



World Food Programme

A Report from the Office of Evaluation



*Full Report of the Review of the
UNJLC CORE UNIT
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Acronyms

ALITE	Augmented Logistics Intervention Team for Emergencies
CD	Country Director
CIMIC	Civil Military Coordination (Military)
CMCoord	Civil Military Coordination (Humanitarian)
CO	Country Office
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DSCAF	Direct Support Cost Advance Facility
ED	Executive Director
FITTEST	Fast Information Technology and Telecommunications Emergency Support Team
FOM	Field Operations Manual
FT	Fixed-Term
HC	Humanitarian Coordinator
HIC	Humanitarian Information Centre
IAET	Inter-Agency Emergency Telecomms
IASC-WG	Inter-Agency Standing Committee – Working Group
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICT	International Communication Technology
IO	International Organization
IOM	International Organization of Migration
IRA	Immediate Response Account
IT	Information Technology
LCA	Logistics Capacity Assessment
MCDA	Military and Civil Defense Assets
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NFI	Non-Food Item
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OD	Operations Department
OEDE	Office of Evaluation
OTL	Logistics Service of OTP
OTP	Transport and Procurement Division
PAHO	Pan American Health Organization
PRC	Project Review Committee
RB	Regional Bureau
RC	Regional Coordinator
SBA	Stand-By Agreement
SO	Special Operation
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
ST	Short-Term
TDY	Temporary Duty
TOR	Terms of Reference
UNCT	UN Country Team
UNDAC	UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination
UNHAS	UN Humanitarian Air Service
UNHCR	UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNHRD	UN Humanitarian Reserve Depot
UNICEF	UN Children’s Fund
UNJLC	UN Joint Logistics Centre
WFP	World Food Programme
WINGS	WFP Information Network and Global System



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Executive Summary

In order to strengthen the institutional development of the UNJLC and to respond to criticisms of the UNJLC, the Core Unit has commissioned external studies of major field operations of the UNJLC in Afghanistan, Iraq and Liberia. There have also been formal internal reviews by Finance and HR, and an ICT and a Procurement review are under way.

The UNJLC has provided responsive and innovative logistics coordination in a number of complex emergencies and has identified and acted on many vital operational logistical bottlenecks that have not been covered by others. The Core Unit provides an effective base for these operations.

The UNJLC, with the management and support of the Core Unit, is an attractive interagency concept to donors and is proving practical and useful to the other UN Agencies, the ICRC, the Federation and NGOs. Its 'can-do' attitude has been to the considerable credit of WFP.

The appreciation of donors and its other partners has not been matched by a similar appreciation by its host agency, WFP, with the result that the UNJLC has often failed to obtain appropriate support services from WFP and there have been considerable misunderstandings.

The Core Unit has been actively and competently pursuing the recommendations of previous reviews and, through this evaluation process and the implementation of many detailed actions, is consolidating a mutually positive relationship with WFP. The recent approval of a Special Account, to support Core Unit activities, illustrates this and is key to the Unit's ability to respond.

This review recommends the acceptance of an 'intervention principle' for the UNJLC, which is that it should only operate where other partners are unable or unwilling and with the formal agreement of the other partners. There will inevitably remain numerous operational tasks requiring intervention by the UNJLC.

The Core Unit is established as an office with sufficient staff to operate and to provide the minimum strength to support new UNJLC actions at a minimum cost and administrative burden on WFP when there are no emergencies.

The Core Unit's capability to put experienced staff on the ground, early, in an emergency is fundamental to its effectiveness. This is difficult at times of crisis, particularly in finding leaders for field operations. Experienced WFP staff have a significant operational advantage as Chiefs of field operations, which makes them the preferred choice for leadership in the field. However, this review recommends that the UNJLC broadens the pool of available staff with the appropriate experience.

The Core Unit's reporting line into WFP may change in August 2004. This is a key issue for the UNJLC, the Core Unit and Common Services development, particularly at a time of on-going IASC-WG discussions on this subject. The conclusion of this review is that it may be premature to change the leadership of the UNJLC.



1. INTRODUCTION

1. There have been a number of OEDE reviews of the UNJLC, both internally on key support areas and externally on the major interventions of the UNJLC in the field. This review focuses on the Core Unit but, of course, it is impossible to separate the activities of the Core Unit from the actions of the UNJLC in the field.

2. CURRENT STATUS OF THE UNJLC AND THE CORE UNIT

2. The UNJLC has evolved from an initiative by WFP to share logistics assets, originally aircraft, to an entity operationally independent of WFP but hosted by WFP, from whom it draws its support services (Air operations remain within WFP). This was a decision of IASC-WG in March 2002. No other entity of the UN system is in a similar position.

3. The UNJLC's mission statement is to complement and coordinate the logistics capabilities of cooperating humanitarian agencies in large-scale emergencies.

4. WFP provides UNJLC's support services of administration, finance and personnel. The UNJLC in the field reports operationally to the Humanitarian Coordinator/Resident Coordinator and to the Deputy Director of the Division of Transport, Preparedness and Response (OTP) in WFP Rome. Under a planned reorganization of the Division due to be put in effect in August of this year, the reporting arrangements in WFP may change.

5. The current Deputy Director of OTP is also the Chief of the Logistics Service (OTL) of the Division and the champion since its inception of the UNJLC concept.

6. The stakeholders of the UNJLC (principally UNHCR, UNICEF and WFP but also other UN agencies with IOs and NGOs as contributing observers) meet quarterly to review its progress and provide operational and policy guidance. The UNJLC reports to its oversight body, the IASC-WG.

7. The Core Unit has been established in Rome to provide a base from which to launch and manage UNJLC operations. The Core Unit maintains contact with the other agencies, contributes to appeals, relieves the field operations of much of the reporting burden, links the field operations to the support services of WFP, organizes training, manages a broad range of information and takes the initiative to improve the effectiveness and capacity of the UNJLC. The Core Unit also acts as a hub where UNJLC's partners can bring together their views and act on a range of global logistics matters.

8. A staff member of WFP on the regular budget manages the Core Unit and UNICEF, UNHCR and IOM currently second international staff, funded by UNJLC.

9. UNJLC field operations are activated on the request of a UN Agency and approved by the IASC-WG. The UNJLC concept and operation has been applied in operations in Somalia, Kosovo, East Timor, Mozambique, Bhuj, Afghanistan, Liberia and Iraq. The UNJLC is currently both coordinating and is, to a degree, operational in Sudan.



10. The UNJLC's field operations are funded out of WFP Special Operations funds, and WFP has recently set up a Special Account for the UNJLC so that it can receive donor funding for the Core Unit and other requirements.

11. The UNJLC expects to be operational in the field within 48 hrs of activation.

3. KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

12. The effective implementation of a Core Unit is vital to the concept of a UNJLC, providing the established base from which to launch UNJLC operations.

13. The UNJLC should only operate where other partners are unable or unwilling and with the formal agreement of the other partners. Under this 'intervention principle', there will inevitably remain numerous vital tasks that the UNJLC will, as in previous operations, be required to intervene in operationally. This approach will not weaken UNJLC's hands-on ethos, will avoid any suggestion of duplication and will continue to give the UNJLC the vital strength in coordination that goes with a practical operational role.

14. UNJLC should add to its normal nucleus of WFP staff to draw its Chiefs of field operations from a variety of sources, broadening the pool of available staff with appropriate experience, expediting the deployment of its missions and reflecting its inter-agency role. It is vital that these staff understand the support services of WFP, have delegated financial authority from WFP and are of the quality on which UNJLC can stake its reputation.

15. The quarterly meetings of stakeholders should be maintained with an open approach to the developing roles of the agencies over Common Service issues and funding. This will be important in developing agreed positions for oversight meetings at the IASC-WG and as the other agencies consider even more positive commitments to the UNJLC through financing their own staff in UNJLC operations.

16. The UNJLC concept and evolution has been very much the initiative of the current Deputy of OTP. Although the UNJLC is making a serious effort to depersonalize its management from its founders, and has succeeded in eliminating its dependence on them as Chiefs of field operations, for the foreseeable future it should remain under the same leadership. This leadership is recognized and appreciated in the interagency environment and is the engine driving its development. A change may well weaken donor and partner support at a sensitive time in its development. This is also strategically important for WFP, as the UN moves further towards the coordinated actions of all the Common Services of the humanitarian agencies.

17. A formal OD Directive should be issued within WFP defining the WFP/UNJLC relationship.

4. ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE UNJLC

18. The UNJLC has filled gaps in the overall logistics picture providing a responsive, innovative and practical lead in coordination and implementation. Both in concept and in practice donors, the Red Cross and NGOs appreciate the UNJLC, and its 'can-do' attitude has been to the considerable credit of WFP. The Core Unit provides the base for these operations and the secretariat for discussion and agreement on logistics activities that underpin future operations -



for example, in the standardization of trucking fleets, strategic warehousing and commodity tracking systems.

19. It has provided logistics coordination in a number of complex emergencies principally through:

- Inter-agency contingency planning exercises
- The rapid positioning of experienced staff
- Regular logistics coordination meetings in the field
- The establishment of the Core Unit
- Logistics training with all of its partners
- The expansion and dissemination of information on logistics through surveys, the web site and mapping

20. Identification of vital operational logistical bottlenecks and issues not covered by others - for example, in:

- Strategic air planning
- Liaison with military logistics
- MCDA
- Air cargo prioritization
- Air cargo handling at destination
- Entry port and external road route planning
- Collective negotiation of airport and port taxes and customs duties and procedures
- Transport infrastructure assessments
- Collective negotiation of trucking and warehouse costs
- Light vehicle workshop organization
- Strategic and operational fuel issues
- NFI logistics
- Specific road, water and rail initiatives

21. The identification and action on other non-logistical operational tasks that are not covered, including logistics support to elections and currency conversion.

5. CRITICISMS OF THE UNJLC

22. The appreciation of donors, the Red Cross and NGOs has not been matched by a similar appreciation by the host agency. Duplication of effort and non-observance of WFP's support service rules are common criticisms. WFP in the field perceives the efforts of the UNJLC as benefiting others and conferring an implementation role on the HC, thus eroding its own dominance of the logistics scene. In one operation the UNJLC was fully funded whilst the WFP was struggling for a minimum of logistics staff. Having given a logistics activity over to the UNJLC, WFP then finds itself reliant on its partner.

23. The net result of its relationship with WFP and lack of knowledge of UNJLC staff of WFP procedures has been that the UNJLC has often failed to obtain appropriate support services from WFP and there have been considerable misunderstandings.

The timing of hiring staff, payment of salaries, obtaining UN identification, procurement and the approval of travel were examples.



24. There has been confusion in the appointment; tracking and payment of UNJLC internationally hired staff with contracts in some cases being signed by staff with no recognized legally delegated authority. Some staff, sometimes traveling without contracts, arriving in the field has found a lack of office organization and delays in obtaining basic equipment.

25. Local staff has been hired without TORs on incorrect salary scales and without 'normal' benefits.

26. It has not been possible to delegate financial authority to many UNJLC staff that are either consultants, seconded or on loan for other agencies and NGOs.

27. UNJLC has not found it easy to quickly find Chiefs of UNJLCs for the field with the appropriate experience and with knowledge of the support service of WFP. The UNJLC has also not yet solved the problem of the early equipping of its staff and offices with vehicles and communications.

28. It places a burden in providing services on its host agency that is out of proportion to the advantages to WFP of a UNJLC.

29. It places CDs in the position of having to decide on priorities between the provision of limited support services to their own operations and the independent UNJLC.

30. As an inter-agency mechanism it has clear donor sympathy and probably raises resources in competition with and at the expense of WFP in general.

31. Its operational activities, intended to augment ongoing actions, are sometimes seen as peripheral to the main logistics effort.

32. Its briefing and debriefing of staff and the provision of standard administrative guidelines is weak with the majority of consultants not knowing their contractual entitlements, medical coverage and administrative requirements.

33. The website information is not very useful to field staff.

34. Warehousing and road transport, for WFP's bags, UNHCR's tarpaulins and UNICEF's schools equipment and medicines don't easily mix.

35. UNJLC's funding is not transparent to its partners.

6. PERFORMANCE ISSUES AND FINDINGS

36. The Core Unit has comprehensively responded to the criticisms of the UNJLC through a detailed internal review of its working relationship with WFP and the commissioning of studies of major field operations. There have been formal reviews by Finance and HR, an ICT review is underway and there will be a Procurement review in July 2004. Field studies have been undertaken in Afghanistan, Iraq and Liberia. The Core Unit has already taken action on many of the resulting recommendations and incorporated them into its 2004 Workplan. In the course of this review interviews were held with UNICEF Logistics staff in Copenhagen, with UNHCR logistics staff in Geneva, with DIFID and ICRC. The bulk of the interviews were with staff at



WFP HQ, largely in the Operations Department, including Regional Managers, but also in Finance, HR, Inter-Agency Affairs and Evaluation. Many of the staff of the UNJLC Core Unit contributed to this review. The following uses the main recommendations made in earlier reviews and repeated/reformulated during this review as the central performance issues for the Core Unit and the findings of this review follow each one in italics. (Where recommendations are similar they have been grouped together.)

6.1 Deployment

6.1.1 Remain, to the extent possible, non-operational, focusing on coordinating inter-agency logistics

37. In complex emergencies, there will be logistics areas that are not covered by other agencies. Filling these gaps has been a vital function that also strengthens the UNJLC's coordinating influence. Common examples of this have been in the area of resolving customs bottlenecks and dealing with fuel issues. A specific example of this in the CIMIC area was JLC's negotiation of prime space at an airport, in advance of any immediate need, that was eventually utilized by helicopter operations.

6.1.2 Provide services only on demand

38. The UNJLC identifies activities that require its intervention through coordination meetings and information gathering. It should adopt the intervention principle recommended in this review only to operate where the other partners are unwilling or unable and with the formal approval of the other partners. This should be straightforward to implement through the logistics coordination meetings that the UNJLC establishes and chairs in nearly all operations. The UNJLC will undoubtedly still find itself operating in many roles in complex situations but will avoid the criticisms of duplication made in earlier operations.

39. Both the UNJLC's role in preparedness planning and its activation prior to an emergency must be governed by the usual activation mechanism of the IASC-WG. The IASC-WG should be guided by the intervention principle (Paragraph 13).

40. The Core Unit should develop a 'menu' of services that it can offer to the HC and the UNCT.

6.1.3 Focus on the short-term

41. The UNJLC should only intervene until an appropriate partner can replace it. The UNJLC must make it clear at the outset of an operation to the UNCT that it is a stop gap measure in those areas where its partners would normally assume operational responsibility. Where another agency is in a position to take over the inter-agency role, then UNJLC steps out. It may be appropriate for UNJLC to fund or second staff to one of its partners to ensure a continuing operation.

42. The Core Unit should continue its practice of developing and regularly reviewing exit strategies that it shares with the UNCT.



6.1.4 Base itself in the WFP office/Base itself in the HC office or with other common services

43. Arguments have been put forward for making the default location the WFP office and strong cases were made for location with other HCS and the HC's office. The argument for locating the UNJLC in WFP offices was that the mutual strengthening of logistics operations from this arrangement makes this the most effective base from which to coordinate. The UNJLC would draw strength from its relationship with the primary logistics operator and WFP would more effectively be able to put its assets at the disposal of the others and itself may more readily draw on UNJLC support. Whilst a strong relationship with WFP can be seen as an advantage in coordination, and would significantly help to cement the working relationship, others can also perceive it as a bias. Clearly there is a case for grouping the Common Services together and for basing coordinating mechanisms in the HC's office and the IASC-WG is operating on the principle of HCS co-location. Reviewing experience so far, it is most practical to locate the UNJLC office depending on local circumstances and that it should be determined through the agreement of the Head of the Core Unit, the WFP CD and the HC/RC.

6.1.5 Be seen as a neutral party in its coordinating role

44. Any action that strengthens its working relationship with WFP should be balanced by a greater transparency in its relations with its partners and a greater sharing of WFP's assets with the others. UNJLC extended the WFP Iraq border agreement with Syria for trucks crossing to allow UNICEF, FAO and others the same priorities. They were unable to include IO and NGO partners in this arrangement. This should be an objective in future negotiations. The UNJLC's survey of the road infrastructure in Liberia allowed the donors to access unbiased information on which to decide their own priorities for repairs.

6.1.6 Maintain an overview of logistics costs

45. The monitoring of logistics costs in air, road, rail, river and warehousing should be a central role for the UNJLC avoiding duplication, ensuring that competition is not pushing up costs and, where possible, sharing assets. Prices should be reviewed regularly. The Core Unit should build this into their standard offer of services to the UNCT and develop a systematic approach. This does not necessarily involve the UNJLC in the long-term as once an emergency has 'settled down' after the initial phase, then cost monitoring could become, for example, a WFP activity possibly with continued financial support from the UNJLC.

46. The UNJLC's successful renegotiation of barge prices on the northern border of Afghanistan, its success in renegotiating trucking rates in Afghanistan and WFP's agreement to share barge capacity with NFIs until a bridge opened, illustrate this role.

47. The Core Unit should not publish commercially sensitive information on costs.

6.1.7 Have a clear relationship with WFP

48. The Core Unit should draft the essential points it considers should be included in the OD Directive specifying what support should be given by WFP to the UNJLC and what WFP can expect from the UNJLC.

49. The Core Unit has already produced a brief on the relationship it sees between the UNJLC office in field and WFP field office support services.



6.1.8 Hold coordination meetings in the field at logistics officer level in addition to those at HC/Country Team level

50. *Clearly involving the logistics officers of UNJLC's partners in the field is a normal and practical function of coordination, as is coordination at the CD level. It is interesting to note that coordination meetings are much better attended when the situation is difficult.*

51. *Another aspect of coordination takes place during the training and workshop meetings that bring together staff of the other agencies, NGOs and donors, developing strong logistics networks.*

6.1.9 Only become operational on a clearly defined request from a major agency

52. *Any activation request will come from the IASC-WG on which WFP is represented (see paragraph 57). The UNJLC should not be in the position of requesting its own activation; rather this should originate at CO and RB with the involvement of OTP and OTP should ensure senior representation at the IASC-WG.*

6.1.10 Continue to identify orphan issues but only intervene after consultation

53. *The UNJLC should normally only deal with logistics related issues. Its can-do approach to taking on other types of orphan issues has been greatly to its credit but should only be undertaken very exceptionally and with the agreement of its partners.*

6.1.11 Consider co-location with UNHAS

54. *UNHAS operates from a WFP base, although it may not be physically in the WFP offices. Co-location would be valuable in certain types of operation but, as in paragraph 43, should be considered on a case-by-case basis.*

6.1.12 Continue to work with the military at strategic level over air corridors, security and airfields

55. *Following the intervention principle, UNJLC would only involve themselves in air operations with the formal agreement of UNHAS. A recent division of responsibility agreed between UNHAS and UNJLC for Sudan followed this guide and resulted in an appropriate, agreed, role for the UNLJC.*

6.1.13 Make contingency plans for future trouble spots/Activate if possible before the emergency breaks/Be clear on the ownership of LCAs

56. *The UNJLCs preparation for Iraq is considered an excellent example of preparedness planning and its early activation was clearly appropriate. UNJLC is currently consolidating the emergency preparedness plans of the CT in Nepal. It is not a complex emergency but clearly a useful role that could be included in the mandate of the UNJLC for those situations which have a clear potential to develop into complex emergencies. UNJLC must make it clear that their involvement in capacity assessment is temporary, specific to any emergency and augments WFP's LCA data.*

6.1.14 Work closely with other UN agencies IOs and NGOs, under a clear mandate



57. *The quarterly stakeholder meeting represents the management of UNJLC. There should always be senior representation from WFP at these meetings so that the workings of the UNJLC and its partners are passed back to WFP through a route independent of the UNJLC.*

58. *To clarify the UNJLC relationship with its partners, the Core Unit should draft a joint MOU, as opposed to a network of individual MOUs, for discussion with the other partners clearly defining their respective roles.*

59. *The Core Unit should ensure that the internal OD Directive within WFP also adequately covers its relationship with UNHAS, UNHRD and FITTEST.*

60. *In the broader picture of Common Services, the Core Unit should also prepare definitions of relationships with CMCoord, HIC and IAET for discussion in the IASC-WG.*

61. *The Logistics Support System being developed with PAHO, with backing from OCHA, UNHCR and WFP, is a good example of inter-agency cooperation. The Core Unit is in an excellent position to bring to bear the experience of other bodies that have attempted similar systems.*

62. *The UNJLC has a sound understanding with the Red Cross family but needs to develop a stronger relationship with NGOs.*

63. *The UNJLC has agreed with UNDAC that UNJLC staff will be on the UNDAC roster for deployment within 24 hrs as a part of the UNDAC coordination team in the event of a natural disaster. Given the present tight staffing circumstances, UNJLC will let UNDAC know when staff are available for inclusion in a team. This is an innovative approach to inter-agency cooperation.*

64. *The Core Unit is taking part in operation Triplex, organized by the International Humanitarian Partnership, a grouping of EU donors.*

6.2 Staffing

6.2.1 Hire and deploy rapidly Chiefs of Mission, adequately equipped, in the field as WFP staff members with at least a further six months of contract life so that they may be delegated WFP authority to incur expenditure/Operate a roster for technical skills

65. *The fundamental key to JLCs effectiveness is the arrival on the ground, early, of experienced staff with personal transport and communications and an effective link to support services. Whilst JLC is better than most it is still far from optimum. At the time of an emergency, everyone needs staff at the same time and rosters break down. This is the issue on which virtually all-else hinges and is extremely difficult to put in place. Experienced WFP staff have a significant operational advantage as Chiefs of field operations, which makes them the preferred choice for leadership in the field. However, WFP itself has difficulty in staffing in emergencies, has not found its roster arrangements very effective, and is currently considering innovative roster ideas. Utilizing WFP staff or any new roster may not help the UNJLC as, in any emergency, WFP will need its own staff and the UNJLC does not want to divert operational staff to coordination functions.*



66. To add to available WFP staff, the Core Unit should identify a limited number of logistics officers from within the agencies, NGOs and donor organizations (SBAs) with a variety of geographical, language and skill backgrounds. The Core Unit should also explore the IHP as a source of potential staff. The staff should be capable of leading a UNJLC mission and be prepared to move at short notice. They should have their organization's consent and be given prior exposure to WFP operations, particularly at the field level, familiarizing them with WFP's support services, WFP's logistics operations and the UN in the field. SOP material would be made available in advance, avoiding long briefings at critical times and ensuring a reasonable familiarity with WFP. The Core Unit would keep actively in touch with these staff. This would bring the other stakeholders in the UNJLC very much into the operations of the JLC but would raise the issue of financial authority in the WFP system. It may be possible to release these staff from their current employment through secondment or leave without pay and then hiring them as WFP staff. The Core Unit has already made tentative steps in this direction, but this issue is so critical to the success of JLC that it requires more thought and action to ensure that the JLC can deploy the right staff at an early stage.

67. The Core Unit should explore the possibility of an ED waiver of the six month contract rule in critical circumstances.

68. The Core Unit must attempt to find a formula for making the Chief of field operations immediately mobile either through local hire, loan or purchase, backed up by an arrangement to ship or fly replacements. UNHCR's regional stocks and arrangements with commercial suppliers should all be pursued. The excellent initiative with FITTEST for flyaway kits must be made to work. Both issues should be more straightforward now that the Special Account is in place.

69. The Core Unit needs two rosters, one for potential Chiefs of field operations and a second for technical staff. The latter should also be developed in concert with donor rosters and SBAs.

6.2.2 Establish appropriate/threshold staffing levels both in the field during operations and in the Core Unit with sufficiently senior staff with logistics experience./Strike a balance between staff in the Core Unit and augmenting WFP HQ staff

70. The Chief of the Core Unit is seconded from WFP. Two senior logistics officers and an information officer seconded from UNHCR, IOM and UNICEF together provide the ability to immediately put senior staff in the field to initiate operations (the UNHCR logistics officer is currently in Sudan) and keep Core Unit functions in operation. A senior and experienced advisor oversees training, CMCoord and other issues. The Core Unit's critical link with WFP support service is provided through an Admin/Finance/HR Liaison Officer who is interchangeable with, and supported by, the officer also responsible for policies and reporting. Two staff work on web management and development and one on mapping. There is an administrative assistant and a secretary and an intern working on information processing.

71. The staffing level of the Core Unit is at an appropriate size to perform its function, including putting staff in the field for short periods during operations.

72. Field staffing levels will be particularly difficult to predict, as they must respond to the demands made on the UNJLC. The level of support the UNJLC will require from dedicated WFP support staff will also vary significantly from operation to operation.



6.2.3 Maximize the use of SBAs and secondments and an effective roster

73. UNJLC uses ALITE to access SBAs and the system works well. The Core Unit's access to the roster of the main donors of SBAs should be looked into in the context of the preceding paragraphs.

6.2.4 Brief staff on appointment and debrief at the end of a mission

74. Effective institutional memory and institutional development will be seriously hampered unless a system of entry and exit briefing is devised and made to work. In the case of Chiefs of field operations, entry briefings can be shortened through the recommendations made in paragraph 66. Specifically packaged SOPs will be vital.

6.2.5 Shorten WFP recruitment periods for international staff and avoid confusion in tracking/Agree contractual arrangements of international and local staff that will shorten recruitment periods and have clear provisions

75. All international consultancies are now arranged centrally in Rome, allowing the Core Unit and HR to keep a close track on all hiring. The current formula of hiring international staff initially on ST contracts, then following up with a Vacancy Announcement and eventual recruitment from the roster as FT works but does not solve the 6-month contractual issue for Chiefs of mission.

76. The approval of the Special Account will allow the Core Unit to hire FT staff in place of consultants.

77. HR hopes to have a new SSA/SC contract for local staff, resolving the multitude of problems currently surrounding the use of these contracts, within eight months. The Core Unit must involve itself in the finalization of this arrangement to make sure it meets emergency needs. Currently, no adequate arrangement exists for hiring daily paid staff but HR should have a procedure in place in a matter of weeks. This is an important step for UNJLC's operations in the field.

78. The Core Unit should make appropriate use of TDY staffing as it entails frequent turnover and often puts temporary short-term staff in the unsatisfactory position of coordinating the long-term staff of its partners.

79. The Core Unit should ensure that RLAs are cleared with the relevant HR officer.

6.3 Finance

6.3.1 The Core Unit should be on a more regular financial footing

80. The Core Unit is currently financed out of unutilized funds from earlier operations, as no other fundings has been available. The recent approval of the Special Account will allow donors, who have already indicated their willingness, to fund the Core Unit directly. The Special Account for JLC operations is essential to the operational effectiveness of the Core Unit.



81. *The proposal that donors may wish to make a regular annual ‘stakeholder’ contribution that links with the Special Account would put the Core Unit’s finances on a sound and predictable footing. This recognizes the vital need for continuity in support for field operations and endorses the current approach of clearly separating SO funded field operations from Special Account Core Unit funding.*

82. *In advance of funds being available from the WFP SO funds for field operations, the IRA is used to jump start UNJLC activities, with minimum risk given the level of donor support for the UNJLC, as is the new DSCAF.*

6.3.2 Maintain continuous financial analysis and budget monitoring

83. *Utilizing WINGS information and putting it in the context of total expected expenditure, which WINGS, of course, cannot do, is vital to the financial analysis and budget monitoring of the Head of the Core Unit. The Admin/Finance/HR Liaison Officer now provides this function in the Core Unit.*

6.3.3 Ensure regular and effective communications between the UNJLC and WFP support services at HQ and in the field/Obtain timely support from WFP finance offices at HQ and in the field

84. *The Core Unit is able to make its own financial decisions as WFP, through the PRC, allows the Chief of the UNJLC in Rome to approve expenditures out of the SO independently of the WFP Country Director. Expenditure is then processed through the WFP system.*

85. *The Core Unit must work within an HR, Finance and admin environment that is designed to support a slower moving and less flexible operation. The ability to provide rapid support to the field at the same time as satisfying the requirements of WFP’s support mechanisms is essential to the UNJLC. This is achieved through the Admin/Finance/HR Liaison Officer position in the Core Unit dealing directly with field offices, liaising with a network of formal focal points in supporting WFP divisions. This takes much of the burden off WFP staff and UNJLC staff in the field.*

86. *SO funding could be used to partly support Finance Officer positions in HQ and finance clerk positions or assistants, in the field. Sending a finance assistant on TDY would also be useful should that be needed. Together with the Liaison position in the Core Unit, this mutually supporting relationship should ensure the rapid processing of UNJLC requirements. The number of financial transactions required by the UNJLC, compared with the WFP office in the field, is relatively small.*

6.3.4 The CO budget/HR functions should be reinforced, utilizing the UNJLC budget/Under no circumstances should CO funds be used to support the UNJLC and vice versa

87. *There is clearly a contradiction in these recommendations. There seems no reason why the UNJLC SO budget or Special Account should not be used to augment WFP operations where that is needed. Equally, the support of the CO in vehicles, IT and many other areas is vital in the initial phase of any operation. The use of a separate SO for the JLC has made accountability much clearer. The Core Unit should clarify this with Finance.*



6.3.5 Ensure the WFP financial rules are followed/Arrange petty cash in the field for small scale interventions/Have an effective link with WFP finance

88. *The Admin/Finance/HR Liaison Officer is in a position to monitor field office compliance with WFP financial rules and represents the field officer's link with financial support in Rome.*

89. *The Core Unit plans a review by MSP of procurement activities in July. Problems over procurement of relatively minor items can cause problems. However, a close relationship with the CD can allow a waiver - for example, of the rule to obtain three quotes for any procurement.' Start up cash' is included in the flyaway kit.*

90. *The Core Unit should stress to Chiefs of mission that they should document, with a note for the file, any key financial decisions that are taken, particularly in the case of waivers or in any negotiation of rates. They should understand that their actions will eventually be audited by WFP.*

91. *UNJLC are aware of the difficulties in accounting for fuel supplies and the Core Unit should urgently produce an SOP for this operation. The Fleet Forum should be able to help with guidelines.*

6.4 Information

6.4.1 Improve dissemination of information/Assess the needs of others to define the content of the website

92. *UNJLC's high quality website and mapping have received widespread acknowledgment as valuable tools in logistics coordination and operations. The website is still more useful at the HQ and donor level than at the field logistics level, partly through problems of access. The maps and website are so visible and popular that the Core Unit must be strict in crediting the origin of the material used and a constant review of what UNJLC's clients need on the website will keep its focus. Attendance at coordination meetings regularly picks up immediately after the issue of a bulletin on the website.*

93. *The FOM is now a very comprehensive collation of a huge amount of relevant emergency documentation and guidelines and includes very operations and its data is vital and is being undertaken partly by using the website as archive material.*

94. *The first UNJLC staff to arrive in the field use the UNJLC brief to inform the UNCT on both what the UNJLC is and what it can do. They should also utilize the 'menu' approach.*

95. *Staff must be given guidelines relevant to the operational nature of their assignment and to the support services of WFP.*

6.4.2 Make its work better known externally and internally

96. *The Core Unit has put a lot of effort into this and it is proceeding well. It is particularly effective through the very successful training workshops, the website and regular attendance at RM meetings.*



6.4.3 Ensure regular communication between the UNJLC chief in the field and the CD/Operate in a country without a WFP office

97. The Core Unit briefing to its staff must emphasize the support and operational relationship with WFP and the consequent need for effective communication.

98. The Core Unit needs to review with HR the situation where a CO does not exist. Temporarily making the UNJLC Chief the CD would seem to provide an answer.

7. CONCLUSIONS ON THE CORE UNIT

99. Consolidating a mutually positive relationship with WFP, whilst retaining its independence, is critical to its future success. This is not an easy balance to strike. The Core Unit, through a series of WFP reviews, through the implementation of the many detailed actions outlined in this report and through its determination to achieve the synergy that will result from an effective partnership with its host, is making effective progress

100. The Core Unit's reporting line into WFP may change in August 2004 (see paragraphs 4 and 16). This is a key issue for the UNJLC, the Core Unit and Common Services development, particularly at a time of on-going IASC-WG discussions on this subject. The recommendation of this review is that this is not the time to change the leadership of this initiative (paragraph 16). A reporting line through the Chief of OTL is under consideration. This would result in an apparently downgraded UNJLC reporting to one of the units for which it is providing coordination, an arrangement that would seem unbalanced to its partners. If depersonalizing the UNJLC is a priority for WFP over the arguments for maintaining the current leadership, then the UNJLC should report directly to the Director of OTP.

101. The Head of the Core Unit has established an effective office with sufficient staff to provide the minimum strength and support to new JLC operations at a minimum cost and administrative burden on WFP when there are no emergencies. It is staffed with personnel committed to the ethos of the UNJLC.

102. The Core Unit in Rome is already actively and competently pursuing the recommendations of previous reviews, the basic material for this review, and has included the most important of them in its current Concept Paper and in the 2004 Work plan. It provides the institutional memory of UNJLC operations and the fixed base for institutional development.

103. Having set high standards in evaluation and response to recommendations, the Core Unit should continue its self-evaluation programme.

104. The UNJLC, with the management and support of the Core Unit, is an attractive concept to donors and is proving practical and useful to the other UN agencies, the ICRC, the Federation and NGOs.