



# World Food Programme

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## A Report from the Office of Evaluation



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*Full Report of the Thematic Evaluation of  
the Protracted Relief and Recovery  
Operation (PRRO) Category  
February 2004*

*Rome, February 2004*

*OEDE/2004/01*

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# Acknowledgements

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Responsibility for the opinions expressed in this report rests solely with the authors. Publication of this document does not imply endorsement by WFP of the opinions expressed.

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# Acronyms

ALNAP	The Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
CAR	Central American Region
CD	Country Director
CFA	Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CP	Country Programme
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DFID	Department for International Development
DHA	Department of Humanitarian Affairs
DOC	Direct Operational Cost
DP	Development Project
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
DSC	Direct support cost
DSCAF	Direct Support Cost Advance Facility
EB	Executive Board
ECHO	European Community Humanitarian Office
EMOP	Emergency Operation
ESF	Emergency Support Facility
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FFA	Food for assets
FFE	Food for Education
FFP	Food For Peace (of USAID)
FFS	Food for skills
FFT	Food for training
FFW	Food for work
FIVIMS	Food Insecurity, Vulnerability Information and Mapping System
GFD	General food distribution
GLR	Great Lakes Regional
HFE	Household Food Economy
HH	Household
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HPG	Humanitarian Policy Group (of the Overseas Development Institute)
ICT	Information and Communications Technology
IDP	Internally displaced person
IEFR	International Emergency Food Reserves
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IO	International Organizations
IP	Implementing partner
ISC	Indirect support cost
ITSH	Internal transport, storage and handling
JAM	Joint assessment mission
JFAM	Joint food assessment mission



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LAC	Latin American countries
LDC	Least developed country
LIFDC	Low-income, food-deficit country
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MT	Metric ton
NFI	Non-food item
NGO	Non-governmental organization
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA	Office of Development Activities
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
ODP	Operations Department-Programming Services
OECD	Organization for Economic Coordination and Development
OEDE	Office of Evaluation
OHA	Office of Humanitarian Affairs
OTL	Operations, Transport, and Logistics
PDM	Programme Design Manual
PRC	Programme Review Committee
PRO	Protracted Relief Operation
PRRO	Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation
PRSP	Poverty-Reduction Strategy Paper
PVO	Private Voluntary Organization
RE	Resources and External Relations Division
SF	School feeding
SO	Special operation
SP	Strategic and Policy Division
SPR	Standardized project report
SSA	Special Service Agreement
TFP	Therapeutic feeding programme
TOR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDG/ECHA	United Nations Development Group - Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VAC	Vulnerability Assessment Committee
VAM	Vulnerability analysis and mapping
WAC	West African Coastal
WHO	World Health Organization
WINGS	WFP Information Network and Global System



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# Executive Summary

The purpose of this thematic evaluation is to assess the value-added to WFP of the protracted relief and recovery operation (PRRO) category and to make recommendations that will improve WFP's responsiveness to protracted crisis and recovery contexts. The evaluation proposes an organizational change model that identifies how the PRRO intervention can be traced at the corporate level through inputs, outputs and outcomes/effects that reflect: expected changes in corporate management systems, implementation of normative guidance, resultant changes in field operations and resource mobilization and unintentional effects. An indicator-based approach is used to evaluate evidence from WFP statistical databases and reports, extensive stakeholder interviews, a Country Director e-mail survey, peer reviewed and international agency reports, and a review of more specific information for a sample of 17 PRROs that underwent Office of Evaluation (OEDE) evaluations, reviews or self-assessments.

The PRRO is a highly relevant corporate innovation in that it addresses the persistent nature of modern crises and provides the ability, within one programming category, to adjust to the changing dynamics of crises and transitional settings. Through its deliberate emphasis on recovery strategy development relatively early on in a crisis (within two years), it creates an opportunity for WFP to anticipate and plan for recovery. At the same time, the broad framework of recovery facilitates developmental relief, linking relief and development. In this way, WFP's framework makes it a trendsetter among United Nations agencies.

One caveat, however, is that there is emergent international concern over protracted application of food aid because of its potentially detrimental effects on security, markets and beneficiaries. Also, there is a mixed attitude among donors towards WFP's comparative advantages in post-emergency settings.

Introduction of the PRRO has brought about important benefits as anticipated. At an aggregate level, the PRRO is associated with lower levels of general relief food assistance; has increased the flexibility of field operations, and has had an apparent positive effect on the organization's ability to mobilize additional resources for addressing protracted crisis and recovery situations. Most WFP staff considers the PRRO to be a valuable programming tool, and the intended conversion policy of moving from EMOPs to PRROs has largely been followed, albeit with some notable exceptions. PRROs appear to be effectively supporting core relief functions and within politically stable settings, recovery activity targets are close to being met.

The evaluation, however, was unable to confirm all of the intended value-added features of the PRRO programme model. While WFP registers progress towards output targets, accomplishment of recovery **outcomes** has been more uneven and largely undocumented due to limited information available on beneficiary outcomes such as nutrition, mortality, livelihood capacity and the creation of sustainable assets. In at least two cases, concern has been raised that introducing recovery objectives into programmes may result in some compromise to core relief functions. The evaluation finds limited evidence that the introduction of the PRRO category has been associated with systematic targeting improvements, nor is there evidence that sufficient strategic planning and thinking has taken place in all cases. Enhanced programme synergies among WFP programme categories have yet to fully materialize.



The evaluation finds recovery to be a challenging concept in the humanitarian world generally, and as such its translation into practical and meaningful programmes on the ground poses dilemmas not only for WFP but also for the humanitarian community as a whole.

The PRROs have shown uneven performance in meeting recovery activity targets, due in large part to unrealistic recovery strategies, particularly in highly unstable settings. Recovery should be viewed as a continuum, with different benchmarks associated with context. The evaluation found that there are at least three distinctively different crisis contexts, requiring different strategies and approaches: that is, highly unstable contexts; protracted refugee operations; and stable settings (including some natural disasters and some post-conflict contexts). For example, in stable settings realistic planning for resettlement and community infrastructure rehabilitation is possible. This is not the case in long-term refugee contexts, where efforts might be better placed on investing in human assets or focusing on activities that enhance the livelihoods of refugees and their hosts. In the case of highly unstable settings, meeting primary core relief needs is already an enormous challenge. In these cases, recovery programming has to a great degree been sacrificed for relief priorities or abandoned because recovery strategies were unrealistic. Here, too, recovery activities focusing on human assets may be the key.

The evaluation found that a number of the “building blocks” of good programme implementation required strengthening, including assessment/targeting/evaluation, strategic partnerships with international NGOs and local organizations, beneficiary participation, and adequate technical staff.

Many of these issues are common challenges to the international humanitarian community. WFP has been a leader in piloting deliberate relief-to-recovery programming. However, it did not dedicate adequate resources to, and its management did not focus on, implementing the full extent of organizational reforms that were needed to support this programme category. There are a number of exceptions to the policy calling for conversion of EMOPs to PRROs within two years. The PRRO policies and guidelines call for enhanced programming capacity in the field, resources for deliberate recovery strategy development and upgrading of field operations to be more developmentally sound. While recovery programming is challenging, and although there are limited international best practices in this area, WFP has not established a facility for organizational learning related to programming in protracted crisis and transitional settings.

At the same time, the shifting of WFP’s portfolio from EMOPs to PRROs required adjustments to management processes and the commitment of additional financial and human resources. The evaluation concluded that these requirements were not systematically addressed, which ultimately compromised somewhat WFP’s corporate goals associated with introduction of the category.

Examples of these problems include the finding that normative guidance was found to be confusing and to give rise to sub-optimal project preparation. The terms “recovery”, “transition” and even “protracted relief” were never clearly defined and associated with objectives and activities. Consequently, there is no commonality in their use among WFP staff. Inputs to PRRO preparation have not been sufficient, and no mechanism for routine updating of recovery strategies has been put in place. The current programme review and approval process is too long. While decentralization is consistent with PRRO requirements for greater autonomy and authority, the process of decentralization has led to uneven results in terms of supporting field planning and implementation. The current financing strategy, which links budget disbursement to tonnage, favours relief over recovery activities.





Based upon these observations, the evaluation recommends that WFP:

- Undertake a detailed review of the implications of designing and supporting recovery-oriented planning. In particular, the review should focus on developing a corporate strategy for strengthening programming capacity at all levels as a starting point for enhanced recovery programming. In this respect, WFP should consider augmenting its senior ranks of programming specialists.
- Develop procedures for enhanced tracking of human resources related to programming as distinct from finance and administration. The aim should be enhanced monitoring of staff programming capacity over time.
- Enhance nutrition and programme evaluation capacity at the field and regional bureau levels. In this context, WFP should budget and allocate more funds to applied research to look at the intended and unintended effects of WFP programmes.
- Develop a corporate strategy for building national staff capacity in programme support functions, which could include enhanced training, professional development opportunities in neighbouring countries and more funds and incentives for staff to participate in in-service degree programmes that could help strengthen recovery programming.
- Develop a small specialized group of staff or consultant roster of individuals who could help support recovery-oriented planning. Consider loan arrangements from other agencies.
- Encourage inter-agency approaches to formulation of future PRROs.
- Improve normative guidance related to recovery to reflect the current state of lessons learned. There needs to be greater corporate clarity regarding terms such as recovery, transition, reconstruction and rehabilitation.
- Place greater emphasis on enhanced monitoring of recovery-oriented outcomes including improved nutrition, livelihoods and durable solutions.
- Undertake steps to monitor and evaluate the risks associated with protracted food aid provision, including the creation of dependencies and economic distortions. In this context, include tools within VAM and within all normative guidance that systematically seeks to assess the effects of food aid on markets.
- Undertake regular reviews of PRROs by developing dedicated budget and technical support. The PRC mechanism needs to provide strategic, technical and operational inputs earlier in the PRRO development process.
- Consideration should be given to dropping the three budget categories-relief, recovery and refugee-within the PRRO. Alternatively, relief and recovery activities should be maintained but better defined so as to clarify which types of activities belong to each category. Activity budget categories should be consistent with donor needs to permit them to draw more transparently from different funding sources. This also will assist with WFP's own internal financial tracking against budgeted items. For administrative purposes, a separate budget breakdown for refugees should be maintained. In this way, relief and recovery components can be tracked for both refugee and non-refugee beneficiaries.
- Finally, WFP should review its financing strategy and other corporate management strategies to ensure that these do not result in disincentives to recovery-oriented programming.



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
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## 1. BACKGROUND

Protracted emergencies, or those lasting more than three years, have become WFP's core business. During the past ten years, contributions to emergency-related programmes have increased nearly fivefold (see Figure 1). At the same time, the percentage of WFP's portfolio has dramatically shifted from development to emergency related.

Figure 1: Trend in WFP Contributions, 1990–2002



Source: WFP Bulletin Board (Resources Mobilization)

The PRRO category represents the latest step in WFP's programming evolution in response to the changing nature of its core business. Beginning in 1989 with the introduction of the protracted relief operation (PRO), and culminating in 1998 with the creation of the protracted relief and recovery operation, WFP introduced two new programme categories in response to the large volume of food aid being targeted to protracted crisis problems. As early as 1989, the Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes (CFA) noted the growing importance of protracted emergencies, particularly those due to civil conflict, and their implications for WFP programmes and operations.<sup>1</sup> In 1989, two thirds of WFP emergency food aid was allocated to refugee operations. In response to this situation, WFP commissioned a study to examine this issue.

The Executive Director directed a re-examination of WFP programmes dealing with these situations. The resulting report concluded the following:

“Analysis clearly suggests that finding a more appropriate approach is a priority. The means currently available to the Secretariat for meeting the needs of refugees and displaced persons have proven deficient in several key aspects: they fail to supply appropriate, balanced food basket; they fail to provide an assured, timely source of sufficient food to deal with these situations from a longer-term developmental vantage

<sup>1</sup> WFP/CFA:27/P/7



point; and they constrain the flexibility needed to meet the varied and changing nature of drawn-out refugee and displaced persons situations. At the same time, the burden of refugee operations on available emergency resources has, to some extent, inhibited the Secretariat's capability to respond to sudden natural disasters, including crop-related shortages. In short, it has become increasingly clear that the current approach was designed for different times and circumstances".<sup>2</sup>

The report also recognized that "the CFA itself needs to be more deeply involved in the developmental deliberations and to exercise oversight of the significant funds involved".<sup>3</sup>

The report focuses on a number of problems surrounding the continued use of the EMOP as the programme category for protracted relief settings:

- Protracted emergencies were consuming a high proportion of WFP emergency resources, and in this way were compromising WFP's ability to respond to new emergencies.
- Protracted emergencies required a continuous and assured food supply, which the International Emergency Food Reserve (IEFR) was ill-adapted to do.<sup>4</sup>
- Protracted emergencies required the CFA's review and engagement for programmatic and resource-mobilization purposes.
- The existing options of EMOP and development categories did not offer sufficient flexibility to respond to rapidly changing circumstances in the field. Afghanistan, Namibia, Somalia, Ethiopia and Cambodia were all cited as problematic cases.<sup>5</sup> The situation was judged as a "rigid separation" between emergency and development interventions, and it was judged to be resulting in the "perpetuation of a short-term approach".<sup>6</sup>
- The needs of populations affected by protracted emergencies were different from those acutely affected. Particular concerns identified included:
  - potential dependencies created by long-term general food distribution;
  - nutritional inadequacy of emergency rations for longer-term application;
  - basic needs for ensuring a productive future for persons affected by protracted crises: including "education and training, and often for agricultural and home industry activities ... and above all to prepare them for a future back home or, in some cases, in the host country".
- The needs of host populations are not adequately addressed through the emergency response category.<sup>7</sup>
- Predictability of resourcing of these operations was compromised by handling them through emergency funding windows.

This earlier analysis also identifies many of the strategies that should be considered in protracted emergencies, such as food for work, social capital investments, and resources for repatriation and resettlement.

The PRO category, covering protracted emergency operations for refugees and displaced persons, was first established by the CFA at the recommendation of WFP management in May 1989. The category was established as a subset of the regular (development) resources. By creating a subset of its development resources, WFP hoped to preserve the development and emergency (IEFR) resource bases for their original purposes while attracting additional net resources to deal with burgeoning needs in this new category. Beginning in 1990, most refugee operations and some operations focusing on large internally

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<sup>2</sup> WFP/CFA:27/P/7 p. 3

<sup>3</sup> Ibid, p. 3

<sup>4</sup> Ibid, p. 7

<sup>5</sup> Ibid, p. 9

<sup>6</sup> Ibid, p. 10

<sup>7</sup> Ibid, p. 9



displaced populations were converted to PROs. However, the category maintained a focus on a particular beneficiary group (displaced persons) as opposed to a crisis context; that is, protracted emergencies. However, the introduction of the PRO appeared to be associated mainly with a shift in resourcing strategies and an increase in the duration of operations (up to three years). No policy or programme guidance accompanied the introduction of the PRO, despite the extensive discussion of the programmatic rationale for introducing the category provided by the 1989 study.

In 1995, WFP established the special operation (SO) category to support significant non-food interventions required to support food interventions (and others) associated with protracted emergencies. This category has been instrumental in situations of large-scale protracted emergencies such as that in Angola.

In April 1998, WFP introduced a significant change to the PRO category when it endorsed WFP's policy proposal in the paper "From Crisis to Recovery".<sup>8</sup> The new protracted relief and recovery operation brought two major modifications to the category. First, all protracted emergency operations – and no longer just refugee and displaced persons operations – would be transformed into PRROs and brought before the WFP Executive Board for approval within two years. Second, the programming requirements for the PRRO category were substantially enhanced. The transformation of EMOPs into PRROs would be done based on the preparation of a recovery strategy that required strategic analysis of the need for continued food aid as well as its evolving role in promoting relief and recovery objectives and the formulation of a recovery strategy.

"From Crisis to Recovery" was based on a considered review of WFP experience in protracted emergency situations. WFP executed a literature review on humanitarian relief and in particular on issues pertaining to linking relief and programme policies and lessons learned by the Commission of the European Community, the Development Assistance Committee/Organization for Economic Coordination and Development (DAC/OECD), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the Department for Humanitarian Affairs/Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA/OCHA), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the World Bank. This was complemented by field assessments of recovery issues in Angola, Cambodia, Mozambique and Sudan, and case studies of transitions in Ethiopia, Guatemala, Kenya, Mali and Pakistan.

The document also emphasizes the developmental role of PRROs in that "recovery interventions have the potential to achieve more than just returning to the status quo; recreating conditions that led to the outbreak of war or drought is usually not desirable. WFP can contribute to the process of transforming insecure, fragile conditions into durable, stable situations." The document stops short of labelling these as objectives but goes on to say that recovery activities should:

- meet the food needs of the most vulnerable through targeted assistance;
- rehabilitate cases of acute malnutrition in mothers and infants;
- rebuild self-reliance and restore positive coping mechanisms;
- restore social cohesion and human capacity, capitalizing on the important contributions of women in these processes;
- develop better access to food by strengthening local food distribution and marketing systems;
- restore/create productive capacity and physical infrastructure to provide direct benefits to targeted groups, address constraints to household food security (specifically labour and energy constraints) and free income and time for further development activities.<sup>9</sup>

Furthermore, the document states that they should be timed so as to:

- avoid dependency through reduced free food distribution;

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<sup>8</sup> WFP/EB.A/98/4, "From Crisis to Recovery"

<sup>9</sup> Ibid, p. 5



- ensure targeting of the most vulnerable;
- support people to build/restore their livelihoods;
- prevent or mitigate future crises.

The document establishes the role of the PRRO as either bridging the relief-development programming space within WFP or leading to an effective exit strategy when self-reliance has been achieved.<sup>10</sup>

The policy document highlights the PRRO's dual aims to save lives and enable people to restore/create livelihoods in order to ensure their longer-term food needs. And it exposes the complexity of balancing these two aims and the criteria for deciding how to balance activities to achieve each. It mentions, but does not emphasize, the importance of weighting social as opposed to physical capital during "early transition" (a term that is never defined in the document). It presents a deliberate decision that the complexity of issues and the uniqueness of context require a different staffing structure than is commonly found in relief operations: "people with skills to develop a recovery strategy, and plan and implement more development-oriented activities ..."<sup>11</sup>

The document also envisages a transformation of WFP's relationships with the international community, international NGOs local governments, local NGOs and beneficiaries in moving from a supply-side relief environment to one that is driven by local organizations and re-aligned partnerships between WFP and its international partners. Cross-cutting themes such as the environment, gender, beneficiary participation, sustainability and monitoring and evaluation are all touched upon in the document as being critical components to strong recovery strategies. The policy also calls for operations to be periodically reviewed and adjusted by country offices to reflect current needs and priorities.<sup>12</sup>

In January 1999, WFP published "Guidelines for the Preparation of a PRRO".<sup>13</sup> The Guidelines provide specific directions for preparing the PRRO document, including page limitations (16 pages total). They also require that budgeting be performed for three categories of distinct activities: i.e., protracted relief, protracted refugee, and recovery; though the difference between relief and recovery activities is never explicitly defined. The Country Director was granted authority to reallocate 20 percent of the total annual PRRO food target among categories.<sup>14</sup> The Guidelines also provide for a contingency mechanism to introduce a new EMOP, if an emergent crisis requires rapid food aid surge capacity beyond the resources available under the PRRO reallocation mechanism.

During its sessions in October 2000 and February 2001, the WFP Executive Board considered issues related to the funding of PRROs and raised questions about the effectiveness of the new category. The Board endorsed a review of the PRRO category as a whole, to be undertaken by OEDE based on the findings of the individual PRRO field evaluations scheduled for 2001–2002,<sup>15</sup> which provided significant substrate for this review.

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<sup>10</sup> Ibid p. 7

<sup>11</sup> Ibid, p. 12

<sup>12</sup> Ibid p. 17

<sup>13</sup> WFP, PRRO Guidelines, 1999

<sup>14</sup> Ibid, p. 21

<sup>15</sup> WFP. *PRRO Review: Initial Findings, the Direction Ahead* (February, 2001) was prepared by WFP for informal Executive Board consultations on resourcing issues related to the PRRO category two years after its creation. Following discussions on the findings of this document, the Board requested a more in-depth study of the substantive elements of the PRRO category.



## 2. EVALUATION OBJECTIVES, FRAMEWORK, SCOPE AND METHODS

### 2.1 Objectives and Scope

The aim of this evaluation is to determine the value-added of the PRRO category and to identify ways to improve its performance as an organizational innovation. The evaluation will meet the requirement of accountability to the Executive Board and will provide policy input to WFP related to the continuation of the category and any organizational changes that are required to enhance its value-added. Specific objectives of the evaluation include<sup>16</sup>:

- to determine the relevance of the PRRO programming category;
- to determine the effects of the category on WFP's operations, management and resourcing capability, including the effectiveness and efficiency of PRRO implementation;
- to identify factors that enhance or impede the ability of WFP to formulate and implement PRROs in a timely, effective and efficient way; and
- to produce recommendations that will improve WFP's ability to implement PRROs at the country and regional level.

The evaluation attempts to answer the following questions:

- a) What is the relevance of the PRRO innovation to WFP, its beneficiaries and its broader stakeholder community? More specifically:
  - i. Is the PRRO relevant to the changing face of crises, and to the needs of its beneficiaries?
  - ii. Is the concept of the PRRO consistent with international policies and approaches to addressing protracted crises?
  - iii. What is the status of current policy debates on the role of food aid in protracted crisis settings?
  - iv. Is the PRRO category logically consistent with WFP's core mission, goals and organizational structure?
- b) What have been the effects of the PRRO innovation on WFP's performance in terms of:
  - i. effective use of food aid;
  - ii. efficient use of food aid;
  - iii. programme category synergies;
  - iv. WFP's ability to raise additional resources and
  - v. improvements in corporate culture?
- c) Has the category been implemented as planned and what factors affect its implementation, including:
  - i. achievement of outputs;
  - ii. adequate inputs; and
  - iii. externalities?
- d) What lessons can be learned from WFP experience and that of other agencies engaged in delivering food aid for recovery in terms of:
  - i. promising practices;
  - ii. emergent management norms and standards; and
  - iii. common pitfalls?
- e) What can WFP do to improve the impact of the PRRO?

In order to address the above questions, the evaluators undertook the following steps:

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<sup>16</sup> See original Terms of Reference, Annex I



- a) Develop a general intervention model for PRROs that fully distinguishes the programming category from EMOPs (see section 2.3), and with that in hand:
- b) Articulate a formal evaluation model that characterizes what the anticipated effects of introduction of the PRRO would look like. We took an indicator-based approach, which had been distilled out of the team's analysis of the various policy documents, normative guidance or PRROs and from interviews with senior WFP managers. This laid the foundation against which the available evidence was then systematically investigated.
- c) Describe data collection and analytical methods.

## 2.2 The PRRO Evaluation Model

We have adopted WFP's evaluation terminology<sup>17</sup> as adapted from OECD in the development of the evaluation model used by this evaluation,<sup>18</sup> in addition to others.<sup>19</sup>

- **Relevance** is the extent to which the objectives of an intervention are suited to beneficiary needs, country needs, organizational priorities and donor policies.
- **Impact** is defined as positive and negative changes produced by an intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended. Outcomes and effects often reflect the range of intended/unintended change, while impacts typically refer to goal-level changes.
- **Effectiveness** is a measure of the extent to which the activity attains its objectives.
- **Efficiency** reflects how economically inputs are converted into outputs.
- **Inputs** refer to the guidelines, policies, financial and human resources, and systems that support the implementation of the intervention.
- **Intervention** in this case is the PRRO category.
- **Outputs** are the products, capital goods and services generated by the intervention.
- **Externalities** are factors outside the organization that affect its ability to achieve its objectives.

The basic evaluation model used here is illustrated in Figure 2 below.

The emphasis of the evaluation is on identifying the value-added of the PRRO programming category as an organizational innovation. In so doing, there is a logical relationship between inputs (or organizational resources devoted to implementing the innovation), outputs (or the extent and quality of PRRO policy implementation) and then effects (or positive and negative changes in WFP's organizational performance associated with the programme category's introduction). It is important to note that this evaluation attempts to assess the PRRO from a corporate level, not at the individual level of operations. Therefore, WFP's ability to raise additional resources ("additionality") is actually reviewed as an outcome in this analysis. An evaluation aimed at explaining the performance of a PRRO would probably consider this to be an input-level factor. The evaluation model also recognizes the influence that externalities have on the intervention system. Below we analyse the PRRO innovation (or intervention) and then elaborate the detailed framework for this evaluation project.

### Figure 2: PRRO Evaluation Model

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<sup>17</sup> WFP, Programme Design Manual, July 2000


<sup>18</sup> <http://www1.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/htm/evalcrit.htm>

<sup>19</sup> Rossi et al.1999[





## Anticipated Value Added of the PRRO Category



### 2.3 Distinguishing Features of the PRRO Category

In order to evaluate the PRRO innovation, it is necessary to examine in more detail the intervention itself. What were the key intended substantive changes in programming that the PRRO would introduce in WFP? How would WFP programmes be different as a result of introducing this category?

OEDE has attempted to develop an intervention model and a series of hypotheses as to how the PRRO might lead to value-added for WFP. Where these hypotheses are explicit, they are cited. Others are inferred as logical expectations of the category.

Before the PRRO was introduced, WFP heavily utilized EMOPS in crisis contexts. These operations could be expanded indefinitely, but had a planning horizon of one year or less and were developed, approved and financed through special mechanisms that were set up to facilitate expedient field delivery of food aid supply to the field.<sup>20</sup>

The PRO category provided for more regular handling of protracted situations, but it emphasized refugee operations and the special nature of their care and support as opposed to crisis operations as a whole and the populations affected by them.<sup>21</sup>

Introduction of the PRRO was intended to change both the administration of and programming strategy applied to chronic emergency and transitional settings. It built on the predecessor PRO category, but

<sup>20</sup> WFP, Programme Design Manual, July 2000


<sup>21</sup> WFP/CFA:27/P/7



implied a more structural change in the way WFP addressed most emergency settings.

A key feature of this change is that the PRRO provides a logical sequential relationship (see Figure 3) between the commencement of an emergency response EMOP (which may be executed without substantial planning in response to an acute crisis) and exit from the EMOP or preparation of/incorporation into new or existing development operations, thereby strengthening the linkage between relief and development and providing a mechanism to enable synergies among WFP's programme categories. This is a particularly important aspect of the intervention model. Not only is the programme content of the PRRO to be different from the other emergency-related categories, but the PRRO also rationalizes WFP's temporal response to emergencies, allowing for an initial rapid response and then a more considered and regularized response. In this way, the PRRO provides a vehicle for greater programmatic synergy between protracted relief operations and development projects. It provides a flexible programming space between crisis response and development (see Figure 3).

**Figure 3: EMOP/PRRO/DP Progression**



By providing a flexible intervention space between acute emergency response and development, the PRRO enables the field office to respond to rapidly changing contexts that are associated with protracted emergencies, and in this way provide more relevant interventions to beneficiaries. It also provides a mechanism for more developmentally sound exit strategies in contexts where the organization will not have a longer-term presence.

As articulated in the key PRRO policy paper "From Crisis to Recovery" and the initial set of PRRO guidelines, the PRRO requires deliberate strategic planning early on in the evolution of a crisis,<sup>22</sup> recognizing that WFP might have to take a lead in doing so. Strategic planning anticipates resettlement of populations affected by crisis as well as rehabilitation/re-creation of the critical social capital and infrastructure required for such populations to engage in sustainable development. Thus, in contrast to the EMOP, which prioritizes saving lives, the PRRO emphasizes creating human, social and physical assets. It places greater emphasis on sound developmental programming.<sup>23</sup> It identifies the role and appropriate uses of food aid in post-emergency settings and emphasizes developmental relief, self-reliance and social asset creation when crisis resolution is not yet in sight. It also recognizes that WFP's recovery strategies may need to be tailored to local conditions; as the effects of conflict and crisis are not generally uniform in space and time, resolution of conflict/crisis might proceed unevenly according to local factors, and the local economies often vary substantially in terms of required recovery/rehabilitation inputs.

In terms of planning and budgeting, except in refugee operations, the PRRO requires separate planning/budgeting of relief and recovery activities. It allows for a time frame of up to three years, as did

<sup>22</sup> WFP, PRRO Guidelines, 1999, p. 26

<sup>23</sup> WFP/EB.A/98/4, "From Crisis to Recovery"



the PRO; as with the PRO, approval for these types of operations takes place at the Executive Board level.

The PRRO was built to permit flexible response to field circumstances by enabling field offices to move resources among the relief and recovery categories as the field situation required or permitted. In comparison with other categories, which allow for 10 percent flexibility in activity-level programming, in the case of PRROs the Country Director is authorized to reallocate a larger percentage, but not exceeding 20 percent of the total amount of PRRO food targets across the whole programme.<sup>24</sup> The PRRO allows for 20 percent movement between relief and recovery sub-categories, with no stipulations about movement at the activity level. On one hand, this permits the field to accommodate surges in relief needs without launching new EMOPs; on the other hand, it permits the country office to seize recovery opportunities in real time.

**Table 1: Characteristics of the PRRO**

<b>Differences between the EMOP and PRRO</b>	
Impact	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• EMOP focuses on saving lives</li> <li>• PRRO focuses on improving nutrition and household livelihoods</li> <li>• PRRO emphasizes asset-creation and recovery of economies</li> <li>• PRRO emphasizes durable solutions, including resettlement</li> </ul>
Effectiveness	PRRO should have : <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• an explicit recovery strategy</li> <li>• increased successful voluntary resettlement</li> <li>• increased targeting and fewer general food distributions (GFDs)</li> <li>• greater reliance on local implementing partners</li> <li>• greater emphasis on beneficiary participation</li> <li>• more emphasis on cross-cutting themes of gender, environment</li> <li>• strengthened assessment and monitoring and evaluation</li> <li>• different relationships with international NGOs</li> <li>• improved coordination and partnerships with international agencies</li> <li>• greater emphasis on capacity-building</li> <li>• greater emphasis on asset-building, particularly human/social capital</li> </ul>
Efficiency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lower quantities of food through GFD</li> <li>• Increased local purchase of food</li> <li>• Planning for contingency resources</li> <li>• Increased use of local resources for food logistics</li> <li>• Improved pipeline management</li> <li>• Improved predictability of resources</li> </ul>

<sup>24</sup> WFP, PRRO Guidelines, 1999, p. 26



**Box 1: Management Requirements/Inputs for Supporting PRROs in Comparison with EMOPs**

- More senior technical staff support for programme formulation
- More programme staff to support increased recovery/development content of programmes
- More local staff to support sustainability, continuity and efficiency
- Better collaboration and coordination among WFP PRRO and development activities
- Increased resources for assessment and monitoring and evaluation (inferred)
- Increased resources for technical assistance and capacity-building (inferred)
- Corporate mechanisms for continuing development of guidance, norms and training related to recovery programming (inferred)
- Mechanisms for ensuring programme quality (work plans, reviews, Memoranda of Understanding [MOUs] similar to those for development projects)
- Advocacy strategies to mobilize donor resources (inferred)
- WFP corporate responsiveness to changing field needs (budget revisions, programme document review and approval) (inferred)

At the same time, the PRRO intends to shift corporate management of protracted crisis interventions. EMOPs would be permitted only during the first two years of a crisis, the idea being that the PRRO would “regularize” WFP’s response to the crisis within that two-year window. In this way, the PRRO is administratively more akin to the development category; the caveat is that it has more built-in flexibility to respond to a more dynamic context. The time frame for the PRRO is up to three years. Programme documents for the PRRO are reviewed and approved in an identical manner to those for a development operation.

By increasingly shifting protracted crisis operations from the emergency response funding window, WFP intended both to improve its responsiveness to acute emergencies by freeing up resources in its emergency account and to recruit more predictable donor funding commitments to protracted emergency operations.<sup>25</sup>

The systematic application of the PRRO has major implications for country offices; these were alluded to in the PRRO Guidelines but not explicitly articulated in normative guidance. Field offices would absorb more management authority and responsibility for resource management as the PRRO provided greater flexibility for programming. Field offices required enhanced staff/technical support to undertake strategic planning for recovery (requiring a relatively high level of analytical sophistication) and also for designing and implementing developmentally oriented relief and recovery activities (requiring experience in programming developmental interventions.) Field offices would be required to engage more systematically in capacity-building and would need to enable more outcome-oriented and regular assessment and monitoring and evaluation activities that were needed for targeting (requirements for more local and non-national staff). Moving from general food distributions to food-assisted strategies implies a greater requirement for non-food items (NFIs).

Also, as the PRRO is more akin to a development project both in content and administration, it implicitly requires similar quality-assurance management mechanisms such as the development of annual work

<sup>25</sup> Interviews with WFP Global Office Resource Division



plans, periodic review of programme performance, supervision, and mechanisms for programme revision. These, too, are called for in normative guidance.

## 2.4 Component Elements of the Evaluation Model

The evaluation model (see Page 8, Figure 3) attempts to articulate the logical framework relating the PRRO intervention to its effects on WFP's performance, corporate culture and image in the eyes of the broader international community. Table 2 provides links to the framework of indicators used in this evaluation for assessing each element in the model. The model is based on a review of WFP normative guidance related to the PRRO<sup>26</sup> and on extensive discussions with WFP staff, including the PRRO review working group.<sup>27</sup>

Both intended and unintended effects are considered. Intended effects include better nutrition and livelihood outcomes for beneficiaries through more relevant and responsive programmes; and more sustainable solutions that result from an increased emphasis on self-reliance and resettlement when possible. Synergies between WFP's emergency-related and development projects also are anticipated.

Efficiency of WFP programmes also is an intended effect of the PRRO. Food aid is to be targeted and should be increasingly delivered by NGOs and local institutions. Longer-term planning should result in better maintained pipelines, while increased outsourcing to local contractors should reduce local storage and handling costs.

By introducing the PRRO, WFP hoped to more effectively attract adequate resources to sustain protracted relief and recovery programme needs and to be enabled to work in legitimate recovery contexts where it might otherwise have had difficulty raising resources.<sup>28</sup>

The PRRO also intended to raise corporate awareness and understanding of the need to link relief and development in the protracted crisis setting.<sup>29</sup> The PRRO's introduction was intended to move corporate thinking from supply-side free food relief to a more concerted effort to consider food as an instrument for facilitating recovery and sustainable development.

The introduction of the PRRO carried potential risks. First, the resource-intensiveness of the category and its relatively complex requirements may result in compromised performance in achieving basic life-saving relief functions.<sup>30</sup> Another potential unintended effect is the creation of dependencies or WFP's creation of new, inappropriate opportunities for its presence.<sup>31</sup> A related concern is the potential damaging effects of food aid on the emergence of fledgling markets.

Outputs refer to the changes in resources and programmes that occurred as a result of the introduction of the category. These include roll-out of PRRO programmes in the field according to plan in terms of timing, number and quality of support and programming. Flexibility and realism are also included as outputs in the model.

Inputs refer to the human and financial resources that are needed to implement the PRRO effectively. Organizational change calls for careful consideration of the inputs required for achieving this change. These include policies and normative guidance, management systems, and human and financial resources. The normative guidance itself calls for substantially increased technical and programme support to the field, which has implications for WFP human resources policies and norms. Staff training is an important

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<sup>26</sup> WFP/EB.A/98/4, "From Crisis to Recovery"; WFP, PRRO Guidelines, 1999

<sup>27</sup> The PRRO Working Group developed the TOR and background materials, and met with the team during its initial briefing in Rome, September 2002.

<sup>28</sup> Senior staff interviews from affected countries/regions

<sup>29</sup> As per senior staff interviews

<sup>30</sup> Initial meeting with PRRO Working Group

<sup>31</sup> This possibility is discussed extensively in the food aid literature, though not explicitly expressed as a concern by the PRRO normative guidance.



consideration. Management systems must be adequately responsive to PRRO field implementation.<sup>32</sup> The evaluation attempts to assess the degree to which inputs were adequate to implement PRROs effectively.

Externalities consider the broader set of contextual factors that affect WFP's ability to utilize the PRRO tool effectively. These include donor factors that drive resourcing decisions; international and United Nations agency policies and normative guidance related to protracted crisis settings; and dynamics of crises, including the heterogeneous nature of protracted crises and the fluidity of crisis settings. Another important contextual factor is the capacity of partner organizations, including international and local institutions.

**Table 2: PRRO Evaluation Indicators and Evidence Base**

<b>OUTCOMES/EFFECTS</b>	<b>EVIDENCE BASE</b>
More effective use of food aid	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ More developmentally sound crisis operations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Improved beneficiary nutrition and livelihoods</li> <li>○ Increased asset creation that benefits food insecure</li> <li>○ Improved recovery/developmental quality of crisis Programmes</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Seizes opportunities for recovery while maintaining core relief functions</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Lower levels of general food distribution</li> <li>○ Improved recovery content of Programmes</li> <li>○ Recovery activities are implemented as planned</li> <li>○ No evidence that recovery compromises core relief activities</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Improved Programme category synergies</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Identified examples of CP/DP and PRRO connectedness</li> </ul>
More efficient use of food aid	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Lower DOC/ton</li> <li>○ Lower cost/beneficiary</li> <li>○ Lower LTSH rates</li> </ul>
Additionality of resources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Total contributions to WFP increase</li> <li>○ Donors draw on resources that they cannot utilize for development operations</li> </ul>
Improved corporate attitude towards relief to recovery programming	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ WFP staff have favourable view of PRRO innovation</li> <li>○ UN Agency personnel have favorable view of PRRO and/or view WFP as key player in recovery/post emergency</li> <li>○ Donors/EB have favourable view of PRRO and/or view WFP as key player in post emergency/recovery</li> </ul>
Unintended effects	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ PRRO compromises core relief functions</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Frequency of problems cited in delivering relief due to recovery activities</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ WFP creates new/inappropriate opportunities for continued presence</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Frequency of indication of market distortions or dependencies created by PRRO (frequency of mention of problems, especially by resource staff)</li> </ul>
<b>OUTPUTS</b>	<b>EVIDENCE BASE</b>
PRROs are implemented according to policy and guidelines	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ #/% EMOPs converted within two years</li> <li>○ frequency of launching new EMOPs when PRRO in place</li> <li>○ PRRO documents conform to guidelines</li> </ul>
PRRO recovery strategy is realistic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Frequency of PRROs that do not meet recovery activity targets</li> </ul>
Adequacy of field resource planning	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ PRROs show increase DSC/ton when converted</li> <li>○ PRRO documents provide for increased requirements associated with assessment/evaluation, project preparation and capacity building</li> </ul>

<sup>32</sup> WFP Summary Report on Staff Workshop on PRRO evaluation, 2003 [



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More flexible Programmes

- o PRROs accommodate surges in relief needs
- o staff judge PRRO to be flexible instrument
- o PRROs include contingency planning/resources



<b>INPUT</b>	<b>EVIDENCE BASE</b>
Adequate normative guidelines	o WFP guidelines are clear, consistent, realistic and complete
Adjustment of management systems to support PRRO	o Adequacy of process for preparation and approval of PRROs o Appropriate mechanisms for programme review and revision o Decentralization
Adequate financial inputs	o Indication of budget increases to support programme needs
Adequate human resources to support PRROs	o Frequency of staffing deficiencies noted o Evidence of increased programme staff after PRRO introduction
Adequate WFP marketing strategy	o Donor awareness of PRRO o Quality of marketing documents (frequency of mention of problems, especially by resource staff)
<b>EXTERNALITY</b>	<b>EVIDENCE BASE</b>
Donor policies and attitudes are favourable to the PRRO	o Frequency and magnitude of earmarking/un-earmarking o Donor knowledge and attitudes towards the PRRO o Donor preferences
United Nations agency policies and programmes are complimentary to WFP's approach	o United Nations agency senior staff attitudes towards relevance of PRRO
Capacities of partner agencies	o Frequency of partner capacity inadequacy as key constraint on performance
Heterogeneous crisis contexts	o Influence of crisis context on PRRO performance

## 2.5 Data and Analytic Methods

This evaluation utilizes a multi-method approach, including an extensive literature review, semi-structured interviews of a purposive sample of WFP, Executive Board and United Nations agency senior staff, a structured e-mail survey of all Country Directors; analysis of routine WFP statistical data available from WINGS, the Resource Division, Standardized Project Reports (SPRs), and WFP in Statistics (annual reports); document review of selected PRRO and EMOP documents, including programme documents, evaluations and assessments, vulnerability analysis and mapping (VAM) and household food economy (HFE) assessments, and reports from Joint Assessment Missions. Table 3 presents the data sources used.

Documents reviewed included key policy documents related to recovery/transition programming from the international humanitarian/development community (the United Nations Transitions Task Force, the World Bank, the Department for International Development [DFID], the United States Agency for International Development [USAID], UNHCR, the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action [ALNAP]; WFP PRRO-specific documents (especially the foundation policy document "From Crisis to Recovery") and strategic policy documents; WFP guidelines for PRRO project preparation, which are contained in the Programme Design Manual and the 1999 Guidelines; and lessons-learned documents and case studies undertaken by WFP and relevant to the analysis of programming in protracted emergency settings. A complete list of documents reviewed is provided in Annex II.





**Table 3: Data Sources Used**

Questions	Data sources
<p>1. What is the relevance of the PRRO innovation to WFP, its beneficiaries and its broader stakeholder community? More specifically:</p> <p>i. Is the PRRO relevant to the changing face of crises? And to the needs of its beneficiaries?</p> <p>ii. Is the concept of the PRRO consistent with international policies and approaches to address protracted crises?</p> <p>iii. What is the status of current policy debates on the role of food aid in protracted crisis settings?</p> <p>iv. What is the relevance of the PRRO to WFP's core mission and goals?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o WFP WINGS</li> <li>o Policy documents</li> <li>o Interviews with WFP, Executive Board, United Nations agencies</li> <li>o Interviews with WFP, Executive Board, United Nations agencies</li> <li>o Policy literature</li> <li>o Policy literature</li> <li>o Donor interviews</li> <li>o WFP senior staff interviews, Executive Board interviews</li> </ul>
<p>1. What has been the impact or value-added of the PRRO innovation to WFP's performance in terms of:</p> <p>a. effective use of food aid?</p> <p>b. efficient use of food aid?</p> <p>c. additionality of resources?</p> <p>d. improvement in corporate culture?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o Case studies</li> <li>o WFP in Statistics (special reports)</li> <li>o SPRs</li> <li>o Country Director surveys</li> <li>o Case studies</li> <li>o WINGS</li> <li>o</li> <li>o Interview, resources and field staff</li> <li>o Resources database</li> <li>o Interviews resources staff</li> <li>o Donor interviews</li> <li>o Staff interviews</li> <li>o Stakeholder interviews</li> </ul>
<p>2. What factors have affected the impact of the innovation, including:</p> <p>a. achievement of outputs?</p> <p>b. adequate inputs?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o WINGS</li> <li>o Case studies</li> <li>o Country Director survey</li> <li>o Resources database</li> <li>o Interviews with field staff, senior staff</li> <li>o Case studies</li> <li>o Country Director survey</li> <li>o WFP staff data</li> <li>o PRRO budget data</li> </ul>



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c. externalities?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o Interviews with resource staff</li> <li>o Interviews with stakeholders</li> <li>o Interviews with various WFP staff</li> <li>o Country Director survey</li> <li>o Case studies</li> </ul>
4. What lessons can be learned from WFP experience and that of other agencies engaged in delivering food aid for recovery in terms of:	
a. emergent management norms and standards?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o Country Director surveys</li> <li>o Staff interviews</li> <li>o IDP case studies</li> </ul>
b. common pitfalls?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o Case studies</li> </ul>
c. promising practices?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o Grey and published literature</li> </ul>
5. What can WFP do to improve the impact of the PRRO?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o Synthesis</li> </ul>

An important source for the evidence base of this study is drawn from a purposive sample of PRROs. Originally, 14 of these were selected based on the availability of some form of assessment or evaluation study. After the first draft of this evaluation study was completed, three supplementary PRRO cases were added in order to better reflect the diversity of crisis contexts and geographic variation in WFP programmes. A supplementary field visit to Sri Lanka also was conducted near the end of this evaluation. Questionnaires were completed and interviews were conducted on two additional cases, Indonesia and Georgia. These later three cases were added to augment the sample and to amplify conclusions.

Table 4 and Box 2 show the inputs that were used in the systematic review of the 17 PRROs, which was part of the thematic evaluation.

**Table 4: Base Documents Used to Construct and Analyse PRRO Cases**

PRRO case	Primary information
Algeria	Self Evaluation: mid-term
Angola	OEDE evaluation
Azerbaijan	OEDE evaluation
Cambodia	OEDE evaluation: mid-term
Central American Regional	Mid-term assessment
Colombia	Self-evaluation, mid-term
Guinea Bissau	Self-evaluation, mid-term
Ethiopia	OEDE evaluation
Great Lakes Regional	OEDE evaluation, summative
Georgia	Assessment/appraisal
Indonesia	Assessment/appraisal
Iran	OEDE evaluation
Somalia	OEDE evaluation
Sri Lanka	Supplementary field assessment for thematic evaluation, summative
Sudan	OEDE evaluation
Uganda	OEDE evaluation
West Africa Coastal	Supplementary review for thematic evaluation, summative



**Box 2: Additional Information Sources Used to Prepare PRRO Case Analysis**

- SPRs
- Mid-term assessments
- Project summary documents
- VAM/household food economy reports
- Joint Food Assessment Mission (JFAM)/Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) reports
- WFP Information Network and Global System (WINGS)
- Resource updates
- WINGS country documents
- WFP IDP case studies
- Interviews with field staff

One of the strengths of this evaluation is the large amount of “data” that was consulted in developing the analysis. Seventeen PRROs represent approximately half of all active PRROs from the time period studied. The evaluation team conducted more than 80 interpersonal interviews, consulted more than 100 documents from the grey and peer-reviewed literature, analyzed corporate data sets, and conducted a structured field survey of Country Directors. In this way, the data base for this evaluation is very extensive.

Two limitations of the evaluation are worth noting. First, as would be expected from this assessment of a relatively new initiative, more complete information only is available from “older” operations, or those approved during the first two years of operation. In fact, four of the operations were probably prepared without the benefit of normative guidance (see page 17, Figure 4). To the extent possible, we have tried to incorporate information about more recent expansions/PRROs especially in examining questions such as the quality of recovery strategies.

A second, and perhaps more important limitation of this evaluation, is the general lack of consistency/comparability of information available for analyzing the seventeen cases. The evaluation foundation varied considerably from case to case. Some of the reports available were mid-term assessments and some final evaluations, some focused on single operations while others were summative (assessing across operations). Some were conducted by external evaluation teams while others were self assessments. Two field assessments were undertaken specifically for the thematic evaluation while others were undertaken primarily to provide inputs for CO planning. While the OEDE evaluations were more consistent in terms of the range of factors to be assessed by the evaluation team, these teams did not utilize standard protocols to collect information nor did they systematically rate PRRO performance and the factors affecting it. While we drew on other information regarding cases to the extent possible, the analysis of cases was largely a qualitative rather than quantitative exercise.


Another aspect of the information consistency problem was the lack of a single and updated data base for these operations. While WINGS should greatly help future thematic evaluations, most of the work on this evaluation focuses on operations that will never be completely updated on the WINGS system. The team found data in several locations often providing contradictory information. This also has implications for the accuracy of findings.

Nevertheless, the team approached the exercise from a convergence of evidence approach. With such a large base of data for this evaluation, we drew conclusions based on findings there were consistent among data sources.



Table 5 demonstrates that the cases included in this analysis are reasonably representative of the total population of PRROs as of April 2002.

**Figure 4: Historical Timeline -- Evolution of PRRO Category and Approval of PRRO Case Countries**



PRROs primarily address man-made rather than natural disasters. Operations addressing natural disasters comprise less than 10 percent of both the case sample and of all ongoing PRROs. Regional representation also is substantiated, as Africa and Asia dominate total tonnage and the sample is broadly representative of the PRROs in terms of Africa and Asia operations. The sample also is reflective of the fact that approximately one quarter of all PRROs are 100 percent refugee operations. The distribution of tonnage among protracted relief, refugee and recovery components also is quite similar between the sample and the total list of ongoing PRROs.



**Table 5: Representativeness of the PRRO Sample**

Sample	Total PRROs
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Sixteen PRRO cases are responses to man-made disasters and 1 responds to a natural disaster (6 percent)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Eight percent of all PRROs are responses to natural disasters</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Nine of 17 (53 percent) PRROs are from the African region and 18 percent are Asian PRROs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Fifty-two percent are from the African region, 13 percent are from the Asian region</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The value of food costs ranges from US\$2,034,490 (Guinea-Bissau 6154.00) to US\$62,298,413 (Great Lakes 6077.01), with an average across the 17 PRROs of US\$20,750,744</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The value of food costs ranges from US\$620,810 to US\$120,738,861, with an average across all PRROs of US\$16,963,864</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The average value in tonnage is 69,409 mt, ranging from as little as 5,743 mt in Guinea-Bissau to 222,891 mt in the Great Lakes</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The average value in tonnage is 68,303 mt, ranging from as little as 2,636 mt to 422,478 mt</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Weighting of protracted relief: 41 percent of the PRROs (7 of 17) allocate more than a third of their budgeted tonnage to this component</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Fifty-one percent of the PRROs allocate more than a third of their budgeted tonnage to this component</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Weighting of recovery: 41 percent (7 of 17) PRROs allocate more than one third of their budgeted tonnage to this component</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Thirty-seven percent of PRROs allocate more than one third of budgeted tonnage to this component</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In the sample, the average percentage of budgeted tonnage allocated to protracted relief and refugee components is 62 percent</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In total, the average percentage of budgeted tonnage allocated to protracted relief and refugee components is 73 percent</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Refugee weighting: 24 percent of the sample are refugee operations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Twenty-seven percent of the total PRROs are refugee operations</li> </ul>

The cases represent the range of contexts felt by WFP staff to represent distinctly different PRRO contexts,<sup>33</sup> namely:

- stable contexts (including natural disasters, some economic and some post-conflict transitions): Cambodia, Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau;
- highly unstable contexts: Angola, the Great Lakes, Uganda and West Coast Regional; and
- protracted refugee settings: Algeria, Ethiopia, Iran and Sudan.

Annex IV provides a tabular description of the 17 cases analysed in this study.

### 3. RELEVANCE OF THE PRRO PROGRAMMING CATEGORY

In this chapter, we set out to identify the relevance of the PRRO category to WFP, particularly whether the PRRO is appropriate to the changing face of crises and the needs of beneficiaries, its congruence with international policies and thinking; its appropriateness given international approaches to food aid; and its relevance to WFP's core mission and goals.


The PRRO is a highly relevant corporate innovation. The intended change introduced by the PRRO is consistent with the needs of its beneficiaries, the evolving nature of crises and the international community's response, and with WFP's evolving corporate mission and vision.

<sup>33</sup> FP Summary Report on Staff Workshop on PRRO evaluation, 2003 W



During the period between 1989 and 2002, responses to protracted emergencies became WFP's core business<sup>34</sup> (see Figures 1 and 5), and indeed the remarkable shift in WFP's portfolio over the decade attests to this fact. While in 1989, 70 percent of WFP's resources supported development operations,<sup>35</sup> in 2002, 87 percent of WFP's US\$1.48 billion expenditure was applied to crises,<sup>36</sup> the majority of which were protracted crises. As of mid-April 2002 there were 34 ongoing PRROs and 35 EMOPs, which represented food tonnage commitments of 2.4 million and 2.7 million mt respectively. Figure 5 demonstrates the dramatic shift in contributions to the Programme. The overall magnitude of WFP's budget increased, while at the same time contributions for development projects eroded during the decade. This trend is a function of two primary factors: the increase in disasters and international responsiveness to disasters<sup>37</sup> on the one hand, and the increasing reluctance of donors to provide food for use as a development resource.<sup>38</sup>

**Figure 5: Total Contribution to WFP, 1999–2002**



At the same time, the nature of emergencies and the international community's response to them also has changed. More modern emergencies are protracted crises. Figure 6 shows the changing pattern of disaster events during the past 15 years. Noteworthy is the increasing frequency of all types of disasters, but especially conflicts and epidemics. Most recently, the era of "economic" crises has arrived. This type of crisis was first formally noticed by the international community at the time of the Asian crisis (1997)<sup>39</sup> and has drawn attention to the needs of the urban poor. In 2002, drought, conflict and economic failure ranked first (42 percent), second (41 percent) and third (16 percent) respectively, in WFP expenditures for conflict-, drought- and economic-related failures.<sup>40</sup>

<sup>34</sup> WFP/CFA: 27/P/7W989.[]

<sup>35</sup> WFP/EB.A/98/4-A, "From Crisis to Recovery"

<sup>36</sup> Source: "WFP in Statistics", 2002

<sup>37</sup> For example, Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) devoted to relief increased from 2 percent in 1989 to approximately 10 percent in 1994, World Bank 1997


<sup>38</sup> With relatively few exceptions donors' policies are converging on food aid as primarily a resource for application in emergency settings

<sup>39</sup> World Bank, ASEM, Asian Financial Crisis Response Fund: A Preliminary Assessment, 2000

<sup>40</sup> Source: "WFP In Statistics", 2002



Figure 6: Trend in Global Disaster Events, 1970–1999



Source: derived from data provided by the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance

Perhaps the most dramatic example of the chronic crisis is the recent Southern African problem. Southern Africa's most recent crisis has been characterized as the first manifestation of a new type of chronic emergency, in which HIV/AIDS is an important dimension of the crisis.<sup>41</sup> Given the rapid growth of HIV in South Asia and parts of Southeast Asia, it may become an important determinant of future crises. WFP currently plays a leadership role in confronting this "new variant of famine" as WFP's Executive Director serves as the United Nations Special Envoy to Southern Africa. Also the Programme serves as team leader on the highly lauded vulnerability assessment committees (VACs) and is currently undertaking one of the most comprehensive planning processes in the development of a regional PRRO to respond to the Southern African crisis.<sup>42</sup>

Most recently, the war on terrorism has given rise to yet another era of humanitarian crises.<sup>43</sup> Afghanistan and Iraq now are protracted crises. The commingling of humanitarian and security policy, the complex cultural issues involved, the trans-national nature of terrorism and counter measures, and resultant shocks to the United Nations system all portend continued protracted crises with different challenges to humanitarian action and recovery programming. Governance and security are increasingly preoccupations. The PRRO is again a highly relevant vehicle for addressing these newer concerns.

WFP has become a major player in the humanitarian arena, and indeed some policy leaders believe that WFP's role may increasingly evolve towards a humanitarian rather than a food agency.<sup>44</sup> Clay argues that WFP has increasingly evolved to be the key United Nations actor in humanitarian action. A number of individual donor and United Nations agency senior staff share this perspective, particularly given WFP's growing competence in large-scale logistics operations.

From a theoretical perspective, the humanitarian and development literature stresses the intimate relationship between crises and underdevelopment and the important need for developmental relief and improved linkages between relief and development programming.<sup>45</sup> The poverty and development literature increasingly recognize the chronicity of effects of crises on WFP's core clients: the poor<sup>46</sup> and food insecure, who often do not recover from the cumulative effects of crisis. It is particularly among the

<sup>41</sup> De Waal, 2003, p. 20–23.

<sup>42</sup> Field interviews, Johannesburg, 2003

<sup>43</sup> Humanitarian Policy Group [HPG] Report, July 2003

<sup>44</sup> Clay, 2003.

<sup>45</sup> Clay, 2003; Maxwell and Slater, 2003.

<sup>46</sup> World Bank, World Development Report, 2000/2001.



poor (households and nations) that recovery is the most difficult and requires deliberate and focused strategies.

On the other hand, as aptly put in one PRRO programme document, “Reconstruction is an opportunity to bring about a change for the better, not to reconstruct the old but to build new structures on the basis of social development policies with a focus on reduction of poverty and vulnerability.”<sup>47</sup> And the humanitarian community is increasingly embracing this challenge. Indeed, an estimated 30 to 50 percent of all humanitarian assistance is disbursed on rehabilitation/recovery activities.<sup>48</sup>

WFP has been a trendsetter among the United Nations family in developing concrete approaches to linking relief and development and facilitating an effective transition from crisis to development. While WFP established a policy and programme framework to address chronic crises and to link relief and development, it is only recently that the United Nations community has taken practical steps to confront these issues. Most recently, the United Nations Secretary-General appointed a high-level working group to address the needs of transitions.<sup>49</sup> The initial work of the group found that transitions had largely slipped through the cracks of the international relief/development community and that there was significant confusion over terminology and concepts about what transition/recovery were. At the same time, many of the recommendations coming out of the working group suggest that WFP’s PRRO is highly consistent with the current needs of beneficiaries and the international community. These include the need to link relief and development, to permit local flexibility and to adopt principle rather than blueprint approaches.

The PRRO innovation also is consistent with Commitment 5 of the World Food Summit Plan of Action, specifically objectives 5.4 (b) and (c), which call for improved linkages between relief and development operations and for fostering transition from relief through recovery to development.<sup>50</sup>

At the same time, the climate of international food aid policy continues to be stormy for non-emergency food aid applications. The shift in funding away from food aid development and towards emergency applications is likely to continue.<sup>51</sup> The academic literature increasingly points to the potentially negative effects of food aid, even in emergency settings.<sup>52</sup> The PRRO may remain the primary vehicle through which WFP can demonstrate its capacity to enable development, and WFP’s operations may be increasingly scrutinized in emergency and post-emergency settings, especially because of growing awareness of the potential risks associated with food aid.

Some donors already have reservations about the wisdom of continued food aid in post-emergency settings or about WFP’s comparative advantage to undertake recovery programming. A number of individuals and donor policies are increasingly moving towards rapid phase-out of food aid assistance and increased use of NGOs as implementing agencies for food aid.<sup>53</sup>

This evaluation concludes that the PRRO category is logically a good mechanism for addressing protracted crises and recovery settings. It provides for a logical sequential progression from immediate response to deliberate planning. It provides for a reasonable planning horizon, it requires deliberate strategic recovery planning, and it is sufficiently flexible to accommodate the spatial and temporal dynamics of protracted crises, possibly best illustrated by the cases of Somalia and Angola, where one programme operation handles a wide range of relief and recovery needs as well as the major regional operations. Where field evaluations examined the question of relevance, the PRRO generally was judged to be relevant. In the case of highly unstable contexts, the question of relevance has been raised by staff

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<sup>47</sup> Programme document PRRO 6089.00, p.3.

<sup>48</sup> ALNAP, *Annual Review*, 2003.

<sup>49</sup> UNDG/ECHA, 2003.

<sup>50</sup> WFP, Plan of Action, 1996, Rome, Italy.

<sup>51</sup> Based on extensive interviews with donors.

<sup>52</sup> Dorosh, October 2003.

<sup>53</sup> One major donor plans to strengthen policy language about application of food aid in post-emergency settings. Other major donor representatives expressed concerns about WFP’s capability to implement recovery programmes.





interviews and one of the field evaluations. The thematic evaluation team concludes, however, that it is not the relevance of the category that is called into question in the case of highly unstable settings, but rather the approaches to strategy development and management that may be different in these settings.

The PRRO is also compatible and complementary to decentralized programming, a strategy that has recently been embraced by WFP and by the larger international community. The PRRO is intentionally flexible and requires substantial local judgment and authority. It places more authority and responsibility on field operators. This change is consistent with international management practices favouring decentralized programming and it is consistent with WFP's corporate commitment to decentralizing, though the team argues later that field staff requirements have substantial implications for WFP human resources planning.

Given the trends in the nature of crises, the evolution of food aid policy and evolving beneficiary needs, the question is not whether or not the PRRO is a relevant organizational innovation, but rather how future PRROs will be formulated and implemented. It is to these questions that we now turn.

#### **4. OUTCOMES/EFFECTS OF THE PRRO CATEGORY**

Introduction of the category has resulted in significant organizational change. At an aggregate level, the PRRO is associated with a lower level of free food assistance; it has increased flexibility of field operations, and has had an apparent positive impact on the organization's ability to mobilize resources. However, its impact on programme quality and the recovery of beneficiaries in the field has been more modest in the first case and not directly measurable in the second.

##### **4.1 More Developmentally Sound Operations**

Overall, the evaluation concludes that PRROs appear to be effectively supporting core relief functions in general and undoubtedly saving lives.<sup>54</sup> However, the extent of the PRRO's success is difficult to quantify, both because quantifying lives saved is difficult to do but also because WFP does not yet have an adequate outcome monitoring strategy for its programmes. This is a common problem in the humanitarian community, but one that has been signalled as serious recently by a number of international initiatives.<sup>55</sup> Evidence that PRROs are protecting and creating livelihoods and sustainable assets is more difficult to find.

For example, among the 17 PRROs reviewed, only six contained any quantitative information monitoring beneficiary nutritional status and only four provided quantitative information about livelihood<sup>56</sup> protection/enhancement. In most cases, except in refugee operations, these survey data had limited coverage and were not repeated systematically over time. Wider review of the SPRs indicates that outcome monitoring is a more systemic issue for WFP, though the Programme is cognizant of this problem and has recently taken steps to increase the availability of beneficiary outcome information. This is, however, a major constraint on effective programming in protracted crisis and transition settings. It is particularly important to establish that shifting emphasis from general food distribution to more targeted approaches does not threaten the health and nutritional status of beneficiaries. At the same time, it is important to establish that "recovery activities" have value-added for communities and household livelihoods.

Nevertheless, relying on qualitative assessments from the field assessments, the evaluators concluded that WFP was generally successful in achieving relief objectives, though in at least two cases some concern

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<sup>54</sup> ALNAP, "Humanitarian Action: Improving Monitoring to Enhance Accountability and Learning" supports the general conclusion that life-saving is achieved at least to some degree; however, mortality, a key indicator, is almost never measured, so the degree of life-saving is not known.

<sup>55</sup> Darcy and Hoffman, 2003.

<sup>56</sup> We reviewed field evaluation documents and SPRs to determine evaluation credibility.



was expressed that recovery functions might be compromising WFP's capability to implement these core functions.<sup>57</sup>

On the whole, recovery objectives were being met only partially (eight cases), and in two cases (Central African Republic and Cambodia),<sup>58</sup> although activity targets were met and recovery activities were having unquestionable value in meeting food gap needs, it was difficult to determine if sustainable assets benefiting beneficiaries were created and if adequate monitoring of potential risks of food aid was achieved. In at least five of the case evaluations, this issue was raised. The reasons for these findings are explored later in this report and in Annex IV. It is interesting to note that, though the Country Director survey was highly supportive of the PRRO category as a whole over the EMOP in terms of the former's value-added, only half of the Country Directors felt that the PRRO resulted in better outcomes for beneficiaries, which is consistent with this finding.

Recovery objectives relating to human assets, including health, education and training, appeared to be more positive and promising. In cases where education/training was available in post-emergency settings, food was generally associated with higher attendance levels. The case of Iran was particularly interesting in that food aid was used as an incentive to families to increase girls' enrolment, which was generally successful,<sup>59</sup> limited only by the availability of schools. However, WFP should look more carefully at the long-term sustainability of change to determine if this is a feasible intervention and scalable in similar settings. The observation that school feeding and vocational training are particularly promising recovery interventions in protracted crisis settings relates both to the sustainability/portability of the asset (that is, people take it with them and it cannot be stolen) and to the fact that there may be fewer competing priorities in post-emergency settings (stable but not yet transitional to peace and resettlement) for displaced persons. In one case, this notion was extended to early childhood education combined with trauma mitigation,<sup>60</sup> which also may be applicable to other settings.

A potential recovery impact of emergency feeding and recovery activities relates to the potential longer-term impact of women's participation in managing these operations on the status of women. WFP's aggressive engagement in Commitments to Women may be particularly important to achieving recovery objectives. Women may have new opportunities in emergencies to demonstrate their management capacity, and their empowerment may persist after a crisis. However, this type of effect has not been assessed systematically.

On the other hand, in at least two cases, Uganda and Sudan, field teams raised the concern that WFP might be having difficulties in balancing relief and recovery objectives and this way compromising its core relief functions. This was possibly the case in Angola as well. In the case of Uganda, the team concluded that the ration step-down strategy might actually have been detrimental to beneficiary well-being. They found that registration/verification, targeting distribution techniques and post-distribution monitoring were deficient. In the case of Sudan, the team concluded that the rush to resettle refugees resulted in WFP's failure to maintain adequate registration card norms. In the case of Angola, it is agreed that setting activity targets for recovery led the country office to be distracted from the key objectives of protecting beneficiary well-being. The Angola evaluation argued that recovery activity targets became objectives for the CO that may have detracted from the real objectives related to beneficiary well being.

A more frequent finding was that recovery activities were often sacrificed when relief needs increased. In fact, Uganda, the Great Lakes, the West Africa Coastal each mentioned this to be a problem, and in other cases, this may have been a factor determining the effectiveness of recovery activities.

## 4.2 Developmentally Sound Programmes

<sup>57</sup> Some evidence suggests that in some cases, field offices may not have been able adequately to balance relief and recovery objectives, resulting in compromised core relief functions. These include Uganda and Sudan.

<sup>58</sup> Guinea-Bissau also meets recovery activity targets; however, it was not evaluated by an external team.

<sup>59</sup> WFP/EB.3/2002/6/5.

<sup>60</sup> The case of Azerbaijan illustrates a promising collaboration with UNICEF to address early childhood development.



A related consideration is the developmental quality of the PRRO. Though the evaluation intended to rate all case operations on programme quality, this turned out to be impossible because of the variability of field evaluation scope and methods. Instead, it looked for the emergence of patterns of favourable ratings or identified weaknesses in the field programmes, combined with the frequency with which these aspects of programme quality were mentioned by WFP staff during interviews. If a particular programme element was cited as being deficient in three or more evaluations and was mentioned on three or more occasions by WFP staff during interviews, then this was interpreted as a likely area of concern. Programme elements that were evaluated positively were later included in the promising practices analysis.

**Table 6: Factors Impeding Effectiveness of PRROs**

Programme element	Number of cases identified as weak within the 17 PRRO cases reviewed by the Evaluation
Targeting	9
M&E	12
Partnership strategy	7
Local participation/ and capacity-building	6
Environmentally sound	3
Coordination	6
Durable assets/benefits for intended beneficiaries	3

The most commonly cited programme quality deficiencies were in the areas of targeting, monitoring and evaluation, implementing partner strategies, and coordination. These also are common programme quality problems in EMOPs,<sup>61</sup> and it is not possible for this evaluation to determine if these problems are more or less frequent among EMOPs; however, there is evidence that they are limitations to the effectiveness of the PRRO category. Of particular concern is the general weakness in the inter-related areas of targeting, assessment and monitoring and evaluation. One of the key changes expected as a result of moving from the EMOP to the PRRO is improved targeting. Yet improved targeting is dependent on good quality assessment and outcome information. The team concludes that this problem is a strategic limitation to the effectiveness of the PRRO. However, the humanitarian action evaluation community recognizes this to be a problem for the broader humanitarian community, not a problem specific to WFP.<sup>62</sup>

<sup>61</sup> Evaluation team reviewed a small sample of EMOP evaluations, ALNAP Evaluation Report on Humanitarian Programmes citation

<sup>62</sup> The ALNAP initiative was created as a response to the humanitarian community’s realization that assessment and monitoring and evaluation were serious constraints to the performance of humanitarian programmes.



An emergent promising practice is the routine use of VAM and the emergence of VAM units within country and regional offices. VAM enjoys a good reputation in the field<sup>63</sup> and is increasingly being recognized as a food-insecurity information centre in many settings. The mid-term evaluation of Cambodia's PRRO observed that "donors were found to attach significant importance to receiving timely and updated information from WFP on the emergence of possible food aid needs".<sup>64</sup> At the field level, VAM increasingly works collaboratively with other food-insecurity information programmes to provide integrated food-insecurity information relevant to targeting and monitoring and evaluation of food aid programmes.<sup>65</sup> VAM is discussed further in the chapter on lessons learned.

Another problem that has significant implications for PRRO effectiveness and efficiency is the approach to implementing PRRO activities. The PRRO policy paper and guidelines call for deeper relationships with IPs and different relationships focusing more on building the capacity of local NGOs and government organizations.<sup>66</sup> The case evaluations found a wide variety of approaches to implementing PRROs, but these often did not strive to meet these more developmental norms for programme service delivery. In the case of Angola, for example, the evaluators found the number of different IPs to be unmanageable, resulting in a recommendation to implement a "focal NGO" or leader NGO approach. Other evaluations found WFP to be the sole implementing agency, such as in Georgia. In many cases, IPs were judged to need training and capacity-building not provided for in the PRRO or by WFP management. Sri Lanka brings forward the example that when sustainable peace occurs, local government agencies may not be knowledgeable about previously inaccessible populations.<sup>67</sup> And in a number of cases, implementing partners capable of undertaking recovery activities were highly scarce (Somalia, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau). In the case of Cambodia, the evaluation states that selection of projects for the social-sector component was more a function of perceived capacity of implementing partners than of beneficiary needs.<sup>68</sup>

An exceptional case was found among the field evaluation studies. In Azerbaijan, where WFP's main IP is World Vision International, a highly experienced relief-to-development Private Voluntary Organization [PVO], WFP had a longstanding working relationship under the previous EMOP that continued and evolved reasonably well under the PRRO, even though recovery expectations were unrealistic.<sup>69</sup> However, this stronger partnership also included capacity building of local organizations, which is an even deeper level of recovery.

The IP strategy in most cases ignores the potential recovery/developmental impact of transferring food aid management skills to local businesses and governments, even in the case of relief aid. These impacts may be significant, but are not documented in the literature, though they may be considered as factors affecting the efficiency of relief operations (Somalia, Southern Sudan, Great Lakes Regional, Iran.) Transitional countries can benefit from the significant technical and financial benefits of large external operations such as those involving WFP food aid.

A key factor that conditions recovery planning and implementation and modifies the effectiveness of the PRRO vehicle is whether the context is:

- unstable;
- politically stable (including natural disasters); or
- long-term refugee.

The findings related to these three circumstances are the following:

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<sup>63</sup> Mock and McCalla, draft FIVIMS evaluation

<sup>64</sup> WFP, Report of the Mid-Term Review Mission for PRRO Cambodia, 2000.

<sup>65</sup> Observations of author based on recent interviews for FIVIMS programme evaluation

<sup>66</sup> WFP/EB.A/98/4

<sup>67</sup> WFP/EB.3/99/7-B1

<sup>68</sup> WFP/EB.2/2000/3/6

<sup>69</sup> WFP/EB.2/2002/3/2



- **Unstable context:** The PRRO has been most problematic in highly unstable contexts, where security makes programme access/implementation difficult. These include cases such as Angola, the Great Lakes region, the West Africa Coastal region and Uganda. In these cases, relief needs swamped programme resources and recovery objectives were generally not achieved. Country offices set unrealistic and sometimes inappropriate recovery targets (resettlement, ration step-down). In these cases, the probability of doing harm through ill-conceived recovery planning is high (stepping down food entitlements in low security situations, for example).
- **Stable context:** In these cases, recovery activity targets are close to being met. However, it is less clear if durable assets that benefit beneficiary populations have been created. These cases generally have articulated recovery strategies, but programme implementation often suffers from lack of beneficiary needs assessment/participation, insufficient technical support and many of the implementation factors that affect traditional development programmes.
- **Long-term refugee context:** These settings are often relatively stable operations in which self-reliance or human-asset-creation strategies are often possible and should be advocated for. In these cases, WFP's programmes have not changed significantly as a result of the PRRO category conversion.<sup>70</sup> In addition, at times unrealistic targets and rations for repatriation have been set and insufficient attention has been placed on ensuring that longer term reintegration/resettlement objectives are attained.

These three contexts are quite different, requiring different strategies, assumptions and partners,<sup>71</sup> although all three contexts may be found within the same operation. Expectations for durable solutions among these three circumstances are quite different, which even calls into question whether the PRRO is the appropriate programme category for unstable circumstances, for example.<sup>72</sup> Thus, the expectations for WFP technical and administrative management are greater at the field level.

### 4.3 Decreased General Relief Food Assistance

One of the key intended outcomes of the PRRO change model was to decrease levels of general relief food assistance in favour of interventions promoting self-reliance and asset-creation. It also anticipates that the PRRO will be an amalgam of relief- and development-oriented activities. This appears to have been achieved, to some degree.

Although time series data on WFP expenditures according to activity type/sector of intervention are not available, a recent exercise by WFP's Statistics Office demonstrates that types of food assisted activities vary considerably among the three primary programme categories; that is, EMOP, PRRO and development. The most notable differences reflect a greater emphasis on human resources in the case of the development category and the other two categories on the one hand; on the other hand, there is a substantial difference in the amount of general food relief assistance provided by the PRRO in comparison with the EMOP category (55.1 percent versus 74.1 percent, respectively). In comparison with EMOP programmes, PRROs have expended greater resources on FFW programmes (19.1 percent versus 6.5 percent). While PRROs support modest levels of resettlement (4.8 percent of PRRO expenditure), EMOPs supported negligible levels of resettlement.

This current array of expenditures according to activity is generally consistent with the PRRO change model, though some of the differences are more modest than desirable. Stepping down in general relief food assistance from the EMOP to the development project category is occurring,<sup>73</sup> though general relief food assistance still account for over 55 percent of all PRRO expenditures. The PRRO has the highest level of resources dedicated to physical/agricultural infrastructure improvement, though this again

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<sup>70</sup> Most refugee PRROs reviewed did not differ substantially from predecessor activities and were frequently free food distribution activities. UNHCR interviews reflect that organization's disappointment in WFP's refugee advocacy efforts.

<sup>71</sup> WFP Summary Report on Staff Workshop on PRRO evaluation, J003 [

<sup>72</sup> Many senior staff feel that it may be appropriate to continue to operate EMOPs in highly unstable contexts when the possibilities for any developmental interventions are remote.



accounts for less than 20 percent of all expenditures. Resettlement is a modest element in the PRRO activity portfolio, accounting for less than 5 percent. The development category utilized more than 7 percent of its resources for resettlement, though the total expenditures were highest in the PRRO category.

**Table 7: Distribution of WFP Expenditures for 2002, by Activity and Programme Category**

	DEV	EMOP	PRRO	TOTAL
General relief food assistance	569 (0.3%)	642,187 (74.1%)	229,266 (55.1%)	853,578 (57.8%)
Human resources	125,274 (64.3%)	166,596 (19.2%)	86,918 (20.9%)	388,424 (26.3%)
FFW	63,845 (32.8%)	56,918 (6.6%)	79,705 (19.2%)	200,470 (13.6%)
Resettlement	5,004 (7.3%)	1,351 (0.2%)	19,850 (4.8%)	27,475 (1.9%)
<b>Total</b>	<b>194,692 (13.2%)</b>	<b>867,052 (58.7%)</b>	<b>415,738 (28.1%)</b>	<b>1,477,482 (100%)</b>

Source: WFP in Statistics, 2002

Table 8 shows that the amount and percentage of expenditures used for general relief food assistance vary dramatically by region. At least in 2002, Africa was by far the largest consumer of general relief food assistance (more than 70 percent of all general relief food assistance), there being a six-fold greater expenditure on this intervention in Africa than in other regions. A total of 75.1 percent of all relief expenditures are accounted for by free food assistance. General relief food assistance also accounts for the highest levels of expenditure as a percentage of total relief expenditures.<sup>74</sup> The Eastern Europe/CIS region also exhibits relatively high levels of expenditure on general relief food assistance, actually quite similar to that of Africa on a relative basis. Latin America accounts for the lowest levels of expenditure on general relief food assistance, both in relative and absolute terms. In Asia, less than one half of all relief expenditure is associated with general relief food assistance. The Asia case, though, is heavily weighted by North Korea, which accounts for the majority of regional expenditures. Although there are a number of contextual factors and differences among vulnerable groups between the regions, the particularly high levels of general relief food assistance in Sub-Saharan Africa and the CIS/Eastern European region warrant closer scrutiny.

**Table 8: Percentage of General Relief Food Assistance of Total Emergency Assistance, by Region**

Region	Free food assistance
All regions	853,578 (66.5%)
Africa	596,268 (75.1%)
Asia	145,989 (40.5%)
Eastern Europe/CIS	62,406 (72.2%)
Latin America/Caribbean	650 (4.7%)

Source: WFP in Statistics, 2002

#### 4.4 Quality of Recovery Strategies

<sup>73</sup> An analysis of a sub-sample of cases (n=6) did not find this be consistently the case for individual operations. For example, only three operations showed a decrease in free food as a percentage of total food; among the three other cases, one showed no difference and the other two showed increased levels of free food as a percent of total assistance.

<sup>74</sup> Source: "WFP in Statistics", 2002.



Seizing opportunities for recovery is predicated on the development of an effective recovery strategy.<sup>75</sup> The PRRO evaluation found this aspect of programme quality improvement to be weak on the whole. Several indicators are used to evaluate the quality of the recovery strategy. One indicator is the number of case operations based on the programme documents, which had complete recovery strategies in the sense of containing all elements of a recovery strategy as per the original policy paper. Another is the judgment of evaluators on the realism of the recovery strategy. The evolution of the recovery strategy is displayed across PRROs to illustrate change, a crude indicator of continuing quality improvement. Finally, also examined is the evidence base that field offices used in the preparation and management of their PRROs.

Of the 17 cases in the sub-study, six of them contained the five required sections of the recovery strategy. Four did not include a section on the role of food aid and six were missing two or more of the required components of a recovery strategy.

The evidence base used by field offices for development of the PRRO recovery strategies is variable (see Annex VI). Two inputs that are consistently used by field offices are VAM reports and JFAMs. These are usually used to guide broad geographic targeting. Five of the seven operations with refugee components reported using joint assessment mission inputs (JFAM/JAMs), which were typically used to determine ration size and composition needs. Those countries transitioning from crisis to durable peace or recovery generally cited at least one background policy document on reconstruction or poverty alleviation, which was most consistently cited in relation to selecting food-for-work activities or the consistency of WFP activities with national priorities. Among countries with more active crises this was found to be true in the cases of Colombia and Uganda. Only two operations cited household economy studies or other in-depth studies of socio-economic status and coping mechanisms, the type of information that is particularly useful in developing livelihood-building recovery strategies.

An e-mail enquiry of regional and country offices suggests that the evidence base for PRRO strategy preparation is improving, though many PRROs are being prepared with limited informational inputs or, in the case of refugee operations, predominantly with the JAMs, which until recently, have been largely operationally rather than strategically oriented.<sup>76</sup>

The evolution of quality of the strategic development of recovery strategies within WFP appears to be incremental rather than dramatically improved with the introduction of the category. Indeed, in a number of cases reviewed, the PRRO was not dramatically different from the predecessor EMOP or PRO; however, some of these operations already had commenced recovery-oriented activities (see Annex VII).

A troubling finding was that there was no common use of basic terminology among field staff in formulating recovery strategies. Terms such as *relief*, *recovery* and *safety nets* were implicitly defined differently among field staff. Some definitions limit the relief component to general food distribution and nutritional rehabilitation; some include resettlement under relief; others include reduced-ration free food under recovery; some include institutional feeding as relief and others as recovery. Sometimes the term safety net is used in relation to relief or recovery, as for example in relation to economic crises. In fact, the West Africa Coastal project document illustrates this confusion, when, under recovery strategy, the author writes, "...emergency response via a general ration; emergency response via curative interventions (therapeutic, supplementary and MCH feeding); emergency/recovery/rehabilitation response via safety net programmes (ESF, FFW, institutional feeding)."<sup>77</sup>

The quality of the recovery strategy is somewhat limited by the fact that a systematic process for developing recovery strategies is not consistently followed and there is no routine process for updating them.

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<sup>75</sup> WFP/EB.A/98/4-A, "From Crisis to Recovery"

<sup>76</sup> JFAM/JAM reports typically focus on refugee food needs, particularly quantity and quality of rations and the immediate factors that affect effective food delivery. However, these assessments are currently being revised to include strategic planning (Ron Ockwell, personal communication).

<sup>77</sup> WFP, Supplementary Review: West Africa Coastal, 2002, p. 11



#### 4.5 Efficiency Measures

The evaluation model expects the PRRO to result in greater efficiency overall, as WFP would use less and better-targeted food, and would improve the quality and cost-efficiency of food logistics through more extensive use of NGOs and local contractors. DSC as a percentage of total costs and per ton might be expected to increase, however, due to more resource-intensive activities such as targeting, capacity-building, and technical support to food-for-work/assets activities. Nevertheless, this should be offset by overall improvements in the efficiency of food aid use.

The fact that there is less general relief food assistance associated with the PRRO suggests that some efficiency gains have been realized at the corporate level.

Among the PRRO field evaluations, only that of Uganda indicated that some efficiency improvements may have been achieved by implementing the PRRO, though most of the reports did not directly compare the efficiency of the PRRO in relation to its predecessor operation. The Uganda evaluation reports that after merger of the previous PRO and EMOP into the new PRRO, the country office was able to reduce a few posts, DOC and DSC rates per ton were lower than the predecessor operations, and operational costs per beneficiary were lower.<sup>78</sup>

Assuming that the shift to a PRRO from an EMOP would typically involve lower overall transport costs, the evaluation examined actual budgeted ITSH for all EMOP that were converted to PRROs during the period 1999-2002. It was found that budgeted ITSH costs were only slightly lower for the PRROs than for the EMOPs.<sup>79</sup>

Budgeted ITSH rates for the period 1999–2002 were only slightly lower for the PRRO than the EMOP (20 percent versus 23 percent). The DOC/ton budgeted amounts were quite similar among the 16 PRRO cases and their predecessor operations (see Annex VIII). The one striking difference is Somalia, which, as it turns out, also illustrated a promising practice for contracting local food transport arrangements, which did apparently have a large effect on efficiency. The evaluation finds this to be a good practice.

A more rigorous assessment of programme efficiency was precluded by the lack of complete information on programme expenditures and resource flows. Thus, the analysis suggests that documenting efficiency gains associated with introduction of the PRRO category is elusive. This type of information is important but will be available only when there is a greater time series of information about PRROs, and when WFP's management information system permits better tracking of expenditure data in real time.

#### 4.6 Programme Category Synergies

The PRRO change model implies that by creating a category that bridges relief and development, more synergies among emergency interventions and development operations might be likely. Based on the review of cases and staff interviews, little direct evidence was found of this type of synergy. Table 9 shows an array of WFP programmes in relation to the 17 cases. Six cases have both development and PRROs ongoing,<sup>80</sup> and three have all three types of operations. All six have some form of VAM capacity.

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<sup>78</sup> WFP/OEDE, Full Report of the Evaluation of Uganda PRRO 6176.00, p. 47

<sup>79</sup> Data for the Great Lakes Regional PRRO was missing at the time of the evaluation

<sup>80</sup> Arguably five, as Cambodia's development activity is relatively insignificant





Table 9: Current Open Operations for 17 Cases

Case	DEV	PRRO	EMOP	VAM**
Algeria		X		2
Angola		X		1
Azerbaijan		X		4
Cambodia	X	X		1
Colombia	X	X		2
Ethiopia	X	X	X	1
Georgia		X		3
Guinea-Bissau		X		2
Indonesia		X		1
Iran		X		2
Somalia		X		2
Sri Lanka	X	X	X	2/3
Sudan	X	X	X	1
Uganda	X	X		1
Great Lakes region		X	X*	1
Latin American and the Caribbean		X		2
West Africa Coastal		X	X	2

\* Burundi and Rwanda

\*\* 1 = dedicated VAM unit; 2 = only regional officer assists; 3 = focal point only, 4 = no VAM unit

Unfortunately, concrete examples of programme synergies were not frequently cited in the case evaluations. Only in the case of Uganda was there clear evidence of synergies among PRRO and development activities. In that country, the country office purchased a significant proportion of its PRRO food needs from small farmer associations, which participate in its Agriculture and Marketing Support Project.<sup>81</sup> In fact, 33 percent of cereals and 37 percent of pulses are procured locally in Uganda. It is interesting to note that Uganda was one of the more “evidence-based” PRROs in terms of its use of multiple information sources and policy strategies supporting the development of its recovery strategy (see Annex VI).<sup>82</sup>

The Sri Lanka supplementary review<sup>83</sup> sheds particular light on why more synergies are not apparent. Though the country office is well aware of the desirability of cross-fertilization among country programmes, “management silos” are difficult to break down. This problem often is complicated by the fact that different local implementing agencies are responsible for reconstruction/recovery-type activities or for IDPs/refugees. In addition, different staff may be required because of ethnic tensions.<sup>84</sup> In Ethiopia, the very different geographic focus of the refugee PRRO and the country programme made synergies less realistic, though the country office envisages better integration of its soon-to-be-converted drought PRRO into its ongoing programmes.<sup>85</sup> However, interviews with other Country Directors revealed that it was not apparent that efforts were being systematically made to develop linkages between programme categories; this argues for increased emphasis on portfolio-wide review and planning.

The apparent lack of synergies represents a missed opportunity for WFP to increase the linkages between its relief and development programmes. Moreover, there is evidence<sup>86</sup> that negative synergies might be

<sup>81</sup> WFP/EB.1/2002/8/2

<sup>82</sup> However, it must be kept in mind that the field evaluation assessment expressed concerns about potential unintended negative effects on beneficiaries.

<sup>83</sup> Tymo, June 2003

<sup>84</sup> Interview with Country Directors

<sup>85</sup> E-mail communication from country office

<sup>86</sup> Interviews with Country Directors



created in some cases because development projects might be subsidized by PRROs and EMOPs that are relatively better funded.

#### 4.7 Additionality

The PRRO has resulted in some additionality of resources for WFP, though the magnitude is difficult to quantify. Trend data on contributions are combined with information about donor financing strategies and emergent food aid policies to draw this conclusion.

To date, the PRRO category has been well resourced; in fact it is the best resourced of the WFP programme categories, using needs versus requirements as the benchmark. The ability of WFP to attract resources through the PRRO is indisputable. For the period 1999–2002, contributions to the PRRO category reached 86 percent of overall needs, and in 2002, contributions met 95 percent of requirements. During the same period, EMOPS were resourced up to 74 percent of overall needs.<sup>87</sup>

Trends in resourcing over the years indicate relatively stable funding for the category. Overall contributions since the PRRO category was created have remained relatively steady during the past three years, levelling off at approximately US\$500 million/year. But levels are expected to increase as some of WFP's older and large EMOPs are converted into PRROs. There is little evidence that many of the PRROs will be discontinued in the near future.

At the same time, contributions to development project have steadily eroded (see Figure 2), but this trend pre-dated the rise of the PRRO. Many donors are increasingly taking categorical stands against the use of food aid for development (most notably the European Community), while others have been gradually withdrawing from this application of food aid.<sup>88</sup>

Donors with a bias towards supporting relief operations (e.g. the European Community, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom) and those who donate generously to relief operations (e.g. Germany, Japan and the United States of America) all support the category, in part from their traditional relief funding windows. Only one donor, Norway, appears to have embraced the more holistic view of the PRRO as presented in "From Crisis to Recovery" and adjusted its funding mechanisms for WFP accordingly, explicitly opening up its development funding window to the category. Other donors also are able to contribute to the PRRO from their development windows. The European Community, for example, contributes to PRROs from both its relief window (ECHO) and its development window (EuropeAid). Similarly, the United Kingdom contributes to PRROs from both its relief and development windows. Australia, for example, in shifting to greater emphasis on emergencies, has contributed to PRROs through its regular budget (which traditionally supported development interventions). The United States, too, will no longer manage PRROs as uniquely emergency operations,<sup>89</sup> enabling PRROs having more than 50 percent recovery content to be financed and managed by the development arm of Food for Peace. Sweden, over the past few years, while sustaining deep cuts to its overall development assistance budget, which resulted in withdrawing support for the development category, has been able to maintain support for the PRRO category.

As some of these donors would not be contributing to development operations, this is considered evidence of the additionality of resources available to WFP as the result of the PRRO; especially inasmuch as the PRRO has enabled WFP to capture resources that might not be otherwise available to its programmes.

#### 4.8 Improved Corporate Attitude Towards Relief-to-Recovery Programming

A less tangible but significant effect of the category's introduction is an increased appreciation of WFP senior corporate and field staff for relief-to-recovery programming. There is evidence of widespread

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<sup>87</sup> WFP *Yellow Pages*

<sup>88</sup> Based on analysis of *Yellow Pages*, interviews with resource staff, senior executives and donor representatives

<sup>89</sup> Personal communication, USAID/Food For Peace [FFP] office



appreciation for relief-to-recovery programming among WFP senior staff. One member of the evaluation team interviewed senior staff a year and one half ago, noting a great difference in appreciation for the PRRO category. He noted that both the category and recovery programming as a whole had a much higher profile within the ranks of senior staff. Indeed, some senior staff saw the PRRO as an integrative mechanism for enabling development and crisis response such that it might ultimately replace the development category. These changes can be attributed, at least in part, to the prominence of the category within WFP.

Appreciation for the value-added of the PRRO category is pervasive in the Programme among senior field and Headquarters staff.<sup>90</sup> They believe that the PRRO provides value-added over and above the other programming categories, including more relevant recovery programming, improved relief programming, flexibility and resource mobilization potential. Only one staff member indicated that the PRRO category should be dropped.

#### 4.9 Unintended Effects

Negative consequences of the PRRO category could be three-fold. First, by introducing unrealistic recovery strategies, core relief effectiveness could be compromised. For example, beneficiaries might be stepped off adequate rations before viable alternatives for self-reliance were possible. Another potential problem might be a decline in relief standards. This is a particularly serious concern given the lack of systematic monitoring and assessment of beneficiary needs in non-refugee contexts. Three of the evaluations raised the concern that introduction of a recovery strategy might compromise core relief functions (Uganda, Sudan, Angola).<sup>91</sup> It is unclear to what extent these problems had an effect on beneficiary well-being, however, because of the lack of systematic monitoring of beneficiary status.

A second unintended effect is the possibility that the PRRO category might facilitate WFP's continued presence where it is no longer needed. This does not appear to be a serious consideration, as most of WFP's relief and PRRO assistance is targeted to low-income, food-deficit countries (LIFDCs), with the exception of the Eastern European/CIS regions and the Middle East. It is in these latter areas where exit strategies are particularly important and where further reflection on the part of WFP regarding its longer-term role is required, particularly given the high level of free food distribution in these regions.

Related to this concern is the potential for market distortions and the creation of beneficiary dependencies due to the longer-term application of food aid interventions. There is very little evidence related to this type of "risk" associated with the PRRO – that is, evaluation teams and SPRs rarely addressed this issue or reported on it, even though this potential is a great pre-occupation of the food security literature.<sup>92</sup> In Tanzania, a household food economy assessment found that food aid was having a significant market effect.<sup>93</sup> But otherwise, no information was available to the evaluation team to examine this question. This concern applies to all three of the programme categories, though it might be particularly important in recovery contexts, because market change can be more rapid and because the emergence of functional markets is particularly important.

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<sup>90</sup> Based on e-mail survey (n = 22, response) and extensive staff interviews

<sup>91</sup> By inference the Angolan evaluation also counsels against benchmarks in the three categories.

<sup>92</sup> Seaman and Leather, 2003.

<sup>93</sup> WFP, Annual Report: Tanzania PRRO 6077, 2000.



## 5. WFP AND EXTERNAL FACTORS AFFECTING PRRO EFFECTIVENESS

### 5.1 Conformity to the Policy of Converting EMOPs to PRROs

In examining the extent to which EMOPs been converted to PRROs in conformity with policy, the conclusion is that for the majority of EMOPs, the policy has been followed (see Table 10). However, 15 out of 57 cases were not converted within the two-year time frame and some of these were very large operations, accounting for a substantial percentage of WFP’s annual expenditures. For example, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has been an ongoing operation for over seven years, and the actual budget for its current phase is more than US\$200 million (for one year);<sup>94</sup> Sudan also is a long-running EMOP with a current budget of more than US\$123 million, and Afghanistan was converted back to an EMOP that is now budgeted at over US\$139 million. (That EMOP was converted to a PRRO after conclusion of this evaluation and not within the prescribed two-year time frame). The Ethiopia country office has one PRRO operation, but it has also launched six EMOPS since 1995.

**Table 10: Conversion of EMOPS/PROs to PRROs**

EMOP/PRO launched and converted to a PRRO as per two-year guide/No other EMOPS launched	Algeria, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Iran, Iraq, Nepal, Somalia, Uganda, Yemen, Serbia/Montenegro, Guinea-Bissau
EMOP launched and completed within two years	Chad, Cameroon, India, Laos, Ecuador , India, Mozambique, Republic of Congo
EMOP launched and not converted to a PRRO within two years	Albania, DPR Korea, Sudan, <sup>95</sup> Ethiopia, Eritrea, Madagascar, Namibia, Pakistan, Palestine Territories , Russia, Zimbabwe (local EMOP absorbed into regional EMOP), Indonesia, Kenya, Regional Balkans, Afghanistan (reverted from a PRRO back to an EMOP for 3 years before re-launching the PRRO)
EMOP/PRO converted to a PRRO/ Subsequent EMOPS launched	Bangladesh*, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti *, Ethiopia *, Eritrea, Sudan *, Georgia, Indonesia, Kenya*, Mali, Senegal, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Zambia*, Central America Regional (El Salvador) , West Africa Coastal (WAC) Operation (Cote d’Ivoire) Great Lakes Regional (Burundi, Rwanda and Tanzania*) * denotes refugee-only PRROs

In 18 out of 36 cases where PRROs were ongoing, subsequent EMOPs had been approved. In some cases, these findings suggest that the EMOP-to-PRRO transition and the use of PRROs to accommodate fluctuating circumstances is not being exercised with discipline by WFP. On the other hand, in some cases the decision to launch an EMOP alongside an existing PRRO is fully justified. This would be true, for example, in the case of a drought or flood-related EMOP in a country with a PRRO, which was assisting only refugees (seven cases). An assessment of factors that affect the decision to convert to the PRRO and to launch a new EMOP is instructive.

A number of factors influence the decision to launch new EMOPs. One is related to programme coherence. Most Country Directors have elected to initiate new EMOPs when the nature of the crisis, affected population, geographic scope, and/or implementing partners varied greatly from those of the existing PRRO.<sup>96</sup>

<sup>94</sup> Source: WINGS, Active Projects

<sup>95</sup> Note that Sudan has both a long-running EMOP for North/South Sudan and a PRRO for refugees

<sup>96</sup> WFP Country Director interviews, Ethiopia Country Director note on study to determine whether to use an EMOP or a PRRO



One of the most common reasons for launching a new EMOP is when the resource requirements far surpass the amounts at the budgetary discretion of the country office. This is outlined in the Guidelines as a legitimate approach,<sup>97</sup> especially when sudden emergencies require immediate response. These operations may be precipitated by drought (Georgia, Ethiopia and Afghanistan) or the new emergence of large-scale conflict (Côte d'Ivoire).

Another rationale followed by field officers is that the nature of the emergency is sufficiently distinct as to warrant a separate project (Sri Lanka, Ethiopia), either because of the cause of the emergency (for example, drought versus high-intensity conflict) or because different parts of the country/region are affected (Sri Lanka, Ethiopia) or different beneficiary groups are affected (especially refugees versus others).

In addition, political considerations may determine the choice among project categories. There remains a perception among some senior staff that EMOPs are more easily resourced.<sup>98</sup> While this does not appear to be true based on statistical data and donor attitudes as a whole, decisions regarding projects are not infrequently made locally. The evaluators found a fairly diverse set of attitudes towards the EMOP and PRRO during donor interviews both between and within donor agencies to some extent. Some donor representatives felt that the EMOP instrument was more clearly identified as humanitarian and thus more acceptable to constituents. Some Country Directors expressed the view that donors felt more comfortable when an operation was set up that they alone might fund. Other donor representatives saw the PRRO as a quality step towards improved developmental relief and felt that WFP was being more consistent with international best practices in humanitarian assistance. Generally, however, donors care less whether an activity is funded through an EMOP or a PRRO than they do about the quality, effectiveness and efficiency of interventions or the nature of the crisis or populations affected.

A factor that may prejudice donor preference among funding vehicles is the political relationship between the donor and affected country. This may well play a role in the cases of the DPRK and Sudan.<sup>99</sup> Some donors also have specific concerns about the transparency of the PRRO category; this will be discussed in more depth below.

Donor fatigue or low resourcing of particular PRROs has been associated with the launching of new EMOPs. For example, the 2000 EMOP for Georgia may have been driven in part by the poor early resourcing of the Georgia PRRO.<sup>100</sup> The EMOP document mentions that the PRRO was only 8 percent resourced four months into the operation.

While these factors generally have resulted in the launching of EMOPs when that opportunity was afforded, one country office illustrates the potential advantages (and risks) of utilizing a single PRRO to manage highly diverse beneficiary needs and a dynamic setting. This case might represent a promising practice. The Uganda PRRO consolidated refugee and IDP operations to its advantage, resulting in gains in efficiency, and a better recognition of and remedy to the inequality of relief assistance between refugees and IDPs.<sup>101</sup> This PRRO also accommodated widely fluctuating beneficiary surges with reasonable success.

The Latin American cases also demonstrate that it is not necessary to wait two years to convert an EMOP to a PRRO. The Central American regional EMOP progressed well within the two-year guideline. In that case, the nature of crisis itself, together with WFP's extensive knowledge of the region, resulted in a rapid progression from an EMOP to a PRRO. The PRRO was implemented within nine months of launching the EMOP. This more rapid-paced progression may be expected in response to natural disasters. In the

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<sup>97</sup> WFP, PRRO Guidelines, 1999

<sup>98</sup> A number of senior staff interviewed remained unconvinced that these two vehicles were resourced equally; approximately 27 percent of Country Directors surveyed were not convinced.

<sup>99</sup> Interviews with regional staff and donor representatives

<sup>100</sup> WFP, Georgia Country Office, EMOP 2002, G. 8<sup>f</sup>

<sup>101</sup> WFP/OEDE/2002/05



case of Colombia, the PRRO was the first operation in response to the violence, reflecting the possibility of advanced planning in response to slow-onset emergencies.

The above discussion illustrates the highly contextualized nature of the decision to convert an EMOP to a PRRO or to launch a new EMOP when a PRRO is already in place. However, it also suggests a need for improved and more rational management of the protracted crisis portfolio.

## 5.2 Realism of Strategies and Quality of Implementation

PRROs often were judged too unrealistic by case evaluation teams. Indeed, in ten cases, evaluators or country offices concluded that the initial targets for recovery were unrealistic and only partially attained. Common types of problems included:

- unrealistic repatriation/resettlement targets (Angola, Ethiopia, Algeria, Sudan);
- insufficient access of displaced persons to land (Angola, Cambodia, Azerbaijan, Uganda);
- insufficient infrastructure, for example, schools to accommodate beneficiaries in food-for-education (FFE) activities (Iran and Azerbaijan);
- over-emphasis on physical assets rather than demand-based and social assets (Angola, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Rwanda);
- unrealistic assessment of host government policies and practices related to refugees and IDPs (Iran, Sudan, Great Lakes Region, West Africa Coastal);
- unrealistic assessment of local implementing partner capabilities (Angola, Somalia, Cambodia, Guinea-Bissau, Algeria);
- WFP staff capacity (see next chapter); and
- great geographic variability in contexts and possibilities, requiring more locally specific strategies (Somalia, Angola).

Many of the critiques of FFW activities are common to FFW projects as a whole, such as:

- inadequate technical supervision;
- lack of norms and standards for work and rations;
- lack of advanced planning for continued maintenance of assets created;
- lack of adequate consideration for the appropriateness of activities for women;
- lack of beneficiary needs assessment; and
- assets created that do not benefit target groups.

Problems with FFT and FFE activities also are similar to those in non-emergency settings (with some exceptions):

- Demand for these programmes may be higher in post-emergency settings.
- Basic infrastructure may be a greater constraint (i.e. lack of school buildings, health facilities).
- Market analysis for goods and services resulting from training programmes may be more challenging as the underpinnings of emergent markets may be more difficult to predict.

Unfortunately, one of the important outcomes of PRROs, the quality of assets created, is variable. Again, though not different from development, planning activities in recovery settings may be more challenging, and the requisite technical resources may be more difficult to mobilize. This was found to be the case in those operations where FFW was a major component of the recovery strategy.

## 5.3 Flexibility

The change model hypothesizes that PRROs improve flexibility, which in turn facilitates more responsive programming and the ability to seize recovery opportunities or respond to crisis spikes. The PRRO has undoubtedly brought increased flexibility to field operations. WFP staff as a whole embrace the PRRO as a flexible instrument. The majority of Country Directors surveyed (65.5 percent) felt that the PRRO



provided more flexibility than did the EMOP. Four of the case evaluations specifically cited the importance of the instrument's flexibility in the context of the crises they were addressing (Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Uganda, and West Africa Coastal). The Uganda case is exemplary in that the PRRO was able to accommodate a surge in IDPs. Though the operation was designed to meet the needs of 190,000 IDPs, the PRRO actually accommodated a surge of more than 300,000 more relatively successfully,<sup>102</sup> though, to a certain extent, this appears to have impaired its ability to manage recovery. Staff interviews generally supported the view that the PRRO improved flexibility. However, many felt that improvements could be made to increase flexibility. Approximately one-third of Country Directors and WFP staff interviewed felt that budgetary flexibility should be increased. A total of 48.3 percent of Country Directors surveyed felt that Executive Board-approved budget revisions were so time consuming as to decrease the relevance of the PRRO category. This finding may account in part for the finding below that EMOPs are frequently launched even when PRROs might accommodate surges in beneficiaries more rationally.<sup>103</sup>

On the other hand, a number of donors expressed concern that the flexibility also gives rise to potential problems with transparency,<sup>104</sup> especially given the fact that the PRRO may last up to three years. This potential issue is made more acute by WFP's relatively complex information systems, which make obtaining quick summary information about an operation difficult to find. WFP's recent requirement that all operations prepare SPRs and its strengthening of guidelines and quality standards may mitigate this problem to some extent, so long as quality standards are maintained.

#### 5.4 Contingency Resources and Planning

Surges in resource needs are an important aspect of protracted crisis settings as are unanticipated opportunities for recovery when peace opportunities suddenly emerge (e.g. Angola). Contingency planning has become a wider WFP activity. Some of the PRROs have successfully accommodated surges in relief needs (Uganda, Angola, Somalia, Sudan). However, this often has resulted in apparent decreased levels of recovery activities; more typically, surges in need are handled through the launching of new EMOPs (see Table 10). While most PRROs are able to accommodate surges in relief, few have good contingency plans for unexpected peace/stability.<sup>105</sup>

#### 5.5 Human Resources

Using the Annual EB published staffing reports from 1999-2002, the team performed a preliminary analysis of trends over time in the numbers of and proportion of WFP international staff that were likely to be engaged primarily in programme development/support. The percentage of total staff in these categories did not change significantly over time and only between 1999 and 2000 was there a notable change in the absolute numbers of staff engaged primarily in programming. Also of note is that senior level staff (P-5 and above) represents a small percentage of the "programming category", only about 10%, and this does not change significantly in absolute or relative terms over time. In addition, there were only 19 posts, 6% of total programming professionals in Rome in 1999, reflecting decentralization. These data suggest that programming capacity development has not increased over time; there are too few senior level programme staff; and a critical mass of programme specialists may not be available at HQ level to sufficiently support the development of adequate tools and lessons for agency wide-learning and competency development related to protracted relief and recovery programme development and implementation.

In addition, there does not appear to be a deliberate strategy on the part of WFP to cross-train its relief and development programme staff so as to ensure that staff have skills and experience base required to support the dual needs of the PRRO.

<sup>102</sup> WFP/OEDE, Full Report of the Evaluation of Uganda PRRO 6176.00, 2001

<sup>103</sup> The Uganda example is illustrative here. The PRRO was unique in several ways, including the combining of refugee and IDP operations and the accommodation of a large surge in IDPs.

<sup>104</sup> This viewpoint was expressed by a number of Headquarters and regional staff members of some of WFP's major donors and was also cited as one of the reasons for the increasing trend in earmarking/un-earmarking.

<sup>105</sup> This need was mentioned as a concern in the Ethiopia PRRO evaluation report.



The evaluation model anticipated a fairly aggressive change to enhance programming capacity in the field. This was not evident in personnel hiring or training policies.

### **Financial Management and Resources**

Financial management issues also were frequently brought up by field evaluation teams and in senior field staff interviews. As recovery activities often use less food that may move more slowly through the system, cash resources available to country offices and regional bureaux are affected.<sup>106</sup> Two PRRO supplementary reviews found these to be serious operational problems. Indeed, the West Africa Coastal PRRO supplemental review states that “the mere fact that resourcing is mostly linked to tonnage encourages, to a certain extent, large-scale relief distribution over recovery.”<sup>107</sup> And the Sri Lanka review states that “rather than designing recovery activities based purely on needs on the ground, the country office is now looking for ways to move food more quickly. Thus the dilemma is how to maintain the integrity of its recovery programme and implementation structure, while ensuring it generates DSC to pay for it”.<sup>108</sup> This approach to financing also affects development projects and, in fact, may result in country offices drawing upon support from EMOPs and PRROs, which are generally better funded, to support CPs/DPs.<sup>109</sup> WFP’s current financing strategy may be a significant “push factor” for relief-oriented as opposed to recovery-related programming. It apparently has had some negative impacts on PRRO implementation in the field. Some steps have been taken to address this problem through an increase in the DSC Advance Facility (DSCAF). However, some of the field Country Directors interviewed were unaware of the DSCAF. Also, the facility only partially addresses this more fundamental problem.

A related consideration is the uneven ability of country offices to manage PRRO budgets due to insufficient budget information (cited as significant issues in three PRRO evaluation/assessment exercises).<sup>110</sup> This problem should be resolved, however, with roll-out of Internet access and WINGS to the country offices.

At both the field and Headquarters levels, required resources for the roll-out and support of the PRRO are not sufficient. Annex IX demonstrates that PRRO project documents rarely budget sufficiently for monitoring and evaluation, assessment and training. In this analysis, the original PRRO and its expansion, when relevant, were reviewed. Only one PRRO budgeted more than 1 percent for assessment/evaluation activities (Cambodia, PRRO 6038.00). Its expansion, however, was budgeted at less than 0.5 percent. Two operations (Somalia and West Africa Coastal) did not have an assessment/evaluation line item in either phase of the PRRO. Ten cases showed a modest budget item for one phase but not the other (typically the expansion phase). Only Cambodia and Guinea-Bissau budgeted more than 0.5 percent for assessment/evaluation. Only Cambodia and the Great Lakes Regional budgeted more than US\$100,000 for these types of activities.

Lack of provision in the budget for project development was even more striking. Five PRROs included no budget for project appraisal. Nine operations had some budget for at least one phase of the PRRO and three budgeted for both phases. Only Cambodia, the Central African Republic and Uganda budgeted in excess of US\$50,000 for one or more phase. Capacity-building/training was budgeted at more than 1 percent of the total budget only in the case of the Central African Republic. Only in seven cases did the amount budgeted for training/capacity-building exceed US\$50,000.

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<sup>106</sup> Tymo, Sri Lanka, June 2003

<sup>107</sup> Ibid; WFP, Supplementary Review: West Africa Coastal, 2002

<sup>108</sup> The Sri Lankan supplementary review explains that the decision to launch an EMOP was driven by the target population, geographic location and nature of the emergency, and the fact that the EMOP was viewed as a more rapid and effective fund-raising mechanism.

<sup>109</sup> Ibid, p. 8

<sup>110</sup> Sri Lanka, West African Coastal





Similarly, an Operations Department study<sup>111</sup> demonstrated that PRRO DSC typically was not budgeted realistically. In fact, the evaluators analysis of DSC costs/ton, and DSC costs/total costs suggests that there were no relative “real” differences between DSC levels between predecessor operations and the PRRO cases (EMOP avg. DSC rate = 10%; PRRO avg. DSC rate = 11%). Although the DSC costs/ton are frequently higher when moving from PRO/EMOP to PRRO, this is almost certainly an artefact of the change in long-term financing strategy implemented in 1999.<sup>112</sup>

At Headquarters, in contrast to the Gender Initiative, for example, WFP has not put deliberate dedicated budgetary resources for necessary inputs such as:

- project preparation;
- increased staffing requirements;
- a focal point for learning and disseminating recovery lessons; or
- training of field staff.

Neither has it mainstreamed the “spirit of recovery” into its corporate incentive system as it has done with gender. In fact, because recovery is more human resource and less food intensive, corporate rewards systems probably still work against those who are recovery champions. At the same time, it was not possible to identify significant compensatory strategies, such as, for example, deepened partnerships with international NGOs or United Nations agencies that might fulfil these needs, though WFP has recently developed guidelines for developing NGO partnerships.

## 5.6 Approval and Review of Operations

The PRRO policy strategy and guidelines call for periodic review and annually updating the operation.<sup>113</sup> The analysis demonstrates that this is not occurring in a systematic fashion. The Great Lakes Regional PRRO had been reviewed at mid-term,<sup>114</sup> as had the Central African Republic, Georgia and Algeria PRROs. An e-mail survey of regional and field offices (16 offices in addition to case offices responded) relating to recent PRROs indicates that in only one case, the Republic of Congo, was a mid-term assessment completed. Four of the 16 offices indicated that no assessment was done. In the case of refugee operations, field offices frequently cited the JFAMs/JAMs as sources of management input. Other offices indicated that they used a variety of different inputs (Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Armenia, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Angola). However, these were most frequently related to the planning of the next expansion of the PRRO rather than for adjusting operations at mid-term. Perhaps the best way to sum up the findings from the field survey is that there was no systematic attempt to review and update the PRRO strategy. As the Sri Lanka assessment states, “A number of assessments and reviews ... the degree to which each impacted on programme management is related to the timing of the mission and the relevance of the TOR”.<sup>115</sup>

Also reviewed were budget revisions, one of the mechanisms available for adjustment of the PRRO. However, revisions were most frequently used for unfunded extensions or for requests for funded extensions. They were rarely used as a mechanism for adjusting PRRO strategy, and they were used to document only those changes made to the operation’s duration or the amount/type of resources needed.

The potential danger of this casual approach to systematic review and updating of the strategy is illustrated by the Iran PRRO. This case represented a blatant departure from initial plans, alienation of WFP’s primary operational partner, and evidence of non-conformity to good humanitarian practices.<sup>116</sup> The now mandatory SPR preparation could be enhanced to become a management review.

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<sup>111</sup> WFP Operations Directive OD2002/07, section V

<sup>112</sup> WFP Resources and Long-term Financing Policies, 1999

<sup>113</sup> WFP/EB.A/98/4, “From Crisis to Recovery”, p. 7

<sup>114</sup> WFP staff observation on GL field assessment.

<sup>115</sup> Tymo, Sri Lanka, June 2003.

<sup>116</sup> WFP/EB.3/2002/6/5



The corporate project preparation support mechanism, the Programme Review Committee, is not consistently providing useful technical input to PRRO preparation. This concern was raised by several WFP country and Headquarters staff during interviews and was found to be a factor affecting the development of a recovery strategy and the PRRO design in Sri Lanka.<sup>117</sup> The sentiment that the PRC “mainly serves to improve the quality of the document for presentation to the Executive Board rather than the quality of programming”<sup>118</sup> was common. Most of those interviewed felt that the PRC review occurred too late in the project preparation process to be meaningful. The evaluation team recognizes that WFP is aware of this problem and has revised its PRC mechanism. However, this issue is still being mentioned by country offices that have undertaken recent PRRO development as an issue.<sup>119</sup>

A second concern voiced by donors and WFP staff was the lengthy time frame required to achieve Executive Board approval. While six months’ lead time is generally not a limitation for development projects/CPs, it is considerable time in the life of a PRRO. Nearly half of all Country Directors surveyed believed that the EB approval process for budget revisions had similar limitations. The example of the Angola PRRO’s coming before the EB after Savimbi’s demise was a case in point. The programme document was entirely inappropriate by the time it was brought to the EB.<sup>120</sup>

### 5.7 Corporate Normative Guidance Relating to the PRRO

While the PRRO Guidelines were state of the art at the time they were produced, they lack enough reference to the issues of recovery, transition and linking relief and development, which are all drawing considerable recent attention in the international community. This is perhaps best illustrated by the United Nations Secretary-General’s launching of a high-level inter-agency working group to develop a strategic approach and to harmonize United Nations efforts to address transition and recovery.<sup>121</sup> Thus, criticisms of WFP’s normative guidance should be taken in the context of a relatively recent and rapidly evolving “field”.

Overall, the team concludes that PRRO guidance does not yet provide a strong logical framework for programme design and calls for project documents that meet neither technical planning needs nor the needs of donors and resource staff.<sup>122</sup>

One of the major concerns identified by many of the evaluation teams is that the PRROs do not have a strong logical underpinning,<sup>123</sup> giving rise to the frequent recommendation that PRROs be designed using a logical framework approach. Guidelines do not illustrate application of the logical framework for programme design in the field.<sup>124</sup> And, indeed, this was not a tool suggested by or referenced in the PRRO Guidelines.<sup>125</sup> Instead, the Guidelines require that project preparation be organized around “relief”, “recovery” or “refugee”. This activity-driven approach has at times resulted in field staff attempting to achieve “activities”, such as food for work or resettlement, that may ultimately be inconsistent with the implicit objectives of the PRRO category (facilitating durable solutions, asset-preservation/creation.) For example, the Great Lakes evaluation found that field staff were missing the point that a seed ration programme activity being done in conjunction with FAO and CARE was an important input to recovery. The importance of this activity to the overall goals/objectives of the PRRO was obfuscated because it had been labelled a relief activity. The Angola evaluation noted that setting

<sup>117</sup> Ibid, p. 8

<sup>118</sup> Ibid, p. 7

<sup>119</sup> WFP staff personal communication. Two out of three of country offices included in the expanded case assessment cited the PRC to be mostly a bureaucratic as opposed to substantive mechanism.

<sup>120</sup> Field, donor and senior staff interviews. Please note that this problem was addressed with a budget revision in September 2003.

<sup>121</sup> A high-level inter-agency transitions working group was set up in late 2002, with Carol Bellemy as Chair.

<sup>122</sup> Resource staff frequently mentioned that the documents were not good marketing tools because they were not sufficiently concise. Field staff noted that too much redundancy was called for on the one hand, but on the other hand not enough detail was included to guide field implementation.

<sup>123</sup> Great Lakes, Angola, Ethiopia, Cambodia, Uganda

<sup>124</sup> Though this is general guidance, no evidence was found of initial use of the logical framework in PRRO design.

<sup>125</sup> WFP, PRRO Guidelines, 1999.



benchmarks for these activities was detrimental because those benchmarks became de facto project objectives.<sup>126</sup> The West Africa Coastal Supplementary Review notes that the “recovery categories are not consistently categorized between countries and the refugee component is neither relief nor recovery, which makes any attempt to separate assistance futile”.<sup>127</sup> Nearly all of the case PRROs operating in protracted conflict settings where durable peace was not in sight set unrealistic targets for recovery activities as judged by programme assessment teams. In the absence of a clear set of recovery objectives, this activity orientation may result in unintended beneficiary effects.

These unintended effects<sup>128</sup> include inappropriate resettlement/repatriation, targeting errors related to the vulnerable not being able to participate in food-for-work activities and pressures to move from free food distribution to other activities before the preconditions for successfully implementing these activities can be met. The lack of consistent monitoring and evaluation of beneficiary outcomes in non-refugee settings makes the actual negative effects difficult to document. In some settings, recovery might best be promoted through general food distribution, when this is done in a targeted and timely fashion.

A further difficulty with the use of the three categories for budgeting is that they do not separate three logically distinct categories, but instead mix up two different characteristics of operations. Refugees are a category of beneficiary whereas relief/recovery is intended to separate two programmatic emphases. As a result of “mixing” two different categorizations into one, both the field and Headquarters have confusing and inconstant information about who is being reached by what type of activity. For example, among refugee operations, some operations do not break out relief and recovery activities. Therefore, it is unclear whether recovery is being targeted or achieved among refugees.

Most field staff interviewed felt that the three categories impeded rather than facilitated the implementation of effective recovery programmes. By separating relief and recovery activities, there is a greater risk that relief and recovery activities will not be linked in a manner that facilitates the transitions of crisis-affected populations from crisis to recovery. Indeed, though the Guidelines mention that making linkages is important, there is no guidance provided to assist field staff in doing this. The Great Lakes evaluation report<sup>129</sup> points out that there was no provision to ensure that families with children in corrective feeding programmes would be referred to other recovery activities. Aside from step-down strategies that elaborate the movement of beneficiaries from free food to FFW/FFA activities, PRRO strategies did not elaborate the linkages among these two components (none were found among cases in this evaluation).

A similar criticism is that the Guidelines do not provide clear guidance on realistic targets for different crisis and recovery scenarios. Indeed, the Guidelines never define the terms *relief* and *recovery*. While a table of activities appropriate to early and late recovery is presented in the Guidelines, this, too, is confusing guidance, as recovery objectives are highly contextualized, as is the specific set of activities required to achieve them.<sup>130</sup>

A final concern is that the Guidelines place too little emphasis on the importance of the food delivery system itself as a factor in recovery. Food aid programmes constitute a large economic force in crisis-affected communities. Through local contracting and capacity-building related to food logistics/management, WFP could make significant contributions to local economic development. The team found little evidence that this important aspect was being systematically considered by country offices during the planning of PRROs.

## 5.8 Strategic Partnerships and Coordination

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<sup>126</sup> WFP/EB.2/2002/3/1

<sup>127</sup> WFP, Supplementary Review: West Africa Coastal, 2002, p. 7.

<sup>128</sup> WFP/WB, Uganda PRRO Evaluation; WFP/WB, Angola PRRO Evaluation

<sup>129</sup> WFP/EB.3/2002/6/10.

<sup>130</sup> UNDG/ECHA, 2003.



Recovery programming requires different types of strategic partners for programme implementation. It requires strong partners in technical areas related to its recovery activities in areas such as protection, MCH, HIV/AIDS, basic and vocational education, engineering, rural development, participatory planning, monitoring and evaluation, and poverty alleviation. While WFP has a longstanding MOU and a relatively well developed relationship with UNHCR, interviews with UNHCR staff suggest that WFP has not been sufficiently engaged with UNHCR in addressing protection issues. In the area of assessment and monitoring and evaluation, there is scope for closer collaboration between WFP and FAO, an agency that is developing significant expertise in food insecurity assessment/analysis methods/tools.

NGOs represent an important partner in protracted crisis and recovery settings. However, current agency policies and guidelines for working with NGOs in these settings remain too general to promote strategic partnerships. Although there is a useful broad framework for NGO partnerships,<sup>131</sup> specific guidance on how to transform initial response partnerships into those that promote sustainable recovery and development is lacking. New guidance material on NGO partnerships being incorporated into the Programme Design Manual (PDM) as this evaluation was being finalized begins to address this concern, though guidelines are rarely sufficient to ensure meaningful translation to field practice.

## 5.9 Marketing

A number of country offices and Headquarters staff have stressed the importance of educating donors about the PRRO, bringing them to the field, and of providing them with a concise written description of the goals, objectives and methods of the PRRO. The evaluation team is unaware that there has ever been an initiative to educate WFP's stakeholders about the PRRO and why its introduction is an important innovation. Many senior staff felt that a different PRRO document was required to better recruit PRRO resourcing.

## 5.10 Decentralization Process

The decentralization process itself has had a variable impact on the Programme's ability to implement effective PRROs.<sup>132</sup> This factor was noted as an important constraint on the effectiveness of the Great Lakes operation. In that case, the consolidation of the Great Lakes Support Unit into ODK resulted in decreased field support to the PRRO<sup>133</sup> and lead to concerns that PRRO DSC might be increasingly supporting regional as opposed to PRRO requirements. It also was brought up as an issue by key WFP donors, one of whom cited the "uneven performance of regional offices"<sup>134</sup> as a significant factor impeding the effectiveness of PRROs in the field. Several country office staff also signalled this issue. Perhaps the concerns are best summed up by a recent review of the decentralization process.<sup>135</sup>

"Each regional bureau initially had the same basic staffing allotment and was expected to cover about 12 countries. Regional officers and advisers were to focus on guiding and supporting country offices. At the time of this writing, two-years into the out-posting, regional officers have multiple and sometimes ambiguous roles: advice and guidance, oversight and quality control, administration and support for regional bureaux and transaction processing for country offices; this applies particularly to specialists in finance, human resources, and ICT. The situation raises doubts whether regional bureaux have enough staff with the right skills to support country offices consistently. Regional configurations have changed: ... This is a good time to re-evaluate the roles, responsibilities and workings of the regional bureaux and to adjust staffing levels and capacities accordingly."

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<sup>131</sup> WFP/EB.1/99/3-A.

<sup>132</sup> WFP/EB.3/2003.

<sup>133</sup> WFP/EB.3/2002/6.

<sup>134</sup> USAID, Rome Office, 2002, personal communication.

<sup>135</sup> WFP/EB.3/2003, p.10.



The Regional Asia Office, however, was frequently cited as being effective in meeting field staff needs.<sup>136</sup> The Asia Office has a unique organization and structure that should be examined in more depth for its general relevance to the organization.

## 5.11 External Factors

### United Nations Agency Factors

The United Nations agency key organizational players have very different programmatic and administrative mechanisms to handle protracted crisis and transition contexts.<sup>137</sup> These differences complicate coordinated strategic and operational planning and implementation. Different programmatic strategies (relief versus development, activity-oriented, thematically oriented, beneficiary-based), programme/project preparation cycles, and resource-mobilization strategies have greatly complicated inter-agency work in protracted crisis and recovery settings.

The absence of a common inter-agency strategy has meant that WFP staff were frequently developing recovery strategies in a vacuum (as exemplified in Angola), especially before durable peace was established, at which time traditional development frameworks emerged (Cambodia). The current work of the Inter-agency Working Group on Transition, however, intends to mitigate this problem.

### Donor Factors

The evaluation found that donor understanding of the PRRO category and how it is managed is highly variable, both between and within donor agencies. Four of the country evaluations mentioned this as a problem, in one case resulting in actual shortfalls in funding.<sup>138</sup> The team's interviews with donor representatives also support this finding. The field evaluations frequently pointed out that education was needed both at the donor and Headquarters level, where funding decisions are often made, and at the local level, where representatives may play a direct or indirect role in financing decisions.

Donor earmarking and especially un-earmarking (excluding certain countries) has been a recent and increasing trend<sup>139</sup> that has demonstrated some effects on PRRO operations, particularly in the context of the current funding context of WFP (which is highly dependent on one large donor that exercises earmarking). Some donors are more engaged in the management of donated resources than are others. Earmarking was noted to affect the Great Lakes and West Africa regional operations, where particular countries were un-earmarked. In West Africa, Liberia was un-earmarked because of political considerations. The level of un-earmarking among contributions for the West Africa Regional reached 63 percent.<sup>140</sup> In the Great Lakes, a major donor excluded Rwanda because the donor judged that other needs took priority for limited funds. Approximately 50 percent of the Great Lakes Regional PRRO 6077.01 was earmarked. In the case of the Great Lakes, earmarking resulted in dramatic reduction in operation activities. It also had an impact on the ability of the operation to flexibly move resources around in the region, which resulted in major programme interruptions (in Rwanda, for example).

Overall contributions are biased against protracted support of recovery from natural disasters. While the early phases of a natural disaster can be well resourced (Mitch as an EMOP and Mitch PRRO in 1999), donors have been less forthcoming in later phases (Mitch from 2000 on, Orissa). Overall, contributions met less than 25 percent of requirements among PRROs addressing natural disasters.

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<sup>136</sup> Tymo, Sri Lanka, June 2003, interviews with country offices and regional bureau staff.

<sup>137</sup> WFP, UNICEF, UNHCR, and UNDP, Notes on United Nations Funding Mechanisms, 2002; discussions with United Nations agency representatives

<sup>138</sup> The Great Lakes regional evaluation noted that the contingency was not funded because donors did not understand how it was to be managed and used.

<sup>139</sup> Interviews with WFP resource staff, donor representatives.

<sup>140</sup> WFP, Supplementary Review: West Africa Coastal, 2002, p. 16



Donors are not biased against longer operations, per se.<sup>141</sup> Met needs are not a function of operation duration,<sup>142</sup> as confirmed by the team in an analysis of met needs in relation to duration of operation.

## 6. LESSONS IDENTIFIED


The international community’s evolution in response to contemporary crisis now recognizes the intimate relationship between crisis and development, the importance of developmentally sound relief and the need to better integrate humanitarian and development programming. WFP has put itself squarely in the mainstream of this movement, and to date it has accumulated much experience in addressing the needs of populations affected by protracted crises and those that are making progress towards the achievement of sustainable development.

It is also important to note that the different programme categories, i.e. EMOP, PRRO and development, are not synonymous with mutually exclusive programme elements; that is, general food distribution, food for work, food for education, etc. In fact, increasingly these component activities are found across the programme categories, but to a differing degree. What is different about the programme categories is two-fold:

- a) The EMOP represents the initial response that permits WFP, with minimal bureaucracy, to implement life-saving and asset-protection interventions rapidly. The PRRO is a more considered response that is implemented with more care and planning.
- b) The PRRO is programmatically more complex. It anticipates stability and requirements for strategic interventions such as repatriation and rehabilitation. Second, the PRRO places greater emphasis on asset-creation/livelihoods and the importance of avoiding dependency-creation.

An important lesson is that recovery is a highly contextualized and complex process, requiring strong programming capacity at the field level. Figure 7 illustrates the different programmatic emphases as crises are resolved. In the midst of an emergency, assistance is predominantly relief assistance, security is generally poor, displacement is great and the goal of assistance is primarily to save lives and protect livelihoods from further erosion. As security begins to improve, it becomes possible to focus on strengthening human assets in particular, and moving towards greater investment in health, education/training. With increased stability it becomes possible to focus on resettlement, and on rebuilding community infrastructure, at least in localized areas. Then, as a peace process takes hold or macro-causes of crisis subside, larger-scale, often national-level reconstruction becomes realistic, as does durable resettlement.

**Figure 7: Common Sequencing in Developmental Relief/Relief-Recovery Programming**



<sup>141</sup> Interviews with humanitarian aid agencies indicate that their concerns mostly relate to accountability and assistance that longer operations are appropriate

<sup>142</sup> Unmet needs were cross-tabulated with duration of PRRO; no difference was found



However, progression is frequently not linear, such that there are at least three key situations which are sufficiently distinct in terms of their programmatic requirements. These are:

- **Highly unstable situations.** These generally require a much more concerted emphasis on achieving core relief objectives while at the same time ensuring that the essential requirements for recovery are met. Programming emphasis is generally at the individual and household level. Core activities include health, education, and adult vocational skills. A related consideration is to deliver food in an efficient manner that does not create long-term dependencies.
- **Long-term refugee settings.** These situations are very different in that the international humanitarian system set up to meet these needs is more formally inter-agency in nature. Self-reliance has been an objective of programmes addressing refugee needs for many years. However, progress in this area is particularly constrained by the policies and dynamics of host countries and communities. WFP programmes have discovered that this problem can be lessened when strategies are developed that lessen the negative impact of refugee influxes and programme approaches are developed that lead to positive impacts for host communities. At the same time, WFP and its partners can be alert and entrepreneurial in seizing emergent recovery opportunities. The Programme also must be prepared to provide sufficient resources for resettlement/reintegration as well as a plan for gauging the success of these efforts.
- **Stable contexts, including post-conflict and recovery from the effects of natural hazards.** In these contexts a recovery strategic framework usually evolves rapidly at the national level. Food aid can support recovery at the community and national levels by emphasizing the creation of community assets that benefit the poor and by using food aid as a stop-gap to top off salaries of civil-service workers and provide national budgetary support.<sup>143</sup> Reconstruction plans often build on strong decentralized development management. Reconstruction countries often progress rapidly to develop Poverty-Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), which serve as a major framework for post-conflict development investment.

In reviewing the PRRO category, a number of lessons have been identified; they fall into three categories:

- emergent best practices (practices or cases that are consistent with international developments);
- promising practices (innovative strategies that have been identified by field staff and evaluators as particularly worthy of further study for future application elsewhere); and
- common pitfalls/problems encountered in planning and implementing PRROs.

### 6.1 Emergent Best Practices

PRRO recovery strategy development is a highly contextualized activity that should be principle driven rather than guided by blueprints. The principles include:

- demand-driven interventions;

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<sup>143</sup> Afghanistan was cited as a good example by other United Nations partners.



- evidence-based programming;
- strategic and evolutionary partnerships with other international agencies, local institutions and beneficiaries; and
- a clear WFP “transition” vision from relief to development programmes or close-down.

Principle-driven rather than more prescribed recovery strategy development is more demanding and requires significant expertise at the field level. Normative guidance will only partially meet the needs of the organization for quality programme implementation.

WFP, through its VAM programme and related initiatives, has learned that a sound information base about beneficiary populations, their vulnerabilities, coping mechanisms and perceived needs is critical to sound programme planning and management. While information initiatives related to assessment, early warning, and monitoring and evaluation have been disjointed in the past, the field is evolving towards more integrated food-insecurity information systems,<sup>144</sup> where these approaches are evolving as complementary tools in the information toolkit for food security improvement. Through VAM, WFP has demonstrated leadership at the field level and has a comparative advantage in this area because of its strong field presence (VAM and its network of food aid monitors).

Creating sustainable assets that benefit WFP’s intended beneficiaries requires beneficiary participation in asset-identification and a maintenance plan for sustaining the asset. It is in this area that WFP can profit from partnerships with NGOs (both international and especially local), which frequently have the capabilities to engage beneficiaries.<sup>145</sup>

In comparison with more stable contexts, crises often result in serious and often rapid decapitalization of human and physical assets; capacity-building strategies are particularly needed in post-emergency settings. Requirements for training and mentoring approaches are greater in these settings than any other that WFP addresses.<sup>146</sup>

Rapid transition from externally managed to locally supported food procurement and logistics systems promises to be more efficient, to better address security problems, and to have potential secondary development impacts. The cases of Somalia and southern Sudan provide illustrations of potential benefits.

The three boxes below highlight lessons, common pitfalls and promising practices gleaned the review, from the PRRO field evaluations or offered from the field by Country Directors.

### Box 3: Lessons

- Sound recovery strategy usually requires sub-national and even micro-level planning. The cases of Angola and Somalia best illustrate this finding. Both countries were affected by a generalized violent conflict; however, many areas of these countries remained stable throughout the conflict or attained stability over time. Later-stage recovery activities were appropriate in these settings. In other areas of the countries, priorities remained on life-saving interventions.
- In southern Africa, the planning of the new PRRO includes an inter-agency field assessment mission to each of the countries that will be included in the regional PRRO. The deliberate inter-agency planning exercise is an emergent good practice.
- Consolidation of WFP programmes under larger operations and improved linkages with country programmes is desirable as it can lead to efficiencies and greater programme coherence. The

<sup>144</sup> FAO, Scientific Symposium on Hunger and Food Insecurity Assessment Methods, 2002.

<sup>145</sup> WFP/EB.1/2000/5/2.

<sup>146</sup> This also was cited as a great weakness of humanitarian response by ALNAP, Annual Review.





Uganda case is a good illustration of this principle. In the case of Uganda, IDPs and refugees are covered by the same PRRO, which has resulted in an enhanced awareness of the rights of IDPs. It also has resulted in programme efficiencies. Uganda also illustrates the strong potential for synergies between WFP's development and PRRO categories.

- In many post-conflict settings, area-based programming models are being adopted by countries and promoted by donors as a reconstruction and poverty alleviation strategy. UNDP and World Bank/regional development banks typically are key partners in this effort. Food aid programmes can leverage greater recovery impacts when coordinated closely with these efforts (Cambodia example).
- Chronic crises often result in long-term displacement. A reality is that in many cases, displaced populations are semi-permanent residents. By considering areas affected by conflict, or hosting areas, as well as displaced populations, WFP may develop strategies that improve the acceptability of hosting. Strategies can include an emphasis on environmental protection and food ration planning that enhances productive trading between refugee and host communities (Tanzania example). The reality of long-term displacement means that key developmental needs of populations should be provided for, and special consideration of the adverse affects of long-term displacement (for example, among youth who have never known another life) should be considered.
- In order to promote recovery, WFP must strengthen management of its collaboration with IPs. One approach is through the use of a "focal point IP" to ensure adequate quality of inputs and accountability. Too often in initial emergency settings, WFP has many IPs, a situation that is clearly unmanageable in the long run. It also is important that there is a clear plan as to how international NGOs will ultimately transfer capacity to local institutions.

- Recovery strategy development should include conflict-prevention/resolution objectives. Food aid can exacerbate or mitigate conflict, and this is an important consideration in regional and community targeting and the planning of programme implementation, which should include a careful examination of tensions between local governmental organizations and affected populations.
- Enhancing the role of women as a recovery/reconstruction strategy. WFP programmes have found that the gender initiative may hold particular promise for recovery. In Iran, the Oil for Girls' Education programme was successful in increasing girls' enrolment. Displacement may result in a window of opportunity to improve access to segments of population that would not normally get it (fewer competing priorities). The elevation of women's status in food aid management may result in sustained improvements in women's status in the community. Chronic crisis often results in changes in the roles of women. This may provide an opportunity for strategic change of the role of women in post-crisis society.

#### **Box 4: Common Pitfalls**

- Programmes are frequently caught off guard when natural disasters strike conflict or economic crisis settings. Natural hazards are often predictable, so vulnerability to these threats can be assessed and appropriate contingency measures adopted.
- The different components of most PRROs are often not coordinated; that is, GFD, selective feeding and FFW activities often are not coordinated closely to support vulnerable families in a coherent way.



- FFW is often seen as an end rather than a means. There is common confusion in the field between FFW as an end rather than as a means to create durable assets that enhance the livelihood capacities of beneficiary populations.
- Displaced persons are often considered temporary residents, but experience shows that too often, displacement may endure for years.
- Recovery is often thought to mean returning to the status quo, pre-crisis state; displaced persons return or should be re-integrated into subsistence farming systems. But subsistence farming is one of the reasons that people are vulnerable to begin with. Post-conflict reconstruction may enable populations to engage in more productive livelihoods. Recovery programmes should attempt to anticipate these types of possibilities. In a similar vein, displaced populations may not return to their place of origin, and this may be a desirable outcome. Often, there is inadequate follow-up on resettled beneficiaries to determine if the assistance provided them was appropriate/effective.
- Recovery opportunities often emerge suddenly. While contingency planning is done for surges in emergency populations, it is rarely done in anticipation of sudden changes that permit rapid repatriation/resettlement.
- Resettlement/repatriation often is executed without adequate planning and follow-up. Rations are frequently inadequate to ensure that returning residents can meet basic needs until they can re-establish livelihoods. Resettlement rations do not always accommodate resettlement/repatriation that occurs late in the agricultural cycle.
- Physical infrastructure can be a constraint on human resources development programmes such as health and education programmes in crisis/post-crisis settings. This often is not adequately planned for in the development of recovery strategies.
- There is inadequate planning for the maintenance of assets created by FFW projects.

#### **Box 5: Country/project Examples of Promising Practices for Recovery**

##### **Promising Practices Identified by the Evaluation Team or Highlighted by the OEDE Field Evaluations**

- Rice Banks in Cambodia: This network of interventions was viewed as a promising practice to address the problem of high indebtedness of the Cambodian poor. While the project had management problems, the evaluation team felt this to be a high potential programme.
- Uganda: A small-farmer development project is supplying local food to WFP's PRRO. Also, it was suggested that micro-credit projects under the PRRO manufacture agricultural tools that might be purchased by farmers under the development activity.
- Azerbaijan: A food-assisted early-childhood-development programme in collaboration with UNICEF addressed the dual needs of education and trauma mitigation.
- Ethiopia: Applied research is demonstrating the impact of WFP food aid on beneficiaries and the environment.
- Multi-country: A recent literature review (Finan, 1998) suggests that food-assisted programming might enhance adoption of farming technologies by reducing risk. This might have strong implications for recovery programmes.

##### **Promising Practices as Suggested by Country Offices Surveyed**



*Full Report of the Thematic Evaluation of the PRRO Category*

- Albania: Illustration of a rapid shift from free food distribution under an EMOP to food-assisted forestry and pasture management under the PRRO.
- Mali: Rapid resettlement combined with an integrated strategy to redevelop livelihoods and income-generating activities, food for training/skills, and communities (school canteens, community infrastructure, improved resilience and self-reliance of northern area of country).
- Tajikistan: Under land-lease projects, collective state farmland is leased for a defined period to beneficiaries identified and assisted by WFP; these projects were found to be innovative and beneficial in that beneficiaries produced food and gained experience in privatization.
- Southern Sudan: Here there is an emphasis on FFT focusing on life skills and potential future income-generating activities, such as food and clothing production (women) and carpentry and blacksmithing among men. Strong IPs and collaboration are key ingredients.
- Swaziland: During the drought of the mid-1990s, a consortium of NGOs was catalysed by WFP to support FFW. This consortium became sustainable after WFP project closure and was able to gear up again in support of the most recent southern Africa crisis.
- Ethiopia: A WFP development project is demonstrating improved food security through natural-resource-management-oriented food-assisted programming.



## 7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The PRRO is a highly relevant organizational innovation. By introducing the PRRO, progress has been made towards rationalizing WFP's relief-to-development portfolio and moving towards more relevant assistance for its beneficiaries. The PRRO has helped WFP become a trendsetter among United Nations agencies in transition programming, and it provides a flexible vehicle that allows WFP both to capture opportunities to promote recovery and to respond to the dynamics of unstable settings.

However, the effects of the PRRO on corporate performance have been variable and difficult to determine because of a lack of conceptual clarity, on the part of WFP, in the corporate change model; a lack of systematic beneficiary outcome data; and overly complex management information systems. Perhaps the greatest documented achievement is the association of the PRRO with lower levels of general relief food distribution. It also appears that the PRRO enables WFP to offset to some degree the decline in development resources. The PRROs success in meeting recovery objectives for beneficiaries is not clear because measurement of outcomes is rarely done.

In general, among PRROs, recovery objectives have been only partially met because of factors related to corporate implementation of the category or because of external factors. The most important external factor is the crisis context. Highly unstable contexts often preclude recovery planning. Protracted refugee operations are frequently challenged by host policies and practices related to refugee entitlements. In stable settings, recovery outputs are often achieved, but impact often is attenuated by lack of a strong planning and evaluation framework, demand-driven interventions and strong implementing partners.

At a corporate level, the team concludes that WFP has not focused on rolling out the PRRO innovation in a disciplined manner, especially as regards implementing policy; strengthening corporate capability to undertake recovery programming, providing adequate normative guidance, reviewing corporate incentive structures for recovery programming, meeting human and financial resource requirements, managing processes, and creating organizational partnerships. At the same time, it has been quite responsive in addressing needs as they have been identified.

### 7.1 Recommendations

1. **Essential.** While the PRRO is an appropriate vehicle for merging relief and recovery objectives and activities that support these, WFP should more carefully consider, at a corporate level, the implications of designing and implementing recovery-oriented activities. While WFP receives high marks for providing life-sustaining food in emergency settings, its capacity to plan and implement recovery-oriented strategies is more problematic. Balancing humanitarian provision of basic survival needs with more developmental interventions is challenging. This is true not only for WFP but for the humanitarian community as a whole.<sup>147</sup> This is a difficult balance, and is one that requires more considered thought at the strategic level of the organization. Regardless of where the organization comes out on this issue, the developmental soundness of its PRROs should be strengthened, either by WFP strengthening its own programme capacity or by more meaningful partnerships with other implementing agencies.
2. **Essential.** WFP must take steps to strengthen its programming capacity. A first step in this process is to take stock of its available human resources and their skill levels to ensure that staff are sufficient in number, seniority and skill levels to implement PRROs effectively. WFP's progress towards building its nutrition and evaluation programme capacity is laudable, but this must be extended to regional and field offices and to other technical areas, particularly protection and livelihood programming. WFP's current capacity-building emphasis is in the areas of finance and management information systems, which are also high priorities. However, WFP should review its staffing adequacy in programme-related functions at Headquarters, regional and country offices and

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<sup>147</sup> ALNAP 2003 report concludes that the humanitarian community is making slow progress in linking relief, rehabilitation and development.



revise current targets for these functions as appropriate. In addition, a deliberate strategy should be developed to review national staff capacity in programme support functions. Capacity-building in areas of particular importance to PRRO programming, including livelihood assessment, conflict resolution/reconciliation, civil-society building; rapid-capacity augmentation, together with traditional development programming skills, should be considered. This might include, for example, just-in-time training modules, use of local staff in neighbouring countries as consultants, and providing funds/incentives for national staff for participation in executive format degree programmes.

3. **Essential.** Strategic recovery planning is a complex activity requiring relatively senior and analytically well trained personnel. WFP should consider augmenting its senior ranks for programming specialists. It also should consider recruiting (hiring/seconding) a multi-disciplinary programming specialist team of experienced programming specialists to review recovery lessons learned and to develop a plan to ensure that WFP field staff are equipped to handle the programming challenges of protracted crisis and transition/recovery settings. WFP should maintain its emphasis on solid generalist field programme staff; however, at Headquarters and regional levels, it should ensure that staff are adequately supported in some of the unique technical areas associated with recovery programming, such as were mentioned above (conflict resolution/reconciliation; livelihood assessment/programming; contingency planning; do-no-harm analysis; capacity-building). Whenever possible, WFP should consider the development of inter-agency team approaches to the development of PRRO strategies following the example that is currently being piloted in southern Africa. It is recommended that WFP commence a real-time evaluation of the PRRO preparation in southern Africa so as to adequately capture lessons from this unique experience and ensure that the experience is built upon and enhanced for future application.
4. **Important.** WFP should consolidate and strengthen the analytical units that support needs assessment, targeting and evaluation of programme impacts in the field. The VAM unit already is a highly credible element of WFP's field programmes. In many country offices, VAM is a multi-service information provider. Planning, targeting, monitoring and evaluation are highly interrelated activities that should be strengthened and coordinated to the extent possible. At the corporate level, WFP should actively promote coordinated inter-agency approaches to vulnerability and food needs assessment in order to strength the quality and utility of information and to minimize bias or suspected bias related to conflict of interest. Again, the southern Africa experience provides a good case example. WFP should re-engage at a senior level in the Food Insecurity, Vulnerability Information and Mapping System (FIVIMS) initiative, which is currently in a strategic planning phase, to re-invigorate an inter-agency programme for food insecurity and vulnerability assessment.
5. **Important.** The team also encourages WFP to demonstrate its successes and its capacity to promote recovery through applied research. This serves the dual purpose of strengthening WFP's evaluation capacity while providing a mechanism for WFP to market its good work. The team was impressed with the evaluation research carried out by the Ethiopian Country Programme and strongly encourages WFP to replicate this approach in other locales. This might begin in countries or regions where WFP has its greatest investments. This type of applied research is relatively inexpensive and is particularly important in recovery settings where innovation is critical to identifying successful, sustainable and scalable asset-creation strategies.
6. **Essential.** Normative guidance should be revised to reflect recovery lessons learned. It should begin by developing corporate clarity in the use of terms such as *recovery*, *transition* and *reconstruction/rehabilitation*. WFP should ensure that findings of the new United Nations Inter-agency Working Group on transitions feed into rapid updating of normative guidance. Normative guidance should reflect the organizational change in programming that was introduced by the PRRO, i.e., a programme category to link relief and development and to regularize the PRRO's assistance to emergency-affected populations. Recovery is a cross-cutting consideration across programme categories. This team concludes that guidance should clarify the different key contexts for protracted crisis operations: that is, stable, long-term refugee and highly unstable, and the



- requirements and appropriate recovery objectives (in terms of beneficiary well-being) in these settings.
7. **Important.** External constraints to recovery programmes have not been sufficiently assessed in recovery strategy formulation, resulting in unrealistic programme strategies. These constraints are well documented and they include: security, host country policies/strategies towards integration of IDPs/refugees, access to land, land tenure policies and implementation in areas of resettlement, implementing partners' capacities. Recovery strategy formulation should include thorough assessment of these constraints and, in the cases where local government policies do not facilitate recovery oriented planning, WFP should consider making approval of operations conditional on improved policies/strategies to support recovery of displaced persons and their hosting areas. Identifying and negotiating conditionalities could be built into the recovery strategy development process.
  8. **Important.** While the WFP PRRO workshop largely endorsed the notion that exceptional cases to the two-year rule for EMOP conversion should be considered on a case by case basis, the evaluation has concerns that WFP already does not exercise adequate discipline in enforcing its PRRO policy. Although there are exceptions to all rules, it is felt that these should be used more judiciously by the organization. Also, it is felt that the problem is not with the PRRO instrument but rather with the development of an appropriate strategy and expectations for programme outcomes based on a realistic assessment of context.
  9. **Essential.** Another important change that should be stressed in normative guidance is the importance of monitoring recovery-related outcomes: that is, improved nutrition, livelihoods and durable solutions. Guidance and training should enable field operators to utilize these outcome measures as a way to ensure that targeting and self-reliance adjustment do not have untoward effects. It also is a way to ensure that activities are contributing to the ultimate objectives of PRROs. Capability to undertake this type of monitoring should be a requirement of IP partnerships in PRRO contexts.
  10. **Essential.** Similarly, WFP should articulate and more carefully monitor the risks of protracted provision of food aid, such as creation of dependencies and economic distortions. The VAM programme already collects some information (such as price data) that could be used to more carefully monitor unintended effects. It is recommended that a tool be added to normative guidance to assist country offices in assessing the effects of food aid on markets, and that this function of VAM be more prominent in vulnerability analyses/assessments.
  11. **Important.** The criteria and strategies for transitioning among the three programme categories, that is, EMOPs, PRROs and development, should be more clearly specified. The launching of a PRRO without an EMOP is a legitimate proposal if not a best practice in situations of slow-onset disasters (some droughts, economic crises, HIV), where safety-net and mitigation strategies are appropriate, especially where food insecurity is a chronic vulnerability factor. The transition from PRRO to an exit strategy or development programme also is important to articulate. The evaluators see this to be a particularly important issue in regions of the world where food aid is primarily a resource transfer. It is particularly in these situations that a clear exit strategy should be elaborated as part of the planning process (Latin American countries and CIS/Eastern Europe). In regions where this issue is most prominent, food-assisted safety-net programmes are common and popular. In these cases, exit strategies should include capacity-building activities to ensure that local organizations can assume the function of food programme implementation as well as a realistic plan for assumption of costs/resource requirements. Exit strategies should be triggered by resolution of crisis conditions or the emergent ability of host governments to assume the costs. As donor fatigue is a risk to these types of operations, capacity-building of host country institutions should begin at the start of a PRRO.



Among LIFDCs and least developed countries (LDCs), planning for transition from the PRRO to a development operation should begin when a development policy framework and strategic plan are in place at the national level. However, recovery is a long-term process, particularly where societies have experienced long-term crises. Therefore this evaluation team believes that PRROs can be justified for extended post-crisis intervention where the positive role of food aid towards recovery can still be demonstrated (and the risks of the negative effects of food aid are negligible and well measured).

12. **Essential.** The three categories were confusing and are generally felt to do more harm than good.<sup>148</sup> Therefore, the team recommends that the three PRRO budget categories – relief, recovery and refugees – be dropped. Alternately, relief and recovery categories could be maintained but clearly defined (for example, general food distribution, special feeding programmes for relief). Activity budget categories should be consistent with donor needs (to enable them to draw more transparently from relief-development accounts) as well as WFP’s internal financial reporting so that budget utilization according to category can be tracked easily. For administrative purposes, a separate budget breakdown according to refugee status (refugee/non-refugee) should be maintained. In this way, relief and recovery components could be tracked for both refugee and non-refugee beneficiaries.
13. **Important.** The project summary document should be revised to be more concise and based on a logical framework approach, where both life-saving/asset-protection and asset-creation/maintenance are articulated. That document should be targeted to executive-level decision-makers. In addition, WFP should require annual work planning and review at the field level. Required components of the PRRO document should highlight key issues for recovery, including those that are weak or not a part of the current requirements:
  - methods for preparing the PRRO: how was it done and what inputs were used;
  - recovery strategy:
    - existing policy environment for transition/reconstruction, including PRSPs where appropriate;
    - role of food aid as a resource to promote recovery (including the food aid delivery system) and assessment of potential risks of food aid and ways these will be minimized/monitored;
    - strategies to move from general food distribution to more developmentally sound approaches, together with the indicators to be used to determine when this is appropriate;
    - key partnerships and the roles of partners;
  - implementation of the operation:
    - targeting and evolution of targeting;
    - beneficiary participation;
    - capacity-building.
14. **Essential.** PRROs should be regularly reviewed for progress towards results. The process of producing the SPR might be enhanced to serve as an internal management review for country offices and regional bureaux, including stipulation of follow-up management corrective actions as required.
15. **Essential.** Several organizational management mechanisms should be better adapted to support the PRRO. PRRO preparation should be a substantial activity requiring dedicated budget and technical support. The PRC mechanism should be reassessed soon to determine whether it provides strategic, technical and operational inputs earlier in the project development process. Dedicated budgetary support for project preparation should be included in regional and/or country programmes. PRRO preparation should involve a multi-agency team that includes key United Nations and host country

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<sup>148</sup> No staff interviewed could provide a rationale for including them. Resources are not tracked by these categories



agencies, including civil-society groups. Strategy planning for recovery should be periodically updated. It is not a one-off activity.

16. **Merits attention.** The project preparation and approval process should be expedited. Staff currently plan on a 6–9 month review and approval process. This process is too lengthy to be appropriate to the PRRO. Project documents may be outdated by the time they are reviewed by the Board for approval. Similarly, budget revisions may have even greater time constraints. Executive Board review and approval of PRROs and budget revisions should be expedited, possibly through some type of electronic approval process.
17. **Important.** WFP should review its financing strategy and work with donors to address the problem of cash flow to the field, which seems to be related to a combination of lower indirect support cost (ISC) rates for PRROs (fixed across categories) combined with DSC availability that is based on food movement. This is a serious constraint on PRRO performance and it encourages food supply-oriented rather than demand-oriented approaches.
18. **Important.** Successful PRROs also will require improvements in WFP partnership strategies. The team recommends that WFP consider five strategies for strengthening partnerships:
  - Strengthen existing core partnerships, for example, with UNHCR, specifically in the area of policy advocacy for the rights of refugees in order to improve joint capacity to improve refugee self-reliance. Perhaps also encourage a review of innovative practices in the field that have resulted in breakthroughs in policy advocacy.
  - Identify and foster new partnerships among organizations that have specific comparative (but not competitive) advantages in sectors such as livelihood programming, civil-society development, micro-credit, engineering and education. These could strengthen programme quality in recovery-oriented activities and also improve mobilization of complementary inputs. WFP might conduct a good practices review and develop an inventory of NGOs and their capacities related to recovery programming, such as beneficiary mobilization/empowerment, infrastructure projects, assessment/monitoring and evaluation and environmental management.
  - Related to the above, focus partnerships with organizations that have an excellent track record in developmental relief/recovery programming. Work closely with the best organizations and with those in both the United Nations and NGO community that work effectively in sectors important to recovery. Develop an indicator framework for evaluating partnership effectiveness over time, moving from food supply partnerships to those that foster demand-generation and indicators that move from international NGOs to local implementing agencies.
  - Develop a model for transforming field partnerships required for recovery, such as the designation of lead or focal point NGO partners working with teams of local NGOs and host country agencies.
19. **Essential.** WFP also should improve its routine management information. Inconsistencies among the various information components on basic programme data such as beneficiary numbers, budget components and expenditures render monitoring of resource flows particularly challenging. The lack of consistency between programme design and financial tracking data makes it very difficult to trace resource flows through programmatic components and to outcomes. Although WFP's most recent initiatives place great emphasis on management information and results-based management, what is needed is consistency of information across databases and simple approaches to tracking resource flows within and across operations.<sup>149</sup>

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<sup>149</sup> WFP WINGS and Statistics and efforts to ensure quality data have improved the information base; more work is needed, however.





20. **Essential.** Strengthening recovery programming will require a more concerted corporate roll-out plan, including staff incentives for quality programming (as opposed to movement of food), adequate budgets for required assessment/analytical activities, a supportive financing system, a locus for identification and dissemination of recovery lessons learned, and internal programme quality assurance mechanisms that are streamlined in order to accommodate the rapidly changing requirements of field operations related to protracted crises.



## Annex I

### Terms of Reference for the Thematic Evaluation

#### 1. Background

The PRO category - covering Protracted Emergency Operations for Refugees and Displaced Persons - was first established by the CFA (Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes) at the recommendation of WFP management in May 1989 (WFP/CFA: 27/P/7). It responded to (i) the growth of migrant groups - both refugees and displaced people - as a result of civil strife, and (ii) the persistence of the problems that had led to their flight and the consequent perpetuation of their status over long periods. A decade of civil conflicts had created the need for an adequate and predictable funding base for refugees.

The category was established as a “subset” of the regular (development) resources. By creating a subset of its development resources, WFP hoped to preserve the development and emergency (IEFR) resource bases for their original purposes while attracting additional net resources to deal with burgeoning needs in this new category.

In April 1998, WFP introduced a significant enhancement to the PRO category when it endorsed WFP’s policy proposals in the paper “From Crisis to Recovery” (WFP/EB.A/98/4). The new PRRO - protracted relief and recovery operation - brought two major modifications to the category. First, all protracted emergency operations - and no longer just refugee and displaced persons operations - would be transformed into PRROs and brought before the Board for approval, generally after two years. Second, the transformation of EMOPs into PRROs would be done based on the preparation of a recovery strategy that would provide the rationale for continued assistance and, to the extent possible, emphasize recovery activities in addition to ongoing relief needs and contribute to conditions for finding sustainable solutions to protracted crises. This emphasis on recovery was very much in line with international support for linking relief and rehabilitation work to longer-term development interventions. Refugee and displaced persons operations (the old PRO category) would benefit from the introduction of a recovery strategy.

The new PRRO category also stressed two important resource dimensions:

- First, within a PRRO, WFP would have the flexibility to move funds freely between relief and recovery activities as the situation on the ground required - to seize opportunities for recovery, but to be prepared to meet unforeseen critical relief needs.
- Second, the new category called for longer-term financial commitments from donors -for predictability and planning as well as for building partnerships for recovery.

During its sessions in October 2000 and February 2001, WFP’s Executive Board considered issues related to the funding of PRROs and raised questions about the effectiveness of the new category. The Board endorsed a review of the PRRO category as a whole to be undertaken by OEDE based on the findings of the PRRO evaluations scheduled for 2001-2002.<sup>150</sup>

Following the decision of the Board, OEDE prepared common generic terms of reference (TOR) for PRRO evaluations. In June 2001, OEDE evaluation missions in Ethiopia (PRRO 6180.00) and Uganda (PRRO 6176.00) tested the common TOR, which were subsequently

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<sup>150</sup> WFP, *PRRO Review: Initial Findings, the Direction Ahead* (February 2001) was prepared by WFP for informal Executive Board consultations to discuss resourcing issues related to the PRRO category two years after its creation. Following discussions on the findings of this document, the Board requested a more in-depth study of the substantive elements of the PRRO category.



revised. This became the basis for examining a common set of key issues in each PRRO evaluation.

## **2. Objectives of the Evaluation**

The objectives of the evaluation of the PRRO programming category are:

1. to determine the relevance and efficiency of the PRRO programming category, and particularly the added value of transforming PROs and EMOPs into PRROs;
2. to determine the extent to which WFP is improving its response to protracted crises by seizing opportunities for recovery and contributing to the pre-conditions for longer-term, sustainable development;
3. to assess whether WFP, through the introduction of the PRRO category, is attracting and investing adequate resources to effectively implement recovery activities;
4. to identify factors that enhance or impede the ability of WFP to formulate and implement PRROs in a timely and effective way;
5. to produce recommendations that will improve WFP's ability to implement PRROs at the country and regional level;
6. to provide accountability to the Executive Board.

## **3. Evaluation Scope**

Using as a starting point WFP's policy paper, "From Crisis to Recovery", in which the PRRO category was introduced, the evaluation will cover the design and implementation of the PRRO category. It will be based primarily on the results of 12 PRRO evaluations, and will also take into account the results of two PRRO supplementary field reviews.<sup>151</sup> Specifically, the evaluation will cover the design, efficiency, effectiveness and relevance/appropriateness of the PRRO model. It will also look at whether WFP is achieving its intended objectives through the introduction of the category.<sup>152</sup> The scope will extend to a broader assessment of the programming and funding trends for development and emergency operations to determine the implications for the PRRO category (and vice versa). It will also cover, where necessary, those PRRO planning documents and resourcing data that were not covered by the 12 evaluations. Finally, SP is undertaking a complementary study of how other United Nations agencies programme in relief-to-recovery situations. The evaluation will take into account the results of that study.

## **4. Key Issues**

The evaluation will address the following key questions:

- What is the value-added of the PRRO category over previously available programming tools?
- What can be done to improve the effectiveness and relevance of the category?

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<sup>151</sup> The supplementary field reviews were launched in 2002 to generate more information on WFP's experience with regional PRROs, and with a natural disaster PRRO. These were not designed as evaluations, but rather to broaden the information base in the above areas for the thematic evaluation.

<sup>152</sup> From Crisis to Recovery (WFP/EB.A/98/4-A) as well as the PRRO Guidelines (Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations: Guidelines for the Preparation of a PRRO, WFP February 1999) form the basis on which the programme category was created and individual operations are designed and implemented.



- What about the future? Is the PRRO still cutting edge?

The evaluation attempts to answer the following questions:

1. What is the relevance of the PRRO innovation to WFP, its beneficiaries and its broader stakeholder community? More specifically:
  - o Is the PRRO relevant to the changing face of crises? And to the needs of its beneficiaries?
  - o Is the concept of the PRRO consistent with international policies and approaches to address protracted crises?
  - o What is the status of current policy debates on the role of food aid in protracted crisis settings?
  - o Is the PRRO category logically consistent with WFP's core mission, goals and organizational structure?
2. What have been the effects of the PRRO innovation on WFP's performance in terms of:
  - o effective use of food aid;
  - o efficient use of food aid;
  - o programme category synergies;
  - o additionality of resources;
  - o improvement in corporate culture?
3. Has the category been implemented as planned and what factors affect its implementation, including:
  - o achievement of outputs;
  - o adequate inputs;
  - o externalities?
4. What lessons can be learned from WFP experience and that of other agencies engaged in delivering food aid for recovery in terms of:
  - o promising practices;
  - o emergent management norms and standards;
  - o common pitfalls?
5. What can WFP do to improve the impact of the PRRO?

## 5. Method

The approach and strategy guiding the evaluation is based on the following principles:

- o The individual PRRO evaluations and the overall evaluation will be collaborative (both participatory and independent).
- o The process will be both structured and transparent so that key stakeholders will be able to act on findings and recommendations with confidence and the overall report will have the highest possible credibility with internal and external users.
- o The evaluation will provide findings and recommendations that are both operational and strategic - applicable to individual PRRO activities as well as to the relevant policies and guidelines.

In order to meet the objectives of the evaluation and to address the key issues, the evaluation will employ the following methodology:



### **A) A Structured Analysis of PRRO Case Studies**

This aspect of the evaluation will consist of a comparative case study review of a sample of PRROs, including those that have been evaluated systematically and a small group of constructed cases that have been added to enhance the representativeness of findings. The comparative case study review will be structured around the overall objectives of the evaluation. These will then be reviewed by a **working group** (OHA, SP, RE, ODP, other?), which will be set up prior to the evaluation (July/August 2002, in order to play a role in finalizing the TORs). As background to this, other relevant documents will also be reviewed during this period, including the results of the study undertaken by SP on related programming used by other agencies.

In addition, the team will compare and contrast “cases” in which EMOPS have been continued compared with those that have been converted to PRROs, to identify any qualitative differences in programmes and resourcing levels.

### **B) Key informant Interviews**

There are two groups to be interviewed: donor representatives and WFP staff. RE and ODP will prepare a list of key donors (and significant non-donors) to the PRRO category. The key "decision-makers" will be individually identified and interviewed according to prepared interview questions. Some of these will be done by telephone; others may require face-to-face interviews.

WFP key informants will include: Regional Directors, Country Directors, OHA, SP, OTL, ODP, RE and the Secretariat of the Executive Board.

### **C) Regional Manager–Country Director Consultations**

Based on initial findings, the team will prepare a strategy to capture field staff input in to the evaluation assessment. This may include a brief survey of staff attitudes towards the PRRO category and perceived needs for strengthening the utility of the category.

Following (i) analysis of the PRRO evaluations and other documents, (ii) the Working Group consultations on the summarized findings and recommendations, (iii) the development of a statistical profile, and (iv) the key informant interviews, the evaluation team will assemble overall key findings and recommendations. At this point, the team will also draft lessons learned for the PRRO category.

The team will test the results through a one-day consultation with Regional Managers and Country Directors. This will be timed to coincide with the Third Regular Session of the Board for 2002, in October. The key overall lessons for the PRRO will be identified at this consultation.

### **D) Synthesis and Reporting**

Upon completion of the interview/consultation process, the team will develop the draft final full evaluation report based on the above inputs, which will be peer-reviewed by the OEDE unit. When the full report has been reviewed, the final document and Executive Board summary will be written.



**Basic Documents to Be Reviewed**

PRRO full evaluation reports/supplementary reviews in 2000–2002:

**2000:** Cambodia (January 2000).

**2001:** Algeria (self-evaluation), Angola (September), Azerbaijan (November), Colombia (self-evaluation), Ethiopia (May–June), Guinea-Bissau (self-evaluation), Somalia (July), Sudan (March–April), Uganda (May–June).

**2002:** African Great Lakes (first quarter), Iran (February), West Africa Coastal (supplementary field review), Hurricane Mitch (supplementary field review).

- “From Crisis to Recovery” (WFP/EB.A/98/4-A)
- “Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations: Guidelines for the Preparation of a PRRO”, WFP, February 1999
- “PRRO Review: Initial Findings, the Direction Ahead”, February 2001
- Executive Board Transcript of PRRO consultations, 15 February 2001
- WFP report on Food Aid in Conflict Workshop, June 2002
- Operations Department study on DSC/ODOC for relief operations
- “Working with NGOs - A Framework for Partnerships” (WFP/EB.A/2001/4-B)
- “Emerging Issues Relevant to WFP” (WFP/EB.A/2000/4-A)
- “Looking Forward: Humanitarian Policy Concerns for WFP” (WFP/EB.3/99/9-B)
- WFP's IDP Review: “Experiences with Internal Displacement”, Background Paper, 16 March 2000
- WFP's IDP Review: “WFP Reaching People in Situations of Displacement”, version II, April 2000
- WFP/OEDE Thematic Evaluation “Recurring Challenges in the Provision of Food Assistance in Complex Emergencies”
- “Food Security and Food Assistance among Long-standing Refugees”, (WFP/Ron Ockwell, Nov. 1999 - for refugee operations)
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## Annex III

### Analytical Strategies Used to Assess Case

#### Information and CO Survey Instrument

Impact infers the measurement of change and attribution of this change to the intervention of interest. Attribution is one of the more difficult aspects of impact evaluation and is rarely achieved without careful planning and the use of randomization in treatment assignment or extensive measurement of intended changes and factors that affect these over time. In this evaluation we examine both the effectiveness and impact of the Programme, though the tools available to assess impact in this post facto evaluation are limited.

- **Effectiveness/adequacy** (or evidence that the intervention’s results are consistent with good practices or the objectives of the Programme): For example, if acute malnutrition levels do not exceed 10 percent, emergency food aid interventions are often judged to be adequate. Similarly, we utilize evaluator ratings to infer that WFP PRROs are performing according to standards of practice. While there are few international standards for adequacy of recovery, we have developed an adequacy rating based on the assessments of the original field team’s evaluation of the PRRO.
- **Changes or differences over time or between groups:** In this we compare PRROs with their predecessor EMOP/PROs. We also compare the activity content of EMOPs with those of PRROs to establish programmatic differences between these categories.
- **Discontinuity in statistical data with the introduction of the category:** In this case, we look for sudden changes in the pattern of statistical data, for example, an increase in contributions that occurs relatively suddenly when the category is launched.

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## Annex IV

### Summary of Results of Evaluation Case Studies

#### Meta-Evaluation of WFP's PRRO Category - Refugees PRRO's evaluated or scheduled for evaluation in 2001-2002

	<b>Sudan</b>	<b>Algeria*</b>																																																			
<b>Operation Number**</b>	6189.00	6234.00																																																			
<b>Region</b>	ODK	ODC																																																			
<b>Evaluation Date</b>	March-April 2001	Oct-2001																																																			
<b>PRRO Name</b>	Food Assistance for Eritrean and Ethiopian Refugees	Assistance to Saharawi Refugees																																																			
<b>Duration of PRRO planned (revised actual)</b>	18 mo (05/01/2000-3/31/2003)	2 yr (09/01/2000-08/31/2002)																																																			
<b>Preceding Operation(s):</b>	WFP has long history there.11/17/1995: PRO 4168.04- Food Assistance for Eritrean and Ethiopian Refugees	06/11/1999: PRO 6099.00 Assistance to Western Saharan Refugees 10/17//1989: PRO 4155.00-08 Assistance to Western Saharan Refugees																																																			
<b>PRRO Overview</b>	This is a refugee maintenance and repatriation program. The goals of the PRRO are to support repatriation of Ethiopian refugees and target more carefully food distribution to vulnerable Eritrean refugees (reduce rations to half for 51% refugees). This operation took almost three years to complete and it met its originally planned tonnage target. Ethiopians were not repatriated and some concern that targeting was not needs based. Aside from repatriation, there is little evidence of recovery programming, only ration step-down.	This project is entirely a refugee maintenance project; a 2100 kcal ration would be provided for its 155,000 beneficiaries. This PRRO represented a 3 fold increase in beneficiaries from previous operation																																																			
<b>Crisis</b>	Man-made: war and conflict	Man-made: war and conflict																																																			
<b>Type of beneficiaries</b>	121,012 Eritrean and 11,919 Ethiopian refugees in 20 camps	West Saharan Refugees																																																			
<b>No. of beneficiaries planned (revised actual)</b>	121,012 (121,012)	155,000 (155,430)																																																			
<b>Food Cost [\$]</b>	6 285 825	14 724 500																																																			
<b>Tonnage [MT] planned (revised actual)</b>	34,313 (34,631)	64,498 (39,570)																																																			
<b>Funding Shortfall</b>	26.27%	38.65%																																																			
<b>PRRO Components</b>																																																					
<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Planned Weighting<sup>a</sup></th> <th>Tonnage</th> <th colspan="3">Beneficiaries</th> <th>Tonnage</th> <th colspan="3">Beneficiaries</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td><b>Protracted Relief:</b></td> <td>0</td> <td>0%</td> <td>0</td> <td>0%</td> <td>0</td> <td>0%</td> <td>0</td> <td>0%</td> </tr> <tr> <td><b>Protracted Refugee:</b></td> <td>34 313</td> <td>100%</td> <td>121 012</td> <td>90%</td> <td>64 498</td> <td>100%</td> <td>155 000</td> <td>100%</td> </tr> <tr> <td><b>Recovery:</b></td> <td>0</td> <td>0%</td> <td>11 919</td> <td>10%</td> <td>0</td> <td>0%</td> <td>0</td> <td>0%</td> </tr> <tr> <td><b>Total</b></td> <td><b>34 313</b></td> <td><b>100%</b></td> <td><b>132 931</b></td> <td><b>100%</b></td> <td><b>64 498</b></td> <td><b>100%</b></td> <td><b>155 000</b></td> <td><b>100%</b></td> </tr> </tbody> </table>									Planned Weighting <sup>a</sup>	Tonnage	Beneficiaries			Tonnage	Beneficiaries			<b>Protracted Relief:</b>	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	<b>Protracted Refugee:</b>	34 313	100%	121 012	90%	64 498	100%	155 000	100%	<b>Recovery:</b>	0	0%	11 919	10%	0	0%	0	0%	<b>Total</b>	<b>34 313</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>132 931</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>64 498</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>155 000</b>	<b>100%</b>
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<b>PRRO Rations</b>																																																					
<b>General</b>	GFD: 500 g cereals, 70 g pulses, 30 g veg oil, 20g sugar and 5 g salt full ration; half rations to camps with land access. Also SF and TF	2,100 kcal 450g cereals, 60g pulses, 25g oil, 30g sugar, 5g salt																																																			
<b>FFW</b>	None	None																																																			
<b>Repatriation Pkg.</b>	3 month repatriation food package planned for Ethiopian case load	None																																																			

\* self-evaluations

\*\* most recent operation for which assessment/evaluation information was available

\*\* most recent per WINGS Project Plan Revision History, Feb 5, 2004

**a** = planned component weighting values were obtained from the PRRO project documents.

**b** = performance values were obtained from PRRO evaluation report and summary documents



## Meta-Evaluation of WFP's PRRO Category - Refugees

PRRO's evaluated or scheduled for evaluation in 2001-2002

	Sudan	Algeria*
<b>PRRO Effectiveness</b>		
<b>Overall</b>	<b>Low quality recovery strategy</b> , outcome information limited but evaluation expressed concerns that rations were insufficient to meet core relief needs. Relief targets mostly met on aggregate, though planned targeting was not achieved because of registration problems. Repatriation targets were not achieved. Recovery planning was constrained by <b>host country policies that did not favor integration</b> , however, team questions sufficient emphasis on human resources recovery strategies	<b>No recovery strategy</b> . It is unclear why there is not a recovery strategy.
<b>Relief Objectives</b>	<b>Partially met</b> . Overall tonnage targets, but indication of targeting problems. Significant problems existed with registration systems. Until 12/31/00 food rations were distributed by camp type (reception, wagebased, land-based), which is not necessarily appropriate for a long term refugee situation. Starting in 2001 food rations were to be distributed through targeting. Full rations were targeted to be provided to 51% of refugees who were most vulnerable and half rations to the remainder. However, due to lack of new ration cards this combined strategy was impossible.	<b>Partially met</b> The nutritional status of beneficiaries remains poor and the 2100 kcal targets were not achieved, though there was improvement over prior years. The evaluation notes variation in levels of food (in)security across the different refugee camps. Effectiveness has also been compromised to by issues of commodity appropriateness.
<b>Recovery Objectives</b>	Low to start with but only <b>partially met</b> . Repatriation did not occur as planned, only approximately half were repatriated. In addition, a three month ration is probably not adequate.	No recovery strategy. It is unclear why there is not a recovery strategy.
<b>Factors Impeding PRRO Effectiveness:</b>		
targeting	very problematic	
M&E	problematic	
IPs/IP strategy		
beneficiary participation/capacity		
environmentally sound	refugees degrading land	degradation of natural resources occurring/not included in design.
coordination		
durable assets		
WFP staff capacity		
realistic planning		judged to be problematic by self evaluation



*Full Report of the Thematic Evaluation of the PRRO Category*

<b>PRRO Efficiency</b>		
	(NI)	(2) Numerous pipeline problems, due to unreliability of donor shipments and pipeline management. WFP assuming greater responsibility without adequate resourcing. LTSH runs at \$01.34/ ton. Inefficient distribution to beneficiaries as no synchronization of commodity distribution.
<b>value-added, liabilities, comments</b>		
	<p>(1) No evidence that this PRRO is qualitatively improved over predecessor PRO, indeed, predecessor placed greater emphasis on livelihood enhancing interventions.</p> <p>(1) The recovery strategy does not lay out how beneficiaries will be supported after repatriation. It also aims to drastically reduce rations among beneficiaries with no off-set livelihood activities. The political and security context is not taken in to account.</p>	<p>(2) There is no indication that the PRRO has added value over the PRO category.</p> <p>(NA) it is difficult to judge whether or not other interventions might improve household livelihood potential. Report suggests that these activities are being done by others.</p>

\* self-evaluations





Full Report of the Thematic Evaluation of the PRRO Category

**Meta-Evaluation of WFP's PRRO Category - Refugees**

PRRO's evaluated or scheduled for evaluation in 2001-2002

	<b>Ethiopia</b>	<b>Iran</b>																																			
<b>Operation Number**</b>	6180.00	6126.00																																			
<b>Region</b>	ODK	ODC																																			
<b>Evaluation Date</b>	May-June 2001	Feb-2002																																			
<b>PRRO Name</b>	Food Assistance for Refugees and for Refugee Repatriation	Food Assistance and Support for Repatriation of Iraqi and Afghan refugees in Iran																																			
<b>Duration of PRRO planned (revised actual)</b>	2 yr (04/31/2000-05/01/2003)	1 yr (05/01/2000-12/31/2002)																																			
<b>Preceding Operation(s):</b>	02/19/1998: EMOP 5978 Food Assistance Voluntary Repatriation of Somaliland and Ethiopian Refugees  06/04/1993: PRO 5241.00-03 Som. Sud. Djib. Ken. Refugees and Ethiop. Returnees	02/06/1998: PRO 5950.00 Food Assistance and Support for Repatriation of Iraqi and Afghan refugees. Food assistance since 1987.																																			
<b>PRRO Overview</b>	This operation was considered to be largely a continuation of the predecessor PRO by the field evaluation team. Consequently it was largely focused on care and maintenance and <b>lacked a comprehensive recovery strategy</b> . Activities are (1) maintenance feeding in refugee camps, with encouragement towards greater self-sufficiency, and (2) Support to repatriation process (esp. among Somali refugees but also for a small number of returning Ethiopian refugees). Self sufficiency is to be achieved by adjusting rations in relation to estimated food gaps. Therefore, different refugee groups receive differing rations. At the same time, special feeding programs were put in to place. Only a small portion of resources are utilized for FFW, SF and repatriation.	The strategy of the PRRO is to meet food gaps among refugees within camps with GFD, to extend assistance to vulnerable refugee HH outside camps, to provide incentives for girls' education, and to support repatriation. The GFD also was supposed to be more specifically targeted within camps to those in need. This operation was delayed one year and then extended another year.																																			
<b>Crisis</b>	Man-made: civil & military strife in neighboring countries	Man-made: civil & military strife in neighboring countries																																			
<b>Type of beneficiaries</b>	refugees from Somalia, Sudan, and Kenya. repatriating Kenyan and Somali refugees.	Refugees from Afghanistan and Iraq; 84,000 living in camps, 40,000 non-camp refugees, and 12,000 repatriates																																			
<b>No. of beneficiaries planned (revised actual)</b>	262,940 (yr 1), 234,250 (yr 2) 248,595 per yr average (173,489)	136,000 (115,000)																																			
<b>Food Cost [\$]</b>	25 367 635	4 516 710																																			
<b>Tonnage [MT] planned (revised actual)</b>	117,036 (91,286)	24,199 (25,825)																																			
<b>Funding Shortfall</b>	22.00%	43.30%																																			
<b>PRRO Components</b>																																					
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<b>Total</b>	17 036	100%	262 940	100%	24 199	100%																															
<b>PRRO Rations</b>																																					
<b>General</b>	1,600-2,100 kcal 400-475g cereal, <50g pulse, 25-35g oil, <25g sugar, 5g salt	originally 1900 as below, but later changed to 1680 350g wheat, 100g rice, 30g pulses, 20g oil, 15g sugar																																			
<b>FFW</b>	Weekly: 3kg	No FFW, but FFE: girls attending refugee schools 4.6 kg per month																																			
<b>Repatriation Pkg.</b>	Nine month ration: 150kg cereal, 10kg pulses, 5L oil per person	50 kg wheat ration																																			

\* self-evaluations

\*\* most recent operation for which assessment/evaluation information was available

\*\* most recent per WINGS Project Plan Revision History, Feb 5, 2004

**a** = planned component weighting values were obtained from the PRRO project documents,

**b** = performance values were obtained from PRRO evaluation report and summary documents



Full Report of the Thematic Evaluation of the PRRO Category

**Meta-Evaluation of WFP's PRRO Category - Refugees**

PRRO's evaluated or scheduled for evaluation in 2001-2002

	Ethiopia	Iran
<b>PRRO Effectiveness</b>		
<b>Overall</b>	Mission indicates that information needed to evaluate effectiveness was not available: I.e., outcome level information. General conclusion is that relief function was relatively effective while recovery was not an emphasis and only partially successful in meeting objectives.	Mission indicates that this operation was not implemented as designed and that the operation was designed without a recovery strategy.
<b>Relief Objectives</b>	<b>Relief objective was met</b> , though the team expressed concerns that little was known about livelihoods and other outcomes for specific refugee groups. Around the refugee camps were 46,360 IDPs to whom no aid was directed, and this likely reduced the amount of aid intended for refugees through sharing.	<b>Relief objectives partially met:</b> The GFD component is poorly targeted and indeed ration entitlements ultimately favor those in least need. Children under two are excluded from beneficiary eligibility. Food rations are not determined as much by need as by political factors. About 75% of this revised planned ration has been provided on average, but only 66% reached the most vulnerable refugees (Afghans). About 62,200 refugees of the 84,000 were reached (41% Afghan, 59% Iraqi). Households outside camps were not effectively reached, only 5000 rations were given to the government, but no tracking of use.
<b>Recovery Objectives</b>	<b>Partially met but recovery activities are small percentage of operation:</b> WFP-supported repatriation was limited and is troublesome given the lack of follow-up for repatriated beneficiaries. First slow steps were taken towards improving the environment and infrastructure around camps, as yet with little integration with WFP's experienced development team in Ethiopia. In 2000, 4,850 Kenyans were repatriated, 50,000 Somalies were repatriated/dispersed, and 1,500 Ethiopians were reintegrated [out of how many planned, though this was lower than anticipated (25% lower). Mission expressed concern that process of dispersion not followed closely enough. FFW targets not met.	<b>Recovery objectives partially met:</b> The recovery component is almost non-existent with the exception of the oil for education component, which was very promising, but only partially implemented. 5,000 of 40,000 outside camp refugees assisted. <b>1,500 of 12,000 Iraqi repatriates assisted with 40kg wheat flour each. Only 71% of oil for education targets were met.</b>
<b>Factors Impeding PRRO Effectiveness:</b>		
<b>Targeting</b>	not clear that beneficiary needs are accurately assessed	no attempt to assess needs, this seen as great problem
<b>M&amp;E</b>	mission indicates that information needed to evaluate effectiveness was not available: I.e., outcome level information.	no outcome monitoring, severe problem
<b>IPs/IP strategy beneficiary participation/capacity environmentally sound</b>		
<b>coordination</b>	PRRO trying to address though progress is slow	not problematic
<b>durable assets</b>		
<b>WFP staff capacity</b>		implied that this was an issue, especially at leadership level and also local staff needed training
<b>realistic planning</b>		

<b>PRRO Efficiency</b>		
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Full Report of the Thematic Evaluation of the PRRO Category

	(3) costs kept under control; budgeted food cost per beneficiary same as in predecessor PRRO; logistics / pipeline etc. well run	(3) Some gains in food flow management/accountability, use of commercial transporters resulted in efficiency gains. Problems experienced with State organization for Grains for release of wheat flour.
<b>value-added, liabilities, comments</b>		
	<p>Little evidence that PRRO improved quality of support to beneficiaries and lead to either improved selfreliance or resettlement.</p> <p>There were elements of a strategy from JFAM (which is "operational" not "strategic" document – see guidelines), but no real strategy articulated; pilot schemes for FFW (around camps) and school feeding (in camps) were introduced by the PRRO (this seems to have been spurred by the introduction of the PRRO category); repatriation strategy was limited to providing the 9 month payoff to so-called returnees to get them out of camps; there was no strategy for assisting longer term settlement; building selfsufficiency in camps was being pursued on an adhoc basis, not as articulated in a strategy; that said, the opportunities for "recovery" among the core beneficiary group (i.e., long-term refugees) were limited</p>	<p>This PRRO was largely a continuation of the previous PRO. The Iran case also demonstrates the potential risk inherent in the PRRO. No significant mechanism is in place to detect deviation from planned programming.</p> <p>The strategy is predominantly GFD, though with some adjustment to ration size. It places only token emphasis on recovery issues. It does not take in to account changing regional factors and advocacy required to enhance refugee HH livelihood potential. No emphasis is placed on assessing need and planning interventions accordingly, even though compelling information suggests the need to readjust ration entitlements.</p>

\* self-evaluations



Full Report of the Thematic Evaluation of the PRRO Category

**Meta-Evaluation of WFP's PRRO Category - Unstable**

PRRO's evaluated or scheduled for evaluation in 2001-2002

	<b>Georgia</b>	<b>Colombia*</b>
<b>Operation Number**</b>	6122.01	6139.00
<b>Region</b>		ODM
<b>Evaluation Date</b>		Nov-Dec 2001
<b>PRRO Name</b>	Relief and Recovery Assistance for Vulnerable Groups	Assistance to Persons Displaced by Violence
<b>Duration of PRRO planned (revised actual)</b>	2 yr (07/01/2000-06/30/2003)	2 yr (07/31/2000-07/31/2003***)
<b>Preceding Operation(s):</b>	07/01/1993: EMOP 5315.00-04 Assistance for IDPs and Vulnerable groups	n/a
<b>PRRO Overview</b>	This operation targets vulnerable Georgians and a small number of Chechnian refugees. It is primarily a recovery oriented operation. Two major components of the program are: 1) relief food distribution to the most vulnerable people., largely through institutional feeding and , 2) food-for-work activities to address recovery, which focus primarily on agricultural rehabilitation. These activities included land irrigation and drainage, as well as road rehabilitation.	This project targeted persons displaced as a consequence of economic crisis and violence. The project provided safety nets and HH asset enhancing interventions aimed at the first two years after displacement in order to enable them to resettle and reintegrate in to the economy. A combination of one 3 month ration, selective feeding, and FFA/FFT were envisioned. Emphasis also was placed on contingency planning.
<b>Crisis</b>	Man-made: conflict and economic	Man-made: conflict and violence
<b>Type of beneficiaries</b>	Resident populations and IDPs, Chechen refugees	IDPs and returnees/resettled in rural and urban areas
<b>No. of beneficiaries planned (revised actual)</b>	454,000 ()	227 000
<b>Food Cost [\$]</b>	7 573 302	5 629 740
<b>Tonnage [MT] planned (revised actual)</b>	29,934 (30,118)	12,910 (36,129***)
<b>Funding Shortfall</b>	0.31%	0.72%
<b>PRRO Components</b>		

<b>Planned Weighting<sup>a</sup></b>	<b>Tonnage</b>		<b>Beneficiaries</b>		<b>Tonnage</b>		<b>Beneficiaries</b>	
<b>Protracted Relief:</b>	3 500	12%	12 000	43%	4 901	38%	90 000	40%
<b>Protracted Refugee:</b>	3 990	13%	10 000	4%	0	0%	0	0%
<b>Recovery:</b>	22 430	75%	432 000	53%	8 009	62%	137 000	60%
<b>Total</b>	29 920	100%	454 000	100%	12 910	100%	227 000	100%

<b>PRRO Rations</b>		
<b>General</b>	Institutional: 350g cereal, 30g pulses, 25g oil Refugee: 450g cereal, 20g pulses, 25g oil, 20g sugar	2,277 kcal, 48g protein (SF: 498 kcal, 19g protein) 400g rice, 50g sugar, 25 g oil, 80g pulses (SF: 50g rice, 10g oil, 40g fortified blend, 30g pulses )
<b>FFW</b>	FFT: one 50 kg bag wheat (monthly) FFW: 500g wheat flour, 30g pulses, 25g oil, 30g sugar	1,869 kcal, 38.25g protein 400g rice, 25g sugar, 20 g oil, 50g pulses
<b>Repatriation Pkg.</b>	None	None

\* self-evaluations

\*\* most recent operation for which assessment/evaluation information was available

\*\* most recent per WINGS Project Plan Revision History, Feb 5, 2004

a = planned component weighting values were obtained from the PRRO project documents,

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**Meta-Evaluation of WFP's PRRO Category - Unstable**



Full Report of the Thematic Evaluation of the PRRO Category

PRRO's evaluated or scheduled for evaluation in 2001-2002

	Georgia	Colombia*
<b>PRRO Effectiveness</b>		
<b>Overall</b>	Not available	
<b>Relief Objectives</b>	Not available	(2) as is typical, results are only measurable at the activity level. No evidence provided at the outcome level. Only 30% of rations were distributed.
<b>Recovery Objectives</b>	<b>Recovery objectives partially met:</b> team indicates that recovery activities may not be achieving objectives of improved livelihoods/durable solutions. Food utilization data by activity not available to evaluation team.	FFW surpassed goals as did modest training goals. Many benchmarks not obtained; however, local team argues that these benchmarks did not have a rational basis
<b>Factors Impeding PRRO Effectiveness:</b>		
<b>Targeting</b>	some difficulties with district targeting	few financial supporters of pre-school programs and recovery programs, such as FFW.
<b>M&amp;E</b>		quantitative analysis deemed "impossible", due to lack of benchmark numbers and inability to properly measure outcomes.
<b>IPs/IP strategy</b>	WFP is major implementing agency, which is viewed as problem	major implementing local IPs not clear on their role initially.
<b>beneficiary part/cap</b>	not sufficient, need more incentive based system	beneficiaries including in implementation decision making, but excluded from planning decisions.
<b>environmentally sound coordination</b>	generally problematic: govt and donors	Obtaining and distributing food aid initially problematic (although became progressively more effective once established).
<b>durable assets</b>	assets may not benefit most needy, also FFW too short	programs lacked sustainability - very relief focused and faulty in recovery efforts.
<b>WFP capacity</b>	WFP staff do not have sufficient technical capacity to support FFW programs	WFP local office present, but initially insufficient to assist (i.e. more offices were later established).
<b>realistic planning</b>		needed to include consideration of and efforts to improve local community and IDP relationships. Unforeseen focus on exit strategy, due to insecurity.
<b>PRRO Efficiency</b>		
	NS	(3-) problems with food flows and logistics due to security concerns and limited government capacity
<b>value-added, liabilities, comments</b>		
	The PRRO was not substantially different from its predecessor. CO affected by major drought that struck around same time as operation. Mission found not enough attention in planning FFW activities to core beneficiaries. Felt FFW projects were too short to have significant impacts. Also recommended contractbased, incentive driven approaches to FFW projects.	(3) not clear that the PRRO provided any value-added over the successor EMOP.  (2+) though little data is provided in support of recovery strategy, strong use of local and international partnerships evident in design. Beneficiary involvement however, not solicited. Lack of emphasis on assessment, monitoring and evaluation is of concern as well as risk monitoring for dependency creation, etc. A clear framework of goals, objectives and indicators was absent.

\* self-evaluations

**Meta-Evaluation of WFP's PRRO Category - Unstable**

PRRO's evaluated or scheduled for evaluation in 2001-2002



Full Report of the Thematic Evaluation of the PRRO Category

	<b>Sri Lanka</b>	<b>Azerbaijan</b>																																																			
<b>Operation Number**</b>	10067.00 (former WIS 6152.00)	6121.00																																																			
<b>Region</b>	ODB	ODR																																																			
<b>PRRO Name</b>	Food Assistance to Conflict Aggected People in Sri Lanka	Relief and Recovery Assistance for Vulnerable Groups																																																			
<b>Duration of PRRO planned (revised actual)</b>	3 yrs (01/01/02-12/31/04)	3 yr (07/01/1999-12/31/2002)																																																			
<b>Preceding Operation(s):</b>	1992, EMOP 4923; PRO 5346.05 converted to PRRO 6 Assistance to Displaced Persons / Assistance to Sri Lankan IDPs / Assistance to IDPs / Relief and Recovery Asst. IDPs in Sri Lanka	11/02/1993: EMOP 5302.00-04 Azeri Refugees and Displaced In and Around Nagorno Kharabakh / Assistance to IDPs and Other Vulnerable Groups / Emergency Food Asst. to IDPs and Vulnerable Groups																																																			
<b>PRRO Overview</b>																																																					
	This PRRO has twin track relief and recovery components for those affected by civil conflict in Sri Lanka. The relief component focuses on residents of welfare centers. The recovery component includes nutritional improvement programs; FFW for rebuilding communities and providing a safety net; FFT to enhance income generation; support to psychosocial programming.	Operation focuses on IDPs in Azerbaijan displaced by war and economic crisis. Three pronged strategy: (1) relief: general ration to approximately 450,000 beneficiaries, which was to be stepped down from 200,000 to 70,000 during the three years of the operation; (2) resettlement as part of larger govt. prog of approximately 50,000 with 3 month rations.; (3) recovery in the form of FFW/FFT, etc. 30,000																																																			
<b>Crisis</b>	Man-made: conflict	Man-made: worsening of socioeconomic conditions & internal conflict																																																			
<b>Type of beneficiaries</b>	IDPs and conflict-affected areas	IDPs, refugees/returnees and other socially vulnerable Groups																																																			
<b>No. of beneficiaries planned (revised actual)</b>	106,370 to 217,030 over three years Average annual: 177,182 (264,530)	485 000																																																			
<b>Food Cost [\$]</b>	11 812 210	12 233 023																																																			
<b>Tonnage [MT] planned (revised actual)</b>	55,513 (65,120)	47,880 (37,847)																																																			
<b>Funding Shortfall</b>	45.47%	23.08%																																																			
<b>PRRO Components</b>																																																					
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<b>PRRO Rations</b>																																																					
<b>General</b>	450g rice, 50g pulses, 20g sugar, 5g salt (SF: 100g CSB, 10g sugarl )	200g wh flr, 30g pulses, 20g oil, 15g sugar, 5g salt																																																			
<b>FFW</b>	225 g rice, 250 g pulses, 100 g sugar	90 day ration 400g wh flr, 60g pulses, 20g oil, 10g sugar, 5g salt, 5g tea																																																			
<b>Repatriation Pkg.</b>	None	90 days 200 g wh flr, 30 g pulses, 20 g veg oil, 15 g sugar, 5 g tea																																																			

\* self-evaluations

\*\* most recent operation for which assessment/evaluation information was available

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## Meta-Evaluation of WFP's PRRO Category - Unstable

PRRO's evaluated or scheduled for evaluation in 2001-2002

	<b>Sri Lanka</b>	<b>Azerbaijan</b>
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Full Report of the Thematic Evaluation of the PRRO Category

<b>PRRO Effectiveness</b>		
<b>Overall</b>	"Lack of both a comprehensive nutritional surveillance and monitoring system make it impossible to determine the impact of the shift away from providing relief assistance". This is a quote from the field assessment, p.11. This problem was cited in 1999 and is still not corrected. Dependency problems cited as issue constraining recovery efforts among those in welfare centers. This operation's recovery component was increased. Many promising inter ventions	Overall, program appears to have maintained nutritional status of IDPs and in this way has met core relief needs. However, the aim to step down general relief food distribution was not achieved as resettlement and implementation of FFW did not occur as planned.
<b>Relief Objectives</b>		Relief-objective: <b>mostly met</b> although step down was only partially met, see below.
<b>Recovery Objectives</b>		Recovery Objectives: partially met 2000 of 50,000 projected due to failure of resettlement scheme; Recovery objectives not met but unclear what level was achieved, some promising projects related to early childhood development. Through FFW/FFT had planned to assist 5,000 in yr1, 10,000 in yr2, & 15,000 in yr3. Low participation due to inaccessibility and poor quality of land, irrigation water charges, IDPs lack of capital, and exclusion of FFW/FFT participants from further rations. The planned stepdown of beneficiaries from general relief to recovery activities was not achieved.
<b>Factors Impeding PRRO Effectiveness:</b>		
<b>targeting</b>	VAM only recently introduced	field team judged targeting as sub-optimal, recommended VAM based needs-oriented targeting
<b>M&amp;E</b>	monitoring and evaluation was particularly weak	good implementing partner resulted in basic outcome information, though need for increased nutritional monitoring was identified
<b>IP/IP strategy</b>		good implementing partner, but not clear why not more emphasis on involvement of local NGOs
<b>beneficiary part/cap</b>		
<b>environmentally sound</b>		insufficient emphasis on this by operation
<b>Coordination</b>		
<b>durable assets</b>		
<b>WFP capacity</b>		
<b>realistic planning</b>	CO noted that he did not have updated access to budget information	lack of realistic planning identified as problem
<b>PRRO Efficiency</b>		
		Relatively cost effective food distribution system, excellent registration of beneficiaries. Resourcing generally okay but significant pipeline breaks noted as well as donor fatigue. For example, a 2-month pipeline break at the start of the PRRO led to a temporary reduction in rations from 3 meals to 1 meal per day.
<b>value-added, liabilities, comments</b>		
	The PRO to PRRO conversion did not result in major changes in strategy. PRRO 10067 rectified that. Between the PRO, PRRO 6152 and the most recent PRRO, there was a progressive increase in the % allocated to recovery activities from insignificant pilot activities under the PRO, to 15% under PRRO 6152 to 83% most recently.	The recovery strategy was judged to be similar to that utilized in the predecessor EMOP by the field evaluation team. Recovery objectives were not achieved and necessary prerequisites to achieving them were not taken in to account when planning. FFW was emphasized and directed at agricultural activities that were not feasible. No other options were presented/discussed as alternatives: FFT, FFE, for example. Small pilot project in trauma/early childhood development with UNICEF was promising and identified as such by team.  While strategy reflects multi-agency input, recovery strategy is naive, lacking a realistic strategy for achieving self-reliance among IDPs, no framework and indicators for recovery, IDP warehousing approach largely followed, and WFP strategies lack creativity as they stress more traditional developing country approaches to recovery (small scale agriculture, etc.). Modern and even information economy approaches should be considered. Therefore, rural oriented strategy also may be misguided, also entrepreneurship is a missing link in this area of the world, an area that could have been an entry point for self-reliance FFS

\* self-evaluations

**Meta-Evaluation of WFP's PRRO Category - Unstable**

PRRO's evaluated or scheduled for evaluation in 2001-2002

	<b>Indonesia</b>
<b>Operation Number**</b>	10069.00



Full Report of the Thematic Evaluation of the PRRO Category

<b>Region</b>	ODB			
<b>Evaluation Date</b>				
<b>PRRO Name</b>	Assistance for IDPs and Urban Poor			
<b>Duration of PRRO planned (revised actual)</b>	18 mo (07/01/2002-06/30/2004**)			
<b>Preceding Operation(s):</b>	11/01/2000: PRRO 6195.00 Food Assistance for the Urban Poor Affected by the Economic Crisis			
	04/23/1998: EMOP 6006.00 Assistance to Victims of Drought and Economic Crisis			
<b>PRRO Overview</b>	Food assistance targeted to the vulnerable population - a total of 2.4 million people, primarily women and children - and to activities supporting rehabilitation and seeking long-term solutions: including i) an average of 350,000 IDPs, with free food rations; ii) 350,000 unregistered ultra-poor households (1,750,000 persons) living in urban slums in Java, under special market operations in Jabotabek, Surabaya and Semarang; iii) 300,000 malnourished children between the ages of 6 to 24 months considered at greatest risk, with locally produced blended food, complementing UNICEF efforts; and iv) the govt. in the formulation of food security policy and strategy.			
<b>Crisis</b>	Man made: conflict and deteriorating socioeconomic conditions			
<b>Type of beneficiaries</b>	IDPs and urban poor			
<b>No. of beneficiaries planned (revised actual)</b>	2 100 000			
<b>Food Cost [\$]</b>	37 056 180			
<b>Tonnage [MT] planned (revised actual)</b>	177,180 (177,180**)			
<b>Funding Shortfall</b>	34.45%			
<b>PRRO Components</b>				
	<b>Planned Weighting<sup>a</sup></b>	<b>Tonnage</b>	<b>Beneficiaries</b>	
<b>Protracted Relief:</b>	69 180	39%	300 000	14%
<b>Protracted Refugee:</b>	0	0%	0	0%
<b>Recovery:</b>	108 000	61%	1800 000	86%
<b>Total</b>	177 180	100%	2100 000	100%
<b>PRRO Rations</b>				
<b>General and SF</b>	IDPs: 400 g rice per day. SF (returnees): 60 g of beans, 30 g oil daily			
<b>FFW</b>	Nurtitional Program (targeted 6 -24 months and under 5 yrs underweight/at risk): 30 g Delvita blended food per day OPSM: 5 kg of rice per week per household at half the market price.			
<b>Repatriation Pkg.</b>	None			

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### Meta-Evaluation of WFP's PRRO Category - Unstable

PRRO's evaluated or scheduled for evaluation in 2001-2002

	<b>Indonesia</b>
<b>PRRO Effectiveness</b>	
<b>Overall</b>	





*Full Report of the Thematic Evaluation of the PRRO Category*

	Limited evaluative information available for Indonesia. Operation is generally well-viewed by donors and meets activity/output targets.
<b>Relief Objectives</b>	
<b>Recovery Objectives</b>	
<b>Factors Impeding PRRO Effectiveness:</b>	
<b>Targeting</b>	noted as significant problem by CO
<b>M&amp;E</b>	
<b>IP/IP strategy</b>	
<b>beneficiary part/cap</b>	
<b>environ sound</b>	
<b>Coordination</b>	
<b>durable assets</b>	
<b>WFP capacity</b>	
<b>realistic planning</b>	
<b>PRRO Efficiency</b>	
<b>value-added, liabilities, comments</b>	
	This PRRO represents a class of "recovery" that is most analogous to a safety net program. The IDP component is mostly relief and probably should be reformulated.

\* self-evaluations

**Meta-Evaluation of WFP's PRRO Category - Stable**

PRRO's evaluated or scheduled for evaluation in 2001-2002

	<b>Guinea Bissau*</b>	<b>Cambodia</b>
<b>Operation Number**</b>	6154.00	6038.00
<b>Region</b>	ODD	ODB
<b>Evaluation Date</b>	May-June 2001	Jan-2000



Full Report of the Thematic Evaluation of the PRRO Category

<b>PRRO Name</b>	Assistance to Vulnerable Groups and Recovery Activities	Food Aid for Recovery and Rehabilitation																																												
<b>Duration of PRRO planned (revised actual)</b>	18 mo (01/01/2000-12/31/2002)	2 yr (01/01/1999-12/31/2000)																																												
<b>Preceding Operation(s):</b>	08/24/1998: EMOP 6033.00 Food Assistance to the Population of Gub affected by armed conflict	01/05/1995: PRO 5482.00-03 Programme for Rehabilitation in Cambodia / Food Aid for Rehabilitation																																												
<b>PRRO Overview</b>	This project is primarily focused on recovery, emphasizing SF (52000 children), as well as rural development through FFW (6100) and demobilization of soldiers using FFT and FFW (6000). Relief is vulnerable group feeding.	Recovery-oriented strategy that emphasizes FFW as tool to close pre-harvest hunger gap while at the same time building self-reliance and community infrastructure. Relief is a very minor contingency. The three major components of this PRRO are: 1. Community rehabilitation and recovery, FFW directed largely at community rehabilitation and infrastructure-this represents more than 80% of food allocation; 2. Social sector recovery (health projects, human resources training, assistance to vulnerable groups); 3. relief Four objectives are income transfers, incentives for treatment, direct nutritional supplements and distribution of health information																																												
<b>Crisis</b>	Man-made: war and conflict	Man-made: conflict																																												
<b>Type of beneficiaries</b>	IDPs and returnees	geographically targeted vulnerable populations, long-term IDPs, resettled IDPs, ecologically fragile areas, defector families in rehabilitation zones																																												
<b>No. of beneficiaries planned (revised actual)</b>	93100 (94,745)	1,299,400 (1,815,400)																																												
<b>Food Cost [\$]</b>	2 367 740	24 189 952																																												
<b>Tonnage [MT] planned (revised actual)</b>	6,985 (5,743)	75,104 (75,497)																																												
<b>Funding Shortfall</b>	17.78%	2.60%																																												
<b>PRRO Components</b>																																														
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<b>PRRO Rations</b>																																														
<b>General and SFP</b>	Vulnerable groups: 300g cereal, 30g oil, 100g pulses, 100g CSB, 20g sugar; 270 days for primary school children: 10g oil, 100g CSB, 15g sugar; Family with girl: 200g cereal	500g rice, 20g fish, 30g oil, 10g salt																																												
<b>FFW and SF, FFT</b>	90 days FFT and 135 days FFW. FFT=450g cereal, 30g oil, 60g pulses	FFT: 10kg rice monthly for literacy teachers FFW: appx 4 month ration																																												
<b>Repatriation Pkg.</b>	None	20kg rice with complimentary fish and oil																																												

\* self-evaluations

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Meta-Evaluation of WFP's PRRO Category - Stable

PRRO's evaluated or scheduled for evaluation in 2001-2002

	Guinea Bissau*	Cambodia
<b>PRRO Effectiveness</b>		
<b>Overall</b>	Relief objectives were met but many recovery	Recovery activities targets largely met and most



Full Report of the Thematic Evaluation of the PRRO Category

	targets were not met. Lack of outcome indicators preclude evaluation of effects. This operation was extended to be considerably longer than planned and food utilization was lower, though the number of beneficiaries was higher.	resources ultimately used for recovery. However, serious concern regarding the impacts of FFW activities on the target beneficiaries, especially women and also on the quality/durability of assets. Related to this is the more recent mid-term evaluation of the 6038.01, which finds similar deficiencies and especially lack of linkage across the PRRO program components.
<b>Relief Objectives</b>	<b>Relief objective met:</b> very little relief apparent. Vulnerable group feeding targets generally met/exceeded; Little information available on health/nutrition status of vulnerable populations.	Changes in targeting criteria/procedures caused lack of continuity. Targeting process used not conducive to a collaborative/integrated approach with partner NGOs. Geographic targeting missed specifically vulnerable persons, demographic/livelihood criteria targeting better. (NA) Although listed as a relief activity, repatriation support would be considered recovery by most. There were no notable relief activities under the PPR;
<b>Recovery Objectives</b>	<b>Recovery objective: partially met.</b> No outcomes measures provided and some FFW and SF targets not met. Problems with weak IPs mentioned together with limited govt. capacity.	Stand alone FFW projects were technically less viable and sustainable than those conducted with 3rd partners having additional resources and a more concentrated field presence (3+) The FFW activities largely were carried out as planned, were appropriate in meeting a seasonal food gap, and largely benefited those in need. There were some problems with the quality of infrastructure activities and questions about infrastructure as compared with FFA approach; Social sector interventions were targeted more by IP capabilities than by population needs. Rice banks are important interventions, but not well implemented. Assessment, monitoring and evaluation were emphasized early by WFP, but lack of continued focus resulted in much data and too little information.
<b>Factors Impeding PRRO Effectiveness:</b>		
<b>Targeting</b>	noted to be problematic	much work done, but evaluation team felt the approach was overly complex and perhaps had some validity problems
<b>M&amp;E</b>	noted to be deficient	lack of long term impact information signaled
<b>IP/IP strategy</b>	Govt and NGO capacity judged to be weak	activities in some areas driven by IP capacity rather than need
<b>beneficiary part/cap</b>	noted to be solicited, but without expertise in this area	noted by field evaluation as a reason for lack of durable asset creation
<b>environ sound</b>		
<b>Coordination</b>		
<b>durable assets</b>	this is not measured	noted as a significant concern by evaluation team
<b>WFP capacity</b>	some deficiencies noted in program capacity	noted as a significant concern by evaluation team
<b>realistic planning</b>	unrealistic targets, especially the weak govt capacity as implementing partner	
<b>PRRO Efficiency</b>		
		LTSH estimated at \$60/ton in 1999. More use of commercial transport sector needed.
	(4) This activity would have been difficult to resource under an EMOP and a development project would not yet be appropriate. Country self-assessment demonstrates the developmental orientation of country staff.  The general approach appears to be appropriate and linked with existing national recovery strategies. The operation, however, is somewhat unrealistic with resources allocated.	The PRRO did provide a funding opportunity that may have been difficult to fund under other circumstances at the time.  This program is quite solid and has been implemented collaboratively with other key international and domestic actors; however, the strategy should confront systematically the key causes of food insecurity, including land tenure problems (and land misuse by the govt.), indebtedness, and low skills/literacy. In addition, the strategy lacks clear objectives and benchmarks; i.e., a solid design framework, but rather, is activity oriented. These all were problems identified by the field evaluation team.

\* self-evaluations

**Meta-Evaluation of WFP's PRRO Category - Stable**

PRRO's evaluated or scheduled for evaluation in 2001-2002

	<b>Central America (Regional)</b>
<b>Operation Number**</b>	6089.00
<b>Region</b>	ODM
<b>Evaluation Date</b>	August 2000



Full Report of the Thematic Evaluation of the PRRO Category

<b>PRRO Name</b>	Assistance for reconstruction and rehabilitation to families in Central America affected by Hurricane Mitch				
<b>Duration of PRRO planned (revised actual)</b>	2 yr (07/16/1999-02/28/2003)				
<b>Preceding Operation(s):</b>	11/11/1998 EMOP 6079.00 Emergency Food Assistance to Households Affected by Hurricane Mitch				
<b>PRRO Overview</b>	Post Mitch recovery is primarily a recovery oriented project, emphasizing FFW for recovery of productive capacity and rehabilitation of infrastructure, school feeding in Honduras and vulnerable group feeding. The project is targeted to areas affected directly by Mitch in Honduras, Nicaragua, Guatemala and El Salvador.				
<b>Crisis</b>	Natural Disaster				
<b>Type of beneficiaries</b>	Resident populations				
<b>No. of beneficiaries planned (revised actual)</b>	1,110,000 (yr 1), 893,000 (yr 2) 1,001,500 per yr average				
<b>Food Cost [\$]</b>	43 093 120				
<b>Tonnage [MT] planned (revised actual)</b>	111,607 (88,229)				
<b>Funding Shortfall</b>	23.28%				
<b>PRRO Components</b>					
	<b>Planned Weighting<sup>a</sup></b>	<b>Tonnage</b>	<b>Beneficiaries</b>		
	<b>Protracted Relief:</b>	0	0%	0	0%
	<b>Protracted Refugee:</b>	0	0%	0	0%
	<b>Recovery:</b>	111 607	100%	1001 500	100%
	<b>Total</b>	111 607	100%	1001 500	100%
<b>PRRO Rations</b>					
<b>General</b>	Primary school children: 25g CSB, 50g biscuit (320 kcal, 10.5g protein); Malnourished mothers and children: 100g CSB (380 kcal, 18g protein), 270 days				
<b>FFW</b>	1976 kcal, 46g protein 450g cereal, 40g pulses, 30g oil, 30g fish, for 150 days year one				
<b>Repatriation Pkg.</b>	None				

\* self-evaluations

\*\* most recent operation for which assessment/evaluation information was available

\*\* most recent per WINGS Project Plan Revision History, Feb 5, 2004

**a** = planned component weighting values were obtained from the PRRO project documents,

**b** = performance values were obtained from PRRO evaluation report and summary documents

Meta-Evaluation of WFP's PRRO Category - Stable

PRRO's evaluated or scheduled for evaluation in 2001-2002

	<b>Central America (Regional)</b>
<b>PRRO Effectiveness</b>	
<b>Overall</b>	even with extensions, this operation did not meet food utilization targets. Evaluation was



Full Report of the Thematic Evaluation of the PRRO Category

	mid-term so do not know final results. Mid-term was optimistic about the work, though no indication that outcome monitoring was undertaken.
<b>Relief Objectives</b>	
<b>Recovery Objectives</b>	Many assets were produced, though no evidence on quality and sustainability nor impact on beneficiary HH economics. Indication of some dead-end investments; i.e., housing construction where there are no services. Unclear to what extent life of project activity targets were met from available data.
<b>Factors Impeding PRRO Effectiveness:</b>	
<b>Targeting</b>	
<b>M&amp;E</b>	evaluation was signalled as a technical asset that needed strengthening in El Salvador
<b>IP/ IP strategy</b>	
<b>beneficiary part/cap</b>	
<b>environ sound</b>	
<b>Coordination</b>	
<b>durable assets</b>	
<b>WFP cap</b>	
<b>realistic planning</b>	
<b>PRRO Efficiency</b>	
	Evidence that pipeline management was smooth across countries because of borrowing, etc. from CPs. Also evidence that strong regional presence resulted in more efficient transport/storage. ITSH of 20 USD/ton by NGO and 15 USD/ton for govt in El Salvador.
<b>value-added, liabilities, comments</b>	
	(3+) evidence that the flexibility of PRRO is particularly appropriate in the case of natural disasters and where regional presence is strong. PRRO was clearly able to link relief and development to the advantage of beneficiaries.; (NI) data related to effect of regional approach not clear from reports.  (3+) this project builds on long term presence to develop appropriate and well-targeted interventions in concert with other major donors. IPs are supported based on their capacity as per FAAD criteria. Both infrastructure and FFT are emphasized as well as NRM.

\* self-evaluations

### Meta-Evaluation of WFP's PRRO Category - Highly Unstable

PRRO's evaluated or scheduled for evaluation in 2001-2002

	<b>Somalia</b>	<b>Uganda</b>
<b>Operation Number**</b>	6073.00	6176.00
<b>Region</b>	ODK	ODK
<b>Evaluation Date</b>	Jul-2001	May-June 2001
<b>PRRO Name</b>	Food Aid for Relief and Recovery	Targeted Food Assistance for Refugees, IDP, and



Full Report of the Thematic Evaluation of the PRRO Category

<b>Duration of PRRO planned (revised actual)</b>	3 yr (07/01/1999-12/31/2003**)	Vulnerable Groups	2 yr (04/01/2000-11/01/2003)					
<b>Preceding Operation(s):</b>	08/13/1998: EMOP 5999.00 Food Aid in Support of Rehabilitation and Reconstruction  05/11/1992: EMOP 5036.00-04 Assistance for Conflict Victims / Food Aid in Support of Emergency, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction	11/24/1997: EMOP 5816.01-02 Assistance to IDPs in Northern Uganda  05/26/1995: PRO 5623.00-01 Assistance to Sudanese Zairean and Rwandese Refugees in Uganda / Assistance to Sudanese Refugees in Uganda						
<b>PRRO Overview</b>	PRRO to address the inter-related problems of drought and conflict. Three pronged strategy: emergency relief for IDPs, VGs and drought affected, accounting for 30%; - 19% to social institutions - recovery for famers/ agricultural activities and FF training for women and youths, accounting for 51%; overall planned. 70% was to be targeted to the Southern, largely agricultural region of the country. Anticipates a step down of relief and step up of recovery during the three years.	This PRRO stresses the goal of self-reliance through a two pronged strategy of incrementally phased out GFD(197,000 to 60,000 in year two) combined with increased levels of recovery activities such as FFW, FFA and FFE. The PRRO takes an area-based approach in that it targets areas where refugees and IDPs are concentrated as opposed to refugees and IDP's per se. A wide range of activities support the recovery component, including: 1.FFW-infrastructure; 2.Agricultural inputs; 3.Resettlement package; 4.Food safety net; 5.Off-farm season FFW/FFT; 6.School feeding; 7.Vulnerable group feeding. PRRO combines formerly separate refugee and IDP operations						
<b>Crisis</b>	Man-made and natural: war/conflict and crop failures	Man-made: civil conflict/wars						
<b>No. of beneficiaries planned (revised actual)</b>	1,320,000 per yr (771,169 ) 700,000 direct	498,000 (yr 1), 325,000 (yr 2) 411,500 (909,651 ) per yr average						
<b>Food Cost [\$]</b>	12 237 195	18 041 534						
<b>Tonnage [MT] planned (revised actual)</b>	63,104 (63,219**)	82,728 (65,673 )						
<b>Funding Shortfall</b>	20.57%	20.62%						
<b>PRRO Components</b>								
<b>Planned Weighting<sup>a</sup></b>	<b>Tonnage</b>	<b>Beneficiaries</b>		<b>Tonnage</b>	<b>Beneficiaries</b>			
<b>Protracted Relief:</b>	18 985	30%	349 140	26%	34 160	41%	100 000	24%
<b>Protracted Refugee:</b>	0	0%	0	0%	21 747	26%	95 000	23%
<b>Recovery:</b>	44 119	70%	970 860	74%	26 821	32%	216 500	53%
<b>Total</b>	63 104	100%	1 320 000	100%	82 728	100%	411 500	100%
<b>PRRO Rations</b>								
<b>General</b>	Emergency intervention: 500g cereal, 60g pulses, 20g oil 1,200 kcal for SF; Institution support: 400g cereal, 50g pulses, 20g oil, 100g CSB (2,100 kcal)	400 cereal, 60 pulses, 20 oil, for 120-365 days	SF=varied, 365 days					
<b>FFW</b>	2100 kcals 500g cereal, 60g pulses, 20g oil	usually 400g cereal, 60g pulses, 20g oil, 60-90 days						
<b>Repatriation Pkg.</b>	None	varied, 180 days						

\* self-evaluations

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**a** = planned component weighting values were obtained from the PRRO project documents,

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## Meta-Evaluation of WFP's PRRO Category - Highly Unstable

PRRO's evaluated or scheduled for evaluation in 2001-2002

	<b>Somalia</b>	<b>Uganda</b>
<b>PRRO Effectiveness</b>		
<b>Overall</b>	Overall "performed substantially according to plan", but recovery targets had to be sacrificed to some degree for an increase in relief needs.	overall objectives were <b>partially met</b> . Evaluation was strongly critical of program for focusing on recovery/self-reliance targets to the detriment of



Full Report of the Thematic Evaluation of the PRRO Category

	Therefore relief ultimately consumed 42% of resources. Also, substantial regional variation in context lead to differing opportunities/constraints.	meeting core relief functions. Also problem with lack of information on outcome level data for relief and recovery.
<b>Relief Objectives</b>	<b>Relief objectives: largely met</b> in terms of food utilization. Outcome information not available. Needs were greater than anticipated and conformity to ration standards not met; Over the first 22 months, relief took 42% of food aid as opposed to the 30% projected (while recovery took 40% as opposed to 51%), owing to a poor rain-fed harvest, population movement, & economic stressors.	Relief Objectives partially met. Relief dominated the project early as a large surge in IDPs (double that planned) necessitated a shift in strategy. Indeed more than 90% year one resources were applied to GFD; though WFP accommodated this need, many problems in the effectiveness and relevance of GFD activities noted, including poor registration, inadequate rations and variable distribution effectiveness; Rations based on the 1,818 kcal per person/day used in Uganda for years not the standard WHO 2,100 kcal. Distribution in some camps not well organized and under-scooping is common. Refugee, IDP numbers generally inflated.
<b>Recovery Objectives</b>	<b>Recovery Objective: Partial met</b> output beneficiary targets were met in 2002 as per the SPR. Although data provided on rations and output level measures for FFW, relief and institutions (e.g., km. of river embankments rehabilitated), but no evidence/discussion of improved self-sufficiency presented (or measured in the project); no evidence of improved beneficiary well being presented beyond amount of labor undertaken in FFW and therefore food transfer achieved. From early 2000, the PRRO was increasingly recovery as planned, but in July 2001 relief again took precedence for the same reasons as before. Recovery interventions were short-term, small scale projects in view of security threats in target areas - lack of govt, infrastructure, etc...	Recovery objectives not met. Also limited outcome data available. They were highly variable in quality, poorly monitored and often without norms and standards and community participation in project identification. Although #s of beneficiaries exceeded targets, food utilization was only one third of target. Activities often engaged host community rather than IDP/refugees. Yr 1 planned 178,000 beneficiaries (11,259 tons). Actual 209,714 beneficiaries, but only 3,123 tons. Reflects a slow start to school feeding and FFA activities. Difficult to generate FFA activities for encamped populations.
<b>Factors Impeding PRRO Effectiveness:</b>		
<b>Targeting</b>		poorly executed
<b>M&amp;E</b>	outcome level information lacking as per evaluation	lack of outcome data noted as major constraint
<b>IP/IP strategy</b>	lack of technically competent IP major constraint	mixed capacities according to region
<b>beneficiary part/cap environ sound</b>		
<b>Coordination</b>		esp need more emphasis on working with govt for framework for resettlement
<b>durable assets</b>	signalled as a likely problem	poorly executed FFW noted as problem
<b>WFP cap</b>	not sufficient staff/capacity for technical requirements of recovery activities**	staff skills in recovery noted
<b>realistic planning</b>	not adequate account of fluctuations and differing needs of northern and southern populations	unrealistic recovery strategy
<b>PRRO Efficiency</b>		
	Good attempts made to stimulate competition among transporters. Efforts to reduce DSC are commendable; costs cut during implementation from foreseen US\$ 879/mt to US\$ 798/mt; air transport for staff a big cost; cost of using local money changers high but necessary; overall, "budget adequate to cover needs... but not overly generously funded). Also no major pipeline breaks noted. LTSH reduced by 17% through effective use of local commercial transportation arrangements	improvements in efficiency noted in terms of consolidation of staff functions when refugee/IDP management was consolidated. Team also notes significant decrease in DSC and DOC and operational costs/beneficiary. PRRO under-resourced from the start, and no commodities arrived until month 3. By end of 2000, pledges=30% & receipt=10% of requested. Also, use of commodity local purchase.

<b>value-added, liabilities, comments</b>		
	Somalia diverse setting and changing needs was well accommodated by flexible nature of vehicle. On the other hand, staffing and M&E not adequate to support programming needs. Has attracted donor funding for "recovery" but it seems this was available in previous EMOPS also; duration of the project , 3 yrs,	some value-added of PRRO: enabled WFP to provision for a two year resettlement plan; more stability in staff as they have 1 year rather than 3 month contracts.; reduction in redundancy in managing multiple versus single project; DOC/DSC and operational costs/beneficiary lower. ; One important liability mentioned was CO's difficulty in



*Full Report of the Thematic Evaluation of the PRRO Category*

	<p>giving longer perspective, with ability to easily shift between programs and little (or no) inflexibility from donors on how the resources are used.</p> <p>The prodoc does not have a "strategy" section – it must be inferred from other sections of the text.; the recovery strategy calls for "integrated strategies" and the creation of long-term employment opportunities, with no specificity; the ambitions for the recovery components described in the strategy are not accompanied by realistic implementation discussion (e.g., .increased staff presence, etc.). Recovery targets are sacrificed for relief needs instead of trying to augment total resources.</p>	<p>balancing relief and recovery objectives, not adequately implementing core program</p> <p>However, the recovery strategy did not identify clear objectives and indicators related to recovery nor did it clearly identify preconditions (indicators) for the application/shift to different types of recovery activities. No provision made for assessing and addresses causes of food insecurity, nor for mobilizing beneficiary population in the design of recovery strategies or specific FFA activities. Though this was one of few recovery strategies that envisioned a link between relief and recovery activities-i.e., relief step down as recovery increases</p>
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\* self-evaluations

**Meta-Evaluation of WFP's PRRO Category - Highly Unstable**

PRRO's evaluated or scheduled for evaluation in 2001-2002

	<b>West African Coast (Regional)</b>	<b>Angola</b>
<b>Operation Number**</b>	10064.00	6159.01
<b>Region</b>	ODD	OBY
<b>Evaluation Date</b>	May/June 2002	Sept/Oct 2001
<b>PRRO Name</b>	Targeted Food Assistance for Relief/Recovery of Refugees, IDPs & Returning Refugees	Assistance to War Affected People
<b>Duration of PRRO</b>	1 yr (01/01/2002-01/31/2004***)	15 mo (04/01/2001-06/30/2002)





Full Report of the Thematic Evaluation of the PRRO Category

<b>planned (revised actual)</b> <b>Preceding Operation(s):</b>	1991: Regional PRO 04604.00-07, PRRO 06271.0 Food Assistance to (Various) Refugees  1990: EMOPs 04309.00, 04452.00-02 Emergency Food Assistance to Displaced Persons (Various Countries)	Series of EMOPs and PROs since the 1980s. Recently: 06/15/1999: EMOP 6138.00 Food Assistance to Displace War-affected Persons  11/07/1995: PRO 5602.00-02 Food Assistance to Displace and War-affected Persons																																											
<b>PRRO Overview</b>	Five country program focusing on meeting relief and recovery needs primarily of displaced and resettled populations. Program combines free distribution, targeted feeding, emergency education and resettlement, FFW/FFT activities. School feeding was to represent approximately 25% of the case load or 250,000, FFW approximately 62,000; and GFD, approximately 440,500.	Twin track recovery strategy of safety nets and FFW activities: 1.GFD to IDP's arriving after Oct 2000 and returnees (40% resources); 2.Safety net supplementary and therapeutic feeding for malnourished individuals/families, and communal canteens for at risk children(30%);FFW in areas of high risk malnutrition(30%)																																											
<b>Crisis</b>	Man-made: war and conflict	Man-made: war and conflict																																											
<b>Type of beneficiaries</b>	Refugees, IDPs, and returning refugees in Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia	IDPs and returnees/refugees (35% women, 40% children)																																											
<b>No. of beneficiaries planned (revised actual)</b>	835,000 (654,872)	1,040,040 (794,140)																																											
<b>Food Cost [\$]</b>	23 813 442	39 316 359																																											
<b>Tonnage [MT] planned (revised actual)</b>	104,943 (105,576***)	228,782 (200,861)																																											
<b>Funding Shortfall</b>	24.47%	24.61%																																											
<b>PRRO Components</b>	<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Planned Weighting<sup>a</sup></th> <th>Tonnage</th> <th colspan="2">Beneficiaries</th> <th>Tonnage</th> <th colspan="2">Beneficiaries</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td><b>Protracted Relief:</b></td> <td>80 860</td> <td>77%</td> <td>496 500</td> <td>59%</td> <td>104 770</td> <td>46%</td> <td>416 016</td> <td>40%</td> </tr> <tr> <td><b>Protracted Refugee:</b></td> <td>0</td> <td>0%</td> <td>0</td> <td>0%</td> <td>60 808</td> <td>27%</td> <td>312 012</td> <td>30%</td> </tr> <tr> <td><b>Recovery:</b></td> <td>24 082</td> <td>23%</td> <td>338 500</td> <td>41%</td> <td>63 186</td> <td>28%</td> <td>312 012</td> <td>30%</td> </tr> <tr> <td><b>Total</b></td> <td><b>104 942</b></td> <td><b>100%</b></td> <td><b>835 000</b></td> <td><b>100%</b></td> <td><b>228 764</b></td> <td><b>100%</b></td> <td><b>1 040 040</b></td> <td><b>100%</b></td> </tr> </tbody> </table>		Planned Weighting <sup>a</sup>	Tonnage	Beneficiaries		Tonnage	Beneficiaries		<b>Protracted Relief:</b>	80 860	77%	496 500	59%	104 770	46%	416 016	40%	<b>Protracted Refugee:</b>	0	0%	0	0%	60 808	27%	312 012	30%	<b>Recovery:</b>	24 082	23%	338 500	41%	63 186	28%	312 012	30%	<b>Total</b>	<b>104 942</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>835 000</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>228 764</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>1 040 040</b>	<b>100%</b>
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**a** = planned component weighting values were obtained from the PRRO project documents,

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## Meta-Evaluation of WFP's PRRO Category - Highly Unstable

PRRO's evaluated or scheduled for evaluation in 2001-2002

	West African Coast (Regional)	Angola
<b>PRRO Effectiveness</b>		
<b>Overall</b>	PRRO meets overall utilization targets though highly dynamic region results in local variability in meeting targets.	operation was able "to meet primary objective of saving lives", though beneficiary numbers are below targets by 20% due to access problems.
<b>Relief Objectives</b>	Relief objectives appear to be met but no	relief objective largely met. needs were met though



Full Report of the Thematic Evaluation of the PRRO Category

	beneficiary assessments provided by reports.	challenges of Angola resulted in excess mortality and malnutrition even in WFP-assisted areas because of enormous needs. Pellagra outbreak occurred in 2000. WFP and others pressured to move away from GFD may have resulted in errors of targeting exclusion.;
<b>Recovery Objectives</b>	Recovery objectives: high variability according to circumstance. Sierra Leone was able to benefit from short term FFW to shift from general food distribution even in absence of durable peace. Though no quantitative information available on extent of recovery activities, beneficiary benchmarks were lower. No evidence of assessment of effectiveness of these interventions, also evidence of insufficient staff to support recovery programming needs.	Recovery objectives only partially met: Activities fell short of goals given the overwhelming relief needs and lack of land available to IDPs. Only 6% resources devoted to recovery objectives in end and no outcome data on long term effects of recovery activities.
<b>Factors Impeding PRRO Effectiveness:</b>		
<b>Targeting</b>	needs work, great variability in approaches within the region	not effective as based on chronological as opposed to vulnerability criteria
<b>M&amp;E</b>	monitoring and evaluation weak generally at output and outcome levels	outcome monitoring a problem
<b>IP/IP strategy</b>	variation in capacities across region	chaotic number of Ips
<b>benefic part/cap</b>		FFW/FFA activities did not capture sufficient beneficiary input, resulting in lack of engagement
<b>environ sound</b>		
<b>Coordination</b>	complicated by regional nature of PRRO Page 26	
<b>durable assets</b>		
<b>WFP cap</b>	staff profiles required are different for recovery. Variable capacities among countries and rigid regional structure	staffing not changed to reflect recovery emphasis
<b>realistic planning</b>		no rationale for optimistic scenarios for resettlement/recovery
<b>PRRO Efficiency</b>		
	costs for food handling consistently lowered with each generation of assistance and no major pipeline breaks noted. Transport costs estimated at 127 USD/ton in 2002.	Improved efficiency over time, though continued needs for air transport makes operation expensive. Reduction in levels of GFD overall, though still high.
<b>value-added, liabilities, comments</b>		
	2) PRRO subcategories are ambiguous and applied in non-standard way within the region. No clear indicators for evaluating effectiveness of recovery and lack of standardized reporting/evaluation across countries.; (3) regional approach favors more efficient food flows; however, lack of harmonization with regional boundaries of other agencies is problematic as is lack of clear management structure and standardized reporting.  (2) Components of strategy based/planned on overlapping groups (mixing types of populations with project activity types): returnees, refugees, TFP, VGF, ESF, FFW, FFT. This does not facilitate coherent recovery. No evidence of thoughtful analysis of recovery prospects for different groups and ways to improve these prospects. Also lacks continuity of assistance from relief through recovery	There has been little evidence of value-added to the PRRO in this context. Recovery activities have been modest in size and scope. Donors see WFP's benefit largely in relief delivery and some express doubt that WFP has role in recovery.  Recovery strategy was too general (lacking regional variation), lacking a detailed analysis of potential entry points for recovery and for the key needs of women, M&E indicators did not include recovery objectives. To its credit, WFP was one of the leaders in developing a recovery strategy and one that was consistent with government norms/approaches.

\* self-evaluations

### Meta-Evaluation of WFP's PRRO Category - Highly Unstable

PRRO's evaluated or scheduled for evaluation in 2001-2002

	<b>Great Lakes (Regional)</b>
<b>Operation Number**</b>	10062.00 (former WIS 6077.01)
<b>Region</b>	ODK
<b>Evaluation Date</b>	Mar-2002
<b>PRRO Name</b>	Food Aid for Relief and Recovery in the Great Lakes Region
<b>Duration of PRRO</b>	18 mo (08/01/2001-03/04/2004***)



Full Report of the Thematic Evaluation of the PRRO Category

<b>planned (revised actual)</b>																					
<b>Preceding Operation(s):</b>	10/24/1996: Regional EMOP 5624.00-01 Food Assistance to Victims of Rwanda/Burundi Regional Emergency  01/19/1999: PRRO 6077.00 Food Aid for Relief and Recovery in the Great Lakes																				
<b>PRRO Overview</b>	The approach is two pronged: to gradually phase out free food distribution towards more targeted approaches, including food assisted recovery and to facilitate a rapid exit through short term recovery activities of one year or less. The PRRO has three basic objectives: 1.To meet nutritional needs and maintain favorable outcomes among target groups; 2.Support recovery opportunities and asset creation; 3.Enhance disaster preparedness to respond to unforeseen crises.																				
<b>Crisis</b>	Man-made: war and conflict																				
<b>Type of beneficiaries</b>	IDPs, refugees, and returnees in Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda																				
<b>No. of beneficiaries planned (revised actual )</b>	1 120 000																				
<b>Food Cost [\$]</b>	62 298 413																				
<b>Tonnage [MT] planned (revised actual )</b>	297,950 (298,040*** )																				
<b>Funding Shortfall</b>	31.37%																				
<b>PRRO Components</b>																					
	<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Planned Weighting<sup>a</sup></th> <th>Tonnage</th> <th colspan="2">Beneficiaries</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td><b>Protracted Relief:</b></td> <td>70 362</td> <td>24%</td> <td>265 500 24%</td> </tr> <tr> <td><b>Protracted Refugee:</b></td> <td>155 766</td> <td>52%</td> <td>566 920 51%</td> </tr> <tr> <td><b>Recovery:</b></td> <td>71 822</td> <td>24%</td> <td>288 500 26%</td> </tr> <tr> <td><b>Total</b></td> <td>297 950</td> <td>100%</td> <td>1120 920 100%</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>Values closely resemble most recent WINGS data</p>	Planned Weighting <sup>a</sup>	Tonnage	Beneficiaries		<b>Protracted Relief:</b>	70 362	24%	265 500 24%	<b>Protracted Refugee:</b>	155 766	52%	566 920 51%	<b>Recovery:</b>	71 822	24%	288 500 26%	<b>Total</b>	297 950	100%	1120 920 100%
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<b>Recovery:</b>	71 822	24%	288 500 26%																		
<b>Total</b>	297 950	100%	1120 920 100%																		
<b>PRRO Rations</b>																					
<b>General</b>	350-450g cereals, 30-120g pulses, 10-20g oil, 5-10g salt, 40g CSB (1857-2105 kcal); SF/TF: 1027-2376 kcal																				
<b>FFW</b>	School feeding: approximately 1400 kcal/ 190 days 1,937-2,014 kcal 333-410g cereal, 120-167g pulses, 20-24g oil,																				
<b>Repatriation Pkg.</b>	None																				

\* self-evaluations

\*\* most recent operation for which assessment/evaluation information was available

\*\* most recent per WINGS Project Plan Revision History, Feb 5, 2004

a = planned component weighting values were obtained from the PRRO project documents,

b = performance values were obtained from PRRO evaluation report and summary documents

Meta-Evaluation of WFP's PRRO Category - Highly Unstable

PRRO's evaluated or scheduled for evaluation in 2001-2002

	Great Lakes (Regional)
<b>PRRO Effectiveness</b>	
<b>Overall</b>	PRRO has been effective in delivering assistance to beneficiaries targeted by relief and refugee components. However, recovery targets were unrealistic and constrained by host and donor country policies. Much variability in time and place in performance.
<b>Relief Objectives</b>	Relief objectives generally met, refugee



Full Report of the Thematic Evaluation of the PRRO Category

	<p>nutritional status generally maintained within international norms. however, targeted distribution to other vulnerable groups did not meet benchmarks and outcome data were more difficult to find. Pipeline management problems caused resource shortages, resulting in an inconsistent provision of rations in the required quantities and aggravating the overall food supply picture on the ground. A pipeline break in July 2001 required a &lt;20% decrease in the ration. Due to resourcing problems and pipeline difficulties, not always able to provide complete rations. Major pipeline break starting July 2000, kcal did not return to 100% until December 2001.</p>
<b>Recovery Objectives</b>	<p>Recovery objectives only partially met. activity targets not met, recovery impacts/outcomes not monitored. Preparedness contingency stock never mobilized. Inadequate staff support for recovery programming needed. 56% of contributions were earmarked by April 2002, which seriously affected performance of Rwanda recovery activities. Donor earmarking limited the intended flexibility of commodity re-allocation.</p>
<b>Factors Impeding PRRO Effectiveness:</b>	
<b>Targeting</b>	
<b>M&amp;E</b>	
<b>IP/IP strategy</b>	
<b>beneficiary part/cap</b>	
<b>environ sound</b>	
<b>Coordination</b>	
<b>durable assets</b>	activities not planned with this in mind
<b>WFP capacity</b>	noted as constraint to recovery programming
<b>realistic planning</b>	unrealistic expectations of achieving rapid results in one year
<b>PRRO Efficiency</b>	
<b>value-added, liabilities, comments</b>	
	<p>Donors cautious about WFP's role in recovery. Flexibility of categories seen as liability by major donor; regional approach gives rise to more effective/efficient pipeline management and generally more coherent programming; however, technical support not adequate. Some evidence that in this region, where country programs are significant, regional strategy may have less value-added.</p> <p>Recovery strategy lacks a clear analysis of recovery prospects and constraints. It also lacks a clear integration of project activities to achieve recovery. Food assisted programming is largely traditional FFW and doesnot consider adequately human assets development; for example, school feeding was relatively minor as a component.</p>

\* self-evaluations

## Annex V

### Planning and Policy Inputs for Recovery Strategies

Country/index PRRO	Operational Inputs			Policies referred to in PRRO proposal					
	JFAM/ JAM	Country Programme	Other	Socio- economic plans	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper	Consolidated Appeals Process	Common Country Assessment (CCA)/ UNDAF	Reconstruc- tion policy plans	Other
Algeria PRRO 6234.00									
Angola PRRO 6159.01			FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission 16 April to 4 May 2000, and 15 May to 6 June 2002; Vulnerability Analysis June-October 2001; VAM exercises						Commitments to Women
Azerbaijan 6121.00			Household Food Economy Survey, 1998- 1999						Commitments to Women
Cambodia 6038.00									CSO
CAR 6089.00								✓	Reports issued by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)

Country/index PRRO	Operational Inputs			Policies referred to in PRRO proposal					
	JFAM/JAM	Country Programme	Other	Socio-economic plans	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper	Consolidated Appeals Process	Common Country Assessment (CCA)/UNDAF	Reconstruction policy plans	Other
Colombia PRRO 6139.00							✓		
Ethiopia PRRO 6180.00	✓✓		FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to Ethiopia, November to 8 December 2001; VAM exercises						WFP Ethiopia's Gender Action Plan
Georgia PRRO 6122.00 6122.01			Georgia Emergency Household Economy Assessment November 2000; VAM exercises						

Country/index PRRO	Operational Inputs			Policies referred to in PRRO proposal					
	JFAM/ JAM	Country Programme	Other	Socio- economic plans	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper	Consolidated Appeals Process	Common Country Assessment (CCA)/ UNDAF	Reconstruc- tion policy plans	Other
GLR 6077.00	✓					✓	✓		From Crisis to Recovery; “ <i>Une stratégie économique et sociale 1998–2000</i> ” (Economic and social strategy, 1998–2000); <i>Public Investment Programme</i> , the <i>Policy Framework Paper</i> and the second Round Table document on reconstruction, rehabilitation and development as its main planning tools, <i>Agriculture Development Strategy towards 2010</i>

Country/index PRRO	Operational Inputs			Policies referred to in PRRO proposal					
	JFAM/JAM	Country Programme	Other	Socio-economic plans	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper	Consolidated Appeals Process	Common Country Assessment (CCA)/UNDAF	Reconstruction policy plans	Other
Guinea-Bissau 6154.00			VAM exercises						
Indonesia 6195.00			VAM exercises						
Iran 6126.00	✓								Commitments to Women
Somalia 6073.00			VAM exercises						
Sri Lanka 6152.00		✓							
Sudan 6189.00		✓	FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission, 8 to 30 October 2001				✓		
Uganda 6176.00		✓✓	Conflict Risk Assessment Report, African Great Lakes (incl. Uganda), September 2002; Nutrition Survey among the Internally Displaced Population in Northern Uganda, January 2003; VAM exercises				✓		Commitments to Women, Country Programme, Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP), Uganda Vision 2025, Agriculture Modernization Plan, National Food Strategy, Self-Reliance, (Uganda) Strategy for Refugee Hosted Areas: 1999–2003, World Bank's Comprehensive Development Framework(CDF)



Country/index PRRO	Operational Inputs			Policies referred to in PRRO proposal					
	JFAM/ JAM	Country Programme	Other	Socio- economic plans	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper	Consolidated Appeals Process	Common Country Assessment (CCA)/ UNDAF	Reconstruc- tion policy plans	Other
WAC 6271.00 10064.0	✓					✓			6271.0: Country Gender Action Plans, Commitments to Women, CSO (under preparation), Country Programme for Guinea 10064.0: Commitments to Women, Guinea Country Programme

## Annex VI

### PRRO Recovery Strategy Progression Table

Country/PRRO	PRRO Recovery Strategy in Relation to Predecessor Operation				Other	
	No recovery elements	Recovery elements unchanged	Recovery elements somewhat different	Recovery substantially different	Substantial difference in successor PRRO in relation to PRRO reviewed	Notes
Algeria 6234.00	X					
Angola 6159.01			X			
Azerbaijan 6121.00		X				
Cambodia 6038.00			X		X	
Central America (Regional) 6089.00				X	X	
Colombia 6139.00				X		
Ethiopia 6180.00			X			No recovery strategy section in project document for 6180
Georgia 6122.00/.01		X				
Great Lakes (Regional) 6077.00*						Unable to assess real shifts in recovery programming between country-level EMOPs and PRRO
Guinea-Bissau 6154.00				X		
Indonesia 6195.00*		X				
Iran 6126.00		X				No recovery strategy section in project document 6126

Country/PRRO	PRRO Recovery Strategy in Relation to Predecessor Operation				Other	
	No recovery elements	Recovery elements unchanged	Recovery elements somewhat different	Recovery substantially different	Substantial difference in successor PRRO in relation to PRRO reviewed	Notes
Somalia 6073.00			X			
Sri Lanka 6152.00*			X		X	
Sudan 6189.00			X			No recovery strategy section in project document 6189
Uganda 6176.00				X		
West African Coast (Regional) 6271.00*		X				



*Rating criteria:* “No recovery elements” = no recovery activities stated in PRRO proposal; “Recovery unchanged” = recovery activities presented are fundamentally unchanged from activities planned in predecessor project(s), or there has been some change in project scope/targeting but no change in the substance of activities; “Somewhat different” = some change in the type of recovery activities planned; “Later PRRO substantially different” = later PRRO(s) describe notably changed recovery planning and activities; “No recovery strategy” = no explicitly stated recovery strategy presented in PRRO proposal documents (reviewed activity)

*Sources:* EMOP/PRO/PRRO proposals for WFP Executive Board Approval, accessed in WINGS. PRO/PRRO evaluation reports, accessed in WINGS or provided by country office.

\*Earlier operation utilized to assess progression



Annex VII

Direct Operational Cost/Ton and Direct Support Cost/Ton



\*\*predecessor projects were EMOPs, all others were PRO/PRRO

+no predecessor project



\*\*predecessor projects were EMOPs, all others were PRO/PRRO  
 + no predecessor project

## Annex VIII

### Specific Programme Components Budgeted Separately

Case	Index number	Total planned budget (cost to WFP) (US\$)	Total tons	Total beneficiaries	Monitoring and evaluation (US\$)	Training/ capacity-building (US\$)	Programme design (US\$)
Algeria	6234.00	27,855,479	64,498	155,000	2,500 (.00897%)	2000 (.00717%)	2,500 (pp) (.00897%)
	10172.0	29,765,704.00	66,654	155,430	None listed	11,000 (.0369%)	(note 1)
Angola	6159.01	167,671,644	228,782	1,040,040	75,000 (.0362%)	93,750 (.0453)	None listed
	10054.1	233,518,264	305,598	1,160,000	None listed	86,600 (.0288%)	None listed
Azerbaijan	6121.00	23,152,786	47,980	485,000	40,000 as eval. (.173%) 20,000 as project appraisal (.086%)	13,500 (.0583%)	None listed
	10168.0	20,163,915	43,087	430,500	None listed	13,500 (.0669%)	None listed
Cambodia	6038.0	40,881,326	75,104	1,299,400	495,000 (1.2%)	59,600 (.145%)	150,000 as pa, studies, surveys. (.364%)
	6038.01	58,301,454	113,550	1,438,334	276,830 (.475%)	36,900 (.0633%)	33,750 as pp (.058%)
Central America Regional	6089.00	73,105,113	111,607	2,003,000	85,000 (listed as eval. and audit) (.116%)	None listed	190,000 as pa (.259%)
	10212.0	56,622,080	129,951	690,000	30,000 (.0449%)	110,500 (1.66%)	20,000 as pp (.0299%) 40,000 as case studies (.0598%)
Colombia	6139.00	8,891,109	38,928	227,000	35,000 (.394%)	None listed	10,000 as pa (.112%)
	10158.0	25,949,993	71,523	375,000	None listed	45,000 (.0937%)	None listed

Case	Index number	Total planned budget (cost to WFP) (US\$)	Total tons	Total beneficiaries	Monitoring and evaluation (US\$)	Training/ capacity-building (US\$)	Programme design (US\$)
Ethiopia	6180	63,653,926	117,036	248,595	40,000 (.063%)	20,000 (.0314%)	20,000 as pp (.0314%)
	10127.0	40,369,322	84,555	160,000	None listed	40,000 (.07%)	None listed
Georgia	6122.00	14,470,657	18,190	182,000	36,500 as project eval. (.367%)	None listed	12,500 as pa (.126%)
	6122.01	14,470,657	29,934	454,000	4,500 (listed as monitoring and logistics) (.031%)	8,000 (.055%)	3,500 as pa (.024%)
	10211.0	23,389,372	50,493	209,500	none listed	46,200 (.198%)	None listed
Guinea-Bissau	6154.00	5,678,894	6,985	93,100	36,000 (.634%)	10,000 (.176%)	20,000 as pp (.352%)
	10148.0	4,352,906	5,987	115,750	None listed	16,000 (.368%)	None listed
Great Lakes Regional	6077.0	269,854,644	422,478	1,250,000	314,704 (.12%)	430,003 (.16%)	None listed
	10062.0	167,087,444	297,950	1,120,000	314,800 (.18%)	156,138 (.093%)	10,000 as pp (.006%)
Indonesia	6195.00	62,071,426	170,850	2,400,000	58,195 (.094%)	None listed	None listed
	10069.0	60,546,172	177,180	1,200,000	None listed	40,000 (.061%)	None listed
Iran	6126.0	6,529,561	24,199	136,000	10,000 (.153%)	None listed	5,000 as pa (.077%)
	10213.0	16,181,887	41,241	1,120,000	None listed	14,000 (.087%)	(Note 2)
Somalia	6073.00	55,448,041	63,104	1,320,000	None listed	46,500 (.084%)	None listed
	10191.0	48,041,251	63,198	2,899,754	None listed	75,000 (.156%)	None listed

Case	Index number	Total planned budget (cost to WFP) (US\$)	Total tons	Total beneficiaries	Monitoring and evaluation (US\$)	Training/ capacity-building (US\$)	Programme design (US\$)
Sri Lanka	6152.00	12,973,786	35,337	100,520	20,000 (.097%)	5,000 (.024%)	5,000 as pp (.024%)
	10067.0	17,898,551	55,513	217,030	None listed	6,000 (.017%)	None listed
Sudan	6189.0	15,114,917	34,313	253,943	40,000 (.26%)	5,000 (.03%)	30,000 as pa (.198%)
	10122.0	7,438,623	15,475	55,000	None listed	5,000 (.07%)	None listed
Uganda	6176.0	50,641,070	82,578	411,500	50,000 (.098%)	40,000 (.079%)	63,000 as pp (.124%)
	10121.0	102,973,763	175,645	1,029,415	None listed	174,000 (.169%)	None listed
West Africa Coastal Regional	6271.0	10,973,763	103,210	965,000	None listed	None listed	None listed
	10064.0	60,400,746	104,943	835,000	None listed	87,567 (.145%)	None listed
	10064.1	56,817,004	98,792	789,430	None listed	114,500 (.2%)	None listed



## Annex IX

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## **Annex X**

### **List of Persons Interviewed** *(Shows post titles at time of interview)*

#### **EB Members**

- M. Modibo Mahamane Touré (Mali)
- M. Didi Ould Biya, Commissaire de la santé alimentaire (Mauritania)
- Mr. James Thompson, Operations Team Leader, Food For Peace/USAID
- H.E. Mohammad Saeid Noori-Naeini (Islamic Republic of Iran)
- Ms Margit Slettevold Permanent Representative of Norway, accompanied by Mr. Anja Sundby HEM Executive Officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo
- Mr. Michael Odeval, Minister, Permanent Representative of Sweden
- Mr. Michael De Knoop, Unité sécurité alimentaire, EuropAid (Bruxelles)
- Ms. Karen Sandercock, Adviser (Development Cooperation) Alternate Permanent Representative of Australia and Ms. Cilla Bellard, Acting Director UN Commonwealth Section, AUSAID
- Ambassador Anthony Beattie, Permanent Representative of the UK, and Mr. Mike Ellis, First Secretary Humanitarian Affairs

#### **WFP Staff**

- Mr. Daly Belgasmi, Director, WFP Office, Geneva
- Mr. J.J.Graisse, Deputy Executive Director, OED
- Mr. Holbrook Arthur, Regional Director, ODK
- Ms. Zoraida Mesa, Regional Director, ODM, Mr. Paul Ares, Deputy Regional Director and Ms. Deborah Hines, Regional Programme Adviser
- Mr. M. Aranda da Silva, Regional Director, ODD
- Mr. Khaled Adly, Regional Director, ODC and Mr. M. de Gaay Fortman, Country Director, Iran
- Ms. Judith Lewis, Regional Director, ODJ
- Mr. Jeff Taft-Dick, Country Director, Sri Lanka
- Ms. Nicole Menage, Country Director, Tanzania
- Ms. Georgia Shaver, Country Director, Ethiopia
- Mr. Louis Imbleau, Mr. G. Lodesani and Mr. J. Bagarishya, WAC Regional PRRO
- Mr. Jamie Wickens, Associate Director of Operations, ODO
- Mr. Francesco Strippoli, Director, Office of Humanitarian Affairs, OHA
- Mr. Amir Abdulla, Director, OEDB
- Mr. Kees Tuinenburg, Director, OEDE
- Mr. Paul Buffard, Senior Programme Adviser, ODO
- Ms. Marianne Ward, Programme Officer, OHA
- Mr. Allan Jury, Chief, PSPP
- Ms. Gordana Jerger, Chief, Programming Service, ODP
- Mr. David Kaatrud, Chief, Logistics Branch, OTL
- Mr. Francisco Roque Castro, Country Director, Angola
- Mr. Stephen Anderson, Programme Officer, ODP
- Ms. Anthea Webb, Assistant to Director, RE

- Ms. Valerie Guarnieri, Senior Policy Analyst, PSPP
- Ms. Rita Bhatia, Programme Adviser, PSPN
- Ms. Annalisa Conte, Chief, VAM
- Mr. Scott Green, Evaluation Officer, OEDE
- Mr. Peter Guest, Programme Officer, ODR
- Mr. Kawinzi Heineman, Budget Officer, OEDB
- Mr. Wolfgang Herbinger, Senior Programme Officer, OHA
- Mr. Thomas Keusters, Chief, HRO
- Mr. Julian Lefevre, Chief Evaluation Officer, OEDE
- Ms. Karin Manente, Sen. Res. Mob. Off. & Deputy Chief, REE
- Mr. Zlatan Milisic, Emergency Officer, OHA
- Ms. Marian Read, Senior Monitoring Officer, OEDE
- Ms. Susana Rico, Deputy Country Director, Afghanistan
- Ms. Guillermina Segura, Senior Liaison Officer, ODM
- Ms. Pippa Bradford, Country Director, Georgia
- Mr. Yulon Tsilosani, Programme Assistant, Georgia
- Ms. Khatuna Epremidze, Programme Officer, Georgia
- Ms. Thi Van Hoang, Head of Programme, Georgia
- Ms. Marloes Van der Sande, Policy Officer, PSPP
- Mr. Suresh Sharma, Director, FS
- Ms. Valerie Sequeira, Director, FRD
- Ms. Dianne Spearman, Director PSPP
- Mr. Michael Stayton, Director, OED
- Mr. Saeed Malik, Director, ODR
- Ms. Beatrice Bonnevaux, Programme Adviser, ODC
- Mr. Bradley Busetto, Project Manager of the Business Process Review, OEDBP

#### **UNHCR**

- Ms. Laura Lo Castro, Senior Food Aid Coordinator, Health and Community Development Section (HCDS)
- Mr. Arafat Jamal, Operations Policy, Evaluation Section
- Janak Upadhyay, Senior Training Officer, Programme Coordination and Operational Support (former Head of Food and Statistical Unit)
- Zahra Mirghani, Senior Technical Officer (Food and Nutrition), HCDS
- Ms. Myriam Houtart, Senior Technical Self-Reliance Officer
- Ms. Marjon Kamara, Director, Division of Operational Support
- Mr. Luc Stevens, Senior Inspections Officer, Office of the Inspector General (former Head of Food and Statistical Unit)

#### **OCHA**

- Ms. Coco Ushiyama (formerly WFP-OHA)
- Mr. Bradley Foster
- Ms. Magda Nanaber van Eyben, Chief, CAP & Donor Relations Section
- Ms. Merete Johannsson, Chief, Europe and Central Asia Section

**UNICEF**

- Mr. Nils Kastberg
- Ado Vaher

**UNDP**

- Ameer Haq

**ECHO**

- Mr. Michel Arrion

**DFID**

- Mr. Donal Brown

**USAID/US Mission**

- Mr. John Brause
- Ms. Regina Davis

**Others:**

- Mr. Ron Ockwell, WFP consultant working on the PDM
- Mr. Daniel Clay, Michigan State University



## Annex XI

### Questionnaire Survey

#### REVIEW OF THE PRRO CATEGORY

For each of the statements below, please indicate the number that best reflects your opinion, where: **1=strongly disagree 2=disagree 3=neutral 4=agree 5=strongly agree 6=no comment/opinion**. If you would like to comment further, space is provided.

1. A PRRO that addresses a particular crisis would be easier to resource than the second or third phase of an EMOP that would address the same crisis, all other factors being equal.

1. Strongly disagree   2. Disagree   3. Neutral   4. Agree   5. Strongly agree   6. No opinion

Comments: (first click and then type in grey box below)

2. The PRRO category is better able to capture longer-term resourcing than is the EMOP category.

1. Strongly disagree   2. Disagree   3. Neutral   4. Agree   5. Strongly agree   6. No opinion

Comments: (first click and then type in grey box below)

3. The PRRO is a more flexible programming instrument than is the EMOP.

1. Strongly disagree   2. Disagree   3. Neutral   4. Agree   5. Strongly agree   6. No opinion

Comments: (first click and then type in grey box below)



**4. In practice, PRRO formulation requires a greater investment of human resources than do EMOPs.**

1. Strongly disagree opinion    2. Disagree    3. Neutral    4. Agree    5. Strongly agree    6. No

**Comments: (first click and then type in grey box below)**

.....

**5. The PRRO process is too cumbersome.**

1. Strongly disagree opinion    2. Disagree    3. Neutral    4. Agree    5. Strongly agree    6. No

**Comments: (first click and then type in grey box below)**

.....

**6. Under normal circumstances, there is sufficient budgetary flexibility within the PRRO budget in order not to have to revert to formal budget revisions.**

1. Strongly disagree opinion    2. Disagree    3. Neutral    4. Agree    5. Strongly agree    6. No

**Comments: (first click and then type in grey box below)**

.....

**7. The current budget revision process for PRROs (In the case of revisions under delegated authority to the Regional Director) is so cumbersome that it discourages using an existing PRRO to respond to changing needs in a country.**

1. Strongly disagree opinion    2. Disagree    3. Neutral    4. Agree    5. Strongly agree    6. No

**Comments: (first click and then type in grey box below)**

.....



**8.a The process for budget revisions requiring EB approval for PRROs is so time-consuming that it compromises the relevance of the category.**

1. Strongly disagree   2. Disagree   3. Neutral   4. Agree   5. Strongly agree   6. No opinion
- 

**Comments: (first click and then type in grey box below)**

.....

**8.b The process for budget revisions not requiring EB approval for PRROs is so time-consuming that it compromises the relevance of the category.**

1. Strongly disagree   2. Disagree   3. Neutral   4. Agree   5. Strongly agree   6. No opinion
- 

**Comments: (first click and then type in grey box below)**

.....

**9. In practice, PRROs require more staff time than do EMOPs.**

1. Strongly disagree   2. Disagree   3. Neutral   4. Agree   5. Strongly agree   6. No opinion
- 

**Comments: (first click and then type in grey box below)**

.....

**10. In general, PRROs are well-integrated with other in-country strategies and programmes.**

1. Strongly disagree   2. Disagree   3. Neutral   4. Agree   5. Strongly agree   6. No opinion
- 

**Comments: (first click and then type in grey box below)**

.....





**11. PRROs, as implemented, contribute to the process of relief to recovery, transforming insecure, fragile conditions into durable, stable situations.**

1. Strongly disagree    2. Disagree    3. Neutral    4. Agree    5. Strongly agree    6. No opinion

**Comments:** (first click and then type in grey box below)

.....

**12. Please indicate whether you agree or disagree that the programme quality of PRROs is superior to that of EMOPs. (Please tick appropriate box)**

**AGREE**  
**DISAGREE**

<input type="checkbox"/> Targeting:	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/> Assessment, monitoring, evaluation:	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/> Gender sensitive approaches:	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/> Greater beneficiary impact:	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/> Capacity Building of local organizations:	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/> Increased partnerships with local organizations:	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/> Community participation:	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/> A clear recovery strategy:	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

**13. Do you believe that the three components under the PRRO (i.e. relief, refugee and recovery) should be retained or eliminated? (Tick box)**

**YES**      **NO**  
     

a. If you feel they should be retained, what value do you feel they have?

.....

b. If the components should be eliminated, what should replace them? Or should they not be replaced?

.....



**14. In your opinion, should the PRRO category be retained? (Tick box)**

YES

NO

a. If yes, why? .....

b. If no, do you think EMOPs and development projects are sufficient instruments for operations in most settings?

.....

c. Do you believe that some other programme category should be used to programme WFP resources? Please explain.

.....

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**15. Please make any suggestions for improvements to the PRRO category in each of the following areas: (tick in grey box then type in your text)**

a)	Design/project preparation and PRRO guidelines:	
b)	PRRO project document:	
c)	Headquarters and regional support to the PRRO	
d)	Country Office staffing configuration:	
e)	Assessment, monitoring and evaluation:	
f)	Reporting:	

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**16. Do you have any other comments on the value-added of the PRRO category?**

.....

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17. Please list and briefly describe exemplary applications of food aid for recovery programming that you think should be included in a WFP “best practices” or “lessons learned” repository for PRROs. Please indicate where, when, how and why the application was successful.

1	
2	
3	
4	
5	

---

**Remember to SAVE your document**

**THANK YOU FOR TAKING THE TIME TO ANSWER THESE QUESTIONS**