World Food Programme

A Report Commissioned by the Office of Evaluation

Evaluation of Kenya
Emergency Operation 10374.0 and Country Programme 10264.0 (2004-2008)

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Acknowledgement

The evaluation team visited Kenya in March 2007. This document was prepared by the mission team leader on the basis of the mission’s work in the field.

On behalf of the team, the author wishes to extend thanks to all those who facilitated the team’s work in the field and in Headquarters.

Responsibility for the opinions expressed in this report rests solely with the authors. Publication of this document does not imply endorsement by WFP of the opinions expressed.

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## Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>AEO</td>
<td>Area Education Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALRMP</td>
<td>Arid Lands Resource Management Programme</td>
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<td>ASAL</td>
<td>Arid and Semi-Arid Lands</td>
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<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community-Based Organization</td>
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<td>CCA</td>
<td>Common Country Assessment</td>
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<td>CO</td>
<td>Country Office</td>
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<td>CP</td>
<td>Country Programme</td>
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<td>CPAC</td>
<td>Country Programme Advisory Committee</td>
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<td>CPAP</td>
<td>Country Programme Action Plan</td>
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<td>CRS</td>
<td>Catholic Relief Services</td>
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<td>CSB</td>
<td>Corn-Soya Blend</td>
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<td>CSN</td>
<td>Country Strategy Note</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Country Strategy Outline</td>
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<td>DEO</td>
<td>District Education Officer</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<td>DHS</td>
<td>Demographic &amp; Health Survey</td>
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<td>DMO</td>
<td>Drought Management Officer</td>
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<td>DMC</td>
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<td>DOC</td>
<td>Direct Operating Costs</td>
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<td>DSDDC</td>
<td>District Social Dimensions of Development Committee</td>
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<td>District Steering Group</td>
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<td>Department of Social Services</td>
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<td>Early Childhood Development Centre</td>
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<td>EFA</td>
<td>Education for All</td>
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<td>EMIS</td>
<td>Education Monitoring and Information System</td>
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<td>EMOP</td>
<td>Emergency Operation</td>
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<td>ESFP</td>
<td>Expanded School Feeding Programme</td>
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<td>FAO</td>
<td>United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation</td>
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<td>FDP</td>
<td>Final Delivery Point</td>
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<td>FFA</td>
<td>Food for Assets</td>
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<td>FFE</td>
<td>Food for Education</td>
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<td>FFW</td>
<td>Food for Work</td>
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<td>Free Primary Education</td>
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<td>GAF</td>
<td>Gender Action Fund</td>
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<td>GER</td>
<td>Gross Education Enrolment</td>
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<td>GFEI</td>
<td>Global Food for Education Initiative</td>
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<td>GoK</td>
<td>Government of Kenya</td>
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<td>HGSFHP</td>
<td>Home-Grown School Feeding and Health Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIV/AIDS</td>
<td>Human Immuno-Deficiency/Acquired Immuno-Deficiency Syndrome</td>
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<td>IGA</td>
<td>Income Generating Activity</td>
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<td>Kenya Country Committee</td>
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<td>Kenya Education Sector Support Plan</td>
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<td>Kenya Food Security Meeting</td>
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<td>Kenya Food Security Steering Group</td>
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<td>LIFDC</td>
<td>Low-Income Food-Deficit country</td>
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<td>LR</td>
<td>Long Rains</td>
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LTSH  Landside Transportation, Storage and Handling
M&E   Monitoring and Evaluation
MDG   Millennium Development Goal
MHTF  Millennium Hunger Task Force
MICS  Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey
MOE   Ministry of Education
MOEST Ministry of Education, Science & Technology
MOH   Ministry of Health
MTEF  Medium Term Expenditure Framework
NACC  National AIDS Control Council
NDP   National Development Plan
NEMA  National Environment Management
NEPAD New Partnership for Africa’s Development
NER   Net Education Enrolment
NFI   Non-Food Item
NPEP  National Poverty Eradication Programme
NGO   Non Governmental Organization
ODA   Official Development Assistance
OEDE  WFP Office of Evaluation
OLS   Operation Lifeline Sudan
OP    Office of the President
PDFP  WFP School Feeding Service
PRC   Programme Review Committee
PRRO  Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation
PRSP  Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PTA   Parents’ and Teachers’ Association
RB    Regional Bureau
RBM   Results Based Management
SAF   Standard Analytical Framework
SFP   School Feeding Programme
SMC   School Management Committee
SMP   School Meals Programme Linked to Local Food Production
SR    Short Rains
UN    United Nations
UNDAF United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDG  United Nations Development Group
UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund
USAID United States Agency for International Development
UFC   Universal Primary Completion
UPE   Universal Primary Education
VAM   Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping
WMS   Welfare Monitoring Survey
WVI   World Vision International
Table of Contents

Acknowledgement _________________________________________________________________ i
Mission Composition _______________________________________________________________ i
Acronyms ______________________________________________________________________ ii
Table of Contents __________________________________________________________________ iv
Executive Summary _______________________________________________________________ v

I. INTRODUCTION ______________________________________________________________ 1
   A. Scope and Purpose of the Evaluation ____________________________________________ 1
   B. Methodology __________________________________________________________________ 1
   C. Country Context __________________________________________________________________ 2

II. FINDINGS ______________________________________________________________________ 4
   A. Relief Operations ______________________________________________________________________ 4
      A.1. General Food Distribution ________________________________________________________ 5
      A.2. Supplementary Feeding __________________________________________________________ 29
      A.3. Food for Work ____________________________________________________________________ 33
      A.4. Expanded School Feeding _________________________________________________________ 36
   B. Development Operations _____________________________________________________________ 42
      B.1. Assistance to Basic Education (Regular School Feeding) _____________________________ 43
      B.2. Nutrition and Care of HIV/ADS-Affected People ______________________________________ 60
      B.3. Food For Work/Disaster Preparedness Facility ________________________________________ 65
   C. Cross-Cutting Issues __________________________________________________________________ 70
      C.1. Nutrition ________________________________________________________________________ 70
      C.2. Gender _________________________________________________________________________ 73
      C.3. Partnership ______________________________________________________________________ 76
      C.4. Connectedness of WFP Development, Emergency and Recovery Activities _____________ 78

III. CONCLUSIONS _____________________________________________________________ 80

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS ______________________________________________________ 82
    A. Relief and Recovery Operations (EMOP 10374.0) _____________________________________ 82
    B. Development Operations ____________________________________________________________ 83
    C. Cross-cutting recommendations _______________________________________________________ 84

ANNEX 1: TORs ________________________________________________________________ 86

ANNEX 2: Schedule of Meetings and Visits by the Evaluation Team ____________________ 100

ANNEX 3: List of Persons Interviewed in Kenya ________________________________________ 102
Executive Summary

1. Kenya has been hit with successive years of drought and then floods which have greatly reduced food and fodder availability and compromised its ability to be food self-sustaining. The 2005 October-December short rains failed, the culmination of successive poor seasons, severely affecting the livelihoods of those living in the northern and eastern pastoral areas and in the south eastern agricultural lowlands. As a result of the drought and diminished livelihood options, children's health and nutrition deteriorated and the livestock that many families depend on for food in the arid north-eastern part of the country died in large numbers from exhaustion, lack of water and adequate pasture.

2. Food insecurity is highest in urban slums and among pastoralists and marginal agriculturalists in remote, arid and semi-arid lands, which comprise 80 per cent of Kenya's land mass. Many households in these areas are chronically poor, and there are persistently high chronic malnutrition rates among children under five. The drought-prone and semi-arid lands have the lowest primary school enrolment and completion rates.

3. In Western Kenya and the Nairobi slums, HIV/AIDS is devastating communities through illness and reduced capacity to earn a livelihood. There are large numbers of orphans and other vulnerable children living in extremely impoverished households that cannot meet basic food needs. The western part of Kenya is normally a food-surplus area, but many households are now HIV/AIDS-affected and dependent on food assistance. The prevalence rates of HIV in parts of western Kenya are far above the national average, and whole villages have been devastated by the disease.

4. WFP has had an open-ended basic agreement with the Government of Kenya (GoK) governing cooperation between the two since March 1980 when WFP started providing lunches to school children in drought-prone areas. WFP’s present operations in Kenya support the Government's efforts in implementing the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), in supporting school feeding and in supporting communities devastated by HIV/AIDs. In addition, WFP emergency assistance to Kenya targets both severely drought-affected households because of the successive seasons of failed rains and those households most seriously affected by the November 2006 floods. Up to three million people each month required food assistance in 2006 under the agency's ongoing emergency operation, in addition to 535,000 receiving school meals under an Expanded School Feeding Programme (ESFP) in the worst drought-affected areas.

5. The mid-term evaluation of the WFP Kenya Country Programme 10264.0 (CP) and the Emergency Operation 10374.0 (EMOP) was organized and managed by the WFP Evaluation Service in Rome. It was, however, an independent evaluation and care was taken to identify five external independent consultants and to undertake all interviews, site visits and data reviews in a spirit of independence, openness and non-attribution to ensure reliable and relevant information was gathered.

6. The team met and interviewed all potential stakeholders including male and female beneficiaries, local community groups, DSG committee members, teachers, GoK Ministers and civil servants, NGO staff, UN staff, Donors and WFP staff in Nairobi and the field. The team
utilized several qualitative data gathering techniques including review of secondary data and reports, direct observations, focus groups, semi-structured interviews and individual conversations. In addition, the team held a day-long workshop with WFP staff and a half-day workshop with NGO staff to obtain more in-depth discussions on thematic issues around the Country Programme and EMOP. Special emphasis was placed on allowing adequate time to interview WFP staff, one on one where possible, to ensure they had access to the evaluation team in order to give information and their own interpretation of events.

7. Overall the team was impressed by the professional and committed attitude of the WFP staff to carry out their CP and EMOP duties, despite high work demands because of the vast geographical area and extensive coverage. Both the EMOP and the CP are highly ambitious programmes and both entail complex logistic arrangements to dispatch food and monitors to all corners of the country. In general the team felt that the programmes evaluated were all impressive in terms of scope, logistical arrangements, and timeliness. The team did, however, question the monitoring and evaluation progress of the programmes, concluding that in many cases the impact indicators and monitoring tools were not successfully informing and improving the programmes. This is a key concern and brings forward issues of: how assessments and targeting are carried out; the training and capacity of WFP staff and partners to undertake activities; and the ongoing monitoring of the programmes to ensure that the intended beneficiaries were supported according to basic standards of fairness, equality, gender sensitivity and participation.

8. A further area of concern was the lack of a coordinated and holistic approach by all humanitarian actors in Kenya to address both the emergency response, but perhaps more importantly, the long term chronic food insecurity issues that have long plagued the country. The team questions the appropriateness of mounting cyclical emergency operations without addressing the systemic underlying causes of food insecurity in-country.

9. WFP assistance has been designed to work in conjunction with other technical and non-food inputs to support government programmes in several critical areas. The medium-term problems facing the nation are overwhelmingly complex: chronic food insecurity facing many millions of Kenyans in the Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASAL); the relatively low school attendance levels, particularly of girls in pastoral and drought-prone communities; the devastating effects on the polity of the nation of the HIV/AIDS pandemic; ever increasing human populations trying to sustainably subsist off a fragile and degraded environment; rural migration to urban areas swelling the existing slums where food insecurity and absolute poverty are exacerbated by dire living conditions. WFP has been involved in these issues, and has successfully delivered needed food and avoided wide-scale hunger and loss of life, but the impact of this food aid is not always clearly measurable because of the complex and multi-faceted causes of hunger and food shortages. A common cry from WFP staff and non-staff alike is “food is not always the answer”, and there is a need to strengthen the support of other sectors and agencies to increase the impact of food aid and to address the underlying causes of food insecurity.

10. The lack of coordination with other humanitarian actors has also perhaps led to reduced funding, particularly for the CP activities. The lack of funds to meet non-food items such as fuel-efficient cookers and weak or non-existent supportive partnerships has limited the impact of the School Feeding Programme. Poor donor support and absence of other specialized UN programmes has greatly reduced the size and scope of CP Basic Activity 2 to support people affected by HIV/AIDS, which the evaluation considers to be one of WFP’s most important and effective interventions. The reason why, in spite of a well managed “food emergency”, malnutrition levels have not been significantly reduced in drought-affected communities is
possible the poor response to non-food needs in the Consolidated Appeal, particularly for health and water requirements. Lack of other non-food interventions has severely limited the recovery and resilience of pastoralists and agro-pastoral communities in the ASAL that have only survived the drought disaster because of WFP food assistance.

11. Steps are being taken by the GoK to create dialogue and analyse the challenges confronting the nation; the team was gratified to see WFP working closely with the GoK in a spirit of partnership and coordination. Although the analysis of long-term development challenges was not within the team’s mandate, the team was encouraged by the readiness of all government officials interviewed to discuss the challenges of the overall development and humanitarian situation and explore ways in which WFP could improve the focus of its assistance to Kenya. The draft policy papers and strategies made available to the team on such issues as Disaster Management, the ASAL recovery, Nutrition and External Aid Coordination demonstrate the openness of the government to dialogue about partnerships in order to find long-term solutions for poverty reduction and risk management. Coordination and partnerships in the programme areas supported by WFP assistance are very weak even amongst UN sister agencies or NGOs working on the same programmes in the same areas. Only the GoK can bring the diverse humanitarian and development programmes together into mutually supportive and focused efforts to confront the challenges ahead.
I. INTRODUCTION

A. Scope and Purpose of the Evaluation

12. The evaluation covered WFP assistance to Kenya under EMOP 10374.0 between August 2004 and December 2006, and CP 10264.0 over the period January 2004 to December 2006. Both the Country Programme and the EMOP started in 2004. The EMOP was due to end in June 2007, while the CP cycle continues until December 2008.

13. The purpose of the evaluation was three-fold:

- Accountability: Under the WFP evaluation policy, the size of the Kenya EMOP and mid-term stage of the current WFP Country Programme requires independent evaluation managed by the WFP Office of Evaluation (OEDE) in Rome. ‘Accountability’ in the context of this evaluation includes both accountability to WFP’s Executive Board and donors and also to its beneficiaries and cooperating partners. The evaluation team was requested to examine whether work has been conducted in accordance with agreed rules and standards, and report objectively on performance results.

- Guidance: The evaluation was expected to provide the Country Office (CO) with an external view of progress towards expected results which may contribute to improvements in the current operations, particularly with respect to strategic decisions;

- Learning: Evaluation has a key role to play in any learning process. This evaluation should assist WFP to identify and disseminate lessons learned to support improved programming and organizational learning across all relevant WFP operational areas;

14. This was the first independent evaluation of these two WFP operations in their current phase. Two previous evaluations of the Kenya programme were undertaken: the OEDE Mid-Term Evaluation of the 1999-2003 CP (carried out in Jan-Feb 2002) and the OCHA/UNICEF 2006 Real Time Evaluation (that did not include WFP participation). Their findings were taken into consideration by the team.

B. Methodology

15. The evaluation obtained perceptions from various sources on the current WFP practices with regard to the implementation of the CP programme and EMOP operations. It consisted of a desk study (literature review); interviews with personnel drawn from WFP itself, government officials, partners, NGOs, community leaders, beneficiaries and implementing agencies; workshops with staff, collaborating partners and agencies; and finally analytical reviews by the Evaluation Team to synthesize and make conclusions about the information obtained.

16. The evaluation team applied a mix of internationally agreed criteria for the evaluation of humanitarian interventions in order to advise on strategic and operational changes that could improve the performance and impact of the second half of the CP and on any further humanitarian assistance through an extended EMOP or PRRO. These criteria were:

- Relevance/appropriateness
- Connectedness
- Effectiveness
- Efficiency
- Sustainability
- Impact
17. The mid-term evaluation of the WFP Kenya Country Programme 10264.0 (CP) and the Emergency Operation 10374.0 (EMOP) was organized and managed by the WFP Evaluation Service in Rome. The evaluative work was carried out by a team of five independent consultants, two of whom were Kenyan citizens. The WFP evaluation manager and team leader visited key stakeholders in February in Nairobi and solicited their comments and inputs to the terms of reference.

18. The evaluation applied a range of standard evaluative techniques, including:

- desk review and analysis of relevant documents including GoK and WFP policy and strategy documents, EMOP and CP project design and implementation plans, monitoring and assessment reports and any relevant secondary data;
- preparatory interviews in Rome and Nairobi in Feb 2007 to identify key stakeholders and solicit their inputs to the evaluation design;
- selected key informant interviews in Rome, Nairobi, and at selected field sites in Kenya with WFP staff members, Government of Kenya counterparts and selected stakeholder groups (e.g. principal donors, other UN agencies, national and international NGOs involved in similar food security activities in Kenya); and
- focus group interviews applying a range of techniques as appropriate with relief committees, beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries, civil society groups and community leaders during field visits to selected locations in Kenya.

19. The evaluation did not attempt to cover the same issues raised by a WFP Internal Audit covering 01.01 2005 to 30.09.2006, although many of the points raised by the audit were taken into account during the Evaluation. Although the evaluation was requested by the Country Office (CO) to cover the WFP Kenya Portfolio, the ongoing Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO) for Somali and Sudanese refugees in Kenya was not included in the Terms of Reference (TORs) since this was evaluated in 2006. Also no attempt was made to evaluate the Special Air Operation mounted by WFP to support communities in the North East Province affected by the flooding of the Tana river in November 2006. This has been the subject of a technical Lessons Learned study.

C. Country Context

20. Kenya is a low-income food-deficit country with a GDP per capita of around USD 460 (2004 World Bank), placing it 152nd out of 177 countries in the 2006 UNDP Human Development Report. The country has been ranked by FAO as amongst the ten most food-insecure countries in the world. Endemic poverty, low economic growth, environmental degradation and high population growth conspire to create problems for household food security, while recurrent floods and droughts tip the fragile balance and send households living on the borderline into food insecurity and desperate need. More than half of the population is considered to subsist below the national poverty line. Two thirds of the country’s land mass are Arid or Semi-Arid Lands (ASAL), which are unsuitable for rain-fed agriculture. The pastoralist communities in these areas have suffered from increasingly frequent droughts, exacerbated by poor land quality and inter-communal violence in competition for natural resources.

21. Malnutrition rates are persistently high among children under five. The ASAL have the highest rates of population growth and the lowest primary school enrolment and completion rates of the nation. Western Kenya and the main urban areas have alarmingly high HIV/AIDS prevalence, and growing destitution because of limited off-farm employment opportunities.
22. In recent years there has been a return to democratic multi-party elections, political stability, a free press and a strong improvement in the economy. Changes in the constitution to further entrench community participation in decision-making and rationalize other anomalies have been the subject of a referendum and are still being debated in a climate of political openness and democratic awareness. The present government has made efforts to reverse the poor domestic and international reputation of previous one-party governments for rampant corruption and economic mis-management. It has instituted important reforms, such as free primary education, to improve the socio-economic conditions of all citizens. Poverty reduction and the elimination of corruption have been two of the government’s main policy objectives. There is lively political involvement in the build-up to the next Parliamentary and Presidential elections, which are due in December 2007.

23. The GoK’s priority areas for budgetary investment are education, health, roads and water. In addition to its key policies to tackle poverty, the GoK also places high priority on: reducing the prevalence and devastation on the polity of the nation of HIV/AIDS; conservation of natural resources and biodiversity; sustainable land use; and reducing the vulnerability of food-insecure populations in the ASAL to a pattern of climatic extremes of drought and flooding. In Kenya, food insecurity is highest in urban slums and among pastoralists and marginal agriculturalists in remote, ASAL, which comprise 80 per cent of Kenya’s land mass.

24. After years of economic stagnation and currency depreciation, there is now strong economic recovery, relatively low inflation, and a steady increase in the value of the Kenya Shilling KSh against the USD. The GoK calculates that the economy grew by 5.8% in 2005 and over 6% in 2006. Rapid growth in building construction is evident everywhere, but particularly in the main urban areas. Private investment is encouraged and this has increased revenue from a reformed and more transparently efficient taxation regime. Tourism, which saw a decline after terrorist attacks at coastal resorts in 2002, has now recovered to an all time high. Nevertheless, personal security and the prevalence of violent crime are still major concerns for all Kenyans. There is an inevitable spillover of weapons and banditry from the conflicts in neighbouring countries.

25. Frequent droughts in the ASAL districts have eroded the asset base of the vast majority of communities, rendering them chronically poor. In these districts, particularly where people depend on livestock for livelihood, there has been little opportunity to rebuild herds depleted by drought. The situation is exacerbated by an increasingly fragile environment whose carrying capacities have been overstretched by animal and human population pressures.
II. FINDINGS

A. Relief Operations

26. The increasingly frequent droughts over the past three decades have required a series of emergency response operations. However, the extent and severity of the most recent drought crises in the ASAL areas of Kenya between August 2004 and December 2006 was unprecedented. By mid 2006 the number of affected people exceeded three million people and required the largest international response ever undertaken in Kenya.

27. The performance of the 2003 Short Rains (from October-December 2003) was poor in most arid and semi-arid lands (ASAL) of Kenya. The failure of the Short Rains (SR) at the end of 2003 resulted in poor pasture and browse, which affected livestock conditions and led to food insecurity among the agro-pastoralist and pastoralist communities of the ASAL who rely on milk, other livestock products, and marginal crop production for their livelihood.

28. The 2004 Long Rains (LR) (March-May) were erratic, further affecting crop and livestock conditions, and leading eventually to serious deterioration in nutrition, particularly in the ASAL areas of the Coast, NE, Rift Valley, Eastern Province. A Long Rains Assessment (LRA) mission was carried out in June 2004. Based on the findings of the mission, the Kenya Food Security Steering Group (KFSSG) concluded that some 1.8 million people in 26 districts required emergency food assistance. The mission also recommended that the school-feeding programme should be extended to an additional 544,000 children in order to cushion the children from the prevalent food insecurity and to stabilize school attendance in the drought-affected districts. The President declared a National Disaster on 14 July 2004 and made an urgent appeal for international assistance.

29. The short rains at the end of 2004 were again below normal in Turkana, West Pokot, Tana River, Narok, Laikipia, Kitui, Makueni and Coast Province. On the other hand some districts in the NE received good and well-distributed rains. The EMOP was extended by WFP for a further six months.

30. The LRA in July 2005 gave grounds for optimism. The rains had been sufficiently good in many districts to lead to the expectation that the EMOP could be phased out completely by the end of the year if the SRs in November/December proved to be adequate. The KFSSG recommended a reduction in beneficiary numbers to one million on general food distribution (GFD), 160,000 on the School Feeding Programme (SFP) and 420,000 on the Expanded School Feeding Programme (ESFP). Two districts, W. Pokot and Narok were phased out.

31. However, by the end of the year such optimism had evaporated. The 2005 October-December Short Rains (SR), which are vital for grazing recovery in the ASAL, failed. The WFP CO released a donor alert on 19 December stating that up to 2.5 million people could be at risk by yet another drought. Two months later the full gravity of the drought situation was fully appreciated. On 9 February 2006 the KFSSG issued a Consolidated Inter-Agency Report on the SR Assessment. It began with the following stark warning:

“The short-rains have failed. Nearly 3.5 million rural pastoral and farming households, including 500,000 school children, in 25 districts are affected and in need of emergency assistance to sustain lives and protect livelihoods. Following on more than five failed or poor seasons, vulnerable populations are running out of coping options. Without an immediate expansion of the current emergency food and non-food aid operation, the humanitarian crisis...
and emergency relief requirements will deepen. There is no time to waste. The Government of Kenya and its partners must act now to avoid a massive humanitarian catastrophe.”

32. The EMOP was expanded from 17 to 25 districts and from 1.1 million to over 3 million recipients: 2.9m on GDF; 381,000 on SFP and 500,000 on ESFP. The EMOP was renewed for one year from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007 with the gross requirement of emergency food was 396,525 mt valued at USD 223 million.

33. 2006 brought deepening disaster to the North Eastern Region. After sustaining huge livestock losses from consecutive droughts, the 2006 Long and Short Rains were excessive. Deforestation in the Ethiopian highlands led to flash-flooding along the Daua River in April and November in Mandera District on the northern border of Kenya. Hundreds of acres of irrigated land were destroyed when top soils were swept away by the torrents. The livelihoods of riverine agriculturalists, who produce the area’s cereal and fruit crops, received severe set-backs. Further south the Tana River flooded in November to form a huge lake which affected over 300,000 people in Garissa, Wajir, Tana River districts and coastal regions. Adding to this calamity was an outbreak of Rift Valley Fever. Although this did not cause major losses of livestock in the NE, the GoK was obliged to freeze all animal movements until the veterinary services could launch a vaccination programme. Livestock marketing prices collapsed while the freeze on movements was in force.

34. WFP rapidly mounted a successful Special Air-Lift Operation SO 10569.0 between November 2006 and February 2007 to provide relief to the flood-affected populations in the NE Province as well as in neighbouring Somalia. The air-lift carried food, medicines, mosquito nets to over 300,000 beneficiaries cut off from road communications by flood waters. It also assisted the GoK in its Rift Valley Fever inoculation campaign. Although the evaluation team did not evaluate the Special Operation, it should be mentioned that the same WFP staff, who were implementing the EMOP, had to re-deploy to manage the SO and continued to work intensively through the Christmas holidays.

35. The EMOP, which started in August 2004 and was still continuing at the time of the evaluation, has overshadowed all regular WFP activities in Kenya. At its height in 2006 over 3 million people were given food assistance through over 2,000 distribution centres in the largest and most complex WFP emergency operation ever mounted in Kenya and WFP’s second largest EMOP in the world after the Sudan.

A.1. General Food Distribution

Relevance

36. The environmental crisis in the pastoral regions throughout the Horn of Africa has steadily deteriorated over the past four decades. The human and animal population pressures on the arid and semi-arid areas have been exacerbated by unpredictable weather patterns, increasingly frequent droughts interspersed with intense rainfall. The recent stock losses have been catastrophic for many nomadic families. The District Steering Groups (DSGs) in the ASAL districts estimated the livestock losses between 30% and 40%. The pattern of reported animal deaths was roughly estimated at the same levels in each district: cattle 70%; sheep 60% goats 50% and camels 5%. In Mandera thousands of people were reported to have dropped out of pastoralism and are now destitute because they no longer have viable herds of livestock. The effects of these shocks have had long-term consequences on the livelihood of pastoral
communities and a major government strategy is to seek to create the conditions for alternative livelihoods for the most vulnerable communities.

37. There are lasting effects of drought on both pastoralists and agro-pastoralists. Rift Valley Fever restrictions on livestock movements depressed the livestock market. Farmers cultivating irrigated crops along the Daua, Ewaso Ng’iro and Tana rivers sustained massive damage from flooding. In November 2006 the Daua river burst its banks and swept away top soil and irrigation canals. In Garissa, WFP mounted a Special Air-Lift Operation from November to January 2007 to provide support to over 300,000 beneficiaries affected by the flooding of the Tana river. This operation also helped to supply food to affected areas of Somalia cut off by floods and the GoK campaign to vaccinate livestock against an outbreak of Rift Valley Fever, which paralysed animal movements and sales. Even in the marginal agricultural areas recovery is still very fragile. Communities working on soil conservation projects supported by the EMOP through German Agro Action (GAA) made convincing arguments about the need for WFP to continue Food For Assets (FFA), rather than cash for assets, until they could regain food security.

38. The dramatic effects of the drought in pastoral communities required General Food Distribution (GFD). Not only was there no time to organize FFA activities, the scope for such labour intensive works in the affected communities is extremely limited. The GoK and WFP response to the food crisis had to follow the same pattern as previous emergency operations, using local administrative and community structures to target and manage GFDs.

39. The evaluation concluded GFD was ‘appropriate’ as the major component of WFP’s emergency response. GFD was the only practical response to preventing starvation, migration and further loss of rural assets of such huge numbers of pastoralists and their children in such widely dispersed communities. The seasonal assessment missions accurately identified the most severely affected districts. Over 2000 distribution points were established to serve the vastness of the drought affected ASALs. This strategy of creating thousands of distribution points proved to be crucial in preventing human migration to relief centres. It also prevented all the negative consequences such migration has had for community recovery and rehabilitation in other emergency operations. In order to administer this widely dispersed operation Community Relief Committees were established by NGO cooperating partners and DSGs and charged with the responsibility of selecting the most food-insecure families in each community. This was an appropriate method of delegation and means of supervising GFDs.

Effectiveness (Outcome Level)

40. In the approved EMOP planning documents, WFP identified Outcome no. 1 of GFD as, “reduced and or stabilised crude mortality in the identified population (saving lives).” The indicator selected as a measure of achievement of this outcome was the crude mortality rate, as reported in the Arid Lands Resource Management Project (ALRMP) early warning system and public records.

41. The Evaluation Team was surprised that there was not a system of regular nutritional surveillance, a function which falls under UNICEF’s mandate, in the most vulnerable districts throughout the crisis. Some limited nutrition surveillance is done through the Arid Lands Resource Management Project Early Warning System which measures MUAC and the Ministry of Health Child Health and Nutrition Information System. In many of the most affected areas
visited, it appears that there was neither a nutritional data-base nor regular assessment of the nutritional status of the most vulnerable members of the community.

42. In the absence of clear nutritional indicators it is impossible to assess the exact nutritional impact of the operation, except to categorically state that the team has no doubt that WFP assistance has helped to improve nutritional intake for some of the poorest and most vulnerable people in Kenya. Following a series of natural disasters in the ASALs, which caused the loss of over 35% of the pastoral livestock herds, there can be little doubt that the general relief food distributions prevented what could have become a massive humanitarian disaster. However, the team did not find sufficient data in Kenya to objectively quantify the numbers of people whose lives were saved by the operation.

Effectiveness (Output Level)

43. The EMOP planning documents identified the intended GFD output as increased access to food distributed, as measured by the (a) quantity of food distributed and (b) the number of beneficiaries. Including all extensions and all budget revisions, the EMOP planning documents aimed to secure and distribute food aid.

44. The donor community and WFP responded to the GoK appeal with an emergency relief programme which grew from feeding 10,000 beneficiaries in September 2004 to 2.2 million people by the end of that year. Over the course of EMOP 10374.0, including all budget revisions, the total planned GFD food aid level would reach 3.2 million beneficiaries requiring 636,898 MT (165,820+76,052+395,026) metric tons at an estimated cost of USD 353,894,000.

45. At the time of the evaluation in March 2007, pledges of cash and commodities had reached USD 361,565,000 or 91.53% of total requirements of the present phase of the EMOP which was due to end in June 2007.

46. The evaluation team concluded that the logistics operation for the EMOP has undoubtedly been a remarkable success. Major pipeline breaks have been avoided. Relief supplies have reached drought or flood-stricken populations before large-scale human deaths occurred and in the words of a major donor, “the operation managed to stay ahead of the problem”.

Efficiency

Role of the Government of Kenya

47. Government-led relief distributions in the 1990s were poorly supported by donors and other humanitarian agencies, partly due to the lack of transparency in beneficiary targeting, distribution and accountability. With the encouragement of donors and humanitarian agencies (especially WFP) the government made radical changes during the previous emergency in 2000 to 2002 to its policy for managing the emergency and took the lead and ownership of the 2004 emergency response from the outset. As a result, in most districts it was possible for the first distributions to start within two months of the President’s declaration of a National Disaster.

48. The principle changes included establishing an effective early warning system, adopting a single pipeline structure, strengthening coordination at all levels, and using elected relief committees to implement community-based targeted distribution.
49. In addition, the GoK has substantially funded the 2004-6 drought response from its own budgetary resources. Altogether the GoK contributed 176,004 MT of cereals through WFP to the National Disaster Appeal, making it the second largest donor. The government’s decision to make substantial in-kind contributions not only enabled relief distributions to start soon after an emergency was declared in August 2004, but was also timed to prevent breakdowns in pipeline supplies. Equally important, the GoK contributions encouraged donors to support the EMOP to an unusually high degree.

50. Districts could access the funds available from the World Bank (WB) credit through the District Contingency Fund (DCF) to address the most urgent needs. These included response to disease outbreak in human and animal populations, ensuring consistent water supply, supporting animal off-take and taking care of the needs of school children. Because of the intense and prolonged nature of the drought, the Drought Contingency Funds were rapidly exhausted.

Planning and Implementation

51. The evaluation found that WFP underpinned the GoK efforts effectively in a number of ways. The WFP Country Office assisted the Government of Kenya in starting relief operations in 26 remote districts with extremely poor road and communication connections. It assisted the DSGs to identify and select NGOs who could serve as cooperating partners, negotiate contracts and budgets with partners, recruit and train WFP staff for ten sub-offices (SOs), rent office premises, procure vehicles, radios, computers and other equipment in order to mount an operation of this size and complexity. The newly appointed and trained WFP SO staff also trained DSGs, partners, RCs and other stakeholders in the concept and application of Community-Based Targeting and Distribution that the Kenya Food Security Meeting (KFSM) had decided to adopt.

52. The deployment of EMOP teams in ten SOs (Eldoret, Mombasa, Garissa, Wajir, Mandera, Marsabit, Lodwar, Isiolo, Kitui (Machakos) and Kajiado (Masai)) gave WFP the most effective field presence of the UN system in Kenya.

53. WFP took a very active role in obtaining donor cash “twinning” commitments amounting to USD 26,179 million to meet the Landside, Transportation Storing and Handling (LTSH) costs for the GoK donated food.

54. The team concluded that WFP has established excellent working relations with government officials and there is a strong sense of Kenyan ownership of the emergency operation at all levels. The importance of sustaining this joint participation in programme ownership as an implementation model for future interventions is strongly endorsed. Under the chair of District Commissioners (DCs), the DSGs bring together district representatives of line ministries, NGOs and humanitarian agencies. The Drought Management Officers (DMOs) of the ALRMP provide the secretariat of the DSGs and produce monthly situation reports. These reports have been invaluable in monitoring the impact that the drought had on pastoral and agro-pastoral communities.

55. The team did note a significant weakness in the GoK’s macro-level coordination of all UN agencies, bilateral organizations and NGOs, and even GoK line ministries. Ideally, an Activity Steering Committee should have been established to provide the national level partnerships of WFP, sister UN Agencies, MOH and Office of the President (OP). This was not done.
56. At a government level, the KFSSM has undoubtedly played a key role in coordinating food security and humanitarian relief efforts. WFP has underpinned the OP in this role, both technically and as a secretariat. However, concerns were raised on two issues:

(1) Bureaucratic delays in releasing the results of the bi-annual needs assessments had serious negative effects on the efficiency of relief interventions across all agencies. The team concluded that the KFSM should redouble efforts to eliminate delays in reporting assessment results, and that the time may have come for WFP to step down from co-chairing the KFSM.

(2) By continuing to co-chair the KFSM, WFP is inadvertently influencing the KFSM activities to remain very food-driven. This is not in the best interests of a multi-sectoral approach and not the intention of WFP CO which clearly recognizes the need for other sectoral agencies to play a role in both drought relief and development activities. WFP and seasonal assessment teams have stressed to the KFSM and donors that food alone could not address all the needs of the drought affected population. The appeals for donor funding to provide water, sanitation and livestock support interventions were strongly supported by WFP. The team was informed that, with the recent establishment of an OCHA presence in Nairobi, WFP is currently funding a consultancy to ‘Review Coordination Structures in Kenya’, whose findings will be discussed with the OP and RC/UNCT. That will determine the appropriate UN involvement in KFSM.

Resources and Pipeline

57. There has been a “stop-go” pattern of relief general distributions depending on regularly repeated, short-term analysis of seasonal and geographic needs assessments and resultant short-term extensions and budget revisions. In addition to being disruptive and difficult to manage, the initial approval for only six months and subsequent six monthly extensions have placed considerable strains on the efficiency of WFP CO’s operational response capacity. NGOs, DSGs and WFP SO staff have had to expand and contract according to constant increases or decreases in the size of the operation. The amount of food distributed in each district is directly linked to funding and, therefore staffing levels of NGO and WFP SOs. This system has obvious drawbacks as well as advantages. A brief summary of these budget revisions is presented below.

**Budget Revision No. 1 (January 2005)**
- Nature of revision: Increase in external transport value of USD 3.17 million as a result of substantial increase in freight costs; extension in time for five months from 1 February, 2005 to 30 June, 2005; No additional commodity.
- Justification for the revision: Due to expected long recovery in pastoral districts and clear indications (to be confirmed through the SRA in January) that drought has persisted: hence continuation of relief food.

**Budget revision No. 2**
- Nature of revision: increase in LTSH.

**Budget Revision No. 3 (April 2005)**
- Nature of revision: Extension in time for four months from 1 Jul to 31 Oct 2005; Additional 76,052 MT (USD 18.2 million) of food commodities with associated costs (USD 42.0 million).
• Justification for the revision: Joint SRA undertaken in Jan 2005 by GoK, UN and NGOs indicated additional needs

**Budget Revision No. 4 (Sep 2005)**

• Nature of revision: Extension in time for eight months from 1 Nov ‘05 to 30 Jun ‘06; No additional food commodities.
• Justification for the revision: LRA undertaken in Jul/Aug 2005 confirmed need for food aid in 17 districts of Kenya until Feb 2006; Net food req of 51,788 MT was less than existing resource shortfall, therefore no need for additional commodities.

**Budget Revision No. 5 (Dec 2005)**

• Nature of revision: Increased LTSH rate.

**Budget Revision No. 6 (2006)**

• Nature of revision: Extension in time for 12 months from 1 Jul ‘0 to 30 Jun ‘07; to increase food commodities by 395,000 MT, with associated costs of USD 225.4 million.
• Justification for the revision: To cover food assistance requirements to 3.4 million beneficiaries, including 500,000 school children; to revise DSC coverage to reflect the need for additional international, national and GS staff to support EMOP; to enhance requisite monitoring of EMOP implementation.

58. The planning figures (2004-2006) varied as per the below table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Planned Beneficiaries (as per approved project doc or budget revisions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GFD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug’04 – Jan’05</td>
<td>1,778,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar’05 – Aug’05</td>
<td>1,011,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept’05 – Feb’06</td>
<td>775,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar’06 – Feb’07</td>
<td>2,900,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NB/ in all cases SF are also counted in GFD. * The ESFP caseload were assumed to be counted already under either GFD or FFW

59. The timing of pledges and shipments has had a direct impact on pipeline management. There were inevitable pipeline breaks in providing the full food basket, but the team concluded that, given the size and complexity of the operation, these were minimal. Pipeline management is never easy, even in regular CP activities because of unpredictable arrivals of shipments and customs clearance delays. But it is much harder to manage in a prolonged emergency with constantly changing numbers of beneficiaries and over 29 donors. The local availability of cereals for GoK contributions and WFP cash purchases has, therefore, been a key issue in WFP’s successful coordination of food security over the past thirty months.

60. WFP borrowed food stocks from the Country Programme and Refugee PRRO to initiate WFP EMOP assistance. WFP HQ released 3 million dollars from its emergency Immediate Response Account (IRA) for associated costs. A further USD 3.95 million was granted from the UN Central Relief Fund (CERF). These cash grants were vitally important to initiate relief activities. They enabled staff recruitment, equipment procurement and, most importantly, “twinning with the GoK” by providing cash to move the GoK maize contribution. No cash
contributions were received from donors for local purchases until November 2004. Supplementary Feeding for pregnant and lactating mothers and under five children could only start in January 2005, when supplies of Corn-Soya Blend (CSB) first became available. Subsequently much larger “twinning” grants were received from donors, including Department for International Development (DFID) and the European Community (EC), to meet the internal transport and distribution costs of locally produced food donated by the government.

Single pipeline

61. An important consideration in the efficiency of the Kenya EMOP has been the government decision to continue the practice adopted in the previous EMOP of insisting on a single pipeline of food commodities. The single pipeline approach under WFP auspices prevented different agencies from competing against each other on requisition of transport, storage and related logistics services and furthermore ensured that WFP was the main entity managing relations with Cooperaing (Implementing) Partners prior to and during the implementation of this extensive operation. These are important lessons for future operations. It is recommended that WFP should advocate a single pipeline of standard commodities in other emergency situations. This system has proved to have both logistic and programme advantages.

Common basket

62. The team also heard repeated praise for the ‘common basket’ approach. Requiring all responding agencies to adhere to the same food basket and agreed distribution norms and practices allowed the GoK, donors, NGOs and UN agencies to follow orderly standards of humanitarian assistance to the disaster-affected communities throughout the country and therefore mitigate the proliferation and diversity of commodities and ration scales that often typify emergency interventions.

Local purchase

63. Another successful aspect of the EMOP has been the extent to which WFP was able to locally purchase grain within Kenya. Using donor cash contributions, WFP has purchased over 100,000 MT of various commodities for the EMOP in Kenya. These local purchases were bought from the National Grain Reserve stocks managed by the National Cereals and Produce Board and to a lesser extent from private local suppliers.

Assessments

64. In order to ensure that GFD targets only populations in need, the EMOP documents envisaged the continuous collection and analysis of information on rainfall, livestock conditions, food prices, and population movements by WFP VAM using primary inputs from WFP field monitors and secondary inputs from FEWS, NGOs, and the GoK ALRMP.

65. The Kenya Food Security Meeting (KFSM) which is co-chaired by the PS Special Programmes in the OP and by WFP has played the lead role in deciding on competing geographical needs and priorities. The KFSM is supported by the Kenya Food Security Steering Group (KFSSG), a technical group of government, ALRMP, NGO and UN experts (including the WFP Vulnerability and Mapping Unit (VAM)) which carries out seasonal assessments and predicts relief requirements. These two bodies have effectively coordinated government/district/UN/NGO and donor response to the 2004-06 drought emergency.
Remarkably, political pressures have been generally resisted and relief has been both targeted to and received by the neediest populations.

66. Long and short rains assessments are coordinated annually by the KFSSG and conducted jointly with representatives of technical ministries, WFP, UNICEF, Lead Agencies (LAs), ALRMP and other DSG team members. The results of these assessments are used to estimate overall needs, and to inform the geographical allocations of available food and non-food resources among the drought-affected districts. The DSGs are responsible for determining the onward allocation of the resources they receive to districts and divisions or livelihood zones. WFP sub-office and cooperating partner staff participate in the DSGs, which make allocations of food to community Relief Committees on a geographical basis.

67. The evaluation noted a consensus among stakeholders interviewed regarding the accuracy and effectiveness of early warning and assessment activities in Kenya. The crop, pasture and rainfall assessment processes established in Kenya through UN, donor and government collaboration is thorough and efficient, especially given the size and socio-economic diversity of the area it covers. They are generally considered to be collaborative, thorough and transparent, and to build appropriately upon the ongoing drought monitoring and early warning systems developed by ALRMP and FEWS Net.

68. The Planning document listed a critical assumption that the EMOP objectives would only be achieved if targeting mechanisms and protocols were designed to ensure limited or no political interference in targeting decisions. The team concluded that, for the most part, this was achieved.

69. The team concluded that the current twice-yearly assessment process has negative effects on efficiency by disrupting the distribution process after each assessment. Once the assessment is finalised, there is usually a time lag between the end of the assessment and the presentation of the next set of targeting numbers. Because it is not clear what the new beneficiary number will be or how it will be divided by district, all of the WFP food assistance has to be suspended awaiting the official “letter”. Several times the new targeting report has been severely delayed, causing hardship to beneficiaries awaiting the food and the cooperating partners who have had to reduce their staff and activities. VAM is working with the GoK/KFSSG on this issue and has improved the full turn-around time for assessment, fieldwork and reporting to two months which is long, but reasonable. For example, in February 2005 the Short Rains Assessment recommended revised beneficiary figures. However, there was a frustrating time-gap between the SRA and the issue of the official letter with the geographical allocation of food to the district authorities. Four districts were phased out of the EMOP and in six districts GFD was converted into Food for Assets (FFA). The GoK once more intervened with timely contributions that prevented pipeline breaks in cereals. Nevertheless the March/April and June/July distributions had to be combined because of pipeline constraints. There was also a delay in the August 2005 distribution because of the time taken to issue the official communication of the results of the LRA to district authorities, and again in September 2006 when a full distribution cycle was missed because of delays in presenting the report findings.

70. The KFSM is officially in charge of the process, and it is the Government, not WFP, which “owns” the results. This system needs to be streamlined so that the relief food aid distribution is not so fully disrupted.

71. A concern was raised that by co-chairing the KFSSM, WFP may have influenced the Meeting to be food-driven at the expense of garnering donor support for the non-food needs of
drought-affected communities. This is not in the best interests of a multi-sectoral approach and not the intention of WFP CO which clearly recognizes the need for other sectoral agencies to play a role in both drought relief and development activities. WFP and seasonal assessment teams have stressed to the KFSM and donors that food alone could not address all the needs of the drought affected population. The appeals for donor funding to provide water, sanitation and livestock support interventions were strongly supported by WFP. The team was informed that, with the recent establishment of an OCHA presence in Nairobi, WFP is currently funding a consultancy to ‘Review Coordination Structures in Kenya’, whose findings will be discussed with the OP and RC/UNCT. That will determine the appropriate UN involvement in KFSM. The team concluded that the KFSM should redouble efforts to eliminate delays in reporting assessment results, and that the time may have come for WFP to step down from co-chairing the KFSM. WFP together with OCHA co-funded a consultancy ‘Review of Coordination Structures in Kenya’ whose draft report recommends that WFP steps down from co-chairing the KFSM, a recommendation which is fully supported by the CO. The endorsement by GoK of this recommendation is still awaited. (accept)

**Targeting (national level):**

72. The Kenya Food Security Steering Group (KFSSG) initially determines the districts and divisions across the country that will be covered and the initial food aid beneficiary numbers and allocation targets to be used within these districts and divisions. To make its determinations, the KFSSG analyses information provided by the Geographical Review Teams and all other relevant technical information on the food security situation otherwise available, including satellite information, price data and field assessments, using a livelihood/food economy context.

**Targeting (district level):**

73. The KFSSG recognizes that its information at the sub-district level is limited and can only provide a rough breakdown of needs at the division or location level. As such, the targets for divisional or intra-district distributions may be modified by the agreement of the Food Security Sub-group of the DSG/DDMC and ratified by the DSG.

74. The Food Security Sub-group includes only technical experts in the food security field, typically including representatives from the Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Livestock, Ministry of Water, Ministry of Health, ALRMP DMO and/or DDO, WFP, and the CLP. The District Security Sub-group advises the DSG/DDC through recorded minutes of the sub-groups meetings.

75. The WFP Guidelines point out that it is always necessary to make a judicious selection of the divisions to be targeted. This selection process can only be effective in mitigating food insecurity and hunger if the following principles are followed:

1) Targeting must be strictly based on need, wherever possible focusing on acute needs rather than on underlying poverty and chronic food insecurity;

2) It is impossible to allocate food resources to everyone;

3) When weighting district need versus the amount of relief food available, planners must focus on the most needy divisions, rather than diluting food aid resources across all divisions, even though this will involve struggling with local interest groups.
Targeting (community level):

76. The DSG contacts the communities to be targeted through the cooperating partners. The cooperating partners then assist the communities in electing relief committees and determining the registration list. This process is highlighted in the Community Based Targeted Distribution (CBTD) Section below.

77. These three levels of targeting form a solid basis for the allocation of food aid to the most food-insecure. This targeting structure was supported during the 2005 Thematic Review of Targeting in WFP Relief Operations, and found to offer a number of benefits for achieving successful targeting. These include:

- Greater agreement and support amongst stakeholders regarding the existence and nature of the food insecurity and therefore who should be targeted;
- A shared understanding of the targeting criteria and process so that it can be widely supported by political stakeholders and better implemented by operational stakeholders;
- Fora to share experiences, resolve difficulties and promote compliance with agreed measures; and

78. Furthermore, this approach has proved to be the best way to minimize diversions, obviate political pressures and strengthen the development of local community governance.

79. Perhaps more importantly, the Kenya targeting process has offered a potential model for other relief operations because it is a dynamic and evolving process, incorporating lessons learned and additional data sources to improve each successive assessment and ensure that vulnerable areas are identified and highlighted.

80. A weakness of the targeting and assessment process is that there is no monitoring of the targeting process and it is not possible to evaluate how well the system is actually meeting its goals. It is important to ensure whether or not the targeting and assessment (ie the areas included and excluded in the distribution) were the correct ones to target. This could only be known through a survey of targeted areas and non-targeted areas to confirm that there is higher food insecurity in the targeted areas.

81. Generally, it is believed by all stakeholders that in terms of district targeting, the coverage rate has been good, with up to 95% of vulnerable districts being included in the relief operation. However, there is less certainty at the divisional and sub-divisional level that the targeting is accurate. Simply put, the correct districts might be targeted, but there is no assurance that the most vulnerable people within these targeted districts are being fed. Proper monitoring is a cornerstone of appropriate targeting and distribution of food aid, and WFP CO needs a monitoring tool that can assess the precision of the targeting and allow for modifications in the targeting where needed. The current PDM is not supplying this information and needs improving. The existing system showed limitations but there are concrete examples where DM and PDM generated corrective actions which resulted in better beneficiary targeting. There is a need to develop a tool for targeting monitoring that could assess the precision of the targeting and allow for modifications where needed. The PDM is expected to be this tool. This is addressed in the Monitoring Section below.

82. Another limitation of the current assessment and targeting process is the lack of clear and reliable nutritional data informing the process. Currently the nutrition information available to the assessments is on an ad hoc basis and dependent on the surveys that have been done in the
areas. There is little collaboration with the results of these surveys and the seasonal assessment information gathered. The Nutrition Division in the Ministry of Health is not sufficiently involved in the assessments despite the fact they have a clear role to play in ensuring that the complicated underlying causes of malnutrition are explored, and that the issue of household nutritional insecurity is seen in the context of food insecurity.

83. It would also be useful to extend the participation of other ministry representatives in assessment missions, such as education, to enhance the areas of knowledge informing the process. If schools are experiencing high rates of student withdrawal/enrolment, this could indicate livelihood stress in a community and help triangulate the information gathered.

84. One form of ongoing assessment that is used to bring nutritional information into the process is the monthly mid-upper arm circumference (MUAC) measurements taken by the ALMRP monitors in the drought-affected districts. These measurements give information about vulnerable areas and offer some trend analysis over time. However, MUAC is a far better measurement of childhood mortality than global acute malnutrition and so while the data can highlight areas in crisis, it is less able to evaluate the nutritional status of the children. The ALMRP MUAC data is not consistently put in the Food Security Monthly Report which could offer a helpful and ongoing analysis of the under five MUAC rates if utilised. Unfortunately, the team was informed by a variety of WFP staff that WFP does not currently have the capacity to read and understand this data in its raw form, and so it is unable to make trend analyses based on the data set which could in turn inform programming. If this data could be rigorously analysed every month it would offer an even better ongoing picture of the child mortality risks in the region.

85. Unfortunately, it was outside the scope of this evaluation to conduct a rigorous evaluation of the MUAC screening, but the team would fully support a retrospective analysis of the MUAC data compared to the food aid targeting to determine if the food aid impact can be seen through improved MUAC measurements of the children under five in beneficiary households. It is difficult to assess this, particularly when the availability of fresh milk and animal products appear to be the central factors determining the increase or decrease of childhood malnutrition rates as referenced in the ALMRP monthly reports. A second predominant factor for child nutrition stability is the correlation with the rains. The malnutrition rates appear to only significantly diminish when the rains come, despite the steady and ongoing supply of food aid through all seasons.

86. Further limitations identified by the evaluation team include the lack of gender balance in both the assessment missions and in the DSG. Considering that over 50% of the intended food aid recipients are women, it would be useful to ensure that the complex gender issues are taken into consideration during the assessment process as well.

Community Based Targeted Distribution (household level)

87. The history of the Community Based Targeted Distribution (CBTD) dates back to 1999, when it was decided that the previous “parallel programming” structure for relief operations was not ideal. Originally, Kenya’s food aid allocation and distribution decisions were undertaken using two parallel programmes – the first through the Government of Kenya (GoK) and the second through the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), in conjunction with donors. The existence of this parallel system resulted in the duplication of effort, a waste of resources and ultimately reduced the effectiveness and efficiency of food aid in Kenya. In response to this problem a workshop took place in 1999 with
the main aim of devising a new single distribution system for emergency food aid in Kenya. As a result, stakeholders including the Government of Kenya, donors, NGOs and UN Agencies agreed to adapt the community based food aid targeting and distribution system to respond to Kenya’s drought situation in 1999-2002\(^1\). The system was successfully used and so has formed the basis of the 2004-2007 EMOP response as well. The community based food aid targeting and distribution system has two basic differences to the previous distribution system. Firstly, all the food (whether coming from GoK, WFP, NGOs or other sources) is combined and distributed through the same channel. Secondly, the communities themselves, rather than government officials or agency staff, are responsible for the selection of the beneficiaries and for the food aid distribution at community level through elected relief committees (RCs)\(^2\).

88. The community based food aid targeting and distribution means that “communities themselves are given the power to make decisions about who amongst them most needs to receive food aid and the communities then manage the actual distribution of the food”\(^3\). The key to the methodology is information, so that the people receiving the food are able to understand the mechanisms by which it is distributed. The system aims to help beneficiaries to make decisions for themselves, rather than competing to be enrolled on a list controlled by agencies who are remote from their immediate environment and to whom there is no right of appeal. An important component of the information phase is to encourage the presence and participation of women within the community relief committees\(^4\).

89. Much has been written about the positive and negative aspects of CBTD\(^5\), and it was not within the scope of this evaluation to fully assess the methodology as such, but rather to determine if the CBTD is being usefully implemented in the WFP programmes.

90. Generally the team concluded that CBTD is the most appropriate method of reaching the targeted community. Given the size of the programme, the geographical reach of the projects and the difficulty in targeting limited resources to a large population demand, CBTD is a good system to continue to follow. Using the Oxfam 2007 CBTD report done in Turkana District as a basis for triangulation, the team supported these basic findings through beneficiary interviews, relief committee interviews and direct observation.

91. As a mode of identifying the “extremely vulnerable”, CBTD is very successful. The registration lists developed by the RC generally are able to ensure that the very vulnerable in the community are identified and included. The CBTD process is also, by and large, able to keep the least vulnerable, most wealthy groups off of the list. There is little inclusion of the top socio-economic segment of the community: the clearest inclusion errors are avoided to a large extent. The system seems to be particularly effective in targeting women. The special considerations that can make women-headed households vulnerable are taken into account and acknowledged by the RC lists.

92. The development of criteria (of who will appear on the list) appears to be fluid rather than rigid allowing for cultural differences and local circumstances to help inform the process. WFP

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\(^1\) Community Based Food Aid Targeting and Distribution in Kenya: A Field Manual. WFP-Kenya, April 2005 (revised)
\(^2\) Community Based Food Aid Targeting and Distribution in Kenya: A Field Manual. WFP-Kenya, April 2005 (revised)
\(^3\) Doyle 1999, Recommended Guidelines for Implementation of Community Managed Targeting and Distribution of Food Aid in Tanzania, page 4.
\(^4\) Community Based Food Aid Targeting and Distribution in Kenya: A Field Manual. WFP-Kenya, April 2005 (revised)
believes that beneficiary selection criteria should be determined by the community. In order to facilitate the process, WFP has developed some “key factors affecting household food security in Kenya” to be used as the starting point for community level discussions, as can be seen below:

### Pastoral Communities
- No livestock owned or less than a defined small number
- No alternative income sources – no petty trade or small business activity
- No food stocks
- Household assets lost to raiding and cattle rustling
- Level of Education
- No assets, no means of support, destitute
- Availability and size of remittances

### Marginal Agricultural Communities
- No livestock owned or less than a defined small number
- No land holdings or extremely limited holdings
- No food crop harvested
- No cash crop harvested
- No food stocks
- No alternative income sources – no petty trade or small business activity
- Household assets lost by raiding
- No assets, landless, destitute
- Availability and size of remittances

* A household is usually defined as a mother and children eating from the same pot. When selecting households for distribution, the food and income resources available to the household as a whole are the main consideration.

93. WFP also allows for input by the cooperating partner to help guide criteria, based on local knowledge of the area and particular social, geographical or economic issues that might have an impact on household food vulnerability. Some larger NGOs, such as OXFAM and World Vision have developed their own criteria for household food vulnerability that they share with the RC to help and guide the process and to ensure that the key vulnerable groups are not left out.

94. The team found that the categories of vulnerability tended to be fairly general and non-specific, but that this was coupled with an intimate community knowledge of the households and their specific circumstances. So, for example, while to the outside observer the criteria of “elderly without social support” could apply to many different households, the community’s detailed knowledge of Mama Koigi’s circumstances and the fact her son and husband died last year and her two cattle were stolen, allows for an intimate selection process to occur based on specific circumstances.

95. During interviews, most beneficiaries were able to state in general terms what criteria the community used for selection onto the relief register. Most beneficiaries were able to identify members of the relief committee and to affirm that the relief committee was present at distributions. Most beneficiaries were able to identify the cooperating partner by name and some were able to identify WFP and/or the government as the source of the food aid.

96. Distribution processes are by and large efficient, equitable and transparent. The food movement to the distribution point, the division of food between like group sizes, and the perception of fairness were all highlighted by beneficiaries. Unfortunately the evaluation team was not able to see an actual general food distribution occurring during the mission due to

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timing, though many interviews were held with the beneficiaries, relief committees and Lead Agencies. The team did see a CBTD-style distribution in an HIV/AIDS devastated community as part of the Country Programme Activity 2.

97. There remain a number of challenges in the CBTD systems that have been highlighted both in the evaluation team’s field observation and in the Oxfam CBTD report. Perhaps the most difficult problem to address is the issue of effective targeting where target numbers are perceived by the community to be inadequate. This is common because the perceived need of a community does not necessarily match the allocation to that community from the District level. As mentioned earlier, in most cases the top and bottom extremes of the community are usually addressed fairly, with the bottom group always benefiting and the upper group not benefiting from the relief food. But this still leaves a large middle section where subtleties of vulnerability are more difficult to rank. The most common complaint heard from the community is “we are all vulnerable, so why should one benefit and not the next”.

98. If a community does not feel that all the vulnerable households which deserve food can be included on the official registration list, there are a variety of ways that the limited rations can be manipulated to reach more households: through purposeful under-reporting of household size; through a rotating registration list that changes every six months; and through forced or coerced sharing where those included are asked to give up a certain amount for a communal pot. To quote the Oxfam report “where target numbers are inadequate to conform to vulnerability profiles, the efficiency, effectiveness and equity of CBTD is compromised with profoundly negative effects on community dynamics and social capital”.

99. Additional guidance on selection of vulnerable households, especially in situations of extreme stress is needed to assist relief committees in making appropriate decisions and on sensitising the community about the proper targeting of limited resources. Criteria for selecting those to receive the free food should be a flexible guide, not fixed, to allow for different community interpretations. However, this does not exclude some guidance to the RCs indicating what constitutes “core vulnerability” if this exists, and how to do a next level of vulnerability screening if most of the community meets these first basic criteria.

100. The PDM quarterly report reflected that a wide range of issues were considered by communities to define vulnerability levels for targeting. The criteria used included: livestock deaths, sale of livestock, livestock condition, herd size and productivity, lack of access to water, gender of a household head, lack of other income, child malnutrition, withdrawing children from school, HIV/AIDS infection, land holding size and quantity/quality of meals.

101. There is open debate amongst food aid specialists about how specific targeting systems can be effective and efficient. In 2005 a “Thematic Evaluation of Targeting in WFP Relief Operations” was undertaken to determine the current parameters of targeting. The document discusses the positive issues of less rigorous community targeting: “During times of crisis, relief food provided to less needy members of the community may also help reinforce traditional social redistribution networks, which people need to rely on when there are food arrival delays.”

Consultancy to Review of the Effectiveness and Validity of Community Based Targeting and Distribution as an Equitable, Effective and Transparent Methodology for Delivering Humanitarian Transfers. Amrik Heyer, January 2007 p.v
EMOP 10374.0 Post-Distribution Monitoring Report June-July-August 2006, WFP-Kenya
Bailey et al Thematic Review of Targeting in WFP Relief Operations, OEDE WFP November 2005
102. A second problem that the team noted was the varying quality of the relief committees. The entire CBTD is only as strong and reliable as the relief committee is fair. Considering the importance of relief committees, the team felt that additional support and awareness-raising needed to occur to ensure that an effective selection process of the committee was undertaken and that only those community members who truly have the best needs of the community at heart, should be elected to RCs. There was no clear consistency amongst the committees, and it was clear that some committees had been fully trained while others were less confident in their purpose. Women’s participation also varied greatly. In some committees, the female members were decision-makers while in other groups women appeared to be token members, without any real say in the proceedings. WFP staff were vigilant on these issues and continued sensitising communities throughout the process, but were limited by the sheer scope of the operation. At its highest, EMOP had more than 2000 relief committees and it was only possible to monitor their work through regular monitoring activities and spot-checks which could cover approximately 20% of the total number of FDPs a month.

103. Furthermore, the social costs borne by the RC cannot be underestimated, especially when the perceived vulnerable households outnumbered the beneficiary allocation in a community. Given that the RC members are also members of the community, the degree of social pressure and obligation that they are under can be tremendous. The RC members must be acknowledged more formally by the rest of the community for their participation, so that they do not extract payment for social pressures and costs through inequitable or incorrect registering.

104. Very clear outlines have been drafted by WFP for the election of relief committees. While these were probably originally followed, there appears to have been some slippage in the recommended election procedures. This should be brought to the attention of lead agency partners again. To quote the field manual, in selecting the Relief Committee, the following principles should be followed:

- Members should be elected.
- The secretary should be literate.
- Women are traditionally responsible for household management, and it has been proved (in other WFP operations) that they work effectively on distribution committees. Therefore, as a requirement for effective programme implementation the Chairperson should preferably be a woman and at least 50% of RC members should be women.
- Relief Committee members must not hold elective office (councillors or chiefs cannot be elected).
- Committee members must be residents in the community.
- Clear criteria such as respect by the community, honesty, openness, selflessness, and trustworthiness are suggested and agreed upon in the public meeting before nominations are taken.
- The entire community should elect committee members. Elections should be carefully planned and monitored to ensure that all can participate.
- Government officials, chiefs and elders should be well informed about the process and their views should be invited.
- It is possible, but not encouraged, to elect members in absentia.

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10 Adapted: Oxfam 1999, Working in Emergencies, Practical guidance from the field 9: Registration and distribution
• The committee members should be made aware of their accountability to the community, and the community should be aware that they can re-elect committee members at any time.

• Elected members must accept their responsibilities and it is also made clear that the committee members will need to work full-time at registration for up to one week, that they will not be paid and must be subject to the same criteria as other villagers regarding decisions on eligibility for food aid.

105. The team found some confusion regarding the last requirement. In some cases all RC members were also beneficiaries, in other cases none of the RC members were beneficiaries. There appears to be no clear policy in place. The team also found that very few non-RC members could effectively articulate the criteria for admission onto the registration list, begging the question of whether the community or the RC alone developed the list.

106. One of the often-cited positive aspects of the CBTD is the idea of “community empowerment”, because the community itself sets its own criteria. Based on findings by the Targeting Thematic Review in 2005, it is not clear that this aspect is always intrinsic to the CBTD system:

A key finding of this review is that irrespective of the theory there is only a degree of decision making power given to the community in CBTD. This may in part relate to the overall food aid resources available and knowledge/preconceptions of WFP and cooperating partners about which households are vulnerable/eligible. Thus, communities were guided as to the percentage of households who should be eligible (and for which there were resources). This is effectively community-based targeting combined with an element of administrative targeting. In other words there were no real examples of ‘pure’ CBTD. Communities were also guided as to the types of household eligibility criteria that should be employed. While communities were informed that they were entitled to modify these eligibility criteria on the basis of local context, in practice they rarely deviated significantly from the ‘suggested’ criteria.

107. The case studies show that the degree to which CPs/WFP imposes criteria and level of resources upon the community will (depending on context) ultimately have a bearing on the degree of success (compliance by the community) of CBTD. Thus, in the case of Malawi in the first EMOP and Ethiopia and Kenya, the PDM data clearly show a reluctance to conform to the CBTD approach. Inclusion errors were high and relief committees were placed under considerable pressures from within the community to share resources more widely. In contrast under the PRROs in Malawi and Myanmar there was general conformity with the targeting in spite of the fact that only a low percentage of households could be included due to resource scarcity and there was limited community control over setting eligibility criteria.

108. The EMOP explicitly states that the planning and management of the CBTD will be a participatory process and that women in particular will be involved in all stages. This unfortunately has not yet been fully realised.

109. A third key issue is around the idea of sharing. Without question, there is widespread sharing of the ration. This sharing happens among family members, with extended families, amongst community members and between people with social or economic debts to repay. For the most part this sharing is considered by all to be a very typical and positive practice in

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11 Bailey et al Thematic Review of Targeting in WFP Relief Operations, OEDE WFP November 2005
Kenyan society. Without a doubt, the traditional sharing practice will be extended to the food aid received, especially in times of crisis. It would be more realistic, efficient and appropriate for WFP to acknowledge that sharing is the social norm. Targeting should be made to work within the context of sharing, rather than on the assumption that no sharing occurs.

110. Given that sharing occurs, and knowing that it is not possible, nor actually beneficial to try to interfere with social norms, questions inevitably arise. Is it appropriate for WFP to assume that the ration is eaten by a single intended beneficiary? Should the impact of that food be measured at a community level instead of at an individual level? The current corporate standard of determining a ration scale based on a certain individual kilocalorie allotment is perhaps not always the most effective method of judging the community-needs during an emergency operation. It is possible that if the needs of a community surpass say 85% (implying that 85% of the population is considered food-insecure and in need of food aid), then the entire community should be supported to reduce ration dilution through sharing and to ensure adequate distribution of the needed resource.

111. While it is important to acknowledge the positive aspects of sharing, it is also important to monitor the sharing practice to ensure that it does not contain elements of coercion beyond basic social cohesion costs. There were a few beneficiaries who complained of being “forced to share”. This could imply that some of the sharing is less a factor of “social sharing” by choice but rather a more systematised sharing or really a pressure to redistribute by members of the RC or the community leaders. If this systematic coerced sharing is occurring then there is a need for improved community sensitisation and possible re-configuration of the RC to protect the rights of beneficiaries.

112. It is important that the needs of beneficiaries be addressed during the different stages of the registration and distribution process. Ideally the RC will be able to address the outstanding issues that arise, or if that is not possible, then the community officials or elders will be able to mediate in any disputes or conflicts. However, it is possible that the basis of the problem itself lies within the RC or the local officials in which case a neutral body is needed, a type of ombudsman, to support the needs of the individual beneficiary. World Vision and a few other NGOs have piloted the use of grievance or problem committees, which have had success and been appreciated by the community. Generally the committees are made up of individuals who are not eligible for food aid, so they are outside the system and therefore able to fairly arbitrate. These committees could also help to report on the role and fairness of the RC, which could serve as a correcting mechanism for the CBTD process.

113. The Evaluation notes that while there are some short-comings (and considerable controversy) in the CBTD and post distribution monitoring modalities, they have, nevertheless, proved to be the best way to minimize diversions, obviate political pressures and strengthen the development of local community governance.

Distribution and Post-Distribution Monitoring:

114. Currently WFP-Kenya undertakes two primary forms of monitoring: distribution monitoring (DM) and post-distribution monitoring (PDM). The purpose of these monitoring tools is to allow for information feedback on the distribution process, the quality and capabilities of the cooperating partners, the use and acceptability of the food aid and the efficiency and effectiveness of the targeting of the food aid to individual households.
115. In April/May 2006, WFP-Kenya introduced a revised monitoring and evaluation system. In the course of 2005 post-distribution monitoring was also done, and district/regional reports were produced during the rains assessments. WFP trained its programme staff and field monitors as well as 150 representatives from the cooperating partners on how to carry-out an effective and efficient distribution and how to undertake post-distribution monitoring.

116. While the 2006 process was commendable, it is important to question why the distribution and post-distribution monitoring systems were not in place from the onset of the emergency. Monitoring the input of food aid is an essential aspect of effective food management and it is not fully clear why the monitoring system was not established earlier. The emergency faced by the Kenya programme was not sudden or new and the monitoring systems should have been established during the 2000 EMOP and then replicated in the current emergency. If this was not possible then the monitoring system should have been developed in 2004 with the development of the emergency programme. Without doubt the 6 monthly EMOP cycles made the scale up of PDM systems a challenge, but given the long-term recurrent emergencies in Kenya, this is a challenge that needed to be faced at the outset, either through a much simplified PDM form or through establishing a roving team trained in PDM that could sample districts in turn. Monitoring is not an “extra” to be added into a programme when time permits, but an essential part of emergency programming. In 2004 an insufficient budget impeded any serious monitoring effort. General distribution monitoring was done by WFP field staff, and in 2005 data were collected through household questionnaires in northwestern and northeastern districts, district and regional reports are available on the record. It was only in 2006 that appropriate resourcing was secured to establish an M&E system, with a huge increment in the 12 month budget. Monitoring is expensive in the EMOP, given the size of the territories covered, the number of enumerators needed, logistics required and security escort costs, as most of the EMOP is in phase III areas where escort is compulsory. Although there was no formal system in place, in the period 2004-2006 there was ad-hoc monitoring and feedback provided, in particular on distributions. Budgetary needs for monitoring need to be built into the programme at the onset to facilitate thorough and complete monitoring.

117. At the district level a schedule of distributions is drawn up by WFP, the cooperating partners, and the DSG. This schedule indicates the approximate delivery dates of commodities and the proposed dates of food distribution from each final distribution point. The cooperating partners is expected to be present at each distribution while WFP field monitors go to different sites on a random basis to do spot monitoring of the distribution and to correct any identified problems in the system. Ideally, WFP monitors would go to each distribution, but because of resource limitations, this is not possible. Generally WFP monitors attempt to cover 10% of the food distributions per month in each district, or approximately 200 distributions per month. The ability of each S-O team to reach this number varies greatly. In 2006 they were able to reach, on average, 60% of the final distribution points they intended to visit between May and December (with a range of 49%-75%).

118. A distribution report is completed by the cooperating partners and a distribution monitoring report is filled in by the WFP field monitor. The format for the DM forms is straightforward, and field staff did not indicate any problems around the use of the form or in obtaining the information that must be collected. The current system appears to be working well and allows for WFP to monitor the performance of its cooperating partners in respect of such issues as WFP distribution policy, logistical arrangements and overall distribution effectiveness and efficiency.
119. The completed distribution monitoring forms are then sent to Nairobi for information analysis and compilation. Some limited data analysis is encouraged in the field for trends and outstanding issues, but the bulk of analysis occurs at the Country Office.

120. The distribution reports from May-December 2006 indicate that field monitors are attending distributions, identifying any irregularities and problems, and where possible seeking to rectify the situation on the spot. The evaluation team was able to triangulate the findings from the monthly reports through interviews with beneficiaries and RCs. It is apparent that despite considerable efforts on the part of WFP field monitors, many distributions are still not running to standard. Key distribution management problems at some of the FDPs include: scooping materials are not to standard allowing for under- and over-scooping; the entitlement is not displayed in the local language or through pictorial reference; many beneficiaries do not know their correct entitlement; registration lists are not kept accurately; registration lists do not include a gender breakdown; there are not demonstrations of the scooping material before distribution; there is not spot weighing of the ration; scales are not available at all sites; vulnerable groups are not always given priority; there are long walks to the FDP and then long waits at the FDP site; and there are no participatory discussions with the beneficiaries about waiting times or distribution management.

121. While not all of the problems listed occur at all of the FDPs, the problems mentioned above were recurrent enough in discussion and in the distribution reports that they need to be mentioned. It is important to bear in mind that there are over 2000 final distribution points in approximately 24 districts that are being monitored on a sampled basis. The sheer scope and complexity of the geographical movements of field monitors must be understood. Because of the difficulty, it is essential that cooperating partners be trained and capable of fulfilling their role of overseeing all distributions and the appropriate functioning of the relief committees. It is possible that additional training is needed around WFP distribution policies, coupled with some form of censure if a cooperating partner is not effectively conforming to these standards. WFP field staff reported that they “know” there are problems at the distributions and they have “told the cooperating partners” to improve performance, but that cooperating partners are sometimes still not compliant. WFP needs to be able to regularly monitor and evaluate cooperating partners in order to give data-driven feedback so that the poorer functioning distribution sites improve.

122. The purpose of Post-Distribution Monitoring (PDM) is to ensure that the GFD is achieving its objectives and, if not, to identify appropriate corrective actions. A PDM is intended to measure the impact of food aid on households to ensure that the beneficiary targeting is appropriate and that those in need are accessing and using the food aid as intended. A very clear and detailed manual was co-produced by the EMOP and VAM units for WFP field staff and partners on the PDM in March 2006. This manual was then introduced during training sessions with partners in April/May 2006 in order to roll-out DM and PDM in the Kenya programme.

123. Worldwide, post-distribution monitoring is an essential tool that is used to inform programming about issues of appropriate targeting, use of food aid and limitations of food aid. PDM activities are by nature intended to be corrective and to identify areas where the GFD programme is not meeting its objectives (preventing loss of life, preventing high rates of acute malnutrition, preventing loss of assets and livelihoods). PDM is a tool that, if used effectively, can inform and improve the programming modalities through regular information gathering amongst beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries.

124. In Kenya, PDM is carried out jointly by the cooperating partners and the WFP field monitors. Each month, six sample sites are selected per district. In each site, monitors are
expected to conduct one community interview, one market report and thirty individual household surveys with questionnaires. This is meant to take on average eight days per month with three months of data collection and then one month of data compilation and analysis per four month cycle. As of the time of this evaluation mission, two report cycles had been completed (June-July-August and September-October-November 2006) and the third (December-January-February 2007) was underway.

125. During the first cycle it was intended to target 450 FDPs/13,500 households, but monitors were only able to reach 333 FDPs/7,439 households, or 55% of the planned figure. This was attributed to the fact that new monitoring staff still being recruited and trained and the same staff also being called upon to undertake the long rains assessment. In the next quarter PDMs were done at 319 FDPs/9,700 households, or 70% of the target of 430 FDPs. This was partially due to the challenging logistics because of the floods in certain districts, which limited access to distribution sites in November.

126. In the first quarterly report the data is not presented with stratification between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries so it is not easy to analyse the difference between these two groups. In the second quarterly report, the households were stratified and 69% or 6,209 were beneficiary households and 31% or 2,798 were not benefiting from food aid. The food aid specific questions were only asked to the households actually receiving food aid, and these included questions on entitlements, use of the food aid, food collection and opportunity costs of food aid. Questions about household composition, household expenditures, consumption, commodity preference, coping strategies, and household assets are asked to all households, whether they are current beneficiaries or not.

127. A central limitation of the PDM is that staff of WFP and the cooperating partners are overwhelmed by the time required and complexity of completing the PDM form and questions. As can be seen in the sampling frame of the two quarters, only 50% and 70% of the proposed sample was reached in each quarter respectively, and the actual time commitment far exceeded the eight days anticipated. Staff were able to complete five to seven household interviews per day rather than the ten to fifteen (per team, not per individual enumerator) anticipated. They were spending up to 21 days in the field each month to undertake the DM and PDM, rather than the two weeks normally allocated. Even with the additional days, the staff were rushed to complete the PDM forms and without doubt the quality of the question/response dynamic was reduced.

128. WFP field staff complained about having to closely monitor some of the cooperating partners and push them to complete the expected PDMs each month. Some cooperating partners have little interest or capacity, despite the WFP PDM training. They claim that they do not understand the purpose of the PDMs and find the forms over-complicated. It would appear that additional sensitization and training is needed with some of the cooperating partners to ensure compliance and ownership of the process. This should improve the quality of the PDM information gathered which in turn will improve the analysis of the current beneficiary situation.

129. The purpose of the PDM is to be corrective, and to act as a monitoring tool that can improve the programme, especially in terms of commodity use and opportunity costs for the beneficiaries. The PDM is really not a reporting tool and should not be used as such, because it is neither specific enough nor detailed enough to give hard factual data. It is more intended to be used for trend analysis and overall programming objectives.
130. For example under “Opportunity Cost of Food Distribution” the following question is asked:

2.2.6 What activities are sacrificed for collecting the food? (Tick the one most appropriate)

- Not applicable (no activities sacrificed)
- Farm labour and animal husbandry
- Paid labour
- Domestic tasks including childcare
- Leisure
- Schooling

131. This question is certainly important on a population basis, to find out, for example, if children were all missing school to go to the distribution. But the question itself is so biased in its phrasing and so specific in its response choices, that it is hard to imagine that conclusive data can be derived from such questions. Perhaps a respondent had two choices she wanted to put down. Perhaps she does not consider leaving her baby with an older child for the day as a “sacrifice”. The point to be made is that the question implies detailed interviewing and knowledge of the beneficiary’s current life situation, but in fact the response is almost totally dependent on the way the enumerator asks the question and the time that is taken to elicit a true response. This will vary greatly from interview to interview and the quality of the response will be as affected by the time schedule of the monitor as by the actual opportunity costs of food aid of the beneficiary.

132. A second example of the incredibly detailed questioning needed to achieve a “sensitive and precise” answer is the questions asked on the PDM about “Receipt of Food Aid”. In the PDM the kilograms received from different sources, for different commodities, for the last month are asked. Then the beneficiary is asked “was the amount received equal to the correct ration entitlement?” “If not, give the reason for the inadequate ration with a circle code of 0-6 possible causes”. The enumerator is intended to probe the beneficiary about each possible category of food aid donor (FDP, government, village elder, friend and relations, faith-based) and then obtain the exact amount given for five possible commodities and then, for each of these, determine if the ration was correct and if not, why not. They are supposed to determine this through comparing actual receipts with the official ration for the area based on household size/type and then verify the quantity of food received by checking the food balances at the time of the visit. This level of precision can only be reasonably gathered through an extensive interview, and not from a quickly filled-out form that is intended to take 20 to 30 minutes to complete.

133. The evaluation team found that the issue of inclusion/exclusion rate and targeting efficiency was highly controversial amongst the donors, the local government and WFP. The PDM is intended to evaluate the targeting process to see if it has appropriately identified the most vulnerable households for inclusion in the programme. In each quarterly report the PDM has attempted to come up with an exclusion and inclusion error and to determine the targeting efficiency of the food aid. Based on the PDM, WFP has come under criticism that their targeting efficiency is very low and shows that they are not properly including or excluding beneficiaries from the food aid. In the first quarterly PDM report the targeting efficiency of the regions ranged between .47-.73, with an average of .63. In the second quarterly PDM, the targeting efficiency ranged from .57-.74, with an average of .65. This is low given that 50% would imply fully random targeting and 70% is considered by the WFP-Kenya team to indicate reasonably efficient targeting.
134. The targeting efficiency is calculated by seeing if the sampled population fits the criteria for food insecurity, and by analysing how many households were included or excluded correctly. To calculate this, the PDM asks a series of questions on household expenditure, food expenditure and assets, and determines a food poverty score, food expenditure as a proportion of total expenditure and asset possession. Unfortunately, the current system relies exclusively on expenditure criteria (the household is under the hardcore poverty line) to calculate target efficiency, because the original plan of using both expenditure criteria and nutrition criteria (one or more child in the household being moderately malnourished) was dropped. It could be argued that an expenditure criterion alone is not a sufficient indicator for drought-impacted household food insecurity, especially given the difficulty of gathering this information and the rigidity of the actual expenditure line. If a household is below the 31 Kenya shillings per day cut-off (after a series of calculations) then it is considered to be “food poor”, but if it is above, even by a few shillings, then they are considered to be “not food-poor”. This is far too sensitive a determination considering the bluntness of the interview tool being used. The calculation did however provide an indication about those districts where targeting was less successful, and it was used for further probing the reasons for low targeting efficiency leading to possible re-targeting.

135. WFP is perhaps doing their own targeting efficiency a disservice by using the 1997 poverty line figures for Kenya. Because of inflation and a changing economic situation, the figures of 43Ksh/day for absolute poverty and 31Ksh/day for food poverty are very low and perhaps do not accurately reflect the current economic situation of Kenya’s very poor. WFP is now planning on revising the cut-off values used to 74Ksh/day for absolute poverty and 55Ksh/day for food poverty. These new values will broaden the definition of food poverty and improve the targeting efficiency by presenting a more realistic living situation for those considered food-insecure and eligible for inclusion into the programme.

136. This team was not alone in questioning the validity of the calculations in addressing targeting and similar issues were raised in 2005 during the Thematic Review of Targeting in WFP Relief Operations, which used Kenya as a case-study.

In Kenya, Malawi and Ethiopia the monitoring led to calculations of inclusion and exclusion errors as well as targeting ‘efficiency’ ratios. However, in all cases there were methodological uncertainties around the approach as well as lack of transparency. For example, calculations of inclusion and exclusion error are based on small samples so that statistical rigour cannot be assumed. Furthermore, it is not clear how or why a target of 0.7 for targeting efficiency (effectiveness) was derived, i.e. what is the empirical basis for this target? There are also difficulties around comparing socio-economic status of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries in order to demonstrate targeting ‘efficiency’, as non-beneficiaries are likely to disinvest thereby leading to increased exclusion error as the programme evolves. The term efficiency ratio used by programme staff in country case studies was invariably referring to effectiveness ratio\(^{12}\).

137. However, this process of evaluating the geographical and household targeting through the PDM is problematic, because the targeting efficiency results are only as good as the PDM data is reliable, and this reliability is highly dependent on the ability of the enumerators to ask consistent questions and obtain precise and valid responses. This problem is further compounded by the difficulty in determining the household expenditure value and the food

\(^{12}\) Bailey et al Thematic Review of Targeting in WFP Relief Operations, OEDE WFP November 2005
poverty score. These are highly sensitive values and the difference of several shillings expenditure can shift a household from one category to the next. In fact the WFP PDM was using a value of 43 KSh for all expenditures to calculate absolute poverty, without properly addressing large annual expenses such as school fees that would dramatically change the results.

138. As was discussed in detail in the Assessment and Targeting section, the DSG relies on the long and short rain assessments plus the monthly drought report to make decisions about districts and communities to target. Once that is set and the beneficiary numbers agreed upon, the individual community then decides which households to target through the CBTD. The PDM then attempts to evaluate this targeting procedure on a sampled house by house basis, which is really an evaluation of the CBTD, rather than of the geographical targeting procedure. To see if the targeting and assessment process is working, the PDM would need to look at the PDM results on a community-level to confirm whether that community is vulnerable and dependent on the food aid as was determined by the DSG selection process. For example, if a district is determined to be 65% vulnerable, then the PDM report should then verify if this level of “food poverty” exists. If that is verified, the PDM could then seek to verify if 65% of people in that district have been selected by the CBTD registration process. But this is not currently happening because there is no clear monitoring system for targeting.

139. Clearly, monitoring of targeting is a relatively new activity for many agencies so that the methodology for analysis needs further critical thinking and elaboration.

“The case studies also show that there has been no monitoring of geographical targeting by WFP. Given the primacy of geographical targeting in terms of reaching the greatest number of correctly identified food-insecure people (compared to lower level targeting as achieved through approaches like CBTD), this is a serious omission, especially given the weakness of the evidence base for geographical targeting in a number of case-study countries.

Best practice to monitor geographical targeting would involve monitoring the food security and related indicators of populations in non-intervention areas and comparing these to populations in intervention areas. This could involve nutrition/mortality surveys and rapid forms of food security monitoring, i.e. coping strategy index, ‚light‘ forms of HEA and implementation of the Cornell Radimer scale. Ideally, monitoring of geographical targeting could be included with ongoing monitoring, e.g. PDM/impact assessment. So called ‘bundling’ of monitoring, i.e. combining monitoring and assessment for different purposes into one large activity, would save on costs and reduce ‘respondent fatigue.’”

140. In fact, currently the ALRMP monthly assessments covers some of the same issues as the PDM including household food security, household food supply and the percentage of households reliant on food aid. It is possible that these other assessments could assist with the monitoring of the geographical targeting in order to reduce the current expectations on the PDM.

141. A final issue that arose during the evaluation was the lack of Somali-speaking WFP field monitors in the Somali-speaking areas of the country. This is not due to a recruitment problem, but rather reflects an actual WFP policy. There is an institutional concern that Somali-speaking staff would be under undue clan pressure that could provoke security or other issues, and therefore it is preferable to not have field monitors from the Somali-speaking areas holding jobs.
in those areas. While not wishing to second-guess this decision, the team did find it problematic for staff to carry out household interviews without having the local language skill, and to have to rely on interpreters from cooperating partners or local authorities to translate during the interviews. It reduces WFP staff direct access to the beneficiaries in these areas.

142. Overall, the team recognised that the PDM is complicated and believed that efforts are being made on the part of WFP to improve the form and the analysis. However, the team felt that the PDM as a tool was not being properly utilised. Monitoring the impact of food aid is an essential part of the relief process, but it needs to be streamlined to meet the needs of the programme in order to inform planning and identify areas where improvements can be made to fully meet the objectives. Questions around opportunity costs, use of the food aid at the household level, duration and acceptability of the commodities are key to ensuring that the food aid is reaching the beneficiaries in an effective and efficient manner. The bigger questions of monitoring the targeting process are also important, but perhaps additional tools need to be developed to ensure that this information is gathered in a reliable and useful manner.

Capacity Building

143. One of the great strengths of WFP has been the creation of ten Sub-Offices (Eldoret, Mombasa, Garissa, Wajir, Mandera, Marsabit, Lodwar, Isiolo, Kitui (Machakos) and Kajiado (Masai)) in the ASAL. WFP has a greater decentralized field presence than any other UN agency. This has given the CO a direct link with the district administrations and ministry representatives in the ASAL district teams. The Team was frequently told about the appreciation government staff had for the support of WFP S-O staff and it is clear that excellent working relations are generally enjoyed by S-O staff and district officials.

Miscellaneous

144. The crisis attracted much international attention, which no doubt helped to generate donor interest, but also placed additional burdens on the CO staff. It should be noted that at the same time, when the emergency team was under great pressure, the office had to receive a series of high-level visitors. Between February and June 2006 the office had to host no less than 15 prominent visitors during an operationally crucial period.

Coherence

145. At the broadest level across the humanitarian community there appears to have been a disconnect between meeting food needs and meeting non-food needs such as medicine, veterinary/livestock support programmes, water, seeds and tools, communications infrastructure and sanitation.

146. A number of WFP cooperating partners interviewed by the Team felt that WFP concentrated too much on food aid and neglected opportunities for complimentary development activities that could lift populations from dependency on external assistance. Indeed, from the advent of the EMOP WFP showed a clear tendency to concentrate on its emergency rather than development objectives. The suspension in August 2004 of CP Activity 3 – the Disaster Preparedness Facility – and the decision to redeploy human, financial and material resources from regular programming to the EMOP are clear examples of this.
Impact

147. It is generally agreed that the Emergency Operation was successful in preventing loss of human life from starvation following the successive droughts in 2004 and 2005 and floods in 2006, which at one point affected over 3 million people in Kenya’s Arid and Semi-Arid Lands. Without the massive “food emergency” which WFP coordinated and successfully managed, the lives of hundreds of thousands of drought-affected people would have been in jeopardy, there would have been large-scale migration to relief camps and people would have been obliged to sell off their meager remaining assets.

148. Nevertheless, the limitations of emergency food relief, by itself and in isolation, are fully recognised. The failure to secure adequate donor support for much of the non-food assistance in this emergency is cause for concern. Food interventions can only have a limited impact on nutrition levels unless other critical needs such as potable water, malaria control and general health care are also addressed. That was not the case in Kenya. As a result, the impact of WFP’s intervention was unnecessarily weakened.

A.2. Supplementary Feeding

Relevance

149. The use of supplemental feeding programmes to target vulnerable groups including children under five and pregnant and lactating women was appropriate in the context of the drought emergency in Kenya. One of the characteristics of the drought was a high level of animal/livestock illness and death in the ASAL of northern and eastern Kenya. The population in the ASAL is highly dependent on livestock to support the food and nutritional needs of young children, pregnant and lactating women and the ill, and the loss of the usual animal protein and milk sources during the drought greatly affected the nutritional intake of these groups. The situation in Kenya, as mentioned above, was further exacerbated by the “chronic” nature of the emergency, with many households already economically precarious due to successive shocks to their livelihood and food security situation. In this context, the WFP supplemental feeding programme was a relevant intervention to help support the nutritional needs of these vulnerable groups.

150. WFP supplemental food targeting attempted to ensure that the supplemental food was only given in the context of sufficient household food, which in the case of the ASAL, meant that food was targeted to areas where a general food distribution was undertaken.

151. Current nutritional discussions question the actual impact and relevance of supplemental feeding programmes\textsuperscript{14} to have an impact during an emergency situation. While the SCF report and subsequent discussions will be highly relevant for eventual WFP programming, at the time of the emergency response evaluated in this report, the Kenya-CO was following the most current guidelines available which indicated that the supplemental feeding program was an appropriate and relevant response to the nutritional emergency occurring in Kenya.

152. It is well established that supplemental feeding programs are only one facet of an appropriate nutritional response to an emergency. If there is insufficient general food availability (either through household food production, purchase or a general food distribution);

\textsuperscript{14} SCF, ENN and Navarro-Colorado A Retrospective Study of Emergency Supplementary Feeding Programmes June 2007 (Draft)
insufficient basic health services; and inadequate clean water and sanitation, then the supplemental food programme will not have any real impact on the nutritional situation of the vulnerable targeted groups. There was an assumption implicit in the EMOP project document that “adequate water/sanitation and healthcare interventions to prevent wasting or poor absorption from (sic) diseases” would be available and twinned with the WFP supplemental food. Given the poor infrastructure and under-developed healthcare outreach services in many parts of Kenya, this basic assumption was not entirely appropriate. The team found that WFP should have made additional accommodations through strengthened partnerships with other agencies and identification of additional nutrition specialist agencies to ensure that the supplemental feeding programs were appropriately twinned with the necessary health, infrastructure and water/sanitation programmes to support the impact of the food intervention. The team found that while the Kenya-CO contacted appropriate sister agencies and developed joint programming plans, these were neither consistently updated nor implemented and therefore minimised the effect of the supplemental feeding programmes.

Effectiveness (Outcome Level)

153. The EMOP planning documents identified the intended outcome (Outcome 3) from supplementary feeding as “improved nutritional & health status of children under 5 yrs of age and pregnant and nursing women”, as measured by (a) prevalence of children under 5 years of age with acute malnutrition (less than 15%), and (b) prevalence of anaemia among pregnant women.

154. Impact assessments for the SFP/TFP are not occurring, so WFP is limited to knowing that they have “provided the food”, without being able to chart actual health impacts associated with this food. According to a 2006 USAID report15, UNICEF estimated 73,000 children and 7,200 pregnant and lactating women were in need of supplementary and therapeutic feeding, with an estimated 50,000 children not being reached. However accurate these figures may or may not be, consolidated programme data, including admissions and outcome data (numbers recovered, mortality, default) are not available. Therefore, it is not possible to compare current programme outcomes with international standards or to determine impact. Drop-out rates are above sphere standards (15%) and readmissions are high. Even community-based therapeutic programmes report low coverage rates of approximately 30%, well below the 50% sphere standard. Large numbers of moderately and severely malnourished children are not receiving treatment. The monthly distribution reports complied in 2006 by WFP indicate that on average between 9%-46% of the total estimated malnourished children in the EMOP districts were being reached with selective feeding programmes16.

Effectiveness (Output Level)

155. The EMOP planning documents identified the intended outputs for supplementary feeding as “increased participation of target populations in food-supported nutrition interventions, as measured by the number of children reached through food-supported nutrition interventions.” In the narrative of the EMOP project document, WFP also promised, “where

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15 Understanding nutrition data and the causes of malnutrition in Kenya, A special report by the Famine Early Warning Systems Network, USAID September 2006
16 Monthly Distribution Reports, WFP Kenya, May-December 2006 Nutrition data on selective feeding was only included in the reports beginning in August 2006. There was a range of EMOP districts with selective feeding ranging from 4-7. The 46% coverage is mainly representative of a single district, Turkana, with an active nutrition NGO.
feasible, supplementary feeding activities will include control measures for intestinal parasites and dissemination of information on care and hygiene practices and HIV/AIDS prevention.”

156. During the EMOP phases, WFP targeted 26% of the total beneficiaries consisting of 20% under 5’s and 6% pregnant and lactating women with a ration of 300g/pp/day of CSB. Pipeline breaks were dealt through skipping of distribution or reducing rations. Only the Arid Districts were targeted for SFP (Turkana, Marsabit, Moyale, Isiolo, Samburu, Mandera, Wajir, Garissa and Tana River).

157. In 2004, 1,162 tons (10%) were distributed against a planned 12,000 tons. In 2005, 6,400 tons (37%) were distributed against a planned 17,459 tons. In 2006, 22,448 tons (87%) were distributed against a “planned” 25,416 tons, primarily because beginning in May CSB was distributed as part of the general ration, and CSB plus sugar was being targeted by nutrition agencies with the capacity. Initial problems with the CSB pipeline were overcome and there was sufficient CSB in 2006 to run the program.

158. One constraint continued to be the specialized agencies ability to expand their coverage as needed. The number of SFP beneficiaries varied per month in 2006 but never exceeded 30,000. Different districts fared very differently depending on the capacity of the local government and the presence of specialized agencies. In the beginning of 2007, the CSB pipeline could still afford CSB in the general ration to continue at a level of 100 gr/pp/day for all beneficiaries while targeted feeding continued in a few remaining districts.

159. The team found that while CSB pipeline issues contributed to the low levels of SFP distribution, a far larger constraint was the lack of capacity of the local government, local ministry of health and specialized agencies to target, manage and distribute the SFP food items. It was felt that WFP overestimated the ability of the specialized agencies to handle large quantities of CSB, but that this overestimation was still far preferable to an underestimation which would have led to shortfalls. The instability of the CSB pipeline and the late-emergency inclusion of the CSB in the general ration in sufficient quantities to help reduce micronutrient deficiencies were avoidable, and lessons should be learned about the need and role of CSB in future emergency operations, especially in arid lands.

160. The evaluation team agreed that SF was an appropriate component of the emergency response. However, the impact of SF is based on the provision of an adequate general ration and on the presence of adequate water, sanitation and health care for the same vulnerable populations. In this case, the implementation of WFP’s SF programme was not optimal. First, the SF component was designed in the absence of requisite information on malnutrition; second, the SF did not adequately overlap WFP’s GFD-targeted areas; third, partnership with agencies providing water and health support was not effectively undertaken and; and fourth, the actual distribution of SF items fell well-below the intended target level because of the lack of specialized agencies with capacity to implement the SF activities.

161. While WFP succeeded in its primary role to resource and deliver the SF food inputs, the absence of critical complimentary health inputs meant that the goals could not be as fully achieved as they otherwise might have been. WFP, the UN system and GoK should have worked more closely together to strengthen programming decisions and partnerships. In areas targeted for the GFD, there was a crucial need to form partnerships with specialized nutritional

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17 There really was no officially « planned » figure in 2006 because the planned was unknown and based on the evolving situation.
agencies, undertaking MOUs with other UN Agencies that defined priorities and areas of shared programming. Supplementary Feeding must be linked to potable water, malaria control and basic health care service areas. The weakness of other sectors and supported partnerships, also observed in previous evaluations, adversely affected the impact of WFP food assistance.

Efficiency

162. The planning document states that WFP will collaborate with UNICEF and partner NGOs in the implementation of supplementary feeding. Specifically, UNICEF will coordinate regular nutritional surveys, chair meetings of the Health and Nutrition subgroup of the KFSM, and train IPs. WFP will provide, store, transport, handle and monitor the distribution at FDPs of blended food for these activities.

163. The central issue the team found in terms of nutrition and WFP programmes is the almost complete lack of timely and consistent nutritional monitoring. Despite the persistently high rates of malnutrition in Kenya as evidenced by the various area-based surveys in the last three years, there is not a functioning nutritional monitoring and surveillance system in Kenya and it is not, therefore, possible to accurately determine the malnutrition rate in each district, or to get accurate trend data on the seasonal and yearly changes in nutritional status of the population. Most surveys are conducted on an ad hoc basis, which does not allow for accurate comparison. There was a country-wide Demographic and Health Survey conducted in 2003 that offered some baseline data, but, since that survey, there has not been another comprehensive survey or regular nutrition monitoring undertaken, even in districts of high concern.

164. For example, there were no comprehensive nutritional surveys done in 2006 in Garissa District despite the multiple crises of drought, floods and Rift valley fever, nor was Wajir District surveyed in 2006 despite a GAM rate of 29.8% in 2005. Surveys are carried out by various specialist NGOs in specific divisions and districts, and UNICEF has undertaken periodic surveys (please see Annex X for details), but this does not alter the fact that there is not a nutritional surveillance system currently operational in Kenya.

| Nutritional Surveys Conducted 2004-2006 By District and Year |
|------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| District         | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 |
| Isiolo           | 0    | 0    | 3    |
| Kajiado          | 0    | 1    | 0    |
| Turkana          | 6    | 8    | 6    |
| Marsabit         | 3    | 0    | 1    |
| Mandera          | 1    | 1    | 5    |
| Garissa          | 1    | 1    | 0    |
| Wajir            | 2    | 2    | 0    |
| Taita Taveta     | 2    | 0    | 0    |
| Kitui            | 1    | 0    | 0    |
| Kwale            | 1    | 1    | 0    |
| Makueni          | 1    | 1    | 0    |
| Tana River       | 0    | 1    | 0    |
| Moyale           | 0    | 0    | 2    |
| Samburu          | 0    | 0    | 1    |

165. The above chart indicates the nutritional surveys that were conducted in 2004-2006 and highlights the ad hoc nature of the in-country surveys. What the chart does not detail, but what is implicit when analysing the nutritional surveys, is that many of the areas that were surveyed in 2005, were not re-surveyed in 2006 despite the very high malnutrition rates in these areas. This
is primarily because there are no guidance mechanisms for surveys and NGOs undertake surveys in their own areas of concern.

166. It is essential that a mechanism be developed to cover Kenya as a whole and to ensure that there are no programme and survey overlaps, or more likely, gaps. The Division of Nutrition in the Ministry of Health would be the most obvious clearing-house for nutrition information and the team recommends that a Nutritional Technical Group be established that reports to the KFSG and handles exclusively nutritional issues.

**Coherence**

167. The evaluation team concluded that there has been little coordination to date on nutrition programming between WFP, UNICEF, the Nutrition Division of MOH, and nutrition-based NGOs. This appears to be improving with increased collaboration on programming and work plans being developed for the rest of 2007.

168. Despite the overall lack of shared programming and dialogue, the team recognised that WFP and UNICEF have done a good job of continuing the SFP with UNICEF providing the NFI and technical support and WFP providing the food.

169. UNICEF is now implementing an ambitious and collaborative plan to strengthen district capacity to monitor and report on nutrition. This includes a nutrition information system that will serve as a clearing-house for nutritional information. The goal is to prepare Kenya for the next emergency so that there does not have to first be dramatic malnutrition rates or even loss of life to indicate that there is a problem on the ground. With regular and updated monitoring, shifts in health and nutrition patterns will be charted which will enable more preventive rather than responsive programming.

**A.3. Food for Work**

**Relevance**

170. Because of the fear of creating dependency amongst recipient communities on free hand-outs, there is an understandable preference by government officials to advocate FFW activities compared to free GFDs. It is generally recognised that long-term relief hand-outs to nomadic communities in the Horn of Africa have engendered such dependency and undermined traditional ways of life. Many alternative approaches to GFDs have been attempted, but very few have been successful. There is a wide variety of reasons for the lack of success including cultural attitudes to physical labour of nomadic societies and the lack of obvious labour intensive work opportunities such as forestry, road construction or soil conservation works in the pastoral rangelands. The main successes have centred around activities which are of direct benefit to livestock, such as dam and hand-dug well construction and water harvesting. But such success-stories have usually depended on strong technical and non-food support. The FFW activities under the EMOP in Kenya are no exception.

171. The Mid-Term Review of the previous EMOP Structures in Kenya (Stephen Anderson – 2001) also questioned the viability of FFW as implemented by WFP to date in Kenya as an effective mechanism for phasing out food aid. This Review, along with the Country Office in-house Final Report on Project Implementation Status, points out a number of inherent weaknesses in the WFP FFW strategy, particularly in schemes whose planning and implementation have not been carefully monitored. WFP FFW activities are monitored first by
community representatives (relief committees), then by the Co-Operating Lead Partners, then by WFP Field Officers assisted by district Project Review Committees and at National level. The FFA activities are guided by National Project Steering Committee (formed of GoK, WFP, UNICEF, FAO, and two NGO representatives—currently World Vision and Action Aid—Chair by GoK). FFW was implemented in areas that demonstrated improving food security, hence most areas of high food insecurity did not benefit from FFA activities. The long distances to work sites posed major challenges—particularly for women—with some taking over four hours to travel to and from work sites.

172. FFW was included as part of the relief strategy in the EMOP project document. In practice, however, FFW activities are particularly difficult to implement during a major relief operation because of the time-consuming demands to identify labour-intensive projects, organize community participation and, most importantly, provide tools, technical design and supervision. WFP assesses the level of food insecurity measured by % of populations assessed to be food insecure plus food needs deficits. FFW was implemented in areas with less than 50% of population requiring 50% or less of food aid to meet daily food requirement. FFW was implemented in even in ASAL areas-Isiolo, Samburu. The most successful FFW activity which the team saw was dam construction in the agriculturally marginal hills of Machakos. This was successful because the work was carefully implemented with the direct daily support of an international NGO, German Agro Action. Hand tools were provided in 2005 (not 2006) by WFP for the labour-intensive activity of soil excavation and transport. However, reports by both the implementing partner and the community indicated that the tools were not sufficient to meet the needs. The community had provided their own worn-out hand tools, but much of the work was done with bare hands. FFA encourages communities to provide any contribution to the projects including hand tools, but it needs to be verified that community members understand this and are in a position to provide the tools needed. This did not appear to be the case in Machakos..

173. The team concluded that FFW is neither viable nor relevant as an EMOP activity without the support of a technical agency (government or NGO), tools and other non-food materials and a development strategy for community participation and maintenance. Without these elements FFW can do more harm than good. No hand tools were provided under the EMOP and adequate technical support from government line ministries was not provided in project implementation although GoK technical officers provided support during design of projects and assessed the quality of projects proposals submitted by communities through the Co-operating partners (CLP). WFP staff were far too busy trying to manage a complex, life-saving relief operation to make any practical contribution to the FFW activities envisaged in the project document. A WFP Field Monitor based in the districts was expected to monitor WFP activities including FFW. Each FFW district submitted a Monthly FFW project progress report.

**Effectiveness (Output Level)**

174. The EMOP planning documents identified the intended outputs of FFW as (i) up to 950 food security productive assets such as water pans, irrigation canals, feeder roads, soil conservation terraces, pit latrines and school dormitories, with at least 50% of the assets benefiting women; (ii) 56,000 participants, 60% of whom are women. It also indicated that these projects should be implemented largely in the marginal agricultural districts of Machakos, Mwingi, Kitui, Makueni, Kwale, Kilifi and Tharaka, and in pocketed areas of agro-pastoral districts of Turkana, Marsabit, Ijara, Garissa, Wajir, and Isiolo.
Some programme activities were implemented as part of the phase-out strategy of the GFD under the EMOP. In May 2005 a total of 136 projects ranging from water dams, pans, soil and water conservation, irrigation schemes, roads and spring protection were implemented in Laikipia, Isiolo, Narok, Machakos, Malindi and Mwingi districts. Water-based activities were more popular with communities (40 percent), followed by soil conservation (32 percent), roads (21 percent) and agriculture (7 percent).

175. Technical support from the GoK line ministries was rarely forthcoming, and WFP staff were generally too busy trying to manage a complex, life-saving relief operation to make any practical contributions to the FFW activities envisaged in the project document. In the cases where adequate non-food inputs and technical support were available, such as from German Agro Action (GAA) in Machakos, the FFW was effective and indeed even preferred to GFD by the recipient community. However, in most other cases the FFW activities never materialized or were ineffective as a result of inadequate support. Based on its visits to project sites, the team found a lack of coherence in terms of the scale of the programmes and level of budget support for tools and other non-food items.

176. The team concluded that this aspect of the EMOP Project document was unrealistically optimistic and should not have been included in an emergency of this nature.

Efficiency

Coordination

177. The EMOP project document specified that FFW activities would be coordinated with UNICEF, with WFP providing food aid and UNICEF providing construction materials and expertise. This did not happen. In fact UNICEF had far less capacity to plan and implement FFW activities than WFP had through its ten Sub-Offices. As mentioned above the S-O staff were far too preoccupied to plan and supervise FFW activities under the EMOP.

Training and Capacity Building

178. The EMOP Project document states that in order to ensure that all stakeholders have a proper and up to date understanding of the CBTD system, WFP would conduct (i) a national workshop for WFP FMs, NGO and GoK counterparts to review previous application of the CBTD system, discuss lessons learned and establish operational modalities for the new EMOP; and (ii) Six district-level workshops for GoK counterparts and FMs or partner NGOs to understand operational modalities at the district level.

179. In addition to the CBTD training above, planning document recognised need for training for WFP, cooperating partner and GoK counterparts on FFW project implementation. In particular it promised WFP would conduct (i) a national workshop for WFP, IP and GoK to review FFW guidelines, discuss lessons learned, and establish operational modalities for the new EMOP, and (ii) six district-level workshops for GoK counterparts and FMs or partner NGOs to understand operational modalities at the district level.

180. Project documents indicated that training on the implementation of WFP’s ECW policy, general gender awareness, and gender-sensitive monitoring and evaluation would be covered in all of the above training sessions.
Provision of Complimentary Inputs

181. In its approved EMOP document, WFP said it would provide communities with critical non-food inputs such as wheelbarrows, pickaxes, shovels, hoes, head pans, spades, mattocks, measuring tapes, sledge hammers, etc. of planned value of USD 367,000. WFP provided adequate tools in 2005. In 2006 WFP did not support Machakos District (GAA) with tools as enough tools were carried over from 2005 while in Kilifi District, World Vision International committed to provide tools but decided to divert resources to cater for immediate needs resulting from the floods.

Targeting

182. Some Districts (communities) insisted on implementing FFW and it would have been rigid not to consider this desire from the communities. Ensuring technical support of government ministries at District level is obviously a major challenge because of resource and capacity constraints, and affecting Government ownership of the assets in the long run. These activities were much fewer than originally anticipated in the EMOP document because of the need for both district and WFP Sub-Office staff to meet the demands of a greatly expanded GFD as the effects of drought and flooding affected increased numbers over widely dispersed areas.

183. The FFW activities which were implemented were open to all members of the community to participate. In this manner the beneficiaries who wished to work were self-selected.

Coherence

184. FFW are preferred by many communities and local government officials in preference to GFD as a means of reducing dependency on free food hand-outs. The suspension of CP Activity 3 when the EMOP was launched deprived WFP of technical and operational structures that could have strengthened community organisations to use FFW as a phase-out of EMOP GFDs. This lack of coherence between the WFP CP development activities and the EMOP FFW/ESFP activities was symptomatic of the culture of separate programme compartmentalisation in the WFP CO and S-Os.

A.4. Expanded School Feeding

Rationale for WFP Assistance

185. The performance of the 2003 Short Rains (October-December 2003) was poor. The 2004 Long Rains (March-May) were erratic and did not provide much relief to the worsening drought situation. In areas affected by drought, households were soon expected to begin applying severe coping mechanisms such as missing meals, distress sale of breeding livestock, feeding on wild fruits, separation of families and taking children out of school. The February 2004 Short Rains assessment and the June 2004 Long Rains assessment missions recommended that the school feeding programme should be extended in order to enhance the effectiveness of free primary education.

186. In the arid areas, the CP Basic Activity 1 targets all pre-primary and primary schools: Assistance to Basic Education. In the semi-arid areas, the regular programme covers only a few divisions. Vulnerable school children consequently excluded from the CP Basic Activity 1 in
these latter areas were targeted through Expanded School Feeding during emergency operations (EMOP) to off-set the negative impact of drought on schooling.\textsuperscript{18}

187. The ESFP would play an important role in addressing food security in the affected districts by cushioning the children against the prevailing food shortage, while also helping to stabilize attendance, as pastoral families and their children do not have to migrate in search of food. Provision of food through the schools was expected to encourage girls' attendance and provide some cost savings for the families. Ensuring that the current school feeding continues without interruption is an important way of cushioning these communities whose resource bases are already overstretched due to the current drought. For children from the very poor households, the school meal could often be the only meal of the day.

188. The Expanded School Feeding Programme (ESFP) component of EMOP 10374.0 has been designed as part of the emergency operation (EMOP) to off-set the negative impact of drought on schooling – i.e. possible increased drop-out rates and decrease in attendance in schools located in pockets of the semi-arid areas that have been affected by drought and that are not covered by the CP Act 1. The ESFP was intended to serve over 544,000 additional children in 1,378 schools. WFP is planning a study to evaluate

\textit{Relevance}

189. The Team observed that it is not easy to determine to what extent the ESFP was conceived as a school feeding intervention aimed at education objectives (long-term objectives, by nature) or as part of a six-month emergency operation using schools as attractive food delivery points to target a specific population (school age children) in crucial need.

190. No baseline survey was undertaken to assess whether the targeted schools had the capacity to accommodate school feeding, not even as part of the ESFP.

191. The Evaluation raises difficult questions about the appropriateness of ESFP. Schools benefiting from WFP food aid under the ESFP have to fulfil the same criteria as schools supported by the school-feeding programme under CP Act 1. This includes the provision of an adequate kitchen, storage, the commitment of the school management committee to supply cooks, firewood, water, etc. The appropriateness of an emergency intervention, whose duration is, by nature, limited to a few months, with modalities established to meet the requirements of a long-term development activity, is highly questionable. Two unexpected outcomes are likely to happen:

- Beneficiary communities that have committed themselves to long-term investments in building facilities question the credibility of both WFP and MOE when ESFP ends. They were encouraged to establish school canteens, but are no longer provided with food from the Government or from external donors. The communities seldom, if ever, have the capacity to provide food to replace WFP assistance.
- The Team was informed that there have been instances that, once the emergency situation is over and the ESFP comes to an end, schools that are not included in the regular SFP have been deserted while those receiving food in the SFP are overcrowded.

192. This leads to some questions, in particular: were the modalities of the school feeding activity under the EMOP appropriate? Other arrangements (such as the temporary provision of

\textsuperscript{18} Kenya EMOP 10374.0 “Food assistance to drought-affected people in Kenya” p. 13.
family take home rations associated with FFA/FFW activities in support of recovery initiatives) could have been explored in order to help households face an emergency situation without creating long-term expectations and dependency. The Team believes that such negative outcomes should be avoided through a more coherent approach.

193. In sum, there is also considerable doubt about the advisability of the ESFP except as a means of supplementing relief distributions. The negative effects of stop-go ESFP probably outweigh the benefits. There will be many problems in realistically achieving a smooth exit strategy when WFP assistance to the SFP ends.

194. In other words, ESFP is merely a temporary "feeding programme in the school". This is probably the reason why school enrolment was so high and new enrolments were observed during the EMOP period. As a result, there is a high degree of uncertainty about the future attendance of children enrolled in ESFP schools once food aid under the EMOP is over. The increased enrolments are, however, not entirely attributed to the feeding programme, but the government incentive to provide free primary education to school going children.

**Effectiveness (Outcome Level)**

195. The Expanded School Feeding Programme (ESFP) is intended to (i) maintain enrolment, (ii) prevent drop-out of school children, (iii) stabilize attendance at assisted pre-primary and primary schools, and (iv) improve the children's attention span by relieving short-term hunger.

196. Under EMOP 10374.0, 544,000 children (294,000 boys and 250,000 girls) at 1,378 pre-primary and primary schools in 15 districts are planned beneficiaries from ESFP. At the end of the third term of 2006 school year a total of 563,854 children (288,683 boys and 275,271 girls) attended school indicating that the ESFP not only succeeded in preventing drop-out and keeping children at school but also gave rise to additional new enrolments.

**Effectiveness (Output Level)**

197. According to the original EMOP Plan of Operations some 544,000 children (294,000 boys and 250,000 girls) at 1,378 pre-primary and primary schools in 15 districts were the intended beneficiaries from ESFP. Data collected in the 15 districts covered by the ESFP show that during the emergency period enrolment and attendance rates at school actually increased. At the end of the third term of 2006 school year a total of 563,854 children (288,683 boys and 275,271 girls) attended the targeted schools. Thus the team concluded that the ESFP not only succeeded in preventing drop-out rates and kept children at school but also provided incentives for additional new enrolments.

**Efficiency**

**Planning and Implementation**

198. No baseline survey was undertaken to assess whether the targeted schools had the capacity to accommodate school feeding.

199. In order to oversee the ESFP implementation, technical groups were established at district level under the auspices of a District Steering Group. These technical groups consist of the District Education Officer (DEO) representative, field monitors, Lead Agency, Drought Management Officer (DMO) and commercial transporters. According to the terms of reference
of these groups, their objectives and responsibilities cover commodity tracking, distribution monitoring, and reporting. Reporting should be done using the forms (SFP 6, 7 and 8) designed for the regular SFP. Data collected should be used to analyse food aid receipt and utilization, as well as to capture attendance patterns in the identified schools. The information should be submitted by the DEO to the SFP Unit within MOE.

200. The EMOP unit was not formed at the time the ESFP was being designed by the development unit. When the EMOP unit was created staff were seconded to join the EMOP unit, which then took over ESFP.

201. Under the ESFP, WFP covers all LTSH costs associated with transport and storage of the food, while in the regular SFP, GoK is required to cover half of them. Likewise, the WFP EMOP Unit alone does assessment of the impact of the ESFP notably through monitoring school enrolment and attendance indicators.

Coherence

202. By nature, an emergency operation is a time-limited response and is not directly concerned by sustainability issues. Nevertheless, the “expanded” aspect of the ESFP, school feeding activities under the auspices of EMOP, has consequences for the long-term objectives and sustainability of the regular SFP.

203. It appears that the WFP Development Unit and the EMOP Unit did not make a joint effort to design the ESFP, monitor its implementation or assess its short- and medium-term impact within the framework of a coherent and global school feeding programme. Likewise, the School Feeding Unit within MOE is not directly involved in the selection of schools under ESFP nor in monitoring education outcomes. The MOE unit’s main contribution to the ESFP consists of providing lists of schools in the divisions identified by the KFSSG as vulnerable and food-insecure.

204. The team found very little coherence between UNICEF and WFP activities on the ground that could potentially enhance complementarities and impact.

Connectedness

205. Kenya faces chronic climatic instability with increasingly frequent droughts and floods resulting in food insecurity for populations living in the ASAL. It has also been established that education systems are affected by these factors. The GoK and WFP response has been to launch emergency operations (ESFP under EMOP) in addition to regular school feeding activities. However, emergency operations are by nature short-term interventions (EMOP 10374.0 was planned to last 6 months) while CP activities aim at long-term development goals (several years). There are, therefore, major concerns about what happens to beneficiaries of the ESFP once the EMOP period is over. What are the lessons learned from the past in Kenya?

206. The initial number of beneficiaries approved under the previous CP (1999-2003) was 270,000 pre-primary and primary school children in ASAL districts and 15,000 children in unplanned settlements of Nairobi. The Evaluation Team was informed that under the previous CP and the United States-funded School Feeding Initiative (2000-2003) about 1.7 million

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19 WFP/EB.3/98/7/3, p. 12.
children were actually fed each year\textsuperscript{20}. Indeed, there were an additional 1.3 million caseload under the auspices of the EMOP response to the 1999-2001 droughts. After termination of the emergency period it was estimated that, due to improvement in food security, the number of children in acutely food-insecure households who had not enough to eat and whose basic education was threatened by poverty could be reduced from 1.7 to 1.1 million. Therefore an annual average of 1 million pre-primary and primary school children were effectively approved under the current CP (2004-2008). In the absence of any follow-up monitoring or specific survey, it is not known what happened to the 600,000/700,000 school children who were no longer supported with WFP food aid. It is, however, assumed that school feeding was terminated without any alternative for maintaining their nutrient intake levels.

207. The same challenge will clearly occur when the present ESFP under EMOP 10374.0 ends. Two possibilities could be envisaged: (i) to incorporate children who have benefited from the ESFP into the regular school feeding activity under the current CP; or (2) to maintain food aid in WFP supported-schools under the EMOP through incorporating them into a PRRO.

208. The first possibility has already been commented on by the mid-term evaluation whose conclusions are still valid: “While the Evaluation Team sees no philosophical problems inherent in moving a significant number of students from the EMOP to the regular school feeding activity, budget constraints on the Kenyan government side would seem to foreclose the possibility”\textsuperscript{21}.

209. It is worth recalling that WFP identifies six programme areas in which food aid can be used in EMOPs and PRROs: general food distribution; supplementary feeding; therapeutic feeding; food for work or food for recovery; market intervention; child care, education, health and other social service support. It is a common view that humanitarian responses to emergency situations do not typically focus on education. However, the preservation, restoration and/or support of education systems are critical elements in efforts to restore livelihoods, ensure long-term success and security, and promote recovery and self-sufficiency\textsuperscript{22}.

210. The Evaluation Team is of the opinion that to move out of the vicious circle linking successive EMOPs to successive CPs, incorporating ESFP schools into a future PRRO seems to be the only possibility, subject to the satisfaction of prior requirements and the implementation of associated measures:

1. Prior to any commencement of a school feeding activity under a possible PRRO it will be necessary to carry out an in-depth appraisal to assess its technical, social, economic and logistical feasibility. Moreover, the main objective of this appraisal will be to assess GoK’s school feeding policy particularly because the government will be eventually expected to take over of full responsibility once the PPRO is over.

2. School feeding under the PRRO should closely associate:
   - Provision of food aid at school in support of school canteens;
   - Provision of food aid targeted at parents in support of Food for Asset (FFA) or Food for Work (FFW). The FFA/FFW activities will be mainly designed to improve the school environment in the long term, and to support parents in their efforts to provide an adequate nutritional intake for their children, either in a school canteen or at

\textsuperscript{20} WFP/EB.3/2003/7/2, p. 10.
\textsuperscript{21} Mid-term Evaluation, p. 35.
home. FFA/FFW will require technical support from other partners (UN agencies, line ministries, NGOs, etc.).

3. Bearing in mind that the main goal of the PRRO will be to help to create a smooth transition from emergency to recovery, the implementation of the PRRO will have to be closely monitored and results evaluated, with an emphasis on coherence between PRRO and CP, and final convergence. Near the end of the PRRO it should be possible to merge all WFP-supported schools into a single and global GoK-run school feeding programme.
B. Development Operations

Overall Description

211. WFP’s Kenya Country Programme 10264.0 focuses on two main outcomes, to which all activities contribute:
   - Progress towards greater well-being for the poor and hungry through improved access to food, health and nutrition practices and increased capacity of communities to rehabilitate/create and maintain assets that provide secure and sustainable livelihoods;
   - Enhanced sustainability of livelihoods for children (especially girls and orphans) of poor, food-insecure households through improved access to basic education and skills training.

212. The CP's three basic activities are:
   - Assistance to Basic Education with 1,000,000 beneficiaries;
   - Nutrition and Care of people affected by HIV/AIDS with 112,460 beneficiaries and
   - Disaster-Preparedness Facility (DPF) with 44,380 beneficiaries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country activity</th>
<th>Programme activity</th>
<th>Quantity of commodities (mt)</th>
<th>Distribution by activity (%)*</th>
<th>Number of beneficiaries* (2004-2008)**</th>
<th>Of Female beneficiaries (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic Activity 1: Assistance to Basic Education</td>
<td>209 987</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>1 000 000</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Activity 2: Nutrition and Care of People Affected by HIV/AIDS</td>
<td>24 492</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>112 460</td>
<td>51</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Activity 3: Disaster-Preparedness Facility</td>
<td>21 531</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>44 380</td>
<td>58</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total CP</td>
<td>256 010</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 156 840</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*direct and indirect
**annual average

213. WFP assistance under CP 10264.0 targets an estimated 1.2 million beneficiaries annually over the five-year period at an estimated total cost of USD 83.2 million. The three Activities of CP 10264.0 are in fact all carry-overs from the previous CP, although, as the 2002 CP Evaluation noted, only the SFP component had been active out of the original three components in the 1999-2003 CP.

214. The current CP has operational requirements of USD 96,515,858, but at the time of the evaluation only 60.61% of requirements had been pledged. This includes a contribution in kind from the GoK of USD 9,915,000 or 10.27% of the total requirements.

Overall CP Coherence

Coherence with WFP Policy and Strategies

215. In general, the evaluation team found Kenya Country Programme 10264.0 to be fully in accordance with WFP Executive Board decision 1999/EB.A/2, in which WFP agreed to focus its development activities on five principle objectives. The Kenya CP addresses four of these five Enabling Development policy strategic objectives:
• enable poor households to invest in human capital through education and training;
• make it possible for poor families to gain and preserve assets;
• mitigate the effects of natural disasters in areas vulnerable to recurring crises;
• enable households that depend on degraded natural resources for their food security
to make a shift to more sustainable livelihoods.

Coherence with GoK Policy and Strategies

216. Overall, the evaluation team found the strategic focus elaborated in the WFP Country Programme document to be coherent with Government of Kenya strategies and policies as articulated in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), the National Poverty Eradication Plan, and the National Development Plan. It also noted WFP’s Country Programme – prepared on the basis of the United Nations Common Country Assessment for Kenya and the revised 2004-2008 United Nations Development Assistance Framework – were consistent with overall efforts of achieving the Millennium Development Goals to which Kenya is committed.

B.1. Assistance to Basic Education (Regular School Feeding)

217. A key GoK goal in Kenya’s poverty reduction strategy is to enable poor households to build human capital through education and training. WFP interventions under the CP are designed to contribute to the realization of the right of all Kenyan children to education and knowledge through improved learning at pre-primary and primary schools. Through the provision of meals to girls and boys attending pre-primary and primary schools, WFP’s SF activities aim to (i) combat short term hunger, thereby improving the pupil’s attention span and cognitive ability; and (ii) provide an incentive for enrolment and regular attendance of pupils until completion, particularly girls and orphans.

218. The School Feeding Programme of the CP has been the flagship of WFP assistance in Kenya since the 1980s. It is the largest WFP-supported school feeding programme in the world, with over 1.1 million beneficiaries in 3,800 schools. It accounts for 82% of the total CP resources. In addition food aid is provided to an average of 500 primary schools per year to undertake the improvement of facilities and school feeding-sustainability initiatives. Malnourished children under 5 years of age at Early Childhood Development Centres (ECDC) supported by UNICEF are also entitled to nutritional support from WFP. To complement the SFP activities and in order to reduce the prevalence of intestinal parasitic infections among school children, a de-worming component is being carried out in selected districts. The activity was also expected to empower parents by helping them build viable institutional mechanisms at the community level and become motivated and capable of continuing to send their children to school.

219. In 1994 WFP extended the SFP further in two unplanned settlements of Nairobi (Mukuru and Kariobangi). The signature of a Memorandum of Understanding between WFP and International Paper Foundation for USD 1.1 million permitted an expansion to four other unplanned settlements (Kibera, Mathare, Kawangware and Kangemi). Under these activities, a daily school lunch and mid-morning snack is provided to 90,981 pre-primary and primary school children in 110 schools, among which 67% are informal community schools. The majority of children (75,293) are in 94 schools supported by the IP-funded project while the others are under the regular CP activity. The IP-funded project is implemented in partnership with an NGO (Feed the Children), while the regular programme is implemented by the City Education Department of the Nairobi City Council.
Relevance

220. The value that the GoK places on these programmes is demonstrated by its high degree of human and financial resources for pre-primary and primary education in order to achieve universal primary education and universal primary completion. The GoK has provided significant in-kind support to the SFP, which is one of the 23 Investment Programmes to be implemented during the 2005-2010 Plan period.

221. There are no easy livelihood options for the high numbers of pastoralists who have been forced to drop out of pastoralism and are now settled around urban areas, often living in destitution. The degraded rangelands and depleted herds can no longer support a human population growing at the fastest rate in Kenya. insecurity in neighbouring Somalia and armed inter-clan clashes in competition for scarce water and grazing exacerbate the ecological and humanitarian crises. For some the main hope lies in better education. Thus, the evaluation team found that supporting educational achievement in ASAL districts is both appropriate and relevant and should continue to be the main component of the WFP Country Programme strategy.

222. However, as the SFP operates in arid and semi-arid districts, a major proportion of children who benefit from WFP food aid in these areas come from non-settled, pastoral households. There is evidence from other studies\(^{23}\) that the nomadic livelihoods present particular challenges to the schooling of children; particularly of girls. In the context of Kenya, these difficulties are aggravated by prevalent civil insecurity, notably along the border with Somalia (most areas where the regular school feeding programme operates are under UN security phase III). In the absence of adequate low-cost boarding schools, WFP’s SFP at established schools cannot accommodate the needs of many nomadic households and therefore, by themselves, are not a sufficient model for targeting such populations. Specific conditions should be associated with specific answers, and alternative and/or innovative solutions explored (e.g. mobile schools, distance education). This requires the leadership of the GoK and the long-term commitment by partners. To support such possible schemes WFP should be prepared to adopt a more flexible approach, perhaps with take-home rations instead of systematically encouraging the establishment of WFP-sponsored school canteens.

Effectiveness (Outcome Level)

223. The intended outcome of the regular school feeding component of the CP as outlined in the programme document is “to contribute to the realization of the right of all children, especially girls, to education and knowledge through improved learning at pre-primary and primary schools.” The outcome indicators chosen to reflect achievement of this outcome were (i) a 5% increase in completion rates of all students, particularly girls and slum children, and (ii) retention in class (attendance records) for girls and boys.

224. The achievements of the three immediate objectives of the CP Basic Activity 1 are in line with one major conclusion of the previous mid-term evaluation. The Team confirms that "there is little doubt that the school feeding activity has enabled hundreds of thousands of young Kenyans from extremely poor households in the ASAL areas of Kenya and in selected slum

\(^{23}\) See inter alia "Education for Nomads in Eastern Africa: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda", a study undertaken with the support of the International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP/UNESCO), the International Institute for Capacity Building in Africa (IICBA/UNESCO), and UNICEF with the financial support of the African Development Bank (ADB).
areas of Nairobi to receive some or all of a primary education and to benefit from improved nutritional intake”.

225. It is difficult to rely on quantitative indicators to assess the correlation between food aid and an improved capacity to concentrate and learn among boys and girls in WFP-assisted schools. Appraisal of outcome in this area is based upon the anecdotal perceptions of teachers, who almost always claim to have observed a positive change in the pupils’ attentiveness in class and pupils’ cognitive and learning abilities.

226. The Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP) indicates that it is not uncommon for children in the ASAL to only receive one meal a day. Many children go to school without eating anything in the morning. This is one justification of WFP food aid as it has been established that in many contexts poor nutritional status increases the likelihood of poorer performance at school. However, during focus group meetings, many parents informed the Team that they no longer give lunch to their children when they go to school as the meal provided at school relieves short-term hunger. Therefore the school meal is potentially replacing the home meal, rather than complementing the food eaten at the household.

227. There is a general consensus that the regular SFP has been running without an in-depth revision for too long in Kenya (more than 25 years). As mentioned above, the programme has grown from 280,000 school children to the current level of 1.1 million, while a realistic exit strategy is as elusive as ever. In some cases it is addressing the most vulnerable populations, in others not.

Effectiveness (Output Level)

228. Considering the initial planned number of beneficiaries, the CP document indicated that WFP would supply 209,987 MT of food over the five-year period in the form of cereals, pulses, and vegetable oil. Thus, an annual average of 41,997.4 MT of food would be made available, representing 82 percent of the total amount of food required for the Country Programme.

229. The annual average quantity of food effectively delivered during the three first years of implementation of the activity has been of some 31,026 MT i.e. less than the annual average of food indicated for 1 million beneficiaries in the CP document and CPAP. The quantity of food delivered during that period represents an annual average of 72.6% of the planned distribution. According to WFP CO, the difference stems mainly from the difficulties faced by MOE in contracting transporters, which delayed deliveries in schools.

230. Output 1.1 of the regular school feeding component is “increased enrolment, reduced drop out and stabilized attendance at assisted pre-primary and primary schools”. The indicators selected to measure achievement of this output were (i) percentage increase in enrolment; (ii) percentage reduction in drop out, and (iii) percentage increase in attendance of participating boys and girls.

231. According to the CP Document, an annual average of 1 million pre-primary and primary school students (500,000 girls and 500,000 boys) at 3,800 schools would benefit from school feeding. The Evaluation Team noted that during the three first years of implementation (2004-2006) the annual average of students assisted under the school feeding activity has increased to

25 The ration per child per day is 150 g of maize, 40 g of pulses and 5 g of vegetable oil per child.
1,146,024 (48.5% of girls) in an average of 3,769 pre-primary and primary schools (3,717 in 2006).

232. Data from the assessment report prepared in 2007 by WFP indicate that in most districts where SFP is implemented there has been a general increase in both Gross Enrolment and Net Enrolment Rates (GER & NER). It is however difficult to attribute this improvement to SFP alone because of both the effect of the national Free Primary Education (FPE) policy being implemented26 alongside SFP, and the impact of drought on nomadic populations.

233. Until now data collected on education indicators (mainly students' enrolment and attendance) have not led to any in-depth analysis and/or impact assessment by either WFP or the MOE. The March 2007 assessment report for the regular SFP27 presents raw data that have not yet been conclusively analysed. No comparative study between samples of supported and non-supported schools has been conducted by MOE or WFP.

234. The increased GER in provinces such as North Eastern, which have risen from averages of 19.7% in 2003 to 28% in 2005, and NER from 21.6% to 23.6%, are still low by national standards of GER – 107.2% and NER of 83.2%. Even so, there is a general agreement that if the SFP were to be suddenly withdrawn, this trend would be reversed. As stated by the previous mid-term evaluation “the best indicator of the influence of the feeding programme on enrolment, stable attendance and drop-out rates seems to be the relationship between attendance rates and the cessation of feeding”.

235. Before the commencement of the IP-funded project, WFP implemented a baseline study covering 30 schools and 900 households. This exercise was followed by an impact assessment in 2005 and by a follow-up survey in 200728. According to this later assessment, one major outcome has been a steady increasing enrolment since the beginning of the programme although, due to a lack of spaces in the schools, by 2005 the enrolment has stabilized. Nevertheless, in 2007 90% of school age children are enrolled in school and regular attendance is very high in supported-schools from the covered areas.

236. Output 1.2 of the regular school feeding component is “Enhanced community and parent participation in education to undertake improvement of school facilities and initiate and initiate development enterprises to sustain the school feeding programme”. The indicators for this output were identified as (i) type of school improvements undertaken, and (ii) number of enterprises initiated and functional.

237. The CP document stated that WFP would support communities in their efforts to assume increasing responsibilities for school feeding activities. This will be done in partnership with Community-based Organizations (CBOs), NGOs and other development partners, through implementation of income-generating activities and rehabilitation of school facilities.

238. An annual average of 10,991 participants in Food for Asset (FFA) activities supporting schools benefited from food aid.

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26 The Government of Kenya introduced free primary education (FPE) in January 2003, which saw the national enrolment increase from 5.4 to 7.5 million children.


239. Output 1.3 of WFP’s regular school feeding activity is “contribute to the reduction of worm infections in school-age children and ultimately improve the children’s health, learning capacity and growth”\(^{29}\). The output indicator identified is (i) percent reduction in worm infestation in school age children.

240. To complement the SFP activities and in order to reduce the prevalence of intestinal parasitic infections among school children, a de-worming component is being carried out by the SFP Unit in close cooperation with the ministry of Health (MOH) in Garissa, Mbeere, Mwingi, and Ijara districts.

241. The Team noted some inconsistencies between the number of targeted children, according to various sources, and the number of children actually benefiting from de-worming treatment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data source</th>
<th>Number of targeted children (Annually)</th>
<th>Number of children who received de-worming treatment at least once</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CP document</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPAP</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP Standard Project Report 2006</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>165,504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP Standard Project Report 2005</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>220,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFP Unit (MOE)</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

242. The Team was not able to decide which are the more reliable figures. One assumption could be that WFP CO refers to WFP-assisted schools only while the MOE totals all children who received de-worming treatment, whether they are in WFP-assisted schools or not. Fluctuation in the number of targeted beneficiaries is a consequence of the absence of a formal Activity Summary. This imprecision limits the possibility of assessment by the Evaluation Team. If findings are based on the CP document, the de-worming exercise has not achieved its targeted objective, but if it is based on the CPAP or the WFP SPRs, it is a success.

243. Output 1.4 is “Outreach to under-5 malnourished children through nutritional support at Early Childhood Development Centres supported by UNICEF”. The output indicator is “number of children attending the centres.”

244. It is unlikely that the objective of providing nutritional support to malnourished children under 5 in Early Childhood Development Centres will be met. It appears that the planned provision of Corn-Soya Blend (CSB) as a mid-morning drink in SFP supported-schools is not being implemented except in a few districts covered by UNICEF.

245. An annual average of 264,943 children under 5 (51.1% girls) received a nutritional support from WFP. It is unclear what proportion of these children is enrolled at primary schools or at Early Childhood Development Centres supported by UNICEF.

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\(^{29}\) WFP/EB.3/2003/7/2, p. 8
Efficiency

Planning and Implementation

246. No baseline survey was carried out at the commencement of the SFP within the framework of the current CP, except in schools supported in the unplanned settlements of Nairobi. According to the CP document, appraisals should have been carried out for each CP activity in order to: assess its technical, social, economic and logistical feasibility; ensure coherence, sustainability and linkages among the activities; and prepare the activity summaries. Detailed operational plans should have been prepared and negotiated with the Government of Kenya, partner UN agencies, NGOs and other partners. The Team noted that these appraisals have not been conducted and that no activity summaries as well as detailed operational plans for each CP Basic Activity have been prepared. Instead, an overall Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP) for the period 2004-2008 was developed and signed by WFP and the Ministry of Finance (05 February 2004).

247. Two years separated the approval of the CPAP and the issue of a draft School Feeding Handbook intended to provide detailed guidelines to carry out the implementation strategy. The Team noted that this draft SF Handbook had not been finalized or circulated to the field. It was also noted that the draft handbook includes important changes compared to the document formally approved by WFP.

248. The long-term and immediate programme objectives articulated in the SH Handbook replicate those of the previous CP for the period 1999-2003. In particular, the SF Handbook includes five immediate objectives instead of the three stated in the current CP document. The same information appears in a brief presented to the Evaluation Team by the School Feeding Programme (SFP) Unit in the Ministry of Education. This lack of coherence in the various logical frameworks associated with planning documents is illustrated in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CP document</th>
<th>CPAP</th>
<th>SF Handbook</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Long-term objective</strong></td>
<td>Contribute to the realization of the right of all children, especially girls, to education and knowledge through improved learning at pre-primary and primary schools.</td>
<td>Contribute to the realization of the right of all children, especially girls, to education and knowledge through improved learning at pre-primary and primary schools.</td>
<td>Promote Universal Primary Education of socio-economically disadvantaged and nutritionally vulnerable children, especially girls, in pre-primary and primary schools in targeted ASAL districts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Immediate objectives</strong></td>
<td>Contribute to the improvement of school enrolment, retention and learning capacity, with special attention to girls, orphans and other vulnerable children; Promote equity of access to cost-effective quality nutrition as close to schoolchildren as possible;</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>Increase enrolment, prevent drop-out and stabilize attendance at assisted pre-primary and primary schools; Improve the attention span and ultimately the learning capacity of pupils by short-term hunger; Provide a significant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CP document</th>
<th>CPAP</th>
<th>SF Handbook</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contribute to the reduction of worm infection in school-age children and ultimately improve the children’s health, learning capacity and growth</td>
<td></td>
<td>contribution to the nutrition intakes of pre-primary and primary school children; Improve school facilities (water supply, classrooms, women teachers’ houses, school based agro-forestry; Assist school committees and communities in the identification and development of enterprises to sustain SFP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Outcomes**

- School enrolment and attendance are increased, and learning achievements are improved.
- Drop-out rates, especially among girls and orphans, are reduced.
- Participation of communities and families in school feeding and education in general is increased.

**Beneficiaries (average per year)**

- 1 million pre-primary and primary school students at 3,800 schools.
- 500 primary schools to undertake the improvement of facilities and SF sustainability initiatives.
- 300,000 children dewormed.
- Malnourished children under 5 at early childhood development centres supported by UNICEF.

**Targeting**

- N.A.
- Subject to future appraisal and preparation of a specific Activity Summary.

- 1 million pre-primary and primary school children at 3,800 schools in the ASAL and Nairobi slums.
- 300 primary schools for improved facilities including latrines for girls and women teachers’ houses.
- 100,000 children dewormed.
- Malnourished children under 5 at early childhood development centres supported by UNICEF.

- 10 arid districts and 19 semi-arid districts (list of districts provided).

- All public primary and pre-primary schools in the arid districts;
- Public primary and pre-primary schools in some selected pockets of extreme poverty characterized by severe food insecurity and low enrolment ration in the semi-arid districts (selection based on the VAM reports).

- The programme targets socio-economically disadvantaged and nutritionally vulnerable children, especially girls, in pre-primary and primary schools (no quantitative data).
- (Other aspects in a specific section covering school health, nutrition and hygiene education)
249. It could be said that the above differences between the three documents are not of fundamental importance, as the main thrust of the strategic long-term goals remains largely unaltered from one CP to the other – which is in line with the Country Strategy Outline. On the other hand, this discrepancy is important because the SF Handbook has been designed to provide guidance on how to manage the SFP. Indeed, this document is intended for District Education Officers and School Feeding Officers, and can be used as a resource for training members of school management committees (SMC), parents and teachers.

250. During field visits the Team observed weakness of information flow amongst DEOs, Head teachers and some SMCs, in addition to a high staff turnover and appointment of new DEOs, resulting in widespread vagueness or mix-up regarding CP Basic Activity 1 objectives, duration, and expected education outcomes. This is a consequence of a school-feeding programme that has been running for more than 25 years – a crucial issue that is discussed in another section of this report.

251. The findings of the Mid-Term Evaluation of the previous CP regarding the implementation processes (as well as many other observations about the school feeding activity as a whole) are still valid.

Coordination

252. The Ministry of Education (MOE) is the key implementing partner for CP Act 1. The School Feeding Programme (SFP) Unit, which was established by MOE under previous phases of SFP, continued to manage the Activity under the CP 10264.0. The staff assigned to the Unit includes a Senior Assistant Director of Education, an Assistant Director of Education, two Education Officers (of whom one is on study leave) and clerical Officers and secretaries. In addition, one officer is attached to the SFP Unit for coordinating School Health and Nutrition activities, which is a critical aspect of the school feeding programme. District Education Officers (DEOs), Area Education Officers (AEOs) and Zonal Inspectors continue to coordinate school feeding activities at decentralized levels.

253. In accordance with the CPAP, the SFP Unit ensures the day-to-day management and implementation of school feeding activities. This includes facilitating and coordinating the receipt and dispatch of food from the port of Mombassa or other inland warehouses to the Extended Delivery Points (EDP) at district level, and then to the Final Delivery Points (FDPs) i.e. schools. Based on school enrolment data the SFP Unit allocates food commodities on a school-term basis and recommends allotments of GoK funds to the DEOs to meet project implementation needs for the transportation, storage and handling of commodities etc. The MOE has established a dedicated Joint Logistics Unit to manage the SFP activity with WFP assistance.

254. In conjunction with WFP, the MOE coordinates food distribution and carries out monitoring and reporting of the school feeding programme in ASAL areas. WFP manages the logistics to 11 districts and the MOE to the remaining districts. The IPF funded project is implemented in partnership with an NGO (Feed the Children), while the regular SF programme in Nairobi slums is implemented by the City Education Department of the Nairobi City Council.

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255. There is close and effective cooperation between the staff of the MOE and the WFP CO in the implementation of the SFP. Apart from cooperation on day-to-day logistics, capacity building of field officers, head teachers and SMC members is also undertaken jointly. WFP takes part in meetings organized by the Government to coordinate partners in support of the national education sector. School feeding has been integrated within the donor supported Kenya Education Sector Support Programme (KESSP) and is part of the prioritized activities of the Education Sector Plan.

256. While the GoK commitment to regular school feeding activities is very high, some of the obligations specified in the CPAP as part of the government’s contribution to the CP have not been fulfilled. In particular the Country Programme Advisory Committee (CPAC), which was to be responsible for general oversight of the CP and chaired by the External Resources Department of the Ministry of Finance, does not appear to exist. Likewise the Activity Steering Committee, chaired by MOE, which was expected to coordinate national level partners has also not been established. In effect there is weak co-ordination of key partners such as UN agencies, line ministries such as the ministries of Agriculture, Water, Health and Office of the President.

257. The Evaluation Team noted that the current SFP Unit staffing does not meet the obligations agreed to by Government as set out in the CPAP\(^35\). The current staff is overstretched and challenged by the complex transfer of thousands of tons of food aid, the timely submission of accurate Monthly Stock Movement Reports, and the necessary monitoring of the programme. MOE has attributed the staff shortage to the general civil service recruitment embargo that has been in force since 1997. This has in fact affected every section of the ministry and is not unique to the SFP Unit. It also leads to high staff turnover reported in the field as the ministry tries to balance the assignments of available staff.

258. According to the CP and CPAP documents,\(^36\) coordination at national level would be through an Activity Steering Committee, chaired by MOE and comprising WFP partner UN agencies, Ministry of Health (MOH) and the Office of the President. The Team noted that this body has never been established.

Community Ownership

259. One of the guiding principles for SFP implementation is participatory development. School Management Committees (SMC) have the role of creating an enabling environment for school food in terms of provision of school kitchens, storage, water, firewood, cooking pots and utensils. It is also their responsibility to ensure food is cooked. In addition, SMCs monitor the governance and accountability aspects of school food.

260. The law governing education in Kenya (Education Act) requires that a 13 member SMC, one third of whom must be women, govern every primary school. Every primary school visited by the Team had an SMC. However, the effectiveness of the SMC is only as good as the literacy levels of its members and each committee’s built-in capacities. The Team noted that literacy levels of SMC members in many schools visited limited their ability to understand their responsibilities for managing food aid. Literacy levels of SMCs, especially in the districts of North Eastern Province, were as low as 12.7 \(^37\). Members were unable to physically count the food containers required and delivered in school or calculate the total quantity of rations issued


\(^36\) WFP/EB.3/2003/7/2, p. 8, and CPAP, § 53, p 15.

\(^37\) 2006 Preliminary National Literacy Survey Report.
daily. In most cases, parents leave management of school food to the head teachers and do not demand periodic reports. However, functional literacy enabled some illiterate parents to actually know the available stock at any one time.

261. There are varying degrees of success in community participation in the provision of cooking facilities. Many parents attempt to construct a kitchen even if it is a temporary makeshift structure. Others send their children with a jerrican of water and firewood for cooking which may or may not be sufficient for cooking needs in the school. Majority of parents contribute (although irregularly) into payment of the school cook. The level and consistency of contributions depends on the level of community destitution.

262. When some 60% of the Kenyan population live on less than a dollar per day, it is impossible for many parents in ASAL to meet their obligations for adequately managing the SFP. It is, therefore, necessary to conduct a realistic analysis of what capacities for meeting SMC obligations exist in different communities. It is, for instance unrealistic to expect parents to provide water to cook lunch when there are acute shortages of water. Collaboration with line ministries and civil societies within the localities can be a viable partnership in assisting communities to meet non-food contributions.

Rations/ Pipeline

263. The daily ration should be composed of 150 g of maize, 40 g of pulses, and 5 g of vegetable oil per child, with a total dietary contribution that is equivalent to 700 kcal and 23 g of protein per student per day. The food would be served in the form of a mid-morning drink and a lunch consisting of maize and beans.

264. The Team noticed some inconsistency between the composition of the food basket indicated in the CP document and CPAP (cereals, pulses and vegetable oil) and the intended form under which food should be served at school, including a mid-morning drink and hot lunch. It appears that Corn-Soya Blend (CSB) has been added to the food basket but in a limited quantity, so that most SFP supported-schools did not receive the CSB. In fact, the provision of CSB to even the ECDCs (supported by UNICEF) has not been consistent despite the high level of appropriateness of CSB for this age group. On the other hand, each child in the IP-funded project in Nairobi unplanned settlements receives a mid-morning snack of hot porridge made of CSB, and a hot lunch.

Provision of non-food inputs

265. Lack of technical involvement of key ministries such as Agriculture and Livestock Development, and key UN partners such as FAO, is a major weakness in the CP FFW component. This should have been built in during the approval at zonal level stage and the training of the MOE implementers. Technical support is necessary for advice on viability of activities and on the environmental impact of the projects. While the Team did not see any school garden in the schools visited, some head teachers pointed out that no tools were provided to support this activity.

266. It was revealed that, until now, parents, SMCs and school administrations are expected to identify the FFW project to be implemented in the school and to develop their proposals for the consideration of the MOE. Some of the projects that have been implemented include: crop farming, horticulture, bee keeping, livestock multiplication, milk production, and tree nurseries. The projects are found in Samburu, Marsabit, Baringo, Kajiado and Kwale districts. An internal
WFP evaluation found varying degrees of the success in these. The most successful were those related to woodlots and dairy. Almost all the projects lacked technical support and were biased towards intensive labour support. There was little monitoring and reporting on these activities.

Monitoring

267. Monitoring and timely data collection in the arid and semi-arid districts is difficult because of distances and poor roads as well as the recent emergencies and insecurity situation. The districts where WFP operates are remote and very often difficult to access particularly during the rainy seasons. Security in the pastoral districts is volatile, requiring police escort for UN staff under MOSS requirements. In addition to staff shortages in the MOE, only 4 development field monitors have been recently appointed (in October 2006) by WFP to specifically monitor the implementation of the CP Act 1.

268. Monitoring is jointly undertaken by WFP and MOE which have developed monitoring tools and organized capacity-building training on the use of monitoring and reporting forms. Reporting forms have been designed to capture information at school level (SFP 6), summarize information collected at zone level (SFP 7) and then compile data at district level (SFP 8). The SFP Unit has also developed a monitoring checklist. These monitoring tools are mainly intended for operational purposes. They capture information on district, school, food stocks, storage status, school enrolment trends, logistical issues and SMC support. They provide information to control food distribution. On the other hand, the Team noted that data on the contribution of parents, in cash or in kind, are not systematically collected. Likewise, no information is captured about the capacity level, or felt needs for capacity upgrading of programme managers at district and school levels.

269. In 2006 the MOE submitted a proposal to DFID to undertake a study on the impact of the school feeding programme. This proposal has been approved, Terms of Reference formulated, and a team of local and international personnel assembled to undertake the task. The Team was informed that the DFID study was reduced to a situational analysis, based mainly on data collected by WFP, but no explanation was provided as to why the situation analysis could not have been carried out by the KCO. This is clear evidence of weakness of both WFP and MOE in the M&E area and of the need for capacity building for the staff of both. This study should help to clarify the difference between monitoring operations in the field and assessing progress and impact of the SFP. The ongoing establishment of an Education Monitoring and Information System (EMIS) within the MOE offers a good opportunity for integrating data on school feeding in the national education statistics system in order to assess its impact without recourse to external support.

Targeting

270. In the absence of a detailed Activity Summary, some crucial indicators are not available, particularly about geographical coverage and criteria for the selection of assisted-schools. While the CPAP indicates that 3,800 schools will receive assistance in 10 arid districts and 19 semi-arid districts and provides a list of the targeted districts, neither the CP document nor the CPAP provides information about the way the above geographical areas and districts have been selected. Nor is it known which criteria a school has to meet in order to be eligible to WFP food aid. This information is only available in the draft SF Handbook that has not yet been circulated, two years after the launching of the operations.
271. The CP document was very vague concerning the geographical coverage of CP basic activities. The only indication was that it had to be based on regular vulnerability assessments undertaken by WFP’s vulnerability analysis and mapping (VAM) unit, in collaboration with implementing partners. Afterwards the CPAP indicated that this collaboration had to be extended to the Kenya Food Security Coordination System and provided a precise list of districts for implementation: 10 arid districts (Garissa, Ijara, Isiolo, Mandera, Marsabit, Moyale, Samburu, Tana River, Turkana and Wajir) and 19 semi-arid districts (Baringo, Koibatek, Kajiado, Laikipia, Mbeere, Narok, Kilifi, Wwingi, Kwale, Lamu, Kitui, Tharak, Machakos, Makueni, Nyeri, Keiyo, Marakwet, Taita Taverta and West Pokot).

272. Equally confusing, districts sharing the same ecological zones, and therefore having the same food security challenges, are not consistently targeted. Some schools have been included and some have been left out. Clearly both the exclusion and inclusion rate needs to be examined and targeting efficiency improved to ensure the school feeding programs are going to the appropriate schools.

273. The Team noted that the geographical targeting of schools puts a great emphasis on food insecurity. Considering that educational achievement is an important goal of any school feeding activity, criteria for selection for participation in WFP school feeding activities should include education indicators (eg. GER, NER, drop-out rates) as well as food security indicators. In 2005 14 districts out of the 29 covered by WFP regular school feeding activities had a net enrolment rate (NER) above the national average. This should have led to a review of the districts included in the program, but it did not.

274. The Team was very concerned that there is no continuously active review, either by WFP or the MOE, of the schools benefiting from WFP assistance. In fact the SFP coverage has not significantly changed since the beginning of the programme. In order to be in accordance with findings from the last updated VAM survey and with the most recent data from the department in charge of statistics within the MOE, the geographical targeting should have been revised and updated. For example, the inclusion of Nyeri district is questionable as it is not food-insecure and it was found to have a school net enrolment rate above the national average in 2005.

275. Improvements need to be made to impact both inclusion and exclusion rates. This can only be done through a clear articulation of the criteria for school participation in the school feeding programme. Lessons learned from other countries could be duplicated in Kenya to improve the accuracy of the targeting. Lists of assisted schools will usually evolve over time, as enrolment and other food security aspects change. The schools must be monitored and the lists changed based on the criteria, the condition of the school and a continuous analysis of evolving education indicators.

Gender

276. The CP document places emphasis on gender issues. However, no special assistance for girls has been included to balance a possible gender gap (e.g. added take home ration specifically targeted at girls). There is a general agreement that this is not justified\(^{38}\). Data from the WFP assessment report indicate that although more boys are enrolling in schools under CP Activity 1, more girls do attend school in many districts. There is an assumption that this trend is a result of advocacy campaigns by various education stakeholders. WFP supports low cost

\(^{38}\) See the Mid-term Evaluation report, p. 33.
boarding schools, to encourage girls especially those in areas where distances and other cultural aspects discourage girls from attending schools. The CO has carried out sensitisation training on the importance of girl-child education.

Exit Strategy

277. The team noted a consensus of concern among stakeholders at the lack of an exit strategy in WFP’s SFP activities. The team concurs there is reason for concern around achieving a smooth exit strategy when WFP assistance to the SFP ends.

Coherence

Coherence with GoK

278. The evaluation team found WFP’s School Feeding Programme (SFP) in Kenya to be fully integrated into the MOE and donor-supported Kenya Education Sector Support Programme (KESSP) developed in 2005, which is one of the 23 Investment Programmes (IP) to be implemented during the 2005-2010 Plan period. The WFP country programme contributes to the GoK’s objective to achieve universal primary education (UPE) by promoting education through school feeding. However, the Evaluation Team concluded that the SFP has not effectively linked education with health and nutrition. Only one staff member from the SFP Unit in MOE is in charge of health and nutrition in liaison with the Ministry of Health, and the Nutrition Unit of the MOH has little or no input in the SFP activities.

Coherence with Activities of NGO Partners

279. The Team noted that at all levels partnership with other educational-oriented agencies is very weak, if not completely absent. It has been pointed out that the Activity Steering Committee that should have provided the national level partnerships of WFP, sister UN Agencies, MOH and Office of the President (OP) has not been established. WFP and UNICEF have signed an MOU in August 2003 and developed a joint work plan, but it has not yet been implemented. The Team learned that each agency is pursuing its mandate without the necessary complementarities that could create maximum impact. In some districts, this parallel focus has resulted in the duplication of activities. The absence of collaboration with UNFPA has not enabled activities regarding awareness about HIV/AIDS and reproductive health in schools. Likewise, no co-operation has been established with WHO. Lack of partnerships with FAO and such ministries as Water and Agriculture has denied the SFP the necessary technical support especially in the agricultural based sustainability activities. Although there is a widespread agreement that food aid should be part of a so-called "Essential Package" delivered in school, at grassroots level the SFP is implemented in a vacuum, without the complementary inputs that would reinforce its impact.

280. As the KCO pointed out to the Team in most cases, the different geographical focus of the other agencies limit the extent to which joint programmes can be implemented, but this is also an indication of weak overall coordination and programme design.

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Internal Coherence

281. WFP’s Assistance to Basic Education component in Kenya conforms to WFP’s strategic objective 4: ‘support access to education and reduce gender disparity in access to education and skill training’ set out in the Strategic Plan 2006-2009\textsuperscript{40}. Its long-term objective addresses Outcome 1 of the 2004-2008 United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) that aims at increasing access to and use of basic social services with particular attention to marginalized and vulnerable populations.

282. However, the Evaluation Team noted an internal lack of synergy between various activities, objectives and outcomes of the Basic education component. This synergy could yet be the basis of the CP. The school canteen can be an entry point from which community development activities could be derived. These could be based on successful initiatives in other countries such as Côte d’Ivoire.

283. The team concluded that the WFP Development Unit and the EMOP Unit have not made a joint effort to design the ESFP, monitor its implementation and assess its short- and medium-term impact within the framework of a coherent and global school feeding programme. Likewise, the School Feeding Unit within MOE has not been closely associated to the ESFP. The Unit’s main contribution consists of providing lists of schools in the divisions identified by the KFSSG as vulnerable and food-insecure. Moreover, no baseline survey was undertaken to assess whether the targeted schools had the capacity to accommodate school feeding, either under the regular SFP or the ESFP.

284. Recommendation: In recognition of the incompleteness of food assistance as stand-alone support to education, strong partnerships must be established now to ensure that interventions work towards a sustainable phase out/exit strategy.

Impact (Goal Level)

285. The impact of WFP assistance is always difficult to measure. The report gives detailed analysis of the various impact studies that have been undertaken, but recognizes that there is little concrete proof about the impact of either the SFP on nutrition and academic performance or of the EMOP on nutrition. The impact of SFP on the academic standards of schools has not been measured, nor have attendance levels of recipient schools been compared with those at non-recipient schools in the same districts. The assumed positive impact of the SFP on performance, attendance and nutrition of some of the poorest school children in Africa, therefore, has to be based on the anecdotal testimony of teachers, parents and the children themselves. Res ipsa loquitur: the thing speaks for itself.

286. It is difficult to rely on quantitative indicators to assess the correlation between food aid and an improved capacity to concentrate and learn among boys and girls in WFP-assisted schools. Appraisal of outcome in this area is based upon the anecdotal perceptions of teachers, who almost always claim to have observed a positive change in the pupils’ attentiveness in class and pupils’ cognitive and learning abilities.

287. The Team noticed that due to limitations mentioned elsewhere in the report the SFP Unit in MOE and the Development Unit in WFP have not demonstrated impact of the CP Activity 1 with regard to its main long-term and immediate objectives. The Evaluation Team feels that

\textsuperscript{40} WFP/EB.A/2005/5-A/Rev.1
there is still a need to introduce the SFP implementing staff to the principles of a Results-Based Management (RBM) that provides an immediate and dynamic overview of achievements.

**Sustainability**

288. After over 25 years old, Kenya’s is one of the longest-running WFP school feeding activities in the world. The current CP is the fifth in this succession covering the period 2004-2008. However, since its inception there has been little change in strategy, selection criteria or in GoK or community measures to make it sustainable when WFP assistance ends. While the GoK recognizes the importance of the SFP, apart from occasional in-kind contributions and sharing the LTSH costs, the government has not yet made any financial commitment or contingency plan to establish a national SFP or even to replace WFP in the ASAL. If the WFP support for the SFP were to be suddenly withdrawn it is most unlikely that either the GoK or the communities could be in a position to realistically take over either the financial or the logistic responsibilities.

289. Interventions in ASAL areas are implemented in very difficult conditions. Sustainability in this environment is extremely difficult to achieve. The poverty, socio-economic and climatic environment presents serious challenges to basic education, something that is clear from NER levels (in 2005, NER in Wajir district was 16.4, in Garissa 20.2, in Ijara 20.2, in Mandera 36.1). It is unlikely that communities in these areas can take over the SFP and therefore stabilize enrolments, attendance and enhance completion rates in the near future. Such communities are chronically vulnerable and may require sustained support for much longer. In addition, due to high adult illiteracy rates in areas where the programme is implemented, many parents, even among SMC members do not have the appropriate capacity to effectively take part into the management of the programme.

290. School feeding phase-out studies have revealed the importance of defining donor phase-out strategies from inception, as well as emphasising the role of the community and Parents’ and Teachers’ Associations (PTAs). Successful school feeding programmes require good local management, with both government support and community ownership.

291. From interviews with implementing staff and discussions with parents during field visits in several districts, the Team observed that government, communities and households perceive the long-standing SFP to be an entitlement. Many parents – many of whom have themselves been beneficiaries of previous SFP phases – feel that school feeding is a public good that is due to their children and that it will last forever. As a result, the commitment from communities to manage SF activities and maintain them with their own resources is not as high as it could be.

292. However, during focus group meetings the Team observed that many SMC members and parents in general are ready to commit themselves to activities that could efficiently contribute to the sustainability of the school feeding. These focus group discussions gave the Team a strong indication of the willingness of many SMCs to be more committed to school feeding, and of future community participation and ownership. Contributions could be in the form of fields that could be cultivated to provide part of the necessary food for the canteen, livestock-dairy farming, goat keeping, tree planting, bee keeping, or building of necessary facilities to manage the programme.

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293. Most of these projects require some assistance that could be supported with food for assets (FFA) or food for work (FFW). Provision was made in the CPAP for FFW as a sub-component of CP Activity 1 with an annual average of 45,000 beneficiaries that should receive monthly family rations of maize (90 kg) and beans (15 kg). The Team noted that the actual implementation of this aspect has been very limited. Only 7,806 adults participated in FFW activities in 2004 and 14,175 in 2005. WFP and MOE have developed guidelines for the implementation of such activities, but these were only circulated in April 2007.

School Gardens

294. School gardens are common features of the FFW activities. They aim to provide significant supplement to the regular diet and increase the palatability of the meals and their micronutrient content. School gardens are a step towards creating small-scale income generating activities and food sustainability in the community. The activity also has the potential to enhance skills training and agricultural techniques of school children.

295. Despite their limitations, school gardens should be encouraged in agro-farming and semi-pastoral environments. However they should be supported with technical advice and regular monitoring. An effective extension service such as the FAO farmer field schools and the junior farmer field schools should be instituted. For arid districts characterized by acute water shortages but adequate pasture, more suitable activities such as bee keeping and limited livestock keeping should be experimented with. They could be linked with communities that support school feeding from livelihood zones based on herding livestock. Water pans should be a vital component for livestock-related projects. There is no apparent reason why schools along the river Tana in Garissa district could not have school gardens under irrigation; this can only be undertaken successfully with the guidance of water engineers and the monitoring of National Environment Management (NEMA) officers.

Community Participation

296. While government support is critical for providing institutional support to the activity, a commitment from the community, in particular from parents, is also essential. School feeding programmes that incorporate some form of parental or community contribution, whether cash payments or in kind (through donated food or labour), tend to be the strongest programmes post-WFP assistance. Programmes that build in this component from the beginning, and consistently maintain it, have the most chance for success. This strategy should be encouraged in Kenya. An ambitious school feeding programme can be developed through government collaboration with WFP. One suggestion could be to insist that all communities contribute some of the food for the school feeding programmes whilst WFP and the government provide other inputs. This strategy has been successfully implemented in other countries.

297. The Team noticed that new initiatives have been envisaged in the context of Kenya notably the School Meals Programme Linked to Local Food Production (SMP) jointly prepared

42 Food for Work (FFW) Guidelines for the implementation of school feeding infrastructure and sustainability project, January 2007.
43 For example in Côte d'Ivoire through the Programme intégré de pérennisation des cantines scolaires (PIP/CS) supported by UNDP, WFP and Japan. In that particular case, diverse types of school canteens are organised: school canteens where food is 100 percent provided by WFP; school canteens were food is 100 percent provided by government; school canteens where food is provided by WFP and/or government with additional input from the community. The plan is to have a progressive hand over from WFP to government and/or communities. The PIP/CS project helps women groups to progressively (four-year plan) take over the provision of food (rice) for the school canteen.
by MOE and the Ministry of Agriculture in partnership with WFP, FAO and MDG Centre. This programme is intended to be a multi-stakeholder collaborative effort. It addresses the dual objectives of increasing national food production through expanding the demand base as well as helping ensure that Kenyan children grow up healthily with real opportunities to learn. This programme proposal is in line with the Home-grown School Feeding and Health Programme (HGSFHP) jointly launched by NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa’s Development), WFP and the Millennium Hunger Task Force (MHTF). This pilot programme is designed to link school-feeding to agricultural development through the purchase and use of locally and domestically produced food. NEPAD and WFP signed a Memorandum of Understanding to enhance cooperation on home-grown school feeding. Nine pilot countries: Kenya, Senegal, Mali, Ghana, Ethiopia, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria and Zambia, were selected to implement the novel programme. Uganda was later included as well. Such options and other possible alternative solutions to make school feeding programmes sustainable should be explored in the context of Kenya.

298. The Team believes that efforts from GoK are still needed with respect to creating stronger institutional arrangements and modalities for implementation. The foreseen and approved institutional structures need to be put in place as soon as possible in order to ensure clarity and better efficiency in execution of school feeding activities under the CP by all stakeholders.

299. Efforts are still required to enable full ownership by the government, with a view to reaching the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)\(^\text{44}\) and the Education for All (EFA) targets. MOE should take stronger leadership in school feeding activities in Kenya as a global programme, be it under regular SFP, ESFP in chronically food-insecure areas or possibly through a PRRO.

300. FP partnerships with sister UN agencies should facilitate the provision of the “Essential Package” of food aid, water, health, sanitation infrastructure, and strengthened community coping capacities. Another observation of the previous mid-term evaluation is still valid: "What is needed in order to further strengthen the school feeding activity over the longer term is the parallel development of community-focused development projects leading to growth of income-earning activities for very poor households”.

- **In the remaining months of the present CP, schools should be supported with quality hand-tools to create school gardens. Not only can these provide valuable school income, but school gardens can also be learning opportunities for pupils to understand horticulture and crop production. Children should be given specific responsibilities in nurturing the gardens. The monitoring checklist should be reviewed to include school garden activity instruments. School gardens and FFW activities should be extended during the next CP and be part of a possible PRRO following the EMOP. Successful school feeding programmes require good local management, with both Government support and community ownership.**

- **With the clearly identified need for hot lunches and a mid morning snack for many children, MOE could use lessons learned to develop a National School Feeding and Health policy. One option is to create a budget line that ensures regularly increasing government contributions to SFP possibly through the strategic food reserve.**

\(^{44}\) Notably to ensure that by 2015 all children, boys and girls alike, are able to complete a full cycle of good quality primary education.
In order to produce tangible results, this strategy requires a high level of collaboration between WFP and other partners involved in the education sector. Moreover, it needs GoK to play a strong leadership role in the implementation of the strategy at the country level. After 25 years of school feeding activities in the country, it is necessary to review successes and failures in order to lay the foundations for a future national policy on School Feeding, Health and Basic Education associated to the necessary institutional, financial and administrative arrangements.

B.2. Nutrition and Care of HIV/ADS-Affected People

The Kenya Country Programme operates five HIV/AIDS projects as part of Basic Activity 2. These include: the Transport Sector Initiative; the Academic Model for the Prevention and Treatment of HIV/AIDS (AMPATH); Busia District HIV/AIDS-Infected Persons Assistance Programme; the Junior Farmer Fields and Life Schools in Bondo District; and the Lea Toto Project for HIV-Positive Children in the Nairobi Slums. Four projects use WFP food aid to support vulnerable groups affected by HIV/AIDS, specifically those HIV-affected households with orphans, elderly caregivers or PLWHA currently in a treatment programme that are acutely food-insecure. In the transport project WFP uses ODOC funds to support the private transporters it contracts through HIV/AIDS awareness training.

Relevance

HIV/AIDS in Kenya is a priority concern. More than 1.1 million Kenyans are currently affected with HIV. In 22 districts more than 15% of the population is HIV positive, exacting an enormous toll on communities. Over 1.1 million children have been orphaned in Kenya, primarily due to HIV/AIDS; these children are often left with siblings or older caretakers who are unable to meet the basic needs of the children.

Many households that have household members with HIV/AIDS are also food insecure because either the primary income earner is ill or the cost of support and treatment of HIV/AID positive people overburdens subsistence-earning households. Food aid can both support the food needs of vulnerable household members (orphans, children under five, pregnant and lactating women) when the household is acutely food insecure, or food aid can directly support people living with HIV/AIDS by providing sufficient nutrition to allow them to take ARV treatment (which is extremely unpalatable on an empty stomach) and further, improves compliance with the rigorous treatment. Many people with HIV/AIDS in Kenya are malnourished due to reduced food intake, and this reduced intake is due to both availability (lack of food resources in the house) and utilization issues (increased food and nutrient needs of people living with HIV/AIDS). Even for people living with HIV/AIDS who are not on ARV treatment, sufficient food intake can greatly enhance the health status and can even improve their survival chances.

WFP food aid support to AMPATH, Busia, Junior Farmer Fields and Lea Toto offers a relevant contribution to each of these projects by supporting and protecting vulnerable individuals and households who are directly affected by food insecurity. The current provision of food aid is both supporting nutritional rehabilitation of those weakened and malnourished by HIV/AIDS and enabling households to undertake income generating activities and livelihood activities during a period of extreme stress and food insecurity. In the transport sector, the WFP funds and policy guidance is reducing workplace stigma and encouraging proactive workplace policies amongst an extremely high-risk group. WFP-Kenya involvement in the transport sector is very relevant in terms of reducing HIV/AIDS discrimination in all WFP activities, and by
including logistics and transport service-providers; WFP is supporting the Kenyan government’s own priority areas for reducing HIV/AIDS prevalence in the transport corridors.

**Effectiveness (Outcome Level)**

306. According to the official project document, Outcome No. 2 of the CP is to “improve the food security of HIV/AIDS-affected households.” The identified indicator of success is ‘five percent increase in the number of foster families adopting and caring for HIV/AIDS orphans’.

307. The evaluation team was able to visit several programmes and a food distribution that is supporting these communities. Interviews were held with community members, with beneficiaries and with staff of the organizations. The positive impact of the food can be seen in both the individual testimonies as well as through the multiple support-groups activities being undertaken by the HIV/AIDS-affected individuals. The impact of the WFP food is tremendous, and allows for some degree of recovery for both those on ARV treatment and those not on the treatment. Testimonies were heard from people who had been fully bedridden, but after receiving the food support, were now able to regain their livelihood activities and become productive. In some instances this was true even in the absence of complimentary ARV drug therapy.

308. The community support groups, which have been formed by HIV victims, have given empowerment to widows to resist being “inherited” by brothers-in-law and have created a culture of dignity and openness about this disease. The team was approached by representatives from other communities asking to be included in the project, but sadly the low level of donor resources makes further expansion of this project impossible as yet.

309. The ARV is very hard on the stomach and is likened to a “poison” if taken without food. The WFP food allows children to eat regular meals and improves drug compliance. The food also supports the family and allows children who might be expected to earn income for food to continue school.

310. The WFP food allowed children to eat regular meals and improves drug compliance. The food also supports the family and allowed children who otherwise would have been expected to leave or miss school to earn income for food to continue in school.

311. A survey was carried out by WFP in 2006 to assess WFP’s transport sector programme and identify key constraints. It showed a high level of compliance among transporters and more importantly a degree of ownership in the programme that is adding greatly to its success. All the transport companies the team interviewed reported that WFP’s vigorous introduction of HIV/AIDS awareness in the workplace for transport companies it contracts to move WFP commodities from Mombasa is being actively implemented and has been effective.

**Effectiveness (Output Level)**

312. Despite the demonstrably successful impact which WFP assistance through this project activity is having, it is seriously under-resourced by donors. Less than 40,000 (only one third) of the anticipated 112,460 beneficiaries have so far been reached.

313. The CP project document identified Output 2.1 as “increased participation of vulnerable households in asset-creation / food security activities,” as measured by (i) percentage increase in
vulnerable households cultivating fallow and under-utilized land, and (ii) percentage increase in vulnerable households utilising modern farming techniques to boost yields.

314. Of the intended 112,460 beneficiaries the CP envisaged that some 57,800 would participate in FFA/FFT activities.

315. The CP project document identified Output 2.2 as, “Improved / enhanced skills among communities, especially the orphaned youth, for sustainable livelihoods. The indicators selected for measurement of success were (i) number of orphaned youth attending vocational training centres; and (ii) the number of graduates getting employment / opening up small businesses.

316. Of the intended 112,460 beneficiaries the CP envisaged that some 8,440 teenage youth enrolled in community-based vocational institutions would be supported with on-site midday meals.

317. The CP project document identified Output 2.3 as, “Increased outreach by volunteer social workers and community health workers to improve the level of HIV/AIDS awareness, health and nutrition education, and home-based care for people living with AIDS.” Success in achieving this output was to be measured by: (i) number of participants covered by each category of training / awareness creation; (ii) percentage increase in participant coverage by volunteer social workers and community health workers, and (iii) percentage of beneficiaries adopting better nutrition practices.

318. Of the intended 112,460 beneficiaries the CP envisaged that some 11,520 severely sick HIV/AIDS-infected persons and malnourished children were to receive supplementary CSB in addition to the general ration, and 24,700 in 4,940 grandparent or child-headed households were to be targeted for free distribution.

319. The AMPATH programme is currently supporting approximately 30,000 beneficiaries represented by 3,000 patients on ARV treatment. Due to the high HIV/AIDS prevalence in the district, there continues to be a high demand to expand the programme, which is primarily constrained due to the availability of WFP food aid. The WFP food aid assistance is limited because of very poor funding and donor support for the HIV/AIDS activities in Kenya. The AMPATH project sites are expanding faster than WFP can provide food support.

320. According to WFP documents, In Busia District WFP has provided food support to over 27,000 people in 5,400 households affected by HIV/AIDS including orphans, vulnerable children, sick caregivers and the elderly caretakers. The support is directed through national/local government (Department of Social Services and District Social Development Officer) and community-based organizations (CCF, REEP and KORDP).

321. WFP’s intervention in the transport sector was not foreseen at the time of the CP design and approval and therefore it is not included in the official logframe. WFP’s activities in this area are designed to improve the food security of HIV/AIDS affected households (Outcome No. 2) by protecting the livelihoods of a particular group of people – transporters – whose activities on behalf of WFP place them at a higher risk of HIV/AIDS exposure.

322. The Lea Toto Programme in the Nairobi Slums offers food support to HIV-positive children on ARV treatment who do not have access to sufficient food. Currently the programme gives a household ration to 357 children in the four clinics, supporting a total of 1,700 beneficiaries. The programme is being expanded at the end of March 2007 to assist 900 children or approximately 4,200 beneficiaries.
**Efficiency**

**Implementation and Coordination**

323. This activity is implemented by the Ministry of Gender, Social Services and Culture. However, the Ministry has not received a financial budget line from the Treasury to meet its 50% share of the LTSH costs of WFP food and its District Social Welfare Officers have no budget to monitor the project activities in the communities where the project is operational. Consequently WFP has appointed a special monitor for this activity who works out of the Eldoret Sub-Office, almost 150 km from some of the project sites in Busia District.

**Targeting**

324. In the three food support programmes, criteria are an important issue. There need to be stated criteria of inclusion and exclusion into the programme that can then be discussed at the lead agency and community level to ensure appropriate participation. Because not all HIV/AIDS-affected households are vulnerable, dual targeting that can identify households that are both HIV/AIDS-affected and food-insecure is necessary. Current information indicates that while this is being done in Busia and the AMPATH project, the targeting in the Lea Toto Nairobi slums project needs additional streamlining.

325. The Busia and Lea Toto activities use CBTD, which requires effective monitoring and support to ensure that credible relief committees were selected and that the Lead Agencies are conforming to basic WFP policy standards for distribution. More monitoring and work with Lead Agencies is needed and improved distribution and post-distribution monitoring is essential. AMPATH uses direct allocation, which requires re-bagging of the commodities by the staff. This improves the entitlement issue but greatly adds to the time and expense of the distribution.

**Monitoring**

326. The Busia programme requires additional monitoring to ensure that the activities run efficiently. The team found examples of inaccurate scooping materials, unclear beneficiary criteria determination, and lack of knowledge around ration entitlement at the distribution point. The recent survey conducted by WFP found that 30% of beneficiaries were not receiving their proper entitlement, while an additional 7% did not know their entitlement.

**Resourcing**

327. The WFP-Kenya HIV/AIDS programme is very poorly resourced. It is almost fully reliant on funds from headquarters as it has not received any substantial donor support in-country. As was found in a recent Malawi study\(^{45}\), the lack of donor funding for the WFP HIV/AIDS programming could stem from both a lack of confidence that WFP is the appropriate agency to address HIV/AIDS and a lack of understanding about the real link between living with HIV and nutritional support. It is essential that WFP should give information to donors and other funding sources on the role that food aid can play in supporting HIV/AIDS-affected households. This information includes:\(^{46}\)

- There is emerging evidence that certain nutrients may halt or at least slow the progress of the disease;

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\(^{45}\) WFP Support to HIV/AIDS Needs, Malawi Study, Shoham
\(^{46}\) WFP Support to HIV/AIDS Needs, Malawi Study, Shoham
• Food aid may assist compliance with treatment (ARV, DOT) and participation in programmes (PMTCT);
• Food aid may be an important vehicle to allow acquisition of skills and community resources and livelihood initiatives;
• Adequate diet is essential for maximising the impact of ARV and having food greatly reduces the negative side-effects of ARV including stomach pains and burning.

328. The WFP-Kenya office should be commended on what it has been able to accomplish considering the low resource base. With minimal funding, WFP has undertaken ambitious and impressive programming. The staff working on HIV/AIDS often undertake HIV/AIDS activities on top of their regular programming. Their dedication should be commended. With additional funds the HIV/AIDS programme could expand coverage and support additional beneficiaries who are living in HIV/AIDS-affected households in HIV/AIDS-devastated communities.

329. The team saw evidence of many other HIV/AIDS-devastated communities that would like to be included in WFP programming if additional food aid resources were available. Sadly, the low level donor resourcing makes further expansion of this project impossible as yet.

Rations

330. The ration basket needs to be consistent over all of the projects and needs to be sufficient to support the high nutritional needs of HIV/AIDS-affected populations. International guidelines have been developed on the food needs of these groups and should be conformed to. The current basket distributed in the HIV/AIDS food support programme is as follows:

• Monthly Family Ration
• 30 kg cereals
• 6 kg Pulses
• 2.25 kg Oil
• 4.5kg CSB + 300g sugar for the sick and malnourished

331. This ration is acceptable, but low. For example, in Malawi, the HIV/AIDS programme is providing 10 kg of CSB/vegetable oil for the chronically ill and 50 kg of maize, 5 kg of pulses and 3.7 kg of vegetable oil for households with chronically ill or orphans. This is a considerably higher allocation than the Kenya ration (with the exception of pulses). It is not known whether this ration scale was developed according to a standardized ration scale from HQ or based on local specifications.

Coherence

332. One serious criticism of the current HIV/AIDS programme is the lack of coordination with other UN Agencies and government partners. Both UNAIDS and UNFPA are actively involved in HIV/AIDS and could offer expertise, guidance and possibly joint funding if the WFP activities were coordinated with these groups.

333. There is some coordination with the GoK, especially for the Busia programme, but overall the relationships could be strengthened to improve government buy-in.

334. Improved linkages between WFP and the Kenya Transporters Association on the Transport Sector activity could strengthen the programme and contribute to a clear government policy on the issue. WFP is currently partnering with Family Health International to train peer educators and develop HIV workplace policies. Enhanced partnership is an essential aspect of
this programme and it is essential that WFP look towards government partnerships to enhance government ownership as well as other UN partnerships to improve collaboration and the potential funding base.

Sustainability

335. The Team found that there is no real sustainability built into WFP to the HIV/AIDS strategy nor are the exit-strategies defined. Each of the four programmes will require a different type of exit-strategy, and given the complicated nature of HIV/AIDS programming, clear benchmarks need to be established and deep partnerships created that will allow WFP to end the direct food assistance.

336. In order to accomplish this the Kenya Country Programme is going to have look to HQ for policy guidelines in HIV/AIDS programming and to other country programmes for lessons learned and sustainable objectives. Issues around livelihood support and income-generating activities for HIV/AIDS-affected households will remain a key issue to allow for household food security once the food aid is discontinued.

337. Without the very substantial financial resources which AMPATH has obtained, all aspects of the programme are not fully replicable, because of the high level of sophistication and high overhead costs. This may or may not have implications for WFP’s continued participation in the project.

338. Assistance to people affected by HIV/AIDS is not coordinated as part of a national programme, in spite of the self-evident beneficial impact which WFP assistance demonstrably has for HIV/AIDS-affected households.

339. The Evaluation concludes that WFP assistance to people affected by HIV/AIDS is one of the most appropriate uses of the programme’s resources. This activity should no longer be a pilot programme, but should eventually become one of the main pillars of humanitarian relief to Africa.

340. While WFP should strive wherever possible to combine food aid with other inputs (treatment, social support, labour opportunities, and livelihood support) it should not refrain from providing assistance to HIV/AIDS-affected households or communities where other inputs are not available.

341. There is a need to improve the enrolment and discharge criteria in the Lea Toto programme to ensure that the registration process captures the households in need. The team also found an inconsistency in the Lea Toto programme regarding the PMTCT support given the official policy must be adhered to regarding exclusive breast feeding or exclusive milk supplementation. Currently due to lack of funding the programme cannot fully support the baby milk formula needs of children of HIV+ mothers and so they are unable to exclusively use milk formula.

B.3. Food For Work/Disaster Preparedness Facility

342. The third basic activity, the Disaster Preparedness Facility sought to provide a safety net for chronically food-insecure communities to build up assets against recurrent droughts, contributing to the achievement of sustainable livelihoods and reduced vulnerability to disasters and food insecurity of communities in the arid and semi-arid lands. However, history has
repeated itself and, as in the previous CP, little progress has been made in implementing this activity. It was suspended in August 2004, shortly becoming operational in four ASAL districts, in order to divert resources to GFD under the EMOP. Because of this the Team could not carry out any evaluation of this component of the CP.

**Relevance**

343. The Standard Office Report of WFP acknowledges the need to run emergency operations concurrently with cross-sectoral longer term interventions which have the potential to build the resilience of the vulnerable communities. Relief interventions alone cannot promote livelihoods and graduate people out of poverty. Similarly, the draft Kenya National Food and Nutrition Policy notes that a safety net programme is not a substitute for development and should be run concurrently with other interventions to enable the poor participate in development initiatives. Strong linkages are required between transitory interventions and recovery/development programmes.

344. In order to achieve effective linkages, the policy proposes to channel a substantial proportion of the resources traditionally used for relief towards the development needs of the vulnerable populations; enhance the capacities of marginalized communities through education and training; promote private sector participation in improving livelihoods in pastoral and other vulnerable areas; invest in water harvesting, conservation, irrigation development and management. Further, it proposes to invest in effective management of the environment as a basis for long-term investment.

345. The team concluded that the CP, as designed, appropriately respected and reflected this philosophy. However, WFP Kenya’s decision in August 2004 to, once again, suspend the longer-term objective of disaster preparedness in deference to the immediate-term objective of emergency response not only deprived vulnerable communities of an important investment in their long-term but also of a critical programme that could have aided them in moving effectively from relief to recovery.

346. During field interviews the Evaluation Team obtained varied reports regarding the relevance of FFW as a strategy for attaining the objectives of the DPF. In Mandera district, members of the DSG expressed the desire to move away from the micro investments that FFW schemes represent, and which are of subsistence value. The District Commissioner was more categorical in doubting the sustainability of FFW schemes in the district.

**Effectiveness (Outcome Level)**

347. According to the Logical framework summary found in Annex II of the CP planning document, the intended outcome (Outcome 3) of this CP component is “to improve the food security of vulnerable communities in ASALs by strengthening their disaster preparedness capacity”. The intended measures of success were identified as (i) proportion of households that create or maintain assets without food aid, (ii) percentage increase in households effectively coping with drought, and (iii) increased capacity of national institutions to respond rapidly and effectively to drought and other natural disasters.

348. Food aid which is targeted to the food-hungry and vulnerable in the target districts is deemed as an appropriate support to disaster mitigation activities. However, the Evaluation Team did not see the direct correlation between the selected activities and disaster preparedness
or mitigation. The food-assisted activities are, as intimated, quite micro in nature; and their overall contribution to objectives of the DPF hard to discern.

349. Activity 3 was designed to enable poor families in 10 ASAL districts to gain and preserve assets; to enhance their capacity to mitigate the effects of natural disasters; and to graduate to more sustainable livelihoods. The long-term objective of Activity 3 is to improve the food security of vulnerable communities in ASALs by strengthening their disaster preparedness capacity. The immediate objectives of Activity 3 are to:

- Reduce the impact of natural disasters on the food security and livelihoods of rural households, particularly those headed by women;
- Improve access of targeted households and communities to skills training (health and nutrition education, drought management, HIV/AIDS awareness and income-generating activities); and
- Strengthen the capacity of relevant national institutions and development partners to respond rapidly and effectively to drought and other natural disasters, through transfer of appropriate skills.

350. Whereas the selected indicators as outlined above can measure some aspects of the activities outputs, they are not exhaustive enough to provide information on the objectives, outcomes and impact. A key aspect for measurement would be the reduction in impact of natural disasters on the food security and livelihoods of rural households. None of the indicators outlined above can measure the intended outcome.

351. The second outcome relates to improvement in access by targeted households and communities to skills training. Again the outcome for this area cannot be assessed on the basis of the indicators selected. The closest indicator focuses on the number of workshops held, an aspect that does not confirm whether access by beneficiaries to skills training in health, nutrition, drought management, AIDS awareness and income generating activities had actually improved. The Team was informed that the CO is planning to restart the DPF activities and is reworking selected indicators to measure outcome and effectively monitor and assess the programme.

Effectiveness (Immediate Objective Level)

352. It was expected that the implementation of Activity 3 would result in various immediate outcomes including: improved availability and access to food by identified beneficiaries; enhanced nutrition and health of the beneficiaries; increased asset levels of participating communities; mechanisms for planning, managing and maintaining productive assets by communities established; a strong early warning system in the Office of the President established; and establishing the capacity among partners to monitor and evaluate food security and disaster-related interventions. It was planned that food aid would be used as an incentive for communities to engage their participation in FFW programmes which in turn would lead to creation of assets – outcomes badly needed, given the recurrent and chronic nature of food insecurity in Kenya.

353. In effect, none of the three immediate objectives of the DPF were met due to lack of adequate funding, lack of prioritization and a lack of institutional will on the part of WFP. What could have been a dynamic and highly relevant programme given the sequential “crises” faced by Kenya, instead became at best a limited food-for-work programme. For the DPF to be
transformed into an appropriate and effective programme, there must be a respect given to the original objectives of: reducing the impact of natural disasters; improving access to skills training; and strengthening the capacity of relevant agencies to respond to drought and other disasters. There are case-studies from other countries that have effectively undertaken these types of programmes and lessons learned should be applied to the Kenya context to improve this much needed programming without delay.

**Effectiveness (Output Level)**

354. The intended beneficiaries of the DPF activity were poor households living in disaster-prone ASAL districts who possessed few or no livestock. The initial focus of the activity was in Turkana, Mandera, Marsabit and Isiolo districts. A total of 5,634 households with 28,170 beneficiaries were expected to be targeted for six months annually.

355. The Logical Framework matrix of the Country Programme identifies Output 3.1 as “Gender-focused sustainable physical and social assets are created at the community level,” as measured by (i) number and type of assets created, (ii) income gains that can directly be linked to assets created, (iii) percentage increase in participation of women on relief committees in decision-making, and (iv) percentage of women in decision-making bodies.

356. The team visited FFA activities being implemented in Machakos district, with EMOP resources, by German Agro Action. The main activities are in dam construction and soil bunding. The community groups interviewed were well organized, highly motivated and expressed a keen desire to continue to have FFA projects. The area is highly populated and overgrazed. The projects visited were impressive and technically well supervised by GAA. However, it was disturbing to hear that the community workers had to share their own worn-out tools for earth moving since the tools procured for the DPF were not available. Lack of appropriate tools greatly increased the work burden of individual households and raised a question as to the purpose of the program: team members questioned whether the goal was to actually finish the dam for the water or to sustain the project life-cycle as a make-work programme (albeit a slow one without tools).

**Coherence**

357. The Standard Office Report of WFP acknowledges the need to run emergency operations concurrently with cross-sectoral, longer-term interventions which have the potential to build the resilience of the vulnerable communities. In this regard, relief interventions alone cannot promote livelihoods and graduate people out of poverty. There are plainly difficulties in having free relief GFD and FFA activities in the same areas or with the same communities. GFD will inevitably undermine the incentives for community labour-intensive activities. The ultimate aim to “target the poorest of the poor” through asset transfer can only be successfully achieved within a carefully designed development programme with strong technical and non-food support. Linkages with other development agency programmes, such as the DFID cash transfer proposal, will be essential for achieving the intended aim of reducing vulnerability and poverty.

**Sustainability**

358. The objectives of the DPF are very ambitious and long-term. The problems facing the livelihood sustainability of communities in the ASAL throughout the Horn of Africa are as intractable as ever, in spite of the billions of dollars in aid programmes spent in the past decades
to generate viable alternatives to pastoralism. In Kenya the ALRMP supports such a long-term strategy to create livelihood options. The original plan in the CP document for the ALRMP to coordinate FFA activities with implementing partners “to ensure complementarity with other poverty-reduction activities” is, therefore, still a valid WFP strategy. But the sustainability of the WFP intervention will require a long-term commitment and much stronger political will than has so far been demonstrated.

359. The Team recommends that FFW and FFA activities suspended under EMOP should now be revived with technical support and adequate tools, possibly through a PRRO. To the extent possible, it should be linked to other ALRMP activities and the proposed DFID cash transfer programme.

360. The food-for-work component of WFP programming needs to be broadened in scope if it is going to have any real or sustainable impact on chronic food insecurity. Appropriate technical support in terms of site selection and construction needs to be included to improve the long-term impact of the schemes. Adequate tools and resources need to be given to adequately support the work projects in a realistic and effective manner. Issues such as the gender implications of the project need to be addressed to ensure appropriate and relevant work conditions and project outcomes. If the intention of the programme is actual disaster preparedness or mitigation, additional efforts must be made in working with both the DSG and local communities to determine creative and effective approaches to the long term issue of food insecurity in the districts.
C. Cross-Cutting Issues

C.1. Nutrition

361. The EMOP has five central expected outcomes, two of which are nutritionally determined to some extent (saving lives and maintaining minimum nutritional and dietary standards of the targeted population). The CP's overall objective is to strengthen the capacity of hungry, poor households to meet their food and nutrition needs. Nutrition is a central aspect of these two programmes in terms of determining impact and meeting objectives. It is therefore critical that WFP be able to both monitor and understand the nutritional situation of the targeted population in order to assist in the analysis of their programming goals and to support their targeting mechanism. Between January and June 2007 WFP did not have a nutritionist on staff although there was a junior national nutritionist during most of the EMOP and CP cycles.

362. WFP is reliant on other nutrition-specializing agencies such as UNICEF and specialist NGOs to provide nutrition information and some technical expertise to assist WFP in assessing the nutritional impact of the food aid. If this information is not available, WFP is in a difficult and unenviable situation of not being able to prove programme impact based on the standard objectives of the EMOP and CP set by the WFP corporate structure. The WFP Country Office is thus attempting to show nutritionally-based outcomes from a programme without having the tools or data necessary to monitor or show these outcomes. Limited nutrition surveillance information is available through Arid Lands MUAC information provided for all the arid lands districts on monthly basis and CHANIS (Child Health and Nutrition Information System), a growth monitoring database kept by the Ministry of Health.

363. The most recent Kenya-wide survey was the Kenya Demographic and Health Survey in 2003. Based on the 2003 DHS, the stunting rate of children under-five was 30%; severely stunted, 11%. Nationally 6% of children were wasted and 1% severely wasted. The survey data show that this national figure masks an alarming wasting rate in North Eastern Province where 27% of children were reported as wasted and 11% of children under five were severely wasted. 20% of children under five were underweight and 4% severely underweight. But again this figure masks the 34% underweight rate of children in North Eastern Province. 7% of women in North Eastern Province are severely thin (BMI< 16.0) compared to the national average of 2%.

364. Growth monitoring data is collected by CHANIS in many of the health facilities in Kenya, but it is an extremely limited monitoring tool in that it is facility-based and collects weight-for-age data. Weight-for-age data is helpful for plotting a growth curve of a young child, but less useful to determine global acute malnutrition. As mentioned above, MUAC is routinely collected by the ALRMP monitors. The MUAC data is fairly consistent and reliable, and is perhaps the most successful ongoing monitoring tool currently available. The monitors routinely measure children and publish the results in the Drought Monthly Bulletins as was mentioned above.

365. In order to understand nutrition, it is important to understand the health context of women and children in Kenya, because many of the health issues relate directly to the nutritional problems of children. The health status of women and children in Kenya is not ideal. For the most recent five-year period preceding the 2003 DHS, infant mortality was 77 deaths per

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47 Kenya Demographic and Health Survey 2003, chapter 10
1,000 live births, and under-five mortality is 115 deaths per 1,000 live births. This means that one in nine children born in Kenya die before attaining their fifth birthday.

366. More important perhaps is that the rates by province vary dramatically, with under-five mortality highest in Nyanza (206 per 1,000 live births) and North-East (163 per 1,000) provinces and lowest in Central (54 per 1,000) and Rift Valley (77 per 1,000) provinces. This implies that a child born in Nyanza province is four times more likely to die before five than a child born in Central province.

367. It is estimated that 40% of births in Kenya are delivered at a health facility while 59% are delivered at home. Home births decrease depending on whether the house is rural or urban, whether the mother is educated and if the household is in a higher wealth quintile. Some 42% of births in Kenya are delivered under the supervision of a health professional, mainly a nurse or midwife. Traditional birth attendants assist with 28% of births while relatives and friends assist in 22% of births. This is important because women that give birth at home are less likely to interact with health facilities before and after childbirth and are less likely to bring their children in for growth monitoring and vaccinations.

368. An estimated 57% of children were considered fully immunized in 2003, 7% had never received any of the recommended immunizations, and 49% of children 12-23 months had all the recommended vaccinations on schedule. This is serious because the links between malnutrition and poor immunization compliance are clear. Children not immunized are more susceptible to different infections that either are compounded by or causally linked to malnutrition.

369. As in most of the developing world, the top five causes of death in children in Kenya under five include: acute respiratory infection, diarrhoea, measles, malaria and malnutrition and anaemia. The Kenya Government adopted an Integrated Management of Childhood Illness (IMCI) strategy in 1998. To date only 18 districts are implementing the strategy in some health facilities. Treatment of diarrhoea is of particular concern because of its links to malnutrition, and current household practices suggest that up 32.6% of children with diarrhoea are given less or nothing to drink. Food intake is curtailed even more than fluid intake during episodes of diarrhoea, with 51.6% of mothers giving children less or no food. To quote the DHS, “these patterns reflect a gap in practical knowledge among some mothers regarding the nutritional requirements of children during episodes of diarrhoeal illness. This indicates a need for further health education efforts to reduce the number of children becoming dehydrated or malnourished due to diarrhoea.”

370. It is recommended that all infants should be exclusively breastfed for the first six months of life to achieve optimal growth and health. Exclusive breastfeeding is correlated with increased child survival and reduced risk of morbidity, especially from diarrhoeal disease. According to the Kenyan 2003 DHS, only 13% of women exclusively breastfed their children for the first six months, and only 29% of children under the age of 2 months. Other reports claim exclusive breastfeeding in the first six months is even as low at 2.8%.

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48 Kenya Demographic and Health Survey 2003, chapter 8
49 Kenya Demographic and Health Survey 2003, p140
50 Kenya Demographic and Health Survey 2003, p145
51 Kenya Demographic and Health Survey 2003, p147
52 Kenya Demographic and Health Survey 2003, p155
53 Understanding nutrition data and the causes of malnutrition in Kenya, A special report by the Famine Early Warning Systems Network, USAID September 2006
It appears that there has never been a comprehensive micronutrient survey with clinical testing in Kenya despite a high likelihood of micronutrient deficiencies in neighbouring countries and given the dietary deficiencies in the arid areas of the country. According to the Division of Nutrition in the Ministry of Health, the micronutrient status of women and children is below standard and requires some form of supplementation. The following approximate statistics for micronutrient deficiencies were given: high rates of anaemia (76% in children ≥5 and 42.9% in women), Vitamin A (61.2% in children <5 and 40% in women), Iodine Deficiency Disease (16%), Zinc Deficiency (in school aged kids 50-60%), B-12 deficiency (80%).

Nutrition information alone is of course just one piece of the puzzle to determine the impact of food aid, but it is an essential piece. The analysis of high GAM rates in Kenya has tended to over-emphasize the absence of food, and thus the response tends to be overwhelmingly food-related, ignoring all of the associated factors that contribute to high malnutrition rates including water, sanitation, infant and child feeding practices, access to health services and child care activities. This would explain, in part, the persistently high rates of GAM in Turkana despite the infusion of food aid into the community. In Turkana, infant feeding practices, especially the lack of exclusive breastfeeding was found by Oxfam and World Vision to be strongly associated with acute malnutrition in children. Water is also a central problem in much of the affected districts of Kenya. In many household and group meetings, women ranked access to clean water above food aid as the top priority for their communities.

WFP needs to seek external expertise to inform many of its food-based decisions, including supplemental feeding programme design, assessment analysis, impact determination and other programming decisions.

Ration Basket Composition

The ration basket developed for the Kenya programmes is different across the various types of programmes. There is a ration for school feeding, for HIV/AIDS, for SFP/TFP, for the GFD at 50%, for the GFD at 75% and FFW. The number of differing baskets is difficult to keep track of and leads to some degree of monitoring confusion.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodity (grams/day)</th>
<th>GFD 75%</th>
<th>GFD 50%</th>
<th>Food for Work</th>
<th>School Feeding</th>
<th>HIV/AIDS</th>
<th>Supplementary Feeding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cereals</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>200</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pulses</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salt</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fortified Blended Food</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>1,140</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The content of the different baskets is reasonable with WFP providing in the GFD either 75% or 50% of daily caloric needs to the beneficiaries, assuming that some amount of the food intake (either 25% or 50%) can be met by the household itself. Whether this assumption is true during all seasons and periods of the year has not yet been adequately monitored by WFP and should be one of the goals of the PDM.

One ongoing problem has been the omission of salt for many months of the EMOP which is a concern given the projected high rates of iodine deficiency disease (IDD) in parts of
northern Kenya. Overall salt was consistently provided in the pastoralist areas beginning in late 2005 when 2,000 MT were purchased.

377. Corn-Soya Blend (CSB) or other fortified blended foods are frequently distributed by WFP in areas that have high rates of micronutrient deficiencies and where there is a normal or high demographic concentration of women and young children. During the EMOP cycles, CSB was not distributed to any beneficiary groups in 2004. In 2005, through a partnership with UNICEF, WFP supplied CSB to the SFP from 2005 until April 2006. It was agreed WFP would give 250g CSB and 20g oil for pregnant/lactating women and children under five who were in the supplemental feeding programs. Unfortunately, WFP budgeted for 26% of the population when the actual coverage into UNICEF programs was far lower.

378. CSB was not added to the general ration until 2006 (May-July each person in the pastoralist districts received 80g, and August-September each person received 100g) and was only given for five months. Generally the SFP distributions were the primary method for targeting this micronutrient-rich food, which is unfortunate because none of the other foods in the general food basket are considered appropriate for young children (under the age of two).

379. While a micronutrient survey is needed (and recommended by this mission), current figures from the Division of Nutrition indicate that micronutrient deficiencies are a real concern, particularly in the arid lands. It could be argued that from a nutritional standpoint, CSB should be provided to all households receiving the general food distribution to increase its impact on the nutritional status by increasing availability and therefore reducing sharing. Ideally CSB would be included in all of the food baskets that cater to women and young children, including the GFD (50% and 75%), FFW, and ECD. This issue was raised in household and beneficiary interviews and women specifically requested CSB for their young children.

380. The primary staple provided is maize grain, which is very well accepted as the primary staple food. However, calculations on the caloric value of the basket do not take into account the milling costs (which though low, do require payment) and more importantly, the milling losses. Beneficiaries report losing approximately 2kg of grain per 10kg milled. If WFP is going to supply whole grain, then it needs to appropriately calculate kilocalorie value of the ration basket based on the milled maize. This is usually calculated to be 7-10% loss of the total cereal, though it could be even higher (20% reported) depending on the type of milling process used.

381. Finally, while acceptance of commodities is asked in the PDM, there is very little known about the household use of the food, or more specifically, how long each commodity lasts the household. In beneficiary and group interviews, the team found that on average the CSB lasted 1 to 2 weeks (no doubt due to household sharing), the oil lasted three weeks, the pulses two weeks and the cereals between 15 and 28 days, depending on the amount of sharing that was done.

C.2. Gender

382. Overall, WFP’s activities in Kenya are generally compliant with most of the aspects of the WFP gender policy. “Enhanced Commitments to Women.” Operational data is disaggregated, women’s participation and support is highlighted and there is a programming commitment to ensure that women are benefiting from much of the programming. Institutionally, WFP has mainstreamed gender issues into programme design and planning, there is sufficient advocacy, and the Human Resources unit attempts to enforce a gender balanced staffing policy, although staffing ratios do not yet meet those specified in the ECW.
383. In 2004 a Self-Assessment Phase of a survey on the ECW outlined the specific areas where WFP CP and EMOP had met their gender-based goals. The results outlined specific changes that were needed to improve compliance. Unfortunately, it appears that very little progress has been made on these issues (with the exception of staffing) in the two years that have followed. Many of the issues highlighted in the self-evaluation have not yet been fully addressed (the areas where the CP and EMOP are compliant are not included):

**Nutrition Intervention (ECW I)**

- De-worming for pregnant (in their second and third trimesters of pregnancy) and lactating women is not occurring.
- Awareness-raising on nutrition, health, caring practices and HIV prevention for at least half of pregnant and lactating women and adolescent girls assisted is still well below 50% for supplemental programmes and no formal training or awareness-raising is ongoing.
- Adolescent girls are not included in out-of-school and life skills training activities and micronutrient-fortified foods intervention.

**Food for Training/Food for Work (ECW III)**

- No formal evaluation of the asset usage has been done to see if women and girls benefit at least equally from the assets created through the FFW activities. However, the team feels that women are fully active participants in the FFW.
- FFW are mostly designed to facilitate the participation of women, but their opportunity costs including long travel time to the site, need to be addressed.
- Programme documents do not explicitly state that appropriate work norms for women in FFW activities should be defined and put in place. Special issues include the safe care of young children at the FFW site.
- No gender-specific and gender-sensitive situation analysis has been undertaken in preparation of the FFW programme design.

**Relief Food Distribution (ECW IV - Women’s Control of Food Aid Distribution)**

- The DM reports that some people, primarily women, are still walking unacceptably long distances.
- In polygamous families, separate rations cards have not been issued for each wife.
- No assessment was conducted to identify the need for special packaging and no dialogue with the Government, donors and other partners on the implications of introducing special packaging has been undertaken. These discussions have not occurred despite DM reports of women having to leave half of the ration with friends and relatives in order to make a second trip to carry the food aid home.

**Women’s Participation in Decision-making (ECW V)**

- There has been no assessment to determine the need for women in relief or FFW activities to have committees separate from men.
- While contractual agreements explicitly state that the partner will provide community participation training and/or leadership training to women who take part in food distribution and/or asset-creation committees, this has not occurred in a standardized manner.
Mainstreaming gender in human resources (ECW VIII)

- Gender balance (% of employees female) in staffing has reached only 36% for national officers though 51% of general service employees are female.
- All sites where food aid monitors work ensured that female food aid monitors can operate in a safe working environment, and 15 of 27 field monitors (55%) are women.
- No national or partner staff had received training on the ECW because no training had been held apart from certain aspects of the ECW that are included in the general recruitment training of new WFP staff.

384. Overall the office has made the appropriate steps in mainstreaming gender issues into all aspects of programming. One gap however has been the lack of a gender focal person over the last few months. There has been a delay in the handing over of the gender focal seat and the new focal person has been waiting for her terms of reference and handover briefing. This gap has limited gender advocacy and planning.

385. At the field level, there needs to be increased dialogue and training of the Lead Agencies around the WFP Expanded Commitments to Women. Currently the ECW are being treated more as a “quota” issue than as a central and sustainable aspect of programming. Progress has been made to assure that “50% of the RC are women”, but whether this translates into women being full members and having a real role in decision-making is not being adequately addressed. Women’s strategic needs, such as focusing on asset creation, decision-making and control of resources, need to be emphasized.

386. There are some indications based on field visits that some gaps in programming for women still exist. These include:

- Site selection of FFW where women walk long hours with their children. Three women respondents reported having stopped breastfeeding because they could not bring their children the distance to the FFW sites.
- Water, shade and latrine facilities are not available, making child care even more difficult for women choosing to carry their children to the site.
- Lack of CSB in FFW ration for pregnant and lactating women and children under five.
- In some cases, women are not active participants on the relief committee and are not given a chance to talk during the relief committee meetings, which are dominated by men.
- Lack of lead agency understanding of the participatory role of women beneficiaries in decision making.
- Lack of coordination with already existing community women’s groups.
- Lack of female representation in the District Steering Groups and assessments.
- Lack of female Somali-speaking field monitors in order to work directly with female beneficiaries in the ASAL areas.
- In ASAL areas girl enrolment in the upper grades is a real issue. Drop-outs due to early marriage in 5th and 6th grades are common. For many security and cultural reasons, parents do not send their older daughters to school. When there are boarding schools available for girls, parents will often send the girls, but currently there are not sufficient numbers to address the needs of older girls.
- Coordination with UNICEF to partner with schools that are providing sanitary supplies for girls.
- FGM rates in many districts in Kenya are over 85%, while the national average hovers between 30-40%. WFP could partner with agencies to address this issue, especially in terms of supporting information and advocacy.

387. Generally the team was satisfied that the “letter of the law” regarding ECW is being followed, but feel less confident that the “spirit of the law” is being applied, or that the staff at all levels recognize why ECW can be used for improved programming. This is an important issue because if the staff is not comfortable addressing issues of gender, they will be less likely to monitor the performance of the Lead Agencies in terms of compliance to the ECW. Additional workshops and training could be beneficial to ensure that staff in Nairobi and staff in the field recognize the vital issues surrounding ECW and the positive impact the ECW can have on programming.

C.3. Partnership

WFP and Lead Agencies

388. Based on interviews with Lead Agencies in Nairobi and the field and through a half-day workshop held with the Lead Agencies, the Team found the WFP-Kenya office to have exceptionally good relationships with their partners. This is not to imply that there are not areas for improvement that were raised, but overall WFP was complimented on being accessible and available to their partners to solve problems as they arise.

389. The Team heard some criticism from WFP staff that at the initial stages of the EMOP implementation in 2004, there were issues regarding the cooperating partner selection process by the DSG that greatly hampered the start of emergency operations by up to 2-3 weeks.

390. A key aspect of the CBTD, as discussed above, is the selection of a cooperating partner to be responsible for the food from the EDP to the FDP and to oversee the selection of the relief committees as well as the food distribution process. Due to the six-month EMOP cycle and the assessment process, cooperating partners are reviewed and selected every six months, though in most cases if a partner is willing and has been doing an adequate job, the reselection process is automatic.

391. The role of the cooperating partner is to serve as a proxy agency for WFP and so it is imperative that the partners selected be competent and professional. WFP drafted a series of guidelines on the selection and responsibilities of the cooperating partner which were given to the DSG for implementation. In a few cases WFP has had to veto a selected partner, but in general the process works quite well now. If the selection process is stalled, this can disrupt food aid deliveries and distributions unacceptable.

392. The government has on occasion also become dissatisfied with the performance of a cooperating partner citing the organisation’s inability or unwillingness to undertake local capacity building and in one instance there were issues around hiring procedures and monitoring activities that initiated a change in partners.

393. The cooperating partners raised several key issues regarding their relationship and contracts with WFP. One criticism that came up on several occasions was the problem of fixed costs versus the tonnage bound payments. For smaller NGOs without substantive budgets, delays in food can become very costly and when the food tonnage is below anticipated, this can cause extreme budget shortfalls. A second concern by several groups was a perception that
while accessibility to WFP field staff was very good, the relationship with WFP was not necessarily a partnership and there was not sufficient room to exchange ideas and programme goals. The more established NGOS would like to be at the table with WFP when important decisions are being reached such as results from the assessment, targeting schemes and future activities. An issue raised by most groups was the problems surrounding the PDMs, with agencies saying that their staff are stressed and overworked by the amount of PDMs expected and the time it takes to complete them each month. A few agencies also questioned the purpose and relevance of the PDMs, implying that further sensitization is needed. A few cooperating partners questioned the overall WFP vision of food aid and felt that increased dialogue around recovery activities beyond food aid and relief were overdue.

394. WFP Kenya did not systematically evaluate the performance of its cooperating partners until 2007. They have just completed the first EMOP partners’ performance evaluation that has assessed through WFP field staff and sub-offices the performance of the partners in six key areas including: dispatches; stock/store management; budget; distributions; coordination; and reporting/finances. For each category the cooperating partner is given an estimate of how well they have met their target and a rating (2-5). There is also a short text of comments. The evaluation was done for each district, and each partner in that district. In general this evaluation serves a useful tool, though it is difficult to understand why it was not undertaken earlier in the EMOP cycle. A few of the partners have received fairly low marks and it will be interesting to see what form the follow-up will take. Finally, it might be useful in subsequent evaluations to also allow partners to be involved in a self-assessment so that the process is dynamic and participatory.

WFP and Other UN Agencies

395. The evaluation team concluded there is a strong need for greater coordination amongst UN agencies in Kenya. Joint UN agency programme activities seem to have been disappointingly weak, even when agreed memoranda of understanding have been reached for mutual programming support. The UN system has failed to coordinate agency activities and mutually supportive, integrated programmes, whether in assisting HIV/AIDS victims, nutrition surveillance in the ASAL districts, the provision of non-food resources to schools in the SFP and ESFP or tools and technical back-up in the EMOP FFA activities.

396. This is a recurrent problem, having been pointed out in two previous evaluations. Even in the 1998 UNDAF document the lack of coordination amongst UN agency programmes was noted: “the relative fragmentation and complexity of United Nations aid programmes in Kenya and their disparate programming and administrative process may be part of the problem”

397. WFP and UNICEF signed a MOU in August 2003 and developed a joint work plan but it has not been implemented until now (2007). The Team found that each agency is pursuing its mandate in a manner that lacks the coordination necessary to achieve maximum impact. In some districts, this parallel focus has resulted in the duplication of activities. The absence of collaboration with UNFPA has not enabled activities regarding awareness about HIV/AIDS and reproductive health in schools. Likewise, no co-operation has been established with WHO. Lack of partnerships with FAO and such ministries as Water and Agriculture has denied the SFP necessary technical support especially in the agricultural-based sustainability activities. Although there is a widespread agreement that food aid should be part of a so-called "Essential
Package” delivered in school, at grassroots level the SFP is implemented in a vacuum, without the complementary inputs that would reinforce its impact.

398. The previous CP Evaluation in 2002 drew attention to the difficulties of improving partnerships and coordinating relief and development programmes in Kenya. As one donor told the team “We talk about partnerships, but don’t do it”. The present evaluation encountered much the same reaction. It is obvious that almost all of the WFP activities could have had a much greater impact had they been supported by other non-food resources.

399. The newly appointed UN Resident Coordinator told the team that one of her main priorities was to create greater team-work and partnerships within the UN agency system. This will be essential if the system is to have any real impact in helping the drought-affected communities in the ASAL to find new livelihood opportunities.

400. The CP 10264.0 document indicates that there is significant scope for finding complementary inputs to WFP assistance and creating synergies with other donors’ activities in areas such as teacher and SMC training, provision of drinking water, sanitation facilities and classrooms, provision of equipment and learning materials, HIV/AIDS and reproductive health, technical assistance for school-based agricultural activities and other income-generating activities. This has not yet fully materialized. It was expected that success in achieving UNDAF outcomes and contributing to the MDGs and national priorities would depend on effective partnerships.

C.4. Connectedness of WFP Development, Emergency and Recovery Activities

401. These are three very distinct activities in the CP, which have no inter-connecting themes. They have been implemented without any cross-cutting strategies even when the EMOP became operational in August 2004. For understandable reasons there has since been a tendency by the Country Office to concentrate on the emergency rather than the CP objectives.

402. The second component in the previous CP, the Fund for Disaster Preparedness, was never fully implemented because of the advent of the 2000-2002 drought. The Activity re-emerged in the present CP as Activity 3, to create a Disaster Preparedness Facility (DPF) contributing to the achievement of sustainable livelihoods and reduced vulnerability to disasters and food insecurity of communities in the arid and semi-arid lands. However, history has repeated itself and little progress has been made in implementing this component. The DPF Activity 3 was put on hold in August 2004 because, once more, the drought required another emergency response. Unfortunately, the DPF has not yet been revived, although some Food For Assets (FFA) activities have been successfully implemented with EMOP resources. An opportunity was thus lost to lay the foundations for the PRRO, which is now so urgently needed to provide a safety net when the EMOP ends.

403. A culture of individual programme management has developed so that there is now little consultation and coordination between the EMOP staff and the CP staff. Unfortunately, the CO dichotomy between the CP and EMOP teams also applies in the S-Os. Since October 2006 there have been four out-posted monitors for the SFP. This belated deployment of SFP monitors is, of course, hopelessly inadequate to monitor the programme in over 3,000 schools. On the other hand there is no policy of involving EMOP staff in the S-Os in carrying out supplementary SFP monitoring. Equally the four out-posted CP field monitors are not required to follow up on EMOP activities; not even on ESFP-expanded school feeding. When asked about this possibility EMOP staff said that they cannot keep up with their GFD and other relief committee/ DSG
tasks. Thus they only monitor the SFP and ESFP occasionally. In a more integrated programme there should be systematic joint monitoring of all WFP programme activities in their district by all out posted S-O staff. It is a perceived weakness of the way the staffing structures of WFP Kenya have developed that the activities of different aspect of the WFP programme are not considered to be the concern of all staff members.

404. The CP Basic activities have very little coherence within the overall development programmes of other UN or bilateral agencies. This has limited the impact that WFP assistance has had, both in the SFP and the HIV/AIDS programmes.

405. The Expanded School Feeding Programme under the EMOP has not been an integral part of the regular SFP. The team noted that the WFP Development Unit and the EMOP Unit have not made a joint effort to design the ESFP, implement, monitor or assess its short and medium terms impact within the framework of a coherent and global school feeding programme. The day-to-day implementation arrangements in WFP for the parallel ESFP and SFP activities are managed independently of each other. Likewise, the School Feeding Unit within MOE has not been closely associated to the ESFP, with its principal contribution consisting only of providing lists of schools in the divisions identified by the KFSSG as vulnerable and food-insecure.

406. In interviews with the SFP Unit, the Team was informed that the SFP Unit was not directly involved in the selection of schools under ESFP and neither is it monitoring education outcomes. The SFP Unit is thus not in a position to provide an education impact assessment of the ESFP. Instead, the WFP EMOP Unit is attempting to assess the impact of the ESFP through monitoring school enrolment and attendance indicators.

WFP intends to fund an evaluation of coordination in the coming months.
III. CONCLUSIONS

407. Emergency food aid cannot be expected to solve the causes of drought nor the social impact of collapsing nomadic and agro-pastoral livelihoods. But it can help to stave off widespread famine, save human lives, prevent migration and assist disaster-affected communities to survive without having to dispose of their remaining assets. The Evaluation Team considers that these objectives were achieved by the EMOP.

408. The team found that it is generally agreed among stakeholders that the Emergency Operation was successful in preventing loss of human life from starvation following the successive droughts in 2004 and 2005, which at one point affected over 3 million people in Kenya’s Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASAL). Without WFP assistance there is no doubt that the huge 35% loss of livestock in 2005/06 sustained by pastoralist communities in the North East and elsewhere, and the devastating floods, which wiped out irrigated lands and crops on the Daua and Tana rivers, there could have been a massive humanitarian disaster. Food was delivered to, and distributed in, over two thousand remote locations before acute malnutrition levels led to any significant loss of human life. The widely dispersed distribution points enabled drought-affected people to receive WFP rations without having to migrate to relief camps or Therapeutic Feeding Centres. Almost all beneficiaries were able to remain on their home territory so WFP assistance had the added effect of helping them to keep their remaining assets, without disposing of them to feed their families.

409. According to the original project document, the ESFP was expected to cover 544,000 children (250,000 girls and 294,000 boys) in 1,378 pre-primary and primary schools in pockets of 15 semi-arid districts in the Coast, Rift Valley, Eastern and Central Provinces of Kenya. Data collected in the 15 districts covered by the ESFP show that during the emergency period, enrolment and attendance rates at school actually increased. At the end of the third term of 2006 school year, a total of 563,854 children (288,683 boys and 275,271 girls) attended the targeted schools. Thus, the team concluded that the ESFP not only succeeded in preventing dropout rates and kept children at school but also provided incentives for additional new enrolments. There will be many problems in realistically achieving a smooth exit strategy when WFP assistance to the ESFP ends. The team concluded that ESFP as implemented in Kenya is merely a “temporary feeding programme in the school”. This is probably the reason why school enrolment was so high and new enrolments were observed during the EMOP period. As a result, there may be a decline in the future attendance of children enrolled in ESFP schools once food aid under the EMOP is over.

410. The achievements of the three immediate objectives of the CP Basic Activity 1 are in line with one major conclusion of the CP mid-term evaluation, "there is little doubt that the school feeding activity has enabled hundreds of thousands of young Kenyans from extremely poor households in the ASAL areas of Kenya and in selected slum areas of Nairobi to receive some or all of a primary education and to benefit from improved nutritional intake." Data from the assessment report prepared in 2007 by WFP indicate that in most districts where the SFP is implemented there has been a general increase in both Gross Enrolment and Net Enrolment Rates.

411. The team also noted almost unanimous concern among stakeholders at the lack of an exit strategy in WFP’s SFP activities. The team concurs there is reason for concern around achieving a smooth exit strategy when WFP assistance to the SFP ends. The team believes that, in recognition of the incompleteness of food assistance as stand-alone support to education, strong
partnerships must be established now to ensure that interventions work towards a sustainable phase-out/exit strategy.

412. With regard to CO Activity 2, the positive impact of the food can be seen in both the individual testimonies as well as through the multiple support-group activities being undertaken by the HIV/AIDS-affected individuals. The impact of WFP food is tremendous, and allows for some degree of recovery for both those on anti-retroviral therapy (ART) and those not on treatment. Testimonies were heard from people who had been fully bedridden but, after receiving the food support, were now able to regain their livelihood activities and become productive. In some instances this was true even in the absence of complementary ART. The Evaluation concludes that WFP assistance to people affected by HIV/AIDS is one of the most appropriate uses of the Programme’s resources in Kenya. This activity should no longer be a pilot component, but should instead become a major component of WFP interventions. While WFP should strive wherever possible to combine food aid with other inputs (treatment, social support, labour opportunities, and livelihood support) it should not refrain from providing assistance to HIV/AIDS-affected households or communities when other inputs are not available.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Relief and Recovery Operations (EMOP 10374.0)

General

413. The Evaluation Team supports WFP Kenya’s intention to continue providing relief and recovery assistance and encourages the CO to re-establish the DPF component of the CP as quickly as possible.

General Food Distribution

414. To reduce critical delays and related inefficiencies in response programming, WFP Kenya and its cooperating partners should encourage and assist the GoK to streamline procedures for releasing results of bi-annual needs assessments.

415. To reduce the food aid focus of KFSM programming and ensure its continued credibility and effectiveness, WFP Kenya should relinquish its responsibilities as co-chair while remaining an active participant in all relevant technical activities of the group. (NOTE: PLS believes this should not appear as a recommendation as it is the subject of another consultancy)

416. WFP Kenya should encourage and support the inclusion of nutritional information in needs assessments to better inform the targeting of food aid. Objective information on the impact of shocks on educational activities should also be collected in order to better inform WFP targeting predicated on such impacts.

417. WFP Kenya should continue to employ and develop CBTD, improving procedures for the selection of relief committee members, the development of registration lists, and the fair, transparent handling of beneficiary grievances.

418. WFP Kenya should continue efforts already underway to strengthen distribution and post-distribution monitoring processes, including prioritising information needs, simplifying data collection and reporting processes, improving and maintaining capacities and sensitising partners to the importance of such monitoring in order to improve programming

419. Given the potential of micronutrient deficiencies in the arid regions of Kenya, CSB should be included in all of the food baskets that cater to women and young children, including the GFD, FFW, and ECD.

420. To have the maximum possible impact on the high levels of Iodine Deficiency Disease found in Kenya, WFP Kenya should ensure that iodised salt is provided in ration basket wherever possible.

421. To improve the impact of food aid, WFP Kenya must revise its targeting practices to account for intra- and inter-household sharing wherever they are prevalent. Consideration should be given to “blanket targeting of GFD” in the most vulnerable communities to support all households (and all household members) equally and reduce the diluting of rations through sharing.
422. To improve the targeting and monitoring of WFP food assistance programmes, WFP CO should conduct yearly self-evaluations of the targeting efficiency and effectiveness to ensure the validity of the bi-annual assessments to identify the most vulnerable populations.

423. WFP should work with the other UN Agencies and the Government of Kenya to assess the targeting effectiveness and efficiency over the entire emergency response.

424. In partnership with MoH, UNICEF and FAO, WFP should undertake retrospective analysis of the MUAC data compared to the food aid targeting to determine if the food aid impact can be seen through improved MUAC measurements of the children under five in beneficiary households.

Supplementary Feeding

425. To improve the coverage of Supplementary Feeding (SF) in Kenya, WFP needs to support capacity building efforts among GoK and partner agencies to ensure that they can appropriately implement SF programmes.

426. WFP should promote and support SF programmes in areas of need as indicated by regular assessments.

Expanded School Feeding Programme (ESFP)

427. To maintain the increased enrollments and attendance achieved under the ESFP, maintain the nutrient intake levels of hundreds of thousands of Kenya’s most food insecure children, and avoid the costs, dangers and overcrowding effects of poor households transferring their children from non-SFP schools to SFP schools, WFP should ensure follow-on school feeding activities (ie. PRRO) until a general re-assessment and re-targeting of regular school feeding assistance in Kenya can be completed.

B. Development Operations

Regular School Feeding Programme

428. WFP and MOE must re-assess the eligibility of all schools and re-target regular SFP to ensure that scarce food aid resources are indeed going to schools in the most food-insecure communities of the country.

429. To improve the performance of the GoK School Feeding Programme (SFP) Unit, WFP and the MoE should review and agree the duties of the Unit, assess its present capacity to perform these duties, and undertake critical resourcing, staffing and capacity building activities required to overcome current deficiencies. In particular, data collection and analysis to inform monitoring and evaluation (M&E) should be improved, possibly with the participation and/or supervision of the statistics division within MOE.

430. To clarify agreements on both strategic and operational levels, the MoE and WFP should review SFP strategic and implementation plans, including agreements on coordination, institutional arrangements, project duration and exit strategies.

431. WFP Kenya and MoE should strive to reactivate the Activity Steering Committee and finalise and distribute the School Feeding Hand Book without further delay.
432. WFP should identify and work with all those partners supporting education sector development to ensure that food aid becomes a fully integrated part of any sector development programme and provides, in the context of such a programme, a valuable contribution to improved educational attainments.

Nutrition and Care of HIV/AIDS affected people

433. In light of clear evidence of the effectiveness of food aid in HIV/AIDS programming, WFP should end ‘pilot’ approach and make HIV/AIDS programming a major component of its programme in Kenya. It is important that any scale up be targeted at food insecure individuals or households, especially (but not exclusively) those receiving ARV treatment.

434. WFP should continue to enhance its partnerships with other UN, NGO, GoK, civil society and private sector activities. This should include linkages to onward livelihood support and income generation activities to allow ‘graduates’ to return to productive work; increased cooperation with the Kenya Transporters Association could encourage government and other agency interest and buy-in for WFP’s Transport Sector Initiative.

435. WFP should Improve normative guidance and technical support to all HIV/AIDS activities, including: (a) review and revise enrolment and discharge criteria; (b) produce standard guidelines on protein, energy and micronutrient needs of HIV/AIDS-affected people; (c) ensure PMTCT policies and practices are upheld according to international standards in all WFP-supported programmes; (d) ensure conformance with standard food baskets across cooperating partners; and (e) clarify issues around orphans and OVC left behind if a parent dies and exits the programme.; Such technical support should conform to recently revised GoK national guidelines

436. As is the case for GFD, WFP should standardize ration baskets to the extent possible across all modalities and partners to reduce confusion, ensure consistency, meet international standards (HIV/AIDS, ECD, SFP), and simplify monitoring requirements.

C. Cross-cutting recommendations

Nutritional monitoring

437. To improve the targeting of the neediest households and communities, increase the effectiveness and efficiency of its operations, and objectively monitor the impact of its food-aid programming, WFP must redouble efforts to ensure the availability of the basic nutritional information required for effective food aid programming, particularly with respect to children under 5 years of age and pregnant or lactating women. This could be done through hiring nutritionists, funding nutritional surveys, seeking partnerships with nutritional specialist agencies, or working directly with the Nutrition Unit of Health Ministry in Kenya.

Gender

438. WFP Kenya should redouble efforts to meet ECW commitments, especially those weaknesses identified in the 2004 ECW survey that have not been effectively addressed to date
Partnership and Coherence

439. WFP Kenya should re-examine the internal and external coherence of its activities in Kenya, identify insufficiencies and elaborate a practical plan for improving coherence.

440. WFP Kenya should continue to monitor the performance and compliance of its cooperating partners and take supportive or corrective action where deficiencies exist. It should welcome partners participation in this process to ensure their agreement / ownership of the results.

441. WFP should continue efforts already underway to improve communications with cooperating partners, to solicit their inputs to key decisions on joint activities, and to ensure that their programming needs and objectives are reflected to the greatest possible extent in WFP intervention designs.
Annexes
ANNEX 1: TORs

1. Introduction and background

Kenya is a low-income food-deficit country with a GDP per capita of around US$460 (2004 World Bank), placing it 152nd out of 177 countries in the 2006 UNDP Human Development Report. Endemic poverty, low economic growth, and high population growth conspire to create endemic problems for food security, while recurrent floods and droughts tip households barely able to make ends meet in good times into a condition of abject need.

In Kenya, food insecurity is highest in urban slums and among pastoralists and marginal agriculturalists in remote, arid and semi-arid lands, which comprise 80 per cent of Kenya's land mass. Many households in these areas are chronically poor, and malnutrition rates are persistently high among children under five. The drought-prone and semi-arid lands have the lowest primary school enrolment and completion rates. Western Kenya and the Nairobi slums have very high HIV/AIDS prevalence and growing destitution.

The 2006 floods followed hard on the heels of a succession of crippling droughts. The 2005 October-December short rains failed, the culmination of three to six poor seasons, severely affecting the livelihoods of those living in the northern and eastern pastoral areas and in the southeastern agricultural lowlands. As a result of the drought, children's health and nutrition deteriorated and the livestock that many families depend on for food in the arid northeastern part of the country died in large numbers from exhaustion and lack of water and food.

WFP has had an open-ended basic agreement with the Government of Kenya governing cooperation between the two since March 1980 when WFP started providing lunches to school children in drought-prone areas. WFP’s present operations in Kenya support the Government's efforts in implementing the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). In addition, WFP emergency assistance to Kenya targets those households most-seriously affected by the floods of November 2006 as well as the successive seasons of failed rains that preceded the flood emergency. Up to three million people each month have required food assistance in 2006 under the agency's ongoing emergency operation, in addition to 535,000 children receiving school meals in the worst drought affected areas.

2. WFP intervention under CP 10264.0 and EMOP 10374

Country Programme 10264.0

The WFP Kenya Country Programme 10264.0 (2004-2008) is based on a country strategy outline for Kenya endorsed by the WFP Executive Board in October 2002. The goal of the country programme is to strengthen the capacity of hungry poor households (especially those headed by women and children) to meet their food and nutrition needs on a sustainable basis and withstand external economic shocks and natural disasters. The present country programme has been prepared on the basis of the United Nations Common Country Assessment for Kenya and the revised 2004–2008 United Nations Development Assistance Framework. It is designed within government policy instruments, including the Poverty-Reduction Strategy Paper, the National Poverty Eradication Plan and the National Development Plan.

This country programme focuses on two main outcomes, to which all activities contribute:
• progress towards greater well-being for the poor and hungry through improved access to food, health and nutrition practices and increased capacity of communities to rehabilitate/create and maintain assets that provide secure and sustainable livelihoods;
• enhanced sustainability of livelihoods for children (especially girls and orphans) of poor food-insecure households through improved access to basic education and skills training.

In accordance with decision 1999/EB.A/2, WFP focuses its development activities on five objectives. Country Programme 10264.0 addresses four of the five Enabling Development policy strategic objectives:

• enable poor households to invest in human capital through education and training;
• make it possible for poor families to gain and preserve assets;
• mitigate the effects of natural disasters, in areas vulnerable to recurring crises of this kind; (d) enable households that depend on degraded natural resources for their food security to
• make a shift to more sustainable livelihoods.

WFP assistance under CP 10264.0 targets an estimated 1.2 million beneficiaries annually over the five-year period at an estimated total cost of US$ 83.2 million. It focuses on increasing access to basic education for all (especially girls and orphans); improving the nutritional and health status of HIV/AIDS-affected households; and contributing to the achievement of sustainable livelihoods and reduced vulnerability to disasters and food insecurity of communities in the arid and semi-arid lands. Activities are concentrated in those areas of Kenya with chronic food insecurity, high rates of malnutrition and high prevalence of HIV/AIDS. In line with WFP’s Enhanced Commitments to Women, at least half of all primary-school children to be assisted under this country programme will be girls. Fifty percent of benefits from food-for-asset activities will benefit women and at least half of the members on food-distribution and asset-creation committees will be women.

EMOP 10374.0

The performance of the 2003 Short Rains (from October – December 2003) was poor in most arid and semi-arid lands (ASAL) of Kenya. The failure of the Short Rains at the end of 2003 resulted in poor pasture and browse, which affected the livestock conditions and led to food insecurity among the agro-pastoralist and pastoralist communities of the ASALs who rely on milk, other livestock products, and marginal crop production for their livelihood. The 2004 Long Rains (March-May) were erratic, further damaging crop and livestock conditions, driving prices 50-80% higher than normal levels, and leading eventually to serious deterioration in nutrition, particularly in ASAL areas.

In August 2004 WFP initiated emergency assistance to Kenya under EMOP 10374.0. The initial intervention aimed to target 166,000 MT of food aid to 2,323,000 beneficiaries for a period of six months at an estimated total cost of USD 81.3 million. The modalities selected included general food distribution (GFD), supplementary feeding (SF), food-for-work (FFW) and expanded school feeding (ESF) programmes. The WFP EMOP adopted the Community Based Targeting and Distribution (CBTD) system, which is intended to empower communities to participate in the planning and management of the project.
A series of budget revisions took place over the next two years, bringing the overall level of EMOP 10374.0 to XX beneficiaries requiring XX MT at an estimated cost of USD XX million. A brief summary of these budget revisions is presented below.

**Budget Revision No. 1 (January 2005)**
- **Nature of revision**: Increase in external transport value of USD 3.17 million as a result of substantial increase in freight costs; extension in time for five months from 1st February, 2005 to 30th June, 2005; No additional commodity.
- **Justification for the revision**: Due to expected long recovery in pastoral districts and clear indications (to be confirmed through the short rain assessment in January) that drought has persisted and hence continuation of relief food.

**Budget Revision No. 2**
- **Nature of revision**: Increase in LTSH.

**Budget Revision No. 3 (April 2005)**
- **Nature of revision**: Extension in time for four months from 1 Jul to 31 Oct 2005; Additional 76,052 MT (USD 18.2 million) of food commodities with associated costs (USD 42.0 million).
- **Justification for the revision**: Joint short rains assessment undertaken in Jan 2005 by GOK, UN and NGOs indicated additional needs.

**Budget Revision No. 4 (Sep 2005)**
- **Nature of revision**: Extension in time for eight months from 1 Nov ’05 to 30 Jun ’06; No additional food commodities; no additional.
- **Justification for the revision**: Long rains assessment undertaken in Jul/Aug 2005 confirmed need for food aid in 17 districts of Kenya until Feb 2006; Net fofd reqt of 51,788 mts was less than existing resource shortfall, therefore no need for additional commodities.

**Budget Revision No. 5 (Dec 2005)**
- **Nature of revision**: Increased LTSH rate.

**Budget Revision No. 6 (2006)**
- **Nature of revision**: Extension in time for 12 months from 1 Jul ’0 to 30 Jun ‘07; to increase food commodities by 395,000 mts, with associated costs of USD 225.4 million.
- **Justification for the revision**: To cover food assistance requirements to 3.4 million beneficiaries, including 500,000 school children; to revise DSC coverage to reflect the need for additional international, national and GS staff to support EMOP; to enhance requisite monitoring of EMOP implementation.

3. **Evaluative context**
The proposed evaluation will take into account and build upon relevant lessons from recently completed, ongoing and pending evaluations. Previous evaluations (both WFP and other) of relevance to this activity include but are not limited to:
4. Scope, purpose and objectives of the evaluation

The evaluation will cover all aspects of WFP assistance to Kenya under EMOP 10374.0 over the period August 2004 – December 2006, and CP 10264.0 over the period January 2004 – December 2006.

The purpose of the evaluation is three-fold:

- **Accountability:** Under the WFP evaluation policy, the size of the Kenya EMOP programme requires that it undergo independent evaluation, and that such an evaluation be managed by the WFP Office of Evaluation (OEDE) in Rome. ‘Accountability’ in the context of this evaluation will include not just accountability to WFP’s Executive Board and donors, but to the extent possible and practical, it should also include WFP’s accountability to its beneficiaries and cooperating partners. The evaluation will examine if work has been conducted in appliance with agreed rules and standards, and report objectively on performance results.

- **Guidance:** The evaluation should provide the Country Office (CO) with an external view of progress towards expected results which may contribute to improvements in the current operations, particularly with respect to strategic decisions;

- **Learning:** Evaluation has a key role to play in any learning process. This evaluation should assist WFP to identify and disseminate lessons learnt to support improved programming and organizational learning across all relevant WFP operational areas;

The principal objective of the evaluation is to analyse the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of the WFP interventions so as to inform advice on strategic and operational changes that could improve the performance and impact of the second half of the CP and / or inform a follow-on EMOP or PRRO, should one be considered necessary.
5. Principal users of the evaluation
The principal WFP users of the evaluation will be WFP Kenya, the WFP Regional Bureau in Kampala, WFP Rome, the WFP Executive Board, the Government of Kenya, and donors financing WFP’s operations. Secondary users may include WFP beneficiary committees, WFP cooperating partners, UN partner agencies and international and local NGOs involved in similar or related activities.

6. Guiding principles of this evaluation
In accordance with WFP evaluation policy and practice, the evaluation will respect the following additional principles of evaluation:

- **Be comprehensive**, by applying the standard OECD DAC criteria for evaluation of humanitarian interventions;
- **Take account of lessons learned** in relevant WFP and other-agency evaluations;
- **Directly address management needs**, by including principle evaluation users in the design of the evaluation and reviewing evaluation findings and lessons learned in relation to the main programme and management functions of WFP;
- **Identify and actively engage local partners in the evaluation**, i.e. identify appropriate roles and responsibilities for key stakeholders, including donors, national partners, cooperating partners and beneficiary groups;
- **Take account of relevant evaluation policies and good practice guidelines**, including those of WFP, donor, and implementing partner policies.
- **Include a strategy for dissemination of findings, lessons and recommendations** among key stakeholders in Kenya and beyond.

7. Methodology

Basic methodological components

The evaluation will apply a range of standard evaluative techniques, including:

- desk review and analysis of relevant documents including GoK and WFP policy and strategy documents, EMOP and CP project design and implementation plans, monitoring and assessment reports and any relevant secondary data;
- selected key informant interviews in Rome, Nairobi, and at select field sites in Kenya with WFP staff members, Government of Kenya counterparts and selected stakeholder groups (e.g. principal donors, other UN agencies, national and international NGOs involved in similar food security activities in Kenya); and
- focus group interview applying a range of PRA techniques as appropriate with relief committees, beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries, civil society groups and tribal leaders during field visits to a range of selected locations in Kenya.

Quality Assurance

The principal components of quality assurance will be the following:

- The Evaluation Manager and two peer evaluation officers from the Office of Evaluation will review all working documents submitted by the evaluation team prior to broader circulation;
- The WFP Evaluation Manager will chair a core evaluation reference group comprised primarily of representatives from various WFP units and offices in Rome and Nairboi;
At his discretion, and with advice of the core group, the evaluation manager may choose to solicit the ad hoc participation of additional stakeholders (e.g. NGO, other UN agencies, GOK, donors and civil society) in the evaluation reference group. The group will serve to advise the evaluation team on technical and cultural issues pertinent to the evaluation as well as to provide objective feedback on ‘good practice’.

- Conformance with the norms and standards of for evaluation set forth by the United Nations Working Group on Evaluation (http://www.Uneval.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=UNEG);
- Conformance with the criteria expressed in the ALNAP Quality Proforma for evaluation practice in humanitarian operations (http://www.alnap.org/resources/quality_proforma.htm);
- Conformance with the Programme Evaluation Standards (PES) elaborated by the Joint Committee on Standards for Educational Evaluation (JCSEE PR-1994);

**Evaluation questions and judgement criteria**

The evaluation will be based on a priority list of evaluation questions to be agreed between the evaluation team and the WFP Evaluation Manager with the input of key stakeholders and the advice of the reference groups. The evaluation team will be responsible for the first proposal of the evaluation questions.

For each agreed evaluation question, quantitative and /or qualitative judgement criteria will be identified, around which data collection methods will be decided and elaborated. The evaluation team will provide a brief outline of key evaluation questions, judgement criteria, and proposed data collection and analysis methods to the Evaluation Manager for comment prior to the start of field work.

**Data collection**

Security permitting, field visits should be made in the most relevant regions of Kenya. Field sites should be selected to include a representative range of intervention contexts.

The proposed evaluation methodology should be in accordance with WFP policies, programme guidance on evaluation (as elaborated in the Programme Guidance Manual and its supporting documents) and the principles and guidelines for humanitarian evaluation published by the OECD/DAC.

**8. Focus of the evaluation**

The evaluation will apply a mix of OECD DAC and ALNAP criteria for the evaluation of humanitarian interventions:

- Relevance/appropriateness
- Connectedness
- Effectiveness
- Efficiency
- Sustainability
- Impact

In order to apply these criteria it will be necessary for the evaluation to describe all EMOP and CP activities and their objectives while providing an overview of the extent to which activity and service delivery targets have been met. The evaluation will also identify and highlight
constraints where planned activities and service targets have not been met and the reasons for this.

Based on preliminary desk study and interviews with key WFP stakeholders in Rome and Nairobi in Jan-Feb 2007, WFP has identified the following issues for detailed attention in the evaluation.

**Relevance/appropriateness:** Relevance is concerned with assessing whether the project is in line with local needs and priorities (as well as WFP, government, cooperating partner, and donor policies). Appropriateness is the tailoring of humanitarian activities to local needs, increasing ownership, accountability, and cost-effectiveness accordingly.

In evaluating the relevance of a programme or a project, it is useful to consider the following questions:

- To what extent are the objectives of the programme still valid?
- Are the activities and outputs of the programme consistent with the overall goal and the attainment of its objectives?
- Are the activities and outputs of the programme consistent with the intended impacts and effects?
- Is the intervention design in line with WFP’s corporate strategies, policies and protocols, and the policies and capacities of WFP’s donors and cooperating partners?

**Special issues for consideration:**

Intervention design: Are the designs of WFP’s EMOP and CP programmes in Kenya appropriate given the magnitude and nature of the food security problems they are intended to address? Do WFP counterparts (ie. GoE) and implementing partners play a significant and sufficient role in the planning of WFP programmes and projects? Are WFP programmes and projects designed taking appropriate account of the capacity of the GoE and implementing partner(s)? Are they appropriate for the array of circumstances and contexts facing beneficiary populations? Are they sufficiently flexible in design to respond to predictable changes in needs?

Targeting: Are targeting criteria appropriate, clearly defined and respected by major stakeholders? Are targeting modalities sufficiently robust to properly direct designated resources to vulnerable or food insecure populations without excess inclusion or exclusion errors? Are targeting criteria sufficiently understood by implementing partners? Do beneficiaries have a sufficient voice in targeting decisions?

Coordination structures: Are inter-agency coordination structures well defined? Are they appropriate given the known mandates and capacities (or potential capacities) of the various entities? Are these structures sufficiently and equally respected by all stakeholders? Are they effective?

Institutional capacity: Is there sufficient capacity in the GoK in terms of staffing, knowledge, skills and operational resources to reasonably expect success from these efforts? Is sufficient effort/investment being made to correct insufficiencies where they exist?

Early warning and assessment activities: Have early warning and assessment information been sufficiently credible and timely to inform appropriate relief and recovery responses and clearly define programming needs. Have there been any critical gaps in information?
Conformance with WFP gender policy: Do the CP and EMOP equally and adequately incorporate WFP policy prescriptions on Gender and participatory approaches and mainstreaming of HIV/AIDS? Are the design and implementation of nutritional programming consistent with recommendations from WFP’s recent thematic review of MCN programming?

Do the EMOP and CP components as presently designed adequately recognise and address the different needs and operational realities of settled vs. non-settled populations? What recommendations can be made to improve the design and delivery of CP and EMOP interventions to pastoral populations?

What were the key lessons learned from these actions and what implications do they hold for future WFP interventions?

**Connectedness:** Connectedness refers to the need to ensure that activities of a short-term nature are carried out in a context that takes into account longer-term goals and priorities and the associated intervention strategies of households, government, WFP or key partners;

When evaluating connectedness, evaluators should concentrate in particular on the following questions:

- Have the key linkages between the relief and recovery phases have been established and addressed?
- Is there a logical exit strategy outlining the timing, allocation of responsibilities on handover to government departments and / or other actors, and adequate resourcing for post-handover operations?

Do WFP’s activities under EMOP 10374.0 and CP 10264.0 sufficiently consider and address the long term food security needs of Kenya? Do the intervention designs reflect a sufficient understanding of long-term GoK strategies for food security? poverty reduction? the medium and long term development aims of WFP in Kenya?

**Special issues for consideration:**

How effective are CP and EMOP designs at distinguishing the difference between episodic and chronic food insecurity, and responding to them distinctly, without undue overlap and with necessary complimentarity?

Partnerships: Both developmental and humanitarian interventions tend to be more effective on ‘connectedness’ grounds where strong partnerships are present. This is particularly the case when such partnerships are not just between international organisations, but between national and international entities and between non-governmental and governmental players. This evaluation should analyse the nature of the partnership between WFP and the GoK, how they came into being, how they are supported, and what are the requirements, constraints and opportunities to further support. Such lessons would be very useful to WFP in successfully sustaining the Kenya operation as well as initiating similar activities in other countries.

Livelihoods: Where possible, the evaluation should examine the degree to which the livelihood strategies of the population are supported (or disrupted) by the WFP intervention.

Local capacities: The evaluation could examine the degree to which the capacities of households, civil society, government or other partners at various levels are supported and developed through the intervention.
**Sustainability:** Sustainability is concerned with measuring whether the benefits of an activity are likely to continue after donor funding has been withdrawn. Projects need to be environmentally as well as financially sustainable.

When evaluating the sustainability of a programme or a project, it is useful to consider the following questions:

- To what extent did the benefits of a programme or project continue after donor funding ceased?
- What are the major factors which influence the achievement or non-achievement of sustainability of the programme or project?

**Special issues for consideration:**

Parent / community participation in school feeding: With levels of donor and government contributions to public education often uncertain, long-term success of school feeding programs will almost certainly be dependent on the degree to which such interventions prioritise and achieve parent and community participation. To what extent has this been a priority in WFP’s school feeding operations in Kenya, and to what end? Does WFP have adequate exit planning in place in Kenya?

Livelihood support vs. one-off life-saving intervention: The peak impact of drought on households – particularly pastoral ones – typically arrives and continues after the immediate year of the shock. Where adequate reserves were not in place in anticipation of the shock, it can take several years for households to restore livelihoods and recover fully. Immediate food aid may or may not be sufficient to allow households to fully rebuild livelihoods. Does WFP’s analysis (ie. ENA and VAM) reflect a sufficient understanding of the multi-year impact of shocks, and is this understanding adequately reflected in its programme planning? Is WFP’s analysis sufficiently sophisticated to distinguish the variability in households’ recovery paths?

It may be too early in the project life of CP 10264.0 to examine sustainability. At best one could review the logic and assumptions of the project against current realities to see if the former still hold on a theoretical basis.

**Effectiveness:** Effectiveness is the measure of the extent to which an aid activity attains its objectives.

In evaluating the effectiveness of a programme or a project, it is useful to consider the following questions:

- To what extent have the objectives been achieved / are likely to be achieved?
- Have the objectives been achieved / are they likely to be achieved evenly for all population groups affected?
- What are the major factors influencing the achievement or non-achievement of the objectives?

Have WFP relief interventions effectively met the emergency food needs of food insecure households in Kenya? What evidence is there that these actions maintained or improved the nutritional status of target populations and prevented erosion of livelihoods?

Did WFP accomplish these objectives with appropriate consideration for age, gender, material and non-material needs?
Special issues for consideration:

Outputs / outcomes compared to logical frameworks: What objective evidence is there to demonstrate results of the various elements of the EMOP or CP as elaborated in their respective logframes?

Process monitoring: In the event that programmes have been too short-lived to show impact, are the monitoring systems in place adequate to show impact over a longer-time period. If not, what improvements could be made to monitoring activities?

Are monitoring systems in place to test the effectiveness of targeting modalities? What impact has the targeting approach had on communities? Are there sufficient resources devoted to monitoring systems?

Coverage: Has coverage been sufficient to equally address the needs of all vulnerable populations in the country?

Efficiency: Efficiency measures the outputs -- qualitative and quantitative -- in relation to the inputs. It is an economic term which signifies that the aid uses the least costly resources possible in order to achieve the desired results. This generally requires comparing alternative approaches to achieving the same outputs, to see whether the most efficient process has been adopted.

When evaluating the efficiency of a programme or a project, it is useful to consider the following questions:

- Were activities cost-efficient?
- Were objectives achieved on time?
- Was the programme or project implemented in the most efficient way compared to alternatives?

Does WFP’s programme combine human, material and financial inputs most economically and in a timely manner to achieve the desired results? What constraints does WFP face in Kenya with respect to organisational structure, partner (incl. GoK) capacity, resourcing, physical access, humanitarian access, and security? Do they employ effective and appropriate strategies to mitigate or overcome these constraints? Were these efforts successful, cost-effective and sufficient? What were the key lessons learned from these actions and what implications do they hold for future WFP interventions?

Special issues for consideration

Operational programming: Under-budgeting of DSC: Why was DSC consistently under-budgeted in initial phases of the EMOP. And could this have been avoided? What was the impact in the end? Short-term extensions: Why was the EMOP implemented in a series of short-term extensions, and what was the resulting impact (eg. wild fluctuations in staffing levels)? Could this have been avoided? How?

What was the impact of donor conditionality on the efficiency of EMOP operations? CP operations?

Partnerships, coordination and ‘twinning’: What are the experiences of WFP partnerships under the EMOP? The CP? How effective have coordination and institutional linkages been between
WFP and its principle partners? What difficulties have been experienced with partnerships and how have these been resolved. What lessons have been learnt concerning these partnership arrangements for other WFP programmes? What impact has ‘twinning’ had on the efficiency of WFP operations in Kenya?

“One pipeline” and “one basket” approach: What have been the strengths and weaknesses vis operational efficiency of the ‘one pipeline’ approach used in Kenya? The ‘one basket’ approach?

Counterpart / partner capacity: Did GoK and CP capacities live up to their expected levels? Where did they excel (ie. flexibility to protect WFP pipeline when needed) ? Where were they weak (eg. inefficiencies in customs clearance, delays and deficiencies in reporting)? Did WFP anticipate weaknesses and provide sufficient support?

In-house coordination: What are the operational and conceptual linkages in the WFP Kenya Country Office between different components of the EMOP and CP, and are these adequate to ensure complementarity and synergy and prevent overlap, duplication and gaps. For example, are the respective target groups clearly and logically delineated? How well coordinated are the various WFP activities at federal, regional, and local levels? What were the positive effects of borrowing from the CP staff to effect the rapid EMOP scale up? What were the negative effects?

What data exist on targeting inclusion and exclusion error what does this show with respect to coverage?

Coherence: Coherence measures the degree to which an intervention takes into account and is consistent (eg. complimentary, supplementary other, synergetic) with other, concurrent activities of government, WFP, households or other partners.

Do the EMOP and CP activities in Kenya appropriately and sufficiently take into account the strategies, objectives and activities of other principle actors, including GoK, communities, effected households (coping activities), key NGO and bi-lateral entities?

Special issues for consideration:

Are relief interventions under the EMOP sufficiently integrated with the development aspects of the CP?

Are the CP and EMOP activities sufficiently aware of other major food security and nutrition programmes, and have all reasonable efforts been made to ensure complimentarity and avoid duplication? Are there unexploited opportunities for further coordination or cooperation?

How do WFP’s HIV activities fit with other HIV/AIDS activities in country? Have all practical synergies been recognised and sufficiently exploited?

How has community involvement in targeting and distribution (community-based targeted distribution, or CBTD) contributed to individual and community empowerment in Kenya, and how has this empowerment, through ‘cross-over capacity’, contributed to onward and outward emergency and development activities? What are the challenges in CBTD (eg. time, cost, effort)
9. Evaluation team composition and experience

The evaluation team will be made up of three international consultants and one national consultant resident in Kenya. All consultants should have proven knowledge and experience of food aid programming in relief and development contexts, and prior experience with evaluating food security and food aid interventions. Familiarity with food and nutrition security issues in Kenya, or East Africa in general, would be highly desirable, as would experience in school feeding or food for education. At least a basic knowledge of WFP structure, modalities and policies is required from all consultants.

10. Roles and responsibilities

Role of Evaluation Team Leader

Under the general supervision of the Evaluation Manager, and unless otherwise specified in these TOR, the team leader will assume overall responsibility for all aspects of the evaluation. (This does not include the evaluation design, nor the identification, recruitment, or contractual management of the evaluation team members.) With the input of the other team members, the team leader will determine the appropriate division of responsibilities between team members as well as their expected contributions to evaluation outputs. The team leader will ultimately ensure that the evaluation timeline is clearly understood and respected by all team members. He will serve as the chief team spokesperson and principle contact person for the evaluation.

Role of all other team members

Under the overall supervision of the Evaluation Manager and the day to day supervision of the team leader, each team member will be responsible for providing technical expertise according to their individual skills and for providing analysis and written inputs to the team leader as directed. At his discretion the team leader may also assign each team member responsibility for specific portions of the evaluation’s draft and final outputs.

Role of the OEDE Evaluation Manager

The OEDE Evaluation Manager will ensure finalization of the terms of reference, conduct team selection and make administrative arrangements for recruitment of the consultants. He will provide ongoing administrative support to the evaluation exercise, including liaising with and between team members and relevant personnel in WFP headquarters, Regional Bureau, and Country Office. He will also monitor compliance with the Terms of Reference and the relevant evaluation standards (cited above).

Role of the WFP Country Office/ Regional Bureau

In coordination with the OEDE Evaluation Manager, WFP Kenya and the ODK Regional Bureau will:

- Ensure that key background documents necessary for the evaluation are identified and provided in a timely manner;
- Assist in the identification of principal stakeholders and their introduction to the evaluation and its aims;
- Identify suitable local consultants for recruitment to the evaluation team and provide their contact details to the OEDE Evaluation Manager; the latter will have the final
decision on the selection of the candidate after a thorough review of candidates’
credentials, references and sample outputs;
- Ensure all necessary preparatory work (eg. travel authorizations, clearances) is
undertaken in-country prior to any evaluation mission visits;
- Suggest a suitable field itinerary for consideration by the evaluation team, and once
agreed and finalised by the team, coordinate the timing and planning of the field visits;
- Provide (or provide for) internal transport for all field activities;

11. Implementation

Phases of the evaluation

The evaluation will have the following main phases:
- Evaluation planning and design
- Desk review
- Stakeholder analysis and solicitation of stakeholder input
- Elaboration of key questions and judgement criteria
- Elaboration of approach and method for data collection and analysis
- Data collection, analysis and judgement
- Presentation and verification of preliminary results
- Report writing
- Presentation and dissemination of reports

Timing

The evaluation will be conducted according to the following schedule.
- Dec 15-31: Evaluation planning and design
- Jan 22-31: Review of background documentation and mission planning
- Feb 01-10: Stakeholder identification and elaboration of working logframe
- Feb 12-17: Preparatory mission
- Feb 19-23: Elaboration of Key evaluation questions and judgement criteria
- Feb 24-Mar 07: Elaboration of approach / methods for data collection and analysis
- Feb 28-Mar 2: Rome briefing
- Mar 05-22: In-country data collection, analysis and judgement
- Mar 23: Presentation and verification of preliminary results with WFP
- Mar 26: Presentation and verification of preliminary results with external stakeholders
- Mar 27-Apr 13: First draft report writing, all products
- Apr 16 –April 30: First draft reports circulated for comments
- May 01–09: Second draft report writing, all products
- May 09-20: Second draft reports circulated broadly for comments
- May 21-24: Incorporation of comments
- May 25-Jun 08: Third draft reports circulated to Exec Staff for comments
- Jun 08-15: Finalisation of all products
- Oct-Nov 2007 (exact date tbd): presentation of report to WFP Executive Board in Rome

12. Expected outputs

The evaluation team will be responsible for the following outputs:

a) ’Working logframes’ of CP 10264.0 and EMOP 109374.0 (if functional logframes do not
already exist);
b) Evaluation questions and judgement criteria;
c) Inception report outlining approach and methodology, including tools;
d) *Aide-mémoire* and PowerPoint (with speaking notes) outlining preliminary findings;
e) First draft of evaluation reports;
   o Summary Report (5000 words)
   o Management Response Matrix (2000 words)
   o Full Report (60-70 pp)
   o Evaluation Brief (2-pp)

f) Second draft of evaluation reports (incorporating OEDE comments);
g) Third draft of evaluation reports (incorporating key stakeholder comments);
h) Final version of all evaluation reports (incorporating Exec Staff comments);
i) Executive Board introduction (2pp) and speaking notes;
j) Key evaluation findings in PowerPoint presentation with speaking notes.

13. **International travel**

International evaluation team members will travel to Kenya via Rome, where they will be briefed before starting the field portion of the evaluation. At the end of the evaluation the team will conduct an official debriefing of the evaluation’s preliminary findings for all WFP stakeholders (CO, RB, and HQ) from Nairobi.

The team leader must be available to return to Rome in Oct-Nov 2007 for 1-2 days (exact date to be determined) to present the summary report to the WFP Executive Board.
ANNEX 2: Schedule of Meetings and Visits by the Evaluation Team

ITINERARY OF THE EVALUATION TEAM and SUB-TEAMS

5.3.07  Meeting with WFP CD
         After Action Review with WFP CP and EMOP staff

6.3.07  Meetings at WFP CO with CP, SFP team
         Meetings with EMOP team
         Security Briefing
         Meetings with VAM, HIV/AIDS and FFW teams

7.3.07  Ministry of State for Special Programmes. OP
         Ministry for Social Services (HIV/AIDS)
         UNICEF

8.3.07  Ministry of Education
         Ministry of Planning and National Development
         World Vision International
         OXFAM GB

9.3.07  FAO Representative
         Workshop with EMOP Lead Agency NGOs
         WFP Logistics Team

12.3.07 Team I
         Fly to Eldoret for visit to AMPATH HIV/AIDS project activities
         Visit National Cereals and Produce Board depot
         Visit Eldoret Maize Milling Company
         Meeting with WFP S-O team

13.3.07 Team I
         Visit NCPB Depot and WFP stores at Bungoma
         Drive to Busia for visit to CP Activity 3 Project sites for HIV/AIDS
         Orphans and affected communities. Community meetings.
         Fly to Nairobi from Kisumu

14.3.07 Team II
         Visit non-formal Kangemi Youth and schools in Nairobi slums
         WHO

15.3.07 EC/ECHO
         DFID
         OP Ministry of State for Special Programmes

16.3.07 Fly to Mandera on Somalia/Ethiopia border in NE Region
         DC Mandera
         Attended DSG meeting at ALRMP Mandera
         Relief Committees and community interviews
         SFP visits

16.3.07 WFP S-O staff discussions
         Lead Agency discussions
         ALRM Drought Coordination Officer
         RC and School visits
Fly to Wajir: meetings with ALRMP Drought Management Officer
Meeting with WFP S-O staff
Fly to Garissa

17.3.07
DC Garissa
Attended DSG meeting at DC’s office, Garissa
Drive to Sankuri for meetings with Boarding school PTA and RC
Meeting with WFP Sub-Office staff

18.3.07
Drive to Nairobi via Mwingi in Machakos
Visit EMOP/FFA dam construction site implemented by German Agro Action

19.3.07
Team I
Visit Leo Toto project activities in Mandera slums, Nairobi
Fly to Mombasa
Meeting with WFP HIV/AIDS Transporter Workplace policy implementation
Team II Drive to Narok to visit ESFP

20.3.07
Team Ia
Discussions with WFP Logistics team, Clearing and Forwarding Agents,
Transporters and Port Authorities
WFP Warehouse in Mombasa Port
Team Ib
Drive to Kalifi to visit EMOP FFA sites and DSG
Fly back to Nairobi
Team II
Visit ESFP in Narok and drive back to Nairobi

21.3.07
WFP HR Unit
US Aid
Ministry of Finance
Ministry of Education School Feeding Unit

22.3.07
WFP Procurement Unit
WFP Regional Information Office
UNICEF Nutritionist
MOE/ SFP
Ministry of Health

26.3.07
UN Resident Coordinator/OCHA
WFP CO Debriefing
WFP HQ Teleconference de-briefing
De-briefing with major stakeholders: GoK, donors, UN agencies and NGO

27.3.07
COOPERATING PARTNERs
Team departs
ANNEX 3: List of Persons Interviewed in Kenya

WFP COUNTRY OFFICE
Burkard Oberle  WFP Country Director
Marian Read    Deputy Country Director
Bai Bojang     CP Programme Officer
Denise Brown  Emergency Coordinator
Simon Cammelbeeck  Emergency Logistics Coordinator
Mietek Maj    Senior Logistics Officer
Anthony Freeman Emergency Logistics Officer
Bent Nielsen-Lautrup   JPO Logistics
Peter Smerdon Regional Public Information Officer
Arben Casilli Procurement Officer
Danston Ondachi  CP National Programme Officer
Alex Muindi Nutrition/HIV/AIDS Officer
Margaret Lukoye CP Programme Officer
Grace Igwetu   CP Programme Clerk
Margaret Adongo CP Field Monitor
John Ndiku     CP Field Monitor
Lorna Likhanga CP Field Monitor

James Kamunge  EMOP National Programme Officer
Thomas Ochieng EMOP National Programme Officer
Philip Ochieng EMOP National Programme Officer
Geoffrey Okoth Monitoring and Evaluation Consultant
Bernard Nyatuga EMOP Programme Assistant
Justina Nthege Gender Focal Point
Joseph Githini Security Officer
Joao Manja     VAM Programme Officer
Allan Kute     VAM National Programme Officer
Jennifer Chege National Human Resources Officer
Gillian Stone  Human Resources Assistant

GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
Prof. George Saitoti  Minister of Education
Prof. Karega Mutahi Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Education
S.K. Karaba Acting Director, Basic Education
N. Gulleid        Head, School Feeding Unit
P. Mungai        Deputy Head, School Feeding Unit
Anne Koori        Deputy Economist and Head of Planning MOE
Dr. Edward Sambili Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Planning and National Development
Jackson Kinyanjui Director, External Resources, Ministry of Finance
Mark Ogot         Desk Officer, External Resources, Ministry of Finance
Under Secretary Disaster Emergency Response Coordination, Office of the
Ibrahim Maalim    President
James Oduor       ALRMP, Drought Management Coordinator

Mwakio Righa Deputy Commissioner for Social Services, Ministry of Gender and Social services
Joyce Muthuri Assistant Commissioner for Social Services
Juliet Kola       Assistant Commissioner for Social Services
Rosemary Ngururo          Nutrition Division, Ministry of Health

**UN AGENCIES**
Elizabeth Lwanga          UN Resident Coordinator/UNDP Resident Representative
Elly Oduol               UNDP Assistant Representative
Jeanine Cooper           OCHA Regional Office

Castro Camarada         FAO Representative
Augusta Abate            Assistant FAO Representative
Calum McLean             FAO Project Manager

Heimo Laakkonen         UNICEF Representative
Roger Pearson           UNICEF Senior Programme Officer
Noreen Prendeville      UNICEF Nutritionist
Yelshi Haile            UNICEF
Dr. J. Onsongo          WHO

**DONOR REPRESENTATIVES**
Stephen Haykin           USAID Mission Director
Nicholas Cox             Regional Food for Peace Officer
Makeda Tsegaye          Emergency Program Coordinator USAID

Simon Mansfield         DFID Regional Humanitarian Adviser
Louise Branham          DFID, Education Specialist
Aadrian Sullivan        EC/ECHO Regional Support Office

**NGO REPRESENTATIVES**
Josie Buxton             OXFAM, UK
Mario Rodrigues          World Vision International

Joshua Makokha           Assistant Manager Leatoto Slum Project
Kezia Mathei            Leatoto Nutritionist

**FIELD VISITS**
Prof. Joseph Mamlin      Field Director, AMPATH, Eldoret
Dr. Sylvester Kimaiyo   Project Director AMPATH
Hannah Tadayo           Nutrition Manager, AMPATH
Catherine Gichunge      Distribution Dept. AMPATH

Peter Ng'etich          Silo Manager, Eldoret NCPB

WFP Sub-Office Staff, Eldoret and Bungoma
A.P. Soni               General Manager, Maize Milling Co. Ltd., Eldoret
R.K. Goyal,             Financial Controller, MM Co Eldoret
Chris Amakobe          Kenya Orphans Rural Education Programme, Busia
CCF Field Monitors

Busia
Mary Makokha            REEP Director, Kisumu

WFP Sub-Office Staff in Mandera, Wajir, Garissa, Mombasa and Narok.
Adan Mohammad           ALRMP Drought Management Officer, Mandera
Adan Hadji Abdikarim    District Agricultural Officer, Mandera
Waweru Kimani 
District Commissioner, Mandera

Members of the DSG, Mandera and Garissa
Community Relief Committees in Burabur, Mandera and Sankuri, Garissa
Abdi Musa 
ALRMP Drought Management Officer, Wajir
Abass A. Mohamed 
COCOP Relief Coordinator, Mandera
Raphael Lemaletian 
Snr District Officer, Mandera

German Agro Action staff, Mwingi, Machakos
Community groups working on FFA projects Mwingi
Gerard Loustaunau 
General Manager, SDV Transami, Mombasa
Jean-Baptiste Rambaud 
SDV, Mombasa
Jean Billard 
SDV Seafreight Manager, Mombasa
Jamal Awadh Bayusuf 
Director A.O. Bayusuf and Sons Ltd. Road Transporters
Fahad Iqbal Bayusuf 
Director Motrex Ltd. Road Transporters
Iqbal Ahmed Bayusuf 
Managing Director, Motrex Ltd. Mombasa