



World Food Programme

# A Report from the Office of Evaluation



*Full Report of the Evaluation of the  
PRRO 10191.00 – Food Aid for  
Relief and Recovery in Somalia*

*Rome, April 2006*

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# Acknowledgement

The evaluation team visited Somalia from 18 June to 13 July 2005. This document was prepared by the mission team leader on the basis of the mission's work in the field.

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Responsibility for the opinions expressed in this report rests solely with the authors. Publication of this document does not imply endorsement by WFP of the opinions expressed.

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# Acronyms

CARE	International NGO
CCR	Community Cereal Reserves
ECHO	European Community Humanitarian Office
EMOP	emergency operation
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FEWS-NET	Famine Early-Warning System Network
FFT	food for training
FFW	food for work
FLA	field-level agreement
FSAU	Food Security Assessment Unit
GFD	general food distribution
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	internal displaced person
JPO	junior professional officer
M&E	monitoring and evaluation
MCH	mother-and-child health
NGO	non-governmental organization
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODK	East and Central Africa Regional Bureau
OEDE	Office of the Executive Director, Evaluation (WFP)
PDM	post-distribution monitoring
PDPT	Emergencies and Transition Unit
PRRO	protracted relief and recovery operation
SACB	Somalia Assistance Coordinating Body
SCZ	South Central Zone
SO	Sub-Office
TB	tuberculosis
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Humanitarian Affairs
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNSECOORD	Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator
USAID	United States Agency for International Development





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WFP Somalia Country Office, Nairobi

Somalia, South Central Zone (SCZ), Wajid

Somaliland, North West Region

Puntland, North East Region

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# Executive Summary

The three-year Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO) 10191.00, at a total cost of US\$48 million, began in January 2003. It aimed to contribute to the improvement of overall food security of about 2.9 million people affected by a combination of natural disasters and protracted civil unrest, which have destroyed productive resources. The evaluation found that PRRO activities have generally been effective in addressing humanitarian needs, although it must be noted that the total needs in all regions far exceed the combined resources of WFP and other agencies working in Somalia. It is important to note that the PRRO has only been fully funded since the beginning of 2005, a side-effect of Tsunami funding for Somalia.

Regional WFP sub-offices have explored a wide range of opportunities, pushed the boundaries of access with local authorities in Somaliland and Puntland and with non-state actors in the South Central Zone, and closely cooperated with FAO's Food Security Analysis Unit (FSAU) in response to emerging humanitarian needs. Social context and community coping mechanisms have been recognized and supported with approaches that elicit support across clan divisions for the WFP interventions and the required security envelope. Security constraints and insufficient staff at the sub-office level have limited the ability to generate reliable data, especially at the outcome level, and thus the evaluation was not able to fully assess the extent to which the PRRO has achieved its stated objectives. Observations from a small number of activities the evaluation team was able to visit and interviews with various stakeholders suggest that the PRRO has made a positive contribution to improving food security among vulnerable populations in Somalia.

Targeting of PRRO activities in each region has been affected by factors outside WFP's control – in particular, conflict, insecurity and access. This is especially problematic given the causal relationship between conflict, insecurity and food insecurity. Regardless of the type of activity, redistribution on the basis of equity rather than vulnerability is widespread. Although redistribution does result in inclusion error, its benefits in terms of bolstering social safety nets and social capital are numerous and outweigh any negative connotation.

WFP staff have made a concerted effort to avoid food-driven projects and ensure that the products of recovery activities make some contribution to improving or supporting livelihoods. Food-for-work or food-for-training activities have the potential to reduce longer-term vulnerability to shocks but they are put in place relatively late. There is a need to recognize opportunities for intervening early to protect livelihoods during acute and deteriorating livelihood crises. Problem analysis and activity design must take into account the livelihood system of the populations.

Furthermore, with the likelihood of natural events occurring over coming years, WFP programming needs to remain flexible in order to rapidly deliver targeted food assistance in response to drought, flood and conflict while in the midst of a recovery operation.







## 1. Introduction

### 1.1 Purpose and Scope of the Evaluation

The WFP Office of Evaluation (OEDE) organized an evaluation of protracted relief and recovery Operation (PRRO) 10191.00, *Food Aid for Relief and Recovery in Somalia*, and the field mission was conducted from 18 June to 13 July 2005. Unlike the evaluation of the preceding PRRO 6073 conducted in 2001, this evaluation did not address as many operational issues, nor did it address logistics issues to a great extent. It focussed on key objectives and subsidiary issues with specific reference to effectiveness<sup>1</sup> and relevance<sup>2</sup>.

The PRRO results have been examined at the outcome level (i.e. measured against progress towards intended achievements) for each relief and recovery beneficiary group in relation to various food intervention strategies. Efficiency<sup>3</sup> (output-level results) was only examined when it was believed to negatively affect effectiveness or the outcome-level achievement of results. This helped to identify how and where strategy can be revised. Two cross-cutting issues formed part of the overall analysis – *gender*, in terms of power relationships in a complex emergency context; and *protection*, as it relates to food interventions.

The evaluation team (Egon B. Westendorf, consultant, team leader; Greg Collins, consultant, M&E/food security assessment; and Stephanie Maxwell, consultant, nutrition/food security) was supported by the evaluation manager (Romain Sirois, OEDE Rome).

The evaluation team held discussions and interviews with WFP staff, donor representatives, representatives of NGOs, UN agencies and local authorities, at the country office level in Nairobi and in Somalia. In addition, the team undertook site visits in WFP's three operational regions in Somalia – South Central Zone (SCZ), Somaliland and Puntland – meeting with beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries, local authorities and community representatives. The team held a mission debriefing with the Country Office (CO) on 13 July 2005. CO comments and responses to them form part of the final reports completed following the debriefing with OEDE Rome on 15 July 2005.

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<sup>1</sup> Effectiveness: The extent to which the operation's objectives were achieved, or expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance (source: WFP M&E Glossary).

<sup>2</sup> Relevance: The extent to which the objectives of a WFP operation are consistent with beneficiaries' needs, country needs, organizational priorities, and partners' and donors' policies (source: WFP M&E Glossary). Also, the preparation of a "recovery strategy", as the base on which all PRRO activities are designed, is recommended in "From Crisis to Recovery" (WFP/EB.A/98/4-A) as well as the PRRO Guidelines ("Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations: Guidelines for the Preparation of a PRRO", WFP February 1999).

<sup>3</sup> Efficiency: A measure of how economical inputs are converted to outputs (source: WFP M&E Glossary).



## 1.2 Background to the Evaluation

### Country context and operating environment

Somalia has remained without a central government for 14 years. Following the ousting of President Siad Barre in 1991, numerous rounds of peace talks have failed to bear fruit. Somaliland in the north-west aspires to complete independence as a sovereign nation and is embroiled in a simmering territorial dispute<sup>4</sup> with Puntland ‘State of Somalia’ to its east. Somaliland has developed state structures and promotes its territorial identity vigorously in dealings with the assistance community. Puntland authorities favour a federal model and role in a future Somalia. There is cautious optimism<sup>5</sup> that recent negotiations between competing groups may result in wider acceptance of the current transitional government (TFG), this being the 14<sup>th</sup> attempt since 1991 at resolving the crisis through political negotiations. However, TFG administrative capacity is not likely to change Somalia in the short term, and the UN can expect to encounter chronic insecurity for the coming years. Regardless of the outcome of current peace efforts, political, economic and social disputes will remain governed in the near future by cyclical violence, revenge and compensation. The resultant insecurity will continue to limit WFP staff movement. If the TFG becomes irrelevant, staff movement will continue to require serious planning efforts. A third scenario is that the TFG collapses, resulting in a shift from the status quo to a rekindling of civil war. This is the worst-case scenario and would result in WFP’s need to help the population affected by a low- to medium-intensity conflict in the context of increasing constraints due to security restrictions imposed by the UN.

Hopes are high that the possible deployment of African Union (AU) cease-fire monitors will support the TFG in tackling the security challenges that lie ahead. International and regional support will be crucial in ensuring the sustainability of emerging governance structures.

All Somali regions continue to suffer from sporadic insecurity and recurring low level conflict, clan rivalry, revenge and crime, new waves of displacement (as a result of conflict and natural disasters) and unmet humanitarian needs. The conflict appears to be at a stalemate, with no group able to gain dominance and “group politics”<sup>6</sup> effectively denying control of various kinds to their opponents. Accordingly, Somalia may best be described as existing in a state of armed peace that can quickly and somewhat unpredictably evolve into armed conflict at regional and local levels. WFP, NGOs and other UN agencies operate in a climate of high permanent

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<sup>4</sup> Concerning the disputed areas of Sool and Sanaag. They form a significant part of the former British protectorate Somaliland but the majority of their communities share the same clan lineage (Darood, from the Harti sub clan) as communities in Puntland, while Somaliland as a whole is predominantly Isaaq. Puntland’s claim over the regions is based on the clan connection.

<sup>5</sup> During the evaluation visit it became clear that major divisions exist between key factions of the TFG.

<sup>6</sup> Somalia is a lineage-based society. Clans are always a central factor in politics, allocations of resources (food aid) and conflicts. There is no individual responsibility therefore, in the absence of a central government; the clan provides the main source of personal protection. As a result the clan provides conflict negotiation and, up to a certain limit, a sort of traditional and minimal law management. This is however particularly complex as clans are divided along sub-clans, sub-sub-clans lines creating chronic instability to the structure alliances. This situation directly affects any political decision at the highest level as even the TFG has been formed on a clan representation basis only. The formula used to share the power among the current government is often referred to the 4/5 formula, which represents the 4 major clans and a group of minorities. Clan alliances are changing and because of backlog issues concerning previous killings, revenge killings can affect individuals from one clan going to another clan area. WFP has to consider it during any planning phase to prevent security incidents.



insecurity and often very limited humanitarian space, and with severe operating restrictions. The restriction of movement affects the national staff as well as the international staff because of UN security regulations (MOSS) and the extremely volatile security situation.

Somalia is one of the most dangerous environments in which the UN operates and the security situation varies from one location to another. There are pockets of stability and some means of economic recovery. It is fundamental to define the main "actors" such as clans, militiamen, elders, warlords, civil society groups, local administrations, Islamist movements and businessmen. The number of actors also reflects the difficulty to plan anything within a specific area in Somalia considering the ease of a small group to act as spoiler.

Paradoxically there is observable in all regions a very vibrant market economy, a functioning (customary Xeer and Sharia) justice system applied by clan leaders and Sharia courts and inter-clan regulatory system, taxation at various levels, and connections between markets. Examples of economic activities that cross the borders of conflict and span across the regions are telecommunications, remittance banks, the livestock trade, airline service, transport of goods between regions and export markets, the lucrative khat trade, the transshipment of small arms from and to the Great Lakes region and beyond, fishing and processing for export, importation and export of consumer electronics and agricultural commodities, exploitation and export of natural resources from charcoal to frankincense and more.

What at first appears to be an unfettered free market economy reveals itself to be a complex, non-state regulatory framework in which clan and sub-clan leadership, as well as clan-affiliated warlords, vie for regional and localized political and economic control<sup>7</sup>. In addition, remittances (estimated at USD1 billion per year) sent from the Somali Diaspora for business ventures, property purchases, and support to family livelihoods play a major and highly visible role in bolstering Somalia's economy.

Humanitarian resources represent a discrete value and there is close attention and publicity given to how and where they are applied. WFP has been careful to ensure equity in resource allocation, both in communities and between regions. This has worked in favour of WFP's ability to implement its activities without creating animosities between groups and factions that might degenerate into situations where food recipients are targeted. Situations can change rapidly, as demonstrated when a significant WFP commodity shipment was hijacked by pirates (targeting the transporter, not WFP) on 2 July 2005 amidst demands as to where these resources should be directed.

The humanitarian community faces real and present dangers. There have been targeted murders<sup>8</sup> of humanitarian workers, extortion, kidnapping and violent clashes, and these have been further exacerbated by the perceived rise in extremist Islamic groups. Insecurity has forced many humanitarian aid organizations to downsize their operations and increasingly rely on local staff,

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<sup>7</sup> Not only does conflict reflect fissures within this regulatory framework and power struggles, continued instability and conflict maintenance ensures that those benefiting from industries and internal and cross-border trade that have flourished in the absence of state regulation continue to do so.

<sup>8</sup> Reputedly by operatives of a Al Qaida associated independent jihadi network operated from Mogadishu by a militia leader trained in Afghanistan. The 1998 bombings of the US embassy and Mombassa Paradise hotel are also reputed to have been organized from Somalia. ICG, reported in Daily Nation, p.12, Nairobi, Kenya. July 11, 2005.



supported by international staff based outside the country. The number of WFP expatriates is very limited and their movement is restricted.

### **Livelihood context**

The majority of Somalia's estimated 6.8 million people live in extremely poor and underdeveloped conditions.<sup>9</sup> The population of Mogadishu is estimated at 1.2 million, Hargeisa at 200,000 and Bossaso at 30,000. Outside these centers, the Somali population is predominantly pastoralist, with less than 20 percent depending solely on agricultural activities. The nomadic and semi-nomadic segments of the population traditionally engage in cyclical migrations related to the seasons. The July 2004 assessment by FAO's Food Security Analysis Unit (FSAU) estimated that nearly 700,000 people are food insecure and require external assistance.<sup>10</sup> An estimated 242,500 are in need of emergency assistance, while 457,500 are considered to be facing a livelihood crisis. Many of these people have been directly affected by the northern drought, and in some areas the situation has been aggravated by recurrent localized conflict.

The 2004 cereal harvest following the long rains (GU) was one of the three worst harvests since 1995. The poor harvest, 20 percent below the post-war average, probably resulted in cereal deficits of at least 36,000 MT, even after accounting for anticipated commercial imports and existing food pipelines (WFP and Care International)<sup>11</sup>. In 2004, cereal prices increased by 150 percent, the highest on record for the last 15 years. It has to be noted that the deficit did not result in overall shortage of food supplies in the markets. Vulnerable poor sections of the population, mainly in drought- and conflict-affected agro-pastoralist communities, lacked the resources to purchase food. Food security in Somalia is persistently a function of access rather than availability. Access in turn is a function of one's position in a clan, sub-clan or as a minority.

Somali society is a segmented, hierarchical clan system<sup>12</sup>. Although, clan and sub-clan divisions and animosities were fortified in the waning days of Siad Barre's rule<sup>13</sup> and linger today, it is important to recognize that the clan system has always had a built-in flexibility<sup>14</sup> in which clan and sub-clan identities can be used as a source of both commonality and differentiation. Outsiders have a poor understanding of the circumstances under which shared clan identity at a higher level in this hierarchy is invoked, as well as the circumstances in which sub-clan and lower divisions are used – to distinguish between groups, claim majority status in a particular area, or control resources, regulation, and rights of passage.

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<sup>9</sup> UNDP/World Bank, Somalia Watching Brief Socio-economic statistics, UNDP/World Bank: 2003.

<sup>10</sup> FSAU Technical Series Report No IV.2, September 21<sup>st</sup>, 2004.

<sup>11</sup> FSAU Post-Gu Analysis Report, September 2004.

<sup>12</sup> Evidenced by the conflict over Sool and Sanaag by the Isaaq and Darood majorities in Somaliland and Puntland, the distrust between clans in CSZ and those in Puntland/Somaliland, the forced 'return' and IDP crisis since 1991 of Somali peoples from all regions to their clan 'birthplace' even where these communities have resided elsewhere (in other clan's 'territories') for many decades, the lesser level of participation by sub-clans in economic activities in the realms of majority clans, difficulties for pastoralists moving between areas where clan land is not contiguous, taxation/fees for transport through clan territories.

<sup>13</sup> Barre utilized classic divide and conquer tactics in an (ultimately unsuccessful) attempt to turn clans against each other and away from a consolidated effort to oust him from power. The result is a continued distrust of central government and enduring clan animosities that persist today.

<sup>14</sup> This does not apply to minority castes.



It is equally important to note that a segment of the population – the Bantus brought to Somalia during the period of Italian influence – falls outside this system and is best characterized as a caste minority<sup>15</sup>.

### 1.3 The PRRO as Planned and Designed

This three-year PRRO began on 1 January 2003 and follows PRRO 6073, a three-year operation that was launched in July 1999 when relatively peaceful areas of the country were beginning to emerge. The PRRO design addresses the recommendation of the July 2001 evaluation. For example, it has been designed through a logical framework exercise and includes an increase in the daily food ration to the WFP/WHO/UNHCR humanitarian assistance norm of 2,100 kcal per person<sup>16</sup>.

The objectives of the PRRO are to: i) ensure the minimum dietary food requirements for vulnerable people through food aid; ii) improve the nutritional status of vulnerable people, especially women and children; and iii) support the capacity of vulnerable populations to create productive assets and resources that enable them to improve their livelihoods. The operation envisions reaching about 2.9 million beneficiaries affected by natural disasters and prolonged civil unrest, at a total cost to WFP of approximately US\$48 million, of which approximately US\$11.3 million are food costs.

The PRRO comprises Relief and Recovery activities. This report follows the terminology used in the PRRO and related documents, which distinguish two types of Relief activities and two types of Recovery activities:

**Table 1 – PRRO Activities**

	<i>Activities</i>
<i>Relief</i>	1. Social Support – TB, Orphans, mental institutions and MCH 2. Relief – Free Food Distribution
<i>Recovery</i>	3. Rehabilitation – Food For Work, Food For Training 4. School Feeding

The initial PRRO plan was to distribute 60 percent of food resources through relief and social support activities and 40 percent through recovery activities. In line with recommendations made in the 2001 evaluation, the aim was to increase the quantity of food distributed through recovery by 10 percent each year as regions became more secure.

The report presents a general discussion and findings within each activity, followed by separate sections on the following cross-cutting issues: planned ration scale, transition from relief to recovery (and vice versa), gender and protection, coordination and partnerships, and monitoring and evaluation. The report concludes with recommendations.

<sup>15</sup> Bantu (Africans) engaged in agriculture and others (blacksmiths and other artisans). Neither are considered acceptable to mix with by marriage and this is strictly enforced by all clans.

<sup>16</sup> See section 7 for list of main recommendations and extent to which they were implemented.



## 2. Main Findings and Recommendations

### 2.1 Relief – Free Food Distributions

#### Activities

Free food distribution activities are enacted in response to needs identified through FSAU assessments and routine monitoring, joint agency assessments, and independent WFP assessments and follow-up investigations in ‘hotspots’ identified by FSAU. Free food distribution may be blanket coverage of a geographic area or targeted to specific populations within an affected area, depending on assessed need, context and scale of response. The size and composition of the ration distributed also varies according assessed need and available resources. Although it is recognized by WFP and others that community redistribution of food aid occurs post-distribution<sup>17</sup>, WFP has made a concerted effort to target those most in need and enhance the degree to which food aid reaches the household via community-based targeting. Such an effort involves the identification of recipient households by community leadership and distribution to women via a ‘sit-on-the-bag’ methodology.

Relief activities in the South Central Zone were small scale and limited to two interventions: three-month provision of monthly food rations to conflict-displaced IDPs from Baidoa and relief food provided to 300 households following a localized flood in Xudor. Relief activities in Somaliland included assistance to drought-affected regions in the eastern part of Somaliland beginning in December 2003 and continuing through the time of the evaluation team’s field visit to Somalia (July 2005), as well as more recent assistance to Awdal region (western Somaliland) beginning in March 2005. Relief activities in Puntland (excluding Tsunami-affected populations covered by the Emergency Operation) include assistance to IDP settlements in Bossaso and assistance to drought-affected regions in the Sool Plateau beginning in December 2003. The latter was expanded to include additional areas in Bari and Mugud regions (in February, April and June 2004) and continued during the evaluation team’s field visit to Somalia.

#### Beneficiaries

Table 2 shows the number of people reached in 2003 and 2004; over-achievements in general food distribution (GFD) result from the drought that started in 2003.

**Table 2 - Beneficiaries reached in 2003 and 2004**

Relief Beneficiary category	2003			2004		
	Planned	Actual	% actual vs planned	Planned	Actual	% actual vs planned
Internally displace people (IDPs)	40 000	19 735	49.3	40 000	10 080	25.2
Returnees	83 520	879	1.1	83 520	1 222	1.5
Beneficiaries of GFD	64 503	105 804	164.0	64 503	259 974	402.7

<sup>17</sup> This issue is discussed in detail later in the document.



The issue of redistribution of WFP food aid has raised some concern about inclusion error. Evidence collected during the evaluation team’s field visit to Somalia suggests that, regardless of the type of activity (relief or recovery), redistribution on the basis of equity within and beyond the community rather than on the basis of vulnerability is widespread. Although strictly speaking this redistribution does result in inclusion error, the benefits of redistribution in terms of bolstering social safety nets and social capital are numerous and outweigh any negative connotation. The evaluation team noted three significant aspects:

- Redistribution of food receipts by beneficiaries represents a repayment to those who supported them before WFP’s arrival. It is clear that equity takes priority over vulnerability in terms of who receives food aid, resulting in target beneficiaries consuming less food than received. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that the most vulnerable retain a significant share of the food aid they receive and that redistribution to better-off relatives among this group is in part a symbolic gesture. It also ensures that these sources of support remain open to them in the future, reducing their vulnerability, increasing their social capital and bolstering existing social safety nets.
- Redistribution also reduces the tension between recipients and non-recipients and is an important, although formally unacknowledged, means of insuring the protection of beneficiaries. This is particularly important within the context of Somalia, where peaceful means of resolving such tensions are overshadowed by violence.

The current terminology used to describe and differentiate among target populations for relief assistance is inadequate<sup>18</sup>. For example, the term IDP is used indiscriminately to describe returnees, pastoral drop-outs living within their home region, and conflict-displaced populations that have migrated north to Puntland from Bay and Bakool. The fact that many of these sub-populations can be found within the same community (e.g. IDP camps) further heightens the need to find an effective means of drawing out their differences.

### **Targeting**

In the north, drought affected areas of Puntland and Somaliland were first identified by FSAU as a looming crisis in 2001 and confirmed during a September 2003 joint agency assessment. Relief activities in Awdal were initiated in response to heightened malnutrition levels, estimated by WFP/UNICEF at 17.3 percent global acute malnutrition (GAM)<sup>19</sup>, despite disagreement between FSAU and WFP/UNICEF on the appropriateness of responding with food aid. The need for relief food distribution in Awdal has been a source of contention between WFP/UNICEF, which identified the need, and FSAU assessments, which do not highlight the area as a food-insecurity “hotspot”. It remains unclear as to why the assessments yielded contradictory results and recommendations for interventions. In itself this is not negative as it highlights CO efforts to identify need and respond in line with agency mandate. However, it does point to the more important issue of developing robust partnership approaches when agencies ‘agree to disagree’.

Targeting relief activities to the most vulnerable/most food-insecure areas in each region is greatly hampered by factors outside of WFP’s control, namely conflict and insecurity and,

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<sup>18</sup> WFP is taking a lead in developing approaches to this issue as part of the ‘Joint UN Strategy to address the needs of Internally Displaced Persons in Somalia’. This is at an early draft stage and funding for the strategy is not secured. The proposals presented here address WFP specific programming needs and do not cover the wider issues of the joint strategy.

<sup>19</sup> % of children under 5 < -2 s.d. weight-for-height (wasted).



therefore, lack of access. This is especially problematic given the causal relationship between conflict, insecurity and food insecurity. For example, conflict and insecurity often result in displacement of populations. The degree to which WFP is able to reach these populations is largely dependent on the ability of displaced persons to reach areas accessible by WFP.

### **Progress toward outcomes**

An attempt was made to use malnutrition data available through the FSAU to gauge the effectiveness of WFP’s relief activities in contributing to improved nutritional and food security outcomes in the drought-affected regions of Somaliland (Togdheer, Sool, and Sanaag) and Puntland (Bari and Mundug). However, a number of factors would suggest that an effort to derive conclusions from such an analysis would be ill-advised. These factors include: inconsistencies between data coverage areas and WFP operating areas; multiple and incomparable sampling methods and anthropometric measures<sup>20</sup>; the inability to isolate WFP’s intervention from an array of confounding factors that influence both food security (e.g. remittances, recent Gu rainfall, existing social safety nets) and nutritional status (e.g. health and disease); and inconclusive findings in terms of an improvement or decline in nutritional status since the beginning of WFP’s activities.

This highlights that WFP cannot rely on food security/nutrition assessment data as a means of evaluating program effectiveness. Coverage area and timing of assessment data rarely, if ever, provide the specificity needed to gauge the impact of relief food. This is true for Somalia as well as elsewhere. That said, WFP Somalia does have the opportunity to work with FSAU, both in planning new data collection and analysing previous data, to tailor FSAU data to WFP’s information needs, including project evaluation. To date, this opportunity has been under-explored.

One emerging opportunity is FSAU’s current efforts to develop a Coping Strategies Index (CSI) for Somalia. The CSI was originally developed by WFP/CARE Kenya tool for food security monitoring and relief food intervention evaluation. The advantage of the CSI for measuring the impact of WFP relief interventions is that, in contrast to malnutrition rates, it provides a measure of food security gauged by coping responses to reductions in food access. This measure fits more squarely with WFP’s relief intervention objective of “ensure(ing) the minimum dietary food requirement for vulnerable people through food aid” and will provide a more useful means of gauging the impact of relief activities<sup>21</sup>.

### **Summary of main findings**

Relief food provision to small-scale conflict and flood-affected populations in the southern-central region was responsive, timely and relevant in terms of the type of response, limited duration, and transition out of relief activities.

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<sup>20</sup> FSAU data, while helpful for establishing nutritional trends, is not suited for evaluating the relief activities as it comes from a variety of sources: Anthropometric Surveys using 30 x 30 cluster methodology and collected weight-for-height data, rapid MUAC surveys in purposively selected villages (during post-Gu assessments), and sentinel site weight-for-height data from health centers.

<sup>21</sup> The CSI offers more specificity in gauging impact than malnutrition rates because non-food factors affect nutrition status and therefore confound the relationship between food consumed and nutrition outcomes.





By contrast, the lack of responsiveness by WFP and other agencies to the slow-onset livelihood crises identified by FSAU in 2001 among drought-affected populations in Somaliland and Puntland represents a missed opportunity by the humanitarian community to protect livelihoods in the face of an acute livelihood crisis. It is noted that this is a contested region with significant issues relating to access, and also that the interagency mission recommended against the use of food aid. Although the issues was continually highlighted in monthly bulletins and seasonal technical reports, and action advocated during SACB meetings, an inter-agency assessment aimed at identifying the extent of the crisis and suitable intervention strategies did not take place until September 2003. As a result, what began as a livelihood crisis deteriorated into a humanitarian emergency, with long-lasting repercussions in terms of livelihood recovery.

Following the September 2003 assessment and identification of the widespread and large-scale need for assistance, WFP did respond in November-December 2003 and continues to provide life-saving relief assistance to drought-affected populations in the region.

WFP's capacity for implementing large-scale livelihood protection projects that do not involve relief food distribution is limited. Given the reluctance of other agencies to declare the region in need of relief food aid, even after the 2003 joint assessment, the ability of WFP to respond was severely constrained. Although some FFW projects did occur in the Sool plateau, project size and the number of beneficiaries were very limited, and the impact negligible given the area affected. All of this suggests that the usual WFP approach of small-scale rehabilitation activities used for recovery is ill-suited for covering such widespread need for activities aimed at protecting livelihoods in the face of a slow-onset, deteriorating livelihood crisis.

One PRRO objectives is “to support the capacity of vulnerable populations to create productive assets and resources that enable them to improve their livelihoods”. The prolonged drought in Sool and Sanag suggests that such ambiguous language makes it unclear as to whether WFP's mandate involves recovery of livelihoods, protection of livelihoods, or both. As stated, it is easy to criticize WFP's failure to meet this objective on the basis that WFP did not act effectively on early warning information to prevent the slow-onset deterioration of a livelihood crisis into a humanitarian emergency before conducting a joint assessment. However, there were valid reasons why WFP was prevented from intervening: lack of capacity to effectively prevent the drought emergency as it developed; and insufficient combined resources of all humanitarian actors to prevent the disaster. However, it must be recognized that the response to this emerging disaster could have been better managed by the wider assistance community. It is hoped that with greater strategic capacity for generating and analysing up-to-date data, with greater collaboration between agencies, and with a recognition of WFPs mandate and the comparative advantage of food aid, there will be better response options developed in future emergencies. (For WFP it is important to recall that the PRRO has been fully funded only in recent months, a side effect of Tsunami funding for Somalia.)

Another issue is that the current range of WFP activities in Somalia is not ideal for protecting livelihoods among specific livelihood groups in times of crisis. Rather, activities are geared more toward recovery post-crisis. A critical example is the panic selling of livestock well into the drought-exacerbated livelihood crises in Somaliland and Puntland. Such selling represents a last-ditch effort to recover some value from weakened animals that were likely to die. However, panic selling leads to flooded markets, reducing prices even further. The result is that pastoralists divest livestock at extremely low prices and poor terms of trade with grains.



Subsequently, many pastoralists are unable to restock when the situation improves. If the drought is protracted over several years, this can lead to a divestment spiral culminating in dropping out of the pastoral livelihood system<sup>22</sup>. As witnessed during the current drought, WFP's current range of activities does little to address this critical issue and new approaches are needed.

## 2.2 Social Support

### Activities

The PRRO project documents state that relief activities focus on objectives 1 and 2, “to ensure the minimum dietary food requirements for vulnerable people through food aid” and “to improve the nutritional status of vulnerable people, especially women and children.”

Within the social support activities there are targeted feeding programmes for malnourished children, and pregnant and lactating women managed through mother-and-child health (MCH) activities and targeted feeding for tuberculosis (TB) inpatients. The remainder of social support food is distributed through institutions such as orphanages, mental institutions and centres for street children.

WFP works with UNICEF and UNICEF's implementing partner to provide a family with a malnourished child and/or malnourished pregnant and lactating woman a family ration for three months, and UNICEF provides a supplementary rations. Distribution of monthly and supplementary rations to the beneficiaries as well as screening, weighing and measuring beneficiaries may take up to two days. During this time, beneficiaries also receive a variety of health and nutrition education information.

Minimum dietary requirements for social support activities are largely provided through institutions (orphanages, mental institutions and street children centres) which would normally be supported by a functioning government or social networks. However, WFP has partially filled a gap in providing food requirements for some of these institutions. Without WFP's support, many of the beneficiaries in these institutions would be considered highly vulnerable and requiring food assistance. Most programmes are one-off, and initiated as a result of the agency/institution approaching WFP programme staff for assistance. The need is investigated and, upon approval, a set number of rations are allocated to the institution. The receiving organization reports on the number of beneficiaries and the quantity of food distributed. At times voluntary workers in these institutions also benefit from these food distributions.

The receiving organization reports on the number of beneficiaries and the quantity of food received. There is good collaboration between UNICEF and WFP with regards to providing assistance to households with malnourished children, pregnant and lactating women through MCH centres. The criteria for selection into the programme is well defined (<80 percent weight/height of the median) and usually understood by the beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. The criteria for selection helps to ensure vulnerable house are identified and targeted with food

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<sup>22</sup> Urbanization, and expansion into non-pastoral economic activities appear inevitable, being forced to do so during times of economic stress puts further pressure on the economy to cope with inevitable change of the economic environment.



assistance. WFP has a defined exit strategy and criteria<sup>23</sup> for food assistance. Internationally agreed standards have been developed to monitor the outcome of targeted feeding programmes.

Identified malnourished children and pregnant and lactating women have their weight monitored and other standard outcome indicators calculated over three months by UNICEF and their implementing partner. Organizations treating TB patients monitor weight gain and other indicators (e.g. default rate, attendance rate) to track the success of their programme. The WFP Country Office (CO) receives this information on an ad hoc basis and it is not used in a systematic manner to monitor the effectiveness of their interventions, for example to determine the change in nutrition status of the beneficiaries or to assist with programme decision making and planning. The reasons for the limited use of this outcome data are lack of time and lack of technical capacity to interpret and use the data. However, it should be noted that since April 2005, CO has begun to initiate a system to routinely collect outcome data from targeted feeding programmes. At the time of the evaluation it was too early to comment on the effectiveness the system, or the outcomes of the targeted feeding programmes.

In the drought-affected areas in Somaliland, mobile nutrition teams implement the targeted feeding activities. The mobile nutrition teams follow the movements of the pastoralists, and distribution and screening sites are established in easily accessible sites. UNICEF's implementing partner is responsible for identifying and monitoring the malnourished individuals and completes monthly progress reports, commenting on standard outcome indicators for targeted feeding programmes as well as the number of beneficiaries and the quantity and type of food distributed. WFP receives monthly information concerning the number of beneficiaries and quantities and type of food distributed. After three months the child is discharged if the child is above 80 percent wt/ht; if the child is still underweight, UNICEF's implementing partner investigates the causes of malnutrition and attempts to address the causes of malnutrition.

WFP provides individual rations for TB inpatients, which may be given to the Ministry of Health and/or NGOs involved in TB treatment. The Somalia Assistance Coordinating Body (SACB) decided WFP should discontinue the TB outpatient food programme. This was the result of tensions among beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries and, at times, WFP's inability to consistently provide the food inputs, which resulted in non-attendance of patients and compromised the TB recovery rates. Implementing partners were unfortunately not always informed of the reasons for this decision.

### **Beneficiaries**

According to the SPR 2003, 1,104 children received a family ration through therapeutic feeding and 8,381 children received a family ration through supplementary feeding. In the 2004 SPR, 1,550 children received a family ration through therapeutic feeding and 30,660 children received a family ration through supplementary feeding. The dramatic increase was due to the expansion of WFP, UNICEF and UNICEF's implementing partner programme for targeted feeding programme activities, especially among the drought-affected pastoralists in the northwest region.

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<sup>23</sup> i.e. after 3 months of family rations and supplementary rations have been received



TB patients admitted into TB treatment programmes are sputum positive patients. According to the Standard Project Report (SPR) for 2003, 6,772 TB patients were undergoing treatment and receiving WFP assistance between January and September 2003. According to the 2004 SPR, 7,500 TB patients received WFP assistance and were treated for TB. Beneficiaries in an institution and receiving food assistance from WFP have fulfilled the institutions criteria for admissions.

### **Targeting**

Geographical targeting is frequently determined by the presence of capable implementing partner for UNICEF and accessibility to an area. The partners work closely together to identify suitable areas/populations to implement targeted feeding programmes. UNICEF's priority for geographical targeting for selective feeding programmes is to areas suffering from food insecurity and elevated malnutrition rates.

In Somaliland targeted feeding programmes were initiated in mid 2004 in the drought-affected regions of Sool, Sanag and Togdheer. UNICEF works through the Ministry of Health in Somaliland as well as willing and capable NGOs (SC USA). In March 2005, targeted feeding activities commenced in two districts in Awdal region due to high malnutrition rates (17.3 percent) recorded using MUAC (Mid-Upper Arm Circumference). Save the Children USA closed down its targeted feeding programme due to a lack of funding as well as improved nutrition situation in its operational area (<10 percent).

Given the generally higher malnutrition rates in south and central Somalia compared with the northwest and northeast regions, the coverage for targeted feeding programmes is lower. This is due to the limited number of available and willing partners as well as many areas being inaccessible due to insecurity and lack of humanitarian access. There are only six targeted feeding programmes, with one outreach post, in south and central region and these are in Bay and Bakol region. Even though WFP and UNICEF have an office in Wajid there is no targeted feeding programme in Wajid town. This is because the potential partner (World Vision) is reluctant to initiate a targeted feeding programme, believing that the high rates of malnutrition in Wajid town are largely due to high morbidity, especially diarrhoeal diseases, poor water and sanitation facilities and insufficient accessible health services.

In Puntland targeted feeding programmes for the malnourished were initiated at the beginning of 2005 and are aimed at IDPs in the urban areas as well as the drought-affected IDPs and non-IDP pastoralists living in rural areas due to their perceived vulnerability to food insecurity. However, it is also recognized that the high malnutrition rates recorded in the IDP urban camps is also due to high morbidity patterns (high incidence of diarrhoeal diseases), limited access to services due to cost, and the IDPs' marginalized state in the community. Targeted feeding programmes have only become possible in Puntland since the emergence of a willing and capable local NGO (AID) as implementing partner. The screening process among the vulnerable has been completed and the first distributions took place in June 2005.

WFP's geographical targeting to TB inpatients, mental institutions and institutions for street children and orphans depends on the capacity of implementing partners. TB treatment centres are usually in urban settings due to the population density and therefore the greater chance of higher numbers of TB patients accessing the service.



### **Progress toward outcomes**

It is very likely the WFP assistance has helped to ensure the minimum dietary food requirements for vulnerable people through the provision of food aid.

WFP does not systematically collect or analyse outcome data from the targeted feeding programme or from the TB programme from the implementing partners. The 2003 SPR reports the treatment cure rate of the TB programme reached 88 percent in 2002, while case detection rates increased from 29 percent in 1996 to 49 percent in 2002. In the SPR for 2003 and 2004 there is no outcome available for the TB patients treated during the existing PRRO. The WFP data do not allow comment on the overall effectiveness (number of individuals who have improved their nutrition situation) of the food provided to the TB inpatients. However, anecdotal information suggests the food provided to inpatients reduced the number of defaulters.

With regard to the number of people who have improved their nutrition situation, the SPR for 2003 only gives figures for therapeutic recovery – 72 percent. Given the operational constraints in Somalia, this recovery rate is very good.



## 2.3 Rehabilitation - Recovery (food for work, food for training)

### Activities

Through the distribution of food as payment or incentives, food for work (FFW) and food for training (FFT) projects contribute to the PRRO objective “to ensure the minimum dietary food requirement for vulnerable people through food aid”. Although an explicit link is not made, the limited assessment of recovery activities conducted by the evaluation team in each region<sup>24</sup> suggests that the majority were designed contribute to the objective “to support the capacity of vulnerable populations to create productive assets and resources that enable them to improve their livelihoods”.

Rehabilitation activities implemented as part of the PRRO cover a wide range, including support to infant industries and small enterprise, construction and rehabilitation of livelihood assets, construction of trade-related and other (health centre, school, government building) public goods, community cereal reserves<sup>25</sup> and skills training (see Table 3).

**Table 3 – Rehabilitation activity typology and projects visited by evaluation team**

Type of Rehabilitation Activity	Projects Visited by Region		
	Southern-Central	Somaliland	Puntland
<b>FFW</b>			
a. Support to infant industries and small enterprise (privately owned)	Nursery project, Wajid town	Salt production, Berbera	Berkhad construction, farm development
b. Construction and rehabilitation of livelihood assets (community owned)	Water catchment development, de-silting	Water catchment development	Flood protection and diversion embankments
c. Construction of trade related public goods	Road development, market shelters	Road development	Road development
d. Construction of other public goods	Health centres	School construction	School construction
e. Establishment of community cereal reserves (CCR)	<i>Pilot project in Wajid District</i>		
<b>FFT</b>			
f. Skills training			Sewing and informal education
g. Literacy training			

<sup>24</sup> Those selected by the CO, plus projects identified by the team and included in the list of communities visited.

<sup>25</sup> A pilot project in Wajid District.



Meetings with sub-office programme staff suggest that they have made a concerted effort to avoid “food-driven” projects by making sure that the output of most rehabilitation activities makes some contribution to improving livelihoods and reducing future vulnerability. However, the lack of an explicit and documented link between on-the-ground activities and the PRRO objectives has resulted in a number of activities that are de-linked from the support to livelihoods objective. As a result, these activities contribute only to the objective of “ensure(ing) the minimum dietary food requirement for vulnerable people through food aid”. Examples include the construction of schools and buildings for use by the government and literacy training.

During the debriefing with CO staff, the Country Director stated that approximately 50 percent of rehabilitation activities were primarily intended to get food to vulnerable beneficiaries. The rationale given is that this “as-if relief” approach was to avoid free food dependency among beneficiaries who are able to work. The brief visit did not allow the evaluation team to explore in depth this disconnect between sub-office staff intently avoiding food-driven projects and CO viewing half of all exchange-based food assistance as food-driven.


### **Beneficiaries**

Most of the current PRRO rehabilitation activities are designed to reach the same food-insecure beneficiary group, i.e. those receiving food as payment or incentives are also those FFT or benefiting from the public good or community/individually-owned asset produced (FFW). However, in several instances this is not the case:

- privately owned berkhads in Puntland. FFW inputs are used by berkhad owners to pay labourers.
- Women’s cooperative farm in Garowe, Puntland. FFW inputs are used by the women’s group to pay labourers.
- China canal near Jowhar, southern-central region. Vulnerable Bantus were paid in food for labour and non-Bantu farmers benefit from flood diversion and potential for irrigation.

In some cases, this division of benefits is well suited to the varying position of different groups within a community on the relief to recovery continuum. Providing labourers with food represents a step above free food distribution in recognition of their capacity to perform productive tasks and reduce the potential for dependency on free food distribution. For these workers, FFW work is essentially “as if” relief. For other food-insecure groups further along the continuum toward recovery, the benefit of individual or community owned assets or public goods, for which food aid represents an input for paying labour, provides a much needed stimulus for improving their food-security status and reducing their vulnerability. However, careful attention to the food-security status of both beneficiary groups is required to avoid excessive inclusion of food-secure households as beneficiaries to the detriment of WFP focusing on its intended beneficiaries.

**Diagram 1 – FFW Activity with Two Distinct Beneficiary Groups**





Anecdotal evidence for the three instances cited above suggests that both beneficiary groups for the privately owned berkhads and women’s cooperative farms in Puntland fall within WFP’s target population. Workers are made up of the most vulnerable (IDPs) who are willing to work for food, and asset beneficiaries who are food-insecure but beginning to invest in enterprises aimed at diversifying or bolstering their livelihoods. Security concerns prevented the evaluation team from visiting the China canal project near Jowhar. Although the benefits of the canal both in political terms and the number of households affected were repeatedly held up as reasons for its success by WFP and others, it remains unclear whether the majority of farmers benefiting from flood diversion and the potential irrigation created by the canal fit within the PRRO’s stated target beneficiary groups.

As in the case of relief activities, the issue of redistribution of WFP food aid has raised some concern about inclusion error. The comments made about redistribution in relief activities apply equally to recovery beneficiaries. As with relief, the terminology used to describe and differentiate among target populations for rehabilitation activities is inadequate.

Although relevant to relief activities, this issue will be particularly critical in designing relevant activities during the transition from relief to recovery. The typology suggested in Table 4 is intended to provide a starting point and stimulate further discussion and refinement by the CO program staff.

**Table 4 – Beneficiary Typology**

Status	Primary Source of Livelihood					
	Pastoralist	Agro-Pastoralist	Farming	Fishing	Urban Poor (petty trade, casual labour)	Urban destitute
IDP within home region (part of majority clan)						
IDP within home region (minority/marginalized clan)						
IDP from different region (define region)						
Returnee (former refugee or IDP) to home area						
Ethnic Somali refugees						
Other refugees						
Bantu						
Other vulnerable populations (describe)						





The identification of target beneficiaries within food-insecure areas varies significantly by region. In the southern-central region, rehabilitation activities are targeted to communities on the basis of communities identified as food insecure by a combination of FSAU and WFP assessment and, on occasion, by communities approaching WFP for assistance. The process of targeting communities is similar in Somaliland, with the added source of potential project proposals provided through the Ministry of Planning. Although this is theoretically advantageous in that the Ministry could provide an initial triage of projects, ensuring that the target beneficiaries and proposed project fit within WFP's target population and PRRO objectives, in practice the Ministry's priorities are inconsistent with WFP's stated objectives and mandate. (In Puntland, lack of staff has required that WFP depend solely on the identification of potential projects by line ministries and communities themselves who approach WFP directly or through local authorities.)

The danger in relying heavily on community-driven proposals, rather than targeting food-insecure communities identified by WFP/FSAU and conducting a problem analysis with community members, is that there is likely to be a negative correlation between a community's ability to organize and approach WFP or local authorities with a proposal for rehabilitation activities and that same community's level of food insecurity. Hence, relying solely on a proposal-driven process for the identification of potential projects is likely to be biased in favour of less vulnerable and less food-insecure communities, detracting from WFP's ability to reach its target population of the most vulnerable.

### **Targeting**

WFP and FSAU sub-office staff describe FSAU's role as identifying geographic areas of food insecurity and WFP's assessment role as identifying more localized pockets of food insecurity. The targeting of rehabilitation activities to the most food-insecure areas involves a process of problem identification through FSAU monthly bulletins and seasonal<sup>26</sup> technical reports. These, in turn, trigger a more localized investigation into the communities or 'pockets' affected, the degree of food insecurity and options for intervention. Although most responses to FSAU alerts by WFP have occurred in areas designated as humanitarian emergencies, areas designated as 'livelihood crises' by the FSAU phase classification may be well suited to preventative and rehabilitation activities<sup>27</sup>.

In a limited number of cases, initial identification of food-insecure areas by WFP staff triggers further investigation and corroboration by regional FSAU staff. At the sub-office level, communication and collaboration between FSAU and WFP works well in this regard, with WFP staff actively involved in the design, data collection, and analysis stages of regional FSAU assessments. For seasonal GU and Deyr assessments, consensus on findings at the regional level is reached before submitting findings to FSAU Nairobi.

Targeting rehabilitation activities to the most vulnerable/most food-insecure areas in each region is greatly hampered by conflict and insecurity and, therefore, lack of access. As a result, multiple rehabilitation interventions by multiple agencies are concentrated in accessible and secure areas (e.g. the existence of market shelter, road and health centre projects in several villages in Wajid district, southern-central region). Although the existence of multiple projects

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<sup>26</sup> Post-Gu (long raining season) and Post-Deyr (short raining season) assessments.

<sup>27</sup> This issue is discussed in more detail in the section on relief.



within communities is likely to have a positive, synergistic effect in terms of improving food-security status, this also means that the areas of coverage are limited. This is especially problematic given that the total humanitarian capacity in Somalia falls far short of humanitarian need.

The lack of suitable implementing partners also greatly constrains WFP's ability to target the most food-insecure areas. The scarcity of implementing partners is most pronounced in Mogadishu and the surrounding area, but is also a significant limiting factor throughout the SCZ. (Somaliland has the highest concentration of suitable implementing partners, including proven LNGOs. Puntland falls somewhere in between, having more implementing partners than the southern-central region, but far fewer than Somaliland.)

### **Progress toward outcomes**

Notwithstanding comments during the CO debriefing that approximately 50 percent of rehabilitation activities were food-driven and intended to function as “as-if relief”, the majority of rehabilitation activities visited by the evaluation team appear to have made some contribution to the objective of “support(ing) the capacity of vulnerable populations to create productive assets and resources that enable them to improve their livelihoods”.

However, as indicated earlier, the lack of outcome level data collected by WFP prevents a refined evaluation and definitive statement concerning the effectiveness of rehabilitation activities. It is possible to provide a suggestive assessment of the effectiveness and relevance of rehabilitation activities visited during the evaluation team's Somalia field visit. Rather than attempting to quantify outcome-level indicators, emphasis is placed on the identification of factors that make some activities more effective than others in their contribution to PRRO objective achievement (see Table 3).



**Table 5 – Factors Associated with Effective Rehabilitation Activities**

Type of Activity	Factors Associated with Effective Activities	Examples of Effective Activities	Examples of Ineffective Activities
Support to infant industries and small enterprise	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Previously established enterprises (WFP's contribution is one of many inputs)</li> <li>• Strong and previously established demand markets for products</li> <li>• Levels of profitability to be self-sustaining (limited timeline for WFP inputs)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Salt production in Berbera, Somaliland</li> <li>• Berkhad construction in Bari region, Puntland</li> <li>• Women's farm cooperative in Garowe, Puntland</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Nursery project in Wajid<sup>28</sup></li> <li>• Bakery in Dangoroyo, Puntland</li> </ul>
Construction and rehabilitation of livelihood assets	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Asset fills a clearly defined need identified by the community</li> <li>• Assets would not be constructed/rehabilitated in the absence of WFP FFW owing to food security status of the population and their prioritization on meeting immediate food needs</li> <li>• Asset construction and site are relevant within the livelihood system</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Water catchment construction and rehabilitation in Wajid District</li> <li>• Pasture enclosures in Puntland</li> <li>• Flood protection canals and embankments (various locations)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Routine de-silting of water catchments in Wajid District</li> </ul>
Construction of trade related public goods	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Links producer communities to favourable markets</li> <li>• Has a clear impact in terms of increasing income and stimulating increased production</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Road construction linking hub and satellite villages to town markets in Wajid District (allows for donkey cart passage)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Market shelters in Wajid District</li> </ul>
Construction of other public goods	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Construction of public good has a clear relationship to PRRO objectives (even if not rehabilitation objectives)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Village health centre construction in Wajid District linked to improved health and nutritional status</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• School construction (not visited)</li> <li>• Construction of government building in Garowe</li> <li>• Rehabilitation of government building in Wajid for clan meeting</li> </ul>
Skills training	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Skills gained are marketable and become a source of livelihood/income</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Skills training (sewing and other) in Garowe</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Literacy training (not visited)</li> </ul>

<sup>28</sup> This project was initially started as a means of replacing trees used by WFP in the construction of mundals for IDPs. It has continued with its primary goal being the supply of trees free of charge to NGOs and communities. Neither of these goals have a clear link to PRRO objectives. However, WFP staff and the agricultural extension worker on the project have suggested it will now attempt to become sustainable by creating a previously non-existent market for fruit and other trees.



### **Summary of main findings**

WFP sub-office programme staff have made a concerted effort to avoid food-driven projects and ensure that the product of rehabilitation activities makes some contribution to improving or supporting livelihoods. However, the problem analysis process described by field staff appears to be more about deciding whether or not a proposed project fits within WFP's usual scope of activities and less about engaging communities in thoughtful problem analyses aimed at maximizing achievement of PRRO rehabilitation objectives. As a result, a significant proportion of the activities visited by the evaluation team appear driven more by replication of past WFP activities than sound problem analysis. This issue is exemplified by the shortage of identified entry points for working with pastoralist populations, a group with which WFP has had minimal engagement in terms of rehabilitation activities, but applies equally to activities aimed at bolstering other livelihoods. It is likely that this focus on types of activities, rather than maximizing PRRO objective achievement, has constrained the development of innovative approaches.

There is little evidence that the problem analyses conducted by WFP go beyond finding entry points for food aid. The comparative advantage of food aid versus other intervention modalities (e.g. cash/non-food inputs) in particular circumstances or at particular times has not been fully assessed. However, as WFP's resources are almost exclusively limited to food, this finding is not surprising.

However, there are several innovative and highly relevant activities that deserve mention. Although the modalities of the community cereal reserves (CCR) pilot project need to be refined, this project does represent an innovative attempt to address a crucial livelihood problem: market indebtedness, in which food-insecure households borrow food during from the market during the lean season and are forced to repay it at three times the quantity during the low-price, post-harvest season. Similarly, support to burgeoning salt production enterprises in Berbera and informal training in marketable skills in Garowe offer examples of highly relevant and thoughtful activities. Given the likelihood of a transition from relief to rehabilitation activities among northern, drought-affected pastoralists in the coming months, the need to link sound problem analyses, activity design and objectives in the next PRRO is paramount.

To date, a significant proportion of rehabilitation activities involving problem analysis have done so at the community level. However, problem analysis and activity design among any livelihood group must take into account the livelihood system. Illustrative examples of how system needs (e.g. links between communities and markets) have been effectively incorporated into the problem analysis include:

- identification of lack or constrained market access among southern agro-pastoralists that has led to FFW road improvement projects linking producers with favourable markets, stimulating further production and increasing income;
- concern that agro-pastoralists were becoming heavily indebted to market traders, which led to the CCR pilot project;
- rehabilitation of the China Canal in Jowhar to divert flood waters and open up the potential for irrigation and increased production in one of the SCZ's surplus production areas.



Understanding the pastoral livelihood system is perhaps even more critical for problem analysis and relevant intervention design as WFP transitions to rehabilitation activities in the drought-affected northern regions. It is undeniable that the impact of the drought in the north over the last four years was exacerbated by livestock numbers exceeding range capacity. This is partially attributable to misguided water development projects implemented by a number of agencies that ignored range management requirements for mobility by reducing the need for seasonal movement. Therefore, localized problem analyses must also incorporate a systems analysis to avoid unintended outcomes.

During the debriefing with WFP staff in Nairobi, it was made clear to the evaluation team that the CO continues the process of transitioning from a large numbers of small, community-level projects to small numbers of larger, livelihood systems projects (the number of projects in 2005 is 25 percent of that in 2003). This transition is advantageous, both from a programme management viewpoint and for maximizing WFP's impact on supporting and bolstering livelihoods among food insecure households. It also highlights the effectiveness of partnering with other agencies.

In some instances, multiple rehabilitation projects have been implemented with the same group of beneficiaries without a coordinated strategy for activities and without an exit strategy. An example visited by the evaluation team is the women's group farm in Garowe, Puntland, for which six and ten FFW activities have been implemented between 1998 and 2000, with each treated as a discrete activity.

The lack of adequate documentation of problem analyses conducted in various settings means that lessons learned remain in the minds of individual WFP staff. This is a missed opportunity in several regards. Documentation provides a means of disseminating lessons from one community to others, provides a means of defending programming decisions, and strengthens institutional memory.



## **2.4 Recovery – School Feeding**

### **Activities**

School feeding has been piloted, and expanded, in Somaliland. The overall goal is in line with the Somaliland Government’s national policy, which states, “the highest priority in educational development is primary education”. The goal of this project is to increase gender equity in access to and completion of basic education, through increased enrolment rates, stabilized attendance and reduced drop-out rates.

The school feeding monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system currently being developed focuses on outcome indicators, while cooperation with UNICEF and others could preferably include use of agreed upon standardized methods for weighing and measuring school-age children to determine the extent to which nutrition goals are achieved.

The gross enrolment rate in primary school in Somalia was 17 percent in 2001. WFP initiated a pilot school feeding programme in 21 schools in West Galbeed, Awdal and Sahil regions in Somaliland in August 2003, and seven schools recently opened (June 2005) in Merka in south central Somalia. There are plans to expand the programme to 15 additional schools in Togdheer region in Somaliland, to 17 schools in Bari, Nugaal and Mudug region in Puntland, and to six schools in Bay and Bakol region in south central Somalia by August 2005. CO anticipates that school feeding has the potential to become a major component of future programming in all regions, fitting well with the policy shift of major donors towards programming for capacity building.

WFP, through contractors, constructed food stores and a simple kitchen in all of the 21 supported schools. WFP has initiated construction activities in schools, which will be supported with the provision of school meals in the future. Non-food items such as cooking utensils and cutlery for all of the pupils are provided from PRRO funds.

WFP enters into agreements with community education committees for the latter to play an active role in ensuring the smooth management and implementation of the school feeding programme. The community is also expected to make contributions in kind – for example, by providing suitable foods to make sauces for the main meal, and providing water to prepare porridge. In Puntland and Somaliland, WFP works through the Ministry of Education, which is actively involved in the planning and selection of the WFP-supported schools.

For basic formal education skills (numeracy and literacy) to be retained, a minimum of three years of education is required. This fits well with the WFP Somalia long-term commitment to expand the school feeding programme.

The CO has recognized existing constraints within the education sector (lack of qualified staff and teaching materials, almost complete absence of government funding, poorly paid teachers and the lack of an agreed curriculum) and is working to address these with partners. In the absence of this, the school feeding programme on its own will have limited long-term impact. WFP works with partners to ensure other educational challenges are being addressed. (For example, WFP works in partnership with NRC in Somaliland, with COSV in Merka and in Puntland, is establishing partnerships with Diakonia and aims to do so with World Vision in Bay and Bakol.)



## **Beneficiaries**

School feeding targets are straightforward. Schoolchildren of primary school age, especially girls, are targeted for the programme. According to the SPR 2003, there were 5,465 children (2,635 males and 2,830 females) receiving school meals. By 2004, there were 7,220 school children (5,275 males and 1,945 females) receiving school meals. The PRRO amendment targets for pupils expected during the first year of School Feeding (September 2003-June 2004) was 5,359 pupils in Somaliland, during year 2 (September 2004 to June 2005), 11,988 pupils in Somaliland and Puntland, and 2,330 pupils in Merka, Bay/Bakol. Therefore, total pupils reached is 14,318 in year 2 and 19,677 pupils for years 1 and 2.

## **Targeting**

The school feeding programme started August 2003 in Somaliland. The criteria used by the Ministry of Education and WFP for selecting the three regions for school feeding were:

- lowest enrolment rates, highest food deficit
- highest number of returnees and/or IDPs
- highest concentration of schools
- logistical access
- security

In compliance with these criteria, West Galbeed, Awdal and Sahil regions were selected for School Feeding activities. Forty-three schools were then selected for screening, based on mixed public schools in areas of high returnee/IDP populations and high food-deficit/low income areas. The second level of screening for selecting the schools was developed by WFP and agreed by the Ministry. The criteria used were:

- The school should be located in a food-deficit area or low-income area.
- The school should have a high proportion of poor pupils.
- The distance from home to school should be at least one hour's walk.
- There should be an active Community Education Committee.
- The pupil-teacher ratio and pupil-class ratio should be less than 50.

Using these selection criteria, 23 schools were selected. Two schools were excluded due to poor management, indicating rigour in school-level monitoring by field staff.

For the selection of the schools within Togdheer region, the previous school selection criteria were used with the following additions:

- There should be more than 50 pupils in the school.
- The school has a permanent building, space and furniture.
- The teachers' salaries and school funding are secured.
- Water is available and accessible.
- The school has been active for more than one year.
- The distance from home to school was changed from at least one hour's walk to more than two hours.

Puntland used the same regional selection criteria as Somaliland for the selection of regions. For the second-level screening (school selection), the same criteria were used but also included the following factors:

- The school should have the potential to expand.
- Schools should also have a low proportion of girls' attendance.



- Schools should have not less than 70 pupils.
- Puntland excluded “The distance from home to school should be at least one hour’s walks” from its selection criteria.

The selection criteria for schools in Bay and Bakol used a combination of the above selection criteria from Puntland and Somaliland.

The WFP sub-offices apply variations for criteria used to select the region and schools for implementing the school feeding programme. This is understandable to some extent because of the different contexts within the three zones. The programme is also a pilot project, which would allow for the possibility to change the selection criteria in order to strengthen the programme. The evaluation noted opportunities for common criteria to assist in decision making and the collection of compatible M&E data.

### **Progress toward outcomes**

At the end of the 2004 scholastic year, WFP and the Ministry of Education conducted a review of the pilot school-feeding programme in Somaliland. In the eight schools visited during the review, enrolment rates had increased from 2,462 for the previous scholastic year to 3,483. This actual increase of approximately 50 percent exceeded the 15 percent target. On average there had been an increase in girls’ enrolment of 70 percent. However, girls still represent only 28 percent of the total enrolment of the schools sampled (on average girls represent 30-40 percent of total enrolment).

In the schools reviewed, the teachers also reported significantly improved attendance rates compared to the previous year. This was largely attributed to the provision of school meals. Improved attendance reportedly contributed to an improvement in pupils’ learning capability (higher exam scores). While the achievement of the school feeding programme in improving enrolment and attendance rate must be recognized, it is recommended that WFP be cautious when attributing the improvement in exam results only to the programme. Several other factors may come into play: better learning materials, improved teacher morale, etc. The reported improvement in attendance is admirable; however, it is unfortunate the study did not quantify this achievement. In addition, the review made no reference to changes in drop-out rates.

The review also acknowledged the existing constraints within the education system – lack of qualified teachers and teaching materials, almost complete absence of government funding, poorly paid teachers, and the lack of an agreed curriculum. The report noted that, on its own, the school feeding programme will have limited positive impact on these constraints. WFP concluded that partnering with implementing agencies was essential for the programme to have greatest impact, especially in terms of addressing the underlying causes of low enrolment (especially among girls) as well as ensuring the provision of quality education. WFP will continue to partner with international NGOs.

Some positive unintended outcomes noted during the review included:

- positive change in parent’s attitude towards girl’s education, which has contributed to increased enrolment and attendance;
- improved nutrition status of the children as stated by parents and teachers;
- improved learning performance (higher scores for exams);
- no interruptions during the scholastic year.





However, the review also noted that due to increased number of students, a need for increased number of classrooms (it is expected more teachers will be required as student numbers rise), as well as for a future expansion of kitchens and dining halls to accommodate girls and boys separately.

It must also be noted that education is not free. Fees are paid by parents in kind or cash. WFP, along with community education committees and other organizations such as UNHCR, has tried to ensure that children from the poorest families are able to attend school, even if they are unable to afford to make a contribution in cash or kind for the management of the school.



## **2.5 Planned Ration Scale and Food Basket – Relief and Recovery**

The PRRO planned ration for recovery and relief is 500g cereal/person/day, 60g pulses/person/day, 20g oil/person/day. This amounts to approximately 2,128 kcals/person/day and is within the Sphere standards. It is generally assumed a family includes six members and therefore a monthly family ration for relief and recovery, based on the above is 90kg cereal, 10.8kg pulses and 3.6kg oil.

The PRRO planned ration for selective feeding is 400g cereal/person/day, 50g pulses/person/day and 30g oil/person/day. This amounts to approximately 2,158kcals/person/day and within the sphere standard. The monthly family ration for selective feeding is 72kg cereal, 9kg pulses and 5.4kg oil.

The planned monthly ration of 90kg for the relief activities in the drought-affected regions of Somaliland and Puntland was reduced to every other month in June 2004. The ration size was reduced to 50kg in October 2004. The deviation between planned and actual food distributions appears to have been driven primarily by logistical constraints and under-funding of the PRRO, rather than a strategic reduction in response to an improving food security situation.

Households with a malnourished child received a monthly family ration for three months based on the above ration. It is likely that this family ration was shared among other family and clan members. Generally, the family ration is distributed on time. However, there have been incidents when security has not permitted (imposed UN security regulations) WFP to distribute a family ration in certain geographical locations, and a supplementary ration was provided without the family ration. (UNICEF's implementing partner does not have to follow the same UN restrictions as WFP.) No analysis has been conducted concerning the impact on recovery for malnourished children when there was no distribution of the family ration. Institutions supporting TB patients, street children, orphans and mental patients received a number of individual rations depending on the number of beneficiaries within the institution. Institutions frequently received a three-month supply in one delivery, which reduced logistics minimized any adverse effects if there were breaks in the pipeline. Within the institutions there is less opportunity for food to be shared so there are fewer indirect beneficiaries.

The ration scale for the school meals comprises 200g rice, 30g pulses, 20g vegetable oil, 50g CSB and 20g sugar person/day. This provides approximately 1,270kcals/person/day and is provided through morning porridge and a main meal at lunch time. This well-balanced ration provides over 50 percent of a primary schoolchild's daily kcal requirement. However, there are suggestions in the literature on school feeding that caloric gains through on-site feeding can be offset by household decisions to reduce food given to children participating in the programme. Some gains in dietary diversity may exist, but there are no data available to substantiate this suggestion.

The large number, small size, and short duration of most rehabilitation activities and the focus of the evaluation on relevance and effectiveness (e.g. outcomes) of intervention strategies prevent a detailed assessment of planned ration scale and food basket versus actual (e.g. outputs).



### **Strategies for ration scales for relief and recovery**

Funding and security constraints have influenced, and will continue to influence, the matching of humanitarian needs with available resources, with the need for a rationale for the use of varying rations. Sphere guidelines are intended as a guide, the needs of beneficiary groups vary and this appears recognised by WFP Somalia. Development and use of such guidelines will assist the regional response.

**Improved data capture.** Data capture has been inadequate but is being developed. One important data set would be a comparison of recovery rates among malnourished children who do and do not receive a family ration alongside the UNICEF supplementary ration. When rations cannot be provided (for example, due to under-funding or logistics issues) such data could capture and analyse the impact on outcomes.

**Post-distribution data on school feeding.** With diversified school feeding modalities, and expanded partnering, post-distribution data should be collected to assess the degree to which school feeding has an impact on nutrition as well as on attendance and enrolment. Previous research by UNICEF, IFPRI and others indicates that households decrease food quantities given to children in proportion to what they receive via on-site school feeding. This suggests that while school feeding is likely to improve consumption quality, it may have marginal or no effect on quantities consumed by individual children (although overall household food consumption may increase).



## 2.6 Transition from Relief to Recovery

### Change in the balance of relief and recovery

The PRRO planned to distribute 40 percent of food resources through recovery activities and the remainder through relief and social support activities. WFP planned to increase the quantity of food distributed through recovery by 10 percent each year, especially in the northwest and northeast regions, and in other areas as they become more secure. Emergency relief in the PRRO was initially planned to be decreased 5 percent each year, and selective feeding to be decreased 5 percent each year.

A number of risks identified in the PRRO have become reality: security, floods and drought. These events have led to an increase in relief activities rather than the intended increase in recovery activities. The latter declined from 52 percent to 38 percent. In 2003 the proportion of food (52 percent) given to rehabilitation activities was more than originally planned (35 percent). However, by 2005, according to the PRRO, 60 percent of food should have been distributed through recovery activities. In reality, less than 40 percent was distributed through recovery activities. It was also hoped that the northwest and northeast regions would expand the quantity of food distributed through rehabilitation activities. However, the quantity of food distributed through recovery activities in these regions has fallen from 30 percent to approximately 18 percent. Social support has declined by approximately 15 percent. Food distributed through relief has increased dramatically, from approximately 14 percent to 47 percent.

**Table 6 - Proportion of food WFP allocated to the activities per year**

	Relief	Social Support	Rehabilitation	School Feeding	Total
<b>2003 Actual</b>	1527MT (14%)	3621MT (32%)	5795MT (52%)	90MT (0.8%)	11,033MT
<b>2003 Planned</b>	8588MT (41%)	4752MT (23%)	7417MT (35%)	180MT (0.8%)	20,937MT
<b>2004 Actual</b>	9178MT (40%)	4693MT (21%)	8305MT (37%)	305MT (1.4%)	22,481MT
<b>2004 Planned</b>	7075MT (34%)	4695MT (23%)	8159MT (40%)	326MT (1.6%)	20,255MT

The PRRO also planned to provide 70 percent of the food resources to the south and central region, with the remainder of food resources being distributed to the northwest and northeast regions. However, the large-scale relief operation to respond to the drought-affected pastoralists in Somaliland and Puntland started in November 2003 and made the original PRRO plans inappropriate. The south and central region received only 42 percent of the food resources. The table below shows actual distributions.

**Table 7 - Proportion of food received per region per year**

	2003	2004	2005
<b>Somaliland (NW)</b>	32% (3623MT)	26% (6056MT)	22% (4511MT)
<b>Puntland (NE)</b>	21% (2330MT)	33% (7467MT)	34% (7110MT)
<b>South Central Zone (SCZ)</b>	46% (5081MT)	39% (8959MT)	42% (871MT)



### Transition strategy

Overall, WFP has shown the flexibility to respond to relief needs despite its plan to transition to recovery activities. Transition activities are actively pursued, both in WFP projects and in partnership with NGOs and UN agencies. The likely scenario for WFP is that there will be numerous localized emergencies requiring relief responses while opportunities exist in other areas to develop livelihood capacities through recovery projects. One such project is the Sustainable Livelihood and Drought Mitigation (SL&DM) programme developed by UNDP in partnership with UNOCHA and WFP. The project will commence in late 2005 and WFP's challenge will be to determine exactly where, when and for how long food inputs can be most effectively applied to supplement inputs by other partners to ensure livelihood outcomes, and to corroborate this through monitoring and evaluation. This applies across all regions, as the Somali development deficit is vast and the sum total of available food aid and non-food aid available to the assistance community represents only a fraction of total need.

Given the lack of a central functioning government, continued insecurity in many parts of Somalia, unfavourable climatic conditions, the breakdown of traditional range land management systems, and inadequate social services (health, water and education), it is not surprising that Somalia remains vulnerable to shocks resulting in food insecurity for large numbers of the population. With the likelihood of these challenges occurring over the coming years, WFP programming needs to remain flexible to retain the comparative advantage of food aid and further develop capacity to rapidly deliver targeted food assistance. However, there are areas of opportunity that allow for imaginative methods of distributing food aid that could be expanded over time, assuming relative stability is maintained. It must be noted that WFP recognizes the labour-intensity of recovery activities compared with relief activities. Over time, WFP has reduced the number of recovery projects from approximately 400 to between 60 and 100.

Conceptually, recovery activities appear largely reserved for those transitioning out of relief or for populations whose food-security status suggests that recovery activities are more appropriate. This approach does not fully capture the potential utility of activities aimed at protecting livelihoods in times of crisis. Although all recovery activities are aimed at reducing longer-term vulnerability, there is a need to recognize the preventative utility of intervening early during acute and deteriorating livelihood crises. The evaluation team recognizes that this will be difficult to implement in the Somali context.



The likelihood of a final shift to recovery does not apply to Somalia for the foreseeable future. However, possible transitions between relief and recovery should be recognized in the next PRRO and the rationale documented. There is consensus between WFP and partners that data from the forthcoming post-GU food security assessment will be a critical input used to inform decision making on relief to recovery transitions and vice a versa. There is a certain amount of pragmatism that is also required to help establish the ability to make the shift. The evaluation, in discussions with sub-office staff, identified a number of questions that can assist in decision making:



- Will recovery activities have sufficient absorption capacity for food to meet the food needs of the food-insecure, and what are the opportunities for direct and indirect participation in recovery activities among the most food-insecure?
- Does WFP have the logistical and technical capacity to assess, support, monitor and at times implement recovery activities to an adequate standard?
- Is it possible to simultaneously provide relief and recovery activities to communities in geographic proximity without creating tensions?
- Do potential partners (UN, NGOs or communities) have adequate implementing and technical capacities?
- Is there consensus among key players of the food security situation, the food needs and an appropriate response for an identified population?



## 2.7. Gender and Protection

### Gender

To date there has been no evidence of a systematic approach<sup>29</sup> to gender at the CO and sub-office levels. Recognizing the efforts of programme staff to reflect Somali cultural norms of respect, care and concern for women, the evaluation focused on three key questions in the review of activities:

- Gender analysis in project design: is it analysed or is it a foregone conclusion?
- Relief distributions: does ‘sit-on-your-bag’ really put women in charge of food where they otherwise would not have control?
- Participation: do women find their participation in committees and food distribution empowering or a burden? If the latter, is WFP’s focus on women a detriment to the rights of beneficiaries?

WFP Somalia strategies differ for relief and recovery settings. For relief settings, the goal is to ensure that food goes directly to households. For recovery projects, the aim is to promote the participation of women and to give them a leading role in food and activity management committees in recovery projects. Specific findings include:

- **Gender analysis:** A gender training workshop was provided to field staff during the mission visit. To date, gender analysis has not been undertaken strategically and the generally free access to women in assessment and implementation is widely and correctly interpreted as evidence that women are not systematically excluded from engaging in processes that aim at addressing their needs. It is also recognized that there are impediments in Somali culture to including women’s views in decision making of a strategic nature.
- **Relief distributions:** In emergency relief settings, where typically more than 90 percent of the recipients are women, the ‘sit-on-your-bag’ system (where family relief food is distributed directly to women) is the norm, ensures that that food goes directly to households, and is accepted by communities and authorities in all regions. In the past, food has looted by combatants or ‘requested’ by clan elders in administration of the ‘Diya’ system for feud<sup>30</sup> settlement. Women’s control over food ensures that they can participate in decisions over this. Emergency distributions are at community level, minimizing transport to homes.
- **Participation:** Women in all relief settings are unequivocal in their support for participation as required by WFP and view this as an extension and recognition of their role in the household and community food economy. Women play an active role in community discussions, participate in school feeding community education committees, participate in needs assessments (for example when responding to FSAU identified food

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<sup>29</sup> A gender workshop, during the evaluation mission, developed a gender and nutrition strategy, as part of WFP Somalia Enhanced Commitment to Women Implementation Scheme and link to the 2005 Work Plan. The process is, despite significant work in recent months, in its early stages.

<sup>30</sup> All regions have their Diya type ‘security fund’ for blood money (feud settlement) operated by clan elders on a sub-clan basis. This is not a regular contribution but takes place when conflict has forced the need to pay another clan to resolve a dispute. Contributions reflect relative wealth and capacity at the time. Women, being forceful participants in community politics, would likely ensure their household contribution reflects relative vulnerability.



insecurity hotspots), are the focus of distribution monitoring and have access to WFP staff in grievance processes.

### **Protection**

The changing nature of conflict and humanitarian emergencies has created an increasing need to find ways to protect those receiving humanitarian assistance as well as civilians in general. Protection has traditionally been the mandate, namely the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Given the magnitude of protection gaps in conflict and emergency situations, however, humanitarian agencies (UN and NGO) have recognized that they can play a complementary role in ensuring the dignity and rights of individuals.

Simple decisions, such as where to locate a well or to distribute food directly to women and children, will reduce vulnerability. Water/sanitation teams can consult with women to identify appropriate locations for latrines, safe access by women to water or cooking fuel can reduce the risk of sexual exploitation, and teachers can provide valuable information on ways to prevent underage military recruitment.

Often there is a link between gender and protection, and WFP has made a commitment consider both as cross-cutting issues in planning and implementation. Projects modalities should be analysed to identify risks and threats, and devise programmes and interventions to eliminate or reduce these.

WFP manages, allocates and distributes high-value commodities that are desirable to communities of varying vulnerability, often divided by clan boundaries. News of intervention is widely shared through broadcasts and radio communications. WFP practices risk mitigation, transparency and equity in decision making and implementation:

- Food storage in warehouses is limited to reduce thefts and attacks, and distributions to beneficiaries are limited to monthly rations.
- FSAU and WFP nutritional data are widely available to stakeholders through various information sharing networks.
- The presence of international staff decision makers at regional level protects national staff from the pressures of clan and sub-clan demands.
- WFP's equitable practice in communities and among regions, works enhances its ability to implement activities without generating animosities.
- Sectoral and inter-agency coordination ensures common understanding between humanitarian actors.
- WFP distribution monitoring includes staff, community representatives and beneficiaries to ensure that food rations are delivered to the targeted populations.
- Food distribution is predominantly to women who, in all Somali regions and social groups, manage food resources at household level, ensure it reaches children, and contribute to community sharing and coping mechanisms through food sharing with the most vulnerable.
- WFP's 'sit-on-your-bag' strategy and village-level distribution minimize the likelihood of separation of food from the household. Social support and school feeding use a similar technique.





## 2.8 Coordination and Partnerships

### Coordination at Nairobi level

There has been a significant expansion of NGO and UN activity since 2004 and opportunities are increasing as agencies establish their operations. WFP has taken advantage of these opportunities and is known to actively pursue partnership. To date, the programme has been characterized by a large number of small projects administered by sub-office staff, reflecting past implementation constraints. Management at all levels recognizes that the administrative demands of small projects place significant constraints on capacity (for example, for monitoring and evaluation) and is searching for solutions to this constraint.

A number of international NGOs, especially in the north, are focusing on developing local implementing capacity. UN interagency strategic focus is on the development of civil society capacities. Major donors such as USAID, ECHO and Cooperazione Italiana are also focusing on institutional goals while maintaining a commitment to meeting emerging food insecurity. For WFP, this should translate into significantly improved opportunities<sup>31</sup> to engage in recovery activities. Coordination between Cooperazione Italiana and WFP is conducted more in Rome than Nairobi, which on occasions has caused communication problems.

FSAU is one of WFP's key partners. FSAU information is generally regarded by donors and implementing agencies to be credible and relevant for guiding programme activities. WFP is on the FSAU steering committee, which meets quarterly to provide direction and to advise FSAU. WFP is also a core technical partner, which allows it to vet the FSAU information before publication. Despite this key partnership, it appears that the relationship between senior WFP staff and senior FSAU staff could be further strengthened. Past tensions between WFP and FSAU at the Nairobi level have resulted in WFP under-utilizing FSAU information as decision-making tool and focusing on finding fault in FSAU data rather than working with FSAU to tailor its information to WFP's needs. The hiring of an ex-FSAU nutrition team member as the WFP VAM officer holds promise in terms of strengthening this relationship and increasing the utility of FSAU data for WFP. In line with its mandate, WFP has the opportunity to take a lead role in initiating inter-agency assessments when FSAU or other data suggest impending crisis. Such assessments help ensure consensus of the food-security situation and appropriate responses.

SACB is a donor-driven coordination body for Somalia and focuses on rehabilitation and development issues. There are several sectoral working groups within SACB. WFP is a member of the food aid and food security and rural development working groups. WFP takes a lead role in the food aid working group and attends the education working group meetings on an ad hoc basis.

WFP is also an active member of the UNCT and has a good working relationship with OCHA. WFP has taken an active role in the OCHA-coordinated inter-agency assessments with regards to planning and providing technical support throughout the assessment, which has been much appreciated by other implementing agencies.

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<sup>31</sup> Future USAID food aid contributions will be through the 'Food For Peace' window, requiring WFP to engage in activities with a recovery focus. This will require significant operational changes in terms of M&E.



### **Coordination at regional level**

Regional WFP offices and programmes work with line ministries in Somaliland and Puntland, and with relevant local authorities in the CSZ.

The Ministry of Planning in Somaliland has overall responsibility for coordinating the humanitarian response. The existence of this ministry gives the impression of enhancing coordination among implementing agencies in Somaliland. However, the evaluation team is unconvinced of its effectiveness. To date, the ministry has not arranged a coordination meeting. Implementing agencies frequently coordinate with their respective line ministries, and it appears that the Ministry of Planning remains poorly informed of ongoing activities. It is apparent that the ministry does not fully understand WFP's targeting criteria for food assistance, which at times leads to misunderstandings. The ministry is also responsible for the initial screening of proposals before they are sent to WFP. It is uncertain how effective or reliable this initial screening process is.

WFP's main office in Puntland is in Bossaso, while most of the implementing organizations and coordination activities are further south in Garowe. However, WFP's respective line ministry is based in Bossaso and the line ministry is responsible for the initial screening of submitted proposals requesting WFP support. WFP has a food monitor based in Garowe who frequently attends the coordination meetings but has limited decision-making authority. UNICEF and WFP in Bossaso occasionally have coordination meetings that feed into the larger coordination meetings in Garowe. WFP recognizes that the existing arrangement weakens WFP's opportunity to actively engage in coordination activities. WFP is in the process reviewing the field staff and aims to ensure good representation and enhanced capacity in both Bossaso and Garowe in the future.

In Wajid the authorities assist the implementing agencies by ensuring relative security for humanitarian access. The District Commissioner in Wajid is helpful and cooperative. In the southern region of Somalia, coordination is constrained by implementing partners being scattered throughout the area and having to travel to a central coordination point which is logistically challenging and at times prohibited due to security restrictions. In addition, the OCHA representative has only recently arrived in Wajid. The WFP compound adjoins two international NGOs involved in food security activities in areas in which WFP also operates. However, there is limited coordination between WFP and these NGOs with respect to their food security activities. In one instance, the same community was targeted by both WFP and an international NGO for a water source development activity. If this had gone unnoticed, the community could potentially have received both cash for work from the international NGO and food for work from WFP for conducting the same activity, something unacceptable to both agencies.

WFP's most significant relationship in the field is with FAO-FSAU. Meetings with WFP and FSAU sub-office staff in each region identified that there is generally a high level of collaboration in terms of sharing resources, conducting food security assessments, and analysing trends in food security status<sup>32</sup>. However, there are exceptions, such as the recent disagreement over the interpretation of high malnutrition prevalence estimates and the appropriateness of

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<sup>32</sup> WFP staff are actively involved in the planning, data collection, and data analysis of FSAU post-Gu and post-Deyr assessments at the regional level prior to their being sent to Nairobi for consolidation.



WFP food interventions in Awdal region, Somaliland<sup>33</sup>. WFP provides office space for FSAU staff in Wajid, which helps to enhance good collaboration. FSAU in Somaliland has informally negotiated with ministries on behalf of WFP when there have been misunderstandings.

OCHA has upgraded its profile since the tsunami and now takes the lead role in coordinating humanitarian response and ensuring humanitarian access. OCHA acts as a negotiator between WFP and authorities when necessary. WFP and UNICEF have good coordination in Somalia, and at the onset of the targeted feeding programmes the two agencies meet regularly to ensure the smooth implementation of these activities.

### **Partnerships**

CARE is one of WFP's key partners, and the working relationship is good. They loan food to each other when necessary, and CARE has assisted WFP with distributing food relief when necessary. CARE and WFP now have an operational agreement that prevents overlap and states that if one agency is unable to provide relief due to security problems in an area, the other agency will also not assist.

WFP implementing partners range from small women's groups to large international NGOs with varying degrees of technical capacity. Frequently where needs are greatest (often in areas of high insecurity), there are few potential implementing partners. As security improves, the number of implementing organizations and potential implementing partners increases and food needs decrease. Especially in the south and central zone of Somalia there are insufficient implementing partners that have the technical capacity to assess, implement and monitor WFP-supported activities. To date, WFP has not had the resources to invest in strengthening the technical capacity of potential partners.

In Mogadishu WFP no longer works through local NGOs as staff members have been "hijacked" by local NGOs due to misunderstandings as to WFP support to them.

WFP staff in all regions have made efforts in ensuring that implementing partners are accepted by the community, have the technical and logistical capacity to carry out the work and adhere to humanitarian principles.

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<sup>33</sup> There is disagreement over whether this outcome is primarily driven by food insecurity, health/disease, or a combination of these causal factors.



### **Strategies for further development of partnerships**

***Further strengthening partnership with FSAU.*** FSAU data collection and analysis are very valuable for WFP's understanding of the food security situation. While FSAU serves the needs of many, the organization recognizes its close historic link with WFP and there is evidence of opportunities for WFP to guide activities to inform PRRO decision making – for example, through participation by WFP senior management in the FSAU steering committee and core technical partner meeting (including review of findings before publication).

***Strengthening WFP partnerships in education activities.*** With the expanding focus on education by emerging governments, UN, donors and others, there is opportunity to promote WFP's role in the education sector through active participation in the SACB education working group and similar forums.

***Expanded engagement with line ministries.*** Strategic engagement (discussion/promotion of programme) with line ministries, other agencies and/or local authorities can be expanded (possibly with monthly reviews). This will lead to an increase in their understanding of WFP's mandate and strategies, with a view to strengthening food security for identified communities.

***District-level coordination.*** While coordination at the regional level (south and central Somalia) remains problematic, it is recommended that WFP actively encourage district-level coordination among the implementing organizations. Such coordination could create a robust mechanism in the context of the current security environment.

***Local capacity building.*** Organizational and technical capacity of local organizations/partners is very low. WFP field staff engage in capacity building where possible, but a strategic uptake of capacity building with donors and international NGOs would ultimately increase the humanitarian access for all actors.

***Partnership agreements.*** Partnership agreements between WFP and their implementing partners should be reviewed and redrafted, where necessary, to assure consistency and equity.



## 2.9. Monitoring and Evaluation

The stated aim of WFP Somalia’s M&E system is “to examine the performance of the PRRO from food and non-food inputs, implementation and outputs to the evaluation of immediate and longer-term outcomes in order to maximize strengths and identify areas for improvement” (PRRO 10191). The degree to which these aims were achieved is variable.

The CO performed well in collecting data for monitoring inputs, activities and outputs at sub-office, and in consolidating sub-office data for reporting purposes in Nairobi. The current database (Project Information System, or PIS) has proved adequate in this regard. In addition to providing information for reporting, the PIS serves as a tool for managing projects and project monitoring at the sub-office level. Its utility appears strongly correlated to its widespread and comprehensive adoption. There is little concrete evidence that country-wide monitoring data are analysed and inform programme decision making beyond reporting. However, the CO program staff stated that it is used in this way.

The CO performed much less satisfactorily in terms of collecting project-level data on immediate and longer-term outcomes<sup>34</sup>. It failed to collect such data for all projects except school feeding activities and some anecdotal outcome-level data for a small number of the FFW projects in the Bay/Bakool region. This includes the lack of documentation and analysis of outcome level-data for projects (such as MCH) for which the data are readily available through partners. Given the absence of outcome-level data at the project level, no attempt has been made to conduct a PRRO impact analysis (the synthesis of outcome level data across PRRO activities to gauge overall PRRO performance) as stated in the PRRO document. This raises a critical concern about how and on what basis project and PRRO management decisions have been made given that, as stated in the PRRO document, outcome-level data collection is critical for “demonstrating the validity of project design and the value of project replication and expansion, enabling continuous modification of intervention strategies”.

The failure to implement the M&E framework designed in 2001/2002 has little to do with lack of forms, checklists, databases, or basic understanding of the logical framework approach among field-level national staff who participated in the framework’s initial design. Rather, the primary cause of this failure is attributable to:

- lack of field staff time allocated to outcome-level data collection
- lack of Nairobi-level technical staff to advise on analysis of project-level data and perform the synthesis of these findings to gauge overall PRRO performance
- low prioritization/lack of mandate on the part of senior and programme management for collecting and analysing outcome data.

This low priority of evaluating activity outcomes at the sub-office level reflects the priority put on this information by CO management. In turn, this reflects the priorities put on outcome evaluation information by WFP globally as well as by donors. In all three cases (WFP Somalia, WFP Rome and donors) M&E is a stated priority and the object of multiple consultations, conferences, and workshops. However, there is little evidence that it is a priority-in-practice, as

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<sup>34</sup> Immediate/longer-term outcomes are termed purpose/goal respectively in project level logical frameworks.



there is no penalty for non-compliance. Moreover, the effectiveness of a CO's M&E system has little or nothing to do with how the CO programme is resourced in the future.

Another factor influencing WFP Somalia's ability to implement an effective M&E system is the contrasting guidance, as well as new reporting requirements and initiatives, consistently coming out of WFP Rome. Few if any of these initiatives have given adequate time for tailoring and implementation at the CO level before a new initiative comes along to derail the previous process. These multiple demands are highly distracting, absorb staff time and prevent the CO from becoming effective.

For example, the M&E consultation to WFP Somalia in 2001 designed and trained staff at all levels in the use of the logical framework approach for identifying the inputs, activities, outputs and outcomes of each activity and situating these in relation to their contribution to PRRO objectives. The same approach was used in a PRRO design workshop held prior to the submission of PRRO 10191, providing a clear framework for linking PRRO and individual activity design to PRRO and individual activity evaluation (see Collins, 2001). The logic of this approach remains well understood by sub-office level and Nairobi national staff. However, turnover in management and international staff, combined with the Results Based Management initiative – seen as a distinct set of requirements, rather than integrally linked to the logical framework approach – resulted in the logical frameworks developed for the PRRO not being fully adopted as living documents for guiding design and M&E. The standardized M&E approach about to be launched by WFP Rome is likely to result in a similar derailment of current WFP Somalia initiatives at addressing their internal M&E needs.

Actions are currently being taken by the CO to address some of the shortcomings identified by the evaluation team, although their outcomes will not bear fruit with the PRRO under evaluation. Actions include:

- A VAM officer has been hired. Programme staff suggest that this person will also assist with M&E data analysis, although the tasks and time allocated between VAM and M&E activities has yet not been clearly delineated.
- A consultant is working on expanding the PIS and data collection forms to include outcome-level data (e.g. database development) and meet reporting requirements for SPRs, etc.
- Programme staff time/time management is being reviewed to determine additional staffing needs.
- A shift is being made to fewer, larger-scale rehabilitation projects (see discussion under rehabilitation), in part to allow for more effective monitoring of activities.



### **Strategies for Monitoring and Evaluation**

**Project outcome data.** Management needs to allocate staff time for the collection of project outcome data (which requires re-visiting projects sites after output delivery). Given the large number and small scale of rehabilitation activities, it is suggested that a representative sample of projects be evaluated within each type of activity. Anecdotal evidence on project outcomes (again a sample) should be collected as a stop-gap measure while a more rigorous approach to outcome evaluation is being designed.

**Multiple demands.** CO management needs to alert HQ when new initiatives and multiple demands are imposed and found to absorb staff time and prevent the CO from becoming effective before outputs for new initiatives are required.

**Additional staff.** Technical staff should be hired at Nairobi level to advise on data collection/analysis and perform impact evaluations. The recently hired VAM officer could be ideal, provided the officer is given adequate time (50 percent of staff time), as there is also a need to link, to the extent possible, data collected for assessment, programme design and M&E<sup>35</sup>.

**Training.** Incoming programme and management staff need to be trained on the use of the logical framework approach for PRRO/project design and M&E.

**M&E system requirements.** The design of an M&E system must take strongly into account the utility of the system for informing programming decision making at the sub-office level. In addition, WFP Somalia senior management needs to ensure that standardized approaches and initiatives from WFP Rome are integrated as secondary priorities into existing M&E initiatives aimed at meeting CO information needs (first priority). This requires a broad enough statement of CO M&E strategy to demonstrate that it meets or exceeds the intent of global standardized approaches.

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<sup>35</sup> The previous approach (again being used in database design) of using consultants and relying on short-term JPOs and ‘focal points’ whose time dedicated to other tasks prevents adequate engagement with the M&E system is likely to result in a repeat failure to effectively gather and analyze M&E information in the next PRRO.



## 2.10 Implementation Status of 2001 Evaluation Recommendations

**Recommendation 1:** *“Further information on the status of poorer pastoralists should be sought via FSAU and other sources, and consideration be given to the feasibility of project assistance to them.”* The previous evaluation’s recommendation to engage pastoralist populations in rehabilitation activities has not been fully adopted. This is due in part to the drought in the northern regions and subsequent relief intervention, but also reflects the lack of suitable entry points identified by the CO in working with this population. WFP’s involvement in the proposed UNDP Sustainable Livelihoods and Drought Mitigation Programme offers the opportunity to take up this recommendation in earnest during the next PRRO period.

**Recommendation 2:** *“Accepting that oil is still not to be distributed for security reasons, the ration should be made of up to 2,100kcal by some other item. Sugar, which would undoubtedly be appreciated, could be considered if it were not either too expensive or a security risk. Otherwise the cereal or pulse ration could be increased.”* The present PRRO considered the July 2001 evaluation and increased the planned ration to provide 2,100kcal/person/day. However, in reality the PRRO was under-resourced until after the tsunami so it was not possible to provide the planned ration (for example, to the drought affected).

**Recommendation 3:** *“Funds from the food distribution study might be usefully invested in obtaining more in-depth information on beneficiaries of selected projects, and on creating case studies for better post-distribution monitoring.”* There has been limited improvement in the depth of knowledge on beneficiaries of selected projects or their particular vulnerabilities. There is no comprehensive documentation. Post-distribution monitoring is still not conducted systematically or routinely.

**Recommendation 4:** *“For the future, the country office should plan a recovery strategy that takes into account the difference between the north and the south. WFP should look for further involvement with line ministries in the north, whether in agricultural, environmental and water projects, or in education.”* WFP has made a concerted effort to consider the different operational environments and contexts between the north and south. However, with its large-scale response to the drought in the northwest and northeast, WFP’s initial plans were largely not possible to implement. WFP remains aware of the varying operational opportunities when considering future programming.

**Recommendation 5:** *“WFP should begin to limit the spectrum of its social institution support projects with a view to phasing out this sector. Meanwhile the focus should be on those projects in which there is more likelihood of eventually finding a strong implementing partner or developing government involvement – for example, in education, whether for school feeding or adult literacy, and in MCH programmes.”* It should be recognized that it is difficult to phase out social support to institutions. Without WFP support many of the beneficiaries would be vulnerable to food insecurity. However, there is no evidence that WFP has actively searched for suitable implementing partners to take over some of these activities. The proportion of food provided to these institutions is relatively small and requires limited input (i.e. low maintenance) from WFP. WFP has involved line ministries in Somaliland and Puntland in its programming. In Somaliland the MCH activities are implemented by UNICEF and its





implementing partner (the Ministry of Health). School feeding has involved the Ministry of Education in Somaliland and Puntland.

***Recommendation 6: “Consideration should now be given to further reducing the security bond by 10-20 percent in relatively secure areas of operation... Further efforts are encouraged to increase contractor competition, in the northeast region in particular.”*** WFP continues to modify the transport agreements in response to the fluid security environment.

***Recommendation 7: “More attention needs to be given to identifying formal indicators for beginning and ending projects and to doing qualitative reporting in general”.*** Little progress has been made on this during the last three years. However, the establishment and increased focus of M&E systems should improve the situation for the future.



## 2.11 Recommendations of the Present Evaluation

### **Recommendation 1: Defining Target Populations**

1. A more refined typology of target groups needs to be identified, focusing on factors relevant to project design and decision making. At a minimum this includes sources of livelihood and a more refined definition of status giving indication of social capital, social networks and social position as they relate to beneficiaries' ability to access such services as market credit and community support mechanisms in times of crisis<sup>36</sup>. The typology suggested in Table 4 is intended to provide a starting point and stimulate further discussion and refinement by the CO programme staff.

### **Recommendations 2: Protecting Livelihoods**

2. A livelihood crisis statement should be developed for the next PRRO. Although protecting livelihoods in times of crisis may be an inferred objective within the stated PRRO objective of “support(ing) the capacity of vulnerable populations to create productive assets and resources that enable them to improve their livelihoods”, a more explicit statement that incorporates protecting livelihoods in times of deteriorating livelihood crises would ensure that the issue is highlighted in the next PRRO. This is critical for Somalia, where the transition from recovery to relief is just as likely as a transition from relief to recovery. In practical terms, this requires rethinking and retooling rehabilitation-like activities with the aim of protecting livelihood assets, reducing the longer-term impact of crisis-driven divestment and losses, and pre-emptively enhancing the ability of vulnerable households to recover their productive assets post-crises<sup>37</sup>.

### **Recommendation 3: Redistribution**

3. The clear benefits of redistribution in terms of bolstering social safety nets, social capital and reducing future vulnerability outweigh the negative aspects of ‘inclusion error’ and should be highlighted in PRRO relief activity design and evaluation.

### **Recommendations 4 and 5: Social Support**

4. WFP should ensure the development and maintenance of staff technical capacity to interpret and use nutritional data.

5. Improved beneficiary profile information should be generated, in collaboration with UNICEF, in order to better understand the causes of malnutrition. (Table 4 is a suggested starting point.)

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<sup>36</sup> It is recognized that this differentiation may not be possible in the initial stages of a relief operation. However, it will form a critical decision making tool in deciding which sub-populations are positioned for transitioning out of free food distribution and in designing appropriate recovery activities.

<sup>37</sup> The identification of appropriate entry points and activities in this regard, such as well timed de-stocking projects at the point of panic selling among pastoralists, requires significant reflection and forethought on the part of WFP and partner organizations. The Coping Strategies Index (CSI), a food security monitoring and food aid evaluation tool developed by WFP/CARE Kenya and in the process of being implemented by FSAU, is likely to provide a useful means of gauging the impact of interventions aimed at protecting livelihoods (e.g. provides measures at the immediate outcome level).



**Recommendations 6 and 7: Rehabilitation Activities**

6. The project approval process for rehabilitation activities needs to be modified to assess projects in terms of specific contribution to PRRO objectives, in addition to local problem analysis. This will serve to refocus activity design on PRRO objectives, rather than activities, and eliminate projects that do not contribute to these objectives. The logical framework approach previously developed for the CO provides the ideal means of making these linkages.

7. The CCR pilot responds creatively to systemic needs of the most vulnerable. A review of the project design can ensure that the initial capital outlay and sustainability of the project are consistent, either by reducing the initial capital input or improving the sustainability mechanism.

**Recommendation 8: School Feeding**

8. WFP's commitment to individual schools should be for a minimum of three years, unless a suitable agency is found to take on the management and support of school feeding.

**Recommendation 9: Transition to Relief and Recovery**

9. Transition should be based on a formal decision-making process based on the logical framework and assess minimum institutional demands by answering a set of agreed key questions. These should include: Will recovery activities have sufficient absorption capacity to meet the food needs of the food-insecure, and are there opportunities for recovery activities among the most food-insecure? Does WFP have the logistical and technical capacity to assess, support and monitor recovery activities to an adequate standard? Is it possible to provide relief and recovery activities to communities in similar geographical areas without creating tensions? Do potential partners (UN, NGO or community) have adequate implementing and technical capacities?

**Recommendations 10 to 12: Coordination and Partnerships with Stakeholders**

10. CO management should take advantage of opportunities to participate in the FSAU steering committee and core technical partner meeting (review of findings before publication). The CARE working relationship provides a relevant example of a constructive engagement with FSAU aimed at meeting programme information needs.

11. Strategic engagement (discussion/promotion of programme) should take place with line ministries, other agencies and/or local authorities to increase their understanding of WFP's mandate and strategies, with a view toward strengthening food security of identified communities.

12. The Puntland Garrowe office requires senior staff with decision-making authority to strengthen existing and emerging coordination opportunities.

**Recommendations 13 and 14: Monitoring and Evaluation**

13. Management should mandate and allocate staff time for collection of project outcome data (note: this requires re-visiting projects sites after output delivery) on a sample of projects by type (see Collins, 2001 for a description).



14. Staff capacities need to be developed. Technical staff need to be allocated at Nairobi level to advise on data collection/analysis and to perform impact evaluations (the VAM officer could be the ideal person, if given adequate time – 50 percent of staff time)<sup>38</sup>. Incoming programme and management staff need to be trained on the use of the logical framework for project design and M&E.

**Recommendation 15: Gender**

15. The delivery and field use of tools for gender analysis and planning should be formalized and systematized. Field data, modalities and outcomes need to be captured in M&E. Furthermore, recovery activities that have an impact on women's needs need to be identified and prioritized.

**Recommendations 16 to 18: Protection**

16. The collection of protection information such as challenges to safety and security of beneficiaries, impediments to access or security of WFP staff in monitoring and evaluation, should be formalized and systematized.

17. Protection issues such as impact of food aid on safety of beneficiaries should be included in post-distribution monitoring (PDM).

18. Agreements with local partners should include specific reference to secure and safe delivery to the most vulnerable and helping ensure that their safety. Security and dignity are not placed at risk as a result of food aid.

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<sup>38</sup> The previous approach (again being used in database design) of using consultants and relying on short-term JPOs and 'focal points' whose time dedicated to other tasks prevents adequate engagement with the M&E system is likely to result in a repeat failure to effectively gather and analyze M&E information in the next PRRO.

# Annexes





## Annex 1 - TERMS OF REFERENCE

### Evaluation of PRRO 10191.0 – Food Aid for *Relief* and Recovery in Somalia

#### Background

The evaluation of the current PRRO 10191.0 in Somalia will focus on key objectives and subsidiary issues/questions. Also, the evaluation will focus on two evaluation criteria, namely: effectiveness<sup>1</sup> and relevance<sup>2</sup>. Results will be examined at the outcome level, namely measured against progress towards intended achievements, for each relief and recovery beneficiary group, in relation to various food intervention strategies. Efficiency<sup>3</sup> (output-level results) will only be examined when believed to negatively affecting effectiveness or the outcome level achievement of results. This will be of great importance in helping to identify how and where strategy can be revised. Two crosscutting issues, namely gender in terms of power relationships in a complex emergency context and protection as it relates to food interventions will also be part of the overall analysis.

Finally, the evaluation will mostly be summative, rather than formative and will, therefore, focus on the past, since the 2001 evaluation. However, its findings will certainly be useful in light of the formulation of the subsequent phase, though it is not intended to be process-oriented. Therefore, it will not address as many operational issues, as did the last evaluation, nor will it address to a large extent logistic issues. Rather, the evaluation will focus on a limited number of topics of overall corporate interest.

#### Objectives

1. Compare **lessons from previous evaluation** and their incorporation into the current PRRO, as incorporated into the annexed table of topics and questions.
2. Evaluate the **relevance and effectiveness of chosen strategies**, in responding to vulnerability to food insecurity in the Somali context and suggest ways for improvement. Consider relief and recover; transition between both components; and co-ordination and partnerships.
3. Evaluate the **relevance and effectiveness of monitoring and the related systems**.
4. Provide WFP with valuable insights and issues for consideration in relation to **future strategies**.

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<sup>1</sup> **Effectiveness:** The extent to which the operation's objectives were achieved, or expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance (source: WFP M&E Glossary).

<sup>2</sup> **Relevance:** The extent to which the objectives of a WFP operation are consistent with beneficiaries' needs, country needs, organizational priorities, and partners' and donors' policies (source: WFP M&E Glossary). Also, the preparation of a "recovery strategy", as the base on which all PRRO activities are designed, is recommended in "From Crisis to Recovery" (WFP/EB.A/98/4-A) as well as the PRRO Guidelines ("Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations: Guidelines for the Preparation of a PRRO", WFP February 1999).

<sup>3</sup> **Efficiency:** A measure of how economical inputs are converted to outputs (source: WFP M&E Glossary).



**Main topics:**

1. Intervention strategies:
  - a. relief and recovery (beneficiary profiles; socio-cultural and socio-economic realities; ration scale and food basket)
  - b. transition from relief to recovery (or vice versa)
  - c. co-ordination and partnerships with stakeholders
2. Monitoring and related systems
3. Cross-cutting issues (gender and protection issues)





<b>Topics and questions</b>	
<b>Relevance and effectiveness to improve household food security through relief and recovery</b> (note: X = selected lessons from the previous evaluation and their incorporation into the current PRRO)	
<b>A. Relevance to needs, priorities and policies<sup>1</sup></b>	<b>B. Effectiveness in achieving outcomes<sup>2</sup></b>
<b>1. Review of relief and recovery strategies (beneficiary profiles<sup>3</sup>; socio-cultural and socio-economic realities<sup>4</sup>; ration scale and food basket<sup>5</sup>)</b>	
<p>1.A.1 Were intervention strategies adequate to address the problem analysis and meet basic food needs?</p> <p>1.A.2 Were linkages between the PRRO logical framework(s) and objectives sufficiently defined?</p> <p>1.A.3 How have beneficiary profiles influenced the development of the strategy? (X)</p> <p>1.A.4 How have cultural and economic conditions been considered in the analysis of intervention strategies? (X)</p> <p>1.A.5 Were selected strategies appropriate and relevant to each of Somalia’s regional contexts? (X)</p> <p>1.A.6 To what extent are targeting methods relevant within the institutional context of local administration, IPs, community structures. Targeting methods can be quotas by region (geographic distribution), HH, individuals or specific groups (supplementary feeding, IDPs). Targeting considers or includes re-distribution mechanisms (administrative, community practices, intra household sharing, debt repayments). (X)</p> <p>1.A.7 To which extent have the following six key questions been given consideration (who needs food aid; why food aid; where is food aid needed; when is the best time and means of distribution; what food; how much food aid?)</p> <p>1.A.8 How were gender issues and protection concerns considered in deciding on the ration scale and food basket? (X)</p>	<p>1.B.1 What evidence is there of factors that impact on success and failure of implementation (consider intended/unintended outcomes) ?</p> <p>1.B.2 How have the six questions (under 1.A.7) impacted on the effectiveness of the PRRO?</p> <p>1.B.3 How have regional strategies (1.A.5) influenced the PRRO effectiveness? (X)</p> <p>1.B.4 How have targeting elements (identify) optimized the likelihood to achieve intended outcomes? (X)</p> <p>1.B.5 How have inclusion/exclusion errors of targeting affected effectiveness (consider guidelines and criteria)? (X)</p> <p>1.B.6 What are the elements of success/failure in targeting beneficiaries and selecting intervention strategies? (X)</p> <p>1.B.7 Give examples of how the chosen ration scale and food basket lead to outcome-level results (relating to intervention objectives) (X)</p> <p>1.B.8 What difference has food assistance made to HH and individual livelihood (consider cross-border movements, seasonal migration, revenue, livestock, agriculture, remittances and trade)?</p> <p>1.B.9 To what extent has the strategy influenced resettlement schemes?</p>

<sup>1</sup> Relevance: The extent to which the objectives of a WFP operation are consistent with beneficiaries’ needs, country needs, organizational priorities, and partners’ and donors’ policies (source: WFP M&E Glossary). Also, the preparation of a “recovery strategy”, as the base on which all PRRO activities are designed, is recommended in “From Crisis to Recovery” (WFP/EB.A/98/4-A) as well as the PRRO Guidelines (“Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations: Guidelines for the Preparation of a PRRO”, WFP February 1999).

<sup>2</sup> Effectiveness: The extent to which the operation’s objectives were achieved, or expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance (source: WFP M&E Glossary).

<sup>3</sup> Consider beneficiary targeting and the specific strategy selected for each beneficiary group.

<sup>4</sup> Consider cross-border movements/seasonal migration and nomadic lifestyle, household income sources (livestock, agriculture, remittances, trade), and other community support systems that impact on disposable household resources.

<sup>5</sup> Consider calorific intake and diversity/source of food basket. Food basket may be looked at in terms of income transfer (e.g. use of WFP commodities in the context of creating/maintaining HH assets)



<b>Topics and questions</b>	
<b>Relevance and effectiveness to improve household food security through relief and recovery</b> (note: X = selected lessons from the previous evaluation and their incorporation into the current PRRO)	
<b>A. Relevance to needs, priorities and policies<sup>1</sup></b>	<b>B. Effectiveness in achieving outcomes<sup>2</sup></b>
1.A.9 What is the evidence that food aid presented a comparative advantage for both relief and recovery activities? 1.A.10 What has worked well and what has not (specify the reasons)?	
<b>2. Transition from relief to recovery (or vice versa)</b>	
2.A.1 How was the relief and recovery transition elaborated? 2.A.2 Were strategies flexible enough to adjust to changing needs or opportunities over time? 2.A.3 How do vulnerability criteria to food insecurity inform design (i.e. on what basis are decisions made about beneficiaries falling under the relief or recovery component, and, when these will move from one to the other)? 2.A.4 How do recovery strategies differ between regions, on the basis of regional contexts/specificities? 2.A.5 What has been learned from the previous evaluation and how did these lessons inform the design of the current PRRO? (X)	2.B.1 What were the main factors influencing effectiveness of the transition process? 2.B.2 To what extent have planned food inputs (pipeline management) affected decisions on outputs (in terms of the share between relief and recovery)? (X) 2.B.3 How have regional contexts/specificities influenced the PRRO effectiveness? (X) 2.B.4 What other factors have affected transition between relief and recovery, and how? (X)
<b>3. Co-ordination and partnerships with stakeholders</b>	
3.A.1 Were co-ordination mechanisms designed to create synergy <sup>6</sup> between stakeholders? (X) 3.A.2 To what extent have co-ordination and/or partnerships been instrumental in targeting (consider needs assessments; decision-making processes; implementation; stakeholder contributions and/or influences on targeting)? (X) 3.A.3 Were partnerships available in all regions, was their capacity appropriate, and were these partnerships relevant to intervention strategies? (X) 3.A.4 Were inter and intra-agency's division of labour/responsibilities, as well as lines of communication, clearly defined? (X)	3.B.1 Have the local authorities been sufficiently involved to ensure buy-in and implementation effectiveness? (X) 3.B.2 Is operational capacity adequate for implementation (WFP and IP)? (X) 3.B.3 What is the level of available skilled implementing partners in each region? (X) 3.B.4 Are there potential partners not interested in collaborating with WFP, and why? 3.B.5 Has the rate of transition been affected by the capacity of partners to respond to the new operational and/or technical focus of the intervention. (X)
<b>4. Gender and protection issues</b>	
4.A.1 To what extent have information gathering and decision making integrated gender issues in defining food assistance strategies? 4.A.2 To what extent have information gathering and decision making integrated	4.B.1 To what extent has targeting achieved gender balance, not only in quantitative terms, but also relating to empowerment <sup>8</sup> ? 4.B.2 To what extent have distribution modalities integrated protection issues, prior, during and after food distribution?

<sup>6</sup> Resulting benefits from coordinating or partnering efforts, over and above the outcomes of single interventions.



<b>Topics and questions</b>	
<b>Relevance and effectiveness to improve household food security through relief and recovery</b> (note: X = selected lessons from the previous evaluation and their incorporation into the current PRRO)	
<b>A. Relevance to needs, priorities and policies<sup>1</sup></b>	<b>B. Effectiveness in achieving outcomes<sup>2</sup></b>
protection <sup>7</sup> considerations in defining food assistance strategies?	
<b>5. Monitoring</b>	
5.A.1 To what extent is monitoring information used for management decisions? (X) 5.A.2 To what extent is monitoring data and information used in fine tuning intervention strategies? (X) 5.A.3 To what extent does monitoring help identify gender issues and protection concerns, where these are affected by food assistance? (X) 5.A.4 To what extent is reporting supportive of both field level staff (including feedback) and corporate reporting requirements (including on strategic priorities)? (X)	5.B.1 To what extent does the monitoring and reporting process contribute towards achievement of results (specify the type of information provided and how it is disseminated)? (X) 5.B.2 How regular and systematic is monitoring, and what opportunities exist for improvement (consider post distribution monitoring)? (X)

<sup>7</sup> Size of ration and composition of food basket have the potential to increase threats to recipients. Timing of distributions, distance between distribution points and home all have the potential to increase threats to recipients. High concentration of people, or one gender, have the potential to increase threats to recipients. WFP ration cards can evidence nationality and residency status and entitlements for IDPs.

<sup>8</sup> Empowerment, first to maintain a role in deciding on the use and benefits of WFP food assistance and activities. Flow on benefits may include wider involvement in community decision making.



## **Annex 2 – Persons Interviewed**

### **WFP Somalia Country Office, Nairobi**

#### **WFP**

Robert Hauser	Country Director
Leo van der Velden	Deputy Country Director
El Rasheed H. Hammad	Program Co-ordinator
Fabrizio Andreuzzi	Program Officer
Maulid Warfa	Assistant Program Officer
Said Warsame Hersi	Information Officer
Anab Mohamed	Finance Assistant
Hibo A. Mohamed	HR/Admin Assistant
Ajan Hassan	Finance Assistant
Yacub Mohamed	Finance Assistant
Omar Hassan Ali	Logistics Assistant
Mukhtar A. Isse	Program Assistant

#### **Other**

Ginevra Lettizia	Head of Development Coop Office, Cooperazione Italiana
Vittorio Cagnolati	Somali Program Advisor, Cooperazione Italiana
Nancy Estes	Food For Peace Officer, USAID
Mitch Kirby	Senior Regional Education Advisor, USAID
Nicholas Haan	Chief Technical Advisor, FSAU
Joe Gordon	Chief of Security, UNDP
Philippe Lazzarini	Head of Office, UNOCHA
Amanda Dilorenzo	Information Officer, UNOCHA
Thierry Grobet	Deputy Head of Somalia Delegation, ICRC
Christian Bosson	Relief Co-ordinator of Somalia Delegation, ICRC
Yves Degiacomi	Water&Habitat Coordinator of Somalia Delegation, ICRC
Elballa Hagona	Country Director, UNDP
Dirk Boberg	AR Representative, UNDP
Graham Farmer	Officer in Charge for Somalia, FAO
Abdi Ali Rhighe	Executive Director, Afrique INGO
John Miskell	Team Leader, CARE INGO
Walter Mwasa	Programme Officer, CARE INGO
Dawer Mohamed	Food Security Sector Coordinator, CARE INGO
Engorok Obui	Programme Officer, CARE, INGO
Yuko Yomeda	Sector Coordinator, CARE, INGO
El Khidder	Country Director, Save the Children UK INGO



### **Somalia, South Central Zone (SCZ), Wajid**

#### **WFP**

Ibrahim Conte	Head of Sub Office
Isaak Sheikh	Program Assistant
Mohamed S. Ahmed	Logistics Assistant
Mohamed Sherif	Program Assistant
Idris Osman	OIC, Mogadishu
Rashid Abdullahi	Food Monitor

#### **Other**

S. Ibrahim & 5 ladies	Wajid Women Organization
Abdicru Sagh	Wiley Village Health Post Chief
Jussuf Mohamad	Wajid Representative, UNOCHA
Abdulkadir Dhalib	Nutrition Monitor, UNICEF
Abdi Razak Osman	National Officer, UNICEF
Ali Noor Mohammed	Team Leader, IMC INGO
Ali Abdurahman	Feeding Centre Supervisor, MSF INGO
Mohammed Ahmed	Chairman of community Berkhad in Godato
Zainab Mohammed	Chairperson of Godato women's group for the CCR

### **Somaliland, North West Region**

#### **WFP**

Jean-Pierre Mambounou	HSO Hargeisa (Somaliland, Puntland)
Musa Warsame	Program Officer

#### **Other**

Wafaa E. Saeed	HSO UNDP Hargeisa
Sadia Muse Ahmed	Country Representative, PENHA INGO
Ahmed M. Mohamoud	Liaison Officer (TA), ECHO
Hassan Mohamoud	Minster of Education, Hargeisa
Dr Abdi Abdullahi	TB Coordinator, Ministry of Health
Mohammed Sheik	Nutrition Officer, UNICEF Hargeisa
Mahimbo Mdoe	Resident Programme Officer, UNICEF Hargeisa
Abdirahman Aideed	Pastoral Coordinator, Oxfam GB INGO
Ahmed Osman	Emergency Coordinator, Oxfam GB INGO
Mahdi Yusuf Derie	Program Officer, Oxfam GB INGO
Ketil Vaas	Education Manager, NRC INGO
Jama Yasin Ibrahim	Progrgam Manager, NRC INGO



**Puntland, North East Region**

**WFP**

Christopher Swaka

OIC Bossasso and Garowe

**Other**

Aminata E. Mansaray

Head of Office Garowe, UNOCHA

Francis O. Olayiwola

Head of Field Office Garowe, UNHCR

Roger Balamujura

Associate Protection Officer, UNHCR

Dr. Hashim Suleyman

Officer in Charge Garowe, WHO

Alhaji Bah

Resident Project Officer, UNICEF Bossaso



### Annex 3 – Documents Reviewed

- WFP. *Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation – Somalia 10191.00*. WFP/EB.3/2002/9-B/6. Rome
- WFP. *Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation – Somalia 6073.00*. WFP/EB.1/99/7-A/3. Rome
- WFP. *Summary of Evaluation of Recommendations and management Response – Somalia PRRO 6073.00*. WFP/EB.1/2002/INF/11. Rome
- Degan Ali, Fanta Toure and Tilleke Kiewied. *Cash relief in a contested area – Lessons from Somalia*. Humanitarian Practice Group Network Paper Number 50, London. 2005
- WFP. *Standardized Project Report 2003 – Somalia – Project 10191.00*
- WFP. *Standardized Project Report 2004 – Somalia – Project 10191.00*
- WFP Hargeisa. *Brief on Somaliland and program overview*. June 2005
- WFP. *Summary Report of the Evaluation of Somalia PRRO 6073.00* WFP/EB.1/2002/5/4
- WFP Merka Office, Lower Shabelle Region, *General Brief Overview Operations in Lower Shabelle* January – December 2004
- *Consolidates Appeals Process (CAP) Somalia 2005* United Nations
- *Consolidates Appeals Process (CAP) Projects Somalia 2005* United Nations
- *Consolidates Appeals Process (CAP) Somalia 2004* United Nations
- Paul Harvey. *Cash and Vouchers in emergencies*. Humanitarian Policy Group Discussion paper February 2005
- WFP *Brief on WFP activities in Somalia for USAID* 29 January 2004
- WFP *Somalia Country Office Results Based Management Monitoring Toolkit*
- FSAU *Monthly Nutrition Update* March 2005
- WFP and *Food based Safety Nets: Concepts, Experiences and Future Programming Opportunities*. WFP/EB.3/2004/4-A
- Norwegian Refugee Council, *Survey Report State House Park, Temporary Settlement for IDPS/Returnees/Refugees Hargeisa*, Somaliland Dec. 2004/Jan. 2005
- WFP *School Feeding Programme Expansion Report – Mainly for Togdheer Region (2<sup>nd</sup> phase Sept/Oct, 2004)*
- WFP *Project Summary, Assistance to Primary Education – Pilot Project SF Project Summary Rev 17* June
- WFP *School Feeding Programme For Somalia*. Appraisal report for Puntland, August 2004
- WFP *School Feeding Survey in Bay and Bakol Regions*
- WFP *Assistance to Primary Education. School Feeding Programme. Pilot Activity in Somaliland. 2003-2004. Review 18 May – 1 June 2004. Draft Report*
- WFP *Internal School Feeding Programme Review for Somaliland, 24-29<sup>th</sup> May 2004, Hargeisa*
- WFP *Budget Revision No.01 for Somalia PRRO 10191.0, 18.09.03*



### Annex 4 – Evaluation Program

Day	Date	Time	Activity	Participants
Sat	18 June	12:10 pm	Arrival of Evaluation Team	Evaluation Team
Sun	19 June		Open for the Team to decide any activity	
Mon	20 June	08:00	Pickup from the hotel to office	Evaluation Team
		08:30 – 10:00	Meeting with DCD	Team, Elrashid, Leo
		10:00 – 11:00	Security Briefing at UNDP – Somalia	Evaluation Team
		11:00 – 12:00	Security Briefing at UNDP - Kenya	
		13:00 – 14:00	Lunch, meeting with CO staff	
		14:30 – 15:30	Meeting with ICRC	Evaluation Team
		15:30 – 17:30	Review and finalize the Evaluation TOR/Travel Plan	Eval. Team, Programme Staff ,UNCAS
		Drop to Hotel		
Tue	21 June	08:30 – 10:30	Meeting with ICRC	Egon, Romain
		11:00 – 16:30	Brainstorming session with CO Programme staff, necessary data/material/file collection for review	Evaluation Team, CO Programme staff (JP, Conteh & Swaka)
Wed	22 June	09:00 – 10:00	Meeting with OCHA	Eval. Team
		10:30 – 11:30	Meeting with FSAU	Eval. Team
		13:00 – 14:00	Lunch, meeting with CO staff	
		14:00 – 16:00	Meeting with USAID	Eval. Team
		16:00 – 18:00	Italian Embassy technical Cooperation Unit	Eval. Team
Thur	23 June	08:00 – 09:00	Discussion at Office based on previous day meeting	Eval. Team
		10:00 – 11:50	Meeting with FAO	Eval. Team
		13:00 – 14:00	Lunch, meeting with CO staff	
		14:00 – 15:00	Meeting with UNDP	Eval. Team
		16:00 – 17:00	Meeting with Somali NGO (AFRIC)	Eval. Team
Fri	24 June	08:30 – 14:00	Meeting with national program staff	Romain, Egon, Greg
		09:30 – 11:00	Meeting with CARE, collecting necessary documents	Stephanie
		11.15 – 13.00	Meeting with SC (UK)	Stephanie
		15:00 – 18:00	Team preparation	
Sat	25 June	09.00-17.00	Planning Meeting for Team	Eval. team
Sun	26 June	05:00	Pickup from Hotel, Travel to Wajid (Overnight at WFP Guest House)	
		11:00	Arrival at Wajid Office, Security briefing	
		13:00 – 14:00	Lunch at Wajid Guest House	
		14:00 – 16:30	Meeting with District Commissioner Meeting with Wajid Women's group Meeting with Wajid Staff, document collection/review	Eval. team
Mon	27 June	08:00 – 17:30	Visit Wiley village area projects, FFW, health center, road, sites on the way	Egon, Greg
		08:00 – 11:00	Travel to Isdhort to visit distribution of targeted feeding programme	Stephanie, Romain
		11:30 – 14:00	Travel to Godato to visit WFP supported Berkhad	Stephanie, Romain
		14:30 – 16:30	Visit the Godatos women's group CCR	Stephanie, Romain
		17:00 – 18:00	Meeting with the UNICEF National Officer in Wajid	Stephanie, Romain





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Day	Date	Time	Activity	Participants
Tue	28 June	08:00 – 09:00	Visit to the WFP supported Wajid nursery	Eval. Team
		09:30 – 10:30	Visit to Boothe – WFP supported returnee resettlement	Eval. Team
		10:45 – 11:30	Visit to WFP supported FFW on Zimbabwe road	Stephanie, Egon
		11:45 – 13:00	Visit to Maikon City – WFP supported resettlement for returnees	Stephanie, Egon
		14:00 – 15:00	Meeting with World Vision Health Officer Wajid	Stephanie, Egon
		15:00 – 16:00	Meeting with WVI health officer, OCHA OIC Meeting with UNOCHA Wajid	Egon Stephanie
		16:00 – 17:00	Meeting with ACF Wajid	Stephanie
		17:00 – 18:00	Meeting with FSAU Wajid	Stephanie, Greg
		18:00 – 19:00	Meeting with WFO OIC Mogadishu	Stephanie, Greg, Egon
Wed	29 June	08:00 – 12:00	Travel to Hargeisa	Eval. team
		14:00 – 17:00	Meeting with WFP staff	Eval. Team
Thur	30 June	08:00 – 18:00	Travel and projects on way to Burao	Romain Egon
		08:00 – 09:00	Meeting with MoE	Stephanie, Greg
		09:00 – 11:00	Visit the TB treatment center, Hargeisa	Stephanie, Greg
		11:00 – 12:00	Visit the orphanage, Hargeisa	Stephanie, Greg
		12:00 – 13:00	Visit the MoP, Hargeisa	Stephanie, Greg
		14:00 – 17:30	Travel to Berbera visit Port and WFP stores	Stephanie, Greg
Fri	01 July	08:00 – 19:00	Visit projects villages around Buraro	Egon, Romain
		09:00 – 11:00	Visit salt production	Stephanie, Greg
		12:30 – 15:30	Return to Hargeisa	
Sat	02 July	08:00 – 18:00	Visit projects villages and return to Hargeisa	Egon Romain
		08:00 – 09:00	Meeting with UNICEF, Hargeisa	Stephanie, Greg
		09:15 – 10:30	Meeting with Oxfam GB, Hargeisa	Stephanie, Greg
		10:45 – 12:00	Meeting with HAVOYCO	Stephanie, Greg
		12:00 – 13:00	Meeting with FSAU, Hargeisa	Stephanie, Greg
		15:00 – 16:30	Meeting with NRC, Hargeisa	Stephanie, Greg
Sun	03 July	08:00 – 18:00	Meetings with EC, Panha, OCHA	Egon, Romain
		12:00 – 16:00	Travel to Bossaso	Eval. Team
		16:00 – 17:30	Meeting with WFP staff at the office	Eval. Team
Mon	04 July	08:00 – 18:00	Travel to Garrowe, projects on the way	Egon, Romain Greg
		08:00 – 17:00	Travel to Hafun, Tsunami assignment	Stephanie
Tue	05 July	08:00 – 18:00	Meeting with WHO, UNHCR, WFP staff, visit projects, camps and communities	Egon, Romain, Greg
		09:00 – 11:00	Visit to IDP camps	Stephanie
		11:30 – 13:00	Visit to Flood protection	Stephanie
		14:00 – 18:00	Finalize Tsunami document	Stephanie
Wed	06 July	08:00 – 18:00	Visit camps and return to Bossasso, meeting with WFP staff	Egon, Romain, Greg
		09:00 – 11:00	Visit WFP supported fruit/veg farms Karin	Stephanie
		14:00 – 15:00	Meeting with UNICEF Bossaso	Stephanie
Thur	07 July	08:00 – 11:00	Debriefing with Bossasso WFP	
		12:00 – 18:00	Back to Nairobi from Bossaso by UNCAS via Hargeisa	Eval. Team
Fri	08 July	08:00	Pickup from the hotel to office	
			Team work, discussion on reports/AM	Eval. Team
Sat/Sun	09/10 July		Team preparation/AM	
Mon	11 July	08:00 – 16:30	Preparation/completion for debriefing sessions	Eval. Team



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<b>Day</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Time</b>	<b>Activity</b>	<b>Participants</b>
Tue	12 July	09:30 – 14:00	Debriefing in Nairobi with CO staff	Eval. Team
			Team work/AM	Eval. Team
Wed	13 July	08:00 – 18:00	Team work to discuss issues related to report writing	Eval. Team
Thur	14 July	01:00	Return travel of the Evaluation Team	