

# Operation Evaluation

## **occupied Palestinian territory PRRO 10387.1: September 2007 and August 2009 An Operation Evaluation**

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*Measuring Results, Sharing Lessons*

Prepared by

Chris Dammers, Team leader

Allen Jones, Team member, logistics

Trish Silkin, Team member, Food security / livelihood analysis

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## **Evaluation Management**

Evaluation Manager:	Michel Denis, Evaluation Officer
Director, Office of Evaluation:	Caroline Heider,

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## Fact Sheet: occupied Palestinian territory PRRO 10387.1

<b><u>Title of the Operation</u></b>	Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations occupied Palestinian territory 10387.1				
<b><u>Number of the Operation</u></b>					
<b><u>Approval Date</u></b>					
<b><u>Objectives</u></b>					
<b><u>Operation specs.</u></b>	<b>Start Date</b>	<b>End Date</b>	<b>Beneficiaries</b>	<b>Metric tons</b>	<b>US\$</b>
Approval design	September 2007	August 2009	665,000	164,605mt	107,234,011
Budget revision of FEB 2009		June 2010	413,000 (West Bank only)	178,101mt	167,266,012
<b><u>Activities</u></b>			<b>Beneficiaries</b>	<b>Metric tons</b>	<b>US\$ (approx.)</b>
FFA/FFW			145,000	37,932	2,471,1282
FFT			144,000	24,538	15,985,591
GFD (contingency)			23,000	8,073	5,259,258
Destitute and institutional feeding			188,000	69,993	45,597,826
School meals			90,000	4,632	3,017,575
Vulnerable group			75,000	19,437	12,662,480
<b><u>Main Partners</u></b>					
Government	Palestinian National Authority				
NGO	Catholic Relief Services, Cooperative Housing Foundation, Near East Foundation, <i>Ard Al Atfal</i> (discontinued)				
Multilateral	UNRWA, FAO, OCHA, UNSCO, UNDP, UNIFEM				
<b><u>Main Donors</u></b>	USA, EC, Italy				
<b><u>Other ongoing WFP Operations</u></b>	<p>EMOP 10817.0 – Emergency Food Assistance for Operation Lifeline Gaza, Jan 2009 – Dec 2009. 365,000 beneficiaries, 73,334 mt of food, total cost US\$76,760,541. Extension sought to December 2010.</p> <p>SO 10815.0 – Logistics Coordination in support of the Crisis in Gaza, cost for 11.5 months from January 15 2009 US\$3,344,884.</p> <p>EMOP 10774.0 – Emergency Response to High Food Prices in the West Bank, Feb 2009 – Jan 2010. Pilot project to provide cash-based vouchers for 5,500 families. Budget US\$6.7m. Extension to June 2010 planned.</p>				

# Executive Summary

## 1. Background

### 1.A Context

1 The occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) witnessed protracted emergency and renewed crisis during the period under review, including major conflict following the Israeli incursion into the Gaza Strip at the end of 2008. The Israeli-Palestinian peace process made no progress. The overall humanitarian situation deteriorated, particularly in the Gaza Strip. The size of the vulnerable population increased.

2 Israeli government policies of closure and blockade are fundamental to the humanitarian crisis in the oPt. Other policies contributing to the humanitarian crisis include land requisition, house demolitions, displacement, and restrictions on access to land and basic services. In the West Bank settlement activity, the construction of the West Bank barrier and the entrenchment of the closure regime have continued.

3 In the third quarter of 2009 unemployment was estimated at 42 percent in the Gaza Strip and 18 percent in the West Bank. Per capita income in US\$ for the oPt is 78 percent of the figure for 1999. In Gaza food insecurity was running at 61 percent in June 2009 and 80 percent of the population receives humanitarian assistance of some kind. In the West Bank food insecurity was 25 percent in March 2009. The situation in the Gaza Strip became radically different from that on the West Bank, with major implications for programming humanitarian response.

Refugees comprise 65 percent of the population of the Gaza Strip of 1.42 million, and 27 percent of the population of the West Bank of 2.34 million. United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) is primarily responsible for work in support of the refugee population. The World Food Programme (WFP) is working in support of the non-refugee population. The need for humanitarian assistance in the oPt will continue for the foreseeable future and remains highly vulnerable to political developments.

### 1.B Description of the operation

The following table summarizes recent, current and planned WFP operations in the oPt.

Title	Period	WFP budget (US\$)	Beneficiaries and activities (planned)
<b>PRRO 10387.0</b>	Sept 05–Aug 07	US\$81m (later revised to US\$103m)	Total 480,000 beneficiaries: MoSA 188,300 chronically poor and 10,600 institutional feeding; 281,100 FFW/FFT for new poor; support to olive producers
<b>PRRO 10387.1</b> (subject of the evaluation; WB only from 2009)	Sept 07–Aug 09 (extended to June 2010)	US\$107m (later revised to US\$172m)	Total 665,000 beneficiaries: MoSA destitute and institutional feeding 188,000; vulnerable groups 75,000; FFW / FFT 189,000; FFE 90,000
<b>EMOP 10817.0</b> (Gaza)	Jan 09–Dec 10	US\$78m (for 2009)	365,000 beneficiaries (in 2009)
<b>SO 10815.0</b> (Gaza)	Mid-Jan to end Dec 2009	US\$3.3m	Strengthening logistics coordination
<b>EMOP 10774.0</b> (West Bank)	Sep 09–Aug 10	US\$6.7m	Pilot project to provide cash-based vouchers for 5,500 families

4 The objectives of protracted relief and recovery operation (PRRO) 10387.1 were to meet the food needs of the most vulnerable food-insecure non-refugees and to support the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) in poverty reduction through productive activities and skills development. It had three basic components:

- protracted and emergency relief, mostly through general food distribution to those most vulnerable, as well as through School Feeding;
- recovery through support for productive activities and skills development through Food for work (FFW) and Food for training (FFT);
- enhanced knowledge, partnerships and advocacy.

5 The intention was to promote needs-based interventions designed to offer assistance according to the socio-economic and livelihood profiles of beneficiaries.

6 The PRRO planned to assist an estimated 665,000 beneficiaries over two years, primarily through provision of 164,605mt of food at a total overall cost of US\$107.2m. Subsequent revisions extended the operation to June 2010 and increased the overall budget to US\$171.9m.

7 In the course of PRRO 10387.1 WFP responded to the December 2008 Israeli incursion into the Gaza Strip with an additional emergency operation (EMOP) 10817.0 – Operation Lifeline Gaza. As of January 2009, PRRO 10387.1 continued only in the West Bank, with 410,000 planned beneficiaries.

### **1.C Evaluation features**

8 The core methodology for the evaluation was to “implement traditional evaluation methods based on programme theory and logical framework approaches and to employ internationally agreed evaluation criteria of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability.”

9 PRRO logframes did not provide a coherent framework for the evaluation, which largely comprised assessment against general objectives and summary targets. Baseline data proved to be very limited.

10 Methodological tools included documentary research, semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions. Both qualitative and quantitative approaches were adopted, along with summative, normative and formative components.

11 The evaluators believe that the process of this evaluation has been unduly protracted, and in particular that stakeholder comments should be solicited concurrently on the first draft of the evaluation report. We also believe the evaluation team should be debriefed at the end of the evaluation process.

## **2. Performance highlights**

### **2.A Operation design: relevance and appropriateness**

#### **Appropriateness**

12 Given the growing impoverishment and chronic food insecurity in the oPt, PRRO objectives were broadly appropriate, though food parcels are not generally the most effective or efficient means of meeting food security needs in the oPt. The bias of the project design in favour of productive activities and skills development - planned as 57 percent of the project - was also appropriate, since such recovery activities have greater impact and elements of sustainability in comparison with relief or welfare components.

13 Background infrastructural and economic conditions in the oPt are comparatively developed, with market mechanisms well able to deliver food supplies unless deliberately disrupted. Israeli policies, particularly those of blockade and closure, have caused serious economic decline, especially in Gaza, and continuing increases in

unemployment, impoverishment and hardship. These policies are also an important factor in determining market conditions and price mechanisms but, as WFP research has shown, they have not been used to generate food shortages as such. The problem has not been the availability of food but the declining purchasing power of large sections of the population.

14 Israeli policies relating to the oPt can in any case readily accommodate changes in underlying economic conditions and such factors as the availability of humanitarian food aid. If these policies were to change further and be used to generate absolute food shortages, this could be done irrespective of the underlying market situation or the amount of humanitarian aid in the pipeline. The only solution in these (hypothetical) circumstances would be to change the Israeli policy.

15 In these conditions, in contrast to WFP operations elsewhere in the world where the economic infrastructure is very weak or non-existent, what matters is the economic value of the resources transferred to the needy and vulnerable, not the nature of the resource transferred (e.g. food parcel, food voucher, cash). Since market mechanisms are able to deliver food for purchase by voucher or cash,<sup>1</sup> and since food parcels involve very substantial overhead costs of transportation and distribution and are also subject to delay or disruption, voucher or cash mechanisms have a very considerable advantage. The management costs and challenges of voucher and cash schemes, though still substantial, are also less overall than for general food distribution.

16 The implications for WFP are considerable. However it would be wrong to move on from general food distribution (GFD) unless alternative mechanisms are in place. Additionally programmes need to remain coherent with those of key stakeholders and will need to be introduced on an incremental basis. Nevertheless the implications of this analysis should be considered very thoroughly.

### **Coherence**

17 The PRRO has been coherent with other WFP programmes in the oPt and has been broadly coherent with wider WFP policies and objectives, including those on food-based security nets, protection and livelihoods.<sup>2</sup> External coherence with PNA policies has been good though diminished by the comparative reversion to relief rather than recovery activities. Coherence with the Consolidated Appeals Process and with other United Nations (UN) agencies has been good. Project design is related to and broadly in line with that of major donors.<sup>3</sup> Coherence with the differing policies of local and international NGOs and civil society organizations is inevitably variable. The programme is coherent with (and related to) the policies of WFP's main international non-governmental organization (INGO) cooperating partners.

### **Project design**

18 There were no evaluations of the WFP programmes that preceded the PRRO. The nutrition portfolio of PRRO 10387.0 was reviewed in 2006. That review identified the main nutritional problem in the oPt as micro-nutrient deficiency and key recommendations included supporting the establishment of a nutrition surveillance system and introducing school feeding into the WFP programme. School feeding was

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<sup>1</sup> In times of war or serious conflict, neither market mechanisms nor humanitarian provision may be able to deliver food to those who need it,

<sup>2</sup> The original project document for PRRO 10387.1 did not make specific reference to WFP's pre-2008 strategic objectives though they are referenced in the revised logframe of May 2009. These strategic objectives do not fit easily with conditions in the oPt.

<sup>3</sup> Most donor agencies have ongoing debates about the appropriateness of food aid in the context of the oPt, and most support moves away from food aid towards alternative modes of relief and recovery assistance such as cash- and voucher-based schemes. WFP moves in this direction are thereby generally coherent with donor policies.

also identified as a priority in the 2006 After Action Review, and was introduced on a pilot basis.

19 The After Action Review also identified the need to improve monitoring of the results of the different activities carried out under the PRRO. WFP has begun to address this need, with good results, though monitoring and evaluation systems need to be strengthened further.

20 The After Action Review recommended that targeting should be based on beneficiaries' socio-economic status and differentiated needs, and that a Food Security Monitoring System (FSMS) should be set up that would establish indicators for assessing the impact of the project from different types of intervention and that would more clearly identify people no longer in need of support and previously excluded people who should be included. The FSMS has been initiated through the WFP/ Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) Socio-Economic and Food Security survey reports (SEFSec).

### **Logical frameworks**

21 Two logframes were developed for PRRO 10387.1. The original logframe was revised in 2009 to align it with WFP's revised global strategic objectives for 2008-2011. Neither logframe offers a coherent framework for monitoring the outcomes of the project, and they have not been used by WFP for this purpose. Outcome indicators in the logframes are impractical as a means of measuring the impact of project activities on people's well-being. In particular, the key indicator of the proportion of household expenditure devoted to food is unrealistic. Intermediate indicators are only weakly linked to their respective outcomes and outcome indicators. This means that only very rough judgments about the possible impact of the interventions can be made, mostly through considering their economic value as welfare in the overall context of the oPt.

### **2.B Outputs and implementation processes: elements of efficiency**

The numbers of planned versus actual beneficiaries for each programme are shown in the table next page.



<b>Comparison of planned versus actual beneficiary numbers for PRRO 10387.1, 2007 – 2009</b>									
	<b>Planned</b>			<b>Actual</b>			<b>Actual versus planned</b>		
	<b>Male</b>	<b>Female</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>Male</b>	<b>Female</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>Male (%)</b>	<b>Female (%)</b>	<b>Total (%)</b>
<b>September – December 2007</b>									
Number of children below 5 years of age	61,412	60,422	121,834	11,712	11,047	22,759	19	18	19
Number of children 5 to 18 years of age	100,041	100,412	200,453	63,692	62,565	126,257	64	62	63
Number of adults	165,517	177,196	342,713	42,683	53,402	96,085	26	30	28
<b>Total number of beneficiaries in 2007</b>	<b>326,970</b>	<b>338,030</b>	<b>665,000</b>	<b>118,087</b>	<b>127,014</b>	<b>245,101</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>37</b>
Beneficiaries of GFD	137,000	149,000	286,000	89,360	98,287	187,647	65	66	66
Children receiving school meals	45,000	45,000	90,000	28,727	28,727	57,454	63	64	64
Participants in FFW (x6 for beneficiaries)	19,000	5,000	24,000	0	0	0	0	0	0
Participants in FFT (x6 for beneficiaries)	7,000	17,000	24,000	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>January – December 2008</b>									
Number of children below 5 years of age	61,412	60,422	121,834	56,235	53,898	110,133	92	89	90
Number of children 5 to 18 years of age	100,041	100,412	200,453	149,786	143,547	293,333	150	143	146
Number of adults	165,517	177,196	342,713	139,999	139,510	279,509	85	79	82
<b>Total number of beneficiaries in 2008</b>	<b>326,970</b>	<b>338,030</b>	<b>665,000</b>	<b>346,020</b>	<b>336,955</b>	<b>682,975</b>	<b>106</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>103</b>
Beneficiaries of GFD	137,000	149,000	286,000	210,455	204,344	414,799	154	137	145
Children receiving school meals	45,000	45,000	90,000	29,209	28,288	57,497	65	63	64
Participants in FFW (x6 for beneficiaries)	19,000	5,000	24,000	16,287	357	16,644	86	7	69
Participants in FFT (x6 for beneficiaries)	7,000	17,000	24,000	30	9,171	9,201	0.4	54	38
<b>January – December 2009</b>									
Number of children below 5 years of age	29,973	28,041	57,414	42,994	41,552	84,546	146	148	147
Number of children 5 to 18 years of age	79,935	76,402	156,337	101,039	96,167	197,206	126	126	126
Number of adults	100,496	98,753	199,249	87,266	86,429	173,695	87	88	87
<b>Total number of beneficiaries in 2009</b>	<b>209,804</b>	<b>203,196</b>	<b>413,000</b>	<b>231,299</b>	<b>224,148</b>	<b>455,447</b>	<b>110</b>	<b>110</b>	<b>110</b>
Beneficiaries of GFD	122,014	118,170	240,184	158,915	145,423	304,338	130	123	127
Children receiving school meals	30,589	33,085	63,674	30,570	33,100	63,670	99.9	100	99.9
Participants in FFW (x6 for beneficiaries)	5,576	3,118	8,694	5,577	3,117	8,694	100	100	100
Participants in FFT (x6 for beneficiaries)	5,576	3,118	8,694	5,577	3,117	8,694	100	100	100

*(For information on tonnages etc please see Annex D of the main report.)*

22 PRRO 10387.1 planned to provide 57 percent of assistance through recovery activities and 43 percent through relief activities. In practice the recovery component was 23 percent in 2007, 17 percent in 2008 and 19 percent in 2009. FFW and FFT were not implemented in the Gaza Strip, nor in 2007 in the West Bank. Beneficiary numbers increased by 45 percent in 2008 as the number Ministry of Social Affairs Social Hardship cases increased.

23 Differences between what was planned and what was implemented were mainly caused by shortfalls in funding, the constraints of working in the Gaza Strip, difficulties generated by the requirements of political vetting, and difficulties generated by problems with two particular shipments of wheat flour.

### **Logistics and procurement**

24 Fluctuating and generally high logistics costs have been unavoidable, being fundamentally a consequence of the closure policy and of the elaborate restrictive procedures involved in transporting food to the oPt. WFP has developed a strong supply chain, but this has been disrupted by a series of problems, very largely outside the control of WFP, over the timing of delivery and with regard to the perceived quality of wheat flour for two major donations. These, combined with decreases in donor funding, led to a major though temporary financial crisis in the second quarter of 2008.

25 Innovative commodity swaps and local food procurement arrangements have helped to overcome problems with the timely availability of wheat flour as well as the intricacies of large numbers of very small scale deliveries. Nevertheless the problems mentioned, and the primary dependence on international shipments, led to disruption of the supply chain and contributed to the unevenness of food distributions.

26 Though rates for truck transport have remained steady, actual landside transport storage and handling (LTSH) figures have fluctuated considerably, depending on the crossings permitted, the amount of cargo through the port, through intermediate storage, or from local purchase. A high proportion of costs are attributable to very elaborate procedures instituted by the Israeli authorities for security reasons.

27 Coordination with cooperating partners and other stakeholders over logistics has generally been good.

### **Local Purchase**

28 Where market conditions permit and cash can be used without restriction, local and regional purchases are more cost- and time-efficient than alternatives. Despite several initiatives in local food procurement which have provided efficient and timely delivery systems, initial targets of one third local procurement have not been achieved. We believe there is a clear justification for giving substantial weight to local purchase in view of the economic decline in the West Bank and economic devastation in the Gaza Strip. Local purchase may be more expensive but there are clear gains in efficiency and timeliness.

### **Targeting**

29 Planned targeting of beneficiaries by category and need was generally appropriate, though there were significant shortfalls in what could actually be achieved and in the overall balance between relief and recovery activities.

30 In practice, targeting by category of beneficiary has shown mixed results. WFP's targeting review shows extremely high correlations (often 100 percent) between beneficiaries and their eligibility for benefits, but did not establish how many of those not receiving benefits were entitled to do so. The FAO/WFP SEFSec for the Gaza Strip shows that around half of those not receiving benefits of any kind (from

UNRWA, WFP or others) should be doing so, whilst nearly half of the top 17 percent of the population, who are classified as food secure, do get benefits. Field interviews confirm the impression that in practice the targeting of beneficiaries is affected by, and made more difficult by, a wide range of factors, including the political restrictions imposed by donors.

### **Monitoring and evaluation**

31 With the Results-Based Monitoring Tool-kit now in use, WFP has developed a potentially powerful resource for understanding the operation of its programmes and their results. In practice the potential of this resource has not yet been realized. In part this is because of underutilization, but there are also quality issues. The information inputted to the database needs to be improved. This in turn requires upgrading the training and capacity of Field Monitor Assistants (FMAs), especially with regard to the collection of qualitative data. FMA monitoring also need supplementing by monitors with different varieties of expertise, e.g. with regard to the technical components of FFW projects. WFP's cooperating partners also need to upgrade their monitoring and evaluation capacity.

### **Adaptation to changing needs**

32 The conflict in the Gaza Strip provided the main change in circumstances during the PRRO. WFP's response was successful and appropriate. The replacement of the Gaza Strip component of the PRRO with an EMOP was justified. Other changes have resulted from the political restrictions imposed by donors; difficulties in adapting to them are intrinsic, and cannot always be overcome.

### **Partnerships, coordination and transfer of competencies**

33 The main focus of WFP's capacity building initiatives has been on improving the efficiency of partners through providing training for programmes in FFW, FFT and assistance to vulnerable groups. WFP also provided guidance on the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) guidelines and restrictions. Ministries of Social Affairs (MoSA), MoA, Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and Cooperative Housing Foundation (CHF) staff were trained in warehouse management. Additional training was provided in programme implementation, donor relations, and monitoring.

### **Internal institutional arrangements**

34 The country office is adequately staffed with 94 staff appropriately deployed in East Jerusalem, Gaza City, Hebron, Nablus, and Ashdod port. The Country Office has developed effective links between offices in the oPt, with the Regional Bureau and with HQ in Rome.

### **Resourcing and cost efficiency**

35 The PRRO was adequately funded in its early months and a solid pipeline was established, though it was virtually impossible to work in the Gaza Strip in 2007 as a result of travel restrictions. Early in 2008 problems with specific wheat flour shipments accompanied by the withdrawal of some funds led to a financial crisis which lasted several months. Although the PRRO was only 75 percent funded by October 2009 lower distribution tonnages than planned and the replacement of the PRRO in the Gaza Strip by the EMOP enabled to the PRRO to be extended. Nevertheless the crisis of 2008 comprised a serious weakness in financial flow.

36 Cost efficiency has to be seen in the extraordinary context of the situation in the oPt. An approximate comparison of costs of the various types of delivery of wheat flour reveals that the most cost efficient is straightforward local purchase or the current wheat swap arrangement. The most expensive is the delivery of in-kind wheat flour. In assessing local purchase options WFP should not only consider the

downside of higher prices but the upside of improvements in flexible and timely delivery and in support for the local economy.

37 The PRRO is vulnerable to cuts in direct support costs (DSC) to an already limited DSC budget, due to the extension of the PRRO on the same budget after the Gaza component was transferred to the EMOP.

## **2.C Results**

### **General food distribution (GFD)**

38 The outcome for GFD in the May 2009 logframe is 'Adequate food consumption over assistance period of targeted households at risk of falling into acute hunger'. Indicators are the household food consumption score and the percentage of household expenditure devoted to food. This is an indicator of limited value, and its assessment has acute practical difficulties.

39 However there is no doubt that WFP food assistance in GFD, FFW and FFT has helped to mitigate the worst effects of economic decline on the food security of Palestinian households and has benefitted large numbers of impoverished and food insecure people. Irregularities in food distribution did not significantly affect this general picture.

40 Except for perception of the quality of wheat flour, particularly in relation to specific consignments, beneficiaries indicated satisfaction with the quality of the food parcel commodities. Despite this they generally expressed a clear preference for voucher schemes, often based on experience with a Red Cross scheme some years ago.

### **Food For Work (FFW)**

41 The FFW programme aimed to preserve agricultural and fishery assets to promote self-reliance and restore livelihoods, and to contribute to longer-term food security.<sup>4</sup> The main FFW focus has been on agriculture and land reclamation but other activities were the rehabilitation or maintenance of community centres, municipal facilities, schools, kindergartens, clinics, hospitals and houses. From 2009 FFW activities have concentrated entirely in the agricultural sector and the planned scale of work was also reduced significantly. A strength of the FFW programme has been its implementation by NGOs in collaboration with municipalities and with local committees formed from representatives of local community organisations, who identify both the FFW activities that will be carried out and those who will participate in them.<sup>5</sup>

### **Food for training (FFT)**

42 FFT in income-generation and vocational training aimed to contribute to self-reliance by imparting marketable skills and producing consumer products to support diversification of livelihoods. As with FFW, outputs proved to be less than initially planned. More attention should be paid to providing training in marketable skills and to developing partnerships that would provide complementary support to enable graduates of training programmes to use the skills that they have acquired.

### **School Feeding**

43 WFP has introduced a pilot emergency school feeding project in the more food-insecure areas of the West Bank and Gaza, based on snacks produced in the West Bank and in Egypt. School feeding is popular with the Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MoEHE) as well as with teachers, parents and pupils, generating

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<sup>4</sup> Because FFW was not implemented in Gaza, none of the activities focused on fishing.

<sup>5</sup> Principally CRS and CHF. The Palestinian NGO *Ard al Atfal* also participated but this proved unsuccessful.

considerable pressure for expansion. To do so on a rational basis, and one capable of attracting long term funding, will require serious assessment of the impact other programme and clarification of its objectives in light of this impact.

44 The project logframe implausibly proposes improved school attendance as a primary outcome. Potentially more plausible but unproven outcomes include post-snack improvements in concentration (and therefore academic attainment) and a reduction in micronutrient deficiencies. Economic transfer has also been proposed. Unfortunately nothing is in place to assess any of these potential outcomes. A study of the impact of school feeding against the outcomes mentioned should be established as a matter of priority. It should include baseline studies in schools about to be incorporated into school feeding as well as those who will not be incorporated in the near future.

### **Institutional feeding**

45 Food assistance has been provided for MoSA's programme of support to hospitals, orphanages and homes for the elderly. WFP aimed to support 8 percent of the group categorised as destitute by MoSA through institutional feeding. WFP's support was seen as critical because of the PNA's declining capacity to meet the needs of those in institutional care, and as an interim measure until the PNA was able to fully resume its responsibilities. Given the de-institutionalisation of the PNA that has taken place particularly since 2006, we believe this is a relevant form of support. Project reports do not provide disaggregated figures for the numbers being assisted in institutions.

## **2.D Cross cutting issues**

### **Gender**

46 The project design aimed to mainstream gender throughout PRRO 10387.1. Women were to form 52 percent of beneficiaries overall, and around 70 percent of participants in life skills training and in other FFT activities and 21 percent of FFW participants. Women's associations were to be responsible for preparing the snacks for schools and kindergartens, and were to be paid an incentive for doing this. Women's associations were expected ultimately to take over full responsibility for school feeding. Women were expected to be 50 percent of local committees for FFW and FFT. In percentage terms these outcomes were achieved for GFD, greatly exceeded for FFT and greatly underachieved for FFW and for participation in local committees.

47 Although the data is somewhat unclear and contradictory, there are indications that men may participate more than women in the economically productive activities promoted under FFW and FFT, It is not clear however that greater participation correlates with greater benefit.

### **Advocacy**

48 Public advocacy initiatives under the PRRO have been comparatively limited, focusing significantly on the SEFSec documents which have provided a valuable benchmark and a useful input into policy formation for the PNA and other stakeholders. Whilst recognizing that WFP advocacy especially on broader issues needs to be coordinated with other UN agencies, we argue that this should be a greater priority. Please see recommendations below for specific suggestions.

### **Protection**

49 Protection issues have not been given priority within the framework of the PRRO. Recent initiatives for staff training are supported, as a component of upgrading work in this field.

### **Political restrictions**

50 Donor restrictions on contact with members of proscribed organizations, principally Hamas, have considerably affected the efficiency of work under the PRRO and jeopardize its stability. The restrictions would be unenforceable if they were strictly applied. Instead stakeholders must adopt a pragmatic approach to the restrictions, which however leaves the programmes highly vulnerable, given the inevitability of real or alleged infractions continuing to emerge, occasionally accompanied by publicity. This is an intractable problem, but donors should be aware of the practical implications of these restrictions and of their potential conflict with humanitarian principles.

### **Sale of wheat flour by beneficiaries**

51 Onward sale of donated wheat flour by a proportion of beneficiaries is inevitable and should surprise nobody. Perceived problems with the quality of the wheat flour is only one reason. Many people buy bread rather than to bake it at home, especially in urban environments.<sup>6</sup> If beneficiaries cannot use their wheat flour ration themselves, it is impractical to stop them selling it on. One of many consequences of making this illegal is to frustrate any objective research into the issue. Since by selling his or her wheat ration the beneficiary still derives an economic benefit the main objectives of the intervention have been achieved. It is very important for stakeholders, especially donors, to get this issue into perspective, and not allow it to continue to jeopardize support for the programme. Readers not persuaded by this analysis are referred to expanded treatment of this question in the main report.

### **Food parcels, vouchers and cash**

52 The WFP voucher programmes in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are not part of the PRRO and were only briefly reviewed. However they are key options for oPt programming. They make sense not only on grounds of improved effectiveness and efficiency but because of the greater dignity and choice afforded to beneficiaries. Cash-based schemes, in turn, are in principle more efficient and effective than voucher schemes, though may also be more difficult to manage, and may not fall within WFP's remit.

53 Research commissioned by WFP, which is coherent with broader economic analysis, shows that food insecurity in the oPt is primarily caused by the continuous decline in the purchasing power of the population - a consequence of the collapse of the economy caused by closure and blockade - and not by the unavailability of food on the market. In these circumstances voucher schemes do not have significant impact on the food supply situation, and have clear advantages of efficiency and effectiveness. Nevertheless they should only be introduced incrementally and in negotiation with key stakeholders.<sup>7</sup>

## **3. Conclusions and recommendations**

### **3.A Overall assessment**

#### **Relevance and appropriateness**

54 In assessing the relevance and appropriateness of the PRRO we assume that the availability of funding for the oPt is a comparatively fixed parameter and is not in very direct competition with funding for other humanitarian emergencies. In this case the key questions become how best to respond, rather than to be unduly focused

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<sup>6</sup> Bakeries are a universal Palestinian institution. They only exist because not everybody bakes at home.

<sup>7</sup> Please see also the discussion of this issue in Section 2.A above under appropriateness. The issue generated more comments on drafts of the report than any other. It is appears that this analysis may not be immediately persuasive. It is presented more fully in the main version of the report.

on the scale of the response. We also assume that WFP is unable to move very far from its core mandate of the provision of food aid.

55 Within this context the PRRO has been relevant, appropriate and reasonably coherent in addressing the humanitarian needs of its target population. However food parcels are generally not the most appropriate form of humanitarian assistance. WFP's moves towards replacing food parcels with voucher schemes are strongly supported. How far and how fast this process can and should proceed depends more on institutional factors than on the most appropriate means of responding to humanitarian need.

### **Effectiveness**

56 Weaknesses in PRRO logframes means that effectiveness has been assessed against the general objectives and targets of the PRRO. The relief components of the PRRO (in support of vulnerable groups) were generally effective, meeting their targets except in the early phase of the PRRO, and despite some significant disruptions to the pipeline. Recovery components of the PRRO failed to meet targets, particularly in FFW interventions. This was because of financial shortfalls which led to the prioritization of relief interventions, the capacity limitations of Cooperation Partners (CP), and the difficulties of working with the political restrictions of donors. Unintended effects include the perpetuation of dependency on welfare provision, but the circumstances of the oPt we believe a substantial component of welfare provision and protracted relief is justified.

### **Efficiency**

57 Cost efficiency has generally been good given the exceptional circumstances relating to the oPt. Local purchase has generally been justified and should be extended; increases in cost may be considerable but are offset by savings in overheads and can also be justifiable in terms of support to the local economy - though the impact needs to be carefully assessed on a case-by-case basis. Reliance on international NGOs as cooperating partners has added to costs but has been the only realistic option. Timeliness was variable. Resource adequacy was generally on track except for a few months in 2008. Coordination with other stakeholders was generally good.

### **Impact**

58 The overall impact of the PRRO, at both macro and micro level, can only be assessed in very general terms. The main impact has been to help arrest or reduce the decline in the assets, purchasing power, food security and wellbeing of the sizeable target population through providing significant de facto economic benefits. The more sustainable elements of the programme have augmented this impact, though not to the extent planned and envisaged.

### **59 Sustainability**

60 Relief activities undertaken under the PRRO are inherently not sustainable. Recovery activities have had varying degrees of sustainability. These have generally been greatest for the agricultural rehabilitation components of FFW. Sustainable components of FFT were unduly limited. The potential for the MoEHE to take over long-term responsibility for school feeding adds a potential sustainable component.

61 Genuinely sustainable income and food security will only be achievable if and when a political settlement is achieved and the closure regime is lifted. For chronic humanitarian emergencies as in the oPt the sustainability of the resourcing of relief and recovery initiatives is itself a key issue. This is a separate question from the sustainability of the activities promoted.

62 WFP's capacity to maintain its interventions under the PRRO has been constrained by the limitations, uncertainties, and time frame of funding commitments, and the vulnerability of the programme to destabilization or discontinuity. Destabilizing factors have included perceived problems with wheat flour quality and with its onward sale. Problems connected with maintaining political restrictions are likely to continue to do so in future.

### Summary of key evaluation criteria

63 The criteria are summarized here in relation to the overall aims of the PRRO i.e.

- the provision of protracted and emergency relief assistance;
- recovery through support for productive activities and skills development;
- the provision of an enhanced knowledge base, partnerships and advocacy.

64 The relevance of relief and recovery interventions is considered here in relation to meeting humanitarian need rather than in relationship to specific modality of intervention.

	Relevance	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Sustainability	Impact
<b>Relief</b>	High	Good, despite some discontinuity	Good in relation to oPt circumstances	Not applicable	Good, some discontinuity
<b>Recovery</b>	High	Low	Limited	Limited, could be greater	Limited; less than planned
<b>Knowledge base</b>	High	Under-used	Low	Good	Not fully realized
<b>Partnerships</b>	High	Varied	Varied	Varied, not always stable	Limited, variable
<b>Advocacy (public)</b>	High (in UN)	Good	Good	Good, improved	Fair

### 3.B Key issues for the future.

65 Conditions in the oPt mean that the need for humanitarian assistance is likely to continue for the foreseeable future. Although there is a continuing need to provide a social safety net for the most vulnerable, interventions with sustainable components have more impact and are more appropriate, effective and efficient than relief or welfare assistance. Finding or creating increased capacity to incorporate interventions with sustainable components is a key issue for a future PRRO.

66 Food parcels are not the most appropriate or efficient forms of relief or recovery assistance in the circumstances of the oPt. The dilemma for WFP is how far and how fast it should aim to transform such programmes, and whether and at what point to hand over responsibility to other agencies, for example those able to implement cash-based alternatives.

67 The future of the school feeding programme, currently still in pilot form, is a major question for WFP. There is an urgent need to assess the impact and establish the objectives of this programme before further funds are committed.

68 Within the framework of recovery operations, especially FFW, it will be important to carefully assess and prioritize the sustainable elements of these interventions. For FFT this involves prioritizing training in marketable skills. WFP should establish whether or not it is able to work with other local or international partners in FFW and FFT initiatives and has the capacity to manage an expansion of its local partners.



69 The political restrictions imposed by donors are likely to continue to generate acute problems for the PRRO and its successor. The unnecessarily vexed question of onward sales of wheat flour may also continue to generate serious difficulties unless stakeholders change their approach to this issue.

70 Local purchase is a key issue. The innovative arrangements that developed in the oPt should be developed and expanded even where the cost implications are significant.

71 WFP's capacity to maintain its interventions under the PRRO has been constrained by the limitations, uncertainties, and time frame of funding commitments

72 Advocacy is an important issue for the future. WFP should lobby on questions of protection, humanitarian access, with particular reference to food. Lobbying Israeli authorities should be key to an advocacy strategy.

### **3.C Recommendations**

#### **General food distribution**

**Recommendation 1:** WFP should continue with its initiatives to replace GFD with voucher-based schemes. Expansion of such schemes should be on a controlled and incremental basis with careful attention paid to lessons learnt from the pilot projects and the requirements for adequate monitoring and management.

**Recommendation 2:** If able to do so within its mandate, WFP should explore the option of replacing GFD with cash based schemes, even if this means relinquishing the operation to another agency. Initially this option should be explored on the West Bank. Management requirements should be carefully determined.

**Recommendation 3:** Further research into targeting is needed should sample the population as a whole. The methodological limitations of the Targeting Review, especially its focusing on existing beneficiaries should be recognized.

#### **Food for work and food for training**

**Recommendation 4:** FFT and FFW initiatives should put much greater emphasis on assessing long term outcomes, and prioritizing initiatives with sustainable components which promote livelihoods. For FFT this means prioritizing training in marketable skills.

**Recommendation 5:** WFP should research and promote the option of prioritizing the planting of olive trees under FFW.

**Recommendation 6:** WFP should institute spot checks and ex post assessments of works completed under FFW.

**Recommendation 7:** WFP should investigate the possibility of working with other local or international partners in FFW and FFT initiatives. Selection of country offices should be based primarily on interest in and capacity for identifying and supporting programmes which promote livelihoods rather than being primarily based on targeting the vulnerable. Priority should be given to local NGOs or INGOs who are willing and able to work with local NGOs. If moving in this direction WFP will need to expand its management capacity appropriately.

#### **School feeding**

**Recommendation 8:** The current pilot project should not be expanded until the proposed consultancy on school feeding is completed and the proposed research into impact has been planned. Key factors for an impact study are set out in Annex A of the main report.

## **Institutional feeding**

**Recommendation 9:** Institutional feeding should be continued along current lines but should continue to be considered an interim measure until the PNA is able to resume its responsibilities.

## **Procurement and logistics**

**Recommendation 10:** WFP should expand the local purchase of food parcel commodities in the oPt. This should be done even if there is a considerable price premium, both to support the local economy and because of improvements in the efficiency, effectiveness, flexibility and timeliness of deliveries. WFP should develop guidelines with regard to acceptable cost premiums for local purchase, which take such improvements into account.

**Recommendation 11:** In considering local purchases WFP should analyse the complex costs involved and establish who benefits from such initiatives and their impact on the local economy.

**Recommendation 12:** WFP should study the effectiveness and impact of purchasing vegetable oil locally, including the option of importing oil seed for local milling.

**Recommendation 13:** WFP should review the option of purchasing olive oil locally, either on a regular or on an ad hoc basis, and if this appears feasible should commission a study of the impact of such an initiative.

**Recommendation 14:** WFP should develop a secure, hand-held, electronic system of receipt, accounting and delivery at warehouses and other end delivery points.

**Recommendation 15:** WFP should consider moving the intermediary warehousing in the Gaza Strip away from its insecure location near the border, and also consider relocating the intermediary warehouse for the West Bank into the West Bank, in order to better complement contingency stocks held by Cooperating Partners.

## **Finance**

**Recommendation 16:** WFP HQ should develop the capacity to provide greater interim financial support in response to temporary financial crises.

## **Advocacy**

**Recommendation 17:** WFP in collaboration with other UN agencies should lobby Israel's Unit for Coordination of Government Activities in Territories (COGAT) and/or other Israeli authorities to allow Palestinian trucks to start loading at *Kerem Shalom* as soon as cargo is available, install lighting to allow movement after dark, and handle waybills in a recognized professional manner for transport waybills.

**Recommendation 18:** WFP in collaboration with other UN agencies should take a lead in explaining the practical impact of the political restrictions imposed by donors on the effectiveness of humanitarian operations and the extent to which they undermine humanitarian responsibilities. The objective would be to get the restrictions modified, both in theory and practice.

**Recommendation 19:** WFP, in collaboration with other UN agencies, should contribute to lobbying the Israeli authorities to mitigate the impact of closure and blockade. In particular WFP should focus on efforts to lift restrictions on the commercial shipment of specific foodstuffs, and to the reopening of Gaza crossing points.

## **Planning, monitoring and evaluation**

**Recommendation 20:** Logframes for the next PRRO should provide genuine route maps for action with relevant and (where possible) measurable indicators. They must

be based firmly on the realities of the programme whilst explaining its connection to WFP strategic objectives.

**Recommendation 21:** Monitoring and reporting procedures should be based on indicators developed in the revised logframes.

**Recommendation 22:** FMA training should be upgraded, especially with regard to qualitative assessment.

**Recommendation 23:** Work between programme staff and Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) staff should be more closely integrated.

**Recommendation 24:** After an initial quality check, the first draft of a WFP evaluation report should be circulated to all WFP stakeholders so that inputs and comments can be made concurrently and at an early date. Debriefings of the evaluation team should take place at or near the end of the evaluation process.

## **Map**

The most relevant and useful maps of the oPt are those produced by OCHA, but they are too detailed for reproduction in this report. Readers are advised to consult <http://www.ochaopt.org>.

## 1. Background

1 This evaluation is of WFP's PRRO undertaken in the oPt from September 2007 to August 2009. The evaluation took into account the significance of the preceding two-year PRRO (10387.0) and of the EMOP started in Gaza following the Israeli incursions of December 2008.

2 The PRRO under review (10387.1) was extended to June 2010, providing a framework for recommendations from the evaluation. In August 2009 it was decided to continue the division between the EMOP in Gaza<sup>8</sup>, extended to the end of 2010, and the PRRO in the West Bank. It is planned to submit a further PRRO to the WFP Executive Board in July 2010.

### 1.A Context

3 The oPt witnessed protracted emergency and renewed crisis during the period under review. The conflict following the Israeli "Operation Cast Lead" into Gaza at the end of December 2008 led to horrific death, injury and destruction.<sup>9</sup> The Israeli-Palestinian peace process made no progress. The overall humanitarian situation in the oPt deteriorated, particularly in Gaza, and especially following the conflict with Israel. Health, education, electricity, water and sanitation services were severely affected. The size of the vulnerable population has increased and their situation has deteriorated.

4 Israel's restrictions on access to Gaza since the Hamas takeover in May 2007 have crippled the private sector, weakened livelihoods, infrastructure and essential services, and led to increased dependence on aid. The situation has been greatly compounded by the international boycott of support to the Hamas authorities, and has deteriorated sharply in 2009. Reconstruction and rehabilitation after the conflict have been acutely hampered by the inability to import materials such as cement, wood, glass and spare parts.

5 In the West Bank (WB), including East Jerusalem, settlement activity, the construction of the West Bank barrier and the entrenchment of the closure regime have continued, despite some limited easing of travel restrictions in 2008. Other Israeli policies contributing to Palestinian hardship include land requisition, house demolitions, displacement, and restrictions on access to land and basic services.

6 Political and administrative divisions between Gaza and the West Bank consolidated. In 2009 unemployment is estimated at 49 per cent in Gaza and 23 per cent in the West Bank. <sup>10</sup> Per capita income in US\$ for the oPt is 78 per cent of the figure for 1999. The situation in Gaza became radically different from that on the West Bank, with major implications for programming humanitarian response.

7 The division of the population of the oPt into refugees and non-refugees is of considerable social, political and economic significance, not least in the sphere of humanitarian assistance. Refugees in the oPt comprise those displaced in 1948 from parts of Palestine taken over by the new state of Israel, along with their descendants.<sup>11</sup> According to the 2007 census, refugees comprise 65 per cent of the population of Gaza of

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<sup>8</sup> Throughout the document, in line with standard usage, "Gaza" is used to refer to the Gaza Strip

<sup>9</sup> The Israeli Government was responding to rocket attacks from Gaza. The three-week conflict led to approximately 1,450 Palestinians dead and 5,450 injured, of whom more than a third were children and women. It led to as well to 13 Israeli deaths and 518 injuries.

<sup>10</sup> Revised CAP for oPt, July 2009.

<sup>11</sup> Subsequent conflicts, notably the war of 1967, created further Palestinian refugees from what are now the oPt to neighbouring countries.

1.42 million, and 27 per cent of the population of the West Bank of 2.34 million. Overall refugees comprise 41 per cent of the oPt population of 3.76 million.<sup>12</sup> A proportion of the refugee population lives in designated refugee camps, but many live outside the camps. UNRWA is the UN agency primarily responsible for supporting the refugee population, generally to the exclusion of other UN agencies. The welfare of the non-refugee population is seen as more directly the responsibility of the PNA which receives support from UN agencies in a manner analogous to governments elsewhere. For this reason WFP is working in support of the non-refugee population of the oPt.

8 Israel's closure policies, whereby towns and villages on the West Bank, or parts or the whole of Gaza, can be cut off or severely restricted for indefinite periods, are fundamental to the humanitarian crisis in the oPt, both through causing hardship and economic breakdown and through restricting or severely complicating opportunities for their alleviation. For WFP closure has a fundamental impact on all aspects of their programme, including logistics and food procurement. Further detail can be found in Annex B.

9 The need for humanitarian assistance in the oPt continued during the period under review and will do so for the foreseeable future. As a result of the Israeli blockade, and the less comprehensive but highly significant Egyptian blockade, Gaza's economy continues to decline. In June 2009 food insecurity was running at 61 per cent. 80 per cent of the population in Gaza now receives humanitarian assistance of some kind. Some easing of restrictions on movement in the West Bank in 2009 were nevertheless accompanied by sharp increase in food prices, with food insecurity running at 25 per cent in March 2009. The humanitarian situation in both the West Bank and Gaza remains highly vulnerable to political developments and in particular further or renewed tightening of the closure regime.

### **1.B Description of the operation**

10 WFP has been active in the oPt since 1991, though the scale of its interventions was quite limited until 2004, with the focus until then on support for social hardship cases derived from lists provided by the Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA). In 2004 assistance levels were substantially increased in order to meet the needs of the 'new poor' - people who lost their employment in Israel and/or as a result of the economic decline.

11 PRRO 10387.0 was not evaluated and its successor was designed primarily on the basis of assessments of food security, markets, Food for education (FFE) and nutrition and on the November 2006 After Action Review.

12 The objectives of PRRO 10387.1 were to meet the food needs of the most vulnerable food-insecure non-refugees and to support the PNA in poverty reduction through productive activities and skills development. It had three basic components:

- protracted and emergency relief, mostly through general food distribution to those most vulnerable, as well as through School Feeding;
- recovery through support for productive activities and skills development through FFW and FFT;
- enhanced knowledge, partnerships and advocacy.

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<sup>12</sup> The population will have increased slightly since 2007, somewhat more so in Gaza than in the West Bank, but the overall picture will not have changed significantly.

13 The PRRO planned to assist an estimated 665,000 beneficiaries over two years from 1 September 2007, primarily through provision of 164,605mt of food at a total overall cost of US\$107.2m. Subsequent revisions extended the operation to June 2010 and increased the overall budget to US\$171.9m.

14 In the course of PRRO 10387.1 WFP responded to the December 2008 Israeli “Operation Cast Lead” incursion into Gaza with an additional EMOP 10817.0 – Emergency Food Assistance for Operation Lifeline Gaza – for a further 365,000 non-refugee beneficiaries and 73,334 mt of food, at a total cost of US\$77.8m. This was supported by Special Operation 10815.0 to strengthen logistics coordination. After the establishment of the Gaza EMOP the PRRO under review continued only in the West Bank. A small EMOP for the West Bank comprised a pilot project running from February 2009 which aimed to offset the impact of higher food prices by providing cash-based vouchers for 5500 families.<sup>13</sup>

15 Originally 38 per cent of beneficiaries of the PRRO were to have been in Gaza and 62 per cent percent in the West Bank. 52 per cent were to have been women. The intention was to target 43 per cent through relief interventions and 57 per cent through recovery activities.<sup>14</sup>

### **1.C Evaluation features**

16 The Terms of Reference for the evaluation are appended as Annex 1, with annotations indicating amendments proposed in the Pre-Mission Report (PMR). The PMR was a significant component of the evaluation process; its purpose was:

- To review and clarify the evaluation terms of reference (TOR) and present the methodology to be used to undertake the evaluation;
- To present the preliminary findings of the desk review and identify information gaps to be filled with data collected during the evaluation mission.

17 When the terms of reference (ToR) were initially formulated it was unclear whether an evaluation team would be able to visit Gaza, and plans were made on the assumption that this might not be possible. Following initial discussions in Rome it was decided to include Gaza as fully as possible. The field work period was extended by three days and the evaluation team spent four nights in Gaza. Apart from initial meetings the schedule for the evaluation was a month later than as per the time frame of the ToR, with field work undertaken in October.

18 A stakeholder matrix for the PRRO is contained in the terms of reference (See Annex 1). This is a good reflection of the stakeholders involved, presented in approximate order of significance, and was reflected in the interviews undertaken during the evaluation.<sup>15</sup> Round table meetings were held with the PNA at the beginning and end of the mission, as well as with a variety of officials in the West Bank. A paper summarising preliminary

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<sup>13</sup> The evaluation does not cover the EMOPs, but reviews them in relation to their links to the PRRO and to options for the future. The West Bank EMOP 10774.0 - Emergency Response to High Food Prices in the West Bank - was evaluated separately shortly after the evaluation of the PRRO.

<sup>14</sup> These figures changed considerably following the crisis in Gaza at the end of 2008 and the establishment of the WFP EMOP for Gaza, though, as will be seen, other factors were also involved. In particular, the balance between relief and recovery interventions moved heavily towards relief.

<sup>15</sup> An exception was that the CO felt it was inappropriate to interview representatives of the Israeli Government, except at the level of logistics operations in Ashdod, Ashkelon and *Kerem Shalom*. In the case of *Kerem Shalom* three planned visits were cancelled without explanation by Israeli officials and only a short visit to the transshipment park, made from Gaza, was possible.

findings was discussed at a telephone debriefing with Country Office, Regional Bureau and headquarters staff.<sup>16</sup>

19 The terms of reference set out the core methodology for the evaluation as follows: “The evaluation will implement traditional evaluation methods based on programme theory and logical framework approaches. It will use stakeholder discussions and secondary data to verify baseline information and to understand intended outcomes. The evaluation will employ internationally agreed evaluation criteria of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability.”

20 Weaknesses in the PRRO logframes (as analysed in Section 2 below) meant that they did not provide a coherent framework for the project nor for its evaluation. The stated objectives of the project, though necessarily general, provided a clearer framework for assessing achievements, and these have been used as the main framework for the evaluation. They are set out in Section 2A. below. As predicted in the PMR, baseline data proved to be quite limited, especially data of a kind that would illuminate questions of contribution and attribution. Standard evaluation criteria could still be applied, but as is often the case, this could only be done on the basis of approximate and/or extrapolated information. In such circumstances the limitations of available evidence put a higher premium on the judgment of the evaluators.

21 More generally, internal reports were extensive but the monitoring processes on which they were based often had methodological limitations.<sup>17</sup> External reports, including some commissioned by WFP, were also extensive but rarely directly addressed the objectives of the PRRO, and were sometimes also hampered by methodological weaknesses. This background put considerable limits on detailed quantitative and qualitative assessment, but provided a good framework for formulating some general conclusions with confidence.

22 The evaluation employed the standard tools of documentary research, semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions. Both qualitative and quantitative approaches were included. In addition to the summative and normative components stipulated by the ToR we emphasized a formative component.<sup>18</sup> Care was taken to ensure that WFP quality assurance criteria were met.

23 The report has followed the stipulated format, including the recent innovation that the Summary Report should replace the Executive Summary and be submitted simultaneously. Some additional criteria that are very specific to the oPt are included in cross-cutting issues. Procurement and logistics issues were a key component of the evaluation. They are summarized in the main body of the report but detailed versions of these findings have been presented in an annex (Annex B) in order to conform to the

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<sup>16</sup> The Pre-mission report recommended an additional debriefing in Rome following the production of this report, but at the time of writing this has not been agreed. By the time of finalizing this report, such a meeting seems to the evaluators to be even more desirable, given the issues raised by the report and responses to it.

<sup>17</sup> This issue is discussed in some detail in Section 2B below.

<sup>18</sup> The normative component comprises evaluation of the project’s degree of success or otherwise by assessing outcomes against objectives. The summative component draws out the broader conclusions from this process, thereby deriving lessons to guide the design of future projects in the oPt. Formative components are those that specifically refer to such planning and improvement of the programme. In relation to summative and formative components it is worth noting that the causes of food insecurity in the oPt and the constraints on operations there have a very specific character, so that lessons derived from this evaluation may have limited application to WFP operations elsewhere. It is also worth pointing out that there is some confusion in the literature about the use and meaning of these terms. “Summative” we take to involve a summary process that draws out conclusions, and therefore has more significant implications for the future of the programme than is involved in normative evaluation processes.



report template they are an integral part of the report and have generated several of its key recommendations.

24 The evaluators found that the lengthy process whereby the first draft of the evaluation report is redrafted on the basis of inputs from the Office of Evaluation, and that only the subsequent second draft is circulated to the country office and other stakeholders, negatively impacted the overall usefulness of the evaluation. In the case of this evaluation it was three months between the end of the field work and the circulation of a draft report to the country office, during which work on planning the next phase of the programme was under way. This problem could be largely addressed if, following an initial quality check, the first draft of the evaluation report could be circulated to all WFP stakeholders, so that comments and inputs could be obtained concurrently. This would also lead to overall savings in time and improvements in the efficiency of the evaluation process.

25 The evaluators believe that WFP should adopt the practice of debriefing evaluation teams at the end or near the end of the evaluation process.<sup>19</sup> This can provide an invaluable opportunity for discussing key findings with key stakeholders, and for briefing more fully on aspects that cannot be fully expressed in the report itself.

NB For further information on some of the parameters and limitations of the evaluation please refer to Section 2A below, and in particular to the section there on the PRRO logframes.

## **2. Main Findings**

### **2.A Operation design: relevance and appropriateness**

#### **Objectives of the operation**

26 The objectives of PRRO 10387.1 as set out in the project document are to meet the food needs of the most vulnerable food-insecure non-refugees and to support the PNA in poverty reduction through productive activities and skills development. The intention was to promote needs-based interventions designed to offer assistance according to the socio-economic and livelihood profiles of beneficiaries. The means of achieving these objectives include:

- enhancing the knowledge base of stakeholders
- developing partnerships and advocacy on food insecurity to improve targeting and coordination and
- ensuring effective use of resources while minimizing negative effects on production and markets.<sup>20</sup>

#### **Internal coherence**

27 WFP policies, including its strategic objectives, are set out in its 2008-2011 strategic plan. The original project document for PRRO 10387.1 did not make specific reference to WFP's pre-2008 strategic objectives but the current strategic objectives are explicitly referenced in the revised logframe of May 2009. In this context it is worth noting that

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<sup>19</sup> In our experience this is a virtually universal practice for evaluations of this scale and scope.

<sup>20</sup> In relation to comments received on the first draft of this report, it may be worth highlighting the finding that these objectives are considered by the evaluation to be broadly appropriate in the context of the oPt, especially if the realities of high donor interest and comparatively good availability of funding (by global standards) are treated as fixed rather than as a variable aspects of the situation under reviews. These findings are elaborated in Section 3A of the report

WFP's global strategic objectives are not always well-adapted to conditions in the oPt. For example, the use of school attendance and retention rates are inappropriate indicators for the oPt where schooling is compulsory and rates are already commensurately high. The attempt to fit the May 2009 logframe into WFP's global framework has to an extent been at the expense of the internal coherence of the project itself. This is analysed further below in connection with the project logframes.

28 The PRRO is coherent with WFP policies relating to food-based safety nets, though it is argued later in the report that food vouchers are generally more efficient than food parcels, and that cash-based programmes may be more efficient than either. The programme is coherent with WFP policies on protection, though this aspect has not had a high profile. The PRRO is generally coherent with WFP humanitarian principles, though the political conditions imposed by donors, in practice, put the principle of impartiality under considerable pressure.

29 The project design had a bias in favour of productive activities and skills development - planned as 57 percent of the project. This is in line with WFP's livelihoods policy, which emphasizes the need to use food aid not only to save lives but also to mitigate the depletion of assets and to assist in the recovery of livelihoods. Given the growing impoverishment and chronic food insecurity in the oPt these objectives were broadly appropriate, though this report will argue that food aid is not generally the most efficient means of meeting them. The extent to which the project met its objectives in practice is discussed in later sections of the report.

30 The PRRO has been coherent with other WFP programmes in the oPt, since they have been broadly similar in objectives. They have comprised:

<b>Title</b>	<b>Period</b>	<b>WFP budget (US\$)</b>	<b>Beneficiaries and activities (planned)</b>
<b>Various</b>	Mar 91-Dec 96	US\$2.3m	Various
<b>5761</b>	Jan-Dec 97	US\$3.9m	Total 50,000 beneficiaries in Gaza, all MoSA social hardship cases
<b>Dev Proj 5474</b>	Oct 97-Sep 99	US\$7.8m	Total 64,800 beneficiaries in West Bank and Gaza: 57,000 MoSA special hardship cases, FFE 2,200, FFW 1,500
<b>PRRO 6214.0</b>	May 00-Apr 01	US\$2.7m	Total 104,000 beneficiaries: 100,000 MoSA special hardship cases and 4,000 institutional
<b>QAP 6276.0</b>	Dec 00-Nov 01	US\$2.7m	Total 47,360 beneficiaries, all FFW/FFT
<b>EMOP 10190.2</b>	Sept 04-Aug 05	US\$43m	Total 480,000 beneficiaries: MoSA social hardship cases + "new poor"
<b>PRRO 10387.0</b>	Sept 05-Aug 07	US\$81m (later revised to US\$103m)	Total 480,000 beneficiaries: MoSA 188,300 chronically poor and 10,600 institutional feeding; 281,100 FFW/FFT for new poor; support to olive producers
<b>PRRO 10387.1</b> <i>(subject of the evaluation; WB only from 2009)</i>	Sept 07 -Aug 09 (extended to June 2010)	US\$107m (later revised to US\$172m)	Total 665,000 beneficiaries: MoSA destitute and institutional feeding 188,000; vulnerable groups 75,000; FFW / FFT 189,000; FFE 90,000
<b>EMOP 10817.0</b>	Jan 09-Dec 10	US\$78m (for 2009)	365,000 beneficiaries (in 2009)
<b>SO 10815.0 (Gaza)</b>	Mid-Jan to end Dec 2009	US\$3.3m	Strengthening logistics coordination
<b>EMOP 10774.0 (West Bank)</b>	Sep 09-June 10	US\$6.7m	Pilot project to provide cash-based vouchers for 5,500 families

## External coherence

31 The PNA Ministry of Planning is responsible for coordinating all development assistance to the oPt. Given the protracted emergency in the oPt, the ministry also has an interest in humanitarian assistance. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the Ministry have made efforts in the last year to better coordinate the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) planning process with development planning and development assistance. At the level of implementation the PNA has more direct responsibility for the non-refugee population than for those with refugee status.

32 The Ministry of Planning has overall responsibility for preparation and implementation of the Palestine Reform and Development Plan (PRDP), which sets out the PNA's objectives and strategies for the period 2008-2011<sup>21</sup>. The objectives and the design of PRRO 10387.1 are broadly consistent with the PRDP, one of whose primary objectives is to provide social protection for those in need. Food aid however is not seen as playing a major role within the PRDP's approach to social protection, though it is a component of the Social Safety Nets Reform plan of the MoSA.

33 Specific project components are in line with the objectives of WFP's direct ministry counterparts. The Assistance to the Destitute component supports 51,000 households or almost 80 percent of MoSA's Social Hardship Cases. The pilot school feeding component is consistent with and supports the objectives of the Ministry of Education and Higher Education and its strategy on school health. FFW activities in agriculture are in line with MoA objectives for the agriculture sector

34 The PRRO is also coherent with impending reforms within the MoSA, notably the planned implementation of the World Bank-derived proxy means testing formula which will should define the Social Hardship Cases caseload to be supported with food by WFP in the extension of the PRRO from July 2010. The objective is to increase coherence, since the European Commission and the World Bank will have the same proxy means testing formula for the cash transfer component of the Social Protection Programme of the MoSA.<sup>22</sup>

35 The project design is related to and broadly in line with that of major donors. Most donor agencies have ongoing debates about the appropriateness of food aid in the current context of the oPt, and most support moves away from food aid towards alternative modes of relief and recovery assistance such as cash- and voucher-based schemes. WFP gradual moves in this direction are generally coherent with donor policies.<sup>23</sup>

36 Local and international NGOs and civil society organizations have a wide range of policies and perspectives making assessment of the coherence of the PRRO with them impractical, though the programme is coherent with (and related to) the policies of WFP's International non-governmental organization (NGO) partner agencies. Insofar as

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<sup>21</sup> The PRDP was preceded for the first period of PRRO 10387.1 by the MTDP: the Medium Term Development Plan.

<sup>22</sup> The current very complex picture with different categories of beneficiary in different types of programme receiving different categories of benefit from different donors according to different sets of procedures was cited by the MoSA during an evaluation interview as matter of particular concern. Expectations for a unified system are high, though its dependence on a unified database is probably a formula for, at the very least, substantial teething problems, and its implementation will require sweeping away a wide range of vested interests. The complexity of the benefits system and the very high numbers of beneficiaries greatly compounds the difficulties of economic and social research.

<sup>23</sup> Four of WFP's main donors were interviewed for the evaluation. The evaluation team also had wider knowledge, from previous experience, of donor policies and debates with regard to the oPt.

NGO and civil society organizations are often concerned with developmental or economically sustainable initiatives, coherence is limited.

37 Within the CAP the PRRO has generally been complementary though not particularly synergistic. The division between refugees and non-refugees creates a natural complementarity between WFP and UNRWA programmes in particular. Historically, for institutional reasons, coherence with UNRWA with regard to programming has been difficult to maintain though it has improved considerably in recent years, culminating in exceptional cooperation over a new programme targeting herders in the West Bank.<sup>24</sup> Cooperation has often been good at a logistical level. Duplication with other agencies involved in CAP is not a significant problem at a programming level; duplication with regard to beneficiaries is a significant longstanding problem, exacerbated by the complex status of beneficiaries (who may have refugees and non-refugees in the same families) and the complexity and variety of welfare and other entitlements and of the agencies administering them.

### **Project design**

38 There were no evaluations of PRRO 10387.0 nor of the WFP programmes that preceded it. However, the nutrition portfolio of PRRO 10387.0 was reviewed in 2006<sup>25</sup>. The review identified the main nutritional problem in the oPt as micro-nutrient deficiency and key recommendations included supporting the establishment of a nutrition surveillance system and introducing school feeding into the WFP programme. School feeding was also identified as a priority in the 2006 After Action Review, and was introduced on a pilot basis in PRRO 10387.1.

39 The After Action Review also identified the need to improve monitoring of the results of the different activities carried out under the PRRO, both in terms of strengthening the framework of indicators used and in terms of strengthening the skills of Food Monitors to fulfil their monitoring responsibilities. The country office has begun to address this need, with good results, though the evaluation has identified that monitoring and evaluation systems need to be strengthened further.

40 Other findings of the After Action Review relevant to project design were that targeting should be based on beneficiaries' socio-economic status and differentiated needs as identified in studies under way at the time<sup>26</sup>. Such targeting is appropriate, though delivery can be difficult to achieve. The After Action Review also recommended that a FSMS should be set up that would establish indicators for assessing the impact of the project from different types of intervention and that would more clearly identify people no longer in need of support and previously excluded people who should be included. The FSMS has been initiated through the WFP/FAO SEFSec that have been developed jointly by FAO, WFP and the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS). The targeting review commissioned by WFP in 2009 addresses the concern with inclusion errors.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> The collaboration was formalized through the signing of an official Memorandum of Understanding between WFP and UNRWA on joint assistance to marginalized communities (Herders / Bedouins) whose livelihood is in Area C of the West Bank

<sup>25</sup> Garzon, Cecilia. November 2006. oPt – A strategic review of the nutrition portfolio of activities PRRO 10387.0 (study commissioned by WFP)

<sup>26</sup> Relevant studies identified in the After Action Review included the Joint Food Security and Vulnerability Assessment for the West Bank and Gaza and the updating of the Coping Strategy Index Tool.

<sup>27</sup> Al Sahel Company for Institutional Development and Communications. 2009. Report of the Review of Targeting in the West Bank Under WFP's PRRO 10387.1

## Logical frameworks

41 Two logframes have been developed for PRRO 10387.1. They are appended as Annex 6. The original logframe contained in the project document was revised in 2009 to align it with WFP's revised global strategic objectives for 2008-2011. Neither the original nor the revised logframe offer a robust or coherent framework for monitoring the outcomes of the project, and they have not been used by WFP for this purpose. Similarly, the logframes did not provide a useful baseline for the evaluation in assessing the progress made in PRRO 10387.1 towards project outcomes.

42 The logframes have several weaknesses. First, the outcome indicators are impractical as a means of measuring the impact of project activities on people's well-being. In particular, the key indicator of the proportion of household expenditure devoted to food is unrealistic since this will be affected by many factors within the family and the wider economy, beyond the assistance provided through PRRO 10387.1. There is no simple or cost-effective way of separating out the specific contribution made by the PRRO to households' expenditure on food.

43 Second, the logframes lack a results chain that links the output indicators with the outcome indicators. Output level results and indicators are often little more than tonnages delivered and numbers of beneficiaries reached, with relatively few additional intermediate indicators that would allow a causal chain to outcomes to be established. Where intermediate indicators exist (for example, number of community assets created) they are only weakly linked to their respective outcomes and outcome indicators. This means that only very rough judgments about the possible impact of the interventions can be made, mostly through considering its economic value as welfare in the overall context of the oPt.<sup>28</sup>

44 The absence of a coherent results chain is partly explained by the difficulty of aligning programme objectives for the oPt with some of the WFP's global strategic objectives and their associated outcome indicators. A general consequence of this is that the PRRO's outputs and output indicators tend to be unduly generic rather than being properly rooted in the actual conditions that exist in the oPt. For example, the logframes contain no reference to local purchase of food and supplies, although this has been undertaken under the PRRO (even if to a fairly limited extent) because of its potentially beneficial impact on a local economy that is severely constrained by the closure regime. Similarly, baseline data from needs assessments in the oPt, which could have been used for monitoring purposes, have not been incorporated into logframes.

45 In developing the second logframe, efforts were made to root PRRO activities more appropriately within the oPt context. For example, school feeding was moved from a strategic objective concerned with encouraging school attendance to a strategic objective concerned with restoring and re-building livelihoods. This shift reflects the fact that education is compulsory in the oPt and school attendance is commensurately high. However, even though school feeding has now been identified as a support to livelihoods, school attendance has been retained as an outcome indicator, even though the influence of school snacks on attendance rates is insignificant compared to the legal requirement for parents to send their children to school.

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<sup>28</sup> With reference to OEDE comments received on the draft of this report, this does indeed mean that the impact of the PRRO on livelihoods and on food security cannot be assessed with any degree of precision. It would be impossible to separate the contribution of the programme to developments in food security or employment from a wide range of other contributing factors. It would require very detailed and sophisticated research to even begin to assess such impact; the logframe is impractical only for assuming that this can be accessed on the basis of very crude indicators.

46 Finally, there is a lack of clarity about why some activities are located under one strategic objective rather than another. For example, it is logical that in the second logframe Food For Work is identified as contributing to the restoration and re-building of livelihoods (current strategic objective 3) but it is then unclear why Food For Training, which addresses similar concerns, is identified as helping to reduce chronic hunger and under-nutrition (current strategic objective 4).<sup>29</sup>

### **Appropriateness of planned activities**

47 In general terms WFP interventions as planned in the PRRO have been broadly appropriate, since the economic and food security situations justify relief and recovery interventions.<sup>30</sup> The initial bias towards recovery interventions (57 per cent of the total) was also appropriate, though this was not met in practice.<sup>31</sup>

48 WFP took care to promote research which would indicate the extent to which interventions were appropriately targeted. However methodological weaknesses in the principal study of targeting (which looked only at existing beneficiaries rather than the population as a whole) gave a misleading assessment of the effectiveness of targeting.

49 Schemes providing relief or recovery assistance by means of food vouchers or cash are generally much more appropriate as well as more efficient than those based on food parcels, especially in a sophisticated environment such as the oPt. This was not reflected in PRRO plans, but has been recognized in initiatives developed by WFP during the course of the PRRO. These issues are also discussed further in Section 2.

50 The main reason for the comparative inefficiency of meeting relief and recovery needs through food parcels, as opposed to alternatives such as food vouchers or cash, relates to the costs of importing, transporting and distributing food. With voucher or cash schemes food is distributed through market mechanisms and the overhead costs - apart from management costs - disappear.<sup>32</sup> Risks of disruption and delay are also eliminated. In addition - though this is not central to the analysis - the means of delivering food at beneficiary level can be more practical, effective and dignified, though they still require careful management.

51 WFP documents emphasize the central importance of Israeli policy in relation to food security in the oPt. Yet the conclusions sometimes drawn from this with regard to factors affecting the security of the food supply, and the presumed consequent need for food aid, do not generally follow.

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<sup>29</sup> The discontinued Life Skills project had a nutritional objective as it was designed to address micronutrient deficiencies such as anaemia and to promote exclusive breastfeeding.

<sup>30</sup> If international comparisons are made with acute emergencies in Darfur and elsewhere this argument is undoubtedly difficult to sustain. If there was a clear alternative between spending resources in Palestine and in other parts of the world, the case for Palestine, on strictly humanitarian grounds, would be comparatively weak. This however is not really the case. Donor funding is available for the oPt because of the political situation in Israel/Palestine. It seems more realistic to accept this as a given, and focus on how funds can best be spent, than to focus on global comparisons.

<sup>31</sup> In this connection it is worth pointing out the PNA Ministry of Planning acknowledges that the number of people in need of social protection continues to rise. However, ministry representatives also expressed concern that the number of humanitarian interventions, their cost, and their preponderance over more recovery-oriented or sustainable interventions are rising even faster. The same representatives also expressed the view that humanitarian assistance has become over-institutionalised within the oPt, with donors giving insufficient consideration to meeting needs through activities that are aimed at recovery rather than at simply providing relief.

<sup>32</sup> The implications of evaluation findings for food aid food parcel programmes generated more stakeholder comments than any other issue. We have consequently clarified and, expanded our findings on this issue, and have present them in this section in consolidated form.

52 Both the West Bank and Gaza are large net importers of food, especially grain. In the oPt, and of course in Israel, the economic infrastructure and capacity is more than adequate for market mechanisms to operate satisfactorily. The only significant inhibiting factor is the Israeli policy of blockade and closure. In other words Israeli policies are the central variable with regard to food supply parameters. As WFP research shows, virtually all categories of food have remained available on the market - even in Gaza, where restriction on the import of other goods has been extremely high. The availability of food was fully restored within two or three weeks of “Operation Cast Lead” even though pricing was volatile. Unless Israeli policy were to move to a different level, the problem is not the availability of food but whether vulnerable people have reached the level of impoverishment where they can no longer afford to buy food and other necessities and therefore require assistance. Whether this assistance comes as cash, food, vouchers or indeed any other valuable or exchangeable commodity is of little relevance with regard to the benefits bestowed and received.<sup>33</sup>

53 The relevance and desirability of the provision of different forms of basic humanitarian assistance (e.g. food parcels, food vouchers, cash) relates therefore to their comparative feasibility and effectiveness. Market mechanisms distribute food for purchase by vouchers or cash, thereby removing a high proportion of the overall costs of delivery, i.e. those costs relating to transportation, importation and delivery. Market mechanisms also avoid the risks of delay or disruption in the supply chain (which in the circumstances of the PRRO have been considerable).

54 If Israeli policy were to move to a new and even more draconian level, which is entirely within Israeli capacity but which may not be within Israeli intentions given the consequences which would ensue, the problem could not be significantly addressed by increasing the availability of humanitarian food aid, nor even by other external interventions intended to influence the market availability of food, since the Israelis would remain in a position to calibrate their response to such developments and to maintain or disrupt the food supply to any degree they considered appropriate to their objectives. The only real solution in those circumstances would be to persuade Israel to change its policy.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> In the aftermath of some emergencies there is concern that even though purchasing power exists or has been restored, money is misspent before the food needs of families are met (e.g. paradigmatically by male heads of household on tobacco or alcohol etc). Although example could no doubt be found, and there may be a need for further research, this does not appear to be a significant problem in the oPt.

<sup>34</sup> A useful way of illustrating this question is to reflect on the consequences of a hypothetical situation in which the Israelis allowed only humanitarian food aid into the oPt whilst cutting off commercial grain supplies and other imported food. The consequences would be far worse than the curtailment of food aid. If vulnerable people retain their purchasing power, by whatever means, including welfare payments in cash or kind, they will be able to feed themselves and their families. If they lose this purchasing power, for whatever reasons, they will not be able to do so. The curtailment of food aid does not cause deterioration if there is an adequate substitution for the economic value it represents. In general the substitutions, though presenting their own challenges, are more effective and efficient options. It is sometimes argued that the Israelis would privilege humanitarian food supplies, and possibly even UN supplies specifically, *vis a vis* commercial or other supplies. However there is no guarantee of this, and there are a range of economic, logistical and security reasons why Israel might prioritize commercial supplies.. Moreover if the UN (in this hypothetical model) were to become the principal overall supplier of food to the oPt it would be in an invidious position, since its interventions would appear to be more closely linked to big power and/or Israeli policies rather than to its core humanitarian mandate. More plausibly it can be argued that Israeli policy can be influenced by UN lobbying, and indeed that such lobbying helped to restore food supplies more quickly than would otherwise have happened following the December 08 / January 09 conflict in Gaza. Hopefully this was indeed a contributing factor, though the weight assigned to all the factors involved in such Israeli decisions would merit a study of its own.

55 Similarly, market volatility may have a variety of causes and can affect the pricing (and so affordability) of food. However in the circumstances of the oPt, market mechanisms - though distorted by the policies of blockade and closure - do not in themselves restrict the availability of food.<sup>35</sup> The Israeli government will still be able to calibrate its response to economic volatility and calibrate the food supply situation accordingly.

56 We appreciate that these can be uncomfortable conclusions for WFP, which is centrally involved with the provision of food aid. We are fully aware that these considerations do not apply in many of the places where WFP works, where underlying market mechanisms are unable to maintain food supplies, and where the purchasing power of vulnerable people may be a great deal worse even than in the oPt. We also appreciate that wholesale replacement of food parcels cannot and should not be done precipitately and would need to be negotiated with a wide range of stakeholders. However there is a need for realism about the reasons for the poor food security situation in the oPt if rational responses are to be developed, and that as evaluators we have a responsibility to present these as objectively as possible.

57 To point to the comparative inefficiency of food parcels is emphatically not to underestimate the growing impoverishment and humanitarian needs of large and growing numbers of vulnerable people in the oPt. Food parcels should only be phased down when alternative means of providing such support are in place. The key issue is not the availability of food - since if it becomes unavailable this will not be because of supply problems but because of calibrated Israeli policies - but of addressing the consequences of the needs of the vulnerable population in the most practical and effective manner.

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<sup>35</sup> This is not of course the case in most of the countries or situations where WFP works,. It may also be true that market mechanisms are unable to work adequately in some isolated villages in the West Bank, e.g. some of those cut off by the separation barrier.



## 2.B Outputs and implementation processes<sup>36</sup>

58 The numbers of planned versus actual beneficiaries for each programme activity and for each year of the programme are shown in the table below.

Comparison of planned versus actual beneficiary numbers for PRRO 10387.1, 2007 – 2009									
	Planned			Actual			Actual versus planned		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male (%)	Female (%)	Total (%)
<b>September – December 2007</b>									
Number of children below 5 years of age	61,412	60,422	121,834	11,712	11,047	22,759	19	18	19
Number of children 5 to 18 years of age	100,041	100,412	200,453	63,692	62,565	126,257	64	62	63
Number of adults	165,517	177,196	342,713	42,683	53,402	96,085	26	30	28
<b>Total number of beneficiaries in 2007</b>	<b>326,970</b>	<b>338,030</b>	<b>665,000</b>	<b>118,087</b>	<b>127,014</b>	<b>245,101</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>37</b>
Beneficiaries of GFD	137,000	149,000	286,000	89,360	98,287	187,647	65	66	66
Children receiving school meals	45,000	45,000	90,000	28,727	28,727	57,454	63	64	64
Participants in FFW (x6 for beneficiaries)	19,000	5,000	24,000	0	0	0	0	0	0
Participants in FFT (x6 for beneficiaries)	7,000	17,000	24,000	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>January – December 2008</b>									
Number of children below 5 years of age	61,412	60,422	121,834	56,235	53,898	110,133	92	89	90
Number of children 5 to 18 years of age	100,041	100,412	200,453	149,786	143,547	293,333	150	143	146
Number of adults	165,517	177,196	342,713	139,999	139,510	279,509	85	79	82
<b>Total number of beneficiaries in 2008</b>	<b>326,970</b>	<b>338,030</b>	<b>665,000</b>	<b>346,020</b>	<b>336,955</b>	<b>682,975</b>	<b>106</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>103</b>
Beneficiaries of GFD	137,000	149,000	286,000	210,455	204,344	414,799	154	137	145
Children receiving school meals	45,000	45,000	90,000	29,209	28,288	57,497	65	63	64
Participants in FFW (x6 for beneficiaries)	19,000	5,000	24,000	16,287	357	16,644	86	7	69
Participants in FFT (x6 for beneficiaries)	7,000	17,000	24,000	30	9,171	9,201	0.4	54	38

<sup>36</sup> The distinction between “Outputs” (Section 2B) and “Results” (Section 2C) could generate repetition. We have included more detailed analysis in Section 2C rather than 2B. Arguably this could have been the other way round - this is OEDE’s interpretation of the report template - but the overall analysis the same.

Comparison of planned versus actual beneficiary numbers for PRRO 10387.1, 2007 – 2009									
	Planned			Actual			Actual versus planned		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male (%)	Female (%)	Total (%)
<b>January – December 2009</b>									
Number of children below 5 years of age	29,973	28,041	57,414	42,994	41,552	84,546	146	148	147
Number of children 5 to 18 years of age	79,935	76,402	156,337	101,039	96,167	197,206	126	126	126
Number of adults	100,496	98,753	199,249	87,266	86,429	173,695	87	88	87
<b>Total number of beneficiaries in 2009</b>	<b>209,804</b>	<b>203,196</b>	<b>413,000</b>	<b>231,299</b>	<b>224,148</b>	<b>455,447</b>	<b>110</b>	<b>110</b>	<b>110</b>
Beneficiaries of GFD	122,014	118,170	240,184	158,915	145,423	304,338	130	123	127
Children receiving school meals	30,589	33,085	63,674	30,570	33,100	63,670	99.9	100	99.9
Participants in FFW (x6 for beneficiaries)	5,576	3,118	8,694	5,577	3,117	8,694	100	100	100
Participants in FFT (x6 for beneficiaries)	5,576	3,118	8,694	5,577	3,117	8,694	100	100	100

<b>Comparison of planned versus actual beneficiary numbers for PRRO 10387.1, 2007 – 2009</b>									
	<b>Planned</b>			<b>Actual</b>			<b>Actual versus planned</b>		
	<b>Male</b>	<b>Female</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>Male</b>	<b>Female</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>Male (%)</b>	<b>Female (%)</b>	<b>Total (%)</b>
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Children receiving school meals	45,000	45,000	90,000	28,727	28,727	57,454	63	64	64
Participants in FFW (x6 for beneficiaries)	19,000	5,000	24,000	0	0	0	0	0	0
Participants in FFT (x6 for beneficiaries)	7,000	17,000	24,000	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>January – December 2008</b>									
Number of children below 5 years of age	61,412	60,422	121,834	56,235	53,898	110,133	92	89	90
Number of children 5 to 18 years of age	100,041	100,412	200,453	149,786	143,547	293,333	150	143	146
Number of adults	165,517	177,196	342,713	139,999	139,510	279,509	85	79	82
<b>Total number of beneficiaries in 2008</b>	<b>326,970</b>	<b>338,030</b>	<b>665,000</b>	<b>346,020</b>	<b>336,955</b>	<b>682,975</b>	<b>106</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>103</b>
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Children receiving school meals	30,589	33,085	63,674	30,570	33,100	63,670	99.9	100	99.9
Participants in FFW (x6 for beneficiaries)	5,576	3,118	8,694	5,577	3,117	8,694	100	100	100
Participants in FFT (x6 for beneficiaries)	5,576	3,118	8,694	5,577	3,117	8,694	100	100	100

59 As indicated, PRRO 10387.1 planned to provide 57 percent of assistance through recovery activities and 43 percent of assistance through relief activities. The table shows that, in practice, relief activities were in the majority in each of the years of the PRRO. To summarize by year:

**2007:**

- relief activities comprised 77 percent of the total and recovery activities 23 percent;
- the only recovery activities were in school feeding; no FFW or FFT activities were implemented.

**2008:**

- relief activities comprised 83 percent of the total and recovery activities 17 percent;
- there was an increase of 45 percent in the planned numbers of beneficiaries; this was due to a rise in the number of Social Hardship Cases registered with the MoSA in the West Bank, and for similar reasons in Gaza;
- no FFW, FFT or school feeding activities were carried out in Gaza.

**2009:**

- relief activities comprised 81 percent of the total and recovery activities 19 percent;
- school feeding was carried out in Gaza, but no FFW or FFT activities were implemented;
- planning figures for FFW and FFT were revised down from the 2007 and 2008 targets of 24,000 each to 8,694 each.

60 The data made available to the evaluation do not allow the total number of beneficiaries of General Food Distribution to be disaggregated by category of beneficiary.<sup>37</sup>

61 The main factors for the differences between what was planned and what was implemented were shortfalls in funding, the constraints of working in Gaza, difficulties generated by the requirements of political vetting, and problems with two particular shipments of wheat flour.<sup>38</sup> In the latter part of 2007 delays in food distribution were also because of strikes by PNA employees and the Ramadan holiday.

62 In terms of the gender distribution of beneficiaries and activities, WFP data show that the main difference between planned and actual occurred in the FFW and FFT activities during 2008. The gender focus of PRRO 10387.1 is discussed in sections 2C Results (FFW and FFT) and 2D: Cross-Cutting Issues.

## **Logistics, pipeline and procurement**

63 Assessment of logistics and procurement aspects, including consideration of implementation mechanisms and service delivery, comprised a major component of the evaluation. The prescribed report template meant that detailed findings on logistics and

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<sup>37</sup> This was recognized as a significant weakness. On the initiative of the OE further requests were made for such data: please see Annex D.

<sup>38</sup> The problems with particular shipments are described in Annex A.

procurement could not be accommodated within the main body of this report and can be found in Annex B. These findings are of equivalent significance to those in the main body of the report and should be read concurrently. Only a summary of these findings is presented here.

64 The fundamental problem for logistics in the oPt is access. The problems in many WFP emergencies of lack of transport, poor roads, fuel etc are not issues in the well-developed infrastructure environment of Israel and the oPt. Making logistics more effective is largely a question of dealing with closure rather than being a question of capacity.

65 Supply corridors to the oPt are limited. Direct delivery to Gaza by sea is not permitted by Israel and there are no airports in operation. Overland transport from Jordan, would be feasible, but it is slow and costly because of limited terminal capacity, severe security requirements and pressure from commercial cargo. The cargo and passenger terminal in *Rafah* on the border between Egypt and Gaza, closed for most of the year for political reasons, has not been a valid alternative with the exception of limited quantities arriving via El Arish in Egypt during Operation Lifeline Gaza.

66 WFP has no choice but to rely on international shipments through the Israeli container port of Ashdod or on local purchase in Israel or the oPt. Local purchase is enthusiastically pursued but severely restricted.

67 Israel entirely controls the type and quantity of commodities allowed into the oPt and the period under review has seen increasing restrictions on movement into, out of and between the fragmented components of the oPt. This has been particularly true in Gaza which has been subjected to virtual blockade since June 2007.

68 As a result of the blockade WFP's transport from Ashdod to Gaza has suffered further delays and additional costs. In 2008 the number of crossing points into the West Bank was reduced but West Bank crossings were not subjected to the back-to-back inspections demanded for Gaza crossings. WFP cargoes into Gaza are now only allowed through one crossing, at *Kerem Shalom* on the border point of Israel, Gaza and Egypt.

69 WFP delivers to the CP warehouses and CPs are then responsible for distribution under Field Level Agreements (FLAs) that share logistics costs. Delays in final distribution were caused by a combination of problems including the availability and quality of wheat flour, security factors and closure.

70 The country office has developed a strong supply chain (combining pipeline, logistics and procurement) supported by comprehensive office systems and very capable staff. However, in addition to the unavoidable delays and high costs as a result of closure, the entire supply chain has been disrupted by a series of problems, very largely outside the control of the country office, over the timing of delivery and over the quality of wheat flour for two major donations, one in-kind and one a regional purchase. This along with decreases in donor funding led to a financial crisis in the second quarter of 2008 which resulted in staff lay-offs and a reduction in programme implementation, especially in FFW and FFT. Funding was in fact quite quickly and successfully restored, not least as a result of successful advocacy, but it took longer for staff levels to be restored, and the overall impact on the programme, including CP finances, was significant .

71 Distribution delays have also been a result of meeting donor restrictions on operations. These restrictions oblige the country office to operate four pipelines - US and non-US for both the West Bank and Gaza - and expend a disproportionate amount of staff time on dealing with these restrictions, and distribution delays whilst beneficiary

lists are “cleaned” of people who fall foul of political restrictions as well as those considered ineligible for other reasons.

72 Fortunately staffing levels and stock levels were restored before the conflict in Gaza at the end of 2008, allowing the country office, supported by an emergency team and a Logistics Cluster, to respond effectively to the situation.

73 Before distributing rations CPs normally wait for the availability of wheat flour (the most important commodity in the food parcel) in order to distribute as complete a ration as possible, so when wheat flour deliveries were delayed so were all ration distributions. Two cycles of distribution of the US pipeline were missed in early 2008 and one cycle of non-US distribution was missed in early 2009.

74 The oPt is dependent on imports of food, the availability and price of which are controlled by Israel.<sup>39</sup> Virtually all wheat grain is imported. However there is milling capacity for wheat in the West Bank and even greater capacity to mill in Gaza, and although movement of commodities between the two areas is prohibited under the closure regime WFP has taken advantage of this capacity. The country office has developed a policy, of purchasing locally where possible and practical, even if the local element is only in processing. This is now particularly successful in an arrangement in the West Bank, by which WFP imports grain for milling and in exchange for the grain takes delivery of milled, fortified, bagged wheat. This arrangement has a modest impact on the oPt economy and overcomes the shelf-life and quality issues that have disrupted distribution efforts. Innovative swaps of commodities for bread through bakeries and for school feeding allow the reliable delivery of fresh commodities as well as overcoming the intricacies of large numbers of very small scale deliveries. The evaluation supports these initiatives even when there is a premium in terms of overall cost.

75 Although there are extra costs in local procurement of some items this is partly offset by suppliers delivering to CPs. This relieves the country office of considerable management and logistics burdens, particularly in the case of school feeding and bread delivery.

76 Despite the initiative taken by the country office distribution levels have been well below those originally planned. However this has primarily resulted from the multiple resource problems faced in the course of the PRRO. Pipeline management handled the difficulties of resource availability very well, local procurement initiatives maximized the limited opportunities available as well as helping to overcome the key problem of the timely availability of wheat flour and the intricate demands of even the pilot school feeding scheme. The logistics department has functioned well in an environment subject to frequent disruptions.

77 Total distribution of all commodities in all pipelines has averaged 4,200 mt out of a planned 5,200 mt per month over the course of the PRRO and the EMOP up to August 2009. 10,000 mt was moved into Gaza in January and 11,000mt in February during Operation Lifeline Gaza.

78 To clarify the narrative of the difficulties faced by the country office in its supply chain and its attempts to deal with them, the following table gives the approximate timing of selected events which have had an impact on distribution. Details of these events are described in Annex B. The first four months and the last two months of the PRRO are not

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<sup>39</sup> As discussed elsewhere in relation to food security, Israeli policy has not been to restrict the overall import of food to the West Bank and Gaza, nor to prevent the import of specific categories of food, but its control produces elements of market distortion which are generally designed to favour Israeli producers. For Gaza food and medicines are the only categories of goods where Israel has not allowed shortages to develop.

included because they did not have short term events; the long term problems, as indicated, continued throughout the PRRO.

Supply chain chronology																				
YEAR													2 0 0 8				2 0 0 9			
MONTH	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D	J	F	M	A	M	J		
Event																				
Gaza access restrictions	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
Compensating increase in ITSH	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
Donor distribution restrictions	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
Operation of four pipelines	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
Forecasted contributions lowered	X																			
Wheat flour shelf life issue			X	X	X	X														
Reduction of number crossings into West Bank				X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
Introduction of back-to-back transshipment for Gaza				X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
Withdrawal of a donor contribution				X																
Financial crisis			X	X	X	X														
Staff cutbacks			X	X																
Cutbacks FFW and GF distribution			X	X	X	X	X	X												
CERF grant						X														
Reconfirmation of forecasted contributions						X														
Major ' Global Price Hike' contribution							X													
Re-hiring of some staff									X	X										
Move from 2 to 3 mth cycle of distribution										X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
Reinstate FFW and GF									X	X										
Rebuilding stocks								X	X	X	X	X								
<b>Operation Cast Lead</b>													X	X						
Wheat flour quality issue																X	X	X		

## Targeting

79 The planned targeting of beneficiaries by category and need was broadly appropriate, though as noted there were significant shortfalls in what could actually be achieved and in the overall balance between relief and recovery activities. Targeting by institution, when applicable, was also broadly appropriate.<sup>40</sup> In practice the main responsibility for targeting has been with the MoSA and the CPs.

80 The targeting by category of beneficiary has shown mixed results This is not an easy area to research or monitor given that recipients may understandably have strong vested interests in presenting a picture about their benefits and their eligibility for them that maximizes the potential for benefits being taken up or continued. It is also inevitable, especially in current circumstances, that humanitarian targeting will be distorted to some degree by political factors.<sup>41</sup> Research on this issue produces apparently very

<sup>40</sup> In the case of schools this has been uncertain in relation to stated objectives; this issue is discussed below

<sup>41</sup> The political restrictions imposed by donors in themselves make this inevitable, though they are not the only factors.

contradictory results (see below). It is not surprising that targeting in the oPt is very far from being an exact science

81 WFP has taken the issue seriously, notably commissioning a Review of Targeting for the PRRO in the West Bank. The review shows extremely high correlations (often 100 per cent) between beneficiaries and their eligibility for benefits. There were however very significant problems with the methodology used. In part these relate to biases in the responses of informants.<sup>42</sup> More seriously, by focusing on existing beneficiaries, the study failed to capture the extent to which people who were not receiving benefits should have been doing so. It is impossible to get an overview of the success of targeting without such information.

82 The SEFSec for Gaza commissioned by FAO and WFP provides a better indication of the extent of difficulties with targeting.<sup>43</sup> The survey finds that 16 per cent of the food insecure, who are the principal target group for WFP and UNRWA, do not get any assistance. Since the food insecure are 61 per cent of the population, this means that at least 9 per cent of the overall population are not receiving assistance when they should be. On the other hand 46 per cent of the least disadvantaged group, the food secure, who are only 17 per cent of the population, do get assistance.<sup>44</sup> So according to SEFSec figures 9 per cent of the overall population of Gaza, all of them food insecure, do not receive any humanitarian assistance at all. The figure for those entitled to but not receiving WFP or UNRWA food aid, the largest but by no means the only category of humanitarian assistance at the time of the research, must be significantly higher, since WFP and UNRWA food aid is targeted at all those families categorized as food insecure. In addition there must be at least some amongst the 40 per cent of the population not classified as food insecure who are not receiving benefits to which they are nevertheless entitled. If SEFSec figures are correct they mean that significantly over 10 per cent of the population are not receiving benefits to which they are entitled.

83 Since according to the same analysis 80 per cent of the population of Gaza receive benefits of one form or another, more than half of the 20 per cent who do not receive any humanitarian assistance at all should in fact be doing so. In these circumstances it is also reasonable to assume that a significant number of the 80 per cent who do receive benefits should not be doing so, though it is impossible to put a figure on this. Even allowing for limitations in SEFSec methodology, the implications of their analysis is striking. They also highlight the limitations in the methodology of the West Bank Targeting Review.

84 The SEFSec analysis does not disaggregate the comparative effectiveness of UNRWA and WFP/MoSA targeting, nor the type of benefit received, but even if these factors are significant they would not begin to account for the limitations in targeting described.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> The main limitations are for the reasons indicated in the previous paragraph. The director of the consultancy firm who undertook the review himself emphasized these limitations, unprompted, during an interview with members of the evaluation team.

<sup>43</sup> The SEFSec for the West Bank was published in August 2009, based on research in January and February. The SEFSec for Gaza was published in October 2009, based on research undertaken in April and June.

<sup>44</sup> For the intermediate groups, 58 per cent of those defined as “vulnerable” (who comprise 16 per cent of the population) and 50 per cent of the “marginally secure” (who comprise 6 per cent) do get assistance. This shows that assistance to the three groups in the better off 40 per cent of the population – i.e. all those people who are not classified as food insecure - does not vary very much (from 46 to 58 per cent) although the vulnerability between these groups varies considerably.

<sup>45</sup> It is very important that this lack of disaggregation is not used to suggest that a radical distinction between targeting by WFP and UNRWA explains the SEFSec findings. The evaluation has not been able to assess UNRWA targeting or targeting claims, but even if WFP targeting was much superior to UNRWA targeting (a hypothesis for which we have no evidence either way) this would not explain the SEFSec findings. The



Unfortunately the West Bank SEFSec does not have a comparable analysis, but it would be surprising if an approximately comparable situation did not pertain.<sup>46</sup> Overall the analysis indicates considerable limitations in the correlation of needs with benefits.<sup>47</sup>

### **Monitoring and evaluation**

85 For the reasons given above, the logframes used for this PRRO have not provided an appropriate framework for tracking progress towards outcomes.

86 Nevertheless, with the Results-Based Monitoring Tool-kit that is now in use, WFP has developed a potentially powerful resource to understand the operation of its programmes and their results. The tool-kit and its associated database needs some fine-tuning but has the potential to generate a wealth of information for managing programmes, for learning lessons and for informing future programme design. For example, in relation to FFW, the database contains information with the potential to provide an overall picture of participants' perceptions of the adequacy of the technical and other support provided by CPs and of their perceptions of the benefits of and equity in the assets created (both community and household). Information of this type is valuable not only in informing WFP about the effectiveness of its support to livelihood recovery in the oPt but also about the competence of its CPs, at least as perceived by beneficiaries.

87 There appear to be two major weaknesses with how monitoring for results has been carried out over the recent period.

88 First, the quality of the information being inputted into the database needs to be improved. Most of the results-oriented information is gathered by FMAs who have little or no previous experience of collecting information of this type. Much of the information that they are required to collect is qualitative and based on the perceptions of beneficiaries or other stakeholders, such as teachers. Such qualitative perceptions are a valid source of information but considerable skill is required to elicit perceptions that are reliable, impartial and representative. The FMAs need training in the skills of asking questions in neutral ways that do not just provoke "correct" answers, and in recording and analysing answers to provide credible and utilizable qualitative information. In addition, monitoring visits have tended to be somewhat irregular and ad hoc, although the country office is now introducing procedures to ensure that visits are more

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important methodological point is that the random sampling of SEFSec, even if also accompanied by respondent misinformation and/or other methodological limitations, produces a much less systematic bias than the reliance on beneficiary interviews of the Targeting Review. The 100 per cent correlations in the latter are themselves an indication of this methodological weakness. With reference to a query made by OEDE on the first draft of this report, it is impossible to put a percentage figure on the probable errors - to do so would only compound the mistaken assumption that such research has been (or easily could be) done with any accuracy. The important point is to recognize that reliance on straightforward questionnaires on these issues when respondents have strong vested interests and decades of dealing with access to benefits is inevitably going to influence results. More recent concerns that beneficiaries will be subjected to political vetting have considerably compounded the difficulties of obtaining objective information.

<sup>46</sup> Evaluation findings on targeting supersede the preliminary findings presented at debriefings at the end of the field work. Subsequent documentary study indicated that targeting was much less effective than is indicated by an initial reading of the Targeting Review. (The review was finalized during the course of the evaluation, though based on field work undertaken in 2008.) That the correlation between needs and beneficiaries is not very strong is confirmed by impressions gained during interviews with beneficiaries. It is also worth noting the ongoing debate about definitions of vulnerability and food insecurity, and their relationship to each other and to factors such as family indebtedness (which is estimated to affect half the population of the West Bank). The Targeting Review attempts to tackle these issues without reaching firm conclusions.

<sup>47</sup> The findings are of less significance in relation to beneficiaries in institutions, including schools.

systematic and regular. When these procedures are in place, it should be possible to reduce the actual number of monitoring visits that FMAs are required to make. At present, it is possible that too much information is being collected too often, and that this is at the expense of the quality of information and analysis.

89 The FMAs are also required to assess aspects of the project for which they may not have the technical competence, for example, the technical standard and likely sustainability of structures completed through FFW. Where possible the qualitative assessments made by FMAs through stakeholder interviews should be complemented by independent assessments (for example, technical assessments of a sample of completed works).

90 Second, the outputs from the database are still a long way from being utilised to their full potential. A positive step has been taken by WFP programme staff who now formally review the monthly monitoring analyses produced by the Programme Support Unit to assess their implications for programming. However, communication between programme staff and programme support staff could be strengthened to ensure that the monthly analyses are designed and presented in such a way as to encourage programme learning and inform programme adjustments. Programme staff and programme support staff should also regularly review what periodic reports may be needed to assist in assessing past work and planning future work. For example, information in the database on participants' perceptions of CPs and the results of FFW activities would be a valuable input into the design of future activities of this type.

91 None of WFP's NGO partners has dedicated M & E staff and none has carried out an evaluation of their WFP-supported programmes. Because programme agreements are negotiated on an annual basis, because there has been uncertainty from year to year about whether FFW and FFT activities would be included, and because the NGOs are effectively sub-contracted by WFP to implement these programmes, there has been limited incentive for the NGOs concerned to invest in systems that would evaluate the results of the WFP-funded programmes. The NGOs interviewed for the evaluation did, however, express interest in being involved if WFP were to organise systematic reviews of what was achieved, problems encountered and how different aspects of planning and implementation could be improved. This could possibly be done through a regular joint reflection with WFP and other stakeholders.

### **Adaptation to changing needs**

92 The conflict in Gaza provided the main change in circumstances during the PRRO. WFP's generally successful and appropriate response is described in Annex B. Other changes have resulted from the political restrictions imposed by donors and discussed elsewhere; difficulties in adapting to them are intrinsic, and through no fault of WFP cannot always be overcome.<sup>48</sup>

### **Partnerships, coordination and transfer of competencies**

93 Donor suspension of support to the PNA after the 2006 elections meant that WFP was unable to pursue initiatives to strengthen the capacity of PNA partners to manage food aid programmes. After mid-2007, under PRRO 10387, this constraint no longer applied in the West Bank but continued to limit collaboration with authorities in Gaza.

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<sup>48</sup> In the opinion of the evaluators the switch from a PRRO to an EMOP was fully justified. The fact that in part this was determined by pragmatic factors relating to fundraising in our view only adds to this justification. (This footnote was added in response to a query from OEDE.)

94 The main focus of WFP's capacity building initiatives has been on improving the efficiency of partners through providing training on compliance with WFP guidelines for programmes in FFW, FFT and assistance to vulnerable groups. WFP also provided guidance on USAID guidelines and restrictions. MoSA, MoA, CRS and CHF staff were trained in warehouse management. Additional training was provided in programme implementation, donor relations, and monitoring. This last area of training aimed to enhance the inputting of data to the monitoring and evaluation database.

95 Through the SEFSec, WFP and FAO are supporting PCBS and developing a sustainable FSMS. Such a monitoring system – which aims to produce timely and comprehensive data and to capture trends over time – will be institutionalized within the regular Palestinian statistics information system.

96 Outside the PRRO, WFP is supporting the MoEHE and the pilot school feeding project by commissioning a consultancy to assist the ministry to develop its policies and strategies for school feeding with a view to institutionalising school feeding under the ministry. This is a useful addition to the school feeding pilot project. It will be important for the consultancy to consider the budgetary and resourcing implications of the ministry's longer-term intention to scale up the pilot project.

### **Internal institutional arrangements**

97 The country office is adequately staffed with 94 staff appropriately deployed in East Jerusalem, Gaza City, Hebron in the West Bank, Nablus in the West Bank and Ashdod port. There are seven international staff, two international consultants, and 85 local staff. With 8 National Officers the country office is strong in experienced and long term senior local staffing.<sup>49</sup>

98 The country office is vulnerable to the likelihood of cuts in DSC to an already limited DSC budget, due to the extension of the PRRO without further commitments.

99 The financial crisis led to staff reductions of around 50 per cent in March and April 2008 and numbers stayed down until September/October when some were rehired in the renewed expansion. The budget cuts in 2008 impacted most severely on the lower paid staff.

100 Senior staff, experienced in emergency coordination, logistics and civil/military coordination, strengthened by stand-by partners, were brought in temporarily for Operation Lifeline Gaza and WFP took charge of the Logistics Cluster, reflecting well on the Emergency Response Training programme

101 The country office has effective links between offices in the oPt and with the Regional Bureau and Rome.

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<sup>49</sup> This assessment has a comparative component, i.e. it relates to WFP resources normally deployed, in which one member of the evaluation team had considerable experience. It is nevertheless a fairly general finding, a detailed management review being beyond the scope of the evaluation. The finding does not in itself have implications for WFP performance, a much wider component of evaluation findings. The PNA expressed to the evaluators the view that there are unduly high levels of international staffing (and costs) for the aid community in the oPt. We do not think WFP necessarily employs too many international staff, though clearly relevant experience and capacity to understand a complex and exceptional environment are at a premium. Although not in itself a guarantee of improved performance, we believe that WFP should put greater emphasis on recruiting Arabic-speaking international staff, despite the difficulties of doing so with an office and much else under Israeli jurisdiction.

## Finance and cost efficiency<sup>50</sup>

102 The PRRO was adequately funded in the early months, gaining pledges of 39 per cent of its two-year budget by November 2007. This, together with a loan from the Working Capital Fund (WCF), established a solid pipeline, though closure restrictions delayed work in Gaza in the early months of the project. By February 2008 further funding had not been pledged and at that point the first wheat flour problem (see below) led to the withdrawal of some funds that had been. Funding commitments dropped back to 34 per cent generating a financial crisis. In fact this was substantially resolved by the middle of the year, sooner than the country office had anticipated, and by the end of the year, just before the Gaza incursion, nearly 60 per cent had been pledged against the budget, a reasonably viable situation given the under-spend by then.

103 The following table summarizes donor contributions to the PRRO, updated to December 2009.<sup>51</sup>

<b>U.S. Dollars</b>		
168,217,123		
<b>Donor</b>	<b>Confirmed (US\$)</b>	<b>% of Required</b>
Australia	1,611,688	0.96%
Austria	562,524	0.33%
Belgium	1,995,338	1.19%
Canada	4,447,475	2.64%
Cyprus	340,237	0.20%
European Commission	29,670,046	17.64%
France	3,800,824	2.26%
Germany	2,365,931	1.41%
Greece	155,763	0.09%
Italy	11,006,290	6.54%
Japan	4,466,077	2.65%
Netherlands	1,351,000	0.80%
Norway	1,242,662	0.74%
Private Donors	111,152	0.07%
Russian Federation	4,093,458	2.43%
Switzerland	1,800,718	1.07%
Turkey	250,000	0.15%
UN CERF Common Funds and Agencies	2,499,998	1.49%
United Arab Emirates	100,000	0.06%
USA	45,418,165	27.00%
Multilateral *	7,097,083	4.22%
CARRYOVER AND MISCELLANEOUS INCOME	8,160,754	4.85%
<b>Total Received</b>	<b>132,547,183</b>	
% Against Appeal	78.8%	
<b>Shortfall</b>	<b>35,669,941</b>	
% Shortfall	21.2%	

\* Multilateral allocation information is based on figures as of 15 Dec 09  
This table excludes allocations from the IRA and advances through WCF.

Source: WFP Resource Update 27 DEC 2009

<sup>50</sup> This section does not cover cost effectiveness, which according to WFP definitions is “an analysis of the costs to produce the benefits of the PRRO compared with alternatives to produce a similar benefit”,

<sup>51</sup> The source for the table is WFP’s resource update of 27/12/09

104 The Gaza EMOP was well funded from the beginning and was also able to access a loan from the Immediate Response Account. Although the PRRO was only 75 per cent funded by October 2009, lower distribution tonnages than planned and the takeover of distribution in Gaza by the EMOP enabled the PRRO to be extended until June 2010.<sup>52</sup> In other words the discontinuation of the PRRO in Gaza enabled it to be extended in the West Bank despite the funding shortfall.

105 Of a total requirement of US\$168.7m for the extended PRRO, US\$120m had been pledged by October 2009, leaving a 25 per cent shortfall. Of a requirement of US\$76.8m for the first year of Gaza EMOP only 12 per cent remained to be identified. The West Bank Voucher programme EMOP was 33 per cent short of its US\$6.6m target. Funding developments are also described in the supply chain and resources sections below.

106 The disruption to food distribution, a key test of the operational effectiveness of the country office, created by the inability of the office to immediately raise funds during the 2008 financial crisis was seen as a serious weakness in financial flow. The PRRO and the EMOP were initiated with loans from the Working Capital Fund (US\$5.6m) and the Immediate Response Account (US\$10m) respectively but it was not accessible to immediately obtain a loan to continue operations at a reasonable level as a result of the suspension of a donor commitment (US\$4.5m) and the non-confirmation of another in early 2008. Recovery from the financial crisis was eventually achieved through a combination of a grant from Central Emergency Revolving Fund (CERF) (US\$2.5M) a major cash donation (US\$6.7m), in response to the food price spike that occurred during the same period, and successful high-level advocacy.

107 Cost efficiency has to be seen in the extraordinary context of the situation in the oPt. The issue of timely delivery is also a critical issue with regard to cost efficiency following the problems over imported wheat flour expiry dates. The highly qualitative nature of WFP's purposes implies that the assessment of a programme's cost-effectiveness cannot be limited to a comparison of financial costs and returns.

108 Using wheat flour as a cost efficiency yardstick, an approximate comparison of costs of the various types of delivery of wheat flour reveals that the most cost efficient is the wheat swap arrangement. This option has the advantage of avoiding the shelf life problem. The most expensive is the delivery of in-kind wheat flour particularly if, as in the case of US wheat flour, it can only be distributed through relatively expensive US NGOs. The Alpha Value of in-kind wheat flour from the US is 1.2 compared with 1.9 for the current swap arrangement, based on a local price of US\$768 per mt.<sup>53</sup>

109 The country office estimates the cost of the school feeding programme at 40-50 cents per child per day. This is high compared with a general ration of around 20 cents per person per day or other school feeding projects.

110 In general the delivery duty unpaid arrangements that WFP has made, in combination with the local purchase are very practical arrangements that ensure timely delivery to multiple distribution points.

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<sup>52</sup> The extension in time, without additional commitments will entail a shortfall in the fixed costs – DSC and ODOC – of the CO.

<sup>53</sup> The Alpha Value is the local market price divided by the cost to WFP to deliver i.e. FOB/T+Ext tpt+LTSH (Free on Board (FOB) or Truck plus External Transport plus Landside Transport Storage and Handling). These figures indicate that, despite high overheads, at the time of the evaluation field mission WFP appeared to be delivering food at well below market price. However the Alpha Value does not include WFP management costs, nor does it take into account disruptions in the pipeline, which are significant and which only occur in market supplies during periods of significant conflict. The absence of WFP management costs from Alpha value calculations comprise a severe constraint on its usefulness.

111 In assessing local purchase options WFP should not only consider the downside of higher prices but the upside of improvements in flexible and timely delivery and in support for the local economy.

## **2.C Results**

112 This section considers the different components of the programme in relation to their effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability. An overview of these key evaluation criteria is presented in section 3.A54

### **General food distribution (GFD)**

113 The outcome for GFD in the May 2009 logframe is ‘Adequate food consumption over assistance period of targeted households at risk of falling into acute hunger’. The indicators for this are the household food consumption score and the percentage of household expenditure devoted to food. The project document does not provide baseline figures for these but the May 2009 logframe quantifies the second indicator as 58 percent of household expenditure on food maintained or reduced. This refers to data from the 2008 Joint Rapid Food Security Survey showing up to 60 percent of household expenditure in the West Bank and Gaza devoted to food.<sup>55</sup>

114 Data on current household food consumption and expenditure are not provided in project documents. The August 2009 SEFSec for the West Bank found that on average 49 percent of household expenditure was for food<sup>56</sup>. The draft October 2009 SEFSec for Gaza reports average household expenditure on food as being 56 percent.<sup>57</sup> The SEFSec reports also show that Palestinian households are increasingly indebted. The reasons given in the survey reports for the high proportion of expenditure on food are high food prices, low incomes and reduced expenditure on ‘non-essentials’.

115 These findings illustrate the acute difficulty of using this indicator to assess the outcomes of the PRRO. It is in any case an indicator of limited value, since it does not necessarily reflect the objective or comparative economic situation of a household. In particular, in a Palestinian context, the level of a household’s wellbeing may relate to its level of indebtedness and its ability or otherwise to meet payment obligations on debts.

116 Given a generally deteriorating economic situation, especially in Gaza, it is reasonable to infer that WFP food assistance (not only in GFD but also FFW and FFT) helped to mitigate the worst effects of economic decline on the food security of Palestinian households by providing an economic input to a significant proportion of the population.. Irregularities in food distribution described elsewhere did not significantly affect this general picture.<sup>58</sup>

117 Beneficiaries interviewed stated that the quality of the commodities was generally satisfactory. Turkish consignments of wheat flour were generally perceived to be of comparatively low quality but the adverse publicity associated with some consignments had little or no factual basis (problems with particular consignments are discussed

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<sup>55</sup> WFP, FAO, UNRWA. May 2008. Joint Rapid Food Security Survey in the oPt.

<sup>56</sup> WFP, FAO. August 2009. Socio-Economic and Food Security Survey Report West Bank.

<sup>57</sup> WFP, FAO. October 2009. Socio-Economic and Food Security (SEFSec) Survey Report 2 – Gaza Strip. Draft.

<sup>58</sup> Evaluation interviews confirmed the impression that informal coping mechanisms, notably gifts and loans in cash or kind from relatives and neighbours, helped to bridge gaps in the supply of food parcels.

Annex B.). Almost all beneficiaries interviewed would have liked olive oil to be included in the food basket.<sup>59</sup>

118 Despite satisfaction with food parcels, beneficiaries expressed a clear preference for voucher schemes, in many cases based on experience with a Red Cross scheme some years ago. Food vouchers are seen as offering a more interesting and varied diet, an element of choice and a more acceptable method of collection since vouchers can be exchanged for commodities at neighbourhood grocery stores and the transaction is therefore akin to normal shopping.

119 WFP has been a major contributor, via food parcels, to MoSA's programme of support to Social Hardship Cases. This complements to cash transfers currently provided by the European Commission via the PEGASE project. Through this support the ministry has been able to meet its commitments to the poorest Palestinian households and to children and adults in various types of institution. WFP was commended by MoSA representatives for being flexible and responsive, and for effectively resolving obstacles to programme implementation. It was noted that WFP had continued its support when the outcome of the 2006 elections led other donors to suspend their aid, which precipitated an economic crisis at national and household levels.

### **Food For work**

120 The FFW programme aimed to preserve agricultural and fishery assets to promote self-reliance and restore livelihoods, and to contribute to longer-term food security; unemployed people in targeted areas were to be encouraged to participate. Because in the end FFW was not implemented in Gaza, none of the activities focused on fishing. FFW activities were not undertaken in Gaza as a result of to the blockade in place since June 2007 and the consequent unavailability and high cost of agricultural/fishing inputs and equipment.

121 The outcome for FFW in the May 2009 logframe is 'targeted households have increased access to assets in fragile, transition situations'. The indicators are 'community asset score' and '100 percent of supported assets are in use and maintained 6 months after completion'. Outputs for FFW are 'employment opportunities provided to vulnerable unemployed workers' and 'developed built or restored livelihood assets by targeted communities and individuals'. Information is not however provided on progress against these indicators in the Standard Project Reports.

122 FFW in 2008 included a wide range of activities. The main focus was on agriculture and land reclamation but other activities were the rehabilitation or maintenance of community centres, municipal facilities, schools, kindergartens, clinics, hospitals and houses. Plans for FFW in 2008 involved 24,000 participants, 19,000 men and 5,000 women. Just over 69 percent of this target figure (or 16,644) participated in practice, 16,287 men and 357 women or 85 percent of the planned number of men and 7 percent of the planned number of women<sup>60</sup>. Men and women formed 98 percent and 2 percent, respectively of FFW participants in 2008.

123 In 2009 it was decided that FFW activities should concentrate entirely in the agricultural sector. This followed recommendations from the review of FFW and FFT carried out in 2007 and because work on non-agricultural assets requires higher other

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<sup>59</sup> Olive oil and *zaatar* (thyme) is a basic food in Palestine, usually eaten with flat bread for breakfast.

<sup>60</sup> All figures for FFW and FFT may need to be revised if the WFP CO is able to resolve discrepancies and produce final figures..

direct operational costs (ODOC) resources<sup>61</sup>. In addition, land rehabilitation and related FFW activities (tree planting and cistern construction, technical support and the encouragement of crop diversification) support MoA objectives for the agriculture sector.

124 With target figures of only 4,347<sup>62</sup> participants, the planned scale of FFW in 2009 was also reduced significantly compared with the original intentions set out in the PRRO project document. While WFP's NGO partners regretted this low level of activity in 2009, they also noted that they had originally anticipated that WFP would be unable to support any FFW activity at all in that year, and they appreciated the efforts the organisation had made to enable some activity to continue.

125 According to WFP records, both CHF and CRS implemented 100 percent of the revised activity plan for 2009 in terms of the nature and level of activities and the number and gender distribution of participants in each location. From the total number of FFW participants, 5,577 or just over 64 percent were men and 3,117 or almost 36 percent were women. This global figure masks a significant difference between CHF and CRS, with participation in CHF FFW activities being almost equally divided between men and women while men form almost 98 percent of CRS participants. This difference is largely explained by the fact that CRS FFW activities in the south mainly focus on land rehabilitation and agricultural road construction and thus involve heavy physical labour of a type that is culturally not accepted for women in the oPt. CHF activities in the north include home gardening as well as the construction of agricultural roads.

126 FFW is implemented by NGOs in collaboration with municipalities and with local committees formed from representatives of local community organisations who identify both the FFW activities that will be carried out and those who will participate in them. This approach is a programme strength, in that it roots FFW activities in local knowledge of what the priority interventions are in each locality and who are the households most in need. It means however that, even where guidelines are strictly adhered to, inevitably some scope remains for inclusion and exclusion errors. Since municipalities and local committees have a predominantly male membership, it is also highly likely that most FFW activities will be those favoured by men. The 2006 Al Sahel evaluation of FFW and FFT made detailed recommendations for how these issues could be addressed, including suggestions for appropriate FFW activities for women.

127 FFW activities (and FFT, discussed below) have potentially the greatest impact in terms of helping to mitigate the erosion of livelihoods and the continuing decline in food security and increasing indebtedness of Palestinian households. Through interviews with participants and other stakeholder discussions, the evaluation identified the following benefits of FFW in the oPt.

128 The importance of land rehabilitation lies in the fact that farmland in the oPt was left uncultivated before the first intifada when large numbers of Palestinians were employed in Israel. Most of these employment opportunities have now ended in the West Bank, and they have completely ended in Gaza. The closure regime has also reduced opportunities for employment within the oPt. If farmland can be brought back into production it provides some prospect for livelihoods to be recovered and for households

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<sup>61</sup> Al Sahel Company for Institutional Development and Communications. June 2007. WFP Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation in the oPt. Report of the Review of the Food-for-Work and Food-for-Training Programs. First draft for review and discussion.

<sup>62</sup> This figure is not entirely consistent between different documents.



to move out of depending on social protection and towards greater economic independence.<sup>63</sup>

129 At the community level, the completed community assets are not only valuable in themselves but can also attract further investment into the area, which in turn can further enhance the sustainability of the assets created. In one of the municipalities visited during the evaluation, the agricultural road constructed with WFP support was now about to be asphalted with European Union (EU)-funding, which would allow heavier vehicles inside the village that would in turn facilitate the construction of additional community infrastructure. In this way, WFP support had both opened up and complemented development assistance available to oPt municipalities through various donor funding mechanisms.

130 At the household level, FFW offers a higher economic transfer than GFD and is a form of assistance that is more conducive to self-respect and less likely to create dependence. Even where FFW provides only short-term employment (for example, work on the rehabilitation of community rather than household assets) it is a source of additional income to households that may allow debts to be paid off, and it may enable participants to acquire new and potentially marketable skills.

131 A major problem for FFW under PRRO 10387.1 has been its vulnerability to supply constraints, resulting in shorter-term implementation than planned and a lower level of activities.<sup>64</sup> In addition FFW has been particularly affected by donor restrictions on contact with proscribed organizations, which has in practice limited the number of municipalities with which CPs are able to work. As it takes time for people to acquire or develop physical assets and employable skills, these disruptions undermine the contribution that the programme could make to livelihood recovery. In addition, switching between (higher value) FFW and (lower value) GFD makes it difficult for households to plan their expenditure. If and when FFW is then resumed, CPs may find it difficult to persuade potential participants that there will be no interruptions in the work. The WFP multi-country evaluation of the effectiveness of its livelihood interventions also noted that a characteristic of these interventions is that time-frames are often too short to see a real and sustained transition towards livelihood recovery<sup>65</sup>.

132 For FFW to provide a more meaningful contribution to livelihood recovery in the oPt, WFP will need to seek ways of generating the required level of resources on a more consistent and longer-term basis.

133 WFP also needs to consider options for providing more diverse and comprehensive support to livelihoods, so that a greater number of participants have opportunities for more than a temporary increase in income. One approach would be for WFP to partner with organisations that are able to provide complementary support, for example, in micro-credit, marketing and so on. This may require WFP to develop a more diverse set of partnerships for FFW than is currently the case, perhaps through encouraging the CPs that implement the FFW and FFT activities to partner with technically specialised

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<sup>63</sup> A further unanticipated benefit of rehabilitating farmland noted by one farmer to the evaluation team was that it had also pre-empted the seizure of his land by a nearby settlement. However land improvement is by no means a guarantee against confiscation, and fear of confiscation may often be a disincentive to its development.

<sup>64</sup> Understandably, supply constraints have led to prioritization of GFD for hardship cases at the expense of FFW and FFT.

<sup>65</sup> WFP. March 2009. Strategic Evaluation of the Effectiveness of WFP Livelihood Recovery Interventions. A Report from the Office of Evaluation. Rome. OEDE/003/2009.

national NGOs.<sup>66</sup> The upcoming round table with government and NGO representatives is a positive step in this direction. Even though WFP would not be implementing such programmes directly, however, providing oversight will have significant capacity implications, and WFP needs to consider carefully whether it will be able to expand management resources to take care of this.<sup>67</sup>

134 Although FFW was planned for Gaza, in the event no FFW activities were undertaken during the period of this PRRO because of the obstacles presented by the degree of closure and the damage caused by Operation Cast Lead and subsequently by recurrent Israeli incursions into the buffer zone along the border of Gaza. We recognise that these factors limit the range of FFW opportunities in Gaza compared with the West Bank but opportunities for livelihood intervention remain and needs may be even greater. We recommend that investigation of this situation is given priority. We support WFP's decision to appoint a Programme Officer with a brief to work on this.

### **Food for training**

135 The FFT in income-generation and vocational training aimed to contribute to self-reliance by imparting marketable skills and producing consumer products to support diversification of livelihoods. Partnerships aimed to encourage secure access to micro-credit schemes.

136 The outcome for FFT in the May 2009 logframe is 'developed and/or enhanced human and financial capital for targeted households'; the indicator is 'number of targeted households with developed and/or human and financial capital by type'. Information is not provided on progress against this indicator in the 2008 Standard Project Report. In particular, information is lacking on whether participants were then able to use the skills that they had learned to improve their incomes. Under PRRO 10387.1 FFT was provided for a two month period, compared with six months for FFW, representing a relatively lower economic transfer to the household.<sup>68</sup>

137 There was a similar lower than planned level of activity in FFT as in FFW. No activities were undertaken in 2007; in 2008, just over 38 percent of the planned number of participants were involved in FFT (9,201 participants as against 24,000). Almost all FFT participants (9,171 or over 99 percent) were women. Only 30 participants in FFT were men. This means that almost 54 percent of the planned number of women of 17,000 participated and fewer than 1 percent of the planned number of men of 7,000 participated.

138 In 2009, a lower planning figure of 8,694 was used for FFT with 100 percent of the planned figure being achieved. No FFT activities were undertaken in Gaza. In 2009 the gender balance was very different from 2008, with 64 percent of participants men and 34 percent women.

139 This overall figure again masks differences between CHF and CRS. Participants in CHF FFT activities were divided almost equally between men and women, while 89 percent of CRS FFT participants were men and 11 percent were women. The difference

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<sup>66</sup> The suggestion that WFP should develop more diverse partnerships is not a criticism of its current partners in FFW, CHF and CRS.

<sup>67</sup> Much of the most productive agricultural land, particularly in the West Bank but also in Gaza, has been rendered inaccessible or is under threat because of Israeli military and settler activities and the consequences of the barrier wall. Nevertheless there are plenty of opportunities for livelihood support to farmers if institutional and management arrangements are in place.

<sup>68</sup> The evaluation team was not of course able to do more than sample cases of those who had been trained. Many of these did not have the capacity to make use of their training.

between 2008 and 2009, is mostly explained by the fact that most training in 2008 was for traditional women's activities (handicrafts: 62 percent; food processing: 34 percent; bee keeping: 4 percent). In 2009, the CHF training focused on home gardening and food processing. Most of the CRS training was directly relevant to its FFW activities, which has the merit that participants will directly be able to use the skills that they have learned.

140 Similar comments apply to FFT as to FFW. It is important that more attention should be paid to providing training in marketable skills and to developing partnerships that would provide complementary support to enable graduates of training programmes to use the skills that they have learned.

141 In the first period of the PRRO, WFP also had a partnership with *Ard al Atfal*, which was providing training in nutrition-related life skills mainly to women and girls in the Hebron area. *Ard al Atfal* uses a 'positive deviance' model to build skills, which focuses on learning from the positive actions taken by some households to avoid nutritional problems rather than focusing on the poor nutritional practices of other households. This approach has reportedly shown good results but the partnership was terminated early, mainly because the organisation was unable to achieve acceptable standards in warehousing and distribution.

142 *Ard al Atfal* was the only Palestinian NGO with which WFP had a direct partnership during the period of this PRRO. The lessons that WFP should take from this experience are that it may not have the capacity to make direct contracts with less experienced NGOs that require more on-going support. In this particular case, it was a mistake to partner with an NGO that had no previous experience of warehousing and distribution. The current management of *Ard al Atfal* formally acknowledged to the evaluation team that it was also a mistake on their part to take on an activity – particularly a very technical one – where they had no previous experience.

### **School Feeding**

143 WFP has introduced a pilot emergency school feeding project in food-insecure areas of the West Bank and Gaza. Snacks for Gaza schools are produced in the West Bank (flavoured UHT milk) and Egypt (date bars). Snacks in the West Bank include date bars, cinnamon rolls, bread with *zaatar* (thyme) topping, and cup cakes. Snacks for West Bank kindergartens are prepared by women's associations and the snacks for primary schools are prepared by commercial bakeries.

144 In line with the WFP global framework, the outcome for school feeding in the May 2009 logframe was 'enrolment of girls and boys in assisted schools at pre-crisis levels' and the indicators for this were retention rates, attendance rates and teachers' perceptions of students' ability to concentrate and learn'. Attendance rates are however inappropriate indicators for the oPt since they are extremely high even without the provision of school feeding. In addition the way that information on concentration levels is collected may well have produced a positive bias in results.

145 As well as these formal indicators, the school snacks are described as an economic transfer to the family, the argument being that parents may no longer be able to provide their children with pocket money. Most informants maintained that this tradition is continuing, however, and although it is quite possible and quite plausible that it has declined, this does not seem to have been seriously researched. The snacks do constitute a small economic transfer to the family, whatever the situation with regard to pocket money, and targeting children has legitimacy. Against this it should be said that school

feeding is not an efficient means of providing an economic transfer to the family and, less seriously, that it does not necessarily target the more vulnerable families.

146 Micronutrient deficiencies comprise the only wide-ranging nutritional problem amongst school-age children in the oPt and impact on this may be the biggest potential benefit of a school feeding programme. Although not part of the formal objectives of the programme, this has also been cited as a justification for school feeding. None of the research on this issue appears however to be linked to school feeding, and the design of the snacks is only limited to micronutrient deficiencies in a general way.

147 Undoubtedly WFP's support to the provision of school snacks is valued by the MoEHE, and by teachers, parents and children. This is a crucial factor with regard to the potential sustainability of the intervention.

148 Unsurprisingly, children's preferences for different types of snack vary: date bars are popular; some children find the *zaatar* snack more difficult to eat because *zaatar* is normally accompanied by tea; some children have difficulties in digesting milk. The qualitative information collected by FMAs also indicates that teachers feel that the snack improves children's concentration levels.

149 The school feeding programme lacks baseline data and in any case has too many objectives for a meaningful assessment of the results of this intervention to be made. Improvement in concentration (and ultimately on academic performance) seems quite a likely benefit, and reduction in micronutrient deficiencies seems a possible one. It is important that these issues are researched (see below).

150 The school feeding programme is very much in line with PNA policies and plans for the future. School feeding enjoys strong support from the Minister of Education and has Cabinet approval. The MoEHE is now developing plans to institutionalise the programme within the ministry and to introduce school feeding throughout the oPt. The MoEHE intends to do this incrementally based on an assessment of available resources and capacity. WFP (outside the PRRO) is providing a consultant to support the MoEHE in this process.

151 A feature of the school feeding programme on the West Bank is the employment of women's organisations to prepare the snacks. This is intended to build the skills that women already have in food preparation and processing, and to provide the women involved with a source of income. This aspect of the programme has been implemented in partnership with the Near East Foundation (NEF). Women's associations were originally intended to prepare snacks for kindergartens and schools in the north and the south of the West Bank. This approach was later scaled back both because NEF does not have offices in the south and so felt unable to provide effective supervision there and also because women's organisations did not have the capacity to produce snacks on the scale required for schools.

152 As well as being of direct benefit to the women concerned, women's organisations are also judged to be an effective means of providing kindergarten snacks. However, there has been no assessment of whether this is an economically viable delivery model or will remain permanently dependent on high levels of subsidy. Some women's organisations have progressed to the point that they have taken over responsibility for the commercial school canteen (or tuck shop) while others appear to require a significant level of subsidy. Where women are making a financial success of the work, there is anecdotal evidence to suggest that this is sometimes through working long and unsustainable hours. The cost-benefit of providing snacks through women's organisations and bakeries is something that the MoEHE consultancy should consider.

153 Costs of production for those snacks produced in the West Bank are comparatively high. As argued elsewhere, we support WFP accepting such a premium. However this question also needs to be considered in relation to the overall costs and capacity for the MoEHE to assume responsibility for a universal long-term programme.

154 The popularity, feasibility and coherence with government objectives, and on the principle of “doing no harm”, provide arguments in favour of the school feeding programme. However the impact and objectives of the programme are not clear, with different objectives. There is an urgent need first to clarify the impact of this programme and so to determine its objectives, albeit retroactively. Unless this is done such a programme may anyway prove unable to secure stable long term funding.

155 The exceptional environment of the oPt (including for WFP) underlies the need for assessment of school feeding, the rationale for which differs from most places where WFP is implementing such programmes. The promotion of general nutrition and/or the promotion of general school attendance, or of girls’ school attendance ,do not apply in the oPt, or only very marginally. Other reasons cited in support of FFE, e.g. promotion of micronutrition, improvements in concentration and learning, and even the transfer of economic resources, are no less in need of proper assessment. FFE has only been a small component of the PRRO, but it is a component widely cited by stakeholders, including the Palestinian Authority, as one that should be greatly expanded. We believe that given the uncertainties about the possible impact and objectives of the FFE programme it would be wrong to expand it without prior study, the costs of which, even if significant, would be very small in comparison with the costs of an expansion. An important recommendation of the evaluation is for an impact study of the school feeding programme. An outline of key components of such a study is included as Annex A.<sup>69</sup>

### **Institutional feeding.**

156 PRRO 10387.1 has provided food assistance for MoSA’s programme of support to hospitals, orphanages and homes for the elderly. WFP aimed to support 8 percent of the group categorised as destitute by MoSA through institutional feeding, with priority being given to institutions with limited support. WFP’s support was seen as being critical because of the PNA’s declining capacity to meet the food needs of those in institutional care. WFP’s assistance was also seen as an interim measure until the PNA was able to fully resume its responsibilities. Given the de-institutionalisation of the PNA that has taken place particularly since the 2006, the evaluators take the view that this is a relevant form of support. Standard Project Reports do not provide disaggregated figures for the numbers being assisted in institutions.

*NB Questions relating to the overall impact and sustainability of the PRRO are considered below in section 3.A of the report.*

## **2.D Cross cutting issues**

### **Gender**

157 The project design aimed to mainstream gender throughout PRRO 10387.1 in line with WFP’s Enhanced Commitments to Women. Women were to form 52 percent of beneficiaries overall. Women were to be around 70 percent of participants in life skills training and in other FFT activities and 21 percent of FFW participants.<sup>70</sup> Women’s

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<sup>69</sup> Because of uncertainty about the conformity of this proposal with other WFP activities and guidelines, these details were omitted from the draft of the report circulated to stakeholders in mid-January 2010. Such issues of internal conformity and coherence are addressed in the Annex.

<sup>70</sup> Figures for 2007 and 2008; disaggregated planning figures for 2009 were not available.

associations were to be responsible for preparing the snacks for schools and kindergartens, and were to be paid an incentive for doing this. Women's associations were expected ultimately to take over full responsibility for school feeding. Women were expected to be 50 percent of local committees for FFW and FFT, and the original project logframe contained an indicator to this effect.

158 In 2007, women formed 52 percent of beneficiaries of GFD, and in 2008 they formed 49 percent of a GFD caseload that was 45 percent more than planned so that the actual number of women beneficiaries was over 50,000 more than planned. Women were also the major beneficiaries of the *Ard al Atfal* life skills programme, which was however terminated early.

159 With respect to FFW the proportion of female participation was much lower than planned, at 2 percent in 2008. The proportion of female participation in FFT was much higher than planned at almost 100 percent. In 2009, women were 34 percent of the participants in FFW and FFT. Reasons for these variations have been described above.

160 There were only one or two women on the committees of each of the sites visited during the evaluation. We recognise that this reflects local cultural norms and that a target figure of 50 percent representation by women was unrealistic. Future PRROs should set achievable indicators for women's participation in formal decision-making structures and should aim systematically to monitor whether and how women's participation increases over time.

161 The original intention that women's associations should be responsible for all school feeding was modified in the course of the operation, with bakeries taking over responsibility for primary schools. This was because women's associations were unable to operate on the scale needed to supply the schools. The incentives paid to women for preparing the school snacks were an important source of income for the women involved in preparing snacks for kindergartens.

162 Although the available figures are not always clear and are sometimes contradictory, there are indications that men appear to participate more than women in the economically productive activities promoted under FFW and FFT. It is not clear however that greater participation correlates with greater benefit - to establish this would be necessary to look at issues of intra-household distribution of resources and such issues as the proportion of female-headed households in the programme relative to their representation in society as a whole. Such research would be challenging and has not been undertaken under the PRRO.

### **Transition from relief to recovery**

163 Genuinely sustainable recovery in the oPt will only be possible if and when there is settlement of the longstanding conflict, which seems highly unlikely in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless there is every reason to promote recovery elements with sustainable elements instead of and in addition to relief or welfare interventions, since the impact and cost-effectiveness of recovery components is much greater and may even, to a small extent, help prepare the ground for an eventual settlement.<sup>71</sup> In this context the shift back towards relief components described elsewhere is unfortunate, even though it can be explained in large part by factors outside WFP's control, notably the conflict in Gaza, and

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<sup>71</sup> This is a general analytical point about the comparative impact and cost effectiveness/cost efficiency of relief and recovery interventions. Well managed recovery interventions have a sustainable component which has a multiplier effect on overall impact and consequently on cost efficiency. In the PRRO sustainable components of recovery interventions have not been given proper emphasis, but the point still applies.

the difficulties generated by funding shortfalls, political restrictions, and other disruptions to funding and pipelines.

164 Similar parameters affect any debate about an exit strategy. On the one hand it is important to recognize that this may continue to be an indefinitely protracted emergency, making an exit strategy inappropriate for the foreseeable future. At the same time efforts to strengthen capacity and transfer authority to local stakeholders, notably the PNA, are worthwhile and should be upgraded, even though the PNA and other local stakeholder are themselves likely to be dependent on external support more or less indefinitely. The Ministry of Planning was a particularly eloquent advocate of the importance of prioritizing more sustainable options.

### **Partnership and capacity development**

165 Partnership and capacity development issues are covered under “External Coherence” in Section 1 of the report and in Annexe B. In summary cooperation with the international NGOs who have comprised WFP’s main cooperating partners have generally been good. Cooperation with the PNA has generally been good, if uneven, and came under considerable pressure as a result of publicity surrounding the problems with regional wheat power purchases. Partnership with Palestinian NGOs has been very limited and has not been successful, in part because of the difficulties of working with the political restrictions imposed by donors.

### **Advocacy**

166 Provision of research and documentation on food security issues is the main component of WFP’s public advocacy with regard to the oPt, with the SEFSec documents, in particular, providing a valuable benchmark in the field and a useful input into policy formation for the PNA as well as other stakeholders.<sup>72</sup> Delays in developing SEFSec were unfortunate and there is a well recognized need to speed up the process and reduce the gap between research and publication. Coordination with UNRWA has been hampered by UNRWA’s non-standard mandate with regard to the PNA, but their involvement is very important.

167 Some WFP advocacy has not been in the public domain and it has not been possible to assess this. Both private and public advocacy needs to be coordinated within the UN system where the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process (UNSCO), Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and (depending on the issue) UNRWA or United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) may be in a leading role. WFP should continue to contribute through its reports and publications to an overall understanding of the reasons for the humanitarian crisis and food insecurity in the oPt.

168 A key to successful advocacy is to engage with issues of genuine significance but where the mandate and expertise of the agency is recognized and perceived as legitimate. WFP may be more effective lobbying on questions of humanitarian access, with particular reference to food security, than in dealing with the wider iniquities of the occupation and closure. For this reason we recommend that WFP, in coordination with other UN agencies, lobbies on specific issues such as improvements in the arrangements at *Kerem Shalom* for the import of food to Gaza, e.g. through changes in the times of access for Palestinian trucks, the provision of proper lighting and a legitimate handling of waybills.

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<sup>72</sup> Partnering with PCBS in production of the SEFSecs also makes an important contribution to building the capacity of a key Palestinian institution.

169 Lobbying Israeli authorities can be frustrating. Nevertheless results can be achieved and we recommend that WFP should give this greater priority.

### **Protection**

170 Protection issues have not been given priority within the framework of the PRRO. There is a very strong case for the UN to continue to upgrade its work on protection, though not for WFP to be a lead agency in this field. Nevertheless WFP can upgrade its response and contribute better to agencies leading on protection through the provision of training and orientation for staff, so that they can respond quickly and appropriately on protection issues. Such initiatives are in hand and are strongly supported.<sup>73</sup>

### **Environmental impact**

171 A detailed assessment of environmental impact would require a very great deal more information than is available. However a few general points can be made.

172 The carbon footprint of transporting food may be the most significant component of the environmental impact of the PRRO. Distances within Palestine are comparatively small, though outside the country are often significant. This comprises an additional argument in favour of local purchase.

173 Since it can be argued that there are alternatives to food aid, this negative environmental impact may seem unjustified. On the other hand since a high proportion of food in oPt is imported, much of it from overseas via Israel, humanitarian food aid would only be replaced by food almost as likely to be externally sourced.

### **Political restrictions**

174 The restrictions of Western donors on contact with members of proscribed organizations, principally Hamas, have considerably affected the efficiency of work under the PRRO and has jeopardized its stability. The nature and clarity of the restrictions and the manner of their implementation varies considerably between donor countries, both in theory and practice. The restrictions imposed by North American donors are considerably more stringent than those of European donors. The restrictions also provide a reason for political interventions by the authorities on the West Bank and the de facto authorities in Gaza.

175 Since a sizeable proportion of the population in the oPt have voted for or otherwise support or are sympathetic towards proscribed organizations, and since Hamas are the de facto authorities in Gaza, allegations about infractions of the regulations will inevitably continue to arise. In addition, and unsurprisingly, Hamas resents these regulations, provoking further instances where conflict, disruption and diversion are inevitable.<sup>74</sup>

176 These restrictions would be unenforceable if they were strictly applied, since it can prove impossible to establish people's political affiliations with certainty in circumstances where there may be significant benefits for individuals or groups to blur the issue, and where all sorts of social pressures may be brought to bear on investigations and vetting by international agencies. This however leaves the programmes highly

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<sup>73</sup> In January 2010, WFP oPt is planning a Protection Training course for staff. The Training normally consists of a standard 3-day package and is expected to increase understanding of protection, humanitarian principles and legal underpinnings of humanitarian assistance among WFP staff; as well as enable WFP staff to carry on a systematic mapping of protection and human right issues as well as to identify recommendations for possible responses, within the boundaries of WFP mandate and policy obligations.

<sup>74</sup> In Gaza there are growing instances where, for example, the de facto authorities have asked for lists of beneficiaries or other details of the activities of humanitarian programmes.



vulnerable, since it is absolutely inevitable that allegations about the rules being broken will continue to emerge.<sup>75</sup> In a few cases they will also generate publicity, which is the point where a pragmatic resolution of the incident is likely to become impossible. If cases come to the attention of politicians in the countries of donors, resolution may also become acutely difficult. The PRRO has already undergone cases where relations with donors have come under pressure and funding has been jeopardized.

177 The restrictions only work because stakeholders are generally prepared to turn a blind eye to possible infractions.<sup>76</sup> However this can become impossible when the infractions, or rumours of infractions, attract publicity, or when, for example, they become the focus of interest for politicians in the donor's home country. Risks are also much higher in Gaza, where Hamas are the de facto authority, than in the West Bank.

178 In addition the restrictions add considerably to the costs of the programmes. Their complexities and the problems they generate add to the demands on programme management staff. Separate and additional pipelines add to time and costs. Proper humanitarian targeting is made more difficult and problematic, and the assessment of targeting is distorted by the interests of beneficiaries in claiming specific political views of allegiances.

### **Sale of wheat flour by beneficiaries**

179 Onward sale of donated wheat flour by a proportion of beneficiaries is inevitable and is entirely unsurprising. There are many reasons for beneficiaries selling wheat flour, though it is a difficult subject to research objectively, given that such sale is technically illegal. Real and perceived problems with the quality of the wheat flour, in comparison with wheat flour available on the market appear to have led to a significant increase in onward sales.<sup>77</sup> Other reasons include the preference of many people to buy bread rather than to bake it at home, especially in urban environments.<sup>78</sup> Available research indicates that onward sales are surprisingly low, but suffers from serious methodological limitations, since asking beneficiaries is unlikely to provide an objective outcome.<sup>79</sup>

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<sup>75</sup> The impact of such allegations may be considerable whether or not the allegations are true. The motives of whoever is making the allegations or drawing attention to breaches of the political restrictions may also be largely irrelevant to the possible outcome.

<sup>76</sup> Hamas itself has a strong interest in maintaining international aid to Gaza, though its lack of access to information about such aid or its beneficiaries clearly has potential for generating problems.

<sup>77</sup> It may have also been at the time that onward sales of wheat flour considered substandard had greater public acceptability or political sanction

<sup>78</sup> There is of course a strong tradition of home baking in the oPt, but not everybody has the space, time, capacity or motivation to maintain this. Bakeries are also a universal Palestinian institution and - in Palestine as anywhere else - bakeries only exist because not everybody bakes their bread at home. In these circumstances prohibition of the onward sale of wheat flour is virtually equivalent to saying that home baking is a compulsory activity. Donors unduly concerned by the issue of onward sales should reflect on how feasible it would be to impose compulsory home baking in their home countries, or to render illegal the sale or barter of valuable domestic items which end up in the possession of somebody unable to make use of them.

<sup>79</sup> It is more important to get the issue of onward selling into perspective than to try to establish its true extent. Any serious assessment would not be based on interviewing beneficiaries but on researching the local economy of wheat flour. Quick insights into the situation could be gained by researching the practices of households which do not bake at home. Wider insights could be gained by selecting a bakery with a well-defined catchment area (for example a village) and researching the overall use of wheat flour (both commercial and donated) within the catchment area. Such a study would need to look at the sales and purchases of the bakery and of any other retail outlets for wheat flour or baked goods. This would need to be combined with careful research into the use of wheat in a random sample of households, which would inevitably include a proportion of people receiving food parcels from WFP, UNRWA, or elsewhere, as well as non-beneficiary households. From this could be constructed some idea of how wheat flour from both humanitarian and commercial sources is actually used. It would presumably reveal a pattern of sale,

180 Since by selling his or her wheat ration the beneficiary still derives an economic benefit the main objectives of the intervention have been achieved. Prohibitions on the sale or barter of household commodities may be ultimately unenforceable. It is very important for stakeholders, especially donors, to get this issue into perspective. Under no circumstances should it be allowed to threaten the continuity of support to the programme, as has happened and at the time of the evaluation continued to do so. The issue is completely different from, for example, the sale of food from warehouses or other genuine varieties of fraud. It is also important that assessment of and response to reported sales of flour is based on extended research and not just on specific instances. Equally important is the need to put publicity of this issue into perspective.

181 Problems with the quality of wheat flour and questions over its shelf life were exaggerated by publicity and by a degree of political manipulation, but are problems which WFP and donors cannot avoid. Problems caused by onward sale of wheat flour could be dealt with comparatively easily. All that is needed is to put the issue in perspective.

### **Food parcels, vouchers and cash**

182 The WFP voucher programmes in the West Bank and Gaza are not part of the PRRO and were only briefly reviewed.<sup>80</sup> Voucher programmes however are key options for oPt programming. They make sense, in comparison with food parcels, not only on grounds of improved effectiveness and efficiency but because of the greater dignity and choice afforded to beneficiaries.<sup>81</sup> Cash-based schemes, in turn, are in principle more efficient and effective than voucher schemes. The programmes also conform much better with PNA priorities.

183 However risks with mismanagement and fraud are high with voucher-based (and cash-based) programmes, and management and monitoring requirements are considerable. Current voucher programmes should be subject to careful review and controlled expansion. On the West Bank pressure for rapid expansion of the voucher scheme, or its replacement with cash-based schemes, may follow UNRWA's plans to replace 80 per cent of its food aid with cash schemes.

184 Research commissioned by WFP shows that food insecurity in Gaza is caused by the continuous decline in the purchasing power of the population - a consequence of the collapse of the economy caused by closure and blockade - and not by the unavailability of food on the market.<sup>82</sup> In these circumstances voucher schemes are unlikely to have any

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exchange, sharing and charitable distribution which would highlight the absurdity of considering the onward sale of food aid to be an illegal activity.

<sup>80</sup> An evaluation of WFP's pilot West Bank voucher programme was undertaken shortly after the PRRO evaluation.

<sup>81</sup> Some other perceived problems, such as the onward sale of wheat flour, are also avoided. The comparative effectiveness and efficiency derives from the elimination of the substantial costs associated with the transport and delivery of food and greatly reduced risk in disruptions to the pipeline. At a local level the management of voucher or cash schemes is more complex, as may be measures necessary to reduce the risk of fraud, and although such complexity has associated costs they are unlikely to compare with the LTSH costs of distributing food. To an extent these are general points that are independent of the oPt and this PRRO. LTSH costs are of course integral to most WFP operations, many of which take place in short term emergencies or in other environments where voucher or cash-based programmes would be difficult or impossible to manage. This however is not the situation in the oPt - even though here as elsewhere there are dangers in underestimating the difficulties of managing such alternative schemes.

<sup>82</sup> Israeli policies distort the market, suppress local production, and give unfair advantage to Israeli produce. However, even in Gaza food and medicines have not been subjected to the wholesale blockade imposed on most other commodities. The Gaza SEFSec shows that virtually all food items have been available on the market, and that this situation was quickly restored after the December 2008 – January 2009 conflict. It is

significant impact on the food supply situation. A related programming consideration is that despite the economic collapse in Gaza there are still pockets of productive and sustainable activity, including in the agricultural sector, which are worth defending and supporting even if the opportunities are comparatively limited.

185 Though worthy of support, WFP's moves towards more sustainable programming options, both in the oPt and globally, have important capacity implications and may face other institutional constraints, notably with regard to how WFP programmes are financed.

### **3. Conclusions and recommendations**

#### **3.A Overall assessment**

##### **Relevance and appropriateness**

186 In assessing the relevance and appropriateness of the PRRO it is necessary to decide which parts of the environment in which it operates are essentially fixed, and which parts are capable of being changed by WFP and can therefore be influenced by this evaluation. These considerations apply to the institutional environment as well as to the wider social and political one.

187 We assume that the international importance of the unresolved and indefinitely protracted conflict in the oPt and Israel means that donors will retain a strong interest in attempting to meet the humanitarian needs of those most disadvantaged by it. This means that, in practice, there is limited purpose in judging the appropriateness of the response by comparing it with other arenas, for example by pointing out that in absolute terms humanitarian needs in other parts of the world are even greater than in Palestine. This means, inter alia, that the relevant questions become those of how best to respond, rather than undue focus on the scale of the response since these parameters are likely to be set by stakeholders over whom WFP has only limited influence.

188 It is also important to take into account the extent to which components of WFP's institutional environment are comparatively fixed. As an agency WFP is institutionally tied to food aid; moreover many of its financial mechanisms are themselves directly tied to in-kind food aid provision. In these circumstances there are limits to how far WFP can move away from food aid, and how feasible it is to judge its programmes and achievements in relation to alternatives to food aid.<sup>83</sup> Moreover the rationale for or against a food aid programme is determined as much by key donor agencies as by WFP, and though humanitarian considerations are key to their policies and decisions, other

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worth noting that there is some resistance to this finding within parts of the humanitarian community, who would prefer to believe that humanitarian food shipments not only provide direct benefits but significantly determine the availability of food. The fact is that in the circumstances of the oPt availability has only been an issue for brief periods, most associated with conflict - though the blockade has certainly affected and distorted prices, as well as raise issue on entry of food items that do not meet the minimum safety and health standards. In these circumstances food parcels indubitably provide benefits, but effectively this is equivalent to an economic transfer. This in turn provides the essential rationale for cash- or voucher-based alternatives. On a strictly cost-efficient basis, WFP may still be able to undercut the market price, though such calculations cannot just be based on the Alpha value which fails to take into account WFP management costs (see footnote to para 111). In our view this is more than offset by the other factors involved; nevertheless monitoring the costs of voucher schemes, and refining the means by which costs are calculated, will be important to future assessment.

<sup>83</sup> As has been seen, in the oPt WFP already operates different modalities with regard to food in kind, as well as voucher programmes and even cash for work components (the local production of snacks). In other words some diversification of instruments used by WFP is already in place in the oPt. The question at issue is how far and how fast these can be extended.

factors are also at work. It seems sensible to assess relevance and appropriateness both within the context of a food aid programme, as well as in a wider context where the rationale for food aid can itself be questioned.

189 Within the overall context of a food aid programme the PRRO has been relevant, appropriate and reasonably coherent in addressing the humanitarian needs of its target population. However food parcels are not necessarily the most appropriate form of humanitarian assistance in the circumstances of the oPt - as indeed is widely recognized within WFP itself. WFP initiatives to move towards alternative methods of assistance through voucher schemes are more appropriate and are strongly supported. How far and how fast this process can and should proceed depends more on practical and institutional factors than on the most appropriate means of responding to humanitarian need.

### **Effectiveness**

190 As noted, PRRO logframes do not provide an adequate or coherent framework for a detailed assessment of effectiveness, which can only be assessed against the general objectives and targets of the PRRO.

191 The relief components of the PRRO (in support of vulnerable groups) were generally effective, meeting their targets except in the early phase of the PRRO and despite significant disruptions in the pipeline caused by problems with particular wheat flour shipments. Recovery components of the PRRO failed to meet targets, particularly in FFW interventions. This was because financial shortfalls, led to the prioritization of relief interventions, capacity limitations of CPs, and the difficulties of working with the political restrictions of donors.

192 Unintended effects include the perpetuation of dependency on welfare provision, which has long been institutionalized in the oPt and is by no means specific to the PRRO.<sup>84</sup> In the circumstances of the oPt we believe a substantial component of welfare provision and protracted relief is justified, though it should certainly be reduced where possible - and impact increased - by prioritizing initiatives with sustainable components.

### **Cost Efficiency<sup>85</sup>**

193 Cost efficiency has generally been good given the exceptional circumstances relating to the oPt. The impact of closure policies on the cost-efficiency of the PRRO has been great but largely unavoidable. Local purchase has generally been justified and should be extended; increases in cost may be considerable but are offset by savings in overheads and can be justifiable in terms of support to the local economy. Reliance on international NGOs as cooperating partners has added to costs but has been the only realistic option. Disruptions to the pipeline have also had some impact on efficiency.

194 Timeliness was variable, with significant disruptions to the pipeline caused by problems with specific shipments as well as by factors connected with the closure regime (especially in Gaza in the early part of the PRRO). Resource adequacy was generally on track though was significantly affected by the disruptions mentioned. Coordination with other stakeholders was generally good.

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<sup>84</sup> Because it is not specific to the PRRO the question of dependency has not been discussed elsewhere in the report. Nevertheless it is important factor affecting all relief and welfare activities in the oPt.

<sup>85</sup> This heading has been revised from "Efficiency" (the heading stipulated in the report template) at the suggestion of the OEDE.

## **Impact**

195 The overall impact of the PRRO, at both macro and micro level, can indeed only be assessed in very general terms. There is little doubt that the programme has helped to counteract the ongoing impoverishment and the decline in the purchasing power of quite a high proportion of non-refugee Palestinian families in the oPt through providing them with significant de facto economic benefits, and particularly, though not exclusively, to its more vulnerable members. In doing so it will have helped to offset the increase in food insecurity, though this is related to shoring up purchasing power far more than the provision of food parcels per se.

196 It is true that most of the PRRO has comprised relief and de facto welfare, and that the recovery components have not only been much less than originally planned but have often lacked more than an element of genuine sustainability.<sup>86</sup> Protracted relief is often seen as providing a disincentive for sustainable economic development, and in the oPt welfare support has undoubtedly institutionalized elements of dependency. This is perhaps the most significant potential negative and/or unintended consequence of the PRRO. However, given that conditions of occupation and closure severely restrict the opportunities for sustainable initiatives, and that the alternative to welfare would be even faster impoverishment and economic decline, we believe that the interventions typified by the PRRO are justified. At worst they will have acted as a disincentive to more sustainable economic initiatives to a very limited degree. Nevertheless the planned but largely unrealized move from relief to recovery would significantly increase the overall impact of the programme.<sup>87</sup>

197 Impact is critically related to sustainability, since genuinely sustainable activities multiply the impact of an intervention. Further references to impact can consequently be found in the following section. They notably include the long term impact of at least some of the infrastructure provided under FFW schemes, and the (largely unrealized) potential of FFT schemes.

198 The main impact of the PRRO has been to help arrest or reduce the decline in the assets, purchasing power and wellbeing of the target population. The more sustainable elements of the programme, as outlined in the following section, have augmented this impact, though not to the extent planned and envisaged.

## **Sustainability**

199 WFP defines sustainability as “the continuation of benefits from an intervention after major assistance has been completed or probability of long-term benefits”.<sup>88</sup> This is a somewhat minimal definition, since it does not necessarily imply the self-perpetuating component that is generally considered integral to sustainability. Nevertheless it is useful in relation to PRRO interventions.

200 The reason for the protracted emergency in the oPt is the occupation, the closure regime and its associated constraints. This means that genuinely sustainable income and food security will only be achievable if and when the closure regime is lifted. It also means that, until such time, all project activities must be regarded as to some extent stop-gap measures.

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<sup>86</sup> Even if lacking sustainability these components still have an impact. The degree of impact is often critically related to the degree of sustainability - see for example paras 199 and 201 below.

<sup>87</sup> Further analysis in relation to impact can be found in Section 2C, especially in the subsection on FFW. Comments on potential impact are also included in the subsection on school feeding.

<sup>88</sup> WFP. April 2008. Technical Note. Evaluation Criteria.

201 Given the length, intractability, and unpredictability of the conflict it needs to be emphasized in this context that an exit strategy is extremely contingent on external developments. There is no point in planning an exit strategy until circumstances make it possible, or at least appear on the horizon. However, for WFP there may be a case for relinquishing parts of its programme to other agencies - for example if cash-based schemes replace food- or voucher-based schemes. Pressures to move on from food aid, including voucher schemes, could in the near future develop into a partial exit strategy for WFP.

202 Some of the assets built through FFW should nevertheless make a contribution to sustainable livelihood recovery. New community assets, such as agricultural roads, can serve to attract further investment into the area; recovered household assets, such as the rehabilitation of farmland, have the potential to provide a continuing source of income to the family. However, rehabilitated farmland is more likely to produce a regular income where complementary activities exist that can provide agricultural inputs and opportunities to market agricultural products. The planting of olive trees may be a particularly useful option to promote.

203 If WFP is to give more attention to recovery activities that may have a chance of producing sustainable benefits, the organisation will need to be able to secure a higher level of resources from donors on a longer-term basis than was the case during PRRO 10387.1.

204 The evaluation found no real evidence that the training conducted through FFT has created new sources of income for participants. While there are limits on the type of training that can be provided in the oPt under current circumstances, an assessment needs to be made of options for training that, together with complementary support, are most likely to lead to new employment or self-employment opportunities.

205 As the MoEHE plans to take over school feeding it has the potential to be, in one sense, a sustainable activity.<sup>89</sup> However, the real costs to the ministry of such a programme, particularly if it is universal, need to be carefully assessed.

206 Provision of welfare and social safety nets, whether through food parcels, vouchers or cash, does not qualify as a sustainable intervention. Nor according to mainstream definitions do most of the FFW and FFT programmes undertaken under the PRRO, though they often include elements contributing towards sustainability, e.g. outcomes that enable sustainable economic activities to survive, or that protect livelihoods and/or encourage the recovery of livelihoods. This is the sense of sustainability used in the table below. It is worth noting in this context that FFW and FFT rarely in themselves create sustainable livelihoods, though they may be able to support and defend livelihoods. Whether they do so in practice requires careful investigation.

207 In addition, for extremely long term humanitarian emergencies as in the oPt the question of the sustainability of the provision of humanitarian support also arises - a separate question from that of the sustainability of the activities promoted. WFP's capacity to maintain its interventions under the PRRO has been constrained by the limitations, uncertainties, and time frame of funding commitments, and the vulnerability of the programme to destabilization or discontinuity because of perceived problems with wheat flour quality and, even less justifiably, by publicity about the onward sale of wheat

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<sup>89</sup> Except in the sense that the PNA itself, if it remains under current political control, is likely to remain dependent on external support for the foreseeable future. Also of course these are essentially welfare disbursements from the public purse so do not have any component of economic sustainability.

flour. On occasion donors have added to this instability by responding inappropriately to the problems that have arisen.<sup>90</sup>

### Summary of key evaluation criteria

208 The criteria are summarized here in relation to the three components of the PRRO i.e.:

- the provision of protracted and emergency relief assistance;
- recovery through support for productive activities and skills development;
- the provision of an enhanced knowledge base, partnerships and advocacy.

209 The relevance of relief and recovery interventions is considered here in relation to meeting humanitarian need rather than in relationship to specific modality of intervention. We have also argued that food parcels are not the most appropriate mechanism for meeting this need, but also that moves away from this approach should be incremental.

	Relevance	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Sustainability	Impact
<b>Relief</b>	High	Good, despite some	Good in relation to oPt	Not applicable	Good, some discontinuity
<b>Recovery</b>	High	Low	Limited	Limited, could be greater	Limited; less than planned
<b>Knowledge base</b>	High	Under-used	Low	Good	Not fully realized
<b>Partnerships</b>	High	Varied	Varied	Varied, not always stable	Limited, variable
<b>Advocacy (public)</b>	High (in UN context)	Good	Good	Good, improved	Fair

### 3.B Key issues for the future

210 Conditions in the oPt mean that the need for humanitarian assistance is likely to continue for the foreseeable future. Although there is a continuing need to provide a social safety net for the most vulnerable, interventions with sustainable components, which have a multiplier effect in the long term, have more impact and are if properly implemented can be appropriate, effective and efficient than relief or welfare assistance. The PRRO had the intention to prioritize more sustainable interventions, but capacity limitations and a deteriorating environment did not enable this. Finding or creating the capacity to do so will be a key issue for a future PRRO.

211 As is widely and increasingly recognized, including within the donor community and within WFP, food parcels are not the most appropriate or efficient forms of relief or recovery assistance in the circumstances of the oPt. Since the needs of beneficiaries are continuing and in many cases increasing, the dilemma for WFP is how far and how fast it should aim to transform programmes based on food parcels, and whether and at what point it should aim to hand over responsibility to another agency. If another agency is in a position to replace food parcel or food voucher schemes with cash-based alternatives,

<sup>90</sup> Notably, in one instance, by suspending funds following publicity about onward sales of wheat flour, which is by no means a surprising occurrence.

this may provide WFP with a reason for pulling back from some of its current commitments.

212 Within the framework of recovery operations, especially FFW, it will be important to carefully assess and prioritize the sustainable elements of these interventions. For FFT this involves prioritizing training in marketable skills.<sup>91</sup>

213 The future of the school feeding programme is a key issue. There is an urgent need to clarify the impact and objectives of this programme.

214 A key issue is whether WFP is able to work with other local or international partners in FFW and FFT initiatives and has the capacity to manage an expansion of its local partners (See Recommendation 7 below).

215 Local purchase has been identified as a key issue. We strongly support some of the innovative arrangements that have been developed in the oPt, and believe they should be developed and expanded even where the cost implications are significant.

216 The political restrictions imposed by donors are likely to continue to generate acute problems for the PRRO and its successor, unless a far more pragmatic and realistic approach can be established. This is a difficult issue, since the principles as spelt out by key donors are virtually unenforceable, and the solution of adopting a pragmatic approach, however essential, is not one that can be easily negotiated. However improved understanding of the practical consequences should help reduce the destabilizing potential of this issue.

217 It will hopefully be easier to make progress on the unnecessarily vexed question of onward sales of wheat flour. WFP and others should give priority to educating stakeholders on this issue, to reduce the currently high risk that this could continue to undermine the programme.

218 WFP's capacity to maintain its interventions under the PRRO has been constrained by the limitations, uncertainties, and time frame of funding commitments, which have been exacerbated by the problems mentioned in the preceding two paragraphs. Progress on these problems should generate progress on the sustainability of funding.

219 Advocacy is an important issue for the future. A key to successful advocacy is to engage with issues of genuine significance but where the mandate and expertise of the agency is recognized and perceived as legitimate. WFP should lobby on questions of humanitarian access, with particular reference to food supply. Protection is another area of particularly legitimate concern, even if WFP is not the lead UN agency. Lobbying Israeli authorities should be key to an advocacy strategy, despite the frustrations that may be experienced.

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<sup>91</sup> A comment on a draft of this report pointed out that some of the most productive agricultural areas (in Gaza as well as in the West Bank) are not accessible for cultivation due to Israeli military activities, and/or the construction of the separation barrier and the expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank. Nevertheless plenty of opportunities remain provided the right institutional framework for such interventions is in place.



### **3.C Recommendations**

#### **General food distribution**

**Recommendation 1:** WFP should continue with its initiatives to replace GFD with voucher-based schemes. Expansion of such schemes should be on a controlled and incremental basis with careful attention paid to lessons learnt from the pilot projects and the requirements for adequate monitoring and management.

**Recommendation 2:** If able to do so within its mandate, WFP should explore the option of replacing GFD with cash based schemes, even if this means relinquishing the operation to another agency. Initially this option should be explored on the West Bank. Management requirements should be carefully determined.

**Recommendation 3:** Further research into targeting is needed should sample the population as a whole. The methodological limitations of the Targeting Review, especially its focusing on existing beneficiaries should be recognized.

#### **Food for work and food for training**

**Recommendation 4:** FFT and FFW initiatives should put much greater emphasis on assessing long term outcomes, and prioritizing initiatives with sustainable components which promote livelihoods. For FFT this means prioritizing training in marketable skills.

**Recommendation 5:** WFP should research and promote the option of prioritizing the planting of olive trees under FFW.

**Recommendation 6:** WFP should institute spot checks and ex post assessments of works completed under FFW.

**Recommendation 7:** WFP should investigate the possibility of working with other local or international partners in FFW and FFT initiatives. Selection of country offices should be based primarily on interest in and capacity for identifying and supporting programmes which promote livelihoods rather than being primarily based on targeting the vulnerable. Priority should be given to local NGOs or INGOs who are willing and able to work with local NGOs. If moving in this direction WFP will need to expand its management capacity appropriately.

#### **School feeding**

**Recommendation 8:** The current pilot project should not be expanded until the proposed consultancy on school feeding is completed and the proposed research into impact has been planned. Key factors for an impact study are set out in Annex A.

#### **Institutional feeding**

**Recommendation 9:** Institutional feeding should be continued along current lines but should continue to be considered an interim measure until the PNA is able to resume its responsibilities.

#### **Procurement and logistics**

**Recommendation 10:** WFP should expand the local purchase of food parcel commodities in the oPt. This should be done even if there is a considerable price premium, both to support the local economy and because of improvements in the efficiency, effectiveness, flexibility and timeliness of deliveries. WFP should develop guidelines with regard to acceptable cost premiums for local purchase, which take such improvements into account.

**Recommendation 11:** In considering local purchases WFP should analyse the complex costs involved and establish who benefits from such initiatives and their impact on the local economy.

**Recommendation 12:** WFP should study the effectiveness and impact of purchasing vegetable oil locally, including the option of importing oil seed for local milling.

**Recommendation 13:** WFP should review the option of purchasing olive oil locally, either on a regular or on an ad hoc basis, and if this appears feasible should commission a study of the impact of such an initiative.

**Recommendation 14:** WFP should develop a secure, hand-held, electronic system of receipt, accounting and delivery at warehouses and other end delivery points.

**Recommendation 15:** WFP should consider moving the intermediary warehousing in Gaza away from its insecure location near the border, and also consider relocating the intermediary warehouse for the West Bank into the West Bank, in order to better complement contingency stocks held by Cooperating Partners.

### **Finance**

**Recommendation 16:** WFP HQ should develop the capacity to provide greater interim financial support in response to temporary financial crises.

### **Advocacy**

**Recommendation 17:** WFP in collaboration with other UN agencies should lobby Israel's Unit for COGAT and/or other Israeli authorities to allow Palestinian trucks to start loading at *Kerem Shalom* as soon as cargo is available, install lighting to allow movement after dark, and handle waybills in a recognized professional manner for transport waybills.

**Recommendation 18:** WFP in collaboration with other UN agencies should take a lead in explaining the practical impact of the political restrictions imposed by donors on the effectiveness of humanitarian operations and the extent to which they undermine humanitarian responsibilities. The objective would be to get the restrictions modified, both in theory and practice.

**Recommendation 19:** WFP, in collaboration with other UN agencies, should contribute to lobbying the Israeli authorities to mitigate the impact of closure and blockade. In particular WFP should focus on efforts to lift restrictions on the commercial shipment of specific foodstuffs, and to the reopening of Gaza crossing points.

### **Planning, monitoring and evaluation**

**Recommendation 20:** Logframes for the next PRRO should provide genuine route maps for action with relevant and (where possible) measurable indicators. They must be based firmly on the realities of the programme whilst explaining its connection to WFP strategic objectives.

**Recommendation 21:** Monitoring and reporting procedures should be based on indicators developed in the revised logframes.

**Recommendation 22:** FMA training should be upgraded, especially with regard to qualitative assessment.

**Recommendation 23:** Work between programme staff and M&E staff should be more closely integrated.

**Recommendation 24:** After an initial quality check, the first draft of a WFP evaluation report should be circulated to all WFP stakeholders so that inputs and comments can be made concurrently and at an early date. Debriefings of the evaluation team should take place at or near the end of the evaluation process.

## **Annex A: Skeleton proposal for an impact study on school feeding in the oPt**

220 School feeding is a major component of WFP's worldwide programme, accounting for around 20 per cent of overall beneficiaries in 2006-8. Plans are in hand for a series of impact evaluations of large, longstanding programmes in Bangladesh, Cambodia, Ivory Coast, and The Gambia, as set out in the Office of Evaluation (OE) Concept Note "Impact Evaluations of School Feeding 2010-11". Unsurprisingly the pilot FFE programme in the oPt was not considered in connection with this series of evaluations, and we are not arguing that it should be.

221 However we believe the school feeding programme in the oPt is a candidate for major expansion, and because of the exceptional circumstances relating to the oPt FFE programme, there are strong arguments why a study of the oPt FFE should be undertaken before any major expansion is undertaken.<sup>92</sup> The rationale for this is contained within the oPt programme rather than within WFP's school feeding programmes worldwide. This is not to say that the lessons from the oPt - despite the uniqueness of the situation - might not be of wider interest.

222 The Concept Note deals with the overall rationale of impact evaluations rather than the specifics of the possible objectives of different programmes. In the oPt it is the confusion over objectives that has been a particular concern of the evaluation. We do not present here a detailed blueprint for an impact study or evaluation, only key elements which we believe should be included in such a study, even if some of them would not be of limited relevance in different contexts. We do not believe the bare bones set out here are in conflict with the broader concerns of the Concept Note, though clearly they would be in need of further refinement if this is taken forward. The study may need to be on a different scale as well as perhaps on a different track from the global series in the Concept Note.

223 We propose that a limited but representative sample of schools who are not part of a school feeding programme, some but not all of which will become so in an imminent phase, should be part of a baseline study designed to determine the impact of school feeding. Research should be designed to show the situation before and after the introduction of school feeding on factors including:

- School attendance.
- Attendance by gender.
- General nutrition.
- Micronutrient deficiencies.
- Concentration levels following consumption of snacks.
- Academic achievement.
- Actual consumption or other use of snacks (to inform other research).

224 These components would require different designs, different sample sizes and different timeframes, though study of some components could be combined. We anticipate that school feeding has little or no impact on school attendance in the oPt, but since this research could be easily undertaken it might well be worth including. Similarly

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<sup>92</sup> These exceptional circumstances are summarized in paragraph 150 of this report.

we would expect little impact on general nutrition, but this aspect could be combined with what may be the most significant variable and most important component of this research, into any short-term and long-term improvements in micronutrient deficiencies following the introduction of snacks.<sup>93</sup>

225 Qualitative research into the impact of snacks on concentration would not require a large sample but would require much more systematic observation and questioning than the collection of teachers' opinions undertaken to date by FMAs. Research should focus both on children who eat snacks at the prescribed time - whether the snacks are provided from home, bought at the school "tuck shop" or elsewhere, or provided by the school - as well as on those children who for whatever reason do not take a snack during the specified time. The different patterns provided by children attending school during afternoon shifts (widespread in the oPt) would also provide useful comparative data.

226 Research into academic achievement before and after the introduction of school feeding is unlikely to provide any definite indications of the possible impact of FFE, given the range of factors that could lead to improved academic results. Nevertheless, like school attendance, this research could be easily done and would be worth including, even if extreme caution would be necessary in ass

227 In addition, and independently of any impact study, research should be undertaken into different options for the production, procurement, and delivery of snacks for FFE.

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<sup>93</sup> In this regard, as well as schools about to participate in a general school feeding programme, research should if at all possible include the introduction of different types of snacks to different schools, even if this can only be done to a very limited extent, e.g. within parameters of the research programme. Schools who continue not to receive school feeding would remain a subject of the research and provide a control.

## **Annex B: Logistics and procurement**

### **The logistics environment**

228 The period under review has seen increasing restrictions on movement into, out of and between the fragmented components of the oPt. This has been particularly true in Gaza which has been subjected to virtual blockade since the takeover of Hamas. Despite pledges by the Israeli authorities to ease the closure regime, and some easing of restrictions on the West Bank in 2008, the Separation Barrier continued to curtail movement and number of physical obstacles, check points, road blocks etc. in the West Bank increased.<sup>94</sup>

229 Construction of the Barrier continued, imposing severe logistical difficulties and controls on food movement. When complete an estimated 35,000 Palestinians with West Bank IDs and 250,000 with East Jerusalem IDs will be located between the barrier and the Green Line and over 150,000 Palestinians will be surrounded by the Barrier on three or more sides.

230 By July 2009, around 413 km of the Barrier's 709 km route had been completed, with a further 73 km under construction. The impact on Palestinian villages, towns and cities has been considerable, with tens of thousands of persons in hundreds of communities separated from land, services and livelihoods inevitably creating yet more needy poor.

231 In the northern West Bank where Barrier construction has been completed, the area between the Barrier and the Green Line has been declared a closed military zone and a restrictive permit and gate regime is in place. In the central West Bank, several Palestinian villages and communities, including many that fall inside the Jerusalem municipal boundaries, are now separated from the city; likewise, East Jerusalem is increasingly isolated from the rest of the West Bank. In the south, the Barrier already separates Bethlehem from Jerusalem; continued construction according to the planned route will see the city isolated from its agricultural hinterland.

232 The ability of humanitarian workers, including UN staff, to reach vulnerable areas and those isolated by the Barrier, deteriorated during 2009.

233 Within this general picture of increasingly enforced closure in the oPt the situation in Gaza deteriorated sharply following the election of Hamas in June 2007, leading an eighteen-month Israeli blockade of Gaza. This was followed the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) incursion at the end of December 2008.

234 Before the takeover of Gaza by Hamas, goods were delivered to Gaza through *Karni* crossing point as containerised cargo. *Karni* crossing was then closed with the exception of an irregularly available conveyor belt for wheat grain and the only access allowed was through *Kerem Shalom* and *Sufa*. *Sufa* was an open field with inadequate facilities and it too was closed in October 2008 leaving the only truck crossing point for humanitarian and commercial cargoes from any direction at *Kerem Shalom*. *Kerem Shalom* itself was closed every other day in 2008 causing major congestion. The number of daily truckloads entering Gaza during the blockade was barely sufficient to avoid a humanitarian crisis and far below provisions laid out in the November 2005 Agreement on Movement and Access.

235 As a result the of blockade WFP's transport costs from Ashdod to Gaza increased in 2007 and as a result of closure in general in the West Bank and Gaza WFP had to

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<sup>94</sup> the total numbers of obstacles recorded by OCHA was 471 in January 2006 and 634 in March 2009.

increase the PRRO overall weighted average of LTSH by nearly fifty percent. Apart from the depreciation of the US dollar the main factors for this increase were the reduction in the number of permitted crossing points into the West Bank, container de-stuffing, cargo palletisation, shrink-wrapping and security and transshipment costs from Israeli to Palestinian trucks at Gaza crossing points

236 In 2008 the number of crossings through the West Bank Barrier available to the UN to transfer goods from Israel to the West Bank was reduced from twelve to four, prompting concerns about the capacity of terminals to process humanitarian supplies. However the reduction in crossing points was accompanied by an agreement that back-to-back deliveries would not be introduced at the agreed crossings.

237 The back-to-back system, the insistence on cargo being shrink-wrapped and stacked on pallets together with increased inspection mechanisms, resulting in further delays and additional costs, so far is confined to cargoes for Gaza and non-bulk cargoes are now concentrated on the crossing at *Kerem Shalom*, on the border point of Israel, Gaza Strip and Egypt. *Kerem Shalom* is developing as a purpose-built crossing for non-bulk cargoes. Bulk grain currently still enters Gaza through the crossing at *Karni*.

238 Following the Israeli incursion into Gaza in 2009 the United Nations (led by the Humanitarian Country Team and incorporating all humanitarian agencies) has tried to insist that all Gaza Strip's borders must be kept open continuously as this is fundamental to recovery and human development work. This has not happened and only limited access is possible through *Kerem Shalom* and *Karni* although an informal system of tunnels from Gaza into Egypt at *Rafah* is significantly increasing the availability of goods in Gaza.

### **The food procurement environment**

239 While Israeli agricultural products have free access to the markets of the oPt, Palestinian agricultural exports to Israel are restricted. According to the World Trade Organization, Israel maintains a relatively large array of trade and trade-related measures intended to support its domestic agricultural sector. These policies have significantly undermined the competitiveness of Palestinian agricultural products.

240 Productive capacity in the oPt is restricted indefinitely by limitations on access to land; limited access to water; the high cost of water; poor quality of water sources; limited access to fertilizers and other inputs; and, increased cost of fertilizer and other inputs. The deficit between consumption and production in staple food commodities is not likely to change.

241 The oPt is dependent on imports, the availability and price of which are controlled by Israel. An exceptional case is olive oil, where local production exceeds local consumption. Virtually all cereals and pulses are imported. Most vegetables are also produced locally and prices follow local market conditions, though within a framework which hugely impacted by Israeli policy choices.

242 Palestinian wheat flour millers are subject to a quota of 30,000mt of direct wheat grain imports per year of a total requirement of around 580,000mt. Above that they are obliged to purchase through an Israeli middleman and any import must include 15 per cent Israeli wheat. There is a much greater capacity to mill wheat in Gaza than in the West Bank but movement of commodities between the two areas is prohibited under the closure regime.

243 Despite these imposed handicaps, and perhaps also because of them, the country office has a policy of purchasing in the oPt recognising that this encourages the unfairly

restricted local economy and creates badly needed employment. There is inevitably a price penalty to pay in this policy.

### **Key issues in logistics and procurement**

244 High logistics costs under the PRRO have been unavoidable, being almost entirely a result of the closure policy and the elaborate restrictive procedures involved in transporting food to the oPt. These problems are particularly acute for Gaza. The overall statistics have also been affected by the problems connected with specific consignments of wheat flour.

245 The country office has developed a strong supply chain (pipeline, logistics, procurement) supported by comprehensive office systems and extremely capable staff. However the entire supply chain has been disrupted by a series of problems, very largely outside the control of the country office, over the timing of delivery and the quality of wheat flour for two major donations, one in-kind and one a regional purchase. This along with decreases in donor funding led to a financial crisis in the second quarter of 2008<sup>95</sup> which in turn resulted in staff lay-offs and a reduction in programme implementation, especially in FFW and FFT.<sup>96</sup> Funding was in fact quite quickly and successfully restored, not least as a result of successful advocacy, but it took longer for staff levels to be restored, and the overall impact on the programme of the crisis was significant. Although the financial shortfalls were significant, and although WFP was able to ameliorate them to a degree through bridging facilities, it would be extremely useful if WFP HQ were in position to provide greater financial support in response to temporary crises of this kind.

246 The current wheat swap arrangement successfully overcomes the problem of timing and quality for a sufficiently large part of the pipeline to reduce the risk of further disruption of ration distribution.

247 Distribution delays have also been a result of working with various restrictions required by donors that oblige the country office to operate four different pipelines (a US and a non-US each for the West Bank and Gaza) and expend a disproportionate amount of staff time on dealing with these restrictions and delays.<sup>97</sup>

248 Response to the acute emergency of the Gaza war was very effective. As the situation deteriorated in November and December 2008, very limited humanitarian assistance could enter into Gaza, stocks were then built up enabling exceptional tonnages to be moved into Gaza in January and February 2009. The transition from the PRRO to an EMOP in Gaza was very efficiently managed. Staff and stock were quickly in place. Senior staff experienced in emergency coordination, logistics and civil/military coordination, strengthened by stand-by partners, were brought in. A Special Operation to support a Logistics Cluster led by WFP was designed, approved and funded.

249 Warehouse accounting and reliance on a comparison of signatures as evidence of delivery to CPs are weaknesses that should be addressed. A secure, hand-held, electronic system of receipt, accounting and delivery at the extended delivery point warehouse level would deal with these problems. The development of this system should be possible in this already well-defined operation and high tech environment.

250 Innovative commodity swaps and local food procurement arrangements have been introduced and have helped to overcome problems with the timely availability of wheat

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<sup>95</sup> Please see the time-chart in the Logistics section of the main report; also the first two footnotes of the Supply Chain subsection which follows this one.

<sup>96</sup> This in turn had a considerable impact on the finances of cooperating partners.

<sup>97</sup> From 2009 the Gaza pipelines were no longer part of the PRRO



flour as well as the intricacies of large numbers of very small scale deliveries. The mission supports the emphasis on local procurement and endorses the need for flexibility in local food procurement guidelines in the exceptional circumstances of the oPt. The procurement and logistics of the school feeding programme work well.

251 The excellent initiatives undertaken by the country office in Local Procurement have increased possibilities for contributing to employment and the economy in the oPt despite severe limitations on what is possible, and at the same time have contributed to resolving the key pipeline issue .

### **The Supply Chain**

252 Food distribution has been uneven during the course of the PRRO. This is largely due to severe disruption of the supply chain caused by problems, largely outside the control of WFP, over the timing of delivery and quality of wheat flour for two major donations, one in-kind and one a regional purchase. Given these problems, a financial crisis in early 2008 and donor restrictions on operations it is surprising that the country office has managed the level of distribution that it has during the course of the PRRO.

253 The first of the major disruptions to the supply chain was related to an in-kind wheat flour donation in early 2008, which, combined with the suspension of two donor commitments, led to a financial crisis that both disrupted food distributions and led to a down-sizing of WFP office staffing. The second disruption, a regional purchase of wheat flour, was in early 2009.

254 Before distributing rations CPs normally wait for the availability of wheat flour (the most important commodity in the food parcel) in order to distribute as complete a ration as possible, so when wheat flour deliveries were delayed so were all ration distributions. Two cycles of distribution of the US pipeline were missed in early 2008 and one cycle of non-US distribution was missed in early 2009. The country office was able to catch up with these lost distributions during 2008 (including extending the FFW and FFT distributions longer than originally planned).

255 The first in-kind wheat flour problem,(explained in detail later in this section) effectively was a complex mix of a shelf life problem that became a quality issue combined with the cancellation of a donation.<sup>98</sup> Dealing with this at the same time as unrelated decreases in donor funding<sup>99</sup> led to a financial crisis in the second quarter of 2008 which resulted in staff lay-offs and a reduction in programme implementation, especially in FFW and FFT.<sup>100</sup> It was not possible to immediately borrow further funds from the Working Capital Finance (WCF) because there were no confirmed future commitments as collateral.

256 Funding was in fact quite quickly and successfully restored, not least as a result of successful advocacy<sup>101</sup> and a grant from WFP's Central Emergency Revolving Fund (CERF)<sup>102</sup> and a donation in response to the 2008 food price spike,<sup>103</sup> but it took longer for staff levels to be restored, and the overall impact on the programme of the crisis was significant.

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<sup>98</sup> The United States government cancelled a shipment/donation of US\$4.5m.

<sup>99</sup> ECHO had in principle pledged US\$12m to WFP in 2007 but was unable to confirm more than about 20 per cent of this amount early in 2008. In the same period USAID reduced its cash for local purchases.

<sup>100</sup> This in turn had a considerable impact on the finances of cooperating partners.

<sup>101</sup> The CD went to the EU Parliament in June 08.

<sup>102</sup> US\$2.5m

<sup>103</sup> A Saudi contribution of US\$6.7m confirmed in June 2008. It was not fungible but was added to the overall pot available for the PRRO and spent in the normal way..

257 This return to financial health coincided with the increasing prospect of crisis in Gaza, signalled in part by increased restrictions on movement of goods late in 2008. WFP was able to build up stocks and to move exceptionally quantities of food into Gaza in the first two months of 2009

258 Delays in distribution created by the second problem with wheat flour were less severe than the first. Problems with the quality of a regional wheat flour shipment arose in March 2009 and the missing of a further distribution cycle. In April 2009 another crisis was precipitated by the response of donors to publicity surrounding the discovery of a truck load of wheat flour, apparently sold to a trader by beneficiaries, which was crossing out of the West Bank to Israel.

259 The wheat swap arrangement (imported wheat grain exchanged for wheat flour milled in the oPt) introduced in 2009 successfully overcomes the problem of timing and quality for a sufficiently large part of the pipeline to reduce the risk of further disruption of ration distribution. This, together with innovative commodity swaps and local food procurement delivered by the supplier directly to CPs in delivery duty unpaid<sup>104</sup> arrangements have played a major part in stabilising the supply chain.

260 Distribution delays have also been a result of meeting donor restrictions on operations. These restrictions<sup>105</sup> oblige the country office to operate four pipelines - US and non-US for both the West Bank and Gaza - and expend a disproportionate amount of staff time on dealing with these restrictions and delay distribution whilst beneficiary lists are “cleaned” of people who fall foul of political restrictions as well as those considered ineligible for other reasons.

261 Pipeline management has handled the inconsistencies of resource availability in a flexible and timely manner contributing significantly to distribution levels that, although well below initial plans, are creditable in the circumstances.

262 Total distribution of all commodities in all pipelines has averaged 4,200 mt<sup>106</sup> per month over the course of the PRRO up to August 2009. This compares with a planned distribution over this period of 5,200 mt<sup>107</sup> per month. 10,000 mt was moved into Gaza in January and 11,000mt in February during Operation Lifeline Gaza.<sup>108</sup>

263 For the financial background to this situation please see Section 2B of the report.

## **Distribution**

264 Wheat flour is imported as in-kind donations, imported through regional purchases, and can be purchased locally in the oPt.

265 The following charts show all tonnages distributed by CPs, taken from the Commodity Movement Processing and Analysis System (COMPAS) that tracks commodities from the port of loading to distribution by Cooperating Partners. The tonnages are the combined tonnages of all four pipelines.<sup>109</sup> Wheat flour is the principal

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<sup>104</sup> Delivery Duty Unpaid.

<sup>105</sup> Restrictions by the United States and Canada have had the most impact.



<sup>106</sup> COMPAS data

<sup>107</sup> PRRO planned tonnage of 178,101 mt to June 2010, over a 34 month period.

<sup>108</sup> This became part of the EMOP rather than the PRRO

<sup>109</sup> Re pipelines see below.. There are two pipelines for the West Bank (US and non-US) and similarly two for Gaza. From 2009 only the West Bank pipelines were part of the PRRO.

resource in the WFP food basket and the interruptions in its availability have caused the most disruption in distribution.<sup>110</sup>



<sup>110</sup> The OEDE requested further details here e.g. requirements and end of month balances. Please refer to the paragraph on distribution shortly above. The CO estimated requirements for the next two or three month distribution cycle then adjusted them in reaction to the availability and timing of resources, restrained by all the factors identified in this report. Further detail would be confusing

### **Imported in-kind wheat flour**

266 24,000 mt of wheat flour was imported between August 2007 and January 2008. This was a large amount to receive in a short space of time given the shelf-life of wheat flour<sup>111</sup> and the planned utilisation rate for both the West Bank and Gaza.

267 This 27,000mt tranche of deliveries of all commodities was an opportunity for WFP to build stocks but one which it took reluctantly. Additional arrangements for port storage and intermediary warehouse space were taken on to accommodate the stock during an anticipated extended distribution period. Distribution was delayed and did not start until December 2007, partly due to the difficulties of meeting donor restrictions on distribution. In March 2008 distribution was halted when the PNA claimed that the quality of the wheat flour had dropped below standard, having passed its six month shelf life. The PNA wanted to reject stock that had already been delivered. Following protracted and difficult negotiations over expiry dates a compromise was reached in which 5,400 mt in stock in the West Bank was re-exported<sup>112</sup> and the balance utilised<sup>113</sup>. Locally milled bags in future will carry a printed expiry date on them and the PNA has extended the expiry guide on US wheat flour to 18 months.

### **Imported regional wheat flour**

268 WFP purchased wheat flour in the region in March 2009 for arrival in April/May.. Despite superintendence before shipment the wheat flour not only turned out to be unfortified but also had a gluten problem that made it difficult to bake under local conditions.

269 WFP contracted Golden Mills, millers in the West Bank, to sort out the gluten issue and refortify 1,400mt, but this did not resolve considerable beneficiary unhappiness and problems for CPs. The supplier replaced around 400mt, repaid WFP in cash for around 2,000mt and the 2,400mt he was left with was being exported at the time of the evaluation.

### **Wheat flour arrangements**

270 The resolution of the wheat flour dilemma has been a well designed approach in which WFP uses non-US funds to purchase wheat grain internationally in bulk for delivery to the major miller<sup>114</sup> in the West Bank who mills, fortifies and bags under a swap arrangement of grain for wheat flour. The wheat flour is then unlikely to run into shelf life problems and is marked with an expiry date.

271 The miller has a virtual monopoly in the West Bank with only two very much smaller competitors<sup>115</sup> who show little interest in participating. This is a weak position for WFP but the significant Palestinian competition is in the Gaza Strip and Israel does not allow exports from Gaza, including to the West Bank.

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<sup>111</sup> Shelf life is anywhere between a few months and 18 months depending on the storage conditions. The PNA uses the 6-month guide and USFFP the 18-month guide. Golden Mills, the local miller, claims 6 months. The Turkish importer claimed a one year shelf life. The fact that deliveries have to be made to Ashdod and that the port can only handle containers reduces the shelf life of wheat flour as a long voyage in a container, on deck, particularly in warm conditions, can be more conducive to infestation than shipping bags in the hold of the ship.. On the other hand fumigation is easier in containers.

<sup>112</sup> Negotiations with Israeli authorities to transport through Israel took more than two months and the re-export was subjected to back-to-back handling and re-stacking on pallets.

<sup>113</sup> The CO did not lose the ODOC, LTSH and DSC for this cargo.

<sup>114</sup> Golden Mills, with a capacity of 250mt per day or 40,000 mt a year.

<sup>115</sup> Mills of 20-30mt per day each, in *Jenin* and *Nablus*.

## Logistics General and LTSH

272 The fundamental problem for logistics in the oPt is access. The problems in many WFP emergencies of lack of transport, poor roads, fuel etc are not issues in the well developed infrastructure environment of Israel and the oPt. Making logistics more effective is largely a question of dealing with closure rather than being a question of capacity. This largely explains why a logistics capacity assessment was not considered a priority and not completed until November 2009. The logistics operation has managed the delivery of WFP's commodities in a calm and professional manner in an environment in which it can only function at the discretion of the IDF, which can change without notice or explanation.

273 Supply corridors to the oPt are limited. Direct delivery to Gaza by sea is not allowed by Israel and there are no airports in operation. Overland transport from Jordan over the Allenby bridge, would be feasible, but it is slow and costly because of limited terminal capacity, severe security requirements and pressure from commercial cargo. The cargo and passenger terminal in *Rafah* on the border between Egypt and Gaza, closed for most of the year for political reasons, has not been a valid alternative with the exception of limited quantities arriving via *El Arish* in Egypt during Operation Lifeline Gaza.

274 WFP has no choice but to rely on international shipments through the Israeli container port of Ashdod or on local purchase in Israel or the oPt. The latter is severely restricted and has fallen short of the 30 per cent-40 per cent planned.


275 Timely delivery of food to *Gaza* and the West Bank is very uncertain, constantly requiring Israeli approval, and expensive. Commercial transport companies are contracted to transport all food from the port to delivery points and WFP has no independent trucking capacity of its own.<sup>116</sup>

276 Israel entirely controls the type and quantity of commodities into the oPt. It controls both the type and the quantity and imposes security conditions that, particularly in the case of Gaza, multiply the cost of delivery. The cost of delivery to Gaza is largely incurred in Israel, in the multiple handling, packing, delays and longer distances involved in using the single surviving entry point at *Kerem Shalom*. These additional costs benefit the Israeli rather than the Palestinian economy.

277 The following chart illustrates the history of LTSH costs during the PRRO. From an original assumption that deliveries could be made directly from the port to the West Bank and Gaza, costs increased as the *Karni* crossing was closed and additional storage and handling costs were required for the in-kind wheat flour. These costs, which reached double the original estimates, remained in the average LTSH matrix until the end of 2008. They fell in 2009 with the separation of the Gaza EMOP from the PRRO and more effective local purchase arrangements. The logistics office has handled the management of increased LTSH costs efficiently and sensitively in balancing donor inputs.

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<sup>116</sup> WFP used to have five trucks and two trailers until they were handed over to the MSA in 2007. WFP's trucks were a stand-by for overcoming temporary blockages or for small-tonnage deliveries to destinations that are not accessible for commercial trucks such as villages isolated by the barrier. UN plated trucks have a distinct advantage at crossings. The optimism behind the decision to release these vehicles may have been misplaced.



### **Logistics response to Operation Lifeline Gaza.**

278 WFP's response to the acute emergency of the Gaza war was very effective. As the situation deteriorated in November and December 2008, stocks were built up. Distribution during early January 2009 during the height of the war in Gaza was naturally very low as staff could not move around and the *Karni* warehouse is in an isolated and insecure position very close to the border.<sup>117</sup> Distribution picked up dramatically towards the end of January and exceptional tonnages were moved into Gaza in January and February 09.

279 The transition from the PRRO to an EMOP in Gaza went well, with staff put quickly in place, a Special Operation to support a Logistics Cluster led by WFP designed, approved and funded, and stocks borrowed from the PRRO pipeline.

280 The Logistics Cluster has continued to operate for the oPt in general. It lobbies the Israeli authorities on behalf of all agencies in the cluster, coordinates requests for access, sets priorities for movement and helps to avoid agencies competing with each other for logistics arrangements. Whilst this was vital during and immediately after the war its utility is now receding.

### **Port Operations**


281 WFP can only ship in containers or bulk, not in bags, to the port of Ashdod. Ashdod is a modern container port with large scale bulk grain handling and silo facilities. Containers are discharged and moved to a customs bonded area prior to clearance. From the customs bonded area ten percent of the containers are moved to a security x-ray for which WFP has to pay an additional cost. In a rare concession to WFP by the Israeli authorities only 10 percent of its containers have to be x-rayed, as opposed to one hundred percent of commercial containers. WFP has negotiated time allowances for demurrage and the return of containers, has a staff member based at the port issuing waybills, and has these costs under reasonable control..

<sup>117</sup> A commercial contractor lost two drivers attempting to move food in this period.

282 WFP contracts a commercial company to handle its port operations and WFP cargo moves through the company's bonded area.

283 Port handling and clearing rates have remained steady throughout the PRRO with the exception of the 27,000 mt tranche at the end of 2007 which obliged the country office to take on additional port storage.

284 WFP has made the best it can out of limited opportunities in port operations and has developed an operation that controls costs and works efficiently.



### Transport from the port

285 Most food is delivered directly by commercial transporter from Ashdod to the storage facilities of cooperating partners in Gaza and the West Bank and WFP rents warehouse space at *Qalandia* near Jerusalem for the West Bank and at *Karni* in Gaza where food is stored if partners have insufficient warehousing space. Cooperating partners, operating under cost-sharing Field Level Agreements (FLAs) carry out onward transport from their storage facilities to distribution sites.


286 An unsatisfactory situation in which one transporter dominated eighty percent of transport from the port was changed in 2008 to a shortlist of six transporters tendering every six months with a possible extension of a further six months based on price and performance. Only transporters who have proved themselves on contract in the past are now asked to tender.

287 The current road transporter from Ashdod to Gaza controls the entire chain of operations from the port to CP warehouses and Karni in Gaza. He is the road transporter, the operator of the Ashqelon facility, operates the transport within the Kerem *Shalom* facility and he subcontracts the transport from Kerem *Shalom* into Gaza.

288 At Ashqelon containers are de-stuffed and the cargo put on pallets and shrink-wrapped. The transporter is responsible for any losses including those incurred at Ashqelon and during security checking at the crossing which could be deducted from his payment. In practice these losses are not deducted from his payment on the grounds that transporters would have to increase their prices in future to take account of likely losses. This, and the monopoly the transporter has on all operations from the port to Gaza, is both a strength and a weakness in the operation, but it is probably the most practical arrangement.

289 The *Qalandia* and *Karni* warehouses are theoretically also useful for contingency stocks but *Qalandia* is on the Israeli side of the wall and the Gaza warehouse is so close to the border that it is immediately out of bounds when there is a security problem and cannot be used.

290 Whilst per ton km rates for truck transport have remained steady throughout the PRRO actual costs/budgeted figures have fluctuated depending on the crossings allowed, the amount of cargo through the port, through intermediate storage, or from local purchase. The increases in transport costs in the chart below reflect the additional distances cargoes were carried to Gaza and to and from intermediate storage as a result of the in-kind wheat flour issues described elsewhere. Transport costs for the PRRO have fallen in 2009 as a result of Gaza deliveries becoming a part of the EMOP. The additional costs for Gaza deliveries are analysed separately.



### West Bank deliveries

291 West Bank deliveries are relatively straightforward. WFP contracted trucks carrying containers from the port can enter West Bank via five crossings<sup>118</sup>. As a contingency stock and in order to manage the balanced deliveries of stock to CPs, WFP maintains a

<sup>118</sup> *Bisan, Al Jalame, Tulkarm, Beituniya and Tarqumiya. Masourmia is an approved crossing not yet used.*



warehouse at *Qalandia*, on the Israeli side of the wall. During 2007 WFP was able to utilise eleven crossings but in a compromise negotiated with COGAT<sup>119</sup> to avoid the imposition of back-to-back<sup>120</sup> deliveries the number of crossings were reduced to five. Trucks can go directly from the port to eighty CP warehouses in the West Bank provided that logistics provides 48-hour advance notice and multiple information on truck and driver details. Only Arab-Israeli or Jerusalem-ID drivers are allowed as the CP warehouses are largely in Zone C urban areas.<sup>121</sup> Commercial vehicles are required to transit back to back as is WFP in the rare cases that they have to export from the West Bank. One transporter handles transport from Ashdod, either directly to CP warehouses or to intermediary storage at *Qalandia* and then from *Qalandia*. Local Purchases of food commodities are delivered by Palestinian traders to CP warehouses.

### **Gaza deliveries**

292 At the time of the mission's visit the main crossing points were functioning to a degree. *Eretz* for people (in tiny numbers), *Nahel Oz* for heavy fuel, *Karni* for bulk grains, *Rafah* for individuals and exceptional non-food supplies and *Kerem Shalom* for general food supplies and other non-food supplies. The amounts allowed through are limited by COGAT; heavy fuel for example is insufficient to maintain electricity supplies. At the time of the mission's visit it was clear that considerable amounts of commercial cargo were coming through *Kerem Shalom*.<sup>122</sup>

293 A miller in Gaza, contracted by WFP to supply wheat flour, imports grain through Israel and is able to use the *Karni* bulk grain terminal.<sup>123</sup>

294 Transport from *Karni* warehouse into Gaza is contracted by the WFP Main Office logistics, who tender annually. Wheat flour deliveries from the mill in Gaza are delivered by the mill to the CP warehouses.

295 WFP deliveries can only be made from Ashdod port via Ashqelon, where all cargoes are removed from containers (which are not allowed through *Kerem Shalom*), stacked on wooden pallets, shrink-wrapped to hold the stacks in position, then transported through the only crossing point open for WFP at *Kerem Shalom*.

### ***Kerem Shalom* Crossing.**

296 *Kerem Shalom* is the only crossing point for WFP non-bulk cargo. The Israeli authorities are steadily developing it with the latest improvement being the hard surfacing of the main areas over the last three months, making a huge difference to movement. It looks increasingly as if this will be the 'permanent' crossing for cargo from Israel, and from Egypt whilst the *Rafah* crossing remains closed. It appears that both

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<sup>119</sup> The Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (or COGAT) is a unit in the Israeli Ministry of Defence that engages in coordinating civilian issues between the Government of Israel, the Israel Defence Forces, international organizations, diplomats, and the Palestinian Authority. COGAT's headquarters are in Tel Aviv. The unit is headed by the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories.

<sup>120</sup> "Back to back" refers to an operation in which one truck is offloaded onto the ground, the cargo is security checked, and then re-loaded onto another truck.

<sup>121</sup> Palestinians who live in East Jerusalem are not Israeli citizens but have identity documents issued by the Israeli government. They are generally able to travel to the West Bank as well as within Israel. Israeli citizens are not supposed to travel to those parts of the West Bank that are supposed to be under Palestinian control, but Palestinians who are citizens of Israel, traditionally but decreasingly referred to as "Israeli Arabs", can often do so, particularly in Zone C, the large part of the West Bank (almost half of it) that is entirely under Israeli control, and is in practice used extensively by Israeli citizens, particularly settlers.

<sup>122</sup> A Palestinian border official interviewed by the evaluation estimated commercial shipments as 80 per cent and humanitarian shipments at 20 per cent (in October 2009) though this may not be a reliable figure.

<sup>123</sup> It appeared that the Israeli supplier was not able to automatically obtain permission to open *Karni* and has to rely on the unpredictable decisions of the IDF.

bulk and fuel infrastructures are also being put in place. The mission was denied entry into the *Kerem Shalom* crossing by the IDF but was able to approach it from both the Gaza and Israeli sides.

297 At *Kerem Shalom* some cargo has to be x-rayed, all cargo is offloaded, checked, moved to another bay and reloaded – a total of seven operations (offloading or loading) between the port and movement out of *Kerem Shalom*. Physical security checks include cutting open a sample of all pallets, which automatically results in damage and losses and is particularly messy with oil containers. The cutting open of the shrink-wrapping also loosens the stacks. Forklift operators regularly damage the bottom layers of palletised cargo. All cargo is stacked outside with only the shrink-wrapping for protection.

298 Trucks from the port offload on one side of the crossing until 1500hrs and Palestinian trucks are only then allowed into the other side to start loading until the light fails. The connection between the two sides is trucks which are dedicated only to movement within the crossing. There seems no reason not to allow the Palestinian trucks to start loading any cargo that is ready.

299 These measures are being taken in the name of security although nothing of significance has ever been found in UN vehicles. The most serious incident was apparently when one infant's shirt in mock camouflage was found in a second-hand clothing delivery by UNRWA. UNRWA was obliged to send back all seven truck loads of the consignment.

300 The *Kerem Shalom* authorities will not formally allow paperwork to pass through the crossing. UNRWA says it does not get any paperwork through but WFP says that it finds most of its Waybills in one of the pallets, stuck in the wrapping. This may be a fine legal point but presumably the fact that WFP loses control/ownership temporarily in the crossing has insurance and legal implications.

301 All humanitarian food cargoes entering Gaza have to be approved by COGAT in *Eretz*<sup>124</sup>. Non-food materials need approval from Tel Aviv. Nothing is allowed through except food and medicine unless considered by COGAT to be priority humanitarian cargoes.

302 Despite closure and the logistics restrictions *Kerem Shalom* was kept open during Operation Cast Lead and the highest ever truck numbers of food were allowed through.

303 The arrangement at *Kerem Shalom* illustrates the impotence of the WFP logistics department in influencing restrictions put in place by the IDF. However the WFP staff are to be commended on the measured and professional manner in which they deal with the multiple frustrations imposed by the IDF

### **Additional logistics costs in deliveries to Gaza**

304 Prior to June 2007 WFP was able to transport cargo in containers through the *Karni* crossing, an average distance from the port of 85 kms, to final destinations inside Gaza. The cost, including terminal charges and the return of empty containers, was an average of US\$25 per mt.

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<sup>124</sup> Since the Disengagement, Israeli COGAT activity with regard to Gaza is carried out by the Coordination and Liaison Administration (CLA) of Gaza. The CLA is located outside Gaza adjacent to the *Erez* Crossing. The CLA is the military unit responsible for the coordination of access to and from Gaza, and the facilitation of activities of the international community and of the civilian and humanitarian needs and requirements of the Palestinian population of Gaza with regard to Israel.

305 The cost of delivery to Gaza, as described in the previous paragraphs, over an average distance of 155kms through Kerem Shalom, is now US\$66 per mt<sup>125</sup>. As the average monthly requirement in Gaza is 3,000mt then the additional cost of closure restrictions for this operation alone are US\$1.5m a year.

306 UNWRA estimates its additional costs to Gaza between 1 January and 31 August 2009 at US\$3.2 million or US\$4.8m a year.

307 Logistics has had no option but to pay the increased transport and handling costs imposed through closure.

### **Final signature**

308 Reliance on a comparison of signatures as evidence of delivery to CPs and relatively minor warehouse accounting issues are weaknesses that should be addressed. A secure, hand-held, electronic system of receipt, accounting and delivery at the CP warehouse level would address these problems. The development of this system should be possible in this already well-defined operation and high tech environment. It should be designed in a way that could then be exported to more demanding circumstances and low-tech environments by incorporating thumb-print reading and battery operation.

### **The Logistics Cluster**

309 The UN coordinating mechanism, a Logistics Cluster, was put in place for Operation Lifeline Gaza with WFP as the Lead Agency. The Israeli air raids on Gaza started on the 27th of December 2008 and the first meeting of the Cluster took place on the 31st. Whilst its support for WFP's operations was considered a success – perhaps due to the fact that COGAT approved humanitarian food deliveries, the Cluster had greater difficulties dealing with the PNA and the IDF over non-food deliveries, particularly those for the Ministry of Health, but did establish a civil/military liaison office with the IDF in Tel Aviv for a three month period.

310 UNWRA dominates Gaza commodity movement but its inclusion in the Cluster was ambiguous. At the technical level it participated in meetings and both helped out the other Agencies and was itself assisted, for example in movement from El-Arish in Egypt. Above the technical level its inclusion was not so clear. Indeed perhaps UNRWA should have been the lead. UNRWA has long-term staff in place in contrast to a series of Temporary Duty arrangements from the other Agencies.

311 The temporary duty staff however, although short term were largely drawn from experienced logistics staff of individual Agencies, had been trained and in many cases already knew each other.

### **Logistical cooperation with UNRWA**

312 WFP draws its light vehicle fuel from UNWRA in Gaza and during the war, when WFP did not have an international staff member in Gaza, UNWRA assisted in moving WFP stocks.

313 Prior to the war WFP had been able to fully stock its Karni warehouse and CP's warehouses and was able to lend UNRWA 2,000mt for its operations as soon as movement was possible.

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<sup>125</sup> Ashdod port to Ashkelon US\$10. De-stuffing, palletising and shrink-wrapping US\$9. Pallets US\$6. Intermediate storage at Ashkeon US\$5. Re-loading at Ashkolon US\$5. Transport from Ashkelon, triple handling at the Kerem Shalom crossing and transport into Gaza US\$31. Total US\$66 per mt.

### **Logistical cooperation with cooperating Partners (CPs)**

314 WFP is working with a variety of CPs including the MoSA, MoEHE, CRS and NEF. WFP delivers to the CP warehouses and CPs are then responsible for distribution under Field Level Agreements (FLAs) that share logistics costs. CPs are obliged to report their distribution statistics monthly and are reimbursed their costs on the strength of this report which is also used in COMPAS. Unfortunately CP reports are often two or three months late, which delays both repayments and entries into the commodity tracking system.

315 Delays in distribution by CPs were caused by a combination of problems related to the availability and quality of wheat flour, security factors, closure, limited CP capacity, late provision of beneficiary lists and a lack of counterpart funds. Unfortunately for the beneficiaries they then lost rations due to the policy of non-retroactive distributions.


316 FLAs provide a variety of support to NGO CPs including staffing, warehousing, vehicles and distribution transport costs. The MSA and MoEHE provide their own warehousing and salaries, with the FLA providing an incentive to warehouse staff and the cost of delivery from bakeries and women's groups to schools.

317 FLAs are based on a "per ton" rate that is inclusive of NGO fixed costs. The formula creates inevitable problems when tonnages drop to levels where CPs cannot meet their fixed costs. In mid 2008, during the country office's financial crisis WFP severely cut NGO operations by half. This had implications for NGO finances, as they were incurring their own fixed costs which they could not easily reduce. The return to health of WFP finances, sooner than anticipated, rescued the situation.

318 In a high tonnage operation, limits on any funding advance (which must additionally be cleared before any further advances can be made) weakens CP response capacity. Whilst NGOs with financial strength can manage with the level of advance available and with any delay in reimbursement, this is a struggle for others.

319 The following table shows the average US\$ cost per mt of distribution through CPs and illustrates the increasing cost of delivery over the course of the PRRO. The increases are due to the LTSH cost of the School Feeding project and due to the NGO share of tonnage increasing relative to the PNA in response to donor political restrictions, particularly in Gaza. The average distribution rate paid to NGOs from LTSH is US\$45 per mt and to the MSA is US\$14 per mt. The cost of distribution in the School Feeding project is US\$250 per mt. ODOC payments to NGOs have grown from US\$680,000 in 2006/7 to US\$1.1m in 2008/9.

320 WFP has handled its relationships with the CP's very well, resulting in a cooperative and effective logistics operation despite the many supply chain disruptions.




### Local Purchase

321 Where market conditions permit and cash can be used without restriction, local and regional purchases are more cost and time-efficient than other sources of food assistance. WFP procurement has had a positive (if limited) impact on market development and food processing in the oPt. At the beginning of the PRRO it was estimated that one third of the food commodities, mainly wheat flour milled from imported grain and oil produced from imported oil seed would be procured locally by WFP.

322 Multiple initiatives taken in local food procurement have provided efficient and timely delivery systems of an intricate variety of commodities from the key commodity of wheat flour (the wheat flour swap can be considered to be local procurement) to freshly baked items. The opportunity to benefit the Palestinian economy under closure in the West Bank and siege in Gaza is not straightforward and in practice local purchase tonnages have dramatically fallen away from the 40 per cent local procurement achieved at the end of the previous PRRO. However the evaluation supports the initiatives taken to pursue limited local purchase opportunities and the effectiveness of the results.

323 The following chart shows the divergence between imports and local procurement and a brief appearance of regional purchases in 2007. The regional wheat flour purchase of 2009 does not appear on the chart presumably because most of it was re-exported.



324 It needs to be borne in mind that most local procurement is in Israel, so the benefits if any to the Palestinian economy need to be assessed on an ad hoc basis. In addition the costs of local production are only partly under the control of Palestinian suppliers and they are constrained in meeting delivery timings by the restrictions of closure and siege with inevitably high-cost results. Because of economic decline in the oPt it is not easy to obtain the requisite number of supplier quotes creating problems of accountability.

325 Although there are extra costs in local procurement of some items this is partly offset by suppliers delivering to CPs. This relieves the country office of considerable management and logistics burdens, particularly in the case of school feeding and bread delivery.

326 In the circumstances of middle income families reduced to welfare by the Occupation the quality of locally procured foods is sensitive. The problems over wheat flour were partly related to quality, as was early resistance to the bread project, but the latter was probably due more to a preference for wheat flour as a useful item to sell.

327 Where local purchases can be undertaken they should be, preferably through the normal purchasing system, but if necessary, given the unique circumstances of the oPt, based on flexible purchasing principles accepted by WFP elsewhere in the world to ensure a fair return.<sup>126</sup> This should not entail accepting a lower quality product. The question of purchasing date bars in Gaza, a possible but very much more expensive option, *vis a vis* purchasing in Egypt is an extreme example of this dilemma. It cannot be resolved without establishing the extent of and the reasons for the price discrepancy. There is clearly a justification for giving weight to local purchase in view of the devastated Gaza economy. How much weight can be given, and how large a cost discrepancy can be afforded, is a key policy issue for WFP and for donors.

<sup>126</sup> The P4P pilots.

### 328 Local and regional purchases at the time of the evaluation:

- Wheat flour in West Bank from a local miller using WFP imported grain in a swap arrangement that allows for blending grains, fortification, milling and delivery<sup>127</sup> ;
- Sugar from local traders who are sourcing in Israel;
- Salt from local traders purchasing from a West Bank salt factory;
- UHT milk from a West Bank factory set up as a non-profit business and buying directly from local dairy farmers. Different colours and flavours are produced to add to the attraction to school children. The purchase price includes delivery to schools.
- Date bars and snacks containing *zaater* (thyme), another containing cheese, and another containing cinnamon, from local bakers in the southern West Bank and from women's groups in the northern West Bank. WFP wheat flour and vegetable oil, sugar and salt are provided to the bakers and the other ingredients are purchased through an agreement with the NEF who sub-contract two suppliers, one for the northern West Bank and one for the southern West Bank.<sup>128</sup> The current snacks arrangement started in Dec 08. For the three months prior to that the snacks were simply purchased and prior to that High Energy Biscuits were a part of the rations.
- Bread from bakers in an innovative mini-swap arrangement of wheat flour for the bread and delivery to the schools.<sup>129</sup>
- Date bars for the Gaza Strip are imported from Egypt as the cost of date bars in Gaza is said to be five times the Egyptian cost<sup>130</sup> and they would be of lower quality.

### Olive Oil

329 Under the previous PRRO 200mt of olive oil produced on the West Bank was purchased at US\$4,500 per mt. The initiative was discontinued due to the high cost relative to vegetable oil, a discrepancy which increased further in 2008. The impact of the initiative on the local economy is not clear, but is not likely to have been significant, especially since price of olive oil is mainly determined by internationally. It seems likely that WFP's decision was justified.

330 The provision of olive oil in food parcels is extremely popular indeed with beneficiaries, and the evaluation argues elsewhere that support for local production can be justified even where this has a considerable cost premium. However we would not support a return to local purchase of olive oil without a serious assessment of the possible benefits (if any) to local farmers.

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<sup>127</sup> See the section on wheat flour. 100 mt of imported grain produces 65mt of fortified wheat flour delivered to CP warehouses.

<sup>128</sup> WFP has contracted the NEF to purchase those ingredients needed in addition to the wheat flour and vegetable oil delivered to bakers and women's groups by WFP. NEF is paid US\$1,200 per mt for the delivered ingredients.

<sup>129</sup> One 50kg bag of wheat flour produces 36kg of bread delivered to schools. There are ten loaves in 1kg.

<sup>130</sup> It was not possible to assess the situation in any detail.

## **Vegetable Oil**

331 The situation with regard to local purchase of vegetable oil is similar. 1,800mt of vegetable oil, milled locally from imported oil seed, was also purchased in the West Bank during the previous PRRO at US\$1,200 per mt. The initiative was discontinued in the current PRRO, again on grounds of cost. Instead international purchases of 5,800mt have been made. at a cost of around US\$1,240 per mt<sup>131</sup>. Locally milled vegetable oil in is sold at US\$2,400, per mt on the West Bank (*Nablus*) i.e. twice the price of international procurement.<sup>132</sup>

332 Unlike olive oil this is a case of local processing rather than of overall local production but still has a benefit to the local economy, though the direct benefit is only to manufacturers rather than farmers. The cost differentials between locally processed and imported vegetable oil though high are considerably less than for olive oil. Again what would be needed if WFP were to reintroduce such a scheme would be a serious impact study as to who would benefit from such an initiative.

333 If such an initiative is again pursued it might be possible to set up an arrangement analogous to the “wheat swap”, i.e. where the manufacturer exchanges oil for oil seed.

## **Timeliness**

334 A major test of the country office was in responding to the conflict in Gaza at the end of 2008. The signs of impending crisis were evident in severe movement restrictions into Gaza in November and December 2008. By then country office had rebuilt staffing following the resolution of the financial crisis and could build stocks. When the war came the IDF was prepared to let food cross and very high tonnages were delivered in January and February 2009. The transition from the PRRO to an EMOP in Gaza was made very effectively. An EMOP was approved, staff and stock were all put quickly in place. Experienced senior staff in emergency coordination, logistics and civil/military coordination, strengthened by stand-by partners, were brought in. A Special Operation to support a Logistics Cluster was designed, approved and funded. country office logistics led the Cluster and successfully moved and distributed record numbers of truckloads into Gaza in January and February 2009. The systemic support for this from both the Jerusalem and Gaza offices, maintained an unusually high level of control and accountability in the circumstances.

335 The use of local purchase, principally the wheat swap arrangements, has improved the timeliness of wheat flour deliveries in general and arrangements for bread delivery and snack delivery to schools also appear to be timely and effective.

## **Coordination**

336 The most important test of coordination in logistics was in the operation of the Logistics Cluster during the Gaza war. Although coordination was good within the members of the Cluster its efficacy was limited by the willingness of the IDF to allow cargo through the crossings into Gaza.

337 Coordination with the major logistics operator in the oPt, UNRWA is generally good and appears to have improved during the course of the PRRO. Coordination with WFP CPs has also been good.

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<sup>131</sup> 2009 FOB cost US\$1,100, external transport US\$45, LTSH (to the West Bank)US\$94 per mt.

<sup>132</sup> The reportedly poor quality of some oil containers in international procurement may account for a part of the price difference.



338 Coordination with the Israeli authorities at a high level is limited and difficult. Coordination at the logistics level where frequent contact is maintained functions is better. Coordination within UN appeared to function well and CPs, despite the difficulties of operations, in general were complimentary about the ease of joint coordination and problem solving.

339 NB recommendations relating to logistics and procurement are included in Section 3.C of the report.

## **Annex C: Israeli closure policies in the oPt.**

### **Background to Closure**

340 The humanitarian needs and delivery of assistance to the Palestinians are related to the policy of closure imposed by the Israeli government. Closure has a fundamental effect on all aspects of the operation and particularly on logistics and food procurement.

341 Current closure policies originated 1991 during the first Gulf War, becoming increasingly institutionalised from 1993.

342 Since the Oslo accords there has been a policy of segregation of Palestinian and Israeli communities through the expansion of settlements, the network of parallel roads for use by Israelis, the construction of the Barrier, and the fragmentation of the Palestinian population between Gaza and the West Bank and into more than 60 semi-isolated blocks in the West Bank.

343 Israel's closure policy is enforced by a complex bureaucratic-military travel permit system reinforced by the differential car licence plate system. The closure policy comprises:

- Internal closure through checkpoints etc, reinforced with curfews and the pass system. Towns and villages can be entirely isolated for extended periods;
- External closure of the border with Israel and between the West Bank and the GS;
- External closure of crossings into Egypt and Jordan.

344 Bypass roads are not integrated with the Palestinian network. Ultimately designed for the exclusive use the IDF, settlers and internationals, this network links with the trans-Israel highway destroying the natural north south transport topography. The system of overpasses and underpasses increasingly separates roads leading to settlements from roads connecting Palestinian areas. Secondary roads that lead onto the primarily Israeli-use roads have been blocked by physical obstacles including roadblocks, road barriers, or earth mounds, preventing Palestinian vehicles from moving onto or across these roads. Consequently these Israeli-use roads have become the main delineators and barriers around the Palestinian enclaves.

345 Transporting goods, including food, water, raw materials, vegetables, fruit and other products, within the West Bank and Gaza has become increasingly difficult and into Gaza in many cases impossible. Travel distances, time and cost for commercial transportation, on which WFP relies, have been rising steadily.

346 Trucks of aid organizations are only permitted to enter and circulate within the West Bank on prior clearance with the IDF District Coordinator's Office. Trucks are not allowed to enter Gaza and all trucks carrying WFP cargoes must be offloaded, security checked and reloaded a number of times in a complex and expensive operation.

347 Humanitarian and other cargoes for aid organizations and the Palestinian Authority experience significant delays and, in some case, are denied entry to Israel or the oPt. Delays can be severe at the port of Ashdod, WFP's main entry point into Israel, where average transit time for containerized cargo can be weeks, and at Allenby Bridge, the general entry point from Jordan.

348 The Bertini Report of 2002 reminded Israel of its responsibility under international law to assist an occupied population and reminded them that the immediate cause of Palestinian impoverishment was the policy of closure.

349 The Roadmap stipulates that “normalization” should include dismantling the restrictions on the movement of Palestinian people and goods. However systematic and methodical fragmentation of the West Bank through closure and settlement on annexed land has continued unabated.

350 On the ground restrictions on the freedom of movement of goods and people, including donors and aid personnel, often implemented by young soldiers with little understanding or sympathy with those are charged with controlling makes the provision of aid increasingly more complicated and expensive.

351 Israeli military officials in the Office for the Coordination of Activities in the Territories, responsible for liaising between the Israeli Defence Forces and the donor and aid community vigorously defend the closure regime as the fundamental security measure. The UN Sec Gen and many others have pointed out that they have had a disproportionate economic and social impact.

## Annex D: Beneficiaries and tonnages per type of intervention

The figures below were assembled by the country office in March 2010 after the evaluation had been completed. It was not possible to subject them to systematic scrutiny or clarify related issues. However the country office issued the accompanying explanatory note:

The table showing tonnage planned vs actual figures for WB and GS 2009 show some discrepancies between COMPAS data and the data recorded in the 2009 Standardized Project Report (SPR). The discrepancy is due to the fact that the SPR deadline was 15/01/10 and by that date WFP had not yet received all the distribution reports from the CPs, mainly MoSA Gaza Strip and West Bank. Once the reports from the CPs were received, the data on COMPAS was updated so this is the most accurate source.

The tables for WB and GS use COMPAS as a data source and hence are the most up-to-date.

In addition, the loan from PRRO to Gaza EMOP was registered under PRRO SPR in COMPAS but the tonnage was actually distributed for Gaza Strip EMOP.

### (a) West Bank

#### Planned beneficiaries and planned tonnage as per project document

<b>Beneficiaries by intervention type as per the PRRO document</b>	
<b>Intervention type</b>	<b>West Bank</b>
<b>Emergency and Protracted Relief</b>	
Assistance to the destitute	98,000
Assistance to most vulnerable groups	43,000
Contingency emergency assistance	12,000
<b>Total relief</b>	<b>153,000</b>
<b>Recovery through livelihoods protection and skills development</b>	
Food for work	100,000
Food for IGA and vocational training	50,000
Life skills training	50,000
Food for education - school feeding	60,000
<b>Total recovery</b>	<b>260,000</b>
<b>Total PRRO</b>	<b>413,000</b>

<b>West Bank</b>		
<b>Actual tonnage distributed</b>		
Intervention type	2008	2009
Assistance to the destitute	16,268.34	9,003.98
Assistance to most vulnerable groups	9,993.77	15,286.93
Contingency emergency assistance	16.872	-
Food for work	7,294.21	2,084.17
Food for IGA and vocational training	2,612.30	521.037
Life skills training	4,555.12	495.951
Food for education - school feeding	2,165.50	2,454.66
UNRWA Joint Programme	-	209.61

**Actual beneficiaries reached and tonnage distributed.**

<b>Actual Beneficiaries Reached</b>				
<b>Intervention type</b>	<b>West Bank/ Planned as</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>Comments</b>
Assistance to the destitute	98000	109,178	105,256	
Assistance to most vulnerable groups	43000	43,040	160,159	
Contingency emergency assistance	12000	3,705	0	
Food for work	100000	99,717	30,131	The same beneficiaries received training for 2 months then worked for 8 months
Food for IGA and vocational training	50000	55,085		
Life skills training	50000	50,000		
Food for education - school feeding	60000	59,669	63,670	
UNRWA Joint Programme			38,923	
<b>Total</b>	<b>413,000</b>	<b>420,394</b>	<b>398,139</b>	The total in SPR is 395,079 (3% duplication of beneficiaries between School Feeding and other programmes)

**(b) Gaza**

**Planned beneficiaries as per PRRO project document**

<b>TABLE 2 - Beneficiaries by intervention type and location</b>	
<b>Intervention type</b>	<b>Gaza Strip</b>
<b>Emergency and Protracted Relief</b>	
Assistance to the destitute	90,000
Assistance to most vulnerable groups	32,000
Contingency emergency assistance	11,000
<b>Total relief</b>	<b>133,000</b>
<b>Recovery through livelihoods protection and skills development</b>	
Food for work	45,000
Food for IGA and vocational training	22,000
Life skills training	22,000
Food for education - school feeding	30,000
<b>Total recovery</b>	<b>119,000</b>
<b>TOTAL PRRO</b>	<b>252,000</b>

<b>Intervention type</b>	<b>Gaza/ Planned as per the PRRO document</b>	<b>2008 as per SPR</b>	<b>Remarks</b>
<b>Assistance to the destitute</b>	<b>90,000</b>	<b>89,702</b>	
<b>Assistance to most vulnerable groups</b>	<b>32,000</b>	<b>172,879</b> ( CHF 127000 + MoA 36,000 + APLA 9879)	<b>MOA was planned as FFT/FFW then converted into GFD general food distribution by March 2008</b>
<b>Contingency emergency assistance</b>	<b>11,000</b>		
<b>Food for work</b>	<b>45,000</b>		
<b>Food for IGA and vocational training</b>	<b>22,000</b>		
<b>Life skills training</b>	<b>22,000</b>		
<b>Food for education - school feeding</b>	<b>30,000</b>		
<b>Total</b>	<b>252,000</b>	<b>262581</b>	<b>2009 there was no PRRO in Gaza</b>

<b>Gaza PRRO 10387.1.01.01</b>		
<b>Actual tonnage distributed according to COMPAS report</b>		
<b>Intervention type</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009 *</b>
Assistance to the destitute	<b>12,916.46</b>	<b>1,520.48</b>
Assistance to most vulnerable groups	<b>9,393.78</b>	<b>1,702.14</b>
Contingency emergency assistance		
Food for work		
Food for IGA and vocational training		
Life skills training		
Food for education - school feeding		
UNRWA Joint Programme		

**\*Although the year 2009 is EMOP in Gaza but that part of the food distributed in 2009 is considered as part of the PRRO (The total PRRO distributed commodities in 2009 in Gaza reflected in the right column of table above)**

## **Annex 1: Terms of reference**

**PMR additions: proposals for additions or modifications to the ToR have been inserted in blue.**

**OEDE, Office of Evaluation Terms of reference**

**Evaluation of WFP Occupied Palestine Territories PRRO 10387.1**

**(Sep 2007- Aug 2009) to be extended to Jun 2010**

### **1. Background**

#### **1.A Context of the evaluation**

1. The WFP PRRO in oPt is approved for the period from Sep 2007 to Aug 2009 and its strategic focus is to meet the food needs of the most vulnerable non-refugees and to contribute to the poverty reduction strategy of the PNA.
2. Palestinians have experienced a dramatic decline in their living standards and a regression of the economy due to internal and external movement restrictions, limited control over natural resources, restricted access to local and international markets, limited access of Palestinian labourers to their former work in Israel and low rates of economic production.
3. The West Bank barrier construction is isolating thousands of people from their land, dividing communities and restricting access to essential services. The restriction on internal movements within the West Bank is contributing to the collapse of an already fragile economy and is threatening the population's food security.
4. In Gaza, the situation is the most critical. The food security of its 1.5 million people has been steadily deteriorating since Israeli sanctions in June 2007 including a suspension of all exports, a decrease of imports and tight restrictions on the type of goods permitted to enter through crossings, frequently closed by Israel. More recently, the conflict in Gaza created an almost complete breakdown of food supply and distribution system. WFP has launched Operation Lifeline Gaza to ramp up the distribution of food to people caught in the conflict, providing food assistance to 365,000 people, or 80 percent of the non-refugee population of Gaza. The PRRO was revised to exclude the Gaza operations.
5. The original version of the PRRO plans to assist 665,000 beneficiaries and the PNA through three fundamental components: (1) protracted and emergency relief, (2) recovery thorough support for productive activities and (3) enhanced knowledge, partnership and advocacy. These components make use of a number of intervention types: targeted food distributions, FFW, FFT, FFE, local food procurement, contingency stocks, emergency preparedness and partnerships and advocacy activities.
6. The operation has currently a total value of 167.3 M US\$<sup>133</sup> and foresees the distribution of 164,605 Mt of commodities. As of May 2009, the operation is resourced some 72 per cent<sup>134</sup>, about two/third through its implementation. An extension of the operation will bring the end date to Jun 2010.
7. Logistically, commodities are mainly procured internationally and deliveries to the oPt are coordinated with the Israeli army. Under security arrangements, deliveries to Gaza strip are trans-shipped at intermediary point where containers are de-stuffed and products are palletized before entering the territory.

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<sup>133</sup> WFP resourcing update May 2009

<sup>134</sup> Ibid.

8. While WFP supports Palestinian non-refugees, UNRWA implements the emergency relief addressing the situation of Palestinian refugees.

### 1.B Stakeholders

9. The stakeholders in this evaluation and their relation to the operation and evaluation are presented in table 1 below. They include external and internal groups which have a stake in the operation and the evaluation.

**Table 1: Stakeholder Matrix**

Key stakeholder groups	Interest in the subject of the evaluation	Interest in the evaluation	Implication for the evaluation
<b>WFP PAL CO staff</b> Management, Programme, Logistics, VAM, Human resources	* Main managers and coordinators of WFP operations and resources in oPt	* Evaluation findings may have an impact on the design of future PRRO in oPt * Evaluation will provide a mid term assesment of WFP PAL operations * Involved in management response to the evaluation	* Main interlocutor for the evaluation * Evaluation will work in direct coordination with PAL CO, including logistic field support * Main source of data * Important source of information
<b>WFP PAL Sub Office / special office staff</b> Local level management, programme, logistics	* Main managers and coordinators of WFP logistics and programme at local level	* Evaluation findings may have an impact on the design of future PRRO in oPt * Evaluation will provide a mid term assesment of WFP PAL operations * Involved in management response to the evaluation	* Main interlocutor for the evaluation field mission * Evaluation will work with West Bank Sub-Offices and Asdod special office during field visits * Important source of information
<b>WFP RB</b>	* PRRO in a country within their region of responsibility	* Evaluation findings may have an impact on the design of future PRRO in oPt * Evaluation will provide ainformation on WFP OMC success in providing assistance to WFP PAL CO, as part of their mandate * Involved in management response to the evaluation	* Keep informed * Source of information on support provided to PAL CO (cross-check) * Will be consulted through teleconference
<b>WFP HQ staff</b> School Feeding Unit, Logistics, VAM, etc.	* No specific role in this operation	* Evaluation findings may provide relevant information to technical units (lessons) * Involved in management response to the evaluation	* Keep informed * Will be consulted through briefing meetings in HQ
<b>Palestinian National Authority:</b> • Ministry of Planning • Ministry of Social Affairs • Ministry of Education • Ministry of Health	* Involved as recipient of international assistance, including capacity development * Cooperating partners in Programme implementation at national level	* Evaluation findings may have an impact on the design of future PRRO in oPt * Evaluation will look at partnership issues and may provide guidance to WFP and partners on future collaboration * Evaluation may provide insight to PNA about the development of a capacity development strategy and its implementation	* Important informant for this evaluation * Will be consulted through formal meetings at national level
<b>NGO partners</b> CRS CHF, NEF, AEA, Juzoor, etc.	* part of the Food Security Group	* Evaluation findings may have an impact on the design of future PRRO in oPt * Evaluation will look at partnership and coordination issues and may provide guidance to WFP and partners on future collaboration	* Informant for this evaluation * Will be consulted
<b>UN partners</b> UNRWA, UNDP, OCHA, UNIFEM, Unicef	* Involved in the implementation strategy of the PRRO	* Evaluation findings may have an impact on the design of future PRRO in oPt, including partnerships with UN agencies * Evaluation will look at partnership issues and may provide guidance to WFP and partners on future collaboration	* Important informant for this evaluation
<b>Donors</b> Main: Eur. Commission, USA	* Contributors to the PRRO with cash and food aid	* Evaluation results may affect donors' attitude vis-à-vis funding of WFP PRRO in oPt	* Source of information on issues like relevance, including appropriateness * Will be consulted through formal meetings at national level
<b>Communities</b> Women associations and Bakeries	* Direct interest in the PRRO as main beneficiaries	* No direct interest in this evaluation * Findings may influence future design of operation, including improved services to beneficiaries	* Key informants on issues like relevance and effectiveness
<b>Government of Israel</b> • Israeli Defense Forces (IDF)	* Interest in the PRRO as humanitarian assistance to population of the oPt * Coordination body for trans-shipment of food aid	* Evaluation findings may have an impact on the design of future PRRO in oPt * Evaluation will look at coordination issues and may provide guidance on future collaboration for enhanced efficiency	* Important informant for this evaluation * Will be consulted through formal meetings at national level
<b>WFP Executive Board</b>	* No specific role in this operation	* Interest in the evaluation as part of global strategy for learning and accountability (annual report)	* Keep informed

10. The PNA, the Government of Israel, and UN main stakeholder groups are composed of the following organisations or ministries.



<p><b>Palestinian National Authority:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ministry of Planning</li> <li>• Ministry of Social Affairs</li> <li>• Ministry of Education</li> <li>• Ministry of Health</li> </ul> <p><b>Government of Israel:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Israeli Defense Forces (IDF)</li> </ul>	<p><b>UN organizations:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA),</li> <li>• United Nations Development Programme (UNDP),</li> <li>• UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA),</li> <li>• United Nations Development Funds for Women (UNIFEM),</li> <li>• United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)</li> <li>• FAO</li> </ul>
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## **2. Reason for the evaluation**

### **2.A Rationale**

11. The evaluation will take place during the third and last year of the PRRO implementation as foreseen in the project document<sup>135</sup> and will provide information to guide the design of future WFP intervention in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

12. The main users of this evaluation will be the WFP PAL country office, the PNA and the Government of Israel. Evaluation findings and recommendations will contribute to the development of the next phase of WFP assistance, expected to start in Jul 2010. The next phase's project document will be presented to the Executive Board meeting in Jun 2010.

### **2.B Objective**

13. The objective of the evaluation is twofold. The main focus of the evaluation will be to seek to improve future performances of WFP operations by determining the reasons for the success and/or failure. Lessons will be internalized in new practices. It will also determine the degree of success and/or failure of the operation and accounts for aid expenditures to stakeholders.

14. The objective of the evaluation is twofold. The main focus of the evaluation will be to seek to improve future performances of WFP operations by determining the reasons for the success and/or failure. Lessons will be internalized in new practices. It will also determine the degree of success and/or failure of the operation and accounts for aid expenditures to stakeholders. The objective of the evaluation is twofold. The main focus of the evaluation will be to seek to improve future performances of WFP operations by determining the reasons for the success and/or failure. Lessons will be internalized in new practices. It will also determine the degree of success and/or failure of the operation and accounts for aid expenditures to stakeholders.

## **3. Scope of the evaluation**

### **3.A Scope**

15. The evaluation will focus on WFP activities and operations implemented for the achievement of the PRRO outcomes. The stated outcomes<sup>136</sup> of PRRO are linked to WFP corporate strategic objectives<sup>137</sup> and have indicators described in table 2 in the next page.

<sup>135</sup> Initially planned for second half of 2008. Due to the PRRO extension in time and JAN 2009 Gaza strip events, it will take place in second semester of 2009.

<sup>136</sup> PRRO 10387.1 project document's logical frame work, annex 2

<sup>137</sup> WFP Strategic Plan 2006-2009. A new strategic plan enters in force as of 2009.

**Table 2: WFP Strategic objectives / PRRO outcomes**

WFP Strategic Objectives:	WFP PAL PRRO Outcomes / (Indicators)
<b>SO2 Protect livelihoods in crisis situations and enhance resilience to shock.</b>	<b>Increased ability to meet food needs within targeted households in crisis situation</b> - Proportion of beneficiary household expenditure devoted to food.
<b>SO4 Support access to education and reduce gender disparity in access to education and skills training.</b>	• <b>Maintained enrolment</b> - Absolute enrolment
	• <b>Maintained attendance</b> – Attendance rates
	• <b>Maintained educational achievements</b> - Repetition rates, drop-out rates
	• <b>Maintained gender parity</b> - Ratio of girls to boys enrolled

16. The geographical scope of the evaluation will comprise Gaza (accounting for one third of PRRO operations) and the West Bank (two third of the operations) as per the original design. In view of the Dec 08/Jan 09 Gaza Strip events, WFP responded with a corporate emergency that affected the way the PRRO is being implemented in the oPt. The field mission will thus focus on West Bank. Security considerations may limit the evaluation mission’s access to the area.

**PMR addition: Please note it has been agreed that, security circumstances permitting, Gaza will be fully incorporated into the evaluation.**

17. The scope of this evaluation will be the operations as described in the project document WFP PAL 10387.1 for the time period from 01 Sep 2007 to 30 Sep 2009 and will include a review of different components of the PRRO (below) and a review of partnership agreements and their implementation.

**Table 3: PRRO components in support to PRRO Outcomes/Strategic Objectives**

Component	Sub component
1. Relief Assistance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Assistance to the destitute (General food Distribution and Institutional feeding)</li> <li>• Assistance to vulnerable groups (General Food Distribution)</li> <li>• Contingency emergency assistance (food stocks)</li> </ul>
2. Recovery through Support for Productive Activities and Skills Development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support for productive activities (FFW)</li> <li>• Skills development (FFT, emergency school feeding)</li> </ul>
3. Enhanced Knowledge Base, Partnership and Advocacy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Food security monitoring system</li> <li>• Emergency preparedness</li> <li>• Advocacy</li> </ul>

### 3.B Evaluability assessment

18. The logic model<sup>138</sup> presented in the project document summarizes the objectives of the operation, including the three intervention components and presents the WFP outputs to support the achievement of outcomes together with their indicators. Though, some indicators divert from corporate indicators, targets are not clarified in the logic model and the link between intervention components and PRRO Objectives will require clarifications for evaluation purposes.

19. Output targets are clearly described in the project document in term of beneficiary numbers and quantity of commodities to be distributed<sup>139</sup>. However, output targets for

<sup>138</sup> PRRO 10387.1 project document’s logical frame work, annex 2

<sup>139</sup> Project document, table 2

component 3: Enhanced knowledge Base, Partnerships and Advocacy will require further clarification.

20. From the project document, it is not clear how partnerships will operate. Letters of agreements with cooperating partners, if available, will explicit expected contributions and responsibilities.

21. The availability of a baseline study, the Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis (CFSVA) (Jan 2007), the Rapid Food Security Needs Assessment in Gaza Strip (Dec 2007) and the Joint Rapid Food Security Survey (FSS) (May 2008) will provide valuable base and trend information. The first round of primary data collection of the SEFSec, to be administered to around 8,000 households will further inform on the extent to which objectives are being met. The database of the SEFSec should be available and data analysis is planned to be carried out 2009 jointly by WFP/FAO and the PNA Bureau of Statistic. The analysis will follow the same food security methodology hence the results will be comparable with the FSS and with the CFSVA.

22. While the local purchase of commodities is part of one component of the PRRO, it is not presented in the logic model nor is it clear in the project documents what are the specific targets of that component. As the intended purpose of local purchases be beyond compliance with the WFP financial rules which stipulate that it should procure from developing countries “to the extent possible”, it may become necessary for the evaluation to review the logic model together with the PAL country office to incorporate objectives and targets for local purchases activities.

#### **4. Key issues/key evaluation questions**

23. In addition to the issues to be analysed by the evaluation, as per the evaluation report template (annex 3), the following key issues will be studied:

24. Beneficiary targeting. Potential duplication of beneficiaries between UNRWA and WFP and between WFP activities can lead to inclusion error in the PRRO. The evaluation will assess the extent to which duplication of beneficiaries of food aid occurs and its impact on the operation performance and cost. The evaluation will also consider exclusion errors of people in need of food assistance, as a result of the clear separation of between refugees (UNRWA) and non-refugees (WFP).

25. Parallel food aid systems. Both UNRWA and WFP are engaged in food aid distribution in the oPt. The two parallel systems, while servicing different beneficiaries, are potentially duplicating efforts. The evaluation will review potential areas of duplications, synergies and comment on current and possible future coordination and partnership.

26. Humanitarian access. The closure policy and IDF military operations limit the capacity of WFP to access beneficiaries of food aid. The evaluation will appraise the effect of these limitations on WFP s effectiveness and efficiency.

27. Rising costs. The evaluation will provide insight on the impact of rising food, transportation prices and transit costs on the ability of WFP to procure food requirements and how this affect programme s performance.

28. Partnerships. The evaluation will also consider levels of costs of cooperating partners and assess the extent of savings through partnering. This will provide an overview of current performance and quality of WFP partners.

29. Protection. The evaluation will consider the extent to which WFP activities are aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of the individual, in accordance with the letter and spirit of international human rights law, international humanitarian law and refugee law.

30. Programme design. The evaluation will inform the country office on the performance and relevance, in the current context, of the particular assistance components and make recommendations for the design and implementation of the following PRRO.

## **5. Evaluation design**

### **5.A Methodology**

31. The evaluation will implement traditional evaluation methods based on programme theory and logical framework approaches. It will use stakeholder discussions and secondary data to verify baseline information and to understand intended outcomes. The evaluation will employ internationally agreed evaluation criteria of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability<sup>140</sup>

32. The evaluation will use a range of data collection techniques such as key informant interviews, focus group discussions and other participatory approaches and structured document analysis. It will ensure that gender-balanced stakeholder groups with diverse views will be consulted to ensure the assessment, findings and recommendations are based on a comprehensive understanding of diverse perspectives on issues, performance and outcomes. Evaluators will act impartially and respect the code of conduct for the profession (Annex 1).

33. The views of beneficiaries on the operation's success to address their immediate food requirements and longer term education objectives will be captured through semi-structured interviews with community key informants during the field mission.

### **5.B Evaluation Quality Assurance System**

34. WFP has developed an Evaluation Quality Assurance System (EQAS) based on the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) norms and standards and good practice of the international evaluation community (Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action [ALNAP]) and Development Assistance Committee. It sets out process maps with in-built steps for quality assurance and templates for evaluation products. It also includes checklists for feedback on quality for each of the evaluation products including the TOR. All these tools are available with OEDE. EQAS will be systematically applied during the course of this evaluation and relevant documents provided to the evaluation team.

35. The evaluation team must implement quality assurance measures for data collected during the course of this evaluation.

### **5.C Phases and deliverables**

36. The evaluation will be undertaken in the main phases presented in the diagram below. For each phase of the evaluation, a specific output which is under the responsibility of the team leader and an allocation of time for each team member is defined. The main phases/outputs are as follows:

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<sup>140</sup> See evaluation criteria annex 5

**Diagram 1: Evaluation phases outputs and timeline**

Description	Output	Team Leader (days)	Team members (days)	Jul-09				Aug-09				Sep-09				Oct-09				Nov-09				Dec-09				Jan-10				
				1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	
<b>Evaluation phase</b>				50				36																								
<b>1 Pre-mission report</b>																																
Briefing	Briefing report	3	3																													
Prepare draft Pre-mission report	Draft pre-mission report	5	3																													
Revise pre-mission report	Revised draft pre-mission report	1	1																													
Final pre-mission report	Final pre-mission report	1	0																													
<b>2 Evaluation Mission</b>																																
Prepare field mission		1	1																													
Field mission	Aide memoir/debriefing presentation	16	16																													
Field mission debriefing	Debriefing	2	2																													
<b>3 Evaluation report</b>																																
Prepare evaluation report	Draft Evaluation report	10	8																													
1 st revision of evaluation report	Reviewed draft Evaluation report	1	0																													
Respond to stakeholder comments	Response matrix	2	1																													
2 nd revision of evaluation report	Reviewed draft Evaluation report	3	1																													
<b>4 Evaluation summary report</b>																																
Prepare summary report	Draft Summary report	4	0																													
Revise summary report	Reviewed draft summary report	1	0																													

**PMR addition: Please note that the above time frame has been revised. The field mission will now run from Oct 11 to Oct 31 an addition of 3 days for all team members, to help accommodate the full inclusion of Gaza in the evaluation. In addition, a debriefing in Rome has been proposed, and addition of 1 day + 1 or 2 travel days for all team members.**

### Pre-mission report.

37. The purpose of the pre-mission report (PMR) is two-fold: (1) review and clarify the TOR and present the methodology to be used to undertake the evaluation; and (2) present the preliminary findings of the desk review and identify information gaps to be filled with data collected during the evaluation mission. The pre-mission report is produced by the evaluation team under the responsibility of the team leader, on the basis of a desk review of all available documents. The pre-mission report will follow WFP Evaluation Quality Assurance System.

38. The visit itinerary will be determined during the preparatory phase by the evaluation team, based on their selection criteria. The visit itinerary will include WFP units, partners and government counterparts to be met in the capital and during field visit and locations to be visited. The country office will provide information on security and accessibility issues. The visit itinerary will be submitted to the country office for logistics and meetings arrangements.

39. The report will be shared with the WFP PAL country office before the evaluation mission, so that the country office is aware of issues and data needs.

### Evaluation mission

40. Fieldwork will be undertaken in the pPt: West Bank, security permitting and in Jerusalem. It consists in 3 main phases:

- a. **Briefing.** The mission will begin in Jerusalem with start-up meetings with stakeholders to brief them about the evaluation, followed by a second briefing to West Bank-based stakeholders.
- b. **Interviews.** Data collection phase with interviews in Jerusalem and at selected field sites will follow for a period of 2 weeks. The field visits will be used to discuss with a cross-section of internal and external stakeholders their views on WFP's performance. During fieldwork a range of evaluation techniques will be employed as defined in the pre-mission report.

- c. **Debriefing.** Finally, the evaluation mission present preliminary findings during two stakeholders' debriefings (West Bank and Jerusalem). HQ and the Regional Bureau will have the opportunity to participate via a teleconference.

## **Evaluation report**

41. The pre-mission reports, team members' reports and aide-memoir are working documents of the evaluation.

42. The findings will be brought together in a succinct analytical evaluation report that will (1) respond to the objectives set out for this evaluation; and (2) report against evaluation criteria specified in these terms of reference. The outline for the final report is included in annex 3.

43. The evaluation report will follow WFP Evaluation Quality Assurance System. The draft final report will be shared with stakeholders for comments. To ensure transparency, the evaluation will document comments received and how they were responded to in the evaluation report (Comments matrix, annex 6).

## **6. Organisation of the evaluation**

### **6.A Expertise of the evaluation team**

44. Preliminary desk review evidenced the need for the evaluation team to include expertise in the areas: livelihoods analysis and logistics. This expertise will cover the core functions of WFP in the oPt. A set of tasks is included in the Job Descriptions in Annex 4.

45. Team leader. The team leader will have strong evaluation experience and a good understanding of complex environment. In addition, team leader will have conceptual knowledge of capacity development. He will have good communication, and writing skills and the ability manage the overall evaluation process. The team leader will also speak Arabic.

46. Food security / livelihood analysis. A team member will bring required expertise in food security and livelihood analysis in particular to review of relevance and effectiveness of the operations on livelihoods.

47. Logistics. WFP's ability to timely deliver commodities at the lowest cost is key to the success of its operations. Expertise in this area will particularly prove useful in assessing efficiency of operation in terms of timeliness, costing, coordination with stakeholders (logistic arrangements). The team member will have proved experience in complex logistics environment.

### **6.B WFP stakeholders' roles and responsibilities**

48. This evaluation is managed by the WFP office of evaluation, the evaluation manager will be Michel Denis. The manager have the responsibility of the overall process of the evaluation, including the following tasks:

- a. Preparation of evaluation terms of reference.
- b. Selection and recruitment of evaluation team.
- c. Budget preparation and management.
- d. Evaluation team briefing.
- e. Field mission preparation, in conjunction with receiving country office (see below).
- f. First level quality assurance.

g. Reports dissemination.

h. Principal interlocutor between evaluation team, represented by the team leader and WFP. The WFP PAL country office will host the evaluation mission and is the main stakeholder of this evaluation. It will be important that time and resources are properly allocated as key source informants and to make available to the evaluation team and the evaluation manager the information deemed relevant during the course of the evaluation.

47. Additionally, the country office will be involved in the evaluation process, including:

- a. Participation in preparation of TORs (background information, key issues and general comments);
- b. Preparation of the field mission. Provide logistic assistance to the evaluation (support in arranging lodging, airport pick-ups and transportation arrangements to project areas);
- c. Provide support in organising meetings with relevant cooperating partners and government officials and accompany evaluation to counterparts, cooperating partners or field visits if required by team leader.

### **6.C Communication**

49. The Pre-mission report, final evaluation report and summary report will be submitted in English. The final report will be available internally by Dec 2009. The Executive Board summary will be presented to the Executive Board, in Jun 2010. The reports will afterwards be posted on WFP website, for general access.

50. In addition, the evaluation results will be incorporated into OEDE's new lessons' sharing system, once it is established (to come on-stream in 2009) to ensure lessons will be accessible to users in and outside WFP.

### **6.D Budget**

51. The evaluation costs will be covered by OEDE PSA Budget for operations evaluations.

### **Annexes:**

1. Background documents on evaluation concepts
2. Bibliography
3. Reports templates
4. Evaluation team
5. Technical annexes

## Annex 2: Bibliography

*NB Numerous internal WFP documents were also consulted; only the more significant are listed here*

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## **Annex 3: Persons met and places visited**

### **WFP - Headquarters, Rome**

Caroline Heider, Director, Evaluation Department, OEDE

Michel Denis, Evaluation Officer

Alphonsine Boya

Sune Kent

Joyce Luma

Claire Conan, Evaluation Officer

### **Country Office, Jerusalem**

#### *Directorate*

Christine van Nieuwenhuysse, Representative and Country Director

Tahir Nour, Deputy Country Director

#### *Finance*

Ahmad Zeitawi, National Finance Officer

Basel Idkeidek, Senior Finance Assistant

#### *Programme Support Unit*

Antoine Renard, Programme Adviser (Head of Unit)

Salah Lahham, Programme Officer (VAM)

Arwa Smeir, Programme Officer (M&E)

Mohammed Melhem, Programme Assistant - M&E Database Prog

#### *External Relation and Support Services Unit*

Olivia Hantz, Programme Advisor (Head of Unit)

#### *Admin Unit*

Thafer Abu-Ghannam, National Admin Officer

Sumood Nierat, Office Assistant

#### *West Bank Operations*

Caterina Galluzi, Head of the West Bank Operations

Sahar Natsheh, Programme Officer UVP

Samah Helou, National Programme Officer

#### *Pipelines and Procurement*

Mike Smeir, National Programme Officer - Pipeline

Ihab Kaloti, Senior Programme Assistant, Pipeline

Mahmoud Khwei, Senior Procurement Assistant

Nihal Nasser Eddin, Food Technologist/Local Procurement

#### *Logistics*

Bekim Mahmuti, Head of Logistics

Amjad Ayeshe, National Logistics Officer

Kirstie Campbell, Logistics Cluster Information Management Officer

#### *Security Unit*

Chris Barron, Civil / Military Coordinator

#### *Consultant (visiting)*

Agnes Dhur

### **Gaza office**

Jean-Noel Gentile, Programme Advisor - Head of Gaza Operations

Anne Valand, Programme Officer

Amir Yasin, Senior Programme Assistant

Wafa Zaqout, Senior Programme Assistant  
Rula Khalaf, Senior Programme Assistant  
Mohammed El Jamaleh, Programme Assistant  
Hafiz Thabit, Senior Logistics Assistant  
Hana Ghussain, Logistics Assistant

**Hebron Sub Office**

Majdi Dana, Senior Programme Assistant

**Nablus Sub Office**

Abbud Alshareef, Senior Programme Assistant

**Ashdod**

Yuval Cohen, Logistics, Ashdod

**Palestinian National Authority**

**Ministry of Agriculture**

Nemer Ayesh, Formerly Assistant General Director for External Services and Rural Development, Gaza

Najah Al Zalan, Formerly Director, Rural Development, Gaza

**Ministry of Education and Higher Education**

Dr Mohammed H. Rimawi, Director General, School Health, MOEHE, Ramallah

Ms Khoulood Nasser, Director, Office of the Deputy Minister

Maged Batran, Directorate General of School Health, MoEHE, Ramallah

**Ministry of Planning**

Dr Cairo Arafat, Director General, Aid Management and Coordination

Ms Maya, UN File, DG Aid Management and Coordination

**Ministry of Social Affairs**

Samar Awwad, External Relations, Focal Point for the Evaluation

Khaled Barghouti, Deputy Director, Directorate General, Combating Poverty

Ahmad Mahran, Deputy Director, Rehabilitation Unit

Mr Mohammed, Programme Coordinator

Khowla Al Nabulsi, Director, Nablus office

**United Nations agencies**

**FAO**

Erminio Sacco, Food security - Chief Technical Advisor

Mohammed El Shattali, Deputy Project Manager, Gaza

**UNDP**

Nasser Al-Faqih, Deputy Team Leader, Governance and Poverty Reduction

**UNDSS**

Andrew Pollock, Field Security Coordination Officer, UNDSS, Gaza.

**UNICEF**

James Kingori, Health and Nutrition

Rafat M. Hassouna, Project Officer, Health and Nutrition, Gaza

**OCHA**

Philippe Lazzarini, Head of Office

**UNRWA**

Thomas White, Deputy Director Operations, West Bank  
Sam Rose, Emergency Officer  
Graham McNeill  
Christer Nordahl, Deputy Director Operations, Gaza  
Jodie Clark, Procurement and Logistics Officer, UNRWA Gaza

**UNSCO**

Maxwell Gaylard, Deputy Special Coordinator and UN Resident/ Humanitarian Coordinator, Jerusalem

**World Health Organization**

Mahmoud Daher, National Health Officer, Gaza

**Donor Governments****Canadian Embassy**

Sandra Choufani, Development Officer  
Naela Shawar, Development Officer

**Department for International Development (United Kingdom)**

Neil Briscoe, Programme Manager  
Colum Wilson, Conflict and Humanitarian Adviser

**European Commission Humanitarian Aid (ECHO)**

Olivier Boudart, Food Assistance and Livelihoods Expert  
Beatrice Suzo

**USAID**

Suzy Srouji, Senior Health Advisor  
Sawsan Baghdadi, Aid Development Assistance Specialist  
Ferial Snouno, Field monitor, Gaza

**NGOs and consulting agencies****Action Contre le Faim (Spain)**

Stephen Williams, Head of Mission  
Elena Bertola, Food Security and Livelihoods Coordinator

**Al-Sahel Company for Institutional Development**

Amer S. Madi, Managing Partner  
Omar Abu Ghoush, Consultant

**Ard al Atfal**

Mahmoud Amro, General Director

**Catholic Relief Services**

Matt Davis, Country Representative  
Ian de la Rosa, Deputy Country Representative  
Issa Allan, Field Manager, Hebron-Bethlehem  
Rana Tubaileh, Senior Project Officer  
Walid Bakri, Assistant Project Officer, Hebron-Bethlehem  
Karina O'Meara, International Development Fellow

**Cooperative Housing Foundation**

Lana Abu Hiljeh, Country Director  
Ra'al Hanania, Programme Manager  
Ameen Alzeer, Deputy Programme Manager

Mohammed J. Sabe, WFP Programme Manager, CHF Gaza

**Near East Foundation**

Salah Abu Eisheh, North Office Manager

**Oxfam (United Kingdom)**

Elena Qleibo, Food Security and Livelihoods Officer, Gaza

**Flour mills**

Ziad Mustafa El Farra, General Manager Palestinian Flour Mills Co. Gaza

Abdel Dayem Awad, General Manager Al Salaam Flour Mills Gaza

Bassam Walweel, General Manager Golden Wheat Mills West Bank

**Places visited by evaluation team**

Jerusalem

Ramallah

Nablus

Hebron

Gaza (Gaza City, Khan Younis, Rafah, Karni)

Villages, and flour mills, in West Bank and Gaza

Ashdod

Ashqelon

Tel Aviv

## Annex 4: Acronyms

ALNAP	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action
BPR	Business Process Review
CAP	Consolidated Appeals Process
CFSVA	Comprehensive Food Security Vulnerability Assessment
CHF	Cooperative Housing Foundation
COGAT	Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories
COMPAS	Commodity Movement Processing and Analysis System
CP	Cooperation Partner
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
DDU	Delivery Duty Unpaid
DOC	Direct Operational Costs
DSC	Direct Support Costs
EC	European Commission
ECHO	European Community Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid
EMOP	Emergency Operation
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FFE	Food for education
FFT	Food for training
FFW	Food for work
FLA	Field Level Agreement
FMA	Field Monitor Assistants
FSMS	Food Security Monitoring System
FSS	Food Security Survey / Joint Rapid Food Security Survey
GFD	general food distribution
GS	Gaza Strip
HEPG	Humanitarian Emergency Policy Group
IDF	Israel Defence Forces
INGO	international non-governmental organization
LTSH	Landside Transport Storage and Handling
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MoEHE	Ministry of Education and Higher Education
MoSA	Ministry of Social Affairs
mt	metric tons
NEF	Near East Foundation
NGO	non-governmental organization
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODOC	other direct operational costs
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OE	Office of Evaluation (ex OEDE)
oPt	occupied Palestinian territory
OSDI	Oversight Services Division Investigation
OSDA	Office of Internal Audit
PCBS	Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics
PNA	Palestinian National Authority
PRDP	Palestinian Recovery and Development Plan
PRRO	protracted relief and recovery operation
SEFSec	Socio-economic and Food Security Monitoring System



SO	Special Operation
SPR	Standard Project Report
ToR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDSS	United Nations Department of Safety and Security
UNEG	United Nations Evaluation Group
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
UNSCO	United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VAM	vulnerability analysis and mapping
WB	West Bank
WFP	World Food Programme

## Annex 5: Evaluation matrix

Issues and questions may be relevant to more than one of the five parameters under which they are grouped; in this case they are included under the most relevant parameter, though occasionally this is somewhat arbitrary.<sup>141</sup>

In many cases the indicators specified will be accessible, if at all, from documentation still to be obtained and reviewed. Such availability will be reviewed in the evaluation report. In the absence of specified indicators, issues will be reviewed in the light of the best indicators or methods available.

Question of contribution and attribution will be central to impact assessment. In the probable absence of sufficiently detailed research, this issue will be addressed in the light of information available

<b>Issue/Question</b>	<b>Indicators/methods</b>	<b>Main sources of information</b>
<b>Relevance, appropriateness, coherence</b>		
To what extent has programme implementation been coherent with WFP policies and strategic objectives?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Coherence between programme objectives and WFP objectives</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Interviews with WFP</li> <li>◦ Consolidated Framework of WFP Policies</li> <li>◦ WFP Humanitarian Principles</li> <li>◦ Other documents in Section 2.2.5 of bibliography</li> </ul>
To what extent has the WFP programme been integrated with and supported PNA recovery policies and strategies, with regard to relief, rehabilitation, recovery and development?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Coherence between WFP and PNA policies and programmes, in theory and in practice</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Interviews with WFP and PNA</li> <li>◦ National Nutrition Policy and Strategy (2008)</li> <li>◦ Palestinian Reform and Development Plan 2008-2010</li> <li>◦ PRDP and PRDP implementation report</li> <li>◦ Other documentation in Section 2.2.4 of bibliography</li> </ul>
What has been the relevance of different interventions to support livelihoods for different social groups?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Quantitative where information available (economic impact of different interventions)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Interviews with beneficiaries and other stakeholders</li> <li>◦ Research documentation where available</li> </ul>
<b>Issue/Question</b>		
<b>Relevance, appropriateness, coherence</b>		
To what extent has programming been consistent with the findings of vulnerability analyses and needs assessments?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Relationship of programming to vulnerability analyses</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Documents in Section 2.2.3 of bibliography</li> </ul>
Were the commodities supplied through the programme acceptable to and palatable for different categories of beneficiary?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Mainly qualitative</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Beneficiary interviews</li> <li>◦ WFP interviews</li> <li>◦ Project reports</li> <li>◦ School Feeding Evaluation-cum-Review, June 2009</li> <li>◦ Information from Section 2.2.3 of bibliography</li> <li>◦ Studies indicating general socio-economic conditions of food aid beneficiaries; Studies indicating beneficiary use of and response to WFP, UNRWA, PNA or similar</li> </ul>

<sup>141</sup> Comments on the PMR draft suggested some issues could be relocated within the matrix; this has been done in most but not all cases.

		<b>interventions</b>
To what extent have Israeli Government policies, especially closure, created the need for WFP programmes? To what extent has this been compounded by denial of humanitarian access? To what extent can WFP address this issue?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Macro-political and general analysis</li> <li>◦ Analysis of institutional position of WFP</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Interviews with wide range of stakeholders.</li> <li>◦ Background documentary research.</li> <li>◦ General analysis, background expertise of evaluation team</li> </ul>
To what extent is there duplication, overlap or lack of coherence between WFP and UNRWA programmes? How has this been addressed?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Comparability of WFP and UNRWA programmes. NB It will not be possible to assess this in great detail.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Interviews with WFP and UNRWA.</li> <li>◦ WFP and UNRWA programme documentation</li> <li>◦ Research documentation if available</li> </ul>
Is there a need to build in flexibility over beneficiary numbers in view of the deteriorating situation and/or to deal with the effects of the WB barrier?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Variations in beneficiary numbers over time</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Interviews with WFP and other stakeholders</li> <li>◦ Project documentation</li> </ul>
Has liaison with the PNA been successful, and at an appropriate level? Have WFP policies been coherent with those of the PRSP and PRDP?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Qualitative assessment</li> <li>◦ Indications from other agencies re nature of their cooperation with PNA</li> <li>◦ Assessment of policy coherence</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Interviews with PNA, WFP, UN agencies, and others</li> </ul>
<b>Issue/Question</b>	<b>Indicators/methods</b>	<b>Main sources of information</b>
<b>Relevance, appropriateness, coherence</b>		
Have field level agreements with local partners been appropriate?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Comparative effectiveness and efficiency of partners (cost-benefit analysis)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Interviews with WFP and local partner</li> <li>◦ Project documentation</li> <li>◦ FLA agreements</li> </ul>
Has coordination with other UN agencies been productive and appropriate? Have policies been coherent with other UN agencies and with the CAP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Qualitative assessment</li> <li>◦ Indications from other agencies re nature of their cooperation with other UN agencies</li> <li>◦ Assessment of policy coherence</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Interviews with UN agencies</li> </ul>
Has liaison with the Government been appropriate? Has liaison with the IDF been at an appropriate level? Is there a need for more formal agreements?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Qualitative and analytical assessment.</li> <li>◦ Indications from other agencies re nature of their liaison with Government and IDF.</li> <li>◦ Analysis of position of WFP in relation to UN lead agencies (UNDP, UNRWA, UNSCO)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Interviews with WFP, Government of Israel, IDF, UNDP, UNRWA, UNSCO.</li> <li>◦ Review of agreements</li> </ul>
Have relations and agreements with donors been appropriate? Have WFP programmes been coherent with donor policies?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Comparative success of fundraising initiatives</li> <li>◦ Qualitative assessment of effectiveness of in-country relationships</li> <li>◦ Assessment of policy coherence</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Relevant agreements</li> <li>◦ Interviews with donors</li> </ul>
Protection: how important is this and how much is there a role for WFP? Are there relevant lessons from the experience of other agencies in combining protection with livelihoods	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Planned and actual results with regard to protection</li> <li>◦ Analysis of institutional position of WFP</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Interviews with WFP and other stakeholders</li> <li>◦ Project documentation</li> <li>◦ Protection and livelihoods in the oPt (July 2009)</li> <li>◦ Building WFP capacity in Protection</li> <li>◦ Fourth Geneva Convention</li> <li>◦ Protection, ALNAP guide for Humanitarian agencies</li> </ul>

<b>Issue/Question</b>	<b>Indicators/methods</b>	<b>Main sources of information</b>
<b>Efficiency</b>		
What circumstances led to the first substantial WFP support for the 'new poor' in 2004?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Changes in indicators of humanitarian need in last decade</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Interviews with WFP</li> <li>◦ EMOP 10190.2 project document</li> <li>◦ Background documentation on humanitarian indicators</li> </ul>
How appropriate has been the overall design of PRRO 10378.1?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Summative</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ PRRO 10378.1 project document</li> </ul>
What has been the cost efficiency of food distribution? What are appropriate parameters for comparison?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Comparative cost per beneficiary over time.</li> <li>◦ <i>NB This indicator is relevant (and often key) to most of the questions/ issues in this section</i></li> <li>◦ Comparison with WFP experience elsewhere, though taking local realities into account</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Detailed reports and financial information</li> <li>◦ Interviews with WFP</li> </ul>
What has been the cost efficiency of WFP's working relationships with local partners through Field Level Agreements (FLAs)? Can this be represented in terms of savings to WFP?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Comparative cost per beneficiary over time per individual partner, and compared with WFP direct implementation.</li> <li>◦ NB Relations between WFP, partners and PNA will need to be taken into account</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ FLA agreements</li> <li>◦ Financial reports</li> </ul>
What has been the impact of rising food, transportation prices and transit costs on the ability of WFP to procure food requirements, and how has this affected the programme's performance?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Comparative cost per beneficiary over time.</li> <li>◦ Analysis of complex variables involved.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Project reports</li> <li>◦ Financial reports</li> <li>◦ Detailed reports on logistics and food supply as requested</li> <li>◦ EMOP 10774.0 (West Bank) project document</li> <li>◦ SEFSec, West Bank, Aug 09</li> <li>◦ Information in documents in bibliography Section 2.2.3</li> </ul>
<b>Issue/Question</b>	<b>Indicators/methods</b>	<b>Main sources of information</b>
<b>Efficiency</b>		
What measures are needed to improve food procurement? What has been the impact of closure policies on food procurement?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Qualitative, analytical</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Detailed reports as requested</li> <li>◦ Stakeholder interviews</li> <li>◦ General analysis</li> </ul>
How efficient has the food pipeline been?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Quantitative, comparative</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Detailed reports</li> <li>◦ Interviews with WFP</li> </ul>
How efficient and reliable have relations with UNRWA been with regard to food supplies?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Qualitative, over time</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Detailed reports</li> <li>◦ UNRWA reports</li> <li>◦ Interviews with WFP and UNRWA</li> </ul>
What has been the effect of the BPR actions on the food pipeline?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Quantitative and qualitative</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Detailed reports</li> <li>◦ Interviews with WFP</li> </ul>
What has been the financial and operational impact of closure on logistics operations?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Quantitative, analytical</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Detailed reports</li> <li>◦ Interviews with WFP</li> <li>◦ General analysis</li> </ul>
What has been the effectiveness of commodity tracking (COMPAS)?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Quantitative and qualitative over time</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Detailed reports</li> <li>◦ Interviews with WFP</li> </ul>

How efficient have been logistics operations? How has this question been affected by liaison with UNRWA? Does WFP need better access to plated trucks?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Quantitative and qualitative over time</li> <li>◦ Comparison with other WFP experience, taking local realities into account</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Detailed reports</li> <li>◦ Interviews with WFP and UNRWA</li> </ul>
How well has WFP managed the transition to (and potentially from) EMOPs 10817.0 and 10774.0?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Qualitative, analytical</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Project documents for EMOPs 10817.0 and 10774.0</li> <li>◦ WFP and other stakeholder interviews</li> </ul>
Are the time frames for planning and implementing PRROs and EMOPs appropriate?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Qualitative, analytical</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Interviews with WFP, UN agencies, donors</li> <li>◦ General analysis</li> </ul>
Are the reporting time frames and templates for PRROs appropriate?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Qualitative, analytical</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Interviews with WFP, UN agencies, donors</li> <li>◦ General analysis</li> </ul>
<b>Issue/Question</b>	<b>Indicators/methods</b>	<b>Main sources of information</b>
<b>Efficiency (continued)</b>		
General management and Internal institutional arrangements: adequate staffing, deployment of personal, training, technical backstopping, linkages between country office, regional bureau and Headquarters	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Qualitative, analytical, comparative</li> <li>NB Comparisons with other WFP operations will need to take into account the very specific circumstances of the oPt</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Interviews with WFP staff</li> <li>◦ Internal project documentation</li> </ul>
Overall cost efficiency of the operation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Quantitative, summative, comparative</li> <li>NB as above re comparisons</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Interviews with WFP staff</li> <li>◦ Internal project documentation</li> </ul>
<b>Effectiveness</b>		
What have been the outcomes against objectives for all the components of PRRO 10378.1?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Summative</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Project documents and reports</li> <li>◦ Revised logframe (May 2009)</li> </ul>
What was the de facto value of the income support provided, in relation to overall needs?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Quantitative, comparative, analysis over time</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Detailed financial information</li> <li>◦ Information from Section 2.2.3 of bibliography</li> </ul>
What factors account for the difference between planned and actual results.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Summative</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ PRRO 10378.1 project document</li> <li>◦ PRRO 10378.1 project reports</li> <li>◦ Detailed reports</li> <li>◦ WFP interviews</li> </ul>
Gender: What are the reasons for the differences between planned and actual results from programme strategies that aimed to promote gender equity? <sup>142</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Planned and actual results with regard to gender</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Interviews with WFP and other stakeholders</li> <li>◦ Project documentation</li> </ul>
Advocacy: What progress has been made in developing the proposed advocacy initiatives, actual results, and appropriateness as perceived by PNA, UN and other stakeholders.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Planned and actual results with regard to advocacy</li> <li>◦ Analysis of institutional position of WFP</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Interviews with WFP and other stakeholders</li> <li>◦ Project documentation</li> </ul>
How effectively has PRRO 10378.1 been monitored?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Qualitative</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Detailed documentation; project reports; interview School Feeding Evaluation-cum-Review, June 2009</li> </ul>

<sup>142</sup> Questions of gender and advocacy can be considered in relation to the appropriateness, effectiveness and efficiency

<b>Issue/Question</b>	<b>Indicators/methods</b>	<b>Main sources of information</b>
<b>Impact<sup>143</sup></b>		
What have been the changes in the conditions of beneficiaries, by type of intervention?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ changes in nutritional and health status of beneficiaries;</li> <li>◦ changes in socio-economic conditions of beneficiaries;</li> <li>◦ proportion of household expenditure spent on food;</li> <li>◦ attendance rates at kindergarten and primary school;</li> </ul> <p><i>NB all these have multiple causes and raise very substantial questions of attribution versus contribution, as well as raising the possibilities of unintended and/or negative impact.</i></p> <p><i>NB2 It is very uncertain how much of this information is available, particularly for the time frame under review (2007-9)</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ See below, by individual issue</li> </ul>
How is it possible to assess the impact of WFP interventions, and especially the contribution of WFP <i>vis a vis</i> other factors?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Analysis</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Addressing Attribution Through Contribution Analysis</li> <li>◦ Contribution analysis. An approach to exploring cause and effect</li> <li>◦ Reporting on Outcomes. Setting Performance Expectations and Telling Performance Stories</li> <li>◦ Various stakeholder interviews</li> </ul>
<b>Issue/Question</b>	<b>Indicators/methods</b>	<b>Main sources of information</b>
<b>Impact (continued)</b>		
How can the health and nutritional status of WFP beneficiaries be assessed?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Quantitative changes in nutritional status of beneficiaries</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ PAL Nutrition review Nov 2006</li> <li>◦ WFP Nutrition review of the PRRO 10387.0</li> <li>◦ WFP Safety Nets Study oPt full report (Jul 2008)</li> <li>◦ National Nutrition Policy and Strategy (2008)</li> <li>◦ Operational Plan of Action for Nutrition 2008-2010</li> <li>◦ Other relevant research and documentation</li> <li>◦ Contribution analysis documentation as above</li> </ul>
How can the socio-economic status of WFP beneficiaries be assessed?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Quantitative economic changes and other qualitative changes in the socio-economic status of beneficiaries</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Humanitarian Impact of the West Bank Barrier Jan 2006</li> <li>◦ Protection and livelihoods in the pPt (Jul 2009)</li> <li>◦ UNRWA Socio Economic Developments Jul 2008</li> </ul>

<sup>143</sup> It was suggested in comments on the draft of the PMR that the Impact section overlapped unduly with PRRO outcomes but while we feel this is true in relation to the issues raised, it is not true in relation to the indicators proposed. The problem with impact assessment is that indicators are likely to be unavailable, or insufficient for serious assessment.

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Progress Reports on the Implementation of the PRDP 2008-2010</li> <li>◦ Other relevant research and documentation</li> <li>◦ Contribution analysis documentation as above</li> </ul>
How can the proportion of household expenditure spent on food be assessed?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Quantitative analysis</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ FFE assessment Dec 2006</li> <li>◦ FOOD SECURITY and MARKET MONITORING Jun2007 report#9</li> <li>◦ Food Security Information for action programme Apr 2007</li> <li>◦ PAL CFSVA Jan 2007</li> <li>◦ PAL Joint Rapid Food Security Survey May 2008</li> <li>◦ WFP Safety Nets Study oPt full report (Jul 2008)</li> <li>◦ Other relevant research and documentation</li> <li>◦ Contribution analysis documentation as above</li> </ul>
<b>Issue/Question</b>	<b>Indicators/methods</b>	<b>Main sources of information</b>
<b>Impact (continued)</b>		
How can the comparative economic and health status of WFP beneficiaries be assessed <i>vis a vis</i> other population groupings, e.g. refugees receiving humanitarian aid; refugees and non-refugees not receiving humanitarian aid.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Quantitative analysis</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ UNRWA Socio Economic Developments Jul 2008</li> <li>◦ WFP Safety Nets Study oPt full report (Jul 2008)</li> <li>◦ Other relevant research and documentation</li> <li>◦ Contribution analysis documentation as above</li> </ul>
How can the comparative impact of different types of intervention be assessed, i.e. food for vulnerable, FFW, FFT, FFE, cash vouchers?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Summative analysis of above findings. NB may provide indicative pointers at best.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ FFE assessment Dec 2006</li> <li>◦ WFP Safety Nets Study oPt full report (Jul 2008)</li> <li>◦ Other relevant research and documentation</li> <li>◦ Contribution analysis documentation as above</li> </ul>
What has been the environmental impact of the programme?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Quantitative and qualitative analysis</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Interviews with WFP, beneficiaries and other stakeholders</li> <li>◦ Documentation if available</li> </ul>
<b>Sustainability</b>		
What does sustainability mean in the context of the oPt?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ General analysis</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Stakeholder interviews</li> <li>◦ Consolidated Framework of WFP Policies</li> <li>◦ General analysis</li> </ul>
How do WFP programmes influence the potential for achieving sustainable impact in the short, medium and longer term, and in a post-conflict situation should it arise?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Information from a variety of documentation</li> <li>◦ Summative analysis</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Project documentation</li> <li>◦ Stakeholder interviews</li> <li>◦ Consolidated Framework of WFP Policies</li> <li>◦ General analysis</li> </ul>
Given the fundamentally political causes of food insecurity, and deteriorating food security conditions, what possibilities or options, if any, exist for WFP developing an exit strategy?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Analysis</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Stakeholder interviews</li> <li>◦ Consolidated Framework of WFP Policies</li> <li>◦ General analysis</li> </ul>

## **Annex 6: Evaluation logframes**

Please find on the following page:

- A. Logframe from PRRO 10387.1 project document
- B. Revised logframe of May 2009



ANNEX II - LOGICAL FRAMEWORK		
Results chain	Performance indicators	Risks, assumptions
<b>Impact:</b> Contributed to the realization of the PNA mid-term development plan by assisting the destitute, protecting livelihoods, supporting productive activities and developing skills.	<b>Impact Indicators</b> Positive change in household food security and livelihoods.	De-institutionalization of the PNA stops. Political and security environments do not deteriorate. Donors support continues notably through contributions in cash.
<b>SO 2: Protect livelihoods in crisis situations and enhance resilience to shocks</b>		
<b>Outcomes:</b> 1.1 Increased ability to meet food needs within targeted households in crisis situation.	<b>Outcome Indicators:</b> 1.1 Proportion of beneficiary household expenditure devoted to food.	
<b>Outputs:</b> 1.1.1 Timely provision of food in sufficient quantity for targeted beneficiaries in crisis and transition situations.	<b>Output Indicators:</b> 1.1.1.1 (By project, category, age group, sex) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; Actual beneficiaries receiving WFP food assistance as a percentage of planned beneficiaries.</li> <li>&gt; Actual mt of food distributed through each activity as a percentage of planned distributions.</li> <li>&gt; Actual participants in each activity as a percentage of planned distributions.</li> </ul> 1.1.1.2 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; Number and types of assets created/trainings conducted.</li> <li>&gt; Percentage of women in decision-making position in food-management committees.</li> <li>&gt; Number of partners attracted to provide access to micro-credit</li> </ul>	Target population participates in identification, planning, implementation and maintenance of project activities and assets created. Appropriate partners are selected for implementation. Partners commitments are honoured. Closures do not increase.  No pipeline breaks.
1.1.2 Enhanced knowledge and advocacy on food insecurity.	1.1.2.1 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; FSMS with nutritional component established.</li> <li>&gt; Number of market analysis conducted.</li> <li>&gt; Food Insecurity Atlas accomplished.</li> </ul>	National Nutritional System is implemented.

ANNEX II - LOGICAL FRAMEWORK		
Results chain	Performance indicators	Risks, assumptions
<b>SO 4: Support access to education and reduce gender disparity in access to education and skills training</b>		
<b>Outcomes:</b> (by gender and type of assisted schools) 2.1 Maintained enrolment. 2.2 Maintained attendance. 2.3 Maintained educational achievements. 2.4 Maintained gender parity.	<b>Outcome indicators:</b> (by gender and type of assisted schools) 2.1.1 Absolute enrolment. 2.2.1 Attendance rates. 2.3.1 Repetition rates. 2.3.2 Drop-out rates. 2.4.1 Ratio of girls to boys enrolled.	Easing of PNA financial crisis and resumption of full payment of salaries to MOEHE employees. Budget allocations to basic education are adequate and timely. Schools keep functioning properly. Adequate human resources are allocated to FFE by partners.
<b>Outputs:</b> The outputs listed below relate to outcomes 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4. 2.1.1 Timely provision of food in sufficient quantity for targeted schoolchildren. 2.1.2 Timely provision of food in sufficient quantity to women's centres and bakeries. 2.1.3 Timely provision of incentive rations in sufficient quantity to women.	<b>Output indicators:</b> 2.1.1.1 Actual children receiving assistance as a percentage of planned, by age group and sex. 2.1.1.2 Actual quantity of food distributed as a percentage of planned by commodity. 2.1.2.1 Actual number of women's centres and bakeries receiving food as a percentage of planned. 2.1.2.2 Actual quantity of food distributed to women's centres and bakeries as a percentage of planned by commodity. 2.1.3.1 Actual women receiving incentive rations as a percentage of planned figure. 2.1.3.2 Actual quantity of incentive rations distributed to women as a percentage of planned by commodity.	No significant schooling disruptions. Closures are not increased or displaced. Women's associations and bakeries keep functioning properly. No pipeline breaks.

ANNEX II - Logical Framework Summary for Occupied Palestinian Territory PRRO 10387.1		
Results-Chain (Logic Model)	Performance Indicators	Risks, Assumptions
<b>Impact:</b> Contributed to the realisation of the PNA mid-term development plan by assisting the destitute, protecting livelihoods, supporting productive activities and developing skills.	<b>Impact indicators</b> Positive change in household food security and livelihoods.	De-institutionalization of the PNA stops. Political and security environments do not deteriorate. Donors support continues notably through contributions in cash.
<b>SO 2: Prevent Acute Hunger and invest in disaster preparedness and mitigation measures</b>		
<b>Goals: To support and strengthen capacities of governments to prepare for, assess and respond to acute hunger arising from disasters; To support and strengthen resiliency of communities to shocks through safety nets or asset creation, including adaptation to climate change</b>		
<b>Components:</b> <b>Enhanced knowledge base, partnerships and advocacy; Protracted and emergency relief assistance (GFD, institutional feeding)</b>		
<b>Outcomes:</b> 2.1 Early-warning systems; contingency plans; food security monitoring systems; in place and enhanced with WFP capacity development support  2.2. Adequate food consumption over assistance period of targeted households at risk of falling into acute hunger	<b>Outcome indicators:</b> 2.1.1. Disaster preparedness index. 2.1.2 Operational food security and monitoring system (100%)  2.2.1. Household food consumption score 2.2.2 Proportion of beneficiary household expenditure devoted to food. (% decreased or maintained at 58%)	
<b>Outputs:</b> 2.1. Disaster mitigation measures in place with WFP capacity development support  2.2. Food items distributed in sufficient quantity and quality to targeted women, men, girls and boys under secure conditions	<b>Output indicators:</b> 2.1.1. Food Security Monitoring mechanisms in place. (2 food Security surveys)  2.2.1 Number of women, men, girls and boys receiving food, by category and as % of planned figures (108,581 ATD beneficiaries, & 95,000 AVG beneficiaries in the West Bank)  2.2.2. Tonnage of food distributed, by type, as % of planned distribution (ATD: 17,422 mt, AVG: 10,118 mt)  2.2.3. Quantity of fortified foods, complementary foods and special nutritional products distributed, by type, as % of planned distribution (100% of planned distribution)  2.2.4. Quantity of fortified foods, complementary foods and special nutritional products distributed, by type, as % of actual distributions (90% of actual tonnage distributed)	Target population participates in identification, planning, implementation and maintenance of project activities and assets created.  Appropriate partners are selected for implementation.  Partners commitments are honored.  Closures do not increase.  No pipeline breaks.  Regular meetings of Nutrition thematic Groups

<p><b>Outputs:</b></p> <p>3.1.1 Food and non-food items (incl. cash) distributed in sufficient quantity and quality to targeted women, men, girls and boys under secure conditions</p> <p>3.1.2. Employment opportunities provided to vulnerable unemployed workers</p> <p>3.2. Developed, built or restored livelihood assets by targeted communities and individuals</p> <p>3.3. School feeding coverage aligned with programme of work</p>	<p><b>Output indicators:</b></p> <p>3.1.1 Number of women, men, girls and boys receiving food and non-food items, by category and as % of planned figures (FFW beneficiaries: 29,218 &amp; School Feeding Children: 52,507 &amp; Cash for Work participants:191)</p> <p>3.1.2. Tonnage of food distributed, by type, as % of planned distribution(1598 mt)</p> <p>3.1.3. Quantity of fortified foods, complementary foods and special nutritional products distributed, by type, as % of planned distribution (100% of planned distribution)</p> <p>3.1.4. Quantity of fortified foods, complementary foods and special nutritional products distributed, by type, as % of actual distributions (90% of actual distributed tonnage)</p> <p>3.1.2.1. Actual number of work days of short term employment created per month (20 days per month, 8 hours per day)</p> <p>3.1.2.2. Actual number of unemployed workers who found short term employment (191 workers)</p> <p>3.2.1. Number of community assets created or restored by targeted communities and individuals(37 community assets)</p> <p>3.3.1. Number of schools and kindergartens assisted by WFP (116 schools &amp; 170 kindergartens)</p>	<p>Target population participates in identification, planning, implementation and maintenance of project activities and assets created.</p> <p>Appropriate partners are selected for implementation.</p> <p>Partners commitments are honored.</p> <p>Closures do not increase.</p> <p>No pipeline breaks.</p> <p>Easing of PNA financial crisis and resumption of full payment of salaries to MOEHE employees.</p> <p>Budget allocations to basic education are adequate and timely.</p> <p>Schools keep functioning properly.</p> <p>Adequate human resources are allocated to FFE by partners.</p>
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SO 4: STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 4: REDUCE CHRONIC HUNGER AND UNDERNUTRITION		
Goal: To help countries to bring undernutrition below critical levels and break the inter-generational cycle of chronic hunger		
Component: Food For Training in income-generating and vocational training		
<p><b>Outcomes:</b></p> <p>4.1 (c) Targeted households have increased their human and financial capital to break the inter-generational cycle of chronic hunger</p>	<p><b>Outcome indicators:</b></p> <p>4.1.1. Household human and financial capital score</p>	
<p><b>Outputs:</b></p> <p>4.1.1 (c) Food items distributed in sufficient quantity and quality to targeted women, men, girls and boys under secure conditions</p> <p>4.1.2 Developed and/or enhanced human and financial capital for targeted households</p>	<p><b>OUTPUT INDICATORS:</b></p> <p>4.1.1.1 Number of women, men, girls and boys receiving food items, by category and as % of planned figures. (29,218 FFT beneficiaries)</p> <p>4.1.1.2. Tonnage of food distributed, by type, as % of planned distribution (533 mt)</p> <p>4.1.1.3. Quantity of fortified foods, complementary foods and special nutritional products distributed, by type, as % of planned distribution (100% of planned Distribution)</p> <p>4.1.1.4. Quantity of fortified foods, complementary foods and special nutritional products distributed, by type, as % of actual distributions (90% of actual distribution)</p> <p>4.1.2.1. Number of targeted households with developed and/or enhanced human and financial capital, by type (4,347 households)</p>	<p>Target population participates in identification, planning, implementation and maintenance of project activities and assets created.</p> <p>Appropriate partners are selected for implementation.</p> <p>Partners commitments are honored.</p> <p>Closures do not increase.</p> <p>No pipeline breaks.</p>

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