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Angola Relief and Recovery
Operations Portfolio*

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Responsibility for the opinions expressed in this report rests solely with the authors. Publication of this document does not imply endorsement by WFP of the opinions expressed.

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Acronyms

ACO	(WFP) Angola Country Office
ADPP	Ajuda de Desenvolvimento de Povo para Povo em Angola (Humana People to People in Angola)
CBAW	Childbearing Age Women
CCA	Common Country Assessment
CCF	Christian Children's Fund
CD	(WFP) Country Director
CFSAM	(FAO/WFP) Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CO	(WFP) Country Office
COMPAS	WFP's Commodity Tracking System.
CSB	Corn Soya Blend (a micronutrient fortified milled and blended food product)
DP	Distribution Point
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EB	(WFP) Executive Board
ECW	(WFP) Enhanced Commitments to Women
EDP	Extended Distribution Point
EMOP	(WFP) Emergency Operation
FAM	Food Aid Monitor
FDC	Food Distribution Committees
FFA	Food-for-Assets
FFE	Food-for-Education
FFI	Food-for-Infrastructure
FFS	Food-for-Skills
FFT	Food-for-Training
FFW	Food-for-Work
GAA	German Agro-Action (NGO)
GAM	Global Acute Malnutrition
GD	General Distribution
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GMO	Genetically Modified Organisms
GoA	Government of Angola
HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
IDD	Iodine Deficiency Disorders
IDP	Internally Displaced Person/People
INEA	Angolan National Roads Institute
IP	Implementing Partner
ISP	DFID-funded Institutional Strengthening Programme
ITSH	Internal Transport, Storage and Handling
LoA	Letter of Agreement
LTSH	Landside Transport, Storage and Handling
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MICS	Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey



MINARS	Ministry of Social Assistance and Reintegration
MINOPS	Minimum Operating Standards
MoEC	Ministry of Education and Culture
MoF	Ministry of Finance
MoH	Ministry of Health
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPLA	Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
MT	Metric Tons
NFI	Non Food Item
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
OCHA	Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance
ODJ	(WFP) Southern Africa Regional Bureau (Johannesburg)
ODOC	Other Direct Operational Costs (a WFP budget category)
OEDE	(WFP) Office of Evaluation
PDM	Post-Distribution Monitoring
PRRO	(WFP) Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation
RBM	Results Based Management
SF	School Feeding
SFP	Supplementary Feeding Programme
SG	(UN) Secretary-General
SO	(WFP) Special Operation
SPR	(WFP) Standardized Project Report
TB	Tuberculosis
TFP	Therapeutic Feeding Programme
ToR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNAIDS	Join UN Programme on HIV/AIDS
UNCT	UN Country Team
UNDAF	UN Development Assistance Framework
UNDG	UN Development Group
UNDP	UN Development Programme
UNHCR	UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	UN Children's Fund
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
USD	United States Dollar
VA	Vulnerability analysis
VAM	Vulnerability analysis and Mapping
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization
WINGS	WFP's corporate information network (global system)/SAP-based



Table of Contents

Executive Summary	v
I. INTRODUCTION	1
1. Context and Evolution of WFP Assistance in Angola	1
2. Objectives of the Evaluation and Scope of Work	6
3. Methodology	7
4. Constraints	9
II. FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	10
1. Relief and Recovery Strategies, Coordination and Partnerships	10
1.1 Overview of Effectiveness, Efficiency, Relevance and Connectedness	10
1.2 General Distributions	20
1.3 Nutrition and Medical Programmes	23
1.4 Food for Work/Food for Assets	34
1.5 Food for Training/School Feeding Programmes	37
1.6 Special Operations	45
2. Targeting	59
3. Monitoring and Evaluation Systems and Results-Based Management	64
4. Protection	75
5. Gender	87
Map of Angola	
ANNEXES	
Annex 1 Evaluation Terms of Reference	
Annex 2 List of People Met by Evaluation Mission	
Annex 3 Field Visit Itinerary	
Annex 4 Bibliography	
Annex 5 Lessons Learned - WFP Angola Portfolio 2001 - 2004	
Annex 6 Recommendations - WFP Angola Portfolio Evaluation 2005	
Annex 7 2002 Angola Portfolio Evaluation Matrix, Updated January 2005	
Annex 8 Planned Vs Actual Beneficiaries and Commodities Distributed 2002, 2003, 2004 (Tables and Graphs)	
Annex 9 Recommendations for Integrated Management of VAM, M&E and Programme	
Annex 10 Angola PRRO 10054 Logframe Matrix	



Executive Summary

WFP has actively served people affected by civil war in Angola since the mid-1970's, alternating between life-saving emergency operations (EMOPs) and protracted relief and recovery operations (PRROs). An average of 1.6 million MT of food reached 1.1 million people each year, peaking at about two million during 1993–1995. The first external evaluation of WFP Angola activities, which took place in September 2001, identified the following challenges for WFP operations:

- 1) determining WFP's overall goals and articulating programme guidelines;
- 2) establishing a flexible and field-based recovery strategy for all FFW activities;
- 3) developing a flexible approach that permitted a rapid expansion of recovery activities or a return to life-saving activities depending on the situation.

The period covered by the Evaluation, from January 2002 to December 2004, included three PRROs and five special operations (SOs), and was characterized by tremendous population movements and critical levels of food insecurity throughout most of Angola. With the return of peace in 2002, Angola's mobile population rose to over four million resettling IDPs and returnees from neighbouring countries. Ironically, the end of the conflict engendered further challenges, as insecurity and widespread displacement, and resulting fractured agricultural productivity produced episodes of acute famine throughout the remainder of 2002 and early 2003.

By 2004, the number of food insecure and highly vulnerable people had significantly declined, leaving fewer but nonetheless critical pockets of at-risk populations. Improved access enabled humanitarian aid workers to reach areas for the first time in decades and increasing numbers of Angolans sought assistance to rebuild their lives. Destroyed infrastructure, staggering mine-clearance requirements, and significantly diminished human capital were but a few of the obstacles hindering progress from emergency relief to sustainable recovery. Possibilities to improve livelihoods, build capacity, and implement sustainable solutions became for the first time in nearly thirty years, more than rhetoric.

As the number of food insecure people declined, WFP's capacity to assess vulnerability expanded, enabling it to offer evidence-based advice for recovery efforts. The Central Highlands thus began to receive increased attention in 2004, as access improved and numbers of resettled people rose in this highly food insecure region. Meanwhile, macroeconomic stability improved, as evidenced



by a steadier local currency (Kwanza), slowed inflation levels and a rise in gross domestic product (GDP) of up to 10 percent in 2004. With considerable natural resources and potential for revenue, the Government of Angola (GoA) has been increasingly pressured by donors to shift spending to social rather than defense sectors. Thus, although social indicators continued to decline, the return of peace to a country with abundant natural resources was accompanied by a sharp decline in donor interest and support, and post-emergency humanitarian resources subsequently dwindled.

While the most recent PRRO called for the distribution of 228,000 MT of food in 2004, and 171,000 MT in 2005, the amount available for 2004 was only 121,000 MT. The present PRRO has subsequently reduced the coverage of most programmes, and concentrated on refining vulnerability analyses and on strategically planning and implementing recovery-rather than relief-oriented activities. As continuing declines in donor contributions diminish WFP's capacity for programming, the ACO will need to expand advocacy efforts for a meaningful partnership with the GoA.

Agricultural production in Angola was expected to improve quite slowly, with constraints of poor soil and limited access to productive assets such as animal traction, seeds, and fertilizers, and inadequate extension services remaining significant. In addition to ensuring adequate food supplies while newly returned people await their first or second harvests, WFP's food assistance has increasingly targeted the most vulnerable, through a variety of safety nets, including ongoing medical and nutrition programmes, SF programmes and FFW to create suitable learning environments for children, and FFW/FFA in line with the UNDAF strategic priorities.

Limited physical access to large areas of the country posed a major obstacle to implementing planned recovery activities. Yet, despite exorbitant costs for transport, and unreliable and even hazardous road and bridge infrastructure, widespread de-mining efforts, and road and bridge repair and construction significantly improved land transport and accessibility. The quantity of food transported by air was reduced from 15 to 10 percent in 2004, as road and bridge improvements through SOs permitted increased access to remote locations throughout the period.

Although undocumented in reports, the evaluation concluded that WFP largely met its objective of saving lives through the regular and substantial distribution of food aid to war-affected vulnerable populations, including internally displaced people (IDPs), returning refugees, and residents without other sources of food. The operation may have failed some of the food insecure population, due to pipeline breaks and delays, lower-than-planned resourcing levels, inadequate targeting methods, and the inability of staff and implementing partners to reach a large number of areas of the country during times of need.



The operation also contributed to nutrition objectives, though in an unquantifiable manner and mainly in terms of reduction of acute, rather than chronic malnutrition. While most achievements in household food security were immediate, rather than sustainable, some recovery objectives, through FFW among others, received increasingly greater focus. Ongoing constraints, including the continuing weak role and presence of the GoA technical services and declining availability of IPs in remote areas, limited achievements in comparison with emergency objectives.

Resettlement of IDPs has taken place throughout the period, but oftentimes under conditions that did not conform to standards established by the international community/GoA. Refugee return has taken place at a much slower rate than planned with an outstanding number of approximately 50,000 identified for return.

The M&E system has steadily improved and now forms a sound basis for efficient data collection and storage. However, the system is isolated from Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping (VAM) and Programme Units, and management, is used exclusively for reporting purposes, and presently does not provide information on outcome level indicators, analysis of achievements, or evaluation of operations. VAM has advanced dramatically and the office benefits from regular vulnerability analyses. While information and VAM selection criteria and indicators are used for geographical targeting, such criteria are not used systematically for beneficiary selection, within the same geographical areas.

School feeding and support to primary education offer an opportunity for broader community participation in development, reconciliation, improving attendance and addressing obvious nutritional need. WFP's contributions to feeding school children must be seen in the overall environment of weak government services, funding and commitment, inadequate IPs and competing educational priorities (teachers, classrooms, books, hygiene, etc.).

HIV/AIDS activities have begun timidly, and WFP has only recently begun to identify opportunities to use food assistance to HIV/AIDS prevention and mitigation efforts.

WFP has played a part in ensuring the protection beneficiaries. However, protection needs have evolved from ensuring basic safety to more complex issues encompassing a wider spectrum of human rights, such as non-discrimination in aid programmes, access to basic services, and land and property rights.

The absence of women in decision-making roles in Angola reflects deep-rooted cultural attitudes and values, according to which women are subordinate to men, and should be at home, either taking care of the children and the family, or working in the fields. The relatively low status of Angolan women and their



virtual absence from formal government positions, or managerial posts in NGOs and humanitarian agencies, may also be a result of their low educational level and high illiteracy rates. High levels of insecurity in the field could also account, at least in part, for the small number of women working in field-based GoA, WFP or NGO posts.

While WFP's recovery activities involved women as beneficiaries, they did not adequately reflect areas of priority interest to women, such as literacy, skills training and income-generation. Moreover, gender imbalances in decision-making bodies, and the special needs of households headed by women did not appear to be addressed by either WFP or IPs.

GoA authorities and IP's were insufficiently aware of WFP's Enhanced Commitments to Women (ECW), and could benefit from additional guidance. Additional gender training for new WFP staff would also be beneficial to promoting the ECW.

Whilst WFP is the main international agency for affected populations of natural disasters, displaced people and refugees, aiming to prevent hunger and malnutrition through the provision of food aid, amongst other interventions, its contributions are intended to complement the inputs of government services, other UN agencies (UNICEF, FAO and WHO) and NGOs working in food deficit areas. The presence of other entities in areas where WFP is operating has been limited in terms of number and technical quality, which has negatively affected the overall effectiveness of WFP's assistance.

WFP staff and partners are to be commended for distributing food in difficult and often hazardous living and working conditions. In order to enhance future operations, WFP should:

- design the next PRRO (2006-2008) in harmony with the undg cycle, focusing on Strategic Priorities 2, 3, 4, and 5, and including indicators from the Corporate Indicator Compendium as far as applicable and deemed feasible;
- include GoA authorities in the preparation of the new PRRO, phasing in GoA contributions and investing in skills development through training, study visits, mentoring relationships, and other forms of capacity-building, for an eventual take-over of activities by the end of the programme cycle;
- at provincial and municipal levels, create models of integrated programming for recovery and development, focusing resources on SF, FFW, SFP and TFP activities in which WFP has distinct added value, as relief distributions gradually subside, and capitalising on experience gained by WFP in other countries in the areas of SF, HIV/AIDS and recovery;
- enhance ongoing VA, including additional indicators to allow for expanded partnerships, and indicators that assess socio-economic and



political issues, to permit the use of results to assess outcomes, and, in the longer term, the impact of WFP and IPs' interventions at local level;

- establish mechanisms to ensure that 1) data analysis is reported, at both output and outcome level, guaranteeing that lessons are learned and taken into account for future similar operations; b) outcome-level information is included in SPRs, allowing for the attribution of results to both SOs and PRROs; and 3) cost-benefit analyses of SOs are conducted to measure the evolution of costs throughout the period of implementation;
- include protection considerations, as well as risks and threats, in the next situation analysis, and clearly articulate the protection dimensions of WFP's activities in future programme documents;
- conduct a thorough gender needs analysis and adjust strategies and programmes accordingly, to ensure that women are more actively involved in all aspects of operations and benefit from assets created, and that the positive effects of activities are maximised, while minimising negative ones.



I. INTRODUCTION

1. Context and Evolution of WFP Assistance in Angola

From 1998 to 2002 the situation in Angola moved from acute emergency to prolonged crisis, with continuing widespread insecurity, extreme poverty and large-scale human suffering. In April 2002, 27 years of civil war came to an end when the Government of Angola (GoA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for cessation of hostilities, thus establishing a framework for the Lusaka Peace Protocol. Nearly three years later, Angola continues to face daunting challenges, including the difficulties of resettling four million refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs).

The overall population of Angola is around 11 million inhabitants, of which some 3.5 million are in the capital, Luanda. Between 1970 and 2001, the urban population rose from 15 percent to over 50 percent of the total. A survey¹ indicates that 63 percent of households in urban and peri-urban areas live below the poverty line, of which 25 percent live below the extreme poverty line. Displaced people continue to return with few productive assets, limited opportunities for income diversification and little access to basic services, including health care and education. In addition, many returnees have lost knowledge of local farming practices after decades of absence from their land.² The slower-than-expected return of refugees³ from neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Namibia and Zambia is also noteworthy. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) originally estimated that 150,000 refugees would return to Angola during 2004, but more recent estimates indicate fewer than 100,000 people, and a more protracted period of return. Poor conditions in Angola, including questionable food security, contribute to the slower pace of return.

Food insecurity varies considerably by location.⁴ The provinces of Huambo, Bié and parts of Huíla in the Central Highlands remain the most vulnerable, followed by Moxico and Kuando Kubango in the southeast, where isolation is the key constraint. All other areas have pockets of vulnerable populations, consisting mainly of recent returnees. Land transport is severely restricted by poor roads, broken bridges, seasonally impassable roads and landmines. Limited access to large parts of the country continues to impede recovery efforts and the delivery of humanitarian assistance.⁵

WFP humanitarian assistance has alternated between life-saving emergency operations (EMOPs) and protracted relief and recovery operations (PRROs). To date, nine EMOPs and six PRROs have been implemented by WFP in Angola, in which 1.6 million MT of food reached an average of 1.1 million war-affected people each year, with a peak of almost two million beneficiaries during 1993–1995. In the aftermath of the conflict, areas

¹ Survey carried out by the National Institute for Statistics, 2001.

² WFP Information Note on Angola - PRRO 10054.2 (WFP/EB.3/2004/10).

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.



accessible to WFP expanded beyond provincial and municipal centres to include vulnerable populations in isolated areas.⁶

The first external evaluation of WFP Angola activities⁷ took place in September 2001 and its findings, conclusions and recommendations were presented, together with the subsequent phase, at the May 2002 Executive Board (EB) meeting. Three continuing challenges were identified:

1. determining WFP's goals and articulating programme implementation guidelines accordingly. Although the Evaluation recommended increasing the importance of recovery activities wherever possible, it advised WFP to discontinue the use of percentages as indicators of success;
2. articulating a flexible and field-based recovery strategy with identifying acronyms such as food for assets (FFA), food for infrastructure (FFI), food for skills (FFS) and food for education (FFE) for all food-for-work (FFW) activities. The Evaluation suggested that WFP's strategy should increase its emphasis on participatory approaches and community mobilisation and highlight self-reliance achieved as a result of recovery FFW activities;
3. developing flexible approaches for each province to allow for a rapid increase of the recovery component when security and military conditions allow. In the event that security conditions should further deteriorate, impeding resettlement programmes and recovery activities, WFP was urged to refocus its efforts on life-saving activities.

Specific recommendations included:

- A. the use of the logical framework for the next phase of the PRRO, in order to clarify goals of intervention, improve recovery strategies and develop an enhanced M&E system;
- B. a dual PRRO strategy based on life saving and asset creation as its two strategic pillars; a wider concept of recovery to encompass the creation of human and physical assets within a population, rather than focusing on FFW;
- C. capacity building as a crucial priority for efficient recovery, implying training of both WFP staff and partners in Participatory Rural Appraisals (PRA) and Rapid Rural Appraisals (RRA).

⁶ WFP project document PRRO 10054.2 (WFP/EB.3/2003/8/3).

⁷ WFP Summary Evaluation Report (WFP/EB.2/2002/3/1).



Table 1 – Summary of WFP Interventions (January 2002-December 2005)

Project	Time period	Beneficiary (,000,000)	Food tonnage (,000)	Resourced in \$ terms @ (%)	Food cost (X \$M)	Total WFP cost (X \$M)
New SO 10375.0	Oct2004- Dec2005	PRRO	n/a	new	n/a	5
PRRO 10054.2	Apr2004- Dec2005	1,5	399	25	82	237
PRRO 10054.1	Jul2002- Apr2004	1,24	342	82	60	200
SO 10146.0	Jan2002- Mar2003	PRRO	n/a	75	n/a	5
SO 10146.1	Apr2003- Dec2004	PRRO	n/a	96	n/a	7
SO 10149.0	Jan2002- Mar2003	PRRO	n/a	72	n/a	2
SO 10149.1	Dec2002- Dec2004	PRRO	n/a	90	n/a	9
PRRO 10054.0	Apr2002- July 2002	1,04	229	74	29	168

Source: WINGS data warehouse on WFP Angola and original project documents

Operational expenditure ranged from USD 109 million in 2002, to USD 145 million in 2003 and finally to USD 79 million in 2004. Food distributions followed a similar pattern with 141,000 MT reported in 2002⁸, rising to 194,000 MT in 2003⁹, and falling to 119,000 MT in 2005.¹⁰ The number of beneficiaries of various programmes varied according to identified needs and accessibility. In 2003, the actual number of assisted beneficiaries was 1,991,447.¹¹ Recipients of general distributions for resettlement constituted the largest number of beneficiaries, representing a monthly average of 79 percent (25 percent for relief distributions and 54 percent for IDPs and refugees). Beneficiaries of emergency nutrition and social programmes made up a monthly average of six percent of the total, while recovery Food-for-Work/Training beneficiaries constituted the remaining 15 percent. In 2004, the actual monthly average of assisted beneficiaries was 1,191,857.¹² Recipients of general food distributions accounted for 71 percent of the total, while vulnerable groups receiving targeted feeding made up less than four percent. Food-for-Work/Training beneficiaries had slightly increased to 16 percent of all beneficiaries.

PRRO 10054.0 continued until June 2002, emphasising life-saving activities for people at risk of starvation through emergency food distributions, maintaining and improving nutrition status through therapeutic (TFP) and supplementary feeding programmes (SFP), and supporting war-affected populations through resettlement and rehabilitation schemes.

⁸ SPR, figure includes 61,000 MT from PRRO 10054.00, and 80,000 from PRRO 10054.01.

⁹ SPR figure, 194,000 MT from PRRO 10054.01 exclusively.

¹⁰ SPR figure, 50,000 MT under PRRO 10054.01, 69,000 MT under 10054.02.

¹¹ Dacota 2003 Report – PRRO 10054.00.

¹² Dacota 2004 Report – PRRO 10054.01.



PRRO 10054.1 was initiated in mid-2002, emphasising the creation of human assets within the target population and the development of skills and capacities as mobile as the population. The PRRO aimed to encourage self-reliance through diverse survival mechanisms, to optimise WFP assistance for those most at risk of food insecurity and to pave the way for more durable solutions. Relief and recovery activities implemented under the PRRO varied, depending on the region/province and in accordance with local capacity, security and vulnerability. More than half of the beneficiaries were supported through relief distributions, and health and nutrition, while resettlement, food-for-work (FFW) and food-for-assets (FFA) activities comprised the bulk of the recovery component. Recognising that ongoing disruption affected different areas to varying degrees, a flexible food assistance strategy was adopted to handle both emergency and recovery situations. Interventions were based on vulnerability analyses for both residents and IDPs, since the conflict had eroded many residents' capacity for self-reliance.

WFP's interventions for 2002–2003 were aimed at contributing to the restoration of sustainable livelihoods of vulnerable IDPs and residents. The immediate objectives were to:

- 1) save lives by meeting basic food needs of the most vulnerable sectors of the population;
- 2) ensure adequate nutritional status in the targeted population; and
- 3) enhance the capacity of the target population to achieve food security through creation of human and physical assets.

Emphasis was placed on increasing options for income-generating schemes and other coping mechanisms in the future. Following the signature of the peace agreement in April 2002, and throughout the remainder of 2002, WFP interventions continued to be of an emergency nature, driven by expanding access to needy populations, the quartering of ex-UNITA soldiers and their dependents through demobilisation, and the influx of populations into provincial capitals from areas previously inaccessible to humanitarian assistance. By 2003, many people in need of relief food assistance progressed to requiring support for recovery, and a large number disappeared from WFP beneficiary rolls altogether.¹³

The initiation of PRRO 10054.2, planned to begin in January 2004, was postponed until April 2004 due to delayed food arrivals under the previous PRRO. The main objective of the PRRO, which is scheduled to end on 31 December 2005, was to contribute to the consolidation of peace through the prevention of hunger and malnutrition and the restoration of sustainable livelihoods among the vulnerable rural population. Accordingly, only one tenth of the tonnage was planned for distribution under the relief component.

The current PRRO also paved the way for a substantial reduction in WFP humanitarian assistance in Angola with a progressive shift of responsibilities to national authorities. This evolution was to be accompanied by increased support for the most vulnerable people through nutrition, medical and other social programmes, food-for-training (FFT), including support for school feeding (SF), FFW and FFA.¹⁴ The GoA offered to contribute USD 7.5 million to the PRRO.

¹³ WFP Information Note on Angola PRRO 10054.2 (WFP/EB.3/2004/10).

¹⁴ WFP Information Note on Angola PRRO 10054.2 (WFP/EB.3/2004/10).



At the February 2005 Executive Board session,¹⁵ WFP approved the revised definition of Special Operations (SO), defined as intending to:

- 1) rehabilitate and enhance transport and logistics infrastructure, to permit timely and efficient delivery of food assistance, especially to meet emergency and protracted relief needs; and
- 2) enhance coordination within the United Nations (UN) System and with other partners through the provision of designated common services.

An SO designed to support on-going WFP interventions contributed to improved roads in Angola. At the end of August 2004, SO 10149.1 (Logistics Services for the Humanitarian Community) was nearly fully funded and extended until February 2005. SO 10146.1 (Passenger Air Services for the Humanitarian Community) experienced a funding shortfall of USD 1 million. After reductions in the frequency of services, the SO still required USD 240,000 per month to operate, and has therefore only been extended to June 2005. SO 10375.0 (Improving Access to Vulnerable Populations through the Repair of Bridges and Water Crossings) was recently initiated and is fully funded.

Improved land travel conditions, including de-mining efforts, repaired roads and the construction of bridges, greatly improved WFP's access to affected populations. At the same time, however, other factors contributed to an overall reduction in planned beneficiaries. In 2004, all traditional large donors reduced their contributions, strongly affecting the implementation of the current PRRO and reducing planning figures for 2005 by up to one half. For example, beneficiary estimates for SF for 2005 were reduced from a planned 400,000 to fewer than 200,000.¹⁶ In light of the poor harvest in 2004, especially in the Central Highlands, WFP prolonged food distributions for an additional year. In anticipation of a better harvest in 2005, WFP's estimated number of beneficiaries for 2005 was reduced accordingly.

In November 2004, the WFP Angola Office began a review of its activities, and initiated strategic planning discussions to determine next steps for a more a development-oriented programme. Consultations continued in 2005, in preparation of the next programming phase, scheduled to begin in 2006. The next phase of WFP interventions will focus increasingly on recovery, gradually moving from relief to developmental activities over the coming three years. Main areas for food aid programming in the future were identified, including human and capital asset creation through targeted FFW/FFA schemes in agriculture rehabilitation and increased access to agricultural areas, human resource development, support to basic education, mother and child health and assistance to households affected by HIV/AIDS. SF programmes will be expanded and HIV/AIDS programmes strengthened, while safety nets will be provided in the form of nutrition and medical programmes.

¹⁵ New definition of special operations: amended General Rule II.2 (d): Programme Categories (WFP/EB.1/2005/5-B).

¹⁶ WFP Information Note on Angola PRRO 10054.2 (WFP/EB.3/2004/10).



2. Objectives of the Evaluation and Scope of Work

The main objective of the evaluation exercise was to review and assess the Angola portfolio, providing evidence-based findings of results, and proposing ways for improvement of the PRRO and SOs, with particular focus on the following topics:

- a) **relief and recovery strategies**, and **coordination and partnerships**, as derived from the problem analysis and the evolution of the situation;
- b) **targeting** issues, as derived from needs and vulnerability analyses and in line with the forthcoming thematic evaluation on targeting; and
- c) the **monitoring system**, in relation to various vulnerability and needs assessments, implementation processes and the need for informed decision-making.

The Evaluation focused on four selected evaluation criteria, in relation to the above-mentioned specific issues: effectiveness (outcomes),¹⁷ efficiency (outputs),¹⁸ relevance (strategy, co-ordination and partnerships),¹⁹ and connectedness (viability/sustainability).²⁰

In addition, two crosscutting issues, protection, in relation to food assistance, and gender in relation to WFP's Enhanced Commitments to Women (ECW)²¹ were given particular emphasis. In light of the potential for increased WFP programming in the areas of basic education and HIV/AIDS prevention and mitigation, both programming areas were given particular attention during the Evaluation. The Evaluation only addressed operational and management issues where they affected WFP's ability to achieve its objectives.

The scope of the Angola Portfolio Evaluation included an analysis of the three most recent PRROs: the final six months of PRRO 10054.0, which covered the period from April 2001 to June 2002; PRRO 10054.1, which extended from July 2002 to December 2003; and the first year of PRRO 10054.2, during the period from January 2004 until 31 December 2004.²² The Evaluation also included four SOs that were implemented to assist the PRROs to achieve their objectives.

To the extent possible, the Evaluation examined results at the outcome level, measuring progress towards achieving what was intended. The Evaluation also considered the unintended effects for each of the relief and recovery components. Relevant output level results were only examined in terms of their effect on outcomes, in order to understand

¹⁷ Effectiveness: Extent to which the operation's objectives were achieved, or expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance (Source: WFP M&E Glossary).

¹⁸ Efficiency: Measure of how economical inputs are converted to outputs (Source: WFP M&E Glossary).

¹⁹ Relevance: Extent to which the objectives of a WFP operation are consistent with beneficiaries' needs, country needs, organisational priorities, and partners' and donors' policies (Source: WFP M&E Glossary). Also, the preparation of a "recovery strategy", as the base on which all PRRO activities are designed, is recommended in "From Crisis to Recovery" (WFP/EB.A/98/4-A) as well as the -PRRO Guidelines ("Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations: Guidelines for the Preparation of a PRRO", WFP February 1999).

²⁰ Connectedness: Ensuring that activities of a short-term emergency nature are carried out in a context that takes longer-term and interconnected problems into account (Source: WFP M&E Glossary).

²¹ WFP's Enhanced Commitments to Women are outlined in the Gender Policy.

²² PRRO ends in December 2005; however, the Evaluation includes activities only until 31 December 2004.



where and why results were affected and to propose specific ways forward. Protection and gender, as cross-cutting issues, were examined in terms of their interactions in food aid interventions.

The four main topics of the Evaluation, strategies; coordination and partnerships; targeting; and monitoring and evaluation (M&E), served as the basis for the following Full Evaluation Report, with the four evaluation criteria addressed in the findings of each topic, as appropriate. Protection and gender were described separately.

The Evaluation provided an opportunity to review best practices and lessons learned regarding the use of food aid to meet immediate humanitarian needs and to create conditions for sustained recovery and transition to development. Annex 5 provides an overview of such lessons, in relation to WFP's strategic priorities and within the Angolan context. The exercise also provided an opportunity to reflect upon the future direction of WFP's interventions in Angola, and recommendations put forward by the Evaluation have been prepared in this light.

3. Methodology

The evaluation methodology consisted of a variety of approaches to information gathering. These included participatory methods such as briefing sessions and workshops with stakeholders (beneficiaries, implementing partners (IPs), GoA officials, donors, UN agencies and WFP staff members) focus group discussions, and one-on-one interviews. The Evaluation included visits to numerous food distribution sites, feeding activities and food warehouses.

An evaluation matrix, developed to provide a framework to guide data collection, fieldwork and analysis, was finalised by the team members and selected Angola Country Office (ACO) staff during the first few days of the Evaluation. The matrix linked key issues to relevant sub-issues, performance indicators, data collection methods and information sources. In developing the evaluation matrix, the Evaluation was able to examine the relationship between intervention objectives or expected output and outcome level results and the situation analysis, as presented in project documents.

In accordance with the ToR, the Evaluation was carried out in five distinct phases:

Phase I: Preliminary In-Country Visit

The team leader and WFP evaluation manager visited Angola in December 2004 in order to meet with WFP staff and together, identify key issues of relevance to the WFP Angola Office and discuss the draft Terms of Reference (ToR). The preliminary visit helped to clarify a number of important issues, to establish the scope of the Evaluation, to identify relevant expertise and finalise the selection of team members and sites to be visited, and decide on the timing of the evaluation visit. During this phase, the team leader and evaluation manager carried out a review of the extensive documentation available on food assistance to Angola, prepared a bibliography, and created a CD-Rom of relevant documents. This exercise resulted in a summary of available information and list of gaps upon which the field visits could focus. Finally, the team leader and evaluation manager designed an evaluation matrix to facilitate data collection and analysis, including suggested methodologies for information gathering.



Phase II: Preparation and Team Member Desk Review

Prior to commencing the evaluation, team members reviewed important background documents (Annex 4), provided to them on a CD-Rom.

The Office of Evaluation (OEDE) provided the ACO with a draft Evaluation ToR, which was shared with key stakeholders for review and comments. Feedback on the draft ToR, issues and topics to be included in the exercise, and a final programme of visits was received from ACO prior to the visit.

Phase III: In-country/Regional Visits and Internal Field Visits Itinerary

Upon arrival in Angola in February 2005, the team members met with ACO managers to finalise the ToR. The team then met with a large group of GoA, donor, NGOs and UN partners in Luanda to brief them on the scope and objectives of the Evaluation. After finalising the evaluation matrix and developing interview questions and other information-gathering tools, the team members conducted interviews with key WFP staff members, donors and partners in Luanda. The team then split into two groups in order to view as many sites as possible during a ten-day field visit (see Field Visit Itinerary, Annex 3). Upon return to Luanda, team members continued to meet with and interview partners, including representatives from the donor community, GoA officials, and staff members of UN agencies and NGOs.

Since the team did not collect primary quantitative data, the main sources of information were quarterly and monthly reports, distribution and post-distribution reports, and surveys. Qualitative information was collected during interviews and discussions with WFP staff members, donor representatives, IPs, including a wide variety of NGOs, UN agency staff and GoA officials at national, provincial and community levels (see Annex 2). Despite time constraints, a considerable number of interviews were held with beneficiaries of WFP programmes during visits to general distributions (GD), HIV/AIDS awareness sessions, FFW activities, nutrition and medical programmes, and SF programmes.

Phase IV: Debriefing Sessions in Three Locations

At the conclusion of the Angola visit, the Evaluation Team members held two debriefing sessions, including one for ACO staff members and a second for partners in Luanda on the Evaluation's main findings, conclusions and recommendations. A third debriefing was held in Johannesburg Regional Office (ODJ) for senior managers and advisers. A final debriefing session was held in mid-March 2005 by the Team Leader, with the participation of the Evaluation Manager, at WFP-HQ in Rome. An aide-mémoire, summarising preliminary findings, conclusions and recommendations was made available to participants prior to all debriefing sessions.

Phase V: Report Writing

Upon return from Angola, the team members prepared various sections of the final report, forming the basis of the Full Evaluation Report. Comments and feedback from all debriefings were solicited and reflected in the report. Upon completion of the first draft, the team leader submitted the report to ACO for comments and verification of data. A summary of the evaluation report will be presented to WFP's Executive Board in October 2005.



4. Constraints

A number of constraints to carrying out the Evaluation were encountered. First and foremost was the difficulty experienced in reaching some WFP activity sites outside of Luanda. While some sites were reached by air, others were only accessible by road. Problems of poor roads and inadequate or broken bridges were exacerbated by the onset of the rainy season. During the field visits, excessive rainfall had resulted in flooding, with large segments of national roads washing away. In one area where key bridges had collapsed, a group of team members and WFP staff members was obliged to adjust its programme of visits, and crossed a river by canoe rather than by car. While the evaluation team travelled only on roads cleared of mines and other unexploded ordnance (UXO), large portions of land bordering access roads were still considered to be red zones and were hence unsafe. Travel by car was slow and arduous, and team members often spent up to ten hours a day to cover distances of less than 200 kilometres. As a result, the number of sites that could be reached during field visits was limited.

As a result of high staff turnover, the Evaluation found that institutional memory was extremely limited in ACO and most sub-offices. Most international staff had been in Angola less than a year and many under six months, and was not very familiar with the programme. Due to the receipt of considerably less resources than anticipated in 2004, overall staff numbers had been reduced by one-third during the final quarter of 2004. As a result, many long-term national and international staff had departed from Angola prior to or during the Evaluation, including the M&E Unit head. A large proportion of NGO staff was new to Angola and GoA officials outside of Luanda had only recently taken up their posts.

Whilst an M&E Unit was established in ACO during the period evaluated, most information collected and recorded on a regular basis addressed outputs, rather than outcomes of WFP interventions. With the departure of many IPs as the humanitarian crisis subsided, important external sources of information and data were no longer available to WFP. At the time of the Evaluation, GoA services had yet to establish reliable information systems for health, nutrition and food security, and no large-scale survey of social indicators had taken place since the 2001 Multiple Cluster Indicator Survey (MICS). A number of key studies and surveys had been completed in 2004, including the food security and livelihoods baseline study conducted in the Central Highlands, food basket monitoring information from Benguela, and the baseline pellagra study. The results and reports were not yet available.



II. FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Relief and Recovery Strategies, Coordination and Partnerships

1.1 Overview of Effectiveness, Efficiency, Relevance and Connectedness

Background

The period under evaluation, from January 2002 to the end of 2004, was characterized by tremendous population movements and critical levels of food insecurity throughout most of the country. With the return of peace in 2002, Angola's mobile populations included resettling IDPs and returnees from neighbouring countries, who numbered upwards of four million people. Ironically, the end of the conflict engendered further challenges, as insecurity and widespread displacement, and resulting fractured agricultural productivity produced acute famine in many parts of the country throughout the remainder of 2002 and early 2003. By 2004, the number of food insecure and highly vulnerable people had significantly declined compared with previous years, leaving fewer but nonetheless critical pockets of at-risk populations.

Improved access following the return of peace enabled humanitarian aid workers to reach areas for the first time in decades. Increasing numbers of Angolans sought assistance to rebuild their lives, mainly in the form of food, seeds, and tools. Destroyed infrastructure, staggering mine-clearance requirements, and significantly diminished human capital were but a few of the obstacles hindering progress from emergency relief to sustainable recovery. However, by the end of 2004, possibilities to improve livelihoods, build capacity, and implement sustainable solutions to widespread problems became for the first time in nearly thirty years, more than rhetoric.

During the evaluation period, WFP, through three PRROs and five SOs, was in the front line of support to those most in need. As the number of food insecure people declined, WFP's capacity to assess vulnerability expanded, enabling it to offer evidence-based advice for concentrating recovery efforts in those areas most affected by food insecurity. The Central Highlands thus began to receive increased attention in 2004, as access improved and numbers of resettled people rose in this highly food insecure region.

The macro-economic situation began to stabilise across the country, as evidenced by a steadier local currency,²³ slowed inflation levels,²⁴ and a rise in gross domestic product of up to 10 percent in 2004. Social indicators, however, continued to stagnate, as the country suffered from inadequate infrastructure and social services.²⁵ Despite its considerable natural resources and great potential for revenue, the Government of Angola failed to

²³ The Angolan Kwanza has been stable since June 2003, while its value against the American dollar had decreased by more than half in the previous year.

²⁴ Annual inflation has fallen to 34.5 percent but it seems unlikely that year-end inflation for 2004 will reach the government's 20 percent target (source: The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report, December 2004).

²⁵ *Some Transparency, No Accountability: The Use of Oil Revenue in Angola and Its Impact on Human Rights* (New York: Human Rights Watch Report, January 2004).



allocate sufficient financial resources for social concerns. Even with adequate financial resources, human resources were unavailable to guarantee acceptable social services.

At the time of the evaluation, donors were reluctant to finance large infrastructure and long-term development projects, while the government earned massive revenues from natural resources. A number of donors had also decreased or discontinued funding for food aid, which they perceived to be unsustainable.²⁶ Donors reported frustration with the government's inability to use its abundant revenues, earned in 2004 from high oil prices, to provide food for its people.²⁷ Donor funding to WFP, including food and cash donations to WFP, fell sharply in 2004.²⁸ Without government funds for the recovery process, the situation facing Angola's most vulnerable became even more precarious, as the flow of international humanitarian assistance slowed to a trickle.

While the most recent PRRO called for the distribution of 228,000 MT of food in 2004, and 171,000 MT in 2005, the amount available from donors for 2004 was only 121,000 MT. The present PRRO has subsequently reduced the coverage of a number of programmes, and concentrated on refining vulnerability analyses and on strategically planning and implementing recovery - rather than relief-oriented activities. As continuing declines in donor contributions diminish WFP's capacity for food aid programming, the ACO will need to expand advocacy efforts for a meaningful partnership with the GoA.

Agricultural production in Angola was expected to improve quite slowly, with constraints of limited access to productive assets such as animal traction, seeds, and fertilizers, and inadequate extension services remaining significant. In addition to ensuring adequate food supplies while newly returned people awaited their first or second harvests, WFP's food assistance increasingly targeted the most vulnerable, through a variety of safety nets, including ongoing medical and nutrition programmes, SF programmes and FFW to create suitable learning environments for children, and FFW/FFA in line with the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) strategic priorities.

Limited physical access to large areas of the country posed a major obstacle to implementing planned recovery activities. Yet, despite exorbitant costs for transport, and unreliable and even hazardous road and bridge infrastructure, widespread de-mining efforts, and road and bridge repair and construction significantly improved land transport and accessibility. The quantity of food transported by air was reduced from 15 to ten percent in 2004, as road and bridge improvements through SOs permitted increased access to remote locations throughout the period.

²⁶ *Coming Home: Return and Reintegration in Angola*. Human Rights Watch Report, March 17, 2005.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid. Reduced international funding to WFP resulted in a 50% cut in cereal rations since 2004, limitations on food assistance to only one growing season and a reduction of SF. An Angolan law banning the import and use of genetically modified foods came into effect in early 2005, caused concern that donor contributions would be reduced even further.



EFFECTIVENESS

Findings

The effectiveness of the PRROs was difficult to assess, since the intended results in terms of outcomes of the operations and how they should be measured were absent from planning documents. However, all three PRROs increasingly applied the Logical Framework (Logframe) approach, with PRRO 10054.2 including a Logframe matrix with clearly stated outcomes and performance indicators.

In terms of saving lives, no data were available to measure the extent to which this objective was achieved. However, a number of IPs, GoA authorities, UN agencies and donors attested to the fact that affected populations, particularly immediately after the war, had nothing else to eat besides WFP rations. According to some people interviewed by the Evaluation, WFP was responsible for “hundreds of thousands of lives saved!”


Despite its considerable efforts and achievements, WFP did not meet all of the food aid requirements identified in needs assessments, due mainly to unfunded SOs, pipeline breaks and delayed deliveries. For example in May and June 2002, and again in December that year, two critical periods of considerable food insecurity in Angola, only about 60 percent of targeted beneficiaries were reached with WFP food assistance (See Table 2 and Annex 7 for details).²⁹

In one case, the Evaluation learned that food aid deliveries to demobilised soldiers were delayed during a critical period following the end of the war, in part due to a joint UN strategy to link humanitarian assistance to increased involvement of the UN in decision-making regarding demobilisation. NGOs who had observed the unmet food needs of large numbers of affected people indicated to the Evaluation that WFP, like other UN agencies, had awaited a UN-sought agreement with the GoA before providing humanitarian assistance to demobilised soldiers in mid-2002. The NGOs acknowledged that in-country food stocks were low at the time, and that once a decision had been taken by the UN to de-link humanitarian assistance from GoA action on demobilisation, WFP rapidly provided food to 450,000 demobilised UNITA soldiers and their families. In fact, according to some, WFP’s food distributions may have been an important factor in saving the peace process.

²⁹ M&E reports 2002.



**Table 2 – Planned vs. Actual Food Distributions for 2002
(by month and by no. of beneficiaries)**



In 2004, toward the end of the evaluation period, WFP's inability to reach targeted food distribution amounts and beneficiaries was due mainly to diminished available resources, resulting from decreased donations of food and cash. While there is no evidence that resource shortfalls at any one time automatically led to declines in nutritional status of planned beneficiaries, in many instances it was acknowledged that WFP was the only source of food for targeted vulnerable populations. Alternative coping mechanisms were extremely limited, particularly for demobilised soldiers, IDPs and refugees who had left temporary settlements and begun returning to their places of origin.

Assessing the results achieved for recovery activities was difficult. In December 2004, at the close of the evaluation period, WFP carried out a food security baseline study in the Central Highlands. The results of the survey were not available during the Evaluation. However, decreasing beneficiary numbers and increasing agricultural outputs indicated that overall dependency on external food assistance had declined since 2001:

- UNICEF, UNHCR, WHO and UNAIDS signed Memoranda of Understanding (MoU)³⁰ with WFP, defining strategies for collaboration, and roles and responsibility of each party. Unfortunately, funds available to UN agencies, NGOs and other partners for recovery/development decreased as the emergency situation improved, making it even more difficult for partners to ensure proper technical/financial coverage for planned activities. The latest MoU between UNICEF and WFP, drafted in January 2005, builds on previous agreements and cooperative experiences between the two agencies. Developed within the

³⁰ MoUs were signed with UNICEF and GoA in 1999, 2002, and 2005 with WHO in 2002, with UNAIDS in 2003 and with UNHCR in 2004.



framework of the global MoU, the document outlines the following objectives: improve access to adequate nutrition and to quality basic education in Angola;

- ensure that adequate nutritional standards are maintained in the target population—infants, young children and their mothers;
- increase awareness of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, in particular to school-age children.

WFP was highly praised by its partners as a strong, non-bureaucratic, rapid and crucial player in the humanitarian arena. Due to its size, outreach and capacity to move enormous quantities of food and NFI, WFP was considered the leading humanitarian partner at national, provincial and field levels during the evaluation period. However, its contributions in the arena of food aid were intended to complement the inputs of other UN agencies (UNICEF, UNHCR, FAO and WHO) as NGOs implementing programmes in food deficit areas.³¹ The nature and scope of WFP's partnerships varied considerably, with some partners using WFP food to complement and strengthen their interventions and others merely assisting WFP with the task of distributing food. Variations in relationships between WFP and partner agencies were reflected in differing degrees of ownership of activities by both WFP and IPs, and in interest in intended outcomes.

Conclusions

The Evaluation asserts that WFP's main objectives of saving lives, and maintaining and/or improving nutritional status have been achieved, based on anecdotal evidence provided in interviews and discussions, and the fact that vulnerable populations depended almost exclusively on WFP for food support throughout most of the evaluation period.

However, without documented evidence to quantify the statement, and in light of the high levels of dependence of some populations on external food aid throughout the evaluation period, the Evaluation believes it possible that the lives of some of the targeted populations may have been lost during periods when inadequate food resources were available and/or pipeline breakdowns occurred.

Although the programme design evolved and improved over the three years, it requires further adaptation, including the determination of expected outcomes, and the identification of practical means of measuring progress towards their achievement.

Interventions planned under the PRROs were based on certain assumptions, including the availability of sufficient and competent IPs, the adequate supply of complementary NFI for FFW/FFA programmes, and the existence of complementary activities and programmes to address the root causes of food insecurity and malnutrition. These assumptions, in many cases, and in varying degrees, were not met:

- to date, no IP capacity assessment has taken place, and IP performance evaluations or assessments were irregular or non-existent. While establishing fewer partnerships with larger, better performing IPs in terms of administrative and technical capacity for implementing programmes would have increased WFP's outcomes, such partners were simply not available;

³¹ Memorandum of Understanding between UNICEF and WFP, draft 11 Jan. 2005.



- the positive effects of some activities including SFP, TFP, medical programmes, and SF programmes were limited by the absence of concurrent support activities. For example, beneficiaries required to remain in centres for long periods of time could have benefited from games and other forms of developmental stimulation, or health, hygiene, literacy, income generating, or vocational training. SF outcomes could have been significantly enhanced by the introduction of health and hygiene promotion, such as deworming and hand washing activities.

WFP contributed considerably to forming and enriching humanitarian coordination and partnerships in collaboration with OCHA, the UNCT, a number of GoA departments, NGOs and donors at central, provincial and municipal levels, which will be of great value during the transition period from relief to recovery.

EFFICIENCY

Findings

According to Project Reports, actual distributions and numbers of beneficiaries reached were nearly always less than planned. Tables found in Annex 7 show a number of critical periods over the three years in which only 60 to 75 percent of requirements were met, and less than 15 percent of intended beneficiaries were reached. On a few occasions in 2002, once in 2003, and over a period of several months in 2004, however, distributions reached intended tonnages. Regarding beneficiary numbers, only at one point in the evaluation period, in early 2002, did the number of actual beneficiaries reach the planned figure. Actual beneficiary numbers peaked at 1.6 million in September 2003, rising from a low of 190,000 people in May that same year.

Throughout 2002, overall food tonnages fluctuated between a low of 8,000 MT in May and a high of over 20,000 MT in November when beneficiary numbers doubled, reaching a figure of over 1.1 million. Coverage of planned beneficiaries varied from month to month, with all intended beneficiaries reached in February/March 2002. In December, however, only 58 percent of planned beneficiaries received food, representing the largest gap that year between those requiring food and those actually receiving distributions.

Following a serious shortfall in distributions compared to planning figures in January and February 2003, distributions followed a pattern similar to 2002, with the largest gaps in April/May and November. While only 70 percent of planned food distributions took place in April and May 2003, the percentage of beneficiaries reached fell to a low of 15 percent of the planned figure in November. Less than 50 percent of planned food requirements were met in November 2003. By the end of the year, however, distributions had reached 100 percent of those planned and over 85 percent of intended beneficiaries received food. Reported figures from 2003 also indicated that distributed food tonnages were much closer to requirements than in 2002, despite considerably higher beneficiary numbers.

Distributed food commodities fell to their lowest level in three years in 2004. As donations declined, only 4100 MT was distributed in October 2004, a figure representing less than 41 percent of that planned, and reaching just over half a million people. The final year of the



evaluation period began with a considerable gap in actual food distributed (62 percent) and number of beneficiaries reached (67 percent), compared to planning figures. The situation improved gradually throughout the year, as planned beneficiary figures and food tonnages fell by September. Food distributions attained 100 percent of planned figures in July and August 2004, but mainly as a result of vast reductions in programme size (from over 16,000 MT distributed in January through March, to only 4000 MT in July and August). A peak of over 100 percent coverage was noted in both July and August, partly due to a 50 percent reduction in beneficiary numbers.³²

Throughout the evaluation period, WFP worked with a large variety of IPs on a considerable number of relatively small-scale projects and activities. In some locations, the number of IPs was disproportionate with WFP's capacity to supervise and monitor project implementation. In late 2004, for example, the Huambo Province sub-office managed over 50 IPs engaged in more than 100 projects. While some IP agreements covered periods of four to six months, some projects were as short as one or two months, which resulted in a heavy administrative burden for WFP, with relatively small outcomes and results. IPs across the country acknowledged WFP's hands-on, practical implementation capacity and willingness to support diverse humanitarian relief and recovery efforts.

With a decrease in available donor resources and improved VAM towards the end of the evaluation period, the ACO adopted a resource-saving strategy of concentrating activities in the most food insecure area of the country, the Central Highlands. In conjunction with this change in strategy, WFP closed several sub-offices and reduced the overall number of staff by about one third.

Conclusions

Actual distribution figures and numbers of beneficiaries reached were nearly always less than planned, with several critical periods over the three years in which only 60 to 75 percent of requirements were met, and less than 15 percent of intended beneficiaries were reached. Distributions reached intended tonnages on a few occasions in 2002, once in 2003, and over a period of several months in 2004, whereas intended beneficiary numbers were only reached once, in early 2002. The number of actual beneficiaries reached a reported high of one. 6 million in September 2003, compared to its lowest figure of 190,000 in May 2003.

The high number of IPs, agreements and large variety of relief and recovery activities increased WFP's management and financial burden in terms of administration, supervision, monitoring and logistics. Ensuring high quality, low-cost project implementation was nearly impossible for WFP Angola, as long as the number of IPs remained unreasonably high, and the scope of activities too broad and geographically dispersed.

The strategy of concentrating efforts in the Central Highlands was appropriate for improved efficiency. However, WFP would require capacity to continue assessing vulnerability in

³² Annex 8.




areas where it no longer had a field presence, and to respond quickly to vulnerable populations in need of urgent assistance.

Table 3 – Number of WFP IPs (per Province per Year - 2002 to 2005)

	2002	2003	2004	2005
Bengo	10	13	15	8
Benguela	46	29	28	17
Bie	21	23	15	12
Cunene	11	9	8	7
Huambo	36	70	72	47
Huila	31	34	26	17
Kuando Kubango	23	12	25	42
Kwanza Norte	17	30	23	6
Kwanza Sul	20	30	22	9
Luanda	30	25	29	25
Lunda Sul	27	0	8	0
Malanje	51	40	35	23
Moxico	45	21	32	21
Namibe	11	10	0	0
Uige	50	18	12	17
Zaire	13	5	3	4
	442	369	353	255

Source: Distribution plans provided by Programme Unit

Table 4 – Number of IPS (per Province per Year - 2002 to 2005)



RELEVANCE

Findings

WFP's Strategic Priorities and outcome indicators were introduced worldwide in 2003, but were not yet incorporated into programming in Angola at the time of the evaluation. However, all activities carried out through PRROs and SOs were related to at least one of the first four Strategic Priorities:



- SP1: Save lives in crisis situations
- SP2: Protect Livelihoods in Crisis Situations and Enhance Resilience to Shocks
- SP3: Support the Improved Nutrition and Health Status of Children, Mothers and Other Vulnerable People
- SP4: Support Access to Education and Reduce Gender Disparity in Access to Education and Skills Training

The fifth Strategic Priority, “Help governments to establish and manage national food-assistance programmes”, was not yet addressed by any of the three PRROs under evaluation.

Conclusions

With transition to recovery and development focus in progress, and social indicators improving rapidly, Strategic Priority 1 (saving lives) has become less relevant for WFP in Angola, while Strategic Priority 5 (developing government capacity) is of considerable importance for the sustainability of WFP’s efforts.

CONNECTEDNESS

Findings

WFP operations were the largest humanitarian interventions in Angola both prior to and during the period evaluated.

The WFP Country Director (CD) chaired the UN theme group on HIV/AIDS.

Other UNDG organisations (UNDP, UNICEF and UNFPA) synchronised their programming cycle for the period from 2005 – 2008. WFP participated actively and constructively in working groups contributing to the GoA’s PRSP, the Common Country Assessment (CCA) and the UNDAF 2005-2008. It had not, however, adapted its programming cycle to that of the other agencies.

WFP activities, while designed earlier than both the GoA’s Poverty Reduction Strategic Plan 2004-2006 (PRSP) and the UN Development Assistance Framework (2005-2008), addressed the following PRSP and UNDAF priorities:

PRSP priorities 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6 (from of a total of 10)³³

- Support the return and resettlement of IDPs, refugees and demobilised soldiers in the areas of origin or resettlement, integrating them in a sustainable way in the economic and social life (1).
- Minimise the risk of hunger, satisfy the internal nutritional needs and revive the rural economy as a vital sector for sustainable development (3).

³³ UNDAF 2005-2008, p. 8 (Portuguese version). These do not represent the full text of the priorities.



- Contain the spread of HIV/AIDS and mitigate its impact on PLWHA and their families (4).
- Secure universal access to primary education, eliminate illiteracy and create conditions for the protection and integration of adolescents, youth and persons with special educational needs, always guaranteeing gender equality (5).
- Improve the health status of the population, in particular through increased access to quality primary health care services, and the control of the spread of HIV/AIDS (6).

UNDAF priorities

Objective 1 - Economic Development, Democratic Governance and Decentralisation: Support the promotion of equitable economic development and democratic governance in accordance with internationally accepted norms, through strengthening national capacities at all levels, providing communities and citizens with the means to increase their participation in decision-making processes.

Objective 2 - Sustainable Means of Subsistence: Contribute to the development of sustainable means of subsistence for the majority of the population through an increase of domestic income and sustainable food security.

Objective 3 - Reconstruct the Social Sectors Reinforce national capacity to provide basic services, and sustain social participation processes, in order to:

- a) reduce the mortality of children under 5 years and of women, and reduce the morbidity from diseases considered as priorities;
- b) contribute to universal access of children to quality primary education.

WFP was expected to contribute 40 percent (USD 117 million) of a total of USD 289 million to the UNDAF resource targets (0 percent of Objective 1; 66 percent of Objective 2 or USD 86 million of a total of USD 130 million; and 27 percent of Objective 3 or USD 31 million of a total of USD 115 million).

Conclusions

During the peak of the humanitarian crisis, immediate food needs were critically high, and WFP's main task therefore consisted of bringing food to the vulnerable population. With vulnerability declining in the past two years, and numbers of people in need of food aid decreasing, the focus has turned more to recovery. While in the future WFP will no longer lead international assistance to Angola, food aid will nonetheless continue to be required to complement the activities of other actors.

Although the harmonised undg programming cycle from 2005-2008 (four years) exceeds the maximum duration of a PRRO (three years), following the current PRRO, which will end in December 2005, the next PRRO could cover the remainder of the undg cycle until 2008.



Recommendations for Relief and Recovery Strategy and Coordination and Partnerships

WFP should:

- design the next programme for a period of three years (2006-2008) with a view to harmonising activities to the extent possible with the UNDG programming cycle, and maintaining close links with the UN Country Team members—led to ensure smooth coordination of assistance to Angola, and to avoid duplication of efforts;
- focus increasingly on Strategic Priorities 2, 3, 4, and 5, including indicators from the Corporate Indicator Compendium as far as applicable and deemed feasible;
- include GoA authorities in the preparation of the new programme, phasing in GoA contributions and investing in skills development through training, study visit, mentoring relationships, and other forms of capacity-building, in order to facilitate a progressive expansion of GoA responsibility for activities throughout the programme cycle;
- at provincial and municipal levels, together with other partners, create models of integrated programming for recovery and development, focusing resources on activities such as SF and FFW, where WFP has distinct added value.

1.2 General Distributions

Background

Even before the end of the conflict in 2002, WFP aimed to progress from GD to FFW and FFA activities in areas at high risk of malnutrition and food insecurity that would eventually lead to self-reliance. In keeping with this strategy, approximately half of all beneficiaries (51 percent) at the start of 2002 received emergency food distributions, whilst the remainder benefited from other forms of food aid.³⁴

Recognising that IDPs displaced since 2001 would require about 18 months after their return home to re-establish their livelihoods, GD were continued for this population, with the aim of reducing vulnerability and ensuring adequate food resources during the period of transition. Small numbers of returning refugees with limited options for durable solutions were also included as GD beneficiaries, as per a local MoU with UNHCR. During the same period, FFW/FFA activities comprised about 24 percent of all distributions.³⁵

Rapid and massive population movements followed the return of peace in 2002. At the same time, humanitarian agencies began to provide services to fixed populations that had been beyond reach during years of conflict. While no reliable, valid mortality data were available throughout the country in 2002, reports of ten to 15 deaths per day in certain areas indicated that the health and nutritional status of those in formerly inaccessible areas was very precarious.³⁶ Accordingly, during the period 2002-2003, most of WFP's operations

³⁴ Data extracted from M&E Quarterly Report, first quarter 2002.

³⁵ PRRO 10054.1, p. 11.

³⁶ This was the case in Chipindo, Huíla Province, in mid-2002, as described by a WFP FAM to the Evaluation.



were geared towards emergency relief through GD and vulnerable group feeding programmes (SFP and TFP).

The number of beneficiaries increased from an average monthly figure of 685,000 in the second quarter of 2002 to over one million in the last quarter. Distributions were carried out upon notice of as little as two or three day, in improvised distribution sites with minimal security conditions. Due to insecurity, food was sometimes provided directly from delivery trucks for very short periods or airdropped when no land access could be obtained.

Findings

The lack of IPs in newly opened areas at the end of the war necessitated the rapid recruitment and deployment of WFP field staff to carry out distributions together with community volunteers³⁷, and the opening of several new sub-offices.

Although PRRO 10054.1 failed to foresee the abrupt end to conflict in 2002, the in-built flexibility of the PRRO allowed WFP to revert to an emergency mode as soon as the situation worsened. WFP was able to rapidly address the food needs of large numbers of people moving throughout the country. The PRRO permitted shifts in programme emphasis without necessitating major readjustments and other cumbersome project approvals processes, thereby preventing to some extent, delays in its response to critical and acute food shortages.

In some cases, the absence of GD was a critical issue that added to the burdens facing returnees, who for the most part arrived in areas that lacked most basic services and infrastructure.³⁸ WFP Luanda's October 2004 Monitoring and Evaluation Report stated, *"Nearly 3,095 beneficiaries did not receive food in Malange, Kwanza-Norte, Bié, Menongue, Kwanza-Sul because the respective recipients did not show up at distribution points. It was reported that many of them had fixed residences far from distribution points and others avoided walking huge distance between resettlement areas and distribution points..."*.

On one hand, WFP and IPs allowed beneficiaries in remote locations to collect their food aid entitlements far away from their homes with no means of monitoring their situations. On the other, WFP refused the requests of local authorities and partners to transport food supplies to isolated communities where they could go, but where the UN was forbidden to go, on the grounds that WFP could not carry out monitoring.

Since neither WFP nor its partners conducted post-distribution monitoring, information was unavailable about what happened to beneficiaries on the way home, whether or not they faced threats or danger, and the precise causes for beneficiaries not showing up when such long distances were involved.

An NGO worker in eastern Angola stated that in some areas there was "too much general food distribution", a sentiment reiterated by WFP staff, who felt that the shift to more

³⁷ One FAM told the Evaluation "we even mobilised catechists" to help in the distributions.

³⁸ See Protection.



development-oriented activities involving FFW could have been phased in earlier. Some WFP staff mentioned that opportunities for building self-sufficiency had been missed.

At times, distribution procedures were found to fall short of commonly accepted standards (i.e. Sphere Standards). Verbal abuse and mistreatment of beneficiaries, together with long waiting lines with no shelter provision, were reported to WFP in late 2002 in distribution sites run by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) in Huíla Province. Although there was a delay of several months in dealing with the case, the matter was discussed with the partner both at the local level and in Luanda and the staff person identified as responsible eventually dismissed.

The Evaluation received no other concrete reports of abuses at distribution sites, although it did receive unspecified reports of disrespect towards beneficiaries and distributions carried out without due regard to the special needs of vulnerable persons (elderly, pregnant women and women with small children) in the central highlands. In mid-February, the Evaluation observed a GD for pellagra patients in Kuito where some older adults, handicapped persons, pregnant women and women with small children were made to stand in lines while other beneficiaries pushed to obtain their food entitlements.³⁹ Concerns were also noted regarding the safety and well-being of beneficiaries who had to walk long distances - in several cases in Moxico, Bié and Huambo Provinces, over 100 km - to receive their food entitlements or seek services because they had settled in inaccessible areas.

Conclusions

The enormous efforts of WFP and its partners to reach increasing numbers of people in urgent need of food assistance in a very short time cannot be understated.

Increased access to formerly remote areas and a growing caseload in 2002 and 2003 required operational flexibility on the part of WFP as it rapidly increased coverage in a greater number of locations. WFP's PRRO strategy allowed enough flexibility to provide for unplanned massive emergency needs, but only within the framework of existing resources.

Some needy communities were not assisted due to Inconsistencies in policy and action with regard to GDs to non-accessible sites.

Recommendations

WFP should:

- review, together with partners, GD procedures to ensure to the extent as possible they are in line with international standards (Sphere);
- conduct, alone or with partners, regular post-distribution monitoring in areas where WFP does not have access in order to monitor the situation of those people who have to walk for long distances in order to receive their food entitlements.

³⁹ The Evaluation was concerned that the distribution had been delayed for several hours until their arrival, which took place later than scheduled, and that people were kept waiting in the sun for that period.



1.3 Nutrition and Medical Programmes

Background

Widespread household poverty and food insecurity contributed to the extremely high rates of wasting among children that was reported in many areas of Angola both during the conflict, and following the peace agreement. According to the Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS),⁴⁰ carried out in 2001 at the onset of the period under evaluation 45.2 percent of children less than five years old suffered from chronic malnutrition in 2001, 31 percent were under weight and 6.2 percent were acutely malnourished.⁴¹

Chronic malnutrition or stunting, based on the height to age ratio, indicates long-term or accumulated results of poor nutritional status. Almost one in two Angolan children were stunted, higher than the average prevalence found in sub-Saharan Africa (40 percent in 2000). Children were more stunted in rural than urban areas (50 percent versus 43 percent). The highest rates of stunting were found in the centre south region (55 percent), followed by the southern Region (53 percent). The lowest stunting was found in the region of Luanda, with 35 percent.

Wasting or acute malnutrition, resulting from excessive loss of weight during a recent period, generally because of illness or lack of food, was six percent in 2001, a level high enough to be of public health concern, and indicating that no improvement had occurred from levels reported in 1996. Underweight, reflecting past nutritional or health deficits experienced by the population (measured by weight relative to age), was 31 percent amongst Angolan children indicating a very high rate of malnutrition according to WHO standards.

A number of micronutrient deficiencies were considered to be of continuing public health significance. The Micronutrient Initiative (MI) estimated that approximately a quarter of a million Angolan children were born mentally impaired each year because of preventable micronutrient deficiencies. It also suggested that 2.1 percent of GDP was lost as a direct result of micronutrient deficiencies.

Nearly three quarters of children (72 percent) were estimated to suffer from iron deficiency anaemia, whilst over half (59 percent) of childbearing age women (CBAW) between 15 and 49 were considered anaemic. Fifty-five percent of under 6 year-old children show signs of subclinical vitamin A deficiency, although encouragingly, three-quarters received at least one high-dose supplement each year.

While little information regarding Iodine Deficiency Disorders (IDD) was available, data suggested that the country suffered from widespread iodine deficiency. The most recent survey (1994) indicated a Total Goitre Rate (TGR) of about 35 percent. Only ten percent of Angolan households were estimated to consume adequately iodised salt, despite the enactment of iodised salt legislation in 1996, and a decree dating from 1972 stating that

⁴⁰ 2001 Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey: Assessing the Situation of Angolan Children and Women at the Beginning of the Millennium, Republic of Angola: National Institute of Statistics/UNICEF, Luanda, Angola: 2003.

⁴¹ UNICEF Draft Country Programme Document: June 2004.



only iodised salt for human consumption could be commercialised in endemic areas and sold at a price comparable to non-iodised salt.⁴² Six provinces were considered IDD endemic: Huambo, Bié, Moxico, Lunda Norte, Lunda Sul, Kuando Kubango.

Non-iodised salt production was substantial in Angola, with about 90,000 MT produced each year, mainly in Benguela, Namibe, and Luanda. Plans were made to introduce salt iodisation units in the mid-1990's, and one unit was installed in 1995. Due to the ongoing civil strife, followed by a lack of funds, low awareness of IDD and its devastating effects, the absence of technical training, and the non-existence of a viable trade and transport network, little progress had been made.

Although Angolan health professionals occasionally identified a few cases of pellagra, a disorder resulting from niacin deficiency, a marked increase was noted in mid-1999, which subsequently rose to alarming levels during the evaluation period.⁴³ Between June 1999 and November 2002, four pellagra outbreaks occurred in Kuito town involving 3859 cases. During the first two outbreaks, the displaced population was mainly affected, with an attack rate of 4.7 per 1000 population. During the latter two outbreaks, the resident population was most affected with rates of 7.1 cases per 1000 in 2001 and 5.5 cases in 2002. In all outbreaks, women 15 years and older was the main population affected.

The general ration food basket, composed of maize flour, pulses, oil and iodised salt, and providing between 1800 and 2100 calories per person, was often incomplete since access to Kuito was severely restricted, and most food commodities during this period were delivered by air. IDPs and others identified as vulnerable in the resident population (children under five, pregnant and lactating women, and disabled persons) were initially targeted with WFP food aid. By November 1999, families with malnourished children and those with pellagra cases were also included in the GDs.

In order to correct the acute niacin deficiency experienced during 1999, dried fish and CSB were added to the general distribution food basket for pellagra cases and others attending feeding centres, and their families. However, due to the non-availability of CSB until June 2000, humanitarian agencies instead distributed vitamin B complex tablets to all women over 15.⁴⁴ Survey results from December 1999 indicated that women's compliance with vitamin B complex tablet consumption was low, prompting agencies to seek more effective and longer-term solutions to combating pellagra. In January 2000, agencies agreed that the general ration should be supplemented with CSB, with IDPs receiving priority for distributions, followed by vulnerable residents. It was also agreed that a more durable solution be sought, including the fortification of donated maize, either in Angola, or prior to shipment, in the country of origin.

Although GD have commonly failed to provide sufficient micronutrients, including niacin, in many emergency programmes, affected populations commonly have access to other sources of food, and generally do not generally develop clinical signs of micronutrient

⁴² ICCIDD, Angola Current IDD Status Data Base, www.people.virginia.edu/~7Ejtd/iccidd/mi/cidds_alpha.html

⁴³ Field Exchange, Issue 10: A Pellagra epidemic in Kuito, Angola, London, UK: July 2000.

⁴⁴ Target group was chosen only because of lack of resources to organise a distribution to the entire population; a total of thirty tablets each was distributed to all targeted women.



deficiencies. However, it not always possible to accurately assess whether or not populations dependent on food aid have access, albeit it limited, to other sources of nutrition, particularly when a large number of agencies are present, and people do not reside in camps.

According to humanitarian nutrition resources, only a handful of pellagra outbreaks have occurred worldwide over the past ten years, all of which were among emergency-affected populations dependent upon food aid, e.g. refugees, returnees and IDPs. In each case, it would have been possible to assess the potential for a pellagra outbreak in each case, if the niacin content of the emergency general ration available to the affected populations had been assessed. That these outbreaks, including the epidemic in Kuito, were not predicted or prevented is evidence of the inadequacy of food aid monitoring and assessments during some humanitarian crises.

Due to the low availability of health services outside of Luanda, and inadequate health information systems, reliable data on morbidity and mortality were extremely limited. Although the number and scope of NGO services had declined considerably since 2003, a number of provincial hospitals and clinics continued to be managed by external humanitarian agencies and church-related organisations. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) were still active in many parts of Angola in 2004, but both agencies indicated that operations had decreased considerably compared to previous years.

Malaria was estimated to be the largest single cause of child mortality in Angola. At the onset of the evaluation period (2001) only two percent of children under five years old used insecticide-treated mosquito nets and malaria accounted for approximately one third of overall hospital admissions and one quarter of all deaths.⁴⁵ More recent data were unavailable on malaria prevalence and treatment.

Table 5 – Infectious Disease Control Indicators - Angola 2002

Infectious Diseases Control Indicators				
Indicator	Value	Data Unit	Year	Source
TB Estimated Number of Cases	44,226		2002	WHO/TB Control Report-2004
TB Case Detection Rate	94	%	2002	WHO/TB Control Report-2004
TB (DOTS) Treatment Success Rate	66	%	2001	WHO/TB Control Report-2004
Malaria Cases per 100,000	6,594	per 100,000	2001	WHO/RBM-2004

Source: WHO-Angola

As shown in Table 5 above⁴⁶ TB is endemic in Angola, with an estimated 50,000 cases of TB in 2002, and a case detection rate of 94 percent, while treatment (2001) reached only two-thirds of all cases.

⁴⁵ MICS 2001.

⁴⁶ WHO Angola.



Overall HIV prevalence in Angola is estimated at 5.5 percent, with an official figure of 9 percent. UNAIDS' most recent data estimates that 3.9 percent of adults between 15 and 49 years of age are infected with HIV, with a total of 240,000 adults and children people living with HIV and AIDS in Angola. Data gaps and extremely weak surveillance prevent the adequate assessment and monitoring of the situation.

Limited knowledge and attitudes towards HIV/AIDS are also cause for alarm: according to UNAIDS, 32 percent of women between 15 and 49 years of age had never heard of HIV/AIDS, and only eight percent had adequate knowledge about HIV/AIDS transmission and prevention. From an estimated 104,000 children orphaned due to AIDS in 2001, projections indicate that the number will increase to 331,000 in 2010.

Table 6 – HIV/AIDS Prevalence Indicators - Angola 2003

HIV/AIDS Prevention Indicators				
Indicator	Value	Data Unit	Year	Source
HIV Prevalence proportion: Adults (15–49 years)	3.9	%	2003	UNAIDS-2004
Estimated number of people living with HIV: Adults and Children	240,000		2003	UNAIDS-2004
Estimated number of people living with HIV: Women (15–49 years)	130,000		2003	UNAIDS-2004
Estimated number of people living with HIV: Children (0–14 years)	23,000		2003	UNAIDS-2004
Males Reporting Condom Use With Last Non-Regular Partner		Data Not Available		
Females Reporting Condom Use With Last Non-Regular Partner		Data Not Available		

Source: WHO-Angola

Findings

Nutrition and Health Information

Nutrition and health statistics from large-scale surveys were not available since the last MICS in 2001. According to UNICEF, the next MICS was scheduled for 2006.

While many nutrition surveys were conducted by many NGOs during the evaluation period, and included morbidity and mortality indicators, most were carried out in an ad hoc manner, and in limited sites where agencies had access to populations.⁴⁷

Although UNICEF maintained a database of nutrition survey results during the evaluation period, neither UNICEF nor WFP systematically monitored the nutritional status of most of the populations served by GD and vulnerable group feeding programmes. While XX nutrition surveys were carried out in WFP operational areas during the evaluation period⁴⁸ the Evaluation could not confirm that standard survey methodologies were adhered to, and if survey results were reliable and valid. From 2003 onwards, nutrition data from punctual surveys were increasingly scarce, due to improvements in health and nutritional status, and

⁴⁷ Between Nov 1999 and April 2003, between 13 and 17 surveys were carried out every six months; from April 2003 two times 5 surveys, and for May-October only one; source: Nutrition Coordination Group; UNICEF.

⁴⁸ UNICEF Nutrition Data Base.



the reduced need expressed by NGOs for statistics to be used in advocacy and fundraising efforts.⁴⁹

Data from SFP, TFP, and a broad range of medical programmes on discharges and new entries of malnourished and ill people generally showed improvements in nutritional status over the period of the evaluation. However, difficulties were encountered in interpreting the results of centre-based data. For example, while declining attendance at nutrition programmes could have been due to reduced rates of malnutrition, other factors, such as population displacements, and/or the non-availability of someone to accompany the beneficiary to the centre, could also have contributed to this phenomenon. Higher attendance could have likewise been the result of increased rates of malnutrition, increased access to centres, or even knowledge amongst rural populations of the availability of food aid.

The Evaluation interpreted reductions in the numbers of beneficiaries attending SFP and TFP programmes throughout the country provided as evidence that levels of acute malnutrition had considerably declined from 2002 levels. Nonetheless, a limited number of nutrition surveys conducted in August and September 2004 in three municipalities of Huíla Province demonstrated levels of Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) comparable to 2001 figures (ranging from 5.2 to 7.8 percent; 95 CI of 3.9 – 9.8 percent). Chronic malnutrition was also estimated to be unacceptably high, while immunisation and vitamin A supplementation coverage levels were moderate to low, with high levels of nutritional anaemia (see table 7 below).

Table 7 – Results of Health and Nutrition Surveys – Angola 2004

TABLE 10 RESULTS OF NUTRITION SURVEYS AMONG CHILDREN 6-59 MONTHS OLD, ANGOLA, AUGUST-SEPTEMBER 2004 (ACH-S, 08-09/04)						
% Acute Malnutrition (95% CI)	% Severe Acute Malnutrition (95% CI)	Measles immunisation coverage (%)*	Vitamin A in the previous 6 months	Anaemia** (%)	Crude Mortality (/10,000/day)	Under 5 Mortality (/10,000/day)
CHIPINDO MUNICIPALITY, HUILA PROVINCE						
5.2 (3.9-6.8)	0.7 (0.3-1.6)	48.5	64.3	61.0	0.1	0.4
CACONDA MUNICIPALITY, HUILA PROVINCE						
7.8 (6.2-9.8)	1.3 (0.7-2.3)	69.3	84.0	69.3	0.46	0.8
GANDA MUNICIPALITY, BENGUELA PROVINCE						
6.1 (4.1-8.9)	0.4 (0.0-1.8)	76.4	52.4	-	0.3	0.9
* According to cards and mothers' statements						
** Hb < 11 g/dl						

Throughout the evaluation period, WFP provided support to SFP and TFP as part of relief efforts under the PRROs. The programmes targeted malnourished children under five years of age, and malnourished pregnant and lactating women. While numbers of malnourished children had declined considerably, and large numbers of centres had closed during the past

⁴⁹ According to MSF, when health and nutrition status improved, surveys were no longer carried out since advocacy for humanitarian funds became of lower importance.



three years, the Evaluation observed several children suffering from severe malnutrition in all centres visited.

Health and nutrition programmes offered by IPs encompassed wide variations in available technical skills and human resources, and involved local and international NGOs, as well as provincial- and municipality-level GoA service providers. Whilst the limited number of TFP and SFP, and hospital-based medical feeding centres visited during the Evaluation were found to be of excellent quality, and run in accordance with established WHO guidelines and Sphere Standards, WFP did not monitor nutrition and health outcomes, nor report on qualitative aspects of the programmes it supported. Therefore, qualitative information, including outcomes of nutrition and medical programmes was not available at the time of the Evaluation.

Nutrition, including Micronutrients

Food baskets for both relief (GD, SFP, TFP, and medical programmes) and recovery (FFW, FFA, FFT) activities include a combination grains or grain meal, pulses, vitamin A and D fortified oil, sugar and iodised salt, and generally provided adequate amounts of nutrients (2100 kcal, etc.). Because of pipeline breakdowns, insufficient donations in cash or in kind, and inappropriate donations in kind, the entire food basket was not always guaranteed. For example, whilst iodised salt was available in some warehouses (Huambo), there were no stocks in others (Kuito). Interviews with beneficiaries of GD from Sumbe reported that iodised salt had been absent from distributions for two months. Beneficiaries reported that they had not replaced the missing food basket item, either with iodised or non-iodised salt, and no salt rations were observed in beneficiary households during Evaluation visits in these areas.

Both WFP policy on iodised salt and GoA legislation required all imported salt for human consumption to be iodised. WFP used appropriate plastic-lined bags for the initial packing of imported iodised salt. The Evaluation did not observe evidence of compliance with other recommended specifications of the International Council for the Control of Iodine Deficiency Disorders (ICCIDD).⁵⁰ The sacks viewed by the Evaluation Mission in WFP and IP warehouses were not marked with the manufacturer's name, date of manufacture, iodising agent, iodine content, date of expiration at 12 months from the date of manufacture, net weight, and the caution to store in a cool, dry place.

Iodised salt testing kits were not available in any WFP warehouse or distribution point (nutrition centre or SFP warehouse) for verifying the iodine content of iodised salt stocks. VAM Unit staff in Luanda stated that kits had been obtained from UNICEF and used for VAM assessments in the field at the end of 2004. UNICEF was unable to provide the Evaluation with a testing kit to verify the iodised salt samples obtained from field-based warehouses.

While some WFP field staff were aware of the health and nutritional benefits of iodised salt, and the signs, symptoms and risks of IDD, following participation at a Nutrition

⁵⁰ In accordance with ICCIDD guidance on regulations for labelling iodised salt.



Training Workshop held in Luanda in December 2004, others, including FAMs and warehouse staff, and IP staff (including those operating in areas where iodised salt had not been delivered and where visible goitres were observed in programme beneficiaries), were not.

Fortified vegetable oil containers (both tins and plastic cartons) available in WFP and partner warehouses were not labelled with adequate information regarding micronutrient fortification. Some round metallic canisters were labelled as “vitamin A fortified”, while other plastic cartons had no indication of fortification on the labels. No packaging observed by the Evaluation indicated vitamin A and vitamin D fortification, in accordance with WFP regulations regarding fortified vegetable oil. Oil containers observed by the Evaluation were found to be either too fragile (plastic containers were easily cracked, resulting in spillage and wastage during transport to distribution points) or inconvenient (round metal cans without handles which were difficult for beneficiaries to carry with other commodities).

In 2003, USD 1.2 million was made available to WFP Angola for a three-year period to address the pellagra outbreak through the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) – WFP Food Plus Initiative. As a result, WFP and a small number of IPs⁵¹ began to provide fortified maize meal.⁵² The Initiative also provided resources for deworming school age children in Bié Province, clean water to schools implementing school feeding (SF), capacity-building of local governments to better understand and address nutrition problems; advocacy for legalised and enforced maize fortification through appropriate policies; training for millers in fortification techniques; and monitoring and surveillance through baseline and post-project surveys.

The Initiative aimed to improve the nutritional status of WFP programme beneficiaries, particularly school children, and to improve their awareness of the importance of consuming fortified foods. It also hoped to reduce parasitic infection amongst school children, improve children’s, parents’ and teachers’ awareness and participation in nutrition activities; and gather lessons learned on the cost-effectiveness of the interventions, and possibilities for replication.

Due to continuing insecurity in Angola, and the considerable time required to establish fortification facilities and to develop reliable means for quality control, the first distributions of fortified maize meal in Kuito only took place in February 2004. Working in partnership with WFP, UNICEF provided the nutrient supplement pre-mix. Results from a baseline study of pellagra prevalence, conducted in 2004 with assistance from the Institute of Child Health in London, was not available at the time of the Evaluation. However, complementary activities to address the multiple causes of malnutrition had been initiated, including the recruitment of a full-time nutritionist and the procurement of deworming tablets.

⁵¹ CARE, MSF-Belgium, CVA, Africare, SOCITRAM (local miller), UNICEF, MoEC, MoH, NGOS, Ministry of Trade and Commerce, and Local Enterprise.

⁵² Maize fortification consisted of Niacin, Thiamine, Riboflavin, Folic Acid, Pyridoxine and Iron-folate.



HIV/AIDS

WFP-Angola assumed a leadership role in the UN HIV/AIDS Theme Group,⁵³ which offered an opportunity for inputs to UN coordination and programming in the area of HIV and AIDS. Partnerships with other technical agencies, including UNAIDS, UNICEF and WHO were being developed at the time of the Evaluation. Strong contacts and collaboration with GoA authorities of the National Programme to Fight HIV/AIDS (PNLS) had yet to be formed, and national guidelines for food and nutrition for PLWHA were not yet in place.

Almost all WFP staff members had received an HIV AIDS Orientation and condoms were available in all offices visited by the Evaluation. In Huila Province, WFP's theatre group, composed of FAMs, stevedores and food distributors in Lubango provided awareness sessions to returnees in the distribution sites. Drama and plays were carried out regularly in Lubango, Caconda, and Mafala municipalities.

Staffing for HIV/AIDS activities was found to be inadequate as the Programme Officer who was designated as HIV/AIDS Focal Point only spent about 40 percent of her time on the issue. A very limited amount of food resources had been allocated specifically for HIV/AIDS activities or programming,⁵⁴ in the form of FFT for the facilitators of community-based orientation sessions, and some feeding activities, which had only begun in 2004. At the time of the Evaluation, WFP was just beginning to identify opportunities for adding value through food assistance to HIV/AIDS prevention and mitigation efforts.

A ten-day mission from WFP Headquarters took place in 2004 to review the HIV/AIDS programming environment and to provide recommendations for enhancing WFP's role in this area. While recommendations from the mission were taken into consideration by the ACO, other priorities and a lack of funds and other required resources, such as technical capacity and staff, had prevented concrete action from being taken. The key recommendation, to integrate HIV/AIDS programming into all aspects of ongoing programmes, was not feasible, in light of WFP's diminishing human resources, and limited technical background in the field of HIV/AIDS prevention and mitigation.

WFP's HIV/AIDS assistance started in 2004, with an emphasis on training, information, awareness and education.⁵⁵ FFT activities aimed to expand knowledge of preventive measures of HIV/AIDS within communities. Families were provided with a 70 kg monthly ration of maize, pulses, vegetable oil and salt in return for carrying out sensitisation activities. In cooperation with GoA and several IPs, WFP planned to host 60 projects, including 44 community-based education interventions in ten provinces, while eight were projects supporting Persons Living with HIV/AIDS (PLWH/A), three for families of PLWH/A, four for caregivers, and one for cooks in the HIV/AIDS programme in Benguela. The total number of expected beneficiaries at the end of 2004 was over 8,000 with nearly 65 MT of food aid.

⁵³ CD was chair during from mid-2004 until the time of the evaluation mission.

⁵⁴ Although there was no limitation to the food resources programmed for HIV/AIDS per se, the CO had allocated a limited amount due to a general lack of resources for the entire programme.

⁵⁵ HIV/AIDS Plan Interventions Monitoring Report, WFP Angola: November 2004.



WFP also began providing food assistance to PLWHA. Food rations were aimed at improving nutritional status of chronically ill people, extending their life span, and supporting the entire household to enable sick people to preserve their assets. PLWH/A and their family members received a daily rations 400 g of maize meal, 50 g of pulses, 30 g. of oil, 15 g of sugar and 5 g of iodised salt. In November 2004, for example, 104 PLWH/A in Benguela received rations, along with 375 family members. In Malanje, MSF-Holland started an intervention in November 2004 for the prevention of Mother to Child Transmission (PMTCT) of HIV in six health clinics, the hospital and at the maternity clinic. Eighty pregnant women infected by HIV/AIDS received the ration above, with an additional 50 g of CSB. In addition to PLWH/A, TB patients, other infected people, and some family members were included in the programme.

Constraints for HIV/AIDS programmes included the unresolved debate on whether WFP should provide cash payments or food rations to *activistas*⁵⁶ for their services, or insist on voluntary contributions of their time for HIV/AIDS orientation once training had taken place; and, in some cases, the content of the messages and cultural issues with the promotion of condom use.

A nationwide system for the provision of anti-retroviral therapy (ART) was being formulated at the time of the Evaluation. A clinic in Luanda provided free HIV-testing and treatment. Although WFP had not established any support for HIV patients, plans were underway for the provision of food for a period of four to six months, followed by FFT or FFW. Programmes to reduce vertical transmission were even less advanced, and therefore no activities were established during the Evaluation period. However, ongoing SFP and TFP, TB and other illness treatment programmes were under consideration as potential HIV/AIDS programmes.

Other Health Issues

Medical programmes for the treatment of malaria, TB, pellagra, leprosy and African sleeping sickness (Trypanosomiasis) were generally successful. However, the impact of food aid on the health and nutritional status of beneficiaries could not be separated from the effects of medical treatment. The Evaluation observed that together, WFP and IPs of nutrition and medical programmes had achieved well-documented and positive results in terms of lives saved and improved nutritional status, through programmes that were largely of high quality, and in accordance with Sphere Standards.

For malaria, TB and sleeping sickness, beneficiaries received WFP food rations up to two months of in-patient feeding, during treatment, and four to six months of outpatient, take-home rations during recovery and/or home-based treatment periods. In addition to providing much needed nutrients to overcome the effects of serious illness, WFP rations served as an additional incentive for sick people and their families to seek timely medical care. The provision of a ration to patients and caregivers was also reported to improve adherence to long-term treatment protocols. Dropout rates of TB programmes, where

⁵⁶ HIV/AIDS awareness promoters are referred to as “activistas”.



Directly Observed Therapy (DOTs) was practiced had decreased considerably in Kuito clinics, possibly due, at least in part, to the regular availability of free food rations.

In Bié, MSF reported diminished mortality amongst under-fives in malaria treatment from 12 to five percent, again, in part, due to improved nutritional status resulting from the regular availability of nutritious food. Of 470 TB patients in Kuito, mortality rates had declined from 20 percent to zero.

The GoA Health Plan, elaborated in 2003, for the period 2004 – 2008 had three aims: to reduce under-5 mortality by 50 percent; to reduce malnutrition in under 5 children by 30 percent, and reduce maternal mortality by 30 percent. Its main strategies included:

- repairing public health services with the support of NGOs and churches;
- mobilising health staff to reach vulnerable groups without access to health services;
- initiating community and family-based preventive activities;
- increasing the capacity of provincial and municipal players;
- promoting innovative ideas that would overcome the barriers to adequate health and health care.

Key constraints to adequate health and nutrition status observed by the Evaluation included:

- lack of access to services due to destroyed infrastructure;
- lack of specialised medical staff, and insufficient capacity of existing staff;
- geographical, economic, and cultural barriers of the population;
- insufficient governmental support to public services, including salaries and benefits, training and housing/transportation of public servants.

While WFP-supported health and nutrition programmes assisted in addressing geographic, economic and cultural barriers to adequate health and nutritional status, the Evaluation noted that they were not yet used to develop health and nutrition infrastructure or to train and otherwise support GoA or NGO health staff.

Conclusions

The causes of malnutrition in Angola were multiple, and included the lack of safe drinking water, inadequate hygiene and sanitation facilities, unavailability of de-worming, insufficient care of young children, older adults or the sick; and high rates of infectious disease, parasitic infestation and other health problems, in addition to a lack of nutritious food.

Partnerships between WFP and the GoA and other agencies to address causes of malnutrition other than food insecurity were necessary, but not always possible. In most cases, such activities had not been carried out in conjunction with feeding programmes, due to low technical capacity in health, nutrition, education and food security and insufficient funds. The token decentralisation of responsibilities and resources limited the effectiveness of the GoA to assume a coordination role.



The GoA had not formulated a national nutrition policy, food aid policy or plan of action for nutrition. Nutrition and health information systems were not yet established, and the limited data available were either unreliable or representative of very small geographic areas of the country.

In light of the potentially high prevalence of Iodine Deficiency Disorders (IDD) in Angola; overall poor nutritional status of the affected population; the lack of availability of iodised salt in Luanda as well as in provincial and rural markets; and the extremely limited purchasing power of affected populations, the absence of iodised salt in GD or other food rations for extended periods of time could have serious nutritional consequences for beneficiaries.

The experiences of the pellagra outbreak in Angola provided a number of lessons learned for preventing similar situations in the future. With better planning, and more consistent, timely and accurate monitoring of both food rations and the nutritional status of the beneficiary populations, it is most likely that the outbreak in Kuito could have been prevented. A WHO review of pellagra in emergencies suggested that the following areas of practice and policy are in need of review to strengthen preventative measures:⁵⁷

- the appropriateness of diagnosis of pellagra based solely upon dermatological criteria;
- the strategy of relying upon distributions of fortified blended foods, such as CSB to prevent and/or alleviate micronutrient deficiency disease outbreaks, in light of recurring evidence that provision of adequate supplies of such foods is often problematic. The reasons for difficulties should be assessed and if necessary, the strategy revisited. In some situations, maize fortification should be considered in preference to this strategy;
- donor policies on the bartering or exchange of food aid should be clarified, in light of the lack of a clear policy statement among bilateral and multilateral donor agencies regarding this important issue.

⁵⁷ From: Pellagra and Its Prevention and Control in Humanitarian Emergencies, Department of Nutrition for Health and Development, WHO/NHD/00.10, Geneva: November 2000.



Recommendations

WFP should:

- work together with UN agencies and other partners to gather quantitative and qualitative information on the causality of malnutrition in areas with chronic food insecurity and persistently unacceptable levels of acute and chronic malnutrition and micronutrient deficiencies, in order to guide decision-making and involve other partners in solutions:
 - determine, on a regular basis, if assessed food aid needs have indeed been met by WFP;
 - use nutrition information systematically in advocacy efforts at all levels, internal and external, aimed at raising awareness of critical situations in order to ensure that planned needs are met.
- continue to cultivate productive partnerships for health, nutrition and HIV/AIDS with UNICEF, FAO, UNFPA, UNAIDS and GoA authorities;
- adhere to WFP policy regarding micronutrient fortification and the provision of fortified commodities;
- contribute to the prevention and mitigation of the negative effects of HIV/AIDS, using an integrated package of inputs that a) increase knowledge and understanding of the disease and how to prevent it; b) improve food security of people living with and affected by HIV/AIDS; and, c) on a pilot basis, provide food and nutritional support to ill people, suffering from AIDS and/or receiving Antiretroviral Therapy (ART).

1.4 Food for Work/Food for Assets

Findings

The objectives of FFW activities were not always clear from programme documents. For FFW aimed at addressing food shortages, the assets created appeared to be less important than accurate targeting of vulnerable beneficiaries. Activities aimed at producing assets were found to be more successful when low technical skills and few NFI were required, such as seed and plant multiplication schemes. When bridge, roads, school and other infrastructure construction or rehabilitation were the intended outputs of FFW, few IPs had sufficient budgets for NFIs or appropriate technical capacity. Although the M&E system started to monitor the results of FFW/FFT in terms of outputs during the evaluation period, the quality and sustainability of reported FFW results were found to be questionable.

At the time of the Evaluation, Angola had entered its fourth year of peace. Yet, the proportion of beneficiaries receiving food through FFW remained low. By the third quarter of 2003, only 15 percent of all beneficiaries received food through FFW, and only 19 percent in the final quarter of 2004.⁵⁸

⁵⁸ Figures from M&E reports. A breakdown of beneficiaries per type of project per year from WFP systems was unavailable, although a 918-page Excel file was obtained, detailing all FFW projects. FFW projects increased in the last 4 months of the year as the planting/lean season begin.



Despite WFP's stated objective of shifting from GD to recovery activities, many FFW activities were used in lieu of GD to people no longer eligible for food assistance, during periods when food needs were still apparent. In some cases, GD and FFW appeared to have been interchangeable and it was unclear why some beneficiaries were included in FFW schemes while others were included in GDs. For example, in the last quarter of 2002, unexpected returnees were included in CARITAS' seed multiplication projects in Menongue, while other returning IDPs received food rations to protect seeds in same period in Mavinga, both in Kuando Kubango Province.⁵⁹

In addition to inadequate technical capacity and the non-availability of competent IPs, a number of other problems limited the success of FFW/FFA projects. As food security improved, and the overall availability of food within communities increased, the attraction of food as payment for work declined. A number of IPs interviewed declared that beneficiary interest in FFW/FFA usually waned within two years of resettlement. In Uíge and Zaire provinces, for example, participants in a joint WFP/UNHCR road rehabilitation project were unwilling to complete the work for payments in food alone. Eventually, UNHCR was obliged to supplement FFW with a cash payment of USD 1.50 per day.

In Bié Province, newly-constructed schools were of adequate design, but the low quality of workmanship had resulted in leaking roofs and poor drainage even before the schools were inaugurated. In most schools visited, fences or other means of enclosing the school grounds were non-existent, allowing free access by cows, goats and other livestock. In others, water points and facilities for sanitation and hygiene had not been installed.

Most of the achievements in terms of household food security through free food distribution were immediate rather than sustainable. Some projects seem to have been suspended at a time when they had not yet reached sustainability.⁶⁰

Coordination between WFP and IPs on relatively small FFW projects consumed considerable resources, including staff time, with sometimes minimal results. For example, a full-time logistician had to be hired to manage FFW for road and bridge repair in Moxico, carried out through a variety of IPs. FFW projects were most successful when they involved several IPs, including the GoA officials.

Reductions in rations due to late deliveries and insufficient resources delayed the completion of several FFW/FFA projects. In some cases, such as literacy projects in Kuando Kubango, workers abandoned activities altogether when food distributions were delayed. The fact that many FFW beneficiaries continued to work on projects, despite reduced rations was an indication of the high level of poverty and food insecurity in certain areas. Moreover, while virtually all beneficiaries interviewed complained about the insufficient quantity of food they received, many indicated a keen interest in being involved in future FFW/FFA projects.

⁵⁹ Quarterly M&E Report, 4th quarter 2002.

⁶⁰ This is the case, for example, of the agricultural project at the leprosy patient's home in Saurimo, which is not yet yielding produce and cannot now pay workers to continue.



The value of various recovery activities involving food aid was felt to be higher in areas where food security was low because of insufficient production, poor access to markets for the sale or purchase of food and other products, or a combination of the two. In many cases, WFP's FFW/FFA constituted an "obligatory passage" from relief to recovery. In addition, such activities permitted IPs to pay workers, a task that would have been impossible due to insufficient project funds.

Recovery activities were mostly initiated by IPs, with little or no input from WFP apart from an assessment of feasibility once a project has been proposed.

Although there has been no formal assessment of the outcomes of recovery activities, improved food availability amongst vulnerable communities and increased the availability of infrastructure, were benefits observed and noted by the Evaluation. However, the sustainability of most FFW projects, according to IPs, was "virtually none". Local government authorities expressed concern that maintenance of community buildings and other infrastructure constructed or rehabilitated with FFW would not be carried out if beneficiaries refused to work without payments in cash or kind is offered.

Conclusions

While many of the FFW/FFA activities appeared to have satisfied some needs with regard to infrastructure, such as roads, schools, health posts, airstrip maintenance, capacity-building, etc., most had been undertaken to satisfy the immediate needs for food of vulnerable populations, without a well-thought out longer-term, including exit, strategy to enhance the self-sufficiency of the population.

In many instances, neither WFP nor its partners possessed the required technical skills for FFW projects.⁶¹ Consequently, a large portion of infrastructure constructed with FFW such as schools and health centres visited by the Evaluation were found to be of very poor quality or inadequately finished.

Because food was the only input WFP provided for FFW, other partners or the communities themselves were obliged to provide all other resources for recovery activities. The lack of additional resources often limited the capacity of IPs, particularly local NGOs, to undertake some of the projects. The establishment of a form of LTSH payment for FFW activities by WFP, or partnerships with other UN agencies such as UNDP or UNICEF might alleviate this situation in future.

⁶¹ Trained agronomists on WFP staff have been instrumental in ensuring the viability of a community agricultural project in Moxico. The assignment of a dedicated logistician to FFW road and bridge construction, also in Moxico, ensured that 116km of road and 5 wooden bridges were completed to a high standard.



Recommendations

WFP should:

- review WFP Angola's FFW/FFA strategy and develop clear guidelines. If possible, develop a new form of LTSH payment for FFW to alleviate the situation of insufficient resources for NFI and other costs;⁶²
- avoid providing food through FFW/FFA as a substitute for GD. While an element of emergency relief may always be present in such projects, WFP must ensure that FFW/FFA projects are not used to replace needed GD to the vulnerable populations because of limited resources or other constraints;
- identify planned outcomes for FFW projects and ensure that measures are taken systematically for the sustainability of activities;
- select FFW projects that fall within the available expertise of WFP staff, unless IPs are technically qualified.
 - Of the available FFW activities, select those that have the greatest potential to foster integration, to reduce tensions and discrimination within and amongst communities, to offer protection benefits, and to address gender-related concerns.

1.5 Food for Training/School Feeding Programmes

Background

At the start of 2003, over a million Angolan children aged six to eleven (44 percent) were out of school.⁶³ In order to meet the goal of universal primary education by 2015, the number of children enrolled in primary schools (approximately 1,5 million in 2000) needed to increase to five million over the ten-year period. To date, however, Angola has made little progress in the social sectors, including the completion of primary school by all Angolan children. National data from the Ministry of Education and Culture (MoEC) regarding primary school attendance showed a net enrolment rate of 47,4 percent and a gross enrolment rate of 59,6 percent in 1998.

The major causes of non-attendance of school by Angolan children included economic factors (informal registration fees and the costs of learning material and the work burden placed upon children by poor families), lack of identity documents (i.e. birth certificates), and an insufficient number of seats in existing schools.⁶⁴ Many children enrolled in the first grade were not able to complete primary school, leading to high dropout rates, with an average of only 24 percent of students enrolled in the first four grades completing their studies.⁶⁵ Although there was little disparity between boys' and girls' attendance rates in primary school, data showed that girls had higher dropout and overall lower completion

⁶² ACO announced that a consultant would be hired in early 2005 to rationalise FFW activities.

⁶³ UNICEF – Angola.

⁶⁴ *ANGOLA, Os desafios pos-guerra*. Avaliação Conjunta do Pais 2002 – Sistema das Nações Unidas em Angola.

⁶⁵ MICS, 2001.



rates. Gender disparities were increasingly evident as children moved into the higher grades of the educational system, with a clear disadvantage to girls.

Throughout the years of conflict, and during the period of the evaluation, Angola suffered a severe shortage of teachers, schools, classrooms and other educational facilities including potable water, latrines, and clean, safe learning environments. Of particular urgency was the need to map existing schools, and to mobilise parents' associations for the construction of additional schools and the rehabilitation of existing classrooms.

Many teachers did not have adequate pedagogical qualifications, particularly in areas outside Luanda.⁶⁶ Officially, schoolteachers were required to have completed 12 years of education, and received additional teacher training. In reality, most teachers (approximately 20,000) had only achieved an eighth-grade education.⁶⁷ According to UNICEF,⁶⁸ nearly half of current teachers (48 percent) or almost 29,000 were under-qualified.⁶⁹ Many teachers had left the profession because of poor working and living conditions and low salaries that were often unpaid for months, as reported in the municipalities of Huambo and Kuito.

Under the present GoA administration, the MoEC did not exert direct influence over provincial education authorities, which were responsible for the budgeting, planning and programming of basic education services. While such decentralisation would have normally been welcomed, in the present context, where human resources, institutional capacities and central level supervision mechanisms of the provinces were extremely weak or non-existent, few improvements were occurring in schools.

Funding was also of concern. According to information provided by the MoEC, public expenditure for education had actually declined since the end of the war, with only 6, 8 percent of the nation's budget allocated to the sector, indicating that basic education was not a main priority. Teacher training and efforts to place adequate numbers of teachers were insufficient to meet rapidly growing demands. Even when education authorities managed to recruit new teachers, the lack of suitable living conditions, infrastructure, and equipment resulted in teachers refusing to move to their posts. The lack of teaching and learning materials in schools throughout the country was critical.

From 1994 to 1999, as part of the emergency operations, the GoA with the support from German Agro-Action (GAA) and Ajuda de Desenvolvimento de Povo para Povo em Angola (ADPP) initiated school feeding (SF) in schools with high proportions of children from displaced families in Benguela Province. In addition, the GoA funded a school milk programme for pupils from the poorest communities in Benguela Province from 1997 to 1999, which was later suspended because of its high cost.

In 1999, WFP launched its first SF initiative under the Protocol of Cooperation with the MoEC. Originally, 2000 children were to attend as part of the pilot SF project in eight

⁶⁶ In Huíla, in 1998 only 7 percent of teachers had received adequate pedagogical training.

⁶⁷ UNICEF – Angola.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Basic Education Statistics GEPE – MOE (in 2003, Angola had 60,137 teachers).



schools in Bié, Kwanza Sul and Luanda. In January 2000, the project was reviewed, and an addendum signed stipulating that an additional 30,000 children were to attend the programme in Luanda. Later, the location of the programme was shifted to Malange. A total of 53 primary schools and 34,334 children eventually received daily meals from WFP during the 2001 school year.⁷⁰ If deemed successful, the project was expected to expand to other schools throughout the country.

In June 2000, the GoA began a SF programme with 103,776,000 Kuanza (approximately USD 1,222,000), with the following objectives:

- increase school attendance and stimulate enrolment;
- prevent drop-outs;
- contribute to the improvement of the nutritional status and health of school children;
- promote the right of the children to have an adequate feeding and reduce the illiteracy rate.

The programme aimed to deliver a glass of milk (200 ml) with a slice of bread and butter for each student. Due to the large enrolment of school children and the lack of space, schools had to run three different shifts, with food distributed three times a day. The MoEC viewed the programme as a strong instrument to fight against school failure, in consideration of the link between adequate nutrition and improved learning capacities in school children, rather than a humanitarian activity. The feeding programme also aimed to gradually develop into a long-term national programme, adapted to local needs and using available resources.

The GoA programme provided food to 160,000 children in 162 schools in nine municipalities of Luanda⁷¹ and 6,910 school children in four municipalities of Kuanza Sul Province.⁷² In addition to insecurity and the lack of sufficient funds, large-scale population movements contributed to the collapse of the feeding programme in 2002.

WFP-Angola's focus on education during the period of the evaluation was aimed at encouraging the development of self-reliance strategies, especially through FFW, FFA and FFT. Under PRRO 10054.2, WFP's support to primary education and HIV/AIDS-awareness programmes was re-established, with the most recent PRRO indicating that a third of the caseload in the second half of 2005 would be assisted under the Support to Primary Education programme.⁷³ WFP also aimed to include rural women into training efforts, including literacy programmes, to improve the informal education system through teacher training and school construction and to assess the feasibility of implementation of SF as a community development project.

The PRRO document emphasised capacity building for national counterpart institutions and dialogue for the transfer of responsibility and skills to GoA authorities.

⁷⁰ 51 schools and 33,404 beneficiaries in Malange; 2 schools and 975 children in Luanda.

⁷¹ Cazenga, Cacuaco, Ingombota, Kilamba Kiayi, Rangel, Sambizanga, Maianga, Samba and Viana.

⁷² Sumbe, Porto-Amboim, Amboim and Cela.

⁷³ PRRO 10054 2 – Oct 2003.



The two broad goals of WFP's support to SF were 1) improved school enrolment and attendance rates for both boys and girls in primary education for out-of-school children or children in the most vulnerable areas and 2) a reduction in short-term hunger of children in the classroom in order to improve their capacity to learn and participate in lessons.

At the time of the Evaluation, a variety of humanitarian agencies had already replaced some of the thousands of classrooms destroyed during the war. In the most recent PRRO, WFP also supported basic education through the construction and rehabilitation of primary schools and classrooms, childcare centres and professional training centres. WFP also provided FFT to support literacy programmes and vocational training for ex-soldiers and disabled people. Other activities included the implementation of itinerant training units, training of agents in rural development, the Teacher Emergency Package (TEP) and support to trainers on HIV-AIDS awareness and prevention.⁷⁴

The FFW component of SF⁷⁵ focused on school construction and rehabilitation, whenever schools selected for SF did not meet the minimum requirements. Through FFW, kitchens, warehouses and eating facilities were constructed, and potable water and latrines created in schools with SF programmes.

An emergency school construction project was initiated under the Protocol of Cooperation signed with the MoEC in May 1999. The project was to be implemented in 12 provinces, for a total output of 900 classrooms and 1,200 latrines in areas with high concentration of IDP's. The initiative aimed to help the GoA to reach the objectives set in its new education programme, namely the construction of 2,700 classrooms by year 2001.

In 2001, a document entitled, *Procedures and Responsibilities for a School Feeding Program* was elaborated by the MoEC, which defined the responsibilities of the SF Technical Coordination Unit (TCU); the Provincial Directorates of Education; school inspectors, SF suppliers and school directors. The TCU for SF was established in the Office of the Vice-Minister of Education, to coordinate project activities at the central level and serve as a Project Management Unit.

The *Ministers' Council approved the Integrated Strategy for the Improvement of the Educational System 2001-2005* in September 2001 and the Basic Education Legal Framework (Lei de Bases do Sistema Educativo) was published in December 2001. The main objectives were to reach a net enrolment rate of 67 percent by 2005 and decrease the illiteracy rate by 50 percent. However, the document did not mention SF or the nutritional and health status of school children.

By 2002, 789 classrooms and 968 latrines had been constructed under the Protocol of Cooperation signed by WFP and the MoEC. WFP met 88 percent of its target for classroom construction and 81 percent for latrines. The main constraints to the full achievement of the projects were the weak participation of the local GoA authorities and IPs, and a lack of financial resources and insufficient NFI such as zinc sheets and cement.

⁷⁴ Development Unit Data Base – 2003/2004.

⁷⁵ *Minimal Standards of Operation*, 2004.



Findings

Food for Training (FFT) during the period of the evaluation mainly consisted of SF, which was re-introduced on a pilot basis in 2003.⁷⁶ Following a base line survey jointly conducted by WFP and provincial education authorities, the project was implemented in three municipalities⁷⁷ where 70 percent of the province's basic education pupils were enrolled.

Of 200,000 school children targeted for SF activities through PRRO 10054.02 in 2004 in Benguela, about 35,000 in five municipalities actually received meals for the entire school year. SF showed some encouraging results: attendance rates at participating schools increasing from 65 to 90 percent during the year. In September 2004, WFP extended its SFP to Huambo Province where an initial 7,000 primary school students were reached.⁷⁸ At the time of the Evaluation, the project covered 91 primary schools and 35,814 children. Although far less than planned, the Evaluation recognised the considerable constraints to implementation, including inadequate partners, insufficient NFI inputs, and the lack of national policy.⁷⁹ Limited reliable and comparable data at both provincial and municipal levels prevented an accurate assessment of the impact of the SF programme. Nonetheless, the MoE reported that SF had resulted in 'substantial increases in attendance and retention' in programme areas.

In terms of gender disparities for access to education, national data showed that there was little disparity between males and females enrolled in primary school. Data from one province showed that there were nearly as many boys as girls registered (61 percent boys – 38,8 percent girls).⁸⁰ According to WFP, attendance figures from schools with feeding programmes showed that girls tended to benefit more than boys did from school feeding.

A Protocol of Cooperation was signed between the MoEC, represented by the provincial government authorities of Bié and Huambo Provinces and WFP/UNICEF/Ibis⁸¹ and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) for an integrated programme to support education in Angola. The Protocol included school construction, teacher assignments and support for the rapid response to basic education known as TEP. WFP contributed with FFW for school construction.⁸²

The Minimal Standards of Operation (MINOPS), proposed by WFP in mid-2004 and approved by the MoEC, provided guidance on the selection of IPs and the identification of schools to be included in SF programmes. The MINOPS also clarified the division of responsibilities between MoEC, IPs, Parent-teacher Associations (PTAs) and WFP.

⁷⁶ WFP Assistance to Education – Programme Proposal 2nd Draft 15/02/2002.

⁷⁷ Lobito, Benguela and Baia Farta.

⁷⁸ Draft MoU UNICEF-WFP, January 2005.

⁷⁹ Pilot project was designed for 70,000 school children in Year 1; 80,000 children in Year 2, representing a 12% increase of school attendance for the second year due to the impact of the project.

⁸⁰ WFP Development Unit Data.

⁸¹ Danish NGO.

⁸² NRC – Angola Teacher Emergency Package (TEP).



No formal partnership was established between the GoA and WFP for SF because of institutional weaknesses and budgetary constraints of the government at all levels.⁸³ Since 2003, WFP assumed coordination of SF activities and initiated discussions with GoA authorities to assume more responsibility for the project. In November 2004, provincial governments in Bié and Kuanza Sul had agreed to take on implementation activities and to become the lead IPs, and SF was expanded to these provinces at the start of the 2005 school year. In Bié Province, the Canadian Food Plus Initiative, which targeted pellagra, permitted WFP to provide fortified maize flour rather than CSB to supplement the diet of 50,000 primary school children in six municipalities. In 2005, additional items such as deworming tablets, water tanks and purification tablets were scheduled to accompany SF activities. Funds from the Japanese Government Trust Fund for Human Security were being sought for Kwanza Sul and Huambo. An MOU with UNICEF, being developed for 2005, included SF in addition to health and nutrition activities.

In the absence of a clear strategy for implementing SF and in consideration of possible cooperation with UNICEF and other UN agencies, WFP developed guidelines based upon the MINOPS and lessons learned from NGO partners. Until a coordination framework could be established to monitor joint efforts in the education sector, WFP's basic education and SF implementation strategy continued to reflect internal SF policy and guidelines.

The operational capacity for SF programmes of both WFP and its IPs was limited, in terms of numbers of staff and competency in the fields of education, health and nutrition, and school construction. Although most IPs were international NGOs,⁸⁴ no assessments had been made of their technical capacity to implement SF programmes. This was reflected in the wide variations in quality of their work, particularly in school construction and rehabilitation. The selection of IPs appeared to be based on which agency was in the field and ready to sign an agreement at the time activities began.

WFP field staff complained that some IPs technical contributions were weak and negatively affected potential outputs and outcomes of SF.⁸⁵ At the same time IPs objected to WFP's bureaucratic procedures⁸⁶ for the preparation of agreements, activity monitoring and reporting, which required considerable time and effort. WFP FAMs were overloaded with monitoring and programming tasks, and therefore did not make regular monitoring visits to the targeted schools.⁸⁷ As a result, follow-up of SF and related activities was relatively weak, and consisted mainly of identifying schools and analysing IP reports.

Parents and communities were supportive to basic education and SF. Children brought firewood to school for cooking SF meals, and communities participated in FFW activities to improve schools and classrooms.

Environmental degradation due to very high consumption of firewood for fuel to cook SF meals was a potentially negative secondary effect of the programme. Discussions on

⁸³ As an example, in Benguela, the Directorate of Education only visited schools when WFP ask them to.

⁸⁴ JAM, Red Cross, NRC, amongst others.

⁸⁵ Sub-office in Benguela complained that JAM's expertise in the education sector is extremely limited.

⁸⁶ NRC, amongst others.

⁸⁷ Benguela Annual Report 2004.



alternative sources of fuel, or energy-saving measure such as the production of biscuits or other pre-cooked foods had not yet taken place.

Although the MINOPs stated that school gardens were required and/or parents must contribute with additional food, plans had not been made for school gardens. However, WFP had provided training to teachers, PTA and other community and administration members on HIV/AIDS, health and hygiene and constructed latrines. While few of the schools assisted by WFP had basic standards for education, nutrition, health and sanitation, and environment,⁸⁸ considerable efforts had been made. Food rations consisted of 145 g CSB, 20 g sugar, 10 oil and 5 g iodised salt. Although data were unavailable on the health and nutritional status of school children, the Evaluation observed that without adequate clean water, school children were unable to maintain high standards of personal hygiene and suffered from skin infections. Some children showed signs of underweight, and many were likely to be stunted (low height for age).

The ACO had a SF coordinating unit, headed by a UN Volunteer. At the regional level, field monitors support the implementation and monitor SF activities in addition to other food distributions.

Conclusions

SF is just one of many educational concerns in Angola and must be taken into consideration along with other priorities: teachers, books, facilities, housing for teachers, and others. SF and other basic education activities supported by WFP must address GoA concerns and priorities for education.

The education sector alone is insufficient to address all the requirements needed for successful SF programmes and an improvement in the quality of education. A foundation exists for partnership with the GoA, particularly at provincial level, which would enhance the sustainability of SF, school construction and rehabilitation. The Ministry of Finance's (MoF) commitment to basic education will be decisive for the success of this partnership.

The absence of formal agreements with GoA and/or other agencies involved in basic education limits the possibilities for a strong and sustainable SF programme. Tripartite agreements between GoA, technical agencies/IPs and WFP are needed as a base for wider intersectoral collaboration especially in areas of water and sanitation, health and nutrition and community development in general, promoting SF as an opportunity for improving attendance, improving quality in learning and addressing nutritional need. A review of previous experiences in SF between WFP and the GoA would be useful before expanding SF activities.

Despite the existence of experienced and dedicated WFP staff for most of its activities, the Evaluation felt that technical inputs for SF were insufficient. Additional technical support is needed, either through training and other forms of capacity building to strengthen the skills

⁸⁸ Such as Interagency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies, Chronic Crises and Early Reconstruction.



and knowledge of existing staff, or through consultants, regional advisors or from other agencies like UNICEF, UNESCO, UNAIDS or WHO.

Due to IPs lack of resources as well as to the weak technical capacity, many school facilities considered completed were found to be of poor quality. Classrooms and other school buildings visited during the Evaluation in Ganda, Cachinbango, and Kunge were weak, rudimentary and uncomfortable, and specifications did not meet international (Sphere) standards.

WFP's SF/basic education programme should be part of an integrated approach to education. The TEP (Teacher Emergency Package), to which WFP already provides most NFI and a FFW ration to construction workers and UNICEF's Back to School Campaign, which includes building classrooms, providing equipment to students, and teacher training, could be components, amongst others, of a holistic education strategy. In order to be effective, SF must be provided in conjunction with health, de-worming and hygiene activities, and provision of safe water, latrines construction, and information on HIV prevention. Adequate housing for teachers is also needed to encourage teachers to work in the most remote areas.

UNICEF is a potentially decisive partner SF for WFP, in light of proposed contributions for the period from 2005 to 2008 in basic education, health and nutrition, water, environmental sanitation and hygiene promotion and HIV/AIDS. UNDP's project to support HIV awareness in primary schools could also be a point of collaboration.

Recommendations

WFP should:

- ensure that SF is implemented within the framework of an integrated package of inputs to basic education, building upon the cooperation in 2001 and expanding to include nutrition, health and sanitation and environmental concerns in addition to education:
 - link the SF strategy to complementary strategies of other partners (GoA, UN agencies, IPs) as stated in the PRRO;
 - develop ToR and engage technical assistance for WFP, GoA and other IPs in the areas of school health, food preparation, hygiene and sanitation and education to enhance the overall outcomes of SF;
 - seek commitments from the MoEC, MoH, and MoF for increased technical and financial support to SF.
- spearhead provincial-level coordination mechanisms for basic education/SF, together with UNICEF and wide group of interested partners under the direction of the GoA directorates of health, agriculture, as well as education, within the national level UNDAF:
 - focus SF on a limited number of provinces, where WFP already has commitments from provincial-level authorities;



- conduct needs assessments which include household food consumption data to determine appropriate SF rations, and/or conduct household surveys to assess changes in the rural socio-economic environment in general, and in children's nutritional status and educational levels in particular, resulting from the introduction of SF programmes;
 - continue efforts to support MoEC's collection and analysis of accurate, reliable, gender-disaggregated data, providing technical assistance at provincial level to improve data collection and monitoring and to identify indicators for a baseline study that can be used to assess nutrition school achievements;
 - closely monitor gender differences in terms of enrolment, in targeted provinces;⁸⁹
 - during the life of the project, conduct a qualitative assessment on the impact of SF on enrolment, attendance and performance.
- specify the minimum standards for school feeding meals, school construction, classrooms, SF facilities, water and sanitation in any IP agreements, and closely supervise implementation and monitor results:
 - establish agreements only with IPs that have demonstrated capacity to implement, supervise and report on high quality SF activities, including school construction and rehabilitation, in accordance with agreed-upon standards;
 - assist the GoA to translate the MoEC's MINOPs into action, working closely with the SF TCU to learn from experiences and to advocate for increased GoA responsibility for SF;
 - together with IPs, undertake an assessment of cooking fuel requirements, pilot test fuel-efficient stoves and other forms of environmentally-friendly cooking facilities for SF programmes, and consider the reduction of cooked SF meals, the installation of fuel efficient stoves in SF kitchens, and/or the replacement of firewood with charcoal or gas.
- review required tasks for the implementation and monitoring of SF programmes, and revise WFP staff ToR to reflect increased time for monitoring and supervision of SF, seeking to retain staff for a longer period of time (at least the duration of the next PRRO until 2008) to permit continuity in programming.

1.6 Special Operations

In Angola, two main type of Special Operations (SO) were carried out in the period covered by the evaluation:

- 1) Passenger Air Services (SO 10146.0 and SO 10146.1);
- 2) Logistic Services to the Humanitarian Community (SO 10149.0). A particularly successful component of this SO was continued in a further phase (10149.1), with an emphasis on improving access to vulnerable populations through wooden and metallic bridge repair and construction.

A third type, Access to Vulnerable Populations, through Wooden and Metallic Bridge Repair and Construction (SO 10375.0) began in October 2004 and is therefore only briefly mentioned by the Evaluation.

⁸⁹ Especially in Bié Province.



1) Passenger Air Services (SO 10146.0; SO 10146.1)

Background

The ratification of the 4 April 2002 addendum to the Lusaka Protocol between UNITA and the MPLA-led GoA resulted in a lasting peace agreement in Angola. While security remained a serious issue in much of the country, largely due to considerable numbers of land mines and other unexploded ordinance and poor or non-existent roads and bridges, the return of peace restored limited access to many areas including Mavinga in Kuando Kubango Province, Cagamba, Cazombo, Luau and Lumbala N'guimbo in Moxico, and Maquela do Zombo in Uige. Other areas that had been accessible by land during the conflict were not served regularly by commercial airlines. The few available commercial passenger air services were severely limited in number, considered unreliable and flew to relatively few destinations.

Despite the poor road transport infrastructure, during the year following the return of peace, massive population movements began. An estimated 2.45 million people, including refugees, IDPs and demobilised soldiers and their families moved during 2003, often to distant provinces where humanitarian assistance was absent, and road access limited or non-existent.

WFP operations during this period required widespread staff mobility to carry out assessments and to implement and monitor programmes over an increasingly large surface area. In response to this need, 13 sub-offices and four field offices operated in 12 provinces. Only a third of the sub-offices were accessible from Luanda within a twelve-hour vehicle journey, and the remainder could only be reached by surface, after days of rough land travel.

In October 2002, a consultative meeting held by WFP with the donor community in Angola concluded that the provision of passenger air services remained necessary for the near future, even though the number of areas accessible by road had increased to some extent. In 2003 and 2004, WFP, UNHCR, and several IPs established field offices to provide services to refugees returning from neighbouring countries. The new offices were located in remote areas that were only accessible by air.

Findings

In 2002, due to inadequate funding, only a limited number of special flights for NGOs were honoured. During the first phase of the SO, air transport was provided to 20 locations with a minimum of two rotations per week to each location.

In 2003, WFP's passenger air services reached approximately 30 locations with a minimum of two rotations per week to each location, according to the SPR. The air service performed more than ten medical evacuations during the first six months, and provided logistical support for interagency missions to carry out rapid assessments of critical needs in newly accessible areas. Personnel from 191 NGOs and UN agencies travelled safely and reliably to areas where they provided humanitarian assistance to displaced persons and returnees.



from neighbouring countries. Air service users were mainly humanitarian workers from ten UN agencies, including WFP (28 percent), one hundred international NGOs (42 percent), 200 local NGOs (15 percent); and other IPs and 20 donors (15 percent).

During 2004, the SPR reported that air services were provided to 29 locations, with a minimum of two rotations per week to each location. Two Beach Aircraft 200s and a combined passenger and cargo Boeing-727 were chartered to accomplish this. WFP also engaged a Caravan aircraft from Mission Aviation Fellowship (MAF), based in Lubango for selected routes. The combined services performed 13 medical evacuations during the year. Passenger Air Services transported staff from 150 NGOs and UN agencies throughout Angola. Following the introduction of a nominal USD 25 booking fee in 2004, a 30 percent reduction in no-shows was achieved, compared to the previous year.

The table below summarises the number of passengers and hours flown during the period 2002 to 2004, indicating a marked increase during 2003, at the height of humanitarian operations.

Table 8 – Passenger Air Service (SO 101460 and 10146.1)⁹⁰

	Passenger		Hours flown	
2002	22,115		Not available	
2003	Total	6,417	Total	1,589
		35,644		4,384
		42,061		5,973
2004	20,307		3,317	

In early 2005, WFP contracted two B-200 Beachcraft King Air aircrafts, one based in Luanda and the other in Luena, each with a capacity of ten passengers, for a minimum of 80 hours per month. WFP also employed the services of MAF to operate a Cessna 208 out of Lubango. At the time of the Evaluation, a combined passenger and cargo Boeing-727, operated by Air Gemini, was used to cover routes such as Luena, Huambo and Menongue with a passenger capacity of 57, and a monthly minimum of 30 hours per month (compared with 50 in 2004). WFP continued to use, on an ad-hoc basis, an eight-passenger Caravan aircraft operated by MAF, based in Lubango for Huíla Province and Mavinga in Kuando Kubango.

Passenger service schedules were developed in consultation with the humanitarian aid community, with slots left open to cover special flight needs. All flights outside of the regular Monday to Friday schedule were operated on a full cost-recovery basis.

A decrease in the number of smaller aircraft used in 2005, and the introduction of a combined passenger and cargo service increased WFP's transport capacity to the most frequented destinations, such as Luena, Menongue and Huambo, and allowed for an increase in the number of passengers per hour flown. The number of flights to Lobito,

⁹⁰ Source: SPR 2002, 2003, 2004.



Lubango, Malanje, N'dalatando and Sumbe were decreased as reliable commercial flights became increasingly available. Flights to Saurimo were terminated due to a phase down of humanitarian operation in the area.

Funding for Passenger Air Services was only 64 percent for the first phase, possibly indicating waning donor support for the SO. This situation was corrected, during the course of 2003. The second phase was financed at 86 percent of requirements, five months before the current June 2005 end-date. A wide range of donors praised the Passenger Air Services, confirming the value placed on WFP's contribution to facilitating access to vulnerable populations in remote locations.

During the period of the evaluation, neither interim nor overall outcomes of the SO were assessed. While output-level information, such as the number of users and destinations, as well as tonnage transported by air and road was provided in SPRs, outcome data were not available. It was therefore difficult to demonstrate the cost/benefit or reductions in costs resulting from the provision of joint NFI transport service. It was noted, however, that the tonnage transported by road had increased, compared to air transport.

Conclusions

WFP's passenger air services strategy is in line with the recent definition of an SO, and considered relevant to the humanitarian operation. WFP responded to an emerging need to improve access to new areas in a timely and efficient fashion, enhancing its own and partners' capacity to assess vulnerability, to respond with increased programming of food and non-food assistance, and to monitor activities. By increasing access to areas that had not been visited nor assessed during the conflict years, WFP's passenger air services facilitated the return of refugees, IDPs, and former UNITA soldiers and their families.

SOs are intended to enhance coordination within the UN system and with other partners, through the provision of designated common services. In this regard, the SO was considered relevant, demonstrating connectedness between WFP interventions and those of the GoA and other partners for peace and recovery. Collaborative needs assessment efforts made possible by passenger air services fostered coordination between stakeholders and facilitated interagency collaboration.

The creation of new air access routes permitted vulnerability analyses in newly accessible areas, improving the effectiveness of on-going operations. However, no comparisons were made between the situations found in newly accessible areas and those in areas that had remained accessible throughout the last few years. Such comparisons would help establish that WFP had indeed made the right choices in targeting certain routes rather than others. Reports on levels of vulnerability in newly accessible areas, compared to that of more easily accessible areas would also help quantify the added value of passenger air services.

Although the routes selected for passenger air services were felt to be appropriate, the evaluation found no documented evidence to demonstrate a positive link between the provision of passenger air services, and improved humanitarian assistance coverage and beneficiary targeting. SPRs mainly reported on products or outputs of the SO, including the



number of entities and users, destinations, as well as medical evacuations. For example, the SPRs noted that approximately 20,000 passengers flew in 2002, a figure which doubled in 2003, and decreased to the 2002 level in 2004. In addition to the SPR, the Evaluation found a letter from WFP to donors providing an ad-hoc analysis of the current phase of the passenger air services.

While such information demonstrates, at least in part, the efficiency of passenger air services in fulfilling a need for access to remote areas, the lack of formal reporting on the results of improved access of the humanitarian community, and its impact on improving the quality of information gathered and analysed, or management decisions, prevented a thorough assessment of the SO. In addition, no cost-benefit analyses of the passenger air services were conducted to permit WFP to justify the expense of providing the service.

Recommendations

WFP should:

- maintain passenger air services to ensure a sufficient level of access, at a time when data from assessments of newly accessible areas and the monitoring of current interventions is crucial for decision-making, particularly in light of the current operation's planned phase down;
- ensure the inclusion of outcome-level information in SPRs, in order to assess the degree of access achieved by the SO, and its effectiveness in supporting the PRRO, in terms of improved targeting and coverage, and enhanced programme monitoring.

2) Logistic Services to the Humanitarian Community (SO 10149.0; SO 10149.1)

Background

SO 10149.0 Logistic Services to the Humanitarian Community consisted of three components:

- Component 1: road and air non-food item transport services;
- Component 2: repair and construction of metallic bridges and water crossings; and
- Component 3: the operation of a leased fleet of 12 all-terrain six-wheel traction trucks.

The subsequent phase (SO 10149.1) focused only on bridge construction, and was funded at 98 percent (USD 8, 6 million). A third SO (10375.0) was approved to continue bridge construction and repair in 2005.⁹¹

⁹¹ SO 10375.0 is not covered by this evaluation as it only started in October 2004 and was funded at four percent as of 24 January 2005.



Findings

Road and Air Non-food Item Transport Services (Component 1)

At the beginning of the evaluation period, WFP sought to continue its free air services to UN Agencies, NGOs and the donor community for NFI humanitarian cargo transportation, as it had done since 1998. Air transport was particularly important when there was an urgent need for deliveries, when no private transporters were willing to travel on particular roads or in locations not considered safe by the UN, and when there was no road access because of broken bridges. At the time of the Evaluation, all air transportation requirements of the humanitarian community were covered by WFP.

In 2002, the service targeted more than 90 NGOs and UN agencies, for the transportation of approximately 8,000 metric tons (MT) or 660 MT per month on average. A total of 81 agencies used the NFI air transport service, nearly 1000 requests for shipments were processed, and 10,227 MT of NFI were transported against a planned tonnage of 8,000 MT.⁹² While 49 percent of the goods were transported by road, the remainder (51 percent) was shipped by air.

Sixty-two NGOs and UN agencies delivered humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations to sustain and improve their conditions during 2003 as a direct result of the service.⁹³ A total of 2,407 MT of cargo including 942 MT of seeds and tools were transported to the provinces of Bié, Kuando Kubango and Moxico. As a result of WFP NFI transport, humanitarian assistance was provided by NGOs and agencies, for agriculture, seeds and tools distributions; water and sanitation; de-mining; emergency health services and immunisations.

In 2004, 28 NGOs and UN agencies used the NFI transport service. From a planned 500 MT of NFI, 833 MT were transported to Bié, Kuando Kubando, Lunda Sul, Moxico and Uíge provinces.

Where road accessibility was feasible, food and NFI were transported overland from the main port cities of Luanda and Lobito, and in some cases from Lubango, the capital of Huíla Province, to the transit points of Luena, Huambo and Menongue provincial capitals. Transportation from these locations onwards was generally by air, particularly during the rainy season. In addition, food was also disbursed to various secondary bases to reduce LTSH costs. WFP also provided air services to selected municipalities that were completely cut off from their respective provincial capitals.

A Boeing 727, operated by Transafrik for the SO and for regular air bridge food and non-food item transportation, and to pre-position fuel for L-100 Hercules planes, was still in use at the time of the Evaluation. Until March 2004, three L-100 Hercules were in use until March 2004 with a monthly minimum of 150 hours each, with one remaining at the time of the Evaluation.

⁹² SPR 2002.

⁹³ SPR 2003.



Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for air transportation of non-food humanitarian aid were published and distributed to all users of the service. The SOP covered issues such as eligibility and limitations of the service; transportation prioritisation issues (humanitarian sectors and items); transport locations serviced; transport request processes; authorisation process; joint quarterly coordination meetings (users and provider); and hazardous and dangerous goods transport.

From 2002 to 2004, as road access improved, the demand decreased for NFIs to be transported by air. However, with gradual improvements in the overall security situation since the 2002 peace agreement and increased access, the number of WFP extended delivery points (EDPs) increased by 150 percent. Thus, the multiplication of air and road deliveries rendered an already difficult logistic operation even more complex.

Table 9 – Road and Air Non-Food Item Transport Services

Expenses	Unit	# of Units	Unit rate USD	Cost USD
Airfreight (Handling, Block Hours, Insurance & Fuel)				
Cost	per MT	5,000	470	2,350,000
Handling cost on/off aircraft	per MT	5,000	10	50,000
Handling cost on/off aircraft	per MT	5,000	10	50,000
Average Road Transport				
Cost	per MT	3,500	157	549,500

Source: Project document extract from Annex 2 of SO 10149.1

Conclusions (Component 1)

Whenever possible, NFIs were transported by road to three transit points. Thereafter, airlifts were used to reach delivery points in various parts of the country. New beneficiary groups were identified in many areas by WFP's IPs. Component 1 greatly increased the transport capacity of WFP and other stake holders, permitting timely and efficient delivery of NFI to meet protracted relief needs, as foreseen by the SO category. Component 1 was relevant during the period it was operational, reaching both old and new areas that were not otherwise accessible by land. In terms of connectedness, the NFI component permitted the transport of bridge parts to various locations, which helped to reduce overall bridge building and repair costs.

While a large number of humanitarian partners indicated that coordination and partnerships with the UN and others were positively affected by the provision of designated common services, the Evaluation found no concrete evidence of this. However, joint quarterly meetings permitted regular communication between stakeholders, and prevented price increases for transportation.



Targeting of the SO activities was relevant and relatively simple, since activity sites were those that had been inaccessible during the war and where the passenger air service was used to conduct various assessments. Airlifts were organised, whenever necessary as accessibility improved.

SPRs usually provided output-level information, such as the number of users and destinations, as well as tonnage transported by air and road. Accordingly, the overall tonnage of both food and NFI transported by road increased, compared to air transport, during the evaluation period. However, it was difficult to demonstrate a clear relationship between the provision of joint NFI transport service and related cost-benefits or cost reductions using existing reports or available data.

The level of demand for NFI transport services, compared to supply, was not clear from reports. An SPR stated that not all transport requests were honoured. In addition, no cost-benefit analyses were carried out, except for a reference to the fact that air transport cost was USD 470/MT, whereas the cost of road transportation was about one third of this amount (USD 157/MT). While it is likely that the NFI component of the SO resulted in savings for on-going humanitarian interventions, no evidence exists in reports to confirm this finding. Unfortunately and to the detriment of WFP, monitoring reports did not demonstrate effectiveness and, therefore, precluded any attribution of the SOs achievements in support of the humanitarian efforts.

Recommendations (Component 1)

WFP should:

- ensure that a cost-benefit analysis is included in the SO project document, clearly outlining the expected costs of the activities in relation to the operations they are intended to support;
- monitor outcome-level indicators and conduct analysis of achievements, both in terms of the SO and in terms of the effectiveness of the operations the NFI transportation scheme it is intended to support.

Repair and Construction of Metallic Bridges and Water Crossings (Component 2)

Background

Prior to 2002, over half (55 percent) of all food aid was transported by air. WFP requested an assessment of various routes in the provinces of Bié, Cuando Cubango, Huambo, Kwanza Sul and Moxico, where broken bridges created critical bottlenecks to delivering humanitarian assistance. The Swedish Rescue Services Agency (SRSA), through a stand-by agreement with WFP, provided expertise and funding for the assessment and presented its findings at the October 2002 donor briefing in Luanda. The mission concluded that emergency repairs were needed at several bridge sites, in some cases using locally available materials such as logs.



According to the agreement signed by SRSA and WFP, the former was responsible for the costs of eight skilled bridge engineers and bridge builders, and transportation of material, plant and machinery, vehicles, mobile camps and other inputs, to project sites, while WFP provided a project team leader and a logistician, and trained provincial logistic staff on periodic bridge maintenance. WFP and the Angolan National Roads Institute (INEA) held weekly provincial coordination meetings to discuss works progress and operational issues. INEA was responsible for follow-up inspections and maintenance of the bridges.

Findings

In 2003, ten metallic bridges were built in the provinces of Huambo, Kuanza Sul and Kuanza Norte, permitting road access to several major areas, and thereby decreased transportation cost to WFP as delivery by road rather than air was possible. However, the main purpose for bridge construction and road repairs was to provide access to new areas, regardless of the need to replace air deliveries by road deliveries. Most, if not all, of such newly accessible areas had not been reached previously by air. As a result, some 80,000 new beneficiaries were assisted with humanitarian aid in Huambo and Kwanza Norte provinces.

In 2004, twelve bridges were constructed in Bié, Kwanza Sul, Lunda Sul, Uige and Zaire provinces, where further road access was needed to support WFP distributions and repatriation programmes. Since road access from Sumbe was difficult in 2003, bridge construction and repairs in 2004 included the Andulo-Mussende axis, between the provinces of Bié and Kwanza Sul. Increased access enhanced humanitarian assistance, improved trade and allowed the freer movement of IDPs, refugees and members of local communities. Maquela do Zombo, Andulo and Luau were once again accessible by road because of reconstructed bridges,⁹⁴ as shown below.

Table 10 – Bridge Construction and Road Repair in Support of Humanitarian Assistance Delivery (from end 2004)

2003 (SO 10149.1)
Kwanza Sul Province
Quibala ⇔ Mussende axis - wooden bridge construction (Save the Children) over Pombuije, Gango and Longa Rivers, as well as road repairs (INEA). Road has never been opened, due to unsuitability for vehicles and lack of support from administration.
Kwanza Norte Province
N'dalatando ⇔ Uige axis - construction of 2 metallic bridges to reach IDPs along the road over Cuzu and Cassis Rivers. No air operations were ever operational to reach these IDPs.
Huambo Province
Construction of 3 metallic bridges, over Salundo, Cuzo and Cuchem Rivers, to reach 100,000 IDPs in camps. No air operations were ever operational to reach these camps.

⁹⁴ SPR 2004.



2004 (SO 10149.1)
Bié ⇔ Kwanza Sul Provinces
Andulo ⇔ Mussende axis (27 July to 12 August 2004) (construction of 4 metallic bridges over Cuime, Membia, Cutato, Cuilo Rivers).
Kwanza Norte ⇔ Huambo Provinces
Kuito ⇔ Huambo axis (23 September 2004): construction of 1 metallic bridge over Vatanga River.
Lunda Sul Province
Saurimo ⇔ Muconda axis (1 September to 25 October 2004): construction of 3 metallic bridges over Lufigi, Luachi and Chiumbe Rivers.
Zaire ⇔ Uige Provinces
M'banza Congo ⇔ Maquela do Zombo axis (8 Oct to 21 Dec 2004): construction of 4 metallic bridges over Mfulezi, Tovo, Luango Rivers in Zaire Province and Luidi River in Uige province, and 1 culvert.

Source: ACO COMPAS and project documents and reports

According to the SO project document, the total cost of emergency bridge repair was to be recovered in less than one year, through reductions in both road and air transport costs. After the first year, reduced turnaround times for trucks, the use of roads rather than air on certain routes, and the creation of a competitive environment between surface transport and air transport were projected to save over USD 2.6 million. Table 11 presents estimated costs savings.

Table 11 – Estimated Cost Savings from Increased Road Access (in USD)

Destination	MT per Month	Air Transport Cost per MT	Land Transport Cost per MT	Air Transport Yearly Cost	Land Transport Yearly Cost	Yearly Savings (Land vs. Air)
Cuamba ¹	450	493	210	2,662,200	1,134,000	1,528,200
Luau ²	150	658	430	1,184,400	774,000	410,400
Mavinga ³	350	604	430	2,536,800	1,806,000	730,800
Total	-	-	-	6,383,400	3,714,000	2,669,400

Source: Project Document (SO 10149.1)

¹ Cuamba: actual monthly current requirements.

² Luau - projected requirement when the refugee return begins in 2003.

³ Mavinga - 350 MT/Month is based on moving 33 percent of projected 2003 monthly requirement by road. Air transport costs based on flights originating from Lobito only.

Table 12 indicates the percentage of air and road food transported by project, over time. Air transport was shown to decrease from 68 percent of the total yearly tonnage in 2001 to 10 percent at the end of 2004.



Table 12 – Yearly Percentage of Food by Transportation Mode

Year	Total Tonnage	Tonnage by Road	% of Total Tonnage	Tonnage by Air	% of Total Tonnage
2001	92,702	29,390	32	63,312	68
2002	123,378	86,603	70	36,774	30
2003	149,525	123,724	83	25,800	17
2004	102,550	92,139	90	10,411	10

Source: Yearly Standardised Project Reports and COMPAS

Average LTSH rates also decreased by one third (a total decrease of USD 100 per MT) between 2002 and 2004. However, this figure is general and does not take into account factors, other than bridge repair, that affected costs.

Conclusions (Component 2)

Component 2 of the SO focused on the rehabilitation of logistics infrastructure in order to enhance road transport capacity for all purposes, which is in keeping with SO guidelines and therefore relevant. The SO provided technical support to build national capacity building, which permitted the project to phase out. While some bridges were built jointly by INEA and SRRC, others were constructed solely by INEA.

Bridge construction and repair activities appeared to have been well conceived and adequately assessed during the evaluation period, and resulted in solid collaboration between WFP, SRSA and INEA. For example, a number of bridges planned by the larger GoA infrastructure rehabilitation programme were appropriately excluded from the SO, which fostered information-sharing and coordinated planning amongst partners during the large-scale relief phase. Approval of a subsequent phase (SO 10375.0) to SO 10149.1 for 2005 indirectly confirmed the success of the SO.

In terms of criteria for the selection of roads for bridge building and repair, WFP's priorities were not always clear. For example, in some of the provinces targeted by the SO, humanitarian assistance was scheduled to decrease considerably in the near future. Whilst all bridge sites were located in areas of WFP's operations, a higher level of analysis and prioritisation, in terms of selecting certain locations, and assessing the relative implementation of WFP assistance may have resulted in better targeting.

While SPRs provided information on the number of bridges completed, no data were available quantifying the benefits of newly-constructed bridges in terms of increased transportation of assistance to areas newly accessible by road. However, since some of the areas were not accessible by air during 2003, the Evaluation concluded that the SO had achieved positive results. The absence of such information in reports is regrettable, considering the tremendous efforts of the SO.

Outcome-level results were not demonstrated convincingly in SPRs in terms of effectiveness. While there was no cost-benefit analysis of the construction of metallic bridges, the overall cost of the project (USD 2.5 to 3 million) appears somewhat high



compared to direct savings in terms of tonnage transported by road versus air, between two points where bridges were constructed to open road access. Such an analysis would require information on cost and tonnage transported by both means over a given period, as well as a projection for real and future humanitarian transport needs.

While the drastic reduction in air transport, from 68 to 10 percent was most likely related to increased land access, WFP did not carry out any assessments, nor conduct analyses that provided sufficient evidence to attribute such decrease to the SO. Similarly, the reduction of LTSH average rates by one third indicated overall figures and therefore cannot be attributed directly to the construction of bridges. The decrease in cost over time of USD 100 per MT is nonetheless positive.

A report for May 2004 of air and road LTSH rates per MT, including a percentage of savings, indicates reductions in transport rates for specific destinations, and is therefore relevant to some of the bridges constructed under the SO. While the evaluation acknowledges that money was saved, there is no evidence that the SO improved logistic capacity for food assistance. It is unfortunate that assessments and analysis of SO outcomes were not carried out systematically, in light of the tremendous efforts made in the logistic sector, for both the purpose of advocacy and to demonstrate how the component supported the effectiveness of on-going humanitarian intervention.

The Evaluation found no evidence to support the SO's claim of savings of USD 2.6 million savings during the first year, based on estimated tonnages. Furthermore, reductions in tonnage of humanitarian items transiting through the project areas did not offer convincing evidence of savings, since requirements fluctuated based on needs and food availability. While a passable road was undoubtedly preferable to one with a collapsed bridge, the 2004 SPRs provided no evidence of either lowered transportation costs or secondary benefits from improved access to certain areas.

The need to make greater efforts in terms of capacity building in areas where WFP has a comparative advantage must be underlined. These areas are related to the capacity to identify and analyse issues of hunger and vulnerability; to plan and implement food assistance strategies; and to ensure adequate knowledge and advocacy. Although SOs facilitated access, they were by no means tools to build capacity in the areas mentioned above. WFP's comparative advantage in bridge building was thus secondary to its relative strength in other strategic areas, including the implementation of and capacity building for Vas, planning and implementing GD, and advocating for hunger and food-insecurity issues.

While acknowledging the importance of WFP support to capacity building in Angola, in light of Strategic Priority 5,⁹⁵ the Evaluation concluded that other entities would be better suited to providing relevant capacity-building in bridge repair and construction, particularly at a stage where the phase-down strategy for the next PRRO was likely to include a drastic reduction in humanitarian assistance.

⁹⁵ Building Country and Regional Capacity (WFP/EB.3/2004/4-B).



Recommendations (Component 2)

WFP should:

- improve reporting on the effectiveness of SOs, through a cost-benefit analysis of savings following bridge construction, compared to previous WFP air and road transport costs, as they relate to transport requirements of on-going operations;
- reconsider currently selected bridge sites, in keeping with projected changes in requirements for food assistance.⁹⁶

Operate a Leased Fleet of 12 All-Terrain Six-Wheel Traction Trucks for NFI Transport (Component 3)

Background

Due to a serious shortage of suitable commercial trucks, WFP was obliged to lease trucks to meet transport needs near M'banza in Congo Province, Cazombo and Luau in Moxico Province, Kuito in Bié Province and Mavinga in Cuando Kubango Province, all areas of critical humanitarian needs, where road access was extremely difficult and local transport capacity nonexistent. Two operators, Angola All-Terrain for Malanje and Lunda Sul Provinces, and AP Enterprises for Huambo and Bié Provinces were selected from the South African Development Cooperation (SADC) region. Together, the companies provided a total turnkey solution for six months, including 12 all-terrain six-wheel traction trucks, drivers, mechanics and spare parts, and repair and maintenance facilities.

The fleet was used for both food and non-food humanitarian cargo, and managed by a fleet coordinator who served as the liaison between WFP and the operators. The fleet coordinator ensured optimal fleet use and deployment in order to minimise costs and maximise access to beneficiaries. While the transport was planned to begin in early 2003, it only commenced at the end of that year and ended in early 2004.

Findings

In 2003, the leased trucks moved some 15,323 MT of food to six provinces.⁹⁷ At the height of the rainy season, between January and May 2004, the trucks moved 1,850 MT of food in Bié, Huambo, Malange, and Lunda Sul Provinces.⁹⁸ While problems were encountered in Malange and Lunda Sul, the operation was reported to be efficient in Huambo and Bié Provinces.

⁹⁶ Example: a site selected for bridge construction in the eastern-most provinces presently includes a 116 km section of road between Macunda, Lunda Sul and Luau, Moxico, under SO10375.0. Since WFP is planning to reduce its presence in this area, and the total number of refugees expected to return to Angola has been reduced to only 50,000, consideration should be given to other sites where more activities are scheduled to take place. In areas identified as low priority during the SO planning phase due to lack of information, such as roads in Moxico Province, updated data should be obtained on current food needs before sites are finalised.

⁹⁷ SPR 2003.

⁹⁸ SPR 2004.



According to correspondence from Malanje Sub-Office, between August 2003 and February 2004, 57 percent of areas with difficult access received food assistance, while 17 percent of targeted areas had not been reached due to lack of trucks, 15 percent due to impeded access resulting from early rainfalls, eight percent due to other access problems, and one percent because of the absence of IPs. In Malanje and Saurimo Provinces, deliveries were commonly late due to frequent mechanical breakdowns occurred because some trucks were of poor quality and quite old, and repairs were slow. In some cases, payments to contractors were delayed, rendering negotiations difficult.

Output indicators for the SO included monthly transported tonnage, as well as MT/km costs. The Evaluation was only able to locate information on general tonnage and costs for all areas, rather than specific all-terrain fleet transport data, information on numbers of beneficiaries reached, and savings in transport costs and numbers of NGOs/agencies assisted by the fleet each month.

Although the SO component had been phased out by the time of the Evaluation, WFP was still unable to rely on the local transport sector to meet its all-terrain trucking needs. Due to insufficient progress in planned road improvement and delays in the development of the commercial transport sector in Angola, this appeared to be the situation for some time to come.

Conclusions

Based on limited information available, the third component of the SO does not appear to have been entirely successful. Unfortunately, monitoring reports failed to capture lessons learned, which would have helped to ensure that future strategies take into account past experiences or at least improve the effectiveness of on-going operations they were designed to support.

The lack of information on the SO, which was short-lived and dates back to 2003 and early 2004, prevented a meaningful analysis.

3) Access to Vulnerable Populations, through Wooden and Metallic Bridge Repair and Construction (New SO 10375.0)

The SO aims to enhance the efficiency of the PRROs, by increasing road access of food and NFI, allowing road access to returning populations and lowering overall transport costs. The expected direct benefits of increased access and humanitarian assistance were improved nutritional and health status, as well as the population's enhanced ability to produce food. Anticipated secondary effects included greater market access and circulation of goods.

Activities planned in the SO included assessment of construction or repair requirements, prioritisation of roads, mine assessment and de-mining, bridge parts procurement and importation, engineering plans developed, emergency repairs and construction of wooden bridges where needed, coordination with and training of INEA for maintenance. Needs



assessments were ongoing at the time of the evaluation, and plans could be modified if needed.

Twenty to thirty metallic or wooden bridges on inter-provincial roads will be built in the following order of geographic priority:

- Priority 1: Bié ⇔ Moxico Provinces: Kuito - Cuemba – Munhango – Luena axis;
- Priority 2: Moxico Province: Lucusse - Lumbala N'guimbo axis;
- Priority 3: Moxico Province: Lucusse – Lumbala Kaquengue axis;
- Priority 4: Lunda Sul ⇔ Moxico provinces: Muconda – Luau axis;
- Priority 5: Bié ⇔ Kwanza Sul provinces: Kuito – Andulo – Mussende axis; Kwanza Sul Province: Sumbe – Quibala – Mussende axis; and Cuando Cubango Province: Menongue – Maringa axis.

ACO expected to receive full funding for the operation and planned to construct at least 15 metallic bridges, averaging 25 m in length, throughout the country, mainly in the central highlands, as well as Lunda Sul and Moxico Provinces. In addition to the metallic bridges, 10 wooden bridges were also planned, with GoA-approved bridge location selection criteria as follows:

- presence of food insecure populations in need of urgent assistance;
- size of projected populations yet to be resettled or returned to the area;
- availability of local market opportunities.

The SO planned to reach up to one million beneficiaries, mainly farmers and local traders, playing an important role in the re-establishment of social and local market activities and facilitating the provision of sales outlets for produce. In addition, reconstruction was expected to lower the cost of WFP food deliveries, especially between Kuito-Cuemba-Luena and Luena-Lumbala N'guimbo.⁹⁹

2. Targeting

Findings

Despite the absence of reliable mortality and morbidity data, the Evaluation had no doubts that WFP's interventions had saved lives. Still, WFP may have failed some of the food insecure population, due to pipeline breaks and delays, lower-than-planned resources, the inability to reach a large number of areas of the country during the times of need, and insufficient targeting.

For example, in 2002, WFP had planned to - and in fact did - reduce the number of beneficiaries in the second quarter of the year, as some of its beneficiaries were believed to have obtained a good harvest. The number of beneficiaries fell from 914,368 in the first quarter of 2002 to 685,000 in the second quarter. However, the reduction in the estimated

⁹⁹ SPR 2004.



number of beneficiaries may have subsequently resulted in insufficient food supplies at the time the 2002 emergency began.

Secondly, according to Médecins Sans Frontières, the UN's response to the urgent humanitarian needs, including food aid, in newly accessible areas and in quartering areas for demobilised UNITA soldiers, was deliberately slowed that year. OCHA, the key coordination body during the period of humanitarian crisis allegedly used aid as a bargaining chip in political wrangling with the GoA over the UN's role in the demobilisation process. As a result, some aid agencies were deterred from entering certain areas. In some cases, donors were requested to refrain from providing assistance.¹⁰⁰ While WFP was also accused of delaying deliveries of food, MSF acknowledged that WFP was eventually the first UN agency to provide assistance. MSF also acknowledged that the organisation had faced serious food shortages at the time due to pipeline delays.

A shortage of resources was a constant concern throughout the period under evaluation, with WFP issuing at least 11 press releases concerning the urgent need for donors to provide the required resources.¹⁰¹ Reductions of rations, particularly cereals, and incomplete food baskets were common throughout the period, with only the vulnerable populations (SFP, TFP and medical programme beneficiaries) and returning refugees receiving full rations.

Constant readjustment of rations resulted in confusion about entitlements, in terms of the duration of the food assistance, with some IPs, GoA officials and WFP officials citing six, 12 or even 18 months of assistance as the norm for either category of returnees. In addition, few mentioned the first harvest landmark as stated in the PRRO and MOU with UNHCR. Throughout 2002, 2003 and 2004, M&E reports cited that actual distributions were lower than planned, but gave no indication as to what happened to the populations that were not reached.

In terms of coverage, the Evaluation noted with concern that some areas remained inaccessible to WFP, either as a direct result of insecurity, due to the presence of mines, or on other grounds. In some of these areas, such as southern Cuando Cubango, both GoA authorities and partners reported needs for food assistance. However, even though some were accessible for those not bound by UN security regulations, WFP refused to provide assistance on the grounds that it could not monitor activities. As it might take some time for access to be obtained for these communities, the Evaluation felt that in some circumstances the policy should be relaxed, especially as the level of monitoring WFP carried out was often quite low in more easily accessible areas. In some areas, beneficiaries were made to walk long distances to distribution sites and virtually no post-distribution monitoring (PDM) was conducted on this caseload.

While the MoUs were clear as to the respective responsibilities of each agency for external returnees, the documents were not always understood by others. The Evaluation found that

¹⁰⁰ Médecins Sans Frontières: *Operational response of the UN to the Nutritional Emergency*, document provided by MSF during a meeting with the Evaluation, undated. The document is part of an internal annual report. Also see *Angola: Row over response to humanitarian crisis*, IRIN, 11.06.02, www.irinnews.org/print.asp?ReportID=28271

¹⁰¹ Press archives for 2002, 2003 and 2004, www.wfp.org



some returnees were 'falling between the cracks', particularly in areas where UNHCR had not foreseen returns, i.e. Lunda Sul Province, and that were therefore not covered by the MoUs.¹⁰² In Lunda Sul, over 11,000 returnees had received only two months' rations at Luau transit centre since 2003, with neither WFP nor UNHCR including them in their distribution lists.¹⁰³

Following requests by the returnees and the authorities to both organisations, the matter was discussed between the two organisations in order to verify the caseload and organise food assistance. The Deputy District Administrator (DDA) raised the issue of some 450 returnees who had arrived in September 2004 in Muconda District and had not received aid after two months. Claiming that he had sent communications both to UNHCR and WFP, the DDA admitted that he was not sure whose responsibility it was to deal with the matter.

The PRROs indicated "self-targeting" as the preferred method of selecting beneficiaries for recovery activities. However, the Evaluation noted that in practice, this form of targeting was limited by a number of issues including:

- access;
- availability and technical skills of IPs in any given area;
- willingness and organisational capacity of a community to engage in FFW;
- willingness and organisational capacity of local authorities (with positive effects in terms of rationalisation and avoidance of conflict when numbers of workers required are lower than those needing food, but also with risks for abuse of authority or politicisation of beneficiary selection - see Protection issues);
- ability of individuals to identify themselves as potential beneficiaries and to carry out the work – which leaves concerns as to the reach of food for work projects to the most vulnerable in the community; and
- availability, workload and wealth of relevant skills of WFP staff, which could be crucial in developing and implementing recovery projects.

Generally, IPs contacted the *Sobas* (traditional community leaders), who called for volunteers and then instructed a literate assistant to note their names. When the desired number of workers was reached, the assistant closed the list, which was then handed over to the IP. In some cases, according to local authorities, beneficiaries were selected if they were heads of households, a criterion that ensured that women would be included in GD lists.

For some projects, beneficiaries were identified by the nature of the activity, such as Portuguese lessons for returned refugees from Francophone and Anglophone countries; literacy projects for women, etc. The Evaluation was unable to obtain information as to how beneficiaries within these categories were selected. However, without clear and widely

¹⁰² According to WFP staff, the percentage of returned refugees who are not receiving food after the initial two months' ration could be as high as 25% of the total, although the Evaluation could not verify such figures. Until the end of December 2004, 279,477 refugees had returned to Angola (93,594 in UNHCR organised repatriation and the remaining spontaneously).

¹⁰³ According to UNHCR, when consulted in their country of asylum, returnees had given another destination, and changed their minds upon arrival in Angola.



known criteria for beneficiary selection, the potential for discrimination and politicisation in targeting, especially in view of the forthcoming elections in Angola, remained an issue of concern.

A provincial-level VAM system was developed, with provincial VA groups composed of multiple partners carrying out VAs and formulating recommendations including areas, number and groups of beneficiaries, modalities of food and other support. VA consisted of roundtable talks with IPs at provincial capitals since field surveys were often not possible due to lack of access.

Targeting beyond geographic zone, based upon population groups was important during past years, and included IDPs, demobilised soldiers, returning refugees, vulnerable residents, and other vulnerable groups. However, there was little evidence of participation by communities in discussions on beneficiary selection and targeting criteria.

IPs participating in the VA also participated in provincial coordination meetings, and then submitted proposals for activities to be carried out in response to the VA report recommendations.

Initially, nutrition surveys were used to identify areas with high levels of malnutrition for targeting of SFP and TFP. As the number of surveys gradually declined over the period evaluated, VAM became the best source of information for malnutrition.

VAs were only carried out in areas that were accessible. However, in some areas, WFP could only reach a small portion of targeted provinces due to lack of security clearance for UN staff based on mines and other UXO. In Huambo Province, for example, only one third of the province was accessible, due to mines. Road access was also limited, with damaged roads and bridges tripling or quadrupling normal travel times.

VA was still very food oriented, ignoring many other causes of food insecurity and vulnerability, such as livelihoods, access to services, etc. It focused exclusively on rural areas, ignoring the fact that over 52 percent of the Angolan population resided in urban centres. With HIV/AIDS rates rising faster in urban, rather than rural areas, WFP was at risk of ignoring large segments of vulnerable populations since its VAM did not operate in all relevant geographical zones.

The Evaluation found widespread consensus among WFP staff and their partners that the most food insecure people were found in the Central Highlands, recognising the potential for pockets of vulnerability in other areas. By focusing activities on a region with a high population density, a considerable number of returnees, and poor soils, the ACO thus attempted to use increasingly scarce resources for people who were most in need.

The Evaluation found no evidence of a relationship between the provision of air services, improved humanitarian assistance and enhanced beneficiary targeting, although WFP staff and partners reported that route targeting was appropriate. Such information would have been useful in showing that the implementation of the PRRO had been more effective because of passenger air services.



Conclusions

As improved access permits more field-based assessments, VA will need to take into account Angola's transition towards recovery and development, and include other indicators, in addition to those related to food needs.

Targeting was relevant, as far as the decision to create new air access routes, in that it supported the need to gain access into new areas, for assessing vulnerability and in order to improve the effectiveness of on-going operations.

A comparison between the vulnerability of people in newly accessible areas and the situation of those who had remained in accessible areas would have helped to establish whether the right choices were made in targeting certain routes. It also would have helped to measure the usefulness and possibly success of passenger air services. However, WFP's need to respond to the demand to access is probably sufficient grounds to offer such service.

The groups presently used to define typical levels of vulnerability in a given area will become less useful as populations become more integrated. Vulnerability will therefore have to be defined along other lines including household composition, household economy and nutritional and health status, etc.

With decreasing overall needs for food assistance, declining food donations and other resources, and drastically reduced food distributions to populations in any given location, WFP will be obliged to increasingly involve communities in the definition and application of selection criteria for more focused targeting of beneficiaries.

WFP cannot ignore the likelihood of urban vulnerability and food insecurity. Since the assessment of urban vulnerability is a complex matter, results of an assessment should be used for the elaboration of the next PRRO.



Recommendations

WFP should:

- enhance ongoing VA, including additional indicators to allow for expanded partnerships, and indicators that assess socio-economic and political issues, to permit the use of results to assess outcomes, and, in the longer term, the impact of WFP and IPs' interventions at local level:
 - increase the use of VA information for improved beneficiary targeting, expanding its use from geographical targeting to include identification of vulnerable communities and individuals within communities;
 - retain VA and monitoring capacity in geographical areas where no assessments have been done and/or WFP is not present including urban locations, together with qualified and interested partners, so that additional resources can be used to pilot activities in the future PRRO and ensure that vulnerable populations are not left unassisted. In other areas, Identify partners who are interested in and able to carry out surveys, assessments or analyses to identify potential beneficiaries.
- depending on available resources, extend its food assistance to reach vulnerable populations that are still inaccessible to WFP, but where GoA and other IPs are willing or able to go;
- ensure that logistics and programme units give priority to ensuring that food baskets are complete and that commodities arrive as scheduled through improved planning, and advocacy to donors and GoA;
- more effectively harmonise the identification of bridge-building locations with WFP's need to improve timely and efficient food delivery and to gain needed information, as stipulated in the special operation project category;
- explore with IPs how communities can be more involved in the definition and application of beneficiary selection and targeting criteria, and require IPs, particularly in the area of FFW/FFT, to enhance the participation of women in such discussions;
- collect and analyse sufficient data to demonstrate the relationship between the provision of the passenger air services and increased access to information, as well as the increased access' repercussions on improved identification or targeting of areas and beneficiary groups.

3. Monitoring and Evaluation Systems and Results-Based Management

Background

Prior to the evaluation period, a WFP monitoring and reporting officer was responsible for the M&E system. A consultant took over M&E tasks in June 2001, who in turn handed them over to a WFP M&E Officer in September 2002. The M&E Officer was assigned the task of rebuilding the entire M&E system, a task completed in 2004. The Officer departed from Angola during the Evaluation in February 2005 and handed over responsibilities to



two national staff members, with part-time support from a UN Volunteer responsible for SF.

During the period under evaluation the following activities were carried out to improve the M&E system:

- reporting formats were developed and adapted to changing requirements;
- sub-office and IP staff were trained in monitoring and reporting;
- the previous system, based on Excel tables, was changed to a dual software system using both Excel (with which all partners and staff were familiar) and Access, which allowed the compilation of tailor-made reports on all data in the system.

Until March 2004, the ACO prepared quarterly monitoring reports, which were based on monthly quantitative and quarterly, more qualitative reports prepared by IPs and consolidated by SOs. As of May 2004, the ACO produced only monthly reports on the basis of provincial reports sent to ACO.

IPs provided primary data on activities and outputs.¹⁰⁴ Food Aid Monitors (FAMs) first reviewed IP reports, checked calculations and discussed discrepancies with IPs and then consolidated them into a monthly SO report for the Luanda M&E unit. Data were rarely verified due to a lack of FAMs and limited access to activities in many areas (see Table 13 below). The Benguela SO Annual Report on SF mentions,¹⁰⁵ “As concerns WFP, due to an accumulation of tasks, monitors did not regularly visit schools.”

Table 13 – WFP Angola Field Monitors (by Gender)

	Total Field			Percent
Year	Monitors	Women	Men	Women
2002	37	8	29	22
2003	47	14	33	30
2004	47	13	34	28
2005	30	8	22	27

Source: CO HR pivot table payroll

Sub-office staff reported that monitoring visits were problematic due to insufficient numbers of FAMs in relation to activities, long distances to project sites, inadequate and/or unreliable transportation¹⁰⁶ and limited availability of funds for transport and DSA. According to WFP staff, problems were detected and addressed too late, and reports were of limited quality. Concerns arising from reports or from daily contacts between FAMs and IPs were discussed and either resolved at SO level, or referred to ACO. It was unclear how information provided through quarterly IP reports was consolidated, communicated or used.

¹⁰⁴ Number of beneficiaries by category, tonnage distributed.

¹⁰⁵ Benguela School Feeding Annual Report, p. 5.

¹⁰⁶ The poor condition and advanced age of many WFP vehicles, especially in light of the extremely difficult road conditions was noted during the Evaluation, with several breakdowns occurring in isolated areas.



In one province (Huambo) FAMs rotated between areas and IPs giving them a wider range of work and preventing WFP staff from becoming too involved with IPs. At the same time, constant rotation diminished continuity and limited the FAMs' familiarity with technical aspects of the projects they supervised.

In addition to monthly reports, the M&E Unit also prepared additional reports including the Blue Book, Shortfall on Monthly Basis, USAID report, ECHO report, and SPRs (per calendar year per activity). WFP had begun to contribute to UNDAF implementation monitoring as a member of the UNCT working group. Once indicators had been selected, the group planned to begin monitoring on a six-monthly basis, using the DevINFO software package.

Findings

Throughout the period of evaluation, steady improvements to the M&E system occurred, in tandem with improved PRRO and SO programming documents.

The M&E system focused on collecting and organising gender disaggregated data pertaining to activities, outputs and commodities in terms of food distributed to beneficiaries in the various categories and target groups. Indicators such as the number of women and men receiving food at distribution, and percentage of women in decision-making positions in food committees were included in the system.

While the M&E system focused mainly on activities and outputs, WFP had made plans to gradually include RBM (Results Based Management) indicators at the outcome level, including:

- gender-disaggregated enrolment at WFP assisted schools;
- % of <5 chronic malnourished (weight/height);
- % of <5 underweight (weight/age);
- % of children in PMTCT testing HIV negative at 18 months.

Overall, data collected by WFP on outcomes was extremely limited and did not permit an analysis of the findings nor conclusions concerning results achieved. Only a limited number of existing reporting formats required outcome data from IPs. In some cases, IPs failed to provide information required by reporting formats and a number of sub-offices did not use the most recent reporting formats. Inadequacies of the M&E system were directly linked to the following areas: PRRO design and planning documents; IP agreements and activity monitoring; sources of data and reporting of M&E results; vulnerability analysis and mapping; and internal WFP evaluations.

PRRO design and planning documents

The Evaluation acknowledged a gradual improvement in PRRO planning documents in terms of expected outcomes and performance indicators. Whereas PRRO 10054.0 did not state any indicators for measuring performance in terms of outcomes, PRRO 10054.1 described an outcome-oriented M&E system based on a Logical Framework (Logframe)



analysis at the design stage. PRRO 10054.2 provided an annexed Logframe, which included performance indicators at impact and outcome level, yet failed to state adequate means of verification and data sources for the respective indicators.

In 2004, the M&E Unit presented a more detailed Logframe matrix in a training workshop for IPs and sub-office staff that provided information on means of verification. However, the training Logframe was different than that annexed to the PRRO 10054.2 document.¹⁰⁷ Since the latest PRRO predates the release of the Corporate Indicator Compendium, neither version of the Logframe included any of the proposed indicators.

IP Agreements, Monitoring and Reporting

While WFP programming documents reflected an evolution towards RBM, agreements with IPs did not evolve accordingly. For example, most IP agreements stated project or activity objectives, but did not refer explicitly to the objectives of the PRRO, nor specify which performance indicators were to be monitored.¹⁰⁸ Other IP agreement formats were more general and only mentioned the distribution of food to populations in need until the next harvest.¹⁰⁹ While an earlier format for NFI distributions stated objectives more explicitly, and included a statement that IP staff would, “monitor that tools are used properly and that crops develop well during the season”, the agreements did not indicate which indicators would be monitored and reported on.¹¹⁰ In no case did IP agreements reflect meaningful partnerships between WFP and the IPs that aimed at achieving joint or mutual objectives. Stated objectives of activities were often unclear, and outcomes and indicators absent from agreements. These concerns, however, were largely a reflection of the low capacity of IPs in Angola.

Since 2003, IP agreements obliged IPs to prepare quarterly reports including both quantitative data and narrative information on outputs and results. However, the agreements did not state explicitly which indicators were to be monitored and reported on. References to reporting formats were weak or absent from IP agreements, although formats were available with the Support Operation Unit of WFP.¹¹¹

Most IP reporting formats required information on outputs, rather than outcomes. For example, reporting formats for medical and nutrition programmes included information on numbers and categories of beneficiaries, but did not include information on nutritional

¹⁰⁷ Annex 10 provides an overview of the changes made to PRRO 10054.2 Logframes.

¹⁰⁸ IP contract with Cruz Vermelha de Angola 044/BIE /LTSH/04: “...has agreed to cooperate with WFP as IP through the provision of services, reception, storage and distribution of food provided by WFP to guarantee alimentation and to encourage the return of displaced populations to their areas of origin”.

¹⁰⁹ IP contract with Movimondo, 0117/LTSH/02: “WFP has signed a Letter of Understanding ... and plans to provide certain quantities of various products and to pay for LTSH costs; WFP has agreed to distribute the various products in a certain area” (e.g. to returnees who find themselves in a critical nutritional situation); the IP “... agreed to cooperate with WFP in the distribution, storage and secondary transport of WFP food to guarantee the alimentation of displaced persons in their resettlement areas until the first harvest” (e.g.).

¹¹⁰ IP contract with CARE International Angola 001/BIE /NFIs/03: IP “...has agreed to cooperated with WFP as an IP distributing tools to allow 21,500 farmers to prepare sufficient land to cover the food needs of their families and maintain their crops adequately during 2003/2004 planting season to improve household food security in targeted rural resettlement areas”.

¹¹¹ Para 6.1 and 6.2 of IP agreement with ADESPOV Huambo 016/Huambo/LTSH/03 or IP agreement with Cruz Vermelha de Angola, 044/Bie /LTSH/04.



status, morbidity or mortality. However, the SF reporting format required information on the total number of children enrolled at the beginning of the school year and the number absent during the reporting month, permitting an analysis of attendance and dropout rates.

Not all IPs used the most recent versions of reporting formats. Although the FFW reporting format requested information on assets created through the activity, in addition to quantities of commodities distributed and numbers of beneficiaries, an IP report on school construction reviewed by the Evaluation used an older reporting format. This version included only numbers of participants, beneficiaries, and quantities of food distributed (planned vs. actual), as well as gender-related information on food reception and participation and decision-making positions of women in food committees.¹¹²

IPs often failed to submit adequate reports within WFP's reporting deadlines. In some instances, WFP was obliged to withhold food deliveries until acceptable reports were submitted. Most IP reports reviewed by the Evaluation provided very limited analysis of outcomes and results. The Evaluation revealed a number of constraints for future improvements, even if qualitative information was more systematically required by WFP, including:

- lack of understanding of IPs of the necessity to report on outcomes;
- insufficient technical capacity of IP staff to obtain, record and report outcome information;
- prohibitive costs of obtaining information in the absence of available, reliable and regularly updated secondary sources of data such as GOA statistics, under prevailing IP agreements and ITSH rates.

Monitoring Reports

WFP monitoring reports provided mainly quantitative information on planned vs. actual beneficiaries and commodities distributed, and served corporate reporting and accountability requirements. While improvements in presentation were noted over the evaluation period (i.e. more graphs), the narrative portions of M&E reports were limited. These consisted mainly of short, "SitRep" style descriptions of key issues, summaries of other VA and other reports, or feedback on M&E issues. According to the M&E Unit, requests for the qualitative analysis of data were uncommon, indicating a low demand for such information.

While the ACO M&E Unit summarised events and trends each month, the Evaluation could not discern how and when the compiled information was used for decision-making. On the other hand, the M&E reports documented a number of programme issues that had been addressed by FAMs, either directly with the IP, through the head of Sub-Office, or in consultation with ACO. For example, through monitoring and IP reporting in Benguela Province, a FAM detected the underperformance of an IP in a SF project. After confirming the problem, Benguela Sub-Office raised the matter with the ACO. As a result, the IP

¹¹² JAM Monitoring Report, Ganda, December 2004.



agreed to recruit and train additional staff in order to improve the quality of project implementation and monitoring.

Data collection, analysis and reporting of WFP's SOs were extremely weak during the period under evaluation, limiting the availability of information on results, including cost-effectiveness. For the Passenger Air Services SO, for example, information contained in SPRs was limited to outputs, such as the number of entities and users, destinations, and medical evacuations. The Evaluation discovered little information on the impact of SOs in creating access to new programming areas, or in improving information gathered and analysed because of improved access.¹¹³ While the Evaluation has little reason to doubt that management decisions for SOs and other programme activities were made on an informed basis, it has been difficult to find evidence to support this assumption.

Gender issues included in the M&E system reflected gender promotion activities of FAM in their work with IPs and beneficiaries. Monitoring reports summarised gender-disaggregated figures for beneficiaries including number of women receiving food at distribution, female participants in FFW/FFT, women participating and holding decision-making positions in food committees. However, the reports lacked an analysis of trends, and failed to draw conclusions or make recommendations on gender issues.

M&E reports did not raise the issue of protection, although the Evaluation was made aware of incidents by IPs during food distributions that could have been reflected in reports.

Sources of Data and Information

Although numerous sources of information were available, both from WFP and externally, none included sufficient information for WFP to be able to assess the effects of its activities, and most are too irregular in time or too limited geographic coverage to be useful. For new activities, WFP carried out its own baselines studies, as was the case for SF projects, and food fortification for pellagra victims in Bié Province.

Secondary data from sources outside WFP were difficult to obtain. National statistics were generally collected in an inconsistent manner, resulting in large variations in data quality between geographic areas, between national, provincial and municipal levels, and different issues or topics. For example, the number of schools in Ganda Municipality provided by the municipality was 130, whereas the number provided by the provincial authorities was only 30. WFP and IPs expressed concern that data provided by various sources reflected the different interests and points of view of the providing entity.

The Evaluation noted that different actors used various definitions of the same indicators and different methods of collecting, calculating and recording data. For example GoA population estimates were based on an adjustment of the 1990 census to reflect estimated population growth rates. The UN, however, estimated the population size by geographic area, using data provided through WHO polio vaccination campaigns, and extrapolating from an estimated percentage of under five children to the entire population.

¹¹³ The only exception to this was a letter to donors, which contained an informal analysis of the current access situation.



WFP involved local authorities, including provincial education and health departments, in data collection and reporting carried out by IPs. However, such cooperation was not systematic, and the Evaluation found no evidence that WFP developed the capacity of local GoA in the area of information collection and management (e.g. school and health statistics, nutrition or health data).

A wide range of data was provided to WFP through surveys carried out by different actors in various geographic areas. However, surveys were often carried out in an ad hoc and isolated manner, and covered only relatively small geographic areas. Many WFP areas of operation were not covered by surveys due to limited access or security restrictions.

The 2001 UNICEF MICS was the most commonly cited source of data on social indicators. A second MICS was planned for 2006, and USAID informed the Evaluation that plans were underway for a comprehensive Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) in the near future.

Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping

WFP established a Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping (VAM) system, headed by an international VAM consultant and staffed by a VAM monitor in each sub-office that produced provincial vulnerability analysis (VA) reports for the entire evaluation period.

VA were undertaken by provincial VA groups¹¹⁴ at six month intervals, covering the periods November – April and May – October. VA groups had limited access to primary field data, mainly due to problems of access, and assessments were thus based mainly on roundtable discussions amongst partners, reflecting their experiences and contacts with relevant population groups. With increasing access, and WFP's concentration on fewer geographic areas, more field- and evidence- based VA were planned. Provincial VA reports were summarised in English at national level.

VAs focused on agricultural production, food availability and food security, shedding little light on other indicators such as school enrolment and attendance, nutrition and health status, and livelihoods. At the end of 2004, WFP conducted a comprehensive food security baseline study¹¹⁵ in the Central Highlands, where future activities were to be concentrated.¹¹⁶ With the imminent departure of the international VAM consultant, the VAM unit did not foresee the implementation of follow-up studies. However, ACO had been selected by HQ to implement the pre-crisis Food Security Baseline Survey (currently underway in southern and eastern Angola), and solicited funds from WFP-HQ to establish a Community and Household Surveillance (CHS) system.

Food basket monitoring was carried out on a pilot basis in Benguela Province, but results were not available at the time of the Evaluation Mission.

¹¹⁴ For the May 2004 assessment, the Bié provincial VA group included, in addition to WFP, 17 GoA, NGO and UN partners; the Huambo VA group included 27 such partners.

¹¹⁵ The questionnaires included questions concerning demographic characteristics, food production, access to land, rural infrastructure including water points, schooling, overall and child health, food consumption, and coping strategies, etc.


¹¹⁶ The results of the study were not available at the time of the Evaluation.



Although the situation in sub-offices differed considerably, the Evaluation observed that VAM, Programme and M&E tasks in ACO appeared to function quite separately. For example, the VAM Unit observed and analysed the situation concerning crops, people, nutrition and coping mechanisms, and derived food aid needs by geographic areas, and partly by beneficiary groups and food aid modalities. At the same time, the Programme Unit identified available resources and partners, and on this basis prepared a plan for operations, while the M&E Unit reviewed the implementation and IP reports, summarising information on activities carried out, and the results achieved. While GD beneficiaries were selected according to VA data, and close coordination amongst the units existed, it appeared to be despite the ACO's organisational set-up, rather than because of it. The vertical, rather than integrated management of the VAM, Programme and M&E Units is illustrated in Table 14.

At provincial level, IPs participated in VAs and regular coordination meetings, and then submitted proposals to WFP for food aid activities. FAMs often assumed combined tasks of programming, monitoring IP projects, and collecting information for VAM. The separation of tasks between VAM, Programme and M&E Units was therefore most apparent at the ACO and considerably less in sub-offices. However, the excessive workload of FAMs limited their capacity to carry out in-depth, high quality work in any of the three areas.

Table 14 – Management of VAM, Programme and M&E Units in WFP Angola



The Evaluation noted the following concerns resulting from the vertical management of key WFP functions:

- M&E Unit did not carry out sufficient analysis of information collected since data analysis was seen as the responsibility of VAM Unit;
- at CO level, the M&E Unit was not involved in programme development although at provincial level, a closer relationship existed between programming and monitoring, with the same person often carrying out both tasks;



- M&E findings did not systematically guide programming and management decisions;
- VAM did not use information available from the M&E system, such as overall trends of beneficiary numbers: none of the VA reviewed referred to M&E reports;
- although the M&E Unit was responsible for the collection, analysis and summarising of information, and providing feedback on programme outcomes, its lack of capacity, insufficient resources and absence of secondary, comparative data sources prohibited it from doing so.

Evaluations

Throughout the evaluation period, the M&E Unit focused on improving its capacity to monitor and report on activity and output-level information, and did not carry out any internal evaluations. Instead, WFP relied on external evaluations such as the 2001 and 2005 Portfolio Evaluations for review and assessment, limiting opportunities to identify broader programme and policy achievements and achievements, and to reflect upon best practices and lessons-learned.

Conclusions

Investments in a dual Excel and Access data system, which stores information in an easily accessible way, and produces reports according to changing requirements, have begun to yield returns in terms of making information available when needed. However, benefits of this system could be multiplied if the system included more information on outcome-level indicators, and if more staff were trained and able to use the system. M&E reports presently do not include information on outcome level indicators, or progress being made towards such outcomes by activities under the PRRO or SOs. Furthermore, WFP's M&E system currently does not permit the analysis of progress made or results achieved due to a lack of information from IPs, insufficient reference data from GoA statistics or other sources, and weak internal demand for such analysis.

The M&E system could increase its effectiveness for management and programming if it increased its capacity to report on results and analysis of outcomes.

PRRO monitoring is currently based on a Logframe that does not yet include corporate indicators, and thus limits ACO's reporting on Strategic Priority outcomes until the new PRRO is approved and implemented.

FAMs provide assistance for programming, management of activities and quality assurance of IP work. However, the capacity of FAMs to adequately cover many tasks, in extremely tough working conditions, is limited.

WFP's adoption of RBM has stimulated needed changes in the current M&E system as it takes on the measurement and reporting of outcomes. In addition to facilitating the preparation and delivery of required corporate reports, improved monitoring and evaluation, RBM is beginning to inspire WFP staff and partners to focus on the impact of food aid, and to use the analysis of outcome indicators for better decision-making.



Large variations exist amongst IPs in terms of monitoring and reporting capacity.

The relationship between WFP and IPs, defined in IP agreements, renders monitoring and reporting obligations external, additional requirements of IPs that are often not adequately budgeted for. As a result, some reporting tasks exceed IP capacity and resources. Inadequate reporting may become even more problematic with WFP's increased focus on results and outcomes, and reduced staff and resources.

Under existing IP agreements, and in light of the multitude of interventions and IPs to be monitored by FAMs, it is unlikely that IPs will provide better or timelier reports in the foreseeable future.

Three major shortcomings impede the adequate analysis of data by the M&E system in terms of progress towards outcomes: (1) IPs do not provide the necessary information; (2) very limited baseline data are available with which intervention-related information can be compared; and (3) there is presently no internal demand for such analysis.

There is great potential for improving the scope of reporting and analysis if the VAM and M&E system were closer related, especially if VAs provided information on outcome indicators as reflected in the Corporate Indicator Compendium.

In order to improve the annual work planning and programming process, WFP's capacity to measure and report on outcome level achievements and to carry out regular internal evaluations of programmes and projects must be enhanced. Internal evaluations would provide evidence on the extent to which targets were achieved during the past work plan, and form the basis of recommendations for the next work plan.

Increasing and widening the demand for the M&E Unit through requests for data analysis, evaluations and recommendations would maximise the role of the M&E Unit, and at the same time, improve knowledge and ensure the availability of lessons-learned for future programming, help to justify programme expenditures, and improve the quality of future programming exercises.

Recommendations

WFP should:

- establish an intervention logic and a Logframe, in conjunction with the next PRRO that incorporates WFP's Strategic Priorities, and includes statements of outcomes to be achieved as well as performance indicators to measure success including those proposed by the Corporate Indicator Compendium;
- in conjunction with the development of a new PRRO and SOs, enhance the M&E system so that it services Programme, Logistics and VAM Units and Management:
 - identify internal needs for monitoring and for evaluation, including the reparation and mid-term review of annual work plans;
 - establish mechanisms to ensure that 1) data analysis is reported, at both output and outcome level, for any WFP operation, guaranteeing that lessons are learned



- and taken into account for future similar operations; 2) outcome-level information is included in SPRs, allowing for the attribution of results to both SOs and PRROs; and 3) cost-benefit analyses of SOs are conducted to measure the evolution of costs throughout the period of implementation;
- to the extent possible, benefit from experiences of the pilot project on “Development of Standardised CO-Based M&E system for Operations”;
- capitalise on the established ACCESS database, incorporating more outcome indicators proposed in the Corporate Indicator Compendium, training more staff to use it, and benefiting from experiences in other countries.
- expand the scope of VAs to feed outcome level information into the M&E system, by including additional indicators and seeking partnerships with other actors interested in this activity (i.e. Save the Children-UK). An alternative model for a less vertical and more complementary relationship between VAM, programming and M&E is described in Annex 9;
- obtain reference data/information by 1) assisting the GoA to establish and maintain sustainable information systems in WFP’s areas of interest; 2) carrying out surveys; 3) contributing to ongoing data collection efforts by other agencies; and 4) using data from surveys carried out by others:
 - include baseline studies carried out at the beginning of interventions in WFP data collection activities;
 - coordinate with other actors in data collection, and support surveys or studies in return for the inclusion of needed indicators;
 - consider cost-efficiency when deciding whether to carry out a survey or to contribute to those implemented by others.
- reach consensus with IPs on proposed results to be achieved, the performance indicators to be monitored and reported on by the IP, and the level of monitoring and reporting expected of IPs:
 - clarify the capacity required by IPs for obtaining, recording and reporting on needed information;
 - estimate the costs for monitoring and capacity building of IP staff, and to the extent possible, ensure that the necessary resources are adequately budgeted for. Within the confines of limited resources, offer capacity building activities to IPs, and include expected start-up or running costs in the IP budget;
 - ensure that monitoring and reporting obligations of IPs are based upon a common understanding of the joint objectives of the activity, are realistic in terms of data availability and adequately budgeted for by both IP and WFP;
 - review and revise formats for IP agreements, ensuring they include a) a clear statement of the objective(s) as well as the intended outcomes and outputs of the joint activity, b) the indicators to be monitored and reported upon to measure performance in terms of outcomes, and c) the means of verification to be used, preferably in the form of a Logframe that corresponds to that of the PRRO. Different IP agreement formats can be designed for each of the different kinds of activities WFP will support in the future.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁷ Field Level Agreement (FLA) format is soon to be in effect and will incorporate the Evaluation’s agreements in an agency-wide format.



4. Protection

Background

The UN and other human rights organisation reported on war-related violations of human rights and humanitarian law, such as deliberate targeting of civilians, destruction of villages, looting, killing, abduction and rape resulting in massive displacement throughout the period of conflict in Angola.

In the last months of 2001 and early 2002, as a GoA offensive sought to deprive UNITA forces of food sources, particularly in the east of the country, thousands of civilians were forcibly removed from rural areas and sought refuge and humanitarian assistance in major population centres.

By the time of the signing of the peace agreement in April 2002, some 4,010,000 people had been displaced by the conflict and over 450,000 had taken refuge in neighbouring countries. In addition, 425,000 combatants and their families remained in UNITA controlled areas. Of the four million estimated IDPs, less than 1.5 million were direct beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance. While some of the displaced lived in camps or transit centres, others were resettled temporarily and yet others were integrated into host communities, all in areas accessible to humanitarian agencies.¹¹⁸

According to an OCHA-led rapid assessment of critical needs of the IDP population, the most widely observed protection incidents were related to the delivery of humanitarian assistance and freedom of movement.¹¹⁹ In the Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General for Displaced Persons, Mr. Francis Deng stated, “In certain areas, the displaced were forced to pay bribes to local or traditional authorities in order to be included on distribution lists or were expected to hand over a portion of their assistance to such authorities. Thefts of food and non-food items by combatants were common, particularly in areas where troops were not regularly paid.”¹²⁰

The report also drew attention to “theft(s) from internally displaced persons of food and non-food items by UNITA, as well as the FAA and national police are systematic, typically occurring after food distributions by international agencies and NGOs.”¹²¹

¹¹⁸ Angola - *The post-war challenges Common Country Assessment (CCA) 2002*, UN System in Angola.

¹¹⁹ *Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on internally displaced persons, Mr. Francis Deng, submitted pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 2000/53 – Addendum - Profiles in displacement: Angola* (E/CN.4/2001/5/Add.5), presented to the 57th session of the Commission on Human Rights, p. 9.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ In contrast, the 2001 Angola Portfolio Evaluation only found “a pattern of ... detrimental practices” throughout the four provinces visited, but that they did not necessarily “point out to systematic violations by local authorities, but would indicate a possibility for it”. The Evaluation identified “scenarios” where WFP assistance may have had a detrimental effect on the protection of the population: “Placing people in insecure areas by allowing IPs to distribute in new resettlement areas, while beneficiaries **believe** that they are highly exposed to attack and theft.” (Idem, p.23). The possibility that malnutrition rates may be manipulated by victimising particular groups, attracting food aid in particular locations. The report also noted that WFP could, through stronger internal guidelines, avoid unintended impact on protection. (*Full Report of the Evaluation of the Angola Portfolio*, WFP Rome, April 2002, ref. OEDE/2002/05, pp.18 and 19).



During the period of the evaluation, the situation of most people benefiting from WFP assistance transformed from one of displacement amidst conflict, to that of durable or permanent return or resettlement in a time of peace. The Evaluation found evidence that the threats highlighted by the Representative of the Secretary-General on IDPs continued throughout this period, albeit to a lesser extent towards the end of 2004, and that some were met by action from WFP staff. During the immediate post-war period, other issues directly affecting human rights emerged that, in relation to food aid, posed great challenges for WFP and its IPs.

The Role of WFP in Protection

As Sadako Ogata, former UN High Commissioner for Refugees said, “*Humanitarian assistance is much more than relief and logistics. It is essentially and above all about protection - protection of victims of human rights and humanitarian law violations.*”

In the Millennium Declaration, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan identified “protecting the vulnerable” and developing a “culture of protection” as UN priorities.¹²² He also noted the need to, “expand and strengthen the protection of civilians in complex emergencies in conformity with international law.” Whilst responsibility for the protection of civilians has rested primarily with Member States, the entire UN family has a special role in promoting human rights, leading the global implementation of the Secretary-General’s agenda on protection and collaborating towards enhanced protection on the ground.

In Angola, as in most countries experiencing humanitarian crises, the UN Human Rights Organisation (UNHRO) assumed the lead role on protection issues, on behalf of the UN and the UNCT. WFP is not commonly associated with protection, which “encompasses all activities aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the relevant bodies of law.”¹²³ Yet, as a UN entity, WFP has embraced a broad mandate to promote and protect human rights and has traditionally operated on the basis of a set of humanitarian principles that apply when providing food aid, NFI and technical support in response to humanitarian needs.¹²⁴ Acting in accordance with the core values of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and respect, WFP has committed itself to, “*providing assistance in ways that respect life, health and dignity*”, while “*upholding internationally recognised human rights.*”¹²⁵

Promoting protection does not infer that WFP must be transformed into a human rights organisation. It does mean, however, that WFP should be conscious of the effects of its interventions, both positive and negative, on the human rights situation of affected populations. WFP should deliver food aid in a manner that enhances the human rights of beneficiaries, helping to protect them from further violations. Promoting protection also implies that WFP staff and IPs are aware of and take an interest in human rights issues, together with a broad range of partners. WFP is expected to refer to issues outside of its

¹²² September 2001.

¹²³ ICRC. “Protection” does not just refer to violence and coercion, but it also to situations of violations of human rights.

¹²⁴ *Humanitarian Principles*, WFP/EB.1/2004-C, Rome: 11 February 2004.

¹²⁵ Ibid.



mandate and scope of action to appropriate bodies, and to advocate on such issues, particularly those that may affect WFP's operations and beneficiaries.

Findings

WFP Staff Awareness of Protection Issues

The Evaluation found that most field-based staff members recognised and understood beneficiaries' needs for protection from the threat of immediate violence, as they had been confronted with many such situations, and even been the victims of such threats. WFP staff members were generally less aware of threats of exploitation and abuse related to food aid, and of needs for protection from other human rights violations. Most staff had not considered the potential of WFP's operations to affect the protection of beneficiaries, nor considered protection as part of their mandate. As a result, WFP planning documents, working plans and reports rarely, if ever, reflected protection concerns. As a rule, protection issues did not inform WFP's programmatic and strategic decisions.

Conducting an analysis of protection issues at a time when WFP is redefining its programme, would help the organisation direct its activities towards those that protect beneficiaries, reduce discrimination and improve self-sufficiency and food-security. Many of WFP's activities would be more durable and efficient if threats to beneficiaries were minimised. For example, securing land tenure for community members involved in an agricultural project through FFW may help prevent instances of exploitation and abuse of beneficiaries by aid workers or others in positions of authority.

Protection Issues in Post-conflict Angola

Since the end of the war, issues shifted from protection from war-related abuses, principally related to physical security, to more complex needs, such as non-discrimination in aid programmes, access to services, and land and documentation issues related to identity, particularly in the context of the massive return and resettlement of populations.

In 2002, the GoA issued the "Legal Framework for the return and resettlement of the populations directly affected by the conflict," which transformed the provisions of the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement into national law. This framework also established minimum conditions for return. These included the provision of at least one hectare of arable land per family; safe access to markets, health care, water, and education; the presence of the state administration; and the provision of resettlement kits, relief food until the first harvest, FFW for land preparation and rehabilitation activities and skills training for returnees. According to OCHA, minimum conditions were met in only about 30



percent of the return and resettlement areas,¹²⁶ although the actual figure could be much lower, between 10 and 15 percent.¹²⁷

In some cases, GoA authorities allegedly forced populations to return to areas of origin that did not fulfill the minimum conditions.¹²⁸ While PRRO 10054.2 linked assistance for resettlement to adherence to the minimum conditions for return, no agencies, including WFP and UNHCR, insisted on compliance by the GoA as a precondition for providing assistance.¹²⁹

According to beneficiaries, IPs and WFP staff, after settling in their areas of origin, many people returned to more populated centres because of the lack of services and infrastructure and/or the inaccessibility of such areas to food distributions. In some areas of Moxico Province, about five percent of the returnees were estimated to have "re-returned" to population centres. OCHA and other humanitarian workers highlighted the disillusionment of the returnee population, particularly of returning refugees, as they discovered that the promises made to them in terms of aid, infrastructure and services were not fulfilled.¹³⁰

The Evaluation learned of a group of over 1,000 former UNITA soldiers and their families who had come to Menongue from Jamba and resettled in the village of Dumbo in Cuando Cubango Province. Although the group planned to return to their areas of origin in other provinces, the GoA refused transport because the demobilisation programme was closed and funds for transportation and other expenses had run out. According to both WFP and Ministry of Social Assistance and Reintegration (MINARS)¹³¹ staff, the displaced group was perceived to have demobilised too late because, lacking confidence in the peace process, it had remained in Jamba. Food and other aid were cut off in 2004 and most of the group remained in Dumbo. A small group of 110 individuals continued to seek support for return but to no avail.

¹²⁶ "Mas depois nao vimos nada" Desmobilizados e repatriados em Angola, MSF, January 2004, p.40-41; Angola: Returnees face threats and discrimination, IRIN, 21.02.05, available from www.irinnews.org; Angola: Homecoming not so sweet for some refugees, IRIN, 21.02.05, www.irinnews.org/webspecials/r/501130Ang.asp. In July 2004, over 50 houses belonging to returnees from Zambia and reported to have links with UNITA were burned down in Cazombo, Moxico Province, following the party's intention to establish an office. Instances of discrimination of returnees from Zambia at Luena hospital were reported. Portuguese knowledge is an issue in the east, in light of "Operação Brilhante", a campaign of expulsion of allegedly foreign diamond workers conducted by the GoA in 2004, which drew criticism from human rights organisations.

¹²⁷ Interview with OCHA Head of Office, Luanda, and *Danish Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons in Angola*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, DANIDA, March 2004, page 38.

¹²⁸ *Angola: Returning IDPs face rights abuses*, NGO, IRIN, 21.02.03, www.irinnews.org/print.asp?ReportID=32446

¹²⁹ Management Response Matrix to the 2001 Angola Portfolio Evaluation, under "Security, Access and Protection Issues."

¹³⁰ Interview with OCHA's Head of Office; see also *Angola: Lack of aid hampers reintegration of returnees*, IRIN, 16 November 2004, www.irinnews.org/print.asp?ReportID=44173, and *Angola: Homecoming joy for returnees, but what next*, IRIN, 15 November 2004, www.notes.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/0/3dcbb3f06605a58ec1256f4d004e0dc6?OpenDocument.

¹³¹ WFP's main GoA counterpart.



Landmines and Unexploded Ordnance (UXO)

Angola is one of the most mine-infested countries in the world, with over 2500 uncleared mine fields.¹³²

Mines and other UXOs presented serious challenges for return and resettlement, especially in areas such as Luau, Moxico province, where people strongly desired to return to their areas of origin but could not. Not surprisingly, as the process of return and resettlement progressed throughout 2004, the number of reported anti-personnel mine incidents increased. In some cases, victims had gone through mine risk awareness sessions and were aware they were venturing into potential mine fields. Three years after the end of the conflict, populations appeared to be less vigilant about mine safety.¹³³

While WFP was not directly involved in de-mining activities, it contributed to efforts by providing transportation services for personnel and both food rations through FFW and NFIs to de-mining NGOs through SOs.

Attacks, Theft of Food, and other Protection Issues of WFP Beneficiaries

During the period immediately following the peace agreements, reports of thefts and attacks on beneficiaries had greatly diminished and had virtually disappeared by 2004. The few such instances reported to the Evaluation took place in 2003 and were identified and promptly and adequately dealt with by WFP and/or its partners, albeit in an ad hoc, rather than systematic manner. These included attacks on recent returnees by local youths immediately after or during WFP directly-implemented distributions in Lunda Sul province; attacks on beneficiaries on their way home from food distributions by men identified as belonging to the armed forces in areas surrounding Cazombo in Moxico Province, and food thefts after distributions in Menongue, Kuando Kubango province.

Despite the absence of specific guidelines on protection, all cases of reported attacks and theft were dealt with at the local level and involved some form of intervention of GoA authorities, security forces and, in rural areas, the *sobas* (traditional leaders). In Lunda Sul, WFP threatened to stop distributions, and in some cases followed through on this threat, but also held extensive meetings with traditional authorities and the communities to explain distribution criteria. According to WFP staff, most cases were not reported to the ACO in an official security incident report, due to apprehension that distributions would be stopped on the grounds of insecurity for WFP staff.¹³⁴

To reduce the threat of theft by criminal gangs in Menongue, WFP ensured that partners carried out distributions from 08:00 to 14:00 only, enabling beneficiaries to return home before dark. At times, police were called in to provide security during food distributions.

¹³² CCA, p. 13; see also *New Government Plans could compromise voluntary nature of return process*, p. 3, updated October 2004, in Global IDP project database, in www.idpproject.org.

¹³³ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), *Humanitarian Situation in Angola – Quarterly Analysis April-June 2004*, in www.reliefweb.int.

¹³⁴ This was a common occurrence, as many incidents involving the protection of beneficiaries were settled locally and not recorded or reported.



The manner in which food distributions were carried out also had implications for the protection of beneficiaries, in terms of their physical safety and respect for their dignity.¹³⁵ For example, verbal abuse and mistreatment of beneficiaries, together with long waiting lines without shelter, were reported to WFP in late 2002 in distribution sites run by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) in Huíla Province by a health NGO working in the area. Although there was a delay of several months in dealing with the case, the matter was discussed with the IP both at the local level and in Luanda, and the staff person identified as responsible eventually dismissed.

Concerns were noted regarding the safety and well-being of beneficiaries who had to walk long distances - in several cases in Moxico, Bié and Huambo Provinces, over 100 km - to receive their food entitlements or seek services because they had settled in remote areas. WFP Luanda's October 2004 M&E Report stated, *"Nearly 3,095 beneficiaries did not receive food in Malange, Kwanza-Norte, Bié, Menongue, Kwanza-Sul because the respective recipients did not show up at distribution points. It was reported that many of them had fixed residences far from distribution points and others avoided walking huge distance between resettlement areas and distribution points..."*. Since neither WFP nor its IPs conducted post-distribution monitoring, information on what happened to beneficiaries on the way home, whether or not they faced threats or danger, and what were the reasons for failure to collect food rations, was not available.

Inconsistencies in distribution policy were noted by the Evaluation. On one hand, WFP and partners allowed beneficiaries in remote locations to collect food entitlements far away from their homes with no means of monitoring their situation. On the other, WFP rejected the requests of local authorities and partners to transport food supplies for GD to isolated communities in areas off-limits to UN personnel, because it was unable to carry out monitoring. Other options however, including TFP SFP, and blanket supplementary feeding for three months were offered to IPs by WFP in such circumstances, if appropriate.

Discrimination of Beneficiary Groups

WFP staff was aware of the potential of food aid to foster divisions in already divided communities, and sought to address this concern by ensuring that food was mainly distributed on the basis of vulnerability and through local officials in difficult areas.¹³⁶ WFP personnel were instructed to avoid making distinctions between beneficiaries on the basis of status (i.e. IDPs, demobilized soldiers, returning refugees, etc.) during GD in newly accessible areas or resettlement areas in order to prevent discrimination and avoid further conflict.

¹³⁵ Although staff claimed that the incidents were communicated in emails to the ACO, no records were found in either Saurimo or Luanda. The Evaluators had to rely on the recollections of individual staff members. For details, see section on GD above.

¹³⁶ For example, WFP – *Reaching people in Situations of Displacement – Framework for Action*, WFP/EB.A/2001/4-C, 17 April 2001, p. 8, states, "Assistance programmes that reach the displaced should not discriminate against other food-insecure groups or cause tensions with host, resident or resettlement communities. WFP will ensure that gender and age considerations figure prominently in assessment and monitoring processes for IDP operations. For example, the Programme will examine factors such as the particular concerns of women-headed households, the special needs of expectant and nursing mothers and the ability of women to reach distribution sites."



The rapid food needs assessment methodology training provided to WFP field staff incorporated questions relating to the composition of the population, the history of the conflict in the area and community relations. Information collected was occasionally used to plan appropriate FFT activities. For example, refugees returning from Zambia were the object of abuse, violent attacks, arrests and ill treatment due to a common perception that they had supported UNITA and their lack of knowledge of Portuguese.¹³⁷ Together with IPs, WFP organised FFT for Portuguese language training in Cuando Cubango for English-speaking returnees from Zambia.

The potential of FFW and other recovery programmes, such as SF, to bring together communities and prevent further discrimination and division were not fully explored, and activities with a protection objective were practically non-existent during the period evaluated.

HIV/AIDS was another issue of concern, in terms of potential for stigma and discrimination. While information about the disease was seriously lacking throughout the country, the Evaluation learned that cases of discrimination of persons infected with HIV (or suspected of being so) had already been registered. Both OXFAM and MSF staff reported tensions in communities as returnees were accused of bringing AIDS into the country. On the other hand, NGOs working in transit centres reported that external returnees were generally more aware of HIV/AIDS, including means to prevent infection.

The Evaluation observed three HIV/AIDS awareness-raising sessions supported by FFW. Although the sessions warned audiences of the dangers of HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted infections (STIs), some of the messages and the negative portrayal of AIDS patients were viewed by the Evaluation as potential sources of stigma and discrimination.

Denial of Food Aid on Political Grounds

Accurately identifying cases of denial of assistance on grounds of political allegiance requires in-depth local knowledge of relations between authorities and the population. Time constraints did not permit the Evaluation to identify specific examples of this issue. Unofficial reports, however, indicated that food aid was a highly political issue and that former UNITA fighters had been stricken off beneficiary lists in order to appease the government. Similar allegations were made by UNITA's leader in October 2004¹³⁸ and expressed by one humanitarian worker during the Evaluation.

¹³⁷ "Mas depois nao vimos nada" Desmobilizados e repatriados em Angola, MSF, January 2004, p.40-41; Angola: Returnees face threats and discrimination, IRIN, 21.02.05, available from www.irinnews.org; Angola: Homecoming not so sweet for some refugees, IRIN, 21.02.05, www.irinnews.org/webspecials/rr/501130Ang.asp. In July 2004, over 50 houses belonging to returnees from Zambia and reported to have links with UNITA were burned down in Cazombo, Moxico Province, following the party's intention to establish an office. Instances of discrimination of returnees from Zambia at Luena hospital were reported. Portuguese knowledge is an issue in the east, in light of "Operação Brilhante", a campaign of expulsion of allegedly foreign diamond workers conducted by the GoA in 2004, which drew criticism from human rights organisations.

¹³⁸ UNITA's leader accused the MPLA of using foreign aid to ensure the backing of vulnerable populations ahead of elections, implementing measures such as forcing people to produce MPLA membership cards before giving them assistance (*AngolaCountry Report, The Economist Intelligence Unit*: December 2004, www.eiu.com).



Abuse and Exploitation of Beneficiaries

Abuse of power and sexual exploitation, particularly of children, was widely acknowledged and reported on during the war. During this period, UN forces were found guilty of exploitation of minors both in Luanda and in the provinces, as stated in a Christian Children's Fund (CCF) report.¹³⁹

None of the persons interviewed by the Evaluation reported instances of exploitation of beneficiaries by humanitarian workers during the past three years. When questioned on the issue were, almost all WFP staff members interviewed were at least vaguely aware of existing procedures and guidelines or of the need to be vigilant.¹⁴⁰ Agreements with IPs included a clause on the obligation to abide by standards set up by the Inter-Agency Task Force on Protection of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, but according to WFP staff, the documents were not always attached to IP agreements.

Posters indicating that relief items, included food, were free for beneficiaries and noting the quantities to be distributed were observed at distribution sites in transit centres run by UNHCR/WFP partners.¹⁴¹ However, no such signs were visible at the site of the pellagra patients' GD observed by the Evaluation in Kuito.

Beneficiary Registration and Documentation

The first step in assisting people in need of protection is to obtain reliable information regarding their identity, profile and location. Much of the population affected by the war, particularly the displaced, did not possess any form of identification. At the time of the peace agreement, it was estimated that some 70 percent of Angolan children did not possess birth certificates.¹⁴² WFP beneficiary lists and ration cards were often the only proof of existence for hundreds of thousands of people, and were used as the basis for registration by state authorities and to provide other forms of assistance. More importantly, ration cards were used in many cases as identity documents by beneficiaries moving to other locations and, in at least one case, provided protection from continued arbitrary arrest.¹⁴³ According to WFP staff in Menongue, Kuando Kubango, in 2001-02, IDPs in Chipongo camp were able to circulate freely to and from Menongue town if they showed their ration card, especially during periods of fierce fighting around Menongue.

In post-conflict Angola, WFP's registration lists and rations cards were no longer the only form of documentation held by IDPs. Nonetheless, a large number of people lacked identity

¹³⁹ Cohen, Adelie, Gabriela Cohen, and Maggie Brown, *Sexual Abuse and Exploitation of Children in Time of War: The Case of Angola*, CCF, Luanda, March 1996. Document prepared for the UN Study on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Children and the 1996 World Congress against the Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children.

¹⁴⁰ As set out in Circular ED/2004/001 by the Executive Director on Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse.

¹⁴¹ Posting of signs indicating the gratuity of humanitarian aid is now standard practice for UNHCR.

¹⁴² Interview with UNICEF; CCA, p. 107.

¹⁴³ In Samulondo, Lunda Norte, around June 2003, WFP staff reported that the ration card shown by an IDP who was erroneously arrested outside the IDP camp after a brawl between IDPs and the local community resulted in his release, after the police approached WFP about his identity. Unfortunately, however, the ration card did not prevent his ill-treatment at the hands of the police. Staff indicated that they never reported this to ACO.



documents. Both UNICEF and UNHCR conducted registration and documentation campaigns, with the support of WFP food.¹⁴⁴

Access to land and land tenure

The Evaluation found that the 2001 Evaluation of the Angola Portfolio statement, "*Land tenure is a major problem in Angola...newly arrived IDPs are resettled on plots of land, which the mission found in most cases not to be adequately registered in the municipal cadastre; nor do beneficiaries receive any document that recognizes their usus-fructus right to exploit the land. As a result there is no guarantee given to resettled IDPs other than word of mouth*"¹⁴⁵ was still valid.

Land titles were virtually non-existent in Angola, and the trend towards increasing land concentration as noted by the UN had continued.¹⁴⁶ A new land law came into force in August 2004, amid concerns by civil society that it favoured private business concerns over individuals. While it included recognition and partial protection of the traditional collective rights of rural communities, it also allowed for the expropriation of rural communities' land because of 'private utility' motives and not just for public interest. It was also unclear how the land law referred to women's right to own property, as women were not allowed to inherit property in Angola.

There was also concern that the most fertile lands were set aside for large-scale exploitation. Problems had occurred in the Central Highlands and Huíla Province, when peasants had reportedly been evicted to make way for commercial enterprises.¹⁴⁷ NGOs, both local and international, expressed concern that those in power urgently wanted to acquire assets and to settle legal matters before the next elections.¹⁴⁸ The Evaluation observed large pieces of fenced land in Lunda Sul that were referred to informally as the "governor's farm", and a former IDP camp outside Saurimo.

WFP supported several FFW agricultural projects involving community participation. Most of these lands had been negotiated and allocated in the traditional manner, with the *Sobas*. Beneficiaries reported that they did not possess any documents showing their entitlement to the land. In one case observed by the Evaluation, an NGO had reportedly purchased the land on which the community was working, from the government.

¹⁴⁴ UNICEF reported the activity as a local arrangement in the provinces, but no evidence of this was found with WFP.

¹⁴⁵ *Full Report of the Evaluation of the Angola Portfolio*.

¹⁴⁶ CCA, pp. 58-59.

¹⁴⁷ Angola: *Parliament to vote on crucial land bill*, IRIN, 9 August 2004, www.irinnews.org; *Traditional land rights clashing with proposed land bill*, Global IDP Project, August 2004, www.idpproject.org; *Land reform highlights in southern Africa, 2003-2004*, in Independent Land Newsletter OXFAM, June 2004, www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we_do/issues/livelihoods/landrights/downloads/ind_land_newsletter_sth_afr_june_2004.rtf; and Palmer, Robin, *OXFAM and land in post-conflict situations in Africa: Examples from Zimbabwe, Mozambique, South Africa, Rwanda and Angola*, OXFAM, November 2004, in www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we_do/issues/livelihoods/landrights/downloads/oxfam_and_land_in_post_conflict_situations.rtf

¹⁴⁸ See OXFAM's *Land Reform Highlights in Southern Africa, 2003-2004*.



Conclusions

Advocacy with the GoA and donors, and a stronger position with regard to resettlement and inherent issues of protection are needed from the UN Country Team (UNCT) as a whole. Increased UNCT advocacy and action could help to ensure that people do not return to areas where there is very little possibility of fulfilling their basic rights, are not made to stay where they do not wish to remain, and are guaranteed a minimum of conditions in areas of return and resettlement.

While many protection needs are only indirectly related to the provision of food, they nonetheless present challenges to WFP as it aims to work in accordance with human rights and humanitarian principles. In this regard, more meaningful partnerships with other agencies with a protection mandate such as UNHRO, UNHCR, UNICEF and NGOs, including Save the Children, Oxfam, and others, could enhance WFP's efforts and at the same time, maximise the protection effects of its activities.

The sustainability of resettlement efforts is directly dependent on the success of the GoA and other humanitarian actors in meeting basic needs and fulfilling human rights. In this regard, the role of WFP, as the UN agency with the largest presence and resources in Angola, in bringing protection issues to the fore and spearheading action by those with relevant mandates and expertise, is of critical importance.

HIV/AIDS awareness sessions attended by the Evaluation tended to infer that people coming from abroad increased the risk of HIV/AIDS transmission. Coupled with an abysmally low level of information about HIV/AIDS, such information was in danger of increasing tension between returnees and their new communities.

Exploitation of beneficiaries is extremely difficult to prove, given that both sides draw some advantages. In light of Angola's past experience, and fear of negative consequences if victims or others speak out, measures must be taken by the humanitarian community to minimise the risk for exploitation and abuse of beneficiaries. Measures could include displaying signs about the gratuity of aid items in all distribution sites; conducting refresher training and awareness sessions for WFP staff, transporters and IP staff; and reiterating the zero-tolerance policy, by which any WFP or IP staff found in violation of the UN Code of Conduct, would face summary dismissal. Other agencies such as Save the Children (UK) have experience and have worked in partnership with WFP in other areas of the world, including Southern Africa.

WFP needs to be vigilant of protection incidents related to food assistance, particularly in view of the forthcoming elections and given the fact that food assistance will diminish in the coming months. Particular attention will be required in the selection of participants of FFW and other recovery activities, which are largely self-targeting.

WFP's policy¹⁴⁹ states, "WFP will work with national and local authorities to secure food-related entitlements for IDPs (e.g. government food coupons) and entitlement to property

¹⁴⁹ *Working with people in situations of displacement – a Framework for Action, WFP.*



rights (e.g. land use, forest products, fishing access) in relation to its food-for-work programmes.¹⁵⁰ The need for WFP to ensure that some form of legal protection for beneficiaries of FFW, as regards land use, cannot be overstated.¹⁵¹

¹⁵⁰ Idem, p. 9. WFP “will also advocate with authorities, partners and donors for the provision of other essential items that would improve the self-reliance of IDPs and other target groups when these items are crucial for WFP’s food-for-work activities.”

¹⁵¹ The 2001 evaluation of the Angola portfolio had already made a similar recommendation: “*WFP should encourage the Ministry of Agriculture, which is in charge of allocating plots of land for resettlement, to issue a right to exploitation title over the size of the land allocation, both in local dialect and in Portuguese. This should guarantee IDPs the right to land exploitation in both temporary and permanent resettlement areas.*”



Recommendations

WFP should:

- include protection considerations, as well as risks and threats, in the next situation analysis, and clearly articulate the protection dimensions of WFP's activities in future programme documents;
- actively seek to obtain protection outcomes from the activities carried out by WFP and IPs with food. Monitoring and reports should include protection issues affecting beneficiaries and, if relevant, actions taken to address them;
- give protection guidance and advocate with appropriate UN partners to meet corresponding training needs for staff and IPs on complex protection issues that may be encountered in the course of recovery programmes, such as discrimination of certain categories of beneficiaries, land tenure, etc.;
- advocate with UN and other partners for, and participate in an assessment of resettlement and return operations. The assessment should determine how many returnees have gone back to live in population centres, and reasons for doing so, and how many returnees have not yet reached their final destination, in order to permit improved targeting of assistance and to advocate for and establish policy for permanent resettlement;
- advocate with other UNCT members, including UNHCR and FAO, for a common position on protection issues as they relate to resettlement, including non-compliance with the GoA's norms for return and resettlement, with a view to taking appropriate action;
- continue to support de-mining activities, through SOs, mine awareness campaigns through SF programmes, etc. in areas where beneficiaries of WFP food aid have settled or are about to settle;
- conduct, alone or through IPs, post-distribution monitoring in areas where WFP does not have access in order to monitor the situation of those people who have to walk for long distances in order to receive their food entitlements;
- provide refresher awareness sessions on the issue of exploitation and abuse of beneficiaries to staff, transporters and partners;
- ensure that at all distribution sites, beneficiaries and others are aware that food aid is free, and review, together with partners, food distribution procedures to ensure that as much as possible they are in line with Sphere Standards;
- ensure that messages given in the course of HIV/AIDS awareness sessions are sensitive to the potential for further tension between communities and portray refugees positively, as agents of prevention of HIV/AIDS and other STIs in order to prevent stigma and help them to reintegrate into their former communities, rather than singling them out as potential risk factors;
- review the land tenure situation of existing and planned FFW projects, and ensure that some form of guaranteed land use exists before approving agricultural projects.





5. Gender


Background

According to PRRO documents, WFP's Enhanced Commitments to Women (ECW) were an integral part of the implementation strategy for the evaluation period. Women were to be actively involved in all aspects of the operation and would benefit from the assets created through FFW. As much as possible, food was to be distributed directly to women, and they would be increasingly involved in food management and Food Distribution Committees (FDCs). Women would participate equally in decision-making processes and income-generating activities would be supported where possible in order to empower women and improve their economic situation.

Special attention would be given in the current PRRO to ensuring that women were represented in all aspects of food assistance, especially on food management and distribution committees. The overall goal would be FDCs with at least 50 percent women members by the end of 2005. Agreements with IPs would reflect ECW's and explicitly set the target as a minimum. WFP would ensure that most of its assistance would be channelled directly through women, who would represent 60 percent of all beneficiaries and 70 percent of those collecting food. Special attention would be given to involving women fully in activity identification for community-based FFW/FFA. Training in capacity building would address gender issues aim the need to enhance women's role in human and physical asset-creation activities.

Findings

The Evaluation confirmed that  most of the FDCs included women. Women also provided considerable labour in FFW activities especially in school construction and rehabilitation. During the evaluation period, the ACO co-ucted an ECW Baseline Survey and carried out gender awareness training for staff. However, some areas of concern regarding gender were noted by the Evaluation:

- 1) women were not present in the PTAs of schools visited by the Evaluation in Ganda (Escola no 244 and Escola 22 de Novembro – Bairro de Cachimbango, and in Kuito (Escola do Kunje). In general, WFP staff and IPs justified the lack of participation of women as merely cultural. While the majority of pellagra patients waiting in the line for GD in Kuito were women, many of whom were pregnant, it appeared that the specific concerns of women were not taken into account. For example, some items were not appropriate for women to transport such as the round metal canisters of oil that were not designed for transport by head and hand. While children were seen helping women to carry food rations, men were only rarely seen assisting women with this task;
- 2) although, women provided considerable labour in FFW activities, their participation may have represented a burden that added to the multiple domestic, agricultural and maternal tasks perform daily; 
- 3) there were no women amongst provincial GoA authorities met by the Evaluation (governors, administrators at municipal or communal level) although women were



in positions of authority at national level in both GoA and NGOs. The Evaluation did not meet any women *sobas*.

Conclusions

The absence of women in decision-making roles in Angola reflects deep-rooted cultural attitudes and values, according to which women are subordinate to men, and should be at home, either taking care of the children and the family, or working in the fields. The relatively low status of Angolan women and their virtual absence from formal government positions, or managerial posts in NGOs and humanitarian agencies, may also be a result of their low educational level and high illiteracy rates. High levels of insecurity in the field could also account, at least in part, for the small number of women working in field-based GoA, WFP or NGO posts.

While WFP's recovery activities involved women as beneficiaries, they did not appear to adequately reflect areas of priority interest to women, such as literacy, skills training and income-generation. Moreover, gender imbalances in decision-making bodies, and the special needs of households headed by women did not appear to be addressed by either WFP or IPs.

GoA authorities and IP's were insufficiently aware of WFP's ECW, and could benefit from additional guidance. Additional gender training for new WFP staff would also be beneficial to promoting the ECW.





Recommendations

WFP should:

- conduct periodic post-distribution monitoring exercises and/or household food consumption surveys to ensure that food and NFI that are targeted to women reach intended beneficiaries;
- take measures to ensure that women are actively involved and have a strong voice in all food-related decision making bodies, including FDCs and PTAs. These measures should include providing leadership and negotiation training for FDC and PTA members, particularly to women members;
- provide training and other forms of capacity building to WFP staff and IPs in gender analysis and gender-sensitive programming, including monitoring and evaluation;
- mainstream gender issues in all training and capacity-development activities;
- conduct a thorough gender-sensitive needs analysis, in collaboration with other UN agencies, NGOs and GoA, and in consultation with appropriate community-based groups. Upon receipt of the results, adjust strategies and programmes to ensure that women are more actively involved in all aspects of operations, that they benefit from assets that weew created, and that the positive effects are maximised, while negative ones are minimised;
- seek additional information on gender issues in Angola (i.e. the national gender assessments); carry out gender research; and/or collaborate with institutions or agencies that conduct such research and link the results to future programming, particularly for SF and recovery activities. Where gender inequality is entrenched for structural reasons, with other UN partners, advocate with the GoA for national policy change;
- seek additional regional information, for example, from the 2004 Regional Report on Gender Responsive Programming in Southern Africa¹⁵² and participate in regional gender initiatives;
- take advantage of WFP's many contacts with men to sensitise them about the needs and concerns of women. Involve beneficiaries in programme design, implementation and review, and work together with men and women beneficiaries, IPs and GoA authorities to bring about a positive change in attitudes regarding gender issues.

¹⁵² Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe.



Map of Angola





Annexes



Annex 1

Evaluation Terms of Reference

1. Background

From 1998 to 2002 the situation in Angola moved from acute emergency to prolonged crisis, with continuing widespread insecurity, extreme poverty and human suffering. In April 2002, 27 years of civil war came to an end when the Government of Angola and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for cessation of hostilities, which established a framework for implementing the Lusaka Peace Protocol.

Angola continues to face daunting economic challenges, together with the difficulties around planned resettlement of some 4 million refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs). Destruction of infrastructure, ongoing mine clearance requirements and a precipitous decline in human capital all have an impact on the country. The overall population of Angola is around 11 million inhabitants, out of which some 3, 5 million are in the capital, Luanda. Between 1970 and 2001, the urban population rose from 15 percent to over 50 percent of the total. A survey¹⁵³ indicates that 63 percent of households in urban and peri-urban areas live below the poverty line, of which 25 percent live below the extreme poverty line.

The movement and resettlement of populations to their areas of origin still mainly determine the food-security situation in rural Angola. Displaced populations continue to return with few productive assets, limited opportunities for income diversification and little access to basic services. In addition to this, many returnees have lost knowledge of local farming practices after decades of absence from their land.¹⁵⁴ The slower-than-expected return of remaining refugees¹⁵⁵ from neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo, Namibia and Zambia is also noteworthy. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) originally estimated that 150,000 refugees would return to Angola during 2004, but more recent estimates indicate fewer than 100,000 and a more protracted period of return. Poorer conditions in Angola, including questionable food security, contribute to this slower pace of return.

Food insecurity varies considerably by location.¹⁵⁶ The provinces of Huambo, Bié and parts of Huíla in the central highlands remain the most vulnerable, followed by Moxico and Kuando Kubango in the southeast, where isolation is the main obstacle to food security. All other areas have pockets of vulnerable populations, consisting mainly of recent returnees. Road transport remains severely restricted by poor infrastructure, broken bridges, seasonally impassable gravel roads and landmines. Limited access to large parts of Angola continues to impede recovery efforts and delivery of humanitarian assistance.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵³ Survey carried out by the National Institute for Statistics, 2001.

¹⁵⁴ WFP Information Note on Angola PRRO 10054.2 (WFP/EB.3/2004/10).

¹⁵⁵ WFP Information Note on Angola PRRO 10054.2 (WFP/EB.3/2004/10).

¹⁵⁶ WFP Information Note on Angola PRRO 10054.2 (WFP/EB.3/2004/10).

¹⁵⁷ WFP Information Note on Angola PRRO 10054.2 (WFP/EB.3/2004/10).



2. WFP in Angola – An Overview

WFP humanitarian assistance has alternated between life-saving emergency operations (EMOP) and protracted relief and recovery operations (PRRO). To date, nine EMOP and six PRRO have been implemented, in which 1, 6 million MT of food reached an average of 1, 1 million war-affected people, with a peak of almost 2 million during 1993–1995. In the aftermath of the conflict, the areas accessible to WFP spread beyond provincial and municipal centres to include vulnerable populations in isolated areas.¹⁵⁸

An evaluation¹⁵⁹ took place in September 2001 and its findings, conclusions and recommendations were presented, together with the subsequent phase, at the May 2002 Executive Board. Three challenges were identified as remaining for the next phase:

- determining WFP's goals and articulating programme implementation guidelines accordingly. Although increasing the importance of recovery activities should be emphasized wherever possible, the use of percentages as indicators of success should be discontinued;
- articulating a flexible and field-based recovery strategy with identifying acronyms such as food for assets (FFA), food for infrastructure (FFI), food for skills (FFS) and food for education (FFE) for all food-for-work (FFW) activities. The strategy should place greater emphasis on participatory approaches and community mobilization and should highlight self-reliance achieved as a result of recovery FFW activities;
- developing flexible approaches for each province to allow for rapid increase of the recovery component when security and military conditions allow. There should be a return to focusing on life-saving activities should security conditions further deteriorate and impede resettlement programmes and recovery activities.

Summary of WFP original interventions (July 2002 to present)

Project	Time period	Beneficiary (,000,000)	Food tonnage (,000)	Resourced in \$ terms @ (%)	Food cost (X \$M)	Total WFP cost (X \$M)
SO 10375.0	Oct2004- Dec2005	PRRO	n/a	new	n/a	5
PRRO 10054.2	Apr2004- Dec2005	1,5	399	25%	82	237
PRRO 10054.1	Jul2002- Apr2004	1,24	342	82%	60	200
SO 10146.1	Apr2003- Dec2004	PRRO	n/a	96%	n/a	7
SO 10149.1	Dec2002- Dec2004	PRRO	n/a	90%	n/a	9

Source: WINGS data warehouse on WFP Go and original project documents

¹⁵⁸ WFP project document PRRO 10054.2 (WFP/EB.3/2003/8/3).

¹⁵⁹ WFP Summary Evaluation Report (WFP/EB.2/2002/3/1).



PRRO 10054.1 was presented at the same Executive Board¹⁶⁰ and started in mid-2002. Emphasis was placed on creating human assets within the target population, and building capacities and skills as mobile as the population. The goals are to encourage self-reliance through diverse survival mechanisms, to optimise and make the best use of WFP assistance for those most at risk of food insecurity, and to pave the way for more durable solutions. Relief and recovery activities are varied, depending on the region/province, in accordance with local capacity, security and vulnerability. More than half of the beneficiaries were supported through relief distribution, nutritional and medical programmes, while resettlement and food for work/ food for assets (FFW/FFA) programmes comprised the recovery component. Recognizing that ongoing disruption affected areas in varying degrees, a flexible food-assistance strategy was adopted to handle emergency and recovery situations. Interventions were based on vulnerability analyses for residents and IDPs, since the conflict had eroded many residents' capacity for self-reliance. The long-term goal of WFP's intervention for 2002–2003 was to contribute to the restoration of sustainable livelihoods of vulnerable IDPs and residents. To achieve this, the immediate objectives were first, to save lives by meeting basic food needs of the most vulnerable sectors of the population, and ensure adequate nutritional status in the targeted population, and second, to enhance the capacity of the target population to achieve food security through creation of human and physical assets. Emphasis on these skills was aimed at increasing future options for income-generating coping mechanisms.

Following the signature of the peace agreement and during the remainder of 2002, WFP interventions continued to be of an emergency nature, driven by: 1) increasing access to needy populations; 2) the quartering of ex-UNITA soldiers and dependants, through demobilisation; and 3) the influx of populations into provincial capitals from areas previously inaccessible to humanitarian assistance. By 2003, many of those in need of food assistance progressed from being relief beneficiaries to people requiring recovery support. Many others disappeared from beneficiary rolls altogether.¹⁶¹

PRRO 10054.2 started late in April 2004, due to delayed food arrivals under the previous operation, and it is scheduled to end on 31 December 2005. The main objective of the PRRO is to contribute to the consolidation of peace through the prevention of hunger and malnutrition and the restoration of sustainable livelihoods among the vulnerable rural population during post-war recovery. Only one tenth of the tonnage is planned for distribution under the relief component. The PRRO also paves the way for a substantial reduction in WFP humanitarian interventions in Angola with a progressive shift of responsibilities to national authorities. This is accompanied by a shift toward support for the most vulnerable people through nutritional, medical and social programmes; help for the education sector; food-for-work (FFW) and food-for-assets (FFA) activities.¹⁶² The GoA has already committed to contributing 7,5 million dollars to the current operation.

A marked drop in the amount of food contributed through the WFP Angola operation has been the single most important factor affecting implementation of the PRRO, despite a

¹⁶⁰ Data reported in the WFP project document PRRO 10054.1 (WFP/EB.2/2002/6/1).

¹⁶¹ Data reported in the WFP Information Note on Angola PRRO 10054.2 (WFP/EB.3/2004/10).

¹⁶² Data reported in the WFP Information Note on Angola PRRO 10054.2 (WFP/EB.3/2004/10).



reduction in the estimated number of food-insecure people and an improved harvest. There has been a significant reduction in contributions from all traditional large donors. By the end of August 2004, only 75,000 tons of new contributions had been confirmed in addition to 35,000 tons carried over from the previous PRRO. Planning figures for 2005 have also been dramatically reduced, largely because of the estimated reduction in the number of beneficiaries and an anticipated shortage of contributions. For example, school feeding beneficiary estimates have been reduced from a planned 400,000 for 2005 to fewer than 200,000.¹⁶³

Significant advances are being made with regards to access to affected populations, including gradual improvements to the road system through de-mining and road and bridge repair. Road repairs have partly been accomplished through a special operation (SO), designed to support on-going WFP interventions. At the end of August 2004, SO 10149.1 (Logistics Services for the Humanitarian Community) was nearly fully funded and has been extended until February 2005. SO 10146.1 (Passenger Air Services for the Humanitarian Community) experienced a funding shortfall of 1 million dollars. Following further reductions in the frequency of services, the SO still required 240,000 dollars per month to operate, and has therefore only been extended to June 2005. SO 10375.0 (Improving Access to vulnerable populations through the repair of bridges and water crossings) was recently initiated.

The next phase of WFP interventions will increasingly focus on recovery, with a transition to developmental activities planned over a three-year period. Future initiatives will include an expansion of school feeding and the introduction of HIV/AIDS programmes.

3. Scope of Work

The examination of the Angola portfolio, including food aid interventions (PRRO) and supporting Special Operations (SO), will be guided by key and subsidiary issues, related to the evaluation objectives below. The period covered will include the years since the last evaluation took place in 2001. Accordingly, the current portfolio evaluation will mostly be summative, rather than formative and will focus on the past period. The main beneficiary population represented internally displaced people, as well as returning refugees involved in resettlement schemes, and host populations.

The evaluation will focus on four criteria, as well as four main topics, as stated specifically under the objectives. Results will be examined at the outcome level, namely measuring the progress towards achieving what was intended, giving due consideration to unintended effects, for each beneficiary group of relief and recovery components and in relation to various food intervention strategies, as compared to the respective problem analyses. Relevant output level results will only be examined when negatively affecting the outcome level achievement of results, in order to understand where and why results were affected and to propose specific ways forward. Two main crosscutting issues, namely gender and protection (also in terms of power relationships in a complex emergency context) will also be part of the overall analysis, as terms of their respective interactions in food aid

¹⁶³ WFP Information Note on Angola PRRO 10054.2 (WFP/EB.3/2004/10).



interventions. The team should give due consideration to the danger of attribution (the tendency to attribute achievements to a single action, without sufficient evidences) and the need for triangulation (a minimum of three sources of information).

Finally, the evaluation will provide an opportunity to outline best practices and lessons learned regarding the use of food aid to meet the immediate humanitarian needs and to create conditions for sustained recovery and transition to developmental impact. A separate annex (two to three pages long) will focus on achievements, in relation to WFP's strategic priorities, in the Angolan context. The four main topics of the evaluation will serve as the basis for the reporting structure, while the four evaluation criteria will represent subdivisions of each topic, when applicable. Attention will be given to the future direction of the intervention, in light of findings and conclusions of the evaluation.

4. Evaluation objectives

⇒ Evaluate three main topics in relation to the Angola portfolio (Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations and supporting Special Operation), namely:

- a) the relief and recovery **strategies, coordination and partnerships**, as derived from the problem analysis and the evolution of the situation (consider GoA policies, the UN system, the donor community and implementing partners and NGOs), and in light of what WFP can realistically be expected to achieve in line with WFP strategic priorities;
- b) **targeting issues**, as derived from needs and vulnerability analyses and in line with the forthcoming thematic evaluation on targeting; and
- c) the **monitoring system**, in relation to various vulnerability and needs assessments, implementation processes and the need for informed decision-making.

In addition, two cross-cutting issues, **protection**, in relation to food assistance, and **gender** issues will also be considered.

⇒ For the above analysis, focus on the following four evaluation criteria (in relation to specific issues), namely: effectiveness¹⁶⁴ (outcomes), efficiency¹⁶⁵ (outputs), relevance¹⁶⁶ (strategy, co-ordination and partnerships) and connectedness¹⁶⁷ (viability/sustainability).

⇒ Present evidenced findings and propose ways for improvement. Conclusions and recommendations should be derived from the findings, including best practices and

¹⁶⁴ **Effectiveness:** The extent to which the operation's objectives were achieved, or expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance (source: WFP M&E Glossary).

¹⁶⁵ **Efficiency:** A measure of how economical inputs are converted to outputs (source: WFP M&E Glossary).

¹⁶⁶ **Relevance:** The extent to which the objectives of a WFP operation are consistent with beneficiaries' needs, country needs, organizational priorities, and partners' and donors' policies (source: WFP M&E Glossary). Also, the preparation of a "recovery strategy", as the base on which all PRRO activities are designed, is recommended in "From Crisis to Recovery" (WFP/EB.A/98/4-A) as well as the PRRO Guidelines ("Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations: Guidelines for the Preparation of a PRRO", WFP February 1999).

¹⁶⁷ **Connectedness:** Ensuring that activities of a short-term emergency nature are carried out in a context that takes longer-term and interconnected problems into account (source: WFP M&E Glossary).



lessons learned, and should be prioritised. Recommendations should comprise issues related to the upcoming phase of the intervention, especially in the education and health sectors.

5. Sub-topics/questions

Detailed sub-topics/questions are reflected in the annexed table. This table will be a guide in developing the evaluation matrix at the beginning of the evaluation mission.

6. Responsibilities and Methodology

The team leader's responsibilities include coordinating the evaluation team and assigning specific responsibilities to team members. However, roles and responsibilities will be clarified once the team meets in Luanda, and further developed as the evaluation progresses. The team leader may organize specific tasks around key issues to be covered by the evaluation. The team leader is responsible for co-ordinating evaluation outputs, in accordance with the TORs and the evaluation matrix (see below for products of the evaluation). Team members will be assigned specific tasks and responsibilities to prepare written contributions and annexes, which will be compiled by the team leader into evaluation reports.

Team members will contribute to the evaluation process, as per assigned responsibilities and participate fully in scheduled information gathering activities. Team members are expected to maintain a good team spirit and to develop harmonious and professional working relationships with others.

The country office will advise on the timing of the evaluation, ensuring that the evaluation reports and other outputs are available for the preparation of the next operational phase; ensure that all necessary documents required for planning the evaluation and undertaking the desk review are provided in a timely manner; assist with the identification and hiring of local consultants as required; ensure that any necessary preparatory work is undertaken in-country prior to the arrival of the evaluation team and facilitate the work of the team while in-country; prepare and organize the in-country field visits itinerary; provide logistical support, including access to staff, sufficient working space and equipment; and assist in the organisation briefing/debriefing sessions.

The Office of Evaluation - OEDE will manage the evaluation and present to the Executive Board evaluation reports and the annexed management response matrix. In addition, the OEDE-appointed manager will provide support to the overall evaluation exercise as necessary, which includes liaising between team members, relevant WFP headquarters staff, and the country office. The manager will also ensure compliance with the intended thrust of the evaluation, and that the necessary logistical support is provided by WFP HQ and the CO. Timely preparation of all relevant documents and reports is the manager's responsibility.

The methodology will consist of focus group discussions and other participatory approaches to information gathering, including field visits, briefing sessions/workshops;



meetings with stakeholders, beneficiaries and WFP staff; and visits to distribution sites. The evaluation matrix provides a framework to guide data collection, fieldwork and analysis, and will be finalised by the evaluation team and selected country office staff, during the first few days of the evaluation mission. The matrix should link evaluation key-issues to relevant sub-issues, performance indicators, data collection methods and information sources. In developing the matrix, the evaluators are expected to examine the relationship between intervention objectives or expected output and outcome level results and the problem/situation analysis, as presented in project documents should be examined. The evaluation will be undertaken by independent consultants in five distinct phases, and in accordance with the TOR, the latter also to be finalised at the beginning of field work.

6.1 Five phases of the evaluation

Phase I – preliminary mission (the equivalent of 12 days for the team leader and the OEDE manager, including 2 days for desk review/preparation at home base and 2 travel days):

A preliminary visit in December 2004 will help clarify/discuss issues related to the evaluation, including: scope and timing; terms of reference, in consultation with the country office; selection of relevant expertise and team members; evaluation framework to facilitate data collection and analysis; methodology; documentation requirements; sites and projects to be visited during the evaluation; action plan; as well as any other issues.

Phase II – preparation/desk review (the equivalent of 5 days for all team members):

Prior to fielding the evaluation, the team will review all relevant background material¹⁶⁸, in the annexed documentation list. Additional indicative documentation is also listed in the annex. A CD Rom has already been provided to the evaluation team, last December, as initial background material. It includes most documentation on the list.

Prior to departure for the in-country field mission, the Office of Evaluation (OEDE) will forward the draft TORs to the country office. These should be shared with key Government focal points and implementing partners. A small task force of key stakeholders (composition to be determined by the CO) may be established to review the TORs, as well as attend the post-mission debriefing session in Luanda.

Phase III – in-country/regional meetings and field visits itinerary (28 days for all members, including 2 travel days and debriefing in Luanda):

To the extent possible, team members will meet with all relevant stakeholders, including beneficiaries, local and national Government/authorities, major donors, key implementing partners and other UN agencies involved. Separate meetings and visits will be scheduled by individual team member to suit specific information needs. The TORs will be finalised and an evaluation matrix completed by the evaluation team.

¹⁶⁸ **Background material:** this material is marked with an asterisk in the annexed documentation list.



Data collection will take place both in the offices of key stakeholders in the capital and during field visits. The team leader, together with WFP staff, will determine the optimum balance between time spent in the field and in the capital city. The team will spend approximately one third of its time on field visits, depending on the prevailing security situation.¹⁶⁹

Key informant interviews may be divided into different groups to optimise limited available time: namely, WFP staff, key institutional partners/actors involved at the national level in programming relief and recovery assistance, institutional/implementing partners, and participants/beneficiaries. Finally, accompanied by project staff, evaluation team members should meet in group settings with each category of food aid beneficiary.

Phase IV – two hour debriefing sessions in three locations (4 days for team leader, including 2 travel days):

There will be three debriefing sessions (one at the country office, one at the Regional Bureau, and one at WFP HQ in Rome) presented by the team leader, with the participation of the evaluation manager. An aide-mémoire will be made available to participants prior to debriefing sessions and should be limited to bullet points for discussion, summarising preliminary findings, conclusions and recommendations.

Phase V – report writing (the equivalent of 5 working days for team members, but 13 for the team leader):

This phase will be co-ordinated by the team leader, and facilitated by the OEDE manager who will seek comments and carry out a quality control of the reports. A Management Response Matrix will also be completed by OEDE and the country office and reports will be processed in a timely manner for the relevant Executive Board session.

6.2 The Evaluation Team

The team should ideally consist of individuals with the following expertise and professional qualities: knowledge of the country and/or the region; WFP PRRO and SO project categories; WFP procedures; food assistance to displaced and refugee/returnee populations in conflict emergencies; household food security and coping strategies; nutritional surveys; school feeding programmes; results-based management; resourcing and programming procedures; in addition to good analytical capability; independence of judgement, and excellent written/verbal communication skills. The following skills would be desirable: able to work and coordinate the work of others under difficult conditions; and have appropriate language skills, namely United Nations Level C in English and level B in Portuguese and/or Spanish. Four international consultants will be selected for this evaluation (there may also be a national consultant), in addition to the OEDE manager.

¹⁶⁹ NB 1: Security clearances and briefings need to be organised by the WFP country office, when mandatory.

NB 2: All consultants may have to undertake and pass the mandatory UN Security Training, as well as provide emergency contact names and numbers, before travelling to the field.



6.3 Timetable and Field Visit Itinerary

In keeping with the below timetable, a detailed itinerary of in-country meetings and visits will be prepared by the country office, in consultation with the Regional Bureau and the Office of Evaluation - OEDE.

Portfolio Evaluation in Angola		
Programme of work and field visits itinerary		
Phase I:	Preliminary mission (team leader and OEDE only)	
Travel to Luanda, Angola		Sun, 5 December 2004
Preliminary visit to Luanda only (see narrative for details) for team leader		Sat, 4 to Sat, 11 December
Preliminary visit to Luanda only (see narrative for details) for OEDE		Sun, 5 to Sat, 11 December
Return travel		Sat, 11 December
Phase II:	Planning and desk review (full team)	
Desk review/reading (the equivalent of 5 days prior)		January 2005
Phase III:	In-country evaluation (briefings and meetings by the full team)	
Travel to the Country Office in Luanda, Angola		Tues, 1 February
Briefing with CO		Wed, 2 February
Briefing with CO, and Briefing with NGO community and UN system (pm)		Thurs, 3 February
Finalise: TORs; Evaluation matrix; Division of responsibilities; Methodology; Itinerary for field visits; Reading documentation (NB: 4 Feb is an official national holiday)		Fri, 4 to Sun, 6 February
Team 1: field visits (3 consultants)		
Departs to Catumbela (Lobito), Benguela (Air Gemini), to Ganda, Benguela by road (overnight in Ganda) and briefing with local authorities and visits		Mon, 7 February
Visits in Benguela province (overnight in Lobito at Pensão Eden)		Tues, 8 February
Meetings, travels to Huambo from Benguela prov. by road (overnight in Huambo)		Wed, 9 February
Meetings and visits in Huambo province (overnight in Huambo)		Thurs, 10 February
Travels to Kuito, Bié from Huambo by road and visit Bié province (overnight in Kuito at CARE guesthouse)		Fri, 11 February
Visits in Bié province and travel to Belo Horizonte (overnight in Kuito at CARE guesthouse)		Sat, 12 and Sun, 13 February
Travels to Mussende, Cuanza Sul by road (via Andulo) and visit Cuanza Sul province (overnight at Quibala guesthouse)		Mon, 14 February
Travel to Sumbe and visits in Cuanza Sul province (overnight in Sumbe)		Tues, 15 February
Team 1 returns to Luanda by road from Sumbe		Wed, 16 February
Team 2: field visits (2 consultants)		
Departs to Luena by air (Air Gemini commercial flight) and meetings (overnight in Luena)		Mon, 7 February
Travels by chartered plane to Luau and visits (overnight in Luau)		Tues, 8 February
Travels by chartered plane to Cazombo and visits (overnight in Luena)		Wed, 9 February
Visits in Luena town, Moxico province (overnight in Luena)		Thurs, 10 February
Travels to Saurimo by road (overnight in Saurimo)		Fri, 11 February



Visits in Saurimo (overnight in Saurimo)	Sat, 12 February
Travels to Luena by road (overnight in Luena)	Sun, 13 February
Departs to Menongue, Kuando Kubango from Luena, Moxico (direct WFP flight) (overnight in Menongue)	Mon, 14 February
Visits to Dumbo, Savipanda and Menongue town in Kuando Kubango province (overnight in Menongue)	Tues, 15 February
Team 2 returns to Luanda from Menongue (Air Gemini commercial flight)	Wed, 16 February
Briefing with Government authorities (technicians) (am), and Donor community (pm)	Thurs, 17 February
Teamwork, conclusion and aide-mémoire (full team, under the responsibility of the team leader)	
Additional meetings, upon request and preparation	Fri, 18 to Thurs, 24 February
Preparation of aide-mémoire and debriefing sessions	Fri, 25 to Sun, 27 February
Phase IV:	Debriefing sessions (Full team, under the responsibility of the team leader, except for HQ Rome)
Debriefing in Luanda with country office only (09:30), and Debriefing with stakeholders in Luanda (15:00)	Mon, 28 February
Travel to the Regional Bureau in Johannesburg, South Africa (at 14:00 (SA055))	Tues, 1 March
Debriefing at the Regional Bureau in Johannesburg, South Africa	Wed, 2 March
Team work to discuss issues related to report writing	Thurs, 3 March
Return travel for all consultants	Thurs, 3 March
Travel to Rome (team leader only)	Mon, 21 March
Debriefing at HQ in Rome by team leader and OEDE manager only (10:00 am)	Tues, 22 March
Return travel for team leader	Tues, 22 March
Phase V:	Report writing (full team, under the responsibility of the team leader)
Report writing (the equivalent of 5 working days for contributions from all team members, but 13 days for the team leader)	
Deadline for first draft report – full	Tues, 22 March
Deadline for first draft report – summary	15 April
Deadline for final draft report – summary (considering comments)	22 April
Deadline for final draft report – full (considering comments)	15 May
Submission at the second 2005 Executive Board session in Nov.	7 to 11 November

6.4 Products of the evaluation

- ◆ TORs to be finalised, with the evaluation team, staff and key stake-holders, including the list of documentation and key issues/questions;
- ◆ Evaluation matrix, with the evaluation team;
- ◆ Aide-mémoire, containing in bullet point form the main findings, conclusions and recommendations (maximum of 2,000 words);
- ◆ Three debriefing sessions (CO, RB, and HQ Rome);
- ◆ Full report, containing all 7 below mentioned annexes;
- ◆ Synthesis report (maximum of 5,000 words and Management Response Matrix).



PS 1 - Full and summary reports:

Preliminary versions of the full report, including all the annexes, and summary report will be required within one month after the mission is completed. These versions will be circulated for comments and will be finalised by the team leader. All written reports and debriefings are to be in English. The mission is independent and fully responsible for its products, which may not reflect WFP's views.

PS 2 - Annexes to the full report are:

- | | |
|----------|---|
| Annex 1: | Final terms of reference – TORs |
| Annex 2: | Evaluation matrix |
| Annex 3: | Itinerary of field visits |
| Annex 4: | Persons met, including name, functions, organisation, and location |
| Annex 5: | Consulted documentation |
| Annex 6: | Written contributions from team members, if deemed necessary
(whether or not they are annexed to the full report, individual
written contributions should be handed over to the OEDE
evaluation manager) |
| Annex 7: | A brief description of findings on the five strategic priorities |

6.5 **Estimated costs**

The current cost to WFP OEDE for such a mission is estimated at some US\$130,000.



List of documentation

- Actions to Prevent Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Humanitarian Crises (WFP/EB.3/2002/INF/27)
- Building Country and Regional Capacity (WFP/EB.3/2004/4-B)
- Comparison Study of WFP and NGOs (WFP/EB.1/2003/4-D)
- Consolidated Framework of WFP Policies - An Updated Version (WFP/EB.3/2004/4-F)
- Danish Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons in Angola: 1999-2003, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DANIDA), March 2004¹⁷⁰
- Definition of Special Operations – amendment to General Rule II.2 (d), programme categories of WFP (WFP/EB.A/2004/5-D)
- Definition of Special Operations (WFP/EB.1/2005-B)
- Emergency Needs Assessment (WFP/EB.1/2004/4-A)
- Evaluation Report of the Angola portfolio (EB.2/2002/3/1)*
- Evaluation Report of the Angola portfolio's Management Response Matrix (EB.2/2002/INF/6)*
- Exit Strategies for School Feeding: WFP's Experience (WFP/EB.1/2003/4-C)
- Food Aid and Livelihoods in emergencies: strategies for WFP (WFP/EB.A/2003/5-A)
- Food for Nutrition: mainstreaming nutrition in WFP (WFP/EB.A/2004/5-A/1)
- Food for Nutrition: mainstreaming nutrition in WFP – Corrigendum (WFP/EB.A/2004/5-A/1/Corr.1)
- Food Security and Food Assistance among long-standing Refugees, (WFP/Ron Ockwell, Nov. 1999 – for refugee operations)
- Food Security Bulletins
- Food Security Updates
- Framework for a common approach to evaluating donor assistance to IDP's: protecting lives and reducing human suffering, Rudge, Philip and Buchanan-Smith, Margie, 4 September 2003, London (104.A.1.E.39)
- From Crisis to Recovery (WFP/EB.A/98/4-A)
- Glossário da avaliação e da gestão centrada nos resultados, Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, Instituto da Cooperação Portuguesa¹⁷¹
- Glossary from the M&E Guidelines
- Humanitarian Principles (WFP/EB.1/2004/4-C)
- Implementing Partners Agreements
- Indicator Compendium (WFP) – June 2004
- Information Note on the Special Operations Programme Category (WFP/EB.1/2004/7)*
- Information Note on the UNJLC Core Unit Review (WFP/EB.3/2004/6-F/Rev.1)*
- Information Notes on School Feeding (WFP/EB.3/2004/4-D)
- Strategic Priorities (2004-2007) – Extract (WFP/EB.3/2003/4-A/1)
- Micronutrient Fortification: WFP experiences +ways forward (WFP/EB.A/2004/5-A/2)
- Millennium Development Goals – UN (8)
- Nutrition in Emergencies: WFP experiences and challenges (WFP/EB.A/2004/5-A/3)
- Operational Report on the PRRO 10054.2 (EB.3/2004/10)*
- Participation in the Consolidated Appeals Process (WFP/EB.3/2003/INF/11)

¹⁷⁰ <http://www.um.dk/Publikationer/Danida/English/Evaluations/DanishAssistanceToInternallyDisplacedPersonsInAngola/summary.asp>

¹⁷¹ http://www.oecd.org/findDocument/0,2350,en_2649_34435_1_119678_1_1_1,00.html



- Programming in the Era of AIDS: WFP Response to HIV/AIDS (WFP/EB.1/2003/4-B)
- Project documents (EMOP, PRRO, SO, etc.), beginning in 2002
- Relief and Post-emergency Operations in Angola: A Joint WFP/NGO/IFRC Evaluation - Project Angola 5602.00 (WFP/EB.3/97/5/Add.5)
- Reports - Dacota, SPRs, Quarterly, JAM and VAM
- Resource summary tables
- Results-Based Management Assessment Checklist
- Results-Based Management in WFP: Next Steps (WFP/EB.3/2003/INF/9)
- Revised July 2002 WFP/UNHCR Memorandum of Understanding
- Strengthening Emergency Needs Assessment: progress to date and implementation plan (WFP/EB.3/2004/4-E)
- Transition from relief to development (WFP/EB.A/2004/5-B)
- Thematic Evaluation of the Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations (PRRO) Category (WFP/EB.1/2004/6-A)*
- Thematic Evaluation of Special Operations (SO) (WFP/EB.3/2002/6/2)*
- Thematic Study of Recurring Challenges in the Provision of Food Assistance in Complex Emergencies (WFP/EB.3/99/4/3)
- UNHCR/WFP Joint Evaluation of Emergency Food Assistance to Returnees, Refugees, Displaced Persons and Other War-Affected Populations in Bosnia and Herzegovina (WFP/EB.2/98/3/1) and Corrigendum (WFP/EB.2/98/3/1/Corr.1)
- Update on WFP's Response to HIV/AIDS (WFP/EB.1/2004/4-E)
- 1997 Joint WFP/NGO/IFRC Evaluation Report (EB.3/1997/5/Add.5)*



Evaluation criteria			
Outcome-level Effectiveness (relief, recovery, special operations) / 1	Output-level Efficiency / 2	Design Relevance (strategy (ies), co-ordination, partnerships) / 3	Connectedness (viability/sustainability) / 4
Topic 1 - <u>Intervention strategy (ies), coordination and partnerships</u> in relation to the evaluation criteria:			
To what extent have intended / unintended outcomes been achieved?	To which extent are procedures and mechanisms (budgets, agreements, meetings, guidelines) supportive to implementation of the strategies?	Was the intervention strategy adequate to address the problem analysis and meet basic food needs?	To what extent is the intervention strategy and selected activities linked to those of others (Government, UN, and IPs)?
To what extent has the strategy been supportive of resettlement schemes?		Which other intervention strategy could have been better adapted to context? Were adaptations possible over time? How was the relief and recovery transition elaborated?	
Are resources (staff, food/NFIs, cash) appropriate?		Were co-ordination mechanisms designed to create synergy between stakeholders?	To which extent are partnerships complementary and viable/sustainable?
To what extent have Special Operations supported the effectiveness of PRROs?	What is the evidence that food aid presented a comparative advantage in recovery activities?	Were inter and intra-agency's division of labour/responsibilities, as well as lines of communication, clearly elaborated to foster collaboration?	To what extent are the intervention strategy and selected activities linked to those of others (Government, UN, and IPs)?
Which other activities has CO carried out in support of the effectiveness of PRROs?	Was there a notable change in transport costs and in access, attributable to Special Operations?	Were partnerships available, considered and collaborated to the intervention strategy?	How is coordination favourable to various interventions' integration



Full Report of the Evaluation of the Angola Relief and Recovery Operations Portfolio

Evaluation criteria			
Outcome-level Effectiveness (relief, recovery, special operations) / 1	Output-level Efficiency / 2	Design Relevance (strategy (ies), co-ordination, partnerships) / 3	Connectedness (viability/sustainability) / 4
Topic 1 - <u>Intervention strategy (ies), coordination and partnerships</u> in relation to the evaluation criteria:			
To what extent has the strategy integrated protection issues?		To which extent have Special Operations adopted the right strategy to support on-going interventions? Were linkages to intervention's logical framework and objectives sufficiently defined?	and capacity building for phase down and hand over?



Evaluation criteria			
Outcome-level Effectiveness (relief, recovery, special operations) / 1	Output-level Efficiency / 2	Design Relevance (strategy (ies), co-ordination, partnerships) / 3	Connectedness (viability/sustainability) / 4
Topic 2 - <u>Targeting issues</u> in relation to the evaluation criteria:			
How targeting optimises the likelihood to reach expected intervention outcomes (consider beneficiary categories, relief and recovery activities and supporting special ops)?	To what extent has food availability been a limiting factor to targeting outputs (in terms of actual food aid recipients/ beneficiaries and food tonnage and basket)?	How do vulnerability criteria to food insecurity relate to design?	To what extent targeting methods and partnerships are appropriate within the institutional context and in light of capacity-building/phase down and hand over?
How are targeting mechanisms, guidelines and criteria affecting achievements (geographic distribution; administrative; IPs; communities; household; individual; redistribution; specific groups (such as malnourished, school pupils, IDPs, returnees, host population, HIV/AIDS, demobilized soldiers, etc.))?	To what extent planned food inputs (pipeline management) affected decisions on outputs (in terms of relief and/or recovery component)?		
How have inclusion errors affected targeting effectiveness?	What is the cost comparison for each targeting method (either quantitatively or qualitatively), in reaching intended food beneficiaries (consider: administrative and IPs, then compare to community-based and self-targeting)?		



Evaluation criteria			
Outcome-level Effectiveness (relief, recovery, special operations) / 1	Output-level Efficiency / 2	Design Relevance (strategy (ies), co-ordination, partnerships) / 3	Connectedness (viability/sustainability) / 4
Topic 2 - <u>Targeting issues</u> in relation to the evaluation criteria:			
How have exclusion errors affected targeting effectiveness?	How cost-effective (either quantitatively or qualitatively) are current food needs assessments for targeting purposes (consider: food crop assessments, needs assessment, vulnerability analysis and mapping, food security analysis, household food economy surveys)?	To which extent have the six following key targeting questions been given consideration for relief, recovery, transition, Special Operations	To what extent co-ordination in targeting has been considered (needs assessments; decision-making processes; implementation; Government contributions; influences on targeting; etc.)?
To what extent targeting integrated protection issues, prior and during food distribution?			
To what extent targeting integrated gender balance issues, not only in quantitative terms, but also relating to decision-making processes and empowerment?			



Evaluation criteria			
Outcome-level Effectiveness (relief, recovery, special operations) / 1	Output-level Efficiency / 2	Design Relevance (strategy (ies), co-ordination, partnerships) / 3	Connectedness (viability/sustainability) / 4
Topic 3 - <u>M&E systems and Results-based Management</u> in relation to the above four evaluation criteria:			
To what extent does M&E system help to demonstrate results?	How does the present M&E system function?	To what extent does M&E system support corporate reporting on strategic priority outcomes?	To what extent does M&E system support a more regular data collection, organization and analysis at local level?
To what extent is the M&E system integrated in cycle of assessment, programming and management?	To what extent is the M&E system cost-efficient in relation to achievements?		To what extent does M&E system include indicators relevant in the Angolan/ provincial context?
To what extent has the M&E system integrated protection issues?			
To what extent has the M&E system integrated gender issues?			

1/ **Effectiveness:** The extent to which the operation's objectives were achieved, or expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance (source: WFP M&E Glossary).

2/ **Efficiency:** A measure of how economical inputs are converted to outputs (source: WFP M&E Glossary).

3/ **Relevance:** The extent to which the objectives of a WFP operation are consistent with beneficiaries' needs, country needs, organizational priorities, and partners' and donors' policies (source: WFP M&E Glossary). Also, the preparation of a "recovery strategy", as the base on which all PRRO activities are designed, is recommended in "From Crisis to Recovery" (WFP/EB.A/98/4-A) as well as the PRRO Guidelines ("Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations: Guidelines for the Preparation of a PRRO", WFP February 1999).

4/ **Connectedness:** Ensuring that activities of a short-term emergency nature are carried out in a context that takes longer-term and interconnected problems into account (source: WFP M&E Glossary).



Annex 2

List of People Met by Evaluation Mission

Organisation	Persons met	Title	Contact
WFP	Richard Corsino	Country Director	
WFP	Sonsoles Ruedas	Deputy Country Director	
WFP	Henning Scharpff	Head of Operations	
WFP	Mario Touchette	Programme Officer	
WFP	Domingos Cunha	Programme Officer	
WFP	Luc Verelst	Head, VAM	
WFP	Ermelinda Caliengue	National VAM Officer	
WFP	Filomena Andrade	VAM Assistant	
WFP	Beatriz Yemenos	Programme Officer M&E	
WFP	Marc R. De la Motte	Programme Policy Officer	
WFP	Silvia Savini	Education Officer	
WFP	Gabriela Cohen	Programme Officer HIV/AIDS	
WFP	Jihan Jacobucci	Head of Administration	
WFP	Christian Fortier	Head of Logistics	
WFP	Humberto Godinho	Air Operations Assistant	
WFP	Leklemariam Moges	Head of CTS/LTSH	
WFP	Antonio Salort-Pons	Programme Officer/Bridges	
WFP	Jose Fernandez	Logistics Officer/Air Operations	
WFP	Fernando Chambel	Security Officer	
AAA (Accao Agraria Alema)	Brigitte Waidelich	Administrator	aaa-luanda@netangola.com
AAA (Accao Agraria Alema)	Peto Hinn	Country Director	aaa-luanda@netangola.com
ACF (Action Against Hunger -Accao contra a fome)	Tomas Serna	Country Director	jm-achangola@achesp.org
ADRA I	Kathia Cordeiro	Finance Director	adraint.finance@ebouet.net
ADRA Angola	Jorge Pina	Coordinator	



Full Report of the Evaluation of the Angola Relief and Recovery Operations Portfolio

AFRICARE	Pedro Chituco	Country Coordinator	africare@ebouet.net
Angolan Red Cross	Simao Calararte	Logistics	
Embassy of Algeria	Joucef Kicha	First Secretary	
Embassy of France	Paul Lechuga	First Secretart	
Embassy of Germany	Herbert Standt	Third Secretary	
Embassy of Great Britain	John Thompson	Ambassador	
Embassy of Great Britain	Manuel Calunga	DFID Assistant	m-calunga@dfid.gov.uk
Embassy of Italy	Simone Ravdino	UN Fellow	
Embassy of Portugal	Duarte Alves	First Secretary	
Embassy of Portugal	Shelley Sa Pires	Secretary	shelley.pires@snet.co.ao
Embassy of Russia	Vladimir Novikov	First Secretary	
Embassy of Spain	Ester Borrás	First Secretary	
FAO	Jean-Francois Dontaine	Emergency Coordinator	jeanfrancois.dontaine@fao.org
GTZ/GFA	Christoff Franke	Team Leader	afrika@gfa-terra.de
ICRC	Gianni Volpin	Deputy Head	luanda@lua.icrc.org
Lutheran World Federation	Petros Wontamo Arana	Representative	repre@lwfangola.com
MEDAIR	Marc-Andre Gagnebin	Country Director	cd-angola@medair.org
MSF-Belgium	Fasil Tezera	General Coordinator	MSFB-luanda-hom@brussels-msf-org
MSF-Holland	Erna Van Goor	Head of Mission	msfh-angola-hom@field.amsterdam.msf.org
MSF-France	Jean Hereu	Country Team Leader	mf@ebonet.net
MSF-France	Aurora Texeira	HOM/Medico	mfal@ebonet.net
MSF-Suisse	Bettina Weitz	Head of Mission	msfch-luanda-hom@geneva.msf.org
MSF-Spain	Javier Fernandez		msfe-luanda-cg@barcelona.msf.org
MSF-Spain	Alberto Vivas	Logistics Coordinator	
MINADER/GSA	Andrade Rodrigues Santos	Technician	andradesantos61@hotmail.com
MINARS	Maria Assis	Directora Adjunta da Unidade Tecnica de Coordenacao da Ajuda Humanitaria	
MINARS	Jose Antonio Ferreira Martins	Principal Advisor to Minister	prspc@ebonet.net
Ministry of Education	Alexandra Semiao	Vice-Minister	
Ministry of Education	Ana Maria Canoquena	Coordenadora do Programa Merenda Escolar - MEC	
Ministry of Family and the Promotion of Women	Ana Paula S. Neto	Directora do Gabinete de Intercambio	
Ministry of Health	Belarmino Joao	Chefe de Dep. Estudos e Projectos	



Full Report of the Evaluation of the Angola Relief and Recovery Operations Portfolio

Norwegian Refugee Council	Maud Johanson	Base Manager	
Oxfam Great Britain	Judy Houston	Country Programme Manager	jhouston@oxfam.org.uk
Oxfam Great Britain	Michele Messina	Programme Coordinator	mmessina@oxfam.org.uk
Oxfam Great Britain	Prasamt Naik	Senior Program Manager	pnaik@oxfam.org.uk
Rede Mulher/Angola	Emilia Dias Fernandes	Secretary General	
SCF-UK	Maria Adela Castro	Advisor	macastro-scuk@snet.co
SCF-UK	Susan Grant	Head	sgrant.scuk@snet.co.ao
Swiss Cooperation	Matthias Anderegg	Director	
TCU-OCHA	Matthew Olius	Senior Field Coordinator	mattolius@hotmail.com
UNAIDS	Alberto A. Stella	Country Coordinator	unaids.angola@undp.org
UNDP	Bernard Ouandji	Poverty Reduction Strategy Expert	bernard.ouandji@undp.org
UNDP	Boubou Dramane Camara	Deputy Resident Representative	boubou.camara@undp.org
UNDP	Gilberto G. A. Ribeiro	National Economist	gilberto.ribeiro@undp.org
UNDP	Philip Dive	Advisor	
UNFPA	Julio Leite	Assistant Representative	leite@undp.org or leite@unfpa.org
UNHCR	Annette Nyekan	Deputy Representative	nyekan@unhcr.ch
UNHCR	Martin Jaggi	Programme	jaggi@unhcr.ch
UNHCR	Josef Mueller	Technical Coordinator	MUELLER@unhcr.ch
UNHCR	Martin Zirn	Technical Coordinator	ZIRNM@unhcr.ch
UNHCR	Emmanuela Gongo	Associate Protection Officer	gongo@unhcr.ch
UN Human Rights Office	Edina Kozma	Human Rights Officer	edinak@unopsmail.org
UNICEF	Cristina Brugiolo	Assistant Education Officer	
UNICEF	Jonathan Caldwell	Planning	jcaldwell@unicef.org
UNICEF	Peter de Vries	Project Officer Education	
UNICEF	Abubacar Sultan	Project Officer - Child Protection	asultan@unicef.org
USAID	Wayne Frank	Agriculture/Food Security Officer	



Full Report of the Evaluation of the Angola Relief and Recovery Operations Portfolio

UTCAH	Maria Assis	Deputy Director	
VVAF (Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation)	Diolo Soares	Admin/Logistics Coordinator	VVAF@nefancola.com
World Vision	Ana Manguiera	Health Manager	ana-manguiera@wvi.org.ou
World Vision	N. Morrow	Early Warning Specialist	nmorrow@worldvision.org
World Vision	Jonathan White	Operations Director	jonathanwhite@netangola.com
WFP	Helena Viegas	Head of Sub-Office	helena.viegas@wfp.org
WFP	Sub-office Staff	Different positions in Sub-Office	
UNICEF	Ligia Fortunato	Assistant Project Officer	
UIEIA	Augusto Cassanga	Representative	
GOAL	Vidal Goncalves Paulo	Project Manager	
GOAL	Elias Pereira	HIV Coordinator	
Nucleo de Artes Kissonde (VIH/SIDA)	Domingos Fernando Caieie	Director	
VVAF (Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation)	Fernando Zas	Logistician	
VVAF	Leo Pavillard	Consultant	
VVAF	Graziella Lippolis	Rehabilitation Centre Manager	
SOAM	Paulo Chimona Sozinho	Assistant	
IEIA	Jose Fernando Luciano	Deputy Provincial Secretary	
ADC	Mateus Lucas Chitanga	Monitor	
LWF (Lutheran World Federation)	Godfrey Kakaula	Repatriation Supervisor	
UTCAH	Carlos Alberto	Provincial Coordinator	
MINADER-PA	Paulo Augusto Lomoi	Head of Department	
MEDAIR	J. Mackenzie	Manager	
UNHCR	Veronique Genaille	Head of Sub-Office	
DPS (Provincial Health Department)	Carlos A. Masseca	Director	
DPS (Provincial Health Department)	Victorina Soi	Head of Therapeutic Centre	



Full Report of the Evaluation of the Angola Relief and Recovery Operations Portfolio

DPS (Provincial Health Department)	Augusto Capule	Head of Suppl. Feeding Centre
Supplementary Feeding Centre	Beneficiary Contact Monitoring	Beneficiaries
AA-SIDA	Jorge Narcisso	Deputy Coordinator
Traditional authorities		Sobas of Muachimbo and Zorro villages
MEDAIR	Madelene Kjellgren	Acting Programme Coordinator
MEDAIR	Clement Philit	Logistics Coordinator
MEDAIR	Rebecca Shakeshaft	Administrator
MEDAIR	Bula Zylka	Registration/Distribution/IT Coordinator
MEDAIR	Petra Jobse	MMT/Recept. Centre/Health Post Coord.
UNHCR	Domingos Cairingue	Senior Field Clerk
UNHCR	Jose Catunda	Senior Field Clerk
WFP Staff	Walter Reithebuch	Logistics Officer/Bridges Project Manager
WFP Staff	Arlindo Cangolo	Bridges Project Assistant
Bridge Contractor	Jose Eduardo Miudo	Contractor's Project Manager
Bridge Building Project	Beneficiaries	Workers
Community	Beneficiaries	Returnees from DR Congo/Zambia in Transit Centre
WFP	Domingos N'dendica	Head of Field Office
LWF (Lutheran World Federation)	Paulo Moises	Reception Centre Manager
LWF (Lutheran World Federation)	Antonio Boas	Distribution Manager
LWF (Lutheran World Federation)	Francisco Antonio	Registration/Distribution/IT Coordinator
LWF (Lutheran World Federation)	Abel Dapenda	Warehouse Officer
Nhacaumba community agricultural project	Lucas Capalo Casueca	Coordinator



Full Report of the Evaluation of the Angola Relief and Recovery Operations Portfolio

Nhacaumba community agricultural project	Beneficiary Contact Monitoring	Participants (including returned refugees from DR Congo and Zambia)
UNHCR	Ronaldo Samuanji Segunda	UNHCR Senior Field Clerk
WFP	Anatilde Sole	Head of Field Office
WFP	Marta Peso	Food Security/Food Aid Monitor
Caritas (Canundambala Lepers' Home)	Sister Dionisia Candeia	Director
Caritas (Canundambala Lepers' Home)	Pedro Capamba	Manager
PHCO	Samuel Linguenu	Agronomist (Returnee from DR Congo)
PHCO	Antonio Eduardo Toze	Coordinator
Local government	Zeferino Chicomba	Deputy District Administrator
Private Transporter	Beneficiary Contact Monitoring	Road User
Village Traditional Authorities	Alfonso Juro	Soba
Village Traditional Authorities	Augustinho Saneca (first Secretary)	First Secretary (MPLA)
Community	Beneficiaries	Residents of Murieje, Cangamba
WFP	Alberto Feliciano Pedro	Head of Sub-Office
WFP	Albino Rodrigues	Food Aid Monitor
WFP	Zacarias Kapilekise	VAM Monitor
Provincial government	Joao Baptista Tchindandi	Governor
MEC (Ministerio da Educacao e Cultura)	Jose Carlos C. Malengue	Deputy Head - Heritage
IGCA (Geography and Cartograph Institute)	Bonifacio Kapoco	Head of Department
ACADIR	Antonio Chipita	Administrator
ADC	Julio Francisco Lucas	Administrator
Halo Trust	Jose Antonio	Administrator
Malteser	Aurora Martins	Administrator
UEIA	Alberto Bras	Coordinator
UEIA	Salomao	Monitor
NRC	Antonio Pequenino	Logistician
WHO	Fadario Kolela	Coordinator
CVA (Angolan Red Cross)	Domingos Jose Cassela	Secretary
MBAKITA	Antonio Dala	Representative



Full Report of the Evaluation of the Angola Relief and Recovery Operations Portfolio

MBAKITA	Beatriz Dala	Secretary
LAP (Ana Paula Home)	Sister Emilia Bundo	Coordinator
INTERSOS	Nicolau Daniel	Administrator
INTERSOS	Gian Pietro Tonglorgi	Demining Coordinator
INTERSOS	Maurizio Gentile	Country Director
MINARS	Nsungo M. Pedro	Director of Aid Department
AIFO/TFD	Inacio Merullen	Provincial Representative
PHCO	Antonio Zenga Mambo	Humanitarian Delegate
MSF-Suisse	Torji Maria Landers	Coordinator
ICRC	Claudia Tocher	Delegate
Caritas	Sister Julia C. Pereira	Director
MINFAMU	Florinda A. Cassanga	Director
UTCAH	Augusto Chicanho (Jnr)	Provincial Coordinator
Saint Saviour Congregation	Fr. Guilherme Salusase	Missionary
Traditional authorities	Adriano Samba	Regidor
Norwegian Refugee Council - NRC	Antonio Pequinino	Project Manager
Traditional authorities	Gabriel Congo	Soba (Resident)
Traditional authorities	Daniel Saapi	Soba (Returning IDP)
Traditional authorities	Daniel Banco	Soba (Returning from Namibia)
Community	Beneficiaries	Residents (returned and resettled refugees from Namibia and Zambia)
	Cirilo Jose Maria da Silva Pedro	Chefe da Area do Ensino Geral SMEC
ONG JAM	Lino Henriques	Monitor
ONG ODCA	Herculano Antonio Martins	Monitor
ONG SOLAP	Domingos Manuel	Director Geral
Escola no. 244	Eduardo Cesar Damiao	Director da Escola no. 244
Centro Nutricional Terapeutico	Maria Helena Chinhama	Tecnica de Enfermagem
Centro Nutricional Terapeutico	Paulo Wilson	Supervisor de Nutricao
Departamento Provincial do Programa de Nutricao	Martinho Wimbu	Supervisor
MINSA	Americo Maquina Daniel	Responsavel
Hospital de Ganda	Miserio Nandumbo Andre	Director
Centro Nutricional Terapeutico	Emilio Bone	Logistico



Full Report of the Evaluation of the Angola Relief and Recovery Operations Portfolio

Escola 22 de Novembro (Cachimbango)	Felix Bamlaka	Director
GoA	Maquina Kangu	Soba
Escola 22 de Novembro (Cachimbango)	Amandio Tchaterca	Sub director
SOLAP (Solidariedade Apostolica)	Victor Fortuna	Coordenador
SOLAP (Solidariedade Apostolica)	Jose Afinhete	Coordenador de Sub- zone
Escola 22 de Novembro (Cachimbango)	Adriano Segunda	Representante dos pais
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Full Report of the Evaluation of the Angola Relief and Recovery Operations Portfolio

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Full Report of the Evaluation of the Angola Relief and Recovery Operations Portfolio

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Full Report of the Evaluation of the Angola Relief and Recovery Operations Portfolio

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GoA	Carlos Soares	Soba
GoA	Miguel Pedro	Soba
GoA	Manuel Ferreira	Teacher
SCF-USA (Gabela)	Mike Tizora	Base Manager



Annex 3

Field Visit Itinerary

LUANDA Tuesday 1 February

Arrival in Luanda

Briefing by CO, WFP Luanda staff

Wednesday 2 February

Meeting with Operations Unit

Meeting with Monitoring and Evaluation Officer (Beatriz Yemenos)

Meeting with VAM Unit

Thursday 3 February

Meeting with Development Unit (general and school feeding)

Meeting with NGOs and UN agencies

Meeting with Monitoring and Evaluation Officer (MCM and PH)

Meeting with Development Unit (HIV/AIDS projects; refugees – MCM only)

Friday 4 February

Review of Terms of Reference, research and documentation, preparation for field visits

Saturday 5 February

Research and documentation, preparation for field visits

Sunday 6 February

Research and documentation, preparation for field visits

I. FIELD VISITS

TEAM 1: Ellen Girerd-Barclay, Elizabeth Coutinho, Peter Haag

TEAM 2: Romain Sirois, María Clara Martín

1) MOXICO PROVINCE (RS, MCM)

Monday 7 February

Travel to Luena by WFP airplane; Briefing with Luena Head of Sub-Office

Meeting with WFP Luena staff

Meeting with Government, IP, NGOs, UN agencies

Tuesday 8 February

Departure to Lumbala N'Guimbo by WFP airplane (change of schedule as initial destination Luau was impossible to reach due to rain)

Visit to Luanguinga bridge rehabilitation project (FFW) – 30 km from Lumbala N'Guimbo on road to Lucusse (RS)

Meeting with MEDAIR staff (MCM)

Meeting with UNHCR Lumbala N'Guimbo staff (MCM)

Visit to Reception Centre for returnee refugees

Return to Luena



Wednesday 9 February

Departure by air to Cazombo
Briefing, Head of WFP Field Office Cazombo
Visit to Reception Centre
Visit to Nhacaumba community mandioca multiplication/agricultural project
Meeting with UNHCR Cazombo
Meeting with LWF staff
Visit to LWF/WFP warehouse
Return to Luena

Thursday 10 February

Briefing, UNHCR Luena (MCM)
Visit to Nutritional Feeding Centre, Luena Central Hospital (RS)
Visit to VVAF Physical Rehabilitation Centre
GOAL's HIV/AIDS awareness session in Muachimbo village
Núcleo de Artes Kissonde's HIV/AIDS awareness theatre session, Zorrò neighbourhood, Luena

2) LUNDA SUL PROVINCE

Friday, 11 February

Travel from Luena to Saurimo by WFP car (6 hours)
Visit to Caritas' home for leprosy patients in Canundambala, Saurimo
Visit to PHCO's communal agricultural project, 4 de Fevereiro area, Saurimo
Briefing, PHCO coordinator, Saurimo

Saturday 12 February

Travel Saurimo-Muconda (WFP's metallic bridges (SO) and FFW road and bridges project.
Discussion with Muconda Deputy Administrator
Discussion with residents of Cangamba village

Sunday, 13 February

Return from Saurimo to Luena by WFP car

3) KUANDO KUBANGO PROVINCE

Monday 14 February

Travel by WFP airplane to Menongue; Briefing by WFP Menongue Base Manager
Meeting with Governor, government officials, NGOs, IPs and UN agencies

Tuesday 15 February

Visit to Dumbo village and discussion with traditional authorities and other formerly assisted returnee IDPs and demobilised soldiers)
Visit to Menongue Orthopaedic Centre (formerly INTERSOS, transferred to Ministry of Health)
Visit to Savipanda village (formerly assisted returnee IDPs, currently assisted external returnees, FFW women's alphabetisation project



Full Report of the Evaluation of the Angola Relief and Recovery Operations Portfolio

Visit to Ninho da Paz School, Menongue town (past FFW construction and school feeding, closed end 2002)

Visit to Santa Elizabeth health post, Menongue town (past FFW construction and CI sheets donation, 2001)

Wednesday 16 February

Meeting with WFP Menongue Staff (Head of Sub-Office, Food Aid and Vulnerability monitors)

Return to Luanda by air

II. LUANDA Thursday 17 February to **Monday 28 February**

III. JOHANNESBURG

Tuesday 1 March to Thursday 3 March

Debriefing at the Regional Bureau in Johannesburg, South Africa



Annex 4

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Annex 5

Lessons Learned - WFP Angola Portfolio 2001 – 2004

1. WFP's interventions (including Special Operations) need to be based on an intervention logic and a corresponding Logframe from the start, with clearly identified indicators for assessment of outputs and outcomes.
2. Monitoring and evaluation must to be driven by internal demand to produce meaningful results in terms of analysis, and feedback for programming and management. Internal evaluations are necessary to review progress and identify gaps in operations to be addressed before Programmes are ended.
3. In order to cultivate responsibility and ensure the ownership of results, partnership agreements (i.e. IP agreements and MoUs) must to be based on joint objectives of WFP and its partners. Otherwise, the latter will function merely as food distribution agents.
4. Meeting monitoring, evaluation and reporting requirements can be labour-intensive and costly. Related tasks and staff responsibilities must be clarified and budgeted for from the outset of operations to ensure that they are not neglected later on in the programming cycle.
5. RBM is not an activity or responsibility allocated to one particular unit or section of WFP, but rather an attitude and way of doing business that characterises all aspects of interventions, from design, to partnership negotiations and agreements, data collection, organisation and analysis, to implementation, to evaluation and redirection.
6. With better planning, and more consistent, timely and accurate monitoring of both food rations and the nutritional status of the beneficiary populations, it is most likely that the pellagra outbreak in Kuito could have been prevented. A WHO review of pellagra in emergencies suggested that the following areas of practice and policy could be strengthened as preventative measures:
 - a. determination of the appropriateness of diagnosing pellagra solely upon dermatological criteria;
 - b. review of the strategy of relying upon distributions of fortified blended foods, such as CSB to prevent and/or alleviate micronutrient deficiency disease outbreaks, in light of recurring evidence that provision of adequate supplies of such foods is often problematic. The reasons for these difficulties should be assessed and if necessary, the strategy revisited or at least qualified. It may be that in some situations fortification of maize should be considered in preference to this strategy;
 - c. clarification of donor policies on the bartering or exchange of food aid, in light of the lack of a clear statement among bilateral and multilateral donor agencies regarding this important issue.
7. The sustainability of resettlement efforts is directly dependent on the success of the GoA and other humanitarian actors in fulfilling basic needs and respecting human rights. WFP's role in bringing protection issues to the fore and spearheading action by those with relevant mandates and expertise, particularly for IDPs, is of critical importance as the UN agency with the largest presence and resources in Angola.
8. Without adequate information on gender, and a thorough gender analysis of beneficiaries and relief/recovery, WFP's task of supporting the ECW is rendered impossible.



Annex 6

Recommendations – WFP Angola Portfolio Evaluation 2005

Relief and Recovery Strategy and Coordination and Partnerships:

1. Design the next programme for a period of three years (2006-2008) with a view to harmonising activities to the extent possible with the UNDG programming cycle, and maintaining close links with the UN-led Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) to ensure smooth coordination of assistance to Angola, and to avoid duplication of efforts.
2. Focus increasingly on Strategic Priorities 2, 3, 4, and 5, including indicators from the Corporate Indicator Compendium as far as applicable and deemed feasible.
3. Include GoA authorities in the preparation of the new programme, phasing in GoA contributions and investing in skills development through training, study visit, mentoring relationships, and other forms of capacity-building, for an eventual take-over of activities by the end of the programme cycle.
4. At provincial and municipal levels, together with other partners, create models of integrated programming for recovery and development, focusing resources on activities such as SF and FFW, where WFP has distinct added value.

General Distributions:

5. Review, together with partners, GD procedures to ensure to the extent as possible they are in line with international standards (Sphere).
6. Conduct, alone or with partners, regular post-distribution monitoring in areas where WFP does not have access in order to monitor the situation of those people who have to walk for long distances in order to receive their food entitlements.

Nutrition and Medical Programmes:

7. Work together with UN agencies and other partners to gather quantitative and qualitative information on the causality of malnutrition in areas with chronic food insecurity and persistently unacceptable levels of acute and chronic malnutrition and micronutrient deficiencies, in order to guide decision-making and involve other partners in solutions:
 - a. determine, on a regular basis, if assessed food aid needs have indeed been met by WFP;
 - b. use nutrition information systematically in advocacy efforts at all levels, internal and external, aimed at raising awareness of critical situations in order to ensure that planned needs are met.
8. Continue to cultivate productive partnerships for health, nutrition and HIV/AIDS with UNICEF, FAO, UNFPA, UNAIDS and GoA authorities.
9. Adhere to WFP policy regarding micronutrient fortification and the provision of fortified commodities.



10. Contribute to efforts to prevent and mitigate the negative effects of the AIDS pandemic, within an integrated package of inputs to: increase knowledge and understanding of the disease and how to prevent it; improve food security of people living with and affected by HIV/AIDS; and, on a pilot basis, provide food and nutritional support to ill people, suffering from AIDS and/or receiving antiretroviral therapy.

Food for Work/Food for Assets:

11. Using information from the review of WFP Angola's FFW/FFA strategy, develop clear guidelines. If possible, develop a new form of LTSH payment for FFW to alleviate the situation of insufficient resources for NFI and other costs.
12. Avoid providing food through FFW/FFA as a substitute for GD. While an element of emergency relief may always be present in such projects, WFP must ensure that FFW/FFA projects are not used to replace needed GD to the vulnerable populations because of limited resources or other constraints.
13. Identify planned outcomes for FFW projects and ensure that measures are taken systematically for the sustainability of activities.
14. Select FFW projects that fall within the available expertise of WFP staff, unless IPs are technically qualified:
 - a. of the available FFW activities, select those that have the greatest potential to foster integration, to reduce tensions and discrimination within and amongst communities, to offer protection benefits, and to address gender-related concerns.

Food for Training/School Feeding Programmes:

15. Ensure that SF is implemented within the framework of an integrated package of inputs to basic education, building upon the cooperation in 2001 and expanding to include nutrition, health and sanitation and environmental concerns in addition to education:
 - a. link the SF strategy to complementary strategies of other partners (GoA, UN agencies, IPs) as stated in the PRRO;
 - b. develop ToR and engage technical assistance for WFP, GoA and other IPs in the areas of school health, food preparation, hygiene, sanitation, and education to enhance the overall outcomes of SF;
 - c. organise a planning workshop with donors, UN agencies, and GoA and other IPs to prepare the next PRRO, establishing common understandings of PRRO funding capacity and encouraging interagency support and collaboration in SF/ basic education;
 - d. seek commitments from the MoEC, MoH, and MoF for increased technical and financial support to SF;
 - e. collaborate with UNDP on monitoring progress towards the Millennium Development Goals and poverty monitoring, to avoid duplication and contribute to joint UN efforts.



16. Spearhead provincial-level coordination mechanisms for basic education/SF, together with UNICEF and a wide group of interested partners under the direction of the GoA directorates of health, agriculture, as well as education, within the national level UNDAF:
 - a. focus SF on a limited number of provinces, where WFP already has commitments from provincial-level authorities;
 - b. conduct needs assessments which include household food consumption data to determine appropriate SF rations, and/or conduct household surveys to assess changes in the rural socio-economic environment in general, and in children's nutritional status and educational levels in particular, resulting from the introduction of SF programmes;
 - c. continue efforts to support MoEC's collection and analysis of accurate, reliable, gender-disaggregated data, providing technical assistance at provincial level to improve data collection and monitoring and to identify indicators for a baseline study that can be used to assess nutrition school achievements;
 - d. closely monitor gender differences in terms of enrolment, in targeted provinces;¹⁷²
 - e. during the life of the project, conduct a qualitative assessment on the impact of SF on enrolment, attendance and performance.
17. Specify the minimum standards for school feeding meals, school construction, classrooms, SF facilities, water and sanitation in any IP agreements, and closely supervise implementation and monitor results:
 - a. establish agreements only with IPs that have demonstrated capacity to implement, supervise and report on high quality SF activities, including school construction and rehabilitation, in accordance with agreed-upon standards;
 - b. assist the GoA to translate the MoEC's MINOPs into action, working closely with the SF TCU to learn from experiences and to advocate for increased GoA responsibility for SF;
 - c. together with IPs, undertake an assessment of cooking fuel requirements, pilot test fuel-efficient stoves and other forms of environmentally-friendly cooking facilities for SF programmes, and consider the reduction of cooked SF meals, the installation of fuel efficient stoves in SF kitchens, and/or the replacement of firewood with charcoal or gas.
18. Review required tasks for the implementation and monitoring of SF programmes, and revise WFP staff ToR to reflect increased time for monitoring and supervision of SF, seeking to retain staff for a longer period of time (at least the duration of the next PRRO until 2008) to permit continuity in programming.

¹⁷² Especially in Bié Province.



Special Operations:

19. Maintain passenger air services to ensure a sufficient level of access, at a time when data from assessments of newly accessible areas and the monitoring of current interventions is crucial for decision-making, particularly in light of the current operation's planned phase down.
20. Ensure the inclusion of outcome-level information in SPRs, in order to assess the degree of access achieved by the SO, and its effectiveness in supporting the PRRO, in terms of improved targeting and coverage, and enhanced programme monitoring.
21. Ensure that a cost-benefit analysis is included in the SO project document, clearly outlining the expected costs of the activities in relation to the operations they are intended to support.
22. Monitor outcome-level indicators and conduct analysis of achievements, both in terms of the SO and in terms of the effectiveness of the operations the NFI transportation scheme it is intended to support.
23. Improve reporting on the effectiveness of SOs, through a cost-benefit analysis of savings following bridge construction, compared to previous WFP air and road transport costs, as they relate to transport requirements of on-going operations.
24. Reconsider currently selected bridge sites, in keeping with projected changes in requirements for food assistance.

Targeting:

25. Enhance ongoing VA, including additional indicators to allow for expanded partnerships, and indicators that assess socio-economic and political issues, to permit the use of results to assess outcomes, and, in the longer term, the impact of WFP and IPs' interventions at local level:
 - a. increase the use of VA information for improved beneficiary targeting, expanding its use from geographical targeting to include identification of vulnerable communities and individuals within communities;
 - b. retain VA and monitoring capacity in geographical areas where no assessments have been done and/or WFP is not present including urban locations, together with qualified and interested partners, so that additional resources can be used to pilot activities in the future PRRO and ensure that vulnerable populations are not left unassisted. In other areas, Identify partners who are interested in and able to carry out surveys, assessments or analyses to identify potential beneficiaries.
26. Depending on available resources, extend its food assistance to reach vulnerable populations that are still inaccessible to WFP, but where GoA and other IPs are willing or able to go.
27. Ensure that logistics and programme units give priority to ensuring that food baskets are complete and that commodities arrive as scheduled through improved planning, and advocacy to donors and GoA.
28. Ensure a better relationship between the identification of bridge-building locations and the need for WFP to improve timely and efficient food delivery as well as access to needed information, as stipulated in the special operation project category.



29. Explore with IPs how communities can be more involved in the definition and application of beneficiary selection and targeting criteria, and require IPs, particularly in the area of FFW/FFT, to enhance the participation of women, through groups and individually in such discussions.
30. Collect and analyse sufficient data to demonstrate the relationship between the provision of the passenger air services and increased access to information, as well as the increased access' repercussion on improved identification or targeting of areas and beneficiary groups.

Monitoring and Evaluation Systems:

31. Establish an intervention logic and a Logframe, in conjunction with the next PRRO that incorporates WFP's Strategic Priorities, and includes statements of outcomes to be achieved as well as performance indicators to measure success including those proposed by the Corporate Indicator Compendium.
32. In conjunction with the development of a new PRRO and SOs, enhance the M&E system so that it services Programme, Logistics and VAM Units and Management:
 - a. identify internal needs for monitoring and for evaluation, including the preparation and mid-term review of annual work plans;
 - b. establish mechanisms to ensure that 1) data analysis is reported, at both output and outcome level, for any WFP operation, guaranteeing that lessons are learned and taken into account for future similar operations; 2) outcome-level information is included in SPRs, allowing for the attribution of results to both SOs and PRROs; and 3) cost-benefit analyses of SOs are conducted to measure the evolution of costs throughout the period of implementation;
 - c. to the extent possible, benefit from experiences of the pilot project on "Development of Standardised CO-Based M&E system for Operations";
 - d. capitalise on the established ACCESS database, incorporating more outcome indicators proposed in the Corporate Indicator Compendium, training more staff to use it, and benefiting from experiences in other countries.
33. Expand the scope of VAs to feed outcome level information into the M&E system, by including additional indicators and seeking partnerships with other actors interested in this activity (i.e. Save the Children-UK). An alternative model for a less vertical and more complementary relationship between VAM, programming and monitoring is described in Annex 9.
34. Obtain reference data/information by 1) assisting the GoA to establish and maintain sustainable information systems in WFP's areas of interest, 2) carrying out surveys, 3) contributing to ongoing data collection efforts by other agencies, and 4) using data from surveys carried out by others.
 - a. Include baseline studies carried out at the beginning of interventions in WFP data collection activities.
 - b. Coordinate with other actors in data collection, and support surveys or studies in return for the inclusion of needed indicators.
 - c. Consider cost-efficiency when deciding whether to carry out a survey or to contribute to those implemented by others.



35. Reach consensus with IPs on proposed results to be achieved, the performance indicators to be monitored and reported on by the IP, and the level of monitoring and reporting expected of IPs:
- a. clarify the capacity required by IPs for obtaining, recording and reporting on needed information;
 - b. estimate the costs for monitoring and capacity building of IP staff, and ensure that the necessary resources are adequately budgeted for, offering capacity building activities to IPs, and including expected start-up or running costs in the IP budget;
 - c. ensure that monitoring and reporting obligations of IPs are based upon a common understanding of the joint objectives of the activity, are realistic in terms of data availability and adequately budgeted for by both IP and WFP;
 - d. review and revise formats for IP agreements, ensuring they include a) a clear statement of the objective(s) as well as the intended outcomes and outputs of the joint activity, b) the indicators to be monitored and reported upon to measure performance in terms of outcomes, and c) the means of verification to be used, preferably in the form of a Logframe that corresponds to that of the PRRO. Different IP agreement formats can be designed for each of the different kinds activities WFP will support in the future.

Protection:

36. Include protection considerations, as well as risks and threats, in the next situation analysis, and clearly articulate the protection dimensions of WFP's activities in future programme documents.
37. Actively seek to obtain protection outcomes from the activities carried out by WFP and IPs with food. Monitoring and reports should include protection issues affecting beneficiaries and, if relevant, actions taken to address them.
38. Give protection guidance and advocate with appropriate UN partners to meet corresponding training needs for staff and IPs on complex protection issues that may be encountered in the course of recovery programmes, such as discrimination of certain categories of beneficiaries, land tenure, etc.
39. Advocate with UN and other partners for, and participate in an assessment of resettlement and return operations. The assessment should determine how many returnees have gone back to live in population centres, and reasons for doing so, and how many returnees have not yet reached their final destination, in order to permit improved targeting of assistance and to advocate for and establish policy for permanent resettlement.
40. Advocate with other UNCT members, including UNHCR and FAO, for a common position on protection issues as they relate to resettlement, including non-compliance with the GoA's norms for return and resettlement, with a view to taking appropriate action.
41. Continue to support de-mining activities, through SOs, mine awareness campaigns through SF programmes, etc. in areas where beneficiaries of WFP food aid have settled or are about to settle.



42. Conduct, alone or through IPs, post-distribution monitoring in areas where WFP does not have access in order to monitor the situation of those people who have to walk for long distances in order to receive their food entitlements.
43. Provide refresher awareness sessions on the issue of exploitation and abuse of beneficiaries to staff, transporters and partners.
44. Ensure that at all distribution sites, beneficiaries and others are aware that food aid is free, and review, together with partners, food distribution procedures to ensure that as much as possible they are in line with Sphere Standards.
45. Ensure that messages given in the course of HIV/AIDS awareness sessions are sensitive to the potential for further tension between communities and portray refugees positively, as agents of prevention of HIV/AIDS and other STIs in order to prevent stigma and help them to reintegrate into their former communities, rather than singling them out as potential risk factors.
46. Review the land tenure situation of existing and planned FFW projects, and ensure that some form of guaranteed land use exists before approving agricultural projects.

Gender:

47. Conduct periodic post-distribution monitoring exercises and/or household food consumption surveys to ensure that food and NFI that are targeted to women reach intended beneficiaries.
48. Take measures to ensure that women are actively involved and have a strong voice in all food-related decision making bodies, including FDCs and PTAs.
49. Provide training and other forms of capacity building to WFP staff and IPs in gender analysis and gender-sensitive programming, including monitoring and evaluation.
50. Mainstream gender issues in all training and capacity-development activities.
51. Conduct a thorough gender-sensitive needs analysis, in collaboration with other UN agencies, NGOs and GoA, and in consultation with appropriate community-based groups. Upon receipt of the results, adjust strategies and programmes to ensure that women are more actively involved in all aspects of operations, that they benefit from assets created, and that the positive effects are maximised, while negative ones are minimised.
52. Seek additional information on gender issues in Angola (i.e. the national gender assessments); carry out gender research; and/or collaborate with institutions or agencies that conduct such research and link the results to future programming, particularly for SF and recovery activities.
53. Seek additional regional information, for example, from the 2004 Regional Report on Gender Responsive Programming in Southern Africa and participate in regional gender initiatives.
54. Take advantage of WFP's many contacts with men to sensitise them about the needs and concerns of women, and work together with men and women beneficiaries, IPs and GoA authorities to bring about a positive change in attitudes regarding gender issues.



Annex 7

2002 Angola Portfolio Evaluation Matrix, Updated January 2005

RECOMMENDATION (October 2001)	ACTION OFFICE/ UNIT	MANAGEMENT RESPONSE AND ACTION TAKEN (March 2002)	MANAGEMENT RESPONSE AND ACTION TAKEN (January 2005)
Assessment of Performance			
Categories used for WFP beneficiaries in the PRRO should be revised by choosing either emergency needs that substitute for unavailable commodities or food security based on vulnerability analysis and mapping (VAM) indicators.	Country office	PRRO 10054.1 is based on needs and vulnerabilities and avoids over-reliance on categorizing beneficiaries. The recovery concept has been refined and the overall strategy of the PRRO is geared to address well-defined goals regarding saving lives and creating assets.	Within PRRO 10054.2, VAM analysis has taken a further step thanks to a quantitative survey in the context of the Vulnerability Analysis of the FAO/WFP Food and Crop Assessment Mission, a complete livelihood zoning analysis as well as a Food Security baseline survey for the Central Highlands. Food assistance to internal and external returnees until one month after the 2005 harvest has been recommended by VAM. Case-by-case assistance is determined by standardized Rapid Food Needs Assessments carried out by VAM staff.
The next PRRO should be designed using a logframe analysis and should include indicators by which to measure achievements.	Country office	A logical framework was prepared at the design stage of the new PRRO.	A copy of the logframe for PRRO 10054.2 is attached in a separate document; it incorporates objectives relative to WFP Strategic Priorities 2, 3 and 4 and several quantitative and qualitative indicators relative to health, education, agriculture, asset creation, HIV, etc.
The recovery strategy should focus on skills and asset development for communities of internally displaced persons (IDPs). Using identifications relating to achievements—FFA: food for assets, FFS: food for skills, FFI: food for infrastructure and FFE: food for education—should improve monitoring and reporting.	Country office	The recovery concept—part of the framework around which the new PRRO is built—now focuses on creation of assets within the target population, with the emphasis on human rather than physical assets.	Resettlement and rehabilitation strategies were incorporated to assist the re-establishment of beneficiaries' livelihoods and, thus, self-sufficiency mainly through: i) FFW activities aimed at improving agricultural, transportation, education and health infrastructures; and ii) FFA activities at the household level to build capital and human assets. The School Feeding (FFE) component is increasing rapidly and will reach 200,000 pupils in 2005 and 300,000 in 2006. M&E of these different components now includes quantitative and qualitative indicators.



Full Report of the Evaluation of the Angola Relief and Recovery Operations Portfolio

Training in rapid rural appraisal (RRA) and participatory rural appraisal (PRA) techniques should be provided for WFP staff, implementing partners and government counterparts.	Country office	Under the new PRRO, special attention is given to this; a significant part of the ODOC budget is earmarked for such training.	During Rapid Food Needs Assessments, some participatory tools are given to WFP VAM staff, Implementing Partners and Government; likewise in the context of the Food Security baseline survey. Full and complete PRA and RRA trainings as such have not yet been carried out. It should be noted that the current PRRO is severely under funded and thus ODOC levels much lower than planned.
Province-specific strategies and implementation guidelines should be developed with the Government and implementing partners for improved integration and coordination of the humanitarian response.	Country office	Flexibility, recognized by the humanitarian community to be the most important feature of strategies for programming food assistance in the ever-changing Angolan context, remains the guiding principle of the new PRRO implementation strategy: “emergency assistance when needed, recovery where possible”. This allows for province-specific action plans and programmes tailored to particular needs. The Luanda office continues to provide guidelines on broad implementation of programmes to ensure coherence of PRRO implementation across the country.	As confirmed by the new livelihood zoning carried out by VAM, Angola encompasses different realities and consequences of 30 years of conflict, different livelihoods and agricultural patterns, different rates of external and internal returns, different contingencies. During the assistance period envisaged for the PRRO 10054.2, several strategies applicable on a provincial basis had to be implemented. Guidance from Luanda remains at a broader national level.
The next PRRO should cover a 30-month timeframe, from 1 July 2002 to 31 December 2004.	Country office, ODY	To develop such a long-term strategy in the Angolan context more than three years in advance and taking the drafting/approval period into account is not realistic. The country office feels that the best course of action is to retain the flexibility linked with regular review of its strategy and harmonize the latter with the humanitarian community’s anticipated scenario, avoiding the risks associated with medium-term planning in the currently fluid situation.	The current PRRO timeframe is January 2004 – December 2005, but the operation started in April 2004 because of a large carryover from PRRO 10054.1. Flexibility was indeed the key word applicable to the PRRO 10054.2, given the unstable rate of return both external (Angolan refugees returning from neighboring countries) and internal (ex-IDPs). Relief, recovery and development-oriented activities are all applicable to the 2004-2005 context and a two year timeframe is an appropriate one. The future PRRO is planned for a period of three years, 2006-2008 included.
General food distribution (GFD) should last until the first harvest, unless the period of arrival or resettlement is inadequate, in which case GFD should be extended to the second harvest. Continuation of GFD should be exceptional and the result of a rapid participatory needs assessment at community level. Beneficiaries’ incapacity to meet food	Country office	Sources of assistance other than relief distributions remain the preferred option and should be introduced as early as possible, as stated in the new PRRO document. There is only one major harvest per year, however, and given the lack of agricultural inputs available to IDPs, the time frame for assistance should normally cover two agricultural	This approach has remained unchanged in PRRO 10054.2; the return of internally displaced populations (IDPs) and refugees returning to Angola from neighboring Zambia, Congo DRC and Namibia after many years away from their villages, cities and fields, has been supported with food assistance. The CO has



Full Report of the Evaluation of the Angola Relief and Recovery Operations Portfolio

needs should be covered under FFA/FFS schemes.		seasons.	followed the one harvest policy as a general framework. However, heavier than normal rains in the Planalto area in the first quarter of 2004 resulted in a very poor harvest. It was therefore necessary to prolong food assistance in this area for one additional year. Other similar cases occurred in other areas of the country where abnormal phenomena occurred or persisted. After the harvest (May/June 2005), GFD will come to a halt and food assistance will come in the form of School Feeding, Nutrition programmes, some Food For Work/Food For Assets when feasible and assessed necessary by participatory needs assessments. FFW will continue in support to the bridge construction Special Operation SO 10375.0.
WFP should organize a workshop with donors and the Government to prepare the next PRRO, establish a clear understanding of PRRO funding capacity and flexibility and encourage donor consensus and commitment regarding future activities in Angola.	Country office	Funding was one of the main issues raised at the donors' meeting held in November 2001 as part of the consultation process for drafting the new PRRO. The issue of funding and flexibility is being taken up by the humanitarian coordinator.	It should be noted that, despite repeated meetings, presentations and appeals thus far, the current PRRO continues severely under-funded. A workshop is planned for spring 2005 following the forthcoming Evaluation Mission, in preparation for the next 2006-2008 PRRO.
WFP should develop an ITSH policy based on clear objectives and review existing ITSH contracts accordingly.	Country office	The system of logistics contracts between programme sections and implementing partners is currently being reviewed. The new system should be in effect as of the second quarter of 2002.	Contracts with IPs are issued at programme level and reviewed by Logistics. Field Level Agreements (FLAs) have been implemented since 2003. The LTSH matrix is reviewed every six months under WFP procedures.
WFP and the humanitarian community should advocate that road rehabilitation and airstrip maintenance be guaranteed by the Government. Both are critical for humanitarian operations and for improving cost-efficiency.	Country office	Advocacy to facilitate the implementation of humanitarian interventions is the responsibility of the international community. WFP has exerted continuous pressure on the Government to expedite repair of the infrastructure. It is the role of the humanitarian coordinator to remind the authorities of their responsibilities. WFP will keep the topic on the humanitarian coordinator's agenda.	Advocacy on this matter has continued after 2002; the GoA is gradually taking a more proactive role in road rehabilitation and especially in de-mining. Some public works have commenced to improve and maintain the road and airstrip network, although at a much lower pace and scale than needed. WFP is bringing its contribution with the Special Operation and some FFW repair works for airstrips (Lumbala N'guimbo airstrip for example) and secondary access roads.



Full Report of the Evaluation of the Angola Relief and Recovery Operations Portfolio

Security, Access and Protection Issues			
Minimum operating standards (MINOPs) should apply to temporary and permanent IDP resettlement. Adherence to these norms should be a requisite for WFP's involvement. Staff should have a clear policy to refer to when aid has to be denied to prevent situations where this may have a negative effect on beneficiaries.	Country office	The new PRRO links assistance for resettlement to adherence to MINOPS, which state that resettlement should be voluntary, that sufficient arable land should be allocated to settlers and that access to social services should be secured for the resettled population.	PRRO 10054.2 highlights some basic conditions that apply to IDP resettlement, namely: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (i) Government Commitment to humanitarian assistance; (ii) Land made available to those that re-settle; (iii) Successful seeds and tools distribution and sufficient rainfall; (iv) Presence of sufficient and competent IPs; (v) Adequate supply of complementary NFIs to carry out FFW/FFA schemes; (vi) Adequate donor support; (vii) Safe access to needy populations is secured.
Coverage, Assessment and Targeting Issues			
Targeting should be based on vulnerability to food insecurity as determined by VAM indicators. For targeting at community level, VAM should develop an assessment tool based on vulnerability indicators. It should use household economy and RRA techniques and analysis of nutritional and epidemiological data. RRA tools should be designed and applied by mobile teams working on programme monitoring. This requires a change in the allocation of human resources, with emphasis on training and retasking of food-aid monitors.	Country office	Community-level assessments require important investment in technical follow-up. Given Angola's size and the restrictions on travel—most areas are only accessible by air—such micro-level assessments can only complement macro-level vulnerability analyses made at the time; they cannot become the main tool for justifying interventions.	The approach suggested is being implemented in the CO. A Food Security baseline survey is underway in the Central highlands; household-level quantitative analysis based on food security and nutritional indicators household will be introduced in 2005. RFNA will continue on an ad-hoc basis. The possibility of implementing a continuous monitoring system of vulnerability with EU funding is under discussion. VAM field staff has been deployed in every Sub-office: this will remain into effect in 2005.
Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Reporting Issues			
M&E systems must be based on logframe planning that identifies assumptions, criteria and performance indicators and allows for development of proactive monitoring and evaluation. More systematic qualitative monitoring by food aid management is required, especially community-level post-distribution monitoring.	Country office	The new PRRO has benefited from the development of a logical framework at the design stage. The efficiency of M&E activities should therefore be enhanced. The recommendation concerning the need for enhanced qualitative monitoring is noted.	The Monitoring system is based on the indicators comprised in the logical framework. A monitoring database was created and improved with the inclusion of corporate indicators for People Living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA), School Feeding (SF), Therapeutic Feeding (TFC), Supplementary Feeding (SFC) and FFW/FFA, thus strengthening the ability to comply with Results-Based Management and Reporting requirements. The CO also routinely produced M&E monthly reports on food distribution



Full Report of the Evaluation of the Angola Relief and Recovery Operations Portfolio

			performance trends. With a view to holding a Food Basket Monitoring (FBM) Pilot Test at Food Distribution Points (FDP) level exercise in Benguela Province from July to September 2004, FDM training took from 23 to 25 June. The FBM Pilot Test Executive Report will be available to the mission. Also, an FBM information session, addressed to POs, on the methodology to select the food distribution points and beneficiary family to be monitored as well as, on the monitoring team composition, tools to be used and operational procedures took place in Luanda on 6 August 2004. CO expects to expand the FBM at FDP within 3 Provinces namely Bie, Huambo and Moxico in 2005.
Implementing Partners			
There should be a common approach to GFD guidelines and procedures by WFP partners.	Country office	During the workshops organized in all provinces, implementing partners were provided with clear guidelines. More efforts to standardize will be made during the implementation of the new 2002 contract system.	Operational guidelines on WFP support to IDPs and refugees returning to their areas of origin were issued. Guidelines for GFD mainly on geographic targeting, beneficiary profiles, duration of assistance, ration size and composition have been updated and disseminated among WFP Base Managers and field staff according to the pipeline situation.
WFP should use the lead-NGO concept to reduce the number of activities that it has to monitor.	Country office	Few NGOs in Angola have the capacity to carry out the task that WFP currently undertakes with its extensive organizational structure and manpower. While it may be feasible to implement this recommendation in some instances, it will not be possible to do so throughout the country.	Still few NGOs have the capacity to do so; the Huambo sub-Office is in the process of consolidating and reducing the number of IPS and using the lead-NGO concept; This is possible thanks to the presence of large and capable NGOs there. The situation is different in most other Provinces, especially as the peace process consolidates and international NGOs also reduce their presence.
FFW training workshops should be held for Ministry of Education (MINARS) staff and WFP's recovery partners in the provinces.	Country office	Training is scheduled for the second quarter of 2002.	This activity has not been carried out so far. However, a French grant has been obtained to carry out a consultancy whose objective is assessing FFW effectiveness and relevance, planned for spring 2005.
In selecting implementing partners for recovery activities, criteria should be established for participatory skills and ability to complement activities with non-food items.	Country office	Partners are selected on the basis of their operational efficiency and cost-effectiveness, with due regard to their staffing, resources and ability to mobilize additional funding for start-up costs, monitoring and reporting. As of 2002, particular	Same as in the past, IPs are selected on based on operational efficiency and cost-effectiveness, staffing and resources, M&E capacity and capacity to raise additional resources monitoring and reporting.



Full Report of the Evaluation of the Angola Relief and Recovery Operations Portfolio

		attention will be given in MOUs signed with implementing partners to encourage participatory approaches for community recovery activities. Capacity building in such areas is planned and financial resources are set aside under the new PRRO for WFP and implementing partner staff.	Participatory skills are looked for when selecting an IP. The CO is still planning for participatory skills training (RRA, PRA, etc.) for IPs and Government; some WFP staff has already been trained. Guidelines for the use of NFI to complement FFW and School Feeding activities have been prepared.
Management			
The country office should seek to retain international staff for longer periods—at least the duration of the next PRRO. It should recruit more qualified national staff to reduce high staff turnover and improve institutional memory.	Country office	The country office currently has 41 international posts and 350 local posts. In spite of the corporate duty station assignment cycle of 1–2 years due to hardship, international staff are encouraged to stay on voluntarily for 3–4 years. With regard to local posts, the following actions are being taken: 1. efforts are being made to widen the target population for vacancies. Vacancy announcements for higher-grade posts are published in the newspapers rather than merely distributed to WFP offices, United Nations agencies and NGOs; 2. regular vacancy announcements are posted in English and Portuguese; 3. the standard job profiles are being translated into Portuguese so that local staff can better understand the expectations concerning the job and required outputs.	This recommendation no longer applies as the CO is rapidly downsizing.
The Government should be encouraged to increase its participation in humanitarian assistance and its commitment to the social sector. This requires increases of funding and human resources within a capacity-building approach focusing on training in PRA, RRA and FFW techniques.	Country office	WFP takes advantage of all opportunities—as does the entire humanitarian community—to encourage the Government to discharge its responsibilities vis-à-vis the humanitarian situation. In 2002, WFP will assist the Government to draft a plan of action for the authorities to take over provision of assistance, with particular regard to social cases.	For the biennium 2005-2005, the percentage of state budget allocated to “Social Assistance” is at 0.8%, while the “Improvement of Social Services” at 19.8%; both total less than 21%, still not a really encouraging figure. WFP is anyhow committed at increasing its capacity-building component and augmented partnership with the Government of Angola in particular in the Health, Education and Social Reintegration sectors.
Inter-agency Coordination and Integration			
Integration partnerships should be developed with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the Association of European Non-Governmental Organizations (EURONAIID) and the European Parliament, using the lead NGO concept. Synergies with implementing partners should be sought to ensure that all needs are met.	Country office	Such strategic alliances will be sought in 2002, especially in the context of implementing recovery activities, in an effort to enhance coordination and the impact of assistance.	Co-ordinated work with FAO has been implemented in the field of Seed Protection (complementary provision of food assistance in order to “protect” the seeds distributed by FAO) and tools distribution; a Memorandum of Understanding is under preparation with UNICEF in the fields of a comprehensive approach



Full Report of the Evaluation of the Angola Relief and Recovery Operations Portfolio

			to education and school feeding, nutrition and pellagra treatment and prevention in Bié Province. The MOU with UNHCR has also been renewed for 2005 as well as a number of agreements with NGOS and INGOS. The lead NGOs concept is being applied in Huambo.
Commitments to Women			
The country office should ensure that gender concerns are reflected at all levels and in all types of programming, guidelines and memoranda of understanding with partners, and that all staff and partners understand the rationale for gender mainstreaming.	Country office	As of 2002, all MOUs will refer to the WFP commitments to women and attention will be given to ensuring that implementing partners comply with them in terms of women's participation in the management of resources. In the new PRRO, an important share of the ODOC budget is earmarked for gender sensitization and training of WFP and implementing partner staff and for community participation, with the emphasis on women's roles and capacities.	WFP ECW are important elements of the implementation strategy, principally through the monitoring of the key role women played as managers and beneficiaries in the FFW/FFA activities. A Gender baseline survey was conducted in 12 provinces covering 118 survey units and the results will be taken into consideration. WFP staff and selected IPs will be trained as trainers on the operational implementation of the eight ECW in March 2005. Specific clause in the partnership contract will make mandatory the implementation of the commitments throughout the project lifetime. Most partnerships will also be established with partners showing sensitivity to gender issues in their organizational structure and approach. Information on ECW-related indicators will be collected and reported on regular basis.
Environmental Impact			
WFP must seek to minimize the negative environmental impact of continuing internal population displacements and incorporate environmental concerns and awareness-building in PRRO activities.	Country office	Angola is a country in the midst of civil war. The situation is characterized by the perpetual re-emergence of the parallel stages of emergency and early recovery. The PRRO currently focuses on emergency interventions. The country office notes the recommendation and attention will be given to the environmental impact of recovery activities in areas that do not require immediate emergency response. Opportunities for recovery remain limited, however.	The next PRRO, covering the 2006-2008 period will incorporate environmental concerns and awareness activities; ration type composition takes into account cooking time in order to minimize environmental damage (deforestation mainly). The CO tries to minimize negative impact of food aid on local markets and on population displacements, but the security and feeble infrastructure situation of Angola and the lack of logistical capacity of IPs renders it difficult to establish distribution points in many localities, obliging many beneficiaries to displace themselves in order to receive food rations.



Annex 8

Planned Vs Actual Beneficiaries and Commodities Distributed 2002, 2003, and 2004 (Tables and Graphs)

2002: Planned vs. Actual (by month)

	Total Beneficiaries 2002		
	planned	actual	percent
January	875,565	792,784	91
February	907,013	840,785	93
March	856,228	865,705	101
April	960,856	722,972	75
May	983,422	624,062	63
June	775,369	707,959	91
July	1,053,669	904,378	86
August	1,102,748	889,189	81
September	1,321,056	934,714	71
October	1,508,853	1,094,767	73
November	1,407,162	1,082,341	77
December	1,468,073	837,471	57


	Total Food 2002		
	planned	actual	percent
January	13,243	11,166	84
February	13,857	13,755	99
March	12,527	10,065	80
April	14,039	9,379	67
May	14,501	8,694	60
June	10,948	9,663	88
July	15,203	12,382	81
August	16,423	12,688	77
September	20,707	13,522	65
October	26,389	17,543	66
November	26,068	20,221	78
December	24,132	14,099	58



Full Report of the Evaluation of the Angola Relief and Recovery Operations Portfolio

	Percent Beneficiaries	Percent Food
January	91	84
February	93	99
March	101	80
April	75	67
May	63	60
June	91	88
July	86	81
August	81	77
September	71	65
October	73	66
November	77	78
December	57	58


Beneficiaries 2002 (all categories)






Full Report of the Evaluation of the Angola Relief and Recovery Operations Portfolio

Food 2002 (all commodities)



Percent actual vs. planned





2003 Planned vs. Actual (by month)

	Total Beneficiaries 2003		
	planned	actual	percent
January	1,425,995	802,808	56
February	1,357,077	902,798	67
March	1,263,123	978,095	77
April	1,510,416	998,951	66
May	1,530,381	190,616	12
June	1,472,027	1,109,583	75
July	1,582,746	1,247,423	79
August	1,635,435	1,365,084	83
September	1,938,592	1,623,948	84
October	1,767,077	1,583,211	90
November	1,637,976	835,151	51
December	1,432,768	1,265,995	88


	Total Food 2003		
	planned	actual	percent
January	24,172	14,390	60
February	21,030	15,107	72
March	19,829	16,036	81
April	22,272	14,828	67
May	22,468	18,407	82
June	21,279	15,936	75
July	24,259	18,676	77
August	25,134	20,754	83
September	28,956	23,563	81
October	15,247	13,402	88
November	15,278	7,890	52
December	13,771	14,110	102



Full Report of the Evaluation of the Angola Relief and Recovery Operations Portfolio


	percent beneficiaries	percent food
January	56	60
February	67	72
March	77	81
April	66	67
May	12	82
June	75	75
July	79	77
August	83	83
September	84	81
October	90	88
November	51	52
December	88	102

Beneficiaries 2003 (all categories)






Food 2003 (all commodities)



Percent actual vs. planned 2003





2004 Planned vs. Actual (by month)

	Total Beneficiaries 2004		
	planned	actual	percent
January	1,632,106	1,098,174	67
February	1,663,935	1,100,667	66
March	1,717,680	1,376,202	80
April	1,752,604	1,293,937	74
May	1,578,772	1,335,270	85
June	1,254,497	1,106,044	88
July	1,057,866	968,401	92
August	1,051,226	959,369	91
September	1,142,440	979,795	86
October	1,024,765	512,951	50
November	n/a ¹⁷³	n/a	n/a
December	n/a	n/a	n/a

	Total Food 2004		
	planned	actual	percent
January	25,797	15,991	62
February	24,838	16,660	67
March	21,664	16,599	77
April	14,330	10,256	72
May	12,031	10,506	87
June	10,165	9,508	94
July	4,551	4,902	108
August	4,149	4,584	110
September	10,209	9,177	90
October	10,128	4,153	41
November	n/a	n/a	n/a
December	n/a	n/a	n/a

¹⁷³ Figures for Beneficiaries and tonnages for November and December 2004 were unavailable at the time of the evaluation.




Full Report of the Evaluation of the Angola Relief and Recovery Operations Portfolio


	Percent beneficiaries	Percent food
January	67	62
February	66	67
March	80	77
April	74	72
May	85	87
June	88	94
July	92	108
August	91	110
September	86	90
October	50	41
November	n/a	n/a
December	n/a	n/a




Beneficiaries 2004 (all categories)



Food 2004 (all commodities)








Annex 9

Recommendations for Integrated Management of Vam, M&E and Programme

The separation of the various areas of work – and some of its consequences – could be overcome by a different perception, less oriented at organisational units, and more at logic at work at the various levels of analysis and intervention:



According to this model, the responsibility for monitoring of the entire operation would not be delegated to one M&E unit, but rather shared between programme and VAM: programme and food monitors would monitor partner activities, outputs, and resources, while VAM would monitor and analyse information concerning outcomes (and eventually impact). The advantages of this would be, that:

- monitoring would not be “somebody else’s task” (and problem), but inherent part of the work of either programming or VAM – thus leading to greater discipline;
- information would more readily be used by the unit that carries out the monitoring, i.e. for programming in the programming unit, and for analysis by the VAM unit;
- those scarce resources would be used more efficiently, while achieving greater outcomes, e.g. providing information on outcome levels (presently hardly available) without more – and potentially with fewer resources.



Annex 10

ANGOLA PRRO 10054 LOGFRAME MATRIX

Differences between WFP Angola PRRO 10054.2 Logframe Matrices

	Official PRRO 10054.2 document Annex IV	Detailed Logframe presented at IP/SO training	Comment to changes made
Goal / Impact	Contribute to the peace consolidation process through prevention of hunger; and Creation of conditions for vulnerable sectors of rural population to restore sustainable livelihoods.	Contribute to the consolidation of the peace process through (1) the prevention of hunger and (2) the creation of conditions for them to restore sustainable livelihoods.	Both aspects of PRRO contribute to consolidation of peace process; Target population becomes less clear.
Performance indicators for goal / impact	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mortality rate among children under 5 decreased; • Land available cultivated; • Seed stocks available and increased. 	1.1 Increased mortality rate among children <5 years old; 1.2 Increased land available cultivated; 1.3 Increased seed stocks available.	Numbering provides clear relation between stated goal and observed indicator; error in wording: mortality rate should decrease, not increase.
Means of verification		FAO/WFP Food Crop Assessment Report of 2004 and 2005; Human Development UNDP reports; External and internal M&E mission reports.	Instead of M&E mission reports, periodic provincial VA reports might provide better insight.
Purpose / outcome	Maintain the lives and nutritional status of targeted vulnerable populations in the context of building a nationwide crisis prevention, preparedness, response and recovery capacity; Build human and physical assets in targeted rural vulnerable populations in return areas that will allow the restoration of food-security capacity.	Ensure capacity to meet basic food needs of most vulnerable sectors of population and to ensure adequate nutritional status in targeted population; Support enabling conditions for the creation of human and physical assets amongst food insecure population in the areas of return and resettlement.	Focus has changed from “maintain lives and nutritional status” to “ensure capacity to meet basic food needs...and adequate nutritional status...”; Focus has changed from “build ...assets” to “support enabling conditions for the creation of human assets” – partly good, reflects beneficiaries OWN development; partly risks to become too vague.



Full Report of the Evaluation of the Angola Relief and Recovery Operations Portfolio

Performance indicators for purpose / outcome level	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Nutritional prevalence levels of beneficiaries increased / maintained at provincial and municipal levels (W/H <10% Z-score, W/A) in the areas of intervention; • Mortality and morbidity rate (CMR, <5MR) decreased at provincial and municipal levels in areas of intervention; • Adequate HH food basket (size and composition) • Access to markets improved; • Market prices of basic food basket decreased; • Agricultural productivity improved; • Improved public infrastructure; • HH water and sanitation infrastructures increased; • School enrolment and attendance improved. 	<p>1.1 Nutritional status of beneficiaries in creased at municipal and provincial levels (W/H, W/A) in the areas of intervention;</p> <p>1.2 Mortality rate at municipal and provincial level in the areas of intervention decreased;</p> <p>2.1 Food stocks at household level increased;</p> <p>2.2 Market prices for basic food basket decreased;</p> <p>2.3 Availability of local products for local purchase increased;</p> <p>2.4 Household water and sanitation infrastructure increased.</p>	<p>Numbering establish clear relationship to objectives; Some indicators have become less clear; Public infrastructure and school enrolment and attendance have been omitted.</p>
Means of verification		<p>1.1 Nutritional surveys of target population carried out by IPs, NGOs and UN agencies (UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO and FAO);</p> <p>1.2 UN agencies joint mission reports.</p> <p>2.1 Regular vulnerability analyses;</p> <p>2.2 M&E quarterly reports;</p> <p>2.3 INFOSEMPs and SitReps;</p> <p>2.4 Post Food distribution Monitoring (PDM) and Community and House-hold Survey (CHS) reports;</p> <p>2.5 School attendance rate increased and drop-out rate decreased.</p>	<p>Most partners stopped doing surveys.</p> <p>UN mission reports are not likely to produce better data than are available for WFP itself.</p> <p>Good data source.</p> <p>These reports only summarise information provided from other sources.</p> <p>Presently no CHS or PDM, some food basket monitoring (pilot).</p> <p>This would be a performance indicator, with the possible means of verification being school, municipal and provincial records.</p>