

Inter-agency Real-Time Evaluation of the Humanitarian Response to the Darfur Crisis

A real-time evaluation commissioned by the
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The opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the UN Office of the
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¹ This is a template prepared by OCHA. It may be replaced by updated versions tracking implementation over time.

² This will be added to the report upon completion.

Overview of the Process, Key Findings and Recommendations of the Inter-Agency Real-Time Evaluation of the Humanitarian Response to the Darfur Crisis

Prepared by OCHA's Evaluation and Studies Unit (OCHA/ESU)
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1. The Process

The perception that the humanitarian response to the Darfur crisis was woefully inadequate prompted the United Nations (UN) Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator (USG/ERC) to launch the *Inter-Agency Real-time Evaluation of the Humanitarian Response to the Darfur Crisis* in August 2004, under the auspices of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC). The approach was groundbreaking in that it was the first attempt to comprehensively evaluate an ongoing crisis across all sectors and functions using a participatory approach involving all key stakeholders *while* the response was still underway. The aim was to allow the UN and other responders to the crisis to benefit from external guidance to help improve the operational response in real-time. The evaluation was also to identify broader lessons learned in Darfur for future humanitarian action there and elsewhere.

It was envisioned that the evaluation team would consist three external consultants. But, in part due to cost implications, the team was led throughout by only two international consultants, supported for a very brief period during the third visit by another independent consultant. Given its focus primarily on learning, the evaluation also relied on the participation of OCHA and CARE staff who were not directly involved in the response. Information was collected from first-hand observation, surveys, key stakeholder interviews, focus groups, background documents, participatory workshops, and other evaluations and lessons learned exercises. The evaluation took place in real-time over the course of three visits to Sudan in September 2004, January/February 2005 and June/July 2005. The purpose of this iterative approach was to allow the consultants to observe the response to the crisis as it unfolded and feed suggestions for immediate course corrections into existing mechanisms and fora, as well as to determine in consultation with responders reasonable expectations for improvements in the response, against which progress could subsequently be measured. Given this focus, the main informants were frontline responders themselves from the UN agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, as well as beneficiaries, primarily internally displaced persons within North, South and West Darfur. Some donor governments and key headquarters stakeholders were also interviewed in New York, Geneva, London and Rome.

The approach to each visit was necessarily flexible, planned in consultation with and to meet the needs of actors on the ground. To this end, the first, short September 2004 visit aimed primarily at allowing the evaluators to: 1) gain a first hand appreciation of the challenges faced by, as well as the achievements of, the agencies on the ground; 2) identify key issues and gaps in the response; and 3) determine reasonable expectations for improvements in the response, against which progress could be measured in subsequent stages of the evaluation.

Capital level interviews in October 2004 helped strengthen working hypotheses on the key issues, in preparation for the second visit. This longer visit of one month, which took place in January/February 2005, aimed mainly at obtaining primary information from frontline responders in the Darfurs as well as beneficiaries, including in the less accessible areas. The main focus of the last month-long visit in June/July 2005 was to gather further data and observation on needs and outputs in terms of scale and timing, and then make specific, targeted trips to the Darfurs to compare these with outcomes. Special emphasis was also placed at this end stage of the evaluation on further developing recommendation sets with practical “how-to” guidance on implementation.

The original scope of the evaluation was broad, to review the effectiveness and impact of: 1) the system in responding to needs in all sectors, including common support services such as security, logistics and coordination; 2) system and agency tools for crisis response such as stand-by arrangements for personnel, supplies and logistics; 3) management of the crisis in critical areas such as early warning, leadership, advocacy, information management, policy coherence and strategic planning; and 5) funding mechanisms and levels.

As anticipated in the original Terms of Reference and necessitated by the limited time-frame of the evaluation (in terms of actual working days) as well as resources and capacity, not all areas were covered. The team focused on the most critical areas they believed would have the greatest impact on the overall response, resulting in 12 recommendation sets addressing issues ranging from advocacy to capacity and staffing.

The fourth and final report, which was to have focused on the lessons learned from the Darfur experience, was never completed as the team leader was forced to resign from all work in August 2005 due to the illness of his son. It was felt that without his involvement the report could not be satisfactorily completed. There remained, however, a need to summarize the main findings and recommendations of the evaluation to facilitate readers’ understanding, as well as ongoing discussions in the field on the implementation of the recommendations. OCHA’s Evaluation and Studies Unit (OCHA/ESU) thus drafted this section of the report alone, at the end of the consultants’ contracts. It is based, however, solely on the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation team in its three reports, which are included in this document. OCHA/ESU also prepared a consolidation of all of the recommendations from each report, which is annexed.

Key Findings and Conclusions

Although humanitarian needs and protection issues in Darfur increased sharply in early 2003, following fighting between the Government of Sudan (GOS) and insurgents groups, the UN humanitarian and diplomatic community did not seriously begin addressing the crisis for nearly a year, despite calls to do so from a number of high-level UN officials. Aid organizations were also slow to begin scaling up programmes. Significant operations were not underway until the GOS eased restrictions on access between March and June 2004 and then finally lifted them in the July 2004.

Meanwhile, the crisis developed into one of the most acute in the world at that time. When the evaluation was launched, nearly 1.2 million internally displaced and vulnerable host

communities were without even a minimum level of humanitarian support and aid. By the time the evaluation concluded, nearly 90 percent of the population was accessible to the UN and/or its partners. But continuing increases in the affected population and the massive initial under-delivery of assistance meant that humanitarian community experienced ongoing difficulties getting “on top of” the crisis. A year after the scaling up of assistance, there were still, in any given sector, a range of 850,000 to 1.24 million people without assistance. Generally declining morbidity and mortality rates over time suggest that the response, however belatedly, did help prevent even more deaths, which could have resulted from the displacement and loss of access to livelihoods after the initial crisis. But, as the team concluded during its third visit in June 2005, the still significant gaps in assistance; the continuing human rights abuses; the lack of access to war affected in rebel-controlled areas; and concerns about the quality and consistency of aid delivery and services were troubling.

Many factors contributed to the delayed and inadequate response. These included the fluidity of the security situation with near daily attacks and fresh displacement; the logistical challenges of providing assistance in an expansive geographic area with limited to no infrastructure; the obstruction of aid by the GOS, in particular from the months of September 2003 to March 2004; reluctance from political as well as humanitarian actors to jeopardize the North-South peace process by focusing on the crisis in Darfur; failure of the in-country aid actors to recognize the signs of a looming humanitarian crisis; and competition for the world’s attention with other high profile crisis such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Many of these issues have been extensively explored by independent authors, such as Hugo Slim, Larry Minear, Victor Tanner and the United Kingdom House of Commons International Development Committee, so this summary does not aim to delve into them in depth. Readers are encouraged to review these reports³ for a further discussion of these issues. The Team in particular recommends the chapter in ALNAP’s *Review of Humanitarian Action in 2004* on lessons learned from the Darfur experience (<http://www.alnap.org/RHA2004/contents.html>), which was based on a desk review by Larry Minear of six evaluations of the Darfur response, including this one. ALNAP is the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action.

Throughout the evaluation period, aid actors continued to struggle with many other challenges as well, including the ongoing violence and armed conflict; the lack of implementing partners; the acute sensitivity of the GOS towards protection activities, in particular those surrounding sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV); and funding shortages, in particular in the non-food sectors. But these are not peculiar to the Darfur response alone, and the evaluators thus

³ Hugo Slim, *Dithering over Darfur? A preliminary review of the international response*, International Affairs, 80 (October 2004), <http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/toc/inta/80/5>.

Victor Tanner, *Darfur: The Crisis that Just Won’t Go Away*, Parliamentary Brief, Vol. 9, No. 8 (June 2005), <http://www.thepolitician.org/june05/june05.pdf>.

House of Commons International Development Committee, *Darfur, Sudan: The responsibility to protect*, Fifth Report of Session 2004-05, Volume 1, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200405/cmselect/cmintdev/67/67i.pdf>

choose not to focus on them, but rather on those issues that it felt humanitarian actors could address. Their key findings follow.

Nearly all agencies and organizations were unable to mobilize the appropriate capacity to respond to the Darfur crisis.

The human capacity available to respond to the Darfur crisis contrasted significantly to some other recent responses where the UN and other organizations have, by comparison, quickly mobilized enough staff and resources to launch major humanitarian operations. The reasons for this vary. Generally speaking, when UN agencies and NGOs did turn their attention to the crisis, those with working internal rosters were able to provide some initial start-up staff quickly. But a greater number found their rosters were not sufficiently maintained and/or managers were reluctant to release staff for service, having had negative experiences with staff sent on short-term assignments to Iraq and Afghanistan, who were then extended well beyond the original agreement or never returned to their post. Those agencies and organizations that declared Darfur an organizational priority had fewer problems identifying and securing the release of experienced staff, but few organizations did so early enough in the crisis. External surge capacity was indispensable for allowing some agencies to staff start-up operations quickly. But some of the staff deployed through these mechanisms did not have the necessary expertise, training and experience. Further, the high-volume of short-term assignments, from both internal and external surge capacity rosters, led to high turnover, which was disruptive to programming and created a heavy administrative burden that detracted from other tasks, such as identifying longer-term staff. The latter proved for many to be equally if not more difficult than staffing their start-up operations. Survey responses indicate that many short-term staff were offered longer-term contracts but chose not to stay. While UN agencies and NGOs surveyed did not keep records of the reasons job offers in Darfur were declined, the majority said they found identifying appropriately qualified staff to work in the Darfurs more difficult than in other crises, and found this indicative of a trend. Even as staffing increased over time, many key positions were vacant at the writing of the third report. It had also become clear that increasing numbers of staff were not necessarily resulting in better service delivery and programming, largely due to the lack of experience and knowledge amongst some staff. While the Team was unable to thoroughly explore actions taken by agency and organization headquarters to address staffing gaps, a large number of staff in Khartoum and the Darfurs identified poor headquarters support as a chief reason for shortcomings in capacity.

The pressure to respond without the appropriate capacity also resulted in many unrealistic demands being made on staff, which put them under severe strain. Although the team observed improvements over time in the living conditions of staff, their psychological welfare remained unaddressed, resulting in a high level of burnout, reduced productivity and tense working relationships. The needs and concerns of national staff were especially overlooked.

A deeper UN field presence would have allowed the UN to better lead and shape the response at the field level.

A core group of NGOs and the International Committee of the Red Cross/Crescent (ICRC) had by far the greatest field presence in the Darfurs, and as a result were the primary drivers and shapers of the response on the ground. This reality was not adequately appreciated by either the UN agencies in Khartoum, or their headquarters. Over time, the Team witnessed improvements in the UN's field presence, but felt that still more could be done, even within the UN's more restrictive security arrangements. The lack of experienced and appropriately trained human rights and security officers in the field was particularly notable. The initial approach of using roving human rights officers for information collection and monitoring not only resulted in inadequate coverage of the Darfurs, but was also ineffective in establishing the necessary level of trust and partnership with local actors. The initial lack of security officers, which was improved by the time of the third visit, led to long delays in conducting security assessments. This meant that many areas were declared "no-go" not based on informed analysis but rather the lack of it. It also meant that aid actors had inadequate security analysis on which to base programming decisions. A more effective UN field presence, both in terms of quantity, quality and distribution, would have enabled the UN to be in a better position to: 1) realize its plans to respond to the crisis; 2) take a more proactive field-based approach to human rights violations monitoring; 3) mediate between the authorities and NGOs when issues arose that left the latter vulnerable; 4) provide technical support, leadership and coordination at the sectoral level, and 4) better inform and guide NGOs on operational as well as policy issues, in particular those taking on new roles.

An agreed framework to protect human rights, and which addresses the full spectrum of rights, is critical.

While the recognition of the crisis as one of protection, rather than relief assistance, was a step forward, it also highlighted how inadequately the international humanitarian community understands what protection is and how to translate it into action. Major efforts were made in late 2004 to develop a protection strategy, but they suffered from a lack of UN leadership and expertise on this issue. Actors became quickly and for a long time bogged down in defining and assigning roles, responsibilities and activities, and overly focused on new and novel approaches, rather than tried and true approaches established by organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) or UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The limitations of providing protection by presence were recognized by some early on. But while some protective programming was taking place, direct, informed action was for the most part lacking. The Team also believes that the distinction being made both in theory and practice between human rights monitoring, investigation and reporting (in this case undertaken by the Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR) and the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) Human Rights Unit) and human rights protection provided by aid organizations, contradicts the Secretary-General's vision of how human rights should be holistically addressed in integrated UN missions, and created unhelpful divisions. For instance, the maintenance of two separate databases for human rights violation reporting – one "owned" by OHCHR and UNMIS Human Rights for verified reports, and the other by the Khartoum Protection Steering Group for unverified reports from aid actors -- threatened to

prevent a holistic analysis of trends on the human rights situation, on which to base programming decisions as well as future efforts at prosecution. SGBV was, at least initially, treated as a reproductive health issue rather than one of the violation of women's human rights; not least due to the lack of training of human rights monitors to address this issue. Lastly, although the team noted improvements in the use of education as a protection tool and strategy by its third visit, it also found that insufficient attention was being paid to monitoring and addressing children's rights and protection.

More, not less, public advocacy on behalf of war affected women, men and children would have helped create a more protective environment.

At the field level, in Khartoum and the Darfurs, UN agencies and NGO staff struggled understandably with the tension between "speaking out" and the need to protect immediate programming, as well as staff and beneficiaries, from reprisals. And while some effective advocacy did take place, some key UN officials remained silent, some simply for lack of guidance and advice on the situation and the appropriate means of effectively advocating on the issues. Others said that in the absence of a coordinated advocacy strategy, they were uncertain whether they should speak out or not. While the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator is to be congratulated for his efforts to call international attention, in particular of the UN Security Council, to the crisis in late 2003 and early 2004, the UN system lacked a strategy for effectively using all high-level UN officials outside Sudan, including heads of UN agencies operating in Darfur, to advocate for action. Tensions surrounding addressing protection issues would have been better addressed and resolved if the UN system and its major entities had a common and clearly articulated advocacy strategy for Darfur earlier in the crisis, balancing both public and "quiet" advocacy initiatives at the highest levels. This would have allowed for more strategic use of system wide resources and better protection for aid actors and beneficiaries.

Despite constraints, the needs of all war-affected would have been better met through more consistent, strategic and coordinated sector leadership and planning.

In many instances, UN agencies and their partners collaborated well in Darfur. But in other critical areas – including protection, camp management, and the provision of some forms of humanitarian relief, such as shelter – agencies lost critical time negotiating roles and responsibilities in the heat of the response. There are many reasons for this, including concerns over the applicability of individual mandates, inadequate funding and capacity, and the selectivity exhibited by both UN agencies and NGOs in choosing activities they were willing and/or able to undertake. The latter was especially damaging to the response, in particular in areas where clear precedents for leadership existed, such as in camp management. In the absence of leadership on this issue, which was critical to the protection of internally displaced persons (IDPs), several UN actors and many NGOs admirably stepped in to fill the gap, but their lack of expertise and capacity resulted in limited and inconsistent performance, as well as some avoidable mistakes, in this area. Similarly, the shared responsibility for returnees has added complexity and thus requires substantial attention to ensure common approaches across state borders.

While the *Sudan Work Plan 2005* sets a high standard for planning and appeal documents, its strategic priorities did not necessarily drive programme implementation at the field level, nor did it sufficiently balance the many competing assistance needs, not all of which could reasonably be met simultaneously with the given resources and capacity. Laudable efforts to identify gaps in aid had not at the writing of the third report reversed the over-concentration of assistance in and around state capitals, nor the inherent tensions between attempts to meet the needs of host and/or nomadic populations and IDPs equally. There therefore remained a need to more deliberately articulate the rationale for who should receive assistance first and which agency should do what where.

Improved accountability and better monitoring are critical to improving performance.

Weaknesses in performance – even obvious ones – remained unaddressed in large part because no formal external mechanisms exist for holding agencies accountable for their collective or individual performance. UN agencies frequently acted as independent entities, rather than integrated components, and rarely, if ever, presumed to call each other to account. They cooperated with the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) and/or ERC, but rarely submitted themselves to their authority. Similarly, the Team believes that NGOs have a collective responsibility for NGO performance that they have yet to fully realize. NGOs acting independently in Darfur have overlapped activities or “staked a claim” to areas in which they failed to deliver. Cooperation among and between UN agencies and NGOs also tended more toward agreeing to be organized in the interest of having their role and location endorsed, rather than taking more responsibility for rationally deciding who should do what based on real capacities, technical expertise and know how. While attempts were made to set and meet standards, the tendency to treat these as absolutes was sometimes self-defeating. Jointly developed benchmarks defining reasonable expectations for progress are more suitable to the fluid context, but were not fully explored. Mechanisms for monitoring and measuring health outcomes and food and livelihood security were also lacking.

The lack of a *common* understanding among responders of the operating environment, and among beneficiaries of the aims of the responders, impeded humanitarian action and contributed to avoidable mistakes.

Beyond the somewhat limited analysis undertaken in the Humanitarian Needs Profile, there have been few efforts to systematically collect, share, compare and analyse available data in a cogent and shared manner. While not uncommon in the early stages of response, more than two years after the initial crisis, proven tools and services such as Humanitarian Information Centers (HICs) and WFP’s Vulnerability Assessment and Mapping (VAM) capacity were yet to be fully established let alone producing comprehensive analysis. Lastly, the initially sparse deployment of United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) officers (the recommended two per state were not deployed until March 2005) left UN agencies and NGOs without adequate security analysis to inform operational planning and more proactively seek access. While many individual and some joint assessments existed, they were not yet inventoried and collected in a single source. Political analysis undertaken by the mission was not being adequately shared with the humanitarian community nor did humanitarians fully develop their own capacity at political analysis. The absence of social and livelihood analysis

was especially lacking. Further, while agencies and organizations in the field were by and large held in high esteem by the communities in which they were working, what disinformation existed about their purpose was not being countered, posing obvious security risks.

More consistent methods for and integration of assessments would have minimized the inattention to cross sectoral issues, in particular protection and gender.

While many assessments were conducted for a variety of programming reasons, their methodologies differed, inhibiting the comparability of data across assessments, while single sector assessments minimized or overlooked the impact of other factors on the situation. The vast majority of assessments were carried out without reference to protection or to gender dimensions, apart from SGBV.

The perceived tension between meeting short-term needs quickly and ensuring qualitative programming needs to be better managed.

Meaningful and sustained attention to the qualitative aspects of programming was lacking, in part due to the urgency of meeting emergency needs. While this was clearly important, doing so at the expense of the qualitative aspects of programming hindered the humanitarian community's ability to properly identify and most efficiently meet needs, most notably of women, as well as to effectively target assistance. Responders in Darfur took important steps towards meeting *Sphere Project Minimum Standards in Disaster Response*, and tracking these through a monthly needs profile. But this had the unintended consequence of discouraging some actors from undertaking activities, which they knew could not reasonably meet the minimum standards, even if doing so would have filled a critical gap. Meanwhile, less attention was being paid to the qualitative aspects of the *Sphere Project* standards, such as beneficiary participation. With some notable exceptions, where beneficiary participation did constitute an aspect of the programming, UN agencies and NGOs alike tended to consult primarily with the traditional male leadership structures within IDP camps, and did not fully explore or build on either women's leadership and organizational capacities, or leadership structures outside of the camps. There was also little evidence that programming took into account the differential impact of the crisis on women and men, girls and boys. Rather, the gender dimensions of the crisis were mistakenly categorized as primarily a reproductive health issue, which had the effect of ensuring that they were *not* mainstreamed into the overall response. By the conclusion of its visit, the team found more attention being paid to the environmental impacts of programming, albeit belatedly.

The humanitarian community is not investing enough in its future work force.

Providing new or junior staff, who made up a large portion of the responders, with appropriate induction and training was neglected by many, if not most, UN agencies and NGOs. Of particular import was the increasing levels in early 2005 of mid-level UN and NGO staff 'badged' as "protection" or "human rights" officers who arrived in-country without the requisite expertise. Further, many staff from various disciplines were unfamiliar with the key policies of their own organizations or those for whom they were implementing partners.

Given the political sensitivities surrounding the crisis, this inexperience put the individuals themselves, as well as organizations and the overall response itself, at risk. While most agencies and organizations indicated that new staff received pre-deployment briefings, many also said their staff had limited to no training, either because no formal training programmes existed or staff on the ground who were supposed to induct new arrivals were too busy to do so. It is the team's view that today's interventions require higher skill levels, better understanding of the qualitative aspects of programming and familiarity with emergency standards; and further that if the Darfur experience is not to be repeated, UN agencies and NGOs must invest now in training and developing the humanitarian responders of the future.

Recommendations

Some of the evaluation's recommendations have already been implemented by some actors and/or groups. The team realizes that some may add to the already high burden of work on staff in the field. And further, that many may require additional resources and capacity. The team however maintains the view that recommendations should not be withheld solely because of these constraints. Knowing that the aim is for these recommendations to be considered by all key stakeholders, including donors, the Team believes that presenting them serves at a bare minimum to flag what may be possible, should the international humanitarian community, at all levels choose to take the necessary steps. Specific actions to be taken to implement these recommendations, as well as focal points and timelines for action, are detailed in particular in the third evaluation report. The recommendations below represent only the evaluation's main findings. Others can be found in the three reports themselves, as well as the attached consolidated matrix of recommendations.

1. Improve accountability of headquarters support to the field

The team recognizes that many agencies – in part due to the difficulties of staffing the Darfur response – have already initiated reforms and/or improvements in their surge and staffing capacities, but believes that more immediate and ongoing attention is needed in this area. All agency headquarters should review their existing staff complement to ensure that their offices are fully staffed and more importantly staffed with appropriately experienced personnel holding contracts for at least one year. Where necessary, quick action should be taken to address existing gaps, replace under-performing staff and surmount recruitment obstacles. All agency headquarters should also enter into an immediate dialogue with their heads of office about other areas of critical support, and develop a plan for addressing weaknesses. If support is found to be particularly lacking based on these initial discussions, the agency should launch a review of its support to its Darfur programme. The ERC should request frank and honest feedback from the HC and UN Country Team (UNCT) on areas in which support from the UN Secretariat, including the IASC and Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs (ECHA), could or should be more forthcoming, and then enter a dialogue to address those issues. To address the psychological welfare of staff, the HC should request that two staff counselors be deployed and made available to all staff.

2. Extend UN presence beyond state capitals

UN satellite offices should be immediately established in areas where they are required for the purposes of sector coordination and/or to fulfill protection responsibilities. In particular, to facilitate human rights reporting and protection, a minimum of two to three satellite human rights offices should be established in each of the four operational areas of the Darfurs. Donors should support these needs; and UNMIS, UNDSS and the African Union (AU) should be actively engaged in identifying and addressing constraints and opportunities for the deployment of UN offices in the deep field.

3. Develop a joint human rights protection framework

Human rights and protection actors should establish a human rights protection operating framework that delineates roles and responsibilities between all human rights and humanitarian agencies/actors and that specifies clear channels of communication and information flow between them, including between the UNMIS Human Rights Unit, the UNMIS Protection Unit, Rule of Law activities, operational UN agencies, international organizations (IOs) and NGOs. The Senior IDP Adviser and the Directors of the UNMIS Human Rights and Protection Units should collaborate in developing this framework in close consultation with the UNCT, ICRC and NGOs. Particular attention should be paid to defining areas of responsibility and accountability for IDPs; addressing weaknesses in the current arrangements for the return, reintegration, resettlement and relocation of returnees; establishing a unified monitoring, reporting and response system for human rights violations and abuse; improving in particular the monitoring and dissemination of information regarding children's current situation; and supporting and ensuring the implementation of the 11 Recommendations to the GOS on SGBV prepared by the UNMIS Human Rights Unit.

4. Develop a common advocacy platform

The Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and/or his deputies should ensure the development of advocacy strategies for the UN mission as a whole and for each major UN entity, based on reliable information on trends and patterns gathered by UN and NGOs. In particular, UN agencies should begin providing leadership and guidance to field-based staff regarding opportunities and strategies for advocacy; and ensure that potential advocates (e.g. mandate holders of the Special Procedures of the Commission on Human Rights) have sufficient information on a timely basis to enable them to make the appropriate approaches.

5. Install a Strategic Planning and Analysis Unit

The HC and UNCT should establish a Planning and Analysis Unit and shape it as their key planning and analysis asset. The Unit should be designed from the outset as a task-based inter-agency asset to fill the current gap in inter-agency planning and analysis. The 'returns group' brought together by the HC in May 2005 for an intensive 10-day collaborative effort demonstrated the value of such an approach. While tasks will necessarily be dictated by the circumstances and issues with which the humanitarian community is grappling, it should

serve primarily to tackle critical cross-cutting issues rather than single sector issues. The creation of such a Unit should also assist the UNCT in resolving the difficulties that have arisen in the implementation of the collaborative approach and to plan ahead.

6. Strengthen sectoral planning at the field level

The HC, with support from OCHA and the UNCT, should strengthen planning and analysis at the sector level in each of the four operational areas in the Darfurs, so that sectoral planning becomes the primary engine for improving the effectiveness and efficiency of humanitarian action in the short to medium term. Actions would include: preparation by each sector of a description of how competing needs are to be balanced; translation of 120-day plans into rolling implementation plans for each sector in each of the four operational areas; instituting peer reviews of sector leads; and requiring discussion of project funding proposals within relevant sector working groups before submission to donors. If the sector lead capacities do not currently exist to support these approaches, donors should provide the necessary support.

7. Develop a common assessment framework

The HC, with support from OCHA/HIC and the UNCT, should consolidate existing assessment data, and work towards multi-sectoral, multi-agency assessments through the development of a common assessment and strategy plan, at least for UN agencies. Every effort should be made to ensure that protection experts participate in all assessments.

8. Improve existing agency-specific and common accountability mechanisms

In the absence of external accountability mechanisms, UN agencies and NGOs should improve their own accountability to each other through benchmarking and testing reasonable expectations. This could be done by recruiting or seconding two senior staff for a period of twelve months with a brief to: a) determine at the field level (not in Khartoum) the degree to which each UN humanitarian agency is meeting the reasonable expectations of other UN agencies and of NGOs; and b) recommend remedial measures to be taken to address shortcomings. NGOs should consider establishing a Darfur-specific NGO performance and accountability process, which could utilize a number of tools for the application of principles and standards, e.g. peer reviews against the *Sphere Project's* common and sector standards and/or regular reviews of progress in relation to agreed time bound common benchmarks. Alternatively, NGOs that are willing could commission a review of their performance and adherence to principles and standards in the Darfurs. This could also result in setting common benchmarks.

Key aid actors should strengthen monitoring of the impact of humanitarian action through health outcomes, food security indicators and livelihood data. To do so, the World Health Organization (WHO), the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the World Food Programme (WFP) should agree on a method or framework for measuring the probable relative contribution to health outcomes (morbidity, malnutrition and mortality) of food aid, targeted nutritional interventions, clean water, sanitation, hygiene promotion, primary health care and shelter, and on that basis, conduct regular joint monitoring and analysis, as well as

disseminate their findings. Similarly, WFP, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and NGOs with relevant expertise, such as Save the Children Fund – United Kingdom (SC-UK) or Action Contre la Faim (ACF), or academic institutions such as Tufts University, should collaborate to establish a food security and livelihood monitoring unit or network. It would need to draw on: 1) logistics capacity, to the extent that it would collect primary information; 2) a broad range of participating agencies, assuming that some form of surveillance via sentinel sites across agro-ecological zones would be required; and 3) a broad enough range of expertise to provide advice on the normal functioning of markets in the Darfurs, the role of livestock (which is often poorly integrated in food security models), and the pressures created by resource competition and desertification.

9. Ensure adequate public information about humanitarian activities

The SRSG and HC should ensure adequate public information about humanitarian activities by acting urgently on the need identified in Security Council Resolution 1547 for effective public information; disseminating the *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement* to IDPs, government officials and humanitarian actors; and ensuring that all staff members and consultants understand and can explain the humanitarian principles, key policies and modus operandi of their organizations. These should be available in Arabic and English to all staff and consultants, as well as beneficiaries and the community. Oxfam's *What is Oxfam Doing in Darfur?* document should be used as a model for providing public information.

10. Improve the qualitative aspect of programming

All aid actors should ensure due consideration of the qualitative aspects of their programming. Practical ways of doing so include: 1) inviting the *Sphere Project* to participate in ongoing discussions on how to appropriately apply the *Minimum Standards for Disaster Response*; 2) investigating formal and informal leadership structures to ensure that the assisted population is involved in decision making (particularly women); 3) making meeting minutes publicly available to ensure the accountability of leaders in IDP camp settings; 4) holding separate discussions with women and men on all new interventions; 4) conducting an immediate environmental risk assessment; and 5) ensuring that the appropriate gender expertise is available to assist agencies in undertaking gender analysis and conducting gender-sensitive programmes, and that staff at the decision making level participate in and support the work of the Gender Theme Group for Darfur.

11. Invest in staff training

All UN agencies and NGOs should review and where necessary invest in strengthened training and induction programmes to ensure that their staff are equipped with the necessary technical skills as well as an understanding of humanitarian principles, basic international and regional human rights instruments, international humanitarian law, and of their own organizations policies and modus operandi.

DARFUR CRISIS REAL-TIME EVALUATION FIRST WORKING PAPER FOR THE UN COUNTRY TEAM

The independent real-time evaluation of the Darfur crisis, organised by OCHA in association with the IASC, is a mixed exercise with three main elements: backward looking elements (genesis of the conflict and international response), real-time elements (identify gaps and assist the UNCT in addressing those) and forward looking elements (lesson learning for future emergencies). The intention of the first two visits is to observe the on-going operation, gain an appreciation of the challenges faced by the agencies on the ground, identify key issues and gaps that need attention, gain an understanding of achievements and what needs to be accomplished by the time the team visits next and to inform the final, lesson learning phase of the evaluation.

The evaluation team visited Sudan for the first, short visit from 11 – 24th September, which included a short visit to the three Darfurs. The itinerary is attached in Annex A. The evaluation team agreed to prepare a short working paper for the UNCT within a week of its first visit that (a) addresses the key issues faced by the UNCT and (b) indicates reasonable expectations of improvements/decisions feasible and desirable by December 2004 when the team returns for its second visit.

The paper also identifies knowledge gaps; specific to the team or apparent amongst UNCT members and / or partner agencies.

While this document refers specifically to the humanitarian response to the crisis in the Darfur region, many of the issues addressed herein either are systemic per se or are indicative of systemic issues. Particular examples include those relating to the human resource capacities of the agencies, funding constraints and the interface between the political and the humanitarian response of the international community. The Team will further examine the systemic issues as the evaluation progresses. Annex B contains a list of systemic issues to be explored by the team in the coming months.

The team members recognise that the HC and UNCT are dealing with input from many quarters and that engaging with a real-time evaluation is in one sense another burden. We trust that the engagement will ultimately be of considerable value.

1. Coverage and Quality of Humanitarian Assistance

The humanitarian situation in the Darfurs is ever-changing due to on-going hostilities, primary and secondary displacement and shifts in the political situation, both domestic and international. Action by the international community continues to evolve in response to the needs and opportunities for humanitarian intervention. It is possible that the crisis has not yet peaked as most of the internally displaced persons (IDPs) have not been able to return to their homes nor plant for the coming year. Moreover, up to 300,000 IDPs and other war-affected persons are inaccessible to humanitarian assistance.

While great strides have been made by the international community to reach the war-affected populations, the agencies and organisations on the ground are constrained by many factors including a lack of funding in key sectors, insufficient (but improving) implementation

capacity, and ongoing insecurity in many areas. Access remains a factor but has improved overall. Since the 90-day plan was formulated in June the gaps in life-saving assistance have narrowed substantially in sectors that previously had very limited coverage, including shelter and sanitation. The shelter gap had been reduced from 88% to 46% by the end of August, but as the agencies and organisations concerned are well aware, the assistance provided is very limited – just one plastic sheet and two blankets for a family of six. The joint venture between the UNJLC and OCHA seems to be working well for NFIs. However there is a need for a more strategic coordination approach to this sector to ensure that NFIs respond to the needs of the affected population.

The food gap remained at 49% over the three months, despite vastly increased supply and distributions. The gap in the provision of basic drugs was similarly constant at around 49%. The gap in access to primary health care was reduced from 57% to 48% but the gap in the number of children assisted through therapeutic and supplementary feeding centers (based on estimates of the number requiring assistance) actually increased from 70% to 79%. The sanitation gap was closed from 93% to 60% over the three months of the 90-day plan, a big improvement. The water gap also stood at 60% at the end of August.

Clearly, despite the progress made, gaps of this magnitude are a matter of grave concern. The context of the challenges faced by agencies and organisations across the sectors includes significantly an increasing target population – up 65% in the case of IDPs and 57% considering all conflict affected people over the three months June-July-August — making it impossible to get in front of the (expanding) needs.

Donors in particular need to be made to understand that the crisis is not over. Mortality rates remain high (thousands are dying each month from preventable disease according to a recent WHO survey), underlining the need to continue to ramp up life-saving assistance to reach quantitative targets in each sector. Consideration also needs to be given to revising the level of assistance, most notably perhaps with regard to shelter given the probability of a large number of IDPs remaining encamped through the next rainy season (see below).

While continuing to accelerate assistance to achieve quantitative targets, the UNCT needs to plan a move towards **a more qualitative response** that considers outcomes as well as outputs, that reflects a better understanding of the socio-economic and cultural fabric of the Darfurs, and that addresses the protection and political issues that underlie the crisis. This means amongst other things addressing conflict resolution and protection as mainstream issues and ensuring that analysis and response integrates gender considerations at all stages. Although continuity of staffing is important and the current high turn over of staff is a chief concern, agencies may also need an injection of a different skill set to achieve such a shift in humanitarian assistance.

The UNCT recognises that it needs to plan not for one scenario (the practice for consolidated appeals) but for several, including: (a) maintenance of the status quo with people remaining in the camps and other settlements, (b) an increase in violence with more displacement, (c) opportunities for a large proportion of IDPs and refugees to return to their places of origin, and perhaps (d) permanent settlement in places other than places of origin. For planning and prepositioning purposes many of the supplies required will be the same whatever the outcome, although the roles to be played by and the modus operandi of each agency may differ substantially. For each scenario, the roles of respective agencies should be agreed now.

In the event of more or secondary displacement agencies are likely to face similar leadership issues in relation to camp management/coordination, shelter, etc as faced in the recent past. Increased conflict could also make it more difficult to reach a large proportion of the war-affected population from the state capitals. Importantly, some work is already underway in preparing the ground for cross-line activities and/or operating from SLA/M areas.

Expectations for end December 2004:

Please note that the ‘expectations’ included in each section in this report are an attempt by the evaluation team to reflect what it would be reasonable to expect to be determined or in place at the end of the four month period 1 September to 31 December. They are essentially benchmarks, expressed herein as end states or outcomes.

- Planning in place to fully meet quantitative life-saving needs before the onset of the next rainy season, contingent on a range of scenarios including (a) maintenance of the status quo with people remaining in the camps and other settlements, (b) an increase in violence with more displacement, (c) opportunities for a large proportion of IDPs and refugees to return to their places of origin, and perhaps (d) permanent settlement in places other than places of origin. This should include *inter alia* the identification of leadership roles (where unclear) and fully worked arrangements for cross-line activities and for operating from SLA/M areas. The most urgent task is contingency planning for (b) an increase in violence with more displacement, particularly in inaccessible or hard to access areas.
- Shelter standards revised (including revision of assumed family size); an agency appointed (or confirmed) as lead NFI coordinator, increased funding, and more strategic NFI distributions; more emphasis on the educational aspects of water and sanitation (e.g. use of latrines, health practices) in order to maximize the use of the facilities provided; more attention to the education sector resulting in an increase in the number of boys and girls able to return to school; and generally more attention across the sectors to SPHERE standards (including gender dimensions) as well as distribution/utilization monitoring (including of food relief and health/essential drug kits).
- The qualitative transformation of humanitarian assistance is clearly underway as evidenced *inter alia* by more emphasis on outcomes and less reliance on outputs; a shift from a sectoral focus to strategic area management; more attention to socio-economic factors in programming; the application of ‘do no harm’ and rights-based principles including programming based on gender analysis; and the incorporation where feasible of conflict resolution strategies in the delivery of assistance.
- The skill set of agency teams will have been reviewed to determine the need for additional qualitative programming input and ‘transition’ expertise.

2. Protection

UN agencies and INGOs have recognized that protection is central to the humanitarian response and many have sought to add relevant expertise to their staff. Additionally, the

OHCHR has brought in a small number of human rights officers⁵ whose work plan includes monitoring and investigation and capacity-building of local structures. There is a lack of capacity, however, throughout the international community in terms of staffing numbers, professional knowledge and experience and seniority. To date, there is also an apparent lack of leadership, guidance, definition and strategy for protection at Khartoum and regional level. There are, however, plans to enhance the protection capacity at all levels and it is hoped that this could remedy these concerns.

The Khartoum-based protection working group (PWG) helped draft protection guidelines but is still seeking (after several months) both to define protection and to draft a protection strategy, which seems extraordinary and appears to indicate a lack of direction and/or leadership. There are PWGs in all three capitals, but, like the Khartoum based group it seems that they are more information-fora than strategy-setting fora. These PWGs are not able yet to provide sound practical advice as to how to incorporate protection into programming. In order to do this effectively, there is a need for protection and other relevant staff to gain a greater understanding of the societal and legal contexts within which both the armed conflict has taken place and the humanitarian response is operating⁶.

For understandable reasons, there is an emphasis on information-gathering, collation and reporting. For reasons too numerous and complex to address here in detail, it is the Team's view that the development of any data-base on protection or violations should be approached with caution and sufficiently researched to ensure that it does not become counter-productive in either the medium or long-term.

It is recognised that the presence of international staff provides a form of protection (with limitations) and so a number of INGOs have established an overnight presence outside the state capitals, most notably in West Darfur. While efforts need to be made to increase international presence outside the capitals, not least for protection purposes, a word of caution is needed against over-reliance on this; aid workers cannot protect civilians against armed groups and individuals and should not be in a position where their own security is compromised. The Government of Sudan remains ultimately and primarily responsible for the protection of its own citizens. The High Commissioner for Human Rights and Special Procedures of the Commission on Human Rights are engaged in a series of visits and it is hoped that their advocacy will assist in the realisation of these obligations.

Analysis of protection needs – as with other aspects of the humanitarian response – has not been characterised by an emphasis on participation and consultation with the conflict affected population. Some steps have been taken to address this, such as training in the Guiding Principles amongst the war-affected population, the GoS and the SLM/A. It is hoped that steps to address this – particularly with regard to the views and coping strategies of women and young people – will soon be put in place.

Expectations for end December 2004:

- A protection strategy or framework adopted by PWG members which incorporates a clear exposition of protection concepts, roles and responsibilities and specific strategies

⁵ The current composition of 8 staff is expected to increase to 16 in the near future.

⁶ Such as the impact of Shari'a law and cultural norms regarding obtaining justice for human rights violations including sexual violence.

for various protection concerns e.g. SGBV and forced movement. As part of these strategies, it is expected that existing and developing partnerships will continue and that other opportunities will be explored, such as working with religious leaders and the mass media.

- Clear agency lead for respective aspects of humanitarian protection and case-based human rights monitoring and investigation.
- As part of a wider gender analysis, there needs to be a greater understanding of the differential impact of the armed conflict and on-going violence on women and men, girls and boys. The wider analysis should also incorporate an understanding of women's coping strategies and mechanisms for survival and identify opportunities for women's participation or lead in decision-making at all levels.
- Sexual and gender based violence: Pilot projects to find ways of reducing women's vulnerability through the need to collect fuel will have commenced and yielded some results. Meanwhile, a lead agency will have been identified to coordinate the analysis and response to this and other issues of gender-based violence⁷, including providing care and support to victims of SGBV and finding mechanisms for redress.
- Return: A greater appreciation will have been gained by those involved in planning for return or other voluntary movement of IDPs of the applicable international human rights and humanitarian law and standards. Some training is being conducted and it is expected both that this will increase and that its impact will start to be felt over the next few weeks. In this regard, initial work needs to commence regarding property and land rights issues, particularly vis a vis inheritance rights for women and children.
- Children associated with armed groups: The GoS has very recently ratified the Optional Protocols to the CRC. UNICEF has conducted an initial survey on this topic and it is expected that this coincidence can be built on to start a strategy for advocacy and demobilisation of children associated with all forms of armed groups.

3. IDP Camp/Cluster Management

Responsibility for assisting and protecting IDPs, and for camp management, is the responsibility of the Government of Sudan and the issue for the international community, therefore, is the coordination of external assistance, both in relation to the provision of life saving services and protection. Thus where used 'camp management' will be referred to in inverted commas.

Although the collaborative approach to internal displacement does not require it, the team believes that in the Darfur context at least the UN is accountable for protection and the coordination of services to camps, and that a UN lead must be identified (if necessary state by state if one agency is not able to lead overall).⁸ This is principally because of the acute

⁷ While UNFPA may be volunteering for this role, issues of SGBV go further than reproductive health issues and so the lead agency should, it is suggested, be one with a wider remit.

⁸ The need for greater *accountability* and *predictability* (in the general senses at least) has however been recognised: See Implementing the Collaborative Response to Situations of Internal Displacement: Guidance for UN Humanitarian and/or Resident Coordinators and Country Teams, September 2004, p 5

protection concerns in Darfur, but also in consideration of the need to ensure adequate overall planning, coverage and capacity-building. The evaluation team submits that the collaborative approach will continue to be fragile and ineffective in contexts like that of Darfur unless clear leadership and responsibility is identified and accountability and predictability established.

UNHCR has increased its presence in West Darfur (currently 14 international staff) but intends to limit its work to (a) protection of refugees, IDPs; (b) profiling of returnees; (c) ensuring that conditions for safe return are in place. While UNHCR has rejected involvement in 'camp management' per se it is suggested that the agency should in the very least take the lead role for IDPs and 'camp management' in West Darfur as already a number of refugees have returned and settled within existing IDP agglomerations. It may also be opportune for UNHCR to take the lead in shelter, at least in West Darfur.

In the absence of UNHCR's agreement to date, the HC has engaged other partners such as IOM, NRC etc. Thus IOM has been formally given the lead for the organisation and management of assistance to clustered IDP populations living in the urban areas of Geneina and Nyala (which will include the construction of a new camp site on the edge of Geneina). This is in addition to IOM's responsibility (by agreement with the GoS) for IDP registration and return. While it is very positive that IOM has stepped forward to play these roles, the team is still of the view that an overall UN lead is required to provide overall guidance and coordination⁹.

In the absence of UNHCR involvement, or in the event that UNHCR only takes the lead in West Darfur where the grounds for the agency's commitment are most cogent, the HC may consider approaching ICRC with a request to take the lead in North Darfur where it has already been involved in 'camp management' and where the Spanish Red Cross now plays a prominent role. At this point, ICRC delegates represent the largest single block of international staff in the Darfurs. The OCHA team may need to take the lead if a gap remains in South and/or North Darfur. This, however, would require additional resources and expertise (ideally including a UNHCR secondee), and there is a risk that it would detract from OCHA's current coordination cum facilitation role.

The evaluation team recognises that the size of the largest camps and the challenges stemming from the lack of site planning, engagement of IDPs, and coordination of services pose stumbling blocks for UNHCR or any other organization that might take a lead role in IDP camp/cluster management (the lesson being that the lead should be identified from the outset). However, the UN should be accountable for these camps, not least because they have become quite volatile posing significant risks *inter alia* to the INGO service providers on which the UN system depends.

⁹ The role of UNHCR in Afghanistan and East Timor indicates that the agency is able to provide such a lead.

Expectations for end December 2004:

- Overall lead agency for the coordination of external assistance to IDP camps and clusters agreed (if necessary a different agency/organisation for each state – e.g. UNHCR in West Darfur, the Red Cross Movement in North Darfur)¹⁰
- All IDP camps and clusters greater than 10,000 people have a clearly-identified agency or organisation responsible for the coordination of external assistance and protection (this could be a group of well experienced organisations (e.g. Spanish Red Cross, NRC, IOM). This will not obviate the need for an accountable UN agency (or the ICRC) in each state to take the lead, ensure protection issues are addressed, provide quality guidance and ensure area management/coordination in non-camp environments.
- More effective engagement of IDPs in decision-making and activities including women and youth (not only through sheiks) resulting in enhanced confidence of IDPs in themselves, each other and the humanitarian community.
- Funding mechanism identified to fund the coordination of external assistance and protection for IDP camps/clusters, at least to entice and ‘jump start’ INGOs willing to undertake a coordination role in relation to the larger camps while resources are being mobilised.

4. Registration, Assessments and Studies

There is currently a patch work approach to registration and counting by UN agencies and INGOs resulting in disagreements about figures. Up to date registration has not been coordinated or streamlined. While rough estimates may be the best approach during the height of the emergency, it is now time to review registration mechanisms, and to streamline and standardize. There are a lot of different figures depending on who registers and the method used. ICRC’s method of getting to know the community first, organizing the camp by tribe and then registering deserves study as it seems to result in more accurate figures. This however requires a sustained presence in the camps/clusters and patience in building trust with sheiks and IDP populations.

Many assessments are undertaken by inter-agency missions and are organized through OCHA. However, there is beginning to be a proliferation of assessments and studies, a number of which are being undertaken by individual agencies/organisations and not subject to a strategic effort. It should be possible to combine some of these efforts (or “piggy-back”) to reduce stress on the population and to maximize resources. This is particularly pertinent in the case of recording SGBV (on which there is perhaps now an over-emphasis on assessment compared to measures to actually reduce the phenomenon).

¹⁰ It is recognized that this may not be achievable given current constraints. However, the team believes that the lead concept should be pursued to the extent possible and, if this is not achievable, recognizes that the second best option of choosing individual leads on a camp-by-camp basis may be the only practical solution.

Expectations for end December 2004:

- Streamlined and more informed beneficiary registration mechanisms; joint registration data bases
- A common assessment strategy and plan, at least for UN agencies.

5. Planning and Coordination

The 90-day plan was a helpful planning tool and presumably provided more accountability. The 120-day plans developed by some agencies should be similarly useful. It is understood that there will not be a combined 120-day plan. In its absence there is some risk of losing momentum and there may be a need for an alternative means of checking performance and identifying gaps. Perhaps the Darfur Humanitarian Profile is sufficient for this.

Periodic plans like the 90-day plan, and for that matter the Humanitarian Profiles, are focused on outputs and do not contain a strategic element to address outcomes. This leaves a significant gap and highlights the need for the UNCT to attempt a more thoroughly integrated, strategic approach (something that should not be left to periodic appeal documents.) The HC and UNCT might consider the merits of a quarterly (scenario based) strategic planning cycle for the Darfurs, based on strategic planning exercises first conducted at the state level. The alternative would be to start with a strategic planning process taking the UNCT up to the commencement of the next rainy season.

Sectoral coordination has now been institutionalized and is taking place in all three Darfurs. The effectiveness of the sectoral coordination teams varies however and there is a tendency of sectoral meetings to turn into information meetings. Stronger linkages and coordination between sectors are also needed to ensure the coherency of the overall response. The absence of clear 'camp management' mechanism and authority in many camps hampers a more strategic and comprehensive planning approach.

Expectation by end December 2004:

- Strengthened UNCT strategic planning and coordination
- Strengthened field level coordination function including sectoral, inter-sectoral and intra-Darfur coordination
- Improved institutional information flow

6. Staffing, security and medical services

UN agencies and NGOs alike face serious staffing constraints. It seems difficult to attract competent staff to work in Darfur and almost all agencies have reported that they find it difficult to fill their positions. Consequently a high portion of staff currently on the ground are on short-term contracts, consultancies, TDY and surge capacity. Many are new to their agencies and have received little training. While this may be normal for the initial phases of an emergency, this situation must be addressed to guarantee stability as well as a more consistent response. In order to reduce the high turn over, the well-being of staff should be a higher priority. Living conditions in the Darfurs are difficult. Induction training for new staff

seems weak and could be strengthened, but it means a longer lead time. A good number of the surge and stand-by staff are still on the ground – this needs to be addressed as most of these are not available for longer-term engagements.

It may be only a matter of time before agency staff suffers injury or loss of life¹¹. IDPs in some of the larger camps (Karma, Mornei) are becoming increasingly aggressive toward the Government (HAC) and agencies perceived to be on the Government's side. This situation clearly needs addressing as it will also affect security concerns for the UN before long. It is also partially relates to the urgency of addressing 'camp management'.

UNSECOORD, while thin on the ground, seems to play a solid role and is mostly accepted as the lead on security issues. The quality of security briefings varied though and the team did not get a full briefing upon arrival in Khartoum. More UNSECOORD presence is needed in order to increase humanitarian access, particularly given the volatile and ever-changing state of affairs.

Expectations for end December 2004:

- Improved staff living conditions
- Well being of staff and teams addressed to reduce high turnover and illness
- Evidence of more longer-term staff deployment; reduced turn-over rates
- More attention to induction training
- At least 2 international UNSECOORD staff and appropriate backup in place for each of the Darfur capitals.
- Medical response and evacuation mechanisms for UN and INGO staff in place in each state

Bernard Broughton, Sarah Maguire and Susanne Frueh
30 September, 2004

¹¹ As a UN staff member said "One victim results in 500,000 victims"

RTE Itinerary

September 12	Team arrives in Karthoum
September 12 – 16	Karthoum. Team met with HC, Darfur Cell, HIC, WFP, UNICEF, WHO, UNHCR, JLC, ICRC, MSF, DFID, UNFPA, Save the Children UK. Attended on-going meetings (Food Security Group, UNCT)
September 16 – 18	Nyala (South Darfur). Met with OCHA field office, UN agencies (UNICEF, WFP, UNSECOORD) and INGOs (NRC, MSF, World Vision) (one team member stayed on until the 19 th). Attended regular inter-agency coordination meeting (UN, NGOs).
September 18-19	Geneina (West Darfur). Met with OCHA field office, UN agencies (WFP, UNHCR, OHCHR, UNICEF, UNSECCORD), IOM, INGOs (MSF, Concern, Medair), ICRC, Sudanese Red Crescent and donors (USAID) Attended UN head of agency meeting and security meeting.
September 19 – 20	El Fasher (North Darfur). Met with OCHA field office, UN agencies (UNHCR, OHCHR, UNDP, UNICEF, UNSECOORD), NGOs (MSF, Save the Children-UK, OXFAM), ICRC, Spanish Red Cross and donors (USAID). Attended a planned meeting (Meeting of INGOs with Louise Arbour, High Commissioner for Human Rights)
September 21 – 23	Karthoum. Team met with UN Country team, Darfur Cell, UNDP, UNHCR, SRSG. Attended regular meetings (protection group, UNCT)

List of Systemic Issues to be Pursued¹²

- ⊖ Early warning and contingency planning: “Why so little attention to the crisis initially?” How could (better) contingency planning have helped agencies to mobilize more efficiently and timely?
- ⊖ Ability of agencies (UN and NGOs) to deploy rapidly (including effectiveness of stand-by arrangements and surge capacity). Why did it take so long to have a level of assistance that is addressing humanitarian needs? Role of donors?
- ⊖ Ability of agencies (UN and NGOs) to deploy the right people. Many agencies have complained that they were not able to field experienced staff (lack of interest, low response to internal vacancy announcements, etc.). Others have said that the skill set of UN and NGO staff has narrowed and that there is an overemphasis on upstream work (policy, advocacy)
- ⊖ The experience gap: The apparent scarcity of experienced HCs and experienced “nuts-and bolts” staff. How to build up a solid roster for all relevant areas. Why are existing mechanisms (such as surge) not working?
- ⊖ Deployment of appropriately qualified/experienced staff (e.g. during the early stages to review whether existing CO capacity is able to deal with the crisis, e.g. during critical phases to beef up capacity).
- ⊖ Availability and effectiveness of on-the-job training programs for new staff deployed in emergencies.
- ⊖ Continued weaknesses in the collaborative approach – how to make the collaborative approach work early on.
- ⊖ The Role of UNHCR in relation to IDP crises, NFIs and shelter provision.
- ⊖ A shift in humanitarian objectives. The increasing influence/supremacy of international politics of donor countries on humanitarian response?
- ⊖ Sectoral coordination. Why was it taking so long to determine/allocate sectoral responsibility? Is it possible to agree upfront on sectoral coordination rather than spending much time and energy on allocating responsibilities during the emergency? Key areas are: camp management, NFI, shelter, protection.
- ⊖ Leadership. Why did it take six months to appoint a new HC? What was the role of the IASC?
- ⊖ Integration. What will be the impact of the coming Integrated Mission?

¹² Some of these issues may need an in-depth review and maybe beyond the scope of the RTE. The team will seek to address these issues during the coming months and intends to work with the CT and the CLG in seeking answers and possible action points for the key systemic issues.

INTER-AGENCY EVALUATION OF THE HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE TO THE DARFUR CRISIS

Observations and recommendations following second visit

9 January to 10 February 2005

In August 2004, the United Nations (UN) Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs/Emergency Relief Coordinator (USG/ERC), in a joint effort with agencies of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), commissioned a real-time evaluation to strengthen the humanitarian response in Darfur and future crises of a similar nature.

The evaluation team conducted the first of three field visits in September 2004. This resulted in a working paper including performance benchmarks in several key areas, which was presented to the UN Country Team in Khartoum. Subsequent discussions with key stakeholders were carried out at the capital/headquarters level in October 2004. In its second visit, conducted from 9 January to 10 February 2005, the team¹³ consulted with UN, non-governmental organisation (NGO) and international organisation (IO) responders to the crisis, donors and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Khartoum, Geneina, Zalingei, Garsila, Nyala, El Fasher and Um Kadada. The team's aim was to deepen its understanding of the challenges facing frontline responders and gain insight into beneficiary perspectives. The third and final visit will focus more on institutional arrangements at the Khartoum and HQ level.

Key findings were discussed with UN and NGO Darfur managers and the UN Country Team on 6 February 2005 and donors on 9 February 2005. A draft report, which built on these consultations, was circulated on 10 February 2005. Recipients were then given until 15 February 2005 – extended to the 25th - to point out factual errors, misconceptions or omissions. These contributions, in addition to comments provided by the inter-agency evaluation Core Learning Group on 28 February 2005, were taken into consideration in the finalisation of the report. Any further correspondence pertaining to the report should be directed to Kelly David-Toweh (david-toweh@un.org).

The team recognises that all responders have been constrained by external factors, and stresses that these will be elaborated on in the final evaluation report.

Overview of progress since September 2004

The crisis in Darfur is recognised by the international community as an ongoing crisis of the protection of human rights within the context of an internal armed conflict and thus subject to international humanitarian law. This recognition has resulted in attention and some resources being paid to finding ways, albeit belatedly, to protect the civilians of Darfur from egregious human rights violations, including the deployment of African Union (AU) cease-fire monitors and the broadening of their mandate. The presence of humanitarian and human rights workers and the AU monitors has inhibited violations, but to a limited extent. The limitations are evident in the upsurge in military activity and displacement in December 2004, and the fact that women continue to be subject to sexual

¹³ Bernard Broughton and Sarah Maguire (independent consultants); Leslye Rost van Tonningen (seconded by CARE/Steering Committee on Humanitarian Response); Kelly David-Toweh (OCHA evaluation manager). Assisted by Halima Yagoub Ahmed (national researcher).

violence in the vicinity of IDP camps. ‘Protection by presence’ complements but cannot substitute for directed, informed action based on the rights and needs of the affected population.

Humanitarian and human rights agencies and organisations are cooperating to implement a strategy that aims at practical protective actions. But the over-riding imperative remains the need for effective international engagement to ensure that the parties to the conflict respect their obligations under international humanitarian and human rights law to protect civilians in conflict. At the same time, the international community must continue to facilitate a political resolution aimed at sustainable peace, development and justice for the people of Darfur.

Humanitarian agencies and organizations have been more successful in providing life-saving assistance to the affected population where they can be accessed (88% of the affected population in December 2004). The tables below summarize the percentage of the population receiving assistance as of the end of September 2004 and the end of December 2004.¹⁴ The number of people directly affected by the conflict increased by 16 percent, from an estimated 2.02 to 2.40 million, over the last quarter of 2004. As a result, more people had to be reached to maintain the same coverage percentage. This should be borne in mind when comparing the tables below.

September 30th 2004 - Coverage

Conflict affected Population		% of Affected Population Reached						
State	Total (IDPs + affected residents)	Food	Shelter	Clean Water	Sanitation	Primary Health	Basic Drug Supplies	Secondary Health
N. Darfur	551,578	65%	60%	56%	60%	78%	74%	62%
S. Darfur	695,000	53%	29%	26%	21%	65%	53%	65%
W. Darfur	774,019	89%	66%	40%	47%	62%	50%	49%
TOTAL	2,020,597	70%	52%	40%	42%	67%	58%	58%

December 31st 2004 – Coverage

Conflict affected Population		% of Affected Population Reached						
State	Total (IDPs + affected residents)	Food	Shelter	Clean Water	Sanitation	Primary Health	Basic Drug Supplies	Secondary Health
N. Darfur	725,736	67%	80%	44%	52%	60%	60%	49%
S. Darfur	824,346	54%	61%	52%	53%	57%	62%	59%
W. Darfur	854,388	66%	79%	52%	63%	68%	66%	54%
TOTAL	2,404,470	62%	73%	49%	56%	62%	63%	54%

¹⁴ Darfur Humanitarian Profile No. 10, OCHA

There have been no major epidemics of cholera or typhoid. The outbreaks of Hepatitis E were contained, but did underscore the need to continue to pay close attention to water and sanitation. Anecdotal evidence shows that crude mortality rates, an important indicator of the overall effectiveness of the response, have improved substantially since September 2004.¹⁵ In particular, responders have been able to avert widespread and large-scale secondary mortality from health-related causes in IDP camps/settlements. However, they continue to struggle with providing adequate services to fresh influxes into existing camps. Medecins Sans Frontieres-Holland (MSF-H) recently reported an alarming health situation in Kalma camp, which continues to receive new arrivals, with indications of an increase in mortality due to diarrhoeal diseases.¹⁶

The transport of food aid has been disrupted by insecurity on the routes used, affecting supply and distribution in all three states. In areas where food distributions have been delayed for up to two months, there has been a corresponding rise in admissions to supplementary and therapeutic feeding centres (e.g. Garsila in late 2004). This demonstrates that food aid is having an impact. While there have been reductions in global acute malnutrition rates in some areas, this is not uniform across the Darfurs, and pockets of exceedingly high global acute malnutrition rates remain.

Overall, there is now more emphasis on the consolidation of activities, such as more attention being paid to preventative health measures in the more easily accessible areas, and the provision of technical support to international NGOs undertaking camp coordination functions. Access and coverage remain problematic however. The military activity from early December 2004 in North and South Darfur has meant that those agencies and organisations whose programming was affected needed to undertake new assessments and reprogramme.

The evaluation team believes that a critical juncture in the intervention has been reached. The UN Country Team and other responders must now take a more holistic view of the complex overlay of needs and vulnerabilities in the Darfurs such as chronic underdevelopment, drought and desertification, and the ongoing conflict and determine what can and should be done beyond the care and maintenance of IDPs. There are chronic deficiencies that cannot be ignored. There are tensions that need to be ameliorated. There are emerging problems that need to be addressed urgently, including the increasing food insecurity of the non-displaced.

Field presence and coverage

Agencies need to renew their efforts to fill gaps in coverage, both geographically and sectorally. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has been assisting in this regard by examining gaps, identifying priorities and suggesting what action is required, such as inter-agency assessments, negotiations with non-state actors, etc.

The relative investment in IDP camps risks increasing displacement due to assistance seeking by vulnerable households (the 'pull factor'). Residence in a camp or recognized IDP cluster should not be the sole determinant of need or vulnerability. The challenge for

¹⁵ WHO, 21 February 2005

¹⁶ Reported in UN Sudan Situation Report dated 9 February 2005.

agencies and donors now is to practically and effectively target vulnerable households in the more complex non-camp/cluster setting.

While it is important not to provide assistance in a manner that exacerbates conflict, humanitarian assistance should be provided on the basis of need without any consideration as to a group's actual or perceived role in the conflict.

Expanding humanitarian assistance geographically requires the establishment of the logistical and infrastructural support needed for a significant and expanded field presence. In this regard, deploying the full complement of UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) field security officers is a very high priority (See section on security below). UN agency headquarters also need to appreciate the need for increased staffing and not make simplistic comparisons with other (inadequately staffed) operations. (See section on staffing below.) Broader coverage also requires good relations with non-state actors.

NGOs and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) have by far the greatest field presence and, as a result, they are shaping the response on the ground.¹⁷ This is a reality that is not adequately appreciated either by UN agencies in Khartoum or in headquarters. It is also not always reflected in the UN's attentiveness to NGOs. Of the UN agencies, the World Food Programme (WFP) and OCHA have the greatest presence outside the state capitals. UN agencies are more constrained by security procedures, but this is not the primary reason for their relative lack of presence.

Even if UN agencies cannot be based in remote areas, their regular presence outside the capitals makes a difference to the capacity of their implementing partners and others to provide adequate services and protection.

Recommendations:

1. To ensure equity in the provision of humanitarian protection and assistance and prevent further displacement and tension between groups, all agencies, organisations and donors should continue to make determined and coordinated efforts to address the needs and vulnerabilities of IDPs and others in less accessible areas, including areas controlled by non-state actors. The UN Country Team should ensure that the upcoming review of the 2005 Work Plan incorporates this reorientation.
2. The UN must develop a deeper field presence to meet its mandated responsibilities, play a greater role in shaping the response, and provide support for NGOs. The latter includes *inter alia* mediating with the authorities to enable NGOs to pursue protection activities. This will involve a range of modalities including establishing satellite offices, mobile staff and improved communication.
3. UN and NGO headquarters need to urgently fill posts and respond positively to additional requests.
4. Efforts should be made to reprioritise tasks to enable existing personnel to spend a greater proportion of their time in the field.

¹⁷ The Darfur Humanitarian Profile No 10 reports that as of 31 December 2004 there were 9,109 aid workers operating in the Darfurs including 605 for the UN (135 international) and 8,503 for NGOs (679 international).

Security

By the time the team left Sudan, UNDSS has not yet deployed two international Field Security Coordination Officers (FSCOs) per each Darfur state capital as planned, and those officers present in the field continued to be rotated frequently to fill gaps.¹⁸ The team heard that this has prevented UNDSS from providing humanitarian agencies and organisations with an adequate ongoing analysis of the security situation on the ground and delayed attention to assessments in some areas. Some key routes travelled daily by NGOs and the ICRC have remained off limits to the UN for extended periods for the lack of a field security officer to assess them. This has for example inhibited coordination efforts for some time by OCHA in Jebel Marra.

UNDSS FSCO responsibilities have too frequently been handed over to security staff from other agencies. This is unfairly burdening them and detracting from their own work.

Overall, UNDSS security briefings for the humanitarian community seem limited to a recitation of incidents and facts, rather than an analysis of security trends and factors aimed at proactively directing agencies and organisations where and how they can work. Nearly all actors interviewed cited as an over-riding concern the need for better security analysis from the UN to inform operational planning. NGOs cited cases, and the team witnessed one example, in which a UNDSS FSCO did not share, until approached, information pertaining to serious security events, even with organisations with staff in the area.

Security briefings for visiting missions can clearly be inadequate. The evaluation team received only one security briefing (in El Fasher). This should be standard on arrival in any location in the Darfurs. No one asked if evaluation team members had completed the standard UN CD Rom security training.

UNDSS has provided some in situ security training to UN staff, as has Red R for NGO staff. However -- with the high turnover and increases in staffing, as well as the large number of relatively junior and inexperienced staff -- the need for further training remains.

Many NGOs operating in more remote areas do so without adequate security for their own operations, and put their own staff as well as others at risk. Few NGOs possess their own security capacity or protocols (exceptions include MSF and Oxfam).

National staff members of some NGOs are working in remote locations with inadequate communications, which jeopardises their security. The NGOs concerned appear to be naïve as to how vulnerable their national staff members are. The safety of national staff should be accorded as high a priority as the safety of expatriate staff.

Some UN entities seem unaware of the need to protect sensitive information in their offices.

¹⁸ It is understood that there are now 6 Darfur dedicated UNDSS security personnel in Sudan, if not actually in Darfur.

Recommendations:

5. If UNDSS has not deployed a planned minimum of two Field Security Coordination Officers per state by the end of February 2005, the Secretary-General should be requested to intervene.
6. The NGO community should establish its own security coordination unit, which would liaise with UNDSS. Also, consideration should be given to the establishment of a joint UN-NGO information and analysis unit for the Darfurs (perhaps located within UNDSS). Donors should consider supporting these initiatives as a matter of priority.
7. UNDSS and Red R should ensure that *all* UN staff and consultants are provided with in situ, context specific security training. These trainings should include special considerations with regard to the security, recruitment and treatment of national staff.
8. Agencies and organisations should now ensure that all staff members and consultants understand the humanitarian principles, key policies and modus operandi of their organisations, and that they can adequately explain them. These should be available (in Arabic and English) to all staff and consultants, as well as beneficiaries and the community. Oxfam's *What is Oxfam Doing in Darfur?* document should be used as a model for providing public information.

Staffing

Staffing levels have increased significantly since the team visited in September 2004 although many positions remain unfilled and many of the capacity gaps identified by the team in September 2004 remain (e.g. in protection and in the experience of staff members). Although there appears to be more staff on longer-term deployments, turnover amongst the UN and NGOs remains unacceptably high. Some organisations continue to field staff with little to no expertise and/or experience in the areas for which they were hired. This includes in positions that require higher-level decision-making and/or political sensitivity and judgement, in which the risk to the individual, the organisation and the overall response are high.

There has been an increase in the quantity of mid-level staff (UN and NGO) badged as 'protection officers' or 'human rights observers' but many arrive without the requisite expertise. In some cases they need basic training in order to start their work, while higher level expertise is still missing. The quality of induction training varies greatly across agencies. The weaknesses are most evident with new or seconded personnel, some of whom are not familiar with important policy documents of the agencies they represent (e.g. the WFP Enhanced Commitments to Women).

Staff whose primary focus should be on programming and monitoring are generally forced to spend far too much time on administrative matters for lack of proper administrative support. Senior staff members are required to spend a significant amount of time receiving visitors, distracting from their ability to focus on programming. Although this inundation of missions can be expected from the outset of the crisis, few if any agencies or organizations plan for how to deal with it.

Living conditions for staff in the state capitals are now acceptable, but those of some staff in more remote locations are very poor. This was most evident to the team in the case of

national staff working on food distributions who were camping in a partly built house with no windows or doors, which belonged to a friend of a staff member. Medical response and evacuation services for staff are only now becoming available.

While the physical aspects of staff welfare have improved, psychological welfare is still not being adequately addressed. Demands on staff in nearly all agencies and organizations are unrealistic. It was evident to the team that some staff in the Darfurs and in Khartoum are being pushed beyond their limits, leading to burnout, hampering productivity and planning, and jeopardising working relationships.

Some agencies and organisations appear insensitive to the concerns of their national staff. Many appear to be unaware of the need to ensure that there is a balance among the various groups in their national staffing. The high turnover of expatriate staff has placed additional pressures on many national staff members who have to train, orient and sensitise their expatriate colleagues on the complexities in the Darfurs.

Recommendations:

9. The UN Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) for Sudan should request that two staff counsellors be deployed and made available to all staff. Periodic counselling should be mandatory for all staff.
10. All agencies and organisations should ensure that their human rights and protection personnel have the necessary expertise and experience upon recruitment. Given the complexity and delicacy of its work, the Darfur context and the need for leadership on these issues, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has a particular responsibility to ensure that its human rights officers are highly trained and experienced.
11. In order to ensure that staff members of all agencies and organisations are conversant in the basics of international and regional human rights instruments and international humanitarian law (IHL), a programme of training should be commenced, or where in place continued, for all humanitarian staff.
12. Organisations should consult regularly with their staff to ensure that they are aware of their concerns and that these are addressed.
13. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), in consultation with his deputies, should appeal to all organisations, donors and states to limit missions to only those that are essential, and should without hesitation decline to accept those that are not. All stakeholders should abide by this principle.
14. If not a function envisioned in the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMISUD), the UN agencies should consider recruiting, through a cost sharing arrangement, a dedicated external relations staff person in each Darfur capital, who would be responsible for handling all inter-agency or external missions. Alternatively, this responsibility could be shared on a rotating basis among the UN agencies on the ground.

Protection strategies and activities

As will be observed, the issues of protection are integrated throughout this report. There is a need, however, to address it specifically, both because of the recent developments in creating a protection strategy and associated activities, and to reflect the centrality of protection throughout the humanitarian response.

A major effort was made in December 2004 to improve the protection strategy with a focus on clear agency responsibility and accountability for particular protection activities. Protection matrices were developed - initially to capture who does what where, but these were considered inadequate so were reworked to create a basis from which to plan activities; this was the focus of attention through January 2005. These processes have been valuable, particularly to those directly concerned, although the matrices developed are still in too unwieldy a format for group action planning or regular performance reporting.¹⁹ It remains to be seen how effectively the new arrangements coordinate the activities of protection personnel working for OCHA, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF).

The team was made aware of several protection activities either on-going or imminent. These include police training; the establishment of women's centres; community centres and legal aid centres; support for established legal and human rights organisations; and longitudinal protection assessments. In terms of national partners, the sheer lack of such organisations and their vulnerability where they do exist is a clear obstacle to the implementation of planned protection activities.

The protection activities being undertaken are based on sound analysis and judgement, although it is difficult to assess progress to date or measure their impact. In terms of the strategy vis a vis activities and action, some NGO staff members feel that they have "reached a moment of crisis in protection." In part this is because some have been warned by their local government Humanitarian Affairs Commission (HAC) counterparts not to even talk about protection (in particular not to mention sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) issues). The NGOs perceive a need for stronger UN leadership/mediation. In West Darfur, UNHCR, which is the lead agency for protection, has increased its protection capacity substantially and is gradually establishing a series of satellite offices to reach further into the field. Other UN agencies that could be expected to support protection activities – including the UN Population Fund (UNFPA), UNDP, OHCHR and UNICEF – are not yet sufficiently staffed or deployed to work alongside their NGO partners in the deeper field.

Recommendations:

15. The protection matrices developed for each of the Darfur States should move to the background while cogent plans for action move to the foreground.
16. Protection strategies and plans should more deliberately reflect international human rights law (IHRL), IHL and thematic UN Security Council Resolutions.²⁰
17. Agencies should identify and provide financial, technical and advocacy support to national organisations to enable them to do protection work and to ensure the sustainability of action.
18. UN agencies with human rights and protection mandates have to do much more to mediate the space at the field level for human rights and protection activities. The

¹⁹ The format includes seven columns; the West Darfur matrix runs to 40 pages.

²⁰ E.g. on Protection of Civilians, Children and Armed Conflict, Women Peace and Security.

Khartoum Protection Steering Group should help the relevant agencies determine how to achieve this.

Child protection

This conflict has a particular and devastating impact on children. Despite this, the crisis does not publicly have a “child’s face”; it could seem that nobody is asking “What about the children?” or speaking out on their behalf. The mandates of UNICEF, the SRSG for Children and Armed Conflict and the High Commissioner for Human Rights provide opportunities and responsibilities to publicly advocate on behalf of children in this crisis - opportunities which are not being realised and responsibilities which are not being met.

The protection of children from violence, abuse and discrimination cannot be effective without adequate information. A systematic monitoring, reporting and response framework would be ideal and there are moves at various levels in the international community to put this in place. Meanwhile, there are unacceptable gaps in the information available to the humanitarian community, in turn hindering effective advocacy and response.

Education is every child’s right²¹. It is also now widely accepted (and forms a basis of UNICEF’s own work on education in emergencies) that in emergencies, education is a protection tool and activity and should be prioritised as part of the humanitarian response. Despite this, the Darfur Humanitarian Profile indicates that, both in real terms and as a percentage of the affected population, access to education has diminished over the last few months. Many of the IDPs interviewed by the team cited education as their key priority. Yet, very few schools are functioning in the camps, and IDPs usually have to pay a monthly fee to contribute to teachers’ salaries to keep the schools open. Moreover, too many children are sharing textbooks, despite the large number apparently supplied by UNICEF. It is recognized by the team that the paucity of teachers and poor quality of teaching staff is endemic to the region and that this problem needs to be addressed in consultation with the Ministry of Education. There are also sensitivities relating to the curriculum. It is accepted and welcomed that UNICEF has established and needs to maintain its good relationship with the Ministry. However, the need to protect this relationship cannot take precedence over ensuring that children have access to school, and it is suggested that UNICEF adopt a more robust approach with the Ministry and more aggressively seek additional partners.

Recommendations:

19. UNICEF, OHCHR and concerned NGOs should systematically gather information on violations of the rights of children to inform legal and political processes, programming decisions and advocacy.
20. UNICEF, OHCHR and the SRSG for Children and Armed Conflict should urgently address violations of the rights of children with reference to the CRC and its Optional Protocol²² and vigorously pursue publicity and public advocacy on their behalf.

²¹ Convention on the Rights of the Child and Principle 23 of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.

²² On the recruitment and use of children in armed conflict.

21. UNICEF and concerned NGOs should formulate an immediate plan with time bound targets to provide all war-affected children with access to education at no cost.²³ Concrete action needs to be taken to overcome obstacles such as the payment of teachers' salaries and lack of implementing partners.

Gender

References and recommendations on gender issues are integrated throughout this report. Nonetheless, the centrality of gender to the response to the Darfur crisis also warrants a separate section.

It is now widely accepted that conflict and crises are gendered, both in terms of the differential impact on women and men, girls and boys, and the gender roles assumed during and after the immediate crisis. Many in the humanitarian community, however, still regard 'gender' as relating solely to issues of sexual and gender based violence, rather than appreciating that there is a gender and women's human rights dimension to all aspects of the response, including non-food item (NFI) selection and distribution, livelihood analysis and protection. Although Sudan is not yet a State Party to CEDAW²⁴, the provisions of other international instruments continue to apply, including the ICCPR²⁵, and UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (requiring all agencies to ensure the involvement of women in decision-making) as well as the Beijing Platform for Action.

With some notable exceptions, where agencies consult with and seek the participation of war-affected people, this tends to be with the traditional male leadership structures, without fully exploring and building on women's leadership and organisational capacities. This gender bias negatively impacts on agencies' and organisations' ability to effectively target assistance. Surprisingly, several NGO representatives in the state capitals expressed doubt about the existence of women's leadership structures in IDP camps, unaware of the shiekat or of the nefeer system of community mobilisation.²⁶

The issue of rape in and around IDP camps is institutionally regarded as one of reproductive health, rather than women's human rights. Consequently, responses tend to coalesce around palliative care rather than prevention. Agencies and organisations should strengthen their engagement with those initiatives that are clearly successful while continuing work on the wider issues of this form of gender based violence, searching for other effective interventions and ensuring that humanitarian assistance is contributing to the solution not the problem.²⁷

Advocacy at all levels, reform of discriminatory legislative or procedural requirements and the provision of adequate security are central to the prevention of rape.

Recommendations:

22. The UN Country Team and NGOs should ensure their responses are informed by ICCPR, BPfA²⁸ and UNSCR 1325.²⁹ The HC should seek the assistance of relevant

²³ Principle 23 of Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.

²⁴ Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination Against Women.

²⁵ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

²⁶ The latter is based on the cooperation of women, men and children for agricultural activities.

²⁷ For instance, not providing fuel for cooking or means of reducing the need to collect firewood.

²⁸ Beijing Platform for Action.

²⁹ Women, Peace and Security (2000).

entities (e.g. the UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), the UN Advance Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS) Gender Adviser and appropriate NGOs) to ensure that all aspects of the humanitarian response are guided by a gender analysis and informed by consultation with affected women and men. Particular attention should be paid to the impact of displacement on gender roles.

23. Agencies and organisations should ensure, at least, that they have staff with sufficient gender expertise and analysis to inform their work appropriately.
24. The HC should ensure that new and existing strategies and implementation plans respond to women and men's protection and assistance needs. This process must be developed in collaboration with those working at the field and state level.
25. The HC should request a relevant agency or agencies to facilitate the development of a common strategy and implementation plan to respond to women and men's protection and assistance needs. This process must be developed in collaboration with those working at the field and state level.
26. Agencies and others specifically tasked with gender issues should be strengthened and supported at all levels in terms of funding, staffing levels and key decision-making fora.
27. Agencies should explore traditional women's leadership structures and women's priorities. All discussions with communities about new interventions, as well as decisions about ongoing interventions, should include separate sessions with women and men.
28. A multi-agency and multi-initiative approach should be taken to prevent and address the rape of women in and around IDP camps. Practical initiatives found to be successful (e.g. fuel efficient stoves³⁰) should be taken to scale as a matter of urgency.
29. Agencies should ensure that all employees and consultants have signed the IASC Code of Conduct on sexual exploitation.

Standard and quality of humanitarian assistance

There has been a tendency to take the quantitative aspect of the Sphere Project Minimum Standards in Disaster Response (e.g. 15 litres of water per person per day, two blankets per family) as absolutes, rather than indicators. But they are means to an end. The overriding concern should be determining what is required to meet the qualitative aspects of living with dignity and security. This means paying more attention to results (e.g. health outcomes).

It should also be acknowledged that treating the Sphere Project minimum standards as absolutes can serve to inhibit, rather than facilitate, action as agencies or organisations may not wish to undertake interventions that are unlikely to meet these 'requirements', even if proceeding would fill a critical gap. This may be a factor in the reluctance of many agencies and organisations to tackle certain problems, such as the congestion of the larger IDP camps.

³⁰ The team recommends this activity in particular be taken to scale for both its protection and environmental benefits. To this end, please see recommendation 35.

Ensuring equity in terms of coverage and the use of available resources typically means reaching out to the periphery. Depending on relative need, this may require foregoing consolidation at the centre. While many NGOs are reaching out to the host community beyond the IDP camps, in some cases this has been undertaken in a manner that merely duplicates the assistance provided in the camps, which may not be appropriate. The environment beyond the camp setting is far more complex. There may be circumstances for example where vaccinating animals or providing seeds is a higher immediate priority than addressing chronic problems like poor health care services or access to water. Protecting livelihoods may have more impact, even in terms of health outcomes.

A rights-based approach to humanitarian assistance and the Sphere Project minimum standards require that beneficiaries actively participate in decision-making. Nonetheless, beneficiaries have still not been effectively engaged in the management of matters that concern them directly. Ongoing discussions with sheikhs and some sectoral committees have been established, but the evaluation team saw little evidence of community-based solutions to humanitarian (or protection) challenges. In addition to the lack of engagement with women's leadership structures, there was little evidence of attempts to investigate or engage leadership structures outside camps (e.g. Omdas).

Environmental issues: The international humanitarian community has paid insufficient attention to the environmental impact of humanitarian assistance activities, and of IDP camps. A number of NGOs expressed concern to the team about the potential impact of drilling and recommended hydrological surveys. This would indicate that UNICEF's plans to develop a groundwater forum to protect the water ecosystems are not widely disseminated at the state capital and field level. The formation of this forum would help to reduce the potential of depleting water aquifers that are not naturally re-charged and improve the overall management of water sources in the Darfurs.

The larger IDP camps in particular are having an impact on surrounding areas. Small trees have been cut by contractors for latrine construction and by IDPs for shelter, which has brought complaints from the authorities. IDPs (of necessity) collect a considerable amount of fuel wood, as well as grass for building material and fodder. Several agencies/organisations have provided training in the construction of fuel-efficient stoves, which can apparently reduce fuel consumption by up to 40 percent. Some NGOs are said to be trucking limited quantities of firewood into camps. Both are sensible interventions.

Shelter/NFIs: The shelter package is inadequate. Two blankets per family are insufficient in areas where the overnight temperature during winter freezes water and NGOs report that their own expatriate staff members need two or more blankets. Although some agencies and organisations attempted to rectify this problem through the common pipeline, the allocation was never in fact increased.

Reliance on cumulative totals of what has been distributed is problematic. Items like blankets, plastic sheeting and mosquito nets distributed many months ago will have deteriorated (some faster than others because the quality of the items distributed differs markedly from donor to donor). It was reported that some families sold the blankets they received in the summer to meet more immediate household needs.

In September 2004, the team emphasised the need to improve shelter before the next rains. This remains a concern. It is understood that the UN Joint Logistics Cell (UNJLC)

plans a second round distribution of NFIs, but the team queries both if it is appropriate to distribute all items at once when some are time specific, and if there are enough NGOs willing and able to effect these distributions.

Water and Sanitation: Investments in the water sector are increasing rapidly with a number of new players bringing in equipment. Although outbreaks of water-borne diseases (hepatitis E, jaundice) have been reported, water chlorination is ongoing and possible water sources of outbreaks have been dealt with effectively. The contamination of ground water by heavy metals and fluoride presents a serious health risk in some areas. UNICEF and other organizations are aware of the water quality issues, and UNICEF is working to ensure that the appropriate water testing equipment is available. Testing is ongoing to ensure that water provided, either from boreholes or bladders is suitable for human consumption. In addition, UNICEF and the World Health Organization (WHO) have been working with agencies and organizations to address hygiene issues in a methodical and standardized manner.

Health: Nearly all IDPs in the camps visited by the team noted that health services were better than they had ever received, underlining the chronic problems pre-dating the emergency. This is not to suggest that this is the case of all assisted populations. Apart from precarious access to water, sanitation and shelter, deaths by malaria, diarrhoea and respiratory infections can also reflect poor access to, or poor quality of, curative health care. While almost all households surveyed by WHO in its September 2004 mortality survey reported seeking medication from a health centre, the survey did not enquire into the health-seeking behaviours of IDPs, nor was any information obtained on the quality of any health care they received. This is a critical area that requires further study.

Food: The general ration distributed by WFP is intended to be the energy equivalent of 2,100 kilocalories per person per day. However, considerably less than this is consumed because many beneficiaries barter or sell a portion of their food ration in order to cover the costs of milling, to obtain commodities not included in the ration, and/or to purchase firewood. In Zalingei the team was informed that the effective ration may be 20 percent less than planned, based on post-distribution monitoring that suggests each IDP family has at least one unregistered member. Post distribution monitoring by WFP has been weak, by WFP's own admission.

In certain circumstances the receipt of food aid and other humanitarian resources can endanger beneficiaries. This includes the risk of relief items being taken forcefully from beneficiaries and the risk of distributions being disrupted to deny combatants access to food. WFP has some responsibility for the safety of IDP beneficiaries but does not have the overall responsibility for protection. This issue is not currently being addressed.

Recommendations:

30. Less reliance should be placed on Sphere Project quantitative targets as the sole measure of achievement. Donors should hold agencies accountable to the qualitative and impact aspects of the Sphere Project minimum standards.
31. The HC should invite the Sphere Project to assist agencies and organisations to appropriately apply Sphere Project minimum standards in the Darfur context.

32. The feasibility of establishing a ‘social safety net’ mechanism for the most vulnerable, initially in urban areas (focusing on IDPs) should be considered.
33. Greater efforts to involve the assisted population in decision-making – particularly women and other marginalised groups - should commence with an investigation of formal and informal leadership structures. Checks and balances, such as the minuting of meetings, should be put in place to ensure the accountability of leaders. Public notice boards should be established at all community and women’s centres, and key decisions regularly posted.
34. The HC should ensure that the appropriate agency conducts an environmental risk assessment immediately, building on existing work.
35. Locally produced fuel-efficient stoves should be promoted on a massive scale, supported by the HC and donors. Time bound targets for the percentage of encamped IDP households utilising the stoves should be set by the UN Country Team in consultation with relevant agencies and organisations, including donors.
36. The convening of the planned Groundwater Forum should be undertaken immediately and be replicated at the state capital level. Agencies should ensure that hydrological surveys available from the government Water, Environment and Sanitation (WES) ministry or other agencies are referred to prior to drilling. Where there is no data or it cannot be obtained they should conduct a survey before proceeding. This information should then be shared.
37. UNICEF should ensure that systems to regularly monitor bacteriological levels are put in place for water sources supported by the humanitarian response. Agencies and organisations undertaking water treatment should be supported by UNICEF with the appropriate expertise, equipment and supplies as needed.
38. Plans for NFI distributions must be more needs driven and timely, and informed by a gendered analysis. If the planned second round distribution cannot be conducted before the next rains, consideration should be given to proceeding first with a distribution of plastic sheeting and waterproof ground mats.
39. Consideration should be given by donors and the UN, in consultation with other aid actors, to the creation of an independent Strategic Monitoring Unit. Under the overall supervision of the HC, the Unit would be tasked with measuring the impact of humanitarian and protection assistance through the conduct of independent monitoring and evaluation of programmes and projects.
40. The Khartoum Protection Steering Group should provide advice to the HC on actions that may need to be taken to address the risk of the receipt of food aid or any other humanitarian resource endangering beneficiaries.
41. Consideration should be given to the conduct of a crude mortality survey before the rainy season to confirm the apparent improvement in trends and health outcomes.

IDP camp/area management and coordination

The primary responsibility for assisting and protecting IDPs, and for camp management, lies with the Government of Sudan. However, the Government has required assistance in all three areas. In relation to camp management, most agencies and organisations are

emphasising their role in coordinating, rather than managing, external assistance to a particular IDP camp or concentration, although a few NGOs have signed ‘camp management’ agreements with the HAC.

In September 2004, the evaluation team expressed the view that in principle a UN agency should be appointed to ensure the overall coordination of external assistance and protection to IDP camps and concentrations (ideally the same agency for all three Darfur states). Among the UN agencies UNHCR has the most expertise, however when requested by the SRSB to take this lead in August 2004, UNHCR declined, proposing instead that it focus on border monitoring and protection in West Darfur (which it did).

Nevertheless, UNHCR has undertaken to provide some technical support to camp management in West Darfur as part of its lead responsibility for the protection (and voluntary return) of IDPs in that state.³¹ UNHCR indicated this by undertaking to pursue a number of “practical protection-based initiatives” including strengthening “the mechanisms for the protection of ‘in-camp’” IDPs by promoting and pursuing better practices of camp management and security, including training and camp/site planning.”³² In the intervening months, UNHCR has provided some training and some support to international NGOs involved in on-site camp management and/or coordination in West Darfur, but this has been constrained by limited field presence and security based travel restrictions. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) has also undertaken a technical support role at the request of the HC and this remains relevant in North and South Darfur (discussed further below).

These arrangements for technical assistance left outstanding the issue of overall coordination, specifically the need to ensure that all IDPs received adequate assistance and protection and that this was well coordinated in each camp or concentration. At the end of September 2004, OCHA circulated a proposal for filling this vacuum with itself in the lead, the central element being the identification of appropriate international NGOs as ‘lead agencies’ in the larger camps/concentrations.³³

OCHA subsequently set a target of identifying lead international NGOs for 30 camps/concentrations of more than 10,000 IDPs by the end of 2004. So far, 39 organizations have signed agreements with either OCHA or the HAC. The role of those signing agreements with OCHA includes “the selection of appropriate sites and facilitating the provision of services and facilities to meet basic needs such as water, health, environmental sanitation, shelter, food, education and protection.”³⁴ Approx. 600,000 IDPs remain in camps or areas (including a large number of more than 10,000 IDPs) without a clearly identified camp coordinator.³⁵

³¹ UNHCR sought and was granted lead responsibility for the protection (and voluntary return) of IDPs in West Darfur by authority of the Secretary-General on 16 October 2004.

³² Information Note on UNHCR’s Protection Responsibilities for Internally Displaced People (IDPs) in West Darfur, 10 November 2004, p 4 under Operational Role.

³³ In early November 2004 the evaluation team provided critical comments to OCHA on its proposal and raised several points, many of which remain to be addressed.

³⁴ Sample Letter of Acceptance of Responsibility for the Coordination of IDP gatherings, OCHA, November 2004.

³⁵ Interview, Humanitarian Coordinator, Manuel Aranda da Silva, 5 February 2005.

Under the circumstances it was sensible of the HC and OCHA to encourage international NGOs to agree to undertake camp management/coordination tasks and this approach should be supported by all humanitarian actors and donors. The immediate challenge now is to strengthen oversight and support. The majority of the NGOs concerned have no prior experience in camp management/coordination. More than half have not yet received the staff they have sought to recruit for this purpose. Many have faced challenges. Chief among them are: negotiating their relationship with the HAC; balancing their coordination responsibilities and programme activities; and fulfilling the protection aspects of their work.

Outstanding challenges include the following:

a) OCHA is currently trying to provide support as needed, in particular in mediating with the authorities, but is still insufficiently staffed to do so adequately and in any event does not itself have camp management expertise. UNHCR is providing some assistance in West Darfur, but this has so far been limited. As a result, the level and type of support that is provided across the Darfurs lacks consistency.

b) IOM's role originated in a request from the HC in August 2004 to take on "the organisation and management of assistance to clustered IDP populations living in the urban areas of Nyala and Geneina" under the overall coordination of OCHA. It was anticipated that IOM's role would expand from there and that IOM would go on to play a key role in providing technical assistance and where necessary filling gaps in on-site management/coordination and sectoral assistance. This broader role was detailed in OCHA's Proposal for Camp Coordination in Darfur circulated in late September 2004. It included *inter alia* filling gaps in on-site coordination and sectoral assistance.³⁶ IOM has subsequently signed with OCHA a Terms of Reference on Joint Support in IDP Camp Coordination in North and South Darfur. To date, IOM has not been able to adequately fulfil this role, in part due to the fact that IOM made a number of early mistakes and has yet to gain the confidence of other agencies. IOM staff members interviewed in the Darfurs remain uncertain about the level of ongoing support for their role.

c) Accountability for the standards and quality of services in the camps remain vague and this needs to be addressed. Despite the agreements they have signed with OCHA, the international NGOs concerned do not consider themselves strictly accountable to OCHA for the quality of services in the camps, nor is it reasonable to expect them to be given the scope of the tasks specified in the agreements and supporting documents. In any event neither OCHA nor IOM are yet able to adequately monitor their performance (or provide adequate technical support, particularly in protection in North and South Darfur). The monitoring tools that were to have been provided by OCHA and IOM have not materialized. OCHA should also seek to monitor those NGOs that have agreements with HAC but not OCHA.

d) Other NGOs working in the camps/areas concerned have a limited understanding of the role of the designated camp manager/coordinator. Few, if any, were consulted in the

³⁶ The envisaged role also included designing a standardized registration and tracking mechanism; developing site assessment criteria with OCHA; conducting on-site assessments with a view to identifying assistance gaps; tracking these in an established database; and providing direct technical and funding support to the implementation of essential services.

development of OCHA's camp/area coordination model or the designation of 'lead agencies'. It is also evident that other NGOs do not generally comprehend the significance of the arrangement. This is not intended as criticism - OCHA is to be commended for getting this far – but to point out that considerable consolidation is now required. Moreover, OCHA needs additional resources and expertise to accomplish this and not have it impact negatively on other coordination functions, and IOM and UNHCR need to provide effective support and technical guidance within the agreed framework.

Recommendations:

42. The model of encouraging international NGOs to assume camp coordination tasks should be fully supported by donors and all humanitarian actors. This urgently requires: a) donors to ensure that OCHA and IOM are sufficiently resourced; b) both agencies' headquarters to fill staffing gaps; and c) others with camp management/coordination expertise (in particular UNHCR and the Inter-Agency Internal Displacement Division (IDD)) to provide technical support and guidance to OCHA and IOM in their new roles.
43. OCHA should continue its efforts to identify NGOs capable of acting as camp/area coordinators in areas not yet covered, in particular in those with more than 10,000 IDPs.
44. OCHA should continue in all states to help all new camp/area coordinators establish and maintain good working relationships with HAC authorities and the UN agencies and NGOs working in their area. Where necessary, OCHA should continue to facilitate these consultations.
45. Subsequently, priority should be given to providing the appropriate technical support and guidance to international NGOs who have undertaken camp/area coordination, in particular to those who have yet to deploy full-time coordinators. OCHA, IOM and UNHCR should serve as 'intelligent conduits' for the transfer of best practices among the camp coordinators and the identification of weaknesses that must be addressed. This requires highly mobile staff in each of the Darfurs, spending most of their time in IDP camps/areas.
46. The HC should clarify the precise arrangements for the provision of support and technical guidance to international NGO camp/area coordinators including *inter alia* demarcation between the roles of OCHA, IOM and UNHCR.
47. Systems for regular monitoring and reporting should also be developed and implemented, in keeping with the original Proposal for Coordination of IDP gatherings in Darfur.
48. The HC should strengthen efforts to secure funding for NGOs who have accepted this task. Donors must recognize the importance of funding this function, both for its coordination and protection benefits.
49. The agreements concluded between OCHA and NGOs for the coordination of assistance in IDP camps/areas should be underpinned with an agreement between OCHA and the HAC (perhaps state by state).
50. The documents detailing the selection criteria for and the responsibilities of camp coordinators should be distributed and explained to all organizations working in areas

with designated coordinators. Consideration should be given to clarifying, and if needed revising, these roles and responsibilities with all actors involved. This should serve as a means of ensuring the buy-in of all actors, as well as strengthening consistency and promoting the convergence of standards across all IDP camps and areas.

IDP registration

There is said to be considerable ‘inclusion error’ in the current registration of IDPs, including some double-counting. It is also recognized that even though mechanisms are in place for ongoing registration, these arrangements do not cover all camps/areas or IDPs: thus there is some ‘exclusion error.’ A general re-registration would address both problems. The information will be very useful to all humanitarian actors, and it is rational to conduct one registration rather than continue to have several agencies/organizations conducting their own (generally partial) registrations or headcounts for non-food purposes.

But the registration needs to be done quickly without occupying too many resources and in a manner that can be repeated, in whole or in part, without too much difficulty. Some agency personnel estimate that the IOM/WFP registration will take significantly longer than the planned three months, even with a large team of enumerators and the assistance of many agencies and organisations.

The problem relates not so much to the time it will take to count IDPs and provide them with a token, but to the time it will take to complete the form for each household. Estimates mentioned range from 15 to 40 minutes.³⁷ The form includes information about households and place of origin that can be used to determine if there is double-counting. However, it is very doubtful that action could subsequently be taken to recover tokens. In addition, some concerns were raised about access to the information to be collected and entered on a database, and how it could be used.

At present, IDPs must stay in the camp in which they are registered in order to receive relief assistance. Yet, IDPs have the right to, and will and do, move from place to place, which has resulted in some losing their entitlements. The evaluation team came across several households that had moved considerable distances (e.g. from Kalma camp near Nyala in South Darfur to Hamidiya camp near Zalingei in West Darfur).

Recommendations:

51. The appropriateness of the planned IOM/WFP registration should be reviewed.
52. Care should be taken to ensure that there is no possibility of the information to be collected endangering IDPs in any way.
53. To enable IDPs to move freely between camps/areas, consideration needs to be given to accepting entitlement documentation (tokens) across camps/areas.

Information and analysis

The Darfurs represent a classic case of a complex political emergency with its interplay of chronic and emergency needs. Yet despite this general understanding of the

³⁷ It is not clear to the team which version of the form these estimates are based on. There have been a number.

complexity of the situation, no agency or organisation seems to have undertaken a thorough analysis. There is little evidence at the field level of political and/or security analysis being undertaken. The political pillar of UNAMIS is presumably undertaking this but it is not being shared. The lack of understanding of livelihoods and the complex relationships between nomads, agro-pastoralists and sedentary farmers impedes programming. Indeed the lack of credible information and analysis of the situation in Darfur cuts across all areas and is one of the single biggest impediments to informed planning and effective action in the Darfurs.

This is not to say that assessments are not being conducted. A number have been or are being conducted by a number of agencies for a variety of programming reasons. These include several larger-scale surveys, such as the WFP-led inter-agency nutrition survey conducted in September 2004, CARE's market survey and Save the Children United Kingdom's (SC-UK) child focused livelihood analysis of North Darfur. These represent a base on which to build, recognising however that the use of different methodologies reduces the comparability of data across assessments, and single sector assessments run the risk of minimising or overlooking the impact of other factors on the situation. Consistency in methods and integration across sectors is needed. At the same time agencies and organisations should resist any ambition to establish a perfect, all encompassing data collection model. It will tie up too many resources. With conflict ongoing, additional localized assessments will be needed.

Beyond the limited analysis undertaken in the monthly Darfur Humanitarian Profile, there have been few efforts to systematically collect, share, compare and analyse available data in a cogent and standardized manner. The Humanitarian Information Centre (HIC) does provide data on coverage, but its presence in the field is limited, as is its overall analysis capacity.³⁸ WFP also has limited Vulnerability Assessment and Mapping (VAM) capacity in the field.

In relation to protection, it is evident that a lack of staff capacity and perhaps some lack of conceptual appreciation of protection issues have meant that inter-agency or single-issue needs assessments are often carried out without reference to protection. Protection issues cut across all sectoral and thematic issues. Without a protection-based approach or analysis, mistakes can be made that are difficult to undo later.

In the absence of livelihood and social analysis, agencies and organisations grappling with longer-term development issues run the risk of applying the logic of an immediate relief intervention to longer term and chronic problems in the Darfurs. Care should be taken to distinguish between care and maintenance programs for encamped IDPs and the very different requirements of conducting interventions in other settings.

Recommendations:

54. An inventory of significant assessments completed in all sectors in the last twelve months should be made by OCHA/HIC, and copies posted on a web site and made available for collection at the OCHA/HIC state offices (in deference to reported difficulties downloading large documents).

³⁸ In three of the four field locations visited by the evaluation team, there were no HIC staff on the ground at the time.

55. UNAMIS should share its political and security analysis (excluding sensitive information). This could include more frequent verbal briefings that include NGO as well as UN actors.
56. To ensure that protection is a central component of all assessments, they should include a risk assessment and the participation of an individual with protection expertise as a core team member.
57. Looking further ahead, a higher priority should be given to conducting multi-agency and multi-sectoral assessments that systematically fill gaps in geographic and sectoral knowledge. This should be coordinated through the state and Khartoum level inter-agency coordination meetings.

Drought response and livelihood protection

The most immediate problem posed by the relative lack of information and analysis relates to the need to plan effectively to deal with food shortages resulting from the poor 2004 harvest, which are now beginning to impact the non-displaced population, as well as to protect livelihoods made more precarious by the conflict and last year's drought. Trade in cereals has been disrupted by the conflict and the nomadic population may no longer be able to find markets for their animals. The conflict thus impacts on normal coping mechanisms. Analysis and planning is hampered by a lack of detailed information *inter alia* about the diversity of traditional livelihoods, markets and coping mechanisms, how they have been eroded and disrupted, and how to help restore them.

WFP, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO), the ICRC and a number of NGOs are well aware of the need to provide relief, agricultural and livestock support in situ, but planning to implement such strategies to scale seems to be at an early stage. The task for WFP in particular is huge in that it necessitates the pre-positioning of food stocks and contingency planning for an air bridge, as well as food drops to cope with the rainy season. FAO has plans to assist 270,000 households with livelihood support, including seeds and tools for 190,000 households by June 2005, but lacks the logistical capacity to achieve this. Both WFP and FAO face the challenge of effectively targeting their assistance in the absence of a complete understanding of vulnerability and need.

Recommendations:

58. FAO, UNDP, WFP, OCHA and NGOs with livelihood protection expertise should meet as a matter of urgency to: (a) collate existing data related to threats to livelihoods (drought, market failure, conflict); (b) prioritise the data that must be collected to fill the gaps and provide a reasonable basis for guiding interventions; and (c) plan for the rapid collection of priority data. To carry out this plan, external assistance should be called for to lessen the impact on ongoing programming.
59. An investment should now be made in establishing a mechanism for regularly collecting, analysing and disseminating integrated livelihood and food security data for the Darfurs.³⁹

³⁹ There are a number of models that could be adapted to the Darfurs: FAO's Food Security Assessment Unit for Somalia, SC-UK's Child Focused Livelihood Analysis in North Darfur. Pre-war baseline data is available from SC-UK, particularly for North Darfur.

60. Recognising the typical weakness of livelihood protection activities in humanitarian interventions, donors should coordinate amongst themselves to ensure that priority livelihood protection activities are fully funded.

Advocacy

Operational NGOs can risk their programmes if they speak out on issues that may be deemed ‘political.’ This is inhibiting. It is for their UN partners, therefore, to use their position, mandate and relative strength to support the operational organisations by engaging in high-level, public advocacy where needed, particularly where ‘quiet diplomacy’ is failing to yield the results needed.

Recommendations:

61. Those heads of agencies and others with explicit protection and/or human rights mandates, including but not limited to UNICEF, the SRSG for Children in Armed Conflict, UNIFEM and the High Commissioner for Human Rights, should do more to lead advocacy on behalf of war-affected women, men and children.
62. Field-based actors should be provided with greater support by high-level advocacy by headquarters, as well as at the Khartoum level, on critical issues affecting programming.
63. Greater guidance should be provided to actors in the more remote areas regarding how to conduct advocacy at various levels and what support they may expect from their own and others’ agencies at the regional or headquarters level.

Public information

There are two critical gaps in public information. The first concerns the programmes and intentions of humanitarian actors. At present, the agencies and organizations in the field are by and large held in high esteem by the communities in which they work. But some individuals have reported uneasiness between themselves and residents. In the absence of effective public information, rumours are circulating, complimented by negative articles in the local press, about the intent of the international community in the Darfurs. National staff, who of course move and talk freely among the community, are in many cases themselves not informed of the humanitarian principles that guide their organization’s work. Disinformation is not being countered, which presents a threat to individuals and the operation.

Secondly, IDPs have no knowledge of the international law or principles applicable to their situation, and are therefore hampered in their ability to act as their own advocates with the authorities as well as aid with organisations.

Recommendations:

64. The need identified in Security Council Resolution 1547 for effective public information remains urgent and should be acted upon as soon as possible.
65. In accordance with Security Council Resolution 1547, the UN should disseminate the *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement* to IDPs, government officials and humanitarian actors. This should be done in Arabic and local languages through a multitude of channels, including radio broadcasts and plays, incorporation of the principles into literacy programmes, and through booklets, newsletters and newspapers. As a first and immediate step, the UN International Displacement

Division should distribute copies in Arabic of the *Guiding Principles* in Arabic to all IDP, officials and aid workers.

Peace-building

It is increasingly acknowledged⁴⁰ that, in order to create the environment for sustainable peace, peace building and conflict prevention should not wait for the immediate conflict and humanitarian crisis to be over, but should be integrated into the response at all stages. First, though, the relevant agencies need to have a greater understanding of what may contribute either to an upsurge in conflict or to its reduction or transformation. Conflict analysis includes identifying the actors as well as the underlying factors and triggers for conflict and an analysis of the support needed to increase the capacity of civil society to reduce or transform violent conflict. If the UN is conducting this analysis it is not being disseminated to humanitarian agencies and organizations. It is encouraging that some NGOs are starting to engage with this issue.

Recommendations:

66. The UN should make a greater contribution to conflict mapping and analysis, and to provide practical guidance to assist humanitarian agencies and organizations to integrate conflict mitigation and peace building in their assistance programmes.
67. Participation of the war-affected population and civil society should be a priority in this regard – with particular reference to women’s role in peace building and conflict transformation in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1325.

Relocation and return

The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between IOM, the government and the UN and related mechanisms concerning the verification and voluntariness of IDP returns has made a significant contribution to preventing involuntary returns (but has not wholly prevented them). Unfortunately, the desirable relocation of IDPs from large camps and towns to nearby sites has reached an impasse, in some cases despite high-level interventions including that of the SRSG. This aspect is proving hard to resolve.

The security conditions in the Darfur region are still not conducive for the safe, voluntary and dignified return of IDPs or refugees to their places and villages of origin.⁴¹ At the same time, it is clear that protracted displacement is not in the interests of IDPs nor their host communities and that the pursuit of longer-term solutions to displacement - be it return, relocation and resettlement or settlement – should be supported by all humanitarian agencies and organisations, while ensuring that initiatives are based on international and regional human rights law, and humanitarian law and standards. All solutions should be explored with a view to the protection and confidence-building of, and consultation with, IDPs – including the most marginalised - and existing populations. The pursuit of durable solutions, in the manner described above, should also be supported by the political, inter-governmental and executive committees of the UN.

There will need to be consistency in the way relocation (as an interim measure to deal with overcrowding or otherwise unsatisfactory conditions) and the pursuit of durable solutions is undertaken across the Darfurs. UNHCR developed a framework for IDP and

⁴⁰ The Report of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges etc.

⁴¹ Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement Principle 28

refugee return for West Darfur in 2004⁴² and has recently signed a Letter of Understanding (LoU) with the Government underpinning this. IOM's earlier MoU concerning the verification and voluntariness of IDP return, discussed above, is not displaced but will henceforth be limited in practice to North and South Darfur. The provisions of UNHCR's LoU and IOM's MoU (and associated mechanisms) are similar but not identical. The terms of UNHCR's LoU are more comprehensive but both state that returns will be in accordance with international humanitarian law, international human rights law and international principles, which provides a common foundation. The particular difference is in the mandate, expertise and experience of UNHCR and IOM.

It is conceivable that UNHCR will at some point in the future seek to extend its role in returns in West Darfur to cover North and/or South Darfur. However the present position is that these areas are IOM's responsibility. Unless there is a strong indication that this will change, agencies and donors need to fully support IOM and proceed with the proposed harmonisation between UNHCR's LoU and the IOM's MoU (and related mechanisms). Some donors stressed to the evaluation team that there will also need to be better cooperation between UNHCR and IOM than has been the case to date.

In the meantime, IDPs remain uncertain about their future. They are entitled to know more. There are measures that can be undertaken now, without alarming IDPs into thinking that forced return is likely or raising expectations unreasonably.

Recommendations:

68. Current high-level interventions in relation to the voluntary relocation of IDPs from large camps and public buildings in towns should be sustained.
69. If IOM is to continue to be responsible for IDP returns in North and South Darfur, in parallel with UNHCR's responsibilities in West Darfur, the HC should make this unequivocally clear to all actors. The HC should address the reservations of some agencies and organisations about IOM's capacity.
70. Although the issue of returns has to continue to be managed with great sensitivity, the UN has to begin to provide some information to IDPs in the three Darfur states about possible mechanisms and programs.

Overall strategic planning

The 2005 *United Nations and its Partners Work Plan for the Sudan* (the 2005 Work Plan) is a very well organised document and the areas specified for special attention in Darfur in 2005 are sensible (protection, voluntary returns, quality of assistance, camp management, registration and common services). Appropriately, the plan anticipates that the needs associated with last season's "near total crop failure" will compound needs associated directly with the conflict. Nevertheless the analysis and areas of strategic focus do not deal satisfactorily with the complex and dynamic overlay of acute and chronic tensions, needs and vulnerabilities confronting responders in Darfur. This stems from the lack of detailed information on which to base the analysis. It is appropriate that the priority is maintaining assistance and providing more effective protection to IDPs. What is lacking is a sense of the relative priority and means of addressing broader challenges.

⁴² UNHCR Framework for IDP and Refugee Return in West Darfur, 20 November 2004

In any event, the 2005 Work Plan is regarded by many agencies and organisations as a 'donor document,' i.e. something prepared to raise funds rather than a strategic framework to guide activities. It has yet to be made relevant to them. Most interviewed outside Khartoum - including the UN heads of state capital offices – said they were not familiar with it and did not have a copy. It is understood that despite the best intentions, time constraints in late 2004 limited engagement with the field, as well as the involvement of NGOs, in the formulation of the plan.

All agencies and organisations have now been requested to assist in the development of a 120-day plan by providing details of their planned sectoral activities (on forms circulated in mid-January). This is necessary to track activities but it will not bring agencies and organisations together in the pursuit of negotiated strategies. Without an additional process, the 120-day plan will be of limited use.

The challenge, as always, is to establish an effective dynamic planning process – one that efficiently engages at least the majority of agencies and organisations in determining, reviewing and amending common strategies. This means regularly revisiting the strategies specified in the 2005 Work Plan and if necessary further developing or changing them. The revised strategies should then inform subsequent 120-day plans. The UN Country Team must be prepared to change course as priorities change, or fill gaps as they emerge. Headquarters will also need to be responsive to a more collaborative and dynamic form of planning. NGOs won't be receptive if the UN can't accomplish this.

In 2005, the gap between Khartoum and field-level planning should be closed and the strategic planning process must be more informed by state-based consultations. Ultimately, area-based plans developed by field actors should be considered as a means of more effectively integrating the response.

Recommendations:

71. The 2005 *United Nations and its Partners Work Plan for the Sudan* should be distributed to UN agencies and NGOs in the field.
72. Regular reviews of the 2005 Work Plan (envisaged for each 120-day period) should commence with a state-level process to be subsequently consolidated into a Darfur-wide meeting of UN and NGO representatives. These reviews should include an appraisal of the continued relevance of existing strategies and of the causal logic between activities and higher-level objectives. The upcoming review in particular should be seized as an opportunity to deal more satisfactorily with the complex and dynamic overlay of acute and chronic tensions, needs and vulnerabilities confronting responders in Darfur.
73. Skilled facilitators should be identified to lead these review/strategic planning processes from amongst the existing compliment of UN agency (including OCHA Consolidated Appeals Process facilitators), IO and NGO personnel. They should form an ad hoc team, supported by the OCHA Darfur Cell. Consideration should be given to providing training in the facilitation of review and planning processes to members of the OCHA Darfur Cell to strengthen the Darfur Cell's capacity to provide advice and assistance to the ad hoc team.

74. Donors should encourage all humanitarian actors to take an active part in these review/strategic planning processes.

Coordination

An enormous effort has been made to coordinate the response and agencies and organisations meet very regularly in various fora. The perception of some key donors however is that the primary purpose served by most meetings is information sharing and there is an undue reticence to openly discuss problems and provide and accept constructive criticism in the interests of improving the relevance and effectiveness of the response.

The UN needs to treat NGOs as equal partners in recognition of the fact that the NGOs are for the most part the frontline responders.

Many organizations – UN agency and NGOs alike – have weaknesses in their capacity. But there is little, if any, attempt to balance comparative advantages and weaknesses. Some smaller NGOs report difficulty in “fitting in” to the overall response in a coherent manner. Several agencies have mentioned difficulties coordinating with agencies that fail to differentiate between capacity and intention.

Opportunities were missed early in the operation to rationalise UN resources in the state capitals. The common pipeline is well-regarded, but UNJLC has been having trouble getting agencies and organisations to undertake distributions, even where CARE is able to undertake transportation to site.

Recommendations:

75. Heads of agencies and organisations should ensure that the ethos in coordination meetings is one in which problems are honestly acknowledged and debated, without undue defensiveness, in the interests of jointly improving the relevance and effectiveness of the response.

76. Consideration should be given by UN agencies and NGOs to the establishment of an IASC structure at the Khartoum. This could be affected by including NGO consortium representatives and the ICRC in regular UN Country Team meetings.

77. Partnership principles or guidelines on inter-agency relations should be jointly developed by UN agencies and NGOs and endorsed by the donor community.

78. Consideration should be given to forming a consortium of humanitarian agencies and organisations at the state level to profile the capacities of all members to aid in planning and coordination.

79. Members of the consortium should make themselves accountable to each other for what they say they are going to do. Donors should support any such initiative.

Next Steps

The evaluation team is conscious of the need to establish mechanisms to ensure the consideration of its recommendations and subsequent action. Accordingly it is suggested that the HC raise the issues and recommendations contained herein with all relevant stakeholders on the ground with a view to discussing the allocation of responsibility for implementation.

It is further suggested that the USG/ERC request that:

- All heads of agencies, organizations and other relevant stakeholders consider the recommendations, fully support their country offices in implementing them and ensure that those pertaining to headquarters-level action are addressed.
- Given the lack of a dedicated gender capacity on the ground, the Special Adviser on Gender Issues raise the recommendations in this report related to gender issues through the appropriate channels.
- Donors actively engage in discussions with agencies, organizations and other relevant stakeholders on the implementation of the recommendations, as well as act on those addressed directly to them.

**INTER-AGENCY REAL-TIME EVALUATION OF THE
HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE TO THE DARFUR CRISIS**

Observations and recommendations
(Third visit report)

Khartoum, 2 July 2005

In August 2004, the United Nations (UN) Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs/Emergency Relief Coordinator (USG/ERC), under the auspices of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), commissioned a real-time evaluation to strengthen the humanitarian response in Darfur and future crises of a similar nature.

The evaluation team conducted the first of three field visits in September 2004. This resulted in a working paper that included performance benchmarks in several key areas, which was presented to the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) on 22 September 2004. Subsequent discussions with key agencies were held at the capital and headquarters level in October 2004 and a presentation was made to the IASC on 9 December 2004. The second field visit was conducted in January-February 2005. Key findings and real-time recommendations were discussed in separate meetings with UN and non-governmental organisation (NGO) Darfur managers, the UN Country Team (UNCT) and donors in early February 2005. The report was revised in light of these consultations, was circulated to the UN Country Team, NGOs and donors in Khartoum on 10 February 2005, and then widely circulated on 28 February 2005.

This report is based on the third visit of the evaluation team conducted from May to June 2005.⁴³ It was presented to the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Sudan/Humanitarian Coordinator/Resident Coordinator (DSRSG/HC/RC) on 15 June 2005 for initial comment, returned to the team on 30 June and revised appropriately before being distributed on 3 July 2005 for comment to UN agencies, International Organisations (IOs) and NGOs operating in Darfur as well as at the headquarters level to an inter-agency evaluation Core Learning Group. On the basis of these additional comments, it was revised again and redistributed on 26 July 2005. A fourth and final report will be presented to the USG/ERC in mid-August 2005.

Many of the recommendations made in the two previous reports remain relevant. This report covers similar ground, but only in those instances where the team felt that further action was needed and/or its existing recommendations could be further elaborated.

Otherwise, the team has sought not to be repetitive.

⁴³ The team for the third visit included Bernard Broughton and Sarah Maguire (independent consultants), Kelly David-Toweh (providing support from headquarters in New York) and, for a brief period, Philip Winter (independent consultant). Research assistance in Khartoum was provided by Derek Geary and in New York by Tanya Prime.

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Acknowledgements and Note to Readers

Thanks to all the overworked people, particularly in the Darfurs, who agreed to take the time to sit down with yet another group of visitors and share their knowledge and experience. The team has been impressed in the course of each of its three visits by the effort and commitment of aid workers on the ground. Darfur is one of the most difficult and trying humanitarian crises in the world and many, when called upon to assist, chose not to go. The team recognizes that what has been achieved is due largely to the willingness of individuals in the field to push ahead, often by overcoming the shortcomings of the humanitarian system as it is presently constructed.

The team further recognizes that implementing some of the following recommendations will add to the burden of their work. And even further, that many require additional resources and capacity. But recommendations should not be withheld solely because of these constraints. Rather, presenting them serves at a bare minimum to flag what may be possible, should the international humanitarian community, at all levels, choose to take the necessary steps.

To this end, the team calls upon each agency's headquarters, donors, the IASC Principals and the ERC to take concerted and collective action to support field actors in the implementation of those recommendations it deems useful to the improvement of the humanitarian response in Darfur.

A. IMPACT OF ASSISTANCE AND CONSEQUENCES OF GAPS

Output level performance

The Darfur Humanitarian Profile (DHP) released on 1 May 2005 covers the four-month period from 1 January to 1 May 2005 and provides a good overview of operational outputs and constraints. The evaluation team encourages those readers not familiar with the operation to refer to it as a starting point (available at www.unsudanig.org). The evaluation team has not attempted to summarise information from the DHP, other than to incorporate some basic data in the following tables, and has sought instead to provide independent interpretation and analysis at the outcome and impact levels.

1 Jan 2005 Coverage of estimated conflict affected population (IDPs + affected residents)

Assessed number		% reached					
Darfur	Conflict affected	Food	Shelter	Clean Water	Sanitatio-n	Primary Health	Basic Drugs
North	725,736	67%	80%	44%	52%	60%	60%
South	824,346	54%	61%	52%	53%	57%	62%
West	854,388	66%	79%	52%	63%	68%	66%
Total	2,404,470	62%	73%	49%	56%	62%	63%

1 May 2005 Coverage of estimated conflict affected population (IDPs + affected residents)

Assessed number		% reached					
Darfur	Conflict affected	Food	Shelter	Clean Water	Sanitatio-n	Primary Health	Basic Drugs
North	856,812	53%	36%	49%	72%	65%	69%
South	941,781	52%	16%	55%	59%	66%	68%
West	939,966	74%	29%	60%	77%	68%	69%
Total	2,738,559	60%	26%	55%	69%	66%	68%

The preceding tables aggregate coverage in the six main life-saving sectors for the Darfurs.⁴⁴ The data is for all people assessed to be in need, of whom not all are accessible. As of 1 May 2005 the population accessible to the UN was 88 percent, the same proportion as of 1 January 2005, although not necessarily in the same areas. Generally speaking despite continuing increases in the number of people assessed to be in

⁴⁴ Information reported to OCHA as of 1 January and 1 May 2005. The other sectors included in the DHP are nutrition, secondary health care (included with primary health care under health), non-food items (included with shelter), agriculture and food security, education, protection and cross-sector support for return and reintegration. Exclusion from the tables does not signify that these are less important. They are simply not amenable to this type of presentation. For example, nutrition coverage cannot be established in a similar manner as these interventions are targeted to areas with a high prevalence of malnutrition. The underlying assumptions relating to coverage in the sectors included above are annexed in the DHP.

need, life-saving assistance is reaching a greater percentage of them. While food relief coverage declined marginally overall, WFP nevertheless increased its absolute coverage by more than 300,000 people over the first four months of 2005. Shelter coverage appears to be an anomaly but only because the coverage shown for May counts distributions for 2005 only, whereas the January figures include the cumulative total of all distributions of plastic sheeting from early 2004.

Nonetheless, in real terms, within any given sector a range of 850,000 to 1.24 million war affected people were still not receiving assistance as of 1 May 2005. Agencies recognise that there are substantial gaps in assistance and that they have generally not been able to meet their targets. They report this to be principally due to operational constraints and in some cases lack of timely funding. (Please refer to the *Chief Reasons for Shortcomings* section below).

The evaluation team has sought but found it difficult to find empirical evidence of impact beyond the aggregate output level information reported, or the general health outcomes discussed below. It has considered the subjective views of humanitarian workers on the ground, most of whom believe that the situation is improving. This is worth noting, but it is also likely that many of those interviewed have lowered their expectations in the course of struggling to meet needs in difficult and wearing circumstances. Nevertheless, some assumptions can be made about the impact of humanitarian assistance based on reported outputs and the logically plausible consequences of meeting assessed needs to an acceptable standard (e.g. with reference to the Sphere Project Minimum Standards in Disaster Response). Thus, where life-saving needs have been fairly consistently met, as they have in some camps, one can assume that this assistance has saved lives.

The greater difficulty is in estimating the consequences of not meeting *output targets* and *standards*. For example, providing less than 15 litres of water per person per day or of not meeting presumed needs at all, such as in areas (e.g. of the SLA) which have been impossible to access. In other respects, however, the consequences of not providing assistance are obvious. For instance, health NGOs noted rising malnutrition following breaks in WFP's food pipeline last year. Further, the inadequate support to FAO this year and the late disbursement of pledges will certainly impact on food security. Similarly, there are also challenges to measuring the *impact* or *outcome* of humanitarian assistance, as elaborated on below.

Health outcomes as overall indicators of the impact of humanitarian assistance

The primary means available for attempting to measure the impact of humanitarian assistance empirically is information on health outcomes: nutritional status, morbidity and mortality. This includes what has *not* happened: the absence of massive death, starvation and disease epidemics. Conducting this analysis is not straightforward, as it is difficult to determine in each setting which gaps in assistance, and/or extraneous factors, are exerting the strongest influence on the overall outcome. Moreover, quantifying what would have been in the absence of humanitarian assistance is impossible. Mortality and morbidity trends do, nevertheless, provide a reasonably good indication of the impact of humanitarian assistance from which the evaluation team concludes that humanitarian action has mitigated the catastrophe that the government and its armed proxies and opponents have visited on the people of Darfur by averting a large part of the excess mortality that could have resulted from displacement and loss of access to livelihoods. Lives have been saved; epidemics arising as a result of the crisis have been averted or

contained; and potential increases in malnutrition have generally been limited or contained.

A crude **mortality** survey led by WHO in June-August 2004 indicated a crude mortality rate (CMR) of 1.5 per 10,000 people per day in North Darfur and 2.9 in West Darfur, exceeding the emergency threshold in both cases of one per 10,000 per day. WHO – again in partnership with the Federal Ministry of Health and supported with personnel and logistics from several UN agencies and NGOs - completed a second crude mortality survey in June 2005, demonstrating that the CMR had “declined substantially” since the first survey - to an average 0.8 deaths per 10,000 people per day in Darfur.⁴⁵ The main causes of death were found to be meningitis outbreaks in North and West Darfur; diarrhoea in West and South Darfur; and injuries in North Darfur.

In terms of **morbidity**, the survey found that the health situation has improved, although WHO cautioned that health status in Darfur is “extremely fragile”. In a press release WHO’s representative in Sudan expressed the following concern about conditions in IDP camps:

The combination of crowded conditions in the settlements, shortage of clean water, inadequate latrines, insufficient soap, and the mire caused by rain-soaked mud mingling with excreta, have combined to make hygiene an impossible goal for people living in small, tarpaulin-covered huts and these conditions need to be solved.⁴⁶

Health NGOs interviewed in Darfur told the evaluation team that diarrhoea is presently their number one concern. The crude mortality survey found that in West Darfur nearly fifty percent of child mortality is related to diarrhoea. The survey found that measles-related deaths are relatively low, owing to a successful measles vaccination campaign, led by UNICEF, last year.

There is as yet no **nutritional** surveillance system covering the Darfurs and it is difficult to draw conclusions from the various surveys independently conducted. A number of surveys in January and February 2005 indicated a positive trend but surveys in March and April (in different locations) indicated an increase in global acute malnutrition (with rates ranging from 14 to 25 percent). A survey in Al Geneina camps in late June found rates at the top end of this range. There was a corresponding increase in admissions to therapeutic and supplementary feeding centres in March and April 2005, seeming to provide further evidence of increased stress. It is possible that these results represent pockets of malnutrition that remain to be addressed. However, it is not actually known how widespread the problem is, if it represents a general trend, and if it does precisely why it is occurring.

The reasons for relatively high malnutrition rates in particular camps are debated, but the most likely cause is believed by health NGOs interviewed to be hygiene related (not food). Increasing malnutrition amongst recently accessed non-camp populations most likely relates to steadily deteriorating food security.

It is important to note that, according to some NGOs, while global acute malnutrition may indeed be rising in some camps and areas, severe malnutrition, which kills, is not.

⁴⁵ Specifically - North Darfur: IDP camps 0.8; IDPs outside 0.9; residents 0.8. West Darfur: IDP camps 0.8; IDPs outside 0.5; residents 0.4. South Darfur: IDP camps 0.9 deaths per thousand. Mortality in Darfur, Second Mortality Survey, Greater Darfur Region Sudan, Preliminary Results, Khartoum, 2 July 2005.

⁴⁶ Dr Guido Sabatinelli, WHO Representative in Sudan, 2 July 2005

The second FMoH/WHO mortality survey concluded in the context of main causes of death that “malnutrition is not a major issue at this time”.

Nonetheless, the situation of the war affected clearly remains precarious. Mortality, morbidity and malnutrition rates may rise as the region approaches its seasonal ‘hunger gap,’ which will be more pronounced than usual for everyone due to the poor harvest in 2004; limited planting this year; restrictions on the movement of livestock; and the ongoing disruption of markets. Living conditions in the camps and spontaneous settlements are already deteriorating with the rains, as noted above by WHO and as witnessed by the evaluation team.

The Protection of Human Rights

The situation on the ground in Darfur is still one of pervasive insecurity. While reports of the destruction of villages have decreased, localised fighting continues to force people from their homes and instances of attacks on civilians - including the rape of women and children - continue on a widespread and systematic scale with impunity. Children’s lives and development continue to be comprehensively disrupted. IDPs are not necessarily safe in camps and they consider it unsafe to travel let alone return home. Meanwhile, the Government of Sudan and non-state actors continue to ignore or deny their role in fostering insecurity. Organisations and their leaders risk being subjected to harassment or worse for speaking out about violations.

As must be expected, it is difficult to assess the impact of protection activities on this reality. Output level results can be measured (e.g. numbers trained, adoption rate of fuel-efficient stoves) but human rights and humanitarian actors are generally unable to determine actual impact. There are a range of obstacles to impact assessment including the generally poor level of cooperation of national and local authorities and the absence of a reliable and comprehensive system for reporting violations (e.g. a functional police service) or for monitoring the performance of those charged with protective functions. The Protection Working Groups at Darfur state capital level have each drawn up a protection framework. For reasons that will be elaborated below, these frameworks have largely fallen into disuse, leaving little in the way of impact measurement.

Coverage of assistance

A ‘coverage and gaps’ mapping exercise undertaken by the evaluation team in June 2005 with Humanitarian Information Centre (HIC) assistance confirms that there has been a considerable expansion in humanitarian assistance since the end of January 2005, most obviously in food relief.⁴⁷ Coverage in water and primary health care, the other two sectors mapped, has also improved markedly although there are still many areas in which identified or assumed needs have not been met at all, including areas controlled by non-state actors.

Humanitarian presence has also increased. The most recent frontier has been the progress in the presence of NGOs and some UN agencies down the Zallingi corridor in West Darfur. There has also been much progress in terms of the recruitment of staff tasked to perform protection activities and with the scaling up of the UNMIS Human Rights Unit. Nevertheless, there are still areas with little to no international presence, and some with NGOs but no UN presence, such as the Jebel Marra. There is insufficient information available to draw conclusions about the impact on the war affected not yet accessed, but

⁴⁷ The three coverage maps – food, water, primary health care – are available on the HIC Sudan website www.humanitarianinfo.org/darfur

it must be assumed until otherwise demonstrated, that serious humanitarian assistance and protection needs remain. Providing relief in these areas is also important to mitigate the further concentration of war affected in IDP camps.

While important, the geographic expansion of assistance is just one dimension. The depth, quality and consistency of assistance are critical. The detailed annexes to the Darfur Humanitarian Profiles assist in estimating the depth and consistency of coverage to particular sites and administrative units but more information would still be required to adequately assess the effective access of the war affected to relief and services. This can be described as an efficiency issue or couched in terms of equity.

A substantial and perhaps increasing proportion of reported assistance gaps represent chronic needs. Although a considerable number of water points and health facilities have been destroyed, lack of access to water and health care is for the most part not a new problem. Labelling needs as chronic does not render them any less compelling: the imperative to save lives knows no boundary. Nevertheless, it is unrealistic to expect an emergency intervention to substitute for government action, as well as from non-state actors controlling territory, and turn around decades of neglect. The sixth recommendation in this report is meant to address the need to balance competing priorities.

B. CHIEF EXTERNAL CONSTRAINTS

The team recognizes that all responders have been constrained by external factors, the following being the most significant.

Operating environment

There has been less warfare since the large GoS campaigns of December 2004 and January 2005, although there has been increased road-side banditry and localised fighting particularly in South Darfur (in June between the SLA and JEM). Thus, although humanitarian access has been relatively good for the most part of 2005 -- facilitated in part by the fact that the UN Department of Safety and Security finally fulfilled the requirement of having two permanently based Field Security Coordination Officers in each of the state capitals -- security remains the primary constraint. Humanitarian agencies are still subject to incidents of harassment by GoS authorities and militia, including the SLA/JEM/NMRD, and this continues to jeopardize the safety and security of staff and operations..

The systematic obstruction of humanitarian operations by the federal government, state authorities and de facto authorities has also been an inhibiting factor. Sustained pressure has removed many bureaucratic obstacles, but these are still employed to frustrate humanitarian activities. Moreover, there is acute sensitivity to protection activities, in particular towards interventions or statements related to sexual- and gender-based violence (SGBV). Threats have been made against agencies and individuals who speak out against or try to address SGBV. Attempts to deal with this reality are complicated by the lack of coherent government policies and positions: what is agreed in Khartoum between the international community and the GoS is often disregarded by the Walis in Darfur. There is a general sense of disappointment among humanitarian actors with what has been possible to achieve in terms of protection, given the antagonism of the government and non-state actors. The lack of stronger relations with civil society, with

whom progress might be realized *in spite of* GoS obstruction, has also been a hindrance. In some locations, humanitarian agencies face considerable difficulties relating to encamped IDP populations who are distrustful and suspicious of the motives of the humanitarian community.

The deployment of the African Union has made many IDPs feel more secure and has encouraged some returns. The AU is also taking on a greater role in supporting humanitarian operations, which has in some areas enabled humanitarian actors greater access to vulnerable populations. But if it is to have an even greater impact, the AU needs to as quickly as possible reach its target of 7,000 personnel and disperse them over (say) 100 locations across the Darfurs. Its planned 66 police stations need to be established and similarly dispersed to locations in a manner that both protects and encourages returns.

Lack of implementing partners

Nearly all UN agencies have indicated that the lack of cooperating (implementing) partners is a key constraint to their work. WFP is now distributing a large proportion of its food directly for want of partners and UNJLC is directly distributing seeds for FAO and plastic sheeting in North Darfur for the same reason. UNICEF reports that a lack of dedicated implementing partners hindered their work on education and child protection. UNIFEM also commented that the lack of cooperating partners with gender expertise affected the integration of a gender perspective from the earliest stages.

Funding and support from diplomatic missions

Too few significant donors and diplomatic missions have provided strong support for the humanitarian operation in the Darfurs by way of funding, secondment of personnel and advocacy. Several humanitarian agencies identified late commitment and disbursement of funds as a significant constraint. Others simply complained that their sector was neglected.

Darfur funding against 2005 Work Plan, January through June⁴⁸

Sector	Requirements to end June 2005	% of total sector funding requirements	Funding received up to 1st July 2005	% of sector requirements funded	% of total funding received
Food Aid	\$438,234,341	66.45%	\$338,494,774	77.24%	79.06%
Shelter & NFIs	\$47,611,591	7.22%	\$14,659,442	30.79%	3.42%
Water & Environ. Sanitation	\$44,170,495	6.70%	\$17,977,037	40.70%	4.20%
Health	\$26,373,646	4.00%	\$13,953,889	52.91%	3.26%
Protection	\$24,517,890	3.72%	\$5,325,538	21.72%	1.24%
Return & Reintegration	\$22,679,500	3.44%	\$2,000,000	8.82%	0.47%
Education & Training	\$19,689,156	2.99%	\$4,203,671	21.35%	0.98%
Food Security & Livelihoods	\$15,411,000	2.34%	\$8,786,624	57.02%	2.05%
Nutrition	\$3,659,040	0.55%	\$1,805,700	49.35%	0.42%

⁴⁸ Contributions are as reported to and compiled by OCHA Khartoum (Michael Jensen). The Work Plan requirements to end 2005 are \$676,362,292 i.e. almost all the year's funding was required by end June.

Coordination & Common Services	\$17,120,289	2.60%	\$15,991,844	93.41%	3.74%
Unspecified			\$4,928,110	100.00%	1.15%
TOTAL	\$659,466,948	100.00%	\$428,126,629	64.92%	100.00%

Activities in the 2005 Work Plan were about 65 percent funded midway into the year. But a large portion of this funding – nearly 80 percent -- has gone towards food aid alone. While the food aid sector commonly receives more funding than non-food activities across all humanitarian appeals, this percentage is nonetheless significant, in particular when one bears in mind that food aid's share of total requirements in the Work Plan is only 66 percent. Overall, only five out of the 10 sectors have received roughly half or more of their funding requirements midway into the year. These include coordination (93 percent), food security and livelihoods (57 percent), health (53 percent) and nutrition (49 percent). Donors surveyed by the evaluation team in December 2004⁴⁹ unanimously identified protection as the most urgent gap in assistance, yet protection activities were only 21 percent funded by 1 July 2005. Water and environmental sanitation, which was ranked by donors as the second highest priority gap, was only 44 percent funded. Food aid, which was ranked as the third major gap, received 77 percent of funds requested. It is imperative that the committed donors not lose interest in Darfur, that others join them, and that diplomatic pressure is maintained and stepped up where and when it can effect change. Agreements made to protect the human rights of the war affected populations are in need of constant diplomatic and public attention, including visits to the field by diplomats. If diplomatic pressure diminishes it will have a negative effect on humanitarian efforts in Darfur and on the safety and wellbeing of the people.

C. CHIEF REASONS FOR SHORTCOMINGS

Lack of accountability for poor performance

The performance of a number of UN agencies is widely regarded as unsatisfactory within the UN, IO and NGO community. This is reflected in comments made to the evaluation team about weak leadership and support in certain sectors; a tendency of some (which was evident to the evaluators) to put a gloss on performance; and the apparent confusion and competition between UN agencies, in relation to human rights, humanitarian protection and rule of law activities. The same often applies to NGOs and IOs, which equally need to be honest about their limitations and self-critical of their effectiveness. A number of NGOs have conducted evaluations, but not many. In any event, individual NGO evaluations cannot effectively address inter-agency issues.

Poor performance can be attributed to a number of factors, including the external constraints elaborated upon above, but these alone cannot be blamed. Internal deficiencies within the international humanitarian response system are also responsible. Chief among these are weaknesses in its overall capacity.

There has been a remarkable increase in the total number of humanitarian personnel assigned to the Darfurs – from 228 humanitarian workers on 1 April 2004 to 11,219 on 1 April 2005, nearly a fifty fold increase. The growth in expatriate personnel over this

⁴⁹ Conclusions are based on the December 2004 responses from ten major donors to the Sudan to a written survey from the Evaluation Team

period was 37 to 915, a twenty five fold increase. There are now 11 UN agencies and 85 NGOs working in the Darfurs.⁵⁰ However, this relatively high number of agencies and personnel does not reflect effective operational capacity. There is a recognised deficit of sectoral experts and there are a large number of inexperienced staff working for UN agencies, IOs and NGOs. Moreover, there is a very high turnover of staff, with the consequence that few of those who gained experience through 2004 remain.

These points should not be taken as criticism of the personnel concerned. Humanitarians are working extremely hard, but any system with so many moving parts and such an uncertain division of labour is bound to be relatively inefficient. Equally, it would be a disservice to pretend that operational capacity does not remain an issue.

Further, a relatively small proportion of the international NGOs are regarded as effective in terms of their expertise and ability to take advantage of humanitarian access and fill gaps in challenging settings. Some observers believe that over the years NGOs have sacrificed operational capacity in order to build their policy and advocacy functions, and that in this way they are becoming more like the UN. This, they posit, has weakened the quantity and quality of sectoral expertise traditionally available in humanitarian emergencies. Although it is difficult to substantiate such observations, there does appear to be some truth in them when one considers the widespread consensus that sectoral expertise was lacking in Darfur. Some commentators argue that NGOs could have done more themselves to negotiate humanitarian access.

There are gaps in the UN humanitarian architecture, most notably the absence of a UN agency for IDPs, as well as weaknesses in the application of the collaborative approach to IDPs, if not in the approach itself. Darfur has demonstrated that roles and responsibilities for camp management, shelter and NFIs, and key aspects of protection, including voluntary return, have to be designated in advance of a crisis, rather than relying on agencies to determine during the response if it is in their interests and within their means to accept these responsibilities.

Lastly, poor performance is also likely attributable to the level of support and guidance staff in the field have received, or not received, from their headquarters. Some agency personnel are adamant that their HQ have not met reasonable expectations for timely and useful support, in particular in staffing, policy and advocacy guidance, as well as day-to-day desk support. There is a strong view amongst senior humanitarians in Khartoum that headquarters staff are driven more by external pressure than the advice, guidance and needs of the staff on the ground.

For further elaboration and recommendations, please see pages 12 to 15.

Inadequate planning, analysis and coordination

Efforts to strengthen planning and coordination have been significant. The 2005 Work Plan sets a high standard for planning and appeal documents. The 120-day planning process also marks a significant investment in inter-agency planning, although it has its internal detractors who question the value of the considerable effort involved in compiling them. Action is being taken to improve sectoral support (e.g. the recently inaugurated Inter-Agency Technical Advisory Group for Water and Sanitation). Meetings of the sector leads have been introduced at the operational level to improve cross-sectoral coordination.

⁵⁰ Of the humanitarian workers present in the Darfurs, 92% are Sudanese although very few are in senior management positions. Of the expatriate staff only 16% work for the UN (the rest are with NGOs and IOs).

Nonetheless, there remains room for improvement in several critical areas, most notably in strengthening contextual analysis and sectoral planning and coordination. On the ground, the humanitarian operation has been constrained from the outset by a lack of political advice. In February, the team identified the lack of credible information and analysis as one of the single biggest impediments to informed planning and effective action in the Darfurs. This continues to be the case. Several sectors do not have implementation plans that satisfactorily marshal the efforts of all actors and this gap impacts negatively on the effectiveness and efficiency of the humanitarian response. Agencies cannot be *forced* to work within the parameters of a common plan – ultimately sector leads must *persuade* the majority of the value of a cohesive approach. In addition, planning, analysis and coordination needs to become sophisticated enough to accommodate both relief and livelihood protection. The humanitarian effort has so far appropriately focused on the provision of emergency assistance to the internally displaced and increasingly to other war affected populations. The challenge now is to accommodate the need to provide more protection and support for livelihoods, including by helping stimulate food production and markets. The humanitarian imperative should be able to accommodate a range of responses aimed both in the short- and medium-term at saving lives.

Plans also need to be made for the possibility of transitional programming in 2006 - the conceptual thinking and practical preparations must be undertaken in 2005. This is a more developmental realm with different principles to emergency response but, practically speaking, the two must co-exist in a unified operation, not least because the majority of humanitarian agencies will be involved in both.

For further elaboration and recommendations, please see pages 15 to 20.

Limited UN field presence

In February 2005, the evaluation team recommended that the UN develop a deeper field presence to meet its mandated responsibilities, play a greater role in shaping the response, and provide more support to NGOs. The team noted that this should include *inter alia* mediating with the authorities to enable NGOs to pursue protection activities and suggested that deeper field presence could be achieved by a range of modalities including establishing satellite offices, mobile staff and improved communication.

In the intervening period several UN agencies have established satellite offices, sub-offices or field offices, although UNMIS Human Rights has yet to do so. While this is real progress, the evaluation team believes that the UN still requires a deeper, and in some cases more capable, field presence.

For further elaboration and recommendations, please see pages 20 to 21.

Weaknesses in the collaborative approach to internal displacement

On 7 April 2005, the IASC Principals acknowledged that the collaborative approach to IDP protection has not been a success in Darfur. Furthermore, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Working Group meeting (22-23 June 2005) endorsed the view that “a major weakness of recent responses to IDP crises has been the absence of operational accountability and leadership in key sectors...” The problem goes beyond protection and concerns a lack of clarity in many areas about roles and responsibilities, a lack of operational and collective accountability for the overall performance of the operation, and the unwillingness or inability of the actors concerned to address these problems decisively. The underlying problems include *inter alia* the competitiveness of the

agencies, which in part reflects insecurity about funding. To be effective, the collaborative approach requires collective responsibility; in turn requiring agencies to agree on priorities and a division of labour even when this cuts across what a particular agency or agencies would like to do. On this basis, cases for funding must be presented to donors.

While there has been progress in critical areas -- in particular on the approach to returns and reintegration across the Darfurs, as well as in filling gaps in camp coordination -- the team believes that further improvements can be made.

For further elaboration and recommendations, please see pages 22 to 25.

Inadequate framework for protection

First and foremost, the primary responsibility for protection of the human rights of civilians lies with the Government of Sudan, but it has committed violations and abuses itself and granted de facto impunity to other perpetrators. It has also ignored its obligations to protect its citizens and worked to obstruct the efforts of those who attempt to ameliorate the dire human rights situation of those affected by the armed conflict. Under these circumstances the international community has a responsibility to protect civilians.

The humanitarian and human rights communities continue to debate where ‘human rights’ and ‘humanitarian protection’ start and finish, respectively. One view is that human rights work is restricted to monitoring, investigating and reporting on violations of human rights. Usually, although not always, this is taken to refer to civil and political rights and/or to egregious violations that constitute international crimes, rather than to economic, social and cultural rights. The evaluation team takes the view, however, that the protection of civilians in situations of armed conflict is broader than ensuring adherence only to international humanitarian law. Rather, it includes the whole body of international and regional human rights and refugee law and standards. On this basis, the team takes the protection of human rights to include that which is commonly known as ‘humanitarian protection,’ as described in the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (1993) and references therein, as well as numerous subsequent global documents on the indivisibility and interdependence of human rights.

The team acknowledges that any mention of ‘human rights’ in the Sudan context can be highly politicised, as it can be seen as confrontational and controversial. This fact, alongside an adherence to the school of thought that separates civil and political from economic, social and cultural rights, has resulted in a false dichotomy in the way human rights violations are addressed *in practice* in Darfur. It arises between those seeking to address ‘humanitarian protection’ and their ‘human rights’ colleagues. Recommendation 10 on page 21 addresses the practicalities of resolving this while maintaining a delineation of roles and responsibilities.

It should be recalled that when the OHCHR first negotiated a presence in Sudan with the Government it was restricted to technical cooperation and had to wage a long and patient contest to be allowed to do any monitoring. The team is firmly of the view that monitoring, investigating and reporting is central to human rights work and welcomes moves by those in humanitarian agencies who regard it as their responsibility to contribute to this work in whatever ways they find possible given their constraints. Although there has been notable progress in some areas, ‘protection’ has been characterised by confusion, a lack of consistent leadership and guidance at the Khartoum

level and an unnecessarily novel ('reinventing the wheel') approach to creating tools, procedures and structures to guide protection action. Many people are still unaware of the work done by, *inter alia*, the ICRC and its partners regarding defining and describing protection. Furthermore, some are of the view that "everyone is doing protection" because of the "protection through presence" paradigm while others consider themselves to be distant from "protection work" if they are not labelled "protection officers". The protection working groups, which can help provide greater clarity, need to be consistently supported to ensure that they stay relevant, useful and dynamic.

There also has been insufficient attention drawn to the continuing impact of the crisis on children. Efforts to collect and disseminate information have been slow and the monitoring of child rights has been neither systematic nor energetic. There has, however, been an increase in attention to education as a protection tool and strategy, and a number of Child Protection Advisers are about to be recruited in UNMIS. Information about children's situation now needs to be translated into effective response measures.

Attempts to prevent the need for women to leave camps and to provide them with some protection (in partnership with the AU) have increased. However, the team found that the overall response to SGBV, continues to lack energy and leadership. UNFPA is attempting to address the issue, but with limited capacity. Further, the tendency so far to leave UNFPA to lead on this issue belies the true nature and scope of the problem, which goes far beyond reproductive health issues to encompass women's human rights (including the right to health). It therefore should have the concerted attention of human rights and protection actors, as well as WHO.

For further elaboration and recommendations, please see pages 21 to 22 and 26 to 33.

Outstanding gaps in programming

The team recommended in February that protection action plans and strategies make explicit reference to international humanitarian and human rights law and standards because explicit references to and knowledge of these better equip staff to address protection issues, both in terms of guiding their own work and in dealing with opposition to the principles of protection. Little progress has been made in this area. NGO cooperating partners are often insufficiently informed about the mandates and operational frameworks of the UN agencies concerned. For instance, although UNICEF's standard cooperation agreements make references to these, their partners are nonetheless not always as informed as they should be about the applicable normative framework.

The team reiterates the belief of the UN Secretary-General that the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement provide a "useful tool" and should be more widely disseminated and applied.

Another continuing gap is the lack of gender mainstreaming across the response. Tools and guidance have been developed by the humanitarian community over the last 15 years and particularly since 1999 to help humanitarian actors integrate gender into their work, but there is little utilisation of this assistance. Some maintain that gender issues are not relevant in an emergency and do not recognise that mainstreaming gender at the earliest stages of a crisis works both to protect women and girls, men and boys, as well as to ensure a more comprehensive and appropriate emergency response. As a result, gender issues in Darfur have come to be narrowly defined as those pertaining to sexual and gender-based violence against women and girls. Thus, wider gender issues continue to go unaddressed.

Lastly, the team also identified in February the need for strengthened analysis on food security and the protection of livelihoods in order to allow intelligent responses to impending food shortages. It is now evident that severe disruptions to livelihoods and markets, last year's poor harvest and low plantings this year have left many of those not displaced very food insecure. Appropriately, WFP has revised upwards its emergency food assistance projections, expecting them to reach a peak of 3.5 million beneficiaries at the height of the 'hunger gap' in the period August-October 2005, of which it is anticipated the ICRC will assist 250,000).

The need for a joint analytical approach to food security and livelihoods, in both the short and the long term, is disputed by no one, but it has not yet been brought into being. For further elaboration and recommendations, please see pages 33 to 37.

Inadequate advocacy

Despite ongoing human rights violations, there has been insufficient high level, sustained and strategic advocacy aimed at helping ensure the protection of civilians, as well as aid workers. Some UN agencies or representatives are notably risk-averse in saying anything that may threaten their relationship with line ministries or the Government centrally while others – such as the mandate holders of the Special Procedures of the Commission on Human Rights - who may be better placed to speak out without fear of jeopardising any programming are not utilised or given sufficient information to do so. The most notable evidence of this is that -- despite the grave impact of this conflict and ensuing crisis on children -- the Darfur crisis still does not have “a child's face.” While field-based actors do what they can within constraints to remind the Government of Sudan of its primary responsibility towards the protection of its own civilians, there is a need for this to be reinforced at high levels and by the diplomatic and donor communities in order to combat the climate of impunity and provide aid workers with support, as well as some degree of protection from harassment and attack.

For further elaboration and recommendations, please see pages 37 to 38.

D. RECOMMENDATIONS

The evaluation team's recommendations to address these shortcomings follow. The team recognizes that many of its observations can equally apply to other humanitarian responses as they do to Darfur, in particular those pertaining to accountability, planning and coordination. Equally, the team recognizes the additional burden of work that implementation of some of the recommendations would impose on staff. To this end, the accomplishment of many of the recommendations requires concerted effort not only at the field level, but by each agency headquarters, as well as the ERC, IASC Principals and donors. In particular attention must be paid to the need for quality staff on longer term contracts, as noted elsewhere in this report. Only with the proper support, is it possible to address systemic issues within an operational context.

COLLECTIVE ACCOUNTABILITY

Improve the accountability of headquarters for support to the field

Who: ERC, all agency headquarters

How: All agency headquarters review their existing staff complement to ensure that their offices are fully staffed and more importantly staffed with appropriately experienced

personnel holding contracts for at least one year. Where necessary take decisive action to address existing gaps, replace under-performing staff and surmount recruitment obstacles. All agency headquarters to enter into an immediate dialogue with their heads of office about other areas of critical support, and develop a plan for addressing weaknesses. If support is found to be particularly lacking based on these initial discussions, the agency should launch a review of its support to its Darfur programme, including the following issues:

- a) **Administrative:** Recruitment (as above); human resources management; finance; procurement, etc.
- b) **Operational:** Workplanning and programming; staffing design; information management; advocacy; resource mobilization.
- c) **Policy:** Strategic policy guidance; organizational and Darfur-wide priorities; relationship with key actors, including the government.

The ERC should request frank and honest feedback from the HC and UNCT on areas in which support from the UN Secretariat, including the IASC and ECHA, could or should be more forthcoming, and then enter a dialogue to address those issues.

Why: Although the humanitarian operation is not as short staffed as it was last year, critical vacancies remain and some senior positions require or will soon require replacement. Some agencies, while fully staffed, continue to rely on a disproportionately high number of consultants and other short-term personnel to staff their operations. Recruitment for the mission is also said to be drawing away key humanitarian staff, who perceive better employment terms there. A large number of staff in Khartoum and the Darfurs also identify poor headquarters support as reasons for shortcomings in the response, in particular in the area of recruitment and administration. The team recognizes that many agencies -- in part due to the difficulties of staffing the Darfur response -- have initiated reforms and/or improvement in their surge and staffing capacities, but believes that more immediate and ongoing attention is needed in this area.

Some field staff also indicated that advice and guidance on key policy issues, such as protection and strategic planning itself, was not forthcoming from headquarters. Further, that guidance on the best strategic use and timing of advocacy, in particular statements from high-level officials such as the USG/ERC, was sometimes ignored, causing tensions and a potential backlash from the GoS.

It is also evident that following the initial lateness of the response and the criticism of several highly engaged donors, pressure from headquarters to improve the response put a severe strain on field staff already working under extremely difficult circumstances. Some have said they then felt they were “working under the microscope” and that headquarters was not as supportive as it should have been under the circumstances. In at least one organization, this appears to have resulted in a lasting sense of frustration on both sides that has inhibited the constructive exchange of views on challenges and potential solutions to them. For this reason, the team feels that all agencies would benefit from at the very least a discussion of their organization’s headquarters support to Darfur, and if necessary, a full review in order to ensure that critical shortcomings and/or tensions are immediately addressed.

Improve the accountability of individual UN agencies to other UN agencies and NGOs by benchmarking and testing reasonable expectations

Who: To be initiated by SRSG or DSRSG/HC depending on outcome of discussions between them. UNCT and NGOs to be involved in the design of the unit. Progress to be monitored by the IASC.

How: Recruit or second two senior members of staff for a period of twelve months with a brief to: a) determine at the field level (not in Khartoum) the degree to which each UN humanitarian agency is meeting the reasonable expectations of other UN agencies and of NGOs; and b) recommend remedial measures to be taken to address shortcomings. The oversight unit would report regularly to the UNCT and the NGO consortium. The unit must be independent from and not be confused with OCHA. One of those recruited should have a strong NGO background.

When: Commence recruitment or secondment process now.

Benchmarks: Within three months - marked improvements in sectoral leadership and participation, and greater clarity about roles, responsibilities and collaborative arrangements, including in relation to protection. This should lead to greater agency accountability and corrective action to improve the overall effectiveness and efficiency of the response.

Why: Weaknesses in performance remain unaddressed in large part because there is no attempt to set benchmarks and no real mechanism for holding agencies accountable for their performance. UN agencies tend to operate like independent entities, rather than integrated components, and rarely if ever presume to call the other to account or to offer help. Members of the UNCT cooperate with the Humanitarian Coordinator, but rarely submit themselves to his authority.

This recommendation aims to break down these barriers by providing a basis for discussion within the UNCT about individual agency performance as it is perceived at the field level, and by including NGOs in this process. This may appear somewhat subjective, but it is submitted that this approach – based on views about reasonable expectations taking into account shared constraints – will be more effective than seeking to evaluate each agency independently.

If the HC does not have the will or authority to establish such a unit, it is recommended that it be established in the office of the SRSG, recognizing however that at this level it would not be solely directed at humanitarian agencies and would cover all UNMIS components.

Take new initiatives to improve NGO performance and adherence to agreed principles and standards.

Who: Group of willing NGOs operating in the Darfurs together with interested donors.

How: Either:

- a) Establish a Darfur specific NGO performance and accountability process, which could utilise a number of tools for the application of principles and standards e.g. peer reviews against the Sphere Project's common and sector standards and/or regular reviews of progress in relation to agreed time bound common benchmarks.

- b) Or, NGOs that are willing commission a review of their performance and adherence to principles and standards in the Darfurs. This could also result in setting common benchmarks (see final paragraph below).

The preferred option, the performance and accountability process, would require additional expertise so as not to further burden NGO personnel occupied with implementation - hence the reference to interested donors. Alternatively, advice and expertise could be drawn from the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership – International (HAP-I) project, if and when it is established in the Darfurs.⁵¹

When: Process or review underway by mid-September 2005.

Why: The responsibility NGOs have towards the war affected population in the Darfurs requires collective responsibility for NGO performance. Some NGO personnel interviewed in Khartoum and the Darfurs resisted this conclusion when pressed, stressing their independence. While this independence is valuable and must be respected, it can jeopardize and weaken coordination and prioritisation. There have been instances where NGOs acting independently have established overlapping activities in areas where there is a concentration of NGOs (e.g. the construction of three health centres in the new Al-Salaam camp on the outskirts of El Fasher when only two were recommended.) There have also been instances where NGOs have ‘staked a claim’ on an area but failed to deliver (e.g. earlier in South Darfur). It is accepted that delays in funding can lead to this but NGOs should factor it in.

The evaluation team recognizes that at the state level, NGOs and the UN (principally OCHA and those UN agencies with implementation agreements with NGOs) work well together to arrive at a relatively rational division of roles and geographic responsibilities. This is positive, but it amounts to agreeing to be organised in the interests of having one’s role and location endorsed, rather than taking more responsibility for a process of determining which NGO should do what where on the basis of agreed priorities. It is recognised that strengthening accountability and coordination amongst NGOs needs to be complemented by better accountability and coordination among UN agencies in so far as the UN should provide coherent leadership. But NGOs also share some responsibility for leadership and coordination.

While NGO consortia (e.g. InterAction, ICVA) or quality and accountability initiatives (e.g. The Sphere Project, HAP-I), may be called on to assist, the vision and leadership for this initiative must come from the NGOs in Darfur themselves if it is to take root. Neither donors nor the UN can be expected to “police” the NGO community, as has been suggested to the team by some.

Benchmarking would be a valuable component of the recommended performance and accountability process or the review because it is a means by which participating NGOs could reach a consensus on what they can reasonably expect of themselves. In turn, this

⁵¹ At the heart of HAP International’s work are the principles of accountability with which all members must comply. The principles require that members: 1) Respect and promote the rights of legitimate humanitarian claimants; 2) State the standards that apply in their humanitarian assistance work; 3) Inform beneficiaries about these standards, and their right to be heard; 4) Meaningfully involve beneficiaries in project planning, implementation, evaluation and reporting; 5) Demonstrate compliance with the standards that apply in their humanitarian assistance work through monitoring and reporting; 6) Enable beneficiaries and staff to make complaints and to seek redress in safety; and 7) Implement these principles when working through partner agencies. (From the HAP-I website.)

would contribute to making NGOs less vulnerable to accusations of inefficiency or of working outside their own mandates. The practical problem in applying principles and standards is that they are absolutes that do not allow for time and circumstance. Benchmarking adds this dimension. This approach must not be used to water down principles and standards, but to engage practically in a process of determining what it is reasonable to expect by particular stages in a humanitarian intervention given a particular set of circumstances.

PLANNING, ANALYSIS & COORDINATION

Establish a Planning and Analysis Unit and shape it as the HC/UNCT's key planning and analysis asset

Who: HC, UNCT

How:

- a) Start from the premise that it is absolutely essential that it is seen and used as a HC/UNCT asset.
- b) Incorporate the positive lessons from the recent collaboration on returns to southern Sudan (the 'returns group').
- c) Ensure tasks undertaken are driven by the HC with UNCT and NGO 'buy in'.
- d) Provide assistance by bringing in expertise from UN agencies and NGOs tasked to the Unit rather than as representatives to it (along the lines of the 'returns group' model).
- e) Ensure that this Unit is not tasked with work in the domain of others (e.g. the Information Management Unit and other mechanisms).
- f) Use existing information and analysis on conflict indicators to ensure that humanitarian programming is informed by conflict analysis.

When: The decision to establish the Planning and Analysis Unit should be taken in the very near future and certainly by the end of August 2005.

Why: The HC and UNCT need an inter-agency planning and analysis unit to assist it to resolve the difficulties that have arisen in the implementation of the collaborative approach and to plan ahead. The team was informed in May that a Planning and Analysis Unit was to be created, but subsequently learned that a Monitoring and Evaluation Unit was to be created instead.

The team believes that the creation of a Planning and Analysis Unit is more appropriate and a higher priority than a new Monitoring and Evaluation Unit. The Planning and Analysis Unit should be shaped from the outset as a task-based inter-agency asset to fill the current gap in inter-agency planning and analysis. The 'returns group' brought together by the HC in May 2005 for an intensive 10-day collaborative effort demonstrated the value of such an approach. While tasks will necessarily be dictated by the circumstances and issues with which the humanitarian community is grappling, it should serve primarily to tackle critical cross-cutting issues rather than single sector issues.

It is not envisaged that the Unit would require additional monitoring or reporting systems. The two members of the Unit will rely principally on discussion and observation. The team recognizes that the most difficult planning decisions involve the roles and responsibilities of several agencies – hence the emphasis on securing the buy-in of all, including NGOs, to the work of the Unit. The Unit will only prove its value if it engages effectively with all agencies, is able to draw on expertise within the agencies, and delivers timely and useful ideas and analysis. UN agencies and NGOs must be prepared not only to second personnel for key tasks for short periods and direct them to operate as an inter-agency team, but to keep the mandates of their respective agencies and organisations in the background.

Focus on strengthening planning and analysis at the sector level in each of the four operational areas in the Darfurs as the primary engine for improving the effectiveness and efficiency of humanitarian action in the short to medium term

Who: Sector leads, HC's office, UNCT, in consultation with NGOs

How:

- a) Where they are absent or inadequate, develop terms of reference for sector coordinators.
- b) Develop a procedure for periodic peer review of sector leads or co-leads, perhaps to be overseen by a nominee from each sector, the results of which would be shared with the HC and discussed and acted upon at the country director/representative level. (HC's office in consultation with the UNCT and NGOs)
- c) Translate 120-day plans into rolling implementation plans for each sector in each of the four operational areas, clearly identifying who will do what where by when with what sector lead support. Recommend a procedure for simply and efficiently updating and disseminating the plan from month to month. (Sector leads in each operational area.)
- d) Prepare and maintain activity maps for each sector indicating who does what where, and which flag jointly agreed priority gaps in assistance. (Sector leads in each operational area with HIC support. OCHA Areas Managers should maintain an overview and facilitate cross-sectoral consultation.)
- e) Undertake water needs assessments in each operational area, in the order of priority agreed. (UNICEF lead)

When: By end of August for terms of reference, by end of September for first rolling plans and activity maps. First peer review to take place by end October. UNICEF to begin needs assessments by the end of August if not before.

Why: Some sectors are not as cohesive, organized and dynamic as they should be. Common planning efforts suffer in some sectors from a lack of attention, leadership and technical guidance. Some NGOs have told the team they don't have the "big" picture in their sector, and are therefore uncertain of the activities and approaches of others and their own contribution. While the 120-day plan provides broad quantitative parameters for sectoral assistance, field-level area implementation plans are nearly non-existent.

While the evaluation team recognizes that cross-sectoral planning is also important, it believes that the present priority is to improve performance in each sector.

The first step to ensuring a more effective and consistent sectoral response is to clarify sector lead responsibilities and expectations by developing terms of reference where they are absent or inadequate. It is noted that terms of reference were drafted a year ago but they evidently slipped by the wayside.⁵² The next step is helping ensure quality leadership by conducting regular peer reviews of the sector leads or co-leads. Peers would include other UN agencies and NGOs operating in the same sector, other sector coordinators and OCHA. If a coordinating agency is found to be unable to dedicate sufficient resources and/or capacity to coordination, or loses the confidence of sector partners, the lead should be changed. It is recognised that the issue is more complex where a government authority is involved in the coordination of the sector, but the humanitarian imperative dictates that an effective solution be found to sector coordination.

A rolling plan with monthly revisions may seem onerous but it need not be and something is required to give the 120-day plans traction in the field. Apart from providing greater guidance, a more detailed and contextualized implementation plan will have the added value of boosting the confidence of all actors operating in the sector, provided of course it is not imposed on them.

It should also be the responsibility of sector leads to provide or mobilise technical guidance and to undertake or commission periodic analysis on behalf of the sector. This analysis is needed *inter alia* to provide guidance in balancing competing needs (see following recommendation).

It is recommended that water needs assessments be undertaken because there is a huge need for water throughout most of the Darfurs, much of it relating to chronic need. At the same time, there are tensions between groups and aquifer depletion risks to consider. UNICEF and OCHA had been planning a joint water needs assessment in North Darfur (including SLA areas) but it did not proceed.

Coverage and gaps maps have been generated for some sectors in some operational areas over the course of the operation, but have generally not been kept up to date. Such maps are an essential planning tool and are far more user friendly than lists and matrices.

UNICEF's water team in West Darfur, in collaboration with the Humanitarian Information Centre (HIC), has been profiling water and sanitation activities in that state. It is understood the results are being mapped with the assistance of the HIC officer in El Geneina. This is a good initiative and should be replicated in other states and sectors.

More deliberately and effectively balance competing assistance needs in sector programming and across sectors

Who: Each sector working group within each of the four operational areas in Darfur. Cross sector meetings facilitated by OCHA Area Managers.

⁵² See Darfur Emergency: Sectoral Coordination, draft of 26 June 2004 prepared by OCHA.

How:

- a) Each sector⁵³ working group convenes at the operational level⁵⁴ to prepare a two-page presentation with an accompanying map describing how competing needs are to be balanced for the remainder of 2005.
- b) Competing needs to consider include care and maintenance of encamped IDPs, reaching IDPs co-existing with non-IDPs, providing assistance to IDPs not living in camps, reaching areas controlled by non-state actors, mitigating if not preventing distress migration (the ‘pull’ factor), reducing friction between IDPs and non-IDPs, assisting returnees and preparing for potential returns, doing more to protect and support precarious livelihoods, and meeting chronic needs.
- c) Sector leads present their outlines in a cross sectoral meeting open to all humanitarian actors in each operational area. The outlines are then revised on the basis of peer advice, combined as one document, and circulated between operational areas and shared with Khartoum. (OCHA to manage the dissemination.)
- d) The outlines would supplement and enrich the Work Plan and 120 day sector plans, not supplant them, although a mechanism should be agreed for revising these plans if compelling reasons for doing so arise in the course of the recommended process.

When: Ideally when preparing 120-day plans for August-December 2005.

Benchmark: Reorientation of agency work to reflect newly agreed priorities; stronger sectoral and geographic linkages.

Why: It is widely remarked that there is still an over-concentration of humanitarian resources in and around the state capitals. There are, for instance, more than 20 humanitarian agencies assisting IDPs in Abu Shouk camp. It is also recognised that there has been a considerable amount of ‘cherry picking’ among the needs to be filled by agencies. This has left, for example, inadequate assistance in camp management and shelter. Moreover, donors have evidently tended to neglect certain sectors. These phenomena are indications of the importance of establishing a more comprehensive, needs-based decision-making process, and of drawing donors into it.

The Work Plan 2005 is one of the best, if not the best example of a consolidated appeal. It sets five sensible strategic priorities for Darfur, and actors did omit some activities that were not congruent with the agreed objectives. But the strategic priorities in the Work Plan do not necessarily drive implementation – indeed there is as yet no process in place to accomplish this. The review of the first 120-day period of 2005 showed no evidence that activities were evaluated against the Work Plan’s strategic priorities. The 120-day plans themselves are helpful and reflect a degree of re-prioritisation, but they are essentially about setting targets, not defining strategies.

⁵³ In this report ‘sector’ includes water and sanitation, health, food, shelter and NFIs, etc. Protection is not included although it is recognised that there is sometimes a perceived ‘competing need’ between protection and assistance.

⁵⁴ In this report ‘operational area’ means those areas managed from the three state capitals - El Fasher (North Darfur), Nyala (South Darfur), and Al Geneina (West Darfur) – plus that part of West Darfur managed from Zalingi.

To deal with emerging needs, efforts have been made to identify gaps in coverage and, to this end, inter-agency assessments have been conducted in unserved areas as well as areas to which there have been some returns. In North Darfur at least, a matrix is being developed that highlights outstanding sectoral and geographic gaps. OCHA Area Managers are well aware of the gaps in South and West Darfur. These efforts are laudable, but they have not reversed the over-concentration in and around the state capitals. They have also not been designed to address some gaps, including the relative lack of attention paid to shelter by operational agencies. Present arrangements are simply too ad hoc. There therefore remains a need to more deliberately articulate the rationale for who should receive assistance and which agency should do what where.

Dealing with chronic needs and some of the political imperatives is tricky. For example, in the first 120-day review of the 2005 Work Plan, the Shelter and NFI sector report states that there is increasing pressure to supply host and/or nomadic populations, as well as IDPs, with NFIs. The report concludes that there is an urgent need for a policy decision on this. Indeed, and the example highlights the potential danger of dissipating humanitarian action by losing focus on or failing to distinguish emergency needs from longer-term ones that cannot be adequately tackled without additional resources and expertise. The water sector also illustrates the need for a clear rationale. Everybody needs more water but not all needs can be met. There is thus an urgent need across the sectors to prioritize which needs are to be addressed with the available resources, and where necessary to mobilize additional capacity and funds.

The approach recommended is intended to be relatively light bearing in mind the heavy demands on individuals' time and energy. Due recognition needs to be given however to the complexity of the issues and the difficulties of agreeing on how the efforts of largely independent actors can be optimised.

Require discussion of project funding proposals within relevant sector working groups before submission to donors

Who: Donors

How: As a first step, sector working groups should be requested to provide an assessment of their capacity to accommodate the requirement. If a compromise has to be made, it should be in the attention sector working groups are expected to give to each proposal. The sector coordinators should then jointly define the criteria against which all projects will be reviewed within each sector. The recommendation does not require that projects be *approved* by sector working groups. Donors should, however, require that agencies and organisations include in their proposals an explanation of any reservations expressed within the relevant sector working groups. Donors should require an explanation from UN agencies, IOs or NGOs that decline to submit proposals to relevant sector working groups. All humanitarian agencies and organisations should, of course, be informed of the requirement and review criteria well in advance. Donors should provide additional support to sector coordinators if they reasonably require it, to ensure that they have the capacity to adequately and efficiently assess proposals.

When: Requirement should be effective 1 September 2005, the commencement of the final 120 day planning period for 2005.

Why: Some proposed activities and projects do not support stated common objectives, and may even be perceived by some to undermine them. Worse still, others are neither well conceived nor technically sound. It is critical to ensure that proposed activities are relevant, well planned and support common objectives. If they do not, they must be questioned. Some of the larger donors will support this approach and others may follow suit. The donors have a corresponding responsibility to ensure that the sector working groups have the capacity to adequately and efficiently assess proposals. The requirements must not create a bottleneck.

Conduct inter-agency monitoring and analysis of health outcomes as an indicator of the impact of humanitarian action to inform planning, prioritisation and remedial action

Who: WHO, UNICEF, WFP and other interested UN agencies and NGOs.

How: Agree on a method or framework for measuring the probable relative contribution to health outcomes (morbidity, malnutrition and mortality) of food aid, targeted nutritional interventions, clean water, sanitation, hygiene promotion, primary health care and shelter. (WHO, UNICEF, WFP.) Conduct regular joint monitoring and analysis and disseminate findings. (WHO, UNICEF and WFP as core group.)

When: Commence by 1 September 2005.

Why: It is well known that general food distributions, nutritional interventions, clean water, sanitation, hygiene promotion, primary health care and shelter all contribute to health outcomes, as reflected in morbidity, malnutrition and mortality levels. Yet, there remains a lack of clear knowledge about the relative contribution of different interventions, and the consequences of gaps, in different settings across the Darfurs. Lacking information and analysis, actors make assumptions that may not be entirely accurate, which can lead to one agency blaming another for shortfalls in its intervention. WFP, UNICEF and WHO all have relevant expertise to contribute to the measurement of health outcomes, e.g. all three now have nutritionists. The actual measurements, such as surveys, need not necessarily be conducted in unison and lead roles can be agreed. Protocols for the collection of information, including location and timing, do however need to be agreed across UN agencies and NGOs. The emphasis of the recommendation is on *jointly* analyzing the information collected, and disseminating findings to inform planning, prioritization and remedial action.

FIELD PRESENCE

Establish more UN satellite offices to facilitate human rights protection and sectoral coordination

Who: UN Human Rights, OCHA, UN agencies with a sector lead.

How:

- a) Establish a minimum two to three satellite human rights offices in each of the four operational areas in the Darfurs. (UN Human Rights)
- b) Establish satellite UN offices where reasonably required for the purposes of sector coordination or to fulfil protection responsibilities. (OCHA, agencies conducting sector coordination and / or protection)

- c) Place more emphasis on and better advise staff on supporting and protecting NGO cooperating partners at the field level. (All UN agencies)
- d) Involve UNMIS, UNDSS and the African Union in identifying and addressing constraints and opportunities for the deployment of satellite UN offices.
- e) Identify obstacles occurring at HQ, including bureaucratic and administrative problems, and find ways to overcome them.
- f) Identify obstacles to funding where these exist and encourage donors to realise the value in a greater field presence.

When: An ongoing priority.

Why: Limited progress has been made by some agencies in deepening field presence, leaving room for further improvements. For example, UNHCR and UNICEF had just one staff member each for the Zallingi corridor by June 2005, which limits the assistance provided to NGOs. Sector and protection leads cannot lead if they do not have an effective presence. The calibre of staff is also an important factor, as well as their proclivity to be supportive and protective of NGOs.

Further, without sufficient field presence, the UN cannot act as a buffer between the authorities and NGOs when issues arise that leave the latter vulnerable. The importance of this has been most pronounced in relation to the referral and reporting of rape cases, which continue to present considerable risks for NGO camp coordinators. For their part, NGOs must recognize the expertise and coverage that the UN can provide, and be willing to take advantage of this. A number of NGOs commented that extending OCHA's presence would encourage more NGOs to move further out. Accordingly, it is suggested that OCHA aim to have two to three satellite offices in each operational area (e.g. Kutum and Kabkabiya in North Darfur, Al Deain, Kass and Menawashei in South Darfur, and additional locations to be identified in West Darfur).

With regard to human rights monitoring specifically, it is now being recognised globally that a greater human rights field presence is required in crises such as Darfur to provide the timely information required by the UN system.⁵⁵ The team believes it also requires a more proactive, field-based approach to monitoring. To date, UN Human Rights has adopted a roving approach to information collection, but UN agencies and NGOs informed the evaluation team that they are seeing a different person each time. This is not conducive to establishing a channel of communication or trust.

UN Human Rights will have as many as 40 Human Rights Officers in the Darfurs, giving it the ability to staff at least 10 satellite offices. The priority should be to establish a presence in locations where there have been a high number of reports of human rights violations or where there are other identifiable risk factors.

⁵⁵ See In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all, Report of the Secretary-General, 21 March 2005, p 37

STRENGTHENING PROTECTION

Define and delineate general roles and responsibilities for human rights protection activities in Darfur

Who: SRSG, DRSGs and the UNMIS Human Rights and Protection Units in consultation with OHCHR, the UNCT, ICRC, Protection Working Groups, NGOs and the AU.

How: Establish a human rights protection operating framework that delineates roles and responsibilities between all human rights and humanitarian agencies/actors and that specifies clear channels of communication and information flow between them, including between the UNMIS Human Rights Unit, the UNMIS Protection Unit, Rule of Law activities, operational UN agencies, IOs and NGOs. The Senior IDP Adviser and the Directors of the UNMIS Human Rights and Protection Units should collaborate in developing this framework in close consultation with the UNCT, ICRC and NGOs. The following four points relate to the complementary roles and responsibilities of human rights and humanitarian protection actors:

- a) Delineate the roles and responsibilities of human rights and humanitarian protection actors including the UNMIS Human Rights and Protection Units and Rule of Law activities.
- b) Adopt a more proactive stance in finding and investigating human rights abuses and provide more pattern and trend analysis for the benefit of the mission and humanitarian actors. (UNMIS Human Rights Unit, Human Rights Officers.)
- c) Develop a clear division of labour between agencies involved in protection work (whether as “human rights” or “humanitarian protection”) and develop clear and realistic terms of reference (TOR) for the KPSG and the Darfur PWGs. Base the TOR on a sound understanding of the international and regional legal framework applicable in Darfur.
- d) Allocate mitigation, remedial and prevention activities to the Protection Working Groups and KPSG/UNMIS Protection Unit. Strengthen these activities by ensuring that they are adequately resourced and otherwise supported, including through advocacy with national and local authorities. (SRSG, donors, OCHA, UNMIS Protection Unit, African Union, OCHA, operational UN humanitarian agencies, NGOs)
- e) Revitalise the Darfur capital-level Protection Working Groups by organising one-off seminars, protection-oriented strategy sessions or outside guest speakers of high calibre.

When: Primary tasks for the Directors of the respective UN Units and the Senior IDP Adviser on appointment.

Why: The UN strategy for Darfur in 2005 specifies a shift to a more strategic focus in four areas, the first of which is, “Strengthening the human rights and humanitarian protection framework.” This recommendation and others that follow address roles and responsibilities that need to be determined to be able to realise this strategy.

Currently, there is a division between ‘human rights’ and ‘protection’ in the integrated mission. The team believes that this reflects a false dichotomy, whereby human rights work is taken to be solely the case-by-case investigation of reported violations of an egregious nature, while humanitarian protection is concerned with issues of access to vulnerable groups; routine denial of access to health care and other social services; and widespread, systematic discrimination and/or relocation by deception. The team is aware that this is a controversial and contested issue, and will address it further in its final report. Meanwhile, the team adopts the definition of human rights protection described by the High Commissioner for Human Rights.⁵⁶

Human rights protection is not a specific tool or approach, but rather refers to a desired outcome – where rights are acknowledged, respected and fulfilled by those under a duty to do so, and as a result of which dignity and freedom is enhanced. Human rights protection results when, through specific actions, individuals who otherwise would be at risk or subject to deprivation of their rights, are able to fully exercise them. It is based on international law... Protection understood in terms of concrete outcomes for individuals ensures that... work... is targeted at achieving real impact.

Define areas of responsibility and accountability for protection of IDPs

Who: HC/UNCT with assistance of Senior IDP advisor, UNMIS Human Rights and Protection Units and relevant NGOs.

How:

- a) First, conduct a full and frank review of the current arrangements in all Darfur states for the protection of IDPs. Identify which capacities are needed and which are available within respective organisations for meeting this need. Pay particular attention to camp/area coordinators’ needs for guidance and timely assistance regarding protection issues.
- b) Identify and coordinate a cadre of protection officers from UN agencies and NGOs. At this stage, this will consist of people recruited by agencies and NGOs carrying a ‘protection’ portfolio of responsibilities, of varying experience, expertise and seniority.⁵⁷.
- c) In West Darfur clarify the various roles of UNMIS Human Rights, UNHCR, OCHA and NGO camp coordinators.
- d) Include modalities for engaging the African Union military and civilian police components.

Why: As long as the parties to the armed conflict continue to commit violations and abuses of human rights, the major and underlying challenge will be to engage the Government and the SLA/JEM/NMRD in practical, as well as theoretical, terms to protect IDPs. Meanwhile, the international community must continue its attempts to ensure protection. To date, the collaborative approach to IDP protection has relied too

⁵⁶ OHCHR Plan of Action, Protection and Empowerment, May 2005

⁵⁷ The OHCHR and OCHA are developing complementary ‘rapid response capacities’ for the longer term. This issue will be addressed in the team’s final Lessons Learned Report.’

heavily on NGOs, IOM and OCHA. From mid-2004, OCHA understandably filled the vacuum and requested NGOs willing to be camp coordinators to assume protection responsibilities. But this was conceived of as a stop gap measure. The responsibilities expected of NGO camp coordinators have necessarily been lowered since the first agreements were signed with OCHA in 2004.⁵⁸ This in part recognized that any action by camp coordinators related to violence against IDPs put them in jeopardy with the authorities. The fact remains, however, that if camp (and now area) coordinators are to be asked to continue to play a vital role in IDP protection, they need stronger UN support. In West Darfur, UNHCR has the formal lead responsibility for IDP protection in general and, as a corollary to this responsibility, is expected to soon assume overall IDP camp coordination, in collaboration with OCHA, which has executed agreements with the NGOs concerned. Particularly, UNHCR intends to assume responsibility for interventions with the authorities on protection-related matters. There is, however, no such solution for the gap in protection in general, in either North or South Darfur. Although IOM now co-chairs meetings with agency focal point for camp coordination, strong overall support for camp/area coordinators is lacking. OCHA continues to play a vital role in the interim, providing leadership, support and guidance as best as it can with available personnel, and liaising with the authorities in Khartoum for support. OCHA cannot, however, be expected to be the primary UN protection agency in North and South Darfur. IOM is formally tasked “to provide an operational capacity to address assistance and protection gaps with available resources” in North and South Darfur, under the policy guidance and overall coordination of OCHA.⁵⁹ This includes providing “a stand-by capacity for addressing gaps in IDP protection.” In reality, IOM is not playing this role and no one appears to expect it to do so. This remains an unresolved conundrum.

The Protection Working Groups and those UN agencies with a protection mandate have a role to play here in helping partners to be competent actors and in coordinating protection-based work, whether this is done as cooperating partners of UN agencies (on a contractual basis) or as colleagues in parallel.

The African Union military and civilian police components now play a greater role in the protection of IDPs, such as undertaking patrols in areas where women are known to collect firewood. Even more support is anticipated as both components come up to strength. However, no formal arrangement or protocol appears to exist for involving the African Union in protection arrangements. The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) *Camp Management Toolkit* provides more detailed guidance that may serve as a starting point for discussion.

⁵⁸ The original responsibilities of NGO camp coordinators were as follows: “...take measures in line with agreed guidelines to improve steps to avoid that the camp population is not physically or sexually abused, tortured, abducted or recruited for military service. The camp coordinating agency, supported by OCHA and other partners, should promote and advocate for enhanced protection and security for IDPs.”

⁵⁹ Terms of Reference for the Joint Support to IDP Camp Coordination in North and South Darfur, OCHA/IOM

Address the weaknesses in current arrangements for return, reintegration, resettlement and relocation

Who: HC, UNHCR, IOM, OCHA, ERC, IASC, donors.

How:

- a) First, conduct a full and frank review of the adequacy of current arrangements, both in practice and in theory, with particular regard to issues of effectiveness and efficiency, as well as compliance with international law and standards. Use existing review mechanisms for this if available. (HC's office, OCHA, UNHCR, IOM)
- b) Utilise the work done and standards developed, where appropriate, for North-South movement to apply a Sudan wide relocation, return and reintegration policy to the Darfurs. (UNMIS Relocation, Return and Reintegration Unit once operational.)
- c) In the interim, UNHCR, IOM and OCHA should articulate a Darfur wide policy and a timebound costed plan for dealing consistently and effectively with IDP relocation and return, which should ultimately be presented to donors as a package. It should be realistic about the respective capacities of each agency and be developed in consultation with all humanitarian actors and the UNMIS Human Rights Unit.
- d) Include arrangements in the policy and plan for collaboration with the African Union military and CivPol components, including on the lines of communication and modalities for coordinated activities, e.g. in relation to the placement of AU police stations. (UNHCR, IOM, OCHA, AU)
- e) Monitor progress in developing the policy and plan, and support implementation efforts in the Darfurs (ERC, IASC, donors, NGOs)
- f) Ensure that return to places or areas of origin or resettlement are de-linked from issues of compensation for violations committed during the armed conflict.

When: Review immediately. Policy and plan to be in place by mid-September 2005. Monitoring to be continuous.

Why: There has been significant and sustained progress in the development of a common approach to returns and reintegration across the Darfurs. Collaboration between UNHCR and IOM has greatly improved. The evidence of a common approach, as mentioned above, is in the 120-day plan. With the exception of the 10 villages selected in consultation with the government as pilot projects for return in West Darfur, the 120-day plan for May-August 2005 provides for the same activities across the Darfurs. These include: conducting field assessment and profile missions to areas of origin; profiling areas of return and potential return; verifying spontaneous returns and any movements that contravene the LoU/MoU; and coordinating interagency assistance and/or protection interventions to sustain returns. This appears to reflect a determination to establish a common durable solutions framework, regardless of the comparative narrowness of the MoU between IOM, the Government and the UN.

Nevertheless the fact that different agencies are responsible for returns in North and South Darfur (IOM) and in West Darfur (UNHCR) has added complexity and an overall

policy and plan would ensure a common approach across state borders. Moreover it has to be recognised that IOM and UNHCR have different capacities particularly in terms of training and experience, which makes a full and equal partnership difficult. The team encourages IOM to review its field capacity and expertise, in consultation with other actors, and take remedial action where necessary to gain the confidence of the humanitarian community. This is not to suggest that IOM alone has weaknesses to address.

A common approach and strong collaboration is critical, not least so as not to give the Government a wedge to drive between any agency or arrangement. A policy and plan will not solve all problems but it will present an opportunity to formally detail the collaboration between the parties across Darfur state boundaries. It should include arrangements for sharing expertise and resources. Any lessons learned from the North / South arrangements should be applied to the Darfur context.

UNHCR, IOM and OCHA all have limited capacity and resources and risk being overwhelmed in the event of a substantial returns movement, voluntary or otherwise. Additional resources, including high calibre staff, are needed to: 1) keep pace with the increasing number of returns taking place outside agreed mechanisms; 2) assess areas of return proposed by the authorities; and 3) pursue opportunities as they may arise for durable solutions. The policy and plan should include an overall funding proposal, which should be presented to the donors as a package, not as disjointed elements. UNHCR may prefer to deal separately with donors to first secure its operations in West Darfur, but there should not be, in effect, a competition for funds to do the same thing on different sides of Darfur state boundaries. The imperative to search for durable solutions and support voluntary returns -- planned or spontaneous -- is no less compelling in North and South Darfur than in West Darfur. Moreover, donors are likely to be encouraged by a combined approach and the indication of clearer, stronger collaboration on the ground; and likely to be discouraged by piecemeal proposals.

The evaluation team considered returning to its original recommendation that UNHCR be asked to assume responsibility, in cooperation with other UN agencies, for the protection and voluntary return of IDPs in North and South Darfur, in addition to West Darfur. However, it decided not to do so because IOM and OCHA have both since invested considerably in arrangements for North and South Darfur. Further, UNHCR continues to be disinclined to accept this responsibility and still possesses limited capacity to do so. Some, including donors, may nevertheless remain unconvinced that the present approach will ultimately prove effective, particularly in the event that there are substantial returns, voluntary or otherwise. Thus the reference to the need for the ERC and the IASC to monitor developments and ensure that the collaborative approach works.

The compensation and restitution mechanism has the potential to be used to encourage returns to areas of origin that would not otherwise take place. It is imperative that this mechanism is de-linked from the issue of return, in order not to create the de facto semblance that financial incentives are being offered for return, contrary to the durable solutions paradigm or the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.

Review the efficiency and appropriateness of current IDP registration procedures so as to apply the lessons to future registrations and verifications in Darfur

Who: HC, WFP, OCHA, IOM

How: Review the current procedures, asking the following questions:

- a) Objectives – What are the objectives of the registration as currently conceived beyond obtaining an accurate IDP count? Could the additional objectives reflected in some of the questions on the form be met by different means, e.g. a sample survey de-linked from the headcount?
- b) Timeliness and efficiency – Has the current procedure proved time efficient? How could it be made efficient enough to be repeated periodically?
- c) Cost-effectiveness – Is the result worth the investment? Is it worth an ongoing investment, particularly in the event of the likely need to re-register substantial numbers at some point in the medium term?
- d) Utility – Is registration ‘inclusion error’ satisfactorily reflected in duplicate entries in the IOM database? If it is, is it feasible to eliminate duplication by asking partners to issue only one card in the case of duplicate entries?
- e) Acceptability – Are all concerned, including the IDPs themselves, willing to continue to conduct registrations in this way, particularly if and when it becomes necessary to re-register many of the same IDPs, e.g. in the event of mass movement?
- f) Appropriateness – Is the current procedure compliant with best practice and good standards, particularly regarding children’s rights and gender.

When: Immediately.

Why: The IOM/WFP/cooperating partner registration was misconceived from the start in so far as it was tied to a questionnaire designed to collect extensive information about people’s origins for the primary purpose of establishing a database that could be used for returns.

Apart from the additional time and complexity, the depth of questioning about family and origin made many IDPs apprehensive about its purpose and some believe it presages involuntary return. This was clear from the very first exercise conducted in Al Geneina in September 2004. Moreover, the questioning provided corrupt leaders with a rationale for agitating against registration. Registration in a difficult exercise under the best circumstances; the questionnaire used in Darfur unnecessarily made it worse.

In February, the evaluation team recommended that the registration not proceed as planned. It did and it ran into problems, overrunning its timeline (it commenced in early March and was to take 60 days). In large part, the delay relates to the refusal of some sheiks to participate because their populations are inflated and they benefit. But it also relates to the questions asked. Some of the most difficult sites had still not been registered at the end of June, including some of the large IDP camps. In some cases, a head count was substituted, or questions removed so as to proceed.

Temporary registration cards are issued upon registration. Final registration cards will not be issued until all IDPs in each state have been registered *and* the data has been entered by WFP’s cooperating partners and processed by IOM. This seemed likely to take three

months judging from the time it was taking to enter the data at the end of June (one NGO quoted a rate of 100 household entries per data entry clerk per day).

In addition to obtaining returns related information, the underlying rationale of asking so many questions about families, village of origin, sheik, etc is to detect duplication. This approach may also prove to be flawed. In any event, if there appears to be, say, a 10 percent duplication, there will be roughly a quarter of a million final registration cards to withhold. Which INGO cooperating partner is going to want to deal with all the arguments and questions that would spring from that?

Establish a unified monitoring, reporting and response system for human rights violations and abuse, ideally for Sudan as a whole but in the first instance for Darfur.

Who: SRSG, DRSGs and the UNMIS Human Rights and Protection Units in consultation with OHCHR, the UNCT, ICRC, the KPSG, Protection Working Groups, NGOs and the AU.

How:

- a) Henceforth report all violations and abuses of human rights (whether or not yet verified) to UNMIS Human Rights Officers (HROs) at the state level.
- b) Identify a 'triage' means of identifying information relating to issues of the protection of human rights, including those that are not immediately verifiable or deemed suitable for case-work investigation; separate the information that can be further investigated on an individual or group basis from broader trends or allegations. (UNMIS Human Rights Unit)
- c) Analyse trends and patterns, respecting confidentiality and the need to protect victims, for use in reporting to appropriate channels⁶⁰ as well as to inform programming (whether human rights, rule of law or humanitarian). (UNMIS Human Rights Unit)
- d) UNMIS Human Rights Officers to share information with humanitarian actors for the purposes of humanitarian protection (mitigation, remedial and prevention activities) work and other programming. Develop guidelines to ensure that confidential information is not disclosed. (UNMIS Human Rights Unit working with the Protection Unit.)
- e) Establish a protocol for information sharing and cooperation with UNICEF and UNMIS Child Protection regarding violations of children's rights. (see below)
- f) Consider the transfer of the protection database currently maintained by OCHA for the Khartoum Protection Steering Group (KPSG) to the UN Human Rights Unit from the commencement of 2006, including information concerning alleged or suspected violations and abuses of human rights.
- g) Specify clear channels of communication and information flow between the UNMIS Human Rights and Protection Units.

⁶⁰ Such as the mandate holders of the Special Procedures of the Commission on Human Rights, the SRSG for the S-G's reports to the Security Council and General Assembly.

When: Start immediately, but pace implementation to the capacity of the UNMIS Human Rights and Protection Units. Step (f) above to be considered in the last quarter of 2005.

Why: Human rights and humanitarian actors have overlapping human rights violation and abuse information needs, the former in the main for investigation and analysis of trends and the latter for humanitarian protection and general programming, etc). This information needs to be collected and utilised in a rational and appropriate way. In this regard the evaluation team believes that the pressing task is to determine roles and responsibilities in relation to reporting and information management, and believes that it is logical to expect the UN's dedicated human rights mechanism, whether as OHCHR or as a Human Rights Unit in an integrated mission, to take primary responsibility, after national government, for the monitoring, investigating and reporting of human rights violations and abuse. As a corollary, the team believes it is logical to expect UNMIS Human Rights to be the custodian of information related to human rights violations (including unverified information).

There are presently several sets of information held by the UN and its partners, including information collected by UNHCR and others, but the focus here is the logic of removing the overlap between the databases established by OHCHR/UNMIS Human Rights on the one hand and OCHA/HIC for the Khartoum Protection Steering Group (KPSG) on the other. The latter, known as the 'protection' database, relates to (unverified) human rights violations. Notwithstanding the pragmatic reasons for the development of this arrangement, it would be more appropriate for information of this nature to be held by UNMIS Human Rights. The opportunity exists to make the transfer and the team intended to recommend that the protection database be transferred to the UNMIS HRU with immediate effect. The team has been convinced however by the feedback received to allow those concerned in the field some months to consider it further.

As mentioned earlier, the HRU appears to be almost exclusively concerned with case-work and investigation of individual cases of violations, rather than the monitoring and reporting of trends covering the whole spectrum of human rights issues. This is not consistent with the Secretary-General's vision of how human rights units in integrated missions should function. Nor is it consistent with the *OHCHR Plan of Action – Protection and Empowerment*, which refers to the necessary role of the OHCHR in all spheres of human rights protection and does not restrict OHCHR's approach at the country level to case-work monitoring and investigation.

The team believes that these distinctions and the institutional divisions they reflect are hindering an effective response -- chiefly by robbing all parties of reliable and comprehensive analysis due to a lack of a central clearinghouse for human rights related reports, and continuing confusion over to whom to report such abuses. If this division is allowed to persist, the response will continue to suffer from a fractured and incomplete understanding of the human rights environment as a whole, which will affect both current programming and future efforts at prosecution.

The evaluation team understands that all UN agencies have a standing responsibility to provide information about violations of human rights to the Resident Coordinator. It should be clarified that in the context of the integrated mission the responsibility should be discharged by providing the information to the UNMIS Human Rights Unit.

For the existing 'protection' database the recommendation is that consideration be given to transferring it to the custody of the HRU from the commencement of 2006. This can be considered in the last quarter of 2005 by which time the Director of UNMIS HR and the Senior IDP Adviser will have established themselves and the PWGs and KPSG should have become more viable and relevant. It will be important to utilise the considerable time and resources that have been spent on the design of the protection database currently maintained by OCHA for the KPSG and PWGs as a basis for the storage of data and from which analysis can be made to inform programming as well as investigations. This lead time would also give the UNMIS Human Rights and Protection Units, the KPSG and the PWGs time to consider whether it is feasible to maintain two systems of information, or if they should be combined (with appropriate mechanisms for protecting confidentiality and the need for greater investigative access in some cases).

The team recognizes that, particularly in the Darfur context, some humanitarian actors may be reluctant to provide information to UNMIS Human Rights if the database is transferred. Humanitarians must continually negotiate access to vulnerable populations and may be subject to harassment and victimisation for speaking out on human rights issues. It is already apparent that the current protection database is underutilised, in part due to fears that the information might not be used for solely humanitarian purposes, but that it could be exploited, resulting in grave repercussions. These fears will have to be overcome. The team believes that this is possible, provided there is strong and capable support and advice from the Human Rights Unit, the Director of UNMIS Protection and the Senior IDP Adviser regarding the use of information.

The UNMIS Protection Unit has a pivotal role to play in facilitating and supporting 'humanitarian protection' i.e. mitigation, remedial and prevention activities undertaken by humanitarian actors. Effective support for these efforts is essential to the work of many agencies, particularly those less experienced in protection activities, including some NGOs and UN agencies for whom protection is a relatively new area. Guidance, training and mentoring should be included in the role of the Khartoum-based Unit, as should oversight of and support to the functioning of the field-level protection working groups. Further support can be provided by appropriate high level advocacy at Khartoum and also at the Geneva and New York levels.

The African Union, particularly CivPol, are well-placed to discover human rights issues and to work with the Human Rights and Protection Units to ensure that this information is shared appropriately. The OHCHR has a Memorandum of Understanding with the DPKO regarding the operation of human rights units within integrated missions; it is recommended that a parallel agreement be reached between the OHCHR and the AU where areas of shared concerns may be identified and collaborative working methods developed.

Support and ensure the implementation of the 11 Recommendations to the Government of Sudan on SGBV prepared by the UNMIS Human Rights Unit

Who: SRSB, HC, all agencies as referred to below.

How:

- a) Conduct a sustained and high level advocacy campaign at Khartoum and HQ levels to ensure that victims are protected from further abuse and are able to access needed health care without discrimination (SRSB, HC, High

Commissioner for Human Rights, SRSG for Children and Armed Conflict, UNIFEM, WHO, UNFPA, Secretary General's Special Adviser on Gender Issues). Utilise the 11 Recommendations to the Government of Sudan prepared by the UNMIS Human Rights Unit as a basis for advocacy.⁶¹

- b) Using the results of a study by Ahfad Women's University⁶² as they become available, collate existing qualitative and quantitative information about rape into a report for wide dissemination, ensuring that the report does not compromise the safety of individuals or organisations. (KPSG and the UNMIS Human Rights and Protection Units in consultation with UNFPA, the UNICEF Country Office, UNHCR, and relevant NGOs.)
- c) WHO to provide support and guidance to medical NGOs regarding the clinical management and psycho-social care of rape victims and to use its relationship with the Government of Sudan to ensure women's and girl's right to health care.
- d) UNMIS HRU, UNDP Rule of Law Project and UNIFEM to continue to provide support and guidance to national human rights organisations regarding advocacy and necessary measures for change.
- e) UNICEF's programme of support on psycho-social aspects of SGBV to be replicated across all Darfur states and repeated to take staff turnover into account.
- f) Ensure that the (S)GBV coordinating groups in Khartoum and Darfur are led and chaired by agencies with experience in this issue.

When: Starting immediately. Thereafter, repeated, opportunistic advocacy and continuous support to medical NGOs. 'Form 8'⁶³ issues resolved by end of September 2005. Those agencies that are not at all or insufficiently engaged with this issue indicate their commitment and plan for involvement. Monitored by the SRSG throughout the rest of 2005.

Information collection and report writing to commence immediately.

Why: Reports of rape around IDP camps indicate that it is widespread and systematic, thus meeting the criteria for constituting a crime against humanity. Rape can also constitute torture under international criminal law, and is contrary to international and regional human rights⁶⁴ and international humanitarian law. Since February, little progress has been made on this issue. The government continues to deny both the scale and the extent of the problem. Women and girls are now under greater pressure to report rape to police, while police are, if anything, less sympathetic than ever. Victims who do report are prosecuted or threatened with prosecution for adultery, while NGOs who assist them may be harassed and can have their operations obstructed.

It is of course important to remember that the primary and ultimate responsibility for the protection of women and girls in Darfur lies with the Government, hence the emphasis on the UNMIS recommendations. As with other human rights issues, however, there is a

⁶¹ See Annexure

⁶² Supported by UNIFEM

⁶³ This concerns access to health care for victims of serious crimes. In short, these victims are obliged to report the violence to the police before they can access health care.

⁶⁴ Including the Convention on the Rights of the Child for victims under 18 years.

legitimate expectation on the international community to exert every effort to use its capacities to promote the protection of women and girls from rape.

While there has been some collaboration across the UN and with NGOs and the ICRC, UNFPA -- despite its lack of experience in conflict-related sexual violence -- has taken on the role of lead agency for the response to SGBV as a reproductive health and rights issue. UNICEF has taken responsibility for the psycho-social dimensions and medical NGOs are providing what support they can in terms of clinical management with some assistance from UNFPA. WHO has a close relationship with the Ministry of Health. Rather than facilitating advocacy on this issue, this relationship may be compromising WHO's readiness to take the lead that may be expected of it on the 'Form 8' issue, which involves the right to health.

Although there have been visits and recommendatory reports on addressing SGBV, neither OHCHR, UNIFEM nor UNFPA at Headquarters' level have taken a lead role on advocacy for this issue.

The UNMIS Human Rights Unit is playing a strong role and working collaboratively with others to negotiate these issues with the government. In this regard, the evaluation team welcomes and supports the 11 Recommendations described above. UNIFEM's efforts in supporting Sudanese women to raise this issue – including with the AU and donors – is also welcomed, but the responsibility should not be placed on women's shoulders alone. An energetic and sustained response by all actors is needed to ensure that this issue continues to be a priority for the humanitarian and human rights communities and for the Government. Some initiatives have proved effective in reducing the incidence of rape, but there is an enduring level of acceptance by the international community of claims by the Government that the issue is 'sensitive,' exaggerated or somehow the fault of victims for not reporting to police. The UNDP / IRC Rule of Law project is training some police officers on this issue, but the police are as a whole still lacking in effective and appropriate responses to victims.

The AU Civilian Police has a key role to play in this regard, by providing mentoring and support to national police in order to ensure that women and girls will be treated with respect and courtesy; and that every report of rape is taken seriously and treated as a crime. There is an urgent need for increased AU Civilian Police – particularly with expertise and experience in dealing with SGBV, not least as a measure of compliance with UNSC Resolution 1325 described in recommendation 19 below.

The AU, donors and others could give consideration to the establishment of a dedicated SGBV Unit, to serve as a repository of information and expertise on this issue with specially-trained male and female police officers, as well as to provide a supplementary service to victims who report to national police stations.

Promote a zero tolerance approach to sexual exploitation and abuse by staff working for international agencies and organisations

Who: SRSR, UN agencies, NGOs, donors, Office of Human Rights Management (UN HQ), Secretary-General's Special Adviser on Gender Issues, IASC.

How:

- a) Provide urgent guidance to assist Darfur state level agency managers (UN and NGO) to develop systems to create and maintain an environment that prevents sexual exploitation and abuse (HC/UNCT/NGOs)

- b) Request an advisory visit to the Darfurs by the UNMIS Personnel Conduct Officer (HC)
- c) Consider creating a network of focal points within each agency on sexual abuse and exploitation (UNCT)
- d) Develop a plan of action for combating sexual abuse and exploitation (HC, Personnel Conduct Officer – UNMIS, UNCT)
- e) Determine what proportion of humanitarian personnel and consultants have signed Codes of Conduct incorporating the IASC Task Force’s Six Core Principles of a Code of Conduct, or the Secretary-General’s Bulletin on special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and abuse (ST/SGB/2003/13); take remedial action to ensure signature before arrival in future or in country for those present who have not. (Office of Human Rights Management, UN HQ; SRSR for the UN in Sudan; OCHA at field level.)
- f) Donors to ensure that grantee organisations and agencies are compliant with the Secretary-General’s Bulletin on special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and abuse.
- g) Ensure that the Secretary-General’s Bulletin in toto, the Six Core Principles and other relevant materials are posted on the HIC and UNMIS web-sites (HIC, UNMIS)
- h) Create a global, mandatory, basic training module akin to the Basic Security Training CD Rom for all staff and consultants of the UN (ERC, IASC). Encourage NGOs and donors to follow this example.⁶⁵

When: Ensure guidance to assist state level agency managers and the signing of the Secretary-General’s Bulletin by all staff and consultants in the Darfurs as matter of urgency. The ERC and IASC to consider the proposed CD Rom in its next consultations on this evaluation. Plan of action to be developed over next 120 days.

Benchmark: Issue to be followed up in the planned visit of the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on Gender Issues later in 2005.

Why: Events elsewhere in Africa and Asia have highlighted the urgent and important need to be vigilant about the behaviour of UN personnel and that of their implementing partners. The Secretary-General has consistently promoted a ‘zero tolerance’ approach to sexual exploitation and abuse by personnel in peace support and humanitarian operations. In 2003, the Secretary-General issued a bulletin on special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and abuse which incorporated the IASC Task Force’s Six Core Principles of a Code of Conduct and which outlined basic rules and standards for the behaviour of individuals, work with partner organisations and the creation of an environment where sexual abuse and exploitation is not treated with impunity. The Bulletin provides *inter alia* that: “United Nations staff are obliged to create and maintain an environment that prevents sexual exploitation or sexual abuse. Managers at all levels have a particular responsibility to support and develop systems that maintain this environment.” Guidelines for the Conduct of UN Personnel in Sudan, signed by the

⁶⁵ DPKO is undertaking such a measure for staff in some locations. The recommendation here, however, is that it is completed by all staff in all spheres of the UN’s work.

SRSRG, were distributed in June 2005. These reinforce the Secretary-General's Bulletin and provide *inter alia* that: "Supervisors will be held responsible for lack of proper oversight to prevent prohibited conduct by subordinates." Managers will require guidance to develop systems to create and maintain an environment that prevents sexual exploitation and abuse and supervisors will require guidance to appropriately oversee subordinates.

In February, the evaluation team recommended that agencies ensure that all employees and consultants have signed the IASC Code of Conduct on sexual exploitation and abuse. It is unclear if any action was taken, but the evaluation team found that, although some agencies and organisations have created their own Codes of Conduct which incorporate the Six Core Principles referred to above, a substantial number of UN staff and consultants interviewed either had not signed any such Code of Conduct or the Secretary-General's Bulletin, or could not remember if they had.

While Darfur has not been a locus of complaint regarding behaviour of international staff, the risk is as present in Darfur as it is in other parts of the world. This risk can be minimised by simple actions, including ensuring a) that all staff members are aware of the Secretary-General's Bulletin and recent references to this issue, including in the recent Security Council Resolutions on Darfur, and b) that they have signed a complying Code of Conduct. Where organisations and agencies have more stringent standards of behaviour, these also should be enforced.

The Team is aware that merely signing a Code of Conduct, the Bulletin or any other document is not sufficient to prevent or cease exploitation and abuse, it goes a long way towards creating a culture of "zero tolerance". Moreover, there are some forms of exploitation and abuse (e.g. using prostitutes who are over 18 years) that are less obvious than others (e.g. sexual abuse of children) and measures such as those recommended will help to drill personnel on what is required of them. The development of a comprehensive plan of action should address these concerns.

Donor government representatives are not bound by the Secretary General's Bulletin and most do not integrate the Six Core Principles into contracts with staff or consultants. Some donor governments, however, have voluntarily agreed that their staff and consultants should be bound by these documents. It is recommended, therefore, that all bilateral donors with personnel present in the country consider ensuring that their own staff and consultants are so bound. In line with best practice as identified in the Secretary-General's Report (2004) on the Bulletin, donors should also ensure that they do not provide financial support to agencies or organisations that are not incorporating the core principles into their own staff codes of conduct.

The production of a global, mandatory training module on security has ensured that all UN staff and consultants are aware of the basics of security – both in terms of their own responsibilities and what they can expect from others. It is recommended that a similar, mandatory training tool be produced on the issue of sexual exploitation and abuse with a view to reminding trainees of the limits of acceptable behaviour, removing the excuse of ignorance and creating an environment of zero tolerance on this issue.

Provide clear and unambiguous information regarding the UNSC referral of the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court

Who: SRS (UNMIS), ICC.

How: Liaise with the ICC with a view to inviting a representative to visit Darfur and talk to IDP representatives (including women and young people), government representatives, representatives of host communities and nomadic leaders regarding the process of a referral to the ICC, the ensuing investigation and its basic implications.

When: As a matter of urgency.

Why: The war-affected and other populations in Darfur are aware that preparations are being made to prosecute senior members of the Sudan leadership for crimes against humanity and war crimes. Many people – both in Darfur and Khartoum - welcome this and recognise it as an attempt by the international community to implement the spirit of the ICC by proscribing egregious violations and combating impunity. Without further and better information, however, it is easy for disingenuous or mischievous people to use this level of knowledge to foment unrest amongst both host and displaced populations. For instance, it may be used to make some Arab populations believe them to be ‘demonised’ by the Western States and leaders; and, by implication, the humanitarian community. It is necessary, therefore, to explain to the war affected communities and others that, for instance, this is not an attempt to prosecute the State of Sudan, nor a move by the international community to dislodge certain members of the Government from their seats by undemocratic means. People also need to understand why the international community steps in when there is an apparently functioning judicial system in the country. The team also believes that the people of Sudan have a right to full and transparent information about such a major event pertaining to their country.

The Khartoum Protection Steering Group resolved in late April to develop policy guidance on the relationship between the UN and the ICC, but this has not been forthcoming.⁶⁶

PROGRAMMING

Ensure that protection action plans and strategies reflect relevant international law and standards in order to provide humanitarian actors with a predictable and reliable foundation for advocacy, action and programming

Who: UNMIS Human Rights and Protection Units; KPSG; Protection Working Groups; OCHA, HIC, UNDP, IRC, NRC, senior IDP Advisers, IDD as requested.

How:

- a) Include explicit reference to relevant international and regional laws and standards (including applicable international human rights law, international humanitarian law and UN Security Council resolutions) in the protection action plans and strategies for each of the Darfur states and at Khartoum level. Where possible, adopt the language of these laws and standards.

⁶⁶ Sector Coordination Meeting Minutes, 8th May 2005

- b) Ensure that all agencies have sufficient, knowledgeable staff to provide a foundation of understanding about how to apply international and regional law and standards to humanitarian operations in the Darfur context.
- c) Provide staff of international agencies in Darfur with basic training and information on relevant international and regional⁶⁷ law and standards, and the definition of protection.
- d) Increase familiarity and use of the Guiding Principles (GPs) and its accompanying Handbook by all agencies operating in Darfur, IDP representatives and Government agencies. Scrutinise action plans and strategies (state level PWGs; KPSG)
- e) Provide access to guided reading through the HIC web-site. (UNMIS HRU, PWG members, HIC.)
- f) Use the accompanying Handbook to the GPs for advice on how to operationalise the GPs. Build on existing dissemination and training on GPs by providing on-site mentoring. (Senior IDP Adviser as focal point. Include in all relevant training programmes)

When: Work on action plans and strategies to take place in August-September 2005. Training to take place immediately and to be continuous.

Why: The Secretary-General's 1997 and 2005 reports oblige all agencies and departments of the UN to incorporate international human rights law throughout their work.⁶⁸ Explicit reference to legal instruments and standards makes humanitarian actors better equipped to address protection issues, both in terms of guiding their own work and in dealing with opposition to the principles of protection.

There has been progress in integrating the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement into the work of UN agencies and their implementing partners. Notable examples include references in the MoU between IOM, GoS and the UN and the LoU between UNHCR and the GoS. There is also a gradual but marked increase in understanding across the humanitarian community about the GPs and their application.

There remains a need for greater dissemination of the GPs however and for their utilisation as a foundation for the humanitarian response. Although the GoS is sometimes reluctant to acknowledge the applicability of the GPs, this should not deter agencies from being assertive about them. The importance of the GPs has been stressed in numerous international fora and documents; notably, they are recognised as a "useful tool" in the IGAD Ministerial Declaration (2003) produced at an IGAD meeting in Khartoum chaired by Sudan. The S-G's report (2005) makes specific reference to the dissemination and implementation of the GPs, which reflect international standards that the GoS has largely declared it will respect. Moreover, the 'Policy Package' on internal displacement (September 2004) binds all UN agencies to make efforts to disseminate the GPs.

⁶⁷ E.g. African Charter on Human and People's Rights, African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, 1969 OAU Refugee Convention

⁶⁸ "To advance a vision of larger freedom, the United Nations and its Member States must strengthen the normative framework ..." In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all, Report of the Secretary-General, 21 March 2005, p 34

In order to realise these recommendations, it is imperative that agencies and NGOs send staff members with practical field experience and knowledge about applying international and regional law and standards in a situation such as Darfur. The high staff turnover amongst international organisations means that many of those who have been trained *in situ* have taken their new knowledge elsewhere. While this is positive for the humanitarian community as a whole, it means that training needs to be repeated periodically.

Ensure that all humanitarian programmes are guided by a gender analysis and explicitly work towards the realisation of gender equality and women's human rights in accordance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Beijing Platform for Action, the African Charter on Human and People's Rights and UNSC Resolution 1325 (Women, Peace and Security)

Who: All UN agencies and cooperating partner NGOs; donors.

How:

- a) Scrutinise programmes and plans for adherence to the above documents and, where appropriate, use the language of these documents to guide action plans and strategies. Where agencies find themselves unable to undertake a gender analysis or conduct gender-sensitive programming, they can make use of existing expertise by consulting the UNMIS Senior Gender Adviser, UNIFEM, the Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and appropriate NGOs. Lack of capacity at Khartoum or HQ is not an acceptable excuse for not complying with obligations.
- b) Ensure that project and activity proposals adhere to the above. (Donors)
- c) Build on existing dissemination and training on UNSCR 1325 (2000) by providing on-site mentoring for UN and NGO staff members. Secure appropriate expertise to supplement the existing capacity of the UNCT and donors where necessary. Commission training and/or other inputs on the implementation of UNSCR 1325, in line with that provided to the HQ-based staff of DPA and DPKO. (UNCT, UNMIS)
- d) Build on existing commitments and developments, e.g. WFP's Enhanced Commitments to Women, High Commissioner for Refugee's Five Commitments to Refugee Women.
- e) Support the Gender Theme Group for Darfur, including by ensuring that it is attended by staff of decision-making levels. (SRSG with assistance of Gender Advisor and UNIFEM)

When: By 1 September 2005.

Why: The IASC Policy Statement for the Integration of a Gender Perspective in Humanitarian Assistance⁶⁹ contained commitments to ensure, inter alia, that IASC member organizations formulate specific strategies for ensuring that gender issues are brought into the mainstream. It also identified as priority areas the need to: 1) ensure the participation of women in the planning, designing and monitoring of all aspects of

⁶⁹ Pursuant to ECOSOC agreed conclusion E/1998/L.15 of 16 July 1998 (www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/csw/Mcaskie.htm)

emergency programs; 2) include a gender perspective in the analysis of information; and 3) develop capacity for systematic gender mainstreaming. One of the underlying principles to these commitments was that gender-sensitive humanitarian assistance can help in mitigating the different and negative affects of complex emergencies and natural disasters on men and women.

As in February 2005 however, the team found that systematic attention to gender issues is still lacking within the humanitarian operation; gender issues are still regarded as the ‘icing on the cake’ rather than a fundamental aspect of the response. Moreover, many agencies and coordinators appear to equate ‘gender’ with ‘women’s issues,’ which in turns leads many to think of SGBV, and further to categorize this first and foremost as a reproductive health issue that can be managed by UNFPA.

The team is of the view that a failure to approach the humanitarian response with a gender perspective has led, for instance, to a lack of women’s participation in planning and organising the response; late attention to the specific needs of women (for instance in distribution of sanitary protection as essential items); and problems with the registration process due to sheikhs being the primary interlocutors with the international humanitarian community. The lack of women’s participation and gendered analysis may also have further negative implications for post-conflict peace-building, as women’s leadership and organising structures have largely been ignored during displacement.

Collate and disseminate information regarding children’s current situation and violations of their rights so as to inform programming decisions, advocacy, and legal and political processes

Who: UNICEF (HQ, Regional Office and Country Office), UNMIS Human Rights monitors, and Child Protection Advisers (CPAs); concerned NGOs at Darfur, Khartoum and Headquarters levels (particularly the Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict and the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers⁷⁰).

How:

- a) Ensure that the up-coming report on the situation of children in Darfur is well informed and widely disseminated. (UNICEF Country Office.)
- b) With UNICEF headquarters and concerned INGOs, develop a system for monitoring and reporting on violations of children’s rights in Darfur. (UNICEF, UNMIS CPAs, INGOs),
- c) Ensure that the new Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights Situation in Sudan and other mandate holders of the Special Procedures of the Commission on Human Rights as well as the SRSG – Children and Armed Conflict are provided with adequate and timely information relating to violations children’s rights in Darfur. (UNICEF, UNMIS Human Rights Unit, KPSG.)
- d) Ensure that information about violations of children’s rights is included in the Human Rights / Protection data-base(s) discussed above and is provided to human rights monitors for investigation and case-work.

⁷⁰ Ref: <http://www.watchlist.org/advocacy/policystatements/vacdac.php>

- e) Clarify the respective roles of the UNICEF and UNMIS Child Protection Officers and Advisers, including regarding their respective roles vis a vis the AU in Darfur.
- f) SRSRG – Children and Armed Conflict to use his position to catalyse and effect the dissemination of information regarding children.
- g) Increase geographical coverage of the Darfurs by UNICEF and appropriate NGOs to ensure both the efficient and comprehensive collection of information about children and that it informs programming in all regards, whether or not directed at children.

When: By end September 2005

Why: Too little is known about the impact of the conflict on children in Darfur and their current situation. Large numbers of children have been displaced, many have witnessed extreme violence and this continues today. Yet programming and advocacy are not systematically directed at the protection of children.

Establish a Darfur food security and livelihood monitoring unit or network

Who: WFP, FAO, and NGOs with appropriate skills; OCHA/HIC and, later, UNDP; UNICEF.

How: WFP, FAO and NGOs with relevant expertise, such as SC-UK or ACF, or academic institutions such as Tufts University, should collaborate to go beyond current initiatives and establish a common food security and livelihood monitoring unit or network. It would need to draw on: 1) logistics capacity, to the extent that it would collect primary information; 2) a broad range of participating agencies, assuming that some form of surveillance via sentinel sites across agro-ecological zone would be required; and 3) comprehensive expertise to provide advice on the normal functioning of markets in the Darfurs, the role of livestock (often poorly integrated in food security models) and the pressures created by resource competition and desertification.

Linkages will need to be established with the FMOH/WHO Early Warning and Reporting System (EWARS) and the nutritional surveillance system to be established by UNICEF. The unit or network would need a 'home' agency with the expertise to develop and maintain an accessible web-based database and produce maps. WFP has plans to establish a food security unit and this could be the unit or network's home, at least for the time being. It could later be transferred to FAO or UNDP. The agency hosting the unit or facilitating the network would have to reassure others that it will take an open and consultative approach.

Donors have funded such work elsewhere, in the belief that it enhances understanding and provides a joint framework through which all humanitarian actors can inform their programmes, not just those delivering food.

When: Before the end of 2005

Why: The crisis in Darfur is generally believed to have led to the near total collapse of the rural economy. Long term desertification and relatively dry conditions in 2005 are contributing to the challenges. Mitigating these effects should be a priority, even if only limited activities can be pursued in the margins of ongoing conflict. A knowledge base is

required for this endeavour that covers but goes beyond drought, crop yields and food availability indicators.

The Emergency Food Security and Nutrition Assessment conducted in September 2004 by WFP, FAO and others will be repeated this September. This could provide an opportunity for collaborating agencies to consider this recommendation and the best way of proceeding.

ADVOCACY

Step up public and ‘quiet’ advocacy at the highest levels of the UN and through the diplomatic community on behalf of war-affected women, men and children

Who: High level UN officials outside Sudan including heads of UN humanitarian agencies operational in Darfur; the High Commissioner for Human Rights; the SRSG for Children and Armed Conflict; the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on Gender Issues; UNIFEM; the Secretary-General’s Representative on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons; Mandate-holders of the Special Procedures of the Commission on Human Rights; Ambassadors present in Sudan, particularly donor and Arab states; high profile NGOs.

How:

- a) Develop advocacy strategies for the Mission as a whole (SRSG) and for each major UN entity.
- b) Use reliable information on trends and patterns gathered by UN and NGOs to inform public advocacy.
- c) Use opportunities presented by specific events or developments (e.g. NGOs harassed for speaking out about rape) to make joint and separate press statements and appearances.
- d) Provide leadership and guidance to field-based staff of UN and NGOs regarding opportunities and strategies for advocacy.
- e) Ensure that potential advocates (e.g. mandate holders of the Special Procedures of the Commission on Human Rights) have sufficient information on a timely basis to enable them to make the appropriate approaches.

When: Repeated, opportunistic advocacy. Overall strategy developed by October 2005.

Benchmark: Obvious indications of high level advocacy can be collected by October 2005.

Why: Sudan is a State Party to the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights and other major human rights instruments⁷¹. Nevertheless, human rights violations of all sorts continue to characterise the situation in Darfur. Advocacy for its own sake is not useful. For instance, there may be times when ‘speaking out’ jeopardises programming in the short term, whereas remaining silent threatens to hinder the entire work or ethos of an organisation. The evaluation team is cognisant of

⁷¹ Including the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Additional Protocol and the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child.

these tensions. Advocacy needs to be appropriate, strategic and made on the basis of careful analysis to be effective.

Notwithstanding (or because of) the above, there is an urgent and continuing need for high-level advocacy in relation to the violations committed against civilians in Darfur. And it needs to be better coordinated. Actors do not appear to have the benefit of an advocacy strategy for Darfur.

Those who conduct advocacy at local or Darfur state capital need the support of their own and other organisations to prevent them being isolated and vulnerable to harassment or attack. It is acknowledged that 'speaking out' in Darfur can lead to the ejection of personnel from the country or bans being placed on high level officials. It is argued, however, that the answer to this is more, not less, public advocacy on the issues of major and priority concern to the 'clients' of the humanitarian community.

The UN Secretary-General visited the region recently, but other, high level UN officials - particularly those without programmes in the country and others such as the mandate-holders of the Special Procedures of the Commission on Human Rights and the SRSG on Children and Armed Conflict -- are also well-placed to speak out (jointly and / or separately) on urgent issues as they pertain to their mandates. Silence on these issues contributes to a climate of impunity and passivity in the face of violations and contraventions of agreements and international law.

For the above, a strategy is needed. People who are motivated to carry out advocacy can be reluctant to do so either for a lack of reliable information from the field or because they are not well enough informed about the most appropriate timing, for instance for Opinion Editorials or press statements. As well as an overall strategy, each entity needs its own advocacy strategy (some UNICEF offices for example have these in other countries) to ensure that their own particular areas of concern are covered and that their staff are confident about when and how to conduct advocacy efforts.

Annexure
Recommendations to the Government of Sudan on SGBV from the UNMIS Human Rights Unit:

1. Declare publicly in national media that sexual violence will not be tolerated and perpetrators will be prosecuted;
2. Ensure that local authorities respect the wishes, the rights and the dignity of the victim when making any decision on the most appropriate course of action to prevent or respond to an incident of sexual violence;
3. Ensure that perpetrators are brought to justice and victims compensated;
4. Create a safe and supportive environment for victims to seek and receive medical and legal services;
5. Train police, prosecutors, judicial authorities and medical staff on the treatment of survivors of sexual violence;
6. Recruit female police officers to conduct interviews with female victims of sexual violence;
7. Take all necessary steps, including law reform if required, to end impunity for crimes of sexual violence;
8. Ensure that local police actively investigate all complains of sexual violence, identify witnesses and collect evidence;
9. Take appropriate disciplinary action (e.g. suspension from duties) during investigation and prosecution of any accused members of law enforcement agencies and armed forces;
10. Make appropriate efforts to protect victims and witnesses during the investigation and trial process and any subsequent period when the safety of the victim or witnesses so requires;
11. Punishment of perpetrators and compensation for victims should be in accordance with the gravity of the crime, and international human rights standards.

Terms of Reference

Real-time Evaluation of the Humanitarian Response to the Darfur Crisis

1. Background

1.1 The Darfur crisis is one of the most serious acute humanitarian situations the world is now facing. However, efforts to respond to massive needs in every sector have been hampered, among other challenges, by violence and armed conflict, lack of access, obstruction of aid, delayed funding, low staffing levels and the logistical challenge of providing assistance in an expansive geographic area with limited to no infrastructure. While notable improvements in the response have recently been realized, these ongoing challenges combined with the scope and scale of the disaster have ensured both that many needs remain unmet and that those affected are vulnerable to further abuse.⁷²

1.2 At present, a substantial portion of an estimated 1.2 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and their equally vulnerable host communities do not have access to even a minimum level of humanitarian support and aid. Children and women constitute the majority of the IDPs, and are the most vulnerable to the impact of displacement and conflict-induced poverty, as well as to violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. Shortfalls are greatest in the health and nutrition, water and sanitation and protection sectors, as well as in IDP camp management. As of this writing, nearly 82 percent of IDPs lacked access to sanitation, while some 50 percent have no access to primary health care facilities.

1.3 The situation is in stark comparison to other recent responses in places such as Iraq, Afghanistan and Kosovo where the UN and other organizations have, by comparison, quickly mobilized enough staff and resources to launch major humanitarian operations.

1.4 To that end, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs/Emergency Relief Coordinator (USG/ERC) believes that the UN and other responders to the crisis would benefit from a real-time evaluation aimed at making recommendations that would help strengthen the immediate and future humanitarian response in Darfur and future crises of a similar nature, through lessons learning.

2. Purpose and scope

2.1. To this end, the objectives of the evaluation will be two fold. It will: 1) recommend actions that may be taken to improve the operational response in the real time, (i.e. what is happening now and how can it be improved); and 2) identify broader lessons learned in Darfur for future humanitarian action there and elsewhere (i.e. what has happened in the past and how can it inform future action). In achieving the latter, the evaluation will review the response from January 2003 onwards, and will aim, and

⁷² These include forced returns, sexual violence and restrictions of humanitarian access.

therefore be timed, to inform the ongoing Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP), which encompasses strategic planning for humanitarian action in Sudan.

2.2 In achieving both objectives, the evaluation will look at the timeliness, coherence, coverage, appropriateness, relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of humanitarian assistance and protection provided to the vulnerable population in Darfur. It will focus primarily on the UN response, including the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs' (OCHA) role, but will also take into consideration the influencing factors of the wider response, such as the role of implementing partners and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in responding to the crisis. While it will focus primarily on the Darfur crisis, it will, specifically in looking at systemic challenges, also consider the implications for other humanitarian crises. The evaluation will consider the linkages to events and the humanitarian response in neighboring Chad, but it will not address the particular issues concerning the refugee situation there. Recommendations will be made in particular on possible ways to address issues surrounding early warning and preparedness, surge capacity and the quality of the overall response, specifically in the sectors of food, health and nutrition, water and sanitation, protection and camp management.

2.3 Given the especially acute vulnerability of displaced children and women, the study will pay particular attention to gender issues, as well as to those of children's rights.

2.4 Given the nature of the conflict that has caused forced displacement and the widespread use of breaches of international human rights and humanitarian law, special attention will also be paid to the human rights dimensions of the humanitarian crisis as it impacts on protection assistance.

2.5 To accommodate these complementary objectives, a phased approach will be taken to allow the team to visit Darfur at three different junctures, as elaborated in Section 4.

3. Issues to be addressed

3.1 It is foreseen that the evaluation will consider the following issues. But, as indicated in Section 4, issues may be added or dropped as the evaluation team homes in on the critical trends and emerging issues. Most of the questions below may help guide the evaluation of both the current and past response, although some – for example those pertaining to early warning – are more relevant to particular stages of emergency response. They are thus phrased (in particular in the verb conjugation) to reflect to the greatest extent possible this continuum, without becoming unwieldy.

3.2 Leadership and coordination: What are the factors that have either inhibited or enhanced leadership, coordination and planning in responding to the Darfur crisis?

- To what extent was there sufficient early warning information on the Darfur crisis?
- To what extent was existing early warning information treated as such?
- Were effective contingency plans and preparedness measures, including the prepositioning of stocks and identification of transport routes, developed and implemented as the proportions of the crisis became known? What challenges may have prevented their development and/or implementation?
- Were/are humanitarian response strategies coherent and appropriate? Were/are they gender sensitive?
- To what extent was the consolidate appeals process and its subsequent update an inclusive process? Was there a clear and coherent humanitarian strategy for addressing the crisis? Was the strategy adapted to reflect the changing emergency?
- What role has OCHA and the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) been playing, from the onset of the crisis until present, in ensuring an effective and timely response to the crisis? In specific, have OCHA and the HC been providing vision and leadership; and what has been its impact on the situational analysis, as well as the development and review of humanitarian strategies?
- What role has OCHA and the HC played in using information and analysis from other parts of the UN system or outside organization; and how has this been shared within the UN, in particular with its political bodies?
- How well have existing coordination mechanisms worked, at the headquarters, national and local levels, as well as within sectors, and to what extent were/are they enjoying agency buy-in?
- How appropriate, effective and mutually reinforcing were/are the arrangements at the capital level in Khartoum and at the field sub-office level?
- How well has the UNCT and wider humanitarian community been balancing the humanitarian imperative to act with political pressure resulting from the ongoing peace process?

**3.3 Overall operational response of the UN agencies, OCHA and NGOs:
To what extent did specific and systemic problems play a role in responding to the Darfur crisis?**

- Were/are system and individual agency tools for crisis response – chiefly stand-by arrangements for personnel, supplies and logistics – existing and available to aid in the response? If so, have/are they being effectively utilized?
- Have international humanitarian agencies been able to rapidly mobilize the necessary capacity, including implementing partners, for a large-scale response? How were local capacities, including qualified national staff, being used and how were staffing gaps in general being addressed?
- How has policy coherence or differences within the UN system and wider humanitarian community affected the overall response?
- How has the humanitarian community been addressing the enormous logistical challenges of delivering aid in such an expansive region with little to

no infrastructure, in particular during the rainy season? To what extent were/are existing capacities and arrangements -- such as the UN Joint Logistics Unit and common air support -- meeting the demands?

- What role have access restrictions played in delaying the initial response (September 2003 to February/March 2004); after they were eased somewhat (March to June 2004); when finally lifted (July 2004); and today?
- Given the challenges, how well were/are the key responders -- the UN, including OCHA, NGOs and the Red Cross Movement -- collaborating (in country and in headquarters) to respond to the crisis?
- Within the limitations, in particular of access, how comprehensive was/is the coverage of assistance, including protection?
- What role has the UN Country Team been playing in responding to the crisis?
- How well was/is the humanitarian community working together as well as with other relevant partners such as the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to identify protection and assistance gaps in the response, develop solutions to them and then ensure their implementation -- specifically in the areas of camp management, health and nutrition, water and sanitation, and protection?
- To what extent did/is the humanitarian community drawing on the expertise of non-humanitarian actors, in particular with human rights actors?
- How well has/is the collaborative approach working in responding to IDP needs?

3.4 Advocacy work of the UN and OCHA: What are the factors that are influencing the decision making process on advocacy?

- What information was available about the Darfur crisis -- from its outset to the present -- and how was/is it being used to advocate for a response to the crisis?
- How effectively has the UN at the highest levels [ERC, Special Envoy for the Secretary-General for Humanitarian Needs in Sudan (SESG), Secretary-General (SG), the High Commissioner for Human Rights (HCHR)], as well as OCHA Sudan, the HC and humanitarian agencies on the ground, been engaging the Government of Sudan and the rebels to ensure humanitarian access, respect of humanitarian principles and the protection of civilians?
- What tools and approaches have/are being used by the UN at the highest levels (ERC, SESG, SG, HCHR) to engage donors, the media, regional organizations and the political bodies of the UN, particularly the Security Council, to address the crisis?
- What has been the impact of the Security Council's increased attention starting in early April 2004? What are the key lessons learned in this regard?

3.5 Donor response: How has the timing and level of aid impacted the humanitarian community's response to the Darfur crisis?

- To what extent did/is the speed of the disbursement of funds affecting the response?

- Did/is the humanitarian community making the best use of the funding sources and mechanisms available to it, such as the Central Emergency Revolving Fund (CERF)?
- Did or is it currently soliciting and making adequate use of in-kind contributions, such as for logistics, as well as direct funding?
- Why have/are donors not funding the Darfur crisis to the same extent as other crises of equally high profile and comparable need? How has the timing, scale and focus of donor contributions been influenced by their policy imperatives with regard to Darfur?
- Have/are non-Western donors, in specific Middle Eastern donors and other Asian countries, being included in fundraising efforts? What has their role been as donors?

4. Methodology

4.1 This real-time evaluation will take an iterative approach, which will include five phases and three distinct field visits, as follows:

Phase I	Preparatory
Phase II	Field visit
Phase III	Agency and donor consultations
Phase IV	Field visit
Phase V	Field visit

4.2 It will be based on a desk review of existing literature on the crisis and the response to it (Phase I and III), as well key informant interviews and focus group discussions with various stakeholder groups, including the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) agencies, the Department of Political Affairs, donor/Member States, the Government of Sudan and the affected population -- both in the field (Darfur region and Khartoum) and at headquarters (Geneva, Rome and New York). As many of the events related to preparedness, donor funding, the prepositioning of stocks, early warning, contingency planning and advocacy took place in conjunction with actors outside of Khartoum, the team will focus on these issues during visits to agency headquarters in Phase III of the evaluation.

4.3 In order not to hamper the ongoing response, the first of the two field visits (Phase II and IV) will be short and unobtrusive, with a focus on allowing the evaluation team to actually observe the ongoing response. The team, to the greatest extent possible, will divide their time to attend already planned meetings and events. Interviews with key informants will depend on their availability. It is foreseen, however, that the UNCT will be available for, at maximum, a half-day workshop with the evaluation team near the conclusion of each field visit. In it, the team will present its impressions and initial recommendations, and an action plan for making real-time adjustments to the response will be jointly developed. Within a week of each visit, a short mission report will be prepared and sent to the UNCT as well as an inter-agency core learning group, whose role and composition is described below in Section 5.

4.4 Over time, the evaluation team, in consultation with the UNCT and core learning group, will refine its focus on emerging issues and critical concern, in consultation with the core learning group. As a result, short terms of reference will be developed prior to each phase of the evaluation. In particular, the purpose of the third visit of the team to the field (Phase IV) will be determined largely by the status of the ongoing response, as well as the evaluation team's previous observations and recommendations, and actions taken as a result of the real-time feedback provided. The core learning group will meet two to three weeks prior to the third visit to determine the scope and focus of the final field visit. In broad terms, however, it is envisioned that this visit will review actions taken since the evaluation began and also contain a strong lessons learning element. Afterwards, the team will provide a comprehensive evaluation report, which incorporates the earlier shorter reports.

4.5 These methods are indicative and will be refined and finalized by the consultant and OCHA's Policy Development and Studies Branch/Evaluations and Studies Unit (PDSB/ESU), in consultation with the core learning group.

5. Management and organization

5.1 Overall management, coordination and logistics of the evaluation will be carried out by PDSB/ESU. The ESU will be responsible for: 1) the conduct of the evaluation; 2) systematically assessing the quality of the evaluation and its processes; 3) chairing an inter-agency core learning group; 4) ensuring that all stakeholders are kept informed; and 5) disseminating the final report.

5.2 While this evaluation is being commissioned by the USG/ERC, OCHA intends to undertake it in close collaboration with the key operational IASC members. Agencies are called upon to participate in this effort, either financially, logistically and/or by serving on a core learning group. This group will be chaired by OCHA and will: 1) facilitate the team's access to the agency-specific information needed to perform the assessment; 2) support the evaluation team's work, particularly from a methodological view point; and 3) ensure that agency expertise on issues relevant to the evaluation are reflected (e.g. by establishing internal agency support groups comprising the relevant competencies such as monitoring and evaluation, protection, water and sanitation, gender, internally displaced etc.).

5.3 The final evaluation report will be made available in the public domain.

6. Reporting Requirements

6.1 The evaluation team will produce:

- A brief inception report prior to the first field visit (Phase II) outlining the proposed method, key issues and potential key informants for the evaluation

- Three aide-memoires to be presented to the UNCT at the end of each field visit (Phase II, IV and V)
- Three short reports describing emerging findings and key issues, as well as indications of those to be addressed in the next phase, which will be presented to the UNCT within a week of each field visit (Phase II, IV and V)
- A short report on funding, advocacy, preparedness and contingency planning following stakeholder consultations in Geneva, New York and Rome (Phase III)
- A final report

The final output of the evaluation will be a report not exceeding 15,000 words in length, excluding annexes, and an executive summary of no more than 1,000 words and be structured as follows:

- Introduction and purpose
- Methodology and report structure
- Key issues – findings and conclusions
- Recommendations
- Lessons for Darfur crisis and elsewhere
- Annexes, including TORs, inception report, Phase II, III, IV reports, historical timeline and relevant maps

7. Team composition

7.1 The team should be composed of at least three international persons. The team leader must have demonstrated extensive operational experience in Sudan and an in-depth knowledge of the broader humanitarian system, as well as a track record as an experienced evaluator. As a whole, the team must reflect the following expertise: protection, political advocacy, the dynamics of humanitarian funding, internal displacement, logistics and gender. Further gaps in expertise, specifically by sector, will be identified as the evaluation proceeds. If none of the team members speaks Arabic, an interpreter should be made available by the OCHA office in Khartoum to accompany the team to the field. One of the three team members will focus more exclusively on the particular challenges and context in which NGOs operate, including vis a vis the UN. Thus, the individual should ideally be chosen by and be able to serve as a representative of the international NGO community and/or have a strong NGO background.

7.2 Two local research assistants will also be recruited. They will assist the team in primarily on conducting local level field research of beneficiary perspectives and needs. They will also assist team in translating and liaising with local authorities. They should: 1) possess a university degree in political or social science, international studies, public administration,

economics, or in a technical (e.g. engineering, earth sciences, etc.) or other relevant field;
 2) have at least five years of humanitarian experience in Sudan, preferably in the Darfurs; 3) be fluent in Arabic; and 4) have demonstrable social research skills.

8. Timeframe

8.1 The evaluation should commence in mid-August 2004 and conclude in May 2005 with the submission of the outputs described above.

8.2 The provisional schedule is as follows.

Phase I Preparatory

3rd – 4th week of Aug.	Contracting of the Team
2 nd – 4 th week of Aug.	Initial Desk Research and Timeline (OCHA staff)
4 th week of Aug.	Revised TOR disseminated to IASC members
1 st week of Sept.	Creation of the Core Learning Group
1 st week of Sept.	Initial Desk Review (4 days)
2 nd week of Sept.	Submission of the inception report (1 day)
2 nd week of Sept.	Briefings and stakeholder interviews in New York, finalization of method (3 days)
2 nd week of Sept.	Meeting of the Core Learning Group (1 day)

Phase II Field Visit

3 rd – 4 th week of Sept.	Initial team visit to Khartoum and Darfur (10 days)
4 th week of Sept.	Half day workshop with country team to discuss early findings and recommendations (1 day)
30 Sept.	1 st report provided to UNCT and other stakeholders, Core Learning Group (3 days)

Phase III Agency and Donor Consultations

2 nd week of Oct.	Desk review (2 days)
3rd week of Oct.	Agency interviews, Member states interviews in Geneva and Rome (5 days)
4th week of Oct.	Agency interviews, Member states interviews in New York (5 days)
2nd week of Nov.	2 nd report on early warning, contingency planning, and international assistance submitted to UNCT and other stakeholders, Core Learning Group (5 days)
3 rd week of Nov.	Finalization of report (3 days)
22 nd -23 rd Nov.	Discussion of initial reports at IASC meeting

Phase IV Field Visit

4 th week of Nov.	Desk review (2 days)
1 st week – 3 rd week of Dec.	Visit to Dafur (15 days)
3 rd week of Dec.	Half-day Workshop with Country Team (1 day)
22 Dec.	3 rd report provided to the field and the Core Learning Group (3 days)

Phase V Field Visit

2 nd week of Jan.	Meeting of Core Learning Group to discuss results-to-date and to develop TOR for the 3 rd and final visit to Dafur (1 day)
4 th week of Jan. Feb. 2005	Desk review (2 days) Three-week mission by core team plus additional expertise (20 days)
One day workshop with the Country Team	(1 day)
Formal debriefing with heads of agencies, GOS	(1 day)
1 st – 2 nd week of March March 2005	Report writing (10 days) Submission of draft final report
May 2005	Discussion of the report at IASC meeting (2 days)
May 2005	Finalization of the full report (2 days)

9. Use of evaluation

9.1 The evaluation will recommend actions that the Country Team, the USG/ERC and the humanitarian community may undertake to address both specific and systemic challenges, in particular in the areas of early warning and preparedness, surge capacity and the quality of the overall response, specifically in the sectors of health and nutrition, water and sanitation, protection and camp management, with the aim of ultimately improving the ongoing response to the crisis in Darfur. The UNCT and the IASC should outline a plan of action based on the evaluation team's interim and final report recommendations. Relevant lessons may lead to further work by the IASC in the identified areas. The short report produced after the first phase of the visit will contribute to the ongoing discussions on Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) to take place in Ottawa in October 2004.

10. Budget

10.1 The following and the attached budget is based on rough estimates, which will be refined and finalized.

TASK	Team leader	Team member 1	Team member 2*
Desk Review	10	10	7
Inception report	1	1	--
Phase I briefings and stakeholder interviews in New York, finalization of method	4	4	--
Phase III briefings and stakeholder interviews in New York, finalization of method	5	5	--
Phase III Stakeholder interviews in Geneva and Rome	5	5	--
Field visits to Khartoum and Darfur	49	49	38
Short report writing (end Phase II, III, IV)	14	14	4
Core Learning Group meeting (prior Phase V)	1	--	--
Final report writing	10	10	10
Discussion at IASC Meeting	2	--	--
Finalization of report	2	2	2
TOTAL	103	100	61

* Participation in Phases IV and V only.

The total cost of the evaluation, which will include the fees for two of three consultants, including travel and per diem, will be approximately USD 200,000. It is hoped that the cost of the third team member will be fully or partially born by a contributing agency, with potential support from OCHA.

OCHA LED DARFUR REAL TIME EVALUATION INCEPTION REPORT

Introduction

The Terms of Reference (ToR) require a “brief inception report prior to the first field visit (Phase II) outlining the proposed method, key issues and potential key informants for the evaluation”. A list of key issues has already been developed and included in the ToR and these are repeated in the attached evaluation framework (with a few additions). Although there is some commentary on the issues in the body of this report, the focus is on evaluation method. The ToR provide some directions concerning method, but the precise approach and the tools to be used have not been specified.

General methods

In very general terms, the evaluation will utilise three principal methods: reliance on interviews and reported/observed events (an inductive method); reliance on causality and reasonable plausibility (a deductive method); and the development and application of reasonable benchmarks for different stages of the operation (adding a dynamic, contextual element). The three complement one another. Ancillary approaches or techniques are also proposed including observation of process, and facilitation. Differing emphases will be given to these methods and approaches according to their appropriateness to the various evaluation topics.

Method 1: Reliance on interviews and reported/observed events

Like all evaluations, this one will rely in large part on drawing generalised conclusions from statements made to the team by key informants and from a limited number of observed practices and events (sitting in on meetings, making site visits). Inductive methods have drawbacks, particularly in emergency settings, because considerable reliance is placed on a relatively small number of people, perhaps sharing a fairly similar perspective. Moreover, there are normally very limited opportunities for direct observation and the situations or events witnessed can be interpreted in several ways, not least because these snippets are isolated from the bigger picture and not necessarily representative of that which is effectively hidden given time, language and access restrictions.

Method 2: Reliance on causality and logical plausibility

That is, deductions made on the basis of apparent causality or at least reasonable plausibility (inputs and activities leading to outputs and outcomes). Most humanitarian agencies and organisations have adopted results-based management (RBM) principles, at least for the purposes of framing proposals. Consolidated appeals reflect these norms up to a point.

The evaluation will consider the relevance and feasibility of formal objectives, and whether or not they are likely to have been achieved, or are being achieved, on the basis of reported outputs (the team won't be able to thoroughly verify these) and the connection to anticipated outcomes/results. This will not be sound to base conclusions about results solely on the basis of reported outputs. It has to be complemented by other methods that are not confined to this logic – including different perspectives and independent evidence gathered by use of the first mentioned method.

Method 3: Benchmarking

This method involves establishing abstract benchmarks of a level of accomplishment that could be expected at stages in an emergency.⁷³ Benchmarks will be developed in consultation with stakeholders for two or three points in the evolution of the crisis, including September 2004 (the time of the first field visit). These benchmarks should take into account on the one hand systemic

⁷³ Applied by UNHCR recently in a real time evaluation of their response in Chad (Real time evaluation of UNHCR's response to the emergency in Chad, EPAU, August 2004)

and operational constraints, and on the other what has been achieved in other operations (standards set) as well as human rights and humanitarian law (standards required).

Seeking agreeing on what it would be reasonable to expect to have been accomplished at certain stages (bearing in mind normative standards on the one hand and constraints on the other) should lead to a good discussion of the underlying issues.

Documenting examples of sound practice in Darfur in the process – showcasing what has worked – will add a positive element to the evaluation. It will also *inter alia* provide a basis on which to identify policy gaps and bolster operational guidelines.

Observing processes

‘Process evaluation’ focuses on ‘the internal dynamics and actual operations of a program in an attempt to understand its strengths and weaknesses’.⁷⁴ This is applicable at different levels, from the overall response ‘system’ to the coordination of individual sectors at the field level. One of the great benefits of real-time evaluation, particularly one like this which is phased over several months, is being present when crucial decisions are being made and action taken. This will provide a more informed (and sympathetic) basis on which to evaluate performance.

Facilitation

The evaluation team is tasked to recommend actions that may be taken to improve the operational response in real time. In some matters the evaluation team will need to stand back and make an independent assessment, and procedures will need to be agreed for efficiently dealing with recommendations that flow from this. But in other matters it will be most productive for the evaluation team to facilitate (or play a role in the facilitation of) the formulation of recommendations and plans. Practically, the most useful recommendations for improving the response are likely to be born of a collaborative process.

The evaluation team will only succeed in playing such a role if it can quickly establish a productive working relationship with UNCT members. There is a balancing act to be performed between being seen to be useful with the need to maintain enough independence to provide ‘real-time accountability’. Moreover, the team must not be too demanding given the pressure people are under, and will initially have to keep to the background and make the most of opportunities that arise for engaging in key processes.

Participatory approaches

This is described as an approach rather than a method because it can be part and parcel of the methods described above (most notably the first). It is unclear at this stage how the evaluation team can effectively involve the intended recipients of humanitarian assistance and protection. The evaluation team will attempt to gather their views in a manner that goes beyond the mere extraction of information. This is a matter for further discussion.

Evaluation topics

The evaluation team will structure its inquiry and its reports according to the subject headings by which the key issues are grouped in the ToR (with slight modifications and in a slightly different order), with the addition of effectiveness and efficiency as a separate topic (drawn from the evaluation criteria specified in the ToR). Issues and criteria have been merged in one framework to facilitate coherent study and reporting.

⁷⁴ From Paten (1997) p 206, describing ‘process evaluation’

The following includes an overview of the issues relevant to each topic and some discussion of method. The detailed exposition of method appears in the attached framework.

Overarching Issues

Three interlinked issues will be investigated in every aspect of the evaluation.

Gender considerations: The conflict in the Darfurs is highly gendered in terms of the impact of the conflict on women and men, girls and boys respectively, increased vulnerability to further abuses and violations and on the differentiated roles that women and men take (or are ascribed) regarding the on-going and future issues such as survival, return. Gender issues are not restricted to those of sexual and gender-based violence but should be considered in every aspect of the humanitarian response to the crisis.

Human rights: Given both the reasons for this crisis and the fact that it currently constitutes a human rights crisis, the violation and abuses of human rights (including violence and discrimination) and issues of compliance with international and regional human rights law and standards will underscore consideration of the humanitarian response. The obligation placed by the UN Charter on both UN agencies and departments and Member States is considered to be the corner stone of this approach.

International Humanitarian Law (IHL): The crisis in the Darfurs has been characterized by breaches of IHL. In many cases, these overlap with human rights abuses but also will be considered separately as they affect the humanitarian response.

Topic 1: Leadership, planning and coordination

The overall issue mentioned in the ToR is: ‘What are the factors that have either inhibited or enhanced leadership, coordination and planning in responding to the Darfur crisis?’ Early warning (what was known when) and contingency planning are referred to. The key words, phrases and concepts in the other ten or so issues include ‘coherence’, ‘situational analysis’, ‘development and review of humanitarian strategies’, dissemination of information, ‘collaboration’, identification of ‘protection and assistance gaps’ and development and implementation of joint solutions.

The actors specified are the HC, OCHA, the UNCT, and more generally key humanitarian responders (including NGOs and ICRC). The field of study broadly refers to coordination mechanisms at all levels/within all sectors. The political domain is mentioned in relation to balancing the humanitarian imperative with political pressure resulting from the ongoing peace process.

It is noted that the Greater Darfur Special Initiative expressly included a strategy based in the main on removing immediate triggers to violence through quick impact projects and facilitating action on underlying issues. The Revised ASAP did not however include a revised strategy. The 90-Day Humanitarian Action Plan developed in early June 2004 sets targets to be achieved by the end of August (a valuable exercise), but it was not designed to describe a strategy. Some commentators have argued that one of the reasons for the poor response has been the lack of an overall humanitarian strategic plan.⁷⁵

Relevance, one of the evaluation criteria referred to in the ToR, should probably be addressed here, that is, the extent to which the intervention as planned and implemented has been/is in line with (a) people’s needs and priorities, (b) humanitarian standards as enunciated in the humanitarian charter and elsewhere, and (c) the mandates of the key responders (and perhaps the

⁷⁵ E.g. Recent testimony of John Prendergast, Special Advisor to the President of the ICG, to the US Congress, ‘Sudan: Peace But at What Price?’ www.icg.org/home/index.cfm?id=2810&1=1

policies of their donors). This is one way of considering the extent to which a human rights-based approach has been adopted in the humanitarian response.

Examination of the CHAP/CAP and the 90-day plan will be relevant. The UNCT is currently reviewing the strategy for the response to Darfur to be contained in the CAP. Sectoral response plans for the remainder of the year are now underway, but these will apparently be more working documents than a published plan (unlike the 90-day plan). This would appear to be an issue related to how ‘heavy’ the planning process can afford to be.

Topic 2: Advocacy work of the UN and OCHA

The main issue raised in the ToR is the effectiveness of the UN at the highest levels in engaging parties to the armed conflict to ensure humanitarian access, respect of humanitarian principles and the protection of civilians. Related issues include the effectiveness of the tools and approaches used (including the collection and dissemination of information) for engaging donors, the media, regional organizations and the political bodies of the UN, particularly the Security Council. Several issues could be added including whether or not senior UN figures were robust enough, early enough; and how the agencies coordinated their advocacy efforts.

Prendergast argues that key members of the Security Council from Europe, Africa and Asia have been ‘stonewalling’.⁷⁶ If this is what it comes down to, what are the lessons? The response of the Commission on Human Rights meeting during March-April 2004 is also of importance.

Topic 3: Effectiveness and efficiency of the response

Effectiveness⁷⁷ is a central, standard evaluation criterion and for the purposes of this evaluation it will be taken to incorporate the related considerations of appropriateness⁷⁸, timeliness, coverage⁷⁹ and overall quality. The efficiency of the response⁸⁰ is a separate consideration but included here for the sake of brevity.

How delayed and how inadequate has the international response been? The ToR take it as read that the response has been relatively poor, noting that “... a substantial portion of an estimated 1.2 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and their equally vulnerable host communities do not have access to even a minimum level of humanitarian support and aid.” The most important question is ‘why’. But before addressing this it may be useful to look more closely at the reported gaps between needs and assistance over time (data generated by the HIC in Khartoum) and assess whether or not the reported information is broadly accurate, meaningful and helpful. One issue that may arise in the course of this is targeting efficiency. For example, concerns have been expressed about food distributions and it should not be assumed that the quantities made available

⁷⁶ Ibid

⁷⁷ OECD/DAC 1999: “*Effectiveness* measures the extent to which the activity achieves its purpose, or whether this can be expected to happen on the basis of the outputs ...Implicit within the criteria of effectiveness is timeliness ...There is value in using it more explicitly as one of the standard criteria because of its importance in the assessment of emergency programmes. Similarly, issues of resourcing and preparedness should be addressed.”

⁷⁸ OECD/DAC 1999: “‘Relevance’ refers to the overall goal and purpose of a programme, whereas ‘appropriateness’ is more focused on the activities and inputs ...”

⁷⁹ OECD/DAC 1999: “*Coverage* – the need to ‘reach the major population groups facing life-threatening suffering wherever they are, providing them with assistance and protection proportionate to their need and devoid of extraneous political agendas’ ...” (apparently quoting Minear)

⁸⁰ OECD/DAC 1999: “*Efficiency* measures the outputs - qualitative and quantitative – in relation to the inputs. This generally requires comparing alternative approaches to achieving the same outputs, to see whether the most efficient process has been used ...”

for distribution have reached intended recipients. This may raise a question mark about the beneficiary figures included in HIC coverage/gap percentages. So outputs should be tested, at least in broad terms (logical plausibility).

Coming to the question of ‘why’ it is proposed that the evaluation consider how the gaps in assistance relate to the performance of the key responders. That is, how much can be put down to external constraints (access, security and donor response), how much to lack of institutional capacity (including surge capacity) and how much purely to the performance of the agencies involved? In relation to the last factor, we need to ask: To what extent have agencies failed to make the most of the resources and opportunities they have had? (The other factors are considered in the next section *Institutional and Operational Constraints* and later under *Donor Response*.)

An introductory note on protection: Humanitarian protection can be pursued by humanitarian and/or human rights agencies by providing (a) humanitarian assistance, (b) maintaining a humanitarian presence, (c) monitoring and reporting on human rights and IHL, and/or (d) conducting humanitarian advocacy.⁸¹ This underscores the need to address humanitarian protection in a number of ways. For the purposes of this evaluation it is proposed that humanitarian protection be considered in the context of:

- advocacy (discussed above),
- humanitarian assistance, and
- as a stand alone issue of the protection of civilians in armed conflict..

Humanitarian assistance and protection

The sectoral fields of inquiry will be (in order of priority):

- Water and sanitation
- Camp management
- Shelter and non-food items
- Health and nutrition
- Food security

Protection will be treated *inter alia* as a prominent cross-cutting issue for interventions in these sectors on the basis (a) that humanitarian responders should promote the protection of civilians, including women and girls and boys, simultaneously with the provision of humanitarian assistance; and (b) that humanitarian assistance should constitute a form of protection eg. protection from the extremes of hunger, from disease, and so on and (c) that humanitarian presence can provide or contribute to some form of protection against violence.

The team will need to distinguish between process/output and outcome/impact indicators. The latter will be most problematic e.g. nutritional status and mortality data is likely to be patchy at best. The difficulty of estimating outcomes will probably force the team to rely fairly heavily on process/output indicators to infer the most probable/plausible outcomes in each sector.

Aggregate quantitative data will be needed as a foundation for considering how well the processes employed and reported outputs are likely to have been resulted in the achievement of stated objectives (as outcomes), including tables and graphs comparing the humanitarian response to assessed needs. Hopefully the data regularly collected and presented by the RC/HC (with

⁸¹ Humanitarian Protection: A Guidance Booklet, Hugo Slim and Luis Enrique Eguren, ALNAP 2004, p 40

OCHA's support) will be adequate for this task, although additional work will probably be required to get the data into an appropriate form. Query what other data the evaluation team should consider (e.g. from non-UN responders). Query also to what extent qualitative data can be collected and results considered in similar ways.

Although necessary and useful up to a point, seeking conclusions about likely results on the basis of reported outputs is problematic (as discussed above). In part this is because it is often undermined by a poor connection in plans (in terms of logical causality) between activities and outcome level results. This deficiency is then reflected in weaknesses in reports – good for aggregating output data but not performance against higher level objectives. Even activity level information can prove problematic once probed and poked by running controls, and even if the data is reliable it is of limited value in the absence of 'contextual' data like population figures to estimate coverage.

For these and other reasons, process/output information will have to be complemented by additional evidence to arrive at conclusions about outcomes and thus effectiveness e.g. additional evidence that the food needs of IDPs were indeed covered over a particular period; that the distribution of health kits are likely to have resulted in improved health outcomes for members of a particular group; or indeed that significant positive changes in people's circumstances can fairly be attributed to the reported intervention.

This additional evidence will be gathered mainly through interviews and where feasible site visits (the inductive method referred to at the outset). The perspective of those directly affected must be sought. Focus group discussions with IDP women, for example, should be helpful. However, it is recognised that there are enormous limitations when these discussions are rapidly organised and concluded in very short time frames. The challenge will be to create the space for beneficiaries/intended recipients to evaluate the international response from their perspective. Checklists for discussions will be helpful although overly structuring such presumably be impractical and the results may be disappointing anyway. Clearly the team will require excellent interlocutors/translators, ideally independent of humanitarian responders.

Physical protection of civilians

Civilians continue to be targeted for attack in the course of this conflict. Additionally, civilians continue to be vulnerable to opportunistic attack (particularly women and girls subjected to sexual violence). At the political level, these concerns "have been raised and received ample attention as seen, for instance, in the Joint Communique and the Security Council Resolution 1556. On the ground, however, the commitments made in various for a have not been translated into action"⁸²

It was proposed in the Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the protection of civilians in armed conflict in May 2004 that 'more precise monitoring, reporting and systematic data-gathering' should be conducted.⁸³ It is noted that USG Egeland is to provide an outline for this enhanced monitoring and reporting framework to the Security Council in December 2004.

Topic 4: Institutional and operational constraints

The main issue in the ToR is: What are the specific and systemic problems in responding to the Darfur crisis? Subsidiary issues raised relate to surge capacity, implementing

⁸² Remaining Humanitarian Requirements for Sudan until 31 December 2004 (Consolidated Appeals Process)

⁸³ Paragraph 46 ('Way forward')

partner capacity, logistics and humanitarian access. The issues are spelled out in the attached framework.

Topic 5: Donor response

The key issues included in the ToR relate to the timing and level of funding, and its impact on the response, and whether or not the key responders could have made better use of the funds to hand and what advocacy was employed to overcome funding constraints. The role of donors present in Sudan will also be reviewed.

Topic 6: Connectedness

That is, the need 'to assure that activities of a short-term emergency nature are carried out in a context which takes longer-term and interconnected problems into account'.⁸⁴ Of relevance may also be the integration of the Darfur assistance programme in the overall Sudan country programme. The upcoming Country Team work planning retreat outcome (21-22 September 2004) will give some important insights in this regard.

Bernard Broughton for the evaluation team, 10th September 2004

⁸⁴ OECD/DAC quoting Minear

INITIAL EVALUATION FRAMEWORK

FOR ADDRESSING PERFORMANCE CRITERIA & ISSUES

Performance criteria and questions ⁱ	Miscellaneous team tasks	Strategies &/or plans	Standards &/or benchmarks ⁱⁱ
1. Leadership, planning and coordination			
<p><i>1.1 Overall</i></p> <p>What are the factors that have either inhibited or enhanced leadership, coordination and planning in responding to the Darfur crisis?</p>	<p>Pose this question to senior UN, IO and NGO managers; ERC, HC, SRSG</p> <p>Get them to differentiate between external and internal factors</p>	<p>Were any strategies and/or plans put in place at any point(s) for improving leadership, coordination and/or planning?</p>	<p>What objective standards can we apply to leadership, coordination and planning? What realistic practice benchmarks can we set for different points (past, present and future)?ⁱⁱⁱ (The starter question for discussing benchmarks could simply be: ‘What would be a reasonable expectation by this stage of the response?’)</p>
<p><i>1.2 Early warning</i></p> <p>Was there sufficient early warning on the Darfur crisis? If not, why? Was existing early warning information treated as such? If not, why?</p>	<p>Plot on a timeline info that could be treated as early warning and correlate with reaction and/or response of UN agencies and other humanitarian actors (examine internal memos, notes of closed meetings if possible)</p>	<p>What early warning strategies and/or plans of which agencies do or should apply to something like the Darfurs (e.g. monitoring mass displacement or human rights abuses)?</p>	<p>What standards can we apply, what benchmarks can we set? It’s a Catch 22 that human rights monitors cannot get in without the permission of the government concerned. On the other hand the responsibilities of both development and emergency agencies on the ground in the absence of human rights monitors must be considered. The situation was well known before the request to field human rights monitors.</p>
<p><i>1.3 Contingency planning/preparedness</i></p> <p>Were effective contingency plans and preparedness measures,</p>		<p>What contingency plans did which agencies put in place and at what times?</p>	<p>We could perhaps derive benchmarks from past operations (for the past). Query what plans should be made for the</p>

Performance criteria and questions ⁱ	Miscellaneous team tasks	Strategies &/or plans	Standards &/or benchmarks ⁱⁱ
including the prepositioning of stocks, staff and identification of transport routes, developed and implemented as the proportions of the crisis became known? If not, what challenges prevented their development and/or implementation?			future contingencies in Darfur?
<p><i>1.4 Strategic planning</i></p> <p>Were/are humanitarian response strategies coherent^{iv} and appropriate? Were/are they gender sensitive? What role has OCHA and the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) been playing, from the onset of the crisis until present, in ensuring an effective and timely response to the crisis? In specific, have OCHA and the HC been providing vision and leadership; and what has been its impact on the situational analysis, as well as the development and review of humanitarian strategies?</p>	<p>Describe the planning process</p> <p>Describe the role of senior UN representatives in shaping the response</p> <p>Who/which agency most influenced the manner of response for better or worse?</p> <p>Which were the most influential non-UN actors?</p>	<p>On the basis of interviews and documents determine the (possibly competing) strategies, underlying assumptions, and their evolution</p> <p>Analyse strategies for coherence and effectiveness as planning documents, including integration of human rights/protection issues</p> <p>Key documents include the GDSI, the Operational Strategy for the Darfur States 1-15 October 2003 and the 90-Day Plan (See QualityCOMPAS G p 14)</p>	<p>For planning standards consider inter alia the CAP guidelines relating to the CHAP.</p> <p>Consider also the references to the Darfur conflict in any planning and reporting documents relating to the MDGs</p>

Performance criteria and questions ⁱ	Miscellaneous team tasks	Strategies &/or plans	Standards &/or benchmarks ⁱⁱ
<p><i>1.5 Dissemination of information</i></p> <p>What role has OCHA and the HC played in using information and analysis from other parts of the UN system or outside organization; and how has this been shared within the UN, in particular with its political bodies?</p>	<p>What were main means of disseminating information and which had the most impact?</p>	<p>Was an explicit strategy adopted for the dissemination of information and for the collection/collation of info from non-humanitarian actors (e.g. OHCHR, UNIFEM)</p>	
<p><i>1.6 Coordination</i></p> <p>How well have existing coordination mechanisms worked, at the headquarters, national and local levels, as well as within sectors, and to what extent were/are they enjoying agency buy-in?</p> <p>How appropriate, effective and mutually reinforcing were/are the arrangements at the capital level in Khartoum and at the field sub-office level?</p>	<p>Ask various informants to draw an organigram to describe coordination at different levels and then inquire about strengths and weaknesses</p> <p>Observe coordination processes including sector working groups</p> <p>The Area Coordination mechanisms introduced by the RC/HC in 2003 requires attention</p>	<p>What formal and informal agreements have been made concerning coordination at different times and have they been effective?</p>	<p>What benchmark would it be reasonable to measure current arrangements against? Should it conform to a particular model?</p>
<p><i>1.7 Political pressure</i></p> <p>How well has the UNCT and wider humanitarian community been balancing the humanitarian imperative to act with political pressure resulting from the ongoing peace process?</p>	<p>Find evidence of the influence of Naivasha if possible i.e. who really said not to rock the boat and to whom?</p>		

Performance criteria and questions ⁱ	Miscellaneous team tasks	Strategies &/or plans	Standards &/or benchmarks ⁱⁱ
<p><i>1.8 Collaboration of humanitarian agencies and organisations</i></p> <p>Given the challenges, how well were/are the key responders -- the UN, including OCHA, NGOs and the Red Cross Movement – collaborating (in country and in headquarters) to respond to the crisis?</p> <p>How well was/is the humanitarian community working together to identify protection and assistance gaps in the response, develop solutions to them and then ensure their implementation – specifically in the areas of camp management, health and nutrition, water and sanitation, and protection?</p>	<p>Observe the problem solving and gap filling process in different contexts e.g. camp management</p>	<p>Global agreements and MoUs constitute plans of sorts. Were their terms honoured?</p>	<p>Standards can possibly be derived from codes of conduct at least for NGOs</p> <p>Reasonable benchmarks can be discussed, probably most beneficially in context of particular sectors</p>
<p><i>1.9 Non-humanitarian actors</i></p> <p>To what extent did/is the humanitarian community drawing on the expertise of non-humanitarian actors?</p>	<p>OHCHR, UNIFEM, UNICEF Protection Unit, CHR Special Procedures, SG’s Representative on Internal Displacement, Human rights INGOs.</p>	<p>Any joint planning? Deng visit and input</p>	<p>Any benchmark of sound practice of collaborating with OHCHR from other operations? Perhaps Burundi?</p>
<p><i>1.10 UNCT</i></p> <p>What role has the UN Country Team been playing in responding to the crisis?</p>	<p>Rely mainly on observation of the process for the first visit</p>		<p>What standards should be expected of UNCTs? Benchmarks from other operations?</p>
<p><i>1.11 Collaborative</i></p>	<p>Clarify origin and</p>	<p>Is the collaborative</p>	<p>Is there a benchmark for</p>

Performance criteria and questions ⁱ	Miscellaneous team tasks	Strategies &/or plans	Standards &/or benchmarks ⁱⁱ
<p><i>approach</i></p> <p>How well has/is the collaborative approach working in responding to IDP needs?</p>	<p>meaning</p>	<p>approach written down as a strategy or plan?</p>	<p>the collaborative approach?</p>
2. Advocacy work of the UN and OCHA			
<p><i>2.1 Decision making</i></p> <p>What are the factors that are influencing the decision making process on advocacy?</p>	<p>Pose this question to senior UN, IO and NGO managers; ERC, HC, SRSG</p> <p>Also pose to potential critics (e.g. journalists, academics)</p>	<p>The USG evidently had a strategy? How well was it realised? What's the strategy now?</p>	<p>The recent review of OCHA advocacy implies that OCHA should not lead other agencies on advocacy, but rather get across a shared view. Should this be the standard or would it often be a compromise?</p>
<p><i>2.2 Information</i></p> <p>What information was available about the Darfur crisis – from its outset to the present – and how was/is it being used to advocate for a response to the crisis?</p>	<p>Use a timeline to note key reports (see for example IRIN) and to gather additional information from key informants at HQ and in Sudan (noting overlap with early warning). Focus on the use (or non-use) of information and consider better ways of using information of this kind in future</p>	<p>Possible advocacy effectiveness measures include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ media coverage generated (causality would need to be established) ▪ donor engagement ▪ Number of hits on IRIN site for Darfur related articles; length of average time site is visited, viewership of specially produced advocacy tools (e.g. film) etc. 	<p>Benchmark should relate to the availability of regular reporting (e.g. through the HIC)</p>
<p><i>2.3 Engaging the Government</i></p> <p>How effectively has the UN at the highest levels</p>	<p>Question needs to be posed to those mentioned, and to SC members (UK,</p>	<p>Reconstruct advocacy strategies of the different players</p>	<p>Can a benchmark of sound practice for engaging the GoS be derived from a previous</p>

Performance criteria and questions ⁱ	Miscellaneous team tasks	Strategies &/or plans	Standards &/or benchmarks ⁱⁱ
[ERC, Special Envoy for the Secretary-General for Humanitarian Needs in Sudan (SESG), Secretary-General (SG), the High Commissioner for Human Rights (HCHR)], as well as OCHA Sudan, the HC and humanitarian agencies on the ground and the Special Rapporteurs etc. of the CHR, been engaging the Government of Sudan and the rebels to ensure humanitarian access, respect of humanitarian principles and the protection of civilians?	Germany, Canada for example) and observers Refer to field visit reports by Morris, Egeland, McNamara, Annan; also Security Council debates and resolutions S-G meetings with key countries Njamena peace process (engaging regional actors) Media (RW, IRIN, major newspapers)	Performance can in part be measured by agreements obtained but must also examine effective access (include both on a timeline)	crisis in the country? From an operation in another country?
2.4 <i>Engaging donors, media, regional organisations and political bodies of UN</i> What tools and approaches have/are being used by the UN at the highest levels (ERC, SESG, SG, HCHR) to engage donors, the media, regional organizations and the political bodies of the UN, particularly the Security Council, to address the crisis?	See above Interview/consider DPA, DPI perhaps, AERIMB in OCHA, IASC, donors, IRIN, HLWG, ECHA	Indicators of performance (although attribution problematic): Attention of Security Council to Darfur (timing and frequency on the agenda); media coverage; funding provided; effective access (CHR debates and Resolutions also)	Benchmark needs to relate to the degree of sustained pressure achieved
2.5 <i>Role of Security Council</i> What has been the impact of the Security Council's increased attention starting in early April 2004? What are the	Examine Security Council resolutions (possibly ask Stig) On question of lessons, discuss with Egeland, key responders. Discuss	Performance could be measured in part by examining compliance with resolutions	

Performance criteria and questions ⁱ	Miscellaneous team tasks	Strategies &/or plans	Standards &/or benchmarks ⁱⁱ
key lessons learned in this regard?	with political sections of SC P5 members (NY, London, Geneva)		
3. Effectiveness^v and efficiency^{vi} of the response (including quality, timeliness, coverage, ^{vii} and appropriateness, including gender issues)			
<p><i>3.1 Comprehensiveness</i> Within the limitations, in particular of access, how comprehensive was/is the coverage of assistance, including protection?</p>	<p>Give this a time dimension (i.e. just how delayed and inadequate has the international response been?) As far as possible seek perspective of intended recipients of assistance (through FGD and spokespersons)</p> <p>Pose the question to potential critics (e.g. journalists, academics)</p> <p>For first visit focus on outputs and outcomes of 90-Day Plan</p>	<p>Obtain major needs assessments plus aggregate HA plans and performance reports incl. outputs (qualitative and quantitative)</p> <p>Timeline comparing needs and effective response (use in various settings at all levels incl. field)</p> <p>Test reported response (consider plausibility, criticisms made)</p> <p>(Tim Pitt, Manager of the HIC Darfur, has agreed to provide support to the evaluation team)</p>	<p>“Although achievement of Sphere standards is the ultimate goal, different assumptions are used for some sectors given the emergency circumstances. These assumptions have been agreed by humanitarian agencies working in Darfur since the Humanitarian Profile project was first launched in September 2003.”^{viii}</p>
<p><i>3.2 Use of resources</i> Have agencies/organisations made optimal use of resources? How have needs been prioritized? Have strategies been efficient in terms of results/costs? (Questions added by evaluation team)</p>	<p>Pose this question to senior UN, IO and NGO managers; ERC, HC, SRSG</p> <p>Note overlap with coordination on prioritization</p>	<p>Obtain budgets</p> <p>Consider issue of airdrops versus overland transport</p>	
<p><i>3.3 Water and sanitation</i> (Key questions will be framed by evaluation)</p>	<p>Attend sector working group in Khartoum and/or</p>	<p>Focus initially on 90-day plan. Obtain HIC trend data on</p>	<p>SPHERE; reasonable benchmarks for attaining</p>

Performance criteria and questionsⁱ	Miscellaneous team tasks	Strategies &/or plans	Standards &/or benchmarksⁱⁱ
team)	state capitals	coverage to gauge performance. Consider forward planning	Right to water (following HR Committee General Comment)
<i>3.4 Shelter and non-food items</i> (Key questions will be framed by evaluation team)		Focus initially on 90-day plan. Obtain HIC trend data on coverage to gauge performance. Consider forward planning	SPHERE; reasonable benchmarks for attaining
<i>3.5 Health and nutrition</i> (Key questions will be framed by evaluation team)		Focus initially on 90-day plan. Obtain HIC trend data on coverage to gauge performance. Consider forward planning	SPHERE; reasonable benchmarks for attaining
<i>3.6 Food security</i> (Key questions will be framed by evaluation team)	Consider issue of final distribution of food	Focus initially on 90-day plan. Obtain HIC trend data on coverage to gauge performance. Consider forward planning	SPHERE; reasonable benchmarks for attaining
<i>3.7 Camp management</i> (Key questions will be framed by evaluation team)		What is the strategy and implementation plan for camp management?	SPHERE; reasonable benchmarks for attaining

Performance criteria and questions ⁱ	Miscellaneous team tasks	Strategies &/or plans	Standards &/or benchmarks ⁱⁱ
<p><i>3.8 Protection of civilians^{ix}</i> (with particular attention to gender issues, as well as to those of children's rights) Which agencies/organisations have or should have undertaken situation analyses and protection assessments? Is there a sense, at least amongst UN agencies, of collective responsibility? Was/has effective complementarity between agencies/organisations been achieved? (questions added by evaluation team)</p>	<p>To clarify mandates, roles and performance ask following questions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ What is your understanding of protection? ▪ What is your agency's role and responsibility re. protection? ▪ Have protection considerations affected how your agency has performed over the last year? What steps has your agency taken to ensure protection of civilians in Darfur? ▪ What support/information/guidance have you received at field level from (a) your own regional office / HQ (b) other organisation (in or outside the UN) regarding protection and humanitarian assistance? ▪ What have you learned about protection? Will you now be able to apply these lessons in Darfur? In other contexts? ▪ How do you suggest that we measure protection – both in needs and in terms of needs being met? 		<p>The Humanitarian Charter includes the following undertaking: <i>We understand an individual's right to life to entail the right to have steps taken to preserve life where it is threatened, and a corresponding duty on others to take such steps. In addition, to ensure compliance, IHL makes specific provision for assistance to civilian populations during conflict, obliging states and other parties to agree to the provision of humanitarian and impartial assistance when the civilian population lacks essential supplies.</i></p> <p>IHL also contains provisions for ensuring compliance.</p>
4. Institutional and operational constraints			
<p><i>4.1 Overall</i> What are the specific and systemic problems in responding to the Darfur crisis?</p>	<p>Pose first question to senior UN, IO and NGO managers; ERC, HC, SRSG. Employ a ranking exercise for this, and seek recommendations for addressing problems identified Also pose to potential critics</p>	<p>Which objectives are most clearly frustrated?</p>	<p>Compare to other operations</p>

Performance criteria and questions ⁱ	Miscellaneous team tasks	Strategies &/or plans	Standards &/or benchmarks ⁱⁱ
	(e.g. journalists, academics)		
<p><i>4.2 Surge capacity</i> Were/are system and individual agency tools for crisis response – chiefly stand-by arrangements for personnel, supplies and logistics – existing and available to aid in the response? If so, have/are they being effectively utilized? If not, why?</p>	<p>Gather contingency plans and early warning reports – analyze usefulness and use. Asks key respondents regarding use or why they were not done. Understand undocumented EW and CP processes.</p>	<p>Track deployment data (for staff, equipment) by agency; review existence and relevance, use of contingency planning; review trigger mechanisms within agencies for using these tools</p>	<p>Sketch how it is all supposed to work and identify the key successes and failures. Deployment performance standards set by agencies themselves (e.g. have team on ground in x hours – problem here is to assess when the emergency actually was acknowledged.</p>
<p><i>4.3 Implementation capacity</i> Has the international humanitarian system been able to rapidly mobilize the necessary capacity, including implementing partners, for a large-scale response? If not, why? If local capacities, including qualified national staff, were/are insufficient, how is the UN in specific, but also other responders, coping without them?</p>	<p>Document and analyse a ‘snapshot’ of the implementation process including:</p> <p>a) How management, staffing and resourcing are facilitating or impeding implementation and how strengths and weaknesses can be built on/addressed in the present and future operations; and</p> <p>b) How the operational context/external factors are impacting on implementation and the implications for the present and future operations.</p>		<p>What is lacking in terms of standards, protocols, policy directives, systems and procedures, operational guidelines etc? To what extent were they in place but were not followed or could not be applied adequately? Any enhancements/additions to normative measures required for future operations?</p> <p>Include management and administration benchmarks</p>

Performance criteria and questions ⁱ	Miscellaneous team tasks	Strategies &/or plans	Standards &/or benchmarks ⁱⁱ
	Also relevant to ask if UN agency and/or donor funding arrangements have made it difficult for INGOs to maintain and/or mobilise surge capacity. Have INGOs disinvested in core areas like water and sanitation and if so why? Assess INGO capacity in key sectors and on what it is dependent		
<p><i>4.4 Logistics</i></p> <p>How has the humanitarian community been addressing the enormous logistical challenges of delivering aid in such an expansive region with little to no infrastructure? To what extent were/are existing capacities and arrangements -- such as the UN Joint Logistics Unit and common air support – meeting the demands?</p>	Gain an overview of logistic needs and assets and how these have evolved	What were the plans/targets for the UNJLC and to what extent have they been realised?	For standards consider UNJLC policy and procedures. For a benchmark consider other operations
<p><i>4.5 Humanitarian access</i></p> <p>What role have access restrictions played in delaying the initial response (September 2003 to February/March 2004); after they were eased somewhat (March to June 2004); when finally lifted (July 2004);</p>	Construct access timeline/map		Standards are in international humanitarian and human rights law

Performance criteria and questions ⁱ	Miscellaneous team tasks	Strategies &/or plans	Standards &/or benchmarks ⁱⁱ
and today?			
4.6 Security of humanitarian workers (includes landmines and UXO)	Compile table of incidents		Request information on MOSS compliance
5. Donor response	<p>Key documents include: Reports/Notes on Funding: Sudan Assistance Bulletin (from May 2003, 32 issues) includes 'Funding News' 2004-07-27 Darfur-Funding-Note 2004-07-27 Darfur-Funding-Overview 2004-08-18 Darfur Funding Note NGOs and Red Cross CAP 2004. (November 2003) Mid-Year Review of CAP: Humanitarian Appeal 2004 Sudan. (Jun 2004) CAP: Revised Appeal for the Sudan Assistance Programme (ASAP 2004) – Darfur Crisis. (March 2004) 2004 End of Year Priorities. (August 2004) Humanitarian Profiles</p>		
5.1 How has the timing and level of aid impacted the humanitarian community's response to the Darfur crisis?	Speak to Karin Soerensen, Special Assistant to the RC, formerly responsible for funding/tracking		Perhaps derive standards from Good Humanitarian Donorship principles.
5.2 To what extent did/is the speed of the disbursement of funds affecting the response?	Have statistical overview prepared Note that disbursement is amongst other things an accountability issue		
5.3 Did/is the humanitarian community making the best use of the funding sources and mechanisms available to it, such as the Central Emergency Revolving Fund	Understand better donor surge contributions (e.g. DFID, Sweden)		

Performance criteria and questionsⁱ	Miscellaneous team tasks	Strategies &/or plans	Standards &/or benchmarksⁱⁱ
(CERF)?			
5.4 Did or is it currently soliciting and making adequate use of in-kind contributions, such as for logistics, as well as direct funding?			
5.5 Why have/are donors not funding the Darfur crisis to the same extent as other crises of equally high profile and comparable need?	Mainly a question for the major donors		Funding provided to other crises?
5.6 Have/are non-Western donors, in specific Middle Eastern donors and other Asian countries, being included in fundraising efforts? What has their role been as donors?	List potential non-Western donors (J. Joergenson).	Ask agency RMUs regarding the approach to and response from non-Western donors	Amount of funding by such donors provided; timeliness of funding
6. Connectedness^x			
	Review 2005 workplan. To what extent is a longer-term vision apparent in Darfur projects? Approach to community participation (difference before and after the emergency?)		Connectedness as reflected in the 2005 work plan. Level of capacity-building of national staff

ⁱ The Terms of Reference (ToR) require that humanitarian assistance and protection be evaluated against the following criteria: **timeliness, appropriateness, relevance, efficiency and effectiveness**. These are incorporated below. The ToR also specify the **issues** to be addressed, and these make up the bulk of the entries in this column.

ⁱⁱ Standards are objective while benchmarks are contextual (i.e. reasonable by a certain stage given the prevailing conditions).

ⁱⁱⁱ The evaluation team will have to determine in consultation with key responders where the benchmarks should be placed in time. Perhaps for the first visit we could suggest early 2004 (say March), September 2004 and end 2004.

^{iv} OECD/DAC 1999: “**Coherence** – refers to policy coherence, and the need to assess security, developmental, trade and military policies as well as humanitarian policies, to ensure that there is consistency and, in particular, that all policies take into account humanitarian and human rights considerations ...”

^v OECD/DAC 1999: “**Effectiveness** measures the extent to which the activity achieves its purpose, or whether this can be expected to happen on the basis of the outputs ...Implicit within the criteria of effectiveness is **timeliness** ...There is value in using it more explicitly as one of the standard criteria because of its importance in the assessment of emergency programmes. Similarly, issues of resourcing and preparedness should be addressed.”

^{vi} OECD/DAC 1999: “**Efficiency** measures the outputs - qualitative and quantitative – in relation to the inputs. This generally requires comparing alternative approaches to achieving the same outputs, to see whether the most efficient process has been used ...”

^{vii} OECD/DAC 1999: “**Coverage** – the need to ‘reach the major population groups facing life-threatening suffering wherever they are, providing them with assistance and protection proportionate to their need and devoid of extraneous political agendas’ ...” (apparently quoting Minear)

^{viii} Darfur Humanitarian Profile No. 5, Office of the RC/HC, 1 August 2004, p 26

^{ix} Terms of reference: Given the especially acute vulnerability of displaced children and women, the study will pay particular attention to gender issues, as well as to those of children’s rights (para 2.3). Given the nature of the conflict that has caused forced displacement and the widespread use of breaches of international human rights and humanitarian law, special attention will also be paid to the human rights dimensions of the humanitarian crisis as it impacts on protection assistance (2.4).

^x OECD 1999: “...**Connectedness**, the need ‘to assure that activities of a short-term emergency nature are carried out in a context which takes longer-term and interconnected problems into account’ ... (quoting Minear)

**INTER-AGENCY STANDING COMMITTEE
PRINCIPALS MEETING**

9 December 2004

9.30 – 13.00 hrs

Room I, Palais des Nations, Geneva

**Lessons learned from the Darfur Crisis: Preliminary observations from the
Darfur Real Time Evaluation of Humanitarian Response**

Circulated: 3 December 2004

The objectives of the evaluation and current status

The first aim of this evaluation is to allow the UN and other responders to the crisis to benefit from external, independent guidance to help improve the operational response in real-time. The second is to identify broader lessons learned in Darfur for future humanitarian action there and elsewhere. The evaluation has so far focused primarily on: 1) observing, in a short visit to Sudan in September 2004, the on-going operation to gain an appreciation of the challenges faced by, as well as the achievements of, the agencies on the ground; 2) identifying key issues and gaps that need attention; and 3) determining, in consultation with the UN Country Team (UNCT), reasonable expectations for improvements in the response, against which progress could be measured in subsequent stages of the evaluation. Headquarters and capital level interviews in October 2004 helped strengthen working hypotheses on the key issues, in preparation for the next field visit, now scheduled for January 2005, in which the team will spend more time in the Darfurs gathering primary information from both beneficiaries and responders in order to deepen its insight. This will inform the final lesson learning phase of the evaluation. The real-time aspect of the evaluation continues to offer the opportunity for timely corrections, and thus the team has and will continue to provide working papers for the UNCT at the conclusion of each visit. UN agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have been constrained by many external factors in responding to the crisis, which will be elaborated on in the final evaluation. This background document for the Inter Agency Standing Committee (IASC) meeting on 9 December 2004 will focus on internal constraints and systemic issues of critical concern.

Factors affecting deployment and response

1. The evaluation continues to wrestle with issues surrounding the timeliness of the intervention. For instance, preliminary analysis of internal early warning information provided by the agencies indicates that some were aware of the crisis as early as the first half of 2003, while by the end of that year Darfur was undeniably at the center of attention. Yet it was only well into 2004 that a comprehensive response was underway. It is thus reasonable to conclude that poor early warning cannot be solely blamed for the slow and inadequate

response and that other elements, including political ones, came into play. The evaluation team will thus have to continue to unravel the many other factors that have inhibited the response.

2. According to recent guidance on the collaborative approach, “the ERC, in consultation with the IASC, is responsible for ensuring that satisfactory mechanisms have been established at the field level for the effective delivery and coordination of assistance and protection in situations of internal displacement”.¹ Practically, this responsibility must be shared among the operational agencies. In many sectors, the collaborative approach has proved effective but in other critical areas – including protection, camp management and some forms of assistance – it has been problematic.
3. There appear to be various reasons for this, including concerns over the applicability of individual agency mandates, inadequate funding and capacity, and the selectivity exhibited by both UN agencies and NGOs in choosing activities that they were willing and/or able to undertake.
4. The role of the IASC in addressing weaknesses and gaps in humanitarian intervention deserves review. Urgent attention should be given to developing a default mechanism for determining which agencies should fill critical gaps that the UNCT has been unable to address. Donor support would be required in each case.

Planning

5. With the 2005 Workplan, the UNCT has attempted a more thoroughly integrated, strategic approach. Most promising is the envisioned quarterly cycle, which suggests that a periodic strategic planning process de-linked from appeals (but feeding into them) will become routine rather than an exception, as it should.
6. Earlier experience and recent planning efforts highlight the need for agency headquarters and regional offices to more actively support and ensure that the UNCT is prepared for all eventualities, including an increasingly negative scenario in Darfur and flare ups elsewhere in Sudan. In doing so, there remains a need to ensure that roles and responsibilities are clearly defined in advance. It is hoped that the contingency planning exercise to be undertaken in January 2005 will take these issues into account.
7. A sound understanding of the socio-political context is a prerequisite to effective assistance and protection. While some agencies are impressively informed, this is not uniformly so for a variety of internal and external reasons, including the lack of appropriately trained and experienced officers, and limited access. Further, given the wealth of knowledge and experience that existed in Sudan, and the Darfurs in particular, there appears to be limited historical memory of previous approaches and interventions, which might have been built upon in the various recent planning efforts. It is hoped that the opening of UNAMIS sub-offices with civil affairs capacities will further assist and support in this regard.
8. There is an outstanding need for a better understanding of the differential impact of the armed conflict and current situation on women and men, girls and boys. There also appears to be a need for greater capacity at the field and Khartoum levels for translating a gendered analysis into assistance and protection. Lessons learned from other crises and the provisions of the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 need to be applied. Gender concerns have centered on sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). While this issue is key, is not the

only issue; women's role as actors in protection, assistance and planning needs to be supported.

Capacity

9. Many agencies have attributed the delayed and inadequate response to the Darfur crisis to difficulties in fielding appropriately senior and seasoned humanitarian emergency managers as well as staff with technical skills, either through internal surge mechanisms or direct recruitment – highlighting an apparent systemic weakness in capacity. Systemically, surge capacity is increasingly being used to fill regular staffing gaps, which is perceived to be due in part to a shrinking pool of experienced emergency response personnel. In part, this is because managers have generally been unwilling to divert or transfer existing staff with the requisite experience, even if they are on surge rosters.
10. As a result, a good number of surge and donor stand-by arrangement personnel are still on the ground. Relying on them indefinitely compounds the problem globally and is unsustainable. It thus needs to be urgently addressed.
11. Many staff are new to their agencies and have received little training. This is understandable for the initial phase of the emergency, but must now be addressed.
12. Common services, including most notably the common pipeline for non-food items, have been beneficial for UN agencies and NGOs alike. Efforts should be made to build on this model through 2005 in order to establish a broader common logistics and operational support infrastructure.

Protection

13. It is positive that this crisis has been recognised as a protection crisis at all levels. This reflects an important shift from other recent crises.
14. The UNCT was slow to develop a protection strategy, not presenting one until well into the crisis in November 2004. This is reflective mainly of a lack of a common conceptual understanding of the actions required, as well as specialised and trained personnel to lead.
15. This strategy derived from a number of agency specific protection interventions throughout the Darfurs and a loosely coordinated response across the system. It divides protection concerns into five broad categories and provides lists of relevant activities for each, which is vital, but the document still requires a clear exposition of priority activities, roles and responsibilities, and specific guidance and tools on how to immediately tackle difficult protection concerns. An implementation matrix is being prepared that will likely fill some or many of these gaps. Nevertheless, the team believes that the supporting 'strategy' should be further developed. Objectives, assumptions and risks also need to be clearly stated and the strategy needs to be more clearly grounded in international law.
16. The protection offered by presence is necessarily limited by the security environment, a culture of impunity and the lack of a military force and credible justice system. Unarmed civilian workers cannot intervene physically, and speaking out carries its own risks. Leadership founded on protection expertise is thus sorely needed.
17. The efforts of the UN to address involuntary and forced returns of internally displaced people (IDPs) on a case-by-case and ad hoc basis has met with inconsistent success. While the recent efforts made and mechanisms devised to resettle IDPs have been appropriate, they are yet to be fully tested. This area will continue to require constant monitoring.

18. Efforts to address SGBV have been weak and immediate concrete attention to reducing the incidence of SGBV is required.

Camp management

19. The critical importance of strengthening camp management to improve environmental health outcomes and address a range of protection issues has long been recognised but has so far resulted in only a handful of camps having a recognised lead. This still needs to be urgently addressed.

20. Further, there continues to be a lack of technical expertise and capacity in this area. Thus, it would seem that there remains an urgent need for the UN, in particular the operational agencies, to backstop current efforts in this area. Without this, camp management will continue to be a central weakness of the response.

21. For example, the lack of effective, comprehensive and uniform approaches to camp management has meant that IDPs themselves are not being effectively engaged. As a result, valuable local capacities to better manage facilities and resources; facilitate protection; and improve environmental health outcomes are not being fully exploited. Doing more in this area will also enhance the confidence of IDPs in themselves, each other and the humanitarian community.

The way forward

22. First and foremost is the need to recognize the value of this real-time evaluation in helping the responders on the ground and other key stakeholders to better understand the particular environment of Darfur; to get an early diagnosis of the problems and obstacles to an effective response; and to make timely corrections as appropriate. Further, to recognize the priority that this places on the IASC to fully support and address field concerns with the urgency and attention they deserve. To this end, the evaluation team submits that the following steps and actions are amongst the most important for the IASC:

23. Protection and camp management have presented considerable challenges in Darfur and have tested the collaborative approach to IDPs. Valuable lessons will emerge from this experience. The immediate task for the IASC is to support the UNCT by helping determine how the existing protection and camp management strategies can be strengthened and effectively implemented. Most importantly this comes down to agencies making commitments to fill the gaps and agree concomitant roles and responsibilities. The UN needs to impose accountability on itself across all sectors and provide the 'backbone' in terms of leadership and expertise.

24. In the medium term more formal arrangements are required including: a) building up technical expertise in protection and camp management and establishing a formal 'home' for this in one or more of the UN agencies (or at least designating this on a crisis-by-crisis basis by agreement of the UNCT); and b) establishing a default mechanism for determining which agencies should fill critical gaps that the UNCT has been unable to address.

25. A quarterly strategic planning process de-linked from appeals (but feeding into them) should be made the standard. Such a planning process should be truly strategic and be informed by: a) more in-depth socio-political, gender and human rights analysis; and b) review exercises that critically evaluate progress in achieving higher level agency-wide objectives in key areas (e.g. SGBV) while assessing potential changes in overall assumptions and risks.

INTER-AGENCY REAL-TIME EVALUATION OF THE HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE TO THE DARFUR CRISIS - NOTE OF APPROACH TO SECOND VISIT

Purpose and objectives

In recognition of the need to strengthen the international humanitarian response to the Darfur crisis, the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) launched this evaluation in August 2004 with two principal aims: a) to allow the UN and other responders to the crisis to benefit from external, independent guidance to help improve the operational response in real-time; b) to identify broader lessons learned in Darfur for future humanitarian action there and elsewhere.

The evaluation has so far focused primarily on: i) observing, in a short visit to Sudan in September 2004, the on-going operation to gain an appreciation of the challenges faced by, as well as the achievements of, the agencies on the ground; ii) identifying key issues and gaps that need attention; and iii) determining, in consultation with the UN Country Team, reasonable expectations for improvements in the response, against which progress could be measured in subsequent stages of the evaluation. Capital level interviews in October 2004 helped strengthen working hypotheses on the key issues, in preparation for the current visit.

The team leader arrived late on 8 January in advance of other members of the team – all four of whom will finally be in place by 18 January. The team will depart on 9 February. During this the second of three visits the team will spend the majority of its time in the Darfurs gathering primary information from beneficiaries and front line responders in order to deepen its insight and provide the basis for recommending timely actions that may be taken to improve the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of the operation. Although the focus will be on the here and now the team will consider progress made in recent months (including against the benchmarks set in September), and comment on current plans (the 2005 Work Plan and the 120 day plan now being developed).

The team wishes to stress that its over-riding purpose is to be of assistance to the UNCT and partner NGOs and IOs.

Evaluation tools

The evaluation tools will include:

Means to end analysis

That is, determining the extent to which all outputs, taken together and considering critical assumptions, are likely to be achieving humanitarian objectives.

Critical indicators

These will include indicators of overall impact (mortality, morbidity, GAM and others) as well as output level indicators (borrowing from those specified in the 2005 Work Plan).

Selected issues

A limited number of issues will be agreed which will serve as proxy indicators for the overall performance of the humanitarian operation. Although limited in number so as to make this phase manageable and valuable, the chosen lines of inquiry will cut across many other important issues in the ToR. It should also be noted that these are starting points and are likely to be amended and/or supplemented in the course of discussions with agencies and organisations.

The current list of selected issues include:

- Sexual and Gender Based Violence
- Efforts to prevent conflict/address conflict
- Timeliness and adequacy of relief/services to war affected (focus on watsan)
- Humanitarian operational capacity (focus on coverage and access)
- UN decision-making and accountability (focus on protection strategy & roles)

Focus of the second visit

The team will examine the response primarily from the perspective of the war affected and front line field workers. The criteria for site selection will include:

- Compare and contrast – e.g. well known and well served sites with relatively easy access vs. less familiar and poorly served sites/areas with more difficult access
- Relevance to a strategic line of inquiry – e.g. opportunity to consider an SBGV activity which may have important lessons
- Opportunistic – e.g. join a needs assessment to a particular site; take the opportunity of being able to get on a helicopter to visit a peripheral area.

The basic model (in the sense of a building block) follows. The team recognises the need to be very flexible about this.

Day 1	2	3	4	5
Travel	Site visit 1	Site visit 2	More interviews and prep for debrief/workshop	Debrief/workshop
Interviews in state capital; collection of secondary data		Site visit 3 (if appropriate)		Travel

Please see the draft itinerary attached incorporating this basic model for visits to each of the three states.

Meetings

The team is planning four working meetings, one in each of the state capitals and one in Khartoum, to facilitate the development of real time recommendations with substantial input from the field. One of the main reasons for the advance arrival of the team leader is to determine the feasibility and acceptability of this process. At each level the meetings will involve UN agencies, NGOs and IOs (on the IASC model). Donors will be briefed separately.

Bernard Broughton, Team Leader, 10/1/05

TENTATIVE PROGRAM, SUBJECT TO DISCUSSION, AVAIL OF FLIGHTS, ETC

<i>Saturday</i>	<i>Sunday</i>	<i>Monday</i>	<i>Tuesday</i>	<i>Wednesday</i>	<i>Thursday</i>	<i>Friday</i>
8 January Team leader arrives Khartoum 2010	9 Consultations with agencies/organizations; advance planning	10 Continue	11 Continue	12 Second team member arrives	13 2 team members travel to one of the Darfurs	14 In Darfur
15 In Darfur	16 In Darfur	17 In Darfur	18 Two team members return Khartoum	19 Full team meeting	20 Team travels to Darfur	21 Team in Darfur
22 Team in Darfur	23 Team in Darfur	24 Team in Darfur	25 Team travels to 2 nd state	26 Team in Darfur (2 nd state)	27 Team in Darfur (2 nd state)	28 Team in Darfur (2 nd state)
29 Team in Darfur (2 nd state)	30 Team travels to 3 rd state	1 February Team in Darfur (3 rd state)	2 Team in Darfur (3 rd state)	3 Team in Darfur (3 rd state)	4 Team returns to Khartoum	5 Preparation for working meeting
6 Half day working meeting with emergency program managers	7 Presentation to principals Presentation to donors Write up	8 Write up	9 Finalise and present report. Team departs			

INTER-AGENCY REAL-TIME EVALUATION OF THE HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE TO THE DARFUR CRISIS

NOTE OF APPROACH TO THIRD VISIT

Introduction

This note is being shared initially with the Humanitarian Coordinator's office and OCHA in Khartoum for comment. A note will subsequently be circulated to all agencies and organizations. The evaluation team is due to arrive on or about 23 April and will remain in Sudan for approximately one month. The team members for this visit include Bernard Broughton and Sarah Maguire (as for the previous two visits) and Philip Winter (replacing Leslye Rost Van Tonningen). Kelly David-Toweh, the fourth team member, will not come to Sudan but will work on the evaluation from New York and Geneva.

Main tasks

1 First set, from starting point of previous recommendations

- Review response to and action taken on the recommendations made by the team at the end of February 2005 (including HQ level recommendations).
- As appropriate, make follow-up, real-time recommendations (during the course of or at the conclusion of the visit); and
- Develop broader lessons for inclusion in the final report, including recommendations as to how they should be applied.

2 Second set, from starting point of drawing conclusions about effectiveness

- Draw conclusions on the effectiveness of the humanitarian response over time (to the extent that this is possible) based on quarterly 'needs and gaps' tables to be compiled by the team based on information provided by the Darfur Cell.
- Where the response clearly fell/falls short, draw conclusions as to how much can be put down to:
 - external constraints (including access, security, etc)
 - policy and mandate responsibility related constraints;
 - lack of institutional capacity (e.g. early warning, surge capacity); and
 - poor performance peculiar to this intervention at field and/or HQ level.
- Test these conclusions with UN agencies, IOs, NGOs and donors and revise as appropriate.
- The team will also identify strengths of the intervention.
- Develop broader lessons about the specific and systemic issues arising for inclusion in the final report, including recommendations as to how they should be applied.

3 Other tasks

- Identify and address any critical outstanding gaps in the team's coverage to date (the team recognizes that further inquiry is required in some areas);
- Provide input to the 120-day review and/or forward planning exercise.

Methods

It is envisioned that the team will initially spend time in Khartoum gathering further data and observation on needs and outputs in terms of scale and timing, and then make specific, targeted trips to the Darfurs to compare these with outcomes.

Observations and conclusions will have to be tested in at least two Darfur states. The team will then return to Khartoum to fine-tune and triangulate the findings before leaving the UNCT and its partners with a draft aide memoire. The majority of the team's time, therefore, will be spent in Khartoum.

Although not highlighted in the ToR, it is recognized that the team needs to explore the HQ-Khartoum relationship and the Khartoum-field relationship and their impact on the effectiveness of the response.

Notes concerning the final report

The team will not in its final report write the definitive history of the response to the Darfur crisis, but rather set the stage for a discussion of the critical issues. The final report will not exhaustively cover all issues, but it will address the most important ones with supporting arguments, rooted in evidence that is as concrete as possible, and which are defensible and outcomes based.

The difficulties of measuring outcomes will be considerable and some conclusions may be limited to noting that outcomes were influenced by a number of factors and thus were not as effective as possible. Measuring protection outcomes will be the most difficult, not least because this is still a relatively new field for this sort of inquiry.

The final report will include lessons generalized to indicate wider relevance to future humanitarian response in Sudan and elsewhere. The team will endeavour to make specific recommendations for applying these lessons, particularly as they relate to systemic strengths and weaknesses.

MANAGEMENT RESPONSE MATRIX FOR REPORT TWO

Relevant – urgent follow up needed

Recommendation	Comment	Focal point
47. Request that two staff counsellors be deployed and made available to all staff. Periodic counselling should be mandatory for all staff.	Specify stress counseling. Attendance prerogative of staff. Decision on funding to be taken, staff to be identified.	UNCT
9. Ensure that staff with sufficient gender expertise and appropriate analysis are available to inform programming and action. 48. Seek the assistance of relevant entities (e.g. the UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), the UN Advance Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS) Gender Adviser and appropriate NGOs) to ensure that all aspects of the humanitarian response are guided by a gender analysis and informed by consultation with affected women and men. Particular attention should be paid to the impact of displacement on gender roles.	Ongoing. UNICEF, UNHCR and WFP all have gender experts. Other agencies following up on identifying focal points. Forward to Gender Advisor at UNMIS. Agencies, in general, involve gender analysis and consultation with women in programming activities.	All agencies Gender Adviser UNMIS
40. Consider creating an independent Strategic Monitoring Unit. Under the overall supervision of the HC, the Unit would be tasked with measuring the impact of humanitarian and protection assistance through the conduct of independent monitoring and evaluation of programmes and projects. 44. Make a greater contribution to conflict mapping and analysis, and provide practical guidance to assist humanitarian agencies and organizations to integrate conflict mitigation and peace building in their assistance programmes.	OCHA operational Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Unit effective 1 May 2005. Ongoing. UNDP post-conflict and HC office political analysts in Khartoum. Dissemination of information to be improved	OCHA HC office
56. Make unequivocally clear to all actors the roles of IOM and UNHCR as regards to relocation and returns, in particular if IOM is to continue to be responsible for IDP returns in North and South Darfur, in parallel with UNHCR's responsibilities in West Darfur. The HC should address the reservations of some agencies and organisations about IOM's capacity.	Efforts to be made to clarify with GoS during high-level visits. Remove the last sentence – not relevant. Discussion on lessons learned and current status of IOM-MCM and UNHCR-LoU to be facilitated by the HC/DHC /OCHA Ongoing discussions between UNHCR and GoS on implementation of the LoU and dissemination of the principle of voluntary returns / relocations in dignity and safety.	HC/DHC, UNHCR, IOM, OCHA
32. Ensure that the ethos in coordination meetings is one in which problems are honestly acknowledged and debated, without undue defensiveness, in the interests of jointly improving the relevance and effectiveness of the response. 33. Consider the establishment of an IASC structure at the Khartoum level. This could be affected by including NGO consortium representatives and the ICRC in	Ongoing reorganization of coordination structure will facilitate revision of coordination mechanisms. Need to optimize existing forums to improve involvement/discussion in analysis/ planning and coordination. OCHA and Sector Coordinators to produce TORs for all coordination meetings. Need to improve minute taking/dissemination.	HC/DHC/OCHA/Sector coordinators

regular UN Country Team meetings.	IASC structure under discussion by HC/DHC	
13. Rely less exclusively on Sphere Project quantitative targets as the sole measure of achievement.	Sector Coordinators to decide on standards/targets to report in the Work Plan Review, HNP and agency documents. To be carried out at the same time as the revision of the workplan. Expected to be completed in mid-May.	OCHA/Sector coordinators
12. Ensure that all employees and consultants have signed the IASC Code of Conduct on sexual exploitation.	Recommend this is done at HQ level during pre-deployment of international staff using IASC codes or agency specific documents. UNHCR, UNICEF, IRC and others already have Codes of Conduct for their staff.	HQ all agencies
1. Address the needs and vulnerabilities of IDPs and others in less accessible areas, including areas controlled by non-state actors. 24. Give higher priority to conducting multi-agency and multi-sectoral assessments that systematically fill gaps in geographic and sectoral knowledge. This should be coordinated through the state and Khartoum level inter-agency coordination meetings.	OCHA is leading discussions on this in various forums at Khartoum and field level. A map/table is going to be developed on a monthly basis, with the support of HIC as a base for discussion on priorities for intervention and revisions of actions taken, based on needs and not on political agendas. HNP data and other information from the field will be used to develop the map and areas of intervention.	OCHA
30. Commence regular reviews of the 2005 Work Plan (envisaged for each 120-day period) with a state-level process to be subsequently consolidated into a Darfur-wide meeting of UN and NGO representatives. These reviews should include an appraisal of the continued relevance of existing strategies and of the causal logic between activities and higher-level objectives. The upcoming review in particular should be seized as an opportunity to deal more satisfactorily with the complex and dynamic overlay of acute and chronic tensions, needs and vulnerabilities confronting responders in Darfur. 31. Identify skilled facilitators to lead these review/strategic planning processes from amongst the existing compliment of UN agency (including OCHA Consolidated Appeals Process facilitators), IO and NGO personnel. They should form an ad hoc team, supported by the OCHA Darfur Cell. Consideration should be given to providing training in the facilitation of review and planning processes to members of the OCHA Darfur Cell to strengthen the Darfur Cell's capacity to provide advice and assistance to the ad hoc team. 37. Ensure that the upcoming review of the 2005 Work Plan incorporates plans to address the needs and vulnerabilities of IDPs and others in less accessible areas, including areas controlled by non-state actors.	Ongoing. An expert from OCHA HQ will arrive in mid-April to lead the process.	OCHA
10. Explore traditional women's leadership structures and women's priorities. All discussions with communities about new interventions, as well as decisions about ongoing interventions, should include separate sessions with women and	Forward to PWG for discussion. Camp coordinators are gathering information on existing networks/associations at camp level to identify possible forums.	Protection Working Group/OCHA

<p>men.</p> <p>15. Involve the assisted population in decision-making – particularly women and other marginalised groups - commencing with an investigation of formal and informal leadership structures. Checks and balances, such as the minuting of meetings, should be put in place to ensure the accountability of leaders. Public notice boards should be established at all community and women’s centres, and key decisions regularly posted.</p>	<p>UN agencies/NGOs regularly involve discussions with beneficiaries, especially women and vulnerable groups, in decision-making processes. Consideration should be given to the fact that material posted in public notice boards may be vetoed by HAC and GoS officials and that staff employed for this task may be subject to intimidations.</p>	
<p>43. Disseminate the <i>Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement</i> to IDPs, government officials and humanitarian actors, in accordance with Security Council Resolution 1547. This should be done in Arabic and local languages through a multitude of channels, including radio broadcasts and plays, incorporation of the principles into literacy programmes, and through booklets, newsletters and newspapers.</p>	<p>Guiding Principles are not recognized or adhered to by the GoS. Copies available at OCHA. Camp management, protection trainings include GP. Protection Steering Group and Public Information Working Group to discuss advocacy initiatives.</p> <p>Consideration should be given to the fact that a recent assessment highlights that UN radio will not be up and running in Darfur until mid 2006 at the earliest and that given the current regulatory structure it's unlikely that alternative means of radio broadcast like camp radios will be allowed before that time. The same evaluation suggests the use of BBC World Service.</p>	<p>Protection Working Group. Pulic Information Working Group</p>
<p>3. Ensure that all staff members and consultants understand the humanitarian principles, key policies and modus operandi of their organisations, and that they can adequately explain them. These should be available (in Arabic and English) to all staff and consultants, as well as beneficiaries and the community. Oxfam’s <i>What is Oxfam Doing in Darfur?</i> document should be used as a model for providing public information.</p> <p>27. The need identified in Security Council Resolution 1547 for effective public information remains urgent and should be acted upon as soon as possible.</p>	<p>Information to staff is made available through briefings at HQs and/or field level. PI strategy has been elaborated by UNMIS in close collaboration with OCHA and other UN agencies. The recently established PI working group will further discuss/address the matter. Major constraint: staffing.</p>	<p>Public Information Working Group</p>
<p>58. The NGO community should establish its own security coordination unit, which would liaise with UNDSS. Also, consideration should be given to the establishment of a joint UN-NGO information and analysis unit for the Darfurs (perhaps located within UNDSS).</p> <p>59. UNDSS and Red R should ensure that <i>all</i> UN staff and consultants are provided with in situ, context specific security training. These trainings should include special considerations with regard to the security, recruitment and treatment of national staff.</p>	<p>For discussion between UNDSS and NGOs</p>	<p>UNDSS/NGOs</p>
<p>28. Ensure as a matter of priority the participation of the war-affected population and civil society in efforts to integrate conflict mitigation and peace building in assistance programmes – with particular reference to women’s roles in peace</p>	<p>Initiatives on-going outside the UN by NGOs and others. Initiatives to address this concern have highly political implications. Establishment of UNMIS presence in the field will boost interaction and UN</p>	<p>UNMIS</p>

building and conflict transformation in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1325.	response. NB: Nomadic Gap Group is a step towards integrating conflict resolution and peace building measures into programmes and should be reflected.	
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Relevant – in progress

Recommendation	Comment	Focal point
23. Include risk assessment as a central component of all assessments, and ensure the participation of an individual with protection expertise as a core team member.	Ongoing. Both aspects are considered in assessment missions.	All agencies
26, 41. Provide greater support to field-based actors on high-level advocacy on critical issues affecting programming. 42. Provide greater guidance to actors in the more remote areas regarding how to conduct advocacy at various levels and what support they may expect from their own and others' agencies at the regional or headquarters level.	Ongoing through information sharing, and continuous contacts between Khartoum and field offices.	All agencies
29. Sustain current high-level interventions in relation to the voluntary relocation of IDPs from large camps and public buildings in towns.	Ongoing through high level delegations from the UN and donors visits in the field and relationship with GoS in Khartoum and Darfur	All agencies
38. Develop a deeper field presence in order to meet mandated responsibilities, play a greater role in shaping the response, and provide support for NGOs, including mediating with the authorities to enable NGOs to pursue protection activities. Modalities include establishing satellite offices, mobile staff and improved communication	Ongoing.	All agencies
52. Ensure that the appropriate agency conducts an environmental risk assessment immediately, building on existing work.	Proposal from OCHA Environmental Emergencies Section received 29 March 2005, to be discussed. Other initiatives already ongoing on firewood resources, overdrilling of water locations.	HC/OCHA
19. Develop and implement systems to regularly monitor and report on the quality and impact of assistance, in keeping with the original Proposal for Coordination of IDP gatherings in Darfur.	OCHA HNP provides info. A process to review/streamline data collection and analysis ongoing. Camp coordinators report format disseminated. First report by Camp Coordinators expected in mid-April. OCHA to compile a consolidated report. Regular/ad hoc meeting at field level address relevant issues.	OCHA
20. Distributed and explain the documents detailing the selection criteria for and the responsibilities of camp coordinators to all organizations working in areas with designated coordinators. Consideration should be given to clarifying, and if needed revising, these roles and responsibilities with all actors involved. This should serve as a means of ensuring the buy-in of all actors, as well as strengthening consistency and promoting the convergence of standards across all IDP camps and areas. 54. Clarify the precise arrangements for the provision of support and technical guidance to international NGO camp/area coordinators including <i>inter alia</i> demarcation between the roles of OCHA, IOM and UNHCR.	OCHA carried out field trips to discuss with camp coordinators issues of concern. Regular forums for discussion established at Khartoum and field level. Revised TOR camp coordinators been disseminated. See 54, 65, 66, 67, 69 TOR IOM finalized. Discussion ongoing with UNHCR.	OCHA
55. Strengthen efforts to secure funding for NGOs who have accepted the task of camp management/coordination.	No information available on problems regarding funding. Advocacy with donors ongoing.	

<p>65. Others with camp management/coordination expertise (in particular UNHCR and the Inter-Agency Internal Displacement Division (IDD)) must provide technical support and guidance to OCHA and IOM in their new roles.</p> <p>66. OCHA should continue its efforts to identify NGOs capable of acting as camp/area coordinators in areas not yet covered, in particular in those with more than 10,000 IDPs.</p> <p>67. OCHA should continue in all states to help all new camp/area coordinators establish and maintain good working relationships with HAC authorities and the UN agencies and NGOs working in their area. Where necessary, OCHA should continue to facilitate these consultations.</p> <p>68. Subsequently, priority should be given to providing the appropriate technical support and guidance to international NGOs who have undertaken camp/area coordination, in particular to those who have yet to deploy full-time coordinators. OCHA, IOM and UNHCR should serve as 'intelligent conduits' for the transfer of best practices among the camp coordinators and the identification of weaknesses that must be addressed. This requires highly mobile staff in each of the Darfurs, spending most of their time in IDP camps/areas.</p> <p>69. The agreements concluded between OCHA and NGOs for the coordination of assistance in IDP camps/areas should be underpinned with an agreement between OCHA and the HAC (perhaps state by state).</p>	<p>Discussions ongoing between IOM, UNHCR and OCHA. With the presence of the Senior IDPs advisor in country, the need for IDD to provide further support does not appear immediate</p> <p>Ongoing. The second list of IDP gathering needing camp coordination arrangements being elaborated.</p> <p>Ongoing. OCHA carried out field trips to discuss with camp coordinators and HAC issues of concern. OCHA continues facilitation both at field and Khartoum level when needed.</p> <p>NRC engaged in camp coordination TOT (May) in the three Darfurs. Requested secondment of NRC expert on camp coordination to be based in Darfur and traveling to support activities as appropriate. IOM and OCHA co-chairing camp coordination meetings in North and South Darfur, negotiations ongoing to establish a similar system in West Darfur</p> <p>Under discussion with NGOs camp coordinator. While some NGOs would prefer a tripartite agreement, other agencies do not agree. Due to the current problems with HAC, including increased harassment of NGOs and existing tensions with OCHA, no immediate solution seem possible.</p>	
<p>84. The UN International Displacement Division should immediately distribute copies in Arabic of the <i>Guiding Principles</i> in Arabic to all IDP, officials and aid workers, in accordance with Security Council Resolution 1547. Also, it should provide technical support and guidance to OCHA in their new roles in camp coordination.</p>	<p>Guiding Principles are not recognized or adhered to by the GoS. Camp management, protection trainings include GP. Protection Steering Group and Public Information Working Group to discuss advocacy initiatives. IDPs Senior Advisor arrived in country. Copies of the IDPs guiding principles available in Arabic in Sudan.</p>	OCHA
<p>17. Ensure that plans for NFI distributions are more needs driven and timely, and are informed by a gendered analysis. If the planned second round distribution cannot be conducted before the next rains, consideration should be given to proceeding first with a distribution of plastic sheeting and waterproof ground mats.</p>	<p>Ongoing. Needs assessments and distribution consider gender issues.</p>	OCHA/JLC
<p>71. An inventory of significant assessments completed in all sectors in the last twelve months should be made by OCHA/HIC, and copies posted on a web site and made available for collection at the OCHA/HIC state offices (in deference to reported difficulties downloading large documents).</p>	<p>Ongoing by OCHA. Once index compiled will be distributed to Sector Coordinators for revision and completion of information. Timeline end of April</p>	OCHA/Sector Coordinators

18. Consider conducting a crude mortality survey before the rainy season to confirm the apparent improvement in trends and health outcomes.	Ongoing. Preparation started in early April. To be completed end of June under the oversight of the HC.	OCHA/WHO
11. Take multi-agency and multi-initiative approaches to prevent and address the rape of women in and around IDP camps. Practical initiatives found to be successful (e.g. fuel efficient stoves) should be taken to scale as a matter of urgency.	Ongoing discussion in multi-agency public forums, and bilateral discussions with the AU, donors, and the humanitarian community at Khartoum and field level. Need to improve reporting on practical initiatives being addressed by the PWG	PWG
5. The protection matrices developed for each of the Darfur States should move to the background while cogent plans for action move to the foreground.	Ongoing. Efforts to improve reporting on actions taken. New reporting format introduced.	PWG
53. Promote locally produced fuel-efficient stoves on a massive scale. Time bound targets for the percentage of encamped IDP households utilising the stoves should be set by the UN Country Team in consultation with relevant agencies and organisations.	Massive production of fuel efficient stoves is not an answer to the problem, training is crucial to changing habits. Training, production ongoing. UN/NGOs projects including training and production ongoing in several locations, more activities planned for the second quarter of 2005	PWG
60. UN agencies with human rights and protection mandates have to do much more to mediate the space at the field level for human rights and protection activities. The Khartoum Protection Steering Group should help the relevant agencies determine how to achieve this.	Ongoing though capacity stretched	PWG
64. The Khartoum Protection Steering Group should provide advice to the HC on actions that may need to be taken to address the risk of the receipt of food aid or any other humanitarian resource endangering beneficiaries.	Ongoing in all sectors and field locations.	PWG
61. UNICEF, OHCHR and concerned NGOs should systematically gather information on violations of the rights of children to inform legal and political processes, programming decisions and advocacy.	Ongoing. Situation Analysis in Child Protection is planned in May. A CAFF assessment was completed in April by UNICEF.	Child PWG
62. UNICEF and concerned NGOs should formulate an immediate plan with time bound targets to provide all war-affected children with access to education at no cost. Concrete action needs to be taken to overcome obstacles such as the payment of teachers' salaries and lack of implementing partners.	The plan is ongoing. MoE issued decree for education at no cost.. MoE , UNICEF and NGOs are implementing an in-service teacher training scheme for volunteer teachers where they receive an 'incentive for teaching' without calling it a salary. More partners were identified	
16. Convene the planned Groundwater Forum immediately and replicate it at the state capital level. Agencies should ensure that hydrological surveys available from the government Water, Environment and Sanitation (WES) ministry or other agencies are referred to prior to drilling. Where there is no data or it cannot be obtained they should conduct a survey before proceeding. This information should then be shared.	Hydro-geological and geophysical surveys are conducted to select sites before drilling. Procurement of new equipment to strengthen survey capacity is in the pipeline. Plans to develop ground water surveillance have been made and awaiting contributions to start implementation.	UNICEF
63. UNICEF should ensure that systems to regularly monitor bacteriological levels are put in place for water sources supported by the humanitarian response. Agencies and organisations undertaking water treatment should be supported by UNICEF with the appropriate expertise, equipment and supplies as needed.	Ongoing by UNICEF and WHO	UNICEF and WHO
21. Take care to ensure that there is no possibility of registration information being collected in ways that endanger IDPs.	Ongoing review. Darfur-wide registration exercise began in early March. As of mid April, 60% completed. Additionally, more sensitive questions	WFP

70. The appropriateness of the planned IOM/WFP registration should be reviewed.	were removed. Lessons learned in certain locations being applied regularly.	
25. Invest in establishing a mechanism for regularly collecting, analysing and disseminating integrated livelihood and food security data for the Darfurs.	WFP/FAO annual food security assessment being regularly produced. Other studies, led by WFP or FAO also available. Special effort put in place recently to strengthen knowledge on effects of poor rainfall in 2004. OCHA, WFP, FAO and other agency joint assessments are underway ensuring response priorities are better coordinated	WFP/FAO

Not specific action to be taken

Recommendation	Comment	Focal point
2. Reprioritise tasks to enable existing personnel to spend a greater proportion of their time in the field.	No specific action to be taken.	n/a
4. Consult regularly with staff to ensure that their concerns are addressed.	No specific action to be taken.	n/a
46. Distribute the 2005 <i>United Nations and its Partners Work Plan for the Sudan</i> to UN agencies and NGOs in the field.	Distributed to UN. Available on UN Sudan website.	n/a
57. Appeal to all organisations, donors and states to limit missions to only those that are essential, and decline to accept those that are not. All stakeholders should abide by this principle.	No specific action to be taken.	n/a
49. Ensure that new and existing strategies and implementation plans respond to women and men's protection and assistance needs. This process must be developed in collaboration with those working at the field and state level.	No specific action to be taken.	n/a

Not relevant/RTE team to clarify

Recommendation	Comment	Focal point
6. Protection strategies and plans should more deliberately reflect IHRL, IHL and thematic UN Security Council Resolutions. ¹	RTE team to clarify. Concepts and principles expressed in IHRL, IHL, UNSCRs are integrated in strategies and plans.	n/a
7. Identify and provide financial, technical and advocacy support to national organisations to enable them to do protection work and to ensure the sustainability of action.	Inappropriate. In the current environment the possibility of endangering national staff too great. Cf. SUDO country director imprisonment, among others	n/a
8. Ensure responses are informed by ICCPR, BPfA and UNSCR 1325.	Concepts and principles expressed in the documents referred to are integrated in strategies and plans.	
14. Examine the feasibility of establishing a 'social safety net' mechanism for the most vulnerable, initially in urban areas (focusing on IDPs).	RTE team to clarify. Implication/acceptability of social safety nets with the social fabric must be taken into consideration.	n/a
22. Consider accepting entitlement documentation (tokens) across camps/areas, in order to enable IDPs to move freely between camps/areas.	Inappropriate. Darfur-wide registration exercise began in early March. As of 4 April, 37% completed. Registration cards mechanism used.	n/a
34. Jointly develop UN-NGO partnership principles or guidelines on inter-agency relations.	Suggest IASC guidelines be used instead of committing the NGOs to developing/signing off on yet another doc.	n/a
39. If not a function envisioned in the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMISUD), consider recruiting, through a cost sharing arrangement, a dedicated external relations staff person in each Darfur capital, who would be responsible for handling all inter-agency or external missions. Alternatively, this responsibility could be shared on a rotating basis among the UN agencies on the ground.	Unnecessary	n/a
45. Provide some information to IDPs in the three Darfur states about possible	Ongoing via UNHCR, IOM and NGOs. Massive return not forecasted in	n/a

mechanisms and programs, recognizing that the issue of returns has to continue to be managed with great sensitivity.	2005. GoS 'encouraged' return being monitored.	
35. Consider forming a consortium of humanitarian agencies and organisations at the state level to profile the capacities of all members to aid in planning and coordination.	Inappropriate	n/a
36. Members of the above consortium should make themselves accountable to each other for what they say they are going to do.		
50. Request a relevant agency or agencies to facilitate the development of a common strategy and implementation plan to respond to women and men's protection and assistance needs. This process must be developed in collaboration with those working at the field and state level.	RTE team to clarify.	n/a
51. Invite the Sphere Project to assist agencies and organisations to appropriately apply Sphere Project minimum standards in the Darfur context.	Not needed. Discussion on standards to be adopted ongoing among sector coordinators	n/a

Specific recommendations for HQ and Donors

Targeted at	Recommendation	Report reference	Focal Point/ Time period for implementation
HEADQUARTERS			
UN Secretary-General	74. If UNDSS had not yet deployed a planned minimum of two Field Security Coordination Officers per state by the end of February 2005, the Secretary-General should be requested to intervene.	Security Rec. 5/ page 5	UN Secretary General
All headquarters actors	75. Abide by the principle of limiting missions to only those that are essential.	Staffing Rec. 13/ page 7	All agencies/Secretariat
All operational actors	76. Urgently fill posts and respond positively to additional requests, including within IOM and OCHA in order to ensure they can carry out their new roles in supporting camp management/coordination.	Field presence and coverage Rec 3/ page 4 IDP camp/area management/coordination Rec. 42/ page 16	IOM and OCHA, ongoing. IOM funding needed.
	77. Ensure human rights and protection personnel have the necessary expertise and experience upon recruitment.	Staffing Rec. 10/ page 6	Ongoing in coordination with field.

Targeted at	Recommendation	Report reference	Focal Point/ Time period for implementation
	78. Ensure that staff are conversant in the basics of international and regional human rights instruments and international humanitarian law (IHL), a programme of training should be commenced, or where in place continued, for all humanitarian staff.	Staffing Rec. 11/ page 7	
	79. Provide greater support to field-based actors on high-level advocacy on critical issues affecting programming.	Advocacy Rec. 62/ page 19	All agencies
Agency specific	80. Given the complexity and delicacy of its work, the Darfur context and the need for leadership on these issues, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has a particular responsibility to ensure that its human rights officers are highly trained and experienced.	Staffing Rec. 10/ page 6	OHCHR
	81. UNICEF, OHCHR and the SRSG for Children and Armed Conflict should urgently address violations of the rights of children with reference to the CRC and its Optional Protocol ¹ and vigorously pursue publicity and public advocacy on their behalf.	Child protection Rec. 20/ page 9	UNICEF, OHCHR, SRSG for Children in Armed conflict
	82. Strengthen and support agencies and others specifically tasked with gender issues at all levels in terms of funding, staffing levels and key decision-making fora.	Gender Rec. 26/ page 10	See 9. Ongoing. UNICEF, UNHCR and WFP all have gender experts. Other agencies following up on identifying focal points.
	83. Those heads of agencies and others with explicit protection and/or human rights mandates, including but not limited to UNICEF, the SRSG for Children in Armed Conflict, UNIFEM and the High Commissioner for Human Rights, should do more to lead advocacy on behalf of war-affected women, men and children.	Advocacy Rec. 61/ page 19	UNICEF, OHCHR, SRSG for Children in Armed conflict
	84. The UN International Displacement Division should immediately distribute copies in Arabic of the <i>Guiding Principles</i> in Arabic to all IDP, officials and aid workers, in accordance with Security Council Resolution 1547. Also, it should provide technical support and guidance to OCHA in their new roles in camp coordination.	Public information Rec. 65/ page 20 IDP camp/area management/coordination Rec. 42/ page 16	See 43. Guiding Principles are not recognized or adhered to by the GoS. Copies available at OCHA. Camp management, protection trainings include GP. Senior IDP advisor deployed in Sudan in early April.

Targeted at	Recommendation	Report reference	Focal Point/ Time period for implementation
DONORS			
Donors	<p>85. Support as a matter of urgency the following interventions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Joint UN-NGO security information and analysis unit (situated in UNDSS) and/or NGO security coordination unit to liaise with UNDSS ▪ Production and distribution of locally produced fuel-efficient stoves on a massive scale. ▪ An independent Strategic Monitoring Unit tasked with with measuring the impact of humanitarian and protection assistance through the conduct of independent monitoring and evaluation of programmes and projects. ▪ NGOs with IDP camp/area coordination responsibilities ▪ The formation of a consortium of humanitarian agencies and organisations at the state level to profile the capacities of all members to aid in planning and coordination, and accountability ▪ The development of UN-NGO partnership principles or guidelines on inter-agency relations. 	<p>Security Rec. 6/page 5 Humanitarian assistance Rec. 35/ page 13 Humanitarian assistance Rec. 39/ page 13 IDP camp/area management/coordination Rec. 48/ page 16 Coordination Rec. 77/ page 24 Coordination Rec. 78/79 page 24</p>	<p>To be re-discussed with the RTE according to comments re: 1) fuel efficient stoves – results are to be expected only if training is carried out at the same time as massive production - see 53; 2) formation of a consortium of humanitarian agencies: Revision of coordination mechanisms to accommodate recommendations and optimize existing forums to improve involvement/discussion in analysis/ planning and coordination. OCHA and Sector Coordinators to produce TORs for all coordination meetings. Need to improve minute taking/dissemination. – see 33; 3) deployment of UN/NGO partnership principles or guidelines on inter-agency relations: Suggest IASC guidelines be used instead of committing the NGOs to developing/signing off on yet another doc. – see 34.</p>
	86. Hold agencies accountable to the qualitative and impact aspects of the Sphere Project minimum standards.	Humanitarian assistance Rec. 30/ page 12	In contradiction with numbers 13 and 31. 13) Rely less exclusively on Sphere Project quantitative targets as the sole measure of achievement. 51) Invite the Sphere Project to assist agencies and organisations to appropriately apply Sphere Project minimum standards in the Darfur context. Note: Sector Coordinators decision on standards/targets to report in the Work Plan Review, HNP and agency documents. To be completed in mid-May.
	87. Strengthen and support agencies and others specifically tasked with gender issues at all levels in terms of funding, staffing levels and key decision-making fora.	Gender Rec. 26/ page 10	
	88. Ensure that OCHA and IOM are sufficiently resourced to carry out their new roles in supporting camp management/coordination.	IDP camp/area management/coordination Rec. 42/ page 16	

Targeted at	Recommendation	Report reference	Focal Point/ Time period for implementation
	89. Coordinate amongst themselves to ensure that priority livelihood protection activities are fully funded, in recognition of the typical weakness of livelihood protection activities in humanitarian interventions.	Drought response and livelihood protection Rec. 60/ page 19	
	90. Encourage all humanitarian actors to take an active part in the joint review/strategic planning processes (2005 Work Plan).	Strategic planning Rec. 74/ page 23	Ongoing

COMMENT AND TEAM RESPONSE CHART FOR REPORT THREE

Reviewers	Comments	Team Response
CHAIR OF THE KHARTOUM PROTECTION STEERING GROUP	<p>The report contained “a lot of valuable ideas and recommendations.”</p> <p>Page 7 Asks for elaboration on what is meant by “an unnecessarily novel approach to protection.” Asks question, “Are there any specific things you are referring to?”</p>	<p>The 'unnecessarily novel' reference is largely about the protection frameworks that were developed a few months ago that seem to have formed the basis of some of the protection work. The team found that these frameworks did not really take account of all the valuable work that has been done by OHCHR, UNHCR, ICRC and others regarding defining protection, indicators, objectives etc.</p>
OCHA	<p>a. The report needs to be “time-bounded” as there are some actions that have been taken already: such as release of new WHO mortality study and new Action Plan for Sudan (25 June). The presence of this report overshadows the critique about inadequate planning.</p> <p>b. Annex on SGBV These points are obvious. “Having it makes us look like we are telling the GOS the very basics.”</p> <p>c. Recommendation 16 (page 27) All UN staff are bound by the SGB on Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and abuse (ST/SGB/2003/13). This is the standard rather than the IASC Code of Conduct (which is still relevant for all IASC members and from which the SGB is drawn). Staff don't have to sign the SGB, it already applies, but they should be given a copy and it is a good idea that they sign and acknowledge it. Similarly, all implementing partners are supposed to undertake to respect the standards in the SGB. OLA/OHRM is currently changing the language in various contracts so this will soon become automatic. In the interim, it would be enough to change the reference to the SGB rather than the IASC Code of Conduct. Similarly in the 3rd BP.</p> <p><i>Re bullet on donors</i>, they should ensure that grantee agencies and organizations are compliant with the SGB or have adopted IASC standards of conduct.</p> <p><i>Re bullet on HIC website</i>, they can check with OCHA HQ focal point re relevant materials or see our website which has them: http://ochaonline.un.org/webpage.asp?Site=sexex</p>	<p>a. The report did include reference to the WHO survey (which was released the same day as the report was circulated for comment). The team does not agree that the presence of the 2005 Work Plan overshadows its observations and recommendations on planning. The team acknowledged in the draft report (page 6) the high standard for planning and appeal documents in Darfur – indeed perhaps the highest yet. But it nonetheless found that there remained room for improvement in several critical areas, most notably in contextual analysis, sectoral planning and coordination.</p> <p>b. At the time of writing the report, it was clear that the GoS was at best ignorant of and at worst reluctant to comply with its obligations regarding the protection of women and girls from SGBV. The Annex came directly from the UNMIS Human Rights Unit and the team felt it sufficiently representative of the key messages that needed to be transmitted to the GoS to adopt the recommendations as they stood.</p> <p>c. The team was grateful for these comments and took them on board in the final report. The report also made it clear that the recommendation for a CD ROM on sexual exploitation was meant for global use, not only for Sudan.</p>

Reviewers	Comments	Team Response
	<p><i>Re bullet on mandatory CD ROM</i>, this should not be a recommendation for Sudan. Just as the security CD Rom has a uniform, world-wide applicability, we need the same for SEA. We have an inter-agency training group on this at HQ. We have developed a basic module, which is mandatory for all peacekeeping missions and we hope to make mandatory for all agencies (with some necessary revisions). We have been and still are considering the CD-ROM option (although there are some indications that it might not be the best way to go). We don't want different country offices developing their own training, that is a HQ coordinated role. Plus the issue is very complicated, the training was very difficult to pull together and there is not enough expertise in the field to do it accurately. Instead, you could suggest that they request HQ support to conduct basic training on preventing sexual exploitation and abuse, using HQ developed programme.</p> <p>Add a bullet point (possibly as first one) that each agency appoint focal points and that the HC ensure an in-country network is established. That network should develop a plan of action for preventing and responding to sexual exploitation and abuse.</p> <p><i>Re the benchmark</i>, the issue can be followed up with the SG's Adviser on Gender but this is not really where the UN responsibility is housed. Better actually with the ERC/DPKO.</p> <p><i>Re the why</i>, as noted above, the SGB is the UN response to the IASC recommendations (it is not accompanied by the IASC Code of Conduct. In fact, there is no real IASC Code of Conduct as such. The IASC agreed on certain standards which each member had to incorporate in their own codes of conduct or rules and regulations)</p> <p>d. Human rights protection section (pages 22- 24) The title of this section is misleading, as it implies that the focus should be exclusively on “human rights protection” rather than on “humanitarian protection” more broadly. Human rights is just one part (albeit a very important part) of the overall protection response. OCHA is concerned that the recommendations in this section give</p>	<p>d. The issue raised here by OCHA is an important one and reflects current debates around the meaning of ‘protection’, a commonly-referred to distinction between ‘protection’ and ‘human rights’ and the perception that ‘human rights’ work is restricted to monitoring and reporting. This</p>

Reviewers	Comments	Team Response
	<p>the impression that “protection” is primarily about the monitoring, reporting and investigation of human rights violations, rather than also encompassing broader, practical humanitarian protection measures (prevention/mitigation/response – e.g. provision of fuel-efficient stoves/fuel alternatives; AU patrols of firewood collection routes; establishment of women’s centres/child-friendly spaces; psycho-social support to survivors of SGBV, etc, etc, etc). It is a matter of perception – but an important one.</p> <p>Disagree with the term “human rights protection operating framework” in the second paragraph, page 22, as this is too narrow. Instead, it makes more sense to establish an overarching “protection framework” that encompasses all relevant protection activities, both humanitarian and human rights, and within which human rights activities (e.g. monitoring, reporting, case work, etc) constitute an integral component, along with the range of humanitarian protection activities (such as child protection activities, refugee protection work, preventive/remedial response to SGBV, return/reintegration, etc, etc). Again, a matter of perception, but important nonetheless.</p> <p>e. Recommendation 13 (page 22) Disagree strongly with the recommendation that the protection database be transferred to the UN Human Rights Unit in UNMIS and that it include information concerning alleged or suspected violations and abuses of human rights.</p> <p>It is critical that a distinction be made between a “human rights database”, which would include details of individual victims/witnesses and events and would require the highest levels of confidentiality and limitations on access, and a “humanitarian protection database”, which is deliberately non-case specific, is geared towards providing better data in order to improve the analysis of protection patterns and trends, and for which wider access (by those agencies/NGOs contributing to the database) is necessary (many agencies would be reluctant to contribute to the database if they were denied access to the information contained therein, so the very existence of the database could be thrown into jeopardy if such access were restricted). It is important that the information be used, as appropriate, for political/advocacy (trend lines) and</p>	<p>issue is now addressed in the body of the report; the team explains its view of this debate, and maintains that this is consistent with the view expressed by the High Commissioner for Human Rights in the OHCHR document, the “Plan of Action – Protection and Empowerment”.</p> <p>e. The recommendation regarding the protection database has been modified in the light of these and other comments. While the team is of the view that the database would be best located in the HRU of UNMIS, it acknowledges that there are many arguments against this course of action – at least at this stage and has sought to find a compromise recommendation.</p>

Reviewers	Comments	Team Response
	<p>programming/response purposes, not only for the investigation/follow-up of individual human rights violations.</p> <p>It is important to recall that this was an issue that was debated at length during the protection workshop in Nov/Dec 2004. At that time, OHCHR had pushed for the database to include confidential details that would enable it to follow up individual cases, but all other UN agencies and NGOs at the workshop were adamant that this was NOT appropriate (the consensus was that if OHCHR needed a database to follow up individual human rights violations, then they should establish their own confidential database, for which the “protection database” could of course provide useful, general, information).</p> <p>Instead, it would be preferable to strengthen the existing mechanism: i.e. protection incident reports submitted to OCHA; discussed at PWG meetings (for clarification, further information, etc); follow-up responsibility assigned in the PWG (in many cases this is assigned to Human Rights) and the details of the incident(s) subsequently entered into the protection database. On the basis of this information, Human Rights (and other agencies assigned responsibility) should follow up accordingly (and, in the case of Human Rights, enter any further details into their own, highly-protected, database).</p> <p>f. Re bullet v) recommending, “UNMIS Human Rights Officers to share information with humanitarian actors for the purposes of humanitarian protection” is not a realistic reflection of the situation on the ground. Clearly, appropriate information sharing is essential. The reality on the ground, however, is that there are not enough HROs to cover the ground in Darfur and it is the humanitarians (who number as many as 10,000) and AU who witness/hear about the overwhelming majority of protection concerns/human rights violations and who make this information available to their human rights counterparts (rather than the other way around). The point should be to improve the consolidation of available information and the coordination of information sharing/exchange (most of which will, realistically speaking, always come from the humanitarian community). Humanitarian workers (in all sectors) should be</p>	<p>f. The team does not mean to imply that HROs should be the <i>only</i> ‘eyes and ears’ of the humanitarian community; rather, this recommendation is aimed at ensuring that there is adequate and appropriate information-sharing regarding the facts of alleged violations and the trends or patterns these may indicate.</p>

Reviewers	Comments	Team Response
	<p>appropriately trained/sensitized and urged to share relevant information with their human rights counterparts, through appropriate channels.</p> <p>g. Re establishing a protocol for information-sharing and cooperation with the African Union (vi), this is needed at three levels: (i) daily information-sharing, such as sit-reps, etc (this currently happens on the ground in Darfur, between the AU and OCHA/UNMIS); (ii) confidential information-sharing, for investigations, etc; (iii) strategic information-sharing and cooperation with the SRSG/DSRSG Humanitarian Affairs (e.g. security in priority areas for return).</p> <p>h. Re bullet viii) re delineating the roles and responsibilities of human rights and humanitarian actors, this recommendation does not address the need for cooperation between the different actors, the coordination of the various protection activities (to avoid duplication) and coordination with other key actors (e.g. the AU).</p> <p>Agree strongly with bullet x) allocating mitigation, remedial and prevention activities to the Protection Working Groups</p>	<p>g. The team welcomes the analysis of the need for cooperation at these three levels.</p> <p>h. The team believes that the issues of cooperation and coordination are addressed in other parts of the recommendation (eg. AU above)</p>
<p>INTER-AGENCY INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT DIVISION</p>	<p>On the whole, well done for managing (once again) to provide practical and concrete recommendations for addressing the big challenges of Darfur.</p> <p>a. Re Lack of accountability for poor performance... Regarding weaknesses in the application of the collaborative approach, you may be aware that, as part of the HRR, the IDD has proposed that specific agencies be designated to assume a more predictable sector leadership and management role, particularly for those sectors in which there are systemic weaknesses, such as protection, emergency shelter, camp management and return and reintegration. IDD submitted a paper on this to the IASC for endorsement. The discussion has continued, with PDSB submitting to the IASC an additional paper on "Developing cluster responsibilities and leadership". Many details still need to be worked out, but there seems to be consensus that designated sector leadership is the way to go. While Darfur already -- more or less -- has established sector leads, weaknesses do remain (as you note) in</p>	<p>a. The team believes that designating leads for camp management, shelter, return and reintegration etc need not be done globally. Indeed, it may be difficult to reach agreement at this level. The team believes that designated roles could differ from country to country or region to region reflecting the capacity, experience etc of agencies in different places. The designation of roles should be part of contingency planning and preparedness. The problem at present is that responsibilities are worked out, painfully, in the heat of the response. Donors would need to be brought in at the contingency planning and preparedness stage.</p>

Reviewers	Comments	Team Response
	<p>precisely the sectors I mentioned above, where there is, as yet, unclear or weak sector leadership.</p> <p>b. You mention in several places the challenges of recruiting qualified and experienced staff, and how this impacts on accountability. Any ideas on how to attract such staff?</p> <p>c. <i>Re inadequate planning and coordination...</i> I question use of the term "prioritization" (used often on page6) which -- in the recommendations section of the document -- seems to equate with "needs-based" planning. These terms seem to be used interchangeably. Prioritization is a term, often used in planning speak, but it remains ill defined. I have often heard donors urge prioritization and then, by way of example, ask the UN to identify whether food or water is a priority. Of course, the answer should be: provide aid according to need. For planning purposes, we should plan according to need; when the money comes in, we should prioritize based on available resources.</p> <p>Agree with your recommendations for improving 120-day planning</p> <p>Agree strongly with establishing planning and analysis unit</p>	<p>b. The team regrets not being able to more thoroughly delve into these issues. It sought to do so but did not feel it received sufficient information on which to make more than impressionistic conclusions.</p> <p>c. The report's point is simply that some actions are more important than others and that choices have to be made. Agencies and donors have to be willing to forego less important activities e.g. increasing health services in a relatively well served IDP camp when less accessible IDPs are unassisted.</p>
WFP	<p>a. Output level performance (page 1) Consider including absolute values in the tables. Reporting only percentages masks the fact that the absolute numbers of people in need of assistance over the period increased nearly 14%.</p> <p>b. Health outcomes (page 2, first para, line 2) First study was reported for "North" and "West". The recent study appears simply to be an aggregate number for Darfur. Are the numbers comparable?</p> <p>c. Health outcomes (page 2 para 5) This paragraph starts by painting a positive picture on general trends, and then promptly contradicts itself with the next two sentences (pipeline breaks and GAM)</p> <p>d. Protection of Human rights Clarify the statement that the lives of children are the "most</p>	<p>a. This is a valid point. However, the team did not modify the tables. It was noted in the explanatory text that the number of people in need continued to increase.</p> <p>b. This observation does appear correct, and thus an exact comparison cannot be made. But it is nonetheless indicative.</p> <p>c. The draft report was revised to reflect this comment.</p> <p>d. The draft report was revised to reflect this comment.</p>

Reviewers	Comments	Team Response
	<p>comprehensively” disrupted. Is there a need for such relativism? The humanitarian community shares a common policy priority to protect children first, but that is a different issue.</p> <p>e. Coverage of assistance (page 3, para 1) The emphasis here should be on the overall analysis, not on the mapping. The latter opens the analysis to skepticism. Maps can be very superficial; they can provide a very basic indication of expansion in ‘geographical’ coverage, but they generally do not speak to depth of coverage, quality of coverage, consistency or continuity of coverage, etc.</p> <p>The last sentence in this paragraph (issue of separating ‘chronic’ needs from new needs deriving from the crisis) addresses an issue that is extremely important for the entire humanitarian response. Wonder if it shouldn’t be pulled out and treated at the very beginning of the report?</p> <p>f. Chief external constraints, Operating environment (page 4, para 2) Consider further dividing “operating environment” to distinguish between (1) Govt disposition toward the humanitarian response, and (2) the civil / security environment; The former is much too important to be hidden in this catch-all category.</p> <p>g. Funding and support from diplomatic missions (page 4, para 1) We have nowhere argued that perhaps “more donors” should take “more interest”. Where is the advocacy in this official UN report for more UN players to get more on board the humanitarian response in Sudan?</p> <p>h. Inadequate planning and coordination (page 6, para 1) The proposal to change focus from emergency assistance to more typical sectoral activities seems at odds with earlier statements that claim, despite all our efforts, security is still not assured and violence is commonplace. What good is agricultural assistance or market development if a woman cannot walk safely to her field or market? If we believe our own claims that the security situation has led to a</p>	<p>e. This is a valid point. But coverage mapping does provide a starting point for discussions. Observations are made elsewhere in this report and previous ones about quality, consistency etc about some services. The team also agrees with the importance of separating chronic needs from new ones, but choose not to move this to the beginning of the report. The need for balancing these competing assistance needs is addressed in Recommendation 4.</p> <p>f. The team accepts this point but did not significantly modify the report in this regard. It, in effect, took the contextual constraints (including the political) as a given and decided not to explore those in depth but rather to concentrate on those things that humanitarian actors can address.</p> <p>g. The report was revised to indicate that more donors should join together with those already supporting the response. Regarding advocacy, the team does not believe the answer to the crisis is for more UN players to join in (and wonders who they would be?), but that the existing ones should be better equipped to do a better job.</p> <p>h. The evaluation team is not suggesting for a moment that normalcy can be restored to agricultural production and markets, but believes some support is feasible.</p>

Reviewers	Comments	Team Response
	<p>virtual collapse of the rural economy, what logic are we using to conclude that the situation has now changed and normality can be restored to agricultural production and markets?</p> <p>Perhaps the issue here is deciding if the 2006 plan is mostly an emergency plan that simply needs to begin to take into account some return to normality in certain areas, or mostly a normalization plan that still needs to take into account persistent security issues in some areas. At the moment it sounds like the latter. This is inconsistent with the picture painted in the rest of the report.</p> <p>g. Recommendation 6 (page 14) There is a logical justification for keeping M&E systems independent from the planning and analysis units they monitor and evaluate, but I see no logic for protecting information systems from planning and analysis unit guidance, if not actual control.</p> <p>h. Recommendation 12, bullet 1 (page 21) Absolutely agree! Information needs are not universally best met through long-winded survey forms. In fact, we have an obligation not to waste a beneficiary's time on any question if the answer to that question can be accurately obtained through other, more appropriate means. All too often our data collection activities are supply driven, i.e. asking merely for the reason that someone might find the data useful some day) and not linked to any identifiable information need or pressing decision that has to be made. We must impose discipline on our data collection activities. If this not already covered in the Sphere guidelines, it soon will be.</p>	<p>g. The report was modified to reflect this comment.</p>
IOM	<p>a. More attention needs to be paid in the report to explaining political and funding constraints.</p> <p>b. Some points raised after the last report were not considered. The Evaluation Team seems to have some preconceived beliefs.</p>	<p>a. The report is an evaluation of the humanitarian response. As noted above, it, in effect, took the contextual constraints (including the political) as a given and decided not to explore those in depth but rather to concentrate on those things that humanitarian actors can address. It did, nonetheless however, endeavour to note the constraints where applicable throughout the report, but the team did not believe that the constraints needed to be repeated at every (albeit relevant) juncture</p> <p>b. The team has taken on board views and comments raised after the second visit report, to the extent that it felt they were relevant and helpful.</p>

Reviewers	Comments	Team Response
	<p>c. The Evaluation is intended to be inter-agency, within the IASC framework. However, the report vacillates constantly between the UN/NGO sometimes referring to IGOs, to IOM by name, or to the IASC. The confusion leaves the Inter-Agency framework as an assumption that sometimes may not be accurate or as intended.</p> <p>d. Recommendation 10 (page 17) It is unclear what is understood by a tripartite agreement. Additionally, what is meant by “in the interim”? A tripartite agreement will simply add more confusion and will slow an already dynamic process. It needs to be clearly recognized that IOM has a signed agreement and is working cooperatively with the rest of the humanitarian community. There is excellent cooperation and collaboration between IOM and UNHCR on returns. IOM has extensive experience in area of return and reintegration worldwide, including in Afghanistan, Liberia and East Timor amongst others. IOM continues to increase its competent and dedicated staff to fulfill its obligations. To add perspective to the effort, it should be noted that IOM has so far received 2.5 million USD out of 7.7 million USD for MCM programming.</p> <p>e. Re the Why? The recommendation provided is vague: What type of “remedial” action is foreseen here? Despite the qualifier, it also puts all liabilities on IOM, while IOM is working closely with all actors and will continue to do so.</p> <p>f. Recommendation 12 (page 21) There is a sense that the Evaluation Team began with a pre-conceived rejection of a registration process, which had been agreed by the UNCT. This process was developed after careful coordination including long discussions with all partners. Many of the humanitarian partners have expressed interest in the IOM database and in detailed information on IDPs. This information is considered important in facilitating the planning and implementation of future activities. The registration has taken longer than originally planned for a variety of reasons, some included in the evaluation. These include the lack of co-operation by local authorities over IOM’s participation for planning operations; access to camps and</p>	<p>c. The final draft attempts to clear up this confusion in nomenclature.</p> <p>d. The team removed the reference to a tripartite agreement. The team believes it accurately reflected the levels of inter-agency collaboration occurring in the field.</p> <p>e. Remedial action refers to ensuring the proper field capacity and expertise. The team did not intend to put all liabilities on IOM, as is stated in the report.</p> <p>f. The team found the plans for the registration process in place during the second visit. At that point, it was concerned about the length of time it would take, the vulnerability of the information contained therein and the comprehensiveness of the process. These issues were raised with agencies and at the UNCT meeting in February. Far from being opposed to there being an efficient and comprehensive data-base of internally displaced persons, the team acknowledges the value of such a tool. It also acknowledges that there are external constraints on any registration process. The registration has indeed taken longer than planned, as anticipated by the evaluation team. The reasons given by IOM for the delay are not disputed. The team’s recommendation is aimed at avoiding a similarly drawn out process when the time comes to conduct another</p>

Reviewers	Comments	Team Response
	sheikh attitudes; security of IOM staff and the capacity of WFP's cooperating partners. It is matter of concern that the evaluation team has ignored such easily verifiable facts.	registration.
UNDSS	While reading the report with great interest we noticed that there is no mention of the UN Department of Safety and Security in this third chapter. Since the last report put an emphasis on strengthening UNDSS presence in the field, it stands to reason that the Evaluation team would assess the impact of the reinforced deployment.	The team recognized the progress made by UNDSS, and for this reason felt that UN security services were no longer among the critical areas that needed to be highlighted. In due respect of this, it has mentioned UNDSS' contribution to improving humanitarian access in the revised report.
UNIFEM	<p>The report offers important recommendations for strengthening inter-agency coordination, planning and analysis, monitoring and oversight.</p> <p>a. Recommendation 14 (page 25) <i>In reference to observation that "WHO and neither OHCHR, nor UN human Rights Unit nor UNIFEM have taken a lead role in advocacy,"</i> In fact, UNIFEM has undertaken two field missions, including one to Darfur last year, which resulted in a widely distributed report with clear recommendations for prevention and response to GBV. This year, the Symposium on Women's Rights and Leadership in Post-Conflict Sudan, was held in Oslo (10 April 2005) under the auspices of Government of Norway, and in collaboration with the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), UNDP and UNIFEM. The resulting Oslo Declaration contains clear language advocating for women's full participation in the Darfur peace process and stronger prevention and response strategies to GBV, including in the context of conflict. UNIFEM is also preparing to provide support to a high-level delegation of the AU to Darfur to advocate on behalf of women's full participation</p> <p>Recommendation 21 (page 32) <i>In response to call for UNIFEM to provide support and guidance to national human right organizations,</i> UNIFEM has also developed a programme to support civil society with the explicit objective of strengthening women's organizations and networks for peacebuilding . . . and has provided support to Ahfad women's University from the Trust Fund in Support of Actions to Eliminate Violence Against women to undertake a study of violence against women.</p>	<p>a. Appropriate references were made in the final draft to UNIFEM's support to these initiatives.</p>

Reviewers	Comments	Team Response
	<p>b. Recommendation 19 (page 30) <i>In reference to creating a gender working group</i>, In fact, a Gender Theme Group is already active in Sudan with one group convening in Khartoum and another in southern Sudan. The Khartoum GTG covers issues related to Darfur, as does the GBV sub-group on protection issues. UNIFEM has established a presence in Khartoum effective July 1, 2005 and will be joining both these groups to contribute technical expertise and support the functioning of the GTG based on experience developed in participating and leading other gender theme groups worldwide.</p>	<p>b. The report has been amended to take this comment into account.</p>
UNMIS Human Rights	<p>a. UNMIS Human Rights regrets that it was not consulted on the proposed recommendations. The consultants received contact details of UNMIS Human Rights staff in Khartoum, but only had very brief talks in corridors or in the margin of other meetings with the staff, who clearly indicated that they would be willing to meet. However, no meeting took place.</p> <p>b. Recommendation 9 (page 16) UNMIS Human Rights agrees that extending its geographic coverage is important, and is currently examining ways of doing so. At this stage the actual modalities of doing so remain to be decided upon, and it is not yet clear if simply establishing more satellite offices is the best response. In addition, it should be noted that the logistical and operational challenges already present with the four offices need to be fully addressed before establishing additional offices.</p> <p>c. Recommendation 13 (page 22) Agree that there is an urgent need to clearly agree on division of labor, role and responsibilities. We have made this point in several fora. We hope agreement will be reached soon.</p> <p><i>d. Re bullet i)</i>, UNMIS Human Rights does not find this rec. useful. The Protection database is covering issues, which go beyond the mandate of UNMIS Human Rights. We are prepared to work constructively with OCHA and UNMIS Protection and submit cases to the database at the Khartoum level. The database should be used</p>	<p>a. The head of the HRU was in Khartoum when the consultant responsible for this area of work was in the Darfurs and vice versa. Thus, they were unable to meet. The team also regrets that it could not meet with more representatives of the HRU, although the consultant did meet with the High Commissioner in May 2005 and her staff in Geneva and had met with the OHCHR staff on several occasions earlier in the RTE process.</p> <p>b. The team acknowledges that there are logistical and operational challenges shared by the UNMIS HRU and others.</p> <p>d. See above in response to OCHA's comments.</p>

Reviewers	Comments	Team Response
	<p>only to identify broader trends so as to assist humanitarian actors in their response. The database should not be used as tool for deciding on a division of labor between actors. In addition, the Database should not overlap the monitoring and reporting work, which UNMIS Human Rights is mandated to do, which also includes more in-depth analytical work, which the database can't cover.</p> <p><i>e. Re bullets ii),</i> UNMIS Human Rights welcomes this recommendation and is prepared to further enhance its cooperation with all relevant actors in Darfur in this regard.</p> <p><i>f. Re bullets iii) through ix),</i> UNMIS Human Rights welcomes these recommendations (s) and is already working to further develop [its] work in this regard</p> <p><i>g. Re bullet x),</i> Before doing anything else, the priority for the protection working groups and the Khartoum Protection Steering Group (KPSG) is to develop a clear outline of a division of labour between agencies and clear and realistic TORs for these groups. These TORs should be based on a sound understanding of the international legal framework applicable in the context of Darfur (International human rights law and international humanitarian law). This will require a cooperative chair respecting the mandates and roles of other actors and playing mainly a facilitating role. It should also be ensured that the KPSG is continuously chaired by the same person.</p> <p><i>h. Re bullet xi),</i> UNMIS Human Rights welcome this recommendation.</p> <p>i. Recommendation 14 (page 25) UNMIS Human Rights fully supports this. In a sense, this recommendation is somewhat superseded by events, as UNMIS Human Rights has prepared a report for the High Commissioner on Human Right on the access to justice of victims of SGBV, which need to be taken into account as well.</p> <p>j. Recommendation 15 (page 26) UNMIS Human Rights is already working closely with UNMIS</p>	

Reviewers	Comments	Team Response
	<p>Child Protection and also with UNICEF on the ground, and is prepared to continue to develop this work.</p> <p>k. Recommendations 18, 19 and 21 (pages 29, 30 and 32 respectively) UNMIS Human Rights fully supports this.</p>	
FAO	<p>It is widely felt that the food security sector, specifically the work of FAO and its partners, is grossly undervalued and under-considered in this evaluation. We would actually urge the evaluators to enquire about the food security and livelihood activities being carried out within the camps (poultry, livestock asset protection, vaccination, fuel efficient stoves, vegetable gardening, fodder distribution, etc.) as well as outside of camp with both IDPs and host-communities.</p> <p>Recommendation 20 (page 31) This recommendation should, at the least, acknowledge the existence of the food security and livelihood coordination and reflection groups which are facilitated by FAO and are well functioning in each Darfur state; and therefore logically suggest that they should be further strengthened. There is a major and persisting contradiction in which the food security and livelihood sector (agriculture and livestock) have been confronted since the beginning of the Darfur crisis. While all eyes were directed to the IDP camps, the sector advocated for support of those who were still in their villages of origin. Although donors are increasingly becoming aware of the issue and therefore are increasingly supporting the sector, our impression of the evaluation is that the problems faced by the sector are still continuing. We regret that the advocacy for the sector we would have expected from such a report is, from our perspective, somewhat lacking.</p>	<p>The team recognises that it was not able to do justice to this sector but did take note of these comments and subsequently amend the report. See in particular Recommendation 6 and also the footnote on page 1.</p>
UNICEF	<p>a. Pages 1-2 Under the section where areas of coverage in assistance and gaps are discussed: it is important to note that Nutrition coverage could not be established in a similar manner as these interventions are particularly targeted to areas with a high prevalence of malnutrition.</p> <p>b. Under the section on Nutrition gaps, the report should be revised</p>	<p>a. This is now reflected in footnote.</p> <p>b. There is no section on nutrition gaps. The team regrets not having</p>

Reviewers	Comments	Team Response
	<p>to include more updated information (which UNICEF can provide to evaluators).</p> <p>Page 2 c. Under ‘Health Outcomes and Mortality’: this section only makes reference to the situation in El Geneina camps, but there are other critical camps to note (e.g. Kalma).</p> <p>d. UNICEF strongly agrees with the finding regarding poor shelter hygiene conditions. However, the report does not provide concrete recommendations in this regard.</p> <p>e. “Agencies recognize that they have not been able to meet targets identified in the 2005 Work Plan.” This statement is puzzling, given that only 6 months of 2005 have actually elapsed. A more appropriate time frame should be used for evaluation; for example, the UNICEF WES sector program has achieved most of the targets set for its 120-day plan.</p> <p>f. Page 4 On the ‘lack of implementing partners’: In the case of protection, this statement should be followed by a qualification which states that this exists “despite the huge efforts exerted to identify partners for areas not covered by child protection activities”. Regarding primary health care, UNICEF is scaling up its efforts to identify partners and increasing the number of formal agreements with INGO/NGOs.</p> <p>g. Pages 4-5 More broadly, regarding the constraints identified (e.g. ‘operating environment’, ‘lack of implementing partners’, ‘funding and support from diplomatic missions’), the report does not provide concrete recommendations to redress the situation.</p> <p>h. Page 5 Regarding the observation that there is ‘weak leadership and support in some sectors’, it would be helpful if the evaluation were more specific. It should clearly indicate which sector and agency, what kind of weakness was observed and at what levels, and how it</p>	<p>time to take his new information into account.</p> <p>c. El Geneina is mentioned because UNICEF and others had just completed a nutrition survey.</p> <p>d. The team did not develop a recommendation about improving shelter and acknowledges that this is a gap.</p> <p>e. The report was amended in light of this comment.</p> <p>f. The revised report acknowledges that agencies have made efforts to secure implementing partners</p> <p>g. The team has addressed the funding constraints in some areas and states that the diplomatic community should engage more regarding certain aspects (pp.11,12,42. Rec. 22). With regard to how to increase implementing partners or tackle the operating environment, however, the report does not posit any recommendations.</p> <p>h. The evaluation team avoided being specific so as not to buy into an argument with particular agencies. The Team believes this was the prudent course.</p>

Reviewers	Comments	Team Response
	<p>could be addressed.</p> <p>i. The report refers to ‘poor performance,’ however the document clearly indicates that significant progress has been made in many sectors and current mortality survey results are quoted for this. In addition, increased presence by agencies is noted. This seems contradictory to the evaluation of poor performance.</p> <p>j. Page 6 On ‘limited field presence’: this statement should be qualified, since in terms of primary health care interventions there is good field coverage (extending to SLA areas).</p> <p>k. Page 7 On the reference to UNMIS child protection advisors: the report should mention the need for clarifying their role vis-a-vis the child protection officers of UNICEF, and addressing their role with regard to the AU in Darfur. The UN should consider developing a protocol of responsibilities between UNICEF, UNMIS child protection advisors and the human rights monitors working at UNMIS.</p> <p>l. Pages 7-11 UNICEF welcomes the recommendation to develop clear benchmarks and reasonable expectations.</p> <p>m. Page 8 “NGO staff implementing programs on behalf of the UN are often insufficiently informed about the mandates and operational frameworks of the UN Agencies concerned”: Standard cooperation agreements include such information, and NGO staff dealing with UN Agencies are briefed. Who is ultimately responsible for ensuring that all NGO staff on the ground are sufficiently briefed?</p> <p>n. Pages 12,13, 15 The time-frame for completing the recommended action is too tight and needs to be reviewed.</p>	<p>i. The team does not believe it is contradictory. The humanitarian effort has, undeniably, saved lives and much progress has been made. But the operation could have been more effective and efficient in areas of all agencies’ responsibility.</p> <p>j. The team maintains the view that field presence is indeed limited. Health care coverage is still not sufficient. Please refer to the primary health care coverage and gaps map generated by the team with input from UNICEF and others.</p> <p>k. This comment was incorporated in Recommendation 20.</p> <p>m. The team understands this point, but believes that its observation stands. To answer the question, each UN agency has a responsibility to ensure that its implementing partners are sufficiently informed about its mandate. If current efforts to achieve this are ineffective, more is clearly required.</p> <p>n. The timeframe was amended.</p>

Reviewers	Comments	Team Response
	<p>o. Recommendation 4 (page 12) It is not clear. On one hand, the evaluation recommends the prioritization of competing needs, yet on the other, it lists all the communities in Darfur. UNICEF’s WES program, for example, already adopts clear prioritization, targeting major IDP camps where there is high population density/crowded and the disease prevalence is high. . After reaching this target, the priority will be to shift to smaller IDP camps, host community and returning communities.</p> <p>p. Page 13 Regarding the recommendation for ‘periodic peer review’ within sector coordination, we foresee difficulty in implementation, since each agency or partner has different governing rules and regulations. For Nutrition, instead of a peer review group, it may be more feasible to form a technical committee mandated within the Nutrition Coordination group under the leadership of UNICEF to undertake the periodic review.</p> <p>q. On the need to improve the overall sector coordination/planning, UNICEF believes that within the health sector, good coordination takes place through weekly and bi-weekly coordination structures.</p> <p>r. Pages 13-14 On the need to improve planning analysis capacities within each sector, particularly recommending that for primary health care a joint assessment take place: It should be noted that the existing health surveillance system gathers information from 96 reporting units (Surveillance sites) -- 33 in West Darfur, 42 in South Darfur and 21 in North Darfur – and shares weekly epidemiological bulletins to all humanitarian partners.</p> <p>s. Page 13 UNICEF welcomes the recommendation to strengthen planning analysis and translating 120 day plans into sector rolling implementation plans. A consultant could be hired to develop sector plans with more in-depth analyses of the state requirement in line</p>	<p>o. The report refers to a very broad range of needs from the care and maintenance of encamped IDPs to chronic needs to make the point that not everything can be done at once and that there has to be prioritization. UNICEF can outline its order of priorities but it is not necessarily as simple as this suggests. It is conceivable that in discussions within sectors some re-prioritization will take place – e.g. here UNICEF puts returning communities last, however, there may be circumstances where this is seen to be inappropriate. This is a kind of discussion that has to take place.</p> <p>p. The Team believes all UN agencies should subject themselves to peer review because it is in the interests of improving the humanitarian response. The individual rules and regulations of an agency should not be employed to frustrate this.</p> <p>q. Nonetheless, the team observes that there are a very large number of actors in this sector and there does not seem to be a common sector plan.</p> <p>r. The teams sees surveillance as a different issue.</p>

Reviewers	Comments	Team Response
	<p>with national plans and reforms.</p> <p>t. Page 13 UNICEF likewise notes the importance of mapping interventions in collaboration with HIC.</p> <p>u. Page 16 UNICEF welcomes the recommendation that Funding Proposals should be discussed within relevant sector working groups before submission to donors.</p> <p>v. Pages 19-20 Regarding the reference to the AU: There is a clear need to develop a protocol for the AU to monitor child rights violations. UNICEF should be noted under “WHO” since it has already initiated work with the AU in this regard.</p> <p>w. Pages 22 and 25 UNICEF should be included among the agencies involved.</p> <p>x. Pages 25-26 Overall, UNICEF’s role in child protection (including SGBV) does not receive due notice in relevant sections of the report. (e.g. pgs. 18, 22).</p> <p>y. Page 30 Education Sector is an area where Gender mainstreaming could be done.</p> <p>z. Page 31 Under ‘Establishing a Darfur Food Security and Livelihood Monitoring Unit/Network’: It will be necessary to address whether the Nutritional Surveillance System that UNICEF is developing in collaboration with partners will form part of this. Data collection for UNICEF’s Nutritional Surveillance System will start toward the end of July 05.</p>	<p>t. The report was amended to reflect this comment.</p> <p>v-x. UNICEF is referred to throughout the recommendations on child protection.</p> <p>y. The team agrees with this conclusion.</p> <p>z. The report amended to reflect this comment.</p>
UNFPA	<p>a. Recommendation 18 (page 28) <i>Re the Who</i>, UNFPA should be added to the list <i>Re the How</i>, UNFPA is organizing training all the time, it would be</p>	<p>a-c. The team agrees that UNFPA is an actor regarding protection. It also agrees with the sentiment expressed in comment b. However, it believes that UNFPA itself is in need of the guidance and frameworks described</p>

Reviewers	Comments	Team Response
	<p>helpful to recommend including it with other agencies.</p> <p>b. Recommendation 13 (page 22) <i>Re human rights protection</i>, UNFPA should also be mentioned, we see the right to reproductive health as universal human right issue and it should be included and it applies to women, men and adolescent everywhere, including humanitarian crisis.</p> <p>c. Recommendation 7 (page 15) UNFPA should be included.</p>	<p>in the report. It therefore does not believe it is in a position to provide that guidance to others.</p>
<p>Humanitarian Accountability Partnership-International (HAP-I)</p>	<p>Great job on this report.</p> <p>The agencies refer to the problems of "insecurity" as the primary explanation for their lack of access to the 20% (over 1 million people) who have received no assistance. The problem with the concept of "insecurity" is that it externalises it as an "environmental" problem and lends an impression of immutability to the phenomenon, at least from the point of view of the agencies managers. I prefer to think of insecurity as a negotiated phenomenon, or perhaps more accurately, a negotiable one.</p> <p>I am . . . convinced . . . that the "humanitarian" agencies have badly failed in their duty to seek better access. In the Darfur context, where honour and transparency are highly valued, I am quite sure that a high level delegation of NGO leaders could have helped to improve the operating context for humanitarian assistance. Of course, it is possible that they may have had to grant concessions for this purpose, the most obvious being their advocacy work which no doubt must be a constant source of irritation to the GoS in particular. In this respect, the report may not fully acknowledge the trade-offs that might be necessary between access and advocacy. However, since IHL made this trade-off big-time with the requirement of neutrality, it is not exactly a new problem. Indeed, were the NGOs in Sudan to be more rigorous in the application of IHL in their own work, it is perhaps the case that there would already be more access and less advocacy even now. What bothers me most is that the decisions about this are not being made in a joined up, collective and sufficiently senior basis.</p>	<p>The team finds these for the most part very interesting comments concerning aspects of the response, which it agrees are not very well addressed in the Team's third report.</p>

Reviewers	Comments	Team Response
	<p>I support . . . the idea that we need some leadership to thrash out some sort of OLS for Darfur. . . it is not too late to try now.</p> <p>The other minor point is that the P in HAP-I stands for Partnership not Project. We are a membership organisation with rules that require compliance with the Accountability Principles. One of the interesting things to know is how far our members in Darfur are in compliance. This is a legitimate question for your evaluation to ask, just as the Sphere compliance question is.</p>	
<p><i>The below comments were submitted by the HC's office in consultation with UN agencies' Darfur sector managers, OCHA and the Deputy HC. But they incorporate some earlier comments made to an advance draft shared only with the HC. Some of these comments had already been addressed when the 2/3 July 2005 draft was shared more widely shared for comment. As a result, some page numbers and recommendation references do not exactly correspond. Indicative headings are thus used throughout to orient the reader, and all responses refer to how the comments were taken into consideration in the final report.</i></p>		
<p>HC's office in consultation with agencies' Darfur Sector Managers and OCHA/HC/DHC</p>	<p><i>Progress</i></p> <p>Positive improvements since last report not noted.</p>	<p>Progress in several key areas was noted in the report. For example, the evaluation team concludes that lives have been saved; epidemics have been averted or contained; and malnutrition has generally been reduced (page 2); that there has been a considerable expansion in humanitarian assistance since the end of January (page 3); that efforts to strengthen planning and coordination have been significant (page 6); that there has been notable progress in human rights protection (page 7); that the UN and NGOs work well together in the Darfurs (page 11); that there has been more emphasis on filling gaps in coverage (page 12); that there has been significant progress in the development of a common approach to returns and reintegration actors the Darfurs (page 18); and so on.</p> <p>The Team accepts the value of giving credit where due and fuller and additional references to positive improvements were thus added.</p>
	<p><i>Capacity</i></p> <p>RTE recommendations do not adequately reflect that part of the essence of the problem is a capacity/experience problem in both UN agencies and NGOs. Specifically, the first 7 recommendations would be less hard to implement if the right staff was on ground. The essential problem in aid work today for a Darfur type operation is that we do not have near enough the numbers of the type of aid worker we need. The slowness in hiring staff and the process</p>	<p>The Team is sympathetic to the view that a lack of experienced aid workers is a key problem in humanitarian response. It is reflected in the section <i>Chief Reasons for Shortcomings</i>, which was strengthened in the report in response to this comment.</p> <p>Recommendation 1, titled "Improve the accountability of headquarters for support to the field," is meant to address the staffing and capacity issues. This recommendation precedes the seven recommendations referred to in recognition of the need for headquarters' support for their</p>

Reviewers	Comments	Team Response
	through which these are selected is not anything that can be changed at the field level. The UN organizations and the NGOs at HQ level for the most part do not take emergencies seriously, lots of rhetoric but little action.	implementation.
	<p><i>Political Reality</i></p> <p>The report is lacking a sense of reality vis-à-vis the operational and political context. Specifically, the role of the authorities. The report shows a dangerous tendency to place unrealistic responsibilities on the humanitarian community (i.e. on protection issues), while downplaying the role of the GoS/SLA in obscuring the work of humanitarians. Instead of pointing out that the security situation in most part of South Darfur is unacceptable due to the destruction perpetrated by GoS supported militias, the RTE report insinuates that this is a result of the lack of a coherent, effective strategy by the UN/NGO. While the RTE points to many relevant issues in need of improvement, it appears that this basic reality, as well as the attitude which is often behind (e.g. that the GoS has explicitly perpetrated ethnic cleansing and scorched earth operations) is somewhat lost on the recommendations.</p>	<p>The final draft includes references to the responsibility of the GoS and SLA to provide security and humanitarian access. The introductory sections and recommendations on protection issues state clearly that the GoS is responsible for the protection of its own civilians and puts the onus for ceasing human rights violations on those who commit them.</p> <p>As stated above, the report is an evaluation of the humanitarian response. It, in effect, took the contextual constraints (including the political) as a given and decided not to explore those in depth but rather to concentrate on those things that humanitarian actors can address. It did, nonetheless however, endeavour to note the constraints where applicable throughout the report, but the team did not believe that the constraints needed to be repeated at every (albeit relevant) juncture</p> <p>The Team does not agree that the report as presented to the Humanitarian Coordinator insinuated that the unacceptable security situation is somehow the fault of the UN or NGOs.</p>
	<p><i>Methodology</i></p> <p>a) The document should include information about methodology, contacts, team composition and capacity, presence in the field, sources... Reference to Lead Sector Agencies is missing in relevant sections of report – e.g. UNICEF is not noted as a partner agency in any of the protection sectors.</p> <p>b) The evaluation team spent limited time in the field and in Khartoum. The team did not meet sufficient key personnel who are involved in the various sectoral programmes. Particularly when discussing the planning/coordination of the sectors.</p>	<p>a) This information is a casualty of brevity. UNICEF is referred to throughout the recommendation on child protection.</p> <p>b) The Team spent as much time in Khartoum and the field as the evaluation budget afforded. For the last visit, the team leader was in Sudan for six weeks and made three trips to Darfur. Another team member was in Sudan for three weeks and spent time in West Darfur. Evaluations are, by definition, time-limited. In addition to seeking out and meeting numerous agency staff, the team advertised its presence and invited any agency to make additional contacts.</p>
	<p><i>Coordination</i></p> <p>The coordination structure the consultancy proposes is not realistic; it simply adds another layer of bureaucracy without any visible positive effects. Once again, almost all recommendations address procedures rather than root causes.</p>	<p>The Team has not recommended a new coordination structure, and is therefore uncertain to what this comment refers.</p>
	<p><i>Leadership</i></p>	<p>The Team believes lack of leadership is a relatively straight-forward</p>

Reviewers	Comments	Team Response
	There is a need to clarify what is meant by ‘lack of leadership’ - such generic, subjective comments appear neither helpful nor relevant.	concept. Nevertheless, this has been reinforced where appropriate in the ‘who’ sections.
	<i>Deadlines</i> Deadlines for the implementation of many recommendations are unrealistic and most appear impossible to achieve.	The Team revised the timings proposed for the implementation of the recommendations. However, this is meant to be indicative only. It is up to the UNCT and other actors to determine for each recommendation what is realistic/feasible.
	<i>Prioritization</i> The report does not sufficiently specify priorities. It is unfortunate, for example, that it does not discuss the priority for beneficiaries to receive assistance.	The Team kept the number of recommendations down to 21 – these are the high priority recommendations. Again, the UNCT might consider which, among these, it considers priorities that can be implemented in the shorter term. It is unclear what is intended by the example given.
	<i>Coverage of assistance</i> The comment made here does not properly take into consideration the situation on the ground before the emergency. The reality then was that many lacked basic services (a structural problem with humanitarian consequences). It is not within the scope of emergency response to address this.	In the final report, the point about chronic needs and the inappropriateness of expecting an emergency intervention to be able to undo years of neglect in the provision of basic services, was strengthened.
	<i>Flawed human rights protection framework</i> The GoS should be mentioned here as the key obstacle to advancing on protection activities.	The final report states that the primary responsibility for protection lies with the GoS, which instead has obstructed protection efforts.
	<i>Lack of accountability for poor performance</i> While possibly correct, statements about staff spending much of their time making inherently weak systems work suggests subjectivism on the part of some disgruntled aid workers. Specific examples are needed.	This statement was not included in the final report, although it is reflected in the acknowledgements that preface the report. The statement referred to did not reflect the views of a few disgruntled aid workers. It was based on multiple stakeholder interviews primarily of extremely committed UN staff, those very staff who are going above and beyond the call of duty to make things work.
	<i>Funding and support from diplomatic missions</i> The relevance of diplomatic pressure should be made more explicit. This point, although not very emphasized in the report, is key to addressing many of the problems highlighted.	The Team agrees that diplomatic pressure is essential. The final report included the addition of a paragraph about the imperative of donors maintaining diplomatic pressure and indeed stepping it up where and when it can effect change. It is noted in this paragraph that if diplomatic pressure diminishes it will have a negative effect on humanitarian efforts in Darfur and on the safety and wellbeing of the people.

Reviewers	Comments	Team Response
	<p>Additional comments made following circulation of revised report: Advocacy: The advocacy comment is very limited, and focuses on child protection, not addressing all populations. References to ‘poor advocacy’ and the ‘missing child’s face’: UNICEF’s substantial advocacy initiatives have not been reflected: roles such as Goodwill Ambassador Visits, Upcoming Child Alert Publication, UN Photo Exhibitions, documentaries, media events in several European and Middle Eastern capitals should be included.</p>	<p>UNICEF was at pains to point out that most of its advocacy efforts had been “quiet advocacy.” The team stands by its comment that there has been a lack of sustained, high level and strategic advocacy by most agencies (indeed the absence of UN advocacy strategy for Darfur underscores this). The Team stands by the comment that the crisis does not have a “child’s face” and has sought the input of the SRSB – CAAC on this issue.</p>
	<p><i>Recommendation: Improve the accountability of HQ to the field</i> No comment made.</p>	
	<p><i>Recommendation: Improve the accountability of the UN Agencies...</i> While a very valid point, the method suggested is impractical. Consultants will not have the necessary clout/authority to elicit the information needed to suggest changes at this level. Requires a mentality change and greater open-ness towards constructive self-criticism among managers. Internal oversight is always tricky and yields skepticism. Recommendation is to bring it up initially at the senior levels, including IASC.</p>	<p>Instead of consultants the final report recommendation refers to UN staff (recruited or seconded). The Team agrees that the need to improve the accountability of UN agencies should be raised at senior levels, including the IASC.</p>
	<p><i>Recommendation: Initiate collective and accountable INGO action...</i></p> <p>a) Recognized as a valid point but the method found to be impractical. It should cover all actors, not only those who wish to participate as this could still leave a large number outside the realm of scrutiny.</p> <p>b) Specific examples of NGO independence hampering the response are needed. Question was asked: What is behind this recommendation, a UN screening mechanism on which NGOs should participate and which should not?</p> <p>c) Lastly, it was noted that if the UN were more practically solidified (i.e. less fragmented) in strategizing on how to approach and respond to humanitarian crises, coordinating NGOs would also be easier.</p> <p>Additional comments made following circulation of revised report:</p> <p>d) The addition of a UN and NGO Oversight Unit in the Humanitarian Coordinator’s Office will merely add yet another layer of Khartoum-based bureaucracy with little or no positive results.</p>	<p>a) The Team agrees in principal that all actors should participate, but believes that on balance it would be better to look to a group of willing NGOs to take the lead rather than try to impose measures on all NGOs.</p> <p>b,c) The final report provides examples; makes it plain that the Team does not recommend a UN screening mechanism; and acknowledges that NGO accountability must be complemented by better accountability and coordination by the UN.</p> <p>d) The Team believes the Unit has the potential to address a fundamental problem – the primary resource required to realize this potential is the</p>

Reviewers	Comments	Team Response
	Further, this Unit will undoubtedly demand extensive reporting by UN and NGO operations in the field, further taxing already overstretched human, material and time resources. The Evaluation Team's recommendation is seen as ill-advised, unnecessary and most-likely counter-productive.	cooperation of the actors concerned. It was not envisaged that the Unit would require additional reporting. The two members of the Unit would rely principally on discussion and observation.
	<p>Recommendation 4: More effectively balance competing priorities...</p> <p>Explicit demarcation is needed of the boundary between emergency assistance and regular recovery/development assistance. The existing capacity in Darfur is largely there to tackle the emergency, however, recovery/development demands are increasingly being placed upon already stretched human resources.</p>	<p>The Team acknowledges that additional demands have arisen that go beyond emergency response. The recommendation seeks to address this and other tensions in the context of finite resources, in this case balancing the ongoing need for emergency assistance and more recovery oriented interventions e.g. distributions of seeds and tools, animal vaccines, etc.</p> <p>The Team believes this approach is preferable to seeking agreement on the exclusion of certain interventions – which is implied by referring to 'an explicit demarcation'. The team agrees however that it is vital that agencies understand the nature of the needs they seek to address. This issue was discussed in the final report.</p>
	<p><i>Recommendation: Strengthen sectoral planning and analysis in the field</i></p> <p>There must be human resources available. This means increased staffing and increased costs. Donors should press for this as capacity is too stretched for taking the time to properly do this.</p>	The Team acknowledges that capacity is stretched, but believes planning and analysis could still be improved. Please refer further to the Team's response to overall comments on the capacity issue (above).
	<p><i>Recommendation 6: Shape the Planning and Analysis Unit as key HC/UNCT asset</i></p> <p>No comment made</p>	
	<p><i>Recommendation 7: Initiate joint monitoring and Analysis of key interventions</i></p> <p>No comment made</p>	
	<p><i>Recommendation: Require discussion of project funding proposals within sector working groups</i></p> <p>No comment made</p>	
	<p><i>Recommendation: Establish more UN satellite offices</i></p> <p>Important but intertwined with the overall issues of collaboration on the part of the governing authorities and capacity. However, this point underlines the need for a common policy to these issues for Darfur. Piecemeal approach (e.g. IOM/HCR for returns) is not going to work unless there are standardized/common criteria/policy to which all must adhere. This is currently not the case with e.g. returns</p>	<p>Please refer to response to overall comments on capacity and political reality of the operating environment.</p> <p>The Team very much agrees with the observation about the piecemeal approach to returns and fully addressed this issue with recommendations for a more common approach.</p>

Reviewers	Comments	Team Response
	<p>in Darfur where HCR has different standards/capacity for assisting spontaneous returns than IOM.</p> <p>Additional comments made following circulation of revised report: The Evaluation Team fails to address the primary reason for failure of agencies to expand their presence in the field with satellite offices: a lack of funding. As an example, UNHCR plans for 2005 call for the opening of 8 field offices: El Fashir, Zalingi, Kulbus, Masteri, Beida, Habillah, Foro Baranga and Mukjar. At the time of the Evaluation Team's review, UNHCR was only 10% funded for 2005 – approximately \$3 million funded of the budgeted \$31 million. Although UNHCR has been able to open its office in Zalingi, and will open in the near future field offices in Mukjar and Kulbus, UNHCR has had to review and possibly revise its operations strategy, including the possibility of not opening some or all of the remaining satellite offices, due to budgetary restrictions. The Evaluation Team failed to adequately address the need for donors to provide funding to protection agencies for their necessary protection presence activities, including opening of field satellite offices.</p>	<p>The Team agrees and reflected the funding constraints more fully in the final version of the report. Generally, the Team's view is that it should not withhold a recommendation solely because it has funding implications, although the Team agrees existing constraints and additional requirements must be flagged. The team is also cognisant of other blockages at HQ level that have contributed to the delay in opening field offices.</p>
	<p><i>Recommendation: Address weaknesses in arrangements for relocation and return</i></p> <p>Agencies tasked with return issues presently engage in a continuous review of their operations, including lessons learned analysis, and are in open discussions with each other. The Team's suggestion of a review of current arrangements is unnecessary and will add further bureaucracy while taking away necessary resources from the actual work of addressing return issues.</p> <p>Agencies involved in the returns in Darfur are also involved in North-South returns and fully participated in the North-South Returns Task Force set up in mid-May 2005. Further, while some of the experiences learned in both North-South returns and Darfur returns are mutually applicable and are shared intra-agency and inter-agency, the Team fails to take into count a fundamental difference between North-South returns and Darfur returns: The existence of a signed Peace Agreement. Standards and work done regarding North-South returns that are applicable to Darfur returns are already being passed amongst agencies tasked with return for Darfur.</p>	<p>The team did not meet or interview any stakeholder who did not believe the current arrangements are sub-optimal. Further, the Team believes that, although agencies attempt to work well on the ground, they are constrained by the current arrangements, which make them vulnerable to disingenuous tactics by some parts of the GoS.</p> <p>The Team remains of the view that IOM should strengthen its capacity, as well as its expertise.</p> <p>The final draft report acknowledged that there has been much collaboration between the agencies and that there has been a good show of solidarity in the ways mentioned in the feedback (eg. Pp 29, 30).</p> <p>The team dropped the reference to a tripartite agreement.</p> <p>The Team believes that the organic nature of the development of the humanitarian community's response to the issues of return and reintegration has left it vulnerable and that this calls for an approach which – while building on strengths – capitalises on the advantages of each agency and makes the whole response one response.</p>

Reviewers	Comments	Team Response
	<p>The Evaluation Team’s suggestion of a tripartite agreement between IOM, OCHA and UNHCR is unnecessary and will merely add yet another bureaucratic layer to the issue of returns. Standards for when conditions are conducive to return are clearly set forth in IOM’s MoU and its MCM documents, and in UNHCR’s LoU. Further, in conjunction with OCHA, there is good cooperation and collaboration between IOM and UNHCR on returns, as evidenced by the response of these agencies to the recent GoS facilitated returns from Nyala to West Darfur [See: The 20 April 2005 demarche letter by IOM, OCHA and UNHCR to the South Darfur Wali; the 30 May 2005 joint letter of cooperation between IOM and UNHCR; the recent, joint, successful actions by these organizations to persuade GoS to provide them with the names of potential returnees in advance of movement for verification of voluntariness; and the collaboration between these agencies at points of departure and destination of the returnees. A package for IOM and UNHCR for funding of resources for return-related activities, and possibly OCHA for coordination activities related to returns as the representative of the HC, can be prepared without the need for yet another formalized agreement. Finally, the Team fails to note that IOM is the responsible agency for returns in North and South Darfur, that UNHCR the responsible agency for returns in West Darfur, and that these agencies have expertise in these areas whereas OCHA is responsible for coordination of the humanitarian response, for which it has expertise, but not, specifically, the issue of returns. Therefore, the recommendation of a tripartite agreement by the Team is unnecessary and ill-advised.</p> <p>UNHCR (West Darfur), IOM (North and South Darfur) and the respective PWGs already liaise with the AU regarding suggested areas for patrolling, including areas of return.</p>	
	<p><i>Recommendation: Strengthen arrangements for the protection of IDPs</i></p> <p>While this may be a valid point, this section underscores a recurrent imbalance in this report: The GoS/SLA are never mentioned as the key responsible agents in protection. To the contrary, the humanitarian community is put at fault for not “protecting” civilians.</p>	<p>The final report stated that the primary responsibility for protection lies with the GOS and that it was instead obstructing this aim. The Team does not agree that the report as presented to the Humanitarian Coordinator blamed the humanitarian community for not protecting civilians.</p>
	<p><i>Recommendation: Review current IDP registration procedures...</i></p>	<p>The final report recommendation made it even plainer that it is forward looking i.e. that current procedures be reviewed to determine how to</p>

Reviewers	Comments	Team Response
	It is too late for this recommendation. However, a lesson learned is that some sort of registration should be prioritized and accompany, to the extent practicable to the delivery of humanitarian assistance from the beginning of the operation.	proceed with future registrations.
	<p><i>Recommendation: Delineate roles and responsibilities and establish a unified system</i></p> <p>The Evaluation Team’s recommendation that the KPSG protection database be transferred to UNMIS HRU is ill-advised. The database was developed by the KPSG at the request of the field PWGs and is an interagency database open to all humanitarian agencies operating in Darfur. Presently, OCHA, under its protection working group role of secretariat, operates the database. Transferring the database to UNMIS-HRU, who would need to establish the capacity to operate and maintain the database – and who have different information requirements - will effectively kill the database. OCHA, as the secretariat for the protection working groups, and as the agency tasked with coordination of the humanitarian response, has the capacity and experience to operate and maintain the database. Therefore, the database should remain with the KPSG, operated by OCHA under its role as secretariat.</p> <p>Where deemed necessary, efforts are already underway for revitalization of field protection working groups.</p>	<p>The Team did not find that everyone agreed that the Protection data-base was field-driven. In any event, the Team believes that the HRU has the capacity to take on this work and, as the human rights body of the integrated Mission should do so. The Team is cognisant of criticisms of integrated Mission HRUs for only doing monitoring and investigating (case-by-case) and believes that the HRU has a wider role to play in assisting the humanitarian actors.</p> <p>Please refer also to UNMIS-HRU feedback and the team’s response to OCHA’s comment above.</p>
	<p><i>Recommendation: Comprehensively address issues of SGBV...</i></p> <p>This is a futile recommendation unless there are more people on the ground. Should be provided in conjunction with a recommendation for troop bolstering as a necessary part of solving this problem.</p>	<p>The Team does not share the view that nothing can be done about SGBV unless there are more people on the ground. The final report addresses the primary responsibility of the GoS – hence the adoption of the 11 recommendations already passed to the GoS.</p> <p>The Team agrees that increased troop numbers and civilian police presence would help with this problem and acknowledges the efforts made in this regard. Issues to do with ‘Form 8,’ however, are not affected by having military presence.</p>
	<p><i>Recommendation: Ensure appropriate monitoring and reporting of violations of children’s rights</i></p> <p>No comment made</p>	
	<p><i>Recommendation: Act fast to prevent sexual violence and abuse</i></p> <p>The Evaluation Team continues to ignore that some agencies [UNICEF, UNHCR, etc.] have their own Codes of Conduct which</p>	<p>Team appreciates this clarification. But still, there seem to be quite a few staff who have not signed a code of conduct and this has to be remedied. The team further understands that both UNICEF and UNHCR also</p>

Reviewers	Comments	Team Response
	<p>apply to their staff members and consultants. This begs the question of why signing yet another Code of Conduct is necessary and whether it will reduce instances of sexual exploitation.</p> <p>Further, the Team continues to stress the signing of the Code of Conduct but not the implementation of the standards set therein. Merely signing the Code of Conduct is an empty gesture unless there is effective implementation and enforcement of the principles and standards contained therein.</p>	<p>subscribe to the IASC Code of Conduct. Where other agencies (eg. IRC) have their own code of conduct, they take the IASC one as a minimum. This is reflected in the text of the report.</p> <p>The Team makes reference to the important role of the Personnel Conduct Officer in the final report (pg 36). It is of the view that, generally, more attention needs to be paid to this role in realising the Zero Tolerance approach of the SG.</p>
	<p><i>Recommendation: Provide public clarification on referral to the International Criminal Court</i></p> <p>The first sentence of the “WHY” paragraph is not very accurate and may benefit from revision</p> <p>There is a necessity to clarify this.</p>	<p>The final report provides additional clarification of the rationale for this recommendation.</p> <p>The Team does not agree that this sentence is inaccurate. It was based on discussions with senior agency staff members in Darfur who had written (jointly) to the SRSG making this same point. (The sentence reads “The war-affected and other populations in Darfur are aware that preparations are being made to prosecute senior members of the Sudan leadership for crimes against humanity and war crimes.”)</p>
	<p><i>Recommendation: Reinforce the relationship between humanitarian action and its normative framework</i></p> <p>Agencies <u>must</u> dispatch more senior staff with better knowledge AND understanding on how to apply this in circumstances like Darfur.</p>	<p>This comment was taken on board in the report.</p>
	<p><i>Recommendation: Mainstream gender in humanitarian programming</i></p> <p>No comment made</p>	
	<p><i>Recommendation: Establish a Darfur food security and livelihood monitoring unit or network</i></p> <p>No comment made</p>	
	<p><i>Recommendation: Target issues of human rights violations and abuse for advocacy at appropriate levels</i></p> <p>No comment made</p>	

MANAGEMENT RESPONSE MATRIX TO CONSOLIDATED RECOMMENDATIONS FROM REPORTS ONE, TWO AND THREE

Note to users

- This matrix is intended to facilitate the management response to all of the recommendations contained in the three reports of the *Inter-Agency Evaluation of the Humanitarian Response to the Darfur Crisis*.
- It is a consolidation of the recommendations prepared by OCHA's Evaluation and Studies Unit (ESU). No recommendations have been omitted. But where repetitive, earlier recommendations have been merged or collapsed into the later, more nuanced ones. But all effort has been made to preserve the intent of the evaluators.
- For ease of reference, the recommendations may have been re-categorized and grouped under simplified headings.
- The reference following the "Recommended actions" headings in the first column of the following matrix indicates the report which contains most of the relevant recommendations. Recommendations from the other two reports within the grouping are noted in parenthesis after the relevant recommendation. Thus (2nd, R53) means that the specific preceding recommendation was recommendation number 53 in the second report.
- The recommendations in the three reports date from Sept. 2004, February 2005 and July 2005. Some of them may no longer be relevant as circumstances on the ground may have changed. Some of them may have already been implemented. And some were already subject to response from the UNCT. Nonetheless, all are reflected in this matrix for a response in order to ensure that: 1) proper consultation has taken place with all actors on all of the recommendations; 2) this response is captured in one document; 3) allow a fully considered response on all of the recommendations to the ERC/IASC.
- As an aid to discussion, ESU has inputted the UNCT's response to the recommendations in report two, which may be revisited/updated in light of developments. ESU has also indicated instances in which recommendations might be considered in light of the ongoing discussions on humanitarian reform within the IASC (new cluster approach) or where other IASC decisions might come to bear.
- In a few areas, ESU has also provided earlier feedback from the evaluation team, but only to recommendations from report two for which the UNCT specifically asked for clarification from the team.

ADVOCACY (1⁸⁵)

1. STEP UP PUBLIC AND ‘QUIET’ ADVOCACY AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS (Also in 2 nd)	
<p><u>Accountable actors:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ High level UN officials outside Sudan including heads of UN humanitarian agencies operational in Darfur ▪ High Commissioner for Human Rights ▪ SRSG for Children and Armed Conflict ▪ Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on Gender Issues ▪ UNIFEM ▪ Secretary-General’s Representative on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons ▪ Mandate-holders of the Special Procedures of the Commission on Human Rights ▪ Ambassadors present in Sudan, particularly donor and Arab states ▪ High profile NGOs. 	
Recommended actions (report 3, rec 22, pg 37)	Response
a. Develop advocacy strategies for the Mission as a whole (SRSG) and for each major UN entity.	
b. Use reliable information on trends and patterns gathered by UN and NGOs to inform public advocacy.	
c. Use opportunities as presented by other specific events or developments (e.g. NGOs harassed for speaking out about rape) to make joint and separate press statements and appearances.	
d. Provide leadership and guidance to field-based staff of UN and NGOs regarding opportunities and strategies for advocacy (3rd), including greater guidance to actors in the more remote	Ongoing through information sharing, and continuous contacts between Khartoum and field offices.

⁸⁵ Indicates the number of recommendations under each heading.

areas on how to conduct advocacy at various levels and what support they may expect from their own and others' agencies at the regional or headquarters level. (2nd/R63)	FP: All agencies.
e. Ensure that potential advocates (e.g. mandate holders of the Special Procedures of the Commission on Human Rights) have sufficient information on a timely basis to enable them to make the appropriate approaches.	

STRATEGIC PLANNING (3)

1. STRENGTHEN STRATEGIC PLANNING PROCESSES (contingency, Work Plan)	
<p><u>Accountable actors:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ UNCT ▪ OCHA/Darfur Cell ▪ NGOs ▪ IOs ▪ Donors 	
Recommended actions (report 2, recs 71-74, pgs 22-23)	Response
a. Develop a contingency plan for a potential increase in violence. (1)	
b. Consider planning for not just one but multiple scenarios. (1)	
c. Distribute the 2005 <i>United Nations and its Partners Work Plan for the Sudan</i> to UN agencies and NGOs in the field.	Distributed to UN. Available on the UN Sudan website.
d. Encourage all humanitarian actors to take an active part in these review/strategic planning processes. (Donors)	Ongoing.
e. Commence regular reviews of the 2005 Work Plan (envisaged for each 120-day period) with a state-level process to be subsequently consolidated into a Darfur-wide meeting of UN and NGO representatives. These reviews should include an appraisal of the continued relevance of existing strategies and of the causal logic between activities and higher-level objectives. The upcoming review in particular should be seized as an opportunity to deal more satisfactorily with: 1) expansion of humanitarian assistance beyond accessible IDP camps and clusters to those in less accessible areas, including	Ongoing. An expert from OCHA arriving in mid-April to lead the process. FP: OCHA

<p>in areas controlled by non-state actors, and 2) the tension between acute and chronic tensions needs and vulnerabilities.</p> <p>f. Identify skilled facilitators to lead these review/strategic planning processes from amongst the existing compliment of UN agency (including OCHA Consolidated Appeals Process facilitators), IO and NGO personnel. They should form an ad hoc team, supported by the OCHA Darfur Cell. Consideration should be given to providing training in the facilitation of review and planning processes to members of the OCHA Darfur Cell to strengthen the Darfur Cell's capacity to provide advice and assistance to the ad hoc team.</p>	
<p>2. ESTABLISH A PLANNING AND ANALYSIS UNIT</p>	
<p><u>Accountable actors:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ HC ▪ UNCT 	
<p>Recommended actions (report 3, rec 4, pg 15)</p>	<p>Response</p>
<p>a. Start from the premise that it is absolutely essential that it is seen and used as a HC/UNCT asset.</p>	<p>OCHA operational Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Unit effective 1 May 2005.</p> <p>FP: OCHA</p>
<p>b. Incorporate the positive lessons from the recent collaboration on returns to southern Sudan (the 'returns group').</p>	
<p>c. Ensure tasks undertaken are driven by the HC with UNCT and NGO 'buy in'.</p>	
<p>d. Provide assistance by bringing in expertise from UN agencies and NGOs tasked to the Unit rather than as representatives to it (along the lines of the 'returns group' model).</p>	

e. Ensure that this Unit is not tasked with work in the domain of others (eg. the Information Management Unit and other mechanisms).	
f. Better use existing indicators and contribute to new conflict mapping and analysis, in order to ensure that humanitarian programming is informed by conflict analysis. Provide practical guidance to assist humanitarian agencies and organizations to integrate conflict mitigation and peace building in their assistance programmes. (Also on 2 nd /R66)	Ongoing. UNDP post-conflict and HC office political analysts in Khartoum. Dissemination of information to be improved. FP: HC Office
3. STRENGTHEN SECTOR LEVEL PLANNING IN THE FIELD	
<p><u>Accountable actors</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Sector coordinators/leads and working groups in four operational areas of Darfur ▪ OCHA Area Managers ▪ HC's office ▪ UNCT ▪ Donors 	
Recommended actions (report 3, recs 5-7, pgs 16-19)	Response

<p>Strengthen sector coordination</p> <p>a. Develop terms of reference for sector coordinators and a procedure for periodic peer review (perhaps to be overseen by a nominee from each sector), the results of which would be shared with HC and discussed and acted upon at the country director/representative level. (HC’s office in consultation with UNCT and NGOs)</p> <p>b. Translate 120-day plans into rolling implementation plans for each sector in each of the four operational areas (clearly identifying who will do what where by when with what sector lead support) and recommend a procedure for simply and efficiently updating and disseminating the plan from month to month. (Sector leads in each operational area.)</p> <p>c. Prepare and maintain activity maps for each sector indicating who does what where and flagging jointly a agreed priority gaps (see above) in assistance. (Sector leads in each operational area with HIC support.) OCHA Areas Managers should maintain an overview and facilitate cross-sectoral consultation.</p> <p>d. Undertake water needs assessments in each operational area, in the order of agreed priority. (UNICEF lead.) Consideration should be given to a similar assessment for primary health care. (HC in consultation with UNCT and WHO sector lead.)</p>	
<p>Balancing competing priorities within and across sectors</p>	

<p>e. Each sector working group to prepare a two-page presentation with an accompanying map describing how competing needs are to be balanced for the remainder of 2005.</p> <p>f. Present these in a cross-sectoral meeting open to all humanitarian actors in each operational area. Revise these on the basis of peer advice, combined them as one document and circulated between operational areas and share with Khartoum.</p> <p>g. Revise the Work Plan and 120-day sector plans if needed, although this process is meant to supplement and enrich the Work Plan and 120-day sector plans, not supplant them.</p>	
<p><u>Reviewing project proposals</u></p> <p>h. Require discussion of project funding proposals within relevant sector working groups before submission to donors.</p> <p>i. As a first step, sector working groups should provide an assessment of their capacity to accommodate the requirement.</p> <p>j. If a compromise is to be made, it should be in the attention sector working groups are expected to give each proposal.</p> <p>k. Sector coordinators should then jointly define criteria against which all projects will be reviewed.</p> <p>l. The recommendation does not require that projects be <i>approved</i> by sector working groups. Donors should, however, require that agencies and organisations include in their proposals an explanation of any reservations expressed within the relevant sector working groups. Donors should require an</p>	

<p>explanation from UN agencies, IOs or NGOs that decline to submit proposals to relevant sector working groups. All humanitarian agencies and organisations should, of course, be informed of the requirement and review criteria well in advance.</p> <p>m. Donors should provide additional support to sector coordinators if they reasonably require it, to ensure that they have the capacity to adequately and efficiently assess proposals.</p>	
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INFORMATION (2)

1. IMPROVE INFORMATION SHARING BETWEEN UN POLITICAL AND SECURITY ACTORS WITH HUMANITARIAN ACTORS, INCLUDING NGOs	
<u>Accountable actors:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ UNIMSUD ▪ HC 	
Recommended actions (report 2, rec 55, pg 18)	Response
a. More frequently verbally brief NGOs as well as UN actors on key issues or developments that affect humanitarian programming, in particular political and security analysis (excluding sensitive information). (UNAMIS/UNIMSUD)	
2. ENSURE ADEQUATE PUBLIC INFORMATION ABOUT HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES	
<u>Accountable actors:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ UNIMSUD ▪ HC ▪ All aid organizations 	
Recommended actions (report 2, recs 8, 64 and 65, pgs 5 and 20)	Response

<p>a. Act urgently on the need identified in Security Council Resolution 1547 for effective public information.</p> <p>b. Ensure that all staff members and consultants understand the humanitarian principles, key policies and modus operandi of their organisations, and that they can adequately explain them. These should be available (in Arabic and English) to all staff and consultants, as well as beneficiaries and the community. Oxfam's <i>What is Oxfam Doing in Darfur?</i> document should be used as a model for providing public information.</p>	<p>Information to staff is made available through briefings at HQs and/or field level. PI strategy has been elaborated by UNMIS in close collaboration with OCHA and other UN agencies. The recently established PI working group will further discuss/address the matter. Major constraint: staffing.</p> <p>FP: Public Information Working Group</p>
<p>c. Disseminate the <i>Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement</i> to IDPs, government officials and humanitarian actors, in accordance with Security Council Resolution 1547 . This should be done in Arabic and local languages through a multitude of channels, including radio broadcasts and plays, incorporation of the principles into literacy programmes, and through booklets, newsletters and newspapers. As a first and immediate step, the UN International Displacement Division should distribute copies in Arabic of the <i>Guiding Principles</i> in Arabic to all IDP, officials and aid workers.</p>	<p>Guiding Principles are not recognized or adhered to by the GoS. Copies available at OCHA. Camp management, protection trainings include GP. Protection Steering Group and Public Information Working Group to discuss advocacy initiatives. IDPs Senior Advisor arrived in country. Copies of the IDPs guiding principles available in Arabic in Sudan.</p> <p>Consideration should be given to the fact that a recent assessment highlights that UN radio will not be up and running in Darfur until mid 2006 at the earliest and that given the current regulatory structure it's unlikely that alternative means of radio broadcast like camp radios will be allowed before that time. The same evaluation suggests the use of BBC World Service.</p> <p>FP: Protection Working Group. Pulic Information Working Group</p>

ASSESSMENT (1)

1. CONSOLIDATE EXSITING ASSESSMENT DATA, AND WORK TOWARD COMMON (MULTI-SECTORAL, MULTI-AGENCY) ASSESSMENTS	
<p><u>Accountable actors:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ HC ▪ OCHA/HIC ▪ All aid organizations 	
Recommended actions (report 2, recs 54, 56, 57, pg 18)	Response
a. Develop a common assessment strategy and plan for assessment in place, at least for UN agencies. (1)	
b. Complete in all sectors an inventory of significant assessments undertaken in the last twelve months and post copies on a web site made available for collection at the OCHA/HIC state offices (in deference to reported difficulties downloading important documents).	Ongoing by OCHA. Once index is compiled, it will be distributed to Sector Coordinators for revision and completion of information. Timeline for completion: end April. FP: OCHA/Sector Coordinators.
c. Include risk assessment as a central component of all assessments, and ensure the participation of an individual with protection expertise as a core team member.	Ongoing. Both aspects are considered in assessment missions. FP: All agencies.
d. Place greater priority on conducting multi-agency, multi-sectoral assessments that systematically fill gaps in geographic and sectoral knowledge. This should be coordinated through the state and Khartoum-level inter-agency coordination meetings.	

QUALITATIVE ASPECTS OF PROGRAMMING (4)

1. APPLY SPHERE STANDARDS APPROPRIATELY	
<u>Accountable actors:</u> All aid organizations Donors HC	
Recommended actions (report 2, recs 30 and 31, pgs 12 and 13)	Response
Invite the Sphere Project to assist agencies and organizations to appropriately apply Sphere Project Minimum Standards for Disaster Response in the Darfur context.(HC)	<u>Not needed. Discussion on standards to be adopted ongoing among sector coordinators.</u> <i><u>Team response: The team disagrees that it is not needed, and queries why asking for guidance to the ongoing discussions would not be useful.</u></i>
Rely less exclusively on Sphere Project <u>quantitative</u> targets as the sole measure of achievement.	<u>Sector Coordinators to decide on standards/targets to report in the Work Plan Review, HNP and agency documents. To be carried out at the same time as the revision of the workplan. Expected to be completed in mid-May.</u>
Donors old agencies accountable to the <u>qualitative</u> and impact aspects of the Sphere Project minimum standards.	In contradiction with numbers 13 and 31 – a and b above. <i><u>Team Response: This is not contradictory. The recommendation is not to rely solely on SPHERE for quantitative targets that need to be tailored to the local context; but to pay greater attention to the qualitative aspects.</u></i>

2. ENSURE PARTICIPATION	
<u>Accountable actors:</u> All aid organizations	
Recommended actions (report 2, recs 27, 33, 67, pages 10, 13 and 21)	Response
Investigate formal and informal leadership structures in order to ensure that the assisted population is involved in decision making – particularly women and other marginalized groups. Meetings should be minuted and these should be made available publically, at all community and women’s centers to help ensure the accountability of leaders. (33) All discussions with communities about new interventions, as well as decisions about ongoing interventions, should include separate sessions with women and men. (27)	<p>UN agencies/NGOs regularly involve discussions with beneficiaries, especially women and vulnerable groups, in decision-making processes. Consideration should be given to the fact that material posted in public notice boards may be vetoed by HAC and GoS officials and that staff employed for this task may be subject to intimidations.</p> <p>Forward to PWG for discussion. Camp coordinators are gathering information on existing networks/associations at camp level to identify possible forums.</p> <p>FP: Protection Working Group/OCHA</p>
Ensure the participation of the war-affected population and civil society in efforts to integrate conflict mitigation and peacebuilding in assistance programmes – with particular reference to women’s roles in peace building and conflict transformation in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1325.	<p>Initiatives on-going outside the UN by NGOs and others. Initiatives to address this concern have highly political implications. Establishment of UNMIS presence in the field will boost interaction and UN response. NB: Nomadic Gap Group is a step towards integrating conflict resolution and peace building measures into programmes and should be reflected.</p> <p>FP: UNMISUD</p>

3. ENSURE HUMANITARIAN PROGRAMMES ARE GUIDED BY A GENDER ANALYSIS; AND WORK TOWARDS REALIZING GENDER EQUALITY AND WOMEN'S HUMAN RIGHTS	
<p><u>Accountable actors:</u> All UN agencies and partner NGOs Donors</p>	
Recommended actions (report 3, rec 19, page 35)	Response
<p>a. Scrutinise programmes and plans for adherence to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Beijing Platform for Action, the African Charter on Human and People's Rights and UNSC Resolution 1325 (Women, Peace and Security), and, where appropriate, use the language of these documents to guide action plans and strategies. Where agencies find themselves unable to undertake a gender analysis or conduct gender-sensitive programming, they can make use of existing expertise by consulting the UNMIS Senior Gender Adviser, UNIFEM, the Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and appropriate NGOs. Lack of capacity at Khartoum or HQ is not an acceptable excuse for not complying with obligations.</p>	<p><u>In response to similar recommendation from report 2:</u> Forward to Gender Advisor at UNMIS. Agencies, in general, involve gender analysis and consultation with women in programming activities.</p>
<p>b. Ensure that project and activity proposals adhere to the above. (Donors)</p>	
<p>c. Particular attention should be paid to the impact of displacement on gender roles. (2nd/R22)</p>	

<p>d. Build on existing dissemination and training on UNSCR 1325 (2000) by providing on-site mentoring for UN and NGO staff members. Secure appropriate expertise to supplement the existing capacity of the UNCT and donors where necessary. Commission training and/or other inputs on the implementation of UNSCR 1325, in line with that provided to the HQ-based staff of DPA and DPKO. (UNCT, UNMIS)</p>	<p><u>In response to similar recommendation from report 2:</u> Ongoing. UNICEF, UNHCR and WFP all have gender experts. Other agencies following up on identifying focal points.</p>
<p>e. Build on existing commitments and developments, e.g. WFP's Enhanced Commitments to Women, High Commissioner for Refugee's Five Commitments to Refugee Women.</p>	
<p>f. Support the Gender Theme Group for Darfur, including by ensuring that it is attended by staff of decision-making levels; and that there is strong collaboration between those in the field and at the state level (2nd/R25) (SRSG with assistance of Gender Advisor and UNIFEM)</p>	
<p>g. Agencies and others specifically tasked with gender issues should be strengthened and supported at all levels in terms of funding, staffing levels and key decision making fora. (2nd/R26)</p>	<p>Ongoing. UNICEF, UNHCR and WFP all have gender experts. Other agencies following up on identifying focal points.</p>
<p>4. TAKE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS INTO ACCOUNT</p> <p><u>Accountable actors:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ HC ▪ UN agencies 	
<p>Recommended actions (report 2, recs 34 and 36, page 13)</p>	<p>Response</p>

<p>a. Ensure that the appropriate agency conducts an immediate environmental risk assessment, building on existing work. (HC)</p>	<p>Proposal from OCHA Environmental Emergencies Section received 29 March 2005, to be discussed. Other initiatives already ongoing on firewood resources, overdrilling of water locations.</p> <p>FP: HC/OCHA</p>
<p>b. Immediately convene the planned Groundwater Forum and replicate this at the state capital level. Agencies should ensure that hydrological surveys available from the government Water, Environmental and Sanitation (WES) ministry or other agencies are referred to prior to drilling. Where there is no data or it cannot be obtained they should conduct a survey before proceeding. This information should then be shared.</p>	<p>Hydro-geological and geophysical surveys are conducted to select sites before drilling. Procurement of new equipment to strengthen survey capacity is in the pipeline. Plans to develop ground water surveillance have been made and awaiting contributions to start implementation.</p> <p>FP: UNICEF</p>

PROGRAMME IMPLEMENTATION (10)

1. INCREASE COVERAGE, ACCESS TO MORE EQUITABLY MEET NEEDS	
<u>Accountable actors:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ UN agencies ▪ Donors 	
Recommended actions (report 2, rec 1, page 4)	Response
a. Determined and coordinated effort to address needs and vulnerabilities of IDPs and other in less accessible areas, including those controlled by non-state actors. (Also in 1st)	OCHA is leading discussions on this in various forums at Khartoum and field level. A map/table is going to be developed on a monthly basis, with the support of HIC as a base for discussion on priorities for intervention and revisions of actions taken, based on needs and not on political agendas. HNP data and other information from the field will be used to develop the map and areas of intervention. FP: OCHA
2. DEEPEN FIELD PRESENCE to better realize: operational mandates, field-level leadership and coordination, human rights protection and support to NGOs	
<u>Accountable actors:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ OCHA ▪ UN Human Rights ▪ UN agencies with a sector lead 	
Recommended actions (report 3, rec 9, page 20)	Response
a. Efforts made to reprioritise tasks to enable existing personnel to spend a greater proportion of their time in the field. (2 nd /R4)	No specific action to be taken.

b. Establish a minimum two to three satellite human rights offices in each of the four operational areas in the Darfurs. (UN Human Rights)	
c. Establish satellite UN offices where reasonably required for the purposes of sector coordination or to fulfil protection responsibilities. (OCHA, agencies conducting sector coordination and / or protection)	
d. Place more emphasis on and better advise staff on supporting and protecting NGO cooperating partners at the field level. (All UN agencies)	
e. Involve UNMIS, UNDSS and the African Union in identifying and addressing constraints and opportunities for the deployment of satellite UN offices.	
f. Identify obstacles occurring at HQ, including bureaucratic and administrative problems, and find ways to overcome them.	
g. Identify obstacles to funding where these exist and encourage donors to realise the value in a greater field presence.	
3. WORK HARDER TO GET ALL CHILDREN IN SCHOOL to as a key child protection issue	
Accountable actors: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ UNICEF ▪ Concerned NGOs 	
Recommended actions (report 2, rec 21, page 9)	Response

<p>a. Formulate an immediate plan with timebound targets to provide all war affected children with access to education at no cost. Take concrete action to overcome obstacles such as the payment of teachers' salaries and the lack of implementing partners. (UNICEF and concerned NGOs)</p>	<p>The plan is ongoing. MoE issued decree for education at no cost.. MoE , UNICEF and NGOs are implementing an in-service teacher training scheme for volunteer teachers where they receive an 'incentive for teaching' without calling it a salary. More partners were identified.</p> <p>FP: Child PWG</p>
<p>4. ENSURE WATER QUALITY</p> <p><u>Accountable actors:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ UNICEF ▪ All aid organizations undertaking watsan activities 	
<p>Recommended actions (report 2, rec 37, page 13)</p>	<p>Response</p>
<p>a. Ensure that systems to regularly monitor bacteriological levels are put in place for water sources supported by the humanitarian response. Agencies and organizations undertaking water treatment should be supported by UNICEF with the appropriate expertise, equipment and supplies as needed.</p>	<p>Ongoing by UNICEF and WHO</p>
<p>b. Place greater emphasis on the educational aspects (e.g. use of latrines, health practices) in order to maximize use of facilities provided. (1st)</p>	
<p>5. UNDERTAKE CRUDE MORTALITY SURVEY</p> <p><u>Accountable actors:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ WHO 	
<p>Recommended actions (report 2, rec 41, page 13)</p>	<p>Response</p>

a. Consider the conduct of a crude mortality survey before the rainy season to confirm the apparent improvement in trends and health outcomes.	Ongoing. Preparation started in early April. To be completed end of June under the oversight of the HC. FP: OCHA, WHO
6. TAKE A MORE STRATEGIC APPROACH TO NFI DISTRIBUTION	
<u>Accountable actors:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ UNJLC 	
Recommended actions (report 2, rec 38, page 13)	Response
a. By December 2004, an agency should be appointed or confirmed as lead NFI coordinator, and donors should provide more funding for NFIs. (1 st)	<i>ESU note: Discussion of the need for an NFI lead coordinator may wish to take consideration the IASC agreement on cluster lead responsibilities. Further, a recent review of UNJLCs recommended that Field Steering Groups be formed to oversee the activities of the UNJLC during emergencies. The Steering Groups would be comprised of the UNCT, NGOs, OCHA etc. The findings of this review will be discussed and acted upon by the ISAC this week.</i>
b. Ensure that plans for NFI distributions are more needs driven and timely, and informed by a gendered analysis. If the planned second round distribution cannot be conducted before the next rains, consideration should be given to proceeding first with a distribution of plastic sheeting and waterproof ground mats.	Ongoing. Needs assessments and distribution consider gender issues. FP: OCHA, UNJLC
7. REVISE SHELTER STANDARDS AND IMPROVE DISTRIBUTION	
<u>Accountable actors:</u> OCHA UNJLC	
Recommended actions (1st)	Response

a. By December 2004, shelter standards revised, including revision of assumed family size.	
8. REVIEW THE EFFICIENCY AND APPROPRIATENESS OF CURRENT IDP REGISTRATION	
<u>Accountable actors:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ HC ▪ WFP ▪ OCHA ▪ IOM 	
Recommended actions (report 3, rec 13, pg 25)	Response

<p>a. Review the current procedures, asking the following questions:</p> <p><u>Objectives</u> – What are the objectives of the registration as currently conceived beyond obtaining an accurate IDP count? Could the additional objectives reflected in some of the questions on the form be met by different means, e.g. a sample survey de-linked from the headcount?</p> <p><u>Timeliness and efficiency</u> – Has the current procedure proved time efficient? How could it be made efficient enough to be repeated periodically?</p> <p><u>Cost-effectiveness</u> – Is the result worth the investment? Is it worth an ongoing investment, particularly in the event of the likely need to re-register substantial numbers at some point in the medium term?</p> <p><u>Utility</u> – Is registration ‘inclusion error’ satisfactorily reflected in duplicate entries in the IOM database? If it is, is it feasible to eliminate duplication by asking partners to issue only one card in the case of duplicate entries?</p> <p><u>Acceptability</u> – Are all concerned, including the IDPs themselves, willing to continue to conduct registrations in this way, particularly if and when it becomes necessary to re-register many of the same IDPs, e.g. in the event of mass movement?</p> <p><u>Appropriateness</u> – Is the current procedure compliant with best practice and good standards, particularly regarding children’s rights and gender.</p>	
<p>b. Take care to ensure that there is no possibility of the information being collected in ways that endanger IDPs. (2nd/R52)</p>	<p>Ongoing review. Darfur-wide registration exercise began in early March. As of mid-April, 60 percent completed. Additionally, more sensitive questions were removed.</p> <p>FP: WFP</p>

c. Consider accepting entitlement documentation across camps/areas in order to enable IDPs to move freely between them. (2 nd /R53)	Inappropriate. Darfur-wide registration exercise began in early March. As of 4 April, 37 percent completed. Registration cards mechanism used.
9. REDUCE WOMEN'S VULNERABILITY TO SGBV WHILE COLLECTING FUEL	
<u>Accountable actors:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ HC ▪ UNCT ▪ Relevant NGOs ▪ Donors 	
Recommended actions (report 2, rec 28 and 35, pgs 10 and 13)	Response
a. Take multi-agency and multi-initiative approach to prevent and address the rape of women in and around IDP camps.	<p>Ongoing discussion in multi-agency public forums, and bilateral discussions with the AU, donors, and the humanitarian community at Khartoum and field level. Need to improve reporting on practical.</p> <p>FP: PWG</p>
b. Promote locally produced fuel-efficient stoves on a massive scale. (HC and the donors) Set timebound targets for the percentage of encamped IDP households utilizing the stoves. (UNCT in consultation with relevant agencies, organizations and donors) (Also in 1 st)	<p>Massive production of fuel efficient stoves is not an answer to the problem, training is crucial to changing habits. Training, production ongoing. UN/NGOs projects including training and production ongoing in several locations, more activities planned for the second quarter of 2005.</p> <p>FP: PWG</p>

10. ADDRESS WEAKNESSES IN THE CURRENT ARRANGEMENTS FOR RETURN, REINTEGRATION, RESETTLEMENT AND RELOCATION	
<p><u>Accountable actors:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ ERC ▪ IASC ▪ HC ▪ UNHCR ▪ IOM ▪ OCHA ▪ Donors 	
Recommended actions (report 3, rec 12, pg 24)	Response
<p>a. First, conduct a full and frank review of the adequacy of current arrangements, both in practice and in theory, with particular regard to issues of effectiveness and efficiency, as well as compliance with international law and standards. Use existing review mechanisms for this if available. (HC's office, OCHA, UNHCR, IOM)</p>	<p>Discussions on lessons learned and current status of IOM-MCM and UNHCR-LoU to be facilitated by the HC/DHC/OCHA. Ongoing discussions between UNHCR and GoS on implementation of the LoU and dissemination of the principle of voluntary returns/relocations in dignity and safety.</p> <p>FP: HC/DHC, UNHCR, IOM, OCHA</p>
<p>b. Utilise the work done and standards developed, where appropriate, for North-South movement to apply a Sudan wide relocation, return and reintegration policy to the Darfurs. (UNMIS Relocation, Return and Reintegration Unit once operational.)</p>	

c. In the interim, UNHCR, IOM and OCHA should articulate a Darfur wide policy and a timebound costed plan for dealing consistently and effectively with IDP relocation and return, which should ultimately be presented to donors as a package. It should be realistic about the respective capacities of each agency and be developed in consultation with all humanitarian actors and the UNMIS Human Rights Unit.	
d. Include arrangements in the policy and plan for collaboration with the African Union military and CivPol components, including on the lines of communication and modalities for coordinated activities, e.g. in relation to the placement of AU police stations. (UNHCR, IOM, OCHA, AU)	
e. Monitor progress in developing the policy and plan, and support implementation efforts in the Darfurs (ERC, IASC, donors, NGOs)	
f. Ensure that return to places or areas of origin or resettlement are de-linked from issues of compensation for violations committed during the armed conflict.	
1. Meanwhile, sustain current high-level interventions in relation to the voluntary relocation of IDPs from large camps and public buildings in towns. (2 nd /R68)	Ongoing through high-level delegations from the UN and donor visits in the field and relationship with GoS in Khartoum and Darfur.
g. Provide some information to IDPs in the three Darfur states about possible mechanisms and programs, recognizing that the issue of returns has to continue to be managed with great sensitivity. (UN) (2 nd /R70)	Ongoing via UNHCR, IOM and NGOs. Massive return not forecasted in 2005. GoS ‘encouraged’ return being monitored. <i>Team response: At the time, the team did not think enough information was being provided.</i>
h. Commence (by Dec. 2004) work regarding property and land issues, particularly vis a vis inheritance rights for women and children. (1st)	

PROTECTION (8)

1. ENSURE THAT PROTECTION ACTION PLANS AND STRATEGIES REFLECT RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL LAW AND STANDARDS; AND STAFF KNOW HOW TO APPLY THEM	
<p><u>Accountable actors:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ UNMIS Human Rights and Protection Units ▪ KPSG ▪ Protection Working Groups ▪ OCHA ▪ HIC ▪ UNDP ▪ IRC ▪ NRC ▪ Senior IDP Advisers ▪ IDD as requested 	
Recommended actions (report 3, rec 18, pg 33)	Response
<p>a. Include explicit reference to relevant international and regional laws and standards (including applicable international human rights law, international humanitarian law and UN Security Council resolutions) in the protection action plans and strategies for each of the Darfur states and at Khartoum level. Where possible, adopt the language of these laws and standards. (Also in 2nd/R16)</p>	<p>Concepts and principles expressed in IHRL, IHL, UNSCRs are integrated in strategies and plans. Concepts and principles expressed in the documents referred to are integrated in strategies and plans. <i><u>Team comment:</u> The team believes that greater expression is still needed.</i></p>
<p>b. Ensure that all agencies have sufficient, knowledgeable staff to provide a foundation of understanding about how to apply international and regional law and standards to humanitarian operations in the Darfur context.</p>	

c. Provide staff of international agencies in Darfur with basic training and information on relevant international and regional ⁸⁶ law and standards, and the definition of protection.	
d. Increase familiarity and use of the Guiding Principles (GPs) and its accompanying Handbook by all agencies operating in Darfur, IDP representatives and Government agencies. Scrutinise action plans and strategies (state level PWGs; KPSG)	
e. Provide access to guided reading through the HIC web-site. (UNMIS HRU, PWG members, HIC.)	
f. Use the accompanying Handbook to the GPs for advice on how to operationalise the GPs. Build on existing dissemination and training on GPs by providing on-site mentoring. (Senior IDP Adviser as focal point. Include in all relevant training programmes)	
2. MEDIATE SPACE IN THE FIELD FOR PROTECTION AND HUMAN RIGHTS WORK; ENSURE SUSTAINABILITY	
<u>Accountable actors:</u> All UN agencies Especially those with human rights and protection mandates	
Recommended actions (report 2, recs 17 and 18, 40 on pgs 8 and 13 respectively)	Response
a. Do more to mediate space at the field level for human rights and protection activities, especially to allow NGOs to pursue protection activities. The Khartoum Protection Steering Group should help relevant agencies to determine how to achieve this. (UN agencies with human rights and protection mandates)	Ongoing though capacity stretched FP: PWG

⁸⁶ E.g. African Charter on Human and People's Rights, African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, 1969 OAU Refugee Convention

b. Identify and provide financial, technical and advocacy support to national organizations to enable them to do protection work and to ensure the sustainability of action. (All agencies)	Inappropriate. In the current environment the possibility of endangering national staff too great. Cf. SUDO country director imprisonment, among others. <i>Team comment: What if national organizations are willing to take the risk? Can we really not offer any assistance in this area because we don't think it is in their best interests? Maybe the recommendation could be amended to include the words 'offer to support' with some recognition of the risks involved.</i>
c. By December 2004, explore opportunities for new partnerships such as working with religious leaders and the mass media. (1 st)	
d. Provide advice to the HC on actions that may need to be taken to address the risk of the receipt of food aid or any other humanitarian resources endangering beneficiaries. (KPSG)	Ongoing in all sectors and field locations. FP: PWG
3. DEFINE ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION <u>Accountable actors:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ SRSG ▪ DRSGs ▪ UNMISUD Human Rights and Protection Units in consultation with ▪ OHCHR ▪ UNCT ▪ ICRC ▪ Protection Working Groups ▪ NGOs ▪ AU 	
Recommended actions (report 3, rec 10, pg 21)	Response
a. Establish a human rights protection operating framework that delineates roles and responsibilities between all human rights and humanitarian agencies/actors and that specifies clear	

<p>channels of communication and information flow between them, including between the UNMIS Human Rights Unit, the UNMIS Protection Unit, Rule of Law activities, operational UN agencies, IOs and NGOs. The Senior IDP Adviser and the Directors of the UNMIS Human Rights and Protection Units should collaborate in developing this framework in close consultation with the UNCT, ICRC and NGOs. (Also in 1st)</p>	
<p>The following four points relate to the complementary roles and responsibilities of human rights and humanitarian protection actors:</p> <p>b. Delineate the roles and responsibilities of human rights and humanitarian protection actors including the UNMIS Human Rights and Protection Units and Rule of Law activities.</p>	
<p>c. Adopt a more proactive stance in finding and investigating human rights abuses and provide more pattern and trend analysis for the benefit of the mission and humanitarian actors. (UNMIS Human Rights Unit, Human Rights Officers.)</p>	
<p>d. Develop a clear division of labour between agencies involved in protection work (whether as “human rights” or “humanitarian protection”) and develop clear and realistic terms of reference (TOR) for the KPSG and the Darfur PWGs. Base the TOR on a sound understanding of the international and regional legal framework applicable in Darfur. (Also in 2nd)</p>	
<p>e. Allocate mitigation, remedial and prevention activities to the Protection Working Groups and KPSG/UNMIS Protection Unit. Strengthen these activities by ensuring that they are adequately resourced and otherwise supported, including through advocacy with national and local authorities. (SRSG, donors, OCHA, UNMIS Protection Unit, African Union, OCHA, operational UN humanitarian agencies, NGOs)</p>	

f. Revitalise the Darfur capital-level Protection Working Groups by organising one-off seminars, protection-oriented strategy sessions or outside guest speakers of high calibre.	
4. DEFINE AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR PROTECTION OF IDPS	
<p><u>Accountable actors:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ HC and UNCT with assistance of ▪ Senior IDP advisor ▪ UNMISUD Human Rights and Protection Units ▪ Relevant NGOs 	
<p>Recommended actions (report 3, rec 11 pg 22) See also recs on IDP camp/cluster management/coordination below)</p>	Response
a. First, conduct a full and frank review of the current arrangements in all Darfur states for the protection of IDPs. Identify which capacities are needed and which are available within respective organisations for meeting this need. Pay particular attention to camp/area coordinators' needs for guidance and timely assistance regarding protection issues.	
b. Identify and coordinate a cadre of protection officers from UN agencies and NGOs. At this stage, this will consist of people recruited by agencies and NGOs carrying a 'protection' portfolio of responsibilities, of varying experience, expertise and seniority. ⁸⁷	
c. In West Darfur clarify the various roles of UNMIS Human Rights, UNHCR, OCHA and NGO camp coordinators.	

⁸⁷ The OHCHR and OCHA are developing complementary 'rapid response capacities' for the longer term. This issue will be addressed in the team's final Lessons Learned Report.'

d. Include modalities for engaging the African Union military and civilian police components.	
e. The feasibility of establishing a “social safety net” mechanism for the most vulnerable, initially focused in urban areas (focusing on IDPs), should be considered. (2 nd /R32)	Implication/acceptability of social safety nets with the social fabric must be taken into consideration.
5. ESTABLISH A UNIFIED MONITORING, REPORTING AND RESPONSE SYSTEM FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND ABUSE, ideally for Sudan as a whole but in the first instance for Darfur.	
<u>Accountable actors:</u> SRSG, DRSGs and UNMIS Human Rights and Protection Units in consultation with OHCHR UNCT ICRC KPSG Protection Working Groups NGOs AU	
Recommended actions (report 3, rec 14, pg 26)	Response
a. Henceforth report all violations and abuses of human rights (whether or not yet verified) to UNMISUD Human Rights Officers (HROs) at the state level.	
b. Identify a ‘triage’ means of identifying information relating to issues of the protection of human rights, including those that are not immediately verifiable or deemed suitable for case-work investigation; separate the information that can be further investigated on an individual or group basis from broader trends or allegations. (UNMISUD Human Rights Unit)	
c. Analyse trends and patterns, respecting confidentiality and the	

<p>need to protect victims, for use in reporting to appropriate channels⁸⁸ as well as to inform programming (whether human rights, rule of law or humanitarian). (UNMISUD Human Rights Unit)</p>	
<p>d. UNMISUD Human Rights Officers to share information with humanitarian actors for the purposes of humanitarian protection (mitigation, remedial and prevention activities) work and other programming. Develop guidelines to ensure that confidential information is not disclosed. (UNMISUD Human Rights Unit working with the Protection Unit.)</p>	
<p>e. Establish a protocol for information sharing and cooperation with UNICEF and UNMISUD child Protection regarding violations of children's rights. (See below recs on child protection)</p>	
<p>f. Consider the transfer of the protection database currently maintained by OCHA for the Khartoum Protection Steering Group (KPSG) to the UN Human Rights Unit from the commencement of 2006, including information concerning alleged or suspected violations and abuses of human rights.</p>	
<p>g. Specify clear channels of communication and information flow between the UNMISUD Human Rights and Protection Units.</p>	
<p>6. ENSURE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 11 RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN ON SGBV prepared by the UNMISUD Human Rights Unit</p>	

⁸⁸ Such as the mandate holders of the Special Procedures of the Commission on Human Rights, the SRSR for the S-G's reports to the Security Council and General Assembly.

<p><u>Accountable actors:</u> SRSG HC All agencies as referred to below.</p>	
Recommended actions (report 3, rec 15, pg 29)	Response
<p>a. Conduct a sustained and high level advocacy campaign at Khartoum and HQ levels to ensure that victims are protected from further abuse and are able to access needed health care without discrimination (SRSG, HC, High Commissioner for Human Rights, SRSG for Children and Armed Conflict, UNIFEM, WHO, UNFPA, Secretary General’s Special Adviser on Gender Issues). Utilise the 11 Recommendations to the Government of Sudan prepared by the UNMIS Human Rights Unit as a basis for advocacy.⁸⁹</p>	
<p>b. Using the results of a study by Ahfad Women’s University⁹⁰ as they become available, collate existing qualitative and quantitative information about rape into a report for wide dissemination, ensuring that the report does not compromise the safety of individuals or organisations. (KPSG and the UNMIS Human Rights and Protection Units in consultation with UNFPA, the UNICEF Country Office, UNHCR, and relevant NGOs.)</p>	
<p>c. WHO to provide support and guidance to medical NGOs regarding the clinical management and psycho-social care of rape victims and to use its relationship with the Government of Sudan to ensure women’s and girl’s right to health care.</p>	
<p>d. UNMIS HRU, UNDP Rule of Law Project and UNIFEM to</p>	

⁸⁹ See Annexure

⁹⁰ Supported by UNIFEM

continue to provide support and guidance to national human rights organisations regarding advocacy and necessary measures for change.	
e. UNICEF's programme of support on psycho-social aspects of SGBV to be replicated across all Darfur states and repeated to take staff turnover into account.	
f. Ensure that the (S)GBV coordinating groups in Khartoum and Darfur are led and chaired by agencies with experience in this issue (3 rd /R12); and that analysis and the response to SGBV issues, including care, support and opportunities for redress to victims, are coordinated. (1 st)	
7. PROMOTE A ZERO TOLERANCE APPROACH TO SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND ABUSE BY STAFF WORKING FOR INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES AND ORGANISATIONS	
<p><u>Accountable actors:</u> SRSG UN agencies NGOs Donors Office of Human Rights Management (UN HQ) Secretary-General's Special Adviser on Gender Issues IASC</p>	
Recommended actions (report 3, rec 16, pg 31)	Response
a. Provide urgent guidance to assist Darfur state level agency managers (UN and NGO) to develop systems to create and maintain an environment that prevents sexual exploitation and abuse (HC/UNCT/NGOs)	

b. Request an advisory visit to the Darfurs by the UNMIS Personnel Conduct Officer (HC)	
c. Consider creating a network of focal points within each agency on sexual abuse and exploitation (UNCT)	
d. Develop a plan of action for combating sexual abuse and exploitation (HC, Personnel Conduct Officer – UNMIS, UNCT)	
e. Determine what proportion of humanitarian personnel and consultants have signed Codes of Conduct incorporating the IASC Task Force’s Six Core Principles of a Code of Conduct, or the Secretary-General’s Bulletin on special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and abuse (ST/SGB/2003/13); take remedial action to ensure signature before arrival in future or in country for those present who have not. (Office of Human Rights Management, UN HQ; SRSG for the UN in Sudan; OCHA at field level.) (Also in 2 nd /R29)	
f. Donors to ensure that grantee organisations and agencies are compliant with the Secretary-General’s Bulletin on special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and abuse.	
g. Ensure that the Secretary-General’s Bulletin in toto, the Six Core Principles and other relevant materials are posted on the HIC and UNMIS web-sites (HIC, UNMIS)	
h. Create a global, mandatory, basic training module akin to the Basic Security Training CD Rom for all staff and consultants of the UN (ERC, IASC). Encourage NGOs and donors to follow this example. ⁹¹	

⁹¹ DPKO is undertaking such a measure for staff in some locations. The recommendation here, however, is that it is completed by all staff in all spheres of the UN’s work.

8. PROVIDE CLEAR INFORMATION REGARDING THE UNSC REFERRAL OF THE SITUATION IN DARFUR TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

Accountable actors:

SRSG

ICC

Recommended actions (report 3, rec 17, pg 33)	Response
<p>a. Liaise with the ICC with a view to inviting a representative to visit Darfur and talk to IDP representatives (including women and young people), government representatives, representatives of host communities and nomadic leaders regarding the process of a referral to the ICC, the ensuing investigation and its basic implications.</p>	

CHILD PROTECTION (1)

<p>1. COLLATE AND DISSEMINATE INFORMATION REGARDING CHILDREN'S CURRENT SITUATION AND VIOLATIONS OF THEIR RIGHTS as basis for informing programming, advocacy, legal and political processes (Also recommended in 2nd report)</p> <p><u>Accountable actors:</u></p> <p>UNICEF (HQ, Regional Office and Country Office) UNMIS Human Rights monitors Child Protection Advisers Concerned NGOs at Darfur, Khartoum and Headquarters levels (particularly the Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict and the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers⁹²).</p>	
Recommended actions (report 3, rec 20, pg 36)	Response
a. Ensure that the up-coming report on the situation of children in Darfur is well informed and widely disseminated. (UNICEF Country Office.)	
b. With UNICEF headquarters and concerned INGOs, develop a system for monitoring and reporting on violations of children's rights in Darfur. (UNICEF, UNMIS CPAs, INGOs),	Ongoing. Situation Analysis in Child Protection is planned in May. A CAFF assessment was completed in April by UNICEF. FP Child PWG
c. Ensure that the new Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights Situation in Sudan and other mandate holders of the Special Procedures of the Commission on Human Rights as well as the SRSG – Children and Armed Conflict are provided with adequate and timely information relating to violations	

⁹² Ref: <http://www.watchlist.org/advocacy/policystatements/vacdac.php>

children's rights in Darfur. (UNICEF, UNMIS Human Rights Unit, KPSG.)	
d. Ensure that information about violations of children's rights is included in the Human Rights / Protection data-base(s) discussed above and is provided to human rights monitors for investigation and case-work.	
e. Clarify the respective roles of the UNICEF and UNMISUD Child Protection Officers and Advisers, including regarding their respective roles vis a vis the AU in Darfur.	
f. SRSG – Children and Armed Conflict to use his position to catalyse and effect the dissemination of information regarding children.	
g. Increase geographical coverage of the Darfurs by UNICEF and appropriate NGOs to ensure both the efficient and comprehensive collection of information about children and that it informs programming in all regards, whether or not directed at children.	
h. By December 2004, a strategy to advocate for and then implement the demobilization of children associated with all forms of armed groups will be developing, based on UNICEF initial survey of Optional Protocols of the CRC, recently ratified by the GoS. (1 st)	

MONITORING AND EVALUATION (ACCOUNTABILITY) (4)

1. IMPROVE THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF UN AGENCIES	
<p><u>Accountable actors:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ SRSG ▪ DSRSG ▪ IASC ▪ UNCT ▪ NGOs 	
Recommended actions (report 3, rec 2, pg 13)	Response
<p>a. Recruit or second two senior members of staff for a period of twelve months with a brief to: a) determine at the field level (not in Khartoum) the degree to which each UN humanitarian agency is meeting the reasonable expectations of other UN agencies and of NGOs; and b) recommend remedial measures to be taken to address shortcomings. The oversight unit would report regularly to the UNCT and the NGO consortium. The unit must be independent from and not be confused with OCHA. One of those recruited should have a strong NGO background.</p>	<p>OCHA operational Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Unit effective 1 May 2005.</p>
2. IMPROVE NGO PERFORMANCE AND ADHERENCE TO AGREED PRINCIPLES/STANDARDS	
<p><u>Accountable actors:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Willing NGOs ▪ Donors 	

Recommended actions (report 3, rec 3, pg 14)	Response
<p>b. Either:</p> <p>Establish a Darfur specific NGO performance and accountability process, which could utilise a number of tools for the application of principles and standards e.g. peer reviews against the Sphere Project’s common and sector standards and/or regular reviews of progress in relation to agreed time bound common benchmarks.</p> <p>Or, the NGOs that are willing commission a review of their performance and adherence to principles and standards in the Darfurs. This could also result in setting common benchmarks (see final paragraph below).</p> <p>The preferred option, the performance and accountability process, would require additional expertise so as not to further burden NGO personnel occupied with implementation - hence the reference to interested donors. Alternatively, advice and expertise could be drawn from the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership –International (HAP-I) project, if and when it is established in the Darfurs.⁹³</p>	<p>Suggest IASC guidelines be used.</p>

⁹³ At the heart of HAP International’s work are the principles of accountability with which all members must comply. The principles require that members: 1) Respect and promote the rights of legitimate humanitarian claimants; 2) State the standards that apply in their humanitarian assistance work; 3) Inform beneficiaries about these standards, and their right to be heard; 4) Meaningfully involve beneficiaries in project planning, implementation, evaluation and reporting; 5) Demonstrate compliance with the standards that apply in their humanitarian assistance work through monitoring and reporting; 6) Enable beneficiaries and staff to make complaints and to seek redress in safety; and 7) Implement these principles when working through partner agencies. (From the HAP-I website.)

3. MONITOR AND ANALYSE HEALTH OUTCOMES AS AN INDICATOR OF THE IMPACT OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION	
<i>Accountable actors:</i>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ WHO ▪ UNICEF ▪ WFP ▪ Other interested UN agencies and NGOs 	
Recommended actions (report 3, rec 8 pg 19)	Response
c. Agree on a method or framework for measuring the probable relative contribution to health outcomes (morbidity, malnutrition and mortality) of food aid, targeted nutritional interventions, clean water, sanitation, hygiene promotion, primary health care and shelter. (WHO, UNICEF, WFP.) Conduct regular joint monitoring and analysis and disseminate findings. (WHO, UNICEF and WFP as core group)	
4 ESTABLISH A DARFUR FOOD SECURITY AND LIVELIHOOD MONITORING UNIT OR NETWORK	
<i>Accountable actors:</i>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ WFP ▪ FAO ▪ NGOs with appropriate skills ▪ OCHA/HIC ▪ UNDP ▪ UNICEF ▪ Donors 	
Recommended actions (report 3, rec 21, pg 37)	Response

<p>a. Those with livelihood protection expertise should meet as a matter of urgency (in February) to: a) collate existing data related to threats to livelihoods (drought, market failure, conflict); b) prioritise the data that must be collected to fill the gaps and provide a reasonable basis for guiding interventions; and c) plan for the rapid collection of priority data. To carry out this plan, external assistance should be called for to lessen the impact on ongoing programming. (2nd/58)</p>	
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<p>b. WFP, FAO and NGOs with relevant expertise, such as SC-UK or ACF, or academic institutions such as Tufts University, should collaborate to go beyond current initiatives and establish a common food security and livelihood monitoring unit or network. It would need to draw on: 1) logistics capacity, to the extent that it would collect primary information; 2) a broad range of participating agencies, assuming that some form of surveillance via sentinel sites across agro-ecological zone would be required; and 3) comprehensive expertise to provide advice on the normal functioning of markets in the Darfurs, the role of livestock (often poorly integrated in food security models) and the pressures created by resource competition and desertification.</p> <p><i>Linkages will need to be established with the FMOH/WHO Early Warning and Reporting System (EWARS) and the nutritional surveillance system to be established by UNICEF.</i></p> <p><i>The unit or network would need a ‘home’ agency with the expertise to develop and maintain an accessible web-based database and produce maps. WFP has plans to establish a food security unit and this could be the unit or network’s home, at least for the time being. It could later be transferred to FAO or UNDP. The agency hosting the unit or facilitating the network would have to reassure others that it will take an open and consultative approach.</i></p>	<p>WFP/FAO annual food security assessment bring regularly produced. Other studies, led by WFP and FAO, also available. Special effort put in place recently to strengthen knowledge on effects of poor rainfall in 2004. OCHA, WFP, FAO and other agency joint assessments are underway ensuring response priorities are better coordinated.</p>
<p>c. Recognising the typical weaknesses in livelihood protection activities in humanitarian interventions, donors should coordinate amongst themselves to ensure that priority livelihood protection activities are fully funded. (2nd/R60)</p>	

COMMON SUPPORT SERVICES (3)

1. BOLSTER SECURITY PRESENCE, TRAINING AND COLLABORATION	
Accountable actors:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ UNDSS ▪ NGOs 	
Recommended actions (report 2, recs 5-7, pg 5)	Response
a. By December 2004, at least two UNSECOORD staff and appropriate back-up in place for each of the Darfur capitals (1 st). If they have not yet deployed by end February 2005 , the SG should be requested to intervene.	Accomplished by March 20005.
b. The NGO community should establish its own security coordination unit, which would liaise with UNDSS. Donors should support this as a matter of priority.	For discussion between UNDSS and NGOs.
c. Ensure that all staff members are provided with in situ, context specific security training. These should include considerations with regard to the security, recruitment and treatment of national staff.	
2. IMPROVE QUALITY OF COORDINATION	
Accountable actors:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ OCHA ▪ All aid organizations 	
Recommended actions (report 2, recs 75-79, pgs 23-24)	Response

<p>a. Identify leadership roles where unclear (protection, camp management/coordination and NFIs specified) (1st)</p>	<p><i>ESU Note: After this recommendation was made, based in part on learning from the Darfur crisis and as a result of the Humanitarian Response Review, the IASC agreed to establish cluster leads in nine areas of humanitarian activity where there was a need to reinforce the current response capacity. IASC principals have agreed that this approach will be applied to all new major disasters, while its application to existing emergencies will be based on an assessment of capacities in those countries where there is a need to strengthen the effectiveness of the humanitarian response and on practical issues that influence the feasibility of introducing this approach. The HC and UNCT may thus wish to consider anew this recommendation in this light.</i></p>
<p>b. Ensure that the ethos in coordination meetings is one in which problems are honestly acknowledged and debated, without undue defensiveness, in the interests of jointly improving the relevance and effectiveness of the response. (Heads of agencies and organizations)</p>	<p>Ongoing reorganization of coordination structure will facilitate revision of coordination mechanisms. Need to optimize existing forums to improve involvement/discussion in analysis/ planning and coordination. OCHA and Sector Coordinators to produce TORs for all coordination meetings. Need to improve minute taking/dissemination.</p> <p>FP: HC, DHC, OCHA, sector coordinators</p>
<p>c. Consider the establishment of an IASC structure at the Khartoum.</p>	<p>IASC structure under discussion by HC/DHC.</p>

<p>d. Form a consortium of humanitarian agencies and organisations at the state level to profile the capacities of all members to aid in planning and coordination. Members of the above consortium should make themselves accountable to each other for what they say they are going to do.</p>	<p>Inappropriate. <i>Team Response: Part of the dysfunction of the humanitarian system is that every agency protects its independence, and this recommendation aims at breaking down these barriers. This recommendations should be considered together with the Recommendation 3 in Report 3 on strengthening NGO performance, which in this matrix appears as the second recommendation “Improve NGO performance and adherence to agreed principles/standards” under monitoring and evaluation.</i></p>
<p>3. CLARIFY AND STRENGTHEN IDP CAMP/CLUSTER MANAGEMENT AND COORDINATION ARRANGEMENTS</p> <p><u>Accountable Actors:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ HC ▪ OCHA ▪ IOM ▪ UNHCR ▪ Participating NGOs 	
<p>Recommended actions (report 2, recs 42-50, pg 16)</p>	<p>Response</p>

<p>a. By December 2004, agreed overall lead agency for coordination of external assistance to IDP camps and clusters (in necessary, a different agency/organizations for each state, e.g. UNHCR in West Darfur, Red Cross Movement in North Darfur) in order to ensure protection issues are addressed, quality programming and coverage of needs, including in non-camp environments. (1st Report)</p>	<p><i>Team note: This recommendation in the first report with the following footnote: “It is recognized that this may not be achievable given current constraints. However, the team believes that the lead concept should be pursued to the extent possible and, if this is not achievable, recognizes that the second best option of choosing individual leads on a camp-by-camp basis may be the only practical solution.”</i></p> <p><i>ESU Note: Subsequently, the IASC, learning from the Darfur crisis and as a result of the Humanitarian Response Review, agreed to establish cluster leads in nine areas of humanitarian activity where there was a need to reinforce the current response capacity. To this end, UNHCR assumed the lead role for “Camp Coordination in Conflict for IDPs.” IASC principals have agreed that this approach will be applied to all new major disasters, while its application to existing emergencies will be based on an assessment of capacities in those countries where there is a need to strengthen the effectiveness of the humanitarian response and on practical issues that influence the feasibility of introducing this approach. The HC and UNCT may thus wish to consider this recommendation in this light.</i></p>
<p>b. Fully support the model of encouraging NGOs to assume camp coordination tasks (Donors and all humanitarian actors). Specifically, ensure: 1) OCHA and IOM are sufficiently resourced (donors); staffing gaps are filled (OCHA and IOM headquarters); technical support is provided to OCHA and IOM in their new roles. (others with camp management/coordination expertise, in particular UNHCR and Inter-Agency Internal Displacement Division (IDD))</p>	<p>Discussions ongoing between IOM, UNHCR and OCHA. With the presence of the Senior IDPs advisor in country, the need for IDD to provide further support does not appear immediate.</p> <p>FP for all: OCHA</p>

c. Continue efforts to identify NGOs capable of acting as camp/area coordinators in areas not yet covered, in particular those with more than 10,000 IDPs. (OCHA) (Also in 1 st)	Ongoing. The second list of IDP gathering needing camp coordination arrangements being elaborated.
d. Help new camp/area coordinators establish and maintain good working relationships with HAC authorities and the UN agencies and NGOs working their area. Where necessary, OCHA should continue to facilitate these consultations.	Ongoing. OCHA carried out field trips to discuss with camp coordinators and HAC issues of concern. OCHA continues facilitation both at field and Khartoum level when needed.
e. Provide appropriate technical support and guidance to international NGOs who have undertaken camp/area coordination, in particular those who have yet to deploy full-time coordinators.	
f. OCHA, IOM and UNHCR should serve as 'intelligent conduits' for the transfer of best practices among camp coordinators and the identification of weaknesses that must be addressed. This requires highly mobile staff in the Darfurs, spending most of their time in IDP camps/areas.	NRC engaged in camp coordination TOT (May) in the three Darfurs. Requested secondment of NRC expert on camp coordination to be based in Darfur and traveling to support activities as appropriate. IOM and OCHA co-chairing camp coordination meetings in North and South Darfur, negotiations ongoing to establish a similar system in West Darfur
g. Clarify the precise arrangements for the provision of support and technical guidance to international NGO camp/area coordinators, including inter alia demarcation between the role of OCHA, IOM and UNHCR. (HC)	TOR IOM finalized. Discussion ongoing with UNHCR.
h. Develop and implement systems for regular monitoring and reporting, in keeping with the original Proposal for Coordination of IDP gathering in Darfur.	OCHA HNP provides info. A process to review/streamline data collection and analysis ongoing. Camp coordinators report format disseminated. First report by Camp Coordinators expected in mid-April. OCHA to compile a consolidated report. Regular/ad hoc meeting at field level address relevant issues.
i. Strengthen efforts to secure funding for NGOs who have accepted this task. (HC and donors). (Also in 1 st)	No information available on problems regarding funding. Advocacy with donors ongoing.

j. Underpin agreement between OCHA and the NGOs for the coordination of assistance in IDP camps/areas with an agreement between OCHA and the HAC. (perhaps state by state)	Under discussion with NGOs camp coordinator. While some NGOs would prefer a tripartite agreement, other agencies do not agree. Due to the current problems with HAC, including increased harassment of NGOs and existing tensions with OCHA, no immediate solution seem possible.
k. Distribute and explain the document detailing the selection criteria for and the responsibilities of camp coordinators to all organizations working in areas with designated coordinators.	OCHA carried out field trips to discuss with camp coordinators issues of concern. Regular forums for discussion established at Khartoum and field level. Revised TOR camp coordinators been disseminated.
l. Consider clarifying and of needed revising, these roles and responsibilities with all actors involved in order to ensure the buy-in of all actors, as well as strengthen consistency and promote the convergence of standards across all IDP camps and areas.	

CAPACITY AND STAFFING ISSUES (4)

1. IMMEDIATELY FILL VACANCIES (See also section on headquarters support to the field)	
<u>Accountable actors:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ UN agencies ▪ NGOs 	
Recommended actions (report 2, Rec 3, pg 4)	Response
a. Headquarters to urgently fill posts and respond positively to additional requests. (UN and NGO) (Also in report 1: Need for longer-term staff deployments and reduced turnover rates)	
2. HIRE QUALIFIED STAFF (especially in protection and gender)	
<u>Accountable actors:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ UN agencies ▪ NGOs 	
Recommended actions (report 2, recs 10 and 23, pgs 6 and 10)	Response
a. By December 2004, review the skills sets of agency teams to determine the need for additional qualitative programming inputs and transition expertise. (1st)	
b. Ensure that all human rights and protection personnel have the necessary expertise and experience upon recruitment. In particular, given OHCHR has a particular responsibility to ensure that its officers are highly trained and experience.	Ongoing in coordination with field.
c. Staff have sufficient gender expertise and analysis to inform their work appropriately. (All agencies and organizations)	

3. IMPROVE INDUCTION AND BASIC TRAINING FOR NEW STAFF	
<u>Accountable actors:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ UN agencies ▪ NGOs 	
Recommended actions (report 2, rec 11, pg 7)	Response
a. By December 2004, more attention to induction training. (1 st)	
b. Commence a programme of training, or where in place continue training for all humanitarian staff in the basic of international and regional human rights instruments and international humanitarian law (IHL).	
4. IMPROVE STAFF WELFARE	
<u>Accountable actors:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ HC ▪ UN agencies ▪ NGOs 	
Recommended actions (report 1)	Response
a. By December 2004, improved staff living conditions.	
b. By December 2004, efforts to address well being of staff to reduce high turnover and illness	
c. By December 2004, medical response and evacuation mechanisms are in place for UN and INGO staff in each state.	
d. Request that two staff counselors be deployed and made available to all staff. Periodic counseling should be mandatory for all staff. (HC) (2 nd /R9)	Specify stress counseling. Attendance prerogative of staff. Decision on funding to be taken, staff to be identified. FP: UNCT

e. Regularly consult with staff to ensure that management is aware of their concerns and that these are addressed. (All organizations) (2 nd /R12)	No specific action to be taken.
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HEADQUARTERS SUPPORT TO THE FIELD (2)

1. STABILIZE STAFFING AND ADDRESS OTHER WEAKNESSES	
<u>Accountable actors:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ ERC ▪ All agency headquarters 	
Recommended actions (report 3, rec 1, pg 12)	Response
a. All agency headquarters review their existing staff complement to ensure that their offices are fully staffed and more importantly staffed with appropriately experienced personnel holding contracts for at least one year. Where necessary take decisive action to address existing gaps, replace under-performing staff and surmount recruitment obstacles.	
b. All agency headquarters to enter into an immediate dialogue with their heads of office about other areas of critical support, and develop a plan for addressing weaknesses. If support is found to be particularly lacking based on these initial discussions, the agency should launch a review of its support to its Darfur programme, including the following issues: Administrative: Recruitment (as above); human resources management; finance; procurement, etc. Operational: Workplanning and programming; staffing design; information management; advocacy; resource mobilization. Policy: Strategic policy guidance; organizational and Darfur-wide priorities; relationship with key actors, including the	

government.	
c. The ERC should request frank and honest feedback from the HC and UNCT on areas in which support from the UN Secretariat, including the IASC and ECHA, could or should be more forthcoming, and then enter a dialogue to address those issues.	
2. LIMIT AND BETTER MANAGE MISSIONS TO THE FIELD in order to minimize distractions from regular programming	
<u>Accountable actors:</u>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ All aid organizations ▪ Donors and member states ▪ SRSG ▪ UNMISUD 	
Recommended actions (report 2, rec 13 and 14, pg 7)	Response
a. Appeal to all organization, donors and states to limit missions to only those that are essential, and decline, without hesitation, to accept those that are not. All stakeholders should abide by this principle. (SRSG)	No specific action to be taken.
b. Consider recruiting, through a cost sharing arrangement, a dedicated external relations staff person in each Darfur capital, who would be responsible for handling all inter-agency or external missions. Alternatively, this responsibility could be shared on a rotating basis among the UN agencies on the ground. (UNMISUD)	Unnecessary.

IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

(to be added upon completion)

Terms of Reference for Monitoring and Evaluation Officer

Duty Station: Khartoum, Sudan

Background

In August 2004, the UN Under-Secretary-General and Emergency Relief Coordinator (USG/ERC) commissioned an *Inter-Agency Real-time Evaluation of the Humanitarian Response to the Darfur Crisis*, to be conducted under the auspices of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC). The evaluation took place in real-time over the course of three visits in September 2004, January/February 2005 and June/July 2005. It produced detailed sets of recommendations designed to improve the ongoing response in real-time. These covered 12 critical areas ranging from advocacy to capacity and staffing issues. Specific recommendations were made to improve accountability through strengthening monitoring and evaluation in the Darfurs. The Humanitarian Coordinator is now leading discussions with key stakeholders in Sudan to prioritize the most relevant among the recommendations, and develop an action plan for their implementation. To do so, he will be assisted by a full-time staff member at the L-4 level for an initial period of six months.

Responsibilities

This staff member will report directly to the HC, but seek advice and guidance from OCHA's Evaluation and Studies Unit (ESU) as needed. S/he will assist the HC in monitoring the follow up to the *Inter-Agency Real-time Evaluation of the Humanitarian Response to the Darfur Crisis*, as well as support him in the broader monitoring and evaluation of the humanitarian response in the Darfur. His/her activities will include:

1. Through a consultative process⁹⁴ with all key stakeholders (UN agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the Red Cross Movement and donors) ensure:
 - a) A management response to *all* recommendations of the *Inter-Agency Real-time Evaluation of the Humanitarian Response to the Darfur Crisis* through the already developed Management Response Matrix;
 - b) Identification of those recommendations that, if implemented, would have the greatest potential impact on assistance to the vulnerable population of Darfur;
 - c) Development of a time-bound action plan for implementation of these recommendations for submission to the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator and IASC Principals for discussion and endorsement.
 - d) The undertaking of follow-up studies or "mini-evaluations" in critical areas as needed to further discussion or implementation of any of the recommendations.

⁹⁴ ESU's preferred means for achieving this would be a multi-stakeholder workshop in which stakeholders consider each set of recommendations in various working groups and then in plenary joint agree upon the priority recommendations, which would then form the basis of the implementation plan.

- e) Tracking of the implementation of the recommendations and regular reporting to the HC (and ESU) on progress.
2. In order to strengthen the overall humanitarian response to the Darfur crisis, the staff member would assist the HC in implementing the evaluation recommendations pertaining to the monitoring and evaluation. These are annexed for ease of reference.⁹⁵ Associated actions would include assisting the HC to:
- a) Launch a discussion and an approach to strengthened progress and performance monitoring of the humanitarian response in the Darfurs on the basis of which remedial measures can be taken. (Report 3, Rec 2, pg 13)
 - b) Strengthen existing individual and inter-agency tools for data collection and trend analysis on the basis of which progress can be measured, whether this be through the Humanitarian Profile, a framework for measuring health outcomes (Report 3, Rec 8, pg 19), a food security and livelihood monitoring unit or network (Report 3, Rec 21, pg 37) or individual agency or NGO mechanisms.
 - c) Working closely with NGOs to establish their own performance and accountability process. (Report 3, Rec 3, pg 14)

Qualifications

1. In-depth knowledge and proven record in applying project planning, including logical framework approach, and M&E methods, including qualitative, quantitative and participatory approaches, is a must.
2. An advanced university degree in a relevant discipline.
3. Ten years of demonstrable experience in: 1) conducting evaluations of humanitarian programmes ; 2) training others in M&E development and implementation; and 3) facilitating learning and joint analysis based on M&E data.
4. Familiarity with software for analyzing quantitative data.
5. The capacity to work collaboratively with multiple stakeholders and on a team; effectively communicate; critically analyze key issues; clearly synthesize and present findings; and draw practical conclusions.
6. Willingness to undertake regular field visits.

⁹⁵ These may, of course, vary depending upon the outcome of the consultations on priority recommendations for implementation.

LIST OF INTERVIEWEES FOR RTE DARFUR (list is not exhaustive)

Name	Title	Agency/Dept	Location	Phase
Alessandra Radaehi		ACF		IV
Isabelle D'Haudt		ACF	Nyala	IV
Philippe Conrad	Head of Mission	ACF	Khartoum	IV
Caleb Muriithi	Head of Office	ACT/Caritas	Zalingei	IV
Patrick Musibi	Field Coordinator	ACT/Caritas	Nyala	IV
Bruno Gonzalez	Head of Mission	ACTED	Geneina	IV
Chris Dove	Watsan Project Manager	ADRA	Geneina	IV
Marija Siriski	Project Director	ADRA	Geneina	IV
Sirill Torkelsen	Health Coordinator	ADRA		IV
Gideon Tesfay		ARC	Nyala	IV
Susan Fleming		ARC	Nyala	IV
Major Abdallah	Military Observer	AU	Zalingei	IV
Major Bajie	Military Observer	AU	Zalingei	IV
Major Joe Aphour	Military Observer	AU	Geneina	IV
Ben Pickering	Humanitarian Programme Officer	British Embassy	Khartoum	
Glyn Taylor	Humanitarian Advisor	British Embassy	Khartoum	
Francis Deng	Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons	Brookings	Washington DC	III
Jock Baker	Coordinator for Quality, Accountability & Standards	CARE	Geneva	III
Kathleen Hunt	Head, Multilateral Liaison Office at the UN	CARE	New York	I
Michele Ceceke		CARE	Nyala	IV
Mohamed Shah Alan		CARE	Geneina	IV
Taheeni Thammannagoda		CARE	Khartoum	IV
Mahamat Babikir	First Secretary	Chad Mission	New York	III
Annette Hearn	Health and Nutrition Coordinator, West	Concern Sudan	Geneina	IV

Name	Title	Agency/Dept	Location	Phase
	Darfur			
Aoibheann O'Keefe	Programme Support Officer	Concern Sudan	Khartoum	IV
Jacinta Barrins	Country Director	Concern Sudan	Khartoum	IV
Piero Schipizza	Water Expert	COOPI	El Fasher	IV
Grene Martino		COSV	Geneina	IV
Abdiraham Mohamed	Field Officer Manager	CRS	Geneina	IV
J. Stephen Morrison	Director, CSIS Africa Program	CSIS	Washington DC	III
Haile Menkerios	Director, Africa I Division, OASG	DPA	New York	III
Isabelle Balot	Political Affairs Officer, Africa I Division, Office of the Assistant S-G	DPA	New York	III
Michael Gaouette	Political Affairs Officer, Darfur Expert	DPKO	New York	I
Antonio De Velasco	Technical Assistant	ECHO	Nyala	
Ivo H. Freijssen	Technical Advisor	ECHO	Khartoum	IV
Tarek Adel	Counsellor on Humanitarian Affairs	Egyptian Mission	New York	III
Sebastien Longueville	Project Manager	Enfants du Monde	El Fasher	IV
Bir Chandal Mandal	Deputy Emergency Coordinator	FAO	Khartoum	
Erminio Sacco	Food Security Analyst, Rehabilitation and Humanitarian Policies Unit	FAO	Rome	III
Marc Bellamans	Emergency Coordinator	FAO	Khartoum	
Sarah McHattie		FAO	El Fasher	
Axel Kuechle	Counsellor	German Mission	New York	III
Julia Gross	Counsellor	German Mission	New York	III
Ann Marie O'Donoghue	Darfur Emergency Coordinator	GOAL	Darfur	
Terri Morris		GOAL	El Fasher	IV
Jemera Rone	Sudan/Uganda Researcher, East Africa/Horn Coordinator	Human Rights Watch	New York	I
Agnes Lesage	Deputy Head of Sub-Delegation	ICRC	Al-Fashir	
Alexandre Liebeskind	Deputy Head of Delegation	ICRC	Khartoum	IV

Name	Title	Agency/Dept	Location	Phase
Ali Naraghi	Head of sub-delegation	ICRC	Zelengi	IV
Andre Liebeskind	Deputy Head of Delegation (Darfur)	ICRC	Khartoum	IV
Bertrand Kern	Diplomatic Advisor, Humanitarian Diplomacy Unit	ICRC	Geneva	III
Dominik Stillhart	Head of Delegation	ICRC	Khartoum	
Frederica Baudry	Head of Africa Section, Protection	ICRC	Geneva	V
Ed Schenkenberg	ICVA Coordinator	ICVA	Geneva	III
Flemming Nielsen	Operations Coordinator, Operations Support Dept	IFRC	Geneva	III
Robert Mister	Operations	IFRC	Geneva	III
Adnan Mirza	Head of Office	IMC	Zalingei	IV
Benjamin Kisu		IMC		IV
James Bishop	Director, Humanitarian Policy & Practice	Inter Action	Washington DC	III
David Mozersky	Analyst	International Crisis Group		
Fred Maio		InterSOS	Geneina	IV
Jette Isaksen	Head of Office	IOM	El Fasher	IV
Louis Hoffmann	Darfur Coordinator	IOM	Khartoum	
Marco Boasso	Chief, Emergency and Post-Conflict Division	IOM	Geneva	III
Omar Horacio Rincon	Head of Office	IOM	Geneina	IV
Ottmar Figueroa	ITC & Information Management Officer	IOM	Khartoum	
Pasquale Lupoli		IOM	Geneva	III
Paul Norton	Chief of Mission	IOM	Khartoum	IV
Paulo Marques	Emergency & Post Conflict	IOM	Geneva	III
Eigil Kvernmo	Camp Coordinator	IRC	Zalingei	IV
Figil Krema		IRC		IV
Pierre Bry	Country Director	IRC	Khartoum	
Sarah Charles		IRC	Khartoum	IV

Name	Title	Agency/Dept	Location	Phase
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Mohamed Siddig	Food Security Project Manager	ITDG	El Fasher	IV
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Tristan Lewis		Medair???	Khartoum	IV
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Mugur Dumitrache	Head of Office	Mercy Corps	Zalingei	IV
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Koen Davidse	Minister Plenipotentiary	Netherlands Mission	New York	III
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Lilian Garbouchian	Country Director	Norwegian Refugee Council	Khartoum	
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Cate Steains	Chief of Unit, a.i., Field Action and Coordination Policy Unit, PDSB	OCHA	New York	III
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Name	Title	Agency/Dept	Location	Phase
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Jan Egeland	USG OCHA / Emergency Relief Coordinator	OCHA	New York	I
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Kevin Kennedy	Director, Coordination and Response Division	OCHA	New York	I, III
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Mike McDonagh	Senior Humanitarian Affairs Officer	OCHA	Khartoum	IV
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Ramesh Rajasingham	Chief of Office	OCHA	Khartoum	

Name	Title	Agency/Dept	Location	Phase
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Vincent Omuga	Humanitarian Affairs Officer, Protection	OCHA	El Fasher	
Winnie Babihuga	Humanitarian Affairs Officer	OCHA	Geneina	
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Elsa la Pennec	Human Rights Observer	OHCHR	El Fasher	IV
Getachew Dirba	Head of Programme Unit	OHCHR	Khartoum	IV
Hala Kallas	Human Rights Observer	OHCHR	El Fasher	IV
Hans Volker	Darfur Manager	OHCHR	Khartoum	IV
Homayoun Alizedeh	Representative	OHCHR	Khartoum	IV
Lynne Miller	Head of Office	OHCHR	El Fasher	IV
Ramiro Lopez da Silva	Country Director	OHCHR	Khartoum	IV
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Manuel Aranda da Silva	DSRSG/RC/HC	ORC/HC	Khartoum	
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Nigel Young	Programme Coordinator	Oxfam-GB	El Fasher	IV
Sarah Lumsdon	Programme Coordinator	Oxfam-GB	Khartoum	IV

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Alfalih Nagim		SRCS	Geneina	IV
Mohmed Al-Jabini		SRCS	Geneina	IV
Abdallar Mohamed Agkep		Sudo	Zalingei	IV
Daifella Yagoub Rahama		Sudo		IV
Ben Webster		Tearfund	Geneina	IV
Brendan Bromwich		Tearfund	Geneina	IV
Ed Walker	Programme Director	Tearfund	Khartoum	IV
Francesca Bomomo		Terre des Hommes	Geneina	IV
Pascal Marlinge		Terre des Hommes	Geneina	IV
Juergen Maresch		THW	El Fasher	IV
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Mary Gorjance		U.S. Department of State	Washington DC	III
Nancy Lees-Thompson		U.S. Department of State	Washington DC	III
Eliane Provo Kluit	Special Assistant to the SRSG	UNAMIS	Khartoum	
Peter Schumann	Director of Civil Affairs	UNAMIS	Khartoum	
Sebastien Gouraud	Programme Officer, Governance & Rule of Law Unit	UNCP	Khartoum	IV
Ade Lekoetje	Country Programme Advisor, Africa	UNDP	New York	III
Gul Mohammed Fazli	Head of Office	UNDP	El Fasher	IV

Name	Title	Agency/Dept	Location	Phase
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Karen Moore	Programme Coordinator – GBV	UNFPA	Khartoum	IV
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Maeve Murphy	Community Services	UNFPA	Geneina	IV
Michael Lindbauer		UNFPA	Nyala	IV
Narinda Sharma	Resident Programme Officer	UNFPA	Nyala	IV
Nimal Hettiaratchy	Resident Representative	UNFPA	Khartoum	IV
Suman Shanshoeva	Emergency Coordinator, South Darfur Head of Mission	UNFPA	Nyala	IV
Zeinab Adam	Emergency Coordinator	UNFPA	Khartoum	IV
Anton Verwey	Head of EPAU	UNHCR	Geneva	III
Bellings Sikanda	Senior Desk Officer, Sudan Desk	UNHCR	Geneva	III
Bobby Ray Gordon	Protection Officer	UNHCR	Khartoum	
Craig Sanders	Head of Desk for Chad/Darfur	UNHCR	Geneva	V
Michael Lindenbauer	Deputy Representative	UNHCR	Khartoum	IV
Bruce Tillman		UNICEF	Nyala	IV
Caesar Hall		UNICEF	El Fasher	IV
Catherine Haswell	Child Protection	UNICEF	El Fasher	IV
Daniel Toole	Director, Emergency Programmes	UNICEF	New York	I
Gordon Weiss	Communication Officer, Countries in Crisis	UNICEF		
Julianna Lindsey	Emergency Programme Officer, Humanitarian Response Unit	UNICEF	New York	III
Kamal Abdel Razig		UNICEF	Nyala	IV
Keith M. McKenzie	Special Representative, Darfur Emergency	UNICEF	Khartoum	IV

Name	Title	Agency/Dept	Location	Phase
Marc Salvail	Senior Programme Emergency Officer	UNICEF	Khartoum	IV
Minja Peuschel	Protection Officer	UNICEF	Geneina	IV
Naresh Gurung	Head of Office	UNICEF	El Fasher	IV
Narinder Sharma	Resident Programme Officer	UNICEF	Nyala	IV
Simon Lawry-White	Senior Programme Officer, Evaluation Office	UNICEF	New York	III
Stefano Pizzi	Assistant Emergency Project Officer	UNICEF	Addis Ababa	
Maha Muna	Programme Manager & OIC of Governance, Peace & Security Unit	UNIFEM	New York	I
Gemmo Lodesani	UN Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator, North Sudan	United Nations	Khartoum	
Douglas Osmond	Darfur Manager	UNJLC	Khartoum	IV
Hubert Bingham		UNJLC	El Fasher	IV
John Levins	Chief, UNJLC Sudan	UNJLC	Khartoum	
Nicolas Daher	Field Logistics Officer	UNJLC	El Fasher	
Steve Gluning	Security Officer	UNSECOORD	New York	I
Anita L. Menghetti		USAID	Washington DC	
Craig Wagner		USAID	Washington DC	
Diane DeBernardo		USAID	Washington DC	
Evan Mac Gibbon	Team Leader, Disaster Assistance Response Team	USAID	Khartoum	
Hank Lutz		USAID	Washington DC	
Joanna Crandall		USAID	Washington DC	
Karri Goeldner	Senior Program Officer	USAID	Nyala	
Kate Farnsworth		USAID	Khartoum	IV
Melody Owen Woolford	UN/NGO Coordinator, Disaster Response Team	USAID	Khartoum	
Sarah W. Cohen	Field Officer, Disaster Assistance	USAID	El Fasher	IV

Name	Title	Agency/Dept	Location	Phase
	Response Team			
Alan Johnson	Logistics Officer – ALITE (OTL)	WFP	Rome	III
Allan Jury	Director, External Relations (PER)	WFP	Rome	III
Anton Bilaver	Operations Officer, UN Joint Logistics Centre (UNJLC)	WFP	Rome	III
Carlo Scaramella	Chief, Emergency Preparedness and Response Unit (OEP)	WFP	Rome	III
Charles Vincent	Deputy Director, NY Liaison/Fundraising Office	WFP	New York	I
Eric Kenefick	Programme Advisor, Vulnerability Assessment & Mapping (VAM)	WFP	Rome	III
Fatina Nabulsi	Senior Liaison Officer, Liaison Office for the East Africa Bureau (ODK)	WFP	Rome	III
Hirotsugu Aiga	Senior Programme Advisor (OEN)	WFP	Rome	III
Jane Pearce	Donor Relations Officer, Donor Relations (FRD)	WFP	Rome	III
Julian Lefevre	Chief Evaluation Officer, Office of Evaluation (OEDE)	WFP	Rome	III
Kees Tuinenburg	Director, Results-Based Management Division, Office of Evaluation (OEDE)	WFP	Rome	III
Laura Turner	Liaison Officer, NY Liaison/Fundraising Office	WFP	New York	I
Lubna Alaman	Chief, Inter-Agency Affairs (PERI)	WFP	Rome	III
Michiel Meerdink	Programme Officer (ODP)	WFP	Rome	III
Patrick Webb	Chief, Strategy, Policy & Programme Support Division, Nutrition Service (PSPN)	WFP	Rome	III
Paul Arès	Senior Staffing Coordinator, Office of	WFP	Rome	III

Name	Title	Agency/Dept	Location	Phase
	Associate Director of Operations (ODO)			
Rita Bhatia	Senior Programme Advisor (PSPN)	WFP	Rome	III
Romain Sirois	Evaluation Manager, Office of Evaluation (OEDE)	WFP	Rome	III
Ruth Grove	Chief, Human Resources Operations	WFP	Rome	III
Samson Mwangi	Logistics Officer – Air Operations (OTL)	WFP	Rome	III
Sarah Laughton	Programme Advisor, Senior Policy Analyst, Emergency & Transition Unit (PSPT)	WFP	Rome	III
William Vigil	Head, Africa Unit, Programming Service (ODP)	WFP	Rome	III
Wolfgang Herbinger	Chief, Emergency Needs Assessment (OEN)	WFP	Rome	III
Alessandro Colombo	Medical Officer	WHO		
David Nabarro	Head of Health Crisis Team	WHO	Geneva	III
Guido Sabatinelli	Representative	WHO	Khartoum	
Mukesh Kapila	Former UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Sudan	WHO	Geneva	III
Philip Mann		WHO	El Fasher	IV
Miki Jacevic	Senior Policy Officer	Women Waging Peace	Washington DC	III
Sanam Anderlini	Director, Policy Commission	Women Waging Peace	Washington DC	III
Victoria Stanski	Programme Associate	Women Waging Peace	Washington DC	III
Fred Rietkirk		ZOA	Nyala	IV