

Impact Evaluation

WFP School Feeding Programmes in Cote D'Ivoire (1999-2009): A Mixed Method Impact Evaluation Vol I Full Report

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Prepared by

Marie Cadrin, Team Leader

Mamadou Baro, Lead Quantitative Research

Koffi Kuakou Adjei, Educational Specialist

Institute of National Statistics, Data Collection/Entry

University of Bouake, Abidjan Campus, Data Collection/Analysis

Marie Sardier, Team Member

Koffi Kuakou Adjei, Special Adviser

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wfp.org

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To all, we offer our sincere thanks and our appreciation of the importance of their contribution to this work.

This evaluation was interrupted by the political crisis in Cote d'Ivoire and could not be completed with the full scope and level of rigour originally designed. It nevertheless offers important evidence on the outcomes and impacts of WFP's support to school canteens and the factors affecting those results.

The opinions expressed are those of the Evaluation Team, and do not necessarily reflect those of the World Food Programme. Responsibility for the opinions expressed in this report rests solely with the authors. Publication of this document does not imply endorsement by WFP of the opinions expressed.

The designation employed and the presentation of material in the maps do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of WFP concerning the legal or constitutional status of any country, territory or sea area, or concerning the delimitation of frontiers.

Evaluation Management


Evaluation Manager:	Sally Burrows, Senior Evaluation Officer
Director, Office of Evaluation:	Caroline Heider

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Fact Sheet: WFP's School Feeding Programmes in Cote d'Ivoire

Project No.	Type	Time frame	End Date (actual)	Title	Total WFP cost	% funded
3358.2	DEV	Oct 1998 Sep 2002	Mar 2004	Support to community programme	5,610,836	88%
10244.0	EMOP	Nov 2002 Jan 2003	Jan 2004	Civil strife in Côte d'Ivoire and regional implications	6,894,969	69%
10244.1	Regional EMOP	May 2003 Dec 2003	Feb 2005	Targeted food assistance to people affected by the Côte d'Ivoire crisis	43,378,653	81%
10372.0	Regional PRRO	Jan 2005 Dec 2005	Jul 2007	Cote d' Ivoire Crisis and Regional Impact	69,630,413	87%
10672.0	PRRO	Jul 2007 Dec 2008	N/A	Assistance to populations affected by the Côte d'Ivoire protracted crisis	78,407,798	60%
10759.0	DEV	Jan 2009 Dec 2013	N/A	Support to Sustainable School Feeding	11,617,439	19%



Source: SPR, *Figures for regional projects are for Cote d'Ivoire only.



Main Stakeholders

- ✓ School children and their families
- ✓ Parents and teachers
- ✓ *Direction Nationale des Cantines* (DNC)
- ✓ Ministry of Rural Development
- ✓ Private non-profit organizations
- ✓ UN Agencies
- ✓ WFP

Main Donors

- ✓ Canada
- ✓ European Commission
- ✓ France
- ✓ Germany
- ✓ Japan
- ✓ Multilateral
- ✓ UNCERF
- ✓ USA

Executive Summary

Background

Evaluation Features

1. This is the fourth in a series of mixed-method impact evaluations of school feeding (SF) commissioned by the World Food Programme's (WFP) Office of Evaluation (OE) and serving both accountability and learning purposes. The objectives of this evaluation are to:

- i) evaluate the relevance and effectiveness of SF in an unstable environment;
- ii) evaluate outcomes and impacts achieved in relation to WFP's new vision of SF as a social safety net;
- iii) identify changes needed to increase the relevance and effectiveness of SF in unstable environments.

2. 1. Since 2002, Côte d'Ivoire has been divided into two zones, the Government-controlled south and the Central North West zone (CNO) of the country, where former *Forces Nouvelles* rebels were based (see map in Annex I). The evaluation was designed to assess impact in both zones.

3. The mixed-methods approach included a review of existing literature and data, and surveys among a representative sample of 1,260 randomly selected households, using a two-stage sampling process. Half the households were in 30 communities, also randomly selected, in catchment areas supported by WFP SF operations – the “treatment communities”; and half were in 30 communities in the same districts but in catchment areas that did not have a school canteen at all – the “non-treatment communities”. Comparison between treatment and non-treatment communities facilitated the attribution of results to the programme.

4. Fieldwork for the evaluation was interrupted by the sudden announcement of elections in Côte d'Ivoire and the political crisis that followed. Planned interviews and focus groups at the school level and with a wide range of stakeholders had to be replaced by telephone interviews, which significantly limited the scope and rigour of the evaluation compared with the original design.

5. The major unit of analysis for assessing impact was the household. Data were analysed in two ways: i) comparison between treatment and non-treatment communities within a single zone – the south or the CNO; and ii) comparison between household responses in the treatment and non-treatment areas in both zones. In addition, the evaluation grouped the households according to their level of vulnerability and determined whether impacts differed by vulnerability group.


Country Context

6. For three decades after independence in 1960, Côte d'Ivoire was one of the most prosperous countries in the region, with correspondingly high indicators of human development. By 2009, however, it ranked 163th out of 182 countries in the human development index. According to the Government's 2008 Living Standards Survey, the proportion of the population classified as poor increased from 38.4 percent in 2002 to 50 percent in 2007.

7. Throughout the period covered by this evaluation, there were almost constant upheavals in the socio-political environment somewhere in Côte d'Ivoire. This is reflected in the number of primary schools functioning throughout the country, which dropped from 8,975 in 2001, to 5,784 in 2003. In the 2006/07 school year, renewed optimism for peace led to an increase, to 9,106, and by 2009/10 a total of 10,009 schools were operating. In the run-up to the 2010 election and during the ensuing crisis, however, schools were not open.

WFP Support to the School Feeding Programme (1999/2000 to 2009/10)

8. From 1998 to 2002, WFP assistance to education was part of the national plan for development of the education sector,¹ and the Government's SF sustainability programme,² which is an early model of a home-grown School Feeding Programme (SFP). Managed by the National SF Directorate, (*Direction Nationale des Cantines Scolaires* ([DNCS]) in the Ministry of Education and following the policy of "one school, one canteen", this programme provides for the gradual hand-over of the School Feeding Programme (SFP) management to communities, through village committees. Following the crisis in September 2002, the regular SFP implemented by the DNCS with WFP support was restricted to schools in the south. To complement this, WFP included SF in two successive nationwide emergency operations, aimed at protecting human and productive assets while political and security solutions to the crisis were being sought. In the CNO, these were implemented by WFP with non-governmental organization (NGO) partners. This dual arrangement continued under two successive nationwide protracted relief and recovery operations (PRROs) from 2005 to 2009, aimed at mitigating the effects of the crisis. Figure 2 presents a timeline of major external events and modifications in WFP operations over the last ten years.



9. Across the two zones, between 70 and 90 percent of schools participating in the SFP received WFP assistance. In academic year 2009/10, slightly more than 50 percent of all schools in the country were participating in the SFP. Figure 3 shows the value of WFP contributions to Côte d'Ivoire from 2001 to 2009, but the percentage devoted to SF is not recorded.

10. In 2009, the SF sustainability programme was again prioritized in a new WFP development project (107590). There are currently 229 home-grown SF groups country-wide, although fewer than 5 percent of school canteens have achieved 100 percent self-sufficiency.

¹ Government of Côte d'Ivoire. 1998. *Plan National de Développement du secteur Education/Formation*. Abidjan.

² Government of Côte d'Ivoire. *Integrated Programme for Sustainable SF (Programme Intégré de Pérenisation des Cantines Scolaires)*. Abidjan.

Timeline of Key Events and WFP Operations 1999–2010

Pre-crisis 1999–2002

Ethnic tensions arise following changes to the Constitution. Military coup in 1999; Presidential election is held without full participation. Liberian refugees remain in West.

Protracted crisis 2003–2007

Three agreements signed since 2003 do not consolidate peace. Profitability of cash crops affected by instability. Lack of regular attendance by teachers, particularly in CNO. Land conflicts continue, extending to long-time foreign nationals.

Transition to peace 2007–2009

Ouagadougou Peace Agreement signed March, 2007; the head of major rebel group made Prime Minister. Voter registration and disarmament begins.

Civil War 19 Sept 2002 – 18 October 2003

Elections October/November 2010 lead to renewed instability

DEV 335800: 10/99 - 3/04 Focus: School feeding vulnerable communities nationally, Liberian refugees, capacity development of Ministry of Education. Total: children: 254,138; women/girls: 43.9%

EMOP 102440: 10/02 - 3/04 Focus: School feeding in Rebel-held North. Total meals: 61,358; women/girls 45.0%

EMOP 102441: 7/03 - 2/05 School Feeding for North & South canteens; total meals: 1,299,501; women/girls 42.4%; Teachers receiving rations: 3,476

PRRO 10372: 3/05 - 7/07 School feeding coverage expands Children receiving meals: 1,756,895; women/girls: 44.3%; Teachers served: 6,130; Deworming & fuel efficient stoves.

PRRO 10672: 8/07 - ongoing; School feeding nationally. Donor support declines. Children receiving meals: 1,713,137. women/girls: 44.5% Teachers served: 2,000. Deworming & fuel efficient stoves.


DEV 107590 : Jan/09 - Dec/13; School feeding nationally and home grown school feeding. Children's meals 2009: 120,000 women/girls: 43.8%

PRE-CRISIS

PROTRACTED CRISIS

TRANSITION TO PEACE

P Contributions to Côte d'Ivoire 2001–2009 (US\$)



11. 2Since the 1980s, a core element of the SF sustainability strategy has been to charge students for school meals, at the rate of 25 CFAF francs (now worth about US\$0.05) per meal. School management committees have been mandated to find ways for children from the most vulnerable households to continue participating.

Outcomes and impacts of SF

Education and Learning


12. According to United Nations data, from 2003 to 2009 primary school enrolments fell nationally, from 92 to 81 percent for boys and from 70 to 64 percent for girls. The evaluation found no statistically significant differences in enrolment between households in treatment and non-treatment communities in either the south or the CNO. When disaggregated into three vulnerability classes, however, household-level data revealed that approximately 17 percent of primary school-age children from the most vulnerable households had never enrolled, compared with 11 percent from the least vulnerable households. Again, there was no statistically significant difference between households in treatment and non-treatment areas.

13. World Bank education statistics for the evaluation period indicate very low completion rates, ranging from 41 percent in 1999 to 46 percent in 2009. Completion rates for girls remained at two thirds of the rates for boys throughout the period. Drop-out rates continued to be an unacceptably high 20 percent.


14. Household-level data collected by the evaluation found that children's pass rates declined significantly at key points in the education cycle: at the age when a child can take responsibility at home, and at the age when parents consider a child to have completed sufficient education. Children reached these critical points at younger ages in the CNO than in the south, but there was no difference between treatment and non-treatment groups.

15. On average, only about one third of school-age children attained age-appropriate education levels. Children from the most vulnerable households were less likely to do so than those from moderately or less vulnerable households. Moreover, children from households in all vulnerability categories in the CNO had lower attainment rates than children from the most vulnerable households in the south. Graduation rates in the south were almost double those in the CNO in both treatment and non-treatment groups.

Educational Attainment (Age-Appropriate Education Level) by Vulnerability Category



Educational Attainment by Age, Zone and Treatment/Non-treatment



Nutrition

16. Nutritional enhancement was not an explicit objective of WFP's support to the SFP. In addition, school canteens have not been operating since June 2010, making comparison of household-level dietary diversity and food consumption³ between treatment and non-treatment communities meaningless.

17. The food baskets provided during the evaluation period differed across time and space and in regularity of supply. Data were incomplete, preventing a systematic review of ration composition. In addition, the political crisis of 2010 prevented the evaluation team from verifying current rations.

18. However, the evaluation found that, on average, households in the CNO ate more meals per day than those in the south, while the most vulnerable households in both zones had far lower dietary diversity – for adults and children – and ate fewer meals per day than other households. For all vulnerability categories, averages in the CNO were lower than those in the south, with the exception of the number of meals for the least vulnerable households, which was not statistically different in the two zones.

Value Transfer

19. Interruption of the fieldwork prevented calculation of the value of the food transferred. However, in both the south and the CNO, the two most commonly cited benefits of the SFP were savings in food or money for the household, and freeing up adults' time that was often used for productive and income-generating purposes. Households in the most vulnerable category perceived greater benefits from SF than the least vulnerable households did.

20. Approximately 50 percent of all households, regardless of vulnerability level, spent less money on food on SF days, but between 30 and 40 percent spent the same as on non-feeding days. Nonetheless, 52 percent of the most vulnerable households continued to prepare lunches, while 38 percent did not. Because fieldwork was interrupted, the evaluation team was unable to probe into the reasons why these households continued to prepare meals. Possible explanations could include cultural inappropriateness of the food served at school, and households' uncertainty that a school meal would be provided on any given day. Focus group discussions with parents and children from vulnerable groups would be necessary to determine the actual reasons.

21. Households in the most vulnerable category were more likely to consider the canteen good value for money than households in the other two categories providing they had the cash to pay the 25 CFAF francs for the school meal. However, a 1992 evaluation of the Primary School Canteen Programme (1989–1993) had found that the 25 CFAF francs charge may have become *de facto* the main selection criterion for deciding which children would have access to the rations when there were fewer school meals available than children at the school. As a result, the rations were not always being given to the same children – for example, children in the same household may have taken it in turns to receive the money for SF – which undermined learning, safety net and nutrition outcomes. In addition, the most vulnerable households with scant or non-existent cash flow tended to be excluded. While recognizing the importance of the principle, the 1992 evaluation had recommended reducing this charge to 15 CFAF francs in the poorest regions.

³ These are proxy indicators for measuring nutrition outcomes.

However, the 2009 evaluation of PRRO 106720 found that schools were still charging 25 CFAF francs for the meal, plus other fees, leaving highly vulnerable households with no access to school meals.

22. The DNCS mandated schools to establish funds for ensuring that children from the most vulnerable households had access to SF, but this does not seem to have been adequate to ensure access.

23. Parents' estimates of annual expenditures on schooling per child did not vary significantly between households from treatment and non-treatment communities. However, there were differences among vulnerability groups. Average per child expenditure for the most vulnerable households was 15,159 CFAF francs (about US\$30), compared with 23,903 CFAF francs (US\$50) – approximately 60 percent more – for the least vulnerable.

24. As the most vulnerable households have average monthly per capita incomes of approximately US\$14, they may have had to choose which of their children would receive the school meal, because they could not pay for all their children to do so. The fee could be a double disincentive for sending children to school, as the household not only has to pay for the meal, but also loses the child's labour in home-based activities, many of which revolve around food production and transformation.

How does School Feeding create impact

The Role of Contextual Factors outside WFP's Control

25. The civil war significantly influenced the results in several ways. First, with no state funding, social services in the CNO were severely disrupted. Struggling parents had to raise funds among themselves to keep schools running. Second, the protracted instability adversely affected livelihoods, particularly those dependent on cash crop sales and other market-related activities. Third, thefts and extortion at road checkpoints by militias from both sides in the conflict increased the costs of getting to market, and independent organizations⁴ have documented widespread human rights abuses, including beatings, killings and rape in both the south and the CNO. The judiciary system became corrupt or non-existent, leaving crimes unpunished and perpetrators free to continue their illegal actions⁵.

26. The combination of lost profits and threats to physical security led to a shift away from cash crops to food crops, also reducing the demand for day labour, a primary source of income for the most vulnerable households. Increasing vulnerability levels reduced households' ability to send their children to school. The most vulnerable households now have incomes significantly lower than their less vulnerable counterparts. The motivations for non-enrolment differed by vulnerability category: parents in the least vulnerable group cited such reasons as "not yet old enough to attend school", while those in the most vulnerable group mentioned mainly financial or cultural reasons. More than one-third stated that they could not afford school, and more than 10 percent did not allow their children to go to school.

27. The most vulnerable households have had to withdraw their children from school, especially during critical points in the agricultural cycle. In these circumstances, there is also documentary evidence of children being recruited by

⁴ Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch

⁵ Eighteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (S/2008/645, 13 October 2008).

rebel forces and militia, with concomitant difficulty in readapting to peaceful life at school when schools reopened. The influence of these factors on household decision-making is evident: children from less vulnerable households are significantly more likely to have attained age-appropriate education than their most vulnerable counterparts.

28. Over the ten years being evaluated, donor support was uneven. The protracted conflict, coinciding with a period of significant natural disasters across the world, made it difficult to secure donor commitments, particularly after the Ouagadougou Peace Accords were signed in 2007. At a time when the population's confidence in a return to normalcy was at its highest, and their commitment to educating their children was returning, donor support dropped to 60 percent, limiting the amount of food commodities in the pipeline and the number of days children were fed.

The Role of Implementation Factors within WFP's Control

29. On average, only 29 percent of the households surveyed during the evaluation had a child who had received school meals daily in the last month. This did not vary significantly by zone. Telephone interviews indicated that the percentage of schooldays when meals were served during the 2009/10 academic year averaged slightly less than 45 percent in the CNO and slightly more than 50 percent in the south. In general, when there was no school meal, small children left school at lunch time and did not return. Older children either returned to school after lunch, or stayed in school and did not eat.

30. During the period of protracted instability, WFP's strategy was to maintain support to the Government's "one school, one canteen" policy. As donor fatigue set in after the Ouagadougou Peace Accords, inadequate food stocks, coupled with a decision to continue serving the same number of schools with less food rather than prioritizing fewer schools, resulted in inadequate service to the schools, and reduced project outcomes. According to key informants, the decision to continue providing rice to schools in the south but not in the CNO contributed to communities' perceptions of government bias in favour of the south.

The Interaction between Contextual and Implementation Factors

31. With the onset of the crisis in September 2002, contextual factors collided with internal implementation factors in the CNO. This had three negative consequences: i) government employees often chose to relocate to the south, or did not receive their salaries, increasing the burden on communities to pay teachers' salaries or stipends to volunteer teachers; ii) schools in the rebel-held areas were initially closed, and when they reopened they did not have food stocks for a daily SF service, or resources to support quality education provision; and iii) severe restrictions on movement due to the insecurity strained households' coping strategies, leaving them without the resources necessary to meet all their labour demands and send their children to school.

32. Anecdotal information from community members indicated that monitoring of food stocks was not strong once the food had been distributed to the local inspectorates of primary education for collection by the communities. When the local inspectorates were not fully functional or when NGOs were distributing the food stocks to communities, the insecurity situation made it difficult for external monitors to ensure compliance with the programme, and parents and teachers did not feel empowered to monitor effective use of the food stocks.

Conclusions

33. The SFP as originally designed prior to the crisis was relevant to the needs at the time and clearly supported the Government's desire to improve school enrolment and achievement, particularly for girls, through its "one school, one canteen" policy. However, as instability continued beyond the emergency phase, the instruments available to WFP and the relationship between WFP and the DNCS no longer supported expected educational outcomes or safety net benefits.

34. Although WFP operations provided meals, using fortified food, to a very large number of children in the CNO and the south, the total number and regularity of meal days were inadequate to stimulate enrolment, attendance and completion. There were no differences in enrolment and achievement rates between treatment and non-treatment groups in either the south or the CNO. In addition, girls continued to lag behind boys in completion of primary school. Potential nutrition impacts could not be measured because school canteens stopped functioning in June 2010, before the evaluation fieldwork started. There was only weak evidence that the school meals conferred significant advantage to households as a value transfer, particularly to the most vulnerable. For these households, the unreliability of school meals made the trade-off between education and home labour too costly to continue sending children to school.

35. External factors caused by the protracted conflict also significantly influenced the results by increasing vulnerability levels, thereby reducing households' ability to educate their children, particularly in the most vulnerable households whose incomes are now significantly lower than those of their less vulnerable counterparts. Some families saw the restart of the SFP as an indication that normalcy was returning, but the unpredictability of the food allocation reduced this inducement for keeping children in school.

36. Prior to the crisis, there was strong justification for WFP to support a truly nationally owned programme. The Government had developed a sustainability strategy that WFP was committed to supporting until the SFP had reached self-sufficiency through its focus on home-grown food production at the community level. However, this strategy did not fully serve WFP's education, gender and safety net objectives when the Government no longer had control of 60 percent of the country and 40 percent of the population.

37. In the face of decreased funding and increased demand after 2007, WFP's concurrence with the DNCS decision to serve the same number of schools with less food, rather than prioritizing and serving fewer schools, also had a negative effect on results. In addition, during the period of protracted instability and increasing geographical inequality in the country, the provision of different food baskets to different geographical areas may have contributed to perceptions of inequity.

38. The crisis that erupted in Côte d'Ivoire in 2010 closed education services and limited the evaluation team's ability to understand the full implications of the socio-political instability for vulnerable households. Until more in-depth information can be obtained through vulnerability and security assessments of vulnerable households, new models of cooperation cannot be proposed.

Recommendations

Recommendations within WFP's purview

39. **Recommendation 1:** Refocus SF support on improving enrolment, completion and pass rates, particularly for the most vulnerable households, when the socio-political situation stabilizes. Once the present crisis has been resolved, conduct a study to better understand the underlying causes of girls' lower participation in school, so that the strategy selected captures the particular challenges faced by girls.

40. **Recommendation 2:** Improve the regularity of participatory monitoring, initially by WFP staff and subsequently by food management sub-committees at the school level, so that communities increase their confidence in the commitment of WFP and the DNCS to school canteens and to improving access to education, particularly for girls.

41. **Recommendation 3:** Reintroduce take-home rations or cash transfers for extremely vulnerable households during the lean season until crops have been harvested, to encourage households to continue sending their children to school instead of withdrawing them to provide labour at critical moments in the food production cycle.

Recommendations Requiring Collaboration with other Actors

42. **Recommendation 4:** Renegotiate the targeting strategy with the DNCS, to ensure that children from the most vulnerable households have access to SF. The strategy could include: i) establishing a scholarship fund using a portion of the 10 CFAF francs per student meal currently reimbursed to the DNCS to cover SF operational costs, so that the most vulnerable households have access to school meals; or ii) establishing a country-wide policy ensuring that the most vulnerable households have access to the meals.

43. **Recommendation 5:** Match coverage to resources. Where the resources available are expected to be less than planned, provide food to fewer schools, giving priority to those in the most food-insecure and socio-politically insecure areas of the country. Pipelines should be maintained for 90 percent of all schooldays. This will require a judicious selection of communities for WFP support, using the results of a country-wide food security and risk assessment.

44. **Recommendation 6:** Revitalize the food management subcommittees in schools by building their capacity to monitor the SFP and to hold the DNCS accountable for food quality and quantity, so that efficiency, effectiveness and community confidence in the system can be maintained.

45. **Recommendation 7:** With the DNCS and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), develop a range of activities for community groups, to promote the sustainability of school canteens. Producing food for consumption in schools is only one option, and other alternatives should be explored, particularly for peri-urban communities and communities where there are tensions over landownership.

46. **Recommendation 8:** Where the lean season and harvest season coincide with school holidays, negotiate with the DNCS to consider offering life skills education for school drop-outs, with WFP supporting their attendance by providing school meals and take-home rations.

47. **Recommendation 9:** Once the present crisis has abated, identify schools with lower than national/regional average completion rates, and conduct focus group discussions with a wide spectrum of parents, teachers and elders to determine how these rates could be improved. If quality of education is the barrier, identify organizations working in the education sector in the area and explore their willingness to include these communities in their programming, with WFP providing food assistance.

48. **Recommendation 10:** If the current crisis continues, WFP should conduct a rapid food security assessment, holding focus group discussions with representatives – women, men and children – from the various household vulnerability categories, to determine the relevance of the current SF modality and what needs to be changed for the SFP to provide a safety net for the most vulnerable households. This work is necessary before the appropriate mix of delivery mechanisms – cash transfers, take-home rations, biscuits, hot meals in school – for sustaining households' commitment to the education of primary school-age children during protracted instability can be identified.

Map

Cote d'Ivoire after Linas-Marcoussis agreement



LEGEND:

PINK: Government controlled area

GREEN: Area not controlled by government (Forces Nouvelles)

SAND: Buffer zone established 2003, later transformed to Zone of Confidence as per Ouagadougou Agreement 2007

1. Introduction

1.1. Evaluation Features

1. The Ouagadougou Peace Accords signed in 2007 laid the foundation for a return to peace in Cote d'Ivoire. The Government was requesting WFP assistance to develop further its capacity to implement its policy of 'one school, one canteen' through an extension of the development project (DEV) 10759 into the northern half of the country.
2. The initial evaluation design, as presented in the terms of reference (see Annex 1) and further developed in the Inception Report could not be implemented, because schools have been closed for most of the period since the Inception Mission in June, 2010, due to teachers' strikes, closures leading up to and during the elections, and the post-election instability. The evaluation team was unable to return to the country to hold in depth discussions with groups of parents, teachers, students about the relevance of SF on their decision-making to send children to school, and about the value of SF for vulnerable households.
3. Instead, the evaluation team received approval to conduct key informant telephone interviews with at least 5 individuals in each community (treatment and non-treatment) over a six week period⁶, in order to learn more about the community members' perceptions regarding the programme over the last 10 years. Information from these interviews was validated through conclusions drawn from other primary research or evaluations conducted in Cote d'Ivoire.
4. In the light of the disrupted field work, the objectives of this evaluation were revised in agreement with WFP's Office of Evaluation unit, and are captured in the revised Evaluation Matrix (see Annex 2):
 - i. Evaluate the relevance and effectiveness of SF in an environment of ongoing instability;
 - ii. Evaluate outcomes and impacts achieved in relation to WFP's new vision of SF as a social safety net with nutrition and value transfer objectives (even though these were not explicitly included in the programme design);
 - iii. Identify changes needed to increase the relevance and effectiveness of SF in an unstable environment.
5. The ten-year time frame of the evaluation covers the period 1999-2009. Annex 3 shows the logic of the SF interventions emerging from the project documents. The format is deliberately adapted from the logic model in the WFP School Feeding Policy 2009, which carries forward education objectives and indicators from the past and adds to them. It also presents objectives and outcomes from the new Policy that was not explicit in past operations but has been considered possible ancillary outcomes not explicitly intended at the outset.
6. For the purposes of the evaluation, two zones were identified that have experienced different levels of insecurity and access to social services were proposed by WFP and the evaluation team and endorsed by the Directorate of the National School Canteen Programme (DNCS) within the Ministry of Primary Education (MEN). The Centre North West Zone (CNO) represents that part of the country that


⁶There are trust issues when collecting qualitative data through telephone interviews with key informants.

was outside of government control for more than 5 years, while the South represents that part of the country in governmental control since 1999⁷.

7. The evaluation team randomly selected 15 schools in each zone that participated in the SFP, and 15 communities with schools in the same Inspectorate of Primary Education (IEP)⁸ as the treatment schools, but did not participate in the SFP due to lack of interest, or inability to meet the pre-conditions, and these schools acted as the evaluation's non-treatment group⁹. A total of 1260 households were then randomly sampled and interviewed across the 60 communities. This allowed the team to assess whether any differences in student enrolment, achievement and attendance, as well as household vulnerability, could be attributed to the SFP, particularly as it related to girls' education.

8. The following figure presents the location of sampled communities across the country. See Annex 4 for the full list:

Figure 1. Distribution map of sampled schools



9. In order to assess impact of the SFP on household vulnerability, and to determine, to the extent possible, how household decision making differs by levels of vulnerability, vulnerability groupings were created using the data from the household survey¹⁰. This also allowed the team to determine whether the most

⁷ Staff from DNCS operating in the regions, as well as experts from the University of Bouake assisted in allocating the sampling selected to the appropriate zone.

⁸ These are the lowest administrative level of the education system in Cote d'Ivoire.

⁹ Following selection based on the original lists provided by DNCS and WFP, it was determined that 16 of the communities in the South did not participate in the canteens and 14 of the communities in the South participated in the canteens. The sample was therefore corrected to reflect the situation found on the ground.

¹⁰ Vulnerability grouping used a statistical method called Principal Components' Analysis to create groupings. The ten indicators are: (1) Dependency ratio; (2) mean number of meals consumed each day by household; (3) Dietary diversity scores (number of food groups consumed in the last 24 hours) of adults; (4) Dietary diversity scores (number of food groups consumed in the last 24 hours) of children; (5) Per capita monthly household income; (6) Total monthly educational household expenditures; (7) Value of livestock assets; (8) Value of

vulnerable households were benefiting more, less, or equally, from project outputs and outcomes, compared to the other groups. Annex 6 provides detailed information on the sampling design, the methodology and the questionnaires used throughout the evaluation.

10. Education data could not be verified at the level of the school or the IEP, but it was triangulated against existing data from other sources. Key informant telephone interviews were also used to collect some historical data on the schools and the canteens.

1.2. Context

11. Changes in the socio-political environment: Upheavals in the socio-political environment have been almost constant somewhere in Cote d'Ivoire since the beginning of the early 1990's. Political tensions building after the death of Cote d'Ivoire's first president in 1993 erupted in December 24, 1999, with a military coup which toppled the government. Elections held in 2000 resulted in a change to leadership, but tensions increased when the government amended the constitution to give priority rights to vote, own land, and to become President, to native-born Ivoirians with parents native to Cote d'Ivoire¹¹ Critical dates and changes to the socio-political environment are presented below:

Table 1: Critical timeline of events

Date	Key Events
Sept. 19/02	Soldiers protesting against planned demobilisation attempt a <i>coup d'etat</i> . Rebels gain control of 60% of country ¹² in the Centre, West and North.
Oct. 18/02	Ceasefire declared
Jan./03	Linas-Marcoussis peace agreement is signed and United Nations Security Council authorizes continued French and Economic Commission of West African States operations until stability returns. Fighting continues
May–July/03	New ceasefire agreement signed and end of war agreement signed.
April/2003	Government cancels exams in the northern and southwest regions of the country
Sept./03 -	Four political parties and three former rebel movements suspend their participation in the National Reconciliation Government due to repression of their militants.
Feb./04	UN Security Council agrees to send a peacekeeping force to supervise the disarmament of opposition forces and the presidential elections planned for October, 2005.
March, 2004	Security forces target demonstrators, with a particular focus on certain community groups (individuals from the North of the country or from neighbouring countries) ¹³ Rebel forces demand that the right to demonstrate is recognized and the decree prohibiting demonstrations in public places is rescinded. Fighting breaks out again.

productive assets; (9) Value of household assets and (10) Value of transportation assets. Displacement was not used as an indicator because the large majority of households interviewed had not been displaced in the year preceding the survey conducted in August/September.

¹¹ Any type of horizontal inequality can provide an incentive for political mobilisation, but *political* inequalities (that is, political exclusion of particular groups) are most likely to motivate group leaders to instigate a rebellion, as can be seen, for example, in the recent case of Kenya (Stewart 2010). By contrast, *economic and social* inequalities and those of *cultural status* are more likely to motivate the mass of the population. Moreover, cultural status inequalities bind groups together and thereby increase the salience of identity differences. Of course, political inequalities themselves may be partly responsible for other inequalities, for example as a result of clientilism and patronage, and decisions about the distribution of public services, as well determining cultural status inequalities –Source: World Bank Background Report, “Horizontal Inequalities

¹² UNHCR Report, January, 2004.

¹³ UN Investigation Report Geneva, 29 April, 2004.

July-Aug./05	Accra III agreement is signed that consolidates the implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis peace process. All sides agree to implement political reforms set out in the 2003 agreement, including participation in a coalition government. UN Security Council sends a large peacekeeping force to supervise disarmament and ensure security during the 2005 elections. Sporadic fighting continues and the New Forces withdraw from the coalition.
Apr./05	Government and rebels sign the Pretoria Agreement in which both sides declare an end to hostilities, the New Forces agree to return to the coalition government and future talks are set on the formation of a united national army and disarmament ¹⁴ .
Apr./05– early 2006	Truce broken on several occasions as militias loyal to the government clash with rebels within the UN-protected buffer zone. Government forces also attacked by rebels operating from Mali and Burkina Faso. Violent inter-ethnic conflict in western part of the country results in the deaths of a number of people, mainly civilians ¹⁵ .
March/07	Ouagadougou Peace Agreement brokered with the help of Burkina Faso President. The head of the rebel faction is named Prime Minister..
2008	The buffer zone between the CNO and the South is demilitarized by UNICO. Civil servants (including teachers) return to CNO. UNICO extends its peacekeeping mission until elections take place.
2009	Preparations continue for elections. Violence continues in the West (Dix-Huits Montagnes and Moyen Cavalley), as does extortion by both government and former rebel militias that were not disarmed.

12. In summary, numerous peace agreements signed between the government and rebel forces did not hold, until the President of Burkina Faso brokered a peace agreement between government and rebels forces in March, 2007. Once this was signed, steps began to be taken towards demilitarisation and restoration of services throughout the country. However, the lack of a functioning judiciary in former rebel areas, and the existence of government militia in government controlled areas have been found to contribute to continued violence to civilian population through extortions, thefts, and abuse of women and children¹⁶. Incidents continued to occur most regularly in Dix-Huits Montagnes and Moyen Cavalley¹⁷.

13. Poverty and Food Security: For three decades after independence (1960), Côte d'Ivoire was one of the most prosperous countries in the region, with a peak in its Human Development Index in 1985 at 98 out of a total of 130 countries surveyed. Adult literacy had increased significantly from 18 percent in 1970 to 42 percent in 1985, second only in the region to Ghana, and significantly higher than Sierra Leone, Guinea or Liberia. The country's daily calorie supply per capita in 1986 was 2,560 kcal, the highest across the same five countries, where Ghana had the lowest daily calorie supply per capita, at 1,760. Cereal food aid was less than 1,000 MT since 1981-82, a very insignificant amount when compared to neighbouring countries over the same period¹⁸.

14. In 2009, Côte d'Ivoire has been ranked as a low-income food-deficit country with a total population of 20.6 million¹⁹. It ranks 163 out of 182 countries in the Human Development Index 2009. While the percentage of people living below US\$2

¹⁴ Ploughshares Armed Conflicts Report, 2009.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Amnesty International Public Statement Côte D'Ivoire. Silence and Impunity: The Only Response To Sexual Violence Against Women, 16 December, 2008.

¹⁷ Human Rights Watch, "Afraid and Forgotten Lawlessness, Rape, and Impunity in Western Côte d'Ivoire", Copyright © 2010.

¹⁸ Source: UNDP Human Development Report 1990.

¹⁹ Wolrd Bank Quick Query.

per day fell from 49.4 percent in 2001 to 46.8 percent in 2007²⁰ educational progress towards the Millennium Development Goals has been slow. Annex 6 gives a summary of core country indicators since 2000.

15. Rural food insecurity is most severe in 4 regions in the West of the country plus Savanes in the centre North. However, according to UNICEF, the highest percentages of underweight under-5's (over 30 percent) is in the North-west of the country, including in one region (Denguélé) that also has lower levels of food insecurity than elsewhere.

16. Education: Education's share of public spending dropped from 27 percent in 1998 to 20.6 percent in 2006, with 46.5 percent of that budget going to primary education²¹. Between 2001 and 2003, the number of primary schools in the country dropped from 8,975 to 5,784 and revived to 9,106 in 2006. By 2009, a total of 10,009 schools were operating country wide.

17. Expenditures per student (in constant CFAF) have been almost halved between 1990 and 2007. In 1990, the state expended an average of 160,000 Ivorian franc (CFAF) per student. By 2007, this had declined to approximately 85,000 CFAF²² despite the establishment of a system of School Management Committees (COGES)²³ that were introduced in each primary school throughout the 90's and were intended to provide support to the School Director in the raising and management of local funds for school-related needs.

18. Under-investment and instability in recent decades have weakened education in Côte d'Ivoire and many development projects called for strengthening basic services such as health and education. Even before the most recent crisis, according to the World Bank, the country was unlikely to reach the its Millennium Development Goals of universal primary education by 2015²⁴.

19. Continued election delays and political turmoil have been used, and continue to be used, to justify poor governance and the lack of investment in public services, according to civil society groups and public sector workers²⁵. Many basic indicators are worsening across the country. The number of women dying in pregnancy or childbirth rose from 459 per 100,000 in 2003 to 810 in 2009; while primary school enrolment amongst boys and girls in 2009 fell to 81 percent and 64 percent compared to 92 percent and 70 percent in 2003, according to the United Nations (UN)²⁶.

20. Humanitarian Situation in Cote d'Ivoire: throughout 9 of the 11 years being reviewed by the evaluation team, refugees and internally displaced persons, fleeing from civil violence has resulted in humanitarian crisis, particularly in the North and West of the country. In addition, urban centres, such as Abidjan and Bouake, have often borne the brunt of violent conflict across political groups, while other areas,

²⁰ UNDP Human Development Reports 2003 and 2009.

²¹ Project Document Côte d'Ivoire 10759.0 (2009-2013) WFP/EB.2/2008/8-A.

²² *Rapport d'Etat du Systeme Educatif Ivoirien*, February, 2010.

²³ Gbo Yao and Rene Goubo Aka, in Prospects, Vol. XXXVI, No. 2, June 2006, Policy Dialogue and Education: African Experiences "The educational community running the school system: The example of school management committees (COGES)".

²⁴ http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSPContentServer/WDSP/IB/2010/04/09/000334955_20100409024915/Rendered/PDF/536660CASoP117101Officialouseonly1.pdf.

²⁵ Traoré Drissa, Abidjan-based human rights lawyer and head of the Ivoirian Movement for Human Rights.

²⁶ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), "Analysis: No political mandate, no development in Côte d'Ivoire", 2 September, 2010.

such as Odiénne and Man, have been particularly disadvantaged due to continued insecurity caused by the lack of any formal judicial system.

21. Throughout the period, internal displacement of Ivoirians has hovered at approximately 4-5 percent of the total population. The greatest proportion of population movement has been from the North and West, which holds approximately 40 percent of the population, so that, in certain regions, the percentage of displaced or migrating persons was much higher²⁷.

22. Refugee and/or movement of internally displaced persons (IDP) in Côte d'Ivoire during the period 1999-2009 are presented in the table below:

Table 2: Refugee and IDP movement into Côte d'Ivoire 1999-2009 ('000s)

Category	Year										
	99	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09
Refugees (primarily from Liberia)	138	121	126	45	76	38	39	23	24	24	25
Returned Refugees	-	-	-	-	16	7	-	-	-	-	-
Internally displaced	-	-	-	100	1,100	38	38	710	710	710	710
Returned IDPs	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		25	166

1.3. WFP Support to School Feeding 1999/2009

23. WFP has been operating in Côte d'Ivoire since 1989, mainly in support of the national School Feeding Programme (SFP). In the early 90's WFP support to SF was narrowed to focus on primary education, terminating support to ongoing secondary and boarding SF. From 1998 to 2002 WFP assistance to education was part of the PNDEF and the government's sustainability programme for SF (PIP/CS), both programmes that were managed under the DNCS.

24. Principal objectives for the assistance, as set out by DNCS in the Operations Manual, included²⁸: (a) increasing education levels of girls; (b) stimulating annual enrolment rates, particularly for girls; (c) increasing support to school infrastructure from decentralized sources and (d) improving the level of disposable income in households.

25. In a 1998 policy declaration, the Government of Côte d'Ivoire announced the Integrated Programme for Sustainable SF²⁹ (PIP/CS) under management of the national SF unit in the DNCS. This provided for gradual hand-over of SF to communities through village committees that would manage the programme on a HGSF model. The model is explicitly intended to play a social and economic role to contribute to poverty alleviation, especially food insecurity, and thereby to contribute to restoring the social fabric damaged by the crisis. It has been supported by WFP since its inception.

²⁷ It is estimated that the large majority of displaced persons from the present unrest are from specific areas of Abidjan (Abobo) and the West of the country, according to UNHCR's Humanitarian report (March 2011).

²⁸ *Ministère de L'Éducation Nationale, Direction des Cantines Scolaires: "Programme Alimentaire des Cantines Scolaires, Manuel de Gestion", undated.*

²⁹ *Programme Intégré de pérennisation des cantines scolaires, PIP/CS.*

26. In both the CNO and South, schools that were active and capable of meeting the conditions of inclusion were eligible to participate in the PIP/CS programme. Conditions include community allocation of lands for home grown production, and the motivation of a group of people, primarily women, who agreed to undertake home grown school food production. Once accepted and provided with technical home food production support, these “*groupements des femmes*” were intended to begin to produce food crops, a part of which would be used to meet predefined school requirements, a part of which would be sold to underwrite expansion or increases in incomes, and a part of which would be for individual members’ consumption or sale.

27. Once communities began to participate in PIP/CS, communities were intended to be assisted to improve their production in support of school canteens through the provision of inputs and technical support. This support was intended to continue over a five year period, as described below:

- Year Zero: The group produces crops with their own means –The group should cultivate 1 ha and produce a minimum of .5 tonnes without external support of inputs.
- Year One: The group receives technical support to improve production of the crops which it has selected. In general, with this technical support, production should increase to 1.5 – 1.8 ton/ha. In this first year, 25 percent of the cereal requirements of the canteen is supported by the group’s production.
- Year Two: The group should continue 50 percent of the cereal needs of the canteen, and should be receiving support for animal rearing, again in support of canteen needs;
- Year Three: The group should be producing and providing 75 percent of the needs of the canteens; and
- Year Four: The canteen should have reached full food self-sufficiency.


28. The remaining production not intended for the canteen was intended to be sold on the private market. The DNCS would participate in cereal purchases, at a fixed price, thereby protecting groups from market fluctuations and this price was fixed by the *Direction Centrale du Marché*³⁰. Production is purchased by a Committee composed of the DNCS and the *Direction Affaire Administrative et Financière du Ministère de l’Education Nationale*.

29. Revenues earned through sales to DNCS or to the private market were intended to be reinvested by the groups. In the case that a surplus existed after purchase of seeds and other inputs, this surplus should flow back to the groups’ bank accounts and put at the disposition of the groups’ members. Animal rearing, access to micro-credit and small farming mechanisation was intended to assist more advanced groups to significantly increase their production and productivity, to the ultimate benefit of households represented by group members, in addition to ensure self-sufficiency of the canteen.

30. The following figure provides an overview of the PIP/CS and how the process leads to ultimate sustainability as a result of the above-described strategy:

³⁰In 2010, for example, rice prices guaranteed to producer groups have been fixed at 415,000 FCA per tonne, well above the real private market price.

Figure 2: PIP/CS Mechanism³¹



31. At its inception, it was intended that *Agence Nationale de Développement Rural*³² would provide technical support to the village committees (“*groupe ment de femmes*”), so that they could maximize production with quality inputs and technical advice. Since that time, DNCS has sought the support of external agencies, such as the FAO and international NGOs to meet these needs.

32. As a result of the crisis, the sustainability strategy was slowed down significantly. During the crisis, the regular SFP implemented by DNCS with WFP support was restricted to schools south of the Green Line, a demarcation between the Government-controlled south and the CNO of the country, where former Forces *Nouvelles* rebels were based. As a complement to this, WFP initiated Emergency SF under two emergency operations (EMOP) 10244.0 and 10244.1).

33. The overall objective of the emergency project was to protect human and productive assets while political and security solutions to the crisis were being sought³³. The intention was to provide a snack³⁴ to children in CNO, with the objective of serving as an incentive to re-open schools and thereby re-establish a sense of normalcy and provide a minimum of structured activities for the psychosocial development of children (and an alternative to child soldiering³⁵). In

31 Etude De Cas – CDI Alimentation Scolaire, Direction Nationale Cantines Scolaires, Partenariat pour le Développement de l’Enfant, Programme Alimentaire Mondial, 2010

32 Agence Nationale de Développement Rural.

33 Project Document EMOP 10244.1.

34 In practice, it appears that no ‘snack’ was ever served beyond the first year of EMOP 10244.0. Instead a standard light school meal was provided for the majority of the school days in the school calendar. Source SPRs.

35 WFP/FAO Proposal for EMOP 10244, May-December, 2003, “CDI crisis and regional implications”, undated document.

the South, it was to encourage IDP families to register and keep their children in school.

34. DNCS³⁶ was involved in implementation, wherever possible. Where not possible (in rebel-held areas), WFP was directly implementing and/or in partnership with CARE, CARITAS, Danish Refugee Council, and other non-governmental organizations. From 2005 to mid-2008, this dual implementation arrangement was continued under two PRROs, aimed at mitigating the effects of the crisis across the whole country (PRRO 10672.0) and sub-region (10372.0).

35. A total of 115,000 MT of food worth US\$86 million was distributed between 2002 and 2007, of which half went to the education sector³⁷.

36. In principle, a hot cooked meal was provided for between 100 to 120 days of the school year. During 2007, in order to attract volunteer teachers to schools where regular teachers had fled from the CNO, PRRO 10672.0 supplied take-home rations. In 2007 and 2008, take-home rations were intended to serve as an extra incentive to girls in Grades 4-6 in the areas with lowest enrolment rates during 2007 (15,000 girls) and 2008 (60,000). From the existing documents, it appears that take-home rations were suspended before the project began, due to lack of resources.


37. Deworming was also introduced in schools under PRRO 10372 and PRRO 10672 and fuel efficient stoves provided to a total of 100 schools.

38. The figure presented on the following page presents a timeline of events in Cote d'Ivoire as well as the timeline of projects implemented by WFP:

³⁶ *Direction Nationale des Cantines and Direction Regionale de l'Education Nationale.*


³⁷ Project Document Côte d'Ivoire 10759.0 (2009-2013) WFP/EB.2/2008/8-A.

**Figure 3 Timeline of Key Events and WFP Operations
1999–2010**




40. **Humanitarian Assistance:** WFP contributions have varied considerably, and range from a lowest value of less than US\$ 5 million to more than US\$ 20 million in 2005 and 2008. Sources of donors to all categories of WFP project (development, emergency and PRRO) from 2001-2010 are shown in Annex 7.

Figure 3: WFP Contributions to Cote d'Ivoire 2001-2009 (US\$)



41. Coverage³⁸: Between the two zones, the percentage of primary schools assisted by WFP was between 70 percent and 90 percent³⁹ of schools participating in the SFP. In 2009/2010, slightly more than 50 percent (5,259 schools out of a total number of 10,009 schools countrywide) of schools were participating in the SFP. WFP supported schools with canteens that were completely dependent upon DNCS/WFP support, as well as schools where associations have been established and are growing food for the school canteen, but have not yet reached 100 percent self-sufficiency in food commodities⁴⁰.

Figure 4: School canteen support



42. According to information provided by WFP/Rome, less than 5 percent of school canteens have so far successfully achieved 100 percent self sufficiency. These are found mainly in the South because this programme began much later in the CNO,

³⁸ Source: SPRs.

³⁹ 2009, *Evaluation of PRRO 10672.0*.

⁴⁰ Tango International, Mixed Method Impact Evaluation Of WFP's SFPs, in Cote D'Ivoire (1999-2009), Inception Report, July 14, 2010.

and/or because support to groups in achieving self-sufficiency had been halted in the CNO⁴¹.

43. By 2009, DNCS was covering all costs of local transport, shipping and handling of WFP commodities, and had their own monitoring system for the food stocks, in addition to the monitoring support provided by WFP. WFP remained involved in procuring commodities internationally, and in conducting the WFP Standardized SF surveys, as part of its own monitoring system and procedures.


44. Since the 1980's, one core element of the sustainability strategy of DNCS has been to charge students for each meal. In 1989, this was standardized at CFAF25 (US\$0.09, 1992; US\$ exchange rate, January, 2010). Despite recommendations to consider a lower fee, DNCS has remained firm on the need to maintain a standard fee, but has recommended that school management committees find a way to provide food for highly vulnerable children. See further discussion next page.

⁴¹ The evaluation team was unable to assess the effectiveness of the Sustainability Programme. However, out of 22 communities who gave responses, only 7 had canteens, of which 5 were in the South and 2 were in the CNO. Community members advised that the groups were not as successful as had been hoped due to constraints of land, labour and materials (seeds, equipment).

2. Results: Relevance and effectiveness of School Feeding as a Safety Net during protracted instability

45. In order to understand impacts and outcomes of the School Feeding Programme on the most vulnerable households in the target areas, the evaluation team developed 3 household vulnerability categories, using principal components analysis (see Annex 6). Vulnerability classes by zone and by treatment/non-treatment, are presented below:

Figure 5: Distribution of vulnerability by treatment/non-treatment and by zone⁴²



* Mean value is different between treatment and non-treatment group, within zone at the .05 significance level.

^c Mean value is different across zones at the .05 significance level.

46. Vulnerability categories were also analysed to determine whether male-headed households and female-headed households showed significantly different levels of vulnerability. There was no statistically significant difference across male and female headed households in the South and in the CNO, in terms of grouping of vulnerability levels.

Table 3: Distribution of vulnerability category by sex of household Head(HHH) and zone

	South			CNO		
	Male HHH	Female HHH	South Total	Male HHH	Female HHH	CNO Total
	%					
<i>Most vulnerable</i>	29.9	25.0	29.3	35.9	29.5	35.3
<i>Middle</i>	51.9	54.2	52.2	45.7	52.5	46.4
<i>Least vulnerable</i>	18.2	20.8	18.5	18.3	18.0	18.3
N	555	72	627	562	61	623

47. The Government's Survey on Living Standards found that approximately 1.27 million rural residents were food insecure. Casual labourers and those living from subsistence farming and animal husbandry were the groups most affected. Nationally, food insecurity was twice as high in households where the head of

⁴² Mean value is significantly different in CNO between treatment and non-treatment group for least vulnerable households at $p=.05$, and is different across zones at the same significance level.

household was illiterate or has not gone beyond primary school than amongst households with secondary level (or higher) education⁴³.

2.1. Educational outcomes and impacts

48. The following section presents education-related results from the SFP. Because children in the 13-18 year age bracket could have participated in the SFP over the evaluation period, data is also provided for this age category:

- Enrolment
- Attendance
- Pass Rates and Completion Rates⁴⁴.

Enrolment

49. World Bank education statistics country wide show little progress over the 10 year period, except that girls' gross enrolment rates increased from 59 percent in 1999 to 67 percent in 2009. Boys' gross enrolment rates, on the other hand, have slipped from 84 percent in 1999 to 81 percent in 2009⁴⁵:

Table 4: National enrolment rates 1999-2009 (year indicative of beginning of school year)

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2006	2007	2008	2009
Gross enrolment rate (%), primary, female	62	62	65	64	64	62	62	66	66
Gross enrolment rate (%), primary, male	84	83	85	87	80	78	78	83	81
Gross enrolment rate (%), primary, total	73	73	75	76	72	70	70	74	74
Gross intake rate to grade 1, female	59	58	56	61	67	59	61	69	67
Gross intake rate to grade 1, male	74	73	70	69	74	70	72	81	77
Gross intake rate to grade 1, total	67	66	63	6	70	65	66	75	72

50. Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey data for the years 2000 and 2006 indicated that net enrolment rates declined significantly in CNO, and either remained stable or increased in the South:

- Net enrolment rates declined by more than 10 percentage points in the North East, the North, the North West and the West. The North and the Northwest showed the lowest net enrolment rates, at less than 32 percent, compared to averages that are more than double elsewhere; and
- Net enrolment rates improved overall in the Centre West and in the South (excluding Abidjan).

⁴³ Ibid


⁴⁴ Pass rates have been used interchangeable with achievement rates.

⁴⁵ Data presented is unavailable for the years 2004 and 2005. Data availability for Cote d'Ivoire is estimated at 60 percent of all data required for comprehensiveness.

51. Net enrolment rates continue to be considerably higher in urban areas than rural: 68.2 percent, as against 49.8 percent (2008). There has been a 2 point gain in gender parity between 2000 and 2008, although as at 2008 the net enrolment rates for boys was 61 percent compared to 49 percent for girls. The net enrolment rates remained below averages for the West Africa region, but particularly for girls⁴⁶.

52. According to the evaluation's household survey, the percentage of children aged 6-12 years enrolled in school in 2010, was higher than the information presented in Table 4, although gains in enrolment have been primarily made in the South. The group of children aged 13-18 years who ever attended school in the CNO is much lower in the CNO than in the South.

Figure 6: Percentage of children who ever attended school 2009/10




Mean value is different between the South and CNO at the 0.001 significance level.

53. The percentage of children aged 6-18 years old who have never enrolled in school ranges between 12 and 17 percent. The most vulnerable households showed the lowest percentages of enrollees when compared to other households, with children aged 13-18 showing the lowest enrolment rates⁴⁷.

⁴⁶ Tango International: Mixed Method Impact Evaluation Of WFP's SFP, in Cote D'Ivoire (1999-2009), Inception Report, July 14, 2010

⁴⁷ Note that children in the 13-18 year age group may have felt the greatest impact of the protracted instability, as the majority had just started school when the crisis started, which interrupted school activities for up to 5 years.

Figure 7: Percentage of children who never attended school 2009/10




Mean value for middle and least vulnerable households is different from the mean value for most vulnerable households is statistically different (p less than or equal to 0.01 percent.)

54. Enrolment of students in WFP-supported schools in 2005 was heavily weighted in favour of Classes 1-3, which accounted for almost 60 percent of the total number of children enrolled. The remaining 40 percent of children were spread across the 3 final grades, fairly evenly, with slightly more students enrolled in Class 4 than in Class 5 or Class 6.

55. According to information collected from telephone key informants for the 2009/10 school year, out of 48 schools that provided information, girls' enrolment is significantly lower in CNO than in the South, compared to boys' enrolment. More disturbing, however, is the fact that there are almost double the number of boys' enrolled in schools with canteens than girls in the CNO.

Figure 8: Boys and girls enrolment 2009/10 sample data



Attendance

56. Standard Project Reports (SPR) provide information on attendance rates from 2004 onwards. Since 2004, attendance rates, according to the SPRs, has hovered between 95 and 98 percent, in all projects⁴⁸ Information on attendance rates was not provided by grade level in the SPRs.

57. According to a WFP Standardized School Feeding Survey conducted in June, 2005⁴⁹, attendance rates in both New Program Schools (NPS) and Existing Program Schools (EPS) surveyed were 94 percent in the lowest attendance month and 97 percent in the highest attendance month. There was no difference in average attendance rates across boys and girls in 2005.

58. The evaluation team was not able to verify these numbers. However, a cursory review of teachers' record books during the inception mission in June, 2010, revealed that (a) afternoon absences may not be rigorously marked; and (b) attendance rates varied so much during the harvest seasons that schools could not count on a good attendance, and could close for the month of June and/or the month of September⁵⁰.

59. Repeats have remained close to 20 percent over the evaluation period, although there have been some gains made in the last 2 years for both girls and boys.

Table 5: Selected statistics on repeat rates (% age of students enrolled)

%	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2006	2007	2008	2009
Female Repeats	25%	25%	25%	22%	18%	24%	21%	18%	19%
Male Repeats	23%	23%	24%	24%	17%	23%	22%	18%	19%
Total Repeat Rates	24%	24%	24%	23%	18%	24%	22%	18%	19%

60. Information on drop-out rates was also unavailable for the sample schools. However, World Bank education statistics over the period 1999-2009⁵¹ indicated that the total drop-out rate did not change significantly over the period, with the exception of drop-out rates for girls, which increased by 20 percent over the period.

Table 6: Selected statistics on drop-out rates (% age of students enrolled)

	1999	2000	2006	2007	2008
Female dropout rate	44	18	34		41
Male dropout rate	33	12	17		38
Total dropout rate	38	14	25	10	39

⁴⁸ In the SPR for PRRO 10372, in 2006, it was noted that girls' attendance was high in the 1st and 2nd trimester (94 and 95 percent respectively), but this declined to 89 percent in the 3rd trimester when girls began to stay home to help during the harvest season.

⁴⁹ The survey was conducted in early June, 2005, before the onset of the normal lean season. However, In Côte d'Ivoire, insecurity, labour shortages and the *de facto* partition of the country continued to disrupt agricultural production and marketing activities, suggesting that the lean season likely began earlier in 2005, as resources were depleted but the next season crops were not yet available for harvest (FAO/GIEWS, September, 2005).

⁵⁰ During the inception mission, there was a teachers' strike, so children were not formally at school, although they did attend to meet the guests.

⁵¹ World Bank Education statistics. No information on drop-out rates was provided for 2001 to 2005 and 2009.

Pass Rates (Achievement) and Completion Rates


61. World Bank education statistics over the evaluation period indicate very low completion rates, ranging from 32 percent (girls) in 2000 to a high of 57 percent (boys) in 2008. Completion rates for girls have remained at 2/3rds the level of male completion rates throughout the period.

Table 7: Completion rates 1999-2009

	1999	2000	2001	2006	2007	2008	2009
Female completion		32%	35%	33%	37%	38%	39%
Male completion		51%	54%	54%	53%	57%	54%
Total Completion Rates	41%	42%	45%	43%	45%	48%	46%

62. Household level data collected during this evaluation, disaggregated by the three vulnerability classes, revealed that, on average, only about one-third of the school age children are in fact “on track”⁵² in terms of their education. Children from most vulnerable households are less likely to have attained age appropriate education than households in moderately or less vulnerable households⁵³. In addition, all categories of vulnerable households in the CNO have educational attainment rates lower than the educational attainment of the most vulnerable household in the CNO.

Figure 9: Educational attainment by vulnerability category



***Mean value is different for most vulnerable households across zones at the .001 significance level.


**Mean value is different for middle and least vulnerable households across zones at the .01 significance level

63. Educational attainment by age means that the child is following the “normal” educational path, enrolling in the appropriate class for their age. As shown in Figure 11 below, children attending schools without canteens in the south have consistently achieved higher attainment rates than all other groups. Children attending schools with canteens show no significant difference in achievement rates than their counterparts in schools without canteens. There are different patterns, however, in achievement rates by age, suggesting that children in the CNO drop out of school earlier (between 7 and 8 or by age 11) when compared to children in the South.

⁵² Children are considered to be “on track” if they are enrolled in the class appropriate to their age (eg. a 6 year old would be expected to be in Class CP1, a 7 year old to be in Class CP2 etc).

⁵³ Because this evaluation has covered a period when all children under the age of 18 accessed primary education services, information on vulnerability and enrolment was collected for the age cohort 6-18.

Figure 10: Educational attainment by age, by Zone, and treatment/non-treatment



64. Educational attainment by age, zone and sex of child, suggests that female and male educational attainment does not vary significantly, except for the following age groups:

- Age 6 (in the South only): Significantly more female children were enrolled in Class 1 in the South at the appropriate age, compared to male children;
- Ages 13 and 14 (in the CNO only): Significantly more male children attained their levels of education for both ages than female children. The difference is significant for both ages (9 percent for males and 0 percent for females age 13 16 percent for males and 2.7 percent for females age 14).

65. In summary, national enrolment rates have continued to rise in the last 3 years. However, dropouts continue to be unacceptably high (20 percent). Achievement rates of children decline significantly at key points in the education cycle (at the age when the child can take responsibility at home, and at the age when the child is basically considered by its parents to have completed sufficient education). What is worrying is that these key points are happening to children at younger ages in the CNO when compared to the South. In the CNO, the critical ages when children are able to contribute to the household welfare is younger than in the South, with the likely implication that there is a large cohort of children in the CNO who have not had the same opportunities to access schools as their counterparts in the South. In addition, girls' enrolment ratio is the lowest in schools in the CNO with canteens. Completion rates have improved overall, but girls continue to lag behind boys significantly. With respect to graduations, household level data has confirmed that graduation rates were almost double in the South, when compared to the CNO. There are no statistically significant differences in enrolment or achievement rates between treatment and non-treatment groups in either the South or the CNO.

2.2 Nutrition: Outcomes and Impacts

66. As originally envisaged the SFP was intended to provide 33 percent of daily nutritional value to primary school aged children in targeted schools⁵⁴, or 672 kilocalories (kcal) for each day the canteen was open. Given the levels of vulnerability in Cote d'Ivoire and WFP experience elsewhere, this should have acted as an incentive to enrol children and send them to school on a regular basis. This assumption is based on (a) a regular commodity pipeline; and (b) regular opening of the school, based on official school dates.

67. The WFP programme in Cote d'Ivoire did not have an explicitly stated nutritional objective. Therefore, the following information is presented to help inform WFP's future strategies in the region.

68. In the areas where WFP has been managing the SFP, the WFP food basket included fortified commodities and was calculated to provide approximately 33 percent of the recommended daily nutritional intake of the child participating in the programme. The package has changed since 1989, as demonstrated in table 8.⁵⁵

⁵⁴ There was limited information available to the mission, nor the opportunity by the team to verify caloric and nutritional value of food actually served through observation. Data on overall food consumption, dietary diversity and number of meals consumed are used as indicators of nutritional outcomes.

⁵⁵ Data provided by WFP Rome. The 2002 EMOP 10244.0 report indicating the distribution of HEB noted that this was provided in 5 separate packets of 100 grams each but does not provide information on the number of times a single child may have received this amount.

Table 8: Food basket in grams/child/day

Commodity	DEV 10759 2009	PRRO 10672 2009	EMOP 10244	EMOP 10244.1	<u>1989</u>
Rice/maize meal	120	150		150	200
Corn Soy Blend	-	-		30	
Meat/fish	-	-		-	20
Pulses	30	30		-	-
Fortified vegetable oil	15	10		-	-
Vegetable oil	-	-		10	10
Iodised salt	5	5		-	-
Sugar	-	-		-	10
High Energy Biscuits			500		
Intended kcal	672	729	not recorded	729	not recorded

69. Because the school canteens have not been operating since the beginning of June 2010, the evaluation has not attempted to assess whether this nutritional package was actually provided to each child.

70. A review of food consumption and dietary diversity patterns among households across treatment and non-treatment groups within a zone and across zones revealed no differences in the South. Households in treatment areas had a slightly lower average of meals per day, when compared to households in non-treatment areas in the CNO

71. This could be a reflection of the timing of the survey, which was conducted when school was out of session, so the food consumption and dietary diversity did not capture the added benefit of the school meals. However, given the irregular nature of the school feeding throughout the year, this would suggest that, when meals are not being provided CNO households in schools with canteens are at a disadvantage. Number of meals also varied between households in the CNO and the South, with households in the CNO averaging slightly higher number of meals than their counterparts in the South ($p < .001$).

Table 9 Mean number of meals per day in August, by zone and treatment/non-treatment

	South				CNO			
	Without Canteens	With Canteens	South Total		Without Canteens	With Canteens	CNO Total	Total
	Mean (std. dev.)							
Mean # of meals per day	2.4	2.5	2.4***		2.6*	2.5*	2.6***	2.5
	(0.628)	(0.663)	(0.644)		(0.574)	(0.626)	(0.602)	(0.637)
N	336	295	631		315	314	629	1260

*Mean value is different between treatment and non-treatment group at the < .05 significance level within zone

*Mean value is different across zones at the 0.001 significance level

72. However, when food consumption and dietary diversity is reviewed by level of vulnerability, differences are noted. First, adult and child food consumption scores, adult and children dietary diversity scores and number of meals per day in both zones are significantly lower for the most vulnerable when compared to all other households. Second, averages in the CNO, for all categories of vulnerability are lower than averages for all scores in the South, with one exception. In both CNO and the South, the least vulnerable households both consume an average of 2.7 meals per day⁵⁶.

73. The programme does not appear to have significantly changed the gender distribution of students participating in the school meals. The percentage of female students participating in the programme was 42 percent in 2001; by 2009 this had increased by less than 10 percent, to approximately 46 percent. This increase is inadequate to fully offset the gap in dropout and completion rates of girls⁵⁷ Girls have not increased their participation in the canteen programs significantly, and they continue to lag behind their male counterparts in completion of primary school.

74. In summary, if there has been any impact on nutrition, it has been negligible. Households in the CNO, on average, eat more meals than in the South. In terms of vulnerability, however, there is a significant difference across households, with the most vulnerable households eating significantly less than all other households. In terms of food consumption and dietary diversity, however, the most vulnerable households are in the CNO.

⁵⁶ Information provided in the February, 2007, Food Security Assessment indicated that, with the exception of those most food insecure, all households were eating 3 meals per day. In the most food insecure category, adults ate only 2 meals per day. While the figures shown above for 2010 show a much lower level of meals eaten per day for all household members, this could be because the 2007 survey was conducted immediately after harvest when food resources were likely more plentiful, while the survey conducted for this evaluation was conducted at the end of the lean season, in August and early September.

⁵⁷ Percentages calculated from SPRs.

Table 10: Food security indicators, by zone and vulnerability category									
	South					CNO			
	Most vulnerable	Middle	Least Vulnerable	South Total		Most vulnerable	Middle	Least Vulnerable	CNO Total
	Mean (std. dev.)								
Adult food consumption score	5.8 ^a	7.9*** ^a	11.4*** ^b	7.9		5.0 ^a	8.5*** ^a	12.1*** ^b	8.0
	(1.4)	(1.4)	(1.9)	(2.4)		(1.8)	(1.5)	(1.8)	(3.0)
Child food consumption score	5.9 ^a	7.9*** ^a	11.4*** ^b	8.0		5.1 ^a	8.6*** ^a	12.2*** ^b	8.0
	1.4	1.4	2.0	(2.4)		(1.8)	(1.5)	(1.8)	(3.0)
Adult dietary diversity score	3.2 ^b	4.8***	6.9*** ^b	4.7		2.9 ^b	4.8***	6.5*** ^b	4.5
	(0.7)	(0.8)	(1.0)	(1.5)		(0.8)	(0.7)	(0.9)	(1.5)
Child dietary diversity score	3.1 ^c	4.7***	6.9*** ^c	4.6		2.9 ^c	4.8***	6.5*** ^c	4.4
	(0.7)	(0.8)	(1.0)	(1.5)		(0.8)	(0.7)	(0.9)	(1.5)
Number of meals per day	2.1 ^a	2.5*** ^b	2.7***	2.4		2.4 ^a	2.6*** ^b	2.7***	2.6
	(0.6)	(0.6)	(0.5)	(0.6)		(0.7)	(0.5)	(0.5)	(0.6)
N	184	327	116	627		220	289	114	623
									1250

***Mean value is different from lowest vulnerability category, within zone at the .001 significance level.

^a Mean value is different across zones at the .001 significance level.

^b Mean value is different across zones at the < .01 significance level.

^c Mean value is different across zones at the < .05 significance level.

2.3. Value Transfer: - Outcomes and Impacts

75. No data is presented on the value of the food transferred under the programme. However, in terms of the value transfer of the school meal itself, a review of the Standard Project Reports demonstrates that school feeding did not occur as planned at any point since 2002⁵⁸.

Table 11: Number of Planned and Actual School Feeding Days

Project Name/Year of Report	Number of School Feeding Days Planned	Number of School Feeding Days Achieved
SPR DEV 3358.2 (2002)	120	57 ⁵⁹
EMOP 10244, 10244.1 (2003 AND 2004)	no information provided	no information provided
PRRO 10372, DEV 3358.2 (2005)	no information provided	no information provided
PRRO 10372 (2006)	120	76
PRRO 10372 (2007)	120	78
PRRO 10672 (2007)	42	34
PRRO 10672 (2008)	115	93
PRRO 10672 (2009)	120	85
DEV 10759 (2009)	120	78

76. The evaluation team's telephone interviews revealed that the number of school feedings days in 2009/10 was even less than what has been reported in SPRs to date, as presented in Table 12 below. In the 30 school sites, 17 of the communities advised that, when no school meals were provided, children continued to attend school all day. In the remaining sites, informants advised that small children often did not return to school after lunch. Older children, on the other hand, would either return home to eat and return to school, or stayed in school and did not eat lunch. Anecdotal information also suggests that, in some schools, there were too many children wanting to participate in the programme. In those cases, the food was split into small portions. In other cases, children brought siblings or friends to the school, and they ate portions of the student's ration.

Table 12: Number of school feeding days 2009/10 in sampled schools

	South			CNO			Total		
	Urban	Rural	Total	Urban	Rural	Total	Urban	Rural	Total
Mean	62	58	61	53	51	51	55	56	56
N	2	12	14	3	12	15	5	24	29

77. The percentage of households with a child that received meals daily for the last month of school does not vary significantly by zone. On average, only 29 percent of children received meals daily from the canteen in the last month of school. What is more worrying is that approximately 16 percent, vs. 8 percent of households in treatment areas in the CNO and the South, respectively, responded that this question is not applicable, suggesting that households either didn't participate in the canteen programme for some reason, or they do not send their children to school, a very critical period for children to be able to pass into the next level of schooling.

⁵⁸ The evaluation team was unable to either observe school records or the DNCS records to know whether the reason for the difference in data presented in the SPR and that obtained through key informant interviews with at least 6 members of a given community who would be knowledgeable about the subject.

⁵⁹ Calculated on the basis of numbers reported in the SPR that 10,293,333 rations were provided to 181,337 persons. If we assume that one ration is one school meal, this averages to 57 days of SF in 2002.

78. For households in the treatment areas, there was no statistical difference in the perceived benefits of the SFP across zones. The two most commonly cited benefits of the SFP were savings in food or money for the household, and economy of time for children to be able to remain at school and study or socialize. Approximately 52 percent of households in the most vulnerable category continued to prepare luncheon meals, while 38 percent did not. On the other hand, most vulnerable households were slightly more likely NOT to prepare a lunch meal, when compared to their counterparts in the least vulnerable categories.

The Importance of Regular School Feeding:

“When the canteens are operating, it allows us to focus on productive activities, without having to stop to feed the children. When the canteens are closed, our productivity is reduced, because we need to dedicate time mid-day to feed our children, rather than risk something happening to them in the house when they are by themselves.”

A shopkeeper in the semi-urban area of Bouake, CNO.

79. Nonetheless, there was no significant difference in the number of households that spent less money on food as a result of the SFP across vulnerability categories. Approximately 50 percent of all households, regardless of the level of vulnerability, spend less money on food, and between 30 and 40 percent spend the same amount as when the child does not receive meals at school.

Table 13: Value transfer indicators by zone - schools with canteens only

	South	CNO	Total
	%		
Less money spent on food when child receives meals at school	46.4*	55.1*	49.8
Same amount of money spent on food when child receives meal at school	35.9	26.1	32.1
Household prepares or purchases the same quantity of food whether the child receives a meal at school or not	42.0**	30.9**	37.7
Value of school meals exceeds the CFAF 25 paid daily by parents	55.6	61.8	58.0
Value of school meals is less than the CFAF 25 paid daily by parents	32.9	21.3	28.3
N	295	314	609

** Mean value is different between treatment and non-treatment group at the .01 significance level.

*Mean value is different between treatment and non-treatment group at the .05 significance level.

80. When assessed by vulnerability category, however, it is evident that, for those most vulnerable households participating in the programme, they consider the canteen “good value for money” compared to the other two categories. This, however, does not say anything about those vulnerable households who might have benefited from the canteen, but did not participate because of a lack of cash to pay for the school meal.

Table 14: Value of school canteen worth 25 CFAF, by vulnerability category

	Most vulnerable	Middle	Least Vulnerable	Total
Yes	66.0	55.9*	48.8**	57.8
No	24.1	30.2	31.2	28.4
n.a.	9.9	13.9	20.0	13.8
Weighted N	211	338	124	673

**Mean value is different from the most vulnerable group at the .01 significance level.

*Mean value is different from the most vulnerable group at the .05 significance level.

81. The CFAF25 that was set by the DNCS and agreed to by WFP was for the following purpose: 50 percent to the canteen (e.g. to equip the canteen, pay the cooks⁶⁰), 25 percent to the regional directorate and 25 percent to the national directorate. A 1992 evaluation of Operation 3358 Primary School Canteen Programme (1989-1993) found that this charge was *de facto* the main selection criterion accepted by all. However, it raised three issues. First, not always the same children received the rations; second, the neediest tended to be excluded; and third, the funds were in fact being used to defray certain operation costs that should have been paid from the Government's budget (e.g. port demurrage, transport to the regions etc). While recognising the importance of the principle, the evaluation recommended reducing the level of the contribution uniformly in the poorest regions to CFAF15 (US\$0.05). However, the 2009 evaluation of PRRO 10672.0 found schools still charging parents CFAF25 for the meal (as well as other fees).

82. A review of schooling expenditure data collected in the household survey shows a wide variation across vulnerability groups, as demonstrated in Table 15 below:

Table 15: Income and educational expenditures, by vulnerability category

	Most vulnerable	Middle	Least Vulnerable	Total
	Mean(standard deviation)			
Monthly income per capita	7201.33 (8886.03)	13069.59*** (14489.99)	17641.64*** (19276.63)	12127.06 (14615.95)
Total per child educational expenses	15014.49 (13217.10)	19025.95*** (17281.75)	24169.70*** (22558.79)	18765.77 (17600.56)
N	387	627	238	1252

***Mean value is different from the most vulnerable group at the .001 significance level

83. While estimates by parents of the annual per child expenditure on schooling for the most vulnerable households was CFAF 15,159 (about US\$30), the least vulnerable households invested an estimated CFAF 23,903(US\$50) in their children's education, or approximately 60 percent more for each child educated than the amount spent by most vulnerable households.

84. The survey confirmed that the most vulnerable households perceived greater benefits from the SFP than the least vulnerable households. However, the evaluation mission did not have the opportunity to speak with the most vulnerable households to determine if the surcharge for the meal put the programme out of the reach of some of the most vulnerable households. Considering that most vulnerable households have monthly per capita incomes equal to approximately US\$14 per month, it may be that they are required to choose between children participating in the school canteen programme because they are unable to pay for all children, which would require approximately US\$0.05 for every day they participate in the canteen. In the worst case scenario, children are no longer able to access canteen services during the lean season, when cash is scarce, or to drop out whenever increased labour demand in the household warrants their remaining at home.

85. Alternatively, this additional cost, when placed against work that can be conducted by primary school age children, becomes a double disincentive, because the household has to expend the cash while simultaneously losing the labour of the child for home-based activities.

⁶⁰ Who also received a daily wage.

86. There was inadequate information available to determine whether the school meal conferred any significant advantage to households, as a value transfer, particularly for the most vulnerable households. For most vulnerable households, their inability to count on the provision of a daily meal has limited the time savings that could have been used for productive purposes, and has made the trade-off between education and home labour too expensive for the children to continue in school.

3. How does School Feeding create impact in Cote d'Ivoire

3.1. The Role of Contextual Factors

87. The civil war effectively split the country into two separate zones, with a buffer zone between the two where peacekeeping operations were spearheaded by forces provided by the United Nations (UN) and by France. Essential social services in the CNO were disrupted, as health clinics closed, and schools had few teachers and supplies. Without access to state funds, keeping a school running in order to be eligible to once again access school feeding, were enormous. Struggling parents had to chip in together to keep the school running and pay stipends to volunteer teachers.

88. In addition, while those state teachers who returned to the CNO after the ceasefire and signing of the first Peace Agreement were eligible to receive salaries, a number of teachers saw their pay suspended without warning for months at a time. As continued insecurity led to the closure of banks, teachers were required to travel elsewhere to receive their salaries, and then to travel to where their family was staying to provide them with resources to live. This required teachers to be absent for short periods of time on a regular basis, and every time a teacher was absent, his/her classroom was locked. If the classroom was locked, children could not attend school, and if children could not attend class, they also could not participate in the SFP.

89. The protracted instability also significantly affected the means of livelihoods of households, particularly those dependent upon cash crop sales and other market related activities. Thefts, extortion and “taxes” levied at check points by either rebels or government militias, significantly increased the cost of any business activity⁶¹.

90. In the process, persons were often beaten or killed, and women were also raped. In the West, widespread human rights abuses by two rebel groups, *Mouvement pour la justice et la paix* and Ivorian Popular Movement of the Great West, forced civilians and Liberian refugee in western Cote d'Ivoire to flee into government-held territory. As the war progressed, rape and looting increased dramatically. In one reported case of five girls and young women between the ages of 14 and 20 were abducted, repeatedly raped by Ivorian and Liberian fighters, and forced to do domestic labour⁶². In the West of the country, this practice has continued to the present day⁶³.

91. The combination of the loss of profits, and the threat to physical security acted as the impetus for households to reduce the level of effort placed in raising cash crops or crops requiring processing for sale in the market, and to increase efforts to grow more food crops⁶⁴. Only households living in more secure areas could continue to grow cash crops in security. Finally, the most vulnerable households tend to rely on day labour, and for those persons, the drop in cash crop production affected demand for their labour.

92. While this may suggest that a SFP may not have provided value added, this is not the case. The most vulnerable households consumed less diverse foods, and ate

⁶¹ In Man, one community member advised that the inability by commercial traders to reach their traditional markets in the South resulted in a shift to serving markets North of the country, such as Burkina Faso. More information would need to be collected in order to determine if this pattern emerged elsewhere.

⁶² Ibid, available at <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/49880666c.html>.

⁶³ There are a number of studies by independent organizations, such as Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch, in addition to reports to the UN Security Council, who have documented the impact of this level of lawlessness on the Ivorian population. Please refer to the Bibliography.

⁶⁴ According to the survey conducted for this evaluation, the most insecure households were much less likely to grow food crops (20-27 percent compared to 14 percent). Households that were highly food insecure were much more likely to rely on day labour, while all categories relied to a certain extent on small business or petty trade.

fewer meals than their better-off counterparts, suggesting that, for the most vulnerable households at least, the canteens may have added value to their food consumption (though not to a measurable extent) and enabled parents, particularly mothers, to concentrate on their other activities, while being confident that their children were well fed and were in a secure place.

93. In both the CNO and South of the country, the judiciary system became either corrupted or was non-existent. Individuals who were victims of crimes (theft, murder, rape) in the rebel-controlled area of the country had no official recourse to an independent body (such as an independent police force or judiciary), with the result that crimes were left unpunished and perpetrators were free to continue their actions⁶⁵. In the South, the independence of the police and judiciary was compromised, as attacks by government military on certain households or communities were justified on the basis of preventing further insurrection. Once again, individuals were unable to seek, and obtain, legal recourse against the perpetrators.

94. In the first years of the conflict, limited income earning opportunities together with closed schools opened the door for rebel forces and militia to recruit young children to fight on their behalf. One teacher in the CNO put it succinctly when he said:

‘This is a crisis distinct from all other crises. Everywhere where you see war, school never stays open. But we have continued to function,’
‘One of the fundamental reasons that we did this was to take children away from the frontline – because there were some who, having nothing to do, knew that their only hope was in war. We were going to start having child soldiers, and we were also starting to see young girls prostitute themselves.’⁶⁶

95. This is, in fact, what started after the civil crisis in September, 2002. Children began to be recruited by the rebel forces based in Bouake by December, and were seen posted at roadblocks⁶⁷. This continued until schools reopened, and parents were able to send their children to school again. Children who returned from the ranks of the rebel army, however, needed to learn to readapt to peaceful life at school. Those that didn’t dropped out of school or were required to terminate their education by the school administration.

⁶⁵ United Nations Security Council, “Eighteenth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cote d’Ivoire”, October, 2008.

⁶⁶ Schoolteacher Koffi Toussaint, from the Djibo Sounkalo school in Bouaké, as quoted in the Chatham House Africa Programme Armed Non-State Actors Series, September, 2007, “*Cote d’Ivoire Forces Nouvelles*” written by Daniel Balint, Kurti, Associate Fellow.

⁶⁷ According to the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers’s Report of 2004 for Cote d’Ivoire, children were initially recruited for roadblocks. In these cases children, mainly between the ages of 10 and 15, were armed with Kalashnikov rifles or other arms..

96. Over the ten year period of the evaluation, donor support has been uneven. The protracted conflict, during a time period when there were significant natural disasters across the world, made it difficult to secure donors' commitments, particularly after the Ouagadougou Peace Accords were signed in 2007. At a time when people's confidence in a "return to normalcy" was at its highest, and the commitment to educate their children was returning, donor support dropped to 60 percent, limiting the amount of food commodities in the pipeline, and the number of days children were fed.

Child Soldiering in Cote d'Ivoire

Discussions with communities in highly unstable areas, such as the West of the country revealed that, when schools were closed, children were eager to "help" whatever soldiers required by way of assistance, carrying water, making tea, washing clothes, etc. For these small errands, children could gain cash, as soldiers/militia regularly had cash due to the "taxes" imposed at checkpoints. Unfortunately, these small tasks evolved into guarding checkpoints with semi-automatic rifles, or into "marriage" of female children to rebel soldiers.

97. In some schools, administrators responded by reducing the quantity served to each child, so that more children could be assisted and would remain in school. However, this did not resolve the general problem of inadequate food stocks to maintain a regular pipeline.

98. One of the factors that can influence the decision-making of households with regard to the education of their children is the general well-being of the households themselves. While income poverty is often presented as an indicator of well-being, it is widely accepted that this measure is too narrow. Other household characteristics, such as asset ownership, nutritional status, and labour availability are other determinants of what is more appropriately called household vulnerability, that is, the expected outcomes from external stress (i.e., conflict, drought) upon the household.

99. In summary, a number of external factors significantly influenced the results reported in Section 2 by increasing vulnerability levels, and thereby reducing the ability of households to educate their children. The most vulnerable households now have incomes significantly lower than their less vulnerable counterparts, which has impacted upon their abilities to expend the resources necessary to send their children to school. Around 17 percent of the most vulnerable primary age children never enrolled, while 11 percent of least vulnerable children did not enrol. The motivations are clearly sorted by vulnerability class. For the least vulnerable, parents gave such reasons as "not yet old enough to attend school", but for the most vulnerable group the most cited reasons were financial or cultural—more than one third stated that they could not afford school and more than ten percent did not allow their children to go to school, although it was not possible to probe more deeply into this topic with these parents.

100. In addition, the most vulnerable households have had to resort to withdrawing their children from school during critical points in the agricultural cycle, in order to grow as much food as possible. The result of this is evident in Section 2, which confirm that children from less vulnerable households are significantly more likely to have attained age-appropriate education than their most vulnerable counterparts.

3.2. The Role of Implementation Factors

101. The SFP began as a joint operation between the Government under the responsibility of the *Direction Nationale des Cantines Scolaires* (DNCS) and WFP. By the last development project (3358.2), the number of ration days were intended to be scaled down on an annual basis until the complete project was turned over to the government.

102. This government-supported strategy implied the following, in term of enabling WFP to meet its objectives of promoting education, particularly to the most vulnerable households and to improve the gender parity in enrolments and achievements:

- **Targeting:** Communities were selected based on general levels of vulnerability, as agreed upon between WFP and DNCS⁶⁸. Once a community was selected (based on their commitment, their willingness to provide the necessary minimal infrastructure, and the school's ability to manage the resources), de-selection only occurred when there was evidence of fraud, or if the site was inaccessible due to security conditions, or if the number of children receiving a ration had dropped below 150, and it was no longer cost-effective to provide school meals to such a small number.
- **Towards a Universal School Feeding Policy:** The government was firm in its request to WFP to provide hot meals at schools, in accordance with its overall strategy of "one school one canteen". However, as resources declined, there were inadequate food commodities to meet the demand. Although WFP staff in Cote d'Ivoire had preferred to reduce the number of schools being served, they decided to follow the DNCS in providing food to the same number of schools but with fewer days.

Targeting

103. Schools receiving WFP resources were intended to be restricted to schools with less than 240 students, and schools in rural communities. It was initially intended that priority access to the school meals would be given to (a) girls; (b) orphans being raised by grandparents; (c) children who lived more than 3 kilometres (km) from the school, from the school, and (d) families with a large number of children going to school compared to the average household. However, it is not likely that this was implemented, and the ability to pay the user fee of CFAF 25 became the "*de facto*" targeting mechanism. The household survey confirmed that the majority of children in the treatment and non-treatment schools (98.5 percent) of all households lived within 2 kilometres of the school, with the vast majority living less than 1 kilometre.

Table 16: Distance of household from school, by zone and treatment/non-treatment

	South				CNO				
	No Canteen	With Canteens	South Total		No Canteen	With Canteen	CNO Total		Total
	%								
less than half km.	65.2	57.6	61.6		60.0	57.3	58.7		60.2
half to 1 km.	25.3*	33.9*	29.3		28.9	30.9	29.9		29.6

⁶⁸ In the early 1990's (DEV 3358) schools were selected for participation by distance from school (and therefore feasibility for students to return home for lunch), in addition to the criteria of food insecurity and/or poverty.

1-2 km.	8.3	7.8	8.1		7.3	11.5	9.4		8.7
2-5 km.	1.2	0.7	1.0		3.2	0.3	1.7		1.3
more than 5 km.	0.0	0.0	0.0		0.6**	0.0**	0.3		0.2
N	336	295	631		315	314	629		1260

** There is a significant difference between the treatment and non-treatment groups within a single zone at the .01 significance level.

* There is a significant difference between the treatment and non-treatment groups within a single zone at the 0.05 significance level.

104. As a result of the civil war in September, 2002, the government lost control of more than 60 percent of the geographical area of the country which included approximately 40 percent of the population. As a result, WFP modified its implementation strategy to work with international and national NGOs in distributing food stocks and monitoring their use, with the result that communities within the NGOs' geographical coverage were likely supported before more isolated communities were reached. Nonetheless, the emphasis placed by WFP on ensuring that once a humanitarian agency was found able to move the food commodities north and to monitor their use, the programme would resume operations was a critical point in halting the recruitment of child soldiers in Cote d'Ivoire. More than 250,000 children in the CNO were served by NGOs in the first years of the instability.

Supporting Government Policy of a Universal School Feeding Programme

105. Since the crisis of September, 2002, WFP began to work with international and national NGOs in the CNO to deliver food commodities under the programme. Food rations began to differ between the South and the CNO, as original rations included rice and other "luxury foodstuffs"⁶⁹, but subsequent resources did not facilitate this continued practice.

106. WFP's decision after the first ceasefire to begin distributing food through NGOs operating in the CNO, who could provide food stocks to communities that had remobilized and reopened the school, was a very good option. WFP's decision to provide take-home rations to volunteer teachers recruited by the community was a good response to the problem of an excessive burden on parents of school going children in the CNO. However, inadequate resources to monitor activities and provide support in resolving security issues resulted in much of the impact of these positive changes being lost.

107. Rice is considered a preferred food over maize meal across the country. When DNCS and WFP agreed to distribute rice in the south but maize meal in the CNO, and following the return of peace, parents of children in the south felt a sense of inequity as some of them were aware that schools in the South still received rice as a major staple. They also recalled when rice was provided to schools in the CNO. This has caused feelings of inequality of treatment.

Increasing Perceptions of Inequality

In semi-urban areas in Bouake, and in certain schools that had been served by the programme prior to the conflict, concerns were raised about the changes in the quality of food served. Community members wanted to know why rice was no longer provided in the schools in the CNO, when it was still being provided in the South. This was perceived as another example of bias by the State against the CNO.

⁶⁹ This included such items as canned fish and meats. According to DNCS, maize was not distributed in the South due to "southern preferences".

Given that the ongoing stability was rooted in feelings of horizontal inequality across the country, WFP's decision to support the food packages recommended by DNCS for the CNO and the South was perceived by some communities as an indicator that WFP was more closely linked with the formal government, rather than being concerned about the welfare of all children country wide.

108. PRRO 10672, which began in 2007, intended to provide take-home rations (take-home ration) for girls in order to promote increased enrolment. However, shortfalls in donor support led to the cancellation of these rations before they were started, in favour of serving hot lunches to as many schools as possible. These take-home rations may have encouraged girls who had dropped out of school during the worst periods of instability to return to school, but the opportunity was lost.⁷⁰

109. In summary, WFP's implementation strategy during the period of protracted instability has inhibited the performance of WFP's work and negatively influenced the results. Inadequate food stocks as donor fatigue set in resulted in inadequate service to the schools. The decision by DNCS, which was supported by WFP, to continue to provide rice to schools in the South but not in the CNO may have been short-sighted and contributed to further feelings of inequality for vulnerable households in the CNO.

3.3. The Interaction between Factors

The Impact of Insecurity on Effectiveness of Canteen Operations:

In Fanhala School, located in an isolated community in the CNO, a canteen was opened in 2005, but was closed later because of management issues. According to one interviewee, "the volunteer teacher responsible for the canteen stole the food stocks, which not only resulted in no meals being served, but eroded the general confidence in the system and the solidarity of the community."

110. With the onset of the crisis, the contextual factors and internal implementation factors collided in the CNO. This had three negative consequences: (a) WFP was in no position to negotiate with any of the rebel authorities to support the school feeding in the CNO, thereby limiting the engagement of the rebel authorities in the SFP; (b) schools in the rebel held areas were initially closed, and when they did open, they did not have food stocks to implement a daily canteen service; and (c) severe restrictions of movement due to the insecurity were

straining the coping strategies of households to have the extra resources necessary to meet all of their labour demands and send their children to school.

⁷⁰ In Ghana, take-home rations were provided to girls in the last years of primary school to promote their continued attendance. It was phased out when the gender parity index (GPI) had been reached. However, according to the evaluation, this may have been premature, as the GPI does not capture the number of girls who never enrolled in school in the first place, which tends to be higher than the number of boys who were never enrolled (Evaluation of Ghana country programme 2006-2010, April, 2010).

111. The contextual factors mentioned above created “a perfect storm” when they mixed with WFP’s implementation strategy. When IEPs were not fully functional, or when NGOs were distributing the food stocks to communities, the insecurity situation made it difficult for external monitors to ensure compliance with the programme, and parents and teachers did not feel empowered to monitor effective use of the food stocks. No alternative monitoring system was developed to adapt to the new realities of living in insecure areas, although it was sorely needed. Anecdotal information received from community members indicated that monitoring of food stocks has not been strong throughout the period, as has overall food management at the school itself. No alternative monitoring system was developed to adapt to the new realities of living in insecure areas, although it was sorely needed.

The Problem with Erratic Food Supply:

How can you expect school canteens to encourage school attendance when they function so seldom and the quality of the food is so poor? In the 120 school days last year, the canteen functioned for only 40. The government and WFP need to review their strategy of covering more schools with less food.

Parent of school children in Trafla Natis 2, in the CNO

112. Telephone interviews revealed that, for a number of parents, the re-start of the SFP were an indication to families that normalcy was returning. Unfortunately, unpredictability of the food allocation did not maintain the necessary inducement for children to remain in the school. Further, the need for increased labour from children as households shifted their production from cash to food crops, which was cited as a critical factor in household decisions regarding education, likely offset many gains that could have been made had the protracted instability been addressed.

4. Conclusions and Recommendations

4.1. Overall Assessment

113. The programmes as originally designed prior to the crisis was relevant to the needs at the time and clearly supported the government's desire to improve school enrolment and achievement, particularly for girls, through its "one school one canteen" policy. However, as the instability continued beyond the emergency phase, the instruments available to WFP and the nature of the relationship between WFP and DNCS were no longer appropriate for promoting learning outcomes or providing safety nets for most vulnerable households.

114. While the projects clearly provided some meals to a very large number of children in the CNO and in the South, the total number of 'meal days' and regularity was inadequate to stimulate enrolment, attendance and completion. This evaluation has demonstrated that there is no difference in enrolment and achievement rates between treatment and non-treatment groups in either the South or the CNO.

115. National enrolment rates have continued to rise in the last 3 years. However, dropouts continue to be unacceptably high (20 percent). Achievement rates of children decline significantly at key points in the education cycle (at the age when the child can take responsibility at home, and at the age when the child is basically considered by its parents to have completed sufficient education), and these critical moments are happening to children at younger ages in the CNO when compared to the South. Completion rates have improved overall, but girls continue to lag behind boys significantly. With respect to graduations, household level data has confirmed that graduation rates were almost double in the South, when compared to the CNO. There are no statistically significant differences in enrolment or achievement rates between treatment and non-treatment groups in either the South or the CNO. Girls have not increased their participation in the canteen programs significantly, and they continue to lag behind their male counterparts in completion of primary school.

116. Based on the limited information available to the evaluation team, the impact on nutrition has been negligible and dietary diversity is not significantly different between treatment and non-treatment group household. Households in the CNO, on average, eat more meals than in the South. In terms of vulnerability, however, there is a significant difference across households, with the most vulnerable households eating significantly less than all other households. Households in the South are most vulnerable, while, in the South, households in non-treatment communities ate the WFP SFP, has not impacted upon food consumption. In terms of food consumption and dietary diversity, however, the most vulnerable households are in the CNO.

117. Evidence is inadequate to determine whether the school meal conferred any significant advantage to households, as a value transfer, particularly for the most vulnerable households. For most vulnerable households, their inability to count on the provision of a daily meal has limited the time savings that could have been used for productive purposes, and has made the trade-off between education and home labour too expensive for the children to continue in school.

118. A number of external factors significantly influenced the results reported in Section 2 by increasing vulnerability levels, and thereby reducing the ability of households to educate their children. The most vulnerable households now have incomes significantly lower than their less vulnerable counterparts, which has impacted upon their abilities to expend the resources necessary to send their

children to school. Around 17 percent of the most vulnerable primary age children never enrolled, while 11 percent of least vulnerable children did not enrol. The motivations are clearly sorted by vulnerability class. For the least vulnerable, parents gave such reasons as “not yet old enough to attend school”, but for the most vulnerable group the most cited reasons were financial or cultural—more than one third stated that they could not afford school and more than ten percent did not allow their children to go to school (perhaps for religious reasons).

119. The most vulnerable households have had to resort to withdrawing their children from school during critical points in the agricultural cycle, in order to grow as much food as possible. The result of this is evident in Section 2, which confirm that children from less vulnerable households are significantly more likely to have attained age-appropriate education than their most vulnerable counterparts.

120. The programme’s strategy, to use school meals for less than 60 percent of school days, during the period of protracted instability has inhibited the effectiveness of the SFP. Inadequate food stocks as donor fatigue set in, coupled with a decision to continue serving the same number of schools with less food, rather than prioritizing a smaller number, resulted in inadequate service to the schools. The decision by DNCS, which was supported by WFP, to continue to provide rice to schools in the South but not in the CNO, according to key informants, contributed to community perceptions of bias.

121. The evaluation team recognizes that, prior to the crisis, there was strong justification for WFP to support a truly nationally owned programme. The government had developed a sustainability strategy through its “*groupements scolaires*” and WFP was committed to supporting this strategy until the programme reached self-sufficiency through its home grown food production. This high level of government ownership, however, did not serve the national objectives of promoting universal education, particularly for girls, once the government no longer had control of 60 percent of the country and 40 percent of the population for an extended period of time. The gap in achievement rates between the South and the CNO is widening, so that children, primarily girls in the CNO, are losing ground against their counterparts.

122. Equally important may be the anecdotal information provided by communities with school feeding groups. In all cases, groups identified the lack of adequate quality land, the lack of quality inputs on a timely basis, the lack of technical support, and the lack of small scale mechanization to promote processing, as key constraints to sustainability of the SFP in each community.

38. The crisis that has once again erupted in Cote d’Ivoire has closed down access to education services for children and has limited the evaluation team’s ability to understand the full implications of the socio-political instability on vulnerable households. Until this more in-depth information can be obtained from members of targeted communities, these new models of cooperation cannot be proposed at this time.

4.2. Recommendations

Recommendations within the purview of WFP:

123. **Recommendation 1:** Refocus support school feeding on improving enrolment, completion and pass rates, particularly for the most vulnerable households, if the socio-political situation stabilizes. Conduct a study once the

present crisis has been resolved to better understand the underlying causes of the lower participation of girls, so that the strategy selected will capture the particular challenges faced by girls.

124. Recommendation 2: Improve the regularity of participatory **monitoring**, initially by WFP staff, and subsequently by food management sub-committees at the school level so that communities have confidence in the state's commitment to the school canteens and to improving access to education, particularly for girls.

125. Recommendation 3: Re-introduce take-home rations or cash transfers during the lean season in the school year for extremely vulnerable households until crops have been harvested, so that households are encouraged to continue to send their children to school, instead of withdrawing them to provide labour at critical moments in the food production cycle.

Recommendations that require collaboration with other actors:

126. Recommendation 4: Re-negotiate with DNCS a particular targeting strategy that enables children from the vulnerable households to access the SFP. This could include (a) the establishment of a scholarship fund using a portion of the 10 CFAF per student presently reimbursed to DNCS to cover operational costs, so that the most vulnerable households could access the canteen; or (b) establishing a country-wide policy enabling the most vulnerable households to access the meals.

127. Recommendation 5: Match coverage to resources. Where resources are anticipated to be less than planned, provide food to fewer schools with priority to those in the most food insecure areas. Pipelines should be maintained at 90 percent of all school days. This will require a judicious selection of communities for WFP support using the results of country-wide food security and risk assessment.

128. Recommendation 6: Revitalize the Food Management Subcommittee in the schools by building their capacity to monitor the SFP and to hold DNCS accountable for food quality and quantity, so that efficiency, effectiveness and community confidence in the system can be maintained.

129. Recommendation 7: With DNCS and FAO develop a range of activities that could be undertaken by community groups to promote the sustainability of the canteens over time. Producing food for consumption in the canteens is only one option and other alternatives, particularly for *peri-urban* communities and communities where tensions already exist over land ownership, should be explored.

130. Recommendation 8: Where the lean season and harvest season coincides with school holidays, negotiate with the Ministry of Education to consider offering **life skills education to dropouts, with WFP supporting their attendance with the provision of school meals and take-home rations.**

131. Recommendation 9: Once the present crisis has abated, identify those schools with lower than average national/regional completion rates and conduct focus group discussions with a wide spectrum of parents, teachers, and elders, to determine how these rates could be improved. If quality of the education is the barrier, **identify those other organizations working in the geographical area in the education sector to explore their willingness to include this community in their programming, with WFP providing food assistance.**

132. Recommendation 10: Should the current crisis continue, WFP should conduct a rapid food security assessment, holding focus group discussions with

representative from the various levels of vulnerable households (women, men and children) to determine the relevance of the school feeding modality as it is presently operating, and to determine what needs to be changed for the SFP to provide a safety net for the most vulnerable households. This work will be required before an appropriate mix of delivery mechanisms (e.g., cash transfers, take-home rations, biscuits, hot meals in school) can be identified that would best sustain household commitment to education of primary school aged children during protracted instability.

Acronyms

ANADER	<i>Agence Nationale de Développement Rurale</i>
CNO	Centre North West
DEV	Development Project
DNCS	<i>Direction Nationale des Cantines Scolaires</i> National Directorate of School Canteens
EMOP	emergency operation
EQAS	Evaluation Quality Assurance System
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IEP	Inspectorate of Primary Education
IRIN	Integrated Regional Information Network
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OE	Office of Evaluation
PIP/CS	<i>Programme Intégré de Pérenisation des Cantines Scolaires</i> Integrated Sustainability Programme for School Canteens
PRRO	Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations
SF	School Feeding
SFP	School Feeding Programme
SPRs	Standard Project Report
ToR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
WFP	World Food Programme
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

Office of Evaluation
www.wfp.org/evaluation



World Food Programme