



# World Food Programme

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**A Report Commissioned by the  
Office of Evaluation**



*Review of the Mid-Term PRRO  
Activities Enabling Livelihood Protection  
and Promotion in Ethiopia*

*Rome, August 2007*

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# Acknowledgement

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Responsibility for the opinions expressed in this report rests solely with the authors. Publication of this document does not imply endorsement by WFP of the opinions expressed.

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# Acronyms

ABM	Action Based Monitoring
ACF	Action Contre La Faim
APL	Action Plan
ART	Anti-Retro Viral Treatment
ARV	Anti-RetroViral
BMI	Body Mass Index
CBPWD	Community-based Participatory Watershed Development
CBWM	Community Based Water Management
CC	Community Conversations
COMPAS	Commodity Tracking System
CP	Country Programme
CSB	Corn Soy Blend
CSI	Child Survival Initiative
CVI	Chronic Vulnerability Index
DA	District Agency
DHS	Demographic and Health Survey
DPPA/B	Disaster Preparedness and Prevention Agency/Bureau
EB	Executive Board
EGS	Employment Generation Scheme
EFSR	Emergency Food Security Reserve
EMSAP II	Ethiopian Multi-Sectoral HIV/AIDS Project
ENCU	Emergency Nutrition Coordination Unit
EWVG	Early Warning Working Group
FAUIS	Food Aid Utilisation and Impact Survey
FDC	Food Distribution Centre
FDP	Food Distribution Point
FFP	Food for Peach
FFW	Food For Work
FM	Field Monitor
FMoH	Federal Ministry of Health
FSCB	Food Security Coordination Bureau
FSCDO	Food Security Coordination and Disaster Prevention Office
FTC	Farmer Training Centre
GAM	Global Acute Malnutrition
GFD	General Food Distribution
GoE	Government of Ethiopia
HAPCO	HIV/AIDS Prevention and Control Office
HBC	Home Based Care
HEA	Household Economy Approach
HEP	Health Extension Package
IFPRI	International Food Policy Research Institute
IGA	Income Generation Activities
INGOs	International Non Government Organisations



ISAPSO	Integrated Services for AIDS Prevention and Support Organisation
ITN	Insecticide Treated Bed Nets
ITSH	Internal Transport, Storage and Handling
JRIS	Joint Review and Implementation Support Mission
LIPA	Labour Intensive Productive Assets
LIU	Livelihood Integration Unit
LLPPA	Local Level Participatory Planning Approach
MERET	Managing Environmental Resources to Enable Transitions
MTE	Mid Term Evaluation
MUAC	Mid Upper Arm Circumference
NCFS	New Coalition for Food Security
NGOs	Non Governmental Organisations
NRM	Natural Resource Management
NSP	Nutrition Surveillance Programme
ODOC	Other Direct Operational Costs
OEDE	WFP Office of Evaluation
OFSP	Other Food Security Programmes
OVC	Orphans and Vulnerable Children
PASDEP	Programme for Accelerated and Sustainable Development to End Poverty
PCDP	Pastoral Community Development Project
PDM	Post-Distribution Monitoring
PEPFAR	Presidential Emergency Plan for AIDS Reduction
PIM	Project Implementation Manual
PLWHA	People Living with HIV/AIDS
PMTCT	Prevention of Mother to Child Transfer
PRRO	Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation
PSNP	Productive Safety Net Programme
PTF	Pastoral Task Force
PW	Public Works
OEDE	WFP Office of Evaluation
P & LW	Pregnant and Lactating Women
RAM	Resource Allocation Model
RRT	Rapid Response Team
SAM	Severe Acute Malnutrition
SC UK	Save the Children UK
SDPRP	Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Programme
SFP	Supplementary Feeding Programme
SNNPR	Southern Nations Nationalities Peoples Region
SO	Sub-Office
SWOT	Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats
TSF/EOS	Targeted Supplementary Feeding/Extended Outreach Strategy
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
USAID	United States Aid for International Development
VAM	Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping
VCT	Voluntary Counselling and Testing



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# Executive Summary

PRRO 10362 was designed to address the food needs of 3.8 million beneficiaries (relief 1.7 million, recovery 2.1 million) over the period 1 Jan 2005 to 31 December 2007. The total proposed food tonnage was 1.4M metric tonnes, and the total cost to WFP was estimated at \$780M.

The four main programme components are:

- A relief programme comprising general food distribution (GFD) and Food for Work (FFW) for food-insecure communities affected by severe, unpredictable food shortages;
- Labour-intensive productive assets (LIPAs), and improved FFA in districts where food insecurity is predictable as part of the GoE Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP)
- Targeted Supplementary Feeding in conjunction with the GoE EOS programme
- Urban HIV feeding programme

Field work for this MTE took place between October 27<sup>th</sup> and December 14<sup>th</sup> in three phases. Six regions were visited; Afar, Amhara, Tigray, Oromiya, SNNPR, Somali region and Gombalcha. Interviews with GoE, UN and INGO/NGO agency staff were conducted in 27 woredas and over 50 kebeles. Beneficiary interviews were conducted wherever possible.

## **WFP role and achievements in supporting GoE Relief Programming:**

WFP provided a significant proportion of food commodities for relief programming during 2005 and 2006 (69% in 2005 and over 75% in 2006) and have been able to deliver food on time to DPPA warehouses with barely any disruptions to the pipeline. WFP have been extensively involved in both monitoring and capacity building – largely through the work of field monitors who work closely with government counterparts (DPPA) at regional and woreda level and travel extensively in the field in order to visit the large number of FDPs.

However, in general, WFP lack sufficient resources to implement the level of capacity building and support needed. This stems largely from the way capacity building funds are generated, e.g. ODOC, and the limited amounts of ODOC available.

The two major implementation problems of the relief component of PRRO 10362 have been distribution in areas of insecurity and targeting – especially amongst pastoral communities. .

## **WFP role and achievements in supporting GoE Productive Safety Net Programme:**

The GoE PSNP represent a significant improvement over previous relief programming and is a positive step towards finding long term solutions to Ethiopia's food insecurity. The PSNP reached 4.83 million chronically food insecure beneficiaries in 2005. In 2006 coverage increased to approximately 7.2 million beneficiaries with the numbers receiving cash peaking at 4.5 million. .





WFP have been instrumental in the significant achievements of the programme to date through provision of essential food resources and on-going contribution to PSNP policy debates and programme development. The introduction and development of Community Based Participatory Watershed Development (CBPWD) as a core component of the PSNP is one of the single biggest design influences that WFP has had on the PSNP. WFP formulation of the relevant parts of the PIM, of the participatory planning process and of the technical guidelines was an enormous undertaking. WFP Ethiopia also deserves congratulation on their efforts to actively promote and support the use of cash over food in the PSNP and in responding rapidly to changing needs as Woredas shifted from cash to food transfers.

PRRO 10362 has already had considerable inputs in developing and facilitating training courses for Regional and Woreda government staff related to CBPWD while WFP Field Monitors add significant value to PSNP by directly supporting implementation at Woreda and kebele level.. There are a number of challenges ahead for the PSNP which WFP could help address.

- The current decision making process for allocating cash or food (or a combination of both) to woredas remains somewhat ad hoc..
- There are concerns that the public works will be unable to “catalyze environmental transformation’ as the approach and guidelines still remain too output and resource driven while there is inherent tension between conditionality and entitlement in the programme.
- Where traditional pastoralism is practiced the application of the current targeting system promotes significant inclusion and exclusion errors and massive dilution effects.
- Graduation requires effective linkages and integration between the PSNP and Other Food Security Programmes (OFSP) as well as a range of additional interventions and ‘enabling processes’. These programmes and enabling processes are not adequately in place
- GoE lacks capacity to fully implement many elements of the PSNP

Priority evaluation recommendations for the relief and PSNP components of the PRRO are:

### *Relief*

*WFP should* advocate for clearer conceptual clarity and frameworks around the emergency food security assessment process

WFP should continuously monitor in-country capacity to implement a large-scale food relief programme in the future as the PSNP embeds and as the relief case loads diminishes.

### *PSNP*

WFP should actively contribute to the development of a decision making framework that will allow calculation of optimal cash/food wages for PSNP to fit with local Woreda conditions.

WFP should instigate/undertake a number of action-research and pilot initiatives in partnership with other agencies to address issues around quality and conditionality of the public works programmes. A number of design modifications to the current PW guidelines are also recommended.

WFP should explore opportunities to contribute usefully to the current debate on graduation, e.g. through work with LIU and using MERET PLUS to pilot approaches.



WFP should also monitor and assess linkages with other food security programmes and the degree to which wider enabling forces that allow graduation are in place.

*Cross-cutting recommendations (for PSNP and Relief modalities)*

WFP must continue to work with pastoral communities, Government and other partners, e.g. PTF, to start developing and field testing more appropriate targeting systems for pastoralist areas.

WFP should formalise mechanisms which ensure that WFP sub-offices are informed when and where food distributions are taking place and to work more closely with the DPPA Information Centre to strengthen the utility of the DPPA website.

WFP could also be doing more to monitor and analyse processes and outcomes using VAM Unit and the FMs. For example, getting FMs more focussed on impact assessment through ABM and becoming more programme rather than food focussed.

WFP and GOE should define together the benchmarks that need to be reached in terms of improved DPPA/FSCB performance on transparent, accountable and timely food reporting to allow WFP to start phasing out of this role.

WFP must seek additional funding to strengthen capacity building functions.

Specific components of a more complete CB contribution would include:

- Helping to make the PIM more user-friendly.
- Supporting GoE woreda staff with vehicles for monitoring
- Assisting each zone/even Woreda to design a PSNP asset creation programme that allows:
  - optimal timing of labour intensive activities
  - optimal cash-food mix
  - optimal timing of cash/food distributions

## **EOS/TSF**

The TSF component of the programme was set up largely to address the enormous scale of moderate malnutrition in Ethiopia where approximately one million children under five are wasted and 4.7 million are underweight. While the objectives of the TSF are typical of traditional supplementary feeding (SFP) programmes, the TSF is not a standard SFP.

The achievements of the TSF in a relatively short space of time have been impressive.

Over a one and half year period the TSF has expanded from just one region and 10 woredas in April 2004 to 264 woredas in 10 regions by the end of 2006. The programme now delivers a targeted food supplement at 2, 246 food distribution centres (FDCs) through a network of 4, 492 trained Food Distribution Agents (FDAs).. By November 2006, approximately 400, 000 children and 190,000 pregnant and lactating women received two distributions of the food supplement i.e. a total of six month supplementary food.

Considerable resources have been invested in TSF staff training at all levels. In addition, the programme provides a 'minimum package' for the regions which includes cars, motorbikes and computers. In 2006, 54% of all TSF woredas received the minimum package



Another significant achievement has been the substantial network of highly capable trained local women (FDAs) created for overseeing all aspects of the food distribution and for providing nutrition education. In addition, WFP has made considerable efforts to strengthen programme implementation – largely through operational research/pilot studies. WFP have also developed a monitoring system especially for the TSF as part of the ABM.

### *Main Challenges*

Currently, there is insufficient evidence that the TSF component is having a positive impact on nutritional status of children enrolled in the programme and no clearly articulated exit strategy for the TSF component although the overall EOS/TSF programme is expected to phase out as the national Health Extension Programme (HEP) expands.

There is also a lack of clarity regarding the role of traditional emergency SFPs in the context of the EOS/TSF.

### *Key recommendations include*

WFP must conduct robust nutritional impact and efficacy assessment with key partners and donors involved in the study design to ensure shared objectives and ownership of the results. The study should either involve case control groups or the monitoring of growth performance of a cohort of children and calculation of the percentage of children that recover, default or die. Data on coverage must also be assessed. If impact and efficacy are demonstrated there must be discussions with key stakeholders to determine clear programme targets for the future including exit criteria.

The role of FDAs in EOS screening should be formalised as this will strengthen the linkages between EOS and create opportunities for FDAs to become a bridge to the HEP.

### **Urban nutrition/HIV programme**

Implementation of this programme in fourteen towns began in August/September 2006. The scale up from only four towns in the CP was a substantial undertaking. All implementing partners highlighted the substantial need for this programme and how successfully it was being delivered..

However, targeting has been problematic. Quotas set for each town and beneficiary category have (with the exception of PMTCT) been filled quickly and implementing partners have been forced to make difficult decisions about who to include and who to exclude.

Another major issue is the lack of Income Generation Activities (IGA) activities available to beneficiaries and resulting difficulties of graduation and exit. .

### *Recommendation*

WFP must continue exploring with other implementing partners links between IGA/food security programming and HIV/food aid programming.

WFP should also explore opportunities to implement urban agricultural and FFW programmes as well as expanding the urban programme to rural areas and linking these to PSNP activities as ARV treatment is rolled out into rural areas. .



## **Over-arching conclusions on PRRO 10362.0**

PRRO 10362.0 is one of WFP's largest current programmes. The diversity, innovation and overall objectives are highly ambitious but highly relevant to the long-standing food security and nutrition problems in Ethiopia.

While WFP has limited room for manoeuvre to increase the impact of PRRO 10362.0 there is considerable scope for greater capacity building of government, 'smarter' monitoring/impact assessment and, where necessary, advocacy.



## **1 Introduction and background**

### **1.1 Development of PRRO**

1. In 2003 the Government of Ethiopia, its principal bilateral donors, UN agencies and NGOs agreed to combine their food security efforts in Ethiopia into a ‘New Coalition for Food Security’ (NCFS). The goal of the NCFS was, by 2008, to achieve food security for 5-6 M chronically food-insecure people, and to significantly improve food security for 10 M others prone to food insecurity.

2. In October 2004 the Executive Board of the U.N. World Food Programme (WFP) approved Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO) 10362.0 elements of which were planned as one of WFP’s contribution to the NCFS. PRRO 10362 was originally intended to address the food needs of 3.8 million beneficiaries (relief 1.7 million, recovery 2.1 million) over the period 1 Jan 2005 through 31 December 2007. The total proposed food tonnage was 1.4M metric tonnes, and the total cost to WFP was estimated at \$780M.

3. Due to critical developments subsequent to the drafting of the PRRO, the EB Secretariat asked WFP Ethiopia to revisit several issues and present revisions for approval at the EB meeting in early 2005. WFP clarified its commitment to the following issues in the Updated Annex<sup>1</sup>, which was approved by the Executive Board (EB) in early 2005:

- deliberate transition from relief to productive investment
- strong preference for local purchase
- shift from in-kind food transfers to cash grants
- extensive capacity-building,
- integration of safety nets with other food security programmes

4. The implementation of PRRO 10362 began in January 2005 although implementation of the safety net component was later than expected due to delays in the start-up of the entire PSNP.. [The present phase of the programme is due to end in Dec 2007). As there was likely to be strong interest for the activity to continue after that date, the WFP Office of Evaluation (OEDE) and the WFP Country Office in Ethiopia agreed that the former would lead an external evaluation of PRRO 10362.0 in the fourth quarter of 2006, with the results to be presented to the annual session of the WFP Executive Board in June 2007.

### **1.2 WFP interventions under PRRO 10362.0**

5. As with all WFP PRROs, Ethiopia PRRO 10362 has a dual nature: relief and recovery. The main objectives of WFP intervention through PRRO 10362 are to (i) save lives, (ii) protect livelihoods in crisis situations and enhance resilience to shocks, (iii) support the improved nutrition and health status of children, mothers and other people at increased risk of vulnerability to food insecurity in Ethiopia.

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<sup>1</sup> PRRO 10362.0 Updated Annex (Mar 05). WFP/EB.1/2005/8-B



6. The main programme components are:

- Protracted relief: general food distribution (GFD) and Food for Work (FFW) for food-insecure communities affected by severe, unpredictable food shortages;
- Recovery component 1: labour-intensive productive assets (LIPAs), and improved FFA in districts where food insecurity is predictable, undertaken by able-bodied beneficiaries in chronically food insecure communities;
- Recovery component 2: targeted supplementary feeding (TSF) for vulnerable children and women.
- Urban HIV nutrition support to those infected and affected by HIV/AIDS

7. General food distributions (GFD) are used to cover food requirements for 3-9 months per year in communities suffering from unexpected shocks resulting in unanticipated food shortages. These interventions are intended to be simple, effective food for work (FFW) activities. Free general rations are permitted for those who are physically unable to work or unable to rely upon family or community assistance or where capacity to organize FFW does not exist.

8. Recovery LIPAs use food rations and participatory planning to engage high-labour inputs to construct assets that will provide ongoing returns in the future. Most projects are aimed at restoring or protecting the natural resource base. This component of the PRRO draws heavily on WFP's experience in the MERET project and was expected to integrate some of the lessons of MERET. The activities are located within the new Government Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) implemented in 2005 to partially replace the emergency appeal system. The PSNP forms a core component of the government's successive poverty reduction strategies; first the Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program (SDPRP) and from 2006, the Program for Accelerated and Sustainable Development to End Poverty (PASDEP)

9. The Targeted Supplementary Feeding programme (TSF) is a radically new programme in Ethiopia involving a partnership between GoE (DPPA and MoH), UNICEF and WFP working within the GoE's framework of Enhanced Outreach Strategy (EOS); UNICEF and GoE regional bureaus of health were to develop and execute the Expanded Outreach System/Child Survival Initiative (EOS/CSI) which involves nutritional screening of children under five and pregnant and lactating women and subsequent referral of those found to be malnourished for supplementary feeding. WFP provides food while UNICEF provides a number of other inputs including vitamin A supplementation, de-worming, ITN distribution, health education, screening for malnutrition and referral to TSF or therapeutic feeding units where available.

10. At the end of 2005, by agreement with the government and major donors, WFP used the budget revision process to transfer the urban HIV/AIDS nutrition support from the CP to the PRRO.10362. HIV/AIDS mainstreaming has always been a part of the PRRO and also continues as part of the CP. There were numerous reasons why this transfer took place. (1) the allocation of programme resources out of overall allocations for development programmes was not considered sufficient to do HIV/AIDS programming justice especially given the GoE declaration of HIV/AIDS as a 'national emergency'; (2) large donors to WFP Ethiopia (eg. USAID) were interested in providing specific funding to enhanced HIV/AIDS activities especially given the roll-out of ART in Ethiopia and the increased recognition of the role of nutrition linked to HIV medication;. Furthermore, the CP Mid-term Review<sup>2</sup> of HIV/AIDS

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<sup>2</sup> World Food Programme 2003-2006 Ethiopia Country Programme Mid-Term Evaluation. 09/09/05



activities indicated that the project had been successful and that WFP should seek additional resources to undertake a phased scale-up of direct food support for infected and affected individuals. Urban HIV/AIDS nutrition support was transferred into the PRRO on 1<sup>st</sup> of March 2006 and the actual scale up commenced in August 2006.

### **1.3 Scope of this evaluation**

11. The evaluation covered all four components of PRRO 10362.0 over the period January 2005 – December 2006. However, the evaluation only addressed the process of scaling up the urban HIV/nutrition programme as a full evaluation of the programme had been conducted as part of the MTE of the CP completed in mid 2005.

The principal objective of the evaluation is to analyse the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of the PRRO 10362 intervention and offer advice on strategic and operational changes that could improve the performance and impact of the intervention over the second half of the PRRO period and potentially beyond, should the activity be extended.

### **1.4 Methodology**

12. The WFP evaluation team comprised five members with collective expertise in relief programming, nutrition, natural resource management, pastoralism and HIV mainstreaming .Two UNICEF consultants with nutritional and epidemiological expertise joined the team for the TSF/EOS component of the evaluation. .

13. Prior to undertaking field work a series of stakeholder interviews were conducted with donor, UN and INGO agency staff in Ethiopia and Rome in order to identify priority evaluation issues for the relief and PSNP components of the PRRO. . Unfortunately, there was insufficient time to set up stakeholder interviews with the Government of Ethiopia. The priority areas identified were;

- Logic, coherence and outcomes of combining relief and PSNP modalities
- Targeting outcomes of PSNP and relief programmes
- Evidence for the appropriateness of food and/or cash as a resource transfer under PSNP
- WFP and GoE monitoring of both programmes
- Outputs of both programmes, e.g. deliveries and quality of public works etc
- Issues around inclusion of pastoralists in relief and PSNP
- WFP capacity building

14. The evaluation questions related to these themes were located within OECD DAC and ALNAP criteria for the evaluation of humanitarian interventions:

- relevance/appropriateness
- connectedness
- effectiveness
- efficiency
- sustainability
- impact

15. For the EOS/TSF component the evaluation team focussed on;

- logic and coherence of the programme



- programme delivery
- output and evidence of outcomes/impact

16. The evaluation of the Urban nutrition/HIV programme focussed upon the experience of scaling up from four to fourteen urban centres.

17. Field work. This was divided into three phases. The first phase (October 27<sup>th</sup> to November 15<sup>th</sup>) focussed on the relief and PSNP elements of the PRRO. The team conducted interviews in Addis with key stakeholders and then visited East Hararghe together in order to develop a common approach to field work. The team then split up into three groups and visited Somali region, Tigray, Amhara, Oromiya and SNNPR regions. Interviews were conducted in over 12 woredas and over 25 kebeles.

18. The second phase of field work involved three WFP consultants and two UNICEF consultants. The focus was on the EOS/TSF programme as well as the urban HIV/nutrition programme. During this phase Afar, Oromiya, Amhara and SNNPR regions were visited

19. The third phase of the field work took place between 20<sup>th</sup> Nov and 2<sup>nd</sup> of Dec. It was undertaken by the pastoralist specialist who visited a number of woredas in Afar region

20. Criteria for selecting field visit sites were based on a mixture of need for stratification and expedience. For example, sites selected for the TSF/EOS component of the evaluation were based on the need to visit both areas where the programme had been operational for over a year and newer programming areas. It was also considered important to visit sites where there had been a recent emergency and resulting need for emergency SFPs. For the relief programme it was important to visit Somali region where most of the current relief beneficiaries are located but also areas where relief and PSNP programming were taking place simultaneously, e.g. East Hararghe. Amhara was selected for the urban HIV/nutrition programme site visit as Barhardir has the highest HIV prevalence rates in Ethiopia. While a certain rationale lay behind selection of all site visits it must be recognised that logistical considerations were also a factor especially given the need to cover many project sites over large distances. Thus, some regions were selected over others on the basis of making flight connections while woreda selection was usually heavily influenced by travel time available to the evaluation team. As a rule most (but not all) woredas visited were within three hours drive from regional capitals.

21. Overall, the evaluation team visited over 50 kebeles, 26 woredas and six regions. At field level, interviews were conducted with a GoE and UN staffs – largely from DPPA, FSCB and Bureau of Health, WFP and UNICEF (mainly WFP field monitors). NGO staff were also interviewed – particularly for the urban HIV/nutrition component of the evaluation. Beneficiary interviews were conducted wherever possible.





## **2 Relief component of WFP PRRO 10362.0:**

### **2.1 Government of Ethiopia Emergency appeals for 2005 and 2006**

22. A Joint Government's and Humanitarian Partners Appeal for 2005 was issued on 23<sup>rd</sup> of December 2004 after a DPPC led needs assessment<sup>3</sup>. The appeal aimed at providing relief support to 2.2 million people affected by the acute emergency situations. On top of this caseload, an additional 933,000 people from Afar and Somali regions were included in the appeal during the first semester of 2005. This largely pastoral population has originally been included in the PSNP but implementation of the programme was postponed as the regions faced critical shortages of food and implementation capacity for the PSNP was not yet in place. Thus, the total beneficiary caseload for relief in the first half of 2005 was 3.1 million people requiring some 398,187 tonnes of food commodities. Substantial non-food requirements were also included in the appeal

23. Reports of increasing acute malnutrition rates and general stress in some areas as well as deteriorating general food security conditions triggered another DPPC led multi-agency assessment in April in eight regions. Based on this an additional 687,470 emergency beneficiaries were identified as requiring food and a flash appeal was released with the emergency caseload peaking in May and June to 3.85 million with the total readjusted food requirement standing at 464,385 MT.

24. The mid-year emergency needs assessment carried out in June/July readjusted number of beneficiaries to a total of 3.35 million people who would require food aid assistance for the rest of the year (August-December). Out of these 471,510 were new beneficiaries in areas where the 'Belg' season failed (Amhara, Oromiya, SNNPR), while beneficiaries in Afar and Somali region continued under emergency food assistance in the second half of 2005. Carry over stocks for relief at the end of 2005 amounted to some 238,034 tones.

25. Overall, donor response was very positive although food availability was a constraint during the first quarter of 2005 as well as October-November due to late confirmation of pledges/arrival of commodities

26. For 2006 the DPPA led Multi-Agency Food Needs Assessment was conducted in three separate arrangements. The first assessment was in areas of the country where cropping is dependent on the meher rains (excluding SNNPR). The second assessment covered agro-pastoral and pastoralist areas of Afar and Somali regions and Borena zone in Oromiya region. The third used a new approach based on household economy and livelihoods based data analysis to assess emergency food needs in SNNPR. The population in need of food assistance was estimated at 2,579, 510 requiring 339, 090 metric tons of food. Sixty nine percent of this population were in the critically affected pastoral and agro pastoral areas of Borena and Bale zones in Oromiya region and Somali and Afar regions while the remaining 31% were from the cropping areas across the country. The food requirement for the pastoral, agro-pastoral and some pocket belg producing areas was only calculated for the first half of the year. This figure was updated in a subsequent assessment – the Belg assessment, which found a mixture of normal to below normal performance in pastoral and agro-pastoral areas. As a consequence a total of 2.8

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<sup>3</sup> A Joint Government and Humanitarian Partners Appeal. December 2004, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia



million people were estimated to need emergency food assistance during the second half of 2006. Out of these 63% were from the pastoral areas of Somali and Afar regions and Borena zone of Oromiya region while the remaining 37% were from cropping areas. The majority of the beneficiaries from the cropping areas were from Oromiya region while the other 33% were from Dire Dawa administration, including the flood victims, and Amhara and SNNPR. The emergency relief intervention was to start in August with a population of 2.8 million diminishing to a minimum of 1.9 million in December 2006.

27. In August 2006 a flash appeal for flooding in response to unusually heavy rains affecting 199,000 people in eight regions of Ethiopia was made. The food needs for this appeal were estimated at 88,159 MT although this was immediately corrected to 10,178 MT of food as of August 2006. The appeal also identified health, water, seed, temporary shelter, livestock health and search and rescue needs. In November, The Government issues a second Flash Flood Appeal for Somali region for a total of US\$

7,006,063 to meet emergency non-food requirements as well as medium-term

rehabilitation needs for the flood affected areas of the region, with non-food US\$

6,326,164 and medium-term rehabilitation US\$ 679,899. The food needs for the flood victims for three months, estimated at 19,820 MT, was available and could be covered by the DPPA with existing relief resources or regular programs, thus food costs were not included.

28. According to the SNNPR needs assessment based on the HEA approach a total of 521,000 people were identified as adversely affected by weather conditions during the meher season and in need of emergency relief during the first half of 2006. This figure was on top of the chronically food insecure population estimated at 760,500 and planned to be covered by the PSNP. The assessment also recommended that 247,000 vulnerable people be closely monitored in order to protect them from further deterioration.

29. Out of the total food requirement of 600,042 tons for 2005 contributions from WFP allowed 412,172 tons or 69% of the overall national requirements to be met. In 2006, the overall relief food requirements were 507,600 tons of which 216,623 were carried over from 2005. Dispatches, however, were well below the requirements with 263,000 tons dispatched from the DPPA, out of which about 196,000 tons (or 75% of the total) were made available through WFP's contributions.

## **2.2 Role of WFP in relief programming**

30. WFP provides a significant proportion of food aid resources for government relief programming. However, relatively successful crop years and the introduction of the PSNP in 2005 have seen a dramatic decline in relief food tonnages during 2005 and 2006. During this period WFP have successfully resourced food aid for government relief programming and have delivered pledged food aid to DPPA warehouses on time. In addition to this substantial contribution to the food aid response WFP have supported government through involvement in early warning, needs assessment, monitoring and capacity building (see sections 2.3). The main difficulties with relief programming in 2005 and 2006 have been with respect to deliveries at extended delivery points and subsequent targeting – especially in pastoral areas. However, WFP have limited mandate and room for manoeuvre to improve the government controlled distribution system other than through supporting government monitoring, capacity building (of government) and advocacy (where needed). WFP have been fully engaged in these areas and



recommendations below mainly serve to support these ongoing WFP activities and to suggest areas where focus should either be intensified or developed.

### **2.3 Early Warning and Needs Assessment:**

31. In Ethiopia information systems for early warning (EW) and needs assessment (NA) have evolved and adapted over many years. There are also a number of new initiatives in different regions of the country currently being undertaken.

32. WFP's role in EW and NA can be categorised under three main headings:

- Involvement in the national EW Working (EWWG) Group and sub-group on methodology
- Work of WFP's VAM Unit
- Support to assessment missions at regional level

33. The Emergency Food Needs Assessment (EFNA) process in Ethiopia is organised through the EWWG which is chaired by DPPA<sup>4</sup> and has FEWS NET as its Deputy Chair while WFP is the Secretary. With the support of OCHA, WFP as the secretary is tasked with compiling information from the monthly meetings on the current situation and preparing short reports on the 'risks and concerns'. The report is to be posted on the EWWG website. . The EWWG has various subgroups. The Methodology sub-group is the forum through which methodological issues are raised and discussed. WFP is also a core member of this group.

34. There are four government-led, multi-agency assessments carried out each year. The main assessment takes place in late November/early December after the main rains (meher). An assessment after the smaller belg rains is also common, and mid-season assessments may also take place. The main assessment typically takes 20 days and involves up to 20 teams of several people with contributions from government ministries, NGOs, UN organisations and donors. The nationally agreed checklists and guidelines include questions on rainfall, crop production, pasture and livestock production, water conditions and markets. Assessment teams obtain quantitative information from the Woredas on needy population (as estimated by Woreda Bureaus prior to deployment of Federal level teams) on crop production and area planted as well as prices. Following discussions and field work, the team develops a qualitative rating of (1-5) on current conditions for each of seven income sources (crop production, livestock production, wage labor, petty trade, petty commodity production, wild food and remittances). A final rating for the woreda as a whole is calculated as a weighted average of the seven individual ratings. In order to calculate needs (beneficiary numbers and duration of support) team members compare the current woreda rating with previous years ratings and refer to historical data on beneficiary numbers and food aid distributed.

35. Teams then return to regional level and report on number of beneficiaries. These are further negotiated at regional level. These figures are then referred back up to federal level where final decisions on numbers for the appeal are made at the National Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Committee level, chaired by the Deputy Prime-minister. It is not unusual for the beneficiary figures decided upon at Federal level to be less than those recommended by regional DPPB

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<sup>4</sup> DPPA was formerly known as the DPPC.



36. There has been much criticism of this system in recent years<sup>5</sup> although a key strength is recognised to be the involvement of a wide range of stakeholders from virtually all levels of government as well as international actors.

In more recent years, (from 2000 onwards), the methodology sub-group of the EWWG has been through a highly collaborative and constructive period of discussion, problem identification and piloting of new methods.

37. Recent methodological developments include introduction of a livelihoods based EWS in SNNPR where, beginning in 2005, seasonal assessments have been carried out using the HEA approach. This method provides exact figures of beneficiaries and also identifies expenditure gaps and non-food needs. Also, the approach, unlike previous systems, is able to determine root crop contributions to food. This is vital as root crops are such an important component of the SNNPR agro-economy, SNNPR is the only area that has moved away from the traditional needs assessment approach. Seasonal monitoring is key in SNNPR as the hunger season ends (due to sweat potato crop) as the Belg assessment begins.

38. Recently, a three year pilot project has been implemented to establish a livelihood integration unit (LIU) within DPPA. This programme has a strong capacity building component and emphasis on linking livelihood baselines with early warning. The LIU is also developing a non-food assessment approach with other line ministries. One of the key aims of the unit is to develop national standard for livelihoods assessment in Ethiopia. The LIU focus is on cropping areas but there may be a secondment by SC UK to focus on pastoralists. The LIU is identifying key parameters based on baseline work, e.g. variables that contribute more than 10% to food and income source. LIU then hopes to link monitoring of these parameters to the baseline so that monitoring in each woreda focuses on key woreda-specific parameters. .

39. Other current EW and NA initiatives include; commissioning of SC UK by the Pastoral Development Community Project (World Bank funded) to develop an early warning system for pastoral regions of the country, and the development of a nutrition information system through the EOS. It is hoped by some that the EOS will replace the SC UK sentinel site based Nutrition Surveillance Programm which operated in many drought prone areas of Ethiopia from the late 1970s to 1998 and provided invaluable and much used information on nutritional trends<sup>6</sup> (see section 8.1-8.4).

40. The existence of the EWWG and the Methodology sub-group, particularly between 2000-3 has been instrumental in opening up the EFNA to critical review and piloting new methods.

41. Limitations of the current EFNA process as identified by the Methodology group include;

- The fact that there is no single way to estimate beneficiary needs from the qualitative woreda vulnerability ratings so that the process is too subjective
- The reliance on historical quantities of assistance as a reference point, rather than determining absolute current needs
- The lack of linkages between the needs assessment and official baseline and monthly monitoring data

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5 ODI report (2006)

6 Dolan.C, Watson.F and Shoham. J (2006): A review of the NSP in Ethiopia. SC UK



- The timing of the assessment in the pre-harvest period, when crop and livestock production for the following period may not yet be clear
- The focus on crop production at the expense of other food and cash income sources.

42. The absence of a clear framework means that the teams are forced to negotiate around general information and perceptions in order to arrive at number of beneficiaries and food aid needs. While qualitative judgement and negotiations are not intrinsically a problem and may well tease out local knowledge from lower level government officials the problem is that information is not organised through a clear conceptual framework and grounded in evidence from the field so that the process is ultimately based on very little but a few individuals personal perceptions.

43. Arguably, matters have been confused further by the advent of the PSNP and the method of determining beneficiaries for this programme. It has been suggested by many key informants during the course of the evaluation that the relief programme simply 'mops up' those who cannot get onto the PSNP. The inter-connection and fluidity between the relief and PSNP programmes and it's beneficiaries is a theme we will return to in the report and one that plays out at a number of levels (see section 5.3).

44. One of WFP's main contribution to early warning and EFSA capacity within Ethiopia is through the VAM unit. Every WFP sub-office has a VAM focal point selected from the field monitors. VAM serves multiple roles which include the development and strengthening of regional EW capacity in Ethiopia, linking information to decision making and action with in and outside WFP and analysis and timely dissemination of existing early warning data. A key EW activity is the monitoring of hot spots by field monitors and VAM officers. Woredas may be classified as hot-spot on the basis of high levels of Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM), or the existence of one or several famine indicators such as migration of entire households, excessive and unseasonable morbidity, excessive mortality, widespread sale of oxen, camels, political instability, etc. There are also specific indicators for determining whether an area could eventually deteriorate to the extent that it would assume 'hot spot' status. The indicators monitored in the hot spots are a mixture of early warning and food security indicators. All these data are inputted into a 'hot-spot' map. The hot spot data and maps are shared with the EWWGs and sub-groups on methodology – the latter being responsible for determining which woredas to visit as part of the multi-agency needs assessment. During 2005 and 2006 VAM data were used to identify between 50-70 hot spots at any one time. This involved a process of consensus and endorsement by the EWWG.

45. There has generally been satisfaction with the overall performance of the Government EWS during 2005 and 2006 and the identification and selection of woredas for relief programming. Joint decisions are taken in the EWWG on which woredas to target through a consensual process involving robust debate. There was excellent early warning for the drought affecting mainly Somali region in December 2005 with information coming from both WFP VAM and the DPPB early warning system.

46. WFP Field Monitors and VAM officers participate in the four major needs assessments each year. WFP vehicles may be used and WFP staff provide invaluable technical and experiential support. Furthermore, WFP field monitors and GoE staff at regional and woreda level will often travel together to areas where acute needs have been reported, e.g. hot spots, to carry out rapid assessments. .



47. The main problem with regard to the EFNA system continues to be the method for identifying numbers of needy beneficiaries and the resulting food estimated for each beneficiary woreda

*Recommendations:*

- WFP have an important advocacy role to play in pressing for clearer conceptual clarity and frameworks around the emergency food security assessment process in Ethiopia so that the system moves away from a negotiation process based largely on rainfall data and historical precedent towards one based on some form of livelihoods analysis and robust quantitative assessment of food security. WFP membership of the EW WG methodology sub-group provides an excellent channel for such advocacy work.
- WFP should assess the performance of the current EFNA approach being employed in SNNPR with a view to taking a strategic position on its strengths and weaknesses and the extent to which it should be rolled out in other regions
- WFP field monitors could collect information which supports the case for developing a more coherent EFNA framework. For example, information on how beneficiaries are allocated to the relief programming or PSNP and the way in which the two case loads are delineated would highlight the confusion around the current approach.
- WFP could lead by example in advocating for a more livelihoods based approach using baseline information and monitoring of key variables by working closely with the newly established LIU. To this end WFP field monitors could collect monitoring information on key parameters identified by LIU for each woreda. The relatively stable presence of WFP field monitors would be invaluable for this newly emerging assessment process.
- The demise of the NSP in 1998 due largely to funding constraints has left a nutritional surveillance gap in Ethiopia<sup>7</sup> One of the objectives of the newly established EOS/TFS is to provide nutritional surveillance information across the country<sup>8</sup>. While the project is in it's infancy it is difficult to determine whether the data from the programme is likely to be useful for surveillance and/or early warning purposes. Given WFP's support for the EOS/TFS and it's expertise in food security assessment and vulnerability mapping, WFP is well placed to monitor the information output from the EOS/TFS programme in order to determine its utility as part of a food security early warning system. Furthermore, VAM is particularly well placed to analyse the relationship between the VAM led multi-agency CVI information, VAM hot spots and the emergency nutritional information from the EOS/TFS. WFP should work closely with UNICEF, the Emergency Nutrition Coordination Unit (ENCU), and MoH to this end.

## **2.4 Delivery of relief food:**

### *Drop in relief case load with advent of PSNP*

48. Since the introduction of the PSNP there has been a significant diminution in relief programming. While some of this may be attributable to the fact that harvests have generally

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<sup>7</sup> Dolan, C et al (2006) A review of the NSP in Ethiopia. SC UK

<sup>8</sup> Chotard, S (2005)



been better than average during 2005 and 2006 in many regions, it is also due to the fact that a significant proportion of the population that would previously have been included in relief programming have been included under the PSNP as chronically food insecure. Indeed a stated aim of the PSNP has been to replace the emergency appeals system<sup>9</sup>. Examples from the evaluation team's field work give an indication of the scale of transfer from one case load to another. Relief programmes have been operating in Fedis and Jarso Woredas in East Hararghe for up to 20 years.

49. As can be seen from the figures below the relief case load plummeted in 2005 and 2006.

2002: Fedis 113,840 and Jarso 35,646  
2003: Fedis 127,400 and Jarso 45,000  
2004: Fedis 97,000 and Jarso 26,800  
2005: Fedis 26,374 and Jarso 3,189  
2006: Fedis 15,330 and Jarso 7,400

#### *Responsibility for delivery of relief food commodities*

50. WFP bring relief food into Ethiopia via the port of Djibouti and then arranges distribution to the main hub warehouses. There are over 100 government/DPPA warehouses and 58 WFP warehouses. Once at government warehouses responsibility for dispatch and delivery of relief food to the FDPs lies with the government (DPPA). There is a commodity tracking system (COMPAS) which WFP helped install and to which WFP have access.

51. One constraint operating for WFP in moving food from port to government warehousing is that trucking may be scarce during peak periods of fertiliser import. February to May is the most congested period and WFP attempt to coordinate shipments to avoid this congestion. The WFP warehouses are mainly used to store food for the WFP non-relief, non-safety net activities, e.g. school feeding, urban HIV/nutrition programme, and also the TSF/EOS. Occasionally, DPPA will utilise WFP storage capacity for relief or PSNP commodities if their storage facilities are stretched.

52. There have been occasions during the PRRO 10362 period when WFP have dispatched small amounts of relief commodities from their own warehouses to meet relief needs, e.g. during flooding in South Omo in 2006

#### *The WFP Relief Food Pipeline during 2005 and 2006*

53. The WFP food pipeline has been generally good during this period. Carry over stocks at the end of 2005 amounted to some 238,034 tons. Out of the total food requirement, WFP contributed 69% of overall national relief needs. The first quarter of 2005 and October/November saw some late confirmation of pledges/arrival while Corn Soy Blend (CSB) became a major problem from June onwards as a large pledge of 35,000 tonnes was cancelled by a donor in August while some 5,700 tons of CSB from the country stocks had to be re-blended due to over-fortification.

54. WFP's pipeline for 2006 has been good although there were anticipated shortfalls in November (at the time of the evaluation). However, due to lower allocations and dispatches than

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<sup>9</sup> Project Concept Note. Ethiopia, Productive Safety Nets Programme APL 11. August 15<sup>th</sup> 2005



planned, the national relief pipeline, by the end of December, still had about 90,000 tons of food stocks to be carried over into 2007

55. Less is known about the government/DPPA pipeline<sup>10</sup>. Pipeline data are available on the DPPA information centre website but it is difficult to translate these data into likely operational outcomes. Thus, up to date stock data are available for seven locations but how this translates into availability at woreda level is unclear. Furthermore, these data only apply to cereals (wheat, maize and sorghum) and not CSB, oil and pulses. Data on pledges are only available for the first six months of the year (i.e. are six months out of date). The evaluation team were informed that donors had under-pledged in relation to the multi-agency appeal over the past 2 years placing some strain on relations between federal and regional government. For a period, WFP did not know the status of GoE food stores for relief commodities although DPPA has cited shortages of food in 2006 and the consequent need to re-target and re-prioritise regions. However, WFP and DPPA have now reconciled stocks and carry-overs

#### *Information on relief deliveries during 2005 and 2006*

56. It is difficult to get precise information on the number of relief deliveries to food distribution points during this period. Although WFP Field Monitors attempt to collect such data from DPPB at regional level and through monitoring at FDPs, the number of sites far exceeds the number of monitors, so that it is impossible to observe every distribution. Furthermore, there is poor communication between DPPB and WFP sub-offices regarding when deliveries to FDPs and hence distributions are likely to take place.

57. While FMs compile monthly reports these are not collated by WFP to provide a zonal or regional overview of deliveries. WFP do collect data retrospectively on deliveries through the annual FAUIS (Food Aid Use and Impact Survey). However, FAUIS was extremely late in 2005 due to the postponing of the meher assessment which coincided with the intended timeframe for FAUIS. Naturally, the meher assessment had to be given priority over the FAUIS since it involves the same staff. This timing of the FAUIS was thus not ideal as it did not occur at the same time as in 2003 and 2004. The FAUIS report for 2005 was based on a sample of six regions, 90 woredas, 180 kebeles and 1784 households. The average number of times a general ration was distributed during the year varied by region. Relief food was distributed twice in Amhara, Oromiya, SNNPR and Somali regions, 3 times in Tigray and 10 times in Afar. Only

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<sup>10</sup> DPPA houses an information centre (IC) in Addis Ababa. This was established as an information bridge between GoE and NGOs following the 1993 drought when there was a recognised information gap. The system has developed a relief management data base with 8 systems.

- appeal for requests
- pledges and response
- planning based on appeal and resources
- food allocation plan
- logistics and dispatches
- actual distribution
- distribution results

The IC has a website. However, information can take from 3-6 months to get from woreda to federal level and a further 2-3 months for all data to be put on the website. NGOs tend to be more efficient at reporting with most delays occurring from the DPPB side. There are currently plans to decentralise the system to regional and woreda level.





21% of beneficiaries reported that food distributions began on time. The main problems identified by communities with regard to distributions were:

- food ration size not proportional to family members
- delays at food distribution sites causing overnight stays and sites too far away, e.g. > 10 kms
- too little food at site
- no channels for complaint

58. Woreda official complaints included:

- late and irregular delivery of food aid
- quantity dispatched not proportional to number of beneficiaries
- problems of storage facilities and distance of distribution point
- delay or unavailability of funds to pay for loading/unloading
- distribution delays
- inadequate information on number of beneficiaries including EGS participants on allocations/dispatches

59. Average ration size received per person per month recorded in the 2005 FAUIS were well below the targets of 15 kg cereal, 1.5 kg pulses, 0.5 kg oil and 4.5 kg of CSB (for 35% of beneficiaries)<sup>11</sup>. The extent to which these figures reflect distribution committees sharing out rations to a greater number of households than planned through the multi-agency needs assessment or inadequate deliveries of food to the FDPs is unclear and will undoubtedly vary by region and time. Dilution of the ration is particularly evident in Somali region where beneficiaries received only 35% of their ration entitlement, while Tigray regions fared relatively better with beneficiaries receiving 60% of the planned ration<sup>12</sup>.

60. There were no FAUIS data available to the evaluation team for 2006 as the exercise was not conducted (the survey will be done during the last quarter of 2007). However, information from the evaluation field work found considerable variation in deliveries. In Somali region only five out of the intended 11 monthly distributions between January and November 2006 had taken place<sup>13</sup>. Furthermore, ration size was frequently as low as 10% of the planned target ration<sup>14</sup>. In contrast in SNNPR and Afar regions most if not all relief distributions had taken place (personal communication from WFP sub-office and woreda government staff) although in the case of SNNPR pulses may have been absent during certain months.

61. Examination of the DPPA Information Centre website shows that data on allocations and distributions are at least six months out of date. In January 2007, data were only reported up until June 2006. Data on affected populations are even more out of date (In January 2007 these were only reported up until December 2004).

62. Furthermore, DPPA allocation and distribution data are reported in such a way that it is impossible to compare planned and realised allocations/distributions. Figures are aggregated by region and it is also unclear whether the tonnages reported for each region are actually those

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<sup>11</sup> Average ration size received in 2005 ranged from 4.75 kg per month in Somali region to 9.20 kg per month in Tigray

<sup>12</sup> FAUIS report: WFP 2005

<sup>13</sup> Field Monitor monthly reports for Jijiga sub-offices (January-November 2006)

<sup>14</sup> This is based on a sample of 20 field monitor reports and 24 household interviews and cannot therefore be taken as representative but rather as an indication of the extent of sharing and ration dilution that can take place.



allocated or distributed. Thus, for Somali region where it is known that only five distributions took place in the first eleven months of 2006, it appears from the website that 6 allocations/distributions took between January and June 2006.

63. Information on the poor delivery schedule in Somali region was made available to the evaluation team by the Somali region WFP sub-office. Other regions visited were unable to provide this information. A major difficulty for WFP is that they are not formally notified of delivery and distributions from the DPPB warehouses to the FDPs. Although WFP does look at the monthly DPPA allocation plan there is no guarantee that government can follow this plan. WFP often have to ask regional DPPB when distributions are taking place.

64. There have been many reasons suggested for the poor delivery performance in Somali region. Transport and security are two main and inter-related factors. It is often difficult to get transporters from the highland regions to deliver in Somali region – security being a factor that dissuades many contractors. Unfortunately, the fleet of trucks held by DPPA for just such circumstances is ageing with many vehicles out of commission. Furthermore, transport companies may win their bids by overstating their capacity and subsequently fail to deliver supplies on schedule.

65. Given the high level of insecurity in Somali region, some food is misappropriated. Lack of monitoring (GoE lacks capacity to monitor in such an insecure environment) means that it is difficult to determine whether misappropriation is a significant factor in the poor delivery schedule for the region.

66. Although delivery schedules appear to be better in other regions – especially for 2006, there are still delays. This has been due to poor road conditions and in some cases the lack of on the shelf public works which can be rolled out. It should however be noted that EGS appears to be diminishing under the relief programme (see section 2.5).

67. A perception (unsubstantiated by the evaluation team) of some GoE staff at regional and woreda level for delays in distribution is that DPPA may not respond rapidly to a request for dispatch of supplies as they know the amount of food supplies in stock at Woreda level and are aware that resources can be, and according to some informants, are, shifted from one program to the other (PSNP to relief)

68. *Recommendations:*

1. The current situation where WFP are not systematically informed as to when food (which to a large extent has been provided by WFP) is to be delivered from hub warehouses to FDPs is unworkable. WFP have to be able to monitor the delivery and receipt of their own food commodities. Formal mechanisms must be established so that DPPB informs WFP sub-offices of planned deliveries and distributions Where these mechanisms already exist they should be enforced. In addition, all WFP FM information on food distributions should be routinely collated at sub-office level and transmitted to head office in order to improve overview of delivery and distribution performance.

2. WFP VAM should work more closely with the DPPA Information Centre to strengthen the utility of the DPPA website. While it may be difficult to significantly improve the timeliness of information flows and display on the website in the short-term (as this may largely be a capacity issue at decentralised level) it should be possible to improve the way that information are presented in order to allow users to better understand food delivery and distribution



performance, e.g. number of monthly distributions versus planned distributions per region, quality of food basket, etc.

3. There is a risk that as the volume of relief food programming in Ethiopia diminishes that the current structures that have been in place for several decades to implement annual relief programming will be eroded. Given that Ethiopia is prone to severe food crises, at least every decade, there is a need to monitor and assess whether capacity to implement a large-scale food relief programme is still in place, e.g. Emergency Food Security Reserve (EFGR), transport fleets, administrative and logistical expertise, etc. While the drought risk financing initiative proposed by the multi-donor consortium for the PSNP<sup>15</sup> may eventually obviate the need for such a capacity, the initiative is still very much a concept and has not been elaborated practically or piloted in any region. An important role for WFP could be to monitor key capacity variables for relief food aid programming over the next few years with a view to scenario planning and advocating for maintaining capacity where appropriate.

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<sup>15</sup> PSNP donors and WFP are working to develop a strategy based around a coordinated portfolio of drought financing instruments. The instruments under review would be;

- i) an Ethiopia specific contingency fund
- ii) a contingent credit with the World Bank/IMF
- iii) weather based insurance instruments

The goal would be to sequence the instruments in such a way so that an emergency appeal would only be needed in the most extreme or outlier events.



## 2.5 Public Works on Relief Programmes

69. Until recently most relief programming in Ethiopia has been through the Employment Generation Scheme (EGS) which is effectively a public works programme. These programmes are meant to be implemented on a 80:20 split so that 80% of beneficiaries are employed on public works while the remainder (those who are unable to work, e.g. the elderly, disabled, heavily pregnant women, etc) receive free food. Public works in predominantly pastoral areas have not been implemented on any scale, e.g. Somali and Afar region, but in other regions like Tigray and SNNPR woreda authorities have had good on the shelf projects which are rolled out rapidly during droughts.

70. Evidence from the 2005 FAUIS report suggests that implementation of the 80:20 split is no longer occurring<sup>16</sup> and that there has been a diminution in public works. These findings were supported by the evaluation team's field work, where many informants (at federal, regional and woreda level) indicated that with the advent of the PSNP public works, those left out and eventually placed on the relief programme were largely in receipt of free food aid. Furthermore, where public works (EGS) are implemented the relative standard compared to PSNP was considered to be far inferior.

71. Most EGS projects involve use of food for construction of roads, terracing, wall building (for health centres/schools), etc, i.e. unlike the PSNP, the works are not focussed on natural resource management

72. The impression that EGS quality is diminishing partly as a consequence of the focus on PSNP public works cannot be substantiated by 'hard evidence'. WFP Field Monitors do not report on the quality of the public works in relief but do so in the case of PSNP.

73. Certainly, there has been no investment in training under the EGS over the past two years. However, past critiques of the EGS pre-PSNP<sup>17</sup> are unlikely to have been addressed during the PSNP era, so it is probable that quality of the works are still poor in many regions and may well be declining given the new focus on PSNP and local perceptions of the relative values of the two types of public works programme.

74. The evaluation team had concerns regarding the potential effect on the community of the juxtaposition of two types of public works programme. The relatively new PW programme under the PSNP comes with a significant capital budget (something lacking with the EGS), a multi-year commitment to beneficiaries, and the anticipated (and in some cases realised) linkages with other food security packages (OFSP). In contrast, the EGS is for 6-12 months, has limited budget for capital costs, limited training and due to poor quality and monitoring may well be demoralising for participants. Given that understanding at community level regarding the different modalities is confused with regard to chronic need versus acute need there is every possibility that the process of delineating the two beneficiary case loads creates local level tensions.

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<sup>16</sup> Based on FAUIS, in Tigray, Afar, Amhara, Oromia, Somali and SNNPR the percentages of beneficiaries on free distribution were; 32.4%, 100%, 30.4%, 42.4%, 96.9% and 48.2% respectively

<sup>17</sup> Middlebrook. P (1999): The Road Ahead. New directions for employment generation scheme in Ethiopia?. WFP February 1999 and Evaluation of WFP-supported EGS pilot schemes in Amhara and Tigray. Summary of major findings, conclusions and recommendations. February 1999



## 75. Recommendations:

- It would be valuable for Field Monitors to map where EGS are occurring and the percentage of relief beneficiaries receiving free food versus those employed on public works. This information would help clarify whether communities and woreda administrations are taking the EGS less seriously.
- It would be useful if FMs could compare the relative quality of the two types of PW programme and also whether the different programmes create social tensions or conflict between beneficiaries where both programmes are operating in a given community
- Based on findings of the Field Monitors it may be appropriate for WFP to advocate for inclusion of EGS beneficiaries under the PSNP PW to ensure a better quality of work. Alternatively, it may be more practicable to replace the PW under the EGS with free food aid in some regions (this appears to be ‘spontaneously’ happening in any case) rather than ‘forcing’ beneficiaries’ to participate in a scheme with limited value and which diverts attention from other livelihoods based activities.

## 2.6 Targeting in Relief Programme:

### *Targeting system in theory*

76. Food aid has traditionally been distributed in Ethiopia under food for work (EGS – employment generation scheme) and free distributions. In recent years the targeting mechanism has been a combination of administrative and community level targeting for both free distributions and EGS. GoE guidelines for combined administrative-community targeting were most recently updated in 2000.

77. After the multi-agency assessment and food needs have been established for each woreda, woreda-level committees assign allocations to individual kebeles within the woreda. The PA leaders prepare a list of beneficiary households against the assigned allocation and distribution is carried out by elders and community representatives at the PA. Thus, while the amount of food to be allocated to each woreda is determined at federal level (using input from regional and local levels), the actual beneficiaries are designated at the local community level.

78. Criteria for the selection of households are established locally to suit the particular disaster affected or food insecure area. Criteria may include, ownership of personal assets, level of income, opportunities for alternative employment, severe illness or chronic disability, etc. Where appropriate, smaller community groups such as Got, Kushet and Ganda are empowered to generate the beneficiary list and submit these to the PA. The household list is meant to be disaggregated by sex, age and family size to facilitate monitoring and evaluation. The woreda DPPB forwards the list of beneficiaries to the food aid programme implementing agency.

79. The 2000 targeting guidelines stated that EGS participants should be households; with able bodied labour available between 18-60 years old, in a disaster-affected/food insecure area for at least one year and be unable to meet their basic food needs due to the effects of disaster/food insecurity. Those eligible for free general rations (no work required) would come from households that fitted certain criteria, e.g. no able bodied members, women more than six months pregnant, persons who have to care constantly for young children or disabled persons, etc. A third category of programme was included in the guidelines – GFFD, which is appropriate for certain specific circumstances, e.g. projects not ready for EGS implementation, beneficiaries



too weak to participate in EGS (due to epidemic). This is not the place to critique the Ethiopian targeting system as others with far greater knowledge have evaluated the process<sup>18</sup> .:

*Evidence for effectiveness of targeting under relief programme*

80. Preliminary information from the 2005 FAUIS report provides valuable insights into how targeting is working under the relief component of the PRRO. Data on average ration size during 2005 shows a considerable short-fall from planned ration receipts (ranging from 4.75 kg per person per month in Somali region to 9.20 kg/person/month in Tigray). This may reflect a number of factors; inadequate quotas provided so committees extend the ration to more households, leakage of food/misappropriation, a culture of sharing amongst the whole community (particularly prevalent amongst pastoralist populations).

81. Other interesting insights from woreda officials were gained during the FAUIS survey. For example, 32% of woreda officials indicated that targeting is done by leadership committees at PA level, 19% said it is done by the community and 13% said it is done by leadership committees at village level.<sup>19</sup> This indicates that there are a combination of targeting levels (the administrative/community combination for targeting).

82. When asked about targeting criteria, the most common response, except for Somali and Afar region, were in order of frequency; crop production failure, livestock ownership, food gap, being elderly, disabled, sick, willing to work for food, other income, ownership and lastly, being a female headed household. In Afar, most woredas officials said that all residents of a PA are entitled to benefit from relief assistance. Two woredas in Afar mentioned family size as being a criteria. In Somali region most of the woreda officials said that being a poor household is the criteria with being elderly or disabled the next most common response<sup>20</sup>.

83. The evaluation team found that the severest targeting problems did indeed occur in pastoral areas. It is estimated that in 2006 most households in Somali region received some relief ration. Given the difficulties of witnessing distributions FMs have had to rely on Post Distribution Monitoring (PDM) and assessment of average household ration receipt in order to assess targeting outcomes. Data from the FM reports and this evaluation have found that ration receipts have varied from 5kg to 25kg in Somali region (6% to 33% of planned ration). Where distribution or beneficiary lists were accessible to the evaluation team in Somali region populations registered have been in excess of 70% (e.g. Gabada FDP). To the extent that targeting took place it has generally been on the basis of poor crop production and people without animals or land.

84. Targeting relief commodities amongst pastoral communities has been notoriously difficult over the years. In 1999/2000 WFP and GoE attempted to implement a systems on the basis of clans. However, this was also found to be problematic. Apart from the culture of sharing, the poor distributions during 2005 and 2006 have meant that many poorer herders have had to borrow from wealthier households. When food aid has arrived poorer households have then paid back loans so their ration has been diminished.

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<sup>18</sup> Molla. D 2001:

<sup>19</sup> FAUIS 2005

<sup>20</sup> FAUIS 2005



85. Another key factor is that the quota set for the pastoral populations in Somali region and elsewhere is considered by many to be inadequate so that committees have simply increased the number of beneficiary households by reducing the ration size per household, e.g. providing for a maximum of 4 or 5 individuals per household. The resistance to targeting amongst pastoral communities was demonstrated recently in Kobbo kebele following a retargeting exercise under the PSNP (see section 4.6).

86. Other regions have also experienced targeting difficulties. For example, in Amhara region one means of dealing with low quotas or poor deliveries appears to be the rotation of beneficiary lists (where these exist) so that groups of people benefit at different periods during the year. The rotation can also take place between the relief and PSNP programme beneficiaries further blurring the distinction between the two programmes.

87. Another targeting irregularity (again witnessed in Amhara region) relates to the setting of beneficiary quotas at Got or community level rather than at Kebele level. Here the quotas set for the kebele are allocated between communities. This can result in the less poor being selected as some selected in a given community (to fulfil the quota) are in actual fact far better off than others in another community in a woreda who cannot be found a place in the quota set for that community.

88. The lack of beneficiary lists in pastoral and some other relief programme areas is a significant programme constraint. Although these lists are meant to be compiled at kebele level, e.g. regional guidelines on reporting and targeting have been disseminated and forms were translated into Somali language in 2005 for Somali region, these have rarely been used (or if they are they are extremely difficult to access). This means that it is impossible to assess inclusion and exclusion error accurately and therefore to determine the effectiveness of targeting. The best that can be achieved is to monitor ration receipts and then to infer probable population numbers receiving the food aid.

89. It was reported to the evaluation team that where there have been concerted efforts by WFP FM and GoE to address identified targeting problems, then progress has been made. However, the extent to which WFP/GoE efforts have successfully addressed targeting problems is difficult to gauge. There are certainly examples where ration receipts have improved following concerted follow up by WFP and/or GoE. In East Hararghe District Agents called a number of public meetings to determine whether the beneficiary lists were deemed fair by the community. This type of follow up and monitoring has been far easier in some regions than other, i.e. in Somali region insecurity and population movements have been a real impediment. At the same time targeting problems have been aggravated by the high turnover of Government GoE staff at woreda level. Furthermore, limited GoE capacity at woreda level, e.g. insufficient DSA provision to allow adequate time in the field to resolve problems, is a constraint to improved targeting. Targeting experiences in Afar (which has many livelihood similarities with Somali region) have generally been positive and have been shared with staff from Somali region

90. It was stressed to the evaluation team by a number of WFP field staff that wherever NGO reporting and monitoring is taking place that targeting is 'relatively better'. There is also a prevalent view that targeting is far more rigorous (although not without its problems) under the PSNP as the PIM is very much clearer about the process. Certainly, the FAUIS 2005 report shows poor knowledge at community and woreda level of how targeting is supposed to be carried out under the relief programme.



## 91. Recommendations:

- WFP must advocate for more comprehensive use of beneficiary lists within relief programming. Lists can then be used to generate more robust data on inclusion and exclusion error. Such data are a minimum for effective monitoring of targeting.
- Linked to this is the need to ensure an overview of targeting at kebele level. Thus, kebele committees must be able to compare the beneficiaries between sub-kebele to ensure that the most poor are included in the kebele quota.
- Given the poor standard of targeting witnessed amongst pastoral populations there is a need to review the feasibility of targeting within such populations. Experiences from other countries, e.g. Kenya and Somalia, should be reviewed as well as earlier attempts to strengthen targeting in Ethiopia. A policy decision should then be taken with regard to the feasibility and appropriateness of targeting relief commodities within pastoral population. This position should then be advocated at government level (see section 4.6).

## 2.7 Capacity Building under relief programming

92. WFP have undertaken a great deal of capacity building of GoE logistic systems within funding constraints. For example, WFP have implemented regional level training for GoE on food aid management - this is now conducted in three languages, Amharic, Tigranya and Oromifa. In 2005 WFP trained 260 counterparts in warehouse management including training in how to identify warehouse pests. WFP have also developed a 'pest poster' to assist identification. In 2007 a further 6 training courses on warehouse management are planned. WFP have also helped install the current DPPA commodity tracking system, e.g. COMPAS. WFP paid for hardware and data clerks.. At federal level WFP routinely invite GoE/DPPA if conducting in-house training on food aid and/or nutrition.

93. WFP have also conducted substantial capacity building at regional and woreda level and have also provided cars, computers and fax machines. The work of Field Monitors involves considerable on the job training with government counterparts both at woreda headquarters level and in the field when government staff are able to accompany WFP staff during field visits. Cooperation between WFP and DPPB is generally very good and WFP frequently share monitoring findings and reports as well as assist DPPB to write reports.

94. In SNNPR where the new EW system is being implemented by GoE, much of the assessment activities involve joint monitoring and most of the time teams use WFP expertise and vehicles. Whenever a problem is identified WFP and GoE come together and discuss how to deal with it.

95. In spite of WFP efforts it is clear that GoE is still very constrained by lack of transport/DSA and expertise. There is also significant disparity in capacity between woredas. Some woredas had extremely motivated and able staff while others were disillusioned, poorly trained and in worst cases were 'mainly following paper trails'

96. Almost all woredas visited complained that transport is a major problem (they lack vehicle to conduct monitoring and follow up) and that DSAs are an issue, i.e. even if they could accompany WFP FMs to the field they lack DSAs to stay for more than two days at a time. Some woreda staff complained that they lacked sufficient numbers of 'experts' for the work load while others complained that they needed more computers or in some cases training in how to use the computers that they had. At almost all DPPB/Food Security Bureau meetings held at





regional or woreda level with the evaluation team there was a strong sense of frustration that they lacked logistical capacity to do their job properly.

97. It was suggested to the evaluation team that DPPA/B is one of the GoE offices where decentralisation has not really worked as there is such a substantial capacity gap. The evaluation could also not help wondering about the extent to which capacity building on the relief side (both by WFP and other agencies) has suffered as a result of capacity building the PSNP programme. WFP have conducted a significant amount of training under the PSNP in 2005/6 (see section 6.2) so that it is perhaps inevitable that capacity support for relief programming has suffered.

98. Capacity building is clearly an area that suffers enormously from the very high turn-over of staff in government departments. The evaluation team learnt that since the setting up of the LIU in 2005 over 50% of woreda level staff trained by the LIU have moved on in one year.

99. Finally, there is a peculiar anomaly in that despite WFP's commitment to strengthen DPPA/B capacity wherever feasible, WFP end up strengthening their own staff capacity (in particular field monitors) in relief programming simply by 'doing their job' while GoE capacity remains poorly supported. The very fact that regional WFP offices have reliable transport and spend so much time in the field gaining experience seems at variance with the fact that GoE staff at woreda level rarely leave the main town for lack of transport and so have relatively few opportunities to build up their own experience and capacity.

#### *100. Recommendations:*

- WFP budget for capacity building appears to be substantially constrained by the way capacity building budgets are generated, e.g. linked to tonnages of food moved, and the fact that major donors fund only a fraction of the capacity building budget lines (ODOC). Given the fact that Ethiopia has certain unusual features, e.g. weak INGO presence and dependence upon government infrastructure and logistics for delivery of food to distribution points, there is a strong case to be made for a different budgetary mechanism to support capacity building for relief programming in Ethiopia to ensure that the food distribution system is properly managed and monitored. WFP must continue to explore how this might be achieved, e.g. identify funding windows specifically for capacity building, diversifying food aid donors etc. Perhaps the single biggest capacity constraint for government relief programming is the lack of vehicles (for conducting needs assessments, distribution and monitoring). Identifying budgetary mechanisms to shore up GoE transport capacity should be given priority.
- Within current budgetary mechanisms and constraints WFP capacity building could be enhanced through some type of SWOT analysis which identifies where resources could be most effectively targeted and for what types of capacity building. One suggestion by DPPA has been that WFP and DPPC could jointly assess capacities and establish gaps. Such a strategy would need to recognise that costs will vary by region depending on a number of factors and that capacity building budgets should reflect this. ITSH needs to be adjusted to reflect differentials across the country
- WFP and partners need to develop a better understanding of the way in which GoE capacity is eroded by high turn over of staff within DPPB/Food Security Bureau. This understanding may lead to a stronger advocacy position regarding internal (and possibly external) movement of GoE staff in order to maintain hard earned gains in capacity building where these have been achieved.



- Given the gradually diminishing role of relief food aid and food aid generally within the GoE portfolio of relief and development activities and the increasing capacity to utilise cash as a resource transfer, there may be a need to develop some form of disaster preparedness for the large scale use of food aid in the event of future food crises. WFP need to consider whether there is a need to maintain food relief programming capacity and how best to preserve this capacity within their own organisation as well as within Government.

## **2.8 Monitoring**

101. A large component of Field Monitor (FM) work in relief programming still comprises monitoring logistic performance, e.g. warehouse dispatches, distribution schedules, delivery and food receipts. FMs have to cover a large number of food distribution points. For example, in Somali region there are two sub-offices with more than 500 FDPs and only 10 FMs. In Dire Dawa sub-office there are seven FMs responsible for 17 woredas in E. Hararghe, 4 in west Hararghe, one in D.Dawa and one in Harar. In SNNPR FMs normally travel for 10-15 days at a time but may only witness 2 distributions – much of their work therefore involves post-distribution monitoring.

102. FMs are responsible for monitoring a number of projects in specific geographic areas and also have responsibility for specific programme modalities, e.g. relief, MERET, etc. Their workload is substantial. In Somali region monitors have to produce numerous reports including a monitoring narrative plus matrix, ABM report, TSF monitoring, biweekly VAM hot spot reports, monthly market price reports and rain updates. All this has to be fitted into a busy and often gruelling travel schedule.

103. With the introduction of the Action Based Monitoring (ABM) FMs are being encouraged to monitor and report more analytically. It was not entirely clear to the MTE team which forms and questions were to be included in the ABM and which were part of the wider RBM system. Through the introduction of the ABM it is hoped:

- To organise monitoring around major issues and aspects of program implementation;
- To develop a monitoring system that is action/solution or problem-solving oriented
- To use monitoring as a regular source of information and rapid management response;
- To standardize field reports.

The ABM system is developed based on CO/SO work plans, programme outputs and WFP strategic and management priorities

RBM surveys are still undertaken by this CO on an annual/biennial basis to respond to the RBM information and corporate needs. As the ABM system is relatively new and the training on data entry into the data base at regional level was ongoing at the time of the evaluation team visits, it was difficult to judge the degree to which the system will prove more analytical.

104. While there is adequate space for narrative under the new ABM format the key question that emerges is whether FMs will receive sufficient support from sub-office and the country office to be able to identify location specific issues and follow up with the types of investigation that will generate answers. Clearly this needs to be an iterative process and one that requires substantial time at head office level. Furthermore, although questions are increasingly geared to improving understanding of how the programme is functioning the evaluation team had



concerns over whether the generated data will be sufficiently robust and therefore useful. WFP plan a first review of implementation of the ABM in the first quarter of 2007..

105. A major difficulty for FMs with respect to the relief programme is that they are not usually informed by the DPPB of when food distributions are taking place. There is no formal mechanism for this or the mechanisms are not enforced. DPPA did provide information on despatches on an exceptional basis in 2006. Sub-offices usually have to contact DPPB to find out about distributions. There are regional differences however, e.g. in Afar, WFP know when distributions are taking place while in Somali region the sub-office are not informed. As a result FMs only witness a small percentage of distributions. Lack of real time monitoring is worse in areas of insecurity where even if distribution days are known it may be difficult to get to a site.

106. Where distribution related problems are identified these are reported back to DPPB and WFP country office. WFP have had varying success with addressing problems identified by FMs.. Where WFP and GoE have been able to conduct strict monitoring, targeting performance has improved. A difficulty for GoE is that in order to follow up on problems identified by WFP FMs woreda level staff must spend time in the field. However, there is often insufficient budget for DSA or lack of transport. In Somali region DPPB does not have one long-distance vehicle. WFP sub-office staff do assist with transport wherever possible.

107. The contrast between GoE and WFP monitoring capacity is immediately evident in the field. In Somali region the team heard that although there is a discrete budget line for GoE monitoring this can be difficult to access. Budget constraints generally mean that the Region/DPPB can only visit areas around Jijiga.

#### *108. Recommendations:*

- WFP must work with DPPB to establish procedures for informing WFP of planned distributions at FDPs. Federal dispatches should be copied to WFP sub-offices as a matter of course rather than as an exception.
- Although it is relatively early days with respect to establishing the ABM this is still a generic monitoring template. FMs must in the medium term exercise and be supported to undertake a more analytical approach to monitoring appropriate for the region and specific woredas. This requires a more iterative process between FM reporting and country office feeding back to support greater analysis. Issues that emerge at field level are many and varied. They are also location specific (regional, woreda and kebele level). They may include targeting and delivery challenges, linkages with other programmes, e.g. PSNP, TSF, quality, appropriateness and availability of EGS, etc. FMs need support in identifying location specific issues and following these up. Information can then be collated and used more effectively for advocacy purposes.
- Review of the ABM in 2007 should not simply focus on utility of specific questions (although this is important) but also look more at the bigger question as to whether the system supports FMs adequately in investigation and analysis and if not what type of training and on-the job learning and support can be put in place to ensure that monitoring becomes more analytical.
- FMs need to collect more robust data on targeting, i.e. not just ration sizes. Thus, FMs must support and encourage kebele and woreda level targeting task forces to construct hard copies of beneficiary lists and to make these available in order to assess inclusion and exclusion error. Targeting experiences in Afar (which has many livelihood similarities with Somali region) have generally been positive and have



been shared with staff from Somali region in December. This type of sharing of experiences and lesson learning is commendable and should be replicated where appropriate

- Given the limited capacity of GoE to monitor relief programming it is important for WFP to support GoE monitoring wherever possible – this is discussed more fully in the capacity building section.

## 2.9 Gender mainstreaming in Relief

109. The Ethiopia country office conducted the enhanced commitments to women (ECW) baseline survey in Sep and Oct 2004<sup>21</sup>. The survey examined a number of relief related questions, e.g. to determine whether women benefit at least equally from the assets created through FFW, to determine women's control of food in relief food distributions, to determine whether women are equally involved in food distribution committees and other programme related local bodies. One of the main findings of the survey was that there is a 91% gender gap in leadership positions on relief committees, i.e. nine women for every 100 men.<sup>22</sup> As a result WFP prepared a proposal to enhance women's participation in decision-making<sup>23</sup>.

110. FAUIS surveys also collect information on gender issues. For example, FAUIS 2005 found that length of time spent at distribution sites for the relief ration was too long. This was attributed to inadequate staffing level at distribution points, inadequate storage facilities, delayed payment of daily labourers, and inadequate staff training. Most severe delays and long waiting times occurred in Amhara, Afar and Tigray regions. Also, while 48% of those who collect food are women and 45% men (in 7% of sample gender not recorded) there is substantial regional variation, e.g. in Somali region 72% of those who collect food are adult women while in Amhara 68% are men. Food commodities appear to be consumed by all members of the family but adult females and the elderly receive least (except for blended food). In 83% of cases adult females decide on utilisation of food aid.

111. WFP's enhanced commitment to women includes; women being involved in beneficiary selection, security around distribution, reduced waiting times, women having information about their entitlement, special packaging, etc. However, in relief programmes in Ethiopia it is proving very difficult to fulfil these commitments largely as WFP have limited control over the distribution process. In 2004 WFP had high level meetings with DPPA to discuss enhanced commitment to women and WFP have worked closely with DPPA where possible since then on gender issues. Leadership training for women at community level has been provided on a number of occasions.

112. WFP have also explored how to coordinate with other projects to bolster women's representation on food distribution committees, e.g. to work with other agencies on literacy projects or projects to reduce women's work load. However, woredas are chosen by GoE and if other UN agencies or NGOs are not present in a woreda then such linkages cannot easily be made. Furthermore, WFP is not encouraged by GoE to work through NGOs in relief activities.

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<sup>21</sup> WFP gender policy 2003-7 Enhanced commitments to women to ensure food security. 2004 Baseline Survey - Ethiopia

<sup>22</sup> These findings were supported by the 2005 FAUIS survey.

<sup>23</sup> Project title: Integrated program to enhance women's participation in decision making.



113. Security at distribution points is a critical issue for women especially with regard to HIV. If distribution points are far from home there is an increased risk of sexual harassment or rape. WFP have made efforts to train staff at woreda level to give women priority so they do not have to wait long hours at distribution points.. However, people may have to queue for up to 20 hours in some locations and some women still need to spend the night at the FDP.

114. In theory women (pregnant/nursing) get special support, i.e. are not supposed to work during the first 3 months of pregnancy and in the last trimester but are still entitled to food. They are also meant to be given lighter tasks. This works well in some communities but not in others. Another 'concession' to women is that they are allowed to bring their own bags so that they can carry manageable portions.

115. In conclusions – implementing gender considerations into relief is proving very difficult but WFP are working with DPPA to make progress. The next ECW survey in 2007 should demonstrate whether there has been any significant progress

*116. Recommendations:*

- Findings from the FAUIS survey on gender related issues, e.g. length of time at FDPs and representation on relief committees should be used to refine FM ABM at regional level. Regional specific issues should be followed up and investigated by FMs and findings collated as a basis for advocacy messages.

## **2.10 IDPs**

117. WFP has provided food under the PRRO for IDPs in Hartisheik and Fafan camps in July and October '06. Furthermore, as a member of the United Nations Country Team (UNCT) Recovery Programme for Somali Regional State WFP has also provided food for 5,518 returnees from these camps in the form of a three month ration. The first phase of the programme was implemented between September 2005 and May 2006 through repatriation of 5,518 IDPs to their areas of origin in Degehabur zone. After that no further significant progress in the recovery programme has been achieved. Overall the recovery strategy's goal was to focus on interventions that would generate and develop the necessary capacity and create enabling environment for sustainable long-term development in the region. In addition WFP has supported conflict affected displaced in Moyale for one month in July 2006 although this population are now included as relief beneficiaries in their woreda.

118. IDPs in Fafan and Hartisheik have faced many difficulties. WFP paid a local NGO – MCDO, Internal Transport Storage and Handling (ITSH) for food in order to undertake the July and October registration and distribution. MCDO has had long experience of this population implementing a nutrition programme in the two camps since 2000 – therapeutic and supplementary feeding, while also conducting regular nutrition surveys finding at times GAM rates as high as 24%

119. IDPs in Hartisheik and Fafan had been receiving relief food from DPPB until the end of 2004 but after Jan 2005 GoE decided that the population were becoming too entrenched and dependent and that if they needed further food support that they would need to be included in the indigenous relief case load. WFP/MDCO had several discussions with GoE finally managing to convince DPPA to provide food in 2006, i.e. July and October 2006. It was not clear at the time of the evaluation whether WFP/MDCO can continue supplying food and are waiting for a DPPA decision on this.



120. In order to carry out the food distributions in July and October 2006, MDCO conducted a registration and found that figures were far higher than those provided by WFP/DPPB, i.e. 1330 for Fafan (instead of 750) and 12,600 in Hartisheik. MCDO has had lots of subsequent difficulties with this programme. The local administration has asked for per diems and wanted to conduct the distribution themselves, while loading and unloading costs were not adequately funded. Furthermore, MCDO have been involved in several discussions with the local administration resulting in repeated trips to IDP sites to resolve problems.

*121. Recommendations:*

- Given the political sensitivities around IDP populations WFP must continue to assist this population by advocating for a nutrition survey which would demonstrate the need for both continued general ration support and a concurrent returnee programme linked to provision of livelihood opportunities back home.

## **2.11 Floods**

122. WFP have supported flood affected populations through PRRO 10362.0. At the time of this evaluation the Gode flood emergency was in full swing. Wabi Shebele river burst its banks on October 20<sup>th</sup> 2006 and many villages were damaged/washed away. Seven mortalities were reported with at least. 200,000 affected. These were reportedly the worst floods in 10 years. WFP and DPPA provided food aid support while UNICEF provided biscuits. There are mini-floods in the region every year and in the past WFP have provided food for one to two months until the population are absorbed into the normal relief programme.. Flood responses are often problematic for WFP. Floods occurred in August 2006 in SNNPR affecting over 100,000 people S.Omo. Wollayta and Sidamo were mainly affected. . There were 368 deaths in S.Omo and many crops were destroyed. Fortunately, existing PSNP food stocks were available. However, the affected populations were difficult to access and the assessment had to be conducted by helicopter for S.Omo. The response involved crossing the river by boat and having trucks on the other side to take the food to the affected population. Most of those affected did not want to be evacuated without their livestock

*123. Recommendations:*

- WFP must work more closely with GoE to bolster disaster preparedness for areas which regularly endure flooding. Needs are largely predictable and logistic capacity could be reinforced, e.g. boats, more decentralised food storage facilities, etc
- WFP has knowledge from VAM and historical data where disaster prone areas are, e.g. flood areas along the Wabi Shebele river. There is scope for public works to address problems. Such interventions could be linked to Meret and PSNP, and include preventive activities such as consolidation and reforestation of river banks, use of pumps, etc. .



### 3 Review of PSNP achievements and implementation

#### 3.1 Concept and Design of the PSNP's

124. In 2005 GoE implemented a new Productive Safety Net Programme as a means of addressing long-term food insecurity in Ethiopia. The programme is based on multi-year predictable investments increasingly financed with cash, rather than in-kind resources. In conjunction with other food security programmes PSNP is meant to address underlying causes of household food-insecurity and forms a core component of the government's successive poverty reduction strategies. Objectives include to contribute to improving productivity and efficiency of transfers to chronically food insecure households, reducing household vulnerability, improving resilience to shocks and promoting sustainable community development. These objectives are meant to be achieved through timely provision of adequate transfers of cash and food to beneficiary households, thus allowing effective consumption-smoothing and avoiding asset-depletion, and the creation of productive sustainable community assets contributing to rehabilitation of severely degraded areas and increasing productivity of households in these areas.

125. Almost all donor, international/national NGO and multi-lateral informants consider the PSNP's core design to represent a significant improvement over the previous relief programming regarding it as a positive step towards finding long term solutions to Ethiopia's food insecurity. There is wide agreement that the added value of PSNP rests on certain key design characteristics:

- its multi-annual funding fund
- the move from food towards cash (or cash and food)
- improved predictability for beneficiaries
- improved multi-donor coordination
- an increasing focus on community led decision making (for planning public works priorities)
- strategic and operational coordination with other components of a wider strategy explicitly aiming at attaining long term food security and sustainable poverty alleviation.
- appreciable commitment on behalf of FSCB to engage with donors and WFP on all issues of programming
- the development of a strategy for impact assessment based on baseline data collected by CSA and analysis being conducted by IFPRI (the International Food Policy Research Institute)<sup>24</sup>

126. In addition, all appreciate the fact that PSNP has not yet attempted to mainstream interventions in predominantly pastoralist areas<sup>25</sup> but instead is supporting analysis to identify

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<sup>24</sup> "Ethiopia National Food Security Program Advisors to the Food Security Monitoring and Evaluation on the design and implementation of the Impact Evaluation of the Ethiopia National Food Security Program; IFPRI, March 2006

<sup>25</sup> Current food distributions in Afar Region are not seen as fully fledged PSNP interventions (in that they are 100% direct support) and targeting is known to be almost meaningless, since traditional sharing practices predominate. However see below for more information regarding PSNP experiences to date with Borana and Koreo pastoralist groups.



appropriate response mechanisms to meet the particular needs of the wide range of pastoralist livelihood situations.

127. However, many informants also expressed reservations concerning certain design aspects of the PSNP:

- A concern that PSNP's current targeting system is resulting in significant exclusion errors in some areas. The chronic-acute distinction is very difficult to determine in many structurally food insecure Woredas and quotas are currently largely determined by centralised decisions and previous appeal mechanisms (widely recognised as imperfect) rather than up-to-date empirical evidence.
- Concern about the lack of clarity regarding how emergency responses integrate and coordinate with PSNP and an unease that responses to major humanitarian crises in the future may be less effective as a result.
- Awareness that insufficiently responsive or sensitive criteria are being used to inform decision making on appropriate cash-food splits (geographically and seasonally).
- Concern that current mechanisms may be insufficient to develop the level of people's participation needed to allow sufficient community ownership of the community assets created.
- Recognition that for labour poor households, the workload demands generated by PSNP may be reducing opportunities for autonomous household asset creation and thereby maintaining dependency on welfare..
- Unease that, for too many PSNP beneficiaries, the necessary linkages with other food security initiatives and pro-poor policies will be insufficient to allow sustainable improvements in household food security on a significant scale.
- Worries about the lack of conceptual and programming clarity regarding graduation, with a growing unease that large numbers of people may be "graduated" out of the PSNP before they are sufficiently food secure in order to meet predefined, top-down targets.

128. These perceived strengths and concerns regarding programme design were sufficiently widespread across the full range of informants interviewed (and sufficiently in-line with the conclusions of recent studies and the team's own analysis) for them to be presented as core conclusions of the evaluation. However, a number of other issues related to core PSNP design characteristics also need to be raised, with the caveat that they reflect a much greater range of opinions and more divergent thinking. These are as follows:

- Some informants believe that improperly promoted Community-based Participatory Watershed Development (CBPWD) may do more harm than good and that unless certain key programme changes are made, PSNP might be better off sticking to "low risk" interventions such as social infrastructure. Doubts were also raised about the assumed wisdom of linking long term community based processes such as CBPWD so closely to safety net programmes whose primary objective remains food/cash transfers as entitlements. Can this apparent conflict of interests (i.e. transfer entitlement v. Woreda supervised public works) result in a genuinely participatory process?
- There are different donor opinions on the aims of the PSNP. Some feel that the asset creation role is fundamental, especially the CBPWD component and expect it to be





instrumental in “catalyzing environmental transformation”<sup>26</sup>. However, others consider that the safety net is and (should be) much more about asset protection than asset creation and that the essential longer term, community based development processes should be supported in their own right (i.e. not just through PSNP).

- Some informants are also worried that the current focus of PSNP places too much emphasis on the use of public works to promote natural resource management (and insufficient for health, education, livestock etc) and that mechanisms to promote a more equitable sectoral balance are not in place.
- Some perceived no qualitative difference between the old EGS under relief programming and public works under the PSNP and want to discourage unrealistic expectations.

There are some who argue that direct support should be reaching many more than is currently the case and predefined ratios (currently guidelines promote a maximum 20%) should be removed to avoid labour poor households being penalized as is currently the case. However, others argue that direct support as a concept should itself be abolished and that instead PSNP should be promoting productive works in which even the handicapped and elderly could participate usefully and with dignity

### **3.2 Institutional arrangements of the PSNP**

#### *Ownership and institutional positioning of PSNP*

129. Although the FSCB is officially placed within the MOARD, Regions and Woredas both perceive the safety net as being dominated by the Administration rather than by the technical line ministry. DAs and Office of Agricultural experts right up to senior Regional managers admit that they do not feel that the CBPWD public works promoted through PSNP are part of their core work and therefore do not feel a strong sense of ownership.

130. The current plans supported by APL II to form a new hierarchy of Public Work Units and Focal Points at Federal and Regional levels to oversee functions such as quality control should therefore be considered carefully<sup>27</sup>. While such decentralisation is welcomed by all stakeholders, this useful initiative may still not solve the remaining institutional problem of weak ownership by the relevant sectoral line ministries for specific PSNP public work activities.

#### *Vertical relationships*

131. A commonly repeated criticism of how the PSNP is being managed is that it remains “highly politicised and centralised”. Some of the core decisions linked to targeting and graduation are perceived as being driven more by centralised assumptions than by grass root realities.

132. For example, in 2005 when in certain parts of the country (including East Tigray and East Haraghe) the drive to promote cash transfers resulted in extended delays due to lack of capacity on the ground (training, vehicles, safe boxes etc). Eventually, it was decided to revert to food

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<sup>26</sup> See for example the APLII PAD document

<sup>27</sup> PSNP Public Works Programme Action Plan and Recommendations for Phase II; APLII Pre-Appraisal (26 October 2006)



deliveries in many Woredas but not before severe nutritional and health deteriorations had occurred.

The recent PSNP report on targeting<sup>28</sup> also highlights the problems that arise when local administrators feel compelled to adhere rigidly to top down quotas: The greater long-term barrier to accountable targeting is the pressure placed on local administrators to meet targets and directives sent from above. In particular, three sets of ‘targets’ encourage upward rather than downward accountability in targeting. These are: graduation, reducing ‘dependency’ and productive public works. While all three of these ‘targets’ are long-term objectives of the PSNP, the ways in which they have been interpreted by local officials has led to both exclusion and inclusion errors in targeting.

### *Institutional perceptions*

133. Linked to this issue is the variation in how Woredas and Regions are interpreting guidelines issued from the centre. In the majority of cases, Woredas do not feel comfortable in challenging or deviating from what they see as PSNP ‘policy’ and directives. This includes what they interpret as “quotas” (e.g. possible numbers of beneficiaries, direct support ratios, working hours/days and numbers to be graduated) as well as certain key issues related to public works (most notably the exclusion of any activities related to homestead development or non-public improvements). The exceptions are found in Tigray, especially where REST is working and there is confidence to interpret targets as flexible guidelines rather than rigid directives and to allow grass root realities and innovations to drive a much more adaptive process.

### *Programmatic coordination and horizontal linkages*

134. The PRRO MTE team concurs with the core conclusions of the recent study on PSNP Policy, Programme and Institutional Linkages<sup>29</sup> that if graduation is to be realised then:

- The OFSPs would require additional support to strengthen and diversify their design, coverage and implementation
- The horizontal institutional linkages between PSNP and OFSPS need to be strengthened if they are to achieve the necessary level of synergy
- In addition to the OFSPs, a range of wider enabling processes would also be needed for graduation to occur

### *Donor coordination*

135. One of the more significant institutional achievements of the PSNP has been the progress made in bringing together key donors (CIDA, DFID, EC, Irish Aid, USAID and the World Bank) and one multi-lateral agency (WFP) to improve strategic coordination and pooling of resources. At the start of the process, WFP’s position in the consortium (and the positive perception of some of it’s members) was by no means assumed, not least because of the assumption that WFP might somehow be ‘resistant’ to a cash-focused safety net. That WFP has become such a respected member of this consortium is largely a result of the vision of the CD at the time and of the considerable investment in time and effort by key members of Ethiopia’s country Team, to fully participate in meetings and working groups and earn the respect of the other members.

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<sup>28</sup> Targeting Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme; Kay Sharp, Taylor Brown and Amdissa Teshome (July 2006)

<sup>29</sup> PSNP Policy, Programme and Institutional Linkages; Rachel Slater et al (Sept 2006)



### 3.3 PSNP implementation

#### Overview

136. The inevitable teething problems encountered during the first two years of PSNP implementation have been well documented by recent reviews and are summarised in the World Bank's PAD for APL II. The over-riding perception amongst the majority of stake-holders however is that given the scale of the operation and the novelty of many of the implementing processes and modalities, the level of achievement to date has been encouraging. Many also note the degree of improvement witnessed during 2006 compared with the previous year.

137. This evaluation would largely support this view and acknowledge that, at Woreda level especially, the efforts to make implementation a success have been enormous. In particular,

- The minimisation of inclusion errors through several rounds of community based targeting (within the limits of set quotas)
- The implementation of labour intensive public works requiring huge organisational and management efforts
- The responsiveness to respond to Woreda-led demands for changes in the cash-food balance of PSNP resource transfer (see Box 1 below)

#### **Box 1 Fluctuating cash-food demand and supply**

For many Woredas, one of the most striking implementation experiences of 2005 and 2006 was the level of flux between the type of resource being transferred, with frequent changes within Woredas between cash-only, food-only and cash-food mixes<sup>30</sup>. During the first quarter of 2006, the overall split between cash and food for the registered PSNP beneficiaries (excluding Somali) was 54% cash and 46% food. By the 3<sup>rd</sup> quarter of 2006, the ratio had shifted to 42% cash and 58% food equivalent and an increase of 1.04 million food beneficiaries. The reasons behind this flux are well documented in other reports (see the Trends and Target Reports for example), but are based predominantly on community prioritization (for many, 180 Birr a year is worth less than 90 kg of cereal, 9 kg of pulses and 2.7 kg of oil) and on Woreda delivery capacity.

138. However, there remain significant implementation difficulties that became increasingly apparent during the course of this evaluation:

The degree of inconsistency in quality of implementation in all aspects of the PSNP is striking. Where there has been investment in Woreda staff and support systems are in place implementation quality improves accordingly. The converse is also true..

In most Woredas, delays in distribution of cash and food remain a concern and negate hoped for benefits accruing from predictability and early resource transfer. The World Bank's recent Joint Review and Implementation Support Mission (JRIS)<sup>31</sup> also highlights delays in resource

<sup>30</sup> As discussed below in Section 4, WFP's success in complying with shifting demands represent one of many operational achievements for PRRO 10362

<sup>31</sup> Aide Memoire: PSNP Joint Review and Implementation Support Mission October 2-12 2006



transfer. The main reasons for these delays, which are discussed in some detail in recent reports<sup>32</sup>, include:

- Federal/Regional delays in transferring cash to some Woredas (largely due to lack of experience in the process and initial lack of capacity of some Woredas<sup>33</sup> to receive cash)
- Lack of Woreda capacity and experience in handling cash transfers
- Federal/Regional delays in delivery of food to some Woredas, linked to a range of capacity problems (including communication systems between FSCB and DPPA)
- Lack of Woreda capacity and experience in handling the large food transfers (in some Woredas, storage space was not sufficient)
- Difficulties at Woreda and Kebele level in interpreting or following the procedures for resource transfer (especially linked to systems for checking public work outputs)

139. There is a low level of participatory planning with most villagers and Woreda informants acknowledging that the natural resource management plans were largely formulated by experts and DAs. In some Woredas, communities were given a chance to comment on these ‘expert derived plans’ but the sense of ownership of the plans was seen as limited.

140. DAs assert that ensuring quality control is problematic as the food/cash is seen as an entitlement irrespective of work quality and as kebele officials will tend to prioritise timely transfer over quality of the works. This issue is explored in more detail in Box 2 below.

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<sup>32</sup> Trends in PSNP Transfers Within Targeted Households; Devereux et al IDS & Indak (August 2006); and also: Targeting Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme; Kay Sharp, Taylor Brown and Amdissa Teshome (July 2006)

<sup>33</sup> Many Woredas do not have banks and physical and human resources needed to receive large amounts of cash all at once have taken time to build up



**Box 2 Participatory development and humanitarian cash/food entitlements: a challenging combination**

The problem of reconciling the entitlement element and labour requirements in the PSNP was a key theme in the Linkages Report<sup>34</sup>. Asset creation is seen more as a secondary feature of the primary welfare objective. There is little or no sense of community ownership and in many areas the whole public works experience remains unpopular both with beneficiaries (who complain of competing labour demands and late payments) and with DAs (who admit how hard it is to motivate workers, and complain of the huge clerical demands placed upon them).

In MERET payment remains task oriented and all involved accept that transfers will not be made until structures are completed according to agreed and transparent levels of quality, based on technical criteria as determined by trained community members and MoARD technical staff (i.e. relevant Woreda experts and DAs). Depending on how it is being facilitated, MERET may or may not engender a sense of community ownership and decision making, but in all cases beneficiaries recognise that the primary objective of the programme is watershed management and not resource transfer. The challenge for PSNP is how to reconcile this apparent paradox. These ideas are explored further in section 3.4 below.

141. Quality control is weakened by the fact that training in new technical and participatory approaches is still ongoing for many Woredas and DAs, However, even where training has been completed supervision and monitoring appears too output focused – work outputs are measured against quantitative criteria (e.g. no of kms of bunds built, number of micro-catchments constructed, no of seedlings planted etc) rather than on the quality of the work.

142. There is lack of clear ownership of natural resource works. For example, in one kebele, no one was clear for example who would have the rights to use (or the responsibilities to manage) a well terraced hillside planted with thousands of tree seedlings.

### **3.4 Evidence of impact to date**

#### *Overview*

143. The scope of this MTE of PRRO 10362 would not allow or support robust impact assessment of PSNP. However, relatively extensive field work did allow the team to draw a number of impact related conclusions with some confidence.

144. Five anticipated impacts are defined in the PSNP document:

- improved household consumption during seasonal food gaps
- protection of household assets
- development of longer term and more effective livelihood strategies by households (due to predictably of food supply), including improved uptake of services
- a range of social and environmental impacts resulting from new community assets produced through public works

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<sup>34</sup> PSNP Policy, Programme and Institutional Linkages; Rachel Slater et al (Sept 2006)



- decreased ‘dependency’ on relief support as households are assisted to graduate from the programme

145. In addition, the PSNP is expected to have positive impacts on production and market development (resulting from the move from food to cash), on women’s situation (as a result of gender sensitivity), on households coping with HIV/AIDS (as a result of its mainstreaming strategies) and on wider issues of Governance (through efforts by PSNP to demonstrate improved transparency and accountability).

146. In every Woreda some positive impacts of the PSNP can be found, both in terms of responding to food gaps (improved consumption patterns, asset protection, reduction in other costly coping strategies such as share-cropping, forced migration and indebtedness) and in terms of benefits from new public work assets created (e.g. increased frequency of visits from Agriculture and health agents due to new roads; soil accumulation due to bunds; improved livestock watering due to ponds). However, the extent and level of these impacts is much less clear. At this stage in the evolution of the PSNP, it is probably more useful to improve understanding of the key factors influencing the level of impact rather than trying to quantify impact per se.

#### *Improved household consumption*

147. Consumption smoothing was the most commonly cited impact across a range of informants. The Trends, Targeting and Linkages Studies and Action Contre la Faim (ACF) research<sup>35</sup> all confirm that PSNP beneficiaries have been able to significantly reduce hunger gaps.

148. However, there is no robust evidence to demonstrate an improved consumption smoothing impact compared to previous relief interventions. The comparison commonly made by several studies between PSNP beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries (e.g. “PSNP households sold about 30% less cattle and 17% less shoats than non-PSNP households”<sup>36</sup>) is inconclusive as it cannot be determined whether the findings are a reflection of successful safety net inputs or of poor targeting?. In Feddis Woreda for example, the PSNP quota was 62,456 people in 2005 and 69,524 in 2006; the 10 year relief average however was around 90,000. For those families who used to benefit from relief and are now excluded from the safety net, the impacts of PSNP will be negative.

149. In order to deal with low ceilings it is often easier to reduce the number of members per beneficiary households so that more households can be included (WFP’s unpublished 2005 FAUIS, the September Rapid Response Team (RRT) mission in Oromiya, the ACF study and the Targeting Report). While this evaluation concludes that the problem of dilution is common, it could not measure the extent to which it is reducing consumption smoothing.

150. This MTR must also draw attention to the negative impacts resulting from late delivery. The results of late arrival of cash/food in 2006 were disastrous for some households; the annual Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) in 2005 recorded alarmingly high increases of malnutrition (with GAM increasing from 9.5% to 14% and SAM from 1.5% to 3% in some areas) attributed to late deliveries.

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<sup>35</sup> Towards a Future Without Hunger? The State of Food Security Policy and Programming in Ethiopia ACF, May 2006

<sup>36</sup> Towards a Future Without Hunger? The State of Food Security Policy and Programming in Ethiopia ACF, May 2006



### *Asset protection*

151. Feedback regarding the contribution of PSNP to asset protection was generally positive although there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate whether asset stripping is being avoided or merely slowed down. The ACF research from SNNPR and Wag Hamra indicates that PSNP beneficiaries are still having to sell off assets but at a reduced rate (experiencing in 2005 “a net average loss of .42 cattle and .29 shoats last year”), while the Trends in Transfers Study<sup>37</sup> reports that only three in five beneficiaries avoided having to sell assets to buy food in 2005 and only 30% avoided having to use their savings to buy food in 2006.

152. The exclusion problem remains just as serious as it does for issues of consumption smoothing. The targeting report suggests that 70% of non PSNP beneficiaries face food gaps and have to engage in asset selling.<sup>38</sup>

153. Only in one Woreda visited by this evaluation (Atsbi in Tigray) did all farmers interviewed consider that they were able to protect their existing household assets as a result of food aid. Interestingly, in this Woreda target ceilings were raised to match the requested amount resulting from the ‘tabia’ based targeting, so that exclusion errors were probably minimal.

154. In all areas reduced impact appears to result from a mixture of four factors:

- the delays in payment (beneficiaries complain that payments often came too late to prevent the sale of productive assets and/or making unfavorable loan agreements);
- the dilution issues discussed above
- the relative value of the resource in Woredas where market realities determine that cash wage rates are too low (findings from ACF’s research<sup>39</sup> indicate that in their study area “PSNP wages would have to be raised 67%, to about ten birr/day per household member, to enable the poorest of the poor to protect household assets”)
- the opportunity costs (largely dictated by household labour availability) of participating in PSNP.

155. In addition to these concerns, our findings indicate that asset stripping for the many structurally food insecure households not covered by PSNP or relief is continuing and that in Woredas where such households used to receive some inputs through the old appeal system the overall situation may in fact be deteriorating.

### *Beneficiaries developing more effective household livelihood strategies and uptake of services*

156. This evaluation (as others) has found that beneficiaries recognise positive impacts in terms of improved planning opportunities when distributions are timely and predictable..

157. This evaluation was unable to quantify changes in uptake of health and education services but acknowledges the positive findings found by the Trends in Transfers study and Linkages study which report increased use of health facilities and school attendance due to PSNP, both as

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<sup>37</sup> Trends in PSNP Transfers Within Targeted Households; Devereux et al IDS & indak (August 2006)

<sup>38</sup> Targeting Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme: Experience and issues raised in the first year of implementation; Kay Sharp, Taylor Brown and Amdissa Teshome (July 2006)

<sup>39</sup> Towards a Future Without Hunger? The State of Food Security Policy and Programming in Ethiopia ACF, May 2006



a result of new facilities being constructed (through the public works) and the population having more resources to spend on services<sup>40</sup>

*Social and environmental impacts resulting from new community assets*

158. Significantly, there are currently no systems built into PSNP for communities to undertake their own impact assessments..

159. Variation in quality of public works (and thus impact) has already been noted. In some areas, farmers recognised real impacts from natural resource activities including crop yield increases, improved fodder production, increased flow of annual streams and new horticultural production. Significantly, many of these positive appraisals were in Tigray Woredas where watershed management work on private land is much more common (in line with the guidelines that indicate this is permitted where necessary).

160. However, for the great majority of sites visited (ponds, reforestations, hillside protections, gully treatments), participants saw little or no direct chance for their livelihoods to be strengthened through the public works. They remained unclear who would be responsible for sustained management, who had ownership of the resource or who could or could not use the assets created. None considered the potential impacts of CBPWD to be sufficient for them to continue activities in the event of cessation of cash or food payments. These findings reflect those in a number of recent reports, e.g. the Trends, Targeting, Linkages<sup>41</sup> and ACF studies<sup>42</sup> and the recent JRIS<sup>43</sup>. The Biannual Report of 2006 for PSNP implementation in Amhara Region is more critical and highlights the problems of poor quality of public works (as well as the poor predictability of the resource transfer)<sup>44</sup>. Furthermore the sustainability of natural resource assets created remains debatable.

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<sup>40</sup> Trends in PSNP Transfers Within Targeted Households; Devereux et al IDS & Indak (August 2006)

<sup>41</sup> Policy, Programming and Institutional Linkages; R.Slater, S.Ashley, M.Tefera, M.Betru, D.Esubalew; Sept 2006

<sup>42</sup> Towards a Future Without Hunger? The State of Food Security Policy and Programming in Ethiopia ACF, May 2006

<sup>43</sup> Aide Memoire PSNP Joint Review and Implementation Support Mission October 2-12 2006

<sup>44</sup> Food Security Coordination and Disaster prevention Office (FSCDO); Biannual Report of 2006 for PSNP implementation in Amhara Region Sept 2006





### **Box 3 PSNP and Sustainable NRM**

A recent paper by GTZ<sup>45</sup> documents their experiences of watershed management work in South Gondor. Despite high levels of technical competency, the authors argue that very low rates of sustainability have been achieved. They conclude that crucial elements missing from the programme are the necessary social organisation at community level for autonomous management to continue, the degree of genuine grass roots decision making in planning and implementation and the issue of land tenure or usufruct. The report also reflects that if not managed carefully, this can become a process that generates impressive looking results in the short term but allows the essential process of genuine community buy-in to be bypassed.

#### *Decreased 'dependency' on relief support and attainment of long term food security*

161. Many Woreda level informants (community and Government) consider that no real impact has yet been made on the underlying causes of vulnerability or dependency of PSNP beneficiaries. While the intended means of graduation is dependent on PSNP beneficiaries benefiting also from other FSP components (and not just PSNP alone), this evaluation found very few informants at Woreda level who felt confident that existing linkages were adequate. This would concur with the findings from Slater et al (2006)<sup>46</sup> who conclude that the level of household asset creation currently being experienced through combined FSP inputs seems too low to expect meaningful levels of graduation in the future, except for those households that are already food secure. These findings are also affirmed by the PAD for APLII (see paragraphs 19 to 22) which concludes that "Graduation out of food insecurity will require greater understanding of Ethiopia-specific factors and sequences".

162. The experience of the R2D programme (implemented by SC-UK from 2003-2005) in Woredas in Wag Hamra and North Wollo is relevant to this MTE. By removing the target Woredas out of the appeal system, guaranteeing predictable transfers (albeit in food rather than in cash) linked to public works and providing an integrated support programme for household asset creation, R2D can be seen in some ways as an initial pilot of the PSNP. A number of reports<sup>47</sup> have examined the experiences of this work. It is particularly noteworthy that despite positive impacts on nutritional status, asset protection and creation and knowledge, attitude and practice, the most recent evaluations<sup>48</sup> sees little substantial progress towards attaining sustainable livelihood security. Many of the recommendation highlight the fact that unless the complementary asset creation initiatives are facilitated to certain minimum standards, the opportunities for significant impact remain very low.

#### *Market and production impacts of cash injections*

163. A recent study<sup>49</sup> on the Impact of Food Aid on the Grain Market in Ethiopia highlights the importance of linking PSNP cash amounts to existing grain market prices, to improve timing of local purchase and to increase investment in market infrastructure and facilities. The same study

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<sup>45</sup> "Who Is to manage the watersheds – donors, experts, administrators or users?" Dr John Baptist, Debre Tabor, GTZ/SUN June 2006

<sup>46</sup> Policy, Programming and Institutional Linkages; R. Slater et al; Sept 2006

<sup>47</sup> Impact of the R2D project, Gubalafto and Sekota Woreda; Acacia Consultants (Oct 2005)

<sup>48</sup> Nutrition Assessment of the R2D/RDIR programme in Sekota and Gubalafto Woredas; C. Lachat, Institute Tropical Medicine, Antwerp (2006)

<sup>49</sup> Study on the Impact of Food Aid on the Grain Market in Ethiopia; TRANSTEC, Remme et al (June 2006)



also highlights the potential for local purchase to have much greater stimulatory effect on economic growth if a number of improvements in current practice take place, e.g. greater prioritisation of local purchase so that it operates on a larger scale, is more decentralised and better timed.

### *Impacts related to gender*

164. This evaluation was unable to find many examples of the PSNP contributing to the wellbeing of women. In many cases, women complain of the increased labour demands provoked by the public works. However, in some Woredas women acknowledged that DAs allowed them to start later and end earlier than men so that they could keep up with other agricultural and household activities. This evaluation did not reveal if women's opportunities for decision making or leadership was in any way affected by PSNP. The recent JRIS mission<sup>50</sup> also highlights that much still needs to be done if PSNP is to start addressing women's needs effectively.

165. The recently conducted Public Works Review also concludes that to date PSNP has not proven particularly gender sensitive. It notes that women must work equally with men for the same payment and that for women working with small infants the work environment is not conducive to maternal or child health. Actions on gender proposed under the Revised PIM are not being implemented and the principle that pregnant and lactating women should be provided with direct support is poorly implemented in practice. The review also notes that current capacity building and training activities relating to integration of gender issues into the PSNP project cycle have had only limited success at kebele and community levels, not least because there are too few gender specialists working on the PSNP<sup>51</sup>.

### **3.5 Wider institutional linkages (between PSNP and other relevant programmes)**

166. The recently completed report on Linkages highlights some key weaknesses regarding PSNP linkages with other programmes. These include: lack of clarity over what it means for a household to graduate; design issues of the OFSP, especially relevant to household credit packages for poorer households; relevant sectoral linkages required at Woreda level not being sufficiently institutionalized at Federal and Regional levels; insufficient attention being given to the additional enabling processes needed to complement the PSNP and OFSP activities if long term graduation is to become a reality.

167. It is encouraging that the decision was taken in 2006 for the OFSP household package to be specifically targeted at PSNP beneficiaries (in contrast to the first year of implementation in 2005 when this was not the case). The role of the OFSP household package is now to complement the safety net function by providing resources for productive investment.

168. Several studies, including this one, indicate concern that the capacity to respond to emergencies may become eroded as the PSNP becomes fully institutionalized. This argues for more clearly articulated conceptual and operational distinctions (and linkages) between the PSNP and relief programme (see section 5.3)

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<sup>50</sup> Aide Memoire: PSNP Joint Review and Implementation Support Mission October 2-12 2006

<sup>51</sup> PSNP Public Works Programme Action Plan and Recommendations for Phase II; APLII Pre-Appraisal (26th October 2006)



## **4 How is PRRO 10362 contributing to the on-going development of PSNP design and what more could it be doing?**

### **4.1 Overview**

169. Although it has no decision making control over PSNP design, WFP does have a significant opportunity to strengthen PSNP policy and design, through its role as an active member of the multi-donor partner's forum. There are at least five mechanisms for this:

- Using existing field experience (programming and operational) to inform policy development and the formulation of PIM guidelines
- Directly supporting action-research through specifically designed pilots (with Government alone or with NGO partners) to demonstrate and introduce new approaches - and use results to inform debate at policy and programming fora (as MERET has been doing)
- Directly monitoring consequences of PSNP policies and their different interpretations on implementation and use results to inform debate in policy and programming for a
- Directly assessing impacts of PSNP policies and the different implementation experiences at grass roots level and use findings to inform debate in policy and programming for a
- Assisting GOE to design, introduce and implement improved systems for food security monitoring to help strengthen targeting and graduation strategies and inform emergency responses

170. In this section of the MTE report we look at how WFP has used these different opportunities to influence PSNP design to date and at what more it could be doing.

171. The starting point must be a clear recognition of the considerable contribution that WFP has already made to PSNP policy development. The evaluation feels it important to highlight the level of vision, initiative, risk-taking and the huge amount of additional work and effort that was required by the Country Director and key members of the country team to allow WFP to become a respected member of the policy consortium.

172. An important part of this process was to overcome the reservations of several partners that WFP will always seek to secure its own operational presence by advocating for food programming. By working to depolarize the debate and shift the focus away from the simplistic cash or food discourse towards one of how best to use food to allow a smooth transition, WFP Ethiopia is continuing to strengthen trust and confidence.

173. Another key finding of this evaluation is the quality and depth of analytical thinking to be found within WFP Ethiopia's PSNP department. A key recommendation to WFP is therefore to prioritize their investment in this team and their recommendations. Indeed it is unlikely that this evaluation will have generated any advice or analysis related to the PSNP that has not already been thought through by the members of this department.

174. All FSCP and donor members interviewed by this evaluation expressed their appreciation of WFP's on-going contribution to policy debates and programme development, touching on a wide range of issues that include: targeting, watershed management, distribution modalities, role of female headed households, participatory planning and technical protocols for public works. There has also been recognition of, and respect for, WFP's considerable flexibility in lobbying and discussion. For example, while voicing their concerns over initial targeting ceilings of



around 5 million (based on 10 year appeal averages), WFP team members realised that continued argument would not help and allowed matters to take their course. By year two, the level of feedback from the field encouraged decision makers to adopt 5 year averages and PSNP quotas have moved up to over 8 million..

175. In conclusion, this evaluation wishes to heartily congratulate the key individuals involved in securing WFP's position in the PSNP policy arena and entering in to the policy debate so actively. We highlight this experience particularly because it raises three crucial lessons that underpin many of the recommendations for WFP's ongoing role arising from this MTE:

- The need for vision, innovation and risk taking if WFP is to maximise its contribution and impact
- The importance of its network of field monitors (and their focus and capacity) in order to generate the relevant operational field experiences to inform policy debate and programming
- The need to continue to re-enforce WFP's capacity, through out the organisation, for thoughtful analysis and lesson learning if it is to sustain the respect it has earned to date

### *Regional and Zonal focus*

176. The enormous variation (ecological, social, cultural, economic, political) found between Regions and Zones determines that centralised guidelines cannot be relevant to all situations. This evaluation is convinced that PSNP would rapidly start to demonstrate greater impact if local programme guidelines were promoted and developed. A starting point might be to explore the potential for Regions to formulate their own PIMs.

## **4.2 Targeting**

### *Strategic concerns – exploring the debate*

177. WFP's involvement to date with the design aspects of targeting systems in PSNP has been limited. The findings of the recent study on PSNP targeting<sup>52</sup> indicate that the problem of exclusion is potentially very serious. The same report also highlights the fact that higher numbers of the population are chronically food insecure than the current quotas allow for.

178. One of the World Bank's preparatory papers<sup>53</sup> for the introduction of the PSNP also highlights the scale of the problem and points out that any final targeting process will have to strike a balance between meeting needs and "reflecting implementation capacity and a strategy for M&E-based phased scaling up". Table 1 below, modified from the paper, illustrates the different options for possible PSNP target populations.

179. WFP's country programme<sup>54</sup> also draws on several sources of Government information to highlight the scale of predictable food insecurity: "18 million of the rural population have food

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<sup>52</sup> Targeting Ethiopia's Productive Safety Net Programme: Experience and issues raised in the first year of implementation; Kay Sharp, Taylor Brown and Amdissa Teshome (July 2006)

<sup>53</sup> Securing Consumption while Promoting Growth: The Role of a Productive Social Safety Net in Ethiopia An Issues Note; World Bank, Sept 2003

<sup>54</sup> WFP's country programme Ethiopia 10430.0 (2007–2011) (WFP/EB.2/2006/8/8)



gaps ranging from 1 to 12 months and there is low resilience to shocks, inadequate access to development opportunities, and a history of receiving limited long-term aid”

*Table 1: Food insecurity in Ethiopia, 2000: Alternative ways of estimating target populations (taken from the World Bank Issues Note: The Role of a Productive Social Safety Net in Ethiopia, 2003)*

Possible targeting criteria	% of HHs	Households (11million in 2000)	Population (65million in 2000)
Population living below national poverty line of \$0.45 per person per day	47%	5 million	31 million
Below minimum calorie needed (i.e. < 2200 Kcal)	39%	4.3 million	26 million
Below 1650 Kcal (severe hunger)	17%	1.87 million	11.4 million

Note: Analysis is based on HIES data collected by the CSA.

180. The majority of feedback collected by this evaluation strongly supports the view presented by the Targeting study and others that exclusion error may be significant in PSNP. We would also agree with these studies that any exclusion errors are largely due to issues of design and not poor implementation.

181. A key problem recognised by many with the existing system is that it is based on previous approaches known to be flawed and inadequate for PSNP needs. The recent review<sup>55</sup> of food security assessment approaches undertaken by ODI for WFP Ethiopia highlights the weaknesses of the previous targeting systems on which PSNP is still based (see section 2.3):

182. The conclusions of a recent study<sup>56</sup> by ACF therefore seem helpfully direct: “weak targeting criteria, fed by poor data, is leading to the exclusion of millions of chronically poor”. The recent JRIS Mission also raises concerns about exclusions and notes that probable exclusions in SNNPR and Oromiya may not be covered even if existing contingency funds are deployed<sup>57</sup>. Recent discussion regarding the opportunities to increase targeting sensitivity (by allowing three categories of PSNP beneficiary to receive benefits for 3, 6 or 9 months periods) also reflects the interest within GOE to make existing targeting systems more responsive to local needs.

183. The conclusions of this mid term evaluation, which match those highlighted above, are summarized as follows:

- The figure of 8.3 million people currently used by PSNP to define who is facing chronic food insecurity (and thus who can be included in the safety net) is not based on sufficiently objective livelihood evidence to justify its continued use. The old

<sup>55</sup> Review of Emergency Food Security Assessment Practice in Ethiopia; Nicholas Haan, Nisar Majid and James Darcy; Humanitarian Policy Group ODI 2006

<sup>56</sup> Towards a Future Without Hunger? The State of Food Security Policy and Programming in Ethiopia ACF, May 2006

<sup>57</sup> Aide Memoire: PSNP Joint Review and Implementation Support Mission October 2-12 2006



needs assessment system used for annual appeals was not designed to identify the chronically food insecure or ensure asset protection.

- The distinction between chronic and transient food insecurity is too ‘hazy’ and therefore not appropriate. Woreda Offices, donors, NGOs and communities repeatedly painted the same picture – that there remains little significant difference between most households in structurally food insecure Woredas since they are all chronically food insecure to some extent. The difference is quantitative, not qualitative, and relates for example to the duration of their food gaps and their level of vulnerability to acute shocks.
- The targeting system aims to select all households that suffer at least 3 months continuous food gap every year. Thus, excluded households still experience food gaps and the need to engage in destructive coping mechanisms to survive.
- The degree of exclusion error varies between Regions and Woredas but in all cases is probably leading to negative consequences that are weakening PSNP impact
- Further study is needed to start quantifying the problem in all Regions – in some Woredas exclusion may be low (less than 10%) and in others much higher (possibly over 50%).

184. Clearly targeting remains a sensitive issue. Ethiopia’s Government is probably unique in Africa at the moment in that it is seeking to reduce donor inputs for short term aid in order to promote long term and sustainable solutions that allow real self-reliance. Thus, an unusual situation applies where some donors actually want to invest more in the safety net to allow exclusion errors to be addressed, but are not doing so because of GOE’s fears of fostering wider dependency on aid. However, it is the belief of this evaluation that the GOE also welcomes critical debate on such issues and encourages all partners to present their point of view based on clear and verifiable evidence.

*WFP’s position on PSNP targeting issues and developing an objective livelihood basis for advocacy*

185. A starting point for WFP should be to clarify its own corporate position on PSNP targeting so that it can lobby and advocate accordingly. This evaluation discovered a range of opinions within the organisation and clearly there are different realities in, and between, the different Regions.

186. A central recommendation of this MTE is that WFP becomes an active partner of the Livelihood Integration Unit’s (LIU) initiative to institutionalise the use of the household economy approach (HEA) for food security needs assessment. With its network of monitors covering all Regions combined with the analytical capacity of its VAM unit, WFP is ideally placed to work with the LIU to explore the potential for using HEA to inform many aspects of PSNP. The working methodologies currently being developed by the LIU would confer a number of targeting related benefits to the PSNP:

- allowing the targeting debate to be informed by a much greater degree of empirical and quantitative evidence than is now possible;
- helping to understand and quantify the livelihood consequences of different wage rates, ration sizes and cash/food balances;
- helping to clarify the programmatic linkages between PSNP and additional relief responses (see section 5.3);



- helping to generate useful working definitions of food security by understanding the additional income needed to meet other livelihood needs (medicine, school books, clothes, social obligations etc);and
- contributing to the debate on graduation by quantifying livelihood impacts of PSNP, OFSP and other interventions.

187. The recent study<sup>58</sup> by ACF also advocates for the use of HEA to better inform targeting of the PSNP.

188. The opportunity to work with FEG and the LIU also represents an exciting opportunity for WFP Ethiopia to develop its own analytical tools for VAM and explore alternatives to the CFSVA<sup>59</sup> approach that it currently uses (and recognises is imperfect). Similarly the LIU itself would welcome WFP as an active partner, recognising its potential to contribute (through the work of its FMs and VAM) and to lead the process for introducing the approach into the PSNP.

189. WFP could also achieve more by working in partnership with other agencies to develop empirical evidence on targeting issues. SC-UK and CARE for example both invest a great deal of field time in accompanying and supporting the targeting process at kebele level, e.g. training, manuals etc..

190. Under PRRO 10362 WFP could be usefully investigating a number of specific targeting-related issues to generate more objective and empirical evidence for the on-going debate. These are as follows:

*Comparative studies of Woreda targeting requests, regional ceilings and local dilution effects*

191. Most Woredas undertake their own targeting (and subsequent retargeting) exercises to arrive at initial estimates of total beneficiary numbers. These then have to be further reduced to fit with the centrally imposed ceilings. For example, following its retargeting exercise Feddis Woreda estimated that approximately 88,800 people required PSNP assistance. During 2005 it was allocated a caseload of 62,456 people (70%) and for 2006 this was increased to 69,524 (78%). It would be instructive to undertake a similar analysis for all Woredas now participating in the PSNP.

192. WFP and partners could then undertake a comparative assessment of dilution effects in different Woredas and examine the connection with targeting and locally perceived exclusion rates. In the Tigray Woredas visited by this evaluation it would appear that quotas were less strictly imposed giving more room for Woreda retargeting exercises to determine final beneficiary numbers. It may be that dilution is less pronounced in such woredas while, as indicated in WFP's (unpublished) FAUIS report for 2005, dilution may be more pronounced in some other Woredas. WFP field monitors and VAM (in partnership with NGOs where present) could begin compiling such data to help inform the targeting debate.

*Working with partners to monitor secondary effects of targeting systems*

193. A particular concern that some informants raised was that the current targeting system could be provoking unhelpful divisions within communities and eroding traditional self-help

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<sup>58</sup> Towards a Future Without Hunger? The State of Food Security Policy and Programming in Ethiopia ACF, May 2006

<sup>59</sup> Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis (CFSVA)



mechanisms. The World Bank's PAD for the APLII<sup>60</sup> for PSNP also highlights this potential side-effect, stating: "that given the pervasiveness of poverty in program Woredas and inevitable budget constraints, there is social tension around the exclusion of households who are perceived as deserving assistance". The Targeting Study alludes to similar problems. The fact that many woredas are implementing linked food security initiatives, e.g. the household package, albeit to widely varying degrees, can only exacerbate such tensions where these exist. While this evaluation was unable to draw any firm conclusions on this subject, it would agree that the issue warrant's further follow up.

#### *Drawing on WFP's international experience with Safety Nets*

194. Several informants, including donors, felt that the targeting bar should be lowered since excluding those with 2 to 0 month food gaps was resulting in too many unprotected households slipping deeper into poverty. WFP could do more to draw on other safety net programming experiences and apply these to the Ethiopia context. WFP might consider organising exposure visits for relevant Government decision makers to help broaden their own understanding and vision.

### **4.3 Cash, food or a combination of both**

195. WFP Ethiopia deserves congratulation on their efforts to actively promote and support the use of cash over food in the PSNP<sup>61</sup>.

196. All donors and GOE informants agreed that the debate is no longer about cash or food, but rather about finding the optimum balance to best fit local livelihood and market realities and how this might change seasonally and annually according to the wider socio-economic environment. All informants also agreed that a more systematic means of decision making to inform such cash-food programming is needed and they welcomed the idea for the development and adoption of a framework for decision-making based on objective analysis of empirical evidence<sup>62</sup>. Current decision making remains somewhat ad hoc and this may be one area where Woredas need help to make more informed decisions. Thus, the mechanism of defining the cash/food split for 2007 will be a combination of the analysis of previous years' experience (the 2005 provisions and the initial plan for 2006) and Woreda preference<sup>63</sup>.

197. A key recommendation to WFP is to actively contribute to the development of a decision making framework based on a sound analysis of relevant market forces that will allow calculation of optimal cash/food wages for PSNP to fit with local Woreda realities.

198. WFP Ethiopia should start by developing and clarifying its own position on the use of cash and food in the PSNP. Already, WFP as an organisation is supporting the use of cash in certain countries. WFP's own policy paper on safety nets<sup>64</sup> draws attention to the added value of using cash instead of food. However, WFP Ethiopia could develop more nuanced understanding around the issue. By drawing on its network of Field Monitors and its VAM unit WFP is well

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<sup>60</sup> Draft Project Appraisal Document (PAD) for A Productive Safety Nets APLII Project (October 3, 2006)

<sup>61</sup> The enormous contribution that WFP in responding to shifts from cash to food is discussed in section4 looking at implementation experiences

<sup>62</sup> We were informed by DFID that the process for developing such a framework is currently being initiated.

<sup>63</sup> Aide Memoire: PSNP Joint Review and Implementation Support Mission October 2-12 2006

<sup>64</sup> WFP and Food based Safety Nets: concepts, experiences and future programming opportunities (WFP/EB.3/2004/4-A)





placed to investigate the practical implications to PSNP of a number of a market related issues, including:

- the effect that the gradual replacement of food aid by cash may have on improving market elasticity and subsequent duration of initial lag period (in which supply fails to adequately reflect demand)<sup>65</sup>
- the role of WFP local purchase initiatives within PSNP
- the differing effects of food and cash injections on market supply and prices, depending on size of distributions, time of year, market linkages

199. It is recommended therefore that WFP consults with the donor consortium and GOE to identify key studies and research issues that fall within WFP's area of expertise. This would link directly to a current WFP initiative to work with IFPRI to develop a WFP cash Transfer Policy Paper (by 2008) and comprehensive programme guidance materials (by 2009)<sup>66</sup>.

200. Research could also address the more controversial issue related to the size of the cash wage. This evaluation would support the findings of others that the key issue related to community preferences is related to the respective value of the cash and food wage being offered (as discussed above in section 3.5). Where the current monthly wage of 30 Birr can buy more than is provided by the current monthly food basket<sup>67</sup> beneficiaries prefer cash and where not, they prefer payment in food. Since invariably this relative value also reflects the food availability in local markets, the issue of access to food need not be seen as a separate issue. However, relative value (and thus preference) does depend on the timing of distribution over the course of the year and in all the Woredas visited by this evaluation, the basic assumption (that food becomes more valuable over the course of the dry season) was upheld.

201. The Food Security Coordination and Disaster Prevention Office (FSCDO) Biannual Report of 2006 for PSNP implementation in Amhara Region Sept 2006 illustrates the issue clearly. "The PSNP wage rate on Public Works was set at 6 Birr per day, on the assumption that this would be enough to purchase 3 kilograms of staple food. Because of variations in prices across both regions and seasons, the actual purchasing power of the PSNP transfer in terms of the four basic staple crops varied by more than 100%, from as little as 2.5 kg (in Tigray in mid-2005) to as much as 5.9 kg (in SNNPR in late 2005). On average over the year, 6 Birr could purchase more than 3 kilograms of staple food in two regions (SNNPR and Oromiya), but less than 3 kilograms in the other two regions (Amhara and Tigray)".

202. Given some of WFP's broader corporate initiatives<sup>68</sup> to promote appropriate cash transfers, such action research within PRRO 10362 would have a much wider importance than just improving PSNP impacts, as the findings would feed into wider policy development<sup>69</sup> Country Office in Addis Ababa should therefore ensure that all field staff are aware of these on-going policy developments within WFP so that they can recognise not only the organisational legitimacy of improving cash transfers but also the corporate importance attached to such efforts.

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<sup>65</sup> This is possibly one area where decision making should not be left entirely to Woredas and beneficiaries. It seems likely that in many areas it will require the gradual replacement of food aid by cash for the responsiveness of markets (i.e. of supply to demand) to become fully developed but that it may take a period of time for this to occur.

<sup>66</sup> Building Consensus on in-kind and cash transfers; a Project Concept Note; PDPS WFP 2006 (contact Steven Omamo)

<sup>67</sup> The current PSNP monthly ration (i.e. for 1 person working 5 days) is 15kg cereal, 1.5 kg pulses and 0.45 kg oil

<sup>68</sup> See for example: Cash and Food Transfers: A Primer; Social Protection and Livelihoods Service (PDPS), WFP (Oct. 2006)

<sup>69</sup> Building Consensus on in-kind and cash transfers; a Project Concept Note; PDPS WFP 2006 (contact Steven Omamo)



#### 4.4 Asset creation and the public works programmes

##### *Progress*

203. The inclusion of Community Based Participatory Watershed Development (CBPWD)<sup>70</sup> as a key part of the PSNP public works programme arises from the commitment and vision of a number of key GOE institutions and actors, not least MOARD. That said, WFP (through MERET) has played a crucial role in formulation of the relevant parts of the PIM, of the participatory planning process and of the technical guidelines. This was an enormous undertaking (as is the on-going capacity building needed to help turn the policy into practice) and has allowed some crucial aspects of effective CBPWD to be included in the necessary guidelines<sup>71</sup>. In addition, WFP has played an important role in helping to develop the procedures for initiating and supporting public works in the other sectors.

204. WFP has also played a key role in helping to draw out lessons from PSNP public works through its involvement in the MOARD's public works review process carried out during the first half of 2006 in the 4 main Regions<sup>72</sup>. WFP has provided expertise and staff to design and carry out the review in all Regions and assisted in writing reports where delegated to do so. Many of the conclusions of this evaluation are reflected in these regional reviews, especially concerning problems linked to capacity, resource flows and the need to improve participation. Several additional issues are raised below which should complement the recommendations of the Public Works reviews.

##### *Conditionality versus entitlement- a challenge for CBPWD?*

205. Concerns were expressed by several key informants that the public works will be unable to “catalyze the environmental transformation”<sup>73</sup> hoped for by the World Bank and others. They consider that the approach and guidelines still remain too output and resource driven. Furthermore they point to a possible contradiction in the system: that of conditionality versus entitlement. How can the threat of with-holding a payment (be it food or cash) be used to ensure quality control, when that same payment represents a humanitarian right being transferred to ensure adequate consumption?

206. At present there are two types of public works:

- one-off projects for which people just have to turn up for work (e.g. most social infrastructure – constructing or repairing schools, clinics, DA offices, bridges and roads etc), and
- long term processes which require high levels of community ownership and decision making to be effective (such as CBPWD)

207. This evaluation concludes that while there are no major design issues undermining the achievement of the first type of public works (i.e. the one-off construction projects) there are

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<sup>70</sup> MOARD's national guidelines: “Community Based Participatory Watershed Management” were developed independently of the PSNP process, as part of the Ethiopia's technical strategy for improving natural resource management. These guidelines also benefited greatly from MERET experiences.

<sup>71</sup> These include many of the participatory planning steps and the agreement that private lands *can* be included in PSNP plans on when such work is necessary to safe-guard the watershed.

<sup>72</sup> See the separate reports for Amhara, Oromiya, SNNPR and Tigray “PSNP Public Works Review Reports”– Draft May 2006

<sup>73</sup> Draft Project Appraisal Document (PAD) for A Productive Safety Nets APLII Project (October 3, 2006)



evident problems with the long term participatory process of CBPWD. In part this is a result of lack of experience and capacity (training is still on-going for many DAs) but also ownership issues. In some Woredas we found substantial differences between CBPWD being conducted through MERET and PSNP by the same DAs and experts using the same planning approach in different watersheds in the same Kebeles. The primary reason was due to the conflict between entitlement to the resource and ownership of the process.

208. Based on discussions with women and men working on CBPWD through PSNP and MERET in a number of Woredas in different regions the MTE proposes a number of action-research and pilot initiatives which if possible should be implemented in partnership with other agencies.

209. The whole process could be tested by MOARD using MERET and any collaborating partners such as GTZ or other NGOs who wish to be involved. Indeed it might be that this also provides an interesting additional variation of a pilot to help MOARD and WFP find the optimal working relationship between CBPWD processes promoted through PSNP and those promoted through MERET. In this variation, in a new kebele MERET PLUS could be used as the mechanism to initiate CBPWD and household asset creation, in partnership with OFSP and any additional initiatives following the same steps as below. Preferably (assuming donor support) a mixed cash-food payment would be used and all who want to participate would have the chance to work. The measures currently being developed and used by MERET PLUS to support labour poor households, breast feeding mothers, handicapped, those living with HIV/AIDS would be adopted. The same community managed quality control and resource transfer would be used as proposed below. An exit strategy for MERET would be defined from the start so that after a given number of years, it could phase out and move to a new kebele. At this stage, the WBOARD would facilitate those catchment residents eligible for PSNP support to register with the safety net. The CBPWD process would continue, with a reduced paid workforce with increased voluntary contributions and/or just reduced outputs.



**Box 4: Action research: Increasing community ownership of CBPWD public works**

- i) According to its own capacity and work plans the Woreda Office of Agriculture and Rural Development (WOARD) facilitates a process of CBPWD in a number of sub-watersheds
- ii) It initiates the participatory planning approach (using existing guidelines) with the whole community living in the sub-watershed regardless of their relative wealth (i.e. both PSNP beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries alike) and generates analyses, objectives, indicators of impact, means of verification and 5 year management plans that are all clearly owned by the local community. The plan provides an overview of all the work that needs to be done, both on public and private land during the 5 year period. It also ensures that the issue of land registration or usufruct is directly addressed so that it is quite clear to all who will actually benefit from a given natural resource.
- iii) DAs then facilitate the community planning team to produce the more detailed annual action plans. Only at this stage is the community planning team facilitated to define the various tasks that will be conducted with cash and/or food for work and capital budget support through PSNP. If any support mechanisms are also available in the watershed (whether MERET, GTZ SUN or the different NGOs support NRM such as Farm Africa, SOS Sahel, SNV, CARE, Action Aid etc) their contribution to the watershed management plan will also be devised at this stage.
- iv) Having agreed on the tasks, the work norms (and thus required person days) and the level of quality needed, the responsibility for managing the food resource is formally transferred to the community planning team (11 members, 5 women and 6 men). This does not imply that the cash or food itself has to be transferred, but that quality control and approval mechanism for payment does not rest with the PA or DA but with the community themselves.
- v) DAs and experts (and any WFP FMs or NGO partners as relevant) will continue to provide technical support and assistance and the PA will provide approval and managerial assistance.
- vi) At the end of each year, the community is facilitated to conduct its own simple evaluation of the process, looking both at impacts on consumption and household asset protection of PSNP beneficiaries and on wider outcomes and impacts of the NRM work.. The results of these evaluations are then used to improve the process for the next year.

210. Additional initiatives that could be considered for piloting (again, preferably in partnership with others) as a means to test feasibility and relevance for subsequent inclusion into PSNP policy guidelines and PIM are:

- Develop and institutionalise the participatory evaluation systems needed to allow PSNP beneficiaries to evaluate the impacts of public works themselves
- Reduce current work norms since those calculated for MERET may be too challenging for safety net beneficiaries. While this will slow down rate of outputs it should not affect quality and will reduce the risk of public work obligations preventing labour poor households from fulfilling their other livelihood activities. By at least piloting such an approach, stake-holders will be able to test whether these advantages are realised sufficiently or whether possible negative impacts result from different sets of work norms being employed for PSNP and for MERET.



### *Increasing potential impact of CBPWD*

211. The evaluation team would endorse the conclusions of the WFP team that greater impact could be generated by PSNP asset creation through a number of design modifications to the current PIM guidelines. Furthermore the feedback collected by the evaluation suggests that at Regional level there is plenty of willingness to allow new ideas to be piloted. It is therefore recommended that in each Region, WFP and BoARD (plus any collaborating NGOs also promoting relevant processes) develop a series of action research sites to allow the testing and demonstration of such innovations within on-going public works. The lessons from such pilots can then be used to inform advocacy for subsequent policy development. Several of the ideas listed below have come directly from WFP team members:

- Develop a range of activities that allow pregnant and lactating women, handicapped and labour-poor households to actively participate in meaningful ways, (e.g. sedentary work in community or private nurseries, helping with crèches etc)
- Allow greater inclusion of homestead oriented activities and household asset creation in general that still contribute to the common good
- Develop mechanisms to allow public works activities to be explicitly used as means of helping labour poor households increase the value of their land

If such action research pilots were set up, communities could be encouraged and facilitated to further identify their own ideas on how special needs groups might contribute and benefit more fully from new and innovative packages.

212. WFP could also significantly increase understanding of PSNP by monitoring various ways that public works are being implemented in practice. At present there is no systematic means for ensuring that this wealth of experience is being compiled and disseminated. In addition there is no strong mechanisms in the Woredas where the seven PSNP NGOs<sup>74</sup> are operating for disseminating lessons learnt. WFP could facilitate such dissemination.

### *Reducing the opportunity costs of public works to participate*

213. WFP could investigate the extent to which public works labour requirements are competing with labour demands for household activities. Recommendations have already been made through APL II to set a ceiling on the number of work days that one individual can be expected to make on behalf of other household members unable to work. Questions include; How would labour poor households be using their time more productively if PSNP labour demands were reduced? What labour non-intensive public works could be introduced to help spread the workload among other members of labour poor households? With appropriate guidance, WFP's field monitors could increase collective understanding on such issues by including structured assessment and field research as part of their routine activities.

## **4.5 Mechanisms for Resource transfer**

214. The recent JRIS and APL II are focusing on improving predictability of resource transfer and a range of new implementation systems will be introduced during 2007<sup>75</sup>, including financial 'front-loading' of Woreda budgets, improved banking systems, improved food

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<sup>74</sup> Action Aid, CARE, CRS, FHI, REST, SC-UK, World Vision

<sup>75</sup> See the World Bank Aide Memoire; PSNP Pre- Appraisal Mission, APL II October 13-26, 2006



procurement and distribution systems and improved use of contingency funds. However, this evaluation also identifies a number of interventions that WFP could usefully consider to help improve mechanisms by which resources are transferred.

215. The first is to pilot an enhanced community role in quality control that can result from increased ownership of the process (as described above). The second is to explore the possibility of allowing resource transfers to be conducted in advance of actual completion of the public works. For many, the full potential impact of PSNP on consumption smoothing and asset protection will only be reached if transfers are carried out in advance of times of need. Furthermore, as seasonality of food shortages is different between Regions and livelihood zones there is an optimal time to receive cash payments and an optimal time to receive food for each woreda.

216. WFP would be well placed (where possible in conjunction with other agencies) to support the relevant action research in a range of Woredas to facilitate these early transfers and monitor impact on:

- household consumption patterns
- household asset protection
- forward planning by households to undertake their own additional initiatives
- outputs and quality achieved in public works

217. It would be relatively simple to make comparisons with neighbouring 'control' kebeles..

218. Thirdly, given DAs' complaints of the enormous clerical workload being generated every month by PSNP's current payment modalities, WFP could usefully impart its experience in managing transfers based on tasks and agreed work norms. Such systems would not only free up DA time to focus more on technical issues but could also serve to strengthen ownership. One approach that deserves piloting (which GTZ SUN also intends introducing) involves agreeing on the total number of person days that a specific task will require and then inviting groups of beneficiaries to organise themselves and bid for the work. In this way, a group could decide on their own time frame, either working hard to complete the task rapidly or more gradually allowing them to simultaneously undertake other activities. Payment could be made as a final lump sum to the work group's own selected organising committee (who would then be responsible for paying the members) or in agreed tranches. The issue of quality control might also be incorporated, by with-holding a proportion of the final payment to the group as necessary. This would not only simplify the transfer process but also generate a series of empowering experiences for the workers.

## **4.6 Responsiveness to pastoralists**

### *Overview*

219. The PSNP has not expanded into all pastoralist areas out of recognition that alternative means of engagement first need to be developed if the particular livelihood opportunities and constraints of pastoralists are to be properly addressed. Food is currently supplied to Afar region woredas as part of the PSNP through the direct support mechanism while in the Borana and



Karrayu homelands of Oromiya Region, PSNP is already fully operational (with WFP support to food only and food/cash Woredas).

220. The recent in-depth study of livelihoods in Somali region by IDS<sup>76</sup> highlights that a key issue for pastoralists is one of decreasing capacity to cope with drought and that food aid does little to strengthen relevant coping mechanisms. The study also highlights the enormous complexity of livelihood types in the region. All key informants interviewed as part of the evaluation argued the need for responding differently to the specific livelihood situations in pastoralist areas (the most obvious example being the difference between destitute ‘ex-pastoralists’ who have already lost all their animals and moved to the peripheries of towns and those who are highly vulnerable but are still herding out in the traditional range areas). Clearly, pastoralist livelihoods are in transition with an emerging destitute class that have lost their livestock and for whom the existing PSNP may well be an appropriate response.

221. The IDS report concluded “...food aid policy in Somali Region [and many of the other pastoralist areas in Ethiopia] urgently needs to be reconsidered. “Since 1999/2000, 25% of the population in Somali has been declared in need of food aid and over a million mt delivered – but the amount received per beneficiary household has been trivial and there has been much misappropriation and an unhealthy effect on markets reducing incentives for traders and producers”. The extensive livelihood analysis done by SC-UK in Somali also back up these conclusions and provides an important foundation from which to design livelihood protection initiatives<sup>77</sup>.

222. Our first and strongest recommendation to WFP Ethiopia regarding pastoralists therefore is to support this opportunity for change and neither presume nor promote the blanket continuation of food aid in pastoralist areas, as current relief responses evolve in conjunction and within PSNP.

#### *Pastoralist Task Force (PTF)*

223. A pastoralist task force (PTF) has been established by the GOE and donors to oversee the process of helping PSNP to become as responsive as possible to pastoralist needs. Chaired by the FSCB with the USAID PSNP coordinator and the Pastoralist focus person for SC-US as acting Secretaries, the PTF is currently facilitating a series of consultancies to identify options for developing pastoralist-specific aspects of the PIM. This task force represents the key mechanism to help improve the pastoralist responsiveness of PSNP design; if WFP is to ensure that PRRO 10362 is involved in this process, it must use its membership on the PTF to full effect to advocate for appropriate development of a pastoralist PIM.

#### *Targeting – “trying (and failing) to knock square pegs into round holes”*

224. Attempts to impose the existing targeting system in pastoralist areas are not working. The evaluation revealed many examples of the inappropriateness of conventional targeting systems for pastoralist communities. It is perhaps surprising that WFP, along with the other PSNP actors continues to use these systems without attempting to develop alternatives. Key conclusions by

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<sup>76</sup> See page 16 in ‘Vulnerable Livelihoods in Somali Region, Ethiopia’ by S. Devereux (IDS Research Report 57 April 2006)

<sup>77</sup> see “Managing Risks and Opportunities – an Understanding of livelihoods in Somali regional state, Ethiopia” which identifies 17 Livelihood Zones and provides full baseline reports, summary livelihood profiles, data spreadsheets and a report on a livestock aerial survey of Somali Region carried out in November 2003.



the evaluation team of PSNP's targeting experiences over the last 2 years with Karrayu, Borana and Afar pastoralist and agro-pastoralist communities are drawn out here. An overall conclusion is that across the considerable range of different pastoralist realities in Ethiopia, no one single targeting system is likely to succeed (or fail) to the same extent. It is clear that the current system is dysfunctional for those groups whose livelihoods still depend on the traditional pastoralist way of life and leads to significant inclusion and exclusion errors and massive dilution effects. An interesting range of discrepancies are apparent under the PSNP: leaders ensuring that they and their extended families are included (and often on direct support); large numbers of households registering but with severely reduced family sizes; beneficiaries rotating after every few months; the extensive use of the relief programme to 'mop' up excluded families.

225. There is also a strong perception that centrally imposed target ceilings are overly restrictive. Thus for the 8 Woredas of Borana, approved PSNP beneficiary numbers remain, on average, at less than 50% of requested allocations generated by local retargeting exercises. For 2006, a total of 124,189 beneficiaries were approved. This contrasts significantly with the relief allocation mechanism, where for 2006 100% of the requested number of 150,172 beneficiaries was approved. A similar situation was found with the Karrayu in Fentale Woreda.

226. Targeting problems are also being experienced with the OFSP. In Fentale Woreda it was found that a great many of the 238 households who were provided with loans (of 2,500 Birr each) were the better-off members of the local society and not the poorer families for whom the credit was intended.

227. The overwhelming experience to date is that regardless of the system applied, the majority of pastoralist groups will ensure that resources are redistributed according to their own systems. These systems may be far from egalitarian or democratic – indeed they are invariably overseen by hierarchies of leaders through the clan system – but they may be the best option available to help people survive in the harsh living conditions of pastoralist areas. Box 5 presents the logic of the Borana pastoralists; While this thinking may not be identical to what occurs in Afar, Somali or other groups, it is largely representative of pastoralist sharing habits.

**Box 5: Borana rationalization for not targeting**

In the words of two Borana pastoralists interviewed during this evaluation:

“Safety net or relief may be terminated or phased out anytime. Then, the only people to turn to in times of need are fellow clansmen with whom one has been willing to share any resource available. Safety net or relief cannot be relied upon at such times. The community managed to hold together and survive to this day not through safety net but because of such institutions. Indeed, no one will come to the rescue of a community member who has not been willing to share together any material expressions of government generosity.”

“We are told that safety net lasts for five years. But our survival as a community all this time has depended not on the government or the safety net and relief programs. Rather our tradition of mutual support is what has guaranteed our continued existence perpetually. Poorer community members manage to survive as a result of the help of the richer fellow villagers. The same will hold true once safety net has outlived its assigned period”.





228. Nonetheless, the evaluation team concluded that the type of targeting system promoted by government and implementing partners is critically important for the following reasons. :

- What may not work for practicing pastoralists may still be appropriate for the many ex-pastoralists whose livelihoods no longer depend on herding – whether agro-pastoralists and newly settled farmers trying to depend more on crops, or the destitute selling firewood and labour who no longer have the same support of the wider clan system as do the practicing herders.
- Even among the many who still have fully pastoralist livelihoods, there is always room to work with leaders and existing systems (rather than against them) to find ways of maximising the potential impact of the PSNP resource for the most needy.
- There is clearly a need to develop a more dynamic targeting system that can, at least to some extent, respond to the different livelihood realities found in pastoralist areas. The Karrayu themselves have a saying that “A poor man in Koboo (a predominantly pastoral Kebele) is better off than a rich man in Gelcha (a sedentary ex-pastoral neighbourhood)” and yet current targeting systems tend to include the former and exclude the latter (although in the Borana Woredas visited, this problem was less evident).
- The rigid application of existing systems is not only extremely time-consuming, frustrating and demoralising for the local administration, experts and DAs, but it may also be under-mining traditional self-help mechanisms. The resulting scramble for external resources is actually contrary to the existing inbuilt traditional mutual support systems and institutions in these communities and in some cases can provoke conflict (Box 6 below illustrates this with an example from the Karrayu that occurred in 2006 ).

**Box 6 Conflict & targeting: a case study from the Karrayu of Kobbo Kebele, Fentale Woreda, 2006**

A committee drawn from the villages (Olla) and communities (Gots) was named to carry out a screening process, to determine who qualified for inclusion and who did not. The committee sat down to business under the blessing of ritual leaders who, by quoting from the Koran, put the members under oath not to discriminate against the less fortunate of their own fellow community members. In the screening process that ensued, twenty five household heads identified as well off were excluded. These reacted by protesting the re-targeting and appealing to the Woreda Agriculture and Pastoral Office for reconsideration. They also sought a reversal of the decision by sending over their wives and children to the concerned office, reasoning that they would get sympathy, because of the current emphasis on gender and child issues. When all this did not work out in their favour, the deselected later mobilized fellow clansmen, trying to retaliate by stopping the public work activities through the incitement of violence. The issue began to take on a clan dimension, resulting in the confrontation of two major clans, with an armed onslaught becoming a possibility. At this point, clan elders intervened and arbitrated between the conflicting sides. They reasoned that the safety net was not there to stay. It was a temporary programme and would be withdrawn at some time but the clans would remain in their native land for generations to come. There was no point, therefore, in allowing the safety net to turn into a blood feud between their two sister clans. Cases of exclusion have also resulted in similar, but less violent, clan associated disputes in other Kebeles.

229. Clearly, WFP must continue to work with pastoral communities, Government and other partners to start developing and field testing more appropriate targeting systems for pastoralist



areas. To this end partnerships should be established with some of the more experienced NGOs working in pastoralist areas (including SC-UK in Somali and Afar and SOS-Sahel, SC-US and CARE in Borana). The considerable livelihood analysis already undertaken by SC-UK represents a significant resource to help start designing improved targeting systems

230. There are at least five key guiding principles highlighted by our brief analysis that should inform the efforts of WFP to improve targeting design:

- consider developing multiple systems that can respond to the different socio-economic realities found in pastoralist areas;
- ensure that pastoralist groups themselves are closely involved in the design and piloting process;
- work in partnership with other agencies already facilitating relevant interventions in pastoralist areas;
- explore the potential for developing self-targeting systems with wage rates low enough to discourage the wealthier groups because of the higher opportunity costs
- ensure that potential clan rivalries are not exacerbated by targeting systems

#### *Cash, food or a mixture of both?*

231. The same issues pertaining to the cash/food debate in settled areas are relevant to pastoralist areas, i.e. where 30 Birr per month can buy more than the monthly food package provided (e.g. as in Yebello Woreda in Borana) cash is preferred; where not (e.g. in Fentale or parts of Tatale Woreda in Borana) food is preferred. Again we see the same potential additional benefits of cash (e.g. greater flexibility to address household needs, easier mobility and lower transaction costs, easier distribution modalities) and the potential drawbacks (e.g. limited availability of food for purchase, temptations for misuse - especially by men, increased difficulties in community targeting). There may also be certain pastoralist specific issues.

232. In pastoralist areas there may be greater need to increase the wage rate compared to cereal-producing regions as market prices tend to be that much higher. However, the degree of variability in expressed preference for one type of resource transfer over another is striking.

233. The absence of storage facilities at Kebele level constitutes another serious challenge in some pastoral areas. Delays in food delivery resulting in late and one-off deliveries meant for three or four months have caused significant storage challenges. In some instances supplies have been dumped in the open and in other cases renting stores from private business owners in the Woreda has been necessary, e.g. in Fentale. Since no budget was allocated for this, the Woreda Agriculture and Pastoral Bureau had to secure extra funds. Beneficiaries also had to travel some distances in order to get to the woreda capital to collect their food wage.

234. There may also be pastoralist specific issues of security. Evaluation team members were told that in some cases cash is easier to manage in an accountable and secure way than food. There were some reports of food stores being broken into and looted while protection of trucks delivering food was occasionally problematic. Where storage facilities have to be improvised, e.g. school compounds, theft was a major risk. However, conflicting opinions exist and many assume that moving around large amounts of cash in areas such as Somali poses significant security risks. Others however point to the considerable success that has been achieved by using private sector mechanisms for cash transfers in pastoralist areas (in Kenya and Somalia). Not only are huge amounts of remittances already being channelled through such informal banking services, but some NGOs are also reportedly beginning to use them.



235. By working in partnership with other agencies, drawing on guidelines generated by the pastoralist task force, and through close consultation with pastoralist groups, WFP could add considerable value to PSNP by improving the process of decision making which selects the final food-cash combination to be used. As proposed for settled farmers (section 4.3), VAM could be helping to develop a framework for decision making based on locally relevant livelihood data. Much of these data are already available through the work of SC-UK. WFP could be doing more to pilot new approaches using field monitors to allow close follow-up of outcomes

### *Public Works*

236. In the pastoralist areas where PSNP has been officially promoting public works (i.e. Borana Zone and Fentale), the general experience has not been very encouraging. Public works have generally been of low quality and for the most part will contribute little in terms of helping to strengthen pastoralist livelihoods. A key reason for the current review being conducted by the pastoralist task force is because the Government and all partners involved anticipated such difficulties.

237. Some of the major problems identified by this evaluation include:

- The lack of experience of local populations in producing project work plans, especially related to watershed management
- The inappropriateness of many of the ‘typical’ public works projects being offered (and in which experts and DAs are trained)
- The fact that the pastoralist workload calendar is completely different to those of cereal producing areas<sup>78</sup>.
- Expecting mobile nomads to come to work in fixed locations often far from their mobile cattle camps
- The lack of any sort of local ownership or perceived benefits among pastoralists of the public works
- The fact that the higher grain prices characteristic of many pastoralist areas reduce the relevance of the official PSNP wage of 6 Birr and also promote a discrepancy with NGO supported activities which pay more<sup>79</sup> than PSNP in an effort to compensate for this market reality.

238. The activities undertaken by the Borana and Karrayu include the construction of community ponds, community feeder roads, supplementary irrigation, micro basins, area closure, bush clearing and in the case of the Borana, fencing schools, public health posts, and farmer training centres (FTC), and other soil and water conservation activities. The unfamiliarity of the locals with the skills that these activities require, the practice by household heads to send over their wives and children to engage in public works, limited perseverance shown while on

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<sup>78</sup> The program has been duplicated in pastoral communities without considering the livelihood patterns and migration cycles of the herding population. Pastoralists with sufficient herds who are therefore much more nomadic will find it convenient to take part in public works during the rainy and post-rainy seasons. Those with less livestock to attend to seem to prefer the dry season (hungry period) to undertake the work. For agro-pastoralist, the post harvest or slack season is apparently the most preferred period for undertaking public works.

<sup>79</sup> An example: the Red Cross and the Pastoral Community Development Project (PCDP) run parallel to safety net in Borana. Recent observations are that households send over for public works those of their members who are physically less fit, while making sure that the most capable engage in the better paying projects run by NGOs. In order to reconcile such differences and introduce uniform payment system, the Zone office is reported to have called a meeting of the concerned groups, due to be held early in December.



duty, and irregularities in reporting for work have been the major challenges in ensuring that beneficiaries comply with the norms of public work activities.

239. An interesting and perhaps unexpected outcome has been that for a range of social reasons, it seems that many pastoralists will take public works employment much more seriously when paid with cash rather than with food. Food payments are perceived more as unconditional and charitable hand outs while cash payment are seen more as contractually binding transfers. Furthermore, as cash is also considered to be private property that need not be immediately shared out, workers are more motivated to do a good job. DAs and Kebele authorities thus found it harder to achieve any sort of quality control when payments were made with food..

240. Another finding of this evaluation is that outputs and outcomes are highly dependent upon skills and leadership qualities of individuals. Contrary to expectations, Moyale is reported to have seen some of the highest quality of public works, e.g. construction of ponds and water wells and the associated cultivation of horticultural fields, since the introduction of the safety net program. As a border woreda linked to a contraband economy with high levels of illegality this was surprising. The success is attributed to the leadership qualities of the Woreda DPPA and Food Security officer who were said to be running the program in a particularly participatory manner..

#### *Horizontal Linkages*

241. The pastoralist environment clearly poses special challenges for PSNP. The need for flexible, multi-faceted and holistic responses involving coordinated partnerships between agencies may be critical. Food aid alone is unlikely to contribute significantly to meaningful change. One of the most productive roles that PRRO 10362 could take therefore is to strengthen partnerships with and between GOs and NGOs and continue to advocate for the complementary interventions necessary to allow its food contributions to have maximum impact. The focus will need to be much more on promoting the enabling economic environment, relevant social services, conflict resolution mechanisms and appropriate livestock related interventions needed to strengthen coping mechanisms. Clearly, much of this falls outside of WFP's remit, but it could take on more of a role than at present in awareness raising of donors and policy makers around these issues. .

### **4.7 Gender sensitivity of PSNP design**

242. The PSNP PIM contains a number of gender sensitive elements by;

- Encouraging women's participation in the Food Security Task Forces (although there are no target percentages at Woreda level there are targets at Kebele level i.e. 3 elected women representatives and at community level, 2 or 3 elected women representatives – (see Revised PIM ))
- Recognising that widows and other female household heads are more likely to need direct support, and that pregnant and breastfeeding women should be exempt from the public works
- Allowing for public works to be carried out on private land owned by labour poor female-headed households and prioritizing activities which are designed to reduce women's regular work burden and increase access to productive assets.

243. However, it does not explicitly direct women to work less hours than men on public work programmes or promote shorter work times to help women accommodate other daily chores.



244. PRRO 10362 does not prioritise gender issues per se for PSNP. At head office in Addis, the responsibility for overseeing gender is part of a combined job description and not a full time post. Furthermore, there are no female members of the PSNP team. However, it should be noted that there are gender focal points in programme units and sub Offices reflecting the fact that WFP follows a mainstreaming approach.

245. Yet, substantial predictions regarding gender mainstreaming are made within the PRRO 10362 document, i.e. “55% of the (PSNP) direct and indirect benefits will accrue to women and ease their workload” (Paragraph 40, page 10). No explanation is made of how being obligated to ‘participate’ in public works will ‘ease workload’; neither are any indicators included in the PRRO logical framework of how this might be verified.

246. This MTE proposes that WFP could and should be doing more to advocate for strengthening gender aspects of the PIM and for WFP to prioritise a number of gender-related issues;

- To advocate for a reduction in the official work hours for women to allow for their additional domestic work chores
- To strengthen the existing guidelines for exempting pregnant, lactating women and female headed households from public works
- Develop and use verifiable indicators that allow PSNP’s responsiveness to women’s needs and opportunities to be measured, e.g. uptake rates of more gender sensitive work options (e.g. pregnant and lactating women) but also impact indicators to measure the extent to which PSNP is developing assets that positively affect the lives of women.
- To explore with the LIU the potential of using the household economy analysis and IFPRI gender disaggregated data to improve understanding of PSNP impact on livelihoods of women headed households
- Design and facilitate appropriate action research to test the gender implications (positive and negative) and feasibility of cash transfers becoming more linked to registration of wives, so that increasingly women become the recipients of cash.
- WFP’s regional office (ODK) has a number of additional excellent suggestions for building on existing opportunities within the PIM to improve assistance to women and other marginalised groups that deserve attention.

247. In addition, WFP could make the additional effort to participate in the existing NGO gender forum for PSNP.

248. Finally, WFP could guide FMs to seek out examples of effective gender sensitive initiatives that have clearly helped women (and conversely negative consequences of existing policy that have hindered them), WFP could begin to compile a directory of practical interventions that are making a difference. These lessons could then be used to advocate for appropriate change in the PIM.

## **4.8 Graduation**

249. It was apparent across all Woredas that confusion remains about graduation. Concerns about setting too rigid time-bound quotas for graduation are raised in the APL II PAD document



which points out: “it is clear that forcing timelines or pushing inappropriate instruments may lead to increased vulnerability”.<sup>80</sup> The need for a third “Integration” phase of the APL series to run from 2010-14 has also been recognised in order to address “the longer term issues of fostering graduation out of chronic food insecurity through appropriate integration of the PSNP and other interventions [which] could not be fully addressed within the time-frame of APLII”.

250. Almost all informants met during this evaluation, from DAs up to donors, would agree that there is a need to better define what is meant by a household ‘graduating’ and how this might be measured objectively. Agreement has recently been reached by the GOE/multi-donor mission (in which WFP was the only UN agency to participate) to develop an empirical, evidence-based definition and measure of “graduation” from food insecurity. It was agreed that this definition will be developed using the baseline data collected by CSA and that guidance will be agreed and disseminated to ensure consistency across the program. This exercise will be completed by April 2007<sup>81</sup>.

251. This evaluation identifies a number of opportunities for WFP to usefully contribute to the current debate on graduation:

- Work with the LIU to use the household economy approach to develop pragmatic and relevant definitions of graduation and household food security that can be measured and verified;
- Use MERET PLUS to investigate the results (both on livelihoods and continued CBPWD activities) of phasing out payments (i.e. current MERET food transfers) while continuing technical support;
- Use FMs to seek out and investigate examples of individuals or households voluntarily leaving PSNP because they have discovered or developed better livelihood opportunities.
- Work with Woreda level government in specific PSNP kebeles where minimum nutritional requirements can be met by the community to offer MERET PLUS as an alternative but on reduced payment rates (e.g. perhaps only 1.5 kg cereal/day instead of 3 kg a day) and monitor and investigate if and why households voluntarily decide to graduate themselves out of PSNP to allow them to enrol with MERET.<sup>82</sup>

252. As the GOE and multi-donor consortium has already clarified, graduation of households out of food insecurity will require not only effective PSNP and other FSP interventions but also effective linkages and integration between the two programs as well as with other rural services and sources of growth<sup>83</sup>. Similarly the Linkage Report<sup>84</sup> points out that even as improvements in the different FSP components are realised, significant food insecurity will continue without a range of additional interventions and ‘enabling processes’ being initiated. All key donors concur that without the policy and procedural reforms needed to substantially increase private sector investment, especially in rural areas, the FSP alone will not be able to lift people out of poverty. This appears even more so in pastoralist areas, where the need for such additional enabling

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<sup>80</sup> Draft Project Appraisal Document (PAD) for A Productive Safety Nets APLII Project (Oct 2006)

<sup>81</sup> Aide Memoire; PSNP Pre-Appraisal Mission, APL II October 13-26, 2006

<sup>82</sup> Some instances were encountered by this evaluation of households choosing not to be included in PSNP (despite being eligible) because they would rather work with MERET PLUS. Although MERET itself does not represent a sustainable alternative to PSNP, it does represent a livelihood choice that provides lower immediate payment (only 3 kg a day without oil or pulses).

<sup>83</sup> Aide Memoire; PSNP Pre-Appraisal Mission, APL II October 13-26, 2006

<sup>84</sup> PSNP Policy, Programme and Institutional Linkages; Rachel Slater et al (Sept 2006)



initiatives (e.g. veterinary support, market interventions, destocking/restocking, conflict resolution) are seen as being especially important for addressing the root problems of increased vulnerability. Furthermore, the difficulties currently being experienced with targeting, transfers and public works are clearly reducing the chances for PSNP to contribute to meaningful graduation in pastoralist areas.

253. This evaluation therefore suggests that WFP could do more to monitor and assess whether these linkages are in place. Based on realistic analysis of root causes of food insecurity in different areas, WFP could become more proactive in lobbying for the relevant alliances needed for its PRRO to become part of an integrated programme that might have a realistic exit strategy. This analysis should not only focus on conventional project inputs but also on the wider enabling forces.

**Box 7: Ideas for a Woreda based linkage analysis to be developed by PRRO 10362**

1. In every Woreda where PRRO 10362 is supplying food, the key Livelihood Zones are noted (from existing zoning already done by LIU, SC-UK or new work done with VAM) and the proportion of PSNP beneficiaries following each livelihood type are recorded.
2. For each livelihood, identify what are the key constraints that need to be overcome in order to attain food security.
3. Record what percentage of PSNP beneficiaries are already accessing the complementary food security initiatives required to tackle the specific constraints identified for their respective livelihood types
4. Draw conclusions as to what percentage of PSNP beneficiaries from each livelihood type have the opportunity to attain long-term food security on the basis of relevant linkages
5. Develop and initiate an appropriate advocacy process to alert GOE, donors and relevant agencies to the programmatic gaps

#### **4.9 Monitoring and evaluation processes and how they link to on-going programming**

254. One of our main conclusions is that WFP could be doing more to monitor and analyse processes and outcomes, using the significant capacities it has vested in the VAM Unit and the FMs. Specifically, we suggest the following options for WFP to consider:

##### *Linking with other initiatives and partners*

255. The importance of collaborating with the LIU has already been discussed. Similarly there will undoubtedly be productive opportunities for WFP to collaborate with IFPRI in the collection of data to assess impact. The first IFPRI impact assessment report is scheduled to come out in the first half of 2007. The evaluation methodology has been designed to quantify impact by comparing consumption and purchasing patterns between households with similar characteristics that are included and excluded from the PSNP..

256. WFP could be taking on a much greater role in helping compile relevant findings from NGO M&E systems incorporating these into agreed advocacy campaigns.



### *Institutionalizing Participatory evaluation in PSNP*

257. The PSNP already has a wide range of its own internal monitoring and evaluation systems - e.g. the Rapid Response Teams, surprise audits, the Joint Review and Implementation Support missions (JRIS), the IFPRI base-line etc . However, these are mainly designed to strengthen upward accountability and to be conducted by the Government and partner agencies. PSNP could be further strengthened by the introduction and development of methodologies for participatory evaluation led by communities themselves. Such evaluation approaches would focus on improved downward accountability to the rural poor. A wide range of tools could be developed, tested and applied.

### *Evaluating training and capacity building*

258. PRRO 10362 has already been responsible for supporting very significant training initiatives that are reaching thousands of GOE field staff and represent the only means for much of the essential skills transfer on which the impact of PSNP depends. There is a clear need to start evaluating the efficacy and impact of this training and use the findings to inform on going capacity building strategies and priorities for PSNP (a recommendation also highlighted by the recent JRIS mission<sup>85</sup>). Whether WFP conducts this evaluation itself or brings in more independent third party expertise is open to discussion. One idea is to develop a joint evaluation team comprising all the NGOs that have also supported training for PSNP. In this way, all partners could learn from each other.

### *Impact focus for Field Monitors*

259. Field monitors remain under-utilised in terms of impact monitoring. ABM is not designed or intended to examine impact and FAUIS is essentially an annual exercise driven by the centre in which FMs are little more than data collectors and enumerators. Given the level of expertise of WFP's field monitors, there is considerable scope for increasing their role in assessing impact either through the ABM or some complimentary system.

### *Programme focus or food focus?*

260. Currently, WFP only monitors PSNP activities and outcomes of beneficiaries receiving food. Should WFP also monitor beneficiaries who only receive cash transfers? It seems irrational to monitor a community for three months while on food and then cease monitoring for the next three months when they receive cash.. The problem is one of capacity – FMs are already stretched and to start taking on a wider programme monitoring role would be unrealistic without a significant increase in numbers. This evaluation would recommend that this is a key issue for donors and GOE to discuss – it of course relates to the issue of whether WFP should be focusing on monitoring itself or on building Government's capacity to monitor – or both (see section 6.2).

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<sup>85</sup> Aide Memoire: PSNP Joint Review and Implementation Support Mission October 2-12 2006





## **5 How is PRRO 10362 contributing to the institutional development of PSNP and agency/programme linkages. What more could it be doing?**

### **5.1 Horizontal and vertical linkages and coordination (and division of roles) between GOE structures and levels**

261. A key feature of WFP's use of food aid to promote natural resource management (LLPPA , MERET and now MEERT PLUS) has been the considerable success that it has had in institutionalising its work within the MOARD. Thus, from the MERET focal person in the Federal MOARD through the Regions and down to Woreda experts and DAs, WFP has managed to inculcate the level of ownership needed for GOE staff to take on MERET as part of their core activities. In contrast it appears that WFP has had little influence to date on institution building and strengthening with regard to the PSNP. As discussed in section 1.3 , a number of institutional issues with respect to PSNP need to be addressed if the programme is to fulfil its potential . In the main there is little scope for WFP to do much more than continue to advocate donors and Government to find solutions. However, there are three areas where WFP could take a more pro-active role:

- Helping in expediting exchange of information between DPPA and PNSP for timely distribution of food resources
- working with partners to assist MOARD (and Regional BOARDS) to integrate CBPWD into the national (and Regional) agricultural extension system in ways that can use PSNP synergistically as one support mechanism for implementation
- Introduction and support for management approaches that reward innovation, risk taking and focus on impact

#### *Strengthen communication systems for FSCB-DPPA*

262. At present, WFP delivers PSNP food to its warehouses around the country and informs FSCB when it has done so. FSCB then requests the DPPA to collect it and deliver to the Woreda distribution sites. For a variety of reasons there may be delays during this step. This evaluation therefore strongly recommends that WFP supports discussion with the relevant members of DPPA and FSCB to identify and address the causes of these delays.

#### *Institutionalise CBPWD into core BOARD programmes*

263. Woredas and Regions consider that the institutional coordination of the different components of the FSP is still not working adequately and that there need to be two developments.

- The line ministries need to take ownership of the agreed activities within their core programmes with PSNP and OFSP becoming one means of supporting implementation
- The systems for linkages and horizontal coordination between departments still needs stronger promotion (possibly by linking to performance appraisals and promotion)

264. The JRIS Mission in October also highlighted the institutional problem inherent in expecting the Natural Resources Department at Regional level to oversee implementation of the majority of public works, while their official role is limited to one of technical backstopping



with no clear institutional ownership.<sup>86</sup> PRRO 10362 could do more to work with Regions and Woredas to tackle this issue.

265. This evaluation would strongly advocate for an approach that sees CBPWD become a core part of MOARD activities. The use of paid labour through PSNP then becomes just one means of contributing to a process that has its own life outside of the safety net.

### *Supporting appropriate management approaches*

266. A centralised PIM is essential to provide the overall framework and guidelines for the programme, but field staff have to be encouraged to find their own ways of making it work. PSNP is very much a 'process' type programme and not a 'blue-print'. This therefore requires the development of a more flexible and bottom-up style of management.

267. Federal and Regional leaders and managers must encourage and support Woredas to take their own initiatives. The following ideas are presented for WFP and its partners to consider:

- Work with Regional FSCB, DPPA and line ministries to develop and introduce systems that allow them to identify and reward Woreda offices on an annual basis – particularly for demonstrating innovation and initiative in developing best practice at field level, (e.g. timely resource transfer, excellence in promoting community participation and ownership, quality of public works, gender sensitivity). To pilot and introduce the approach, PRRO resources can be used to fund the relevant rewards and prizes.
- A similar process could be introduced at Woreda level to allow annual identification and prizes (radios, backpacks, books etc) for individual experts and DAs demonstrating extra initiative, imagination, creativity, skills etc in making PSNP a success.
- Develop guidelines for WFP FMs to monitor different management approaches and experiences in the Woredas
- Compile lessons from the efforts and experiences of WFP's Country Programme to institutionalise Result Based Management into BOARD as a means of strengthening MERET and use conclusions to inform PRRO 10362's strategy for supporting the development of GOE management approaches for PSNP.

## **5.2 Linkages and coordination with other FSP components and interventions relevant to long term food security**

268. The MTE has two specific recommendations:

- Improve understanding of how the GOE's resettlement programme is interacting with PSNP and OFSP. What lessons can be learnt from case-studies of households voluntarily leaving PSNP to resettle? How might resettlement impact on PRRO 10362 and vice versa? The report by the Forum of Social Studies on recent resettlement experiences provides a basis from which to develop further relevant questions<sup>87</sup>.

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<sup>86</sup> Aide Memoire: PSNP Joint Review and Implementation Support (JRIS) Mission October 2-12 2006

<sup>87</sup> Understanding the Dynamics of Resettlement in Ethiopia; Dr Alula Pankhurst, Dr Assefa Tolera, Dr Gebre Yntiso, Dr Kassahun Berhanu; Forum for Social Studies, Policy Briefings No. 4 (January 2006)



- The World Bank has a number of on-going projects which could help inform the PSNP planning process and which WFP could examine, e.g. the Pastoral Community Development Project, The Emergency Drought Recovery Project and the Food Security Project.

### **5.3 Linkages and coordination with relief interventions**

269. The conceptual, institutional, and operational linkages between the PSNP and relief programme are poorly articulated within Ethiopia and therefore within the PRRO.

#### *Conceptual Linkages*

270. The PSNP is meant to be targeted to chronically food insecure woredas and those that have been recipients of food aid for a significant period. Households are meant to be targeted if they are in one of the food insecure designated woredas, have faced continuous food shortages (usually more than three months of food gap) in the last three years and received food assistance and households that suddenly become more vulnerable as a result of a severe loss of assets and are unable to support themselves (last 1-2 years). Relief recipients are meant to be those who have experienced a recent unpredictable shock (usually drought or flood induced crop failure or pasture failure impacting livestock morbidity/mortality).

271. There are two conceptual ambiguities here. First, targeting criteria for PSNP include criteria whereby those who have experienced recent acute shock may be included. Second, the acute shock experienced by relief beneficiaries may well be the norm, i.e. it may have recurred frequently in recent years. Indeed, many regions and woredas in Ethiopia have been on more or less continuous relief programming for the past 10-20 years.

272. This conceptual blurring undoubtedly leads to confusion at a number of levels regarding the beneficiary caseloads.

#### *Institutional Linkages*

273. At federal level institutional linkages between DPPA and FSCB need to be further strengthened. This will help clarity with regard to distinguishing between the two beneficiary case loads. It is apparent that the way in which final relief beneficiary needs are determined takes account of number of beneficiaries already under the PSNP. The processes of distinguishing the two caseloads at federal level need more elaboration.

274. At regional level the DPPB and Food Security Bureau are merged into one office. Thus, although there are separate staff for each programme, the evaluation team found good communication and linkages between the two offices at regional level. WFP field monitors cover both programmes, i.e.. relief and PSNP.

275. Below regional level the main responsibility for targeting of PSNP falls on specially – constituted food security task forces at woreda, kebele and community levels supported by the Woreda and Kebele Council and Administration. The prescribed process of beneficiary selection is a combination of administrative and community targeting. The targeting design of the PSNP builds on decades of Ethiopian experience in targeting emergency aid and public works programmes. The institutional structures; the key role of community representatives, the asset, income and livelihood criteria for household selection; and the division of beneficiaries between PW and DS according to their ability to work are all very similar to the pre-existing system of targeting for the annual cycle of emergency relief. However, as concluded in the recent



WB/DFID review of targeting (Sharpe, K 2006) it is not clear whether the targeting of the PSNP is significantly different to targeting under the relief programme.

### *Operational distinctions and linkages*

276. The evaluation team made a number of observations about the way the two programme caseloads are distinguished at regional and woreda level.

- Woreda officials are sometimes confused about whether to put people into the PSNP or relief programme.
- Regional officials have difficulty distinguishing between the two case loads. The difficulty arises as most of the population are chronically food insecure yet many have been on relief food aid for 10-20 years. The actual demarcation therefore is based on the allocated quota for the PSNP. As a result, the relief programme ends up supporting the chronically food insecure who could not be included under the PSNP – i.e. they are not quite as food insecure as those on PSNP
- Food may be borrowed from one programme or the other if it runs out, i.e. food aid resources appear to be fungible between the two programmes.
- Woreda level task forces frequently decrease family size to get more households registered on the PSNP and those left over are placed on the relief programme.
- There may be tensions at community level as those on relief programmes do not have guarantees of food aid for more than 6-12 months and are offered no linked food security packages. Some relief beneficiaries complained to the evaluation team that they were doing the same work as those on the PSNP but getting less food (see section 3.1.).
- Conversely, in some woredas (SNNPR) relief food was mainly allocated without requirement to work. This created resentment amongst PSNP beneficiaries who did have to work.
- In most woredas where both programmes were operating simultaneously, food distribution under the PSNP and relief programmes were carried out on separate days.
- Some regional officials believed that there was a tendency to miss out certain woreda from the multi-agency relief needs assessment if those woredas were already receiving PSNP support, e.g. 2005 Gurage and Silti zones.
- Lack of clarity between the two programme caseloads has meant a greater tendency to share resources. This can lead to delays in dispatch of food for one programme or the other as DPPA may assume that stocks for one programme can and will be used for the other.

### *Does it matter?*

277. It was impossible to assess the extent to which the phenomena listed above were taking place. More focussed monitoring should be conducted to gauge scale of problems and to obtain a more balanced overview of problems emanating from lack of clarity between the two programmes and their caseloads.

278. In general, there is a sense that the relief programme has now become rather nebulous and perceived as 'less important'.. PSNP. Certainly, beneficiary caseloads for the two programmes during 2005 and 2006 support this. Indeed part of the rationale behind the different elements of PRRO 10362.0 was that the relief programme and TSF would shore up any failure of the PSNP. This has indeed been the case where for example cash deliveries as part of the PSNP in 2005 were implemented in a number of food deficit woredas in east and west Hararghe leading to rising levels of malnutrition as beneficiaries were unable to purchase food and WFP lobbied



DPPA to allocate more relief rations – from the PSNP contingency reserve. Several regions have absorbed the relief case load by applying the PRRO contingency.<sup>88</sup>

### 279. Recommendations

- Ideally, all chronically food insecure should be placed under the PSNP with relief beneficiaries being identified on the basis of the extent to which acute shock result in a food and/or income deficit at household level. The PSNP quota therefore needs to reflect and encompass objective measures of food insecurity as well as subjective perceptions of communities. If communities perceive that many chronically food insecure are omitted from the PSNP then rations will be spread further (household size reduced) and relief food will be allocated to the chronically food insecure. WFP must therefore advocate for greater clarity around the methodology for delineation of the two case loads. (see section on Early Warning and Needs Assessment and on PSNP).
- This will only come about when there are improved working modalities between DPPA and the Food Security Bureau at federal level. WFP should advocate for this
- WFP field monitors should have a check list of questions relating to distinctions and linkages between PSNP and relief. This information should be collated at country office level to form a more comprehensive overview of the extent to which lack of clarity between the two programmes impacts (negatively) upon operational practice
- It may be expedient to consider placing EGS beneficiaries on PSNP public works where a higher standard of implementation and monitoring is taking place (see section

## 5.4 Linkages and coordination between agencies supporting PSNP

### *WFP-NGO relationships*

280. A number of PRRO donors considered that opportunities for synergy were being lost due to WFP's weak relationship with PSNP NGOs..

281. No examples of strong coordination between WFP and NGOs working in the PSNP were found by this evaluation. All NGOs questioned (CARE, CRS, SC-UK and REST) were unaware of the extent of WFP's role in PSNP, perceiving it largely as a provider and monitor of food inputs.. They were surprised to learn of the scope of WFP's other significant contributions to the programme, e.g. policy dialogue, training and capacity building, developing guidelines, etc. Many of the PSNP NGOs also admitted that their own coordination history has been weak and that genuine joint learning is still a long way off. However they do have a 'Learning Coordinator' (housed in CARE).

282. A number of options present themselves for improved WFP-NGO coordination:

- WFP formally requests the NGO Learning Coordinator to start inviting WFP to all its meetings

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<sup>88</sup> The PRRO has a contingency of 165,336 mt to cover a six month food requirement for 1.12 million people for normal rations and 1.1 million for supplementary rations. This is under 15% of total cost of PRRO. The contingency is meant to be used if contingency plans or government led multi-agency assessments determined that emergency relief food requirements were 1) beyond projected requirements of relief component of PRRO and ii) would not be covered by NGOs or bilateral contributions to government.



- The PSNP Coordinator within USAID facilitates a quarterly meeting for all PSNP NGOs and WFP to share experiences and strategize
- WFP takes its own initiative to attend all Quarterly Regional Meetings (and approaches the relevant GOE body to obtain official invitation)



## **6 How is WFP adding value to PSNP implementation and what more could it be doing?**

### **6.1 Supporting implementation: the role of sub-offices and field monitors**

#### *Overview*

283. The role of WFP's Regional Sub-Offices (SOs) and network of Field Monitors (FMs) in supporting PSNP implementation is considerable. FMs are intimately involved in all components of the programme, from initial targeting through to public works planning and implementation and then evaluation. The FMs add value in a wide range of ways: encouraging and motivating, guiding and explaining, providing on-the-job training, trouble-shooting, reporting and calling for assistance when problems can not be solved on the ground. All the Woredas visited during this evaluation expressed their appreciation of the FMs' supportive role.

284. While the Action Based Monitoring (ABM) system currently being developed by WFP Ethiopia has a clear monitoring role (see section 4.3 below) its primary function is to help users (usually FMs) focus on immediate problem solving. ABM is therefore essentially about improving implementation and WFP should be encouraged to continue with this commendable initiative.

#### *Resource Transfer*

285. WFP's role in responding rapidly to changing needs as Woredas shifted from cash to food transfers has been commendable. At the start of 2005, WFP was responsible for providing food aid to over 1.7 million safety net beneficiaries from 83 Woredas, predominantly on about a 40-60 food-cash split., In 2006, with a net swing of Woredas moving from cash only to food only or cash and food, WFP became responsible for provision of food for a total of 120 Woredas, covering almost 2.9 million beneficiaries whose support rations ranged from 100% food and no cash to 10% food and 90% cash.

286. This evaluation is not in a position to recommend exactly how to improve DPPA performance and transparency<sup>89</sup>. However, it is evident that where a WFP sub-office makes it an absolute priority to ensure that food deliveries are made on time, WFP can make a real difference. A key recommendation must be to invest much greater effort in managing the sub-offices and their teams to prioritize above all else support for regions and Woredas to improve on timeliness and predictability of transfer. A wide range of suitable management techniques could be used to do this.

#### *Participatory Planning for Public Works*

287. All evidence from the Woredas visited (including the 'flag-ship' MERET Woredas of Atsbi and Wukro) indicates that PSNP 'participatory' planning is often little more than

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<sup>89</sup> At present it is not clear how DPPA tenders the distribution to Woredas; Region make the allocation plans, FSCB compiles them and then instructs DPPA to deliver, but waybills do not delineate whether food is PSNP, relief, etc; also it is not clear if DDPA then informs FSCB that food is dispatched, nor do they warn the store keepers in advance that food is coming.



consultation, with varying degrees of involvement of the community planning team (see section 3.4).

288. Given the crucial nature of the participatory planning for the public works in general, but especially for the CBPWD, it would seem that a great deal more on-the-job support and assistance is needed. WFP needs to think clearly what further role it can play, directly and indirectly, in ensuring that such assistance is provided. Clearly WFP can not be expected to deal with this alone, but given that it remains such an important supporter for MOARD in facilitating CBPWD it must recognise that it has to take a lead role. Due to its network of field monitors and the collective experience of its core NRM team, no other partner currently has the breadth or depth of insight into CBPWD as does WFP. If WFP feels that it can not (or should not) take a lead, is it clear who should? And how might this be facilitated? Are the steering committees and technical committees addressing (or even fully aware) of the problems identified here and if not what more needs to be done?

## **6.2 WFP's role in capacity building – what, how and where**

289. One of WFP's Corporate Strategic Objectives is directly aimed at developing the organisation's role in providing relevant technical capacity building to Governments to improve their response to food insecurity. PRRO 10362 has already had considerable inputs in developing and facilitating training courses for Regional and Woreda government staff related to CBPWD. Furthermore, significant value is being added by a number of more focused initiatives, e.g. a WFP consultant is currently reviewing high quality gully-control measures to improve efficacy of public works. Unfortunately, there appears to be no provision within PRRO 10362 to assess utility of training and skill gaps that still need to be filled.

290. Clearly, WFP Field Monitors are already adding significant value to PSNP by directly supporting implementation at Woreda and kebele level through accompanying GoE staff to the field, mentoring and problem solving. Such support provides important, practical, on-the-job training to complement the more formal training courses also provided.

291. However the capacity constraints to effective implementation of PSNP are significant. Many Woredas remain under staffed. The constant reshuffling of Government staff also remains a real problem and probably significantly diminishes the actual impact of much training (see also section 2.7).

292. While recognising the need for improved quality, coverage, depth and coordination of training, a number of operational constraints are also apparent. Foremost in the perceptions of WFP Ethiopia are the funding constraints imposed by the lack of full cost recovery for ODOC funding. At the same time FSBC complains that PRRO 10362 is not providing the 10 % capital budget provided to complement cash wage inputs.

293. With these issues in mind, the evaluation makes the following recommendations (see also the related points in section 4.9 on Monitoring):

### *Prioritize Support for Capacity Building*

294. Seek additional funding to allow WFP to undertake its capacity building functions according to need rather than (as present) on the basis of available ODOC budget. Many of the donors interviewed for this evaluation considered that WFP's key role in PSNP should be in developing Government capacity at all levels.





295. Specific components of a more complete CB contribution identified by this evaluation would include:

- Helping to make the PIM more user-friendly and developing a mechanism to allow DAs and experts to make their own suggestions for improvement. FMs could easily undertake a simple initial survey of ‘end-user’ opinions on how the PIM could be improved.
- Exploring opportunities for helping MOARD adjust its management approach away from conventional top down management towards more learning-focused approaches that prioritise initiative, innovation, learning, and impacts (see section 3.2)
- Working with federal, Regional and Woreda DPPA to strengthen working procedures for food distribution. This could usefully include clearer systems for tendering; for finalization of allocation plans; for use of waybills to delineate whether food is PSNP, relief, MERET; for ensuring that Woredas store-keepers are informed in advance that food is arriving.
- Assisting each zone/Woreda to design a PSNP asset creation programme that allows:
  - optimal timing of labour intensive activities
  - optimal cash-food mix
  - optimal timing of cash/food distributions

#### *Coordination of capacity building*

296. Almost all the NGOs involved in PSNP are designing and providing their own training interventions. In addition, other agencies not directly supporting PSNP continue to provide significant amounts of training that are highly relevant to many of the public works (the GTZ-SUN programme in Tigray and Amhara is one example that provides training to all Woredas for community led watershed management). Currently there is little or no effective coordination of these efforts. All agencies met expressed an interest to discuss how they could start working with WFP and avoid unhelpful or wasteful replication. Being the only support agency for PSNP operating at a national level across all Woredas, WFP is ideally placed to lead such an initiative. A useful starting point would be to carry out an assessment in each Region of what has already been done and what is planned in terms of CB. Combined with a simple needs assessment (linked to the recommended impact assessments), an integrated strategy for combined CP support for each Region could be developed.

#### *Training and managing Sub-Offices and Field Monitors*

297. WFP needs to review the way the Country Office manages its sub-offices (SOs) and in particular how SO Heads and FMs are recruited, trained, supported and appraised. The evaluation found that there is more room for clear leadership and appropriate support to SOs from the centre. Furthermore, if FMs’ roles are shifting more to on the job capacity building, are they being recruited accordingly? Are they receiving the right sort of training from WFP? Are current appraisal systems rewarding them for the right sort of initiatives and qualities?

### **6.3 WFP’s role in monitoring**

#### *Food Monitoring*

298. As discussed in section 4.9 there is a case to make for WFP to focus more on monitoring impact of its support for PSNP. However, the more conventional monitoring role of implementation (i.e. tracking of food flows to strengthen transparency and upward accountability) still remains an important task of FMs. Indeed, many donors still consider this to



be a key reason for channelling food through WFP – in order to improve accountability of food delivery.

299. Although COMPAS is being used by DPPA the extent to which WFP is able to track what happens to the food after it has been delivered to FDC/FDP remains limited. It remains difficult to get accurate or reliable food distribution data on time, there are often discrepancies between Woreda and Regional distribution lists while FAUIS, COMPAS and actual distribution lists often seem to bear little relationship to each other (see also section 2.4).

300. “Real time” monitoring of distributions by FMs remains very uncommon (the FMs met estimated that they manage to actually witness between 0-20% of the PSNP distributions carried out in their focus Woredas). Currently there are no systems for FMs to be informed by Woredas (or by Zones or Regions) of when and where distributions will occur – it is more by chance, by ad hoc information sharing or by special initiatives of FMs that distributions get to be monitored as they happen. However, the Regional and Woreda representatives of DPPA and FSCB consulted by this evaluation saw no problems in developing a system for informing WFP in advance so that field monitors could attend. Indeed, in some Woredas, experts and DAs said that they would prefer FMs to be present rather than absent so that they could see (and report) the difficulties that they face and help out as necessary.

301. The Action Based Monitoring (ABM) system currently being developed is based on the principle that certain on-going data collection carried out throughout the year could be more effectively compiled and used if continuously fed into a data base that can process and organise the information to allow trends to be identified. However, it remains unclear how information generated by all of the food monitoring systems under PRRO 10362 are used in practice to improve performance of Government partners’ distributions.

302. One of the key reasons that many donors continue to use WFP as a conduit for food is because they lack confidence in the effectiveness, transparency and accountability of GOE food monitoring systems. In effect, donors are transferring the responsibility to WFP to ensure that the Government manages food donations effectively and transparently. Inevitably, despite a clearly buoyant working relationship between GOE and WFP, this can provoke its own set of challenges for both parties. Furthermore, it is virtually an impossible job for WFP which has much less political power or leverage than the donors do to encourage improved accountability. For PSNP food channelled through WFP, neither FSCB nor DDPA need be accountable to the donors, since the contract is being managed by WFP. At the same time WFP is unable for reasons already discussed to conduct real-time monitoring of distributions.

303. Within these constraints, WFP Ethiopia still makes considerable efforts to track food deliveries by DPPA. In some cases WFP can respond to identified problems especially those linked to lack of local capacity; however, where problems are linked to negligence or misuse, WFP is less confident that it can effect change. In such cases, it may be that donors need to play a more active role in working with relevant GOE counterparts to rectify problems.

### *General Recommendations*

304. Many of the recommendations already discussed above have been related to the added value that FMs could provide by being guided to undertake specific monitoring and field research activities. Below we list the recommendations related to more conventional role of food distributions within PSNP (and the relief programme):



- ‘Real-time’ monitoring. WFP could and should be doing more to increase its ability to monitor food distributions as they take place. WFP would need to develop systems with DPPA/FSCB to ensure that Woredas inform FMs and Sub-Offices in advance of planned distributions.
- Strengthening GOE’s food monitoring system. This evaluation is cautious about making glib recommendations on this subject, recognizing that WFP has been attempting to improve GoE systems for many years. However, it would seem that more can still be achieved as evidenced by different progress made in areas to introduce COMPAS reflecting not only local willingness but also the level of determination of the sub-office teams involved.
- Change donor-GOE-WFP relationships. A logical although perhaps more radical suggestion would be for donors, WFP and GoE to define together the benchmarks that need to be reached in terms of improved DPPA/FSCB performance on transparent, accountable and timely food reporting to allow WFP to start phasing out its role as a conduit for donor food. The development of such an exit strategy for WFP from this particular role would be highly appreciated by both donors and Government, allowing donor food for PSNP to be channeled direct to GOE counterparts. The benefits of such a transfer in roles from WFP to Government (for tracking of food flows) would be considerable:
  - reducing donor costs
  - directly supporting the development of food management capacity at local level
  - allowing WFP to focus on more productive and creative tasks, including better impact monitoring (rather than the current focus on output monitoring)
  - contributing to the shift in roles and relationships that seems to be so important if real progress is to be made (e.g. for WFP to focus more on programme development and capacity building, for donors to start supporting WFP indirectly of food aid, for Government to become more directly accountable to donors for how food aid is used)

305. By explicitly developing and working towards its own exit strategy from channeling and monitoring food aid in PSNP (and relief), WFP could demand greater support from donors to allow it to undertake the necessary capacity building functions. An approach worth considering would be to pilot gradual transfers of responsibility while supporting WFP or a third ‘independent’ party to monitor what happens.

- Roving food audits. Currently, the new systems for helping GOE to strengthen accountable management of PSNP transfers are all designed for cash, not for food. Why not pilot the same roving audit system now being used to strengthen cash management for strengthening food management as well
- Continue to strengthen ABM. Apart from encouraging FMs to take on a greater problem solving role, the Action based Monitoring system has the opportunity to focus on the key indicators or benchmarks related to successful implementation of PSNP and track changes in these indicators over time. Such indicators might include key issues that all partners agree require improvement, for example: timeliness of distribution; perceived relevance of the support (cash/food), disaggregated by gender; degree of dilution; participatory nature of planning for public works; quality and perceived usefulness of public works, disaggregated by gender; responsiveness to pastoralist needs etc. ABM could also become a key tool for tracking any agreed



indicators being used to regulate a phased exit strategy for WFP in terms of food monitoring itself.



## **7 What are the implications of these conclusions for improving the design of PRRO 10362?**

### **7.1 PRRO Programme mix and focus**

306. WFP has two main choices in terms of future programme direction:

- Either to focus only on strengthening PSNP's contribution to consumption smoothing and asset protection through improving targeting and resource transfer (cash/food rates, mixes and timeliness of distribution)
- Or to also seek to improve PSNP's contribution to asset creation, livelihood development and graduation - largely by addressing issues about public works and the linkages to complementary programmes in order to achieve sustainable food security.

307. It is not clear which of these options PRRO 10362 is pursuing. Its current programme goal indicates that it aims to take on the second more ambitious goal, in addition to the essential first step of laying the 'foundation' of asset protection and consumption smoothing. However, all WFP staff involved recognise that it is not realistic for "5 million chronically food insecure people to attain food security in 5 years" and that the validity of 10362 is undermined by adopting such a goal.. WFP's PRRO could retain its current goal but within an extended time frame. In this case, it can and should be explicitly making programmatic linkages with the wider FSP and PASDEP processes and the range of other agencies working on long term food security programmes. In this case, its role and programme focus will have to shift to give much greater attention to issues of advocacy for policy development, partnerships and linkages and the wider enabling processes needed to allow sustainable food security. Inherent in this shift is the need to redefine its role in the transition away from approaches dominated by food aid.

308. Despite its ambitious overall goal, the current PRRO document pays scant attention to withdrawal or phase out strategy. As WFP's own internal Policy Issue Paper<sup>90</sup> on safety nets points out: "A major concern related to WFP's involvement with safety nets is ensuring that there is a clear exit strategy. The existing PRRO 10362 has not yet developed a clear strategy for how it will ensure this.

### **7.2 Should WFP be supporting the PSNP and if so, within what parameters?**

309. In evaluating the PRRO's contribution to the safety net it has been important to understand the opportunities and limitations for WFP to actually influence the PSNP. In practice, WFP largely acts as a conduit for donors to channel food aid into a GOE owned and implemented operation over which WFP has no direct mandate for decision making or control. WFP can certainly attempt to influence PSNP policy and programme planning (and has already had considerable success in doing so), but only as one voice along side the more powerful members of the donor coordination group. Apart from meeting its logistical obligations to deliver food on time to DPPA/WFP Regional stores, WFP's operational room for manoeuvre is largely limited to field monitoring plus a certain amount of Woreda-level support and capacity building.

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<sup>90</sup> WFP and food based safety net: concepts, experiences and future programming opportunities (WFP/EB.3/2004/4-A).



310. The challenge for WFP Ethiopia therefore is how to maximise the opportunities it has within these limitations to influence policy and practice..

311. Our conclusion is that WFP has a vital role to play if it explicitly defines its role (and design's its PRRO accordingly) as helping to improve the programming and implementation of the following key components of the PSNP:

- Targeting
- Timely and appropriate resource transfer
- Asset creation
- Linkages
- Graduation strategies

### **7.3 Wider implications for WFP management – WFP as a learning organisation.**

312. Evaluation of WFP's role in the PSNP has left a general impression that, as an organisation, WFP has yet to fully institutionalise a learning culture. The evaluation picked up on a number of indicators that WFP Ethiopia could still usefully look at strengthening its own organisational approach to promote learning. Thus we found examples of:

- Overly defensive reactions to critiques raised by the evaluation
- A general impression among several staff (management and field) that helping WFP Ethiopia to expand its operation would be a more positive trend than helping it to contract
- An unwillingness to challenge donors' opinions regardless of the technical and/or programmatic reality
- Reluctance by field monitors to be quoted where criticising WFP
- Assumptions by some field monitors that recommendations to replace food with cash would be unwelcome in WFP at all levels and that they would be penalised for promoting the use of cash

313. At the same time WFP Ethiopia needs to be commended on continuing efforts to develop monitoring and evaluation systems within the Programme - Results based Management (RBM) annual reports (RBM), the Action Based Monitoring (ABM) system, the Participatory Evaluation and Performance Profiles (PEPP) system being used by MERET (plus one-off impact and cost-benefit studies). However, such systems are only useful if staff are actively encouraged to use them to identify weaknesses and challenge the ways things are being done. Thus the extent to which the RBM reports are actually read, let alone used as tools to promote learning and challenge strategies was not clear. The reports do not offer many critical lessons and appear to lean a little too much towards a role of reassurance and corporate loyalty. Several staff considered that many of these reports are not really being used. As one FM said "Even if we raise important programming issues in our monthly narrative reports, we never receive any feedback from Addis as long as the food is delivered and reported on".

314. Linked to the issue of learning and reflection is a tendency to focus more on activities and outputs rather than on impacts. This evaluation would agree the conclusion of the Mid-Term Evaluation of WFP's on-going Country Programme regarding the focus of the existing



monitoring systems being too output oriented. Recommendation no. 42 of the CP evaluation<sup>91</sup> therefore seems particularly relevant since it asks WFP Ethiopia to focus more on discovering to what extent its "...achievements actually contribute to poverty reduction?". The extra-ordinary delays in getting out the FAUIS reports also suggest that perhaps lesson learning and impact analysis is not being prioritised.

315. The general perception is that field staffs' opportunities for being rewarded by the organisation (in terms of promotion or long term contracts) remain largely based on output oriented functions. Field staff do not consider that their careers will be enhanced by focusing on critical analysis, innovation, challenging accepted norms, identifying weaknesses within WFP's strategy or performance, developing exit strategies or "doing WFP out a job". There are however a number of WFP Ethiopia staff who strongly feel the need to help the country team further develop its capacity for thoughtful and critical analysis.

316. Certainly some efforts are being made to strengthen internal thinking and reflection. The recent formation of the Safety Net Technical Working Group is a positive example of what might be done by bringing together relevant programme staff (from PSNP, TSF, Relief, and VAM) to discuss strategic issues. This evaluation reveals that all donors involved would welcome and support WFP to take on a more reflective and self-critical role; it would seem that far from jeopardizing future funding, WFP Ethiopia's willingness to prioritize learning and transparency would strengthen potential for support .

317. Some general recommendation for strengthening learning and focus on impact are included in section 11.

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<sup>91</sup> Mid-Term Evaluation of 2003-2006 Ethiopia Country Programme (Dec 2005)



## 8 EOS/TSF

### 8.1 Background and Context

318. Ethiopia has unacceptably high levels of malnutrition. Among children under five, the prevalence of wasting (low weight for height) is 10.5% (above the threshold for defining a nutrition emergency), stunting (low height for age) is 47% and underweight (low weight for age) stands at 38%. Ethiopia has approximately 12.4 million children under the age of five. This means that over one million children are wasted and approximately 4.7 million are underweight (UNICEF 2004). It is in this context that the EOS/TSF is operating.

319. The Enhanced Outreach Strategy (EOS) and Targeted Supplementary Feeding (TSF) programme was initially piloted in the Southern Nations and Nationalities People's Regional State (SNNPR) of Ethiopia in April 2004. It is implemented by the Federal Ministry of Health (FMOH) and Federal Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Agency (DPPA) of the government of Ethiopia (GOE) with support from UNICEF and WFP. The programme is considered to be unique in terms of scale, design, and range of activities. It is also unique in combining the capacities of the four partner agencies and in this respect, the GOE and particularly the DPPA, for accepting the initiative and promoting it from the outset should be applauded for recognising the need to address the huge scale of the child health and nutrition problem and implementing an integrated programme approach. The EOS/TSF programme is a component of the Government's Child Survival Initiative (CSI). It is intended that it will provide a bridge for the implementation of a key component of the CSI, the Health Extension Package (HEP)<sup>92</sup> which is being implemented nationwide. Furthermore, the TSF is the first WFP programme building upon the decentralised GOE structure. Programme implementation is the responsibility of regional DPPB offices and the TSF, by working through this structure, is contributing to the strengthening of regional capacities as well as towards increased accountability and transparency as food movements are more closely monitored and reported in a decentralised system

#### *Crisis in SNNPR in 2002/03*

320. The EOS/TSF programme arose as a result of a nutrition crisis in SNNPR region in 2002/03 which led to a substantial increase in child malnutrition and child mortality. The crisis occurred during a period of drought and severe food scarcity. The programme was designed to address all three underlying causes of malnutrition simultaneously i.e. food insecurity, poor health and inadequate caring practices. This integrated approach represents an important departure in Ethiopia which, for decades, has deployed food aid as the dominant response to nutrition crises often to the exclusion of important non-food interventions<sup>93</sup>. The approach also provided the main impetus for forging the partnership between the four agencies as no one agency has the capacity to implement the range of activities needed to address the food, health and care determinants of malnutrition. The programme also developed under very strong

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<sup>92</sup> The HEP aims to train two health extension workers in each kebele to provide preventive and promotive services from kebele level Health Posts to the local community.

<sup>93</sup> The EOS/TSF also emerged at a time when the government's Productive Safety Nets Programme was being developed signalling a strong desire to move away from food aid as the main approach to addressing chronic food insecurity to non-food alternatives such as cash transfers.





leadership from the UNICEF and WFP country offices with country directors strongly advocating for the joint approach.

### *Inadequate nutrition information*

321. During the SNNPR crisis inadequacies in nutrition information were again highlighted reflecting the absence of a robust nutrition surveillance system in Ethiopia<sup>94</sup>. Another objective of the programme was therefore to generate regular trend data on child nutritional status to contribute to early warning and needs assessment capacity. At the time, the need for regular nutrition information was high on the national agenda and concerted efforts were underway to strengthen the role of the Emergency Nutrition Coordination Unit (ENCU) at federal and regional level in nutrition information monitoring<sup>95</sup>.

### *Operating challenges*

322. Although the emergency situation has passed in SNNPR, the programme, which has since greatly expanded, operates in a very challenging nutritional context. The Ethiopian context is characterised by persistent high levels of moderate and severe wasting in under fives<sup>96</sup>, low-level capacity to provide treatment for children with severe acute malnutrition (SAM), inadequate access to health services<sup>97</sup> and high levels of chronic and acute food insecurity. There are marked inter and intra regional variations in these constraints as well as in the overall level of development between regions.

### *Programme activities*

323. The EOS/TSF programme delivers a combination of key child and maternal health interventions including Vitamin A supplementation, measles vaccination, provision of insecticide treated bed nets and de-worming on a six-monthly basis. Screening of pregnant women, women with children under six months of age and children under five years of age<sup>98</sup> using mid-upper arm circumference (MUAC)<sup>99</sup> also takes place in conjunction with delivery of the health inputs.

324. Those women and children who are found to have a MUAC below the cut-off point of 21.0cm and 12.0 cm respectively are given a ration card and referred to the TSF programme and, (where available) those with a MUAC below 11.0cm and/or with oedema, for treatment of severe malnutrition. The TSF beneficiaries receive two 3 monthly food supplements which provides 25 kg of micronutrient fortified Corn (or Wheat) Soya Blend (CSB) and 3 litres of fortified vegetable oil. This is a nutrition supplement equal to 1,690 kilocalories, 55 grammes of protein and 15 grammes of fat per day. At the end of 6 months, they automatically leave the programme.

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<sup>94</sup> Note that capacity for analysis of nutritional trends was lost in 2002 with the demise of the Nutrition Surveillance Programme supported by SC UK for 20 years.

<sup>95</sup> WFP Country Office verbal communication

<sup>96</sup> Global Acute Malnutrition prevalence is 10.5%

<sup>97</sup> It is estimated that 60% of population estimated to have access to primary health services

<sup>98</sup> The screening actually includes older children who are stunted as the entry to the EOS programme is based on a height less than 110.0cm

<sup>99</sup> Up until March 2006, MUAC screening was followed by weight for height measurements but this was stopped after agreement among all stakeholders to simplify the system and use only MUAC as a good predictor of mortality risk.



325. The MUAC screening and TSF referral takes place every six months at designated EOS sites while the TSF distribution takes place every three months at TSF designated sites. The FMOH/UNICEF are responsible for the EOS component while DDPB/WFP are responsible for the TSF component.

#### *Programme Aim*

326. The overall aim of the combined components of the EOS/TSF is to “reduce morbidity and mortality in children under five”.

#### *Programme Objectives*

327. The EOS and TSF have separate specific objectives. EOS objectives relate to the delivery of the maternal and child health inputs while the TSF objectives are nutritional and are as follows:

- To prevent the nutritional deterioration of children under five and pregnant and lactating women
- To prevent those moderately malnourished becoming severely malnourished
- To rehabilitate moderately malnourished children and PLW through the provision of fortified supplementary food
- To promote key nutrition messages

328. While the objectives of the TSF are typical of traditional supplementary feeding (SFP) programmes, the TSF is not a standard SFP<sup>100</sup>. Typically, SFPs include a monthly ration (dry or wet), combined with a general ration and linked to a therapeutic feeding programme<sup>101</sup>. SFPs usually also involve regular monitoring of weight gain and a discharge criteria based on an individual achieving a target weight for height or weight for age. The TSF, however, operates on the basis of a three-monthly food distribution without direct provision of a general ration and there is no follow up of a child or women’s weight gain during their enrolment in the programme. In this regard therefore, it is important to recognise that the TSF can not be judged against standard criteria for SFP programmes.

#### *Programme expansion*

329. The EOS component of the programme was piloted in SNNPR in 14 woredas (districts) between April and May 2004 and extended to 40 additional woredas between June and August 2004. The TSF component was launched in April 2004 as a six-month pilot programme in 10 woredas as an “extended package of the EOS” and was scaled up in 2005 to cover 169 districts by December 2005<sup>102</sup>.

330. The target woredas are those defined as chronically food insecure (food insecure for 3 to 12 months per year) and transiently food insecure (food insecure for up to 3 months per year).

#### *Evaluating the pilot*

331. An evaluation of the pilot carried out September 2004<sup>103</sup> identified various achievements and problems. Achievements included over 90% coverage with vitamin A supplements, measles

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<sup>100</sup> The SFP style objectives for the programme may well have created unrealistic expectations of the programme

<sup>101</sup> MSF Emergency Nutrition Guidelines

<sup>102</sup> WFP Annual Report Ethiopia 2005

<sup>103</sup> Evaluation of the EOS Programme in Ethiopia. Peter Baron. 13 October 2004



immunisation, targeted nutrition screening and eligible beneficiaries receiving the TSF. Problems included resource constraints (inadequate training, rushed micro-planning), weak nutrition screening and delays in distributing the food supplements. The evaluation recommended rapid programme scale up which meant that DPPB/WFP faced considerable pressure to expand the programme in order to ensure that the EOS activities were complimented with the TSF activities. Today the EOS and TSF operate in all 10 regions of Ethiopia in target woredas defined as chronically vulnerable<sup>104</sup>.

## 8.2 Achievements

### *Scaling up the programme*

332. Over a one and half year period the TSF has expanded from just one region and 10 woredas in April 2004 to 264 woredas in 10 regions by the end of 2006. The programme now delivers a targeted food supplement to malnourished children and pregnant and lactating women (P&LW) at 2, 246 food distribution centres (FDCs) through a network of 4, 492 trained Food Distribution Agents (FDAs) and aims to “deliver the food directly to the door of the people .. By November 2006, approximately 400,000 children and 190,000 P&LW received two distributions of the food supplement i.e. a total of six month supplementary food<sup>105</sup>. The end of year 2006 figures show 484,794 children and 227,794 PLW. This represents an increase of over 100,000 beneficiaries compared to 2005<sup>106</sup>.

333. There is substantial support and approval for the programme from government, especially at regional and woreda level, as well as support from communities. This support has been an important factor in the programme’s rapid expansion.

334. The scaling up of the programme is a considerable achievement given the human, financial, transport and communication constraints facing Ethiopia. The decentralised approach whereby each region is directly responsible for the programme and receives direct budget support for implementation is also an achievement. There have however inevitably been problems associated with the rapid expansion and the efforts to overcome challenges are described below.

### *Resourcing the programme*

335. A great deal of work has been undertaken by the four partners to outline different roles and responsibilities of implementing staff at all levels . Job descriptions are available and there are also various Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for the four partners at federal, regional and woreda level as well as with other agencies (NGOs, transporters etc). DPPB and WFP staff are provided with a salary through the WFP budget with staffing levels as follows:

DPPB staff:

Regional Coordinators covering 244 woredas

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<sup>104</sup> CVI

<sup>105</sup> WFP CO monitoring data

<sup>106</sup> At the same time, the EOS has also reached all 10 regions covering slightly more woredas than the TSF (n= 325) and aims to reach 5.4 million children and 1.6 million P&LW every six months.



11 Regional Assistant Coordinators covering 207 woredas

18 Area Coordinators covering 186 woredas

In total, there are 36 dedicated DPPB staff.

WFP staff:

WFP has 8 Sub-offices (SO) in the country with a focal point person for the TSF in each SO as well as WFP field monitors. In total, there are 12 TSF staff

WFP also has support staff for the TSF based in Addis including 3 international and 2 national staff<sup>107</sup>

336. Considerable resources have been invested in TSF staff training at all levels. The approach adopted is ‘cascading’ training whereby trainers of trainers (TOT) are trained at one level who then train staff at the next level. This approach is entirely appropriate given the scale of the training undertaken. Table 2 shows the numbers trained and the type of training undertaken between 2005 and 2006. Training for the EOS component is carried out separately from the TSF training.

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<sup>107</sup> 1 other national TSF staff member is being recruited which will bring the total to 6 TSF staff



Table 2: Training courses for the TSF component

<b>Participants</b>	<b>Type and Length of Training</b>	<b>Numbers Trained</b>
<b>Federal and Regional Level</b>		
1. Country and sub-office WFP staff	Results Based Management -1 week	12
	Results Based Management -1 week	36
<b>Regional and Area Level</b>		
2. DPPB-Regional and Area Coordinators	Overview of Nutritions – 1 week	36
	Basic Nutritions concepts – 2 days	36
	Food Logistics – 1 day	36
Also included food transporters, chairmen of bidding committee and heads of finance	Food Commodity Management TOT – 5 days	590
	Nutrition Education and Promotion TOT- 4/5 days	590
<b>Woreda (District) Level</b>		
3. Woreda focal point, DPP and health staff	Food Commodity Management – 2/3 days	4492
	Nutrition Promotion – 2/3 days	4492
<b>Kebele Level</b>		
4. Food Distribution Agents ( local women)		

337. While there are no plans currently for additional TSF related formal training, on-the-job refresher training is carried out by the WFP Field Monitors during TSF post distribution monitoring meetings and TSF site visits.

338. It is important to note that the WFP training budget relies on a pre-determined percentage of funds related to the volume of food delivered. The amount allocated varies by donor but relative to the cost of food aid, is small. The funds available for training and other capacity development activities, therefore, are on a pre-determined financial ceiling. In the case of the TSF, the WFP budget for further capacity development is not adequate.



339. In addition to staffing and training, the programme provides a ‘minimum package’ for the regions which includes cars, motorbikes and computers, essential resources for programme monitoring and implementation. Based on WFP monitoring data for 2006, 54% of all TSF woredas are in receipt of the minimum package<sup>108</sup>.

#### *Enhancing the role of women*

340. A unique and impressive feature of the TSF is the substantial network of trained local women who are responsible for overseeing all aspects of the food distribution and also for providing nutrition education.

#### *Roles and responsibilities of the Food Distribution Agents*

341. At each Kebele, two local women who are respected and known to the communities are elected as Food Distribution Agents (FDAs). These women are, wherever possible, literate and are paid a small volunteer salary by WFP in line with the government volunteer payment regulations<sup>109</sup>. They are trained (see above) to carry out a considerable range of activities as follows:

- Receiving the food supplements into food distribution centres (FDCs) from the food transporters
- Safe storage of the food supplements in the FDCs
- Close liaison with the Kebele level leaders
- 3 monthly targeted food distribution
- Nutrition education for P&LW and mothers of malnourished children
- Upkeep of a register for recording beneficiary information
- Attending post distribution meetings to discuss constraints and problem solving options.

342. Based on meetings with the FDAs and observations of the TSF in progress during the evaluation team’s field visits, it is apparent that the FDAs are both highly capable and well respected. They are clear about their roles and responsibilities and, as outlined below in the recommendations section, are a major resource capable of an expanded remit in the EOS/TSF programme.

343. It is also evident that the programme has, through the considerable responsibilities offered to the FDAs and the financial gains (albeit a very small gain) they receive, empowered these women. This feature of the TSF component is to be applauded.

344. The FDAs do sometimes face serious challenges to their role as ‘gatekeepers’ of the TSF distribution. For example, during a visit to East Haraghe by the evaluation team, a group of Kebele leaders had prevented the FDAs from distributing the food by withholding information from the community about the date the distribution was to take place. These leaders wanted control of the food distribution.. Fortunately, in this instance, the Woreda TSF focal person had, by bypassing the Kebele leaders, ensured the food distribution took place.

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<sup>108</sup> WFP CO monitoring of TSF for 2006

<sup>109</sup> Approximately 35 Birr per day for approximately 12 days per quarter.



### *Strengthening programme implementation*

345. During the expansion of the programme, significant improvements in the delivery of key TSF activities are evident. Improvements have been possible as a result of operational research initiatives to resolve particular operational challenges and through regular monitoring. Examples of these are provided below:

#### *Study into the viability of pre-positioning food for more rapid distribution*

346. This study was initiated to explore the potential of pre-positioning food before EOS screening in order to decrease the time lag between the EOS MUAC screening and the delivery of the targeted food supplement<sup>110</sup>. The programme has an agreed target of 21 days between the EOS screening results being received by the DPPB and the food distribution taking place but has had problems meeting the target. This study, carried out in Sidama Zone in SNNPR in March 2006 examined the advantages and disadvantages of pre-positioning food based on previous MUAC screening trends. The study found that while there were obvious advantages to pre-positioning the food, a large number of sites (60%) had too little food (despite a 20% contingency) and some had too much food and lacked storage capacity.

347. The authors appropriately recommended that pre-positioning was not a viable option but identified a number of options to help reach the 21-day target. The authors recommended priority be given to speeding up the MUAC screening information transfer to the DPPB, speeding up food transportation, involving the FDAs in the EOS screening process and ensuring the beneficiary registers were given to the FDAs immediately after the completion of screening. Many of these recommendations are being taken forward. It is apparent that where the programme is well established such as in SNNPR, Tigray and Amhara region, EOS screening and TSF distribution are taking place according to the targets that have been set i.e. that the regions with the greatest experience are doing better<sup>111</sup>.

348. Piloting an expanded role for FDAs:

In response to the pre-positioning study, FDAs in one locality are attending and supporting the EOS screening activities on a pilot basis to identify the benefits and feasibility of their involvement. Programme implementers have identified numerous advantages as follows:

- To provide continuity between screening and food distribution
- To increase the speed of information retrieval from the EOS screening
- To increase awareness among the FDAs as to who the beneficiaries are in their locality
- To ensure the beneficiary register is rapidly and accurately completed
- To support the EOS teams in carrying out different activities during the EOS rounds

#### *Piloting collaboration with NGOs*

349. As indicated above, capacity for the treatment of severe malnutrition is low in Ethiopia and therefore, the opportunities for referral of severely malnourished children identified at the EOS screening sites is limited. To help overcome this, the TSF programme has collaborated with NGOs who are supporting increased capacity for the treatment of malnutrition as well as monthly supplementary feeding.

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<sup>110</sup> Belete D et al March 31<sup>st</sup> 2006. Addis Ababa presentation

<sup>111</sup> WFP monitoring data



350. There are other instances where identified problems have been resolved. For example, falsifying the ration cards has been addressed by altering the colour of the ration card between each food distribution and by issuing the FDAs with their own ink stamp to show that the ration has been collected by the appropriate person. A new Beneficiary Registration Book has also been introduced which indicates all registered beneficiaries by name, location, sex, ration card serial number and their MUAC measurement. Only those beneficiaries in the register should receive the TSF food upon the beneficiary presenting the ration card to the FDA. This is an important development as it provides rigorous checks and balances as well as ensuring the FDAs have the appropriate information for the food distribution to take place. The registration book contains duplicate copies for the FDAs, health woreda and DPPD staff. In some regions, delays arising because of the lengthy transport tendering process have been addressed by extending the contract period to cover two food distributions rather than just one. The WFP Logistics Unit organised a “Logistics Road Show” for transporters to help overcome transport delays.

#### *Programme monitoring and performance*

351. A monitoring system has been developed for the TSF component as part of the WFP Action Based monitoring system. The monitoring started in 2006 and involves;

- Checklist for the FDAs to complete-known as the ‘FDA Reporting Format’
- Checklist for monitoring the food distribution centres –known as the ‘FDC monitoring checklist’ which is compiled by the Woreda, regional and WFP staff.
- Checklist for post distribution interviews –known as ‘beneficiary interviews’ which is compiled by Area, regional and WFP staff.

352. The monitoring data provides information on inputs and activities for example on beneficiary numbers, the tonnage of food distributed, condition of the food stores, number of nutrition education sessions carried out, etc.

353. Training of DPPB and WFP staff is taking place in the regions on the use of the monitoring system and on how to use the new software. Once fully operational, this will enable regional and federal level analysis.

354. There is also regular field based monitoring undertaken by the WFP field monitors in tandem with the Area and Regional Coordinators and the Woreda TSF focal person. During the field visits undertaken for the evaluation, it was apparent that FM regular field presence provides crucial day to day programme management support including on-the-job training, problem identification and solving as well as support for all four partners to improve coordination. This level of field presence is not as evident for the EOS component activities. The WFP monitors are undoubtedly a real asset to the programme and should be applauded for their considerable efforts.

355. In 2006, WFP CO staff carried out an analysis of 2005 monitoring data to help identify key programme achievements<sup>112</sup> It was found that around half (52%) of all target TSF beneficiaries were preparing the ration and consuming the ration correctly. Furthermore, the majority (88%) of beneficiaries indicated that they received the correct amount of CSB and oil and that almost all (98%) of FDAs were promoting key nutrition messages during the food distribution sessions.

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<sup>112</sup> The data analysed was based on non-representative information gathered in 2005 from approximately 500 completed checklists.





Whilst the data were not drawn from a representative sample of programme areas or beneficiaries, it nonetheless does indicate positive achievements.

356. In order to determine the performance of the TSF in relation to recovery and default rates, a study was undertaken by WFP in 2006<sup>113</sup>. This involved an analysis of the registration books from 32 Food distribution Centres in SNNPR and Tigray Region. Unfortunately, due to limitations in the study design<sup>114</sup> the findings can not be used to determine whether or not the TSF has resulted in positive nutrition outcomes. It is important however, to recognise the effort made to evaluate the programme's impact and to acknowledge that measuring nutrition impact of any programme is rarely easy or straightforward.

### 8.3 Main Challenges

#### *Evidence of nutritional benefit*

357. As indicated above, despite some efforts to measure impact, evidence that the TSF component is having a positive impact on nutritional status of children enrolled in the programme is not available. The absence of evidence of impact is of major concern for all involved in the programme especially given the scepticism about the programme expressed by some donors and INGOs at federal level. It is important, however, to recognise that because the EOS/TSF is not a typical supplementary feeding programme (even though it has objectives typical of SFPs) standard criteria for measuring impact can not be applied. Furthermore, the programme approach is fairly unique and therefore, evidence from similar programmes by which to infer likely impact is not available. Investment by the partners in measuring impact will be relevant not only in the Ethiopia context, but also more widely. It is the view of the evaluation team that until impact data is available, there is no reason to explore alternative means of addressing moderate malnutrition in Ethiopia.

There is a view within WFP that case control studies are unethical. However, such studies can be implemented opportunistically by including groups who would not have been included in the programme<sup>115</sup>. Alternatively, cohort studies can provide valuable information about programme efficacy e.g. the percentage of children who recover over a period of time.

358. During the evaluation, it was apparent that there is a general perception at regional, woreda and community level that the TSF is conferring nutrition benefits. Statements such as "children are getting stronger" and that hospital admissions for therapeutic feeding have declined were made<sup>116</sup>. However, 'anecdotal evidence', although encouraging, is no substitute for evidence of impact based on carefully conducted impact assessment using quantitative measurements.

#### *Implementation*

359. While significant improvements have been made over the past year and a half in implementing the TSF component, problems clearly still exist. These problems vary by region, according to the length of time the programme has been in operation and in their magnitude.

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<sup>113</sup> Sample Study to Determine Performance Indicators of TSF Programme. WFP CO, 2006.

<sup>114</sup> For example, it was assumed that if a recipient was not re-admitted to the TSF after 6 months that this indicated that he/she had recovered.

<sup>115</sup> Duffield. A et al

<sup>116</sup> Verbal reports to the evaluation team from staff in East Haraghe and in Afar Region



Implementation challenges cut across both the EOS and TSF components and in many instances, problems with one directly affect the other. The main challenges in implementation are described below.

### *Delays in food distribution*

360. Delays are arising at virtually all stages of the food distribution process although generalisations about the magnitude and extent of the problem should be avoided. This is because each region is at a different stage of programme implementation and each is facing differing constraints. The WFP Country Office drew up a table in 2005 to identify the different phases of the TSF programme by region. This categorises each region into 3 distinct phases: Set-up Phase during which delays in food distribution would be expected, a Consolidation Phase during which the MOU targets would be met and a Linkages Phase during which the programme would integrate with other programmes such as the HEP. At the time of this evaluation, all regions were either in the first or second phase of programming.

361. The reasons for delays are numerous. For example, EOS staff face considerable time pressure during the EOS screening sessions and may not have time to compile the MUAC screening information at the end of the sessions but produce the information some two to three days or even one week later. Poor inter-sectoral communication between DPP and MOH staff at woreda level can result in lengthy delays in handing over the MUAC data for estimating food requirements. During the evaluators visit to East Haraghe it was noted that the Woreda health staff were sending the MUAC screening data to the Zonal health office rather than to the Woreda DPP staff which was causing delays as well as considerable tension between the two departments. Delays also arise with the food transport tendering process which can take considerable time where the contracts only cover one round of TSF at a time.

362. At the community level, there are examples of kebele leaders failing to inform the target group of the food distribution dates which creates delays. This may arise due to a lack of understanding about the programme approach i.e. targeted food supplements. It was reported that mobilisation is difficult in situations where the TSF targets those who are “better off” with malnutrition rather than those who are poorer but who do not have malnutrition. In areas where poverty is equated with food aid entitlement, the TSF approach, if not well communicated, will result in confusion and conflict.

363. Finally, delays also arise in providing the FDAs with the beneficiary register which lists all the beneficiaries and is essential for the FDAs to identify and cross check those on the register with the information on their ration cards. Recently, in recognition of this problem, a new register has been designed to ensure that a copy of each page is available for health and DPP staff as well as for the FDAs<sup>117</sup>.

364. Delays in food distribution undermines the potential impact and the credibility of the programme<sup>118</sup>. For example, although the food had been delivered on time to the FDCs in East Haraghe, most of the food arrived in a spoiled state and could not be distributed. It was clear that this was causing considerable disquiet among community leaders, FDAs and the target

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<sup>117</sup> This is another good example of problem solving undertaken by the programme staff

<sup>118</sup> Overall, however, there is a general perception among all stakeholders that delays in food distribution are reducing due to the remedial efforts described in the section above.



group concerned. It should be noted however, that this seems to have been specific to East Haraghe and is not a general problem.

### *Targeting*

365. The target group for the programme is children under five while the entry criteria to the EOS is based on those whose height falls below 110 cm. because of the difficulty of establishing age of children at field level. This means that children who are stunted but above five years of age are enrolled onto the programme. Whilst this is not in itself a problem as older stunted and wasted children should benefit from the programme, it has created a problem in the way EOS programme coverage is estimated. Currently EOS under-five coverage is over-estimated due to the inclusion of this older group by a factor of around 20% and this will need to be addressed in all future coverage estimates<sup>119</sup>.

366. A more significant issue with the EOS relates to the quality of the MUAC screening and therefore, eligibility for the TSF. Questions about the accuracy of MUAC measurements have been raised throughout the life of the programme as measurement errors are being detected although the extent of these errors is unknown. Regular supervisory visits of the EOS screening activities or post screening coverage surveys to check coverage and ration card allocation are not undertaken in the programme. In the absence of such quality assurance, it is not possible to identify where exclusion or inclusion errors are arising, the reasons for these problems or the remedial action required to reduce such errors<sup>120</sup>.

367. Concerns were raised during the evaluation about the allocation and management of ration cards and instances cited where ration cards were poorly targeted<sup>121</sup>. Pressure on EOS screening team staff to provide cards to their community members irrespective of MUAC status as well as the pressure of time during the screening activities resulting in cards being allocated without MUAC measurements and oedematous cases being falsified are all incidents highlighted. In Afar Region ration cards in one FDC had not been given to all those on the beneficiary register and they (ten women and children) were therefore not able to collect their ration<sup>122</sup>. Instances of ration cards being sold were also reported<sup>123</sup>. Nonetheless, as indicated above, the introduction of the new Beneficiary Registration Book reduces the opportunities for falsified or excess ration cards to be validated. Discussions about refinements to the registration book have been ongoing between the Regional Health Bureau, DPPB, UNICEF and WFP.

368. While efforts are focussed on positioning the FDC as close to the communities as possible and a target of a maximum of two hours is set as the time it should take to reach the FDCs, this is not always possible. In Afar Region for example where population groups are highly dispersed, it was observed that women were travelling for up to four hours to receive the food supplement and then another four hours to return home<sup>124</sup>.

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<sup>119</sup> Note that the EOS screening data, even if more representative and accurate is not collected regularly enough for early warning purposes.

<sup>120</sup> For a more detailed analysis of the MUAC screening issues, readers are referred to the UNICEF evaluation report (in process)

<sup>121</sup> Ration cards are allocated by the EOS team staff and are supplied by the DPP prior to the screening activities

<sup>122</sup> Aysaita Woreda

<sup>123</sup> Verbal communication WFP CO and SC UK staff

<sup>124</sup> The women had only been informed the previous day that distribution was to take place



369. As indicated above, according to WFPs analysis of available monitoring data, around half of the target beneficiaries report that the supplementary food is given to the child or mother for whom it is intended. Nonetheless, sharing of the food ration does take place as evidenced during interviews and household visits carried out by the evaluation team. A significant proportion of beneficiaries met by the evaluation team<sup>125</sup> reported sharing the food among family members (particularly other children) and the food lasting on average six weeks as opposed to twelve weeks.

370. Sharing is unsurprising in view of the fact that the TSF component is operating in an environment of high levels of chronic and acute food insecurity, declining provision of a general ration and, in some areas, a traditional practice of sharing resources. It is very likely that there is a seasonal dimension to the practice of sharing with higher levels of sharing when food is in short supply. The ration provides around 1, 600 kilocalories per person per day which is 400 kilocalories higher than the ration recommended for a traditional take home SFP. The extra provision was designed to mitigate the sharing of the ration.

#### *Referral for Therapeutic feeding*

371. The EOS screening identifies very large numbers of severely malnourished children but, as the treatment of severe malnutrition is not yet a routine part of the health system, there is only minimal capacity in Ethiopia to treat these children. There are non-government organisations (NGOs) supporting capacity for treatment (in-patient and community based treatment) but these are few. For example, while the EOS is operating in 325 woredas, NGOs are in just 10% of the woredas in the country where the EOS/TSF is being implemented.

372. Theoretically, all cases of severe malnutrition will be screened by the EOS and enrolled onto the TSF and it is likely that, in some instances the TSF will be the only source of additional food for these children. The outcome for this group given the time delay between screening and food distribution which at best occurs within 21 days is not known as individual cases are not followed up by the health sector staff. It has been argued that the detection of large numbers of severely malnourished children in the absence of capacity to treat these children could be viewed as unethical unless the information are used in a concerted advocacy campaign to address capacity issues.<sup>126</sup>

#### *Nutrition Education*

373. The EOS/TSF programme is trying to address inadequate caring practices through nutrition education and promotion. During the TSF food distribution, the FDAs have responsibility for imparting key “life-saving” nutrition messages including the need to exclusively breast feed for the first six months and on appropriate complimentary feeding. In line with WFP corporate policy, important messages about food ration entitlement and preparing the blended food preparation are also given. There is a view within WFP that initiatives at this scale will have a positive impact on behaviour although the evaluation team’s view is that it is very doubtful whether complex behaviour changes can be achieved at a food distribution setting at which there are large crowds of people, considerable noise and workload for the FDAs<sup>127</sup>.

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<sup>125</sup> The evaluation team recognise that this does not constitute a representative sample

<sup>126</sup> Verbal communication CONCERN Ethiopia

<sup>127</sup> A due to be launched WFP 3 month study on the social causes of malnutrition has examined the effectiveness of the nutrition education sessions at the FDCs and will provide important information on the link with behaviour change.



374. Experience shows that a high level of local knowledge and skills are required as well as repeated interaction with the target group in order to change behaviour. The FDAs currently have two days training in nutrition education and a very short time (ten or twenty minutes) to deliver the messages just once every three months.

### *Monitoring and Coordination*

375. As indicated above, considerable information is collected by the TSF to monitor inputs and activities and while it has not been possible to examine the monitoring system in detail, there seems to be considerable overlap in the data collected as well as information collected which may not be particularly useful<sup>128</sup>. For example, all three checklists include considerable information on nutrition education activities and the FDC checklist appears overly long and could potentially overburden the staff concerned. There is awareness of these limitations in the WFP CO.

376. The FAUIS study in 2005 contained a small element on the EOS/TSF but pressures of time and the need to address relief and PSNP elements of the PRRO dictated that the sample for the EOS/TSF component was extremely small. As a result the findings are not presented here as they cannot be taken as representative.

377. Although the EOS/TSF was designed to be a joint programme, implementation is largely carried out separately and vertically. The EOS activities fall under the FMOH and UNICEF while the TSF activities fall under the DPPA and WFP. Each has its own budget, monitoring system, objectives and staff. While there are MOUs clearly outlining each partners roles and responsibilities, there is no designated responsibility for overall programme management and performance at regional level nor joint responsibility for overall programme performance for example in relation to identifying nutrition impact.

378. The distribution of ration cards is a good example of how this separation plays out in practice. The EOS staff distribute the ration cards following the MUAC screening which they receive from the DPPB. Once distributed, the TSF staff then deliver the food supplement without the involvement of the EOS programme staff. Joint discussion and analysis as to how well the activity has gone, whether shortfalls have arisen or what remedial action is required can take place at the post-distribution monitoring meetings but full participation by MOH and DPP staff does not always take place. Furthermore, it seems that there are perhaps too many actors in this activity which adds to the problems with ration card management highlighted above.

379. Based on observations during the evaluation, coordination, though improved, remains constrained at some levels. At the Federal level the Interagency Coordinating Committee for the EOS/TSF and the Technical Working Group that advises the committee are reported to be meeting regularly while at other levels it is less regular<sup>129</sup>.

380. In the regions visited, the Regional Coordinating Committees meet irregularly which means that their capacity to address programme constraints in a timely and coordinated manner

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<sup>128</sup> The Beneficiary Interview checklist includes re-measuring a child's MUAC at the time of the interview which could provide information on whether there has been any improvement. However, the form does not include the original MUAC measurement taken at the EOS screening so it is not possible to compare one measurement with another.

<sup>129</sup> It is reported by WFP CO staff that the Interagency Coordinating Committee met 3 times in 2006 and the Technical Working Group met six times.



is problematic. Tensions between the four partners at all levels are evident and a ‘culture of blame’ has arisen in some instances with for example, EOS staff blaming TSF staff for food distribution delays and vice versa. During one evaluation visit to a region, it was not possible for the evaluation team to meet jointly with health and DPPB staff, underlining the fact that while considerable improvements in coordination have taken place, problems are still being faced in terms of coordination and communication.

381. Tensions also arise where resources for the programme components are unequal. It was noted that resources are more concentrated in the TSF component and that while there are shortages of transport and other essentials, DPP/WFP staff overall are better resourced than their health counterparts<sup>130</sup>. The TSF component activities benefit from more frequent supervision by the WFP Field Monitors and TSF Area and Regional Coordinators. These visits help strengthen overall coordination such as facilitating regional coordination committee meetings as well as providing an opportunity for ongoing capacity development of TSF (and other) staff. While efforts to share resources are evident, joint monitoring and coordination continues to be constrained in many situations<sup>131</sup>. This emphasises the need to invest additional resources in strengthening the capacity of staff from the health bureau..

382. Finally, there is a lack of clarity in Ethiopia as to the role of traditional SFPs in the context of the EOS/TSF. It is reported that situations have arisen where the EOS/TSF has been viewed as a replacement for traditional SFP in situations where child wasting levels have substantially increased. For example, in June 2005 in SNNPR, NGOs were unable to implement SFPs because the woreda staff saw the TSF as a replacement for an SFP<sup>132</sup>.

383. As already described, the TSF is not a traditional SFP and clearly it is inappropriate for the programme to be viewed in this light and for the presence of TSF activities to inhibit an appropriate and adequate response to nutrition “hot spots”.

### *Linkages*

384. When originally conceived as part of the PRRO, the TSF was intended to serve a beneficiary population that were a subset of the relief and PSNP beneficiary case load. Although not clearly articulated in the PRRO documents it could be inferred that there were two reasons for this; i) the assumption that those targeted for relief and PSNP would be most likely to have malnourished children, ii) recognition of the fact that supplementary feeding must be carried out in conjunction with a general ration if malnourished children and pregnant and lactating women are to recover.. A high proportion of TSF beneficiaries may therefore not be in receipt of an adequate general ration. The evaluation team found that varying proportions of families on relief or PSNP had children enrolled on the EOS/TSF. Where families are not enrolled on relief or PSNP programmes but in receipt of a TSF ration there will inevitably be some level sharing (small scale studies conducted by WFP suggest that 50% of beneficiaries may be sharing rations with other family members) and dilution of impact of the TSF ration. However, as a significant

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<sup>130</sup> Transport shortages within the TSF component are reported which is reducing capacity for monitoring and coordination

<sup>131</sup> It should also be noted that some very positive examples of coordination were observed during the field visits notably where Health Extension Workers (HEW) and other kebele and woreda level staff were actively supporting the FDAs during the food distribution sessions. These support staff were not receiving additional financial remuneration for their efforts yet spent long days helping the FDAs (particularly those who are not literate) to read the beneficiary register data and to record written information.

<sup>132</sup> Verbal communication CONCERN Ethiopia.



proportion of those identified as mild or moderately malnourished may not be food insecure but affected by poor health and inadequate caring practices, it may not be necessary to formalise a linkage between the TSF and relief/PSNP components of the PRRO. This issue requires follow up study to determine whether, and to what extent, a formal link between the programmes should be established and whether such a linkage would ensure better targeting of the supplement leading to improved rates of recovery from mild and moderate malnutrition. .

*Exit strategy*

385. There is no clearly articulated exit strategy for the TSF component although the overall EOS/TSF programme is expected to phase out as the national HEP expands. It is unclear how long the planned HEP expansion will take although considerable progress is being made in training HEW and in constructing health posts. In addition, there is currently no stated role for supplementary food in the HEP documentation.

386. The Government of Ethiopia has endorsed the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for 2007 to 2011 which contains a specific component for the EOS/TSF and which commits UNICEF/WFP to continuing their assistance to the programme. In addition, WFP is investing in building the capacity of DPP staff with the intention that DPPA/B will take over the TSF project cycle management and create a budget line to fund the programme in the future.

387. Nonetheless, it is important that criteria for determining when the programme should be phased out and stopped are established based on targets for the achievement of nutrition outcomes.



## 8.4 Recommendations

388. The following recommendations apply to the TSF component. Complementary recommendations for the EOS component are contained in the evaluation report commissioned by UNICEF. The recommendations are based on the ideas put forward by TSF programme staff, some of which, are already being implemented, and on the views of the evaluation consultants as to the main priorities for strengthening the programme.

### *Urgent impact assessment*

389. Given the significant investment in the EOS/TSF programme, it is vital that robust nutritional impact data are generated as a matter of priority. It is clearly stated in the WFP/UNICEF MOU that where a programme has nutritional objectives, then nutritional impact must be assessed.

390. All parties and donors need to be involved in the study design to ensure shared objectives and ownership of the results. The findings of the study should be widely disseminated both within Ethiopia and to the international community.

391. The impact study will need to be carefully designed with the full support of a statistician. It is likely to involve conducting studies on a representative sample of a cohort of children to assess nutritional outcome (e.g. the percentage of children who recover from moderate malnutrition) with a comparison group made up of children who only receive the EOS inputs (i.e. not the TSF) or a cohort study to examine efficacy of the programme in terms of percentage of children who recover in relation to cost of inputs (material and human). The study should also include programme coverage indicators to understand what levels of exclusion and inclusion error are arising, the accuracy of the ration card distribution and where possible, what access EOS/TSF beneficiaries have to other relief and development programmes<sup>133</sup>.

392. The ENCU has capacity in carrying out nutrition surveys as well as in training survey teams and in data analysis. It is recommended therefore that consideration should be given to involving the ENCU in all aspects of the study. At the same time, it is recommended that consideration is given to a potential role for the FMOH Nutrition Unit to help carry out the study. This will ensure that the capacities of both federal level nutrition units are brought to bear on the process as well as offering a learning opportunity for those involved.

### *Widely disseminate impact findings*

393. Results from the impact survey should be discussed with key stakeholders and programme re-design undertaken if necessary.

### *Increase the role of the FDAs*

394. The role of the FDAs in providing support during the implementation of the EOS activities has already been successfully tested and it is therefore recommended that agreement is reached as soon as possible between all partners to formalise their role.

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<sup>133</sup> For a more detailed discussion on the study design, please refer to the UNICEF evaluation report (in progress).





395. The advantages of this include the creation of a direct link between the EOS and TSF components i.e. between the food and health activities as well as increasing the FDAs awareness of who the target beneficiaries are in their catchment area. FDAs, with additional training will be capable of supporting a range of EOS activities including MUAC measurements and information about the EOS activities.

396. Another advantage of the FDAs involvement in the EOS is in aiming to create a direct link between the FDAs and HEWs who are already active in the EOS/TSF programme. This link can support the FDAs in carrying out their roles and responsibilities as well as encourage close cooperation which could be of longer-term benefit to the HEP in the event that FDAs become HEP community volunteers. Finally, expanding the role of the FDAs is in keeping with the important efforts to ensure local women are empowered through undertaking a range of programme responsibilities.

#### *Rapidly distribute the new beneficiary register*

397. To help reduce delays arising in the FDAs receiving the TSF beneficiary details, the newly designed registration book should be distributed as rapidly as possible. This will involve resources for training the FDAs (and others) in how to compile the registration book and also ongoing support for the FDAs in compiling the registration book (especially when illiterate). The direct involvement of the FDAs in this activity at the time of the MUAC screening will also help to reduce incidences where MUAC screening data is being falsified by helping to ensure it is correctly recorded.

#### *Focus on essential food supplement information*

398. It is recommended that messages given at the food distribution sites should focus on information on preparing the blended foods, the food entitlement and the need to attend both food distributions (note that much of this information is already available in posters) rather than on broader health and nutrition education.

399. Broader health and nutrition education is a key activity of the HEWs requiring a detailed knowledge of the factors that determine nutrition related behaviour and a range of tools for communicating behaviour change. Thus, broader nutrition education needs to take place at health posts, health centres and at the community level during household level visits. The FDAs do not currently have the range of skills nor are the FDC sites, the appropriate venue for this activity. However, it is likely that the FDAs do have local knowledge which can be of value to the HEWs who are often not from the local community. It is possible that the role of the FDAs could, at a future stage, be expanded to support the HEWs in carrying out nutrition related behaviour change and communication activities at the community level following appropriate training.

#### *Focus on communicating with local leaders*

400. It is recommended that efforts continue to ensure that the Woreda and kebele level administration clearly understand the programme approach to targeting to reduce malnutrition and are encouraged to mobilise support for the FDAs prior to and during food distribution. In some places, mobilisation and support is working extremely well as HEWs, community volunteers, agricultural or education staff assist by cross checking the beneficiary lists with ration cards and in helping to compile the FDA monitoring check list. It is also evident that where the Kebele leaders obstruct the work of the FDAs, the Woreda administration is able to directly intervene to resolve the problems. A key concern about the support FDAs need from the



HEWs and other staff is whether this support can be sustained given their existing work demands and the lack of remuneration for carrying out TSF related duties. The DFID funded Institutional Strengthening Programme aimed at increasing awareness of the TSF amongst district and sub-district leaders in 270 districts through 1-3 days of training in 2006 and 2007 will undoubtedly have a positive impact on the programme.

#### *Support six-monthly food transportation contracts*

401. It is recommended that the six monthly food transport agreements across all regions are approved at both federal and regional level to reduce the delays arising in food delivery due to the bidding process conducted every three months. Note that in Afar region, this is already being implemented based on zonal level approval and is a key focus of the ongoing WFP “Logistics Road Show”.

#### *Reduce problems with the ration card*

402. It is recommended that consideration be given to FMOH/UNICEF taking responsibility for providing the TSF ration cards to reduce the current problems with shortages and delays in the allocation of these cards to the EOS sites. This will also reduce the number of people involved in this activity.

#### *Rationalise the monitoring system*

403. A great deal of work is ongoing to decentralise and refine the TSF monitoring system though it is apparent that there is some overlap in the information gathered and that it may not be necessary to collect all the information to improve programme implementation. It is therefore recommended that where possible, the TSF monitoring system is rationalised and simplified in order to focus on the key indicators that are needed to measure programme performance and to free up time for the staff to undertake more on the job supervisory support and training. Fortunately, a TSF monitoring review is planned for February 2007 which will be able to re-assess the monitoring system.

#### *Support regional programme reviews*

404. Since the programme started, there has not been the opportunity for regions to review their progress and the outstanding challenges of the programme. It is therefore recommended that a series of regional workshops are held to identify progress and challenges of EOS/TSF with all stakeholders.

405. The emphasis should be on learning from the woreda level about their experiences of implementing the programme (both positive and less positive). The workshops should bring together all partners and, if possible involve some field based work looking at the programme activities with key actors such as the FDAs, kebele leaders and HEWs. It should aim to have focussed working group meetings to develop practicable recommendations that are region specific and which take account of their existing capacity and resources.

#### *Support the regions to analyse their programme capacity*

406. Following the workshop, it is recommended that the Regional Coordinating Committees compile a review of capacity for implementing the EOS/TSF and report on their findings to the federal Inter-agency Coordinating Committee. This is essential if progress is to be made in strengthening overall programme monitoring (including quality assurance) and coordination.



*Support each region to identify a lead agency*

407. It is also recommended that each region identify a lead co-ordination agency based on capacity and consensus at the regional or zonal level. The lead agency will facilitate the involvement of all four partners in the review process as outlined above as well as to mobilise partners to coordinate through the existing coordinating structures. This role can be rotated on an annual basis to avoid over-burdening one particular partner.

*Continue to -invigorate federal coordinating structures*

408. In order to reinforce the joint approach and aim of the programme as well as to provide federal level leadership, it is recommended that efforts continue to ensure the Inter Agency Coordinating Committee and the Technical Working Group (TWG) meet on a regular basis. Key non-government organisations with experience of nutrition-related emergency and longer-term nutrition programming should also be involved in the TWG.

*Develop guidance on response to nutrition “hot-spots”*

409. There are situations where the TSF has been viewed as a replacement for traditional SFP and it is therefore recommended that guidance notes are developed on when additional supplementary food response is needed to respond to “hot spots”. This is necessary to ensure that where emergency nutrition situations arise, the presence of the TSF does not inhibit an appropriate and adequate response. This guidance can be drawn up by ENCU with assistance from the four partners and can draw heavily on existing government guidance on responding to hot-spots as well as INGO experiences of conducting emergency supplementary feeding in woredas where the EOS/TSF is also being implemented, .

*Develop guidance on EOS data for early warning purposes*

410. The value of the EOS MUAC screening data as a tool or early warning is unclear. It is therefore recommended that guidance is provided on when and how the screening data can be utilised.

*Advocate for resources for the treatment of severely malnourished children*

411. A major limitation of the programme is that whilst thousands of severely malnourished children are detected, there is a lack of capacity for treating these children. It is therefore recommended that all programme partners as well as non-government organisations mount an advocacy strategy to persuade donors and government of the need for resourcing the mainstreaming of treatment within the health system and support for community based treatment approaches. In order to support such advocacy this it would be useful to map the case load of SAM identified by EOS/TSF for each region and wereda and compare this to the regional capacity for treatment.

*Advocate for resources for increased capacity development and monitoring*

412. The current budgetary restriction facing WFP for training and capacity development is limiting their ability to meet all the needs of the programme. It is therefore recommended that WFP advocates to donors for increased funding for training and capacity development. This should focus on funding for the programme review workshops outlined above, for strengthening supervision (jointly with health) to help push up standards and for refresher training to continue to build programme capacity at all levels.



413. UNICEF also faces similar resource constraints and it is therefore recommended that both agencies develop a joint resource strategy to implement future joint initiatives. These should focus on the need for joint programme monitoring and supervision at all levels with regular on-the-spot monitoring of EOS and TSF activities as they are being implemented.



## 9 HIV mainstreaming

### 9.1 Background

414. WFP HIV mainstreaming activities fit comfortably with national HIV priorities and contribute directly to PASDEP targets. WFP have been mainstreaming HIV in school feeding and MERET activities as part of their Country Programme for a number of years. This has been undertaken largely through ‘community conversations’ (CC) in MERET and in schools through peer education training and strengthening anti-AIDS clubs. WFP has also trained Anti-AIDS club members who have undertaken sensitisation in market places and peer education in schools. CC is a process of community dialogue focussing on the identification of HIV/AIDS related challenges, threats and fears, the development of local based solution, establishing mechanisms for applying community decisions and producing change. WFP carries out training of local government partners from HIV/AIDS, health and agricultural bureaus who are responsible for implementing CC, training of trainers and community facilitators in collaboration with local government partners, ongoing support in the form of stationary and relevant IEC materials and actively participating in the monitoring and evaluation process through regular visits to partners and CC implementation sites.

415. Mainstreaming activities were reviewed as part of the MTE of the CP completed in 2005<sup>134</sup>. A key finding of the evaluation was that there should be a systematic review of current CC process in 14 woredas prior to scaling up with a view to streamlining the process. The authors recommended that the aim should be to produce a less resource intensive CC intervention which would be more cost-effective, less of a management burden on WFP and could be better adapted to existing WFP programming across the board including under the PRRO. The MTE also recommended that other entry points for mainstreaming should be explored and incorporated into the draft mainstreaming strategy. Furthermore, indicators of behavioural change should be incorporated into the monitoring plan for CC.

416. In 2005 WFP developed an HIV/AIDS mainstreaming strategy<sup>135</sup>. Mainstreaming comprised three components; considering the impact of HIV/AIDS on WFP’s work, assessing the relevance of WFP’s work to the wider HIV/AIDS situation, and maximising opportunities that arise from WFP’s work to impact positively on the HIV/AIDS situation. The strategy was developed in close collaboration with all sub-offices. At national level WFP HIV/AIDS staff undertake a considerable amount of advocacy work continually encouraging HAPCO, FSCB and donors to mainstream HIV/AIDS activities. WFP have been instrumental in getting mainstreaming incorporated into the GoE global fund application as well as multi-sectoral programmes of the World Bank.

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<sup>134</sup> World Food Programme. 2003-2006 Ethiopia Country Programme. Mid-Term Evaluation.

<sup>135</sup> Zero Draft. WFP Ethiopia HIV/AIDS mainstreaming strategy



## 9.2 Review of Community Conversations

417. At the time of this PRRO evaluation a CC review process was being undertaken in four woredas<sup>136</sup>. The review is scheduled to be completed by the end of 2006. WFP have also been engaged with PSNP donors to scale up CC in PSNP woredas. Up until the CC review impacts have largely been measured anecdotally. For example, in Wollayta where there had been many reports of women being raped in night markets CCs contributed to decisions that markets should be held earlier during the day. In Amhara it is believed that CCs have helped reduce female circumcisions and safer syringe practices amongst unlicensed doctors (personal communication).

418. The review process covers process, outputs and outcomes. Outputs are for example, number of community facilitators trained while outcomes are focussed on the attitude and behavioural result brought about through the CC process. Using the 'significant impact' approach, the behavioural and attitudinal changes observed at individual, group and community level are documented by the facilitators in a Result Ledger. Initial findings from the WFP CC review appear mixed. Strengths include the way the implementation has been conducted, higher demand for VCT, large numbers of CFs working closely with kebele HIV/AIDS committees, success in facilitating community consensus on several issues, graduation of CC groups and set up of new ones. Challenges have included inadequate documentation of changes/results, resistance on some issues like female circumcision and difficulty in getting medical assistance to replace unwanted traditional practices<sup>137</sup>. However, the review has not been completed so it is premature to draw firm conclusions until all the information and analysis have been completed.

## 9.3 Mainstreaming under Relief and PSNP

419. There have been no mainstreaming activities under the relief component of the PRRO apart from HIV/AIDS awareness training for WFP transporters, although there are plans to work with partners in 2007 to increase their understanding and competence in HIV mainstreaming. WFP is also considering progressively increasing EOS/TSF entry points to initiate discussions around HIV/AIDS – although these ideas need to be developed further with UNICEF.

420. Last minute requests to WFP from FSCB to include gender and HIV mainstreaming in the PSNP training meant that WFP had to rapidly develop special training module. The training covered possible HIV/AIDS related risks associated with the PSNP, planning and needs identification, activity implementation, monitoring and evaluation and the role of DAs in the fight against HIV/AIDS. There was also a checklist for mainstreaming HIV/AIDS into PSNP design, implementation and monitoring. At the time of the evaluation HIV/AIDS mainstreaming was being transferred into the PSNP in woredas in Oromia region and preparations were being finalised for woredas in Amhara region.

421. The Government agreed in the recent JRIS Mission that gender and HIV/AIDS studies on targeting of PSNP resources would be undertaken. Further, building on these studies it was agreed that a Social Assessment study would be a useful tool to inform improved targeting of PSNP resources, particularly to female headed households and HIV/AIDS affected households.

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<sup>136</sup> Terms of reference for the CC review process in four woredas

<sup>137</sup> Summary report on the findings of CC review in West Hararghe and Draft summary report on the findings of the Kallu community conversation review



The APL II document sets out annual indicators against which progress can be measured: the % of HHS receiving HIV/AIDS training is planned to increase from 65% to 85% during the next 3 years of PSNP (2007-9). It is also stated that the community Food Security Task Force will work in close collaboration with Anti-AIDS committees to raise community awareness.

422. WFP states in its PRRO document<sup>138</sup> that: counterpart training for LIPAs and TSF will routinely focus on developing community-based capacities in HIV/AIDS preventions and mitigation”. However, in all kebeles visited it was not clear how this was being done. In some Woredas it seems that the population (regardless of whether they are PSNP beneficiaries or not) are getting useful levels of exposure to HIV/AIDS issues, but more as a result of the initiative of the Woreda Health Office than to any design feature of PRRO 10362. In other Woredas, PSNP beneficiaries stated that they had received no awareness raising, but would be interested to do so. WFP Field monitors were familiar and generally enthusiastic about the “Community Conversations” component of MERET that facilitate community discussion of HIV/AIDS issues, but the programming linkages of these activities with PSNP seemed weak or non-existent in the Woredas visited.

423. WFP have recently designed a study on distribution practices and their impact on HIV with SC UK. Funding is currently being sought. WFP are also exploring productive roles for PLWHA in PSNP.

#### **9.4 Recommendation:**

424. This evaluation believes that while HIV/AIDS mainstreaming is an important activity, there needs to be a more robust method for determining whether mainstreaming is effecting behavioural change. While WFP’s approach to measuring outcomes for CC is used by other agencies engaged in CC, e.g. UNDP, there is still insufficient evidence for impact. The current review of CCs discussed above focuses largely on process and output measures. The behavioural outcomes that are assessed are based on largely qualitative and subjective methods, e.g. through assessment of the participating communities themselves and the partners. Measuring knowledge transfer and resulting behavioural change is methodologically difficult and it is questionable whether WFP has the capacity to undertake such assessment on it’s own and within the limited ODOC resources at its disposal. . It would therefore appear sensible for WFP to involve other agencies in Ethiopia and UNICEF globally to strengthen future CC impact assessment.

425. As with all behavioural change tools and approaches (irrespective of the sector) education, knowledge transfer and awareness raising is only part of the picture. Other interventions need to be carried out simultaneously in order to maximise impact. For example, there is little point in conducting nutrition education if mothers and households lack resources to purchase or produce nutrient rich foods. Similarly, in the arena of HIV/AIDS prevention, greater impacts will be attained if environmental factors are concurrently addressed. For example, increasing access to VCT sites and targeted HIV/STI prevention and treatment services at convenient locations, e.g. border crossing points, reducing the border crossing times for transporters, increasing DSA for transporters or subsidising hotel accommodation so that there is less economic incentive to spend the night with sex workers. It is therefore important that WFP HIV mainstreaming work

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<sup>138</sup> Paragraph 70, Page 15, Enabling Livelihood Protection and Promotion - PRRO Ethiopia 10362; WFP/EB.3/2004/8-B/4



focus in equal measure on advocacy (to change the environment) and knowledge transfer. Although it can reasonably be argued that much of this advocacy work is best conducted by WFP implementing partners it is important for WFP to be aware of the need for a dual approach and to capitalise on advocacy opportunities where these arise. WFP's current strategy is perceived by some stakeholders as overly focussed on knowledge transfer.

## **9.5 Integrated Service for AIDS Prevention and Support Organisation (ISAPSO)**

426. ISAPSO, WFP and the Road Transport Authority entered into an agreement in 2005 to implement HIV/AIDS mainstreaming into 21 companies over a two year period. The 21 companies are those that have contractual agreement with WFP in transporting food items from the Djibouti port. Six were government owned, five were truck owners associations, six were PLCs, 2 were Safety Net and another two were established by endowment funds.

427. The expected outcomes of the project was increased commitment and capacity of the transport companies in implementing workplace HIV/AIDS prevention, care and support activities and promotion of behaviour change towards HIV/AIDS amongst transport workers. In order to implement the project managerial level workshops were conducted to build consensus with the top level management of the companies on workplace policy, and related issues. Also, peer education, club management and counselling trainings were provided to drivers and off road transport workers selected by their companies. Condoms and different IEC/BCC material were distributed to the transport companies.

428. Some companies performed extremely well - usually where management was strong and committed. There were also good examples of Anti-AIDS clubs and designated health officials in companies performing well. However, performance of other companies was weaker and after the first year and a number of reported difficulties it was agreed by partners to conduct a mid-term evaluation to assess progress and document lessons learned.

429. The evaluation<sup>139</sup> found that in spite of many successes the project failed to achieve a number of planned outputs and outcomes while some selected targets were unrealistic given the project time frame.

Factors impeding success included:

- lack of commitment on the part of transport company management
- truck owners associations have weak links with the drivers so that it is difficult for them to implement activities
- lack of commitment from the administration in the PLCs.
- difficulty in getting drivers to take training due to their mobility
- monitoring and follow up of drivers is difficult due to their mobility.

430. The evaluation recommended three primary areas of focus for the next project phase.

- Focus activities on a smaller number of companies that have already demonstrated their commitment to working on HIV/AIDS. The project will not work directly with

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<sup>139</sup> ISAPSO/WFP/RTA Joint mid-term evaluation report on "capacity strengthening of 21 truck companies for HIV/AIDS and mitigation activities project"





truck owners associations as they do not provide realistic opportunities to target drivers. The project will work with managers on a company by company basis to develop and introduce realistic workplace policies.

- Given the substantial gaps in drivers and other transport sector workers' knowledge of key issues related to HIV/AIDS, the project will develop IEC/BCC materials that contribute directly to the peer support component by encouraging testing, positive living and access to ART and PMTCT. Mini-media which has proved an effective method of communicating HIV/AIDS information to staff should also be used for IEC.
- Given the limited impact on drivers (the primary target group) subsequent phases of the intervention will focus on developing driver capacity to provide peer support as opposed to peer education. The project will train increased numbers of drivers who will be identified through volunteering. Drivers will assist in developing mobile strategies for contacting each other, providing peer support and monitoring and evaluation. The project will also produce a peer support manual.

431. A project amendment was completed at the end of November 2006 for a fourteen month period<sup>140</sup>. The target will be employees of 12 transport companies in Addis Ababa and other major towns. It is intended that the project will help in the design of workplace policies and will encourage sharing of programme experience between managers, club leaders and peer support promoters and mini-media focal persons. Furthermore, a total of 60 truck drivers will be trained in three places on the concept and application of peer support approach. A manual will be developed on peer support by ISAPSO/WFP/RTA. The manual will focus on knowledge on HIV/AIDS, VCT, ART, positive living, communication skills, reporting formats and supportive directories on VCT centres and related issues. It will also include information about referrals/directories on STI and reproductive health services. IEC/BCC materials will be developed targeting transport workers on VCT, positive living and ART. A three days mini media training will be provided for 20 mini-media operators.

#### 432. Recommendations

- ISAPSO and WFP should collaborate with other partners, e.g. UNDP, UNICEF, SC US, etc, to strengthen capacity to assess changes in behaviour as a result of the project and also explore environmental factors that may be addressed to positively impact transport workers behaviour with respect to HIV/AIDS prevention
- WFP could explore collaboration with IOM on cross-border activities and ILO for linkages with the transport sector
- WFP could explore through internal discussions the use of leverage to get companies to cooperate more fully, e.g. transport companies that implement HIV mainstreaming effectively could be given priority in tendering by WFP.

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<sup>140</sup> Project Amendment. Capacity building of road transport companies for HIV/AIDS prevention, care and support. 29/12/06



## 10 Urban HIV/Nutrition Programme:

### 10.1 Background

433. WFP has been supporting households, women and children infected and affected by HIV/AIDS as part of the WFP Ethiopia Country Programme (2003-2006). The programme has been under implementation since December 2003 in Addis Ababa, since 2004 in Nazareth and Dire Dawa and more recently in Mekele. Four types of beneficiaries were being targeted in AA, Nazareth and Dire Dawa – chronically sick patients, orphans, HIV-positive pregnant/lactating women and their infants attending PMTCT and Home Based Care Volunteers. As a result of the CP mid-term review which recommended that WFP should seek additional resources to undertake a phased scale-up of the programme, WFP prepared a proposal<sup>141</sup> for PEPFAR wrap around funds for scale up of activities. Another critical reason for the scale up was that the Government of Ethiopia were keen for nutrition support to be rolled out and linked with the roll-out of ART in urban areas especially in light of the poor nutritional status of many urban Ethiopians. The fact that HIV/AIDS was declared a national emergency by Government demonstrates the priority afforded by the Ethiopian government to this issue. The WFP proposal was for beneficiaries to be targeted in fourteen major urban areas (including existing towns) in Ethiopia, with higher rates of HIV/AIDS prevalence and existing structures and partners for implementation. The project aimed to address the following priorities; i) improve the nutritional status and quality of life of ART, PMTCT clients and PLWHAs, ii) promote uptake and adherence to ART and PMTCT programmes and iii) contribute to the stabilisation of orphans school attendance. Assistance was to be provided to 8410 HIV positive pregnant and nursing women enrolled in PMTCT from their first consultation until six months after delivery, 11,235 food insecure PLWHA households and 56,176 ART patients identified as requiring ongoing nutrition support, 37,585 HIV/AIDS orphans attending primary schools and 8900 HBC volunteers who were to be provided with food incentive for their home care services.

434. At the end of 2005, by agreement with the government and major donors, WFP used the budget revision process to transfer the urban HIV/AIDS nutrition support from the CP to the PRRO.10362. There are numerous reasons why this transfer took place. (1) the allocation of programme resources for development programmes was not nearly sufficient to do HIV/AIDS programming justice especially given the GoE declaration of HIV/AIDS as a ‘national emergency’; (2) large donors to WFP Ethiopia (eg. USAID) were interested in providing specific funding to enhanced HIV/AIDS activities especially given the roll-out of ART in Ethiopia and the increased recognition of the role of nutrition linked to HIV medication. However, while USAID were eager to provide WFP with food for an HIV programme they had difficulties with allocating this through a development programme (Country Programme).

435. Furthermore, as indicated above, the CP Mid-term Review (June 2005) of HIV/AIDS activities recommended that as the project had been successful, WFP should seek additional resources to undertake a phased scale-up of direct food support for infected and affected individuals.

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<sup>141</sup> Country programme scale up activity summary. Urban HIV/AIDS – supporting households, women and children infected and affected by HIV/AIDS



## **10.2 Negotiation leading to scale up**

436. WFP Ethiopia wrote to WFP PDPH (the HIV/AIDS Service) in Rome arguing that HIV/AIDS was a national emergency yet programming was only part of the CP raising the issue of whether this demonstrated adequate commitment by WFP. It was also, argued that food can help with ARV uptake and adherence. The letter also made it clear that there were no existing WFP resources for scale up yet USAID were willing to fund such a programme. PDPH agreed to support the scale up so WFP Ethiopia elaborated a budget for an additional component of the PRRO in Sep 2005. ODK approved the proposal and budget with minor changes and agreed to a 19 million dollar budget revision to the PRRO. The proposal was eventually approved on 9<sup>th</sup> March 06. WFP had already started assessments and identified warehouses and partners although the programme really only began in July/August. WFP approached PEPFAR for \$321,000 based on absorption and management capacity and level of need and PEPFAR responded with an allocation of \$350,000.

## **10.3 Project preparation:**

437. In selecting towns for the scale up WFP considered all major towns, their HIV rates, adult population size, poverty levels and likely number of beneficiaries (PLWHA, OVCs, etc). Selection was also influenced by WFP's 'logistic belt', e.g. to ensure the programme was logistically feasible and would get support from sub-offices. WFP only chose major towns in the belt although regional partners and USAID wanted more towns included.. An assessment was then conducted in each short-listed town (WFP and PEPFAR were part of the assessment team). This assessment looked at what was already being implemented, e.g. PMTCT, OVC, Home Based Care (HBC), etc. and 'town readiness', e.g. existence and capacity of regional HAPCO and partners. There were then discussions with partners about how to fill gaps. These were then followed by consultation workshops for all partners where issues like targeting criteria and protocols were developed. At this stage certain changes from the CP were already agreed upon based on the CP MTE, e.g. prioritisation of those on ARVs, OVC age increased from 15-18 years, introduction of pulses, etc.

438. As rural kebele committees were not as strong and functional as those in Addis there was a need to adjust targeting procedures. IDIRS and NGOs played a more significant role in the targeting process in the 'scale-up' towns. Monitoring indicators were also reviewed at the consultation workshop. Establishing suitable project management structures was a considerable challenge. It was necessary to agree upon combinations of IPs, NGOs and GoE partners who would be responsible to WFP. Based upon an agreed set of criteria, partners would select a core NGO (greatest capacity) who would be responsible for logistics based upon an agreed set of criteria. HAPCO remained responsible for coordination.

439. Most towns had a project coordinating committee chaired by HAPCO with the core NGO acting as secretary. The process had to be managed carefully with WFP providing only minimal support to NGOs (implicit GoE policy) and at the same time supporting GoE/HAPCO (provision of vehicles) in order to strike a balance. NGOs were therefore substantially bringing in their own resources to the programme. The consultation workshop in February 06 led to town action plans which then resulted in project initiation workshops where a range of town actors were represented, e.g. Idirs. Here participants were briefed on targeting criteria and other outcomes of the February workshop.



440. Such widespread collaboration with the NGO sector was unusual for Ethiopia where GoE is normally reluctant to support such partnerships. Many of the local NGOs are linked with idirs (formerly burial associations) which have developed an extensive social security network. There are neighbourhood based idirs and ethnically based idirs. WFP partners are mainly neighbourhood based reflecting the geographic focus of the project.

#### **10.4 Implementation of CP MTE recommendations:**

441. Urban HIV/AIDS nutrition support was transferred into the PRRO on 1<sup>st</sup> of March 2006 and the actual scale up commenced implementation in August 2006.

442. As the programme had only been evaluated in June 2005 and implementation of scale up begun in August 2006, it was felt too early to conduct a further evaluation. It was therefore decided to describe and review the process of scale up of the programme over the first few months with a view to highlighting initial lessons learnt.

443. In spite of the short time between the country programme mid term review and this mid-term PRRO evaluation, WFP country office managed to prepare an update of activities implemented since the mid-term review of the CP based upon recommendations therein.

##### *Actions taken on recommendations in mid-term country programme evaluation:*

- WFP successfully scaled up the project to ten more towns and the food basket has been enhanced to include pulses.
- WFP has been working with the World Bank in the preparation of the Aide Memoire for EMSAP II where the possibility of providing nutritional support to HIV infected and affected including OVCs in rural and semi-urban areas was highlighted. WFP has also continued its efforts to harness other complimentary resources including Global Fund in (AA), and PC3, in the new towns which are providing schooling support to the OVC beneficiaries.
- In response to recommendations to improve uptake of the PMTCT programme the food insecurity/poverty criteria were revised to take into account family size. The renewable voucher system has also been introduced and is being used, particularly in Adis Ababa. The food basket has also been revised to include pulses and wheat while the quantity of vegetable oil has been increased.
- The upper age limit for entry has been increased for OVCs from 15 to 18 taking into account demands from partners and the average age for the completion of the primary cycle of education.
- Quality of life and ART related indicators have been introduced in monitoring while changes in nutritional status were measured in the last results survey.
- There has been an increased focus on ART users as entry criteria<sup>142</sup>
- WFP has included a plan for pilot testing Plumpy Nut as part of its proposal to USAID but it has not been accepted due to PEPFAR regulations.
- An advocacy strategy has been developed for implementation to share successes and attract more resources.

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<sup>142</sup> World Food Programme Urban HIV/AIDS project. Beneficiary entry and exit criteria and procedures.



## 10.5 Main findings from the review of scale up:

444. Time constraints determined that the evaluation was only able to conduct a limited number of interviews related to this programme. Interviews were held with HAPCO in Addis Ababa, Bahir Dar and Awassa while group partner NGO meetings were held in Addis (Idirs) and Bahir Dar (OSSA, etc). Beneficiary and HBC carer interviews were held in Bahir Dar while several meetings with WFP country staff were held in Addis, SNNPR and Bahir Dar. The Mayor of Bahir Dar was also interviewed. USAID and the Dutch government representative also provided valuable donor insights into the programme

### *Challenges*

445. Unwavering support and demand for the programme was expressed from all quarters, e.g. GoE/ HAPCO, local implementing partners and beneficiaries. While there have been substantial organisational challenge for WFP and partners in scaling up these have largely been met through hard work and close cooperation between all partners. Teething problems have perhaps been inevitable given the large number of new NGO partners implementing the programme as part of the scale up. Scaling up so significantly in the short period between signing the agreement in March and implementation in August/September is a major achievement for which WFP, GoE and it's implementing partners are to be congratulated. While information and data on impact were reported in the MTE for the CP, this review has not revisited impact data collected since then.

### *Quotas and targeting*

446. All partner NGOs and HAPCO staff expressed the need for further scale up of the programme and the fact that demand far outstrips supply. While quota limits (determined by lack of resources available to the programme) and resulting targeting tensions have been a feature of the programme before scale up, there is a sense that as the programme is scaled up, expectations are further raised and targeting becomes more contentious and difficult for implementing agency staff. With the exception of the PMTCT component, all designated quotas have been met quickly.

447. Targeting problems remain a key concern of agency staff. Prior to scaling up targeting of the HIV infected had been based on proxy clinical indicators like weight loss, fever, oral thrush, etc. These criteria were applied by Idirs who were not technically trained so that the criteria were not robustly applied. In some areas partners used HIV certificates (but this was against WFP policy)

448. With scale up the priority has been given to ARV users. ARV beneficiaries are referred by health centres. PEPFAR wanted earlier stages supported, e.g. stages 2 and 3, so that food would have an impact on peoples lives. WFP and implementing partners have not phased out anyone in stage four but are shifting more to selecting those at earlier stages.

449. The problems of targeting and quotas are linked. While WFP had wanted to scale up the programme further there was concern that USAID support might be finite so WFP erred on the side of caution purposively keeping quotas low. Although the French government pledged support for the programme in 2005 WFP are keen to obtain wider donor support for the programme and less dependence on one main donor. .



### *Need in rural areas*

450. A number of agency staff expressed the view that the programme should be rolled out gradually to rural areas. An often heard argument is that many urban beneficiaries come from rural areas – they become displaced due to stigma, and that although prevalence rates of HIV will be lower than in urban centres, the need in rural areas is considerable. As many urban beneficiaries are homeless, programming in rural areas may therefore prevent displacement to urban centres as well as respond to need.

### *Exit strategies and linkages to IGA/economic programmes*

451. Two developments are occurring as the targeting criteria have increasingly prioritised ARV patients under the scale up. First, the gradual introduction of free ARV in Ethiopia, now means that the case load are drawn from all economic spheres including the poor. Secondly, formerly bed-ridden beneficiaries of WFP food assistance are now beginning the process of recovery. The two developments are creating increased demand for economic opportunities for beneficiaries. The current strategy of discharging beneficiaries to a three month half ration once their BMI exceeds 18.5 is creating tension especially for those with no means of supporting themselves once the ration is finally stopped. There are anecdotal reports of some beneficiaries refusing to sign up to the arrangement.

452. All agency partners interviewed expressed concern at the lack of IGA activities available to beneficiaries. Some partners have been implementing small scale IGA programmes for a number of years for both HIV positive beneficiaries and OVCs but with limited resources the scale of need cannot be adequately addressed. There is an ongoing initiative in Addis Ababa where Global Fund money for IGA is targeted at beneficiaries of nutritional support. Another initiative is through SC US in Nazareth and HAPCO in Addis Ababa where IGAs are linked to community dialogues at coffee ceremonies aimed at reducing stigma in the local community.

### *Double registration*

453. With increasing number of NGO partners under the scale up there have been some reports of beneficiaries registering with more than one partner in order to obtain more than one programme package. Where this has occurred IPs have taken steps to address the problem. Beneficiaries are also now required to sign an agreement stating that if such behaviour is discovered then they will be ejected from the programme.

### *Distributions challenges for new agencies*

#### *Scale up and logistics*

454. Logistics has proven to be challenging. Many partners are new to commodity and food handling so there have been inevitable teething problems. Implementing distribution has been a challenge for some of the newer partners. Insufficient numbers of staff for distribution at warehouses, poor staff motivation (as a result of low pay), dealing with different ration quantities for the different programme elements, e.g. OVCs, HBC carers, etc, have been cited as factors. WFP training and supervision has been instrumental in overcoming many of these problems.

455. There have also been challenges around warehousing. Warehousing is meant to be provided by city administrations. While many suitable premises have been provided, others that have been offered have needed additional work in order to be utilisable. . In some instances this



has delayed programme implementation while other warehouses have been sought or sites have had to be cleared or modified.

456. Transportation has also been an issue. There were some delays in getting transportation quotes from WFP logistic section to WFP/HIV section.. This problem was compounded by fuel price changes. Furthermore, NGOs took a long time to understand and ‘get to grips’ with budget lines..

#### *PMTCT quotas not filled*

457. As occurred with the CP, it has been difficult to fill PMTCT quotas under the PRRO, e.g. Bahir Dar where only 2 out of 50 places have been taken. Suggested reasons for this vary.

- Stigma and generally low uptake of PMTCT services
- lack of health focal person at health centre to refer cases and to follow up
- lack of availability of infant formula

#### *Infant formula and inflexibility*

458. Current WFP policy states that WFP should not provide infant formula although it can assist PMTCT clinics where NGO partners or the government provide infant formula and the necessary guidance and conditions are met. A number of agency staff expressed the need for greater flexibility on this policy. Current international guidelines on PMTCT and the role of infant formula are flexible in regard to this. Where basic hygiene and sanitation conditions can be met the mother should be offered the use of formula as long as remaining risks are explained and proper use of milk products are set out. There were anecdotal reports that some mothers would not enrol on the PMTCT programme due to the lack of availability of milk products.

## **10.6 Recommendations:**

- Current WFP monitoring of the programme is providing some useful insights into the impact of the programme, e.g. on school attendance, compliance with ARV etc. In 2006 WFP HQ selected Ethiopia as a pilot country for testing M and E indicators. Studies are also under way to throw greater light on impact. However, most of this work is not sufficiently robust to draw firm conclusions. For example, it is important that control groups are used and that nutritional status changes in particular are included in studies. One view expressed to the evaluation team by the country office and WFP HQ is that using control groups to demonstrate programme impact is unethical. However, the evaluation team would like to point out that control groups can be found not by withholding interventions from groups that would otherwise be targeted but by selecting controls groups that would not otherwise be included in the programme. Such groups may not be included for a variety of reasons including lack of resources, being located in areas where the intervention is not being rolled out, etc.
- With greater evidence of impact it will be easier to seek and obtain funding. While some donors are broadly supportive of this programme, others are more circumspect about the role of food in HIV programming generally. One key variable that undermines donor support for food aid/HIV programming is the lack of clear exit strategies. While exit strategies for HIV positive ARV beneficiaries are now clearly established in Ethiopia the question remains as to what these beneficiaries will graduate to? Exit strategies for OVCs are still age so that this potentially enormous group of individuals would require food aid support for many years. Therefore, without well managed and linked food security and IGA activities, exit strategies will



remain a serious challenge to the programme and a source of concern to donors fearful of the need to support open-ended programming.

- WFP will need to invest considerable energy in developing strategies to ensure that there is capacity to link IGA/food security programming with HIV/food aid programming. This will almost certainly involve linking with other implementing partners who have more experience with this type of activity (something which WFP is currently doing). However, there may be scope for WFP itself to implement certain types of urban agricultural programmes and for implementing HIV/food aid programming in rural areas and linking these to PSNP programmes.
- The gradual advent of free ARV treatment in rural areas opens up the opportunity for rolling out the programme into suburbs and rural areas. This in turn provides an opportunity for linkages with the PSNP which will in turn provide an exit strategy for the programme.
- Given the relatively hygienic environment in some urban centres where the programme is being implemented as well as relatively safe water supplies, it is important to consider WHO's AFASS criteria in order to determine whether there can be a more flexible policy on infant formula within PMTCT programming. The current blanket ban by WFP may not be appropriate for urban Ethiopia. In Nairobi, with an arguably similar urban environment, more flexible provision is made for the use of formula milks in PMTCT programming. As these criteria are not easy to apply without some form of expert guidance, WFP would need to 'buy in' experience in order to determine whether conditions in urban settings warrant a more flexible policy on infant formula provision.





## **11 Over-arching conclusions on PRRO 10362.0**

459. PRRO 10362.0 is one of WFP's largest current programmes. The diversity, innovation and overall objectives are extremely ambitious but eminently sensible given the long-term food security and nutrition problems (and the newly emerging threat from HIV) that exist in Ethiopia.

460. The four discrete elements of PRRO 10362.0 are all coherent with current GoE policies and strategies on food security, health, nutrition and HIV/AIDS. There is however less internal coherence and clarity with regard to the different PRRO elements. Thus, linkages between the different elements have either been assumed or not explicitly made (e.g. between TSF and PSNP or relief programme), while linkages with external interventions that are critical to the success of activities have not been made (e.g. between OFSP and PSNP) or are only now emerging as important (e.g. IGA with urban HIV/Nutrition)

461. The PSNP and EOS/TSF are both new programmes which pose fresh technical, institutional and logistical challenges, while the urban HIV programme is also relatively new for WFP and raises issues about the optimal use of food aid within HIV programming.

462. Yet, in spite of these challenges there is an extraordinary belief and commitment from WFP Ethiopia staff to make this programme work even though many are being extended and tested as never before.

463. There are legitimate questions being raised about programme design, role of/appropriateness of food aid under certain modalities, programme impact, exit strategies and funding security within a PRRO. There are also questions about whether WFP has sufficient in country capacity, experience and technical knowledge to mount such a challenging programme.

464. This evaluation is clear that WFP's main contribution to improving the impact of PRRO 10362.0 can only be through greater capacity building of government, 'smarter' monitoring/impact assessment and, where necessary, advocacy

465. However this does raise questions about WFP's institutional mandate and 'sovereignty' – in other words should WFP be venturing into some of these newer and largely developmental areas or should these type of activity be left for other UN (and INGOs) agencies who arguably have greater experience and a clearer mandate for such activities.

466. There are also key issues and lessons about whether programme objectives are being sufficiently tested within this PRRO and the concern that if they are not then programmes may face criticisms and potential loss of donor support. Impact and effectiveness assessment is a very specialised area requiring specific expertise. Yet, such assessment is critical where new types of programming are being implemented and where external agencies and donors may be casting critical eyes over unfamiliar activities. WFP may well need to 'buy-in' impact assessment expertise and support for 'smarter' monitoring –, i.e. less standardised and more impact/effectiveness focussed. A rule of thumb that emerges from this evaluation is that WFP should not scale up activities before there is robust evidence of impact and effectiveness, where new types of programme are being implemented, e.g. TSF/EOS.

467. The need to strengthen WFP learning capacity has been raised in this evaluation. There are a number of recommendations for supporting greater learning. These include;



468. Facilitate a series of internal workshops within WFP Ethiopia to discuss key messages that management might wish to highlight from this evaluation (e.g. the process of change of organisational focus within WFP, changing roles, the need for critical analysis and “thinking outside of the box”, the organization’s position on cash vs food, exit strategies, down-scaling as an indicator of success etc)

469. Review the way in which Sub Offices and Field Monitors are managed and supported, so as to maximise their opportunities for learning and feeding back lessons into processes aimed at policy development.

470. Review the current staff appraisal system to give much greater emphasis to lesson learning, critiquing, innovation, risk-taking and be ready to reward such qualities when they arise

471. The current guidelines for WFP’s internal Standard Project Reports (SPR) promote the inclusion of boxed case-studies under the title a “Story Worth Telling”. WFP Ethiopia could consider further developing its SPR so that they also include sections on “Learning from Failures - what did not go as hoped, but can now be improved”

472. Ensure especially that all field staff are fully aware of WFP’s evolving policies on the use of cash. This should not only involve the circulation of relevant papers<sup>143</sup> but also the facilitation of mini-workshops to properly explain WFP’s position and allow the necessary discussion to help staff internalize all the issues. A briefing on the proposed consultation process with IFPRI<sup>144</sup> should also be included to help staff in Ethiopia recognise the contribution of their local efforts to processes taking place at international levels.

473. Continue to develop the ABM tool to strengthen its contribution to the identification and use of lessons form the field that can be fed back into ongoing development of methodologies, guidelines even policy.

474. Strengthen the impact monitoring role of Field Monitors and ensure that, if it is to be continued as one impact monitoring tool, FAUIS reports are completed and circulated far more rapidly than they are at present.

475. Finally, whether WFP should be moving into newer and more developmental activities as has occurred in Ethiopia, is not easily answered in this evaluation. It may be that decisions must be made on a country by country basis and depend upon government policies, capacity and mandate of other agencies present, and WFP’s in country capacity. In the Ethiopia context it is easy to understand why this shift in programming has occurred – WFP has a long history in country and a good institutional memory of what works and what doesn’t. WFP’s current PRRO portfolio is effectively a set of creative initiatives that have evolved out of many years of attempting to tackle long-established problems. Questions about whether WFP is adequately equipped at this point in time in terms of it’s mandate, policy development, organisational structure, agency culture and funding modalities to effectively move into these new areas are valid. However, these are large questions that can only be flagged under a mid-term PRRO evaluation but they are questions that the wider organisation must nonetheless consider as a matter of priority.

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<sup>143</sup> For example: “Cash and Food Transfers: A Primer”; Social Protection and Livelihoods Service (PDPS), WFP (Oct. 2006)

<sup>144</sup> See “Building Consensus on in-kind and cash transfers; a Project Concept Note”; PDPS WFP 2006 (contact Steven Omamo)



## **Priority Recommendations:**

### *Relief Component of PRRO*

#### *Advocacy*

WFP must advocate for greater conceptual clarity and frameworks around the emergency food security assessment process in Ethiopia.

WFP should promote a more livelihoods based approach for EFSA using baseline information and monitoring of key variables. WFP should consider working more closely with the newly established LIU to this end

#### *Monitoring capacity to implement relief programming*

WFP should continuously monitor and assess in-country capacity to implement a large-scale food relief programme as the PSNP embeds and as relief case loads diminish.

### *PSNP component of PRRO*

#### *Cash versus food*

WFP should actively contribute to the development of a decision making framework that will allow calculation of optimal cash/food wages for PSNP to fit with local Woreda realities.

#### *Public Works under PSNP*

WFP should instigate or conduct a number of action-research and pilot initiatives to address some of the concerns that the public works will be unable to “*catalyze environmental transformation*’ and the inherent tension between conditionality and entitlement in the programme.

A number of design modifications to the current guidelines are also recommended.

#### *Graduation*

WFP can contribute usefully to the current debate on graduation by for example collaborating with the LIU to use the household economy approach to develop pragmatic and relevant definitions of graduation and household food security that can be measured and verified and use of MERET PLUS to investigate the results of phasing out payments while continuing technical support;

WFP should institutionalize monitoring of linkages between the PSNP and other food security programmes (OFSP) and wider enabling forces through field monitors.

### *Cross cutting recommendations (Relief and PSNP)*

#### *Pastoral communities*

WFP must develop a strong working relationship with the Pastoralist Task Force.

WFP must continue to work with pastoral communities, Government and other partners to start developing and field testing more appropriate targeting systems for pastoralist areas, e.g. multiple systems that can respond to the different socio-economic realities found in pastoralist areas, involving pastoralists in the design and piloting process;, explore the potential for



developing self-targeting systems with wage rates low enough to discourage the wealthier groups, ensure that potential clan rivalries are not exacerbated by targeting systems

Targeting experiences in Afar (which has many livelihood similarities with Somali region) have generally been positive and should be drawn upon to inform this policy development.

### *Food distributions*

Formal mechanisms must be established for DPPB to inform WFP sub-offices of planned deliveries and distributions Where these mechanisms already exist they should be enforced.

WFP VAM should work more closely with the DPPA Information Centre to strengthen the utility and currency of the DPPA website.

### *Targeting*

WFP should advocate for national use of the methodologies currently being developed by the LIU which will confer many targeting related benefits and allow the targeting debate to be informed by a much greater degree of empirical evidence than is now possible

WFP could also undertake a number of studies to strengthen targeting, e.g. compare woreda targeting experiences, regional ceilings and local dilution effects, monitor secondary effects of targeting, e.g. on pastoralists and relief beneficiaries, etc

### *WFP Monitoring*

WFP should strengthen monitoring by linking with other initiatives and partners, e.g. LIU, institutionalising participatory monitoring, evaluating training and capacity building, getting FMs more focussed on impact assessment through ABM, becoming more programme rather than food focussed, e.g. taking responsibility for monitoring woredas when cash programming.

Donors, WFP and GOE should define together the benchmarks that need to be reached in terms of improved DPPA/FSCB performance on transparent, accountable and timely food reporting to allow WFP to start phasing out of this role.

### *Capacity building*

WFP must seek additional funding to allow capacity building on the basis of need rather than (as present) on the basis of available ODOC budget. WFP should also conduct SWOT analysis to identify where existing WFP capacity building resources can be most effectively targeted.

Specific components of a more complete CB contribution would include:

- Helping to make the PIM more user-friendly and developing a mechanism to allow DAs and experts to make their own suggestions for improvement.
- Assisting each zone/Woreda to design a PSNP asset creation programme that allows:
  - optimal timing of labour intensive activities
  - optimal cash-food mix
  - optimal timing of cash/food distributions

### *EOS/TS*

#### *TSF Impact*

WFP must obtain robust efficacy and effectiveness data for the TSF.



Two methods could be adopted;

- case control study involving a representative sample of children to assess nutritional outcome on the programme with a comparison groups made up of children who do not receive the food supplement (children could be on the EOS or not).
- a cohort study to examine efficacy of the programme in terms of percentage of children who recover, default, do not respond or die. The study should also include programme coverage indicators to understand what levels of exclusion and inclusion error are arising

All parties and donors need to be involved in the study. The findings of the study should be widely disseminated both within Ethiopia and to the international community.

Agreement must be reached as soon as possible between all partners on the role of FDAs in providing support during implementation of EOS

Guidance must be developed on when additional emergency supplementary feeding is needed to respond to “hot spots” as well as the role of EOS screening data in early warning. .

#### *HIV mainstreaming and urban HIV programme*

WFP should involve other agencies in Ethiopia and UNICEF globally to strengthen future impact assessment of Community Conversations and focus in equal measure on advocacy to change the environment and knowledge transfer

ISAPSO and WFP should collaborate with other partners, e.g. UNDP, UNICEF, SC US, etc, to strengthen capacity to assess changes in behaviour as a result of the project and also explore environmental factors that may be addressed to positively impact transport workers behaviour with respect to HIV/AIDS prevention

WFP will need to work closely with implementing partners to link IGA/food security programming with HIV/food aid programming.

WFP should explore opportunities for establishing certain types of urban agricultural programmes linked to the HIV programme and for implementing HIV/food aid programming in rural areas and linking these to PSNP programmes.