



World Food Programme

A Report from the Office of Evaluation

*Full Report of the Evaluation of
UGANDA PRRO 6176 - "Targeted
Food Assistance for Refugees, IDPs
and Vulnerable Groups*

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Responsibility for the opinions expressed in this report rests solely with the authors. Publication of this document does not imply endorsement by WFP of the opinions expressed.

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Acronyms

AAH	Aktion Afrika Hilfe
ACF	Action Contre la Faim (Action Against Hunger)
ACORD	Agency for Cooperation, Research and Development
ADEO	African Development and Emergency Organisation
AHA	African Humanitarian Action
ADF	Alliance of Democratic Forces
CAP	Consolidated Appeal Process
CEFORD	Community Empowerment for Development
CO	(WFP) Country Office
COPR	Country Office Progress Report
COR	Country Progress Report
CSB	Corn Soya Blend
CTS	Commodity Tracking System
DDMC	District Disaster Management Committees
DED	Deutsche Entwicklungsdienst (German Development Service)
EDP	Extended Delivery Point
EFNA	Emergency Food Needs Assessment
EMOP	Emergency Operation
ERC	Emergency Relief Coordinator
EVI	Extremely Vulnerable Individual
FAO	(UN) Food and Agriculture Organization
FBM	Food Basket Monitoring
FDP	Final Distribution Point
FEWS	Famine Early Warning System (supported by USAID)
FFA	Food for Assets
FFW	Food for Work
FFT	Food for Training
FO	Field Office (WFP)
GAP	Gender Action Plan
GFD	General Food Distribution



GLR	Great Lakes Region
GWENET	Gulu Women's Empowerment Network
HFEA	Household Food Economy Assessment
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
INGO	International Non-Government Organization
IOM	International Office for Migration
IP	Implementing Partner (of WFP)
IRC	International Rescue Committee
JAM	Joint Assessment Mission (GoU/UNHCR/WFP)
JFAM	Joint Food Assessment Mission (GoU/UNHCR/WFP)
LC	Local Council
LTSH	Landside Transport, Storage and Handling
LOA	Letter of Agreement
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
LWF	Lutheran World Federation
MCH	Mother and Child Health
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
NFI	Non-Food Item
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
NURP	Northern Uganda Reconstruction Programme
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OPM	Office of the Prime Minister
PDM	Post-Distribution Monitoring
PRAFORD	Participatory Rural Action For Development
PRRO	Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation
RWC	Refugee Welfare Committee
SAP	Systems Applications & Products (now "WINGS")
SAT	(WFP) Security Awareness Training
SC/UK	Save the Children (UK)
SC/US	Save the Children (US)
SFI	School Feeding Initiative
SFP	School Feeding Programme
SO	Sub-Office (WFP)



SRS	Self-Reliance Strategy
SI	Shipping Instruction
TFC	Therapeutic Feeding Centre
TQL	Total Quality Logistics
UNDAF	UN Development Assistance Framework
UNHCR	UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNDMT	UN Disaster Management Team
UPDF	Uganda People's Defence Forces
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VAM	Vulnerability Assessment and Mapping
VGF	Vulnerable Group Feeding
WFP	(UN) World Food Programme
WHO	(UN) World Health Organisation



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Executive Summary

The stated goal of Uganda PRRO 6176 Targeted Food Assistance for Refugees, IDPs and Vulnerable Groups is to contribute to the improved household food security of the most vulnerable people in Uganda while creating social and economic assets and income-generating activities to enhance their self-sufficiency. In its first year of implementation, the PRRO performed well in meeting its protracted relief objective under challenging circumstances, and less well in meeting its recovery objectives, due largely to the continued encampment of IDPs.

The main achievement of the operation has been feeding unplanned, large numbers of refugees and IDPs in an unstable, unpredictable environment. While relief activities have dominated PRRO 6176, attention has tended to focus on instituting recovery activities. This is understandable given the emphasis WFP now gives to effecting a transition from relief to recovery. However, phasing down relief has almost become an end in itself and it appears to have distracted attention from fundamental tasks required to discharge WFP's core responsibility, which is to feed the hungry poor (i.e. meet assessed needs). In view of this, more attention should be paid to verifying refugee and IDP numbers, improving final distribution mechanisms, and post-distribution monitoring.

The projected relief feeding caseload for the first year was 320,000 (60% IDPs, 40% refugees). However, due mainly to renewed LRA activity in Gulu and Kitgum Districts the actual caseload increased dramatically and peaked at 732,000 (nearly 80% IDPs) in June 2000. This did not amount to a corresponding increase in commodity requirements because rations were set lower than was provided in the PRRO project document, resulting in an increase in commodity requirements of only 16% for the first year.

WFP and its IPs were able to distribute approximately 75% of this revised commodity requirement, a commendable performance given security and other constraints. Refugees were generally better provided for than IDPs - approximately 82% of their requirements were met in the first year. IDPs had approximately 70% of their requirements met overall. The largest caseload, the IDPs in Gulu District, received only 62% of their assessed commodity requirements.

The undersupply was mainly due to a pipeline break in September-October 2000, an event that the CO regards as the biggest problem faced in the first year. It appears to the mission that the pipeline break was avoidable. Another factor was the phenomenon of 'rolling undersupply' caused by delays in the completion of distributions, together with insecurity, which remains a significant constraint.

Rations vary considerably across the operation, depending on the circumstances of the refugees/IDPs. Overall, ration levels seem to have been appropriate given what is known about nutritional outcomes. It should be noted, however, that the rations provided to IDPs and refugees are based on average needs and not on the (greater) food gap of the 'most food insecure' (typically approximately 30% of the total). The effects of this are not well understood.

The Emergency Food Needs Assessment (EFNA) methodology developed by the CO and Regional VAM Office in 2000 has contributed very substantially to making food needs



assessments for both IDPs and refugees more systematic, more responsive to programming needs, and more collaborative. The mission encourages the CO to continue to build on this commendable initiative.

The recovery component was to have consisted mainly, but not exclusively, of FFW and FFT. This component was intended to help IDPs resettle and (to a lesser extent) refugees become self-sufficient. But the IDPs were not able to resettle and WFP found it difficult to generate FFW activities for encamped populations of IDPs or refugees. WFP has instead mainly worked with non-IDP and non-refugee populations. The concentration on non-IDP populations is questionable given the stated objectives of the PRRO. In refugee hosting areas it is appropriate to include the host population in FFW activities but only in as much as this furthers objectives vis-à-vis refugees. During the first year, FFW projects tended to be supply and policy driven, with relatively little guidance provided to field offices.

The number of FFW beneficiaries in the first year of the PRRO exceeded the projection (137%) but the quantity of food utilised was well under target (28%). Some of the FFW activities have been of considerable value to beneficiaries, while others were poorly conceived. Projects have often been undermined by a lack of matching inputs and many beneficiaries participate to receive the ration, not for the asset. It should be noted that the CO recognized the weaknesses of the FFW approach undertaken under the PRRO during the first year, and based on this, has halted any new activities pending the preparation of comprehensive Food for Asset (FFA) guidelines for Uganda.

School feeding is a valuable component of the PRRO although it places considerable demands on already stretched field offices. School feeding programmes have been started in Gulu and Kitgum Districts but are yet to commence in West Nile and Bundibugyo. Overall, the students benefiting from school feeding were 74% of the target in the first year. However, only 27% of planned commodities were actually distributed.

Two of the biggest future challenges concern the Self-Reliance Strategy for Refugees (SRS) and the resettlement of IDPs. Although WFP activities in refugee-hosting areas are explicitly linked to the SRS, this linkage is weak at the operational level and needs to be strengthened. A related weakness of the SRS is the lack of clarity about the conditions for self-reliance. In relation to the resettlement of IDPs, WFP needs to be more proactive at both the district and national levels, setting its sights on an agreed framework for resettlement. While it may be difficult to determine exactly what approach (and what risks) WFP should take, it is abundantly clear that the status quo is unsatisfactory. People are suffering, opportunities for recovery are being lost, and there is a risk that WFP will be caught off-guard by a request to support a resettlement (or 'decongestion') plan that is not in the interests of the people concerned. Strong leadership is required from within the UN system in Uganda, both to advocate more urgent consideration of resettlement, and to coordinate the funding and allocation of material inputs. Given its IDP mandate, OCHA appears to have an important coordination role to play, although OCHA's capacity clearly needs to be bolstered.

The PRRO project document focuses on women and makes it plain from the outset that women should be targeted as disadvantaged and often vulnerable members of the IDP and refugee populations. Moreover, appropriate targets are set. However, the project document does not provide adequate analysis or guidance. The WFP Uganda Gender Action Plan for 2001 and the workplans for the PRRO have a narrow focus on Commitment III (taking action to facilitate women's equal access to resources, employment, markets and trade).

The CO has nevertheless addressed WFP's Commitments to Women in the implementation of the PRRO, making concerted efforts to encourage a greater number of women to collect rations on behalf of their families and successfully endeavoured to ensure participation of



women in key community structures. This was particularly notable in Bundibugyo and Kitgum.

Overall, field staff in Uganda are working under generally unpredictable and sometimes very threatening conditions, particularly in the north and west. It is clear that volatile security conditions (and unexpected crises such as ebola) have an impact on the ability of staff to plan, implement and monitor. It is also recognised that a number of positive changes have been introduced over the past year to improve the way the PRRO is managed. The mission appreciates the frank acknowledgement of programming weaknesses by CO/SO staff, and their openness to suggestions for improvement. This is reflected in the thorough preparation for and active co-operation with the evaluation mission. Staff in the CO and in the field have a good understanding of the local situation and number of ideas for improving WFP's performance. This needs to be harnessed during the development of the next phase of PRRO 6176.

1. INTRODUCTION

Evaluation objectives

The objectives of the evaluation were to:

- assess the relevance, timeliness, efficiency and effectiveness of WFP assistance under the PRRO in order to improve the implementation of the current operation and assist with planning the next phase;
- assess the added value of including the operation in the PRRO programme category, thereby contributing to an understanding of the usefulness of the new PRRO category both as a resource window and as a programming instrument;
- provide accountability to the Executive Board.

The Terms of Reference are included as Annex A.

Scope of Work

The evaluation team was tasked to focus initially on the PRRO's recovery strategy and then to assess both the protracted relief and the recovery elements of the PRRO, in both cases focusing on the conduct of planned activities, delivery of outputs and achievement of targets and stated objectives. This was to involve reviewing systems and support (financial, staff, partnerships, etc.) underlying the PRRO and the strategic linkages between the two component elements to determine if opportunities for recovery were successfully seized. Strategic linkages with sister agencies, implementing partners and other stakeholders were also to be examined and the evaluation was also directed to consider how effectively WFP's Commitments to Women have been integrated in the design of the operation and mainstreamed into the operation's activities.

Method

The mission consisted of five team members¹, including a UNHCR staff member given that a large portion of the PRRO caseload are refugees. The Team Leader and WFP Evaluation Officer were briefed in Rome before proceeding to Uganda, and returned to Rome to present preliminary findings. The mission spent 25 days in Uganda in May-June 2001 and in addition to consultations in Kampala visited all WFP sub-offices involved in implementing the PRRO. The mission split into two teams for the majority of the fieldwork to cover more sites.² As a preliminary exercise the team worked with CO and field staff to clarify the objectives and intended outputs and activities of the PRRO by drafting a results hierarchy (the first column of a Logframe).

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² See Annex B, Itinerary; Annex C, People Consulted

2. CONTEXT OF THE CRISIS AND WFP'S PRRO

Evolution of the protracted situation

As at 31 March 2001 there were 147,323 registered southern Sudanese refugees in Uganda (77% in West Nile) and 520,522 registered IDPs (65% in Gulu District). Southern Sudanese refugees, the largest group of refugees in Uganda, began arriving in 1988 with the largest influx occurring in 1992. Southern Sudanese refugees have fled persecution from government forces, internecine fighting amongst southern Sudanese militias and general insecurity. Many young men have fled conscription. The Ugandan government accepted all southern Sudanese as refugees on a prima facie basis. They were initially assisted in camps.

Insecurity in Gulu and Kitgum Districts, the cause of internal displacement, relates to an insurgency commenced in 1986 by the Holy Spirit Movement and elements of the overthrown army (the UPDA). Attacks in 1996/97 by a successor rebel group, the Lord's Resistance Army, caused large-scale displacement and resulted in the policy of 'protected villages' and the creation of IDP camps. Many of the attacks were intense - in Lamwo County, Kitgum District, a total of 412 people were reportedly killed over just three days in January 1997.

Insecurity in Bundibugyo District commenced in 1996 with the insurgency of the Alliance of Democratic Forces (ADF). WFP initially provided assistance but with a cessation in rebel activities stopped distributions in July 1998. When the insurgency recommenced, the number of displaced grew and WFP resumed assistance to IDP camps.

In 1994, the focus of assistance for refugees shifted from care and maintenance to local settlement and self-sufficiency in food production. Refugees were moved away from the camps and allowed to settle in areas where the government provided them with access to land, and where UNHCR ensured that infrastructural improvements were in place. In 1998, the GoU and UNHCR launched the Self-Reliance Strategy (SRS). It has three objectives - to promote self-reliance amongst refugees in Uganda, to integrate services for refugees with national services, and to contribute to sustainable development in refugee-hosting districts.³

From 1996 to 1999 the number of Sudanese refugees was reduced from 264,000 to 170,000 as a result of resettlement and repatriation. Most Sudanese refugees would prefer to go home, but are awaiting less threatening conditions in Sudan and a repatriation framework.

WFP began to shift its focus of assistance to the recovery of IDPs from late 1997 when insecurity subsided for a period. Assistance has focused on the camps because the UPDF restricts the movement of people due to insecurity - IDPs are only granted permission to move outside the camps to farm during daylight hours. Although there was once again considerable insecurity in Gulu and Kitgum Districts in the first half of 1999, security improved through July-September 1999 and WFP scaled back rations. IDPs certainly want to go home, and are awaiting improved security and a 'green light' from the government to do so.

³ OPM/UNHCR, 'Strategy paper: self-reliance for refugee-hosting areas in Moyo, Arua and Adjumani Districts (1999-2003)', Kampala, 1999; OPM, 'Guiding principles for harmonizing interactions between the OPM, UNHCR, Districts, donors and other partners in the framework of the Self-Reliance Strategy for refugees in Uganda', Kampala, 2001.

Government policy is not as developed in relation to IDPs and is complicated by internal and external security issues. Basically the 'protected villages' policy remains current and no resettlement policy has been announced.

Role of food aid and rationale for WFP assistance

It was envisaged that food aid would play both a relief and recovery role, in the latter case through FFW/T and bridging food gaps while refugees and IDPs became self-sufficient.⁴ Food aid has played an indispensable relief role to date, and in the case of refugees has provided the intended bridge to greater self-sufficiency within the context of the SRS.

The rationale for assistance was straight forward in so far as WFP already had a caseload of refugees and IDPs dependant on WFP assistance and had to continue providing food relief. This remains the case.

3. PRRO STRATEGY AND DESIGN

Evolution from an EMOP/PRO and formulation of the recovery strategy

In accordance with the policy proposed in 'From Crisis to Recovery' and approved by the Board in 1998⁵ EMOP 5816 (three phases) *Assistance to Displaced Persons in Uganda* and PRO 5623.01 (two phases) *Assistance to Sudanese Refugees in Uganda* were rolled into PRRO 6176 *Targeted Food Assistance for Refugees, IDPs and Vulnerable Groups*.⁶ Continuity was maintained across the refugee and IDP operations and indeed the programming change did not have a marked impact on implementation. The PRRO project document provided for a shift to recovery but the themes of phasing down general food distributions and increasing FFW activities were present in the preceding EMOP and PRO.

The most significant contextual factor influencing the orientation of the PRRO was that, at the time of drafting, there had been some months of relative calm in Gulu and Kitgum Districts and the resettlement of the IDP caseload seemed feasible. The recovery strategy was constructed on this premise. Unfortunately, there was a resurgence of rebel activity in late December 1999 and WFP's IDP caseload increased dramatically through early 2000.

The PRRO project document was presented to the Executive Board in February 2000. It is noted that, despite the dramatically changed scenario on the ground, the project document and recovery strategy were not revised in the three months prior to commencement in April 2000. Perhaps it was hoped that security would be restored. This situation has been compounded by the absence of a review process to enable the CO to revisit the recovery strategy. The CO now envisages doing so in the formulation of the next phase of the PRRO.

Assessment of the recovery strategy

The recovery strategy states that there *will* be a transition from relief to recovery, with a large expansion in the level of resources for FFW and FFT as general distributions are phased out (up to

⁴ See Annex D, Original Estimate of Food Aid Requirements (taken from Annex III of the PRRO project document).

⁵ WFP/EB.A/98/4

⁶ WFP/EB.1/2000/7-B/2

80% of resources were to be invested in recovery by the second year).⁷ But it does not provide much guidance about how or under what precise circumstances the big shift from relief to recovery would be made. For example, the fact that no indicators are provided for making the shift was brought to the attention of the mission by WFP staff. Apart from this lack of guidance, the main deficiencies were not acknowledging that renewed insecurity was a 50/50 risk and not incorporating any contingency plans for less optimistic scenarios. The strategy was also too narrowly focused on the IDPs in the north and paid inadequate attention to the refugee caseload or the IDPs in Bundibugyo.

The project document stresses food security, gender and environmental issues which is positive but strategic planning to address these is deficient. This goes back to the situation analysis in the PRRO project document, which describes problems (including chronic food insecurity, deforestation around camps, disadvantages faced by women) but does not analyse causes. As a result the document lacks credible strategies for addressing these problems.

WFP Uganda responded well to the increased relief requirements, in this sense affirming the flexibility of the PRRO category. However, without clear guidance concerning the conditions under which recovery activities should be pursued or put on hold, SOs/FOs were initially unsure how to proceed with the planned recovery activities, resulting in some confusion, particularly in programming FFW. Staff are now very aware of this problem and are focused on resolving it.

Assessment of the PRRO design

While the PRRO project document is readable and informative, it does not provide a good 'road map' for management purposes, a good basis for developing annual workplans or monitoring systems, or a good basis for review and evaluation. To deal with this situation, the mission worked jointly with the CO to develop a draft logframe to provide a better platform for the evaluation.

While the CO has made considerable progress this year in developing workplans based on actual circumstances, satisfactory activity and output statements need to be finalised to provide a solid foundation for future monitoring and reporting.

PRRO 6176 illustrates the need for WFP to devise a PRRO project document revision mechanism to ensure that strategies, planned outputs/activities and budgetary provisions provide a relevant foundation for developing workplans and monitoring/reporting formats. The need for such a mechanism should be evident from the very nature of a PRRO, the distinguishing feature of which is the ability to move backwards and forwards between relief and recovery.

Recommendations

- WFP should establish a standard review process for PRROs to ensure that the flexibility of the PRRO category is reflected in up-to-date strategies and design documents. The mission suggests a biannual process consisting of a major annual review complemented with a mini 'catch-up' review. The annual workplan would be prepared at the conclusion of the major annual review.
- All PRRO project documents should include a description of the operation based on a logical hierarchy (as used in the first column of a logframe). The emphasis should be

⁷ The PRRO states: "It is expected that both groups (refugees and IDPs) will continue to gradually settle on new land or return to their farms, thereby decreasing the number in need of food rations, at varying levels, from the 1999 level of 861,000 to 498,000 in year one and 325,000 in year two when the PRRO, subject to resource availability and assessed need, is expected to be replaced by infrastructural development, school feeding, vocational training and functional literacy projects."

on improving the logical progression of activities-to-outputs-to-purposes, and developing output and purpose statements that include both quantitative and qualitative elements.

4. ACHIEVEMENT OF RELIEF OBJECTIVES

Objectives and required outputs

The stated protracted relief objective is:

*To maintain minimum nutritional and dietary standards among population groups most at risk, including refugees, displaced and the hungry poor living in areas with acute local and seasonal food shortages.*⁸

- This was to be achieved through general food distributions (GFD), particularly in the first year. An important element in the PRRO is the emphasis on phasing down GFD (discussed further below) and increasing FFW.⁹ Supplementary and institutional feeding was also utilised.
- At the field level the provision of food relief to maintain minimum dietary and nutrition standards involves several essential steps or outputs, which are not necessarily explicit in the PRRO project document. These include (suggested output statements are in parenthesis):
 - Assessment (required output: a reasonably good understanding of nutritional status, food security/insecurity and vulnerability for food relief programming purposes);
 - Rations levels (required output: agreed rations including food basket composition based on assessed food gaps and kcal requirements);
 - Registration and verification (required output: a reasonable estimate of IDP and refugee numbers obtained with assistance of counterparts and regularly updated);
 - Transparency (required output: a good understanding of food entitlements by intended beneficiaries achieved by communicating distribution plans and PRRO rationale via the IP, posters and pictograms);
 - Distribution system (required output: efficient and effective final distribution mechanisms that fairly represent beneficiaries including women and best enable beneficiaries to receive their entitlements);
 - Delivery to IP (required output: delivery of commodities to FDPs for distribution by IP in accordance with distribution targets based on agreed beneficiary numbers, ration levels, food basket composition and distribution cycles)
 - Final distribution (required output: final distributions conducted efficiently and equitably)
 - Complaints procedures (required output: a means of forwarding complaints to WFP and having them acted on agreed and in use)
 - Monitoring (required output: a reasonably sound understanding of the efficiency and effectiveness of distributions, obtained by monitoring actual distributions and conducting post-distribution household monitoring)

⁸ PRRO project document, 6 January 2000, p 12

⁹ The October 2000 SitRep to the Regional Bureau stated that 'ration phase down will continue for general distribution in favour of FFW'. This implies that FFW would be used target ongoing needs in place of GFD, which it cannot. See *FFA Guidelines* below.

Some of these outputs are examined in this chapter and some in chapter 5, *Factors in the Effectiveness and Sustainability of the PRRO*. The focus here is on WFP's attention to core responsibilities, performance against targets and the appropriateness of the set ration levels.

Core responsibilities

While relief activities have dominated PRRO 6176, the attention has tended to focus on instituting recovery activities. This is understandable given the emphasis WFP now gives to effecting a transition from relief to recovery. However, phasing down relief has almost become an end in itself and it appears to have distracted attention from fundamental tasks required to discharge WFP's core responsibility, which is to feed the hungry poor (i.e. meet assessed needs). The mission recognised that WFP also has a responsibility to assist refugees and IDPs to recover and that relief should where possible be geared to recovery. Nevertheless, the relief responsibility is primary and irreducible.

Insufficient attention to core responsibilities was identified in the following areas: registration/verification, targeting, distribution techniques and post-distribution monitoring. The mission noted that:

- Although efforts to verify refugee and IDP numbers are now underway, there was no verification leading up to the PRRO and no move to address the issue until six months into the PRRO (see *Registration and Verification* in chapter 5)
- Although progress has been made in differentiating the needs of the most food insecure, there is not yet a strategy for reaching them (see *Targeting* in chapter 5)
- Although most IP distributions are probably well organised, distributions in some camps are not, leading to a 'scramble' for food and on one occasion to a reported fatality in an IDP camp (see *Distribution Mechanisms* in chapter 5)
- Although the importance of post-distribution monitoring has been recognised by the CO and there is a commitment to introduce it, post-distribution monitoring was not undertaken in the first year other than as part of the EFNA exercises (see *Monitoring* in chapter 5).

The Uganda CO should ensure that more attention is focused under PRRO 6176 on the fundamentals of efficiently and effectively directing food assistance to those assessed as needing it, and making it possible for field staff to discharge these responsibilities. Attention to core responsibilities could be strengthened institutionally by including *relief and recovery strategies* in future PRROs, ensuring that key operational issues are addressed (including strategies for verifying beneficiary numbers, ensuring distributions are safe and equitable, reaching the most vulnerable, building recovery into relief interventions, and above all determining when to make transitions from relief to recovery activities). A relief and recovery strategy should be prepared for the next phase of PRRO 6176, founded upon renewed attention to the fundamentals of meeting assessed needs and upon a reassessment of recovery opportunities both in the context of ongoing displacement, and of resettlement/repatriation. This would include a strategy for encouraging and supporting resettlement (in the case of IDPs) and increased access to land (in the case of refugees).

Recommendations

- WFP Rome should amend the PRRO Guidelines to require a *Relief and Recovery Strategy* to ensure that core mandate responsibilities related to meeting food relief needs are planned for, including the development of strategies for verifying beneficiary numbers, ensuring distributions are safe and equitable, monitoring final distributions and reaching the most food insecure.
- The Uganda CO should define WFP's core responsibilities under PRRO 6176 and give priority to improving performance in this area. To provide guidance the Uganda CO should prepare a brief for SOs outlining WFP's core mandate responsibilities and their application to the existing phase of PRRO 6176. The increased attention to core responsibilities should be reflected in revised workplans for 2001/2.

Targets and achievements

The following table summarises projected beneficiaries and food needs for the first and second year of the PRRO.

Table 1: Projected vs actual beneficiaries

	<i>Original projection 2000/1</i>	<i>Original projection 2001/2</i>
IDPs	190,000 ¹⁰	10,000 ¹¹
Refugees	130,000	60,000 ¹²
Total beneficiaries	320,000	70,000

	<i>Actual peak (June 2000)</i>	<i>Caseload at 31 March 2001</i>
IDPs	573,440	520,522
Refugees	158,589	147,323
Total	732,029	667,845

Clearly WFP has had to care for vastly more beneficiaries than anticipated and will continue to do so – more than double the PRRO projection through the first year and nearly ten times the optimistic PRRO projection at the commencement of the second year. However, this did not equate to a doubling of commodity requirements for the first year because the projections were based on higher ration levels than were in fact provided (see Table 2 which compares PRRO targets with commodities distributed up to 31 March 2001). Thus although full rations were projected for all refugees as well as IDPs in Bundibugyo District, and three quarter rations were projected for all IDPs in Gulu and Kitgum Districts, actual ration levels were generally set well below this.

¹⁰ This includes 130,000 IDPs in Gulu and Kitgum Districts (full year) and 60,000 IDPs in Bundibugyo District (120 days only). See Annex D for more detail on original projections.

¹¹ For IDPs in the north not resettled. It was anticipated that the bulk of food support would be through recovery activities (FFW) in the second year.

¹² Those refugees not yet considered self-reliant and thus still receiving some food assistance.

Table 2: Commodity requirements and performance in the first year of PRRO 6176¹³

Original projection of commodity requirements for 2000/1	44,026.00 tons ¹⁴	
Reassessed commodity requirements for 2000/1	51,165.43 tons ¹⁵	Requirement: 116% of PRRO projection
Commodities distributed to end March 2001	38,169.84 tons ¹⁶	Performance: 74.6% of assessed requirement

Table 3 following breaks this down and summarises WFP's performance in providing commodities to its IPs for final distribution (on the basis of agreed ration requirements, beneficiary numbers and distribution cycles).¹⁷ This is essentially the same as measuring delivery to final distribution points (FDP) although it assumes no commodity losses in transportation from EDP to FDP.

The mission acknowledges that taking the operation as a whole, deliveries to FDPs against the targets set were reasonably good for the first year of the PRRO (75% overall). Nevertheless there have been significant shortcomings, most notably the 62% performance against target achieved in relation to roughly half WFP's caseload in Uganda – the IDPs in Gulu District.¹⁸ Their target rations equate to a little less than one-third of total food requirements¹⁹ so the 38% undersupply means that external food relief theoretically met no more than about 20% of total food requirements of IDPs in Gulu District (i.e. IDPs had to provide 80% themselves).

Table 3: Revised Targets vs Actual Deliveries to FDPs²⁰

IDPs		Refugees	
Gulu District		Arua District (Rhino/Imvepi)	
Cereals	68%	Cereals	88%
Pulses	44%	Pulses	91%
Oil	54%	Oil	87%
Kitgum District		Adjumani and Moyo Districts	
Cereals	80%	Cereals	99%
Pulses	70%	Pulses	83%
Oil	75%	Oil	97%
Bundibugyo District		Pader District (Achol-Pii)	
Cereals	78%	Cereals	78%

¹³ Cereals, pulses and oil only. CSB, salt and sugar not considered in this table

¹⁴ Only 11,881 tons was projected for the second year.

¹⁵ I.e. what would have been required to meet assessed need in accordance with beneficiary numbers and agreed ration scales.

¹⁶ As per data prepared for the mission by the CO

¹⁷ WFP only conducts the final distribution in Bundibugyo District, in the absence of an IP

¹⁸ 11,182,411 tons distributed against a requirement of 18,382,680 tons to provide the agreed rations to 340,420 beneficiaries for 12 months.

¹⁹ The Gulu ration is 100 gms cereals, 40 gms pulses and 10 gms oil per person per day. It is described as a 'quarter' ration because it includes a quarter of cereal requirements based on a 1,818 kcal reference, however because the proportion of pulses and oil is relatively high the ration approaches one third of total food requirements and equates to 32% of kcal requirements using 1,818 kcals as a reference (but only 28% using WHO's revised 2,100 kcal recommendation).

²⁰ This table is based on data compiled by the team contained in Annex E, Performance against Assessed Needs based on Rations Provided. Note well the assumptions.

Pulses	71%	Pulses	78%
Oil	91%	Oil	78%
		Masindi District (Kiryandongo)	
		Cereals	60%
		Pulses	65%
		Oil	79%
Unweighted averages		Unweighted averages	
Cereals	75%	Cereals	81%
Pulses	62%	Pulses	79%
Oil	73%	Oil	85%
Overall unweighted average		Overall unweighted average	
	70%		82%

The main cause of the undersupply was a pipeline break in September-October 2000 (see *Predictability and Regularity of Resources* in chapter 5), which resulted in ration cuts borne mainly by IDPs. Another factor was the phenomenon of ‘rolling undersupply’ caused by delayed completion of distributions that characterised operations through 2000, most notably in Gulu District (subsequently rectified by the CO by instituting a six-week distribution cycle). Insecurity has been and continues to be a significant factor in delayed distributions to IDPs generally. Security incidents (generally ambushes) stop operations for a period, and convoys are delayed every day awaiting a security clearance and the provision of a military escort. The outbreak of the ebola virus in Gulu District delayed the recommencement of distributions through October 2000 after the pipeline break.

Prior to the major rupture, ration cuts were sometimes made for refugees in response to stock shortages - the August 2000 JFAM drew attention to this and recommended that requests from camps should always be for the full food requirement and should not be adjusted based on what is available in the EDP warehouse or in the pipeline.

Recommendation

- WFP Rome and the Uganda CO should study the causes contributing to the PRRO 6176 pipeline break in 2000 to determine to what extent systems enhancements could be made to avoid it happening again.

Appropriateness and impact of rations

While ration levels seem to have been appropriate given apparent outcomes, setting rations below the food needs of ‘the most food insecure’ may not have been appropriate. It could be argued that WFP should align ration levels with the needs of the most food insecure, or provide different amounts to refugees and IDPs depending on their assessed need.

The apparent absence of alarming problems should not mask the fact that encamped refugees and IDPs are struggling to make ends meet under often disturbing and dangerous conditions (attacks, abductions, rape, social decay). With so much emphasis on scaling down relief distributions there is a risk of taking an overly optimistic view of people’s means. This needs to be highlighted to donors.

The PRRO reference ration

An explanation of nutritional standards and practice in Uganda is warranted. The 100% daily per capita reference ration for refugees confined to transit camps used at the commencement of the

PRRO by WFP Uganda was equivalent to 1,818 kcals per person per day.²¹ This ration was instituted in 1989 with the first big influx of refugees. In 1997, mean per capita energy requirements in emergency situations was revised upwards by the WHO to 2,100kcal.²² By this time many of the refugee beneficiaries of WFP were on reduced rations and had access to alternative sources of food. Hence, the WFP Country Office saw no basis for increasing the rations.

The August 2000 JFAM affirmed the 1,818 kcal ration as the 100% reference ration for Sudanese refugees, stating that any ration cuts would be defined in percentages of this standard. It was agreed however that new *major* influxes of refugees confined to transit camps would receive rations amounting to the higher 2,100 kcals standard (it was argued that refugees arriving in small numbers can be settled and can commence cultivation quickly).²³

The PRRO project document planned full rations for refugees and IDPs in Bundibugyo (based on the 1,818 kcal standard) and ‘three quarter’ rations for IDPs in Gulu and Kitgum Districts.²⁴ Rations have in practice ranged from full rations (some refugees and a very small number of IDPs), through ‘quarter rations’ for the vast majority of IDPs²⁵ right down to ‘last phase’ rations for refugees that only include 10 gms of oil.

Formally, rations are based on food needs assessments (incorporating food production, household income, assets and coping mechanisms) and nutrition surveys of children under five years. However, this is only true of refugee areas. In IDP areas the conduct of assessments and surveys has been uneven and a number of key decisions about rations have been based on ‘informed judgements’, as is often the case in emergency settings.

Rations for IDPs

WFP made a small reduction to the IDP ration in Gulu District in mid-1999 because the situation appeared to be improving and FFW and school feeding were being introduced. The standard became a ‘quarter’ ration.²⁶ This alteration was an informed judgement based on rough estimates of potential IDP food production, their ability to cope and anthropomorphic data. Malnutrition levels assessed by the April 1999 ACF survey were reasonable²⁷ and stable judging by admission rates to ACF feeding centres. Nevertheless a ‘quarter’ ration is cutting it very fine and leaves no margin for error in the event that IDPs own means are inadequate. The mission understands that insecurity has indeed disrupted access to fields during some periods.

Higher rations were maintained in neighbouring Kitgum District because IDPs generally had less access to fields, potable water or sanitation (thus less food and a higher disease rate). The standard ration was described as a ‘half’ ration.²⁸ In the three camps bordering Sudan, a higher ration was provided because they had virtually no access to land.²⁹ Malnutrition levels assessed by the April

²¹ 450 gms of maize grain or 400 gms of maize meal, 60 gms of pulses, 20 gms of edible oil and 5 gms of salt

²² Assuming standard population distribution, body size, warm climate, pre-emergency nutritional status and physically light activity

²³ EFNA has incorporated 2,100kcal in its calculation of food gaps for refugee, refugee hosting areas and IDP camps

²⁴ 300 gms of maize grain, 60 gms of pulses and 15 gms of oil

²⁵ 100 gms of maize, 40 gms of pulses and 10 gms of oil

²⁶ See earlier footnote for full description of ration. It replaced a monthly family ration of 25 kgs of cereals, 3.7 kgs of pulses and 1.65 kgs of oil (i.e. somewhat less than a half ration).

²⁷ 6.4% and 4.9% global acute malnutrition based on Z-score (camps with and without health facilities respectively)

²⁸ Includes 200 gms of cereals, with 30 gms of pulses and 10 gms of oil.

²⁹ 400 gms of cereals, 60 gms of pulses and 20 gms of oil per person per day.

1999 ACF survey were slightly higher than in Gulu District.³⁰ Much of the malnutrition is linked to poor hygiene/sanitation rather than external food needs.

The respective rations for Gulu and Kitgum Districts described above were in place when the PRRO commenced and were still in place when the evaluation took place (with the exceptions of reductions made in September-October due to the pipeline rupture and some seasonal variations in 2001).

The PRRO project document projected full rations for IDPs in Bundibugyo District but when the PRRO commenced the rations were reduced from full to ‘half’ rations³¹ on the basis that IDPs had some access to their farms (sometimes under the escort of soldiers) and could harvest perennial crops including bananas and cassava. Joint household assessments were conducted with UNICEF and OCHA and data from ICRC and MSF was used. The October 1999 MSF health and nutrition survey suggested low malnutrition³² but indicated a high <5 mortality rate believed to be due to malaria, dysentery and possibly cholera. WFP agreed to include CSB in the ration for a period to counterbalance the micronutrient deficiencies caused by the diseases and to assist the children. Oil was withdrawn from the Bundibugyo food basket in August 2000 on the basis that local palm oil was readily available.

(See also *Targeting Conundrums* in chapter 5).

Rations regimes for refugees

Following a JFAM conducted in 1998 under the PRO, guidelines were put into place to outline the method to be followed in making ration cuts. It was agreed that settlements meeting 50% of their food needs would be phased down systematically. A 20% ration cut in cereals was suggested every six months to allow beneficiaries enough time to use some of the harvest to meet their needs. The 20% ration cut in cereals was viewed as a strategy to curb dependency and act as an incentive to beneficiaries to aspire to produce more. Based on this formula rations could be phased out over three years. Cuts were only to be instituted each season if favourable weather conditions and average production levels were achieved. The following *indicative* scale was developed for phase downs.

Table 4: Phase downs in Adjumani/Moyo as a percentage of 100% reference ration

Phase	Cereals	Pulses	Oil
1	100	100	100
2	80	100	100
3	50	100	100
4	50	50	50
5	25	50	50
6	0	0	50
7	0	0	0

Actual phasing has generally followed subsequent JFAM recommendations. Two successful harvests has been the eligibility criteria for communities to be considered for phase-down. The rationale for phasing down in settlements with arable land at their disposal has been to spur them to open more land, cultivate more and thereby increase productivity. In Moyo/Adjumani, AAH, UNHCR and WFP believe that this strategy is effective.

³⁰ 7% acute global malnutrition (Z-score) in comparison with 6.7% in the surrounding villages.

³¹ 200 gms maize, 30 gms pulses, 10 gms oil per person per day

³² 2.6%

In some instances WFP and UNHCR have provided one-off distributions for refugees whose rations had been discontinued as a 'bridging' tool, enabling refugees already on the road to recovery to maintain the momentum towards self-reliance during hard times (caused, for example, by adverse weather conditions, insecurity). This is a sensible arrangement.

For WFP and other agencies responding to communities in such a transitional mode between food security and insecurity, it is crucial to address the mid-term and longer-term recovery elements (e.g. through distribution of agricultural inputs, restocking etc.), rather than provide a contingency ration only and expect the communities to have the means to address the causes of the acute food insecurity. While such interventions are beyond WFP capacity, the CO should play an advocacy role to ensure that a sustained effort is made to meet non-food needs.

Note that salt has only been provided to refugees on a full ration because a family that is partially self-sufficient is presumed to be able to access salt locally and iodine deficiency has not been a problem (no known goitre cases). Salt has recently been removed other than for new arrivals.

Rations for heavy physical activity

The WHO recommends 2,700 kcals for *heavy* physical activity (2,100 kcals assumes light physical activity). The majority of WFP's beneficiaries cultivate, which is seasonally arduous. No allowance is made for this, nor is any allowance made for the needs of adolescents. The 2000 JFAM recommended 2,700 kcals for specific population groups including unaccompanied adolescent boys but UNHCR, WFP, OPM and IPs determined this to be too complex to implement in the context of phase downs and the SRS.

Nutritional impact³³

Maintaining nutrition is one of WFP's main operational objectives but it is difficult to monitor. Weight for height data is an important tool but it is backward looking (it takes some time for inadequate nutrition to show up in this way). Nevertheless positive assumptions can be made about the impact of WFP's assistance if nutrition outcomes are stable or improving from survey to survey, although it has to be recognised that it is difficult to isolate the impact of food aid on nutritional status from other factors including health and caring practices.

It also needs to be borne in mind that WFP is in most cases providing only modest rations so impact should not be overstated, even if the rations provided do make a critical difference. Most refugees and IDPs are expected to meet most of their food needs themselves.

Nutrition surveys conducted mainly for refugees show a relatively satisfactory situation throughout the first year of the PRRO, with the exception of Achol-Pii where the W/H Z score reached 10% in late 2000 and remains at this level. This caseload is on 100% rations and although there have been some supply problems it is believed that non-food factors other than the ration are involved (health status and low vaccination coverage). WFP's IP, IRC, has brought in a nutritionist from the US to investigate. It is also evident from nutrition survey reports prepared by ACF/AHA in Adjumani District in April and December 2000 that nutritional status over time does not necessarily correlate with rations provided.

Recommendations

- The Uganda CO should in future fully document all decisions and assumptions related to the setting of rations, providing references to key documents (e.g. WFP rapid assessment, NGO nutrition survey, etc).

³³ See also chapter 5, *Monitoring Nutritional Status* and Table 7, *Nutrition Survey Results*

- The Uganda CO should establish the WHO recommended reference ration of 2,100 kcals per person per day in the next phase of the PRRO (replacing the existing 1,818 kcals).
- The Uganda CO should consider establishing the WHO recommended 2,700 kcals per day ration for heavy physical activity, as well as providing for the additional needs of adolescents, in the next phase of the PRRO.

Unintended Effects and Impact

Food relief is unlikely to be a disincentive to production considering that WFP is only providing a narrow range of commodities, which are often not preferred foods (eg no millet) and in most cases only a partial ration. To the extent that rations are being sold by refugees and IDPs and these commodities are competing with local production WFP's assistance may be having a disincentive effect on production. However, the competition between relief commodities sold and local production is probably not great given that it is mainly pulses and oil that are sold which are different to the local product and also given that the refugees and IDPs spend the proceeds locally, often on produce.

There is possibly a risk that the emphasis on phasing down rations unintentionally interferes with the higher objective of meeting minimum nutrition requirements as defined by WHO – both WFP and UNHCR have to guard against this in part by ensuring staff are never hesitant to champion the need to maintain rations.

5. ACHIEVEMENT OF RECOVERY OBJECTIVES

Objectives

The stated recovery objectives are:

*To promote resettlement and create short and long term-term employment opportunities leading to self-reliance and food self-sufficiency; and To provide incentives for the poor and food insecure to attend vocational training and to become self-supportive.*³⁴

Planned outputs

The recovery activities that were planned assumed the resettlement of IDPs. Outputs directly linked to resettlement were to include provision of:

- Basic infrastructure (rehabilitation/rebuilding)
- Agricultural inputs (\$530,000 budgeted for agricultural tools and equipment)
- Three-month resettlement package
- Food safety net (during resettlement while general food distribution is being phased)
- FFW opportunities (during the off-farm season), training for employment, and the creation of physical and human assets.³⁵

³⁴ The mission suggests the following purpose statement for the next phase: *To contribute to the self-reliance of IDPs and refugees (whether in the context of encampment or resettlement/rehabilitation) through the implementation of projects utilising food and other resources to create social, economic and human assets.*

³⁵ See further Annex D, Original Estimate of Food Aid Requirements.

School feeding was included as a major intervention (discussed in detail below) as was supplementary and therapeutic feeding, and assistance to demobilised combatants and former abducted children, returnees from DRC, malnourished children, expectant and nursing mothers and orphans. Reference is also made to supporting the initiatives of IPs, supporting HIV/AIDS interventions, and advocating access to land for refugees and IDP resettlement.

There is a strong emphasis in the project document on women with 65-70% of recovery activities targeting primarily poor or disadvantaged women. Activities specifically targeting women are to include nursery establishment, tree planting and maintenance, seed/cassava multiplication, functional literacy and formation, and training of women's farming/trading associations in food production, fish farming and food storage, processing and marketing.

Targets and achievements by mid-term

The first part of Table 5 records projected beneficiaries and commodities by activity by year.³⁶ The second part, recording achievements, is information provided by the CO.

Table 5: Projected vs actual beneficiaries and commodities utilised³⁷

Activity	Beneficiaries	
	Original projection 2000/1 ³⁸	Original projection 2001/2
Rehabilitation/FFW	60,000	80,000
Food for training	6,000	14,000
MCH	6,000	6,000
Abandoned/orphans; Returnees/abductees	6,000	5,000
School children	100,000	150,000
Total beneficiaries	178,000	255,000
Projected commodities	11,259 tons	15,562 tons

	Reported number of beneficiaries 2000/1	Planned vs actual beneficiaries (%)	Planned vs actual commodities (%)
Rehabilitation/FFW	82,168	137%	29%
Food for training	10,455	174%	15%
Therapeutic & supplementary feeding; MCH	18,897	315%	No target data
Abandoned/orphans Returnees/abductees	24,391	407%	57%
School children	73,803	74%	27%
Total beneficiaries	209,714	118%	28%
Commodities utilised	3,123 tons ³⁹		

Neither the PRRO project document nor the workplans have suitable output level statements (eg increased production of fish in the case of fishponds or increased access to services and markets in

³⁶ See further Annex D, Original Estimate of Food Aid Requirements.

³⁷ See further Annex E, Performance Against Assessed Need based on Rations Provided.

³⁸ Up to 31 March 2001

³⁹ Projected by the mission on the basis that 2,421.621 tons of cereals reported utilised (multiplied by 29%).

the case of roads), which makes it difficult to monitor and evaluate outcomes. Benchmarks by which to measure recovery or the attainment of self-reliance are absent, reflecting shortcomings in both WFP's planning and in the GoU/UNHCR Self-Reliance Strategy. Field staff regularly visited FFW sites but results were not assessed and it is not clear from reports what has really been achieved – for example reporting the number of fish ponds constructed gives no hint that they were not stocked with fish, and reporting the number of bricks burned for schools gives no hint that in many cases the bricks were not used because NFIs were not provided. While it is difficult to gauge the impact of recovery activities, it is apparent that the PRRO has fallen short of intentions in the first year (for reasons discussed in detail below).

School feeding

The stated objective is:

To increase school enrolment and literacy rates, particularly for women/girls⁴⁰

School feeding is a valuable component of the PRRO, although a lot is involved in setting it up, supervising implementation and expanding coverage. This is pushing SOs/FOs to reallocate staff resources, which risks compromising attention to existing core tasks. Overall, participating students are 74% of the initial target set for the first year, but commodities utilised are just 27% of the initial target. Progress has been reasonable in Gulu and Kitgum District and schools are operational. School feeding is yet to commence in West Nile and Bundibugyo District but needs assessments have been undertaken and schools identified.⁴¹ An interagency task force has been established in each district in West Nile to identify strategies for implementation.

In both Kitgum and Gulu the schools presently supported are in IDP camps, although some non-IDP children attend them. Under the planned expansion (early 2002) non-IDP camp schools will also be supported. The schools proposed for support in Bundibugyo are not all IDP camp based schools. If there is no necessary connection with IDP or refugee children it may be advisable to move the school feeding into the Country Programme (see *Programmatic linkages and sustainability*). If school feeding remains in the PRRO it should be integrated into the recovery strategy. Wherever it is located there is a need for more attention to the sustainability of the school feeding initiative and for a phase out strategy.

The target for male/female retention is 50:50. Overall, the achievements in terms of enrolment and attendance are sound.

The usual problems of a few teachers diverting food are present and need to be addressed firmly. Some teachers are selling food to pay cooks. Shortages of utensils have meant that children are sometimes fed in shifts, some after school.

School feeding could have an unintended impact on the functioning of classes. The CO needs to closely monitor, and pace expansion with the ability of the MOE/districts to accommodate increased enrolment through the construction of classrooms, latrines, wells, and provision of teachers to maintain a reasonable teacher/student ratio.

It is also necessary to develop a standard reporting format for schools and IPs; to review the merits of girl rations for those areas where attendance is low; and to bring together baseline data for existing schools and collect it for new schools.

⁴⁰ Other statements of intent appear in the PRRO project document including: 'Improve the nutrition and cognitive performance of children while they are learning'.

⁴¹ See Draft School Feeding Needs Assessment Report from the West Nile Region, Uganda (April 2001).

There is no formal agreement with the government on including school-feeding in the PRRO. This should be rectified.

(See also chapter 7, *Environmental Impact*.)

Recommendations

- In the context of the School Feeding Initiative, HQ should design a standard form to capture baseline data and standard reporting formats for schools and IPs. Attendance data should be disaggregated between lower and higher grades to track the retention of girls throughout primary school.
- The expansion of school feeding should be based on a) an overall strategy in the district concerned; b) the capacity of SO staff to monitor the intervention; and c) the capacity of the local government to accommodate the expansion of school feeding (setting up management systems, providing extra teachers and facilities as enrolment increases, etc.). In addition, baseline data should be collected on the schools currently in the pilot and any which are added.
- If school feeding remains in the PRRO (and is not taken into the Country Programme) it should be integrated into the PRRO recovery strategy. In doing so the Uganda CO should address the issue of the sustainability of the school feeding programme and develop a phase out strategy.

Therapeutic and supplementary feeding/MCH

The PRRO project document stated several reasons for including these forms of assistance, including a) improving the nutritional status of mothers and children, and b) encouraging women and children to seek proper medical attention, attend basic training in health and nutrition and to sustain them while they are patients.

The overall target was set at 6,000 malnourished children and expectant or nursing mothers. Beneficiary targets were greatly exceeded according to WFP data (315%). Unfortunately the PRRO design provides no target for the utilisation of commodities, which is a more reliable measure of quantitative performance.

In addition to providing food to feeding centres, food was provided to hospitals for inpatients during the ebola outbreak, and for patients with sleeping sickness and TB. The mission visited Lacor Hospital in Gulu, which is clearly a valuable and well-run institution.

All supplementary feeding for refugees ended on April 1, 2001 and only small quantities are now required for therapeutic and supplementary centres in IDPs areas.

Institutional feeding (abandoned/orphaned/abductees/returnees)

The original plan was to provide food to some 3,000 children living in orphanages and other institutions where basic education and vocational skills are being provided, and to 3,000 returnees from the DRC, demobilized combatants and traumatized children/abductees.

The beneficiary target was greatly exceeded (407%) but the commodity utilisation target was not (57%). The mission visited WVI's trauma centre in Gulu and found it to be a well run institution worthy of continued support.

Milling

WFP is obliged under the global MoU with UNHCR to provide milled food to refugees. Rather

than provide milled cereals the UN has run mills in West Nile for many years. However, they were poorly managed and maintained and WFP undertook to have the engines repaired and to support the training of IGA milling groups (basic business and mechanical training). There have clearly been delays in the repair and reinstallation of the engines, but progress is being made. Training of milling groups is proceeding although not quite on target. Some earmarked funds have become unavailable (see *Adequacy and flexibility of the PRRO budget* in chapter 5). Not surprisingly, assigning mill management to new groups in the community is proving a challenge.

Two milling groups visited in Rhino camp became operational in January 2001, prior to which training in basic business skills was provided to a milling committee and mechanical training for mill operators. Both mills are run as income generating activities by a milling committee of 10-11 members of mixed nationals and refugees, and operated on commercial business terms. Based on interviews with committee chairmen and mill operators, the mission believes the mills are providing an essential service to the community as well as generating a considerable income to the milling committee members. Though the training provided is enabling mill operators and committee members to perform basic repairs, maintenance and book keeping, sustainability of the mills is difficult to assess, as mills are largely dependant on spare parts being brought in from Kampala, and on WFP food basket inputs of maize grains.

In Achol-Pii, three mills have been rehabilitated and returned to the field in March 2001. However, IRC has not yet repaired the mill houses and reinstalled the repaired mills. Three milling groups have been selected and Basic Business Skills Training proposal has been submitted to the CO for budget approval.

Food-for-Work and Food-for-Training

It is intended that FFW and FFT be utilised to assist in the resettlement of IDPs and in the promotion of the self-reliance of refugees. However, the IDPs were not able to resettle and the SOs found it difficult to generate FFW activities for encamped populations of IDPs or refugees. As a result the SOs have tended to support projects put forward for or by non-IDP and non-refugee populations. The concentration on non-IDP populations is questionable given the stated objectives of the PRRO. In refugee hosting areas it is appropriate to integrate the host population in FFW activities but not to concentrate on them. In West Nile the majority of FFW activities have involved nationals and quite a few have been located in areas remote from refugee settlements or camps.

FFW and FFT were reformulated as Food-For-Assets during the first year of the PRRO, in line with WFP policy. FFT was in principle well suited to the encamped context. But the creation of physical assets was problematic – opportunities are limited and IDPs are reluctant to invest in assets they can't take home.

In the first year of the PRRO the number of FFW and FFT beneficiaries exceeded the projection (137% and 174% respectively) but the quantity of food utilised was well under target (29% and 15% respectively). One FFW project in Gulu District (the Oitino road, bridge and dam project) consumed half the commodities utilised in that district. A summary of FFW and FFT activities undertaken in the first year of the PRRO is contained in Annex F.

Some of the FFW activities have been of considerable value to beneficiaries (rehabilitated valley dams) but others have been poorly conceived. In many cases intended beneficiaries clearly indicated that the benefit of the project in question derived not from the asset, but from the food distributed. In some cases, communities view FFW simply as '*lejaleja*' (casual labour). For example, in Imvepi camp respondents made it clear that they perceive the beneficiaries of a FFW

road to be the workers who received the food. Some refugees believe FFW is intended to mitigate the effects of ration reductions, which upsets those who can't work and feel excluded from assistance.

Projects have often been undermined by a lack of matching inputs supposed to have been provided by others (e.g. fish fry to stock fishponds, NFIs to go with bricks burned to construct schools). The Bundibugyo SO has been further hampered by the lack of an IP.

FFT offers some potential to enhance the productiveness of refugees and IDPs (e.g. training in innovative agricultural techniques) and UNHCR is funding some NGOs to pursue this. The challenge is to come up with training that is of real interest to IDPs and refugees. In terms of the need for WFP assistance in this area it should be recognised that if training taps a strong demand, a food incentive may become unnecessary.

FFW/FFA projects lend themselves to being conducted in conjunction with others but FFW has, by and large, been perceived to be a WFP matter, and partnership opportunities have not been maximized.

In general, FFW projects started out being supply and policy driven – SOs had to proceed with FFW activities, with relatively little guidance. WFP Uganda staff recognise the weaknesses of the FFW approach undertaken over the past year and the role lack of guidance played in this. A number of staff told the mission that the first year was a 'learning' period. The CO has halted any new activities pending the preparation of comprehensive FFA guidelines for the country.

Appropriately, the CO's draft FFA guidelines emphasise the asset and not the food transferred (although FFA will only be warranted in the context of food insecurity). This is important because it indicates that FFA will not be treated as a means of phasing out of GFD, either to bridge a remaining food gap or to assist the most food insecure. FFA is not an efficient way of meeting substantial food gaps in a large population because it is extremely difficult to organise and supervise effective recovery activities en masse. The focus on the asset will help ensure that FFA activities are developmentally sound.

More caution is warranted for future recovery activities in the use of food as an incentive. In Pabbo IDP Camp, Gulu District many people agreed to plant seedlings because they were given food for doing so – but very few were maintained after planting. With hindsight the IP described the food as a hindrance in this case because it masked people's intentions. Food incentives may appear to be an effective way of mobilising a community, but attention should be paid to the risk that it will undermine community development (and thus recovery) processes.

Recommendations

- The Relief and Recovery Strategy for the next phase of the PRRO should provide more guidance on how to build recovery into relief interventions, and how to determine when to make the transition from relief to recovery activities given different scenarios. The strategy should define what 'recovery' means for each target population and be sensitive to the need for matching NFIs.
- WFP's Programme Design Manual does not yet provide much needed guidance to the field on designing and implementing FFA projects. ODA should give priority to developing and distributing corporate guidelines on FFA.
- In the interim, the WFP Uganda FFA Guidelines should be finalised and released as a matter of urgency. They should emphasise the asset and not the food transferred.
- The mission agrees that no new FFA activities should be initiated under PRRO 6176 until the guidelines are in place, although works that have been started should be

completed (including the Oitino project) and commitments to partners should be honoured (e.g. to nursery establishment in Pabbo Camp).

- The principal beneficiaries of PRRO 6176 FFA should be IDPs and refugees, although it is acknowledged that in the case of refugees, the host population should be integrated in these activities and also benefit.
- The Bundibugyo SO should not undertake any additional FFA projects until a suitable IP can be identified.
- The Uganda CO should obtain examples of FFA technical standards developed by other COs and IPs, and adapt these for use in Uganda in consultation with district counterparts, beneficiaries and IPs. The Uganda CO should then organize training to provide guidance to IPs on the planning process, design, technical standards and material requirements.

FFA in the context of an IDP resettlement plan

If IDPs begin to resettle in substantial numbers they will initially have a very considerable labour burden and it would not be appropriate to involve them in FFA activities immediately, certainly not on a large scale. In the north, resettlement would ideally take place late or early in the year when grass is available for thatching. Next, returning IDPs would concentrate on opening their gardens and planting the first crop. Thus FFA could not be implemented until several months after resettlement commenced. This would give WFP adequate time to consult and plan.

Returning IDPs could be given a 'bye bye' package of food. Realistically, they will probably need food until they can re-establish a reasonable level of agricultural production, which means at least one season. These food needs should be met by a general distribution of a partial ration (depending on assessed need). This assistance could be termed 'Food for Recovery'.

Public assets including schools, health centres and access roads will require significant repair if not replacement. WFP should consider playing a key role in the rehabilitation of such assets. If WFP incorporates this approach in future strategies it will be critical to attend to the issue of the required matching NFIs (iron sheets, cement, steel rods, culverts or culvert moulds, etc). The more control WFP has over the supply of NFIs the better. This could be achieved by using cash resources to purchase NFIs and/or by entering into MoUs with other UN agencies and/or NGOs.

As long as there is uncertainty about resettlement, opportunities to help IDPs prepare for resettlement by supporting FFA in their home areas will have to be identified in the context of a framework agreement with the district authorities.

Recommendations

- In preparing for the next phase of the PRRO, the Uganda CO should incorporate in its planning ongoing assistance for a defined period, at least for some IDPs. This may include continued GFD until a first harvest for resettled IDPs (labelled as 'Food for Recovery'), special assistance for EVIs, and ongoing support for certain institutions (e.g. former abductees).
- The Uganda CO should also prepare to play a key role in the rehabilitation of public assets including schools, health centres and access roads and attend to the issue of the matching NFIs required. Utilising FFA for these assets could be differentiated from the assets envisaged in the FFA guidelines by labelling it FFCA - 'Food for Community Assets'.

Outstanding challenges

Self-reliance strategy for refugees

Although WFP activities in refugee-hosting areas are explicitly linked to the Self-Reliance Strategy (discussed above), this linkage is weak at the operational level and needs to be strengthened. The problem is related to the lack of clarity and detail in the SRS. As with WFP's recovery strategy, the SRS at times appears to 'will' self-reliance without concretising this notion. This is unfortunate, as there are a number of areas in which the comparative advantages of WFP and UNHCR could be combined to maximise impacts. One arena in which such opportunities exist is in the domain of increasing agricultural productivity, where both organizations have been running similar, but often parallel, activities.

A related weakness of the SRS is the lack of clarity about the conditions for self-reliance. Access to land is recognised as being key (0.3 hectares per person is allocated) but more guidance and exactness is required. Moreover, the definition 'refugee hosting area' in the SRS needs to be tightened up to assist programming. It should refer to directly affected populations (i.e. where there is a competition for resources).

Recommendation

- The Uganda CO should develop with UNHCR and OPM a definition of a 'refugee hosting area' allowing WFP to focus its recovery interventions in areas populated by refugees. Once defined, both refugees and nationals could be embraced by WFP FFA interventions.

Resettlement of IDPs

WFP staff involved in the development of EFNA stressed to the mission in their presentation that:

'The conditions for population encampment and the strategy within which food aid is applied to sustain the IDP camps MUST be revisited among humanitarian agencies, donors and policy makers' and 'It is imperative that food aid should remain neutral and facilitate the conditions for peace and return of the IDP population to their villages'.

WFP is operating within a static framework within which the intentions of government are unclear and there are no firm resettlement plans. FOs/SOs are involved in an ongoing dialogue with district authorities about peace and resettlement – for example the head of the FO in Kitgum is an active member of the Joint Forum for Peace chaired by the Resident District Commissioner. However, WFP needs to be even more proactive at both the district and national levels, setting its sights on an agreed framework for resettlement. While it may be difficult to determine exactly what approach (and what risks) WFP should take, it is abundantly clear that the status quo is unsatisfactory. People are suffering, opportunities for recovery are being lost, and there is even a risk that WFP will be caught off-guard by a request to support a resettlement (or 'decongestion') plan which is not in the interests of the people concerned.

WFP cannot 'go it alone' given that resettlement involves security issues, requires high-level central government support, is easily politicised at the district level, and will require strong support for non-food items (NFIs). Strong leadership is required from within the UN system in Uganda, both to advocate more urgent consideration of resettlement, and to coordinate the funding and allocation of material inputs. Given its IDP mandate, OCHA would appear to have an important coordination role to play. WFP has provided considerable support to OCHA and should continue to do so.

It is entirely possible that despite everyone's best efforts the 'green light' will not or cannot be given to resettlement. Under these circumstances WFP and others will be left to 'push the boundaries' of assisting IDPs to resettle on a camp by camp basis. Some NGOs are currently operating in this manner. Even if a green light is given, it will not necessarily result in everyone immediately going home – it is not that simple. It will depend on what they have (or don't have) to go home to, what assistance is offered, the time of year in relation to the agricultural cycle, etc. Moreover, a 'bye bye' resettlement package may not be adequate for those that do leave the camps - ongoing food assistance may be required, at least for the duration of an agricultural production cycle. (See above *FFA in the context of an IDP resettlement plan*).

Recommendations

- The Uganda CO should participate in GoU and donor forums where resettlement is discussed and promote the need to develop a framework for resettlement involving government, UN agencies, donors and NGOs, and for contingency plans and funding to be put in place. In addition, the Uganda CO should advocate in the appropriate forum that an IDP coordinator be appointed (possibly an OCHA representative).
- The formulation of a Relief and Recovery Strategy for PRRO 6176 should include careful consideration of what type of IDP resettlement plan would be in the interests of the people and what type of plan WFP should promote and support.
- In the event that IDPs do 'decongest' (eg Pabbo Camp in Gulu) WFP should be receptive to providing rations directly to them rather than expecting them to return to the 'mother' camp for distributions.

Local Procurement

Local purchase is conducted by the Uganda CO on a significant scale and CP 6100, the Agriculture and Marketing Support Project, works to build capacity of small farmer associations who participate in WFP tender processes. This project has proved very complementary to PRRO 6176, during the first year of which 33% of cereals and 37% of pulses were procured within Uganda. A total of 6% of this was procured from local farmers in or near areas of operation (as opposed to commercial suppliers). The PRRO project document mentions encouraging local purchase to increase efficiency but doesn't make the link to recovery. Nevertheless, market support through local purchases is clearly an important recovery activity⁴² and the mission learned that there is widespread support for local purchase from district authorities in operational areas.

Recommendation

- Any project extension to PRRO 6176 should clearly outline the support expected through CP 6100 and include a local purchase strategy, setting realistic targets in terms of procurement from local farmers in the geographic areas covered by PRRO 6176. As part of this strategy, the CO should consider making concessions to local farmers (in terms of UN procurement standards). WFP may have to lift its restrictions on purchases of small quantities and accept more inconvenience (within reasonable bounds) in order to increase local purchases.

Amnesty Commission

The Uganda CO appears to be prepared to accept a request for assistance from the Amnesty Commission to feed 'reporters' (former rebels) while they are being held prior to release into the

⁴² See *From Crisis to Recovery*, WFP, paragraph 52

community. In principle this type of support for the peace process would be appropriate but there are risks because WFP does not have the mandate or expertise to vet the amnesty process and in particular the treatment of reporters. Under these circumstances it would be prudent to ‘stand behind’ ICRC or another organisation or agency that could satisfactorily monitor the process.

6. FACTORS IN THE EFFECTIVENESS AND SUSTAINABILITY OF THE PRRO

Registration and verification of refugees and IDP

Initial registration is principally the government’s responsibility although not solely in the case of refugees where UNHCR has a mandate responsibility. WFP’s role in practice is to assist with registration where asked. If not involved in the registration of IDPs, WFP has a responsibility to verify the numbers put forward to ensure food relief needs are being met and food is not wasted. This task can be contracted to an IP but WFP should be engaged in the count.

Registration/verification has not been adequately prioritised by UNHCR or WFP until recently. This is ‘core business’ and more effort should have been made earlier on to ensure refugee and IDP numbers were reasonably accurate.

Overall, refugee and IDP numbers in Uganda are evidently inflated (the count that is proceeding in Gulu District is confirming this) although there may be some instances where the opposite is true, most notably in IDP camps Kitgum District (discussed below).

Table 6: Registered refugees and IDPs as at 31 March 2001

<i>Refugees</i>		<i>IDPs</i>	
Arua District (Rhino/Imvepi)	52,658	Gulu District	340,420
Moyo District	13,848	Kitgum District	82,645
Adjumani District	47,284	Bundibugyo District	97,457
Pader District (Achol-Pii)	25,754		
Masindi District (Kiryandongo)	7,779		
Totals	147,323		520,522

Refugees

There has been no census of Sudanese refugees since 1997, although WFP has advocated for one and the August 2000 JFAM recommended it be undertaken before the end of 2000. It is not clear what has delayed the census for so long (UNHCR attributes this situation to a combination of insecurity and lack of funds). A GoU/UNHCR/WFP task force has now been formed and a census should take place in mid-2001. Achol-Pii refugee camp is reported to have the most inflated figure (it is officially around 26,000 but believed to be several thousand less). On the other hand, the mission was told in Kiryandongo that there are 5,500 unregistered refugees. The August 2000 JFAM recommended that the status of the ‘non-registered’ Kiryandongo caseload be determined and the mission supports this. If the majority are registered refugees from Achol-Pii as the CO believes, there may be a protection issue to assess given the relatively poor security status of that settlement (there was a massacre of over 100 refugees in Achol-Pii in 1999 by the LRA and a number of incidences and alarms since).

IDPs in Gulu District

The planning figure for general rations in Gulu District has stood at 340,420⁴³ since the PRRO commenced and the last registration was in 1998. WFP encouraged the IP to verify the numbers but the exercise was put off due to the ebola epidemic and only recommenced in late March 2001. It is going well and due for completion soon (17 camps had been completed by 21 June with an overall reduction of approx. 50,000).⁴⁴ Appropriately, given that the Acholi are polygamous, NRC is treating a woman and her children as the basic social unit and heading family lists with women (men are included under one of their wives).

WFP was initially asked to assist 20 IDP camps in Gulu District (before the commencement of the PRRO) but since 1999 WFP has occasionally been requested by camp representatives and district officials to assist IDPs in a number of 'unofficial' camps (of which there are 13 in total). The SO did make an assessment of one camp (Purongo, population approx. 5,000) in October 1999. The report was not published but it was apparently agreed to provide a one-off 30-day distribution to three unofficial camps - Purongo, Agung and Wii-Lawora, and to subsequently monitor them. The one-off distribution was not effected until April 2000.

The EFNA fieldwork conducted in October 2000 visited Unyama, one of the camps not assisted by WFP, apparently as a control. It was assessed as not needing assistance because the IDPs had relatively good access to their gardens and in discussions with district counterparts it was agreed that none of the other 12 unofficial camps needed assistance or could be assisted. The approach and outcome are somewhat questionable and EFNA should have included visits to a sample of the 13 unofficial camps to properly determine if any assistance was warranted or not. The issue had not been resolved at the time of the mission's visit to Gulu.

The mission's conclusion, based on staff interviews and a review of the files, is that WFP has not satisfactorily responded to requests for assistance to the additional IDP camps by assessing needs and addressing them accordingly.

IDPs in Kitgum and Bundibugyo Districts

The number of IDPs in Kitgum District (over 82,000) originates from a 1997 estimate, however many more people share the rations distributed than are registered (camp officials claim a total IDP population of over 124,000). The District's view, shared by the SO, is that the level of food assistance is appropriate and that verification should not be conducted because it will lead to higher numbers. This is an unsatisfactory position and should be reconsidered, if only because some recipients are relying on the charity of those registered many years ago. Generally, the CO needs to make it plain that needs are paramount over the phasing down of rations.

The IDP numbers in Bundibugyo are said to be inflated. An NGO working in Bundibugyo District has helpfully prepared a matrix showing the IDP estimates, by camp, of four operational agencies (including WFP). They are startlingly different with no apparent pattern to the differences. A verification exercise is clearly required - the SO is pursuing this with the District Disaster Management Committee (DDMC).

Another matter that needs to be resolved is capturing the movement of IDPs between camps in Bundibugyo District. It is known that rations are being 'eroded' in some camps by increased numbers as IDPs move between camps.

⁴³ Or 370,781 beneficiaries for all food uses, with a slight drop since February 2001

⁴⁴ The mission was informed that IOM is also planning to count IDPs in Kitgum and Gulu.

Recommendations

- The Uganda CO should ensure that a reasonably accurate estimate of beneficiary numbers is attained and maintained. A strategy for achieving this should be included in the PRRO Relief and Recovery Strategy.
- The Uganda CO should continue to advocate for and invest in the registration of refugees and verification of all IDP numbers. Verification of IDPs should be conducted in close collaboration with district authorities through DDMCs. IPs may be contracted to conduct verification but the SO/FO should remain directly engaged in the count.
- The Gulu SO should approach the District on the issue of the 13 ‘unofficial’ camps, stressing that eligibility for WFP assistance is assessed need, not displacement or residence in a camp. WFP should propose that the needs in each camp be assessed first, followed by a count of those requiring assistance.
- The Kitgum FO should propose to the District that a verification be conducted of all IDPs, whether ‘official’ or not. The standard IDP ration for Kitgum District could then be reset based on reassessed need, possibly bringing it into line with Gulu District if the food needs are indeed similar.
- The Bundibugyo SO should continue to advocate for a verification of all camps, taking this forward through the DDMC. The mobility of IDPs between camps should be encouraged if it assists them to move closer to their original homes. To facilitate this, appropriate arrangements should be made for deregistering and reregistering IDPs as they move.

Assessments and surveys

WFP needs a reasonably good understanding of vulnerability, food gaps and nutritional status for food relief programming purposes. In Uganda, like elsewhere, the ‘architecture’ for doing so is more developed for refugee than IDP caseloads and includes annual Joint Food Needs Assessment Missions (JFAMs) with UNHCR and the GoU, and biannual nutrition surveys conducted by ACF-USA under contract to UNHCR.

WFP Uganda’s capacity to assess the food needs of both IDP and refugee caseloads has been strengthened recently with the development of the Emergency Food Needs Assessment methodology (EFNA) by the CO and the Regional VAM Office in collaboration with WFP’s counterpart, the Office of the Prime Minister, as well as UNHCR, FAO and several NGOs. It is essentially a hybrid household food economy model with a focus on building assessment capacity.

All nutrition surveys and food needs assessments conducted during the first year of the PRRO are listed in Annex G.

JFAMs

Joint GoU/UNHCR/WFP Food Assessment Missions (JFAMs) are conducted for the Sudanese refugee caseload each year a couple of months after the first harvest to assess food (and food related) needs and recommend ration levels. The 2000 JFAM (which was conducted in early August) focused on the feasibility and appropriateness of continued ration cuts in the context of potential refugee food production and income generation. A ‘mini JFAM’ was conducted at the Country/Field level in February 2001 to follow-up on developments in the second season and recommend appropriate measures (including possible ration reductions).

JFAM missions have always been unable to assess Achol-Pii due to insecurity at the time. The evaluation mission was also unable to visit after all UN travel was halted within Kitgum and Pader

Districts when the military escort accompanying a convoy including IOM trucks transporting WFP food was fired on at Acholi Bur (south of Kitgum).

There is no equivalent of the JFAM for IDPs, essentially because no operational UN agency is mandated to care for IDPs. The mission recommends that WFP seek to introduce a JFAM for IDPs by developing its partnership with OCHA, which although not operational has a mandate for coordinating efforts to assist IDPs. OCHA should be asked to participate in regular joint assessments (but not leading and initially seconding only one person on assessment missions given OCHA's limited assessment expertise and staffing). The strategy should be to put OCHA in a better position to lead with respect to advocacy, leaving WFP to continue to lead operationally.

EFNAs

The development of EFNA is a valuable initiative in that it has 'packaged' a practical method for determining with more confidence what food aid is needed to supplement people's own resources and available options (i.e. to determine food gaps and ration sizes). Although expensive to develop, the assessment method should not be expensive to replicate.

EFNA emphasises *differentiation* in recognition of the fact that food needs vary by types of population, geographic locations, and seasonally across different population groups. However although EFNA draws out the differences in food aid needs between camps and within camps, it does not attempt to provide a means of targeting within camps (see *Targeting* below).

There is some overlap in the methodology of the EFNAs and JFAMs in terms of the collection of information at the camp level but they are distinguished by the concentration of the JFAMs on overall food production and food security and consideration of related issues including access to land, markets and trade, income generation, nutrition and health, water and sanitation, etc. In refugee settings EFNAs (including 'mini' EFNAs) play an intermediate role between the JFAMs and regular monitoring. The two exercises are also complementary – for example the February 2001 mini-JFAM incorporates EFNA data on the production of the most food insecure and makes recommendations on the basis of food gaps calculated by EFNA.

The authors of the EFNA report⁴⁵ recognised the limitations of emergency needs assessments in general and noted that the critical interpretive steps in the EFNA approach are:

- calculating the actual per capita kcal gap
- projecting that gap into future months, and
- extrapolating from the sample locations to broader geographic areas and administrative units.⁴⁶

In relation to the last point the report notes that errors of both exclusion and inclusion may have occurred in the fieldwork. The mission believes this risk to have been unacceptably high in Gulu District in the way in which the 13 IDP camps not assisted by WFP were all grouped into categories not requiring food aid on the basis of a visit to only one camp and the opinion of SO staff.

An EFNA exercise was undertaken in October 2000 immediately after the method was developed, which included a sample of camps/settlements in all areas other than Achol-Pii and Kiryandongo. By the time of the evaluation there had only been limited further use of the method in the form of 'mini' EFNA exercises conducted in some refugee camps/settlements in West Nile (there has also

⁴⁵ A Collaborative Emergency Food Needs Assessment for Uganda, WFP, November 2000, Kampala

⁴⁶ p ix

been a follow-up practical training exercise in Bundibugyo). No mini-EFNA exercises have been undertaken in Gulu or Kitgum Districts.

Ongoing food security assessment is imperative and to underline this and institutionalise the EFNA method the CO should determine how many mini-EFNAs can be done each year (given staff and budget resources) and include them in a workplan, allocating mini-EFNA ‘slots’ between the SOs. The SOs can plan around these mini-EFNA allocations, determining in their own time which camps/settlements require attention. Mini-EFNAs need to be supported from Kampala to ensure the method is properly followed and findings properly documented.

Nutritional surveillance

The global MoU between WFP and UNHCR requires UNHCR to conduct regular nutrition surveys. UNHCR has contracted ACF to conduct surveys every six months for the refugee caseloads. There is no equivalent requirement for IDPs. This should be corrected by the agencies and donors involved. For IDP caseloads, WFP generally relies on the interest and capacity of NGOs to conduct nutrition surveys.

The gaps in Table 7 were not necessarily caused by a lack of NGO interest or capacity. ACF had planned to conduct surveys in Gulu and Kitgum Districts in October 1999 and April 2000 but could not do so due to insecurity. The ebola outbreak then scuttled ACF’s plans to conduct a nutrition survey in October 2000 and more recently ACF has faced funding difficulties. WFP co-funded ACF to conduct a nutrition survey in Gulu District in February 2001. An ACF survey of Kitgum District was postponed due to funding problems and WFP now plans to collaborate with UNICEF to co-fund a survey by ACF. MSF was not able to follow up on its October 1999 nutrition survey in Bundibugyo District, also due to insecurity. Now that the situation has improved UNICEF is planning to fund an ACF survey.

Table 7: Nutrition survey results (6-59months)

Camp/ Settlement ⁴⁷	April-June 2000 % W/H Z score	Oct-Dec 2000 % W/H Z score	April-June 2001 % W/H Z score
Rhino camp (DED)	5.9	8.3	Results not available
Imvepi (DDHS)	3.7	10.3	
Adjumani (AHA)			
0% ration	6.2	6.8	
25-50% ration	9.3	5.0	
80-100% ration ⁴⁸	6.1	5.9	
Moyo (ADEO)	7.4	4.9	
Achol-Pii (IRC)	8.9	10.0	
Kiryandongo (ACF)	7.5	5.7	
Bundibugyo (MSF)	Nil - insecurity		Nil – no funding
Gulu (ACF-USA)	Nil - insecurity	Nil - Ebola outbreak	Feb/March 2001 (7.2%)
Kitgum (Oxfam GB)	Nil - insecurity	Nil	Nil
Pader (Oxfam GB)		4.5	

While the PRRO budget does not make any provision for nutrition surveys, it has been reprioritised by the CO to contribute to surveys.

⁴⁷ Imvepi and Rhino camps have a high movement of refugees to and from Sudan and surveys can be skewed by those not generally resident in the camps.

⁴⁸ These three categories are used to compare groups

The August 2000 JFAM recommended that an analysis of underlying causes of malnutrition be conducted to create better insights in the remaining malnutrition scenario, particularly within the age group of 6-29 months. This study, to be jointly funded by WFP and UNHCR, will go ahead in Adjumani and Moyo at the end of 2001 and it is expected that the results will guide programming future decisions.

(See also M&E systems, *Monitoring nutritional status*, below)

Programming issues

The correlation between programming decisions and survey/assessment results has been imperfect, partly because data has often been unavailable, partly because survey/assessment results are not easy to interpret and/or apply, partly because policy and supply issues are also in play, which can act against increasing rations. EFNA recommendations to vary rations according to seasonal food availability have not been fully acted upon and/or the timing has been poor. In Gulu District the lean months are May and June, an appropriate period in principle in which to increase rations. Harvests commence from July and August, an appropriate period to reduce them again. But at the time of the mission's visit the increase was being programmed for July, which was too late.

One of the outstanding challenges for WFP is satisfactorily combining or linking EFNA studies and nutrition surveys. This is important for programming. Efforts were made to incorporate nutritional considerations in EFNA when the method was being developed (including non-food health determinants like sanitation and social care), but it was not achieved. WFP should continue to pursue this issue. WFP's regional nutritionist informed the mission that there is considerable debate about whether to try to include broader nutrition issues in EFNA or accept EFNA's limitation (the narrow focus on food availability) and find better ways of interpreting EFNA findings and linking them to nutrition survey results.

Seasonal targeting

The October 2000 EFNA recommended targeting according to seasonal food availability in all IDP camps. This has been applied to a limited extent. In this regard the mission suggests that the CO consider stopping partial distributions in August-September in Kitgum and Gulu Districts for one or two months to coincide with the harvest (subject to assessments).

Recommendations


- In collaboration with the OCHA office in Kampala, the Uganda CO should recommend to OPM that a six monthly assessment process be introduced for IDP operations (described as JAMs rather than JFAMs given that issues related to resettlement would be considered), mirroring the assessment process in place for refugees. If this is accepted, OCHA should be asked to assign an experienced member of staff to participate.
- The Uganda CO should determine how many area specific EFNA studies (mini-EFNAs) are required and can be managed in one year. Provision for these should be made in a budget revision of the present phase of PRRO 6176, and the budget of the next phase. The CO should devise a mechanism for allocating the budgeted mini-EFNAs between the SOs/FOs based on their needs.
- The Regional VAM Office and Regional Nutritionist should help the Uganda CO determine how to satisfactorily combine or link emergency food needs assessment studies and nutrition surveys, both in terms of the information collected and the interpretation of findings to guide programming, particularly in the IDP context where

there is no JFAM mechanism to bring food availability and nutrition assessments together.

- Upcoming joint missions (including JFAMs and EFNAs) should prioritise visiting Achol-Pii in Pader District given the fact that no joint mission has been able to assess needs in the camp for more than three years due mainly to insecurity.
- The Uganda CO should contribute to the conduct of biannual nutrition surveys of IDP populations to ensure they take place.
- In consultation with IDP representatives, district officials and its IPs, the Uganda CO should clarify its strategy in relation to the seasonal adjustment of rations. If seasonal adjustments are endorsed as an appropriate strategy careful consideration should be given to determining when and by what amount rations should be increased/decreased during an annual cycle.

Targeting conundrums

WFP conducts geographic targeting in so far as the standard rations provided to IDPs and refugees vary depending on the district and the camp or settlement (based recently on a typology developed by EFNA). There is however no targeting within camps/settlements. The EFNA method differentiates between the ‘food secure’, ‘food insecure’ and ‘most food insecure’ sections of camp/settlement populations (see following pie-chart) and estimates are made of their respective food gaps, but the final calculation for planning purposes is the *average per capita kcal gap* of each type of camp or settlement population. Even if EFNA is not driving ration calculations, all partial rations are implicitly based on average needs.



The result must be that the ‘most food insecure’ (who typically represent about 30% of the camp/settlement population) receive only a portion of what they need to bridge their (greater) food gap. In Gulu District a simple calculation shows that the standard ration could only meet roughly half their assessed energy gap – the October 2000 EFNA estimated that their energy gap of the ‘most food insecure’ was approximately 60%, yet the prevailing ration equates to 32% of energy requirements.⁴⁹

Under these circumstances it is vital that WFP invest in understanding how the most food insecure fare in the context of general distributions. At the same time it would be helpful to invest in understanding the dynamics of redistribution within camps/settlements (both positive and

⁴⁹ Based on a 1,818 kcal reference ration. The Gulu ration equates to only 28% using the WHO 2,100 kcal standard.

negative). Particular attention should be paid to redistributions in favour of the most food insecure because this could provide the basis for reinforcing positive social redistribution (and ensuring that WFP's approach to distribution does not undermine it).

Targeting the 'most food insecure'

It would be tempting to try to target the 'most food insecure', possibly as part of a strategy to phase out GFD. But it is problematic, principally because it is very difficult to differentiate a substantial proportion of a camp/settlement population (like 30%) from the rest. It should be remembered that most IDPs and refugees are poor and that the task would be to differentiate between their relative food insecurity/vulnerability.

Thus, the mission suggests continuing GFD while investigating how positive social redistribution can be enhanced. It is also suggested to target extremely vulnerable individuals (EVIs), particularly in the context of ration reductions/phase outs.

Targeting EVIs

It is important to distinguish between the 'most food insecure' and 'extremely vulnerable individuals (EVIs)'. The EVIs are a small sub-set of the most food insecure and their special needs are compelling. As a result they are easier to target. EVIs are targeted for special assistance in some refugee camps and settlements but there are no such arrangements in place in IDP camps. In Rhino Camp and Imvepi in Arua District extremely vulnerable refugees are identified by social welfare committees established by the GoU/UNHCR and given full rations. WFP needs to determine if the same arrangement would be appropriate in Moyo and Adjumani.

WFP also needs to consider how to approach the problem in IDP camps. One way would be working with and reinforcing existing social welfare mechanisms. Practically it would involve making an allocation of food to an identified social welfare group or committee (on the basis of a rough estimate of the number of EVIs in a certain type of camp and negotiated selection criteria) and leaving the group/committee to select the actual beneficiaries. Thereafter WFP would concentrate on monitoring the effectiveness of this approach by spot-checking who was included/excluded. The level and type of assistance could be adjusted upwards and downwards on the basis of WFP's findings. This would require a substantial investment by WFP and genuine participation by IDPs.

There are many risks, including that the vulnerable may be isolated in the process i.e. cut off from what little assistance they obtain through social obligation/redistribution. Any intervention would have to be on the basis that WFP and the community *share* the responsibility for EVIs. This may warrant an agreement of some kind to define roles. Maintaining a balance between taking over EVIs and merely backstopping the community would require considerable understanding and skill. Unfortunately it is doubtful if WFP's implementing partners have such skills.

There are also considerable risks involved in identifying and nurturing suitable local groups to collaborate with (whether they be women's groups, digging groups, church groups, etc). It is also possible that social redistribution in reality does not extend 'beyond the river' i.e. that it does not extend beyond the clan and the idea of nurturing a social welfare group that works across clans is flawed. Clearly, the first step has to be gaining a better understanding of vulnerability and social dynamics.

If some form of community managed targeting was undertaken it would be important to start with a small percentage (restricting it to EVIs) and to do so while GFD is still in place. Assistance to

EVI could continue after GFD is withdrawn. It would also be important to bring in other UN agencies/NGOs because the vulnerable need more than food.

Recommendations

- The Uganda CO should task SO/FOs to determine how the most food insecure cope given that general rations based on averaged needs don't meet their assessed (greater than average) food gap. The Uganda CO should ask SOs/FOs and IPs to study distribution dynamics focusing on positive and negative redistribution and how this impacts on 'the most food insecure' and on extremely vulnerable individuals (EVIs). Recommendations should be made for future programming, both in terms of reducing negative redistribution and enhancing positive social redistribution (which may be an entry point for indirect targeting).
- The Uganda CO should consider introducing targeting mechanisms for extremely vulnerable refugees in Moyo and Adjumani Districts and for extremely vulnerable IDPs in general. With respect to IDPs the CO should task SOs/FOs to consider if EVIs could be assisted by working with and reinforcing traditional social welfare mechanisms.

Final distribution mechanisms

WFP requires efficient and effective final distribution mechanisms that fairly represent beneficiaries, including women, and best enable beneficiaries to receive their entitlements. Distribution tasks are typically passed to IPs, but the final responsibility has to remain with WFP. The mission found that the distribution arrangements put in place by IPs vary from area to area but generally involve beneficiaries lining up for their rations and having it scooped out for them.⁵⁰ This seems to work relatively well where there is good control and distributions are decentralised to smaller units within camps/settlements. However, the mission was informed in Gulu District that there is often a 'scramble' for food towards the end of distributions. Indeed a baby strapped to her mother's back was reportedly injured, and later died, in an incident reported to police. There seem to be two factors at work. The food is sometimes not enough to serve everybody (either due to diversion or the presence of unregistered people). In addition, outsiders sometimes appear on the scene and try to disrupt proceedings to get food.

'Under-scooping' and other forms of petty diversion are apparently quite common. The mission was informed in focus group discussions in some camps that scoopers are generally paid from the leftovers, which gives them an incentive to under-scoop. In the largest camp in Gulu District (Pabbo) it was reported that the tin cans used for scooping have been cut down to reduce the amount given. The system in use also takes a long time to complete (three days in Pabbo).

The most vulnerable probably suffer most from deficiencies in final distribution. The October 2000 EFNA reported that in Gulu and Kitgum the most vulnerable complained of unfair treatment during and after the distribution exercise, mentioning food thefts and associated thuggery and pointing out that food aid is regarded as a free resource to be taken by the most powerful.⁵¹

Food distribution committees have been established in IDP camps, although the real authority rests with the camp chairmen who answer to the district. In West Nile UNHCR promotes

⁵⁰ WFP's 'Red Book' gives no alternative to scooping (see Food Aid in Emergencies Book A: Policies and Principles, Chapter A7 Implementation Mechanisms and Means, September 1991). Alternatives are however provided in the more recent Food and Nutrition Handbook, chapter 10.

⁵¹ EFNA report, November 2000, p 17

community self-management and each refugee settlement is responsible for all stages of food distribution through RWCs and/or distribution committees. These are appropriate measures however the problems identified indicate that these arrangements have not necessarily assured effective and efficient distributions.

Final distribution is core business and WFP should improve its performance in this area. WFP needs to continue to examine the different arrangements/systems that are in place and determine which are more effective and why. The system used by NRC in Kitgum District is said to be better than the system in Gulu District (the difference is apparently that responsibility for distributions is more decentralised in Kitgum). There are two distinct systems in operation in West Nile. In Arua and Adjumani food is distributed within clusters of households of between 5 and 100 households. Within the clusters lining and scooping is used. In Moyo, AAH has introduced a system whereby beneficiaries form food distribution groups according to family size, each family size having its own distribution point (e.g. families of seven members are grouped together). This is described as the 'semi-Malawian model' and is regarded highly by WFP field staff.

The mission suggests that the best result will be achieved by thoroughly decentralising the conduct of final distributions to groups of no more than 10 households or 60 people (the ideal size will depend on being able to allocate whole bags/containers to the group for distribution). The distribution groups could be self-selecting (distribution 'clubs') or selected against fixed criteria (family size, village of origin, etc). No payments should be made for any aspect of the distribution (including scooping if it is used).

Recommendations

- The Uganda CO, in collaboration with district authorities, distribution committees, IPs and with UNHCR in refugee hosting areas, should continue to review distribution systems in use with a view to improving their effectiveness, particularly in relation to equity and the safety of beneficiaries. Immediate attention should be paid to the conduct of distributions in Gulu District.
- The new edition of WFP's 'Red Book' should provide alternatives to the 'line and scoop' method of final distribution, including decentralised, low stress systems that minimise risks to women and children.
- Posters that visually present changes and/or people's entitlements should be put up in public places in all IDP and refugee camps (such as those used by DED in West Nile).
- In the next phase of PRRO 6176, more attention should be paid to strengthening the capacity of distribution committees or their equivalents.

M&E systems

There are a number of areas in which the M&E system needs to be strengthened. Existing data was available and was utilised to draft the PRRO project document, but it was not synthesised into a baseline report for later reference. The project document includes a list of indicators but they are essentially activity level indicators and not helpful for monitoring achievements at the output and objective levels. Moreover, the project document does not gather key assumptions in one place and there is no mechanism for monitoring assumptions or managing risks. On the positive side an M&E focal point for the Uganda CO was appointed at the beginning of 2001 and the CO and staff recognise the need to address the design deficiencies of PRRO 6176 in the next phase.

In practice monitoring has focused on tracking commodities and commodity utilisation (which are both important). There has been little monitoring of the effectiveness of relief and recovery interventions.

More work is required to apply the EFNA methodology to monitoring (i.e. to operationalise EFNA as a monitoring tool for use by FO/SO field staff). This should involve putting more emphasis on the incremental collection of information about needs and WFP's performance in meeting them, rather than relying solely on one-off assessment exercises.

Monitoring general food distributions

WFP Uganda's monitoring capacity and practice is improving but still requires considerable attention. In Gulu and Kitgum Districts monitoring is almost always conducted as part of food distributions. Although it is important to check on the conduct of distributions by IPs, the emphasis should be on monitoring conducted independently of the IP and its distributions, including random household checks to determine what rations were taken home and how they were utilised. The importance of this form of post-distribution monitoring is recognised but it is not yet being conducted.⁵² There are several constraints. Monitoring staff are multi-tasked and monitoring tends to be the first casualty when the SO/FO is under pressure, which points to inadequate staffing. Lack of training and guidance is also a factor. The EFNA conducted last year demonstrated the value of 'learning by doing'.

Insecurity is also an issue. Even when accompanying the IP the team normally leaves the camp early for road security reasons so there is no presence during the closing stages when the greatest problems occur. The difficulty of organising additional security escorts is cited as an obstacle to conducting post-distribution monitoring.

A stumbling block for doing distribution monitoring in West Nile is the lack of clarity between UNHCR and WFP regarding monitoring responsibilities. The MoU refers to tripartite agreements between UNHCR, WFP and the IP but none have been signed (despite WFP's interest in doing so). WFP sometimes monitors distributions (independently of IPs) but responsibilities should be clarified. This is compounded by the fact that the IP responsible for food distribution normally has only one food distribution monitor. Nevertheless 'food basket monitoring' (FBM) is often undertaken by IPs on distribution days in refugee camps/settlements (households are sampled to determine what they take home). FBM reports suggest a fair consistency in maintaining the planned calorific levels for the different populations on general rations, and though the reports indicate ration deficiencies more frequent than surplus, negative deviance in both Moyo, Arua and Adjumani have remained within 90% of target ration. FBM is not conducted in IDP areas.

Beneficiary 'self-monitoring' has not been adequately utilised in IDP areas. Beneficiaries can contribute very substantially to the effectiveness of final distributions if the rationale for programs and ration entitlements are clearly communicated and if means of forwarding complaints to WFP and having them acted on is agreed and functioning. In West Nile WFP/UNHCR and their IPs are quite successfully disseminating pipeline and food basket information (utilising posters and circulating distribution plans). This is in contrast to IDP areas where these techniques are not utilised. What is missing in both cases is an effective complaints procedure. Beneficiaries can complain to RWCs/camp administrations and IPs may occasionally detect problems and ensure the individuals concerned are assisted. But this is inadequate. However, each camp/settlement should also have an ombudsperson responsible for receiving and forwarding (but not hearing) complaints.

⁵² The Country Office Management Report for the second half of 2000 noted that 'enhancing post-distribution monitoring' would be in the next workplan and it is mentioned in some SO/FO workplans for 2001 (for West Nile it is an activity, the Kitgum FO refers to training in post-distribution monitoring).

Monitoring nutrition status

Regular nutritional monitoring is required to supplement periodic nutrition surveys and is particularly important in IDP areas where nutrition surveys are irregular. In Gulu District WFP had been receiving feedback from six supplementary feeding centres and two hospital based therapeutic feeding centres assisted by ACF, as well feedback from health outreach workers. However, ACF has had to reduce its involvement in feeding centres and with it nutritional surveillance. In May 2000 ACF submitted two proposals to DFID for nutrition support to Gulu and Kitgum districts, but was unsuccessful. The core activity in both proposals was to guide the establishment of a surveillance system based on sentinel site 'contingency' feeding centres.

In the case of refugees, health issues are the responsibility of UNHCR and its IPs, although WFP should be involved and ensure information on nutritional status is collected and available to SOs/FOs. UNHCR's IPs presently only monitor admission rates - active surveillance has not really been operational. The analysis of underlying causes study (mentioned above) is to provide direction as to the type of indicators that need to be monitored to provide insights into the nutritional situation in the settlements. Monitoring underlying causal factors is expected to be much more proactive than measuring/screening actual nutritional status (although the latter could also become part of the surveillance system) and can be more helpful for programming.

Reporting⁵³

A lot of quantitative data is generated, particularly by the Commodity Tracking, Logistics/Pipeline and Finance Units, but also from the field. It is generally very necessary and valuable information. By comparison there is very little *qualitative* reporting and even the quantitative reports do not record performance against targets and generally do not include any analysis to guide managers. Reporting is an output of monitoring and it suffers the same basic constraint - poor PRRO design in a formal sense (inadequate hierarchy of activities, outputs and objectives, inadequate indicators, etc). Other constraints are the relatively poor quality of information received from IPs, and the lack of standardisation.

The mission understands that the COPR is being replaced with the more results-oriented Country Office Report (6 monthly). It would be appropriate for the Uganda CO to redesign its reporting system based on the COR and it would be helpful if ODO could undertake a follow-up exercise to develop standard IP reporting formats to support the COR.

The regular SitReps provided by SOs/FOs are an important source of information to managers but they do not report on progress in achieving objectives, at least not in a methodical way. There is typically little information on outputs and none on impact at the purpose level. As with other reports, achievements are not compared to targets so the information is relatively meaningless. There is no analysis of the information presented and the M&E focal point in the CO recognises that this is an area that requires strengthening.

Recommendations

- As its first priority in relation to strengthening M&E, the Uganda CO should invest in the capacity of field staff to conduct post-distribution monitoring. This may require revising the job descriptions of field staff (not only Field Monitors) and report formats.
- The mission supports the August 2000 JFAM recommendation that a uniform way of collecting, disseminating and utilising Food Basket Monitoring information should be put in place by UNHCR/WFP/IP along with a follow-up mechanism to review action.

⁵³ See Annex H, Reporting Arrangements

- The Uganda CO should hold discussions with IPs and other NGOs concerning the establishment of more methodical nutritional monitoring for IDP camps to inform decisions regarding rations. This should be considered a ‘core’ function and allocated the necessary budgetary resources by WFP if they are not forthcoming from elsewhere.
- The SOs/FOs should discuss the establishment of complaints procedures for refugees and IDPs with the DDMC and its IPs.
- The procedures should be aimed at ensuring the most vulnerable have a means of redress in the event of short rations/exclusion, and at improving distribution systems. Each camp/settlement should have an ombudsperson responsible for receiving and forwarding (but not hearing) complaints.
- SAP could resolve the issue of providing timely financial information to COs to allow for proper planning of activities covered under DSC/ODOC. In the interim, however, a solution must be found to ensure that each CO is provided with the information necessary to keep track of and programme its resources. It is untenable that this basic information is not made available to the CO.
- The Uganda CO should redesign its reporting system based on the revised, results-oriented Country Office Report (6 monthly). The down-stream reporting formats should be modified based on the information required for the new COR.
- ODO at HQ should assist by developing standard IP reporting formats to support the COR. At a minimum, this should cover the typical range of WFP interventions: General food distribution, school feeding, FFA, supplementary and therapeutic feeding.
- The Uganda CO should revise the format of field reports (including SitReps) to ensure that performance is reported in a methodical and informative way. This should include comparing activities undertaken and outputs delivered to targets, commenting on the implications for the achievement of purpose level objectives, and recommending any changes that could be made to secure achievements at the purpose level.
- The monitoring and reporting obligations outlined in the MoUs between WFP and its IPs in Uganda (including the LoU with OPM) should be reviewed and revised in order to a) standardise the relevant clauses; b) clarify the specific monitoring roles of each party; and c) provide standard report formats for each type of intervention (general food distributions, school feeding, FFA, etc.) which allow IPs to capture the essential information needed to report on inputs, outputs and, to the extent possible, impact at the purpose level.

Coordination

The objectives and activities of the PRRO are compatible with the policies/programmes of the Government of Uganda and the PRRO is incorporated in the UN Common Strategic Framework and the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP). However, inter-agency mechanisms (including the UNDMT) are not functioning very effectively in relation to IDPs and need to be enhanced. It is not clear how this can be achieved. OCHA has a general coordination mandate and a specific one in relation to IDPs but needs to develop its capacity.

WFP’s main government counterpart is the Office of the Prime Minister (Department of Disaster Preparation and Refugees) with whom WFP maintains good relations. The government’s coordination mechanisms have not been very effective, due in large part to lack of capacity, and OPM recognises this. WFP’s counterpart at the District level is formally the District Disaster Management Committee (DDMC) however these have not been very well developed and SOs/FOs tend to relate directly to key officials and representatives. WFP appears to enjoy smooth

and amicable working relationships in each District although in some cases the authorities believe WFP could do more to support agricultural production and infrastructural development. There is a need to include WFP's activities in District Development Plans. It would be wise if all SOs/FOs consulted more closely with the District Council. The SOs/FOs hold both regular and ad hoc meetings with government counterparts and IPs. Efforts should continue to be made to improve coordination and strategic planning between humanitarian agencies and the government in Bundibugyo District.

WFP enjoys good relations with UNHCR and cooperates closely in refugee hosting areas. However, WFP and UNHCR need to revisit the JFAM recommendation to draft joint annual workplans. There also needs to be a stronger linkage between the PRRO and the SRS. While in practice the former is premised on the latter, the opportunity to design programmes jointly and combine resources has not often been exploited or encouraged. The CO needs to be proactive and suggest how to achieve this.

UNHCR is in the midst of an exercise at redefining itself, and paring down to 'core activities'. While the outcome of this exercise is not yet clear, WFP should remain seized of developments, as it could see UNHCR retreating from some non-core activities that it is currently involved in.

The refugee and IDP problems in northern Uganda are bound up with events in southern Sudan. The CO has worked with Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) to establish an information sharing system to ensure WFP Uganda has access to food security information from Southern Sudan. The CO should continue to push for greater collaboration with OLS.

WFP enjoys an exceptionally good relationship with its largest current donor in Uganda – the mission was informed by USAID representatives in Kampala that WFP is a 'sturdy' and 'strategic' partner in Uganda and that cooperation with WFP is 'excellent'. USAID representatives in Kampala informed the mission that they would like to see the CO establish a forum for meeting regularly with Title II partners to ensure all activities funded by USAID are complementary. There have apparently been differing approaches e.g. sale vs free provision of seeds.

Recommendations

- The Uganda CO should contribute to improving the functioning of inter-agency mechanisms in relation to IDPs and continue to assist OCHA to 'grow into' its mandate.
- Without neglecting to maintain its linkages with central authorities, the Uganda CO should explore opportunities created by government decentralization in Uganda and forge linkages on the basis of shared interests with the Districts. It should also ensure that its activities are accounted for in District Development Plans. SOs/FOs should consult more closely with District Councils and invest more in developing the capacity of District Disaster Management Committees.
- In line with recommendations in the UNHCR/WFP MoU, joint plans of action consistent with SRS should be developed at field level to forge stronger links between UNHCR, WFP, GoU and IPs. The emphasis should be on projected outcomes and mutually agreed roles in the different sectors.
- WFP and UNHCR should give renewed consideration to entering into tripartite agreements with IPs in Uganda. In relation to nutrition monitoring the CO should consider pursuing a tripartite agreement between WFP, UNHCR and the health IP's to streamline information needs and establish mechanisms for addressing problems.

- As recommended in the 2000 JFAM, WFP should strengthen its relations with Operation Lifeline Sudan in order to exploit windows of opportunity for common programming.

Implementing partners

WFP has the same INGO IPs for PRRO 6176 as it had for the preceding EMOP/PRO. These include AAH, DED and LWF (refugees in West Nile); IRC (refugees in Achol-Pii); and NRC (IDPs in Gulu and Kitgum Districts). WFP has not been able to secure an IP in Bundibugyo District, which constrains implementation. This is partly due to poor security.

The Uganda CO generally views IP's in West Nile as competent and accountable and working relationships are described as amicable and effective. In contrast, the main IP in Gulu and Kitgum Districts appears to be weak (the issue has been raised with NRC headquarters) but the scale of the task and insecurity make it difficult for WFP to secure an alternative IP.

In Gulu and Kitgum Districts WFP also utilises CBOs - most FFW activities have been contracted to the Gulu Farmers Development Association and institutional feeding (other than school feeding) is channelled through GWENET (although this is resented by some recipients of including Lacor Hospital and Rosary). In West Nile WFP works with two CBOs – PRAFORD in Adjumani and CEFORD in Yumbe (FFT project).

Relations with IPs are generally good but a meeting with CRS in Gulu (a WFP IP since 1997) on FFA revealed tensions. WFP has not signed an MoU with CRS since May 2000. CRS' 14 FFA projects have been adversely affected by delays in delivery and lack of clarity about the nature of the projects. One reason for food delivery problems is the absence of an agreed reporting format and cycle. Other IPs complained about the time taken to pay handling costs (e.g. Gulu Farmers).

In West Nile, WFP and UNHCR are often using the same IP and should give renewed consideration to tripartite agreements. The CO does not have criteria for assessing/selecting IPS and should develop them.

Lack of transparency and effective communications is an issue between WFP/IPs and some beneficiaries. There have been complaints that there is poor follow-up by WFP/IPs to issues raised by camp leaders in meetings.

Recommendations

- The Uganda CO should prepare simple criteria for selecting IPs for FFA, GFD, SFP/TFP and SF (including assessing their technical capacity) and consider assisting existing IPs to train their staff to improve the performance of the PRRO.
- The Gulu SO should give priority to reviewing arrangements with IPs to ensure that MoUs and reporting processes are in place. This review should also include an assessment of the performance of the IPs.

Extent of capacity building

The PRRO project document emphasises capacity building concentrating on women's groups and small-farmer associations. In Gulu District WFP is certainly pursuing this. The project document also refers to upgrading the skills of national counterparts (i.e. OPM) but there does not appear to have been any investment in this to date.

EFNA is a capacity building undertaking – indeed one of its objectives is to increase national assessment capacity and around 60 people have been trained in the method. WFP's key role in the Food Security Assessment Working Group also represents a valuable contribution to capacity

building. (The group includes the Ministry of Agriculture's Early Warning Unit, OPM, FEWS, OCHA, FAO, WFP and Save the Children (UK).

Management, human resources and training

Over the past year, a number of positive changes have been introduced to improve the way the PRRO is managed (including the appointment of area coordinators, a more rational division of labour among CO staff, 6 weekly field co-ordination meetings, regular workplans, etc). The mission has observed that these improvements are very much appreciated by CO/SO/FO staff.

Moreover, staff have frankly acknowledged programming weaknesses and the mission commends their openness to suggestions for improvement. This positive approach to improving the PRRO is also reflected in thorough preparation for and active co-operation with the evaluation mission.

It is recognised by the mission that field staff are working under generally unpredictable and sometimes very threatening conditions, particularly in the north and west. Volatile security conditions (and unexpected crises such as the ebola virus) have an impact on the ability of staff to plan, implement and monitor. The difficult conditions in some of the SO/FO postings would also make it difficult to recruit and keep staff with the right experience and qualifications.

At the SO/FO level staff are generally spreading themselves too thinly, and appear to have too many desk-bound commitments. The problem rests in a combination of insufficient staff, lack of appropriate experience, and the need for management to prioritise tasks. It is compounded by requests from the CO/HQ with tight deadlines, and staff being assigned to other tasks without assessing the implications for 'core business'. The mission observed that two key areas are being neglected: monitoring (including the analyse of information collected), and strategising/planning. The effectiveness and efficiency of SOs/FOs can often be improved, but there are absolute limits to the capacity of SOs/FOs to implement operations/programmes beyond which the SO/FO becomes overextended and the quantity, quality and timeliness of work suffers.

In West Nile some WFP Heads of SOs/FOs suffer from a credibility problem owing to the relatively junior grade of their posts compared to their counterparts and there is a perception that heads of SOs/FOs lack authority and need to consult with Kampala on routine operational matters.

WFP should consider locating a staff member in Rhino camp, which is the prime location for WFP activities in Arua, to allow for regular monitoring, complement UNHCR's field presence and forge closer links with the IP (DED).

Staffing levels are critical for running an effective operation and in the case of Uganda needs to be closely monitored, particularly if activities like school feeding continue to expand and if the resettlement of IDPs takes place. WFP runs the risk of overextending itself and care needs to be taken not to further compromise attention to core mandate responsibilities. At a minimum, activities should be rationalised to ensure that core (relief) responsibilities are discharged (see *Core responsibilities* in chapter 2). Area coordinators should be tasked to work with heads of SOs/FOs to optimise the effectiveness and efficiency of the SOs/FOs. Management training may be appropriate, preferably tailored precisely to the management tasks of heads of SOs/FOs.

CO and SO staff have identified the general lack of experience and training in planning and managing development (recovery) activities as a weakness. While staff, particularly at the CO level, have had opportunities for training over the past year (see Annex I), not enough has been undertaken for field staff expected to carry the burden of monitoring or for IPs and district counterparts in support of some of the key operational aspects of the PRRO (core relief functions, planning and managing FFA and SF, etc.).

Recommendations

- WFP should revise the PRRO guidelines to require that the feasibility of the operation, and the impact on other programmes, be assessed in terms of available human resources and any training required.
- The Uganda CO area coordinators should be tasked to work with SOs/FOs to ensure core mandate responsibilities are being discharged and if necessary recommend to the CO non-core activities that may need to be rationalised or eliminated.
- Heads of SOs/FOs should facilitate adequate attention to the discharge of core responsibilities by helping staff prioritise and schedule their work. The CO should be a party to these arrangements and keep them in mind when making requests involving SO/FO staff time.
- A staff member with the appropriate skills should be assigned the tasks of assisting with the preparation and monitoring of the Relief and Recovery Strategy for the extension of PRRO 6176. A primary responsibility will be to monitor the indicators for recovery and assist colleagues with planning and implementing the transition.
- Job titles/descriptions should be reviewed for the implementation of the next phase of PRRO 6176, ensuring in particular that they reflect WFP's core responsibilities.
- Training needs of SO staff and IPs should be reviewed for the implementation of the next phase of the PRRO, ensuring that staff have the skills necessary to discharge WFP's core relief responsibilities as well as more developmental functions under a PRRO.
- The Uganda CO should consider locating a staff member in Rhino camp.

Effectiveness of logistics and quality control systems

PRRO 6176 'inherited' a mature logistics system at the centre but there were deficiencies at the EDP level. Improvements commenced in May 2000 with the Regional Office's application of Total Quality Logistics (TQL). Warehousing and warehouse management has been enhanced. Through the course of 2000 WFP's 'strategic fleet' was phased out and transportation up to extended delivery points (EDPs) was fully commercialised. Losses have been low. Overall the mission regards logistics as an area of considerable strength.

There have been some problems including delays by commercial contractors in delivering commodities to EDPs (to Fort Portal for Bundibugyo District and to EDPs in West Nile, although quickly rectified); and delays in delivering commodities to FDPs (most notably to IDP camps and institutional recipients in Gulu and Kitgum Districts).⁵⁴ In the latter case, insecurity has been an important factor. WFP's secondary transport contractor, IOM, has to wait for clearance to travel and for an escort to be assembled every morning and there are security incidents from time to time (as noted earlier the military escort accompanying a convoy including IOM trucks carrying WFP food was fired on by rebels in a road ambush in Kitgum District during the evaluation mission and IOM took its fleet off the road for a week).

CTS is fully operational down to the SO/FO level. CTS is a valuable tool but a major shortcoming from the field perspective is that reports cannot readily be generated from the CTS database on planned vs actual commodities released from the EDP for final distribution. This is a key indicator of SO/FO performance and indispensable for managers.

⁵⁴ Refer to Chapter 3. In IDP areas WFP contracts secondary transportation (IOM in the north and a commercial operator in the west). In refugee hosting areas secondary transportation is contracted by UNHCR (to DED in Arua, LWF in Adjumani and AAH in Moyo).

There have been no major problems with quality control. While fumigation procedures appear unwieldy to field staff because WFP has to contract a fumigation company from Kampala, this is proper procedure and cannot be short-circuited.⁵⁵ There have apparently been some delays in fumigating suspect commodities but it is not clear if this was because there were delays in notifying Kampala or delays in responding or a combination.

Some locally purchased maize meal was declared unfit for human consumption following WFP procedures, including 155 tons delivered to Gulu District. The Gulu SO indicated that attempts have been made to sell this for animal feed to recoup some of the losses (certificates declaring it fit for animal consumption were obtained). A small amount of imported maize meal deteriorated during storage in West Nile due to poor EDP management and was destroyed.

The mission was informed of a number of other relatively minor problems including long delays in calibrating and replacing platform scales, appropriateness of sourcing pallets from Kampala, inconvenience of taking vehicles to Kampala for servicing; and infrequency of monitoring visits from logistics unit in Kampala (the logistics unit however asserts that it visits regularly).

Recommendations

- In the development of the new scope of COMPAS by HQ (specifically the module streamlining programming and logistic coordination at the CO/SO levels) provision should be made for monitoring actual vs planned performance at all levels, including actual vs planned deliveries to FDPs for each distribution cycle for each SO/FO. This may need to be preceded by further developing and standardising procedures and the associated paperwork at the SO/FO level for planning and calling forward commodities (including the development of standard LoUs with basic information on commodity requirements to provide the basis for requests to CO logistics to deliver commodities).
- In the interim, the Uganda CO, if necessary with the assistance of WFP Rome, should devise a simple way for SOs/FOs to track performance against targets for each distribution cycle for each operational area. Ideally this information could be rendered in chart form so that it could be posted in prominent places in each SO/FO. The information should be a key feature in monitoring reports.

Security

As noted in earlier sections, security is a considerable constraint on the efficiency and effectiveness of operation, particularly in Gulu, Kitgum and Bundibugyo Districts. It imposes downtime on deliveries to camps, sometimes for a week at a time, prevents assessment teams visiting some camps and inhibits monitoring.

WFP and IP staff face considerable dangers in these areas, particularly from road ambushes. However, adequate and appropriate measures have been introduced and adhered to in order to minimise the risks. Security plans are in place and Security Awareness Training has been undertaken for all staff. Communication facilities and journey monitoring are excellent. Drivers are clearly very security conscious.

The mission does have some concerns. Firstly, the mission observed an IOM vehicle bearing large WFP stickers transporting soldiers in Gulu town. Secondly, IOM was until recently using its own vehicles to transport soldiers leading convoys. The driver of this vehicle, presumably an IOM employee, must have been at extreme risk (often being the first target in a road ambush).

⁵⁵ WFP Food Storage Manual

Commercial vehicles are now hired for this purpose but WFP/IOM still has some responsibility for the driver of this vehicle. Thirdly, SOs/FOs do not have incidence books to record breaches of security regulations (e.g. arriving back after dark) or other issues of note.

Recommendations

- The Uganda CO should ensure enforcement of its zero-tolerance approach to using UN registered or marked vehicles for transporting soldiers (or any vehicle bearing a UN insignia/sticker) and consider shifting to a 60-day distribution cycle to reduce exposure to insecurity on the roads and the demands on the UPDF for clearance/military escorts.
- SOs/FOs should maintain security incidence books to record breaches of regulations as well as actual incidences of insecurity. The Uganda CO security contact person should review the books periodically.

Adequacy and flexibility of the PRRO budget

Overall the mission was given no reason to believe that the PRRO budget was inappropriate given its objectives and planned activities although the CO acknowledged that the cash component would not be adequate to purchase the NFIs required if large-scale resettlement became possible.

The CO saw no reason to seek a budget revision during the first year of the PRRO but in the mission's view it would have been preferable if the PRRO project document, including the budget, had been revised by the end of the first year to reflect the changed circumstances of the project. As has been mentioned earlier, there is as yet no mechanism for doing so. One should be devised to ensure that design documents and budgets continue to provide sound guidance during implementation, providing, as they should the basis for workplans and monitoring.

Information on and budgetary control over the PRRO monies available under DSC and ODOC are currently centralised with the Regional Finance Officer in HQ. The CO is not receiving regular information on the amounts available (despite frequent requests), and therefore does not have the necessary financial information available to plan expenditures under DSC and ODOC. While it is said that SAP will solve this problem, the fact is that for some months this basic management information has not been made available. As a consequence the CO was not informed that US\$600,000 in DSC was carried over from PRO 5623.01. Some of this money was intended for the milling programme, some could have been utilised to cover training of staff and IPs, some staff costs, and equipment for FFA and SF. Unfortunately the money has, according to a memo received by the CO, been returned to the donor by Financial Services.

Predictability and regularity of commodities and other resources and impact on the PRRO

The PRRO was under-resourced at its commencement and encountered a higher relief burden than anticipated (116% of projected commodity requirements). No commodities arrived until three months into the PRRO. By the end of 2000 pledges only amounted to 37% of what was requested⁵⁶ and receipts to only 10%.⁵⁷ Most of the resources used by the PRRO until the end of 2000 (over 33,000 tons) came from carry-overs from the preceding EMOP (5816.2) and PRO (5623.1).⁵⁸ If these stocks had not been available the PRRO would have been starved of commodities, although WFP may have found ways of addressing this problem if it had arisen.

⁵⁶ 31,314 tons

⁵⁷ 7,993.15 tons out of 82,728 tons

⁵⁸ At termination on 31 March 2000, 37,862 tons were available (as stocks held, repayments due and expected arrivals).

Despite these substantial carry-over stocks some commodity shortfalls were experienced. To some extent these have been managed by borrowing from other projects (including school feeding allocations for Karamoja under CP 6101). This has contributed to flexibility in terms of meeting needs within the constraints of the overall pipeline.

Nevertheless there was a major pipeline rupture which affected supply for September-October 2000 which the CO dealt with by suspending general distributions to most IDPs; halving the rations of refugees and IDPs on full rations (other than EVIs) and making proportional cuts to the rations of other refugees. The CO regards the pipeline rupture as the biggest single problem encountered by the PRRO.

It is not clear why the rupture occurred – it was not for lack of donor commitments. The pipeline report of 30 April 2000 showed that there would be a significant shortfall of *pulses* seven months out in November, and no pulses for December and beyond. The incoming DCD was alerted that shortages were going to occur much earlier when he was in Rome en route to Uganda in mid-August 2000. The pipeline report subsequently generated on 18 August showed a significant shortage of pulses in September and no pulses in October. In relation to *cereals*, the April report indicated no shortfall through 2000 but the 18 August report indicated a significant shortfall in November and very little cereals in December.

There was apparently a failure in pipeline monitoring for several months, primarily by the CO. Perhaps HQ could also have picked it up. The looming rupture was simply not recognised early enough. The use of PRRO 6176 commodities for the Karamoja EMOP 6235 between April and June 2000 contributed to the problem. The narrative section (but not the tables) in the PRRO project document included a contingency for the Karamoja EMOP but the CO must have either not appreciated the impact on PRRO 6176 or believed the commodities would be reimbursed to PRRO 6176 (they weren't because EMOP 6235 did not receive adequate contributions to do so).

As of June 2001 there was a large shortfall of commodities for the remaining year of PRRO 6176.1 (in the order of 52.35%) and no maize in the pipeline to meet projected requirements in September, October, November 2001 and no pulses August through December 2001.⁵⁹ The mission was assured by HQ that the situation is not as grave as this suggests, but it is not yet clear where the necessary resources will come from (a one-month stop gap allocation of cash may be forthcoming but this will not solve the problem).

Resourcing of NFI requirements has not been an issue due to the continued encampment of IDPs and consequent under-expenditure on recovery. The situation could be very different if resettlement becomes possible.

7. MEETING COMMITMENTS TO WOMEN

The Situation Analysis in the PRRO project document refers to the disadvantage faced by women, particularly female-headed households and women in the conflict-affected north. The PRRO project document provides that beneficiaries of recovery and rehabilitation assistance will be drawn from the more vulnerable segments of the refugee and displaced communities, including households headed by women with high dependence ratios and widows without family support. Elsewhere it is provided that recovery activities will target primarily poor or disadvantaged women (65-70 %) and that women will be allocated at least 30% of

⁵⁹ Resourcing Update of April 9, 2001; Planning Figures, Food Requirements and Food Shortfalls, May 2001–December 2001 updated June 3, 2001

outputs/assets created through FFW ‘as a means of strengthening their status, power and economic position’. Reference is made in the Situation Analysis to women’s exclusion from the cash economy and one of the stated objectives of the PRRO is to ‘increase women’s access to resources, employment, markets and trade’.

Clearly the PRRO project document focuses on women and makes it plain from the outset that women should be targeted as disadvantaged and often vulnerable members of the IDP and refugee population. Moreover, targets are set, including a minimum of 50% women on (recovery) project committees. There is a strong link between the Situation Analysis, which refers to the correlation between illiteracy and household nutrition, and the implementation of emergency school feeding (now the School Feeding Initiative) and the objective of achieving 50:50 male/female attendance. Overall however, the project document does not provide adequate analysis or guidance. It does not refer specifically to WFP’s Commitments to Women, the analysis is not specific to the camp/settlement context, and it is not clear how vulnerable women were actually to be targeted for assistance. No real direction is given in terms of collecting gender disaggregated data and no qualitative gender sensitive indicators are suggested for evaluating WFP’s performance beyond the numerical achievements. There is no discussion of how GFD or FFW can be tailored to meet the strategic and practical needs of women.

The PRRO may have been strengthened if it had been more closely based on the 1999 Gender Baseline Survey,⁶⁰ which incorporates a problem analysis and needs assessment (although it also has limitations).

The WFP Uganda 2001 *Gender Action Plan* is organised according to the Commitments to Women but only makes reference to PRRO 6176 under Commitment III (see below). (Perhaps this is because the PRRO project document only incorporates Commitment III in its objectives.) The CO’s *Workplan 2001: Broad Cross-Cutting Objectives* only addresses gender in the context of the School Feeding Initiative. The *Workplan 2001* itself offers very little guidance on gender. Neither the cross-cutting objectives nor the Workplan mention the Commitments to Women. The Workplan is also limited by the fact that it is based on the objectives specified in the PRRO project document, which is appropriate in a formal sense, but the objective related to gender is too narrow – it is based solely on Commitment III. In any case, gender should be mainstreamed and should feature strongly in the activities and key outputs.

For an overview of the degree to which the PRRO is meeting the Commitments and mainstreaming a gender perspective, refer to Annex J.

Commitment I: Provide direct access to appropriate and adequate food

Generally, WFP and its IPs have made efforts to encourage a greater number of women to collect rations on behalf of their families. Outcomes are uncertain because there is no reporting of who collects rations on behalf of the family (although the mission understands that this is about to begin in West Nile), nor is there reporting of control of the family entitlement. It is fairly clear however that who receives food is influenced by the various distribution systems in use, different cultural practices and the presence in some refugee camps/settlements of a large number of young men. In the IDP camps in Gulu and Kitgum women collect family ration entitlements more often than men but this is not the picture painted of distributions in the refugee camps/settlements in

⁶⁰ WFP Uganda (1999): Gender Baseline Survey, August to October 1999, by Okumba Miruka and Kwame Owino. The baseline included Adjumani District (refugees 5,623) and Gulu District (IDPs and SFP 5,816). In Adjumani it included 5 out of 33 camps, in Gulu 4 out of 20 camps. See also WFP Uganda (2000): Report of the Gender Analysis in Karamoja and Gulu.

West Nile. The difference may be that Acholi women traditionally manage food stocks while Sudanese women do not, although many social groups are represented in the refugee camps/settlements and it is unlikely to be this clear cut.

The vast majority of the refugees and IDPs assisted under PRRO 6176 belong to polygamous societies of which the smallest social unit is a woman and her children. It is very significant in terms of distributions and targeting women because the 'female-headed household' is in a sense the norm, not the exception. Husbands/fathers have authority over this household (often over several such households) but this is at the next level in the social structure. The CO understands this and MoUs with IPs now specify that women should be registered as heads of families/households.⁶¹ This system has recently been adopted by the Bundibugyo Sub-Office (where there is no IP).

Having women head beneficiary units on distribution lists facilitates their collection and control of rations. But the issue of *control* of the family entitlement remains an issue and this is not being monitored.

Commitment I is also concerned with the extent to which women are put at risk in collecting rations. This is clearly an issue that must be urgently addressed given that dangerous 'scrambles' develop at some distributions (see chapter 5, *Final Distribution Mechanisms*).

Commitment II: Take measures to ensure women's equal access to and full participation in power structures and decision-making

WFP expects women to take a lead role in decision-making and have equal representation with men. Assistance should be conditional on achieving equal representation or an intermediate target. The PRRO project document focused on women's involvement in the recovery process and set equal representation as a target on recovery project committees. No such committees have yet been formed. Representation on food distribution committees was not considered in the project document however targets have since been set by some SOs, most notably Bundibugyo District where the stipulation is now 90% female representation on distribution committees. Some men interviewed by the mission said the women are doing a better job than the men who were previously in charge.

Representation and the level of authority of women is more satisfactory in the IDP camps than in the refugee camps/settlements. In some IDP camps women have been appointed chairpersons and endowed with key food management tasks of e.g. signing waybills, reporting beneficiary numbers, checking food quality, etc. This represents progress but women are still generally excluded from the higher levels of local decision-making (as was found to be the case by WFP's Regional Gender Officer in 2000⁶²). No social analysis of gender dynamics has been undertaken in IDP or refugee camps/settlements (apart from EFNA).

In refugee camps/settlements in Arua and Adjumani Districts women hold only a minor share of positions in the food committees (usually 3 out of 11 members) and on the Refugee Welfare Committees that often act as food committees. No women hold any of the three leading positions: chairman, vice-chairman or secretary (in one settlement women said that men would accept increased representation of women - it have just never been addressed). WFP has raised these

⁶¹ This approach entails registering women and their children as beneficiary units and adding men and the elderly to one female-headed unit. For verification purposes each unit can usually be identified by a separate kitchen or cooking place (the 'keno' in Acoliland). Men 'float' from unit to unit depending on their marital status and are often served by a number of kitchens. They need to choose which women to be registered under.

⁶² WFP Great Lakes Region, Report of the Gender Analysis in Karamoja and Gulu, March 2000

matters with UNHCR and IPs. Moyo District is the exception and the implementing partner, AAH, has taken the lead in establishing food committees across the existing political structures with 50% representation of women. Gender division of labour for scooping (where used) appears to be universal in both refugee and IDP areas.

The CO told the mission that the involvement of women in food management committees and camp leadership is helping women gain confidence. This is probably true where women are well represented but can't be verified in the absence of monitoring data. No leadership training or other capacity building is provided to women.

Where the 'line and scoop' distribution method is used, whether in IDP or refugee camps/settlements, women mostly scoop the light commodities (pulses and oil) while men assist with the maize.

Commitment III: Take positive action to facilitate women's equal access to resources, employment, markets and trade

One of the objectives of the PRRO is taken directly from Commitment III (increase women's access to resources, employment, markets and trade). There is also a reference in the document to strengthening the status, power and economic position of women.⁶³ The original outputs/targets included allocating 65-70 percent of recovery resources, a minimum of 50 percent of education resources, and at least 30 percent of project outputs/assets created through FFW to women.

Many FFW interventions have fallen short of addressing gender issues in their formulation or who will benefit from the assets created. Where an asset like a road has been created this may not be fatal but in other cases it is likely that assets have been created that perpetuate the status quo (e.g. a community centre built with a high proportion of female labour but controlled by men. The questions of addressing women's needs and actual benefit are not being monitored. Some staff told the mission that assets created under FFA have been targeted at empowering women. It is hard to credit that this has been the case with FFW, but it may have been with FFT, which perhaps offers more opportunities for targeting women. FFT has arguably been under-utilised. The mission learned that FFT with direct linkages to IGA is attractive to women. Women's farming groups in some refugee settlements are a possible entry point for FFT and revolving loans activities.

The CO is aware of shortcomings in relation to FFW and is planning to address them. One of the objectives of the *2001 Gender Action Plan* stated for PRRO 6176 is to provide training to FFA implementing partners focusing on gender sensitive participatory methods for better selection and management of projects.

Commitment IV: Generate and disseminate gender disaggregated data and information for planning and evaluation

WFP has collected a considerable amount of disaggregated data and requires IPs to do so.

Commitment V: Improve accountability on action taken to meet the commitments

The agreements signed with IPs in 2001 refer to WFP's Commitments to Women and require certain actions of them, although they deal with the Commitments in different ways and to different extents (e.g. the agreement with LWF is more specific than the agreement with NRC). Provisions dealing with the Commitments are collected under Monitoring and Reporting and are

⁶³ Paragraph 30

not reflected in the IP Obligations section. The agreement with LWF refers to WFP's Checklist for Integrating a Gender Perspective into WFP Operations, October 2000.

It is unclear how well the SOs/FOs have been monitoring IP performance in relation to the Commitments.

In terms of staff recruitment the CO is performing very well - four out of five heads of SO/FO are women.⁶⁴

Recommendations

- The Uganda CO should undertake a follow-up survey to the 1999 WFP Uganda Gender Baseline Survey in order to measure progress against original baseline data in the geographical areas and sectors relevant to the PRRO.
- The Uganda CO should carefully involve field staff and implementing partners when preparing Gender Action Plans, as they will be expected to implement them.
- The successor phase PRRO 6176 project document should refer specifically to meeting WFP's Commitments to Women and this should be reflected in workplans. Gender sensitive performance monitoring indicators should be developed to enable measurement of achievements against the Commitments to Women and WFP Uganda's Gender Action Plan.
- The Uganda CO should ensure that the FFA guidelines currently being prepared outline how to involve women and men as labourers and as eventual beneficiaries/owners of the assets created. Efforts should be made to ensure that more of the assets created actually improve the situation of women.
- MoUs with IPs in Uganda should in future include provisions reflecting WFP's Commitments to Women in the sections headed 'IP Obligations' and 'WFP Obligations' as appropriate.

8. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT

The PRRO project document addressed environmental issues from the perspective of recovery rather than relief and there is no reference to mitigating the impact of the refugee and IDP camps/settlements on the environment. In practice little mitigation has been attempted in IDP areas (reforestation in IDP areas has focused on planting seedlings at homesteads, not as a fuel wood resource for camps) but more directly relevant activities have reportedly been undertaken by UNHCR's IPs in refugee areas. Most notably, ACCORD has introduced energy saving stoves in Adjumani and Moyo and the WFP offices in Gulu and Kitgum have included training in the development and use of fuel saving stoves in their workplan for 2001.

WFP has contributed to mitigation by providing maize meal in some instances (most consistently Bundibugyo) although it was provided because grinding mills are not available and some IDPs sold off maize grain when it was distributed.

The PRRO project document puts considerable emphasis on environmental rehabilitation in the context of recovery and one of the PRRO's stated objectives is to 'restore natural habitat through

⁶⁴ Mainstreaming gender relations: One of the two objectives of the 2001 Gender Action Plan given for PRRO 6176 is to ensure that gender is mainstreamed in the FFA guidelines. The August 2000 JFAM recommended that advanced gender mainstreaming be pursued in all areas of self-reliance supporting activities, e.g. agriculture, income generation (trade, vocational & business skills training etc.).

rural infrastructure and reforestation schemes'. However in the first year few environmental interventions were undertaken apart from a small number of FFA activities (principally support for nurseries).

WFP Uganda's draft guidelines for FFA include two objectives (of three) which are environmental (drawn from WFP's Enabling Development policy) - mitigating the effects of natural disasters in areas vulnerable to recurring crises and enabling poor food-insecure households that depend on degraded natural resources for their food security to shift to more sustainable livelihoods.

The school-feeding programme plans to introduce activities related to the conservation and rehabilitation of natural resources. This is to include the introduction of fuel saving stoves, establishing nurseries and vegetable gardens and planting fruit trees (mangos).

Recommendation

- The SOs/FOs should train women in time saving food preparation techniques; promote alternative sources of fuel (e.g. palm oil husk, reeds etc) and enhance collaboration with NGO's such as ACCORD to train refugees and IDPs in the construction and use of fuel saving stoves.

9. COMMENTS ON THE PRRO CATEGORY

As a resource window

PRRO 6176 has been under-resourced since its commencement (discussed above under *Predictability and regularity of resources*) but there is nothing that the mission is aware of to suggest that this has anything to do with the PRRO category. When it was introduced it was hoped that the PRRO category would lead to longer-term funding commitments. This has not been achieved to date with PRRO 6176.

Presenting and tracking the PRRO budget by component elements (protracted relief and recovery) has not had an impact as far as the mission is aware. The main donor is USAID and its practice is normally to not pay LTSH for recovery or development activities. However, this has not been applied to PRRO 6176 apparently because it remains predominantly a relief operation.

However, the mission was informed by USAID that if the resettlement of IDPs becomes possible and the emphasis shifts substantially to recovery, USAID would be inclined to channel its funding for recovery directly through its NGO partners (CRS, World Vision, etc) rather than channelling it through WFP (as an intermediary to more or less the same NGOs). The USAID representatives also expressed the view that they generally see cash-for-work as more positive than FFW. These points have implications for resourcing a resettlement programme in northern Uganda, and for other PRROs that shift into recovery.

WFP needs to recognise that there are some sceptics of FFW, and of the value added of channelling funding through WFP. This is partly due to a perception on the part of many donors, agencies and INGOs that WFP is a (valuable) food delivery agency, and increasingly needs assessment agency, but not a development agency. All recognise the importance of making the transition to development, but WFP is undermined by its heavy reliance on FFW.

Thus to secure funding for recovery oriented PRRO's, WFP should invest more in demonstrating the effectiveness of FFA and the value WFP adds in terms of design and supervision. This will require a greater investment in project design and staffing, adding to the cost of PRROs.

The success of FFA projects is also dependant on securing matching NFIs. It would be preferable from an operational point of view if WFP sourced cash for NFIs directly from donors. But to the extent that an operation faces a deficit in NFI funding, WFP will have to rely on other UN agencies and INGOs to source the funds for NFIs. This puts a premium on coordination with other agencies and organisations, and the credibility of WFP's recovery strategy in so far as WFP will need to convince others to 'buy into' WFP's approach.

As a programming instrument

Combining PRO 5623 and EMOP 5816 (and thus combining the Uganda refugee and IDP caseloads into one operation) has resulted in some rationalisation of management and other efficiency savings:

- After the merger into PRRO 6176 the CO was also able to reduce a few posts, thus streamlining the management structure and marginally lowering administrative costs.
- PRRO contracts are generally for one year. Staffing under the preceding EMOP was unstable and short-term (3 month contracts), reflecting uncertain and short-term financing.
- DOC and the DSC rate per ton are lower for the PRRO than the amounts for the preceding PRO/EMOP. Operational costs per beneficiary also appear to be significantly lower than the preceding PRO/EMOP.⁶⁵

There is no conclusive evidence however that the combination of the refugee and IDP operations has resulted in lower ITSH rates. Economies of scale and negotiating strength already applied.

The PRRO instrument has not resulted in any dramatic changes in implementation in Uganda. The focus on phasing out relief and instituting FFW are not new preoccupations.

The most significant departure was the provision made for the resettlement of IDPs over two years, which could not have been achieved with an EMOP. PRRO 6176 still remains a valuable tool for preparing for the resettlement of IDPs.

It is evident from this evaluation that WFP needs to match the potential flexibility and responsiveness of the PRRO category with equally flexible planning procedures and documentation. This includes the ability to revise the project document to ensure that it continues to provide direction. The Uganda CO attempted to deal with change through the workplan. But workplans should be anchored by the objectives stated in the project document and should not be the means by which objective statements are revised (workplans should only make changes at the activity level).

It is also evident that there is a risk that the focus on recovery will lead to inadequate attention to relief responsibilities (see chapter 3, *Achievement of Relief Objectives*).

Recommendation

- To secure funding for recovery operations, WFP needs to achieve recognition as a development agency by demonstrating the effectiveness of Food for Assets projects and the value added by channelling the funds for such activities through WFP.

⁶⁵ Based on comparisons provided to the mission by the CO.

Annexes

ANNEX A

TERMS OF REFERENCE

Background

The PRO category - covering Protracted Emergency Operations for Refugees and Displaced Persons - was first established by the CFA at the recommendation of WFP in May 1989 (WFP/CFA:27/P/7). The category responded to (i) the growth of migrant groups – both refugees and displaced people - as a result of civil strife, and (ii) the persistence of the problems which led to their flight and the consequent perpetuation of their status over long periods. In short, a decade of civil conflicts had created the need for an adequate and predictable funding base for refugees. By creating a subset of its “development” resources, WFP hoped to preserve the development and emergency resource bases for their original purposes while attracting additional net resources to deal with burgeoning needs in this new category.

In April 1998, WFP introduced a significant enhancement to the PRO category when it endorsed WFP’s policy proposals in the paper “From Crisis to Recovery” (WFP/EB.A/98/4). The new PRRO – Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation - brought two major modifications to the category. First, all protracted emergency operations – and no longer just refugee and displaced persons operations - would be transformed into PRROs and brought before the Board for approval, generally after two years. Second, the transformation of EMOPs into PRROs would be done based on the preparation of a recovery strategy that would provide the rationale for continued assistance and, to the extent possible, emphasize recovery activities in addition to ongoing relief needs and contribute to conditions for finding sustainable solutions to protracted crises. This emphasis on recovery was very much in line with international support for linking relief and rehabilitation work to longer-term development interventions. Refugee and displaced persons operations – the old PRO category – would remain a subset of the new category and would benefit from the introduction of a recovery strategy.

The new PRRO category also stressed two important resource dimensions:

- First, within a PRRO, WFP would have the flexibility to move funds freely between relief and recovery activities as the situation on the ground required - to seize opportunities for recovery, but to be prepared to meet unforeseen critical relief needs;
- Second, the new category called for longer-term financial commitments from donors – for predictability and planning as well as for building partnerships for recovery.

During its sessions in October 2000 and February 2001, WFP’s Executive Board considered issues related to the funding of PRROs and raised questions about the effectiveness of the new category. The Board endorsed a review of the PRRO category as a whole to be undertaken by OEDE based on the findings of 10-12 PRRO evaluations scheduled for 2001-2002.

PRRO Uganda 6176 - An Overview

Since 1964, WFP has provided more than \$270 million in development (36%) and emergency (64%) assistance to beneficiaries in Uganda (including local populations and refugees).

Immediately prior to PRRO 6176 the Uganda Country Office implemented two protracted relief and emergency operations which targeted distinct groups in northern and western Uganda:

- PRO 5623 (two phases) *Assistance to Sudanese Refugees in Uganda* (October 1995 to September 1999): Sudanese refugees have been living in the West Nile district since 1988. From a peak in the mid-90s, the number has decreased from 264,000 to a population of 183,000 (UNHCR estimate in mid-2000), largely due to repatriation and local settlement on land provided by the Ugandan government. Due to a fear of conscription if they repatriate, males represented 55% of the refugee population.
- EMOP 5816 (three phases) *Assistance to Displaced Persons in Uganda* (February 1997 to December 1999): In 1996, rebel attacks on civilians caused the displacement of over 110,000 people in Gulu district. Subsequent rebel attacks in the north and the emergence of a new rebel group in the west resulted in a total of 453,000 displaced people in Uganda in need of food assistance in 1999. At this time, women represented 54% of the IDP population.

The above two activities were combined into the current PRRO 6176, which was approved by the Executive Board in February 2000 with a duration of two years: 1 April 2000 to 31 March 2002. The total cost to WFP is US\$50,641,070 with a targeted population of 411,500 refugees, displaced people and vulnerable local inhabitants. The goal of the PRRO as stated in the approval document is:

To contribute towards improved household security of the most vulnerable people in Uganda while creating social and economic assets, and income-generating activities to enhance self-sufficiency.

The objectives of the PRRO are to:

- Maintain minimum nutritional and dietary standards among population groups most at risk, including refugees, displaced and the hungry poor living in areas with acute local and seasonal food shortages;
- Promote resettlement and create short and long-term employment opportunities leading to self-reliance and food self-sufficiency;
- Restores natural habitat through rural infrastructure and reforestation schemes;
- Increase school enrolment and literacy rates, particularly for women/girls;
- Provide incentives for the poor and food insecure to attend vocational training and to become self-supportive; and
- To increase women's access to resources, employment, markets and trade.

There are two main components of PRRO 6176:

- **Protracted relief** The activities under this component include: distribution of general food rations; and food for work and training.
- **Recovery** The activities under this component include: food for work and training; food for mothers and children attending health facilities; food for orphaned/abandoned children; and school feeding.

In addition to PRRO 6176, the Uganda Country Office is involved in managing a number of other interventions. These include:

- a **Country Programme (1999-2004)** which has three main components: education, adult literacy and vocational training; agricultural and marketing support (FFW); and vocational training for orphans and street children.
- **EMOP 6235.01 “Assistance to Drought-affected persons in Karamoja” (October 2000 – April 2001)**. The main activities are: targeted feeding; food-for-work; vulnerable group feeding; and school feeding for pre-primary school children.
- **Regional PRRO 6077 “Food aid for relief and recovery in the Great Lakes region” (August 1999 – July 2001)**. A small number (20,000) of Rwandan, Congolese and Burundian refugees residing in four settlements in the southwestern region are being assisted under this regional PRRO.

In the past decade, WFP’s operations in Uganda have not been evaluated. While Uganda was covered by two recent evaluations of operations in the Great Lakes (Evaluation of WFP Strategic Fleet Operations in the Great Lakes Regions WFP/EB.3/99/4/2 and the Tripartite (UNICEF/UNHCR/WFP) Study of the Great Lakes Emergency Operation WFP/EB.3/98/5/3), these have little bearing on the situations currently being addressed under PRRO 6176.

Objectives of the Evaluation of PRRO Uganda 6176

The objectives of the evaluation are:

- 1) To assess the relevance, timeliness, efficiency and effectiveness of WFP assistance under the PRRO in order to improve the implementation of the current operation and assist with planning the next phase.
- 2) To assess the added value of including this operation in the PRRO programme category, thereby contributing to an understanding of the usefulness of the new PRRO category both as a resource window and as a programming instrument. Specifically, the evaluation will:
 - Assess the PRRO’s recovery strategy and determine its relevance to creating conditions for sustainable solutions to the protracted situation;
 - Assess the added value of assisting the target populations under PRRO 6176 in comparison with its predecessors (*Emop5816.02 and PRO 5623.01*); and
 - Determine whether the conditions set out in WFP’s policy paper “From Crisis to Recovery” have been met within the PRRO and the extent to which these conditions are relevant to project preparation and implementation.
- 3) To provide accountability to the Executive Board.

Scope of Work

The evaluation of PRRO 6176 will focus initially on the PRRO’s recovery strategy¹, assessing how it was formulated, how it has evolved over the life of the project and its relevance to the situation analysis.

¹ “From Crisis to Recovery” (WFP/EB.A/98/4-A) as well as the PRRO Guidelines (“Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations: Guidelines for the Preparation of a PRRO”, WFP February 1999) call for the preparation of a “recovery strategy” as the base on which all PRRO’s activities are designed. The strategy may or may not lead to

Based on the initial recovery strategy, PRRO 6176 identified two component elements: *protracted relief and recovery*. These elements and their respective activities will be assessed individually to determine a) if activities took place, outputs were delivered and targets reached and b) if this was sufficient to achieve the stated objectives.

On a practical level, this will include reviewing the systems and support (financial, staff, partnerships, etc.) which underly the PRRO. On a more general level, the strategic linkages between the two component elements will be assessed to determine whether the PRRO has successfully seized opportunities for recovery. In addition, the PRRO's relation to other WFP interventions, including the Uganda Country Programme, EMOP 6235, and the regional Great Lakes PRRO 6077 will be considered.

The evaluation will also examine the PRRO's strategic linkages with sister agencies, implementing partners and other stakeholders: first to determine their contribution to meeting the objectives; and second to shed light on whether the PRRO has contributed "to the process of transforming insecure, fragile conditions into durable, stable situations..."².

The evaluation will also consider how effectively the Commitments to Women (formulated at the Beijing UN Conference for Women) have been integrated in the design of the operation. In addition, it will assess how well the consideration of gender relations, which can be a major impediment to improved food security, have been mainstreamed into the operation's activities.

Findings and recommendations will be forward-looking with a view to extracting lessons about the use of food aid for meeting the immediate humanitarian needs of people affected by conflict and for helping to create conditions for sustained recovery and development. Individual lessons from the evaluation should also contribute to eventual adjustments to the PRRO category as a whole.

Key Issues and Sub-Issues

The evaluation will address the following issues and sub-issues:

1. Recovery Strategy: Is the strategy well prepared and does it convincingly set the foundation for the activities of the PRRO? Does it accurately gauge the opportunities to introduce recovery activities and challenge WFP to contribute to phasing down and achieving sustainable solutions for the protracted crisis?

- 1.1 At what point was the recovery strategy developed for the PRRO? Has it been periodically reviewed or modified over the life of the operation in order to maintain its relevance with changing circumstances?
- 1.2 What resources have been devoted to the development of the PRRO recovery strategy and what mechanisms for consultation, partnership and review have been utilized?
- 1.3 Does the recovery strategy provide the rationale for operating in the protracted situation, identify and justify the role of food aid, identify target areas and groups, and define assistance modalities?

"recovery" components within the PRRO, depending on the opportunities available within a particular country context.

² "From Crisis to Recovery", WFP 1998.

- 1.4 Has there been an effort to integrate developmental approaches as early as possible in relief and recovery activities and what lessons can be drawn from these attempts?
- 1.5 What risks to the PRRO were foreseen in the recovery strategy (e.g., the resurgence of violence, the influx of additional refugees, loss of donor support) and have appropriate contingency plans been made?
- 1.6 To what extent has the adoption of a recovery strategy allowed WFP, partners and donors to establish a basis for a longer-term commitment to the PRRO?

2 Design of the PRRO

- 2.1 Do the PRRO objectives reflect the situation analysis presented in the recovery strategy?
- 2.2 Are the PRRO objectives coherent?³
- 2.3 Are the activities and outputs tailored specifically to achieve the objectives?
- 2.4 To what extent are the PRRO objectives still valid?
- 2.5 Is the strategic orientation of the PRRO compatible with the policy “From Crisis to Recovery”?

3 Achievement of PRRO Objective To what extent are the activities and outputs of the PRRO achieving the objectives? Have there been relevant unexpected effects?

Appropriateness of food rations

- 3.1 Is the food ration adequate and acceptable in light of the PRRO’s objectives and targeting?
- 3.2 Are the nutritional objectives realistic and to what extent are they being achieved?
- 3.3 What has been the nutritional impact of WFP assistance on refugees, IDPs and other targeted vulnerable groups?
- 3.4 Have there been ration reductions or phasing out of “general” food assistance and, if so, on what basis?

Standards and Quality

- 3.5 What systems are in place for assuring programme quality:
 - assessing community/implementing partner capacity and section criteria?
 - ensuring contributions from partners/communities?
 - setting appropriate technical standards using local experts and partner agencies?
 - *training?*

4 Effectiveness and Sustainability of the PRRO

Assessment/Targeting

³ Section 6, “Notes on Methodology”, recommends that prior to arrival in country the mission prepare a logframe for the PRRO in order to systematically assess objectives, activities and outputs.

- 4.1 Is the PRRO targeting the appropriate beneficiaries? Is there evidence that the targeted beneficiaries are being reached?
- 4.2 Under FFW/FFT, are the targeted groups benefiting from the assets being created?
- 4.3 How have food insecurity, vulnerability and beneficiary figures been assessed and subsequently adjusted as the operation has evolved?
 - At the country level? (e.g., FAO/WFP Food and Crop Assessments, WFP/VAM, GIEWS, FEWS, JFAMs, composite household surveys, camp registration)
 - At the community level? (e.g., RRA, PRA)
 - At the household level (e.g., women’s organizations, relief committees)
- 4.4 Are there mechanisms to signal opportunities (or provide guidance in the case of resource shortfalls) for further targeting, for ration adjustments, for modifications to the role of food aid, for the introduction of recovery elements, or for phasing down and/or exiting?
- 4.5 What is the nature of the interaction between refugees/IDPs and the local population and how has the operation weighed/addressed the needs of these groups?
- 4.6 What information on expected funding has been available during the formulation and implementation of the operation and how has this influenced targeting?

M&E Systems

- 4.7 Are appropriate and functioning M&E systems supporting the implementation of the PRRO?
- 4.8 Was baseline data collected and were appropriate indicators identified at the outset for measuring progress and results?
- 4.9 What is the type and frequency of reporting for the operation, including periodic participatory appraisals? Is the information analyzed and used to make decisions regarding the management of the PRRO?
- 4.10 What are the constraints to monitoring – such as access, disruption of activities, security, manipulation of data – that affect the operation and how does the CO attempt to overcome these?
- 4.11 Have criteria been established to signal when to shift activities from “relief” to “recovery” and likewise from “recovery” to “development”? If so, are these being applied effectively?

Achieving programme linkages and sustainability

- 4.12 Has there been any added value to transforming long-standing refugee and IDP operations into a PRRO in terms of building linkages and improving the likelihood of sustainability?
- 4.13 What are the prospects for the sustainability of each main PRRO activity?

- 4.14 Have opportunities been identified and pursued for making the transition from relief to recovery activities (in particular, restoring livelihoods) where appropriate (follow-up to 4.11)?
- 4.15 To what degree has WFP food aid contributed to promoting resettlement and food self-sufficiency, as applicable?
- 4.16 What role, if any, has resource availability and predictability played in building relief-development linkages?
- 4.17 Are the objectives and activities of PRRO 6176 compatible with and complementary to those of the other interventions (EMOP 6235, CP, regional PRRO 6077) currently being implemented by the CO? Have appropriate linkages been made with the recovery/development activities of other interventions?

Implementing Partners

- 4.18 What systems do the WFP Country Office employ to assess the capacities and comparative advantages of potential implementing partners (IPs)?
- 4.19 Are the number and nature of IPs under the PRRO adequate and appropriate for implementing the range of activities? Has there been a trend towards or away from using local implementing partners?

Coordination

- 4.20 Has preparing and implementing the PRRO broadened and improved coordination compared to the predecessor operations?
- 4.21 What are the mechanisms within the PRRO for coordination with government, donors, UN agencies (UNHCR, FAO, IFAD, ILO, UNICEF, UNDP, etc.), NGOs, etc.? Assess their meaningfulness to the implementation of the PRRO.
- 4.22 Are the objectives and activities of the PRRO compatible with the policies/programmes of the Government of Uganda (where relevant)? How do PRRO activities relate to district plans in the context of decentralization in Uganda?
- 4.23 How is the preparation and implementation of the PRRO linked with the UN Common Strategic Framework, the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP), and any contingency planning exercises?

Effectiveness of Logistics Arrangements

- 4.24 Was planning for logistics requirements adequate and what have been the major challenges to the smooth functioning of the PRRO?

Security

- 4.25 In the context of the security situation in Uganda, have adequate and appropriate measures been introduced and adhered to in order to minimize the risk to WFP staff and implementing partners involved in the implementation of the PRRO?
- 4.26 Are there significant security challenges to the smooth functioning of the PRRO?

Budgets and financial resources for preparation and implementation

- 4.27 Did the preparation and implementation of the PRRO (compared to the previous EMOP/PRO) result in management changes and efficiency savings?
- 4.28 How has the budget of the PRRO changed compared to its predecessor operations? Has preparation of the PRRO resulted in a change in the ratio of dollars spent per ton of commodities delivered compared to EMOP 5816.02 and PRO 5623.01?
- 4.29 Does the Country Office have the resources required – staff and cash – to prepare and implement the PRRO as foreseen in the “Guidelines for Preparation of a PRRO”, including staff or consultants with a “combination of development and emergency experience; and strong background in planning, design and strategy formulation”?⁴
- 4.30 Is the PRRO budget appropriate in relation to its objectives/activities, and what factors (such as CO size, additional staff requirements for PRRO implementation) have affected individual budget items, particularly DSC?
- 4.31 What has been the impact of presenting and tracking the PRRO budget by component elements (protracted relief and recovery), including earmarking resources to particular components?

Flexibility of PRRO budget and shifts in resources/activities

- 4.32 Have the contingency mechanisms intended to deal with setbacks, reversals and new emergency/disaster outbreaks – such as PRRO budget revisions – been employed?
- 4.33 To what extent has the Country Director utilized his authority to transfer funds between components and geographic areas?

Predictability and regularity of resources and impact on PRRO

- 4.34 What have been the major resource constraints for the PRRO and have they changed as a result of transformation of the operation from an EMOP/PRO ?
- 4.35 To what extent have the resourcing requirements for the operation been met and how has the CO managed shortfalls? How predictably and regularly have resources been supplied to the PRRO?
- 4.36 Has transformation to a PRRO resulted in longer-term (more than 1 year) financial commitments to the operation?
- 4.37 How successfully has the PRRO resourced its non-food inputs and what, if any, have been the constraints?

Donor perception of the PRRO and advocacy with donors and partners

- 4.38 What has been the extent and nature of Country Office advocacy for the PRRO with donors and other partners, particularly UNHCR?

⁴ Guidelines for the Preparation of a PRRO, section 3.3; the Guidelines suggest the establishment of a “planner post” for preparing a PRRO.

- 4.39 What effect does having multiple and varied components within the PRRO (e.g., relief feeding and recovery FFW) have on WFP's ability to successfully advocate for donor support?

5 Meeting Commitments to Women

- 5.1 Do the design and implementation of the PRRO and its component elements adequately address WFP's Commitments to Women?
- 5.2 Has adequate effort been made to mainstream gender considerations?
- 5.3 What changes are required in a future phase to ensure better compatibility with these Commitments?

6 Environment

- 6.1 Have environmental concerns been adequately addressed within the PRRO, particularly with regard to energy-related issues (e.g., cooking time) and the placement of IDP/refugee camps?
- 6.2 Impact of Relief Activities: What effect have the camp sites had on the environment? What effect have rations and cooking requirements had?
- 6.3 Impact of recovery activities: What has been the environmental impact of recovery activities within the PRRO? Are the PRRO activities helping to restore the natural habitat through rural infrastructure and reforestation schemes?

7 Other lessons

What other lessons can be drawn from the experience in designing and implementing PRRO 6176 and what measures can be taken in the development of a future phase in order to improve it's effectiveness?

8 Notes on Methodology

8.1 Stages of the evaluation

The evaluation will be divided into three phases:

Phase 1 – Preparation and Desk Review (3–5 days):

Prior to the in-country mission, the team will review all relevant background documentation. The team leader will join the OEDE Evaluation Officer at WFP in Rome for a briefing prior to departure. The other team members will review materials provided electronically or by the Country Office prior to the beginning of the mission.

The team leader will plan, in consultation with the Evaluation Officer and with organizational support from the CO, a logframe exercise to take place at the outset of the mission. This exercise will involve all WFP staff currently working on PRRO 6176. The purpose of the exercise is to help structure the evaluation and ensure a systematic examination of the project's effects. The output will be a logical framework for the current PRRO 6176.

Key information should also be assembled by the WFP Country Office, prior to the arrival of the mission. This includes:

Basic Documents to be Reviewed:

- WFP PRRO policy document: “From Crisis to Recovery” (WFP/EB.A/98/4-A)
- WFP, Guidelines for Preparation of a PRRO
- PRRO Uganda 6176 project document
- WFP/RE resource summary table for PRRO 6176
- EMOP 5186.02 and PRO 5623.01 project document(s), and any related evaluations/reviews undertaken
- Country Strategy Outline and Country Programme
- Regional Great Lakes PRRO 6077
- EMOP 6235 project document
- Previous evaluation summaries and full reports
- Country or operation case studies
- Documentation on UN CSF, CCA, UNDAF
- WFP/OEDE thematic evaluation “Recurring Challenges in the Provision of Food Assistance in Complex Emergencies”
- “Food Security and Food Assistance among long-standing Refugees”, (WFP/Ron Ockwell, Nov. 1999 – for refugee operations)
- Most recent JFAM mission report “Sudanese Refugee Settlements in Uganda”, August 2000
- A Collaborative Emergency Food Needs Assessment (EFNA) for Uganda, November 2000
- GOU/UNHCR Self Reliance Strategy for Refugees in Uganda (1999-2003)
- WFP/UNHCR Grain Mill Privatization Report, August 2000
- WFP Food Security, Food Aid and HIV/AIDS Study, (December 2000)
- Most recent WFP/FAO Food & Crop Assessment reports
- Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal 2001
- Any evaluations/reviews undertaken by implementing partners during the last 2 years

Key information to be prepared by the WFP Country Office:

- Basic country data
- Basic data on the country’s food balance, including its import and food aid requirement and local commodity prices
- Completed Self-Evaluation Report (SER) – pages 1 and 2 only
- Resource table for the PRRO with stock balance, information on losses and regularity of deliveries
- Management structure of PRRO: list of staff, equipment, etc. for the PRRO
- Outputs achieved vs. planned for PRRO (disaggregated)

- Relevant comparative data (budgetary, output) for EMOP 5186.02 and PRO 5623.01
- Socio-economic status of beneficiaries broken down by gender, beneficiary category, location
- Local monetary value of the ration/per beneficiary category and relation to household income
- Description of logistics and security arrangements (maximum 5 pages each)

Prior to departure for Uganda, the Office of Evaluation (OEDE) will forward the TORs to the Country Office. These should be shared with key government focal points and implementing partners. A small task force of key stakeholders (composition to be determined by the country office) may be established to review the TORs, host the evaluation team during the mission, and host the debriefing at the end of the mission

Phase II – The in-country evaluation (3.5 weeks):

To the extent possible, the Team should meet with all relevant stakeholders, including beneficiaries, local and national government, key implementing partners and other development agencies involved in the UNDAF and with any of WFP's programmes.

Data collection will take place both in the offices of key stakeholders in the capital and in the field where the activities of the PRRO can be visited. The mission leader, together with the Country Office, will determine the optimum balance between mission time spent in the field and in the capital.

Key informant interviews to be carried out by the Team may be divided into different groups:

Group one: WFP full time and contract staff working on PRRO 6176 and other relevant CO interventions (CP, EMOP6235, PRRO 6077);

Group two: Key institutional partners/actors involved at the national level in programming relief and recovery assistance. These may include:

- relevant government ministries and district administrations
- relevant UN agencies (OCHA, UNHCR, UNICEF, FAO, WHO, etc.)
- local offices of World Bank and regional development bank
- bilateral donors with a significant presence in relief and recovery assistance,
- NGOs with a mandate for relief and recovery assistance and a strong presence and reputation in food aid and/or food security

Group three: Institutional partners engaged in WFP activities

- national, provincial and local offices of PRRO implementing partners
- staff of national and international NGOs involved in the delivery of WFP assistance within the PRRO
- staff of human service agencies supported within the PRRO such as nutrition rehabilitation units, MCH centres, etc.

Group Four: Participants and Beneficiaries

The mission members should visit households, and meet with key informants and groups which represent each category of PRRO beneficiary.

Phase III – Report writing (5 working days team members, 10 working days Team Leader).

During each phase of the PRRO evaluation, the team leader should confirm the duties and responsibilities of each team member. These can be organized around the subjects to be covered in the full evaluation report (see annex 1). The team leader is responsible for co-ordinating inputs to and writing the Aide Memoire, evaluation summary and final report.

8.2 The Evaluation Team

The evaluation team is composed of five members:

Team Leader: external consultant with experience in evaluation, relief/refugee situations and strategic planning

Team members:

- Nutritionist (local consultant)
- UNHCR Evaluation Officer
- WFP Evaluation Officer
- WFP Programme Officer, Kenya CO Refugee Unit

8.3 Timetable and Itinerary

Include in this section a tentative, detailed itinerary for the CP evaluation. An example:

Review/finalize evaluation TORs	2-27 April 2001
Planning/desk review	7-11 May 2001
Briefing at WFP Rome	10-11 May 2001
Travel to Kampala	13 May 2001
In-country mission	14 May – 6 June 2001
Debriefing of Country Office/Ips/GOU	4-5 June 2001
Travel to Rome	6 June 2001
Debriefing at WFP Rome	8 June 2001
Deadline for Final Evaluation Report	22 June 2001
Deadline for Evaluation Summary	6 July 2001

8.4 Organization of the mission

Role of the Team Leader: Will finalize the methodology and key issues for the evaluation. This will be done in consultation with the OEDE Evaluation Officer. He will also clarify the role and input of each team member, including individual requirements for the Aide Memoire, Evaluation Summary and Final Report. With assistance from the WFP Evaluation Officer, the team leader will define any preparatory work required by the CO and/or local consultants prior to the mission (at least 4 weeks notice should be given to the Country Office). The team leader will assume overall responsibility for the mission, and will synthesize the inputs from all sources in order to produce the necessary outputs.

The Team leader is responsible for producing the following outputs :

- an **Aide Mémoire** for presenting the mission’s early findings and recommendations at the final debriefing in Uganda and at HQ ;
- a **Final Evaluation Report**; and

- an **Evaluation Summary Report** for presentation to the Executive Board.

The team leader will present the team's findings at all debriefings and will ensure that all deadlines are met for the above outputs.

Role of the other team members : To provide technical expertise according to individual skill sets, and to provide written inputs to the Aide Memoire, Evaluation Summary and Final Report under the guidance of the Team Leader and WFP Evaluation Officer.

Role of the WFP Evaluation Officer : The Evaluation Officer will participate as a full team member in the evaluation. In addition, she will provide support to the overall evaluation exercise as necessary, which includes liaising between team members, relevant areas of WFP headquarters, UNHCR and the country office. She will also ensure compliance with the intended thrust of the evaluation, and that the necessary logistical support is provided by WFP HQ and the CO.

Role of the Uganda Country Office : To advise on the timing of the evaluation to ensure that the evaluation outputs are available for the preparation of the next phase of the PRRO. To ensure that all necessary documents required to plan the evaluation and undertake the desk review are provided in a timely manner. To assist with the identification and hiring of local consultants as required. To ensure that any necessary preparatory work is undertaken in-country prior to the arrival of the evaluation team, and to facilitate the work of the team while in-country. Prepare and organize the mission in-country itinerary, and organize the PRRO evaluation briefing/debriefing.

8.5 Products of the Evaluation

- **Aide Mémoire** for debriefing the Country Office and HQ (maximum 5 pages)
deadline : 3 June 2001
- **Final Evaluation Report and Recommendation Tracking Matrix**
deadline : 22 June 2001
- **Evaluation Summary Report** (maximum 5000 words)
deadline : 6 July 2001

All reports will be prepared in English and must be written in conformity with the outlines in Annexes 1 and 2. Draft versions of the Evaluation Summary Report and Final Report will be reviewed by the OEDE Evaluation Officer prior to being finalized.

The Evaluation Summary Report, technical reports and Final Evaluation Report must be submitted in hardcopy accompanied by an electronic version. If applicable, annexes should also be made available in WFP standard software (i.e., Microsoft package). For ease of processing, the Summary Report should be submitted as plain, unformatted text only (no paragraph numbering, limited bold, underline, etc.).

The mission is fully responsible for its independent full report, which may not necessarily reflect the views of WFP.

The evaluation shall be conducted in conformity with these terms of reference and under the overall guidance of OEDE.

The Annexes to these Terms of Reference provide the evaluation team with some tools to be used in carrying out and reporting on the CP evaluation.

ANNEX B
MISSION ITINERARY

May 10 - 11	Briefing, WFP Rome
May 13	Travel from Rome to Entebbe
May 14	Briefings, WFP Regional Office and Uganda Country Office
May 15	Briefings, WFP Uganda Sub-Office and Field Office staff Finalise Itinerary and Method Development of Logical Hierarchy for PRRO 6176
May 16 - 18	Meetings with OPM and other government departments; USAID and other donors; UNHCR, OCHA and other UN agencies; IPs/NGOs
May 19 - 27	Field work – included meetings with District authorities and other partners, as well as visits to camps/settlements during which teams split up to conduct focus group discussions with a) camp authorities, b) refugees/IDPs. FFW sites and institutions assisted were also visited
May 19 - 21	Team A to Bundibugyo District by air. Team B to West Nile by air (commencing in Arua District)
May 22 - 24	Team A to Gulu District by air Team B continues in West Nile (Adjumani and Pakelle)
May 25	Team A continues in Gulu District (unable to proceed to Kitgum and Pader Districts for security reasons) Team B continues in West Nile (Moyo)
May 26	Team A to Kiryandongo by road and on to Kampala Team B returns to Kampala by air
May 27 - 31	Meetings in Kampala with World Bank and ICRC. Further meetings with CO, Government, NGOs. Preparing for debriefing
June 1	Team A to Kitgum District by air for day only
June 2 - 3	Team prepares aide memoire and inputs for full report
June 4	Aide memoire presented to CO and revised
June 5	Aide memoire presented to GoU, donors, UN agencies, IPs. Tymo departs for Rome
June 15	Debriefing in Rome

ANNEX C

PEOPLE CONSULTED

	ROME
	Briefing/debriefing at HQ
May 10- May 11; June 14	Zlatan Milisic, Emergency Officer, OHA Nic Paulsson, JPO, Programming Service, Operations Department Chris Nikoi, Senior Logistics Officer, Transport & Logistics Division Susanne Frueh, Scott Green, OEDE Deborah Hines, Senior Adviser, SPP Michelle Barrett, Resources Officer, Resources and External Relations Rita Bhatia, Senior Programme Adviser, Public Health and Nutrition Policy Service (SPP), Strategy and Policy Division Laurent Bukera, Compas Project Manager, OTF Jouko Ala-outinen, Africa Regional Bureau
	KAMPALA
	Briefing with WFP RO/CO staff
May 14	Burk Oberle, Regional Manager Great Lakes/CD Uganda Ken Noah Davies, Deputy Country Director Jakob Eilsø Mikkelsen, Reg. Coordinator, West Nile Amos Mwesigye, Reg. Coordinator, Gulu/Kitgum Tom Ahimbisibwe, Reg. Coordinator, Bundibugyo Magdalena Moshi, Reg. Coordinator, Karamoja Marina Rais, Programme Officer, Development
	Briefing with WFP field staff
May 14 & 15	Nicky Atkinson, Emergency Officer/HoSO Bundibugyo Gordon Lakidi, Prog. Ass./HoFO a.i. Pakelle Ruth Butao Ayoade, HoSO Gulu Zeff Kapoor, Logistics Officer, Uganda Peter Otto, Field Monitor, Pakelle Martin Malinga, HoSO Arua Caroline Opok, HoFO, Kitgum Elvis Odeke, Prog. Ass., Gulu Anthony Esenu, Reg. M&E Officer
May 15	Getachew Diriba, Vulnerability Analysis & Mapping (VAM), Regional Adviser Kiganzi Nyakato, VAM Focal Point, Uganda
	Briefing with OPM
May 16	Martin Odwedo, Principal Sec., OPM Carlos Twesigomwe, OPM Osakan Solomon, OPM R. Nokeasugo Rose, OPM
	Briefing with OCHA
May 16	Michael Jones, OCHA Country Rep. & former WFP Uganda DCD

	Briefing with UNHCR
May 17	Saihou Saidy, Country Director, UNHCR J. M. Castro Magluff, Deputy Country Director, UNHCR Abdul-Kadir H. Jama, Snr. Prog. Officer, UNHCR Linnie Kesselly, Snr. Community Service Officer, UNHCR Abel Mbilinyi, Snr. Protection Officer, UNHCR Sam Chakwera, Prog. Officer, UNHCR
	Briefing with USAID
May 17	Patrick Fleuret, Deputy Director, USAID, Uganda Walter Welz, USAID, Food for Peace Officer, USAID Ron Stryker, USAID Randolph Harris, USAID, Northern Uganda
	Briefing with UNICEF
May 17	Bill Fellows, Regional Manager for Northern Uganda, UNICEF Guy Clarysse, Regional Manager for South-West Uganda, UNICEF Jan-Olov Baaroy, Emergency Focal Point, Children in Armed Conflict (CIAC), UNICEF
	Briefing with other UN agencies
May 18	Felix Mathenge, Emergency Coordinator, FAO John Walburn, IOM Representative
	Briefing with NGOs
May 18	Byamekame Johnson, Prog. Coordinator, OXFAM-GB Annette Naluaga, Prog. Ass., LWF George Eburg, Ass. Prog. Coordinator, LWF Jan Coffey, Country Director, IRC Cathy Skonk, Country Director, ACF Luca Gaorum, Food Security S.P.D., AVSI Catherine Lorenzen, Socio-Economist, EU Mission Charles Avuasea, Project Coordinator, URCS James Odong, Relief Associate, World Vision Alex Mugume, M&E Officer, TASO
	Security briefing
May 18	Christophe Boutonnier, Reg. Security Officer, WFP, GLR
	Other meetings
May 18	Gloria Kusemereraw, Nutritionist, ACF
May 31	Patrick Ocailap, Commissioner, Aid Liaison Department
May 31	Robert Blake, Country Program Manager, World Bank
May 31	Markus Dolder, Health and Relief Coordinator, ICRC, Uganda

	Debriefing with Government
June 5	Solomon Osasan, Settlement Officer, OPM Joseph Okello, Senior Policy Analyst, MOLG Carlos Twesigomwe, OPM Gerald Duda, Technical Advisor, OPM/GTZ Robert B. Okudi, Principal Economist, ALD/MOFPED Mulyalyo Carthben, Snr. Education Planner, MOES
	Debriefing with donors and UN agencies
5 June	Walter Welz, Food Peace Officer, USAID Sandra J. Ayoo, conflict Advisor, USAID Ruth Sempa, USAID Sarah Metcalf, Deputy Programme Manager, DFID Doreas Nyakana, Exec. Sec. to the Director, Italian Cooperation Deborah Saidy, Reg. Programme Advisor, WFP Michael Jones, Head of Office, OCHA Jan Baaroy, Emergency Focal Point, UNICEF J.M. Castro-Magluff, Deputy Rep., UNHCR
	Debriefing with NGOs
June 5	R. Ferguson, Programme Officer, Aktion Afrika Hilfe Halvard Holoeyen, Ag. Res. Rep, NRC Erling Bratheim, Project Leader, NRC Martha Nbusuga, Ass. Administrator, IOM John Walburn, C.O.M. ai, IOM Adi Gerstl, Programme Coordinator, DED Elly Abiriga, Agronomist, ICRC Markus Dolder, Health and Relief Coordinator, ICRC Alice Anukur, Deputy SG, URCS David Apollo Kazungu, Programme Officer, AHA Paavo Faerm, Representative, LWF Daniol Garcia, Administrator, ACF Francis G. Iwa, Field Coordinator Pakelle, LWF Greg Duly, Kampala Director, SCF-UK Edward Kibirige, Country Director, FHI
	FIELD WORK TEAM A
	Bundibugyo District
May 19- May 21	Bakatusuka B. Boniface, Inspector of Schools Kamero K. Elastus, Chairperson Education Commission Dr Bamwitirebye Peter, Ag. Ass. D.E.O. Besemelyo Schola, Mataisa Women Justus B. Kayarwa, D/Speaker Tom Ahimbisibwe, WFP Wamuyu Maina, Evaluation Team Member Dr Sikyemaude WM, DDHS Babungi Silvano K., District Chairperson

	Gulu District
May 22- May 24	<p>WFP STAFF Amos Mwesiigye, Programme Officer, WFP Ruth Butao Ayoade, Programme Officer/Head of Sub-Office, Gulu Elvis G. Odeke, Programme Assistant, WFP-Gulu Josephine R. Ojera, WFP-Gulu</p> <p>GOVERNMENT Lt Col Walter Ochora Odoch, Chairman, Gulu District Council Hon. Oryem Jackson, District Vice Chairman, Gulu District Council Musa Ecweru, RDC-Gulu Uma Charles, Assistant CAO/Clerk to District Council and i/c DDMC LC5 Capt K Magara, Pro-UPDF 4TH Division Jackson Boyem, Dist Vice Chairman Gulu Ochen D. Willy, District Fisheries Officer Charles Uma, Asst. Chief Administration Officer-Gulu Lakor Jackson, AG, DAO-Gulu Lt. Victor Apure, Political Senior Mobiliser, Gulu Ochen D. Willy, DFO Ocan Ongom Michael, Education Officer Lakor Jackson, Agric Officer Anna Bala, L.C. III Babi Obwoya Walter, L.C. III Lamogi Odida Masimo, C/Person L.C. III Atiak Obwoya Patrick, for District Engineer, Gulu Obiya Ikarekiyak, Chairman L.C. III Anna Bala, Councillor L.C. III, Bobi Obwoya Walter, Chairman L.C. III Lamogi</p>
	<p>NON-GOVERNMENT Liv Morberg, Field Officer, UN OCHA, Gulu Piloya Grace, IOM Erling Bratheim, Project Leader, Food Distribution, Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) Ojera Kennedy, Field Officer, RDI Obina Peter, Co-Ordinator, GFDA Opira Charles Demas, Data Clerk/Micro Project Officer, Gulu Women Empowerment Network (GWENET) Akech Christine, Nutritionist, ACF Bruno Corrado, MD, Deputy Director, Lacor Hospital Adong Gertrude Okot, I/C Stores, Lacor Hospital Okao Abdanah, Project Officer, CRS Celestino Opobo, Catechist, Holy Rosmary William Thomas Otto, Coordinator, Paan Orphanage Aber Florence, Chairperson, Paal Orphanage Okor Peter, ACF Gulu Charles Komakech, SCF Denmark Gulu Malfrid Anestad, NRC</p>

	<p>Ojera Kennedy, Field Officer, RDI Akech Christine, Action Against Hunger Ochora Ochitti, DPC Gusco, Gulu Ongom Akoko, Distribution Officer, GFDA Atine Aleo, Development Facilitator, World Vision Ocowcin Christopher, Radio 4, Gulu John Opio, Radio Freedom (FM), Gulu</p>
	Kitgum District
June 1	<p>Caroline Opok, HoFO, WFP Filder Sharon Odong, Field Monitor, WFP Richard Osia, Data/Logistics Clerk, WFP Ambrose Olaa, Community Development Officer, Kitgum Simon Opio, District Administrative Officer, Kitgum Mercy Auguste, Field Officer, UNHCR Jeffrey Donahue, Field Coordinator, IRC Dr. Michael Otim, Project Coordinator, CARE Andrew Obol, Field Coordinator, Caritas/CRS Christopher Ofsu Onok, Program Officer, ICRC-Kitgum David Okware, Program Ass., AVSI Terence Aroge, TFC Supervisor, St. Joseph's Hospital Oruk Hussein, Admin. Officer, NRC, Anne Kipola, Programme Officer, NRC Francis Obote, Logistics/Field Officer, NRC</p>
	FIELD WORK TEAM B
	Arua District
May 19	<p>WFP staff Stanley Miseleni, HoSO, UNHCR Horace Anguzu, Prog. Ass., UNHCR Muzamil Chabo, Field Ass., UNHCR Martin Malinga, HoSO, WFP Collins Nyeko, Log. Clerk/FM, WFP Peter Otto, Field Monitor, Pakelle</p>
May 19	<p>Imwepi Camp, Arua – Briefing with partners J. Soyekwo, OPM, Imwepi Isaac Ocosoko, UNHCR Stephen Lumumba, Field Coordinator, DED, Imwepi Daniel Okirur, DED, Imwepi Julius Tomiso, DED Imwepi Martin Mapabi, DED, Imwepi Drakua Akim, DED, Imwepi Richard Abidrabo, DED, Imwepi Robert Lomumbe, DED, Imwepi Robert Inziko, DED Imwepi</p>

May 21	Local Government, Arua District – Briefing with District Officials Nyalulu Okoth, RDC, Arua Haruna D. Seboi, Deputy RDC, Arua Alex Jurua, Chairman LC5, Arua George Ambe, Vice Chairman LC5, Arua Francis Drasa, Security Secr., Arua Caroline Arubaku, District Agricultural Officer, Arua Ambako Kibray, DSO, Arua Mr. Wafula, Head of OPM, Arua
	Adjumani
May 22	Nixon Owole, Chairman LC5, Adjumani Philip Mondia, Vice Chairman LC5, Adjumani
	Pakelle
May 22	WFP, Pakelle – Briefing with Staff Gordon Lakidi, HoFO a.i., WFP, Pakelle Beatrice Lakot, Field Monitor, WFP Pakelle
May 22	WFP Pakelle – Briefing with partner agencies Gabriel Joseph Bagui, HoSO Pakelle, Adjumani Ms. Kyi Kyi, Field Officer, UNHCR C.B. Opio, Acting Desk Officer, OPM Adjumani Girma Kibret, Project Coordinator, AHA Stephen Warri, Ag. Prog. Coordinator, ACORD V. Vuzzi Azza, Ass. Prog. Coordinator, ACORD Stefano Canu, Project Director, JRS Francis G. Iwa, Field Coordinator, LWF
	Moyo District
May 25	Local Government, Moyo – Briefing with District Officials and partners Onama Gray Chairman LC5, Moyo Gregory Drale, Vice Chairman LC5, Moyo J.P. Odonguara, Chief-Administrative Officer, Moyo Gilbert Mutai, Field Officer, UNHCR Richard Ewila, Field Officer, UNHCR Jackson Vunni, ACORD, Moyo

ANNEX D

ORIGINAL ESTIMATE OF FOOD AID REQUIREMENTS

UGANDA PRRO 6176.00 - FOOD AID REQUIREMENTS BY COMPONENT, TARGET GROUP AND RATION										
Component	Year	Days	Beneficiaries	Cereals	Pulses	Oil	Sugar	CSB	Total	
Protracted Relief										
Refugees	2000/1	365	130000	18980	2847	949			22776	tons
				400	60	20			480	gm
	2001/2	365	60000	8760	1314	438			10512	tons
				400	60	20			480	gm
IDPs North	2000/1	365	130000	14235	2847	712			17794	tons
				300	60	15			375	gm
	2001/2	365	10000	1095	219	55			1369	tons
IDPs West				300	60	15			375	gm
	2000/1	120	60000	2880	432	144			3456	tons
				400	60	20			480	gm
Total			390000	45950	7659	2298			55907	tons
Recovery activities										
Returnees/ abductees	2000/1	180	3000	189	54	14	11	41	309	tons
				350	100	25	20	75	57	gm
	2001/2	180	2000	126	36	9	7	27	205	tons
				350	100	25	20	75	570	gm
Mother/child health	2000/1	365	6000			55	44	548	647	tons
						25	20	250	295	gm
	2001/2	365	6000			55	44	548	647	tons
						25	20	250	295	gm

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Abandoned/ orphaned	2000/1	365	3000	383	110	27	22	82	624	tons
				350	100	25	20	75	570	gm
	2001/2	365	3000	383	110	27	22	82	624	tons
				350	100	25	20	75	570	gm
School children	2000/1	220	100000	4400	1320	330			6050	tons
				200	60	15			275	gm
	2001/2	220	150000	6600	1980	495			9075	tons
				200	60	15			275	gm
Rehabilitation /FFW	2000/1	120	60000	2880	432	144			3456	tons
				400	60	20			1920	gm
	2001/2	120	80000	3840	576	192			4608	tons
				400	60	20			1920	gm
Food for training	2000/1	60	6000	144	22	7			173	tons
				400	60	20			960	gm
	2001/2	60	14000	336	50	17			403	tons
				400	60	20			960	gm
Total			433000	19281	4690	1372	150	1328	26821	tons
Sub-total	2000/1		498000	44091	8064	2382	77	671	55285	tons
Sub-total	2001/2		325000	21140	4285	1288	73	657	27443	tons
TOTAL FOR TWO YEARS				65231	12349	3670	150	1328	82728	tons

ANNEX E

PERFORMANCE AGAINST ASSESSED NEED BASED ON RATIONS PROVIDED

PRRO 6176 - Performance against assessed beneficiary needs based on rations provided									
	Plan. Rationⁱ	Act. Ration 1	Act. Ration 2	Plan. Benef. ii	Benef. 1	Benef. 2	Needs 1+ 2ⁱⁱⁱ	Act. Distr. iv	% Variance^v
Gulu									
<i>Cereals</i>	300	100	0	130,000 ⁱ	340,420	0	12,255,120	8,361,867	68%
<i>Pulses</i>	60	40	0		340,420	0	4,902,048	2,157,477	44%
<i>Oil</i>	15	10	0		340,420	0	1,225,512	663,067	54%
Kitgum									
<i>Cereals</i>	300	200	400		74,567 ⁱⁱ	8,079 ⁱⁱⁱ	6,622,925	5,269,029	80%
<i>Pulses</i>	60	30	60		74,567	8,079	993,438	694,739	70%
<i>Oil</i>	15	10	20		74,567	8,079	326,610	244,694	75%
Bundibugyo									
<i>Cereals</i>	400	200	0	60,000 ^{iv}	116,746 ^v	0	8,404,712	6,580,209	78%
<i>Pulses</i>	60	30	0		116,746	0	1,260,856	895,300	71%
<i>Oil</i>	20	10	0		126,096 ^{vi}	0	151,315 ^{vii}	138,086	91%
Achol Pii									
<i>Cereals</i>	400	450	0	130,000 ^{viii}	25,164 ^{ix}	0	4,076,568	3,183,339	78%
<i>Pulses</i>	60	60	0		25,164	0	543,542	424,445	78%
<i>Oil</i>	20	20	0		25,164	0	181,180	141,482	78%
Arua (Rhino/Imwepi)									
<i>Cereals</i>	400	90	450		40,500 ^x	7,850 ^{xi}	2,583,900	2,278,790	89%
<i>Pulses</i>	60	24	60		40,500	7,850	519,480	473,871	91%
<i>Oil</i>	20	8	20		40,500	7,850	173,160	149,938	87%
Rations have changed in Moyo/Adjumani over the last 12 months. See annex.									
Adjumani/Moyo^{xii}									
<i>Cereals</i>	400					^{xiii}	4,902,058	4,848,917	99%
<i>Pulses</i>	60					0	921,878	762,432	83%
<i>Oil</i>	20					0	338,604	329,507	97%
Kiryandongo									
<i>Cereals</i>	400	450 ^{xiv}	121 ^{xv}		2,705 ^{xvi}	5,394	636,654 ^{xvii}	384,000	60%
<i>Pulses</i>	60	60	27 ^{xviii}		2,705	5,394	110,858	72,000	65%
<i>Oil</i>	20	20	8 ^{xix}		2,705	5,394	35,011	27,600	79%

- i. Planning rations as specified in the PRRO document.
- ii. Planned beneficiaries as in PRRO document.
- iii. Calculation:
 - Ration x 360 days (not 365) x population
 - Ration used is the actual ration applied under first 12 month of PRRO - not planned ration.
- iv. Data from "Summary Table for Food Distribution, Beneficiaries and Recipients of Food Aid in Uganda pr. Camp" presented to the team.
- v. Different from Summary Table as 'revised' ration is not transparent.
- vi. Planning figure of 130,000 covers all IDP's in the North (both Gulu/Kitgum)
- vii. Population in 5 camps registered in 1997
- viii. Population in 3 camps registered in 1999
- ix. Planning figure of 60,000 for IDPs in West
- x. Average figure over 12 months, assuming 96,507 beneficiaries in the last 5 months. 5667 congolese refugees not included
- xi. Average of 4 months, since effective August 2000 oil was phased out
- xii. Actual needs estimated for four months only
- xiii. Figure covers refugees in West Nile, Achol Pii and Kiryandongo
- xiv. Average figure over 12 month
- xv. Average figure based on Distribution reports
- xvi. Average figure based on Distribution report. Category includes EVI's and New Arrivals
- xvii. Rations have been adjusted upwards and downwards in Moyo/Adjumani over the last 12 months based on JFAM recommendations. See Annex for intricate counting of figures in Adjumani and Moyo.
- xviii. See Annex for Population figures for Moyo and Adjumani
- xix. VG's and people with no access to land have been on full ration throughout.
- xx. Average ration based on 4 different rations (4 months at 135 and 7 at 112,5). Cereal was phased out effective March 2001
- xxi. Total figure of 8099 Beneficiaries in Kiryandongo differs with 188 from the figure recognised by the CO. Annex figure is based on JFAM counts for reasons of counting the 3 different rations used over three different periods of the first 12 months.
- xxii. Only assumes 11 months ration for Benef. 2 as cereals were phased out effective March 2001
- xxiii. Average ration calculated on the basis of 3 different rations used in 3 different periods (4 mth at 33, 7 mth at 24 and 1 mth at 18 - all these rations are themselves averages of two different rations for two different populations) See annex in last JFAM
- xxiv. As with pulses: an average ration is calculated of six rations used for two population groups over three different periods. When needed, figure has been adjusted upwards.

ANNEX E1

Adjumani/Moyo rations April 2000 to March 2001 (based on JFAM figures)							
	Apr - Aug 2000	Sep - Feb 2001	March 2001				
	Feb 2000 JFAM	Aug 2000 JFAM	Feb 2001 JFAM				
	152 days	182 days	31 days				
Cereal Ration							
	<i>Population</i>	<i>Population</i>	<i>Population</i>	<i>Tonnage (152 days)</i>	<i>Tonnage (182 days)</i>	<i>Tonnage (31 days)</i>	
225	28,170	19,169	10,323	963,414	784,970	72,003	
360	13,772	9,896	7,031	753,604	648,386	78,465	
450	4,368	4,368	7,722	298,771	357,739	107,722	
113	17,791	21,880	24,667	305,578	444,998	86,408	
0	3,835	12,623	19,438				
<i>total</i>	<i>67,936</i>	<i>67,936</i>	<i>69,181</i>	2,321,367	2,236,093	344,598	4,902,058
Pulses							
60	32,585	20,842	11,098	297,175	227,595	20,642	
45	0	0	5,504	0	0	7,678	
30	31,516	34,471	39,639	143,713	188,211	36,864	
0	3,835	12,623	12,940				
<i>Total</i>	<i>67,936</i>	<i>67,936</i>	<i>69,181</i>	440,888	415,806	65,184	921,878
Oil							
20	32,585	20,842	16,638	99,058	75,865	10,315	
10	35,351	47,094	44,911	53,733	85,711	13,922	
0	0	0	7,632	0	0	0	
<i>total</i>	<i>67,936</i>	<i>67,936</i>	<i>69,181</i>	152,791	161,576	24,237	338,604
(cc Master Annex)	Needs:	Actual Distr.	% Variance				
Cereals	4,902,058	4,848,917	99%				
Pulses	921,878	762,432	83%				
Oil	338,604	329,507	97%				
Pop. Figures:	Recommended feeding Population figures from JFAMs						

ANNEX F

FFW AND FFT ACTIVITIES IN THE FIRST YEAR OF PRRO 6176

Valley dams

In Gulu and Kitgum Districts 19,000m³ of water reservoir (valley dams) were reportedly rehabilitated. The mission was unable to visit any sites but was given the impression this was a generally successful activity. The water is intended for both human and animal consumption.

Fishponds

In Arua and Adjumani Districts fifteen fishponds were constructed among local population groups, two of which were said to be active as of 31 March 2001.

In Gulu District 21 fishponds were constructed and farmers were trained in fish farming techniques/management of ponds. However no fish fry were available and the ponds have not been stocked. The nearest fish fry facility is near Kampala (Kajanzi). The Gulu SO (and AVSI) has provided assistance to the Fisheries Department (FFW) to rehabilitate the Laliya Fish Fry Centre in Gulu (which could be operational by the end of the year). Two fishponds were constructed at Achol-Pii but presumably not stocked.

Roads

In Gulu District 182 kms of road were constructed; in Kitgum District 21 kms (plan/planned to build a 62 km road by 2001?); in Bundibugyo completed first stage of Bunyaruta IDP camp road (8 tons to 120 beneficiary families). In West Nile 37 km of roads were constructed/rehabilitated among refugees and local population. Community members interviewed claim broad support behind the road works idea. However, refugee respondents in Imvepi refugee camp claimed that the road met no important community needs and was merely a means for a few to benefit from food payments.

Oitino road/bridge/dam

By far the largest project (50% of all food used on FFA in Gulu District) involving a road, bridge, dam, and irrigation. From July 2000 to March 2001 this project had consumed 375 metric tonnes of commodities (including maize grain, maize meal, peas, beans and vegetable oil). Had problems with the productivity of workers (said to have had 3,237 workers working one day a week initially) with an output of only 0.1 cubic metres per worker day. Switched to a full time workforce of 448 (100 of whom women), replaced every two months. Not clear who will get the benefit of irrigation if project completed. Men in control of project not women.

Reforestation

In West Nile 36,350 seedlings reportedly raised and 43,000 trees planted among refugees and local population. In Gulu and Kitgum Districts 24,500 seedlings said to have been raised. The mission visited Pabbo Camp where Emmanuel International run a small agro-forestry project. WFP provides FFW for the nursery and for planting out the seedlings. EI told the mission that food is a hindrance when provided as an incentive to plant trees because people come for the food and don't look after the seedlings. However, they said it was useful for opening land for the nursery and for paying the nursery workers. People are interested in planting trees at home because rebels unlikely to disturb them and will be a good resource later.

Community stores

Four food stores were constructed among refugees and local population in Arua and Adjumani Districts. During discussions with refugees in Maaji settlement in Rhino camp it became apparent that those who did not have a direct involvement with the stores did not feel they benefited the community as a whole. Many rejected the notion that the stores protected against theft, explaining that in their attacks LRA would not wait for food to end up in the stores, but instead steal it directly from the fields. Partly for this reason, a recent evaluation of this activity under DASS has recommended that further construction of the stores be halted till the three existing ones prove their worth. Plans were originally made for ten stores.

Schools

WFP reports that 23 school facilities were improved among refugees in Rhino Camp. However, the mission found that a school construction project in Quiver, Rhino camp initiated in August 2000 has so far only succeeded in providing bricks for the basic wall structure. Providers of remaining structural components and NFIs for the interior have not yet been identified.

In Gulu District 210,000 bricks were burned for a total of 50 classrooms in nine schools but it is not clear if the bricks were used. The mission was told that the majority of bricks were not utilised due to the lack of NFIs. In Bundibugyo District thirteen schools have been assessed for assistance but work has yet to commence.

Community centres

Ten community centres were constructed/rehabilitated among refugees in Rhino Camp. In Odubo settlement in Rhino Camp the mission saw a community centre and offices located just next to a big primary school. At another site in Rhino Camp a community centre was located next to a church. The church was well-maintained while the centre was not. Refugees explained that, in fact, the church and the school often served as a centre and meeting place.

Production

In Kiryandongo refugees came up with a proposal for cassava multiplication using schools. They prepared the gardens but OPM did not supply the planting material. Nobody was paid but they did get some tools. The refugees involved put in maize and beans instead.

Post Harvest Handling and Storage

1,080 farmers were trained in post harvest handling and storage in Yumbe, West Nile.

Sanitation

16 community pit latrines were constructed in Rhino Camp and garbage collection was conducted in Bundibugyo town camps (through MSF - 6 beneficiaries only).

Spring protection

In Bundibugyo District WFP provided food for the protection of Bumadu Spring near an IDP camp (through MSF).

ANNEX G

NUTRITIONAL SURVEYS AND FOOD NEEDS ASSESSMENTS IN THE FIRST YEAR OF PRRO 6176

PRRO 6716	Refugees			IDPs		
	<i>West Nile</i>	<i>Kiryandongo</i>	<i>Achol - Pii</i>	<i>Gulu</i>	<i>Kitgum</i>	<i>Bundibugyo</i>
April 200	Nutrition Survey ¹ HH Food Survey ²	Nutrition Survey				
May	JFAM ³		Nutrition Survey	EFNA	EFNA	EFNA
June						
July						
August						
September						
October	EFNA ⁴ Nutrition Survey.. ⁵	Nutrition Survey		Nutrition Survey (Pader, Oxfam)		
November	Mini - EFNA ⁶					
December						
January 2001						
February	Mini - JFAM ⁷					
March (April)	Mini EFNA ⁸					
(May)						

NB: All nutrition surveys were conducted by ACF-USA unless specified otherwise.

¹ Adjumani and Mojo Districts (only)

² Household Food Availability Survey in Phased Out Refugees Settlements in Moyo and Adjumani, UNHCR Sub-Office Pakelle, May 2000. WFP and several NGOs participated.

³ Joint Food Assessment Mission, 1 - 11 August 2000

⁴ Moyo District (only)

⁵ Rhino Camp, Imvepi, Adjumani

⁶ Mini-EFNA conducted in one settlement, Zone 4, in Adjumani District

⁷ 31 January to 8 February 2001

⁸ Mini-EFNA conducted in same settlement as in Nov. 2000

ANNEX H

REPORTING ARRANGEMENTS FOR PRRO 6176

- a) Field reports from IPs: IPs are providing information to the SOs using various formats (and therefore providing different types of information), with a focus on quantitative data, primarily food utilization. The periodicity varies from weekly, bi-monthly to monthly. There appear to be no standard reports for standard activities such as school feeding, GFD and FFA. No regular post-distribution or nutritional monitoring is reflected in the reports reviewed.
- b) Sub-Office Situation Reports: Each SO sends a fortnightly SitRep to the CO (this has recently been changed to monthly). The contents are primarily descriptive updates of activities (which are variable), with almost no information on outputs and none on impact.
- c) Email communications: Although it is not formally part of the reporting chain there is a lot of email traffic between SOs/FOs and the CO and some of this includes reporting.
- d) CO reports to the Regional Bureau: Based on the Sitreps from the SOs, the CO sends a fortnightly report to the Regional Bureau at HQ (also recently changed to monthly). The reports are informative but would not adequately allow busy regional managers to keep abreast of achievements, setbacks and problems which need to be addressed. It is not clear how valuable these reports are to the Bureau.
- e) CO Management Report for Uganda: Prepared every six months by the CO, it covers all interventions as well as CO management issues. The report is sent to the Regional Bureau. It is informative and gives a good overview although the focus is primarily on the pipeline situation and food deliveries. It is a summary document and evidently not intended to provide the basis for management decisions regarding the PRRO, but it would be useful if it contained a brief indication of performance against targets in relation to relief and recovery activities and outputs and some indication of achievement of objectives.
- f) Commodity tracking and pipeline reports: A Commodity Situation Report is prepared every 6 months and shows what has been received from donors against pledges. It also specifies how much ITSH and DOC has been received and used. A pipeline report described as Planning Figures, Food Requirements, and Food Shortfalls report highlights shortfalls. The latter is in a very clear and useful format (the report for May 2001 – December 2001 shows that there is essentially no maize to meet projected requirements in September, October, November and no pulses August through December).
- g) Standard Project Report (annual): This reports covers the calendar year and is prepared for RE (and therefore for donors). The 2000 report for PRRO 6176 is not yet finished and so could not be reviewed. The purpose of this report is to provide information to donors, and therefore it is not intended to capture the information needed to manage the intervention. The 1999 report for the predecessor EMOP includes a report format for ‘actual output vs revised/planned output (%)’ but it was filled out.

ANNEX I

TRAINING UNDERTAKEN SINCE JANUARY 2000

March 2000: **PRRO and Food for Assets Training Workshops**, Gulu, Kitgum, Moroto, Kotido – WFP staff, IPs, district officials

March 2000: **PRRO and Nutrition workshop**, Aura, Pakelle, Moyo – WFP staff, IPs, district officials

June 2000: **Multi-purpose Logistic Assistant Training**

August 2000: **H/Hold Food Economy Assessment**

September/October 2000: **On-the-job training in EFNA** (this is on-going) - WFP staff, IPs, district officials, camp officials

October 2000: **Regional Gender Sensitive Project Design, Monitoring and Evaluation Workshop** – some CO staff

October 2000: **Storekeeping refresher, CTS back-up; CTS, Stage two training**

January 2001: **Great Lakes Nutrition Programming Workshop** – some CO staff

April 2001: **FAAD Training Workshop**, Nairobi – some CO staff

October 2000, March 2001: **Security Awareness Training**– all WFP staff

ANNEX J: CHECKLIST FOR MEETING THE COMMITMENTS TO WOMEN & MAINSTREAMING A GENDER PERSPECTIVE

Essential Elements of Commitments to Women and Gender Mainstreaming Policy	Detailed Observations	Level of PRRO Coherence With Commitments to Women and Gender Mainstreaming Policy			
		Very High	High	Low	Very Low
Commitment I: Provide Direct Access to Appropriate Food for Women					
◆ Does the PRRO make a real effort to get food into the hands of women, e.g. through women's ration cards?	Generally, WFP and its IPs have made efforts to encourage a greater number of women to collect rations on behalf of their families. Outcomes are uncertain because there is little reporting of who collects rations on behalf of the family, nor is there reporting of control of the family entitlement. Having women head beneficiary units on distribution lists facilitates their collection and control of rations.		X		
◆ Do the PRRO activities address micronutrient deficiencies amongst women and children?	Conscious attempts are made to meet the nutritional requirements of vulnerable populations and monitor their nutritional status, notably in refugee camps and settlements through regular nutrition surveys under the auspices of UNHCR. The lack of same in IDP camps require attention.		X		
◆ Do the PRRO activities consider local cooking and eating habits?	Local cooking and eating habits were probably considered, although there is no evidence of flexibility other than in relation to providing milled maize in some instances.			X	
◆ Have women been consulted in determining the food basket?	Apparently not.				X
◆ Are female-headed households given special attention because of their greater poverty and time constraints?	Not by WFP or its IPs. It is possible, however, that there is some positive social redistribution within the camps. This deserves further enquiry.				X

Essential Elements of Commitments to Women and Gender Mainstreaming Policy	Detailed Observations	Level of PRRO Coherence With Commitments to Women and Gender Mainstreaming Policy			
		Very High	High	Low	Very Low
◆ Does the PRRO make an effort to reduce the security and/or health risks women face when collecting food?	Perilous ‘scrambles’ have developed at some distribution sites, notably in IDP camps, at which women and children in particular have been at risk when collecting their rations. This is an issue that must be urgently addressed.			X	
Commitment II: Take Measures to Ensure Women’s Equal Access to and Full Participation in Power Structures and Decision-Making					
◆ Does the PRRO address women’s strategic needs, i.e., use an approach that challenges traditional gender roles and empowers women? Describe how.	Representation of women on food distribution committees and the level of authority of women is generally satisfactory, more so in IDP camps than in refugee camps/settlements. Involvement of women in food management committees and camp leadership is assisting women in gaining confidence. This, however, cannot be verified in the absence of monitoring data. Cultural and religious factors play a role and women in some areas are less vocal and empowered. No leadership training or other capacity building has been provided to women.		X		
◆ Does it address gender relations? Does it bring men into the dialogue around the issues of women’s status?	Not to the team’s knowledge.				
Commitment III: Take Positive Action to Facilitate Women’s Equal Access to Resources, Employment, Markets and Trade					
◆ Are PRRO resources deliberately targeted to women and girls where there is a big gender gap, i.e. of 25%? ¹ What is done?	Targets are set in the PRRO Document including 65-70% of recovery resources and a minimum 50% of educational resources, and at least 30% of project outputs/assets created through FFW. Recovery activities were very limited due to ongoing insecurity, so the conditions were arguably not present to improve women’s access to employment, markets and trade.			X	

¹ For information on the gender gap in your country, contact the Senior Gender Adviser, SPP at HQ.

Essential Elements of Commitments to Women and Gender Mainstreaming Policy	Detailed Observations	Level of PRRO Coherence With Commitments to Women and Gender Mainstreaming Policy			
		Very High	High	Low	Very Low
◆ Does the PRRO have incentive programs to address the gender gap in primary education? What are they?	No.				
◆ Do women participate in FFW? As labourers or also as decision-makers? Do they control the assets created?	Many FFW interventions have fallen short of addressing gender issues in their formulation or identifying who will benefit from the assets created. In addition, whether women's needs are being addressed and what benefits they actually receive is not being monitored. The CO is aware of <i>inter alia</i> this shortcoming in relation to FFW and is planning to address them.			X	
◆ Is there any opportunity in the PRRO for women to learn new skills through FFT for greater development sustainability?	FFT arguably has been under-utilized as an intervention modality to target women for skills development.			X	
◆ Does the PRRO engage in advocacy on behalf of women? For gender equity? To leverage resources for partnership work?	Not to the Teams's knowledge.				
Commitment IV: Generate and Disseminate Gender-Disaggregated Data for Planning and Evaluation					
◆ Are the M&E systems used in the PRRO sensitive to gender? Explain how.	The PRRO Document only includes Commitment III in its objectives and the WFP Uganda 2001 Gender Action Plan only makes reference to PRRO 6176 under Commitment III. The CO's Workplan 2001 itself barely mentions gender and does not refer specifically to any of the Commitments to Women. Thus the basis for monitoring the Commitments to Women is lacking in PRRO 6176.			X	

Essential Elements of Commitments to Women and Gender Mainstreaming Policy	Detailed Observations	Level of PRRO Coherence With Commitments to Women and Gender Mainstreaming Policy			
		Very High	High	Low	Very Low
♦ Is qualitative information sensitive to gender also collected?	Gender sensitive post-distribution monitoring was not undertaken in the first year of the PRRO other than as part of the EFNA exercises, however, the importance of post-distribution monitoring has been recognised by the CO and there is a commitment to introduce it.			X	
♦ Does the PRRO look at inputs, outputs outcomes and impact from a gender perspective?	Little output and outcome monitoring to gauge progress and performance against objectives, hereunder in relation to gender, is undertaken in general. In relation to FFW, the CO is planning to strengthen this.			X	
Commitment V: Improve Accountability of Actions Taken to Meet the Commitments					
♦ Are WFP staff managing the PRRO held accountable for meeting the Commitments to Women and mainstreaming gender? How?	Not as far as the team is aware.				X
♦ Is the Gender Focal Point given sufficient authority to influence decision making with regard to the PRRO? Support?	There is no indication that the Gender Focal Point lacked authority.		X		
♦ Are implementing partners held accountable for meeting the Commitments to Women and mainstreaming gender? How?	The LOAs signed with IPs in 2001 refer to WFP's Commitments to Women and require certain actions of them, although they deal with the Commitments in different ways and to different extents. It is unclear how well the SOs/FOs have been monitoring IP performance in relation to the Commitments.			X	