



World Food Programme

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MALAWI Country Programme (1998-2001)*

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Responsibility for the opinions expressed in this report rests solely with the authors. Publication of this document does not imply endorsement by WFP of the opinions expressed.

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Executive Summary

1. The process of developing a Country Strategy Outline (CSO) and Country Programme (CP) in Malawi has resulted in a recognisable but insufficiently coherent CP as described and expected in the policies and guidelines of WFP. The CP is indeed compatible with national policy on food security. However, it is **insufficiently integrated** within the national development strategies and programmes in the sectors relevant to its core activities as well as in the programmes of the other UN agencies (UN Development Assistance Framework-UNDAF partners) and the bilateral donor agencies.
2. At the same time, despite its acceptance of a substantial quantum of WFP food aid resources, the government of Malawi (GOM) has evinced scant interest in the management and oversight of the CP. **Thus, government ownership of, and hence interest and involvement in the CP projects, has been limited.** This is reflected in the difficulties encountered in getting the Country Programme Advisory Committee (CPAC) established on a firm footing, as well as in securing donor support for the complementary activities that are included in, but not funded by the CP.
3. There is another issue of fundamental importance. WFP's principal resource is food. If this is to be useful in promoting long-term development, as distinct from satisfying short-term hunger, then the **complementary resources required** (both in quantity and quality) must be made available in a timely manner. For this to happen, donor countries need to ensure the inclusion within their commitments of the complementary resources for CPs that the Executive Board has approved.
4. However, while approving the use of food aid resources for development on the EB, the representatives in Malawi of several donor countries appear **sceptical about the relevance and usefulness of food aid for development.** They appear, therefore, to have been reluctant to provide resources, apart from food for emergencies, from within their bilateral in-country programmes in support of WFP development activities. This ambivalence seriously constrains WFP's capability in this area inasmuch as food, by itself, without complementary human, financial and material resources, is not a sufficient input for the achievement of the CP goals.
5. The mission observed that the objectives of the CP and its constituent activities appear to possess what might be termed **passive consistency** with the new WFP policy on **Enabling Development.** Even so, the mission considers that insufficient attention is being paid in project design to the need to secure the sustainability of the assets created and to define an exit strategy for the termination of WFP assistance. This can only be secured through sustained efforts in support of a village (and district) level participatory approach (VLPA) and the introduction of joint programming with all development partners. These issues should be addressed immediately in respect of current activities, as well as in the preparation of the next Country Programme. In Annex II, the mission has prepared a detailed checklist of the extent of CP compatibility with the objectives of Enabling Development.
6. In support of development, WFP country offices are now required to implement country programmes and prepare and manage activities efficiently and effectively, as well as to establish partnerships with key stakeholders. This means that the **staff complement and profile, and the logistic resources must be appropriate** for these tasks together with adequate budgeting and financial flexibility. The mission found that, in the case of Malawi, shortcomings in these areas have seriously constrained CP preparation and implementation.
7. The CP process was expected to result in greater **coherence and consistency** in programme activities as well as **concentration of resources.** The mission observed that there was **strategic focus** on the most vulnerable areas and groups together with a certain degree of coherence and **complementarity** in the CP. However, this latter condition seemed to exist more by accident than design. Indeed, the mission was unable to discern any deliberate effort to exploit the potential for linking the activities in the CP in terms of sector, geographic area, beneficiaries or other common elements: training in soybean production and processing (e.g. the Assistance to Malnourished



Groups {AMG} and School Feeding {SF} projects). The mission is of the opinion that there is a strong rationale for making these linkages.

8. Another issue concerns the **determination of an appropriate strategy for WFP assistance in Malawi**: choices in strategic areas such as: key partners inside and outside government; geographic target areas; targeting considerations within geographic areas; programme areas best dealt with by other agencies. These points need to be elucidated during the preparation of the next CSO/CP. Agreement in this field should help to avoid programming failures, such as the inability to attract funding for the soybean revolving fund, because this is perceived by WFPs principal donors as falling outside of its mandate.
9. **Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping (VAM)** is yet another issue to be resolved. It is clear that an important determinant of the relevance of a CSO/CP is an accurate analysis of national and sub-regional (within the country) food insecurity and vulnerability – a hunger analysis. VAM, however, is a user of secondary data and the output from VAM can only be as good as the inputs. The current CSO/CP is based on a 1996 VAM baseline analysis and it is expected that the next CP will be based on an analysis of the 1998 Population Census and the 1999 Integrated Household Survey (IHS).
10. **Responsibility for VAM** is at present dispersed among institutions (donor agencies) outside of government and there is a co-ordinating body composed of representatives of the various stakeholders. As the mission has noted above, this arrangement does not ensure sustainability nor does it guarantee the quality of the primary data. Given the consensus on the need for VAM, it is expedient that the Government of Malawi (GOM) and other stakeholders agree on a suitable home for VAM analysis. In the longer term, it may be that WFPs major role might be to provide support to improve the collection of relevant primary data while orchestrating a more co-ordinated donor and GOM effort to meet food security information needs rather than keeping its own in-house capacity.
11. The mission found that the **delegation of authority** to the regional and country office levels has enhanced the flexibility of the Country Director (CD) in developing and negotiating a CP and in making shifts in resources when appropriate. However, the process has been protracted and there are still grey areas and differing interpretations about procedures and the precise extent of the delegated authority, particularly in the area of budget and finance. It does not seem, therefore, that adequate flexibility has been provided at the Regional Office/Country Office (RO/CO) levels in terms of planning and budgeting for development activities.
12. In respect of **resource allocation and funding**, the mission observed that a serious constraint on WFP's ability to carry out development activities efficiently and effectively is constituted by the methodology followed in the calculation and allocation of Direct Support Costs (DSC). This appears to be largely an adaptation of the methodology used to calculate DSC for emergencies. It acts, however, as a serious impediment for development assistance and indeed as a disincentive to staff, to the extent that such activities require the investment of considerable time and effort for which adequate budgetary resources are not provided. This is so because the calculation of the advance DSC for the next year appears to be based on the actual **"amount of food moved"** the previous year, which in a development activity may depend on factors other than the quality of logistic management. Thus it may result in reduced funding for programme staff the following year, although the volume of related activities is greater (development of partnerships, joint planning and programming, training and capacity building).
13. To be effectively used to promote development, **food must be combined with other inputs** (human, material, financial and technical know-how). Also, by its nature, food for development requires more programming inputs than emergency food aid. There must be discussions and agreements with beneficiaries/communities, government agencies, UNDAF and bilateral donor agencies as well as NGO partners. The mission considers, therefore, that while the formula for calculating DSC may have been suitable for a logistics oriented programme preoccupied with



“moving food” in emergencies, it is completely unsuitable for an agency engaged in development support activity. In light of the experience of the WFP office in Malawi, it is evident that the procedures and rules for establishing programme and project budgets are inappropriate to a CP approach, inasmuch as they do not allow for the required flexibility in resource planning and allocation.

14. This implicit bias in the budget methodology towards systems and approaches more appropriate for emergencies also appears to exist in regard to the **appropriate numbers, qualifications and experience of the personnel** required in WFP field offices that manage CPs. Indeed, the mission concluded that the problems of programme preparation and implementation that have arisen during the CP process in Malawi, may well be attributable in large part to the continued use by CO staff of approaches and procedures followed in emergencies. The mission considers therefore that the staffing mix and internal organisation of the country office is not entirely appropriate, given the requirements of the CP approach. There is also need for increased staff training in the tools of project design, logical modelling and formulating measurable objectives/indicators.
15. The mission noted that current activity design does not facilitate **monitoring** in that it does not specify the indicators to be monitored and how they could be made operational. This requires direct input from key stakeholders in developing a performance-monitoring plan. The identification of assumptions and analysis of risk is another important area where monitoring is weak. Identifying assumptions with key stakeholders and coming up with risk mitigation strategies is not yet an integral part of project or programme management.
16. The mission found that the CP lacked a **logistics strategy and plan** and that WFP’s record in Malawi has been poor in terms of ensuring that food is delivered in good condition and in good time to the targeted beneficiaries. This appears largely due to the fact that logistics has been neglected and inappropriately staffed and structured. The formulation of a logistics plan is thus a matter of urgent necessity together with the restructuring and staffing of the logistics unit.
17. It appeared to the mission that the CP might be overtaxing government capacity in certain areas. The **use of UN Volunteers (UNVs)** has been seen as a means of enhancing national implementation capacity. However, the mission considers that this is not being done in ways that maximise their effectiveness. Indeed, it is clear that the current arrangement of UNVs operating independently with a direct line to WFP, neither enhances capacity building nor encourages local “ownership”. This situation seems due in large part to the limited government involvement in the CP so far. The mission would suggest that this issue should be put on the agenda of the first meeting of CPAC.
18. The mission is of the opinion that the **design of the three core activities** is in need of a certain degree of modification. This is necessary to ensure that the objectives are attainable within the given time frame and with the resources envisaged. There are also parallel actions to be carried out that are beyond the control of the managers of the activity but essential for its success in terms of effects and ultimate impact. For example, the availability of extra classrooms and teachers and the establishment of school gardens in the case of the school-feeding project; or the provision of training in nutrition, and soybean production and processing in the AMG activity. Joint programming and the establishment of partnerships for implementation will be required to this end.

INTRODUCTION

In 1994, WFP introduced a new policy framework called the **country programming approach**. This replaces the project-by-project approach, which made it difficult to relate WFP assistance to overall national planning. With the previous approach, there was little integration of different WFP activities



to ensure a coherent country programme. The new approach implies some fundamental changes to the way WFP plans and programmes, focusing on a people-centred and food-based strategy and using the “country” as the basic entity for WFPs engagement. A country programme should be a cohesive and focused response to those strategic objectives of a recipient country that coincide with the strategic objectives of WFP and other assistance partners. This new orientation is also in step with the direction of UN reform (CCA, UNDAF, etc.).

The Malawi Country Programme was presented to the Executive Board in April 1998, based on a 1995 Country Strategy Outline (CSO). The document outlines WFP assistance over a four-year period, which involves a core allocation of 16.8 million dollars for direct operational costs as well as supplementary activities valued at close to 12.2 million dollars (also for direct operating costs). The programme targets an estimated 938,000 beneficiaries over the four years.

The CP supports food security and increased nutrition with a focus on the most vulnerable groups in Malawi. In line with the Government’s long-term goal of sustaining improvements in the food security of female-headed households, a high proportion of WFP’s food assistance is aimed at women and children. Finally, Malawi is a pilot country for the UNDAF. UN agencies have agreed to harmonise their respective programme cycles to cover the period 1997-2001, and hence the four year length of this CP.

This report is based on the work of an evaluation mission, which visited Malawi between 28 March and 23 April 2000. The main goal of the evaluation was to assess whether the CP approach has been an effective tool for preparing and implementing WFP assistance to national development and relief programmes, and to determine whether this strategy has led to better results than the previous project approach. The mission’s work was guided by terms of reference¹ focussing on the following specific tasks:

- To assess the extent to which WFP’s current development activities in Malawi have been influenced by the CP approach so that they constitute a recognisable CP and identify needs for adjustment, where necessary and appropriate.
- To assess the extent to which WFP’s systems and procedures for programme and project identification, design, budgeting, funding and implementation at both the headquarters and field levels have enhanced or impeded the CP approach in Malawi.
- To assess the extent to which the CP in Malawi has resulted in a more effective WFP contribution to both development and relief.
- To assess the extent to which the individual WFP activities in Malawi represent effective use of food aid (particularly in light of the practices and principles enshrined in the new “Enabling Development” policy).
- To provide recommendations for the CP that can be used in the development of the next Country Strategy Outlines and CP, and to provide accountability to the Executive Board.

Thus the present analysis does not constitute an evaluation *stricto sensu* of the individual core and supplementary activities in the CP. It is rather an assessment of the suitability and effectiveness of the country programming approach to achieve the four qualities of integration, concentration, coherence

¹ See Annex I.



and flexibility² sought through the application of a new process (together with government and all other key stakeholders) of joint programming and activity preparation.

RATIONALE FOR WFP FOOD AID

Food insecurity and poverty

Malawi is one of the world's poorest countries. It has a high population density (about 110/km²), a mainly rural population (85%) and a predominantly agricultural economy (35% of GDP and 90% of exports). Sixty percent of the population is estimated to live under the poverty line and income disparity is high and increasing- the Gini coefficient has worsened from 0.48 in 1968 to 0.62 in 1995. However, although agriculture is indeed the backbone of the national economy, in effect the largesse of the donor countries and agencies is arguably one of the principal determinants of the level of Gross National Income.

Declining agricultural productivity has resulted in increasing importation of maize- the country's staple food - in recent years (except in 1999). The rapid increase in population has resulted in reduced land holding per farm family, shorter fallow periods and the expansion of cultivation to marginal and less fertile areas. This is leading to deforestation, soil erosion and general degradation of the natural resource base. This problem is most serious in southern Malawi, as compared to the central and northern regions.

There are a number of factors that cause malnutrition in Malawi. These include frequent infections, low energy intake, poor dietary habits and traditions such as early weaning and close birth spacing, which are being aggravated by HIV/AIDS. Most families do not produce or acquire enough food due to lack of cash for purchasing farm inputs such as improved seed, fertilisers, pesticides, and improved livestock breeds and livestock drugs. The households most vulnerable to food insecurity in Malawi are female-headed households (estimated at 33% of all smallholders), farming households with less than 1 hectare of land for cultivation, estate tenants and the urban poor

Improving food security and satisfying the nutritional requirements of the population have been cardinal tenets of national development policy in Malawi for many years. Even so, food shortages have recently been a recurring phenomenon. This may have been due to an explicit policy bias towards measures to increase **national** food security by favouring maize production (through input subsidies, and research and extension support) at the expense of other food crops. At the same time, a panoply of wage and price controls favoured cash crop production in the estate sub-sector at the expense of food crops in general. Thus, **household** food security was neglected. Current policies and strategies, however, are directed specifically to correcting this imbalance.

For a long time controlled wage and producer price structures have distorted the opportunity cost for labour to support the estate sub-sector's demand for cheap labour. At present, only maize prices are being controlled through a price band system. High demand for casual labour on the tea and tobacco

² To define more specific criteria against which to assess the Malawi CP, the mission came up with the following expanded working definitions (for the original definitions see CFA 38/P/6):

Integration: WFP's core CP activities are consistent with and targeted to the stated strategic priorities of the government and other UN agencies within the UNDAF framework.

Concentration: Food aid is targeted to the poorest regions and the most food insecure households, and used to support the most appropriate activities in the given socio-economic context.

Coherence: Degree of complementarity and internal linkages among the main elements of the CP, and the CP's external linkages to other government and donor development activities.

Flexibility: Extent to which resources may be switched between activities within a CP (at present 10% of total CP budget).



estates traditionally appears during peak periods that also happen to coincide with the months of food insecurity in the rural areas (November to February). This pattern has tended to reinforce and perpetuate the vicious circle of “low capital investment-low productivity-high food insecurity” resulting from low household income. The diversion of labour from the smallholder sub-sector to the estate sub-sector arising from market distorting wage and price policies reduces on-farm labour availability and perpetuates the vicious circle of poverty.

National development policies and priorities in food security and the role of food aid

There is as yet no explicit food aid policy. However, the proposed agriculture sector food security policy recognises that “increasing food production and incomes is a necessary but not sufficient condition for improved nutritional status” and thus several strategies for dealing with other factors affecting individual or household food security have been elaborated. In essence, these comprise:

- Re-examination of sector strategies in terms of focus and implementation in relation to policy;
- Replacement of the Strategic Grain Reserve with a Food Security Emergency Fund administered by the Reserve Bank (FSEF) that would be drawn upon as required;
- Encouragement of the development of farming systems based on ecological suitability;
- Fostering change from maize-based food habits to alternative food habits based on cassava, sorghum, soybean, potatoes, rice and others;
- Encouragement of processing of produce into storable products using improved local technologies;
- Introduction of a food coupon programme to replace the starter pack and improve the targeting and administration of safety net programmes;
- Design of safety net programmes to deal with transitory vulnerability and not permanent poverty and food insecurity problems; and
- Review and harmonisation of safety net programmes.

In the absence of a national food aid policy, the proposed safety net strategy currently under discussion constitutes the most relevant policy guideline for orienting WFPs strategic objectives and Country Programme in Malawi. This is based on the premise that food aid will continue to be required for short-term relief and longer term development programmes. These would aim to address the problems of two vulnerable groups: those who are unable to produce enough on their own plots for their needs; and those who do not have sufficient resources to access food in the markets.

The policy discussions appear to lean towards a definition of safety nets as having “an emphasis on transitory poverty, and aiming to catch the large numbers of households that seasonally slip into poverty due to sudden shocks or that have become disadvantaged due to an inability to take advantage of emerging opportunities”. This would be done through the adoption of a “moderate” intervention strategy for the next 10 years, putting more emphasis on productivity for developmental growth while not neglecting welfare support, and targeted at the poorest 25 % of the population.

Four types of programme modalities are identified: public works programmes; a child nutrition programme; a targeted starter pack programme; and direct cash transfers. The role for food aid implicit in these policy prescriptions appears to be three fold:



- to enable poor households to invest time and resources in improving their economic situation;
- to improve human resource development through better nutrition; and
- to strengthen coping mechanisms in the face of adverse economic shocks and natural disasters.

WFP's development priorities

In 1999, WFP reformulated its development priorities to focus on five activities with the goal of meeting the urgent needs of people largely by-passed by the conventional processes of development:

- To enable young children and expectant and nursing mothers to meet their special nutritional and nutrition-related health needs;
- To enable poor households to invest in human capital through education and training;
- To make it possible for poor families to gain and preserve assets;
- To mitigate the effects of natural disasters in areas vulnerable to recurring crises of this kind; and
- To enable poor households which depend on degraded natural resources for their food security to make a shift to more sustainable livelihoods.

The role for food aid implicit in current policy thinking within the Malawi government, as outlined in the previous section, appears to be entirely in line with current WFP development priorities.

THE COUNTRY PROGRAMME AND ITS ACTIVITIES RE-EXAMINED

WFP activities prior to the Country Programme

Until the Mozambican refugee crisis in the late 1980s, the WFP programme in Malawi was small and confined largely to a Vulnerable Group Feeding project. During the period of the protracted refugee operation (finally phased out in 1995), WFP activities were suddenly scaled up to over 30 000 tonnes of food aid per month. Thus, immediately before the commencement of the CP, the WFP programme comprised three parts: development, drought relief and refugees. The development aspects of that programme were largely contained in project Malawi 4780- "Household food security and nutrition intervention among vulnerable groups".

This project was the follow-on of a project initiated in 1972 and extended through four phases over 22 years. It consisted of two principal components: vulnerable group feeding (VGF) and agricultural development. The VGF component aimed to improve food availability for selected vulnerable groups through supplementary feeding to reduce malnutrition, especially in the "lean season" and rehabilitate severely malnourished children through feeding at nutrition rehabilitation units (NRUs) and paediatric wards. It was also to contribute to the improved use of primary health care in rural areas by integrating food aid within the health service package, while facilitating the expansion of primary health care services through food-for-work programmes in rural areas.

A review-cum-appraisal mission in 1994 questioned whether this was the most appropriate strategy for dealing with the root causes of malnutrition, or even for treating the symptoms i.e. providing supplementary feeding for malnourished people rather than directly treating the causes. That mission suggested changing the strategy. Food for work in chronically food deficit targeted areas would be phased in as the new approach to food aid in the country. At the same time, vulnerable group feeding



channelled through MCHs and NRUs would be phased out over a three-year period. Supplementary feeding channelled through communities would continue in targeted villages and also be phased out by 1998.

The agricultural component of Malawi 4780 was introduced on the recommendation of a 1991 evaluation mission that a preventive approach was needed to address the direct causes of household food insecurity in addition to supplementary feeding which was essentially a palliative. Under this, agricultural inputs were provided such as hybrid maize seed, fertiliser, soybean seed and inoculum on credit, with the main objective of increasing food production. Households headed by women with 0.5 ha or less of land were the principal target group.

This component was not given the minimum resources needed to ensure its feasibility. This shortcoming appears to have been aggravated by poor design, inadequate participation of key stakeholders and inappropriate WFP field staff skill sets. Moreover, because of the lack of appropriate and objectively verifiable indicators, it was never clear whether the stated objectives were met. Finally, it appeared that the original assumption made in the design of this component was incorrect i.e. that targeted farmers with a 0.5 ha or smaller plot would be able to produce enough food to repay the credit in addition to meeting their own consumption needs. Therefore, this component was discontinued after the 1994/95 season.

Since 1990, there have been 5 emergency operations. In 1992/93, and again in 1994/95, drought relief was covered by WFP Emergency Operations 5053 and 5639. In 1997, flood emergency operations were undertaken by EMOP 5827. One factor common to these operations was that only the availability of adequate buffer stocks ensured that the distribution was maintained. In the earlier drought operation, borrowing from large refugee stocks permitted early distribution pending the arrival of imports. It also prevented distribution breakdowns when the pipeline came under strain. In 1994/95, grain was borrowed from the SGR.

Objectives of the Country Programme and its components

The CP has two long-term development goals and four related, lower level “principal objectives”. The goals are:

- To strengthen the ability of targeted households to provide for their own sustained food and nutrition requirements; and
- To decrease vulnerability levels of targeted groups to nutritional insecurity and the adverse effects of recurrent disasters.

It is assumed that these goals will be attained by actions to:

- Bring about sustainable improvements to rural infrastructure for household food security through the provision of short-term employment and community self-help initiatives;
- Contribute to the better utilisation of Mother and Child Health Centres (MCHs) and community-based health services through the provision of dietary support;
- Alleviate the negative impact and likelihood of natural disasters through rapid response to localised food shortages and disasters; and
- Enhance human development through improved access to education, especially for girls.



Three core activities³ and one supplementary activity are identified in the CP as the means through which WFP food aid may contribute to the attainment of the CP objectives. These are: Assistance to malnourished groups (\$6.7 million-40% of the CP); Rehabilitation and development of rural infrastructure (\$5.1 million- 30% of the CP); and Human resource development through increased primary educational opportunities for girls (\$5 million-30% of the CP). The first project appears to have been rolled over into the CP with slight modifications; school feeding and food for work programmes are new projects. Under the rubric of expandable safety nets, resources are provided for disaster relief and mitigation (\$2.5 million annually). Vulnerability analysis, gender activities and monitoring and evaluation are estimated to cost \$450 000, \$30 000 and \$50 000 respectively per year; and a soybean seed revolving fund is envisaged at a cost of \$100 000 over the CP period. However, it is not clearly explained in the CP how these supporting activities are to be funded.

A notable lacuna in the CP is the absence of a logistics strategy and plan. In the CSO, it is noted that only the presence of adequate buffer stocks in the country (because of the refugee operations) had enabled WFP to mount a rapid response to disaster situations. Thus, in a future situation in which such stocks would clearly no longer exist, the formulation of such a plan should be a matter of urgent necessity.

The two overall goals of the CP are clearly defined. However the immediate (principal) objectives are not clear, their relevance to the process for the achievement of the programme goals appears uncertain and they seem inspired more by the pre-existing projects than by a strategic vision of the scope and nature of WFP assistance. Indeed although the existing projects have all been redesigned or modified to some extent so as to strengthen their potential contribution to CP objectives, this process does not seem to have improved the relevance of some of the proposed activities. Finally, objective #4 is not linked to either of the CP goals.

The lack of clarity at the CP level is repeated at the project level: objectives are often overly ambitious, the activities and resources required for their achievement are not all clearly identified and, in many cases, achievement and certainly sustainability is difficult to measure. Indeed the evaluation mission found a general tendency for objectives to be a mix of background narrative, intention, expected result, and planned activity.

It is noteworthy that, in respect of the AMG activity, the stated objective appears to ignore the suggestions of the review-cum-appraisal mission. These concerned the need to rethink the entire project strategy with a view to addressing the root causes of malnutrition (food production, on the one hand and better information to mothers on the use and preparation of the most appropriate weaning foods available to them, on the other). However, the thrust of the objective is to continue the feeding activity (already generally agreed to be only a palliative and thus to be phased out by 1998) and a means to the end of "better utilisation of MCHs". This is perhaps in itself a laudable aim. It is unclear, however, in what way it would contribute to the sustained reduction in vulnerability levels of the targeted groups.

The mission attempted to assess whether the CP objectives are realistic and attainable. However, the objectives are very broad and performance indicators are not included to help explain expectations, making it difficult to answer this question. To assist, a detailed analysis of the four principal objectives of the CP is presented in the matrix below.

The cause-effect logic between activity/project and programme objectives, and the related assumptions, is not clearly elucidated in the CP. Also, the planning and implementation process is still

³ The term "activity" as used by WFP refers to what are conventionally known as "projects". Throughout this report, the mission will use the usual term (project) to avoid confusion between activities in a CP and activities in a project.



carried out in isolation as in the past when projects were separate and discrete activities. Finally, they appear not to have been completely synchronised with the UNDAF programming process. The mission considers that the coherence, clarity and viability of objectives at all levels, as well as the synergies to be expected from joint activity preparation in a programme context would be enhanced by the application of a logical framework analysis or other logic modelling tools. The planned introduction and use of results-based management (RBM) by WFP could be expected to help CO teams to adopt a more disciplined approach in thinking through the internal logic of projects and the CP, together with key stakeholders.



Country Programme Objectives (broken down into specific statements)	Realistically Achievable?		
	Short-term (1998-2001)	Medium-term (within 5 years)	Long-term (10 years plus)
Improvements to rural infrastructure (assuming effective community participation)	Perhaps	Perhaps	Yes
Sustainable improvements to rural infrastructure built during 1998-2001 (assuming creation of suitable institutional framework)	Perhaps	Perhaps (if “owned”)	Perhaps (if “owned”)
Improved household food security (based on rural infrastructure constructed)	No (too early)	Unlikely (still too early)	Maybe (if maintained)
Community self-help capability (assuming CBOs are created)	Limited	More likely	Potentially fully effective
Better utilisation of MCH and CBHS (assumes food incentive is continuous)	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sustainable reduction in levels of malnutrition (based on AMG)	No	No	Maybe (if redesigned)
Alleviate negative impact of natural disaster	No	Limited	Maybe (if redesigned and integrated with other related actions)
Alleviate likelihood of natural disasters	No	No	Limited (unless combined with water harvesting schemes and flood control)
Enhanced human development especially for girls	No	Perhaps (assuming greater family and community involvement)	Yes (assuming greater family and community involvement)
Improved access to education especially for girls	Yes	Yes	Yes

Analytical Basis for the CP

The current CP and its constituent activities are largely based on the VAM baseline analysis of 1996, which provides the basis for all social and geographic targeting at activity level. This has led to some geographic overlap in certain EPAs among the SF, AMG and FFW activities. There are no other planned common elements. There seems to be, however, a certain degree of implicit (and perhaps accidental) coherence, as is evident in the schematic below. The nature, scope and implementation modalities of the CP appear, on balance, to have been determined largely in relation to clearly defined technical and strategic objectives (creation of community assets for the food-insecure poor, human resource development and disaster mitigation).

Strategic orientation of the CP


The principal benefits expected to accrue from the country programming approach are fourfold:

- **Integration:** WFP’s core CP activities are consistent with and targeted to the stated strategic priorities of the government and other UN agencies within the UNDAF framework.



- **Concentration:** Food aid is targeted to the poorest regions and the most food insecure households, and used to support the most appropriate activities in the given socio-economic context.
- **Coherence:** Degree of complementarity and internal linkages among the main elements of the CP, and the CP's external linkages to other government and donor development activities.
- **Flexibility:** Extent to which resources may be switched between activities within a CP (at present 10% of total CP budget).

It is thus necessary to examine the Malawi CP in terms of its performance in these four areas.



At present, the CP does not realise the full potential for programming linkages (**integration**) among its core projects and supplementary activities or for linkages with the relevant national sector programmes. This is not surprising, because the first “pilot” CP has been largely led by the logic of existing projects. Thus, the projects have led the CP rather than the vision of the CSO and the strategy of the CP influencing the choice of projects and their design. The schematic presented above attempts to identify the potential for developing further integration within the CP.

There is a strong rationale for building additional links between the AMG, FFW, and school feeding projects within the most vulnerable EPAs. AMG provides nutritional training to mothers especially on the preparation and use of likuni phala. AMG has an important (although presently inactive) component to promote the cultivation of soybeans. AMG can also be used for double targeted (by EPA and by most vulnerable group) short-term distribution of emergency food aid in the event of crop failure. School feeding targets school age children, but is only sustainable if parents are eventually enabled to provide their girls and boys with a nutritious breakfast meal from the family farm.



This apparent **complementarity/coherence** is further supported by the possibility of communities using FFW to build productive assets (wood lots, soil and water conservation infrastructure, shallow wells, etc.) to improve household productivity and income in the long term. The primary school curriculum would also be a good vehicle for messages of community organisation and nutrition, and school gardens could be an effective place to demonstrate and practise learned behaviours.

In light of these considerations, the mission is led to conclude that the process of developing the first CP has not resulted in a clear development strategy or a coherent programme for WFP in Malawi. Indeed, it seems to be a repackaging of existing projects (with the exception of Food for work and school feeding), which continue to be managed and revised independently of one another. As the mission has already noted, the four key activities appear compatible with government policies, although not always well **integrated** with them (e.g. school feeding is not mentioned in the Ministry of Education's Policy and Investment Framework 2000-2012, nor is the AMG activity included in the National Health Plan 1999-2004).

Moreover, there do not seem to be enough effective partnerships either within or outside of government in terms of planning and managing activities. Certainly, there is minimal sense of "ownership" on the part of government. Many government officials made it clear to the mission that WFP acts quite independently of the government, that it is WFP's country programme, and that the counterpart ministries are not real partners in planning and implementing WFP-assisted activities.

There is little evidence of a strategic approach to address the problem of implementing capacity, or efforts to form serious implementing partnerships with NGOs (AMG, SF). In this connection, the mission considers that serious consideration should be given to carrying out the AMG activity in partnership with a suitable NGO. After more than 25 years of uneven performance, WFP has not demonstrated that it is able effectively to undertake this activity unaided.

The mission found evidence of a deliberate bias in the CP towards **concentration** of food aid towards the most food insecure EPAs (mainly in the southern region), disaster prone areas and towards women. There seems to be no move toward concentration by type of activity. This may now need to be taken into account in light of the current debate on safety nets. It may have been argued in the past that, given the widespread nature and depth of poverty and household food insecurity in Malawi and the limited WFP food aid resources available, it was rational to spread these resources as widely as possible. However, a consensus seems to be emerging between government and donor agencies on the need for limiting the scope of these social transfers in the interest of long-term sustainability. This issue will, therefore, need to be revisited in the context of the CSO and CP for 2002/06.

Under the CP, the Country Director has the authority to move up to 10% of total CP resources among core and supplementary activities. There appears to have been as yet no need for the exercise of this **flexibility**. Even so, it is clear that in a country such as Malawi, historically prone to recurring floods and periods of drought, such flexibility is needed and, indeed, an even greater degree of flexibility may be required. It appears, however, that this may be assured through the proposed Disaster mitigation project.

SYSTEMS AND PROCEDURES SUPPORTING THE CP

Decentralisation and delegation of authority

The country programme approach was introduced while WFP was embarking on a process of decentralisation. This entailed the creation of regional offices and the delegation to them and to the country offices of the responsibilities for programme and project preparation and approval, formerly exercised by WFP HQ in Rome. This was expected to enhance the flexibility of the Country Director



(CD) in developing and negotiating country programmes and making shifts in resources when appropriate. However, the process has been protracted and there are still grey areas and differing interpretations about procedures and the precise extent of the delegated authority, particularly in the area of budget and finance.

The Maputo Regional Office was created in November 1996 (Executive Director's memorandum of 15 November 1996) and oversees significant development resources in the 5 countries in the cluster. Regional offices are to provide support for programming; logistics management (procurement post in Harare); finance and administration; telecommunications and information technology; personnel management; pipeline management and reports administration. However, the memo states that the exact role of the RO will vary according to the configuration and needs of the country grouping. COs would be delegated authority according to how well equipped they are to carry out a wider range of tasks. The staffing of the RO took some time to complete. As no regional programme advisor was assigned to Maputo until Nov 1997, it was decided that the CO would correspond directly with HQ on the preparation of the CP. Similarly in logistics, a regional post was created as from January 1998.

Two issues arise, however, in respect of the technical support required for programming (as well as managing, monitoring and evaluating) development activities. There should be clear guidelines and manuals setting out what is to be done and how it is to be done as well as adequate training to that end. The needs of the CO in this area (CSO, CP and activity preparation) are considerable. The mission noted that the RO had made a valiant effort to assist the CO by providing programming guidelines based on the process conducted in Mozambique. Regional training workshops have also been organised, with additional training planned for 2000. Even so, the experience of the past four years has made it abundantly clear that these tasks cannot be carried out efficiently, effectively and in a timely manner by one single officer in the RO.

Budget preparation is co-ordinated with the RO (preparation of CO budgets and RO and CO work plans is done jointly with the RO). Regional meetings are held at least 3 times per year (the matter of country programming procedures was addressed in a regional meeting held in June 1998) and the RO makes a concerted effort to keep COs informed and to provide regional training, etc. Thus, although supporting systems and clear procedures were not in place for the preparation of the first CP, the situation has now improved. There are frequent regional meetings and consultations, and the Programme Design Manual (PDM) is also now available through the internet and on CD-ROM.

Recommendation:

The regional programme adviser's office should be strengthened as a matter of urgent necessity. The RO should be equipped with the funds and expertise to organise regular programming workshops in a region where development is a principal activity.

Guidelines, Directives, Policies

One of the main principles of the organisational change strategy is that WFP must change fundamentally how it works, particularly in terms of how development work is carried out. Country offices were asked to undertake the first generation of CPs **before** the supporting systems/policies/guidelines were put in place. Since then, some of these have been provided: Resources and Long-term Financing Policy (1999); Enabling Development policy (1999); Programme Design Manual (2000); Disaster Mitigation Policy (2000).

On the procedural side, and in the absence of the PDM, there has been a series of informal "guiding" emails from HQ and the RO. These have sometimes been in conflict and have thus left the CO in doubt as to the correct procedure to be followed. A case in point has been the scope, nature and timing of appraisal/evaluation in the activity preparation process, which appears to be within the purview of



the CD, subject to technical clearance by the RO. This problem needs to be analysed in the context of the decentralisation process in the Southeast Africa cluster.

Recommendation:

There is a need for a precise definition of the respective areas of responsibility of the WFP HQ and field offices (RO&CO) with regard to programme development, monitoring and evaluation, and for clear guidelines and rules of procedure.

Resource allocation and funding issues

As noted above, there appears to be some confusion over budget and finance matters and this has hindered the management and implementation of the CP. In this respect, a serious constraint on WFPs ability to carry out development activities efficiently and effectively is constituted by the methodology followed in the calculation and allocation of DSC. Food by itself can indeed be an investment resource; but to be effectively used to promote development, it must be combined with other inputs (human, material, financial and technical know-how). This is less so in emergencies, where the overriding consideration is speed and food has the sole purpose of satisfying hunger and is not also a means to an end-i.e. sustained improvement in food security through development.

By its nature, food for development requires more programming inputs than emergency food aid. There must be discussions and agreements with beneficiaries/communities, government agencies, UNDAF and bilateral donor agencies as well as NGO partners. The CP must be aligned with the Enabling Development policy. The next CSO and CP must be prepared jointly with government and other development partners. Finally, non-food inputs must be actively sought and managed (training, capacity-building, equipment, wells, etc.). It is noteworthy that, funds permitting, short-term consultants are often used to assist in various stages of activity/document preparation (e.g. the CSO document, activity appraisals, evaluations and activity document preparation). This is mainly because CO personnel may not have the time, or the expert knowledge to do this. While the most effective procedure would be to have key documents prepared in house as part of the programming process, this has not always been possible.

In the past, programme support and administrative (PSA) funding provided the CO with the resources required for financing these other essential, complementary inputs. This seems no longer to be so. Direct support costs (DSC) are now capped as a percentage of the food programmed and actually delivered. The less food “called forward” and delivered the smaller the DSC funding available. However, there is no direct correlation between the technical support required and the “**amount of food moved**”. The mission recognises that this may well be an appropriate way to calculate DSC for emergencies. It acts, however, as a serious impediment for development assistance and indeed as a disincentive to staff, to the extent that such activities require the investment of considerable time and effort for which adequate budgetary resources are not provided.

Furthermore, the calculation of the advance DSC for the next year appears now to be based on the actual “**amount of food moved**” the previous year (i.e. if all of the food programmed is not “moved”, the CO is penalised the following year through a reduction of the DSC). This results in a paradox. If a CO invests time in developing partnerships, joint planning and programming, training and capacity-building (time-consuming and labour intensive activities), it will be penalised for any consequent delays in “food moved” by receiving a budgetary allocation that may vary in inverse proportion to the effort expended. The mission is thus compelled to the conclusion that while the formula for calculating DSC may have been suitable for a logistics oriented programme preoccupied with “moving food” in emergencies, it is completely unsuitable for an agency engaged in development support activity.



Recommendation:

A more appropriate **formula for calculating DSC for development activities** should be found. In addition, COs need to be kept regularly informed of the various funding sources available at HQ that could be used to finance complementary activities or other technical support for which funding is not provided in the CP or in their operating budgets.

Human resources

Within the region, personnel administration seems to be an area in which there is little consultation between WFP/HQ and its field offices. The Human Resources Division (HRD) does not appear to consult with the regional office or CO, or keep them informed in good time of personnel movements that affect them directly. The Malawi CO has been without a CD for 10 months, and it is still not clear to the RO/CO when this situation will be resolved.

The mission also noted that the acting CD had made proposals to HQ to adjust the existing staff profile of the CO and the Blantyre sub-office in order to resolve staffing problems arising from changes in the scope and nature of the work. However, HQ (the Regional Bureau and HRD) does not appear to have taken this fact into consideration when making recent staffing assignments. For example, without consultation, staff contracts have been extended and new staff reassigned to posts in Malawi for which the CO has proposed a change in grade and job description. These actions appear inconsistent with the purpose and principles of decentralisation i.e., that management decisions of this nature should take account of knowledge of the local situation and conditions.

Certain core functions are required for planning and implementing development programmes (e.g. logistics, M&E, gender, VAM, possibly others). Indeed the mission observed that although WFP has an historical comparative advantage in logistics, and a significant number of personnel experienced in this area, its record in Malawi is mixed. This appears largely due to the fact that logistics has been neglected, and inappropriately staffed and structured. To fulfil the expectations laid out in the Enabling Development policy and ensure that COs are equipped to carry out development activities properly (as distinct from emergencies), WFP needs to review and adjust the typical country office staffing profile for countries which manage CPs.

An allied issue concerns the qualifications and experience required of the Country Director. The mission is of the opinion that in countries such as Malawi where the development aspects of food aid have a predominant role, it is imperative that the CD should be a serving staff member with long experience of food aid programming and management. This is all the more important in the new situation created by the Enabling Development policy.

The mission considers that this issue merits close attention by the WFP/HRD. A necessary condition for the successful preparation and management of WFP country programmes is the presence in the CO of personnel in sufficient numbers and with suitable training and experience. To this end, it would seem imperative that a review of the staffing of the field offices should be undertaken by WFP/HRD. This exercise would seek to define the minimum fixed core staffing required (both national and international) for the effective management of development activities, irrespective of the planned (or realised) annual food tonnage. It should also attempt to arrive at a suitable formula for determining those posts (programme and support staff), the numbers of which would vary with the size, complexity and geographic coverage of the programme.

Recommendations:



The Operations Department (OD) should examine the issues of staffing and implementation modalities with a view to determining:

- A suitable formula for determining the staffing required (both national and international) for effective programme management, irrespective of the planned (or realised) annual food tonnage; and
- the appropriate staffing profile and internal organisational structure.

For **decentralisation/delegation of authority** to be effective, WFP field offices must be consulted and informed before staffing decisions are made.

A **logistics plan and management structure** should be prepared before the arrival of the new CD. This should include the establishment of an international logistics post to be filled by an experienced WFP logistician. Priority should be given to solving current logistics management and other problems with support from the RO. WFP and GOM should agree on the right strategy (greater use of the private sector and other alternatives to PMU and TLU etc.) within CPAC. Specific modalities should be worked out for each district and WFP-assisted activity prior to the beginning of the next CP.

Monitoring and evaluation

The CP specified the routine collection of data on indicators to assess the “process, outputs and effects” of WFP assistance. These included the cost effectiveness of food aid management; co-ordination with government, bilateral donors and NGOs; the effectiveness of food aid as a relief and development tool; effectiveness of food aid in meeting the needs of vulnerable groups, particularly from a gender perspective; beneficiary participation in food distribution and asset management; and benefit analysis by beneficiary groups, gender and activity type. This was supposed to be a primary responsibility of a monitoring and evaluation unit within the CO in collaboration with the gender and VAM officers.

The mission noted that WFP HQ has not yet made adequate provision in terms of human, financial and material resources and appropriate systems to equip COs to perform these functions. The programme staff have not yet been given adequate training in M&E systems and methodology and thus there has been no systematic monitoring of the CP. Baseline surveys are conducted for each activity, as are mid-term and final evaluations. However, these are mostly conducted by external consultants and are of uneven quality. They seem to be aimed at collecting a wide range of data related to the scope of the project activities with little relevance to the indicators specified in the CP. With some important exceptions, monitoring primarily consists of recording and reporting on completed activities, food distributed, and the number of beneficiaries. In addition, objectives are not often well articulated. Thus, it has been difficult for project teams to select practical, key performance indicators on which to report.

Generally, therefore, the evaluation mission found that current activity design does not facilitate monitoring. The mission considers that the reason for this must be sought in the weakness of project design in specifying the indicators to be monitored and how they could be made operational. This requires direct input from key stakeholders in developing a performance-monitoring plan. The identification of assumptions and analysis of risk is another important area where monitoring is weak. Identifying assumptions with key stakeholders and coming up with risk mitigation strategies needs to be made an integral part of project or programme management.

These shortcomings make it difficult to monitor the progress of the CP in achieving its objectives. To do this properly will require significant improvements in monitoring standards at project level - the performance of the CP can only be assessed on the basis of the level of achievement of its constituent projects. The evaluation mission is of the opinion that improved results monitoring of individual



projects, using key performance indicators, should be a priority area as the CO moves to make the CP more performance-oriented. This will require more extensive use of participatory techniques so that monitoring systems are owned and used by key stakeholders. These activities are costly, but are clearly necessary in order to determine the relevance and effectiveness of the CP. Resources will thus need to be set aside for this purpose if M&E is to be carried out efficiently and effectively. The report of a consultant hired in January 2000 to design an M&E system for the CP has yet to be submitted. The CO should take account of the above considerations in assessing this report and in deciding on the follow-up action required.

Recommendation:

Improved results monitoring of individual projects, using key performance indicators, should be a priority area as the CO moves to make the CP more performance oriented. This will require more extensive use of participatory techniques so that monitoring systems are owned and used by key stakeholders. Training for programme staff in this area is an urgent necessity.

Gender

The CO has a gender focal point responsible for consolidating the CO gender action plan (GAP), as well as for internal advocacy and monitoring of gender issues. The GAP translates the WFP Commitments to Women into operational terms. All programme staff participate in the development and biannual review of the WFP gender action plan (GAP). The GAP has a detailed outline of all the activities to be undertaken to ensure gender equity and empowerment of women in the CP. The table on the following page shows how the different activities adhere to the Commitments to Women (as of December 1999). Overall, the performance of the CP in this respect is commendable.

The gender activities of the CP are also well integrated with the national gender policy. The WFP gender focal point has been an active member of all national fora on gender policy and related gender issues. In-addition, the WFP focal point is a key member of the UN, donor, government and NGO co-ordination group on gender – the Development Assistance Group on Gender (DAGG). The mission noted that this had all been done despite the fact that gender issues are not budgeted for under the different CP activities and the allocation of \$30 000 envisaged in the CP has not yet been made available.



Adherence to the Commitments for Women as of December 1999

Commitment	Comments
Target 80% of relief food directly to women	For the two safety nets implemented, Health Centre staff targeted households through malnourished children. Since women are the ones who take children to health centres, 83% of the food distributed was distributed directly to them.
Address micronutrient deficiencies and consider local habits	All WFP processed foods are fortified with appropriate micronutrients to address the needs of malnourished children, expectant and lactating mothers.
Ensure a lead role for women within all local decision making committees on food management and in the management of the assets created by food for work projects	In both School Feeding and FFW projects, 50% of the members of the committees are women, but cultural constraints still limit their active participation in decision making. In FFW women are secretaries and men are chairmen. For school feeding, women do the cooking and men make the decisions. The long-term assets created through FFW are considered to be community assets and hence not owned by women. Men control them, because of community power structures, but women have access to them .
Contribute to the UN goal of reaching gender equity by the year 2001, particularly in higher management positions	Deliberate efforts are made when advertising to ensure that women are encouraged to apply for jobs, and qualified women who pass interviews are recruited. For EMOP 5997/01 equal numbers of women and men were recruited as Food Monitors.
Target 60% of country programme resources to women and girls in those countries where gender statistics demonstrate a 25% point disadvantage for women compared with men	In terms of food received and participation in training, about 70% of CP activities, on average benefited women and girls.
Target 50% of educational resources within a country programme to girls	About 75% of School Feeding resources benefit girls. The school-feeding project is also used as an incentive for girls aged 13years and above to attend school on a regular basis and to complete primary school. Whilst porridge and fish are given to all pupils from class 1 to 8, only girls from classes 5 to 8 were given maize to encourage them to stay on in school.
At least 25% of project outputs/ assets created with FFW are to be invested in activities aimed at the advancement of women	Less than 25% of project assets created with FFW were water supply projects which benefit women in terms of saving time for other project activities.
Collect data on % resources from food distributed for women / men	Gender disaggregated data are not being collected for all projects of the type and to the extent required.
Collect data on % benefit for women/men by activity	These data are collected during evaluation.
Collect data on women in food management committees	This is done.
Define the implementation and monitoring requirements of the commitments in the contractual agreements with partners	WFP ensures that PLANOPS and MOUs contain clauses stipulating GOM and NGO obligations aimed at planning, monitoring, evaluating and reporting on gender related activities and that reports show gender disaggregated data.

Vulnerability analysis and mapping (VAM)



Support for VAM is included in the CP under supplementary activities. It is the major geographic targeting tool for the CP and has been used during the design of individual projects to select priority EPAs. The overall goal of VAM is to transform raw data into information of use to analysts and policy makers concerned with food insecurity in Malawi. It helps determine where the vulnerable are located, the degree of their vulnerability, the causes of this vulnerability and potential responses. Obviously this makes the VAM information highly relevant to the CP. It should be noted, however, that the VAM unit is a user of secondary data and the quality of its output is therefore directly related to the quality and reliability of the primary data.

The evaluation mission did not attempt to assess the effectiveness of VAM. However, several concerns were noted. During interviews with bilateral donors, the accuracy of the 1996 VAM baseline was questioned. It was also felt likely to compromise the accuracy of the vulnerability assessment for 1999/2000. At present, the VAM unit is awaiting primary data from the 1998 national census and an Integrated Household Food Security Survey, commissioned by the National Economic Council (NEC), the results of which are being analysed by the National Statistics Office. This is expected to permit the updating of the VAM baseline and to provide more reliable data and better reflect the situation at household level. Delays in the publication of these data have meant that an updated VAM baseline is not available as input for the present process of formulating a new CSO. However, the WFP-Malawi office is expecting to rely on this baseline when designing core activities and allocating funds for the new CP.

VAM activities are carried out by a unit within the CO providing information to the local WFP offices and to WFP/HQ in Rome. The VAM unit is part of a local network through an Inter-Agency VAM Group which includes NEC, DRRA, MOA, UNDP, FEWS, RESAL and CADECOM. However these co-operating institutions are also involved in a number of other food security monitoring systems. Some of them produce their own vulnerability assessment reports. For example, the “RESAL Malawi” initiative is a parallel in-house system to give policy advice to the EU food security unit.

It appears to the mission that, within existing data constraints, the VAM analysis and targeting are generally satisfactory. However, the current dispersion of responsibility for this activity among institutions (donor agencies) outside of government does not ensure sustainability. Also the current arrangements for co-ordinating VAM could be more clearly defined and focused. Given the consensus on the need for VAM, it is expedient that GOM and other stakeholders agree on a suitable home for VAM analysis. In the longer term, it may be that WFP’s major role might be to orchestrate a more co-ordinated donor and GOM effort to meet food security information needs rather than keeping its own in-house capacity.



Recommendations:

VAM needs to become an integral part of the CP programming process. The mandate and TORs of the VAM unit should be reviewed, and GOM and other stakeholders should agree on a suitable home and support modalities for VAM analysis. This will require the following actions:

- The issue of the appropriate institutional arrangements for VAM should be placed on the agenda of CPAC;
- At an early stage of the CSO/CP preparation process, the CO should have a brainstorming session to determine what outputs are required of VAM to support the CP process. This should be done in the context of current efforts by the VAM Unit in WFP/HQ to ensure better integration of VAM into programming and determine how it can better serve programming needs;
- The VAM team should be requested to accelerate the preparations for undertaking the next baseline analysis, so that, if possible, the analysis is ready in time for the preparation of the next CP. In principle, the 5-year baseline analysis should be available at the outset of the CCA/CSO preparation phase to be used as a programming tool for UNDAF.
- Where data on HIV/AIDS exist, the VAM team should be requested to incorporate these given the possible impact on programme beneficiaries (and therefore probable skewing of monitoring data).

FACTORS IN THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CP

National government involvement and support

Government involvement in, and hence ownership of the CP appears to be minimal. From an analysis of the files, it is evident that the current CSO and CP documents were drafted largely by WFP (with the help of external consultants) and then circulated to government and donors for review. In the case of the CP, preparation began in the last quarter of 1997. The draft was presented to government agencies for “refinement” in a one-day workshop in October of that year. Written comments were also invited; some were received from bilateral donors and UN agencies. It is noteworthy that at that workshop, government officials protested that they had not been given enough time to prepare proper comments. The final version was sent to WFP/HQ in December 1997 for review and submission to the EB in May 1998. It is clear that a properly comprehensive and consultative process would have required more time and an earlier beginning.

The CP agreement was not signed until July 1999, more than 18 months after its commencement. Also, as yet, the Country Programme Advisory Committee (CPAC) envisaged in the CP agreement has not been established on a firm footing. This body was to be set up under the joint chairmanship of the National Economic Council (NEC) and the Ministry of Finance, with representatives of WFP, counterpart ministries, WFP principal donors, selected national and international NGO partners and UN agencies. NEC and CPAC were supposed to drive the CP process. In fact, this has not happened and, in consequence, the CP appears to be low on the scale of government priorities because it has little sense of ownership or control. The CPAC has not been active. So far only one meeting has taken place. No recommendations have been made by NEC nor have there been joint field assessments of WFP supported activities.

The situation described above may, to some extent, be of WFP’s making. The introduction of the CP approach requires changes in the work methods of WFP staff, and in the manner and substance of their interaction with government officials. These behavioural changes may not have been as rapid and



thorough as necessary because of insufficient training. The mission was made aware of the government's dissatisfaction with this state of affairs at the policy co-ordination level.

However, the mission is of the opinion that the government must accept some responsibility for the insufficient integration of CP activities into the programmes of the sectoral ministries. It has, after all, entered into agreements with WFP for the provision of a substantial amount of food aid resources. It is thus legitimate for WFP to expect, at the very least, a demonstration of some interest on the part of the government in setting up and managing the mechanisms for the joint oversight of these resources. Moreover, the difficulties that have arisen in project implementation (poor food logistics and management, lack of complementary resources etc.) would have found more rapid and durable solutions in such a context.

In terms of country programming and management, the mission is convinced that the *process* of formulating the CSO and CP documents is at least as important as the content of the final documents. It is through this process that strategic choices may be jointly made, effective partnerships formed both with government and other donors, implementing arrangements agreed upon and effective ownership by all key stakeholders guaranteed. It is also an opportunity for re-assessment in terms of internal programming, and making linkages within the programme.

In the case of the first generation CP, the process was unsurprisingly weak. Indeed, in 1995, the CO expressed concern to HQ about the inadequate preparations for equipping it to conduct the new process of country programming, pointing out that it implied a great deal of time for consultations and workshops, and therefore for more and suitable staff to do the job. They also expressed an urgent need for manuals to help with planning and programme development. As mentioned in paragraph 4.5, these were not available at the time.

For the second generation, there is time to ensure a more inclusive and participatory process. Indeed, taking account of lessons drawn from the preparation of the current CP, **WFP Malawi has already structured the planning process for the next CP to ensure maximum GOM/UNDAF/bilateral donor involvement.** This will, however, require much greater engagement in the CP on the part of government at policy level and readiness to integrate its constituent activities within its programmes at sector and district level. GOM should also give an indication of national strategic objectives and a programming framework for food security and food aid. This process of dialogue should facilitate the establishment of appropriate institutional mechanisms (such as CPAC) for joint programming and project formulation and GOM/UNDAF/donor co-ordination.

Recommendations:

The **CP process** needs to involve the government (as well as key stakeholders and potential partners) from the beginning rather than its role being limited to a review of documents. During this process, government's perception (at all levels) of the importance and relevance of the CPAC may reasonably be expected to grow, thus strengthening that body. Preparation of the CSO and CP should commence at least 10-12 months in advance of the deadline and should be carefully planned to maximise involvement of all stakeholders at all levels. The next CP should incorporate inputs from communities and district authorities and be designed in the context of the decentralisation process with modalities to ensure maximum community participation. This might include *inter alia* the following steps:

- Organise workshops involving GOM, NGOs, UNDAF and bilateral donors, under a neutral, credible outside facilitator;
- Identify key representatives from GOM and other stakeholders with a potential stake in WFP's programming to constitute a CSO/CP preparation task force;



- Elaborate a clear step-by-step CSO/CP preparation process with activities and expected outputs to be completed in an agreed time frame;
- Provide resources directly to the task force to help it in its preparatory work;
- Integrate the CP process into the larger planning process for the government's own development planning and programming;
- Constitute this same task force as a sub-committee of CPAC, meeting quarterly, to act as a Programme Review Committee (PRC) providing the bulk of the GOM input during biannual CPAC meetings;
- Invite GOM, through the PRC, to review the terms of reference for activity appraisals and mid-term evaluations as well as to oversee future CP evaluations.

Careful attention should be paid to the **process**. The mission believes that planning the CP process is a serious exercise in itself, which may require bringing in local expertise to advise on the best ways and means to involve government, identify implementing partners, programme activities with other agencies, etc. For example, 1-2 day programming workshops could be organised for each activity – e.g. School Feeding – led by the relevant ministry with a small group of potential partners.

Integration into CCA/UNDAF and the programmes of bilateral donors

For the reason set out in the previous and earlier sections of this report, it does not appear to the mission that the process of developing the current CP has appreciably enhanced WFP involvement in the CCA and UNDAF process. Indeed, a closer examination of the individual core projects (see Chapter 6) indicates that many opportunities for collaborative action and mutual support with other UN programmes are being missed.

The preparation of the next CSO/CP has, however, got off to a promising start. Workshops have been scheduled with government agencies, bilateral donors, UN Agencies and NGOs during the period April/June 2000 to discuss food policy issues as well as the scope and nature of possible future WFP development assistance activities. This discussion takes place against the background of each agency's projected programme and budget for the next five years.

However, these actions at programme level need to be accompanied by specific actions (in terms of joint programming) at the project management level to identify probable key partners for each CP activity. NPOs and POs should formalise this by including in their 2000 work plans the responsibility for identifying and approaching possible partners, in terms of providing essential inputs, and implementing all/part of the activity.

The mission was also made aware that a number of the donor agencies in-country, although prepared to assign substantial unprogrammed resources to WFP for **emergency operations**, question the appropriateness of **food aid for development**. They also seem doubtful of WFP's capacity to prepare and implement **development activities** efficiently and effectively. These doubts are compounded by the general awareness that WFP has weak implementing partnerships and a consequent perception that WFP has a predilection for acting independently of others.

In terms of implementation, WFP's capability is indeed quite weak (although the pilot school feeding is being conducted reasonably well, perhaps on account of its small scale in one district and a heavy management input by UNVs). Indeed, in most cases, WFP relies on implementing structures, both government and in-house, that are seriously over-stretched. Thus, it would be opportune that the donor



agencies take action to integrate within their in-country development programmes, and to provide the complementary resources needed for the WFP/CP development activities that, in many cases, they have approved as members of the WFP Executive Board.

Compatibility with the Enabling Development policy

As the mission has already observed above, the objectives of the CP and its constituent activities are entirely consistent with the new WFP policy on Enabling Development. Even so, the mission considers that insufficient attention is being paid in project design to the need to secure the sustainability of the assets created and to define realistic exit strategies for the termination of WFP assistance. These issues need to be addressed immediately in respect of current activities as well as in the preparation of the next Country Programme.

In Annex II, the mission has prepared a detailed checklist of the extent of CP compatibility with FAAD objectives. The main observations emerging from this are that there is *passive compliance*, in that project objectives are largely consistent with FAAD objectives. However, much work needs to be done to make them *actively compliant*. This can only be done through sustained, in-depth dialogue with the government, key stakeholders (beneficiaries, community-based organisations, traditional authorities and district administrators), and potential partners (NGOs, other UN agencies and bilateral donors). The key to this is the introduction of participatory appraisal and programming techniques at community level as well as the deepening of the CP process referred to above. This process should favour the development of a strong sense of national ownership (at all levels from communities upwards).

CONTRIBUTION OF ACTIVITIES TO CP OBJECTIVES

The pre-existing activity-Assistance to Malnourished Groups MLW6241

This vulnerable group-feeding project was renamed, the geographic target for the supplementary feeding component was changed, and some other design changes were introduced. But essentially this activity is a repackaging of MLW 4780/01, which ended in December 1999 (and which a previous review mission had recommended to be phased out in 1998). AMG has been planned as an important and integral part of the CP and as such was allocated 40% of total resources.

The four objectives of this project are all directly relevant to the CP goal of decreasing “vulnerability levels of targeted groups to nutritional insecurity” and principal objective 2 of contributing to the “better utilisation of MCHs and CBHS through the provision of dietary support”. As the mission has already observed above, this is not really an objective in itself, but rather a means to the end of better health for mothers and children. Had this principal objective been clearly defined, the activities required to achieve this end (*inter alia*, community participation, nutrition education, training in the cultivation, processing and use of suitable weaning foods at household level) might perhaps have become more evident. The mission is therefore of the opinion that the project, as designed, will not materially contribute to the achievement of the CP goal on a sustainable basis.

Immediate objective one- rehabilitation of malnourished children - is achieved on a daily basis at NRU clinics across Malawi as a direct result of this activity. However, the one-year delay in the sourcing and delivery of dried skimmed milk (DSM) has undermined the effectiveness of the entire activity, in that the utility of the rest of the commodities for use in the first phase of therapeutic feeding of severely malnourished children under five, has been compromised. Although registration and life history data are collected, and presumably rehabilitation success rates at each clinic could be calculated, the mission did not find performance standards in rehabilitation being applied at any of the clinics visited. Also, while most NRUs do record the percentage of children admitted who eventually



recover, re-admittance of individual children or mothers is not routinely monitored. Thus it is not known whether the caseload changes from year to year.

Immediate objectives two and four, which include improved birth weights, reduced mortality for children under-five, and improved child weaning practices, seem attainable given that the project provides pre- and post- natal training and nutritional support to mothers, and specifically targets those women considered at risk. However, the monitoring system has been unable to provide evidence that these objectives are actually being achieved, even in villages long associated with this project. Furthermore, the project is designed to improve weaning practice partially by promoting village-level rotating soybean stocks. Unfortunately, this planned activity is not being implemented due to lack of funds.

Immediate objective three - improved nutrition and primary health skills of health workers, volunteers, and beneficiaries – might have been realistic and attainable if funding had been obtained for all the types of training envisaged in the project. For example, government-employed health personnel train mothers, who attend centres where food is distributed. It is not clear whether the effectiveness of this training is monitored and whether it has led to changed practice. Also, the mission found that training of health workers and volunteers at sites visited had been haphazard and not necessarily linked to critical skill gaps. Systematic monitoring of skill levels at the MCH centres is not part of the project.

The Christian Hospitals Association of Malawi (CHAM) is a major implementing partner, with a health service delivery network that WFP uses to reach the beneficiaries. However, WFP seems to be assuming the main project management role and not the government or CHAM, although the current expertise within the CO is not suited for this purpose. Other potential partners include the Catholic Relief Services (CRS), the Catholic Development Commission of Malawi (CADECOM), and World Vision International (WVI). All provide services such as nutrition and health education, reproductive health and HIV/AIDS education, which are complementary to the supplementary feeding. In addition, all have community outreach activities and the potential to implement complementary household food security interventions for enhancing nutritional security e.g. soybean production.

In this project, **food aid plays a crucial role in preventing death from severe malnutrition and reversing the effects of short-term hunger on vulnerable groups**. However, it is clear that the methods employed and the current project design are unlikely to ensure that this outcome can be sustained after external support is terminated. This appears to be so because the resources committed are inadequate, given the poor state of the health infrastructure that they are supposed to help strengthen. District health services are rudimentary with insufficient health centres and inadequate health staff and resources. In such a situation, staff tends to be over worked, under paid, poorly motivated and insufficiently trained. The training envisaged is inadequate and staff supervision is also quite rudimentary. Monitoring and follow up in these conditions is thus inadequate thereby reducing the impact of food aid.

The project has now been underway for about 26 years and levels of malnutrition in the targeted EPAs appear not to have been reduced. This might perhaps be achieved by modifying the project to place food aid at the centre of a nutrition education strategy; it would require the reactivation and funding of the training component originally envisaged. This observation was borne out by the situation at one of the sites visited where villagers had built an impressive mud-brick warehouse through self-help for storage of food aid in the village. But the emphasis on receiving free food seemed to have overshadowed the educational messages of planting soybeans and improving under-five nutrition. This would appear to suggest the need for a change of approach to one that focuses on addressing both the effects and root causes of malnutrition and not just its effects, as is presently the case.



The mission noted that some donors appear to have been unwilling to fund the soybean revolving fund component of the AMG, because in their view, crop production and processing do not fall within WFP's mandate. This situation may be traceable to a failure on the part of the CO to integrate WFP activities within the UNDAF framework. A joint approach together with FAO should be mounted in order to activate this essential development aspect of the AMG activity.

Finally, the mission observed that the four likuni phala production plants originally set up with WFP assistance have no obvious business plan to break their dependence on WFP purchases. Linkages to the local economy and village farms are not being fully exploited. This is especially the case in Mulanje. WFP needs to make clear that further purchases from the plants would be contingent on competitive pricing. In the short-term, subsidising the plants by paying higher than market prices should only be considered if part of a longer-term, viable business plan which breaks their dependence on continued WFP purchases.

Recommendations:

AMG: WFP should no longer attempt to manage AMG directly. Before the start of the next CP, and in collaboration with the MOHP, WFP should find an appropriate NGO partner to implement the supplementary and therapeutic feeding components, which should be reformulated to address the causes rather than the effects of malnutrition. This will allow for additional components to be added to address community education, the rapidly increasing number of HIV/AIDS patients, etc. The implementing partner selected should be well equipped to design, manage and/or implement the community education/follow-up component.

For the next CP, WFP should plan jointly with the MOHP a re-configured PMU, with the necessary skill sets to manage and monitor the activity. Given the deficit of nutritionists in the MOHP, the UNV nutritionist, now in the CO, should be re-assigned to the PMU as a counterpart to the PMU manager.

A nutritionist should review the food basket with a view to including a vegetable protein (e.g. beans). At present, mothers and older malnourished accompanying children do not receive any protein during their 6-week stay in the therapeutic feeding centres.

In order to strengthen the likuni phala production units established with its support, WFP should assist them in developing further linkages with the local economy in the context of a long-term, viable business plan which breaks their dependence on continued WFP purchases.

The introduction of weight for height charts should be done in collaboration with MOHP and WHO to ensure conformity with national policy and practice.

New activities

1. Enhanced Food Security through Targeted Food for Work QAP MLW 5782

This completed Quick Action Project (QAP) had five objectives. Although these were all relevant to the overall goals of the CP, they were overly ambitious given the short duration of the project, which began shortly before the CP was approved by the Executive Board and ended shortly after the CP was signed by GOM. It fits under CP core activity two for which 30% of CP resources have been allocated.

The assets created under this FFW activity included 676 km of district and village access roads; 312 ha of micro-irrigation schemes; 28.5 ha of soil/water conservation structures; 6 earth dams; 190 ha of fuel wood and agroforestry plantations; and 7 shallow wells. At one site visited, the FFW incentive to plant a communal tree lot seemed to have kick-started other self-help initiatives organised without food incentive. The mission found some evidence during site visits that this may be happening, albeit



in a haphazard manner, where community ownership is strong. Depending on their effectiveness, long term sustainability could possibly be achieved by working through the new district assemblies now being introduced as part of the government decentralisation process.

Immediate **objective one** – improved short-term food security through employment generation (targeted specifically to include women) - seemed to be realistic. Geographic targeting through VAM helped the project select the most food insecure EPAs. However, because of food delivery delays at a number of sites, the potential for improvements to short-term food security was not maximised. For **objective two** – improved village accessibility through road and path construction - detailed project reports show impressive outputs. Most of the activities in this project centred on road construction, but the question of longer-term maintenance of new assets, especially public access roads, remains largely unanswered. At two road rehabilitation sites visited by the evaluation team, no credible arrangement had been made for follow on maintenance.

Objective three – improved productivity of small holders – was reasonable and attainable only in the few micro-projects that led to community-owned soil and water conservation and agro-forestry interventions. Since outputs achieved were overwhelmingly in road construction, possible future increases in farm productivity attributable to this project are likely to be very small.

The **fourth objective** – reduced workload of women by improving water supply, while not explicitly included as a CP objective, is consistent with the overall gender considerations stated throughout the CP. Unfortunately, because of shortcomings in project design, the mission found that this objective was unlikely to be achieved. Moreover, the mission was informed that the ILO/WFP/GOM standard work norms for FFW projects are not gender sensitive. Thus, there is at present no way to take account of different gender requirements for women participants (e.g. day care, more generous piecework norms, priority for lighter jobs, etc.). Also, in some areas beneficiaries are still awaiting food delivery several months after the completion of the work and the termination of the project. At the site visited in Chikwawa, delayed delivery of promised food commodities and the fact that women workers received only maize, may have increased the nutritional vulnerability of the female participants.

The construction of shallow wells was envisaged in order to give women better access to water thereby reducing their workload. However, only 7 wells were actually constructed. Moreover, several women beneficiaries, during informal group discussions with the mission at a village near Chikwawa, suggested that the FFW activity had actually increased the workload of women. Already overburdened with household tasks and, in some cases pregnant, women working on the rehabilitation of public access roads, were getting up very early in the morning, completing four hours of road repair, and then starting their daily routine chores, including field work.

At this particular village, the situation was aggravated by conflicting instructions from supervising officials and by heavy rains that destroyed the first attempts at road rehabilitation. Because maize was allocated to the site based on a fixed number of kilometres completed, participants ended up working, over a 12-month period, much more than they had originally expected. Moreover, the project was bedevilled by delays in food delivery. At one point the beneficiaries became so incensed with the delay in maize payment and the amount of work expected, that they blocked a WFP vehicle from leaving the work site.

Finally, **objective five** – improved disaster preparedness through identification of reserve projects – seems to have been achieved to the extent that some requests (mostly for road construction or repair) have been received from vulnerable communities for further FFW micro-projects.

II. Rural Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Development (RIRD) MLW 5782/01



The FFW QAP registered high achievements in km of roads constructed, but much less in the creation of assets that can be owned and used by food insecure communities. The RIRD activity has been modified to improve effectiveness and sustainability by working with a more appropriate government department. The budget has been reallocated to increase funding for community forestry (household orchards and wood lots) from 25% in the FFW to 30%; the land and water management schemes from 6% in the FFW to 35%; and to reduce the roads component from 65% in the FFW to 35%. The design emphasises increased agriculture productivity and has expanded the targeted beneficiaries to include 30 “peri-urban” communities.

Based on internal technical notes reviewed by the mission, it is clear that WFP has taken into account some of the lessons learned in the previous FFW pilot project. However, some important issues do not seem to have been addressed adequately in the design of this new phase. For example, the quality of the assets created in the previous project was not considered equal to that of other public works schemes in the country because of poor technical supervision by line ministries. In-addition, institutional arrangements for the maintenance of the assets created are not explicitly included in the project design. Although women are the targeted food insecure group to benefit from the created assets, these benefits are unlikely to materialise, unless women are actively involved in community-based discussions on the design and implementation of individual micro-projects. Only the shallow wells directly benefit women and these make up a very small proportion of the works envisaged.

The project, though renamed to emphasise sustainability and “development”, again has five objectives that are very similar to those of MLW 5782. The identification of reserve micro-projects for disaster preparedness has been dropped as a separate objective and improving degraded former refugee resettlement areas has been added. This objective is not altogether new. For although not explicit in MLW 5782, the previous QAP had targeted a number of EPAs where refugee pressure had significantly added to environmental degradation.

Overall, the five objectives are relevant to the CP. However, there remain the same concerns expressed above concerning realistic expectations: timely delivery, gender, and sustainability. Given the short duration, it is unrealistic to expect to measure increases in productive capacity or improved food security due to new assets. Also, the mission considers it inopportune to add a peri-urban component to the new project, when effective implementation modalities (community participation, food logistics and work site supervision and management) in rural areas have not yet been adequately worked out. As in the QAP, it appears that project success is to be measured primarily in terms of tree seedlings planted and kilometres of roads and footpaths rehabilitated. In order to assess the long-term sustainability of these assets, the mission considers that the establishment of suitable institutional mechanisms at community level would also need to be monitored.

A significant change is that the project will be implemented in partnership with the Department of District and Local Government Administration (DDLGA) The previous FFW activity was implemented with the Department of Relief and Rehabilitation Affairs (DRRA). It is hoped that the DDLGA partnership will help ensure project integration with district development plans and improved collaboration with and technical supervision from line ministries. It should also ensure greater community participation and the setting up of village level institutions to deal with maintenance activities and the share of assets directly beneficial to women as well as their access to community assets created.

In these *Food for work* projects, men prefer cash payments and women prefer food. The projects are thus self-targeting to the most food insecure, the majority of whom are women. The use of food here is also very appropriate since it directly supports household food consumption and solves short-term hunger. The mission observed, however, that the FFW activities, while solving short-term hunger, are not aimed at creating *directly productive* assets that could contribute to solving the problem of long-term hunger. In-addition, the food distribution was very erratic, resulting in people working longer



periods and getting less food than needed to replace the energy expended. This is inconsistent with the nutritional objective of the CP as well as with the first policy objective for food aid stated above.

Recommendation:

The mission observed that it was proposed to add two urban pilot areas to the rural infrastructure project. It was not clear if this decision was the result of a joint strategic planning process together with government and potential partners or a unilateral decision taken in the light of the new FAAD priorities. In any case, the mission would suggest that a hunger analysis be undertaken in urban areas. This would provide the basis for informed strategic decisions to be made regarding the inclusion of urban areas in WFP geographic priorities in Malawi and the appropriateness of food aid for tackling the problems identified

III. Targeted Safety Net Emergency Project EMOP 5997 and 5997/01

These EMOPs are directly relevant to the CP strategy under “supplementary activities” and expandable safety nets. As laid out in the CP, EPAs selected were based on VAM. Targeting was further narrowed using already established growth monitoring of under-five children implemented by the Ministry of Health and Population. In response to GOM appeals, emergency food aid for drought relief was provided through WFP from bilateral donors who, as envisaged in the CP, would “express a willingness to provide additional resources on an annual basis as expansion of core activities”. Again as envisaged, this emergency assistance involved short-term geographic expansions of an existing core activity, namely AMG.

The EMOPs had the same two objectives: to sustain the nutritional status of vulnerable children under-five, and to provide food insecure households with immediate access to a supplementary diet during a critical period. These objectives were clearly in line with overall CP objectives. Final project reports, formal interviews with the bilateral donor agencies involved and anecdotal evidence collected by the mission, suggest that, considering the difficult realities of providing emergency assistance in Malawi, these objectives were reasonably achieved. Efficiency was reduced by the fact that as many as 25 percent of recipients were not those intended (i.e. the most vulnerable); and delayed distribution meant that some of the maize was received well after the local harvest had commenced and after the end of the critical lean period.

IV. School Feeding MLW 5934

In this project, food aid supports the government’s efforts to introduce universal primary education that were being constrained by a high school drop out rate due to hunger and poverty. Girls are the most affected inasmuch as their education is the first to be curtailed in times of hunger. They are expected to take care of the family while the mother goes in search of food and are forced into early pregnancies and marriages in an attempt to bring in food and cash to the family. Food aid, in this case, fulfils an immediate and basic need of the family, thereby relieving the pressures that would otherwise be placed on their daughters.

The three objectives for this project (30% of CP resources) are well focused, gender sensitive, mutually reinforcing, measurable and directly relevant to principal objective 4 of the CP. During much of the project design and approval phase, the CP was also being developed and approved. The mission found both qualitative (parent and teacher testimonies) and quantitative (disaggregated enrolment figures) indicators that the project was making progress in achieving its objectives and therefore contributing to one of the higher-level CP objectives. In-addition, the parents stated that the food received had removed the need for them to send girls in search of food/money for the family and had also enabled the whole family to concentrate their labour on their own gardens instead of working on other people's gardens for food.



At issue in the SF activity is the matter of sustainability. The high food and NFI costs make it impossible for government to sustain this activity in the long run. Thus, it is clear that school feeding requires an agreed long-term exit strategy, integrated with the national and agriculture sector development plans. The mission noted that community members expressed their willingness to continue this activity after the end of WFP assistance. However, they would have to know well in advance when this would happen and would need to be trained in managing it. They would also need to be given technical assistance for the cultivation of soybeans for use in the preparation of Likuni phala and taught how to prepare it – some schools are already planting soybeans in their school gardens. These are complex development issues that may require a considerable amount of time (at least 10 years) and concerted and co-ordinated effort to resolve.

Tight control and direction by WFP (three active UNVs living in the project area) have ensured the completion of planned activities and the achievement of good results. However, the lesson learned is that more direct and significant involvement of the District Administration in school feeding is needed to ensure that this initiative is sustainable in the long term, so that it is owned and managed by GOM and the participating communities and not by WFP. This more participatory process will require time and patient effort.

The issues of teacher recruitment and classroom construction are other important lessons learned. Class size will grow rapidly and dramatically when school feeding is introduced. Spill over from surrounding villages will be difficult to control. Unless the number of teachers and classrooms is also increased, it will be impossible to maintain primary education standards. The quality of primary education is presently not addressed by this pilot. The WFP initiative of school feeding must be part of a more comprehensive government strategy – supported by different donors - to provide free, accessible primary education which is also relevant and effective.

The project presently uses high-value canned fish as an incentive payment. It seems clear that beans (more culturally appropriate and usually available in country) could be provided at lower cost. Moreover, some parents are demanding incentive payments to operate the school kitchen and calling for additional commodities such as salt. There have also been delays from some schools in forwarding updated enrolment figures. These all suggest that community awareness building and mobilisation is a time consuming process that should be started well in advance. It requires consistent, sustained, and persistent but sensitive support, especially during the first few years. If school feeding is to be expanded to other EPAs, the MOE will need to be clear on how this critical support can be given in a context of limited government resources.

Recommendations:

The expansion plan of this pilot project should be developed with full involvement of the district authorities as well as MOE support and made conditional on complementary inputs from government in terms of classrooms and teachers to cope with expected increases in enrolment.

Community sensitisation should be carried out through district assemblies and their staff well in advance of the commencement of school feeding operations in order to ensure the setting up of structures at village level that can take steps to carry on school feeding after the termination of WFP support.

Complementary assistance should also be sought from other partners (e.g. Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation, bilateral donor agencies and FAO) for the provision of bore holes and the development of school gardens, as part of an exit strategy.



V. Expandable Safety Nets

An indicative annual budget of 2.5 million dollars was included in the CP for “expandable interventions” in EPAs experiencing “unusual levels of food access stress”. In recognition of the frequency, diversity and intensity of natural disasters in Malawi, Parliament has approved a Disaster Preparedness and Relief Act. To give effect to this, the government is in the process of formulating a National Disaster Management Plan that emphasises the importance of a multi-sector approach to reducing the impact of disasters. In addition to improving disaster preparedness and response, the plan emphasises actions to reduce the vulnerability to disasters of populations in flood and drought-prone areas. In the light of these considerations, the WFP country office, together with Government has recast the expandable safety net supplementary activity as a Disaster Mitigation and Response project.

The mission noted that, at present, despite a current food surplus of 657 674 MT from the 1998/9 harvest, vulnerability analysis and mapping (VAM) estimates indicate that 36 out of 154 extension planning areas (EPAs) are below the minimum energy requirements of 2200 Kcal per day. These are all in the southern and central regions. These EPAs usually produce less than their energy requirements even in favourable conditions and are therefore almost always food insecure. Areas of acute and chronic food insecurity, exacerbated by high vulnerability to natural disasters, are likely, therefore, to persist in the short and medium term. The mission is thus persuaded of the relevance and usefulness of the activities envisaged.

However, there is a need to ensure that disaster mitigation takes precedence over response in the sense of reducing the scale of the response required by taking adequate preventive measures to reduce the scope and negative effects of likely natural disasters. In Malawi, these usually come in the form of drought and/or floods and thus require *inter alia* the creation of water control and harvesting infrastructure, the consolidation of river embankments and the carrying out of appropriate soil and water conservation measures. To this end, the capacity of households and communities to find lasting solutions to their food security and development problems will need strengthening. This outcome might best be achieved through an approach integrating prompt response, informed advocacy and community-based development.

It follows then from the preceding analysis that disaster mitigation and response activities are, in effect, a sub-set of general development actions involving elements of social (institutional mechanisms) and physical (hydraulic structures) engineering, directed at reducing the vulnerability of specific populations and areas to natural disasters. In the context of the WFP Malawi Country Programme, the mission is of the opinion that these activities may be carried out most cost effectively by integrating the resource flows for RIRD with those proposed for DM&R in the framework of a single food aid facility.

This intervention should be designed in an integrated and flexible manner so as to maximise community participation in the planning, design and implementation of activities and the identification of beneficiaries. It would also facilitate a multi-sector approach utilising Food for Work, Food for Training, and Institutional and Therapeutic Feeding. The food assistance provided by this facility would operate through District or Urban Assemblies in the most vulnerable EPAs of Malawi as defined by the vulnerability assessment and recommendations from the respective districts. The implementing partner may be an NGO, community group or district administration.



Recommendation

The mission recommends that in the period up to the end of the current CP, the modified intervention should be introduced on a pilot basis within the framework of the RIRD and DM&R activities to test the feasibility and efficacy of the approach. The approach envisaged would have the virtue of combining and maximising the four benefits expected to accrue from country programming: integration; concentration and better targeting; coherence and internal consistency; and flexibility. It would also contribute directly and effectively to the two long-term goals of the CP.



Annex 1
Terms of Reference
for the

**Evaluation of the Malawi Country Programme
(1998-2001)**

1. Objectives of the Malawi Country Programme Evaluation

- 1) To assess the extent to which WFP's current development activities in Malawi have been influenced by the CP approach so that they constitute a recognizable CP.
- 2) To assess the extent to which WFP's systems and procedures for programme and project identification, design, budgeting, resourcing and implementation at both the headquarters and field levels have enhanced or impeded the CP approach in Malawi.
- 3) To assess the extent to which the CP in Malawi has resulted in a more effective WFP contribution to both development and relief.
- 4) To determine whether the development activities ongoing in Malawi have been designed to make a direct contribution to the objectives of the CP.
- 5) To assess the extent to which the individual WFP activities in Malawi represent recognized good practice in food aid (including the practices and principles recognized in the "Enabling Development" policy).
- 6) To provide recommendations for the CP which can be used in the development of future Country Strategy Outlines and CPs and to provide accountability to the Executive Board.

2. Scope of Work

Evaluating the Country Programme In Light of Its Constituent Activities

The evaluation of the CP in Malawi will focus primarily on the development and implementation of the programme as a whole. It will consider the programme in the context of the principles of the CP approach as they were understood and communicated throughout WFP at the time that the current CSO and CP were developed.

While focusing first at the programme level, the evaluation will also consider the way in which activities have been integrated into the programme and the extent to which they make a contribution to the programme objectives as well as meet their own. ***It is important to distinguish between the evaluation of the CP and the separate exercise of evaluating each of the activities which make up the CP, the latter being outside the scope of the current evaluation.*** In CP evaluations, a team works its way from the general to the particular, from the CP to the activity level. Activities are assessed in terms of their logic and their expected contribution to meeting the objectives of the CP. It may be that activities provide the most concrete opportunity for assessing progress toward overall programme objectives.

Country Programmes and "Enabling Development"

The findings and recommendations of the evaluation will be forward-looking in that they will be framed in a way which supports the development of a new CSO and CP which will conform to current requirements, including those of the "Enabling Development" policy. Since the "Enabling Development" initiative dates from 1999, it



will not be appropriate to evaluate programmes developed before that in terms of their effectiveness in meeting the requirements of this policy. Rather, the evaluation team will assess the current programme for its fit with the policy prescriptions evident in “Enabling Development” and make recommendations for the future CP/CSO. The assessment of programme fit with “Enabling Development” will be guided by the template provided in Annex 3.

Linking the Country Programme to Other Activities

The evaluation will directly cover only the activities defined under the CP. As such it will not attempt to assess the effectiveness of relief and recovery activities, or any development activities which may exist outside of the CP. However, the evaluation will examine which development activities in the CP have been designed so that they may support current or future relief operations.

3. Key Issues and Sub-Issues

The evaluation will address the following issues and sub-issues.

1. Has the process of developing a CSO and CP in Malawi resulted in a recognizable CP as described and expected in the guidelines and policies of the WFP?

- 1.1. How many activities in the current CP were ongoing before the establishment of the CP? Were they modified to fit more readily into the CP approach? How?
- 1.2. Did the process of developing the CSO and CP include an analysis of national and sub-regional (within the country) food insecurity and vulnerability – a hunger analysis? Does the CSO and/or the CP make reference to any material developed for this country by the VAM Unit of WFP?
- 1.3. Did the process of developing the CSO and CP result in an identified strategy for WFP development programming in Malawi? Did it include, for example, choices in strategic areas such as: key partners inside and outside government; geographic target areas; targeting considerations within geographic areas; programme areas best dealt with by other agencies?
- 1.4. Are the activities in the CP designed to be complementary or to be linked in terms of sector, geographic area, beneficiaries or any other common elements? If not, is there a strong rationale for not making these linkages?
- 1.5. Are there specific objectives expressed at the level of the CP (as opposed to the activity level)? Are they relevant, realistic and attainable in light of the approved activities in the CP?⁴
- 1.6. What evidence exists that the current CP exhibits the desired characteristics of:
 - ◆ integration;
 - ◆ coherence;
 - ◆ concentration; and,
 - ◆ flexibility.⁵

⁴ It will be necessary for the evaluation teams to determine the fit between programme level goals and objectives and those of the individual activities making up the programme. Output and outcome indicators may not be practical at the level of Country Programme objectives but may be found in relation to specific Activities.

⁵ These terms have not been defined in the documentation on the country programming process. Reasonable definitions would be as follows:



- 1.7. Does the design of each activity include links to the common objectives of the CP or to WFP country level strategies identified in the CP?
- 1.8. Are procedures in place to monitor progress toward objectives at both the programme and activity level? Is it appropriate to specify objectives at both programme and activity level and to monitor progress toward objectives achievement at both levels? If not, why?

2. To what extent did WFP's systems and procedures for programme and project identification, design, budgeting, implementation and review enhance or impede the CP approach in Malawi?

- 2.1. To what extent has the delegation of authority to the regional and country office level enhanced the flexibility of the Country Director in developing and negotiating a CP and in making shifts in resources when appropriate? Has the Country Director been pro-active in using those authorities which have been devolved?
- 2.2. Have appropriate policy statements, guidelines, and headquarters/regional staff support been made available to country offices during the development of CSOs and CPs?
- 2.3. In the experience of the WFP office in Malawi, are procedures and rules for establishing programme and project budgets appropriate to a CP approach? Do they allow for the required flexibility in resource planning and allocation?
- 2.4. Is the staffing mix in the country office appropriate given the requirements of the CP approach? Is short-term technical support available where it is needed and appropriate?
- 2.5. Were the defined procedures for preparing and implementing the CP at country level followed? For example, has a CP agreement been signed with the government? Were appraisal missions carried out to prepare Project Outlines? Were Project Summaries prepared? Does the Programme Review Committee exist and does it function?
- 2.6. What problems or constraints have been identified during the development and implementation of the CP?

3. To what extent has the design, development and implementation of a CP in Malawi resulted in a more effective WFP contribution to both development and relief?

- 3.1. Was the national government fully involved in the review of needs in preparation for the CSO and does it agree with the stated priorities of the CP?

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- **integration**; design components of each activity which call for the implementation of specific sub-activities across projects. For example, recruiting participants from vulnerable group feeding projects into food for work projects when appropriate;
 - **coherence**; the absence of any design elements in one activity which may work counter to achieving the objectives in another activity;
 - **concentration**: evidence that more than one activity has encompassed a common target group of beneficiaries; and,
 - **flexibility**: evidence that resources can be moved from one activity to another as appropriate; that the rate of implementation of an activity can be increased or decreased to meet changed circumstances; or that the geographic location and target group of an activity can be altered quickly to meet changing needs.



- 3.2. Did the process of developing the CP enhance WFP involvement in the CCA and UNDAF processes under way in Malawi? Did the shift to a CP enhance WFP's ability to contribute to UN coordination through the CSN, CCA, UNDAF or other processes?
 - 3.3. Has the process of developing the CP had any appreciable effect on the ability of the national government to make and meet programme commitments regarding counterpart contributions including both finances and staff time?
 - 3.4. Does the CP include contingency planning measures at either the country programme or activity level? Does it include measures in one or more activities aimed at ensuring that disaster preparedness or disaster mitigation actions are taken in development projects so that the transition to relief measures if they become necessary may be more effective and timely?
 - 3.5. While the CP does not include resourcing and planning for PRROs and EMOPs, does it describe them and note any possible actual or potential interaction between development activities and relief?
 - 3.6. Did the CP mechanism permit necessary and appropriate shifts of resources among activities in a timely and efficient way?
- 4. Have the development activities of WFP in Malawi been designed to contribute directly to the objectives of the CP?**
- 4.1. Have new projects been identified for the CP and do they include realistic and attainable objectives relevant to the objectives of the CP? Is there an explicit reference in the design of these activities to their ability to contribute to CP objectives?
 - 4.2. Have pre-existing activities been modified to identify and enhance their potential contribution to CP objectives?
- 5. Do the activities which make up the CP represent recognized good practice in the use of food aid at WFP? For example:**
- 5.1. Is food aid the most appropriate resource for use in the CP activities? Is food aid justifiable and necessary for the achievement of the activity level objectives?
 - 5.2. Are WFP's partners in each activity the most appropriate? What measures were taken during the design of the activity to assess possible partners?
 - 5.3. Is food aid used in the activities in the CP targeted to food deficit sub-regions and/or populations identifiable as the hungry poor? Is there evidence that these targeted people are being reached?
 - 5.4. Are assets being created in the activities? If so, what measures are in place to ensure that the targeted beneficiaries benefit from these assets?
 - 5.5. Do the activities in the CP adequately address gender issues? Do they adhere to WFP's Commitment to Women?
 - 5.6. What indicators are being monitored which can be used to assess the effectiveness of the activities in the CP? Do they provide information regarding the achievement of anticipated outputs, outcomes and impacts? Were appropriate baselines established for the indicators being used?



6. To what extent does the use of food aid in the current activities of the CP conform to the “Enabling Development” policy⁶?

- 6.1. Are the current activities in line with the “Enabling Development” policy?
- 6.2. If not, can they be modified to better reflect these principles during the present programme?
- 6.3. What changes would be required in the development of a new CSO and CP which would ensure compliance with “Enabling Development”?

7. What measures can be taken in the development of the CSO and the next CP to improve the effectiveness of WFP’s contribution to development and relief during the next programming cycle?

8. Are there any lessons to be learned from the experience gained in designing and implementing the current CP in Malawi?

4. Methodology

Phase I - Desk review:

Prior to the in-country mission the team will review all relevant background documentation, including the CSO and CP, activity summaries, project progress reports, project mid-term and terminal evaluation reports, relevant international and national sectoral publications/reports. In addition, the team should locate and review country studies carried out for recent thematic evaluations such as the review of WFP Commitments to Women. Key team members may be assembled at WFP in Rome for a briefing prior to departure. Alternatively, some members of the team may review materials provided electronically and join the team directly in the field. Following decentralization of many programme functions to the field level, some of the documentary material on programmes and activities is best accessed at the level of the Country Office.

Phase II - The in-country evaluation:

To the extent possible, the Team should meet with all relevant stakeholders, including beneficiaries, local and national government, key implementation partners and other development agencies involved in the UNDAF and with any of WFP’s programmes.

Data collection during the CP Evaluations will take place both in the offices of key stakeholders in the capital and in the field where examples of major programme activities can be visited. Priority should be given to meetings in the capital but some coverage of field activities will be necessary. A useful rule of thumb may be to spend two-thirds of the available time in the capital and one-third visiting activities in the field.

Key informant interviews to be carried out by the Team may be divided into different groupings:

Group One: WFP full time and contract staff working on development activities;

Group Two: Institutional Partners/Actors in the Development and Coordination of Programmes at National Level. For example:

- UN Agencies active in consultative processes relating to development such as the CCA and UNDAF including UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA, FAO, IFAD, WHO;

⁶ It is important to note that issue number 6 does not mean that the current country programme will be retroactively evaluated against the criteria of Enabling Development. Rather, the programme will be assessed with a view to providing guidance as to any changes required to ensure compliance in the future.



- Government Ministries who are either involved at the national level in consultations on donor coordination (the Ministry of External Cooperation, Ministry of Planning, Ministry of Finance, for example) or represent current or planned partners in WFP development activities: Ministry of Agriculture, National Water Authority, Ministry of Health, National Forestry Service, as appropriate;
- The local offices of the World Bank and regional development bank;
- Bilateral donors with a significant presence in sectors of WFP programming (e.g. DANIDA in PHC in Tanzania, US-AID in family planning and child survival in Uganda); These should be identified by the WFP office in the country. Of special interest will be donors who are taking part in structures aimed at coordination at the national level, such as the health and population working group in Bangladesh.
- NGOs with a national presence and mandate in food security and/or poverty alleviation. The WFP office should be able to identify a small group of national and international NGOs with a strong presence and reputation in food aid and/or food security and poverty programming. Ideally, these organizations should be recognized by the government as co-participants in national or regional programmes.

Group Three: Institutional Partners Engaged in WFP Activities

- national, provincial or local offices of the agencies implementing WFP activities on behalf of government (water authority staff, district medical officers, agriculture extension service staff, national forest service staff, as appropriate);
- Staff of national and international NGOs involved in the delivery of WFP food aid and/or the planning and completion of infrastructure assets created with food aid;
- Staff of human service agencies supported by WFP food aid such as nutrition rehabilitation units, mother and child health clinics, schools, etc.

Group Four: Participants and Beneficiaries

Accompanied by project staff, the mission members should meet in group settings with participants in food for work projects, children in schools, attendees of MCH clinics etc. Groups can be comprised of village elders or representatives, women youth, etc. These meetings will serve as a first level test of the targeting aspects of the development activities.

Past experience strongly suggests that the WFP Country Office would benefit by hosting a meeting of the Team, WFP staff and key stakeholder organizations to discuss the preliminary findings of the evaluation prior to the Team's departure for Rome.

Phase III - Report writing:

During each phase of the CP evaluation, the team leader should confirm the duties and accountabilities of each team member. This can be easily organized around the products of the evaluation which are in turn organized around the key objectives and issues.



Full Report of the Evaluation of the Malawi Country Programme

The team leader is responsible for co-ordinating inputs to and writing the Aide Memoire, evaluation summary and final report. Individual reports by team members may either be integrated into the final report or, where necessary, presented as annexes.

Annex 2: Indicative Checklist for Country Programme and Project Compatibility With Enabling Development

Essential Elements of Enabling Development	Detailed Observation	Level of CP and Project Compatibility With Enabling Development Policy			
		Very High	High	Low	Very Low
<i>1. Government Commitment</i>					
◆ National food security strategy or other enabling policy in place – identify policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Poverty Alleviation Policy since 1995 National Plan of Action for Nutrition, 1996/97, from MOA 		X		
◆ Inter-ministerial cooperation established – note any committees, mechanisms	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Country Programme Advisory Committee (CPAC) established but except for one meeting never activated NEC role remains unclear 				X
◆ Committed to targeting the poorest – including women – references in CP agreement or activity designs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ministry of Gender established GOM Food Security and Nutrition Policy Statement emphasizes “improved nutrition for the most vulnerable” and female headed HHs 	X			
◆ Staff and other human resources assigned in line with capacity – any references to insufficient or under-qualified counterparts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Overstretched Government counterparts at national level makes involvement in CP process difficult Limited capacity at District level makes implementation difficult HIV impact on civil service 				X
◆ Related capacity building measures identified if problems occur in qualifications and availability of counterpart staff	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Decentralization initiative has unknown staffing implications UNDAF and bilateral donors emphasise capacity building. Several donors have made Malawi a priority country e.g. DFID. So far WFP record has been mixed (VAM internal to WFP, DDGLA versus DRRA, PMU, TLU) 			X	
<i>2. Coordination</i>					

<i>Essential Elements of Enabling Development</i>	<i>Detailed Observation</i>	<i>Level of CP and Project Compatibility With Enabling Development Policy</i>			
		<i>Very High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>Very Low</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ <i>Programme refers to and conforms with priorities of UNDAF/CCA – cite reference in CP and activities to UNDAF/CCA</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>CO programming cycle was harmonised with UNDAF in the CSO and the resulting CP that was approved by the GOM</i> • <i>CP predates UNDAF but nonetheless CP objectives are broadly in line with UNDAF</i> 		X		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ <i>Complementary linkages with other partners – evidence of participation of non-traditional and non-governmental partners</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Numerous NGOs have been used as implementers and CP calls for “heavy reliance on NGOs”</i> • <i>Partnership with CPAR including piloting led to stronger design for School Feeding</i> • <i>However, full potential for using NGOs and dealing with them as planning and design partners rather than primarily as implementers has not been actively pursued</i> 			X	
3. Operational Partners					
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ <i>Identify operational partners – cite key operational partners by activity</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>AMG – MOHP, CHAM, Concern</i> • <i>FFW – DRRR and now DDGLA, CADECOM, World Vision, PROSCAP, Inter Aide, CADECOM, ELDP, ACIDI, GTZ</i> • <i>Safety Net - CHAM</i> • <i>School Feeding – CPAR (no longer)</i> • <i>VAM – MOA, FEWS, RESAL, UNDP</i> 		X		

<i>Essential Elements of Enabling Development</i>	<i>Detailed Observation</i>	<i>Level of CP and Project Compatibility With Enabling Development Policy</i>			
		<i>Very High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>Very Low</i>
◆ <i>Operational partners chosen for effectiveness</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>FFW - Switch from DRRA to DDGLA was conscious search to improve effectiveness. Logistics support to GTZ</i> • <i>AMG – CHAM partnership has not been exploited to improve effectiveness at NRUs.</i> • <i>FFW and School Feeding - The call-for-proposal approach to selecting best partners has not be used and may be helpful NGO partners are usually selected for convenience or because they happen to be working in the same area</i> 			X	
◆ <i>Strategy for building operational partnerships</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>WFP has not been very proactive in building long-term partnerships with NGOs. Small-scale lukuni phala production plants need to break their dependence on WFP. Make better use of CHAM</i> • <i>Could CO become more service oriented to NGOs?</i> • <i>TLU and PMU have been not been successful strategies</i> 			X	
4. Understanding Needs					
Consumption Needs					
◆ <i>Food consumption problem adequately identified? – cite references to VAM or other mapping/targeting exercises and information</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>VAM has improved geographic targeting but now considered out of date. Waiting for new data from GOM</i> • <i>Up to EPA there has been a lot of improvement with FEWS/VAM. But VAM unable to identify HH food security</i> 		X		
◆ <i>Nature of the food consumption problem – geographic location, effected population, severity</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Donors running parallel food security monitoring systems rather than co-ordinating under one roof, sharing resources, and improving overall quality</i> 			X	

<i>Essential Elements of Enabling Development</i>	<i>Detailed Observation</i>	<i>Level of CP and Project Compatibility With Enabling Development Policy</i>			
		<i>Very High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>Very Low</i>
◆ <i>Key indicators of the food consumption problem – indicators cited in CP and activity documents</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>CP does list key process, output, and effect indicators for each core activity. Some of these are cited and used in project documents but many of them have not been operationalised or used as part of project performance monitoring systems</i> 				X
Consumption/Investment Link					
◆ <i>How food was linked to the development opportunity in CP and activity plan</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>FFW to FFA shift is noticeable in documents for project 5782/01</i> • <i>School feeding links food to investment in human assets, namely children and especially girls</i> • <i>AMG does not fully exploit educational potential of food handouts nor link to soybean production by parents</i> • <i>AMG/FFW/School Feeding complementarity for development not developed</i> 			X	
5. Creation of Lasting Assets and Human Capital					
◆ <i>Which assets were created and for whom?</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>FFW – roads, communal wood lots etc. Women targeted</i> • <i>School Feeding – human assets especially the girl child</i> 		X		
◆ <i>Which are the sustainable benefits from the assets and for whom?</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>AMG – no assets created</i> • <i>FFW - sustainability not adequately addressed</i> 				X
6. Reaching the Right People					

<i>Essential Elements of Enabling Development</i>	<i>Detailed Observation</i>	<i>Level of CP and Project Compatibility With Enabling Development Policy</i>			
		<i>Very High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>Very Low</i>
◆ <i>Indicators used to identify geographic areas and target groups within these areas</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>VAM uses composite index for EPA targeting but not able to identify HHs</i> • <i>Further targeting by nutritional status of under-fives and individual assessment of health risk to mothers (AMG), primary school attendance and gender (School Feeding), and by self-selection and community mobilization (FFW)</i> • 		X		
◆ <i>Are women equally targeted?</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Application of WFP gender commitments has been strong</i> 	X			
◆ <i>Do targeted areas match with most food insecure areas?</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Yes, to the best of VAM's accuracy.</i> 		X		
7. Participation					
◆ <i>Government departments involved in designing, planning, and monitoring</i>	<i>Limited involvement and small national or community ownership of CP</i>				X
◆ <i>Participatory tools and methods used to facilitate planning and ownership by local government and communities</i>	<i>This is still at a very preliminary stage</i>			X	
◆ <i>How women and men were involved in planning, implementation and/or monitoring – cite references in activity documents to special measures to encourage full participation in decision making</i>	<i>This is still to be worked out</i>			X	

<i>Essential Elements of Enabling Development</i>	<i>Detailed Observation</i>	<i>Level of CP and Project Compatibility With Enabling Development Policy</i>			
		<i>Very High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>Very Low</i>
8. Cost Effectiveness					
◆ <i>Alternatives examined for meeting food aid objectives</i>	<i>This has not been explicitly done</i>			X	
◆ <i>Measures introduced to minimise costs</i>	<i>There should be maximum use of NPOs and there should be a logistics strategy and plan</i>			X	
9. Technical Quality					
◆ <i>Activity appraisal mission?</i>	<i>Confusion on this point and guidelines and procedures need to be established</i>			X	
◆ <i>At what stages of programme cycle was technical expertise used?</i>	<i>Appraisal and evaluation, but not systematically and with mixed results</i>			X	
◆ <i>From Where (FAO,ILO,UNESCO,WHO)?</i>	<i>UNDAF and national consultants but not systematic and co-ordinated; little joint programming</i>			X	
◆ <i>Criteria used for sustainability of assets?</i>	<i>Worked out with ILO and training given</i>		X		
◆ <i>Conditions under which WFP assistance no longer required – cite reference in activity plan</i>	<i>Need to work out exit strategies. Not yet being done</i>				X
10. Market Impact					

<i>Essential Elements of Enabling Development</i>	<i>Detailed Observation</i>	<i>Level of CP and Project Compatibility With Enabling Development Policy</i>			
		<i>Very High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>Very Low</i>
◆ <i>Analysis of food aid imports or local purchase impact on local markets</i>	<i>Not being done systematically</i>			<i>X</i>	
<i>11. Demonstrating Results</i>					
• <i>Performance indicators established and in use?</i>	<i>Not yet being done satisfactorily</i>			<i>X</i>	
◆ <i>Available and measurable objectives for both CP and activities?</i>	<i>Still to be done</i>			<i>X</i>	
◆ <i>Monitoring and evaluation system set up at CO level?</i>	<i>Still to be done</i>			<i>X</i>	
◆ <i>Baseline survey completed?</i>	<i>Update of previous one already scheduled</i>		<i>X</i>		
◆ <i>Data disaggregated by gender?</i>	<i>Not yet available</i>		<i>X</i>		