

# A Report from the Office of Evaluation

*Full Report of the Joint WFP/UNHCR Evaluation of SUDAN PRO 4168.5 and PRRO 6189.0* 

(15 March - 04 April 2001)

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# Acknowledgement

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Responsibility for the opinions expressed in this report rests solely with the authors. Publication of this document does not imply endorsement by WFP or UNHCR of the opinions expressed.

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# Acronyms

CARE Care Relief Everywhere	
CLU Logistic Unit, Commissioner for Refugees	
COR Commissioner for Refugees (Ministry of the Interio	or)
EDP Extended Point of Delivery	
EMOP Emergency Operation	
FDP Final Distribution Point	
FFW Food for Work	
GOS Government of the Sudan	
LOU Letter of Understanding	
MOU Memorandum of Understanding	
MUAC Mid-upper Arm Circumference	
NGO Non-governmental Organization	
PDM Post Delivery Monitoring	
PRO Protracted Refugee Operation	
PRRO Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation	
SCF UK Save the Children Fund, United Kingdom	
SFP Selective Feeding Programme	
TB Tuberculosis	
TOT Training of Trainers	
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	
USD Dollars of the United States	
WFP World Food Programme	

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#### TECHNICAL REPORTS PREPARED BY MISSION MEMBERS ARE AVAILABLE FROM THE OFFICE OF EVALUATION UPON REQUEST

# 1. INTRODUCTION

In "chronic" refugee emergencies like in the Sudan the distinction between emergency and recovery has become blurred since the first refugee crossed the Sudanese border in 1967.

Big agricultural inputs had improved self-reliance in land-based refugee camps (then called settlements) in the 1980s and induced UNHCR/COR to introduce community participation in the camps, meanings that refugees had to cover service costs and pay for water and food distribution.

In the 1990s it became evident that self-sufficiency of the refugees in land-based as well as in wage-based camps could not be achieved. Donor fatigue resulting in the elimination of agricultural inputs, the political insecurity in Eritrea preventing repatriation and the stance of the Sudanese Government (not allowing refugees to integrate locally) left no other choice for WFP and UNHCR but to continue its food aid in the 1990s. This conclusion was confirmed by two jointly conducted socio-economic surveys in 1997 and 1999 which found that less than 50 % of the refugees have access to land.

After the census of 1996 the refugee population dropped by 52 % UNHCR reduced its own budget as well as the one of COR (e.g. personnel was cut by 50 %). Further UNHCR cuts of global and country budgets occurred. To the detriment of the refugees COR did not apply linear budget cuts but reduced staffing and services in the refugee camps disproportionally.

The long standing operational experience of 34 years has, so far, withstood a thorough review of the new joint working arrangements as proposed by the global MOU WFP – UNHCR. Some possible arrangements are now recommended to be adopted, mainly the shifting from UNHCR to WFP of responsibilities for operation, maintenance and repair of EDP warehouses, final food distribution and conclusion of a tripartite agreement WFP – UNHCR – COR on distribution modalities and reporting responsibilities.

Under PRO 4168.05 the health and nutritional status of refugees in camps could be improved. The planned phasing out of the ten feddan refugee farmers was not implemented due to the findings of the joint WFP – UNHCR – COR food assessment mission of September 1999 which recommended to provide them with half ration of cereals and full ration of non-cereals. The additional food requirements could be covered as no FFW activities took place.

The implementation of PRRO 6189.00 was hampered in general by a renewed influx of 94,000 Eritrean refugees in May/June 2000 which took most of the energy of the WFP and UNHCR staff for five months. The incursion of rebel forces in Kassala on 8 November 2000 made a relocation of the WFP and UNHCR field staff for 40 days necessary. Ramadan in December 2000 also slowed down the taking up of the PRRO.

At the inception of PRRO 6189.00 (end of April/beginning of May 2000), registration for repatriation of Eritreans was underway and UNHCR did not want to give wrong signals by replacing the old illegible ration cards which might suggest that a continued stay in the Sudan was expected. As the available refugee figures stem from the last census of 1996, with an update in 1998, no precise information on numbers of refugees was available.

As a consequence, the combined strategy of distributing full rations to vulnerable groups of Eritrean refugees and reduced food rations to the others failed, as targeted feeding was not possible. Thus, lacking the basis to allocate and distribute food in the proposed targeted way, WFP undertook to distribute half rations to all beneficiaries. This lack of database had further implications, as Food Allocation Plans could not be designed properly and this led to delays in food deliveries to EDPs. The checking of the beneficiaries' entitlements during food distributions against the COR masterlist depended on the good memory of the responsible COR storekeepers as up to 65 % of ration cards per camp were illegible.

Food distribution monitoring was faced with the same difficulties and the regular joint UNCHR -WFP food distribution monitoring visits to refugee camps of the past occurred less frequently over the past few months and were undertaken almost unilaterally by WFP. Tripartite high-level Food Coordination Meetings WFP – UNHCR – COR are attended by relatively junior UNHCR field officers. A continued cutting of the UNHCR budget leaves vacant posts in the field.

Integration is not a GOS policy and, therefore, not a viable durable solution. After the cessation clause for Ethiopian refugees in March 2000 some 5397 have still not left and are presently screened by UNHCR. From the influx of Eritrean refugees of last year 27,000 (catered for under the separate EMOP 6250.0) have not yet left, adding to the remaining 121,012. UNHCR is soon expected to pronounce a cessation clause for all Eritrean refugees. Previous experiences indicate that also the latest repatriation schedule may be over optimistic.

## 2. ORIGINS AND OBJECTIVES

WFP has provided food to refugees in Sudan for over three decades. The vast majority of these refugees originated from Ethiopia and Eritrea, fleeing civil conflict and political instability often exacerbated by natural disasters such as drought and famine. The first major influx of Ethiopians occurred in 1967 following which there was a continuous flow of refugees to the Sudan. The next major influx of refugees was in 1984-1985 when over one million people crossed the border. Cumulatively a total of 1,380,716 refugees have been supported by WFP with food assistance.

Several postponements of the mission, due to new emergency operations and security risks, were the reason to assess not only the achievements of PRO 4168.05 (which ended in April 2000) but also the mid-term achievements of the successor PRRO 6189.00.

Although a large number of refugees have returned over the years, WFP continued to assist 132,931 Ethiopian and Eritrean refugees under PRO 4168.05. Assistance to refugees has been through emergency interventions and protracted relief operations. Apart from supplying daily food rations to all refugees, WFP has provided support to selective feeding programmes with special attention given to malnourished children (under 80% weight for height), pregnant and nursing mothers and TB patients at a total cost of USD 20,459,719.

WFPs main objective under PRO 4168.05 was: a) to maintain and improve the health and nutritional status among camp based refugees until repatriation; and b) assist in increasing self reliance and reducing dependence on food aid.

PRO 4168.05 began in November 1998 and terminated in April 2000 (18 months) with a total caseload of 132,931 Ethiopian and Eritrean Refugees. Refugees under this operation were 91%

Eritrean and 9% Ethiopian. Refugees reside in 22 camps in Eastern Sudan classified into three categories:

- *Reception camps*: with 47% of the refugee population (62,009),
- *Wage-based camps*: with 30% of the caseload (39,555) and
- Land-based camps: 23 % of the refugee population (31,367).

The current project, PRRO 6189.00 - 'Food Assistance for Eritrean and Ethiopian Refugees' - is operational from May 2000 to October 2001 (18 months) at a total cost of USD 15,114,917. The project as written was expected to assist 132,931 beneficiaries for the month of May and 121, 012 from June 2000 to October 2001. Based on the objectives and goals, PRRO 6189.00 was expected to focus on:

- a) complete voluntary repatriation for Ethiopian refugees in May 2000 and commence and continue this process for Eritrean refugees over the 18 months of the project;
- b) b) vulnerable feeding for female headed households, children under-five, pregnant and nursing mothers, TB patients all together 68,095 refugees receiving a full ration and targeted feeding for all other 52,971 refugees receiving a half ration; and
- c) c) increasing participation of women refugees in general food management and providing them with skills which could assist their timely integration once they chose to return to their countries of origin.

UNHCR remains the lead agency with responsibilities to oversee camp management, food distribution, provision of non-food items and social services as well as its usual protection role. The WFP – UNHCR Memorandum of Understanding (last revision 1997) involved WFP to a greater extent in the monitoring and evaluation of food distributions. In this regard the Joint WFP – UNHCR evaluation provided an opportunity to review the levels of co-operation between the two agencies.

## 3. PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF EVALUATION

The scope of the mission was:

- to examine the achievements against the objectives of PRO 4168.05 and PRRO 6189.00 and the transition from one to the other;
- to examine efficiency and effectiveness of WFP's response to the problems faced by the refugee population;
- to identify and examine factors which substantially influenced the collaboration between WFP and its partners;
- to critically examine existing coordination mechanisms between WFP UNHCR and the implementing partner COR from an independent point of view.

# 4. METHODOLOGY

Briefing by WFP HQ staff and initial desk review of WFP documents took place in Rome between 12 and 14 March. In Sudan representatives and staff of WFP and UNHCR as well as those of the Commissioner for Refugees (COR) were met in Khartoum on 17 and 18 March and in Es Showak on 20 and 21 March. Field visits to 11 of 23 refugee camps in the Gedaref and Kassala area were made from 21 to 29 March. Refugee camp visits began with introductory remarks by the camp manager, followed by a question and answer session with selected camp officials and concluded with interviews of refugees selected individually by each of the three team members without the presence of any WFP/Sudan, UNHCR or COR official. During the debriefing of the WFP and UNHCR sub-offices and the regional office of COR in Es Showak held on 30 March the mission's findings were presented and checked against positions held by the participants. At country level in Khartoum on 2 April the mission presented its draft aide memoire (findings and recommendations) which met with the general approval of the WFP and the UNHCR Representatives as well as the Commissioner for Refugees.

## 5. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The present report is a more elaborate version of the Evaluation Summary Report which is based on the Aide Memoire and the comments of the concerned parties (WFP, UNHCR and COR Khartoum) offered during the presentation of the findings and recommendations on 2 April 2001.

#### 5.1 Implementation Environment

#### **MOU Impact**

Over the 34 years since the first refugees arrived in Eastern Sudan, WFP and UNHCR have come to fine-tune their operation mode adapting to the specific requirements of the Sudan. This long standing operational experience has, so far, withstood a thorough review of the new joint working arrangements as proposed by the global WFP – UNHCR Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). Some of these arrangements have already been in place, have partly fallen into disuse and are now recommended to be revived (mainly co-ordination and collaboration mechanisms, see below). Others, such as the formal association of UNHCR in a tripartite Letter of Understanding (LOU) might be difficult to introduce with regard to existing long-time separate arrangements of WFP and UNHCR with the GOS. Some of these arrangements might in fact improve efficiency and overall performance of the operation. In some cases, it is tehrefore recommended that they be adopted: these are: shifting of responsibility for operation, maintenance and repair of EDP warehouses and for the final food distribution from UNHCR to WFP and the conclusion of a tripartite agreement WFP – UNHCR – COR on distribution modalities and reporting responsibilities.

## **Project Funding**

All funds for both refugee projects in Eastern Sudan under review are channelled either through UNHCR or WFP. External financial support to the five local NGOs has not been checked in detail as their impact is restricted to the health sector and their budgets are submitted to UNHCR for funding.

#### **Problems and Constraints**

At the inception of PRRO 6189.00 (end of April/begining of May 2000), registration for repatriation of Eritreans was underway and UNHCR did not want to give wrong signals by replacing the old illegible ration cards which might suggest that a continued stay in Sudan was expected. This resulted in the impossibility to allocate and distribute food in the targeted way

proposed by the tripartite (WFP, UNHCR and COR) 1999 food assessment mission of 1999 and designed accordingly (i.e. reduced rations to all Eritrean refugees and full rations to targeted vulnerable groups of Eritrean refugees) WFP undertook to distribute half rations to all beneficiaries.

Between April and May, it became clear that Ethiopians would not leave, as UNHCR had to finalise repatriation procedures projected to be ready by August 2000. As no food was available for this caseload under PRO 4168.05, WFP took the 3 months repatriation package and divided it into half rations lasting six months. WFP took 2 months rations from PRO 4168.05 stocks and one repatriation package from PRRO 6189.00 stocks to satisfy the Ethiopians' needs until end of August (starting in March as per cessation clause). By August spontaneous repatriation under EMOP 6250 occurred (new caseload of Eritreans); after the needs were reduced WFP agreed to have the Ethiopians fed under PRRO 6189.00 from the excess stocks of the EMOP.

The project implementation was hampered in general by a renewed influx of refugees from May 2000 onwards. A total of 94,000 Eritreans benefited from WFP food aid under EMOP 6250.00, which took most of the energy of the WFP and UNHCR staff for five months. Then came the incursion of rebel forces in Kassala on 8 November 2000, which made necessary a relocation of the WFP and UNHCR field staff for 40 days. Ramadan in December 2000 also slowed down the implementation of the PRRO.

#### **Recommendations:**

- UNHCR and WFP are to update jointly the number of beneficiaries in refugee camps with UNHCR funding: immediate handing out of new temporary ration cards in camps without repatriation under the reaffirmed tripartite agreement Eritrea Sudan UNHCR until September 2001; in other camps after the first repatriation.
- UNHCR to share the new masterlist with WFP and COR.

#### Appropriateness and Impact of Food Aid

Despite UNHCR's extensive assistance, attempts at achieving self-sufficiency for the refugees in land-based and in wage-based camps failed. This left no other choice for WFP and UNHCR but to continue its food aid in the 1990s. Interestingly, UNHCR has never documented this change of approach from promoting self-sufficiency in refugee settlements to care and maintenance in refugee camps in a specific policy document. The socio-economic survey of SCF in 1997 confirmed the appropriateness of continued food aid.

In Kassala State where most of the refugee camps are located the local cereal production amounts to 300,000 MT and WFP pro-rated distributions do not exceed 20,000 MT per year. The Ministry of Agriculture of Kassala State states that the influence of refugees bringing cereals to the local market has only an influence on the micro-economic situation around the refugee camps and not on the food situation in Eastern Sudan as a whole.

#### 5.2 Co-ordination and Partnership Arrangements

#### **Policy Co-ordination**

The cessation clause for Ethiopian refugees was announced in September 1999 and came into force on 1 March 2000. The tripartite agreements Eritrea – Sudan – UNHCR resulted in an information campaign and ensuing registration of Eritreans for voluntary repatriation in April and May 2000 (i.e. prior to the renewed outbreak of hostilities between Eritrea and Ethiopia on 18 May 2000). These were the reasons for UNHCR to concentrate for the last two years mainly on repatriation and providing only basic care and maintenance for the refugees (Agreements UNHCR – GOS for the years 2000 and 2001).

UNHCR was opposed to the exchange of new ration cards for the 121,012 Eritrean refugees at a time when preparations for the repatriation operation were in an advanced stage. The important percentage of illegible ration cards made impossible the targeting of food aid and, consequently, resulted in an ad-hoc change of the food ration design at the inception of PRRO 6189.00.

The issue had almost been resolved in 1999 when UNHCR stopped the whole exercise. COR had requested to have its services for the updating and issuing of new ration cards paid in addition to the salaries and allowances agreed with UNHCR under the Agreement of that year.

When, in the late 1980s, important agricultural inputs made self-reliance of land-based refugees seem feasible UNHCR began to promote community participation and COR undertook to cover their service cost by having the refugees pay for food distributions (porters and scooping) and for water in the camps.

Over the years it became evident that integration is not a GOS policy and, therefore, not a viable durable solution. UNHCR's and WFP's attempts to achieve success with refugee self-reliance could, therefore, only be temporary as the renewed dependency on food aid of land-based refugees shows clearly; notwithstanding this fact they still are paying for food distribution costs and for water.

Food Coordination Meetings, formerly called for either by UNHCR or COR, now take place upon WFP initiative and in accordance with an agenda formulated by WFP. These high-level meetings were held on a monthly basis but now sometimes one or two months are missed; when UNHCR participated only a junior field officer was attending.

The timing of monitoring and reporting procedures as agreed between WFP and COR was not adhered to by the latter, e.g. the final report for PRO 4168.05 was submitted on 15 March 2001 instead of 31 July 2000. No interim reports were presented at all and the accounting for the sale of empty containers was inadequate and insufficient.

#### **Recommendations:**

- UNHCR to provide again food and water free of charge to the refugees.
- UNHCR to participate again with a decision-maker in the regular tripartite WFP UNHCR COR Food Coordination Meetings.

#### WFP and UNHCR Roles

UNHCR continues to be the lead agency in refugee affairs with responsibilities to oversee camp management, food distribution, provision of non-food items and social services as well as its usual protection role.

After the influx of Eritrean refugees in 1984-85, the total refugee caseload amounted to one million refugees. Soon afterwards there was a change of UNHCR policy: in sanitation, community services and environment as well as food distributions, community participation of refugees was the key word. COR undertook to cover the service cost by having the refugees pay for water and for food distribution. As important agricultural inputs had improved self-reliance in land-based refugee camps (then called settlements) this was part of the strategy leading towards sustainability.

In the 1990s, it became evident that self-sufficiency of the refugees in land based as well as in wage based camps could not be achieved. Donor fatigue resulting in the elimination of agricultural inputs, the political insecurity in Eritrea preventing repatriation and a negative stance of the Sudanese Government not allowing refugees to integrate locally left no other choice for WFP and UNHCR but to continue its food aid in the 1990s. This conclusion was confirmed by two socio-economic surveys in 1997 and 1999, which found that less than 50 % of the refugees have access to land.

When the goal of self-reliance of land-based refugees proved to be no exit strategy in the Sudan, UNHCR reduced its objective to care and maintenance of the refugees; complementary food commodities are no longer made available.

After the census of 1996 (which was the first time UNHCR got involved), the refugee population dropped by 52 %. New assessment of refugee needs and implementation implications for COR led to budget cuts at UNHCR and as a consequence of COR (e.g. personnel was cut by 50 %). Since then further UNHCR budget cuts occurred due to global budget cuts and reduced donor funding for the Sudan project. COR did not apply linear budget cuts but reduced staffing and services in the refugee camps.

The warehouse management at the Extended Delivery Points (EDPs) by UNHCR's implementing partner COR was not in accordance with WFP standards nor were repair and maintenance of the warehouses. At the end of last year, UNHCR sent a formal request to WFP asking to take over. This led to the drafting of a Letter of Understanding (LOU) between WFP and COR on warehouse management.

WFP has assumed the responsibility to purchase and deliver basic food commodities to the warehouses at the EDPs. UNHCR cut their budget for warehouse management, repair and maintenance of warehouses and delivery to FDPs. As a result, distribution of food rations and monitoring of the process suffered. To improve this situation UNHCR asked WFP to take over these additional responsibilities. Correspondingly a LOU WFP – COR was prepared and is to be signed soon.

Some years back UNHCR had to change its objective from achieving self-reliance for refugees in land-based camps to care and maintenance and repatriation as donor fatigue drastically reduced the formerly heavy agricultural inputs and GOS did not make integration part of its policy. This, together with the budget cuts, has brought refugees in land-based camps from near

self-sufficiency back to nearly complete dependency on food distribution. But refugees still are paying for water and food distribution.

#### **Recommendations:**

- Finalise and sign as soon as possible the LOU WFP COR on warehouse management and repairs/maintenance.
- Investigate possibility of responsibility transfer from UNHCR to WFP for transport of all basic food commodities from the Extended Point of Delivery (EDP) and for their final distribution.
- Conclude a tripartite WFP UNHCR COR agreement on distribution modalities and responsibilities for reporting on distribution and use of food commodities.
- All services under the yearly agreement between UNHCR and COR should again be provided free of charge to the refugees.
- WFP and UNHCR to undertake a new socio-economic survey through an international consultant to analyse the dependency of refugees in the various categories of camps on food distribution and to identify and measure their coping mechanisms.

#### **Project Partnerships**

Co-ordination between WFP and UNHCR could be improved further by regularly exchanging policy documents and agreements with GOS. Such an exchange of information is, so far, mainly assured informally at Khartoum level. At Showak level existing WFP – UNHCR co-ordination and collaboration mechanisms in the field of planning and monitoring have fallen into disuse partly due to the lack of UNHCR funds for human resources to fill existing posts. An important seniority gap between the heads of sub-offices tipping the balance heavily towards UNHCR did not contribute to overcome existing co-operation deficits.

The regular joint UNCHR and WFP visits to refugee camps to monitor food distributions of the past (with issues being addressed jointly) occur now rarely and are often undertaken unilaterally by WFP (keeping UNHCR informed).

Over the years, UNHCR and COR have developed a working relationship which does not facilitate the implementation of agreements concluded on a yearly basis. This stems mostly from financial issues, due to the fact that COR does not respect budget lines, does not properly liquidate working advances, does not report on sales procedures of water, lacks accountability for trucks, has not implemented computerised accounting and does not submit audit certificates (UNHCR audit observations of 18 May 2000). Supervision proves to be difficult as COR is not only UNHCR's implementing partner but also represents the Government of Sudan in its relations with UNHCR. This adds a political dimension to finding solutions for implementation disagreements. Tax exemption on imported non-food items is another area of misunderstanding which can lead to rupture of supplies to refugee camps, (e.g. of drugs and lubricants for water pumps).

WFP's working relationship with COR suffers from the non-adherence of COR to agreed timing of project monitoring and reporting procedures (LOU WFP – COR). The final report for PRO 4168.05 was submitted seven months late, no interim reports were presented at all and the accounting for the sale of empty containers was inadequate and insufficient.

Since the mid-1990s, International NGOs are no longer involved in implementing refugee projects. Local NGOs are only active in the health sector; they are: Islamic African Relief Agency, Benevolence International Foundation, Sudanese Red Crescent, Human Appeal International, Global Health Foundation and Sudan Council of Churches (until 2000).

#### **Recommendations:**

- Institutionalise exchange of policy papers, agreements with GOS and project documents as well as institutionalise monthly co-ordination and planning meetings at Khartoum level.
- Revive joint WFP UNHCR camp visits.
- Institutionalise monthly co-ordination and planning meetings at Showak level.
- Upgrade the WFP post of head of sub-office Showak and fill it as soon as possible.

#### Impact of GOS Policy

Integration is not a GOS policy and, therefore, not a viable durable solution. Repatriation needs to take into account the different circumstances of the various refugee populations. Of the remaining 11,919 Ethiopian refugees under PRRO 6189.00, 6,522 were officially repatriated by March 2001 but the remaining 5,397 are still in Sudan (mainly in camps). Of the new influx of about 94,000 Eritreans after the outbreak of renewed hostilities between Eritrea and Ethiopia in May 2000, 44,000 returned spontaneously and 25,000 returned with the support of UNHCR. This still leaves 27,000 refugees who came last year adding to the remaining 121,012 Eritreans in Sudan. Under the latest agreement between Sudan – Eritrea – UNHCR signed on 23 March 2001, 62,000 refugees are planned to be repatriated this year (to begin in June 2001) and the rest by the end of 2002. During the course of this year UNHCR is expected to pronounce a cessation clause for all Eritrean refugees coming into force probably at the beginning of 2003.

Repatriation has in recent years not only reduced the refugee population in Sudan but also led to UNHCR reducing the COR budget. This perspective does not enhance smooth repatriation procedures as previous experiences have clearly shown (e.g. repatriation of Ethiopians expected for mid-1998 started only in November 2000) and might prove also the latest repatriation schedule to be over optimistic.

Some of the Eritrean refugees have stayed in Sudan since 1967 and show no interest in returning to "their country of origin" (Eritrea was not an independent state when they left their homes) or are too weak to do so. They have children and even grandchildren some of whom have never lived outside of refugee camps.

#### **Recommendations:**

- WFP to immediately begin drafting a PRRO 6189.01 (projected inception date: November 2001) with implementation mechanisms allowing for a flexible response in case actual repatriation does not match planned UNHCR figures.
- Conduct joint WFP UNHCR COR food needs assessment as a basis for PRRO 6189.01 as soon as possible.
- Define an approach to take care of vulnerable Eritreans who will stay beyond the coming cessation clause.
- WFP to be invited as formal observer to the meetings of an eventually established repatriation UNHCR GOS commission

#### 5.3 Project Implementation

#### Quantity of food ration

The general food ration distributed by WFP to the refugees in Eastern Sudan consists of wheat, pulses (mostly green or yellow peas, sometimes lentils), vegetable oil, sugar and salt. The full ration provides approximately 2100 kcal per person per day, as is recommended in the WFP/UNHCR guidelines of 1997. This is enough food for the beneficiary to live a healthy life, with light levels of activity.

Under PRO 4168.05 food rations were to be distributed according to the type of camp. The refugees in the reception and wage-based camps received full rations throughout the operation period.

In the land-based camps reduced food rations were to be distributed because households were able to grow food for themselves and more so in the 10 feddan than the 5 feddan camps. Therefore they only needed food aid as a supplement to their own products. In the land-based camps where 5 feddan plots have been allocated, half cereal rations and full non-cereal rations were distributed. In the 10 feddan land-based camps the refugees received the same as the 5 feddan camps during the first six months. Their ration was reduced to half cereals and half non-cereals for the last 12 months. Based on a survey carried out in 1999 the planned reduction of the ration in the 10 feddan camps to no cereal was not carried out to prevent malnutrition levels from rising, as not all families had been allocated plots to cultivate. See Annex 2 for the planned and actual distribution under PRO 4168.05.

Under the current PRRO 6189.00 food rations were to be distributed according to vulnerability of the individual: full rations to vulnerable and half rations (both cereal and non-cereal) to less vulnerable beneficiaries. New ration cards were necessary to implement the food distribution as planned. As they have not yet been replaced, an alternative food distribution is being used.

From May to October 2000 all beneficiaries received half rations of cereals and non-cereals. In November and December full rations were distributed in reception and wage-based camps and half cereal/full non-cereal rations in all land-based camps. Since January 2001 again only half rations are being distributed in all camps, as new ration cards are still not available. It should certainly be avoided in the future that half rations are being distributed to families with limited coping strategies during many months.

A serious problem that a majority of households in all camps face is the fact that the family consists of more people than are registered on the ration card. Because the cards have not been updated since the end of 1998, the rations distributed have to be shared among more individuals than was intended.

#### Quality of food ration

The full ration provided by WFP consists of 500g wheat, 70g pulses, 30g vegetable oil, 20g sugar and 5g salt. The ration is compiled to cover energy and protein needs of the recipients. The vegetable oil is fortified with vitamin A and the salt is iodized. The amount of wheat includes a 10% compensation for milling losses.

The energy, protein and fat content of the ration appears in agreement with the guidelines of 2100 kcal, 10-12% of energy from protein and 17% of energy from fat, when the 10% loss of wheat is taking into account.

Two joint UNHCR/WFP food assessment missions (in 1997 and 1999) mention that the price paid for milling in the camps accounts for 10-15% of the value of the cereal. In addition, during milling part of the total weight is lost (to know the percentage lost this way weighing of grain before and after milling would be necessary, which was not possible during this evaluation mission). These two aspects of payment and loss combined are likely give a loss of 15-20% of the total amount of wheat provided.

The micronutrient content of the food ration is limited. Refugees have to add fresh foods to obtain the necessary intake of vitamins and minerals. In households where some money is available fresh vegetables (such as onion, tomato, okra), spices, coffee and tea are bought. Households that hardly earn any cash money sell part of their food ration (mainly wheat and pulses, but sometimes also oil) to buy those additional products that make the food much more varied and palatable.

#### **Recommendations:**

- Compensate for both the losses during milling and the payment for the milling with at least 15% to obtain an adequate food intake.
- Conduct a small study to measure the exact milling losses and cost of cereal milling to determine the necessary compensation.

#### Acceptability of food ration

The food ration should be culturally acceptable to the beneficiaries. The refugees in Eastern Sudan mainly receive wheat as a cereal, because this is usually donated in kind. Sorghum is much more preferred, therefore, many refugees exchange at least part of their wheat for local sorghum. As they have received wheat for many years, refugees also appreciate using a mixture of wheat and sorghum flour for food preparation.

The pulses distributed are mainly yellow and green peas and sometimes lentils. The refugees prefer lentils and many of them dislike peas and do not always know how to cook them. As a result, peas are often the first part of the food basket sold or exchanged to obtain other foods. WFP has started training women on the nutritional value of pulses and on how to best prepare

peas using the least possible cooking fuel and in varied ways. This appears to improve the consumption of peas by the refugees.

The ration of sugar is hardly ever sold. Most households buy more sugar to add to the amount they receive.

#### **Recommendation:**

Continue with the training of the women on how to utilize the pulses they receive to ensure they make the best use of this nutritious food product.

#### Frequency of food distribution

Throughout PRO 4168.05, the availability of food has only been subject to minimal breaks in the pipeline. Food distribution has been quite regular for most commodities most of the time.

The first six months under PRRO 6189.00 half rations were distributed to all beneficiaries. As the scoops available in most camps are based on full rations and it takes a lot of time to obtain adjusted scoops, several camps changed to bi-monthly distributions.

In January and February 2001 no food distributions took place, because the food allocation plan had not been finished. This was due to the fact that targeting of the food aid as intended under the PRRO was still not possible because of lack of data and a decision had to be made on the mode of distribution in the meantime.

#### Ration reaching beneficiaries?

Refugees appear to be aware of the food they are entitled to receive. Although no Food Basket Monitoring data have been made available to the mission, WFP's post distribution monitoring reports indicate that beneficiaries receive the exact quantities of available food commodities they are supposed to receive. No refugees ever mentioned that they had not received the food they were entitled to when it was available in the camp.

There is no data on the allocation of food within households. Therefore, nothing can be said as to whether available rations are divided according to the individual needs of each member of the household.

#### Total diet and food ration

Most refugees in the reception and wage-based camps indicate that the bulk of the food they consume is provided by the food aid from WFP. However, now that they receive half rations, many mention that the distributed food only lasts them a very short time and they encounter many difficulties in acquiring enough food until the next distribution. Several families that have no source of income of their own say they now eat the food ration only and are not able to add any fresh foods or spices to enhance the taste of the meals.

In the land-based camps the households that own land mentioned that they grow sorghum for their own use and in good harvest years sell part of the harvest. As the harvest in 2000 was not very good, many families mention that they consume all that they harvested and sell part of the

distributed food ration in order to obtain cash needed for services, non-food items and fresh foods.

#### Effectiveness of food assistance

The effectiveness of the food assistance is dependent on more than the food provided itself. Even when the distribution of the food is regular, the effectiveness of the assistance is also dependent on the way the beneficiaries use the food they receive.

Beneficiaries sell or exchange part of their food ration to diversify their diets with other foods, including fresh foods and more preferred staple foods.

At the start of new refugee operations the refugees are supplied with many items, as they are not able to buy any of those themselves. Apart from food and water, they also get housing (materials), blankets, soap and cooking fuel. Furthermore, health care and primary education are provided.

The refugees in Eastern Sudan have been living in the camps for 10 to 30 years. Health care and primary education are still provided for free, food is still being distributed and water is still available from safe sources. However, more day-to-day non-food commodities like soap, blankets, cooking fuel and house repair materials are no longer provided. In addition, the refugees have to pay fees for the food distribution and the water service and when certain drugs are not available at the dispensary, the refugees have to buy them in a local pharmacy.

In order to obtain these services and commodities the refugees have a need for cash money. In almost all households at least one person is trying to earn some money through odd jobs or growing their own crops. However, employment opportunities are scarce, regular employment is almost non-existent and only few households have a piece of land to grow food of which part could be sold.

The only other options left to obtain cash is to sell assets the household owns or to sell part of the distributed food. In fact, a large majority of the households does sell part of their food ration, even though currently only half rations are being distributed.

Consequently, the effectiveness of the food assistance is far from optimal. As the food aid is meant to provide the refugees with the necessary calories to help them live a healthy and active life, it is assumed that most food aid given is also consumed.

#### **Recommendations:**

- Harmonize all assistance given to the refugees by WFP and UNHCR to ensure that the aid provided does not need to be used as a compensation for the lack of other necessary assistance.
- Conduct an extensive food economy survey in all the camps to determine who are the most vulnerable in order to allow for a proper justification of the targeting (more considerations regarding vulnerability and targeting under section "Relevance of Approach and Objectives").
- Assure acceptability of targeting by the refugees.

#### Lessons learned with Regard to Food Assistance to Refugee Operations

Several lessons can be learned from the findings of this mission with regard to food assistance to refugees in general:

• Where food aid is based on the type of camp in which refugees are staying, it has to be taken into account that not all individuals experience the same conditions. In the case of Eastern Sudan: not all refugees in the land based camps actually have access to land. Therefore, careful consideration should be given to what food aid is most appropriate.

When the food items provided are unknown to or disliked by the beneficiaries, effort has to be made to either change the product for a more acceptable and known one or otherwise, education on how to prepare the food item and its nutritional value has to be ensured.

To ensure that food assistance is effective, the utilization of the food by the beneficiaries has to be monitored and the food aid given has to be harmonized with other assistance needed.

#### Health Services

Health clinics are present in all the refugee camps in Eastern Sudan. The clinics are run by Sudanese NGOs. UNHCR is providing the funds for staffing, equipment and inputs. The clinics are opened during office hours and emergency care is available 24 hours.

The clinics are staffed with medical examiners and nurses. Eight doctors are employed for the benefit of the refugees. Hospital beds are available as well as a pharmacy. In most camps a nutritionist is responsible for the implementation of the selective feeding programmes. Home visitors in every camp are responsible for follow-up of outpatients and beneficiaries of feeding programmes and giving education to mothers on feeding practices and hygiene. Newborns and deaths are registered in detail at the clinics.

Drugs were in short supply during the visit of the evaluation team, especially several lifesaving ones like chloroquin tablets and antibiotics. This could lead to unnecessary deaths among refugees that cannot afford to buy the drugs at local pharmacies.

#### **Recommendation:**

• The organizations responsible should make sure that essential drugs are available to the refugees at all times. (Without going into the causes of the absence of the drugs, the organizations involved should find short term solutions to prevent refugees from suffering).

#### Drinking Water and Sanitation

In all camps drinking water systems are provided. As mentioned earlier, refugees have to pay for water, so that pump operators and guards can be paid. Most water systems provide good quality water.

In two camps, Karkora and Um Gargour, the water provided is very saline. As refugees have already used this water for many years, it would be appropriate to investigate the consequences for their health in these specific camps.

In several camps, no water was available due to a lack of lubricants or fuel for the pumps. Refugees had to find water from alternative, less safe, sources.

#### **Current Health Situation**

Incidence of diseases has reduced since 1998, especially malaria and diarrhea. Annex 3 shows the reduction in those diseases and mortality aggregated over all camps.

#### Selective Feeding Programmes

Selective feeding programmes are carried out in all clinics, both supplementary feeding and therapeutic feeding. Registration of admission, attendance and discharge is usually very accurately undertaken by the NGOs.

Therapeutic feeding in Fau 5 has stopped because of lack of water. Nothing has been done to get water in alternative ways.

Weight and height of all children under the age of five are measured monthly. The children with a weight-for-height below 80% of the reference value are admitted to the supplementary feeding programme. They receive a weekly supplement consisting of CSB, oil and sugar, providing 941 kcal per day. According to the UNHCR/WFP guidelines for selective feeding programmes in emergency situations this should be 1000 to 1200 kcal.

Children with a weight-for-height below 70% are admitted to the therapeutic feeding programme. This means they visit the feeding centre daily from around 8 a.m. until 2 p.m., during which time they receive several ready made meals. Those feedings include high energy milk, porridge and fresh foods. The mother or caretaker stays with the child in the centre. In most camps the mother/caretaker also receives one meal during the long morning that she has to stay. This is provided for in the therapeutic feeding ration. For the remainder of the day a premix is given to the caretaker to prepare several more meals for the malnourished child at home.

Discharge from the supplementary feeding programme is done when the weight-for-height of the child reaches over 85%. Most children stay in the supplementary feeding programme for 2.5 to 3 months.

Adults are also admitted to the selective feeding programmes. Pregnant women are enrolled in the supplementary feeding programme from the 6th month of pregnancy for up to 6 months of the lactation period. TB patients, other medical referrals and social referrals can be enrolled in the therapeutic feeding programme for up to a few months when this is deemed necessary by the medical staff.

#### **Recommendation:**

• Increase the supplementary feeding ration to more than 1000 kcal.

#### Effectiveness of Selective Feeding Programme

The effectiveness of the selective feeding programme can be determined by investigating the duration that the beneficiaries receive the feeding. It was not possible within the scope of the evaluation mission to determine the long term running of the programmes and the effectiveness over time. Also the readmission of beneficiaries would be a good indicator of the effectiveness of the selective feeding programmes within the current situation of the refugees.

Pregnant and lactating mothers also receive selective feeding for a total of nine months and more when medically indicated (e.g. anemia). However, no measurements are taken to decide whether some of them might need the extra food before six months of pregnancy or still after six months of lactation. Therefore, the effectiveness of this part of the selective feeding cannot be determined.

#### **Recommendation:**

• Determine the nutritional status of at least the lactating mothers through body mass index (BMI) or mid upper arm circumference (MUAC) to decide whether there is any need for prolonged provision of selective feeding to them to maintain their nutritional status and ability to provide enough milk to the infant.

#### Achievements/Factors regarding Maintenance/Improvement of Health/Nutritional Status

One of the objectives of the PRO and PRRO under evaluation is to maintain or improve health and nutritional status of the beneficiaries. From 1998 to 1999 nutritional status, as measured during the annual nutrition survey has clearly improved and has been maintained until 2000. This is the conclusion when looking at the overall figures of 13% acute malnutrition of children under five in 1998, 8% in 1999 and 8% in 2000.

The improvement from 1998 to 1999 was in fact a general one. All the camps benefited from the increase in the food ration from 1900 to 2100 kcal, a reduced incidence of diseases in 1999 due to less rain and proper vector spraying and relatively regular distribution of the food throughout 1999. Blanket feeding that was implemented in several camps after the nutrition survey of 1998 also improved nutritional status there. However, in the year 2000 half rations were provided during 6 months. This was especially harsh for the beneficiaries in the reception and wage-based camps, as they used to receive full rations previously.

Consequently, the nutrition survey of 2000 shows a clear increase in malnutrition rates in the wage-based camps from 6.9% of malnourished children under five in 1999 to 9.4% in 2000. This is still not an alarming rate, but the survey was carried out shortly after a two-month period of full rations, that will be followed by another 5 months of half rations. At the time the evaluation mission was taking place, the data of the reception camps were not yet complete, so no conclusion can be drawn about those. See Annex 3 for camp-based data on nutritional status from 1998 to 2000.

#### Concerns Regarding the Nutritional Status of Refugees under PRRO 6189.00

Even though the nutritional status of the refugees currently is within acceptable limits in all the camps, some concerns for the future exist because of the way in which PRRO 6189 is being

implemented. The first six months half rations were distributed, followed by two months of full rations, and a planned continuation of another five months of half rations for all camps.

This small amount of food available to the beneficiaries, combined to their need for a minimum amount of cash money (and limited ways of obtaining it), can only result in a deterioration of their health and nutritional status in the long run. As mentioned, the latest nutritional survey does not show this. However, this might just be a matter of time. The nutritional survey only looks at the status of children under five years. It is very well possible that their nutritional status is kept at an acceptable level thanks to the available selective feeding programmes.

A possible indicator of reduced nutritional status or at least reduced availability of food for the children is the number of days required before they can be discharged from the SFP. This number of days may be much higher than in the past, because supplementary feeding is now more a substitute than a supplement with the current food rations. Length of stay should be used as an indicator next to the admission rates to the feeding programmes. The main complication in the use of the admission rates is that they have to be compared with previous years, because admission rates also very with the season.

Another indicator is the nutritional status of older children and adults. In many societies, mothers will forego most of their own food to ensure that their husbands and children at least get something to eat. Therefore, monitoring the nutritional status of the mothers through BMI or MUAC might give a good indication of what is happening within the refugee families.

#### **Recommendations:**

- Increase the food ration during the remaining months of PRRO 6189.00 to at least the level of the previous PRO to prevent rising malnutrition rates among both children and adults.
- Especially in situations where no full rations are provided monitor the nutritional status of older children and women as well as that of children under five.
- Continuously monitor the length of stay of beneficiaries in the selective feeding programmes, to notice changes in overall nutritional status.

#### Food For Work

During the phasing out of PRO 4168.05, Food for Work activities were to replace general food distribution to 10 feddan refugee farmers. CARE, which had previous Food for Work experience in Sudan, had joined a WFP assessment mission to look at possible ways of implementing Food for Work activities. But projects such as tree planting did not seem to be a real incentive for the beneficiaries as repatriation was considered. When CARE was no longer available and no other International NGO was ready to take over implementation the Food for Work idea was no longer pursued. This decision was supported by the fact that very few refugees in land-based camps really had 10 feddan plots, which excluded the planned phasing out. Conditions not having changed during the design stages of PRRO 6189.00, no Food for Work activities were integrated into the operation.

#### **Recommendation:**

• Analyse Food for Work project possibilities (i.e. environmental rehabilitation) and if appropriate design and implement such Food for Work activities (beyond Training of Trainer activities) under the new PRRO 6189.01.

### Logistics

Clearance of incoming food commodities normally takes two weeks; concerned authorities are Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Trade, Ministry of International Co-operation, Ministry of Health, Customs Authority and Sea Port Authority as well as the Sudanese Standard and Meteorology Organization. While shipping documents are processed in Khartoum, WFP assists COR staff in obtaining the exemption; this is usually achieved in an efficient way. Customs and port fees have to be budgeted by the Ministry of Finance in compensation for the "loss of income" of Customs Authority and Sea Port Authority. If the budget line for the yearly global exemption is not well calculated and needs replenishment, this may cause delays in clearance for up to two months.

When exemption papers reach Port Sudan via WFP Khartoum, food commodities are stored in CLU warehouses in Port Sudan. Improper management and stacking procedures in those warehouses resulted in the loss of 700 MT of pulses. WFP and COR Showak develop movement plans to the Extended Points of Delivery (EDPs). WFP contracts transporters on the free market (where strong competition and low fuel prices have led to low transport costs) with CLU organising loading of the trucks, issuing them with waybills (due to Ministry of Finance requirements differing from the WFP waybills) and unloading at the EDPs. Upon early arrival of shipping documents and smooth exemption process, food commodities can be transported directly from the ship to the EDPs; this was possible several times in the year 2000. This saves not only time but also warehousing and handling costs of presently USD 78/MT.

At EDPs watchmen were reduced to two guards per warehouse only, water penetration and infiltration occurred during the rainy season, no proper pest control, sterilization or fumigation was undertaken. Lack of maintenance and repair of warehouses, warehouse compounds and facilities (such as weighing scales, pallets etc.), stationary and salaries for the warehouse personnel induced UNHCR to ask WFP to take over complete responsibility with regard to warehousing (a relevant Letter of Understanding with COR is being finalised) which is in accordance with the global MOU.

No significant pipeline ruptures were observed and the pre-positioning and storing at camp level before the rainy season started was successfully implemented last year.

#### **Recommendations:**

- Promote advance delivery of bill of lading and certificate of origin to WFP Khartoum to facilitate advance clearing on incoming food commodities.
- Have Letter of Understanding between WFP and COR on warehouse management and repairs/maintenance signed as quickly as possible.

#### Gender

Under PRO 4168.05 WFP endeavoured to reinforce the role of refugee women in the management of the relief food. The idea to recruit women to assist in food distribution at an equal share of men did not succeed as only15 women do work as porters and scoopers. On the other hand, during the past three years, cultural and traditional barriers were overcome to a large extent because of women's participation in Elder Committees of the camps. Following the initial nomination by camp managers and male elders, most of these women stood successfully for elections after one year and are now full and active members of the Elder Committees. The objective is achieved fully in the Eastern camps where endeavours to promote the role of women began already three years ago. The fact that these women did not replace the traditional elders but joined and never outnumbered them in the Elder Committees facilitated their acceptance.

In Western camps some of these women had only been informed by the camp manager and the male elders that from now on they were to tell interviewers that they were members of the Elder Committee. The profile of the women elders is rather homogeneous: they are around 30 to 35 years of age, usually well educated (8 grades of the elementary school or secondary school); they have taken courses offered in the camps, they are employed as house visitors, health workers or teachers and also trainer of trainers; they are rarely married and seldom have children.

Promotion of women as members of Elder Committees progressed well under PRRO 6189.00. Further developed was a training-of-trainers (TOT) concept with a food for training component concentrating on women introducing new cooking methods for pulses, use of energy saving stoves and household hygiene. As of December 2000, 1,215 women have been trained in basic hygiene and nutrition.

A similar WFP project will soon be operational with the Sudanese Red Crescent as implementing partner (also male youths will be addressed).

## 5.4 Monitoring

#### Adequacy of Delivery Monitoring

Port Sudan is monitoring the loading and dispatch activities of food commodities and WFP Kassala is monitoring the transport and arrival at EDPs.

The establishment of the three yearly food allocation plans (January to May, June to October – rainy season - November and December) which are the basis for timely delivery to the EDP suffered from the lack of precise refugee numbers (see above census and ration cards). The new deliveries should arrive during the last month of the previous allocation plan which was not possible in December 2000 – the food commodities only arrived towards the end of February 2001.

During the delivery process to EDPs, WFP logistic monitoring detected additional hazards, which could mostly be addressed in time to prevent delays. The main hazards wereas follows: contracted transporters did not provide sufficient transport capacity in time; they used old Fiat trucks from the Suk and take longer than the agreed long-distance trucks. On occasions, transporters first served the easy destinations close to the main road and left the more difficult

accesses for later (WFP contracts on the basis of cheaper rates for easy access and higher rates for difficult access).

Storage and stacking of food commodities in the EDPs is mostly well done but suffers from lack of sufficient pallets and plastic sheets. The fencing of warehouse compounds and lack of adequate maintenance and repair of warehouses jeopardises warehouse management in accordance with WFP standards.

#### Adequacy of Distribution Monitoring

WFP food monitors based in Showak calculate the amount of food required, check stock balances and monitor each food distributions jointly with UNHCR. Food distribution monitoring has been severely hampered by the high percentage of illegible ration cards (up to 65 %).

As the international head of sub-office of WFP Showak has not been replaced since January 2001, one of the only four local food aid monitors assumed the role of Officer-in-Charge reducing the WFP monitoring capacity. UNHCR Showak has not replaced its international logistics officer since early 2001 leaving the sub-office without a mandated focal point for food issues.

In the absence of a specialised logistics officer, UNHCR is not in a position to carry out its food distribution monitoring. UNHCR's national field officers have not participated in food monitoring over the past months. WFP prepares field monitor reports on a monthly basis and shares them with the UNHCR staff in Showak who, in turn, use these documents as a basis for their reports on food issues (their reporting format has no section on basic food issues).

WFP monitors conduct also random surveys of beneficiaries after food distributions; these Post Delivery Monitoring (PDMs) are executed one month after a distribution on a bi-monthly basis. UNHCR Showak does not share any reports with WFP Showak and when the mission asked for such reports they were referred to UNHCR Khartoum.

#### Health and Nutrition Monitoring

Five local NGOs provide health services in the camps. They send monthly reports to the Health and Nutrition Unit of COR and the medical section of UNHCR, both in Showak, containing information on incidence of diseases, admission and discharges of selective feeding programmes, newborns and deaths. Representatives of both UNHCR and COR make regular visits to the camps to monitor health services and identify and solve problems. (NGOs send standardized monthly reports to COR health and nutrition unit, containing the number of births, deaths, morbidity by disease, numbers of children in SFPs, malnutrition rates.)

As mentioned before, annual nutrition surveys are undertaken. These are jointly carried out by UNHCR, WFP and COR.

Monitoring of selective feeding and nutrition status is done by UNHCR through the monthly reports from the NGOs. WFP has set up a Malnutrition Early Warning System to monitor the malnutrition rates in a different way: they compare the numbers of participating children in the feeding programmes in a camp with the previous month. There seems to exist an overlap in data here that could easily be solved by sharing the information provided by the NGOs with WFP as well. However, this should not even be necessary as COR and UNHCR can use the data

available to them to make monthly calculations on the malnutrition situation in each camp. In fact, this would even make the annual nutritional survey superfluous, as monthly data is available on all children under five in all camps, which is also the target group in the nutritional survey.

#### **Recommendation:**

• Use the available data on the numbers of children under five and their height and weight measurements to assess the nutritional status in all the camps on a monthly basis. That way, changes can easily be monitored and thus timely and appropriate action taken and double collection of data prevented.

#### Adequacy of Nutrition related Monitoring

One of the aspects of monitoring is comparing the data from different camps to assess the various situations of the refugees. This is hardly ever done.

Another aspect of monitoring is to obtain an insight in what is happening in the camps over time. To do this, data of several months have to be combined to look at the trends. As this activity is rather complicated and takes a lot of time, it is hardly ever done.

Monitoring is necessary in order to know whether implementation of activities is happening as intended. When problems or constraints are noticed, action has to be taken to improve the situation. An example of where this was done is the implementation of the Training of Trainers, because of observations from the PDMs that pulses are often sold because the refugees do not like them very much. This training programme of women aims to improve the knowledge of the women in the camps on personal and food hygiene, the nutritional value of the WFP food commodities and how to diversify the preparation of pulses.

Another of follow-up action is that observations from different monitoring activities by WFP are discussed during monthly Food Coordination Meetings that are meant to share the information between WFP, UNHCR and COR and to enable the responsible organization to be aware of, and solve problems.

Unfortunately, not all meetings are attended by all three organizations, which sometimes seriously hampers coordination and problem solving.

In short, several monitoring activities related to health and nutrition are undertaken. However, it is not always the right organization that is actually carrying out the tasks and the impression is that sharing of information is very limited and follow-up actions are not undertaken through cooperation between organizations, but rather by stand-alone actions, if at all.

#### **Recommendation:**

• Monitoring should be undertaken jointly by UNHCR and WFP, at least where food and nutrition are concerned. All information derived from monitoring activities by one agency should be shared with the other and appropriate actions should be designed and implemented in coordination.

#### 5.5 Relevance of Approach and Objectives

#### Appropriateness and Feasibility of Targeting

Under PRRO 6189.00 targeting of the general food ration was intended. Due to reasons mentioned before, this was not executed. However, this section will discuss the proposed targeting itself.

Targeting aims to provide full rations to vulnerable groups, identified as being children under the age of five, expectant and nursing mothers, households headed by women and tuberculosis patients (Proposal for project 6189.00, item 15). The same item also states that the rest of the refugees have been assessed to have some elements of recovery and self-reliance in food. However, there is no indication as to where to find this assessment. The evaluation mission assumes that the joint COR/UNHCR/WFP food aid assessment mission of September 1999 is meant here. Their report however only states that several households are more vulnerable than others, but does not state that 'all the rest of the refugees' as indicated in the proposal are found to have some self-reliance. That is of course true for several, but the assumption made in the proposal is not based on any clear evidence.

The choice of the vulnerablegroups in the proposal of PRRO 6189.00 could be correct in itself, but might not be complete. The rest of the refugees cannot be classified as 'non-vulnerable'. Therefore, implementing the project as proposed might be an undertaking that can endanger the health and nutritional status of many refugees.

Another issue is that individual vulnerability as intended under PRRO 6189.00 is probably not the most appropriate. This vulnerability is based on individual physical determinants, while it might be more effective when vulnerability would be based on the ability of the household/family to access income or food. For example, the intention was to give full rations to women heading a household and to children under 5. However, when a woman is head of a household and has four children between 5 and 15 years, the family will receive one full and four half rations for five individuals who might not able to earn any additional income, (unless child labour is considered an option).

When a project like this would be implemented, certain conditions should be met. The nutritional status of the beneficiaries of half-rations should be monitored continuously, to assess the impact of the implementation. This was not foreseen in the implementation as given in the proposal. Furthermore, continuous registration of beneficiaries and their classification into vulnerable or non-vulnerable has to be taken care of, to ensure that individuals that become vulnerable receive an increased ration from the moment they need it. How this is to be implemented has to be thought of carefully in advance.

Another concern that is not discussed or even hinted at in the proposal document is the acceptability of this kind of targeting to the refugees. A report from Save the Children Fund (UK) on a household food economy assessment done in 1997 already mentions this issue. In the recommendations it states: "It is important that lessons should be learned from past experience. Previous attempts to target (the so-called 'vulnerable groups' system) proved unpopular and unwieldy; they were seen as arbitrary (because quotas were imposed), unfair (because some genuinely vulnerable families were always excluded) and tended to create conflict (between COR and the refugees, and between members of the committees)." This remark makes it evident

that any intended targeting needs to be discussed with the refugees and when serious objections exist, alternative distributions have to be used.

When the previous issues have been addressed the issue of feasibility of actual implementation still remains. For example, are families that are calculated to receive 3.5 rations (or any x.5 rations) supposed to receive this half ration? In the field situation it is not easy to scoop half rations during distribution as special scoops are usually needed for this. This has to be given thought as well. When the decision would be to round up all half rations to whole rations (3.5 to 4 etc.) then this extra amount of food has to be budgeted as well. When the rations are rounded down (3.5 to 3), then a good explanation has to be given as why even less is given.

In short, although targeting appears a food distribution system that gives more aid to families more in need, the justification, acceptability and consequences for implementation need to be considered very carefully and discussed with all parties involved.

#### **Recommendations for the future project PRRO 6189.01:**

- The most funded way to decide on targeted general food distribution would be to first undertake an extensive household food economy survey in all the camps and settlements to decide on the most vulnerable.
- Careful consideration should be given to the most appropriate definition of vulnerability in the Sudan context: should targeting be directed at individual or household level?
- Before implementation, the acceptability of the targeting to the refugees has to be assured to prevent problems mentioned before.
- The agreement needs to be obtained of all parties involved in the food distributions.
- All aspects of implementation have to be considered in advance to make sure the implementation will be feasible.
- Continuous monitoring of the impact of targeting on the non-vulnerable is necessary to be able to intervene when negative consequences are noticed.

#### **Relevance of Support Regarding Objectives**

Under PRO 4168.05 the health and nutritional status of refugees in camps could in fact be maintained (first objective). Indicators are the malnutrition statistics of children under five years of age which show even an improvement from 1998 to 1999 (the project began in November 1998 and ended in April 2000).

The second objective of increasing self-reliance and reduce dependence on food aid of refugees with access to land did fail. The planned phasing out of the ten feddan refugee farmers was not implemented due to the findings of the joint WFP – UNHCR – COR food assessment mission of September 1999. A large number of refugees in the ten feddan camps have no access to land but have similar population structures as in the other camp categories (a high percentage of vulnerable); the 1999 assessment mission therefore recommended to provide them with the same ration as the land-based camps with five feddan, i.e. half ration of cereals and full ration of non-cereals. The additional food requirements could be covered as no Food for Work activities took place.

Under objective 1 of PRRO 6189.00 the residual caseload of 11,919 Ethiopian refugees were to receive a one-month repatriation food package under PRRO 6189.00 and a two-month

repatriation food package from carry-over stocks under PRO 4168.05. Between April and May it became clear that Ethiopians would not leave (cessation clause came into effect on 1 March 2000) as UNHCR had to finalise repatriation procedures projected to be ready only by August 2000. As no food was available for this caseload under PRRO 6189.00 WFP took the 3 months repatriation package and divided in into half ration lasting six months.

No revalidation of ration cards (issued after the last census in 1996) was undertaken by UNHCR resulting in a direct and important impact on the implementation of PRRO 6189.00. One day before the inception of PRRO 6189.00, WFP had to take a unilateral *ad-hoc* decision to distribute half rations to all Eritrean refugees. Neither UNHCR nor COR protested but from November to December 2000 WFP increased to full rations because a potential danger was feared if the half rations were to be continued. Then again in January WFP reduced to half ration. This measure is still in force, due to of lack of food for full rations during the last eight months of the project life.

All camps visited had women on the Elder Committees playing an active role in management and organization in general food distribution (objective 3) which has been actively promoted. The promotion of women training commenced under 4168.05 was continued and expanded under the Training of Trainers project.

Project documents if structured in the fashion of a logical framework would provide clearer guidelines for the implementation and would facilitate monitoring and evaluation. Objectives formulated as activities even if measurable are no criteria for the success of a project. The definition of indicators and external factors would give advance guidance with regard to the faced implementation challenges.

#### **Recommendation:**

• Apply the logical framework technique for the elaboration of the imminent PRRO 6189.01 document.

#### Effectiveness PRO/PRRO Approach Regarding Long-term Refugees Support

In "chronic" refugee emergencies like in the Sudan, the distinction between emergency and recovery has become blurred over the past 34 years. With the creation of different camp categories (reception camps, wage-based camps and land-based camps) UNHCR has followed the general WFP approach that different groups have contrasting needs and require different forms of assistance.

Even these differentiations have become blurred. Refugees who have stayed over 30 years in reception camps have developed coping mechanisms that enabled them to overcome the reduction of the food basket to half rations (under PRRO 6189.00). On the other end of the scale refugees in land-based camps (called settlements during the 1980s and early 1990s when heavy agricultural input was available) have suffered from depletion of their lands due to overuse and lack of fertiliser. Their offspring have now own families with dependents but no land at all. On a average basis in land-based camps less than 20 % refugees have 10 feddan but more than 50 % have no land at all. The climatic constraints with recurrent droughts have reduced the chance for satisfactory crops in rain-fed agriculture in general and even more so for refugees. The assumption that refugees in land-based camps have achieved a high degree of self-reliance is, therefore, wrong even if it was true to some extent 10 or more years ago.

Recovery cannot be taken for granted under the prevailing circumstances in the Sudan. Had integration been a viable alternative for the GOS, the previously stated recovery might have turned into development and led to a durable solution for the Eritrean refugees. Recovery no longer seems feasible, which leavesWFP confronted with a protracted refugee and relief situation. Due to these constraints, the new PRRO approach does not appear to equip WFP with a better tool than the old PRO to cope with the intricacies of the Sudan.

#### **Recommendation:**

• Limit the overall objectives of future projects in the Sudan with regard to the old caseload of Eritrean refugees to improve the nutritional well-being of the most vulnerable refugees through targeted food aid and to build assets through Food for Work and Training of Trainers.

# Annexes

## **TERMS OF REFERENCE**

## Evaluation of Sudan PRO 4168.05 "Food assistance for Ethiopian and Eritrean refugees"

#### 1. BACKGROUND

Since the first massive influx from Ethiopia in 1967, there has been an almost continuous stream of refugees into Sudan with a peak during the 1984-85 drought when more than a million people arrived. Over the years, many Ethiopian and Eritrean refugees have returned to their homelands and the present caseload is mainly the result of new influxes in 1990-91 due to civil unrest and drought. WFP has, in collaboration with UNHCR and the Government of Sudan, provided food assistance to Ethiopian and Eritrean refugees in Sudan through a number of emergency interventions (EMOPs) and protracted refugee operations (PROs). Cumulatively, some 1,386,000 refugees have been supported with WFP food aid.

The Commission for Refugees (COR), placed in the Ministry of Interior, is responsible for the coordination of assistance to refugees and for the management of the camps in collaboration with UNHCR. There are three different types of refugee camps in Sudan:

- **reception camps**, originally intended to act as immediate reception centres from which the refugees would later be resettled. However, it has not been possible to resettle most of the refugees who arrived after 1985;
- **wage-based camps**, located mainly in agricultural areas where it was expected that the refugees would be able to find employment; and
- **land-based camps** with most refugees having been allocated five feddans or more of agricultural land.

A Household Food Economy Assessment of the situation of the refugees in camps in eastern Sudan, undertaken in 1997 by the SCF/UK, showed that refugees with access to land had more opportunities for self-reliance than those without land. Refugees allocated 10 feddans were most likely to achieve some degree of self-reliance.

The Assessment also found that refugees in wage-based camps had not been as successful as hoped in finding nearby employment. Consequently, there was little difference in the situation of refugees in the wage-based camps and in the reception centres. The majority in both relied heavily on assistance to meet their food needs.

A socio-economic survey conducted jointly by WFP, UNHCR and COR in 1999 concluded that 40 percent of the refugees residing in land-based camps had not been provided with land. It was also found that a substantial proportion of land originally allocated to refugees was uncultivated due to the discontinuation of technical assistance, (credit, tractor services, seeds and fertilizers), previously funded by UNHCR, and the elimination of agricultural subsidies by the Government.

For planning purposes, the number of beneficiaries of PRO 4168.05 was at the beginning of the operation estimated at 138,000. By early 2000, at the end of this operation phase, a total of 132,931 refugees required WFP assistance of which 11,919 were Ethiopians. On 23 September 1999, UNHCR

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announced the application of the "ceased circumstance" cessation clause to pre-1991 refugees from Ethiopia. This was to be applicable as of 1 March 2000, after which the 11,919 Ethiopians still in the camps would cease to be recognized as refugees and would only be entitled to a repatriation food package from PRRO 6189, the successor of PRO 4168.05. Voluntary repatriation of Eritrean refugees was then not deemed feasible because of unresolved diplomatic tension between the Governments of Sudan and Eritrea.

However, as of early May 2000 no repatriation of Ethiopian refugees has taken place. Considering the difficult situation in Ethiopia, UNHCR has asked WFP to continue distributing food also to the Ethiopian refugees till end August 2000. As, however, the food requirements for Ethiopian refugees in PRRO 6189 were assumed to be limited to a repatriation package, available food resources are insufficient. WFP is, therefore, for the time being distributing only half rations (vulnerable groups receiving a full ration) to these refugees.

With regard to the Eritrean refugees, the situation appears more positive than it was at the time of preparing the PRRO 6189 document. UNHCR has opened an office in Asmara and a tripartite agreement concerning repatriation has been signed between UNHCR and the Governments of Sudan and Eritrea. In a statement dated 10 August 2000, UNHCR reports that since 25 July some 21,000 Eritrean refugees had been voluntary repatriated under their supervision.

#### 2. PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION

The purpose of the evaluation is to examine the achievements against the objectives of PRO 4168.05:

- to maintain or improve the health and nutritional status of refugees in the camps until repatrition (or an alternative solution) is possible; and
- for those refugees with access to land, to help them increase their self-reliance and reduce dependence on food aid.

More specifically, the evaluation mission will examine the efficiency and effectiveness of WFP's response to the problems faced by the refugee population. This refers to all stages of the operation including needs assessments, coordination in planning and programming of food aid, operations implementation including issues of transport, storage and distribution, beneficiary identification, participatory approaches, and monitoring.

The mission will identify and examine the factors which have substantially influenced, positively or negatively, the effectiveness of the collaboration between WFP and its partners (UNHCR, the Government, NGOs) and assess the impact this had had on the performance of the operation. In this context the mission will also examine the working of the current MOU between WFP and UNHCR and its effects on the operation.

This being a joint WFP/UNHCR evaluation, issues of common interest to the two agencies will be emphasized. In connection with its assessment of the effectiveness of WFP/UNHCR cooperation, as mentioned in the previous paragraph, the mission is expected to critically examine existing coordination mechanisms. The mission will also look into policy issues such as the application of the cessation clauses and decisions/actions connected with repatriation and assess their impact on the refugees' situation.

Although the purpose of the evaluation is to assess achievements under the completed PRO 4168.05, the mission will also examine the transition to the current WFP operation PRRO 6189. The evaluation will focus on the situation with regard to three groups of beneficiaries: refugees with land; long staying care and maintenance refugees; and recent arrivals.

The mission will extract lessons learned from the implementation of such a protracted refugee operation based on the findings made regarding the key issues listed below and any other relevant points identified during their work.

#### 3. KEY ISSUES

The mission will in particular examine the following issues:

- needs assessments, issues of vulnerability, nutritional surveys;
- the efficiency and effectiveness of targeting, including criteria used for beneficiary selection, shared understanding/agreement on identification and application of selection criteria;
- the effectiveness of the coordination and cooperation mechanisms between the various partners (WFP, UNHCR, Government, NGOs, etc.);
- the respective roles of WFP and UNHCR in the Sudan context, including areas of complementarity and degree of mutual support;
- role of the WFP/UNHCR MOU (applicability, practicability, etc.) in improving efficiency and overall performance of the operation;
- degree of coordination between WFP and UNHCR policies;
- effectiveness of repatriation and/or integration efforts;
- the appropriateness of the stated objectives, level of achievements in the light of overall assistance provided, local capacities and coping mechanisms;
- scope and usefulness of food-for-work schemes;
- the effectiveness of the selective feeding programme;
- logistics and distribution issues;
- monitoring issues;
- reporting, information sharing;
- food aid provided by WFP: rations, resources situation, pipeline management;
- benefits of the food aid, both intended and unintended;
- provision of non-food items;
- funding of specific development activities to improve the situation of the refugees;
- the manner in which the PRO activities complement, duplicate, overlap or work at cross-purposes with other projects/programmes;
- the extent to which the PRO has addressed the gender issues;
- problems/constraints that have affected the implementation of the PRO.

#### 4. METHOLOGY

The team will use the following methods for collecting the information needed for the evaluation:

- review of documents at WFP headquarters and the Khartoum Country Office;
- discussions with WFP, UNHCR and concerned Government officials;
- field visits to refugee camps in eastern Sudan and interviews with refugees and staff of implementing partners;
- debriefing sessions on departure from Khartoum and at WFP headquarters.

#### 5. TEAM COMPOSITION

The mission will comprise the following members:

- WFP/OEDE consultant team leader; with expertise in evaluation and refugee programmes in Sudan;
- UNHCR team member;
- Nutritionist, WFP/OEDE consultant.

Individual responsibilities and TOR coverage will be finalized at the briefing in Rome. The team leader is responsible for coordinating the mission's work and for the timely preparation of required reports.

#### 6. SCHEDULE AND LOGISTICS

The evaluation is managed by the Office of Evaluation (OEDE), WFP Rome. Logistics support for the mission (transportation, interpretation, preparation of the detailed itinerary for field visits, security clearance, and also relevant briefing documentation for each mission member) will be provided by the WFP Country Office in Khartoum.

The tentative schedule is as follows:

٠	Briefing and initial desk review in Rome	12-14 March
٠	Travel Rome – Khartoum	15 March
٠	In Sudan	16 March – 04 April
٠	Travel Khartoum – Rome	04 April
٠	Debriefing at WFP headquarters	05 April

#### 7. **REPORTING**

The team is expected to produce the following reports:

- an Aide Memoire listing major findings and recommendations for use at the mission's rounding-up meetings with WFP, UNHCR and the Government before leaving Sudan and at the debriefing at WFP headquarters in Rome;
- a recommendation tracking matrix to be discussed with WFP Khartoum before leaving the country. Subsequent action taken in response to the recommendations will be checked by OEDE and the matrix presented to the Executive Board together with the summary report;
- individual mission members' contributions to the summary report, including statistical annexes and technical information, to be submitted within one week after the debriefing in Rome;

• individual mission members' inputs for the mission's full report. To be submitted within three weeks after the debriefing in Rome;

- an evaluation summary report, maximum 5,000 words, to be prepared by the team leader, using the contributions from the mission members. The summary report should be submitted to OEDE within three weeks after the debriefing in Rome;
- a full evaluation report, to be prepared by the team leader on the basis of the technical reports. This report should be submitted to OEDE within six weeks after the mission's debriefing in Rome.

#### 8. PRESENTATION OF THE EVALUATION FINDINGS

The evaluation summary report will be presented to the October 2001 session of the WFP Executive Board (EB.3/01). WFP editors' (RECC) deadline for processing of the evaluation summary is 20 July 2001.

Planned and actual Food Distributions under PRO 4168.05 and PRRO 6189.00

# Planning of rations according to PRO 4168.05 (1 November 1998 – 30 April 2000) and PRRO 6189.00 (1 May 2000 – 31 October 2001) in grams per person per day.

Projectno			PRRO 6189.00				
Subdivision	R/WB	LB5	LB10	LB10	LB10	Vulnerable	Non-
							vulnerable
Period			1/11/98-	1/5/99 –	1/11/99-		
			30/4/99	31/10/99	30/4/00		
Cereals	500	250	250	250	-	500	250
Pulses	70	70	70	35	35	70	35
Veg. Oil	30	30	30	15	15	30	15
Sugar	20	20	20	10	10	20	10
Salt	5	5	5	5	5	5	5

# Actual distribution of rations under PRO 4168.05 and PRRO 6189.00 in grams per person per day.

Projectno		PRO	D 4168.05		PRRO 6189.00			
Subdivision	R/WB	LB5	LB10	LB10	All	R/WB	LB 5+10	All
Period			1/11/98-	1/5/99-	1/5/00-	1/11/00-	1/11/00-	Since Jan
			30/4/99	30/4/00	31/10/00	31/12/00	31/12/00	2001
Cereals	500	250	250	250	250	500	250	250
Pulses	70	70	70	35	35	70	70	35
Veg. Oil	30	30	30	15	15	30	30	15
Sugar	20	20	20	10	10	20	20	10
Salt	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5

R reception camp

WB wage-based camp

LB5 land-based camp, 5 feddan

LB10 land-based camp, 10 feddan

Vulnerable: children under five, expectant and nursing mothers, TB patients and female-headed households Non-vulnerable: everyone not classified under vulnerable

## Morbidity and Mortality among Children under five in all Refugee Camps from 1998 – 2000



# UNDER FIVE MORTALITY





# Malnutrition Rate of children under five by Camp from 1998 to 2000

Name Of Camp	Туре	Sample size	1998		1999		2000	
		N	Ν	%	N	%	N	%
Shagarab	R	900	151	17	100	11	Not a	available
Wad Sharifey	R	896	171	19	101	11	67	7
K.Girba	WB	898	145	16	59	7	97	11
Kilo 26	WB	900	122	14	65	7	84	9
Wad Helew	WB	493	65	13	44	8	59	10
Um Rakoba	LB5	455	35	8	44	9	Repatriated	
Karkora/Um Gargour	LB10	895	87	10	82	9	50	6
Abuda/Um Ali	LB5	870	97	11	77	9	26	6
Hawata/Mafaza	LB5	534	74	14	35	6	54	8
Um Sagata Area	LB10	895	109	12	18	5	82	9
Abu Rakham	LB5	511	46	9	42	9	20	6
Fau 5	WB	134	16	12	8	5	11	7
Suki Area	WB	384	22	6	21	6	21	6
Um Gulja	WB	309	17	6	18	5	Repatriated	
Total		9074	1157	13	714	8	571	8

Rreception camp WB wage-based camp LB5 land-based camp, 5 feddan LB10 land-based camp, 10 feddan