mid-December, 2000 a peaceful election was, in fact, successfully held.

⁵ GSS 1999, p.23.

22. Often in developing countries, unequal distribution of income among the population is disguised by national averages. In Ghana, income distribution (as measured across expenditure quintiles) is relatively equally distributed. This can be seen in Table 3 below where the Gini Coefficient (a measure of the inequality of income distribution) is a relatively low 32.7 percent⁶ signifying that income distribution in Ghana is not seriously distorted in favour of the wealthy.

Table 3: Income Distribution Among the Ghanaian Population, 1997

| Gini coefficient | Lowest 10% | Lowest 20% | Second 20% | Third 20% | Fourth 20% | Highest 20% | Highest 10% |
|------------------|------------|------------|------------|-----------|------------|-------------|-------------|
| 32.7 | 3.6 | 8.4 | 12.2 | 15.8 | 21.9 | 41.7 | 26.1 |

Source: World Bank: World Development Report (WDR) 2000/2001

C. Measuring Changes in Poverty During the 1990s

23. During the 1990s, Ghana made considerable progress in reducing the incidence of poverty as attested by the results of the recently published Round Four of the Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS4). In this survey, largely conducted during 1998, new ‘upper’ and ‘lower’ poverty lines were developed as a means of improving the measurement of absolute and relative states of poverty in the country. The *lower* – absolute – poverty line was defined as the level of expenditures – in nominal terms – needed by a household to purchase a nutritionally minimally adequate level of food for all household members.

24. Households whose per adult⁷ expenditures (in 1998 cedis) fell below ₵700,000 per year were defined as existing in extreme poverty – i.e. a situation in which a household devoting all its annual expenditures on food would still be unable to purchase a nutritionally adequate diet for all household members. This was established as the lower poverty line. The *upper* poverty line was set at ₵900,000 per year. Per adult equivalent household expenditures at or above this level were defined as being minimally adequate in 1998 for a household to meet both its nutritional needs and basic non-food needs. Using these calculations, GLSS4 determined that about 22 percent of urban inhabitants fell below the upper poverty line in 1997/98, while 14.5 percent of urban inhabitants fell below the lower poverty line. In rural areas, the comparable figures were 51.6 percent below the upper and 36.2 percent below the lower poverty lines respectively.

25. Regional cost-of-living indices were also developed, in recognition of the fact that food and non-food costs vary across Ghana’s principal regions. The regional costs-of-living for a consumption basket in each of four areas of the country were compared with the cost of an identical basket in Accra. The following table shows the comparisons:

Table 2: Regional cost of living indices (January, 1999)

| | Food index | Non-food index | Housing |
|----------------|------------|----------------|---------|
| Accra | 1.0000 | 1.0000 | 1.0000 |
| Other urban | 0.9193 | 0.9111 | 0.6668 |
| Rural coastal | 0.8816 | 0.9802 | 0.6446 |
| Rural forest | 0.8075 | 0.9846 | 0.5025 |
| Rural savannah | 0.7091 | 1.0642 | 0.4302 |

Source: Ghana Statistical Service (1999) *Poverty Trends in Ghana in the 1990s*

⁶ A figure better, in fact, than that of the U.S. (40.8%). To provide regional comparisons, Nigeria has a Gini Coefficient of 50.6 and Côte d’Ivoire 36.7.


⁷ The age-based nutritional requirements of all household members were converted to adult equivalents for this exercise.

26. Table 2 demonstrates that the costs of food and housing differ significantly among these areas, while the non-food index displayed less variation. Applying these indices, each household's consumption expenditures can be expressed in constant Accra prices (deflated by periodic changes in the Consumer Price Index).

27. Refinements in the poverty line analysis and improved cost-of-living indices have enabled comparisons of both the *incidence* of poverty and the *depth* of poverty in Ghana between the 1991/92 GLSS3 data and that contained in the 1998/99 GLSS4. This comparison provides a sense of the progress made during the decade of the 1990s in reducing poverty in Ghana. The results, shown in Figures 1 and 2 below, are encouraging for Ghana as a whole in terms of the incidence of poverty – i.e. the proportion of a given population identified as poor. The improvement is far less evident when looking at the depth of poverty – i.e. the extent to which those defined as poor fall below the poverty line.


28. Figure 1 is the best available look at the pace with which the overall incidence of poverty in Ghana was reduced during the 1990s. It shows a reduction in the percentage of Ghana's total population who are living below the upper poverty line from 51 percent to 43 percent. In northern savannah areas, however, the story is not as good. In the rural savannah the incidence of poverty dropped only marginally, from 72 percent to 71 percent. In the towns of the north, the incidence of poverty actually increased, from 38 percent of urban inhabitants to 42 percent. Thus, within both rural and urban localities, the incidence of poverty in the northern savannah remains much higher than in the rest of the country and has been more resistant to improvement.

Figure 1: Poverty incidence by locality, 1991/92 and 1998/99



Source: GSS: *Poverty Trends in Ghana in the 1990s*.

29. Figure 2 below presents a somewhat more disquieting picture for people in extreme poverty – those existing below ₵700,000 per year. Here, four of the seven locality categories exhibited increases rather than declines, indicating a continued presence of a relative large number of very poor, despite a significant decrease in overall poverty.

Figure 2: Extreme poverty incidence by locality, 1991/92 and 1998/99

Source: GSS: *Poverty Trends in Ghana in the 1990s*.

30. The most important implication of the data in Figure 2 is that the poorest of the poor in Ghana – as measured by household expenditure levels – have been largely untouched by the government’s poverty reduction efforts in many sections of the country. When population growth over the decade is factored in, the absolute number of Ghanaians existing in extreme poverty has, in fact, increased slightly over the period – from 36 percent of 14.6 million in 1991 (5.3 million) to 29 percent of 18.5 million in 1998/99 (5.4 million). The overall economic situation in Ghana has, in fact, deteriorated significantly in recent years. As shown in the next section, there appears to have been a marked increase in the number of Ghanaians living below the poverty lines – both upper and lower – during the 1999-2000.

D. Recent Economic Developments

31. During 1999 and 2000, rapid depreciation in the value of the cedi – in part the result of declining terms of trade between Ghana’s exports and essential imports together with high domestic inflation – have worked to deepen poverty. At the 1998/99 cedi-dollar exchange rate⁸, the upper poverty line of ₵900,000 was the equivalent of US\$382.65 per year (US\$1.05/day) and the lower poverty line of ₵700,000 was equal to US\$297.62 (\$0.82/day), already a very low figure. At today’s (mid-October, 2000) exchange rate,⁹ the dollar value of the upper poverty line has dropped precipitously to \$132.35 (\$0.36 per day) and that of the lower poverty line to \$102.94, or \$0.28 per adult equivalent per day. These recent shocks threaten to undermine much of the growth thus far attained and to set back successes in reducing the levels of poverty. To maintain the generally accepted one dollar per day poverty line used as rule of thumb for developing countries, Ghana’s upper poverty line would have to be reset to ₵2,482,000 per person as of October 2000. Few Ghanaian households earn enough income to have per-person expenditure rates of this level and the ratio of those below the line to those above would be dramatically different from that defined just two year ago.

32. Not only have currency depreciation and high domestic rates of inflation created clear uncertainty with the 1998 definition of the poverty lines and the numbers of people likely to live below them, they have also served – together with poor export performance – to reduce the rates of annual economic growth in 1999/2000 and 2000/2001 to zero – or even to negative rates of year-on-year growth.¹⁰ This

⁸ ₵2,352 = US\$1.00

⁹ ₵6,800 = US\$1.00

¹⁰ Personal comments to Evaluation Team by World Bank Resident Representative, USAID Mission Director and CEPA Director.

recent downturn in what had for the past decade been apparent stellar growth performance are likely to have significant implications for World Food Programme food aid to Ghana in the near future.

E. Food Insecurity and the Role of Food Aid

33. Food production data are not reliable in Ghana and published data are often contradictory. The sample frame used by the Ministry of Food and Agriculture to gather area planted, yield and production figures for Ghana's principal food crops has gradually shrunk to 10 farms per Enumeration Area (EA) and to segments of only five farms per EA for plot measurement and crop yield determination. Government staff confirmed to the Evaluation Team that, even at these small sample sizes, lack of transport, measuring tapes, and compasses have hampered the gathering of statistically-reliable information. Increasingly, field enumerators are having to guess at areas planted, yields and overall production.

34. In the absence of reliable data, it *appears* that food production in Ghana during the 1990s did not keep pace with the growth in export crop production. Growth in cereal production, in particular, was slow during the 1995-1999 period, in part due to inconsistent weather. Maize production was relatively stagnant and rice production actually decreased. Root and tuber crops were, according to FAO data, relatively good performers.

Table 3: Estimated Gross Food Production in Ghana, 1995-1999 ('000MT)

| | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 |
|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| Maize | 1,034.2 | 1,007.6 | 1,020.8 | 1,034.5 | 1,014.5 |
| Rice | 104.4 | 101.8 | 93.1 | 59.4 | 64.4 |
| Millet | 209.0 | 193.0 | 139.0 | 172.0 | 159.8 |
| Cassava | 6,611.4 | 7,111.2 | 7,149.6 | 7,226.9 | 7,845.4 |
| Yams | 2,125.7 | 2,274.8 | 2,417.1 | 2,633.6 | 3,249.0 |

Source: Centre for Policy Analysis, 2000

Table 4: Estimated Food Balance in Ghana, 1995-1999 ('000MT)

| | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 |
|---------|--------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| Maize | 14.9 | -44.7 | -52.9 | -95.6 | -114.4 |
| Rice | 17.9 | -55.8 | -71.1 | -111.6 | 30.8 |
| Wheat | -150.3 | -128.0 | -127.7 | 45.0 | -34.8 |
| Millet | -149.7 | -170.1 | -214.8 | -208.6 | 219.1 |
| Cassava | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| Yams | 956.2 | 1,045.1 | 1,132.1 | 1,277.3 | 1,739.4 |

Source: Centre for Policy Analysis, 2000

35. A few months after the World Food Summit of November, 1996, Ghana submitted its "Draft Strategy for National Agricultural Development" aimed at achieving a sustained 6 percent growth rate in agricultural production¹¹ as a major component of its food security strategy within the Vision 2020 paradigm. The principal investment vehicle is the Agricultural Services Sector Investment Program (AgSSIP) which addresses the following nine "problem areas:"

- Access to markets
- Technology for better natural resources management
- Rural infrastructure
- Agricultural promoters and producers
- Formation and strengthening of agricultural associations

¹¹ Established by the government's "Accelerated Agricultural Growth and Development Strategy" (AAGDS).

- Capacity of agricultural training institutes, colleges and universities
- Agribusiness development
- Capacity of MOFA and MDAs
- Access to agricultural credit

36. The elements of the AgSSIP sector programme address food insecurity in three ways: i) increasing the agricultural productivity of smallholders, ii) increasing the incomes of smallholders, iii) increasing employment in agribusiness and in other agricultural value-added endeavours.

37. The government's overall agricultural growth agenda has implications for food aid in several ways. First, the strategy contains strong elements of both export promotion (resulting, it is hoped, in income increases for farming households growing export crops such as cocoa, coffee and palm oil) and import substitution (e.g., locally-produced rice and vegetable oils substituted for imports). Second, activities aimed at removing constraints impeding increased agricultural productivity include: i) rehabilitating and extending the rural road network; ii) reversing the deterioration of soil resources; iii) expanding both large and small-scale irrigation; iv) reforestation for land conservation; v) on-farm brush and tree cover replanting; and vi) expanding village woodlots for construction materials and cash income generation. All are candidates for food assistance in areas where these constraints exist and local households suffer food deprivation seasonally. Third, the government – particularly MOFA – is quite sensitive to possible disincentive effects from imported foods at a time when it is trying to raise the production of both food and cash crops.

38. In April 1998, the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MOFA), assisted by FAO, assembled its Special Programme for Food Security (SPFS) which was an attempt to rationalize all agricultural production activities in terms of their contribution to national food security and to add components to support particular food crop expansion in selected areas of the country in order to increase local food security in those areas. These efforts were above and beyond the activities included in the larger, on-going AgSSIP activity.

F. The Food Balance Situation in Ghana during the 1995-2005 period

39. In a major exercise financed by USAID in 1999/2000 to help it determine the continuing need for food aid in Ghana through 2005,¹² the Ghanaian Centre for Policy Analysis (CEPA) undertook a food needs assessment and analysis of potential disincentive effects of food aid in Ghana (CEPA, 2000). Its analysis of the balance between domestic production and domestic consumption requirements of the basic foodstuffs over the 1995-2005 period is summarized in Table 5.

¹² In satisfaction of the U.S. Government requirement that a so-called "Bellmon Determination" be undertaken to analyse the potential for disincentive effects and other problems from any proposed USAID food assistance to a developing country.

Table 5: Domestic Production of Key Crops Minus Estimated Demand, 1995-2005 ('000MT)

| Year | Maize | Rice | Millet | Cassava | Yam | Wheat |
|------|--------|--------|--------|---------|---------|--------|
| 1995 | 11.8 | -124.4 | -149.7 | NA | 956.2 | -230.5 |
| 1996 | -34.7 | -135.1 | -170.2 | NA | 1,045.1 | -238.6 |
| 1997 | -49.6 | -152.4 | -214.8 | NA | 1,132.2 | -247.4 |
| 1998 | -67.4 | -194.9 | -208.6 | NA | 1,277.3 | -256.2 |
| 1999 | -109.9 | -199.1 | -219.2 | NA | 1,739.4 | -265.4 |
| 2000 | -119.4 | -152.0 | -210.5 | 1,903.4 | 1,079.3 | -274.3 |
| 2001 | -137.3 | -168.9 | -229.7 | 1,837.8 | 1,062.0 | -282.3 |
| 2002 | -155.9 | -165.5 | -265.3 | 1,769.8 | 1,044.0 | -290.5 |
| 2003 | -177.4 | -183.0 | -248.9 | 1,699.2 | 1,025.3 | -298.9 |
| 2004 | -197.3 | -200.1 | -268.6 | 1,626.0 | 1,005.8 | -307.6 |
| 2005 | -218.0 | -198.1 | -279.1 | 1,550.2 | 985.6 | -316.5 |

Source: CEPA 2000

40. Table 5 is, of course, not a full food balance sheet. There are many foods not shown and it includes consumption estimates based largely on present consumption patterns projected into the future at the rate of estimated population growth. Nonetheless, it shows a likely growing gap in cereal demand versus domestic cereal production and a pattern of declining surpluses in roots and tubers balances. Demand for maize, rice, and millet will grow more rapidly than domestic production indefinitely into the future, unless efforts to both spur agricultural productivity and reduce the rate of population growth are successful.

41. The Evaluation Team's conclusion is that demand for food in Ghana is growing faster than production. The overall food balance between what is produced and consumption needs shows that Ghana will almost certainly require higher food imports in the future. The country must either purchase these food imports with its scarce foreign exchange holdings or it will have to receive food assistance from willing donors. When the apparent declining purchasing power of the poorest segments of the population is added to the picture, there is reason to be increasingly concerned that, overall, household food security in Ghana may be worsening, with additional deterioration over the 2001-2005 period a decided possibility because the factors likely to generate increased per capita food and agriculture production are not in place and are unlikely to be in place in the near or medium term.

42. In sum, the rationale for WFP food aid in the late 1990s was – and is – that food production in Ghana has not been keeping pace with population growth. Under these circumstances, food aid from abroad – particularly in the relatively small amounts likely to be provided in WFP's annual programme levels – will not constitute a disincentive to local food production. Since the food was to have been targeted on recipients lacking the ability to grow or purchase enough to satisfy their nutritional requirements – and not even, in fact, their minimal requirements, it would not displace market demand to any noticeable extent.

III. THE COUNTRY PROGRAMME AND ITS ACTIVITIES

43. The 1998-2002 Country Strategy Outline (CSO) and Country Programme (CP) were prepared during 1995-96 using as guidance WFP's "Principles and guidelines for country programming" document as approved in Session 38 of the CFA in December 1994. These guidelines were, in turn, a reflection of the document entitled "WFP's overall policies, objectives and strategies" tabled at the May 1994 CFA session which set out the overall goal and objectives of the organization. These two sets of guidance reconfirmed WFP's commitment to eradicating hunger as the organization's overriding goal and established the comprehensive country strategy as a way of adding "...a dimension of programmatic planning as a basis for identifying and executing [WFP's food aid] activities." The guidelines emphasized the need, in each country programme for more integration, coherence, focus and flexibility than had been the case in most WFP country-based activities in the past.

44. The CSO also reflected the WFP experience in Ghana during the preceding two decades. WFP had been providing food assistance to Ghana since 1963. These efforts encompassed development programmes in the transport, forestry, export expansion, agriculture, health and education sectors. Between 1983 and 1992, WFP/Ghana was a major participant in multi-donor programmes supporting the Government of Ghana's efforts to reinvigorate an economy which had fallen into severe decline during the 1970s and early 1980s. The combined government-donor programme focused on: i) increasing real GDP growth to five percent per year; ii) reducing average annual price inflation from 37 to 5 percent; iii) adjusting public sector salaries upwardly to restore civil service incentives; iv) increasing domestic savings and investment rates; and v) diversifying the export base as a means of increasing foreign exchange earnings and improving the balance of payments situation. During the period, WFP provided food assistance worth more than \$100 million in such activities as: Export Sector Rehabilitation (GHA 2752); Assistance to Railways, Ports and Highways (GHA 2716); Assistance to Forest Plantations (GHA 2075/II); and Assistance for Planting of Oil Palm and Rubber (GHA 2258).

45. WFP assistance encompassed wage supplementation for those whose salaries had been effectively devalued by high inflation, dietary supplementation for vulnerable groups, food resources to help increase commercial and farm productivity and decrease absenteeism and, through the generation of counterpart funds from monetization of imported food, local currency to meet logistics costs of WFP food commodities and to finance selected priority costs within the government's Public Investment Programme (PIP).

46. During the 1983-92 period – and to a lesser extent during 1992-96 – WFP was, thus, an active participant in a Consultative Group-led process supporting a quite successful effort in turning around Ghana's declining economic fortunes. Within this multi-donor effort, WFP's food resources were tightly integrated at the project level with non-food resources of other donors and the government's own human and financial resources. Population groups most adversely affected by the structural reform programmes were the intended targets – retrenched workers and those hardest hit by monetary and fiscal policy changes which had caused significant price rises and the termination of numerous government subsidy programs. There was less emphasis during the 1983-92 period on assistance to the chronically poor (i.e., those who were abjectly poor, with or without structural adjustment) inhabiting the traditionally poorest geographic areas, the northern savannah and pockets of poverty in the southern forest zones. The emphasis was on reviving the more productive geographic areas and economic sectors of the economy.

47. Starting in 1992 and continuing into 1996, a series of emergency situations, caused in part by political problems in neighbouring countries and ethnic clashes in Northern Ghana, led to a large and rapidly growing number of refugees and internally displaced people in the country in need of food assistance. As a result, a full two-thirds of the approximately US\$15 million per year WFP programme in Ghana during that 5-year period was diverted to relief operations for Togolese and Liberian refugees and Ghanaian displaced populations. By 1996, the need for most of these relief operations had decreased and there was, at the time the CSO was being prepared, the opportunity to once more devote WFP resources largely to development rather than relief activities. The earlier ERP/SAP effort had largely succeeded (it was believed) in removing the worst of macroeconomic malaise and WFP was, thus, ready to focus its post-1996 efforts, i.e., those encompassed by the new country programming exercise, on population groups bypassed by economic recovery/structural adjustment programmes – e.g., chronically poor households in the remote and disadvantaged regions of the country.

The First CSO - 1991

48. The Country Strategy Outline approved in 1997 was not the first CSO for Ghana. WFP's first CSO, intended to cover the period 1992-1997, was actually prepared and presented to WFP/ Rome in 1991, based on guidance transmitted to WFP/Ghana in 1989. While, perhaps more a 'trial run' than an approved country strategy, the 1991 document was, in fact, quite well-done – clear, well-organized and targeted. It called for WFP resources in five sectors:

- A final phase of support for developing and rehabilitating the transport sector by helping attract and retain an experienced workforce, reducing absenteeism, and mobilizing community participation in maintaining feeder roads.
- Continuation of support within the Programme of Action to Mitigate the Social Costs of Adjustment (PAMSCAD) for school feeding at approximately 200 cash-strapped secondary boarding schools to enable them to assure regular feeding for their students and to be able to remain open throughout the school year. The programme monetized food to generate cash enabling these schools to purchase food locally and cover transport costs.
- A proposal to rehabilitate rural health facilities using locally-generated counterpart funds.
- A proposal to participate jointly with the government, UNICEF, WHO, UNFPA and UNDP in efforts to improve maternal and child nutrition by strengthening the nutritional surveillance system and establishing feeding centres in needy locations with community participation.
- A proposal to support the government's efforts to protect and manage its forestry, game and wildlife resources and to support community agro-forestry programmes.⁹

49. Many of the programme proposed in the 1991 CSO were never put into effect during the 1992-1996 period because of the aforementioned deteriorating security situation in neighbouring countries and in Northern Ghana in the early 1990s eventuating in emergency and relief activities which reduced the ability to design and implement some of the longer term food-aided development activities proposed in the 1991 CSO. Three emergency operations were initiated: EMOP 5245 – Assistance to Togolese Refugees; EMOP 5452 – Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons in Northern Ghana; and LIR 4 – Assistance to Liberian Refugees in Ghana.

50. Some development activities continued to 1995, but at reduced levels. Support to the PAMSCAD activity (Ghana 3273 – Assistance to Mitigate the Structural Adjustment Effects in the Social Sector) continued to March 1995. The Transport Sector Rehabilitation Project (Ghana 2714) was phased out in December 1995 as was the Development of Forestry Reserves Project (Ghana 3919). The maternal child supplementary feeding programme was eventually initiated (April 1995) in a somewhat different form (GHA 4932 – Supplementary Feeding, and Health and Nutrition Education).

The Second CSO – 1996

51. The CSO being evaluated in this report is thus the second CSO produced by the Ghana CO. It was developed in 1995, with considerable participation by the government and the UN agencies and other donor governments represented in Accra who commented on a circulated draft of the CSO before it was finalized and sent to Rome. In a workshop held to discuss the proposed 5-year WFP programme¹³ to be derived from the CSO then in preparation, WFP representatives noted that the government had had difficulty in the past in living up to its agreed financial commitments, but also noted that fully one-third of its entire development budget had been allocated as government contributions to donor-financed development projects. A government representative noted that part of the government's difficulty stemmed from the fact that WFP required a government commitment amounting to approximately 20 percent of the full value of the particular project while most other donor requirements for government contributions averaged about 10 percent. The government was simply hard pressed to come up with the cedi budgets requested by WFP. In reviewing the targeting of the proposed CSO strategy, the government requested that WFP focus on four types of activities:

- As part of the UNDP's overall country programme focus, WFP should concentrate on projects promoting household food security
- Dam rehabilitation in the Upper East Region in concert with IFAD and small-scale irrigation and drinking water development in several poor rural areas in the north

¹³ Initially, the programme was to have been for the five-year period 1996-2000.

- Labour-intensive feeder road construction and maintenance
- Local community rural forestry and agro-forestry.

52. The redrafted CSO was reviewed by the Ghanaian WFP Project committee on March 14, 1996. Representatives from several government agencies, the UN family and other donor groups participated. Among the more important points raised were: i) a reaffirmation by all parties of the continuing need for food aid; ii) continued concern by WFP regarding an apparent lack of commitment by the government to implementing food aid projects; and iii) the need for government to focus its resources on those proposals in the CSO which they were 'seriously willing to entertain...'

53. While drafted at the same time as the UNDP's first Country Strategy Note (April 1995) for Ghana and fully consistent with the CSN in terms of the need to focus on the areas in Ghana where poverty was the greatest – the rural savannah, it should be noted that there is no significant mention of food aid as a resource in the CSN.

54. The subsequent review of the 1996 CSO by WFP/headquarters noted that the CSO was too all-embracing and not sufficiently focused in its use of limited food aid resources, except in terms of its geographic focus on the northern savannah. It suggested that the final version of the CSO look less like "...a big, multi-purpose project with rather small activities..." and more like a set of coordinated activities focused on a limited number of achievable objectives. The Executive Board also recommended greater targeting of women and girls in the CP.

55. The 1996 CSO, as approved by WFP's Executive Board in October 1996, determined that the largest concentration of the food insecure and hungry poor were to be found in the rural savannah of the three northernmost administrative regions –Upper East, Upper West and Northern – and in pockets of the rural forest areas in the central and southern portions of the country. While noting that there appeared to have been improvement in domestic food production, the CSO, citing evidence from FAO crop production data and World Bank analyses, projected a food deficit in Ghana and a continuing need for food imports throughout the 1998-2002 period. It noted the successes thus far achieved by the government in increasing the rate of economic growth, its development of a targeted anti-poverty programme(PAMSCAD), and its efforts to devolve governmental decision-making to locally-elected District Assemblies. The government's food security policy was focused on strengthening food and agriculture production in order to increase the productivity of those engaged in agriculture and the availability of food in local markets.

56. The CSO argued that, during the CP period, WFP resources should be concerted with the government's national poverty reduction efforts first in rural development (feeder road rehabilitation and construction, irrigation, land improvement and afforestation) and second in meeting the food needs of the most vulnerable groups, including those engaged in capacity-building endeavours, food supplementation for malnourished women and their young children, support to skills training, and support for strengthening civil society. The target groups for these activities would be small and marginal farming households, farm labourers and other non-farm self employed and private, informal sector employees in the rural savannah of Upper West, Upper East and Northern Regions and selected areas in the rural forest areas of Volta, Central and Western Regions. To the extent possible, WFP's programmes would be undertaken jointly with other development agencies and in conformance with the priorities for short and medium-term development enunciated in the government's *Ghana – Vision 2020* long term development plan. The CSO called for a programme level of \$7-8 million per year, with monetization playing a reduced, but still visible, role.

The CP - 1997

57. Approval of the Country Programme (CP) followed approval of the CSO by one year. During the intervening time a draft CP was prepared, vetted with UN agency officials in Accra, with the

government, and with staff of other donor agencies. As part of the government's review, the Chief Director of the Ministry of Finance commented that:

“...the Government has taken due note of the new directions for WFP food assistance in Ghana for the period 1996-2000. The programme's new directions which include such thematic areas as targeted assistance to the poor, creating employment opportunities, poverty reduction and social development complement the framework of our national objectives and must be encouraged...Ghana's development programme is being assisted by both bilateral and multilateral agencies, the need to harmonize programmes among them cannot be over-emphasized.”

58. The CP proposed a strategy aimed first at using food aid to support economic and social development and, second, to promote national food security, “...especially the food security of poor people and communities.” The stated objectives were: i) developing human skills potential in target regions by enabling more girls to go to school in the north; ii) continuing an activity providing supplementary feeding to women and their small children; iii) expanding the forest areas and reducing environmental degradation; and iv) increasing agricultural production and rural incomes through the rehabilitation of rural infrastructure – feeder roads, irrigation and storage.

59. Five activities were proposed: one carry-over and four new programs. Activity One in the human resources development sector was Supplementary Feeding, and Health and Nutrition Education (Ghana 4932) which provides nutritional supplements to malnourished expectant and nursing mothers and their malnourished infants at selected community-based health centres in the savannah areas of Upper West, Upper East, and Northern Regions. This activity had been launched in 1995 and was carried over into the 1998-2002 CP period. Approximately 24,000 children have been receiving cooked meals and 14,000 women receiving take-home rations and training in basic health and nutrition per year at a total of 90 community health centres.

60. Activity Two was Human Resources Development in Ghana's Northern Savannah Areas - Education of Girls (Ghana 5995). This activity was not alluded to in the CSO, nor was girl's education listed as an element of the CSO's WFP strategy for Ghana. The objective of the activity was, and is, to increase the numbers of girls able to complete the first nine years of education (primary and junior secondary school) in those areas of Ghana where economic and social traditions have not supported the equal access of girls to educational opportunities. The project provides take-home food rations of cereals and cooking oil as an incentive to the families of these students to allow their daughters to continue in school. The target set by WFP was to increase the total number of girls in primary school in the participating regions by between 6.3 and 7.1 percent. There were to be 7,500 girls assisted in the first year, growing to a coverage of 25 percent of girls in the north by the end of the 5th year – a total of 28,450 girls in primary school. In junior secondary school (grades 7-9) the goal was to grow from 5.5 percent of girls in the first year to 3,750 girls, or 16.3 percent of total girls in school, by year five. This project commenced operation in the second half of 1999.

61. Activity Three in the human resources category was to have been a project entitled Skills Training and Income Earning Activities. This activity was first mentioned in the CSO and was listed as a proposed 8activity in the CP. For a variety of design reasons, consideration of this concept was first postponed and later dropped.

62. The three activities above were all in the human resources development sector. The Fourth and Fifth activities identified in the CP fell in the rural and environmental development category. The first of these, Participatory Rural Forestry in Ghana's Northern Savannah Areas, was intended to improve the food security of selected groups of the rural poor by enabling them to participate in reforestation activities and to increase income-earning opportunities by assisting these or other rural poor households to grow and sell fast-growing forest and fruit trees. This activity was intended as a component of the multi-donor financed Savannah Resource Management Project (SRMP) – itself a component of the Natural Resources

Management Programme (NRMP) of the Ministry of Lands and Forestry. The NRMP is a ten-year programme, supported by a World Bank-led consortium of development partners involving the EU, DANIDA, DFID, JICA, FAO, GTZ/Forum, the Government of the Netherlands and WFP as well as the World Bank. WFP had initially undertaken preliminary project preparation of a stand-alone activity. However, in 1997, the government proposed that WFP consider participation in the NRMP – at the time being jointly designed by the government and other donors.

63. Of the several components of the NRMP, the one which most closely fit WFP's focus on the northern savannah was the proposed SRMP and, in early 1998, The government expressed its desire for WFP participation in the first phase of the project and WFP indicated willingness to do so. It was agreed, however, that WFP assistance in Phase I should focus on on-going Forestry Department activities in the three northern regions. Information to this effect was provided enabling the preparation and appraisal of the project. Delays in receiving the Mission report and comments from the government on the report, coupled with the implementation of project activities ahead of schedule, led to the demand for a new set of information on activities and targets. Although the government had, as of mid-2000, provided information on the activities and targets, WFP still – as of the time of drafting of this Evaluation Report – needs added information from the government on the modes of food aid distribution at the community level.

64. The Fifth and last activity proposed in the CP was Rural Infrastructure Development in the Northern Savannah and Rural Forest Areas of Ghana. As with Activity Four, this proposal has not yet been implemented. There are a number of reasons for this. The proposed activity was to have three major components: feeder roads, small-scale dam construction in support of irrigation, and the construction of food storage structures. As stated in the CP, the objective of this activity was to improve the food security status of poor households in food deficit areas by helping to increase agricultural production, reduce post-harvest losses and increase incomes of poor rural households. In the feeder road component, WFP was to have provided food assistance as payment to workers in on-going (i.e., as a sub-component of the Rural Infrastructure Development Project, RIDP) and new feeder roads rehabilitation and construction activities in the northern savannah. It was to have been undertaken jointly with central and regional government agencies and with the International Labour Organization (ILO). Discussions with ILO and the government did not result in an approvable modality for using WFP food aid to supplement wages for unskilled workers employed by private contractors or the relative roles of community-based workers and contractor employees. There had been an earlier agreement between ILO and WFP that 50 percent of payment in such WFP activities should be supplied in food and 50 percent in cash. This arrangement did not seem to be consistent with new FAAD guidance, however. After a lengthy WFP review, a WFP position was finally reached that payment had to be 100 percent in food. This was conveyed to the CO through the regional office and then to the government. The Feeder Road Department found this unacceptable and the activity was cancelled as a result.

65. Little progress has been made on the small dam and irrigation sub-component. After exchanges between WFP/Ghana and the Irrigation Development Authority (IDA) of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture in 1997, more than two years elapsed when there was, apparently, no communication on this sub-activity. The CO reported they were waiting for feedback from the Irrigation Authority and that none was received during that period. The CO concluded that the irrigation activity was a “non-starter.” However, in March 2000, the IDA belatedly contacted WFP/Ghana requesting food assistance for the government's Small Scale Irrigation Development Project. WFP responded that in the absence of communication from the government on this sub-element, WFP had assumed by that time that the government was not counting on WFP participation. The government responded that the delay had been caused first by difficulty in satisfying conditions precedent in project loan (African Development Bank, AfDB) effectiveness, that both sides had been lax in keeping communications open, and that government had been “...ignorant of [WFP's] operational procedures...” As a result of this hiatus in communication and of the government's inadequate understanding of WFP procedures WFP/Ghana had, in effect, shelved the activity.

66. Insofar as the Evaluation Team could determine through conversations with WFP/Ghana staff and a review of the files, there has been no discussion with government on the food storage sub-component since the CP was approved. It appear to be a dead element of the Country Programme at this time.

67. In sum, of the five activities identified in the 1997 CP, only two are operational in October 2000. The next sections offers an assessment of the programme in light of the objectives stated in both the approved CSO and the approved CP and in terms of the lack of progress in implementing the remaining activities.

IV. ASSESSMENT OF THE 1998-2002 COUNTRY PROGRAMME

68. There are three major and several lesser issues the Team discusses in this Section. The first of the larger issues deals with the coherence between the WFP strategy in Ghana – as identified in the CSO and approved by WFP’s executive board in October 1996 – and the actual programme identified in the CP and approved by the Executive Board in October 1997. The second concerns the lack of progress in activating three of the programme elements identified in the CP. This issue relates also to the discussion in Section V of the overall effect on the Ghana programme of WFP’s systems and procedures and to the Section VI discussion regarding the interface between the changing global WFP policy agenda and the assessment of Ghana’s specific development problems and needs. The third issue focuses on the relationship between the WFP country programme strategy, as approved, and the actual poverty and food security situation in Ghana. This third issue also involves consideration of the appropriateness of the 1998-2002 WFP strategy to Ghana’s need for external assistance as it might have been perceived in the 1996-7 period. This might be particularly useful for those who will be engaged in drafting the 2001-2005 CP.

Issue One: The approved CSO is not the operational strategy guiding the approved CP.

69. The CSO proposed a WFP strategy focused on increasing the production, transport and storage of food as well as the incomes on the poorer groups in the northern savannah as the best possible use of food aid in increasing the food security of the rural poor in Ghana’s poorest areas. The CSO strategy represented a transition from WFP’s having been a component of the structural adjustment process to one focused less on groups adversely affected by structural adjustment and more on the poorest households who had been by-passed by it. The core elements were to have included rural development activities such as feeder road rehabilitation, irrigation and land improvement. Food assistance was to have been targeted on the poorest households in the northern savannah and on selected locations in the rural forest areas. Feeding programmes such as mother and child supplementary feeding, skills training and support for local NGOs and local governance were among the activities in the second priority group of proposed activities. An estimated \$7-8 million of food assistance, including modest levels of monetization were proposed for the five-year programme.

70. The CP, which was approved a year after the CSO, differs in significant ways from the CSO. First, it established as the overall WFP goals as: “a) use of food aid to support economic and social development; and b) promote national food security, especially the food security of poor people and communities.” The CP established girl’s education, skills training for women, and improved food intake of children and expectant and nursing mothers as it top objectives, reforestation/agroforestry as its second tier objectives and increasing agricultural productivity and rural incomes as its third level objectives. The top priority target group included girls, malnourished children and their mothers. Human resources development was made the top priority and rural development the second priority – reversing the order in the CSO. While the CSO proposed a five-year funding level of \$35-40 million, the CP notes that “...the CP budget was reduced at the country office level to about 28 million, in part because of the government’s concern with the level of expected counterpart contributions. The CSO determined that Ghana’s own food security strategy required a focus on energizing the food and agricultural sector. The CP moved this down to the third tier.

71. While the CP strategy may or may not have been, in fact, a more appropriate strategy for the use of WFP resources in Ghana in the context of a fresh review of Ghana's needs and priorities and what resources other donors were providing, the analytic basis for veering significantly from the path and rationale laid down in the CSO is not explained. Had the situation in Ghana changed significantly between preparation of the CSO and preparation of the CP? Had the earlier CSO analysis been determined to have been flawed? Had the overall government or UN family development strategies themselves changed? The answer to these theoretical questions seems to be no. What apparently changed the strategic focus and modalities proposed for the five-year WFP programme in Ghana was guidance from WFP/Rome to increase the positive impact of the Ghana programme on girls and women, to eliminate the element of monetization from the programme, to reduce the size of the annual food aid budget to conform to Ghana's ability to provide counterpart contributions and, in general, to focus more on social programmes and less on agriculture and food production.

72. The issue is not whether the CSO approach or the CP approach was more appropriate for Ghana. The issue is that the CP became, in effect, a strategy as well as a programmatic document meaning that there were two approved strategies for Ghana which were significantly different from each other. The CSO became, more or less, a dead document upon the approval of the CP. Further, it, the CP strategy, seems to have been far less based on an analysis of the causality of poverty and food insecurity specific to Ghana than was the CSO. There is no discussion in the CP of how WFP's focus on girl's education and supplementary feeding of – in total – about 50-60,000 beneficiaries in northern Ghana was going to have a significant and sustained positive impact on the factors which in Ghana had created the need among the target populations for WFP's food assistance, nor on how this programme was a more appropriate use of food aid – in the Ghana context – than the rural development, food and agriculture production emphasis in the CSO.

73. The issue – and it is a significant one – is the interface between in-country analysis contained in the CSO suggesting one path for WFP food assistance and a WFP-wide, headquarters-based policy agenda suggesting another path. In effect, the CSO proposes that what Ghana needs most from WFP is food assistance to rehabilitate roads, increase the availability of small-scale irrigation in the least irrigated country in Sub-Saharan Africa, and build additional food storage as a way of increasing the food supply, reducing the price of food to poor people, and increasing income opportunities for some of Ghana's poorest farm households. The CP says that the top priorities are girl's education and MCH supplementary feeding as a means of confronting serious malnutrition and increasing the status of women in northern Ghana. At present these are the only active projects in the portfolio.

Recommendation No. 1: WFP must clarify the relationship between the CSO as a statement of approved WFP strategy in a country and the CP as the description of the approved programme to carry out *that* strategy. If the strategic focus is changed, the change must be reflected in both the CSO and the CP, not solely in the CP document itself.

Recommendation No. 2: A CSO must be very clear regarding how the application of overall WFP policies in a recipient country has been adapted to the particular array of factors causing and perpetuating poverty, economic malaise and food insecurity in that country. The tendency to substitute prescriptive, policy-based approaches for solid, local analysis of poverty causality and WFP responses clearly derived from that analysis must be avoided. The diagnosis should determine the prescription; not the reverse.

Issue Two: At the mid-point in the 1998-2002 programming period only two of five activities, constituting the approved country programme, are operational. This situation is not effectively promoting a coherent WFP development strategy in Ghana.

74. The slow progress by WFP/Ghana in initiating implementation of the five activities composing the approved CP has many causes. Some have been apparent to the Evaluation Team, others have not. The net effect of having two of three human resources development activities operational but neither of the two natural resource development activities (both of which were intended to be multi-dimensional in their effect) is that neither the explicit WFP strategy of the CSO or the implicit WFP strategy of the CP is, at present, being effectively carried out. The impact of the present programme on: i) problems of poverty, ii) food insecurity, or iii) improving the capacity of the government to extend/improve its health care delivery system in a sustainable fashion, or iv) to develop the human resource potential of girls appears to be limited to the “output” level. Several thousand malnourished women and children are receiving supplementary feeding. These women are also receiving nutrition and health training. The families of several thousand girls are receiving take-home rations and young girls from these families are attending primary school and junior secondary school regularly. The long-term impact in changing patterns of behaviour for the better (e.g., mothers putting their nutritional/health training to practical use in maintaining improvements in their and their children’s nutritional status after the period of support from the WFP supplementary feeding is over, or girls receiving lasting benefit from their extra time in school that will actually improve their status or quality of life) is untested and therefore unknown.

75. In both activities the hypotheses that relate outcomes at the output level to progress toward broad development, poverty-reduction or food security objectives remain unproven. Therefore it is difficult for this, or any, Evaluation Team to conclude: i) whether or not WFP’s food resources are having the impact at the goal or objective level sufficient to justify the present programme; ii) whether these activities are as effective as alternative activities might be; or iii) whether these activities were as effective, *per se*, as they might be. On this third point the Evaluation Team has recommendations in Section VII.

76. Part of the reason the programme has been slow in starting is found in problems attendant on the individual activities. The description of these problems is found in Section VII below. From the overall, programmatic, perspective, general reasons for the difficulty in getting the full programme underway can be grouped in four categories: i) problems within the government of Ghana, ii) problems relating to difficulties of ‘partnering;’ iii) staffing and other difficulties in the WFP/Ghana office; and iv) problems related to WFP systems and procedures. The following paragraphs discuss the first three. Section V discusses the fourth.

Slow programme implementation: the government

77. The government of Ghana deals with a large group of donors and a resultant large number of donor-financed activities. The number of people in government dealing with all this is limited; donor demands on the time of this relatively small group of officials are heavy. The government’s policy of delegating increasing responsibility for development activities to district councils and district administrators means an added layer of local government participation and further complexity for the donors. When there are several donors competing simultaneously for the time and efforts of key government staff, there are not enough staff resources to cover all the bases and delays occur. During the ERP/SAP period – when donor collaboration was close and focused on the single goal of reviving the economy – the problem was controllable. Since the mid-1990s as each of the donors has carved out its own particular development objectives (though, for most, within the framework of the government’s Vision – 2020 development agenda) the call on the time and resources of the government’s various ministries and agencies has multiplied.

78. In the case of WFP, there have been a number of instances – particularly in the development of the Participatory Rural Forestry and Rural Savannah activities – where government personnel have apparently been so deeply involved with the numerous donors involved, that communications with WFP have, at best, been intermittent. Reviews of activity files show periods of several months without written communication (or memos of verbal communications) between government and WFP on these activities. From the government’s side the reason seems to have been simply that there were too many donors and

too few staff to maintain the needed information and communications flows. From WFP's side the reason seems to have been staff turn-over and the level of effort needed to deal with other activities in the portfolio. The lack of progress in bringing these two activities to the point of implementation is to a very great degree a result of inadequate communications between the government and WFP/Ghana for protracted periods.

Slow programme implementation: problems in 'partnering'

79. A second cause of inadequate development of the full WFP programme strategy over the 1997-2000 time period has been the incremental demands on WFP staff time caused by the desire of all participants in Ghana's development for close cooperation and 'partnering' of activities in order to cut down on unnecessary or overlapping economic development projects. In the two CP activities which are still not to the implementation stage, the competing demands of other donors partners – the World Bank and African Development Bank, for example – have slowed WFP's attempts to finalise its own support packages for these two projects. As one WFP staff person put it "...it is like being a wagon attached to a tractor. When the tractor stops, the wagon stops." And thus it has been for WFP in both of these activities. The government took a long time to meet the major donors' conditions precedent for project loan effectiveness in both activities.

80. As noted earlier, in the particular case of WFP assistance to feeder road rehabilitation and construction, it proved impossible for WFP and the ILO to reach agreement on methods for combining food-for-work and ILO cash payment in a 50-50 combination for road construction workers and to find a way to provide payment both for minimum wage employees of contractors and for community-based workers. After months of discussions, WFP/Ghana finally decided that there could be no bridging of the gap between WFP and ILO policies of these matters and decided to drop consideration of the roads component.¹⁴

81. Partnering has also been an issue in the girl's education activity. In this case, a potential partner – Catholic Relief Services (CRS) – was already providing in-school feeding for all students and take-home rations for the families of girl students in a number of primary schools in the same three northern districts where WFP wanted to start its take-home rations for girl students program. While WFP does not provide take-home rations for girls in the same schools assisted by CRS, there are still problems. The WFP take-home ration is different in composition from that of CRS. Both female and male students in the CRS schools also receive a meal served during the school day and at least some of the parents of children in the WFP-supported schools feel they would rather be supported by CRS because they perceive that support package as being better. Although CRS was consulted by WFP during the preparation of the girl's education activity, they reported to the Evaluation Team that they believed the design and implementation of the WFP girl's education activity had not taken their concerns into account and the WFP activity had created difficulties in the implementation of their own programmes. In this case, closer cooperation and, possibly, a partnering arrangement with CRS might have proven beneficial, although the Team recognizes that policy and methodological differences might have made it difficult to achieve a truly collaborative implementation mode.

Slow programme implementation: WFP/Ghana staffing problems

82. Some 18 months after approval of the CP, a nearly complete change in the WFP professional staff in Accra occurred. Both expatriate officers and one of the two Ghanaian programme officers departed the Country Office. The remaining Ghanaian programme officer was on maternity leave for several months. The net result was that for much of the period after approval of the CP, the CO was either short-staffed or staffed by officers new to the office. In addition, as is further discussed in Section V, WFP was in the

¹⁴ It is also likely that WFP policies stemming from the "Enabling Development" document, which, in effect, downgraded the relative utility of food-for-work programmes vis-à-vis other food aid modalities, may have played a role in this decision by WFP/Ghana. This topic is discussed further in Section IX.

midst of a restructuring process in which there were new policy guidelines being formulated and issued and a major decentralization being effectuated. Under these circumstances, it was difficult for the new WFP staff in Ghana to receive appropriate policy guidance or timely interpretation of the application in Ghana of much of the new guidance.

Issue Three: is the present strategy and the present CP consistent with Ghana's development assistance requirements?

83. The CP makes the case that Ghana remains a food insecure country and that the worst manifestations of food insecurity are found in the northern savannah. The CP states that "These communities experience major problems of basic food supply even in a normal year, and the impact of drought years can be enormous. Produce markets in these areas are unreliable, and even in cases where markets are available, households often lack the income necessary to buy the food required for basic survival." The presently active elements of the WFP 1998-2002 programme – Girl's Education and Supplementary Feeding of malnourished mothers and their infants – while providing food transfers to poor households in the first case and transfers to several thousand malnourished mothers and infants in the latter case – do not, except indirectly, deal with: i) "...major problems of basic food supply..." ii) unreliable food markets; and iii) insufficient household incomes identified by the CP as the primary problems of food insecurity in Ghana.

84. The two activities not yet underway, once they become operational, would channel WFP food resources to: i) overcoming problems more directly associated with the causes of continued low food productivity (by increasing the rate with which small-scale irrigation endeavours could be created and utilized by smallholders to increase food crop yields); and ii) increase household incomes in poor areas in the northern savannah (by developing community wood lots and increasing the capacity of farmers to grow and sell more food and other agricultural production as a result of increased irrigation and better storage facilities for smallholder agricultural crops). Were these activities – which the CP allocated to secondary priority – underway, the entire programme would be better focused on the problems contributing to the continuation of food insecurity and poverty.

85. Under these circumstances, it is imperative that efforts be intensified to re-invigorate the processes leading to early implementation of WFP support for the rural infrastructure project, particularly the irrigation sub-component.¹⁵ In addition, discussions should be intensified between government, WFP/Ghana and other involved donors leading to WFP's being ready to assist in Phase II implementation of SRMP activities as soon as Phase II commences. There is no need to wait for development of the 2001-2005 CSO/CP. Once these two activities have been added to the two elements of the programme already active, the entire array of these four WFP assistance activities will constitute a far more appropriate attack on the causes of food insecurity and poverty in Ghana than the more limited progress toward WFP's objectives in Ghana likely to occur as a result of the girl's education and supplementary feeding activities alone.

V. SYSTEMS AND PROCEDURES SUPPORTING THE COUNTRY PROGRAMME

86. This section discusses the changing nature of WFP's policies and modalities and how they may have impacted on the design and implementation of the country programme in Ghana. These modalities include WFP's decentralization of decision-making and backstopping to regional offices, thematic guidance on monetization, food-for-work, gender, partnering, VAM indicator monitoring, the methods

¹⁵ Although the Evaluation Team was informed during the drafting of this report that AfDB has, at least temporarily, suspended financing of their component of the irrigation project because Ghana is presently in arrears in repayment of past loans.

for determining the size of budgets and personnel for country programmes, and the role of food aid in development generally.

87. Section IV above notes that the slow start of some of the CP activities can be ascribed in part to problems associated with changes in systems and procedures within WFP. In particular, the decentralization of programme support, logistics management, finance and administration, information technology support, personnel management, pipeline administration and preparation of reports to six regional offices which was initiated in November, 1996 created a problem for WFP/Ghana. During the period 1997, 1998 and much of 1999, WFP/Ghana was not considered part of the Abidjan regional cluster and therefore not supported by the regional office serving the West Africa region. Neither was Ghana one of the six stand-alone country programmes. For reasons that remain unclear to the Evaluation Team, the Ghana programme continued to be backstopped from Rome during this 2½ year period even though most of the personnel providing such backstopping were in the process of being reassigned to the six regional offices or being moved to other assignments. Further, since it was primarily a development – as opposed to an emergency (EMOP), or protracted recovery (PRRO) – programme during a time when WFP was focused largely on emergency or protracted recovery operations, less administrative attention seems to have been provided to the programme in Ghana.

88. Even after Ghana was added to the list of countries covered by staff in the Abidjan regional office in October 1999, problems continued. The staff in Abidjan was not augmented as a result of the addition of Ghana to the countries supported by that office. The same number of professional staff were simply asked to cover WFP/Ghana's backstopping requirements in addition to their prior workload. Since the region had more than its share of crisis countries (e.g., Liberia, Sierra Leone and, more recently, Côte d'Ivoire itself) staff time available for assisting the WFP/Ghana's development programme was limited. The files in WFP's Accra office display several instances where regional staff were unable – because of duties elsewhere in the region – to respond on a timely basis to requests for assistance from WFP/Ghana. The problem was exacerbated to a certain degree by the WFP staff in Accra seeking, on a number of occasions, WFP guidance on whether certain procedural or programmatic decisions which the Ghana CO wanted to take were "FAAD compliant" (i.e., sanctioned by new policy guidelines stemming from the "Enabling Development" policy direction). When these queries regarding FAAD compliance were not answered, or the answers were delayed, WFP/Ghana staff felt they could not proceed since to have done so, in the CO's view, might have raised false expectations, wasted the time of the authorities/partners/CO, and been detrimental to WFP's image should there have been a subsequent ruling that the activity was not "FAAD compliant". The whole concept of "FAAD compliance" is taken up in Section IX below.

89. Other WFP policies and recent organizational and policy changes have also had significant effects on the WFP/Ghana 1998-2002 country programme. Those that relate to "Enabling Development" are covered in Section IX. The remainder are covered briefly below.

Ghana's LDC status

90. The policy that WFP food aid recipient countries that are Low-Income Food Deficit (LIFD) countries but which are not ranked by UNCTAD as Least Developed Countries (LDCs) are required to pay all costs associated with the inland transport of WFP food aid has been a significant burden on the Ghanaian government. With an average per capita income which has never exceeded US\$400 per year and exhibiting other attributes of widespread and chronic poverty among the majority of its citizens, Ghana would clearly seem to qualify as an LDC. In response to a query from the Evaluation Team, an UNCTAD official informed the Team that Ghana "...are qualified to be an LDC and the UN has offered them that status but they have not taken it up ..."¹⁶ This situation, if confirmed between WFP and UNCTAD, presents WFP with additional options. Ghana apparently qualifies as an LDC – meaning it evinces the traits required for membership in that group of extremely poor countries. Even though it, for

¹⁶ UNCTAD (Charles Gore) to Riley e-mail message 30/10/00.

whatever reasons, has declined to be listed as an LDC, its population and government are suffering under the same or similar hardships and constraints as are countries officially designated as LDCs and so treated by WFP. Since it is the status of poverty and related considerations that qualifies a particular poor country as an LDC, these factors should also cause WFP to consider and treat Ghana as an LDC whether or not it has accepted that designation.

Recommendation No. 3: WFP should clarify with UNCTAD and other UN organizations whether Ghana qualifies to be included as an LDC. If so – and whether or not the government of Ghana is willing to be officially so designated – Ghana ought to be offered the same relief from counterpart contribution requirements as are afforded other LDCs and consideration given to increasing the level of food assistance commensurate with that status.

Monetization

91. Changed policy in WFP regarding the in-country or third country monetization of WFP food aid is also likely to hamper the effectiveness of the WFP programme in Ghana. While the 1996 CSO called for a limited amount of monetization to generate local currency needed to cover some of the internal costs associated with programme implementation, the 1997 CP – reflecting guidance from WFP headquarters – deleted monetization from the programme. It has become WFP policy in recent years to scale back dramatically that proportion of WFP food which is not provided directly to target recipients.

92. In Ghana, because it is a net food importer and because – in particular – the better-off population in both urban and rural areas are historically consumers of bread, there is the need to maintain wheat imports; yet, because of the country's trade imbalance, indebtedness, and overall poverty, there is also need to reduce the foreign exchange burden on the economy associated with its importation. USAID and CIDA have maintained large programme food aid components over the past several years. In both cases – particularly for the U.S. – a large proportion of this programme food aid is monetized. Three USAID-assisted NGOs – ADRA, TechnoServe, and CRS each monetize approximately \$5 million in PL480 Title II wheat (ranging between 15,000-20,000 MT per year for each of these NGOs)¹⁷ to generate local currency to purchase local foods for their direct food transfers in Ghana and to cover other costs associated with their poverty-focused development programmes. Since, in many cases, these in-country purchases can be undertaken in locations relatively closer to the intended participant-recipients, in-country transport costs are reduced. Thus, the U.S. food aid programme is serving at least three purposes: i) providing imported wheat – a food consumed by better-off Ghanaians as bread (the absence of which could lead to political turmoil), ii) the selling of that bread to generate local currency used by the monetizing U.S. NGOs to cover the local costs of their development activities, iii) the use of some of this local currency to purchase local grains, root crops and locally-produced vegetable oil and other commodities for use in targeted feeding programmes. This latter serves as an incentive to local producers by increasing effective demand for their products.

93. Ghana is a country where monetization of some WFP food aid to generate funds for some of the operating costs of on-going programmes and for the purchase of local foodstuffs for local feeding activities (e.g., the take home rations in the Girl's Education and Supplementary Feeding activity), would seem to make a great deal of sense. As will be seen in the discussion on the need for VAM activities in Ghana, there is also need for local currency to finance the local training and payment of monitors to track significant indicators of change in poverty status and vulnerability to food insecurity. In addition, given the fact noted above that Ghana appears to qualify for LDC status, there may be need for additional local currency support to cover in-country transport costs. Finally, given the way in which WFP now makes budgetary support available to its development programmes in countries such as Ghana, there is probable need for additional local currency to help cover local costs associated with programme development and

¹⁷ US Agency for International Development, 2000.

implementation. This requirement will be made larger in Ghana by the need for data gathering and analysis associated with the preparation of the new CSO.

94. Even the modality for monetization in Ghana could be handled with minimum difficulty by negotiating with one of the existing NGOs to take on the actual monetizing of, say, wheat which could be imported by WFP for that purpose. There is precedent for NGO monetization of WFP food aid in Uganda where ACDI-VOCA has been monetizing wheat for WFP for a small fee for several years. The monetizing entity in Ghana could theoretically be any of the three existing NGOs undertaking programmes utilizing USAID provided wheat. The “Bellmon Determination” (CEPA, 2000) analysis of need and of lack of disincentive effect undertaken for USAID can, with modest modification, serve WFP’s needs as well.

Recommendation No. 4: WFP should consider adding a modest monetization element to the Ghana country programme to generate local currency to cover some of the local costs associated with programme development and implementation, the added needs of analysis to underpin the 2001-2005 CSO and to cover the costs of establishing a VAM presence in Ghana. This recommendation is made in full knowledge that recent WFP policy has been to diminish, rather than expand, monetization.

Budgets for Support Costs

95. The WFP programme in Ghana is presently, and will increasingly in the future be, adversely affected by WFP’s Resources and Long-Term Financing Model (RLTF) – a system of providing direct support costs (DSC) to its food aid programmes globally. The RLTF allocates financial resources to a WFP Country Office as a percentage of quantity of food programmed. Thus, a programme with a single, large, on-going food aid activity would be provided a more substantial support budget than would a smaller country programme with several small but complex activities requiring greater staffing effort in, say, more intensive planning and programming, more difficult operating conditions, or the need for greater participation with a large number of donors or NGO partners. This method of calculating and allocating DSC seems to work very much against country programmes such as Ghana where the demands on a planned smaller human resource base are increasing. If these countries are to “enable” development in the human resources-intensive manner envisioned in the “Enabling Development” document, a way must be found to provide them the financial tools needed to accomplish WFP’s country objectives appropriately and successfully.

96. The move towards a system where world-wide DSC is not shared globally but rather remains with the country that generates it (“you earn it you keep it”) may also serve to encourage the wrong behaviour. The system forces country programmes to consider increasing the value of the food component and associated costs in order to generate enough DSC to meet the costs of implementing development projects (which, under WFP’s “Enabling Development” policy, require ever more demands on human resources). Consequently, to increase the amount of DSC, country programmes sometimes look to higher value trade offs – importation rather than local purchase, high cost food basket rather than low, more food inputs rather than less, larger projects rather than smaller more manageable ones. Following the “Enabling Development” policy puts smaller programmes such as Ghana in a bind; if they implement large programmes to generate enough DSC to survive, they spend their limited staff resources on logistics/administration rather than on all the aspect of the development machinery needed to ensure that “enabling” factors are in place.

97. Ghana, where two of the four activities are still in the throes of negotiation and collaborative efforts with several levels of government and a large number of partners is operating on a smaller budget than it requires because initiation of two of its activities has been delayed, in part due to exogenous issues of other donor partners. Thus, the labour-intensive period of ‘partnering’ – i.e., the preliminary stages of collaboration and planning – receives no additional funding to cover such costs as support staff for joint planning, field assessments and project preparation. Once the activity becomes operational and the staff

workload lessened the support funds, presumably, begin to flow. There would seem to be a flaw of logic here.

98. To a certain extent these budgets are developed on the basis of prior experience in a country programme and can be reallocated, in part, at mid-year intervals when funds can be moved from COs where commitments or expenditures are less than programmed to COs where the need for financing is greater than the approved level. Under these circumstances, it is impossible, from the perspective of the CO, to commit to joint planning and analysis efforts, to recruit local staff or contracted skills when the level and availability of financial resources is not known ahead of time.

99. Using the guidelines of the present Resourcing and Long Term Financing (RLTF) model, which is to become fully operational in 2001, WFP/Ghana is projected to have a staff of one international officer, two Ghanaian professionals and three support staff plus \$55,000 per year in support costs. Making matters even more difficult for Ghana: the unallocated DSC in any given year is intended to be used by WFP globally as a reserve for emergency needs. There is at present, the Evaluation Team has been informed, no method by which a development-focused food aid programme – such as that in Ghana – can gain access to the unallocated DSC budget.

100. There are, as of October, 2000, two international staff in Ghana and two Ghanaian professional staff. In 2001, if present plans hold, this will be reduced by one international staff person. Given what this evaluation has already asserted regarding the tasks necessary to get two extremely important (in terms of increasing the focus of WFP resources on the causes of poverty and food insecurity in Ghana) activities operational as soon as possible; given the need for WFP/Ghana to engage in a new CSO/CP exercise two years early in order to bring the programme into line with the UNDAF and Ghanaian government planning frameworks;¹⁸ given the need to undertake a serious analytical effort to establish and monitor indicators of what appears to be deepening poverty and food insecurity in both rural and urban areas; and given the need, discussed below, to undertake a contingency planning exercise; the CO requires, at a minimum, the continuation of two full-time professional international staff, plus augmentation of Ghanaian professional staff by at least one person needed to take on what this Evaluation Report proposes as needed VAM responsibilities and to participate in a contingency planning exercise discussed in the next sub-sections of this Report.

Recommendation No. 5: The size of the international staff of WFP/Ghana should remain at the present level of two professional staff plus a UNV. In light of recommendation No. 7 below, the Ghanaian professional staff should be increased from two to three professionals. The added person would be responsible for VAM activities and VAM training. In the Evaluation Team's judgment, non-concurrence with this recommendation would place WFP at grave risk of underperformance in meeting its programme goals and objectives in Ghana.

101. It is absolutely clear to the Evaluation Team that the present WFP financing modality has had an adverse impact on the Ghana programme over the past year by slowing the ability of the resident WFP staff to move more expeditiously to establish the full programme in Ghana. The local currency costs associated with planning, analysis, appraising, monitoring, auditing, day-to-day activity management, negotiating, establishing and measuring changes in indicators of effectiveness and impact, etc. cannot be appropriately conducted within the limits of the present and projected local currency budget.

¹⁸ Involving considerable on-the-ground effort to develop partnering models and actual 'partnered' activities with central and district governments, several other donors and both international and local NGOs.

Recommendation No. 6: WFP must establish a realistic and sustainable long-term budget for support and other local direct costs relating to its programme in Ghana. Funds must be provided at this level for the 2001-2005 period. If it is impossible to provide sufficient DSC funds, WFP should consider augmenting the food allocation to the Ghana country programme by an amount of food (presumably wheat) to enable monetization sufficient to cover the budget shortfall in each of the next five years. This may require that WFP reconsider its present policies regarding the extent to which monetization can be used in development programmes such as Ghana. It is the Team's judgment that such reconsideration is warranted.

VAM in Ghana

102. The present CP indicates that a Vulnerability Assessment Mapping (VAM) exercise was undertaken in support of the GLSS exercise and was indirectly accessed as an element of the CSO/CP preparation. The Evaluation Team could find no evidence in the files or in interviews that any VAM work has ever been undertaken in Ghana. The content of the present CP has been determined, in part, on the basis of generally-held views regarding the pace and success of development activities undertaken as part of the ERP exercise, from evidence in the 1992 GLSS3, and from the WFP experience with PAMSCAD participation in the mid-1990s. As noted in Section II above, there are many reasons to believe that during the 1998-2000 period of the present WFP country programme the situation of the poorest segments of the population in Ghana may have worsened, may even have worsened dramatically.

103. The lack of a VAM unit in Ghana, or of a USAID-financed FEWS unit, or of an effective FAO-financed FIVIMS unit, or of a similar poverty measuring and analysis unit financed by any donor or by the government of Ghana has left all participants in Ghanaian development programmes operating more-or-less in the dark regarding changes in poverty status. Worse, there may have been acceptance of an image of improvement in poverty status which has led to a reduction in resources intended to confront the causes of poverty and food insecurity in the belief that the lives and livelihoods of the poorest were improving and that added resources were, perhaps, not needed.

104. The Team's impression, based on a time-shortened review of demographic, food production, environmental, social, health, employment, and, above all, wholesale and consumer prices, rates of inflation and exchange rate depreciation data, is that both the rural and urban poorest households have experienced greatly increased costs of living in the past 12-18 months, reduced access to food, declining real wages and continuing distortions in markets. The net result, the Team has tentatively concluded, is that an undetermined but significant number of Ghanaian households have slipped below the upper poverty line and a smaller, but still significant, number of these households have fallen below the lower poverty line during this time period. There is need to determine the validity of this assertion and, if valid, the magnitude of the problem in terms of the breadth and depth of increased food insecurity, if any.

105. WFP's VAM capability is needed in Ghana at this time. The proven utility of the VAM methodology and the numbers in WFP trained in VAM methodology and able to train others in its application make WFP the most suitable donor agency for undertaking this task in Ghana. While it is conceivable that a regional VAM office might suffice, if adequate training could be provided to Ghanaians and a funding mechanism could be located to support a Ghanaian VAM-type unit, there is no VAM unit in the Abidjan regional office and none is proposed.

Recommendation No. 7: WFP should consider setting up a VAM unit in Ghana with the immediate task of ascertaining the true magnitude of an apparent, recent further impoverishment of large numbers of households in both rural and urban Ghana. Such VAM analysis should assess the likelihood and direction of a continuation of trends which may be responsible for such increases in severe and/or chronic poverty and food insecurity. The unit may or may not be temporary in nature, but should seek to establish and train a Ghanaian VAM unit and seek funding from non-WFP sources for the continuation of such a unit. This effort should be coordinated, to the extent practicable with FAO's FIVIMS unit and other interested government and donor organizations.

Contingency Planning in Ghana

106. Contingency planning is an area of importance to Ghana which the CO has not yet addressed to the extent that WFP policy requires, although there are plans to do so in the future. WFP's August 2000 draft guidelines entitled "Contingency Planning in WFP" recommends that countries should undertake such contingency planning "...in anticipation of foreseeable crises..." In the case of Ghana, a country of recent stability in a region of political and social turmoil, the rationale for undertaking serious contingency planning efforts is clear. During the period the Evaluation Team was in Ghana, staff from the regional office in Abidjan were "evacuated" to Accra on one occasion, nearly so on another. Continuing political uncertainties and heightened social tensions in Côte d'Ivoire could result, at any time, in a forced repatriation of many hundreds of thousands of Ghanaian workers. There have also been social and cultural unrest in Nigeria where there also tens of thousands of Ghanaians who might be forced to return to their homeland. The CO in Accra should develop contingency plans for these eventualities as well as for other refugee and internally displaced population scenarios – particularly in light of the heavy load of EMOP activities that occurred in the mid-1990s. A return of the causes of those emergencies is still very possible.

107. Here, again, is evidence in support of a stronger WFP staff presence in Ghana than is called for by WFP's present personnel deployment strategy. Given recent experience with the limited staff availability from the regional cluster in Abidjan, and given the fact that Côte d'Ivoire is not only the home of the regional cluster but the source of potential problems for WFP in Ghana – should the oft-threatened repatriation of Ghanaians from Côte d'Ivoire occur – there is urgent need for developing a WFP contingency plan in Ghana. This should occur *pari passu* with preparation of the CSO and negotiations with government regarding – and presumed re-appraisals of – the rural infrastructure and savannah resources activities.

Recommendation No. 8: The Ghana Country Office should prepare an emergency operations contingency plan as soon as possible, given the fragile political and social situations in neighbouring countries, the strong possibility that hundreds of thousands of Ghanaian workers elsewhere in West Africa could be forcibly returned to Ghana at any time, and the possibility that other refugees and/or internally displaced populations could require significant WFP EMOPs in Ghana in the near or medium term.

Concluding thoughts

108. The recent pace of change within WFP has been very rapid – decentralization, the Enabling Development policy, a new financing system, and the shift to the SAP system and a host of new policy pronouncements are indicators of the magnitude of this change. A result is an increasing workload for many WFP staff at a time when formerly clear operational systems are now in flux. For the Ghana programme, this has meant, in effect, a decision-making vacuum, as the need for policy interpretation has conflicted with the difficulty in this changing environment for providing such interpretation. Just as there has been flux on the WFP side, so, too has there been an apparent significant change in the nature of poverty in Ghana and a reduction in the effectiveness of donor-government cooperative efforts to confront food insecurity and poverty. The need for food aid – in combination with other forms of assistance – may have been growing at the same time as WFP’s capacity or willingness to provide needed food assistance to Ghana may have diminished. The need for a new, thoughtful review of the nature of the problems in Ghana and of the ability of WFP to respond to those problems is clear. The development of a new country programme for Ghana in the next few months is of critical importance in these circumstances.

VI. FACTORS IN THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE COUNTRY PROGRAMME

109. Much of what has been discussed in earlier Sections of the Report constitutes factors influencing the effectiveness of the CP. This Section touches on several others: i) the collaborate manner in which both the CSO and CP were developed in Ghana; ii) the particularly well-knit UN family of organizations operating in Ghana; iii) the donor-government “Mini-CG” process; iv) the present status of the Common Country Assessment (CCA) and the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) now under development and their relationship to the government’s own planning exercise; and v) some of the programmes of actual and potential partners – particularly UNICEF, UNFPA, possibly FAO and one or two of the NGOs, particularly CRS, which have had a bearing on the effectiveness of the WFP programme in Ghana. Factors specific to the effectiveness of individual activities are dealt with in Section VII. Section VI begins with a quick overview of some of the more important of the development framework documents recently prepared, or in process of preparation, by the government and several of the donors. This helps in understanding the relative role and position of the WFP CSO/CP and implementation of the country programme within the broad array of similar documents prepared by the many different development organizations operating in Ghana.

110. For better or worse, Ghana has hosted the preparation of a particularly rich set of development “frameworks” intended to guide the integration of development resources around what are intended to be commonly agreed targets and objectives based on assessments of the problems creating poverty and strategies for removing or reducing them. These include the long-term development framework crafted by the government in 1995 – the “Ghana - Vision 2020” – document plus documents prepared by the World Bank, the UN family and individual donor organizations, including WFP. The following paragraphs describe briefly each of these “framework” documents.

Ghana - Vision 2020

111. This 1995 conception of an appropriate future for Ghana and its peoples establishes the overall development goal as enabling Ghana to become a “middle income” country by 2020. This requires GDP growth in excess of 7 percent per year for the entire 25 year period (as compared to GDP growth of about 4.5 percent in the early 1990s). The strategy focuses on enhancing the human capacities of all Ghanaian citizens while simultaneously increasing the productive potential of its natural resources. Ghana - Vision 2020 was concerned largely with the first five years, 1996-2000, of a development programme focused on “consolidating the foundations” of the economic progress achieved during the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP). To be effective, the strategy required a policy framework built on political and economic decentralization, increased democratisation, popular participation, and the return to

constitutional government. Both human and natural resources development were to be promoted. Implementation details were set out in the National Development Policy Framework (NDPF). This proposed developing a robust, diversified agricultural sector and a technologically-progressive, market-oriented industrial sector engendered by development programmes enhancing human development and economic growth in both rural and urban areas.

112. Sectoral resource allocations were to be significantly different from those contained in the 1994-1996 Public Investment Programme (PIP), particularly in the mix of resources devoted to human resources development. In the capital budget, 13.5 percent of financial resources were to be invested in agricultural and industry, 53.5 percent in energy, water, transport, communications, tourism and financial services, and 28 percent were to be in the social services – education, health, housing, etc. The government's recurrent expenditures would continue to be heavily focused on social infrastructure, primarily on education.

113. The "Vision 2020" framework served as the primary economic development paradigm for the 1996-2000 period and all donor-supported activities over that period including the World Bank's Country Development Framework, the UN family's original UNDAF exercise and WFP's 1998-2002 Country Programme.

114. The WFP CSO and the CP were developed within the context of overall donor support for the Vision 2020 framework. The WFP country programme was intended to operate in a highly collaborative mode within the donor community and with considerable government participation. In the preparation of both the CSO and CP, workshops involving donors and government agencies were held to review the drafts and to gather views and comments from these agencies. The cooperation was particularly close within the UN community, with most agencies providing written comments and with an internal UN family review of the CP chaired by the UNDP Resident Representative. Comments from UNDP noted that the government lacked an effective food aid policy and proposed that the CP "assist the government to develop one." The need for the CP to be consistent with the principal direction of the UN's Country Strategy Note (CSN) was also stressed. Joint sessions were also held with the World Bank Resident Mission in Accra to review the relationship between what WFP was proposing in the CP and the World Bank's overall development strategy.

115. While there were a large number of suggestions made by government and donor representatives regarding the inclusion of several particular components and sub-components of the CP (e.g., suggesting WFP support for activities in agricultural production, rural roads, post-harvest losses, water), the majority of these proved unfeasible. In sum, the development of both the CSO and CP were undertaken in a highly cooperative atmosphere in which staffs of all the UN agencies, other major donors and the government participated in the review of the draft documents, actively offered comments for consideration by WFP/Ghana and were generally in agreement with the programme suggested in each of the two WFP documents.

The Comprehensive Development Framework

116. The World Bank's Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) model (World Bank 2000a) has recently been guiding the preparation of CDFs for poverty-reduction strategies in all developing countries where there are World Bank operations. Ghana is one of eleven countries world-wide included in the first wave of CDF countries. The draft of the Ghana CDF¹⁹ served as the major agenda item for the 10th Consultative Group Meeting, held in Accra in November, 1999. The draft CDF developed a set of 14 sector issues papers from which an overall development focus on the theme of "...reducing poverty

¹⁹ Government of Ghana, Ministry of Finance (1999) "A First Draft Comprehensive Development Framework Towards Ghana Vision 2020." The sectors covered in the CDF are: poverty reduction, health, roads, education, AGSSIP/Food Security, Public Finance Management, Decentralization, Energy, Private Sector Industrial Development, Urban Development, Water, Natural Resources/Environment and the Finance Sector.

through improved agriculture...” was proposed. Each of the sector papers in the draft CDF was developed by a Sector Coordinating Group (SCG) chaired by one or more donors. There were a total of 12 different donors chairing or co-chairing individual SCGs. With its small staff, WFP participation in the SCG work was necessarily limited. It chaired none of the 14 sectoral groups. As part of the preparation for the 10th CG, a system of quarterly mini-CG meetings was established. WFP was not initially a participant in the mini-CG process, but was later included and has since been participating fully.

117. It is worth noting that, although Ghana has experienced a number of disasters and emergencies during the early 1990s involving droughts, floods, large-scale refugee influxes and internally displaced people, there is no evidence that the CDF process has taken this into account in its analytical work relating to Ghana’s development prospects and Vision 2020-related development strategy preparation. Given the near certainty that serious disasters or emergency situations will develop in the future,²⁰ and the likelihood that they will adversely impact Ghana’s pace of economic development, finding ways for Ghana to improve its contingency planning and preparedness for such eventualities should be made an explicit element of its overall CDF-related planning exercise for the 2001-2005 period.

Recommendation No. 9: WFP/Ghana should urge, presumably within the mini-CG forum, consideration of a joint donor-government task force to develop a strategy for strengthening Ghana’s emergency-related contingency planning and response capabilities as part of the Phase Two (2001-2005) Vision 2020 development effort. WFP/Ghana should be provided the staff resources by WFP/headquarters sufficient to enable it to be the donor focal point for this effort.

The Poverty Reduction Strategy Programme

118. As part of efforts by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to reduce international indebtedness of the poorest Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC), those HIPC countries wishing to be candidates for debt forgiveness and continued concessional loans from these organizations are required to prepare Poverty Reduction Strategy Programs (PSRPs) for review and approval by the IMF/World Bank before new concessional lending programmes can be initiated. Thus far, seventeen countries, including Ghana, have prepared Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (IPRSPs) enabling IMF/World Bank lending to continue while the full PRSP is being fully developed for final approval.

119. Ghana and the resident donor community have taken the PRSP process seriously. The IPRSP is regarded by World Bank staff as a very good initial poverty reduction strategy document when compared to other country submissions thus far received.²¹ The full PRSP is being developed in concert with Phase Two of the Ghana – Vision 2020 strategy and will be a central strategy document setting the themes for development activities in Ghana over the next five years. As such, its basic outline needs to be considered carefully by WFP from two perspectives: first, in helping to determine whether WFP/Ghana ought to be a more central participant in the preparation of the full PRSP; and second, in determining how the poverty reduction strategy adopted in the PRSP will fit WFP’s own 2001-2005 CP strategy and the extent it will shape WFP’s future participation in mainstream development activities in Ghana.

Recommendation No. 10: WFP/Ghana should become a more active, central participant in the PSRP development process in Ghana.

²⁰ Present political instability in neighbouring Côte d’Ivoire is only the most recent manifestation of political problems in the region which can, and often do, impact Ghana adversely.

²¹ Personal comment by a World Bank staff person to the Evaluation Team Leader.

120. Two reasons underlie this recommendation. First, the Interim PRSP, as has been the case with the CDF preparation, does not deal adequately with the likelihood and impact of emergencies and disasters on the pace of development in Ghana. The experience in Ghana in the early 1990s – as in many other African countries – is that disasters and emergencies can seriously derail the pace of economic growth and development – sometimes producing such an adverse impact on growth and development that it can take years to recover momentum. Having the capacity in country to deal promptly and effectively with emergencies and disasters must, therefore, be an element in any development strategy in a disaster-prone country with highly vulnerable populations. Second, many of the present WFP CSO and CP strategy elements parallel those contained in the IPRSP. For example, the IPRSP places its poverty reduction strategy in the context of the Medium Term Macroeconomic Framework which is intended to enable low inflation and stable exchange rates.²² Assuming that these conditions can be achieved, labour productivity increases must be realized by investments directly targeted to increasing productivity in the major asset-creating sectors of the economy. Achieving this then enables government expenditures to be targeted on poverty reducing strategies aimed at human resource development:

“The reorientation of Government expenditures towards poverty reduction will be achieved through better prioritisation of expenditure resulting from the use of the medium term expenditure framework, greater decentralization, and increasing the share of public resources going to poverty related programmes and to areas where poverty is widespread.”
(IPRSP, June 2000)

121. The two as-yet-inactive components in the present WFP country programme which are focused on natural resources development would fit well with the PRSP strategy for increasing rural labour productivity. The Girls’ education and Supplementary feeding activities would benefit from increased government resources focused on poverty in areas where it is prevalent.

122. The IPRSP poverty reduction agenda for 2000-2002 focuses on:

- deepening access to basic social services and infrastructure by the poor
- increasing support to basic education – particularly on quality and quantity of teachers and teaching supplies
- reducing enrolment disparities
- promoting accelerated growth in agriculture
- establishing food security programmes
- improving access to markets
- increasing investment in agriculture
- improving the productivity and technical proficiency of the poor and their entrepreneurial skills
- improving primary health care
- improving access to water
- improving the nutritional status of women and children
- addressing the special needs of women

123. Many of these strategic objectives dovetail very well with elements of the present WFP country programme. The finalisation of what is called “Step Two” of Vision 2020 is occurring as this Evaluation Report is written. This will probably confirm the general outline of the IPRSP and, in effect, validate a strategy with elements similar in many ways to the present WFP CP.

The Common Country Assessment

124. The work underway by the UN family to develop the second UNDAF document will rely heavily on the results of the Common Country Assessment (CCA) which is presently being finalised. The first

²² Which, as noted in Section II above, is far from being achieved at the moment and seems unlikely in the near term as well.

CCA was a tightly organized and useful assessment which was completed at about the same time as the CSO in 1996. As a learning tool for those responsible for the preparation of subsequent CCAs its role was limited since it was prepared by contracted consultants rather than by UN agency and government staff directly. Its impact on the preparation of the 1997 CP seems to have been minimal.

125. The CCA now in preparation might have a more significant impact on the next WFP CSO and CP, at least in theory. The intent of the new CCA is to guide strategy preparation by all UN member organizations, including the Bretton Woods institutions. As such, it will be particularly important in preparation of the 2001-2005 UNDAF document. In reviewing the August 18, 2000 draft CCA, the Evaluation Team concluded that considerable work is still needed if the CCA is to provide a sense of the relative importance of the many sectors and sub-sectors it discusses in order to better serve as a guide in determining relative requirements and priorities for the disposition of donor and government resources. In addition, as noted in Section II of this Report, there is reason to believe that widely-held assumptions regarding the state of poverty and of Ghana's economic growth prospects – assumptions largely reflected in the August 2000 CCA draft – should be tested in the context of recent trends and emerging data. Whether it will be a useful source for preparation of the 2001-2005 CSO will depend on the results of editing and review of the present document.

The United Nations Development Assistance Framework

126. The first CCA prefaced the first UNDAF (1998-2000) document which, in effect, limited itself to recasting, in a new framework, UN family development programmes already underway. As such, it was "...a stocktaking exercise rather than a strategic one..." intended to reinforce the spirit of cooperation among the member UN organizations in Ghana. The second UNDAF is now being prepared, based to a great degree, on lessons from the experience with the first UNDAF. Foremost among these is "...the need to have a clearer management of cross-cutting issues, including gender, environment, HIV/AIDS and culture in order to realize the potential impact from collaboration."

127. The clear intention of the new UNDAF is better integration of all resources of UN member agencies – including WFP – around a development strategy. It will focus on: i) helping generate sustainable economic growth; ii) reduced poverty and inequalities; iii) increased income earning capabilities among the poor; and iv) a healthier, better educated and more productive population. The UNDAF will propose that UN agency programmes in Ghana be organized around three themes:

Theme 1: Access to quality basic services for all in primary health care, basic education, water, and sanitation.

Theme 2: Opportunities for sustainable income, employment, and personal development through accelerated private sector growth, skills acquisition, infrastructure development, improved food security and agricultural productivity, improved nutrition – especially for women and children, prevention and control of HIV/AIDS, gender equality/equity, a sustainable environment, and strengthened cultural dimensions.

Theme 3: Improved national capacity for development management and implementation through increased community ownership of the development process, strengthened community-based organizations, increasingly effective public and private institutions for service delivery, more effectively managed private enterprises/institutions, strengthened legal framework for access to and protection of resources, effective protection of the rights of vulnerable groups, more effective information systems, and greater transparency, accountability and wider participation in public affairs.

128. While the first UNDAF did not seek to integrate UN agency programmes around a common set of objectives, the new UNDAF will do so. In this context, WFP/Ghana's CSO and CP will need to harmonize both WFP's programming cycle and its development objectives with the precepts contained in

the approved UNDAF. In the preliminary draft, WFP is specifically enjoined to: i) continue "...to pursue 'Joint Strategic Formulation' within the 'Education Coordination Group' with a focus on creating girl-friendly school environments for basic education. 'Joint Impact Monitoring' will be undertaken as well as 'Coordinated Geographical Targeting' and joint activity frameworks to avoid duplication or to consolidate efforts."

129. With regard to food security, the present draft suggests that WFP work with FAO, the World Bank, the United Nations University (UNU), UNDP, IFAD, UNICEF and WHO to intensify "...their efforts to assist Government initiatives toward greater food security in Ghana, particularly under the Agriculture Services Subsector Investment Programme (AgSSIP) and the National Programme on Food Security. This support will focus on a greater use of the established Task Force on Food Security (WFP is a member) for co-ordination, more frequent 'Joint formulation' and 'appraisal of projects, Co-financing', 'Joint monitoring and evaluation' and efforts to mobilize other donor support for the sector."

130. In sum, the present CCA and UNDAF were not major influences on the shape, scope and objectives of WFP's on-going programme in Ghana. The next round will, however, influence and guide the new CSO and CP. While the draft UNDAF is quite all-encompassing and needs further development of prioritisation, it is nonetheless a framework that, in its present formulation, is enabling of almost anything that WFP should decide to undertake within its own "Enabling Development" strategy framework. The one area where WFP should seek to expand the draft UNDAF is in the inclusion of emergency/disaster mitigation, preparedness and response as a major area of concern.²³ To continue to ignore the major adverse impact of emergencies and disasters on the pace of development in all the programmes identified in UNDAF is to risk possibly serious setbacks in Ghana's ability to achieve its Vision 2020 objectives.

The World Food Summit Follow-Up, Ghana (FAO, 2000)

131. The World Food Summit in November 1996 committed the attendees to seeking to reduce the numbers of malnourished people in the world by half – from approximately 800 million to around 400 million – by 2015. FAO was charged with tracking performance in Ghana toward achieving this objective. This follow-up document describes 26 constraints which need to be overcome in the food and agricultural production sector (and in the policy framework which influences agriculture production) if Ghana is to significantly reduce chronic food insecurity. Given the primacy of agricultural development in the next phase of Vision 2020 progress, WFP, as it develops its 2001-2005 country programme, should take this analysis into account.

Counterpart contributions

132. A major impediment in improving the scope and effectiveness of the WFP country programme has been the on-going issue of the government's counterpart contribution – a problem which has bedevilled the WFP programme from the beginning. The CO files are filled with communications between WFP and the government on the issue of the government's apparent inability to discharge its counterpart commitments. As noted earlier, the government has in the past complained that WFP's requirement is higher than is the case for most donors. The history of not meeting these commitments was used as a rationale during the review of the 1997 CP for reducing the overall size of the 1998-2002 programme. As noted elsewhere, there is reason for WFP to reconsider the treatment of Ghana as a non-LDC. Should this be done and Ghana provided the same concessions as are provided other LDC countries, the counterpart requirement would be significantly reduced. Given Ghana's good performance in contributing a large share of its limited financial resources to the social sectors and to the reduction of poverty there are good reasons to establish future counterpart requirements at the lowest possible level.

²³ While the need for contingency planning is acknowledged in an annex to the UNDAF document, there is need to raise the priority for undertaking this task.

VII. CONTRIBUTION OF FOOD AID ACTIVITIES TO PROGRAMME OBJECTIVES

133. This section deals largely with the contributions of the two activities which have been operational during the 1998-2000 period. There are brief additional comments on the two activities not yet operational and commentary on the use of delegated authority by the Country Director to move several metric tonnes (MT) of food from an one of the on-going activities to assist an experimental HIV/AIDS programme in dire need of a small amount of food – and the potential positive impact of this important use of a Country Director’s authority on HIV/AIDS research in Ghana.

134. Two principal objectives of the country programme are to: i) develop human resource potential in target regions through the provision of incentives for girls’ education and skills training for women; and ii) improve the food intake of children and expectant and nursing mothers. The activities which promote those objectives are the Girls’ Education and the Supplementary Feeding activities.

Human Resources Development in Ghana’s Northern Savannah Areas – Education of Girls

135. This activity responded to a government request for assistance in promoting improved access to education for girl students in basic education in the northern regions of the country. The appraisal was undertaken jointly by WFP, UNESCO and the Ghana Education Service (GES) of the Ministry of Education in March 1998 and the Plan of Operation for Project 5995 became effective in November 1998. The activity was initiated in 15 districts in the three northern regions with the first distribution of food occurring in February 1999. Over the proposed five year lifetime of the activity, the number of girls in primary and junior secondary school being enabled to attend school is to grow from 8,750 girls to 32,200.

136. The activity provides a monthly ration of 8kgs of maize and 2kgs of vegetable oil per girl per month to the girls’ families for each girl who has maintained an attendance rate of at least 85 percent of days in the previous month for each of the nine months in the school year. Through the second year of the activity (1999/2000), food rations were being provided to the families of a total of 11,202 girls, about 87 percent of target. In addition, the District Assemblies were providing the transportation costs of moving food from district depots to the schools and providing some storage facilities.

137. In looking at the contributions of the activity to WFP objectives in Ghana a number of observations can be made. First, the activity is high priority for both the government and for WFP. It is also a high priority activity within the CDF, PRSP, UNDAF and “Enabling Development” frameworks both in terms of increasing educational opportunities for girls, and in terms of appropriate geographical targeting. Second, it seems to fit the criteria for WFP’s focus on gender promoting activities.

138. There are some issues with the girls’ education activity, however, deserving of review, as they raise wider issues for WFP policy consideration. The first, which is further discussed in Section VIII, relates to the distinction between focusing on achievement at the *output* level vs. focusing on achievement at the *objective*, or goal, level. In this case, the objective of the activity is to “...contribute to the development of human resource potential in the project area and to the country’s social development programmes, specifically those covering the development of girls.” This is a fully appropriate object – in line with both the Government of Ghana’s gender objectives and those of WFP. The design of the activity, however, is unclear regarding, on the one hand, the relationship of WFP’s inputs into the activity and the outputs derived from those inputs, and the measurement of progress is achieving the girl’s human resource potential on the other. Success is being measured at the output level, i.e., estimates of the additional number of girls attending school as a result of food distribution to their families, not at the objective level.

139. Developing human resource potential within this activity occurs as a result of the combination of attending school and the nature and quality of education received by these girls at the schools. Merely subtracting the girls from their families' labour pool and sending them to sit in a classroom devoid of an adequate and appropriate learning experience is unlikely to convince their families of the value of this experience above and beyond the receipt of payment (WFP food) for sending them there. The opportunities to convert education to changed behaviour and changed attitudes are as important as school attendance itself. Developing the human resource potential of these girls is, in part, exogenous to the WFP girls' education activity and, thus, partially outside its control. In order to measure progress toward the activity's objectives there must be established, in the activity's initial design, a way of measuring the quality of education being offered these girls and its impact on their well-being. Otherwise the unstated hypothesis linking WFP's support to school attendance and the "development of human resource potential" of these girls is untested and possibly invalid.

Recommendation No. 11: To the extent that the success of WFP projects at the goal or objectives level is dependent on exogenous factors, the design and approval of activities, WFP must insist on a clear relationship between the types and levels of WFP resources provided and progress to be engendered at the objectives level from the combination of WFP and exogenous inputs provided and outputs achieved. To the extent there is a tendency in WFP projects, generally, to accept progress at the output level as equating to progress at the objectives level, there is need to review and improve project design and approval to remove such tendencies. What is required is a more thorough and rigorous expression of hypotheses linking achieving proposed output levels to progress toward desired objectives. This, in turn, requires better monitoring of progress toward objectives and of impact achieved. A more rigorous use of 'project logical framework' techniques is suggested.

140. A second, related issue with the girl's education project has to do with the social and cultural aspect of achievement of stated objectives. Young girls in Northern Ghana are often regarded as a potential source of income through the payment of a bride-price by the family of the husband-to-be to the family of the bride-to-be. These girls marry young in this cultural milieu – sometimes as young as 12 years old. Further, as girls become old enough to be useful as labours in the household or in the fields, it becomes more difficult to convince the household not to employ them in these pursuits. The education received by the girl in question must be seen to be more valuable either to the birth family or to the husband's family than the extra output or income derived from keeping that girl at home. The education received by the girl must be seen by these households as eventually being more valuable than the product of the foregone labour. So long as WFP is willing to provide something of value to the household, they are happy to exchange the time of their daughters for these commodities.²⁴ This does not necessarily result in changing the mindsets of the households toward the value of the education itself, vis-à-vis the opportunity costs of the foregone labour.

141. Again, what needs to result from the WFP activity is the realization by the family that the education received by their daughters²⁵ has more value to the girl (or to the girl's family or her husband's family) than the output of that girl without education. The education itself must be seen to have a pay-off. The point of the WFP input is to prove that value. The present activity is not designed to do that. There is an assumption that just getting the girl into school is enough. This is unlikely to be the case, in the long run. All that it is presently proving is that families are willing to exchange the time of their young daughters for food. What is needed is an 'end-game' situation where the families become willing to send their daughters to school *without* payment from WFP, in other words, when WFP support ends, families in the area are still willing to send their daughters or teenage wives to school because they now understand the benefit of doing so.

²⁴ Particularly so, the Evaluation Team found in its interviews in the north, when the girls are very young and unable to provide much return to their labour.

²⁵ Or, in some cases, by teenage wives.

142. This is added weight to the argument made earlier that WFP/Ghana needs either more staff to design and undertake the monitoring, surveys and local evaluations that will help WFP to determine the effectiveness of its programme in terms of progress toward objectives or actual impact, or it needs added local currency resources to hire local consultants to undertake this task on a contracted basis. This, in turn, adds weight to another argument made earlier for monetizing food in order to generate sufficient local currency resources to undertake this task.

143. A third issue with the girls' education project relates to the whole concept of "partnering" (which is further discussed in the Section IX treatment of "Enabling Development"). There are actually two sub-issues here. The first relates to a situation where – as in this case – an existing development entity was already operating a similar programme in the same geographic area and WFP initiated an operation without having established a fully collaborative operating mode with the existing entity. Here, Catholic Relief Services (CRS) had been operating a primary school feeding programme in a number of regions in Ghana including the three regions where WFP had been invited by the Ghana Education Service (GES) to initiate operations. The CRS programme provides in-school feeding as well as take-home rations for girl students. The WFP take-home ration is different (has greater market value) from that of CRS, but this is more than offset by the CRS in-school ration. In the process of selecting the schools to be included within the WFP programme, the GES apparently subtracted some schools from the CRS programme and added them to the WFP programme. At least some of these schools were, the Team was informed, unhappy about losing the CRS in-school feeding element (which the WFP programme does not offer). On the other hand, since the value of the WFP take-home ration is greater, the parents of girls receiving this ration were anxious to be participating in the WFP rather than the CRS programme. A final element helping create lingering unhappiness within the CRS staff is their view that WFP treated CRS concerns a little too lightly in the design of the WFP Girls' Education activity.

144. This is a good example where more proactive partnering could well improve the effectiveness of both WFP and CRS programmes. Without venturing too deeply into the details of individual activities – which is beyond the mandate of this evaluation – three possible areas of increased cooperation suggest themselves:

- WFP taking over responsibility for all take-home rations for girls in the districts where both CRS and WFP are operational. This might free CRS resources now used for take-home rations for primary school girls to expand the in-school lunch programme to all schools where WFP is offering take-home rations for girls. While there are logistics problems that would have to be overcome (since the two donors use differing methods to transport and store food) this action would enable all schools in the CRS and WFP programmes to be treated equally.
- CRS could take over full responsibility for primary schools (i.e., years 1 through 6) and WFP could take over responsibility for Junior Secondary School (JSS) (i.e., years 7, 8 and 9). CRS policy precludes involvement beyond primary school. WFP regulations allow assistance for basic education for grades 1 through 9. Since the present CP lists among its objectives and intended outcomes for this activity that it result in "a slow-down in the growth of the population ... [by] avoid[ing] child marriages and teenage pregnancies, as well as strengthening women's capacity to decide upon the family size," WFP's emphasis would necessarily focus on girls of age 12 and higher. While WFP might, from an education perspective, desire to focus on primary school girls, WFP's gender policy would clearly be better served by a focus on JSS students in this activity.
- WFP and CRS might agree on a common take-home ration for girls. This would presumably require that WFP reduce or remove the vegetable oil element from its ration and possibly substitute a like weight of pulses. CRS had already removed vegetable oil from its ration because, the Team was informed, it was highly susceptible to diversion – sale in local markets for cash before (or after) reaching the target households. CRS has already been asked by the

Ghana Education Service (GES) to reduce the vegetable oil content of its monthly ration because the amount was excess of what these households normally consume.

145. The second partnering issue in the girls' education activity revolves around the need to ensure that the girls being assisted under the activity are indeed helped to benefit from the educational opportunity that WFP food aid has offered them. The partnering in this instance would be what WFP's "Enabling Development" document terms "sequential partnering" whereby WFP/Ghana would seek NGO or donor assistance to provide additional skills training to the girls graduating from JSS (and possibly from primary school) intended to build on the general knowledge base obtained there and provide them with skills of a type enabling them to become more employable and to earn higher levels of income.

Recommendation No. 12: WFP/Ghana should become proactive in improving the partnering aspects of its girls' education activity by seeking to improve overall effectiveness and impact through closer collaboration with CRS in delivering food aid to school children in northern Ghana and by seeking sequential partner NGO or donor organizations to provide additional skills training to girls graduating from WFP-assisted junior secondary schools.

Supplementary Feeding, and Health and Nutrition Education (GHA 4932)

146. The long-term objective of this activity is "...to improve the nutritional status of children and expectant and nursing mothers, and to support government efforts to improve the coverage of primary health care and nutrition services." This project operates in community health centres in northern Ghana. The intended outcome would provide supplementary feeding to 24,000 malnourished children and basic education and take-home rations to 14,400 mothers annually. These rations act as incentive to mothers to participate in health and nutrition training at the centres.

147. The Team believes that two issues related to this activity are of interest, generally, to WFP. The first has to do with the philosophy of providing assistance to this type of project. The second is another instance of how expanded partnering might improve the impact of the activity on its intended beneficiaries.

148. This is an activity which, in effect, treats symptoms rather than causes. Small children and their mothers are malnourished for many reasons. The programme feeds them so that they are less malnourished. They go back to homes where the reasons for malnutrition are undiminished. Often, the Team was informed, when the same mother gives birth again she is back with her new child – both are malnourished so they are fed, enabling them to become less malnourished...and so on. While the mother is indeed provided training in health, sanitation and the precepts of nutrition, she may or may not have the resources at home to enable her to put these lessons into practice.

149. WFP is caught in a quandary in this type of supplementary feeding activity. It is WFP policy to seek out the poorest of the poor, the malnourished, and the downtrodden, and to help them through difficult times. WFP's policy is less clear regarding the extent to which WFP has – and is willing to commit – resources adequate in size and duration for attacking the *causes* of poverty, malnutrition, and food insecurity in a given country as opposed to limiting itself to treating their outcomes – i.e., feeding hungry women and children. The very fact that, worldwide, more than two-thirds of WFP's food resources are devoted to emergencies and protracted recovery is a signal of an agency finding it difficult in using its food resources as a development tool for confronting the causes of malnutrition. The Ghana Supplementary feeding project is a good example of what happens under these circumstances. It focuses far more on comforting the malnourished than on reducing the risks of being malnourished. There is little the activity itself can do to reduce the numbers of women and children needing food assistance; nor,

without additional food resources is it able to similarly provide nourishment and training to hundreds of thousands of women and children in precisely the same predicament elsewhere in northern Ghana or in other areas of the country. It is also the kind of activity where it is difficult to terminate food aid once the programme is started. Without successes in reducing the causality of malnourishment and food insecurity (and with the numbers of the poor and malnourished increasing) there is no surcease in those needing assistance.

150. A country programme finds itself in a quandary under these circumstances. Should food aid be used more aggressively to confront and reduce causes? Should it assume that the World Bank, other UN agencies and the larger bilateral donors are more appropriate organizations for focusing on the development agenda, leaving WFP to provide short-term succour to the poorest of the poor? Can it appropriately marry food resources with the financial, technical and commodity resources of the other UN agencies and wider donor community to confront the development agenda? Thus far, the long-term impact of the Supplementary Feeding activity has been muted by its inability to do so.

151. It could be argued that the health and nutrition training element of the activity is its developmental aspect; that these mothers are able to use this training to improve the quality of nutrition being provided to the rest of the family. While possible, there seems to have been no monitoring of the extent to which the women already provided this training have used it and what might have been the possible impact on their families' nutritional status. Thus, the hypothesis that this training will have a positive benefit in terms of the activity's objectives in terms of continuing – as opposed to transitory – improvement in child and mother nutrition is untested and therefore unproven.

152. The Team agrees that targeting child and maternal nutrition in Ghana is one of the most important objectives that WFP could have adopted in Ghana. There is no argument regarding its priority or its being continued. What is at issue is seeking ways to make the activity more effective in achieving its objectives and of being able to, in effect, prove that effectiveness. This is not an issue for WFP/Ghana so much as it is an issue for the entire organization in the way it allocates scarce resources and the importance of being able to test hypotheses and monitor impact of the development side of WFP's programmes.

153. The situation in Ghana, and presumably elsewhere is one where WFP's food aid needs non-food elements of support in order to attain its desired objectives. These other resources might be available to some degree from greater use of the monetization of food aid in countries where the importation of food is required by domestic demand for these foods exceeding local production. More often, however, or in addition to monetization, there is need for other donors, NGOs, and the host government to concert development activities with WFP in various partnering combinations to mutually reinforce the possibility of achieving greater or faster progress toward shared objectives.

154. In the case of the Supplementary Feeding activity there are two requirements: the first is monitoring of whether the mothers are actually learning and using the information about health and nutrition at home; the second is a mechanism enabling mothers to make use of that information in such a way that they and their infants are no longer chronically malnourished and no longer need to return to the community health centre for food. This, again, suggests the need for sequential partnering whereby some other entity – perhaps, in this case, outreach programmes of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture's extension service – can target the women who have received the health and nutrition training with further assistance. Such an effort could provide them with, say, additional extension and home economics support enabling them to put them into practice the nutrition training received under WFP auspices. By providing training in agronomic practices, the sequential partner enables these women to grow and store (or purchase) more of the nutritious foods they have learned they should be feeding their children and other members of their families.

155. The Team, in meetings with senior officers at MOFA, determined that the Ministry would be willing to focus efforts on these women, so long as there was financial assistance from donors to enable

them to cover the costs. The Team also discovered that there might be interest by at least one donor in providing assistance in such an effort. The point of this discourse is not to design a project, but to reinforce the need for WFP to link closely with other sources of resources to increase the likelihood that the WFP resources can be capitalized by others in ways that greatly increase the achievement of WFP's objectives (as well as those of the government within the Vision 2020 context and the UN family within the UNFAD framework).

156. Assuming that some form of sequential partnering could be arranged for the households participating in the activity, and further assuming the efficacy of the hypothesis that this would gradually reduce the number of repeat visits by individual women and their children, WFP resources could then be available for new participants and new communities – or could gradually be reduced, if that were WFP's choice, without there being concern that there had been no lasting benefit to the target audience.

157. The system in place for monitoring and accountability of WFP commodities seems to be reasonably acceptable. While the Evaluation Team came across no major problems in this area, there were, nonetheless, some apparent opportunities for leakage.²⁶ There are concerted and serious efforts by government counterparts to monitor the activity closely but they are limited in numbers of officers available to do so. There has been some success in enlisting the local committees to monitor food aid storage and distribution. Attention has been devoted to adopting new mechanisms such as distributing the food as soon as it arrives in the store in the Girls' Education activity. Strengthening of commodity monitoring can be increased still further through increased partnership and community participation. Suggestions likely to lead to improved monitoring include:

Partnership: coordinate programmes to improve monitoring. WFP should seek opportunities for meshing systems and training coordinators, training programmes and possibly monitoring staff with appropriate partner agencies. There might be opportunities for closer coordination with CRS in this area.

Community participation: the participation of community members – especially women – is central to effective monitoring. When communities feel ownership of the project's resources and are convinced of the value of the output, monitoring is likely to improve and leakages to decrease.

Gender: the number of women committee members should be increased (often there will be only a single woman on the committee). Women participants should be informed regarding the objectives of the activity and the composition and amount of the food basket to better allow them to monitor activities.

158. The responsibility for in-country transport of the food commodities rests with the implementing ministries and, in certain cases, with District Assemblies. In cases where the tallies of arriving and stored food do not correlate with the figures of food loaded onto transport, the transporter is charged the cost of the food plus a substantial penalty fee. During the Team's field visits there were no complaints from recipient schools and community health centres that the food was arriving late or that the amounts were less than agreed.

159. While the Team interviews uncovered no other major issues in the management and monitoring of food commodities, this does not necessarily mean that such issues might not exist. The CO is strongly urged to maintain a high level of monitoring of food commodity transport, storage and distribution in Ghana. The Ghanaian staff responsible for this aspect of the programme are, in fact, the most experienced of the Country Office staff and appear well able to direct such efforts.

²⁶ Since this is a Country Programme evaluation, not an audit of procedural problems, the investigation was confined to issues of policy or programmatic importance.

WFP Food Aid in the Fight against HIV/AIDS in Ghana

On October 12, 2000, the Team visited the Centre for the Scientific Study of Traditional Medicine in Mampong, about a hour's drive north of Accra. The purpose was to be briefed regarding the use of a small amount of WFP food aid in a study of the effectiveness of several traditional medicines in combating the symptoms (if not the disease itself) of full-blown AIDS. Herbalists all over Ghana were selling remedies which they claimed were effective in treating the symptoms of HIV/AIDS, if not the disease itself. The Centre was testing the effectiveness of selected purported remedies.

After pre-testing some of these purported remedies, and insuring their ingredients were safe, several herbalists and their remedies were selected for further trials with approximately 85 patients suffering from full-blown AIDS. The remedies were provided to the patients over a several month period. Of the group, 2-3 died. Virtually all of remaining patients showed clear evidence of improved immune response and improved health; so much so, in fact, that for many their appetites had returned to normal, food needs had gone up and there was not enough food available to them to maintain their improved health. It was at that time that the Centre requested the WFP Country Office for a relatively small amount of food for several dozen of the patients involved in the study. The WFP Country Director requested the permission of the Ministry of Health to divert a few tonnes of food from the Supplementary Feeding activity for the HIV/AIDS study, which was granted.

The Team was informed that the study was nearing its end. The research revealed that the CD-4 count in the blood of the patients had increased from an average of 60-80 to as high as 160. The higher the CD count in the blood, the better the immune system is functioning. HIV/AIDS depletes the number of these cells, so any increase was seen as – at least temporarily – offsetting the adverse impact of the virus. While it was too early to know with certainty how long the traditional remedies might be effective, there was clear evidence that at least a few of these remedies were apparently effective over a period of months – and possibly considerably longer – in returning most of the patients in this study to a more or less normal existence.

In interviews with the patients, the Team was informed that some of them had been carried in on stretchers at the start of the study several months earlier. Now, many were not only able to walk – they were even playing football again. Several patients had been, prior to the study, in a deteriorating condition for as long as seven years. Some of these had now been symptom-free for as long as a year, since initiating intake of the traditional remedies. The cost of the medicine from the herbalists averaged 400,000 cedis per month – about \$60-65. Most of the patients said they would have been unable to afford this amount had it not been for the study paying these costs.

The next step is to be a full medical panel review of the results of the study. Of particular need was additional blood testing to be able to determine changes in the actual virus load in the blood samples drawn from each patient every two weeks over the course of the study and stored. There is much hopeful news in the preliminary results. Perhaps a low cost remedy might come out of it. Who knows? In sum, this was an extremely good use of WFP food aid which might have long-lasting and far-reaching benefits. The lesson here for WFP is to enable the CO to have full discretion over the use of some amount of programme food aid to be supportive of important, but experimental and creative uses of food aid.

VIII. GENDER: MEETING COMMITMENTS TO WOMEN

160. The World Food Programme is committed to using its food resources to improve the status and well-being of women in both the near- and longer-term. A substantial strengthening of this commitment came out of WFP's participation at the Beijing Women's Conference of 1995. It has been strengthened still further by a number of WFP policy pronouncements since 1995. The question for this Evaluation Report is: to what extent has the commitment been enshrined in the Ghana Country Programme; and to what extent has the set of resultant activities been successful in attacking the problems creating and perpetuating gender inequity and inequality in Ghana?

161. There can be little doubt that the present country programme in Ghana has a strong emphasis on improving the status and quality of life of women. The CSO and CP make a substantial case for the primacy of gender issues in WFP's programme in Ghana. The 1996 CSO states that women "...exhibit to a larger extent the characteristics associated with poverty [than men]." They have more limited access to land, credit, education and other assets. The lack of health facilities in rural areas together with heavier workloads has a disproportional negative impact on women, especially during pregnancy and lactation.

162. The 1997 CP indicated that the use of food aid to support economic and social development and promoting the food security of poor communities and households would be particularly targeted on women and children in poor households. The need for a special emphasis on improving the state and status of women is clearly evident in Ghana. The percentage of women in formal employment, only 9 percent in 1989, had dropped still further – to 6.2 percent – by 1999. In 22 sector ministries, there are presently less than 5 women serving as Chief Directors. An estimated 27 percent of all women working in the agricultural sector receive no payment for their labour (compared to about 12 percent for men) and even in the formal sector, average salaries for women are lower in virtually every job category than men. Women are normally excluded from participating in the cash crop sector, although some women have advanced to powerful positions in the marketing and trading sub-sectors.

163. In the particular situation of the northern Savannah where WFP activities are concentrated, the situation of women is further exacerbated by entrenched socio-cultural norms and taboos meant to keep women in a subordinate position. Access to land, ability to own property/assets including livestock, inability to participate in development programmes without permission from male family members, all tend to militate against improving the lot of women in this society. Women in these northern areas have traditionally tended to accept their position and generally would rather not "rock the boat" in ways that they perceive might put their very survival in jeopardy.

164. Both of the presently active WFP projects focus largely on girls and women, as is noted in Section VII. The intent is clearly to use WFP food assistance to improve the status and state of women and girls through education, training and supplementary feeding. Looked at in terms of whether there is a focus on gender concerns in the Ghana programme, an observer would have to assign high marks to the overall effort.

165. That said, there is some concern regarding the ability of the present activities to address root causes of gender inequity and inequality in Ghana and confront, as forcefully as the situations require, the magnitude and depth of poverty experienced by many of the poor, but particularly by women. The issue is, perhaps, not so much one for the present 1998-2002 programme, but for the development of the 2001-2005 CP. In this regard, a look at the experience with the present programme offers lessons for the next round of activity design and negotiations.

166. WFP's 1999 mid-term review of implementation of its "commitment to women" policy (WFP, 1999) states that:

"Gender and women have increasingly been integrated into project design, but the concept of women's strategic (as opposed to their practical) needs should be emphasized, focusing on asset

creation, decision-making and control of resources. Baseline surveys, which are crucial to measuring the progress toward meeting the Commitments to Women, were rarely conducted in the past...It is unlikely that success in meeting the Commitments to Women will be met by 2001 unless changes are made in the way they are implemented.”

167. Looking specifically at the likely gender impact of the two activities being implemented in the current CP, there are mixed results. The girl’s education activity seems to be enabling of improved status and improved equality of educational opportunity. A higher percentage of girls are enabled to attend primary school and (at a lesser rate) junior secondary school. The assumption is that there will be a long-term pay-off, both to the girls themselves and to the society as a whole, as was discussed in Section VII. The validity of that assumption depends on what they learn in school and whether their families become so convinced of the value of this education to the girls or their households that they will eventually not need the inducement of monthly rations of WFP’s food aid to send more their daughters/young wives to school. In order to have actually made a contribution to WFP’s Commitment to Women, that assumption must be tested. There must be a way to measure both changes in the actual status of girls who have attended primary and/or junior secondary school in order to validate the additional hypothesis that this activity is worthy of WFP’s use of its scarce resources. Simply measuring increased attendance is not enough. Recommendations No. 10 and 11 speak to this issue.

168. The strategic utility of the Supplementary Feeding activity is less apparent. Ghana clearly needs assistance to help its malnourished women and children to achieve and retain better nutrition levels. What Ghana needs even more is help to expand its support to cover a preponderant majority of women and children thus malnourished – something that is not achievable within the design and implementation parameters of the present activity. Even more than that, Ghana needs help in reducing the low productivity, inefficient markets, unavailability of agricultural inputs, poor food storage facilities and deteriorating natural resource base that gives rise to so many malnourished poor people to begin with. Is it not possible that a greater pay-off in terms of the use of WFP’s food aid might come from devoting a significant share of it to reducing the causes of food insecurity and malnutrition – from which women and children suffer disproportionately?

169. The small supplementary feeding activity as presently being implemented seems unlikely to accomplish more than just providing seasonal food supplementation to 30-40,000 Ghanaians indefinitely. Is this an adequate return on WFP’s food aid investment? Should there not be an institutional strengthening and capacity building aspect to it that engenders expansion and/or reduces the need? The answer to this question, in the Evaluation Team’s view, is yes. There should be greater impact derived from the programme than is now being achieved. Some of this expanded impact – in terms of meeting the Commitments to Women – will come from the bringing the other two activities on-line. But both the Girls’ Education and the Supplementary Feeding activities require redesign in some of their aspects – along the lines suggested in the previous section – if the programme in Ghana is to meet the *strategic* needs of the women of Ghana to any appreciable degree.

170. As a concluding observation: without in any way downplaying the importance of gender focused activities, the Evaluation Team suggests that, rather than excluding men in the design of important women-focused activities, it might be prudent to design programmes to include men in activities where successes can benefit both men and women whilst at the same time empowering women to be able to participate in decision making on issues affecting themselves and their families. Fortunately this seems to have happened to some extent under the girls’ education program, where men and women together acknowledge the benefits to be gained from educating young women. During the Evaluation Team’s visit to the north, it was observed that men argued for changes to improve the delivery of the programme (never mind that they wanted the take home ration programme extended to boy children as well) a situation which, the Team was informed, would not have existed ten years ago.

Recommendation No. 13: In its 2001-2005 programme, WFP/Ghana should seek ways to use food resources to generate *institutional change* and *capacity-building* needed to create expanded and sustainable capacity to meet *strategic* needs of women in Ghana. The design of gender activities should include both men and women as participants and beneficiaries and must concentrate on reducing the root causes of gender inequality wherever they exist.

IX. ENABLING DEVELOPMENT

The Principal Attributes of Enabling Development

171. WFP's "Enabling Development" states: "Food aided projects should give poor people scope for their ingenuity and efforts, leveraging their access to the benefits of development. This should be the special niche of WFP food aid." This is the theme which underpins the Food Aid and Development (FAAD) policy environment of WFP which, in turn, establishes the leitmotif for all country programmes. Food aid is needed by the food insecure, malnourished, poor but it should be provided to them in situations where they can take advantage of the food resources to reduce their poverty, improve their well being and increase their status. Normally, this requires that WFP operate in partnering arrangements so that the donor, NGO, government agency or private enterprise partners can provide the added resources needed by the food insecurity, malnourished poor to help themselves. Thus partnering is, or should be, an essential element of a country programme consistent with the precepts of Enabling Development.

172. The policy calls for food aid to be provided in one or more of five general categories in a target country: i) helping mothers and small children meet their nutritional requirements and health needs; ii) investing in human capital building by poor households through education and training; iii) helping poor households gain and preserve assets; iv) mitigating the effects of natural disasters in vulnerable areas in food insecure countries; and v) to enable households dependent on degraded natural resources for their food security to shift to more sustainable livelihoods.

173. It is not enough within the Enabling Development guidelines just to locate country activities within these categories. Each such activity must be more rigorously designed than in the past so as to leave behind (or, presumably, build toward) one or more lasting assets which benefit poor, food insecure households. Food resources should be provided within activities which are concentrated geographically and targeted on appropriate participating beneficiaries. It should be provided with careful consideration of composition and timing and in concert with other donor, NGO and government resources.

174. The use of indicators to monitor needs and performance leading to a focus on results are two other important attributes of the Enabling Development approach. This policy also requires a more rigorous approach in identifying needy target groups, establishing baselines, and enabling appropriate linkage between needs assessment, programme design, and implementation. Participation in design by partners and intended beneficiaries is essential. So, too, is cost effective use of scarce WFP food resources. The programme and each of its activities must be able to demonstrate lasting results at the objective level as measured by qualitative and quantitative information collected as part of the implementation process. Gender is to be a foundation element of all WFP activities in the food security and nutrition area and all WFP programme activities will be made to fit within the UNDAF.

The Country Programme in Ghana Measured Against Enabling Development Guidelines

175. The 1998-2002 programme stands up reasonably well when measured against the overall objectives of the Enabling Development philosophy; somewhat less well, perhaps, when measured against the four primary elements of the policy – integration, coherence, concentration and flexibility. This is to be expected; the present CP was approved prior to enactment of the Enabling Development

policy document and institution of the FAAD. Nonetheless, in a general sense the programme can be seen to be very much in line with what Enabling Development intends – the use of food aid to help the poorest households in the poorest region of the country to enhance their ability to participate in development. It does this by attempting to improve the nutrition status of malnourished women and children so that they are more physically able to engage in remunerative endeavours (women) or to develop more fully physically and cognitively (under-five infants) because of having received appropriate nourishment at key times in their lives.

176. Similarly, the Girl's Education activity is in line with the basic precepts of the Enabling Development philosophy by attempting to improve the education-based skills of girls and young women who might not otherwise have gone to school and, in doing so, making them more likely to receive higher incomes, or to be better suited for other aspects of the social, economic and political participation in their households, local communities and districts.

177. **Integration:** The Ghana CSO and CP were both prepared in a fully interactive design process in which the UNDP, other donor and government agencies participated fully in the preliminary aspects of their preparation. Some of the resulting activities were more fully integrated with government and donor activities than others – as noted elsewhere in this Report.

178. **Coherence:** The coherence called for in the Ghana programme is coherence between the WFP programme – in both its entirety and in its specific activities – and the overall development strategy of the government and donors in Ghana. This is contained in the Ghana - Vision 2020 strategy and in the PRSP, CDF, CCA, and UNDAF analysis and strategy documents. There may be some inconsistency between a WFP programme that is seen to be coherent within this frame of reference – i.e., one operating specifically in the Ghana context – and a more generic WFP strategic framework that looks for coherence in terms of the elements of the a WFP programme working with each other (i.e., do WFP's resources link well together), or in terms of being congruent with WFP's global programme philosophy. The Evaluation Team believes that the "coherence" that needs to be tested is that between WFP's food resources in the context of total donor, government and private development resources focused on country-specific priorities, targets and problems to be overcome, not on whether specific elements of the WFP programme in that country are coherent in terms of each other. This seems also to be the objective of Enabling Development.

Recommendation No. 14: If there is any conflict between defining WFP programmatic coherence as that between and among the total government/donor/NGO development organizations in a country (involving all resources engaged in poverty reduction, food security promotion and economic growth) and coherence defined by WFP/Rome as that between and among WFP's activities alone, this must be resolved in favour of the former.

179. **Concentration:** The present Ghana Country Programme is clearly focused on households and regions that are consistent with WFP's overall priorities. These are the poorest, most food insecure, households in the country in the poorest regions. The CSO and CP were both clear in identifying the northern regions as the appropriate target area. Application of the Enabling Development guidance would generate the same targets. This focus will certainly be maintained as the remaining activities in the present programme eventually start up. Given the likelihood that most of the present set of activities would be included in the new 2001-2005 country programme, there is little doubt that the target group and geographic area of focus will not change significantly.

180. **Flexibility:** The discussion of the use of a small amount of WFP food in Ghana to support the study of traditional medicines and HIV/AIDS is a good example of the importance of flexibility. Another, programmatically very important aspect of flexibility which has not been manifest in the

present programme is flexibility in undertaking mid-course corrections in an activity to better achieve objectives. To do this appropriately requires that monitoring of both effectiveness and impact – especially if undertaken as a participatory exercise with the intended beneficiaries. The Ghana programme will need to make better use of participatory monitoring techniques and be willing to use the results of such monitoring to make mid-course corrections in its on-going activities. This is countenanced, in fact, encouraged, by the Enabling Development approach.

181. Concluding Comment: The Enabling Development policy agenda should be informed by field experience and field testing, not simply a set of guidelines from headquarters. The plan for action for Enabling Development outlines a learning-by-doing approach that “...will allow WFP to learn by, doing, integrating change with ongoing programming...”

Recommendation No. 15: The Ghana office should push the boundaries of the Enabling Development Policy and use it as an opportunity rather than as a constraint. Allowing Enabling Development to be field tested and subsequently modified as a result can ensure that the policy develops realistically and is truly “enabling” of achievement of local objectives in real world local situations.

X. CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, LESSONS

A. Conclusions

182. The Report’s conclusions are divided into two clusters. The first contains conclusions regarding the usefulness of the country programme process in improving the effectiveness and impact of WFP’s 1998-2002 country programme. The second cluster looks ahead to the new 2001-2005 country programme exercise now underway.

Pertaining to the 1998-2002 CP

183. *The Ghana programme had been utilizing many of the precepts of the desired CP process long before the preparation of the 1998-2002 CSO/CP.* Even before receiving the 1995 instructions for developing a country programme in Ghana based on “Principles and guidelines for country programming,” WFP/Ghana was utilizing many of the precepts of that guidance. The overall purpose of that guidance, as noted earlier, was to add a dimension of “programmatic planning” to identification and implementation of WFP activities in a recipient country. Since the mid-1980s the programme in Ghana had been focused on a limited set of objectives, implemented in concordance with the government’s own development strategy and collaboratively with all the major multilateral and bilateral donors. The design and implementation of individual activities was quite carefully integrated with the resources of the World Bank and other donors to achieve maximum impact in reviving economic growth, employment creation and incomes. The Ghana programme was, thus, clearly in line with the basic intent of the new country programming process even before the guidance was received.

184. *The country programming exercise enabled WFP/Ghana to re-focus on the poorest of the poor, by-passed by the ERP/SAP process.* During the 1983-1992 period, WFP/Ghana had provided significant resources to help re-inflate the economy. The target beneficiaries – while poor – were not the poorest. The 1992-1996 period was characterized by emergency operations rather than the implementation of development activities. The targeting was not necessarily geographic. Therefore, the exercise which led to the 1998-2002 programme came at a propitious moment, a time when the CO was ready to re-establish the development momentum of food aid in Ghana and a time when there was recognition that something more had to be done for those thus far by-passed by the ERP. In developing the CSO and the CP, the CO was enabled to re-target both geographically and in terms of focusing on the chronically poor.

185. *The relationship of the strategy in the approved CSO and the implicit strategy of the approved CP is important to understand, as it suggests a need for WFP to remedy the manner in which these two separate documents are approved.* This Report makes the case that the CSO strategy and the implicit strategy of the CP are different in substantial ways from each other. The types of activities which would seem to emerge from the CSO as having highest priority are accorded secondary priority in the CP²⁷ and the human resource development activities which were of secondary priority in the CSO were moved up to top priority in the CP. Activities less likely to generate agricultural production, employment and growth – at least in the near term – were promoted in importance over those needed to spur agriculture-led growth and increased food production more directly. While there may have been good reason to make these changes, they should have been made in a redrafted CSO not in the CP alone because this has led to a situation where the approved CSO is, arguably, significantly at variance from the approved CP. The Evaluation Team has recommended elsewhere in this report that changes in strategy must occur in an amended CSO, not in the CP document which should describe and defend a programme of activities intended to carry out the strategy of an approved CSO.

186. *The CSO and the CP were drafted with commendable collaboration with both the UN family of agencies and with the government and the larger donor community.* The CO files contain much evidence of close collaboration and sharing of ideas during the formulation of both documents. The UN Resident Representative chaired workshops of representatives of all the major development organizations which generated considerable discussion regarding the nature of WFP proposed strategy and programme. The process was sufficiently well coordinated that it should serve as a model for WFP strategy and programme development elsewhere. It is, in large part, a reflection of the development of a particularly harmonious UN family in Accra, evincing broad concurrence in the basic precepts of Ghanaian development and of the various roles to be played by the UN development agencies within that development paradigm.

187. *The implementation of the 1998-2002 WFP programme has been slow and incomplete.* While there are a large number of reasons for the lack of progress in the two activities that have not yet started, the total effect has been to impair the effectiveness of WFP in achieving its country objectives in Ghana. The lack of communication on the apparently aborted Skills Training activity is also significant. The Team could not determine the reason for this proposed activity not having been actively worked on in the period since the CP was initiated. There is no indication, for example, that what was to have been accomplished within this activity was found to be unneeded in Ghana. To the contrary, such training is key to both the development of human resources and of natural resources and to growth, development, employment creation and increases in incomes which are critical to Ghana's future. The slow development of both the Rural Infrastructure and Savannah Forestry activities is testament to the difficulty for WFP in being a relatively small partner in large multi-donor activities where the bigger players themselves have difficulties which slow implementation. In both the irrigation component of the Rural Infrastructure activity and in determining at what point food resources could be best used in the lifetime of the Forestry activity there was need for more intensive and constant communications between WFP and the other involved parties. This is identified elsewhere in the Report as a Lesson for WFP.

188. *In both presently active elements of the programme there is need for expanded partnering in order to increase the likely effectiveness of on-going operations and the long-term impact on intended beneficiaries required to achieve programme objectives in Ghana.* While this is a conclusion for consideration in the design of the new 2001-2005 programme, it is based on a review of the actual experience, to date, with the Girls' Education and Supplementary Feeding activities. The impact of both could be significantly improved if there were greater efforts to seek out and interest other donor and government agency partners in collaboration. The reasons and remedies are identified elsewhere in the

²⁷ And in the WFP/Rome approval of the CP it was proposed to the Ghana CO that, due to budget constraints, the initiation natural resources development activities which had been top priority in the CSO should be delayed until later in the 5-year implementation timeframe.

Report and Recommendations are made. To undertake the necessary actions has an important impact on the size of the resident staff in Ghana.

189. *The size of the WFP staff in Ghana is too small to be able to deal effectively with the day-to-day communications and joint design, implementation and monitoring required.* Partnerships in a development programme requires continuing – often intensive – collaborative efforts. WFP cannot be an effective partner in development – which is inherently complex – with a CO as lightly staffed as has been the case in Accra. There is, in the professional judgments of the Evaluation Team members, need for a minimum of three professional Ghanaian staff and two international professional staff. In addition, Ghanaian professional staff are the essential linkage between departing and incoming international staff. When there is discontinuity – as was the case with the Ghanaian professional staff – there is danger of a hiatus in programme momentum when there is a time gap between departures and arrivals of international staff. There may be need for WFP to focus on ways to better ensure retention of top local staff. The situation in Ghana where one person departed and another was away for several months on maternity leave left a total void in local professional staff at the very time when there was a complete change-over in international staff. If the staff should shrink further, as is now proposed for Ghana, the situation will worsen. There is a Recommendation elsewhere in the Report on this situation.

190. *The regionalisation of WFP has not, to date, been a positive factor in the design, implementation or monitoring of the WFP programme in Ghana.* There has been difficulty in gaining needed backstopping, receiving answers to queries regarding policy compliance of pending decisions, and filling short-term skills requirements. Some of the reason seems to stem from Ghana having been added to the responsibilities of the regional cluster office in Abidjan only recently and without reinforcement of the regional staff. Prior to that time, Ghana's backstopping was located in WFP headquarters which itself was being restructured. It is still not clear how, and to what extent, the present regional structure will be able to provide needed support. The political uncertainties surrounding Côte d'Ivoire's continued stability add another degree of uncertainty.

191. *Both the gender focus and the overall strategy in using WFP resources in Ghana are in quite good compliance with the precepts of WFP's gender focus and "Enabling Development."* As is discussed in the body of the Report, WFP/Ghana has done a quite good job in developing a gender-targeted programme and one which fulfils the primary precepts of the Enabling Development strategy of WFP. This is particularly noteworthy since the decisions and actions which cause this statement to be true were in place or in process before official enactment of the WFP policies in question.

Conclusions regarding the future of WFP in Ghana.

192. Most of the conclusions related to the present programme are equally conclusions for the next programme. Much of what is included in the 1998-2002 CP will need to be continued into the 2001-2005 programme. There are several additional conclusions, however, which the Evaluation Team believes ought to help guide the preparation of the next CP and the development of programme activities over the five-year period.

193. *Ghana will need food aid well into the future.* There are, in truth, no realistic prospects, given the arithmetic of population growth, low rates of increase in food production, and limited foreign exchange earnings capacity over the next several years, for any significant change in the growth of the basic food gap. The analysis undertaken by CEPA shows that even in the roots and tubers sub-sector, the rate of production growth is likely to slow significantly over the next five years. The gap between cereals production and cereals consumption – especially if a nutritional requirement rather than an effective market demand calculation is used – will continue to grow. Major improvements in the production, transport, storage and marketing of food and other agricultural commodities will occur only after there have been successes in increasing productivity per agricultural worker, increased availability of agricultural inputs at affordable prices, improvements in the rural road networks, a substantial increase in the percentage of smallholder plots with access to irrigation and improvements in market performance

enabling a fair return to the producer and reasonable prices to consumers. Until most of these changes have occurred (hopefully, with WFP participation) Ghana will need to import (probably increasing amounts of) food and will likely have insufficient foreign exchange to purchase it.

194. *WFP should give consideration not only to establishing a VAM presence in Ghana to help speed information about the extent and depth of vulnerability to food insecurity, but should help establish an on-going Ghanaian capacity to continue VAM data gathering and analysis.* WFP/Ghana should seek a source of financing for such a unit which, the Evaluation Team suggests, should be located outside of government but used by government and donors both. Using CEPA as a model, a VAM research institute should be considered whose research, monitoring and analytical efforts are financed by a pool of donors (and possibly private foundations) needing the information and data it produces – and willing to pay for it.

195. *WFP/Ghana needs to introduce the concept of contingency planning into the mini-CG deliberations related to the Vision 2020, PRSP/CDF, and UNDAF exercises.* The importance of this should not be underestimated. Development programmes attempting to reduce poverty and food insecurity can be set back quickly and substantially by emergencies/disasters, particularly if appropriate response mechanisms and resources are neither available nor planned for. Both natural and human-caused events are very likely – either inside Ghana or in neighbouring countries – with adverse consequences for Ghana and for the successes of all the programmes of all the donors and government. WFP should propose that a sub-committee of the mini-CG be established (and, presumably, chaired by WFP) to ensure appropriate consideration in each of these interrelated planning documents of the need to bolster the government's ability to respond quickly to disasters and the establishment of contingency arrangements involving all the large donors, government and the NGO community.

196. *WFP should give greater consideration to using food aid – in combination with the non-food resources of other donors to confront directly the causes of Ghana's relatively poor performance in food and agriculture production.* As part of the CSO/CP preparation for the 2001-2005 country programme, WFP should look very carefully at the possibilities of using food aid in ways that increase the production of food in Ghana by smallholders. While the use of food aid to increase food production is not obviously a part of Enabling Development's major objectives, such a focus in Ghana will actually help to build and keep assets (which *is* a core objective of Enabling Development) as well as increasing food availability and incomes. A number of on-going programmes financed by other donors including the World Bank and FAO have been discussed, albeit briefly, in the Report. If there are ways that WFP food aid can be used to augment or speed the implementation of these activities, consideration should be given to doing so. At a minimum, WFP support to the irrigation component of the Rural Infrastructure project should be initiated (assuming the problem of Ghanaian loan arrearages to the African Development Bank has been resolved).

197. *A monetization element needs to be added to the programme.* This has been discussed at length in the body of the Report and a recommendation provided. The conclusion in all of this is that the WFP programme in Ghana needs a minimum level of financial support to accompany the food aid. The purpose of this local currency is to finance the in-country costs associated with programme design and development, the monitoring and analysis that needs to be undertaken to track performance and impact. While the best option would be for sufficient funds to be made available in the DSC budget, the Evaluation Team was assured in Rome that all such budgets will likely be quite limited. If so, the ability of WFP/Ghana to carry out its Enabling Development mandate would be likewise curtailed. The obvious answer is to provide additional food resources (wheat being the most appropriate candidate) intended to be sold to generate local currency needed to finance these programmatic costs. To the extent that present WFP policy would tend to foreclose this option, the policy should be revisited in relation to the programme in Ghana.

198. *The size of the professional staff of WFP/Ghana must be consistent with the requirements of managing a food aid programme of a magnitude, duration, and direction consistent with Ghana's needs*

and other donor resource availabilities. The programmatic environment in Ghana, the nature and size of the problems creating enduring poverty and chronic food insecurity, the particularly close and harmonious relationship among the UN family agencies and the particular need for food aid create for WFP what can only be deemed an exciting set of opportunities to put into effect many of the development precepts of the organization. But to do it right, there must be a staff of appropriate size to take on – and do well – all the task realistically required. There should be no less than two international professionals, a UNV, and three Ghanaian professional officers abetted by technical expertise from the regional cluster.

199. *There should be greater emphasis on WFP collaboration with international and Ghanaian NGOs, using food aid to generate and sustain institutional strengthening and capacity-building.* During the 2001-2005 programme period WFP/Ghana should consider becoming more proactive in seeking out NGO partners as entities capable of extending the effectiveness and increasing the sustainability of progress toward WFP's long-term objectives in Ghana. Those NGOs, particularly international NGOs partnered in mentoring relationships with Ghanaian NGOs and community-based organizations, which are operating at the community level, can be particularly good intermediaries in utilizing WFP food aid and small amounts of accompanying local currency to help communities to cope with their own adversities. Many international NGOs have increasingly focused on strengthening the capabilities of national NGOs to work with local communities to identify local factors perpetuating poverty and food insecurity and to develop locally-based projects aimed at removing those impediments. The focus on institutional change (i.e., changing age-old folkways and mindsets that have slowed adoption of improved ways to produce more, earn more, save more and live better) and capacity-building (i.e., strengthening the effectiveness of community-based associations of all types, local governance, and locally-based, shared enterprises) holds within it far better chances for being sustained over the long term. WFP should seek ways to support these local capacity- strengthening efforts.

B. Recommendations

200. The following are the 15 principal recommendations contained in the body of this Report:

Recommendation No. 1: WFP must clarify the relationship between the CSO as a statement of approved WFP strategy in a country and the CP as the description of the approved programme to carry out *that* strategy. If the strategic focus is changed, the change must be reflected in both the CSO and the CP, not solely in the CP document itself.

Recommendation No. 2: The CSO must be very clear regarding how the application of overall WFP policies in any particular recipient country has been adapted to the particular array of factors causing and perpetuating poverty, economic malaise and food insecurity in that country. Any tendency to substitute prescriptive, policy-based approaches for solid, local analysis of poverty causality and WFP responses clearly derived from that analysis must be resisted. The diagnosis should determine the prescription; never the reverse.

Recommendation No. 3: WFP should clarify with UNCTAD and other UN organizations whether Ghana qualifies to be included as an LDC. If so – and whether or not the government of Ghana is willing to be officially so designated – Ghana ought to be offered the same relief from counterpart contribution requirements as are afforded other LDCs and consideration given to increasing the level of food assistance commensurate with that status.

Recommendation No. 4: WFP should consider adding a modest monetization element to the Ghana country programme to generate local currency to cover some of the local costs associated with programme development and implementation, the added needs of analysis to underpin the 2001-2005 CSO and to cover the costs of establishing a VAM presence in Ghana.

Recommendation No. 5: the size of the international staff of WFP/Ghana should remain at the present level of two professional staff plus a UNV. In light of recommendation No. 7 below, the Ghanaian professional staff should be increased from two to three professionals. The added person would be responsible for VAM activities and VAM training. In the Evaluation Team's judgment, non-concurrence with this recommendation would place WFP at grave risk of serious underperformance in meeting its programme goals and objectives in Ghana.

Recommendation No. 6: WFP must establish a realistic and sustainable long-term budget for support and other local direct costs relating to its programme in Ghana. Funds must be provided at this level for the 2001-2005 period. If it is impossible to provide sufficient DSC funds, WFP should consider augmenting the food allocation to the Ghana country programme by an amount of food (presumably wheat) to enable monetization sufficient to cover the budget shortfall in each of the next five years.

Recommendation No. 7: WFP should agree to establish a VAM unit in Ghana with the immediate task of ascertaining the true magnitude of an apparent, recent further impoverishment of large numbers of households in both rural and urban Ghana. Such VAM analysis should assess the likelihood and direction of a continuation of trends which may be responsible for such increases in severe and/or chronic poverty and food insecurity. The unit may or may not be temporary in nature, but should seek to establish and train a Ghanaian VAM unit and seek funding from non-WFP sources for the continuation of such a unit. This effort should be coordinated, to the extent practicable with FAO's FIVIMS unit and other interested government and donor organizations.

Recommendation No. 8: The Ghana Country Office should prepare an emergency operations contingency plan as soon as possible, given the fragile political and social situations in neighbouring countries, the strong possibility that hundreds of thousands of Ghanaian workers elsewhere in West Africa could be forcibly returned to Ghana at any time, and the possibility that other refugees and/or internally displaced populations could require significant WFP EMOPs in Ghana in the near or medium term.

Recommendation No. 9: WFP/Ghana should urge, presumably within the mini-CG forum, consideration of a joint donor-government task force to develop a strategy for strengthening Ghana's emergency-related contingency planning and response capabilities as part of the Phase Two (2001-2005) Ghana - Vision 2020 development effort. WFP/Ghana should be provided the staff resources by WFP/headquarters sufficient to enable it to be the donor focal point for this effort.

Recommendation No. 10: WFP/Ghana should become a more active, central participant in the PSRP development process in Ghana.

Recommendation No. 11: To the extent that the success of WFP projects at the goal or objectives level is dependent on exogenous factors, the design and approval of activities, WFP must insist on a clear relationship between the types and levels of WFP resources provided and progress to be engendered at the objectives level from the combination of WFP and exogenous inputs provided and outputs achieved. To the extent there is a tendency in WFP projects, generally, to accept progress at the output level as equating to progress at the objectives level, there is need to review and improve project design and approval to remove such tendencies. What is required is a more thorough and rigorous expression of hypotheses linking achieving proposed output levels to progress toward desired objectives. This, in turn, requires better monitoring of progress toward objectives and of impact achieved. A more rigorous use of 'project logical framework' techniques is suggested.

Recommendation No. 12: WFP/Ghana should become proactive in improving the partnering aspects of its girls' education activity by seeking to improve overall effectiveness and impact through closer collaboration with CRS in delivering food aid to school children in northern Ghana and by seeking sequential partner NGO or donor organizations to provide additional skills training to girls graduating from WFP-assisted junior secondary schools.

Recommendation No. 13: In its 2001-2005 programme, WFP/Ghana should seek ways to use food resources to generate *institutional change* and *capacity-building* needed to create expanded and sustainable capacity to meet *strategic* needs of women in Ghana. The design of gender activities should involve both men and women and must concentrate on reducing the root causes of gender inequality wherever they exist.

Recommendation No. 14: If there is any conflict between defining WFP programmatic coherence as that meant to exist between and among the total government/donor/NGO development organizations in a country (involving all resources engaged in poverty reduction, food security promotion and economic growth) and coherence defined by WFP/Rome as that existing between and among WFP's activities alone, such conflict must be resolved in favour of the former definition.

Recommendation No. 15: The Ghana office should push the boundaries of the Enabling Development Policy and use it as an opportunity rather than as a constraint. Allowing Enabling Development to be field tested can ensure that the policy develops realistically and is truly "enabling" of achievement of local objectives in real world local situations.

C. Lessons

201. There are a very large number of potential lessons of use, in the Team's judgment, to WFP/Rome and also to those who will be designing and implementing the 2001-2005 programme. Much of the rationale for the 15 recommendations and many of the conclusions contained in this Evaluation Report are, in fact, based on lessons derived from the experience to date. There are, however, some additional lessons for WFP consideration not otherwise addressed herein. The more important of these lessons include:

202. WFP must have access to as much information as is available about the economic situation and the status of, and trends in, poverty and food insecurity in Ghana. In countries such as Ghana which suffer from chronic food insecurity and are also subject to droughts, floods and human-caused disasters there must be some on-going entity responsible for continually tracking indicators revealing changes in each of the major determinants affecting the vulnerability of poor households to downturns in their food security and the risk that trends or events will worsen perceptibly.

203. Partnering can slow implementation, at least initially. It is easy to understand the benefits of cooperation and collaboration among government, donors and private development entities. It is much harder to implement such collaboration and cooperation. The pace of implementation and the relative success in attaining benchmarks of progress and movement toward goal achievement is not entirely in the hands of the local WFP country office, no matter how earnest, skilled and hard-working that unit might be.

204. There is need in countries like Ghana for continuing VAM-type monitoring of changes in factors affecting risk and vulnerability. This relates to the previous lesson, but has a more WFP-wide implication. The lesson here is that WFP's VAM may be uniquely good at what it does. WFP might want to consider the development of indigenous, sustainable VAM units in all countries where WFP operates (excluding those, of course, where VAM-type activities are already being adequately accomplished by non-WFP assisted entities, e.g., FEWS or FIVIMS).

205. The imaginative use of small amounts of food aid for testing and experimenting can have a big potential pay-off. There is a lesson in the CO's use of a few tonnes of food to support a small but potentially highly important study into the efficacy of traditional medicines in combating the effects of advanced AIDS infection. There is something potentially very exciting in the preliminary results and it is to WFP's great credit to have been a willing participant in this endeavour, even though it is not part of the approved strategy. WFP/headquarters might want to consider setting aside a small pot of food

assistance that can be tapped – quickly – by country offices needing small quantities of food for important, but somewhat experimental, activities. WFP/Rome might follow-up with this activity for publicity's sake.

206. There is need to maintain a documentary record of the actions taken and decisions made during programme development and implementation. The Team was hampered in its efforts to understand why the Skills Training component of the CP was never energized by the total lack of any files on the subject and the departure of those involved. Attempting to track down former officers to see if they might remember the circumstances of this or that event is not an adequate approach. There should be a minimum requirement placed on all country offices to document major changes in the implementation of approved programmes. WFP should review its policies regarding what needs to be recorded and kept in CO files and field offices required to abide by such guidance.

207. It is difficult to measure the impact of gender activities on gender objectives. The Evaluation Team is concerned by the possibility that WFP may claim success in gender programmes (or, in fact, in measuring significant accomplishments in most sectors of their country programmes using very superficial criteria). It has been the experience in many past evaluations conducted by members of the Evaluation Team that claims for programme or project successes are based on having achieved desired output levels and assuming or hypothesising that achievement of outputs would result in desired progress at the level of programme or project objectives. This situation could well be the case in the Girls' Education activity in Ghana because what is being measured is increases in numbers of girls attending school. What needs to be measured is evidence that attending school has resulted in some improvement in the status of those girls and that households generally have become convinced of the benefits of girls' education and are now more willing to send their daughters/wives to school as a result of this conviction – of this changed traditional mindset. WFP may need to provide added guidance to country offices regarding the clarification of relationships between project outputs and achievement of programme objectives and goals.

208. The level of collaboration and cooperation within the UN family of agencies and among the donors and government in the mini-CG framework is extremely good. The Team is very impressed by the level of cooperation between the UN agencies in developing the overall UNDAF programme and in reviewing each others activities. There is ample opportunity for such cooperation to move to the next level – collaboration on actual activities in achieving mutual objectives. The situation in Ghana is reputed to be one of the best such cooperative efforts in the entire UN system. It is important for WFP to be seen as a significant participant in the years ahead as the 2001-2005 programme unfolds. The experience of WFP's involvement in Ghana may well come to serve as a model for WFP country offices elsewhere.

ANNEXES

Annex 1 – Terms of Reference

1 BACKGROUND

1. The Country Programming Concept

In 1994, WFP introduced a new policy framework called the country programming approach. This replaced the project-by-project approach which made it difficult to relate overall WFP assistance to overall national planning. With the previous approach, there was little integration of different WFP activities to ensure a coherent strategy for the country. The new approach implied some fundamental changes to the way WFP plans and programmes, focusing on a people-centered and food-based strategy and using the “country” as the basic entity for WFP’s engagement. A country programme should be a cohesive and focused response to those strategic objectives of a recipient country that coincide with the strategic objectives of WFP and other assistance partners. This new orientation is also in step with the direction of UN reform (CCA, UNDAF, etc.).

In agreeing to the Country programme approach, WFP’s Executive Board stipulated (CFA 37/P/7) that this approach must be supported by 3 key operational principles:

- predictability of resource levels over several years;
- integrated planning; and
- flexibility in resource management.

In addition, the CP approach also requires:

- **concentrating on the neediest** which has implications for targeting, as WFP must redeploy and concentrate its efforts on the neediest people in the neediest countries. This also implies improving analytical, planning and operational capacity at the country level.
- **focusing on fewer priority activities**, which concentrate on:
 1. meeting the immediate needs of the hungry poor;
 2. improving the quality of life for the most vulnerable people; and
 3. building assets and promoting self-reliance through labour-intensive activities.

2. The Ghana Country Programme

2.1 The CP as designed

The Ghana Country Programme is based on a 1996 CSO, and was approved by WFP’s Executive Board at its October 1997 session. Following the recommendations of the Board concerning the targeting of women and girls, subsequent discussions with the Government of Ghana have led to the incorporation of assistance to girls’ education and skills training for women into the Country Programme (CP). While the CSO proposed a five-year total budget of 35 to 40 million dollars, the CP budget was reduced at the country office level to about 28 million dollars (46,755 tons of food) because of the Government’s concerns over the level of expected counterpart contributions. However, in view of the declining level of WFP development resources for non-least developed countries, and as Ghana is an LIFDC, the CP was subsequently reduced to of 32,500 tons of food commodities estimated at about 20 million dollars, which included five million dollars already committed under ongoing projects and 15 million dollars to be committed, subject to the availability of resources.

The CP’s geographical targeting was based on the vulnerability assessment and mapping (VAM), conducted within the context of the Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS). Based on the incidence of poverty, the areas of greatest need are:

- a) rural savannah areas comprising the administrative regions of the Upper East, Upper West and Northern administrative regions (particularly the districts adjacent to the Upper East region); and
 b) rural forest areas, especially the pockets of the Volta, Central and Western administrative regions, where living conditions are also very difficult.

All activities were designed to complement a number of existing national sectoral programmes: the Basic Education Sector Improvement Programme, also known as the Free Compulsory Universal Basic Education (FCUBE) Programme, the National Forestry Development Plan; the National Feeder Roads Development Programme; the Medium-Term Health Programme; and the medium-term agricultural development programmes.

The goals and objectives of the CP are as follows:

| | |
|----------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| CP Goal | Use food aid to support economic and social development |
| | Promote national food security, especially the food security of poor people and communities. |
| CP Objectives | Develop human resource potential in target regions, through the provision of incentives for girls' education and skills training of women; |
| | Improve the food intake of children and expectant and nursing mothers, and support Government efforts to improve the coverage of primary health care services; |
| | Expand the forest area and reduce the environmental degradation as well as erosion of agricultural land in the more densely populated and denuded savannah areas, while increasing the income-earning capacity and environmental awareness of rural farmers and their families; |
| | Increase agricultural production and rural incomes through improvement of farmers' productivity and the rural infrastructure such as feeder roads, and irrigation and storage facilities. |
| CP Activities | A 1: Ghana 4932: Supplementary feeding, and health and nutrition Education (ongoing): |
| Human Resources | Focus: to supplement the diet of malnourished pre-school children, and to encourage expectant and nursing mothers and the mothers of malnourished children to attend nutrition education sessions. |
| Human Resources | A 2: Ghana 5995: Human resource develop't in Ghana's northern savannah areas—Education of girls Focus: Contribute to 1996 Government CUBE goal to make education free and compulsory for all school-age children by the year 2005 |
| Human Resources | A 3: Skills training/Income-generating activities Focus: help rural and urban unemployed youth (including street children and young adolescent females) to acquire trade skills. |
| Rural Development | A 4: Participatory rural forestry in Ghana's northern savannah areas Focus: a) improve the food security of poor rural dwellers working on rural forestry schemes in remote communities in the northern savannah and rural coastal areas; and b) improve the income-earning capacity and environmental awareness of rural farmers and their families, through the production of fast-growing forest and fruit trees and other agroforestry crops. |
| Rural Development (cancelled 09/00) | A 5: Ghana 6047 Rural infrastructure develop't in the northern savannah & rural forest areas of Ghana Focus: a) promote the concept of ownership of feeder roads, by involving local Communities in the maintenance of roads; b) improve food security among rural farmers working to construct and rehabilitate dams in drought-prone, food-deficit areas within the project area; and c) construct hygienic food-storage facilities to avoid post-harvest losses. |

2.2 Current Status of the CP

Implementation of the CP experienced a number of delays. To date, only Activities One and Two are operational: **4932 - Supplementary Health and 5995 - Girls Education.**

Activity Four: Savanna Resources Management. Awaiting government inputs. This assistance is to be provided only during the lean season, which is between April/May and October.

Activity Five: Rural Infrastructure Development. The CO has developed an Activity Summary in 1999 which took considerable time to receive feedback on. This activity is also planned for the lean season, and could therefore start at the earliest in April 2001.

The CO never developed the irrigation component as the authorities have not provided any feedback since 1997. No food was requested for this component for year 2000. The CO is currently discussing whether or not to maintain this component.

The storage component has never been developed.

4) **Activity Three: Skills Training.** This activity has not been developed to date. UNFPA had been indicated as a possible partner in the CP but the proposed activity is outside of UNFPA's mandate. The CO is currently investigating a possible focus and partnership for this Activity/Project.

3 Objectives of the Country Programme Evaluation

- 1) To assess the extent to which WFP's current development activities in Ghana have been influenced by the CP approach so that they constitute a recognizable CP.
- 2) To assess the extent to which WFP's systems and procedures for programme and project identification, design, budgeting, resourcing and implementation at both the headquarters and field levels have enhanced or impeded the CP approach.
- 3) To assess the extent to which the CP approach in Ghana has been a more effective tool for preparing WFP's contribution in both development and relief.
- 4) To determine whether the development activities ongoing have been designed to make a direct contribution to the objectives of the CP.
- 5) To assess the extent to which the individual WFP activities represent recognized good practice in food aid (including the practices and principles recognized in the "Enabling Development" policy).
- 6) To provide recommendations which can be used in the development of future Country Strategy Outlines and CPs and to provide accountability to the Executive Board.

4 Scope of Work

Evaluating the Country Programme In Light of Its Constituent Activities

The evaluation of the CP in Ghana will focus primarily on the development and implementation of the programme as a whole. It will consider the programme in the context of the principles of the CP approach as they were understood and communicated throughout WFP at the time that the current CSO and CP were developed.

While focusing first at the programme level, the evaluation will also consider the way in which activities have been integrated into the programme and the extent to which they make a contribution to the programme objectives as well as meet their own. ***It is important to distinguish between the evaluation of the CP and the separate exercise of evaluating each of the activities which make up the CP, the latter being outside the scope of the current evaluation.*** In CP evaluations, a team works its way from the general to the particular, from the CP to the activity level. Activities are assessed in terms of their logic and their expected contribution to meeting the objectives of the CP. It may be that activities provide the most concrete opportunity for assessing progress toward overall programme objectives.

The evaluation will also consider how effectively the Commitments to Women (formulated at The Beijing UN Conference for Women 1996-2001) have been integrated into the CP. In addition, it will assess how well the consideration of gender relations, which can be a major impediment to improved food security, have been mainstreamed into the programming process.

Country Programmes and “Enabling Development”

The findings and recommendations of the evaluation will be forward-looking in that they will be framed in a way that supports the development of a new CSO and CP that will conform to current requirements, including those of the “Enabling Development” policy. Since the “Enabling Development” initiative dates from 1999, it will not be appropriate to evaluate programmes developed before that in terms of their effectiveness in meeting the requirements of this policy. Rather, the evaluation team will assess the current programme for its fit with the policy prescriptions evident in “Enabling Development” and make recommendations for the future CP/CSO. The assessment of programme fit with “Enabling Development” will be guided by the template provided in Annex 5.

Linking the Country Programme to Other Activities

The evaluation will directly cover only the activities defined under the CP. As such it will not attempt to assess the effectiveness of relief and recovery activities, or any development activities which may exist outside of the CP. However, the evaluation will examine which development activities in the CP have been designed so that they may support current or future relief operations, as well as why development activities may exist outside of the CP (if applicable).

5 Key Issues and Sub-Issues

The evaluation will address the following issues and sub-issues.

1. Has the process of developing a CSO and CP in Ghana resulted in a CP as described and expected in the guidelines and policies of the WFP?

1.1. How were activities/projects ongoing before the establishment of the CP modified to fit more readily into the CP approach?

1.2. Did the process of developing the CSO and CP include an analysis of national and sub-regional (within the country) food insecurity and vulnerability? Does the CSO and/or the CP make reference to any VAM material developed for this country?

1.3. Did the process of developing the CSO and CP result in an identified strategy for WFP development programming? Did it include, for example, choices in strategic areas such as: key partners inside and outside government; geographic target areas; targeting considerations within geographic areas; programme areas best dealt with by other agencies?

1.4. Are the activities/projects in the CP designed to be complementary in terms of addressing the cycle of food insecurity from various angles, or to be linked in terms of sector, geographic area, beneficiaries or any other common elements? If not, is there a strong rationale for not making these linkages?

1.5. Are there specific objectives expressed at the level of the CP (as opposed to the activity/project level)? Are they relevant, realistic and attainable in light of the approved activities/projects in the CP?²⁸ Further, can the achievement of objectives be measured at the program level?

1.6. What evidence exists that the current CP exhibits the desired characteristics of:

- ◆ integration;
- ◆ coherence;
- ◆ concentration; and,
- ◆ flexibility.²⁹

2. To what extent did WFP's systems and procedures for programme and project identification, design, budgeting, implementation and review enhance or impede the CP approach?

2.1. To what extent has the delegation of authority to the regional and country office level enhanced the flexibility of the Country Director in developing and negotiating a CP and in making shifts in resources when appropriate? Has the Country Director been pro-active in using those authorities which have been devolved?

2.2. Have appropriate policy statements, guidelines, and headquarters/regional staff support been made available to country offices during the development of CSOs and CPs?

2.3. In the experience of the WFP country office, are procedures and rules for establishing programme and project budgets appropriate to a CP approach? Do they allow for the required flexibility in resource planning and allocation?

2.4. Is the organizational structure of and the staffing mix in the country office appropriate given the requirements of the CP approach? Is short-term technical support available where it is needed and appropriate?

2.5. Were the defined procedures for preparing and implementing the CP at country level followed? For example, has a CP agreement been signed with the government? Were appraisal missions carried out to prepare Project Summaries? Does a Programme Review Committee exist and does it function?

2.6. What problems or constraints have been identified during the development and implementation of the CP?

3. To what extent has the design, development and implementation of a CP resulted in a more effective WFP contribution to development programming in Ghana?

²⁸ It will be necessary for the evaluation teams to determine the fit between programme level goals and objectives and those of the individual activities making up the programme.

²⁹ These terms have been defined in the documentation on the country programming process (CFA 38/P/6):

- **integration:** with the priorities and other activities of the country itself, as well as those of the UN system and other donors.
- **coherence;** (so that the elements of the WFP sub-programmes in each country relate closely to each other to achieve a clear purpose.) the absence of any design elements in one activity/project which may work counter to achieving the objectives in another activity/project;
- **concentration:** focused – on those geographical areas and households that represent WFP's target groups, and,
- **flexibility:** allowing for activities to be adjusted within the programme period in line with changing circumstances.

3.1. Was the national government fully involved in the review of needs in preparation for the CSO and does it agree with the stated priorities of the CP?

3.2. Did the process of developing the CP enhance WFP involvement in the CCA and UNDAF processes under way? Did the shift to a CP enhance WFP's ability to contribute to UN coordination through the CSN, CCA, UNDAF or other processes?

3.3. Has the process of developing the CP had any appreciable effect on the ability of the national government to make and meet programme commitments regarding counterpart contributions including both finances and staff time?

3.4. Does the CP include contingency planning measures at either the country programme or activity level? Does it include measures in one or more activities/projects aimed at ensuring that disaster preparedness or disaster mitigation actions are taken in development projects so that the transition to emergency operations may be more effective and timely when necessary? Is there evidence that contingency planning will be included in the development of the next country programme?

3.5. While the CP does not include resourcing and planning for PRROS and EMOPS, does it describe them and note any possible actual or potential interaction between development activities/projects and emergency operations?

3.6. Did the CP mechanism permit necessary shifts of resources among activities/projects in a timely and efficient way?

4. Does the design of the activities/projects which make up the CP incorporate the lessons reflected in the Enabling Development Policy? For example:

4.1. Is food aid the most appropriate resource for use in the CP activities/projects? Is food aid justifiable and necessary for the achievement of the activity/project level objectives?

4.2. Are WFP's partners in each activity/project the most appropriate? What measures were taken during the design of the activity/project to assess possible partners?

4.3. Is food aid used in the activities/projects in the CP targeted to food deficit sub-regions and/or populations identifiable as the hungry poor? Is there evidence that these targeted people are being reached?

4.4. Are assets being created in the activities/projects? If so, what measures are in place to ensure that the targeted beneficiaries benefit from these assets?

4.5. What indicators are being monitored which can be used to assess the effectiveness of the activities/projects in the CP? Do they provide information regarding the achievement of anticipated outputs, outcomes and impacts? Were appropriate baselines established for the indicators being used?

5. Do the activities/projects in the CP adequately address gender issues and adhere to WFP's Commitments to Women?

5.1. Does the country programme approach make it easier or more difficult to meet the Commitments to Women, and to mainstream a gender perspective? (For a detailed guide to addressing this issue, see Annex 4.)

5.2. What changes would be required in the next CSO and CP to ensure better compatibility with the Commitments to Women.

6. To what extent does the use of food aid in the current activities/projects of the CP conform to the “Enabling Development” policy³⁰? - For a detailed guide to addressing this issue see annex 5.

6.1. What changes would be required in the development of a new CSO and CP which would ensure better compliance with “Enabling Development”?

7. What measures can be taken in the development of the CSO and the next CP to improve the effectiveness of WFP’s contribution to development during the next programming cycle?

8. Are there any lessons that can be learned from the experience gained in designing and implementing the current CP?

7 Notes on Methodology

6.1 Stages of the Evaluation

The method proposed below is indicative and may be revised and/or refined by the team leader. The evaluation will normally be divided into three phases:

Phase I –Preparation and Desk Review:

The terms of reference should be shared with the Government who should be asked to review the TOR and to nominate a key focal point for the mission.

Prior to the in-country mission the team will review all relevant background documentation, including the CSO and CP, activity summaries, project progress reports, project mid-term and terminal evaluation reports, relevant international and national sectoral publications/reports. In addition, the team should locate and review country studies carried out for recent thematic evaluations such as the review of WFP Commitments to Women. Some members of the team may review materials provided electronically and join the team directly in the field. Following decentralization of many programme functions to the field level, some of the documentary material on programmes and activities is best accessed at the level of the Country Office.

Phase II - The in-country evaluation (3 weeks):

To the extent possible, the Team should meet with all relevant stakeholders, including beneficiaries, local and national government, key implementation partners and other development agencies involved in the UNDAF and with any of WFP’s programmes.

Data collection during the CP evaluation will take place both in the offices of key stakeholders in Accra and in the field where examples of major programme activities can be visited. Priority should be given to meetings in the capital but some coverage of field activities will be necessary. A useful rule of thumb may be to spend two-thirds of the available time in Accra and one-third visiting activities in the field.

Key informant interviews to be carried out by the Team may be divided into different groupings:

Group One: WFP full time and contract staff working on development activities;

³⁰ It is important to note that issue number 6 does not mean that the current country programme will be retroactively evaluated against the criteria of Enabling Development. Rather, the programme will be assessed with a view to providing guidance as to any changes required to ensure compliance in the future.

Group Two: Institutional Partners/Actors in the Development and Coordination of Programmes at National Level. For example:

- UN Agencies active in consultative processes relating to development such as the CCA and UNDAF including UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA, FAO, IFAD, WHO;
- Government Ministries who are either involved at the national level in consultations on donor coordination (the Ministry of External Cooperation, Ministry of Planning, Ministry of Finance for example) or represent current or planned partners in WFP development activities: Ministry of Agriculture, National Water Authority, Ministry of Health, National Forestry Service, as appropriate;
- The local offices of the World Bank and regional development bank;
- Bilateral donors with a significant presence in sectors of WFP programming; These should be identified by the WFP office in the country. Of special interest will be donors who are taking part in structures aimed at coordination at the national level.
- NGOs with a national presence and mandate in food security and/or poverty alleviation. The WFP office should be able to identify a small group of national and international NGOs with a strong presence and reputation in food aid and/or food security and poverty programming. Ideally, these organizations should be recognized by the government as co-participants in national or regional programmes.

Group Three: Institutional Partners Engaged in WFP Activities

- national, provincial or local offices of the agencies implementing WFP activities on behalf of government (water authority staff, district medical officers, agriculture extension service staff, national forest service staff, as appropriate);
- Staff of national and international NGOs involved in the delivery of WFP food aid and/or the planning and completion of infrastructure assets created with food aid;
- Staff of human service agencies supported by WFP food aid such as nutrition rehabilitation units, mother and child health clinics, schools, etc.

Group Four: Participants and Beneficiaries

Accompanied by project staff, the mission members should meet in group settings with participants in food for work projects, children in schools, attendees of MCH clinics etc. Groups can be comprised of village elders or representatives, women youth, etc. These meetings will serve as a first level test of the targeting aspects of the development activities.

Past experience strongly suggests that the WFP Country Office would benefit by organizing a one-day feed-back workshop for WFP staff and key stakeholder organizations to discuss the preliminary findings and recommendations of the evaluation prior to the Team's departure. This debriefing could be provided for key government, NGO representatives and donors as well as to WFP staff and other UN agency staff. In addition, a structured debriefing with an aide memoir summarizing key preliminary findings and recommendations is essential prior to the team's departure.

Phase III - Report writing (5 working days team members, 10 working days Team Leader):

During each phase of the CP evaluation, the team leader should confirm the duties and accountabilities of each team member. This can be easily organized around the products of the evaluation (see Annexes 1 and 2) which are in turn organized around the key objectives and issues.

The team leader is responsible for co-ordinating inputs to and for the overall drafting of the Aide Memoire, evaluation summary and final report.

6.2 The Evaluation Team:

The team should contain the following expertise:

- development planner/economist
- food security expert
- participatory rural development expert

One team member should be a locally recruited national consultant. One team member should also be able to review gender issues as they relate to the CP and the Commitments to Women.

In addition, team members should be familiar with the country situation, have solid evaluation expertise and good drafting skills in English.

6.3 Timetable and Itinerary:

| | |
|-------------------------------------------------|-------------------------|
| Rome Briefing | 5 –6 October 2000 |
| In-country mission: | 7 October – 25 October |
| Accra | 9 October – 13 October |
| Project Visits | 14 October – 18 October |
| Accra | 19 October – 26 October |
| Feed-back Session with Country Office | 23 October |
| Evaluation Debriefing Workshop | 24 October |
| Aide-Memoire Presentation to Government and WFP | 25 October |
| Finalization of Aide-Memoire | 25 October |
| Departure | 25 October (evening) |
| Debriefing at WFP Rome | 26 October |
| Deadline for Draft Evaluation Report | 12 November |
| Deadline for Evaluation Summary | 26 November |

6.4 Organization of the Mission:

Role of the Team Leader : finalizes the methodology and key issues for the evaluation. This will be done in consultation with the OEDE Evaluation Officer. He will also clarify the role and input of each team member, including individual requirements for the Aide Memoire, Evaluation Summary and Final Report. With assistance from the WFP Evaluation Officer, the Team Leader will define any preparatory work required by the CO and/or local consultants prior to the mission (at least 2 weeks notice should be given to the Country Office).

The team leader will assume overall responsibility for the mission, and will synthesize the inputs from all sources in order to produce the necessary outputs. The Team leader is responsible for producing the following outputs :

- **Aide Mémoire** for presenting the mission’s early findings and recommendations at the final debriefing of the Country Office and at HQ ;
- a **Final Evaluation Report**; and
- an **Evaluation Summary Report** for presentation to the Executive Board.

The team leader will present the team's findings at all debriefings and will ensure that all deadlines are met for the above outputs.

Role of the other team members provide technical expertise according to individual skill sets, and to provide written inputs to the Evaluation Summary and Final Report under the guidance of the Team Leader and WFP Evaluation Officer.

Role of the WFP Evaluation Officer : provides support to the overall evaluation exercise as necessary, which includes liaising between team members, relevant areas of WFP headquarters, and the country office. She will also ensure compliance with the intended thrust of the evaluation and may contribute to the assessment/examination of some of the key issues (to be determined when the methodology and key issues are finalized). The WFP evaluation officer will also ensure that the necessary logistical support is provided by WFP HQ and by the CO.

Role of the Ghana Country Office : advises on the timing of the evaluation to ensure that the evaluation outputs are available for the preparation of the CSO. Ensures that all necessary documents required to plan the evaluation and undertake the desk review are provided in a timely manner. Assists with the identification and hiring of local consultants as required. Ensures that any necessary preparatory work is undertaken in-country prior to the arrival of the evaluation team, and to facilitate the work of the team while in-country. Prepares and organizes the mission in-country itinerary and arranges for organization of the CP evaluation workshop.

6.5 Products of the Evaluation :

- **Aide Memoire** for debriefing the Country Office and HQ (maximum 5 pages)
deadline : day of debriefing in Accra
- **Final Evaluation Report**
deadline : two weeks after leaving Ghana
- **Evaluation Summary Report** (maximum 5000 words)
deadline : four weeks after leaving Ghana

All reports will be prepared in English and must be written in conformity with the outlines in Annexes 1 and 2. Draft outlines of the Evaluation Summary Report and Final Report will be reviewed by the OEDE Evaluation Officer prior to writing.

The Evaluation Summary Report, technical reports and Final Evaluation Report must be submitted in hardcopy accompanied by an electronic version. If applicable, annexes should also be made available in WFP standard software (ie. Microsoft package). For ease of processing, the Summary Report should be submitted as plain, unformatted text only (no paragraph numbering, limited bold, underline, etc.).

The mission is fully responsible for its independent report, which may not necessarily reflect the views of WFP.

The evaluation shall be conducted in conformity with these terms of reference and under the overall guidance of OEDE.

Annex 2: Indicative Checklist for Activity/Project Level of Coherence of Ghana CP with Enabling Development

| Essential Elements of Enabling Development | Detailed Observations | Level of CP and Project Coherence With Enabling Development Policy | | | |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|------|-----|----------|
| | | Very High | High | Low | Very Low |
| 1. Government Commitment | | | | | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ National food security strategy or other enabling policy in place – identify policy | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ There are a several organizing development frameworks being applied in Ghana. These include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. the government’s ‘Vision 2000’ 25 year development framework and the first and second five-year development plans (1996-2000 and 2001-2005) components of that frame; b. The government’s Medium Term Agricultural Development Strategy (1991-2000) which was the precursor to Vision 2000 and was policy in use at the time of the preparation of the CP. c. The UN’s CCA/UNDAF development framework intended to link all UN family development efforts (post CP), d. the World Bank/IMF’s PRSP process and the World Bank’s CDF framework intended to organize all donor programmes around common objectives. The recent embodiment of this is the National Poverty Reduction Programme (NPRP) -- post CP; e. WFP’s CSO/CP organizing framework intended to focus WFP food resources on WFP’s priority objectives within a common latticework of activities. ◆ The government has not established a specific food aid policy. ◆ Food security issues have been partially addressed in the Ministry of Food and Agriculture’s (MOFA) Special Programme for Food Security (SPFS) which was aimed at increasing agricultural production through support to the sector. Food security is also implicit within Vision 2020. Phase 2 Vision 2020 is poverty reduction focused and food security issues are largely subsumed under this category. ◆ A draft gender strategy has been prepared by the government but it has not been finalized. | | | | |

| Essential Elements of Enabling Development | Detailed Observations | Level of CP and Project Coherence With Enabling Development Policy | | | |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|------|-----|----------|
| | | Very High | High | Low | Very Low |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ A specific school feeding strategy has not been established. Despite the lack of a policy on the issue, school feeding is not only being implemented at field level but being prioritised as well. However, the lack of a clear policy does mean that hand-over and sustainability are not explicitly spelled out other than in project documents. ◆ Girl's education is clearly prioritised in the Government's policy for free education (F-CUBE). | | | | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Inter-ministerial cooperation established – note any committees, mechanisms | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Ghana does not appear to deal with sectoral issues through the use of inter-ministerial/inter-agency committees, and the mechanism is not used generally. However, informal inter-agency committees have been formed by donors (e.g. several donors regularly collaborate in the water sector). ◆ In practice, better linkages are formed at the District level and tend to be operational in nature. For instance, a link between income generation and girls education is being made at District Assembly level and below. ◆ There are not inter-ministerial mechanisms for either of the two operational projects (Health and Education). ◆ The Health project should have had a link to MoA for the community gardens component but this has not come about. ◆ The Savannah project has inter-ministerial cooperation built into its structure at project level. It is dealt with at national level as a sub-category under the Project Coordination Committee (PCC) of the National Poverty Reduction Program of the World Bank. | | | | |

| Essential Elements of Enabling Development | Detailed Observations | Level of CP and Project Coherence With Enabling Development Policy | | | |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|------|-----|----------|
| | | Very High | High | Low | Very Low |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Committed to targeting the poorest – including women – references in CP agreement or activity designs | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ The government has made a strong commitment to poverty alleviation in its Vision 2020 policy (Phase II). ◆ Girls have clearly been prioritised in the governments education policy for free primary education (F-CUBE). This priority is consistently voiced within government from top to bottom. ◆ One can read an implicit government intention to target the most disadvantaged in both the Health and Education projects by the fact that this has more or less happened in practice. ◆ The Government consistently gives the message that it targets the poorest areas of the country (North). Donors appear to be following this direction. There is also no sign of political pressure on WFP to direct development resources to wealthier areas. | | | | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Staff and other human resources assigned in line with capacity – any references to insufficient or under-qualified counterparts | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ The counterparts for the two operational projects are strong and of a high calibre at the national level. ◆ Some minor issues in terms of staff quality at the operations level (e.g. needing a store keeper rather than an accountant in one instance). ◆ District level capacity - regional and district level officers for education and nutrition are in place and operational. There is a need for more people and resources to improve monitoring and to better work with communities. They also need help in meeting reporting requirements. While not ideal, the numbers are not woefully inadequate given government constraints. However, capacity building must be a priority to ensure that those staff in place are well trained. | | | | |

| Essential Elements of Enabling Development | Detailed Observations | Level of CP and Project Coherence With Enabling Development Policy | | | |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|------|-----|----------|
| | | Very High | High | Low | Very Low |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Related capacity building measures identified if problems occur in qualifications and availability of counterpart staff | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ WFP has conducted a gender awareness training for all government counterpart staff. ◆ Beyond this, budget has been the restricting factor. ◆ Capacity building is a key area for WFP to explore co-funding with other UN and donor agencies. Additional counterpart capacity building needs identified by WFP staff include food management, monitoring and evaluation and participatory techniques such as PRA. | | | | |
| 2. Coordination | | | | | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Programme refers to and conforms to priorities of UNDAF/CCA – cite reference in CP and activities to UNDAF/CCA | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ The CP was developed before the UNDAF process was completed in Ghana (as was the case with several other UN agencies). Consequently, there is no reference in the CP to UNDAF. The UNDAF is careful to reflect existing programmes and is thus quite broad in nature. | | | | |

| Essential Elements of Enabling Development | Detailed Observations | Level of CP and Project Coherence With Enabling Development Policy | | | |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|------|-----|----------|
| | | Very High | High | Low | Very Low |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Complementary linkages with other partners – evidence of participation of non-traditional and non-governmental partners | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ The collaborative linkages envisioned in the CP were with UNDP (who agreed to provide resources to provide technical assistance to WFP projects), with UNFPA (who agreed to collaborate with WFP on skills training and income-generating activities, and to integrate population education activities into WFP programmes), with FAO (who agreed to provide technical expertise to WFP project design) and with local NGOs and other grass roots organizations (unspecified involvement in implementation). However, none of these linkages appear to have successfully taken off. ◆ Specific project level linkages have been more successful and include: the Savannah project has linkages with several other donors and government ministries under the project management structure and the irrigation component as a direct collaboration with the African Development Bank. Several local level initiatives have complemented WFP inputs (World Vision involvement in building health centres, a local NGO Rural Aid construction of toilets at health centres) but these have been fortuitous rather than pre-meditated. ◆ The WFP staff feel that opportunities to develop these linkages abound but what is lacking is the time to develop them. | | | | |
| 3. Operational Partners | | | | | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Identify operational partners – cite key operational partners by activity | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Education - MoE (implementing agency) ◆ Health - MoH (implementing agency) ◆ Savannah - Ministry of Lands and Forestry (coordinating ministry) plus other Ministries for technical expertise (MoFA, MME, MEST, MLGRD) and donors for funding and technical expertise (IDA - World Bank, GEF, DANIDA, RNE, and WFP). ◆ Irrigation - Ghana Irrigation Authority (implementing agency) and ADB (funding agency) ◆ Feeder Roads - Dept of Feeder Roads (implementing agency) | | | | |

| Essential Elements of Enabling Development | Detailed Observations | Level of CP and Project Coherence With Enabling Development Policy | | | |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|------|-----|----------|
| | | Very High | High | Low | Very Low |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Operational partners chosen for effectiveness | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ The operational partners have been chosen more by default as dictated by the sector of involvement or the need to work through government. ◆ Room in future to strategically bring in other partners. | | | | |
| 4. Understanding Needs | | | | | |
| <i>Consumption Needs</i> | | | | | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Food consumption problem adequately identified? – cite references to VAM or other mapping/targeting exercises and information | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ VAM did not do an analysis on the GLS survey as mentioned in the CP. ◆ Macro level analysis was based on the GLS survey. The overall food consumption problem was identified as chronic food insecurity. ◆ As with other agencies, there are some issues which need more in-depth study at community / household level such as labour availability, land ownership, and a general baseline picture of how people survive. | | | | |

| Essential Elements of Enabling Development | Detailed Observations | Level of CP and Project Coherence With Enabling Development Policy | | | |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|------|-----|----------|
| | | Very High | High | Low | Very Low |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Nature of the food consumption problem – geographic location, effected population, severity | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ The geographic area of need clearly identified to district level. ◆ The affected population was identified to the extent that the sector of the population is clear (malnourished children and their families, girl students of the school catchment area, unemployed school leavers, rural farmers). ◆ Seasonality understood but more information is needed on its implication at the household level (e.g. in terms of coping strategies). The Savannah project team displayed an excellent understanding of these dynamics, although they were weak on gender analysis and translating the understanding into action (which the WFP officer has been active in trying to resolve). ◆ The severity of the food consumption problem is understood in terms of when the lean period is. However, a wider understanding of the underlying reasons behind poverty and food insecurity is missing. | | | | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Key indicators of the food consumption problem – indicators cited in CP and activity documents | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ General information provided in the CP is as per government statistics and other national level sources. ◆ Malnutrition rates (baseline cited in the CP is from the national nutrition survey of 1986) the key indicator in the Health project. ◆ Gross enrolment rates by sex is the key indicator in the education project. ◆ The Savannah project uses the Regional Poverty Index. ◆ If WFP is to move away from measuring projects by achievement targets to measuring projects by output (not outcome), the baseline information needs to be developed from a livelihood perspective with more information on how people survive and how programming affects this dynamic. | | | | |

| Essential Elements of Enabling Development | Detailed Observations | Level of CP and Project Coherence With Enabling Development Policy | | | |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|------|-----|----------|
| | | Very High | High | Low | Very Low |
| Consumption/Investment Link | | | | | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> How food was linked to the development opportunity in CP and activity plan | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The link between the specific development opportunity and food aid is clear in the CP with an acceptable rationale. However, an overall framework that ties the activities together is missing as is the combined impact of the activities on creating and maintaining assets. | | | | |
| 5. Creation of Lasting Assets | | | | | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Which assets were created and for whom? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Education - supporting primary and some JSS education for girls is clearly helping to build assets in the form of human resource development. There is an increased commitment from parents to educate girls and an attitude shift that evolves in the community. However, the degree to which the asset is truly lasting or not depends on a number of other issues that need to be addressed (quality of education, drop out rate of girls at older ages, what opportunities exist after the girls are finished school, the attitude of men in the community, etc.) Health - better informed mothers is one asset in the sense that education is a lasting asset. Less stunted children is a lasting asset. Savannah - expected assets are related to improved agricultural production in a protected environment, increased awareness, and increased food security. However, the issue of who owns the assets and its benefits must be further explored. | | | | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Which are the sustainable benefits from the assets and for whom? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Education - community awareness about the value of educating girls is a lasting benefit for the community. The sustainable benefits come from the educated girl -- she is more likely to educate her children, immunize them, practice family planning, engage in income generating activities --- these all benefit the community as well. | | | | |

| 6. Reaching the Right People | | | | | |
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| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Indicators used to identify geographic areas and target groups within these areas | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Education: boy/girl enrolment ratio and drop out rates were used to select the District of operation and to prioritise schools. Within the District it depends on where the CRS project operates. Within each school, any girl child is eligible. ◆ Health: Malnutrition rates, infant and maternal mortality rates used for site selection. Any child or mother is eligible in each centre. ◆ Savannah: technical criteria are used for geographic area selection such as closeness to reserve and state of land degradation. As far as selecting target groups within these areas, the poorest are to be targeted with the communities but the system must be worked on. ◆ Irrigation: technical criteria are used for geographic area selection. Community self-targeting is to be used for participant selection with emphasis on women and the poor. The mechanisms for this are yet to be developed. | | | | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Are women equally targeted? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Education and health are clearly targeted to women and girl children. ◆ Savannah will target women as they acknowledged as key to the production system. The details must be worked out to ensure that poor women are targeted and that they control the assets created. ◆ Irrigation has an initial target of at least 25% of women (again, work needs to be done to ensure proper targeting). | | | | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Do targeted areas match with most food insecure areas? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Yes -- by region and by district. | | | | |

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| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Methods/techniques used to identify groups of participants within a geographic area – cite methods noted in activity summaries. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Education: all girls in each school are eligible -- self selecting. ◆ Health: any mother and child that meets the criteria in a village is allowed to participate. In practice, the criteria have not been strictly adhered to as cut off by age or nutritional status have not been imposed and numbers of participants have not been limited (e.g. food for 120 participants will be shared by 160). ◆ Savannah: To be developed ◆ Irrigation: To be developed | | | | |
| <p>7. Participation</p> | | | | | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Project participants involved in planning, implementation and/or monitoring | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Irrigation: community led in theory with management contract to be signed with communities. Exactly what the community role will be in each stage is to be worked out with WFP. ◆ Savannah: The project plans to have a strong component of community participation (in implementation and monitoring but not planning). Work remains to be done to ensure that this component is practically developed. ◆ Education: No participant involvement in planning. SMCs are the focal point for participant involvement in implementation and monitoring. This is an area for improvement to ensure women have a voice and that SMCs are truly involved in all aspects of implementation, especially monitoring. ◆ Health: No participant involvement in planning. The community management committee is the focal point for implementation and monitoring. Efforts can be made to strengthen these committees and increase the participation of women. | | | | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Participatory tools and methods used | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Savannah: Use of focus group meetings to interact with the community. ◆ Health: No specific participatory tools are used. ◆ Education: No specific participatory tools are used. ◆ Irrigation: To be developed. | | | | |

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| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Mechanisms used for Facilitating participation | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Education and Health: The management committees of both projects often include neighbourhood representatives from the traditional system ◆ Irrigation: Water User Associations are the focal point (with Farmer Irrigation Associations to be developed). | | | | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ How women and men were involved in decision making – cite references in activity documents to special measures to encourage full participation in decision making | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Education: through the SMC. ◆ Health: through the CMC. ◆ Savannah: Committees with female participants to be formed. ◆ Irrigation: Committees with female participants to be formed. | | | | |
| <p>8. Cost Effectiveness</p> | | | | | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Alternatives examined for meeting food aid objectives | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Education: food aid was cited as the best incentive in a food deficit area. ◆ Health: food aid was cited as the best incentive in a food deficit area. (While food is the central part of improving malnutrition, a more extensive package of interventions is needed to address the root causes of malnutrition.) ◆ Savannah and Irrigation: food is one input among many in this project. Food is specifically needed to replace income from other activities that farmers forego to participate in the scheme. It also ensures that coping strategies are not damaged during participation in the project. | | | | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Measures introduced to minimize costs | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ local purchase ◆ Use of a UNV for monitoring purposes ◆ (forward looking: get other players involved to share technical inputs, expertise, infrastructure and budget) | | | | |

| 9. Technical Quality | | | | | |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|--|--|--|
| ◆ Activity appraisal mission? | ◆ yes for Feeder Roads, Savannah, Education and Health. | | | | |
| ◆ At what stages of programme cycle was technical expertise used? | ◆ Activity appraisal stage as above. Evaluation stage for the Health project. | | | | |
| ◆ From Where (FAO,ILO,UNESCO,WHO)? | ◆ Feeder Roads (ILO) Savannah (FAO), Education (UNESCO), Health (WHO). | | | | |
| ◆ Criteria used for sustainability of assets? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Irrigation: when systems are in place to ensure maintenance and continued support (scheme to be maintained and operated by the communities. Community contribution through marketing of agricultural products at profitable prices.) ◆ Education: community awareness is such that girls are sent to school without an incentive. Education is sustainable by nature. ◆ Health: Improved family income. ◆ Savannah: Increased incomes and consequently, increased food security. | | | | |

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| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Conditions under which WFP assistance no longer required – cite reference in activity plan | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Health: As the project makes impact in one area, assistance was to be phased out to allow other areas to benefit. This has not happened. Income generating activities were to be added to the project to improve household food security which, in turn, would enable food aid to be phased out. This has not happened to date as the government is having trouble meeting its commitments. ◆ Education: A planned phase out of WFP food aid is envisioned by inter-sectoral collaboration with MoA to train beneficiaries to increase and diversify their food supply, and collaboration with the Ministry of Social Welfare to initiate income generating activities. This is yet to begin. ◆ Savannah: improved incomes (to be detailed). ◆ Irrigation: improved incomes (to be detailed). | | | | |
| <p>10. Market Impact</p> | | | | | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Analysis of food aid imports or local purchase impact on local markets | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Not discussed in the CP. ◆ Health and Education: standard analysis of food imports and local purchase on local markets included and found no negative impact. | | | | |
| <p>11. Demonstrating Results</p> | | | | | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Performance indicators established and in use? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Education: enrolment, attendance, drop out rates, comparison to non-ration schools, • Health: yes -- used in quarterly reports • Savannah: being established • Irrigation: being established | | | | |

Annex 3: Checklist for Meeting the Commitment to Women and Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective

| Essential Elements of Commitments to Women and Gender Mainstreaming Policy | Detailed Observations | Level of CP Coherence With Commitments of Women and Gender Mainstreaming Policy | | | |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|-----|----------|
| | | Very High | High | Low | Very Low |
| Commitment I: Provide Direct Access to Appropriate Food for Women | | | | | |
| Does the Country Programme make a real effort to get food into the hands of women, e.g. through women's ration cards? | Yes. Two of the HRD projects require that women (mother) collect ration on behalf of beneficiaries. | | ✓ | | |
| Do the CP activities address micro nutrient deficiencies amongst women and children? | Yes. | | ✓ | | |
| Do the CP activities consider local cooking and eating habits? | Yes. | | ✓ | | |
| Have women been consulted in determining the food basket? | At the governmental level. It is not certain whether local communities were directly involved. | | | ✓ | |
| Are female-headed households given special attentions because of their greater poverty and time constraints? | This does not seem to be a factor in the CP | | | | ✓ |
| Does the CP make an effort to reduce the security and/or health risks women face when collecting food? | Not necessarily. Specific mention not made in CP | | | | ✓ |
| Commitment II: Take Measures to Ensure Women's Equal Access to and Full Participation in Power Structures and Decision-making | | | | | |
| Does the CP address women's strategic needs, i.e., use an approach that challenges traditional gender roles and empowers women? Describe how. | Not strategically | | | ✓ | |
| Does it address gender relations? Does it bring men into the dialogue around the issues of women's status? | Yes. | | | ✓ | |

| Commitment III : Take Positive Action to Facilitate Women's Equal Access to Resources, Employment, Markets and Trade | | | | | |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---|---|---|--|
| Are country Programme resources deliberately targeted to women and girls where there is a big gender gap, i.e. of 25%? (This includes most WFP-assisted countries.) What is done? | Yes as well all the other projects have women targeted as major beneficiaries. | | ✓ | | |
| Does the CP have incentive programmes to address the gender gap in primary Education? What are they? | Yes. By providing take home ration to families of girls achieving specified attendance rates. | ✓ | | | |
| Do women participate in FFW? As labourers or also as decision-makers? Do they control the assets created? | Yes. Mostly as labourers. However in view of the fact that almost all technical and supervisory staff of government departments specifically targeted for assistance are men, it is doubtful if many women participants will be in decision- making position .known since project is not on going CP does not specify | | ✓ | | |
| Is there any opportunity in the CP for women to learn new skills through FFT for greater development sustainability? | Yes, however skills training does not specifically target women for | | ✓ | | |
| Does the CP engage in advocacy under the CP on behalf of women? For gender equity? To leverage resources for partnership work? | Yes. | | ✓ | | |
| Commitment IV: Generate and Disseminate Gender-Disaggregated Data for Planning and Evaluation | | | | | |
| Are the M&E systems used in the CP sensitive to gender? Explain how. | Not necessarily since data Are not gender disaggregated | | | ✓ | |
| Is qualitative information sensitive to gender also collected? | Yes | | ✓ | | |
| Does the CP look at inputs, outputs outcomes and impact from a gender perspective? | Not strategically. There is no indication from majority of the projects to suggest that specific attention has been paid to attaining outcomes and impacts from a gender perspective. However, by default, the programme ensures that inputs and outputs are gender sensitive even though this might not be specifically presented in monitoring and evaluation reports. | | | ✓ | |

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