



WFP-UNHCR Joint Evaluation



WFP-UNHCR Joint Evaluation of the  
Pilot Food Distribution Projects  
Full Report – Volume II  
Five Country Case Studies

*Rome, January 2006*

*Ref. OEDE/2006/2*





# Table of Contents

## Volume II

Case Study No 1	Pakistan (12 - 25 July 2004)
Case Study No 2	Sierra Leone (28 October - 11 November 2004)
Case Study No 3	Uganda (17 November - 01 December 2004)
Case Study No 4	Zambia (03 - 16 May 2005)
Case Study No 5	Kenya (05 - 17 June 2005)





# Case Study No 1 - Pakistan (12 - 25 July 2004)





# Acronyms

BEST	Basic Education and Employable Skills Training
CAR	Commissioner for Refugees
CD	Country Director
CO	Country Office
COMPAS	Commodity Movement Processing and Analysis System
CRS	Catholic Relief Services an NGO
EDP	Extended Delivery Point
EM	Evaluation Mission
EMOP	Emergency Operation
EVI	Extremely Vulnerable Individuals
FDP	Final Distribution Point
GMCW	Global Movement for Children and Women, local NGO
INTERSOS	NGO from Italy
IP	Implementing Partner
JA	Joint Agreement
JFAM	Joint Food Assessment Mission
LTSH	Landside Transport, Storage and Handling
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MT	Metric Ton
NFI	Non-food Items
NGO	Non governmental Organization
NWFP	Northwest Frontier Province
PRS	Pakistan Rupees
SAFRON	Ministry of States and Frontier Regions, Government of Pakistan
SFP	Supplementary Feeding Programme
SGBV	Sexual and Gender Based Violence
SI	Shipping Instruction
SNI	Shelter Now International, NGO working in NWFP in 2002
TOR	Terms of Reference
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USD	US Dollars
WESS	Water environment and Sanitation Society
WFP	World Food Programme







# Table of Contents

<b>Executive Summary</b>	<b>v</b>
<b>Introduction</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Background</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>I. Cost and Logistics</b>	<b>3</b>
1. Introduction	3
2. The Contractual Arrangements	3
2.1 The Contractual Arrangements in Force up to the 31 <sup>st</sup> December 2002	3
2.2 The Contractual Arrangements during the Transitional Period in 2003	4
2.3 The Contractual Arrangements Effective in 2004	5
3. The Distribution Operations in the Camps	5
4. The Costs of Food-aid Management and Distribution in the Camps	6
4.1 Analysis of the Cost Structure up to the 31 <sup>st</sup> December 2002	6
4.2 Analysis of the Cost Structure in 2003	7
4.3 Analysis of the Cost Structure in 2004	7
5. Landside, Transport, Storage and Handling (LTSH)	7
6. The Impact and Cost Implications on Staffing	9
7. The Transfer of Assets	9
<b>II. Management and Coordination</b>	<b>10</b>
1. Introduction	10
2. Coordination	10
3. Implementing Partners	10
4. Government	11
5. Monitoring	11
6. Reporting	11
7. Training/Capacity Building	12
<b>III. Beneficiaries and Protection</b>	<b>13</b>
1. Introduction	13
2. Participation and Perception of the Beneficiaries	13
3. Protection and Food Delivery	14
4. Identification, Ration Cards and Registration	14
5. Food Related Protection Issues	14
6. Gender	15
7. Training in Protection	15
<b>IV. Concluding Remarks and Lessons Learned</b>	<b>16</b>
<b>Appendix</b> Summary Results of Discussions with the Beneficiaries in Pakistan	





# Executive Summary

The World Food Programme (WFP) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) have worked together providing humanitarian assistance to refugees and displaced persons for years. This collaboration was strengthened with the signing of a revised Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in July 2002. Through this document both agencies agreed that on a pilot basis WFP would take over the responsibility for the entire food distribution programme in 5 countries, and after one year each of the 5 pilot projects would be evaluated.

This case study of Pakistan is the first of 5 evaluations to be prepared by two consultants selected by both WFP and UNHCR. Terms of Reference for the Evaluation were prepared jointly by UNHCR and WFP. The case study follows the methodology prepared for the evaluation and focuses on three key issues outlined in the Terms of Reference. These are: Cost and Logistics; Management and Coordination; and Beneficiaries Perspective and Protection. The key findings for each of these issues are described in detail in the text of the document and summarized in the concluding Remarks and Lessons Learned at the end of the study below.

Based on the results of the Pilot Project outlined above, the Evaluation Mission feels that the handover of the entire food distribution system from UNHCR to WFP has been a smooth and generally positive transition. The effective transfer during pilot project led to overall savings, streamlined the logistics operation, supported interagency cooperation and management and had minimal effect on the beneficiaries and their protection.

The Evaluation Mission would like to thank the staff of WFP and UNHCR in both agency headquarters as well as the country and field offices for their cooperation and assistance in providing information on the transfer of the food distribution from UNHCR to WFP through the Pilot Project implemented in 2003. The Evaluation Mission also notes with appreciation the valuable contribution made by the implementing partners. Finally, the case study for Pakistan could not have been undertaken without the support and contribution from the refugees who participated in the food distribution and benefit from the assistance.





## Introduction<sup>1</sup>

1. The World Food Programme-United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (WFP-UNHCR) Joint Food Distribution Evaluation Mission is to visit five countries selected by both agencies as pilot projects where UNHCR has handed over full responsibility of food distribution to WFP. The pilot projects were initiated in Pakistan, followed by similar projects in Uganda, Sierra Leone, Kenya and Zambia.

2. The joint evaluation mission consists of two consultants selected and agreed to by both UN agencies. Following a week of briefings in the Headquarters of WFP in Rome and UNHCR in Geneva (6-9 July 2004,) the evaluation mission flew to Pakistan on the 11<sup>th</sup> of July 2004. Representatives from UNHCR and WFP Evaluation Units in Headquarters joined the mission for the first week in Pakistan. The mission will travel to Uganda and Sierra Leone in October 2004; it will visit Kenya and Zambia in early 2005.

3. The evaluation mission not only gathered country specific information in Pakistan, but also set up systems and established the basic framework to be used in the other four case studies. Based on the Terms of Reference (TOR) and building on the evaluation methodology, the results found in Pakistan will lay the groundwork to compile lessons learned and identify common themes of the pilot food distribution projects in all 5 countries.

4. The Pakistan situation is unique and will differ from the other countries included in the evaluation in a variety of ways. Although the Afghan refugees now receiving food live in camps established after September 11<sup>th</sup> 2001, Pakistan has provided assistance to Afghan refugees for more than 20 years. Both agencies have extensive “institutional memory,” and staff with years of experience working with Afghan refugees. Coordination and communication between the two agencies in Pakistan have always been good--even before the pilot project began in 2003. WFP has always played a major role in the food delivery system in Pakistan, and was responsible for the delivery of food from the port to the Extended Delivery Point (EDP) up until 2003. UNHCR then took over and was responsible for the delivery of the food from the EDP to the Final Delivery Point (FDP). One unique feature in Pakistan was that the distance between the EDP and the FDP was minimal with Rubbhall warehouses often located in the various refugee camps. This has made the handover to WFP much easier.

5. Several issues affected the mission’s collection of data in Pakistan. For security and logistics reasons, the mission was only able to visit two camps; one in the Northwest Frontier Province (Shamshatu) and one in Baluchistan (Muhammad Kheil). The most significant factor affecting the mission was the recent decision to cease assistance--including food delivery--at the end of August this year. This decision taken only a few weeks prior to the evaluation mission’s arrival made interviews with refugees difficult; beneficiaries of the food distribution were more concerned about their future without food assistance, than in talking about the actual food system of the past. National staff from both agencies raised the possibility of increased protection and security issues once the food distribution ceased.

6. This case study of Pakistan is the first of the five country reports on the Pilot Food Distribution Projects. The report is based on the methodology developed for the evaluation and focuses on the three main issues outlined in the Terms of Reference; i.e.:

- Cost and Logistics Considerations
- Management and Coordination
- Beneficiaries’ perspective and Protection

---

<sup>1</sup> Consultants: Mitchell L. Carlson and Francois de Meulder.



## Background

7. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is the lead UN agency for refugee protection and assistance. The World Food Programme (WFP) is the food aid organization of the United Nations. The two agencies work closely to provide humanitarian assistance to refugees. Their specific areas of collaboration, roles and responsibilities of each agency have been outlined in several Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) beginning in 1985 and revised and updated in 1994, 1997 and most recently in 2002.

8. Up until the last revised MOU, WFP was responsible for the procurement and delivery of the food from the port to the Extended Delivery Point (EDP). In Pakistan, the EDP was often located in the camps. UNHCR was responsible for the final distribution of the food to the refugees. This was done through Implementing Partners (IP) under contract with UNHCR for food distribution, and often other activities within the camp (e.g. water, sanitation, community services, etc.). The Implementing Partner collected the food from the EDP and distributed it to the beneficiaries.

9. With the revision of the global MOU signed by the Heads of the two organizations in July 2002, both agencies agreed that on a pilot basis, WFP would take over responsibility of from delivery to final distribution to the beneficiaries. Pakistan was selected as one of the five pilot countries. The WFP and UNHCR country offices in Pakistan signed a Joint Agreement in January 2003 outlining the responsibilities for a joint feeding operation. This formed the basis for the implementation of the pilot food distribution project in Pakistan, where WFP was responsible for the food distribution from “port to mouth.” Workplans were developed and approved by the two sub-offices (Peshawar and Quetta) of both agencies in February 2003.

10. According to the workplans and joint agreement, WFP was to provide the basic food ration in 16 camps (9 in NWFP and 7 in Baluchistan,) for an estimated population of 288,000. The basic ration consisted of wheat flour, pulses, vegetable oil and iodized salt, and provided 2,225 Kcal/person/day.

11. For the pilot phase in 2003, Tripartite agreements were signed by WFP, UNHCR and an Implementing Partner (IP) responsible for the food distribution in each camp. The implementing partners were agreed upon jointly by WFP and UNHCR; the Commissioner for Afghan Refugees (CAR) was kept informed of the decision. In general the Implementing Partner remained the same during the pilot phase as had been responsible previously for food distribution under agreement with UNHCR. Following the one year pilot phase, the food distribution under WFP continued in 2004. Both agencies agreed that Tripartite Agreements were not required and WFP entered into bilateral agreements with the implementing partners for food distribution. WFP also switched from a service-type agreement similar to the one used by UNHCR, to a per tonnage agreement with the implementing partners. Food distribution was to end the 31<sup>st</sup> of August 2004.



## I. Cost and Logistics

### 1. Introduction

12. Basically the overall transport chain of food-aid to the Afghan refugees' camps inside Pakistan was not altered by the joint UNHCR – WFP Pilot Project coming into force on the 1<sup>st</sup> January 2003. The standard WFP procedures for securing the necessary resources from donors, the procurement, the shipment, the port transit and inland transport operations to the extended delivery points (EDPs in Peshawar and Quetta) remained in full force under the sole control and responsibility of WFP. Equally so, the transport of food-aid from the EDPs to the final delivery points (FDPs) inside the camps has remained under the operational and financial responsibility of WFP. Waybills, with steady reference to the WFP SI (Shipping Instruction) consignment number, appropriately covered all stages of the transport chain inside Pakistan. Consequently the flow of food-aid from point of origin to the recipient FDPs inside the various camps was adequately tracked and efficiently monitored via the WFP COMPAS system.

13. Although the organisational structure of the “food management”<sup>2</sup> inside the camps was slightly modified, the Pilot Project has, as from the 1<sup>st</sup> of January 2003, squarely transferred the responsibility for the “food distribution” from UNHCR to WFP. While changes in the “food management” and “food distribution” arrangements in the camps have hardly been noticeable, the Pilot Project has entailed substantial shifts in the contractual arrangements between the three major stakeholders, UNHCR, WFP and the Implementing Partners (IPs), during the period under review. In parallel control of the overall distribution costs has improved.

14. Considering that the changes in the contractual agreements and obligations between the major stakeholders concern almost exclusively the “food management” and the “food distribution” inside the camps, this section on logistics focuses mainly on the two last stages of the food-aid transport chain; there were no changes in the preceding stages of the transport chain.

### 2. The Contractual Arrangements

15. The contractual arrangements linking UNHCR and WFP with the IPs were substantially modified by the new Memorandum of Understanding signed in July 2002. These changes were carried out progressively and fall broadly under three distinct periods: the situation existing in 2002 before the Pilot Project took effect; a transitional period during the year 2003; and the situation as it prevails since the beginning of 2004.

#### 2.1 The Contractual Arrangements in Force up to the 31<sup>st</sup> December 2002

16. Up to the end of end of 2002 the “food management” and the “food distribution” activities, though carried out by the same IP, were kept separate and entrusted to the two distinct UN agencies. The former was the responsibility of WFP and the latter the responsibility of UNHCR. Various types contractual arrangements were signed with the IPs; the procedures were certainly not uniform throughout.

17. “*Food Management*” The organisation of the food management differs between the camps in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and the camps situated in the Baluchistan province. The “food management” in the NWFP camps (with the exception of the Shamshatoo camp<sup>3</sup>) was carried out by WFP staff (storekeepers and labourers). The most likely reason for this arrangement was that the road transport between the Peshawar (Nasir Bagh) EDP and the camps was undertaken by a UN fleet of trucks operating out of Peshawar (Nasir Bagh). Storekeepers and labourers were specially dispatched with the WFP convoy each time a food distribution took place in one of the camps. On the other hand the “food management” in the camps in Baluchistan was contracted out by WFP to IPs under separate tripartite agreements. WFP covered the cost of the “food management” in both the NWFP and Baluchistan.

<sup>2</sup> The “food management” inside the refugees camps is a service which covers the reception of the food-aid inside the rubb-halls, the stacking of the various food commodities in line with good storekeeping practices, the storekeeping, the stock movement reporting, the delivery of the food-aid commodities to the IP, the provision of security guards (chowkidars).

<sup>3</sup> In Shamshatoo camp the “food management” AND “the food distribution” was the sole responsibility of WFP even before the Pilot Project. SNI was contracted by WFP as sole IP for both activities.



18. “*Food Distribution*” The food distribution was, with the exception of Shamshatoo camp (near Peshawar), the exclusive responsibility of UNHCR. This agency had entered into contractual arrangements with various IPs for a wide range of camp services for the refugees including *inter alia* the distribution of food-aid. These contracts were budget based contracts approved by UNHCR. Payments were released to the IPs against justification of the costs set out in the budget. As a rule the contractual arrangements were made for one calendar year and could be renewed. With the exception of the Shamshatoo camp where the distribution cost was supported by WFP, the “distribution costs” for all the other camps were born by UNHCR.

19. The 2002 contractual arrangements are summarized in Table 1 below. It should be noted that in early 2002 one NGO (CRS,) operating in Mohamed Kheil camp, provided its own funds for both “food management” and “food distribution.” The table exemplifies the rather fragmentary approach to the variety of contractual arrangements.

**Table 1**

Camps in NWFP	Food-aid Management	Food-aid Distribution
1) ASGHARO 1 & 2	Carried out by WFP staff	UNHCR - INTERSOS
2) BASU	Carried out by WFP staff	UNHCR - IRC
3) OLD BAGZAL	Carried out by WFP staff	UNHCR - INTERSOS
4) SHALMAN 1 & 2	Carried out by WFP staff	UNHCR - IRC
5) KOT KAI 1 & 2	Carried out by WFP staff	Tripartite UNHCR/WFP – BEST plus separate agreement UNHCR – BEST paid by UNHCR (Budget based)
6) BARKALAY	Carried out by WFP staff	UNHCR - INTERSOS
7) SHAMSHATOO	Bilateral WFP – SNI (budget based)	Bilateral WFP – SNI (budget based)
Camps in Baluchistan	Food-aid Management	Food-aid Distribution
8) MOHAMED KHEIL	Tripartite UNHCR/WFP - WESS but paid by WFP (budget based)	Bilateral UNHCR – WESS (from 04/02) paid by UNHCR. (budget – based)
9) LATIF ABAD	Tripartite UNHCR/WFP – GLOBAL but paid by WFP (budget based)	Bilateral UNHCR – GMCW (from 06/02) paid by UNHCR. (budget based)
10) DARA 1 & 2	Tripartite UNHCR/WFP – GLOBAL but paid by WFP (budget based)	Bilateral UNHCR – GMCW (from 06/02) paid by UNHCR. (budget based)
11) ROGHANI	Tripartite UNHCR/WFP – GLOBAL but paid by WFP (budget based)	Bilateral UNHCR – GMCW (from 06/02) paid by UNHCR. (budget based)
12) LANDI - KAREZ	Tripartite UNHCR/WFP – GLOBAL but paid by WFP (budget based)	Bilateral UNHCR – GMCW (from 06/02) paid by UNHCR. (budget based)
13) KILI FAZO	Tripartite UNHCR/WFP – GLOBAL but paid by WFP (budget based)	Bilateral UNHCR – GMCW (from 06/02) paid by UNHCR. (budget based)

## 2.2 The contractual Arrangements during the Transitional Period in 2003

20. In January 2003 both UNHCR and WFP took the necessary steps to comply with the new working arrangements under the revised 2002 MOU whereby WFP assumed responsibility for the entire food distribution. All of the 2002 existing contractual arrangements with the IPs were replaced by a “Basic Tripartite Agreement between UNHCR/WFP and the designated IP” covering both “food management” and the “food distribution” activities. The new agreements became effective on the 1<sup>st</sup> January 2003, and were identical for all IPs. Contrary to the UNHCR’s practice to enter into agreements based on a calendar year, the new 2003 tripartite agreements were linked to the remaining period of implementation of WFP’s approved EMOP 10228.0. Furthermore the agreements were essentially budget based, but with an oblique and non binding reference to an indicative average cost per ton. The budget agreements covered both the “food management” and the “food distribution” costs. Payments were released against the presentation of duly justified expense records in line with the approved budget figures.

21. One noteworthy fact is that for the year 2003 both UNHCR and WFP signed tripartite agreements linking them jointly with the IPs, instead of opting for a more straightforward bilateral agreement between only WFP and the IP concerned. It was felt that a transitional, tripartite agreement involving UNHCR was more palatable





and confidence inspiring for the GOP, CAR and the NGO/IP. Eventually this tripartite arrangement worked very well, although focusing primarily on the obligations of WFP and the IP; UNHCR's obligations were only subsidiary. The initiative for a tripartite agreement, though apparently not dictated by the HQs of UNHCR and WFP, was certainly a very sound move on the part of the Pakistan Country Directors of both UNHCR and WFP in ensure that the transition was as smooth as possible.

### 2.3 The Contractual Arrangements Effective in 2004

22. The tripartite agreements entered into in 2003 with the IPs were gradually replaced by a more straightforward bilateral "Agreement between WFP and the *designated IP* regarding management and distribution of commodities supplied by WFP under EMOP 10228.0." These bilateral agreements came into force on the 1<sup>st</sup> February 2004, in Baluchistan, and on the 1<sup>st</sup> April 2004 in NWFP. Here again the agreements were linked to a specific WFP project, EMOP 10228.0, and made very clear reference to the food management and distribution services to be provided by the IP. The style of the agreement was definitely more to the point; the agreement is strictly fixed rate and tonnage based. Paragraph 7.1 of the agreement clearly specifies "*The settlement of the accounts will be made on the basis of cost per ton at an agreed rate of ... per ton and in accordance with the actual quantity of food distributed by the IP...*" This very important change greatly simplifies the payment process and frees firstly the IP from the obligation of supplying detailed justifications for the costs incurred, and WFP from auditing all the figures submitted. It seems however that the switch from a budget based to a tonnage based remuneration was not fully understood and accepted by all IP staff; some accountants and financial officers continued to prepare detailed budget breakdowns of costs when submitting payment requests to WFP.

23. The bilateral WFP/IP agreements yielded very good results. Most IPs voiced their satisfaction with the WFP/IP bilateral agreement; one IP however expressed preference to include UNHCR as per the previous Tripartite agreement. This was based on a discussion about communication between the three partners and the IP felt Tripartite agreements facilitated cooperation between agencies.

### 3. The Distribution Operations in the Camps

24. Though the contractual arrangements were subject to substantial modifications during the period 2002 – 2004, these changes hardly affected the "food management" and the "food distribution" activities inside the camps. Foremost the collaboration and understanding between UNHCR and WFP have at all times, been exemplary. The choice and appointment of IPs was always the result of a concerted approach. Most of the same IPs were retained and those under contract were entrusted with the responsibility for both the "food management" and the "food distribution" during the pilot phase.

25. The implementation of the Pilot Project appears to have had no adverse consequences on the regularity of food distribution in the camps and the quality of the services to the beneficiaries. At the final distribution points the evaluation mission did not detect significant changes in terms of logistics which could be considered as positive or negative for the beneficiaries.

26. Certain food-aid commodities were in short supply and pipeline breaks did occur during the pilot project, disrupting the distribution calendar in the camps and causing difficulties for the refugees (see protection below.) As can be seen from the 2002, 2003 and 2004 commodity utilisation schedules in the camps and the quarterly food-aid stock positions in Peshawar and Quetta during that same period, both UNHCR and WFP succeeded in maintaining a fairly steady supply of food commodities to the camps. The reasons for the delays are many, well known and often duly justified, but none of these delays appears to be attributable to the Pilot Project coming on line.

27. There was however a vague perception on the part of the beneficiaries that the food basket was more comprehensive when UNHCR was in charge of the distribution (see Beneficiaries below.) This perception is correct for indeed UNHCR had in the past, provided additional items in the food basket. Funds and/or in-kind donations for these items ran out; moreover the distribution of non food items (NFI) was also reduced or curtailed due to lack of funds and donations.



#### 4. The Costs of Food-aid Management and Distribution in the Camps

28. While the various changes in the contractual arrangements had minimal effect on logistics and food distribution in the camps, the policy choices and options which have accompanied these contractual changes have greatly influenced the final cost for food-aid management and distribution in the camps, often with very positive results. Although the initial agreements were mainly budget based and did not take into consideration the quantity of food handled or not handled by the IPs, the evaluation mission considered it useful to determine the final cost per ton of food managed and distributed in the camps irrespective of the agency (UNHCR or WFP) providing the funds.

##### 4.1 Analysis of the Cost Structure up to the 31<sup>st</sup> December 2002

29. As previously indicated, the “food management” activity, in terms of budget and financing, was kept separate from the “food distribution” activity.

30. *Food management.* In the NWFP the food management was carried out by WFP staff at an estimated average cost of US \$3.62 per MT<sup>4</sup> covering the costs for the storekeepers and the casual labourers for the storage of the food in the Rubbhalls. In Baluchistan separate contracts were in force with the IPs. The cost price for the food-management averaged between \$3.89 USD and \$8.35 per MT (see Table 2 hereunder).

31. *Food distribution.* The cost per MT for the distribution of the food-aid in NWFP and Baluchistan oscillated between \$9.97 USD and as much as \$26.88 (see Table 2 below). Fluctuations in camp population, tonnages of food eventually distributed and the organisational structure of the IP contracted (national versus international staff) are only a few of the many elements explaining these significant variations.

32. UNHCR project budgets with the IPs are worked out on an annual basis and include a wide variety of services; the distribution of food being only one of them. The cost of food distribution is often lost in an UNHCR/IP budget which includes many other camp services. With these activities grouped together it is difficult for UNHCR to have a clear overview of the exact cost of the distribution of food-aid in the camps.

33. In order to determine a realistic costing figure the evaluation mission used an estimate of 60 percent of the UNHCR budget lines B28 or A98 to extract the food distribution element from other activities charged under these lines (e.g. preparation of hot meals, transport of NFI, hire of vehicles etc.). Using this estimate the following cost per ton was calculated for 2002 and summarized in the Table 2 below. It is significant to note that the bilateral WFP/SNI contract covering both the management and the distribution of food turns out to have been the most cost efficient, well before the Pilot Project came into being.

**Table 2**

Implementing Partners in 2002	Tonnage Food Aid Distributed	Food Management in USD per MT	Food Distribution in USD per MT	Total in USD per MT
BEST ( NWFP)	3.743 MT.	\$3.62	\$17.66	<b>\$21.28</b>
INTERSOS ( NWFP)	4.959 MT.	3.62	14.07	<b>18.69</b>
IRC (NWFP)	4.177 MT.	3.62	26.88	<b>30.50</b>
SNI (NWFP)	8.390 MT.	See note *	See note *	<b>6.08</b>
WESS (Baluchistan)	5.427 MT.	8.35	11.35	<b>11.60</b>
GMCW (Baluchistan)	10.643 MT.	3.89	10.53	<b>8.51</b>
MCI (Baluchistan)	7.427 MT.	6.27	9.97	<b>9.58</b>
CRS (Baluchistan)	3.107 MT.	See note **	See note **	See note **

Note \*: WFP had entered into a contract with SNI covering both the management and the distribution.

<sup>4</sup> Excluding Shamshatoo camp, as much as 13,322 MT of food-aid was distributed in 2002 in the NWFP camps. WFP supported the costs of the food management inside the camps for a total of US\$ 48,244 or US \$3.62 per MT.



Note \*\*: CRS paid all the management and distribution costs from its own resources.

#### 4.2 Analysis of the Cost Structure in 2003

34. For the year 2003 the tripartite contracts negotiated with the IPs were all budget based and covered both the management of the food in the Rubbhalls and the distribution. The average price per ton amounted to \$11.00 USD with a maximum of \$15.14. For the year 2003 the comparative schedule of cost per MT is summarized in Table 3 below.

**Table 3**

2003 Implementing Partners	Tonnage food – aid managed and distributed	Total cost per ton in USD
BEST (NWFP)	2.844 MT	<b>\$10.50</b>
INTERSOS (NWFP)	3.961 MT	<b>15.14</b>
IRC (NWFP)	3.424 MT	<b>14.53</b>
SNI (NWFP)	5.900 MT	<b>11.66</b>
WESS (Baluchistan)	9.725 MT	<b>10.50</b>
GMCW (Baluchistan)	17.111 MT	<b>11.26</b>

35. The higher cost per MT figures for both INTERSOS and IRC is explained to a certain extent by the higher personnel charges for international staff. Comparing the total distribution cost per MT for the year 2003 with the figures of 2002, the reduction in cost is quite significant. The various budget items appears to have been much more clearly defined; moreover the food distribution costs were not lost in an UNHCR budget encompassing many other services. The chances of double accounting of overhead charges by the IPs with two separate budgets were greatly reduced if not completely eliminated.

#### 4.3 Analysis of the Cost Structure in 2004

36. For the year 2004 the comparison is fairly simple since the contracts were all based on the fixed tonnage rates in the table below. The 2004 contractual rates are in line with the figures for the year 2003 and confirm the substantial reduction in management and distribution costs achieved since the Pilot Project came into force.

**Table 4**

2004 Implementing Partners	Fixed rate per MT in USD
BEST ( NWFP)	<b>\$12.81</b>
INTERSOS (NWFP)	<b>16.39</b>
IRC (NWFP)	<b>12.00</b>
WESS (Baluchistan)	<b>10.61</b>

### 5. Landside Transport, Storage and Handling (LTSH)

37. The graph in Figure 1 below gives an overview of the evolution of the distribution cost per IP for the period 2002 – 2004 as explained in point 4 above. The working conditions in each camp and for each IP vary substantially; for example the working environment and the demands on the IP (SNI) operating in Shamshatoo cannot be compared with an IP operating in the Chaman camps. The distance from the warehouse is much greater for the Chaman camps and they are in a more isolated, less secure border area while Shamshatoo is on the outskirts of Peshawar and food can be delivered directly from the warehouse to the camps in a few hours. While exercising the greatest caution, it is quite apparent that the distribution costs decreased from an average of \$16.10 USD per MT in 2002 to an average of \$12.71 USD per MT in 2004 or by 21 percent.

38. The decrease in costs became apparent in 2003 once the Pilot Project came into force. In 2002 the food distribution costs were hidden in an UNHCR/IP budget which included food distribution among many other camp services. Food management costs were covered by a separate contract with WFP. This multiplicity of contractual arrangements made it difficult to have a clear understanding of the exact food-aid management and distribution costs.



39. As from 2003 the overall food distribution costs were included under one budget devoted solely to the food management and distribution. The figures became much more transparent for WFP, UNHCR and the IPs.

40. The trend in the reduction of distribution costs was confirmed in 2004 when the rates were established through fixed rate per tonnage agreements. The rates agreed upon between WFP and the IP were supported by detailed budget figures. The slight increase of the distribution cost recorded for the year 2004 over the year 2003 is due in part to inflation in Pakistan and also to the depreciation of the US dollar (USD) against the Pakistan Rupee (PRS). This however does not contradict the general decrease of distribution costs since 2003. The figures are summarized in the figure below.




Figure 1: Summary Cost per Ton in US Dollars for Implementing Partners

41. The distribution cost in the camps is one of the many elements included in the LTSH. The WFP country office in Pakistan included the following LTSH costs in its various EMOP budgets: Table 6 below summarizes the post EDP costs as submitted by WFP – Pakistan in the various EMOPs budgets.

Table 5

EMOP #	Dates	Revisions	Cost per MT in US\$
PAK EMOP 10043.1	01/09/01 – 30/06/02	Budget 13/02/02	\$ 8.74
PAK EMOP 10228.0	01/10/02 – 30/09/03	Budget 11/09/02	\$14.00
PAK EMOP 10228.0	01/10/03 – 30/09/04	Budget 10/03/04	\$14.00

42. For EMOP 10043.1 the budget figure is very slightly in excess of the amount paid for the food management during 2001 and 2002. The rate of 14.00 US\$/MT per MT for the food management and the distribution in 2003 is realistic.

43. Focusing on the WFP-LTSH figures during the Pilot Project, it is evident that the distribution costs have increased from approximately \$5.93 USD per MT in 2002 (only food management) to approximately \$12.71 per MT in 2004 (both food management and distribution) or an increase of roughly US \$6-7 per ton. This extra cost must be borne by WFP as was mutually agreed under the terms of the 2002 revision of the MOU signed between the two agencies. From the figures quoted in Table 6 above WFP has correctly adjusted its LTSH figures to cover the additional costs incurred during the implementation of the Pilot Project.

44. On the other hand, this increase in costs for WFP should entail an equal reduction in costs for UNHCR. At the time of writing this report, the Evaluation Mission was not able to establish the extent of the reduction of costs for the UNHCR 2004 budget figures for the Afghan refugee programme.



## **6. The Impact and Cost Implications on Staffing**

45. It appears that little or no attention was given to the shift in workload and consequences for staffing for the two UN agencies when the Pilot Project was implemented (see Management and Coordination below). UNHCR indicated that the Pilot Project and transfer of food distribution to WFP did not have an impact on its staffing levels. There was a reduction in staffing but this was due to an overall budget cut (25 percent in 2003 and 2004) and not to the implementation of the pilot project. Some internal re-allocation of UNHCR staff to other duties did take place, however.

46. WFP managed the extra workload of the pilot project without taking on extra staff in the field offices. They did recruit additional finance staff to prepare the budget payments for the Implementing Partners, but the switch from budget based to fixed rate tonnage based contracts has reduced the additional finance work significantly.

47. The implementation of Pilot Project has not necessarily increased the number of staff of the implementing partners. Disruption and layoffs were minimized with WFP using the same IPs UNHCR had contracted for food distribution in the camps. Only one NGO (WESS - Quetta) indicated they had recruited an additional senior programme officer to cope with the extra workload.

48. Given the above, it appears that the implementation of the Pilot Project in Pakistan has had very limited consequences on the staffing of UNHCR, WFP and the Implementing partners. Staffing costs for all partners did not significantly change when WFP assumed responsibility for food distribution in the refugee camps.

## **7. The Transfer of Assets**

49. With the Pilot Projects no major assets have been transferred from UNHCR to WFP. Under a verbal arrangement, WFP is using 10 UNHCR Rubb Halls for the distribution of food in the camps; however no formal arrangement for the transfer of these assets has been made. The Evaluation Mission recommended that in the absence of a formal transfer of property a “Right of Use Agreement” should be signed between the two agencies.



## II. Management and Coordination

### 1. Introduction

50. As noted above, the latest revision of the MOU was signed by the Heads of both agencies in 2002. The agreement to establish pilot projects where WFP assumes at its own costs the responsibility for the final distribution of the basic ration in 5 countries was included in the MOU, but the specific countries to be included in the pilot were not identified in the MOU. Based on discussions at both the Headquarters and the country office level, it appears that the decision to identify the countries for the pilot was taken at the Headquarters level of both agencies. The decision is mentioned in both interagency and Food Coordination meeting minutes at the country office and field level in Pakistan, but more as a *fait accompli* than as a point of discussion.

51. Given the commitment of both agencies at the headquarters level, the good communication and coordination between the two agencies at the country office level in Pakistan, the proximity of the Extended Point of Distribution (EDP, often in the camps,) to the Final distribution Point (FDP,) and the continuation of the same implementing partners in food distribution in most camps, there were no major problems reported during the transition period. The Evaluation Mission noticed some tension at the field office or sub-office level, but given the support from the Headquarters and Country office, minor programme issues can be resolved, and practical field problems worked out through regular meetings between the two agencies.

### 2. Coordination

52. The Joint Agreement signed by the WFP and UNHCR Country Directors in Pakistan was prepared following the signing of the revised MOU in July 2002. It calls for regular interagency, food coordination and other sector meetings including monthly meetings between the two offices to review the implementation of the pilot project. The joint work plans signed by each sub-office also call for coordination meetings at the field level, in particular to discuss the implementation of the joint work plans which were prepared as part of the Pilot Project.

53. In both field offices (Peshawar (NWFP) and Quetta, Baluchistan) UNHCR chairs a fortnightly interagency meeting with representatives from WFP, CAR and the IPs/NGOs to review camp situations, repatriation issues, etc. WFP chairs a weekly food coordination meeting attended by WFP logistics and programme officers, UNHCR staff and the IPs. Available stocks, stock movements, distribution schedules at the camps, caseloads are standard items of the agenda of the meeting. In the camps UNHCR chairs a weekly coordination meeting with the NGOs in order to review all the camp services and a fortnightly meeting with the Elders Committee representing the refugees. WFP and the relevant IP/NGOs attend these meetings accordingly.

54. In sum the implementation of the pilot project supported the ongoing coordination between UNHCR, WFP, the IPs/NGOs, Government and the beneficiaries. The same level of coordination and consultation between all the stakeholders has been maintained since the beginning of the Pilot Project. All parties expressed satisfaction with the coordination; however communication on specific distribution changes needs to be maintained. This was an issue where UNHCR felt refugees were delaying their return in hopes of receiving back rations.

### 3. Implementing Partners

55. According to the Joint Agreement in Pakistan, UNHCR and WFP were to consult each other on the selection of the implementing partner (IP) responsible for food distribution. As noted above, in the majority of camps, the same IP under contract with UNHCR continued the food distribution during the pilot phase.

56. Implementing partners were informed of the handover of food distribution from UNHCR to WFP through the interagency meetings chaired by UNHCR and in the Food Coordination Meetings chaired by WFP. Their agreements with the UN agencies were modified accordingly. In 2003 Tripartite agreements for food distribution were signed by UNHCR, WFP and the IP using a standard format agreed upon by UNHCR and WFP Headquarters. WFP modified the agreements from service based to tonnage based bilateral agreements in 2004 (see costs and logistics above). As noted above, during the discussions with the evaluation mission, one



implementing partner suggested that UNHCR be included in the contract arrangements to ensure better coordination and communication between all three parties.

#### **4. Government**

57. Both UNHCR and WFP have legal agreements with the Government of Pakistan, however the Government is not directly involved in the logistics of the food distribution. The offices of the First Secretary and The Commissioner for Refugees were informed of the handover of food distribution from UNHCR to WFP. During discussions with the Evaluation Mission, the officials did not appear too concerned about the transfer of the food distribution to WFP, but confirmed that UNHCR was still the lead agency in refugee assistance.

58. According to the Letter of Understanding between WFP and the Government (States and Frontier Regions or “SAFRON”) and its coordinating arm the Commissioner for Afghan Refugees (CAR,) the Commissioner’s office is to oversee the implementation of the food distribution through the Implementing Partners/NGOs and provide its own staffing and funds for the operation. Government staff provide security at the food distribution points in each camp. The Government is also responsible for the collection and sale of empty containers (bags, tins, etc.). The proceeds from the sale of these items must be used to support the humanitarian assistance operation, or directly benefit the refugees.

59. According to the Joint Agreement between the WFP and UNHCR Country Offices and the workplans in each sub-office, the Tripartite Agreements signed with implementing partners in Pakistan “will be shared with” the Commissioner for Afghan Refugees (CAR;) the Government is not involved in the selection of the IPs. The Evaluation Mission noted that the role of the host government in food distribution and the selection of Implementing Partners may vary with each case study and Pakistan may be an exception as far as Government involvement in the process.

#### **5. Monitoring**

60. According to the 2002 Global MOU and the Joint Agreement signed in Pakistan both WFP and UNHCR are responsible for monthly food basket/distribution monitoring and are to share their findings with each other, the implementing partners, and the Government. Under the pilot project and according to the Joint Workplan signed between the two agencies at the field offices in Peshawar and Quetta, WFP is to monitor the quality and quantity of food at the Port of Entry, Extended Delivery Points, and at the distribution sites. Both agencies are to conduct post distribution monitoring with the participation of the Implementing Partner. Nutritional surveys are to be jointly organized by WFP and UNHCR and an implementing partner. UNHCR is responsible for any Special or Supplementary Feeding Programmes.

61. Based on discussions with the field office staff of the two agencies, the implementing partners and the responses from the beneficiaries to questionnaires, post distribution monitoring is not well defined and not consistent. This was true both before and during pilot project, however and the general consensus is that the agency in charge of distribution should also be overall in charge of monitoring, including post distribution monitoring. The Evaluation Mission felt that the monitoring, particularly the post distribution monitoring, needs to be strengthened.

#### **6. Reporting**

62. The Joint Agreement in Pakistan as well as the joint work plans for each region or sub-office require that the implementing partners for food distribution and special feeding programmes provide regular reports to both WFP and UNHCR. UNHCR is responsible for providing the population figures to WFP and the Implementing Partner prior to any food distribution. UNHCR is to ensure that the Implementing Partner in charge of supplementary feeding shares its reports with WFP. UNHCR is also to provide WFP with the results of all nutrition surveys, population statistics, registration figures, etc.

63. According to the joint work plan signed by the sub-offices of both agencies, a standard format for reporting by the Implementing Partner was to be agreed upon. In discussions with the Peshawar sub-offices, UNHCR suggested that these IP reports should also include protection issues. The Evaluation Mission noted this



suggestion; as both agencies are to agree to the reporting format, this should be reviewed and agreed upon jointly between UNHCR, WFP, and the IP.

## **7. Training/Capacity Building**

64. According to the Global MOU, each organization is responsible for the development of its own training materials; however, joint workshops are to be conducted to support the implementation of the new MOU. As part of the Joint Agreement, both agencies were to plan and undertake training of their own staff as well as NGOs and Government counterparts in food management, nutrition, storage, survey techniques, reporting.

65. As part of the training, a Joint Workshop was held in Cairo 21-24 June 2004 with representatives from both UN agencies and several of the implementing partners. The Workshop focused on “Enhancing the Effectives of the Revised MOU.” Feedback from the participants in Pakistan was generally very positive, but the need for additional training was emphasized.

66. Training is included in the Agreements between WFP and the Implementing Partners. Some basic training particularly in warehouse management (stacking, rotation, fumigation, etc.) has been done, however it does not appear that UNHCR was involved in this training. Many IPs felt that more training by WFP should be done in monitoring, reporting, etc.

67. Training of WFP and Implementing Partner staff by UNHCR in protection issues was recommended in several meetings in the field offices. WFP field staff expressed an interest in understanding the practical aspects of protection and the Standard Reporting Procedures of protection incidents (see Training in Protection below).





### **III. Beneficiaries and Protection**

#### **1. Introduction**

68. The latest revision to the global MOU and the Joint Agreement signed in Pakistan between UNHCR and WFP state that both agencies will work together to involve the beneficiaries, particularly women, in the management of food aid. This same emphasis on refugee involvement in the food distribution process is included in the Tripartite Agreements signed by WFP, UNHCR and the Implementing Partner during the pilot phase under review.

69. The Terms of Reference and the Evaluation Methodology call for the participation of the beneficiaries in the evaluation. The Cairo Workshop held in June 2004 recommended that the views of the refugees involved in the pilot food distribution projects should be collected as part of any evaluation. The Evaluation Mission attempted to obtain information directly from the refugees regarding their experience and views of the transfer of the food distribution system from UNHCR to WFP in 2003. As noted above for security as well as for political and logistics reasons, the Evaluation Mission was able to visit only two of the 16 camps receiving food assistance. For cultural reasons, it was also not possible for the Evaluation Team members (both male) to interview women; however both UN agencies agreed to provide female staff to interview the beneficiaries using a questionnaire. Finally, with the recent announcement of cessation of assistance including food aid, refugees were more focused on what happens after 1 September, than in the pilot scheme and the changes that took place from January 2003.

#### **2. Participation and Perception of the Beneficiaries**

70. In order to obtain information from the beneficiaries, a short questionnaire was developed which was used to guide discussions with groups of individuals (usually male or female; seldom mixed) to obtain information on the perceptions of the beneficiaries in the handover of the entire food distribution system to WFP. The information was gathered in most of the camps in Pakistan by female staff from both UNHCR and WFP. 19 questionnaires were completed by the WFP and UNHCR field staff. This included 12 from Baluchistan and 7 from NWFP. The summary of the information obtained through the questionnaires is summarized in Appendix 1. General observations on the key findings of the questionnaire are briefly outlined below.

71. Based on the results of the questionnaires, awareness among the refugees of the change in the food distribution system from UNHCR to WFP was mixed at best and often varied with the gender of the interviewees; men were more likely to be aware of the details of food distribution than women. This is due in part to culture of the refugees, where males are encouraged to go to school, allowed to work, and participate in activities like food distribution in the refugee camps, while educational opportunities for women are limited, their appearance in public places discouraged, including their participation in the distribution of food.

72. More of the groups participating in the discussions were aware of the role of the two agencies; in general the perception of UNHCR as lead agency, providing protection and assistance to the refugees prevailed. There was some confusion however, regarding the implementing partners and their roles and responsibilities. The response for the coordination of food and non-food items (NFI) was again mixed. This was due in part to the limited and reduced amount of NFI distributed during the pilot phase (2003) compared to earlier years. In sum the beneficiaries' perception of the main actors in the food distribution was unclear. The Evaluation Mission found that regular and repeated communication with the beneficiaries on the role and responsibilities of WFP, UNHCR and the implementing partners needed to be strengthened.

73. Beneficiaries participated in the food distribution process through distribution committees, meetings with the elders, women's committees and female social animators were established in most camps. Through this involvement food issues were communicated to the beneficiaries. Most people interviewed were aware of the procedures for complaints about the food distribution and brought their complaints to a combination of the Elders, block and section leaders, female social animators, the implementing partner, community support staff (UNHCR, NGO, government,) and WFP. All of the groups interviewed reported that women were included on the ration cards and participated in the food distribution. Complaints on delay in delivery and no retroactive distribution of food were common as were complaints about the quality of the food (rice is poor quality and



wheat is preferred.) Several referred to the when UNHCR was involved, tea and sugar were provided along with non food items (NFI).

### **3. Protection and Food Delivery**

74. According to the Joint Agreement in Pakistan, WFP is to provide the basic food ration to the refugees on a monthly basis and states that the IP is to ensure a monthly distribution cycle of one week per camp. The Joint Agreement also states that WFP and UNHCR are to “consult immediately” if there is a delay in the delivery of food and non-food items. The basic food ration is for 30 days; according to the Agreement there is no automatic retroactive distribution of food if delivery is delayed or disrupted. If food is not delivered within the 30 days, refugees go hungry or must borrow food. This creates potential protection problems, leads to indebtedness, and does not provide for the basic nutritional needs in a timely manner.

75. The impact on protection is one of UNHCR’s main concerns in the transfer of the food distribution to WFP. It became clear through discussions at the field office level that WFP staff did not foresee any problems as long as the food was delivered within a 30 day margin. UNHCR on the other hand felt that any delay created potentially serious protection problems.

76. In discussions with UNHCR, WFP, the implementing partners and some of the refugees involved in the food distribution, suggestions were made to have fixed dates for delivery of the ration within the 30 day timeframe to ensure prompt and regular delivery of the basic food ration. To do this, WFP needs a contingency of at least 90 days and/or a budget to draw down to ensure adequate pipeline and timely delivery. Representatives from both UN agencies and several of the implementing partners participating in the Pilot Project in Pakistan attended a UNHCR/WFP Workshop on Enhancing the Effectives of the Revised MOU held in Cairo 21-24 June 2004 recommended more coordination at the field level to ensure rapid and effective delivery of commodities to the beneficiaries. Awareness of the protection issues needs to be strengthened; UNHCR could do this through protection workshops for both WFP and IP staff.

### **4. Identification, Ration Cards and Registration**

77. The Global MOU states that the host government is responsible for determining the number of refugees, but that as part of its protection mandate, UNHCR will support the government in the registration of refugees and the issuance of ration cards. The Joint Agreement signed in Pakistan confirms that WFP and UNHCR, in consultation with the government of Pakistan, are to assess jointly the number of refugees eligible for food assistance. Both agencies are to participate in and fund together Joint Food Assessment Missions (JFAM).

78. Questions of registration came up in many of the discussions with UNHCR, WFP and the Implementing Partners. Registration and accurate issuing of ration cards are key to protection of the refugees, and the food distribution programme. UNHCR with the Government should take the lead role in this. The draft summary of the Cairo workshop highlights the need for standard operating procedures for registration and ration card management, and recommended greater interagency participation in the registration process. WFP expressed its willingness to play a more active role in the registration procedures.

### **5. Food Related Protection Issues**

79. As noted elsewhere in the report, cultural traditions of the Afghan refugees play a key role in defining protection issues as well as reporting them. Reports of protection incidents regarding refugee rights in food distribution; incidents of Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV) particularly against the Vulnerable were minimal. UNHCR reported a total of about 40 SGBV cases from 2000-2003. Only 8 cases of domestic violence were reported in Chaman in 2003; none of these were specifically related to food.

80. The majority of responses from the groups interviewed through the questionnaire (see above) stated that all family members had access to food and were not aware of any food related protection incidents. As per the responses above, the answers to these questions depended on the composition of the interviewees and cultural interpretations. Several groups responded that protection issues should be settled within the community and not brought to the attention of the international staff. Others commented that their community took care of the EVI themselves.



## 6. Gender

81. The Global MOU also stated that both UNHCR and WFP will collaborate to promote gender issues and enhance the status and role of women in their programme activities. Each agency has issued guidelines for gender issues; UNHCR has 5 Commitments to Refugee Women, and WFP has 8 Enhanced Commitments to Women. According to the Joint Agreement, both WFP and UNHCR are to encourage the participation of the beneficiaries, particularly women in the food distribution process and to support the creation of female distribution committees.<sup>5</sup>

82. WFP and UNHCR worked together to establish Women's committees and Community based female social animators in the camps (Peshawar reported 39 percent women participate in food and NFI committees in the NWFP camps) and assist in post distribution monitoring. Food distribution is held separately for female heads of household and vulnerable (20 percent of rations in Peshawar collected by women). The 2002 Registration in the new camps focused on the identification of single/unaccompanied female heads of household. The Evaluation Mission noted some confusion, particularly in the field offices, in the designation of a focal point for Gender; although an important issue and not directly related to the transfer of food distribution to WFP, both agencies need to continue to work on increasing female participation in their activities.

## 7. Training in Protection

83. As noted elsewhere in the report, training and capacity building are key components of both agencies and are mentioned in most of the important documents. During several discussions with UNHCR, WFP and the implementing partners, it was acknowledged that Protection is the mandate of UNHCR, but that with WFP and the implementing partners directly involved in the food distribution, training in basic protection issues is important. It was suggested that UNHCR undertake this training and at the same time develop communication or reporting procedures on protection incidents. Should a protection matter be brought to the attention of the WFP and/or Implementing Partner staff during food distribution, monitoring, or general visits to the camps, these can be immediately brought to the attention of UNHCR and procedures to do this need to be established and agreed to by all parties.

---

<sup>5</sup> The Evaluation Mission noted with appreciation that both agencies have recruited female field staff who are working with the refugees and Government authorities under very difficult conditions.



#### IV. Concluding Remarks and Lessons Learned

84. In general, the Evaluation Mission found that the handover of the entire food distribution to WFP in Pakistan had been a smooth transition. There were significant cost savings and the streamlining of the food delivery management, using one agency responsible for all stages, was more efficient. Although beneficiary perceptions of the change were mixed, there were no adverse effects to the handover process undertaken during the pilot project.

85. Although the difference in programme cycles--EMOP of WFP vs. UNHCR's annual programming--could be an issue in other countries in the future. This did not present a major problem in Pakistan and as noted above, the switch to a per tonnage contract by WFP led to significant cost savings and streamlined management of the food distribution.

86. It became very clear to the Evaluation Mission that even if food assistance were to continue in Pakistan it would not be possible and indeed counterproductive to reverse the process at the completion of the pilot phase and return to the previous situation. Staff in both agencies as well as Government and the Implementing Partners have adjusted to the changes as have the refugees who benefit from food assistance from WFP under the overall coordination of UNHCR.

87. The Evaluation Mission was able to visit only two of the refugee camps and was informed that for political and security reasons, staff could not visit several of the camps. In some of the camps in NWFP, food distribution was actually stopped or postponed due to security reasons. Security is a major concern which was somewhat downplayed by the security briefings the Evaluation Mission had, particularly in Quetta. Security has major protection implications for the refugees as well as for the staff trying to assist them and access to the refugees is key to their protection.

88. It should be noted that the Evaluation Mission did not look at the Supplementary Feeding programmes and did not go into detail on the distribution of Non-food items. The amount of food for the supplementary feeding programmes was so small that it is sent along with the basic ration, and there were no problems reported with this procedure. The introduction of the pilot project and WFP taking on the responsibility of the final distribution had nothing to do with the availability of NFI; this was simply a question of available funds or donations in kind to UNHCR which have decreased significantly over the years.

89. The Evaluation Mission looked at gender issues as related to food distribution and were informed that both agencies have held Gender Workshops. There seemed to be some confusion however, as to the focal point for gender in each agency, coordination of gender activities between the two agencies, and the involvement of the staff in the sub-offices. Although gender workshops were held in Quetta in May and September 2003, WFP was not listed as a participant. The Evaluation Mission felt that stronger coordination on gender issues is needed with a clear gender focal point identified and recognized by both agencies. Implementing partners and the refugees should also participate in gender workshops. An interagency approach which would include UNICEF as well as other UN agencies may help mainstream Gender issues.

90. Although the announcement earlier this year to cease assistance including food aid had nothing to do with the pilot project, it affected the Evaluation Mission's ability to gather information, and was a major preoccupation of both refugees and staff from all agencies; UNHCR, WFP, and the Implementing Partners. During the interviews, several staff complained about the lack of or limited communication, and pointed out that the decision could create additional protection problems. With Ramadan occurring in October and winter approaching, the timing of the decision did not allow the UN agencies or the refugees much time to plan for this significant change. In this regard, the draft minutes for the UNHCR/WFP Workshop on Enhancing the Effectives of the Revised MOU recommended that joint assessments include designing the phase-out strategies of any refugee/food distribution programme. The workshop summary also pointed out that the closure of camps in Pakistan (and Iran) should have been discussed.

91. The following is a summary of the main findings or Lessons Learned for each of the three main issues outlined in the Pakistan Case Study. Details on the findings are described in the text and the attachments to the report.



### **Cost and Logistics**

- Food management and food distribution inside the camps, formerly the responsibility of WFP and UNHCR respectively is now the sole responsibility of WFP. In terms of logistics, changes in food management and distribution activities in the camps, as a result of the implementation of the Pilot Project, have been hardly noticeable.
- Contracts developed from budget based contracts to tonnage based contracts with agreed fixed rates per ton of food-aid distributed. The number of contracted IPs was reduced and streamlined. Existing contractual arrangements in 2002 evolved towards a more uniform and simplified bilateral agreements between WFP and the Implementing Partner (IP) in the first quarter of 2004. In 2003, in order to ensure a smooth transition, WFP and UNHCR initiated tripartite agreements between the UNHCR, WFP, and the IP.
- The costs per ton of food-aid managed and distributed inside the camps, decreased during the Pilot Project from an average of \$16.10 USD to \$12.71 USD per MT. or a reduction of 21 percent.
- The LTSH cost for WFP increased by \$5.00 to 6.00 per MT with WFP assuming responsibility for the entire food distribution. On the other hand UNHCR distribution costs decreased accordingly.
- The Pilot Project had very little effect on the staffing levels of each agency, and The pilot Project did not result in the transfer of major fixed or mobile assets.

### **Management and Coordination**

- The decision to select Pakistan as one of the pilot programmes appears to have been made at the WFP and UNHCR Headquarters level with little discussion or input from each agency's country offices. Coordination and collaboration at the country level between the two UN agencies was excellent before the pilot project and remained so throughout the implementation of the pilot project. Government and Implementing Partners were informed of the decision to include Pakistan as one of the pilot countries for the transfer of food distribution from UNHCR to WFP.
- Both WFP and UNHCR continued to monitor the food distribution in collaboration with the Government authorities (Commissioner for Refugees) and the Implementing Partners, but the general conclusion from the Pilot Project was that the agency in charge of food distribution should take overall responsibility for food monitoring. Monitoring responsibilities need to be clarified and post distribution monitoring in particular, strengthened.
- The Pilot project identified opportunities for more frequent interagency training on an expanded number of topics related to food aid, including protection, monitoring, reporting, survey skills, etc.

### **Beneficiaries and Protection**

- There was no change or decrease in the perception of UNHCR as lead agency or overall in charge of assistance to the refugees with the handover of the food distribution to WFP during the implementation of the pilot project. The roles and responsibilities of each agency, WFP, UNHCR and the implementing partner, need to be more clearly explained and communicated to the refugee population.
- Traditional mechanisms were used to communicate food aid information to the refugees under the pilot project, but efforts by the UN agencies to strengthen and support community structures, particularly involving women, were limited due to cultural traditions of the refugee population.
- Access to food and registration was not a major issue, but delays in the delivery of food created problems for the refugees and increased protection concerns for UNHCR. These delays in delivery were not due to the implementation of the pilot project, but remained a serious issue for UNHCR. The lack of non-food items (NFI) and the delivery of good quality food were an issue for the refugees, but was not related to the coordination of delivery of food and non-food items and the transfer of the food distribution to WFP under the pilot project.
- Registration and accurate numbers of ration cards are key to the protection of refugee rights and the success of any food distribution programme. The Pilot Project reconfirmed that UNHCR should be the lead agency in registration, but that WFP should be actively involved in revalidation and re-issuing of ration cards.



- Training of both WFP and the staff of the Implementing Partner to understand and bring protection issues to the attention of UNHCR was a key recommendation coming out of the implementation of the pilot project.



### Appendix 1 - Summary Results of Discussions with the Beneficiaries in Pakistan

Questions for Discussion	Yes	No	Don't Know	Comments/Remarks/Observations
Are the beneficiaries aware of the change in the food distribution from UNHCR to WFP?	8	7	3	Knew UNHCR better.
Do they understand the role of the two agencies?	12	6	1	All assistance "sponsored" by UNHCR. UNHCR is "our mother."
Who is Implementing Partner and are they aware of its role/responsibilities?	9	8	1	Know Distribution team by name in one camp.
Is their coordination of delivery of food and non-food items? Are the refugees aware of who delivers what?	6	5	8	Soap is now the only NFI.
Are the refugees aware of the community structure and communication channels for food distribution? Are there food committees? Who represents them?	13	5	1	Elders with limited or no women's participation.
Are they aware of the basic ration and do they receive it?	16	3		Signs are posted, but some cannot read.
If not, do they complain and if so to whom? What was the result of their complaint?				4 did not complain. Inform Elders, IP, CSS, CAR, UNHCR, etc. One group went to UNHCR Office in Peshawar to complain. Also complained to BBC. No improvement after complaints.
Do women participate in the distribution?	13	6		Women (widows, EVI) have separate distribution points. IPs have hired women to assist in food distribution for women.
Would they prefer to have more women involved?	8	8		Some male elders did not want greater women's participation.
Were women/spouses included on the ration cards?	19			
Have the distribution points changed to make it easier to take the food home? Has packaging changed to facilitate transport?	10	9		4 reported distribution points are farther away, more costly. 3 complained of oil containers.
Do all members of the family have access to food?	17	1		1 group said "sometimes."
Are they aware of or ever reported/been involved in food related protection incidents?	1	18		No registration, no food.
To whom would they turn to complain or report Protection Issues?				CSS, elders, UNHCR, CAR. Community should solve its own problems and not involve internationals.
Are there specific protection problems that relate to women? SBGV protection issues related to food distribution?	4	12	3	
Are there protection issues for the EVI related to food distribution?	2	15	2	Community works together to help each other
Any suggestions, complaints, recommendations, or Lessons Learned regarding the food distribution system either before under UNHCR or now under WFP?				Under UNHCR more quantity and items provided more regularly, rice quality bad, prefer wheat, less monitoring/supervision with WFP, no retroactive food distribution for delays in delivery, prefer larger old ration.



# Case Study No 2 - Sierra Leone

(28 October-11 November 2004)







# Acronyms

ADDO	Arch-Diocesan Development Office
BPDA	Bo Pujehun Development Association
CARE	Care International
CD	Country Director
CM	Camp Manager
CO	Country Office
COMPAS	Commodity Movement Processing and Analysis System
CP	Coordinating Partner
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
DSC	Direct Support Costs
EDP	Extended Delivery Point
EM	Evaluation Mission
EMOP	Emergency Operation
EVI	Extremely Vulnerable Individuals
FBM	Food Basket Monitoring
FDP	Final Delivery Point
FNA	Food Needs Assessment
FPA	Food Pipeline Agency
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IP	Implementing Partner
IRC	International Rescue Committee
ISC	Indirect Support Costs
JA	Joint Agreement
JFAM	Joint Food Assessment Mission
JPA	Joint Plan of Action
Kcal	Kilocalorie
LOU	Letter of Understanding
LTSH	Landside Transport, Storage and Handling
LWF	Lutheran World Federation
M & E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MCH	Mother and Child Health
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MT	Metric Ton
NaCSA	National Commission for Social Action Government Agency for refugees
NFI	Non-food Items
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
PDM	Post Distribution Monitoring
PRRO	Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation
PWJ	Peace Winds Japan
SFP	Supplementary Feeding Programme
SGBV	Sexual and Gender Based Violence
TA	Tripartite Agreement
TFP	Therapeutic Feeding Programme)
TOR	Terms of Reference
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USD	US Dollars



VAM	Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping
WB	World Bank
WFP	World Food Programme
WVI	World Vision International



# Table of Contents

<b>Executive Summary</b>	<b>v</b>
<b>Introduction</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Background</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>I. Cost and Logistics</b>	<b>3</b>
1. Introduction	3
2. Logistics	3
2.1 The Situation before the 1 <sup>st</sup> of March 2003	4
2.2 The Situation after the 1 <sup>st</sup> of March 2003	5
2.3 The Situation as of September 2004	6
3. The Pilot Project and the Contractual Agreements	6
3.1 UNHCR – IP Bilateral Camp Management Agreements	6
3.2 WFP – IP Bilateral Agreements for Food Management and Distribution	7
3.3 UNHCR-WFP-IP Tripartite or Quadripartite Agreements	7
4. The Pilot Project and the Cost of Transport, Management and Distribution of Food	8
4.1 The Management and Distribution of Food	8
4.2 The Transport of Food-aid from the Port of Freetown to the Beneficiaries	9
4.3 The Pilot Project and the LTSH	10
5. The Pilot Project and the Caseload Figures	10
6. The Pilot Project and Staffing	10
7. The Pilot Project and the Transfer of Assets	11
8. The Pilot Project and NFIs	11
<b>II. Management and Coordination</b>	<b>11</b>
1. Introduction	11
a. Coordination between UN Agencies	11
b. With Government	12
c. With Coordinating (Implementing) Partners	12
d. With Beneficiaries	12
2. Monitoring and Reporting	12
3. Training/Capacity Building	13
<b>III. Beneficiaries and Protection</b>	<b>14</b>
1. Introduction	14
2. Participation and Perception of the Beneficiaries	14
3. Protection and Food Delivery	15
4. Identification, Ration Cards and Registration	15
5. Gender	15
6. Training/Capacity Building	16
7. Other Issues Raised by the Refugees	16



**IV. Concluding Remarks and Lessons Learned**  
**Appendices**

17

- Appendix 1 Summary of Implementing Partners Camp Population and Food Figures as of September 2004
- Appendix 2 Breakdown of the Post Transit, Long Distance and Secondary Transport, Handling and Distribution Costs
- Appendix 3 Summary Results of Discussions with the Beneficiaries



# Executive Summary

The World Food Programme (WFP) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) work together providing humanitarian assistance to refugees and displaced persons. This collaboration was strengthened with the signing of a revised Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in July 2002. Through this document both agencies agreed that, on a pilot basis, WFP would take over the responsibility for the entire food distribution programme in 5 countries, and that, after one year of implementation, each of the 5 pilot projects would be evaluated.

This case study of Sierra Leone follows those of Pakistan and Uganda and has been prepared by the two consultants recruited by both WFP and UNHCR. It builds on the systems and framework established in the first two studies and focuses on three key issues outlined in the Terms of Reference for the Evaluation: Cost and Logistics; Management and Coordination; and Beneficiaries Perspective and Protection. The key findings for Sierra Leone are described in the text of the document and summarized in the Concluding Remarks and Lessons Learned at the end of the study below.

The implementation of the Pilot Project in Sierra Leone did not lead to any significant cost savings; however, during the implementation of the pilot project WFP took steps to streamline food delivery from the port to the camps and eliminated one warehouse and associated offloading at an EDP, which led to significant savings. WFP was able to consolidate and streamline its food distribution system from the port to the beneficiaries with the change from four Food Pipeline Agencies (FPA) to WFP designated as the sole agency responsible for food distribution in all the refugee camps.

The transition to WFP as sole food pipeline agency had little effect on the beneficiaries' overall understanding of UNHCR as lead agency responsible for refugee protection. It strengthened their perception of WFP as the agency responsible for food distribution. Although coordination and cooperation between the two agencies improved under the pilot project, the general consensus was that a single implementing partner should be responsible for both camp management and food distribution.

The Evaluation Mission would like to thank the staff of WFP and UNHCR in Sierra Leone for their cooperation and assistance in providing information on the Pilot Project implemented in 2003-2004. The Evaluation Mission also notes with appreciation the valuable contribution made by the Government of Sierra Leone and the Implementing Partners. Finally, the case study for Sierra Leone could not have been undertaken without the support and contribution from the refugees who, through their elected representatives and Food Management Committees, participated in the food distribution, and benefit from the assistance provided by the international community through the two UN agencies.





## Introduction<sup>6</sup>

1. The Memorandum of Understanding signed by the World Food Programme and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (WFP-UNHCR) in July, 2002 proposed that Pilot Projects be established in five countries where UNHCR handed over full responsibility of food distribution to WFP. Pilot food distribution projects were initiated in Pakistan in 2003, followed by similar projects in Uganda, Sierra Leone, Kenya and Zambia. Based on this, a Joint Food Distribution Evaluation Mission was established to prepare case studies for the five countries.
2. The joint Evaluation Mission (EM) consists of two consultants selected by both UN agencies. The mission commenced its work with a week of briefings in the Headquarters of WFP in Rome and UNHCR in Geneva (6-9 July 2004,) followed by a visit to Pakistan from 11 -25<sup>th</sup> of July 2004. Representatives from UNHCR and WFP Evaluation Units in Headquarters joined the mission for the first week in Pakistan. A draft report for the Pakistan case study was circulated in September. The mission traveled to Uganda and Sierra Leone in October and November, 2004; it is scheduled to visit Kenya and Zambia in early 2005.
3. Following the Terms of Reference (TOR) and evaluation methodology, the evaluation mission gathers country specific information, using the basic systems and framework established in Pakistan. Although no specific recommendations will be made on whether the pilot food distribution project should be extended, the case studies summarize the lessons learned, and identify common themes as well as unique characteristics of food distribution in the 5 countries selected for the Pilot Project.
4. This case study of Sierra Leone is the third of the five country reports on the Pilot Food Distribution Projects and follows the draft study prepared for Pakistan and Uganda. It was prepared following the visit to Uganda and preparation of that country's draft report. The Sierra Leone case study builds upon the previous two studies and focuses on the three main issues outlined in the Terms of Reference; i.e. Cost and Logistics Considerations; Management and Coordination; and Beneficiaries' Perspective and Protection.

## Background

5. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the World Food Programme (WFP) work closely together to provide humanitarian assistance to refugees around the world. The former is the lead UN agency responsible for refugee protection and assistance, while WFP provides food to refugees, internally displaced and vulnerable populations. The two agencies have signed several Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) over the years (1985, 1994, and 1997) and most recently in 2002.
6. In most countries before the signing of the revised MOU in 2002, WFP was responsible for the procurement and delivery of the food from the port to the Extended Delivery Point (EDP,) and then handing over to UNHCR, who with its Implementing Partners, was responsible for the final distribution of food to the refugees. The situation was different in Sierra Leone however; camps for the Internally Displaced (IDPs) were established before those for returnees and refugees. WFP was one of four "food pipeline agencies" (FPAs), each responsible for food distribution in that specific geographic area.
7. Prior to the start of the pilot project in Sierra Leone in March 2003, WFP was responsible for distribution in only two of the seven established camps (Jembe and Gerihun) with a total population of some 14,000 refugees. Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and World Vision International (WVI) were providing food in two camps each, while CARE delivered food to one camp.<sup>7</sup> The total refugee population in the seven camps was some 53,000 Liberian refugees.
8. At the same time that assistance to the Internally displaced population (IDPs) was gradually phasing down, the security situation deteriorated in Liberia and, by the end of 2002, there were over 40,000 Liberian refugees in Sierra Leone. The 7 former returnee camps were used to house the refugees from Liberia. To accommodate this growing influx an 8<sup>th</sup> refugee camp was established on the 31<sup>st</sup> March 2003, to accommodate an additional

<sup>6</sup> Consultants: Mitchell L. Carlson and Francois de Meulder.

<sup>7</sup> There was a separate project in SIL for returnee settlement in Lokomasama and Bari Chiefdom. Also while the "camps" were accommodating returnees, they were also referred to as "settlements;" however, after the arrival of the Liberian refugees, all 7 locations were converted in to "camps".





10,000 refugees.<sup>8</sup> In May 2003, UNHCR undertook a verification exercise of the refugees in the 8 camps and came up with a revised population figure of over 54,000.

9. In July 2002 the revised global MOU was signed by the Heads of UNHCR and WFP and Sierra Leone was selected as one of the five pilot countries. Towards the end of the year the major donors requested that the food distribution system for refugees be consolidated under WFP. In consultation with UNHCR, "Coordinating Partners" for food distribution were identified, which included two of the former FPAs (CARE withdrew from food distribution in the refugee camps).

10. Prior to March 2003, UNHCR had contracts with six non-governmental organizations (NGOs) for camp management. With the implementation of the pilot project and the opening of Tobanda camp, agreements for camp management were signed with seven partners. In five of the eight camps, the same agency responsible for camp management was also responsible for food distribution (see Appendix 1 for list of Camps and Implementing Partners). Tripartite Agreements were signed between UNHCR, WFP and the Implementing Partner (IP) for both of these services. In three of the camps, a different partner was responsible for food distribution. For these three camps, Quadripartite Agreements were signed between the two UN agencies and the two partners; one responsible for camp management and the other for food distribution.

11. As of September 2004, the eight refugee camps housed a total of between 50,000 – 55,000 people. They are relatively close together and all could be reached in one day from Bo or Kenema towns. Both WFP and UNHCR have offices in the latter and WFP maintains a warehouse as well. UNHCR has a Field office in Bo. In August of this year, WFP streamlined the logistics of food delivery by taking the food directly from the port to the camps. Prepositioning takes place the first week of every month. Food distribution starts simultaneously in all camps on the 10th of every month and is usually completed in 6-8 days. WFP has built warehouses with covered waiting areas in all but one of the eight camps. The waiting areas serve as crowd control; in most of the camps; distribution is done by family size; in several of the camps this is further divided where males receive food from one end and female heads of household receive food from the other side of the warehouse. The vulnerable (EVI) do not wait in line and are given their food separately from the rest of the camp population.

12. Food distribution to individual families is done through the use of scoops; each food item has its own scoop. Both men and women participate in the distribution, although the goal of both UN agencies of 50 percent women serving in the refugee administration and food committees has not yet been achieved. A unique characteristic of the food distribution in Sierra Leone is the participation of the surrounding host community. Local residents assist in off-loading and scooping; 50 percent of the refugees involved in scooping are women.

13. The basic ration consists of bulgur wheat, vegetable oil, pulses, CSB (corn soy blend,) and salt. Canned fish or meat were distributed occasionally when a donation was received for the refugees. The refugees were not accustomed to the bulgur wheat and were selling part of it to pay for grinding. Another unique aspect of the food distribution in Sierra Leone is the provision of grinders. WFP procured hand grinders for the camps to minimize sale or trade of the bulgur wheat.

14. UNHCR is in charge of registration and regularly updates the population figures to include new born children, marriages, family reunion cases, etc. A unique aspect of the registration in Sierra Leone is the inclusion of two photos on the ration cards. The photos of both the head of household and spouse are included on the ration card which serves not only for food distribution but also as identification of the beneficiaries. The two photos were introduced in 2003 after the revalidation of the entire refugee caseload. Laptop computers are used in the camps to verify and ensure beneficiaries are registered residents of the camp.

## I. Cost and Logistics

<sup>8</sup> Tobanda Refugee Camp was the 8th camp, established in April, 2003 after the start of the Pilot Project when WFP was responsible for food distribution in all camps.



## 1. Introduction

15. As outlined in the revised global MOU (July 2002), UNHCR and WFP jointly agreed to initiate the Pilot Food Distribution Project in Sierra Leone from the 1<sup>st</sup> March 2003. Before this, the responsibility for moving the food-aid from Freetown port to the camps was vested in four “Food Pipeline Agencies;” Catholic Relief Services (CRS,) World Vision (WVI,) CARE and WFP. At the same time that the Pilot Project came into force, donors requested WFP take over, as the sole agency responsibility for moving the food from the Freetown port to the 8 refugee’s camps. The annual volume of food directed to the camps for the period 2002 - 2004 ranged between 7,000 and 10,000 MT, or a monthly average of between 600 - 900 MT.

16. Consequently, as from the 1<sup>st</sup> of March 2003, not only the visibility but also the responsibilities of WFP were greatly enhanced by the combined action of the Pilot Project and the donor decision to streamline the number of Food Pipeline Agencies down to one. This led to an overall increase in efficiency through a more effective and efficient food distribution system. At the same time, the core functions of UNHCR as lead agency responsible for the protection and well being of the refugees remained the same or were even reinforced with a clear delineation of responsibilities between WFP and UNHCR.

## 2. Logistics

17. Under the terms of the Pilot Project the responsibilities for food-aid management<sup>9</sup> in the Extended Delivery Points (EDPs) and/or Final Delivery Points (FDPs) including the final distribution of the food to the refugees were clearly transferred from UNHCR to WFP. At the same time, WFP, at the request of the major donors, was designated the sole agency responsible for food-aid for the refugee camps. These two initiatives implied a major review and careful evaluation of numerous logistical arrangements in place with IPs and transporters; consequently two important steps were taken:

- For both the years 2003 and 2004, UNHCR and WFP country offices worked out very comprehensive Joint Work Plans, clearly establishing the roles, responsibilities and goals agreed between the two UN agencies, while also taking into consideration the changes to be made under the Pilot Project. This created a strong sense of vision and purpose among both the WFP and UNHCR staff.
- Prior to the start of the Pilot Project, WFP conducted a detailed and comprehensive survey in all refugee camps to obtain baseline information on all agencies and Implementing Partners (IPs) wishing to carry out food-aid activities in the camps<sup>10</sup>.

### 2.1 The Situation before the 1<sup>st</sup> of March 2003

<sup>9</sup> Food-aid management comprises the handling and the storekeeping of food-aid at the FDPs inside the camps.

<sup>10</sup> Trip Report and Action Plan for the extension of WFP provision to all the refugee camps in Sierra Leone (4 – 7 February 2003) by Ms. Michelle Iseminger, Programme Officer – operations.



18. Prior to the initiation of the Pilot Project, the responsibility for the delivery and distribution of food-aid was divided between four “Food Pipeline Agencies” (FPAs) and IPs operating more or less independently except for the IP for camp management under UNHCR:

CAMP	FOOD PIPELINE AGENCY (1)	IP for FOOD DISTRIBUTION (2)	IP for CAMP MANAGEMENT (3)
Taiama	CARE	CARE	African Concern
Largo	Catholic Relief Services	Catholic Relief Services	Catholic Relief Services
Gerihun	World Food Programme	Archdiocesan Development Off.	Int. Rescue Committee
Jembe	World Food Programme	Archdiocesan Development Off.	Nor. Refugee Council
Gondama	World Vision International	World Vision International	Bo Pujehun Dev. Ass.
Jimmi Bagbor	World Vision International	World Vision International	Peace Winds Japan
Bandajuma	Catholic Relief Services	Peace Winds Japan	Peace Winds Japan
Tobanda	(4)		

- (1) The food pipeline agencies were each assigned to a specific geographic area within Sierra Leone, responsible for moving the food-aid from under ship’s tackle to the beneficiaries. Each pipeline agency was running its own logistics set-up comprised of separate warehouses inside or outside the port area, upcountry intermediary depots, and specific contractual arrangements for the road transport inside the port, the long distance haulage and the secondary transport upcountry.
- (2) The final food distribution to the beneficiaries was carried out either by the “Food Pipeline Agency” itself or else by the camp manager. For the Gerihun and Jembe camps however WFP chose ADDO as its IP for the final distribution of food to the refugees.
- (3) The camp manager services provided by an IP are regulated by a bilateral or sub-agreement between UNHCR and IP.
- (4) Tobanda camp was established 31<sup>st</sup> March 2003 after the start of the Pilot Project.

19. The “Food Pipeline Agency” organized the storage of the food-aid under its responsibility in main depots inside or outside the Freetown port perimeter, and in inland depots in or nearby the towns of Bo or Kenema. Invariably these arrangements involved extra costs for double or treble handling and for piecemeal and fragmented transport operations.<sup>11</sup>

20. In the absence of adequate storage and distribution facilities inside the camps, the “Food Pipeline Agencies” had to organize the distribution of the food-aid off the tailboard of the trucks. Not only were the distribution operations time consuming, but they were also conducted under very uncomfortable, dangerous conditions for staff and beneficiaries; on several occasions, distributions became disorderly if not unruly and IP staff had to evacuate.

21. In the camps of Gerihun and Jembe, WFP initiated, with the assistance of the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC,) the construction of a multi-functional warehouse for food storage, combined with a distribution centre providing shade and facilitating crowd control. Once WFP took over food distribution in all camps, similar structures were replicated in all the other refugee camps in Sierra Leone except in the Largo camp where CRS had built a limited storage facility. The food storage area in Largo was not adequate and CRS procured second-hand shipping containers to provide additional storage.

22. The “scooping system” for the distribution of the food to the beneficiaries was the standard procedure in all the camps. This system was harmonized in all camps after extensive discussions in the Committee for Food Aid and National Technical Committee on Food Aid. The host community and the refugees were actively involved in unloading the food, scooping (see Participation below).

23. In this early phase, there were no common dates set for distribution in the camps. Only the Largo camp had a single agency involved in the food delivery and distribution.

## 2.2 The Situation after the 1<sup>st</sup> of March 2003

24. After Sierra Leone was selected as one of the countries in the Pilot Project, WFP in close cooperation with UNHCR undertook a review to streamline food-aid management and distribution activities. The performances of

<sup>11</sup> It should be noted that Food Pipeline Agencies were providing significantly more food to IDPs/returnees prior to the MOU than to refugees through their food for agriculture/food work projects in the specific geographic area.



all the IPs were jointly assessed prior to the start of the Pilot Project. On the strength of this exercise, both WFP and UNHCR reviewed the contractual arrangements and agreed to the following Implementing Partners (IPs):

CAMP	FOOD PIPELINE AGENCY (1)	IP for FOOD MANAGEMENT and DISTRIBUTION (2)	IP for CAMP MANAGEMENT (3)
Taiama	World Food Programme	World Vision International	African Concern
Largo	World Food Programme	Catholic Relief Services	Catholic Relief Services
Gerihun	World Food Programme	Archdiocesan Develop. Off.	Int. Rescue Committee
Jembe	World Food Programme	Archdiocesan Develop Off.	Archdiocesan Develop Off.
Gondama	World Food Programme	World Vision International	Bo Pujehun Develop. Ass.
Jimmi Bagbor	World Food Programme	Peace Winds of Japan	Peace Winds Japan
Bandajuma	World Food Programme	Peace Winds of Japan	Peace Winds Japan
Tobanda	World Food Programme	Lutheran World Foundation	Lutheran World Foundation

- (1) As “Food Pipeline Manager” WFP assumed sole control of the entire transport chain from under ship’s tackle up to the final distribution of food to the beneficiaries.
- (2) The IPs in charge of the food management and distribution operated under a bilateral contract with WFP. In order to stress the link with UNHCR this same operation was also covered either by a tri- or quadripartite agreement.
- (3) The camp management services provided by an IP were regulated by a bilateral agreement between UNHCR and IP; these contract arrangements were not altered by the Pilot Project.

25. UNHCR and WFP retained the same IPs for both the camp management and food distribution in five of the eight camps; this was the case in only two of the camps before the Pilot Project started. Together the two UN agencies prepared annual work plans and drafted tripartite or quadripartite agreements outlining the responsibilities of the one or two implementing partners with UNHCR and WFP in each camp.

26. Under the Pilot Project with its responsibility for the entire transport chain, WFP introduced uniform food management and distribution procedures in all 8 camps. In addition, WFP undertook, in close consultation with UNHCR, measures aimed at enhancing the efficiency of the transport system and uniformity of the food distribution procedures, including:

- the drafting of bilateral agreements between WFP and IPs for food distribution;
- the strengthening of the monthly food basket monitoring (FBM) and the quarterly post distribution monitoring (PDM);
- the construction of adequate food storage and distribution centres in 5 camps;
- the supply of hand grinders in each community or cluster in all the camps in line with the MOU; and
- through the implementing partners and in close consultation with UNHCR and the Camp Management, promoting sensitization activities on SGBV, HIV-AIDS, commitments to women, nutrition and health related issues, food preparation, etc.

27. With the dual-purpose storage and distribution centres (FDPs) constructed in all the camps, WFP was able to store a month’s supply of food in each camp, eliminating the insecure distribution system. The multitude of depots, warehouses and go-downs operated by the former “Food Pipeline Agencies” was dispensed with;<sup>12</sup> WFP retained only three EDPs; one inside the Freetown port adjacent to the main berth and container terminal; the two other located respectively in Kenema and Bo.

28. The existence of warehouse/distribution centers in each camp made it possible to de-link the road transport operations from the distribution activity inside the camp. This facilitated and standardized same day distribution on the 10<sup>th</sup> of every month in all camps. This fixed distribution date ensured that both the beneficiaries and aid-workers were aware of the distribution, allowed for planning of other activities including repatriation, better use of staff time, and minimized double dipping by refugees moving between camps<sup>13</sup>.

<sup>12</sup> Some of the FPAs maintained their warehouses, etc. for their projects targeting returnees/local population.



29. Long distance transport (800-1.000 MT monthly) between Freetown, Kenema and Bo was contracted to private commercial road haulers. WFP's truck fleet undertook the secondary transport from the Kenema and Bo EDPs to the 8 camps.

30. As a result of these measures, WFP became the sole "Pipe Line Agency" for refugee food aid and the food pipeline became much more manageable. Pipeline breaks were almost totally eradicated (except for one late arrival of a consignment of vegetable oil in Freetown during June/July 2004), the distribution schedules were adhered to, the food basket was complete and the reporting procedures became much more streamlined.

31. With the new system, food distribution to the beneficiaries took between 6 to 8 days as against 10 to 15 days before the Pilot Project started. The working of the different committees was optimized. TORs and reporting channels were developed, as a joint effort by both UNHCR and WFP, and were made more or less identical in all 8 camps.<sup>14</sup>

### 2.3 The Situation as of September 2004

32. In September 2004 WFP decided to streamline the system of long distance road transport from Freetown (EDP) to Kenema (EDP) and Bo (EDP) and eliminate the need for secondary transport from the EDPs to the FDPs in the camps. WFP contracted commercial haulers to move the food directly from its Freetown EDP to the 8 individual FDPs inside the camps, thus eliminating double handling and intermediary storage of the food aid. At the same time WFP downsized the truck fleet it had positioned at its Kenema depot.

33. This initiative led to substantial cost saving for WFP, and was only possible once WFP was responsible for the entire food transport chain. WFP was able to negotiate with the contract haulers and meet the request for delivery of steady monthly tonnages. The Evaluation Mission noted however, that the type of trucks--horse trailer combination--used by the commercial haulers were in general more suitable for long distance transport operation over trunk roads than delivery to the camps along dirt tracks. The lorry drawbar trailer combination is more appropriate equipment on muddy tracks during the rainy season.

## 3. The Pilot Project and the Contractual Agreements

### 3.1 UNHCR – IP Bilateral Camp Management Agreements

34. UNHCR uses a standard format of agreement for the management of the refugee camps throughout the world. All the services the selected IP is expected to provide as camp manager fall in the category of "Care and Maintenance." The detailed budget agreed upon by the parties forms part of the agreement. Unfortunately the structure of the budget agreement does not allow for exact cost price calculations of each separate service extended by the IP; e.g. the cost of the food distribution before the Pilot Project became effective was not apparent. Budgets are also quite often revised during the course of the agreement in line with the range, size and frequency of the services provided.

### 3.2 WFP – IP Bilateral Agreements for Food Management and Distribution

35. Since the 1<sup>st</sup> of March 2003, WFP entered into separate agreements with each IP providing food management and distribution services in each of the camps. The 2003 and 2004 contracts, while serving the same purpose, were not always identical. The 2004 contract was more elaborate; it established in greater detail the duties and the responsibilities of the two parties to the contract and stipulated clearly that the IP was expected to provide services for the *reception, storage, handling and distribution* of WFP food aid commodities.

<sup>13</sup> During the evaluation mission only one IP was in favor of staggered food distribution dates claiming that this would permit a better utilization of the available staff.

<sup>14</sup> The many camp activities are arranged through committees, e.g.: Food distribution, Complaints and grievances, Discipline, Social Services, Shelters, NFI, Water sanitation, Child and Welfare, SGBV, Hygiene. A NACSA (National Committee on Social Action) representative is based in each camp and serves as an overseer and coordinator on behalf of the government of Sierra Leone. He chairs a monthly coordination meeting attended by all the stakeholders.



36. The bilateral agreement between WFP and the IP was carefully drafted and covered all the logistical aspects of the operation. It is important to note the following:

- The remuneration for the services provided by the IP was based on a fixed US dollar rate per MT of food-aid distributed. The rate is justified and supported by the IP's budget which is duly approved and attached to the agreement.
- The bilateral agreement between WFP and WVI for 2004, while similar in scope, was quite different in wording and format from the agreements signed for the same year with the four other IPs. This contract granted WVI some form of financial protection should the anticipated tonnage not be required; the other 4 contracts do not mention this possibility.
- Para 4.9 and 4.9.1 (Bilateral agreement WFP – IP) refer to the activities the IP must undertake to sensitize its own staff and the beneficiaries on various topics including SGBV, HIV-AIDS, hygiene, food preparation, etc. There was no specific budget for these activities and no remuneration could be claimed for these services based on the fixed rate per MT of food distributed. While acknowledging the importance of these campaigns, the Evaluation Mission inquired whether these activities should fall under a contract serving primarily a logistics purpose. Considering the nature of the services, the fact that UNHCR had bilateral agreements with IPs to perform similar if not the same services, it would be more clear if UNHCR underwrote the funding for these activities. WFP did mention that they provided training of trainers in consultation with UNHCR for the implementing partners, but that this came out of the WFP Country Office budget and not the agreement with the IP.

### 3.3 UNHCR-WFP-IP Tripartite or Quadripartite Agreements

37. In order to stress the close association and cooperation between WFP and UNHCR and highlight the coordination of the food-aid management and distribution, Tripartite or, in the camps where food distribution was undertaken by a separate IP from the one in charge of camp management, Quadripartite agreements were drawn up between UNHCR and WFP and the IP or IPs. These agreements provided the overall policy framework between the two UN agencies and the IPs, including the reporting procedures and division of responsibilities. They did not include budgets however; these are drawn up as bilateral agreements between WFP and the food distribution partner, or UNHCR and the partner responsible for camp management. In practice the bilateral agreements negotiated between the IPs and UNHCR or WFP took precedence over the Tri- and Quadripartite Agreements since the bilateral agreements set the rates or amounts paid for the services rendered.

38. The Tripartite Agreements<sup>15</sup> did not have any budget or logistics implications for WFP, but support the coordination mechanisms between UNHCR, WFP and the IP. They reinforced the separate bilateral agreement WFP signs with the IP which was more specific and included the approved budget (see paragraph 3.2 here above).

39. The Quadripartite Agreements<sup>16</sup> established the respective responsibilities of the IP involved in camp management and the IP in charge of food distribution in the three camps where these two activities were divided between two partners. As noted above, separate bilateral agreements were signed between one IP and WFP for food distribution, and a different IP and UNHCR for camp management.

40. The separation of camp management and food distribution and the associated Quadripartite Agreements created some confusion in the three camps. The Evaluation Mission noted:

- The Quadripartite and Bilateral Agreements signed by WFP and the IP were sometimes contradictory in terms of which IP finally provided which service. A case in point is the 2004 Quadripartite Agreement signed between UNHCR, WFP, ADDO and IRC (28/04/04). Paragraph 3.1 states that IRC is *responsible for the proper storage and handling of WFP/UNHCR food in Gerihun, Bo District*. On the other hand the 2004 bilateral agreement signed (19/12/03) between WFP and ADDO covering the services to be provided at the Gerihun and Jembe refugee camps stipulated that the IP agrees to provide *services for the reception,*

<sup>15</sup> A tripartite agreement is signed when one IP is providing services for both camp management and food distribution. This is the case in 5 of the 8 camps.

<sup>16</sup> A quadripartite agreement is signed between WFP, UNHCR and two IPs where camp management is the responsibility of one agency and food distribution is undertaken by a different IP.



storage, handling and distribution of WFP food-aid commodities. Paragraph 4.1 sets out the obligations of ADDO: *Be responsible for the reception, storage and handling of WFP food commodities at the final distribution point (FDP) and distribution to beneficiaries.*

The Evaluation Mission noted the confusion as to which IP was ultimately responsible for the storage and the handling of food at the Gerihun FDP. Luckily the situation was less complicated on the ground for it is understood that IRC, the appointed camp manager with staff permanently on location, provided the storekeeper; however should a claim for theft or damage at the FDP ever arise, UNHCR and WFP could face legal problems.

- When a quadripartite agreement was in place, the processing of the transport documentation did not reflect accurately the situation on the ground. Consignments dispatched by WFP – Freetown were covered by a WFP waybill consigned to the IP with whom WFP had entered into a bilateral agreement; e.g. in the Gerihun camp it was ADDO. The FDP is staffed by an IRC storekeeper, and IRC signs the waybill for receipt of the goods. The present system needs to be reviewed as it could be difficult to apportion responsibilities between the two IPs should there be a delivery problem.

41. Based on the above, the Evaluation Mission found that the usefulness of the Tripartite and Quadripartite Agreement was unclear. The reporting responsibilities under the Quadripartite Agreements need to be clarified. In general The Mission found that the system of one IP in charge of both food distribution and camp management had its merits and should reduce overall operating costs. As noted above, the bilateral agreements between UNHCR and WFP and their respective IPs take precedence over the Tripartite and Quadripartite Agreements and it should be possible to minimize the number of documents signed while ensuring efficient coordination between the two UN agencies and the IPs.

**4. The Pilot Project and the Cost of Transport, Management and Distribution of Food**

42. From the budget and costing figures provided it is possible to gauge the effects of the Pilot Project on: the costs for the management and the distribution of the food aid inside the camps; the costs for moving the food-aid from the port of Freetown to the beneficiaries; and the LTSH figures. These calculations are summarized in the paragraphs below.

**4.1 The Management and Distribution of Food**

43. From the UNHCR budget and accounting system it was not possible to extract the precise cost for the management and distribution of food in the camps before the 1<sup>st</sup> of March 2003. However before that date, WFP was operating as “Food Pipeline Agent” for the camps of Gerihun and Jembe. ADDO had been selected by WFP as the IP in charge of food distribution at an agreed rate of \$17.00 US/MT. This is the only precise cost indication available for the period before the Pilot Project. The following schedule gives a general overview of the rates agreed with the IPs for the management and distribution of the food-aid in the camps:

Implementing Partner	Camp	Before 01/03/2003 Jan – Feb 2003	After 01/03/03 Mar – Dec 2003	Jan – Dec. 2004
WVI	Taiama - Gondama	Not available	\$26.14 US/MT	\$23.45 US/MT <sup>17</sup>
CRS	Largo	Not available	\$16.00 US/MT	\$16.80 US/MT
ADDO	Gerihun - Jembe	\$17.00 US/MT	\$21.00 US/MT	\$17.60 US/MT
PWJ	J. Bagbor - Bandajuma	Not available	\$23.40 US/MT	\$22.50 US/MT

<sup>17</sup> Perhaps interesting to note that WVI claims that the effective cost of the food distribution amounts to \$40.00 US/MT out of which it must subsidize as much as \$17.00 US/MT.



LWF	Tobanda	Not yet opened	\$14.00 US/MT	\$16.30 US/MT
<b>Compounded average for tonnage</b>		<b>\$17.00 US/MT</b>	<b>\$21.00 US/MT</b>	<b>\$20.03 US/MT</b>

44. The figures for the period before 01/03/2003 are too scanty to conclude that there was a substantial increase in the management and distribution costs between the periods before and after 01/03/03. The rate agreed between WFP and ADDO indeed increased from \$17.00 US/MT to \$21.00 US/MT after 01/03/03 but tapered off again in 2004 to \$17.60 US/MT. From the figures above, WFP monitored the management and distribution costs since 01/03/2003, even obtaining a small decrease in the rates in 2004.

#### 4.2 The Transport of Food-aid from the Port of Freetown to the Beneficiaries

45. Much more indicative is the evolution of the cost price for moving food from Freetown to the beneficiaries during and after the Pilot Project. The table below summarizes the cost of changes in food delivery over time.

Time Period	Food Distribution Responsibility	Amount/MT
Before 01/03/2003	Transport of food aid was entrusted to 4 " Food Pipeline Agencies" (CARE, WVI, CRS, WFP) with an average cost.	\$86.00-92.00 US/MT
Mar – Dec 2003	WFP was in sole control of the entire food chain. The food-aid was routed via the EDPs of Bo and Kenema.	\$86.04 US/MT
Jan – Aug 2004	WFP was in sole control of the entire food chain. The food was routed via the EDPs of Bo and Kenema.	\$88.74 US/MT
Since Sep 2004	WFP was in sole control of the entire food chain. The food is routed direct from Freetown to the FDPs inside the camps.	\$66.56 US/MT

46. The price fluctuations up to September 2004, though moderate, are explained by increases or decreases in the port tariffs, the storage, the commercial transport and secondary transport rates (from BO and Kenema EDPs to the camps) whether by UNHCR and WFP trucks or by commercial vehicles. It is interesting to note that up to March 2003 the cost of secondary transport averaged \$20.00-32.00 US; afterwards it stabilized at \$20.20.

47. In September 2004, WFP decided to do away with the secondary transport and, fine-tuning its logistics, managed to re-organize the entire operation with the commercial hauler moving the food in one go from Freetown port direct to the FDPs in the 8 camps. This required close monitoring of the pipeline between the port and the FDPs. As a result of this initiative, WFP managed to reduce the total LTSH cost by some \$22 US/MT; this eventually led to the substantial reduction of the WFP fleet of trucks positioned in Kenema, and the closure of the Bo EDP altogether. This decrease in LTSH cost was not a direct result of the Pilot Project; however with WFP assuming sole control and responsibility of the entire transportation and distribution operation under the Pilot Project, it had a far better overview of the pipeline flows and the related costs and was in a position to take initiative to reduce its operating costs accordingly.

#### 4.3 The Pilot Project and the LTSH

48. The LTSH figures WFP Sierra Leone submitted for consideration in the subsequent PRRO 10064.1 – 2 and 3 projects do not tally exactly with the LTSH figures for the refugee food project.

Project in Sierra Leone	LTSH rate submitted to EB	LTSH for refugee food-aid project
10064.1 period 01/03-12/03	\$110.00 US/MT	\$86.04 US/MT
10064.2 period 01/04-12/04	\$108.12 US/MT	\$88.75 reduced to \$66.53 US/MT
10064.3 period 01/05-12/06	\$154.41 US/MT	\$80.00 US/MT*

\* For the 2005 - 2006 an estimated 20 percent increase over the 2004 4<sup>th</sup> quarter figure (\$66.53/MT)





49. The variation between the Sierra Leone national LTSH figure (all projects) and the specific LTSH figure for the refugee food-aid project is also due to the high tertiary transport costs incurred by other projects such as school feeding and mother child health projects. These projects have a high number of delivery sites, with very small deliveries to each site compared to the refugee camps. These deliveries are mostly done by WFP's own fleet due to lack of available commercial transport for tertiary deliveries.

## **5. The Pilot Project and the Caseload Figures**

50. The monitoring of the refugee caseload figures is the responsibility of UNHCR and the Government of Sierra Leone. The population figures for the 8 camps is up-to-date; the last revalidation took place in May/June 2003. Over the years UNHCR has modified the registration process and now uses laptop computers to update refugee registration. New laminated identification and food ration cards incorporating photos of head of household and the spouse are included on the cards. UNHCR introduced the new Profile registration system and related progress database application in Sierra Leone in September-October 2004.

51. In close cooperation with NACSA, WFP, the IPs involved in camp management and food distribution and the refugee committees, UNHCR provides complete camp population figures on the 5<sup>th</sup> of each month, and handles any discrepancies. The updated feeding/distribution list is available to WFP and the IP at least 3 days before the food distribution on the 10th. The list of EVIs is kept up to date by the IP/camp manager and maintained in the UNHCR data base.

52. Although some difficulties were reported concerning the timely registration of "foot" arrivals, new born babies, and the correct assessment of EVI beneficiaries, registration of beneficiaries did not present major problems in food distribution. In fact, the refugees in several camps complained about the computers and asked that these not be used, basically because they eliminated double registration and identified ration cards of families who had already returned to Liberia.

## **6. The Pilot Project and Staffing**

53. The number of staff of UNHCR, WFP and the IPs was not affected by the implementation of the Pilot Project when WFP only took over food assistance for all "displaced persons" or "returnees" from March 2004. The switch from four "Food Pipe Line Agencies" to only one (WFP) did cause CARE, CRS and WVI to reorganize their staffing, but this was not related to the Pilot Project.<sup>18</sup> The decision by WFP in September 2004 to do away with the secondary transport entailed a reduction of the WFP truck fleet in Kenema and the closure of the Bo EDP. Five WFP drivers based in Kenema and one logistics assistant and one storekeeper in Bo became redundant as a result of this decision, but were reassigned elsewhere.

54. UNHCR did reduce some staff working in the camps by transferring some responsibilities and functions to the IP/Camp Manager. This change in staff was not dictated by the Pilot Project however, but stems from funding problems during the Pilot Project.

## **7. The Pilot Project and the Transfer of Assets**

55. No transfer of major, tangible assets between the two UN agencies was reported.

## **8. The Pilot Project and NFIs**

56. The handling and distribution of NFIs remained under the sole control of UNHCR. All the NFI distribution procedures remained unchanged. Maggie cubes<sup>19</sup> are distributed every two months simultaneously with the distribution of the food. Soap and sanitary kits are distributed every three months. Other items like tarps, cooking

<sup>18</sup> Even after March 2004, the same pipeline agencies plus a new agency Africare continued to have a large food aid component in their development projects.

<sup>19</sup> 5 Maggie cubes per beneficiary every two months.



pots and buckets are distributed to new arrivals, and to vulnerable on an ad hoc basis by the camp manager in close association with UNHCR. Soap, sanitary kits and Maggie cubes are stored for short periods in the FDPs in the camps, but the main NFI stocks are kept in UNHCR stores in Freetown and Kenema.

57. Occasionally at UNHCR's request, WFP and the IP in charge of food distribution collect the empty bags from the refugees. Although they are in demand in the camps, the returned bags are then used to support Sierra Leonean returnees.

58. Before the Pilot Project was initiated, WFP distributed aluminum hand grinders for the milling of bulgur wheat in the two camps (Jembe and Gerihun) where they were responsible for food distribution. After the 1<sup>st</sup> of March 2003, WFP extended this initiative to the remaining six camps and arranged for IRC to purchase grinders using funds from donors (US and UK). Unfortunately during the EM a significant number of these hand grinders were reported damaged beyond repair. Refugees have lost the benefit of a handy and very simple cost saving device<sup>20</sup>. It is unfortunate that the funding of \$3,000-5,000 US to procure some 500 new hand grinders is not forthcoming. This small out-lay would yield a large cost savings and benefit to the refugees and reduce the sale or trade of the basic ration to pay for the grinding in private mills.

## **II. Management and Coordination**

### **1. Introduction**

59. The latest revision of the MOU signed by the Heads of both agencies in July 2002 agreed to establish pilot projects in five countries under which WFP was to assume responsibility, at its own cost, for the final distribution of the basic ration to the refugees. The MoU did not mention which 5 countries, however. The selection of Sierra Leone as one of the five countries for the Pilot Project was initially raised in September 2002 in the context of UNHCR's financial crisis and UNHCR HQ asked for volunteers and the country office agreed. The WFP Country Director requested that Sierra Leone be included as a pilot country because of its experience with IDPs and refugees; at his initiative Sierra Leone was included as one of the pilot countries.

60. The pilot phase involved management and coordination between the two UN agencies as well as with implementing partners, government and the beneficiaries. A standard set of meetings were established before the pilot project with representatives from Government (NaCSA,) UNHCR, WFP, Implementing Partners and the beneficiaries in all camps. These meetings including pre and post-distribution meetings and general coordination meetings continued under the pilot project. The following sections review coordination between the UN agencies and the various partners during the implementation of the Pilot Project.

#### **a. Coordination between UN Agencies**

61. Coordination between the two UN agency country offices was well established before the pilot project. Once Sierra Leone was identified as one of the countries for the pilot project, both agencies worked together to ensure a smooth transition. The process started in November 2002. It was discussed at the Committee on Food Aid (CFA) chaired by WFP with participation from the Government of Sierra Leone, UNHCR and the relevant partners involved in both food distribution and camp management.

62. As noted in section I above, staffing levels of both UN agencies were not significantly affected by the introduction of the pilot project. Although UNHCR increased staff in 2003; this was due primarily to the budget restrictions from the previous year, and the need to improve SGBV monitoring, as the result of gender/sexual abuse allegations in the region. WFP was able to reduce staff with the closure of the warehouse in Bo, but did not increase staff to handle additional contracts and financial submission due to the increase in the number of Implementing Partners.

#### **b. With Government**

63. At the central level, the Government of Sierra Leone participated in the CFA meetings where the pilot project was introduced. Similar meetings were held at the field level with the local government representatives

<sup>20</sup> The price to have one 50 kg. bulgur wheat bag milled at a commercial mill is 2,500 Leones or about \$1.00 US



(NaCSA.) There was adequate time to plan and sensitize the government and partners to the changes as the process started in late 2002, but the Pilot Project was not initiated until March the following year.

### **c. With Coordinating (Implementing) Partners**

64. In close coordination with UNHCR, WFP requested letters of interest from the existing Food Pipeline Agencies (FPA) and provided a format for the submission of proposals. As noted above, CARE declined. WFP undertook an evaluation of the existing partners, and with input from UNHCR, identified the coordinating (implementing) partners for food distribution in the camps.

65. Depending on the camps, Tripartite or Quadripartite Agreements were signed between UNHCR, WFP and the partners involved in food distribution and/or camp management (see Background and section I above). Although Tripartite Agreements existed before the pilot project, there was some confusion under the Quadripartite Agreements where the storekeeper was employed as part of camp management under UNHCR, but food distribution was done by WFP's implementing partner. This also led to confusion of responsibility for signing waybills (see Cost and Logistics).

### **d. With Beneficiaries**

66. As their participation is key to the success of the food distribution, the beneficiaries were involved in the initial discussions, and then in the dissemination and sensitization process. All refugee executive bodies and food committees were informed of the new responsibilities of WFP, and they in turn informed the rest of the refugee population. The information sharing lasted for more than three months before the actual implementation of the pilot food distribution project.

67. As part of their mandate to encourage refugee participation, particularly women, in the food distribution process, both UNHCR and WFP encouraged the refugee executive bodies and food committees to be composed of at least 50 percent women. Although this started before the pilot project, women's participation in food distribution increased during the pilot phase.

68. UNHCR prepared Terms of Reference (TOR) for the various refugee camp committees including Food Distribution Committees and, with the Government monitored periodic elections of the camp officials. Both UN agencies encouraged women to participate in the elections and camp committees, and although the elections took place before the start of the Pilot Project the process was refined and the TORs finalized during the period in question.

## **2. Monitoring and Reporting**

69. Monitoring of refugee assistance is key to both UNHCR and WFP's programme management. Both UN agencies worked together in line with the revised MoU to monitor food distribution and share information. There was greater refugee involvement particularly of women, in monitoring food distribution under the pilot project. A unique characteristic of the food distribution in Sierra Leone was the involvement of residents from the surrounding host communities; they were asked to participate in offloading and scooping.

70. UNHCR and WFP took the lead to organize Interagency Food Basket Monitoring (FBM,) and Post Distribution Monitoring (PDM,) in 2002. Monitoring forms were established and standardized with all four FPAs. A joint interagency PDM took place in at least 2 of the camps in the 4<sup>th</sup> quarter of 2002. These monitoring exercises were extended to all camps when WFP took over food distribution in 2003. Contrary to Pakistan, PDM in Sierra Leone seemed better defined and more consistent, using a standard reporting format. According to the WFP Country Office, the PDM reports were key in convincing donors to maintain the existing food basket for refugees in Sierra Leone.



71. Some IPs complained about the number of reports they had to prepare for both UNHCR and WFP<sup>21</sup>. At least one IP stated that field staff spent 5 days every month to prepare reports for both agencies. Report writing definitely has a price tag and although the Evaluation Mission did not focus directly on the cost of report writing, it recommends that both UN agencies review the reporting requirements and streamline them wherever possible.

### 3. Training/Capacity Building

72. Training and capacity building are key elements of both UN agencies, not only for their own staff, but also for the beneficiaries and partners. The implementation of the Pilot Project in Sierra Leone did not require any new specific training on the part of either UN agency, however each agency undertook some training activities and WFP included training in the contracts with its partners.

73. As noted above, during the course of 2003, UNHCR developed Terms of Reference (TORs) for the Camp Management committees, and these were shared with WFP, particularly for the Food Committees. With the changes in the elected camp administrations, many beneficiaries felt that awareness trainings on the role of both UN agencies as well as a review of the Terms of Reference should be done on a regular basis, or at least after each election. In addition, given the proximity of the camps and the strengths and weaknesses of some of the camp administrations, another suggestion was to arrange for camp leaders to meet together and exchange ideas on problem solving, camp management, etc. With UN logistics support and minor guidance, the refugees could organize these workshops themselves.

74. WFP provided training in warehouse management (stacking) to its implementing partners and this continued beyond the pilot phase. WFP provided training of trainers as part of the sensitization activities in Gender, HIV/AIDS, and SGBV. As part of the contracts signed between WFP and their Implementing Partners (IPs,) the IPs were supposed to conduct sensitization workshops during the food distributions on the same topics. WFP did not provide funds for these activities however, and the IPs did not have the staff or experience to undertake them on their own. In addition, UNHCR had contracts with other agencies to undertake training in these core areas. The Evaluation Mission felt that WFP should not include training in these core areas in the food distribution contracts, but should coordinate closely with UNHCR and relevant partners in the training of trainers, and ensure that both WFP staff and their partners participate in these workshops. The food distribution centers can still be used as locations for the sensitization and awareness training of the beneficiaries.

75. Although a regional workshop was held in Accra in April 2004 to review the Global MoU this took place after the initial one year of the pilot Project and did not involve many staff from Sierra Leone. WFP staff felt that a similar workshop should be held in country with representatives of both UNHCR and the Implementing Partners of both UN agencies. Registration related issues could be taken up during this proposed regional workshop.

---

<sup>21</sup> IPs under contract with WFP are expected to submit the following monthly reports: on receipt, movement and use of the WFP provided food on WFP Standard Project Report format; quantitative data on food stocks, losses, distribution figures etc; quantitative and narrative information on the progress and achievements of the food distribution activities; a final summary report at the end of the contract period. UNHCR requests the same set of reports for NFIs. Moreover WFP expects quarterly reports both narrative and quantitative on the achievements of the various sensitization campaigns.



### III. Beneficiaries and Protection

#### 1. Introduction

76. Input from the beneficiaries themselves is essential to the evaluation of any food distribution project. Refugee participation in food distribution is highlighted in the revised MoU and is part of the tasks to review in the Evaluation Mission TOR and Methodology.

77. The Evaluation Mission visited all eight of the refugee camps in Sierra Leone and met with representatives of the Refugee Executive Committees, the Food Management Committees (FMC,) and the Implementing Partners. Following these group discussions the Evaluation Mission also interviewed single female heads of households and/or vulnerable individuals to ascertain their perception of any change in food distribution during the period of the Pilot Project.

78. The same survey or set of discussion questions developed in Pakistan was used in Sierra Leone. WFP field staff completed 39 survey forms; an average of 5 forms was done for all but one of the eight camps. A summary of the information obtained through the questionnaires is included in Appendix 3. General observations on the key findings of the questionnaire are briefly outlined below.

#### 2. Participation and Perception of the Beneficiaries

79. Based on the results of the questionnaires, only 10 percent of the refugees interviewed said they were aware of the transfer of the food distribution system from UNHCR to WFP. Over 60 percent responded that there had been no change and/or that UNHCR had never been involved in food distribution. This is true to an extent, given that Food Pipeline agencies provided the food to the camps before the start of the pilot project, and that WFP through its implementing partners had provided food to two of the seven camps prior to the start of the pilot project.

80. 100 percent of the responses stated that they understood the difference between the two UN agencies and the role of each. Two of the groups surveyed said that UNHCR provided "basic support" while all seem to understand that UNHCR was responsible for protection, the population figures, and distribution of NFI through its implementing partners, and that WFP was responsible for food. Two other groups said UNHCR was responsible for the refugees' "welfare" while WFP was responsible "for our food."

81. Although 95 percent of the responses said they were aware of the roles of the Implementing Partners (IPs) in each camp, the surveys from one camp did not mention who the IPs were. Responses in all camps seem to indicate that the refugees were aware of the IP responsible for camp management, and for food distribution in those three camps where these two functions were divided between two agencies. Coordination did not seem to be an issue; 94 percent of the responses said there was coordination between the two UN agencies and the Implementing Partners, often noting that the refugees were involved and participated in the activities.

82. 100 percent of the responses received through the surveys indicated the refugees were aware of their community structures and the communication channels. Several of the survey forms indicated a separation between executive committees and camp management; the former being the refugee structure, the latter being that of UNHCR's IP.

83. Based on the survey results and interviews in the camps the Evaluation Mission found:

- there did not seem to be any change in the refugee's overall perception of UNHCR as the lead agency responsible for refugee protection and assistance; and
- periodic sensitization campaigns on the role of each UN agency along with a review of the refugee responsibilities and their Terms of Reference should be undertaken on a regular basis, especially following the election of new refugee officials.



### 3. Protection and Food Delivery

84. 100 percent of those interviewed said they were aware of the basic ration and some commented that they knew the number of scoops, but not the weight for each item. Several surveys noted that posters were displayed around the camps before each distribution, and the refugees were informed through sensitization, pre and post distribution meetings about the food ration. All but one of the survey forms submitted stated that all family members have access to food.

85. Unlike the interviews in the other countries, there were no complaints about changes in the delivery schedule. This is due to the fact that food distribution in all eight camps takes place simultaneously on the 10th of every month.

86. All the refugees were delighted with the provision of grinders to mill the bulgur wheat, but every camp complained about the need to repair/replace the grinders. Many acknowledged that they did not have to sell or trade part of their basic ration to grind the wheat.

87. 57 percent of those surveyed said they were aware of food-related protection incidents, but said that only 5 percent involved women, and that 72 percent of the incidents concerned EVI. Based on the comments in the surveys, domestic violence did not seem to be a major problem in the camps and only three forms said there were problems with missing or stolen ration cards or deleted names. Most of these issues seemed to be resolved using the refugee administrative structures along with UNHCR.

88. Several of the comments under the question about protection incidents involving EVIs stated that, although EVIs may be served first and/or have separate lines to receive their food, many had to give part of their ration or pay to have the food transported from the distribution area to their homes. Only one camp (Largo) seemed to have a well-organized system of transporting the food at no cost to the EVI's house; this was done as part of a community service programme by the IP in the camp.

### 4. Identification, Ration Cards and Registration

89. Based on the comments from the surveys and as noted in section I above, registration of refugees did not seem to be a major problem in the camps in Sierra Leone. Several survey forms mentioned that newborn babies were registered and included in the basic ration, although it sometime took some time. There were comments about problems of missing ration cards, but all said these issues were resolved by the refugee committee and UNHCR.

90. In one camp, there were some animated discussions during one of the general camp meetings about UNHCR's use of the computer to validate the number of people eligible for food. Several complained vehemently and requested that the computers be removed. This only proved that the registration system was working and was able to remove names of individuals or families who had returned to Liberia, or had settled outside the camps.

### 5. Gender

91. Based on the results of the responses from those interviewed in the camps, 100 percent of the responses stated that women/spouses were included on the ration cards and 100 percent confirmed that women participated in the food distribution. 68 percent of those participating in the surveys stated that they would like to have more women involved in the food distribution and gave reasons such as women were more sympathetic and understood the plight of the people, were more patient and cared more than men. Several of those surveyed also said the men had to participate in the food distribution as the bags were too heavy; only they could help unload the trucks.

92. Women played a significant role in the administration of the camps. The Evaluation Mission noted very dynamic women in senior positions in several of the camps. They seemed to have authority and the respect of the entire population. Their experience and skills should be utilized to train other women.



## 6. Training/Capacity Building

93. Although UNHCR has arranged protection-related training for the local authorities and police guarding the camps and works regularly with the refugee grievance committees in the camps, there did not appear to have been any joint workshops or trainings on protection with WFP staff or its partners. UNHCR has arranged training in Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV) with its partners, but again WFP and its partners were not involved.

94. There was a general interest on the part of the WFP and its Implementing Partners to understand the basic principles of protection training. In discussion with WFP it was felt that their field staff should also participate in basic protection training. As noted above, although WFP has arranged training of trainers in the core areas of Gender, HIV/AIDS, for its partners, there is significant scope to coordinate these workshops with UNHCR and include implementing partners of both agencies as well as the beneficiaries.

## 7. Other Issues Raised by the Refugees

95. Through the surveys there were several responses to the question about suggestions, complaints, lessons learned. Many requested an increase in the basic ration, particularly oil, and a return to the previous amount of bulgur wheat. Others requested that canned fish and meat be returned to the food basket; they had been distributed as a one-off donation during the Pilot Project. Several mentioned the lack of variety in the food basket, and asked that sugar be included, along with other condiments (several requested an increase in the amount of condiments; UNHCR provides 5 blocks of Maggi to each family every other month).

96. Several of the survey forms included "lessons learned" in their comments. Some of these were:

- appreciation for the greater involvement of the refugees in the food distribution;
- improved distribution due to construction of warehouses and covered distribution areas;
- improved verification of beneficiaries with the use of two photos (although not all were happy with this innovation; see above).

97. One group commented that UNHCR should verify the ration cards, but the camp management should provide the tokens used in each distribution. Two groups actually stated they were satisfied with the "service" in food distribution.



## IV. Concluding Remarks and Lessons Learned

### Introduction

98. The Evaluation Mission has been asked to identify Lessons Learned and Best Practices for each country case study. Although no specific recommendations on the continuation of the Pilot Project are to be made, the main Conclusions and Lessons Learned for Sierra Leone are summarized below for each of the three main topics.

### Cost and Logistics

- The date set for the Pilot Project to become effective was also the date set to cancel the existing food pipeline arrangements involving four different “Food Pipeline Agencies.” At the request of donors WFP was retained as sole agency responsible for organizing and operating the complete food pipeline from Freetown port to the 8 camps. This greatly enhanced the WFP logistics monitoring capabilities.
- Careful preliminary assessments of the IPs, logistics planning and preparatory work by both UNHCR and WFP preceded the implementation of the Pilot Project.
- In 5 out of 8 camps UNHCR and WFP chose one IP for both the food-aid management and distribution, and camp management. The overall recommendation was to have one partner in charge of both camp management and food distribution.
- All the contractual agreements have been reviewed and updated, however the need for tri- and quadripartite agreements was not always clear. Quadripartite agreements need some adjustment to avoid confusion and difficulties should a claim arise.
- The Pilot Project did not affect the food management and distribution costs; however the re-organization and streamlining of the road transport operations from port to the camps, by-passing the Kenema and Bo EDPs, and doing away with the secondary transport allowed for a cost saving of approximately \$20.00 US/MT.
- WFP initiated the construction of warehouses and covered distribution centers in all camps and standardized the storage, distribution and reporting systems in all camps.
- WFP's introduction of grinders for the bulgur wheat was a creative innovation which provided the beneficiaries with means to prepare their own food and avoid or minimize selling or trading their ration for grinding services. Unfortunately, no funds were available for the repair or replacement of these heavily used manual machines.
- UNHCR's monitoring of the refugee caseload figure is reliable, timely and extremely supportive of the WFP managed food distribution.
- The Pilot Project did not change staffing levels of either UN organization. Only the re-organization of the road transport resulted in a diminution of 7 WFP employees.
- The NFI procedures remained unchanged and no transfers of major assets took place between UNHCR and WFP.

### Management and Coordination

- The selection of Sierra Leone as one of the 5 countries included in the Pilot Project was successful due to the very good coordination between UNHCR and WFP under the full support of the two agency country directors and their Headquarters. This was key to streamlining the existing complicated systems to ensure effective food delivery to the refugees.
- Coordination existed before and only improved with the implementation of the Pilot Project. Adequate time was available to sensitize Government, Implementing Partners and the beneficiaries in the transition to WFP taking over the entire food distribution system.
- As noted above, the general observation was that a single agency responsible for both camp management and food distribution eliminated the need for Quadripartite Agreements and streamlined the coordination and management of refugee assistance.
- Both UN agencies need to review together the type and number of reports required and minimize duplication of reporting wherever possible.





- The participation of the beneficiaries, particularly women, was strengthened under the Pilot Project and their role in camp management, particularly food distribution and monitoring strengthened through regular elections and the development of Terms of References. These TORs can serve as models for other refugee food distribution situations in other countries.
- Cross fertilization between camps through the exchange of refugee camp administrations would provide training and help resolve problems in certain camps.
- Both refugees and the surrounding resident population participate in the food distribution (offloading and scooping.). The Post Distribution Monitoring reports proved key documents in providing information to the Joint Food Assessment Missions and determining any adjustments in the food basket.
- Training and capacity building of both UN agency staff, their counterparts and the beneficiaries are key to camp management and food distribution. Both UN agencies need to continue to work together to arrange workshops to explain the role of each agency, review the TORs of the camp management and Food Committees, with the newly elected refugee authorities, and ensure coordination in awareness campaigns for Gender, HIV/AIDs, SGBV.
- An in-country review of the revised MoU with the participation of both UN agencies, their partners and possibly Government counterparts was proposed for 2005.

### **Beneficiaries and Protection**

- The beneficiaries' perception of UNHCR as lead agency responsible for refugee protection and assistance did not change with the implementation of the Pilot Project; on the other hand, the role of WFP was clarified when it assumed responsibility as sole agency for food distribution to the refugee camps in Sierra Leone.
- Periodic briefings on the role of each UN agency as well as the IP should be continued, particularly following the election or change in the Executive and Food Committee staff.
- Attention to the EVI population, particularly where there is no system to deliver the food from the distribution center to the EVI dwelling needs to be strengthened in most of the camps; the need to sell or trade part of their ration to pay for the transport of the food to their homes needs to be addressed.
- Replacement for the grinders and a system to ensure continued operation and maintenance needs to be developed with the participation of the beneficiaries (see above).
- The role of women in camp administration and food distribution continued to be strengthened under the Pilot Project. Specific training and awareness campaigns coordinated by both UN agencies to encourage further participation of women should be continued and expanded.
- Training in basic protection for WFP and all partners working in the camps was identified by both agencies as a possible activity with UNHCR taking the lead role in organizing the workshops.



## Appendix 1

### Summary of Implementing Partners Camp Population and Food Figures as of September 2004

#	Camp	Population	Food Pipeline Agency <sup>22</sup>	Coordinating Partner <sup>23</sup>	Camp Manager <sup>24</sup>
1	Taiama	6,038	CARE	WVI	African Concern
2	Largo	6,592	CRS	CRS	CRS
3	Gerihun	5,300	WFP	ADDO	IRC
4	Jembe	6,805	WFP	ADDO	NRC/ADDO (after 03/03)
5	Gondama	8,050	WVI	WVI	Bo Pujehun Dev. Assoc.
6	Jimmi Bagbor	5,612	WVI	PWJ	PWJ
7	Bandajuma	3,678	CRS	PWJ	PWJ
8	Tobanda	6,240	WFP	LWF	LWF
	<b>Total</b>	<b>48,315</b>			

<sup>22</sup> Food Pipeline Agency (FPA) up to March 2003, then WFP took over all food delivery

<sup>23</sup> Coordinating Partners (CP) under contract with WFP March 2003

<sup>24</sup> Camp Manager (CM) under contract with UNHCR



WFP-UNHCR Joint Evaluation of the Pilot Food Distribution Projects – Full Report

**Appendix 2 - Breakdown of the Port Transit, Long Distance and Secondary Transport, Handling and Distribution Costs<sup>25</sup>**

Cost Component	Year 2002 and Jan – Feb 2003 4 Food Pipeline Agencies via EDP/upcountry depots (1)			Mar – Dec 2003 via EDP (2)	Jan – Aug 2004 via EDP (3)	Since Sep 2004 Direct (4)
	WFP	CRS	WVI	WFP	WFP	WFP
<b>Food Pipe Line Agent.</b>						
Container Handling	-	-	-	4.70	3.76	3.76
Documentation fee	2.35	2.35	2.35	2.90	3.06	3.76
Container Inspection fee	-	-	-	-	0.47	0.47
Port Handling	5.40	3.50	3.50	5.40	6.26	6.26
Warehouse discharging	1.25	1.50	1.50	1.46	2.24	2.24
Warehouse loading	1.25	1.50	1.50	1.46	2.24	2.24
Fumigation and reconditioning	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50
Road transport						
Port to EDP (Bo)(5/8 of commercial rate ) (5)	14.06	40.00	44.00	15.00	15.00	-
Port to EDP (Kenema)(3/8 of commercial rate ) (5)	10.31	-	-	10.50	10.50	-
EDP to camps (WFP fleet or Commercial trucks)	31.84	22.00	20.00	20.20	20.20	-
Port to camps (Commercial transport) (6)	-	-	-	-	-	28.00
EDP handling (offloading)	1.25	0.75	0.75	1.46	2.24	-
EDP handling (loading)	1.25	0.75	0.75	1.46	2.24	-
Distribution by appointed IP	17.00	17.00	17.00	21.00	20.03	20.03
<b>Total</b>	<b>86.46</b>	<b>89.85</b>	<b>86.04</b>	<b>86.04</b>	<b>88.74</b>	<b>66.56</b>

- (1) Period before the Pilot Project became effective. The food pipeline from Freetown port to the camps was entrusted to 4 different Food Pipeline Agencies. Food is routed via upcountry depots operated by the 4 Food Pipeline Agencies. (CARE, CRS, WVI and WFP).
- (2) From 01/03/2003 till 31/12/2003 WFP is the sole Food Pipeline Agent. Distribution in the camps is carried out by WFP appointed IPs. Food is routed via the WFP EDPs in Bo and Kenema.
- (3) From 01/01/2004 till 31/08/2004 WFP is the sole Food Pipeline Agent. Distribution in the camps is carried out by WFP appointed IPs. Food is routed via WFP EDPs in Bo and Kenema.
- (4) From September 2004 onwards. WFP is the sole Food Pipeline Agent. Distribution in the camps is carried out by WFP appointed IPS. Food is routed direct from WFP Freetown port EDP with commercial haulers to the FDPs inside the camp.
- (5) For WFP the commercial transport rate is apportioned: 5/8 for Bo EDP and 3/8 for Kenema EDP.
- (6) Average commercial rate between Freetown port and the 8 camps.

<sup>25</sup> All figures in US\$ per MT

**Appendix 3 - Survey Results of Discussions with the Beneficiaries**

Refugee Camps: 8 in Sierra Leone

Gender of Interviewee/s: Male: 9; Female: 19; Mixed: 11

Total Groups interviewed: 39 from 8/8 camps

	<b>Questions for Discussion</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>Don't Know</b>	<b>Comments/Remarks/Observations</b>
1	Are the beneficiaries aware of the change in the food distribution from UNHCR to WFP?	10%	4	32	3	A summary of the general comments, remarks and observations is included in section III of the text.
	Do they understand the role of the two agencies?	100%	39			
	Who is the Implementing Partner and are they aware of its role/responsibilities?	95%	36	1	1	
	Is their coordination of delivery of food and non-food items? Are the refugees aware of who delivers what?	94%	32	2		
2	Are the refugees aware of the community structure and communication channels for food distribution? Are there food committees? Who represents them? Percent of women on the food committees?	100%	38			
	Are they aware of the basic ration and do they receive it?	100%	37		1	
	If not, do they complain and if so to whom? What was the result of their complaint?					



	Questions for Discussion	%	Yes	No	Don't Know	Comments/Remarks/Observations
3	Do women participate in the distribution? Percent of women employed as scoopers? Monitors?	100%	38			A summary of the general comments, remarks and observations is included in section III of the text.
	Would they prefer to have more women involved?	68%	26	12		
	Are women/spouses included on the ration cards? Percent of women collecting food?	100%	38			
	Have the distribution points changed to make it easier to take the food home?	100%	38			
	Has packaging changed to facilitate transport?					
4	Do all members of the family have access to food?	97%	37	1		
	Are they aware of or ever reported/been involved in security or protection incidents related to food?	57%	21	16		
	To whom would they turn to complain or report Protection Issues					
	Are there specific protection problems that relate to women?	5%	2	33	2	
	SBGV protection issues related to food distribution? Are there protection issues for the EVI related to food distribution?	72%	23			
5	Any suggestions, complaints, recommendations, or Lessons Learned regarding the food distribution system either before under UNHCR or now under WFP?					





# Case Study No 3 - Uganda

(17 November - 01 December 2004)







# Acronyms

AAH	Aktion Afrika Hilfe
ACORD	Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development
AHA	Uganda NGO
CD	Country Director
CO	Country Office
COMPAS	Commodity Movement Processing and Analysis System
DED	German NGO
DSC	Direct Support Costs
EDP	Extended Delivery Point
EM	Evaluation Mission
EMOP	Emergency Operation
EVI	Extremely Vulnerable Individuals
FBM	Food Basket Monitoring
FDP	Final Delivery Point
FNA	Food Needs Assessment
GOU	Government of Uganda
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IP	Implementing Partner
IRC	International Rescue Committee
ISC	Indirect Support Costs
JA	Joint Agreement
JAM	Joint Assessment Mission
JFAM	Joint Food Assessment Mission
JPA	Joint Plan of Action
Kcal	Kilocalorie
LOU	Letter of Understanding
LTSH	Landside Transport, Storage and Handling
LWF	Lutheran World Federation
M & E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MCH	Mother and Child Health
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MT	Metric Ton
NFI	Non-food Items
NGO	Non governmental Organization
OCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OPM	Office of the Prime Minister
PDM	Post Distribution Monitoring
PRRO	Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation
RWC	Refugee Welfare Committee
SGBV	Sexual and Gender Based Violence
SFP	Supplementary Feeding Programme
SRS	Self Reliance Strategy
TA	Tripartite Agreement
TFP	Therapeutic Feeding Programme)
TOR	Terms of Reference
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme



UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
URCS	Uganda Red Cross Society
USD	US Dollars
VAM	Vulnerability Analysis land Mapping
WB	World Bank
WFP	World Food Programme



# Table of Contents

<b>Executive Summary</b>	<b>v</b>
<b>Introduction</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Background</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>I. Cost and Logistics</b>	<b>5</b>
1. Introduction	5
2. Logistics	5
3. The Pilot Project and the Tripartite Contractual Agreements	6
4. The Total Cost of the Food Distribution Operation	7
a. The Cost for Managing the EDP Warehouses and Distributing the Food-aid	7
b. The Cost of the Secondary Transport	8
c. Conclusion	8
5. The Importance of Accurate Caseload Figures	9
6. The Pilot Project and Staffing	9
7. The Pilot Project and the Transfer of Assets	10
8. The Handling of NFI	10
<b>II. Management and Coordination</b>	<b>12</b>
1. Introduction	12
a. Coordination between the UN Agencies	12
b. With Government	13
c. With Implementing Partners	13
d. With Beneficiaries	14
2. Monitoring	14
3. Reporting	15
4. Training/Capacity Building	15
<b>III. Beneficiaries and Protection</b>	<b>16</b>
1. Introduction	16
2. Participation and Perception of the Beneficiaries	16
3. Protection and Food Delivery	17
4. Identification, Ration Cards and Registration	17
5. Gender	18
6. Training/Capacity Building	18
7. Other Issues Raised by the Refugees	18



#### **IV. Concluding Remarks and Lessons Learned**

20

##### **Appendices**

- Appendix 1 Summary of WFP/UNHCR Implementing Partners for Food Distribution from April 2003
- Appendix 2 Summary of Uganda Settlement Details as of September 2004
- Appendix 3 Survey Results of Discussions with the Beneficiaries



## Executive Summary

The World Food Programme (WFP) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) work together providing humanitarian assistance to refugees and displaced persons. This collaboration was strengthened with the signing of a revised Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in July 2002. Through this document both agencies agreed that, on a pilot basis, WFP would take over the responsibility for the entire food distribution programme in 5 countries, and that after one year of implementation, an evaluation would be undertaken for each of the 5 pilot projects.

This case study of Uganda is the second of the five evaluations written by two consultants recruited by both WFP and UNHCR and follows the Terms of Reference and methodology prepared jointly by the two UN agencies. The case study for Uganda builds on the systems and framework established in the Pakistan study and focuses on three key issues outlined in the Terms of Reference: Cost and Logistics; Management and Coordination; and Beneficiaries Perspective and Protection. The key findings for Uganda are described in the text of the document and summarized in the Concluding Remarks and Lessons Learned at the end of the study.

Based on the results of the Pilot Project implemented in Uganda, there was very little apparent change in the food distribution system when UNHCR handed over the secondary transport from the Extended Delivery Point to the Final Delivery Point to WFP. The Implementing Partners remained the same. The effective transfer had minimal effect on the beneficiaries' perception of WFP as the agency responsible for food distribution, and little effect on their overall understanding that UNHCR is the lead agency for their protection. The pilot project supported the latest MoU and strengthened interagency cooperation and management.

The Evaluation Mission would like to thank the staff of WFP and UNHCR in the Uganda country offices for their cooperation and assistance in providing information on the transfer of the food distribution from UNHCR to WFP through the Pilot Project implemented in 2003-2004. The Evaluation Mission also notes with appreciation the valuable contribution made by the Government of Uganda and the Implementing Partners. Finally, the case study for Uganda could not have been undertaken without the support and contribution from the refugees who, through their elected Refugee Welfare Committees and Food Management Committees, participated in the food distribution and benefit from the assistance.





## Introduction<sup>26</sup>

1. The Memorandum of Understanding signed by the World Food Programme and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (WFP-UNHCR) in July, 2002 proposed that Pilot Projects be established in five countries where UNHCR handed over full responsibility of food distribution to WFP. Pilot food distribution projects were initiated in Pakistan in 2003, followed by similar projects in Uganda, Sierra Leone, Kenya and Zambia. Based on this, a Joint Food Distribution Evaluation Mission was set up to prepare the 5 country case studies.

2. The joint Evaluation Mission (EM) consists of two consultants selected by both UN agencies. The mission commenced its work with a week of briefings in the Headquarters of WFP in Rome and UNHCR in Geneva (6-9 July 2004,) followed by a visit to Pakistan from 11 -25<sup>th</sup> of July 2004. Representatives from UNHCR and WFP Evaluation Units in Headquarters joined the mission for the first week in Pakistan. A draft report for the Pakistan case study was circulated in September. The mission traveled to Uganda and Sierra Leone in October and November, 2004; it is scheduled to visit Kenya and Zambia in 2005.

3. Following the Terms of Reference (TOR) and evaluation methodology, the evaluation mission gathered country specific information, using the basic systems and framework established in Pakistan. Although no specific recommendations will be made on whether the pilot food distribution project should be extended, the case studies summarize the lessons learned, and identify best practices, common themes as well as unique characteristics of food distribution in the 5 countries.

4. This case study of Uganda is the second of the five country reports on the Pilot Food Distribution Projects and follows the draft study prepared for Pakistan. Although the Evaluation Mission visited Sierra Leone before Uganda, it was agreed that, given the complexity of the Uganda situation, the case study for Uganda would be prepared before that of Sierra Leone. This report on Uganda follows the outline of the Pakistan case study, and focuses on the three main issues outlined in the Terms of Reference; i.e.

- Cost and Logistics Considerations
- Management and Coordination
- Beneficiaries' Perspective and Protection

5. Before reviewing the three issues above, a Background section outlines the situation in Uganda and some of the unique characteristics of the pilot food distribution project there. This includes a summary of the Government of Uganda's Self-Reliance Strategy (SRS,) the Registration of the refugees, and the Semi-Malawi Food Distribution system which is used in all of the settlements.

---

<sup>26</sup> Consultants: Mitchell L. Carlson and Francois de Meulder



## **Background**

### **1. Introduction**

6. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the World Food Programme (WFP) work closely together to provide humanitarian assistance to refugees around the world. The former is the lead UN agency responsible for refugee protection and assistance, while WFP provides food to refugees, internally displaced and vulnerable populations. The two agencies have signed several Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) over the years (1985, 1994, 1997,) and most recently in 2002.

7. Up until the last revised MOU, WFP was responsible for the procurement and delivery of the food from the port to the Extended Delivery Point (EDP,) and then handing over to UNHCR, who was responsible for the secondary transport and the final distribution of the food to the refugees. UNHCR's Implementing Partners (IPs) collected the food from the EDPs to distribute to the beneficiaries.

8. With the revision of the global MOU signed by the Heads of the two UN organizations in July 2002, both agencies agreed that on a pilot basis, WFP would take over responsibility of the entire food distribution process, including the secondary transport from the EDP to the final delivery point (FDP.) Uganda was selected as one of the five countries where the pilot project was to be implemented.

9. The pilot project in Uganda was initiated the first of April 2003 following several meetings and discussions between the two country offices of UNHCR and WFP, a joint field assessment to review the "modalities for the transfer of secondary transport and food distribution responsibilities," and a regional workshop held in Nairobi in early February 2003 which reviewed policy and operational issues including the latest revisions to the MoU. A joint workplan was prepared at the country level and shared with the field offices of both agencies.

### **2. Uganda and its Self-reliance Strategy**

10. The refugee situation in Uganda is unusual for a variety of reasons. Uganda has served as a country of asylum for refugees from all neighboring countries, and different ethnic groups starting as early as 1959. Today, the majority of the refugees are from Sudan, but there are also significant numbers from Rwanda, as well as refugees from Burundi, Somalia, Congo, and Kenya. Many of the present caseload have been in Uganda since at least 1994.

11. The Uganda government has taken a very unique approach to assisting the refugees. A special section of the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) was created to address refugee issues (as well as Internally displaced and emergencies). The Government proclaimed a "Self Reliance Strategy" (SRS), where Uganda provides the refugees with land for cultivation. UNHCR and WFP support the Government's SRS strategy, where refugees are housed in settlements, not closed camps. The two UN agencies work with the Government to assess production twice a year, and depending on the crop yield in each settlement, adjust the food ration to reflect the crops grown by the refugees. Over the years, refugees living in some of the settlements have become self-reliant, and have been taken off the food ration.

### **3. Registration**

12. According to the revised MoU, registration of the refugees and the issuing of food ration cards is the responsibility of UNHCR in cooperation with the OPM. UNHCR is to maintain the data base and issue food ration cards. Food ration cards are important documents not only for food but also for access to health services, education, distribution of NFI, etc. They also serve as an identification document.

13. With the implementation of the Pilot Project where WFP was responsible for the final distribution of food to the refugees, WFP needs accurate population figures to determine the quantity of food to deliver. WFP and the IPs use the registration information provided by UNHCR to determine the number of refugees eligible for food in each settlement.





14. The last general registration of refugees took place in May-June of 2003. Refugees residing in the settlements were revalidated and new ration cards issued. New arrivals are screened by OPM for refugee status, and if approved are issued food ration cards. In theory, adjustments are made for registration of new born children, newly married couples, family reunion cases, etc.

15. The status of the registration process varies with each region in Uganda. Registration has been complicated and adjustments delayed, particularly east of the Nile River in the north, due to security incidents which caused the displacement of refugees from their settlements. This in turn has required that the displaced refugees be put back on the 100 percent food ration again. Registration in the north is out of date; new born babies have not been registered, and the settlement population and the food figures do not match. With the implementation of the Pilot Project and its responsibility for final distribution, WFP has taken a strong interest in the registration and has questioned the accuracy of the population figures. Discrepancy in the figures and disagreements with UNHCR at the field level have created confusion with the IP and delayed food delivery to some of the settlements in the north.

16. On the other hand, a pilot re-registration exercise is ongoing in the south using UNHCR's new computer software programme "Progress or Profile." This registration includes all new born babies, takes photos of all family members, and updates the population figures for each settlement. Although in its early stages, UNHCR already estimates that the number of refugees registered in some settlements could decrease by some 20 percent.

17. Unfortunately, UNHCR does not have funding to extend the re-registration to the rest of the country, particularly the north where it is so desperately needed. Although not directly linked to the pilot project, registration is key to both UNHCR, for repatriation which is to take place next year, and for WFP to ensure adequate food supplies are delivered to a registered population.

#### **4. The Semi Malawi Food Distribution System**

18. Food distribution in Uganda is done through the "semi Malawi" system. This system was introduced before the pilot project was initiated, but has continued through the pilot phase. The semi Malawi system emphasizes the role of the refugees in the food distribution process, and encourages their participation in the distribution of the food.

19. Participation of the refugees, particularly women, in the distribution of food is a key component of both the UNHCR and WFP assistance strategy and is included in the revised MoU. Both agencies have supported the creation of elected "Refugee Welfare Committees (RWCs) in each settlement with the representation and participation of women a key element of these administrative structures. With assistance from OPM, the roles and responsibilities of the RWCs have been delineated. Food distribution is one of the tasks of the RWC and its Food Management Committee delivery of the food for each group. Women participate both as members of the Food Management Committees as well as in the direct distribution of food.

20. As per the Self Reliance Strategy outlined above, food assistance varies according to the settlement, the number of years a refugee has lived in Uganda, the amount and quality of land available, etc. Crop yield assessments (CYA) are undertaken twice a year by implementing partners funded by UNHCR. Information gathered through the CYA is combined with other data from nutrition surveys, food assessments and analyzed in the Joint Assessment Mission (JAM). The JAM makes recommendations on whether to increase, reduce or maintain the basic ration for each settlement.

21. During the pilot phase of the food distribution project in Uganda, food was provided to nearly 143,000 refugees residing in 11 settlements scattered in 8 districts along the western half of the country. Out of this total refugee population only 67 percent of the refugees are receiving some level of food assistance. Food assistance varies across a wide spectrum depending on a variety of factors including length of stay, availability and fertility of land, crop yields, etc. While some refugee have been taken off food assistance, others receive 25, 50, or 80 percent of the basic ration.



22. Food rations are also adjusted for households with special circumstances. Extremely vulnerable individuals (EVIs) receive 100 percent ration. Those classified as EVIs are screened by UNHCR, WFP, the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) and the Implementing Partners (IPs.) New arrivals are screened by OPM and registered by UNHCR as outlined above. They receive full ration for the first two years they reside in Uganda, but as part of the Government's SRS strategy, are subject to reduced rations after this initial period.



## I. Cost and Logistics

### 1. Introduction

23. At the start the Pilot Project in Uganda on the 1<sup>st</sup> of April 2003 food distribution some 213,000 refugees<sup>27</sup> took place on a monthly basis in 11 different settlements located in 8 districts. The total tonnage of food-aid distributed averages between 24,000 - 27,000 MT over a 12 month period, or some 2,100 MT a month period.

24. The implementation of the Pilot project in Uganda only concerns the last link in the transport and distribution chain. It is this latter stage of the food pipeline which, was transferred from UNHCR to WFP under the terms of the July 2002 MOU on the 1<sup>st</sup> of April 2003 and is the focus of this section of the study.

### 2. Logistics

25. The Pilot project did not modify the food-aid pipeline from point of origin to the receipt of the commodities inside the EDPs. WFP remained solely in charge of this phase of the operation. The final distribution of food to refugees, from the EDP to the settlements, is comprised of two distinct operations:

- The secondary road transport from the EDPs to the FDPs inside the settlements;
- The final physical distribution of the food commodities to the beneficiaries.

26. Before April 2003, these two distinct operations were the responsibility of UNHCR; with the inception of the pilot project, they were transferred to WFP. Through continued close cooperation both UNHCR and WFP chose to use the same IPs for both the management of the EDPs and the organization of the food distribution in the settlements (UNHCR uses the same IPs for camp management as well). The table in Appendix 1 summaries the implementing partners (IPs) retained by both UNHCR and WFP for the management of the EDP and the distribution of food commodities from April 2003 to date.

27. Using the same IP for both the EDP and final distribution enhanced the continuity of the food distribution operation; consequently the management of the stocks inside the EDPs and the organization of the food distribution in the settlements were not altered with the Pilot Project coming on line. Both operations continued to be carried out by the same IPs maintaining the same staff in the EDPs and in the settlements. Consequently the implementation of the Pilot Project did not cause any disruption, in fact, the practical aspects of the food distribution remained unchanged in terms of:

- Participation of the food management committees (FMCs);
- Involvement of the Refugees Welfare Committees (RWCs);
- Application of the semi-Malawian distribution method in force throughout the settlements since December 2001;
- Involvement and participation of refugees, women, EVIs etc. in the food distribution;
- Handling of complaints and claims, if any;
- Monitoring the distribution operations by the OPM, UNHCR, WFP and IP.

28. With the Pilot Project the secondary transport did change; UNHCR handed over this responsibility to WFP in April 2003. As a part of this, WFP was given the operational and financial responsibility of six trucks from the UNHCR fleet. Additional transport capacity is provided by WFP allocating extra trucks from its own Kampala fleet.

29. From the beneficiaries and an outsider's perspective, the changes in the logistics were minimal and hardly noticeable, save that in a few settlements the familiar UNHCR trucks were replaced by WFP trucks (see section III below). From UNHCR and WFP management's point of view, the Pilot Project brought about significant changes in terms of:

- The Tripartite contractual arrangements between UNHCR, WFP and the IPs;
- The total costs of the distribution operations;
- The need for accurate caseload figures.

30. No food aid pipeline breaks or major logistics failures were encountered during the period under review. There were some delays in distribution however, due to confusion over the population figures which led to

<sup>27</sup> JAM final report May 2003.



postponements in delivery, disrupting the 30 day distribution cycle (see section III for details). Furthermore, the buffer stocks kept by WFP in the EDPs are apparently not as large as when UNHCR was responsible for the final distribution of food aid. Finally, many of the trucks UNHCR provided to WFP are in poor condition, often breakdown and require frequent service; this has disrupted food distribution and delayed delivery.

31. It was reported that, as a result of poor communication between the IP (IRC), WFP and UNHCR in Kiryandongo settlement, the October 2004 food distribution was skipped. The absence of a WFP and UNHCR representative on site was pinpointed as one reason for this mishap. It appears that various fail-safe trigger mechanisms did not work as planned for a variety of administrative reasons and no food was delivered. Even though the caseload of beneficiaries is minimal (475 beneficiaries who were primarily EVIs,) this mishap highlights the necessity to ensure accurate communication between the two UN agencies, Government and Implementing Partners, and between the camps and the country offices so that food deliveries take place as planned and the beneficiaries receive their basic ration.

### 3. The Pilot Project and the Tripartite Contractual Agreements

32. Before the start of the Pilot Project where WFP was responsible for the management of the EDP warehousing facilities, and UNHCR responsible for the final distribution, a Tripartite Agreement was signed between the two UN agencies and the IP. This trilateral approach for a single agreement for the management of the EDPs and the physical distribution of the food in the settlements was fully justified.

33. During the period under review 2002-2004, the content of these formal Tripartite Agreements remained almost unchanged. Considering that the Pilot Project came into force in April 2003 some paragraphs of these agreements seem slightly out of step. In this respect it is interesting to note the following:

- a. Paragraph 1.1 of the Tripartite Agreements concluded during the years 2002-2004 specifies *“The final distribution of food commodities will be normally the responsibility of the implementing partner of UNHCR.”* From 2003 onwards this sentence is qualified in the Tripartite Agreements as follows; *“(except in those countries selected for the pilot activities mentioned in article 5.8)”* which refers to the July 2002 MOU and therefore applies to Uganda. The exact meaning of this sentence is further elaborated in paragraphs 1.2 and 1.3.
- b. In the Tripartite Agreements signed from April 2003 onwards, paragraph 1.3 specifies; *“In Uganda it has been agreed between the WFP/UNHCR country team that WFP will take over the management of specified food storage facilities, including the maintenance cost.”* As a matter of fact, the responsibility for running the EDPs has long been vested with WFP. It was the responsibility for transporting the food from the EDPs to the FDPs and the final distribution of food to the beneficiaries which the Pilot Project shifted from UNHCR to WFP.
- c. The content of paragraph 4.3 in the Tripartite Agreements signed during the three years 2002-2004, setting out the duties of the IP has remained identical: *“The partner will receive, store, handle and dispatch the commodities at the Extended Delivery Point (EDP,) will transport the commodities from the EDP to Final Delivery Point (FDP,) and will carry out the final distribution to the target beneficiaries.”* The enumeration of services to be extended by the IP is complete and correct, but the paragraph makes no mention of the changes which took place when the Pilot Project came into force; it is not clear for which UN agency the IP is providing services.
- d. Paragraphs 4.15 and 4.16 in the 2002 Tripartite Agreement, and paragraphs 4.17 and 4.18 in the 2003 and 2004 Tripartite Agreements, relate to the services to be provided by the IP for WFP and the applicable fixed or variable rates. Here again none of these paragraphs refer to the distribution of duties and responsibilities between WFP and UNHCR vis-à-vis the IP. Only a close analysis of the attached budget schedule will give an idea of the exact range of services the IP is to provide under the Tripartite Agreement.



34. Under the MoU and the Pilot Project in Uganda, WFP through its partners, was clearly responsible for the management of the EDP, the road transport and the final distribution of food commodities. This would therefore suggest that a bilateral agreement could be signed between WFP and the IP jointly selected by the two UN agencies (this was the case in Pakistan for the contracts signed the year following the Pilot Project). Such bilateral agreements could still be countersigned by UNHCR for coordination or as a witness. It could not be ascertained the exact reasons why a Tripartite Agreement was preferred over a Bilateral Agreement, after the initial one year of the Pilot Project; the latter offers the advantage of setting out more clearly, the responsibilities and duties of the two parties involved, WFP and the IP.

35. The hybrid mode of remuneration to the IP for the services provided has not been modified with the implementation of the Pilot Project. As in the past the IP's remuneration is partly calculated on a fixed budget basis and partly on a fixed rate per ton basis. Under this system the IP is expected to submit invoices complete with the necessary supporting documentation duly approved by the WFP field offices, according to the agreed budget. The Pilot Project was not seen as an opportunity to opt for a more manageable and transparent remuneration system, exclusively based on a fixed rate per ton of food commodities distributed, which would minimize administrative procedures for both WFP and IP.

#### 4. The Total Cost of the Food Distribution Operation

36. Knowing that the Pilot Project was conducted on a trial basis, it is important to measure, if at all possible, the impact the project may have had on the distribution costs. Unfortunately the structure of the UNHCR budget and accounting reports did not permit in the short time imparted to the mission, the extraction of the exact costs UNHCR had to support before the 1<sup>st</sup> of April 2003 for the secondary transport and the physical distribution of the food. Using the Tripartite Agreements (complete with budget figures) concluded between UNHCR/WFP and the IPS over the years 2002, 2003 and 2004 supplemented by the annual WFP comparative co-operating partner budget analysis, it is possible to gauge the impact of the Pilot Project on the various costs supported by UNHCR and subsequently by WFP as summarized in the table below.

##### a. The Cost for Managing the EDP Warehouses and Distributing the Food-aid

Year	Period in Months	IP	Services Contracted	Planned tonnage in MT	Total Budget in US\$	Cost/MT to WFP (US\$)
2002 <sup>28</sup>	12	AAH	Management of EDP in Palorinya (Moyo)	2,392	\$58.450	\$24.43
2002	12	URCS	Management of EDP in Nakivale & Oruchinga (Mbarara)	2,990	39.650	13.26
2002	5	LWF	Management of EDP in Pakelle (Adjumani)	3,304	50.667	15.33
2003/4	12	All IPs	Management of EDPs and final distribution in all 11 settlements	27,239	520.113	19.09
2004/5	12	All IPs	Management of EDPs and final distribution in all 11 settlements	26,637	611.789	22.92

37. The cost per ton indicated for 2002 relates only to the management of the EDP (storekeeping). For 2003 and 2004 the cost per MT relates to both the EDP management and the physical food distribution inside the settlements. The management and distribution cost recorded against each settlement fluctuates within a fairly large margin. The large number of distribution points in some settlements explains this variation.

38. The difference in cost per ton between the years 2002 and 2003 reflects in theory the additional cost to WFP from the 1<sup>st</sup> of April 2003 for the actual distribution of food in the settlements. While exercising the greatest caution when extrapolating between the available costing figures, one may reasonably assume that the distribution cost in the settlements is between \$5-6 USD/MT. This figure can be considered as commensurate to the additional services contracted by WFP with the various IPs.

<sup>28</sup> For 2002, the indicative budgetary figures of only 4 out of 11 settlements were available.



39. It is also interesting to note that the final distribution cost per MT (\$19.09 US/MT in 2003/4 and \$22.92 US in 2004/5) includes approximately \$2.00 US per ton listed in the budget as “one-off costs” such as the purchase of IT equipment, bicycles and motorcycles, the building of offices and staff houses, etc. Some IPs receive cash to purchase the equipment, while others receive the equipment in kind.

40. From the limited costing figures available it is not possible to determine accurately the impact of the Pilot Project on the costs. From the figures at hand one may reasonably assume however, that the distribution costs remained equal before and after the 1<sup>st</sup> April 2003. The cost for WFP increased between \$5-6 US/MT. It could not be verified however whether this increase was matched by an equal decrease in cost for UNHCR.

#### **b. The Cost of the Secondary Transport**

41. It was not possible to determine the precise costs UNHCR paid for the secondary transport of food aid prior to the 1<sup>st</sup> of April 2004 nor to extract the relevant figures from the UNHCR budgets; the analytical accounting figures were either too scanty or incomplete. There is however an indication that for the 8 UNHCR trucks based in Adjumani and Moyo district a total cost of \$82,194 US (excluding depreciation) was recorded for the year 2001. Assuming a 70 percent fleet utilization for food-aid distribution activities with a total volume of 14,000 MT carried into the settlements, the secondary transport cost per ton works out at approximately \$4.10 US/MT. Such reasoning calls for caution, however.

42. UNHCR trucks: After the 1<sup>st</sup> of April 2003 WFP paid for the operation and maintenance of the fleet of 6 trucks ceded by UNHCR. WFP paid initially a rate of \$0.16 US per MT/KM to LWF and DED exclusive of fuel costs for the maintenance and servicing of the trucks. This rate was subsequently revised and increased to \$0.176 US per MT/KM. On this basis and compiling the transport statistics for LWF and DED over the period April 2003 to August 2004, the secondary transport in Adjumani, Moyo and Arua districts amounts to \$5.28 US/MT including the fuel cost<sup>29</sup>.

43. WFP trucks: WFP Kampala transport division allocates IVECO type trucks as and when required for distribution operations to refugees in the districts of Mbarara, Kyenjojo, Masindi and Arua. The WFP Kampala transport division keeps accurate costing figures for their fleet; according to the statistical data the total cost per MT/KM including fuel, but excluding depreciation, amounts to \$0.14 US. On the basis of 15 MT payload per voyage over an average distance of 30 kms. the cost per MT amounts to \$4.20 US per MT inclusive fuel cost<sup>30</sup>. The rate of \$0.14 US per MT/KM is no doubt favorably influenced by the economy of scale achieved with the much larger WFP School feeding programme using the same type of trucks. The final cost per ton for the secondary transport under the Pilot Project must therefore come closer to \$5.00 US per MT inclusive of fuel cost. This figure is comparable with the costs recorded for the UNHCR trucks operating in the Northern districts.

#### **c. Conclusion**

44. Given the budget and accounting figures available it has not been possible to compare the cost of the operations first under the responsibility of UNHCR and then under WFP. It has been possible however, to establish that the additional cost for WFP since the 1st of April 2004 amounted to \$10-12 US per MT, as follows:

- Secondary transport with UNHCR donated trucks or with WFP trucks: +\$4-6.
- Final distribution of the food aid in the camps: + \$5 - 6 US.

45. For the period 01/04/2004 to 31/03/2005 this represents a price tag of approximately \$275,000 US. Since the onset of the Pilot Project the total cost price per ton from the time of receiving the food in the EDP to the final distribution to the beneficiaries ranges from \$24 to 26 US for the period 2003/2004 and from \$26 to 28 US for the period 2004/2005.

## **5. The Importance of Accurate Caseload Figures**

<sup>29</sup> Cost of Food Distribution (UNHCR/WFP Pilot project) period from April 2003 to August 2004 compiled by WFP Kampala Logistics Unit.

<sup>30</sup> Performance and cost analysis of trucks under the direct School feeding management – period January to December 2003 compiled by WFP Kampala Logistics Unit.



46. As noted in the Background section above the timely registration of refugees, the continuous updating of the refugees master database and the delivery of ration cards are core tasks of UNHCR. Accurate caseload figures are a prerequisite for the successful planning of any food distribution operation.

47. The content of paragraph 4.5 of the Tripartite Agreements has not been modified with the Pilot Project coming on line; its states inter alia: *"...The ordinary procedure is that the UNHCR Sub/Field office submits beneficiary figures to the WFP Sub/Field office. WFP establishes the food requirements and call forward of the food commodities from Kampala. WFP also notifies the Partner (IP) about the food requirements upon which the Partner prepares a distribution schedule to be submitted to UNHCR and WFP Sub/Field – offices..."*

48. Although the distribution of the various tasks set out in paragraph 4.5 of the Tripartite Agreement has remained unchanged, WFP has become much more directly concerned with the population figures since, as per the MoU and Pilot Project, WFP is responsible for the final distribution of food in the settlements. From two main stakeholders responsible for the final distribution before the Pilot Project, there are now three main stakeholders; UNHCR, the IP and now WFP. Therefore it is not uncommon for WFP to question the caseload figures.

49. Given difficulties in obtaining reliable beneficiary figures, WFP resorted to a two pronged approach. The first one is "top down" whereby either OPM or UNHCR inform WFP and/or the IP of any changes in the caseload due to births, deaths, departures or new arrivals. The second is "bottom-up" whereby one or two weeks before a distribution takes place, the various refugee group leaders together with the IP go through their respective food log (a list of refugees according to the family size and the cluster) to ascertain the accuracy of the log, checking the physical presence of the refugee and his family in the settlement and the existence and validity of the ration card.

50. Discrepancies or uncertainties in the population figures between UNHCR and WFP created confusion with the IPs and the refugee food management committees and invariably caused unnecessary delays in the food distribution. This explains, at least in part, why refugees perceive the distribution of food aid as having become much more irregular with the implementation of the Pilot Project (see section III).

51. As an example of this, food distribution was cancelled in the Adjumani/Pakelle settlement in July 2004 due to lack of accurate caseload figures. In the same settlement the November and December food distribution suffered undue delays for apparently the same reason. Moreover, this precarious situation was compounded by protracted discussions between UNHCR and WFP regarding the size of the food ration, particularly for the displaced, and whether to extend the food distribution to all the refugees (including those phased out from the food ration).

## **6. The Pilot Project and Staffing**

52. The transfer of the secondary transport and the final distribution activities from UNHCR to WFP was not translated into either a reduction in staff for UNHCR, or an increase for WFP; staffing levels remained virtually unchanged. The implementation of the Pilot Project, being merely limited to a few contractual and procedural changes, had very little effect on the workload of both the UNHCR and WFP field staff. If the Pilot Project happened to make some staff member redundant or superfluous (e.g. reduction of the UNHCR food distribution staff in some settlements,) they were promptly re-assigned to other duties or other locations.

53. The Tripartite Agreements states that with the Implementing Partners, UNHCR is responsible for Food Basket Monitoring (FBM,) and WFP is responsible for the Post-distribution monitoring (PDM). There seems to be some confusion in the field on monitoring responsibilities. Neither agency has enough staff to have a continual presence in all settlements. With the transition under the pilot project, some UNHCR field staff felt that WFP needs to strengthen its presence to ensure that the food distribution is done efficiently with appropriate monitoring (see section II below).



54. The activities of the IP remained exactly the same before and after the 1<sup>st</sup> of April 2004. None of the IP reported any decrease or increase in their staffing levels with the start of the Pilot Project. There was some concern in some settlements that the implementing partner responsible for food distribution, was also in charge of monitoring (see section II below).

55. With the responsibility for the secondary transport between the EDPs and the FDPs, WFP had to allocate 3-4 trucks for the days when food was distributed to the central and south-western settlements. This involved more work for the WFP Kampala transport division, but due to good planning, and careful allocation and monitoring of truck fleet and drivers, the extra demand for transport services was met with existing means. The transfer of UNHCR trucks to WFP in the Northern settlements did not require additional WFP staff; WFP provides wages for some mechanics and drivers through specific contractual and budgetary arrangements with the IP.

## 7. The Pilot Project and the Transfer of Assets

56. The Pilot Project did not result in the outright transfer of property assets between the two UN agencies. UNHCR did agree however, to transfer the "right of use" to WFP of six of its trucks based in the Arua, Moyo and Adjumani districts. The April 2003 Tripartite Agreement refers briefly in paragraph 1.3 to this arrangement specifying; "...It has further been agreed that WFP for the duration of the pilot project will take over the management of a specified number of UNHCR trucks, including the running cost. These trucks will provide secondary transport to some of the refugee locations ("the North"), while WFP trucks will facilitate secondary transport at the remaining locations ("the South-west")."

57. A Joint Field Assessment mission in January 2003 reviewed the practical modalities of transferring the secondary transport responsibility from UNHCR to WFP<sup>31</sup>. The initial proposal was to transfer 8 trucks from the UNHCR fleet to WFP; eventually only 6 UNHCR were made available to WFP. Despite the JFA mission, no formal agreement has been concluded between UNHCR and WFP setting out the precise terms and conditions for the utilization of the UNHCR trucks. The transfer of these trucks involves extensive administrative procedures on the part of UNHCR; the direct management of this fleet by WFP remains one of the unresolved issues almost 12 months after the Pilot Project came into force<sup>32</sup>.

58. The UNHCR trucks ceded to WFP under this Pilot Project have retained their UNHCR logos, tarps and markings. This confuses the refugees and their perception of the roles and responsibilities of each agency (see section III below) but also has political implications when the trucks are used to deliver food to Internally Displaced (IDPs,) and for other WFP projects like the national school-feeding programme which is not part of UNHCR's mandate. In addition, no arrangements have been made to replace the UNHCR almost life-expired trucks.

59. UNHCR still provides the EDP storage facilities at two of the 11 refugee settlements<sup>33</sup>. No formal agreement has been made regarding the right of use of this infrastructure. One senior UNHCR official indicated that if needed, two depots could be dismantled and transferred at short notice to South Sudan. The future use of these structures and their replacement if necessary needs to be reviewed by the two UN agencies.

## 8. The Handling on NFI

60. UNHCR procures non-food items (NFIs) and its Implementing Partners distribute these items (tarps, blankets, cooking pots, etc.) to the refugees upon arrival in the settlements. Due to funding constraints, UNHCR was not in a position to distribute NFIs at regular intervals in any of the settlements, even though the refugees repeatedly request replacement of worn out items (see section III below).

61. Some NFIs are distributed to the most needy however, following periodic surveys of the most vulnerable in each settlement. The procurement, distribution and monitoring of NFIs remains the sole responsibility of

<sup>31</sup> Joint Field Assessment (JFA). Recommendations on the practical modalities for the transfer of the secondary transport responsibility from UNHCR to WFP. 20 – 27 January 2003 (Chris Gad).

<sup>32</sup> WFP (Ken N. Davies, representative) letter 02/03/04 to UNHCR Kampala representative (Ms. Cynthia Burns).

<sup>33</sup> Kyaka II and Kiryandongo settlements two tin halls/PS capacity each 300 MT owned by UNHCR.





UNHCR; assistance or involvement of WFP in this respect is not expected nor required. Both UN agencies consider that the distribution of NFI is beyond the scope of the Pilot Project.



## II. Management and Coordination

### 1. Introduction

62. The latest revision of the MOU signed by the Heads of both agencies in July 2002 agreed to establish pilot projects in five countries under which WFP was to assume responsibility at its own cost for the final distribution of the basic ration to the refugees. The selection of Uganda as one of the five countries for the pilot was made at the Headquarters level; according to staff in the country offices, the decision to include Uganda was "imposed" more as a *fait accompli* than as a result of a discussion with the country offices.

63. The pilot phase involved management and coordination between the two UN agencies as well as with implementing partners, government and the beneficiaries. The following sections review the inter-relationship of the various partners during the implementation of the Pilot Project.

#### a. Coordination between the UN Agencies

64. Coordination between the two UN agency country offices was well established before the Pilot Project and relations only improved in the following months. Once Uganda was identified as one of the countries selected for the Pilot Project, both agencies undertook efforts, at somewhat short notice, to implement the transfer. This was facilitated by the continuation of the same implementing partners in food distribution and camp management. WFP and UNHCR worked together to review the MoU (regional meeting in Nairobi in February, 2003) and assess the capacity of existing Implementing Partners (January 2003) in food distribution.

65. The revised MoU calls for regular interagency coordination meetings to review the implementation of the Pilot Project. In Uganda, a joint work plan was prepared which outlines the major tasks of each agency and actions to be taken. Unlike Pakistan, no specific joint workplans were developed at the field office level, however.

66. Coordination meetings at the country office level were not scheduled on a regular basis but were called on as "as needed" basis. Coordination meetings in the field varied with each region. In the north, OPM chairs a monthly coordination meeting where refugees often participate. In the south, UNHCR chairs both the coordination and interagency meetings which review camp management, repatriation, security, etc. The interagency meetings often include both implementing as well as operational partners (those assisting refugees but not under contract with UNHCR), WFP and OPM attend both meetings.

67. Both UN agencies plus OPM, the IPs, and sometimes donors, participate in the Joint Assessment Missions (JAMS) which take place twice a year. The JAMS are critical to the Self-Reliance Strategy (SRS) as they determine the food ration will be maintained, reduced or increased for each settlement. The JAMS analyze information collected through the nutrition surveys, the crop yield assessments and the emergency food needs assessment. UNHCR has contracts with implementing partners working in the health sector to undertake nutrition surveys; they have also contracted NGOs to undertake crop yield assessments (CYA) to determine the level of agricultural production from the plots allocated to refugees.<sup>34</sup>

68. As noted in the Background and section I above, registration is key to the success of any refugee operation. The MoU states that registration is the responsibility of UNHCR and the Government, and that WFP should work closely with UNHCR to ensure accurate population figures are maintained. WFP has taken a keen interest in registration with the implementation of the Pilot Project and their responsibility for final distribution; accurate figures are required for the accurate delivery of any food aid.

69. Although the pilot re-registration is ongoing in the south and the number of registered refugees resident in the settlements is expected to decline, registration in the north particularly east of the Nile is out of date and complicated by the displacement of refugees from their settlement. WFP staff have questioned some of the population figures; this has created misunderstanding between the two UN agencies as well as confusion for the

<sup>34</sup> UNHCR has informed the Government and WFP that it will not be able to fund the CYA studies in 2005. WFP with support from the Government and donors needs to ensure that these studies continue to collect this crucial information for the JAMS so that the basic food needs of the refugees are met either through distribution or local cultivation as part of the SRS strategy.



implementing partners. With UNHCR's funding problems, both UNHCR and WFP need to seek donor support to ensure that the re-registration takes place throughout all the refugee settlements in Uganda.

70. The tension between the two agencies' field offices in the north has been compounded by the number of displaced, registration problems and the role the OPM commandant sees his office play in the coordination of refugee activities, and miscommunication between staff in the two agencies' field offices. Both UN agencies informed the Evaluation Mission that they will address the matter as soon as possible. Suggestions to improve the situation include:

- Clarification on the role of OPM in registration, particularly in the northern settlements;
- preparation of joint workplans by the WFP and UNHCR field offices in each district;
- periodic (quarterly?) meetings with field staff from both offices coming together to review practical issues.
- alternating the location of the meeting between districts to include field visits as well as discussions of particular problems, lessons learned, or best practices

#### **b. With Government**

71. Both UNHCR and WFP have legal agreements with the Government of Uganda, and the Government through its OPM officials based in each settlement provides security and monitors food distribution among other settlement activities. During discussions with the Evaluation Mission in Kampala, the Commissioner for the OPM reported that he was unaware of any MoU between the two UN agencies, but expressed interest in the outcome of the evaluation.

72. The role of the OPM in the settlements seemed to be interpreted differently by the OPM commandant in each district. In the north the OPM official stated that registration was the responsibility of the government, while in the south and central areas, the OPM officials oversee the overall management of the camps, liaise closely with UNHCR and WFP, and monitor the activities of the implementing partners and the RWC, with the understanding that UNHCR is the lead agency in charge of registration.

73. Given that registration is key to refugee assistance, not only food distribution under the Pilot Project, but other activities including repatriation, the re-registration of refugees needs to be undertaken as soon as possible, particularly in the north. As per above, the role of the OPM in registration in the north needs to be clarified and funding identified to extend the registration to other areas.

#### **c. With Implementing Partners**

74. Implementing partners were informed of the handover of the entire food distribution system from UNHCR to WFP through interagency meetings at the country office and field level. Selected IPs participated in the regional workshop in Nairobi to review the revised MoU. Both UNHCR and WFP undertook a joint assessment of the IPs involved in camp management/food distribution before the start of the Pilot Project and both agencies agreed that the same IPs involved in camp management would be responsible for food distribution.

75. Before the pilot project was implemented, Tripartite agreements were signed between WFP, UNHCR and the Implementing Partner (IP) covering two activities; the management of the EDP, and the secondary transport and final distribution of the food in the settlement. These Tripartite Agreements did not specify that the IP was responsible to WFP for the former, and UNHCR for the latter, but separate budgets were drawn up for each activity and paid for by the relevant UN agency. With the selection of Uganda as one of the five pilot projects, new Tripartite Agreements were drawn up with the IPs clearly responsible to WFP for food distribution. UNHCR had separate bilateral agreements with the same IP for camp management (see section I).

76. The two UN agencies issue contracts covering different time periods; UNHCR contracts on a calendar year basis, and WFP following the dates of the PRRO. This did not appear to be a major issue among the implementing partners, however.

77. The Implementing Partners (IPs) in charge of food and camp management often hold pre-distribution meetings with the Refugee Welfare Committee (RWC). These are to prepare the population for the upcoming



distribution, communicate any changes in the basic ration, and inform the refugees of the date of the food distribution. Information is obtained from UNHCR and WFP through meetings and correspondence. The OPM camp officials often attend these meetings. WFP and UNHCR field staff may also attend, however UN staff are often responsible for more than one settlement and therefore cannot attend all the meetings.

#### **d. With Beneficiaries**

78. Participation of the refugees, particularly women in the food distribution is a key strategy of both UNHCR and WFP and is included as a major component of the revised MoU. In cooperation with the Government, both agencies support the creation of refugee administrative structures which include the Refugee Welfare Committee (RWC) and a Food Management Committee (FMC). UNHCR and WFP coordinate closely with these Refugee Committees in the distribution of food and non-food items (NFI) and general camp management. Both agencies support greater participation of women in food distribution and camp management (see section III below on Beneficiaries and Gender for more details).

79. The Semi-Malawian food distribution described above centers around refugee participation in the food distribution. Women play a key role in the distribution of the food and are encouraged to receive the family ration.

## **2. Monitoring**

80. Monitoring of refugee assistance is key to both UNHCR and WFP's programme management. It is included in the revised MoU where both agencies are to monitor food distribution and share information with each other.

81. According to the Tripartite agreements, Food Basket Monitoring (FBM) is to take place after each distribution. In Uganda FBM varied with each settlement. In some areas, FBM was undertaken by the health agency under contract with UNHCR; this provides a transparent separation of responsibility between the food distribution partner and the one responsible for health and nutrition. In some settlements, there was only one implementing partner responsible for both food distribution and health. Therefore, in these settlements the same agency was responsible for both food distribution and monitoring. The Evaluation Mission found that the best practice is to have one agency responsible for food distribution and a separate one for monitoring.

82. WFP is also supposed to monitor the food distribution. Both the WFP and UNHCR field offices reported that WFP is not always present during distributions. This may be due to allocation of staff, but monitoring procedures and clear lines of responsibilities need to be discussed between the two agencies as part of the review of the pilot project. Both agencies also need to ensure that women--both UN staff and beneficiaries-- participate in all aspects of the food distribution. This is particularly important in gathering information from the refugees through the food distribution and post distribution monitoring.

83. Post distribution monitoring (PDM) is done on a quarterly basis, and provides input to the twice yearly Joint Assessment. PDMs are undertaken jointly by UNHCR, WFP, and the implementing partners with WFP assuming the lead role. UNHCR through its health agency is responsible for the nutrition surveys, and has funded a separate NGO to prepare crop yield assessments (CYA). Information from these activities is compiled and included in the Joint Assessments. The Joint Assessment Missions (JAMS) determine the ration to be given to each settlement as part of the Self Reliance Strategy (SRS) of the Government. Again, both UN agencies need to ensure that the partners and refugees include women in these assessments.

84. The Evaluation Mission noted several issues related to monitoring and the Pilot Project:

- As mentioned above the UNHCR's continued funding of the CYA is in jeopardy; this crucial input to the JAM needs to be continued.
- The semi-Malawi is accepted and appreciated by the beneficiaries, but there is no weighing of the ration in the FBM. Refugees requested scales to weigh bags before distribution (complaints of underweight bags) and to check by weight through the Food Basket Monitoring, what is actually received (see section on Beneficiaries below.) Distribution also takes place in the open on the ground, which poses problems particularly during the rainy season.



- WFP has not increased its field staff to cover the additional responsibilities of the secondary transport, distribution and monitoring. This lack of staff for a regular field presence and accurate monitoring was raised as a concern by UNHCR field staff.

### **3. Reporting**

85. Both UN agencies have developed standard reporting formats for their operations. These existed before the implementation of the pilot project. As noted above, UNHCR is responsible for providing the population figures to WFP and the Implementing Partner prior to any food distribution. UNHCR is to ensure that the Implementing Partner (IP) in charge of supplementary feeding shares its reports with WFP. The Tripartite agreements call for the IP in charge of food distribution to provide regular reports to both UNHCR and WFP.

86. Since the same Implementing Partner has agreements with UNHCR for camp management and with WFP for food distribution, both agencies require separate reporting. Duplication seems to be limited, but one agency complained about the number of reports required for each agency. The Evaluation Mission noted this and felt that both UN agencies need to review together how to streamline reporting requirements and procedures.

### **4. Training/Capacity Building**

87. Although training and capacity building are key components of both UNHCR and WFP, the implementation of the pilot project did not require any new specific training. WFP had provided training in warehouse management to most of the implementing partners before the pilot project began. With staff changes, several partners requested that these workshops be repeated.

88. A workshop was held in Nairobi in February 2003 just before the start of the pilot project, to review the revised MoU. Implementing partners along with representatives from UNHCR and WFP from the region participated in the 4 day workshop. One of the recommendations was to hold similar workshops in each country for both UNHCR and WFP field staff as well as with the key implementing partners. Registration/beneficiary issues could be one of the topics discussed during these joint workshops.

89. As noted above under coordination, WFP has quarterly meetings with its field staff and rotates the venue between the field offices. To address practical issues, and exchange best practices, joint workshops with both WFP and UNHCR field staff were proposed.

90. Through discussions with various partners and UNHCR and WFP field staff, several suggestions for additional training were identified. These include: a standard procedure for identifying the Extremely Vulnerable Individuals (EVIs) and a workshop on the basic principles of protection (see section III below).



### III. Beneficiaries and Protection

#### 1. Introduction

91. Input from the beneficiaries themselves is essential to the evaluation of the pilot food distribution project implemented in Uganda. Refugee participation in food distribution is highlighted in the revised MoU and is part of the Evaluation TOR and Methodology.

92. The Evaluation Mission visited six of the 11 settlements and met with representatives of the Refugee Welfare Committee (RWC), the Food Management Committee (FMC), OPM, and the Implementing Partners. Following these group discussions the Evaluation Mission also interviewed single female heads of households and/or vulnerable individuals regarding the food distribution and their perception of any change during the period of the pilot project.

93. The same survey or set of questions developed in Pakistan was used in Uganda. WFP field staff and its implementing partners completed 111 survey forms for 9 of the 11 settlements. The summary of information obtained through the questionnaires is included in Appendix 1. General observations on key findings are briefly outlined below.

#### 2. Participation and Perception of the Beneficiaries

94. Based on the results of the questionnaires, 58 percent of the refugees interviewed said they were aware of the transfer of the food distribution system from UNHCR to WFP. There seemed to be some confusion however, as to when the pilot study started and when the change in the food distribution actually took place. Several responses said WFP took over the food distribution in the mid-1990s.

95. Half the responses said they understood the difference between the two UN agencies and the role of each. In two responses in the south, UNHCR was called the "father" and WFP the "baby sitter." Several forms in the north stated that UNHCR was the "sole provider" while WFP implemented "on behalf of UNHCR."

96. Although 81 percent of the responses identified the Implementing Partners (IPs) in the settlement and were aware of their roles, and 57 percent said there was coordination of the delivery of food and non-food items (NFIs), there were several comments that the refugees did not understand "who was doing what," and requested a meeting to explain the differences.

97. 97 percent of the responses indicated the refugees were aware of their community structures. Several settlements had prepared ToRs for the roles and responsibilities of the RWC, Food Management Committees, etc. and in Kiryandongo OPM had prepared a "constitution" with the refugees outlining the rules and regulations of the settlement as well as the responsibilities of the various refugee committees. Similar ToRs were prepared in other countries, and field staff from both UN agencies in Uganda requested copies<sup>35</sup>.

98. The Evaluation Mission found that:

- there does not appear to be any change in the beneficiaries' perception of UNHCR as lead agency responsible for refugee protection and assistance;
- periodic briefings on the role of each UN agency as well as the IP should be continued, particularly with the new election or change in the RWC and Food Committee staff; and
- ToRs and other documents should be shared between the various field offices in Uganda. Similar documents could also be exchanged between the country offices involved in the pilot project.

#### 3. Protection and Food Delivery

<sup>35</sup> The Evaluation Mission provided copies of the TORs used in Sierra Leone.



99. As noted one third of the entire refugee caseload has been phased off of food assistance as part of the Government of Uganda's Self Reliance Strategy (SRS). The ration is determined by the Joint Assessment Missions which are held twice a year to adjust the amount of food provided to the needs of the refugees (see above.) 95 percent of those interviewed were aware of the basic ration; there were many complaints about the reduction in food and poor harvests due to weather, limited land allocation, etc. which led to requests to increase the ration to 100 percent.

100. A significant number of the respondents complained about the changes in the delivery schedule. Several mentioned what appeared to them to be arbitrary cancellations or postponements in the food distribution plan, and the lack of a fixed date of delivery of the food for each month.

101. The food ration is calculated on a 30 day ration (even for those receiving reduced rations as part off the SRS strategy,) and refugees come to expect food delivered on a certain date. As noted in section II above, there did not appear to be any pipeline problems in Uganda and the logistics support (truck fleets, warehouses, EDPs), for the distribution seemed adequate. WFP confirmed that refugees were given priority over their IDP and school feeding activities.

102. Delays in delivery can create protection issues for the general population (borrowing food with interest, selling NFIs,) but can be acute for the Extremely Vulnerable (EVIs) who are receiving 100 percent ration and rely on the food for their basic subsistence. The lack of a fixed delivery date was raised as a protection issue in Pakistan, and could create protection issues, particularly for vulnerable families in Uganda (see case in point in section I). The Evaluation Mission felt that WFP should be aware of the potential protection issues in food distribution, and should work with UNHCR to establish a fixed delivery cycle for food distribution in the settlements. Communication lines with the partners and refugees need to be strengthened; the refugees need to be informed immediately of any changes in the food distribution plan.

103. Although 53 percent of those who responded to the survey said they were aware of food-related protection incidents, only 36 percent stated that these protection incidents involved women, and 51 percent responded that the EVI were involved in food related protection issues. In the comments from the survey, several groups reported "normal" incidents of domestic violence involving drunk husbands who tried to sell the food to buy alcohol. Although several surveys confirmed that EVIs received 100 percent food ration and special assistance during distribution, several reported problems in the registration of EVIs (see below).

#### **4. Identification, Ration Cards and Registration**

104. As noted above, registration was one of the most sensitive issues raised during the Evaluation Mission. Through the surveys, several groups responded that newly married couples and new born were not included in the food lists, and that it took more than 6 months to get them registered. These complaints were particularly from the northern camps where the displacement of refugees has only complicated refugee registration and food distribution.

105. The most recent revalidation of the number of refugees took place in June 2003, just after the start of the pilot project. UNHCR has started a re-registration exercise in the south, using its new software Progress/Profile, but confirmed that they do not have adequate funds to extend the registration exercise to the other settlements. With the displacement in the north, and the movement of refugees to and from Sudan, re-registration is essential to resolve any discrepancy between the food log and population figures.

106. Although 87 percent of those responding to the survey reported that all family members had access to food, many surveys reported that food was shared with those who were not registered or had been removed from the food list. Registration should produce a more accurate, up-to-date number of beneficiaries and therefore adjust the food requirements for each settlement. An accurate registration will also be key to the repatriation/resettlement of the refugees. The Evaluation Mission encouraged WFP and UNHCR to work together with the Government of Uganda and donors to ensure adequate funds are available to update the registration, particularly in the north.



107. Several groups reported that EVIs were either not registered or had not received special assistance. The Evaluation mission noted that there seem to be a different criteria in registering EVIs in the various districts and definitions of EVI seems to vary between UNHCR and WFP. Registration of EVIs should be standardized across all settlements and both UN agencies with the relevant IPs should review the existing procedures to ensure that all eligible EVIs are receiving their food rations and other assistance.

## **5. Gender**

108. Based on the results of the questionnaire, 93 percent of the responses stated that women/spouses were included on the ration cards and 99 percent stated that women participated in the food distribution. 68 percent of those participating in the discussion survey stated that they would like to have more women involved in the food distribution, although several survey forms remarked that they preferred a balance of genders and that, although women were more concerned and honest when it came to food distribution, men were required to offload the trucks and move the heavier items to the distribution area.

109. Although women were elected to the RWC and food management committees, the Evaluation Mission noticed that there were few women in Senior positions. Most women in the Uganda settlements held deputy positions, and it appeared that women were less likely to serve as chairpersons of the RWC or FMC than in the camps in Sierra Leone.

## **6. Training/Capacity Building**

110. A few of the respondents to the questionnaires requested that the Refugee Welfare Committee, and more particularly the members of the Food Management Committees receive training in their roles and responsibilities. The training should include not only the distribution of the basic ration, but monitoring and reporting. Those surveyed felt this was important after the election of new Food Management Committee members.

111. As noted above, both UNHCR and WFP staff along with the relevant implementing partners should participate in a workshop on EVIs to standardize the registration procedures and ensure that EVIs receive the same assistance in all settlements. UNHCR should take the lead role in this, but participation by WFP is important as part of the ongoing food distribution.

112. As in other countries, both IP and WFP staff expressed an interest in understanding the basic principles of protection of refugees, not to become protection officers, but to ensure protection incidents are reported promptly to UNHCR. UNHCR agreed to include WFP field staff in protection workshops organized in Uganda (see above).

## **7. Other Issues Raised by the Refugees**

113. There were several complaints about the quality of the food (particularly maize procured locally) and the lack of variety in the food basket. Many of those surveyed complained that over the years certain items (salt, sugar, soap) had been removed from the food basket (see section I above).

114. There were several comments that the food basket was better under UNHCR before WFP took over. This response had little to do with the implementation of the pilot project, and was more related to the SRS strategy which starts after two growing seasons once the refugee family has been allocated land.

115. Several groups complained that they had not received Non-Food Items (NFI) since they arrived more than 10 years ago and that their cooking pots and utensils were worn out.

116. Some of those interviewed complained that food is stacked on the ground and no plastic sheeting was available to protect against moisture. In those settlements where no distribution shelters were available, damage to the food, or delays in distribution due to weather could be serious problems. The Evaluation Mission noted that those settlements with a shelter completed the distribution more efficiently with less complaints and damage to the food than those that distributed on the ground. Warehouse/distribution sheds similar to those built by WFP in





Sierra Leone could be considered if funding is available; the same semi-Malawi distribution system can still be used in these shelters.

117. Many of the groups interviewed expressed satisfaction with the semi-Malawi distribution system. Many complained about underweight bags and requested weighing scales for each settlement/distribution point. Several groups also raised the issue of the scoops vs. weight of the food ration; this came up as an issue during both distribution and post distribution monitoring where the refugees are asked if they received the correct ration but no spot-check weighing is done (see monitoring above). Some also complained about the distribution in the open air on the ground.



## IV. Concluding Remarks and Lessons Learned

### Introduction

118. The Evaluation Mission's Terms of Reference state that no recommendations are to be made regarding the continuation of the Pilot Project, but that the country reports should summarize best practices and lessons learned for each country. Therefore concluding remarks and lessons learned are summarized for each of the three main topics of the evaluation of the Pilot Project in Uganda in the paragraphs below.

### Cost and Logistics

1. Changes in the logistics aspects of food management and distribution activities in the camps, as a result of the implementation of the Pilot Project were minimal. All UNHCR appointed IPs were retained by WFP. The UNHCR trucks utilized for the secondary transport from EDPs to FDPs were only partially replaced by WFP trucks in the Southern districts.
2. Food management, secondary transport, and food distribution inside the camps was made the sole responsibility of WFP in line with the objectives of the Pilot Project as set out under the revised MOU of July, 2002.
3. The contractual agreements with the IPs concerning the EDP management and the distribution of food continued to be governed by the standard Tripartite Agreement signed by UNHCR, WFP and the IP; however, the actual services provided were essentially bilateral, involving only WFP and the IPs.
4. IPs are remunerated under a dual system of a negotiated fixed monthly revenue and a flexible revenue based on a tonnage rate.
5. It has not been possible to assess the exact cost of the secondary transport and the food distribution prior to the start of the Pilot Project. The additional cost for WFP taking over the responsibility for the secondary transport and the final food distribution is estimated with reasonable accuracy to between \$10-12 US\$ per MT.
6. With the introduction of the Pilot Project, WFP became more directly involved in the final food distribution activities, and as such WFP is more directly concerned by the timely production of accurate caseload figures. Absence of these population figures caused severe disruption in the food distribution.
7. The strength of the labour force of UNHCR, WFP and IPs was not affected by the implementation of the Pilot Project.
8. No transfer of property of assets was registered. The terms and conditions for the lease or temporary use of assets and equipment have not always been negotiated in depth and recorded properly.
9. The handling of NFI was not perceived as part of the Pilot Project and has remained under the sole custody of UNHCR.

### Management and Coordination

1. Coordination between the various partners, particularly the two UN agencies was good before the Pilot Project and only improved with its implementation. This was facilitated by the use of the same Implementing Partners UNHCR had used when WFP took over the entire food distribution system.
2. The role of the Government, particularly the OPM offices was interpreted differently in different locations. This needed to be clarified particularly OPM's role in registration in the northern settlements.
3. Registration figures of the settlement populations was a major issue in the north. The use of the UNHCR PROGRESS software needs to be urgently utilized in the north and funds need to be identified to ensure that the registration can be done and maintained properly throughout the country.
4. Although workplans were prepared at the central level, preparation of joint workplans by the WFP and UNHCR field offices in each district would further strengthen cooperation and ensure field staff understand the roles and responsibilities of their sister agency.
5. In addition to joint workplans, periodic (quarterly?) meetings with field staff from both offices coming together to review practical issues and discuss lessons learned, or best practices would strengthen working relations between both UN agencies. The location of the meetings could rotate between field offices and include visits to the settlements.



6. The semi-Malawi distribution system was acceptable and appreciated by the beneficiaries, but there is no weighing of the ration in the FBM. Refugees requested scales to weigh food items before distribution and after as part of the Food Basket Monitoring (FBM).
7. Food distribution often took place in the open on the ground. WFP may want to consider storage structures where there are none, and covered distribution areas, particularly for the rainy season, but also to assist in crowd control even when using the semi-Malawi distribution system.
8. WFP may need to review its staffing levels to cover the additional responsibilities of secondary transport, food distribution and most importantly, monitoring. WFP needs to ensure an appropriate field presence for accurate monitoring.
9. Food distribution and monitoring were done by separate agencies in most of the settlements. This separation of responsibilities is a good check and balance. Health agencies under contract with UNHCR often were responsible for the FBM and participated in the PDM and undertook the nutrition surveys.
10. The Pilot Project offered an opportunity for both UN agencies to review its reporting requirements for food related activities. Some IPs complained about the number and time required to produce reports. Both UN agencies could work together to streamline reporting procedures minimize and duplication.
11. An in-country review of the revised MoU with both UN agencies and their implementing partners was suggested as a possible workshop for 2005.

### **Beneficiaries and Protection**

1. The beneficiaries' perception of UNHCR as lead agency responsible for refugee protection and assistance did not change with the implementation of the Pilot Project.
2. Protection and food distribution was linked to the Government's SRS strategy, which is determined in part by the JFAMs which are based on the crop yield assessment (CYA,) nutrition surveys, etc. All of these inter-linked activities need to be continued and funding should be identified to ensure there is no disruption.
3. Delays in food delivery can produce protection problems. WFP staff need to ensure that food is delivered within the agreed upon distribution cycle (normally a 30 day ration is distributed).
4. Workshops on the determination of EVIs need to be conducted with both UN agencies and the IPs participating. More attention needs to be given to how the EVI transports his/her food from the distribution center to the home.
5. Periodic awareness campaigns on the core areas of Gender, HIV/AIDS, and SGBV should be undertaken as joint efforts by both UN agencies and the Implementing Partners.
6. ToRs on the roles and responsibilities of the refugee committees should be prepared in consultation with the beneficiaries in each settlement. These should be reviewed periodically, particularly when there is an election or a change in the RWC or Food Committee staff. The roles and responsibilities of UNHCR, WFP and the Implementing Partners should be reviewed periodically with the general beneficiaries and with any newly elected refugee officials.
7. Training in basic protection issues by UNHCR for WFP and IP staff was identified as a need for 2005.



**Appendix 1**  
**Summary of WFP/UNHCR Implementing Partners for Food Distribution from April 2003**

DISTRICT	SETTLEMENT	Before 01/04/2003		01/04/2003 – 31/03/2004		01/04/2004 – 31/03/2005	
		EDP Mgmt.	Distribution	EDP Mgmt.	Distribution	EDP Mgmt.	Distribution
ARUA	Rhino Camp	DED	DED	DED	DED	DED	DED
	Impevi	DED	DED	DED	DED	DED	DED
	Madi Okol			DED	DED	DED	DED
YUMBE	Ikafe			LWF <sup>36</sup>	LWF	IRC <sup>37</sup>	IRC
MOYO	Palotinya	AAH	AAH	AAH	AAH	AAH	AAH
ADJUMANI	Pakelle	LWF	LWF	LWF	LWF	LWF	LWF
MASINDI	Kiryandongo	OPM	OPM	IRC	IRC	IRC	IRC
HOIMA	Kyangwali	AAH	AAH	AAH	AAH	AAH	AAH
KYNJOJO	Kyaka	OPM	OPM	URCS <sup>38</sup>	URCS	URCS	URCS
MBARARA	Nakivale	URCS	URCS	URCS	URCS	URCS	URCS
	Oruchinga	URCS	URCS	URCS	URCS	URCS	URCS

<sup>36</sup> Agreement signed for the period 01/09/2003 – 31/03/2004.

<sup>37</sup> Agreement signed for the period 01/06/2004 – 31/03/2005.

<sup>38</sup> Agreement signed for the period 01/06/2003 – 31/03/2004.



**Appendix 2**  
**Summary of Uganda Settlement Details as of September 2004**

#	Settlement Location/EDP	District	WFP Sub-office	Implementing Partner	Total Population			Total Population Receiving Food			Completed Survey Forms Received	Distribution Points/# of Villages
					Males	Females	Total as of Sept 2004	Males	Females	Total as of Sept 2004		
1	Rhino	Arua	Arua	DED	13,721	12,693	26,414	13,234	13,313	26,547	16	44
2	Imvepi				9,356	12,065	21,421	12,620	10,141	22,761	10	10
3	Madi Okol				3,459	3,690	7,149	3,517	3,785	7,302	7	4
4	Ikafe	Yumbe		LWF/IRC	4,475	4,214	8,689	4,988	4,605	9,593	10	5
5	Palorinya	Moyo	Pakelle	AAH	16,510	15,644	32,154	12,878	11,888	24,766	26	34
6	Pakelle	Adjumani		LWF	31,950	30,271	62,221	20,783	19,183	39,966	26	30
7	Kiryandongo	Masindi	Masindi	IRC	8,324	7,464	15,788	0,828	0,945	1,773		1
8	Kyangwali	Hoima	Mbarara	AAH	9,158	8,419	17,577	5,766	6,364	12,130	7	
9	Kyaka	Kyenjojo		URCS	3,948	4,003	7,951	2,820	1,950	4,770		1
10	Nakivale	Mbarara		URCS	7,992	7,316	15,308	7,535	7,614	15,149	5	4
11	Oruchinga				1,989	1,926	3,915	2,059	1,966	4,025	4	1
		<b>Total</b>			<b>110,882</b>	<b>107,705</b>	<b>218,587</b>	<b>87,028</b>	<b>81,754</b>	<b>168,782</b>	<b>111</b>	



**Appendix 3**  
**Survey Results of Discussions with the Beneficiaries**  
**WFP-UNHCR Joint Food Distribution Evaluation Mission in Uganda 17/11 - 01/12/04**

Settlements: 11 Settlements in Uganda  
 Gender of Interviewee/s: Male: 29; Female: 40; Mixed: 42;  
 Total Groups interviewed: 111 from 9/11 settlements

**Guidelines for the Interviews with the Beneficiaries**

- Interview 5-10 families/households per group. Interview a minimum of 5 groups for each camp.
- Attempt to interview at least 50% women.
- Include group discussions with leaders, women’s groups, food distribution committees, beneficiaries, etc.
- Answer the following questions and try to ascertain if the refugees are aware of any changes from before April 2003 when UNHCR and IPs delivered the food, and when WFP took over the responsibility (from April 2003 onwards.)

	Questions for Discussion	%	Yes	No	Don't Know	Comments/Remarks/Observations
1	Are the beneficiaries aware of the change in the food distribution from UNHCR to WFP?	58%	64	38	9	A summary of the general comments, remarks and observations is included in section III of the main report.
	Do the understand the role of the two agencies?	50%	62	37	8	
	Who is Implementing Partner and are they aware of its role/responsibilities?	81%	87	12	8	
	Is their coordination of delivery of food and non-food items? Are the refugees aware of who delivers what?	57%	60	32	3	
2	Are the refugees aware of the community structure and communication channels for food distribution? Are there food committees? Who represents them? % of women on the food committees?	97%	106	3		
	Are they aware of the basic ration and do they receive it?	95%	103	4	1	
	If not, do they complain and if so to whom? What was the result of their complaint?					



	Questions for Discussion	%	Yes	No	Don't Know	Comments/Remarks/Observations
3	Do women participate in the distribution? % of women employed as scoopers? Monitors?	99%	109	1		A summary of the general comments, remarks and observations is included in section III of the main report.
	Would they prefer to have more women involved?	68%	73	32	2	
	Are women/spouses included on the ration cards? % of women collecting food?	93%	97	6	1	
	Have the distribution points changed to make it easier to take the food home?	40%	43	64		
	Has packaging changed to facilitate transport?					
4	Do all members of the family have access to food?	87%	96	14		
	Are they aware of or ever reported/been involved in security or protection incidents related to food?	53%	56	48	1	
	To whom would they turn to complain or report Protection Issues					
	Are there specific protection problems that relate to women?	36%	38	68	1	
	SBGV protection issues related to food distribution?					
	Are there protection issues for the EVI related to food distribution?	51%	54	49	2	
5	Any suggestions, complaints, recommendations, or Lessons Learned regarding the food distribution system either before under UNHCR or now under WFP?					







# Case Study No 4 - Zambia

(03 - 16 May 2005)





# Acronyms

AAH	Aktion Afrika Hilfe
AHA	Regional Health NGO based in Uganda working in Zambia
CARE	CARE International, NGO
CD	Country Director
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CO	Country Office
COMPAS	Commodity Movement Processing and Analysis System
COR	Commissioner for Refugees
CORD	Christian Outreach Relief and Development
DSC	Direct Support Costs
ECW	Expanded Commitments to Women
EDP	Extended Delivery Point
EM	Evaluation Mission
EMOP	Emergency Operation
EVI	Extremely Vulnerable Individuals
FBM	Food Basket Monitoring
FDP	Final Delivery Point
FNA	Food Needs Assessment
GOZ	Government of the Republic of Zambia
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IP	Implementing Partner
ISC	Indirect Support Costs
JFAM	Joint Food Assessment Mission
Kcal	Kilocalorie
LOU	Letter of Understanding
LTSH	Landside Transport, Storage and Handling
LWF	Lutheran World Federation
M & E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MCN	Mother and Child Nutrition
MHA	Ministry of Home Affairs
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MT	Metric Ton
NFI	Non-food Items
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
PDM	Post Distribution Monitoring
PRRO	Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation
RO	Refugee Officer, represents the Commissioner for Refugees
SFP	Supplementary Feeding Programme
SGBV	Sexual and Gender Based Violence
TA	Tripartite Agreement
TFP	Therapeutic Feeding Programme
TOR	Terms of Reference
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
USD	US Dollars
VAM	Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping
WFP	World Food Programme
WVI	World Vision International



ZI  
ZRCS

Zambia Initiative  
Zambia Red Cross Society





# Table of Contents

<b>Executive Summary</b>	<b>v</b>
<b>Introduction</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Background</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>I. Cost and Logistics</b>	<b>3</b>
1. The Organisation of the Food-aid Pipeline and Final Distribution	3
2. The Agreements with the Implementing Partners (IPs)	4
3. The Total Cost of Food Management (EDP) and Distribution (FDP)	5
a. Before the Pilot Project Came into Force	5
b. Once the Pilot Project Came into Force	5
4. The Organisation of the Secondary Transport	7
5. The Pilot Project and its Budgetary Consequences for UNHCR & WFP	7
6. The Registration and Revalidation of Refugees	7
7. Staffing	8
8. The Transfer of Assets	8
9. Handling of NFIs	9
10. Packing Materials	9
11. Milling Operations	9
<b>II. Management and Coordination</b>	<b>10</b>
1. Introduction	10
a. Coordination between UN Agencies	10
b. With Government	11
c. With Implementing Partners (IPs)	11
d. With Beneficiaries	11
2. Monitoring	12
3. Reporting	12
4. Training/Capacity Building	12
<b>III. Beneficiaries and Protection</b>	<b>14</b>
1. Introduction	14
2. Participation and Perception of the Beneficiaries	14
3. Protection and Food Delivery	15
4. Identification, Ration Cards and Registration	16
5. Gender	16
6. Training/Capacity Building	17
7. Other Issues Raised by the Refugees	17
<b>IV. Concluding Remarks and Lessons Learned</b>	<b>18</b>



## **Appendices**

- Appendix 1 Summary of Zambian Refugee Population and Number of Questionnaires by Camp/Settlements
- Appendix 2 Summary Results of Discussions with the Beneficiaries



# Executive Summary

Collaboration to provide humanitarian assistance to refugees and displaced persons between the World Food Programme (WFP) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was strengthened with the signing of a revised Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in July 2002. Through this document both agencies agreed that, on a pilot basis, WFP would take over the responsibility for the entire food distribution programme in 5 countries, and that after one year of implementation, an evaluation would be undertaken for each of the 5 pilot projects.

This case study of Zambia is the fourth of the five evaluations prepared by the two consultants recruited by both WFP and UNHCR. The study follows the Terms of Reference and evaluation methodology prepared jointly by the two UN agencies and builds upon the framework established in the previous studies in Pakistan, Sierra Leone, and Uganda. The report focuses on the three key issues outlined in the Terms of Reference: Cost and Logistics; Management and Coordination; and Beneficiaries Perspective and Protection. The key findings including lessons learned and best practices for the pilot project in Zambia are described in the text of the document and summarized in the Concluding Remarks and Lessons Learned at the end of the study.

Based on the results of the case study for Zambia, the Pilot Project for food distribution did not greatly affect food distribution in the refugee camps/settlements in Zambia. Although WFP assumed responsibility at its own cost from UNHCR for the secondary transport from the Extended Delivery Point to the Final Delivery Point, the Implementing Partners (IPs) remained the same during the pilot phase. The beneficiaries' perception of UNHCR as lead agency for their protection remained the same. Government, refugees and the IPs commented that WFP presence in the field was strengthened with the implementation of the Pilot Project and this was appreciated by all parties. The Commissioner for Refugees even commented that WFP is the UN Food agency and it made sense that it take full responsibility for all food related activities for the refugees. Interagency cooperation and management were strengthened through the planning and implementation of the Pilot Project in Zambia.

The Evaluation Mission would like to thank the staff of WFP and UNHCR in the Zambia both in country offices in Lusaka and the field offices in Mangu and Kawambwa for their cooperation and assistance in providing information on the Pilot Food Distribution Project implemented in 2004. The Evaluation Mission also notes with appreciation the valuable contribution made by the Government of Zambia, particularly the Office of the Commissioner for Refugees (COR) and the Implementing Partners. Finally, the case study for Zambia would not be complete without the input from the refugees themselves. Their participation and support during the interviews and food distribution, particularly those of the elected leads and Food Committee members was essential to the study.







## Introduction<sup>39</sup>

1. The World Food Programme (WFP) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) signed a revised Memorandum of Understanding in July 2002. As a part of this Pilot Projects for the hand over of food distribution from UNHCR to WFP were to be implemented in five countries. The two UN agencies jointly agreed that Pakistan (in 2003), Uganda, Sierra Leone, Zambia and Kenya would be selected for the Pilot case studies. Following this a Joint Food Distribution Evaluation Mission was established to review the Lessons Learned and Best Practices in each of the five country case studies.

2. UNHCR and WFP together selected two consultants to undertake the joint Evaluation Mission (EM) which began its work in Rome with WFP, followed by briefings in Geneva with UNHCR (6-9 July 2004). The EM then traveled to Pakistan in July 2004, followed by Sierra Leone (October 2004,) and Uganda (November 2004). The EM came to Zambia in May 2005 and its findings are the result of this study. The consultants are scheduled to travel to Kenya for the fifth and final study in June 2005. A final summary of all 5 case studies is to be produced in July followed by a debriefing of the two UN agencies.

3. As per the EM's Terms of Reference (TOR) and the methodology developed for the evaluation, the consultants met with local stakeholders in each country to gather information on the transfer of the food distribution from UNHCR to WFP. The basic data collection tools, questionnaires and interviews which were established during the first country visit to Pakistan were used for the rest of the case studies. Each study summarizes the lessons learned and best practices of the Pilot Projects, identifying the common themes and unique characteristics of food distribution in the 5 countries.

4. The Zambia case study is the fourth of the five Pilot Food Distribution reports and follows the same reporting outline and format used in the initial Pakistan study. As with the other case studies The Zambia report focuses on the three main issues outlined in the Terms of Reference which are:

- Cost and Logistics Considerations
- Management and Coordination
- Beneficiaries' Perspective and Protection

5. Before reviewing the three main topics above, the following Background section gives a brief overview of the situation in Zambia which includes some of the main characteristics of the pilot food distribution project. Each of the three topics above are then summarized; this is followed by Concluding Remarks at the end of the case study.

## Background

6. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is the lead UN agency responsible for the protection and assistance of refugees, while the World Food Programme (WFP) WFP is the Food Aid Organization of the United Nations. Together the two UN agencies provide humanitarian assistance to refugees around the world including food. Over the years (1985, 1994, 1997) the two agencies have signed Memoranda of Understanding (MOU); the most recent revision was signed in July 2002 which led to this Pilot Project for Food Distribution in 5 countries including Zambia.

7. A major change in the revised MOU was that both UN agencies agreed that, on a pilot basis, WFP would take over responsibility of the entire food distribution process at its own expense, including the secondary transport from the Extended Delivery Point (EDP) to the Final Delivery Point (FDP). In the past, UNHCR, with its Implementing Partners (IPs), was responsible for the secondary transport and the final distribution of the food to the refugees, while WFP was responsible for the procurement and delivery of the food from the port of entry into the country to the Extended Delivery Point (EDP).

---

<sup>39</sup> Consultants: Mitchell L. Carlson and Francois de Meulder.



8. The Government of Zambia requested WFP assistance to provide food to the refugees in the country in 2003. A Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation document (PRRO 10071.1) and a Letter of Understanding were signed in 2003 between the Government and WFP which stated in part that WFP in Zambia would assume "direct responsibility for managing food distribution in refugee settlements/camps, as on of the five pilot operations worldwide<sup>40</sup>." Although Zambia was selected as one of the five case studies for the pilot food distribution project, both UN offices agreed that the pilot project would not be implemented before 2004.

9. The Pilot Food Distribution Project in Zambia began on the 1<sup>st</sup> of January 2004 for an initial period of twelve months, and was extended through 2005. The following three sections summarize the findings of the Evaluation Mission for the Pilot Project in Zambia. These are followed by a summary of Concluding Remarks based on the findings in the main sections.

---

<sup>40</sup> Letter of Understanding Between the World Food Programme and the Government of the Republic of Zambia concerning Food Assistance for Refugees from Angola and DR Congo (PRRO 10017.1) signed in 2003.



## I. Cost and Logistics

### 1. The Organisation of the Food-aid Pipeline and Final Distribution

10. UNHCR transferred its responsibilities for the distribution of food-aid in the Zambia refugee camps to WFP on the 1<sup>st</sup> of January 2004 in line with the provisions of the Pilot Food Distribution Project as outlined in the UNHCR – WFP Revised MOU of July 2002). At that moment, Zambia was providing asylum to some 227,000 refugees; 130,000 refugees were living in six designated camps/settlements out of which some 108,000 refugees, mainly from Angola and the DRC, were receiving food-aid under the PRRO 10071.1. Consequently the responsibility for the management of the food-aid pipeline up to the EDP, already vested with WFP, was extended to include both the movement of the food-aid from the EDP to the FDP and the final distribution to the refugees inside the camps and settlements. This was in line with the LOU signed between WFP and the GOZ concerning the PRRO 10071.1 makes specific reference to WFP assuming as from January 2004 direct responsibility for managing food distribution in refugee camps/settlements, as one of the five pilot operations world-wide<sup>41</sup>.

11. During the last quarter of 2003, both UNHCR and WFP prepared with great care the practical implementation of the pilot project. It was mutually agreed to retain the services from the same IPs in order to ensure a smooth transition of responsibilities. The following table exemplifies this:

CAMP/SETTLEMENT	YEAR 2003	YEAR 2004	YEAR 2005			
	EDP	Distribution	EDP	Distribution	EDP	Distribution
MEHEBA	WFP	LWF	WFP	LWF	WFP(*)	LWF
MAYUKWAYUKWA	LWF	LWF	LWF	LWF	LWF	LWF
NANGWESHI	CARE	CARE	CARE	CARE	CORD(**)	CORD(**)
MWANGE	WFP	ZRCS	WFP	ZRCS	WFP(***)	ZRCS
KALA	WVI	WVI	WVI	WVI	WVI	WVI
UKWIMI	LWF	LWF	LWF	LWF	-	-

(\*) WFP will transfer the EDP management to LWF as of 01/07/2005.

(\*\*) CORD (Christian Outreach Relief and Development) took over EDP management and distribution from CARE as of 01/01/2005.

(\*\*\*) WFP will transfer the EDP management to ZRCS as of 01/07/2005.

12. This commitment to continuity on the part of WFP did not preclude however the gradual implementation of significant improvements in the distribution chain, such as:

- the rehabilitation and expansion of the distribution centres in the camps and settlements (chute system);
- the rehabilitation and the improvement of various waiting shelters;
- the strengthening of the presence of WFP food-aid monitors in the camps in an attempt to solve problems on the spot with the IP and the refugees, if not anticipating them before they arose;
- the gradual introduction of fortnightly food distributions at twice monthly fixed calendar days;<sup>42</sup>
- a continuous drive to keep all communication channels open at all times and at all levels from the high level quarterly GOZ/MHA/COR – UNHCR – WFP – IPs co-ordination meetings down to the monthly interagency meetings and fortnightly pre and post distribution meetings at camp level involving all the stakeholders including the community section leaders and food committee members;
- the closer involvement of the refugee community in the distribution process (reception of food-aid in the FDPs, calling forward of refugees, scooping etc.) with strict adherence to the principles of gender equality;
- the progressive switch from camp section based distribution to family size distribution in Mayukwayukwa (the other camps/settlements had been based on family size distribution already);
- the shift of the milling operation where practicable, such as in Kala, to after the food-distribution, creating income generating opportunities for the refugees in particular the women, to be more closely involved in the milling operation;
- the manufacturing of scooping utensils inside the camps again as an income generating activity;
- provision of a sufficient number of weighing scales to enable food basket monitoring on the spot;
- capacity building and adequate training of IP staff manning the EDPs and FDPs.

13. Such measures yielded positive results under the pilot project considering that:

<sup>41</sup> LOU between WFP and GOZ PRRO 10071.1 covering the period 01.01/2004 to 31/12/2005.

<sup>42</sup> On the 1<sup>st</sup>/2<sup>nd</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup>/17<sup>th</sup> day of each month.



- the distribution cycle was reduced in all camps from an average of 4-6 days to 1-2 days, the final aim being a distribution cycle which lasts no more than one day;
- all parties – UNHCR, WFP, IPs and not the least, the refugees – are unanimous in recognising that the pilot project has permitted a far better monitoring of food-aid movements, stocks, estimates, shortages and eventually pipeline breaks confirming thus that the reporting has indeed substantially improved;
- WFP feels confident to transfer the management of its EDP warehouses in Mwange and Meheba camps to the IPs, respectively to ZRCS and LWF<sup>43</sup>.

14. Pipeline breaks still did occur but such breaks were totally extraneous to the pilot project<sup>44</sup>. With WFP solely in charge of the pipeline, it has the capacity to handle such issues in a very pro-active way. It adopted the same line of conduct when facing the sorghum – maize issue.<sup>45</sup>

## 2. The Agreements with the Implementing Partners (IPs)

15. Before January 2004 the specific services extended by an IP for the food-aid distribution in the camps were covered by a standard tripartite UNHCR-IP-MHA agreement,<sup>46</sup> which, according to the camps, could encompass, beside the camp management, a wide variety of other camp related activities and services. The remuneration of the IP was based on mutually agreed budget figures, which formed an annex to the agreement. Though quite detailed, such budget figures do not permit the calculation of the exact cost of each and every service extended by an IP in a camp. It is clear that the distribution of food as a specific service to the refugees, was covered by the much wider UNHCR agreement. As a rule, UNHCR was and still is adopting a more flexible attitude as and when changing working conditions dictate a revision of the budget. Half-yearly budget revisions are not uncommon.

16. WFP negotiated separately at the end of 2003 and at the beginning of 2004 annual bilateral agreements with each individual IP covering both the management of the EDP and/or the final distribution of the food-aid depending on the camp or settlement. These agreements are very professional, well drafted and to the point. Whilst serving identical purposes, it is interesting to note that the agreements are not always identical in formats. Contrary to the remuneration agreed with UNHCR, the remuneration of the IP by WFP is strictly tonnage based, supported by a duly justified and agreed budget which forms part of the contract. This latter arrangement is a cause of concern for some IPs when the anticipated annual throughput does not materialize<sup>47</sup>. WFP recognizes the problem and is working out appropriate modalities to resolve the issue raised by the IPs.

17. The right of use of specific WFP assets (cars, motorbikes, milling equipment) by an IP is, since January 2004, appropriately covered by a carefully drafted addendum to the bilateral agreement. On the other hand the occasional supply of ICT or communication equipment to the IP is not recorded in the budget as a payment in kind by WFP to the IP<sup>48</sup>.

18. Neither UNHCR nor WFP have felt the necessity to confirm their joint commitment towards an IP, whether inside or outside the scope of the pilot project, by a specific tripartite or even quadripartite agreement as was the case in Pakistan, Sierra Leone and Uganda. Equally so, no IP has indicated that there was a need for such an agreement. Under the provisions of the UNHCR/WFP revised MOU of July 2002 a Tripartite agreement (TPR) is required. It should be noted that there is no financial obligation for any of the three parties in the countries where a TPR was initiated.

19. IPs did voice their concern about the extra administrative work for them since WFP took over the responsibility of the distribution (see Reporting in section II below). WFP introduced new reporting formats in

<sup>43</sup> As of 1 July 2005.

<sup>44</sup> Commodity shortages occurred at all camps and settlements during the last quarter of 2004. The supply of the Nangweshi campsite has proven erratic during the first half of 2005 due to the absence of adequate transport to move food from Senanga to Nangweshi which involves crossing the Zambezi River.

<sup>45</sup> Maize was not available and WFP was forced to substitute with sorghum which the Congolese refugees in the two northern camps have refused.

<sup>46</sup> The so-called “care and general services agreement”.

<sup>47</sup> This situation arises when camps are closing or when refugees choose not to take delivery of their ration (sorghum issue).

<sup>48</sup> As is the case in Sierra Leone.



early 2005, which have, besides causing delays, compounded the problem. The pilot project could have been an ideal opportunity for UNHCR and WFP to streamline, simplify and greatly reduce the reporting procedures. In all fairness, WVI indicated however that the WFP/UNHCR reporting procedures were not out of step with its own WVI reporting procedures.

### 3. The Total Cost of Food Management (EDP) and Distribution (FDP)

#### a. Before the Pilot Project Came into Force

20. Before the pilot project came into force, WFP was directly in charge of the food management (EDP) at the camps of Meheba and Mwanze. The cost for running these two EDPs is not recorded separately by WFP. The food management (EDP) at the four other camps (Mayukwayukwa, Nangweshi, Kala and Ukwimi) was contracted out in 2003 to respectively LWF, CARE and WVI at rates ranging between 6.00 and 9.50 US\$ per metric ton of food received at the EDP.

21. The food distribution was the responsibility of the same IPs but under contract with UNHCR. As already indicated the UNHCR budget figures do not permit the extraction of the costs for food distribution at the FDP. The IP was paid for his services based on the approved fixed budget, and its monthly report and justified claims for reimbursement, no matter the volume of food-aid distributed.

22. Interestingly WVI on its own initiative provided some costing figures for the distribution of the food-aid in Kala camp for the year 2003 which can be considered as indicative; 59,861 US\$ for 4,087 MT or 14.67 US\$ per ton of food-aid distributed (see the Table below for estimates on per tonnage cost estimates).

#### b. Once the Pilot Project Came into Force

23. The contractual arrangements concluded as from the 1st of January 2004 between WFP and the IPs allow for an accurate analysis of the costing of both the food management (EDP) and the food distribution (FDP). WFP has, for the year 2004 negotiated separate rates for the management of the EDP on the one hand and the distribution (FDP) on the other hand. For the year 2005 WFP has negotiated an all-inclusive rate with the IPs for both EDP and FDP costs. The following schedule gives an overview of the rates for 2003-2005:

Camp/ Settlements	Year 2003			Year 2004			Year 2005		
	Approx. tonnage	EDP cost US\$/ MT	FDP cost US\$/MT	Approx. Tonnage	EDP cost US\$/MT	FDP cost US\$/ MT	Approx. tonnage	EDP cost US\$/ MT	FDP cost US/ MT
Meheba		WFP	UNHCR	3,300 MT	WFP	21.63	1,500 MT	WFP	37.06
Mayukwayukwa		9.41	UNHCR	3,800 MT	12.17	16.86	1,000 MT	30.00 (***)	40.52 (***)
Nangweshi		6.09	UNHCR	5,700 MT	9.23	10.40	4,367 MT	9.00 (***)	14.53 (***)
Mwanze	5,358 MT	WFP	UNHCR	5,600 MT	WFP	15.51	5,700 MT	WFP	15.37
Kala	4,087 MT	7.79	14,67 (*)	5,500 MT	8.92	12.51	5,000 MT	9.00 (***)	16.00 (***)
Ukwimi		9.41	UNHCR	540 MT	43.40 (**)	36,36 (**)		Camp closed	

(\*) Figure provided by WVI.

(\*\*) Low tonnage results in high EDP management and FDP distribution costs per MT.

(\*\*\*) Total rate apportioned over EDP management and the FDP distribution.

24. On the basis of the figures indicated in the schedule above it is not possible to determine precisely whether the combined EDP and FDP costing figures have effectively decreased or increased as a result of the pilot project. Considering that the same food distribution structure has been kept in place, one may reasonably assume that the combined EDP and FDP costing figures have remained fairly stable save the depreciation of the Zambia Kwacha against the US\$.

25. Disregarding the high costing figures recorded in certain camps and explained by low tonnage figures, it appears that the EDP management cost averages approximately 9.00 US\$ per MT. For the final distribution the



cost per MT averages approximately 16.00 US\$. The combined EDP and FDP costing figure stands at 25.00 US\$ per MT. This figure correctly reflects the cost for the services at both the EDP and FDP.

#### 4. The Organisation of the Secondary Transport

26. The characteristics of the secondary transport vary immensely from camp to camp. The distances average between 0.5 and 17 km. The road conditions vary from quite good to real quagmires during both the dry (sand drifts) and rainy seasons (mud pools). Consequently the type of equipment to be put in line could range from a small agricultural tractor and trailer combination to a heavy duty 6 x 6-drive 10-ton capacity truck. The organisation of the secondary transport must be approached considering the prevailing road conditions near each camp and the number of days a truck will be required to supply an FDP in time rather than a simple equation between tonnage of food to be transported times the rate applicable to move goods from point a to b.

27. The movement of food commodities from Senanga (EDP 1) to Nangweshi (EDP 2) over a distance of some 50 km. over the worst dirt-roads and sand drifts including the crossing of the Zambezi river with a ramshackle ferry, is a problem and poses a logistics nightmare on its own. Pragmatic solutions are not many; considerations of feasibility, flexibility and reliability must eventually supersede mere considerations of costing.

28. UNHCR had, before the pilot project came into force, organised the secondary transport using its own fleet of 8 trucks. Though the UNHCR vehicles were almost life expired and thus prone to frequent breakdown, it had the advantage that the transport operation remained under the sole and exclusive control of UNHCR. Considering that the trucks were more or less permanently based in the camps for both secondary food transport operations and other transport requirements, it is not surprising that the refugees perceived the secondary food transport operations by UNHCR as fairly regular and reliable.

29. In October 2003 WFP did evaluate very carefully all the possible options for organising the secondary transport: rental or leasing of UNHCR trucks, IFRC trucks (ex Norwegian army trucks), private haulers or WFP trucks. The solution with private haulers was eventually selected based primarily on costing and administrative considerations.

30. With WFP choosing commercial haulers, the organisation of the secondary transport became subject to recurrent "Request for quotation" procedures where the quoted transport rates per ton/km more often than not became almost the sole determining factor. Moreover the scarcity of haulers with equipment appropriate to the peculiar road conditions prevailing in each area or camp caused the proposed rates to vary seriously from one RFQ to the other. Differences of more than 200 percent were recorded. WFP eventually succeeded in organising the secondary transport but WFP staff repeatedly stressed that the organisation of the secondary transport was for them the most serious and continuous challenge.

31. The haulers have repeatedly been under-performing, forcing the WFP logistics department to keep the transport situation under review for each and every distribution cycle. Trying to organise low density/short haul transport on the same footing as high density/long haul transport, WFP has perhaps not chosen for the easiest solution.

32. The distribution cycle appears to have suffered the most in the Nangweshi camp and the Mayukwayukwa settlement as a result of the transport difficulties. Furthermore the milling operations in Nangweshi are repeatedly disrupted by erratic supplies of whole grain given the logistical problems and that milling for Nangweshi takes place before distribution as part of a fortified cereals project (see Milling below).

33. It has not been possible to collect accurate costing data for a meaningful cost comparison between secondary transport organised under UNHCR and under WFP; separate UNHCR secondary transport cost figures are not readily available and the fluctuations of the rates quoted to WFP by commercial haulers are considered too large to be meaningful.

34. In December 2003 at the onset of the pilot project WFP and UNHCR entered into an ad hoc arrangement whereby UNHCR agreed to keep at the disposal of WFP 8 UNHCR trucks for 6 days a month to carry out the



secondary transport during the first quarter of 2004. Similarly special arrangements were made to supply fuel to WFP in remote areas. These arrangements exemplify once more the excellent spirit of mutual understanding and support existing between the two UN agencies. Without going into the merits of the various transport options, for the sake of this evaluation, the significant difference in the approach to secondary transport is that UNHCR chose to provide its own vehicles for transport, while WFP opted to contract private commercial haulers.

## 5. The Pilot Project and its Budgetary Consequences for UNHCR and WFP

35. Two PRRO projects, both related to assistance to refugees, have been submitted to the Executive Board of WFP for approval: PRRO 10071.0 effective from 01/01/2002 till 31/12/2003 and PRRO 10071.1 effective 01/01/2004 till 31/12/2005. The start of the second project coincided with the start of the pilot project. The LTSH calculated for the former project was 138.00 US\$/MT and 176.00 US\$ for the second one. The increase of 38.00 US\$ per MT is quite large. The pilot project coming into force in line with the PRRO 10071.1 cannot solely explain this significant increase; other elements justify this increase like repatriation, milling costs and taking over the distribution from EDP to FDP.

36. When extracting and comparing the anticipated budget expenditures for EDP operation and FDP distribution<sup>49</sup> for PRROs 10071.0 and 10071.1 the cost per ton increases from 7.16 US\$/MT to 33,08 US\$/MT or a cost increase of some 26.00 US\$ per MT. This increase is to a large extent attributable to the secondary transport and the cost for running the FDPs. These two activities became, as of 1 January 2004, the sole responsibility of WFP.

37. The specific distribution costs (running the FDP and the physical distribution) are covered by service contracts negotiated with the IPs. The distribution cost excluding the EDP cost amounts to some 16.00 US\$ per MT (see chapter 3b above). The remainder part of the increase: 10.00 US\$ (26.00 US\$ less 16.00 US\$) is the cost per ton for the secondary transport. Although the cost for the secondary transport fluctuates from camp to camp, a figure of 10.00 US\$ per MT can be regarded as a fair average and is substantiated by the quotations received at the time the budget was prepared in 2003.

38. From the foregoing it is possible to conclude that the pilot project has definitely caused a shift of direct expenditures from UNHCR to WFP of approximately 25 - 26 US\$ per MT. This amounts to an increased expenditure for WFP of some 1.1 million US\$ for the PRRO 10071.1 alone. This transfer of expenditure from one UN agency budget to another concerns only the direct and immediate costs resulting from the pilot project. Variations resulting from staff strength decreases or increases or other DSC and ODOC costs are not included in this figure.

39. It has not been possible to determine whether the pilot project resulted in a decrease in the UNHCR budget. UNHCR staff hinted that the savings have permitted adjustments to other budget lines, keeping in mind financial constraints not related to the Pilot Project.

## 6. The Registration and Revalidation of Refugees

40. The pilot project has in no way influenced the registration procedures of refugees. The degree of accuracy of the database jointly kept by MHA and UNHCR appears to have remained unchanged and so have the delays – short or long – for the registration of births, deaths and departures. WFP, having become a key player in the food distribution with the pilot project, has become directly interested, concerned and involved in the accurate registration of refugees and subsequently with the timely presentation of up-to-date food lists. The registration process certainly has been strengthened thanks to the close interaction of WFP and its IP with UNHCR and the MHA.

41. All in all the food distribution operations in the camps have not been significantly affected by the inevitable shortcomings of the registration process, though complaints are numerous about torn, illegible and defaced ration cards (see section III below). Both WFP and its IP strive to solve any ration card problems on the spot. It is clear

<sup>49</sup> Budget lines 542150 and 542160 of:

- PRRO 10071.0: EDP operations & distribution costs: 373.245 US\$ for 52.122 MT.

- PRRO 10071.1: EDP operations & distribution costs: 1.382.928 US\$ for 41.791 MT.





however, that the distribution operation would benefit from clear, strong and tamperproof ration cards establishing without doubt the food entitlement of each household.

42. The Mayukwayukwa settlement has adopted a very good practice where on the 20-22<sup>nd</sup> of each month the IP carries out with the community leaders a physical check of the ration cards.<sup>50</sup> In Nangweshi on the contrary refugees complained about lost ration cards. It seems that the cards are retained at the time of distribution to be returned at a later stage to the refugees via the section leaders.

43. In Zambia it is clear that the issuance of the rations cards is the responsibility of UNHCR. WFP takes an active role in the registration/revalidation of the refugees, providing UNHCR and the COR with additional staff and vehicles.

44. The refugees complained about the poor condition of the ration cards and have requested that new ones be issued (see section III below). At the present, the UNHCR ration cards are used more as identification cards. WFP has planned to issue new food ration cards, but has postponed issuing them pending the completion of the revalidation exercise. These "in-house" ration cards are to be kept in the camps and up-dated by WFP and its IP.

45. The issuance of WFP ration cards will require close coordination with UNHCR and the Government. The administration of a food ration card system by WFP and its IPs will entail additional administrative work for WFP and will require staff dedicated to the maintenance of the system. Budgets for additional staff plus the plus the costs of printing and issuing the cards every year will have to be borne by WFP. The food ration cards will have to be linked with the registration of the refugees to avoid duplication.

46. The EM noted that the issuance of ration cards by WFP is a policy decision for both UN agencies. Although the revised MOU clearly states that the Government and UNHCR are responsible for the registration of the refugees, no mention is made of WFP taking on the responsibility of issuing ration cards. Should WFP become involved in issuing ration cards, clear guidelines need to be worked out and mutually agreed to by both UN agencies.

## 7. Staffing

47. UNHCR has not recorded a diminution of staff as a result of the pilot project, while WFP increased its field presence during the pilot project but kept its staff strength under constant review. In 2004 WFP upgraded in three of its field offices to the level of sub-offices. Having re-assessed the situation in 2005, one WFP sub-office and two field offices were closed and the staff level adjusted accordingly.

48. The WFP Mangu sub-office engaged 2 food-aid monitors, 2 logistics officers and 1 storekeeper to keep abreast of the workload. The increase in staff was not solely attributable to the pilot project, but to other WFP activities as well including SFP, FFA and to the difficulties with secondary transport (from Senanga EDP 1 to Nangweshi EDP 2). On the other hand the transfer of EDP management in Mwange and Meheba from WFP to the IPs in July 2005 will result in a reduction of WFP staff with a commensurate increase in IP staff.

49. The IPs' staff strength has for the most part remained unchanged since the inception of the pilot project. LWF Mayukwayukwa did have to engage more staff in the field however to support the food distribution activities (1 food coordinator, 1 warehouse manager and 1 distribution supervisor).

## 8. The Transfer of Assets

50. The distribution centres erected by UNHCR were all placed in the custody of WFP. Often the layout of the centres was improved or enlarged by WFP during the Pilot Project. No formal transfer of property appears to have taken place between UNHCR and WFP. No other fixed or movable assets changed hands.

51. The IPs were provided with the necessary equipment to discharge their contractual duties in the field. A right of use agreement signed between WFP and the IPs covers appropriately light vehicles and motorbikes. ICT equipment, VHF handsets and Codan HF radios are also placed at the disposal of the IPs. Budget cover is

<sup>50</sup> The latest food distribution lists are ticked off against presentation of the ration cards.



provided under the heading ODOC (Other direct operational costs). This equipment is, unlike in Sierra Leone, apparently not considered as part of payment in kind to the IP.

## 9. Handling of NFIs

52. Soap is distributed monthly by the WFP IP as part of the general food distribution to the refugees. This is done at no cost to UNHCR. All other NFI supplies are managed, controlled, distributed and accounted for by UNHCR and its appointed IPs.

## 10. Packing Materials

53. The control over the packing material or empty containers has substantially been reinforced since the inception of the pilot project. All the packing material is retrieved and put to good use for:

- a) Incentives to food and security committee members;
- b) general distribution to the households;
- c) promotion or implementation of community or social services;
- d) packing material at the milling plants.

## 11. Milling Operations

54. Milling of the cereals is a key component of the food distribution in Zambia. In order to minimize the sale UNHCR from the beginning arranged for the maize to be milled first outside the camps 1998-99). For example in Kala some milling took place before the distribution and involved the costly shunting of grain and mealie meal between EDP, private warehouses and FDP. Later WFP, UNHCR, and other donors provided mills in the camps. Grinding was free for refugees, with costs covered by WFP through agreements with the IPs.

55. In 2003 women's groups were formed and took over the running of the hammer mills under the supervision of a local NGO, and refugees contributed for the grinding. WFP through its IPs covered the operation and maintenance costs of the mills. In 2005, the women's groups formed two cooperatives and WFP decided to hand over the hammer mills ("right of use") and provide some working capital directly to the women's groups. The cooperatives now operate the mills, using the funds generated to cover operation and maintenance, as well as fund other community service and income generating activities. It should be noted that private commercial hammer mills operate side by side with these women-run cooperative mills inside the camps<sup>51</sup>.

56. Milling is thus done in the camps after the distribution. The exception to this is in Nangweshi camp where the milling is done prior to the distribution in two portable milling units located outside the camp. This milling operation is part of a pilot fortification project funded by Canadian CIDA where minerals and nutrients are added to the milled grain before it is distributed in the camp. Refugees, particularly women are involved in the milling. This project is implemented by CORD the implementing partner in charge of food distribution on behalf of WFP.

---

<sup>51</sup> Kala camp: 6 WFP mills and 6 private commercial mills. Mwanze camps: 7 WFP mills and 7 private mills.



## II. Management and Coordination

### 1. Introduction

57. The revised MOU signed by the Heads of both UN agencies in July 2002 agreed to establish pilot projects in five countries under which WFP would take over from UNHCR and assume responsibility--at its own cost--for the final distribution of the basic ration to refugees. The first three pilot countries were identified in 2002 and the pilot initiated in 2003 (Pakistan, Sierra Leone and Uganda). Zambia was identified as the 4<sup>th</sup> country in early 2003.<sup>52</sup> The selection of Zambia was agreed to by both Country Directors following bilateral discussions with each agency's headquarters in Rome and Geneva.

58. The pilot project involved planning and close collaboration between the two UN agencies. This was complemented by coordination with implementing partners, Government and the beneficiaries. The following sections review the inter-relationship with the various partners before and during the implementation of the Pilot Project.

#### a. Coordination between UN Agencies

59. Both Country Directors began discussing the possibility of including Zambia as one of the pilot countries in early 2003. Details of the arrangement were worked out at the programme level of both agencies over the course of the year including use of UNHCR trucks if necessary, review of staffing requirements--including emphasis on using refugees--and budgets for the Implementing Partners (IPs) involved in the food distribution.<sup>53</sup> Although no joint workplans were prepared at the Lusaka or field level, several Interagency meetings were held from September 2003 onwards where the plans to hand over the food distribution to WFP were reviewed and communicated to the Government and Implementing Partners.

60. Coordination between the two UN agency country offices was well established before the Pilot Project and relations improved during the period under review, particularly with WFP increasing its presence in the field from one Field Monitor to full sub-offices in the north and west. Through the Pilot project, WFP and UNHCR worked out of the same compounds in the two field offices; in 2005 WFP is moving to a separate compound in Mangu, in part because it needs more space for both the refugee and regular country programmes. The EM felt that the proximity of the two agencies sharing the same compound increased communication, and facilitated problem solving at the field level.

61. As per the revised MoU both UN agencies participated in regular interagency coordination meetings at both the country office and sub-office level. Government, IPs and both UN agencies attended in the meetings which were usually chaired by UNHCR. A review of the implementation of the Pilot Project was a part of these meetings.

62. In addition to the interagency meeting both UN agencies plus Government and some of the IPs participate in the Joint Food Assessment Missions (JFAMs) which normally take place annually. During the pilot phase, a JFAM was organized in March 2004; none has been scheduled to date for 2005.

63. Although less of a sensitive issue than in Uganda, registration of the refugees in Zambia remains a crucial exercise to both UNHCR, the Government and WFP. UNHCR and the Government were clearly in charge of registration. Accurate figures are required for any food distribution; there continued to be some discrepancy between population and beneficiary figures, due primarily to the poor condition of the existing ration cards and confusion with the registration lists. Both UNHCR and the Government need to update their population figures, particularly in light of repatriation. WFP and its IPs need to have these figures to ensure accurate food distribution figures.

64. The poor condition of the ration cards now in use in the camps has led to several complaints even from the refugees (see section III below) and both UN agencies have agreed in principle to the new ration card format.

<sup>52</sup> Summary Notes to WFP-UNHCR High Level Meeting dated 18.03.03. See also email dated 13/0/2/3 from Zlatan Milisic to Richard Ragan the then WFP Country Director.

<sup>53</sup> Email message dated 15/10/03 summarizing meeting between UNHCR and WFP on the transition to WFP of the food distribution.



WFP has been planning to introduce its own "internal" ration cards in the camps since mid-way through the pilot project, but has yet to do so, pending some verification of the refugee numbers.

65. As noted in section I of this report, the EM felt that WFP not only at the country level but in Headquarters should carefully consider the repercussions of issuing ration cards separate from those issued by UNHCR. Maintaining up-to-date figures requires an administrative structure that WFP presently does not have in the field. WFP needs to continue to liaise closely with UNHCR and the Government to ensure there is no overlap should WFP ration cards be issued.

#### **b. With Government**

66. As in other countries both UNHCR and WFP have legal agreements with the Government of Zambia, through its Commissioner for Refugees. Although the Commissioner mentioned that he was unaware of the revised MOU between the two UN agencies, his office was aware of the transition to WFP through interagency coordination meetings. The LoU between the Government and WFP specifically mentions that "WFP in Zambia will assume direct responsibility for managing food distribution in refugee settlements/camps, as on of the five pilot operations worldwide."<sup>54</sup>

67. The Commissioner also commented that the change to WFP made sense; WFP is the food agency for the UN and therefore should be responsible for all food issues. He had no problems with the arrangements under the pilot programme as long as the food was distributed to the refugees.

#### **c. With Implementing Partners (IPs)**

68. The Implementing Partners (IPs) participate in the interagency coordination meetings; through them, they were informed in 2003 of the planned takeover of food distribution by WFP. In addition, WFP continued to use the same IPs who have been under contract with UNHCR to do the food distribution when it assumed responsibility (changes in IPs occurred later but this was not related to the pilot project). The same IPs in charge of camp management were also in charge of food distribution in all but one of the camps (in Mwanze WVI is responsible for camp management and ZRCS is in charge of food distribution).

69. Although the LoU between WFP and the Government states that "the Government designates" the NGOs (at the time, LWF, ARCS, WVI, HODI, and CARE International) "as executing agencies for the implementation of the refugee operations in the country," bilateral agreements were signed with each UN agency for their separate responsibilities under WFP. UNHCR continued to use Tripartite Agreements between the IP, UNHCR and the Government (COR). As in other countries the WFP contract was based on a per tonnage basis, while UNHCR contracts were budgeted for each activity listed in the agreements (see section I above).

70. In discussions with the various IPs, the majority accepted and approved the change from UNHCR to WFP in food distribution. Although some complained of additional reporting (see below,) the majority appreciated the good working relations with both UN agencies.

#### **d. With Beneficiaries**

71. Participation by refugees is key to the success of any food distribution and is a key strategy of both UNHCR and WFP as outlined in the revised MoU. Beneficiaries were informed of the pilot project and the handover of the food distribution from UNHCR to WFP through camp coordination and food distribution meetings which were held at least monthly if not more often. Although in theory the refugee leaders were to inform the general population of the transfer of the food distribution from UNHCR to WFP, the "trickle down" effect varied between sections in a camp and between settlements. The EM felt that the refugees need to be continually reminded as part of an ongoing awareness/sensitization process of the roles and responsibilities of not only the UN agencies, but also the IPs, Government and the refugee committees themselves.

---

<sup>54</sup> LoU between WFP and the Government concerning Food Assistance for Refugees from Angola and DR Congo (PRRO 10071.1 signed 2003).



72. Based on discussions, it appeared that the Food Committees were strengthened when WFP became more actively involved in the camps. Although the Government/COR staff had developed general TORs for the various refugee committees, these could be strengthened and introduced in the camps/settlements in the West of Zambia (see capacity building below and in section III).

## **2. Monitoring**

73. According to the revised MoU both UN agencies are to monitor food distribution. Prior to the pilot project, WFP had only a limited number of monitors stationed in the field. With the start of the pilot, WFP established sub-offices and recruited adequate staff to ensure appropriate monitoring of the food distribution (see section I above).

74. The IPs involved in food monitoring vary with the camp/settlement. Although the ideal would be to have a different NGO monitor the food from the one that distributes it, in some cases the same IP is doing both the distribution and the monitoring. This was the case in Mawenge in the north where ZCRS is responsible for both food distribution and the health programme which does the food monitoring.

75. Post distribution monitoring (PDM) during the pilot project was done monthly by WFP and its IPs. In other countries this is done on a quarterly basis and involves UNHCR and its IPs as well. Zambia may want to consider changing the PDM schedule to quarterly and include UNHCR and other partners in the process.

76. UNHCR is responsible for the nutrition surveys. Usually the IP responsible for health conducts a nutrition survey and depending on its capacity may recruit a nutritionist to conduct the survey. These are done on an annual basis; WFP and its IPs usually participate in the survey and regularly receives the nutrition reports.

77. A Joint Food Assessment Mission (JAM) is usually done annually in Zambia. The last one was conducted during the pilot phase (March 2004). None has been scheduled for 2005. This should be done, given the present concern about the drought in the country. Refugees particularly those "weaned off" the food ration should be evaluated for their food security in light of the drought. At the time of the evaluation, three vulnerability assessments were ongoing to determine the affects of the drought on food security. The results of these surveys were not available at the time of this writing.

## **3. Reporting**

78. Both UN agencies require separate reporting based on their bilateral agreements with the IPs. Each has developed standard reporting formats, however WFP's formats changed during the pilot phase and again in 2005.

79. Although duplication of reporting seems to be limited, one IP complained about the amount of paperwork required for both UN agencies covering food distribution and other camp activities separately. Another agency said the reporting requirements were in line with their own procedures and with their donor requirements (see section I above). As in other countries, the EM noted that, while both UN agencies have obligations to the Donors, and the Implementing Partners are required to account for the funding they receive from UNHCR and WFP, the extensive reporting requirements need to be reviewed jointly by both UN agencies to streamline reporting requirements with their IPs.

## **4. Training/Capacity Building**

80. Training and capacity building are key components of both UNHCR and WFP, and are mentioned as responsibilities of both agencies in the revised MOU. Training is for the UN agencies' staff, the Government, the IPs and the refugees (see section III below for refugee capacity building).

81. Part of the policy of both UN agencies is to strengthen the capacity of the refugees to manage their own affairs in the camps. TORs have been prepared by the COR and UNHCR to outline the basic roles and



responsibilities of Camp/settlement Leaders at least in the north. It may be useful to prepare similar TORs for the camps in the west, and these can be reviewed through workshops with the beneficiaries, Government and IPs.

82. As there is some confusion of the role of the food Committee and how they were selected in the western camps, the EM felt that an exchange visit with the north could be useful to review best practices, discuss the TORs and ensure that the camp leaders work closely with the food committees. To support this, the EM provided copies of the TORs used in Sierra Leone and Uganda for refugee committees including one for food distribution.

83. Specific training by UNHCR for WFP, the IPs, and Government staff in protection issues is ongoing and took place during the pilot phase. Training in protection issues including basic reporting procedures has been a request in other countries and it appears to be a continuing activity in Zambia.

84. WFP has undertaken training of its IP staff in logistics, warehouse management, Gender, M & E during the pilot project. Although the training is an ongoing process, some IPs requested that storekeeper training be repeated. WFP is concerned about the high level of staff turnover among the IPs which requires repeated training. At the moment, WFP is expected to meet all the training costs for IPs which becomes untenable for frequently repeated trainings in the same subject.

85. WFP and UNHCR in conjunction with other UN agencies, partners, may want to consider joint sensitization workshops in three thematic areas: gender, SGBV, and HIV/AIDS. These cross-cutting themes are part of the UN global commitments. Both UNHCR and WFP have organized trainings in these areas but may want to coordinate on these workshops.

86. There was no regional or country workshop organized with UNHCR, WFP, Government or the IPs to review the revised MoU. Similar workshops have been held in other regions (Cairo, Nairobi) and both UN agencies may want to hold similar workshops at the country level with key partners.



### III. Beneficiaries and Protection

#### 1. Introduction

87. Beneficiaries' participation in food distribution is key to the success of any food assistance programme and is highlighted in the revised MOU. Their input into the evaluation of the pilot project is an essential component of the Evaluation Missions TORs and Methodology. To ascertain information from the refugees, the Evaluation Mission visited 4 of the 5 existing camps/settlements (in the north, the team split up with each member visiting a different camp). They met with the refugee leadership and the food committee members to ascertain their perception of any change in food distribution during the pilot project.

88. In addition, the same questionnaire used in the previous pilot studies in Pakistan, Sierra Leone and Uganda was used to obtain information from the refugees in Zambia. Staff from UNHCR, WFP, the IPs and even the government completed 80 survey forms. The paragraphs below highlight the major observations.

#### 2. Participation and Perception of the Beneficiaries

89. According to the survey results, 84 percent of those interviewed were aware of the change in the food distribution from UNHCR to WFP and 88 percent claimed they understood the role of the two agencies. 99 percent identified the implementing partner. One form said that WFP "does what UNHCR says," while another said the two UN agencies "do the same work."

90. 92 percent of the responses in the questionnaire said there was coordination and were able to identify which agency was responsible for what items. One form commented that there was "no coordination in UNHCR times," and many of the forms mentioned that distribution of NFI was not regular.

91. Nearly all of those interviewed (99 percent) were aware of the community structures in the camp, but it was not possible to ascertain from the responses the number of women participating in camp administration (one form said the women "were poor leaders"). Most responses seemed to appreciate the food committees (kept order, helped solve problems, etc.) but there were a few complaints (they "don't represent us"), and it was obvious in the camps/settlements in the west that the food committees were a separate entity from the rest of the refugee administrative structure (see below). The number of women participating on the food committees varied by section and by camp; only one section reported less than 50 percent women on the food committee.

92. The refugee camps in the north seemed to have documented the administrative structure more than those in the west. The Refugee Officer (RO) in Kawambwa gave the EM TORs his office had prepared on the roles and responsibilities of the refugee committees. Several staff from both UNHCR and WFP as well as the IPs and MHA expressed an interest in seeing the TORs prepared in other countries; the EM provided these to the WFP field staff requesting they share them with UNHCR and COR representatives and the camp leaders.

93. In sum, the Evaluation Mission found that:

- there does not appear to be any change in the beneficiaries' perception of UNHCR as lead agency responsible for refugee protection and assistance;
- although there seemed to be a general understanding in the camps, periodic briefings on the role of each UN agency, the IP and even the Government should be continued, particularly in light of the possible repatriation and after every election or change in the refugee committee staff; and
- TORs and other documents should be shared between the various field offices of both agencies, the Government and the IPs. If possible exchange visits could be organized to provide refugees an opportunity to compare best practices, lessons learned between the camps or regions in Zambia.



### 3. Protection and Food Delivery

94. According to the results of the survey, 86 percent of the respondents were aware of the basic ration. 9 different survey forms said they were aware by the number of scoops, but not necessarily by the weight of the ration. Two forms commented that the ration was larger under UNHCR.

95. 62 percent of those interviewed through the questionnaires reported a change in the food delivery schedule, but only 30 percent said there were delays in the delivery of food to the camps. 17 out of the 80 forms included comments that distribution took more time under UNHCR. Comments on the number of distributions per month varied by location; this is normal since distribution in the refugee camps is twice a month, while it is once a month in the settlements.

96. 17 of the 80 survey forms stated that delays were due to transport problems, while 10 said that any delays were explained to the leaders and refugees were informed of the problems. 17 forms noted the change from UNHCR trucks bringing the food to camps to "special" trucks under WFP.

97. While just over half of the responses stated that distribution points had changed, 8 responses commented that the distribution structures had improved; before distribution took place in the open, while now it is done under covered structures. The majority of those who responded to the questionnaire said that the collection of food was easier now than before.

98. Very few of the responses (12 percent) said there was any change in the actual distribution system, but some commented that plastic scoops had been replaced by metal, and that scoops were bigger under UNHCR. Two forms said that WFP introduced the food committees, while others said the food ration had been reduced and scoops were no longer filled to the top during distribution. Only 3 percent said there had been a change in packaging.

99. Delays in food delivery or problems with the pipeline can create protection problems. Although no protection problems were reported, there were significant pipeline problems in the last two months (November and December 2004) of the pilot project; cereals and pulses were reduced by 50 percent due to shortages of supply in country. Refugees were informed of the problem and accepted the 50 percent ration. Neither UNHCR or the MHA reported an increase in protection/security problems; this may be due to communication with the refugees as well as resolving the problem in a short time span.

100. Although normal food distribution resumed in January 2005, maize was temporarily replaced by sorghum as the cereal. The camps in the west have accepted this, while those in the north have refused to accept sorghum. There has been some concern that this protest could get out of hand, but to date, there have been no protection problems related to delivery of sorghum instead of maize (see comments below.)

101. Just under 50 percent of the responses to the survey said they were aware of protection incidents related to food; however the majority of the forms (48/80) said women were safe during the distribution. Several survey forms gave examples of food-related protection incidents including: catching cheats (2); collection of food for repayment of loans (3); ration card issues (6); and selling food (1).

102. Although responses varied by camp, in general the refugee population seemed aware of whom to contact for protection issues. Most responses to the survey said that a combination of authorities were contacted include community leaders, police MHA, UNHCR, and WFP usually in that order, depending on the issue. 15 of the survey forms said that SGBV/community services were contacted for protection issues.

103. 37 percent of the responses in the survey said there were specific protection problems related to women, although several qualified the response stating these were "not food related" (5). Specific examples included "property grabbing" (4), beating, polygamy (4,) and one commented that these problems included "both sexes." Although only 26 percent of the responses said that there were SGBV incidents related to food distribution, several of the forms commented that divorce was an issue where the husband kept the card (12). Lost cards were also mentioned as a problem.





104. There did not appear to be any significant protection problems for the vulnerable, based on the responses to the questionnaire. Depending on the camp and the structures in place, special attention was given to the EVI for food distribution including specific distribution point (3), assistance from the camp leaders and/or food committees (29), support from community services (7). 36 of the forms commented that friends or relatives helped the vulnerable take their food to their homes.

105. Part of the populations in the two settlements of Mayukwayukwa and Maheba have been "weaned" off of the food ration. These refugee families were given 2.5 ha of land and have had two successful harvests, and therefore have been determined to be self-sufficient. Although there did not seem to be any major issues raised by the refugees regarding those who no longer receive the food ration, the Government and the two UN agencies will need to continue to monitor this population, particularly in light of the present drought in Zambia.

#### **4. Identification, Ration Cards and Registration**

106. Registration seemed to be less of an issue with the refugees in Zambia than in some of the other countries included in the pilot study, although the condition of the ration cards was raised in every camp visited (9 forms commented under suggestions that the ration cards need to be replaced.) 91 percent of those interviewed responded that all members are registered and included on the ration card. Registration of new born babies seemed to take longer in the west than in the camps in the north. Some of the interviewees commented that some family members are excluded from the ration cards; others said the computer "omits" members (4).

107. Revalidation took place in November-December 2004 at the end of the pilot project in the northern camps. Refugee beneficiary figures were reduced by some 12 percent. A similar exercise was undertaken in the west. With the repatriation of the Angolan refugees now ongoing, camp population figures will have to be updated regularly.

108. As noted above, there was no question that registration of refugees and issuing of identification cards was the responsibility of UNHCR and the Government. WFP initiated plans to issue its own ration cards during the pilot project. A design has been prepared and approved by both UNHCR and WFP. Due to delays in updating the UNHCR data base, WFP has not started to issue new ration cards. Ration cards remained are a key issue to the refugees; the two UN agencies need to work closely together to resolve the matter.

#### **5. Gender**

109. The LoU between the Government and WFP states that both names of the Head of household and the spouse should appear on the registration and food ration cards as co-recipients. Although 99 percent of the responses to the survey said that women were included in the ration cards, 6 of the completed survey forms noted that men were required for unloading and heavy work. One form said, "women should be Head of Household on the Ration Cards." This may be one reason for WFP to issue new ration cards where women are the main recipients of the food, with their spouses names included in the family food list.

110. 100 percent of the respondents to the survey said that women participate in the food distribution while 74 percent said they would prefer to have more women involved in the food distribution. 18 of the survey forms said that the ratio of men to women working in food distribution should be balanced. Other comments on reasons why more women should be involved included women "take care of food, are in charge in the kitchen" (8), women don't over-scoop and they reduce pilferage (3).

111. The LoU between the Government and WFP has a specific section on the "Role of Women." It states that efforts should be made to recruit more women in responsible positions in the management and distribution of food and that both WFP and UNHCR will monitor this recruitment. As in other camps, women have been elected as camp leaders and serve on the food committees (50 percent) the Evaluation Mission noticed that based on the meetings in the camps there were fewer women involved in camp administration and fewer still in senior positions. It appeared that women were less likely to chair refugee committees, but often served as deputies or assistants.



## 6. Training/Capacity Building

112. As noted above, the EM felt that the structure and capacity of the refugee leadership was stronger in the northern camps than in those in the west. Clear guidelines on the roles and responsibilities of the refugee committees including food committees could help build this capacity. Training in monitoring and reporting should be ongoing, and repeated anytime there is a change in the members of the food committee or a new election. The UN agencies along with implementing partners and the Government could facilitate workshops to develop and review TORs for each committee.

113. The confusion or conflict between the camp leaders and the food committee members in the western camps should be resolved. A workshop could be organized to review this, and it may be useful to bring refugees and/or staff from the north to the west to facilitate this.

114. The LoU states that WFP food commodities should be used to support training of women in education, gender, development, family planning, health and nutrition. WFP is to monitor the training and use of food in capacity building for women (see Gender above) and encourage their participation.

115. Although UNHCR has organized protection workshops, these need to be repeated on a continuous basis and include not only the participation of the refugees but also the Government, host communities, WFP and the various IPs. Both UN agencies should continue to work together on "cross cutting" themes to support training in gender, SGBV, and HIV/AIDS. In addition, with repatriation to Angola taking place, mine awareness campaigns need to be conducted for the returning population.

## 7. Other Issues Raised by the Refugees

116. The last question of the survey asked about suggestions, complaints, recommendations for the food distribution; although 15 of the forms said the system was fine, 5 said that the system had improved under WFP. Other comments were recorded on the survey forms. These are summarized in Appendix 2, and highlighted below:

- On the food distribution system
  - Improve communication on ration, know what food to give and ensure food is acceptable to refugees:
    - Consult the refugees; do not just inform of changes;
    - visit and listen to the refugees, and pay attention to refugee complaints
    - Change the food committee every 5 months
    - Provide information on the food pipeline so "refugees know when to repatriate."
  - Observe delivery schedule and improve transport
  - Move FDP to each section
  - Replace ration cards (see above)
  - Weigh all food
  - Under UNHCR, leaders were more respected and responsible for distribution; Leaders were paid under UNHCR, but not under WFP
  - Provide incentives to Food committee (1,) leaders (2)
  - Help EVIs and give specific cases priority during distribution
- On the rations
  - Increase food ration particularly for single and small households
  - Change bean quality and do not deliver Sorghum
  - Issue NFI more regularly
  - Prepack food according to family size
  - Distribute empty containers
  - Change the food basket and add variety to avoid monotony





## IV. Concluding Remarks and Lessons Learned

### Introduction

117. The Terms of Reference (TORs) for the Evaluation Mission state that the country case studies should summarize best practices and lessons learned for each country, but should not make any specific recommendations particularly regarding the possible extension or continuation of the Pilot Project. Therefore this section summarizes the main findings of the EM; they are divided according to the previous three sections of the study and are summarized in the bullet points below.

### Cost and Logistics

- 1) Changes in food management and distribution activities in the camps and settlements, as a result of the implementation of the Pilot Project in 2004, have in terms of logistics hardly been noticeable in the camps. All the UNHCR appointed IPs were retained by WFP. The commitment to continuity did not preclude however, WFP from introducing significant improvements in the food distribution system.
- 2) The food management (EDP) and the food distribution (FDP) services are covered by bilateral agreements between WFP and the designated IP. These services are contracted on a fixed rate per MT. The right of use of WFP assets is also covered by an ad-hoc addendum to the bilateral agreement. The care and general services in the camps are still covered by tripartite UNHCR – IP – MHA agreements.
- 3) For 2004, the year of the Pilot Project, WFP negotiated with the IPs distinctive rates for the food management (EDP) and the final distribution (FDP). For 2005 WFP negotiated a single all-inclusive rate for both operations. It has not been possible to ascertain the exact cost of distribution under UNHCR. Under WFP the total cost of food management and food distribution works out at approximately 25 US\$/MT.
- 4) Before the Pilot Project, UNHCR used its own fleet of trucks for the secondary transport of food. Under the pilot project the organisation of the secondary transport became the responsibility of WFP; however UNHCR placed at WFP's disposal the UNHCR trucks for the first quarter of 2004.
- 5) Having carefully considered all the options, WFP opted for commercial haulers. Trying to organise low density/short haul transport on the same footing as high density/long haul transport has in certain refugee camps not always yielded the desired results. Transport breaks have occurred while rates quoted for the services varied dramatically. WFP officials recognised that the organisation of secondary transport was their main concern.
- 6) The impact of the pilot project on the WFP budget is on average 26 US\$/MT; 10 US\$ for the secondary transport and 16 US\$ for the food distribution. For the PRRO 10071.1 this works out at 1.1 million US\$ extra charges to be born by WFP. Having analyzed the UNHCR budget for the care and general services in the refugee camps, it has not been possible to determine whether this reduction of costs has led to lower overall budget.
- 7) The pilot project did not influence the registration and revalidation procedures for refugees. With WFP becoming a key player in the food distribution operation, it is more directly interested in accurate, up-to-date food lists. There is a tendency in the camps for the UNHCR ration cards to be considered as mere identification cards. WFP is considering issuing food ration cards. This initiative stems from a sensible drive on the part of WFP to exercise a better control over the entire distribution process. There is however a danger of duplication and eventually such initiative has a price tag, which must be carefully evaluated at the onset by both UNHCR and WFP.
- 8) WFP increased its field presence during the Pilot Project but has since closed some offices and reduced staff. Staffing for UNHCR has remained almost unchanged. In July 2005 WFP will transfer the management of the Meheba and Mwanze EDP to a designated IP.
- 9) Save the food distribution centres (buildings), no other fixed or movable assets were transferred from UNHCR to WFP under this pilot project. IPs have been receiving from WFP the necessary equipment such as light vehicles and communication equipment. These expenditures are listed and recorded under the ODOC budget.
- 10) Soap was the only NFI distributed on a regular basis in the camps. It is distributed simultaneously with the general food distribution by the IP under contract with WFP at no cost to UNHCR.
- 11) The packing material or empty containers are recovered and used in all the camps.



- 12) The milling operations were previously conducted under the responsibility and at the expense of UNHCR “before” the distribution of the food commodities took place. WFP has managed to transfer the milling operation “after” the food distribution, placing the entire operation under the control of the refugee women's groups.

### **Management and Coordination**

1. Coordination between the two UN agencies and their partners was good before the Pilot Project and improved with its implementation. This was facilitated by WFP continuing to use the same Implementing Partners UNHCR had used for food distribution.
2. The Government, particularly the COR offices played a key role in the registration of the refugees and management of the camps. COR worked closely with both UN agencies and was pleased with the results of the Pilot Project.
3. Registration of the refugees was not a major problem in the Zambian refugee camps. Ration cards were however in very poor condition and need to be replaced. WFP is considering issuing its own "in-house" ration cards, which will require close coordination with the Government and UNHCR.
4. Although no joint workplans were prepared at the central or field level, WFP and UNHCR shared common premises for field offices during the pilot project. This facilitated cooperation and ensured that any problems could be resolved immediately.
5. Periodic (quarterly or biannually) meetings with field staff from both offices coming together to review practical issues and discuss lessons learned, or best practices would facilitate closer working relations between the UN agencies. The location of the meetings could rotate between field offices and include visits to the camps/settlements.
6. The refugees were informed of the transfer of responsibility for food distribution from UNHCR to WFP. Roles and responsibilities of each UN agency, the IPs and even the refugee committees should be reviewed regularly and communicated to the beneficiaries.
7. Food distribution and monitoring were undertaken by separate agencies in all but one of the camp/settlements. This separation of responsibilities is a good check and balance. Health agencies under contract with UNHCR were usually responsible for the FBM; they also participated in the PDM and undertook the nutrition surveys.
8. The IPs were informed in advance of the pilot project through the monthly interagency meetings and reported that the transition went smoothly. Some IPs complained about the reporting requirements. Both UN agencies could work together to streamline reporting procedures minimize and duplication.
9. An in-country review of the revised MoU with both UN agencies and their implementing partners may have facilitated understanding of the Pilot Project.

### **Beneficiaries and Protection**

1. The beneficiaries' perception of UNHCR as lead agency responsible for refugee protection and assistance did not change with the implementation of the Pilot Project.
2. Although delays in food delivery or breaks in the food pipeline can create potential protection problems, none were reported by UNHCR or COR even though half rations were issued for pulses and cereals the last two months of the pilot project.
3. Periodic awareness campaigns should be held regularly to ensure the refugees understand the roles of the UN agencies, the IPs, Government and refugee committees.
4. TORs on the roles and responsibilities of the refugee committees should be prepared in consultation with the beneficiaries in each settlement, particularly the camps in the west where there is some confusion over the roles and responsibilities and selection of the food committee members and the section leaders. These TORs and the roles and responsibilities of UNHCR, WFP, the IPs and Government should be reviewed periodically, particularly when there is an election or a change in refugee committee staff.
5. Training in basic protection issues by UNHCR should continue for WFP and IP staff working in the camps in Zambia. Both UN agencies should coordinate their training in the cross-cutting themes of Gender, SGBV, and HIV/AIDS.





## Appendix 1

## Summary of Zambian Refugee Population and Number of Questionnaires by Camp/Settlement

## Evaluation of Joint WFP-UNHCR Pilot Food Distribution Project – 3/17 May 2005

	Camp	Initial	Population as of April 2005			# of Surveys	Participants			
			Male	Female	Total		Male	Female	Total	Unmarked
1	Nangweshi	NWS	9,164	10,464	19,628	32	29	43	72	12
2	Mayukwayukwa	MKK	3,620	3,472	7,092	34	49	56	105	
3	Kala	KAL	10,677	11,270	21,947	5	22	19	41	1
4	Mwange	MWG	11,831	12,488	24,319	5	23	28	51	
5	Meheba	MHB	11,405	12,033	23,438	4	2	1	3	1
	<b>Total</b>		<b>46,697</b>	<b>49,727</b>	<b>96,424</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>125</b>	<b>147</b>	<b>272</b>	<b>14</b>
	Percentage		48%	52%	100%		46%	54%	100%	

"Unmarked" questionnaires that did not state number or gender of interviewees

**Appendix 2****Summary Results of Discussions with the Beneficiaries****WFP-UNHCR Joint Food Distribution Evaluation Mission in Zambia – 3/17 May 2005**Camp: **80 Surveys from all 5 Camps/settlements in Zambia**Gender of Interviewee/s: **Male: 125, Female: 147, Total: 272**

14 unmarked forms; number and gender of interviewees was not given.

	Questions for Discussion	%	Yes	No	Don't Know	Total	Comments/Remarks/Observations
1	Are the beneficiaries aware of the change in the food distribution from UNHCR to WFP?	84	66	8	5	79	Verification much stricter under WFP. Required to show ration cards.
	Do they understand the role of the two agencies?	88	70	6	4	80	UNHCR: Gen Welfare: Protection 10, Repatriation 3; NFI 42 "Looks after us." "WFP: Food "Does what UNHCR says." "do the same work."
	Who is Implementing Partner and are they aware of its role/responsibilities?	99	73	1		74	Most included only camp manager IP. Some included Health, MHA, and other actors.
	Is their coordination of delivery of food and non-food items? Are the refugees aware of who delivers what?	92	65	6		71	Food: majority said WFP; some said IP in charge NFI: majority said UNHCR; some said IP in charge. "not regular" NFI and Food together. "No coordination in UNHCR times."
2	Are the refugees aware of the community structure and communication channels for food distribution? Who represents them? Are women in leadership roles?	99	79		1	80	Majority aware. One complained that women were poor leaders.
	Are there food committees? What is the composition and what % of the food committees are women? Are the committees useful in resolving food distribution problems?	90	71	5	3	79	# and % of women members varied by camp and section but only one section reported less than 50% women on the food committee. Comments on role of food committees included: kept order and controlled crowds & scooping 6, helped solve problems 16, share info, represent people on food issues 3. Now not helpful 4; don't represent us 1; women members restrict cheating, one form said "awaits formation."

	Questions for Discussion	%	Yes	No	Don't	Total	Comments/Remarks/Observations
--	--------------------------	---	-----	----	-------	-------	-------------------------------





					Know		
3	Are they aware of the basic ration and do they receive it? Did it change between UNHCR and WFP?	86	69	9	2	80	Aware through # of scoops not weight 9; better, greater quantity under HCR 2,
	Were there any changes in the delivery schedule between UNHCR and WFP?	62	48	27	2	77	Distribution took more time under HCR 17, fixed dates and more effort under WFP; comments # of distributions (1 or 2 times) per month varied by camp.
	Are there delays in food delivery? If so why? Do they complain and if so to whom? What was the result of their complaint?	30	23	53		76	Delays rare and explained by leaders 10, delays due to transport problems 17, before UNHCR trucks, now new "special trucks 17, problems with distri list, "no one helps" when they complain.
	Have distribution points changed to make it easier to carry food?	53	42	37		79	Move from open to covered structures 8. Majority claimed collection of food is easier
	Has distribution changed (scoops vs. group distribution, etc) between UNHCR and WFP?	12	9	68		77	Plastic to metal scoops for oil 2, before scoops were bigger 3, WFP introduced Food Committee 2, food ration reduced; buckets not full
	Has packaging changed to facilitate transport?	3	3	72	1	76	Mealie meal is bagged
4	Do women participate in the distribution? What % of women are employed as scoopers? Monitors?	100	77			77	Estimates of % women varied by questionnaire from 30-90%, but all agreed women participate.
	Would they prefer to have more women involved?	74	45	16		61	Should be balanced 18, more men than women and men to do heavy work 6, more women than men 13, women are lazy 2, women take care of food and are in charge in kitchen 8, women don't over-scoop and reduce pilferage 3
	Are women/spouses included on the ration cards? What % of women collect the food?	99	72	1		73	Estimates of % of women on the ration cards varied from 30-90%; majority confirmed women were included on ration cards. Comments included "women should be Head of Household on the Ration Cards,"
	Do all members of the family have access to food? Are all family members registered and included on the ration cards?	91	69	7		76	Registration does not seem to be a major issue based on the survey results. Comments included "head of household represents whole family 8, # of cards depends on date of arrival 2, family members excluded and computer omits members 4
	Are they aware of or ever reported/been involved in security or protection incidents related to food distribution? Are women safe at the food distribution?	48	37	34	6	77	Majority of survey forms said women are safe at the distribution areas 48, other incidents included: catching cheats 2, credit repayment 3, ration card issues 6, quarrels 1, selling food 1,



WFP-UNHCR Joint Evaluation of the Pilot Food Distribution Projects – Full Report



	Questions for Discussion	%	Yes	No	Don't Know	Total	Comments/Remarks/Observations
	To whom would they turn to complain or report Protection Issues						Responses varied by camp and often included a combination of refugee leaders, police, MHA, UNHCR, WFP. The number for each group mentioned is as follows: Camp Council 36, police 13, HCR 14, RO 22, SGBV/Com Service 15 , other 2
	Are there specific protection problems that relate to women?	37	28	45	2	75	Not food related 5, "property grabbing" 4, beating 1, polygamy 4, pregnant 1, both sexes 1,
	Are there SGBV protection issues related to food distribution?	26	19	48	6	73	Husband takes card in divorce 12, lost cards, 1
	How do the vulnerable (EVI) collect their food? Are there protection issues for the EVI related to food distribution?						Majority of responses said friends and relatives assist 36, Com. Services 7, camp leaders & food committees 29, specific distribution point 3,
5	Any suggestions, complaints, recommendations, or Lessons Learned regarding the food distribution system either before under UNHCR or now under WFP?						<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Replace ration cards 9,</li> <li>• Change the food committee every 5 months 2,</li> <li>• Increase food ration</li> <li>• Change bean quality 7, change Sorghum 2</li> <li>• Improve food distribution service 3, pay attention to refugee complaints</li> <li>• Issue NFI more regularly</li> <li>• Observe delivery schedule and improve transport</li> <li>• Move FDP to each section</li> <li>• Prepack food according to family size</li> <li>• Increase ration for single and small households</li> <li>• Distribute empty containers</li> <li>• Improve communication on ration, know what food to give and ensure food is acceptable to refugees,</li> <li>• Consult not just inform of changes 3; visit and listen</li> <li>• Inform on food situation so "refugees know whether to repatriate."</li> <li>• Weigh all food 2</li> <li>• Monotonous, change the food basket 4</li> <li>• Under UNHCR leaders were more respected and responsible for distribution; Leaders paid under UNHCR but not under WFP 5</li> <li>• Provide incentives to Food committee 1, leaders 2</li> <li>• Help EVI in distribution 2 and give specific cases priority during distribution</li> <li>• Under WFP system has improved 5</li> <li>• System is fine 15</li> </ul>





## Case Study No 5 - Kenya (05 - 17 June 2005)





# Acronyms

CARE	CARE International, NGO
CBO	Community Based Organization
CD	Country Director
CO	Country Office
COMPAS	Commodity Movement Processing and Analysis System
CSB	Corn Soya Blend (Blended food)
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DSC	Direct Support Costs
ECW	Enhanced Commitments to Women
EDP	Extended Delivery Point
EM	Evaluation Mission
EMOP	Emergency Operation
EVI	Extremely Vulnerable Individuals
FBM	Food Basket Monitoring
FDP	Final Distribution Point
FNA	Food Needs Assessment
GFD	General Food Distribution
GOK	Government of Kenya
HH	Head of Household
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IGA	Income Generating Activities
IP	Implementing Partner
ISC	Indirect Support Costs
JAM	Joint Assessment Mission
JMTF	Joint Monitoring Task Force (WFP, GoK, UNHCR)
Kcal	Kilocalorie
KSH	Kenyan Shillings
LoU	Letter of Understanding
LTSH	Landside Transport, Storage and Handling
LWF	Lutheran World Federation
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MCN	Mother and Child Nutrition
MHA	Ministry of Home Affairs
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MT	Metric Ton
NBI	Nairobi
NFI	Non-food Items
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
PDM	Post Distribution Monitoring
PRRO	Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation
SGBV	Sexual and Gender Based Violence
SFP	Supplementary Feeding Programme
TFP	Therapeutic Feeding Programme
ToR	Terms of Reference
TPR	Tripartite Agreement
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
US\$	US Dollars
VAM	Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping



WFP

World Food Programme







# Table of Contents

<b>Executive Summary</b>	<b>v</b>
<b>Introduction</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Background</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>I. Cost and Logistics</b>	<b>2</b>
1. The Organization of the Food-aid Pipeline and Final Distribution	2
2. The Pilot Project and Secondary Transport	3
3. The Pilot Project and the Various Contractual Arrangements	4
a. Before the Pilot Project	4
b. Once the Pilot Project Came into Force	4
4. The Total Cost of the Food Management (EDP) and Distribution (FDP)	5
a. The Cost of the EDP Operation	5
b. The Cost of the Secondary Transport	6
c. The Cost of the Final Food Distribution	6
5. The Pilot Project and its Budgetary Consequences for UNHCR and WFP	8
6. The Registration and Revalidation of Refugees	8
7. Staffing	8
8. The Transfer of Assets	9
9. Packing Materials	9
10. Handling of NFIs	9
11. Milling Operations	10
<b>II. Management and Coordination</b>	<b>11</b>
a. Coordination between UN Agencies	11
b. With Government	11
c. With Implementing Partners (IPs)	11
d. With Beneficiaries	12
2. Monitoring	12
3. Reporting	13
4. Training/Capacity Building	13
<b>III. Beneficiaries and Protection</b>	<b>15</b>
1. Introduction	15
2. Participation and Perception of the Beneficiaries	15
3. Protection and Food Delivery	15
4. Identification, Ration Cards and Registration	16
5. Gender	17
6. Training/Capacity Building	17
7. Other Issues Raised by the Refugees	17
<b>IV. Concluding Remarks and Lessons Learned</b>	<b>19</b>



## **Appendices**

- Appendix 1 Schedule of the Monthly Distribution Figures January 2003 – April 2004
- Appendix 2 Summary of Kenya Refugee Population and Number of Questionnaires by Camp/Settlement (06-17 June 2005)
- Appendix 3 Summary Report of Distributions with the Beneficiaries



# Executive Summary

The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the World Food Programme (WFP) have worked closely together for many years to provide humanitarian assistance to refugees and displaced persons. This collaboration was strengthened in July 2002 when the two UN agencies signed a revised Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) which stated, among other things, that WFP would take over, on a pilot basis, the responsibility for the entire food distribution programme in five countries. This was to be followed with an evaluation of each of the five pilot projects.

This case study of Kenya is the fifth and final evaluation of the Pilot food Distribution Project prepared by the two consultants selected jointly by WFP and UNHCR. The two consultants visited Kenya from 05-17 June 2005, and met with staff from both UN agencies, their partners and the refugees. This included field visits to the two main camps of Kakuma and Dadaab. The Pilot project was ongoing; the only country where this was the case.

The Kenya case study was prepared based on the Terms of Reference and evaluation methodology agreed to by the two UN agencies; it follows the same framework established in the four previous studies in Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Uganda, and Zambia. As with the others, the Kenya case study focuses on the three main issues as outlined in the Terms of Reference: Cost and Logistics; Management and Coordination; and Beneficiaries Perspective and Protection. The report summarizes the findings of these three issues in separate chapters. Lessons learned and best practices for the pilot project in Kenya are summarized in the last chapter on Concluding Remarks at the end of the study.

Based on the results of the mission to Kenya the implementation of the Pilot Food Distribution Project did not greatly change the existing system and procedures for food distribution in the refugee camps. The Implementing Partners (IPs) responsible for food under UNHCR remained the same with WFP assuming responsibility for the final distribution. There was no change in the refugees' perception of UNHCR as lead agency for their protection. WFP did take over from UNHCR and at its own cost the secondary transport from the Extended Delivery Point to the Final Delivery Point, but this was not a major change and the costs for WFP did not increase dramatically.

The Evaluation Mission would like to thank the staff of WFP and UNHCR both in the country offices in Nairobi as well as in the field offices in Kakuma and Dadaab for their cooperation and assistance during the evaluation of the Pilot Food Distribution Project in Kenya. Their knowledge, experience and logistic support were of great help in the preparation of this document. Given the harsh working conditions and isolation of the camps, their dedication of the field staff in particular was greatly appreciated.

The Evaluation Mission would also like to thank the Government of Kenya (GOK,) particularly the district Officers in Kakuma and Dadaab for their support and assistance. Their staff provided security and supported registration and food distribution during the pilot phase.

In addition, the Implementing Partners (IPs) provided valuable insight and information for the preparation of this study. Their contribution to the evaluation, particularly the institutional memory of some of their long-serving key staff was greatly appreciated.



Finally, the evaluation of the Pilot Food Distribution Project in Kenya could not have been done without the valuable input from the refugees. Their participation during the group meetings, their responses to the questionnaires, and during individual interviews were valuable contributions to this study.

The findings and conclusions in this case study are those of the authors and do not imply endorsement by UNHCR or WFP.



## Introduction<sup>55</sup>

With the signing of the revised Memorandum of Understanding in July 2002, the World Food Programme (WFP) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) agreed to hand over the food distribution from UNHCR to WFP as part of a pilot project in five countries. The two UN agencies identified Pakistan, Uganda, Sierra Leone, Zambia and Kenya for the five Pilot case studies. A Joint Food Distribution Evaluation Mission was established once the pilot project was started to review the Lessons Learned and Best Practices in each of the five countries.

Two consultants were selected jointly by both agencies to undertake the joint Evaluation Mission (EM). Kenya is the fifth case study and follows the same reporting outline and format established in the previous studies. As with the other case studies the one for Kenya focuses on the three main issues outlined in the Terms of Reference including:

- Cost and Logistics Considerations
- Management and Coordination
- Beneficiaries' Perspective and Protection

## Background

1. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the World Food Programme (WFP) work together to provide humanitarian assistance to refugees around the world including food aid. UNHCR is the lead UN agency responsible for the protection and assistance of refugees; WFP is the Food Aid Organization of the United Nations. Over the years (1985, 1994, 1997) the two UN agencies have signed Memoranda of Understanding (MoU). The most recent revision, which led to the Pilot Project for Food Distribution in five countries (including Kenya), was signed in July 2002.

2. In the past before the signing of the revised MoU, UNHCR, with its Implementing Partners (IPs) was responsible for the secondary transport and the final distribution of the food to the refugees, while WFP was responsible for the procurement and delivery of the food from the port of entry into the country to the Extended Delivery Point (EDP). With the revised MoU both UN agencies agreed that, on a pilot basis, WFP would take over responsibility of the entire food distribution process at its own expense, including the secondary transport from the Extended Delivery Point (EDP) to the Final Delivery Point (FDP).

3. Kenya was selected as one of the five case studies for the pilot food distribution in 2003; however, both UN offices agreed that the pilot project would not start until 2004. Following a needs assessment and discussions on the modalities for the transfer of the Final Distribution to WFP, a Tripartite Agreement (TPR) was drawn up and signed by the two UN agencies in July 2004. The signed document was submitted to the Government of Kenya for their approval, but at the time of the EM's visit, the document had not been signed by the Government. The target beneficiaries included in the TPR were some 225,000 refugees and asylum seekers from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Eritrea, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda.

4. The Pilot Project in Kenya came into effect on 1 July 2004 and was to run for one year. It was implemented under two Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations (PRRO 6226 and 10258) of WFP and the UNHCR agreements for Kenya (04/AB/KEN/CM/201 and 202). Contracts, agreements and workplans were signed by UNHCR, WFP and the Implementing Partners as part of the implementation of the Pilot Project. These along with the findings of the Evaluation Mission are discussed in the following three sections.

---

<sup>55</sup> Consultants: Mitchell L. Carlson and Francois de Meulder.



## I. Cost and Logistics

### 1. The Organization of the Food-aid Pipeline and Final Distribution

5. The responsibility for the final food distribution in the refugee camps of Kakuma and Dadaab was transferred from UNHCR to WFP on 1 July 2004 in line with the provisions of the UNHCR/WFP revised MOU of July 2002. The average population estimates requiring food-aid stood at 90,781 refugees in Kakuma camps and 139,578 refugees in Dadaab camps.<sup>56</sup> The monthly average tonnage of food to be distributed was 1,500 tons for the Kakuma camps and at 2,200 tons for the Dadaab camps.

6. In preparation of the Pilot food distribution Project, UNHCR and WFP Kenya have devoted significant time and effort from mid-2003 to study the contractual, financial and logistical implications of shifting the responsibility for the final food distribution from one UN agency to the other. WFP conducted a detailed assessment of the FDPs in close association with UNHCR and the IPs. WFP looked into various options to streamline the distribution operations so as to make these more cost efficient while maintaining the same standard of services for the refugees.<sup>57</sup> The pros and cons of four different FDP management scenarios were carefully evaluated in terms of the quality of the managerial services, the staffing required and the financial impact on the WFP budget. These were identified as follows:

- 1) The services of UNHCR's existing IPs (Lutheran World Federation (LWF) in Kakuma and CARE in Dadaab) are retained by WFP, but under separate bilateral contractual arrangements;
- 2) WFP manages the FDPs and conducts the distribution operations itself;
- 3) New IPs are identified and appointed to manage the FDPs on WFP's behalf;
- 4) WFP manages the Kakuma and Dadaab FDPs through separate (and presumably asymmetric) implementation arrangements for each FDP.

7. Serious consideration was given to the second scenario whereby WFP would manage the distribution operations at the FDPs by itself even if this scenario would have required fresh capital investment from WFP, recruitment and training of staff and a complete restructuring of the Kakuma and Dadaab FDP operations. From a logistics and costing point of view this scenario appeared at first sight quite attractive, provided WFP could identify and train the necessary staff. In the end, having closely scrutinised and reduced the budgets of both IPs (LWF in Kakuma and CARE in Dadaab) WFP decided to retain the services of the same IPs as UNHCR for the FDP operations. This exercise proved very useful in that the organisation of the distribution, the staffing of the FDP by both IP staff and refugees, and all the FDP costing elements were carefully evaluated and tested prior to the change-over.

8. From the refugees' point of view the structure and the organisation of the operations at the FDPs remained basically unchanged (see section II and III below). Changes, if any, were experienced by the refugees as an improvement in the distribution process, e.g.

- The quality and reliability of the weighing operations improved substantially with the introduction of digital weighing scales. 100 percent of the rations are now weighed before exiting the distribution corridor.
- Spillage is minimized and retrieved.
- Distribution corridors have been enlarged in Dadaab FDPs.
- Length of distribution cycle reduced from 6 to 4 days in Kakuma FDPs thanks to better management and monitoring; such changes were less noticeable in Dadaab.
- Bulk of complaints, irregularities and discrepancies are dealt with and solved on the spot.

9. Reviewing the records, general food distributions at both Kakuma and Dadaab camps were adversely affected by a number of pipeline breaks, entailing last minute modifications of the food basket. Pipeline breaks were more easily corrected in Kakuma with loans and borrowings from other projects. Food distribution in Dadaab suffered more directly from poor road conditions and severe customs clearance delays in Mombasa.<sup>58</sup> For

<sup>56</sup> PRRO 10258 Project papers submitted to the WFP Executive Board 2-3 June 2003 para 35.

<sup>57</sup> Assessment of the FDPs and Proposal for the WFP Management of the FDPs in Kakuma and Dadaab by Ifigenia Metaxa (Consultant) – WFP Nairobi November 2003.

<sup>58</sup> Customs clearance delays resulting from lengthy custom exoneration application procedures at the Ministry of Finance in Nairobi.



the most part UNHCR and WFP managed to offset or minimize these inconveniences adjusting the food basket while respecting the daily 2,100 Kcalories minimum daily ration.

10. It should be noted that the extended delivery points (EDPs) and depots are situated within a couple of hundred metres of the final delivery points (FDPs). Therefore, the community leaders and refugees can easily monitor the arrival of food and assess the daily stock position in the warehouses. Improved regular information sharing between WFP, UNHCR, the IPs and the refugee leadership would help to mitigate the situation with regard to pipeline breaks.

11. The pipeline breaks are extraneous to the Pilot Project. A two percent emergency stock was held in Dadaab by UNHCR prior to the pilot phase, because the EDP and FDP were under different management. During the pilot phase both agencies agreed that there was no need to maintain an emergency stock at Dadaab camp level, given that the necessary food could be delivered as required. In Kakuma, the practice of keeping a 2 percent emergency stock was discontinued in 2003, as it was felt that refugees arriving in Kakuma could be immediately integrated into the general food distribution. Having occurred in 2003, this was not linked to the pilot project.

12. At the end of 2004, WFP initiated an evaluation of the pilot project covering the initial first six months from July through December 2004. In association with UNHCR and the IPs, this in-depth exercise endeavoured to assess a wide range of performance indicators strictly related to the FDP operations. From the results it is quite clear that from the onset of the Pilot Project the entire general food distribution operation is much more streamlined; each stakeholder – UNHCR, WFP and the IP – is better able to focus on its core functions.<sup>59</sup>

13. It is interesting to note that, contrary to the situation existing in other countries, the Kakuma and Dadaab EDPs are managed by WFP and not by an IP especially contracted for this work. The Kakuma EDP has been managed by WFP since 1997. In the Dadaab camps WFP chose to take over the EDP management from its contracted IP (CARE) on 1 July 2003. A detailed and extensive study preceded this move.<sup>60</sup> This partly explains why WFP Kenya has also seriously considered the possibility of taking over the management of the FDPs from the IPs.

## 2. The Pilot Project and Secondary Transport

14. The secondary transport involves the physical movement of food from the EDPs to the FDPs. In Kakuma this transport is done with 10-15 ton capacity trucks over a distance of 3 to 6 kilometres. In Dadaab, considering the very short distance separating the FDPs from the EDPs, the bulk of the food commodities are handled with casual labourers recruited from the refugee community. Only one truck is required to shuttle food commodities from EDPs to FDPs on an ad hoc basis to balance stocks.

15. Before the Pilot Project became effective LWF and UNHCR were using two or three trucks to move food commodities from the EDPs to the FDPs in Kakuma prior to each distribution cycle. Outside the distribution cycle the very same trucks were utilised for other services including in the UNHCR/LWF general care and service contract. Neither LWF nor UNHCR kept distinct records of the costs for moving the food from the EDPs to the FDPs. The transport was the responsibility of UNHCR and was covered by the general project budget. In Dadaab UNHCR used one of its trucks to move food commodities from one EDP to another as and when required.

16. WFP took the initiative to purchase four new Isuzu truck in July 2004 at the start of the pilot project. Three trucks are based in Kakuma and one in Dadaab. The trucks are solely used for the movement of food and are in excellent condition, allowing for the timely supply of food to the FDPs prior to each distribution cycle. WFP carried out enquiries in both camps, prior to the Pilot Project, to contract commercial haulers. It was found, however, that this proposition would prove expensive and unreliable, and would have had a negative impact on food deliveries and distributions.

<sup>59</sup> WFP Nairobi. Final Distribution Point indicators. Comparative schedules for Kakuma and Dadaab camps on 01 July and 31 December 2004.

<sup>60</sup> Assessment of CARE's implementation of EDP management in Dadaab. WFP Field visits report 26 June – 01 July 2002.



17. The purchase of these four trucks and the related capital investment were the subject of a careful evaluation by WFP. No WFP staff seems to have a clear overview of the exact running costs of these four trucks, however. Considering that the utilisation of these trucks is fairly low, only 8 to 10 days a month, and the distances are very short, the final cost of transport per ton must be fairly high (annual write-off cost, driver, fuel, maintenance, insurance etc.). Regardless of the transport cost, the certainty of having good and reliable trucks readily available as and when required is conducive to timely and reliable food distribution. All in all the secondary transport in Kakuma under WFP is a smooth running, professional operation.

### 3. The Pilot Project and the Various Contractual Arrangements

#### a. Before the Pilot Project

18. Initially the final food distribution operations at the FDPs in both Kakuma and Dadaab were covered by a “*General care and maintenance agreement*” signed between UNHCR and the IPs. These bilateral agreements, normally with a validity period of one calendar year, covered a wide range of services in each camp and included the management of the FDPs. The remuneration of the IP is based on mutually agreed budget figures in line with the range of services provided. Payment is effected on a monthly or quarterly basis against documentary evidence that the services were effectively provided. As a rule UNHCR undertakes budget revisions if changing conditions in the required services so justify.

19. Several components of the bilateral UNHCR/IP “*General care and maintenance agreement*” were also included in the January 2004 “*Tripartite Agreement between UNHCR, WFP and IP on the distribution of WFP and UNHCR supplied food commodities*” as stipulated in the revised UNHCR/WFP MOU of July 2002. Although the Tripartite agreement (TRP) has no direct financial implications for any of the three parties, it stresses the commitment of the two UN agencies and the IP towards the refugees and defines:

- the modalities for the distribution of food and non-food items to the beneficiaries;
- the respective responsibilities/obligations of the parties;
- the reporting obligations of the IP.<sup>61</sup>

#### b. Once the Pilot Project Came into Force

20. The scope of the Pilot Project has been formally enacted in the “*Tripartite Agreement between the GoK, WFP and UNHCR on the distribution of WFP and UNHCR supplied food commodities and non – food items.*” Both UNHCR and WFP signed this agreement in July 2004. The signature of the agreement by the GoK is pending, for reasons which are extraneous to the Pilot Project. The agreement defines:

- the respective and joint responsibilities and obligations of WFP, UNHCR and GoK;
- the mechanism for sharing information among the parties and the refugees;
- the modalities for the storage, transportation and distribution of food and NFIs;
- the strategy for monitoring the effectiveness of food distribution during the Project;
- the modalities for the transfer of assets and the cost for maintenance.

21. Numerous preparatory meetings, consultations and evaluations at the field and CO levels preceded the signature of Tripartite Agreement. The agreement was entered into for a period of 12 months expiring on the 30<sup>th</sup> of June 2005, with the possibility of extension through an exchange of letters. This important document clearly indicates how the three parties are to ensure the success of the Pilot Project. It appears that experiences from other Pilot Project countries were not shared or exchanged.

22. While the “*General care and maintenance agreement*” between UNHCR and its IPs remained in force, specific and separate bilateral agreements were prepared between WFP and its IPs for the reception, handling, and distribution of food at the various FDPs in Kakuma and Dadaab. The “*Agreement between WFP and IP (the Partner) regarding the implementation of a WFP assistance programme (WFP PRRO number 10258)*” became effective on the 1<sup>st</sup> of July 2004 and was valid for 12 months.<sup>62</sup> The remuneration is based on an all-inclusive rate

<sup>61</sup> Of note is that Paragraph 1.2 of the TPR signed in January 2004 between UNHCR, WFP and CARE or LWF makes specific reference to the possibility of WFP taking over at some stage the responsibility for final food distribution.

<sup>62</sup> Meanwhile the bilateral WFP/IP agreements have been extended.





agreed to by the Parties, within the limits of the approved project budget. Paragraph 8.2 of these agreements does not explicitly specify the rate per ton agreed, however, and slightly contradicts paragraph 4.1, which refers simultaneously to fixed, time-bound and variable tonnage-bound costing elements. The remuneration agreed by both parties is only mentioned in the annexed budget. The remuneration agreed by both parties is definitely based and calculated on the quantity of food distributed, it would be advantageous if the rate is clearly mentioned in the agreement.<sup>63</sup>

23. The existing “Tripartite agreements” (TRP) of January 2004 between UNHCR, WFP and LWF or CARE were retained and remained in force during the pilot project. At one stage UNHCR and WFP envisaged an addendum to the TRP to reflect the new situation and the transfer of responsibilities at the FDPs. This proposal has so far not been implemented; however, it is obvious that both UNHCR and WFP have been extremely attentive to ensuring that all contractual arrangements accurately reflect the changes resulting from the Pilot Project coming into force.

#### 4. The Total Cost of the Food Management (EDP) and Distribution (FDP)

24. The food distribution process inside the refugee camps can be broken down in three distinct stages:

- 1) the EDP operation comprising the reception, handling, storage and delivery of food commodities;
- 2) the secondary transport whereby the food commodities are moved from the EDPs to the FDPs;
- 3) the FDP operation comprising the reception, handling and final distribution of food to the beneficiaries.

##### a. The Cost of the EDP Operation

25. The Pilot Project has not altered the management and operation of the EDPs in either Kakuma or Dadaab. WFP was running the EDPs before and after July 2004. Consequently the introduction of the Pilot Project had no influence on the cost of the EDP operations.

26. According to the latest LTSH Estimation Matrix, the cost per MT for the EDP operations averages US\$9.28<sup>64</sup> As a matter of interest the following EDP costs per ton were negotiated with the IP and/or recorded under the LTSH cost estimates prepared by the Logistics department of WFP Kenya:

Period	EDP Location	Managed by	Cost/MT KSH	Cost/MT US\$	Remarks
01/01/02 – 31/12/02	Dadaab	CARE (K)	1.347/71	17.28	Project 06226.00 Letter of Agreement Feb/Mar 2002
01/01/03 – 30/06/03	Dadaab	CARE (K)	1.537/46	19.71	Project 06226.00 Letter of Agreement March 2003
Year 2003	Dadaab & Kakuma	WFP	1.544/81	19.80	Project 06226.00 LTSH Cost estimates still in force in Feb. 2004. Item 5 EDP operations cost minus fumigation and set-up costs. <sup>65</sup>
01/10/03 – 30/09/05	Dadaab & Kakuma	WFP	723/61	9.28	Project 10258 LTSH Cost estimates last revised in Dec. 2004 Item 5 EDP operations costs minus 64 million KSH for road repair in Dadaab

27. Caution should be exercised when interpreting the US\$9.28 figure; while the costs for running the EDPs appear to have decreased substantially with WFP taking over the management of the EDP in Dadaab (1 July 2003) it appears that some WFP costs are not listed under the LTSH estimate, but are budgeted under the Direct Support Costs (DSC). Therefore, the EDP cost per ton under CARE and WFP management cannot be compared like for like for the former includes all the overhead costs of CARE. This is not the case for the EDP per ton cost figure under WFP management. WFP has made a consistent effort to reduce the cost of the operations at the Kakuma and Dadaab EDPs, however.

<sup>63</sup> The “Letter of Agreement” signed between WFP Kenya with the IP for the management of the EDPs in Dadaab and Kakuma made clear reference to a per ton rate the IP would be paid for the services rendered. These letters of agreements became obsolete with WFP taking over the management of the EDPs using its own staff.

<sup>64</sup> See LTSH Estimation Matrix Project PRRO 10258 revised in December 2004, Fields 55, 56 and 57 minus 64,000,000 KSH budgeted for road repair in Dadaab.

<sup>65</sup> See also “Assessment of the FDPs and proposal for WFP management of the FDPs in Kakuma and Dadaab” by Ifigenia Metaxa – Consultant – November 2003 – Attachment “0” indicating an EDP operation cost of US\$17.27 per ton.

**b. The Cost of the Secondary Transport<sup>66</sup>**

28. It has proven extremely difficult to measure correctly the exact impact of the Pilot Project on the cost for the secondary transport. Before the start of the Pilot Project the cost for secondary transport was supported by UNHCR. The bulk of the transport in Kakuma was done with UNHCR trucks. No one appears to have kept an accurate record of the cost for this shuttle transport. The expenses for this transport are included in the overall UNHCR fleet budget and not specified for food transport.

29. Since the start of the Pilot project, WFP has been operating a fleet of four new ISUZU trucks. Unfortunately the cost for operating this fleet is also not clearly identified. The current LTSH matrix (“field 60”: transport beyond an EDP) does not give any indication of the anticipated transport cost beyond the EDPs; however, in November 2003 WFP estimated the cost for the secondary transport at US\$9.78.<sup>67</sup>

30. Considering the low tonnage volumes, the short haul and the idle time, together with the costs for the annual depreciation<sup>68</sup>, fuel, maintenance of the trucks, supply and repairs of tarpaulins, drivers wages, allowances for overtime, TA and TEC, insurance and road licensing fees, the cost for operating these four trucks must average anything between US\$5 to 6 per metric ton.

31. If the need arises, WFP has also availed itself of the use of an additional LWF truck in Kakuma. A special agreement has been negotiated at a flat daily rate of 8,000 Kenyan Shillings (KSH) per truck. Considering five transport shuttles daily between the EDP and FDP with a payload of 8 tons this works out at an average cost of 200 KSH per ton or US\$2.65 per ton.

32. Though the secondary transport operations have become more reliable in Kakuma, there are no clear-cut indications that the final cost was reduced by WFP taking over the responsibility for the secondary transport using its own trucks. The absence of consistent and reliable figures from both UNHCR and WFP precludes any meaningful comparison.

33. In Dadaab where the food commodities are handled with casual labourers from the EDP to the FDP, WFP considers this transport cost as marginal; it is merely paid as a petty cash expense. The modus operandi has not changed with the Pilot Project. One can conclude that the cost for the secondary transport in the Dadaab camps has remained the same.

**c. The Cost of the Final Food Distribution**

34. UNHCR has been able to extract from the “Food distribution financial expenditure report for the year 2004 Sector activity B28” the following indicative figures:

IP	Food commodities distributed Jan/June 04 in MT	US\$ Equivalent paid for distribution Jan/June 04	Average distribution cost per MT. in US\$	Food commodities distributed Jul/Dec 04 in MT	US\$ Equivalent paid for distribution Jul/Dec 04	Average distribution cost per MT. in US\$
LWF Kakuma	9,087	105,453.01	11.60	8,749	17,902.87	2.03
CARE Dadaab	13,617	196,402.54	14.42	13,985	41,647.54	2.97

35. The UNHCR figures are interesting because they give an indication how much UNHCR paid to its IP for food distribution in the six month period before and after the start of the Pilot Project. If one considers the amounts paid during the second half of 2004 as IP’s residual expenditures indirectly related to the food

<sup>66</sup> Transport of food commodities between EDP and FDP.

<sup>67</sup> See also “Proposal for the WFP Management of the FDPs in Kakuma and Dadaab” – WFP study prepared by Ifigenia Metaxa – Consultant, November 2003 indicating under Attachment “0” LTSH cost estimates in January 2003 of US\$9.78 per ton for transport beyond EDPs.

<sup>68</sup> ISUZU truck purchase value of US\$70,000 written off over 5 years



distribution at the FDP (e.g. service vehicles and drivers paid by UNHCR under the “General care and maintenance contract”) which were equally paid during the first half of the year, the net cost of the food distribution becomes:

LWF – Kakuma	US\$11.60 per ton less US\$2.03 per ton or US\$9.57 per ton.
CARE – Dadaab	US\$14.42 per ton less US\$2.97 per ton or US\$11.45 per ton.

36. These last two UNHCR figures must be compared with the rates WFP has negotiated with the IPs for the food distribution for the 12 months from 1 July 2004 through 30 June 2005:

LWF – Kakuma	US\$11.00 per ton.
CARE – Dadaab:	US\$11.07 per ton.

37. The figures of UNHCR and WFP are very much in the same bracket. One may therefore conclude that the cost for the distribution operations at the FDPs remained stable before and after 1 July 2004 and was not substantially influenced by the Pilot Project. This is corroborated by the fact that the mode of operation inside the FDPs has not been altered.

38. To recap:

- The operations inside the EDPs remained 100 percent under the management of WFP with no changes. The Pilot Project had therefore no impact on the EDP operations cost.
- The responsibility for the secondary transport was shifted from UNHCR to WFP. There are no indications of substantial increase or decrease of the transport cost; the available costing data is too incomplete and fragmented to support any meaningful conclusion.
- The responsibility for the FDP operations was transferred from UNHCR to WFP. The same IPs were retained and the mode of operation did not undergo substantial changes. From the costing figures submitted one can conclude that the cost per ton remained stable.

39. Similarly the implementation of the Pilot Project appears to have had no effect on the “LTSH cost estimate.” The LTSH remained stable throughout the period under review and corroborates the conclusions arrived above:

Project	Tonnage	Period	Date matrix prepared or revised	LTSH US\$/MT
PRRO 10258	115,333 MT	24 months	January 2003	119.04
PRRO 6226	113,296 MT	24 months	February 2004	125.00
PRRO 10258	124,809 MT	24 months	December 2004	119.55

## 5. The Pilot Project and its Budgetary Consequences for UNHCR and WFP

40. The volume of food-aid being delivered in Kakuma and Dadaab averages 45,000 tons over 12 months. The budgetary savings for UNHCR on an annual basis amount to:

- |  |                  |
|--|------------------|
| • Secondary transport cost estimated at US\$5.50 per ton x 45,000 tons | \$247,500        |
| • Cost of the FDP operations US\$10.50 per ton x 45,000 tons           | \$472,500        |
| • Estimated total savings for UNHCR on annual basis:                   | <b>\$720,000</b> |



41. For WFP the Pilot Project definitely resulted in extra expenditures of almost **US\$750,000** on annual basis or some **US\$16.00 per ton**.<sup>69</sup> It would be interesting to establish whether the extra costs to WFP during the Pilot Project are effectively offset by measurable savings on the part of UNHCR. The EM was not able to determine this, given the lack of data.

## 6. The Registration and Revalidation of Refugees

42. From a logistics point of view the entire food distribution process hinges on two important documents: the food distribution manifest and the ration card. The manifest is prepared by UNHCR and transmitted to WFP and its IP two to three days before the distribution takes place. The ration card is presented by the beneficiary when s/he collects the food ration.

43. It was obvious that UNHCR has a good grip on the entire identification, registration, validation or revalidation process. WFP and the IPs consider the food distribution manifest a reliable document, which allows for accurate planning and logistics. Discrepancies remain well within the acceptable limits for such an operation. With the pilot project, most problems are solved on the spot. The attitude of the staff is definitely pro-active.

44. The collation and tabulation of ration cards with the food distribution manifest does not constitute a constraint for the distribution process.

45. In 2004 a complete "UNHCR-PROGRESS" re-registration exercise was successfully completed in the Kakuma camps; in the Dadaab camps the same exercise was in progress at the time of the Evaluation Mission. The thoroughness, with which UNHCR and GOK conduct these re-registration exercises, can only enhance the efficiency of the food distribution operations. The control mechanisms in place during the distribution cycles are not only hassle free but almost foolproof. The number of recorded irregularities indicates a steady decline since the onset of the Pilot Project.

46. The food ration cards are legible and of good quality. The issue of new ration cards to replace expired ones is an ongoing process with little or no problems. It is interesting to note that as much as 4,000 old ration cards were not surrendered in June 2004 when a general replacement exercise was conducted.

## 7. Staffing

47. UNHCR indicated that the implementation of the Pilot Project had not caused any change in staff strength in either camp. Excess staff was simply re-assigned to other tasks. The Pilot Project has resulted in a shift in the payment of former IP food distribution staff salaries under contract with UNHCR to WFP.

48. The strength of the WFP staff in Kakuma remained unchanged before and after the Pilot Project.<sup>70</sup> Months ahead of the Pilot Project WFP increased its staff with two field monitors and one logistics assistant. This move was dictated by the necessity for WFP to improve the follow-up and monitoring of the food flow through the EDP to the final distribution and the wish to increase WFP's field presence.

49. LWF in Kakuma indicated a need to increase staff, but said that the staff strength remained frozen pending whether the Pilot Project would be extended beyond the 12 month period expiring 30 June 2005.

50. The WFP international and regular staff strength in Dadaab increased from 14 in January 2004 to 18 people in May 2005. The number of casual labourers increased from 33 in June 2004 to 46 in June 2005.<sup>71</sup> These increases in staff were not all directly related to the Pilot Project however; they occurred mainly in the aftermath of WFP taking over the management of the three EDP stores from CARE in June-July 2003 and also as the result of an enhanced school feeding programme.

<sup>69</sup> Annual average quantity of food distributed was 45,000 to 50,000 tons. The secondary transport cost was US\$5.00 per ton and the final food distribution cost was US\$11.00 per ton.

<sup>70</sup> WFP Kakuma staff: 1 international Staff, 11 regular national staff, 2 special service agreements, 17 casuals and 42 daily wages (porters).

<sup>71</sup> The complete list of staff members and casual labourers was supplied by the WFP HR officer-Dadaab.



51. Looking at the posting of the staff, it is clear that UNHCR, WFP and CARE have endeavoured to increase their presence and visibility inside the camps; CARE has a logistics supervisor in each camp while WFP and UNHCR each have a field distribution monitor and one field clerk on duty in each camp at least during the distribution. WFP also retains the services of two or three store keepers at each camp.

## **8. The Transfer of Assets**

52. Both UNHCR and WFP in Nairobi have been particularly attentive to the issue of transfer of assets. Chapter 5 of the "July 2004 Tripartite Agreement between the Government of Kenya, WFP and UNHCR" specifically deals with this issue; it was then agreed that assets would be transferred from UNHCR to WFP on a "right of use" basis for the purpose of food distribution. All smaller assets like weighing scales, troughs, scooping material, have been transferred from UNHCR to WFP and well documented. This included the return of all small items by the IPs to UNHCR, transferred to WFP and then reissued to the IP. No trucks, cars, IT or office equipment were otherwise transferred from UNHCR to WFP.

53. As part of the TRP signed between the two UN agencies the distribution centres and waiting areas in Kakuma and Dadaab are explicitly listed as assets transferred from UNHCR to WFP for the length of the Pilot Project. This includes the responsibility for the proper use and maintenance of these assets. WFP needs to budget for the regular repair of these facilities as part of its responsibilities under the Pilot Project and the TRP.

54. During the visit to the camps it appeared that the ownership of the rubbhalls, used by WFP as EDP stores, was not always clearly established. While minor repairs and maintenance are carried out under the WFP budget, discussions may arise when major repairs or disposal are considered. This issue is not related to the Pilot Project, however.

## **9. Packing Materials**

55. The procedures for the retrieval of empty packing material remained unchanged. The IPs continued to retrieve all empty packing material. The containers are then re-issued to various refugee organizations for community services and income generating activities (IGA.) These include HIV/AIDS sensitisation campaigns, training of food distribution monitors, assistance to vulnerable women, etc. General distribution of empty containers to the refugees is still organised on a quarterly basis as it was before the start of the Pilot Project.

## **10. Handling of NFIs**

56. The distribution of the soap ration<sup>72</sup> is organised at no extra cost to UNHCR by WFP and its IP and takes place simultaneously with the general food distribution. The procurement of the soap is however the responsibility of UNHCR. The handling, storage and distribution of other NFIs remained the sole responsibility of UNHCR. Special rubbhalls are kept by UNHCR in Kakuma and Dadaab for this purpose.

## **11. Milling Operations**

57. Neither UNHCR nor WFP are or have been involved in milling activities. The milling of cereals has been left to the refugees in the camps where it has developed as a cottage industry. The milling machines are basic, and the quality of the milled grain is questionable.

58. Maize milling costs range from 3 to 5 Kenyan Shillings per kg. Considering that the market value of yellow maize is only 5 KSH/kg, the milling cost is prohibitively high. From a protection point of view the

---

<sup>72</sup> The official soap ration is 250 grams per person per month. At the time of the Evaluation Mission UNHCR was providing 50 percent of the soap ration.



involvement of UNHCR to resolve this issue in coordination with WFP would be desirable. In Kakuma camp the ration of 220 grams maize was increased to 235 grams to partially offset the milling cost.<sup>73</sup>

---

<sup>73</sup> In response to a draft of this report, WFP Kenya noted that refugees often mill maize themselves, though the extent of this milling has not been quantified.



## II. Management and Coordination

### a. Coordination between UN Agencies

59. Coordination roles were spelled out in the TPR signed between the two agencies. "Overall coordination and monitoring of the refugee programme" was to remain UNHCR's responsibility, while WFP was to be responsible for the "coordination and monitoring of food related issues."<sup>74</sup> Point 4.1.5 of the TPR also spells out that WFP and its IP will be responsible jointly with the GoK and UNHCR for the pre-food distribution coordination meetings held in the camps before each distribution.

60. Both UN agencies participated in the preparation of a list of indicators which were used in the initial handover and to assess the implementation of the pilot project. Joint workplans were prepared at the field level in each of the two field offices and endorsed by both Heads of agencies in 2004 and again in 2005. The actual implementation of the pilot project in Kenya started 1 July 2004. It was the only ongoing pilot project the Evaluation Mission (EM) visited during the course of its work.

61. UNHCR chairs and WFP participated in regular interagency coordination meetings at both the country office and sub-office level which included discussions on the implementation of the Pilot Project. Through these meetings which are mentioned as part of the revised MoU, UNHCR and WFP briefed Government, IPs on the plans for the pilot project. Both agencies briefed the beneficiaries through camp level meetings with the refugee leaders and food committee members.

62. It should be noted that the TPR states that any "extension beyond the termination date" of the pilot project "shall be made only with the written consent of the parties to the agreement and prior to the expiration of the agreement."<sup>75</sup> This is the first time the EM has noted that the pilot project would not automatically be extended. In fact, the country offices of both UN agencies were waiting on the results of the evaluation to decide whether to extend the pilot project or not.<sup>76</sup>

### b. With Government

63. Although both UNHCR and WFP have legal agreements with the Government of Kenya regarding assistance to refugees, the Government is not as involved as in other countries. The Government was informed of the plan to transfer the entire food distribution for the refugees to WFP. District officers in both Kakuma and Dadaab were informed of the plans to implement the pilot project, and had no objection. As noted above, the two UN agencies signed a Tripartite Agreement and submitted it to the government of Kenya for approval and signature in July 2004 at the start of the Pilot Project.

64. Although the Government of Kenya is in the process of registering refugees with UNHCR, it is UNHCR which issues the ration cards and provides the population figures to the Government as well as WFP and the implementing partners. The Government is kept informed but is not actively involved in the registration as is the case in other countries. This may change as there is legislation pending which would address refugee issues in Kenya.

### c. With Implementing Partners (IPs)

65. The Implementing Partners (IPs) were informed of the plans to transfer responsibility for the final segment of the food distribution to WFP through the monthly interagency meetings. The same IPs responsible for food distribution under contract with UNHCR were maintained by WFP; therefore the transition to WFP involved the same partners and went smoothly. The same IPs responsible for food distribution were also responsible for the management of the camps.

<sup>74</sup> Point 3.2 of General Principles in the July 2004 Tripartite Agreement (TPR).

<sup>75</sup> Point 6.2 of the TPR under General Conditions

<sup>76</sup> In a response to the draft of this report, UNHCR Kenya stated that it believed that the current (pilot) distribution arrangement should be sustained on a more permanent basis in Kenya.



66. Given the isolation of the refugee camps in Kenya and the need to coordinate assistance, the IPs welcomed a stronger presence of WFP in the regions and supported the implementation of the pilot project. Bilateral agreements were prepared separately for the specific activities WFP and UNHCR required of the IP. WFP's arrangements for payments were on a per tonnage basis, while UNHCR continued with a line item budget with an initial advance and reimbursement for actual expenses for each activity. Neither of the IPs complained of additional reporting requirements; the IP monthly reports are shared with both UN agencies.

67. It is interesting to note that the TPR signed between the two UN agencies mentions that WFP is to "determine the appropriate mode of implementation," and the option of direct implementation was mentioned along with contracting an IP. As noted in section I above, Kenya is the only country where WFP has taken over responsibility of the EDPs from IPs, and there was some discussion about taking on the actual final distribution as well.

#### **d. With Beneficiaries**

68. Refugee participation in both the pilot project and the evaluation are key to both UN agencies and is a major component of the revised MoU. The TPR signed between UNHCR and WFP in July 2004 states that WFP is responsible for informing the beneficiaries about the implementing arrangements and for providing guidance to them "on their entitlements, distribution schedules and how to prepare food...<sup>77</sup>". As noted above, the refugees were informed of the transfer of the final distribution from UNHCR to WFP through coordination meetings with the refugee leadership and the food distribution meetings which take place twice a month before each distribution. The camp leaders and food committee members were then supposed to inform the rest of the refugee population of the changes.

69. Given that the preparations took more than 6 months, there was adequate time to ensure that the refugee population was informed of the changes to take place with the implementation of the pilot project. As in other countries, the EM felt that the "sensitization process" is continual and should be repeated regularly, targeting all segments of the population and ensuring that the illiterate are included in the process (see comments in section III below).

## **2. Monitoring**

70. Monitoring and evaluation are key components of both UN agencies programming activities. The revised MoU notes that both agencies should monitor the distribution of food to the refugees. The TPR signed between the two UN agencies and submitted to the Government calls for both WFP and UNHCR to "jointly monitor food distributions."<sup>78</sup> It also states that "WFP, GOK and UNHCR will form a Joint Monitoring Task Force (JMTF) to oversee the implementation of the pilot initiative."<sup>79</sup> This JMTF was to oversee the transfer of the FDP to BY, assess the achievements of the pilot project using the indicators agreed to by both agencies (see above), document challenges and recommend solutions.

71. WFP introduced with its IP 100 percent weighing of the food as part of its monitoring responsibilities when it took over the entire food distribution. Each family ration is weighed using digital scales procured by WFP before it leaves the distribution center. In addition to the 100 percent weighing which takes place at the distribution centre, the IP under contract with UNHCR for Health also does some spot checking. This additional check by a separate NGO not under contract with WFP is ideal; however, both the UNHCR and WFP staff admitted that the number of families checked is not near the proposed 10 percent of the families receiving food. These IPs should be encouraged to increase the level of monitoring.

72. Post distribution monitoring (PDM) was scheduled on a quarterly basis during the implementation of the pilot project. Under the overall guidance of WFP, participants included staff from UNHCR, the IP in charge of

<sup>77</sup> Point 4.1.8 of the TPR signed between WFP and UNHCR, July 2004

<sup>78</sup> Point 3.7 of TPR

<sup>79</sup> Point 4.4.3 of the TPR under Joint roles and responsibilities





food distribution, and the IP in charge of health who also provides some of the spot checking after each food distribution. These reports look at the general use of food, the price of food commodities in the market, and other factors which have an impact on food security in the camps.

73. According to the TPR, the Government and UNHCR are to "ensure that nutrition surveys continue to be undertaken by the health agencies on an annual basis."<sup>80</sup> UNHCR is to ensure that WFP participates in the nutrition surveys and receives copies of the results.<sup>81</sup>

74. In principle, both UN agencies are to participate in a Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) every year. The last one in Kenya took place in 2002, before the start of the pilot project. Another JAM is scheduled for later this year, after the completion of the initial one year of the pilot phase and training of staff has been completed. Given the isolation of the camps and climatic conditions which prevent the refugees from growing even a portion of their own food, a JAM should be conducted with input from the nutrition surveys on at least an annual basis.

### 3. Reporting

75. The TPR signed between the two UN agencies is very clear on the reporting requirements, spelling out that the IP for WFP is to report to both WFP and UNHCR after every distribution cycle.<sup>82</sup> Although each UN agency has its own reporting formats and requires specific reporting requirements which are spelled out in the agreements with the IPs, no IP complained about excessive reporting or significant duplication in what they prepare for UNHCR and WFP. The EM noted however, the extensive reporting required; UNHCR and WFP could review their reporting requirements as part of their ongoing coordination activities to streamline the paperwork requested from their IPs.

### 4. Training/Capacity Building

76. Both UNHCR and WFP include training and capacity building of their own staff, the IPs, Government and refugees as part of their main responsibilities. The revised MoU mentions that training is part of the policy for both agencies.

77. UNHCR had created the food committees in the Kenyan refugee camps before the start of the pilot project. Terms of Reference (ToRs) outlining the roles and responsibilities of the refugee committees, including the food committees had been developed. With changes in staff and periodic elections, plus the need to continually sensitize the general population, these should be reviewed and presented to the refugee on a regular basis.<sup>83</sup>

78. As WFP is in charge of the food warehouses (extended delivery points or EDPs), in both camps, there has been limited training on warehouse management for the IPs. WFP meets regularly with the refugee leaders and the food committees and has encouraged participation of women in the food distribution process. As noted in the responses to the questionnaire, refugees requested rotation of the food committee members and their regular training in food distribution. WFP has provided training in gender and monitoring and evaluation to both the IPs and refugees; UNHCR staff also attended.

79. UNHCR has arranged periodic training in protection issues; staff from the Government, the IPs and WFP has participated in these workshops. As noted in other countries, protection of refugees is recognized as the mandate of UNHCR; training in protection issues including basic reporting procedures has been part of the coordination and capacity building activities of UNHCR and is continuing in Kenya.

80. Both UNHCR and WFP have organized sensitization workshops in three thematic areas: gender, SGBV, and HIV/AIDS in these areas but may want to coordinate on these workshops. As these cross-cutting themes are

<sup>80</sup> Point 3.8 of TPR signed in July 2004 by UNHCR and WFP.

<sup>81</sup> The nutrition survey for Dadaab took place in June 2004 before the start of the pilot project, and the one for Kakuma took place in October 2004 after the Pilot Project began. The latest Dadaab nutrition survey was done in June of this year and results are expected by August. The next survey for Kakuma is scheduled to take place in October, 2005.

<sup>82</sup> Point 4.1.9 of the TPR.

<sup>83</sup> The Evaluation Mission provided examples of TORs used in other countries to the field offices.



part of the UN global commitments, they many want to work with the other UN agencies and partners in Kenya (UNAIDS, UNICEF, UNFPA, etc) to coordinate joint activities in these areas.

81. It should be noted that one of the IPs involved in food distribution (CARE) has sent its staff to Zambia to assist with the food distribution in the refugee camps there. This cross cultural and inter-country experience should be encouraged by the UN agencies as well as the IPs.



### III. Beneficiaries and Protection

#### 1. Introduction

82. Beneficiaries' participation in food distribution and their input into the evaluation of the pilot project is an essential component of the Evaluation Mission's TORs and Methodology and is highlighted in the revised MOU. To ascertain information from the refugees, the Evaluation Mission visited the camps in Kakuma and Dadaab and met with representatives of the refugee leaders and food committee members in the various camps to ascertain their perception of any change in food distribution during the pilot project.

83. The same questionnaire used in the previous pilot studies in Pakistan, Sierra Leone Uganda and Zambia was used to obtain information from the refugees in Kenya. Staff from UNHCR, WFP, the IPs interviewed refugees and completed 22 survey forms. The paragraphs below highlight the major observations.

#### 2. Participation and Perception of the Beneficiaries

84. Based on the results of the survey, 91 percent of those interviewed said they were aware of the change in the food distribution from UNHCR to WFP. 100 percent claimed they understood the role of the two agencies and 95 percent were able to identify the implementing partner. Several forms stated that the illiterate were not aware of the change and women were not informed.

85. 90 percent were able to identify which agency was responsible for what items. Two forms commented that UNHCR was responsible for complementary food. One form commented that food distribution was better with UNHCR, while two forms mentioned that UNHCR was responsible for complementary food.

86. All of those interviewed (100 percent) stated they were aware of the community structures in the camps, including food committees, but it was not possible to determine the participation of women from the survey results. Most forms said women assumed leadership roles and those surveyed said women represented 50 percent of the food committees. Although it was acknowledged that more women participated in the refugee administration than before, their participation, even during the EM's meetings was far below 50 percent.

87. The Evaluation Mission found that the implementation of the pilot project did not affect the perception of the refugees that UNHCR was the lead agency for refugee protection and assistance. As in other countries, the EM felt that sensitization of the roles and responsibilities of the two UN agencies along with the Government the IPs and the refugee administrative structures should continue, with a focus on women and the illiterate.

#### 3. Protection and Food Delivery<sup>84</sup>

88. Although 82 percent of those interviewed said they were aware of the basic ration, many complained that the ration received was not the full entitlement and did not meet the minimum calorie requirement. Several stated that the ration under UNHCR was better and one surprise said that the lower ration was due to the scales and the weighing of each family's ration at the end of each distribution.

89. Through the meetings the EM held in both camps it was apparent that the refugee leaders and food committee members were completely aware of their entitlements and what was in the EDP warehouses. They were aware and the results of the survey confirmed (62 percent) that there were delays in delivery and that some items were not available at the time of distribution. Although most appreciated that the distribution now took less time than before (from 6 to 4 days in the Kakuma camps), many complained about the incomplete ration, the change in cereals from wheat flour to maize and the quality of the food received.<sup>85</sup> Comments in the surveys attributed this to "poor planning" and "donor fatigue."

<sup>84</sup> In a response to a draft of this report, UNHCR Kenya felt that the results of the interviews with the refugees about the pilot project had provided useful perceptions, but could have been more useful if the views of the refugees were integrated with results of surveys made by other agencies. For instance, procedures for giving priority to the needs of vulnerable groups during the food distributions and when there is a food shortfall are well established.

<sup>85</sup> In response to a draft of this report, WFP Kenya noted that WFP ensures that all beneficiaries are provided with acceptable quality food. Whenever there is doubt on the quality of food, tests are made to guarantee that the food meets required standards before it is distributed.



90. 38 percent of those who responded to the questionnaire commented that the distribution points had changed. One noted this was due to an increase in the camp population and a need for an additional distribution site, while others commented on the improved structures (shaded areas, wider corridors) noting that the food distribution was now "more humane."

91. 65 percent of those interviewed said that the distribution had changed noting that scoops are adjusted depending on the food item and its availability and that digital scales had been introduced and weighing had been built in as part of the monitoring of the food distribution. Some commented that the use of the Ration card is not "more strict" and people without ration cards are referred to UNHCR (see below). There were no comments on any change in packing material and 90 percent of those interviewed said there had been no change.

92. 8 of the 12 (40 percent) of the survey forms said there were protection incidents related to food but 9 of the forms stated that women were safe during the distribution. Several forms stated that in the past women had been beaten and that men "trample" women during distribution. Others complained about the security guards in the distribution area.

93. 37 percent of those interviewed said there were specific protection problems related to women. Although not necessary food related, examples given during the interviews included violence against women who left the camp to collect firewood, harassment by security personnel, etc. While only 6 percent of those interviewed felt that there were Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV) protection issues in the camps, the majority (17 of the 18 responses) did not feel that these were common. Divorce and associated ration card issues and domestic violence were listed as examples of SGBV in the camps.

94. Based on the results of the surveys, the refugees were aware of whom to contact for protection-related issues. Most said they would contact the refugee security and/or government police in the first instance (13 responses). This was followed in numbers by UNHCR (10) and CARE Community Service personnel (7).

95. Although the majority (65 percent) of responses to the survey said that the vulnerable had protection issues related to food distribution, comments varied by camp. 11 of the survey forms (65 percent) stated that the vulnerable were given priority or special consideration during food distribution while two forms said there was no special assistance. No specific protection issues were reported through the survey or the meetings in the camps.

96. Although not related to the pilot project, the EM noted that the camps in Kenya are located in dry, desolate areas, and the refugees have little or no possibility to grow their own food. The surrounding local population suffers from these same conditions, and there were reports of incidents between the refugees and the local population before Food for Work projects were introduced. Even though UNHCR has not had the funds to provide complementary food, every effort should be made to ensure that the basic food basket is delivered on a timely basis and that if possible fresh vegetables be provided (voucher system through the local market is a possible option) the complement the dry ration.

#### **4. Identification, Ration Cards and Registration**

97. As noted in section I above, registration of the refugees in Kenya seemed to be less of an issue than in other countries.<sup>86</sup> The TPR states that "UNHCR and the GOK will retain the joint responsibility of determining the population figures...,<sup>87</sup>" and that WFP is to receive copies of the updated food distribution management at least 5 days before the next food distribution. As far as those registered in the camp, UNHCR plays the lead role and is using the Progress computer system to photograph all refugees and provide them with ration cards. The EM was able to see the registration in progress with both UNHCR and the Government working closely together. The latter is fingerprinting all refugees above 18 as part of its own registration process. Revalidation exercises have been done or are planned and ration cards have been replaced.

<sup>86</sup> The Government is preparing legislation requiring that all refugees be registered in Kenya.

<sup>87</sup> Point 4.3.1 outlining the responsibilities of UNHCR under the TPR.



98. Based on the survey results 62 percent of the responses felt that all members of access to food--as long as they are registered. There were complaints about delays in registration of new born babies and asylum seekers (new arrivals.) Other than the special case of the Somalis, registration of new born children was said to take between 1-3 months.<sup>88</sup>

99. Although most asylum seekers are registered in a timely manner, Somalis are not given ration cards. Several complained to the EM about this and stated that there are cases pending since 2000. The rationale by the Government not to register this group is that they may be Kenyan citizens and therefore not eligible for refugee assistance.

## 5. Gender

100. The TPR signed by the two UN agencies and submitted to the Government calls for "women (to) take a lead role in the management of food distribution," and that "where possible, food (should) be placed directly in the hands of women."<sup>89</sup> All (100 percent) of the questionnaire forms stated that women participate in the food distribution, and that while 89 percent reported that women/spouses are included on the ration cards, the percentage of women collecting the food varied from 35-90 percent.

101. The TPR also calls for women to represent 50 percent of the members of the food coordination meetings.<sup>90</sup> The question about whether more women should be involved in food distribution was fairly evenly split with 53 percent stating they should. Most forms stated that men were needed for the heavier items, distribution of maize, etc. Several responses noted that women were more sensitive and responsible for food-related matters. Comments in the survey encouraged greater participation of women not only in food but all refugee matters.

## 6. Training/Capacity Building

102. Although Terms of Reference (TORs) provide guidelines on the roles and responsibilities of the refugee leaders and food committees the general public is not aware of these. The two UN agencies, their Implementing Partners, Government and the refugees could work together to update TORs for each committee and disseminate this information to the general refugee community. Training in monitoring and reporting has taken place, but comments in the surveys noted the need to train food committee members should be ongoing, and repeated anytime there is an election or change in the members.

103. UNHCR has organized protection workshops which are continuing. Participants should include staff from WFP, the various IPs, Government, refugees, and possibly the host community, given the tension between the two groups in the past. With the possibility of repatriation to Sudan picking up, UNHCR may need to sensitize not only the refugees but WFP and the partners. Training in "cross cutting" themes in gender, SGBV and HIV/AIDS should be coordinated as part of the capacity building organized by both UN agencies.

## 7. Other Issues raised by the Refugees

104. The questionnaire has one last question asking for suggestions, complaints, recommendations or lessons learned for the food distribution either before the Pilot project under UNHCR, or now under WFP. The comments from the refugees are outlined below:

### On the food distribution system

- Inconsistent delivery with last minute changes.
  - Inform community in advance of any changes
  - Strengthen food pipeline; fill the EDPs at least 3 days in advance.
  - Food basket is seldom complete; need to provide minimum Kcalories.

<sup>88</sup> In a response to the draft of this report, UNHCR Kenya advised that efforts were being made to redress the problem of a backlog in registration. Registration of new born babies was being done on a regular basis. Registration of over 7,000 births and deaths had been almost completed by August 2005. Sudanese new arrivals are registered upon reporting at the UNHCR Field Office in Lokichoggio, after entry into Kenya.

<sup>89</sup> Point 3.1 under General Principles of the Tripartite Agreement (TPR) of July 2004.

<sup>90</sup> Point 4.1.5 of the roles and responsibilities of WFP in the TPR.



- Change regularly refugee scoopers, monitors and security personnel and provide them with uniforms so that they can be distinguished.
- Provide drinking water at FDC.
- Reduce "long hours" required to collect food.
- Repair floors in distribution areas.
- Train security not to be so "rough."
- Train Food committee members and encourage women to participate.
- 100 percent weighing and digital scales are good.
- Transport at FDP has improved.

On the food ration

- Quantity is not enough and quality poor.
- Before wheat flour, now it is (dusty) maize.
- Request wheat flour and rice.
- Request donors for good quality, culturally acceptable food.
- Food ration is not enough for 15 days.
- Food is inappropriate for elderly, sick, young, pregnant.

For UNHCR

- "Relax" manifest to allow food distribution to missing.
- Quickly resolve lost and missing card issue.
- Register all asylum seekers regardless of nationality.
- Provide complementary food and NFI.



## IV. Concluding Remarks and Lessons Learned

### Introduction

105. Although the Evaluation Mission (EM) was asked not to make specific recommendations, particularly in regards to the possible extension or continuation of the Pilot Food Distribution in other countries, the Terms of Reference (TORs) do include preparation of best practices and lessons learned for each case study. This final chapter to the Kenya study summarizes the main findings for each of the previous three sections.

### Cost and Logistics

- From mid December 2003 as part of the preparation for the start of the Pilot food distribution Project, both UN agencies devoted time to studying all the contractual, financial and logistical implications of shifting the FDP operations from UNHCR to WFP. Different scenarios were looked into; WFP eventually choose to retain the services of the same IPs as UNHCR for the final food distribution. WFP took the opportunity to review and streamline the entire distribution process inside the FDPs which resulted in measurable improvements to the system.
- In replacement of the old UNHCR and LWF fleet of trucks WFP, after having conducted a detailed costing exercise, brought into service 4 new ISUZU trucks to carry out the secondary transport operations between the EDPs and the FDPs. This greatly improved the shuttle operations between the EDPs and FDPs, particularly in Kakuma.
- All the agreements and contractual arrangements existing between UNHCR, WFP and the IPs were reviewed and revised as necessary to reflect the new situation under the Pilot Project. A "Tripartite Agreement (TPR) between the GOK, WFP and UNHCR on the distribution of WFP and UNHCR supplied food commodities and non-food items," although never formally endorsed or signed by the GOK, set out clear operating guidelines for the Pilot Project and the new distribution of responsibilities.
- From the figures supplied by UNHCR and WFP, it appears that the cost for the final food distribution operation has remained almost identical before and after the Pilot Project. The cost price remained stable at 11.00 US\$/MT. For the secondary transport the absence of consistent and complete costing figures did not permit a reliable comparison between the transport organised respectively by UNHCR and WFP. The LTSH cost estimate at 120.00 US\$ per MT has also remained stable. It is difficult however, to gauge correctly the impact of the Pilot Project for this cost estimate is also influenced by other cost factors and strategic decisions, e.g. road rehabilitation works.
- The Pilot Project should in theory entail cost savings for UNHCR estimated at some US\$720,000 on an annual basis. For WFP the Pilot Project represents an extra cost to the same tune of more or less US\$16.00 per ton.
- UNHCR in Kenya has excellent control over the entire registration and revalidation of the refugee camp population. The food manifests prepared by UNHCR and submitted to WFP are reliable and therefore contribute greatly to the correct planning of the general food distribution operations.
- The UNHCR and IP staffing levels remained unchanged. The WFP staff strength increased slightly during the period under review partly in anticipation of the Pilot Project and partly as a result of the management of the EDPs returning under the direct control of WFP in mid-2003. All three parties definitely increased their presence and visibility in the FDPs during distribution cycles.
- The transfer of assets, whether on a right of use basis or otherwise and the related maintenance, have been contractually agreed in line with the provisions of the UNHCR – WFP July 2002 MOU. Documentary evidence of the transfer of assets exists.
- The procedures for the retrieval of empty packing material were not modified during the pilot project. Good use is made of the packing material for the benefit of the refugees.
- Under the Pilot Project Soap a NFI is distributed by WFP to the refugees simultaneously with the general food distribution. The management and distribution of other NFIs have remained the sole responsibility of UNHCR.
- Neither UNHCR nor WFP are involved in milling activities in or near the campsites. It has however been noted that the milling tariffs prevailing in the camps are extremely high.



## Management and Coordination

- Coordination between the two UN agencies and their Implementing Partners (IPs) was well established before the Pilot Project began and was strengthened through extensive planning before the start of the Pilot Project in June 2004.
- WFP and UNHCR prepared joint workplans at field level which were approved by both country offices. The two UN agencies shared common premises in Dadaab, and their compounds were "across the street" in Kakuma which facilitated cooperation and ensured that any problems could be resolved immediately.
- The Government of Kenya (GOK) was involved in the registration of refugees, and provided support to UNHCR to oversee the management of the camps. The GOK was a partner but never signed the Tripartite Agreement signed by the two UN agencies.
- A significant reason for the smooth implementation of the Pilot Project in Kenya was the continuation of the same Implementing Partner UNHCR had used, when WFP assumed responsibilities for the final food distribution. The IPs were informed of the Pilot project through monthly coordination meetings; all appreciated working with both UN agencies and welcomed the greater role of WFP in the camps under the Pilot Project.
- UNHCR and WFP informed the refugees of the transfer of responsibility for food distribution through food distribution meetings. Both UN agencies supported the expanded role of women in the food committees and refugee administrative structures. Sensitization of the general refugee population on the roles and responsibilities of each UN agency, the IPs and the refugee committees should be continued on a regular basis.
- 100 percent monitoring and the introduction of digital scales were innovations implemented during the pilot project. Responsibilities for food distribution and monitoring were undertaken by separate agencies, which provides a good check and balance. Health agencies under contract with UNHCR were responsible for the FBM; WFP field staff felt that the number of beneficiaries included in the FBM needed to be increased.
- Reporting requirements were not a major issue for the main IPs of each UN agency. A periodic review of the reporting requirements and formats by both UN agencies could streamline reporting procedures minimize and duplication.
- Staff from both UN agencies and the IPs participated in a Joint Assessment Workshop which reviewed the revised MOU as an initial basis for discussions. Training in basic protection issues by UNHCR should continue for WFP and IP staff working in the camps in Kenya. Both UN agencies should coordinate their training in the cross-cutting themes of Gender, SGBV, and HIV/AIDS.

## Beneficiaries and Protection

- The perception of the refugees of UNHCR as lead agency responsible for refugee protection and assistance did not change during the implementation of the Pilot Project.
- At least the refugee leaders and food committee members were aware of their entitlements and the available stocks in the warehouses. Pipeline breaks and changes in the food basket during the Pilot Project created the erroneous perception among the beneficiaries that food distribution under UNHCR was more reliable and consistent. The records prove otherwise, however. UNHCR and WFP need to minimize changes and disruptions in the food pipeline while at the same time continue to sensitize the general population on food related issues.
- Although the majority of refugees said they were aware of the change in the food distribution and could identify the roles of the UN agencies and partners, periodic sensitization campaigns should be conducted and include the general refugee population to ensure that the roles of the UN agencies, the IPs, Government and refugee committees are understood.
- Although 100 percent of the refugees said women are involved in the food distribution, the number who participate in the meetings is below 50 percent and both UN agencies need to continue to promote the role of women in all camp activities.
- TORs on the roles and responsibilities of the refugee committees have been prepared in consultation with the beneficiaries, however these need to be periodically updated and reviewed, particularly when there is an election or a change in refugee committee staff.
- See comments and suggestions from the refugees at the end of section III above.





**Appendix 1 - Schedule of the Monthly Distribution Figures January 2003 – April 2004  
(Camp population – tonnage of food-aid- Average Kcalorie per ration)**

Months	Average Population	GFD - Food-aid requirement. MT	GFD - Food-aid distributed MT	Percentage requirement versus qty. distributed	Av. daily Kcal distributed	Percentage versus daily 2166.8 Kcal required
<b>Kakuma:</b>						
January-03	81,558	1,431	0,762	53.10%	1,153.5	53.10%
February-03	82,468	1,447	1,330	92.60%	1,992.4	92.40%
March-03	82,444	1,446	1,071	72.50%	1,607.9	75.50%
April-03	86,270	1,514	1,086	79.00%	1,547.6	75.60%
May-03	84,931	1,490	1,474	101.80%	2,148.6	101.30%
June-03	86,270	1,514	1,512	97.80%	2,163.8	97.40%
July-03	86,525	1,518	1,407	97.20%	2,019.0	96.10%
August-03	86,653	1,521	2,343	153.00%	3,337.9	153.00%
September-03	87,384	1,534	0,748	45.40%	1,025.8	44.50%
October-03	87,790	1,541	1,566	101.40%	2,202.4	100.20%
November-03	88,270	1,549	1,542	99.20%	2,157.0	99.10%
December-03	89,063	1,563	1,597	101.30%	2,214.1	101.60%
<b>Dadaab:</b>						
January-03	135,065	2,371	1,189	49.90%	1,082.2	49.90%
February-03	134,987	2,369	2,174	93.50%	1,971.8	92.30%
March-03	135,386	2,376	2,827	130.00%	2,554.7	126.10%
April-03	128,924	2,263	0,989	44.90%	0,934.5	43.90%
May-03	130,569	2,291	2,241	103.80%	2,108.2	104.50%
June-03	130,042	2,282	2,288	99.80%	2,171.7	100.20%
July-03	131,154	2,302	2,308	100.30%	2,172.7	100.20%
August-03	131,154	2,302	2,315	100.50%	2,178.8	100.50%
September-03	132,503	2,325	3,472	146.40%	3,234.7	145.70%
October-03	133,442	2,342	2,337	98.70%	2,161.9	98.50%
November-03	133,559	2,344	1,156	49.60%	1,079.8	49.80%
December-03	135,560	2,344	2,331	99.10%	2,165.7	99.30%
<b>Total 2003 Kakuma &amp; Dadaab:</b>		<b>45,979</b>	<b>42,065</b>	<b>92.40%</b>	<b>1,979.3</b>	<b>91.90%</b>
<b>Kakuma:</b>						
January-04	88,817	1,559	1,568	100.60%	2,203.2	101.70%
February-04	88,009	1,545	1,465	94.80%	2,052.7	94.70%
March-04	84,341	1,480	1,553	104.90%	2,279.4	105.20%
April-04	89,617	1,573	1,476	90.20%	2,054.9	94.80%
May-04	88,335	1,550	1,491	96.20%	2,109.1	97.30%
June-04	89,285	1,567	1,535	98.00%	2,134.6	98.50%
July-04	89,889	1,576	1,617	102.60%	2,216.6	102.30%
August-04	86,897	1,525	1,469	96.30%	2,096.9	96.80%
September-04	85,854	1,507	1,467	97.40%	2,109.2	97.30%
October-04	84,784	1,488	1,488	100.00%	2,173.3	100.30%
November-04	83,992	1,474	1,344	91.20%	1,979.9	91.40%
December-04	84,098	1,475	1,364	94.80%	2,013.9	92.90%



Months	Average Population	GFD - Food-aid requirement/tons	GFD - Food-aid distributed/tons	Percentage requirement versus qty. distributed	Av. Daily Kcal distributed	Percentage versus daily Kcal required
<b>Dadaab:</b>						
January-04	134,563	2,362	2,334	98.80%	2163.9	99,90%
February-04	134,944	2,368	2,205	93.10%	1964,2	90,70%
March-04	135,343	2,375	2,423	102.00%	2177,4	100,50%
April-04	135,597	2,379	2,206	92.70%	2028,9	93,60%
May-04	135,919	2,385	2,323	97.40%	2129,5	98,30%
June-04	136,588	2,397	2,125	88.60%	1948,3	89,90%
July-04	136,799	2,401	2,470	102,90%	2222,7	102,60%
August-04	137,874	2,419	2,243	92,70%	2008,6	92,70%
September-04	138,165	2,421	2,429	100,20%	2169,9	100,10%
October-04	137,098	2,406	2,373	98,60%	2147,7	99,10%
November-04	137,448	2,412	2,307	95,64%	2060,6	95,10%
December-04	137,622	2,298	2,164	87,00%	1914,0	88,30%
<b>Total 2004 Kakuma &amp;Dadaab:</b>		<b>46,942</b>	<b>45,439</b>	<b>95.00%</b>	<b>2059.1</b>	<b>95.00%</b>
<b>Kakuma:</b>						
January-05	84,087	1,525	1,455	95.40%	2141.5	98.80%
February-05	83,815	1,373	1,244	90.60%	1841.9	85.00%
March-05	84,733	1,537	1,372	89.30%	1996.0	92.10%
April-05	85,988	1,509	1,440	94.80%	2079.2	96.00%
May-05	87,913	14	1,531	96.10%	2157.5	99.60%
<b>Dadaab:</b>						
January-05	139,800	2,417	2,417	98.90%	2140.0	98.80%
February-05	140,610	2,107	2,107	91.50%	1858.4	85.80%
March-05	140,605	2,310	2,310	94.00%	2023.7	93.40%
April-05	141,664	2,360	2,360	94.90%	2062.1	95.20%
May-05	140,726	1,918	1,918	77.90%	1716.0	79.20%
		18,650	18,154			

Data supplied by WFP – Nairobi/Refugee Project Section - 17/06/2005



## Appendix 2

## Summary of Kenya Refugee Population and Number of Questionnaires by Camp/Settlement (06 - 17 June 2005)

	Camp		Registered May 2004			Registered March 2005			Questionnaire Results			
			Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	# Surveys	Male	Female	Total
1	Kakuma	KAK	90,383	53,791	36,592	86,794	51,556	35,238	6	23	22	45 <sup>91</sup>
2	Ifo	IFO	51,90	24,901	26,478	52,956	27,076	25,880	5			<sup>92</sup>
3	Dagahaley	DAG	33,879	16,654	17,225	35,076	17,934	17,142	6	24	30	54
4	Hagadera <sup>93</sup>	HAG	50,939	25,049	25,890	52,722	26,957	25,765	5			
	<b>Total</b>		<b>226,580</b>	<b>120,395</b>	<b>106,185</b>	<b>227,548</b>	<b>123,523</b>	<b>104,025</b>	<b>22</b>			
	Percentage			53%	47%		54%	46%				
	Increase		968	3,128	-2,160							

<sup>91</sup> This does not include those interviewed in 4 surveys labeled "Male" (2) and "Female" (2) with no number of interviewees.

<sup>92</sup> No Breakdown by Gender in Ifo Camp.

<sup>93</sup> Ifo, Dagahaley, and Hagadera are the three continuous camps that make up Dadaab.



WFP-UNHCR Joint Evaluation of the Pilot Food Distribution Projects – Full Report

**Appendix 3 - Summary Results of Discussions with the Beneficiaries**  
**WFP-UNHCR Joint Food Distribution Evaluation Mission in Kenya (06 -17 June 2005)**

Camp: 22 Surveys from Kakuma and Dadaab (3 Camps) in Kenya  
 Gender of Interviewee/s: Male: 61, Female: 68, No Gender identified: 45 Total: 174<sup>94</sup>

	Questions for Discussion	%	Yes	No	Don't Know	Total	Comments/Remarks/Observations
1	Are the beneficiaries aware of the change in the food distribution from UNHCR to WFP?	91	20	2		22	One form commented UNHCR "better" for food distribution. Others said women are not informed and assume both agencies are "UN. Illiterate are not aware of change.
	Do they understand the role of the two agencies?	100	22			22	Unaware of when change took place. UNHCR: overall in charge, monitors refugee assistance. WFP: provides/monitors food, responsible for food security.
	Who is Implementing Partner and are they aware of its role/responsibilities?	95	21	1		22	Partner: LWF in Kakuma, CARE in Dadaab for food. Both camps mentioned GTZ provides firewood.
	Is their coordination of delivery of food and non-food items? Are the refugees aware of who delivers what?	90	18	2		20	Food: majority said WFP with IP; 2 forms mentioned UNHCR for complementary food. NFI: UNHCR and IP.
2	Are the refugees aware of the community structure and communication channels for food distribution? Who represents them? Are women in leadership roles?	100	21			21	All reported to be aware of community structure and role and responsibilities. Most forms mentioned women in leadership roles with some stating there were more women now than before. One form said women are represented but do not fully participate.
	Are there food committees? What is the composition and what % of the food committees are women? Are the committees useful in resolving food distribution problems?	90	19	2		21	The majority said there were 50% women on the food committees, but some of the forms did not know the number of women. Several commented that the Food Committees were useful for solving problems (fights, ration card issues,) but one complained that they do not share information with the community about food issues.

<sup>94</sup> The total number of interviewees does not include 4 forms each marked "male" (2), or "female" (2) which did not give the number of people interviewed in Ifo camp in Dadaab, however the results of these interviews have been incorporated below.



	Questions for Discussion	%	Yes	No	Don't Know	Total	Comments/Remarks/Observations
3	Are they aware of the basic ration and do they receive it? Did it change between UNHCR and WFP?	82	18	3	1	22	Several complained that the ration is less than the entitlement, and that it was "better" under UNHCR. One complained that the ration board was not updated, while another said the ration varies with the cycle. Another complained they do not receive the correct ration and blamed it on the scales.
	Were there any changes in the delivery schedule between UNHCR and WFP?	68	13	6		19	Preposition is now done 2 days before, now reliable trucks are available, digital scales and 100% weighing have been introduced.
	Are there delays in food delivery? If so why? Do they complain and if so to whom? What was the result of their complaint?	62	13	8		21	Many commented that delays were due to transport or bad roads as well as problems at the port. One commented that delays were due to poor planning and "donor fatigue." Complaints were addressed to the IP, UNHCR and WFP with some reporting they were informed of delays, changes in the food basket (given what is available), and issues were resolved
	Have distribution points changed to make it easier to carry food?	38	8	13		21	Several commented that there is now covered waiting areas, more space in the corridors and one reported a new centre to serve the increased population. Two forms commented that the distribution is now "more humane."
	Has distribution changed (scoops vs. group distribution, etc) between UNHCR and WFP?	65	13	7		20	Several commented on the need to change staff (refugee scoopers and monitors). Two forms commented that distribution now takes 4 days whereas before it took 8. Scoops change with item and entitlement. The use of ration cards is more strict
	Has packaging changed to facilitate transport?			18	2	20	No comments.
4	Do women participate in the distribution? What % of women are employed as scoopers? Monitors?	100	20			20	All said women participate in distribution but the percentage estimates varied from 40-100%.
	Would they prefer to have more women involved?	53	9	7	1	17	This was roughly evenly split with several comments that men were needed for the heavier items, while women were more sensitive and responsible for food
	Are women/spouses included on the ration cards; what % women collect food?	89	16	1	1	18	Most forms said that all those registered receive food. Estimates varied from 35-90% of the women collect food.
	Do all members of the family have access to food? Are all family members registered & included on the ration cards?	62	13	8		21	There were several complaints about delays in registration of new born babies, and asylum seekers. One mentioned outstanding registration cases pending since 2000 who were not receiving food.
	Are they aware of or ever reported/been involved in security or protection incidents related to food distribution? Are women safe at the food distribution?	40	8	12		20	9 of the responses said women were safe at the food distribution, while several commented that women were beaten before, and men "trample" women. Two complained of security guards in the distribution area.



WFP-UNHCR Joint Evaluation of the Pilot Food Distribution Projects – Full Report

	Questions for Discussion	%	Yes	No	Don't Know	Total	Comments/Remarks/Observations
	To whom would they turn to complain or report Protection Issues?						The highest number of responses said they would complain to the security/police (13), UNHCR (10), CARE Community Service (7), group/section leaders (3).
	Are there specific protection problems that relate to women?	37	7	12		19	Specific problems included women going out to collect firewood, being harassed by security personnel.
	Are there SGBV protection issues related to food distribution?	6	1	17		18	Issues included divorce (Ration Card issues,) domestic violence, children taken away from the mothers. Several suggested separate cues for women..
	How do the vulnerable (EVI) collect their food? Are there protection issues for the EVI related to food distribution?	65	11	5	1	17	Answers varied here by camp; some said EVI are given priority or special consideration (11,) while 2 responses said there was no priority or special assistance. No protection issues were mentioned.
5	Any suggestions, complaints, recommendations, or Lessons Learned regarding the food distribution system either before under UNHCR or now under WFP?						<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Quantity is not enough and quality is poor. Before system was better; now more problems with WFP: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o Before wheat flour and greater quantity, now it is dusty maize</li> <li>o Request wheat flour (4) and rice (2)</li> <li>o Request donors for good quality, culturally acceptable food</li> <li>o Food ration is not enough for 15 days</li> <li>o Food is inappropriate for elderly, sick, young, pregnant</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Inconsistent delivery with last minute changes: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o Inform community in advance of any changes</li> <li>o "strengthen food pipeline" fill the EDPs at least 3 days in advance</li> <li>o Food basket is seldom complete; need to provide minimum Kcal</li> </ul> </li> <li>• For UNHCR <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o "relax" manifest to allow food distribution to missing</li> <li>o Quickly resolve lost and missing card issue</li> <li>o Register all asylum seekers regardless of nationality</li> <li>o Provide complementary food and NFI</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Change regularly refugee scoopers, monitors and security personnel and provide them with uniforms so that they can be distinguished</li> <li>• Provide drinking water at FDC</li> <li>• Reduce "long hours" required to collect food</li> <li>• Repair floors in distribution areas</li> <li>• Train security not to be so "rough"</li> <li>• Train Food committee members and encourage women to participate</li> <li>• 100% weighing and digital scales are good</li> <li>• Transport at FDP has improved</li> </ul>