



World Food Programme

A Report from the Office of Evaluation

*Full Report of the Evaluation of
PRRO Somalia 6073.00, “Food Aid
for Relief and Recovery in Somalia”*

(4 – 24 July 2001)

Rome, January 2002

Ref. OEDE/2002/04



Acknowledgement

The evaluation team visited Somalia from 4 to 24 July 2001. This document was prepared by the mission team leader on the basis of the mission's work in the field.

On behalf of the team, the author wishes to extend thanks to all those who facilitated the team's work in the field and in Headquarters.

Responsibility for the opinions expressed in this report rests solely with the authors. Publication of this document does not imply endorsement by WFP of the opinions expressed.

Mission Composition

- Mr. Julius Holt, Mission Leader/Food Security Expert, OEDE Consultant
- Ms. Ifigenia Metaxa, Logistics Expert, OEDE Consultant

The mission was organized by Ms. Maha Ahmed, Evaluation Officer, OEDE



Table of Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	iii
--------------------------------	------------

1. THE CONTEXT OF THE PROTRACTED CRISIS AND WFP PRRO	
1.1 The Evolution of the protracted situation.....	1
1.2 Food insecurity and poverty	1
1.3 Rationale for WFP assistance to the PRRO	4
2. PRRO RECOVERY STRATEGY AND DESIGN	
2.1 Formulation of the recovery strategy	5
2.2 Assessment of the PRRO strategy and design.....	6
3. ACHIEVEMENT OF THE PRRO OBJECTIVES	
3.1 Overview of resource allocation	7
3.2 Aspects of the regional programmes visited by the evaluation team.....	10
3.3 Appropriateness of food aid	14
3.4 Social institutions support and the future.....	15
3.5 Appropriateness of rations.....	16
4. FACTORS IN THE EFFECTIVENESS AND SUSTAINABILITY OF THE PRRO	
4.1 Relevance of policies, guidelines and directives on PRROs	17
4.2 Assessment and targeting	18
4.3 Monitoring and evaluation	19
4.4 Implementing partners	20
4.5 Effectiveness of logistics arrangements	22
4.6 Human resources	26
4.7 Budget and financial resources for preparation and implementation.....	27
5. MEETING THE COMMITMENTS TO WOMEN.....	29
6. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT.....	31
7. RECOMMENDATIONS AND LESSONS.....	31

ANNEXES

ANNEX 1	Evaluation issues and method
ANNEX 2	Checklist for meeting WFP's Commitments to Women
ANNEX 3	Persons interviewed
ANNEX 4	Documents reviewed
ANNEX 5	Terms of Reference for the evaluation



Executive Summary

The Somalia PRRO 6073.00 was evaluated in July 2001 at the end of year two of its current three-year phase. The PRRO came at the end of a decade, which began with clan warfare and famine as Somalia broke apart. Since that time the south and centre of the country have continued with no central government, but large areas have seen diminishing conflict, although the capital city, Mogadishu, remains riven by factions. The secessionist North-West and North-East regions have been largely peaceful for a decade, developing their own government systems. The PRRO follows upon EMOPs, which were a response to both population displacements and drought caused a further emergency with which the PRRO began.

The PRRO was designed to concentrate some 70% of its resources in the south, where the main agriculture takes place in this predominantly pastoral country, and where drought and flood as well as conflict have contributed to often acute food insecurity. Overall in the three-year period, 63,104MT of food would be distributed, reaching a yearly total of 1.32mn people of whom a little over half would be direct beneficiaries. Rehabilitation & recovery (R&R) projects would take 51% of the food, emergency relief an estimated 30% and support for social institutions the remaining 19%.

In the event, 31,172 MT had been distributed between July 1999 and May 2001, but the initial drought relief exercise had meant that slightly more food had gone to relief (42%) than to R&R (40%). Once the rains returned in 2000, R&R activities came into full swing. The PRRO format had thus allowed a flexible response to prevailing conditions, as well as continuity. Donor pledges, although generally short term, have kept the pipeline going; but in mid-2001 there was concern at a potential pipeline break later in the year if pledges for the anticipated new emergency relief exercise did not emerge in time.

The PRRO has encompassed considerable differences in programmes in different regions; for instance, Support to Social Institutions accounted for only some 4% of food aid in the Bay/Bakool area (the biggest operation of the PRRO) as against some 26% of food aid in the North-West (the second biggest operation). To a considerable extent this reflects differences in local conditions, with a far larger, functioning urban sector in the North-West. However, this use of food aid may become less appropriate over the years in areas where general economic and social conditions continue to achieve a kind of normalcy.

A problem common to most regions has been the lack of substantial, experienced Implementing Partners in the field, although the PRRO has had a strong partnership with UNICEF and a handful of international NGOs. Also partnerships exist with a few functioning line ministries in the North-West and North-East, although these still have limited outreach. For the most part the channel has either been local authorities, especially in the south, or very small and new local NGOs. R&R projects have typically been small and very short-term, and WFP staff has had to identify, negotiate, supervise and monitor a large number of separate projects. They seem to have done this with dedication and imagination, and with an eye for abuses such as false beneficiary numbers at an orphanage or food-for-work being sub-contracted out. Periodic emergency relief exercises have also required a hands-on approach by WFP staff, including those called out from the Country Office in Nairobi to assist.



In the south, WFP officers have made increasing efforts to work directly with communities, undercutting the tendency for a top-down approach displayed by the authorities, but doing so with sufficient tact to retain the trust essential for the continuation of the programme. It is clear that major efforts have been made to meet WFP commitments to women, including continued insistence upon women physically receiving relief rations for the family, the promotion of women's participation in adult literacy projects, the membership of women on relief committees and their involvement in project management. On the other hand, female participation in food-for-work still tends to be low, and where the reason is discrimination WFP continues to apply what pressure it can.

For food security assessment and early warning of emergency requirements, WFP as well as donors and others have been able to rely heavily upon the Food Security Assessment Unit for Somalia, co-ordinated for its first few years by WFP itself. However, WFP also relies on its own field staff and Implementing Partners, especially for information on groups of people below the district level. Project monitoring by field staff and Implementing Partners has been stronger on quantitative rather than qualitative reporting. M&E procedures are under review with a view simplifying reporting formats but encouraging more analytical capacity.

Logistics faces the challenges of insecurity and a road infrastructure in very poor condition over large distances, and of a limited number of contractors able and willing to take the cargo. Transport costs in this PRRO are consequently relatively high, and WFP Somalia has been concerned to reduce them by whatever means possible. Special effort has gone into increasing competition amongst contractors for the business, most recently by reducing the level of the security bond deposit required of them for deliveries in south and central Somalia, which has greatly contributed to the safe arrival of cargo for several years. Other measures taken by WFP in 2000 had already reduced LTSH costs by 17%. Beyond this, commendable efforts to reduce Direct Support costs have included a major reduction in the non-food Items budget and a reduction of the contribution deemed necessary towards the joint UN air support facility.

The Evaluation Team appreciates the overall success of this PRRO in often difficult conditions, but offers some recommendations referring in effect to different time-scales. For the present, it is suggested that the policy on excluding oil from the emergency ration be reviewed, and that at all events the ration be made up to 2100 kcal pppd by adding one or other item. On the logistics front, consideration should be given to further reducing the security bond by a further 10-20% in relatively secure areas. For the short-to-medium term, it is suggested that the vulnerability status of poorer pastoralists be reviewed and further consideration given to the feasibility of project assistance to them. It is recommended that more attention be given to the use of formal indicators for beginning and ending projects. It is also suggested that it would be helpful to fund some case studies on the status and selection of project beneficiaries, and secondly on beneficiaries' receipt and use of emergency rations as a boost to post-distribution monitoring.

Looking to the longer term period of an anticipated extension to the PRRO, it is suggested that recovery strategy should deal with the growing difference between conditions in the north and the south. Specifically in the north where feasible, projects which are somewhat more extended over time and space should be looked for with line ministries e.g. in agriculture, water and education. At the same time the spectrum of social institution support projects should be limited, favouring association with strong Implementing Partners, and with a view to eventual phasing out.



1. The Context of the Protracted Crisis and WFP PRRO

1.1 The evolution of the protracted situation

The polity of Somalia imploded in January 1991, contributing to a famine in which WFP provided emergency food aid for nearly 1.5mn people. Since that time Somalia has been a country without a central government, and the southern part of the country has seen continuing inter-clan strife, centred on local ‘warlords’ and encompassing the capital, Mogadishu, and many districts. In the North-West and North-East regions of the country relative peace has prevailed, and the local authorities have declared their areas as independent nations (*Somaliland*, *Puntland*); but these have not received international recognition.

Because of the lack of a central authority in the country, the aid community has adopted an ‘area-based approach’, responding to the humanitarian needs of the place and the moment. The North-West and North-East regions are termed *recovery zones*. Here government administration and policing, and public services in the form of schools and medical centres operate, however minimally, under the aegis of a central ‘government’ which is recognised by the communities over which it claims authority, and to which they pay tax. *Somaliland* has the stronger structure in this sense, although clan tensions still call the location of the eastern ‘border’ into question. *Puntland* has more such tensions, but remains basically stable.¹

The central regions and some southern areas are seen as *zones in transition* between crisis and recovery, where communities are nominally answerable to localised political authority, and mostly pay no taxes and receive no services, but where there is no open inter-clan or other political conflict. The rest of the south consists of *zones of crisis*, not at war all the time but prone to armed clashes between political groups, and ruled by local leaders whose longevity is determined by clan allegiance and the gun. The south overall is where humanitarian aid is most indicated and where WFP has concentrated most of its resources.

In August 2000 a 245-member ‘Transitional National Administration’ was formed with a set of line ministries and a President elected for a three-year term. The majority of the southern population apparently supports this but not by several warlords; and it is not recognised by the North-West and North-East authorities as having any jurisdiction over their territories. During the period of the PRRO the south in general, although still divided between hostile factions, was less volatile than in previous years. But there were no grounds for any firm prediction of lasting peace in the south, or of a rapprochement between north and south, within the remaining year of the current phase of the PRRO or indeed within any given time-frame.

1.2 Food insecurity and poverty

Somalis have been historically and culturally mainly a pastoral people, and even today livestock production is described as ‘the backbone of the economy’ for the great majority of regions, even some defined by riverine geography such as Lower Shebelle. But an increasingly large minority of people became settled or partially-settled into agriculture during the course of the last century. As of today, some 50% of the national population are pastoralists, 25% are involved

¹ Political tension increased in the north-east during the second half of 2001.



with crop production as a major part of their livelihood, and 25% are urban or peri-urban dwellers, a figure undoubtedly reflecting to some extent the displacement of rural people caused by war and drought. The south is the particular home of agriculture, with some 80% of the country's farmers, whether agro-pastoralists or, in majority, cultivators who live in the vicinity of the two main rivers, the Juba and Shebelle. These groups together form about 57% of the southern rural population, whilst the south also contains 43% of the country's pastoralists.² Lands associated with the two rivers have been the subject in the past of investment in irrigation and commercial plantations (whence the previous export of bananas), and these and other parts of the south were the subject of the government-organised settlement into agriculture of pastoralists from elsewhere in the country. The rainfed arable lands of Bay and Bakool regions are the source of some 80% of the country's sorghum, the principal nationally-produced cereal.

However, the growing dependence on rainfed agriculture of increasing numbers of formerly pastoral people brings considerable food security risks alongside the potential advantages of settlement, including greater access to education and other services (as in the neighbouring Ogaden region of Ethiopia and elsewhere in the semi-arid Horn of Africa). The phenomenon is mostly not due to any favourable trend in rainfall in these areas, but rather to the impossibility for traditional pastoralism to satisfy the needs of populations, which double every 25-30 years within the same range land. The paradox of rainfed agriculture in such areas is that wide fluctuations in rainfall performance mean remarkable, 'bumper' crops in some years but poor or failed crops in rather more years. This is to say that beneath and beyond the ravages of warfare in recent years there lies a long-term economic problem, which will present the greater challenge of the future.

The south as a whole has some 60% of the national rural population as opposed to 32% in the north and 8% in the central zone. The latter zones differ from southern Somalia not only in having been more peaceful during the last ten years but also in the fact that pastoralists represent 89% of the rural population (as opposed to 57% of the total national rural population). During at least the latter half of the last century, the trade of livestock via northern ports to Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Gulf States provided the single greatest visible export income of the country. This includes cattle and camels, although sheep and goats are in the greatest number, and by the mid-1980s the north-western port of Berbera was the avenue for more than 85% of all Somalia's live animal exports.

Adding cash value to livestock through export has been one way of supporting a growing population on the range land. But official acceptance of this import by Saudi Arabia, the biggest potential customer, as well as by other importers, requires some guarantee of the health status of the animals, and in particular the credible certification of vaccination. The veterinary system was an early victim of political upheaval and warfare and has been slow to re-establish itself. On several occasions during the last ten years, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States have banned the importation of livestock from northern Somalia; the most recent episode began in September 2000 and remained current at the time of this evaluation. The loss of income to herders, traders and the sailors of the dhows mainly used for the sea passage have been a major matter of concern. In the case of herding families, the ban has direct food security implications, since

² These and the following proportional figures are calculated from food economy group population estimates given by the Food Security Assessment Unit for Somalia.



most of them expect to obtain at least half of their food – and often much more - in the form of grain from the market, for which they need the cash from livestock sales.

More generally, during the past decade rural and urban food insecurity has been triggered by two factors. Local warfare has caused both population displacement and the frequent disruption of some

principal marketing routes, e.g. the grain trade between Bay and Mogadishu. Drought has periodically struck at both livestock and crop production. Whilst rural Somali economies have traditionally been strongly adapted to the inter-annual climate swings typical of semi-arid regions, the extra impoverishment caused by the political upheaval has reduced people's ability to cope economically with a season of failed rains.

On the other hand, amongst the populations of the Horn of Africa it is the Somalis who have been perhaps the most noteworthy for their economic activity outside their own country. This has included trade and the transport sector in Kenya and far beyond, as well as maritime employment during more than a century which has resulted in the establishment of Somali communities in port-towns of Great Britain and elsewhere. In addition, educated Somalis have migrated to the Gulf, Europe and North America in considerable numbers, often as refugees, and the overall number of Somali refugees rose during the '90s beyond the fluctuating numbers in refugee camps in Kenya and Ethiopia.

Somali out-migration over many years has led to remittances from family members abroad forming a major plank of the economy, worth some hundreds of millions of dollars each year. During the last decade this has also allowed a remarkable volume of private investment in the rebuilding of destroyed towns, notably in Hargeisa, the north-western capital, and even in Mogadishu most recently, despite continued civil insecurity. The north-eastern towns of Bossaso and Garowe have also expanded markedly. However, it is less clear how far the remittance economy, let alone the urban investment, has benefited rural populations during the last decade. It appears that the receipt of remittances concerns mainly urban families, with an accent on the middle and upper economic groups rather than on the many very poor urban families, including recent returnees from refugee camps and internally displaced people. But some of this income is passed on from town families to their rural kin, at least when the latter are under unusual economic stress. Also, remittances increase urban demand not only for imported items, whether rice or *kat*³, but for rural products, especially meat and milk; in recent years fresh milk has been the subject of an expanding, daily network of motor transport in some northern areas.

Amongst the most vulnerable of the urban dwellers can be numbered IDPs especially in the capital city, Mogadishu, as well as returnees from Ethiopian refugee camps and elsewhere who form a large part of the poorer populations in northern towns. In a number of cases, these latter were originally rural dwellers that lost their livestock and therefore their grip on any viable rural existence. In turn, many are single women, with or without dependants, since the rigours of warfare, flight, and refugee camp existence over several years increased the already relatively high incidence amongst Somalis of estrangement and divorce. The upheaval also delayed the

³ *catha edulis*, a leaf chewed as a stimulant, imported from Ethiopia and Kenya and a major item of expenditure amongst urban households



marriage of younger women, some of whom were not unhappy to settle into urban living on their return (2).

The mass starvation amongst southern populations, which triggered the UNITAF/UNOSOM relief intervention from the end of 1992, has not been repeated, in part due to subsequent food aid interventions. However, the overall nutritional evidence points to continued food insecurity, which strikes at local populations from season to season. UNICEF's *End Decade Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2000*, as reported in *The State of the World's Children, 2001*, suggests that Somalia's children show a markedly lower degree of long-term malnutrition (as indicated by low weight- and height-for-age) than children for instance in Ethiopia, Eritrea or Yemen. We have seen no explanation for this, but might guess at the relative availability of animal milk for children from weaning. On the other hand, acute malnutrition – wasting – is on a par with the worst of these countries, and 'South/Central Somalia' taken separately stands out as the worst of all. This is likely to reflect the combined toll of acute local food problems and unchecked disease.

A case in point is UNICEF's April 2000 survey, in collaboration with the Food Security Assessment Unit for Somalia, of nutritional status in Bakool region (where, together with Bay region, WFP has its biggest operation). This showed global acute malnutrition rates in three districts of between 21% and 30%, suggesting a serious situation by any standards, linked to successive crop failures from mid-1999. A year later, in April 2001, a similar survey in the Jemame District of Lower Juba Region showed global malnutrition of 14.3%, a level still to cause concern. For this, different food economy groups did not stratify the statistical sample. The results appear to be a merging of higher malnutrition scores amongst both agro-pastoral and urban children (c16% global malnutrition), and lower (11%) global malnutrition amongst 'riverine' cultivators, be people with access to irrigation or flood-retreat cultivation. Displaced families tend to be amongst the most nutritionally vulnerable in the urban population, suggesting also a justification for WFP programme for IDPs in Mogadishu.

On the other hand, malnutrition is not confined either to the south of Somalia or to agricultural and urban populations. For instance, the Food Security Assessment Unit for Somalia reports in its Monthly Nutrition Update for June 2001 that in Badeweyn and Eyl MCH centres, serving pastoral areas in the North-East Region, the global malnutrition rate rose from under 10% in February 2001 to 20% and 27% respectively by April. These results are not strictly comparable to sample survey results, but indicate an upward trend in malnutrition which seems to be influenced not only by the rigours of the long dry season but by the economic effects of both price inflation and the ban on livestock exports.

1.3 Rationale for WFP assistance to the PRRO

The primary aim of WFP in this PRRO was stated succinctly in the Project Document of 1999 (1) as follows:

'The emergence of some relatively peaceful areas in Somalia and the remarkable determination of rural communities to re-establish a sense of normalcy in their lives and take charge of their own recovery and communal rehabilitation have encouraged WFP to launch a protracted relief and recovery operation. It is hoped that this move will contribute to a broader framework for integrated rehabilitation programmes in Somalia, while maintaining flexibility to both grasp development opportunities and respond to emergency situations.'



It has been possible for WFP to stick to this rationale despite continued political tension and occasional warfare in the south. The striving after rural ‘normalcy’ has continued, whilst in main

towns of the north the high level of private investment in construction has underlined an apparent faith in a peaceful future. For the most part, relief aid in the PRRO has answered to drought effects rather than to new population displacement caused by strife, although a sizeable chunk of the social institution budget has gone to IDPs and returnees of longer standing.

It should be noted that the UN Principles of Engagement with Somalia, as a country still effectively without a functioning central government, stipulate impartiality in delivering assistance, so that aid is provided throughout the country. This assistance is subject to the availability of resources, according to humanitarian needs and the prospects for sustainable peace and development. Although conditions of governance in much of the north contrast greatly with those in much of the south, WFP could not set up a regular country programme in the north without an internationally recognised government there. The choice for Somalia as of mid-2001 remained either an EMOP or a PRRO.

2 PRRO Recovery Strategy and Design

2.1 Formulation of the recovery strategy

Over the three-year period of the current PRRO, 51% of total food aid was projected to go towards the Rehabilitation and Recovery component, hereafter called ‘R&R’, as against 30% for Emergency Relief and 19% towards support to Social Institutions. The PRRO food aid would reach a yearly total of 1,320,000 people just under half of whom would be indirect beneficiaries. This coverage would represent 21% of the national population of 6.2 million in 2000 as projected in the UNDP Somalia Human Development Report (3). The PRRO would provide 63,104 MT of food commodities at a cost of just under \$55.5 million.

In the Project Document, two threats to food security were perceived to be linked: the effects of periodic droughts and crop failures were exacerbated by civil insecurity which reduced rural people’s capacity to apply traditional coping mechanisms in times of shortage. The first effect sought by R&R activities must be for beneficiaries to be strengthened in their ability to cope with adversity through resumed or strengthened economic activity. Target areas are conceived on the basis of the ‘food economy’ groups into which the Food Security Assessment Unit divides the population: rain-dependant farmers, flood irrigation farmers, pump irrigation farmers, agro-pastoralists and pastoralists.

Of the PRRO beneficiaries, 75% were to be in south & central Somalia and 25% split between the northern regions. In effect, the expectation was that the majority of WFP beneficiaries would be southerners involved in farming. The project document points to food insecurity, caused by drought and flood as well as warfare, being ‘widespread among small-scale agriculturists and agro-pastoralists, seasonal agricultural wage labourers and the urban poor’. Amongst these, ‘small external shocks, such as reduced rainfall and smouldering unrest, can result in acute vulnerability in a matter of days. Population groups with limited sources of food and income, particularly agriculturists with little or no livestock and people mainly dependent on wage labour, are continuously faced with high levels of food insecurity.’ Pastoralists (i.e. herders who practice no agriculture) were not put in the list of people thus chronically food insecure.



Targeting was defined not only in terms of those economic groups but also along social lines. In the Emergency Relief sector, apart from people affected by crop failure, targets would be IDPs, female heads of household, elderly and widowed people without sufficient clan and family

support, and the elderly and disabled amongst the urban poor. For support to Social Institutions, targets would be malnourished children and infants, expectant and nursing mothers through MCH centres, children in orphanages, primary school children during lean periods, and patients at TB hospitals. In all targeting and project decision-making, gender issues would be mainstreamed as far as possible.

2.2 Assessment of the PRRO strategy and design

EMOPs in Somalia between 1994 and mid-1999 WFP distributed upwards of 113,000 MT of food aid, reaching on average some 1.3mn beneficiaries per year. The design of the PRRO was able to make good use of WFP previous local experience. An example on the logistics side is the anticipated continuation of the bond system whereby local contractors are asked to deposit a cash or bank guarantee equal to the value of food commodities they are to transport (see section 5.5). Another important example is the gender-based distribution policy, which was introduced in 1996. More specifically the introduction in the 1997 drought response of a system to ensure as far as possible the passage of rations into the domestic sphere controlled by women, by targeting women and, as far as possible, being the direct recipients of the food (see section 6).

The anticipated R&R activities also seem to have reflected known possibilities, including for instance the rehabilitation of wells, ponds and irrigation networks and the reconstruction of river embankments. The PRRO document, despite a reference to the creation of long-term as well as short-term employment opportunities, does not propose long-term or large-scale projects in the R&R sector. This seems wise given not only the unpredictable nature of security in the majority of regions but the lack of strong governmental or NGO partners. Indeed, the PRRO strategy was already in danger of assuming more than realistic levels of co-operation with local government and partner agencies. This, even though it was noted that ‘potential partners are scarce in the most insecure and most vulnerable areas’, which are mainly in the south where the bulk of WFP assistance would be targeted. The acute differences between south and north were perhaps underplayed in the Project Document: it was likely from the beginning that the different problems and opportunities would invite substantially different responses.

However, the opportunity for ‘integrated strategies’ anywhere in Somalia would be distinctly limited by comparison with countries with well-established government and other agencies in the field, and the likelihood was always that WFP staff would often have to take a direct, ‘hands-on’ approach in order to promote local activities. In this regard, we may note that the review exercise undertaken by the Somalia office in the second year of the PRRO considered *inter alia* the relief/development link. The pursuit of the kind of community-based, bottom-up, participatory development process seen as best practice would require increased field staff; but this was felt to be somewhat at odds with the tying of Direct Support Costs to the tonnage of food aid throughput. For emergency provision too, the lack of strong Implementing Partners means that WFP not only has to temporarily employ local field assistants but must involve both field and country office staff in any substantial operation, negotiating directly with local authorities and community representatives and overseeing food delivery.



As noted in the previous section, there was an implication in the Project Document that pastoralists, who form a slight majority of the total national rural population, were less chronically food insecure than other economic groups. It may be deduced that the possession of livestock was considered to make them, of all the groups, the best positioned to secure food, whether from the market or directly in the form of animal products. On the other hand, pastoralists are noted in the document to be commonly subject to food stress towards the end of the dry seasons, as evidenced by increased malnutrition. In addition, the 'food economy baseline profiles' developed by the Food Security Assessment Unit show similar proportions of 'poor' amongst pastoral and agro-pastoral groups, at around 25-30%.

Also, it is emphasised that for pastoralists the income from the sale of livestock is critical so that the export bans must have added to their vulnerability. Pastoralists have certainly not been ignored in emergency relief; but it seems advisable now to think again about the overall food security status of poorer pastoralists and whether further R&R project assistance might be targeted at them – always recognising the difficulties inherent in pursuing projects for frequently 'moving targets'.

3. Achievement of the PRRO Objectives

3.1 Overview of resource allocation

The statistics for the period July 1999 to May 2001 (i.e. just under two of the three years of this phase) show that the PRRO had distributed 31,171MT of food aid (see Table 1 below). It amounts to 49% of the total resource projected for the three years and 74% of the target of 42,068 MT for the period in question. Fulfilment of projections is the combined function of need, opportunity and, not least, donor pledges over time.

The PRRO has performed substantially according to the pattern outlined in the Project Document, but circumstances have forced some change in the proportions of food aid devoted to the different sectors. The original projection of the division of resources between the three sectors of activity over three years must always have been indicative rather than binding, otherwise the flexibility of a PRRO would be compromised from the start.

The PRRO began from mid-1999 with a period in which relief predominated due to a series of factors: poor main (*Gu*) rains leading to a poor rainfed harvest and some population movement induced by both conflict and drought. There was added economic stress from the effects of currency devaluation and the ban from 1998 on exports of livestock to the main Saudi/Gulf markets, and a closure of the border with Kenya. Relief distributions mainly occurred up to March 2000, although continuing somewhat later in North-West region. The rains in early 2000 were much improved, especially making for a far better agricultural performance, so that the focus could now be heavily on the R&R activities, the core of the PRRO, as well as Social Support. However, as of July 2001 similar elements of stress to July 1999 threatened again, and it seemed likely that relief would again become an important factor later in 2001 at least in the south. In mid-2001 it was not clear whether anticipated new emergency food requirements would be fulfilled in time.



Table 1. Regional food distribution (in MT) by sector, July 1999 – May 2001

Region	Relief	Rehab & Rec.	Soc. Support	Total
Bay	3047.4	2121.5	345.3	5513.2
Bakool	3015.9	2826.2	94.8	5936.9
Middle Shebelle	62.4	638.0	143.4	843.7
Benadir			2140.6	2140.6
Lower Shebelle		1078.1	481.0	1559.1
Mid./Lower Juba		938.1	276.1	1214.1
Gedo	1336.5		104.7	1441.2
Hiran & Galgadud	660.0	1280.7	252.7	2193.4
North East	1906.4	1657.9	808.2	4372.5
North West	2582.4	1729.5	1644.2	5956.1
Total	12611.0	12268.9	6291.0	31170.9

The figures in Table 1 above show that over the first 23 months of the PRRO the Relief sector took up 42% of all food distributed, which is therefore significantly above the 30% projected over 36 months. R&R took 40% as opposed to 51% projected, but Social Support stayed almost exactly on course, at 18%. However, the overall percentages mask differences between areas of operation: in Bay/Bakool 53% of food aid went to relief, since drought was particularly serious in this area dominated by rainfed sorghum production. By contrast, Relief took 44% and 32% of food aid in the North-West and North-East respectively. Again, there are considerable differences from year to year as well as place to place. In 1999 55% of food aid to the North-East went to Relief as opposed to only 9% in 2000; by contrast the respective figures for the North-West were 39% and 56%. In Gedo, a temporary area of operation in the far Southwest, 93% went to relief over the whole period in question; in Benadir 100% went to Social Support in the form of assistance to IDPs and TB patients. It is concluded that the switches from the projections by sector were necessary: when required, emergency relief distributions must take precedence over other matters, however much the intended focus of the PRRO is on R&R activities.

Table 2, in two parts below, shows the regional pattern of FFW achievements, i.e. the physical works which have taken up most of the R&R investment.



Table 2. Food-For-Work achievements by region (July 1999 – May 2001)

Region	Agric. Land Rehab ha	Irrigation Canals Ha	Water catchments	River Embankments km	Veg. Production ha	Roads Airstrips km	Bridge	Wells
Bay	2	0	133	0	6	1056.5 5.25	0	61
Bakool	2	0	29	0	2	516 2.8	0	46
Lower Shebelle	60	170	3	45.5	0	45	0	8
Benadir	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hiran & Galgadud	54	103	27	0	0	352	1	2
Middle Shebelle	0	240	43	0	0	205	0	12
Middle Juba	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
Gedo	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
North-East	7	36	9	0	0	349	0	52
North-West	1200	0	63 dams	0	1	308	0	0
Total	1325	549	244	45.5	9	1259	1	184

Region	Sanitation Pits	Schools	Training Centres	Health Posts	Blacksmith's Workshops	Market Sheds	Shelters (huts)	Public Buildings
Bay	32	8	2	0	15	10	449	0
Bakool	33	0	16	3	20	10	774	0
Lower Shebelle	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Benadir	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hiran & Galgadud	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Middle Shebelle	12	0	0	0	0	0	131	0
Middle Juba	3	0	0	0	0	0	42 sites	0
Gedo	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
North-East	4	4	7	2	0	8	0	71
North-West	3	2	9	0	0	0	0	2
Total	89	14	34	5	35	28	1354	73

Four kinds of activity offer the largest opportunity for labour input (and therefore for food transfer): agricultural land rehabilitation (often meaning erosion control and flood protection), rehabilitation/extension of irrigation canals, desilting and/maintenance of water catchments and dams, and road maintenance/building. The large number of other categories of project shows the degree to which WFP and its partners have sought to spread the utility of food aid in project terms. However, this is often at the cost of having a large number of discrete mini-projects, each requiring separate planning and agreement with local authorities and communities, which then adds to the time burden on field personnel and the difficulty of monitoring.



The non-food items budget for the R&R sector was projected at an average of \$1.25m per year for some 55 projects with a cash requirement, i.e. those which would not be implemented using food-for-work alone. In the circumstances of Somalia it was not expected that Implementing Partners would meet all of this, and that WFP would need to meet 40% of the costs at an average of \$500,000 per year. The country programme decided that this was over-estimated and reduced this annual budget to \$200,000 per year.

As of May 2001 the current budget stood at \$US 383,000, of which \$97,397 had been programmed (with just over half aimed at R&R in Hiran via Oxfam) and \$40,897 actually disbursed, leaving a balance available for programming of \$285,603.

Clearly there is a problem of matching opportunities to this resource. However, this should also be seen in relation to extra funding which has been available to the project through two monetisation funds. The USAID fund over the PRRO period to May 2001 amounted to \$943,986, of which all but \$12,349 had been spent, the majority - \$673,469 - on support to projects. The Italian magnetisation – the ‘Pasta Fund’ – amounted to \$266,753, of which \$110,479 had been spent on projects and a further \$76,290 committed, leaving a balance of just under \$80,000.

3.2 Aspects of the regional programmes visited by the evaluation team

3.2.1 Bay and Bakool regions

This important zone of rainfed agriculture and livestock herding has recently suffered from significant drought one year in two. As a result of crop failures in 1997 and 1999, WFP undertook emergency provision, which in the latter case became the first major exercise of the PRRO. In July

2001 the evaluation team was able to witness the widespread failure of sorghum to reach maturity due to the further drought earlier in the year. Between July 1999 and June 2000, 7537 MT of food was distributed to some 60,850 direct beneficiaries, with rations available for some 365,000 people on the basis of an average six per family (although many families received repeat rations). This would suggest an average receipt of 21kg of food per head, or the full food-energy for about five weeks.

Part of the area in south-west was under the separate aid of CARE International, and as a result of initial confusion over geographical responsibilities some localities were at first neglected, until the issue was resolved at Nairobi level. Other problems were those inherent in any work in southern Somalia: poor road access to some communities and security problems barring direct access to many others (as determined by close consultation with local authorities). Where access was possible, convoys often had to take long routes because short-cuts were barred by insecurity. Extended Delivery Points were created to serve inaccessible populations, although the movement of people under stress undermined population estimates. Where the target volume of food aid could not be delivered, rations were diluted to allow all beneficiaries to receive some food. It was considered by WFP that despite the problems of delivery, many lives and assets were saved and that there was a reduction of the numbers of people moving in search of food.



In the year 2000 the bulk of food aid was provided for R&R activities, at 4548 MT of maize, pulses and vegetable oil distributed between May and December, and an additional 273 MT distributed for Social Support projects. Projects have included the enhancement of community water facilities, the promotion of vegetable production, road rehabilitation, primary school construction, local-house construction and airport rehabilitation.

In the R&R projects in total, some 50,300 direct beneficiaries received an average of 90kg of food each, which would provide for the basic food-energy intake of a family of six for approximately a month. This indicates the typically short-term interventions; many completed within a period of thirty days. Local conditions have not been conducive to investment in longer-term or large projects, given in particular the constant threat of insecurity and difficulties of direct access, and the dependence upon working with local authorities rather than through experienced agency Implementing Partners.

The projects were therefore small in scale and large in number. For instance, water catchments rehabilitation & construction involved 3251 beneficiaries in 152 projects, giving an average of 21 people per project, and well excavation and desilting involved 1206 people in 108 projects, i.e. 11 people per project. In the construction of local fixed houses (*munduls*), usually for IDPs resettling on town peripheries, each one of the impressive figure of 1263 houses was considered as a project in itself, involving about 12 beneficiaries in the work; but a given site might have a dozen or more such houses.

These figures seem appropriate for small projects based in small communities, but the implications are large for staff time devoted to project identification/acceptance, initial arrangements and monitoring. In some cases, e.g. water catchment rehabilitation, WFP was usually assisting a long-standing system of annual desilting work organised within the community. In others, such as road rehabilitation, this was more in the line of public works organised via local authorities, although later 'contractees' have been village representatives who have *inter alia* signed for cash inputs. As far as possible WFP has arranged for food distributions to take place on-site or at the community location.

The Evaluation Team gained a strong impression of an imaginative programme approaching major constraints with good judgement. Dependence on local authorities for project proposals and the basic arrangements with communities was a necessity, which presented several difficulties. A tendency to regard food aid as a free good for the widest-spread distribution is not confined to emergency relief, and is perhaps partly an inheritance of the mass-distributions of UNOSOM times. WFP officers have had to negotiate down from a plethora of proposals, many without much transparency as to process or beneficiary selection. Local authorities also have a tendency to want to use private contractors to undertake work, and these in turn have a high tendency to monetize the food 'payment'. But over the months a certain trust has developed which has led to local authorities agreeing for WFP to work increasingly with communities themselves as Implementing Partners from early 2001.

WFP field staff has been able to rely in part on standard procedures in the design of interventions, especially the use of standard work norms. But in many instances, whether in dealing with local authorities or in putting together novel projects, there is no 'norm' which can be followed, only common sense and some inventiveness. Thus in the case of the construction of houses for IDPs there were no available worknorms, and these had to be created via a somewhat intricate calculation of tasks and time and local wage-levels.



But WFP programme staff are not usually employed for specific technical skills, whether in agriculture or construction or water development. The lack of agency Implementing Partners with a technical capacity has limited such technical ventures as may have been feasible with short-term projects, as well as the uptake of the non-food Item budget. It is possible that this has also prevented the development, however cautious, of any larger-scale or slightly longer-term projects, e.g. in the environmental or agricultural sectors, which might be feasible given political and social circumstances. A partial solution would be the employment by WFP of one or two technical field officers, and this is understood that the country office plans for this from the third year of the PRRO, filling one or two vacant posts.

In the support to Social Institutions, including aid to two orphanages in the Bay regional capital Baidoa, the joint WFP/UNICEF Supplementary Feeding Programme is the big item, covering three MCH centres in Bakool region and one at Baidoa. This took up 432 MT of food in the PRRO period up to May 2001. WFP involvement goes beyond the logistics of provision to helping with the screening of children for receipt of the WFP ration cards and arranging the handling of the food by women's groups, which then receive a payment of \$10 per MT distributed. The somewhat remote centre at Rabdhure in Bakool observed by the Evaluation Team appeared to be under good management, with an effective screening and registration procedure and orderly disbursement of rations. However, as in most instances, this has required the presence of WFP staff since women's groups have not possessed the level of literacy to properly deal with ration cards and screening. These interventions seem to give a highly-valued service to families coming from as far as a day's walk, as well as to newly arrived IDPs from Ethiopia in the Rabdhure case at the time of observation.

3.2.2 The North-West region

With a total of 5958 MT of WFP food aid between July 1999 and May 2001, this region is the second biggest recipient of WFP food aid after Bay/Bakool, to which it is otherwise in great contrast. The fact of peace and an elected government for the past decade is the most obvious difference; but economically too, the contrast is clear. Although it has an elevated zone devoted to crop production in the north-west towards the Ethiopian border; this is not enough to satisfy local demand even in a good harvest year.

Perhaps one-third of the Region's rural population is engaged to some extent in agriculture; pastoralism and trade, and often both together, are the characteristic occupations of the remaining rural majority.

The livestock market at Bur'ao in particular acts as a collection point for livestock from both this region and from Ethiopia, which are mainly destined for export through the port of Berbera. A recent peak of officially recorded exports in 1997, numbering 2.8mn sheep and goats, 67,000 cattle and 50,000 camels⁴ shows the importance of earnings from this industry, and also suggests the serious effects of the livestock export ban imposed by Saudi Arabia and others in September 2000. No exports of livestock are recorded from October 2000 onwards.

⁴ Figures provided by the Berbera Port Authority, Manifest and Statistics Office



In response, in March 2001 WFP mounted an emergency food distribution of 535 MT to 34,920 pastoralists, i.e. 15.3kg per head or a month's supply of basic food. This required WFP to organise provision over a very extensive geographical area, to people in not less than 90 locations in 30 districts of four (sub-) regions. Such an exercise, requiring the attendance of available WFP staff from the Country Office, as well as the region, cannot be undertaken with any frequency. It is to be hoped that the distribution of a single month's food supply was appropriate, and that advantage should not have been taken of distributing, say, two months' supply. However, WFP was acting as usual primarily on the information of the Food Security Assessment Unit for Somalia. The previous distributions of emergency relief during the PRRO were in response to drought, with provision at a more restricted set of locations of 463 MT to 17,100 people (27kg per head) in July-August 1999 and 1627 MT to 96,215 people (17kg per head) between March and October 2000.

Between July 1999 and May 2001, 44% of the food aid went to Relief, 30% to R&R and 26% to Social Support. The proportion for Social Support is a far higher than in Bay/Bakool, and there seem to be two principal reasons for this contrast. One is that it is far easier to develop R&R projects for settled populations, who predominate in Bay/Bakool, than for semi-nomadic pastoralists who is the majority in the North-West. Secondly, the functioning urban sector is markedly larger in the North-West than in Bay/Bakool, and the urban milieu particularly offers social institutions to support, including hospitals. Thus, for instance, between July 1999 May 2001 and WFP provided 258 MT of food to hospitals in North-West region, with a little over half going to TB hospitals and with the Ministry of Health as the main Implementing Partner. In total the recipients numbered 1,383, and the average receipt was 186kg/person, which is some nine to month's requirement for an adult patient in food-energy terms. Thirteen of the 15 projects were on-going as of May 2001, one had been suspended and one closed.

The bulk of food for support of Social Institutions, namely 547MT, went to orphanages, street children, and feeding centres for handicapped children and the aged. Training programmes for police and for mine awareness have also been helped with food. In total, 1,761 beneficiaries (34% female) received on average 310kg/person. It is noteworthy that out of 21 projects, support was withdrawn from eight and suspended for one. The reasons were mainly misuse of the aid, including fraudulent beneficiary lists, the apparent, substantial non-attendance of those supposed to be fed, and constant sale of the maize to buy other things, including the preferred rice. This testifies to the vigilance of WFP officers, but also to the nature of the charitable scene in the towns which is dominated by very small local NGOs, often set up for one project, who become WFP Implementing Partners. On the other hand, the biggest orphanage, at Hargeisa, with Catholic Relief Services as WFP Implementing Partner, received 104 MT in the period in question, which was the third biggest single project grant amongst all the Social Support and R&R projects.

The majority (60% of 1457 MT) of the food support for R&R projects went to farmland development (e.g. soil conservation, flood control) and water management (dam desilting, well and ground water-tank – *berkad* – excavation) which helps pastoralists amongst others.

The remaining 40% went to environmental development (including river bank protection, seedling nursery development, and bush clearance at an airport site), training for skill development and adult literacy, and income generation projects. Roughly speaking this also reflects a 60/40 split between rural and urban/peri-urban R&R projects (which we shall label 'rural' and 'non-rural'). The Evaluation Team was able to visit an impressive flood control scheme on prime agricultural land, with the Ministry of Agriculture as an Implementing Partner. This was in principle typical of FFW projects in many countries, except that the participants were mainly people who had returned to their



villages in recent years from refugee camps in Ethiopia. Female participation in the ‘rural’ projects was particularly low at an average of 5%.

By contrast, the ‘non-rural’ projects are varied and often unusual. The evaluation team was able to visit in the capital Hargeisa different projects. These were resulted to adult literacy for war veterans and war widows (134 men, 66 women), a blackboard chalk-making enterprise struggling to restore profitable operation after war-destruction (17 women, 17 men), and one of several projects helping disadvantaged minority community artisans, in this case for 65 potter women. Overall, the ‘non-rural’ projects have a female participation of 23%.

It is noteworthy that the average food receipt by beneficiaries in the ‘rural’ R&R projects was 146kg/person as contrasted with 310kg/person in the ‘non-rural’ projects, which echoes the high figures given above for the urban-oriented Social Support projects other than hospital support. This divide is no doubt an unintended effect. The reason for the difference lies in the nature of the projects, since the physical land and water work tends to be finite and short-term, whilst the training or enterprise support projects are longer, if not potentially open-ended. There are many very poor people in the towns, but no substantial evidence has been seen to show that the rural poor are less in need of support. Indeed in sheer numbers they are the majority of those who have been helped, even if we set aside emergency relief whose target population is overwhelmingly rural. There are genuine difficulties in finding longer projects and/or larger-scale works-plans for rural R&R without strong Implementing Partners. But it is recommended that WFP, which is already open to this issue, put increasing efforts into pursuing such possibilities with the Ministry of Agriculture and other line departments and agencies.

3.3 Appropriateness of food aid

Somalia is an exceptionally expensive country to which to deliver food aid (see sections 5.5.1/5.5.2 below), and WFP Somalia is conscious of the need to justify aid in the form of food. Several factors tend towards that justification, beyond the fact that Somalia is one of the very poorest countries in the world. The country as a whole is in food deficit in any year, and food must be imported one way or another; populations in many locations are isolated from customary markets, and doubly disadvantaged by a loss of purchasing power due to the loss of primary occupations and assets. In times of local crop failure in particular, these factors accentuate food insecurity.

There are, however, contrary arguments to be heard. A principal one is that, given the cost of food importation, it would make more sense to give people money to buy local food, whether as cash-for-relief or cash-for work. It has to be said that in Somalia, as elsewhere, this argument has never been substantially tested by donors/agencies: at some level there is a greater reluctance to fund the distribution of money in this way than to fund the distribution of food, even at high transport costs. And there are local factors, which would justify this reluctance. Given the overall need for food importation, in much of inland Somalia (i.e. for a large part of the rural population at least) the demand chain between local market and importing trader is often fragile at best. This is especially true of insecure areas of the south and/or populations distant from market centres, which accounts again for a good part of the rural population. In other words, money in hand is not the same as food in hand.

This is especially true of insecure areas of the south and/or populations distant from market centres, which accounts again for a good part of the rural population. In other words, money in hand is not the same as food in hand. The lack of integrated markets would mean that the subsidised new cash demand for food would add to food price inflation already arising from seasonal market shortages, if not actual from crop failures or the periodic, private bulk-importation of currency notes which cause



sudden devaluation. Setting a ‘money ration’ intended to equate for any reasonable planning period to a minimum, purchased food basket would be a gamble indeed.

A second argument is that food aid should be sourced from local purchase in those locations which produce surpluses, thus at the same time avoiding high import-transport costs and helping local farmers to get a better return on their produce. This is an argument which makes great sense ‘if all other things are equal’; but they rarely are. WFP has made some attempts to set up local purchase arrangements and has encountered considerable problems in securing a trustworthy source of bulk commercial grain at reasonable prices, where the source area and the target area are within feasible reach with *safe* transport. In a good production year, in certain localities, for certain target beneficiaries, there ought to be some scope for this, and WFP must be encouraged to keep trying to test the possibilities, perhaps, for instance, for food-for-work projects in Lower Shebelle.

However, more typically elsewhere the frequent poor production years present obvious problems of supply, especially when an emergency distribution needs to be organised. Also, the irrigated areas with their more trustworthy production are mostly not strategically situated in safe transport terms for main target populations elsewhere, even if the market could bear the extra demand without high price inflation. Even in other countries without such security problems the local sourcing of bulk food aid is often problematic. Given the need to import at least most of the food in order to run the programme, it is necessary to maximise its impact as far as possible through collaboration with other agencies. This co-operation adds value *inter alia* by increasing technical inputs and the use of complementary non-food items – indeed where possible, food aid should become complementary to projects built mainly on non-food investment. If the points in this section are not the subjects of a formal recommendation, it is because it was clear to the Evaluation Team that WFP Somalia is keenly aware of these issues.

3.4 Social institutions support and the future

There is a further question which is likely to gain significance over time, and that has to do with food aid for social sector projects. It was appropriate for WFP to subsidise with part of its food aid the quest of local communities, nascent government departments and agencies to rebuild and run institutions, including hospitals and orphanages. This especially given the wholesale destruction of clinics, schools and other service infrastructure, and the dispersal for many years of the personnel trained to run the services. Without stretching definitions too far, this could be seen as a form of emergency assistance.

However, as pointed out in section 4.2.2, these commitments of their nature tend to be longer-run than most R&R projects, if not sometimes in effect open-ended. At least it was not clear what the exit strategy was in a number of instances. The Evaluation Team recommends that WFP should begin to limit the spectrum of its social institutions support projects with a view to the eventual phasing out of this sector as it stands. It should be said immediately that this is a suggestion not for a quick fix but for a strategy over a period of perhaps four years or more, meaning the last year of the present PRRO and a possible extension. Again, different time-scales need to be envisaged as between North and South, assuming neither a marked deterioration in political and economic conditions in the North nor an extremely rapid resolution of those factors in the South which block the road towards stability and improvement.

The question for the North in particular is how long food aid will be appropriate as a subsidy for institutions. One issue is the need for government departments, and where relevant communities, to take on the full responsibility for funding as well as running institutions. A connected question is at



what point it can be deemed that the availability of food through the market has become reasonably stable, so that here is no special reason to offer food, as opposed to finance or equipment, directly to institutions. This is an issue particularly for the North-West and North-East, where the majority of cereals and pulses are always imported, and where over the last decade the market network has normalised to a considerable degree.

This is not to say that problems will not invite assistance for many years to come. But insofar as food aid is deemed appropriate for some longer-term uses, it should not be the subject of a continued series of short-term extensions. In the case of the North, it seems timely to begin thinking of investment in selected programmes which can be planned and consolidated with government departments and Implementing Partners on a somewhat longer-term basis, e.g. school feeding and MCH support. There will still need to be an exit strategy related to growing strength of service departments and their financial base.

In other cases, there can be a shift from ‘social support’ into the ‘recovery’ sector. Here the lead is given by WFP Benadir (Mogadishu) office, which has developed a plan for changing its aid to vulnerable IDPs (numbering 11,774 beneficiaries as of May 2001). The plan is titled: ‘Our strategy is not to abandon feeding projects currently implemented by the four partners but to stop gradually and shift into the food for work sector, since the need to help and assist these vulnerable groups is still there in order to improve [their] livelihood...’ (8)

3.5 Appropriateness of rations

The Project Document proposed different ration mixes for the three sectors, using commodities known to be locally acceptable from previous EMOP experience, although the maize is the least preferred cereal in most locations. For R&R and Social Support, the target was the standard WFP ration level of 2100 kcal per person per day. The R&R daily ration was set at 500g cereal, 60g pulses and 20g oil; the Social Support ration, reflecting institutional feeding requirements, was set at 400g cereals, 50g pulses, 20g oil and 100g corn-Soya blend. Rations for support of primary school children would be about half, providing 1,100 kcal.

But the emergency ration was set at 1,950 kcal pppd. The reason was that the usual oil component was to be excluded ‘since fat is available in Somalia from three sources: livestock, local sesame production and imported oil’.⁵ This rationale seems open to question. As far as one can tell, the idea was that most emergency relief would go to pastoralists, who normally produce fat or can sell animals for oil, whilst most other food aid would go to non-pastoralists – hence the inclusion of oil in R&R and Social Support rations. But this fails to address the problem of the accessibility/availability of butter or oil to poor people, especially poor pastoralists, in an exceptionally bad season, which triggers an emergency response.

For livestock-keepers the first thing to dwindle or disappear in a drought is milk – and therefore butter – production. The second thing to diminish is the value of animals on a glutted market, where people are trying to sell extra animals to buy grain at probably higher-than-usual prices. By the same

⁵ It appears that there was a miscalculation here, and the actual ration level should logically have been set at 1920 kcal pppd. The calorie content of oil is 9 kcal/g. If we take the R&R ration of 2100 and deduct the 20g of oil, i.e. 180 kcal, we are left with 1920 kcal from 500g cereals and 60g pulses, giving a value of 3.428 kcal/g for the mixture. It appears that for the emergency ration calculation this figure was misread as 3.482 kcal/g, which would indeed give 1950 kcal for 560g of the mixture.



token, their purchasing power for higher value items such as sesame or imported oil would be unusually low. One might by a similar logic reduce emergency cereal rations to farmers because grain is available from the field and the market, including imported rice.

The problem is not properly addressed by the added statement in the Project Document that ‘a contingency oil requirement of one third of daily emergency requirements is provide for, should the need exist’; and there is no explanation of the criteria for using this contingency. For the PRRO in general it is reported that ‘Oil rations were only included in the relief basket in isolated cases where global malnutrition rate among children was reported above 20% and availability of fat was limited.’(5) But oil seems frequently to have been part of the emergency ration in the North-West and North-East in this PRRO. The policy on oil in the emergency rations needs to be revisited and clarified.

Currently a far more compelling argument by WFP is that because of the high cash value of oil, its transport and distribution presents an unacceptable security risk to its handlers (this appears to be especially the case in the south). However, accepting completely that oil is not to be distributed where it poses a security risk, there is no reason why the calorie value of the emergency ration should not be made good to the 2100 kcal pppd standard by adding another commodity. For instance, an extra 50g of cereal/pulse would make up the difference or 45g of sugar if that were feasible financially and were not also a security risk.

4. Factors in the Effectiveness and Sustainability of the PRRO

4.1 Relevance of policies, guidelines and directives on PRROs

The Somalia PRRO has been conducted squarely within the spirit of the available WFP guidelines, both in moving from emergency response to recovery activities as soon as feasible and in looking for a wide spectrum of project uses for food aid. We have seen that the flexibility afforded by the PRRO format was tested in the first two years of operation by a heavy concentration on relief in approximately the first nine months, followed by a major swing towards R&R in 2000 as soon as the improved rains took effect.

This is a step along the link between relief and development as expounded in the 1998 paper *From Crisis to Recovery* (4). However, that document emphasises problems associate with that link:

‘...The idea of linking relief and development is appealing but conducive to positive expectations. However, the practicality of securing relief/development linkages is hampered by a number of factors. Among the most important are: the often inherent conflict between the short-term perspective of relief and the longer-term focus of development; the need for co-ordination in the field, links between humanitarian and development organisations and the need for integrated strategies...’

These are important caveats. On the whole, the Somalia PRRO has dwelt on the shorter-term ‘perspective’ if that can be broadened to include short-term physical activities under R&R. This does not imply a lack of longer-term vision, expressed for instance in projects supporting adult literacy and income generation and women’s groups. Rather, it is a matter of working within the limitations of insecurity, periodic emergencies and the lack of government services or other substantial Implementing Partners.



The PRRO straddles a territory, which shows acute geographical and political differences. In the 'situation indicators' outlined in the PRRO Guidelines prepared by WFP in 1999 (6), the *early recovery* is represented by the 'zones in transition' of the southern sector in which WFP works, although the threat of acute emergency is ever-present, whether from resumed violence or from crop failure. In areas such as Bay/Bakool, as some form of political stability has continued over the months it has perhaps been permissible to think, very cautiously and provisionally, that a step is possible towards more stability in livelihoods, nutrition and health. At such a low level of economic resources and services the foundations of progress have hardly been laid, and people's defences against rain failure, let alone warfare, remain perilously thin. But with each season of peace and reasonable rains, R&R projects can aim to support the maintenance of land and water assets available to people. They can also promote small increments in income through seed or small stock provision, or through literacy schemes which make women traders and others more efficient.

The northern half of the country is generally in the stage of *early recovery*. There is localised political stability (although still not to be taken for granted anywhere), but rural livelihoods, nutrition and health still have some way to go before improvement can be considered firmly founded. Even in the north, the 'development' end of the *emergency-recovery-development* transition is still only dimly visible outside the towns. But given continued peace and no catastrophic sequence of drought, there is hope that a development environment will emerge sooner rather than later, serviced by stronger government and supported by donors, but led, as ever, by the myriad efforts and decisions of households and communities. For this reason, planning for a further phase of the PRRO must aim to look more towards longer-term project possibilities in the north, and will have to differentiate more clearly its strategies for north and south.

4.2 Assessment and targeting

WFP relies principally upon the Food Security Assessment Unit for Somalia (FSAU) for vulnerability analysis and early warning of emergencies. The donor community and others also closely listen to FSAU. It was set up in 1996 as an inter-agency effort under WFP co-ordination, with core funding from the European Union. In 2000, co-ordination was transferred to FAO. Its base office is in Nairobi, but it has some 20 officers in different regions of Somalia. The Unit collaborates with USAID/FEWS especially for market surveillance, and with other agencies in covering such spheres as nutrition survey and livestock conditions. No party has a monopoly on information, and WFP relies also on its own field staff and its Implementing Partners for as full a view as possible of conditions in Somalia.

The core analysis in FSAU has depended on the 'household food economy' methodology, and one of the early products was a mapping of the country in a way, which most usefully expressed its economic geography in relation to food security. The rural population is divided into some 20 food economy groups, which are related to an analysis of different modes of livelihood in the country and their location. For example, *Bay-Bakool high potential sorghum; cattle and camel; Kakaar pastoral: sheep & goats* (in a part of the North-East); *Agro-pastoral: cowpea, shoats, camel, cattle* (in a part of Middle Shebelle and Galgadud). Profiles have been developed of these areas (and are still subject to further research) which delineate the relative dependence of the population on livestock, crops, trade etc., and also break down the population into wealth groups, describing the differences in assets and activity between them. This template serves both for baseline vulnerability analysis and the monitoring of change, notably the judgement of who will be affected and how severely by shocks, whether drought, flood, warfare or the livestock ban. The district map of the country is



superimposed upon the food economy area map so that responses can be planned according to populations in administrative units.

WFP looks primarily to FSAU for identifying relief needs down to the district level and for justifying relief plans to donors. Below the district level WFP tends more to use its own local information to target specific populations for relief distributions. The quality of information from WFP field monitors and their local contacts is therefore of the first importance, and is paramount in deciding on specific actions in the R&R and Social Support sectors. The number of beneficiaries targeted for these projects has depended more on opportunities on the ground than on aiming at a global number in need. The availability of food aid does not appear generally to have been a constraint in this.

An anthropologically-oriented study on the targeting of emergency food distribution in southern Somalia, funded by WFP in late 2000, offered a sensitive and informative contextual analysis in the light of Somali culture and social hierarchies and networks. The principal question was whether there were traditional mechanisms, which could be used for food distribution, which would have more efficient and/or equitable results than the current system, which is directed largely by local authorities with considerable oversight by WFP staff. The study was unable to show convincingly that in the altered social circumstances of present-day Somalia, traditional networks offer a practical alternative to the current mode of operation.

However, given the remaining balance of funds from that exercise, the Evaluation Team recommends investment in some further field research, probably in the form of case studies, on two aspects of targeting not covered by the study. One is the status of beneficiaries of selected R&R and social support projects and how the beneficiary selection process was conducted, since in-depth information on this seems largely lacking. The second is on emergency ration receipt and sharing and any problems associated with this. In theory, this is covered by the Post Distribution Questionnaire; in practice, it seems to have been impractical to expect field staff to devote the required time – and logistics – to properly fulfil this requirement. Of particular value would be further information on the ‘sit-on-your-bag’ system for handing food directly to women, in confirming (or perhaps qualifying) the success of a system which ought to be of considerable interest for operations in other countries.

Secondly, there is the question of how far rations are kept entirely by target families and how far redistributed in the community, and by what mechanism. The particular interest here would be to learn whether or not there is a need for any revisions in the criteria and process of targeting.

4.3 Monitoring and evaluation

Reporting formats have been under review by the M&E focal point officer. M&E was also to be the subject of a special consultancy in October 2001, which should include the revision of indicators, the development of a database for analysis and the introduction of the logical framework methodology, and staff training in both. Therefore this evaluation did not go into this subject in depth.

The relief, food-for-work/food-for-training, social support and school feeding project proposal, monitoring and completion forms, as well as the Beneficiary Contact Monitoring Questionnaire are certainly detailed in terms of the information and explanations asked for. But a principal reason for the review of reporting formats is that they been found to be excessively lengthy and to use indicators which are not always seen to be relevant by WFP field staff or Implementing



Partners. The realities of the Somalia programme are that monitoring is often hindered by various factors. These are limited access to project sites because of long distances and/or security problems, limited time of staff, limited capacity of Implementing Partners, involvement of local authorities in selecting beneficiaries, and the pressure for quick execution of relief food distributions for logistical and/or security reasons. Shorter and simpler reporting formats are envisaged.

Despite remaining problems in obtaining disaggregated data on beneficiaries, e.g. by age categories, monitoring to date in the PRRO has been stronger in quantitative than in qualitative reporting. Delivery, beneficiary numbers and project output statistics are not to any strong degree accompanied by analysis of actual or potential outcome/impact - a situation not confined to Somalia. It is true that most activities are localised and short-run, and medium/long-term effects cannot be expected to be gauged. This does not invalidate the activities, of course, but it leaves a gap in reporting which might be filled by more qualitative information on the physical and social environment of the activities, and narrative reporting on the process of projects – without which any analysis of the programme must remain hampered. Perhaps due mainly to the large number of small and separate projects and the time constraints on WFP field staff, baseline information on the executors and beneficiaries of recovery and social support projects has sometimes seemed sketchy or informal in nature. However, it is always the case that much more information is held in the heads of staff than they can ever write down, of the kind, which goes towards the day-to-day decision-making, which is the basis of operations. Capturing more of this would be one useful element of the study suggested at the end of the previous section.

Beyond an improvement in qualitative reporting, one aspect, which the evaluation team felt needed further attention, was the definition of formal indicators for beginning and ending projects. This would serve to strengthen the ‘project objectives’ question in the proposal forms; but perhaps the main requirement is to encourage consideration of exit strategies, both for social sector projects and some R&R projects. It is possible that the introduction of a logical framework methodology for M&E will make this recommendation redundant; if so, that will be all to the good

4.4 Implementing partners

The PRRO has evolved strong partnership with a limited number of international agencies/NGOs, notably UNICEF, COSV and Oxfam-Quebec. But, as will be clear from several references above, the major collaboration with such Implementing Partners envisaged in the project document has not generally materialised. This has been either because few are present, especially in the south and centre, or because their programmes are often not easy to associate with food aid. As a result, overall nearly 70% of the food aid has gone through local authorities and local NGOs, and in Bay/Bakool 93%, as calculated from Table 3 below.

Table 3: Distribution of food aid by category of partner and region

Region	UN agencies	Int’l NGOs	Local NGOs	Local Authorities	TotalMT
Bay	345.3		396.6	4771.3	5513.2
Bakool	94.8	49.0	30.5	5762.6	5936.9



Lower Shebelle		942.4	616.7		1559.1
Benadir		2140.6			2140.6
Hiran & Galgadud		1533.4		660.0	2193.4
North-West	1433.1	926.4	1365.5	2231.2	5956.1
Middle Juba		1214.1			1214.1
Gedo		104.7		1336.5	1441.2
North-East	66.5	885.2	741.0	2679.7	4372.5
Middle Shebelle			843.7		843.7
Total	1939.7	7795.8	3994.0	17441.3	31170.8

There are evident advantages to this in terms both of using local knowledge to the full and of local capacity building. However, there has been an inevitable and heavy requirement for WFP field officers to be involved in all aspects of activities, whether relief distribution or the planning and execution of projects. In many cases and in Bay/Bakool especially, WFP has effectively had to act at least as a joint Implementing Partner for relief distribution and running projects. In the North-West, and particularly in towns where new local NGOs seem to be formed with growing frequency, setting out their stall with very small projects, WFP officers have to exercise considerable judgement to decide whether they should be supported.

The demand in some regions by local authorities for food aid activities to be channelled only through them has led to a number of concerns for WFP Somalia. Contrary to the principle of a 'bottom-up', beneficiary-driven approach espoused by WFP, there has been a strong tendency towards a top-down approach to project planning and organisation, with little community say in the procedures. There has also been some lack of transparency about beneficiary selection, and a worry about local authorities sub-contracting out projects with hired labourers completing the work. WFP officers are vigilant for abuses where it appears that food has been diverted from intended beneficiaries. The main problem however has been the tendency of local authorities to attempt to maximise the availability of food aid for their area by proposing a great number of projects, so that WFP must go to considerable trouble to sort out those which appear well-grounded.

The problem of instituting a participative approach to project development and execution is not simple to solve, given the number and short-term nature of most projects and the necessary limit on field personnel. WFP is not, after all, an NGO. However, some steps have been taken: all food-for-work projects are contracted in the presence of the targeted beneficiaries, and strong efforts are made to ensure that beneficiaries are aware of their exact entitlements. On the other hand, a pre-requisite for project approval is evidence of a contribution by beneficiaries in kind or cash. Beyond this, WFP has had some success in getting local authorities to allow projects to be negotiated directly with communities, in the absence of local NGOs. This can be a delicate matter, and testifies to the trust WFP has been able to gain over time.

4.5 Effectiveness of logistics arrangements

4.5.1 General arrangements

Transport of food aid to and through Somalia is relatively costly and time-consuming, and WFP Somalia has made a priority of reducing both of these elements. The three key problems are: a decayed, damaged or rudimentary transport infrastructure; a variety of security problems mainly in the south, where trucks frequently have to pass through territories controlled by different armed



factions; and the limited number of agents able and willing to compete for contracts bearing a substantial financial guarantee.

Mombasa Port (Kenya) is used both as the regional entry point and as the primary storage facility of cargo destined to Somalia. In order to keep stocks inside Somalia at a minimum necessary level, cargo deliveries are split into progressively smaller lots whether through both transshipment to ports in Somalia and forward inland deliveries, or overland transit in Kenya to cross-border operations in the south. The transport corridors that serve deliveries to EDPs are:

- Berbera -> North-West Somalia
- Bossaso -> North-East Somalia
- Merka -> Gedo, Lower Shabelle, Middle Juba, Lower Juba, Bay and Bakool
- El Maan -> Benadir, Hiran, Middle Shabelle, Bay and Bakool
- Mandera -> Bay, Bakool and Gedo

For South Somalia, the security situation of the time determines the choice of corridor. WFP HQ/OTS arranges the ocean freight to Mombasa and the transshipment operations to north Somali ports in co-ordination with WFP Somalia in Nairobi and WFP Mombasa. The cargo transshipment to south Somali beach ports, the overland and inland transport and storage in Somalia are arranged by WFP Somalia in Nairobi in co-ordination with WFP Somalia field offices and with the assistance of WFP Mombasa with regard to Mombasa operations.

All logistics services are commercially contracted except for storage/handling services in the North, which are directly managed by the WFP Somalia sub-offices. The ocean freight to south Somali ports and the Kenya-Somalia cross-border transport, as well as all logistic services within Somalia, is contracted to Somali agents to promote safe delivery.

In 2000, WFP Somalia made a major effort to increase competition for this business through the establishment of a short-list of qualified logistics service providers. In view of security problems, transport agents with strong local connections were favoured for such destinations as Bay/Bakool. These arrangements helped to minimise the time spent negotiating for the sub-hiring of trucks and for security and rights of passage. Thus the transit time for inland transport within Bay and Bakool ex Baidoa was reduced to an average of 2 days, and cross-border operations ex Mandera were reduced by 10 days.⁶

In order to further encourage competition, the period of awarded contracts was reduced from a year to four months, with a Request for Offers (RfO) that is tendered only to the short-listed agents. No cargo loss is allowed in the contract, and as of 2000/2001 the award can be withdrawn if the Contractor is found unable to perform as per the Agency Agreement and within the specified time.

The security bond system, which has been in place for a number of years, is applied to contracted services only for south/central Somalia. Under this system the Contractor raises in

⁶ The number of short-listed logistics service providers per transport corridor was:

North-West: 8 agents for the CF services ex Berbera port + 5 agents for inland transport services; North-East: 4 agents for all logistics services; Central/South: 5 agents for sea freight ex Mombasa to south Somali beach ports, storage and inland transport (using either El Maan or Merka corridor); 6 agents for overland and cross-border transport services; 3 agents for warehousing and inland transport services ex inland storage facility (ie. Baidowa).



advance and submits to WFP a bank or cash guarantee that equals the CIF value of the cargo at final destination. With this system full responsibility is placed on the Contractor for the transport and handling of cargo in his custody, and the value of any loss or damage to cargo (including associated service costs) is deducted from the Contractor's service invoice or from the security bond, depending on the amount. Losses and damage are assessed by WFP. To increase reliability in calling in a bond, by the beginning of 2001 cash guarantees were accepted only at the WFP Somalia office in Nairobi.

The security bond system has been found very successful in eliminating losses and increasing the reliability of arrival at delivery points. But it has limited competition among potential logistics service providers by excluding those who did not have the financial capacity to raise a bond at the full value of the cargo. In 2001, the level of the bond was reduced from 100% to 50% of the cargo value; partly reflecting reduced risks in Somalia. The Evaluation Team recommends that consideration should be given to further reducing the security bond by 10-20% in relatively secure areas of operation such as Bay/Bakool and cross-border ex Madera.

The United Nations Combined Air Services (UNCAS) provides and co-ordinates Air transport for the UN agencies and NGO Implementing Partners. UNCAS was created by UNICEF, UNDP and WFP in the absence of commercial airline services; it is based in Nairobi, operated by WFP and funded on a cost recovery basis. The original PRRO budget estimation required US\$ 816,104 per year for WFP to finance about 1,000 return flights for its staff and Implementing Partners (1/4 of the annual UNCAS operating costs). Following budget revision, the present UNCAS cost for WFP amounts to US\$ 504,400 per year.

4.5.2 Service costs

In the year 2000, WFP succeeded in reducing the LTSH component of the PRRO budget from US\$ 276 / MT to US\$ 228 / MT, a 17% cut, and under the new contractual arrangements further reductions are anticipated. (As a comparison, the PRRO LTSH rate for landlocked Burundi was quoted at US\$ 201 / MT.) The costs for ocean freight to Kenyan and Somali ports and for storage/handling in Mombasa are covered by the External Transport Costs, whilst it is the costs for overland transit and inland transport which are covered by the LTSH component. Presently, the LTSH cost amounts to about 43% of Direct Operational Costs of the PRRO Budget (DOC = Commodity Cost + External Transport Costs + LTSH). The External Transport Costs add roughly another 5%.

Following the 2000 revision, the LTSH rate was calculated on the basis of 19,878 Mt per year. The breakdown of LTSH costs was:

Transport (road)	58.93%,
Port Handling & Storage	30.33%,
Intermediate Storage & Handling	1.21%,
Distribution / Post EDP	8.79%,
Miscellaneous	0.75%

Indicatively, the present average cross-border transport cost to Bay region ex Madera is about US\$ 92 / MT (based on minimum reported fees/costs from different sources) of which the security-related costs represent about 18% and the truck sub-hiring costs, including maintenance and fuel, represent about 53%. This is a 15% reduction of the former average cost for Bay/Bakool of US\$ 108 / MT, resulting from increased competition effected by the reduction of



the security bond level and the introduction of new transport agents (particularly in the south). Other examples of major reductions are the average ocean freight cost to Merka port ex Mombasa and transport to coastal stores in Somalia. These costs were down 25% to US\$ 101 / MT. Also, the ocean freight cost to El Maan port ex Mombasa and transport to Mogadishu warehouse down 33% US\$ 94 / MT. The average inland transport cost to Awdal region ex Hargeisa store down 42% to US\$ 29 / MT.

On the other hand, where competition has remained limited, chiefly in the NorthEast region, service charges have either increased or remained the same. Thus, the present average inland transport cost to Bari, Nugal and Mudug regions ex Bossaso store is about US\$ 66 / MT against the old average cost of US\$ 65 / MT. Further efforts are encouraged to re-assess the transport sector here and increase contractor competition.

In central and south Somalia in the past there was a problem of contractors frequently claiming for longer routes because the short routes were insecure. After disputes about this with contractors WFP has introduced a rate per ton in place of a rate per kilometre. Paradoxically, this appears to represent an increase in cost over the old system when related to the shortest routes, but in fact makes a saving given the former claims of longer routes.⁷ The system is under review and fine-tuning.

There may be opportunities for further contingency planning. For instance, in the light of previous experience consideration could be given to re-introducing intermediate storage at Mandera by identifying efficient and reliable Contractors who could be mobilised at short notice. Also, an eye should be kept on overland transport charges and their competitiveness with the sea corridors (i.e. in terms of blanket transport agreement and fuel price indicator).

4.5.3 Response time

Delivery response times to EDPs after calls-forward by Programming have been significantly reduced over the life of the PRRO. This is the combined result of the new contractual arrangements, the establishment of intermediate storage in Somalia (Baidowa, Merka, Mogadishu, Bossaso, Berbera, Hargeisa) reflecting minimum operational needs, the establishment of a minimum acceptable buffer stock in Baidowa at 5%, and the use of a strategic stock in Mandera, Kenya (discontinued).

This has allowed the Programme to increase its flexibility to respond to security and weather related constraints (e.g. blocked routes due to warfare, suspended transshipments due to rains) and to move resources between relief and recovery activities. For instance, in case of an emergency, food stocks in Somalia are used for relief distribution while a new call-forward with additional food needs is being arranged with Nairobi.

The present estimated response times, including customs clearance, mobilisation of trucks/vessel fixture, loading onto trucks/vessel, security arrangements and transit voyage, are within the acceptable time limits for the region:

- overland operations ex Mombasa and into Somalia (Bay, Bakool, Gedo) via Mandera, WP 20 days

⁷ E.g. the present average inland transport cost to Bay region ex Merka store is about USD 91/ MT against the old average short-route cost of USD 75 / MT (+ 17.6%); the old average longer-route cost of USD 113 / MT (- 19.5%).



- transshipment operations ex Mombasa to Berbera and Bossaso ports, WP 30 days
- transshipment operations ex Mombasa to South Somali ports, WP 20 days.

On occasion, minor delays have been experienced as a result of changes in food calls-forward, which in turn necessitated changes in customs documentation and truck mobilisation arrangements. There is room for some improvement in matching calls-forward with perceived distribution needs in the short to medium term. In cases of low stocks in Mombasa, regional loan arrangements have been made, with Donors' approval.

The food pipeline and Mombasa stocks are limited by pledge levels; in particular, donors are not willing to pledge resources for long periods (it takes about 6 months for the food cargo to reach Mombasa from the time a pledge is activated). As a result of the operational limitations beyond WFP control (e.g. security risks, unpredictable weather patterns, the limited number of qualified Implementing Partners), long-term food aid projections are usually not feasible. To date, pipeline breaks have not been a major feature because regional loans have been possible. However, as of mid-2001 the break anticipated later in the year appeared to be serious.

Logistics and Programming work closely together particularly at the field level, for instance on invoice verification, logistical advice on food deliveries, and food monitors' supervision of deliveries at the EDP. The Somalia operation is characteristically 'hands on' as far as field-based staff are concerned, and on occasion field logistics staff are involved in Programme activities, which may affect their timely fulfilment of their logistics responsibilities. In case of increased personnel needs during relief distribution, local field assistants are hired on a short-term basis; however, if there is an expansion of project work in the major operational areas it is possible that one or two Programme staff may need to be added to the complement.

The logistics operation is satisfactorily monitored and accounted for, with few cases of problems in tracking despatches ex warehouse (i.e. in Mandera operations). In such cases appropriate action appears to have been taken. The COMPAS system has recently been introduced. Consideration should be given to further training for logistics staff in food storage and handling, including fumigation, assessment of storage facilities and transport documentation.

4.5.4 Security

The security arrangements made by WFP for its staff, cargo, and local establishment appears to be appropriate. WFP has made a significant investment in specific security training for Somali based staff (over and above the standard WFP security awareness training), as well as in communications and other security equipment. In addition the Programme has contributed towards the cost of a UN common security system.

WFP has tried through community sensitisation to change the common Somali perception that aid cargo is general public property rather than a scarce resource for limited targeting. However, staff is constantly on the alert for potential trouble in food deliveries and distribution. At times of particular tension, local authorities are called upon to facilitate the movement of food convoys, and if necessary longer, alternative routes are used to reach the delivery points. In addition, there is an 'Operational Agreement Between WFP And Local Authorities In Bay And Bakool Regions' in which it is stipulated that the RRA and District Authorities are responsible for providing a secure working environment for WFP staff, cargo and assets. In discussions with



these bodies the Evaluation Mission noted their repeated concern that WFP continue and increase its programme; it seems clear that they are well aware that this can only be done in circumstances of reasonable security. However, their control over some local groups is intermittent or lacking, and WFP must continue to operate with caution and vigilance.

4.6 Human resources

The only substantial staffing changes between the previous EMOP (5999) and the current PRRO were the addition of two international posts of Deputy Country Director and an Assistant Programme Officer, and the conversion of temporary positions for some national staff into Fixed Term posts or Service Contracts.

As of May 31, 2001, WFP Somalia had a complement of 134 staff plus two international consultants. The staff was divided as follows:

Location	International (Fixed Term)	National
Nairobi, CO	8	36
Hargeisa (NW)	2	30
Berbera (NW)	0	8
Bosasso (NE)	0	27
Baidoa (S)	1	9
Bardera (S)	0	1
Beletweyne (S)	0	1
Mogadishu (S)	0	9
Merka (S)	0	2
Total	11	123

Their status was:

International FT	9
National FT	18
JPO	1
UNV	1
Service Contract	74
Special Service Agreement	31
Total	134

Between July 1999 and May 2001 the only substantial change in numbers had been the increase of Fixed Term national staff from 4 to 18. Staffing provision in the PRRO has been considered adequate, as suggested by the decision to save costs on a number of posts: 3 Programme Officers (Nairobi based), 1 Programme Assistant (Somalia based) and 2 Administrative Assistants (1 Nairobi based, 1 Somalia based). However, it is understood that two Programme Officer post are to be filled from the second half of 2001, given the anticipated increase in programme activity; one at least is aimed at increasing technical capacity for project identification and supervision. There is therefore still room for further employment of staff if required, perhaps especially in the south: Bay/Bakool has a low complement relative to the NorthWest and NorthEast, but a greater throughput of food aid. Security constraints and lack of access to wide areas contribute to the limitation of staff numbers; the NorthWest and NorthEast, by contrast, are wide territories with generally secure access.



4.7 Budget and financial resources for preparation and implementation

Overall the budget of the PRRO has been adequate to cover needs, in part due to DSC funds transferred from the previous EMOP along with the food stock of 8,786 MT. The same funds were also used for the preparation of the PRRO. Nevertheless, the budget is not over-generously funded. After nearly two of the three years of the planned life of the operation there was a shortfall of 54% against the planned tonnage contribution and 50% against the cash contribution (taking budget revisions into consideration). The European Union has been the single biggest contributor (29% of the food), followed by Japan, Italy, The Netherlands and Canada as major contributors.

The budget is not split into sectoral components (relief, recovery, social support) or geographical areas of operation, and therefore the flexibility has been available to manage commodity and cash resources according to changing needs, as noted in section 4.1 above. The budget also allows the reallocation of funds between expenditure lines (i.e. Direct Support Costs), including for the recruitment of new staff (e.g. national staff in south Somalia). Donors have mainly supported this flexibility in view of the large element of unpredictability in Somalia and WFP overwhelming responsibility for food aid provision in most of the country. The European Union has been perceived to be reluctant to provide resources for non-emergency-relief project use, although the Evaluation Team was told that this was not a matter of fixed principle and any proposition would be judged on its merits.

The major factors taken into account in designing the budget were:

- the cost of staff travel into Somalia and between regions, which is primarily by Air due to the badly deteriorated road network and security risks.
- the need to hire vehicles for the central/south operations, instead of using WFP ones, due to security risks.
- the need to pay salaries in US dollars due to wide fluctuations of Somali Shilling.
- the need to rely on 'cash facilitators' (with commission rates up to 3-5%) due to the absence of a central bank in Somalia

The efforts that have been made to reduce the level of Direct Support Costs (DSC) are highly commendable. During the year 2000 the budget for support costs was reduced from US\$ 206 / MT to US\$ 177 / MT (-14%) mainly through reductions in the amount deemed necessary for air support (UNCAS) and non-food Items. Although the DSC rate remains higher than under the previous EMOP (US\$ 140.45 / MT) the actual expenditure to date under the PRRO has been lower than budget at about US\$ 120 / MT. Hence a further reduction in DSC cost budget may be possible.

As noted above, the efforts at cost containment have also included a conservative deployment of staff. As regards LTSH reduction (see section 5.5.2 above) it was reported that WFP is in process of directing the savings on LTSH into the purchase of food. Most Donors granted their approval, with the exception of the EU.



Following the PRRO budget revisions, the cost currently amounts to about US\$ 798 / MT against the original rate of about US\$ 879 / MT (-9.22%). The percentage allocation of funds is as follows:

- Direct Operational Costs (DOC) = 71.78%
- Direct Support Costs (DSC) = 21.61%,
- Indirect Support Costs (ISC)⁸ = 6.61%

The situation as regards non-food Items is given in section 4.1 above.

The introduction of COAG-SAPint in February 2001 has the following implications:

- spending authorisations for the Other Direct Operational Costs (ODOC), Incorporated in the DSC since 1999, are not covered under the SAP;
- there is a gap in information regarding the migration of payment authorisation Balances to the new WFP system;
- requests to HQ for payment authorisations related to External Transport Costs had not been granted as of mid-2001; therefore, relevant service invoices were paid from the LTSH, although these costs are not included in the matrix.

The Mission would encourage WFP HQ to provide payment authorisations on shortfall costs, viz. External Transport Costs.

5 Meeting Commitments to Women

The Project Document set out clear aims for meeting WFP commitments to women. Gender issues would be mainstreamed in all R&R activities, including women's involvement in project identification and design through to food distribution and management. Increased enrolment of girls would be a precondition of assistance to primary schools in the Social Support sector; and women heads-of-household as well as expectant and nursing mothers would have priority status as emergency relief beneficiaries.

The current status of women in Somalia presents major challenges and some opportunities, and any judgement of WFP success in mainstreaming gender must take both into consideration. The accentuated social and political dominance of males in this 'patriarchal, patrilineal and patrilocal' culture (5) is perhaps more a function of traditional pastoralist society than of religious precept. On the other hand, women are influential in the domestic sphere, notably in determining the sharing of food resources, and amongst the majority pastoralists, they play a vital economic role. This vital role translates into both organising the necessary physical mobility of the house (*aqal*) and its contents and taking responsibility for the maintenance of a portion of the livestock, especially through supervision of children tending small stock.

However, the economic tribulations of the years of political upheaval as well as drought have to some extent promoted women's economic activity beyond the domestic sphere. For many men, the basis of their economic activity has been weakened or has even disappeared, because main herds of cattle or camels have been lost, and labouring opportunities on plantations have

⁸ The ISC funds the HQ costs. A rate of 7.1% is applied on the total of DOC and DSC.



dwindled with the destruction of commercial operations. It has fallen to women to pursue opportunities for petty trade and the sale of craft items, in order to gain the essential cash without which any rural household, let alone an urban household, can function. In this circumstance, men appear to accept the advantage of increased skills for women, especially a level of literacy, which will enhance trading and other income-earning opportunities.⁹

The PRRO did not begin with an empty slate as regards gender issues; progress had been made in previous EMOP activities. In 1996, the country office introduced a gender-based distribution policy prioritising households headed by women and families with one or more malnourished children as the primary beneficiaries of WFP assistance. Traditional birth attendants and female health workers were requested to participate in the formulation of food distribution plans and beneficiary identification, and pressure was applied to have women as members of relief committees. At the same time, the system of 'sit-on-your-bag' was successfully instituted at emergency relief distributions. Thus, as far as feasible, only women representatives of households are physically given the family ration and they are asked to sit on the bag as a sign of personal receipt which is apparently respected by men. The previous experience, or at least the fear, was that men tended to divert some part of family rations for their own cash purposes. The idea was therefore to get the food as directly as possible within the domestic sphere, i.e. under women's control for intra-family sharing. It seems to be accepted that this advantage outweighs the disadvantage to women of the extra burden of queuing at the distribution site often for several hours.

The PRRO has continued to promote these innovations. The Evaluation Team appreciated the need for a constant process of tactful persuasion by WFP field staff; for these arrangements in one way or another decrease the control, benign or otherwise, of local authorities and elders whose Cupertino is nevertheless indispensable for the efficiency and safety of operations.

In Bay/Bakool and North-West regions a major effort has been made to involve women formally on the management committees of MCH, kitchen garden, orphanage and elderly care programmes. A particular benefit aimed at capitalising women's associations/co-operative projects is the payment of a fee of \$10 per metric ton in the handling of food at MCH stations. Food-for-training is invested in adult literacy schemes in Lower Shebelle region as well as the NorthWest. More generally, women have been particularly, but not exclusively, targeted in the support of craft and other projects aimed at enhancing their commercial activities and employability. Implementing Partners as well as WFP field staff have participated in three regional workshops designed to inculcate the principles of WFP commitments to women.

Statistics of the PRRO output have been substantially expressed with disaggregated figures for female and male beneficiaries, despite difficulties experienced in regular and accurate data collection. It is anticipated that the ongoing review of M&E will *inter alia* establish ways of strengthening recording procedures, e.g. of numbers of pregnant and lactating women and age breakdowns.

One set of statistics in particular continues to indicate apparent gender discrimination, and that is in the participation of women in food-for-work (FFW) activities in the R&R sector. Women constitute about 20% of participants overall in FFW activities, and can reach twice that

⁹ The Evaluation Team interviewed women traders in Hargeisa market who were personally involved in organising wholesale grain importation from Ethiopia, including the hire of trucks; but this is not necessarily a phenomenon only of the last few years.



proportion in traditional activities such as the annual desilting of dams. But in certain 'non-traditional' activities they are in a small minority, with as few as 2% in some road rehabilitation activities. WFP staff attempt to encourage greater equality of participation, but the matter is not always clear-cut. In some cases it is true that adverse discrimination applies, and men are reluctant to allow women into non-traditional activities, perhaps at some distance from the village. But often it is not a case of discrimination in that sense. FFW typically consists of heavy labour tasks; women are offered lighter, secondary tasks. Again, for many women the time required by FFW participation can conflict with domestic requirements, and in particular child-care. (In some projects women are allowed to begin work earlier than the men, and to return home after fewer hours' work.) Finally, it must be recognised that many men have lost their principal economic activity due to the war and displacement. There is increased pressure for them to travel away from home for long periods to find casual employment, to the social detriment of the family. FFW employment can offer a modest counter-effect.

To date the PRRO has taken major and successful steps to give women direct access to the food aid, to give women a say in project plans and management, and to target them specifically or in majority at women. Further, it has set firmly before Implementing Partners the requirement of gender-sensitive planning and activity. But it is fair to say that the PRRO has not yet been able to take on the wider aim to promote the empowerment of women, and in the Evaluation Team's estimation this is a correct state of affairs. Even in more stable times, Somalia would present an unusually hard challenge in this regard¹⁰. At present, in a society at different stages of transition from chaos, it is an achievement to have come to practical arrangements with the almost exclusively male world of local authorities and traditional elders which enhance the position of women in food relief and project terms. The wider aim requires time and opportunity for nurturing a long-term relationship with communities and authorities which has not been available to WFP or indeed to many NGOs in the field. That process lies at the 'development' end of the relief-recovery-development spectrum.

6. Environmental Impact

Somalia exhibits all the environmental problems of semi-arid Africa, including the loss of arable soils through gully erosion and occasional flash floods. More extensive flooding associated with the El Nino phenomenon occurred in 1997 and early 1998 in Gedo region in the far southwest. In some areas there is a growing problem of the permanent loss of useful plant cover to over-grazing and over-cutting for fuel-wood.¹¹

A number of the R&R projects in the PRRO, although on a very limited scale, are relevant to environmental protection (see section 4.1, Table 2). In particular, agricultural land rehabilitation has had an important element of gully control and flood protection and riverbank treatment, and there has been some support of tree seedling nurseries. Expansion of such activities should be a

¹⁰ There is an historical dimension to this: during the former regime, the national network of women's associations was apparently much promoted but then subverted by harnessing it to political party or faction ends.

¹¹ The lack of government control in the south has encouraged an extreme problem of the creation of charcoal for export, now apparently at a 10-year peak. The main client countries are in the Gulf, and information available to WFP suggests that in the calendar year 2000 in excess of 100,000 MT of charcoal was shipped out of Mogadishu, indicating a major assault over a wide area on the acacia trees which are particularly used for the production. The North-East has also had an active trade in charcoal, but it is claimed that government control and awareness campaigns have stopped as much as 85% of the exports (7).



priority, but is dependent on finding strong Implementing Partners, who are a scarce resource in Somalia.

7. Recommendations and Lessons

Overall, the PRRO has been a successful operation in often-difficult circumstances. To some extent solutions have come out of the previous experience with EMOPs in Somalia during the 1990s. However, WFP staff have shown initiative and judgement in negotiating a path alongside and beyond local power structures in order to allow a wide variety of activities to take place, increasingly generated at the community level. The substantial, internal mid-term review exercise mounted by Country Office (29/10-2/11 2000) highlighted some inherent problems in food aid-based programming in Somalia. The self-critical approach evident in the written record of this exercise, as in briefing documents for the Mission, struck the evaluation team as a sign of strength in WFP Somalia.

The advantage of a PRRO in allowing both continuity and flexibility was highlighted in the first two years of the operation. This was reflected in an initial high requirement for relief assistance followed by a marked improvement in food security after good rains and an extended period when recovery and social institution support projects could be developed. In the circumstances of Somalia, it is hard to imagine how WFP, or any food aid agency, could mount periodic emergency operations with either speed or efficiency without some continuous presence in the field. This is not only a matter of logistical arrangements but of working relationships with local authorities and others, which cannot be created instantly, nor maintained from the distance of Nairobi. However, a PRRO can only enjoy the flexibility to switch to emergency mode if appropriate food pledges materialise. In this case, it remained to be seen whether some difficulties would arise later 2001 in dealing with anticipated new relief requirement in the south whilst maintaining on-going social support projects and pursuing actual or planned recovery projects. Donor response to food aid for Somalia has tended to be emergency-led, but the PRRO has so far managed to attract sufficient donations which are not emergency-tied, so that R&R project investment, especially from mid-2000, was able to take off with some confidence.

Finding strong Implementing Partners has been more difficult than anticipated in the original PRRO Project Document, and field staff has been considerably stretched in pursuing projects, however short-term, with local authorities as well as directly with communities. By the same token, field staff has also been somewhat constrained in achieving adequate monitoring. The CO has recognised, but not yet resolved, the issue of food-led versus project-needs-led interventions; even amongst WFP personnel it is possible to discern differing emphases as between getting food to needy people and getting projects done. The two objectives seem to have coexisted reasonably comfortably in the short-run projects, which have so far been typical in the recovery sector. But as more stable circumstances, especially in the north, invite longer-term project involvement, tensions in the PRRO may emerge between careful development of activities with ministries and communities and the need/expectation of a significant throughput of food. It seems likely that this problem is shared by other PRROs at some stage, and is also a problem associated with non-emergency food aid in other contexts.

This issue highlights the growing difference in circumstances and potential operations between south and north within the same PRRO, geographical differences, which the PRRO has the flexibility to encompass. Specifically, a new normalcy is being established at least in the NorthWest region as it enters a second decade of relative political peace, albeit without international recognition of its government. As economic and social regeneration continues,



however skewed towards the urban sector, new questions must arise about appropriate roles for food aid.

Periodic droughts will probably continue to require a relief food response, but in between, what kind of food aid projects will be justified? The plethora of often imaginative, short-term micro-projects has been a function of aid to recovery from a peculiarly socially and physically destructive war. At a certain stage, however, the potential project beneficiaries must pass from being 'returnees' or otherwise victims of a terrible episode in their national history, to people who, although often poor, live in an economy where food is not usually critically difficult of access. In much of Somalia this will always in large part be a statement of people's effective demand for cereal-based staples on the market, some of it produced in parts of the south, most of it imported.

It seems possible that at least for a large minority of the country's population, rural and urban, who live in the central and northern regions, that stage may be reached within the period of an extension of the PRRO. This will need to be reflected in its design, putting a particular accent on more extensive and/or longer-run recovery projects, edging towards the 'development' end of the *relief-recovery-development* progression hoped for in the PRRO format.

Recommendation 1: (section 4.2.2)

For the future, the CO should plan a recovery strategy, which takes into account the differences between the north and the south. WFP should look for further involvement with line ministries in the north, whether in agricultural, environmental and water projects, or in education and health.

Thinking again of a time-period encompassing an extension of the PRRO, the question arises how far food aid provision for Social Institutions support will remain appropriate. This sector has taken up a little under 20% of the PRRO food aid. Short-term food support for hospitals and orphanages still finding their feet after the previous chaos and wholesale destruction was perhaps appropriate at the beginning of the current PRRO, but such commitments have a tendency to endure, through multiple extensions. When, as in the north of the country where there is some concentration on this sector, the market system for food has returned to stability and a new normality, institutions must be expected to purchase food, whether or not via financial assistance.

Recommendation 2: (section 4.4)

WFP should begin to limit the spectrum of its Social Institutions support projects with a view to eventual phasing out of this sector. Meanwhile the focus should be on those projects where there is more likelihood of eventually developing government involvement or of finding a strong Implementing Partner, e.g. in school feeding and MCH programmes.

This leads us to the more general point that it is sometimes not clear what the exit strategy for projects really is, and, to a lesser extent, on what grounds the choice to support one or other project was taken.

Recommendation 3: (section 5.3)

More attention needs to be given to formal indicators for beginning and ending projects, and to qualitative reporting in general.



WFP pushes local authorities and other Implementing Partners to target the most vulnerable categories of people, whether for food relief or for project participation. There are some gaps in the available information on the actual choice of beneficiaries and what happens to food once received by target families, including redistribution within the community.

Recommendation 4: (section 5.2)

Funds remaining from the targeting study commissioned by WFP in late 2000 might usefully be invested in obtaining more in-depth information on the beneficiaries of selected projects, and on case studies towards enhanced post-distribution monitoring.

A different aspect of targeting has to do with assumptions apparently made in the formulation of the PRRO that pastoralists, who form the majority of the national rural population, were the least vulnerable group at least in terms of chronic food insecurity. If this was ever true of poorer pastoralists, recent drought and the re-imposition of the livestock ban may well have changed the picture. Whilst they have been a target of emergency relief in response to these factors, they have not been prominent in R&R activities, and it is recognised that they are a difficult group to devise projects for.

Recommendation 5: (sections 3.1 & 3.2)

Further information on the vulnerability status of poorer pastoralists should be sought via the Food Security Assessment Unit for Somalia and other sources, and further consideration given to the feasibility of project assistance to them.

Apparently also with basic reference to livestock owners, the emergency ration differs from the R&R and Social Support rations in that vegetable oil is excluded, and the calorie value is thus reduced from 2100 kcal to c1950 kcal pppd. The original rationale concerned the availability of fat from livestock, sesame seed or imported oil. This seems highly questionable for poor pastoralists/agro-pastoralists in a bad year. A more compelling reason at least in the south is the security risk posed to transports and distributors by such a high value item.

Recommendation 6: (section 4.5)

The reasons for the exclusion of oil from the emergency ration should be reviewed. Where security threats require exclusion, the ration should be made up to 2100 kcal pppd by increasing/adding another item, e.g. cereal, pulse or sugar.

Last, but far from least, WFP Somalia has made major and highly commendable efforts to reduce the costs of the PRRO operation, with transport costs as the principal target. One aspect is the encouragement of competition amongst transport contractors, but one barrier to this is the otherwise highly successful security bond system first introduced during previous EMOPs to encourage safe delivery of the entirety of the cargo. This was first set at 100% of cargo value, but reduced in 2001 to 50% in view of improved security conditions and to encourage competition from contractors who could not meet the 100% level.

Recommendation 7: (section 5.5.1)

Consideration should now be given to further reducing the security bond required from transport contractors from the current 50% of cargo value to 10-20% in relatively secure areas of operation; and further efforts are encouraged to increase contractor competition in particular in the North-East region.



Annexes

ANNEX 1

Evaluation Issues and Method

The Terms of reference for the evaluation mission necessarily covered a wide spectrum of issues but the Somalia PRRO invited particular interest in the flexibility to engage in emergency activities or recovery projects as the situation demands. Both in appropriate roles for food aid in non-emergency activities and in the special logistical challenges and costs associated with local security problems and very poor infrastructure.

The mission had two members. The mission leader was a food security expert with experience in vulnerability assessment and WFP relief and recovery programmes, policy and planning. The second member was a logistician with experience of WFP operations in Somalia and elsewhere. A third member, a US citizen, was to have covered especially gender, nutrition and M&E issues, but was unable to participate because at the last moment the US authorities issued a new security warning against US citizens travelling in Somalia. It was agreed in Rome that some aspects of the programme would be looked at in less detail than others: in particular budget, financial resources and management structure, and M&E (it was expected that an M&E consultant would visit the Somalia programme in September 2001).

The mission took place between 2 and 23 July 2001. The team leader was briefed at Rome HQ and then joined the second member in Nairobi from 4 July. The mission was well briefed in Nairobi and Somalia, with specially prepared reports and other material from the five continuing areas of operation: NorthWest region (sub-office in Hargeisa), NorthEast region (Bossaso), Benadir (Mogadishu), Lower Shebelle (Merka) and Bay/Bakool (Baidowa). The mission had the advantage of the presence of two senior staff throughout the field visit to Somalia: the Deputy Country Director and the Programme Co-ordinator.

Travel in Somalia was from 7 to 14 July. This was three days shorter than the planned field visits because during the stay of the mission at Baidoa new insecurity arose in one of the three locations scheduled for the visit, Merka on the southern coast. Travel to Merka had to be cancelled at a day's notice – underlining in a small way the difficulties of planning operations in the political environment of southern Somalia. However, the two regions of WFP biggest activity were visited: the NorthWest region and Bay/Bakool in the south. In the NorthWest, the team visited projects, offices and/or warehouses in Hargeisa, Borama, Berbera and the Boqor farmland flood protection scheme some 90 km from Hargeisa. For the southern visit the team flew to Rabdhure in northern Bakool, and after a night there went by road to the Bakool capital, Wajid, and then on to Baidowa, the Bay capital and location of the WFP sub-office.

At the time of the mission no emergency activities were under way; however, the mission was able to witness serious crop failure in the main sorghum belt (Bay/Bakool) and hear considerable discussion in the field and in Nairobi of the assessment of emergency relief needs for later in 2001. At each station visited, the mission interviewed WFP and other agency staff, met with local authority representatives especially in the south, and visited warehouses where relevant, but spent as much time as possible visiting project activities where discussions were held with participants, with the help of translation.

ANNEX 2

Checklist for Meeting the Commitments to Women & Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective

Essential Elements of Commitments to Women and Gender Mainstreaming Policy	Detailed Observations	Level of PRRO Coherence With Commitments to Women and Gender Mainstreaming Policy			
		Very High	High	Low	Very Low
Commitment I: Provide Direct Access to Appropriate Food for Women					
◆ Does the PRRO make a real effort to get food into the hands of women, e.g. through women's ration cards?	Yes, particularly through the 'sit-on-your-bag' system in relief distributions discussed in section 6.	x			
◆ Do the PRRO activities address micronutrient deficiencies amongst women and children?	Yes, in the context of assistance to MCH programs and in promoting kitchen gardens run by women.		x		
◆ Do the PRRO activities consider local cooking and eating habits?	The rations contain familiar and acceptable items; the maize is generally less preferred than other cereals, which are locally more expensive for that reason. Where relevant, for Social Support it is required for officers to report on cooking facilities and eating utensils.	x			
◆ Have women been consulted in determining the food basket?	The items were established several years before in previous EMOPS		?		
◆ Is the female-headed household issue given special attention because of the households' greater poverty and time constraints?	Yes, they are prime targets for food aid.	x			
◆ Does the PRRO make an effort to reduce the security and/or health risks women face when collecting food?	WFP staff makes every effort to ensure, with local authorities, the safety of ALL concerned which often means women in majority. Near-exclusive handing of relief rations to women sometimes means an extra time burden on them, but it is agreed that the advantages outweigh the disadvantages.	x			

Essential Elements of Commitments to Women and Gender Mainstreaming Policy	Detailed Observations	Level of PRRO Coherence With Commitments to Women and Gender Mainstreaming Policy			
		Very High	High	Low	Very Low
Commitment II: Take Measures to Ensure Women's Equal Access to and Full Participation in Power Structures and Decision-Making					
◆ Does the PRRO address women's strategic needs, i.e. use an approach that challenges traditional gender roles and empowers women? Describe how.	The successful pressure on local authorities and local Implementing Partners to accept/plan for gender sensitive approaches and women's membership of relief committees and involvement in management of projects constitutes a considerable challenge to the traditional non-public role of women. For a wider ambition of empowerment, longer association with communities will be necessary as part of future development work.	x (?)			
◆ Does it address gender relations? Does it bring men into the dialogue around the issues of women's status?	Yes, in the sense of gaining acceptance by local authorities and elders – and male heads of household – for women-oriented distribution and activities. But true dialogue requires considerable time and focus with communities, which is not yet available in the circumstances of the PRRO.		x		
Commitment III: Take Positive Action to Facilitate Women's Equal Access to Resources, Employment, Markets and Trade					
◆ Are PRRO resources deliberately targeted to women and girls where there is a big gender gap, i.e. of 25%? ¹ What is done?	NA				
◆ Does the PRRO have incentive programs to address the gender gap in primary education? What are they?	Yes, higher enrollment of girls is a condition of PRRO assistance to primary schools	x			

¹ For information on the gender gap in your country, contact the Senior Gender Adviser, SPP at HQ.

Essential Elements of Commitments to Women and Gender Mainstreaming Policy	Detailed Observations	Level of PRRO Coherence With Commitments to Women and Gender Mainstreaming Policy			
		Very High	High	Low	Very Low
◆ Do women participate in FFW? As labourers or also as decision-makers? Do they control the assets created?	Yes, although the proportion of participation rarely reaches 50%. This is partly due to reluctance of men to allow women onto public works-type projects, partly due to other burdens on women's time. WFP and partners have sometimes been able to arrange for women to anticipate on the basis of lighter tasks and fewer hours. The assets created/improved tend to be communal, except for income generation projects which may be aimed specifically at women. However, improved water provision has a particular impact in reducing burdens on women and children for distant collection.		x	(?)	
◆ Is there any opportunity in the PRRO for women to learn new skills through FFT for greater development sustainability?	Yes, WFP has made a point of supporting women's literacy and craft projects.	x			
◆ Does the PRRO engage in advocacy on behalf of women? For gender equity? To leverage resources for partnership work?	Yes, by example and project design as well as workshops for both WFP local staff and Implementing Partners.		x		
Commitment IV: Generate and Disseminate Gender-Disaggregated Data for Planning and Evaluation					
◆ Are the M&E systems used in the PRRO sensitive to gender? Explain how.	Yes. M&E procedures and reporting formats are under review but as of mid-2001, the indicators for relief and FFW are all disaggregated by gender as relevant. Relief monitoring requires a statement whether women are on relief committee and if not, why not. Social Support reporting requires <i>inter alia</i> a statement on whether training or special education reflects women's priorities.		x		
◆ Is qualitative information sensitive to gender also collected?	Yes, see previous section. But qualitative information collection has <i>generally</i> been somewhat limited in the PRRO.			?	
◆ Does the PRRO look at inputs, outputs outcomes and impact from a gender perspective?	Yes, as a function of planning and reporting on relief programs and projects.		x		

Essential Elements of Commitments to Women and Gender Mainstreaming Policy	Detailed Observations	Level of PRRO Coherence With Commitments to Women and Gender Mainstreaming Policy			
		Very High	High	Low	Very Low
Commitment V: Improve Accountability of Actions Taken to Meet the Commitments					
◆ Are WFP staff managing the PRRO held accountable for meeting the Commitments to Women and mainstreaming gender? How?	Yes, managers, program staff and field monitors are confidentially assessed on improvement of accountability and actions taken. Three awareness-building workshops in different regions have been held.		x		
◆ Is the Gender Focal Point given sufficient authority to influence decision making with regard to the PRRO? Support?	NA				
◆ Are implementing partners held accountable for meeting the Commitments to Women and mainstreaming gender? How?	Yes, a clause committing counterparts and local authorities to include women at all levels of a project cycle is incorporated in the Letters of Understanding.		x		

ANNEX 3

Persons Interviewed

WFP Rome

Alan Wilkinson, Director, Office of Evaluation (OEDE)
Julian Lefevre, Chief Evaluation Officer, Office of Evaluation
Paul Buffard, Emergency Assessment Officer, Africa Bureau
Zlatan Milisic, Office for Humanitarian Affairs
Valerie Newsom Guarnieri, Senior Policy Advisor, Strategy and Policy Division

WFP Somalia Country Office, Nairobi

Kevin Farrell	Representative / Country Director
Abnezer NGowi	Deputy Country Director
Edward Kallon	Programme Coordinator
Maulid Aden Warfa	Programme Assistant
James Legg	Officer in Charge, Baidowa sub-office
John Hayes	Logistics Officer
Sadik Ibrahim	Logistics Assistant
Chris Mshamba	Logistics Assistant
Morris Oduor	Commodity Tracking Analyst
Hiroko Nishino	JPO, M&E Focal Point
Innocent Kabalisa	Finance Officer
Akberet Tedla	Senior Finance Assistant
Stefania Spadano	Int'l Administrative Assistant / Acting Finance Officer
Alivereti Tuimavana	Security Officer

Other Nairobi Offices

Randolph Kent	UN Resident & Humanitarian Coordinator (UNDP)
Bernard Harborne	Chief, UN Co-ordination Unit for Somalia (OCHA / UNDP)
André Le Sage	Humanitarian Affairs Officer, “ “ “
Holbrook Arthur	WFP Regional Manager
Eddie Boyle	TA Food Security, European Union
Henrik Jespersen	Chair, Somalia Aid Coord'n Body (R. Danish Embassy)
Buzz Sharp	Chief Technical Advisor FSAU ¹²
Thierry Antoine	Food Security Analyst FSAU
Alexandra Williams	Communications & Info. Officer FSAU
Noreen Prendiville	Project Officer, Nutrition FSAU
Mahdi G. Kayad	Livestock Officer FSAU
Michele Nori	Socio-Agronomist FSAU
Sidow Addou	Representative for Somalia, USAID/FEWS NET
Scott Faiia	Country Director, CARE Somalia
Lex Kassenberg	Asst. Country Director

¹² Food Security Assessment Unit For Somalia, coordinated by FAO

Godfrey Abuor
Jeyilan Ali Kediye

Logistics Officer
Managing Director, Jak Line Co. Ltd. (WFP contractor)

Somalia – Bay/Bakool

WFP

Jeremey Hopkins
Mohamed Shariff
Muktar Mohamed Ibrahim
Muhiadin Maolin Yarow
Abdullahi Ibrahim Halane
Ali Mohamed Bashir

Acting OIC / Asst. Programme Officer,
Logistics Assistant
Food Monitor
Food Monitor
Food Monitor (Belet Weyne)
Food Monitor (Bardera)

Local Authorities

Hassan M.N. al-Turabi
Sheikh Aaden M. Noor
Hassan Moalim Hassan
Yuusuf Mohamed Kheyr
Isaaq Noor Isaaq
Abdi Aden Garas
Ali Ahmed Hassan
Ahmed Hassan Abdi

RRA Chair
Second Deputy of RRA
District Commissioner, Baidowa
Governor of Bakool, Wajid
District Commissioner, Wajid
Deputy DC, Wajid
District Commissioner, Rabdhure
Deputy DC, Rabdhure

Other

Hawo Ahmed Hassan
M. Bertha
Abdirahman Ibrahim
Abdikarim Mohamed Aden
Abdirashid Sheikh Ahmed
Sheikh Ibrahim

Head, Women's Organisation, Rabdhure
Co-ordinator, UNICEF Baidoa
Isaaq UNICEF rep. Midow borehole project
UNICEF rep. at Rabdhure MCH
IMC rep. at Rabdhure MCH
Managing Director, Al-Khalil Co. (WFP contractor)

Somalia - North-West Region

WFP

Kaniz Khan
Mohamed Kahin
Musa Warsame
Asha Osman
Ismail Mohamed
Yusuf Haji Omer
Ahmed Hussein
Shuaib Hassan

Officer in Charge, Hargeisa
Finance/Admin. Assistant
Programme Assistant
Food Monitor
Logistics Assistant
Asst. Storekeeper, Hargeisa warehouse
Asst. Storekeeper, Berbera warehouse
Security guard, Berbera warehouse

N.W. Government

Mohamed Osman Fadal
Ali Omer Mohamed
Abdirasak Sh. Muhumed
Ibrahim Arab

Minister of Planning, Hargeisa
Port Manager, Berbera
Ministry Of Agriculture, Director – Geed Abera
Head of Section – Geed Abera

Other

Yahye Haji	Project Coordinator, Boqor Farmland Development
Annalena Tonelli	Doctor in Charge, Borama TB Hospital
Asha and Wasira	NGO workers, Kalmo Orphanage, Borama
Ahmed Mohamed	Executive Director, Havoyoco Girl's Education
Ifrah Khalif	Gender Officer
Kamal Mohamed	Project manager
Ahmed Diriye	Manager, Hargeisa seedling nursery
Rashid Hussein	Chair, Minority Crafts Project and Childrens' School
Amina Abdullahi	Chair, Women's Training & Adult Education, Hargeisa
Abdi Aden	Manager, chalk-making enterprise, Hargeisa
Hassan Gure	Sooyaal Literacy Programme, Hargeisa

ANNEX 4

Documents Reviewed

The first eight documents are numbered according to specific reference made in the text.)

- WFP Rome. *Project Document: Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation – Somalia 6073.00*. WFP/EB.1/99/7-A/3, Rome
- SC-UK (Julius Holt & Mark Lawrence). *The Prize of Peace – a survey of rural Somaliland*. London 1992
- UNDP Nairobi/New York. *Human Development Report: Somalia 1998*.
- WFP Rome. *From Crisis to Recovery*. WFP/EB.A/98/4-A (1998)
- WFP Somalia. *Brief on Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation Somalia 6073.00 – July 1999-May 2001*. Nairobi June 2001
- WFP Rome. *Guidelines for the Preparation of a PRRO*. January 1999
- FP Bossaso. *Review of Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations (PRRO 6073) for Period from July 1999 to May 2001*. June 2001
- WFP Mogadishu. *Brief on the Mogadishu Supplementary Feeding Programme*. Mogadishu June 2001
- WFP Rome. *A Policy for Results-Oriented Monitoring and Evaluation in WFP*. June 2001

ITAD/WFP Rome, *Draft Monitoring and Evaluation Guidelines*. June 2001

- WFP Somalia. *PRRO 6073 Review Mission: Logistics Review Brief*. Nairobi June 2001
- WFP Somalia (Simon Narbeth). *The targeting of emergency food distribution in Somalia: vulnerability, redistribution and beneficiary participation*. Nairobi March 2001
- WFP Hargeisa. *Briefing Report for Evaluation of PRRO 6073.00 - July 1999-May 2001*. June 2001
- WFP Hargeisa. *Projects implemented in year 2000*. December 2000
- WFP Merka. *Brief on Lower Shabelle Operation – July 1999-May 2001*. Merka June 2001
- WFP Baidowa. *Briefs on sectoral projects – July 1999-May 2001*. Baidowa June 2001
- WFP Somalia. *Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation Somalia 6073.00 – Review (from 29/10-2/11 2001 workshop)*. Internal document, Nairobi

- FSAU. *PowerPoint presentation: Scenarios and Analysis of Three Food Economy Zones in Southern Somalia – over the coming year*. Food Security Assessment Unit for Somalia, Nairobi July 2001
- FSAU/SC-UK. *Food Economy Baseline Profiles*. Food Security Assessment Unit for Somalia & Save The Children UK, Nairobi 2000
- FSAU. *Focus reports: Deyr 2000/01 Crop harvest in Southern Somalia; The Livestock Ban: Increasing Vulnerability during the Jilaal Season; Gu 2001 Crop Establishment in Southern Somalia and Food Security Implications*. Food Security Assessment Unit for Somalia, Nairobi March-July 2001
- FSAU. *Monthly Food Security Reports 2001*. Food Security Assessment Unit for Somalia, Nairobi 2001
- FSAU. *Somalia Year 2000 Review*. Food Security Assessment Unit for Somalia, Nairobi 2001
- Terra Nuova (Mahdi G. Qayad). *Somali Livestock Baseline Information*. 1998
- SACB. *Donor Report 2000*. Somalia Aid Coordination Body, Nairobi 2000
- UN-OCHA. *United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Somalia – 2001*. Geneva 2001

ANNEX 5

Terms of Reference

Evaluation of Somalia PRRO 6073.00 “Food aid for relief and recovery in Somalia” (July 1999 – June 2002)

1. Background

The PRO programme category (Protracted Emergency Operations for Refugees and Displaced Persons) was originally established by the Committee on Food Aid (CFA) in May 1989 (WFP/CFA:27/P/7). The category responded to (i) the growth of migrant groups – both refugees and displaced people - as a result of civil strife, and (ii) the persistence of the problems, which precipitated their flight and the consequent perpetuation of their status over long periods. In short, a decade of civil conflicts had created the need for an adequate and predictable funding base for refugees. By creating a subset of its “development” resources, the Programme hoped to preserve the development and emergency resource bases for their original purposes while attracting additional net resources to deal with burgeoning needs in this new category.

In April 1998, WFP introduced a significant enhancement to the PRO category in a policy paper entitled “From Crisis to Recovery” (WFP/EB.A/98/4). A new programming category was introduced known as the PRRO – Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation - brought two major modifications to the category. First, all protracted emergency operations – and no longer just refugee and displaced persons operations - would be transformed into PRROs and brought before the Board for approval, generally after two years. Second, the transformation of Emops into PRROs would be done based on the preparation of a recovery strategy that would provide the rationale for continued assistance and, to the extent possible, emphasize recovery activities in addition to ongoing relief needs and contribute to conditions for finding sustainable solutions to protracted crises. This emphasis on recovery was very much in line with international support for linking relief and rehabilitation work to longer-term development interventions. Refugee and displaced persons operations – the old PRO category – would remain a subset of the new category and would likewise benefit from the introduction of a recovery strategy.

The new PRRO category also stressed two important resource dimensions:

- First, within a PRRO, WFP would have the flexibility to move funds freely between relief and recovery activities as the situation on the ground required - to seize opportunities for recovery, but to be prepared to meet unforeseen critical relief needs;
- Second, the new category called for longer-term financial commitments from donors – for predictability and planning as well as for building partnerships for recovery.

The Global PRRO Review

During its sessions in October 2000 and February 2001, WFP’s Executive Board considered issues related to the funding of PRROs and raised questions about the effectiveness of the new programming category. The Board endorsed a review of the PRRO category as a whole to be undertaken by OEDE based on the findings of 10-12 PRRO evaluations scheduled for 2001-

2002. This evaluation is among the planned PRRO evaluations and, therefore, its findings will feed into the planned review.

2. PRRO Somalia 6073.00 "Food aid for relief and recovery in Somalia" – An Overview:

The emergence of some relatively peaceful areas in Somalia, and the determination of local communities to re-establish a sense of normalcy in their lives and take charge of their own recovery and communal rehabilitation, encouraged WFP to launch a Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO) to succeed the series of emergency operations (EMOPs) which WFP launched since 1991. Food aid for relief and recovery in Somalia (PRRO 6073.00) was approved by WFP Executive Board in January 1999 for a three-year duration, with a total food commitment of 63,104 tones.

The Goal of the PRRO is to contribute to the improvement of household food security and the revival of local economies in Somalia. The primary objectives, in line with WFP's mandate in Somalia, are:

- a) promote and support local initiatives that will create short- and long-term employment opportunities and lead to self-reliance;
- b) maintain minimum nutritional standards among population groups most at risk;
- c) promote and support educational activities and increase enrolment, with particular emphasis on attracting and retaining girl students;
- d) provide life-sustaining food to the hungry poor in areas with acute local and seasonal food shortages; and
- e) promote adult literacy education.

Accordingly, the following three activities were planned and under implementation in order to contribute to achieving these objectives:

Rehabilitation and recovery activities;
support to social institutions; and
emergency relief assistance.

About 700,000 direct beneficiaries and 620,000 indirect beneficiaries per annum will be reached through the above three activities. 70% of these beneficiaries are in southern Somalia, 30% in northwest and northeast Somalia. They include: rain dependent farmers, flood irrigation farmers, pump irrigation farmers, agro-pastoralists and pastoralists and, as far as they can safely be reached, urban dwellers.

A review workshop was undertaken by the Country Office last October, 2000 with the goal of drawing on lessons learnt and best practices during these fifteen months of implementation of the PRRO (1 July 1999 to 30 September 2000), and to prepare regional strategies and implementation plans for the period 1 October 2000 to 30 September 2001. The report of this review will be available for this evaluation.

3. Objectives of the Evaluation of PRRO Somalia 6073.00

The objectives of the evaluation are:

- 1) To assess the relevance, timeliness, efficiency and effectiveness of WFP assistance under the PRRO in order to improve the implementation of the current operation and assist with planning the next phase.
- 2) To assess the added value of including this operation in the PRRO programme category, thereby contributing to an understanding of the usefulness of the new PRRO category both as a resource window and as a programming instrument. Specifically, the evaluation will:
 - Assess the PRRO's recovery strategy and determine its relevance to creating conditions for sustainable solutions to the protracted situation;
 - Assess the added value of assisting the target populations under the PRRO in comparison with its predecessors; and
 - Determine whether the conditions set out in WFP's policy paper "From Crisis to Recovery" have been met within the PRRO and the extent to which these conditions are relevant to project preparation and implementation.
- 3) To provide accountability to the WFP Executive Board.

4. Scope of Work

The evaluation of the PRRO will focus initially on the recovery strategy¹³, assessing how it was formulated, how it has evolved over the life of the project and its relevance to the situation analysis.

Based on the initial recovery strategy, the PRRO identified two component elements: **protracted relief and recovery**. These elements and their respective three activities (1) Rehabilitation and recovery; 2) Support to social institution; 3) Relief assistance) will be assessed individually to determine a) if activities took place, outputs were delivered and targets reached and b) if this was sufficient to achieve the stated objectives.

On a practical level, this will include reviewing the systems and support (financial, staff, partnerships, etc.) which underly the PRRO. On a more general level, the strategic linkages between the two component elements will be assessed to determine whether the PRRO has successfully seized opportunities for recovery. In addition, the PRRO's relation to other WFP interventions in the country will also be examined.

The evaluation will also examine the PRRO's strategic linkages with sister agencies, implementing partners and other stakeholders: first to determine their contribution to meeting

¹³ "From Crisis to Recovery" (WFP/EB.A/98/4-A) as well as the PRRO Guidelines ("Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations: Guidelines for the Preparation of a PRRO", WFP February 1999) call for the preparation of a "recovery strategy" as the base on which all PRRO's activities are designed. The strategy may or may not lead to "recovery" components within the PRRO, depending on the opportunities available within a particular country context.

objectives; and second to shed light on whether the PRRO has contributed “to the process of transforming insecure, fragile conditions into durable, stable situations...”¹⁴ .

The evaluation will also seek to identify generic (broadly applicable) lessons regarding the use of food aid for meeting the immediate humanitarian needs and for helping to create conditions for sustained recovery and development. Findings and recommendations identified within the present evaluation exercise will also contribute to eventual adjustments to the PRRO category as a whole.

5. Key Issues and Sub-Issues¹⁵

The evaluation will address the following issues and sub-issues:

1. **Recovery Strategy: Is the strategy well prepared and does it convincingly set the foundation for the activities of the PRRO? Does it accurately gauge the opportunities to introduce recovery activities and challenge WFP to contribute to phasing down and to achieving sustainable solutions for the protracted crisis?**

- 1.1 *At what point was the recovery strategy developed for the PRRO? Has it been periodically reviewed or modified over the life of the operation in order to maintain its relevance with changing circumstances?*
- 1.2 *What resources have been devoted to the development of the PRRO recovery strategy and what mechanisms for consultation, partnership and review have been utilized?*
- 1.3 *Does the recovery strategy provide the rationale for operating in the protracted situation, identify and justify the role of food aid, identify target areas and groups, and define assistance modalities?*
- 1.4 *Has there been an effort to integrate developmental approaches as early as possible in relief and recovery activities and what conclusions can be drawn from these attempts?*
- 1.5 *What risks to the PRRO were foreseen in the recovery strategy (e.g., the resurgence of violence, a compounding natural disaster, changing needs of target groups, loss of donor support) and have appropriate contingency plans be made?*
- 1.6 *To what extent has the adoption of a recovery strategy allowed WFP, partners and donors to establish a basis for a longer-term commitment to the PRRO?*

2. **Design of the PRRO**

- 2.1 *Do the PRRO objectives reflect the situation analysis presented in the recovery strategy?*
- 2.2 *Are the PRRO objectives coherent?*¹⁶
- 2.3 *Are the activities and outputs tailored specifically to achieve the objectives?*
- 2.4 *To what extent are the PRRO objectives still valid?*

¹⁴ “From Crisis to Recovery”, WFP 1998.

¹⁵ In this section, those items printed in italics will be covered mainly by the country office, in conjunction with the evaluation team.

¹⁶ Section 6, “Notes on Methodology”, recommends that prior to arrival in country the mission prepare a logframe for the PRRO in order to systematically assess objectives, activities and outputs.

2.5 *Is the strategic orientation of the PRRO compatible with the policy “From Crisis to Recovery”?*

3. Achievement of PRRO Objective To what extent are the activities and outputs of the PRRO achieving the objectives? Have there been relevant unexpected effects?

Appropriateness of food rations

- 3.1 *Is the food ration adequate and acceptable in light of the PRRO’s objectives and targeting?*
- 3.2 *Are the nutritional objectives realistic and to what extent are they being achieved?*
- 3.3 *What has been the nutritional impact of WFP assistance on the targeted vulnerable groups?*
- 3.4 *Have there been ration reductions or phasing out of “general” food assistance and, if so, on what basis?*

Standards and Quality

- 3.5 *What systems are in place for assuring programme quality:*
- assessing community/implementing partner capacity and selection criteria?
 - ensuring contributions from partners/communities?
 - setting appropriate technical standards using local experts and partner agencies?
- 3.6 *Are staff working on the PRRO adequately trained ?*

4 Effectiveness and Sustainability of the PRRO

Assessment/Targeting:

- 4.1 *Is the PRRO targeting the appropriate beneficiaries? Is there evidence that the targeted beneficiaries are being reached?*
- 4.2 *Under FFW/FFT, are the targeted groups benefiting from the assets being created?*
- 4.3. *How have food insecurity, vulnerability and beneficiary figures been assessed and subsequently adjusted as the operation has evolved?*
- At the country level? (e.g., FAO/WFP Food and Crop Assessments, WFP/VAM, GIEWS, FEWS, JFAMs, composite household surveys, camp registration)
 - At the community level? (e.g., RRA, PRA)
 - At the household level (e.g., women’s organizations, relief committees)
- 4.4 *Are there mechanisms to signal opportunities (or provide guidance in the case of resource shortfalls) for further targeting, for ration adjustments, for modifications to the role of food aid, for the introduction of recovery elements, or for phasing down and/or exiting?*
- 4.5 *What information on expected funding has been available during the formulation and implementation of the operation and how has this influenced targeting?*

M&E Systems:

- 4.6 *Are appropriate and functioning M&E systems supporting the implementation of the PRRO?*
- 4.7 *Was baseline data collected and were appropriate indicators identified at the outset for measuring progress and results?*
- 4.8 *What is the type and frequency of reporting for the operation, including periodic participatory appraisals? Is the information analyzed and used to make decisions regarding the management of the PRRO?*
- 4.9 *What are the constraints to monitoring – such as access, disruption of activities, security, manipulation of data – that affect the operation and how does the CO attempt to overcome these?*
- 4.10 *Have criteria been established to signal when to shift activities from “relief” to “recovery” and likewise from “recovery” to “development”? If so, are these being applied effectively?*

Achieving programme linkages and sustainability

- 4.11 *Has there been any added value to transforming long-standing emergency operations into a PRRO in terms of building linkages and improving the likelihood of sustainability?*
- 4.12 *What are the prospects for the sustainability of each main PRRO activity?*
- 4.13 *Have opportunities been identified and pursued for making the transition from relief to recovery activities (in particular, restoring livelihoods) where appropriate (follow-up to 4.11)?*
- 4.14 *To what degree has WFP food aid contributed to promoting resettlement and food self-sufficiency?*
- 4.15 *What role, if any, has resource availability and predictability played in building relief-development linkages?*

Implementing Partners

- 4.16 *What systems do the WFP Country Office employ to assess the capacities and comparative advantages of potential implementing partners (IPs)?*
- 4.17 *Are the number and nature of IPs under the PRRO adequate and appropriate for implementing the range of activities? Has there been a trend towards or away from using local implementing partners?*

Coordination

- 4.18 *Has preparing and implementing the PRRO broadened and improved coordination compared to the predecessor operations?*
- 4.19 *What are the mechanisms within the PRRO for coordination with government, donors, UN agencies (UNHCR, FAO, IFAD, ILO, UNICEF, UNDP, etc.), NGOs, etc.? Assess their meaningfulness to the implementation of the PRRO.*
- 4.20 *Are the objectives and activities of the PRRO compatible with the policies/programmes of local government structures?*

- 4.21 *How is the preparation and implementation of the PRRO linked with the UN Common Strategic Framework, the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP), and any contingency planning exercises?*

Effectiveness of Logistics Arrangements

- 4.22 *Has food availability been adequate to meet the PRRO requirement?*
- 4.23 *Has the coordination of Programming and Logistics been adequate in terms of efficient implementation of the PRRO food delivery requirements ?*
- 4.24 *What systems have been put in place for assuring the quality of logistics services provided ?*
- 4.25 *What have been the security challenges to an efficient and cost-effective logistics operation in the PRRO?*
- 4.26 *Have appropriate and adequate measures been taken to minimise risks and losses?*
- 4.27 *To what degree has the PRRO logistics operation achieved success in getting food to the targeted beneficiaries?*
- 4.28 *Have the food accounting measures (reporting systems, monitoring) been adequate in terms of storage, deliveries and beneficiary receipts?*
- 4.29 *What measures have been taken to meet the differing logistics requirements of the PRRO by component elements (relief, rehabilitation/recovery, support for social institutions) ?*
- 4.30 *Have the number and training of staff working on the PRRO logistics operations been adequate and appropriate for the implementation of the operation?*

Security

- 4.31 *Have adequate and appropriate measures been introduced and adhered to in order to minimize the risk to WFP staff and implementing partners involved in the implementation of the PRRO?*
- 4.32 *Are there other, significant security challenges to the smooth functioning of the PRRO?*

Budgets and financial resources for preparation and implementation

- 4.33 *Did the preparation and implementation of the PRRO (compared to the previous EMOP/PRO) result in management changes and efficiency savings?*
- 4.34 *How has the budget of the PRRO changed compared to its predecessor operations? Has preparation of the PRRO resulted in a change in the ratio of dollars spent per ton of commodities delivered compared to the previous operation?*
- 4.35 *Does the Country Office have the resources required – staff and cash – to prepare and implement the PRRO as foreseen in the “Guidelines for Preparation of a PRRO”, including staff or consultants with a “combination of development and emergency experience; and strong background in planning, design and strategy formulation”?*¹⁷

¹⁷ Guidelines for the Preparation of a PRRO, section 3.3; the Guidelines suggest the establishment of a “planner post” for preparing a PRRO.

- 4.36 *Is the PRRO budget appropriate in relation to its objectives/activities, and what factors (such as CO size, additional staff requirements for PRRO implementation) have affected individual budget items, particularly DSC?*
- 4.37 *What has been the impact of presenting and tracking the PRRO budget by component elements (protracted relief and recovery), including earmarking resources to particular components?*

Flexibility of PRRO budget and shifts in resources/activities

- 4.38 *Have the contingency mechanisms intended to deal with setbacks, reversals and new emergency/disaster outbreaks – such as PRRO budget revisions – been employed?*
- 4.39 *To what extent has the Country Director utilized his authority to transfer funds between components and geographic areas?*

Predictability and regularity of resources and impact on PRRO

- 4.40 *What have been the major resource constraints for the PRRO and have they changed as a result of transformation of the operation from an EMOP/PRO ?*
- 4.41 *To what extent have the resourcing requirements for the operation been met and how has the CO managed shortfalls? How predictably and regularly have resources been supplied to the PRRO?*
- 4.42 *Has transformation to a PRRO resulted in longer-term (more than 1 year) financial commitments to the operation?*
- 4.43 *How successfully has the PRRO resourced its non-food inputs and what, if any, have been the constraints?*

Donor perception of the PRRO and advocacy with donors and partners

- 4.44 *What has been the extent and nature of Country Office advocacy for the PRRO with donors and other partners?*
- 4.45 *What effect does having multiple and varied components within the PRRO (e.g., relief feeding and recovery FFW) have on WFP's ability to successfully advocate for donor support?*

5 Meeting Commitments to Women

- 5.1 *Do the design and implementation of the PRRO and its component elements adequately address WFP's Commitments to Women?*
- 5.2 *Has adequate effort been made to mainstream gender considerations?*
- 5.3 *What changes are required in a future phase to ensure better compatibility with these Commitments?*

6 Environment

- 6.1 *Impact of recovery activities: What has been the environmental impact of recovery activities within the PRRO? Are the PRRO activities helping to restore the natural habitat through rural infrastructure and reforestation schemes?*

7 *Lessons:*

What generic lessons¹⁸ can be drawn from the experience in designing and implementing the PRRO?

6. Notes on Methodology

6.1 Stages of the evaluation

The methods proposed below are indicative and may be revised/refined by the OEDE Evaluation Officer and/or team leader.

The evaluation will be divided into three phases:

Phase 1 – Preparation and Desk Review (1 day in Rome, and 2days in Nairobi):

Prior to the in-country mission, the team will review all relevant background documentation. The other team members will review materials provided electronically or by the Country Office prior to the beginning of the mission.

In order to help structure the evaluation and ensure a systematic examination of the project's effects, the evaluation team – with the assistance of the responsible OEDE officer - may wish to prepare a “mock” logical framework of the PRRO prior to arrival in country. The logframe should first draw a link between the PRRO objectives and the situation analysis as presented in the project document. Objectives should then be linked to each PRRO activity and its expected outputs. Finally, the evaluation team should indicate its strategy for gathering information on the specific outputs (e.g., statistical review at WFP Country Office, beneficiary interviews, etc.). A summary chart of the logframe may be used to structure the initial briefing with the Country Office and amended based on Country Office input.

Key information should also be assembled by the WFP Country Office, prior to the arrival of the mission.

Basic Documents to be Reviewed:

- WFP PRRO policy document: “From Crisis to Recovery” (WFP/EB.A/98/4-A)
- WFP, Guidelines for Preparation of a PRRO
- PRRO project document for the project being evaluated
- WFP/RE resource summary table for the PRRO
- Preceding EMOP or PRO document
- Country Strategy Outline and Country Programme
- Previous evaluation summaries and full reports
- Country or operation case studies
- Documentation on UN co-ordination frameworks (CCA, UNDAF or other)
- WFP/OEDE thematic evaluation “Recurring Challenges in the Provision of Food Assistance in Complex Emergencies”

¹⁸ A lesson is an instructive generalization based on a learning experience. As such it should be generic and applicable beyond the project evaluated. (For more information see OEDE's lesson's Paper).

- “Food Security and Food Assistance among long-standing Refugees”, (WFP/Ron Ockwell, Nov. 1999 – for refugee operations)
- Most recent JFAM mission reports and other assessment reports
- Most recent WFP/FAO Food & Crop Assessment reports
- Most recent Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) documents
- Previous evaluation summaries and full reports
- Country or operation case studies
- Any evaluations undertaken by the implementing partner during the last two years

Key information to be prepared by the WFP Country Office

- Basic country data
- Basic data on the country’s food balance, including its import and food aid requirement and local commodity prices
- Resource table for the PRRO with stock balance, information on losses and regularity of deliveries
- Management structure of PRRO: list of staff, equipment, etc. for the PRRO
- Outputs achieved vs. planned for PRRO
- Socio-economic status of beneficiaries broken down by gender, beneficiary category, location
- Local monetary value of the ration/per beneficiary category and relation to household income
- Description of logistics and (*if appropriate*) security arrangements (maximum 5 pages each)

Prior to departure for the mission, the Office of Evaluation (OEDE) will forward the TORs to the Country Office. These should be shared with key government focal points and implementing partners. A small task force of key stakeholders (composition to be determined by the country office) may be established to review the TORs as well as the debriefing at the end of the mission.

Phase II – The ‘in-country evaluation’ (three weeks):¹⁹

To the extent possible, the Team will meet with all relevant stakeholders, including beneficiaries, local government, other implementing partners and other agencies involved in the UNDAF or other UN co-ordination frameworks.

Data collection will take place both in Nairobi and in the field where the activities of the PRRO can be visited. The mission leader, together with the Country Office, will determine the optimum balance between mission time spent in the field and in the capital.

Key informant interviews to be carried out by the Team may be divided into different groups:

Group one: WFP full time and contract staff working on the PRRO;

¹⁹ Since the Somalia Programme country office is in Nairobi, as well as the main programme offices of a number of key partners, the mission will split its time between a visit to Somalia and work in Nairobi.

Group two: Key institutional partners/actors involved at the national level in programming relief and recovery assistance. These may include:

- relevant government ministries,
- relevant UN agencies (OCHA, UNHCR, UNICEF, FAO, WHO, etc.)
- local offices of World Bank and regional development bank
- bilateral donors with a significant presence in relief and recovery assistance,
- NGOs with a mandate for relief and recovery assistance and a strong presence and reputation in food aid and/or food security

Group three: Institutional partners engaged in WFP activities

- local offices of agencies implementing PRRO activities
- staff of local and international NGOs involved in the delivery of WFP assistance within the PRRO
- staff of human service agencies supported within the PRRO such as nutrition rehabilitation units, MCH centres, etc.

Group Four: Participants and Beneficiaries

Accompanied by project staff, the mission members should meet in group settings with each category of PRRO beneficiary.

Phase III – Report writing (5 working days team member, 10 working days Team Leader).

During each phase of the PRRO evaluation, the team leader should confirm the duties and responsibilities of each team member. These can be organized around the subjects to be covered in the full evaluation report (see annex 1).

The team leader is responsible for co-ordinating inputs to and writing the Aide Memoire, evaluation summary and final report. Individual reports by team members may either be integrated into the final report or, where necessary, presented as annexes.

6.2 The Evaluation Team

The evaluation mission will be composed of two members, including the Team Leader:

- A socio-economist/ household food security expert with experience in nutrition and in relief-to-recovery strategy and planning (Team Leader)
- A logistician

6.3 Timetable and Itinerary

The evaluation mission will take place beginning of July 2000, for a duration of three weeks which include briefing in HQ, field trip to the Country office in Kenya and project site in Somalia, and debriefing at the Country Office in Kenya.

Briefing in Rome	2 July
Travel to Kenya	3 July
Briefing in Kenya	4 – 5 July
In-country mission – Field trip to Somalia	7 - ?16 July
Nairobi-level interviews. Aide memoire	17 – 22 July

(Conclusion & Recommendations) writing	
Debriefing of Country Office/GOE and IPs	23 July
Travel from Kenya	24 July
Deadline for Evaluation Summary	4 August
Deadline for Full Evaluation Report	4 September

6.4 Organization of the mission

Role of the Team Leader : Will finalize the methodology and key issues for the evaluation. This will be done in consultation with the OEDE Evaluation Officer. He/she will also clarify the role and input of each team member, including individual requirements for the Aide Memoire, Evaluation Summary and Final Report. With assistance from the WFP Evaluation Officer, the team leader will define any preparatory work required by the CO and/or local consultants prior to the mission (at least 2 weeks notice should be given to the Country Office). The team leader will assume overall responsibility for the mission, and will synthesize the inputs from all sources in order to produce the necessary outputs.

The Team leader is responsible for producing the following outputs :

- an **Aide Mémoire** for presenting the mission’s early findings and recommendations at the final debriefing in country;
- an; **Evaluation Summary Report** for presentation to the Executive Board and
- a **Full Evaluation Report**.

The team leader will present the team’s findings at all debriefings and will ensure that all deadlines are met for the above outputs.

Role of the other team member : To provide technical expertise according to individual skill sets, and to provide written inputs to the Aide Memoire, Evaluation Summary and Final Report under the guidance of the Team Leader and WFP Evaluation Officer.

Role of the WFP Evaluation Officer : The Evaluation Officer will provide support to the overall evaluation exercise as necessary, which includes liaising between team members, relevant areas of WFP headquarters, and the country office. He/she will also ensure compliance with the intended thrust of the evaluation, and that the necessary logistical support is provided by WFP HQ and the CO.

Role of the Country Office: To advise on the timing of the evaluation to ensure that the evaluation outputs are available for the preparation of the next PRRO. To ensure that all necessary documents required to plan the evaluation and undertake the desk review are provided in a timely manner. To assist with the identification and hiring of local consultants as required. To ensure that any necessary preparatory work is undertaken in-country prior to the arrival of the evaluation team, and to facilitate the work of the team while in-country. Prepare and organize the mission in-country itinerary, and organize the PRRO evaluation briefing/debriefing.

6.5 Products of the Evaluation

- **Aide Mémoire** for debriefing the Country Office and HQ (maximum 5 pages)
deadline : (23 July, 2001)
- **Evaluation Summary Report** (maximum 5000 words)
deadline (4 August, 2001)
- **Full Evaluation Report and Recommendation Tracking Matrix**
deadline : (4 September, 2001)

All reports will be prepared in English and must be written in conformity with the outlines in Annexes 1 and 2. Draft versions of the Evaluation Summary Report and Final Report will be reviewed by the OEDE Evaluation Officer prior to being finalized.

The Evaluation Summary Report, technical reports and Final Evaluation Report must be submitted in hardcopy accompanied by an electronic version. If applicable, annexes should also be made available in WFP standard software (i.e., Microsoft package). For ease of processing, the Summary Report should be submitted as plain, unformatted text only (no paragraph numbering, limited bold, underline, etc.).

The mission is fully responsible for its independent full report, which may not necessarily reflect the views of WFP.

The evaluation shall be conducted in conformity with these terms of reference and under the overall guidance of OEDE.