

# Country Portfolio Evaluation

## Chad: An Evaluation of WFP's Portfolio (2003 – 2009)

June 2010

Commissioned by the

**Office of Evaluation**

*Measuring Results, Sharing Lessons*

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Report number: OE/2010/012



**World Food Programme**

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## **Acknowledgements**

The evaluation team would like to express its appreciation to the World Food Programme (WFP) staff in the Chad country office, the Regional Bureau in Dakar, and Rome Headquarters. The Chad country office and sub-offices generously provided critical support during the course of the evaluation, including making available staff for constructive discussions, providing data and information, and organizing the logistical support to the mission. Colleagues in the Regional Bureau in Dakar and in Rome Headquarters provided orientation and feedback to the evaluation team.

Similarly, the evaluation team would like to express its appreciation to key partners and stakeholders of WFP in Chad, include:

- The Government of Chad, especially the Ministries of Planning and Economics, Agriculture, National Education, and Health, at the central, regional, and district levels;
- United Nations Agencies, including UNHCR, UNICEF, UNDP, OCHA, FAO, and UNFPA;
- Multilateral and bilateral donors;
- Non-governmental organizations, both international and national;
- Community leaders, health workers, teachers, parents, and others in the community.

All of the people consulted were generous with their time and shared their views and insights openly with the evaluation team. All of these interactions were invaluable to the evaluation team in forming its views and complement data and information found in documentation.

### **Disclaimer**

The opinions expressed are those of the Evaluation Team, and do not necessarily reflect those of the World Food Programme. Responsibility for the opinions expressed in this report rests solely with the authors. Publication of this document does not imply endorsement by WFP of the opinions expressed.

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## Fact Sheet: WFP's Portfolio in Chad (2003 – 2009)

Timeline and funding level of CHAD portfolio operations.


Operation	Title	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
DEV 10018	Country programme	Req: \$ 33.5 - Contrib: \$ 23.3						
DEV 10478						Req: \$ 37.8 - Contrib: \$ 28.5		2010
PRRO 10510	Assist. to CAR Refugees in Southern Chad				Req: \$ 36.7 - Contrib: \$ 36.3			2010
EMOP 10325		Req: \$ 0.2 Contrib: \$ 0.16						
EMOP 10327	Emerg. Assist. to Sudanese Refugees and Host Communities in Eastern Chad		Req: \$ 61.6 Contrib: \$ 47.0					
EMOP 10327.1				Req: \$ 90.3 Contrib: \$ 64.2				
EMOP 10295	Food Assist. to Refugees from the CAR in Southern Chad	Req: \$ 4.5 - Contrib: \$ 3.0						
EMOP 10295.1				Req: \$ 5.7 Contrib: \$ 3.1				
EMOP 10559	Assist. to Sudanese Refugees, IDP, Host Communities and Refugee-Affected Local Pop. in Eastern Chad					Req: \$ 195.5 - Contrib: \$ 129.8		2010
EMOP 10559.1							Req: \$ 316.5 Contrib: \$ 247.0	
<b>Beneficiaries (actual)</b>		202,551	365,564	703,356	733,147	608,611	791,502	884,706
<b>Food distributed (MT)</b>		8,788	28,730	49,097	54,139	65,773	64,630	90,547
<b>Direct Expenses (USD, mill.)*</b>		\$6	\$37	\$50	\$55	\$72	\$95	\$130
<b>% of Direct Expenses: Chad vs. World</b>		0.2%	1.3%	1.7%	2.1%	2.6%	2.7%	3.3%

Source: last SPR available, Resource Situation (1<sup>st</sup> August 2010, for on-going projects), Annual Performance Report 2009.<sup>1</sup>

Activities by operation and beneficiaries proportion by activity

Operations	GFD	FFW/FFA/FFT	Education	Nutrition	HIV
DEV 10018		X	X	X	
DEV 10478		X	X	X	X
PRRO 10510	X	X		X	X
EMOP 10325	X			X	
EMOP 10327	X	X		X	
EMOP 10327.1	X	X		X	
EMOP 10295	X			X	
EMOP 10295.1	X	X		X	
EMOP 10559	X	X	X	X	
EMOP 10559.1	X	X	X	X	
<b>% of planned beneficiaries</b>	<b>48%</b>	<b>22%</b>	<b>19%</b>	<b>10%</b>	<b>1%</b>
<b>% of actual beneficiaries</b>	<b>55%</b>	<b>18%</b>	<b>18%</b>	<b>8%</b>	<b>1%</b>

Planned beneficiaries by activity



Source: DACOTA (12 April 2010)

### Top 5 Donors (2003 – 2009)

USA, European Commission, Japan, United Kingdom, Canada.

Source: ERD

<sup>1</sup> Requirements (Req.) and Contributions (Contrib.) are US\$ million.

Colour: percent funded (Contrib. vs. Req.). Green: ≥ 75 percent, Orange: 75 percent > funded > 50 percent. \*Excludes PSA costs. 2008 & 2009 expenses are according to IPSAS and not comparable to 2007 & previous years' values based on UNSAS.

# Executive Summary

## Background

### Evaluation Features

1. This report presents the findings on the evaluation of the WFP Country Portfolio in Chad between 2003 and 2009. The purpose of this evaluation was to generate evidence in support of decision-making about strategically positioning WFP in Chad. Its objectives were to provide *accountability* - assessing and reporting on the performance and results of WFP's portfolio in the context of its mandate and in response to the humanitarian and development challenges that the country faces - and support *learning* by generating evidence-based analysis and insights on the way in which the portfolio and its operations are planned and managed.

2. The evaluation addresses three main questions: i) How well did WFP position itself strategically and align with Government and partners strategies? ii) How did WFP make choices and how strategic were these? and iii) How did the portfolio perform and what were the results? The evaluation was conducted by a consultancy firm with field work taking place in February 2010.

### Context

3. Despite a satisfactory gross domestic product (GDP) growth and existing policies for key sectors such as health, education, and agriculture, Chad struggles with low social indicators. Insufficient funding and weak capacity to plan, coordinate, manage, and implement initiatives in these sectors have limited their impact.

4. Poverty affects 55 percent of the population and rural households, especially female-headed households, have significantly higher incidence of poverty. While access to education has improved, especially for girls, rates of infant and juvenile mortality have remained the same since the 1990s. Food insecurity affects 44 percent of the population and the national daily caloric intake is below the Sub-Saharan Africa average. The *Sahelian* zone is particularly affected by chronic food deficits. Despite numerous nutrition interventions, global acute and chronic malnutrition rates have remained above critical thresholds in a number of regions.


5. Since the end of 2003, Chad has sheltered 265,000 Sudanese refugees in the east and 58,000 Central African refugees in the south, as a result of the degradation of the security situation in Sudan's Darfur region and persistent insecurity in the Central African Republic (CAR). Increasing internal instability due to activities by armed groups and inter-ethnic tensions has also caused the displacement of 180,000 Chadians in the east. In addition, Chad is susceptible to high climate variability and while agricultural production was relatively stable from 2003 through 2009, households, especially the *Sahelian* zone, experienced erratic rainfalls and localised droughts and floods. Major droughts usually occur once per decade with minor ones once every five years.

### WFP Portfolio

6. The influx of refugees from Sudan and the CAR, which started in 2003 marked a significant shift in the type, size and complexity of the WFP operations. Previously made up of small, development-based operations in the *Sahelian* zone, the portfolio became largely dominated by emergency operations, focused on assistance to

Sudanese Refugees, internally displaced and host communities in the east and on Central African Refugees in the south.

7. From 2003 to 2009 the Chad country office (CO) has implemented ten food assistance operations, including two country programmes (CPs), seven emergency operations (EMOPs), and one protracted relief and recovery operation (PRRO), with three operations still in progress at the time of the evaluation. The country office also implemented six special operations in support of the emergency operations to augment the logistics capacity and provide flight services but these were not included in the scope of the evaluation.



8. The total cost of the portfolio under consideration is about US\$ 711 million, with 87 percent devoted to the EMOPs, ten percent to the country programmes and the rest for the PRRO. Relatively speaking, the portfolio is considered large by WFP standards.

9. The portfolio operations collectively seek to contribute the following corporate strategic objectives (SOs):

- Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies (SO1) through assistance to refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and other vulnerable groups whose food and nutrition has been adversely affected by shocks; to reduce acute malnutrition and to protect livelihoods and enhance self-reliance in emergencies and early recovery. Related activities include general food distribution (GFD), emergency nutrition programmes (therapeutic and supplementary feeding as well as mother child health nutrition (MCHN)) and food for work (FFW), which have been common to all the emergency operations and to the PRRO.
- Prevent acute hunger and invest in disaster preparedness and mitigation measures (SO2) by supporting and strengthening the resiliency of communities to shocks through safety nets. The related activity is FFW in the context of the country programmes.

- Reduce chronic hunger and under-nutrition (SO4) by increasing levels of education, basic nutrition and health. Related activities include mostly school feeding and MCHN in the context of the country programmes.

**Activities by operation and beneficiaries proportion by activity**

Operations	GFD	FFW/FFA/FFT	Education	Nutrition	HIV
DEV 10018		X	X	X	
DEV 10478		X	X	X	X
PRRO 10510	X	X		X	X
EMOP 10325	X			X	
EMOP 10327	X	X		X	
EMOP 10327.1	X	X		X	
EMOP 10295	X			X	
EMOP 10295.1	X	X		X	
EMOP 10559	X	X	X	X	
EMOP 10559.1	X	X	X	X	
% of planned beneficiaries	<b>48%</b>	<b>22%</b>	<b>19%</b>	<b>10%</b>	<b>1%</b>
% of actual beneficiaries	<b>55%</b>	<b>18%</b>	<b>18%</b>	<b>8%</b>	<b>1%</b>

### Alignment and Strategic Positioning

10. The evaluation found the portfolio generally well aligned with the WFP corporate strategy throughout the period as well as with the national policy framework and Government sectoral objectives. This alignment was particularly visible in the education sector, where school feeding clearly contributes to the national goal of education for all. One area where WFP was not fully aligned was in the balance between the assistance provided to the refugees and the host population in eastern Chad. While the WFP assistance has inevitably been highly skewed towards refugees in earlier years, more resources were recently devoted to host populations in line with Government calls to this effect.

11. Despite important analytical work, which makes WFP a leader in analysing the national hunger and food security issues, the country office did not sufficiently leverage its analyses to impact national discussion, contribute to Government or partner strategies or build national technical capacity towards institutionalisation. The engagement, advocacy, and dialogue required for a more active strategic positioning were generally weak and a communication gap exists between WFP and the Government, which resulted in the misperception that WFP is not a significant player in humanitarian assistance.

12. The Government policies and strategies have not translated into sufficient budget allocation for key sectors such as school feeding, nutrition, agriculture, and rural development. Weak national institutions, capacity and commitment have limited WFP's incentive and ability to effectively partner with the Government to implement activities and have limited the Government's ability to technically support WFP activities. As a result, there is little Government ownership of the WFP strategy and programmes and WFP generally works with, but not through, Government structures at the national and sub national levels even for activities such as school feeding and support to health clinics, which are valued by the Government. At various times WFP has tried to actively engage and coordinate more closely with the Government and there have been some successes such as recently when a joint mission was conducted to verify schools as a basis for future school feeding assistance.

13. While WFP operations were not previously following the cycle of United Nations (UN) agency-wide planning tools, WFP is now an active participant in the development of the Common Country Assessment (CCA), United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), and Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) processes and the WFP country portfolio is currently aligned with the UN strategies in the country. However, challenges persist in translating these efforts into coordinated UN programmes as there appeared to be only limited joint planning and implementation of activities. The use of clusters has been mixed, with the logistics and food security ones being the most active.

14. With the exception of the effective partnership with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to assist refugees, there is limited synergy between the WFP programmes and those of key partners, in part due to their restricted presence. Enhanced synergy and coordination with the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) would strengthen WFP's relative input in nutrition, education and food-for-work activities by leveraging WFP's food for their technical expertise and financial resources.

### **Making Strategic Choices**

15. Programme choices and implementation options have been bound by external factors. The magnitude of needs in the northern and eastern part of the country far outstrips WFP's ability to access resources and implement programmes resulting in an understandable need to prioritize. Serious security concerns have made planning, food delivery and monitoring difficult and risky, particularly in the east where military escorts are required. Logistical challenges are also substantial: the country is landlocked, large, has poor infrastructure, and the rainy season limits the ability to move food half of the year through the main corridor.

16. WFP's response strategy in the east took into consideration the strategies and programmes of partners and possibilities for synergy. This was rendered possible by the high level of resources available generally to assist Sudanese refugees and the consequential presence of more partners, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs, in this part of the country. In other parts of the country, and notably in the *Sahelian* zone, lesser donor interest as well as the low capacity of partners, notably of the Government, to plan, organize, and implement activities affected programmatic and partnership options for the country programmes.

17. Corporate policies clearly guided choices of the country office in terms of programme categorisation but the parameters which define these categories are both limited and limiting. As a result, response strategies and activity choices tended to be driven by what is possible within each programme type and not necessarily by what is programmatically the best option and the portfolio has been viewed and managed as a discrete set of food assistance operations, not as an integrated portfolio with a clear vision, common goal and strategy.

18. The country office has conducted an impressive amount of analytical work to enhance its understanding of the national hunger and food security issues and guide its own decision-making. There is a clear link between assessment findings and the geographic targeting of operations, which focus on the parts of the country that either present the highest food insecurity (*Sahelian* zone) or where there is a clear humanitarian need (eastern and southern Chad). However, there is not always a clear link between assessment findings and the development of response strategies.

19. The country office showed the ability to recognise and adjust to changing needs when, in light of the increased integration of CAR refugees into the local community

and agricultural production levels enabling many households to become self-sufficient, the country office decided to transition in March 2006 from an EMOP to a PRRO emphasising self-reliance and sustainability in southern Chad. However, assessments have repeatedly shown global acute malnutrition rates above emergency levels in the *Sahelian zone*, which should have called for more emphasis and resources and possibly for a different programme categorisation than a development project. It is important to note, though, that the 2010 EMOP in the *Sahelian zone* will address some of these issues, even if the drought and not the chronic food insecurity and high malnutrition rates were the impetus. The evaluation also questioned whether the current programme category of EMOP in the east is still warranted after almost seven years while corporate guidance usually limits EMOPs to 24 months.

20. WFP's monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system has generally been weak, focussed on outputs thus providing limited insights for informing decision-making on the basis of results. However, in the past year, significant effort was made to strengthen the standards and systems including strengthening of staff in sub-offices and initiating the collection of outcome indicators with a view to correcting implementation, if required, and contributing to future programme design.

## **Portfolio Performance and Results**


21. **Relevance and appropriateness.** The activities of the portfolio were all relevant given the level of food insecurity and need in the targeted parts of the country. In particular, assistance to refugees in eastern and southern Chad, which made up the bulk of the portfolio, was relevant and the chosen modalities of general food distribution as well as supplementary and therapeutic feeding were appropriate given the initial life-threatening situation. However, the level of assistance for both the Sudanese refugees in eastern Chad and the host population must be reviewed. The recent increased economic activity in refugee camps in eastern Chad calls into question the continued appropriateness of GFD, especially at the current ration size while the high level of food insecurity and malnutrition within the Chadian populations in the East and the *Sahelian zone* has not been sufficiently addressed.

22. Beneficiary selection criteria varied across activities and were generally adequate. Refugees living in camps were enrolled based on their status determined by UNHCR screening; IDPs on the basis of their status and of results of annual crop assessments carried out by WFP, FAO, and other partners; and host population in the east and south of the country were selected based on vulnerability analysis and mapping (VAM) assessments validated by the food security cluster. mid-upper arm circumference (MUAC) screening was used for selecting beneficiaries for nutrition projects except in refugee camps where all pregnant and lactating mothers were entitled to the assistance. Finally, schools for the school feeding programme were selected by the Government and WFP in areas with the lowest education levels and criteria included having a classroom, a parent association, a water supply, a kitchen and storage room as well as sanitation facilities. However, only a fraction of the schools were found to meet all criteria.


23. **Efficiency.** Overall 73.5 percent of the portfolio financial requirements were met, which is generally good. However, while the larger refugee operations in the east and south were funded at 75 and 78 percent respectively, contributions to the smaller country programmes only met 57 percent of the requirements.

24. The portfolio performed well in reaching between 75 and up to 200 percent of its intended beneficiaries with an average of about 500,000 beneficiaries per year. There was a steady increase in assistance over time as 200,000 beneficiaries were assisted in 2003 against 885,000 in 2009. Beneficiaries in all parts of the country expressed their appreciation for the assistance they received.

**Figure one: Portfolio resource flows by operation based on actual reported expenditures in US\$.**



**Figure two: Receipt of donations by geographic region during the portfolio period, in US\$.**




Source: WFP Country Office and project documentation

25. GFD consistently had the highest absolute as well as planned versus actual number of beneficiaries and tonnage reflecting the high priority placed on the life-saving objectives of the refugee assistance. Nutrition interventions did not increase at the same rate as GFD but peaked in 2004 when actual beneficiaries exceeded planned numbers by over 200 percent.

26. School feeding, for which Government ownership was the strongest, had the second highest absolute number of beneficiaries and tonnage but with an actual versus planned beneficiaries and tonnage below the portfolio-wide average.

27. Although FFW activities had higher numbers of beneficiaries and tonnage early in the evaluation period, its relative importance within the portfolio decreased overtime to represent only a small proportion of activities. FFW was not well-resourced in the CPs and was given a relatively low priority in the EMOPs. FFW activities in the east were repeatedly suspended when additional resources were required for refugee assistance and due to security reasons.

**FIGURE 7: TREND OF BENEFICIARIES AND TONNAGE DELIVERED BY ACTIVITY ACROSS OPERATIONS, 2003 - 2008**



Source: WFP Country Office

28. Efficiency was hampered by the fact that activities are designed and implemented within the context of individual operations. There is a structural disconnect between programme activities and the implementation structure that is partly the result of the operations-based approach and partly due to the funding model.

29. There is most synergy within an operation given that resources are easily adjusted and technical staff is working towards the same operation outcome. However, working through individual operations, as opposed to viewing operations as part of an overall country portfolio, has worked against developing systems and standards that apply to all operations and has limited possible cross-fertilization between operations. Activities within each operation are conducted independently, with little

sharing of experience and lessons with similar activities in other operations and synergies that could come from resource sharing—both technical and financial—were not achieved. A balance is required between setting up systems and standards to meet the programme, M&E and reporting requirements by operation with the need to gain efficiencies across operations for the portfolio as a whole.

30. The logistic operations were performed professionally and efficiently and were highly supportive of operations not delaying or negatively affecting the implementation of activities. Opportunities for local or regional food procurement are extremely marginal and 96 percent of commodities were purchased internationally. The cost of the food commodity per MT has almost doubled during the portfolio review period from US\$250/MT to US\$450/MT, but it remained in line with the WFP corporate commodity cost average. Significant is that the ratio reserved for commodity cost (34 percent) is below the corporate average (49 percent), while the ratio of financial resources set aside for logistic operations has been almost twice the WFP average.

31. The high logistics costs are explained and justified by the extremely difficult operational conditions as well as long inland and transfer haulages, multiple handling and warehouses inside and outside Chad. The entire logistic operations hinges on two corridors: the Douala Corridor, which accounts for 60 percent of food-aid transit and the Benghazi Corridor, used for the remaining 40 percent. While expensive, this later corridor opened in recent years has proven efficient and essential for the steady supply of food assistance to Eastern Chad. There are no indications that the final cost unit of food-aid delivered has modified in one way or the other the design and the implementation of any of the portfolio activities.

32. While Chad is a difficult duty station to recruit for (language requirement, non-family post, difficult environment), staffing has been increased with the expansion of programmes and good use was made of UN volunteers, consultants and short term contracts. However, several key positions, including the Country Director, Nutrition Officer, and the Human Resources Officer remained vacant for periods up to one year and the justified frequency of rest and recuperation (R&R) breaks for international staff combined with insufficient focus on building the capacity of senior national officers have, at times, prevented the smooth implementation of activities.

33. **Effectiveness and impact.** The evaluation found that the assistance to refugees has been effective: it clearly saved lives in the early years and contributed to reducing malnutrition which stabilized at acceptable levels overtime (SO1). This was made possible by a good resource level and a consequent regular pipeline flow and by the complementary services provided to the refugees by the many partners, including NGOs, active in eastern Chad. Another contributing factor was the excellent partnership with UNHCR. Still, there are examples where increased coordination - for example, making mills operational in eastern Chad -could result in increased synergies that would reduce programme costs through increased effectiveness and efficiency.

34. Supporting IDPs and the host population in eastern Chad has not been as high a priority as assisting refugees despite malnutrition rates above emergency thresholds and similar conditions to those of refugees. Yet, FFW was discontinued when additional resources were required to meet refugees' needs. As a result, the level of assistance to IDPs and the host population in eastern Chad was judged inadequate and the effectiveness of activities in their favour was limited given that there was a low level of activity compared to the high level of need. In addition, this discrepancy between the food and general services provided to refugees and Chadians has resulted in tensions in the region.

35. The FFW activities such as the construction of small dams, wells, and water catchments; rehabilitation of irrigation dikes and roads and reforestation directly link to increased food production and improved food security. Still several factors limited the effectiveness of FFW to strengthen the resiliency of communities to shocks through safety nets (SO2) including the fact that the activity was not seen as reliable due to frequent suspensions and the short time-span of contracts with partners as well as the little resources devoted to non-food items, which limited the scope and size of possible FFW activities. Finally, the availability of technical assistance to design and support FFW activities, whether internally or through partners, was limited.

36. The evaluation found that school enrolment during the portfolio period increased (SO4) by almost 200 percent in eastern Chad and about 100 percent in the Sahelian zone and that girls' enrolment followed a similar trend, thus reducing gender imbalances. While attribution is difficult, the increase in access to education seems primarily due to expansion of the school feeding programme, and to a lesser extent to an increase in the number of schools. Beneficiaries clearly indicated that school feeding, including the take-home rations for girls, was an important incentive in their decision to send and keep their children in school. However, as the Government is under pressure to expand education for all children, it places more emphasis on increasing access to education than on enhancing its quality. Unless a genuine effort is made by the Government and WFP to combine school meals with good curriculum, well-trained teachers, safe drinking water, a latrine, and a dynamic parent association, the quality of the intended education outcome will continue to remain relatively low.

37. Except in refugee camps, nutrition activities were insufficient compared to the needs and nutrition rates in the east and *Sahelian* zone partly deteriorated. More efforts should be placed on improving the referral system between supplementary and therapeutic feeding and in nutrition education. WFP's support to PLWHIV is highly appreciated, encouraged people to get tested and showed positive nutritional effects.

38. **Sustainability.** For the bulk of the portfolio, which focused on life saving activities for refugees, sustainability was not the intended outcome. However, in several camps in the south, with the support of WFP and UNHCR and thanks to a conducive environment, refugees have actually become self-reliant permitting to reduce assistance levels. Ownership of FFW, which is key for sustainability through asset maintenance, was generally low except when the work focused on building schools, a clear priority of local communities.

39. Sustainability is a challenge due to the weak capacity of the Government and because of the limited number of NGOs. There is little possibility to hand over any of the WFP portfolio activities to the Government of Chad and the commitment of the Government to continue activities that WFP currently implements is absent.

## **Main recommendations**

**Recommendation 1: The Country Office should develop a clear five-year strategy and vision for the overall country portfolio, which would permeate the entire country office operations and guide programme decisions and resource allocation with a view to increasing impact and sustainability.** Key country office staff, especially the Country Director, Deputy Country Director, and heads of units, should participate in the strategy development process as well as senior managers from technical units the Regional Bureau (RB) and Headquarters (HQ) in order to ensure that the engagements are realistic and implementable. Consultation with key stakeholders including the Government, other

UN agencies, multilateral and bilateral donors and NGOs is also recommended to ensure that realism, relevance, and coordination are achieved. External facilitation is recommended to ensure a well-articulated process.

**Recommendation 2: The Country Office should develop a management approach that supports the implementation of the strategy and attainment of the vision by integrating decision-making across the entire country portfolio.** A clearly articulated management approach is required given the breadth of decisions and challenges across all operations to increase responsiveness to field requests, allow the country office to adapt to changing needs, and improve operational efficiency and effectiveness. Several specific actions are recommended: 1) developing a detailed schedule of authorities specifying who is responsible for routine and exceptional decisions and who should be informed; 2) giving increased responsibility (under proper oversight by senior manager) to sub-offices and notably the *Abeche* office in eastern Chad; 3) preparing a more detailed and integrated annual work planning process describing major activities, roles and responsibilities to guide and empower sub-office managers; and 4) develop a strategy to ensure that sufficient staff are available (taking into consideration R&R, etc) and that staff are living and working in adequate conditions.

**Recommendation 3: The cost of implementing programme activities should be reviewed as part of developing the strategy on where and how WFP will intervene in Chad with a view to lower the high costs of implement projects in Chad.** It is recommended that a complete portfolio review be conducted to see where cost synergies can be gained (for example by clustering activities in smaller areas, etc).

**Recommendation 4:** Given the size and complexity of the portfolio, the Country Office, Regional Bureau, and Headquarters should clearly identify what technical support and backstopping is required from the RB and HQ and give higher consideration to staffing needs and staff rotations to ensure a smooth portfolio implementation and management.

**Recommendation 5: The Country Office systems and standards must be strengthened to increase operational efficiency and reinforce programmes.** The country portfolio faces a complex mix of operational challenges, technical demands and reporting requirements. Simple systems and standards on communication, programme, monitoring and reporting should be put in place and communicated throughout WFP and to stakeholders in order to enhance efficiency. The administrative, financial, and programme systems should be further coordinated and aggregated to support efficient decision-making and understand trade-offs.

**Recommendation 6: The Country Office should develop a systematic approach with its key partners to strengthen partnership, integration, and coordination with the Government of Chad.** In addition, a higher level strategy that engages and commits the Government is required that will involve a frank dialogue with senior Government officials, and reconnect WFP with the Ministry of Plan and Economics (which has a coordination role). The focus should not be what can you do for me but what can we accomplish together and how can we do it? WFP could use the existing UN coordinated structures as a forum to facilitate this.


**Recommendation 7: The Country Office should review the scope, content, and potential for integration across activities in its programmes to ensure focused efforts towards high-level performance and results.** It is recommended that a formal review, with support from the Regional Bureau and Rome Headquarters, of the scope, content, and potential for integration within operations and across activities be conducted. Although this should be done initially

as an internal exercise, the Government of Chad and other UN agencies should subsequently be included in the dialogue to ensure that realistic expectations are conveyed to stakeholders and that ownership and buy-in occur.

**Recommendation 8: The Country Office needs a fully qualified Public Relations Officer to ensure that the message of the WFP's good work gets out and that important emergency situations receive sufficient attention.**

This would avoid misinformation and poorly coordinated messages, which do not sufficiently highlight WFP's good work in Chad and would allow to highlight the food security situation and assistance needs for the host population in the east of the country and in the *Sahelian* zone.

# Map



## 1 - Introduction

1. The influx of refugees from Darfur into eastern Chad and from the CAR into southern Chad that began in late 2003 exacerbated conditions in a country already struggling with high levels of food insecurity and poverty. The resulting complex and serious humanitarian crisis serves as the context for the Country Portfolio Evaluation (CPE) of the 10 WFP food assistance operations implemented in Chad between 2003 and 2009.
2. This chapter introduces key features of the evaluation and the Chad country context that have influenced the WFP country portfolio. Annex 1 presents the Terms of Reference for the Chad CPE and Annex 2 lists documents used in the preparation of this report.

### 1.1. Evaluation Features

3. **Scope.** The Chad CPE encompasses the 10 WFP food assistance operations between 2003 and 2009. The time period was selected on the basis of the influx of refugees from Sudan and the CAR in 2003, which marked a significant shift in the type and size of the country portfolio. The report covers seven EMOPs<sup>2</sup>, one PRRO,<sup>3</sup> and two CPs,<sup>4</sup> including CP 10018, which started in 2001 but finished in 2007. Given the strategic focus of this evaluation, special operations (SOs) will be considered a technical activity supporting the objectives of existing operations (such as EMOPs and PRROs) used by the CO to achieve objectives and foster partnerships. The SOs will be included and reviewed to this extent in the evaluation.

4. Given its strategic nature, the CPE did not evaluate the 10 individual food assistance operations as such, but examined the relevance and coherence of the WFP portfolio as a whole. The CPE also examined the portfolio evolution, its performance and WFP's strategic role in Chad. The report evaluated how main activities across operations contributed to the achievements of the strategic objectives.

5. The geographic scope included all areas of the country covered by the country portfolio. The fieldwork focused on the three areas covered by WFP assistance: 1) eastern Chad; 2) southern Chad; and 3) five provinces in the *Sahelian* zone.

6. **Rationale.** This CPE will assist the Chad CO in reviewing past performance and comparative advantage and will support strategy definition for future WFP activities. The evaluation provides insights for the preparation of the 2010 Chad Country Strategic Document (CSD). In line with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations, the preparation of the CSD will synchronize the country portfolio with the preparation of a national Poverty Reduction Strategy 2 and the UNDAF as it draws from and informs this process. The next UNDAF cycle in Chad should begin in 2011.

7. This CPE is additionally motivated by the fact that none of the operations implemented since 2003 have been evaluated<sup>5</sup>. The CO was the main beneficiary of an independent assessment of its operations, especially as many of their operations will enter new phases in 2010. In addition, the CO recognizes the need to examine potential overlap in targeting and activities.

8. **Objectives.** The CPE had both accountability and learning objectives. As such, this evaluation will 1) assess and report whether or not the performance and results

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<sup>2</sup> EMOPs: 10295; 10325; 10327; 10295.1; 10327.1; 10559; 10559.1

<sup>3</sup> PRRO 10510

<sup>4</sup> CP 10018 and CP 10478

<sup>5</sup> In 2005 an evaluation mission to Chad rapidly reviewed CP 10018 as part of the formulation of CP 10478.

of the CO portfolio agree with the WFP mandate in response to humanitarian and development challenges in Chad (accountability), and 2) draw lessons from successes and failures to allow the CO to make informed strategic decisions about positioning in Chad, strategic partnerships, operations design, and implementation (learning). Of these two objectives, emphasis was placed on learning, in line with the rationale for this evaluation and of the perceived interest of key stakeholders.

**9. Key Issues for the Evaluation.** The evaluation will focus on three issues:

**10. Strategic alignment of the WFP portfolio.** The main questions were: Is WFP Chad's portfolio aligned with the country's humanitarian and developmental agenda, needs, priorities, and capacities of the Government and its partners (multilateral, bilateral, and NGOs)? Does the WFP Chad portfolio take domestic and regional aspects of the crisis into account? Have there been any trade-offs between aligning with national strategies and WFP strategic plans and corporate policies?

**11. Making strategic choices.** The main questions were: Did WFP Chad analyze the national hunger, food security, and nutrition issues or use existing analyses to understand key hunger challenges in making programming decisions? Did WFP contribute to putting hunger, food security, and nutrition issues on the national agenda, advocate for inclusion to national and partner strategies, and build national capacity? In what ways did WFP position itself as a strategic partner with Government, multilateral, bilateral, and NGO partners? Which underlying factors drove WFP strategy?

**12. Performance and results of the WFP portfolio.** The main questions were: How did the operations perform and what did they achieve in terms of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, and sustainability? Were there synergistic and multiplying effects across similar activities in different operations? What was the interdependence between the logistics operations and the food aid operations? Were there operational synergistic and multiplying effects between WFP activities and those of partners (multilateral, bilateral, and NGOs)?

**13. Main Activities Undertaken during evaluation.** The Chad CPE team was composed of a team leader (who was also the food security specialist), a logistics specialist, a nutrition specialist, and an education/school feeding specialist. The CPE was organized into three phases: an inception phase, an evaluation phase, and a reporting phase. The inception phase, which lasted from December 7, 2009 – January 30, 2010, included a briefing in Rome (3 days), a preparatory mission in Chad (1 week), a stakeholder analysis, and all preparatory work that led to the development and acceptance of the Inception Report.

14. The Evaluation Phase, which occurred between February 8 – March 4, 2010, included all field work activities, including additional review of data and information, extensive stakeholder consultations, and visits to all parts of the country where food assistance operations were implemented during the 2003 – 2009 evaluation period. Evaluation methods used were both qualitative and quantitative, using quantitative methods when reliable data were available and qualitative approaches when data were not available.

15. Several constraints were faced during the evaluation including:

- Civil insecurity. The whole of Chad remains in a high UN security phase, with a significant part of eastern and northern Chad in UN security phase 4 and the western and southern part of UN security phase 3;
- With the exception of the immediate area around the sub-offices, civil insecurity in eastern Chad restricted movement and observations of the evaluation team. Military escorts were required to visit refugees and IDP camps in this area.

16. Logistical challenges. Chad has substantial logistical challenges: the country is landlocked, large, has poor infrastructure, and the rainy season limits food through the Douala Corridor and the internal movement of food. These challenges are compounded by numerous and scattered final delivery points. Planning in coordination with WFP CO and sub-offices maximized time allocated for evaluation fieldwork, but some parts of the country were not visited due to logistical constraints (particularly, *Maro* in southern and *Haraze* in south-eastern Chad).

17. Lack of institutional memory. During the 2003–2009 period, there has been significant staff-turnover, poor documentation of past project activities, a weak M&E system, and no formal evaluation of operations. The significant staff turnover and lack of institutional memory limited in some cases the team’s ability to have sufficient detail to evaluate the earlier portion of the country portfolio. In some cases where staff members worked in the same WFP office or another one in-country, a more complete historical perspective was possible. The evaluation consequently focused on more recent food assistance operations.

18. Nation-wide school teacher strike. During the first week of the evaluation, a nation-wide school teachers’ strike was called. Although this limited access to school teachers, the evaluation team met with Government officials, teachers in several parts of the country (especially at the end of the mission), and beneficiaries (parents and students).

19. These challenges, however, did not substantially impact the ability of the evaluation team to implement activities.

20. Quality assurance was done through developing the best sampling method possible, using solid data collection methods, triangulating results, and verifying the results with several stakeholders.

21. **Intended Users.** The intended users of the evaluation are first and foremost the Chad CO and its partners in the Government of Chad, as well as the United Nations Country Team (UNCT), multilateral and bilateral donors, and NGOs. Also important are internal WFP stakeholders such as the Regional Bureau (Dakar), Headquarters management and relevant units and the Executive Board. In particular, the evaluation expects to inform:

- WFP on strategic positioning of operations in the future and adjusting programmes as necessary;
- The Government of Chad on domestic policy agenda and work toward improved ownership and coordinated policies and activities;
- The UNCT as it develops its new UNDAF planned for 2011;
- Multilateral and bilateral donors on the performance and results of activities that it funds, including whether and how these programmes can complement their own in the health, education, and food security and rural development sectors; and
- NGOs on the performance and results of activities, how these activities can increase impact and be more relevant, efficient, effective, and sustainable, and how WFP can better partner with them.

## 1.2. Context

22. This section explains critical aspects of the social and economic context in Chad from 2003 to 2009 that shaped WFP’s mission and country portfolio.

**23. Overview.** Chad is a landlocked country, located about 1700 km from the nearest sea port of Douala, Cameroon. Chad continues to struggle with high poverty levels (about 54 percent) and underemployment. Population density increases as one moves southward: about half the population lives in the southern belt (one-fifth of the country's territory), where most of Chad's major cities, including the capital city N'Djamena, are located. The south also has relatively high investment in industry, including newly found petroleum deposits. The rest of the population resides mostly in the central belt and about 100,000 pastoralists live in the Saharan region in the north.

24. The economy has historically been agricultural and pastoral, as petroleum production is a recent development (since 2003). Over three-quarters (76 percent) of Chad's population of approximately 11 million live in rural areas and mainly make a living by subsistence cultivation, herding, and/or fishing. Locally-produced cereals (millet, sorghum, rice, and maize) are generally sold for consumption within Chad or exchanged in Nigeria. Cotton production in the south provides the principal cash crop as well as significant rural employment (about 2 million people). Apart from the petroleum sector, industries are limited to a few agricultural-based processing units, cotton and meat products, and production of bottled beer, soap, cigarettes, and construction materials.

**25. Poverty and Level of Development.** Chad is one of the poorest countries of the world, ranking 170 of 177 in the 2008 Human Development Index. It has a small formal sector and a large, thriving informal sector. Statistics indicate the following distribution of GDP: agriculture, 21.5 percent (farming, livestock, and fishing); industry, 47.8 percent; and services, 30.6 percent. The country depends highly on foreign assistance and while it has generally maintained a satisfactory macroeconomic track record for GDP growth (averaging 5.2 percent between 1994 and 2003), the distribution of these gains has not been widespread throughout the population. Over half of the population remains below the poverty line. Indications are that revenue from the petroleum sector, which reached US\$1.2 billion in 2008, has had an impact on infrastructure development (especially roads), but only a modest impact on improving access to education and health.

26. Poverty in Chad is the consequence of more than two decades of civil war, limited economic and livelihood opportunities, increasing population pressure, and limited Government expenditure in key sectors such as agriculture, health, and education. Rural households, especially female-headed households, have significantly higher incidence of poverty.


27. Development indicators have generally been poor during this period. While access to education has improved, especially for girls, rates of infant and juvenile mortality have remained the same since the 1990s. Worse yet, maternal mortality and infant malnutrition have increased. The illiteracy rate is high among adults and the education level in rural Chad, particularly among the transhumant and nomadic population in the remote northern part, is low.

**28. Natural and Manmade Disasters.** The main natural and manmade disasters in Chad include high climate variability, conflicts, and price variability. Although agricultural production was relatively stable from 2003 through 2009, households, especially the *Sahelian* zone, experienced erratic rainfall and localized droughts and floods. Major droughts generally occur once in every ten years, with minor droughts occurring once in every five years. Although the average annual rainfall varies depending on the part of the country, there are wide inter-annual swings in total precipitation and spacing over the season, and in much of the arable south there is roughly one "poor" year in three. The most significant manmade disasters were related to civil insecurity, produced by internal and external factors (see section

below). The implication of recurring natural and manmade disasters is a need to periodically expand or adjust operations WFP operations in Chad.

**29. Civil Insecurity.** Civil insecurity is not new to Chad. For more than two decades, civil insecurity and unrest have had a destructive influence on the people, limiting livelihood options, restricting economic development and resulting in mass movement of people, both internal displacement and out-migration. Since 2003, the degradation of the security situation in Sudan’s Darfur region, persistent insecurity in the CAR, and increasing internal instability due to activities by armed groups and inter-ethnic tensions has further deteriorated the country’s already precarious security situation. Figure 1 illustrates the high level of insecurity in the country. Although the level of insecurity diminished in the southern part of Chad, eastern Chad remains in a precarious situation (phase 4). The implication of high civil insecurity for WFP operations is that access to beneficiaries, especially in eastern Chad, can be limited, increase the cost of delivering food assistance and make post-delivery monitoring more difficult.

**Figure 1: Number of security incidences in Chad, January 2006–June 2009**



Source: United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS)

**30. Food Insecurity.** Almost eighty percent of the population depends on subsistence farming and herding for their livelihoods. Agro-pastoralism is the predominant livelihood in eastern Chad, with agriculture dominating in the southern areas and livestock rearing prevailing in the north. Cereal production is heavily affected by erratic rains, cyclical droughts, and pest infestation (especially locusts). An indicator of chronic food insecurity is the high rates of malnutrition throughout the country (see section on health and nutrition).

31. Chadian agriculture has the current capacity to meet 60-70 percent of consumption requirements in normal years, with the balance imported commercially or brought in as food assistance. About 40 percent of the Chadian population are either food insecure or at risk of food insecurity.<sup>6</sup> While the entire country is vulnerable to food insecurity due to the risk of civil insecurity and natural disasters, the areas considered to be highly vulnerable are *Bourkou-Ennedi-Tibesti* (BET) *Kanem*, *Baril El Gazal*, *Batha*, *Guera*, *Ouaddai*, and *Wadi Fira*. The *Sahelian* zone is characterized by chronic food deficits. An estimated 69 percent of household expenses are devoted to food, which implies a high vulnerability to price fluctuations and high transport costs. Half the population eats fewer than three meals a day and

<sup>6</sup> Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping (VAM), 2009.

13 percent eat once a day only. The national daily caloric intake stands at 1,720 kcal, a decrease of 20 percent since 1971, which places Chad well below the Sub-Saharan Africa average (2,160).<sup>7</sup>

**32. Government strategy and capacity.** The Government of Chad has articulated priorities in four ways: the development of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2 (PRSP), the adoption of the Millennium Development Goals, the commitment to of Universal Primary Education, and the declaration of the Chadian President when he took the oath of office in 2006. The PRSP 2, released in April 2008 covers the 2008 – 2011 period and focuses on good governance, a good policy environment to support strong economic growth, robust rural development, development of infrastructure, investment in human resources, and good economic management. The PRSP 2 integrates the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) indicators, gender questions, as well as conflict prevention.

33. When taking office in 2006, the Chadian President stated that his attention would be dedicated to social issues, including poverty reduction, expanding access to health care, education, and social justice. These statements clearly state the goals and objectives of the Government; but they do not constitute a strategy that articulates a clear action plan.

34. Building on the 2004 common country assessment, the UNDAF for 2006–2010 presents the United Nations UN vision of its contribution to the realization of the PRSP 2 and puts forward five thematic areas of work for UN agencies: 1) developing human capital; 2) promoting democratic and economic governance; 3) restoring and safeguarding ecosystems; 4) managing crises and emergencies; and 5) fighting HIV/AIDS. WFP should continue to work through the UNDAF process to coordinate with other UN agencies in support of the goals of the PRSP 2.

35. The Government of Chad has developed, or worked with partners to develop, policies and programmes in key sectors such as health, education, and food security. For Health, UNICEF and the Government have agreed an action plan for the period of 2006–2010.<sup>8</sup> The main objectives of this agreement are 1) to eradicate polio, neonatal and maternal tetanus, and to control measles; 2) to implement in 18 districts the relevant components of the *Stratégie d'Accélération de la Survie et le Développement de l'Enfant*, or SASDE, which include immunization, management of infection, and ante-natal care; 3) to increase the rate of exclusive breastfeeding and to ensure that a minimum of 60 percent of all severely malnourished children are correctly treated, and 60 percent of all children under five and pregnant mothers receive micronutrient supplements and de-worming medicine; 4) to allocate 80 percent of all medical services in the 18 districts to assist in HIV/AIDS programming; and 5) to strengthen the capacity of partner institutions to react quickly in emergency situations. In May 2007, the Government adopted a new health policy that was broader than previous policies by expanding access to health care, providing medicine for HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis, the distribution of mosquito nets, expanding immunization, and providing potable water. Still, fundamental problems continue to limit healthcare access and quality, including insufficient public spending, poor planning, coordination, coverage and poorly trained staff.

36. The Government adopted in 2002 a national action plan to provide access to education for all children and improve the quality of education by the year 2015.<sup>9</sup> To support this action plan, UNICEF and the Government developed an action plan for the *Sahelian zone* (2006–2010)<sup>10</sup>. This plan included mobilizing resources to train

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<sup>7</sup> CSAO–CILSS, Profil Sécurité Alimentaire, April 2008.

<sup>8</sup> République du Tchad/UNICEF: *Plan d'Action du Programme Pays entre le Gouvernement de Tchad et le Fonds des Nations Unies pour l'Enfance* (UNICEF) 2006–2010.

<sup>9</sup> Government of Chad. 2002. *Plan d'Action National de l'Éducation pour Tous (PAN/EPT) à l'an 2015*.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

additional teachers, increasing school attendance (especially girls), building and improving schools in remote areas, and strengthening Ministry of National Education (MEN) staff to plan, manage, and deliver services. An important milestone was the creation of an agency to promote and support local initiatives for education (APICED) in 2003.

37. For food security, a national programme for food security (*Programme national des Securite alimentaire* [PNSA]) was developed in 2006 with FAO support. It aims to fight hunger and food insecurity by increasing productivity as well as the population's quantitative and qualitative access to food commodities while preserving basic natural resources. This programme is very inclusive conceptually, but has not received sufficient funding to implement its mandate. FAO was also implementing a project, funded by the European Union (EU), to support the Systems, Applications and Products in Data Processing (SAP), although this project was ending in 2009.

38. The generally weak capacity of the Government to plan, coordinate, manage, and implement initiatives in key sectors such as health, education, and food security (especially agriculture and rural development) constrains the implementation of Government strategies. Interviews with the Government, UN agencies, multilateral and bilateral partners, and NGOs repeatedly highlighted weak Government capacity and resources that were insufficient for Government agencies to carry out mandates. There is also a weak national M&E system and process, greatly limiting the collection, availability, and use of data in decision-making. This is especially true in key sectors such as education and health.

**39. Agriculture and Rural Development.** Chad's environment is fragile, subject to climatic and economic vagaries, uncontrolled population pressure that have resulted in increasing soil impoverishment, poor use and over-exploitation of natural resources, the destruction of fauna, and uncontrolled transhumance. Civil instability, poor planning, insufficient budget resources toward basic services and enforcement have further restricted agricultural growth and rural development.

40. Only a part of the country (mainly in the south) receives sufficient annual rainfall in the single rainy season to allow crop cultivation. Yearly rainfall ranges from virtually zero in the desert, through 350 mm in the central arable areas to over 800 mm in the far south. There are important areas of flood-retreat agriculture on annual river floodplains in the far southwest and southeast, favouring the production of rice and sorghum/millet respectively. Lake Chad supports active fishing in several livelihood zones. Chad has large underground water reserves suitable for irrigation, but only a small area is actually under irrigation. In this context, agriculture is generally low and WFP could seek to contribute to improving infrastructure or increasing productivity.

**41. Health and Nutrition.** Over the last 10 years, no progress has been accomplished with respect to acute and chronic malnutrition despite numerous nutrition interventions. Global acute malnutrition rates have remained above the 10 percent critical threshold, rising from 11.7 percent in 1996 to 14.4 percent in 2004. In rural areas, the situation is particularly critical with an average rate of 15.8 percent in 2005.

42. According to the 2005 VAM survey, the nutritional situation of children under 5 years of age was already very poor, with global acute malnutrition (GAM) rates ranging from 7.2 percent to 28 percent. In northern Chad, the overall GAM rates were 22 percent, with chronic malnutrition rates as high as 38 percent in parts of *Kanem, Batha, Wadi Fira* and the eastern part of *Guéra*. The VAM assessment also showed a concerning nutrition situation in the eastern part of the country, with GAM rates ranging from 12.7 percent to 18.6 percent. The situation further deteriorated over the next couple of years, with UNICEF/WFP (2007) and ACF (2009) studies

documenting GAM rates among children under five 5 significantly above 15 percent, which is the international benchmark for declaring nutritional emergencies.

43. The situation in southern Chad never exceeded 10 percent of GAM among children under 5 years of age – which is true for the local population as well as the refugees from CAR. There is a higher agriculture potential in southern Chad and more dietary diversity, thereby providing increased access to a better diet.

44. The nutritional situation of Sudanese refugees has been documented in a very systematic way by UNHCR since 2004 (see Annex 7). Sudanese refugees began arriving in April 2003 and showed GAM levels close to 40 percent in children under 5 years of age. The international community reacted fast, and the nutritional situation improved greatly; since 2006 it is below the critical benchmark of 15 percent—in most cases below 10 percent of acute malnutrition. In any case, the nutritional situation is better as compared to the local population in the East and North of the country.

45. Global chronic malnutrition (GCM) also remained extremely high, with rates above the 30 percent threshold, for example 38.8 percent in 1996 and 36.7 percent in 2004<sup>11</sup>. The evaluation team did not find a single study that explored possible factors explaining these high GCM levels, but contributing factors include poor access to food, health services, education, quality water, and sanitation. UNICEF studies have focused on health and care aspects; while VAM studies have focused more on food availability aspects and dietary diversity.

46. Descriptive statistics presented in the Chad demographic and health survey showed that malnutrition rates were twice as high in children with illiterate mothers as compared to mothers with higher education. Because illiteracy rates are still very high in Chad, this seems to be one of the major obstacles to sustainably improve the nutritional situation. This observation is very much in line with the meta-analysis done by the International Food Policy Research Institute.<sup>12</sup> Looking at improvements in malnutrition from 1976 to 1995, they found that over 50 percent of the successes were due to women's education and women's social status.

47. In the context of health and nutrition, WFP has started the support to HIV/ AIDS affected people and their families. The current HIV/ AIDS epidemic update (April 2009) reveals that 200,000 people were living with HIV/ AIDS in 2007. The prevalence rate amongst adults was estimated to be 3.3 percent. Women seem to be more susceptible (4 percent) as men (2.8 percent). In addition there are regional variations (South: >10 percent), urban (7 percent – rural (2.3 percent) differences and higher susceptibility among certain professions like traders (9 percent), lorry drivers (10 percent), and combatants (7 percent).

48. **Education.** The Government has stated its commitment to achieving objectives of the MDG. They recognize that universal education is an important part of meeting the MDG targets, and in Chad the Government is trying to achieve two objectives related to education:

- Achieve universal primary education, specifically by having all boys and girls able to complete the full course of primary school by 2015; and
- Promote gender equality and empower women by eliminating gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and to all levels of education no later than 2015.

49. To achieve these objectives several multilateral and bilateral donors have provided financial and technical assistance, including the World Bank, the African

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<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Smith et al, International Food Policy Research Institute, 2000.

Development Bank, the French Development Agency, the EU, and the United States Government. The World Bank, for example, has assisted the Government through the Education sector reform project which operated from 2003 until assistance was halted in 2008 due to poor use of oil revenues. The main objective was to develop the policy framework, strategies, and means for quality universal basic education and to implement corresponding activities. Over US\$100 million was invested in this programme.

50. Access to basic education is very limited<sup>13</sup>. According to the latest official statistics,<sup>14</sup> the gross school enrolment rate was 75.4 percent in 2000–2001, with major differences between geographical areas and gender. In that school year, only 58.9 percent of girls attended primary school. Large numbers of pupils drop out, especially toward the end of the syllabus, a phenomenon affecting 9.2 percent of schoolchildren at the national level (9 percent boys and 11.1 percent girls).<sup>15</sup> During the course of the year, both boys and girls drop out part of the time to support the family in agricultural activities (including herding). As both boys and girls get older (especially girls), drop out rates increase for cultural (girls) and economic (boys and girls) reasons. According to the 2000–2001 statistics, 74 percent of the population group aged 15 and over was illiterate.

51. The MEN faces the challenge of educating an ever-increasing number of children and reaching children in remote localities. The Government does not have a good track record in improving education, both in terms of facilities and developing curricula. Public schools record high dropout rates and numbers of students repeating the same grade. Expanding the availability of education requires the Government to build school facilities in remote areas, but that only addresses part of the problem. The Government has a weak capacity to implement or support implementation with partners of education activities. The MEN has not been able to effectively mobilize all partners to strengthen and expand access to education in Chad.

52. Education in Chad is constrained by socio-economic, socio-cultural, and security factors. Children from poor families find it difficult to stay in school as staying in school has an high opportunity cost for households as children are needed for economic-earning and household activities. In addition, many parents do not have the financial resources to buy books, stationary, and school uniforms. Malaria and other infections that affect the poor also reduce school attendance.

53. Teachers also have a difficult time keeping education viable. Many teachers do not have sufficient training, are not paid regularly, and do not have sufficient facilities (classrooms, storage, kitchen, and water). Teachers also lack pedagogical and didactical materials. Finally, teachers do not always have a secure workplace.

**54. Humanitarian Situation and International Assistance.** Since mid 2003, a serious humanitarian crisis has unfolded in Chad as a result of the degradation of the security situation in Sudan's Darfur region, persistent insecurity in the CAR, and increasing internal instability due to activities by armed groups and inter-ethnic tensions. Since then, Chad has sheltered 255,000 Sudanese refugees in the east and 58,000 Central African refugees in the south, while internal conflicts have caused the displacement of 188,000 Chadians in the east. No returns of refugees from Darfur are envisaged for the foreseeable future. Furthermore, 5,500 refugees from Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Rwanda live in urban areas. The current humanitarian crisis has both a regional and internal causes.

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<sup>13</sup> See Annex 8 for available disaggregated data tables for education.

<sup>14</sup> Ministry of Education, Chad National Report, 2004.

<sup>15</sup> Statistical data on education, 2000–2001 and 2001–2002 school years, Directorate for analysis and forecasting, December 2002.

55. In addition, Chad has also faced several sporadic natural disasters (mostly floods and disease outbreaks), which could become more frequent and extreme due to climate change<sup>16</sup>. During the evaluation period households in the *Sahelian* zone faced several drought and locust infestations, including a severe drought and locust infestation in 2005 and a severe drought in 2009. While flooding routinely occurs in southern Chad, these floods do not usually have a negative impact on agricultural production as they are a source of water for irrigation and recessional agriculture.

56. The efforts of the international community (including donors) and of the Government have steered away from development to focus heavily on the emergency relief needs of IDPs, refugees, and host populations. The overall Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) requirements have increased from US\$30.1 million in 2004 to US\$389 million for 2009, with between 40 and 45 percent of these requirements for food assistance.<sup>17</sup>

57. In line with the humanitarian reform, sectoral clusters were activated in 2007 to improve coordination mechanisms. While the delivery of assistance has been impeded by a deteriorating security situation, an improvement is expected as a result of the deployment of a peacekeeping force in eastern Chad.

58. All refugees are under the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior, which appointed a local structure to coordinate with different donors: Commission *Nationale d'Accueil et de Reinsertion des Refugies* (CNAR). The CNAR role is to coordinate refugee affairs with relevant UN donors, such as UNHCR and WFP. UNHCR's responsibility is to provide protection to refugees and WFP's is to provide food (including logistics). NGOs are implementing agencies within this structure.


59. The Commission *Nationale d'Appui aux Forces Internationales* (CONAFIT) is entrusted to provide support to the international forces, for example UN and European Union Force (EUFOR). EUFOR withdrew from Chad in March 2009 at the end of its mandate. Most of the EUFOR forces have been absorbed by the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), the UN body established by the Security Council to provide security in the refugee camps and for IDPs in Chad. The CONAFIT structure includes military and civilian units. The structure has been decentralized in order to address issues at the local level (humanitarian and development). CONAFIT regional offices are in *Salamat, Wadi Fira, Ouaddai, and Dar Sila*.

60. The major donors that supported humanitarian activities in Chad during the 2003–2009 period were the United States of America (USA), the EU, United Kingdom, Japan, Netherlands, France, and Canada. Figure 2 presents an aggregation of funding across all food assistance operation during the evaluation period. It should be noted that emergency operations in eastern and southern Chad to support the Sudanese and CAR refugees, respectively, were very well funded; while activities in the *Sahelian* zone to support development activities were poorly funded (less than 9 percent of total funds expended).

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<sup>16</sup> FEWS NET documents

<sup>17</sup> Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) CAP documents



**Figure 2: Funding history and total contributions in Chad by multilateral organizations, 2004–2009 in US\$ (as of 14 June 2009)**

### 1.3. WFP’s Portfolio

**61. Overview of WFP in Chad.** WFP operations in Chad started in 1963, when WFP was created as an independent UN programme. Since then, 61 operations have taken place in Chad for a total value of US\$1 billion. Since 2003, the main focus of WFP operations in Chad has been providing food assistance to refugees, IDPs, and host populations affected by conflicts in Sudan and the CAR.

**62. Portfolio.** Since 2003, WFP assistance to Chad increased dramatically and has amounted to more than US\$767 million, strongly focused on direct response to, and support of, conflict-related emergencies in eastern and southern Chad (see Table 1). The Chad CPE for the period 2003 – 2009 focuses on 10 different food assistance projects, including 2 CPs, 7 EMOPs and 1 PRRO. Out of these 10 projects, 3 were still in progress<sup>18</sup> at the time of the evaluation. A CP developed in 2001 focused on reducing food insecurity in the short-term and vulnerability to drought in the medium terms in the *Grand Kanem, Batha, Guera, Biltine, and Ouaddai*; and a second CP was developed to continue this work. Two EMOPs were developed in 2003 to address the needs of the influx of refugees from Darfur, Sudan into eastern Chad and from the CAR into southern Chad. In 2006, a PRRO was developed for southern Chad to replace the EMPO, and focused on the CAR refugees located in the South of the country and the host population of *Logone, Mandoul, and Moyen Chari*. In 2007 the fourth EMOP was developed for eastern Chad, and for the first time included assistance for IDP host communities and refugee-affected local populations.

<sup>18</sup> DEV 10478 01/01/2007 – 31/12/2010 ; EMOP 10559.1 01/01/2009 – 30/06/2010 ; PRRO 10510 01/03/2006 – 31/03/2010

**Table 1: WFP operations 2003–2009**

	# of operations	Total cost (US\$)	Percentage
Country Programmes (CPs)–	2 <sup>19</sup>	69,225,428	9
Emergency Operation (EMOP)	7	616,180,524	80
Protracted Relief and Recovery	1	25,349,000	3
Special Operation (SO) in support	6	56,522,711	7
<b>Total</b>	16	767,277,663	100

Source: WFP CO and project documents

63. The dramatic shift toward humanitarian assistance beginning in 2003 is confirmed by the general quantities of food aid delivered per food aid type per year, both in volume and in percentage (emergency compared to development (see Table 2).

**Table 2: Food aid delivered in Chad 2003–2007 in MT per food aid type**

Food Aid Type	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	Total
Emergency	3,256	33,172	57,494	50,814	56,792	201,528
Development	12,780	8,313	14,632	8,379	10,765	54,869
<b>Total</b>	16,036	41,486	72,126	59,193	67,557	256,397

Source: Source–WFP INTERFAIS database in WFP.org website.

64. Key external events from 2003 through 2009 that led to significant changes in WFP operations can be divided into two types: civil insecurity in neighbouring countries and macroeconomic shocks. As previously mentioned, the conflicts in Sudan (Darfur) and the CAR resulted in a massive influx of refugees into eastern and southern Chad, respectively. The other significant external shock during this period was the 2008 world high food and fuel price crises.


65. The geographic distribution of the 10 food assistance operations is shown in Figure 3 and the temporal distribution in Figure 4. The portfolio provides assistance into three regions:

- **Eastern Chad:** These operations provide assistance to Sudanese refugees, IDPs, IDP host communities, and refugee-affected local populations in eastern Chad;
- **Southern Chad:** These operations provide assistance to CAR refugees in southern Chad; and
- **Sahelian zone:** These operations provide development assistance in the central and western part of the *Sahelian zone* of the country (*Kanem, Baril El Gazel, Batha, Ouaddai, and Wadi Fira*).

66. The rationale of this division is that in each of these three regions a series of operations were initiated due to a consistent set of circumstances that have continued in the same area. It should be noted that there was an overlap between the CP for 2001 – 2005 (10018.0) and the EMOPs for eastern Chad, with food assistance operations assisting beneficiaries under both operations. In the CP for 2007 - 2010, the portion of the *Sahelian zone* was covered only by the EMOPs for eastern Chad, which were expanded to include local Chadian populations

<sup>19</sup> Including CP 10018, which started in 2001 and finished in 2007.

Figure 3: Geographic distribution of WFP Country Portfolio Operations 2003–2009



Source: WFP Country Office and project documents

Figure 4: Presentation of operations by geographic area and time

Region	Year								
	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	
Eastern Chad		EMOP 10325	EMOP 10327		EMOP 10327.1			EMOP 10559	
Southern Chad		EMOP 10295			EMOP 10295.1	PRRO 10510			
Sahelian Zone	CP 10078 (started Jan. 2007)								

Key  
Approved  
Extension

Source: WFP CO and project documents

67. Table 3 lists summary statistics of all operations, with the most recent operation in each region listed first.

Table 3: Summary statistics of WFP operation between 2003 and 2009

Region	Operation	Beneficiaries	Tonnage	Food Cost	Total Cost
Eastern Chad	EMOP 10559.1	787,000	163,430	70,009,22	258,441,970
	EMOP 10559	500,000	76,287	51,956,01	195,474,918
	EMOP 10327.1	366,540	89,492	22,558,84	90,265,719
	EMOP 10327	72,500	13,878	18,381,77	61,636,604
	EMOP 10325	n/a	n/a	154,142	199,369
Southern Chad	PRRO 10510	45,000	10,406	7,762,276	25,349,000
	EMOP 10295.1	32,000	3,914	2,185,841	5,665,571
	EMOP 10295	40,037	4,345	1,857,791	4,496,373
Sahelian zone	DEV 2007-2010	200,634	31,217	14,967,04	35,751,000
	DEV 2001-2005	170,000	35,383	12,500,79	33,474,428

Source: WFP Country Office and project documents

**68. Objectives and activities.** While the food assistance operations implemented since 2003 related to previous strategic plans, it is possible to use the terminology of the latest strategic plan to group the stated or unstated objectives of these operations as follows:

- **Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies (SO1).** This strategic objective encompasses assisting refugees, IDPs, and other vulnerable groups and communities whose food and nutrition has been adversely affected by shocks; and reducing acute malnutrition, protecting livelihoods, and enhancing self-reliance in emergencies and early recovery. Related activities include general and targeted food distributions, emergency nutrition programmes (therapeutic and supplementary feeding as well as MCHN) and FFW programmes, which have been common to all the emergency operations and to the PRRO implemented in Chad since 2003.
- **Prevent acute hunger and invest in disaster preparedness and mitigation measures (SO2).** This strategic objective includes supporting and strengthening the resiliency of communities to shocks through safety nets. The related activity is food-for-work in the context of the country programmes.
- **Reduce chronic hunger and under-nutrition (SO4).** This strategic objective encompasses increasing levels of education, basic nutrition, and health. The related activities include mostly school feeding and MCHN in the context of the CP.

69. The operations do not pursue a common goal at the country level. The food assistance operations, approved during the 2003–2009 period, state objectives that can be grouped as:

- **General food distribution (GFD):** To provide immediate assistance to those facing severe food shortages to secure sufficient food for consumption and prevent people from adopting negative coping strategies such as depleting productive assets. With the exception of the CP (2007–2010), GFD is an activity in all operations in the Chad country portfolio.
- **Support to education:** To contribute to the improvement of school enrolment and attendance rates in primary schools through school feeding, take home rations, adult literacy, and Food-for-training (FFT) . Support to education is a core activity of both CPs as well as two EMOPs (10327.1 and 10559) in eastern Chad.
- **Improvement in the health and nutrition of vulnerable groups:** To contribute to the improvement of health and nutrition of vulnerable groups that require immediate assistance (e.g., supplemental or therapeutic feeding) or to reduce chronic malnutrition). Improvement in the health and nutrition of vulnerable groups is a prominent feature of all 10 food assistance operations in the country portfolio. Support to people living with HIV/AIDS has been incorporated to the CP in the North and PRRO operations in the South.
- **Improvement in food security and rural development:** To strengthen livelihood strategies or reduce long-term food insecurity of food insecure people, households, and communities, primarily through food-for-work activities. Improvement in food security and rural development is a core activity in the CP as well as two EMOPs (10327.1 and 10559) in eastern Chad and the ongoing PRRO in southern Chad (10510).



**70. Resource Flows.** The receipt of donations and expenditures for the 10 food assistance operations during the 2003–2009 periods is illustrated in Figures 5 and 6. These highlight the prominence and increasing size of operations that provide assistance to Sudanese refugees, IDPs, host communities in eastern Chad. Resource flows to assist to CAR refugees in southern Chad and for development operations in the *Sahelian* zone are relatively smaller, but do show a slight upward trend over the evaluation period.

71. Table 4 shows the funding ratios for each food assistance operation and regional summary for the evaluation period, which shows that CP was relatively funded at a much lower percentage (57 percent) compared to the EMOPs and PRRO in the eastern and southern parts of the country, 75 percent and 78 percent, respectively. Taken as an ensemble, it is clear that the resource flows were the largest and the most consistent for the EMOPs in eastern Chad and that the food assistance operations in southern Chad (EMOPs and PPRO) compared to the development activities in the *Sahelian* zone.

**Table 4: Ratio of resources received compared to total approved, as of 31/12/2009**

Region	Operation	Total Budget as Approved by EB or ED(US\$)	Resourcing Recorded as Confirmed by WINGS I and II(US\$)	Ration of Funding	Regional Summary Ratio
Eastern Chad	EMOP 10559.1	258,441,970	182,989,701	71	75
	EMOP 10559	195,474,918	169,490,556	87	
	EMOP 10327.1	90,265,718	56,490,077	63	
	EMOP 10327	61,636,603	45,329,186	74	
	EMOP 10325	199,368	0	0	
Southern Chad	PRRO 10510	31,201,823	27,566,314	88	78
	EMOP 10295.1	5,665,571	2,937,524	52	
	EMOP 10295	4,496,373	1,806,773	40	
<i>Sahelian</i> zone	DEV 2007-2010	36722389	21805992	59	57
	DEV 2001-2005	29402019	16083381	55	

Source: WFP country office and project documentation



Source: WFP Country Office and project documentation

**Figure 5: Resource flows by operation for the 2003–2008 period based on actual reported expenditures, in US\$**

**Figure 6: Receipt of donations by geographic region for the 2003–2009 period, in US\$**

**72. Special Operations.** From 2003 through 2009, there were six special operations in Chad, including three that provided humanitarian air services (SO 10338, SO 10338.1, and SO 10560), one that provided logistics support to EMOP 10327 (SO 10390<sup>20</sup>, eastern Chad), one that optimized the Libyan Corridor (SO 10741), and one for fleet augmentation and logistics cluster coordination (SO 10761) (see Table 5).

**Table 5: Basic information about special operations approved between 2003–2009**

Special	Title	Total Cost	Duration
SO 10338	WFP Humanitarian Air Services	1,805,950	February–December 2004
SO 10338.1	WFP Humanitarian Air Services	7,150,532	July 2005–December 2006
SO 10390	Logistical Support to EMOP 10327	n/a	April–October 2008
SO 10560	WFP Humanitarian Air Services	8,577,976	January 2007–June 2008
SO 10741	Optimization of the Libyan Corridor	1,615,836	April–October 2008
SO 10761	Fleet Augmentation and Logistics	5,273,973	September 2008–August 2009

Source: WFP project documents

**73. New Initiatives.** No new initiatives—cash and vouchers, Purchase 4 Progress (P4P), or grants—took place during the evaluation period (2003–2009). The country office stated these initiatives could be useful in the future and are being assessed in light of the country strategy development but the focus of country office efforts has clearly been the implementation and management of the complex set of ongoing operations. There has been experience in Chad with both cash and vouchers in the past, and preference by both Government and donors have been for cash because it provides flexibility and does not undermine the private sector.

**74. Overview of the CO’s analytical work.** The Chad country office has a solid assessment and analytical capacity located in the programme office, composed of technical experts, the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) unit, and the (VAM) unit. Some of the analytical work is done internally within the WFP country office, but much of the assessment and analysis is conducted with partners. Some of the analytical work includes:

- Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis (CFSVA), which provides an in-depth picture of the food security situation and the vulnerability of households and a breadth of information on the political, socio-economic, and agro-ecological, food supplies, markets, livelihoods, coping strategies, nutrition, health, and education. A CFSVA was conducted in 2005, and one is currently being finalized (preliminary results were available). These reports provide two reference points: June/September 2005 and May/June 2009, to compare a range of indicators relevant for the evaluation, especially food security.
- Joint assessment missions (JAMs): JAMs are jointly undertaken by UNHCR and WFP to understand the situation, profiles, and needs of refugees, IDPs, and host populations, with particular regard to food security and nutrition. The memorandum of understanding (MOU) between UNHCR and WFP signed in July 2002, forms the basis of UNHCR-WFP collaboration. The JAMs have also included the participation of other partners such as the Government of Chad, UNICEF, other UN agencies, donors, and implementing NGOs. JAMs are conducted 1) if there is a new influx of refugees following a crisis, 2) to assess the food security and self-reliance of long-term refugees, or 3) to lay the groundwork for voluntary repatriation and reintegration. The JAMs that were available had a wealth of descriptive information, but it did

<sup>20</sup> The project document for SO 10390 was requested, but not available.

not seem to be factored into the selection of programme categories or programme decisions.

- Emergency food security assessments (EFSA), which analyses the impact of a crisis on the food security of households and communities and is conducted when a natural disaster, a conflict, or an economic shock causes population displacements and food insecurity. An assessment can be triggered by a sudden event such as an earthquake or a flood or by a slow onset crisis, for example, a progressive deterioration of the economic situation. EFSA includes a forecast of how the situation may evolve and an analysis of possible food and non-food responses. EFSA has been conducted in Chad since 2004 for a select number of locations and are done initially as internal activities or with other UN agencies, but were increasingly done in close collaboration with partners, including *Système d'Alerte Précoce* (SAP), FEWSNET, CILSS . During the evaluation period, at least 14 EFSA<sup>21</sup> were conducted, which were useful to provide some additional data that can be used as benchmarks that can be compared against the reference period data and information collected in the CFSVA.
- Food Security Monitoring System, which monitors changes in people's food security situations, aiming to alert the humanitarian community when a situation deteriorates and to ensure that assistance can be provided in a timely and appropriate way. It collects information on individual households' food consumption, their income, and the strategies they develop to cope with difficult situations. A Food Security Monitoring System was established in 2005 and continued at WFP until it was transferred in 2008 to the *Système d'Alerte Précoce* (SAP as part of a capacity strengthening effort. Limited support, mostly by FAO and FEWSNET with funding from the EU and USAID), respectively, continues to be provided to the SAP. Additional support by WFP could strengthen the SAP.
- Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E): The M&E Unit is expanding the amount and quality of data and information that is captured and made available for routine and ad hoc analysis. These data are used to contribute to the development of new food assistance programmes, monitoring reports (e.g., the Standardized Project Reports (SPRs)—see below), and ad hoc reporting. WFP's M&E systems during most of 2003-2009 were weak, focusing more on the collection of output indicators (for example, number of tons delivered and beneficiaries), but do not provide insight into the performance and results of an activity. Efforts to improve the M&E system were done in 2009.
- SPRs: These internal reports are completed annually for each operation to describe the operations' objectives, results (beneficiaries reached, outputs, outcomes, and progress toward sustainability and capacity development), inputs (resources from donors, Government, and partners, food purchases, transport, and post-delivery losses), management (partnerships/lessons learned), and financial details.

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<sup>21</sup> The evaluation team was supplied with 14 EFSA that were conducted between 2004 and 2009. More EFSA may have been conducted, but those interviewed were not sure if others were done.

## 2. Evaluation Findings

### 2.1. Alignment and Strategic Positioning

#### Alignment with Government Policies

75. The Government of Chad has a limited set of mechanisms to coordinate aid from donors, UN agencies, and NGOs. While the Ministry of Planning and Economics (MPE) has the mandate for coordination, the MPE signs the plan of operations for WFP-assisted projects, including the approval of the country programme. WFP does inform the MPE about its plan for activities, but it does not coordinate the implementation of their activities with them. There has been a unit in the MPE that was created to work directly with WFP to improve coordination (there now is a single unit to coordinate across all UN agencies), but there has not been much coordination or collaboration with this unit.

76. The most significant coordination mechanism is the *Secretariat du Comité d'Action pour la Sécurité Alimentaire et la Gestion des Crises* (CASAGC), established in the wake of the 1984 drought. This is the main forum for identifying and responding to natural disasters and food security crises, determining where and when to release national food security stock. WFP is a leader within the CASAGC, providing members of this forum with critical information about food security conditions and vulnerable populations within Chad.

#### WFP Mandate compared to Government of Chad priorities

77. The Government has explicitly articulated its priorities in four ways detailed in paragraphs 56 – 60. Overall, WFP's role and operations within the country portfolio activities were generally aligned with Government policies during the 2003–2009 period, but it was a passive, not active, alignment. Though individual activities in each food assistance operation fit within the broad policy framework of the Government, the active engagement, advocacy, and dialogue required for a closer alignment with Government was generally weak. For example, FFW activities easily fall within the broad policy framework of the Government, but the prioritization, selection, and implementation of activities was not done in consultation or coordination with Government.

78. In terms of assistance to Sudanese refugees, WFP was aligned with the Government given that it recognized the status of refugees and officially condoned the support by UNHCR and WFP to the refugees. However, the Government also wanted equal attention for IDPs and the host population given their poor nutritional status. WFP has over time tried balanced assistance to refugees with increasing assistance to host populations, though the resources were still highly skewed towards refugees (while there are similar numbers of beneficiaries between the refugees and Chadian IDPs and host population, almost 80 percent food assistance is provided to refugees).

#### Geographic Targeting

79. The geographic focus of activities was dictated by of the influx of refugees, both in the eastern (from Sudan) and southern (from CAR) parts of the country. These groups have received almost 90 percent of the assistance provided in terms of total cost. The deciding factor was the magnitude and timing of refugees entering the country.

80. WFP has used Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission and other assessments to identify areas that require the greatest assistance. In general terms,

targeted areas are the most food insecure and vulnerable and are consistent with areas identified by Government as priority areas, including the *Kanem, Baril El Gazel, Batha, Wadi Fira, Ennedi, Ouaddai, Dar Sila, Guera, Salamat*, and Lake Chad. In addition to low levels of education (lower than the national average), households in these areas generally have a structural food deficit, high climate variability, and are prone to drought. With the exception of *Guera*, households in these areas are very remote with poor access to services. There is coherence between areas where WFP is intervening and those identified by Government as the most in need of assistance.

81. Specific activities have not always targeted the people that have the greatest need. For example, *Kanem, Bar El Gazel, Batha, Wadi Fira, Ennedi*, and *Ouaddai* comparatively have the greatest need and require the most effort for more people (see paragraph 55). While WFP is working in these areas, there appeared to be no specific targeting of activities to the most needy.

### **WFP Portfolio activities in relation to Government of Chad sectoral strategies**

82. **Education.** Education is an integral part of the Government's policies and strategies to attain the long-term goal of reducing poverty and achieving education for all. WFP's participation is fully integrated into the MEN strategy, as evidenced by the level of coordination between WFP and the MEN, including the development of selection criteria, agreement on which schools will be on the list, the plan to jointly monitor schools and the annual review of the performance and results of the programme. The MEN acknowledges WFP as a key partner in promoting universal primary education as WFP supports its objective of expanding educational opportunity to all Chadian children through its school feeding activities. These activities attract children to schools and increase enrolment of all children, particularly of girls. The food that WFP supplies to school canteens is a relatively small, but strategic, input to achieve the Government's education goals in the ten selected *Sahelian* provinces that are characterized by low level of education (below the national average) and chronic food deficits.

83. **Nutrition.** Although improving access to health and nutrition services is a stated Government objective (in the PRSP2) and WFP's activities fit within the Government's strategy, the GOC implementation and coordination on health and nutrition issues with WFP is very poor. Although WFP has a nutrition strategy embedded in the PRSP2, coordination of activities with the GOC proved difficult. During the evaluation period, the very first Nutrition Cluster Meeting at the N'Djamena level was convened and chaired by UNICEF. Though there have been some nutrition cluster meetings in *Abeche*, the impact of these cluster meetings on implementation activities is yet unclear to the evaluation team. GOC has not actively participated in these meetings. Since nutrition activities are not streamlined and well coordinated with other agencies and Government, their contribution to the overall goal is limited. The nutritional situation of the Chadian population in the east and north of the country, which did not improve over the years, demonstrates the limited impact.

84. Within the Ministry of Health, the "Programme *National de Lutte Contre les MST/ VIH/ SIDA*" published a report on the national situation between January 2006 and December 2007. The report provided a basis for the UNGASS monitoring process. The National Council for the fight against AIDS (*Conseil national de lutte contre le SIDA*) agreed on a "*Cadre Strategique National de Lutte Contre le VIH/ SIDA et les infections sexuellement transmissibles 2007 – 2011*". This national strategy is replacing a strategy that was formulated for the years 1999 – 2003. There was no official HIV/AIDS strategy from 2004 to 2006. The initiative to support

HIV/AIDS-affected families through WFP activities is in line with “*axe stratégique 6*”, which is outlined in the national strategy. The 6<sup>th</sup> objective aims at giving socio-economic support to people living with HIV (PLHIV). Objective 5, which aims at supporting as well AIDS orphans and other vulnerable children (OVC) and youth, as not yet been systematically included in WFP support. WFP is active in the HIV/AIDS thematic group, chairing this group in 2008 (rotational chairing). Officially, WFP intervenes only within the *Sahelian* zone where the CP is being implemented.

**85. Food security, agriculture, and rural development.** The strategy to improve food security, agriculture production, and rural development in Chad is an integral part of the PRSP2. The PRSP2 states that agriculture is the backbone of the Chadian economy, providing the engine of growth through the provision of jobs and income to a majority of people in the country, contributing to improved food security (self reliance and physical access to food), and the diversification of the economy. Within the Government, some structures are in place to improve and strengthen food security, agriculture, and rural development, including the CASAGC, ONASA, and PNSA. As previously mentioned, the CASAGC is the main forum for identifying and responding to natural disasters and food security crises, and WFP is a key participant in this structure. ONASA is mandated to intervene with reserve stocks when there is a crisis. WFP has not collaborated with *Organisme Nationale d'Appui à la Sécurité Alimentaire* (ONASA), although sharing of data and information and coordination could strengthen geographic targeting and operational efficiency of both organizations. PNSA has a framework for food security and rural development, primarily to coordinate within the Government of Chad, but also to implement activities that increase production and improve food security. WFP has not coordinated with PNSA. PNSA could also be a partner in setting rural development and food security priorities, and potentially be a source of non-food item (NFI). WFP also works with the national early warning unit (SAP), a WFP partner in food security assessments such as CFSVA and ESFAs. The coordination of sector priorities and field activities between WFP and the Ministry of Agriculture is not strong.

## **Ownership**

86. The integration of WFP strategy into Government structures at the national and sub national levels is a complex issue. Ownership requires taking responsibility for the planning and implementation of activities that result in the improved well-being of its people. Ownership requires a willingness to actively engage and coordinate, by both WFP and the Government. Activities that would indicate ownership, clear roles and responsibilities of WFP and Government, and the commitment to implementation and achieving results, are clearly stated in policy and strategy documents, but are largely absent in practical terms. The Government lacks the capacity and allocated budget to key sectors such as health, education, and agriculture to be the driving force in these sectors, and therefore not a guiding and collaborative partner with WFP. WFP has made some efforts during the period under evaluation to strengthen Government through engagement and capacity building, but these efforts have been limited.

**87. Government ownership.** Overall, ownership and involvement of the GOC varies across activities in the portfolio. There is greater Government ownership and involvement in school feeding activities, but much less in nutrition and FFW activities. The relative focus of the WFP portfolio on refugees further decreases the level of ownership as the Government focuses on the welfare of Chadians. For example, though there are about an equal number of refugees and Chadian beneficiaries in eastern Chad, the actual level of resources is highly skewed (80 percent) towards refugees. Expanding activities with Chadian beneficiaries will increase ownership by the Government.

88. For education, the level of ownership and involvement is higher, but not sufficient. The number of beneficiaries of school feeding programmes is quite large. For the contribution of WFP's contribution of food to school feeding to have the highest impact, there needs to be several components in place, namely infrastructure, teachers, supplies and parent support. The level of GOC's contribution to education has been to provide training and paying school teachers and building school infrastructure, although the working conditions and support to teachers (e.g., training, regular payment of salaries, ...) has generally not been adequate. The GOC's efforts have expanded access to education for all children, but it considers the improvement of quality a secondary objective to building more schools. The expansion of education drives GOC interactions with WFP, including putting less emphasis on improving quality (e.g., providing fewer resources for monitoring). The level of resources that parents put into school canteen evidences ownership and appreciation for school feeding programmes.

89. For nutrition, WFP's emphasis is focused on the number of beneficiaries that have received food based on nutritional and/or health status. WFP's mandate is to provide food assistance to malnourished children. While food is a critical input to address malnutrition, the GOC is more interested in addressing the root causes of malnutrition, including the lack of purchasing power, the lack of a balanced diet, the lack of hygiene, poor quality water, and the incidence of health and diseases. Though the GOC appreciates WFP feeding programmes, they have little ownership in them. There is generally less local ownership for nutrition activities since the activities are more targeted to specific members of the family and beneficiaries must at times travel long distances to health centres. Little follow-up and poor communication has also negatively impacted local ownership of these activities. As the Government places little emphasis on nutrition, even local ownership is low. As long as nutrition does not receive attention from other stakeholders, local ownership will be limited. Although absent, nutrition educational material and key messages are necessary to create and build awareness.<sup>22</sup> WFP does not provide nutrition education materials or messages to increase the effectiveness of its nutrition programmes, both internally to WFP staff to ensure that nutrition activities are well implemented or externally to Government or beneficiaries to lead to improved outcomes.

90. The GOC has very little ownership in FFW programmes, given the lack of coordination with the Ministry of Agriculture staff in N'Djamena and the field, and limited activity size and impact. There is, however, more ownership at the local Government level, as some FFW activities have had a geographically limited, but important, impact. FFW activities, where they have been implemented, have also had good support from local communities. Some activities, such as the building of schools with FFW, have received strong local ownership, especially as this work was tied to an important education initiative.

**91. Local ownership.** Government processes and structures are generally weak and poorly funded, which limits opportunities for WFP to integrate into them. At various times during the period under review, WFP has actively tried to work more closely with the Government. Although WFP has had some success, the weak Government processes limit the degree to which integration is possible.

92. WFP's use of national Government processes varies across activities. For its biggest programme, supporting refugees in eastern Chad, there are no Government processes to implement activities with as the refugees are not Chadians. As described, WFP works relatively well with Government to implement its school feeding programme. An additional example of coordination is the recent assessment of all

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<sup>22</sup> The only positive example the evaluation team was able to know about was at ACF in *Abeche*. ACF did some awareness and educational activities in the field concerning malnutrition. As a result, the consultation numbers went up in subsequent months.

schools in the country with WFP-supported school feeding (SF) programmes. During this assessment all schools were visited and available facilities were inventoried (e.g., number of classrooms, adequate storage for WFP food, presence of a latrine, and access to a water point). Conversely, FFW activities are not executed through Government processes. There is little coordination between WFP and the Government on the identification, selection, and implementation of these activities. The extent to which WFP works through national institutions in the health and nutrition sector is limited. Most nutrition support focuses refugees and cooperating partners in refugee camps. A limited amount is channelled through Government health facilities, either in SF or therapeutic feeding (TF) activities.

93. The Government has a limited set of mechanisms through which WFP can coordinate activities. The Ministry of Planning and Economics has the mandate to coordinate the activities in sector-oriented ministries, but WFP only informs the MPE about its plan for activities, not coordinating the implementation of their activities with them and line ministries. The coordination mechanism that WFP most actively engages with is the Secretariat du *Comite d'Action pour la Securite Alimentaire et la Gestion des Crises* (CASAGC), which is the main forum for identifying and responding to natural disasters and food security crises, determining where, how much, and how to intervene. WFP plays a lead role in providing information to other CASAGC members.

**94. Working at the local level.** There is generally more collaboration at the local Government level compared to the national level. WFP consistently works on SF with the Government at the local level. Certain factors limit collaboration between MEN staff and WFP, mainly due to insufficient staff levels, the lack of travel resources for MEN staff to monitor schools, and the poor technical level of MEN staff to be able to fulfil their responsibilities. Local coordination between the Ministry of Health and WFP is insufficient (see section on alignment with partners, paragraphs 125 - 127). FFW programmes are also not well coordinated with the Ministry of Agriculture local staff. The Ministry staff is potentially a source of technical support to FFW activities if NFIs are locally available.

**95. Alignment with partners.** The WFP country portfolio is currently aligned with UN agencies. In the past, WFP has been out of cycle with the development of UN agency-wide planning tools, but they are increasingly aligned and active participants in the development of the COMMON Country Assessment (CCA), UNDAF, and CAP processes. WFP is an active participant in these processes and prioritization of levels of need and priority activities, but during implementation the coordination that would lead to the synergy across activities is lacking. Each agency implements their activities within the context of their own programmes, not coordinating and harmonizing activities.

96. UNHCR and WFP work together on refugee issues. The coordination between UNHCR and WFP was excellent given the clear mandate and operating procedures as articulated in the global MOU (2002). Together they did remarkable work to stabilise and service an extremely large number of refugees from 2003 to 2009. In this respect WFP is well aligned with UNHCR activities.

97. There is relatively less alignment and coordination with UNICEF and FAO, as evidenced by limited coordination and integration of plans and activities. WFP views NGOs, both international and local NGOs, as implementing partners—not full partners in developing an activity implementation strategy. Selection of health facilities by UNICEF and WFP that were to be supported by WFP not clear, reflecting a lack of alignment. Coordination between UNICEF and WFP in this respect is almost absent and thus referral systems did not work well. The supply chain for health facilities is not reliable and several health facilities have run out of supplies or were

close to depletion. This was true for basic drugs, plumpy nut and, at times, for WFP supplementary food.

### **Synergies through partnerships**

**98. Support to refugees.** The partnership between WFP and UNHCR to support refugees has been extremely successful, having saved lives and significantly reduced malnutrition of this precarious and vulnerable population. Still, there are areas (for example, getting the mills operational in eastern Chad) where increased coordination, could increase synergies and reduce programme costs through increased efficiency. In these areas there are limited efforts towards rationalizing activities and avoiding duplication. For example, both UNHCR and WFP conduct post-distribution monitoring (PDM) in refugee camps, which could be done jointly to minimise duplication.

**99. Education.** Partnership between UNICEF and WFP has potential for synergies in education. However, the weak coordination and harmonisation of activities, primarily where they will be undertaken and for which schools has limited this potential synergy. WFP's relatively limited input education activities would be strengthened if coordination were improved with UNICEF. There are very few NGOs working in the *Sahelian* zone where the CP operation is implemented, which limits the potential for synergy and partnership. In *Ouaddai*, however, International Relief and Development (IRD) has been a WFP partner in SF. There are other partners, for example *CORD* and *Secours Catholique et Developpement* (SECADEV), which could be approached to implement school feeding activities. Another factor that limits synergy with NGOs is that WFP has perceived NGOs as implementing partners, rather than full partners that could be involved in all aspects of education activities.

**100. Nutrition.** UNICEF partnership with WFP also has potential for synergies in health and nutrition, which do not seem to occur systematically. There seems to be no systematic approach to ensure that referral systems between TF and SF activities function well. There is an annual MOU between WFP and UNICEF that articulates their partnership, but is not specific enough in operational details to lead to synergies. WFP's relative input to nutrition activities would be strengthened with increased coordination with UNICEF, leveraging WFP's food for their technical expertise and financial resources. Some NGOs like *Centre de Support en Santé Internationale* (CSSI) are engaged in nutrition activities, especially in areas where malnutrition exceeds emergency levels. But there is a limited number of NGOs with whom synergies could be achieved.

**101. Agriculture, food security, and rural development.** There are some opportunities for partnerships in agriculture, food security, and rural development with FAO, International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), and the World Bank, but they are limited by these organizations restricted presence in Chad. FAO's presence in Chad during the period under review was limited to eastern Chad and the *Kanem*, and a relatively small staff. IFAD has implemented activities in the *Sahelian* zone (*Kanem* and *Guera*), focusing on water harvesting and water spreading (irrigation by flooding) using small dams. The World Bank's has had a limited presence during the last half of the evaluation period. Therefore, the possibility to work with these agencies and achieve synergy through joint activities was also limited. WFP's relative input food for work activities would be strengthened with increased coordination with FAO, IFAD, and the World Bank, and would leverage WFP's food for their technical expertise and financial resources.

## **Alignment with WFP corporate strategy**

### **Strategic Objective 1: Save lives and protects livelihoods in emergencies**

102. Portfolio activities are fully aligned with this strategic objective. The biggest activity in Chad, support to refugees in eastern Chad directly relates to Goals 1 and 3 under this SO, namely to “*To save lives in emergencies and reduce acute malnutrition caused by shocks to below emergency levels*” and “*To reach refugees, IDPs, and other vulnerable groups and communities whose food and nutrition security has been adversely affected by shocks*”. Activities related to nutrition and FFW activities are fully aligned with Goal 2 under this SO, namely “*To protect livelihoods and enhance self-reliance in emergencies and early recovery*”.

103. While assistance to refugees has been well aligned with the corporate strategy, assistance to vulnerable Chadian groups and communities that exceed the emergency level threshold for malnutrition GAM rates in excess of 15 percent is largely missing. This limited, but necessary, support to these populations in the *Sahelian* zone and eastern Chad illustrates that this aspect is not well aligned with needs, and therefore with the corporate strategy.

### **Strategic Objective 2: Prevent acute hunger and Invest in disaster preparedness and mitigation measures**

104. Current FFW activities fully align with Goal 2 under this strategic objective. The main focus of these activities has been asset creation in road rehabilitation, building schools and clinics, and physical structures that make water more accessible for agriculture and family use (e.g., drinking, cooking, and bathing). Activities such as the construction small dams and water encatchments and the rehabilitation of irrigation dikes in the *Sahelian* zone are good examples of using FFW to make households in this area more resilient to climate change.

### **Strategic Objective 4: Reduce chronic hunger and under nutrition**

105. SF, MCHN, and HIV/AIDS activities fully align with Goals 2 and 3 of this strategic objective, respectively “*To increase levels of education and basic nutrition and health through food and nutrition assistance and food and nutrition security tools*” and “*To meet the food and nutrition needs of those affected by HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and other pandemics.*”

## **2.2. Making strategic choices**

106. The evaluation analysed factors that underlie WFP’s decision-making in terms of their effects on strategic choices. The evaluation assumes that analytical information can be used to make more informed decisions and develop response strategies, and improve the performance and results of programmes.

### **Generating and using analytical information**

107. The WFP country office conducted data compilation and analytical work to understand the national hunger and food security issues in Chad and guide internal WFP decisions. The VAM activities include the participation of key food security stakeholders such as the Ministry of Agriculture and FEWSNET in the data collection field work. There is a link between the results of these assessments and the general direction of the food assistance operations. The use of nutritional data collection through WFP assessment—for example the CFSVAs—has only partially guided decisions. The 2005 CFSVA and subsequent assessments clearly showed GAM global acute malnutrition rates of 25 percent, putting into question the CP category and the level of assistance provided. According to the UNHCR/WFP guidelines on selective

feeding in emergency situations, acute malnutrition rates above 15 percent call for a blanket supplementary feeding (BSF) programme, which was never in place for the local population in the North.

108. The results of these assessments have not influenced the national agenda, contributed to Government or partner strategies, or built national technical and operational capacity. As a result, several problems arise. First, national partners are not included in all aspects of the assessment process, especially conducting the analysis and developing recommendations, which would offer an important opportunity to get ownership of the process and results, and to develop analytical skills. The process of designing, collecting, and analysing food security and vulnerability information can be used as a practical capacity strengthening exercise, especially with Government technical staff, as a means towards institutionalizing these activities. Second, the insights and analysis from these assessments are not sufficiently leveraged by WFP to impact national discussion or decision-making of partners as part of the development of their response strategies.

109. WFP's M&E systems during most of 2003-2009 were weak, providing only limited data for assessing impact and improving programmes (see Para 96).

### **Developing response strategies**

110. **Drivers of strategic choices.** The drivers of the strategic choices leading to response strategies have been dictated by external events and internal policies and procedures. The evaluation period has been dominated by two external factors, namely the refugee influx of refugees and the persistent insecurity situation in eastern Chad, which have largely dictated where and how much food assistance was required, and the logistics required getting that assistance to beneficiaries. How WFP designs food assistance operations (restrictions imposed once the programme category is selected limit how WFP can intervene) and the possible programme options available have been the main internal drivers of choices.

111. **Adjusting to changing needs** Response strategy development and adjustment to changing needs has focused on WFP internal procedures to meet objectives for different food assistance operations. With respect to assistance to refugees, a recalculation of rations or the inclusion of increasing FFW activities may be warranted and the nutritional situation does not call for on-going BSF of pregnant and lactating mothers, which is valid in emergency phases with very high malnutrition rates, but which needs to be replaced by a more targeted approach once the situation has improved. According to the Joint UN Publication on Food and Nutrition Needs in Emergencies, phase II of the emergency should include periodic re-assessments to revise and adjust food needs. There should also be a plan for longer-term assistance or phase-down and phase-out strategies. Food assistance programmes should be based on a regular assessment and clear understanding of the refugee socio-economic situation. As camps in eastern Chad have developed into rural settlements with economic activities, there is increased need for a socio-economic baseline survey, and to adjust the general ration provided to actual need. This analysis for the east could result in the design of a PRRO, recognizing that the situation of Sudanese refugees might not warrant another EMOP.

112. While the hunger situation has been effectively addressed for the refugee population in Chad, malnutrition above the emergency threshold amongst the local population in the east and the *Sahelian* zone, has been ignored. Even with the focus on refugees, the local Chadian population should have received assistance.

113. **Analysis of Government and partner goals.** As previously discussed, the WFP response strategy and the goals of the Government are connected, but passively.

WFP's response strategy aligns with other UN agencies, CCA, UNDAF, and CAP, but it is developed independently from other UN agencies. For example, there appeared to be insufficient coordination between WFP and UNICEF in health and education strategies and activity implementation.

**114. Selection of programme category.** An assessment of whether or not the WFP country office made the correct programme category choice is complicated and varies by geographic area. Current WFP parameters that define these categories are limited.

- **Southern Chad.** The 2003 selection of an EMOP and the March 2006 transition to a PRRO make southern Chad a suitable selection given the initial magnitude of the emergency and eventually the emergence of conditions that have led towards the stabilisation of livelihoods and food security. Increasingly the CAR refugees have become food self-sufficient and have required less assistance.
- **Eastern Chad.** The situation in eastern Chad is more difficult to assess. While the initial situation clearly warranted an EMOP, studies should assess the level and vigour of economic activity in refugee camps (flourishing markets, general trade, mills, tailoring services, and so on) to determine whether or not the current programme category of EMOP is still warranted after almost seven years (even though the WFP corporate guidance indicates that an EMOP maximum length is 24 months). Some visual and anecdotal evidence that the level in some refugee camps was active enough to potentially warrant a reduction in ration size. On the contrary, the level of food insecurity and malnutrition rates in the host Chadian population in eastern Chad (GAM rates were well above 15 percent) indicate that the amount of programming resources and emphasis was insufficient given the humanitarian needs.
- **Sahelian zone.** WFP has implemented the CP in the *Sahelian* zone, where malnutrition has exceeded emergency levels since 2001. Given the high level of food insecurity and malnutrition (GAM rates greater than 15 percent, a different programme category than a CP might have been warranted. It is important to note that in the *Sahelian* zone of Chad the new EMOP will begin to address some of the issues, even if the impetus is the drought, which exacerbated the food insecurity situation even further.

### **WFP priorities and operating model**


115. The challenge for a large country office with a significant portion of its portfolio responding to refugee needs and the rest to development needs is achieving a balance in several areas. First, a balance is needed across activities in different operations, for example gaining and sharing experience and lessons learned. Given the compartmentalised approach to working according to food assistance operations, synergies that could come from resource sharing—both technical and financial—were not achieved. The EMOP in eastern Chad, for example, has relatively more financial and technical resources; while the CP in the *Sahelian* zone has much fewer staff and limited programmes. Finally, a balance is required between setting up systems and standards to meet the M&E and reporting requirements by operation with the need to gain efficiencies across operations. Working through individual operations, as opposed to viewing operations as part of an overall country portfolio, has also worked against developing systems and standards that apply to all food assistance operations in a country.

## 2.3. Portfolio performance and results

### Overview of assistance delivered by activity

116. For the period of 2003–2008<sup>23</sup>, the number of beneficiaries and tonnage for each programme activity are presented by year in Figure 7<sup>24</sup>.

**Figure 7: Trend of beneficiaries and tonnage delivered by activity across operations, 2003–2008**



Source: WFP country office

117. These figures show several important trends:

- the total number of beneficiaries increased from 187,233 in 2003 to 695,206 in 2008, with an average of almost 500,000 beneficiaries per year during that period;
- between 2003 and 2008, programmes in the portfolio reached between 73 percent (nutrition) to over 100 percent (GFD and FFW) of intended beneficiaries;
- Third, GFD had the highest absolute number of beneficiaries and tonnage over the course of the evaluation period, and consistently had the highest actual versus planned beneficiaries and tonnage. This trend reflects the relatively high priority to meet needs of refugees and save lives;
- Fourth, support for school feeding activities had the second highest absolute number of beneficiaries and tonnage over the course of the evaluation period, though the actual versus planned beneficiaries and tonnage over the period were below the portfolio-wide average;
- support for nutrition interventions did not increase over the years. The fact that figures rose in 2004 to 216 percent (percent actual vs. planned) is mostly due to the influx of refugees and the nutrition support terminated at this time. WFP projected even further needs in nutrition support for 2005, but as the situation among the refugee population improved, the percent of actual versus planned beneficiaries fell to 28 percent. The table below does not allow the disaggregation of data in terms of intervention (SF, TF, MCHN, and PLHIV) and beneficiary group (refugees, IDPs, local population).<sup>25</sup> Finally, FFW participation and tonnage was higher earlier in the evaluation period, but was relatively less active in the last three years (although data are not available, FFW activities were suspended in the CP and EMOP areas in 2009).

<sup>23</sup> Data for the number of beneficiaries and tonnage delivered in 2009 were not yet available from WFP.

<sup>24</sup> More detailed tabular data on beneficiaries and tonnage delivered during 2003 – 2008 are presented in Annex 6.

<sup>25</sup> Unfortunately, though requested, the country office was not able to provide these statistics in time to be included in this report.

118. During the review period as much as 374,293 MT of food assistance was delivered to beneficiaries, achieving a performance ratio of 64 percent<sup>26</sup>. This figure must be related to the funding ratio of 74 percent. The difference is explained by the lag between the funding and procurement, deliveries and distribution of food aid to beneficiaries.

### **Assessment of assistance provided**

119. **Beneficiary selection.** The criteria for beneficiary selection depended on the type of operation. For EMOPs in the east and south, beneficiaries were determined by refugee status. Refugees were screened by UNHCR and were required to live in the camp to entitle them to food assistance, general feeding, and a range of services (protection, TF, nutrition, education, health, water, sanitation, firewood). IDPs were selected based on the result of crop assessments.

120. For the PPRO, beneficiaries are refugees with increased means to produce and/or acquire income. In southern Chad, refugees in several camps have contributed increasingly to their food security and require decreasing assistance. The level of rations has reduced as a result of the increased capacity of refugees to provide for themselves.

121. There are different modes of beneficiary selection for the CPs. The criteria for having a school canteen are: proof that the school exists, that classrooms must be built and ready, it must have an active parent association, a water supply in or near the school (within 300 meters), storage for food, a kitchen, and sanitation facilities. The geographic selection is done by the Government in collaboration with WFP, and is concentrated in areas with the lowest levels of education but the need for these programmes exceed the current level of programming. There is also selection by school level and gender. All girls in grades five and six who attend the school and have an 80 percent attendance rate during the trimester are eligible for dry take-home rations.

122. FFW activities are targeted to areas that are consistent with the Government priority areas, concentrating on the *Sahelian* zone (including that which extends into eastern Chad). Participation in FFW activities is self-targeting and participants receive a family ration. There are vulnerable populations that do not participate in FFW activities, including those not able to do the manual work (e.g., the elderly, HIV affected, and children).

123. Nutrition activities are targeted to nutritionally vulnerable people, identified through screening (for example a malnourished child [weight/ height < 80 percent of median], or an HIV-positive person under anti-retroviral [ARVs]). For pregnant and lactating women, there are two modes of beneficiary selection. Among refugee women all pregnant and lactating women are entitled to a supplementary ration during the last six months of pregnancy and the first 6 months of breastfeeding, Chadian women are selected based on nutritional status (MUAC < 210 mm). Whether MUAC is the best indicator for Chad should be verified within a future nutrition study given conflicting results for MUAC in different surveys. The mere fact that the number of health facilities being supported by WFP is rather limited results in a limited access of vulnerable people to necessary assistance.

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
<sup>26</sup> Three projects were still ongoing on 31.12.2009.



begin looking for trucks to deliver the food. Finally, in eastern Chad the security situation restricted movement and deliveries.

128. Figure 9 shows the trends of the number of beneficiaries and tonnage delivered for education activities across all operations (2003 – 2008). There is a closer trend between the planned and actual number of beneficiaries, although the number of beneficiaries and tonnage delivered was consistently below planned levels.

**Figure 9: Beneficiaries and tonnage provided to education activities, 2003–2008**




Source: WFP Country Office

129. **FFW activities.** Unlike nutrition and education activities, FFW activities are not continuous. Frequency has depended on the development, approval, and implementation of discrete activities. Although there have been issues related to FFW activity implementation, there have been few delays in delivering food to beneficiaries that have worked on FFW projects. An exception is the situation in Mao, where food was misallocated and in some cases not delivered.

130. Figure 10 shows the trends of the number of beneficiaries and tonnage delivered for FFW activities across all operations (2003 – 2008), highlighting the decrease in FFW as an activity over the period. There were also frequent suspensions of activities, most recently in 2009, due to prioritisation of GFD for refugees and to high levels of insecurity limiting the capacity to implement FFW.

**Figure 10: Beneficiaries and tonnage provided to FFW activities, 2003–2008**



## Attaining objectives

### Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies (SO1)

131. **Refugees**—WFP achieved its objectives of saving lives and protecting livelihoods in emergencies for refugees in the southern and eastern parts of the country. There was no break in the pipeline—it was regular and well resourced—and a second corridor from Libya was opened. The data available for Sudanese refugees in the East clearly demonstrates that the nutritional situation improved over the years and has stabilised at a level below the critical emergency level of 15 percent of acute malnutrition (in most cases even below 10 percent). WFP has undoubtedly contributed to these positive changes by providing a general ration and through supplementary and therapeutic feeding even if these changes are due to a number of factors, given the multi-causality of malnutrition. Apart from food assistance, refugees received support that included improved drinking water, hygiene and sanitation, health services, and education. Numerous interventions contributed to an impressive situation improvement for Sudanese refugees.

132. Other visible changes can be noted among the Sudanese refugee population. The refugee camps have turned into real settlements. From the camps visited by the team in eastern Chad, the degree of development varies between camps, but markets are well developed and there is some vitality to economic activities. For example, in the *Irimi* camp (*Iriba* sub-office), a group of women worked for “*Chad Solaire*” to make solar stoves for refugees in the camp. Yet, all refugees continue to receive complete food rations with no distinction according to socio-economic status. School buildings and health facilities are well developed and equipped (one school in MILE camp even has IT equipment); they are far better off compared to the infrastructure found among local and host populations. The evaluation team is convinced that assessments results point to a potential general ration reduction and more FFW activities.

133. Given the relatively conducive weather conditions (rainfall) and the availability of land, CAR refugees with the support of WFP and UNHCR have reached a stage of transition to a more stable situation. In several camps, refugees have actually become food self-sufficient, permitting a reduction in the nature and quantity of assistance.

134. Assistance to refugees has been both efficient and effective. Mainly because this assistance was made the highest priority, and that the level of food assistance and complementary inputs, like drinking water, health services, toilets, schools, and firewood was adequate. Donor participation and interest meant that the food assistance was well funded and resources were available to meet the refugees’ needs. No trade-offs were required to ensure that the refugees’ needs were met. Partnerships with UNHCR, and NGOs as implementing partners to support refugees were more robust compared to other activities. There were more NGOs willing to deliver food assistance and manage refugee camps.

135. **IDPs and the host population.** The assistance provided to IDPs and the host population in eastern Chad addressed some of their needs, but as a residual priority. The EMOP focused on refugees, and assistance to the host population depended on availability of resources. For example, FFW was discontinued when additional resources were required to feed an increased number of refugees. The IDPs in eastern Chad also were not as high a priority as the refugees. The amount of assistance depended on crop assessments carried out in October by WFP, FA, and other partners and on availability of resources.

136. Discussions with Government officials and tribal leaders highlighted that the discrepancy between the food assistance and services provided to refugees and Chadians (local population and IDPs) has resulted in tension in eastern Chad. This differential in treatment has also increased tension between WFP and the Government.

137. It is reasonable to state that overall the effectiveness of interventions for host and IDPs in eastern Chad was limited given the low level of activity compared to the high level of need. Given high malnutrition rates over many years, the local population in the east faced a silent emergency and the reasons for not factoring the high malnutrition rates into programme classification remain unclear. Care for the refugee population in the east, living under comparable geographical and climatic conditions proves that acute malnutrition rates above 15 percent are preventable with proper intervention. However, saving lives requires a concerted effort, which needs to address the many causes of malnutrition.

### **Prevent acute hunger and invest in disaster preparedness and mitigation measures (SO2)**

138. This strategic objective involved supporting and strengthening the resiliency of communities to shocks through safety nets.

139. FFW activities were both relevant and appropriate given high levels of food insecurity and poverty in rural areas. There were a diversity of FFW activities implemented during the evaluation period, including the construction of small dams, wells, and water catchments; rehabilitation of irrigation dikes and roads; reforestation; windbreaks and live fences; and technical training. FFW activities could be strengthened and expanded to cover critical assets such as soil and water conservation, water harvesting and water spreading (irrigation through flooding), conservation of biodiversity, dune stabilization, and rotational grazing. These activities directly link to increased food production and improved security.

140. There are examples of efficient and effective FFW programmes. For example, in the village of *Bredjing (Farchana)* five schools were built with local NGOs. The amount of resources required by WFP was negligible, and the local community willingly participated and provided resources. Yet, there was a large difference between planned and actual outcomes of FFW activities and several factors limited the efficiency of the programme:

- FFW activities were poorly resourced and represent a small percent of programme activities implemented by WFP. The overall operation was not well resourced in the CP, and in the EMOP and PPRO areas, this activity was given relatively lower priority;
- When there was a need to increase food assistance levels in refugee camps, FFW activities were suspended and the programme was thus not seen as reliable;
- Security in the eastern part of the country also limited FFW activities;
- The availability of technical assistance to design and support FFW activities, whether internally or through partners, was limited;
- The contracts with partners for FFW activities generally spanned extremely short time periods and the limited availability of resources to purchase NFIs confined activities to small projects;
- There were some improprieties in FFW activities in the Mao district, which were investigated.

141. Environmental conditions in eastern Chad and the *Sahelian zone* where WFP implements activities were already fragile before 2003. The increased pressure on the scarce water and firewood in eastern Chad has further exacerbated the tenuous environmental situation in the region through increased demand and competition for scarce resources. While the activities were essential to ensure the safety and basic

needs of refugees that came into eastern Chad, the increased resource demands have had a negative impact on the environment.

### **Reduce chronic hunger and under nutrition by increasing levels of education and basic nutrition and health (SO4)**

142. **Education.** After several meetings with MEN, UNICEF, and WFP, a review of the available data (see Annex 8 for some indicative disaggregated education data), and interviews with beneficiaries during the mission, it is safe to assert that during the 2003–2009 period, all of the 10 regions initially selected for school feeding activities were covered by the school canteens and the total number of beneficiaries receiving school meals (wet and dry rations) reached about half a million children. This level far exceeds expectations. The timing of food deliveries varies from one area to another, with some schools receiving food up to 2 months after the school year begins.

143. There was generally an increase in enrolment in both the Sahelian zone and eastern Chad during the period under evaluation. According to MEN statistics, enrolment increased by almost 200 percent (from 32,328 to 95,415 students) between the 2003/04 school year and the 2009/10 school year; with the increase in the enrolment of girls recording a similar percent increase. Enrolment in the Sahelian zone, Mao and Mongo, also recorded large increases (about a 100 percent increase), with the increase in girl's enrolment increasing in Mao by almost 170 percent over the same period. Although it is not possible to attribute the increase in enrolment to WFP's food contribution to school canteens, beneficiaries clearly indicated that it was an important incentive in their decision to send and keep their children in school.

144. However, a very small number of all assisted schools meet all stated criteria for inclusion in the school feeding programme<sup>28</sup>. Still, the Government is under pressure to expand education access for all and especially girls. As a result, there is more emphasis on increasing access to education than on assuring that the education that is provided is of a sufficient quality. Under the circumstances, the impact of school feeding is to increase enrolment and attendance—but not necessarily assure that the education provided will lead to improved education levels. Unless a genuine effort was made to combine school meals with good curriculum, well-trained teachers, safe drinking water, a latrine, and a dynamic parent association, the quality of the intended education outcome will continue to remain relatively low.

145. **Basic nutrition.** According to project documents the intended objective of the country programme is “improved health of targeted vulnerable groups — mothers and vulnerable children and people living with HIV/AIDS — through improved health and hygiene practices and care for malnourished children”. This objective has been partially fulfilled, as the number of supported health institutions increased over time<sup>29</sup>. However, quality and quantity of interventions have not been sufficient to improve health and well-being of mothers and their children in the North and East of Chad.

146. The performance indicators of the country programme state that the programme aims at three outcomes. First, the programme aims at a “reduction in the proportion of children below weight at birth, of premature births and of post-natal haemorrhages and post-natal infections in nursing mothers.” There are no data

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<sup>28</sup> Data about the number of schools that actually meet the criteria to be eligible for a school feeding programme were not available at the time of the evaluation. WFP in collaboration with MEN had undertaken a survey of all schools under the school feeding program, but the data were not yet available.

<sup>29</sup> Unfortunately, the evaluation team cannot include figures on actual vs. planned outcomes due to nutrition intervention. These figures were requested, but the CO could not provide them in time to be included in this report.

available at baseline nor are there any data that can prove the effectiveness and outcome of this performance indicator. Second, the programme aims at a “reduction in the rates of malnutrition, morbidity and mortality in children below five”. Unfortunately, this objective has not been achieved, as the nutritional status of children deteriorated over the last years. Finally, the programme aims at a “reduction of mothers’ morbidity and mortality through early identification of risk factors”. There is no baseline information or statistics on present morbidity and mortality to measure the impact of WFP interventions.

147. Supplementary feeding was provided to malnourished children with a targeted approach, while support for pregnant and lactating mothers was either absent or targeted to mothers with a MUAC below 210mm. There is no clear strategy for nutritional support to pregnant and lactating mothers and there are few data available on the nutritional situation of adult women. The only data available are deriving from the DHS (2004) survey, which revealed that malnutrition rates (BMI < 18.5) among non-pregnant women were alarming. The prevalence rates showed 32.7 percent for BET, *Kanem* and Lac; 36.2 percent for *Batha*, *Guéra*, and *Salamat* and 19.2 percent for *Ouaddai* and *Wadi Fira*. There was again another zone with a very high malnutrition rate (35.7 percent), namely *Hadjer*, *Lamis*, and *Chari Baguirmi*.

148. Supplementary feeding activities among the local population in the East and North has most likely had little or no impact on the nutrition situation for the following reasons: 1) high malnutrition rates among children indicate family tension and reflect food and nutrition insecurity of the entire population; 2) food supplements given to malnourished children can dissolve into the household; and 3) malnutrition rates (acute: weight / height) did not improve but partly deteriorated in the North and East of the country.

149. The present referral system between SF and TF activities is inefficient. Community-based management of severe acute malnutrition would need to be established in collaboration with UNICEF. For now, SF and TF concentrate on curative measures and there is little emphasis on malnutrition prevention.

150. There is no clear nutrition communication strategy, no basic nutritional training and hardly any nutrition education material available. This relates to the simple nutrition messages as well as those catering for the special needs of PLHIVs. This supports the impression that neither the country nor the implementing partners have a clear vision on the key problems and thus key messages to be disseminated through various channels.

151. **HIV/AIDS projects.** According to UNAIDS, the support of WFP towards PLHIVs is highly appreciated. WFP has started work in this field through its most recent CP and PRRO and the number of supported PLHIVs increased since then. In 2009, 2045 people under ARV treatment received a family ration (five-person household) for a period of six months. Given the fact that the number of people receiving ARV (in 2009) was around 32,000 (among an estimated 200,000 HIV positive), the assistance covered merely 6.4 percent of the affected population under treatment. This figure clearly demonstrates increased demand in the near future. The support has only started and thus it is too early to assess the impact but beneficiaries stated their appreciation for the support and they feel encouraged to get tested if they know that there is assistance for them.

152. For now, only 64 health facilities provide ARV treatment. Prevention of mother-to-child transmission is dealt with in 81 centres, among the 600 health facilities in the country. As issues like family planning and sexually transmitted diseases (including HIV/AIDS) are sensitive subjects for cultural reasons, there is clearly a need for advocacy and awareness-raising. This is especially true in the North of the country, where prevalence rates are officially low, but actual rates are predictably

higher. Voluntary testing coverage is very low<sup>30</sup>, which means that there is no real grip on actual prevalence rates.

153. The nutrition support of PLHIVs showed positive effects. However, the support is meant for only six months and experience from ID, *Moundou*, and Mao shows that support can often not be stopped after six months. Indeed, after about two months, without support people tend to re-enter the project due to vulnerability and inability to work.

### **Sustainability**

154. For the bulk of the portfolio, which focused on the stabilization and maintenance of refugees from Sudan and the CAR, sustainability was not the intended outcome.

155. The sustainability of activities in the portfolio was limited to FFW activities—not a high priority of the overall portfolio. These activities had several problems that limited sustainability, including that FFW was relatively poorly funded (especially missing NFIs), frequently suspended activities, insecurity in eastern Chad limited access to beneficiaries, and implementation problems in the Mao sub-office. Sustainability is a challenge for several reasons, primarily due to weak technical capacity of the Government (which should assure the long-term food security of Chadians through sustainable solutions), the few NGOs working on the education, nutrition, and FFW activities.

156. **Capacity for handover.** There is little possibility to handover any of WFP response activities to the Government of Chad. The technical, operational, and managerial capacity within Government to undertake these activities, whether in emergency, protracted, or development operations, is not sufficient to expect that these activities would continue successfully. In particular, the Government does not have an interest in maintaining assistance to refugees. The will and capacity of the Government to continue activities that WFP currently implements to support the Chadian population is also not present. The Government expects WFP to provide assistance and support vulnerable groups, but the level of engagement and allocation of resources clearly indicate that they are not ready to take on WFP activities. The food security monitoring system that WFP managed (2005-2008) was transferred to the National Early Warning Unit (SAP), and has only continued because they obtained FAO assistance and EU funding.

### **Factors explaining the results - External Factors**

157. **Level of need.** The magnitude of poverty and the health and nutrition situation through the northern and eastern part of the country far outstrips WFP's ability to access resources and implement programmes. This has resulted in an understandable need to prioritize, but has led to public relations issues with the Government and local communities.

158. **Civil insecurity.** Since 2003, the degradation of the security situation in Sudan's Darfur region, persistent insecurity in the CAR, and increasing internal instability due to activities by armed groups and inter-ethnic tensions has further deteriorated the country's security situation. It is clear that this had a major impact on portfolio activities during the 2003–2009 period by making food delivery and monitoring very difficult, sometimes too risk and impossible. Monitoring requires a military escort, but staff at sub-offices reported that given the high cost and few military staff, the availability of escorts has been erratic or they were delayed. Civil

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<sup>30</sup> At a health centre 20 km north of Mao only 3 among 60 mothers gathered there had done voluntary testing during pregnancy. These findings are in line with WHO (2004) documents, which state as well that only 8 percent of all pregnant mothers do voluntary testing.

insecurity led to a massive shutdown of activities in February 2008, when rebels made it to N'Djamena.

**159. Funding availability and availability of implementing partners.** The overall funding ratio for the review period was 73.5 percent, which is excellent considering that three projects were still in progress. There were no pipeline breaks as a result of poor or late funding. However, resources were skewed towards eastern Chad. There more NGOs working in the eastern part of the country as this is where resources are. WFP activities in other parts of the country, especially in the CP area (*Sahelian zone*), receive significantly less resources in those areas there are fewer partners with the capacity to plan, organize, and implement activities, which limits the potential synergy. Other partners, especially NGOs, provide little value-added to the technical development and implementation of activities.

**160. Weak Government commitment.** Policies and strategies are not supported through sufficient budget allocation, even though education, health and nutrition, agriculture, and infrastructure are stated priorities and should be supported through oil revenue. The Government does support the school feeding activity, but is more focused on expansion of education access, not necessarily providing quality education. This lack of commitment and poor resource availability restricts key monitoring and support activities. Weak institutions and capacity have limited WFP's ability to partner with the Government to implement activities. Weak Government capacity limits their ability to technically support WFP activities.

**161. Limited coordination across UN agencies.** UNDAF, CCA, and CAP are good processes, and WFP has made significant progress to harmonize it's with these processes. Still, although these processes are well coordinated, the delivery of services to beneficiaries is not well coordinated. With the exception of the excellent working relationship between UNHCR and WFP in providing assistance to refugees, UN agencies implement their own activities independently, limiting the potential for synergies. The use of cluster meetings has been mixed, with logistics and food security meetings occurring more frequently.

### **Factors explaining the results - Internal Factors to WFP**

**162. Logistics operations** were performed professionally and efficiently, notwithstanding the long inland haulage, multiple handling and transfer haulages, numerous warehouses inside and outside Chad, and expensive (but efficient) Benghazi Corridor. With few exceptions, logistics did not delay or negatively affect the implementation of portfolio activities.

163. Given that there are limited opportunities for local or regional procurement, about 96 percent of commodities had to be procured internationally. Approximately 280,000 MT of commodities were procured outside Chad. Less than 1 percent was procured in Chad from local traders and less than 3 percent, was regionally procured in Cameroon. Between 2005 and 2008, approximately 70,000 MT of food was redirected from neighbouring Sudan and CAR to meet increased demand created by the influx of refugees from these countries into Chad.

164. The cost of the food commodity per MT has doubled during the portfolio review period from US\$250/MT to US\$450/MT, but it remained in tune with the WFP corporate commodity cost average. Significant is that the ratio reserved for commodity cost (34 percent) is well below the corporate average (49 percent). The single most important feature, as revealed by the analysis of the various portfolio projects cost components, is the high level of costs which logistic operations in Chad unavoidably attract. To be conducted successfully the ratio of financial resources to be set aside for logistic operations 41 percent, against a WFP average of 22 percent.

The complexity of the logistic operations translates to the high costs recorded. The total cost for the review period is US\$1,088 per MT of food aid delivered, against a WFP corporate average of US\$886. The most expensive project per metric ton of food assistance delivered is the CP 10.478, with US\$1,312 per metric ton of food assistance delivered. The small quantities and numerous food distribution points (FDPs) often dispersed in remote and isolated villages explain this high cost. There are no indications that the final cost unit of food-aid delivered has modified in one way or the other the design and the implementation of any of the portfolio activities.

165. The logistical challenges in Chad are substantial: the country is landlocked, large, has poor infrastructure, and the rainy season limits the ability to use the Douala Corridor. These challenges are compounded by numerous and scattered final delivery points, and the relatively high cost in delivering food to these places that are remote and have poor road. The entire logistic operations hinges on two corridors: the Douala Corridor, which accounts for 60 percent of food-aid traffic destined for Chad, and the Benghazi Corridor, used to deliver the remaining 40 percent. This latter corridor has proved, since its opening, essential for the steady supply of food assistance in Eastern Chad. The Douala Corridor is organized in a classical manner with transit operations in *Ngaoundere* (rail head) and further as required in N'Djamena and *Abeche* before being dispatched to the FDPs in the camps. The Libyan Government and the UN Resident Coordinator in Cairo played a significant role in getting the Libyan corridor operational, including three-week road convoys through the desert.

**166.** WFP warehousing is up to standards while storage conditions in schools and health centres are often below standards. Considering the harsh environmental conditions and the necessary lead time required to procure, produce, transport, and route maize meal and CSB to the various extended delivery points (EDPs) and FDPs, delivery to beneficiaries with a remaining acceptable shelf life has proven difficult. At times the quality of the CSB delivered to the beneficiaries was marginally acceptable. It has occurred that the distribution of CSB and maize meal was organized in a hurry to “beat the expiry date”.

**167. Limited time of field-level agreement (FLA) and MOUs.** WFP Chad has associated itself with many implementing partner (IPs). Most FLAs and MOUs often have short execution periods, which tends to generate a continuous “stop and go” feeling. The FLAs are often negotiated in such a way that the distribution costs are kept extremely low. These numerous short-term contracts provide for a certain amount of food-aid to be made available to the IP, but make no provision for distribution costs. This approach explains in part the very low other direct operating costs (ODOC) cost ratio noted in Chad, one percent against an accepted WFP corporate ratio of seven percent. This approach is commendable on the part of the CO, but deprives WFP of the necessary leverage to ascertain whether extra services to be provided are indeed furnished in line with the FLA.

**168. Programme activities.** Programme implementation of activities was limited in several ways. First, activities are designed and implemented within the context of individual operations, not taking into account lessons learned in other operations. Activities are designed and implemented in isolation of potential synergies with other activities (for example linking school feeding with FFW). Second, WFP staff especially in the sub-offices require substantial technical training and support given their backgrounds and the breadth of activities that they are responsible to implement. Third, monitoring of activities was difficult either as a result of security (at various times in several parts of the country and currently in eastern Chad), dispersion and long distances over which activities are taking place, or insufficient staff or financial resources (most acute in the CPs).

169. **Weak systems (especially M&E).** Although progress has been made in the last year of the evaluation period, the M&E system was weak and limited the evaluation's assessment of the performance and results of programme activities. The focus was only on initial data collection and output indicators, not outcome indicators.

170. **Staffing.** The staff strength – both international and national – has throughout the review period been adjusted to agree with caseload. The HR department has maintained flexibility at all times, making good use of UN volunteers, consultants and short term “service contracts.” Still, several staffing issues have impacted performance and results of the country portfolio. First, HR is not integrated into the programming activities and therefore unable to provide sufficient support in prioritizing short-term and long-term staffing needs. Second, there have been several vacancies of key staff during the evaluation period, including the Country Director, Nutrition Officer, and the Human Resources Officer. Some of these positions were absent for over a year (e.g., the Country Director). Third, Chad is a difficult post to recruit for given the need for French, non-accompanied post, security, and difficult working conditions (especially in sub-offices). Fourth, staff resourcing is focused too much on international, with insufficient focus on building the capacity of senior national officers. Fifth, the frequency (but understandably needed ) of R&Rs for international staff have, at times, prevented the smooth implementation of activities as key staff are frequently out of the country.

### **3. Conclusions and Recommendations**

#### **3.1. Overall Assessment**

171. The conclusions and recommendations provided in this chapter are firmly grounded in the qualitative, quantitative, and anecdotal evidence that was gathered during the evaluation from WFP and partner documents and interviews with WFP staff, partners, and beneficiaries.

172. The WFP country portfolio is well aligned with the WFP Corporate strategy and with Government policies during the 2003 – 2009 period, but it was a passive, not active, alignment. Although the individual activities in each of the food assistance operations fit within the main policies and strategy of the Government, the engagement, advocacy, and dialogue required for a more active alignment was generally weak. One area where WFP was not fully aligned with the Government of Chad, which was not avoidable, was in the low level of assistance provided to the host population in eastern Chad compared to Sudanese refugees. WFP had an obligation to assist the Sudanese refugees, even though the Government of Chad wanted more emphasis on the host population.

173. Government processes and structures are generally weak and poorly funded, which limits WFP incentive and ability to integrate into them. As a result WFP generally works with, but not within, Government processes and structures. At various times during the period under review, including recently, WFP has tried to actively reach out and work more closely with the Government. There have been some recent successes. Although it is clear that the Government appreciates and values WFP's contribution to school feeding and health clinics, there appears to be little ownership of these efforts by the Government.

174. The WFP country portfolio is currently aligned with UN agencies. In the past WFP has been out of cycle with the development of UN agency-wide planning tools, but they are increasingly aligned and active participants in the development of the CCA, UNDAF, and CAP processes. WFP is a leader in Chad in analyzing the national hunger and food security issues in Chad. With the exception of the partnership with

UNHCR to support refugees, which has been extremely successful, there appeared to be no joint planning and implementation of activities, which has limited the potential for synergy. WFP's relative input to nutrition, education, and food-for-work activities would be strengthened with increased coordination with UNICEF and FAO, leveraging WFP's food for their technical expertise and financial resources.

175. The portfolio evaluation highlights that potential choices in terms of programme and implementation were bounded by significant external factors such as the high level of civil insecurity, the size of the country, poor infrastructure, weak key partners (especially Government), and the high level of need given the state of development and the level of poverty.

176. The Country Office has conducted a significant amount of analytical work to understand the national hunger and food security issues in Chad. These are clearly used to guide some internal decision-making such as choices to focus food assistance operations in the parts of the country that either have the most vulnerable populations (*Sahelian* zone) or where there is a clear humanitarian need. However, all assessments of the nutritional situation of the Chadian population in both eastern and *Sahelian* zone parts of the country confirm that they meet the criteria of an emergency but that are not receiving sufficient assistance. Assessment have not been used effectively to place food security and hunger issues on the national agenda, to contribute to Government or partner strategies, or build national technical and operational capacity.

177. The development of response strategies has focused on WFP internal procedures and processes to meet the objectives and targets in the project documents for the different food assistance operations.

178. The evaluation team's overall assessment of the portfolio performance from 2003 to 2009 is positive. The WFP programme activity areas—GFD, FFW/FFT, SF, MCHN, TF, HIV assistance and adult literacy—were all relevant and appropriate to the needs of the people given the level of poverty and needs in the parts of the country where these activities were geographically targeted. The beneficiaries that were visited in all parts of the country expressed their appreciation for the assistance that they received.

179. Between 2003 and 2008<sup>31</sup>, WFP in Chad assisted an average of about 500,000 people per year, reaching between 75 – 100 percent of its intended beneficiaries. GFD consistent had the highest absolute number of beneficiaries and tonnage over the course of the evaluation period, and consistently had the highest number of actual versus planned beneficiaries and tonnage over the period. This trend reflects the relative high priority that was placed on meeting the needs of refugees to save lives.

180. WFP generally achieved the targets and objectives as established in the project documents for the 10 food assistance operations and throughout the period, WFP has effectively moved food in a timely manner under very difficult logistical challenges. The Programme responded quickly and effectively to the initial influx of refugees from both Sudan and the Central African Republic, providing critical food assistance and coordinating well with UNHCR to establish well organized and functioning camps that saved lives. Within the timeframe of the evaluation WFP has contributed to the significant reduction of GAM rates in Sudanese refugees camps. Other contributing factors include donor interest implying that the food assistance and other complementary services provided by partners were well funded. Partnerships with UNHCR, and NGOs as implementing partners to support refugees were more robust compared to other activities.

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<sup>31</sup> Data were not yet available for 2009 as the SPRs for the EMOP, PRRO, and CP were not finalized.

181. The same is unfortunately not true for the Chadian population in the Sahelian zone and eastern Chad and the level of assistance was judged insufficient. The assistance that was provided to IDPs and the host population in eastern Chad was appropriately designed for their needs, but was delivered almost as a residual priority. The focus of the EMOP was on the refugees, and assistance to the host population depended on the availability of resources. For example, FFW was discontinued when additional resources were required for the refugees. The IDPs in eastern Chad have also not been as high a priority as the refugees.

182. Increased education participation. The WFP school feeding programme, in collaboration with the Government of Chad, has had a positive contribution to the Government's stated goal of education for all in four ways. First, school feeding increased access to education for children across the country, especially in the *Sahelian* zone. Second, school feeding has expanded participation of girls, reducing the gender imbalance. Third, key informant interviews have also indicated that the school feeding programme has increased retention levels, especially among girls (given the dry take-home ration), and therefore contribute to higher completion levels of primary school.

183. There has been a gap between programme design and implementation which is due to a number of factors, including the weak implementing capacity of key partners, a potentially volatile political and security situation, a high turnover of Government staff, and weak institutions. It is important to note that the operating model that drove the CO's priorities during the 2003 – 2009 period has been one that focuses on designing and implementing individual food assistance operations, not one that is an integrated country portfolio strategy. The country portfolio has been viewed and managed as a discrete set of food assistance operations, not as an integrated portfolio. As a result, resource and programming choices were not made at the overall country portfolio level, which has limited the potential for synergy and performance across the entire portfolio. As the Country Office moves towards a portfolio management approach, broader sectoral discussions will result in significant dividends.

184. There is no vision on how food security and nutrition can improve in Chad. The tasks are enormous, and include providing support to national nutrition policy, streamlining food and nutrition interventions within WFP, aligning them with WFP guidelines, and providing the complementary interventions.

185. For the bulk of the portfolio, which focused on the stabilization and maintenance of refugees from Sudan and the CAR, sustainability was not the intended outcome. With the exception of school feeding, there is little ownership of Government of WFP activities. Increased ownership of FFW was observed when it was focused on building schools, a clear priority of local communities. There is little possibility to handover any of the WFP activities to the Government. The technical, operational, and managerial capacity within Government to undertake these activities, whether in emergency, protracted, or development operations, is not sufficient to expect that these activities would continue at the appropriate level.

### **3.2. Key Lessons for the Future and Recommendations**

186. First, the evaluation derived from its observations of the Chad programme is that the country portfolio has been viewed and managed as a discrete set of food assistance operations, not as an integrated portfolio with a clear strategy and vision. Instead of a country portfolio that has a clear strategy and vision where the staffing structure, the management approach, and programming capacity and decisions are made efficiently and effectively across the entire country portfolio, decisions are

made primarily on an operation by operation basis. This has limited the effectiveness of resources in the country portfolio.

187. Second, the evaluation observed a structural disconnect between programme activities and the implementation structure. Part of this disconnect is the operations-based approach. The other aspect that drives this disconnect is that WFP has an underlying tonnage-driven model that drives programming towards tonnage-based solutions. With multiple ongoing operations this approach has resulted in a highly centralized decision-making structure, which has at times delayed key implementation decisions. Identifying the best programming choices should be the starting point, followed by an assessment as to what (if any) role WFP should have.

188. Third, the evaluation highlights is that the Government of Chad is extremely challenging to partner to work with given their weak capacity and limited resources that have been allocated in areas that are associated with WFP programme areas such as school feeding, nutrition, agriculture, and rural development. To have impact and sustainability in its programmes WFP has to partner with other UN agencies (especially FAO and UNICEF), donors, financial institutions, and NGOs to support and strengthen Government policies, structure, management, and technical capacity. The strengthening of Government has to occur at all levels so that from central planning and decision-making through capacity in the field to implement activities.

189. Fourth, increased attention needs to be placed on Chadian beneficiaries. Although it was appropriate at the beginning of the 2003 – 2009 period to focus on the needs of the refugees that came into Chad from Sudan and the CAR, there are equally significant humanitarian assistance required to address Chadian populations that exceed the criteria for emergency assistance. This is an extremely large and difficult challenge, and one that will require WFP Regional Bureau and headquarters support. The introduction of the EMOP in the *Sahelian* zone is a good opportunity to begin addressing this need.

190. Fifth, the evaluation highlighted that a clearer determination and articulation of programme activities has to be made. During the period under evaluation the size and complexity of the programme has grown to where technical staff are dispersed across N'Djamena and 12 sub-offices, and working in three food assistance operations. This has made the management and capacity strengthening of these staff difficult, and has made a coordinated technical approach to activities not possible. This complexity has also put pressure on the capacity of the staff to do core technical activities such as design, implement, and monitor progress of activities. Harmonizing and rationalizing technical activities across the portfolio should be done in the future, and could include work planning that integrates technical activities, thematic technical groups that share best practices, and providing technical support when there is a surge of activity.

191. Sixth, there are several staffing issues that need to be addressed at the policy level to identify, maintain, and retain a complete staff of professionals. The two main staffing issues that arose during the evaluation are vacancies and living and working conditions in the sub-offices. The recruitment of key CO personnel—senior management and technical staff—needs to be a priority to have the necessary complement of staff to implement the very complex and ambitious portfolio. The living and working conditions in several of the sub-offices are very difficult, and a baseline understanding should be documented and a plan developed to monitor and review these conditions on a regular basis.

192. Seventh, the possible withdrawal of MINURCAT in 2010 may severely disrupt the present precarious security situation in eastern Chad, potentially disrupting the well-functioning transport and logistic structure. Much will depend on the schedule of withdrawal of MINURCAT and the speed with which the Chad Armed Forces and

the Detachment *Integre de Securite* (DIS) squadrons will fill the vacuum of power that will likely be created. It can be assumed that the destabilization activities of rebel groups on both side of the border will not automatically cease with the departure of the MINURCAT. There is here a task for the UNCT to sensitize the Government to this issue and to the need to exercise caution when modifying the balance of security forces in that region. Failing have a secure environment may result in a collapse of the entire humanitarian aid system in Eastern Chad.

193. Eighth, a sharp communication gap exists between WFP and the Government, private sector, and the general public. The objectives and the activities of WFP are not well understood, especially by Government officials, which have resulted in WFP being perceived as not engaged or a significant player in humanitarian assistance. This erroneous perception must be reversed. WFP must present itself as a strong and reliable partner of the Government, with a clear mission to assist the people of Chad.

194. Ninth, the evaluation of the logistics, and a general review of the each cost components, highlighted the critical level of “total operational expenditures” to conduct projects in Chad. With the exception of emergency situations, the rationale for conducting PRRO and \development projects (DEV) given the extremely high cost of delivering food should be reviewed. The dearth of donors, international non-governmental organizations, and the absence of a strong partnership with the Government has limited the amount of development assistance that has been delivered in Chad. While there are significant development needs in Chad, the WFP should review its future role.

195. Finally, the evaluation highlights the need to review the future composition and targeting of the food assistance in terms of both quality and quantity for the refugees in eastern Chad and the Chadian host population. During the course of the evaluation several issues have arisen that warrant this review for future operations. First, the general ration should be adjusted to fit the actual needs of the refugee population. Second, an assessment of whether there is a need to should be made. Third, an assessment of whether targeted feeding of malnourished children in the local population sufficient, given the high food insecurity in the entire population. Finally, an assessment of whether or not free distribution can realistically be replaced through FFW activities.

196. **Recommendation 1:** The Country Office should develop a clear 5-year strategy and vision to guide its portfolio in Chad. A strategy and vision for the overall country portfolio needs to be articulated and permeate the entire Chad Country Office (CO) operations and activities. This strategy needs to have a clear vision of what success will look like at the end of the five years to allow for the development of a roadmap to chart the required actions and activities to achieve the desired vision. A was conducted as part of the development of the Uganda Country Strategy for 2009 – 2014 which is an excellent starting point for strategic planning in Chad. It is recommended that the country office undertakes a strategic planning exercise and that outside facilitators be engaged to ensure a well articulated process. Full participation of key in-country staff (especially the Country Director, Deputy Country Director, and Heads of Units) and from the Regional Bureau and Rome Headquarters (at sufficient seniority) is required to ensure that the strategy and engagements made are realistic and implementable for all stakeholders. While the 5-year strategy has to be an internally-driven process, consultation with external stakeholders—the Government of Chad, other UN agencies, multilateral and bilateral donors, and NGOs should be consulted to ensure realism, relevance, and coordination are achieved.

**197. Recommendation 2:** The Country Office should develop an integrated management approach to allow for decision-making across the entire country portfolio and increase the responsiveness to field requests and operational efficiency. This approach should support the implementation of the strategy and attainment of the vision. The decision-making process needs to include the breadth of decisions and challenges across all operations to make the best decisions for the overall performance and results of the country portfolio, and to be able to adjust activities as conditions on the ground change. Several recommendations are proposed:

- First, it is recommended that a detailed schedule of authorities be developed that clearly describes who is responsible for all routine and exceptional decisions, and who should be informed;
- Second, it is recommended that increased responsibility be given to sub-offices, in particular the *Abeche* office in Eastern Chad, (within proper oversight by senior Country Office management) to increase efficiency and responsiveness. A more detailed and integrated annual work planning process could describe the all major activities across operations that are envisioned for the year, and specific roles and responsibilities that ensure compliance to WFP rules and regulations, but allow the sub-office managers to move forward with their activities. Once that integrated work plan has the approval of the Country Director the sub-office manager would then be empowered to implement that work plan. An agreed upon set of management reports from the sub-offices should be developed and supervisory visits taken to ensure that the work plan is being followed and compliance to regulations are being followed. Documenting the agreed upon activities that are planned and then allowing the sub-office managers to implement their activities will increase operational efficiency. A process must be in place to initiate a revisiting of the work plans if conditions change significantly and require changes;
- Finally, a staffing strategy is required to ensure that sufficient staff are available (the right skills at the right time), necessary R&R and leave are schedule to not negatively impact on operations, and that staff are living and working in adequate conditions.

**198. Recommendation 3:** The cost of implementing programme activities should be reviewed as the cost of implementing projects in Chad is high. Costing is a factor which must be taken into consideration before embarking into a new project or the extension of an existing project, influencing whether or not that activity will be done or how the activity will be done (e.g., clustered in a smaller area to contain costs). It is recommended that a complete portfolio review be conducted to see where cost synergies can be gained.

**199. Recommendation 4:** The Country Office, the Regional Bureau, and the Rome Headquarters should articulate the technical support and staffing needs to ensure a smoothly operating Chad Country Office. The Country Office, Regional Bureau, and Rome Headquarters should jointly articulate the support and staffing needs required given the size, complexity, and demands of the Chad country portfolio. There is a wealth of technical capacity and experience at the Regional Bureau and Rome headquarters that can be leveraged to support the management and technical implementation of activities in Chad, including technical support and backstopping, advocacy with Rome Headquarters, and integration with other country offices. It is recommended that during the strategic planning exercise the support and staffing needs be discussed and a strategy developed that clearly lays out what the Country Office needs in terms of support, and how the Regional Bureau and Rome Headquarters will help address those needs. A dialogue between the CO and the

Regional Bureau, and Rome Headquarters that anticipates staffing needs and changes, for example during the reassignment process, should be proactive to ensure the minimum impact on the country portfolio.

**200. Recommendation 5:** The Country Office systems and standards need to be strengthened to increase operational efficiency and strengthen programmes. Currently the systems in place in Chad—administrative, financial, and programme management (especially M&E)—are not sufficiently coordinated and aggregated to support efficient portfolio-level decision-making, especially to understand trade-offs. To address these challenges simple systems and standards need to be put in place and communicated throughout WFP and to stakeholders. Systems are needed to improve the communication, programme monitoring, M&E, and reporting. Standards are needed to provide more consistent programming, improved monitoring (including post-distribution monitoring), and better reporting from partners. In addition, improvement of the working and living conditions for sub-office staff need to be addressed through a thorough review of the current situation, and a plan to monitor and assess conditions (and make necessary changes) on a regular basis. The initiative to improve systems and standards will require resources, and should also be part of the strategic planning exercise. Provision should also be made for comprehensive training programmes in order to familiarize more staff with the new software programmes COMPAS, WINGS II, SAP, and new programmes which are presently rolled out: Project Planning Module, Common Monitoring tool, and others. Some emphasis should as well be put on post-distribution monitoring as a guiding tool for programme adaptation.

**201. Recommendation 6:** The Country Office should develop a strategy to strengthen the partnership, integration, and coordination with the Government of Chad. To maximize WFP's resources and increase the performance and results of its programmes, WFP needs to develop a strategy that will systematically approach the partnership, integration, and coordination with the Government of Chad. It is recommended that the country office use the existing structures within the UN systems (CCA, UNDAF, CAP, and cluster meetings) as fora to develop a coordinated approach to strengthen and partner with the Government of Chad. The planned meeting with all stakeholders around the issue of school feeding would be an excellent venue to lay out institutional strengths, weakness, opportunities, and threats to developing a coordinated strategy among all stakeholders. These forums can be help for all programme areas. Still, a broader level strategy that engages and commits the Government of Chad is required. It should not be “what can you do for me?”, but “what can we accomplish together and how can we do it?”. This strategy should involve a frank dialogue with senior Government officials, and should reconnect WFP with the Ministry of Plan and Economics (which has the role of coordination within the Government of Chad). The final piece of this puzzle is donors. The challenges to engage the Government of Chad and the magnitude of the issues to be faced will require resources. Once the programme level forums are completed and the dialogue with senior Government officials has progressed, a joint UN agency and Government of Chad proposal for institutional and capacity strengthening should be developed. This proposal should be clear about the commitments of all stakeholders to ensure transparency and allow progress to be monitored. WFP, through its VAM unit, should support FAO and the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET's) assistance to the SAP to strengthen the capacity of the SAP to monitor and assess food security. The Food Security Cluster is a key forum to support this activity.

**202. Recommendation 7:** The Chad Country Office should review the scope, content, and potential for integration across activities in its programmes. It is recommended that a formal review, with support from the Regional Bureau and Rome Headquarters, of the scope, content, and potential for integration within and across activities be conducted to see how synergies in integrating these activities can be achieved. Although this should be done initially as an internal exercise within WFP, the Government of Chad, other UN agencies, and other partners should subsequently be included in the dialogue to ensure that realistic expectations are conveyed to stakeholders and that ownership and buy-in occur. Included in the review of programme activities should be an examination of ways that activities could be integrated to achieve synergy. An example of a way to focus efforts on the school feeding programme would be to maintain the current feeding at all of the current schools throughout the country, but at the same time develop a “Model School” programme that focuses efforts of the Government of Chad, UNICEF, and WFP on a limited number of schools to develop a better way that these organizations can work together in an environment that is close to towns (thereby reducing the constraint of supporting and monitoring the schools). As these model schools become successful, lessons learned can be incorporated into a more global school strengthening strategy that can be sequentially rolled out in the entire country. An example of integrating different activities would be to combine FFW and school feeding using an approach that provides an incentive to rural families to use FFW to develop the classrooms, office, kitchen, storage, latrines, and water point to be eligible for a school canteen. WFP could work with the Ministry of Education and UNICEF to establish a programme called “The Path to a School Canteen” that clearly describes in simple language the steps that rural families need to follow to build all relevant physical structures using FFW that will result in their inclusion into the school canteen programme, and a clear commitment by the Government of Chad, WFP, and UNICEF to deliver on that agreement if the structures are built.

**203. Recommendation 8:** The Chad Country Office needs to have a fully qualified Public Relations Officer to ensure that the message of the good work that WFP gets out, and that significant emergency situation get sufficient attention. There is a significant amount of misinformation and poorly coordinated messages that do not correctly highlight the good work that WFP does. It is also necessary to highlight critical food insecurity, for example in the *Sahelian* zone and eastern Chad, to clearly show the extent of the critical nutrition and poverty situation to attract donors to support special programmes to address these needs. Although there is someone on the CO staff that is responsible to supply information to the public, a fully-qualified PR Officer is required. The PR Officer should be fully conversant with the various media communication channels, their specific potentialities and limitations, and should be able to correctly interpret and report on current data on food and nutrition security. Fluency in both French and English is also required to ensure messages are clear in both languages.

## Annexes

### Annex 1: Terms of reference

#### 1. Introduction and background

##### 1.A. Introduction

The CPE encompasses the entirety of WFP activities during a specific period. They evaluate the performance and results of the portfolio as a whole and provide evaluative insights to make evidence-based strategic decisions about positioning WFP in a country, strategic partnerships, operations design and implementation. The evaluation of the Chad portfolio is the third of this type of evaluations in WFP.

The draft terms of reference (ToRs) was prepared by the WFP Office of Evaluation (OE) evaluation manager based on a document review and discussions with WFP stakeholders.

The purpose of these ToRs is to provide key information to stakeholders about the proposed evaluation and to guide the evaluation team in its work during the various phases of the evaluation. The ToRs are structured as follows: Chapter 1 provides information on the context; Chapter 2 presents the rationale, objectives, stakeholders and main users of the evaluation; Chapter 3 presents the WFP portfolio and defines the scope of the evaluation; Chapter 4 identifies the key issues; Chapter 5 spells out the evaluation approach; and Chapter 6 indicates how the evaluation will be organized. The annexes provide additional background information on bibliography, basic facts about Chad, the WFP portfolio in Chad, the WFP strategic objectives as well as templates of reports and job descriptions of the evaluation team members.

##### 1.B. Country Context

This section is based on some of the publications listed in Annex one (bibliography). Annex two also presents some basic figures about Chad.

**Poverty.** Chad is among the ten poorest countries of the world, ranking 170 of 177 in the 2007 Human Development Index. Since 1994, Chad has generally maintained a satisfactory macroeconomic track record and its GDP growth averaged 5.2 percent between 1994 and 2003, mostly thanks to investments in the petroleum sector since 2001. However, progress in the fight against poverty has been mixed and 55 percent of the population lives below the poverty line. In addition, Chad struggles with low social indicators. While access to education has improved, especially for girls, rates of infant and juvenile mortality have remained the same since the 1990s. Worse yet, maternal mortality and infant malnutrition have increased. In addition, there are only 1,100 km of paved roads in a country more than twice the size of France.

Eighty percent of the population still depends on subsistence farming and herding for their livelihoods. Agro-pastoralism is the predominant livelihood in eastern Chad, with agriculture dominating in the southern areas and livestock rearing prevailing in the north. Cereal production is heavily affected by erratic rains, cyclical droughts and locust infestation.

**Food insecurity and nutrition.** Food insecurity affects 44 percent of the population and while the entire country is vulnerable to food insecurity, five regions are highly vulnerable: BET in the north as well as *Kanem*, *Biltine*, *Guera* and *Batha* in the *Sahelian* zone, which is particularly affected by chronic food deficits and where the arrival of thousands of Sudanese refugees since 2003 has compounded the situation. It is

estimated that 69 percent of households' expenses are devoted to food, which implies a high vulnerability to price variations of the food basket. Half of the population eats less than three meals a day and 13 percent eats once a day only. The national daily caloric intake stands at 1,720 kcal, a decrease of 20 percent since 1971, which places Chad below the Sub-Saharan Africa average (2,160)<sup>32</sup>.

Over the last 10 years, no progress has been accomplished with respect to acute and chronic malnutrition despite numerous nutrition interventions. Global acute malnutrition rates have remained above the 10 percent critical threshold and rose from 11.7 percent in 1996 to 14.4 percent in 2004. In rural areas, the situation is particularly critical with an average rate of 15.8 percent in 2005. Global chronic malnutrition rates have also remained critically above the 30 percent threshold with 38.8 percent in 1996 and 36.7 percent in 2004<sup>33</sup>.

**Government strategy.** The Government adopted a PRSP in 2003 focusing on (i) Promotion of good governance; ii) ensuring strong and sustainable growth; iii) developing human capital; iv) improving living conditions of vulnerable groups; and v) restoring and safeguarding ecosystems. Taking into account the 2004 Common Country Assessment (CAA), the United Nations Development Assistance Framework for 2006 – 2010 (UNDAF) presents the UN vision of its contribution to the realisation of the PRSP and puts forward 5 axis of work for UN agencies: i) developing human capital; ii) democratic and economic governance; iii) restoring and safeguarding ecosystems; iv) Management of crises and emergencies; v) fight against HIV/AIDS.

In 2008, a revised PRSP was published, which integrates the MDG indicators, gender questions, as well as conflict prevention. The UNCT is currently reviewing the UNDAF to further align it to the priorities and cycle of PRSP2. In addition, the Government developed in 2006 with FAO support a national food security policy for 2006 – 2015, which aims to fight hunger and food insecurity by increasing productivity as well as quantitative and qualitative access of population to food commodities while preserving basic natural resources.

**Humanitarian situation and international assistance.** Since the end of 2003, a serious humanitarian crisis has unfolded in Chad, as a result of the degradation of the security situation in Sudan's Darfur region, persistent insecurity in the CAR, and increasing internal instability due to activities by armed groups and inter-ethnic tensions. Since then, Chad has sheltered 265,000 Sudanese refugees in the east and 58,000 Central African refugees in the south, whilst internal conflicts have caused the displacement of 180,000 Chadians in the east and no returns of refugees are envisaged for the foreseeable future. The current humanitarian crisis thus clearly has both a regional dimension and as well as an internal causes due to internal instability. In addition, Chad has also faced several sporadic natural disasters (mostly floods and disease outbreaks), which could become more frequent and extreme due to climate change.

In light of this situation, the efforts of the international community (including donors) and of the Government have steered away from development to focus heavily on the emergency relief needs of internally displaced, refugees, and host populations. The overall Common Appeal Process (CAP) requirements have increased from US\$ 30.1

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<sup>32</sup> CSAO – CILSS, *Profil Securite alimentaire*, April 2008

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

million in 2004 to 389 million for 2009. Of these, between 40 and 45 percent of the requirements have been for food assistance<sup>34</sup>.

In line with the humanitarian reform, sectoral clusters were activated in 2007 to improve coordination mechanisms. While the delivery of assistance has been impeded by a deteriorating security situation, an improvement is expected as a result of the deployment of a peacekeeping force in eastern Chad to be completed by 2009.

## **2. Reasons for the evaluation**

### **2.A. Rationale**

WFP operations are guided by its corporate strategic plans. The latest Strategic Plan (SP 2008-2011) marks a historical shift from WFP as a food aid agency to a food assistance one, with a more nuanced and robust set of tools to respond to critical hunger needs. Its overarching goal is to reduce dependency and to support Governmental and global efforts to ensure long term solutions to the hunger challenge. The objectives of the SP (see annex three) reflect the continued importance of coherence in United Nations delivery at the country level. The new SP marks a transition<sup>35</sup>:

- From WFP as a food aid to WFP as a food assistance organisation;
- From project to strategic and comprehensive approaches;
- From implementing to enabling Government ownership, capacity and accountability while ensuring hunger, food security and nutrition are on the national agenda;
- From working with partners to working more effectively in partnerships within the new aid environment.

As they align country-level planning with the 2008 - 2011 strategic plan and objectives, COs, including the Chad CO, are required to prepare CSD which are the basic vehicle for the Strategic Plan implementation and outline the current and future strategic orientation, priorities and expected results of the main WFP activities at country-level<sup>36</sup>. This process is also expected to ensure a transition towards a more strategic-oriented CO, which, in coherence with the national agenda, is positioned well in the UN harmonisation process and among other partners in the host country<sup>37</sup>.

The rationale for this Country Portfolio Evaluation is to contribute to assist the Chad CO in reviewing past performance and comparative advantage and in supporting its efforts to define the strategy for future WFP activities in the country.

The evaluation is undertaken at this point in time to inform in a timely manner the preparation of the Chad CSD expected to start in 2010. Indeed, in line with the Paris Declaration on Aid effectiveness and the Principles for Good international Engagement in Fragile States and Situations, the preparation of the CSD should be synchronized with

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34 OCHA CAP documents.

35 Source: WFP/EB.A/2008/5-A/Rev.1

36 Framework for the Strategic Plan implementation at the CO-level through a Country Strategy Document; draft 08/05/2009.

37 CSDs seek to: Assess the rationale and define strategies for future WFP activities in the country; Strengthen/redefine the strategic position of the CO in the host country's humanitarian and development process and among UN and other development partners; Guide and support the implementation of the Strategic Plan at the CO-level. Strengthen the CO's analytical capacity and national capacity development assistance with the aim of including hunger, food security and disaster issues in the national humanitarian and development framework.

the analytical processes preceding the preparation of national Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) and the UNDAF as it draws from and informs this process. The next UNDAF cycle in Chad should commence in 2011.

Furthermore this country portfolio evaluation, requested by the Country Office, is motivated by the fact that none of the operations implemented since 2003 have been evaluated and that the CO would benefit from an independent assessment of its operations especially as many will enter new phases in 2010. In addition, the CO also recognizes the need to look critically at potential overlap in targeting and activities.

## 2.B. Objectives

Evaluations serve the dual objectives of accountability and learning. As such, this evaluation will:

- Assess and report on the performance and results of the CO portfolio in line with the WFP mandate and in response to humanitarian and development challenges in Chad (accountability);
- Determine the reasons for observed success / failure and draw lessons from experience to produce evidence-based findings to allow the CO to make informed strategic decisions about positioning itself in Chad, strategic partnerships, operations design and implementation (learning).

Of these two objectives, emphasis will be placed on learning in line with the rationale for this evaluation and with the perceived interest of the key stakeholder groups described in 2.C.

Other objectives of this evaluation are to further refine the methodology for country portfolio evaluations in WFP and continue testing the use of this type of tool corporately. In particular, this country portfolio evaluation will serve to test its methodology in a context of a large country presence with mostly an emergency response portfolio. Findings related to these objectives will not be included in the evaluation report but will be gathered directly by the evaluation manager throughout the process, shared with the RB and used in discussions within the Office of Evaluation to decide on the future development of this type of evaluation.

## 2.C. Stakeholders and users

**Table 1.1: Preliminary stakeholders analysis**

Key stakeholder group	Role and interest in the evaluation
<b>Internal</b>	
WFP CO management	The CO management is responsible for country-level planning and operations implementation. It has a direct stake in assessing the relevance, coherence and performance of WFP in Chad and in drawing lessons thereof to take future strategic decisions. The evaluation will further contribute to enhancing the CO accountability to the Government, WFP RB and HQ, partners, donors and beneficiaries.
WFP Regional Bureau	The RB management are responsible to provide guidance and technical support to COs in the region and in particular to the Chad CO, which is the largest and most complex WFP intervention in the region. The RB has an interest in ensuring that the Chad portfolio is reviewed to ensure further coherence within operations, increased effectiveness and strategic positioning of the WFP CO.

WFP HQ management	Senior HQ managers and in particular the Office of Performance Measurement (OEDAM) and members of the Strategic Plan Implementation Working Group (SPIWG) and the Strategic Review Committee (SRC) responsible for providing guidance and oversight for the roll-out of CSD have an interest in ensuring that they are based on lessons learned on the country presence.
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<b>Key stakeholder group</b>	<b>Role and interest in the evaluation</b>
WFP OEDE	The Office of Evaluation has a direct stake in this evaluation as the manager of this evaluation as it allows further testing of the CPE tool and of its use for informing CSDs.
WFP Executive Board	The EB has a direct interest in the effectiveness of WFP operations at large, in their harmonisation with strategic processes of Government and partners and in ensuring that WFP is adequately effecting the transition prescribed by the 2008-2011 strategic plan.
<b>External</b>	
Government partners	The Government sets the policy agenda in the country (national strategies and development frameworks) and aims at ownership, harmonization and aid effectiveness in the spirit of the Paris Declaration. It has a direct interest in ensuring that WFP's operations are effective, aligned with their agenda and harmonised with the action of other partners.
UN Country Team	The UNCT is a local strategic and operational partner. The harmonised action of the UNCT overall contributes to the realisation of the Government humanitarian and developmental agendas. The UNCT has an interest in ensuring that WFP operations are effective and that WFP strategically reviews its portfolio to participate effectively in the upcoming UNDAF preparation as well as in other local strategic processes.
NGO partners	NGOs are WFP's partners in programme implementation and design and as such have a stake in the WFP assessment of its portfolio performance as well as an interest in its future strategic orientation.
Donors	Donors are either funding WFP operations or other operations in related fields, which could inform the evaluation of the developments in certain sectors. Further, donors have an interest in the performance and results of the WFP activities, as well as in its future strategy which may complement their own strategies and supported-programmes.
Beneficiaries	As the ultimate recipients of food assistance, beneficiaries have a stake in WFP determining whether its assistance is appropriate and effective. As such, perspectives from beneficiaries should be sought.

The intended users of the evaluation are first and foremost the Chad CO and its local partners including the Government, UNCT, and donors. In addition, the other stakeholders groups identified below notably the WFP management at large and the Executive Board are also expected to be users of the evaluation.

### **3. WFP portfolio and scope of the Evaluation**

#### **3.A. The WFP Portfolio in Chad**

WFP operations in Chad started as early as 1963, the year which marks the creation of WFP as an independent United Nations Programme. Since then a total of 61 operations took place for a value of US\$ 1 billion. Annex four provides a list of all WFP operations implemented in Chad since 1963 (including number, food cost and total cost).

**Table 1.2: Overview of WFP operations in Chad 1963 – 2008<sup>38</sup>**

<b>Number of operations</b>	<b>61</b>
Total cost	1,003,458,445
Total cost excluding 6 logistics Special operations	946,935,734
Total food costs	319,739,578
Food cost as a percentage of total cost (excluding 6 SOs).	34%

**Development vs. Emergencies.** The value of the WFP assistance between 1963 and 2003 amounted to about US\$ 260 million or 25 percent of the total and 61 percent of the budget was directed to development projects while 39 percent went to emergency operations related mostly to natural disasters.

In contrast, the WFP assistance to Chad increased dramatically since 2003 and amounts to over US\$ 767 million or 75 percent of the total cost of all operations implemented since 1963. Of the 16 operations implemented since then, 14 have been focused on responses to conflict-related emergencies (7 EMOPs), follow-up and support thereof (1 PRRO and 6 Special Operations). Overall, 91 percent of the total budget went to these. The two longer-term development operations (Country Programmes) amount to 9 percent of the total resources.

**Table 1.3: WFP operations 2003 – 2009**

	<b># of operations</b>	<b>Total cost (US\$)</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Development	2 <sup>39</sup>	69,225,428	9
Emergency Operation (EMOP)	7	616,180,524	80
Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO)	1	25,349,000	3
Special Operation (SO) in support of EMOPs	6	56,522,711	7
Total	16	767,277,663	100

There has thus been a drastic shift towards humanitarian assistance as of 2003 as confirmed by the below table on the quantities of food aid delivered per food aid type per year. Annex five provides a list of the WFP operations since 2003 (including number, type, cost and activity types).

**Table 1.4: Food aid delivered in Chad 2003 - 2007 in MT per food aid type<sup>40</sup>**

Food Aid Type	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	Total
Emergency	3,256	33,172	57,494	50,814	56,792	201,528
Project	12,780	8,313	14,632	8,379	10,765	54,869
Total	16,036	41,486	72,126	59,193	67,557	256,397

<sup>38</sup> Source: WFP Go website, including “completed projects database”; standard project reports and Executive Board documents.

<sup>39</sup> Including CP 10018, which started in 2001 but finished in 2007.

<sup>40</sup> Source – WFP INTERFAIS database in WFP.org website.

**Geographical focus.** Since 2003, the operations of a humanitarian nature (EMOPs, SOs, and PRRO) have focused on two distinct regions. In southern Chad, assistance has been provided to Central African Refugees; while in the east of the country, assistance has been provided to Sudanese Refugees, internally displaced and host communities.

The development projects focus on other parts of the country, namely in the areas most exposed to weather hazards and to recurrent food insecurity as per the WFP vulnerability assessments. The five regions targeted by both CPs have been *Kanem, Guéra, Batha, Ouaddai* and *Wadi Fira*.

**Objectives and activities.** While the food assistance operations implemented since 2003 related to previous strategic plans (see annex six for a list of the stated objectives and activities per operation), it is possible to use the terminology of the latest strategic plan to group the stated or unstated objectives of these operations as follows:

- **Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies (SO1).** This strategic objective encompasses assisting refugees, IDPs and other vulnerable groups and communities whose food and nutrition has been adversely affected by shocks; to reduce acute malnutrition and to protect livelihoods and enhance self-reliance in emergencies and early recovery. The related activities include general and targeted food distributions, emergency nutrition programmes (therapeutic and supplementary feeding as well as MCHN) and food for work, which have been common to all the emergency operations and to the PRRO implemented in Chad since 2003. (See Annex five and six.)
- **Reduce chronic hunger and under-nutrition (SO4).** This strategic objective encompasses increasing levels of education, basic nutrition and health. The related activities include mostly school feeding and MCHN in the context of the country programmes. (See Annex five and six.)
- **Prevent acute hunger and invest in disaster preparedness and mitigation measures (SO2).** This strategic objective includes supporting and strengthening the resiliency of communities to shocks through safety nets. The related activity is food for work in the context of the country programmes. (See Annex five and six.)

### 3.B. Scope

The scope of this evaluation covers the WFP Chad portfolio defined as the 10 food assistance operations covering the period 2003-2008 because the humanitarian crisis, which started at the end of 2003, heralded a significant shift in the nature and objectives of the WFP assistance in Chad. The operations included are seven emergency operations<sup>41</sup>, one protracted relief and recovery operation<sup>42</sup> and two country programmes<sup>43</sup>, including CP 10018, which started in 2001 but finished in 2007. In light of the strategic focus of this evaluation, the Special Operations will be considered as one technical activity supporting the objectives of other existing operations (e.g. EMOPs and PRRO) used by the CO to achieve its overall objectives and to foster partnerships and will be included and reviewed to this extent in the evaluation.

In light of the strategic nature of this review, the focus shall not be on evaluating the 10 individual food assistance operations *per se* but rather to look across operational divides

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<sup>41</sup> EMOPs: 10295; 10325; 10327; 10295.1; 10327.1; 10559; 10559.1

<sup>42</sup> PRRO 10510.

<sup>43</sup> CP 10018 and CP 10478.

to provide an assessment of the relevance and coherence of the WFP portfolio as a whole, of its evolution overtime, of its performance, and of the strategic role played by WFP in Chad, as detailed in the key questions (section 4). The focus should thus be on how groups of main activities across operations have contributed together to their respective objectives stated in paragraph 28, e.g. how targeted food distributions, emergency nutrition programmes and food for work have together and across all EMOPs and the PRRO contributed to saving lives and protecting livelihoods in emergencies.

The analytical work conducted by WFP (either alone or with partners<sup>44</sup>) as well as WFP's participation to local strategic processes also form part of the scope of this evaluation, not to assess the methodology or quality of the products as such, but to determine the extent to which it influences and complements the work and strategies of others.

The geographic scope includes all areas covered by the portfolio. However, the field work will focus on the areas covered by WFP assistance in eastern and southern Chad as well as in two of the five provinces covered by the country programmes. The latter will be selected by the evaluation team during the inception phase on the basis of transparent criteria.

#### **4. Key Issues for the Evaluation**

Key questions have been developed for this evaluation. They will be further detailed in a matrix of evaluation questions to be developed by the evaluation team during the inception phase. Collectively, the questions aim at highlighting the key lessons on the WFP country presence and performance, which could inform future strategic and operational decisions. These are:

**Strategic alignment of the WFP portfolio including the extent to which:** i) its main objectives and related activities have been strategically in line with the country's humanitarian and developmental needs, priorities and capacities and; ii) its objectives have been coherent with the stated national humanitarian and developmental agendas; iii) there have been trade-offs between aligning with national strategies on one hand and with WFP strategic plans and corporate policies on the other hand; iv) its objectives have been strategically coherent and harmonized with those of partners in Chad (multilateral, bilateral and NGOs); and v) its objectives have taken into account the domestic and regional aspects of the crisis.

**Making strategic choices** including the extent to which WFP: i) has analyzed the national hunger, food security and nutrition issues or used existing analyses to understand the key hunger challenges in the country; ii) contributed to placing these issues on the national agenda, to developing related national or partner strategies and to developing national capacity on these issues; iii) positioned itself as a strategic partner for the Government, multilateral, bilateral and NGO partners and in which specific areas; and iv) identify the factors that determined existing choices have been based on identifiable factors (perceived comparative advantage, corporate strategies, national political factors, resources, organizational structure, etc.) to understand drivers of strategy and how they need to be considered and managed when developing a country strategy.

**Performance and Results of the WFP portfolio** including: i) the level of efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of the main WFP portfolio activities and

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<sup>44</sup> See for example the CFSVA (Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Assessments), the JAMs (Joint Assessment missions), the nutrition reviews etc. More details are provided in Annex one.

explanations for these results (this will include a review of factors such as internal arrangements e.g. staffing, administration etc as well as factors beyond WFP's control); ii) the level of synergy and multiplying effect between similar activities in different operations and between the various main activities regardless of the operations; iii) the inter-dependence between the logistics operations and the food aid operations; and iv) the level of synergies and multiplying opportunities with partners (multilateral, bilateral and NGOs) at operational level.

## **5. Evaluation Approach**

### **5.A. Evaluability Assessment<sup>45</sup>**

The challenges of evaluating the WFP Chad portfolio include the following:

- The absence of an overall strategy and logframe for the WFP portfolio in Chad since until now, COs did not prepare country strategies stating WFP's objectives and goals for the portfolio as a whole. While each operation has its own logical framework these do not add up to common objectives or goal for operations in Chad overall;
- The difficulty of assessing the less tangible aspects of positioning oneself strategically as a partner and of influencing the strategies of others are difficult to measure;
- Baseline and monitoring data as well as evaluation information (self-evaluations, reviews and evaluations of partners) are available<sup>46</sup>; however these are piecemeal and tend to focus on the output rather than on the outcome or goal levels. They will thus be insufficient to assess outcomes and impact in a systematic manner.

### **5.B. Methodology**

Tendering firms will be required to present an outline of the proposed evaluation approach and methodology for this assignment. During the inception phase, the evaluation team will further provide additional details and the final methodology will be presented in the inception report. The parameters which need to be taken into account when designing the approach and methodology include:

- The evaluation approach should be based on a model that looks at groups of "main activities" across a number of operations rather than at individual operations. As such, the operations should be aggregated to develop an understanding of their contribution to the relevant sectors and objectives. The focus should be on how groups of main activities across operations have contributed together to their respective objectives. Annex 7 provides a suggested evaluation model, which should be revised / built upon by the evaluation team;
- The evaluation will employ relevant internationally agreed evaluation criteria including those of relevance, coherence (internal and external), efficiency, effectiveness, impact, sustainability and connectedness;

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<sup>45</sup> Evaluability is the extent to which an activity or a program can be evaluated in a reliable and credible fashion, which depends on the clear understanding of the situation before assistance was provided, a clear statement of intended outcomes and impacts, clearly defined appropriate indicators, and target dates by which expected outcomes and impacts should occur.

<sup>46</sup> In particular, a baseline for school feeding was done in 2007 for the CP; a VAM study was conducted in 2005 and one is currently ongoing; JAM have been conducted every year for the EMOP and the PRRO as were nutrition surveys.

- The proposed methodology should ensure that the key questions of the evaluation are addressed and that evaluability challenges are taken into account as well as given budget and timing constraints. Generally, the methodology should ensure impartiality and aim to avoid biases by ensuring that a cross-section of information sources is used (e.g. stakeholder groups, including beneficiaries, etc.) and that an approach mixing methods is used (e.g. quantitative, qualitative, participatory) to allow triangulation of information through a variety of means.
- The proposed sampling technique should ensure impartiality in selecting fieldwork sites and stakeholders to be interviewed.

### **5.C. Quality Assurance**

WFP's evaluation quality assurance system (EQAS) is based on the UNEG norms and standards and good practice of the international evaluation community (ALNAP and DAC). It includes quality assurance of evaluation reports based on standardized checklists. This quality assurance process does not interfere with the views and independence of the evaluation team. The evaluation manager will conduct the first level quality assurance, while the OEDE Director will conduct the second level review. Relevant EQAS documents will be provided to the team at the start of the evaluation. The consultancy firm will be required to ensure quality assurance throughout the analytical and reporting work.

## **6. Organization of the Evaluation**

### **6.A. Evaluation team**

In order to uphold the evaluation independence in line with the WFP Evaluation policy, the evaluation will be conducted by an independent consultancy firm with proven record in country level and strategic evaluations identified through a transparent tendering process.

The evaluation team to be retained by the consultancy firm is expected to include the following competencies:

- Strong experience in strategic positioning and planning related to humanitarian assistance;
- Ability to conceptualize complex evaluation and to design ensuing approach and methodology;
- Technical expertise in food aid and food security, humanitarian nutrition, education (school feeding experience would be an asset), livelihoods/ safety nets specialist (food for work experience would be an asset), logistics (experience in logistics for large humanitarian operations would be an asset). Other technical expertise related to the scope could also be brought in, if necessary.

National expertise would be an added value as part of the team or to complement it by assisting in research, field work, etc.

All proposed team members should have strong analytical skills and ability to communicate effectively in French (oral and written). They will not have been significantly involved in work for the Chad CO or have other conflicts of interest.

## **6.B. Roles and Responsibilities of WFP stakeholders**

This evaluation is managed by OEDE and Claire Conan, Evaluation Officer, has been appointed as evaluation manager. She is responsible for drafting the ToRs; selecting and contracting the evaluation team; preparing and managing the budget; setting up the review group; organizing the team briefing; assisting in the preparation of the field missions; conducting the first level quality assurance of the evaluation products and consolidating comments from stakeholders on the various evaluation products. She will also be the main interlocutor between the evaluation team, represented by the team leader, and WFP counterparts to ensure a smooth implementation process.

The Country Office is expected to provide information necessary to the evaluation; be available to the evaluation team to discuss the programme, its performance and results; facilitate the evaluation team's contacts with stakeholders in Chad; set up meetings and field visits, organise for interpretation if required and provide logistic support during the fieldwork, including booking local flights, accommodations and providing vehicles for transportation as needed.

Relevant WFP stakeholders at RB and HQ levels are expected to be available for interviews/meetings with the evaluation team and to comment on the various reports throughout the evaluation process.

To ensure the independence of the evaluation, the CO and RB staff will not be part of the evaluation team or participate in meetings where their presence could bias the responses of the stakeholders.

## **6.C. Communication**

All evaluation products will be available in French and some key documents (ToRs and evaluation summary report) will be translated in English by WFP to ensure that all the expected users have access to the main evaluation documents. Debriefing sessions with the main stakeholders will be held upon completion of the field work to share and verify initial findings, provide an opportunity to clarify issues and ensure a transparent evaluation process.

To disseminate findings, the summary evaluation report will be submitted to the WFP Executive Board in June 2010 and will be made available to the public through the WFP website. Depending on availability of funds, a feedback workshop could be organised by the CO to serve as a forum to discuss with partners the future strategy of the CO in Chad based on the recommendations of the evaluation.

To maximise lessons sharing a short evaluation brief will be prepared by the evaluation manager and shared with internal and external stakeholders. Lessons will also be incorporated into OEDE's system for sharing lessons.

## **6.D. Resources and Budget**

The overall budget for the evaluation is estimated at approximately US\$210,000 covering consultancy fees, international travels, per diem and miscellaneous expenses. Internal travels including flights will be covered by WFP.

Funds will be provided from the OEDE PSA budget, as per the approved 2008–2009 biennium work plan and budget.

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## **Annex 3: List of Persons Consulted**

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Mr. Abbas Abdelkerim, Président d'UNATRANT (Syndicat des transporteurs).  
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Mr. Baba-Dina Dadelemou, Chef de Service transit maritime, STAT  
Mr. Bamaye Mamadou Boukar, Président Fédération Nationale des Ass. Des Parents d'Elèves du Tchad  
Mr. Habibou Mahamat Seidou, Transporteur, Abéché

Meetings were also held with refugees in Iridimi, Bredjing, Djabal, Treguine, Bosseye, Amboko, and Gondje Camps; the Gouroukoun IDP Camp; and beneficiaries of school feeding, nutrition centres, and FFW programmes in and near the Abeche, Iriba, Guereda, Goz Beida, Farchana, Mao, Mongo, and Gore Sub-Offices.

## Annex 4: Complete logistics assessment

(Contribution from F. De Meulder)

### Overview

The Chad country portfolio evaluation for the period 2003 – 2009 encompasses 10 different projects, including 2 country projects, 7 EMOPs and 1 PRRO. Out of these 10 projects, 3 were still in progress<sup>47</sup> at the time of the evaluation. A CP developed in 2001 focused on reducing food insecurity in the short-term and vulnerability to drought in the medium terms in the Grand *Kanem, Batha, Guera, Biltine*, and *Ouaddai*; and a second CP was developed to continue this work. Two EMOPs were developed in 2003 to address the needs of the influx of refugees from Darfur, Sudan into eastern Chad and from the Central African Republic into southern Chad. In 2006, a PRRO was developed for southern Chad to replace the EMPO, and focused on the CAR refugees located in the South of the country and the host population of *Logone, Mandoul* and *Moyen Chari*. In 2007 the fourth EMOP was developed for eastern Chad, and for the first time included assistance for IDP host communities and refugee-affected local populations.

From January 2001 through the end of December 2009, as much as 374.292 MT<sup>48</sup> of food-aid has been handed over to the IPs for distribution at a total operational cost (ISC excluded) of US\$ 434.5 million<sup>49</sup>. Data presented in Annex 5 summarise the specific tonnage and costs for each of the 10 projects. Chad being a food deficit country, the bulk of the food-aid was procured outside Chad save the purchase of a few trial consignments, bought locally, totalling less than 2.000 MT.

### Resourcing

The overall funding ratio for the portfolio review period stands as 73.5 percent. This is a very good performance even considering that 3 projects were still in progress at the end of the review period. Development project were funded to the tune of 55 to 60 percent. This ratio is within the norm for this type of project. The PRRO project (assistance to CAR refugees in Southern Chad and the host population) was, with a ratio of 88 percent, very well funded. For the 7 EMOPs (aid programmes aimed at the Darfur refugees and host population in Eastern Chad) the funding ratio averaged between 50 and 86 percent which is a fair record considering that the perceived degree of urgency of these programme has lessened over the last 3 to 4 years.

Thanks to an appropriate funding ratio no pipeline breaks occurred as a result of poor or late funding. Except for the 2 DEV projects and the 1 PRRO project which were spanning longer periods, the EMOPs have been running over successive series of shorter periods of 24 months or less. This has created the possibility for the CO to carry over balance stocks of food-aid from one EMOP to the next giving the new EMOP the necessary lead time for securing fresh financial resources. According to the COMPAS records as much as 94,333 MT of food-aid were transferred from one ending project to the subsequent one (See table in Annex 4).

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47 DEV 10478 01/01/2007 – 31/12/2010 ; EMOP 10559.1 01/01/2009 – 30/06/2010 ; PRRO 10510 01/03/2006 – 31/03/2010

48 Situation as at 31/12/2009: Food-aid tonnage handed over to IPs 374,292 MT – food aid in stock: 24,862 MT.

49 Total operational costs (excluding ISC) amounted to US\$ 434,553,919 as at 31/12/2009 – figures extracted from WINGS I & II. Pre-commitment provisions are excluded.

**Table 1: 10 projects - Ratios budget/funding – Situation as at 31/12/2009**

Project	Period	Total Budget as approved by EB or ED – US\$	Resourcing recorded as confirmed in WINGS I & II	Ratio of funding %
DEV 10018	01/01/01–31/12/06	29,402,019	16,083,381	55
EMOP 10.295.0	15/07/03–31/03/05	4,496,373	1,806,773	40
EMOP 10.325.0	27/10/03–26/05/05	199,368	0	0
EMOP 10.327.0	17/01/04–30/06/05	61,636,603	45,329,186	73
EMOP 10.295.1	01/05/05–28/02/06	5,665,571	2,937,524	51
EMOP 10.327.1	01/07/05–31/12/06	90,265,718	56,490,077	63
EMOP 10.559.0	01/01/07–31/12/08	195,474,918	169,490,556	86
DEV 10478	01/01/07–31/12/10	36,722,389	21,805,992	59*
PRRO 10.510.0	01/03/06–31/03/10	31,201,823	27,566,314	88*
EMOP 10.559.1	01/01/09–30/06/10	258,441,970	182,989,701	70*
<b>Total</b>		713,506,752	524,499,504	73.5

\* Projects still in progress on 31/12/2009.

The major donor countries are the USA, E.U. and Japan. Other major donors - Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland, – gave sustained support to the various Chad projects. Support was fair over all four categories of projects, in particular during the last three years as exemplified by the following table:

**Table 2: Comparative table of yearly funding (US\$).**

Comparative table of yearly funding							
Functional Area	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	Grand Total
DEV	1,063,130	905,317	5,332,486	1,085,112	13,050,586	50,274	21,486,905
EMOP	46,644,396	42,996,860	46,746,713	88,553,442	109,033,598	114,444,961	448,419,970
PRRO			4,362,210	1,114,909	9,655,636	10,767,839	25,900,594
SOP	4,081,118	1,867,081	5,184,706	10,674,518	9,852,222	14,766,445	46,426,090
Grand Total	51,788,644	45,769,258	61,626,115	101,427,981	141,592,042	140,029,519	542,233,559

No doubt the CO played a major role in securing the necessary funding. But, considering that few countries maintain in Ndjamena a fully fledged diplomatic mission dealing with humanitarian assistance and aid projects, it can be assumed that OMD in Dakar, the WFP Resourcing Office in Dubai and the REP and REG divisions in WFP Rome played a very significant role in maintaining a satisfactory level of resourcing.

## Procurement

Some 280,000 MT have been imported into Chad during the portfolio review period 2003 – 2009. Out of this amount only 2,000 MT (or less than 1 percent) was procured in Chad from local traders. The commodities, not necessarily locally produced, were beans, sorghum, sugar and vegetable. During that same period a total of 7,925 MT (or less than 3 percent) was regionally procured in Cameroun: mainly maize meal, beans, salt, and sorghum. The balance, or 96 percent, was procured overseas by OMLP in Rome. More than two thirds of the commodities were procured under FOB and FCA conditions the

external transport being organised by OMLS in Rome. The remainder was procured under CFR or DDU terms. At the same time some 70,000 MT of food commodities<sup>50</sup> were redirected between 2005 and 2008 from neighbouring Sudan and CAR into Chad to meet the extra demands created by the influx of refugees from both these countries into Chad.

The responsibility for the procurement of food-commodities is vested with OMLP in Rome. The cost price of the commodities is carefully and continuously monitored at local, regional and world market level<sup>51</sup>. The OMD and a Regional Procurement Coordinating office, opened in 2009 in Ouagadougou – Burkina Faso, provide both support as and when necessary. The implication of the CO in the procurement activity is rather minimal. It should be noted that the VAM / FEWS unit in Ndjamena is keeping a limited database on a few commodities such as millet; imported and local rice, maize and sorghum. The data collected is limited to the market places of *Ndjamena, Abeche, Moundou, Sahr* and *Bol*. It is not clear what good use is made of the data collected. Whilst the chain of command and responsibility is not rigidly defined, the procurement activities have in general kept pace with the level of programme activities and pipeline breaks were kept to a minimum. Occasional shortages of sugar and salt have been recorded. Otherwise the temporary shortages were appropriately corrected with a slight adjustment to the food basket.

Maize meal (MML) and CSB have been retained as important components of the food basket particularly for the aid activities: SF, MCHN, TF and HIV/AIDS. It is well known that the shelf life of both these commodities seldom exceeds 12 months. The supply lines and lead and transit times are often long. CSB is procured in South-Africa, Italy, Belgium and Turkey. Coupled with the need for intermediary storage along the main corridors and the obligation to constitute important stocks in anticipation of the rainy season, the normal shelf life is often exceeded or very close by at the time commodities are delivered to the school and/or health centres. The mission has noted that as a result almost half the consignments MML and CSB in WFP EDP warehouses and in the FDPs (schools and health centres) are infested with weevils. This situation calls for repeated fumigation often with mixed results. Few consignments indicate a production date and even fewer consignments have an expiry date displayed on the bags. In some cases WFP or the beneficiaries have to embark on large scale sifting exercises. This problem is well known to the staff and CO management though concrete measures to contain the infestation are still lacking, save repeated fumigation of the consignments. OMLP in Rome, being questioned on this specific issue, indicated that no such problem had ever been brought to its attention.

The analysis of the cost per ton per project and per cost component (See Annex 3) reveals that the commodity cost has almost doubled during the review period of the portfolio rising from an average of US\$ 250 in the years' bracket 2003 – 2005 to US\$ 450 for the years' bracket 2008 – 2009. A peak of US\$ 625 per MT has been recorded for the ongoing DEV 10.478. This increase in commodity cost reflects the hike in food prices on the world market during the period 2007 – 2008. The evolution of the Chad commodity cost is however totally in line with the evolution of the WFP -budgeted corporate commodity cost. The average commodity cost during the whole portfolio review period is

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<sup>50</sup> 21,467 MT from Sudan projects 10339.1 and 10557.0 to Chad project 10.327.0, 11,762 MT from Sudan projects 10339.1 and 10557 to Chad project 19.327.1

38,120 MT from CAR and Sudan projects 10557.0 – 10189.1 – 10478.0 to Chad project 10559.0

<sup>51</sup> OMLP in Rome is making good use an "Import Parity Form" which details for each PO the commodity prices as proposed on the local, regional and world market.

US\$ 366. Finally the level of commodity cost is to a certain extent influenced by the cost of CSB – a commodity in short supply on the world market – and that of MML.

The mission has not come across records indicative of the purchase of a significant amount of NFIs with the exception of the purchase of a few shovels and wheel barrows. This observation is corroborated by the extremely low level of ODOC costs, just 1 percent of the total costs.

### **Implementing partners**

Small national and local NGOs are plenty. Most of them are organised as self-help group and provide assistance to the local community. The ones which succeed in teaming with an NGO outside CHAD display often a striking degree of effectiveness<sup>52</sup>. There are only 10 to 12 major NGOs capable of entering into medium or large scale contractual agreements with WFP (or UNHCR) for the implementation of programmes or activities at regional, district or camp level<sup>53</sup>.

The Ministry for Education (Division of Primary Education) and the Ministry of Health must also be considered as major IPs. Both ministries are key partners in conducting SF, MCHN, TF, supplementary feeding and HIV/AIDS activities. The SF programme is organised and kept under regular review jointly by MEN and WFP. In the health sector the approach is more fragmentary and activities are negotiated on an ad-hoc basis. Whilst the undertaking made by WFP to deliver certain quantities of food commodities to schools and health centres is quite straightforward, the undertakings made in turn by the ministries or their divisions are less obvious and often open-ended. The food-aid so provided loses its boosting and support effects and is eventually downgraded to a mere assistance activity devoid of any multiplying effect. Views were expressed at the Ministry of Planning and by various parastatal bodies like ONASA that the information provided by WFP about the progress made with the implementation of the various projects was rather scanty.

The main feature of most FLAs and MOUs negotiated between the IPs and WFP is their extreme brevity. The contractual period is mostly three months and seldom exceeds a six months period. The only exception to this approach is the (tripartite) contracts related to the general food distribution in the camps which are entered into by the IP with WFP and UNHCR. The brevity of the contracts is apparently dictated by a prevailing feeling of uncertainty about the funding, the availability of food commodities, the capabilities of the IP on the ground, the limited scope of the activities, mainly FFW and FFT and finally by an unexplained propensity to favour the short term approach over medium and long term planning. In Mongo all the FFW/FFT activities had been kept on hold pending the recalibration of the projects and the organisation of a preliminary training session in favour of local NGOs interested in being associated with FFW/FFT projects.

This attitude generates a “stop and go feeling”. Agreements are continuously nearing their expiry date. Automatic renewal or extension of a contractual agreement is seldom and often entail protracted negotiations. Eventually, short of an enforceable agreement, assistance in the field is abruptly halted, pending renegotiation of an FLA<sup>54</sup>. Quite often the contract faces so many delays that its purpose and impact on the ground is seriously

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<sup>52</sup> NGO Centre *Djenadoym Naasom* (CDN) in *Moundou* providing a comprehensive assistance to HIV/AIDS patients linked to Initiative de développement - ID (France) is a good example of excellent teamwork.

<sup>53</sup> The larger NGOs are: Africare, Care, MSF, IRC, ACF, GTZ, IRD, ACORD, SECADEV, *Croix Rouge du Tchad* and World Vision International.

<sup>54</sup> Example: Mongo district. 8 CNS had their food supplies coming to a stand still since in mid-January 2010 pending the renegotiation of a contract which had expired end December 2010.

impaired<sup>55</sup>. This approach precludes any long term planning on the part of the NGOs and entails for WFP an unnecessary and repetitive amount of administrative follow-up which could be made more productive with monitoring activities. Finally the brevity of the FLAs bars the NGO from any capacity building benefit.

The SF activity and the bi-annual re-supply of the school canteens start invariably late, between 45 and 60 days after the official start of the school year begin October. Late submission by the Ministry of national Education (MEN) of the list of schools retained in the WFP SF programme with the caseload is apparently the reason of the late start of the SF programme. The delay is invoked by some school directors for delaying the start of the school year until food supplies have arrived. In other schools they adopt coping mechanism stretching the remaining stock of the April/May delivery to bridge the late arrival of supplies in November. The end result is that the daily rations are reduced well below the agreed daily norm.

The FLAs are often negotiated in such a way that the distribution costs are kept extremely low. Numerous contracts provide for a certain amount of food-aid commodities to be made available to the IP but make no provision whatsoever for the payment of distribution costs (time and tonnage based components)<sup>56</sup>. This is particularly the case for activities like MCHN, TF, supplementary feeding. This approach explains in part the very low ODOC ratio recorded in Chad: 1 percent of the total costs exposed against an accepted WFP corporate ratio of 7 percent. The CO can be commended for an approach which keeps the final distribution costs extremely low. On the other hand in the absence of any budget discussion and of financial reward for the ancillary services provided by the IP, it becomes difficult for WFP to exercise any leverage upon the IP to ascertain whether the extra services to be provided to the beneficiaries are in line with the provisions of the FLA.

The selection of IPs, contrary to a WFP practice in other countries<sup>57</sup>, is handled solely by WFP or in the case of the refugee camps in the East and the South jointly by WFP and UNHCR. The Government of Chad is no stakeholder in the selection process which is perhaps a missed opportunity to strengthen the partnership with the authority.

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<sup>55</sup>Example FLA ABE O24/2010 IRD /WFP Distribution of 283 MT of food-aid in schools of IDPs negotiated for the period 01/01 /2010 – 30/06/2010 whilst the school opens in October/November.

<sup>56</sup> See FLA ABE 23/2010 WFP/ACTED, FLA ABE 21/2010 WFP/IMC, FLA ABE 012/2010 WFP/IMC

<sup>57</sup> The selection of IPs in Malawi is vested with the « Joint Emergency Food Aid Programme – JEFAP » regrouping the Government of Malawi, donor countries, WFP and an NGO consortium. Under the chairmanship of the “Department of Prevention and Disaster Management – DoPDM” IPs are selected, screened and allocated the geographical area where they will operate.

## Staffing and logistics

The staff strength has, during the portfolio period, evolved as follows:

**Table 3: Strength of WFP international and local staff**

Date	International Staff				Local staff			CHAD Total strength	Total Ndjamena
	FT/IA /CON	UNV	CST	TDY	Local FT	SC	SSA		
01/01/2004	1	3	-	-	14	28	3	49	17
01/01/2005	19	5	12	1	11	46	66	168	46
01/07/2005	16	2	20	2	14	73	129	256	70
01/01/2006	18	7	11	1	14	196	2	249	75
01/07/2006	15	7	9	-	18	201	-	250	74
01/01/2007	21	9	9	1	18	208	5	271	79
01/07/2007	17	7	11	1	10	184	3	241	79
01/01/2008	21	5	8	-	18	193	10	255	92
01/07/2008	21	8	8	3	15	203	18	276	94
01/01/2009	25	4	14	-	15	213	11	282	94
01/07/2009	32	4	12	-	16	241	12	317	98

Table 3 gives a good indication of the gradual build up of the staff strength in Chad as more projects were picking up steam like the opening of the CAR refugee camps in the South as from 2005 and the strengthening of the national DEV projects in Karen, Bar-el-Gazel and Batha districts. Among the international staff good use has been made of United Nations Volunteers and consultants permitting a certain degree of flexibility. The international staff, in view of the UN declared security phase 3 or 4 in the country, is on a “R & R” service roster. This has an indirect bearing on the number of international and national staff required to maintain the necessary continuity of the operations.

The vast majority of the national staff is under “Service Contract” for a limited period of time, though renewable. This again offers the advantage of rapid adjustment of the staff strength as the situation and working conditions in the country evolve.

The logistic operations prove to be extremely complex in Chad requiring proven expertise and foremost the ability to monitor costs. The logistics representing something like 45 percent of the total project cost the CO can praise itself lucky that it succeeded availing itself extremely well-qualified international and national staff fully conversant with the tracking of commodities, the COMPAS system, the transport cost matrix calculations and the landside transport, storage and handling (LTSH) monitoring.

Properly organized training courses for logistic staff were few and far distant in time. Courses have been organized in Abeche and Ndjamena for warehouse keepers. Many COMPAS data entry clerks did complain that no proper COMPAS familiarization courses had been organized. Often the training was limited to a two day on the spot training with a colleague and for the remainder clerks had to resort to self-help. The same applies for the newly introduced WFP Information Network and Global System (WINGS) II system. No proper initiation courses were organized. The staff was suggested to go through a distant e-learning course. The success of such training is open to questioning.

The same is true for training of food monitors and staff of partner organisations in the field of nutrition. Given the high staff turn-over, there would be need to regularly train

and refresh knowledge in this field. There was only one training in June 2009 (almost at the end of the period under review). This training was for nutrition focal points in each sub-office and a reduced training for staff of implementing partners.<sup>58</sup>

## Logistics

The entire logistic operations hinges on two main access corridors: the Douala Corridor which is the normal gateway for the Chad import and export trade and the Benghazi corridor which was opened in 2004 once the UN lifted its sanctions in Libya. The Douala Corridor handles some 60 percent of the food-aid transit traffic destined for Chad and the Benghazi Corridor the remaining balance of 40 percent. The Benghazi corridor has proved, since its opening, essential for the steady supply of food-aid assistance to Eastern Chad. WFP Chad did correctly establish that the Douala Corridor did not have the spare capacity required to pre-position enough food commodities in anticipation of the rainy season (period June – September). Hence the opening up of the Benghazi Corridor was a correct decision.

The number of WFP offices, sub-offices, field offices and antennas to make the logistics work, is with 14 offices quite impressive: a head office: Ndjamen (1); sub-offices: *Abeche*, *Mao*, and *Mongo* (3); field offices in *Bahai*, *Farchana*, *Goz-Beida*, *Maro*, *Guereda*, *Iriba*, *Gore*, *Koukou* (8); and antennas in *Daha* and *Haraze* (2). Adequate storage facilities with a global capacity of some 35.000 MT are maintained in Ndjamen, *Abeche*, *Mao*, and *Mongo* and at the 8 field offices or nearby camps.

The Douala corridor is organised in a classical manner. WFP has appointed SAGA / SDV as its sole carriage and freight agent who is responsible for the on-carriage of the import consignments to their final destination. The transport is organised either by rail to *Ngaoundere* (railway head of *Camrail* in Cameroun) with on-carriage by road to final destination in Chad, either directly all the way by road from Douala port to final destination. This second alternative is used sparingly for reasons of cost. STAT, as sub-agent for SAGA / SDV in Chad is responsible for the cross border formalities and for the customs clearance. Transit times from Douala to final destination are anything between 4 and 6 weeks and remain acceptable given the limitations of the port of Douala (chronic port congestion) and of *Camrail*. Damages to food consignments remain limited to petty theft. WFP Chad maintains (at its own cost) a small antenna in the offices of WFP Cameroun in order to monitor the landing and transit operations in Douala. SAGA/SDV has, as per agreement, the upper hand in selecting and contracting the road hauliers. Chad based hauliers feel somehow excluded from the WFP long distance transport activities though they often participate in the WFP transport operations as sub-contractor for account of Cameroun hauliers. Bagging facilities are available for cereal consignments arriving in bulk in Douala.

The Douala Corridor is, never mind its capacity limitations, working satisfactorily. The costs for the different operations all along this corridor are well known. The various service providers are continuously monitored and COMPAS data entries are being fed in the system without undue delay. It can only be regretted that WFP is not using its status

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<sup>58</sup> During the field work of this evaluation, WFP supported nutrition training from IMC at *Guereda*. This training was for IMC staff and was supported by WFP, UNICEF, UNHCR and IMC staff. The evaluation team had chance to observe some of the training taking place. The following observations were made: a) the mode of training was very academic and less participatory b) the level of training was at times far to high and not adapted to the needs of local staff c) The training tried to cover too many topics d) one medical doctor, who was trying to capture attention of participants had obviously the feeling for adequate training methodology. Unfortunately, he only talked English to the participants and only very few of them could follow his valid interventions. His contributions were never translated.

of leading (world) shipper to obtain from the shipping lines an extended container franchise. An extended container franchise, from a standard 15 days to 40 days would enable WFP to move its consignments vegetable oil, sugar and peas all the way in containers up to final destination reducing thus spillages and leakages to almost nil.

Despite sustained efforts to move commodities directly from Douala port to final destination, consignments are often stored in transit at the WFP warehouses of Ndjamena and Abeche before being moved to the EDPs near the sub-offices or in the camps. Consignments are sometimes handled 6 or 7 times before reaching the beneficiaries. This inflates the costs and eventually the occasions for spillages or damages. Secondary transport operations are controlled by the CO where a tender committee is awarding the transport contracts in line with the WFP standard procedures. The hauliers' syndicates in Ndjamena and Abeche were as a rule very pleased with the WFP tender awarding procedures. Hauliers had no complaint about late payments of their invoices by WFP. It seems that the WFP Admin/Fin department is attentive to this point. Prompt payment eventually bolsters the good name of WFP. Local hauliers are apparently meeting with little or no security problems in Eastern Chad. Their perception of the lack of security on the road is totally different from the security perception prevailing in UN and NGO circles and very much kept alive by UNSS and DIS.

The Libyan Government and the UN Resident Coordinator have played in 2004 a very significant and important role in opening up the *Benghazi* corridor. From 2005 to 2007 the corridor was operated as a special operation (SO10.417.0). The operations along this corridor form since 2008 an integral part of the Chad operations and the costs are supported by the Chad CO. Food is shipped in Libya through the port of Benghazi where WFP has a small office run by national staff. Bulk consignment of cereals can be received in silos just outside the port perimeter where bagging operations take place before their on-carriage to *Al-Kufra* the last point reachable on paved road in the South of Libya. WFP maintains, courtesy of the Libyan Government, a large transit facility placed under the responsibility of one international staff a small national team. From *Al-Kufra* the bulk of the food is transported by convoys of special desert trucks on a three week journey across the Sahara desert. A few consignments depart directly for Chad from Benghazi port. Large consignments of sorghum are routed via this corridor.

Road convoys out of *Benghazi* or *Al-Kufra* comprising between 25 and 70 vehicles are carefully planned and their position monitored daily. Convoys are operated once a month sometimes twice. The vast majority of consignments are directed straight to *Abeche* warehouses but consignments of 500 MT and over are sometimes diverted directly to the camps<sup>59</sup>. Haulage contracts are awarded in line with the WFP established tender procedures. Contracts run for periods of 6 to 12 months. The road haulage cost from *Benghazi* via *Al-Kufra* to *Abeche* or the camps amounts to anything between 300 and 350 US\$ per MT. Transport operations along this corridor are therefore expensive but it is the only reliable and reasonably secure alternative to serve Eastern Chad especially in the period leading to the rainy season.. Its worth noting that Libyan transporters have, contrary to the well established rule within WFP, obtained from OMLS the payment of a provision before they set off on their journey.

The warehousing inside the WFP warehouses and rub halls is correct and in general up to standard. Most warehouses are facing problems with CSB and MML consignments infested with weevils. From the indications on the stacking cards it is quite clear that such consignments are often received closed to the expiry date of their normal shelf life. Warehouse keepers do abide to the FIFO rule. Pilferage in WFP warehouses is negligible

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<sup>59</sup> Refugee camps of *Oure Cassoni*, *Am Nabak*, *Irdimi*, *Touloum*, and *Kounoungou*.

and confined to petty thefts of vegetable oil or sugar. In some warehouse consignments cartons of vegetable oil are, as a result of space shortage, stacked well above the normal standard height of 8 – 9 cartons. Stacks of 23 cartons high were noted.

The storage at the final distribution points is generally considered appalling and well below acceptable standards. Most schools and health centres are devoid of any decent facility for any long term storage (4 to 6 months often more) of food commodities. Increased number of deliveries of smaller quantities of food aid would alleviate this problem but it would definitely add to the costs. The mission could only visit a small sample of such storage places. A more regular and structured monitoring of the FDPs would give a better view of the many shortcomings suspected in this specific area.

The mission visited a wide range of final distribution sites but the timing did not permit to assist to food distribution activities, general or otherwise. The beneficiaries in the camps are all well organised with a “Food Distribution Committee” overseeing the distribution operations. All beneficiaries were reasonably satisfied with the distribution process. Complaints, if any, are as a rule dealt with on the spot. Representatives of WFP, HCR, and the IP are in attendance. In the three refugee camps near Gore<sup>60</sup> the IP apparently decided on its own to switch, for reasons of shortage of staff and time, from the established monthly distribution to a two monthly distribution system. This decision did not meet with strong objections from the beneficiaries. On the contrary the two monthly distribution systems is not entirely without merits in particular during the planting and harvesting season. However a careful evaluation of the merits of this initiative by all stakeholders should be considered without undue delay.

The delivery of food-aid to the schools in eastern Chad is often challenging. Military escorts are required in order to proceed to distant and isolated schools. The delivery of the right quantity to the right person is often left to the sole appreciation of the driver. The presence of an IP or WFP representative would entail unrealistic extra costs (driver and monitor wages and DSA allowances, fuel costs etc...).

WFP was operating mid 2009 a total fleet of 42 vehicles made out as follows: 34 Toyota vehicles and 8 DAF trucks type YA5442. There were 42 drivers on the payroll to drive this fleet. The DAF trucks, which were bought second hand, have a payload capacity of only 4 tons. This fleet, at present beyond its useful economic life cycle, was only used for ancillary transport for account of the WFP and occasionally for other UN agencies. This fleet of vehicles, which over the years developed serious suspension problems, was at no moment lined up for the regular transport of food-aid between the EDPs or between the EDPs and FDPs.

A new fleet of 12 reconditioned DAF 12 tons capacity truck has been received in the country under the cover of a SO and will be ready for transport operations in April 2010. A sufficient stock of fast moving spare has been supplied with the truck. The exact deployment of the trucks remains to be decided. Neither is it sure whether the trucks will be operated under the WFP banner or whether these will be leased or hired out to interested parties: UN agencies, NGOs or national haulers. If the trucks are operated in eastern Chad under the WFP banner, special security escort arrangements will have to be provided. This would hamper the usefulness and flexibility of the fleet. This type of truck will come in very handy for secondary transport operations. A custom software (FMS<sup>61</sup>) is being tested in order to keep track of the operational cost of the fleet. The software will also assist in calculating the cost price per MT/km transported.

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<sup>60</sup> The three camps are :*Amboko*, *Gondje* and *Dosseye* totalling 32.392 refugees from CAR.

<sup>61</sup> FMS : Fleet Management System.

## Results

Results in terms of output. Considering all the inputs in terms of funding, procurement, selection of IPs, the WFP manning provided and the transport strategy adopted, WFP succeeded in delivering some 374.292 MT of food-aid to the IPs during the period of the portfolio. The summary breakdown per project is as follows:

**Table 4: Output achieved during CPE period**

Project	Period	Total Tonnage to Be Delivered as per PD or BR	Tonnage Delivered to IPs for Final Delivery to the Beneficiaries	Performance Ratio %
DEV 10018	01/01/01-31/12/06	40,939	22,805	57
EMOP 10.295.0	15/07/03-31/03/05	5,001	543	11
EMOP 10.325.0	27/10/03-26/05/05	483	303	63
EMOP 10.327.0	17/01/04-30/06/05	60,081	54,576	90
EMOP 10.295.1	01/05/05-28/02/06	6,562	4,246	65
EMOP 10.327.1	01/07/05-31/12/06	91,706	65,835	71
EMOP 10.559.0	01/01/07-31/12/08	166,729	113,381	68
DEV 10478	01/01/07-31/12/10	31,217	13,050	42*
PRRO 10.510.0	01/03/06-31/03/10	21,101	22,815	105*
EMOP 10.559.1	01/01/09-30/06/10	163,430	76,739	47*
<b>Totals</b>		<b>587,249</b>	<b>374,293</b>	<b>64</b>

\* 3 projects still in progress.

The global performance ratio of the 7 completed projects and the 3 projects in progress is 64 percent. The funding ratio for the 10 projects was 74 percent. The difference between the two ratios is explained by the inevitable time lag between the funding activity and the physical distribution of the food-aid to the beneficiaries and the stocks on hand (24,862 MT) on December 31, 2009 and not yet distributed to the beneficiaries. The rate of output achieved, in comparison with the project documents and the subsequent budget revisions can, be considered as more than satisfactory.

The DEV projects are performing slightly below the expectations but this is not unusual for this type of projects which do not always enjoy the favours of donor countries and require, for an equal quantity of food aid, a far greater input in terms of staff and means. These projects are often much more difficult to implement correctly. Taken globally the performance ratio for the successive EMOPs is, with 70 percent, more than fair.

Results in terms of costs. There are two approaches for the evaluation of various cost components of the portfolio projects: comparing the intrinsic costing levels of each cost component of a project with the WFP corporate average levels and comparing simultaneously the ratio of each cost component of a project in value terms with the average ratios at WFP corporate level. Annex 5 presents a table that summarises the costs per ton of food-aid delivered (or still in stock) per project and per cost component. The analysis is throughout based on the tonnage figures extracted from COMPAS and the costing figures entered into WINGS I & II as recorded in both systems on 31/12/2009.

The following table compares the various cost components and ratios between the 10 Chad CPE projects and the WFP corporate average.

**Table 5: Comparison of the cost component levels and ratios for the 10 Chad CPE project with the WFP corporate averages**

	<b>10 Portfolio projects cost US\$ per ton period 2003-2009</b>	<b>WFP corporate average for Each cost component in US\$ period 2008–2009 (*)</b>	<b>10 Portfolio project ratio of components in the total cost in value terms %</b>	<b>WFP corporate ratio % (**)</b>
Commodity cost	366.03	491.90	34	49
External transport cost	117.05	83.10	11	9
LTSH	445.96	196.80	41	22
ODOC	13.14	20.30	1	7
DSC	146.49	94.70	13	13
<b>Total</b>	<b>1088.67</b>	<b>886.8</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

(\*) Figures extracted from WFP Management Plan 2010–2011-Chapter “Operational Requirements by Cost Components Period 2008–2009–estimated figures Page 32/36. (\*\*) Figures extracted from WFP Management Plan 2010–2011-Operational requirements by cost components in value terms ( Page 28)

The figures listed here above are significant in various aspects. The most striking feature is the LTSH cost per ton which is more than double the corporate average. This is in turn confirmed by the ratios recorded for the LTSH component which absorbs as much as 41 percent of the resources made available against a corporate average of 22 percent. The landlocked position of Chad and the long road distances to be bridged make inland transport operations together with the warehousing and the distribution very expensive. The ODOC component is kept very low. Costs exposed for capacity building, NFIs and IPs’ time bound expenses have been kept to a bare minimum and are therefore almost negligible<sup>62</sup>. The differences in commodity cost are explained by the fact that the periods are not strictly running in parallel. Interesting however is the commodity cost ratio which is only 34 percent against a corporate ratio of 49 percent. This is the immediate and logic result of the high LTSH rate which absorbs a larger portion of the available resources. The direct support costs(DSC) cost per ton, though above the WFP corporate average, is in percentage at par with the corporate average. The higher rate is simply explained by higher staffing costs (R&R and DSA) and the costs of WFP staff stationed outside Chad in *Al- Kufra* and *Douala*.

The same exercise is repeated hereunder for the three projects which are still ongoing.

<sup>62</sup> ODOC : US\$ 5.2 million out of a total cost of US\$ 434.5 million

**Table 6: Comparison of the cost component levels and ratios for the 3 Chad ongoing projects with the WFP corporate averages**

	<b>Chad project DEV 10478 2007–2010 cost US\$ per ton</b>	<b>WFP Corporate average for each cost component period 2008– 2009 (*)</b>	<b>Chad project DEV 10478 2007–2010 ratio of cost components in value terms %</b>	<b>WFP corporate ratio for DEV projects in value terms (**) %</b>
Commodity cost	625.91	491.90	48	59
External transport cost	183.58	83.10	14	9
LTSH	400.46	196.80	30	14
ODOC	6.03	20.30	1	7
DSC	96.86	94.70	7	11
<b>Total</b>	<b>1312.84</b>	<b>886.8</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

(\*) Figures extracted from WFP Management Plan 2010–2011-Chapter “Operational Requirements by Cost Components Period 2008–2009–estimated figures Page 32/36. (\*\*) Figures extracted from WFP Management Plan 2010–2011-DEV Operational requirements by cost components in value terms (Page 31)

	<b>Chad project PRRO 10510 – 2006–2010 cost US\$ per ton</b>	<b>WFP cge for each cost component period 2008– 2009 (*)</b>	<b>CHAD project PRRO 10510 - 2006–2010 components in value terms %</b>	<b>WFP corporate ratio in value terms for PRRO projects % (**)</b>
Commodity cost	426.94	491.90	43	57
External transport cost	129.17	83.10	12	9
LTSH	340.39	196.80	34	19
ODOC	18.07	20.30	2	4
DSC	90.02	94.70	9	11
<b>Total</b>	<b>1004.59</b>	<b>886.8</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

(\*) Figures extracted from WFP Management Plan 2010–2011-Chapter “Operational Requirements by Cost Components Period 2008–2009–estimated figures (Page 32/36). (\*\*) Figures extracted from WFP Management Plan 2010–2011-PRRO Operational requirements by cost components in value terms (Page 30)

	<b>CHAD project EMOP 10.559.1 – 2009–2010 cost US\$ per ton</b>	<b>WFP Corporate Average for Each cost Component period 2008 – 2009 (*)</b>	<b>CHAD Project EMOP 10.559.1 – 2009–2010 Ratio of Components in Value Terms %</b>	<b>WFP Corporate Ratio in Value Terms for EMOP Projects (**) %</b>
Commodity cost	468.51	491.90	38	38
External transport cost	110.20	83.10	10	9
LTSH	468.32	196.80	38	35
ODOC	15.59	20.30	1	2
DSC	164.59	94.70	13	16
Total	1227.21	886.8	100	100

(\*) Figures extracted from WFP Management Plan 2010–2011-Chapter “Operational Requirements by Cost Components Period 2008–2009–estimated figures Page 32 /36. (\*\*) Figures extracted from WFP Management Plan 2010–2011-EMOP Operational requirements by cost components in value terms ( Page 30)

The three tables here above highlights once more the fact that the cost per ton of food-aid delivered to the beneficiaries in Chad is between 15 percent and 48 percent more expensive than the WFP corporate average. The high cost per ton for DEV 10478 - US\$ 1312.84 per ton – stands out and illustrates appropriately the complexity of running such projects efficiently. Tonnages are low and FDPs are many, far apart and often out of reach. The cost components ratios for the ongoing EMOP 10.559.1 are completely and perfectly in line with the WFP corporate average for WFP EMOP projects. This however does not make the project cheap for it remains extremely expensive as a result of the high transit and transport costs it attracts for commodities routed via the Benghazi corridor.

**Table 7: 2003–2009 CHAD Portfolio Analysis of the cost components per project, situation as at 31/12/2009**

Figures extracted from WINGS I and II

Project Code	DEV. 10018	EMOP 10295.0	EMOP 10325.0	EMOP 10327.0	EMOP 10295.1	EMOP 10327.1	EMOP 10559.0	CP. 10478	PRRO 10510	EMOP 10559.1	Total
	Starting 01/01/2001 End 31/12/2006	Starting 15/07/2003 End 31/03/2005	Starting 27/10/2003 End 26/05/2005	Starting 17/01/2004 End 30/06/2005	Starting 01/05/2005 End 28/02/2006	Starting 01/07/2005 End 31/12/2006	Starting 01/01/2007 End 31/12/08	Starting 01/01/2007 End 31/12/2010	Starting: 01/03/2006 End 31/03/2010	Starting: 01/01/2009 End 30/06/2010	
Commodity Cost	5,856,117.01	1,164,082.30	122,905.52	11,813,976.83	816,027.40	13,746,398,26	46,698,120.25	10,109,697.00	10,895,092.00	44,881,396.00	146,103,812.57
External Transport	1,865,205.71	162,096.42	5,723.06	3,264,024.64	237,644.23	6,615,036.40	17,755,076.79	2,965,122.,00	3,296,332.00	10,556,577.00	46,722,838.25
LTSH	7,413,421.43	1,011,256.51	15,918.30	19,734,559.76	1,258,275.22	28,432,529.20	60,124,053.67	6,468,218.00	8,686,430.00	44,862,972.00	178,007,634.09
ODOC	451,665.78	88,132.60	0.00	1,233,717.23	42,382.93	316,961.02	1,062,159.28	97,450.00	461,149.00	1,493,022.00	5,246,639.84

Project Code	Starting End	DSC	Un-programmed	Total direct project costs	ISC	Total costs
DEV. 10018	Starting 01/01/2001 End 31/12/2006	2,477,911.28	0.00	18,064,321.21	0.00	18,064,321.21
EMOP 10295.0	Starting 15/07/2003 End 31/03/2005	244,598.54	0.,00	2,670,166.37	0.00	2,670,166.37
EMOP 10325.0	Starting 27/10/2003 End 26/05/2005	8,355.94	0.00	152,902.82	0.00	152,902.82
EMOP 10327.0	Starting 17/01/2004 End 30/06/2005	8,035,450.77	0.00	44,081,729.23	0.00	44,081,729.23
EMOP 10295.1	Starting 01/05/2005 End 28/02/2006	462,497.50	0.00	2,816,827.28	0.00	2,816,827.28
EMOP 10327.1	Starting 01/07/2005 End 31/12/2006	10,217,311.95	0.00	59,328,236.83	0.00	59,328,236.83
EMOP 10559.0	Starting 01/01/2007 End 31/12/08	17,397,916.01	0.00	143,037,326.00	0.00	143,037,326.00
CP. 10478	Starting 01/01/2007 End 31/12/2010	1,564,507.00	0.00	21,204,994.00	0.00	21,204,994.00
PRRO 10510	Starting: 01/03/2006 End 31/03/2010	2,297,241.00	0.00	25,636,244.00	0.00	25,636,244.00
EMOP 10559.1	Starting: 01/01/2009 End 30/06/2010	15,767,205.00	0.00	117,561,172.00	0.00	117,561,172.00
Total		58,472,994.99	0.00	434,553,919.74	0.00	434,553,919.74









Summary of total direct project costs (actual + commitments ) per project and different cost components. (US\$ ) - ISC costs excluded.

**Table 8: Cost per ton per project and cost components. (US\$ per MT), situation as at 31/12/2009**

**Figures based on COMPAS and WINGS I and II**

<b>Project Code</b>	<b>DEV. 10018</b>	<b>EMOP 10295.0</b>	<b>EMOP 10325.0</b>	<b>EMOP 10327.0</b>	<b>EMOP 10295.1</b>	<b>EMOP 10327.1</b>	<b>EMOP 10559.0</b>	<b>DEV. 10478</b>	<b>PRRO 10510</b>	<b>EMOP 10559.1</b>	<b>Total</b>
Food aid commodities (MT) handed over to CPs or in stock (COMPAS figures as at 31/12/09)	22,805	543	303	54,576	4,246	65,835	113,381	16,152	25,519	95,796	399,156
Commodity cost	256.79	2,143.80	405.63	216.47	192.19	208.8	411.87	625.91	426.94	468.51	366.03
Transport	81.79	298.52	18.89	59.81	55.97	100.48	156.6	183.58	129.17	110.2	117.05
LTSH	325.08	1862.35	52.54	361.6	296.34	431.88	530.28	400.46	340.39	468.32	445.96
ODOC	19.81	162.31	0	22.61	9.98	4.81	9.37	6.03	18.07	15.59	13.14
DSC	108.66	450.46	27.58	147.23	108.93	155.2	153.45	96.86	90.02	164.59	146.49
Un-programmed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total direct project costs per MT.	792.12	4,917.43	504.63	807.71	663.41	901.17	1,261.56	1,312.84	1,004.59	1,227.20	1,088.68
Tonnage distributed as at 31/12/2009								13,050	22,815	76,739	
Tonnage in stock as at 31/12/2009								3,102	2,704	19,057	24,863
Remark 1: All figures submitted by WFP CHAD CO as extracted from COMPAS and WINGS I & II systems.								16,152	25,519	95,796	
Remark 2: Project EMOP 10559.1: To calculate the different cost components per ton of food-aid delivered and already in stock as at 31/12/2009 no account has been taken of pre- commitment provisions to the tune of 37.260.033 US\$.											

**Table 9: Graphical comparison of the ratios in value terms of the 10 Chad Portfolio projects and the 3 projects still in progress:**



**Table 10: Tonnage Handled during the Chad CPE period 2001 – 2009. - Summary table of the tonnages handled**

Project code	Start and End years	Tonnage planned as per PD or BR	In					Out				Tonnage of food aid carried over to other projects
			Tonnage of food-aid received from other projects	Tonnage of food-aid received via the Douala corridor	Tonnage of food aid received via the Libyan corridor	Tonnage of food-aid received by air or purchased locally	Net tonnage of food-aid borrowed from other projects less reimbursement	Net tonnage of food-aid given on loan less repayments	Tonnage of food-aid lost in the course of transport or declared unfit for consumption	Tonnage remitted to Ips for distribution to beneficiaries	Stocks on hand as at 31/12/2009	
CP 10018	2001-2007	40,939		18,498		1,175	18,892	4,666	493	22,805		10,603
CP10478	2007-2010	31,217	10,603	4,190			1,459		100	13,050	3,102	
EMOP 10295	2003-2005	5,001		2,492		1,844	1,256	33	6	543		5,010
EMOP 10325	2003-2004	483		75		395	663	650		303		180
EMOP 10327	2004-2006	60,081	180	103,835	8,495	3,249	21,468	4,210	158	54,576		78,284
EMOP 10295.1	2005-2007	6,562	1,170	1,797			1,295		16	4,246		
EMOP 10327.1	2005-2008	91,706	16,328	16,112	22,679		11,762		789	65,835		256
EMOP 10559	2006-2008	166,729	25,348	2,138	48,402	26	38,120		652	113,381		
EMOP 10559.1	2008-2010	163,430	37,572	17,445	36,841		4,419		481	76,739	19,057	0
PRRO 10510	2006-2009	21,101	3,133	10,077	207		12,220		118	22,815	2,704	0
<b>Total</b>		<b>587,249</b>	<b>94,333</b>	<b>176,660</b>	<b>116,623</b>	<b>6,689</b>	<b>111,555</b>	<b>9,559</b>	<b>2,813</b>	<b>374,292</b>	<b>24,862</b>	<b>94,333</b>

## Annex 5: CPE of WFP Assistance to Chad: Beneficiaries and tonnage by activity across operations, 2003-2008

Table 1: BENEFICIARIES FOR ALL OPERATIONS (2003-2008)

Activity type	Year 2003			Year 2004			Year 2005			Year 2006			Year 2007			Year 2008			2003-2008		
	Planned	Actual	% actual vs planned	Planned	Actual	% actual vs planned	Planned	Actual	% actual vs planned	Planned	Actual	% actual vs planned	Planned	Actual	% actual vs planned	Planned	Actual	% actual vs planned	Planned	Actual	% actual vs planned
GFD	73.876	35.302	48%	100.037	236.420	236%	225.000	213.740	95%	254.000	267.619	105%	408.000	432.021	106%	412.000	470.113	114%	1.472.913	1.655.215	112%
NUTRITION	34.376	26.908	78%	29.036	62.592	216%	130221	36.686	28%	48.132	36.589	76%	53.758	40.527	75%	57.022	54.119	95%	352.545	257.421	73%
FOOD FOR EDUCATION	125.000	104.857	84%	125.000	73.539	59%	205912	157325	76%	150.491	172.806	115%	128.631	88.120	69%	199.087	150.393	76%	934.121	747.040	80%
FOOD FOR WORK	33.000	20.156	61%	75.000	15.941	21%	28000	113.439	405%	50.186	107.962	215%	32.566	30.717	94%	45.146	20.581	46%	263.898	308.796	117%
HIV																12.000	7.060		12.000	7.060	
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>266.252</b>	<b>187.223</b>	<b>68%</b>	<b>329.073</b>	<b>388.492</b>	<b>133%</b>	<b>589.133</b>	<b>521.190</b>	<b>151%</b>	<b>502.809</b>	<b>584.976</b>	<b>128%</b>	<b>622.955</b>	<b>591.385</b>	<b>86%</b>	<b>713.255</b>	<b>695.206</b>	<b>83%</b>	<b>3.035.477</b>	<b>2.968.472</b>	<b>96%</b>

Table 2: TONNAGE FOR ALL OPERATIONS (2003-2008)

Activity type	Year 2003			Year 2004			Year 2005			Year 2006			Year 2007			Year 2008			2003-2008		
	Planned	Actual	% actual vs planned	Planned	Actual	% actual vs planned	Planned	Actual	% actual vs planned	Planned	Actual	% actual vs planned	Planned	Actual	% actual vs planned	Planned	Actual	% actual vs planned	Planned	Actual	% actual vs planned
GFD	4572	1505	33%	16714	21739	130%	59151	42240	71%	51009	47876	94%	51217	60727	119%	95616	57236	60%	278280	231324	83%
NUTRITION	1093	650	59%	1331	4839	363%	3756	1001	27%	1901	1460	77%	3812	2047	54%	6409	2190	34%	18302	12186	67%
FOOD FOR EDUCATION	8003	4182	52%	4182	1785	43%	5668	2548	45%	5238	2892	55%	4738	1496	32%	6147	4416	72%	33975	17319	51%
FOOD FOR WORK	1670	1605	96%	2128	367	17%	7072	1716	24%	6605	921	14%	6253	1503	24%	17723	109	1%	41451	6221	15%
HIV	0	0		0	0		0	0		0	0		0	0		2616	678		2616	678	
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>15338</b>	<b>7942</b>	<b>60%</b>	<b>24356</b>	<b>28730</b>	<b>138%</b>	<b>75647</b>	<b>47505</b>	<b>42%</b>	<b>64753</b>	<b>53149</b>	<b>60%</b>	<b>66020</b>	<b>65773</b>	<b>57%</b>	<b>128509</b>	<b>64629</b>	<b>42%</b>	<b>374623</b>	<b>270310</b>	<b>54%</b>

## **Annex 6: CPE of WFP Assistance to Chad: Nutrition intervention technical note**

**(contribution from F. Bellin Sesay)**

### **Introduction**

In the frame of the independent CPE of WFP Assistance to Chad, the following paper aims to discuss some important aspects of the nutrition components of during this time period.

The operations included:

- supplementary feeding of pregnant and lactating mothers (MCHN);
- supplementary feeding of moderately and severely malnourished children under 5 years of age (SF);
- support to people accompanying severely malnourished children admitted to Therapeutic Feeding Centres (TF);
- support for people living with HIV (PLHIV).

In addition, nutrition considerations include quality and quantity of general rations provided for refugees and IDPs.

### **Nutrition situation in Chad between 2003 and 2009**

Looking at the available data on the nutritional situation in Chad, a good number of studies have been carried out – some nationwide, some at provincial level or even smaller entities.

In any case it seems worthwhile to look at the results from different perspectives. In geographical terms, one would look at the results from the South, East and North. These studies are mostly done among the Chadian population, excluding the refugees.

Table 2 and 3 summarize the results from the first VAM (2005) up to preliminary results of the most recent VAM (2009). According to the VAM 2005, the nutritional situation of children under 5 years of age was already very bad, revealing that 25 percent of all children in the North of Chad suffered from acute malnutrition. Whilst the situation in the East (VAM 2005) showed around 11 percent of acute malnutrition amongst children under 5 years of age, the situation deteriorated and results of UNICEF/WFP (2007) and ACF (2009) studies showed prevalence rates above 15 percent, which is the internationally accepted benchmark for declaring nutritional emergencies.

The situation in the South never exceeded 10 percent of acute malnutrition among children under 5 years of age – which is true for the local population as well as the refugees from Central African Republic.

The nutritional situation of Sudanese refugees has been documented in a very systematic way by UNHCR since 2004 (see Table 5). Sudanese refugees arrived and showed acute malnutrition levels close to even 40 percent in children under 5 years of age. The international community reacted fast and the nutritional situation improved greatly and is since 2006 below the critical benchmark of 15 percent - in most cases even below 10 percent of acute malnutrition. In any case, the nutritional situation is better as compared to the local population in the East and North of the country.


The nutritional status of mothers was only looked at in the WFP/UNICEF survey 2007, which took place in the North and East of the country, namely Batha, Guera, Kanem, and

*Ouaddai*, including the IDPs. The results showed the following alarming rates of malnutrition (BMI < 18.5): *Batha* 26.2 percent), *Guera* (22.2 percent), *Kanem* (35.8 percent), *Ouaddai* (24 percent), and IDPs (15.9 percent).

According to International standards, malnutrition prevalence rates among adults above 20 percent indicate a serious situation, which warrants specific action (Young, Jaspers 2009).

According to guidelines for selective feeding programmes the situation in the East and the North of the country should have seen blanket supplementary feeding programmes for acutely malnourished children (see figure below).

Figure 3: Framework: Selective Feeding Programmes (Modified from: Nutrition Guidelines; MSF, 1995)



SHRIMPSON (2009) published in the latest SCN<sup>63</sup> News an article on “The impact of high food prices on maternal and child nutrition”. He added a table in which he indicated the triggers for action. The following trigger points and interventions are indicated in the following table:

**Table 1: Essential Interventions to ensure food and nutrition security outcomes during the food price crises across the life course**

Stages in life cycle	Target groups	Indicators	Triggers for action	Interventions	Other considerations
<b>Pregnancy, birth lactation</b>	Women during pregnancy and lactation	Anemia	>40 %	Iron folate supplements	- De-worming -Malaria prevention and control
		Low Birth weight	> 15 %	Food supplements	
<b>Infant /toddler</b>	Infants (0-6months)		Universal	Promotion of exclusive breastfeeding	- Baby-friendly hospital initiative
	Infants (7 – 24 m)		Universal	Behaviour change communication for adequate complementary feeding and continued breastfeeding	- De-worming - Malaria prevention and control
		Wasting	> 15 %	Food supplements targeted to wasted children, Ready to use therapeutic foods (RUTFs)	
		Anemia	> 40 %	Iron supplements	
			> 5 %	Fortified foods, sprinkle	
<b>Adulthood</b>	Women of reproductive age	Low BMI	> 20 %	Cash transfer	Teenage pregnancies, too many pregnancies De-worming, malaria control
		Anemia	> 40 %	Supplements	

It should be noted, that there are hardly any data on micro-nutrient malnutrition in Chad, so there is no basis to judge on the necessity (quantity and quality) for fortified foods.


<sup>63</sup> The SCN (Standing Committee on Nutrition) under the United Nations tries to harmonize nutrition interventions among the UN partner organizations.

## Interpretation of Results

The malnutrition rates discussed above are a result of many different factors, such as food security, food intake, health, hygiene, care and education, just to name a few. The nutritional status of an individual is the best indicator to explain the state of nutrition security in a given situation.

The concept of nutrition security could be explained best using the famous and often cited UNICEF model, which will be presented here in another adapted version. Instead of using the negative model resulting in malnutrition and death, the model below is looking at positive impacts. Thus nutrition security (expressed by the nutritional status of the population) is positively influenced by adequate health and adequate food intake. The underlying conditions are food security, care and functioning health services and good environmental/ hygienic conditions. In this context the importance of food security in terms of achieving a good nutritional status is very obvious.


**Figure 1: Concept of food and nutrition security**



As to the understanding of nutritionists, the complete UNICEF model comprises the concept of Nutrition Security as expressed by the nutritional status, whereas Food Security is one but very important part in the overall concept and is marked with green letters (left side of the model).

The UNICEF model, however, does not provide any idea on the impact of each of these underlying causes on malnutrition. In this context it is useful to cite the study on “Overcoming Child Malnutrition in Developing Countries” (IFPRI, 2000) in which the authors were trying to identify the main reasons for improving nutrition between 1970 and 1995. Both, improved food availability and improved health environment contributed with 26.1 percent and 19.3 percent, respectively. However, the most important impact came from the education of women (43 percent) and their social status (11.6 percent). This fact helps to explain, why there are sometimes very high rates of malnutrition in so-called food secure areas or the “food baskets” of countries.

**Figure 2: Estimated Contribution of Major determinants to reductions in child malnutrition, 1970–1995**




There is a need to ask for the correct entry point. Projects often identify the status of food security and the nutritional status of people, they examine the linkages and whether or not there is a significant relation between the two. There is need to collect this information from time to time in order to describe changes. But does it really matter to discuss, which one is more important?

For example: if the results show that there is no access to safe drinking water but there is no significant impact on the nutritional status, does this mean, the improvement of drinking water is not important? The reason that we might not find any impact is simply that the entire population is affected.

It is sometimes useful to present data in using the bell shape normal distribution curve. The curve below was taken from the Guinea Bissau Baseline Survey 2006 and it shows that (as compared to the reference population) the distribution of the study population is normal as well; however, it has shifted towards the left side – which means an increasing number of children are falling below the – 2SD of the reference population. Looking at the right side of this distribution, it is obvious that even here is a shift towards the left and even the children plotted on this side have not reached their potential. The insignificance of findings could be thus interpreted in the following way: the entire population is affected by poor sanitary conditions and therefore there is no significant

impact on the so called malnourished children alone. The prevalence rate is providing information on how much the bell shaped curve has shifted; it describes the degree of malnutrition in the entire population.



The supplementary food provided at health units for pregnant and lactating mothers, and for moderately malnourished children under 5 years of age **is CSB** which should be enriched at the centre level with oil and sugar to increase energy density and palatability. CSB and other fortified blended foods have long been used in food assistance programmes as a “one – size – fits-all” solution to prevent and to address nutritional deficiencies. There is, however, growing consensus, that the CSB currently used is not ideal for treating moderate malnutrition among young children, because it contains too little of the essential nutrients they require for growth and has a relatively high content of anti-nutrients that limit the absorption of essential micronutrients, especially iron and zinc (Sight and Life 2008, Vol 1 No 4, October 2008).

Another important concern is, that efficacy and effectiveness of complementary feeding interventions are sometimes questionable. A systematic review of complementary feeding projects done by DEWEY and ADU-AFA WUAH (2008) revealed a questionable efficacy of these interventions and demonstrated at the same time the importance of good nutrition education as a complementary activity. In addition there is evidence that especially foods deriving from animal sources would have a stronger impact on the improvement of the nutritional status.

Last but not least, there is no control on how CSB will be used as it is a take home ration which will be prepared at home. One should reflect back on the milk powder debate about 40 years back, when NESTLE was accused of killing babies. The mere fact that

CSB porridge prepared at home might be too diluted and thus having even low energy and micronutrient density might in some cases even aggravate the nutritional situation of children instead of improving it.

In the context of Chad it has to be noted, that CSB given to malnourished children in the East and North, where the food security situation for the entire family seem to be completely insufficient, CSB will be shared amongst all household members and the effect for the malnourished child is questionable.

In terms of food safety aspects, the following observations have been made in connection with CSB. The majority of bags did not show production and expiry dates. This however should be the case according to international regulations. In case that expiry dates were found on the bags, the evaluation team found in many cases bags that were either at the edge or beyond expiration. On top of this, many bags were infested with weevils.

Apart from CSB, **maize meal** is the commodity that has a very short shelf life and was found in many cases to be expired. Even maize meal was in many cases infested with weevils.

Another commodity that needs to be reconsidered is **beans**. Especially in areas where firewood is scarce, one would have to consider the amount of fire wood needed for the long cooking and food preparation time. Women in the North proposed to replace beans with “haricot jaune”.

**Table 2: Anthropometric Results**

	VAM 2005			VAM 2009 – Draft						
	North	South	East	Batha	Kanem	Baguirmi	Guera	Salamat	Ouaddai	Du Lac
Sample size	900	700	1400							
H/A global	32.8	12.1	22.8		51.4	44.2	41.1		35.1	54.4
W/A severe	20.3	7.4	10.3							
W/H global	25	7	11.1	25.3	23.8	22.9	22.4	20.8	20.4	19.9
W/H severe	2.8	3	2.3							
H/A globale	17.9	14	23.5							
H/A severe	10.4	7.8	13.5							

**Table 3: Nutrition Surveys in Chad**

Region	WFP UNICEF 2007 Only NCHS reference					ACF 2008	ACF 2009
	<i>Ouadai</i>	<i>Kanem</i>	<i>Guera</i>	<i>Batha</i>	IDP	<i>Kanem</i>	<i>Ouadai</i> <i>Ville d'Abéché</i>
Sample size	601	443	402	370	216	567	854
W/A global	41.6	54.2	41.1	43.1	43.2		
W/A severe	14.5	25.4	17.2	13.3	17.4		
W/H global	17.9	18.4	23.4	16.7	21.4	17.1(NCHS)	20.6(NCHS) 22.7 (OMS)
W/H severe	3.8	2.8	4.8	2.1	2.6	2.8 (NCHS)	3.2 (NCHS) 6.3 (OMS)
H/A global	33	49.3	32.1	30.3	36.9	28.1(NCHS)	
H/A severe	14.5	25.4	17.2	12.5	17.4	28.8(NCHS)	

**Table 4: Anthropometric Results Eastern Chad**

Eastern Chad nutrition surveys 2004 - 2006 - 2008													
Camps	Values	2004				2005				2006		2008	
<b>OURECASSONI</b>		Nutrition Survey CDC		Nutrition Survey ACF-USA		Nutrition Survey ACF		Nutrition Survey-ACF-		Nutrition survey NSC-		Nutrition survey NSC&ACTED	
		May-Jun.04		Dec.04				28-30 Nov.05		Aug.06		Jul.08	
		<b>MAG</b>	<b>MAS</b>	<b>MAG</b>	<b>MAS</b>			<b>MAG</b>	<b>MAS</b>	<b>MAG</b>	<b>MAS</b>	<b>MAG</b>	<b>MAS</b>
	<b>%age of Median</b>			12,3%	0,7%			8,2%	0,2%	5,3%	0,3%	6,0%	0,1%
	<b>Z-Score</b>	39,2%	6,4%	20,5%	1,7%			15,7%	1,4%	8,80%	0,7%	13,8%	0,7%
<b>TOULOUM</b>		Nutrition Survey CDC		Nutrition Survey MSF-B						Nutrition survey MSF-L		Nutrition survey NSC	
		May-Jun.04		Oct.04						Aug 06		Aug 08	
		<b>MAG</b>	<b>MAS</b>	<b>MAG</b>	<b>MAS</b>					<b>MAG</b>	<b>MAS</b>	<b>MAG</b>	<b>MAS</b>
	<b>%age of Median</b>			10,5%	1,0%					2,9%	0,0%	4,3%	0,2%
	<b>Z-Score</b>	35,6%	5,6%	19,6%	2,6%					6,3%	0,1%	9,5%	0,6%
<b>IRIDIMI</b>		Nutrition Survey CDC		Nutrition Survey MSF-B						Nutrition survey MSF-L		Nutrition survey NCS	
	Date	May-Jun.04		Oct.04*						Aug 06		Aug 08	
		<b>MAG</b>	<b>MAS</b>	<b>MAG</b>	<b>MAS</b>					<b>MAG</b>	<b>MAS</b>	<b>MAG</b>	<b>MAS</b>
	<b>%age of Median</b>			13,9%	0,7%					2,9%	0,0%	3,6%	0,0%
	<b>Z-Score</b>	35,6%	5,6%	21,20%	2,2%					6,3%	0,1%	10,6%	0,5%
<b>MILE</b>		Nutrition Survey CDC				Nutrition Survey ACF-USA				Nutrition survey IMC		Nutrition survey NSC & IMC	
	Date	May-Jun.04				Jan. 05				Sep. 06		Aug 08	
		<b>MAG</b>	<b>MAS</b>			<b>MAG</b>	<b>MAS</b>			<b>MAG</b>	<b>MAS</b>	<b>MAG</b>	<b>MAS</b>
	<b>%age of Median</b>					8,6%	0,1%			5,6%	0,2%	3,9%	0,0%
	<b>Z-Score</b>	35,6%	5,6%			15,8%	0,8%			8,7%	0,8%	9,8%	0,4%
<b>KOUNOUNGOU</b>		Nutrition Survey CDC								Nutrition survey IMC		Nutrition survey NSC & IMC	
	Date	May-June.2004								Jun.06		Aug 08	
		<b>MAG</b>	<b>MAS</b>							<b>MAG</b>	<b>MAS</b>	<b>MAG</b>	<b>MAS</b>

	<b>%age of Median</b>									2,8%	0,0%	4,9%	0,1%
	<b>Z-Score</b>	35,6%	5,6%							4,7%	0,2%	12,1%	0,4%
<b>AMNABACK</b>		Nutrition Survey CDC		Nutrition Survey ACF-USA				Nutrition Survey ACF-		Nutrition survey IMC		Nutrition survey NSC & IMC	
	Date	May-Jun.04		Dec .04				21-23 Nov.05		Jun .06		Aug 08	
		<b>MAG</b>	<b>MAS</b>	<b>MAG</b>	<b>MAS</b>			<b>MAG</b>	<b>MAS</b>	<b>MAG</b>	<b>MAS</b>	<b>MAG</b>	<b>MAS</b>
	<b>%age of Median</b>			14,6%	1%			8,4%	0,3%	4,6%	0,2%	5,8%	0,0%
	<b>Z-Score</b>	35,6%	5,6%	24,6%	1,8%			18,1%	0,5%	11,2%	0,4%	9,1%	0,5%
<b>FARCHANA</b>						Nutrition Survey MSF-H		Nutrition Survey MSF-H		Nutrition Survey MSF-H		Nutrition Survey NSC	
	Date					Jan .05**		25-29 Jul.05		Mar .06		Jul.08	
						<b>MAG</b>	<b>MAS</b>	<b>MAG</b>	<b>MAS</b>	<b>MAG</b>	<b>MAS</b>	<b>MAG</b>	<b>MAS</b>
	<b>%age of Median</b>					8%	1,1%	12,8%	1,7%			4,9%	0,1%
	<b>Z-Score</b>									5,79%	0,4%	12,9%	0,9%
<b>BREDJING</b>						Nutrition Survey MSF-H		Nutrition Survey MSF-H		Nutrition Survey MSF-H		Nutrition Survey NSC	
	Date					Jan 05**		25-29 Jul 05		Mar.06		Jul. 08	
						<b>MAG</b>	<b>MAS</b>	<b>MAG</b>	<b>MAS</b>	<b>MAG</b>	<b>MAS</b>	<b>MAG</b>	<b>MAS</b>
	<b>%age of Median</b>					8%	1,1%	12,8%	1,7%			4,4%	0,0%
	<b>Z-Score</b>									5,79%	0,4%	11,9%	0,8%
<b>DJABAL</b>		Nutrition Survey COOPI				Nutrition Survey ACF		Nutrition Survey ACF		Nutrition Survey COOPI		Nutrition Survey NSC&COOPI	
	Date	Oct.04				Feb.05		14-16 Nov.05		Sep .06		Jul. 08	
		<b>MAG</b>	<b>MAS</b>			<b>MAG</b>	<b>MAS</b>	<b>MAG</b>	<b>MAS</b>	<b>MAG</b>	<b>MAS</b>	<b>MAG</b>	<b>MAS</b>
	<b>%age of Median</b>	12,9%	1,3%			9,7%	2,5%	2,2%	0%	3,0%	0,2%	3,4%	0,0%
	<b>Z-Score</b>					15,6%	3,1%	4,8%	0,1%	8,3%	0,3%	10,4%	0,9%
<b>GOZ AMIR</b>		Nutrition Survey COOPI				Nutrition Survey				Nutrition Survey COOPI		Nutrition Survey NSC&	
	Date	Oct.04				ACF Feb. 05				Jun .06		Jul.08	
		<b>MAG</b>	<b>MAS</b>			<b>MAG</b>	<b>MAS</b>			<b>MAG</b>	<b>MAS</b>	<b>MAG</b>	<b>MAS</b>

	<b>%age of Median</b>	12,9%	1,3%			6,5%	0,8%			4,4%	0,2%	5,0%	0,0%
	<b>Z-Score</b>					10,1%	1,5%			7,2%	0,3%	8,6%	0,7%
<b>TREGUINE</b>				Nutrition Survey ACF						Nutrition Survey FISCR/CRT		Nutrition Survey NSC &	
	Date			Dec.04						Jun .06		Jul. 08	
				<b>MAG</b>	<b>MAS</b>					<b>MAG</b>	<b>MAS</b>	<b>MAG</b>	<b>MAS</b>
	<b>%age of Median</b>			8,0%	0,5%					5,7%	0,1%	6,5%	0,2%
	<b>Z-Score</b>			11,3%	1,1%					8,4%	0,2%	11,4%	0,7%
<b>GAGA</b>										Nutrition Survey CORD		Nutrition survey NSC & IMC	
	Date									Sep .06		Jul. 08	
										<b>MAG</b>	<b>MAS</b>	<b>MAG</b>	<b>MAS</b>
	<b>%age of Median</b>									7,7%	0,4%	6,2%	0,4%
	<b>Z-Score</b>									12,0%	0,80%	13,1%	0,8%
* NSC: Nutrition Steering Committee including UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO ( under coordination of UNHCR)													

## Acronyms

ACTED	Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development
ARV	anti-retroviral
BET	<i>Bourkou-Ennedi-Tibesti</i>
CAP	Consolidated Appeals Process
CAR	Central African Republic
CASAGC	Comite d'Action pour la Sécurité Alimentaire et la Gestion des Crises
CCA	Common Country Assessment
CFSVA	Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Assessment
CNAR	Commission Nationale pour l'Accueil et la Réinsertion des Refuges
CO	Country Office
COMPAS	Commodity Movement Processing and Analysis System
CONAFIT	Coordination Nationale d'Appui au Déploiement de la Force Internationale à l'est du Tchad
CP	Country Programme
CPE	Country Portfolio Evaluation
CSB	corn-soya blend
CSD	Country Strategy Document
CSSI	Centre de Support en Santé Internationale
DEV	Development Projects
DIS	<i>Detachment Intégré de Sécurité</i> - Integrated Security Detachment
DSC	direct support costs
EDP	extended delivery point
EFSA	emergency food security assessment
EMOP	emergency operation
EU	European Union
EUFOR	European Union Force
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FDP	Final Distribution Point
FEWS NET	Famine Early-Warning Systems Network
FLA	field-level agreement
FFT	Food-for-training
FFW	Food-for-work
GAM	Global Acute Malnutrition
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GFD	General Food Distribution
HQ	Headquarters
IDP	internally Displaced Person
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IRD	International Relief and Development
IP	Implementing partner
JAM	joint assessment mission
LTSH	landside transport, storage and handling
M&E	monitoring and evaluation
MCHN	mother-and-child health and nutrition
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MINURCAT	United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in Chad and Central African Republic
MOU	memorandum of understanding
MT	metric ton
MUAC	mid-upper arm circumference

NFI	non-food item
NGO	non-governmental organization
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODOC	other direct operational costs
OE	Office of Evaluation (ex OEDE)
ONASA	Organisme Nationale d'Appui à la Sécurité Alimentaire
PLHIV	people living with HIV
PNSA	<i>Programme nationale des Securite alimentaire</i>
PRRO	protracted relief and recovery operation
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
RB	Regional Bureau
R&R	Rest and Recuperation
SAP	Systems, Applications and Products in Data Processing
SECADEV	<i>Secours Catholique et Developpement</i>
SF	school feeding
SO	special operation
SPR	Standardized Project Reports
TF	therapeutic feeding
ToR	Terms of reference
UN	United Nations
UNCT	United Nations country team
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
VAM	vulnerability analysis and mapping
WINGS	WFP Information Network and Global System
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

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