



OFFICE OF EVALUATION

FULL REPORT

of the

EVALUATION OF CAMBODIA PRRO 6038  
“Food Aid for Recovery and Rehabilitation”

10 to 31 January 2000

*Rome, April 2000*

## **Acknowledgement**

The evaluation team visited Cambodia from 10 to 31 January 2000. This document was prepared by the mission team leader, Mr. Jon Bennett and contains the written contributions of the mission's members.

On behalf of the team, the author wishes to extend thanks to all those who facilitated the team's work in Cambodia and in Headquarters.

Responsibility for the opinions expressed in this report rests solely with the authors. Publication of this document does not imply endorsement by WFP of the opinions expressed.

## ACRONYMS

CARERE	Cambodia Area Rehabilitation and Regeneration Project
CO	Country office
CRC	Cambodian Red Cross
CSO	Country Strategy Outline
FFW	Food for work
FSDP	First Socio-economic Development Plan 1996-2000
GTZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer Technische Zusammenarbeit (German Agency for Technical Cooperation)
IDP	Internally displaced person
LDC	Least developed country
LIC	Low income country
LIFDC	Low income food deficit country
LWF	Lutheran World Federation
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MRD	Ministry of Rural Development
NGO	Non-governmental organization
PDRD	Provincial Department of Rural Development
PRO	Protracted Relief Operation
PRRO	Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
VAM	Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping
VDC	Village Development Committee
WFP	United Nations World Food Programme

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### Team composition and schedule

The evaluation team comprised three core members:

Jon Bennett development programming expert/Team Leader

Detlev Puetz socio-economist

Tony Randell logistician

In the final week, the team was joined by Abraham deKock, evaluation officer from OEDE. Two additional independent evaluation reports were prepared by in-country consultants prior to the team's arrival - a nutrition report (Eric Kenefick) and a technical assessment of FFW projects (SAWAC). Both are appended to this report.

The evaluation was undertaken from 10-31 January 2000. Field trips were made to the Northwest (Batambang, Bavel and Samlot), the South East (Kampong Cham and Prey Veng) and to various Social Sector activities in an around Phnom Penh.

### Evaluation Methods

A full TOR for the mission is attached (Appendix 1). In brief, the evaluation sought to clarify the utility of the PRRO as a new programme category, ensuring the effective utilization of resources made available to achieve stated objectives. Key issues examined were: (i) transition from relief through recover and rehabilitation; (ii) facilitation of settlement through food aid; (iii) effectiveness of FFW schemes; (iv) adequacy of targeting and monitoring, and (v) the coherence and balance of the programmatic focus as it feeds into the next phase.

Methods included:

- a review of documents provided by HQ, the CO and implementing partners
- a review and in-country presentation of the additional commissioned technical reports
- extensive consultation with CO staff, implementing partners and government representatives
- group and individual interviews held with project beneficiaries on-site. Also non-beneficiaries in villages adjoining project sites.

### PRRO Goals and Objectives

The broad goal of PRRO 6038 is sustained food security among the chronically hungry poor, simultaneously with the promotion of re-emerging social cohesion and support systems. The objectives are:

- (a) build and rehabilitate essential assets, facilitate reconciliation and promote self-reliance among the poor;
- (b) contribute to improving the quality of life;
- (c) provide immediate relief from hunger among specific groups temporarily unable to meet their basic food needs.

## Activities

The breakdown of each of these programme components in 1999 is:

- (a) Community rehabilitation and recovery – food-for-work (FFW) 82 percent of food aid allocation - 1,328,000 beneficiaries;
- (b) Social Sector - 13 percent of food aid allocation - 74,000 beneficiaries.
- (c) Emergencies - 5 percent of food allocation - 115,000 beneficiaries.

The total official beneficiary numbers (rounding to the nearest thousand) in the previous three years are:

1997	967,000 beneficiaries
1998	1,419,000 beneficiaries
1999	1,516,000 beneficiaries

WFP has reached more than 7 million people over the past six years (although many are the same food-insecure families who were assisted in more than one given year).

Projects supported in the same six year period include:

### *Water resource development:*

501 kms. of dikes and dams repaired/constructed  
1,344 kms. of canals rehabilitated  
1,578 community ponds constructed  
30,000 plus family ponds dug  
1,724 wells dug  
37 water gates

### *Transport sector:*

More than 7,200 kms. of tertiary roads constructed or repaired (after total reduced by 20 percent to allow for roads that were repaired more than once).  
200 kms. of secondary roads repaired  
687 bridges constructed

### *Other activities:*

Land clearance for resettlement of 31,000 hectares (more than half in 1999)  
349 schools constructed - 99 of which were in 1999  
9 health clinics built  
692 rice banks (not all still functioning)

### *Health:*

160,000 TB patients to complete treatment  
Although WFP assists many vulnerable people largely through NGO assistance programmes, this

accounts for only a very small portion of total WFP assistance (117,000 people out of more than 7 million beneficiaries over six years; 4,000 tons of rice out of 247.000 tons).

## OVERVIEW AND CONCLUSIONS

The mid-term evaluation of PRRO 6038 is unique in two respects: Cambodia was the first application of the PRRO as an official WFP programming category; and this is the first country in which an evaluation has been undertaken of the PRRO category. In Cambodia the PRRO was conceived and developed as a 'country programme', an umbrella for a group of protracted recovery activities with a small contingency for relief activities. In examining the utility of the PRRO, the evaluation necessarily returns to first principles: are the goals and objectives of PRRO 6038 consistent with complex realities on the ground, and to what extent are the type, relative balance and coherence of activities an appropriate response to Cambodia's accelerating restoration and stability? Because the PRRO was designed only for an initial two years, the evaluation is also forward looking, asking whether the recovery programme should be extended or, alternatively, whether WFP should move to a more traditional country development programme (which Cambodia has not previously had).

In the aftermath of political unrest in 1997, normalcy returned in late 1998 with the creation of a new coalition government (November 1998), the regaining of Cambodia's seat at the United Nations in (December 1998) and formal admission to ASEAN in April 1999. Political stability seems set to continue, but the population remains extremely vulnerable to economic threats posed by poor access - to goods, basic services, education, employment, income opportunities and, in many areas, food. Cambodia produces a small annual rice surplus, but poor purchasing power and geographical isolation of its majority rural population leads to continued food insecurity.

Substantial private and public investment has yet to take place. International financial institutions (notably the World Bank and Asian Development Bank) are, however, beginning to make significant commitments to Cambodia. Meanwhile, WFP is the only agency with a countrywide coverage, working in targeted communes in 22 of 23 provinces (with FFW, and in all 23 provinces if Social Sector projects are included). It not only provides a food-based safety net for the chronically and transient poor; it also - through its geographical presence and unique data on poverty at commune and household level - acts as a catalyst and advocate for future development interventions. WFP very effectively fills the gap in anticipation of more regular development assistance forthcoming. The mission believes that it is vital for WFP to retain this profile and role throughout the transition period.

Programming for development as such in Cambodia would be premature. Cambodia is only just beginning to emerge from 30 years of conflict. Although the economy is stabilizing, communities are slowly being rebuilt and refugees and IDPs have almost all been resettled, formidable challenges remain. National social welfare systems are extremely depleted and Cambodia has one of the worst human development indicators in Asia (0.509 HDI, according to the 1999 Cambodia Human Development Report), even lower than what should be expected for a country at its low level of per capita income (\$ 280 ). More than 40 percent of the rural population live below the poverty line, 90% of them in rural areas. The capacity of the Royal Government of Cambodia (hereafter referred to RGC), national and local, remains extremely weak; the overstuffed civil service (about 160,000) receive an average of less than \$20 a month and absenteeism is rife. Allegations of corruption and impunity are widespread. These macro indicators point to the need for economic and political reform which would greatly enhance aid effectiveness.

The WFP PRRO will need to remain flexible and responsive to changing realities on the ground. To help promote social cohesion among previously antagonistic communities, for example, WFP will need to continue working in the new 'reconciliation' areas, those which have only recently come under RGC control. Once stability is restored, evidence shows the swift establishment of farming, trading and transitory employment in rural Cambodia, although some these outlying areas remain particularly inaccessible. It is also important to note the inward migration of large numbers of people to some less populated reconciliation areas where land is more readily available.

WFP's sophisticated targeting methods developed through the VAM Unit rely on administrative boundaries (communes) and a set of commune-level indicators from which vulnerability is deduced. These indicators are not, however, systematically cross referenced with other important data such as related inter-agency activities, access to essential services in neighbouring (possibly non-target) communes within a district, and data on agro-ecosystems which would reveal patterns of production and crop calendars. The coincidence between seasonal migration on the one hand and diverse economic activities on the other have a critical impact on food security. The measurement of impact itself requires a better conceptual and methodological framework.

WFP's key sectoral and geographic emphasis - representing about 82 percent of total food aid allocation - has been on community recovery and rehabilitation, mostly FFW activities to improve infrastructure, with the Ministry of Rural Development (MRD) as the main operational partner. Five percent of resources in 1999 were allotted to emergency response (including the repatriation of 40,000 refugees) and 13 percent to Social Sector activities - public and community health projects, human resource development and training, and assistance to vulnerable groups (street children, orphanages, day care centres, prosthetics centres, school feeding).

For WFP, 'social cohesion' is a by-product of two mechanisms: community participation and joint endeavour in rebuilding assets; and assisting civil authorities in establishing a presence in newly opened (previously Khmer Rouge) areas. Clearly, 'cohesion' cannot be empirically measured but evidence suggests that the process is accelerated and reinforced through appropriate WFP assisted interventions - construction of schools, health centres, adult literacy, and the like - coupled with the bolstering of local leadership. By far, the most common FFW activity is road construction. Although road construction is vital, this should be a smaller component of the range of options available to WFP. The mission believes that WFP should explore additional options which involve a more sustained presence in all areas.

For WFP, recovery should be an incremental and localised process in which a food-based safety net offsets the worst effects of chronic and transitory food insecurity at household and village levels. The notion of a safety net implies two things: that food aid interventions mitigate the worst effects of chronic poverty, economic shocks and/or disasters; and that to maximise their impact they should stimulate or complement other development measures which together lead towards sustainable food security. There is no doubt that the 20 kg of rice/beneficiary/annum earning through FFW distributed usually during the pre-harvest 'hunger gap' is an important supplement to income and nutrition; this should be emphasised equally to that of the longer term impact of roads, canals, etc.

There will continue to be distinct disadvantaged groups and individuals for whom food aid interventions are crucial. WFP's Social Sector component (some 13 percent of the total programme) benefits about 74,000 people each year. The mission found, however, that the selection of projects did not adhere to an explicit criteria or prioritisation, relying more on the perceived efficiency and



reliability of implementing partners. In a country where effective partnership is at a premium, this is perhaps inevitable. However, a more strategic alliance with development partners - particularly government bodies with the capacity for growth - would lead to more sustainable programming and priorities.

The transition from recovery to development is premised strongly on the ability of WFP to build and reinforce capacity at national and local levels. A PRRO for the next three years must include a comprehensive strategy, including measurable outcomes, for the development of staff, partner and community human resources.

Finally, there is increasing evidence that stand-alone WFP/PDRD (Ministry of Rural Development) projects, particularly those generated through FFW, are less technically viable and sustainable than those conducted with third partners having additional resources and, in some instances, a more concentrated field presence. This is particularly noticeable in the construction of roads where, for example, the Tertiary Roads Improvement Project (TRIP, a KfW/MRD/WFP joint venture in two provinces) technical assistance and maintenance considerably improved the over all quality of road construction. WFP does not give additional support to communities to maintain assets generated by FFW, though the SEILA process in the Northwest has begun to identify community inputs in this respect. SEILA (meaning 'foundation stone' in Khmer), is a decentralised village, commune and provincial level local planning process – initially in five provinces. The SEILA process has been adopted by the RGC as national policy for rural development planning and is to be expanded to all 23 provinces. Meanwhile, in project areas without the benefit of established community planning structures, the ad hoc nature of project sustainability is likely to persist.

## **FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

### ***General***

1999 saw the coming together of several trends which together have created conditions conducive to recovery. These include, inter alia, relative political and social stability, a partial return to a functioning cash economy, the settlement of hitherto transient population groups and their gradual rehabilitation, and increasing responsibility assumed by government bodies. WFP's response to this has been the identification of increasingly diverse and better understood beneficiary groups, the creation of a greater number of productive assets, an increase in participation, and greater linkage with complementary donor programmes. However, in many of WFP's targeted population groups, food security remains extremely precarious, underscored by poverty and malnutrition indices. The mission believes that in order to build on achievements to date, the PRRO must be extended beyond the current two-year timeframe.

#### **Recommendation:**

- ***The WFP Cambodia Country Office should prepare, in full consultation with operational partners, an expansion of PRRO 6038 from January 2001 to December 2003.***

### ***Food Security***

Food insecurity is geographic and household specific rather than national. The FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment in February 1999 noted a three percent increase in total paddy harvest (wet

and dry season) from the previous year. This represented a total domestic rice availability of 2.24 million tons. With utilisation requirements of about 2.21 million tons, Cambodia's small surplus was thus 30,000 tons. Preliminary estimates of the 1999/2000 harvest are again encouraging, though the causes of food insecurity remain. The continuing need for food aid relates to several interrelated issues:

- district, inter-district and household production/consumption variations due primarily to poor infrastructure and access, lack of purchasing power and poorly developed markets;
- the necessity for poor farmers to often sell a major proportion of their produce immediately after harvest to repay debts;
- indebtedness at high interest rates requiring large rice repayments against harvest;
- structural problems in some areas such as heavy pressure on land resulting in small holdings, and poor soil quality;
- extremely limited off farm income in rural areas;
- low level of land tenure and hence uncertainty leading to low investment in land, and sometimes forced take-overs
- poor access to health services resulting in shocks that push a household into deep poverty.
- the (illegal) export of grain to neighbouring countries by provincial traders.

### ***Land Tenure***

Land is the most important productive asset and store of accumulated wealth for 84 percent of Cambodia's population. With the major economic reforms of 1989, the RGC attempted to implement an effective land management policy, ensuring that land was distributed to private individuals (in contrast to the devastating policies introduced during the 1975-79 Khmer Rouge period) and private ownership of land was reintroduced. However, the complexity and lack of clarity of the new regulations give rise to enormous issues and conflicts relating to land encroachment, land grabbing and increasing incidences of landlessness, especially among vulnerable groups - female-headed households and disabled people. Technically, only possession and use rights are embodied in law; yet people continue to sell and transfer land from one to another. Moreover, owing to the lack of distinction between common property and state property, millions of hectares of forest and agricultural lands have been granted to private companies and individuals for long-term investment and concession exploitation.

The mission believes that where WFP has invested in local land use - for example, through FFW projects to clear agricultural land, particularly in the new reconciliation areas - efforts should be made to ensure that private ownership and usage is retained by the beneficiaries. As part of an inter-agency endeavour, WFP should combine local advocacy in this respect (guarantees with provincial government, etc) with sustained pressure at a national level to ensure that basic land rights are upheld and respected.

#### Recommendation:

***WFP's advocacy role, both local and national, should include efforts to obtain minimum guarantees of individual and community ownership of assets generated and supported by the programme. This includes, for instance, ensuring that where FFW is used to clear land, that land remains the property of the beneficiary family.***

## **Targeting**

The mission was impressed by the pioneering and innovative work of the WFP Cambodia VAM (Vulnerability Assessment and Mapping) unit in assessing the country's most vulnerable population groups, for identifying specific geographic priority areas for WFP's PRRO activities, and for sharing its large data and knowledge base with many government agencies, NGOs, and other donors.

However, the mission was concerned about the complexity and occasional incoherence of the targeting process. Firstly, geographic targeting strategies and criteria vary for the different PRRO components and groups of beneficiaries (RTC [Regular Targeted Communes], PET [Protracted Emergency Target] communes, Social Sector, and Emergencies). Secondly, the targeting process and criteria have been adjusted annually over the last few years, although the changes in broad target areas have been relatively small. Thirdly, about 15 percent of WFP's FFW assistance is currently carried out by NGOs and other implementing institutions in areas that have not necessarily been selected according to WFP's general geographic targeting criteria (these are referred to as OTCs – Outside Target Communes). However, in 1999 and previous years almost all OTC FFW projects were in communes adjacent to target communes.

For the largest PRRO component - FFW in RTC communes - targeting is primarily based on a set of indicators of poverty and food insecurity at commune level (communes are usually about 8-15 villages). WFP is currently less concerned about particular households or individuals, not least because participation in FFW activities is high, reaching between 60 and 80 percent of the male and female population in the vicinity of the work. By contrast, for PET communities the geographical targeting criteria have been applied less rigidly, mainly because the socio-economic database has generally been weaker in these areas. Yet six geographic targeting criteria have been applied, including displacement, recent conflict, social isolation, lack of public services, and a rather crude assessment of income.

The mission was satisfied that WFP's FFW activities are indeed located in many of Cambodia's poorest, most food insecure and until recently conflict-ridden districts and communes, a view supported by many of WFP's development partners in Cambodia. WFP's Social Sector activities largely address the needs of persons in special individual crises, in urban and rural areas.

However, several issues and concerns have emerged over time that may warrant closer attention:

- Targeting has often been a complex process, demanding a significant amount of staff time and attention. On the other hand, the process has helped to sensitize staff and partners to the targeting process and may have shielded WFP and its staff from undue political influence on the selection of target areas.
- Changing targeting criteria and procedures almost annually has produced a degree of discontinuity among target communes and their respective villages. The mission notes, however, that after the latest changes in targeting procedures, some 85 percent of communes targeted in 1999 actually are likely to be kept for the 2000 programme, and that about 20 percent of all communes targeted in 2000 have continuously received some form of food assistance in each of the past five years.
- WFP's commune-based targeting process is not always conducive to a more integrated approach with other partner development organisations working in the same district or regional, but not necessarily in WFP's target communes.

- Too much emphasis may have been placed on geographic targeting at the expense of targeting more distinct groups of food-insecure beneficiaries with specific vulnerabilities, based more on demographic criteria or livelihood strategies.
- In 2000, a new geographic targeting index, composed of five indicators of poverty and food insecurity has been used to identify priority communes. These indicators are (1) agricultural land per capita, (2) forest coverage, (3) women's literacy rate, (4) dependency ratio, and (5) access to safe water sources, pipes and tubewells. The mission expressed some concerns about the adequacy, validity, and reliability of these indicators, particularly as they provide little information on income from non-rice and non-forest sources, and the information on women's literacy rates and dependency ratios at commune level may either be rather unreliable or not particularly persuasive as a relative indication of poverty. The mission notes, however, that these indicators have been selected by VAM after establishing close statistical correlation with previously used indicators in areas where WFP currently works and more detailed data has been collected over the years. The new index also offers WFP the opportunity to look beyond its current area of operation (which covers 22 out of 23 provinces) and to potentially identify additional areas of work.<sup>1</sup>

Recommendations:

- ***There should be less emphasis on commune-specific targeting. WFP should even move towards the concept of clustering communes and integrated regional planning.***
- ***In the future, similar methodologies and criteria should be phased in for targeting RTC (Regular Target Communes) and PET (Protracted Emergency Target) communities. Targeting criteria for beneficiaries of Social Sector activities should be more clearly defined.***
- ***WFP should review the appropriateness of the current targeting process, taking better account of regional differences, particular local food economies and income strategies, and the data quality associated with certain indicators.***
- ***WFP should consider better identifying distinct target groups with common food insecurity and vulnerability characteristics, e.g. according to agro-ecological zones, distinct demographic or capability characteristics (young widows, handicapped), or main primary income sources and coping mechanisms.***
- ***WFP should continue to give substantial weight to qualitative assessments by experts who are familiar with local conditions and with the ultimate objectives of the programme; the goal for the VAM unit should be to inform the process with complementary data rather than to drive it.***

### ***Beneficiary Impact, Monitoring and Evaluation***

The last evaluation mission in 1997 found a “disappointing lack of data on benefits derived from project activities” and “no satisfactory system for monitoring programme effects”. WFP Cambodia

<sup>1</sup> The indicators used in the new index are similar to those derived from multi-variant analysis of WFP VAM database, the WFP Gender differential analysis and the Ministry of Planning Socio-Economic Survey of Cambodia (SESC) 1997.

thus made a commitment under PRO 6038 to develop an impact monitoring system; that is, to measure the programme impact on the lives of beneficiaries. This evaluation mission noted major efforts and progress by the country office - particularly its VAM unit - in designing improved M&E systems leading to impact assessment. This is a welcome development, particularly given the recent emphasis by WFP on 'Results Based Management' principles.

The three major socio-economic, health and nutrition surveys conducted by WFP in 1998 and 1999 (UNICEF/WFP Baseline Survey of UNICEF/CASD and WFP Target Areas, PET baseline, and Gender Survey) clearly show that indeed the poorest and most food insecure population groups and poor women have been major beneficiaries of the WFP FFW programme. In the short-term, the allocation of 20 kg of rice/beneficiary/annum (amounting to almost 15 percent of annual rice needs) plus other minor, but valuable, food items in FFW projects, undoubtedly significantly close the 'hunger-gap' and mitigate high-risk and costly coping strategies such as enforced debt, work in landmine-infested areas, sale of assets, and so on.

On the other hand, there is little information on the long-term impact (improved infrastructure, health etc.) of the assets generated. The 1999 review of FFW programmes by a consultancy firm, SAWAC, for instance, only covered the technical aspects of the most recent FFW projects, without assessing the long-term quality of road and other infrastructure projects. The impact of WFP Social Sector activities is also unclear, although the mission notes efforts to improve monitoring and assessment of the long-term impact of these programmes.

One of the most serious concerns regarding impact measurement, monitoring, and evaluation of the PRRO is the need for greater clarity over exactly what the programme is designed to achieve. With the exception of some basic output indicators such as the number of participants and beneficiaries, there is no method for identifying and operationalizing critical impact and process indicators.

A rich reservoir of data from various WFP in-house and outside surveys and rapid assessments has been assembled by the VAM unit that would allow WFP to: (a) better identify distinct groups of beneficiaries, their vulnerability characteristics, and appropriate interventions; (b) map vulnerability according to food economy zones, income and coping strategies, and household specific characteristics, (c) determine specific intervention strategies; and (d) assess beneficiary impact. Although many of these surveys and data sources have already yielded valuable information for WFP programming, they still seem to be under-utilised. A more thorough analysis would better inform WFP's programming.

Recommendations:

- ***WFP should identify clear measurable indicators on short-term impact (relating to filling the 'hunger-gap'), long-term impact (food security, 'social cohesion', reduced health risks, etc.), and quantitative targets for these indicators.***
- ***Although a 2000 monitoring and evaluation plan for the programme exists, this plan should be reviewed to establish (a) a more realistic workplan, including more specific research questions, a conceptual framework and more narrowly defined indicators, and (b) a comprehensive report on programme results and impact. WFP might also benefit from more senior consultancy input on food security and other socio-economic issues.***

- Impact assessment should become part of the regular monitoring and reporting system. More emphasis should be given to regular narrative and quantitative reporting of beneficiary impact. In turn, this will sensitize staff at all levels on the ultimate programme goals and outcomes.

### **Gender priorities**

WFP continues to support the work of the Ministry of Women's and Veterans' Affairs (MoWVA) and various NGOs that focus specifically on improving women's quality of life throughout the country. Some of the projects supported by WFP include women's literacy training under the UNICEF/CASD programme, and support to female volunteers under the MoWVA (UNFPA-assisted) Birth-Spacing Outreach Programme.

As a follow-up and complement to the 1998 'WFP/ UNICEF Baseline Survey in Community Action for Social Development (CASD) and WFP targeted communities' which, to a large extent, focused on the socio-economic, health and nutritional status of women, WFP in 1999 carried out two additional surveys that helped the organization better respond to women's and children's needs. These were (a) the WFP Protracted Emergency Target (PET) areas survey which provided information on the status of women and their children among former and current Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) populations and resettling former Khmer Rouge populations, and (b) the WFP Gender Survey which provided information on the impact of WFP activities on women and female-headed household. Preliminary results of this survey served as a reference tool for the First National Conference on Gender, held in Phnom Penh in September 1999.

Between 1997 and 1999, the percentage of female field staff has increased from 15.7% to 35%, the long range goal being full parity for the national level staff among WFP staff.

Within the FFW component of the PRRO, half of the 1,600,000 rural poor participants are women. However, the aforementioned Gender Survey found that some rural poor households, mostly headed by women, have noticeably not been reached as effectively as desired by the programme, particularly those in households headed by single, young females with children, one of the poorest and most food-insecure groups in rural villages. These households frequently lack labour opportunities and child-minding facilities that prevent them from greater participation in FFW activities. They are often the last to know about the FFW programmes and cannot afford to wait several weeks for the distribution of the food ration.

#### Recommendation:

- ***To identify and address the major constraints of young female-headed households' participation in FFW activities, and to build on the extensive recommendations of the recent WFP Gender study, WFP should consider working more closely with the Ministry of Women and Veterans Affairs and their extension staff in the field. This might also include the identification of complementary and alternative interventions specifically addressing the food security and nutritional needs of young women with children in single-headed households.***

### **Technical proficiency of FFW**

A technical assessment by local engineering consultancy firm, SAWAC, was conducted in November-December 1999. Of the 2,448 FFW project agreements implemented in 1999, a random selection of 57 projects were assessed by SAWAC across the country. The conclusions were:

- The quality of the *roads* constructed through FFW projects was found to be 'fair to good'. The major problem identified was the poor quality of materials available for the road surface, leading to erosion.
- In contrast to roads, *canals* differed more widely in their design; the most common deviation being a smaller top width. Poor alignments, divergent steep slopes and lack of compacting were identified as deficiencies in specific instances.
- *Culverts* complied well with their agreed design.
- The quality of the one *bridge* reviewed was very good, built in full compliance with its design.

SAWAC recommended (a) the use of one format for registering work output and related food calculation, and (b) WFP to establish internal guidelines for reconciling the food allocation with actual and agreed volume of work output.

Community groups created for the purpose implemented 80 percent of the FFW projects. SAWAC noted that greater involvement of the communities was required to maintain the physical assets created, but no clear maintenance plans were apparent. Moreover, some village leaders argued that they would need additional food or funds for maintenance (not currently within WFP/PDRD priorities). Within the SAWAC study sample, only one road was found to be well maintained by the Village Development Committee (VDC). SAWAC recommended greater attention to the process of establishing community groups so that obligations on maintenance were clearly understood. WFP should develop an appropriate monitoring regime for this.

Recommendations:

- ***Annual technical assessments of FFW projects should continue, though the project selection should also compare recently completed projects with those undertaken in the past three years.***
- ***The technical assessment should compare 'stand-alone' WFP/PDRD projects with those supported by other technical assistance and/or maintenance agreements with development agencies. A cost/benefit analysis should include recommendations drawn from this comparative study.***

### ***Social Sector Activities***

About 13 percent of WFP's assistance support public health care, social service delivery and human resource initiatives, benefiting approximately 70,000 people a year. In 23 provinces, WFP works with over a hundred partners, including government agencies and NGOs. In the current PRRO the strategic focus highlights four interrelated objectives: income transfers (in training), treatment incentives (TB patients), direct nutritional supplement (particular vulnerable groups) and the distribution of health messages (through food distribution gatherings).

Recommendation:

- ***The selection of projects within the Social Sector should adhere to explicit criteria and prioritisation rather than relying solely on the perceived efficiency and reliability of implementing partners. In terms of sustainability, greater emphasis should be given to projects implemented through RGC ministries.***

### ***Nutritional Issues***

The nutritional situation in Cambodia, especially of children and women, is the worst in South East Asia. Countrywide studies and accumulated evidence from WFP, UNICEF, WHO and health NGOs suggest that although lack of access to food determines long-term stunting in general, malnutrition is more commonly associated with low levels of education, inadequate child care and weaning practices, and lack of access to public health services. Poor nutrition and health education among vulnerable groups is well documented, explaining high levels of malnutrition among urban as well as rural people.

WFP's only development project for Cambodia - Project Cambodia 6188 'Supplementary Feeding of Mothers and Young Children in Food Insecure Areas' addresses some of these concerns. The short-term positive nutritional impact of FFW in the lean season is also noted. But in itself, without complementary investments in health services, education, child care and development interventions leading to improved food security, the ration is unlikely to have a significant impact on the cycle of undernutrition and poverty. The daily food ration appears to be sufficient in terms of quantity and composition, but little information exists on post-distribution usage and how much is consumed or sold. The Baseline Survey shows that there appears to be greater impact of FFW projects on child nutrition in areas also covered by UNICEF's community development programme, with its strong emphasis on mother and children health care activities.

WHO, UNICEF and WFP plan a National Nutrition Surveillance programme for 2000, in accordance with the recommendations emanating from the April 1999 National Seminar on Food Security and Nutrition in Cambodia. The Seminar, in which WFP played a leading role, helped to re-activate the RGC's National Council for Nutrition which will act as the inter-ministerial partner for the forthcoming Surveillance Programme.

#### **Recommendations:**

- ***WFP should expand its collaboration with UNICEF, government agencies and NGOs that specifically address family health and care issues. Where appropriate, activities under WFP's Quick Action Project (Project Cambodia 6188) might also be more closely linked to FFW projects undertaken in the same areas.***

### ***School Feeding Pilot Project***

In Takeo Province, WFP has joined the World Bank (EQIP - Education Quality Improvement Project) and the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports (MoEYS) in a school feeding programme supporting (to date) 61 schools (about 37,500 children) in the province. The objectives are to increase girls' and boys' access, retention and achievement in basic education and to support complementary activities such as training in health, hygiene and nutrition within the schools and wider community. The selection of schools for the pilot phase was based on the priority communes



from the VAM analysis, schools clusters under the EQIP project, and a formal submission and commitment by the schools themselves which must adequately prepare all cooking and storage facilities. The children are provided with one breakfast meal a day before school commences. The entire costs of providing the meals, outside of WFP provision of rations, are borne by the community; only one school cluster (5 schools) has actually applied for EQIP funds to assist with cooking equipment.

National indicators pointing to extremely poor school attendance, repetition and drop out, especially for girls, provide adequate rationale for a concerted inter-agency effort to revitalise the school system as a whole. The RGC's commitment to structural reforms in public sector finance and management, and the medium term plan to decentralise decision making and funding to province and district levels, suggest that school feeding might be retained as an option for local investment. Meanwhile, its current affordability relates to additional inputs from EQIP with its 3-4 year horizon. The mission believes that the pilot project should be extended in line with EQIP/MoEYS priorities pending further research on impact and sustainability.

Recommendations:

- ***The school feeding pilot programme should be retained in those school clusters where additional inputs from EQIP (Education Quality Improvement Project)/MoEYS (Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports) are available. Where possible, complementary area programmes in health, hygiene and nutrition should be sought to further encourage community mobilisation and commitment.***
- ***The Country Office should explore optional funding mechanisms for this programme outside the PRRO as early as possible, preferably before the end of 2001.***

### ***Rice Banks***

Village rice banks have been widely implemented by WFP with some success since 1996. There has been some hesitation in establishing rice banks without a strong technical partner. Successful rice banks can help to counter the chronic cycle of debt in rural areas whereby a large percentage of farmers' produce is bought by or repaid to traders immediately after harvest. In 1999, WFP supported 68 village level rice banks (356 tons of rice), benefiting about 35,600 people. Three of these in Kampong Thom were linked to GTZ credit training projects; a further 14 in Kracheh and Stueng Traeng were linked to technical support provided by the NGO, PFD (Partners for Development). Although the Ministry of Rural Development provincial department (PDRD) has a staff person focusing on rice banks in each province, the sustainability of these projects will depend on a lasting strong technical partner to monitor them.

The 1997 evaluation of PRO 5483 lamented the poor performance of rice banks supported by WFP in the UNDP/CARERE programme area where all but one collapsed due to poor management. Success was clearly linked to training in credit facility and a strong community involvement. The current mission found again that credit management was paramount, represented, for instance, by the greater efficiency demonstrated in areas where the EU-supported PRASAC credit programme was underway. As part of an assistance package to selected village communities, the mission encourages the further development of rice banks with explicit entry criteria and closer monitoring of output. As far as possible, these projects should also be linked to technical assistance in storage. The mission

also supports the linkage between rice banks and the development of animal credit schemes (for example, where the ‘profit’ from the rice bank is used to purchase community-owned draft animals) - a idea just beginning to be developed in some communes.

Recommendation:

- ***Rice banks should be extended in targeted communes, contingent upon a prior understanding of credit modalities and strictly monitored outcome. Standardised bookkeeping, contracts and reporting formats should be developed by MRD and WFP with an understanding that WFP’s initial food input is always a one-off contribution to initiate the project.***

### ***Capacity building: Operational Partners***

Capacity building is an important implicit component of the PRRO strategy and will be more explicitly developed in the PRRO expansion. WFP faces certain constraints in building effective partnership, especially with government counterparts:

- Rather limited managerial and implementation/technical capacities of government counterparts as a consequence of the country’s recent history;
- Budgetary constraints (not able to pay adequate salaries to attract or retain competent staff. The Ministry of Rural Development, WFP’s main national counterpart was established only in 1994, recruiting staff from other RGC bodies. Many of them had no technical background and had to be trained by WFP (joint training workshops for Provincial Department of Rural Development (PDRD) and WFP staff).
- NGOs are selected for their complementary technical and managerial competence. WFP has set no clear guidelines on the extent to which it is willing to contribute to building their capacity, other than invitations to national workshops, etc.

Recommendation:

- ***In compliance with the PRRO strategy of increasing responsibility of programme management within key ministries, WFP should develop a training schedule with its partners as part of an ultimate exit strategy. The ability of these partners to secure funds for needed inputs/services in order to independently continue certain specified activities must be determined within the three year PRRO extension.***

### ***Capacity Building: Local Communities***

Recent history is testimony to the extent to which the Cambodian people have been deprived of the opportunity of steering their own fate. Basic capacity and local initiative is much lacking. Community self-management and governance are relatively new concepts, and management, planning and participatory skills have yet to break the top-down paradigm.

The CAREERE/ “SEILA” village and commune level planning process presents opportunities for having targeted beneficiaries as implementing partners, where planning, execution and contribution

towards projects is a community responsibility. The replicability of this 5-province programme, however, might be compromised by the haste with which the RGC wishes to introduce decentralisation.

Recommendation:

- ***As a means towards project diversification and understanding of food security at a local level, WFP should become more fully involved in facilitating commune/village level discussions generated by the SEILA process and its equivalent in other areas. This might include, for instance, helping village animators become more aware of project possibilities based on food aid.***

### ***Capacity Building: WFP staff***

The mission found Country Office management systems, inter-personal relationships and the general efficiency of the office to be exemplary. Administrative and finance review was not part of the mission's terms of reference.

The shift from recovery towards development activities within the PRRO is likely to broaden the range of required staff skills and experiences. Efforts made towards building WFP's own staff capacity have included ad-hoc training by WFP international staff with counterpart national staff, overseas training (e.g. workshops in the Philippines), and temporary duties in other programmes (Albania/Kosovo, East Timor). As a first step towards handing over responsibilities and management, three national (professional) officers have been hired. Simultaneously, the number of international staff is being reduced. In 1996, international staff were re-located from the provinces to the Country Office, leaving national staff in charge of provincial offices.

Recommendations:

- ***Staff capacity building efforts should be placed within a clear career development strategy. Further efforts should be made to establish a framework for staff training, the selection of trainees and appropriate subject areas.***
- ***A monitoring system should be established to assess progress made in achieving capacity building among staff and implementing partners.***

### ***Logistics***

Over twenty years of WFP presence in Cambodia has resulted in substantial local knowledge and experience, including well-developed transport, storage, and handling systems and trained local support staff. Local food procurement activities have been added to the logistics portfolio in support of the WFP recovery programme.

A country-wide network of 11 warehouses has been established in 11 of Cambodia's provinces. WFP currently has the capacity to transport commodities from the port to the CDP (Central Delivery Point) by road or rail; the CDP to the EDP (Extended Delivery Point) by road, rail and barge; and the EDP to the FDP (Final Delivery Point) by road. The main operating partners have been the CRC (Cambodian Red Cross) and the RTC (Cambodian Railway Transport Cooperation's commercial

agent, the Rail Transport Company). The CRC operates a fleet of 39 WFP-owned trucks and provides a maintenance service. Depending upon availability and seasonal constraints (flooding), several methods of transport are available. Air transport is not part of WFP's current operations.

Both local WFP staff and the CRC have been provided with some training of WFP systems to better support the WFP operations and as general support to staff capacity building. Computer data-bases and reporting formats have been developed and put in place at all WFP offices and the CRC Phnom Penh office. Communications equipment at operation locations include cellphones, email, telephone, fax and radio. Reporting of stocks, receipts and dispatches are maintained, but not in a completely standardised form. Warehouse management systems are currently not standard, though similar.

Partial procurement of rice and iodised salt is undertaken locally by WFP's Logistics Section. Of the total rice procured/delivered in 1999 (24,500 MT), approximately 55.5 percent (13,600 MT) was purchased locally, (this does not include 10,906 tons carried over from 1998). Local procurement is expected to increase in 2000. There is a number of rice suppliers able to meet WFP demands. The most important advantages of local procurement over international procurement are: (a) a positive impact on the local economy; (b) saving the large costs of international transport and handling; (c) the provision of a locally acceptable rice quality; and (d) better control of the logistics process with a system of delivery on call-up.

The past political and economic situation required secondary transport (CDP-EDP and EDP-FDP) assistance from WFP's main partner, the CRC. While this partnership has been beneficial to both sides, alternative commercial options have become available as security improves and the Cambodian commercial transport sector grows. From 1997, WFP therefore has worked increasingly with local commercial transporters.

The transfer of transport operations from the CRC partnership to a more cost effective commercial sector will be accelerated in 2000. The phasing-out of operations with the CRC will initially involve a split - 36 percent (15,000 tons) to the CRC and 64 percent (25,000 tons) to the commercial sector. The long-established working relationship between WFP and CRC should continue until the end of 2000 and, pending a review of efficiency and cost-savings involved (including a recalculation of LTSH), the entire secondary transport function should then be subcontracted to commercial carriers. Should the commercial sector prove unable to perform as expected, WFP may wish to retain the CRC as a partner for a limited interim period.

The WFP-owned, CRC-operated assets (vehicles, workshop equipment & tools) now have only a small resale value, due to their age and condition. They do, however, have a real local market value as useable vehicles. Due to a reduction in transport tonnage for the year 2000, the number WFP trucks required by the CRC should be reduced to actual needs. The balance of WFP assets should then be disposed of, subject to agreement between the Country Office and CRC. Two options (or a mix of both) include (a) donating all assets to the CRC as part of WFP's capacity building strategy, (b)'selling' all assets to CRC or WFP's commercial transport partners – to be paid in services for transport and/or maintenance & repair of WFP light vehicles.

Recommendations:
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- ***The transfer of transport operations from CRC to the commercial sector should continue, with the final hand-over being completed by early 2001, pending a full review of the cost-effectiveness of the new arrangement.***
- ***A strategy should be developed by WFP concerning the timely disposal of WFP-owned assets being operated by the Cambodia Red Cross (CRC) – trucks, and workshop equipment and tools. The disposal should also be effected by the end of 2000/beginning of 2001.***
- ***WFP should introduce regular training for logistics warehouse staff in warehouse management, loss and spillage management, and reporting procedures. Standardised reporting forms and procedures should be introduced as a matter of urgency.***

### ***Exit Strategy***

The PRRO (current and foreseen expansion phase) should give increased attention to the ‘enabling development’ programming principles, including the strengthening or reorientation of existing partnerships and/or resource allocations. Inevitably, this implies a greater demand for management and technical capacities of partner agencies.

The two year time-frame of PRRO 6038 has brought WFP in line with the RGC’s five-year planning cycle and the programme cycle of other UN agencies, as represented in the 5-year UNDAF draft (under consideration). No exit strategy as such was prepared for this PRRO. The fact that it was submitted during a period of social and political turmoil in 1998 was itself a constraint on planning, given the rapidly evolving situation in the country. The mission accepts the necessity for a continued recovery programme based on a gradual handover of responsibilities to RGC partners in particular matched with a more comprehensive capacity building programme.

### **Recommendation:**

- ***In preparing a PRRO expansion, WFP should examine each component of the programme with a view to gradually phasing out support for certain activities in line with the recovery timeframe. A realistic assessment should be made of the conditions necessary for the evolution of certain components into development projects; the closure of certain programme elements should also be anticipated within the timeframe. RGC, NGO and inter-governmental partners should be involved in the planning of the new PRRO so that a clear understanding and commitment is made to an exit strategy and to the risks and assumptions inherent to it.***

## ANNEX 1

### Terms of Referenc For the Evaluation of the Cambodia PRRO 6038

#### Background

WFP has been providing relief assistance to Cambodia since 1979. The shift from emergency relief to a rehabilitation oriented programme was made during 1994-95 with the approval of PRO (Protracted Relief Operation) 5483. Through the PRO the focus of WFP aid shifted to address the continuum from relief to rehabilitation, progressing from emergency relief rations to a variety of food-for-work and supplementary feeding activities. By 1996, the bulk (85%) of WFP-provided commodities were distributed through village-based food-for-work in targeted areas. Parallel to this change, the poor appeared to enjoy an improved level of self-sufficiency, bringing about a diminishing reliance on food aid.

An evaluation of PRO 5483 was undertaken in 1997. The evaluation mission found that emergency/relief elements and rehabilitation/development activities were well combined within the operation. It was observed that no satisfactory systems for monitoring the effects of the programme were in place. Targeting of the assistance should be revised with the aim of better prioritising the most needy villages and households within them. The mission also stressed that WFP should ensure that the necessary non-food inputs (technical assistance, material and financial resources) are made available in order to complement food aid.

PRRO (Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation) 6038 was approved by WFP Executive Board-3 (October) 1998 with a duration of two years: January 1999 - December 2000. The total cost to WFP amount to 40.8 million dollars, while 1,815,400 people will benefit from the assistance provided. Its defined broad goal is to achieve sustained food security among the chronically hungry poor, simultaneously with the promotion of re-emerging social cohesion and support systems. The recovery activities to be undertaken include: community recovery and rehabilitation, improvement to the quality of life and short-term emergency relief/ immediate hunger relief.

#### Mission objectives

The operation to be evaluated represents the first application of the PRRO as an official WFP programming category. As conceived, the PRRO could serve as an umbrella for a group of relief and recovery activities, identical to a Country Programme. Individual activities under the PRRO could be approved through separate activity summaries. Alternatively, it could serve as a, comprehensive stand-alone project document. The Cambodia PRRO was however intended as a 'programme'.

The proposed evaluation would seek to clarify the utility of the PRRO as a new programming category, ensuring the effective utilisation of resources made available to achieve stated objectives. PRRO 6038 has a number of characteristics, common to other operations through which WFP assistance is provided to refugee/internally displaced people. An evaluation would provide insights concerning several policy and implementation issues (see: Key Issues).

Findings and recommendations of this evaluation should feed into the next phase of PRRO 6038. As such, the evaluation will adopt a forward-looking approach, contributing to accentuate or, if needed, suggest a re-orientation of the adopted programmatic focus.

## Key Issues

- Transition from relief (PRO) through recovery and rehabilitation (PRRO) to development-oriented assistance (CSO);
- Facilitation of settlement through food aid;
- Effectiveness of FFW schemes (provision of required non-food inputs, technical assistance, sustainability and replicability concerns, technical quality of works);
- Adequacy of targeting: identifying problem areas, most needy/vulnerable population groups.

## Tentative Schedule

In consultation with the WFP Cambodia Country Office, and considering the linkage between the evaluation of PRRO 6038 and Country Strategy Outline review, the following mission schedule is proposed:

Briefing at WFP Headquarters, Rome	20-21 December
Travel Rome - Phnom Penh	08 January
Travel Phnom Penh - Rome	31 January
Debriefing at WFP Headquarters, Rome	14-16 February

## Team composition

- Team leader/development programming expert, with sound knowledge of WFP programming considerations related to the transition from relief to recovery and development, strong M&E skills.
- Socio-economist, conversant with food aid and food security issues, and capable of addressing community development and local capacity building issues/concerns.
- Logistician, to participate partially in the mission ( up to 10 days).

In addition, consultants (Nutritionist and Rural Civil Engineer) will be locally recruited through the Country Office in order to conduct preparatory studies, prior to the mission's arrival.

The responsible OEDE officer will join the mission at it's last stage, including the country-level debriefing.

## Reporting

The mission is expected to yield the following reports:

- Evaluation summary, maximum of 5,000 words, for EB2/May2000; draft to be prepared by the Team Leader and submitted within two weeks upon completion of the mission;
- Final, consolidated report; draft to be prepared by the Team Leader and submitted within one month upon completion of the mission.
- Technical reports by the Socio-economist and Logistician which will be presented as Appendices to the consolidated mission report; drafts should be submitted within two weeks upon completion of the mission.

It should be noted that the PRRO evaluation summary is targeted for submission to **EB2/May2000**. RECC (WFP Rome editor's) deadline for this document is **25 February 2000**. (The expansion phase of the PRRO will be submitted to EB3/October 2000 for approval.)

## Methods

It is anticipated that the evaluation mission team will:

- review relevant documents and information to be made available through WFP Headquarters and the Country Office, or locally gathered while visiting Cambodia;
- review the outcome of studies to be commissioned through the Country Office, and conducted by locally recruited consultants prior to the arrival of the evaluation team;

- consult Country Office staff, WFP implementing partner agencies, representatives of central and local government authorities;
- undertake field visits to a sample of sites where the implementation of activities under PRRO 6038 and assets created can be observed;
- use participatory approaches to seek the views of beneficiaries and, where appropriate, non-beneficiaries.

### **Documents to be consulted**

1. Guidelines for the preparation of a PRRO (February 1999)
2. EB policy issues paper, 'From Crisis to Recovery', WFP/EB.A/98/4-A
3. Submission PRRO Cambodia 6038, Food aid for recovery and rehabilitation in Cambodia, EB.3/98/8-B/2
4. Submission PRO Cambodia 5483, Programme for rehabilitation, SCP: 13/3-A(ODP) Add1
5. EB evaluation summary PRO 5483, WFP/EB.3/97/5/Add.3
6. Full Technical Report Evaluation PRO 5483, 10-29 March 1997
7. Cambodia case study: WFP-NGO Partnership Evaluation, (September) 1999)
8. WFP Country Strategy Outline, Cambodia, 1996, EB3/96/6/Add.1
9. CCA, Cambodia, 1999
10. UNDAF, Cambodia, (December) 1999
11. Report on the Cambodian 1998 Joint UNICEF-WFP Baseline Survey of CASD (Community Action for Social Development) Project and WFP Target Areas
12. Survey of Household Livelihoods and Nutrition in Cambodian Communes Affected by civil Conflict since 1989: UN-WFP Protracted Emergency Target P.E.T. Survey, September 1999
13. Poorer Cambodian Rural Households Participating in Food For Work: Income and Expenditure Patterns, Strategies to Access Rice, Rice Food Security Status, and Related Findings on Food Insecurity and Rural Poverty, by: Kent Helmers, Chan Neang and Kien Vaddanak, September 1997
14. National Seminar on Food Security and Nutrition in Cambodia, Royal University of Agriculture - Chamcar Daung, 20-21 April 1999
15. Gender Survey, (October) 1999
16. Papers to be prepared by the WFP Country Office and local consultants prior to the evaluation: Technical review, Social sector review, Nutrition paper, papers on Targeting and Impact monitoring.



## **ANNEX 2**

# **LOGISTICS REPORT**

Prepared by:

Tony Randall,  
Logistics Expert, WFP Consultant

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## **I. EVALUATION OBJECTIVES**

World Food Programme has been present and active in Cambodia since 1979 - over 20-years of support. Beginning with primary relief assistance, the program has developed into operations of relief and rehabilitation in the past years. WFP remains the main agency in Cambodia involved in targeted food assistance programs for chronic and transitory food insecure households and vulnerable groups.

The last available evaluation reports made available to this mission were written in 1997, including a logistics report. The objectives for this evaluation report were set forth in the General Terms of Reference (ToR) for the Evaluation of PRRO Cambodia 6038, Food Aid for Recovery and Rehabilitation, version 0.5, dated 22.12.99. Accompanying the general mission ToR (see Annex) was an individual ToR for the Food aid logistics expert.

Specifically, an logistics evaluation was requested to examine the:

- quantity, relevance, type and quality of commodity deliveries,
- accessibility of areas targeted to receive WFP assistance,
- planning of the delivery/distribution of WFP food aid, taking into account logistics-transport economic considerations,
- effectiveness of regional, local purchasing arrangements (saving time and transport costs, ensuring the steady/timely supply of foodstuffs which are compatible with the local diet), and
- other issues considered to be important for the performance of the evaluation.

The entire evaluation mission was scheduled from 20 Dec. 1999 – 16 Feb. 2000, whereas the logistician participated only partially (effectively 11-calendar days in country) in the mission. The time allowed for the logistics evaluation was sufficient only to assess five sites, hold in-depth discussions with the local WFP logistics and program staff, and review available documents. The local country office was very supportive in providing the requested time, staff, transport, and documents to support the evaluation mission. This report reflects the findings of the logistics mission in Cambodia during the period of 21.02 – 01.02.00.

Overall, the WFP logistics operations in Cambodia are given a positive rating by this evaluation. Only minor - yet important - recommendations are herein proposed, to further improve the logistics ability to more efficiently support the country programmes.

## **I. EVALUATION ACTIVITIES**

During the logistics evaluation mission period spent in country, the following operations sites were reviewed with the WFP Logistics Officer in Cambodia, Robert Gillenwater:

- WFP Country Office in Phnom Penh
- WFP Central Delivery Point (CDP –warehouse) in Phnom Penh
- WFP sub-offices and Extended Delivery Points (EDP's – warehouses) in Siem Reap and Battambang,
- the WFP proposed site for a new EDP in Banam in Prey Veng province
- operations and facilities at the main seaport of Sihanoukville during arrival of 1,037-MT of rice in 40' containers (part of a 5,000-MT donation)
- roads Battambang-Phnom Penh, Phnom Penh-Banam/Prey Veng, Phnom-Phen-Sihanoukville,

- rail line Battambang-Phnom Phen and railheads/stations at Phnom Phen CDP, **Battambang**, and Port Sihanoukville
- river and barge facilities at Siem Reap, Battambang, and Banam/Prey Veng,

The logistics input for the Aide Memoire (AM) was presented to the Evaluation Team leader on 29.01.00. The remaining mission time in country was spent with the evaluation team revising the AM and presenting it separately to the WFP country staff and to a group of representatives of the Cambodian government. A revision of the logistics input for the Aide Memoire (AM) was sent to the Mission Leader. The final version of the AM will be submitted directly to the WFP, Rome headquarters by the Mission Leader.

### III. COMMODITY DELIVERIES

#### III.A. Quantity of Commodity Deliveries

The WFP food aid basket consists of rice, canned fish, vegetable oil (vitamin A enriched), (iodized) salt, and – for emergencies - biscuits. The bagged commodities – rice and salt - are delivered in 30-50-60kg bags –usually as general cargo. The canned commodities (canned fish and veg. oil) are packed in cartons of a size easily stacked – shipped in containers usually un-stuffed in port.

The WFP country program, PRRO 6038, foresees a total delivery of two years (01.1999-12.2000) as follows.

70,000-tons	rice
2,500-tons	canned fish
2,766-tons	vegetable oil
704-tons	salt
-----	
75,970-tons	total

According to WFP, Cambodia reports (FASREP), a total 34,083.513-tons of food aid were distributed in 1999.

Rice	Vegetable Oil	Canned Fish	Salt	Country Stocks
10,906.276	238.450	770.212	52.797	Opening 1999 total – 11,967.735-MT
31,455.285	1,213.926	1,229.996	184.307	Distributed 1999 total – 34,083.513-MT
3,271.534	588.817	497.922	68.435	Closing 1999 total 4,426.708–MT

This leaves a balance to be delivered during the year, 2000, operations of:

Rice	Veg. Oil	Canned Fish	Salt	Total
43,545	1,552	1,270	520	46,887-MT

It should be noted that a quantity of 1,500-tons of rice has been included in the WFP total as an emergency contingency. The 1,500-MT forms a part of the total stock stored by WFP, and is not maintained as a separate emergency stock. Any balance remaining at year's end has been carried forward into the next year's total; and any shortage has been made up in the amount procured the following year. According to the Programme section, 1,796-MT of this emergency stock was distributed in 1996 during the last large-scale flooding and 1,665-MT in 1999 as an emergency response for the last returnees to Cambodia.

The extent to which these statistics are accurate depends upon how the records are kept and reported – this varies somewhat from EDP to CDP to EDP. Little or no reporting of losses due to spillage, damp-loss, insects or rodents, theft, etc. was seen at the EDP's visited. Only the CDP seemed to have been introducing measures for loss control and reporting. While the EDP stock numbers tally, closer examination at the warehouses visited showed different strategies for accounting for any losses (see section VII.A).

### **III.B. Type and Relevance of Commodity Deliveries**

The WFP food basket for Cambodia has been determined as rice, (vitamin A enriched) vegetable oil, (iodized) salt, and canned fish. Nutritional details and the extent to which this food complements the local diet can be found in the technical report of the nutritionist attached to this evaluation mission.

From a logistics point of view, these commodities can be handled, stored, and transported with relative ease. Attention must be given to the moisture problem with rice and salt. Humidity tests must be carried out regularly, care taken in loading/unloading operations, and storage facilities must be upgraded to avoid flooding or humidity problems. Salt has a tendency to "bleed" and can dissolve concrete flooring. Local procurement of rice (92% of the total food basket) and salt is quite feasible, as the country's production capability has begun to recover. Over 60,000-tons of rice were projected by the Cambodian government as a surplus for the 1999/2000 season harvest. Economic accessibility to the market and sufficient food levels remains a key problem for the under-privileged.

### **III.C. Quality of Commodity Deliveries**

During logistics operations, WFP has methods to assure the quality of commodities procured and delivered:

- quality control by a local superintendent at the port of arrival, supplier's warehouse, and first WFP warehouse of delivery,
- humidity checks at irregular intervals,
- standardized levels of quality set forth in local procurement and checked (anonymously) by a superintendent,
- rehabilitation of the CDP infrastructure, purchase of new pallets, installation of drainage ditches, new roofing and siding

Again, the extent of accuracy of the information provided relies upon the statistics given. As noted under section III.A., little/no statistics were maintained at the EDP's visited – reported standard for all the EDP's - concerning losses or disposal of unfit quantities – losses due to natural damage caused by rodents, insects, damp, etc. It is unclear if all food aid given out was of good quality or if the warehouse statistics have been adjusted to cover disposal of unfit quantities.

#### **III.C.1 Superintendence**

WFP relies in Cambodia with the government agency, CAMCONTROL (CC) for superintendence services -quality and quantity analysis of imported and locally procured food. Due the political and economic situation in Cambodia, there is reportedly only one such facility in all Cambodia – alternatives are located in Bangkok, Rome, or Singapore. It is questionable as to whether the Cambodian authorities would acknowledge the results of a foreign analysis. While the University in Phnom Phen does have laboratory facilities, they do not have the staff to undertake actual monitoring services. Consideration has been given by WFP to supporting the establishment of an independent superintendent company with laboratory equipment and field staff.

There were no reports of unusual problem related to working with CC. A 12-month Agreement has been signed, establishing the services and an all-in price of US\$1/ton. Quality and quantity inspections at the port of entry or supplier’s facilities and at the first WFP warehouse of delivery, humidity tests when requested and issue of all required written reports and documents needed by WFP are provided by CC. Samples and the testing thereof during local procurements are send via the WFP office, not directly from the supplier to CC.

**Fumigation** is undertaken by the WFP, Cambodia Logistics Section, who have trained two of its own staff to undertake necessary operations. The equipment and chemicals needed are stored at the CDP, and operations undertaken when required. A recent instruction issued from WFP, HQ for use only of environmentally friendly chemicals is being followed up on and a supplier is being sought.

#### IV. ACCESSIBILITY/DELIVERY CONSTRAINTS

After over 20-years of presence in Cambodia, the main constraints for WFP logistics operations remain those of seasonal weather problems – the monsoon season – and its effects upon roads, bridges and rail lines. During the period of July-Dec the monsoon season arrives in Cambodia. Normal water levels allow for access to most parts of the country and to WFP destinations. The security problems with overland transport have been reduced to a level where a recommendation was made by WFP-OTL in 1997 to switch from a sole partnership with the CRC, for secondary and final transports, to working with the commercial transport market.

##### IV.A. Delivery Points

A country-wide network of 11 warehouses, or delivery points – DP’s, has been established by WFP, representing a 26,700-MT capacity in 11 of Cambodia’s 23 provinces.

No .	Location City-town/province	MT-Capacity	Sq-Mtr Size	KM to Phnom Phen	Monthly Rental Costs
1	Phnom Phen (CDP), Kandal	15,000	7,868	--	2,444
2	Battambang, Battambang	3,000	1,100	290	300

3	Banteay Mean Chey (Sisphon), Banteay Mean Chey	3,000	1,400	370	200
4	Pursat, Pursat	1,500	1,152	180	150
5	Siem Reap, Siem Reap	1,800	1,250	310	200
6	Kampong Thom, Kompong Thom	1,000	500	165	150
7	Mondulkiri, (Sen Monorum) Mondulkiri	350	300	395	350
8	Anlong Veng, Otdar Mean Chey	400	350	430	No charge
9	Ratanak Kiri, (Banlung) Ratanak Kiri	350	138	640	No charge
10	Stung Treng, Stung Treng	100	48	510	No charge
11	Kratie, Kratie	200	160	350	No charge
12	Banam, Prey Veng*	(tbc) to be confirmed	tbc	110	tbc
13	Sihanoukville port**, Kampot	Diverse – as needed	Diverse – as needed	250	Diverse

Note:

\* Prey Veng not yet established - planned for the year 2000

\*\* Port facilities are not a WFP DP –used only for import shipments

Of the above mentioned DP's, all but 3 (operated by the NGO's, CARARE – Cambodian Area Rehabilitation and Regeneration - at Ratanak Kiri, and PFD – Partners for Development – at Stung Treng and Kratie) are managed by WFP. Acting as central re-delivery sites in a hub-system, the CDP (Central Delivery Point, WFP's main warehouse) and the EDP's (Extended Delivery Points) operate a delivery cycle of every 1-3 months to the FDP's (Final Delivery Points), depending upon storage capacity and extent of work completed (Food for Work – FFW – projects).

The FDP's are the actual distribution points of food aid to the beneficiaries – FFW sites or institutions (clinics, schools, or hospitals). A breakdown of the FDP's shows:

No.	Province	No. Of FDP's	Average km's from the EDP/CDP
1	Banteay Meanchey	31	48.9 from B.M
2	Battambang	50	57.82 from B.
3	Kampong Thom	15	26.53 from K.T.
4	Pursat	31	34.65 from P.
5	Siem Reap	20	60.1 from S.R.
6	Kampong Cham	12	81.08 from P.P
7	Kampong Cham East (of river)	7	151.29 from P.P.
8	Kampong Chhang	6	93.0 from P.P.

9	Kampong Speu	27	74.22 from P.P.
10	Kampot	10	148.8 from P.P.
11	Kandal	16	41.94 from P.P.
12	Phnom Pehn	18	21.94 from P.P.
13	Prey Veng	12	126.92 from P.P.
14	Sihanoukville	1	248 from P.P.
15	Svay Reing	6	177.17 from P.P.
16	Takeo	13	86.53 from P.P.

Note: the above chart is valid per 11 Nov. 1999, and may change as old projects are closed or new ones open.

#### IV.B. Accessibility

While all DP's (Delivery Points) can be accessed during most of the year, the main constraints in the delivery of WFP cargo are weather related – primarily due to heavy rains. While the roads and rail line are open for most of the year, there can be delivery constraints during the monsoon season.

**Trucking** of cargo on regular 20-40 ton trucks moves WFP's food aid directly from the port or local supplier to the inland CDP or EDP's. All WFP DP's (Delivery Points) are accessible by truck during most of the year, and the roads used to WFP destinations have been cleared of mines. Due to the WFP contract with the Cambodian Red Cross (CRC), trucking has been the preferred mode of transport. WFP provides a CRC-operated fleet of 38 vehicles (see Pos. IV.B.1) with 4x2 and 4x4 capability.

**River** barges can access 3 DP's (Banam/Prey Veng, Kratie, Stung Treng, along the Mekong River and the "port" to Siem Reap on Lake Tonle Sap for most of the year. The larger lake barges can carry up to 400-tons of general cargo (bags & cartons). The capacity of the smaller river carriers could not be confirmed during this mission. River traffic is limited to the rainy season of Oct-Dec. Outside of this period, prior care needs be taken to consider the lower levels of the river and lake, and the reduced quantities that boats can carry as the dry season peaks.

**Rail** transport is possible along the country's single rail line from the port of Sihanoukville via Phnom Pehn to Pursat-Battambang-Sisophon (originally ending ending at Bangkok, the Sisophon to Thailand-border rail line has been disrupted and the tracks and ties removed). Railheads are to be found at the port of Sihanoukville and at or near 4 of WFP's DP's – directly at the CDP in Phnom Phen, and near to the EDP's at Pursat, Battambang, and Sisophon. WFP work exclusively with the Railway Transport Cooperation (RTC), the commercial agent for the Royal Railways of Cambodia (RRC) for rail transport. The rail line is old and there have been problems in the past with old wooden ties, soft ground, and part of the line being under water. The greatest problem with the rail transport is its heavy use by the construction industry. Most rail wagons are in constant use transporting imported cement from the port, thus the availability of rail wagons for alternative use is limited.

**Air** transport does not at present form a part of the WFP operations in Cambodia, however all provincial capitols have the capacity to handle small-mid sized cargo and passenger planes. Insufficient data was available at the time of this evaluation, and an in-depth study would have to be made to determine further details needed before use of cargo planes for delivery in an emergency situation.



**IV.B.1. WFP Fleet/Cambodian Red Cross**

The fleet of vehicles in use by both WFP and CRC in Cambodia are as per 20.12.99:

No. Vehicles	Vehicle Type	Model year	Operated by
1	Nissan Water Tank truck TK20L	1991	CRC
26	Nissan 4x4 cargo truck TFA 21L	1991	CRC
13	Nissan 4x2 cargo truck TK20L	1991	CRC
11	Toyota Landcruiser pick-up's	1991/96/97	WFP
9	Toyota Landcruiser Stationwagons	1990/92/97	WFP
3	Land Rover Discovery	1996	WFP
1	Jeep Cherokee	1995	WFP
2	Toyota Corolla autos	1998	WFP
1	Nissan Patrol	1997	WFP
75	Motorcycles	1992-99	WFP
2	Small boats	1998	WFP

The fleet of WFP trucks was reduced in late-1999 (the above listing reflects the actual number present in country in Jan, 2000) by 16 trucks, which were sent to the WFP operations in East Timor. As per contract with the CRC, all WFP vehicles are maintained including parts (for the trucks only) at no additional cost by the CRC. All WFP-owned trucks are parked at CRC locations in Phnom Phen and in the provinces, where EDP-FDP deliveries are made. The WFP trucks are now 10 model-years old, but have been reasonably well maintained. All are reported operational.

WFP has provided CRC with staff training on workshop and transport management and reporting, and maintain staff at the CRC location to monitor and coordinate operations with WFP's Logistics Section. Computers are used and records are maintained at the CRC workshop/parking location in Phnom Phen.

In addition to operating WFP's fleet of heavy vehicles, the CRC operate their own fleet of heavy and light vehicles.

**IV.B.2 Commercial Transport**

**Trucking** possibilities in Cambodia with the commercial transport market began to re-emerge with the subsiding of the political situation. One now sees many Russian and Japanese model trucks on the road, transporting cargo to and from all provinces. The owners of various size companies operate their own fleets, consisting of diverse models of trucks – 4x2's, 4x4's, and 6x6's. Some of the larger vehicles are reportedly ex-military.

**Rail transport** is available, as the Cambodian Royal Railways (CRR) operate a rail system, although data on the number and type of locomotives and wagons was not available at the time of this evaluation. A single line is in existence, operating from the port to Sisophon via Phnom Phen. The cement industry heavily dominates the capacity of the railway, and the wagons seen were visibly old, dirty, and had nails & wires hanging from the sideboards.

**IV.B.3 NGO's and Other Government Agencies**

Due to financial constraints, there has been no government co-funding of WFP logistics operations in Cambodia. The only ministry at present working with WFP operations is the MRD (Ministry for Rural Development).

While WFP programs work with a large number of international and local NGO's in Cambodia, the logistics operations deal with only the CRC (Cambodian Red Cross), CARARE (Cambodia Area Rehabilitation and Regeneration Project), and the PFD (Partners for Development).

#### **IV.C. Delivery Constraints**

Due to a return to a politically secure status in Cambodia since mid-1999, no constraints were reported to this evaluation due to political/security problems. On the roads used by transporters to WFP destinations, the mines have been removed. While a criminal threat does exist in such situation, convoys are used when possible, but single trucks are able to travel without protection.

The only reported constraints to traffic are those caused by rainfall during the 6-month period of July-Dec. As most of the country's secondary roads are not paved, and even on the primary roads bridges are often in need of repair, the flooding which occurs during the monsoon season causes occasional stoppages for both rail and truck transport. The EDP's are given a stockpile of commodities – relevant to warehouse capacity and actual needs - before the heavy part of the monsoon season in order to minimize the number of deliveries to the EDP's.

##### **IV.C.1 Seasonal and Weather Constraints**

During the period of July-Dec, the monsoon season affects also the ability to transport and handle food aid. Discharging of cargo from ships and trucks is slowed and stopped at times. The otherwise poor quality of most roads and the rail line do not, at times, allow passage through areas near the rivers and lake when the flood levels rise above "normal" levels.

##### **IV.C.2 Condition of Roads, Bridges, Rail lines, Rivers/Lake, and Airstrips**

The time allowed for this evaluation allowed only a cursory assessment of the roads and rail lines in Cambodia. The Sihanoukville to Phnom Penh road is in good condition, having been recently renovated, while the other three main roads from Phnom Penh - north on Nr. 7 to Stung Treng, northwest on Nr. 6 to Siem Reap, and northwest on Nr. 5 to Battambang – are all in need of repair. Potholes and disruptions in the asphalt are normal and the bridges/culverts are generally in poor state. While passable during normal times, heavy flooding causes delivery constraints. All WFP DP's are accessible by road.

The March 1997, Internal Evaluation Report noted that Cambodia "displays tremendous innovation and adaptation in the range of IMT's available almost everywhere". The variety and number of transport possibilities is considerable. Even bicycles and motorcycles are fitted with trailers of different sizes. The commercial trucking sector has since grown to offer large-scale transport of commodities throughout the country.

The single rail line from the port of Sihanoukville via Phnom Pehn to Sisophon is old and heavily used for cement transport. The rail lines are old and are affected by flooding with problems of rotting rail ties, rain-soaked ground and high water. Only the WFP DP's of Phnom Pehn, Pursat, and Battambang are accessible by rail.

Water transport along the Mekong River and Lake Tonle Sap allow passage for smaller boats during nearly the entire year, however use of the waterways for delivery to WFP DP's with larger barges is limited to the higher water periods of the rainy season, as. The DP's of Siem Reap, Kratie, Stung Treng, and Ratanak Kiri are accessible by water transport.

All provincial capitals have airstrips or airports. No information was available with WFP, Cambodia

at the time of this evaluation as to the local capacity for airfreight or air traffic. Air transport is not, at present, part of the WFP logistics operations. There are several local airlines carrying passengers on mid-sized airplanes. A further study would be required to assess the capacity for an airlift operation.

## V. PLANNING DELIVERY/DISTRIBUTION OF WFP FOOD AID

Scheduling of logistics activities for local procurement and delivery to the EDP's is coordinated with the Program Section. Based upon needs and the international Pipeline, local purchases of rice and salt are made. Deliveries are made directly to the EDP's and CDP on a scheduled basis considering warehouse storage capacity and area needs for the period calculated. This system seems to function and no problems were reported by either program or logistics sections. Stocks are maintained at all CDP and EDP warehouses.

### V.A. Security

The 1998/99 internal conflict between the country's two main political parties brought a dual form of government, which resulted in a tense situation for several months. After a return to a secure political level in Cambodia, the security situation also normalized. All roads used by WFP have been de-mined, and no politically organized threat exists to transport operations. Criminal activity was reported minimal, and no losses were reported by WFP due to theft.

### V. B. Warehouse Capacities and Delivery Schedule

Deliveries to the FDP's are made on every 1-3 months, depending upon the DP's capacity to store food and the progress of the FFW (Food for Work) projects. In advance of the heavy rainy months, stocks of food at the EDP's are increased.

The storage capacity at the EDP's was not perceived as a constraint, as the delivery of food commodities is spread out over the year to accommodate needs. With respect to actual needs for each period between deliveries, EDP stock levels are kept to the levels needed, including a small emergency reserve. (see section IV.A)

### V. C. LTSH

The LTSH rate remained in at the same level from 1998 through 1999, but is expected to be revised in early 2000. The current rate is US\$60/ton.

Expected to affect this rate are actual adjusted rates for year, 2000:

- superintendent costs in Cambodia have been increased to US\$1/ton
- for primary transport in Cambodia, the contract (see annexed tariff) with RTC, has been further reduced at end-1999 by US\$5-8/ton (depending upon destination) to reflect actual market conditions (new tariff forthcoming).
- for secondary transport with the CRC and the 2 commercial transporters, Khmer Express and Tang Kong Y, projected savings are calculated at US\$505,000 (see following table – comparing costs of the actually planned split of transport/cargo and if 100% were carried by CRC or the commercial carriers)

Carrier	Planned Tons in 2000	Transport costs in US\$	If 100% of cargo tons	Transport costs in US\$
CRC	15,000 or 38%	435,000	40,000	1,160,000

Khmer Express Tang Kong Y	25,000 or 62%	225,000 or 44% savings	40,000	352,000 or 70% less
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**Note:** see rate structure table in section VI.A

Costs for transport beyond EDP's (section 6 of the Summary LTSH Costs Estimate), which amounts to 49% of the budgeted costs, is – if the commercial transporters prove able and rates remain stable - projected to be reduced from \$29/ton to US\$16.50/ton – a 43% savings in distribution costs. This equates to potential overall savings in LTSH of 19%. Again, this savings is projected, and it remains to be seen if the commercial carriers can implement the WFP operations and maintain their transport tariff.

*Recommendation:*

The commercial transport sector was determined in 1997 (A.Verken report) as capable of handling the transport of WFP aid commodities – a situation more applicable today. As such, this evaluation recommends that a phasing-out of the contract with CRC, and phasing-into the commercial transport market should continue to the end of this year's (2000) operations. During this time, if the commercial carriers prove able to operate and more or less maintain their rates, a recalculation of the LTSH reflecting these new costs should be undertaken.

## VI. LOCAL PURCHASING

The local procurement of food aid (rice and salt), inland transport, and repair services is undertaken by the WFP, Cambodia Logistics Section. After due process of tendering and selecting a service/commodity supplier, a system of committee (members of the WFP Administration, Programme, and Logistics sections) then assesses and sign off on their recommendation. Written records with standardized forms are used and maintained.

A number of 6,000 locally produced, good quality pallets were purchased by WFP – from a local NGO, who employs mine-victims.

### VI.A. Transport Services – Carriers and Modes

Commercial and aid cargo is carried in Cambodia by various modes on a network of primary/paved and secondary/dirt roads, the single rail line from the port through to Sisophon, along the Mekong River, and onto paved or dirt landing strips at all provincial capitals.

A cost analysis was made by WFP in June, 1997 (A.Verken, OTL) quoting the transport market at that time. While the CRC continues to decline to reduce its charges (same as in the year, 2000), the commercial market in 1997 reflected costs of US\$0.14 – 0.19/ton-km. Rates have since further declined. WFP, Cambodia have developed a km-distance chart CDP-EDP's-FDP's to also assist in verifying the km/ton costs of transport. Contracts with commercial companies for transport are being signed for this year (2000) based upon calculations of:

Carrier	US\$/Ton in 2000	US\$/ton-km in 2000
Cambodian Red Cross for 15,000-tons	29	0.38
Commercial Transporters for 25,000-tons	9	0.10

### **VI.A.1 Cambodian Red Cross**

WFP cooperate in Cambodia with a diverse number of local and international partners in the program areas. Since early after WFP's arrival in Cambodia, an agreement was made with the Cambodian Red Cross (CRC) for transport services. This arrangement was due to the political and security situation in the country, and the CRC's acceptance by both sides, allowing them access to areas denied other groups. Until recently, cooperation with commercial partners was limited, due to the security situation in the country, and all secondary and final transport was made by the CRC. Only the primary (port to EDP/CDP) transports were made by the RTC or local rice suppliers.

In addition to their own fleet of trucks, the CRC operate the WFP-owned fleet of trucks in Cambodia (see list in section III.B.1) to transport WFP food. A one-year Agreement, valid to end-2000, has been signed with the Cambodian Red Cross (CRC). The Agreement includes the final (EDP-FDP) transports and maintenance (with WFP provided tools and equipment) of WFP heavy and light (HV's and LV's) vehicles and motorcycles. WFP have provided tools and equipment to the CRC for the maintenance of vehicles. CRC normally obtains the needed parts them selves, while WFP have, on occasion, given the CRC a stock of spare parts.

CRC organizes convoys and delivers direct to the FDP from the EDP's, as instructed by WFP. Provisions were made in the contract to cover possible secondary (CDP-EDP) transport - when the CRC have trucks moving to/from Phnom Phen, WFP may use them to carry cargo. Transport is carried out based upon WFP orders, and the vehicles are only to be used for WFP transports. It is difficult to maintain complete control over misuse of the vehicles, however odometers are checked against waybills by WFP.

While past WFP/CRC agreements have covered 100% of the country wide final deliveries, the agreement for the year, 2000, limits the total tonnage to be carried by CRC to 15,000-tons as part of a disengagement process. The balance (circa 25,000-tons – or 63%) is to be transported by commercial carriers.

### **VI.A.2. Commercial Carriers**

WFP, Cambodia signed a contract with the Port of Sihanoukville authorities in March, 1999 for port services. The rates appear to be the normal port rates for services, however these services were later part of the contract with the RTC for primary transport of WFP cargo.

WFP has chosen 3 commercial carriers to transport its food aid in the year, 2000 for primary, secondary, and final transports.

Primary transport from port has been contracted to the Railway Transport Cooperation (RTC), as agent for the Royal Railways of Cambodia (RRC). A 2-year Agreement was signed in Sept. 1999, with all-in (loading, handling, storage, transport) services and rates per ton, including truck or rail transport to WFP CDP or EDP's. The rates vary between US\$7.50 – 30.30 (see annexed tariff copy), depending upon destination. These rates have since (Dec, 1999) been reduced by US\$5-8/ton – a new tariff is being issued.

A contract was finalized in March 1999 with the RRC and RTC for rail link improvements at the CDP. At that time, WFP invested US\$11,000 and advanced US\$36,000 to RTC – the money advanced is being repaid by RRC/RTC in reduced freight rates. Part of the contract includes the clause that, "WFP reserves the right to negotiate a decrease in the rates if the market conditions

change". The RTC provide the primary transport (port to CDP) services to WFP after winning a 2-year contract. The rail rehabilitation investment of WFP is being repaid by the RTC/RRC in reduced freight rates. Both port handling and primary transport by rail and truck are provided, including any interim port storage required.

Primary transport for local procurement of food commodities from local suppliers to the CDP or EDP has been part of the purchase contract (all-in prices, free-arrival WFP-warehouse). There exists no analysis of actual costs for transport from the diverse locations of the suppliers' to WFP warehouses.

Secondary transport from Phnom Penh (CDP-EDP) has been reduced to a minimum, due to direct deliveries as part of the primary transport. If necessary, the CRC-operated WFP-trucks are used at no cost, which are moving from region to region.

Final transport (from the EDP's to the FDP's) has been contracted to the Cambodian Red Cross (CRC) for several years, due to the unstable security situation in the Cambodia. The CRC has been able to access areas denied to other carriers. The contracted cost for this transport in the year, 2000, remained at US\$29/ton in (based upon US\$435,000 for the year's transport of 15,000-tons).

Several companies applied for a contract with WFP for primary, secondary, and final delivery transport. After due process, 2 were chosen – Khmer Express and Tang Kong Y – to deliver undertake final deliveries of cargo (63% of total in the first year, 2000). The system for primary and secondary transports are currently being undertaken by commercial transporters.

Barges with a capacity of 400-tons are available for carriage of WFP cargo, and can be contracted through either of the commercial transporters used by WFP. This option is seldom used, but remains an alternative mode during the monsoon season. WFP own and operate two smaller boats with outboard motors – 1 in Phnom Penh and one in Siem Reap for rainy season operations.

#### **VI.B. Food Commodities**

24 local, Cambodian suppliers tendered bids on a recent (Dec99) WFP purchase of rice. The rice was locally manufactured. In 1999, 30% of the total rice (ca. 15,000-tons) procured by WFP for Cambodia was purchased locally. This percentage is planned to increase to 50% for the year, 2000.

350-tons of local salt was purchased in Dec. 1999 in Cambodia, from one of 4 suppliers who placed a bid. Acceptable quantities of iodine were determined and checked at the time of delivery. The packaging was not satisfactory, and improvement needs to be required and monitored.

#### **VI.C. Advantages**

Advantages to a policy of local procurement in Cambodia are to be noted primarily in:

- provision of a locally accepted quality of rice and salt,
- greater control over the delivery schedule,
- saving of costs for international transport and port handling,
- support of the local economy and agriculture sector in a country, where 85% of the population are involved with agriculture production – mainly rice.
- Continuing to be careful not to bring unnecessary imported rice or salt into a country that has to reconstruct its own self-sufficiency

## **VII. OTHER**

In addition to the primary objectives, an evaluation was made of other issues deemed important to the mission. Two topics, warehouse management and continuation of the shift from sole reliance upon the CRC as a transport partner to the commercial transport market, are herewith addressed.

### **VII.A. Warehouse Management**

Management of WFP warehouses in Cambodia does not appear to have been established in a standardized method. Each warehouse has its own system of operations, recording and reporting. No system of dealing with spoiled or spilled food was seen outside Phnom Phen – indeed, few losses were reported at the EDP's assessed. Spillage/sweepings were simply given to the loaders – a system, which encourages further losses – and the statistics, documents and reports adjusted accordingly.

Deliveries from the EDP's to the FDP's (Final Delivery Points) are often done by the kilo, in order to comply with beneficiary rations. This system results in a complicated form of accounting, where errors often occur, yet few losses are recorded. *Example:* of the 5,000-tons received and dispatched from the Siem Reap EDP in 1999, only 30-kg were recorded as loss (due to spillage) – very low. No explanation was given, but the storekeeper admitted they did not keep records of losses. The FASREP shows a country total of 1,416-tons lost (0,017% of total) in the year, 1999. Outside the CDP, only 3 other warehouses reported any losses – a total of 444kg. Most warehouses keep no record of their losses.

Reportedly, some storage facilities have dirt floors and the use of pallets is not standard. Warehouse managers should be logistics staff, answering to the Logistics Officer for procedures and reports, while their daily activities fall under the administration of the local sub-office. Warehouse management seminars should be held for all warehouse managers and key storekeepers to provide for a standardized level of knowledge. There are standard WFP methods for operating a warehouse.

To be included in the capacity building should be:

- stacking and storage of commodities,
- stack cards, waybills, stock recording and reporting – use of a common database form,
- spillage, reconstitution, and loss reporting,
- reconstitution and disposal procedures,
- procedures for pest control and fumigation,
- closer inspection of packaging against spillage, weight, and quality – preparedness to refuse delivery

Further,

- periodic checks should be undertaken by the Logistics Section to assure maintenance of warehouse standards, records and reporting,
- structural precautions need to be made or completed at all warehouses against rain/flood damage
  - drainage ditches, use of pallets, regular airing of the warehouses to minimize the moisture needs to be carried out,
- lease/rental contracts need to be standardized.

### **VII.B. Transfer of Transport Operations to Commercial Market**

Acting upon the positive developments in Cambodia in the area of security and economy, a recommendation was made by WFP in 1997 to move to work with the local, commercial transport sector for transport needs (see A.Verken report of Sept. 97). This meant a move from 100% dependence upon the CRC to a flexible, more cost-effective approach with the local commercial market. The move to less WFP dependence on the CRC was already started with a closer relationship to the Ministry of Rural Development (MRD) in the area of programming.

Due to the political situation in 1998/99, the actual implementation of this decision was delayed. The continued, healthy state of the Cambodian commercial transport market sole means that a dependence upon the CRC for WFP's transport needs can now no longer be justified, especially on a cost-effective basis. Whereas necessity formed the key reason for the past relationship with the CRC, a gradual, phased move in this year from work with the CRC to subcontracting all local transport operations to commercial carriers is being undertaken. This decision should be completed by the end of this year's (2000) operations period. Should by then the decision to transfer operations to the commercial market prove justified, a complete uncoupling of WFP operations from the CRC should be finalized and support for the commercial transport market intensified.

#### **VII.B.1 Disposal of WFP-Owned, CRC-Operated Assets**

A strategy should be made by WFP concerning the timely disposal of WFP-owned, CRC-operated assets (39x trucks, computer/s, and workshop equipment & tools). The disposal should be completed by latest end-2000/early-2001, as logistics operations allow. These assets – all over 10-years of age – have a minimal resale value, due to their age and condition, yet they do have a local market value due to their actual functional existence. Before this value further declines, first the actual assets needed by CRC for this year (2000) should be determined.

The actual tonnage to be transported (reduced from 34,000-tons in 1999 by 56% for 2000 to 15,000-tons) will require fewer trucks than used in the past by the CRC. A phased plan of disposal could be considered, and thereafter various options of disposal are open:

- donate all assets to the CRC as part of WFP's exit or emergency capacity building strategy
- "sell" all assets to CRC for their local market value – to be paid in services for transport and maintenance/repair of WFP light vehicles.
- "sell" all assets to WFP's commercial transport partners for their local market value – to be paid for in transport services.
- Any mix of the above.

Consideration should be given to the long CRC-WFP partnership while disengaging. The Executive Board Evaluation of Aug. 1997 noted that "prior to the creation of the new MRD, CRC was characterized as working "on behalf of the Government". There seemed to be no obvious institutional "home" for the project in the Government and CRC stepped in to provide one." CRC could remain for WFP a partner in case of emergency, should commercial transporters not be able to perform in time of emergency. Considerable skills and confidence have been built up over the years of joint operations with WFP. Jobs at the CRC will likely be lost, and local entities may work to hinder the WFP decision to dispose of the assets.

#### **VII.C. Exit Strategy**

As part of the WFP exit strategy, the ability to administer a logistics response to an emergency could be introduced. Training as capacity building could be extended from WFP staff to key staff from the such government ministries as:

- MRD (Ministry for Rural Development),



- NCDM (National Committee for Disaster Management),
- ERG (Emergency Response Group)
- CRC (Cambodian Red Cross)

The recent creation of these government institutions and their limited financial ability equate into an inability to cope with larger scale operations. WFP could play a valuable role in bringing their knowledge of emergency aid management to the ministries assigned this responsibility.

## **VIII. CONCLUSIONS**

Overall good marks are given to the logistics operations in Cambodia. This evaluation sees, however, the necessity to implement the measures noted in section VII in order assure a WFP-norm in quality of operations and to avoid losses in food aid commodities. Further, in order to avoid the doubtless difficult situation concerning the WFP-owned, CRC-operated assets, a strategy should be worked out with the CRC concerning a timely disposal of these assets, with a deadline set.

## **IX. REFERENCE MATERIALS**

- *WFP Cambodia Briefing, January 2000*
- *WFP Logistics Input in the Cambodia Country Programme, A.Verken, 20.06.97*
- *WFP PRO Programme for Rehabilitation, Internal Evaluation, 10-29 March 1997 (full technical report)*
- *WFP Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons, Country Case Study on Internal Displacement, Cambodia – Displacements between War, Poverty, and Floods, Oct. 1999*
- *General Terms of Reference for the Evaluation of PRRO Cambodia 6038, Food Aid for Recovery and Rehabilitation, version 0.5, dated 22.12.99*

## **X. ANNEXES**

- *Road/river/rail map of Cambodia*
- *RTC tariff*
- *LTSH matrix, per 19.06.98*

## **ANNEX 3**

# **BENEFICIARY TARGETING AND MONITORING & EVALUATION**

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## **I. Overview**

1. This report presents the main findings and recommendations of the WFP Evaluation Mission of PRRO 6038 to Cambodia from Jan. 10 - 31, 2000 on issues related to beneficiary targeting and monitoring and evaluation. It starts with a brief review of the food security situation of the country and WFP's targeted beneficiaries.

## **II. Food Security**

### **Aggregate food availability and HFS**

2. Sustained food security among the chronically hungry poor is one of the two broad goals of PRRO 6038 (Cambodia), the other one being social cohesion and support systems. Signs of overall economic growth are encouraging, and a nominal food surplus exists at aggregate national level. The FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment in February 1999 noted a three percent increase in paddy harvest from the previous year, with a total domestic rice availability of 2.24 million tons. With utilization requirements of about 2.21 million tons, Cambodia's small surplus was thus 30,000 tons. Preliminary estimates of the 1999/2000 harvest are encouraging.
3. Yet, the food security status of large segments of the population in Cambodia remains precarious, contributing to some of the highest levels of undernourishment and malnutrition in South-East Asia. Food insecurity is geographic and household specific rather than national. The highest incidence of poverty is in rural areas (40% vs. 30% in urban areas), with rural HH accounting for almost 90% of the total poor. The highest rate of poverty (44%) is found among households where agriculture is the primary source of income. According to the World Bank at least 20 percent of rural inhabitants cannot secure enough food to meet the nutritional norm of 2100 Calories/day.
4. Poor standards of health care, and high incidence of infectious diseases, including malaria, tuberculosis, diarrhea, STDs, HIV (among the highest in the world) contribute significantly to poverty and food insecurity, through reduced productivity and increased household indebtedness from health care expenditures.
5. The continuing need for food aid relates to several interrelated issues:
  - inter-district and household production/consumption variations, due to poor marketing infrastructure, access, and lack of purchasing power;
  - substantial (illegal) exports of grain to neighbouring countries;
  - poor farmers selling major proportions of their produce immediately after harvest to repay debts at high interest rates;
  - low agricultural productivity caused by poor access to improved seeds, fertilizers, irrigation and credit;
  - heavy population pressure on land;
  - limited rural off-farm income opportunities, declining access to common property resources (forests and rivers), and poor prospects for seasonal rural-urban migration;
  - uncertainty of land tenure leading to low investments and forced take-overs; and poor access to health services.

6. Although WFP is not expected to single-handedly address the complex underlying causes of food insecurity, nor to mitigate all negative effects, WFP has a major role to play where food--as a special resource--can make a difference in poor people's lives; and where advocacy among government agencies and the donor community for food-based targeted interventions and safety nets can lead to changes in attitudes, programmes, and policies.

### **III. Targeting the most vulnerable**

7. After immediate food and other crises have abated, food may no longer be required for survival only. With pockets of relative security and political stability, general free food distribution should gradually be replaced by targeted help for selected groups. Food insecurity increasingly becomes linked to specific target groups who are still not in a position to rely on pre-crisis coping strategies. In Cambodia, WFP originally started with free distribution in the early and mid-90's, and then switched to a geographically targeted approach under the previous PRO (PRO Cambodia 5483). PRRO 6038 was to continue this process and to address some of the targeting issues identified by an earlier evaluation mission of PRO 5483 in 1997. The main recommendations of that mission included: to simplify a somewhat complex and cumbersome targeting system, to review some of the methodologies utilized, and to reassess the reliance on self-targeting mechanisms. It also addressed the dilemma that targeting may mean to forgo some of the benefits of complementary inputs from collaborating agencies that, unlike WFP, may not be working in the poorest, most food-insecure areas of the country.

#### **A. What was planned ?**

##### **Intended target groups**

8. According to the PRRO 6038 document, WFP activities to increase income and employment in rural areas would be concentrated in chronically food-insecure communes (or "Regular Target Communes" [RTC]), and in communes that only recently have been emerging from long-term conflict and isolation (WFP uses the term Protracted Emergency Targets [PET] for this group).
9. RTC. Based on land cover types, agricultural statistics and socio-economic data, two out of five identified food security zones in Cambodia were targeted by WFP for rehabilitation activities among communities with severe problems of chronic or recurrent food insecurity: rainfed lowland areas and scrub/degraded forest. In rainfed lowland areas, target populations mainly rely on single non-irrigated wet season rice crops on small plots as their major source of food and income, extensively employing high-risk coping strategies in times of crisis (e.g. indebtedness, land sales, migration etc.). For scrub/degraded forest areas, targeted beneficiaries try to eke out a living from degraded forest resources, limited cultivation of rice, and wage labour. Access problems to non-timber forest resources often require reliance on risky coping strategies.
10. PET. Secondly, WFP identified internally displaced persons and former refugees in new settlements as populations of special concern. Target beneficiaries include people who have been displaced from one to five years and newly resettled former refugees. A special target population are families living in zones of former Khmer Rouge control and families having been repatriated from Thailand.

11. Social Sector. Activities under the Social Sector component--with the main objective of improving the quality of life of the disadvantaged--would be serving key groups of socially disadvantaged persons nationwide, addressing the needs of persons in social and personal crises, and building human capacity through support for education. Specific target groups for these activities would include tuberculosis patients, illiterate women, street children, amputees at prosthesis centres, members of poor families receiving skills training, and the lone elderly.
12. Gender issues were considered a high priority in the WFP Cambodia operation, as there is a disproportionately high number of FHH in the country. As a result of WFP's objective to improve food security among women, all field research and data collection would include gender specific questions regarding livelihood, nutritional status, shocks, and coping strategies. Gender dimensions would be stressed in vulnerability analyses, outcome indicators for M&E, and village level representation.
13. Targeting mechanisms were not specifically described in the PRRO document.

## **B. What happened ?**

### **Targeting mechanisms and effectiveness**

14. On general targeting effectiveness, the mission found that WFP's FFW activities are indeed located in many of Cambodia's poorest, most food insecure and until recently conflict-ridden districts and communes, a view expressed by many of WFP's development partners in Cambodia. WFP's social sector activities largely address the needs of persons in special individual crises, in urban and rural areas.
15. Geographic targeting has been successfully applied and the methods have been continuously refined over the past four years (see Annex 1 for details). Thanks to long-run WFP efforts, for most of Cambodia the geographic areas with the highest concentration of poverty and food-insecurity and the vulnerability of particular population groups are by now well known. WFP has shared this information generously with the Government, other donors, and the NGO community. WFP Cambodia is by now highly respected for its expertise in the field of targeting, and regularly contacted by other agencies for assistance in programme and project targeting.
16. Geographic targeting strategies and criteria vary for the different PRRO components and groups of beneficiaries (RTC-areas, PET-areas, Social Sector, and Emergencies). The targeting process and criteria have also been changed several times over the last few years, although the changes in broad target areas have been somewhat limited. For instance, 85 percent of communes targeted in 1999 are likely to be kept for the 2000 programme, despite significant changes in the main indicators. Moreover, about 20 percent of all communes targeted in 2000 have continuously received some form of food assistance in each of the past five years (see Annex 2; Graphics 1 and 2).
17. Also, about 15 percent of WFP's FFW assistance is currently carried out by NGOs and other implementing institutions in areas that have not necessarily been selected as first priority according to WFP's geographic targeting criteria (called by WFP "Outside Target Communes" or OTC).

18. For the largest PRRO component--food-for-work in RTC communes--targeting is primarily based on a set of indicators of poverty and food insecurity at commune level. WFP is currently less concerned about particular households or individuals, last but not least, as participation in FFW activities is rather high, reaching between 60 and 80 percent of the male and female population in the vicinity of the work. For PET communities the geographical targeting criteria have been applied less rigidly, as the data base has generally been weaker. Yet six geographic targeting criteria exist, including displacement and recent conflict, social isolation and lack of public services, and a rather crude assessment of income. Assistance under the Social Sector component is more directed towards humanitarian goals, addressing in particular social and personal crises and human capacity building. Assistance in this sector relies more on the availability of effective implementing partners (NGOs), and also aims to support emerging public sector activities, such as volunteer training by the Ministry of Women and Veterans Affairs (MoWVA).

### **Improved targeting of poor households and individuals**

19. A certain amount of “*leakage*” -- defined as serving those not poor, or missing those who are poor -- is a common feature in poverty targeted programmes, particularly when targeting is based on geographic criteria alone. Thus, during meetings with field staff and WFP project officers ways were explored to better reach poor individuals within their communes and villages. It became clear that in the case of Cambodia, usually only very few villagers in geographically targeted villages were considered not to be able to participate actively in FFW (no more than 5 – 10 % of the total population). This group of non-participants would include, in particular (1) the elderly without family, or those taking care of young kids; (2) young women with young children; (3) the handicapped (particularly the blind, although some *do* participate); (4) the very sick; and (5) those who cannot afford to forgo daily wage income and wait several weeks until food aid is distributed. It was also agreed that wealthier people don’t participate as the food ration is not very attractive to them.

20. In trying to come up with activities to target the poor even better, several actions were suggested and several caveats were pointed out. Providing facilities to take care of children was seen as one of the most effective way to attract an even higher percentage of the poor, particularly among poor women. Special projects around the house that would target individual families (generating amenities such as family ponds, tree nurseries etc.) were also considered, but the problems of jealousy from non-targeted villagers and divisiveness as a result of unequal treatment of villagers was strongly pointed out by field staff. The option of generating voluntary local contributions for targeted funds from medium or less poor households--that often are the first immediate beneficiaries of generated assets—was discussed and considered a possible way to further explore and go. In contrast, free food distribution for those unable to work was only seen as an option where villagers were able to select beneficiaries themselves. To reduce current WFP food rations in order to increase self-targeting was regarded as a completely unacceptable option, that would just generate resentment and trouble.

21. It also became clear that targeting within villages may be difficult and costly for WFP. As neither WFP nor its main counterpart, the Provincial Department for Rural Development (PDRD) have sufficient field staff, partners with field presence would be needed. Such potential are rare, they might come from other government agencies (e.g. under the *seila* process), or from NGO’s and other development donors. Village committees and traditional leaders (“*achars*”), or monks

from the local *pagodas* might be a better instrument to guide targeting decisions and ensure better equity.

22. The bottom line of the informed opinion of WFP and counterpart field staff was that outsiders are unlikely to be able to impose targeting, or specific criteria for targeting, on villagers unwilling to accept them. What seemed more important than formal “targeting guidelines” for enhanced participation and inclusion of the poor, was to raise villager awareness for benefits of targeting, ask village leaders to inform *all* villagers about the programmes, and, especially, to expand the programme cycle to two or more years, as more poor people tend to participate in subsequent years than in the first one.

### C. Issues and Concerns

23. WFP’s targeting process in Cambodia has many merits and has been conducted in a highly effective and professional way. Yet, several issues and concerns have emerged over time that may warrant closer attention.
24. Targeting has often been a complex and complicated process, drawing a lot of work and attention of WFP’s country office staff, VAM officers, and field staff from other critical implementation activities. Changing targeting criteria and procedures almost annually produced a certain degree of uncertainty and discontinuity among target communes, villagers, and staff. On the other side, the process appears to have sensitized staff and villagers and on brought targeting issues to the forefront. It also may have shielded WFP and its staff from undue political influence on the selection of target areas.
25. Too much emphasis may have been placed on geographic targeting at the expense of targeting more distinct groups of food-insecure beneficiaries with specific vulnerabilities, based more on demographic criteria or livelihood strategies.
26. The commune based targeting process has sometimes not lent itself very well to integrating activities with other partner development organisations that work at district or regional level but not necessarily in WFP’s target communes (note that communes represent only between 8 and 15 villages).
27. In 2000 a new geographic targeting index, composed of five indicators of poverty and food insecurity has been used to identify priority communes. These indicators are (1) agricultural land per capita, (2) forest coverage, (3) women’s literacy rate, (4) dependency ratio, and (5) access to safe water sources, pipes and tubewells. There are some concerns about the adequacy, validity, and reliability of these indicators, particularly as they provide little information on income from non-rice and non-forest sources, and the information on women’s literacy rates and dependency ratios at commune level may either be rather unreliable or not very powerful. It is noted, however, that these indicators have been selected by VAM after establishing close statistical correlations with previously used indicators in areas where WFP currently works and more detailed data has been collected over the years.
28. It should also be recognized by WFP that (a) the most appropriate poverty/food security indices may be specific for different locations, food economies, and livelihood strategies, rather than valid nationwide; (b) the quality of available data from different sources for various indicators

may be rather weak; and (c) there is a shortage of critical, statistically reliable targeting data at the level of disaggregation required for commune or village level targeting, for instance on children's malnutrition. This dilemma of what is desirable and what is available in terms of targeting information should be kept in mind. Any poverty or food security index should be used judiciously under such circumstances.

29. In sum, the Vulnerability Assessment and Mapping (VAM) unit of WFP Cambodia deserves much credit for its pioneering and innovative work in assessing the country's most vulnerable population groups, for identifying specific geographic priority areas for WFP's PRRO activities, and for sharing its large data and knowledge base generously with many government agencies, NGOs, and other donors. While VAM has taken the lead role in data collection and analysis, the geographic targeting process has also greatly benefited from the advice and input of project field staff, programme officers, and other experts on the most vulnerable, food-insecure and poor districts and communes.

#### **D. Main recommendations on targeting**

- *WFP should continue to refine its geographic, group, and self-targeting mechanisms for providing employment and income under FFW. WFP should concentrate its vulnerability assessments in areas where less information is available, particularly in those of recent conflict and in urban environments.*
- *While continuing its broad-based, geographically and self-targeted interventions through FFW, WFP should expand services for particularly vulnerable households and individuals (e.g. ponds or vegetable garden for single-female headed households, special activities for the handicapped, underemployed landless, demobilized former soldiers etc.). Wherever possible, WFP should involve local institutions in this process, e.g. village heads (achas), pagodas, Community Development Committees (CDCs) and Village Development Committees (VDCs), and raise the awareness and capacity among communities for group and individual targeting.*
- *WFP should consider to better identify distinct target groups with common food insecurity and vulnerability characteristics, e.g. according to agro-ecological zones, distinct demographic or capability characteristics (young widows, handicapped), or main primary income sources and coping mechanisms.*
- *There should be less emphasis on commune specific targeting. WFP should rather move towards (or re-employ) the concept of cluster districts and integrated regional planning. Within clusters, specific villages, communes, and demographic groups should be selected based on the local expertise of WFP's field staff, MRD counterparts, local institutions, and other development experts. WFP's VAM unit would be instrumental in this process by providing disaggregate quantitative data on poverty, food insecurity, and malnutrition from secondary sources and, where necessary, collecting additional information through PRAs.*
- *WFP should continue to give substantial weight to qualitative assessments by experts who are familiar with local conditions and with the ultimate objectives of the programme. Local communities, government counterparts, and other development institutions should be involved in this process. The goal for the VAM unit within WFP should be to inform the process with complementary data rather than to drive it. In terms of expanded data for*



*targeting, VAM should increasingly collect and use more information on income from non-farm sources, natural resources, remittances, and migration.*

- *It should be recognized that targeting is a dynamic process and requires constant monitoring, as circumstances of those most in need may change. Capacity building of national and local counterparts is therefore essential for sustainability.*
- *In order to increase the impact of WFP food assistance through integrated approaches, to test and develop new models, and to generate counterpart capacity WFP should designate some “high-concentration clusters”. WFP should make efforts to concentrate and coordinate recovery and development planning and implementation with development partners in those areas.*
- *In the future, similar methodologies and criteria should be used for targeting RTC (Regular Target Communes) and PET (Protracted Emergency Target) communities. Yet, while similar criteria of poverty and food insecurity would be most useful for targeting these distinct areas, the social isolation, poor infrastructure and service levels, and abundance of land mines in the second category may call for some special considerations for food and other assistance during a transitory period.*
- *Targeting criteria for beneficiaries of social sector activities should be more clearly specified. Institutional targeting should remain the main targeting mechanism to be used, by selecting development organizations with proven track records in these areas. Where possible, priority will be given to institutions working in WFP’s clusters of employment and income generation and those of high concentration.*

#### **IV. M&E, Programme Effects/Results, Beneficiary Impact**

##### **A. What was planned ?**

30. According to the PRRO document (para. 62–64) WFP Cambodia and its main counterpart, the Ministry for Rural Development (MRD), would maintain an integrated database linked for tracking performance and impact. The database would comprise (1) a well developed *project database* for tracking activities and food aid flows on a monthly basis, including the allocation of food rations, type, size, and date of activity implementation, and the number of participants and beneficiaries by gender (2) a *target database*, including current and chronic vulnerability of potential target villages, as well RRA information by village; (3) *baseline information*, to track nutritional status of beneficiaries and economic outcome indicators, and (4) a list of *monitoring indicators* to specifically assess the effects of outputs in terms of boosting agricultural production and economic activity, thus enhancing food security.
31. The last evaluation mission of PRO 5483 in 1997 found a “disappointing lack of data on benefits derived from project activities” and “no satisfactory system for monitoring programme effects”. WFP Cambodia thus made a commitment under PRRO 6038 to develop an impact monitoring system, that is to measure the programme impact on the lives of beneficiaries. WFP would conduct a joint baseline survey with UNICEF (who WFP is cooperating with in some of the targeted areas). The baseline survey would focus on food security outcome indicators, such as female body mass index (BMI), food expenditure shares, anemia, service access, mother and

child health care, and micro-nutrient issues. Key indicators of transition for PET areas would include information on families living in declared home villages without further displacement; unimpeded land tenure; and the percentage of families with de-mined land.

32. WFP would also fund two external evaluations a year, the first one being a technical review of projects; the second one being a participatory evaluation with beneficiaries to determine satisfaction, perceived understanding and achievement of food aid objectives, and the degree of womens' participation.

## **B. What happened ?**

33. The evaluation mission noted major efforts and progress by the country office - particularly its VAM unit - in designing improved M&E systems leading to impact assessment. This is a welcome development, particularly given the recent emphasis by WFP on introducing 'Results Based Management' principles. A rich reservoir of data from various WFP in-house and outside surveys and rapid assessments has been assembled by the VAM unit over the past few years. Future M&E can build on this information which includes:

- (1) a well developed **project database**; for tracking activities on a monthly basis, including the allocation of food rations, the number of participants and beneficiaries, gender equity, the completion of infrastructure, and the origin of food by donors;
- (2) **two detailed baseline surveys and a survey on gender issues**; conducted under the present PRRO, helpful for assessing programme effectiveness and beneficiaries' vulnerability, food deficits, and programme participation;
- (3) **PRA vulnerability assessments** in more than 550 communes and several **ad-hoc surveys** on issues ranging from traffic analyses on WFP constructed roads to the changing conditions in reconciliation districts;
- (4) a 1999 **technical review** of the quality of infrastructure built through FFW (to be repeated this year by a technical consultant agency, SAWAC)
- (5) a vast array of **secondary data** from the 1998 census, biennial crop assessments, land-use information, and various socio-economic surveys; to be used for targeting and vulnerability assessment.

34. This data base allows WFP to: (a) better identify distinct groups of beneficiaries, their vulnerability characteristics, and appropriate interventions; (b) map vulnerability according to food economy zones, income and coping strategies, and household specific characteristics, (c) determine specific intervention strategies; and (d) assess beneficiary impact. Although many of these surveys and data sources have already yielded valuable information for WFP programming, they still seem to be under-utilised. More thorough analysis might be useful in better informing WFP's programming.

## **Assessment of project effects and impact**

35. The three major socio-economic surveys conducted by WFP in 1998/1999 (RTC baseline, PET baseline, and Gender Survey) clearly show that indeed the poorest and most food insecure population groups and poor women have been the major beneficiaries of the WFP food-for-work programme. Participants in FFW not only have fewer assets and less rice land per capita compared to non-participants, but also a higher share of anemic mothers that would benefit from assistance.
36. In the short-term, the allocation of more than 20 kg of rice per beneficiary and annum (amounting to almost 15 percent of annual rice needs) plus other minor, but valuable, food items in FFR projects, significantly helps to close the 'hunger-gap' and mitigate high-risk and costly coping strategies such as enforced debt, forced migration, and so on (it should be noted, though, that as to date no hard data backs this implicit and most likely assumption). This food assistance is concentrated during the "*lean season*" from July through Decemer the most critical time of the year in terms of seasonal food insecurity.
37. While the poorest members of society have by and large been reached by WFP food and other assistance, some women, noticeably, may not have benefited as much as desired, particularly those in households headed by single, young females with children, one of the poorest and most food-insecure groups in rural villages. Results of the 1999 WFP gender survey--conducted in a limited number of villages with FFW activities--show that female headed households frequently lack labour opportunities and child-minding facilities that prevent them from greater participation in FFW activities. They are often the last to know about the FFW programmes and often cannot afford to wait several weeks for the distribution of the food ration. The gender survey also provides useful insights into the perception of WFP programmes from the villager viewpoint. Although the survey was not methodologically designed for assessing impact, it adds to WFP's understanding of achievement of food aid objectives among key beneficiaries.
38. As far as the long-term impact of generated assets is concerned, little quantitative information is available on the effects of improved access and utilization of these assets, particularly by the poor. The 1999 review of FFW programmes by a local consulting firm, SAWAC, for instance, only covered the technical aspects and sustainability of very recent FFW road and agricultural infrastructure projects, without assessing their long-term quality and impact.
39. For social sector activities WFP's gender-disaggregated project data base system contains excellent monitoring information on the number and other characteristics of beneficiaries reached. It does, however, not provide any qualitative and quantitative information on programme impact, or on the use of assets gained while benefiting from the services offered. The long-term impact of WFP social sector activities on beneficiaries in personal crises is unclear, although the Mission notes efforts to improve monitoring and assessment of the long-term impact of these programmes. The current M&E system also does not request explicit information from implementing agencies that could be used in a standardised way. Many, though not all, of the agencies involved in social sector activities are very capable of producing such data, reporting on it, and using it. Some agencies, particularly Government institutions, have greatly improved over the past years, too. Therefore, WFP has initiated new project proposal and evaluation forms for social sector activities, as well as field operation forms to improve the quality of monitoring information (see Annex 3).

## **Baseline follow-up**

40. To improve WFP's understanding and demonstration of short- and long-term impact of its interventions in Cambodia, the two baseline surveys conducted in 1998 (in RTC areas) and 1999 (in PET areas) could be used for more in-depth analysis, once they are complemented by a scaled-down, follow-up survey in selected participant and comparable non-participant households. Such a follow-up survey should preferably be conducted later this year (2000) or in early 2001.
41. Such an exercise would, however, require to carefully assess what activities have been implemented in the villages of the baseline survey under WFP's FFW activities in 1998 and 1999, as well as those planned for 2000. Secondly, it might be helpful if some of the FFW activities in 2000/20001 could be particular targeted towards those villages and communes covered in the baseline survey (while maintaining a control group without interventions). Third, villages and households with exposure to UNICEF/CASD activities which were part of the original RTC baseline survey should be maintained to assess the synergistic effects of intersectoral and interagency cooperation.
42. There may also be some merit in re-analyzing the baseline surveys in terms of short-term impact related to earlier WFP programme interventions in 1997 and 1998 (during PRO 5483), provided that indicators and the conceptual and methodological framework for the analysis are clearly defined.

### **C. Developing a conceptual and methodological framework for M&E /LOGFRAME planning**

#### **Clarifying programme objectives and performance indicators**

43. Improved monitoring and beneficiary impact assessment would require a better conceptual and methodological framework, starting with a clearer, more coherent definition of what the PRRO is supposed to achieve. While there is general agreement on the broad goals and objectives (food security, social cohesion, asset generation, quality of life, and emergency assistance) there seems to be genuine confusion about primary outcome and impact indicators related to these broader goals and objectives. With the exception of some basic output indicators such as the number of participants and beneficiaries, the PRRO document provides little assistance for identifying and operationalizing critical process and impact indicators. Changes in personnel of those in charge of M&E and VAM in early 1999 contributed to reducing the institutional memory on M&E priorities.

#### **LOGFRAME planning**

44. In order to develop a better focused and improved M&E system a more systematic reflection about the PRRO's objectives and its related activities and outcomes leading to these objectives might be helpful. This could be achieved through systematically developing a logical framework matrix (LOGFRAME) for the next PRRO that would allow to better formulate indicators for tracking project performance, critical external factors, and measuring impact, thus effectively supporting a results-based management (RBM) approach. Among others, a LOGFRAME approach would require to include the main risks and assumptions associated with the programme which may require close monitoring for management purposes. Moreover formulating a LOGFRAME of all CP related activities with full participation of WFP field

officers and government counterparts, beneficiary representatives, and related NGOs may considerably increase the sense of programme ownership and responsibility among implementing staff and beneficiaries.

### **M&E workplan**

45. While a basic monitoring and evaluation plan for the PRRO exists, it might benefit from better formulations in terms of the most relevant research questions and indicators, methodologies to be used, and responsibilities for systematic reporting on M&E outcomes. Overall, given the limited resources for M&E and vulnerability assessment at the country office, better prioritization might be useful. VAM should try to (1) define main research questions more narrowly and concisely and link them more clearly to programming options; (2) develop a conceptual framework how FFW/FFR and social sector interventions are supposed to make a difference in beneficiaries' lives and derive data needs; (for example graphically, or with a set of simple equations); and (3) better address sampling and control group requirements in assessing impact (randomization; quasi-experimental design; etc.); on a methodological note, it should be considered to make more use of multivariate analyses.
46. WFP should identify a set of simple, measurable, and attributable indicators on short-term effects of food assistance, mainly in terms of "filling the hunger-gap", as well as long-term, sustained food security, the major goals under the PRRO. Such indicators may include women's body mass index (BMI), the amount of rice consumed, change in coping mechanisms and the use of generated assets (such as roads or irrigation). Social sector activities would require additional indicators, reflecting specific short-and long-term goals for that sector, such as better health, education, and re-integration. Particular attention should be paid to monitoring and evaluating PRRO effects related to gender equity, capacity building, and advocacy. Another major monitoring issue would be beneficiaries' use of the food ration, its appropriate level, and the question of food vs. cash in urban areas, particularly in view of self-targeting, cost-efficiency, and phasing-out. Targeting in urban areas will be another priority issue.
47. Based on its experience with the gender survey WFP may also want to consider introducing periodic PRA-type surveys on beneficiaries' satisfaction with WFP services and their perceived impact. Moreover, In addition to more formal, data intensive or PRA studies, field personnel should be encouraged as part of regular reporting, to narratively assess programme effects on beneficiaries' lives and on changes in their vulnerability.

### **Performance, effects and impact assessment**

48. The current M&E system was primarily designed to provide information on beneficiary vulnerability, and to identify and target the most vulnerable groups in rural Cambodia. This is broadly in line with the main mandate of the VAM unit within WFP. Although the TOR of the baseline surveys emphasized impact assessment, survey design, methodologies, and data analysis of these surveys in the end were mostly geared towards vulnerability analysis and provision of targeting information than to the assessment of impact. Many resources of VAM in 1999 and previous years have been directed towards data management and dissemination, improvements in targeting, and assisting in baseline survey design, implementation, and processing.

49. In the future, the VAM unit may want to de-emphasize targeting, and instead intensify monitoring and programme support, impact assessment, and related staff and counterpart capacity training, to the extent that these activities fall into VAM's mandate and priorities. While the VAM unit is staffed with excellent experts on data management, statistical analysis, and information display, as well as experienced experts in designing and implementing field surveys, the mission perceives a clear need for more senior level expertise on food security and socio-economic issues.

### **C. Main recommendations on M&E**

- *WFP should identify clear measurable indicators on short-term impact (relating to filling the 'hunger-gap'), long-term impact (food security, 'social cohesion', reduced health risks, etc.), and quantitative targets for these indicators. For this purpose, it might be useful to reassess PRRO goals and objectives in a LOGFRAME framework.*
- *The monitoring and evaluation plan for 2000 and beyond should be reviewed to (1) establish a more realistic workplan, including more specific research questions, a conceptual framework and more narrowly defined indicators, (2) include a comprehensive report on programme results and impact so far, and (3) define specific responsibilities for M&E and data analysis within the country office. WFP might benefit from more senior level expertise on food security and other socio-economic issues.*
- *Impact assessment should become part of the regular monitoring and reporting system. More emphasis should be given to regular narrative and quantitative reporting of beneficiary impact. In turn, this will sensitise staff at all levels on the ultimate programme goals and outcomes.*
- *To identify and address the major constraints of female participation in FFW (Food for Work) activities, and to build on the extensive recommendations of the recent WFP Gender study, WFP should consider working more closely with the Ministry of Women and Veterans Affairs and their extension staff in the field. This might also include the identification of complementary and alternative interventions specifically addressing the food security and nutritional needs of young women with children in single-headed households.*

## ***Annexes***

### **Targeting of WFP Food-for-Work Communes 1997 – 2000**

WFP's Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping unit is responsible for targeting food to the most needy communes in the country. Technical aspects of the targeting process and its main changes from 1997 to 2000 are reviewed below.

- 1997.** 550 poor communes were selected on the basis of interview with a series of experts in the country. Half the villages in each of the selected communes were surveyed with a detailed socio-economic questionnaire (→ 2,751 villages). After another round of expert consultations, results were summarized into 27 socio-economic indicators and a weighted poverty score was compiled. The results were used to identify communes for food for work interventions by MRD and WFP. Village results were averaged by commune, weighted by population. Communes falling in the lowest 25 percentile were mapped, and geographic clusters of communes were identified for priority food for work. Clustering was defined by district boundaries and distance. Outlying communes which fell out of a 30 kilometer radius of other targeted communes, and were outside of district boundaries where other communes were located, were not included as first priority. This approach to targeting strongly emphasized the planning functions as opposed to mere poverty levels. In addition to these communes, some emergency targets were included as priority areas.
- 1998.** Five food economy zones were derived at district level based on a series of indicators (satellite data, crop production, wage income, urban/rural locations etc.). Each district was classified by its predominant food economy zone. The five main zones identified were: urban, riverine, forest, lowland, rainfed, and scrub. Each food economy zone had broadly homogenous food access strategies within itself. Once food economy zones were defined, the best set of food insecurity predictors for the different zones were determined (predictors were chosen from the 1997 socio-economic village survey). It was found, for instance, that rice crop statistics were a powerful determinant to outcomes in lowland rice areas, but not in other areas. Cash income sources and reliance on high risk coping strategies were closely linked to scrub zones, while distance from markets and major roads were more closely linked to riverine outcomes. In all zones, being adjacent to a national highway was one of the single most important factors to both nutritional and expenditure outcomes. After the analysis, a basic set of targeting indicators at district level were selected and reviewed. Once districts were ranked and selected, the results of the 1997 Commune Assessment were used to prioritize communes for targeting. In order to ensure that targeting is based on current conditions, a set of criteria have been adopted to update commune information, which would show significant changes in reliance on high risk coping strategies, changes in production, and sudden changes in income sources.
- 1999.** With the new PRRO, the targeting process in 1999 was centered on four groups of beneficiaries: (a) people in chronically food insecure communes, also called Regular Target Communes (RTC), (b) special population groups in the Protracted Emergency Target (PET) areas; (c) social sector beneficiaries; and (d) people affected by short-term emergencies.

**RTC.** To assess the food aid needs of chronically food insecure people in 1999, an initial list of 470 communes was compiled by WFP in consultation with concerned government

officials and NGOs. These were then filtered through a selection process based on two composite indices. One was an analysis of the Poverty Score Index (from the 1997 survey in 2,751 villages), and the other was the presence of communes within a “High Priority District”, derived during the 1998 targeting. Using the above two composite indices, 170 communes out of the original 470 were selected for WFP food assistance in 1999.

**PET.** Protracted Emergency Communes are selected on the basis of six criteria: 1) loss of assets; 2) man-made events causing an involuntary change in livelihood strategy; 3) high-risk coping strategies; 4) poor security with the last 12 months; 5) social isolation from services and neighboring communes; and 6) inadequate income. The target populations with these areas are returnees, long or short-term IDPs, or recently resettled communities usually with the old civil conflict zones. A special target population comprises families living until 1998/99 in areas outside of the control of the Cambodian Government. These areas were closed to the outside world until mass defections by former Khmer Rouge soldiers, and are classified as “Reconciliation Zones”. The targeting criteria for selection are those areas that were not under Government control prior to August 1996.

**Social sector beneficiaries** were covered almost all across the whole country, and short-term **emergency target communes** were decided on a case-to-case basis.

**2000.** The targeting process for the year 2000 was based on the premise that at least half the communes targeted in the previous year should also be covered in 2000, to ensure continuity. On this basis, WFP’s and MRD’s field staff were asked to submit three sets of communes. The first one consisted of 1999 chronically food insecure communes that still were perceived in need of food aid, the second were communes that might not need continued assistance in 2000, and the third set included communes not targeted in 1999, but considered in need of assistance in the year 2000. These three added up to 267 communes of which a first list of 145 communes were selected.

The selection was on the basis of five indicators derived from recent data sets. Cropland per household, forest land per household, dependency ratio, female literacy, and access to safe water. These five indicators were chosen based on series of statistical tests with other indicators, and on the basis of intuitive (!!!!! “conventional wisdom”) knowledge of food access sources: natural resources; crop/forest, labor; literacy/dependency ratio, services/urban, access to safe water. Each of the 267 communes was given a value of 1 for each of the five indicators, if those indicators were below the mean. Then communes showing at least 4 of the 5 indicators below national mean, were chosen (145 communes) for the first list of targeted chronically food insecure communes. These 145 communes were then ranked into three categories of vulnerability: A, B, and C, based on a z-score index of the five indicators. Communes ranked ‘A’ would get a higher allocation of food aid per capita than ‘B’, and ‘B’ would get more than ‘C’ communes.

Almost all of the PET communes in 1999 (a total of 113 communes) would receive assistance in 2000 because of the long-term nature of displacement problems in these areas, and hence no commune level targeting was necessary.



### Current Monitoring and Evaluation Plan

	MONITORING	EVALUATION
<b><u>Objective 1: Short-term and long-term food security</u></b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Monthly updates of WFP beneficiaries, outputs (roads [km], ponds [no.], TB patients etc.), gender breakdowns, and food aid quantities broken down by location, donor, and type (from project database)</li> <li>• Field reports – as presented by WFP province directors at monthly meetings</li> <li>• Use of FFW assets - based on tracking forms</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Baseline surveys</li> <li>• Comparison of food deficits with food aid quantities; months of rice left after harvest, rice sales</li> <li>• Indebtedness, literacy, landlessness, and dependency ratio in WFP target areas (compared to national averages)</li> <li>• Cost-benefit analysis of assets generated through WFP FFW/FFR assistance</li> </ul>
<b><u>Objective 2: Social cohesion</u></b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Targeting of areas affected by civil insecurity</li> <li>• Qualitative surveys and field reports</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Assessment of WFP involvement in areas heavily affected by civil insecurity</li> <li>• Qualitative survey on FFW role in improving social cohesion</li> </ul>
<b><u>Objective 3: Quality of life</u></b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Tracking beneficiaries, such as TB patients, birth spacing volunteers (project data base)</li> <li>• Tracking forms on location</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• NGO partnership evaluation</li> <li>• Quality of NGO program and benefits</li> </ul>

<p><b><u>Objective 4: Gender equity</u></b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Tracking of WFP projects by extent of gender participation and benefit distribution</li> <li>• FFW committees with appropriate gender divisions in decision making</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Gender surveys</li> <li>• Analysis of distribution of WFP food and asset benefits by gender</li> </ul>
<p><b><u>Objective 5: Capacity building</u></b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Forms to track training activities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Number of trained staff on food for work, VAM etc.</li> </ul>
	<p><b>Monitoring</b></p>	<p><b>Evaluation</b></p>
<p><b><u>Reaching the poorest</u></b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Regular informal field visits by food monitors, programme assistants and programme officers</li> <li>• Targeting reassessment form &amp; visits upon request</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Baseline socio-economic surveys (RTC and PET)</li> <li>• Gender survey</li> </ul>
<p><b><u>Changes in vulnerability</u></b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Acquiring and analyzing new VAM data for regular targets and emergency contingency planning</li> <li>• Compare WFP beneficiary profiles to national averages</li> <li>• Migration levels within WFP FFW areas (caused by debts)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Update information from Government and other agencies</li> <li>• Comparing food deficit of beneficiaries with WFP quantities of food aid</li> </ul>
<p><b><u>Verification of project implementation and food deliveries</u></b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Project database (with GPS points)</li> <li>• Logistics database (Waybills)</li> <li>• Monthly meeting with field officers</li> <li>• Informal PA &amp; PO /NPO visits</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Technical review</li> <li>• PRRO 6038 evaluation Jan. 2000</li> </ul>

## ANNEX 4

### **Nutritional Aspects of PRRO Cambodia 6038 – External preparatory study for the Evaluation of PRRO 6038: Food Aid for Recovery and Rehabilitation**

This external report was commissioned to assist the evaluation team, especially the socio-economist, in examining aspects of PRRO 6038 in relation to food security and nutrition. Such issues include the impact of food aid on household food security and also nutritional outcomes/status of women and children in rural Cambodia. In addition, the usefulness of nutritional outcomes in identifying those communities most in need of food aid will be covered. Finally, the extent to which beneficiaries' lives are impacted from food assistance will be addressed. Since the current monitoring system is used both for targeting of beneficiaries and also for assessing impact in the form of poverty reduction and improved nutritional outcomes, the following specific topics will be addressed from both perspectives:

- Maintenance and/or improvement in nutritional status of beneficiary household members;
- Adequacy and appropriateness of food rations;
- Capability of the current M&E system in assessing changes in nutritional status of targeted vulnerable populations.

The material presented in this report draws primarily from internal documents as well as the following data sources and reports.

- 1998 Baseline survey of WFP target areas
- 1998 survey of Protracted Emergency Target (PET) zones
- 1999 Gender Research Project

#### **Maintenance and/or improvement in nutritional status of beneficiary household members**

The current targeting system evolved initially from a rapid assessment of villages in the programme area which helped WFP to develop a poverty index based on certain key variables associated with poverty and vulnerability in rural Cambodia. Those key variables included landlessness, indebtedness, vulnerability of female-headed household, and few or no productive assets. Since that time, several studies have been carried out both externally as well as internally that have provided information to further refine the targeting process which has been very useful during this time of rapid political and economic change in Cambodia. The data from the 1996 Socio-Economic Survey of Cambodia (SESC) provided the first comprehensive view of the extent of malnutrition across the country. These nutritional outcome measures were linked with the existing data in the WFP-VAM office and provided the first glimpse of the usefulness of linking geographic and vulnerability indicators with nutritional outcomes. As a result, WFP, in collaboration with UNICEF, conducted a vulnerability survey of households in their target areas in April and May of 1998. The results of the study were used to further refine the targeting process, especially in providing a demographic and economic profile of FFW households as well as in finding correlations between household characteristics and malnutrition. The survey of households in Protracted Emergency Target (PET) zones provided additional insight in the differences between target communities in relation to nutritional outcomes, geographic location, and livelihood practices, which helped to provide even clearer understanding of the intricate relationships between poverty and malnutrition in rural Cambodia. Therefore, from a targeting perspective, the internal surveys conducted have been useful in providing that extra insight needed to illuminate the characteristics of vulnerability, when linked with the existing monitoring data. The targeting exercise for 2000 was aided greatly by the

additional information provided through the use of nutritional outcomes in painting a clearer picture of vulnerability.

There is a different use of this information when considering nutritional impact on beneficiary households. Firstly, the survey methodologies considered only households with children less than five years of age and therefore are only representative of those households, when considering economic and livelihood factors. However, the academic literature has shown in the past that the nutritional status of children less than 5 is reflective of the community in which they live. Therefore, in principal, the use of anthropometric measures in children does reflect the overall nutrition status of a population. In practice, the surveys were designed to provide a snapshot picture of the overall situation at the time of data collection. Therefore, the data alone cannot prove that WFP activities are either directly or indirectly improving the nutritional status of beneficiaries. However, the survey results have shown that children from households participating in FFW activities are in fact, worse off nutritionally and that the value of the food ration is most likely enough to offset further nutritional deterioration during the lean season but that the programme itself will not push those families out of poverty. It should however be mentioned that the purpose and design of PRRO 6038 is more to prevent nutritional decline and is not a nutritional rehabilitation programme.


Characteristics of FFW participant households from the 1998 Baseline survey (WFP target areas only) are compared in Table 1 below. These households were examined alone so as not to include those households receiving the additional benefit of community development provided by the UNICEF CASD (Community Action for Social Development) programme. Differences between FFW participant families and non-participant families are highlighted.

Table 1 – Comparison of FFW participant and non-participant families

	<b>FFW-no</b>	<b>FFW-yes</b>	<u>Significant</u>
Household size	6.42	6.60	
% female-headed households	6%	7%	
Dependency ratio	1.45	1.59	
Spouse literate	44%	46%	
Number of household assets	1.44	1.18	< 0.05
% owning wet season rice land	84%	88%	
Hectare rice land owned/capita	0.131 ha/cap	0.114 ha/cap	
% selling rice produced	9%	9%	
% using rice to pay back loan	40%	37%	
% reported borrowing rice or money	84%	90%	
% total expenditure used to pay debt	14.4%	14.3%	
% total expenditure on food	38.4%	38.4%	
% mothers malnourished	26%	19%	
% mothers anemic	68%	79%	< 0.05

The results of the April-May 1998 survey found few statistically significant differences between FFW participants and non-participants. However the main finding is that the participant families have significantly fewer productive household assets and higher dependency ratio. In addition the non-pregnant women from participant families are significantly more likely to be anemic.


Chart 1 – Comparison of nutritional outcomes of children 6-59 months of age by FFW participation



In every measure, the rates of malnutrition were higher in children from families that participated in FFW projects in their home village, but not significantly so. An additional comparison can be made between children from households receiving UNICEF community development benefits in addition to FFW participation. There appears to be a greater impact of FFW projects on child nutrition when accompanied by a community development programme. For each measure of malnutrition there is little or no difference in prevalence between WFP and UNICEF when there was no FFW project. However, there are noticeable differences in nutritional outcomes of children from WFP beneficiary families.

A closer look at just WFP beneficiary children and prevalence of acute malnutrition (wasting) by age group shows a clear use of the data in evaluating the effectiveness of the targeting process. Chart 2 illustrates the much higher rates of malnutrition in children from beneficiary households in the critical ages of 6 to 23 months.

Chart 2 – Acute malnutrition by age and FFW participation



The main points to be made in this section in regards to usefulness of nutritional outcomes as measures of program impact are that they can be used but that the monitoring and evaluation system should be modified to collect data over time in order to link program benefits to nutritional improvements. As it stands now, one-time household surveys have been extremely useful in creating a profile of vulnerability in the country and in refining the targeting process, but alone, cannot provide the crucial linkage between programme and outcome.

### ***Adequacy and appropriateness of food rations***

This section is the most difficult to assess as little field research has been conducted on the recipients to understand their perspective on this issue. From the targeting perspective, information on market value of food rations and the self-targeting aspect of public works projects provide the best look at the adequacy and appropriateness of the rations. From a nutrition/consumption viewpoint, the most useful information from the field was collected during the 1999 Gender Research Project of participant and non-participant households.

First of all, it is important to define exactly the purpose of food aid in PRRO 6038. A memo from the nutritionist at WFP Headquarters in Rome pointed out that in most cases, a FFW food ration is an income transfer primarily composed of the local staple (rice) with a value not exceeding the local agricultural wage. The transfer should be completed with a minimal logistical cost. This perspective is the most logical to follow in cases of public works programs. Therefore, the composition of the food ration should be considered primarily for the market value and secondarily for the nutritional value in situations where food is available in the market and the issue is to provide access or purchasing power to recipients with the ultimate goal of preventing nutritional deterioration.

According to the WFP-Cambodia VAM office, the value of the average food ration is approximately riel 4,500 per day (4 kgs rice, 120 grams oil, 120 grams fish). This compares with the average agricultural labor wage of between 3,500 and 4,500 riel per day (of course, this does not take into account the seasonal fluctuation of agricultural labor wages). So, the food ration, as it stands, is

adequate enough to provide incentive for poor households that rely heavily on agriculture wage labor to participate in the FFW projects especially during the dry season since there are very few other opportunities for job. Taking into account the nature of the work, the ration provides enough self-targeting at the household level. Of the households in WFP project areas that participated in FFW projects (Baseline, 1998), 52% built roads, 27% ponds, 11% canals, and 11% dikes/dams. Significantly more participant households relied on short-term work for income while significantly fewer relied on crafts, log cutting and scrub collection for income when compared to non-beneficiaries.

Another consideration of the adequacy and appropriateness of the ration in terms of targeting and delivery is whether cash would be more appropriate in the Cambodian context. Certainly national food production is at an all time high with national surpluses reported for the past 3 years. However, rural infrastructure is still inadequate and thus the market structures are still tremendously underdeveloped. This leaves large part of the population with limited access to food and constraint the poorest households focus nearly all of their energy in obtaining food, even more when commodity market prices (especially rice) increase considerably over the pre-harvest season. Local research has shown that if households are divided into quintiles based on percentage expenditure on food, the children in the 4<sup>th</sup> quintile have the worst nutritional outcomes rather than those in the lowest quintile. As a family gets slightly less poor, they reprioritize and focus on obtaining productive assets, reallocating precious resources towards attaining a slightly more materialistic lifestyle, sacrificing caloric intake to some extent. In addition, the poorest would not be easily reached with cash aid scheme that are weak under current institutional structures: the leakage would be greater with corruption, control, and absorption problems, and the targeting would be weaker in an economy where rice is often used as cash. Overall, it is difficult to completely understand how resources are obtained and allocated within rural households, as the climate is extremely fluid with new opportunities for income and expenditure arising every day.

From a consumer view, (rural household), any new opportunity for income, either in cash or kind, is welcomed in rural Cambodia, especially amongst the poorest. This is supported by the qualitative findings of the Gender Research Project in which poor rural Cambodians concurred that FFW projects are welcomed in the villages. However, the study pointed out that a major factor in this is not the ration itself but the improved infrastructure and the opportunity to “take responsibility for their own future and to contribute to the next generation.”

### ***Ration composition***

Looking specifically at the ration composition again, rice is the main source of calories which is appropriate since one study conducted in 1996 estimated that more than 80% of calories in the rural Cambodian diet comes from rice. In addition, canned fish is provided as a source of protein while oil provides additional kilocalories from fat. Research from the 1998 Baseline Survey and the PET survey indicate that there are some differences between FFW participant groups in consumption of foods by children 24-59 months of age. The Baseline survey found that, during the dry season, children from participant households were significantly more likely to have eaten meat or fruits and vegetables than those from non-participant families. The results from the IDP and Recon households of the PET survey, which was conducted in November and December, found that young children from FFW participant households were significantly less likely to eat meat. However, there were opposite significant results with fish and cassava/potato consumption indicating that circumstances beyond that of access influence individual food consumption in rural Cambodia.

In the ration, the rice is likely to be consumed and partly monetized or used to repay debts while the fish is more likely to be consumed by the recipient household since rural Cambodians typically consumed dried fish or fermented fish paste. The oil is likely to be used and sold as well since most rural households prepare soup-like dishes for typical home consumption (HKI, 1999). Iodized salt is also provided in the ration. Although generally, in food-for-work rations, little attention is paid to nutritional concerns since it is mainly an income transfer, adjustment of the ration contents have been made to render it more sound in addressing basic nutritional needs as highlighted in the surveys. The provision of oil fortified with vitamin A and more appropriate levels of proteins from fish in the ration, together in maintaining an adequate level of incentive, at reasonable costs for WFP, were taken into consideration. Otherwise, for the purposes outlined in PRRO 6038, the rations are both adequate and appropriate. It would, however, be useful to conduct further research into the use of FFW rations if the linkage is to be made to between FFW participation and increased consumption.

Capability of the current M&E system in assessing changes in nutritional status of targeted vulnerable populations.

A brief overview of the main sources of information currently available in the WFP-Cambodia office is presented below. Strengths and weaknesses are presented for each source.

1998 Baseline Survey – The design is strong, using random sampling procedures and collecting consumption and morbidity information as well as anthropometric outcome measures for children. Has been useful in targeting. In addition, allows analysis of the added impact of community development to the public works projects. Would be more useful if a follow-up study were conducted to allow for comparison over time, due to the rapidly changing political and economic circumstances in rural Cambodia. Shortcomings are that more detailed information on WFP program participation as well as livelihood systems was not included in the Baseline.

PET household survey (late 1998) – Has a similar study design as the Baseline, which allows for some seasonal comparisons to be made. In addition, has provided greater and much needed detailed information regarding WFP programs, helping to further define the profile of vulnerability in rural Cambodians. When excluding households from the Highway PET communes, it is probably the most useful source of information to assess WFP programme impact on nutritional status of rural children.

Gender Study Project (1999) – Alone, is not useful in assessing nutritional changes since very limited anthropometric information was collected. However, it provides useful insight into the perception of WFP programs from the villager viewpoint. The design was not methodologically appropriate for assessing impact.

The following are a list of additional variables necessary to make a clear linkage between programme participation and nutritional outcomes:

Expenditure patterns as a proxy indicator for income, especially for food, debt and medical treatments

Overall indebtedness

Rice production of households and per capita thresholds necessary to remain above the poverty line.

Regional productivity differences should be considered, especially the high productivity of rice paddy in Battambang province.

Consumption and feeding habits of children as well as dietary diversity

Child immunization and illness

Income sources and seasonality



Risk taking and coping mechanisms  
Nutritional outcomes of children and mothers  
FFW participation – detailed information  
Overall access to and utilization of health care, as well as costs

There are also many considerations involving the current targeting process. At the commune level, should targeting be conducted based on poverty and vulnerability or rather on the need for infrastructural improvements? The current system relies more heavily on poverty assessment and if the needs for infrastructure improvements are slight, then a programme of simple targeted food distribution could be more appropriate in the context and would likely have a stronger nutritional impact on the beneficiaries. At the village level, the current procedure focuses on who to benefit from the project, based on previous research that has provided a profile of vulnerability. A different approach would be to determine criteria of exclusion, initially assuming that all households in the village are vulnerable. This practice could then eliminate those households who meet criteria of exclusion. However, the villagers themselves would likely be more responsible for helping to develop that profile. I.e. households with children who are NOT malnourished could not participate, this could have drawbacks in that some families could actually be encouraged to withhold food from their children in order to participate.

From a nutritional perspective and based on the ultimate goal of preventing further decline in nutritional status, it may be wise to further consider FFW programming on a 2-5 year basis. Acute malnutrition in non-emergency situations is found more often in children between 6 and 23 months of age. Stunting is a measure of chronic or long-term malnutrition. Underweight is a measure that is a combination of acute and chronic malnutrition. Changes in prevalence of wasting and underweight are more likely to be detected over shorter periods of time, since linear growth is a much slower process. Also, consumption and subsequent prevalence of malnutrition is seasonal in rural Cambodia. Not only will there be delays between increased consumption and measurable changes in child nutritional outcomes, the proven impact of improved infrastructure (FFW projects) such as roads and ditches will not be immediate. Continued assistance in the form of a 2-5 year commitment is more likely to have a measurable impact on the nutritional status of children in the those villages. There are further considerations at the household level.

Often the most vulnerable are identified as having particular household demographic situations with fewer earners, more dependents and marginal access to income and food. Large amounts of food provided at one time are not likely to provide the same impact necessary for sustained development as is found in emergency situations.

Nutritional status of children in a community can change noticeably over time and could be detected using the current M&E system, with some modifications. Further studies in the form of monitoring systems could be adapted from the Baseline and PET surveys to measure participation in relation to nutritional outcomes while controlling for other predictors of child nutritional outcomes.

The current M&E system was designed to provide information for identifying and targeting the most vulnerable groups in rural Cambodia. The targeting process is the key to a successful FFW project in achieving maximum impact from a food distribution system. In this manner the studies conducted in 1998 and 1999 have achieved their objectives of providing information to further refine definitions of rural poverty and vulnerability and to relate them to demographics, expenditure, production, consumption and ultimately improved health and nutrition in rural communities.

In order to measure programme impact on the nutritional status of the target population, the current M&E system which has a strong focus on targeting should either be modified to include a monitoring component which regularly measures nutritional impact or a separate system should be established. As it stands now, the current system is incapable of assessing changes in the nutritional status of the targeted population and attributing impact to the program.

A proposed system would be to set up a 2-5 year methodologically sound study, devised to systematically collect data from a representative sample of participant households and from comparable non-participant households using a longitudinal quasi-experimental design. Changes over time, controlling for external factors could be detected through statistical analyses and opportunities for re-targeting could be detected as the need would arise.