

Country Portfolio Evaluation

Haiti: An Evaluation of WFP's Portfolio (2005-2010)

November 2011

Commissioned by the

Office of Evaluation

Measuring Results, Sharing Lessons

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Report number: OE/2011/025



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Acknowledgements

The evaluation team would like to express its deep appreciation to the entire staff of the World Food Programme Country Office in Haiti for its technical, logistical, and personal support during the team's work in Haiti from March 28, 2011 – April 15, 2011. The WFP staff in Port-au-Prince, Cap Haitien, Gonaives, and Jacmel offered full and unstinting cooperation and support. Without their help this work would have been impossible. The WFP/Rome team, led by Evaluation Manager Michel Denis, and the Regional Bureau in Panama City also provided invaluable orientation and feedback to the CPE team.

In Haiti, many organizations contributed materially to our understanding of the current needs of and emergencies in Haiti and to our appreciation of the WFP response to these situations:

- The Government of Haiti, especially the Ministries of Agriculture, Education, Public Health and Population, and the Department of Civil Protection;
- The UN Country Team and Humanitarian Team, especially UNICEF, WHO, UNFPA, OCHA, UNHCR, FAO, and UNDP;
- Multilateral and bilateral donors including Canada, Brazil, France, the World Bank, the European Commission, and USAID;
- International and national NGOs;
- Department level officials and community representatives in the Ouest, Artibonite, Nord, and Nord-Est.

All those consulted were more than generous with their time and their ideas and they contributed materially to the thinking that has entered into the construction of this CPE report. The team would also like to acknowledge Dr. Millie Gadbois for her contributions to the evaluation mission.

Disclaimer

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Fact Sheet: WFP's Portfolio in Haiti (2005-2010)

Operation	Time	2005		2006		2007		2008		2009		2010	
DEV 10217	Sept 03 Dec 07	2003 ← Req: \$37.0 - Contrib: \$30.9											
PRRO 10382	May 05 Dec 07	Req: \$43.8 - Contrib: \$32.3											
DEV 10386	Jan 08 Dec 09							Req: \$9.2 - Contrib: \$7.1					
PRRO 10674	Jan 08 Dec 09	LEGEND Funding level						Req: \$154.7 Contrib: \$132.5					
PRRO 10844	Jan 10 Dec 11												
EMOP 10785	Sept 08 Dec 08	> 75%						\$0.5 \$0.3		2011 →			
EMOP 10781	Sept 08 May 09	Between 50 and 75%						Req: \$31.6 Contrib: \$22.3					
EMOP 200107	Jan 10 April 10	n/a								\$0.5 \$0.5			
EMOP 200110	Jan 10 Dec 10							\$473.5 \$373.5					
SO 10449	Sept 05 Dec 07	Req: \$2.9 - Contrib: \$2.0											
SO 10779	Sept 08 Feb 09							\$8.0 \$7.1					
SO 10780	Sept 08 May 10							Req: \$10.8 Contrib: \$8.0					
SO 200108	Jan 10 Dec 10							\$79.9 \$47.7					
SO 200109	Jan 10 Dec 10							\$31.7 \$17.6					
Food Distributed* (MT)		25729		20118		24131		50349		65835		310386***	
Direct Expenses** (USD, millions)		21.5		14.7		21.7		59.5		72.6		n.a.	
% Direct Expenses: Haiti vs. World		0.7%		0.6%		0.8%		1.7%		1.8%		n.a.	
Beneficiaries* (actual, thousands)		M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
		497	1044	325	719	441	965	1247	2671	1025	2131	3906.5***	


Source: WFP WINGS I and II, SPRs (*), Annual Performance Reports (**), Programme of Work 23 July 2010 (***, planned figures), (*) 310386 MT planned to be distributed in 2010 include 46,568 MT that are converted in cash values

Main donors and partners

Donors: United States of America, Canada, Private donors, Spain, European Commission.

Partners: Government of Haiti, 73 local and 25 global NGOs.

	Education	Nutrition	GFD	FFW/FFA/FFT	HIV	CASH
DEV 10217	X	X		X	X	
PRRO 10382		X	X	X	X	
DEV 10386	X			X		
PRRO 10674	X	X	X	X	X	
PRRO 10844	X	X	X	X	X	
EMOP 10785			X			
EMOP 10781	X	X	X	X	X	
EMOP 200107			X			
EMOP 200110			X	X		X



Executive Summary

BACKGROUND

Evaluation Features

1. The Haiti Country Portfolio Evaluation (CPE) encompasses the 14 World Food Programme (WFP) operations that were active between May 2005 and December 2010, 9 food assistance operations and 5 special operations. The 2005 – 2010 time period was marked by severe natural and manmade disasters in Haiti, significantly changing the size and scope of the WFP country portfolio. This period was chosen for evaluation as a tool to support the Country Office (CO) in developing lessons learned from a challenging and evolving food security environment as they look forward to developing programmes in a situation of post-earthquake recovery. The focus of the CPE is not on evaluating the 14 individual operations per se, but rather looking across operational divides to assess the relevance and coherence of the WFP portfolio as a whole, its evolution over time, its performance, and the strategic role played by WFP in Haiti.

Context

2. With the highest poverty rate in Latin America and the Caribbean, Haiti ranks 145 out of 169 countries on the United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) Human Development Index. A series of natural disasters such as flooding, hurricanes, and the 2010 earthquake exacerbated conditions in a country that was already struggling with high levels of food insecurity and poverty. As a net importer of food, the food-fuel-financial crisis of 2007 – 2008 also added to the country's economic insecurity. These disasters combined with environmental degradation, endemic poverty, and weakened survival mechanisms because of the political, socio-economic and climatic shocks suffered over the past few decades make the country particularly vulnerable.

3. Social services remain inconsistent and insufficient to meet demand. Approximately 40 percent of the population has no access to basic health care and infant mortality and maternal mortality are the highest in the region and among the highest in the world. These poor health conditions, insufficient health services, and food insecurity hamper the country's ability to address crisis such as malnutrition and HIV/AIDS. The generally poor education system is characterized by very low academic performance and high dropout and repeat rates, resulting in 57 percent illiteracy, the highest illiteracy rate in the Caribbean.

WFP's Portfolio in Haiti

4. WFP assistance has increased dramatically from 2005 to 2010, with total direct expenses growing from US\$21.5 million in 2005 to US\$72.6 million in 2009 and nearly US\$300 million in 2010. Similarly, WFP opened 6 new sub-offices during the same period and staff strength increased by a factor of 10 for the international staff and by a factor of 5 for the national staff. The country portfolio was dominated by the response to the January 2010 earthquake. Notably, EMOP 200110 and the supporting special operations (SO) 200108 and 200109, which addressed the most urgent needs of the 3.5 million earthquake victims, represent approximately 65 percent of the total country portfolio over the period of evaluation. In addition to providing general food distribution (GFD) in response to emergencies, WFP Haiti has also been focusing its resources on recovery activities, consisting mainly of school feeding, support to people living with HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis (TB), mother and child nutrition, and food for work (FFW) and significant new cash for work (CFW) programmes. In addition to these operations, WFP Haiti has also contributed significantly to the body of analytical resources with solid assessment and analytical capacity, particularly in the vulnerability analysis and mapping (VAM) unit and through the support of the Logistics Cluster.

5. Donor contributions to fund WFP Haiti activities have been driven by government donor contributions, with contributions from the United States, Canada, and the European

Commission representing a large percentage of donations from 2005 – 2010. Additionally, the contributions made by private donors represent an important characteristic of the Haiti operations, comprising nearly 20 percent of the total funds collected in 2010.

PERFORMANCE HIGHLIGHTS

Alignment and Strategic Positioning

6. At present, the evaluation team found WFP planning and implementation to be generally well integrated with the Government of Haiti policies and priorities overall, thanks in part to recent improvements to coordination mechanisms in certain sectors such as FFW/CFW and nutrition. Over the period of evaluation, this alignment was often more passive than active with WFP-led initiatives submitted to the relevant government partners for approval. Although the individual activities in each of the food assistance operations may fit within the main policies and strategy of the government, the engagement, advocacy, and dialogue required for a more active alignment was sometimes weak. A volatile operating environment and insufficient government resources, especially after the earthquake, also contributed to these challenges.

7. In terms of disaster response, WFP was able to respond immediately to the Government of Haiti's request for assistance to the storms and floods in 2008 and the earthquake in 2010, despite suffering many institutional losses of its own. Other targeted programmes such as education, nutrition, HIV/TB, and FFW/CFW were planned jointly with the ministries in question.

8. Through the cluster system, WFP Haiti provides strong leadership and collaboration, adding particular value in the clusters where WFP is the lead agency – namely the Food, Logistics, and Emergency Telecommunications Clusters. WFP is also an active participant in the Nutrition and Education clusters.

9. With WFP Haiti's rapid growth and geographic expansion over the period of evaluation, the CO was faced with many new coordination challenges. WFP's interventions into new geographic areas where other partners had formerly been dominant at times created confusion from a coordination perspective. On the other hand, WFP's increasingly proactive engagement through the Logistics Cluster was universally appreciated by the development community.

10. While there are some examples of strong synergies and partnerships with other United Nations (UN) agencies (e.g. UNDP, FAO, and UNICEF) and NGO partners (e.g. Agro Action Allemande), the evaluation team concluded that there were other opportunities to more effectively marry WFP's core competencies in relief and recovery with other agencies' or partners' longer-term objectives for increased development impact.

11. Although the period under review covers different WFP corporate Strategic Plans, the evaluation analysed the extent to which the portfolio still matches the new priorities as outlined in the current WFP Strategic Plan (2008 – 2013). In relation to the WFP Strategic Plan in force, the country portfolio in Haiti covers all five of the strategic objectives, with approximately 70 percent of the activities in the Haiti portfolio aligned with Strategic Objective 1 in terms of beneficiaries reached.

12. On a more specific policy level, while WFP Haiti activities are generally aligned with sector specific corporate guidance, there are at times gaps in this guidance. For example, during the period of evaluation, Haiti often found itself responding to rapid onset emergencies. However, up-to-date corporate guidance to support the CO's transition from a period of relative stability to emergency support and back to recovery was not always available. In addition, new initiatives such as Cash for Work—which was implemented on such a large scale in Haiti—were not supported by clear operational directives regarding financial and technical procedures at a corporate level.

13. The evaluation also found that there were sometimes gaps in the CO's ability to implement corporate policies either because of a lack of capacity or a lack of prioritization of particular activities in relation to the corporate portfolio.

Making Strategic Choices

14. WFP Haiti has done an impressive amount of analytical work to increase its understanding of the national hunger and food security issues so it can guide internal WFP programming and operational decisions. The VAM unit provides leadership and technical capacity to undertake assessments with key partners that set the baseline and provide updated analysis when shocks occur. In this sense, WFP is both a key contributor to the content of the analytical information available, helping to place food security issues on the government and international development agenda, and also a strategic partner to the government in developing local capacity to continue this work in the future. In a complex environment such as Haiti, punctuated by repeated shocks and a volatile political landscape, programming decisions more often relied on other factors such as feasibility, capacity, policies and strategic frameworks, or other situational contexts which cannot be captured in a food security assessment, or which can make recommendations from these assessments not feasible or inappropriate. In the food assistance operations, the CO's ability to plan activities in accordance with the level of need is often hampered by the capacity of implementing partners. The areas that are the most food insecure are hard to reach remote areas with fewer potential partners, forcing the CO to make difficult decisions with a limited budget—a trade-off between reaching a greater number of needy beneficiaries versus reaching a smaller amount of people with a greater relative need.


15. In terms of type of food assistance within activities (e.g. ration composition and modality selection), operational decisions were made for a variety of reasons including in response to recommendations from various evaluation and/or formulation missions but also changes in funding availability or WFP corporate or joint UN directives. Strategic choices about which modalities to employ in response to emergencies—in the case of school feeding, for example—were not necessarily the most appropriate interventions for a quick response activity with limited duration. Not only was this programme design not optimal for an emergency intervention, but it will now also create challenges for WFP to scale down activities as Haiti moves out of an emergency context. While efficiencies associated with capitalizing on complementary distribution channels/partners across activities were implemented in some instances, there are other potential synergies and opportunities that were not exploited.

16. WFP's monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system during the evaluation period was weak, providing a limited amount of data useful for assessing impact and improving programmes. During the evaluation period, the focus was weighted towards collecting and documenting output indicators such as number of tons delivered and beneficiaries, which do not provide the full picture of programme performance and results. The tremendous number of implementing partners at any given time and their varying levels of reporting capabilities makes outcome level data difficult if not impossible to assess. More robust quantitative and qualitative data about which activities proved to be the most successful and why could help drive more strategic decision-making moving forward.

Performance and Results

17. Between 2005 and 2010, WFP Haiti's outreach changed dramatically, assisting approximately 600,000 beneficiaries in 2005, 3.1 million beneficiaries in 2008, and over 4 million in 2010 as shown in figure 1. For most operations, the level of funding was generally satisfactory and operations were implemented quickly and efficiently in the face of natural disasters and political unrest.

FIGURE 1: PLANNED VS. ACTUAL BENEFICIARIES AND TONNAGE, 2005 - 2010



Source: WFP Haiti Project Documents

18. With the exception of the immediate response EMOP 10785, the requirements as set out in the project documents and the budget revisions have been generally well funded at a rate of 63 – 83 percent. Although the funding rate for Special Operations was slightly lower (65 percent on average), this did not prove a major impediment. As for Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations (PRRO), PRRO 10674, was affected by less regular funding, creating stress in operations.

19. Relative to initial annual projections, WFP Haiti often exceeded original beneficiary projections and in no year did they drop below 74 percent of planned targets. However, in terms of commodities distributed, WFP Haiti generally fell short, with only two operations reaching a distribution level of at least 75 percent of planned.

20. The Haiti CPE was dominated by the GFD emergency response to the 2008 hurricanes and the high food price crisis and the 2010 response to the earthquake. Despite suffering many human, institutional, and infrastructure losses, WFP was able to mobilize an unprecedented amount of resources quickly and distribute them to beneficiaries where the assistance was needed most. In the scope of this evaluation, WFP was at its best when leading large-scale GFD operations.

21. For targeted food distributions, school feeding and CFW/FFW were consistent priorities for WFP Haiti, representing 36 percent and 25 percent of the beneficiaries reached under targeted food distribution portfolio on average. Maternal and child health and nutrition (MCHN) was also a priority, but decreased significantly in relative importance in 2009 and 2010, dropping from approximately 40 percent of the targeted food distribution portfolio on average from 2005 to 2008 to only 10 percent in 2009 and 15 percent in 2010. HIV/TB activities were significantly less of a focus, with an average relative reach of 8 percent over the period of evaluation.

22. There is a significant amount of variability across years and programme categories in the intended outputs and outcomes of the successive operations. For the outputs that were

measured, namely beneficiaries and commodities, there was also consistent variability between actual results relative to planned, especially in more recent years.

23. Performance indicators linked to objectives in many sectors have generally not been systematically collected and/or compiled during the CPE period. This is due to diverse factors including delays and weaknesses of reports transmitted by implementing partners. In some activities, however, the evaluation team was able to measure indicators such as recovery rate for MCHN activities (50 percent in 2005 and 59 percent in 2009), the Community Asset Score (CAS) for CFW and FFW programmes, and qualitative beneficiary data about a household's improved ability to cope with shocks through WFP food assistance.

24. While each sector may have faced individual challenges to the achievement of performance and results, some common factors across activities include:

- **Changing development needs** – In addition to the recurring disasters in Haiti, changes in government policies, donor priorities, or updated information about the food security situation can force WFP to change course, challenging its ability to achieve objectives outlined in a given operation during programme design.
- **Evolving corporate policy framework** – Changing WFP corporate policies and objectives can impact programme design and implementation at the country level. It is challenging for long-time WFP staff to develop expertise in given protocols and modalities to quickly shift to new developments in corporate priorities.
- **Insufficient procedures and systems** – Corporate systems that are designed to ensure quality control and automation, may in fact hamper efficiency in Haiti, given the CO's need to ramp up operations quickly. The introduction of the WFP Information Network and Global System (WINGS), aimed at simplifying payment procedures, has done little to allow sub-offices control over the processing of an invoice before the final payment is processed in Port-au-Prince. The processes in place for obtaining a check for the payment of simple services are unnecessarily cumbersome. The multiplicity of delays and bottlenecks need an in-depth analysis by system experts. Additionally, the evaluation team found that while CO staff is generally very aware of the funding available for different programme components, relatively little attention is devoted to an understanding or control of implementation costs. The circulation of information on implementation cost is in general restricted to a few senior staff members resulting in cost control not being perceived or promoted as a collective responsibility. WFP's challenge in this area is both systemic and operational. In the absence of an analytical accounting system it is difficult to determine the true cost of activities and operations devoid of any food aid content. In addition, there is little accountability for cost control on a programme management level.
- **Reliance on implementing partners** – The CO's ability to implement and monitor its activities is dependent on the strength of its network of cooperating partners across sectors. Many of the challenges WFP faces in achieving results are due to bottlenecks at the cooperating partner level—gaps in technical capacity, contractual backlogs, or geographic dispersion for example.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Overall Assessment

25. Given the extraordinarily challenging operating environment in Haiti over the period of evaluation, the Haiti CO has had some remarkable successes. In addition to recurring natural disasters, WFP Haiti has been faced with other destabilizing factors such as civil and political unrest which characterized the period 2005-2008, the food-fuel-financial crisis of 2007 -- 2008, and the coinciding launch of the WFP new strategic plan. In the midst of this instability, coupled with the complexity of operating within an integrated mission, WFP Haiti has made great strides in partnering with the government and in meeting the changing

needs of the Haitian people, both during the response phase as well as during development and recovery.

26. The activities across the country portfolio were faced with the recurring challenges of moving from a development context to an emergency context and back to development. Given this backdrop, WFP's strengths over the period of evaluation were in its ability to respond quickly and effectively to emergencies.

Alignment and strategic positioning

27. While many recent advances to the strategic partnerships with the Government of Haiti have been made, the CO's planning and coordination with government counterparts was not always actively coordinated, nor government led throughout the period of evaluation. WFP's participation in the cluster system and notably their leadership in the Logistics and Food Clusters has been much appreciated by the humanitarian community and is an example of where WFP has leveraged its core competencies to partner with other UN agencies and NGO partners to increase development impact. There remain many opportunities for more collaborative programming and synergies with other development partners. Given the nature of the Haiti country portfolio, WFP's role in relation to SO1 has been of primary importance and is the area where WFP is strongest. The challenge that WFP faces in the more targeted activities is in balancing corporate and government priorities, especially in a volatile post-emergency context.

Making strategic choices

28. The primary drivers of change to WFP Haiti's activities across the portfolio were the 2008 and 2010 emergencies. Within this context of emergency response, WFP Haiti was also faced with corresponding changes in the capacity and priorities of government, donor, and implementing partners, as well as changing corporate priorities that influenced the CO's strategic choices. Through the VAM Unit and the Logistics Cluster, WFP provides a tremendous service to the development community in Haiti, particularly in the areas of food security analysis and logistics support. However, the evaluation team found that WFP is often constrained in its ability to base its strategic choices on this analytical data. Systems are needed to improve the communication, programme monitoring, M&E, and reporting. Standards are needed to provide more consistent programming, improved monitoring (including post-distribution monitoring), and better reporting from partners to facilitate the CO's ability to make more informed decisions.

Portfolio performance and results

29. The evaluation team aimed to evaluate WFP's performance in relation to the beneficiaries and assistance provided, the objectives attained, the contribution of the portfolio to the national humanitarian/development changes, and the factors explaining the results. This analysis can also be summarized in terms of the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, and sustainability of WFP's activities across operations as discussed below.

30. **Relevance.** Over the period from 2005 – 2010, the WFP Haiti portfolio consisted of activities in School Feeding, Maternal and Child Health and Nutrition, HIV/TB, CFW/FFW, and GFP. While the size of the portfolio grew by more than 20-fold and the percentage of beneficiaries receiving assistance under each of these interventions changed over time in response to evolving development needs, all 5 activities existed throughout the period of evaluation in line with relevant development challenges in Haiti and corresponding to WFP's five strategic objectives. All WFP programme activities were relevant and appropriate given the level of poverty and need in Haiti. Beneficiaries in all parts of the country visited expressed their appreciation for the assistance they received. Especially in the days and weeks following the earthquake, support to urban and peri-urban populations around Port-au-Prince clearly saved lives.

31. **Effectiveness and Efficiency.** In a volatile environment such as Haiti, it is a challenge to achieve objectives effectively and efficiently given not only the recurring natural disasters, but also the accompanying changes in national (and international) development priorities and WFP's corporate policy framework, insufficient processes and systems for this context, and extreme reliance on the capacity of implementing partners. The evaluation team observed consistent discrepancies between the planned beneficiary targets and actual beneficiaries reached across all sectors. This inconsistency seems to result in large part from both deficiencies in the planning process and a lack of accountability for results. Additionally, the challenge of shifting between a development and an emergency context and the associated changes in funding levels and priorities has been a struggle for the CO from both a programme design and systems perspective.

32. From a logistics perspective, WFP Haiti has a proven capacity to react quickly to emergency situations. Thanks in large part to the high quality of the logistics operations, the required volumes of food-aid were procured, transported, stored, and delivered in a timely manner in accordance with programme requests. WFP is at its best when it leads large-scale general food distribution operations. Even in response to the severe disasters Haiti has been faced with in the last few years and significant organizational losses, WFP has been able to distribute an unprecedented amount of food aid quickly and efficiently. Generally satisfactory funding levels facilitated the continuation and relatively orderly implementation of activities in Haiti during the period of evaluation. At times the operations suffered from less regular contributions but WFP took measures to mitigate the negative effects. Where and when possible WFP has made good use of the funding facilities provided under Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), IRA and the World Chambers Federation to overcome the difficulties created by resourcing levels not always commensurate with the level of operations. Good use was also made of the facility to borrow commodities from other ongoing projects in order to get the projects going. Procurement was able to take advantage of in kind donations, transfer and loans of commodities between operations, and even limited local purchase opportunities to ensure efficient food distribution.

33. **Impact.** While it was clear that WFP was able to reach an enormous amount of beneficiaries through both general and targeted distribution throughout the period of evaluation, measuring real impact of WFP activities is severely constrained by deficiencies in the M&E system. Outside of some conclusions that one may assume from some national indicators that point to improved trends in the sectors where WFP works and evidence of short-term benefits such as asset creation, there is very little potential for impact analysis. Currently, WFP's M&E system in Haiti effectively measures inputs to its programmes—commodities and contributions received. WFP also tracks basic output data—amount of food/cash distributed and the number of beneficiaries—but even the basic beneficiary data is variable and inconsistent in terms of baseline assumptions (e.g. individual vs. family) and disaggregation. Challenges to data collection are many and include: poor systems, insufficient institutional capacity for compilation or analysis, and unrealistic and/or inappropriate indicators in the programme documents for Haiti. Efforts to measure outcomes, development impact, or historical comparisons of the results of these investments over time and space have proven inadequate. The lack of reliable data and the inconsistency in reporting is frustrating to donors and partners and could potentially hamper future funding for WFP. In addition, WFP's inability to show relative impact of their interventions in such a competitive donor landscape is a critical disadvantage.

34. **Sustainability.** In Haiti, nearly half of the total beneficiaries reached since 2005 have benefitted from general food distribution initiatives in response to severe humanitarian crises. While there have been some efforts to build the capacity of the Department of Civil Protection (DPC) to deal with emergencies, it is unlikely that emergency food distribution will be an activity that can be handed over to the government or local implementing partners in the near future without substantial additional resources and increased capacity development efforts. In other targeted distribution interventions, some strides have been made towards handover, but overwhelming food insecurity, weakened government capacity

after the earthquake, and recent political changes may impede progress towards these goals. In terms of WFP's role in the generation of analytical information, significant efforts have been implemented to transfer capacity to local organizations such as the *Centre National Geographique de Haïti* and the National Coordination for Food Security (CNSA).

Key Issues for the Future

35. One of the significant limiting factors has been that the country portfolio has been viewed and managed as a discrete set of food assistance activities and operations, not as an integrated portfolio. Although typical for WFP given the operations, logistics, procurement, and cost structure, the approach has influenced the staffing structure, resource allocation, and programme decisions, resulting in a fragmented country portfolio. Understanding this challenge is especially crucial as Haiti enters into a post-emergency period of contraction.

36. WFP Haiti will have to carefully track the current political developments in Haiti. There will likely be new government counterparts that may necessitate increased dialog and partnership efforts under the new political leadership. Changes in key interlocutors for the programme may emerge and the CO will have to devote itself to establishing the same relationships of confidence and trust they now have with the highest levels of the Government of Haiti.

37. Given the importance of new initiatives like Cash for Work and local purchase to the political agenda and the international donor community in Haiti, the CO should explore new opportunities in these areas and prioritize the establishment of appropriate systems and processes, soliciting support from the regional bureau and corporate headquarters as needed.

38. WFP's activities in Haiti would benefit from more deliberate cross-sectoral alignment with the country's strategic vision for improving food security and nutrition. The tasks are enormous, and include supporting national policies, streamlining food and nutrition interventions within WFP, aligning them with WFP guidelines, and reinforcing complementary interventions. The Government of Haiti's National Food and Nutritional Security Plan is developed in accordance with the 4 pillars of availability, access, utilization, and stability. For future country portfolio planning, the evaluation team recommends that WFP envision its activities within this framework as well.

Recommendations

39. ***Recommendation 1: WFP Haiti should strengthen its monitoring and evaluation systems to improve consistency and reliability of data and to measure the impact of its operations.***

40. For an M&E system to be sustainable and scalable, a uniform coordinated system should be developed, but with responsibility for management of data decentralized to the sub-offices and programme divisions. Combined with this decentralization should be supportive supervision and on-the-job training to ensure the systematic and reliable quality of data collection and reporting in the field. There should also be a clear feedback loop for reporting back to implementing partners, donors, and the government that reinforces ongoing participation and partnership. This regular reporting function will also help WFP to make mid-course adjustments to programme design and improve future programming efforts.

41. ***Recommendation 2: WFP Haiti should ensure that the logistics cluster activities continue to be funded and staff retained in order to ensure the continuation of invaluable emergency preparedness and response activities.***

42. As the special operation 200108 under which logistics cluster activities are funded is scheduled to end in December 2011, it is important to ensure that the strategic logistic capacity be maintained under PRRO 10844.

43. ***Recommendation 3: WFP Corporate to conduct an in-depth review of their management and operational systems in order to identify the causes of systemic procurement and processing problems which arise when operations***

shift from a GFD programme to more targeted food-aid and cash transfer programmes.

44. The evaluation identified that beyond a certain threshold the management starts encountering difficulties in making systems—both operational and financial—operate smoothly and in maintaining the necessary capacity and desired efficiency to continue to deliver the volumes of food-aid and cash as set out in the project documents.. This issue is considered beyond the reach of Haiti CO and is therefore best addressed at corporate level.

45. Recommendation 4: WFP Haiti should improve its planning process to develop more realistic targets that can be better aligned with realities of implementation.

46. The evaluation mission recommends that WFP establish a formula for developing targets that takes into account current demographic trends (e.g. malnutrition levels, patients receiving anti-retroviral therapy (ART) and past portfolio performance. Being able to justify the targets set forth in programme documents would not only help to explain any deviation from these targets but also would improve programme planning and potentially increase WFP's ability to mobilize funding for certain activities.

47. Recommendation 5: WFP Haiti should seek out potential for integration across activities and with other partners such as a Model School programme to leverage impact and ensure that their efforts are achieving maximum results.

48. A review of the scope and content of the school feeding, nutrition, HIV/TB, and CFW/FFW activities should be done to see how synergies in integrating these activities could be achieved in the formulation of future operations. It is recommended that a formal review, with support from the Regional Bureau and corporate headquarters, of the scope, content, and potential for integration within and across activities be conducted. In addition to this internal review, WFP should explore synergies with other UN agencies and partners to explore new avenues of collaboration.

49. Recommendation 6: The awareness among the CO staff of the true cost of the various component parts of the operations should be enhanced.

50. Staff of all ranks are quite sensitised to project funding and budget issues, but should also be more actively involved in a permanent drive to find cost savings in the day to day running of operations.

51. Recommendation 7: WFP Haiti should take advantage of more ambitious and long lasting capacity development projects in emergency preparedness.

52. Given the likelihood of recurring natural disasters in Haiti, it is important that the Government of Haiti, through its emergency response agency DPC, have a dedicated network of warehouses where strategic food reserves and equipment can be stored over longer periods irrespective the prevailing climatic conditions, something they are currently lacking. The advantages of such a project would be threefold: alignment with the capacity development policy of WFP, leading the way towards an exit strategy for WFP, and enhancing Haiti's resilience capacity to catastrophes and emergencies.

53. Recommendation 8: WFP Haiti should develop strategic partnerships with implementing partners for rapid deployment in emergency and recovery operations.

54. To reduce the contracting burden of managing so many implementing partners and field level agreements, the CO should explore tiered partnerships with strategic partners across sectors. Having fewer contracts with larger organizations would serve several purposes: build strategic alliances with partners who have the capacity to provide supplementary services such as nutritional training and capacity development of local entities, establish a quick response contracting vehicle which enables WFP to quickly move resources after an emergency, and alleviate the management burden of working with many small partners.

Map



1. Introduction

1. This chapter of the report provides an introduction to the key features of the evaluation and the aspects of the Haiti country context that have influenced strategic choices and directions of the World Food Programme (WFP) country portfolio during this period. Documents used in the preparation of this report are listed in Annex 2.

1.1. Evaluation Features

2. **Scope.** The scope of the Haiti CPE encompasses nine WFP food assistance operations plus five Special Operations between 2005 and 2010. This time period was selected to assist the CO to find innovative means of dealing with a challenging and evolving food security situation that has been punctuated by a series of severe natural disasters. The operations included are four EMOPS¹, three PRROs², two Development Operations³ (CP/DEV), and five special operations⁴ (SOs). Given the strategic focus of this evaluation, the SOs that provided air passenger services and logistics support will be considered an activity supporting the objectives of other existing operations (such as EMOPs and PRROs) used by the CO to achieve its overall objectives and to foster partnerships. The SOs are included and reviewed to this extent in the evaluation.

3. Given the strategic nature of the CPE, the focus is not on evaluating the 14 individual operations per se, but rather looking across operational divides to assess the relevance and coherence of the WFP portfolio as a whole, its evolution over time, its performance, and the strategic role played by WFP in Haiti. The analytical work conducted by WFP (either alone or with partners⁵), as well as WFP's participation in local strategic processes also forms part of the scope of this evaluation. The geographical scope of this evaluation is the entire country.

4. **Rationale.** The rationale for this CPE is to contribute and assist the Haiti CO in reviewing past performance and comparative advantage and to support its efforts to define the strategy for future WFP activities in the country. The evaluation is undertaken at this point in time to provide input and insights into the preparation of the new Country Program and to inform the formulation process of the next United Nations Development Framework (UNDAF), which will take place during the course of 2012.

5. **Objectives.** Evaluations serve the dual objectives of accountability and learning. As such, this evaluation will 1) assess and report whether or not the performance and results of the CO portfolio are in line with the WFP mandate and in response to humanitarian and development challenges in Haiti (accountability) and 2) determine the reasons for observed success/failure and draw lessons from experience to produce evidence-based findings to allow the CO to make informed strategic decisions about positioning itself in Haiti, strategic partnerships, operations design, and implementation (learning). The relative emphasis is placed on learning, in line with the rationale for this evaluation and with the perceived interest of the key stakeholder groups.

6. The summary evaluation matrix, presented in Table 1 presents the three key evaluation issues, types of analyses, main sources of data and information, and the range of end products. Annex 4 presents the complete evaluation matrix.

¹ EMOPs: 200110; 200107; 10781; and 10785.

² PRROs: 10844; 10674; and 10382

³ CP/DEV: 10217 and 10386.

⁴ SOs: 200109; 200108; 10780; 10779; and 10449.

⁵ CFSVA, EFSA, etc.

TABLE 1: SUMMARY EVALUATION MATRIX FOR THE HAITI CPE

Key Evaluation Issue	Analyses	Main Sources of Data and Information	End Products
Strategic Alignment of the WFP/Haiti Portfolio	Primarily qualitative assessments with some quantitative analysis	WFP documents; interviews of WFP; interviews with partners (UN agencies, multilateral and bilateral partners, and NGOs); documents from partners.	Description and timeline of key events
Making Strategic Choices	Primarily qualitative assessments with some quantitative analysis	WFP documents; interviews of WFP; interviews with partners (UN agencies, multilateral and bilateral partners, and NGOs); documents from partners.	Description
Performance and Results	Analysis of output and outcome indicators, depending on the availability of data	WFP documents; interviews of WFP; interviews with partners (UN agencies, multilateral and bilateral partners, and NGOs); documents from partners.	Description

7. **Methodology and Limitations.** The Haiti CPE methodological approach balances rigorous methods with the practical challenges of this complex evaluation. The approach combined a literature review; qualitative interviews at central, provincial, district and village levels; and field visits and inspections. Whenever possible, the team used focus group discussions and village-household visits. The team triangulated findings from the discussions with stakeholders and various documentation to confirm common issues and identify differences. To understand outcomes, the evaluation used VAM, or baseline surveys undertaken earlier by the country office. The team met with key partners both in Port-au-Prince and in the regions; however, a particular aspect of the WFP response to the earthquake is the staff turnover, which was a challenge to the evaluation in terms of institutional memory. In addition to qualitative information, quantitative data and other information included in partner reports, assessments, and evaluations provided key insights to the evaluation team.

1.2. Context

8. This section provides critical aspects of the social and economic context and events in Haiti from 2005 to 2010 that have shaped WFP’s mission and country portfolio.

Poverty and Level of Development

9. Haiti has endured political instability, chronic challenges in governance, and the highest levels of poverty in the Western Hemisphere⁶. Three quarters of the population is poor (living on less than the equivalent of US\$2 per day), and over half is extremely poor (living on less than US\$1 per day). Haiti ranks 145 out of 169 countries on the UNDP Human Development Index, a composite measure of health, education, and income⁷. Haiti also has the most unequal income distribution in the Latin American and Caribbean region⁸. The food-fuel-financial crisis of 2007 – 2008 added to the country’s misery, particularly as Haiti is a net importer of food. A series of natural disasters such as flooding, cyclones, and an earthquake in early 2010 exacerbated conditions in a country that was already struggling with high levels of food insecurity and poverty. The result has been a complex and serious humanitarian crisis that has continued to deepen. This is the backdrop for the CPE of the 14 WFP operations between 2005 and 2010.

⁶ UNDP, Transparency International 2009, Rice and Patrick 2008.

⁷ UNDP, 2010.

⁸ IFPRI, 2008.

Food insecurity


10. Rural-urban inequalities are high in Haiti. Increasing levels of rural impoverishment have driven massive levels of rural-urban migration in recent years, as economic opportunity is sought in urban areas. The percentage of the total population living in urban areas has increased from just over 20 percent in 1980 to 38 percent in 1990 and almost 50 percent by 2009.

11. Haiti remains a food deficit country, relying heavily on imported food. In 2007/2008, 52 percent of nationally consumed food was imported, while 48 percent was produced locally; and food assistance filled 5 percent of the national need⁹. During the international food crisis in 2008 local food prices rose nearly 70 percent over a 4-month period¹⁰. The National Coordination for Food Security (CNSA) estimated that an additional 800,000 people were facing short-term food insecurity during this time (3.3 million people total). Agricultural activities are geared towards household food consumption, and are done on a small scale. Land plots are generally small and households have little equipment. The farming activities are heavily dependent on climatic conditions, and often affected by crop diseases.

12. The limited national food production capacity and the dependency on food imports, combined with the lack of basic social services, vulnerability to natural disasters, the socio-political instability, violence and insecurity in poor urban areas, and widespread poverty contribute to food insecurity by restricting the availability of food and hampering households' access to food¹¹.

13. Figure 2 presents the number of people facing food insecurity in Haiti. In mid-late 2008, more than 3 million people faced food insecurity due to a series of severe storms combined with the international food crisis that significantly raised food prices that year. By mid-2009 the number of food insecure had decreased sizably to less than 2 million people. The 2010 earthquake had a devastating impact on food insecurity, as an estimated 3.3 million people were food insecure by mid-January 2010, although by June the number had decreased to 2.4 million¹². This volatility is indicative of the fragile nature of the food security situation in Haiti.

FIGURE 2: NUMBER OF PEOPLE FACING FOOD INSECURITY DURING THE PERIOD APRIL 2008 – JUNE 2010



Health and Nutrition

14. While some gains have been made in the health sector over the last decade, the prevalence of natural disasters in Haiti results in severe shocks to an already fragile health infrastructure and the disruption of development programming which can have significant deleterious impacts on the Haitian population. In 2010, eight hospitals were totally destroyed, and 22 seriously damaged in the three departments most affected by the earthquake (Ouest, Nippes, Sud-Est). An outbreak of cholera was confirmed in Haiti in October 2010, resulting in nearly 5,000 deaths by April 2011.

⁹ WFP Haiti Country Overview (<http://www.wfp.org/countries/haiti>); CNSA.

¹⁰ CNSA.

¹¹ WFP Haiti CFSVA 2007/2008.

¹² CNSA.

15. The principal health indicators in Haiti are very alarming. Approximately 40 percent of the population has no access to basic health care. Prenatal care coverage is low, 76 percent of deliveries are attended by non-qualified personnel, and 25 percent of deliveries experience complications. The infant mortality rate in Haiti is 80/1000 live births and the maternal mortality rate is 523/100,000 live births, the highest in the region and among the highest in the world. It is estimated that 15 percent of newborns have low-birth-weight. Acute respiratory infections and diarrhoeas are the cause of death in half of the children under five years of age.

16. Before the earthquake: the prevalence of chronic malnutrition (stunting) among children under five years varied between 18.1 percent and 31.7 percent, that of global acute malnutrition (GAM or wasting) between 2.0 percent and 5.1 percent, while the prevalence of severe acute malnutrition (SAM) ranged between 0.0 percent and 2.0 percent.

17. Recent data on micronutrient deficiencies are limited, but anemia rates are known to be very high (60 percent in children under-five years of age and around 50 percent in women of reproductive age). One third of the children under-five have vitamin A deficiency. Ninety percent of households use non-iodized salt; close to 60 percent of children in the age group 6-12 years are iodine deficient.

HIV/AIDS

18. Despite the reduction in the HIV prevalence rate from 5.5 percent in 2000 to 2.2 percent in 2006¹³, various demographic groups are more heavily affected than others. For example, Nippes (3.0 percent), the Nord (2.9 percent) and the Nord-Ouest (2.7 percent) departments have the highest rates in the nation. Males practicing voodoo and sex workers in Saint-Marc have rates of 12.1 percent¹⁴ and 11 percent¹⁵, respectively. In 2009, 7,600 new HIV infections contributed to the 67,000 people estimated to be carriers of the virus. Of the estimated 60,000 people eligible to receive ART, 26,000 were reported to have received treatment. With higher HIV prevalence rates in women, more females (58 percent) than males were enrolled in government-sponsored ART programmes¹⁶. The Ministry of Public Health and Population (MSPP) managed 48 ART treatment facilities in 2007 with nearly one-third located in and around Port-au-Prince¹⁷.

19. In addition to clinical treatment (ART and TB) and prevention (counselling and testing and prevention of mother to child transmission) programmes the Government's multisectoral HIV strategy stresses the need to address social aspects through HIV prevention, tolerance and disease management messages, support for non-risky employment options and strengthening support systems for those adversely affected by the disease financially and psychosocially. An example of one of these interventions is to provide life skills-based HIV education through schools. In 2009, only 13 percent of schools¹⁸ held such classes.

¹³ Haiti: PRSP report, IMF, 2009.

¹⁴ Cayemittes, Michel, Marie Florence Placide, Soumaïla Mariko, Bernard Barrère, Blaise Sévère, Canez Alexandre. 2007. *Enquête Mortalité, Morbidité et Utilisation des Services (EMMUS), Haïti, 2005-2006*. Calverton, Maryland, USA: Ministère de la Santé Publique et de la Population, Institut Haïtien de l'Enfance et Macro International Inc. p. 244.

¹⁵ Programme National de Lutte contre le SIDA (PNLS). 2008. *Plan Stratégique National Multisectoriel 2008-2012*. Port-au-Prince, Haiti: Gouvernement de la République d'Haïti. p. 35.

¹⁶ Joint UN Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS). 2010. *Report on the Global HIV/AIDS Epidemic 2010*. Geneva: WHO.

¹⁷ National Programme in the Fight Against AIDS *Programme National de Lutte contre le SIDA (PNLS)*. 2008. *Rapport National de Suivi de la Déclaration d'Engagement sur le VIH/SIDA (UNGASS)*. Port-au-Prince, Haiti: Gouvernement de la République d'Haïti. p. 39.

¹⁸ Joint UN Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS). 2010. *Report on the Global HIV/AIDS Epidemic 2010*. Geneva: WHO.

Agriculture and rural development

20. The agricultural sector's—including animal production, forestry, and fisheries—contribution to real gross domestic product in Haiti has declined from more than 30 percent at the beginning of the 1990s to approximately 25 percent in 2007. Haiti has approximately one million small farms with an average farm size of 1.5 hectares¹⁹. Haiti has a vast array of agro-ecological zones, ranging from highlands to plains. Cutting of trees has led to significant environmental degradation, which has resulted in significant levels of land erosion which leads to decreases in land productivity. Most farmers do not have secure title to their land, which reduces incentives to invest in medium or long-term strategies. The lack of adequate farm to market roads contributes to the high percentage (estimated at 35 percent) of post-harvest losses. Value chains for selected commodities are underdeveloped lacking post-harvest facilities or credit for on-farm or marketing investment. In 2005, the World Bank's evaluation of potential Haitian agricultural value chains found the most profitable to be rice, banana, vegetables, tubers, dairy products, local chickens for the domestic market and cocoa, coffee, mango, potatoes, and essential oils for export markets.

21. The January 2010 earthquake had significant impact on the agricultural sector and its ability to contribute to economic growth with significant damage to agriculture production, irrigation infrastructure, agriculture roads, food processing infrastructure, and government offices and storage warehouses estimated at over US\$31 million²⁰.

Education

22. One of the strongest priorities in the government's programme is that education for all is the basis of equal opportunity and long-term poverty reduction. However, as of 2006 net enrolment was measured at 49.6 percent, compared to 54.3 percent in 2000²¹. The dropout rate is particularly high in the first basic cycle at 29 percent²². Close to 60 percent of children drop out of school before receiving their primary education certificate. Of the two million children enrolled in the basic level, only 56 percent are at the required age for the first cycle (ages six to twelve).

23. According to the operational plan 2010 – 2015²³ some 10 years after the launching of the *Plan National d'Education et de Formation*²⁴ and in spite of an increase in the number of schools and school children, the salient characteristics of the education system are still the same:

24. Historically and globally insufficient education system relative to the social demand for education, resulting in 57 percent illiteracy—the highest illiteracy rate in the Caribbean—and approximately half a million children 6-12 years of age unable to enter the education system, largely dominated by the non-public sector;

- Relatively poor quality of education, evidenced by very low academic performance, high dropout and repeat rates;
- Relatively poor external efficiency in all education sub-sectors resulting in a high unemployment rate among youth under 30, close to 70 percent;
- Weak governance. In addition, the education sector has been greatly affected by the 12 January 2010 earthquake. The extent of material damage, the loss of human lives, and the resulting psychosocial trauma are still enormous.

¹⁹ MARNDR/FAO, 2010.

²⁰ Haiti: National Agriculture Investment Plan, May 2010.

²¹ Haiti: PRSP progress report, IMF, 2009.

²² Haiti: PRSP, IMF, 2008.

²³ *Vers la Refondation du Système Éducatif Haïtien – Plan opérationnel 2010-2015 des Recommandations de la Commission Présidentielle Education et Formation, Ministère de l'Education Nationale et de la Formation Professionnelle (MENFP), août 2010.*

²⁴ National Plan for Education and Training.

Government Strategy and Capacity

25. The government first adopted an interim poverty reduction strategy paper in 2006 which was followed the next year by a more comprehensive one focusing on 1) growth vectors (Agriculture and Rural Development, Tourism, Infrastructure); 2) human development (Education and Training, Health, Water and Sanitation, Persons with Disabilities, Childhood Poverty, Young People, HIV/AIDS, Gender Equity); and 3) democratic governance (Justice System, Security, Modernization of the State, Territorial Development and the Macroeconomic Framework).

26. More recently, the National Development and Reconstruction Plan²⁵, was developed in response to the 2010 earthquake. The plan proposes areas of involvement for eight major sectors: governance; regional development; environment; risk and disaster management; social sectors; infrastructure; productive sectors; and the cross-cutting themes of youth, gender, and vulnerable people. The Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources, and Rural Development (MARNDR) has also recently developed a National Plan for Investments in Agriculture.

27. Constraining the implementation of national strategies is the generally weak capacity of the government. Significant losses of personnel, information, and infrastructure incurred as a result of the 2010 earthquake has further hampered the already limited capability of the government to plan, coordinate, manage, and implement initiatives in key sectors such as health, education, and food security. However, there are several dynamic leaders in the government that are considered by WFP staff and other donors interviewed during the mission as key partners and advocates for change.

Natural Disasters

28. Haiti is situated in the path of storms and hurricanes and is, after Cuba, the country in the region most at risk from natural disasters as evidenced in Table 2 with tropical storms and hurricanes becoming more frequent. From May to November, Haiti is exposed to cyclones, which inflict considerable damage from the high winds, flooding, landslides and mudflows they cause. In addition to the hydro-meteorological threats, Haiti is in a seismically active zone.

29. These threats combined with environmental degradation, endemic poverty, and weakened survival mechanisms because of the political, socio-economic, and climatic shocks make the country particularly vulnerable.

30. To ensure effective coordination and deployment of resources and support furnished by the international donors in response to the January 2010 earthquake, the Interim Commission for the Reconstruction of Haiti (CIRH) was established. The CIRH provides support to the Government of Haiti in the following main sectoral priorities: education, health, agriculture, housing, debris removal, disaster preparedness, and infrastructure²⁶.

²⁵ www.refondation.ht

²⁶ www.cirh.ht

TABLE 2: TYPE OF DISASTERS AND NUMBER OF PEOPLE AFFECTED DURING THE PERIOD 2004-2010

Disaster	Date	Total Affected	Killed	Damage (000 US\$)
Cholera Epidemic	22-Oct-10	70,865	2,761	
Tropical Storm Matthew	24-Sep-10	73,122	6	
Earthquake (seismic activity)	12-Jan-10	3,700,000	222,570	\$8,000,000
Hurricane Tomas	04-Nov-10	5,020	21	
Hurricane Ike	08-Sep-08	125,050	74	
Hurricane Hanna	02-Sep-08	48,000	529	
Hurricane Gustav	26-Aug-08	73,006	85	
Hurricane Noel	28-Oct-07	108,763	90	
Flood	07-Oct-07	75,947	41	
Hurricane Dennis	07-Jul-05	15,036	40	\$50,000
Hurricane Wilma	19-Oct-05		12	\$500
Tropical Storm Jeanne	17-Sep-04	315,594	2,754	\$50,000

Source: "EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database www.em-dat.net – Université Catholique de Louvain - Brussels - Belgium"

Civil Insecurity

31. The government's capacity to make and implement social and economic policy declined after the end of the Duvalier government in 1986, as a series of military coups, political turmoil, aid and trade embargoes, foreign intervention, a declining economy, and heightened levels of crime and corruption all coalesced to elevate levels of civil insecurity.


32. 2010 general elections, originally scheduled for February 28, 2010, were postponed to December 2010 as a result of the earthquake. The results from the first round of the elections were contested as fraudulent by some, resulting in violence between the contending parties. Run-off elections and results were delayed but preliminary results were finally announced on April 4, 2011 during the evaluation mission indicating that Michel Martelly had won the presidential election and is scheduled to be sworn in May 2011. In general, the public reaction to this announcement was celebratory and optimistic, potentially ushering in a new era of political stability for Haiti.

International Assistance

33. Since 2002, the net official development assistance has increased in both development and peacekeeping expenditures. In 2008, Haiti received US\$912 million in ODA flows from all donors combined, with the United States, Canada, the Inter-American Bank, and the European Commission as the largest. In 2007 – 2008, most aid was spent on social services and infrastructure, particularly health activities, government services, and peace-building.

34. In response to a March 2010 request from the Government of Haiti, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the UN, and the World Bank, along with contributing donors, established a multi-donor fund called the Haiti Reconstruction Fund (HRF). The role of the HRF is to support the Government of Haiti's post-earthquake Action Plan for the Recovery and Development of Haiti and related initiatives. The overarching strategy for international assistance in 2010 was outlined in the UN Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) for Haiti, articulating the joint strategy of United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and the UN Country Team in support of the Government's stability and reconstruction efforts after the earthquake of January 2010. As of May 2011, pledges amounted to an estimated US\$508 million of which US\$282 million were received²⁷. The Haiti Revised Humanitarian Appeal (January – December 2010) request for US\$1.5 billion was funded at about US\$1.1 billion²⁸.

FIGURE 3: RELATIVE RESOURCE MOBILIZATION OF WFP HAITI OPERATIONS, 2005 – 2010




Source: WINGS Project Management Overview (PMO) documents as at 31/12/2010, SPRs and relevant COMPAS records

1.3. WFP's Portfolio

Overview of WFP in Haiti

35. WFP has been present in Haiti since 1969. Since 2005, WFP assistance has increased exponentially—from 25,700 MT for approximately 1 million beneficiaries to 131,581 MT of commodities distributed to over 4 million beneficiaries in 2010. Direct WFP expenses increased from US\$21.5 million in 2005 to US\$72.6 million in 2009 while total direct expenses for 2010 alone (all food-aid and special operations) reached close to US\$300 million.

FIGURE 4: EVOLUTION OF WFP ACTIVITIES (ACTUAL BENEFICIARIES), 2005 – 2010



Source: WFP CO

36. The Haiti country portfolio 2005 – 2010 comprises 9 operations with a food aid component. Five operations fall in the categories CP, DEV, and PRRO and focus primarily on community development, enhanced food protection of vulnerable groups, assistance to food insecure persons in crisis situations or exposed to recurrent shocks. As a result of the extensive floods in Gonaives township and Artibonite department in September 2008 and

²⁷ www.haitireconstructionfund.org/hrf

²⁸ <http://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=emerg-emergencyDetails&appealID=893>

2010 earthquake—two major EMOPs were launched each preceded by a limited “immediate response” EMOP. In both events, 2 separate SOs, providing a wide range of extra road, air, and sea transport and ancillary services, were activated in a drive to shore up the emergency aid provided by both WFP and the international community. LACERN, an “Emergency Response Network” spanning Latin American and Caribbean countries, including Haiti, originally listed as SO 10449, provided valuable external support to the “immediate response” operations EMOP 10785 and 200107.

TABLE 3: STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES AND MAJOR ACTIVITIES IN THE HAITI COUNTRY PORTFOLIO

Strategic Objective (2008 – 2013)	Major Activities	Relative importance in terms of number of beneficiaries met
1. Saving lives and protecting livelihoods in emergencies: assisting disaster victims	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • General food distribution • Targeted food distribution • Supplementary feeding • Cash and voucher transfers • Emergency needs assessments / analytic work • Emergency logistics / cluster-lead • Special Operations 	Approximately 70 percent of beneficiaries
2. Preventing acute hunger and investing in disaster preparedness and mitigation: by strengthening community capacity to reduce risks and adapt to climate variability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Food security analytical work • Disaster risk reduction (DRR) capacity development • Targeted food, cash and voucher assistance as safety nets • FFA/FFW/FFT • Special Operations • Analytical Work 	Approximately 5 percent of beneficiaries
3. Restore and rebuild livelihoods in post-conflict, post-disaster or transition situations: by 1) increasing access to food to mitigate seasonal food insecurity, and restore assets affected by shocks and 2) stabilizing children’s participation in education.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Targeted food, cash and voucher assistance as safety nets • Target food distribution • Rebuilding essential delivery infrastructure • FFA/FFW/FFT • Analytical Work • Special Operations 	Approximately 15 percent of beneficiaries
4. Reduce chronic hunger and under-nutrition: by improving the nutrition status of 1) targeted women and children and 2) PLHIV.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mother and child health and nutrition (MCHN) • School feeding • Food/nutrition in HIV/AIDS/TB Programs • Relevant policy and programmatic advisement • Analytical Work • Special Operations 	Approximately 10 percent of beneficiaries
5. Strengthen the capacities of countries to reduce hunger through hand-over strategies and local purchase: by building consensus on programme design and partnership opportunities, including community initiatives.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Procurement of food / NFI for producers / service providers • Local Purchases • Capacity development of local partners • Program advisement • Advocacy • Analytical Work 	N/A

37. Notably, EMOP 200110 and the supporting SOs 200108 and 200109, which addressed the most urgent needs of the 3.5 million victims of the January 2010 earthquake, dwarf in terms of resources mobilized²⁹ all previous operations taken together as shown in Figure 3.

38. While responding to emergencies, WFP Haiti has also been focusing its resources on recovery activities, in the aftermath of civil unrest, floods, drought, and earthquake. These activities consist mainly of school feeding, support to people living with HIV/AIDS and TB, mother and child nutrition, and FFW/FFT/CFW as shown in Figure 4.

39. **Strategic Objectives.** The operations have not been driven by a collective logical framework or common goal at the country level. In addition, the period under review covers different WFP corporate Strategic Plans. In relation to the WFP Strategic Plan in force, the Haiti portfolio aims more specifically to the objectives and activities as defined in Table 3. A breakdown of the activities that are included in the WFP portfolio can be found in the Haiti CPE Terms of Reference (Annex 1).

40. **Geographical Area.** WFP operations are implemented country wide in response to disasters taking into account government’s priorities, health and nutrition situation, and vulnerability to natural disasters and food aid coverage. WFP’s ability to intervene nationwide has changed dramatically over the period of evaluation as the organization expanded its nationwide presence. In the period of review, WFP operations grew from one central office in Port-au-Prince and one sub-office in Cap Haitien in 2005 to 7 sub-offices in 2010, distributing food in 151 communes³⁰.

41. **Resource flows.** The receipt of donations for the operations during the 2005 – 2010 period as illustrated in Table 4 shows the contributions in 2005 and 2010, respectively. In 2005, there were relatively few donors and the size of the portfolio was US\$18,751,690. In contrast, in 2010 there was a dramatic increase in the number of donors and in donations (US\$359,259,415), primarily due to a response to the earthquake in January 2010.

TABLE 4: DONOR CONTRIBUTIONS TO WFP HAITI, 2005 AND 2010

All Donors		Top 10 Donors	
	2005 Contributions (US\$)		2010 Contributions (US\$)
Canada	\$8,870,966	USA	\$149,912,817
European	\$4,825,091	Private Donors	\$69,412,678
USA	\$2,175,620	Canada	\$55,114,424
Switzerland	\$1,328,392	Spain	\$17,948,718
France	\$717,604	European Commission	\$16,613,998
Spain	\$337,802	Brazil	\$12,867,761
Haiti	\$307,200	UN CERF	\$10,677,768
Private Donors	\$189,015	UN Common Funds and Agencies (excl CERF)	\$10,078,870
Grand Total	\$18,751,690	Japan	\$10,000,000
		Thailand	\$6,632,381
		Grand Total	\$359,259,415

42. The contributions made by private donors—almost 20 percent of the funds collected—are a very important characteristic of the Haiti operations. Strong partnership with the World Bank and personal visits of the Country Director (CD) to major donors and

²⁹ Figures extracted from WINGS Project Management Overview (PMO) documents as at 31/12/2010, SPRs and relevant COMPAS records.


³⁰ WFP Haiti Country Office

institutions in Brussels, Ottawa, and Washington have greatly enhanced the commitment of donor countries, especially from USA, Canada, Spain, European Union and Thailand. WFP has taken advantage of the various financing tools provided by the system: UN CERF, IRA and World Chambers Federation. Good use was made of carryover funding from previous operations where appropriate.

WFP Response to Key External Events

43. Figure 5 highlights some of the significant external changes over the period of evaluation and WFP Haiti's response.

FIGURE 5: EVOLUTION OF WFP HAITI OPERATIONAL CONTEXT



Source: WFP Haiti CO

44. In response to this evolving development context and WFP's rapid growth in Haiti, staff strength increased by a factor 10 for the international staff and by a factor 5 for the national staff during the period under review. At the end of December 2010, WFP Haiti counted 107 international and 349 national staff.


New Initiatives

45. Out of 374,537 MT of food-aid commodities procured during the CPE review period, the share of local purchases represents with 10,309 MT or approximately 2.75 percent. A strong awareness of the importance to promote local procurement has prevailed in line with the declared Government of Haiti policy and WFP's objectives. For example, the School Feeding programme is experimenting with the purchase of local products to supply food for the programme. WFP also took advantage of some interesting initiatives of the French Cooperation buying rice and maize from upcoming farmers' cooperatives. Likewise, WFP increased collaboration with the private sector and small producers to enhance local production of specific nutritious foods such as ready-to use supplementary food (RUSF), fortified blended foods, iodized salt, fortified cassava, fortified wheat flour and fortified maize meal.

46. CFW as a modality was introduced in Haiti in 2010. Not only was it introduced in Haiti without a pilot programme, but also, as shown in Figure 6, Haiti's approved budget in 2010 for CFW anticipated that it would be by far the largest cash for work programme worldwide. The Cash and Food for Work (CFFW) programme in Haiti represents WFP's first experience

in bringing employment-based cash programming to scale in an emergency setting³¹. While there have been many successes achieved in CFW and it is greatly supported by the government and international community, WFP has experienced some challenges in introducing this modality that will be explored in more detail in Chapter 2.

FIGURE 6: WFP GLOBAL CASH FOR WORK PROGRAMMES 2010



Source: WFP Haiti Country Office

Overview of the CO’s Analytical Work

47. The Haiti CO has a solid assessment and analytical capacity located in the Program Office, composed of technical experts, the Monitoring and Evaluation Unit (M&E), and VAM. Some of the analytical work is done internally within the WFP CO, but much of the assessment and analysis is done with partners. Some of the analytical work includes:

- **Standardized Project Reports (SPR):** These external reports are completed annually for each operation to describe the operation’s objectives, results (beneficiaries reached, outputs, outcomes, and progress toward sustainability and capacity development), inputs (resources from donors, government, and partners, food purchases, transport, and post-delivery losses), management (partnerships and lessons learned), statistics (resources from donors and commodity transactions), and financial details for the donor community. These reports can help to evaluate progress of operations over time.
- **Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Surveys:** are undertaken by VAM in collaboration with CNSA, which is a semi-autonomous agency associated with MARNDR. CNSA has been working with WFP since 1996. Periodic Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis (CFSVA) are undertaken to provide an in-depth picture of the food security situation and the vulnerability of households in Haiti. The objective of the CFSVA is to guide WFP’s interventions in 2010 – 2011, informing Haiti’s Humanitarian Response Plan 2010 and providing a potential basis for improved geographic and socio-economic targeting of the most food-insecure people.
- **M&E:** The data captured by the M&E Unit over the period of performance has been woefully poor, but they are working to expand the amount and quality of data and information that is captured and made available for routine and ad hoc analysis.

³¹ WFP Haiti: Cash and FFW Programme 2010-2011, Information Update. February 2011.

- **Other Key Documents** include Emergency Food Security Assessment (EFSA) Rapid Post-Earthquake Food Security Assessment (March 2010) and Executive Brief (September 2010); *Impacte de la crise alimentaire sur les populations urbaines de Port-au-Prince* (Nov. 2008); *Mission d'évaluation de la récolte et de sécurité alimentaire en Haïti* (Sept. 2010) and periodic Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) Haiti Outlook, and Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission (CFSAM).

2. Evaluation Findings

2.1. Alignment and Strategic Positioning

48. In this section, the evaluation analyses the degree to which WFP:

- Aligned itself strategically with the Government of Haiti policies, key partners, and the WFP corporate strategy to maximize contributions to address emergency and development needs of Haiti;
- Integrated operations with Government of Haiti processes and structures to engender ownership, and increase the impact and sustainability of its activities; and
- Has coordinated with key implementing partners to maximize the performance and results of activities by leveraging partner activities and obtaining synergies through partnerships.

49. Given the evaluation's country portfolio mandate, the evaluation team's findings are focused on assessing how groups of activities across operations have contributed together to the overall performance of the portfolio, with a keen eye towards learning. For this reason and for reasons related to data availability and relevance, the evaluation team has weighted its analysis on more recent activities, even taking into consideration the CO's current initiatives as they relate to the team's recommendations for the future.

50. In light of the overwhelming importance of emergency preparedness and disaster relief and response in the Haitian context, this evaluation report will address each of these three questions first as they relate to WFP's role as an emergency responder in general and then as they relate to more targeted sector specific interventions.

Emergency Preparedness and Disaster Response

Alignment with Government of Haiti

51. WFP is a key strategic partner of the Government and the humanitarian community in terms of disaster response and emergency preparedness. The DPC is the government body with whom WFP works most closely on these issues. While WFP does work in close partnership with established national authorities, there is less joint planning and collaboration at this level than that which exists at the departmental level, at least in part as a result of the decentralized structure of the DPC.

52. All WFP Haiti's emergency preparedness activities have been coordinated through the Logistic Cluster, which is a permanent member of the Emergency Preparedness and Response Working Group. Great attention has been dedicated to establishing efficient and open communication channels with the DPC, MINUSTAH, and the Joint Operations and Tasking Centre. DPC noted the importance of the capacity and expertise that WFP provides in state-of-the-art logistical services (i.e. leadership, information, planning, warehousing and road, air and sea transport which are provided through the Logistical Cluster) in addition to the food aid that they are generally more recognized for. For example, the Logistics Cluster is the driving force behind a Joint Natural Disaster Simulation Exercise that took place in 2010 with another scheduled for April 2011.

53. WFP Haiti's GFD efforts in response to emergencies are closely coordinated with appropriate government ministries. WFP works closely with MARNDR for example to manage the phase-out of GFD after an emergency. While the government enforces a clear

phase-out of GFD so as not to negatively impact local markets, WFP works closely with government and implementing partners to ensure that vulnerable communities who are the most food insecure are being identified and their needs are being met.

Alignment and Synergies through Partnerships

54. The mere existence of the Logistic Cluster, which started in Gonaives as a regional Logistics Cluster in the immediate aftermath of the floods of September 2008 and gradually developed itself as a full fledged comprehensive provider of logistic services, communication facilities, and critical up-to date transport information for the benefit of the government of Haiti and the whole international and national aid community, can be considered as the key element and lynch pin of WFP's Emergency Preparedness policy. Inside the Logistic Cluster the collective experience in all aspects of logistics is varied and vast.

55. Not only were surface, sea and air transport services and storage facilities provided free of charge for the benefit of the national and international aid community but also coordination meetings were organized at regular intervals in Port-au-Prince and provincial towns. Detailed information was circulated in respect to import procedures, port and road conditions, situation reports and nationwide logistic capacity assessment via widely distributed reports and bulletins backed by an excellent dedicated Logistic Cluster website³². Coordination meetings were well attended by the entire UN and NGO community. From January 2010 to the end of March 2011 as many as 122 users have relied on the various transport services offered by the cluster, transporting almost 15,000 MT (Sea: 11 percent, Air: 10 percent, Road: 79 percent). The top users of the services provided were (by tonnage) World Vision, WFP, FAO, UN Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development, and the World Health Organization (WHO).

56. WFP is also the coordinator of the Emergency Telecommunications cluster. As many as 80 NGOs and all the UN agencies made use of the "Security Voice Structure – via VHF" interlinking approximately 2,500 aid-workers via 5 strategically located communications centres manned 24/7 by WFP operators. WFP is also providing "Data Connectivity Services" not only for all the WFP offices but also to UNDP and Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Plans are in progress to develop a common IT network complete with common back-up services.

Alignment with WFP Corporate Strategy and Priorities

57. In accordance with Article II of WFP's General Rules and Regulations, one of the three purposes of WFP is "to meet refugee and other emergency and protracted relief food needs"³³. In Haiti, the vast majority of WFP human and financial resources have been dedicated to this humanitarian mission, aligned with Strategic Objective 1, saving lives and protecting livelihoods in emergencies. In response to the emergencies in Haiti during the period of evaluation, WFP's interventions were well aligned with stated corporate policies and priorities, responding flexibly and rapidly to ensure that its aid reaches and benefits the most needy³⁴ and providing food to meet the acute life threatening and livelihood threatening food needs of populations in crisis³⁵.

58. In terms of disaster preparedness (SO2), the WFP Policy on Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) states "for WFP, DRR also means complementing emergency response and preparedness with targeted prevention and preparedness activities before disaster strikes"³⁶. In accordance with this mandate, WFP prioritizes strengthening capacities of governments to prepare for, assess and respond to hunger arising from disasters; and assisting communities to build resilience to shocks and outlined a framework for analyzing how WFP

³² www.logcluster.org/ops/hti10a

³³ General regulations, General rules, Financial regulations, Rules of Procedure of the Executive Board, November 2010.

³⁴ WFP mission statement.

³⁵ Emergency Preparedness and Response Framework, March 2003.

³⁶ WFP/EB.1/2009/5-B.

tools can be used in disaster risk reduction. Using the framework, the evaluation team considered WFP Haiti's specific activities and their alignment with WFP's policy as shown in Table 5.

TABLE 5: WFP'S ROLE AND TOOLS IN DISASTER RISK REDUCTION IN HAITI BETWEEN 2005 AND 2010

DISASTER RISK REDUCTION ACTIVITY WHERE WFP PLAYS CORE ROLE	WFP TOOLS											
	Capacity development	Cash/vouchers	Food for training	Food for work/assets	Maternal & child health & nutrition	School feeding	Special operations activities	Therapeutic feeding ³⁷	Vulnerability assessments	Weather risk transfer tools	Early warning systems	Market interventions
UNDERSTANDING RISK												
People-centred early warning system	✓								✓		✓	
Comprehensive risk & vulnerability assessment								✓	✓			
PREVENTION												
Socio-economic prevention	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓		✓	✓			✓
PREPAREDNESS												
Contingency and disaster planning	✓								✓		✓	
Logistical preparedness	✓			✓								

Legend		
✓✓	Most appropriate tool according to DRR policy	WFP Haiti activities especially strong in relation to DRR policy
✓	Supporting tool according to DRR policy	WFP Haiti generally well-aligned with DRR policy

59. Based on this analysis, the evaluation team identified several areas where WFP's activities in Haiti are particularly effective, all in areas that are identified as priority tools by the corporate Disaster Risk and Reduction (DRR) policy:

- VAM office's CFSVA and other vulnerability assessments supports national/international understanding of risk
- Pre-positioning of food through cooperating partners nationwide supports logistical preparedness
- WFP strong partner in building capacity for contingency planning and disaster preparedness through simulations with DPC and other first responders to humanitarian crises

³⁷ UNICEF is responsible for supporting, coordinating and mobilizing resources for therapeutic feeding, as outlined in the WFP/UNICEF MOU on Nutrition (2005), while it is UNHCR's responsibility in refugee situations as specified in the UNHCR/WFP Guidelines for Selective Feeding (2011). In both situations, WFP provides logistical support as needed. In Haiti, the UN Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS), which is administered by WFP, has provided support to the transport of UNICEF supplies when required.

Education

Alignment with Government of Haiti

60. School feeding has been one of the Government of Haiti's priorities for a long time. During the period covered by the CPE, a series of major strategic documents have been elaborated, demonstrating the continual importance of school feeding and reflecting the evolution of the conceptual approach in this area.

61. Haiti's mid-term strategy for the period 2002 – 2006³⁸ made reference to the *Plan National d'Education et de Formation* initiated in 1993; one major action of this plan was the implementation of health and nutrition programmes with the provision of daily hot meals in schools to reduce the high dropout rate and improve student performance.

62. In September 2006, the Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy paper confirmed this commitment, as "Improvements in the areas of preschool, primary, and secondary education will be linked as much as possible to health and nutrition services. Accordingly, the *Ministere de l'Education nationale et de la Formation professionnelle* (MENFP) will strengthen the nutritional food programme for pupils of the three cycles of elementary school, using student canteen programmes, so as to provide 1.5 million meals per day, including essential vitamins."³⁹

63. In September 2007, the National Strategy and Action Plan on Education for All (SNA/EPT)⁴⁰ put a great emphasis on school canteens with a view to increase the number of beneficiaries up to 1,014,737 children in 2015. In February 2008, a presidential decree established a working group on education and training, *Groupe de travail sur l'éducation et la formation*, (GTEF). The GTEF recommended that the state provide a daily hot meal for all school children attending pre-school and basic education with a priority for the most disadvantaged children.

64. The plan for the implementation of Education for All during the period 2008 – 2011⁴¹ established by the MENFP a few weeks later endorsed the GTEF's recommendation and introduced the possibility of local food procurement, similar to the so-called "Home-grown school feeding". The linkage with the MARNDR and the perspective of using local agricultural production in school canteens were confirmed when the 1996 *Plan National de Sécurité Alimentaire et Nutritionnelle* (PNSAN) was updated.⁴²

65. Following the January 12, 2010 earthquake, an Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of Haiti⁴³ was formulated. It marked a new stage in the Government's approach through associating the concept of social safety net to school feeding. In August 2010, the Ministry of MENFP formulated a new Operational Plan for the period 2010 – 2015⁴⁴ whose one strategy aimed at the improvement of the health and nutrition status of school children through school feeding services. The plan targets 1.7 million beneficiaries (5 percent of pre-school children, 80 percent of children attending the two first cycles of basic education, 100 percent of out-of-school children attending non-formal basic education alternative programmes).

66. The *Programme National de Cantines Scolaires* (PNCS), created in 1997, is the national institution in charge of school feeding in Haiti. It is designed to play a double role:

³⁸ Haïti - *Stratégie à Moyen Terme 2002-2006*, Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances.

³⁹ A window of opportunity for Haiti – Interim PRSP I, September 27, 2006.

⁴⁰ *Stratégie Nationale d'Action pour l'Education pour Tous*, Ministère de l'Education nationale et de la formation professionnelle, septembre 2007.

⁴¹ *Plan de mise en œuvre de l'Education pour Tous (PMO/EPT) 2008-2009*, Ministère de l'Education nationale et de la formation professionnelle, mai 2008.

⁴² *Actualisation du Plan National de Sécurité Alimentaire et Nutritionnelle (PNSAN)*, Conseil Interministériel pour la Sécurité Alimentaire (CISA), Coordination Nationale de la Sécurité Alimentaire (CNSA), mars 2010.

⁴³ Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of Haiti – Immediate key initiatives for the future, Government of the Republic of Haiti, March 2010.

⁴⁴ *Vers la Refondation du Système Éducatif Haïtien – Plan Opérationnel 2010-2015 des Recommandations de la Commission Présidentielle Education et Formation*, MENFP, août 2010.

regulation of school feeding activities throughout the country on one hand, implementation of a national school canteens programme with government resources and the support of several partners including WFP, World Bank, Brazil, USAID and more than 25 national and international NGOs on the other hand.

67. Other major actors operate school feeding programmes in the country, essentially WFP, the World Bank and USAID. The implementation modalities of school feeding activities vary by funding agencies. Although the PNCS has created *the Conseil National des Cantines Scolaires* as an overarching steering body, until now there are four independent operating models in the country. The government's leadership and coordination role has still to be strengthened not to say established. In cooperation with the PNCS, important steps oriented towards national ownership have been taken during the most recent period with the support of WFP, the World Bank, and Brazil through the organization of stakeholder's workshops, consultancies, drafting of plan, and issuing a school feeding concept note. The school feeding programme is the largest food-based safety net in Haiti.

Alignment and Synergies through Partnerships

68. A harmonized programme cycle was not possible due to unstable conditions during most of the CPE period. A Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) has been launched in November 2007. The 2002 – 2006 UNDAF was replaced in 2004 by an Interim Coordination Framework extended to 2007. The UNDAF for the period 2009 – 2011 has been signed with the Government in November 2008 and has been implemented since January 2009⁴⁵. WFP contributed to the preparation of this later notably with regard to its role within the implementation of the SNA/EPT through material and technical support to school canteens. WFP is a member of the UNDAF thematic group on Sustainable Human Development.

69. In partnership with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the NGO *Agro Action Allemande* (AAA) WFP launched a school garden pilot project under Act.2 of the 2003 – 2006 CP 10217. Although encouraging lessons had been learned from this very limited initiative, the project was never scaled up and terminated in 2008 mainly because of lack of technical support.

70. WFP has been a regular member of the *Groupe de Travail Sectoriel sur l'Education* headed by UNESCO since 2003. This group includes the MENFP, more than 30 local and international organizations, and representatives of public sector and donors. WFP participates also in the education cluster coordinated by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) in collaboration with the MENFP with a main focus on emergencies. Following the earthquake in late January 2010, the education cluster conducted a Rapid Joint Needs Assessment that provided basic information for the post-disaster needs assessment (PDNA).

71. UNICEF praises both the participation of WFP to the education cluster and its great ability to react, notably during emergency situations. But joint initiatives have not always been successful: on one hand, in cooperation with MENFP and MSPP both agencies participated in a School Health Committee, that proved finally to be not enough active. On the other hand, in 2009 a close cooperation was effective in the Nord-Ouest department where, in accordance with the "Essential Package" approach, UNICEF supported schools to fulfil WFPs selection criteria to become eligible for school feeding activities. This joint approach, that should have been formalized in a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and expanded to other departments, could be revived under the next WFP PRRO.

Alignment with WFP Corporate Strategy and Priorities

72. During the whole period covered by the CPE, and depending on the situation in the country characterized by recurrent shocks, WFP school feeding activities in Haiti have contributed to achieve the strategic priorities/objectives stated in the successive WFP

⁴⁵ *Plan Cadre des Nations Unies pour l'Aide au Développement – UNDAF 2009-2011 «Pour l'Inclusion de la Protection Sociale»*, novembre 2008.

Strategic Plans: SO1 (through social safety nets), SO3, SO4 (through support to school enrolment and retention). Support to strengthen the capacities of the government in view of a progressive phasing out and long-term handover of school feeding activities (SO5) has been a continual concern of the CO.

73. Following the endorsement of the WFP corporate School Feeding Policy⁴⁶ in 2009, the CO has embarked in a series of intense activities to align its action with the new approach and the 8 Guiding Standards, particularly in the areas of local production and sourcing, social protection, and support to a national policy formulation.

Nutrition

Alignment with Government of Haiti

74. Haiti's first National Nutrition Policy was released in 2001 by the MSPP. While quite comprehensive in its content, the document was not widely disseminated and therefore had limited influence⁴⁷. Indeed, while the policy calls for "a preventive orientation", particularly for pregnant women and children under two years old, a curative approach through targeted supplementary feeding (TSF) was favoured in most WFP operations. To align its activities with the national policy, WFP planned to gradually move from a strictly curative approach towards a preventive approach in PRRO 10382⁴⁸. In practice, the CO applied only TSF to all beneficiary categories, on the premise that the blanket approach entails a greater number of beneficiaries and hence larger food storage capacity and human resource requirements that exceeded the capacity of implementing partners. However, preventing nutritional deterioration among the most vulnerable groups—children below two years of age and pregnant and nursing women (PNW)—through blanket supplementary feeding has been rightly implemented in the EMOPs and in the relief components of most recent PRROs.

75. Furthermore, while consultation and information sharing with the MSPP was minimal in the first half of the period under review, it gained momentum with the establishment of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee cluster approach, which was launched in Haiti in 2008 in response to the hurricane season. WFP is an active member of the Nutrition Cluster which was re-activated 10 days after the earthquake. The nutrition cluster mandate and activities are particularly relevant to WFP's mandate in nutrition in emergencies. WFP has been regularly participating in the cluster's coordination and technical working group meetings. In terms of nutrition surveillance, assessments and information sharing, the Global Nutrition Cluster Annual Meeting held in Geneva in July 2010, welcomed WFP for involving the Cluster in the Food Security Assessment they undertook in collaboration with CNSA⁴⁹.

Alignment and Synergies through Partnerships

76. WFP is an active member of the Consultative Nutrition Committee which was established by the MSPP and comprised representatives of the World Bank the Inter-American Development Bank, WFP, UNICEF, WHO, USAID, with the Director of Nutrition acting as permanent secretary. The Consultative Nutrition Committee's main purpose is to discuss and decide on strategic orientation to nutrition, information sharing, joint planning and co-financing. WFP was instrumental in launching the *Comité Technique de Nutrition* by organizing a workshop with funding from the Micronutrient Initiative. The *Comité Technique de Nutrition*, which is chaired by the Director of Nutrition/MSPP, was set up to facilitate coordination, information sharing, and contingency planning.

77. The WFP-supported MCHN activities are implemented through public (MSPP) and non-profit private sector (NGOs, religious organizations, foundations and associations)

⁴⁶ WFP/EB.2/2009/4-A, 8 October 2009.

⁴⁷ World Bank 2010 Promoting Nutrition Security in Haiti.

⁴⁸ WFP 2005 PRRO 10382 Assistance to Food Insecure Persons in Crisis Situations.

⁴⁹ Inter Agency Standing Committee, Global Nutrition Cluster Meeting Report, July 2010.

facilities. This mirrors the health system in Haiti in which, according to some estimates, the non-profit sector accounts for about one-third of the country's health care facilities⁵⁰.

Alignment with WFP Corporate Strategy and Priorities

78. WFP policies covering MCHN are covered under several policy directives. The WFP Policy Paper on Disaster Reduction⁵¹ states that SO4 is “key to socio-economic prevention” and lists MCHN activities, currently implemented through PRROs, among the socio-economic prevention tools in which WFP has a core role. The more recent WFP Policy Paper Programme Category Review adds that the development programme category, including CPs and DEVs, should provide the mechanism for action towards SO4 in the future. In Haiti, MCHN activities have been implemented under all operations.

HIV/AIDS and TB

Alignment with Government of Haiti

79. In 2002 the Government of Haiti published a new HIV strategy covering 2002 – 2006⁵². Two new strategies have since been released: 2007 – 2011⁵³ and 2008 – 2012⁵⁴, with an addendum⁵⁵ to the 2008 – 2012 strategy released in March of 2010. The addendum reinforces the 2008 – 2012 strategy for the post-earthquake period whose foci followed six axes⁵⁶: Risk Reduction, Vulnerability Reduction, Impact Reduction, Human Rights Promotion and Defence, Performance Measure Developed, and Epidemiological Monitoring and Research.

80. The new government strategy puts more emphasis on the development of a single monitoring system for all HIV-related activities. The activities include comprehensive coverage of prevention, care, support, and treatment. WFP activities fit in with this plethora of activities.

81. In the Multisectorial Strategy for HIV 2008 – 2013, food supplementation as a means for improving adherence rates to ART is mentioned as a lesson learned⁵⁷. This is an indication of true local ownership. Program managers visited at health facilities were well versed on the feeding programmes for people on ART and TB treatment and felt they were an important component of treatment to ensure optimal absorption of the medication. Despite HIV activities being promoted cross-sectorally in the Government (through Ministries of Education or Agriculture for example), there was no evidence that WFP had made any efforts to target people living with HIV and AIDS (PLHIV) or educate beneficiaries on sexually transmitted infections through non-health activities.

82. Government Ministry of Health staff and donor respondents did not feel that WFP had been an active participant in the war against HIV. Those interviewed did not recall WFP attending thematic working group meetings. This may be due to the lack of WFP staff capacity in the past where one person was responsible for all health interventions, under which HIV activities fall. This is possibly also influenced by historically weak government leadership at the National Programme in the Fight Against AIDS and the fact that to date, the Government of Haiti has focused attention on the Prevention and Support working group

⁵⁰ PAHO, 2001 <http://www.paho.org/english/sha/prflhai.htm>.

⁵¹ WFP 2009 WFP Policy and Disaster Reduction.

⁵² MSPP. Mars 2002. *Plan Stratégique National pour la Prévention et le Contrôle des IST et du VIH/SIDA en Haïti 2002-2006*. Port-au-Prince, Haïti: l'Institut Haïtien de l'Enfance, ONUSIDA, l'OPS/OMS et l'USAID.

⁵³ PNLS. Mars 2007. *Plan Stratégique National Multisectoriel 2007-2011*. Port-au-Prince, Haïti: Gouvernement de la République, d'Haïti.

⁵⁴ PNLS. 2008. *Plan Stratégique National Multisectoriel 2008-2012*. Port-au-Prince, Haïti: Gouvernement de la République d'Haïti.

⁵⁵ PNLS. Mars 2010. *Plan Intérimaire VIH/SIDA Suite au Séisme du 12 Janvier 2010: Addendum au PSNM 2008-2012*. Port-au-Prince, Haïti: Gouvernement de la République d'Haïti, Ministère de la Santé Publique et de la Population (MSPP), Unité de Coordination des Programmes.

⁵⁶ PNLS. 2008. *Plan Stratégique National Multisectoriel 2008-2012*. Port-au-Prince, Haïti: Gouvernement de la République d'Haïti.

⁵⁷ Ibid

outputs in which WFP has not been involved. Both WFP and the National Programme in the Fight Against AIDS are working to strengthen their participation and guidance.

Alignment and Synergies through Partnerships

83. UNICEF mentioned that there had been efforts made to avoid duplication of services to schools and coordination of services in nutritional programmes through health facilities but not on the HIV/TB front. The UN agency and donor representatives interviewed who are active in HIV-related activities were aware that WFP was providing food supports to PLHIV but were uncertain of the details of the project. The implementing partners visited are the link between WFP and treatment beneficiaries who understood the dual role of WFP food aid—to maintain a well-nourished patient and as an incentive to continue treatment.

84. Under CP 10217, WFP demonstrated some interest in HIV prevention education through schools and supported an HIV sensitization campaign that reached just over 18,000 students⁵⁸. Some institutional feeding through orphanages and food for work activities may have touched on people affected by HIV but these data were not collected. No other evidence indicated that synergies existed between other activities or with external partners in the area of HIV.

Alignment with WFP Corporate Strategy and Priorities

85. During the period under evaluation two WFP HIV strategies have been approved^{59,60}. With the approval of the new policy in 2010, WFP has shifted its focus from targeting all PLHIV and TB patients under treatment in food insecure zones to malnourished ART/TB clients to ensure full nutritional recovery of both ART and TB clients. They maintained and reinforced their foci on:

- ensuring nutritional recovery for HIV and TB treatment patients,
- promoting safety nets and livelihoods,
- capitalizing on distribution points as an opportunity to educate beneficiaries on HIV and other health issues,
- developing and maintaining strong partnerships with government, UN agencies, USA President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief and the Global Fund to Fight Against AIDS, TB and Malaria, NGOs, and the private sector to coordinate, collaborate, and garner support for activities especially during emergency situations, and
- contributing the national dialogue towards the development of national policies, strategies and programmes to promote a conscientious food security agenda for PLHIV.

86. The CO has been aligned with the WFP corporate HIV policy but is not fully implementing all aspects of the policy, choosing to focus on the care and treatment pillar (an acceptable decision within the policy framework). Their activities have been promoting nutritional recovery for which they have a number of institutional partners through which they are providing support to ART and Directly Observed Therapy (DOT) patients. They have been conscious of the need to include PLHIV in their livelihoods activities that are currently under development but have not deliberately sought PLHIV for inclusion in these activities. Currently, however, the CO is working to develop strategies and interventions which will be more inclusive of PLHIV in livelihoods activities. Distribution points have not been used to deliver health messages but may not be necessary as all people collecting food are just coming from visiting their clinician. Partnerships outside of those with health facilities have not been nurtured. Implementing patterns suggested that WFP also support home-based care projects which are not a part of the corporate HIV strategy. Participating in the national dialogue towards national and UN-joint policy formulation and standards is a part of the

⁵⁸ SPR.

⁵⁹ WFP. 2003. *Programming in the Era of AIDS: WFP's Response to HIV/AIDS*. Publication no. WFP/EB.1/2003/4-B: Original English. Rome: WFP.

⁶⁰ WFP. 2010. *WFP HIV and AIDS Policy*. Publication no. WFP/EB.2/2010/4-A: Original English. Rome: WFP.

WFP corporate HIV strategy and one area where the CO was perceived as weak. The UN HIV/AIDS working group, led by UNAIDS was working to improve inter-agency coordination but remains a fledgling group. The group is in the nascent stages of determining their strengths and way forward. The Haitian government, UN, and donor representatives did not recall WFP participating in any national meetings on HIV during the period under evaluation.

Food Security, Agriculture, and Rural Development

Alignment with Government of Haiti

87. For the Government of Haiti, the agricultural sector has always been the pillar of development and of poverty reduction in the country⁶¹. Similarly, food security in Haiti is based primarily on the agricultural sector as the main provider of food commodities to the population. For this reason, WFP Haiti's primary counterpart in the Government of Haiti is the MARNDR. WFP is an active partner of MARNDR and works closely with government officials at the national and departmental levels to adapt WFP interventions in accordance with government strategies and operational plans while focusing on Haiti's food security needs.

88. The CNSA was established under MARNDR in 1996 to address issues of food insecurity at a national level. At the time of the creation of CNSA, the first PNSAN was developed. The process of updating this plan began in 2006 with a final updated version finalized in March 2010. While agriculture may be the lead sector, the new PNSAN has outlined food security as a cross-sectoral issue, with clear guidelines for government intervention shown in Table 6⁶².

TABLE 6: GOVERNMENT OF HAITI SECTORAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO FOOD SECURITY

Elements of Food Security	Agriculture	Environment	Food Crises and Social Protection	Employment, Cooperatives, and Financial Services	Fiscal and Commercial Policy	Health and Nutrition	Education
Availability	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Accessibility	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓
Stability	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓
Quality	✓			✓	✓	✓	✓

Source: PNSAN, March 2010 (translated from original French document)

89. In accordance with this policy and MARNDR's agriculture policy⁶³, WFP is implementing a combination of CFW and FFW in rural and urban areas primarily as a social safety approach to reach vulnerable populations and areas of high unemployment. While the PNSAN does recognize a role for CFW/FFW activities to reach the most vulnerable populations, the CNSA expressed some frustrations with these activities because of their short-term focus.

90. Especially in the last year, there have been tremendous strides made in the government ownership of these activities. In accordance with the government's draft Operation Manual for the Job Creation Programme for Improving Food Security⁶⁴ published in March 2010, all CFFW activities in Haiti are subject to review by a *comité de validation* made up of representatives of several government and civil society organizations. Through this Operation Manual, the government also established parameters regarding the types of labour that are appropriate for CFFW projects and a standardized minimum wage equivalent.

⁶¹ *Document de Strategie Nationale pour la Croissance et pour la Reduction de la Pauvrete*. Novembre 2007.

⁶² *Actualisation du Plan National de Sécurité Alimentaire et Nutritionnelle*. Mars 2010.

⁶³ MARNDR. *Politique de développement agricole*. Avril 2010.

⁶⁴ Programme de Création d'Emplois pour l'Amélioration de la Sécurité Alimentaire (PCEASA) (DRAFT), *Manuel d'Operation*. Mars 2010

91. For WFP operations prior to the establishment of the new government led validation committee process in 2010, WFP and all other organizations with CFW/FFW programmes were following their own organizational practices in terms of the rations and types of work. In Haiti, because of the large number of aid organizations implementing CFW/FFW projects, local governments were not always aware of the various activities occurring in their regions. While department level government officials reported increased satisfaction and ownership of activities with this new uniform process, the standardized process has posed some challenges to WFP in terms of ration composition and geographic targeting that are discussed in more detail in Chapter 2B.

92. Another challenge that WFP Haiti faces in aligning its activities with governmental priorities surrounds local purchase. While it is a priority expressed in the MARNDR's National Agriculture Investment Plan, local purchase remains a challenge for WFP to implement in Haiti. Linking food aid to national agricultural production has potential in Haiti as food security remains especially high in certain areas while in others there is a surplus of production during certain periods of the year⁶⁵.

93. A strong awareness of the importance to promote local purchases has prevailed in line with the declared government of Haiti policy and WFP's objectives. However, of the approximately 375,000 MT of food-aid commodities procured during the CPE review period, the share of local purchase during this period represented only 2.75 percent⁶⁶. WFP also took advantage of some interesting initiatives of the French Cooperation buying rice and maize from upcoming farmers' cooperatives. As a key member of a working group, which includes MARNDR, CNSA, French Cooperation, and Brazilian Cooperation that is tasked with implementing a programme for local purchases, WFP is continuing to explore additional opportunities in Haiti.

Alignment and Synergies through Partnerships

94. As the lead of the food cluster, WFP plays an important role coordinating efforts between food aid partners, providing comprehensive summary information about recent food aid activities and sharing strategies for the future, which is widely appreciated.

95. While there are inherent limitations to WFP's CFFW programmes such as short-term contract lengths and WFP's restrictions on the procurement of tools and other non-food items, WFP has sought out innovative partnerships in order to leverage impact. For example, while WFP can procure basic tools and utensils like wheelbarrows, pick axes, and shovels, they cannot procure other construction materials such as cement. In many areas, WFP has partnered successfully with UNDP on C/FFW activities where WFP provides the food aid to an implementing partner and UNDP provides the cash component. In these situations, UNDP is able to expand the project's procurements to include supplies like cement. A notable partnership with UNDP was a mapping effort of both agency's CFFW activities across the country that also indicated where projects were being implemented jointly that was used as a tool to explore more opportunities for synergies.

96. Another example of positive interagency collaboration is a joint WFP/UNDP/FAO project in the Ouest that is a watershed management, livelihood protection project. CFW is a modality that has been promoted by the Government of Haiti and used very successfully to bring together agencies with different mandates but a similar goal.

97. Other UN partners described WFP as having the reputation for being a proactive and willing partner at the agency level, due in part to their leadership role regarding the Logistics Cluster and the analytical support provided through the VAM unit. As the current CO management team has been instrumental in forging some of these partnerships in recent

⁶⁵ MARNDR. *Plan National d'Investissement Agricole*. May 2010.

⁶⁶ Figures extracted from WINGS Project Management Overview documents as at 31/12/2010, SPRs and relevant COMPAS records.

years, it was noted that this interagency collaboration and information sharing could be more formalized to ensure continued collaboration and increase effectiveness.

98. The short-term nature of WFP's CFW and FFW projects can pose challenges to their ability to work with partners who have longer-term development goals. In certain situations, implementing partners with a long history in Haiti such as AAA are able to leverage WFP support as a tool in a longer-term watershed management development strategy, as evidenced by a current co-financed project between WFP, IFAD, and AAA.

99. Some donor partners expressed frustration in WFP's coordination with other food distribution partners in Haiti. With WFP's recent geographic expansion, some donors felt that there was a duplication of efforts and inefficiencies in areas of the country where there were already strong implementing partners such as the USAID-funded Multi Year Assistance Programmes. A WFP-USAID coordination mechanism exists at Port au Prince and the local level to try and address these coordination concerns.

Alignment with WFP Corporate Strategy and Priorities

100. While generally aligned with WFP strategic plans (SO2 and SO3), CFW and FFW activities promoting agricultural development and food security face challenges in terms of their alignment with WFP policies in the Haitian context for several reasons. While the primary goal of WFP's CFW and FFW activities is increased food consumption, a secondary goal is community asset creation in support of longer-term food security. This community asset creation goal was sometimes a challenge in Haiti for several reasons:

- There was an overwhelming need for urban debris removal after the earthquake. As such, a portion of the CFW and FFW activities was focused on these projects (albeit not as much as expected due to complications related to the availability of machinery and issues associated with the ownership of rubble which had economic value).
- The absence of a clear framework for land ownership in Haiti means that many rural beneficiaries of CFW and FFW activities are not landowners and therefore may find themselves working to improve land that is owned by someone else. WFP has worked to implement activities on land managed at the community level.

101. In addition, as a relatively new modality for WFP, the scale of the CFW programme in Haiti was unprecedented in WFP and therefore lacked best practices regarding implementation mechanisms such as establishing selection criteria, project appraisal and approval procedures, and monitoring indicators.

2.2. Making Strategic Choices

Generating and Using Analytical Information

102. Especially through its leadership of the Logistics Cluster and the contributions of the VAM unit, the WFP Haiti CO has played a prominent role in the generation of analytical information and the coordination of development interventions to the government and the entire humanitarian response community.

103. The VAM unit is a strong contributor to the food security body of knowledge in Haiti, working closely with CNSA. It provides technical and managerial capacity to produce baseline studies and emergency analyses aftershocks. VAM frequently coordinates with other UN agencies such as FAO and UNICEF and partners such as FEWSNET to develop nutrition surveys, price bulletins, and other early warning assessments. Primary contributions related to food security during the period of evaluation include: Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis Report – 2005, Impact of the High Food Price Crisis on the Urban Populations of Port-au-Prince – 2008, CFSVA – 2009, Port-au-Prince Emergency Market Mapping and Analysis – 2010, EFSA) – March and June/July 2010, and CFSAM – 2010.

104. At the time of evaluation, the VAM unit was in the process of working with CNSA and other partners to prepare a follow on "CFSVA+" to take stock of the food security post


earthquake. Based on interviews with government partners and other stakeholders, the humanitarian community greatly appreciates WFP’s leadership in this area. In this sense, WFP is both a key contributor to the content of the analytical information available, helping to place food security issues on the government and international development agenda, and also a strategic partner to the government in developing local capacity to continue this work in the future.

105. While WFP’s VAM office does generate invaluable information regarding food insecurity in Haiti, this analysis was used as a driver of operational decision-making only indirectly, in that the humanitarian community in Haiti writ large relied on this information. External factors such as natural and manmade crises; evolving priorities of government, donor, and corporate stakeholders; and the capacity of implementing partners had a more direct influence on the CO’s strategic choices.

Drivers of Response Strategies

106. The myriad of internal and external shocks that occurred in Haiti during the period of evaluation, such as natural disasters and the global economic crisis of 2008 had a considerable impact on the physical and human environment, forcing the CO to quickly change course and challenging their ability to implement activities in accordance with the strategies planned in the project documents. WFP Haiti was faced with a range of natural and manmade disasters, some of which were gradual and others that occurred without warning as shown in Figure 7.

FIGURE 7: NATURAL AND MANMADE DISASTER IN HAITI 2005 - 2010



107. The primary drivers of change to WFP Haiti’s activities across the portfolio were the 2008 and 2010 emergencies. The scale of the emergencies in Haiti resulted in necessary changes to the operational design of WFP interventions. In the latter half of the evaluation period, WFP operations appropriately shifted from development-focused activities to activities focused on emergency response marked by the succession of relief, recovery, and emergency operations responding to sudden crisis and recurrent shocks. Within these operations, new activities across sectors such as seasonal safety net take home rations or CFW programmes often had to be envisioned to reflect the changing needs of communities post disaster. The 2008 and 2010 emergencies also resulted in WFP increasing its geographic presence and infrastructure, opening new sub-offices and improving logistical capabilities.

108. Within this context of emergency response, WFP Haiti was also faced with corresponding changes in the capacity and priorities of government, donor, and implementing partners, as well as changing corporate priorities that influenced the CO’s strategic choices. Some crosscutting examples are presented here while more details about how these drivers of strategy were reflected in individual sectors are explored in the sections below.

109. In response to the crises of 2008, the Inter-agency Standing Committee cluster approach was established in Haiti. WFP’s active involvement in the Food, Logistics, Emergency Telecommunications, Nutrition, Education, Health, and Agriculture clusters has generally increased collaboration and information sharing with government partners and

other members of the humanitarian community. Improved alignment with national policies and collaboration with the relevant sector ministries have progressively improved over the portfolio period, driving changes across sectors in WFP's outreach, rations, and the nature of interventions. Changes in the government's capacity and priorities drove changes such as increasing activities across sectors or a postponement of the gradual phase out of additional schools included as part of the 2008 emergency response that was planned during the initial PRRO period and that should have used a well-defined and Government-led handover strategy⁶⁷ in the case of school feeding activities, for example.

110. Other external factors such as an influx of donor funding in certain sectors (e.g. emergency school feeding, HIV/AIDS, and CFW), changes in the capacity of implementing partners, and an evolving WFP corporate policy landscape drove the CO to make changes to the types of interventions implemented, ration composition, geographic outreach, and implementation protocols across the portfolio.

111. A challenge to the CO's ability to make strategic choices in all sectors lies in the weaknesses of the M&E data. While output level data is collected by WFP field monitors and implementing partners, the tremendous number of implementing partners at any given time and their varying levels of reporting capabilities makes outcome level data difficult if not impossible to assess. More robust quantitative and qualitative data about which activities proved to be the most successful and why could help drive more strategic decision-making moving forward. Without this data, it is difficult for WFP to assess where its contributions have been the most effective and efficient.

Emergency Preparedness and Disaster Response

112. In reaction to these recurring shocks, the CO has had to develop flexible response strategies in terms of planning and logistics. Strategic choices regarding disaster response were driven by an analysis of Haiti's most vulnerable areas. Twice when disaster struck Haiti in September 2008 and January 2010, the CO decided to initiate Special Operations in order to provide additional logistic support not only to its own EMOPs but also to the many emergency operations launched by other UN agencies and the international community. In the field of logistics, WFP systems were well equipped to respond quickly with a broad based approach.

113. In terms of emergency preparedness, WFP also made pre-positioning and logistics decisions in line with an analysis of risk factors such as seismic risk, flooding, and cyclonic activity combined with levels of food insecurity. Over the period of evaluation, WFP expanded its number of sub-offices significantly in line with its increased level of activities based on these geographic needs. From two offices in 2005 (Port-au-Prince CO and Cap Haitien) to two additional sub-offices (Gonaives and Jacmel) after the disastrous floods in 2008, the network was expanded again in 2010 with small sub-offices being opened in Leogane, Hinche and Les Cayes. Several implementing partners expressed great satisfaction with this enhanced geographic presence, enabling WFP to enhance its implementing and monitoring capacity while food-aid programmes became more and more focused.

114. Simultaneously, WFP's warehousing capacity, about 14,300 MT in 2005, has increased to more than 50,000 MT at present. The warehousing facilities are a mix of rented concrete buildings, Megatents, Wiikhalls and Rubhalls, reflecting WFP's drive to modulate both inside and outside warehousing capacity to respond to the expanding pattern of the aid programmes. As leader of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee for logistics, WFP is also providing ample open and covered storage capacity for the equipment of other UN agencies and the international NGO community. The total WFP warehousing capacity in Haiti will amply suffice to sustain 3 to 4 months activity. Hurricane proof warehouses are being erected both in Jacmel and Les Cayes. As such, the WFP warehousing facilities constitute the corner stone on which the entire emergency response preparedness plan rests.

⁶⁷ According to the Programme Formulation Support Mission – HAITI PRRO, March 15th – April 6th 2009, Final Report.

115. A challenge that WFP will face moving forward is being able to contract operations post disaster. Over the last five years, WFP has proven itself quite nimble in being able to quickly expand operations to meet increased demand, in part by collocating with other UN agencies like MINUSTAH, which has a presence in each department. While it is likely that Haiti will continue to endure significant natural disasters in the future, there will presumably not be a crisis as extreme as the 2010 earthquake. The Resident Coordinator of the United Nations country team referenced a possible closing of the Hinche sub-office given the strength of other implementing partners in this area, but such reductions require careful planning and sustainability strategies. In all sectors, WFP's greatest challenge in terms of making strategic choices centres on quickly shifting from development to emergency operations. The struggle moving forward will be reorienting interventions away from the emergency back to a development focus.

Education

116. The Haiti CO has implemented school feeding activities throughout the period covered by the CPE through three types of WFP operations, which were sometimes conducted simultaneously, and aimed at: development (1 CP), emergency (2 EMOPs), and protracted relief and recovery (2 PRROs). While it was possible to conduct development activities during the first 3 years, the second half of the evaluation period was marked by a rapid succession of relief, recovery, and emergency operations responding to sudden crisis and recurrent shocks.

117. Activity 2 of CP 10217⁶⁸ "Investment in Human Capital through Education and Training" that was implemented from 2003 to 2007 was in line with many other similar school feeding programmes operated worldwide by WFP at that time. Its main and specific objectives were mainly education-oriented, its coverage limited to food insecure areas as determined through VAM surveys, its modalities in accordance with operational guidelines for WFP assistance to Education from the School Feeding Handbook⁶⁹. In 2006, this activity benefited from a technical review that recommended some improvements that were later taken into consideration. The successor operation (PRRO 10674⁷⁰) that started in January 2008, covered part of the previous CP, specifically school feeding, and was not designed to introduce strategic changes. On the contrary, the project document highlighted "the relevance of the possible return of an education component in a development project will be reviewed regularly".

118. Beginning in 2008, the CO faced an unexpected situation that influenced its strategic choices. Several budget revisions to PRRO 10674 and one EMOP⁷¹ were necessary to address the increased food commodity prices on international markets in April 2008, assist an increased number of new beneficiaries, and support families affected by an unprecedented sequence of hurricanes and tropical storms that hit the country in August and September of the same year. These interventions initiated a turning point in the CO strategy as emergency school feeding activities were intended to "act as a safety net mechanism which will facilitate the normalization of living conditions in affected areas." Two initiatives were then developed in addition to the "regular" school feeding activities: provision of daily school meals for children attending summer camps during school year break and seasonal safety nets (distribution of family take-home rations to mitigate the burden of school fees at the start of the new school year).

119. WFP was also responding to donor priorities, as noted by the 2008 expansion of 17 WFP school feeding programmes worldwide, with one of the largest expansions being in Haiti⁷², thanks to financing by the World Bank. Under this expansion, school feeding

⁶⁸ WFP/EB.3/2002/8/3.

⁶⁹ School Feeding Handbook, WFP/UNESCO/WHO, Rome, 1999.

⁷⁰ WFP/EB.2/2007/9-C/3.

⁷¹ Emergency Operation 10781.0 "Food assistance to flood affected populations in Haiti».

⁷² Bangladesh, Benin, Burundi, Central African Republic, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kenya, Liberia, Mozambique, Nicaragua occupied Palestinian territory, Pakistan, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Pakistan.

programmes under emergency operations were implemented in nine countries⁷³. Around 4.5 million beneficiaries were reached through these projects, highlighting the importance of children going to school even in emergency situations such as natural disasters, conflicts, or high food prices. In-school meals were provided in eight out of the nine countries; take-home rations were distributed in six countries.⁷⁴

120. The safety net approach and the new operation modalities were highly recommended by a WFP formulation mission conducted in March – April 2009 and fully integrated in the successor PRRO 10844⁷⁵, along with the provision of daily meals to children in schools in areas most affected by recurrent shocks. In addition, in line with the recently endorsed WFP School Feeding Policy, the project document put a great emphasis on hand-over strategy, notably through the exploration of local purchases from small farmers to supply nearby schools and the strengthening of PNCS. These later activities were strongly supported by France and Brazil. During the implementation period of PRRO 10844 the CO planned to gradually hand-over to the PNCS and/or partners schools that had been added to the programme as a result of the previous crisis.

121. Due to the January 2010 earthquake, school feeding activities under PRRO 10844 were interrupted after 10 days of implementation and the subsequent launch of an EMOP 200110. Instead of the planned handover of schools to the PNCS foreseen under PRRO 10844, WFP engaged in social safety-net activities under this EMOP and was requested (26 March 2010) by the government to scale-up its school-feeding programme as part of targeted interventions instead of GFD. The provision of in-school meals to a vastly increased number of school-age children, as well as to out-of-school children, was completed by a one-off distribution of family take-home rations for 15 days to help offset the costs associated with the return to school. Under the pressure of emergency, at the end of 2010 WFP had almost doubled the number of beneficiaries of its school feeding activities compared to the situation a few months earlier (tripled when compared to the figures from the CP).

122. All regular school feeding programmes are criteria-based. The selection of schools eligible to school feeding activities is generally based on a list of criteria presented in the detailed Activity Summary and the plan of operation that follow the endorsement of a development programme/project document. The evaluation mission of Activity 2 of CP 10217 conducted in 2006 analysed these criteria and concluded that some of them (access to drinking water, distance between dining-areas and latrine, for example) were too constraining and that a strict adherence to these prerequisites could exclude schools whose children are the most in need of food assistance. When crisis occurred, the CO expanded its school feeding programme to additional schools, using the same operational modalities that had been applied under the development programme, i.e. in-school hot meals along with all the set-up and infrastructure associated with school canteens. Other possibilities could have been envisaged, which can be more easily interrupted or phased out, for example the distribution of high-energy biscuits: “They are cheaper and easier to distribute than meals, and often aim to act as an incentive for increased school access, but they are less substantial and their financial value to families is lower. Biscuits are a compact source of nutrients produced off-site that is easy to pack, store, and transport. They are particularly used in emergency or crisis contexts for rapid scale-up or in situations of poor school infrastructure and storage facilities.”⁷⁶ For example, the 2005 South Asia Earthquake that struck northern Pakistan affected over 3.5 million people. Under the EMOP, some 126,000 school children

⁷³ Bangladesh, Chad, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Haiti, Pakistan, Philippines, Russian Federation and Sudan.

⁷⁴ School Feeding – Background on new directions, WFP School Feeding Unit, Policy & Strategy Division, 23 March 2010.

⁷⁵ WFP/EB.2/2009/9/1.

⁷⁶ Rethinking School Feeding: Social Safety Nets, Child Development, and the Education Sector, WFP/The World Bank Group, 2009.

were provided with fortified biscuits⁷⁷. Not only was the emergency school feeding programme design in Haiti not optimal for an emergency intervention, but it will now also create challenges for WFP to scale down activities as Haiti moves out of an emergency context.

Nutrition

123. The geographic coverage of MCHN activities over the period 2005 – 2010 has been guided by various food security and nutrition assessments undertaken by WFP and/or others. It gradually expanded from two departments—Nord and Nord-Est and the Port-au-Prince Metropolitan area (under the CP)—to include all ten departments in June 2010 under EMOP 200110. The scale of activities, namely the number of planned beneficiaries per department has been driven by needs as well as the availability of health facilities and adequate implementing partners. The limited capacity of the MSPP nutrition infrastructure and the lack of presence of NGOs in some departments have severely limited the coverage of WFP-supported MCHN activities in all its operations. These limitations have been repeatedly mentioned in the various Nutrition Cluster Reports in 2011.

124. There was a five-fold increase in the total number of health facilities implementing MCHN activities between 2005 and 2010 (from 48 to 261). The number of health facilities remained relatively stable in the Nord and Nord-Est Departments. Those two departments have been targeted in five of the six operations. The largest gradual expansion over the five years occurred in the Ouest Department, with a peak in 2010 in the aftermath of the earthquake.

125. Various changes were made in the planned ration composition, size, and nutritive values for MCHN between operations, which are discussed in more detail under Chapter 2.3. While changes were generally in line with evolving WFP and international guidance, these changes often caused confusion among implementing partners and beneficiary communities who were the same from one operation to the next.

126. In this respect, the changes did not always adhere to the rations and principles laid down in WFP's Programme Guidance Manual such as the one relating to the number of commodities which states: "In general food baskets may comprise 1-3 commodities. Most WFP-supplied food rations comprise a basic cereal/pulse combination and edible oil. The food basket must not be too complex or this will overburden staff at health institutions, as well as putting pressure on logistical systems of supply and distribution." In the case of Haiti, while alignment with WFP's internal or joint UN guidance was gradually achieved, these changes did cause confusion among partners and beneficiaries.

HIV/AIDS and TB

127. Between 2005 and 2010 the emphasis on HIV and TB as an issue of national priority increased dramatically in Haiti. An influx of President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief and Global Fund monies, from US\$104.7 million to US\$281.1 million⁷⁸, improved the population's awareness and knowledge about HIV and AIDS; increased the number of trained clinical and laboratory service providers; built and renovated counselling and testing, laboratory, and treatment space; built community capacity to provide home-base and palliative care; procured and donated life-saving drugs; and developed patient and activity tracking systems.

128. As the numbers of facilities and qualified supportive personnel within the government system increased, so did the targeted and actual numbers of WFP beneficiaries receiving ART and DOT. The extraordinary change in the HIV and TB operating environment in Haiti resulted in the CO increasing the geographic coverage of activities from four regions under

⁷⁷ School Feeding – Background on new directions, WFP School Feeding Unit, Policy & Strategy Division, 23 March 2010.

⁷⁸ <http://www.pepfar.gov/about/c24880.htm> and <http://portfolio.theglobalfund.org/Country/Index/HTI>. Downloaded 16 June 2011.

the country programme 10217 to all ten regions under PRRO 10382 and increasing the numbers of beneficiaries from 32,000 in 2005 to nearly 92,000 in 2010. Within these regions the beneficiaries have been targeted through health facilities providing ART.

129. Under all operations, WFP Haiti's main partnerships have been with institutions managing medical facilities. These strategic partnerships make good sense operationally, allowing WFP to efficiently and effectively target HIV and TB patients. While community programmes such as home-based care or orphan care projects would bring much larger numbers of beneficiaries and target the heart of malnutrition, identifying and contracting with and distributing the food to thousands of CBOs would be logistically challenging. Through WFP's targeted investments in their strategic local partners, such as paying for NGO staff monitoring agents, the partners themselves and the WFP sub-office staff felt that the number and quality of reports has increased. These facilities now have improved physical infrastructure and monitoring systems in place to more readily respond in time of crisis, increasing their ability to deliver food. This is an important benefit in Haiti where recurrent shocks disrupt recovery and development activities.

130. Standards of care were being developed on the international front during the evaluation period. In 2006, the WHO published ART guidelines, which were subsequently updated in 2010. According to UNAIDS calculations, the updated guidelines increased the estimated number of people who were eligible for ART in Haiti from 43,000 to 60,000 people in 2010. In 2007, the CNLS updated their multi-sectorial HIV/AIDS strategic plan, which stated, "The National Strategic Plan 2007 – 2012 emerges during a promising period of a return to political stability. It is a continuation of the national Strategic Plan 2002 – 2006, is multi-sectorial in terms of its application and is focused on the sustainability of key programme activities."⁷⁹ The CO did not change their HIV or TB approaches in response to either publication.

Food Security, Agriculture, and Rural Development

131. While WFP is a strong partner in the generation of food security information, this information is not necessarily used at an operational level for CFW and FFW activity planning. In CFW and FFW activities, the decisions regarding programme implementation have been driven more by the capacity of local implementing partners and the availability of funding than by the needs as identified in the food security analysis. Some of the most food insecure areas of Haiti are also the areas that are hardest to reach and have the fewest implementing partners. Likewise, WFP's funding situation has changed so drastically in the last year that the sub-offices were doing very little targeting—the CO was entering into agreements and funding many more CFW and FFW programmes than it would have in prior years based on pressure from the international community to push out donor contributions and get resources into the community. In this emergency environment, strategic decisions about whether implementing partners had the appropriate capacity were not always possible. In the post emergency environment, discussions with the sub-offices revealed that decisions regarding revised (reduced) targets for 2011 are based more on anticipated funding levels than beneficiary needs.

132. In implementing CFW/FFW programmes, WFP has not always been able to target the beneficiary groups that are the most food insecure because of the limited implementing partners in food insecure areas and a declining cost benefit ratio inherent in reaching remote areas. The increased cost of working in hard-to-access areas means that fewer beneficiaries may be reached. In addition, since the establishment of the government-led *comité de validation* in 2010, political tensions among government decision makers may also pose challenges to WFP's geographic targeting. For example, lack of expertise or disagreements about the role of the *comité de validation* may prevent CFW/FFW programmes from being approved in certain regions or push programmes to groups that may not be the most

⁷⁹ PNLS. Mars 2007. *Plan Stratégique National Multisectoriel 2007–2011*. Port-au-Prince, Haïti: Gouvernement de la République, d'Haïti.

vulnerable. Specifically in the Nord and Nord-Est departments, there are very few WFP CFW/FFW activities because of these tensions.

133. In the period of performance before March 2010, WFP’s FFW rations were intended to provide a household food supplement equivalent to approximately 75-80 percent of market wage. However, with the new government directives last year, a nationwide standard of 200 gourd/day for workers⁸⁰ was established. For WFP, this has meant that they have had to adjust food basket changes with food valuation changes (i.e. market prices), which can be quite volatile. Adjusting rations to a constantly fluctuating national and regional market value while taking into consideration commodities that will not compete with local production has proven to be a complicated and cumbersome process, especially if the adjustment calls for a reduction. Recognizing these difficulties, WFP has managed to limit the number of adjustments made to the food basket; however, in 2010, there were already 2 adjustments that had to be made since March.

2.3. Portfolio Performance and Results

134. In this section, the evaluation team aims to evaluate WFP’s performance in relation to the beneficiaries and assistance provided, objectives attained, and the contribution to national humanitarian/development changes where possible with particular attention paid to the logistics concerns and other factors that contributed to portfolio performance.

TABLE 7: ALIGNMENT OF STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES TO WFP HAITI ACTIVITIES AND EVALUATION SECTORS

	Focus	Major Activities	Relevant Sectors
SO1	Emergency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ GFD ■ Emergency School Feeding ■ Blanket Supplementary Feeding ■ Logistics Support 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Emergency preparedness/disaster response ■ Education ■ Nutrition
SO2	Prevention, preparedness, and mitigation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Logistics Support ■ Analytical Work ■ CFW/FFW 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Emergency preparedness/disaster response ■ Food security, agriculture, rural development
SO3	Post-crisis situations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ School Feeding ■ Targeted Supplementary Feeding ■ CFW/FFW 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Education ■ Nutrition ■ Food security, agriculture, rural development
SO4	Chronic hunger and undernutrition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Targeted Food Distribution ■ Nutrition ■ HIV/TB 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Nutrition ■ HIV/TB
SO5	Capacity development	Cross-cutting across activities and sectors	

135. Consistent with the analysis in the rest of the evaluation report, the evaluation team has organized its findings by sector, with a special section dedicated to emergency preparedness and response, which primarily encompasses the emergency operations, special operations, and other logistics arrangements. In these sectors are aligned with the WFP 2008 – 2013 Strategic Plan framework and WFP Haiti major activities. This matrix organizes WFP’s activities in Haiti by the greater strategic objectives to which they primarily contribute. However, the walls between the SOs are fluid and many activities may at times contribute to other objectives, especially in case of emergency. Strategic Objective 5, capacity development, is a crosscutting objective with many notable successes across sectors including local purchase initiatives, nutrition-based safety nets, and capacity development of local institutions such as CNSA, PNCS, and Centre National Geographique de Haiti. Certainly, more can be done towards this objective, especially in the field of emergency preparedness, as disaster response is likely to be an ongoing need in Haiti. The better equipped the

⁸⁰ Ibid.

Government of Haiti is to respond to these inevitable disasters, the less dependent Haiti will have to be on WFP and foreign assistance in the future. Additional information regarding alignment with these SOs and partnerships with government partners can be found in Chapter 2.1.

136. The CPE was confronted with major constraints hampering the assessment of the portfolio performance and results: an overall lack of reliable data and statistics in the country, the loss of certain archives during the earthquake, a weak M&E system in WFP CO, and significant staff turn-over resulting in a limited institutional memory.

Emergency Preparedness and Disaster Response

137. Given the history of natural disasters in Haiti since 2005 combined with the country's cyclonic frequency, seismic risk, and geographic conditions that make it vulnerable to flooding, WFP's role in risk reduction and disaster response has been and will likely continue to be the agency's most important contribution to the country's portfolio.

138. In analyzing WFP's role in emergency preparedness, it is useful to use the *Disaster Risk = (Hazard x Vulnerability) / Response Capacity* framework⁸¹. As the potential for a damaging physical event or phenomenon is high in Haiti, WFP's ability to contribute to disaster risk reduction lies in the other components of the equation:

- **Vulnerability** – Decreasing the population's vulnerability by increasing household capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impact of a hazard.
- **Response capacity** – Building the capacity—within the organization itself and its partners—to provide assistance or other interventions during or immediately after a disaster to meet the life preservation and basic subsistence needs of those people affected.

139. These are key pillars of WFP's corporate objectives and areas of core competency for the organization.


Beneficiaries and Assistance Provided

140. The Haiti CPE was dominated by the emergency response in 2008 as a result of hurricanes and the high food price crisis and the 2010 response to the hurricane in 2010. As shown in Figure 8, the number of beneficiaries reached during these two crucial times in Haiti was extraordinary and unprecedented.

141. In response to these emergencies, WFP initiated large-scale GFD operations, a core competency of WFP where it is able to perform at its best. This was definitely the case at the beginning of 2010, for example, and then again in October 2010 with the distribution of some 12,000 MT extra dry food rations to children already identified and

enrolled in the regular school feeding programme. Despite suffering many organizational losses and the massive destruction to the logistics infrastructure after the earthquake, the CO

FIGURE 8: PLANNED VS. ACTUAL BENEFICIARIES, 2005 - 2010



⁸¹ IASC 2007.

was able to mobilize an unprecedented amount of resources quickly and distribute them to beneficiaries where the assistance was needed most.


Attaining Objectives

142. In terms of emergency response, the objectives of the EMOPs are in line with WFP Strategic Objective 1, specifically to: save lives in emergencies by improved food consumption for the emergency affected households, and protect livelihoods and enhance self-reliance in the emergency and early recovery phases. The expected outcomes therefore include adequate food consumption of affected populations over the assistance period, with special attention to school children, pregnant and lactating mothers, and other nutritionally vulnerable groups.

143. Given that EMOP 200110 dominated an overwhelming percentage of the portfolio, the evaluation team focuses on this operation as a case study to analyse how well WFP achieved its objectives in terms of emergency response and where there may have been challenges.

144. Figure 9 illustrates for EMOP 200110 the variances that appear between the overall programming objectives as set out in the programme document/budget revision and monthly planning on the one hand and the results achieved on the ground on the other hand. Provisions were made in the EMOP 200110 programme document/budget revision documents to distribute more than 229,000 MT of food aid in 2010, but by year-end, only 57 percent (131,581 MT) was actually distributed to the beneficiaries, indicating that the CO was not able to fully realize the outcomes planned under this operation.

FIGURE 9: EMOP 200110 - PLANNED VS. ACTUAL FOOD AID DISTRIBUTION



Source: WFP Haiti Project Documents

145. While the volumes of food commodities distributed by the logistics department match perfectly the monthly planning figures issued by the programme department, a serious drift appears during the second half of the year when, save for the month of October, the volumes delivered represented only 1/3 of the programme figures put forward in the programme document and budget revision 2 (BR2). The exact reasons for not achieving the targets as set out in BR2 of EMOP 20110 between July and December 2010 are not immediately apparent and could be many. Based on the evaluation team's findings, shortages of food commodities could not be the reason for the shortfall, as stocks of food-aid in the ports and WFP warehouses were largely sufficient to meet the tonnage objectives. There are also no indications that the various assessments and analyses on nutrition and food security by the WFP Program or VAM sections were misleading or flawed.

146. A tilting moment seems to be reached when an operation shifts from GFDs to more highly focused and finely tuned targeted food distributions. The sheer number of field level agreement to be entered into with implementing partners⁸², often for a very short period of time, the multiplicity of sites where food-aid must be served, often with very small

⁸² On 15/09/2010 309 field-level agreements were on record (261 approved, 20 pending approval, 13 drafts and 13 on hold).

quantities, the processing of thousands of requests for transport, the volume of entries in the WFP Logistics Programme “COMPAS” system which runs in the thousands per month⁸³, the follow up of the implementing partners’ monthly reports, the monitoring of the operations in the field, the many controls built into the system before payments for services provided can be carried out, the launching of CFW and FFW programmes suggesting a totally different working environment, are many features which in combination come to strain the system⁸⁴. Attempts to overcome the difficulties with extra staff and/or overtime often fail to yield lasting results. Not the dedication or the motivation of the staff is being put in question and certainly not their expertise. Some possible factors explaining results are analysed later in this chapter but further study and analysis are required in order to verify the possible existence of systemic faults or bottlenecks when operations are shifted into lower gear.

Contribution to National Humanitarian/Development Changes

147. The severity of the humanitarian impact of the 2008 and 2010 disasters on Haiti is explored in detail in Chapter 1. WFP’s response to these disasters was immediate and substantial, reaching more than 3 million beneficiaries in 2008 and over 4 million in 2010. WFP’s extraordinary disaster preparedness efforts—namely its national and regional logistics capabilities, pre-positioning efforts, and extensive partnership network—enabled the organization to quickly respond to the worst earthquake in the region in more than 200 years.

148. Evaluating its own services, an extensive Logistics Cluster 2010 Emergency Preparedness survey was conducted in order to measure the effectiveness of the Logistics Cluster response to the 2010 cyclonic season. Using these findings, the Logistics Cluster has drafted an extremely comprehensive Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan in anticipation of the 2011 hurricane season. This programme highlights the interdependency of all the civil, military and UN agencies when preparedness and response in the face of an emergency are at stake. The plan addressed the many issues that are, when disaster strikes, too often overlooked.

149. The entire “Emergency Preparedness and Response” planning hinges on the expertise accumulated inside the Logistics Cluster since its inception in 2008. The cluster has developed open and privileged communication channels with the DPC, Ministry of Health, MINUSTAH and military actors, and OCHA; it is the driving force behind the Emergency Preparedness and Response Working group and all the Interagency Coordination Mechanism. If it is decided to suspend the SO 200108 at the end of 2011 a skeleton staff should be retained and incorporated into the PRRO 10844 with the task to keep abreast of the logistic information and its distribution to all interested third parties, the up-dating of the contingency plan and the Logistics Capacity Assessment document. These activities are integral to humanitarian community’s ability to respond to emergencies in Haiti.

150. Additionally, the Geographic Information System has not only published a wide array of useful country maps ranging from road conditions, cholera maps, detailed location of schools enlisted in the school feeding programme, warehousing facilities. These maps, which prove extremely useful, are continuously updated. The Geographic Information Systems has also entered into an agreement with the *Centre National Geographique de Haïti*, which provides for continuous training facilities for 5 Haitian trainees. This represents one tangible example of capacity development the mission came across. The relationship with the *Centre National Geographique de Haïti* should be upheld. In this respect, the possibility to sign on an officer expert in disaster prevention and mitigation should be explored.

⁸³ EMOP 200110 – 55,000 entries in COMPAS for the deliveries alone. (Average quantity per COMPAS entry 2.4 MT).

⁸⁴ A similar phenomenon has occurred during EMOP 200170 in Niger. The degree of implementation of the programme was 56 percent. Tonnage delivered dropped substantially below the project document objectives once the operation shifted from a GFD mode to a fine-tuned targeted food distribution mode.


Education

151. According to UNDP's Human Development Indicators, the number of years of schooling that a child can expect to receive in Haiti is 6.8⁸⁵ years, and the adult literacy rate is currently at 65 percent. As explained in Chapter 1, education for all as the basis of equal opportunity and long-term poverty reduction is one of the Government of Haiti's priorities.

Beneficiaries and Assistance Provided

152. At output level, it is possible to diachronically compare the initial planned number of beneficiaries according to the successive project documents with the actual number of beneficiaries reached during the whole period under evaluation as shown in Figure 10. Such a comparison highlights longitudinal trends and reflects the strategic choices made by the

FIGURE 10: PLANNED VS. ACTUAL SCHOOL FEEDING BENEFICIARIES, 2005 - 2010



Source: WFP Haiti CP

CO to respond to emergency situations. It also shows the great capacity of the CO to react to crisis and disasters, be they economic or natural.

Attaining Objectives

153. Depending on the type of operation, the objectives of each education intervention varied from education-oriented to humanitarian-oriented objectives, making it difficult to assess the portfolio's attainment of objectives over time.

- **Education objectives** – CP 10217: “to help achieve the principal goal of the National Programme for Basic Education, i.e. to improve the quality of education in Haiti”; PRRO 10674: “Support access to basic education by school-aged children and adults”; PRRO 10844: “Stabilize children’s participation in education”
- **Nutrition objectives** – EMOP 10781: “Adequate food consumption of affected populations with special attention to school children in areas not covered by the current PRRO”
- **Humanitarian objectives** – EMOP 200110: “to facilitate early recovery as quickly as possible”

154. Performance indicators linked to these objectives have not been systematically collected and/or compiled during the CPE period. This is due to diverse factors including delays and weaknesses of reports transmitted by implementing partners. In the absence of time series data, with control groups, plus the lack of regularly updated official data at

⁸⁵ <http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/HTI.html>.

national and departmental levels against which one can compare existing even partial results, the achievement of most of the objectives cannot be assessed conclusively.

155. For the same reason, some questions remain unanswered, notably about activities or operation modalities that were planned and duly implemented under the CP and successor PRRO and stopped without having been previously evaluated: provision of a snack to children in WFP assisted schools in addition to the daily hot meal, distribution of take-home rations to women attending literacy courses, for example.

Contribution to National Humanitarian/Development Changes

156. Following two budget revisions, the CO requested an additional budget revision to extend the EMOP 200110 from 1 January to 31 March 2011 and allow a transition to a planned budget revision to the PRRO 10844 which will run from 1 April 2011 to 31 December 2012. Although the CO estimates that this budget revision “does not propose any major strategic shifts in activities from what has been previously approved under the EMOP and the two previous budget revisions”, it nevertheless implies an effective shift with regard to long-term strategic perspectives. Moreover, it illustrates a major challenge faced by WFP Haiti during the whole CPE period: to combine long-term strategic choices with short-term humanitarian requirements. Such conflict underlines some possible confusion of humanitarian aid and development assistance that can occur in countries affected by chronically recurrent shocks like Haiti.

157. Throughout the CPE period the CO has sustained a remarkable effort in the area of government capacity development, specifically through interventions with PNCS such as workshops, consultancies, contributions to the elaboration of national school feeding plans of action, and school feeding concept notes. During the period of evaluation, there were several factors which positively impacted these efforts towards sustainability, namely:

- The endorsement of the WFP School Feeding Policy (2009), which put great emphasis on government capacity development, local purchases (in close cooperation with the Ministry of Agriculture), and sustainability (SO5) in view of handover.
- Additional resources and attention on Haiti after the earthquake literally “boosted” this activity: during her seven-months assignment in Haiti in 2010, a senior staff member from WFP Rome did very impressive work in this area and is one of the 4 authors of the WFP/World Bank publication “Rethinking School Feeding” which contributed to establish the basis for the School Feeding Policy. While in Haiti, this research was customized for the Haitian context and presented under the title “Rethinking School Feeding in Haiti”.

158. National statistics are a major problem in Haiti, notably in the education sector. Significantly, lines related to Haiti in tables on school population from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics are empty. During the last 15 years, there have been only two official education censuses in the country, one for the 1996 – 1997 school year and the latest for the 2002 – 2003 school year. In 2002 – 2003 there were 390,618 children enrolled in public schools and 1,716,187 in private schools i.e. a total of 2,106,805 school children. In order to provide an order of the proportion of school children reached through WFP supplementary feeding programmes, as compared to all children enrolled in schools, the number of actual beneficiaries of WFP supplementary feeding operations during the period 2005 – 2010 increased from 203,390 (CP 10217 in January 2005) to 993,600 (EMOP 200110 in December 2010). Similarly, according to an estimate by the World Bank, there were 375,853 out-of-school children in the country in 2002 – 2003. Although there is no indication about their updated total number seven years later, under EMOP 200110 WFP reached 139,954 out-of-school children in one department (Ouest) out of the ten that compound the whole country.

159. At the time of the CPE mission, the Ministry of Education did not know the actual number of schools throughout the country. The MENFP has launched an exercise to collect

data on the numbers of schools and school-going children whose results should be used to inform the successor WFP school feeding programme.

Nutrition

160. Based on Demographic and Health Survey and Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transition survey data, chronic malnutrition has been increasing in Haiti over the period of evaluation. However, severe acute malnutrition appears to be concentrated in a few areas of the country, mainly those heavily hit by natural disasters and others of which are remote and have poor access to services. MCHN activities, whether curative or preventive, are therefore relevant.


Beneficiaries and Assistance Provided

161. Between 2005 and 2010 MCHN programmes have been implemented under 6 operations (CP, PRRO 10382, PRRO 10674, PRRO 108440, EMOP 10781 and EMOP 200110). In TSF, the screening criteria have changed across operations. For PNW, criteria were anemia (PRRO 10382) and Mid-Upper Arm Circumference (MUAC) ≤ 22 cm (PRRO 10674). For malnourished children, weight-for-age, was used in all operations until 2010. After adoption of the national protocol in May 2010, the weight-for-age criterion was gradually replaced by MUAC. For PNW, the MUAC threshold was changed to < 21 cm in accordance with the national protocol.

162. The total number of planned MCHN beneficiaries increased from 90,542 in 2005 (CP and PRRO 10382) to 719,000 (EMOP 200110), an eight-fold increase. However, the proportion of planned beneficiaries actually reached varied greatly, over 100 percent in 2006 and 2007 but less than one third in 2009 and less than 50 percent in 2010 (Figure 11).

163. In 2009, the targeted number of supplementary feeding beneficiaries in Gonaives was not reached as activities through dispensaries and health centres took more time to set up, as some health partners had not recovered from the damages of the floods. Most women and children under five were reached through “*cantines populaires*” in Gonaives, which included wet feeding⁸⁶.

FIGURE 11: PLANNED VS. ACTUAL MCHN BENEFICIARIES, 2005 - 2010



Source: WFP Haiti Project SPRs

164. As shown in Table 8, various changes were made in the planned ration composition, size, and nutritive values between operations. There is lack of consistency in ration design, as during the same year, a ration consisting of five commodities, namely cereals, pulses, Corn-Soya Blend (CSB), vegetable oil and iodized salt was planned under PRRO 10674 (January 2008 – December 2009), and another consisting of CSB, vegetable oil and sugar was planned under EMOP 10781 (September 2008 – May 2009).

⁸⁶ SPR 2009 for EMOP 10781.

TABLE 8: MCHN INDIVIDUAL RATION COMPOSITION, SIZE, AND NUTRITIVE VALUE BETWEEN 2005 AND 2010

		CP	PRRO 10382	PRRO 10674	PRRO 10844	EMOP 10781	EMOP 200110	
							Blanket	Targeted
Commodities	Cereals (g)	89		50				
	Pulses (g)	19	20	50				
	CSB (g)		125	100	200	200		
	Vegetable oil (g)	14	15	25	20	20		
	Sugar (g)				15	15		
	Iodized salt (g)		5	5				
	Supplementary Plumpy™ (g)							92
	Plumpy Doz® (g)						46.3	
	Number of Commodities	4	4	5	3	3	1	1
Nutritive Value ⁸⁷	Energy value (Kcal)	499	700	1064	1037	1037	247	500
	Protein (g)	12.7	26.5	37.5	36.0	36.0	5.9	12.5
	Iron (mg)	44	17.7	21.5	25.7	25.7	9	10.6
	Vitamin A (µg)	32	762	852	1183	1183	400	840

Source: WFP Project Documents

165. While changes to ration composition were generally made in accordance with WFP internal guidance and national protocols as explained in Chapter 2.2, a changing commodity makeup creates challenges to distribution and monitoring at all levels. It is important to note that United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), WFP Guidelines for Selective Feeding recommend that a take-home (or dry) ration should provide from 1,000 to 1,200 kcal per person per day to account for sharing; so while the ration is described as “individual”, the amounts proposed often take into account possible sharing.

166. In EMOP 200110, RUSF, such as Supplementary Plumpy™ and Plumpy Doz® were distributed. These products are being increasingly used worldwide but are the subject of several operational research projects that are regularly discussed in WHO, UNICEF, WFP and UNHCR consultations on the dietary management of moderate malnutrition⁸⁸. While the amounts provided are in line with current WFP and the manufacturer’s recommendations⁸⁹, interviewed implementing partners (MSPP staff as well as NGOs) expressed concern about the small size of the ration in light of the deeply rooted food sharing tradition in Haiti.

167. In practice, food rations were delivered with periodic adjustments (for example rice and pulses in substitution to CSB), to keep rations as balanced as possible because of commodity pipeline breaks⁹⁰. Frequent pipeline breaks were also documented by the evaluation mission for PRRO 10382 in 2006⁹¹, and reported by implementing partners interviewed by the CPE evaluation mission.

168. Another point regarding rations that came up repeatedly during the course of the evaluation is related to utilization. The beneficiaries interviewed in all sectors were universally dissatisfied with the make-up of the ration, specifically the small peas because they were too hard to cook. There were also some complaints about the distribution of high

⁸⁷ For all rations (except the RUSF), nutritive value was calculated using WFP/UNHCR. NutVal. Rome, WFP 2008. <http://www.nutval.net/> or <http://www.nutval.net/2008/05/download-page.html>. For RUSF, the nutritive value is taken from WFP information sheets.

⁸⁸ http://www.who.int/nutrition/topics/moderatemalnutrition_followup_meeting_mm1_report.pdf.

⁸⁹ <http://www.nutriset.fr/en/product-range/produit-par-produit/plumpydoz.html>.

⁹⁰ SPR 2006 and 2007 for PRRO 10382; and SPR 2008 for PRRO 10674.

⁹¹ WFP 2007 PRRO 10382 Full Evaluation Report

energy biscuit (HEB) after the earthquake because beneficiaries assumed they were nutritionally equivalent to a cookie. This dissatisfaction surrounding the types of food could possibly be ameliorated with clear educational campaigns regarding appropriate use and nutritional benefits of commodities with simple educational messages accompanying the distributions with easy-to-use graphic explanations of recipe ideas and nutritional benefits to families. Staff and partners charged with food distribution should be trained on how to communicate these messages to beneficiaries to ensure appropriate utilization of food resources.

Attaining Objectives

169. Various outcomes and indicators were proposed in the relevant logical framework matrices of the operations under review. However until 2010 the data registrations and reporting forms have remained unchanged, focusing on three outcome indicators: recovery, defaulter and death rates among beneficiary children, as recommended in the joint UNHCR/WFP Guidelines for Selective Feeding guidelines. Recovery rate among children has been systematically included in all SPRs for all operations, which allows for a comparison of performance across operations from 2005 – 2010. As can be seen in Figure 12, the recovery rate was barely above the 50 percent alarming threshold in 2005 and 2006 but improved gradually, while remaining below the desirable level of 70 percent.

170. Figures for 2010 have not been included in this graph, as a new M&E system was initiated by the Nutrition Unit of the WFP CO. This M&E system is in line with the joint UNHCR/WFP guidelines as well as with the outcome indicators recommended in the national nutrition protocol, namely: recovery, defaulter, and death rates as outlined in Table 9. The new system is being gradually introduced in WFP-assisted health facilities. As of end 2010, the new system has been applied in Leogane and Port-au-Prince where implementing partners have been trained by WFP on the new national nutrition protocol. According to these data, the recovery rates are well above the “acceptable” cut-off point of 70 percent, reaching 78.4 percent and 90.9 percent in Leogane and Port-au-Prince respectively. However, in Leogane the defaulter rate (14.8 percent) is just below the acceptable level of 15 percent, while the death rate (5.5 percent) exceeds the 3 percent acceptable threshold. These results should be interpreted with caution as they are based on a limited number of reports. In fact, the rate of report submission from implementing partners was 34 percent for Port-au-Prince and 53 percent for Leogane.

FIGURE 12: SUPPLEMENTARY FEEDING RECOVERY RATE



Source: WFP Haiti Project SPRs

171. In summary, a comprehensive presentation and discussion of nutrition-related outcomes in the portfolio is not possible, either because the indicators proposed in the logical framework matrix were not feasible (such as anemia), or they were feasible but the data collection forms and the M&E template followed by the M&E unit were not modified to reflect changes in indicators proposed in the respective new operations. For instance, in the CP and subsequent PRRO 10382, objectives were quantified; for example:

TABLE 9: INDICATORS FOR ASSESSING THE EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF SUPPLEMENTARY FEEDING PROGRAMS

Indicators	Acceptable	Alarming
Recovery rate	> 70%	< 50%
Death rate	< 3%	> 10%
Defaulting rate	< 15%	> 30%

“at least 65 percent of beneficiary PNW have gained weight and/or seen an improvement in their anemia”. Relevant indicators were proposed, namely: a) percent and number of PNW who have gained weight; and b) percent and number of PNW whose anemia has improved. A relevant indicator was included in the reporting form but no information on anemia could be collected due to insufficient instruments in the health facilities.

172. On the other hand, in PRRO 10674 outcomes indicators were streamlined and clearly defined in the logical framework matrix. For children recovery and drop-out rates were retained, while for PNW, two indicators were proposed, namely: a) the number of pregnant women with a positive weight gain of 1 kg/month as a percentage of number enrolled; and b) percentage of women whose MUAC at the end of the supplementation cycle is > 22 cm. However in the end of cycle report prepared by the M&E unit, only data on recovery and drop-out rates for children were monitored and compiled. No data on the outcome indicators for PNW were collected.

173. In PRRO 10844, “improved nutrition status of targeted women, girls and boys through supplementary feeding” was to be assessed on the basis of a single outcome indicator the “Prevalence of underweight among targeted children 6-59 months below 10 percent”, leaving PNW out of the proposed performance indicators. But as stated earlier, this operation was interrupted after the earthquake.

174. Finally, for EMOPs 10781 and 200110, the “household food diversity and frequency score” known as Food Consumption Score was retained as the outcome indicator in the logical framework matrix. This widely recommended indicator, which is to be collected through annual household surveys, is among WFP’s corporate performance indicators⁹². It is intended as a proxy of household access to food as well as intake of energy and micronutrients. However, no information has been collected on this indicator.

Contribution to National Humanitarian/Development Changes

175. Various outcomes and relevant indicators were proposed in the relevant logical framework matrices, however the data registrations and reporting forms have remained unchanged throughout the operations, focusing on the recovery, defaulter and death rates among beneficiary children. The recovery rate has improved between 2005 and 2009, but remains below the acceptable level of 70 percent as shown in Figure 12.

HIV/AIDS and TB


176. Since 2005, the estimated need for HIV and TB treatment in Haiti has remained relatively constant at approximately 70,000 potential patients. The actual numbers of ART and DOT patients, however, has tripled from just over ten thousand to greater than 30 thousand people. The HIV epidemic in Haiti is one of the government priorities as listed in its PRSP. TB has re-emerged together with HIV, because the two pathologies are linked: 32 percent of HIV/AIDS patients are also infected with TB⁹³.

Beneficiaries and Assistance Provided

177. Between 2005 and 2010, HIV and TB activities were planned for under CP 10217, PRRO 10382, PRRO 10674, EMOP 10781, EMOP 200110, and PRRO 10844. However, under EMOP 10781 and PRRO 10844, no HIV and TB activities were reported.

178. Other than in 2005 under the CP where HIV and TB activities were focused in Nord, Nord-Est and Ouest

FIGURE 13: PLANNED VS. ACTUAL HIV/TB BENEFICIARIES, 2005 - 2010



Source: WFP Haiti Project SPRs

⁹² WFP The Strategic Results Framework.

⁹³ <http://www.wfp.org/countries/Haiti/Overview>.

Regions, HIV and TB activities were planned to cover the entire nation. There were no data available to confirm the type or depth of activities in each region. It is assumed that the majority of the work took place within health facilities as support to treatment patients.


179. The trend lines in Figure 13 represent the planned and actual direct and indirect ART and TB beneficiaries. These figures are more accurately interpreted as the “Number of rations distributed”. The numbers may also be misleading since the actual indirect beneficiaries are unknown. A third constraint to these numbers is that from 2005 to 2007 WFP staff and partner organizations stated that they did not provide reports to WFP so data may over or under represent the actual number of people WFP assisted. Data were collected and recorded for those who fell under the health interventions. In addition, there was data for one prevention activity that took place in 2007 that was reported in the SPR but these numbers are not included.

180. In 2005, the government estimated approximately 8,800 people were under ART in the country. Presumably in response to greater need for ART coverage, WFP planned to distribute food to the families of 12,000 patients as shown in Figure 14. In 2008, the Government of Haiti requested a greater role for WFP food in ART programmes in response to the government’s goal to put 35,000 people on ART by 2012. WFP responded to the government’s expressed desire for more food assistance to HIV and TB clinical patients with a considerable increase in planned beneficiaries.

181. WFP staff stated they had not been using monitoring data or assessment data for planning or evaluating progress under stable or emergency situations. This is reinforced by looking at the total number of HIV and TB patients existing in the country for the selected years. WFP was supporting over 100 percent of the patients plus their family members who were on treatment for HIV and TB.

182. Had WFP observed this trend, adjustments to target numbers would have been made especially considering that WFP only supports new cases for six to 12 months. In 2009, UNAIDS estimated 7,600 new cases of HIV. Hypothetically speaking one-third might need treatment. Add those 2,300 antiretroviral patients to the 2,000 people in 2009 under TB treatment⁹⁴ and one finds that only 4,300 people would need HIV/TB nutritional support if all of the new cases were malnourished whereas over 30,000 patients were planned for.

FIGURE 14: WFP HIV/TB PLANNED BENEFICIARIES VS. NATIONAL HIV/TB RATES, 2005 - 2009



Source: Haiti PLNS

183. The content of each ration remained relatively constant throughout the period under evaluation. Each ration contained cereals, pulses, CSB (except the CP), oil, and salt in varying quantities during different operations. In other aspects, notably the number of rations allotted per household, the quantity of commodities and the duration of the services, variations were significant as shown in Table 10.

⁹⁴ WHO. 2010. Global Tuberculosis Control: WHO Report 2010. Geneva, Switzerland: WHO.

TABLE 10: HIV/TB RATION STANDARDS ACROSS OPERATIONS

Operation	# of Rations	Months of Rations ART	Months of Rations DOT	Kg / Beneficiary / Distribution	Total Kg / Beneficiary / Year
CP 10217	5	9	9	0.15	6.89
PRRO 10382	3	12	12	0.35	12.60
PRRO 10674	1	6	8	0.23	1.38
EMOP 10781	5	3	3	0.62	9.23
EMOP 200110	5	8	8	0.62	24.60
PRRO 10844	5	6	6	0.62	18.45

Source: WFP Project Documents

184. There is no international standard for ration size or composition, especially as WFP uses it to entice new patients to treatment or improve the metabolism of drugs. There are some nutritional criteria patients must meet but the rationale for a family ration under the auspices of HIV programming contradicts the current trends for nutrition projects on directed and therapeutic feeding given that the majority of HIV activities' objectives were to improve nutritional status.

Attaining Objectives

185. Depending on the operation, HIV and TB activities fell under different operations' objectives:

- CP 10217: Nutrition and health support to vulnerable groups
- PRRO 10382: Increased ability to manage shocks, secure livelihoods and meet necessary food needs
- PRRO 10674: Contribute to improve nutrition and the state of health of children, pregnant and lactating women and HIV-positive and TB-affected people
- EMOP 200110: Save lives in emergencies by improved food consumption for the emergency affected households

186. In each of these operations, WFP implementing partners stated the objective of the WFP HIV/TB activity was to improve adherence rates to ART and DOT by increasing the numbers of people maintaining treatment regimens over time and decreasing the side effects of therapy due to a lack of food through improved nutritional status.

187. Beneficiaries and their family members interviewed appreciated the food and some felt they would be unable to cope with the strain of supporting a sick person were it not for the food. But interviewees stated that they did not feel that they started or were more adherent to treatment because of the food. They had seen cases where people stopped taking medications after feeling better and forewent the food supplements, implying that food did not act as an incentive for treatment. Supporting this claim, under EMOP 200110, the ART adherence rate for 2010 was 88 percent at both the beginning and the end of the year. Outside of this one indicator, reported on for one year, outcomes were not measured as planned for in the project documents.

188. HIV interventions as they are currently implemented are appreciated by beneficiaries and health facility staff but they may not be relevant to the stated objectives in their current form. Addressing HIV in the context of malnutrition, social safety nets, and education make more sense than targeting beneficiaries because of an illness they possess. This approach requires a heightened awareness of all project staff and partners that HIV and TB are not activities relegated to health care providers but as being promoted by the government of Haiti, cross-cutting concerns for all technical sectors.

189. Other than these most basic of data, other information used to determine effectiveness and efficiency were not available from the CO. Nutritional status reported on in some cases

using Body Mass Index. CD4 counts were collected and reported to WFP. Graduation rates were also reported on but unavailable for the evaluators. Due to the lack of data, nutritional and health supports were certainly occurring but the degree to which improvements in health status took place cannot be assessed.

Contribution to National Humanitarian/Development Changes

190. Qualitative data support the conclusion that WFP’s interventions have been successful in reducing the pressures of disease on household food security by providing family rations to HIV and TB patients through treatment centres. However, weak government leadership and low WFP engagement to effectively plan and communicate were prohibiting factors to achieving results and measuring performance from involvement in the national arena to measuring adherence. The lack of high quality data upon which informed decisions can be made is also a prohibitive factor to determining WFP’s contributions towards national progress. The available quantitative data only show that the strong emphasis that WFP places on moving food allowed food to arrive in a timely manner more often than not. Beneficiaries and implementing partners found stock outs problematic but not overly burdensome.

Food Security, Agriculture, and Rural Development


Beneficiaries and Assistance Provided

191. FFT, FFW, CFW, or a combination of CFFW are grouped together for purposes of this evaluation and described as FFW/CFW as activities that are most directly associated with livelihoods recovery in response to shock or as a means to improving chronic food security. Some combination of the above modalities was identified as a planned activity in all food aid operations in the evaluation period.

192. As shown in Figure 15, there were considerable differences between the planned and actual number of beneficiaries throughout the period of performance, with actual beneficiaries ranging between 52 percent and 260 percent of planned beneficiaries.

193. Based on the feedback received during the evaluation mission, this discrepancy is primarily due to the programme’s reliance on implementing partners. In FFW and CFW programming in Haiti, there is a seemingly unlimited number of applications from potential implementing partners that are interested in working with WFP. The capacity of these partners to implement appropriate activities, WFP’s capacity to manage these partners, and the CO’s ability to mobilize the resources to fund these activities are the primary drivers of decisions regarding implementation. WFP partners with many local NGOs which may have little experience with WFP, which leads to long start-up times required to bring partners up to speed on distributions and monitoring and evaluation.

FIGURE 15: PLANNED VS. ACTUAL FFW/CFW BENEFICIARIES, 2005 - 2010



Source: WFP Project Documents

194. Additionally, the combined impact of the outbreak of cholera, hurricane Tomas, and civil unrest in December slowed down all activities from mid-October onwards.

195. Similarly, actual geographic outreach was driven more by the availability of implementing partners in a given area rather than the operation's stated targeting objective. While programme documents expressed an emphasis given to high chronic malnutrition or food insecure areas, the majority of FFW and CFW activities have been implemented in areas where strong partners exist. Some WFP staff noted that they were constrained by the number of potential partners and WFP's ability to conduct necessary reviews in hard to reach rural areas, which tend to also have the highest levels of food insecurity (such as the Nord-Ouest).

196. The composition of rations and duration of work changed over the period of evaluation, seemingly less because of identified need, and more because of resource availability. For example, one project document stated "because of the lack of resources, the family ration has been changed and reduced to a ration for only four persons.⁹⁵" During the period of evaluation, the mission heard repeatedly from beneficiaries that the assumptions for the family ration size were not realistic in the Haitian context given the strong tradition of food sharing in Haiti that was discussed earlier.

197. Additionally, the appropriate number of workdays per beneficiary varied from operation to operation and between project planning and implementation. Especially in urban areas, where the number of beneficiaries exceeded the amount of work available, CFW and FFW activities would rotate labourers every 12 days rather than the recommended 36 days in order to increase the number of beneficiaries reached according to implementing partners interviewed during the evaluation.

198. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the design of the FFW and CFW has changed dramatically over the last year in accordance with the new governmental standards established after the earthquake. While these changes have sometimes created challenges for WFP, there is at least now a government-led standard and consistency that is being implemented across activities in terms of rations, days worked, type of labour, etc.

199. One of the biggest challenges the CO faced in regards to the FFW and CFW modality in Haiti over the evaluation period was the introduction of the CFW programme in 2010 discussed earlier. Political and economic pressures led to implementation of CFW without a pilot and without clear operational guidelines. It was implemented on a large scale very quickly and in the rush to ramp up implementation, there was a point in the summer of 2010 where there existed two contradictory CFW operational guidelines for Haiti simultaneously.

200. For example, programmes involving cash under EMOP 200110 were challenged to distribute the US\$46 million that were earmarked in BR2 for cash distribution in the 6 month period from July – December 2010. At the end of December, this programme was funded at US\$30 million. By the end of January 2011, only US\$6 million had effectively been transferred to the beneficiaries. The lengthy selection process of suitable CFW programmes, the need to find implementing partners capable of leading CFW programmes, the search for partners who can simultaneously supply expertise, engineering equipment, and building material, and finally the selection of a reliable bank or financial institution capable of handling the physical distribution of the cash to hundreds of beneficiaries in often remote locations, are some of the many difficulties that must be overcome to bring CFW programmes to fruition⁹⁶.

201. While there was much appreciation for the use of this new modality by donor, partners, and beneficiaries, especially in urban areas, WFP activities were being implemented at a scale that quickly outgrew the existing systems creating challenges related to due diligence, monitoring, training, communication systems, and remuneration processes with implementing partners. The evaluation team heard of several instances of beneficiaries that had not been paid in over six months and related riots in some areas of the country. At the

⁹⁵ CP 10217 Project Document.

⁹⁶ WFP Haiti CFFW Donor progress report 02/03/2011 – Cash and FFW programme – Information update – February 2011.

time of evaluation, all partners had expressed great interest in continuing to partner with WFP and renewing their commitments in 2011—a tribute to the WFP’s reputation in Haiti.

Attaining Objectives

202. The primary measure of impact for FFW and CFW activities relates to the asset creation score. Within each operation, activities are usually framed as having dual objectives or providing immediate support to livelihoods through cash or food wages and longer-term impact on livelihoods through the building of community assets, often specifically related to watershed management and the restoration of agricultural land in Haiti.

203. These assets are measured through the CAS which is based on the number of assets within a defined set of categories which exist, which are functional, and which are accessible to at least half of the community. The CAS increases when new assets are created or when existing assets are rendered functional or accessible. In 2010, the average increase in CAS associated with current and completed CFFW activities was 0.989. A total of 106 community assets were created and another 70 were rehabilitated. Of 178 discrete activities, 115 involved the creation or rehabilitation of a single type community asset, while 28 were associated with 2 or more asset categories. There were 35 activities that did not directly involve asset creation or rehabilitation⁹⁷, primarily related to activities such as urban debris removal post earthquake.

204. However, the question of whether or not activities were able to meet objectives around livelihoods recovery is not as easily answered, as there is no follow up M&E on the sustainability or actual community use of the asset. Some observed challenges to achieving impact on livelihoods included a lack of adequate non-food resources (the budget allocated under other direct operating costs for CFW and FFW programmes is extremely small, only funding the purchase of basic equipment such as wheelbarrows, pick axes, shovels, and brooms), short-term contract lengths, and WFP staff and implementing partner technical capacities and skills to ensure that good quality and sustainable assets were being built. For example, some implementing partners recounted instances about assets that would wash away with each rain and rebuilt year after year with continuous CFW and FFW projects.

Contribution to National Humanitarian/Development Changes

205. Thanks to WFP’s established logistics networks and inclusive strategy to engage local implementing partners, the organization’s contribution to Haiti’s humanitarian challenges through CFW and FFW interventions has been significant. Many partners interviewed expressed increased food security and community assets thanks to WFP programmes. With widespread unemployment (estimated at 41 percent in 2010) and underemployment, more than two-thirds of Haiti’s labour force do not have formal jobs⁹⁸ and are therefore highly vulnerable to shocks. WFP’s CFW/FFW interventions in Haiti, most remarkably in the year following the 2010, were both rapidly implemented and significant in scale. In all cases, the partners interviewed said that the particular mix of cash and/or food that they were receiving through the programme was appropriate to their individual household needs (i.e. cash was the preferred modality in urban areas where food was readily available and food was the preferred modality in more rural areas).

206. Some successes had been realized with CFW/FFW project co-financing (i.e. UNDP/FAO) that helped overcome challenges related to technical capacity, equipment purchase, and synergies with medium and long-term development objectives. It was noted that there were other interesting plans for synergies with other activities such as HIV/AIDS prevention education in programme documents⁹⁹, but actual implementation of these joint activities were not documented in the M&E systems and not remembered by current WFP staff.

⁹⁷ WFP Haiti CO.

⁹⁸ CIA World Factbook (<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ha.html>).

⁹⁹ PRRO 10382 Project Document.

Common Factors Explaining Results

207. In analyzing the findings above, it's important to note the extraordinary circumstances the Haiti CO has operated under since 2005, but especially in light of the 2010 earthquake. Following the earthquake, the CO published a booklet under the title "Haiti 2010 – A Year of Resilience and Rebuilding Lives". This booklet is dedicated to Berline, a WFP staff and personal assistant to the Country Director, who was among the victims of the earthquake. In the booklet, we can read, "Each and every WFP employee lost a family member, a friend or a loved one in the earthquake. Homes were destroyed or badly damaged. In that sense, the experience of this organization mirrored that of the population as a whole though WFP also realizes how fortunate it was—there were other parts of the UN which suffered even more. Despite their losses, all staff members who lived through the earthquake, nationals and internationals, threw themselves into their work from the outset (...). Their commitment was beyond the ordinary call of duty". In light of these circumstances, the psychosocial conditions under which some CO staff members have been operating has been extreme, undoubtedly contributing to post-traumatic stress disorder or burn out in some staff. Challenges to WFP's performance over the last year and difficulties the evaluation team faced in meeting with certain staff members or other stakeholders during the evaluation mission must be considered in this context.

208. In addition to the difficult operating environment, many other contributing (and often related) factors that were touched on in the sections above and that cut across activities include:

- **Changing development needs** – In addition to the recurring disasters in Haiti, changes in government policies, donor priorities, or updated information about the food security situation can force WFP to change course, challenging its ability to achieve objectives outlined in a given operation during programme design.
- **Evolving corporate policy framework** – Changing WFP corporate policies and objectives can impact programme design and implementation at the country level. It is challenging for long-time WFP staff to develop expertise in given protocols and modalities to quickly shift to new developments in corporate priorities. On one hand, some WFP staff who have gained solid expertise in their field may feel destabilized by the introduction of new concepts and objectives, feeling that their expertise is no longer applicable and/or recognized by the organization and potentially resisting change. On the other hand, more recently recruited staff who have not yet benefited from specific training as a follow-up of the new policy are in a situation of "wait and see". Transition to full adoption of a new policy requires training of WFP staff and implementing partners and can present significant challenges, particularly in a context as difficult as Haiti.
- **Insufficient procedures and systems** – Corporate systems that are designed to ensure quality control and automation, may in fact hamper efficiency in Haiti, given the CO's need to ramp up operations quickly. The introduction of WINGS, aimed at simplifying payment procedures, has done little to allow sub-offices control over the processing of an invoice before the final payment is processed in Port-au-Prince. As a result, many difficulties experienced with the rapid growth of activities in this emergency context extended outside the agency as well. Most private road transporters reported extremely long delays—80 to 120 days—before getting paid for their services¹⁰⁰, invoices being checked and counter-checked at many levels at sub-office and country office level. Implementing partners experienced similar problems with delays in the payment of invoices, a problem that is compounded by the fact that their remuneration is divided between other direct operating costs and landside transport, storage, and handling funding, requiring tedious controls at different levels by both the logistic and programme

¹⁰⁰ In this respect «La liste des progressions des factures dans la landslide transport, storage and handling» dated 02/04/2011 prepared by the transport section in PAP is very revealing. It has the merit to analyse the progress and the history of 145 transport invoices in the sole transport section. It fully corroborates the statements by the private road transporters the mission met in PAP, CAH, Gonaives and Jacmel.

section. These payment delays can put programme and logistic officers in the uncomfortable position of negotiating with parties that are more concerned with getting paid for past services rendered than future transports or request for services. The processes in place for obtaining a check for the payment of simple services are unnecessarily cumbersome, adding unnecessary costs for WFP¹⁰¹. The multiplicity of delays and bottlenecks need an in-depth analysis by system experts. There is a problem that needs to be addressed at corporate level. Additionally, the absence of an appropriate accounting system to monitor the true costs of new non-food activities (i.e. CFW programmes) is another handicap. Asking how the cost for leading such programmes were recouped, the mission was told that from the funds earmarked for the CFW programmes as much as 29 percent was reserved to cover the inherent costs (12 percent other direct operating costs, 10 percent direct support costs (DSC), and 7 percent ISC). The CO management team is fully aware of these developments and makes truly honest attempts to correct the situation¹⁰². Extra staff is signed on, overtime work is considered and extra progress reports are commanded. However, the procedures and systems are insufficient in view of the changing pattern of programmes.

- **Reliance on implementing partners** – The CO’s ability to implement and monitor its activities is dependent on the strength of its network of implementing partners across sectors. WFP’s ability to both reach vulnerable populations and also assess its performance is dependent on the strength of the implementing partners. Many of the challenges WFP faces in achieving results are due to bottlenecks at the IP level—gaps in technical capacity, contractual backlogs, or geographic dispersion for example. Weaknesses in M&E that are discussed at length in this chapter prevent WFP from being able to fully analyse its impact. A cornerstone of improving WFP’s M&E system is building this capacity in the IPs.

Procurement Operations

209. As a support function to the essential programme activities, WFP’s logistical support is an important factor to address in terms of the explanation of results that cuts across all sectors.

210. Taken together the operations of the Haiti 2005 – 2010 have been, from a logistics point of view, conducted in an extremely professional manner. Despite all the adversities the required volumes of food-aid were procured, transported, stored and timely delivered in line with the instructions from the programme sections. WFP has, throughout the entire logistic process from procurement to the final distribution of the food-aid to the beneficiaries, adhered to the standards of good practice prevailing in the international transport and distribution industry. WFP’s own rules and regulations were, during the CPE period, strictly complied with.

211. In terms of procurement operations, the bulk of the purchase orders – 419 out of 561 – were negotiated on FOB terms involving lead times of 90 to 120 days. Only 4 purchase orders were negotiated on DAP¹⁰³ terms. Most commodities were shipped in containers under liner terms to the ports of Port-au-Prince and Cap-Haitien involving inevitable transshipment in Freeport (Bahamas), Kingston (Jamaica) or Santo Domingo (Dominican

¹⁰¹ Example: 20 containers rice BL. VN1354915 M/V Saint Martin CMA – CGM arrived in PAP on 14/03/2011. Invoice from ships’ Agent for THC and Receiver charges 20 x 210 US\$/container dated 14/03/2011. Containers cleared by Customs on 14/03/2011. The cheque necessary for obtaining the release of the containers from the port area was issued on 05/04/2011 (22 days). Result: Extra port storage charges and CMA-CGM container detention charges.

¹⁰² The management has in a drive to streamline the procedures taken the excellent decision to do away with the FRN, the monthly distribution plan prepared by the programme section to be considered as a general FRN. On the other hand it can be regretted that a good initiative taken in Haiti in 2005 whereby the logistic section, in order to assist private road transports often illiterate, was drafting pro-forma transport invoices in order to avoid errors and so speed up the entire payment process, has been reversed on instruction from the audit department in Rome.

¹⁰³ DAP: International Chamber of Commerce (INCO) term for Delivered in place.

Republic). Large consignments, mainly rice from Thailand and Pakistan were delivered directly to Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitien with WFP chartered tonnage.

212. Whereas WFP was facing in 2006 recurrent pipeline breaks for pulses, cereals and CSB resulting mainly from the absence of a pipeline officer and subsequent inadequate planning, the situation has gradually improved over the years. A sustained funding commensurate with the ongoing operations together with the posting of a highly qualified pipeline officer in Haiti facilitated the good planning and the timely calling forward of the various commodities. Eventually pipeline breaks have been reduced in 2010 to almost nil mostly limited to temporary shortages of HEB. Problems are however still encountered with donations in kind where WFP has little or no control over the movement and the arrival time of commodities. In 2005/2006 WFP was faced with a massive unscheduled arrival of vegetable oil consignments from Canada which took almost 24 months to absorb or else commodities arriving with great delays as in 2010/2011 with rice consignments promised since months by Brazil and Thailand.


Infrastructure

213. As discussed earlier, WFP’s operational infrastructure and warehousing facilities are the corner stone of WFP’s emergency response preparedness plan. Despite rapid growth over the last five years, WFP’s warehousing and stock keeping have consistently been managed professionally in line with industry best practice standards. For example, losses in the warehouses in 2010 amounted to only 0.7 percent of total food aid distributed. These losses were due in large part to severe weather conditions and the looting and destruction of the Fort St. Michel warehouse (accounting for more than 50 percent of the total loss).

214. WFP has over the year correctly assessed the need to avail itself a dedicated fleet of trucks in order to supplement the local transport industry, which is often fragmented and operates with a fleet of second hand vehicles prone to repeated breakdown. The arrival of a fleet of new trucks should be taken as a good opportunity to manage the fleet in line with the management standards applied by modern and efficient trucking companies.

215. Dictated by the necessity to be prepared for possible severe disruption of the road network during the rainy and hurricane seasons 2008, 2009 and 2010, WFP decided to charter adequate tonnage to be lined-up for short-sea voyages¹⁰⁴. This decision had certainly the great merit to enhance the emergency preparedness of WFP. At the same time it could benefit from the financial support from ECHO. But on the strength of the volumes transported, the voyage rotations achieved, the

FIGURE 16: PLANNED VS. MOBILIZED RESOURCES (FINANCIAL AND COMMODITIES) ACROSS OPERATIONS, 2005 - 2010



Source: WFP Project Documents (excludes PRRO 10844)

¹⁰⁴ 2008 Chartering of LCT and small ferry to serve Gonaives, 2009 chartering of tug/barge for the July – November period. Transport of hospital Equipment to Grande Anse, 2010 Chartering of barge/tug for the June – December period. Costs split between Logistic Cluster and WFP CO.

multiple and lengthy idle times clocked¹⁰⁵ linked to a certain unfamiliarity on the part of WFP staff with this type of short-sea type of service, it seems, from the information collected, that the equipment has not been utilised to the fullest. Finally the contribution of this type of maritime transport to the successful conduct of the aid operations has been rather minimal.

Cost Analysis


216. With the exception of the immediate response EMOP 10785, the requirements as set out in the project documents and the budget revisions (BR) have been generally well funded at a rate of 63 – 83 percent as shown in Figure 16. Although the funding rate for SOs was slightly lower (65 percent on average), this did not prove a major impediment. This satisfactory funding level has enabled operations to be implemented in an orderly manner. However, a review of confirmed contributions to PRRO 10674 show that for some period of time contributions were not commensurate to the programme of work, creating a stress in operations and management. Additional details regarding the breakdown of these contributions are covered in Chapter 1.

217. The successful mobilization of the financial resources has offered the CO good opportunities to conduct the operations as set out in the project document and subsequent BR. The procurement has been carried efficiently taking advantages of arising opportunities such as donations in kind, local purchases however limited, and transfer and loans of commodities between the various operations. Faced with natural disasters and political unrest, WFP's response has been swift, to the point, and appropriate throughout. The various logistics systems, standards, guidelines and regulations have in general functioned correctly and have enabled the programme section to carry out its activities in line with its objectives.

218. However, objectives in terms of commodities distributed generally fell short of funding levels, with only two operations (CP 10217 and DEV 10386) reaching a distribution level of 75 percent of planned as shown in Figure 16.

219. Leaving aside the high commodity cost noted for the two IR-EMOPs 10785 and 200107 linked to the supply of small emergency consignments of HEB biscuits, the commodity cost for the remaining 7 projects has risen by some 57 percent over the 6 year period of the Haiti CPE in line with the stiff commodity price increases on the world market.

FIGURE 17: WFP HAITI COMMODITY COSTS PER MT COMPARED TO CORPORATE AVERAGE



¹⁰⁵ WFP chartered a barge Whitehall Bay and tug Bloody Bay from 17/06/2010 till 16 /12/2010 at a total cost of 607.704 US\$ excluding fuel , stevedoring and port charges. 178 MAERSK rice containers (3500 MT) were moved from Santo Domingo in 4 voyages to Port-au-Prince and 1 voyage to Gonaïves were it was kept riding at anchor full 5 days waiting for the rice containers to be returned empty. Subsequently the barge/tug carried for the WFP Logistic Cluster some 1.500 MT aid equipment.

The high commodity cost noted under EMOP 200110 stems also from the choice for more sophisticated and processed food commodities such as meal ready-to-eat, HEB, Plumpy Doz, and Supplementary Doz.

220. Comparison of the cost components between the various programmes of the Haiti portfolio and with the WFP corporate average rates is indicative of the degree of efficiency or otherwise of the various operations. Figure 17 gives a summary analysis of the level of costs per cost component calculated on the strength of the financial figures recorded in the SPR and PMO WFP WINGS Data warehouse. For the two IR-EMOPs 10785 and 200107, high commodity costs are linked to the supply of small emergency consignments of HEB biscuits, and are therefore excluded from this analysis. Additionally, figures for PRRO 10844, which was suspended after 12 days, can be disregarded for the operational environment was exceptional and reflect values that are neither indicative nor relevant.

221. The DSC value for EMOP 200110 is double the WFP average – US\$237 per MT versus a corporate average of US\$117 – and needs to be looked into. It is accepted that the circumstances were exceptional at the onset of EMOP 200110. The international staff count increased from 34 in January 2010 to 104 in July 2010 involving extra rest and recuperation and travel expenditures, extra costs for the temporary posting and housing of temporary duty staff, increased number of service vehicles, enhanced security services. A more detailed study of the budget/actuals/ commitments figures should shed some light for this unusually high DSC value.

222. The funding of the different components of programmes tends to retain the continuous attention of the staff whilst much less attention seems to be devoted to the costing control. Few staff members have an inside knowledge of the true costs and demands on their part to have access to the budget versus reality figures for their office, department and/or section are uncommon. Cost control is more a precinct reserved to few senior members of the staff rather than a collective responsibility.

223. In the absence of an analytical accounting system it is difficult to determine the true cost of the WFP 69 strong vehicle fleet. The average transport cost per MT is, if not totally unknown, merely a rude approximation. This situation needs to be looked into. Quite similar is the difficulty to monitor the true costs for conducting the steadily increasing number of CFW programmes. There is a strong demand to segregate non-commodity activities within projects and allow separate funding streams. There is an obvious need to modify the DSC funding model from a rate per metric ton to a percentage of the operational budget¹⁰⁶.

224. Substantial resources are allocated to CFW programmes. At the same time programmes with a food-aid component are actively pursued with the result of inflating the stocks on hand, which in turn call for increased warehousing capacity and thus extra costs. Priorities have to be reviewed and defined and extra costs of this two-pronged approach assessed.

3. Conclusions and Recommendations

225. The conclusions and recommendations provided in this chapter are firmly grounded in the qualitative, quantitative, and anecdotal evidence that was gathered from WFP and partner documents and interviews with WFP staff, partners, and beneficiaries. In a brief period of time the evaluation team was able to visit a significant part of the country where WFP has worked during the period under review and met with numerous WFP staff, partners, and beneficiaries.

226. This chapter of the evaluation report presents the conclusion and recommendations of the evaluation of the Haiti country portfolio is provided, exploring the three key issues for the evaluation, namely 1) the strategic alignment of the portfolio; 2) making strategic choices; and 3) the portfolio performance and results. The basis for this assessment is

¹⁰⁶ Ref. Financial Framework Review EB Agenda item 5 – WFP/EB.2/2010/5-A/1 dated 7 October 2010.

provided in the previous chapter that details the evaluation team's findings. Second, key issues for the future are provided. Finally, a limited number of recommendations are provided to realistically and practically strengthen current and future WFP food assistance operations in Haiti.

3.1. Overall Assessment

227. Given the extraordinarily challenging operating environment in Haiti over the period of evaluation, the Haiti CO has had some remarkable successes. In addition to recurring natural disasters, WFP Haiti has been faced with other destabilizing factors such as civil and political unrest which characterized the period 2005-2008, the food-fuel-financial crisis of 2007 -- 2008, and the coinciding launch of the WFP new strategic plan. In the midst of this instability, coupled with the complexity of operating within an integrated mission, WFP Haiti has made great strides in partnering with the government and in meeting the changing needs of the Haitian people, both during the response phase as well as during development and recovery.

228. The activities across the country portfolio were faced with the recurring challenges of moving from a development context to an emergency context and back to development. Given this backdrop, WFP's strengths over the period of evaluation were in its ability to respond quickly and effectively to emergencies.

Alignment and strategic positioning

229. WFP was a key strategic partner of the Government of Haiti, most notably in areas of emergency preparedness, food security, and education where strong partnerships exist between WFP and government counterparts in terms of implementation coordination through government led processes coupled with capacity development. Depending on the sector, partnerships may be stronger at the national level or the local level.

230. While many recent advances to the strategic partnerships with the Government of Haiti have been made, the CO's planning and coordination with government counterparts was not always actively coordinated, nor government led throughout the period of evaluation.

231. The cluster approach, formalized in Haiti in 2008, has been a strategic coordination mechanism for improving alignment between partners and the donor community. WFP's participation in the cluster system and notably their leadership in the Logistics and Food Clusters has been much appreciated by the humanitarian community. While there are additional opportunities that can be explored, WFP has had some success in partnering with other UN agencies and international NGOs to dramatically increase WFP's ability to have a development impact.

232. Given the nature of the Haiti country portfolio, WFP's role in relation to SO1 – Saving lives and protecting livelihoods in emergencies has been of primary importance and is the area where WFP is strongest (approximately 70 percent of beneficiaries). The challenge that WFP faces in the more targeted activities is in balancing corporate and government priorities, especially in a volatile post-emergency context.

Making strategic choices

233. Through the VAM Unit and the Logistics Cluster, WFP provides a tremendous service to the development community in Haiti, particularly in the areas of food security analysis and logistics support. However, the evaluation team found that WFP is often constrained in its ability to base its strategic choices on this analytical data. The Haiti country portfolio is made up of a complex mix of operational challenges, technical demands, and reporting requirements that has taken place in a very difficult environment, which is characterized by increased international attention, recurring natural disasters, poor infrastructure, and rapid growth resulting in an increased number of sub-offices in a relatively short period of time. Currently the systems in place in Haiti—administrative, financial, and programme

management—are not sufficiently coordinated and aggregated to support efficient portfolio-level decision-making, especially to understand trade-offs inherent in making strategic choices.

234. The primary drivers of change to WFP Haiti's activities across the portfolio were the 2008 and 2010 emergencies. Within this context of emergency response, WFP Haiti was also faced with corresponding changes in the capacity and priorities of government, donor, and implementing partners, as well as changing corporate priorities that influenced the CO's strategic choices.

235. Systems are needed to improve the communication, programme monitoring, M&E, and reporting. Standards are needed to provide more consistent programming, improved monitoring (including post-distribution monitoring), and better reporting from partners to facilitate the CO's ability to make more informed decisions.

Portfolio performance and results

236. The evaluation team aimed to evaluate WFP's performance in relation to the beneficiaries and assistance provided, the objectives attained, the contribution of the portfolio to the national humanitarian/development changes, and the factors explaining the results. This analysis can also be summarized in terms of the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, and sustainability of WFP's activities across operations as discussed below.

Relevance

237. Over the period from 2005 – 2010, the WFP Haiti portfolio consisted of activities in School Feeding, Maternal and Child Health and Nutrition, HIV/TB, CFW/FFW, and GFD. While the size of the portfolio grew by more than 20-fold and the percentage of beneficiaries receiving assistance under each of these interventions changed over time in response to evolving development needs, all 5 activities existed throughout the period of evaluation in line with relevant development challenges in Haiti and corresponding to WFP's five strategic objectives.

Effectiveness and Efficiency

238. In a volatile environment such as Haiti, it is a challenge to achieve objectives effectively and efficiently given not only the recurring natural disasters, but also the accompanying changes in national (and international) development priorities and WFP's corporate policy framework, insufficient processes and systems for this context, and extreme reliance on the capacity of implementing partners. The evaluation team observed consistent discrepancies between the planned beneficiary targets and actual beneficiaries reached across all sectors. This inconsistency seems to result in large part from both deficiencies in the planning process and a lack of accountability for results. Additionally, the challenge of shifting between a development and an emergency context and the associated changes in funding levels and priorities has been a struggle for the Haiti CO from both a programme design and systems perspective. While efficiencies associated with capitalizing on complementary distribution channels/partners across activities were implemented in some instances, there are other potential synergies and opportunities that were not exploited.

239. From a logistics perspective, WFP Haiti has a proven capacity to react quickly to emergency situations. Thanks in large part to the high quality of the logistics operations, the required volumes of food-aid were procured, transported, stored, and delivered in a timely manner in accordance with programme requests. WFP is at its best when it leads large-scale general food distribution operations. Even in response to the severe disasters Haiti has been faced with in the last few years and significant organizational losses, WFP has been able to distribute an unprecedented amount of food aid quickly and efficiently. Generally satisfactory funding levels facilitated the continuation and relatively orderly implementation of activities in Haiti during the period of evaluation. At times the operations suffered from less regular contributions but WFP took measures to mitigate the negative effects. Where

and when possible WFP has made good use of the funding facilities provided under CERF, IRA and the World Chambers Federation to overcome the difficulties created by resourcing levels not always commensurate with the level of operations. Good use was also made of the facility to borrow commodities from other ongoing projects in order to get the projects going. Procurement was able to take advantage of in kind donations, transfer and loans of commodities between operations, and even limited local purchase opportunities to ensure efficient food distribution.

Impact

240. While it was clear that WFP was able to reach an enormous amount of beneficiaries through both general and targeted distribution throughout the period of evaluation, measuring real impact of WFP activities is severely constrained by deficiencies in the M&E system. Currently, WFP's M&E system in Haiti effectively measures inputs to its programmes—commodities and contributions received. WFP also tracks basic output data—amount of food/cash distributed and the number of beneficiaries—but even the basic beneficiary data is variable and inconsistent in terms of baseline assumptions (e.g. individual vs. family) and disaggregation. Challenges to data collection are many and include: poor systems, insufficient institutional capacity for compilation or analysis, and unrealistic and/or inappropriate indicators in the programme documents for Haiti. Efforts to measure outcomes, development impact, or historical comparisons of the results of these investments over time and space have proven inadequate. The lack of reliable data and the inconsistency in reporting is frustrating to donors and partners and could potentially hamper future funding for WFP. In addition, WFP's inability to show relative impact of their interventions in such a competitive donor landscape is a critical disadvantage.

Sustainability

241. In Haiti, nearly half of the total beneficiaries reached since 2005 have benefitted from general food distribution initiatives in response to severe humanitarian crises. While there have been some efforts to build the capacity of the DPC to deal with emergencies, it is unlikely that emergency food distribution will be an activity that can be handed over to the government or local implementing partners in the near future without substantial additional resources and increased capacity development efforts. In other targeted distribution interventions, some strides have been made towards handover, but overwhelming food insecurity, weakened government capacity after the earthquake, and recent political changes may impede progress towards these goals. In terms of WFP's role in the generation of analytical information, significant efforts have been implemented to transfer capacity to local organizations such as the *Centre National Geographique de Haïti* and CNSA.


3.2. Key Lessons for the Future

242. WFP Haiti will have to carefully track the current political developments in Haiti. There will likely be new government counterparts that may necessitate increased dialog and partnership efforts under the new political leadership. Changes in key interlocutors for the programme may emerge and the CO will have to devote itself to establishing the same relationships of confidence and trust they now have with the highest levels of the Government of Haiti.

243. Given the importance of new initiatives like Cash for Work and local purchase to the political agenda and the international donor community in Haiti, the CO should explore new opportunities in these areas and prioritize the establishment of appropriate systems and processes, soliciting support from the regional bureau and corporate headquarters as needed.

244. The Government of Haiti's National Food and Nutritional Security Plan is developed in accordance with the 4 pillars of availability, access, utilization, and stability. For future country portfolio planning, it may be useful to envision WFP's activities within this framework as outlined in Figure 18.

FIGURE 18: ROLE OF WFP IN A FOOD AND NUTRITIONAL SECURITY FRAMEWORK



3.3. Recommendations

245. **Recommendation 1: WFP Haiti should strengthen its monitoring and evaluation systems to improve consistency and reliability of data and to measure the impact of its operations.** During the evaluation mission, a consultant was onsite working to improve WFP's M&E system and the country office seemed optimistic about the results. As new developments are still in the early stages and there is still much progress to be made, the evaluation team proposes several recommendations. For an M&E system to be sustainable and scalable, a uniform coordinated system should be developed, but with responsibility for management of data decentralized to the sub-offices and programme divisions. Combined with this decentralization should be supportive supervision and on-the-job training to ensure the systematic and reliable quality of data collection and reporting in the field. There should also be a clear feedback loop for reporting back to implementing partners, donors, and the government that reinforces ongoing participation and partnership. This regular reporting function will also help WFP to make mid-course adjustments to programme design and improve future programming efforts.

246. **Recommendation 2: WFP Haiti should ensure that the logistics cluster activities continue to be funded and staff retained in order to ensure the continuation of invaluable emergency preparedness and response activities.** As the special operation 200108 under which these logistics activities are funded is scheduled to end in December 2011, it is important that a skeleton staff be retained under PRRO 10844. Maintaining logistics information for the humanitarian community and updating the contingency plan and the Logistics Capacity Application document are essential activities for WFP to continue if it wants to retain its strategic nature in Haiti.

247. **Recommendation 3: WFP Corporate to conduct an in-depth review of their management and operational systems in order to identify the causes of systemic problems which arise when operations shift from a GFD programme to more targeted food-aid and cash transfer programmes.** The complex field level agreement monitoring and processing system and strong centralized payment processing structures under WINGS prevent WFP from achieving its set objectives. The evaluation has revealed that beyond a certain threshold the management starts encountering difficulties in making systems—both operational and financial—operate smoothly and in maintaining the necessary capacity and desired efficiency to continue to deliver the volumes of food-aid and cash as set out in the project documents. It is a situation that is inherent to WFP's operating

systems and working methods in force that are not appropriately adapted to support the CO in this transition. This issue is considered beyond the reach of Haiti CO and is therefore best addressed at corporate level.

248. Recommendation 4: WFP Haiti should improve its planning process to develop more realistic targets that can be better aligned with realities of implementation. In all sectors, the evaluation team often found marked inconsistencies between planned beneficiary levels targeted in the programme documents and actual beneficiaries reached in implementation of activities. While the reasons for these discrepancies are varied, the overarching trend was remarkable and should be addressed. The evaluation mission recommends that WFP establish a formula for developing targets that takes into account current demographic trends (e.g. malnutrition levels, patients receiving ART) and past portfolio performance. Being able to justify the targets set forth in programme documents would not only help to explain any deviation from these targets but also would improve programme planning and potentially increase WFP's ability to mobilize funding for certain activities.

249. Recommendation 5: WFP Haiti should seek out potential for integration across activities and with other partners such as a Model School programme to leverage impact and ensure that their efforts are achieving maximum results. A review of the scope and content of the school feeding, nutrition, HIV/TB, and CFW/FFW activities should be done to see how synergies in integrating these activities could be achieved in the formulation of future operations. It is recommended that a formal review, with support from the Regional Bureau and corporate headquarters, of the scope, content, and potential for integration within and across activities be conducted. In addition to this internal review, WFP should explore synergies with other UN agencies and partners to explore new avenues of collaboration. For example, WFP Haiti should consider initiating a new approach aimed at testing small-scale demonstrations of best-practice models in school feeding adapted to the Haiti context that could be ultimately mainstreamed into the national programme. A way to focus efforts on the school feeding programme would be to maintain the current feeding at all of the current WFP supported-schools, but at the same time develop a "Model School" programme that focuses the efforts of the Government of Haiti, UNICEF, and WFP on a limited number of schools to develop a better way for these organizations can work together. As these model schools become successful, lessons learned could be incorporated into a more global school strengthening strategy that can be sequentially rolled out in the entire country.

250. Recommendation 6: The awareness among the CO staff of the true cost of the various component parts of the operations should be enhanced. Members of the staff should be made aware of the many opportunities to affect substantial savings in the way day-to-day operations are conducted. Cost control should become an intrinsic part of the staff training programmes.

251. Recommendation 7: WFP Haiti should take advantage of more ambitious and long lasting capacity development projects in emergency preparedness. Given the likelihood of recurring natural disasters in Haiti, it is important that the Government of Haiti, through its emergency response agency DPC, have a dedicated network of warehouses where strategic food reserves and equipment can be stored over longer periods irrespective the prevailing climatic conditions, something they are currently lacking. WFP Haiti should explore, perhaps with the backing of the World Bank, the possibilities of entering into a strong partnership with the DPC and embarking on a comprehensive nationwide warehousing project. The advantages of such a project would be threefold: alignment with the capacity development policy of WFP, leading the way towards an exit strategy for WFP, and enhancing Haiti's resilience capacity to catastrophes and emergencies.

252. Recommendation 8: WFP Haiti should develop strategic partnerships with implementing partners for rapid deployment in emergency and recovery operations. To reduce the contracting burden of managing so many implementing partners

and field level agreements, the CO should explore tiered partnerships with strategic partners across sectors. Having fewer contracts with larger organizations would serve several purposes: build strategic alliances with partners who have the capacity to provide supplementary services such as nutritional training and capacity development of local entities, establish a quick response contracting vehicle which enables WFP to quickly move resources after an emergency, and alleviate the management burden of working with many small partners. After the 2010 earthquake for example, precious time was spent to draft, negotiate, and finalize partner agreements which could have been expedited had tiered partnerships with key partners been in place and plans drafted which specified how new and on-going needs can be met.

Annexes

Annex 1: Terms of Reference

1.A. Introduction

1. CPE encompass the entirety of WFP's programme-related activities during a specific period. They evaluate the performance and results of the portfolio as a whole and provide evaluative insights to make evidence-based strategic decisions about positioning WFP in a country, strategic partnerships, operations design and implementation.
2. The purpose of these terms of reference (TOR) is to provide key information to stakeholders about the proposed evaluation, to guide the evaluation team and specify expectations during the various phases of the evaluation. The TOR are structured as follows: Chapter 1 provides information on the context; Chapter 2 presents the rationale, objectives, stakeholders and main users of the evaluation; Chapter 3 presents the WFP portfolio and defines the scope of the evaluation; Chapter 4 identifies the key issues; Chapter 5 spells out the evaluation approach; and Chapter 6 indicates how the evaluation will be organized. The annexes provide additional information on bibliography and reporting templates.

1.B. Country Context¹⁰⁷

3. Haiti has endured political instability, chronic challenges in governance and the highest levels of poverty in the Western Hemisphere (UNDP, Transparency International 2009, Rice and Patrick 2008). According to several indexes measuring states' fragility, Haiti performs particularly poorly, ranking twelfth out of 177 countries in the Failed States Index (Fund for Peace 2009) and 129th of 141 countries according to the Index of State Weakness in the Developing World (Rice and Patrick 2008).¹⁰⁸
4. **Poverty:** Haiti ranks 149th of 182 countries on the UNDP Human Development Index.¹⁰⁹
5. 76 percent of Haitians lived on less than US\$2 per day in 2005, a 16.9 percent increase in five years from 65 percent.¹¹⁰
6. Despite falling by 5 percent between 1990 and 2001, the proportion of the population living on less than US\$1 a day, increased from 54 percent (2001) to 56 percent (2005). As one of the Millennium Development Goals, this indicator is supposed to reach a level of 28.4 percent by 2015, i.e. a reduction of 49 percent. Haiti has the highest poverty rate in Latin America and the Caribbean.¹¹¹
7. **Food Availability:** Haiti remains a food deficit country. It relies heavily on imported food – 48 percent of national consumed food is imported, 47 percent is produced locally while food assistance fills 5 percent of the national needs.¹¹² Agriculture activities are geared towards households food consumption and are done on a small scale. Land plots are generally small and households have little equipment. The farming activities are heavily dependent on climatic conditions, and often affected by crop diseases.
8. This limited national food production capacity and the dependency on food imports combined with the lack of basic social services, vulnerability to natural disasters, the socio-political instability, violence and insecurity in poor urban areas and widespread poverty

¹⁰⁷ From "Haiti Earthquake Response, context analysis", ALNAP, (2010).

¹⁰⁸ More details on the background to the political, economic and social context of Haiti in section two of the Haiti Earthquake Response, political context.

¹⁰⁹ Human Development Report 2009.

¹¹⁰ Haiti: PRSP progress report, IMF, 2009.

¹¹¹ Haiti: PRSP progress report, IMF, 2009.

¹¹² WFP Haiti country Overview (<http://www.wfp.org/countries/haiti>).

contribute to food insecurity, by restricting the availability of food and hampering households' access to food.¹¹³

9. **Food access:** About 68 percent of food items consumed by rural households are bought on the market. Despite that many rural households are farmers; most of them do not produce enough to cover their needs. Access to food is thus determined by households' income. Food expenditure represents about 59 percent of households' spending. About 75 percent of rural households have farming activities. However, the cash income generated accounts only for 26 percent of their total cash income. The rest of their income comes from other activities such as livestock rearing (poultry and goats), transfers from other households and remittances, non-agricultural wage labour. The sale of charcoal is the main source of income for 9 percent of the rural population. About 20 percent of households live only from their agricultural activities, representing 90 percent of their income. This group of households has the lowest income.¹¹⁴
10. Urban populations are highly dependent on markets¹¹⁵ for acquiring food and are vulnerable to market perturbations due to natural disaster and/or to grain and petrol price fluctuations, in particular low income households.
11. The Haitian rural population is young and suffers from lack of employment opportunities, poor access to social and health services and insufficient and inadequate offer of education. Women are more affected by unemployment; especially women from the poorest households are most often economically inactive.
12. **Nutrition:** One third of newborn babies are born underweight. Acute undernutrition among children under 5 is 9 percent. Chronic undernutrition is 24 percent. 50 percent of pregnant women and two thirds of children under 5 are affected by anemia. It is estimated that more than 2.4 million people in Haiti are food-insecure. National surveys show that 72 percent of children aged 6–12 in rural areas suffer from iodine deficiency; 32 percent of school-age children are infected by intestinal parasites. It is estimated that cognitive development of almost 30,000 babies is affected because their mothers suffered from iodine deficiency during pregnancy.¹¹⁶
13. The proportion of children underweight augmented¹¹⁷ from 17.3 percent in 2000 to 22.2 percent in 2006, leaving a large gap to be bridged to meet the 2015 target of 13.4 percent
14. **Health:** Despite some reduction from 5.5 percent (2000) to 2.2 percent (2006)¹¹⁸, the HIV rate remains the highest in the region. It is slightly higher for women than for men, with marked geographical differences. The epidemic represents a public health problem and is part of the government priorities listed in its PRSP. TB has re-emerged together with HIV, because the two pathologies are linked: 32 percent of HIV/AIDS patients are also infected with TB.¹¹⁹
15. As of 3 November, the MSPP reported 6 742 cholera cases including 442 deaths. The departments where confirmed cases have been reported include Artibonite, Centre, Nord, Nord-Ouest, and Ouest. In response to the outbreak, WFP has been distributing ready-to-eat meals and High Energy Biscuits at hospitals in Saint-Marc, Mirebalais and Lascahobas.
16. **Natural disasters** have only worsened Haiti's plight. Haiti is situated in the path of storms and hurricanes and is, after Cuba, the country in the region most at risk from natural disasters; tropical storms and hurricanes are becoming more frequent. Environmental degradation, endemic poverty and weakened survival mechanisms because of the political,

¹¹³ WFP Haiti CFSVA 2007/2008.

¹¹⁴ WFP Haiti CFSVA 2007/2008.

¹¹⁵ Impact de la crise alimentaire sur les populations urbaines de Port-Au-Prince (Nov 2008).

¹¹⁶ WFP Haiti CFSVA 2007/2008.

¹¹⁷ Haiti: PRSP progress report, IMF, 2009.

¹¹⁸ Haiti: PRSP progress report, IMF, 2009.

¹¹⁹ WFP Haiti country Overview (<http://www.wfp.org/countries/haiti>).

socio-economic and climatic shocks suffered over the past few decades make the country particularly vulnerable.

17. On 18 September 2004 the tropical storm Jeanne left a path of devastation in the western coastal areas of Haiti, particularly in the city of Gonaïves. Nearly 300,000 people were affected by the flooding and rains. Death toll reached some 3,000, more than 4,500 houses were destroyed, dead livestock contaminated water supplies, edible food was in scarce supply, crops were wiped out, access to the city was treacherous at best, and security was non-existent. An estimated 35,000 homes in Gonaïves were affected with nearly 5,000 destroyed or damaged. Almost all the city's 397 elementary and 54 secondary schools were damaged and closed. Gonaïves' hospital was damaged and closed down indefinitely, and health care made available primarily through small health centres. With the entire watershed already denuded because of deforestation, an estimated 70 percent of the region's agricultural areas were damaged.
18. During the 2008 hurricane season, severe storms devastated more than 70 percent of Haiti's agriculture and most of its roads, bridges and other infrastructure, creating pockets of severe malnutrition and killing 800 people. Nearly all agricultural land was flooded, resulting in the loss of the corn, bean and banana harvest, 800 people were killed and 3.3 million people were left in need of food support.
19. More recently, the earthquake that hit Haiti on 12 January 2010 killed more than 200,000 people, injured 300,000 and left over one million homeless. With its epicentre only ten kilometres below the surface and close to the urban centres of Port-au-Prince, Leogane and Jacmel, the earthquake was the most powerful the country had experienced in 200 years. In response, a massive relief and recovery effort has been undertaken by a complex array of national and international actors, including WFP and was one of the largest since the Indian Ocean tsunami of December 2004.
20. The already fragile nature of Haiti's governance institutions, compounded by the loss of important government personnel and severely damaged infrastructure, left the government of Haiti in a particularly difficult situation following the earthquake.¹²⁰ The Interim Commission on the Reconstruction will support the Government of Haiti in the following main sectoral priorities: education, health, agriculture, housing, debris removal, disaster preparedness and infrastructure.¹²¹

FIGURE 1: TYPE OF DISASTERS AND NUMBER OF PEOPLE AFFECTED DURING THE PAST 10 YEARS.

Type of Disaster	Year	Total number of people Affected
Earthquake (seismic activity)	2010	3,700,000
Storm	2008	125,050
Storm	2008	73,006
Storm	2008	48,000
Storm	2007	108,763
Flood	2007	75,947
Storm	2004	315,594
Flood	2003	150,000
Drought	2003	35,000
Flood	2002	38,339


Source: "EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database www.em-dat.net – Université Catholique de Louvain - Brussels - Belgium".

¹²⁰ Grünewald and Renaudin 2010.

¹²¹ www.cirh.ht.

21. **Education:** One of the strong points advanced as a priority in the government's programme is that education for all is the basis of equal opportunity and long-term poverty reduction. However as of 2006, net enrolment was measured at 49.6 percent, from 54.3 percent back in 2000.¹²² The dropout rate is particularly high in the first basic cycle at 29 percent.¹²³ Close to 60 percent of children drop out of school before receiving their primary education certificate. Of the two million children enrolled in the basic level, only 56 percent are at the required age for the first cycle (ages six to eleven).
22. **Government Strategy:** The government first adopted an interim poverty reduction strategy paper in 2006 which was followed the following year by a more comprehensive one focusing on 1) growth vectors (Agriculture and Rural Development, Tourism, Infrastructure); 2) human development (Education and Training, Health, Water and Sanitation, Persons with Disabilities, Childhood Poverty, Young People, HIV/AIDS, Gender Equity); and 3) democratic governance (Justice System, Security, Modernization of the State, Territorial Development and the Macroeconomic Framework). More recently, the National Development and Reconstruction Plan (<http://www.refondation.ht>), was developed in response to the 2010 earthquake.
23. **International assistance**¹²⁴: Since 2002, the net official development assistance has increased in both development aid and peacekeeping expenditure. In 2008, Haiti received US\$912 million in ODA flows from all donors combined. The largest donors were the United States, Canada, the Inter-American Bank and the European Commission. Over the period 2007-08, most of this aid was spent on social services and infrastructure, particularly health activities, government services and peace building activities.
24. In response to a March 2010 request from the Government, the Inter-ADB, the UN and the World Bank, along with contributing donors, established a multi-donor fund called the Haiti Reconstruction Fund. The role of the HRF is to support the Government's post-earthquake Action Plan for the Recovery and Development of Haiti and related initiatives. As of 16 NOV 2010, pledges amounted to an estimated at US\$ 508 million of which US\$135 million were received.¹²⁵
25. The Haiti Revised Humanitarian Appeal (January - December 2010) requests for US\$1.5 billion is now funded about US\$1 billion as of 16 NOV 2010¹²⁶.

FIGURE 2: NET ODA FROM ALL DONORS TO HAITI (2002-2008)



Source: "Aid to Fragile States: Focus on Haiti", OECD

¹²² Haiti: PRSP progress report, IMF, 2009.

¹²³ Haiti: PRSP, IMF, 2008.

¹²⁴ OECD "Aid to Fragile States: Focus on Haiti", OECD.

¹²⁵ www.haitireconstructionfund.org/hrf.

¹²⁶ <http://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=emerg-emergencyDetails&appealID=893>.

2. Reason for the Evaluation

2.A. Evaluation Rationale

26. Haiti is a country having recognised significant food security issues and a consequent significant WFP programme in terms of magnitude and diversity.
27. The CO deals with a challenging food security situation which is repeatedly punctuated by severe natural disasters. The combination poses particular challenges that the CO needs to managed so that a holistic evaluation such as the CPE should be able to shed light on how well the CO is coping and what could be done differently, if anything, to help them do as well or better.
28. The Haiti CO will design the follow up intervention to the current PRRO (to be extended to DEC 2012) and response to the 2010 earthquake in the course of 2012. Findings and recommendations from this evaluation exercise will inform this process. The follow up intervention will be presented at the Executive Board (EB).² NOV 2012 and is planned to start JAN 2013.
29. This evaluation will also inform the formulation process of the next UNDAF. Such formulation will take place in the course of 2011.

2.B. Evaluation Objectives

30. Evaluations serve the dual objectives of accountability and learning. As such, the evaluation will:
 - a) Assess and report on the performance and results of the country portfolio in line with the WFP mandate and in response to humanitarian and development challenges in Haiti (accountability);
 - b) Determine the reasons for observed success/failure and draw lessons from experience to produce evidence-based findings to allow the CO to make informed strategic decisions about positioning itself in Haiti, form strategic partnerships, and improve operations design and implementation whenever possible (learning).

2.C. Stakeholders and Users¹²⁷

31. The main intended users and stakeholders for this evaluation exercise are: the WFP Haiti CO and its local partners including the Government, the UN country team and donors. Other users can include: World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and IDB.
32. In 2010, 14 UN clusters are operating in Haiti. Of particular interest to this evaluation are the Emergency Telecom, Food and Logistics Clusters for which WFP is the responsible agency. Also, local coordination mechanisms (government led) also played a role in the response to earthquake.
33. Beneficiaries have an important stake in the operations as recipients of assistance. They constitute an important source of information to the evaluation in areas of relevance, appropriateness, effectiveness and impact of the WFP intervention and will be systematically consulted.
34. Within WFP organisational units have different stake in the operation and the evaluation. The main stakeholder is the WFP CO as the principal manager of WFP intervention. The evaluation will inform about the degree of success or failure of it and will inform future orientation. Others include the Regional Bureau and Headquarters (HQ) technical unit which may benefit from findings by guiding future operations in the region and in their area of expertise, through lessons learned. A particular aspect of the WFP response to the

¹²⁷ See annex 5: Preliminary Stakeholder Analysis Matrix.

earthquake is the staff turnover which will be a challenge to the evaluation in terms of institutional memory.

35. NGO partners support the implementation of various component, particularly in FFW activities, GFD, school feeding and vulnerability analysis. They constitute a group with stake in both the operation and the evaluation.
36. WFP partners also with UN agencies and development banks (FAO, IDB, IFAD, ILO, UNAIDS, UNDP, UNICEF, World Bank, WHO).
37. Government of Haiti has a stake in the evaluation exercise as a partner of WFP and as a representation of beneficiary populations. The Ministry of Planning and Cooperation is the main line ministry. The Secretary of State for Agriculture coordinates the intergovernmental strategy on food security and, together with CNSA, is the main technical counterpart to WFP. Collaboration is strong with the Nutrition Department of the Ministry of Public Health and Population (MoH) and the National School Feeding Programme (PNCS) of the Ministry of National Education and Professional Training (MoE).
38. MINUSTHA and USA military are also stakeholders in WFP operations. Civil/military coordination was particularly important during the initial stage of earthquake response. Areas of coordination were in food distribution for security escorts to convoy and security at food distribution sites, security food storage and management of port and airport.
39. Finally, the Haiti Evaluation Task Force of the humanitarian community which aims to coordinate evaluations will be a source of valuable information. A large number of evaluations have been/are being conducted; the evaluation team will seek to generate synergies by using the findings/evidence that others generated if and whenever applicable and useful. ALNAP portal lists a number of these evaluations.

3. Subject of the evaluation

3.A. WFP Portfolio in Haiti

40. WFP has been present in Haiti since 1969. Since 2005 the WFP assistance has been increasing from 25,700 MT for 1.5M beneficiaries to reach some 65,800 MT of commodities distributed to 3.15 M beneficiaries in 2009. WFP plans to reach some 310,000 MT distributed to 3.9 M beneficiaries in 2010. The direct WFP expenses accordingly increased from 215 M US\$ in 2005 to 72.6 M US\$ in 2009. Expenses may well reach in the 450 M US\$ for 2010.
41. Since 2005 WFP implemented 14 operations ranging from a (1) country programme and (1) development activity to EMOPs (4) and PRROs (3) supported by various Special Operations (5).
42. For that period, while responding to emergencies, WFP has been focusing its resources on recovery activities, in the aftermath of civil unrest, floods, drought and earthquake. These activities consist mainly of school feeding, support to people living with HIV/AIDS, Mother and Child nutrition and food for assets.
43. WFP in Haiti also made use of a grant (French Trust Fund) for the establishment of a school feeding baseline survey (2007) under PRRO 10674.
44. Analytical work is also part of the WFP activities in Haiti. In the past 5 years, WFP has conducted various food security analysis including CFSVAs, EFSAs, CFSAMs and contribution to local initiatives, particularly to the National Coordination for Food Security (*Coordination Nationale de la Securite Alimentaire*).

FIGURE 3: WFP OPERATIONS ACTIVE 2005-2010

		No. of operations	Total Budget Weight (MUSD) ¹	Weight (%)	Food Distributed (MT)					
					2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010*
DEV/CP	Development	2	46.13	4%	6,978	9,118	8,976	2,662	4,055	0
EMOP	Emergency operations	4	507.85	49%	6,854	0	0	8,965	7,743	229,393
PRRO	Relief and Recovery	3	346.15	33%	9,198	11,000	15,157	38,720	54,038	80,993
SO	Special operations	5	133.23	13%						0
Total		14	1,033		23,030	20,118	24,133	50,347	65,836	310,386

Source: SPR and Project Documents, WFP ODXR Programme of Work 4/10/2010, planned needs (*).

¹ As per latest SPR

45. **Geographical area:** WFP operations are implemented country wide in response to disasters while the development activities take into account government's priorities, health and nutrition situation and, vulnerability to natural disasters and food aid coverage, leading to intervening the Nord, Nord Est, Nord-Ouest, Ouest and Artibonite departments.
46. **Strategic objectives:** The period under review covers different WFP corporate Strategic Plans. In relation to the WFP Strategic Plan in force, The Haiti portfolio aims more specifically to the following objectives. Their estimated relative importance in terms of number of beneficiaries met for SO1 to SO4 is also presented.
- Strategic Objective 1** – Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies: assisting disaster victims. Approximate 70 percent of beneficiaries.
 - Strategic Objective 2** – Prevent acute hunger and invest in disaster preparedness and mitigation measures: by strengthening community capacity to reduce risks and adapt to climate variability. Approximate 5 percent of beneficiaries.
 - Strategic Objective 3** – Restore and rebuild lives and livelihoods in post-conflict, post-disaster or transition situations: by 1) increasing access to food to mitigate seasonal food insecurity, and restore assets affected by shocks and 2) stabilize children's participation in education. Approximate 15 percent of beneficiaries.
 - Strategic Objective 4** – Reduce chronic hunger and undernutrition: by improving the nutrition status of 1) targeted women and children and 2) PLHIV. Approximate 10 percent of beneficiaries.
 - Strategic Objective 5** – Strengthen the capacities of countries to reduce hunger, including through hand-over strategies and local purchase: by building consensus on programme design and partnership opportunities, including community initiatives.
47. An Office of Evaluation (OE)-managed evaluation of the PRRO 10382 revealed that the operation addresses the priority needs of the country and targets vulnerable populations. Also, the project design, which combines emergency and recovery components, and the various components are deemed appropriate and relevant. The evaluation, which was carried out over three-quarters of the intervention period, shows that the implementation of activities was only 47 percent despite adequate funding.

3.B. Scope of the Evaluation


48. The portfolio evaluation will look across operational divides to provide an assessment of the relevance and coherence of the WFP portfolio as a whole, of its evolution overtime, of its performance, and of the strategic role played by WFP in Haiti, as detailed in section 4 below. The focus will be on how groups of activities across operations have contributed together to their respective objectives stated in paragraph 46, e.g. how targeted food distributions; emergency nutrition programmes and food for work have together and across all 14 operations contributed to these objectives.

49. The scope of this evaluation will include the 14 operations which were active from May 2005 to Dec 2010 inclusive and will also include the grants used during that period. The special operations, in support to WFP intervention in Haiti are included in the portfolio under evaluation.
50. A five year window will allow for the inclusion of the PRROs which marked a repositioning of WFP in Haiti and covers the period of increasing humanitarian aid to the country.¹²⁸
51. The analytical work conducted by WFP (either alone or with partners¹²⁹), as well as participation to local strategic processes also forms part of the scope of this evaluation.
52. The geographical scope of this evaluation is the entire country.

4. Evaluation Questions

53. The CPE will be addressing the following three key questions, which will be further detailed in a matrix of evaluation questions to be developed by the evaluation team during the inception phase. Collectively, the questions aim at highlighting the key lessons from the WFP country presence and performance, which could inform future strategic and operational decisions. It should be noted that question three will constitute the largest part of the inquiry and evaluation report.

FIGURE 4: COUNTRY PORTFOLIO EVALUATION MODEL



SO: Strategic Objective; SF: School Feeding; GFD: General Food Distribution; FFA/W/T: Food for Assets/Work/Training; ART, TB & PMTCT: Anti-Retroviral Therapy, Tuberculosis and Prevention of Mother to Child Transmission; MCH: Mother and Child Health.

54. **Question one - Strategic alignment** of the WFP portfolio including the extent to which:
 - i) its main objectives and related activities have been in line with the country's humanitarian and developmental needs, priorities and capacities and;
 - ii) its objectives have been coherent

¹²⁸ See figure 2.

¹²⁹ CFSVA, EFSA, etc.

with the stated national agenda and policies, including sector policies; iii) its objectives have been coherent and harmonised with those of partners (multilateral, bilateral and NGOs); iv) WFP has been strategic in its alignment and positioned itself where it can make the biggest difference; and v) there have been trade-offs between aligning with national strategies on one hand and with WFP's mission, strategic plans and corporate policies on the other hand.

55. **Question two - Making strategic choices** including the extent to which WFP: i) has analysed the national hunger, food security and nutrition issues, or used existing analyses to understand the key hunger challenges in the country; ii) contributed to placing these issues on the national agenda, to developing related national or partner strategies and to developing national capacity on these issues; iii) positioned itself as a strategic partner for the government, multilateral, bilateral and NGO partners and in which specific areas; and iv) identify the factors that determined existing choices (perceived comparative advantage, corporate strategies, national political factors, resources, organisational structure, monitoring information etc.) to understand these drivers of strategy and how they need to be considered and managed when developing a country strategy.
56. **Question three - Performance and Results** of the WFP portfolio including: i) the relevance to the needs of the people; ii) the level of efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of the main WFP programme activities and explanations for these results (including factors beyond WFP's control); iii) the level of synergy and multiplying effect between similar activities in different operations and between the various main activities regardless of the operations; and iv) the level of synergies and multiplying opportunities with partners (multilateral, bilateral and NGOs) at operational level. In relation to question three, it should be emphasised that in light of the strategic nature of CPEs, the focus shall not be on assessing individual operations per se but rather to look across operational divides to provide an assessment of the performance and results of the portfolio.

5. Evaluation Approach

5.A. Evaluability Assessment

57. Evaluability is the extent to which an activity or a programme can be evaluated in a reliable and credible fashion, which depends on the clear understanding of the situation before assistance was provided, a clear statement of intended outcomes and impacts, clearly defined appropriate indicators, and target dates by which expected outcomes and impacts should occur
58. The challenges of evaluating the WFP Haiti portfolio are:
- The absence of an overall strategy and logframe for the WFP portfolio in Haiti. WFP did not prepare country strategies stating WFP's objectives and goals for the portfolio as a whole. Each operation has its own logical framework and additional operations are created as needs arise.
 - The difficulty of assessing the less tangible aspects of positioning oneself strategically as a partner and of influencing the strategies of others are difficult to measure.
 - Baseline and monitoring data as well as evaluation information (self-evaluations, reviews and evaluations of partners) are available; however they tend to focus on the output rather than on the outcome or goal levels. They will thus be insufficient to assess outcomes and impact in a systematic manner.
59. A WFP Food security and Vulnerability Analysis was conducted in 2004, which was followed by a CFSVA – 2007/2008. These will be useful snapshots of households vulnerability profiles at different times, allowing for trend analysis. Also, a WFP emergency food security assessment was completed following the 2010 earthquake. Food security information from third party (FEWS NET and PDNA) will also allow for triangulation and further snapshots over the period under evaluation.

60. Project documents make reference to the elaboration of baseline information: for the current EMOP, it is planned that baseline information produced through the EFSA will be evaluated at the end of the operation through a final survey. Resources have been budgeted to implement these studies. The current PRRO states that a baseline will be established and that WFP field monitors will collect quantitative and qualitative data regularly, which will be analysed jointly by the vulnerability analysis and mapping and programme units. Similarly, past EMOPs and PRRO make such reference. Furthermore, a school feeding baseline is reported as having been conducted in 2007. The evaluation will assess their existence and quality for potential use for this evaluation.
61. A challenge to the evaluation is the frequency and magnitude of natural disasters may induce setback to progress achieved previously and affect negatively gains made in improving food security and the nutrition status of the population. The evaluation team will need to take this into account when dealing with the above mentioned information.
62. The inclusion of the special operations in support to EMOPs and PRROs in the scope of this evaluation may prove challenging. Typically, information that would allow to measure their degree of success or failure is not available (baseline, clear targets, etc.) though SPRs are produced. This aspect will have to be carefully incorporated in the evaluation.
63. Finally, the OE-managed evaluation of PRRO 10382 will provide information to the degree of success of that operation which is part of the portfolio under evaluation.

5.B. Methodology

64. The evaluation will employ relevant internationally agreed evaluation criteria including those of relevance, coherence (internal and external), efficiency, effectiveness, impact, sustainability and connectedness.
65. During the inception phase, the evaluation team will design the evaluation methodology to be presented in the inception report. The methodology should:
 - a) build on the logic of the portfolio and on the common objectives arising across operations.
 - b) be geared towards addressing the evaluation questions presented in section 4. A model looking at groups of “main activities” across a number of operations rather than at individual operations should be adopted.
 - c) take into account the limitations to evaluability pointed out in 5.A as well as budget and timing constraints.
66. The methodology should demonstrate impartiality and lack of biases by relying on a cross-section of information sources (e.g. stakeholder groups, including beneficiaries, etc.) and using a mixed methodological (e.g. quantitative, qualitative, participatory) to ensure triangulation of information through a variety of means. The sampling technique to impartially select field visit sites and stakeholders to be interviewed should be specified.

5.C. Quality Assurance

67. WFP’s evaluation quality assurance system (EQAS) is based on the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) norms and standards and good practice of the international evaluation community (ALNAP and DAC). It sets out processes with-in built steps for quality assurance and templates for evaluation products. It also includes quality assurance of evaluation reports (inception, full and summary reports) based on standardised checklists. EQAS will be systematically applied during the course of this evaluation and relevant documents provided to the evaluation team. The evaluation manager will conduct the first level quality assurance, while the OE Director will conduct the second level review. This quality assurance process does not interfere with the views and independence of the evaluation team, but ensures the report provides the necessary evidence in a clear and convincing way and draws its conclusions on that basis.

68. The evaluation team will be required to ensure the quality of data (validity, consistency and accuracy) throughout the analytical and reporting phases.

6. Organisation of the evaluation

6.A. Phases and Deliverables

69. The evaluation will take place in five phases with timing as shown above:

- (i) **Preparation** is to establish and agree on the terms of reference, identify the evaluation team leader and team members, establish the reference group and peer review panel, and compile background information and relevant documents for easy access of the evaluation team during the next phase.
- (ii) **Inception phase** is for the evaluation team to arrive at a common understanding of the terms of reference, review documentation, develop an evaluation matrix accordingly, decide on the methodologies to be used during the evaluation and site selection for field work, assign division of responsibilities in the team and determine the logistics arrangements for field work and the timetable for delivery of the evaluation report. This phase will include a briefing at WFP HQ.
- (iii) **Evaluation phase** is the actual field mission in country. The mission will allow for direct interaction with stakeholders, including beneficiaries. This phase will include the field work in Haiti and a debriefing.
- (iv) **Reporting** is the preparation of the evaluation report including quality control/comments steps.
- (v) **Executive Board and Follow up** is for the dissemination of report.

FIGURE 5: EVALUATION TIMELINE

CPE – Phases, Deliverables and Timeline		Key Dates
Phase 1 – Preparation		
	Desk review, first draft of TOR and quality assurance	01 SEP - 15 Nov 2010
	Circulation of TOR and review	16 – 26 Nov 2010
	Identification and recruitment of evaluation team	23 Dec 2010
	Final TOR	30 Dec 2010
Phase 2 – Inception		
	Briefing core team at WFP HQ	12-14 Jan 2011
	Preparatory mission to Country (Evaluation manager and team leader)	24-28 Jan 2011
	Review documents and draft inception report including methodology.	29 Jan – 12 Feb 2011
	Submit draft inception report to OE	14 Feb 2011
	OE quality assurance and feedback	17 Feb 2011
	Revise inception report	18 – 28 Feb 2011
	Submit revised inception report to OE	07 Mar 2011
	OE shares inception report with stakeholders for information	09 Mar 2011
Phase 3 - Evaluation Mission		
	Field work	21 Mar – 06 Apr 2011

Debriefing	07 Apr 2011
Aide memoire	08 Apr 2011
Phase 4 – Reporting	
Draft evaluation report	08 – 30 Apr 2011
Submit Draft evaluation report to OE	02 May 2011
OE quality feedback	13 May 2011
Revise evaluation report	16–23 May 2011
Submit revised evaluation report to OE	23 May 2011
OE shares evaluation report with stakeholders (working level)	23 May – 03 Jun 2011
OE consolidate comments	06 Jun 2011
Revise evaluation report	07 – 17 Jun 2011
Submit revised evaluation report to OE	20 Jun 2011
OE circulates the Executive Summary to WFP’s Executive Staff	22 – 30 Jun 2011
OE consolidate comments	01 Jul 2011
Revise Executive Summary of evaluation report	01-05 Jul 2011
Submit final evaluation report to OE	07 Jul 2011
Phase 5 Executive Board and follow-up	
Editing / translation of summary report	08 – 30 Jul 2011
Preparation of Management response	Jul 2011
Preparation of evaluation brief and dissemination of reports	Sep 2011
Presentation of evaluation summary report to the EB	EB.2 Nov 2011
Presentation of management response to the EB	EB.2 Nov 2011

6.B. Evaluation Team

70. The **team leader** for the evaluation requires strong evaluation and leadership skills and technical expertise in one of the technical areas listed below. His/her primary responsibilities will be (a) setting out the methodology and approach in the inception report; (b) guiding and managing the team during the inception and evaluation phase and overseeing the preparation of working papers; (c) consolidating team members’ inputs to the evaluation products; (d) representing the evaluation team in meetings with stakeholders; (e) delivering the inception report, draft and final evaluation reports (including the Executive Board summary report) in line with agreed OE standards (EQAS) and agreed timelines. The full job description is provided separately.
71. The **evaluation team** will bring together a complementary combination of technical expertise in the fields of education, nutrition, HIV&AIDS, emergencies, livelihoods support and logistics. The team leader will be internationally recruited. The remaining team members can be a mix of international and national recruitment. The blend of technical areas across the team will depend on that of the team leader first. At least one team member should be familiar with WFP’s work in general. Finally, capacity development expertise will be required.
72. Main areas of expertise among team members are proposed to be divided as follows:
- a) Evaluation, (food aid/food security)

- b) Nutrition / food security analysis
- c) HIV and AIDS
- d) Education
- e) Logistics

73. The **evaluation team members** will contribute to the design of the evaluation methodology in their area of expertise; undertake documentary review prior to fieldwork; conduct field work to generate additional evidence from a cross-section of stakeholders, including carrying out site visits, as necessary to collect information; participate in team meetings, including with stakeholders; prepare inputs in their technical area for the evaluation products; and contribute to the preparation of the evaluation report. The full job descriptions are provided separately.
74. All members of the evaluation team will abide by the Code of Conduct for evaluators, ensuring they maintain impartiality and professionalism.

6.C. Roles and Responsibilities

75. This evaluation is managed by the WFP Office of Evaluation. Michel Denis has been appointed as evaluation manager. The Evaluation manager has not worked on issues associated with the subject of evaluation in the past. He is responsible for drafting the TOR; selecting and contracting the evaluation team; preparing and managing the budget; setting up the review group; organizing the team briefing in HQ; assisting in the preparation of the field missions; conducting the first level quality assurance of the evaluation products and consolidating comments from stakeholders on the various evaluation products. He will also be the main interlocutor between the evaluation team, represented by the team leader, and WFP counterparts to ensure a smooth implementation process.
76. The Co is expected to provide information necessary to the evaluation; be available to the evaluation team to discuss the programme, its performance and results; facilitate the evaluation team's contacts with stakeholders in Haiti; set up meetings and field visits, organize for interpretation if required and provide logistic support during the fieldwork.
77. Relevant WFP stakeholders at Regional Bureau and HQ levels are expected to be available for interviews/meetings with the evaluation team and to comment on the various reports throughout the evaluation process.
78. To ensure the independence of the evaluation, the CO and Regional Bureau staff will not be part of the evaluation team or participate in meetings where their presence could bias the responses of the stakeholders.

6.D. Communication

79. The evaluation will ensure communications at several milestones in the form of distributing and discussing: (a) the draft terms of reference; (b) the draft inception report; (c) briefing for the WFP CO and key partners at the beginning and end of the fieldwork; (d) the evaluation report. In addition, the evaluation results will be incorporated into OE's new lessons' sharing system (planned for 2011) to ensure lessons will be accessible to users in and outside WFP. The evaluation report will be written in French.

6.E. Budget

80. The evaluation will be financed from OE's Programme Support and Administrative budget. The total budget for the evaluation team is US\$220,000.

Library and Reference Material

File name
1 - Docs on Evaluation exercise
A - Evaluation Quality Assurance System files
1 - Inception Report
CPE Inception report Process.pdf
CPE Inception report Template.pdf
CPE Inception Report Quality Check list.pdf
TN Work Plan and Proposed Stakeholders Meetings.doc
2 - Evaluation Report
CPE Evaluation reports and follow up phase Process.pdf
CPE Evaluation Report Quality Check list.pdf
CPE Evaluation Report template.pdf
3 - Technical Notes
Haiti Evaluation Model.pdf
TN - evaluation matrix.doc
TN Evaluation criteria.pdf
CPE ER Template.dotx
Impacts evaluations and Development - NONIE Guidance.pdf
UNEG Code of Conduct 2008.pdf
WFP evaluation policy.pdf
2 - Background documents
A - General docs on WFP
1 - WFP - UN Documents
Consolidated framework of WFP policies (Nov 2010).pdf
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10 - Procurement
Food procurement report 2009.pdf
Local procurement of food and non food.pdf
11 - Safety nets
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12 - Capacity Development
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Operational Guide to Strengthen Capacity of Nations to Reduce Hunger (Mar 2010).PDF
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13 - Disaster and risk reduction
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14 - Refugees
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15 - HIV & AIDS

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16 - REACH

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2 - Partnerships

[NGO partnership framework.pdf](#)[Working with partners.pdf](#)

3 - Gender

[Gender and Enhanced Commitment to Women.pdf](#)[WFP Gender Policy \(Feb 2009\).pdf](#)[Women's Control Of Food In Relief \(Dec 2004\).pdf](#)

4 - Livelihood

[Livelihoods in emergencies \(May 2003\).PDF](#)

5 - Nutrition

[10 min to learn about \(2008\).pdf](#)[Food for nutrition mainstreaming nutrition in WFP \(Apr 2004\).pdf](#)[Micronutrient fortification \(Apr 2004\).PDF](#)[Mother and child nutrition \(MCHN\).pdf](#)[Nutrition in emergencies \(Apr 2004\).PDF](#)

6 - School feeding

[Essential Package.pdf](#)[HIVAIDS education School Feeding.pdf](#)[Rethinking School Feeding.pdf](#)[School feeding and nutrition 2010.pdf](#)[School Feeding guidance note 1 \(SF and micronutrients\) 2009.pdf](#)[School Feeding Policy \(Oct 2009\).pdf](#)

7 - FFW

[10 Key Steps for your FFW projects English.pdf](#)[Food for work and assets GUIDELINE.pdf](#)

8 - Cash and Voucher

[Cash and vouchers manual.pdf](#)[Voucher opportunities.pdf](#)

9 - Targeting

[Targeting guideline.pdf](#)

B - Documents on HAITI from WFP

[Haiti CSO 2001.pdf](#)

C - Documents on HAITI from external sources

1 - UNDP

[Annual Report 2009.pdf](#)[Haiti CCA 2000.pdf](#)[Les lecons du Programme de Gouvernance Locale dans le Nord-Est \(Oct 2007\).pdf](#)

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UNDP strategic plan, 2008-2011.pdf

2 – UN

CAP Haiti mid year review (Jun 2010).pdf

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SUMMARY Mission d'évaluation de la récolte et de la sécurité alimentaire en Haïti (Sep 2010).pdf

SUMMARY Rapid post-earthquake food security assessment (Mar 2010).pdf

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4 - Evaluation Reports covering Haiti

A - Internal Evaluations

Summary WFP PRRO 10382 Evaluation (Oct 2007).pdf

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B - External Evaluations

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5 - Documents on WFP operations 2006-2010

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Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis Report 2005	WFP/VAM
Earthquake Health Response 2010	WHO
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Annex 3: List of persons consulted

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Annex 4: Methodology / Evaluation Matrix

EVALUATION MATRIX: ISSUE #1: STRATEGIC ALIGNMENT OF WFP/HAITI PORTFOLIO

Key Questions for the Evaluation	Main Sources	Indicators	Analyses
i) its main objectives and related activities have been in line with the country's humanitarian and developmental needs, priorities and capacities			
What were the main humanitarian and development needs, priorities, and capacities during 2005 - 2010?	World Bank, WFP docs, FEWS NET, Government docs	Importance of issues in PRSP, CFSVA, and government docs	Chronology of key events
How did changes in the humanitarian and development conditions on the ground, which have included such natural disasters as cyclones, floods, a major earthquake, in addition to an international food crisis, influence changes in operations (timing, content)?	WFP docs Staff interviews Partner interviews	Evidence of adaptations to WFP programmes	Comparison of key events and WFP objectives
ii) its objectives have been coherent with the stated national agenda and policies, including sector policies			
Did the Government have a stated agenda related to emergency assistance, food security, gender, health/nutrition, and education/school feeding?	Government docs Partner interviews	Existence of government strategy	Qualitative assessment
How did repeated national disaster and international food and economic crises affect adherence to this agenda? (Were there sufficient resources and follow up)?	Government docs Partner interviews	Government programme funding records	Qualitative assessment
How did this agenda change over the 2005 – 2010 time period? If yes, what were the changes?	Government docs Partner interviews	Evidence of adaptations to government strategies	Qualitative assessment
iii) its objectives have been coherent and harmonized with those of partners (multilateral, bilateral and NGOs)			
Were partner objectives and strategies clearly stated and available?	Partner docs Partner interviews	Existence of partner strategies	Qualitative assessment
To what extent did the objectives of WFP receive support and backing from the donors? Did the donors have a good reading and understanding of the WFP's objectives?	Donor community WFP programme manager	Program funding records	Qualitative assessment
iv) WFP has been strategic in its alignment and positioned itself where it can make the biggest difference			
Has WFP been strategic in its alignment? If so, indicate how, and in what manner. Assess impact.	Staff interviews Donor community	Existence of GOVERNMENT and partner strategies	Qualitative Assessment
What are the key elements of the strategic alignment? What were the key drivers?	Staff interviews	Program reports	Qualitative Assessment
v) there have been trade-offs between aligning with national strategies on one hand and with WFP's mission, strategic plans and corporate policies on the other hand			
Were trade-offs between aligning with national strategies and WFP strategic plans and corporate policies necessary?	WFP docs Staff interviews (esp CD,DCD, and programme)	Evidence of adaptations to accommodate discrepancies	Qualitative assessment
Were there periods where WFP was not able to realize its strategic plan because of a lack of resources?	WFP docs Staff interviews (esp CD,DCD, and programme)	Program evaluation reports	Qualitative assessment
What was the impact of the various crises on the relative level of resources available?	WFP docs Staff interviews	Program evaluation reports	Qualitative assessment

EVALUATION MATRIX: ISSUE #2: MAKING STRATEGIC CHOICES

Key Questions	Main Sources	Indicators	Analyses
i) Has analysed the national hunger, food security and nutrition issues, or used existing analyses to understand the key hunger challenges in the country			
What analytical framework was used?	WFP docs Staff interviews	Project planning documents	Qualitative assessment
Did the analytical framework that was used allow for a consistent determination of key nutrition, education, and food security indicators?	WFP docs Staff interviews Partner interviews	Consideration of issues in project planning docs	Qualitative assessment
Did key WFP documents reflect the national hunger, food security, education, and nutrition issues during 2005 - 2010?	WFP docs (operations, SPRs, ...)	Alignment of WFP strategy with development needs in programme operations docs	Qualitative assessment
ii) contributed to placing these issues on the national agenda, to developing related national or partner strategies and to developing national capacity on these issues			
Is there an official WFP policy that outlines the role and expectations for Country Offices?	WFP Rome docs and interviews	Existence of policy	Qualitative assessment
What specific actions/activities has the CO undertaken to place these issues on the national agenda?	Staff interviews Partner interviews (especially Government)	Evidence of WFP leadership in elevating issue at national level	Qualitative assessment
Is WFP seen as a leader in terms of food security, hunger, nutrition and education issues?	Partner interviews	Partner perception	Qualitative assessment
iii) positioned itself as a strategic partner for the government, multilateral, bilateral and NGO partners and in which specific areas			
How has WFP dialogued with government, multilateral, bilateral, and NGO partners?	Staff interviews Partner interviews	Meeting minutes/participation	Qualitative assessment
How do these partners perceive WFP as a strategic partner?	Partner interviews	Partner perception; MOUs	Qualitative assessment
iv) identify the factors that determined existing choices (perceived comparative advantage, corporate strategies, national political factors, resources, organizational structure, monitoring information, etc.) to understand these drivers of strategy and how they need to be considered and managed when developing a country strategy			
What were the drivers of strategic choices made by WFP during 2005 - 2010?	Staff interviews	Project planning docs	Qualitative assessment
Were these drivers the most effective ones?	Staff interviews Partner interviews	Expected vs. actual impact	Qualitative assessment
Were there other objectives that might have been more important (e.g., water and sanitation, development of agriculture through local purchase) that might have contributed more to food security and nutrition outcomes?	Staff interviews Partner interviews	Expected vs. actual impact	Qualitative assessment

EVALUATION MATRIX: ISSUE #3: PERFORMANCE AND RESULTS OF THE WFP/HAITI PORTFOLIO

Key Questions	Main Sources	Indicators	Analyses
i) the relevance to the needs of the people			
Was programme development adapted based on documented needs?	WFP docs Staff interviews Partner interviews	Evidence of adaptations to development context	Qualitative assessments
Are the food products provided culturally and nutritionally appropriate for the target beneficiaries?	WFP docs Partner interviews Beneficiary interviews	Level of satisfaction of beneficiaries	Qualitative assessments
Has sufficient attention been paid to requests from the government to integrate local purchases of food which could enhance longer-term prospects for food security?	Staff interviews Partner interviews	Evidence of adaptation to sectoral government policy	Qualitative assessments
ii) the level of efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of the main WFP programme activities and explanations for these results (including factors beyond WFP's control)			
How efficient and effective has programme delivery been for the different technical activities (FFW, school feeding, nutrition, logistics)?	Operation documents WFP Country Office Partner interviews Clinic/school/camp records	Transit times Final cost Compliance with agreed-upon time frame Quality of information exchange	Review of actual cost Least cost method Competitors cost Cost of other options
What impact has the programme activities had? Nutritional status improved? Improved access to education? Policy changes? Other stakeholder impacts?	Data and information from World Bank, VAM, SPRs, JAMs, FEWS NET WFP documents (e.g., project, SPR, JAM, ...) WFP Country Office Partner interviews Clinic/school/camp records Beneficiary interviews	GAM/SAM rates MUAC Chronic malnutrition rates Micronutrient deficiencies Disease rates Clinic/school attendance (male, female, total) Quality of clinic/school facilities Clinic staff/teacher qualifications Literacy rates percent of pop food security Income Calorie intake per day etc	Quantitative analysis (establish baseline and compare with trend data) Qualitative assessment
How sustainable are outcomes of the operations, including outcomes and continuity? Is there an exit strategy around each action?	Data and information from the World Bank and Government WFP Country Office Partner interviews Beneficiary interviews	Public expenditure data and assessment of will, capacity, and resource availability Partner, government, and beneficiary perception of activities and their appropriateness	Institutional assessment of government using public expenditure data and qualitative assessment Qualitative assessment of perception of activities
What technical support role does the Regional Bureau play? Are they helping to fill gaps in capacity?	WFP staff interviews	Staff perception	Qualitative assessment
Does WFP have the correct staffing structure to undertake the necessary operations in Haiti? Do the staff have the correct skill sets? Are they properly supported by Rome and Regional Bureau?	WFP Country Office Partner interviews	Impact of interventions compared to need	Qualitative assessment
iii) the level of synergy and multiplying effect between similar activities in different operations and between the various main activities regardless of the operations			

Key Questions	Main Sources	Indicators	Analyses
How well do the technical staff working on different operations interact (share data, information, lessons learned)?	WFP CO(Port au Prince and ad sub-offices)	Formal and informal KM mechanisms	Qualitative assessment
How well does the WFP CO team work with their sub-office technical counterparts (share data, information, lessons learned)?	WFP CO(Port au Prince and ad sub-offices)	Formal and informal KM mechanisms	Qualitative assessment
iv) the level of synergies and multiplying opportunities with partners (multilateral, bilateral, and NGOs) at operational level			
How well do WFP staff interact with partners (share data, information, lessons learned) ?	WFP staff Partners (government, multilateral, bilateral, and NGOs)	Formal and informal KM mechanisms	Qualitative assessment
How well does the WFP staff in Port au Prince with their counterparts outside Port au Prince (share data, information, lessons learned)?	WFP staff Partners (government, multilateral, bilateral, and NGOs)	Formal and informal KM mechanisms	Qualitative assessment

Acronyms

ALNAP	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance
AAA	<i>Agro Action Allemande</i>
ART	antiretroviral therapy
BR	Budget revisions (BR2, Budget revision 2)
CAP	Consolidated Appeal Process
CAS	community asset score
CCA	Common Country Assessment
CD	Country Director
CERF	UN Central Emergency Response Fund
CFFW	Cash and Food for Work
CFSAM	Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission
CFSVA	Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis
CFW	Cash for Work
CNSA	National Coordination for Food Security
CO	Country Office
COMPAS	WFP Logistics Programming
CP	Country Programme
CPE	Country Portfolio Evaluation
CSB	Corn Soya Blend
DEV	Develop Projects (same as CP)
DHS	Demographic and Health Survey
DOT	Directly Observed Therapy
DPC	Department of Civil Protection
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
DSC	direct support costs
EFSA	Emergency Food Security Assessment
EMOP	Emergency Operation
EB	Executive Board
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FFT	food-for-training
FFW	food-for-work
FSMS	Food Security Monitoring System
GAM	global acute malnutrition
GFD	general food distribution
GTEF	<i>Groupe de travail sur l'éducation et la formation</i>
HDR	Human Development Report
HEB	High Energy Biscuit
HRF	Haiti Reconstruction Fund
HQ	Headquarters
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IRA	United Nations International Relations Association
JAM	Joint Assessment Mission

M&E	monitoring and evaluation
MARNDR	Ministry of Agriculture Natural Resources, and Rural Development
MCHN	maternal and child health and nutrition
MENFP	<i>Ministere de l'Education nationale et de la Formation professionnelle</i>
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MSPP	The Ministry of Public Health and Population
MT	metric ton
MUAC	Mid-Upper Arm Circumference
NFI	non-food inputs
NGO	non-governmental organization
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OE	Office of Evaluation
PDNA	post-disaster needs assessment
PLHIV	people living with HIV
PNCS	Programme National de Cantines Scolaires
PNLS	National Programme in the Fight Against AIDS <i>(Programme National de Lutte contre le SIDA)</i>
PNSAN	<i>Plan National de Sécurité Alimentaire et Nutritionnelle</i>
PNW	pregnant and nursing women
PRRO	Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
RUSF	ready-to-use supplementary food
SAM	severe acute malnutrition
SF	supplementary feeding
SNA/EPT	National Strategy and Action Plan on Education for All
SO	Special Operation
SPR	Standardized Project Report
TB	tuberculosis
TF	therapeutic feeding
TSF	Targeted Supplementary Feeding
UN	United Nations
UNDAF	United Nations Development Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEG	United Nations Evaluation Group
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHAS	United Nations Humanitarian Air Service
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USA	United States of America
VAM	vulnerability analysis and mapping
WINGS	WFP Information Network and Global System
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

Office of Evaluation
www.wfp.org/evaluation



World Food Programme