

COUNTRY PORTFOLIO EVALUATION

Republic of Congo: An evaluation of WFP's Portfolio (2009-2012)

Evaluation Report

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Fact Sheet: WFP's portfolio in the Congo

Timeline and funding level of Congo portfolio 2007 - 2012


| Operation | Title | Time Frame | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | | | |
|--|---|-----------------|--------|-----------------------------|--|---|---------|---|--------|---------|--------|
| SO 200413 | Strengthening Logistics Capacity of the Government of the Republic of Congo to Support the Emergency in Brazzaville | May 12 - Oct 12 | | | | | | Req: \$450 thousand Contrib: \$ 425 thousand | | | |
| IRA-EMOP 200408 | Emergency Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons | Mar 12 - Aug 12 | | | | | | Req: \$ 1.5 | | | |
| DEV 200144 | Support to Primary Education (in Cuvette, Lekoumou, Plateaux, and Pool Regions) | Oct 11 - Dec 13 | | | | | | Req: \$14.2 Contrib: \$9.8 | | | |
| DEV 200211* | Development Operation Republic of Congo 200211 - Safety Net Programme | Jul 11 - Apr 13 | | | | | | Req: \$3.6 Contrib: \$3.1 | | | |
| PRRO 200147 | Assistance to Congolese Refugees from DRC in the Likouala Province of the Republic of the Congo | Mar 11 - Dec 12 | | | | | | Req: \$33.9 Contrib: \$13.2 | | | |
| EMOP 200095 | Food Assistance to Congolese Displaced in Likouala Province | Jan 10 - Feb 11 | | | | Req: \$37.7 Contrib: \$18.1 | | | | | |
| SO 200140 | Provision of Humanitarian Air Services in Congo | Jan 10 - Dec 10 | | | | Req: \$ 2,1 Contrib: \$ 482 thousand | | | | | |
| IR-EMOP 200093 | Displaced Population from DRC in the Likouala Region | Nov 09 - Feb 10 | | | Req: \$499 thousand Contrib: \$413 thousand | | | | | | |
| PRRO 10312.1 | Assistance to Populations Affected by Conflict and Poverty | Jun 07 - Jun 11 | | Req: \$29.1 Contrib: \$16.6 | | | | | | | |
| Food Distributed (MT) | | | 2,475 | 3,497 | 3,673 | 8,358 | 7,917 | 5,296 | | | |
| Direct Expenses (US\$ millions) | | | 2.8 | 3.4 | 4.5 | 11.6 | 11.7 | - | | | |
| % Direct Expenses: Congo vs. WFP World** | | | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | - | | | |
| Beneficiaries (actual) | | | M | F | M | F | M | F | M | F | |
| | | | 30,884 | 38,636 | 29,804 | 41,711 | 31,463 | 39,941 | 62,959 | 102,139 | 76,982 |
| Total of Beneficiaries (actual) | | | 69,520 | 71,515 | 71,404 | 165,098 | 222,026 | 174,117 | | | |

Source: last SPR available, Resource Situations, APR 2006 - 2012
Requirements (Req.) and Contributions (Contrib.) are US\$ millions
* Project did not start in 2011
** Absolute figures are too low and not captured by the %

| Activities by operation and beneficiaries proportion by activity 2009-2012 | | | | | | | |
|--|-----|-----------|-----------|-----|-------------|------------------|---------------------------|
| Type of activity / Operation | HIV | Education | Nutrition | GFD | FFW/FFT/FFA | Cash and Voucher | Strategic Objectives (SO) |
| IR-EMOP 200408** | | | | X | | | 1 |
| DEV 200144 | | X | | | | | 4 |
| DEV 200211* | X | X | X | | | X | 4, 5 |
| PRRO 200147 | | | | X | | | 1 |
| PRRO 10312.1 | X | X | X | X | X | | 1, 2, 3, 4 |
| EMOP 200095 | | | X | X | | | 1 |
| IR-EMOP 200093** | | | | X | | | 1 |
| Planned % of beneficiaries | 11% | 29% | 1% | 42% | 1% | - | |
| Actual % of beneficiaries | 9% | 24% | 0% | 52% | 1% | - | |

Source: Dakota, PD's, SPR's 2009-2012

Planned % of beneficiaries 2007-2012



Source: SPRs 2009-2012

Top 5 donors: USA, Brazil, UN CERF, European Commission, Republic of Congo

Partners: Government of Congo, 8 International Agencies, 14 NGOs

Executive Summary

Introduction

Evaluation Features

1. This country portfolio evaluation (CPE) covers operations in the Congo from 2009 to 2012. Country portfolio evaluations serve the dual purpose of facilitating accountability and contributing to learning. They evaluate the entirety of WFP activities in a country against three evaluation questions: i) portfolio alignment and strategic positioning; ii) factors that have driven WFP's strategic decision-making; and iii) performance and results. This CPE is of particular relevance as it involves a middle-income country (MIC) and comes at a time when a new country strategy document (CSD) and country programme are being prepared.
2. The evaluation was carried out by a team of independent consultants brought together by Mokoro Ltd, with fieldwork in January and March 2013. The main points of reference for the evaluation approach were the five Strategic Objectives from the WFP Strategic Plan (2008–2013); the principal outcomes across the component areas and the cross-cutting themes of the portfolio; and the evaluation questions set out in the terms of reference.
3. The team conducted an in-depth review of available data and documents, semi-structured interviews with informants, focus group discussions with beneficiaries, field visits and observations. The work covered all portfolio component areas and took place in four provinces. A total of 166 informant interviews and 14 focus-group discussions were conducted. Because time and resources were limited and in-country travel to remote locations was restricted, the evaluation team was unable to visit all sites of WFP operations, and field visits were short and intensive. General weaknesses and inconsistencies were found in monitoring and reporting; for closed operations, it was difficult to find beneficiaries or, in some cases, detailed documented evidence of results.

Context

4. In 2011 the population of the Congo was 4.1 million.¹ Since the ending of the civil war in 1999, the security situation has stabilized. With fast-growing internal revenue – oil accounted for 70 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2011 – the country has moved to MIC status.² It has the potential to invest in its national development plans, but is constrained by weak national institutions and administration with limited implementation capacity.³
5. Over the evaluation period, the country continued to face shocks and longer-term development challenges such as access to quality social services (health, education) and food insecurity. Significant inequalities persist (see Table 1), with half of the population living below the poverty line; the proportion is even higher for the 300,000 ethnic minority pygmy population.¹

¹ WFP development project 200144 – Support to Primary Education.

² WFP mid-term evaluation of the safety-net voucher pilot draft (14 January 2013).

³ "Four Strategic Evaluations on the Transition from Food Aid to Food Assistance: A Synthesis" (OE/2012/S002).

Table 1: Selected Social Indicators for the Congo

| <i>Human Development Report</i> indicators 2013 | | Data (%) |
|--|--------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| Poverty (percentage of population) | Vulnerable to poverty | 17.7 |
| | In severe poverty | 22.9 |
| | Below national poverty line | 50.1 |
| Contribution of deprivations to overall poverty ⁴ | Health | 45.6 |
| | Education | 10.4 |
| | Living standards | 44.0 |
| Gender inequality | <i>Human Development Report</i> rank | 142 nd of 186 countries |

Source: UNDP Human Development Report (2013)

6. Over the evaluation period, the country continued to face shocks and longer-term development challenges such as access to quality social services (health, education) and food insecurity. Significant inequalities persist (see Table 1), with half of the population living below the poverty line; the proportion is even higher for the 300,000 ethnic minority pygmy population.¹

7. The Congo is characterized by high levels of mortality and morbidity, reflecting weaknesses in the country's health system. AIDS remains a leading cause of death among adults, with HIV prevalence about twice as high for women as for men. Cases of tuberculosis (TB) are also on the increase.⁵

8. Nationwide demographic and health surveys conducted in 2005 and 2011/12 reveal a relatively stable nutritional situation for children under 5: stunting slightly decreased from 26 percent to 24 percent, wasting from 7 percent to 6 percent and underweight from 14 percent to 12 percent. Regional and age differences were observed for all three indicators. The level of acute malnutrition range from 12 percent to less than 3 percent across regions. Underweight was more common in rural areas (16 percent) than in urban areas (9 percent).

9. Food insecurity is more prevalent in rural areas, with 15 percent of rural households affected – more than double the national average. Two thirds of the population live in urban areas: the capital, Brazzaville, is a priority for addressing food insecurity, with 20 percent of the absolute number of food-insecure persons.⁶ Less than 2 percent of the arable land is cultivated, meaning that agriculture performs below its potential, contributing only 3.8 percent to GDP in 2005. Two thirds of food needs and 94 percent of cereal requirements are imported; as a result, food security is affected by inflation in both rural and urban areas,⁶ with particular implications for the poor. Recently, social protection has become an important element of the Government's agenda.

⁴ UNDP. 2013. This composite multi-dimensional indicator measures poverty according to the extent of people's deprivations in three areas – education, nutrition and standard of living – each of which has further sub-indicators. The overall indicator provides insight into different types of deprivation and how these are interconnected. It is a more comprehensive indicator than traditional income-based indicators.

⁵ World Health Organization. 2010. Factsheets of health statistics. Geneva.

⁶ WFP. 2010. *République du Congo – Analyse approfondie de la sécurité alimentaire et de la vulnérabilité*. Available at: <http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/ena/wfp223366.pdf> (french only)


10. Since 2000, the Congo has been transitioning from a humanitarian to a development context. However, humanitarian intervention has been required in response to several events, two of which are significant to the CPE. In late 2009 an estimated 115,000 refugees from the Democratic Republic of the Congo entered the country, requiring both immediate and longer-term assistance. In March 2012, the explosion of an arms depot in Brazzaville devastated the surrounding neighbourhoods and, according to official figures, killed 286 people, injured 3,277 and displaced over 10,000.

11. The Congo is an “aid orphan”: stability and economic growth are making it difficult to attract international aid. Official development assistance (ODA) has fluctuated significantly – from US\$200 million to US\$1.6 billion between 2004 and 2010^{7,8} – and remained low as a proportion of GDP.⁹ This has influenced the number and capacity of international organizations. Coordination within the aid community occurs only in response to specific needs, as and when required. The Government is keen to continue to engage with development partners and has recently provided funding directly to partners, including WFP.

WFP's portfolio and strategy

12. The CPE divided the portfolio conceptually into four component areas: humanitarian response, nutrition and health, education and social protection (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Evaluation model for the Congo CPE



13. During the period under review, the WFP country office implemented seven major operations across these component areas, on which the evaluation focused. Operations were progressively refocused on recovery, development and capacity development. Two development operations were initiated in 2011: i) the first focused on the expansion of school feeding in four regions (targeting enrolment and

⁷ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Financial tracking service. <http://fts.unocha.org/>

⁸ ODA for the Congo showed a marked increase in 2010; the largest bilateral ODA sector was debt-servicing.

⁹ United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Evaluation Office. 2008. Assessment of development results. Evaluation of UNDP contribution. Republic of the Congo. New York.

retention, in particular of girls); and ii) the second was a one-year pilot programme to build the Government's capacity to set up safety net programmes that use electronic voucher transfers. Table 2 provides an overview of the country office portfolio under review. The focus of activities has been on emergency general food distributions and support to education.

Table 2: Overview of WFP Operations in the Congo 2009-2012

| | EMOP 200095 Food assistance to DRC refugees in Likouala | PRRO 200147 Food assistance to DRC refugees in Likouala | SO 200413 Strengthening the logistics capacity of the Government of the Congo to respond to the explosion in Brazzaville | EMOP 200408 Food assistance to IDPs from Brazzaville explosion | DEV 200144 School feeding (Cuvette, Plateaux and Pool regions) | DEV 200211 Safety-net programme (Brazzaville and Pointe Noire) | PRRO 103121 Assistance to conflict and poverty affected populations (Pool) |
|----------------------------|---|--|---|---|---|---|---|
| Actual timeframe | 1 Jan 2010 – 28 Feb 2011 | 1 March 2011 – ongoing | May 31 – 31 October 2012 | March – 31 Aug. 2012 | 1 Jul 2011 – 31 Dec 2013 | 1 July 2011 – 30 April 2013 | April 2007 – 30 June 2011 |
| Targeted beneficiaries | 249 400 | 210 200 | 30 trained | 25 000 | 45 000 | 109 | 348 983 ^a |
| Actual beneficiaries | 225 114 | 206 058 | 25 trained | 17 866 | 109 686 | 19 200 | 180 764 ^a |
| Target tonnage (mt) | 27 245 | 25 698 | - | 1 249 | 874 | 37 929 | 21 073 ^b |
| Actual tonnage (mt) | 7 020 | 8 262 | - | 228 | 1 757 | 55 | 7 920 |
| Total budget appeal (US\$) | 33 308 502 | 33 827 940 | 450 000 | 1 464 091 | 14 241 781 | 3 579 405 | 29 145 708 ^c |
| % confirmed contributions | 55 | 45 | 94 | 98 | 69 | 87 | 50 |

Source: WFP project documents and Standard Project Reports

^a Includes only beneficiaries from the evaluation period 2009–2012.

^b Total target tonnage in 2011.

^c Refers to project duration 2007–2011.

Evaluation findings

Alignment and strategic positioning

14. The WFP portfolio evolved to respond to both development and humanitarian needs. Overall, geographical and beneficiary coverage matched the main needs. In the humanitarian domain, however, WFP was unable to shift from emergency feeding to save lives to food assistance in support of livelihoods when the context changed, because of the temporary nature of the assistance WFP provided to refugees expected to repatriate.

15. The policy environment evolved with a new National Development Plan and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, alongside work to develop sector-specific policies and plans, although a number of these remain to be formally defined and/or approved. WFP activities corresponded with the priorities expressed in these documents and with emerging/unwritten policy statements by the Government. In education (school feeding) and social protection WFP engaged with the Government to support ongoing processes of policy development. For the Government, WFP has been a privileged dialogue and implementation partner.

16. The evaluation found that WFP had a comparative advantage in school feeding and its humanitarian work, stemming from its strong field presence and

capacity to reach remote areas. In emergency situations WFP also had the capacity to respond quickly. With the reorientation of the portfolio to development work, WFP endeavoured to build a comparative advantage in the field of social protection and had a pioneering role in this respect. The country office also explored market access as part of its school feeding and social protection work. However, WFP's innovative role was not sufficiently matched with technical and operational capacity across portfolio areas. WFP was not perceived by development partners as having a strong comparative advantage in the technical capacity and organizational experience needed for development work.

17. The portfolio was aligned well with WFP corporate objectives, including the shift to food assistance. However, it did not consistently follow the specific guidance provided by WFP policies: in school feeding it did not include the introduction of an essential package; in social protection there was no capacity assessment or gender analysis; in the humanitarian response there was no shift to disaster mitigation; and in nutrition insufficient account was taken of epidemiological data, ensuring adequate levels of ownership, quality monitoring and evaluation, and establishing partnerships.

18. WFP project documents and United Nations development assistance frameworks included plans for alignment with both United Nations and other partners. For the most part, plans were not implemented. The main limiting factors were the small number of development partners, capacity constraints of partners and WFP, weak coordination between the United Nations country team and the Government, coupled with an unclear vision, funding shortfalls and lack of incentives for alignment.

Factors and Quality of Strategic Decision Making

19. External factors that affected the portfolio included the challenging logistics/transportation situation, the MIC context, the shift from a humanitarian to a development context, government funding capacity and strong interest, the influx of refugees and unforeseen events such as the March 2012 explosion. The main internal factor affecting the portfolio was the funding shortfall. WFP corporate strategies and country office capacities and constraints – inadequate human resources, inconsistent outcome monitoring and limited partnership opportunities – also shaped performance. The country office's entrepreneurial leadership in working with the Government on developing new interventions and exploring new sources of funding was recognized.¹⁰

20. The country context was characterized by limited analyses and little accurate up-to-date information. WFP used available studies and data to inform decision-making on priorities and programme content, and supplemented this with its own analysis of elements related to the portfolio component areas. Although these studies were relevant, they sometimes missed out on important aspects, affecting coherence in design and implementation. For example, this was reflected in WFP's gender approach, where sensitivity to gender constraints and target group issues was superficial.

21. WFP worked with the Government to help build the national social protection agenda. In education WFP supported efforts to develop a legal framework and

¹⁰ Japan, Brazil and the Government were all new donors to the country during the evaluation period.

guidance on school feeding. National capacity development was a minor, but growing, component of the portfolio and covered all four component areas. Government sectoral capacity in education was built through a visit to the WFP Centre of Excellence in Brazil. Capacity development efforts were not informed by specific analyses of capacity constraints.

22. WFP's technical and operational staff was increased to compensate for gaps identified at the start of the evaluation period. However, with two new development operations in 2011 and emerging work in market analysis, this did not fully meet the needs of the growing portfolio, because of funding shortages and in spite of staff numbers increasing more than originally planned. The planned increased involvement of NGOs in support of implementation did not materialize.

23. Systems to collect monitoring data were put in place across the portfolio and provided a range of output-related data and selected outcome data. This data covered the main aspects by component area and reflected the geographical scope of the portfolio. WFP did not consistently carry out baseline studies. The demands of the pilot and the complexity of conditions were not taken into account in the design of the monitoring system for the safety net programme. Monitoring data were analysed at the operational level to feed into reporting; however, the link between information and decision-making was not always made by either WFP or the Government. Information on outcomes was collected inconsistently, further hampering analysis of effectiveness over time. In the areas of education and social protection, government staff were involved in monitoring, but breaks in information collection and processing affected understanding and decision-making by WFP and by government counterparts.

24. Opportunities for partnership were scarce over the evaluation period given the paucity of potential partners. Selected operational partnerships were entered into across different portfolio components and involved the Government, private sector (in social protection), United Nations agencies (humanitarian) and NGOs (for humanitarian and nutrition work). Partnerships predominantly focused on logistical support for the delivery of food and services. In the later part of the evaluation period partnerships with a more technical focus were established with the Government in social protection and education. In the humanitarian area all partnership agreements were terminated at the end of 2012 for financial reasons and no plans for hand-over were made. The abrupt termination affected food distributions in late 2012 and early 2013.

Portfolio Performance and Results

25. The evaluation examined efficiency and effectiveness, synergies, impact and sustainability. Across the portfolio there were challenges in reaching the planned number of beneficiaries and in providing regular rations/vouchers that met the established requirements.¹¹ Portfolio performance was affected by considerable financial shortfalls, accessibility issues, poor transportation capacity of local transporters, procurement difficulties and internal capacity shortfalls affecting monitoring, design and operational planning.

¹¹ For example, transfers made through the safety-net programme for the period under review represented less than 15 percent of the planned value; in the refugee operations, 76 percent of planned beneficiaries received 34 percent of the planned tonnage.

Humanitarian assistance

26. During the evaluation period, WFP assisted between 95,100 and 124,700 refugees each year in Likouala province (94 percent of planned beneficiaries). More women than men were reached through general food distributions, which was a reflection of targets set. Across operations there were discrepancies between planned and actual beneficiaries. Distributions were not regular, nor did they consistently provide the planned 30-day ration in terms of either food basket or total calories, with beneficiaries receiving less than half – and in some cases only a quarter – of planned entitlements.

27. At the outcome level, for the refugee operations, studies found improved food security, acceptable food consumption scores, increased diversification of sources of income and lower malnutrition rates. These results could not be attributed entirely to WFP's operations given the lack of baseline data. The rations distributed by WFP were designed to cover 75 percent of the daily requirements according to assessed needs. However, rations distributed were less than planned and refugee populations all reported engaging in other activities to supplement their diets.

28. WFP responded quickly to the explosion in Brazzaville and provided essential coordination for the response. Although the project document originally estimated 25,000 people to be in need of food assistance, WFP served 17,866 people in camps, and not those in host communities. A follow-up review found that the majority of beneficiaries had acceptable food consumption scores.¹² WFP special operation 200413 aimed to increase government capacity in humanitarian logistics. A number of warehouses were established and staff trained, but outcome indicators were neither set nor measured.

Health and nutrition

29. Nutritional support for people living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA) on anti-retroviral treatment (ART) and for TB patients on directly observed treatment was the main nutrition activity in the portfolio. Planned figures for HIV/AIDS and TB patients were surpassed, but the number of beneficiaries reached decreased over the evaluation period from 6,000 in 2009 to less than 1,000 in 2012.

30. Actual beneficiary numbers fell short of plans in the prevention of mother-to-child transmission (PMTCT) component, which provided food rations to food-insecure mothers and children; 58.2 percent of the target of 600 was reached. A review of national statistics on the potential beneficiary numbers suggests the target was too high given actual needs and capacities. Reduced achievements were attributed to serious resourcing shortfalls, as was the lower target in 2011.

31. Planned support to malnourished children through two operations did not materialize because of the lack of partner NGOs.

32. For PMTCT, outcome indicators were not recorded and could not be established by the evaluation. For HIV patients on ART, adherence to treatment was very high at 98 percent between 2009 and 2011 and nutritional recovery improved from 90 percent in 2010 to 95 percent in 2011. HIV survival rate at 12 months improved from 75 percent in 2010 to 80 percent in 2011. Outcome indicators changed over the life of the same operation, making a consistent assessment difficult.

¹² *Enquête de sécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle des populations sinistrées par l'explosion de Mpila*. WFP country office assessment report, 2012.

Education

33. School feeding, which provided one cooked meal a day to children in remote rural schools, reached a total of 174,900 primary school children over the four-year period – 72 percent of the target of 241,000. WFP selected areas with poor nutrition indicators. The number of schools assisted by WFP increased from 180 in 2009 – 55 percent of the target – to 342 in 2012 – 98 percent of the target. Community and government involvement in school feeding was an important element of the model.

34. At the outcome level, WFP-supported schools increased enrolment year by year, from 6 percent in 2010 to 25.7 percent in 2012. Enrolment of indigenous children also increased. The ratio of girls to boys in the targeted schools increased from 0.90 in 2008 to 0.95 in 2012; the national gender parity index was 0.90 in 2009. Attendance rates at WFP-supported schools were consistently high throughout the evaluation period.

35. Over the evaluation period, the number of feeding days increased from less than half of school days to over three quarters. The school feeding intervention did not include most of the elements of the Essential Package. The motivation of the voluntary cooks – women who contribute between two and four days a month without remuneration – was affected by the abolition at the beginning of the 2012/13 school year of the food ration they formerly received. Studies were conducted during the evaluation period to develop an understanding of markets and local procurement.

36. At US\$80 per pupil per year in 2012, the school feeding results were achieved at double the average cost globally, reflecting difficult logistics and high transportation costs for implementation.

Social protection

37. The safety net pilot project sought to provide vouchers to over 500 households with pregnant or lactating women and/or with malnourished children under 2.¹³ The pilot reached all the intended beneficiary categories, although targets were exceeded in some cases and not reached in others. In 2012, 345 pregnant or lactating women were reached – 68.2 percent of planned.

1. In practice, the conditionality of health visits and education compliance, which was part of the project design and implementation, was not enforced under this pilot programme and no beneficiaries were excluded for not complying with conditions. Programme targeting was partially skewed towards women, and the gender imbalance was increased by men's reluctance to engage with the medical and social services that might have led to their registration for social transfers.

2. For the provision of vouchers, 14.5 percent of the planned amount of funds was transferred during 2012, with only seven of the nine monthly transfers made following the delayed start in April 2012. Numerous operational and logistical problems arose during the pilot period. In months when they actually received the transfer, households experienced a significant addition to their food supply, although data are insufficient to conclude whether their food needs were fully met.

¹³ Mortality of children under 5 has increased sharply in the Congo over the last decade: 104/1,000 live births/day in 1990 against 128/1,000 live births/day in 2009. The 2005 demographic and health survey showed that 70 percent of pregnant women and 60 percent of lactating women were anaemic (WFP DEV 200211, 2011).

Beneficiaries saw the benefits received as strictly temporary, and anticipated a relapse into poverty and poorer nutrition once they ceased.

3. At the outcome level, it is too early to provide a complete assessment of this pilot. WFP achieved a strong profile in social protection in the Congo by identifying an area of strategic development that was highly relevant to the needs of the largely impoverished population. The project did not include measures to help beneficiaries achieve resilient and sustainable livelihoods, such as transferring skills in the development of income-generating activities. Operationally, WFP and its government and private-sector partners did not have the human resources or the systems to implement or assess results of this activity adequately, even on a pilot scale.

Conclusions & Recommendations

Main Lessons for the Future

4. This section identifies lessons from the evaluation period that may be of relevance to the next period of engagement as well as to WFP more broadly.

- Small offices in MICs where funding from host countries may be possible have potential for innovation and for piloting new approaches that can feed into the wider organizational knowledge base.
- Progress at the policy level must be substantiated by solid operational performance. In the context of MICs, decisions on objectives need to be balanced with considerations about staffing needs and other inputs that will determine the quality and quantity of outputs. As a major funder, the Government may require more evidence of effectiveness and efficiency of operations.
- There is a need for better coordination between corporate policy making and support given to the implementation of country portfolios to ensure that policies receive attention in design and, particularly, in implementation. Attention should also be given to allowing field implementation to feed back into policy formulation.
- The experience of the safety net programme, set up without a strategy for phasing out and/or providing beneficiaries with continuity, underscores broader issues of programme design for WFP: developing efficient and effective social protection programmes requires consistent, well-managed effort for much longer than 12 months. Operational complexities, the length of the learning curve and the need for technical skill and effective coordination should not be underestimated. From the beneficiaries' perspective, social protection should build long-term resilience into livelihoods, not just provide short-term support. This is also true of WFP's humanitarian programming, which should place greater emphasis on livelihoods and on disaster preparedness and mitigation.

Overall assessment

41. **Relevance.** WFP operations were appropriately targeted to geographic areas and to specific groups. WFP's portfolio has evolved, shown continued relevance, and been well adjusted to needs and to government priorities. WFP operations were well

aligned with the evolving humanitarian and development needs of the people. WFP also aligned itself well with the broad emerging policy frameworks of the Government, as formulated in the National Development Programme and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, and with existing sectoral strategies. In education and social protection, WFP engaged strategically with the Government to support ongoing processes of policy development. The country office also initiated exploratory work on market analysis and local procurement.

5. **Efficiency.** WFP performed below expectations, with fewer beneficiaries reached than planned for most operations. WFP reacted rapidly in the case of emergencies, and overall it was efficient in the initial response. However, across the portfolio, weaknesses in design, planning, implementation and monitoring resulted in beneficiaries receiving irregular or incomplete entitlements. A major constraint on WFP's achievement of outputs was that its ambitious evolving agenda was not matched with sufficient resources for implementation. In the latter period, when activities were predominantly funded by the Government, efficiency constraints existed mainly in the area of non-financial resources, which were not adjusted to the changing needs of the portfolio or the context.

6. **Effectiveness.** In the humanitarian domain, improvements were recorded in the nutritional status of refugee populations but it was not possible to establish whether they could be attributed to WFP activities. There is evidence that nutritional support brought improved nutritional recovery and HIV survival rates for PLWHA, and that it was associated with higher TB treatment adherence and completion rates. However, no data were available for other nutrition-related work (PMTCT and attendance at health clinics by pregnant or lactating women). In education, WFP-supported schools saw an increase in enrolment and attendance and an improvement in gender parity, compared with baselines. It is too early to make an informed assessment of the effectiveness of the safety net programme.

7. **Impact and sustainability.** Shortcomings related to its analysis work – lack of baselines, change of monitoring indicators, inconsistent outcome monitoring, unfilled gaps – gave WFP only a partial understanding of the contribution of food assistance to the food and nutrition status of the population, and of the strategies and interventions that worked best and what made them work. Nonetheless, the close alignment of WFP operations with government priorities, the increasing government involvement in programming and implementation, and the expanded government funding of WFP's operations, constituted important steps toward sustainability. These aspects received attention during the evaluation period and were part of the country office strategy.

Recommendations

45. The evaluation report findings and conclusions led the evaluation team to propose the following recommendations, formulated to feed into the CSD finalization process.

8. **Recommendation 1:** Conduct an independent formative evaluation of the safety net programme to inform the planned scale-up and identify priorities and strategies for continued support to this area as one of the main components of the new CSD. (Country office with support from regional bureau and Headquarters)

9. Given that social protection is a government priority, the independent evaluation, which will also provide input to recommendation 7, should identify how

the safety net programme can be effectively adjusted and set out the monitoring and evaluation plan.

10. **Recommendation 2:** As part of the immediate implementation of school feeding, the country office, in collaboration with partners, should identify elements of the Essential Package that it is realistic to roll out in the current programme on a pilot basis, in line with corporate guidance, and to roll out progressively to all WFP-supported schools within the new CSD period. (Country office)

11. School feeding is a government priority and will continue to be a major component of the CSD. Ensuring attention is given to school health, nutrition and other aspects of the Essential Package will enhance the effectiveness of these interventions and ensure that school feeding is aligned with corporate WFP policy.

12. **Recommendation 3:** Before the 2013/14 school year, the country office, in cooperation with the Government and the International Partnership for Human Development, should review the current approach to community cooks and ensure that appropriate compensation is provided in line with WFP school feeding policy, harmonized among partners and proposed for inclusion in the Government's school feeding strategy. (Country office)

13. The involvement of community members is an essential aspect of the school feeding strategy. Partners for school feeding have followed different approaches in providing compensation for food preparation. This is not always understood by communities and the amount of time volunteered – 2–4 full days per month – puts a substantial burden on women in poor communities. A harmonized approach would respect the principles of community participation and fair compensation.

14. **Recommendation 4:** Ensure the humanitarian assistance component under the new CSD includes capacity development of the Government and operational partners, especially in the area of disaster mitigation and preparedness. (Country office)

15. In line with the sharper focus on development in the evolving context of the country, the new CSD should ensure stronger links between the humanitarian and development components of the portfolio through the inclusion of specific strategies for capacity development in disaster mitigation and preparedness.

16. **Recommendation 5:** The new CSD, while addressing both humanitarian and development needs, should prioritize capacity development and knowledge transfer; include a transition road map for further increasing government responsibility and takeover of funding; and contain explicit commitments and strategies for enhancing coordination efforts by the Government. (Country office with support from regional bureau and Headquarters)

17. Paving the way to sustainability, a medium- to long-term transition/hand-over plan with set milestones should be agreed upon with the Government. The new CSD should include explicit commitments to: i) support the Government in developing policy and coordinating the activities and inputs of its development partners, and ii) play a prominent role in structures and processes for coordination among United Nations agencies in the country, in areas where WFP has an established and emerging comparative advantage: humanitarian assistance, school feeding and social protection.

18. **Recommendation 6:** Develop a joint WFP–Government capacity development plan for the priority areas in the new CSD and ensure its inclusion in

the detailed planning for component implementation. (Country office with support from regional bureau)

19. This capacity development plan should outline priorities across the component areas and clearly indicate where WFP will provide inputs. The priorities identified should be included in WFP's internal planning process (recommendation 7), and in the implications for funding to be discussed with the Government (recommendation 10).

20. **Recommendation 7:** Under the framework of the annual performance plan, develop an implementation plan in 2014 for each area of the new CSD that maximizes alignment with WFP and government policies; identifies partners, strategies and targets; strengthens monitoring, and specifies appropriate human resource and funding needs. (Country office with support from regional bureau and Headquarters)

21. This exercise should provide the basis for the implementation of the portfolio and allow for planning of resource needs (recommendations 8 and 10). For each component, it should:

- build on the findings of the present evaluation, in particular with reference to gender, social protection and capacity development, and seek to improve alignment with WFP policies;
- include strategies and targets for both policy and operational aspects of the portfolio;
- identify opportunities for partnerships and strategies to optimize these, giving specific attention to technical, non-logistical areas;
- formulate strategies that allow for streamlining and improving the monitoring systems; and
- identify implications for staffing and resource needs.

22. This process should be carried out with the involvement of the Government and implementing partners, and the recommendations should be reflected in country office programming.

23. **Recommendation 8:** Conduct a review of country office staffing needs in light of the CSD priorities in social protection, market analysis, and disaster preparedness and mitigation. (Headquarters, regional bureau and country office)

24. Draw up a staffing plan for the CSD period that will allow the country office, within each of the component areas, to: i) adequately respond to requirements; ii) increase effectiveness and efficiency; and iii) play a stronger technical assistance/advisory role in its engagement with the Government. This should equip the country office with a fit-for-purpose team and adequate staffing level to analyse strategic opportunities, while achieving efficient performance in the conventional management functions. Attention should be given to securing the appropriate skills sets in the team, both national and international, in core component areas of the portfolio, which are:

- social protection, including education/school feeding;
- market analysis for local purchases and urban vouchers; and
- humanitarian response and disaster preparedness and mitigation.

25. This would allow WFP to provide more substantial input to national dialogue and coordination, and support the implementation of the portfolio through strong

technical input in appropriate areas. Outputs from recommendations 6 and 7 would contribute to the staffing profile.

26. **Recommendation 9:** Before the implementation of the new CSD, conduct a comprehensive review of the country office monitoring and reporting practices, based on the new Strategic Results Framework, to strengthen links between data collection, analysis and use of data for decision-making. (Country office with support from regional bureau)

27. This should include: i) redoubling efforts to make sure all monitoring is done comprehensively and accurately to generate full data sets; ii) ensuring that all project monitoring is done in partnership with the Government and/or NGOs; and iii) planning and implementing external evaluations at appropriate times in project cycles.

28. **Recommendation 10:** Draw up a funding strategy from 2014 onwards to support advocacy with the Government as to the funding of operations and staff in line with the agreed CSD and transition plan. (Country office with support from regional bureau)

29. The strategy for continued and scaled-up funding of WFP operations by the Government should be in line with the agreed transition road map (see recommendation 5) so that by the end of the CSD period the bulk of the technical positions are funded by the Government. The plan should be based on the detailed planning for components (see recommendation 7) and staffing needs (see recommendation 8). It should also identify how the monitoring of operations – outputs, outcomes and achievements of the programme – will be reported back to the Government to provide the rationale for continued support (see recommendation 9).

1. Introduction

1.1 Evaluation Features

1. Country Portfolio Evaluations (CPEs) examine the performance and results of a World Food Programme (WFP) portfolio over a specific period. The Republic of Congo (the Congo) was selected for a CPE in 2013, which was conducted as an independent evaluation covering the period 2009-2012.

2. **Rationale:** the on-going preparation of a new country strategy document (CSD) and country programme led to a demand from the WFP Country Office (CO) and the Regional Bureau (RB)¹⁴ for an independent CPE¹⁵. By reporting on and assessing the results of the portfolio and reviewing the comparative advantage¹⁶ and positioning of WFP's operations in the Congo, this evaluation sought to contribute towards future programming decisions and strategic prioritisation. This CPE may also be of particular interest to the organisation as it involves a Middle Income Country (MIC).

3. The evaluation served the dual **objectives** of accountability and learning. The focus of the evaluation was on the country portfolio as a whole, rather than on individual operations. In this manner the evaluation sought to provide an objective view of:

- The comparative advantage and position of WFP operations in the Congo
- Reasons for observed success and failure
- Performance and results
- Lessons learned

4. The evaluation was carried out by a team of independent consultants brought together by Mokoro Ltd. The team included expertise in nutrition, education, humanitarian work, food security, and social protection. A consultant based in the Congo provided support throughout the process. Two independent Mokoro experts quality assured the work of the evaluation team (see Annex 1).

5. The CPE was guided by the evaluation Terms of Reference (ToR) (Annex 2), and the evaluation Inception Report (IR). Central to the IR was the evaluation matrix (Annex 3) which systematically linked evaluation questions from the ToR to detailed areas of inquiry, sources, and methods for data collection, and was used to guide the inquiry of the field mission.

6. **The methodology and approach** were fine-tuned and agreed with WFP's Office of Evaluation (OEV) during the inception phase. Details of the evaluation methodology can be found in the IR (Mokoro, 2013) and in summary in Annex 4. The evaluation used a mixed methods approach comprising a literature review, key informant semi-structured interviews (SSI), focus group discussion (FGD) with beneficiaries, field visits and observations, and triangulated key findings. The main


¹⁴ The Regional Bureau responsible for the Congo changed from Nairobi to Johannesburg in February 2013, both of which have been involved in the evaluation process.

¹⁵ This would complement the evaluation that was conducted by Cucchi and Geeraerd, in 2012, and which was commissioned by the CO.

¹⁶ For the purpose of this assessment the evaluation used WFP's definition of comparative advantage: "The theory of comparative advantage highlights that goods and services should always be delivered by the organization that is in the best position to do so in the most efficient way" (WFP, 2008h). The document notes that comparative advantage can be linked to strengths and weaknesses and that it may simply be due to the fact that there are no better positioned actors or may be a reflection of an acquired capacity (e.g. vulnerability mapping).

points of reference for the approach were: the five *strategic objectives* from the WFP global strategic plan 2008-2013; the outcomes across the *component areas* and the cross-cutting *themes* of the portfolio; and the *evaluation questions* (EQ) from the ToR. The EQ related to: a) portfolio alignment and strategic positioning; b) factors and quality of strategic decision-making; and c) portfolio performance and results. Figure 1 presents the evaluation model for the Congo, and the portfolio's conceptual division into four component areas – humanitarian response, nutrition and health, education, and social protection. These component areas provide the structure for the findings of the evaluation in section 2.3.

Figure 1 Evaluation model for the Congo CPE



7. **Inception phase:** (January-February 2013) – this comprised a briefing in Rome for the evaluation team¹⁷, followed by a preparatory mission in the Congo by two members of the team together with OEV staff. The evaluation matrix was designed, data sets and documentation were reviewed, and the approach to the evaluation was finalised (see Figure 1 above). This initial work resulted in the evaluation operational plan, both approved by OEV prior to the field work.

8. **Field work:** (March 2013) – team members conducted fieldwork in the Provinces of Likouala, Lekoumou, Pool and Pointe Noire (see Annex 6 for the schedule and Annex 7, Table 16 for site visits), and interviewed a wide range of WFP CO and sub-office staff, other stakeholders field staff, beneficiaries and local level stakeholders. Over 166 key informant interviews and 14 focus group discussions were conducted – see Table 1 for a summary of SSI and FGD done. A list of those

¹⁷ Except Alessandra Cucchi who is based in the Congo.

interviewed with detailed breakdown by type of stakeholders is presented in Annex 7 (Table 15 and Table 17), and a list of all documents consulted is provided in the bibliography at Annex 17.

Table 1 Summary of SSI & FGD per type of respondents & component areas

| Stakeholders consulted | Humanitarian Assistance | Health & Nutrition | Education | Social Protection | All |
|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------------|--------------------|
| | Respondents | Respondents | Respondents | Respondents | Respondents |
| WFP staff total | 12 | 13 | 13 | 17 | 55 |
| The Congo | 12 | 12 | 8 | 20 | 52 |
| Partners & stakeholders | 24 | 18 | 7 | 10 | 59 |
| Total SSI | 48 | 43 | 28 | 47 | 166 |
| Community stakeholders | - | - | 30 | 36 | 66 |
| Beneficiaries | 6 large groups | 33 | 17 | 23 | 123+ |
| Total FGD | 50+ | 33 | 47 | 59 | 189+ |

Source: See Annex 7 for the full table.

9. **Debriefings:** (March/April 2013) Initial findings were presented in Brazzaville for the WFP CO, RB and HQ and for external stakeholders (separately), at the end of the fieldwork. A more substantive presentation of the findings, preliminary conclusions and emerging recommendations took place in Rome in early April, to inform the CSD development process.

10. **Limitations:** Owing to limited time and resources, and given that in-country travel to remote locations of the WFP interventions is time-consuming and difficult, the evaluation team was unable to visit all sites of WFP operations, and the field visits were short and intensive. General weaknesses and inconsistencies in monitoring and reporting were also constraints for this CPE. Furthermore, for closed operations, it was difficult to find beneficiaries or, in some cases, detailed documented evidence of results.

1.2 Country Context

11. The Congo is a MIC that has suffered several episodes of civil war since its independence in 1960. Years of unrest and unstable governments have resulted in weak national institutions and administration with limited implementation capacity. Historically, the Congo's administration has been highly centralised, limiting the involvement of local communities in improving services (WB, 2012b). Annex 8 provides an overview and timeline of the main economic, social, political, and contextual factors within which WFP was working during the evaluation period.

12. Since the end of the civil war in 1999, the security situation has stabilised. With fast growing internal revenue from natural resource exploitation – mainly oil which accounted for approximately 70% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2011, 84% of exports, and contributed 79% of public revenue (WFP, 2013a) – the country today has the potential to invest in economic and social development.

13. However, in spite of its MIC status, selected groups of people in the Congo continue to face short-term shocks as well as longer-term development challenges, including access to quality social services (health, education) and food insecurity.

14. **Economic and poverty trends:** There are significant planning, coordination, capacity and governance challenges in using the country's oil revenues to stimulate broad-based, inclusive growth, and to improve basic social services (IMF, 2010), although the country has a positive medium-term economic outlook.

The country struggles with corruption, ranking 144th out of 176 countries and territories in the Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency International, 2012). However, on the Mo Ibrahim Index for African Governance, the Congo's ranking on accountability rose by 2 points between 2010 and 2011 giving the country its highest assessment to date for public management – 14th out of 53 countries on the continent.

15. Despite the country's significant wealth, Table 2 illustrates a country with significant inequalities.

Table 2 Indicators of inequality for the Congo

| HDR Inequality data 2013 | | Data |
|---|-----------------------------|------------------|
| Population | Vulnerable to poverty | 17.7% |
| | In severe poverty | 22.9% |
| | Below national poverty line | 50.1% |
| Contribution of deprivations to overall poverty (%) ¹⁸ | Health | 45.6 % |
| | Education | 10.4 % |
| | Living standards | 44.0 % |
| Gender inequality index | HDR rank | 142 (out of 186) |

Source: UNDP, 2013b

16. The Congo had an approximate population of 4.1 million in 2011, with 300,000 estimated to be from the ethnic minority pygmy group (WFP, 2011a). There is a lack of data on poverty in the Congo; however, preliminary data from the 2011 Household Survey (ECOM, 2011) reveal that over the 2005-11 period the percentage of the population living below the poverty line dropped by 4 percentage points to 46.5%. A 2009 Employment and Informal Sector Survey conducted by the National Statistics and Economic Centre of the Congo's Ministry of Planning, Spatial Organization and Economic Integration, based on a representative sample of the population, put general unemployment at 16.1%. This figure rose to 26.6% for the general population when discouraged job seekers were included, and to 42.2% amongst youth (WB, 2012a).

17. **Health:** the health situation in the Congo is characterised by high levels of mortality and morbidity. The epidemiological profile of the country is dominated by infectious and parasitical diseases. The principal cause of death in children under five years is malaria (26%) followed by pneumonia (14%) (WHO, 2010). The effects of these illnesses – many preventable – reflect the weakness of the country's health system. In spite of a slight decrease in national Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) sero-prevalence from 4.1% in 2003 to 3.2% among women and men aged 15-49 in 2009 (GoC, 2009), HIV and the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) remain a leading cause of death among adults (GoC – MoHP, 2007; CNLS, 2008). HIV prevalence is about two times higher in women than in men. The country is also experiencing an increase in cases of tuberculosis (TB), which is strongly associated with HIV infection. According to World Health Organization (WHO) data

¹⁸ This composite multi-dimensional indicator measures poverty by the extent of people's deprivation in three areas – education, nutrition and standard of living – each of which have further sub-indicators. The overall measure provides insight into different types of deprivation and how these are interconnected and is a more comprehensive measure than traditional income based indicators (UNDP, 2013b).

published in 2010, the TB incidence rate increased from 350 per 100,000 people in 2000 to 390 in 2008.

18. Nationwide Demographic and Health Surveys conducted in 2005 and 2011-2012 (EDSC-I and EDSC-II) reveal a relatively stable nutritional situation for the under-fives: chronic malnutrition (or stunting) has slightly decreased from 26% to 24%; acute malnutrition (wasting) from 7% to 6% and underweight from 14% to 12%. Regional and age differences are observed for all three indicators. Prevalence of stunting increases rapidly with age from 9% in children less than 6 months to a maximum of 37% at 18-23 months. It is higher at 30% in rural areas against 20% in urban areas; and is highest in Lekoumou (39%) and lowest in Brazzaville (19%). Wasting prevalence is highest among children under 12 months (9% and more). The level of acute malnutrition reaches 12% in Bouenza, whereas it is 3% or less in Likouala, Sangha and Cuvettes. Finally, underweight is more common in rural areas (16% against 9% in urban areas), and reaches 19% in Lekoumou and Plateau.

19. **Food security and nutrition** – Food security is a problem in the Congo, which ranks 27th out of 78 in the International Food Policy Research Institute's (IFPRI) Global Hunger Index (GHI) for 2012. Whilst this is an improvement since the 2001 GHI, the situation is categorised as being serious (IFPRI, 2012). The WFP 2009 Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Assessment (CFSVA) confirmed that food insecurity was more prevalent in rural areas, where 15% of households (double the national average) suffered from food insecurity in three regions (Lekoumou, Cuvette and Plateaux). However, the CFSVA also identified Brazzaville as a priority, representing 20% of the absolute number of food insecure persons (WFP, 2010h: p.51-2).

20. About two thirds of the Congo's population (63%) live in urban areas (WFP, 2010h). Agriculture, with less than 2% of the arable land cultivated, performs below its potential, contributing in 2005 only 3.8% towards GDP (WFP, 2010h). The Congo produces almost no food in spite of having fertile arable land. Two thirds of food needs and 94% of cereal requirements are imported (EIU, 2008); as a result, national food security is particularly vulnerable to inflation, which can erode the purchasing power of the population – reducing access to food – in both rural and urban areas (WFP, 2011b). This situation disproportionately affects the poor.

21. **Education** – The Congo reached universal access to primary education in the 1980s but the civil war of the late 1990s to early 2000s left the education system in disarray, as reflected by low enrolments, poor quality of education and inequality of access across regions (and between urban and rural areas). There are marked gender disparities, in particular at secondary level and amongst adults in terms of literacy levels. Disparity in education is also marked by poverty levels, geographical location, and ethnicity. Amongst the indigenous population of the Congo, few send their children to school because of their migrant lifestyle.


22. **Social Protection:** for a MIC¹⁹ the Congo's social development status lags behind (see Table 2). Hunger and poverty are major issues. With its growing economy the Government has been advised by institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to increase budget allocations to social services (EIU, 2012). In the recent period, social protection has become a more important element of the Government's agenda.

¹⁹ The usefulness of this category has been disputed (IDS, 2012).

23. **Key humanitarian events:** since the end of the civil war the Congo has been in transition from a humanitarian to a development context. However, there have been several humanitarian events, two of which are key to the evaluation period:

- Late in 2009 refugees from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), estimated at 115,000 (UNHCR, 2012), crossed the border into Likouala Province. In May 2012 the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) began voluntary repatriation (46,369 refugees returned to DRC in 2012, and a further 9,324 in January and February 2013²⁰).
- On 4th March 2012 the explosion of an arms depot in Brazzaville devastated the surrounding neighbourhoods, and, according to the official figures, killed 286 people, injured 3,277, and caused the displacement of over 10,000 (GIEWS/FAO, 2012).

Figure 2 Official Development Assistance (ODA) and humanitarian assistance to the Congo 2004-2011



Source: OECD DAC and UNOCHA Financial Tracking Service (UNOCHA, 2012)
 Note: No ODA data available 2012 – data for ODA is disbursements in current US\$.

24. Figure 2 shows the Official Development Assistance (ODA) and humanitarian assistance to the Congo from 2004 to 2011; ODA has fluctuated significantly over the last decade. The overall level of ODA has remained low as a proportion of GDP (UNDP OE, 2008). This has influenced the number and capacity of the international organisations in the Congo. There are very few international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and few national non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which tend to have low capacity.

25. The Congo does not have a comprehensive coordination mechanism (UNDP OE, 2008). Coordination within the aid community tends to occur on an ad hoc basis in response to specific needs.

26. As a country, the Congo is an ‘aid orphan’ and attracts limited donor interest. As the Congo attained the status of a MIC – based on its per capita GDP – most of

²⁰ Figures obtained from UNHCR Impfondo during field visit, March 2013.

the donors have ceased their cooperation programmes. The Congo has become the main source of funding for activities previously funded by external donors, a trend expected to increase in the future.

1.3 WFP's Portfolio in the Congo

27. WFP has operated in the Congo since 1964, implementing a total of 30 operations. During the civil wars in the 1990s (1993, 1997, 1998) WFP closed its office in the Congo, and operations were managed from Kinshasa. WFP re-opened a full CO in 2002.

28. During the period under review (2009-2012), the county office implemented seven major operations on which the evaluation focused, and a large proportion of which focused on humanitarian assistance. These started in response to the civil war prior to the evaluation period and turned, in late 2009, to food assistance provision for refugees in Likouala and, in 2012, to internally displaced persons (IDPs) following the explosion in Brazzaville (see paragraph 23).

Table 3 Overview of WFP operations in the Congo 2009-2012

| | EMOP-200095: Food Assistance to Congolese Refugees in Likouala Region | PRRO 200147: Food Assistance to Congolese Refugees in Likouala Region | SO 200413: Strengthening the logistical capacity of the Congo to respond to the explosion in Brazzaville | EMOP 200408: Food Assistance to IDPs following explosion in Brazzaville | DEV 200144: Primary school feeding in Cuvette, Plateaux and Pool regions | DEV 200211: Safety net programme in Brazzaville and Pointe Noire | PRRO 10312.1: Assistance to populations affected by conflict and poverty - Pool Region |
|----------------------------------|---|---|--|---|--|--|--|
| Actual timeframe | 1 Jan 2010 – 28 Feb 2011 | 1 March 2011 – on-going | May 31 – 31 October 2012 | March – 31 August 2012 | 1 Jul 2011 – 31 Dec 2013 | 1 July 2011 – 30 April 2013 | April 2007 – 30 June 2011 |
| Targeted beneficiaries | 249,400 | 210,200 | 30 trained | 25,000 | 45,000 | 109 | 348,983* |
| Actual Beneficiaries | 225,114 | 206,058 | 25 trained | 17,866 | 109,686 | 19,200 | 180,764* |
| Target tonnage (mt) | 27,245 | 25,698 | N/A | 1,249 | 874 | 37,929 | 21,073 ^b |
| Actual Tonnage (mt) | 7,020 | 8,262 | N/A | 228 | 1,757 | 55 | 7,920 |
| Total Budget appealed for (US\$) | 33,308,502 | 33,827,940 | 450,000 | 1,464,091 | 14,241,781 | 3,579,405 | 29,145,708 ^a |
| % Confirmed Contributions | 55% | 45% | 94% | 98% | 69% | 87% | 50% |

Source: WFP Project Documents and SPRs

*Only includes beneficiaries from the evaluation period 2009-2012.

^aThis is for the project duration 2007-2011.

^bTotal target tonnage in 2011 SPR for the evaluation period 2009-12

29. In March 2007 the protracted relief and recovery operation (PRRO) (10312.1) was approved, building on two previous PRROs. The operation focused particularly on malnourished children, primary school age children, and people with HIV/AIDS²¹, as well as vulnerable people through food for work (FFW). The


²¹ Support to PLWHA was provided in Lekoumou and Bouenza departments – Pool department had been identified as most vulnerable but was excluded because of continuing insecurity. The departments of Brazzaville, Niari and Pointe-Noire were subsequently added based on high HIV prevalence (WFP, 2009i).

programme – initially planned for 24 months – was extended until July 2011. Budget revision documents assumed that the situation in the Congo would continue to improve, towards recovery.

30. The portfolio progressively refocused on recovery, development and capacity development over the evaluation period. The shift in the portfolio is operationalized in the two development operations initiated in 2011:

- DEV 200144: designed to expand school feeding in four regions, covering more schools, and targeting enrolment and retention (in particular of girls);
- DEV 200211: introduced as a pilot programme to build the Government's capacity to set up safety net programmes, using electronic voucher transfers.

Figure 3 Actual Beneficiaries by Activity 2009-2012



Source: updated data from ToR table 4: p.8. Includes data from PRRO 103121 from 2009-2011 and the pilot safety net for 2012

31. Figure 3 shows the spread of the portfolio across different activities/ thematic areas. It highlights how, over the evaluation period, the greatest focus has been on general food distribution (GFD) and education (school feeding). The majority of GFD has been provided to refugees (in Likouala Province) under EMOP 200095 and PRRO 200147 and to IDPs (in Brazzaville) under EMOP 200408.

32. This shift in programming towards a stronger development focus over the evaluation period reflected a strategic drive in WFP towards safety nets and social protection and the expansion of the WFP CO tool-kit to include cash and vouchers. The emphasis in the safety net programme has been on strengthening Nutrition Assessment, Education and Counselling (NAEC) and has targeted Brazzaville and Pointe Noire where HIV prevalence is highest.

33. WFP's support to education included school feeding and enrolment in schools or apprenticeship programmes for beneficiaries of the safety net programme (DEV 200211). In the period under evaluation, support to school feeding was provided through PRRO 103121 for the first two and a half years and in October 2011 school feeding transitioned to DEV 200144 (at the start of the 2011/2012 school year).

34. The two key humanitarian events of 2009 and 2012 (see paragraph 23) resulted in the approval of four emergency projects: the refugee influx brought about the emergency operation (EMOP) 200095, which targeted food provision to refugees²², and a subsequent PRRO to provide support until repatriation (PRRO 200147); and the March 2012 explosion resulted in two WFP projects. WFP response was part of an overall UN effort, and focused on provision of food, water and shelter to persons affected and displaced (EMOP 200408) as well as on humanitarian logistics capacity development to the Congo (SO 200413).

35. Several analyses and studies were carried out by or for the CO to feed into their programme development during the evaluation period, as well as a draft CSD for the period 2011 to 2013 (not approved at higher levels). These studies, their role and their relevance to the portfolio as a whole are discussed in relevant sections throughout this report.

2. Evaluation Findings

2.1 Portfolio Alignment and Strategic Positioning

36. This section answers EQ 1 in the ToR for the CPE, concerning the strategic alignment of the WFP portfolio in the Congo.²³ All findings presented in this chapter have been triangulated. This section also includes an assessment of WFP alignment with relevant corporate policies²⁴.

2.1.1 Relevance to people's humanitarian and developmental needs

Key findings: In the current development context selected groups of people of the Congo continue to have food security challenges. WFP's portfolio evolved to respond to both development and humanitarian needs. Geographical and beneficiary coverage matched the main needs in the humanitarian and development domains. In line with the national priorities and policy choices of the Government, in the humanitarian domain, with the changing situation, WFP did not shift from emergency feeding for saving lives towards food assistance in support of livelihoods.

37. As noted in section 1.2, short-term shocks and longer-term stresses continue to affect the livelihoods of many Congolese households: not only in rural areas such as Likouala, Cuvette, Plateaux and Lekoumou (WFP, 2011b: np), but also in the two main cities.

38. The WFP portfolio evolved between 2009 and 2012 from a focus on humanitarian work to stronger inclusion of development-focused activities, in line with the evolving needs and priorities of the population; WFP also maintained support to refugees, and responded promptly to provide emergency assistance during moments of unexpected crises (see section 1.3).

39. The coverage of WFP activities was based on available data and sought to focus on geographical areas with greatest needs. For the humanitarian domain, interventions appropriately targeted the refugee areas. The 2006 WFP Emergency

²² This operation was preceded by EMOP 200093, a short-term provision of food from when the refugees arrived in November 2009. Humanitarian air services were also provided by WFP during 2010 under SO 200140. Neither of these two operations are included in the scope of this CPE, for reasons described in the approved ToR.

²³ See Annex 3 – the evaluation matrix which provides EQs and further detailed sub-questions to guide the inquiry.

²⁴ This was not explicitly part of the EQ that the evaluation team was asked to answer.

Food Security Assessment (EFSA) (WFP, 2006b) guided the decision to focus on the Pool region (PRRO 10312.1), identified as the most food insecure area of the country. Nutrition interventions were implemented in the geographical areas where major disparities in nutritional status existed. In education, with national retention rates of 77 % at primary level, DEV 200144 focused its school feeding programme on Cuvette, Lekoumou, Plateaux and Pool regions, where retention rates are the lowest (around 35%), and where CFSVA data reported food insecurity as a limiting factor to access of educational services. Within social protection, the safety net pilot project targeted selected low income areas of the two main cities of Brazzaville and Pointe Noire which have high levels of poverty and vulnerability and where the majority of poor people live, as stated in the 2008 PRSP and substantiated by WFP's own feasibility study (WFP, 2010d).

40. In addition to an appropriate geographical focus, WFP also selected beneficiary groups that reflected humanitarian and development priorities. Nutrition-specific beneficiaries included identified vulnerable segments of the population with particular needs, namely infants and young children, and pregnant or lactating women, people living with HIV and AIDS (PLWHA) and TB patients, as well as refugee and displaced populations. Interventions were implemented across programmes. Nutritional surveillance of PLWHA coupled with adequate nutrition counselling and food assistance were among the priority actions identified under the preventative strategies in the National Nutrition Strategy (NNS) (GoC, 2011), areas of focus for WFP's nutrition work. In addition, through the selection of geographical areas and schools, WFP specifically sought to address the needs of indigenous children (12% out of the total intended beneficiaries). School feeding targeted girls and boys equally²⁵, in line with CFSVA data (WFP, 2010h), which reported disadvantages of indigenous children, of whom 40% are chronically malnourished (compared to the 26% national average), and of whom 65% have never attended school (compared to 39% at national levels, WFP, 2011a). Within social protection, the pilot's target groups – poor households with children out of school, pregnant or lactating women, poor households with malnourished children and households with malnourished members who are on ART or TB treatment – were relevant to the nature of food insecurity and vulnerability in the Congo.

41. Scale and coverage were broadly realistic and appropriate, although at times ambitious (education – see section 2.3.3) or not based on accurate data (nutrition – see section 2.3.2). In the humanitarian domain, WFP targeted the whole of the refugee population, initially essential considering the scale of the needs. As the situation stabilised, refugees became fully integrated with local communities and livelihoods²⁶ but WFP, in line with the Congo policy choice of repatriation, did not shift from emergency feeding for saving lives²⁷ towards food assistance in support of livelihoods.²⁸ Within the nutrition component of the portfolio planning, figures of target beneficiaries were not always appropriate: comparison with the national HIV status reports (IMF, 2010b) confirms that the nutrition activities' targets for PMTCT within PRRO 103121 were too high compared to needs (and capacities). In 2009, a

²⁵ This was appropriate, as girls' and boys' enrolment at primary level shows no major gender disparity. Nonetheless, the school feeding intervention was intended to have a differential effect on girls' enrolment/attendance, though there was no provision for special measures (such as take-home rations) for girls.

²⁶ According to interviews, with the local host populations in 3 sites and with refugees in four sites.

²⁷ It must however be noted that rations were reduced to cover just 75% of needs. This signals that the CO was aware of the changed needs. The GoC were also pushing repatriation of the refugees which may have made more sustainable responses challenging.

²⁸ This change in focus would – in the evaluation team's opinion – have been more in line with the changed situation and needs.

total of 919 expectant mothers tested HIV-positive, with 350 under ARTs, while PRRO 103121 proposed to reach 3,000 women under PMTCT. The PRRO targets for PLWHA were, however, realistic. In education, the number of schools targeted and reached increased from 187 planned/ 127 reached to 350 planned/ 348 reached, respectively over the evaluation period (Table 7), and in 2012, the WFP assisted schools represented 40% of schools in the four geographical areas covered.²⁹ However, scale was a challenge in light of internal and external constraints (see section 2.3.3). Scale and coverage of the safety net pilot project (DEV 200211) were appropriately modest, aiming to cover a selection of households in the poorest parts of urban areas where the logistics of the exercise are more feasible³⁰.

2.1.2 Alignment with government policy and planning

Key findings: The overall policy environment of the Congo evolved with a new National Development Plan (NDP), PRSP and a number of sector specific policies and plans, but was fluid over the evaluation period, with key policies remaining to be formally defined and/or approved. WFP's activities corresponded with the priorities expressed in national and sector policies and plans, as well as with emerging/unwritten policy statements by the GoC. In education and social protection, WFP strategically engaged with the Government to support on-going processes of policy development in these areas. For the GoC, WFP has been a privileged dialogue partner.

42. The NDP, and the two PRSPs (PRSP I – 2008-2011 and PRSP II – 2012-2016) provided the broad framework for alignment and were the key reference documents for WFP's interventions (GoC, 2008; GoC, 2012; GoC – MoP, 2012). All three documents put the accent on development priorities for the country.

43. WFP aligned well and appropriately with this policy framework. The 2008 PRSP includes goals and commitments to enhanced food security under Axis 3 and to social protection under Axis 4, both of which are key focus areas of the WFP programme. Education is included under the social component, and prioritizes: i) ensuring primary education for all; and ii) integrating the poorest through promotion of access to basic social services, including education. These priorities mirror those of WFP's school feeding programme. The subsequent PRSP included similar commitments to education, social protection and nutrition, under Pillar 4, 'Social Development and Inclusion' with which WFP continued to be aligned.

44. At the sector policy level the framework is less well defined. In the social sectors in which WFP has operated, key policy and strategy documents were either non-existent, under preparation, or finalised but never formally approved. Sector policy was thus implicit rather than explicit, and alignment was based on policy statements and dialogue with government.

45. Within the humanitarian sector the Government did not provide a clear strategy or framework³¹. Interviews reported that WFP's actions were considered to support government policies and plans. The Government, in conjunction with

²⁹ Data provided by the WFP CO indicate that in 2012 there were a total of 881 primary schools in the four regions covered by the WFP school feeding programme.

³⁰ The pilot project used mobile phone technology to distribute food vouchers to improve food security of populations – something more appropriate to urban settings in the Congo's context.

³¹ There is no published humanitarian government policy. It should be noted that the Ministry of Planning recognises lack of coordination as a weakness and is currently drawing up a list of who does what where (as reported in GoC interviews – Ministry of Planning).

UNHCR, strongly encouraged voluntary repatriation and WFP's activities were in line with this. WFP's prompt response earned the respect and support of the Government (as evidenced by interviews at national and regional level) and of other agencies (interviews with UN agencies and NGOs). The fact that WFP responded quickly resulted in opportunities to be involved in the coordination of the humanitarian response, through the logistics cluster. WFP was also asked by the GoC for input on logistics through the capacity development training provided for the Ministry of Social Affairs and Humanitarian Action (MASAH).

46. At the time PRRO 103121 was designed, there was no policy to guide WFP's nutrition-specific interventions. The first National Nutrition Policy (NNP) was developed during a consultative process that involved the nutrition thematic group of which WFP is a member. Finalised in 2010, it is not yet validated. Prior to the NNP, WFP's nutrition-specific activities were identified and agreed upon with the GoC (*Cadre Stratégique National de Lutte contre le VIH SIDA* (CNLS, 2008) for 2009-2013). WFP's food assistance to PLWHA, started in 2001, changed over the years in line with evolving national treatment strategies and coverage, including stronger linkages to ART as it became available.

47. In education, the main reference documents were the draft sector strategy (GoC, 2009), and, in the latter part of the evaluation period, an approved plan of sector priorities based on the NDP (MEPSA, 2012). While these documents provided general guidance, there was no specific GoC policy or strategy on school feeding. WFP used consultation and dialogue with the GoC to ensure that its targets and activities were in line with the Congo's priorities. A comparison of WFP priorities with the draft sector policy and the plan of sector priorities, triangulated with government officials' interviews, confirmed that WFP aligned well with the overall educational priorities. The Education Sector Strategy (GoC, 2009), seeks to increase access to primary education, a key goal of WFP's school feeding programme. The more recent "*Programme d'Actions Prioritaires et Cadre de Dépenses à Moyen Terme: PAP-CDMT 2012-2016*" (MEPSA, 2012) similarly identifies the expansion of school feeding as one of the GoC key strategies and highlights a specific strategy to attract indigenous children to schools, both priorities reflected in the WFP school feeding approach.

48. The emphasis in the safety net programme on strengthening NAEC was in line with nutrition guidance, including the NNP, and with other sectors' policies and strategies such as the National Food Security Policy (NFSP). However, as in education, there was no formal policy framework, and WFP alignment was based on close discussions with government. In these two component areas (social protection and education) the evaluation established that WFP not only aligned with policy, but also made explicit efforts to contribute to the developing policies (see section 2.2.2).

49. Finally, the majority of interviews with senior government officials consistently highlighted that WFP developed a strong position in the GoC. Senior government officials expressed a keen interest in continuing to work with and through WFP in areas such as food security, capacity development, school feeding and safety nets, areas where WFP is perceived to have expertise. From the Government perspective, WFP's strong record and professionalism in humanitarian work, and its status as a UN agency (assumed to ensure continuity) were cited as being important factors in the GoC's desire to see WFP continue to work in the Congo.

2.1.3 Alignment with other partners

Main findings: Alignment at UN level was sought through the UNDAF. WFP project documents and UNDAF included plans for alignment with UN as well as other partners. However, most plans have not been implemented in practice. The small number of development partners, capacity constraints of partners and WFP, weak/ineffective UNCT/Government coordination and vision, lack of funding, and lack of incentives for alignment have been key limiting factors.

50. Interviews underscored considerable challenges to strategic and operational partnerships. Weak partnership in terms of field presence, numbers, and capacity are major issues for partners, as is the lack of effective coordination and vision of the UN Country Team (UNCT)/Government. The 2009 RB programme review mission (WFP, 2009i) highlighted these challenges as well as implications for alignment, and pointed to the need for WFP to engage strategically with partners, involving them not just in logistics, but identifying opportunities for technical and strategic inputs.

51. Project documents included references to alignment with activities of partners, in particular the UN, but also others such as NGOs. In some cases, specific areas of intended coordination were highlighted such as with the International Partnership for Human Development (IPHD) for school feeding and with the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) for deworming, in DEV 200144. Coordination and consultation with UN agencies were mentioned in various portfolio project documents for nutrition and social protection: e.g. with UNICEF for supplementary feeding, the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) and the World Health Organization (WHO) for the PLWHA component.

52. The UNDAF should have been the principal framework for alignment with the rest of the UNCT. However, interviewees indicated that it was not effective for this purpose. There was general rather than specific alignment across the various areas of importance to the portfolio, in education (with UNICEF) and in the emerging social protection strategies and operational plans of other partners (notably UNICEF and, lately, the World Bank) and with the 2009-2013 UNDAF (outcomes 2 and 3) (UN/GoC, 2008: 11-15). Most respondents from WFP, the UN, and the GoC interviewed, indicated that the UNDAF was too general and vague; that the existence of parallel programmes in the field remained a problem; that it failed to inhibit competition among agencies for funding (including governmental funding); and that the coherence of UNCT programming was therefore inadequate.

53. There was only loose coordination through the Education, Social Protection, and Food and Nutritional Security thematic groups of the UNCT. Interviews with The GoC, WFP, and INGOs underscored that these groups functioned irregularly. For example, the education group was active in the aftermath of the 4th March 2012 explosions, but many of the thematic groups were reported dormant after completion in 2012 of the current PRSP. Interviews as well as document review showed that the manner in which partners (including WFP) positioned themselves relative to other partners was not conceived to optimise respective contributions – which reflects the challenges to co-ordination. For example, WFP, UNICEF and the World Bank were all engaged in the social protection sector by the end of the evaluation period, but without explicit agreement about their respective roles and contributions. Interviews suggested that the lack of alignment could be due to the limited capacity and the meagre field presence of many of the UN agencies and bilateral agencies, particularly

in comparison with WFP, which had a comparatively strong field presence (UNHCR was mentioned as the other exception).

54. Various examples were provided by WFP staff of attempts/plans to engage with UN actors on a specific activity which subsequently failed to materialise, with funding frequently being cited as a key constraint. This included coordination efforts with the World Bank-funded United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) project on boreholes for schools approved at Resident Coordinator (RC) level; an agreed collaboration with UNICEF for deworming and vitamin A tablets for schools; an in principle agreement to promote local markets and nutrition between WFP and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO); as well as plans to increase access by PLWHA to adequate and balanced nutrition with the International Labour Organization (ILO), UNAIDS and UNICEF.

55. Another factor repeatedly cited by interviewees at national level (UN, donors, the GoC) was the limited incentive for better coordination and alignment in a context of few effective partner forums, weak capacity, and little accountability or compliance with international frameworks for alignment demands by the GoC. As acknowledged by the Ministry of Planning during interviews and a presentation of the evaluation's preliminary findings, The GoC co-ordination of development partners is not yet effective. Minutes of the irregular meetings of the social protection thematic working group of the UNCT (virtually dormant after 2012) do not document substantive co-ordination among these partners or between them and government. Most of the interviewed partners explained that coordination with the Government takes place on a bilateral basis. A relevant example relates to the coordination between the two main partners in school feeding. In 2011, WFP and IPHD worked together to identify schools that would be targeted under the expansion through the DEV 200144, resulting in a number of IPHD schools taken over by WFP. The two organisations also provided mutual support on logistics in the field. However, alignment did not involve more than operational coordination and did not extend to the models for school feeding, only partially aligned (see section 2.3.3). Interviewees (The GoC, IPHD and WFP) were of the opinion that in the absence of a clear GoC school feeding policy, differences in these models will persist and there will be little incentive to align.

56. Internal constraints of the CO also influenced partnership engagement, mainly in terms of technical capacity and consistency/frequency of engagement (interviews with external partners) as well as time constraints and overlapping work obligations (WFP internal interviewees). These issues and implications for partnership engagement were recorded in internal reports (see WFP, 2009i). Questions were raised by some of the external stakeholders on the capacity of WFP to participate and to provide a strong technical contribution in key domains, such as social protection. However, examples were cited of WFP taking an active role in encouraging bilateral and multilateral partners to understand issues at community level by inviting senior representatives (e.g. UN RC and Ambassadors) to visit WFP operations in the field. Finally, it appeared from interviews that personality clashes between heads of mission may also have interfered with ensuring that WFP's priorities were reflected in the requests to the GoC for funding, and with transforming coordination plans into programming.

57. In the humanitarian response, alignment with NGO partners was reported to be relatively strong (interviews with partners and The GoC), in particular in the immediate period following crises. Examples include the WFP air bridges

(SO200140) for the refugees put in place in 2010 and the establishment of common warehouses in Brazzaville (SO200413). However, in spite of the scale of the humanitarian operations in Likouala, WFP was not found to have high visibility within the humanitarian community (even at field level). Interviews with staff at partner/non-partner NGOs highlighted that even amongst WFP staff, there was a lack of clarity about WFP's priorities and strategy. And, whilst WFP appeared to have been responsive initially, its operations were not always closely linked at design phase to the changing context (transition from emergency to repatriation) or the plans of other agencies. This lack of alignment was problematic in the implementation of projects and there was little coordination or awareness of the work of others in similar sectors. Most of the humanitarian actors consulted in Likoulala Province (except UNHCR) had little idea of how WFP was working, i.e. in terms of frequency and duration of food distributions. In nutrition there was little alignment with other partners (see section 2.3.2). In social protection, bilateral development agencies and NGOs did not have significant social protection strategies for WFP to partner with. Interviews with WFP and MASAH officials indicated that such operational alignment with potential technical organisations was precluded by cost considerations³² and by the preference of MASAH for direct implementation of the safety net pilot, despite the provision of the project document for implementation through NGOs (WFP, 2011h: 10) (see sections 2.2.2 and 2.3.4).

2.1.4 Alignment with WFP's objectives and policies

58. **Main findings:** In education and social protection, the CO followed most of the key aspects of corporate guidance, although school feeding did not include the introduction of an essential package and in social protection there was no capacity assessment or gender analysis. In the humanitarian and nutrition component areas selected design and implementation guidance was not consistently followed. In humanitarian response there was no shift to disaster mitigation and preparedness. In nutrition, insufficient account was taken of epidemiological data, ensuring adequate levels of ownership, quality M&E, and putting in place partnerships.

59. All of WFP's activities were oriented towards WFP's Strategic Objectives, as can be seen in Annex 5. The evolution of the Congo's portfolio was also consistent with WFP's global shift towards food assistance approaches under the safety net and school feeding interventions (see section 2.3.3). The portfolio aligned strongly with Government policies (see section 2.1.2). However, it was less strong towards capacity and system development (see section 2.2.3). Where actions targeting these areas were included in the planning stage, as in education and social protection, translating them into concrete actions proved challenging (see sections 2.3.3 and 2.3.4).

60. The evaluation assessed the portfolio against specific WFP policies and guidance within each of the component areas. This analysis, shown in detail in Annex 9, indicates that WFP's engagement in social protection and education generally aligned well, with specific points for improvement noted around local production (where recent efforts have been made in market analysis but where further progress will require a sustained long-term focus and corresponding capacity in this important area) and complying with elements of WFP/UNICEF Essential Package (in

³² A leading local NGO had presented a proposal to the WFP CO for the provision of technical support for the pilot programme implementation, which was rejected reportedly on cost concerns (although the MASAH's preference to implement this pilot directly has also been highlighted by MASAH interviewees).

education); and gender, institutional coordination and ownership (in social protection). In the humanitarian and nutritional component areas, however, the evaluation finds that a number of important key elements of WFP's standards were not, or not consistently, applied in design and implementation of operations. In the humanitarian area, challenges included working on risk reduction and management and capacity development. In HIV and AIDS this includes taking into account the epidemiological data, conducting appropriate studies on nutritional challenges for PLWHA, and ensuring adequate levels of ownership, quality M&E, and partnerships.

2.1.5 Maximized comparative advantage within the broader external context

Main findings: WFP's comparative advantage in school feeding and humanitarian response has come from its strong field presence and capacity to reach remote areas. In emergency situations WFP also had the capacity to respond quickly. With the reorientation of the portfolio to development work, WFP endeavoured to build comparative advantage in the field of social protection, but its innovative role in this area was not matched with technical and operational capacity. Overall, WFP is still perceived as a primarily humanitarian organization, with less comparative advantage in development sectors.

61. In its engagement with development-oriented activities, interviews with national partners (Government, NGOs and UN agencies) consistently showed that WFP was, and is still, perceived as a humanitarian agency. Its expansion into development work was questioned by more established development agencies on the grounds of WFP's technical capacity (see section 2.3), and of its relative lack of experience in development work, particularly social protection.

62. WFP was acknowledged by partners – GoC, NGOs, UN – to have a demonstrated comparative advantage in its humanitarian work. Interviews highlighted that WFP drew upon its expertise in the CO, in DRC, and in the region to react quickly in emergencies to both mobilise and coordinate partners. WFP also took the lead on joint assessment missions (JAM 2009 and follow-up of 2010 and assessment in 2012), in implementing training for government staff (SO200413), and in carrying out GFDs to refugees (EMOP 200093 and PRRO 200147) and IDPs (EMOP 200408). Across these operations, response was rapid and well organised, and maximized the available resources by coordinating partners.

63. Under the UNAIDS Division of Labour (UNAIDS, 2010), WFP is responsible for 'integrating food and nutrition programmes within the HIV response'. Interviewed stakeholders (WHO and CNLS) acknowledged that WFP in the Congo fulfilled this role at the policy and operational levels, but both reported little consultation in project design and implementation. WFP's comparative advantage could have been stronger if partnerships (with national entities, UN agencies, or with associations of PLWHA) at a strategic level had been established.

64. In education, WFP's comparative advantage came from the organisation's global work and reputation and from the reputation it had already gained through its historical engagement in school feeding in the Congo. A particular acknowledged comparative advantage was WFP's capacity to reach remote locations – an area in which WFP compared well to the other implementing partner IPHD, which has focused on urban, accessible schools. The majority of GoC stakeholders and beneficiaries respondents were of the opinion that, over the evaluation period, WFP

continued to build on these strengths by expanding its work to more schools, reaching a larger number of beneficiaries, in hard to reach areas.

65. In social protection, WFP was positioning itself corporately during the evaluation period. But in the Congo, it did not yet have demonstrable comparative advantage at the policy and operational levels, lacked experience in this field, and was mostly seen as an emergency-oriented organization. In Congo, no other organisation had significant comparative advantage with regard to the operational aspects of social protection, although UNICEF was making contributions in the policy field – an area where WFP did not demonstrate strong capacity during the review period. Social protection was also not consistently viewed within WFP as an area of organisational comparative advantage in the Congo: it was not mentioned as such in the 2009 RB programme review mission (WFP, 2009i)³³, nor in the internal CSD concept note (WFP, 2013b)

66. Nevertheless, the interviews and documentation highlighted that the CO seized the opportunity to address this emerging GoC policy priority during the latter part of the evaluation period (WFP, 2011b). With the support of HQ and RBs, the CO worked hard to build a profile with regard to social protection through its pilot. Interviews with the GoC and multilateral partners indicated that the CO is perceived to have succeeded in doing so. The pilot experience of WFP has also informed key partner documents and plans, including UNICEF's social action policy documents (UNICEF, 2011) and the emerging World Bank planning for technical assistance to a social protection programme (WB, 2013b).

2.2 Factors and Quality of Strategic Decision Making

2.2.1 Extent to which WFP analysed the context and appropriately targeted its interventions using this analysis

Key findings: The country context is characterized by limited analysis and little accurate up-to-date information. WFP conducted analysis both at the overall context and at thematic levels to feed into its choices. Gender was included in most analysis, but lacked depth in some reports/lines of inquiry. Across the portfolio a number of recommended studies/evaluations have not been implemented. Humanitarian assessments focused on food security and followed standard guidelines, but were not systematically followed up in design and implementation. Existing data from other sources were used to inform decisions on targeting in school feeding, where no studies were specifically commissioned, with the exception of the work on local procurement. In social protection and nutrition, various studies were done by WFP, however, these studies missed out on key lines of inquiry. WFP did not carry out a specific study on HIV to better understand the nutritional challenges facing PLWHA.

67. Studies in the Congo are few and far between, and limited by the lack of accurate, up-to-date, data. The CO used existing studies and commissioned and/or conducted studies specifically to understand the context for its programming. A key piece of work was the 2011 external evaluation of its portfolio (Cucchi and Geeraerd, 2012), commissioned by the CO to inform the 2011-2013 CSD draft (WFP, 2011b). Although the consultants reported not having received comments on the draft report, the findings from the evaluation were reported by the CO staff at Brazzaville level to

³³ This report however mentions social protection as a needed programmatic area (see par. 72).

have fed into the draft CSD produced by the CO. However, this report was never formally approved.

68. A second important document, produced by the CO, was the 2009 CFSVA (WFP, 2010h), set out to provide a view of food security nationwide, and a key resource for programming by the CO (WFP, 2009i). This document was used for the programming of DEV 200144 and DEV 200211, but was criticised in interviews and internal documentation for its lack of analysis of issues such as household expenses in rural/urban areas, subsistence strategies, purchasing power (by sex, education, type of shocks), etc., and the implications for food insecurity.

69. The CO also explored market access as part of its school feeding and social protection work. An innovative area of engagement and study has been related to local procurement. Feasibility studies were done in 2011/12 for cassava fortification and local palm oil purchases. The CO reported that these studies should allow WFP to conduct scale up local purchasing starting in 2014. However, this is an area that will require further support to strengthen market analyses and support local production.

70. Other analyses were conducted at component level. Within the humanitarian component WFP carried out inter-agency rapid assessments (in Likouala, 2009 and Brazzaville, 2012) to make initial programming decisions which led to the two EMOPs (200095 and 200408). In Likouala WFP drew on the 2010 emergency food security assessment (WFP, 2010b) and the October 2010 JAM (WFP, 2010d) for the design and justification of the PRRO 200147. However, longer-term follow-up or analysis was weak. In Likouala Province the planned 2011 JAM was cancelled because of lack of funding, and there has been no assessment since 2010 in this area³⁴. Analysis on gender and ethnicity was not given attention in operational design or implementation.³⁵ Neither of the assessments carried out in Likouala (WFP, 2009h, WFP, 2010j) mention gender, except in terms of the composition of the households. Programming in the humanitarian sector followed a template of 'standard' GFD. Initial assessments were shared with other actors (although not necessarily with NGOs³⁶), but WFP's analysis of portfolio priorities was centralised in Brazzaville. Lessons learnt were not consistently applied to new humanitarian operations, where similar problems were experienced (short-term vision, inability to address host populations' needs).

71. In education, WFP based its design and targeting on data from other sources. The 2009 RB programme review mission (WFP, 2009i) looked at the WFP school feeding experience in the Congo and highlighted a number of areas of weakness. The report included a mapping of nutrition and education indicators against data available from other reports and provided suggestions on priority geographical areas for school feeding. It also used a review of lessons learnt from WFP's own activities to identify and propose criteria for the selection of specific schools. The report did not do a specific analysis of gender aspects of school feeding, noting that gender is not a major constraint for enrolment in education. The CFSVA (WFP, 2010h) was also used to inform the initial decisions on targeting of DEV 200144 but did not include disaggregation of the indigenous population. The CO did do an analysis of ethnicity,

³⁴ The portfolio evaluation carried out in 2012 (Cucchi and Geeraerd, 2012) covered humanitarian activities but had not been made available to field staff.

³⁵ Although the 2012 SPR for PRRO 200147 does provide new indicators on gender, these are not linked to a situation analysis. See EQ3 for discussion of the relevance of indicators used.

³⁶ Although WFP NGO partners were aware of evaluations and assessments having happened, they did not have copies of them.

which resulted in the identification of a numeric target for ethnic minority children to be covered through DEV200144. Nor did the CFSVA include anthropometric indicators, such as the Mid-Upper Arm Circumference measurements among children under five. Broader assessments of the relevance of school feeding to the country context or of the education situation were not undertaken, the planned mid-term evaluation of the school feeding programme did not take place (WFP, 2011a), and the CO did not comprehensively draw on information from the only other significant actor in the sector, IPHD³⁷. The absence of such studies meant that WFP had a limited understanding of how factors and choices influenced outcomes.

72. With regards to social protection, the 2009 RB programme review mission identified the need for social protection interventions and for nutritional support to PLWHA (WFP, 2009i: 21, 22)³⁸. Following this the CO commissioned two studies that were significant for its emerging strategy on social protection. The first was the CFSVA (WFP, 2010h), the second was the feasibility study on the introduction of a social safety net in Brazzaville and Pointe Noire (WFP, 2010d). Whilst the feasibility study included information on food consumption patterns, markets, household expenditures and curative health-seeking behaviour and expenditures, it did not include information on malnutrition, nor did it analyse constraints on access to or utilisation of preventative health care, and it did not examine food security issues in the context of HIV/AIDS. The study however included disaggregated data on gender to highlight particular concerns for women and to assist in the understanding of the findings.

73. UNICEF, following a request for an assessment on social development policy by the GoC, produced a thorough and comprehensive review of the issues and options (UNICEF, 2011). This analysis was more gender-specific than WFP's studies and picked up on the importance of HIV/AIDS³⁹. However, UNICEF's study did not significantly influence WFP's programming as, by the time it was published, the safety net pilot had been designed. Review of WFP's project document for the pilot shows that although it drew on sources beyond the CFSVA and the feasibility study to justify the major emphasis in its targeting to PLWHA and to Pointe Noire, it did not undertake fundamental strategic analysis of the sort since produced by UNICEF. WFP made use of EDSC-I and nutritional survey results (those jointly conducted by the Ministry of Health and Population (MoHP) and UNICEF) in analysing the nutritional situation. A study on the vulnerability of PLWHA was conducted with UNAIDS in 2011 (Ponzio, 2011) which identified food insecurity as one of the main concerns; however, it did not identify specific strategies for addressing food insecurity of PLWHA, as had been recommended in the CFSVA report.

³⁷ Comparative data on the two models of school feeding, with a control group, could have provided crucial information on outcomes and impact and on the relative merits of the different approaches. It is the evaluation's opinion that a significant opportunity was missed when this was neither planned nor implemented. In school feeding the lack of a comparative analysis of the different intervention models was a missed opportunity to understand the impacts of school feeding on education, nutrition and other areas, across different target groups, e.g. girls, boys and ethnic minorities, and how school feeding as a safety net affects household income.

³⁸ Although it recommended that the planned project should operate only in rural areas (subject to refinement by the CFSVA then on-going).

³⁹ WFP's analysis (WFP, 2010hand WFP, 2010d) referred to women and female-headed households but did not provide any focused discussion of the gender dimensions of vulnerability or potential action to address these. It also gave no analysis on the impact of HIV/AIDS on vulnerability.


2.2.2 Contribution to placing issues on the national agenda, developing partner strategies, and strengthening national capacity

Key findings: WFP worked closely with the GoC to help build the national social protection agenda. In education, WFP supported GoC efforts to develop a legal framework and guidance on school feeding and a visit to the Brazil Centre of Excellence contributed to broader sectoral capacity development. Overall national capacity development was a minor, but growing, component of the portfolio and covered all four component areas. It was not informed by specific analyses of capacity constraints.

74. The interviews and documentation showed that WFP strategically identified opportunities to place key issues on the national agenda and to contribute to developing strategies of the GoC. It did so in a deliberate manner in two key areas, social protection and school feeding.

75. This engagement reflected internal strategizing which started as early as 2009, and was helped by WFP's acknowledged reputation as a responsive and operational agency, in a context where the GoC has few partners to work with. Increasing financial space, as well as suggestions by international partners that the GoC increase spending in social sectors, led the GoC to actively seek out WFP's support in areas where it had an acknowledged comparative advantage. It also resulted in funding by the GoC to development partners for its social development programmes (see Figure 4). In this context, the GoC raised capacity development as a concern, opting on the one hand for using the capacity of partners such as WFP to deliver, and on the other hand beginning to explore mechanisms for its own capacity development (a summary of capacity development by operation is in Annex 10).

Figure 4 Contributions from the Government to WFP's portfolio in the Congo (US\$)



Source: WFP data sets produced for Inception Report (2013)

76. In education, the 2012 inter-ministerial visit to the WFP/Brazil Centre of Excellence Against Hunger placed school feeding as a strategy for improving enrolment and retention high on the Government agenda. The visit resulted in the drafting of an action plan and policy for school feeding, which includes the creation of a new department for school feeding. Both were awaiting approval at the time of the CPE. The Brazil visit⁴⁰ gave WFP a key entry point in government discussions

⁴⁰ An exchange visit to Ivory Coast was also being prepared for April 2013.

and raised WFP's profile as a valued partner, because of its technical expertise and international experience of school feeding.

77. WFP used its proactive stance to place social protection on the national agenda, develop national and partner strategies, and build national ownership of social protection. Through regular but informal and largely undocumented interactions with MASAHA, the CO responded to and helped to reinforce the growing conviction in government that social protection has a central role to play. According to interviewees, this contributed to emerging national strategy development. Across operations this dialogue was mostly bilateral (see section 2.1.3).

78. The mutually reinforcing operational links between the CO and MASAHA sought to ensure ownership of the safety net pilot from the outset. Senior GoC interviewees asserted that this is a government programme (a view not fully shared by government field staff). However, the structures for dialogue and the roles of partners remained unclear: structures, systems or documented agreements specifying the respective roles of NGOs, bilateral and multilateral agencies were not developed. The evaluation found that it was UNICEF, rather than WFP, that worked with government on situation analysis and policy development, and that the CO was only recently informed of the World Bank's proposal to work on safety nets.

79. Sector capacity remained a challenge during the evaluation period, across the areas of the portfolio. Interviews with UN agencies, other development agencies, and with relevant GoC departments, as well as documentation (see Annex 6 and GoC, 2008, GoC, 2012, GoC – MoP, 2012) highlight capacity constraints on the Government side in areas such as policy, planning, implementation, monitoring, reporting and evaluation, as well as in specific capacity/technical areas (for example, understanding of school feeding in education, and social protection in the safety net area). Such weaknesses were evident to the evaluation team during fieldwork⁴¹ and are illustrated in the lack of a simple national mapping of agency activities in the country. Capacity development became a focus of the WFP portfolio in the latter part of the portfolio period⁴². However, engagement remained modest. Training focused on process/programme implementation rather than on broader sectoral issues. No specific studies were conducted by WFP in this area (see Annex 10). Specific WFP efforts on capacity development by component are discussed in Annex 11 and provide further details on specific findings.

2.2.3 Level of technical expertise (internally and externally) to strategically manage interventions

Key findings: Over the evaluation period, WFP expanded from a humanitarian and recovery-oriented portfolio to one with a strong development focus. An increase in WFP's staffing – technical and operational – took place to compensate for gaps that were identified at the start of the evaluation period. However, WFP human resource increases for the portfolio – with two new development operations from 2011 – did not meet the needs of a growing portfolio, in spite of human resource achievements

⁴¹ As an example, in the school feeding programme, weaknesses in supervision capacity, lack of understanding of the need for a broader approach to school feeding, and difficulties in filling out and analysing monitoring information were observed by the evaluation team, and corroborated the interviewees' reports that government capacity in this sector is limited by human resource and technical constraints as well as the inaccessibility of many of the schools in rural areas.

⁴² WFP made efforts during a retreat in February 2012 on partnership. The workshop included exercises based on the Capacity Development Toolkit for alignment and capacity development, as well as a stakeholder analysis.

being larger than planned. The planned involvement of NGOs to support implementation of these programmes did not materialise.

80. Annex 12 provides an overview of staffing changes over the evaluation period. This shows a substantial increase in staff between 2009 and 2012, for technical, programme, logistics and administrative areas, and reflects recommendations made by the 2009 RB programme review mission (WFP, 2009i).

81. In parallel, the scope, diversity and complexity of operations running in the Congo increased significantly. This included new areas of intervention and a change of role as WFP engaged in development oriented work. This required different kinds of expertise in newer areas (for example in social protection and broader education expertise, but also across sectors to provide inputs in institutional strengthening, capacity development, and system building); different planning and monitoring skills and systems (adapted to longer term engagement), and a different type of engagement (such as policy dialogue).

82. Interviews and documentation provide evidence of the CO's strong and committed entrepreneurial engagement to build perceived comparative advantage in social protection, humanitarian response and school feeding⁴³. This was done mainly at senior CO level, with strong engagement from CO technical staff. However, internal and external interviews showed that the CO lacked sufficient staff to implement the work generated by the two new development projects (one a pilot with substantial GoC funding commitment). Capacity constraints also affected the existing humanitarian work and the engagement in the area of health and nutrition. Detailed findings in this area are provided in Annex 15.

83. WFP could not draw extensively on the expertise of partners to strategically manage its interventions given the shortage of consultants, INGOs or NGOs in the GoC. Until the end of the evaluation period, NGOs⁴⁴ carried out all of the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) and food distributions for WFP in Likouala Province. At the end of December 2012, however, partnership agreements were terminated for financial reasons. As a result of the short notice given to field office staff concerning the termination there were no food distributions in January 2013, and some sites had none in December. No specific plan was drawn up on how the extra work generated would be absorbed by the limited field staff. There had been no handover or gradual phasing out of partners.

84. In the social protection area, and in the school feeding interventions, the planned involvement of NGO partners was not implemented in practice, for reasons that were different in the two component areas. In social protection, interviews with the CO indicate that the relevant Government partner wanted to ensure ownership by involving staff of Social Action Centres (CAS) rather than to pursue NGO involvement (as well as for cost consideration, see sections 2.1.3 and 2.2.2). In education the planned involvement of NGOs was based on an assumption at the time of programme design that such partners existed which was later found not to hold.

⁴³ The 2012 retreat reports that local procurement was also an area where the GoC sees an added value.

⁴⁴ The Agency for the Assistance of Refugees and Repatriated (AARREC) and Caritas Congo

2.2.4 Monitoring and evaluation systems supporting strategic decision making

Key findings: Across the portfolio component systems to collect monitoring data were put in place and provided a range of mostly output-related data. WFP did not consistently carry out baseline studies. Analysis of monitoring data was done at an operational level to feed into reporting, but the link between information and decision-making was not consistently made, within WFP or within government. Information on outcomes was collected inconsistently, further hampering analysis of effectiveness over time. In education and social protection, government staff were involved in monitoring and did not consistently supply all the required data.

85. Robust monitoring and evaluation is one of five key issues flagged as a critical attention point early on in the evaluation period by the 2009 RB programme review mission (WFP, 2009i)⁴⁵. That mission identified CO shortcomings in lack of baselines and data on effects of interventions and on impact. Weak/insufficient WFP and partner staff and capacity to monitor results were identified as contributing factors, together with the absence of a national database on food and nutrition monitoring from which to draw data. The report made recommendations aimed at ensuring robust monitoring and evaluation under the planned DEV intervention.

86. By the end of the period under evaluation, systems existed that regularly collected data on interventions across the various components of the portfolio. This information was fed into the Commodity Movement, Processing and Analysis System (COMPAS), as well as into WFP's internal reporting (SPRs). For the humanitarian work, monthly reports compiled and verified by the sub-office with inputs from partners were transmitted to Brazzaville. Data were entered into COMPAS at sub-office level. In education the reporting systems consisted of monthly and trimestrial reports by schools, monitoring reports by WFP staff, verifications during field visits by WFP staff and GoC school inspectors, monthly reports from sub-offices, and SPRs. These data were collected and fed back to Brazzaville, and were available to the evaluation team. In social protection (including nutrition) nine M&E forms were designed as part of the safety net pilot. WFP transmitted sets of these forms to CAS and ambulatory treatment centres equipped with computers to ensure their availability and facilitate recording and regular reporting. In practice the flow of monitoring data proved to be incomplete and irregular.

87. Efforts were made to increase the monitoring capacity of the CO, under the assumption that this would facilitate lesson learning and strategic decision-making (WFP, 2009i). Eight WFP field monitors were recruited over the evaluation period to strengthen field monitoring, as recommended by the 2009 RB programme review mission (WFP, 2009i). Two staffing reviews (2009 and 2010) were conducted, and necessary adjustments made. CO staff also reported efforts made to include other WFP staff regularly in monitoring through participation in field visits and in relevant internal meetings.

88. As per recommendations of the 2009 RB programme review mission, training was provided to GoC staff and at community level across portfolio components to strengthen monitoring. Beneficiaries of the training, as well as supervisors, in different sectors reported to the evaluation team that the trainings were much appreciated, had provided useful skills, and had helped strengthen the links with the

⁴⁵ Similar recommendations were also made in the evaluation of the PRRO (Gervais et al, 2008).

Government departments/ministries. In education, interviews showed that this contributed to greater ownership, with schools directors, teachers, and PTAs reporting that school inspectors consistently included school feeding in their overall regular inspection visits.

89. These monitoring systems were meant to provide a consistent stream of information that was fed back to the CO. Nonetheless there were apparent weaknesses in the functioning of the monitoring system as a whole, and in the linkages to decision making, which reduced its usefulness. A number of general factors were reported – from the various interviews at the CO and sub-office level, and through field verification visits, as well as FGD, individual interviews at school and community level, and verification of monitoring forms and reporting – as having interfered with the frequency and quality of monitoring across the portfolio:

- Food monitors at the CO had multiple responsibilities, affecting the extent to which monitoring plans were met. Although the number of field monitors increased (see paragraph 87) the reported amount of person time available for field monitoring did not increase to the extent that the number of monitors might suggest.
- Financial constraints led to staff requests for per diem for field visits being subject to questioning and scrutiny by management of the CO
- Field offices have not had sufficient human or material resources.
- In the latter part of the evaluation period senior management spent little time in the field.

90. Certain projects under the humanitarian component of the CO portfolio did not benefit from regular reporting. For the two emergency operations (EMOP200408 and SO 200413) carried out following the 2012 explosion – with a combined value of over US\$1,900,000 – there were no internal monitoring reports⁴⁶ until the SPR for 2012 was published in March 2013.

91. In education, in spite of recommendations to this effect (2009 RB programme review mission, PRRO evaluation (WFP, 2009)), no baseline survey was carried out at the start of DEV 200144. Nor were the recommended comparative studies conducted of samples of WFP-assisted and non-assisted schools undertaken (WFP, 2009). In addition, the monitoring systems did not sufficiently allow the Government officials to act on the information, given that reports from schools were frequently submitted directly to WFP rather than following official GoC administrative channels. GoC officers reported that the parallel monitoring system disempowers government school inspectors and weakens the link from monitoring to decision-making for them. This point was acknowledged by WFP CO staff and further efforts are being made to improve coordination and to streamline the flow of information by providing training to the schools and PTAs and through the distribution of a school feeding manual which outlines roles and responsibilities of intervening parties. A further key weakness was the frequency of supervision visits to schools (see section 2.3.3). The anticipated increase in staff resources (although not quantified in the project document), which was part of the DEV 200144 design, did not materialize, contributing to a limited monitoring capacity.

92. Monitoring also faced challenges for the pilot safety net programme. MASAHTutors reported not having enough forms – indicating poor logistics by the Ministry

⁴⁶ The only documents that exist for EMOP 200408 are the project document and Budget Review (2012). For SO 200413 there is the project document and an update on the resource situation (October 2012).

and possibly WFP – and WFP complained of delays in reporting – which it could arguably have followed up more systematically, although this was an agreed role for the Ministry. The forms included gender and outcome indicators as listed in the project’s logframe matrix. However, they also included data such as detailed information on immunization and other medical examinations, and attendance of pregnant women at prenatal consultations, which were onerous to collect. CAS personnel were meant to monitor not only the registration at school of children from participating households but also their attendance, on the basis of school records. Interviews yielded no evidence that this was being done systematically.

93. The monitoring system described above fed data back to the CO in Brazzaville. However, the feedback loop to using monitoring information for lesson learning and decisions was weak and/or not sufficiently followed up. For example, lesson learning in Likouala Province in terms of planning and implementing emergency food distributions was found not to have been transferred to the operation to support IDPs in Brazzaville in 2012.⁴⁷ In education, there were efforts at lesson learning by compiling the information from the different monitoring forms and analysing it, and a series of priority actions to improve the school feeding programme were identified. However, lack of capacity and time in the field was reported to have continued to hamper real progress against these plans.

94. Design of the pilot safety net programme assumed that implementation would be accompanied by a solid monitoring system. The project document specified an interlocking structure of monitoring, database and reporting systems that would primarily be the responsibility of MASAH and the implementing NGO. Interviews and available data show that M&E in the social protection field was challenged at various levels during the evaluation period. Field monitoring was not shared with an implementing NGO and depended solely on local staff of MASAH. Data delivery was incomplete and irregular, due to a range of logistical, staffing and operational problems. Monitoring systems were gender-disaggregated, although this is inadequately reflected in the 2012 SPR on the safety net project (WFP, 2013e). Reporting was largely restricted to standard WFP formats, notably the SPRs. Interviews with MASAH field staff indicate that they were not always fully committed to monitoring and considered this a supplementary activity (for which WFP paid them a supplementary monthly payment). Partner capacity failed to make up for WFP’s own M&E shortfalls in the field of social protection. At this early stage of a challenging pilot, the CO was largely absorbed in tackling the teething troubles of implementation and findings from M&E were not yet being used.

95. Monitoring is meant to support evaluation. A planned evaluation of school feeding in the second year of DEV 200144 did not take place. In social protection, WFP ended the evaluation period without an adequate analysis on which to base strategic and operational planning for future engagement in the sector (see section 2.3.4)⁴⁸.

⁴⁷ In some respects it seemed to the evaluation team on examining findings about both operations that similar mistakes were made in EMOP200408 – due consideration was not given to the host families/ communities at implementation stage in both operations (although it was reported by external sources that in the 2012 EMOP, host populations were eventually given food by NGO partners using government food). In both cases there was weak long-term vision (see section 2.3.1) and insufficient monitoring and reporting (see section 2.2.4).

⁴⁸ According to interviews with the CO, the draft mid-term evaluation commissioned in late 2012 (WFP, 2013a) for social protection was found by CO senior management to be inadequate to allow for a strategic assessment and for scale-up options of the pilot, although it did make a number of operational comments and recommendations.

2.2.5 To what extent has WFP entered into and managed appropriate operational partnerships?

Key findings: Opportunities for partnership were generally scarce over the evaluation period given the paucity of partners to work with. Operational partnerships were entered into across different portfolio components, involving the Government, private sector (in social protection), UN (humanitarian) and NGOs (for humanitarian and nutrition work). Partnerships predominantly focused on logistical support for the delivery of food and services. It proved difficult to develop substantial partnerships because of staff constraints at the CO, and of the limited partnership culture in the Congo. The latter part of the evaluation period saw some effort to undertake partnership reviews and assessments.

96. The lack/weakness of operational partnerships was highlighted in various reviews and evaluations prior to and during the evaluation period (Gervais et al 2008, Cucchi and Geeraerd, 2012, and WFP, 2009i). Accordingly, in the design of the development interventions (WFP, 2009i) recommendations were made to strengthen these. Various suggestions were made, including stronger engagement in the UNCT thematic working groups, ensuring that WFP activities were embedded in GoC strategic plans, conducting a careful analysis of potential opportunities based on areas of mutual comparative advantage, and periodically assessing and evaluating partnerships (WFP, 2009b). A summary of the partnerships and the number and types of agreements during the evaluation period can be found at Annex 14.

97. A number of steps were taken to respond to these recommendations. External interviewees and documentation showed that WFP participated in coordination meetings, including of the UNDAF, and made technical contributions in this context. However, the weaknesses of these forums, and of the partners, coupled with staffing challenges and high workloads/conflicting priorities of WFP staff (see section 2.2.3), reportedly reduced the effectiveness of this participation.

98. WFP made considerable efforts at partnering with UN organizations (section 2.1.3), most of which, as noted, did not come to fruition (a key exception being with UNHCR in the humanitarian area), frequently due to weaknesses of the partners concerned. WFP was, however, more successful in embedding its activities in Government plans, in particular in social protection and education (section 2.1.2). WFP (most recently the WFP CO retreat 2012) reviewed partnerships, and sought to identify strategies and areas for collaboration. This analysis lacked depth, in part reflecting the dearth of partners in the Congo (as per document review and confirmed through the interviews) as well as capacity constraints among the few that exist. Nonetheless, in social protection (see below) there were missed opportunities to rigorously identify partners and to engage in partnerships that went beyond engagement at the level of logistics and distribution.

99. In the humanitarian domain, WFP worked with a number of NGOs. Partner NGOs carried out distributions and collected data for M&E for WFP⁴⁹. The partners provided WFP with coverage and good contacts with the communities. There was no evidence from the interviews or documentation that partners had been involved in strategy or planning. Partners in Brazzaville and Likouala reported that these

⁴⁹ In December 2012 contracts were ended with the NGOs working with WFP in Likouala Province. This was for budgetary reasons (interviews with field staff and partners).

logistical relationships had worked well, although partners in Likouala were confused as to why the agreement had been terminated⁵⁰.

100. The safety net pilot had an ambitious partnership strategy including joint work between the Government and the private sector, as well as the support of an NGO (WFP, 2011e; WFP, 2012h). As noted in sections 2.1.3 and 2.2.5, the involvement of an NGO was not pursued. The revised partnership structure worked and ensured implementation, although there were many operational challenges during this pilot period. Interviewees from WFP and external informants reported that implementation would have been stronger if NGO support had not been excluded, spreading the administrative and logistical burden and strengthening the interface with beneficiaries. WFP's agreements with MASAH and the phone company Mobile Technology Network (MTN) for the safety net pilot stated the parties' respective obligations, but did not specifically focus on complementary technical expertise (MASAH and WFP, 2012a; MASAH and WFP, 2012b). An additional complication, inherent to the pilot nature of this initiative, was that none of the partners had experience in this area. As explained in section 2.3.4, technical, bureaucratic and communication weaknesses could not be fully resolved during the early stages of the safety net pilot (WFP, 2013c, np). Flows of funds between WFP, MTN, bank and beneficiaries were irregular, often delayed and usually incompletely communicated among the parties. Monitoring data flows between MASAH and WFP were similarly incomplete and irregular. Beneficiaries were often ignorant as to whether, or when, a month's transfer would be made.

101. In education, the main partnership related to the school feeding programme was with the Ministry of Primary, Secondary and Adult Education (MEPSA). This partnership initially focused on programme implementation (logistics, reporting) issues, and, over time, evolved to include technical responsibilities for MEPSA, in a partnership that all sides reported as having worked well. In school feeding various partners were also involved in the framework of local procurement: FAO, IFAD, three local NGOs, the Ministry of Agriculture, an industrial transformation unit, the centre of agronomic research and the centre of seed multiplication.

102. The foreseen Field Level Agreement (FLA) with NGOs for the school feeding component was not put in place (see Annex 14). While not mentioned in operational reports or SPRs there was some operational informal collaboration with IPHD around targeting of schools and logistics at local level. IPHD field staff suggested that a more formal partnership for support to the supervision of schools could have at least partially addressed the monitoring challenges that WFP faced.

103. In nutrition, under PRRO 103121, partnerships were to be established with 'technical' NGOs reported to have nutritional programmes for the HIV/AIDS component. In practice, this evaluation found that partnerships were established with two non-technical NGOs whose responsibility was food distribution and M&E (as per letters of agreement with WFP). Interviews with the NGOs involved in the HIV component of the PRRO indicated that WFP provided training on nutrition, and that they were conducting Information, Education and Communication (IEC) on food distribution days and cooking demonstrations. According to WFP staff, no other NGOs were interested in collaborating with this activity.

⁵⁰ Partners (Caritas and AARREC) gave different reasons for why the partnership had been ended and were unclear as to whether it would be resumed.

104. In the safety net programme, MASAH opted for using ministry staff, namely social workers, as “tutors” to select and follow up safety net beneficiaries. According to one CAS chief, some tutors had administrative/clerical positions in MASAH before being appointed as tutors and therefore had little technical expertise. This, in the context of care for PLWHA, did not help addressing the issue of stigmatisation that arose when photo-taking for badges was being proposed to selected beneficiaries.

2.2.6 Influence of internal and external factors

Key findings: External factors that affected the portfolio included logistical constraints, the MIC context, the shift from humanitarian to development context, little capacity for partnerships, refugees and unforeseen events (4th of March explosions). On the internal side the main factor influencing the portfolio was the considerable shortfall of funding. Other factors that affected the portfolio included the entrepreneurial leadership of the CO, WFP corporate strategies, and CO capacities and constraints.

105. On the external side a number of factors influenced the direction of the portfolio in the Congo. Logistical difficulties – including difficult terrain, high transport costs, poor capacity of transporters, and little ability to procure locally – have affected the portfolio throughout the implementation (see sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.3). The CO was innovative in opening up a corridor from Douala; however, the corridor was closed off because of regional insecurity.

106. The Congo’s MIC status provided both opportunities and challenges. The opportunity came from the Government having fiscal space to increase spending on development priorities, something which has effectively happened, and which has provided much needed resources to WFP (see Figure 4), but with the caveat noted below that disbursements have suffered considerable delays. The opportunities also included a strong interest by the Government in developing social protection, and in expanding its school feeding programme as part of this broader social protection commitment. The challenges related to the Congo’s MIC status have been the declining presence of donors in the country and a difficult and challenging funding climate for organisations (including WFP which saw repercussions for the implementation of operations, particularly in the earlier part of the evaluation period), and a decline in the number of implementing partners and presence of INGOs. It should be noted that, given that WFP’s own approach and policy on MIC countries are still in formulation, guidance to the CO in this matter was not corporately available. Furthermore, the technical resources that might have allowed WFP to better respond to the challenges of working in a MIC were not readily available given the status of the office as a small CO.

107. WFP’s biggest challenge, during the period up to end of 2011, was funding. This has made it very difficult to adequately address issues related to human resources and service delivery. The Government has committed funds, but with the exception of the transfer for the school meals programme for 2012, no funds had been received as of June 2013. The contributions for the safety net in 2012 and 2013 and for school feeding continued to be outstanding at the time of this report.

108. On the positive side, internal factors also included committed and entrepreneurial leadership in the CO at the time that the portfolio shifted towards a stronger development focus. This ensured that the CO made bold choices and operationalised them. Other internal influences included WFP’s corporate shift from

food aid to food assistance, accompanied by an increasing commitment to non-food transfers for promoting food security (WFP, 2011b; WFP, 2011y).

109. These factors created opportunities and constraints for WFP's programming in the Congo (WFP, 2011y, WFP, 2013j, 2013y). The opportunities were enthusiastically grasped and solidified WFP's reputation with the Government. Interviews, field observations, and the review of the annual performance plans, and risk registers by the CO, show that the constraints were partially recognised and not sufficiently thought through in terms of the implications for shifting from emergency to development interventions, and of engaging in new challenging areas of the portfolio including expansion of the school feeding programme, transition from food aid to food assistance, and a pilot social protection programme. To succeed, the CO required strong capacity, resourcing, management and partnerships. These strong strategic choices were compromised by weak organisation and inadequate capacity internally, as well as among the key partners externally (see section 2.2.3), constraining the extent to which portfolio activities were implemented successfully.

2.3 Portfolio Performance and Results

110. This section examines the performance and results separately for each of the four component areas of WFP's portfolio in the Congo (see Figure 1). Key findings with respect to gender and capacity development are discussed under each section.

2.3.1 Humanitarian Response

Effectiveness: beneficiaries

111. Between 63-84% of planned beneficiaries were reached across all operations under review (see Table 4). As shown in Table 20 (Annex 15), discrepancies between planned and reached beneficiaries are mostly linked to the non-activation of some sub-components (supplementary feeding, returnee packages). The number of female beneficiaries reached across GFDs was substantially higher than male beneficiaries, reflecting higher targets.

Effectiveness: attainment of objectives

112. The operations sought to provide monthly (30 day) rations to refugees in all the sites, over a three-year period covered by the EMOP and the PRROs.

113. Interviews with beneficiaries and host communities (in four refugee sites) showed that distributions were neither regular nor did they consistently fulfil the planned 30-day ration (both in terms of food basket and total calories) (see Table 21 and Table 22 of Annex 15). The irregularity (in frequency and size) of distributions caused confusion amongst the stakeholders. Beneficiaries wondered if this was to encourage them to repatriate. NGOs questioned whether it was due to funding constraints, the end of the project, or a coordinated effort with the UNHCR to encourage refugees to go home.

114. Table 4 below illustrates the extent to which planned rations were diluted amongst the caseload. While an overall average of 76% of total planned beneficiaries were reached, the average tonnage of food distributed was less than 34% of what was planned across all humanitarian operations⁵¹. Distributions through the EMOP

⁵¹ For further analysis of the amount distributed compared to the number of beneficiaries see Annex 15, Table 22.

200408 were the lowest with 84% of planned beneficiaries reached with only 19% of the planned tonnage⁵².

Table 4 Planned versus Actual Tonnage and Beneficiaries for humanitarian activities

| Operations | 2009 | | 2010 | | 2011 | | 2012 | | Overall | |
|----------------------|---------|--------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|--------|---------|-----------|
| | Planned | actual | Planned | actual | Planned | actual | Planned | actual | Target | % reached |
| PRRO 10312.1 | | | | | | | | | | |
| Beneficiaries | 112,500 | 71,404 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 112,500 | 63% |
| tonnage | 6,425 | 3,673 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 6,425 | 57% |
| EMOP 200095 | | | | | | | | | | |
| Beneficiaries | 112,500 | 50,504 | 124,700 | 114,594 | – | – | – | – | 237,200 | 70% |
| tonnage | 9,210 | 2,391 | 23,126 | 5,967 | – | – | – | – | 32,336 | 26% |
| PRRO 200147 | | | | | | | | | | |
| Beneficiaries | – | – | – | – | 115,100 | 122,977 | 95,100 | 83,081 | 210,200 | 98% |
| Tonnage | – | – | – | – | 13,264 | 4,514 | 12,434 | 3,748 | 25,698 | 32% |
| EMOP 200408 | | | | | | | | | | |
| Beneficiaries | – | – | – | – | 95,100 | 83,081 | 25,000 | 17,866 | 120,000 | 84% |
| Tonnage | – | – | – | – | 12,434 | 3,748 | 1,249 | 228 | 13,683 | 19% |
| Total average | 7818 | 3,032 | 23,126 | 5,967 | 12,849 | 4,131 | 6,842 | 1,988 | 21,486 | 16% |

Source: SPRs 2010, 2011 and 2012 and Project Documents for EMOP 200095, PRRO 200147 and EMOP 200408.

115. For SO 200413 four temporary warehouses were erected and MASA staff were trained in humanitarian logistics (numbers vary from 6 reported by WFP staff to 25 in the 2012 SPR).

116. Operations in Likouala Province address WFP's Strategic Objective 1 “saving lives”. Although there was irregularity of distributions, a WFP study (WFP, 2010j) reported that the majority of the beneficiaries had acceptable food consumption scores by May/June 2010. Given the various non-WFP interventions targeting the same group of beneficiaries and the lack of baseline data for the WFP operations, the evaluation was not able to establish to what extent this can be directly attributed to WFP.

117. Gender has been considered across the humanitarian portfolio and operations have scored well on the indicators tracked. However, conversations with beneficiaries and other actors suggested that the indicators used⁵³ were not highlighting the key issues around gender relations, such as camp security, violence against women, and the rising levels of HIV/AIDS and sexually transmitted diseases.

118. Studies by WFP and others showed improved food security of refugee households and found an increased diversification of sources of income. The 2009 UNHCR/WFP JAM and the follow up 2010 WFP survey (WFP, 2009h; WFP, 2010j) reported lower malnutrition rates, and recent studies by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) (MSF, 2012a; MSF, 2012b) show that severe cases of malnutrition have

⁵² For this operation, WFP was not able to reach the groups of beneficiaries envisaged in the project document – of the women 69% were reached, 64% of children under 5 were reached, and none of the children in host families.

⁵³ Name on the ration card and proportion of women in leadership on the refugee committees.

reduced. This cannot be entirely attributed to WFP's operations in Likouala. The ration distributed by WFP – even if consumed entirely⁵⁴ – covered less than the planned 75% of daily requirements⁵⁵ and refugee populations all reported engaging in other activities to supplement their diet.

119. In Brazzaville, the 2012 study (WFP, 2012k) found that the majority of beneficiaries had acceptable food consumption scores. Again, given the lack of baseline data (which the SPR attributes to a lack of time in a short operation) this cannot be fully attributed to EMOP 200408 (WFP, 2013f) given that beneficiaries also received food from the Government, and cash packages for basic needs, and relied upon income-generating activities (WFP, 2013f). The SO 200413 aimed to increase government capacity in humanitarian logistics and to increase storage space available to the Government. The SPR states that both outcomes were achieved and that the impact of this was "appropriate storage of the received donations, minimising losses of donated goods and allowed for timely daily distribution to the camps" (WFP, 2013g: p.5), but outcome indicators were neither set nor measured. No evidence was found other than the number of warehouses provided and number of people trained.

Effectiveness: Contribution to national humanitarian changes:

120. WFP's humanitarian work providing food rations to refugees across Likouala Province has been significant. WFP served all of the refugee sites and has operated in the area since the start of the influx in 2009 until the present. Along with UNHCR, WFP is one of the few agencies to have provided sustained support to the refugees.

121. Whilst WFP's interventions in Brazzaville to serve those affected by the March 2012 explosion were on a much smaller scale, they were significant because of their location. The GoC recognises WFP as being one of their key logistical partners and it was for this reason it turned to WFP for training and logistical capacity development following the explosion.

Efficiency

122. In its humanitarian programming WFP has done well with regard to timeliness. It has responded quickly and is therefore seen by government to be one of the key humanitarian actors. Whilst it has struggled with funding for its refugee programmes (PRRO 200147 was 46% funded and EMOP 200095 36% funded) the funding following the explosion in Brazzaville was generous (EMOP 200408 funded to 98% and SO200413 to 94%). The costs per beneficiary are high and have varied. Costs per beneficiary of the refugee operations have in fact gone up over time where one would expect increased efficiency in a long-running operation: US\$60 per beneficiary under PRRO 200147 versus US\$54 for EMOP 200095. But they remain lower, despite inaccessibility of Likouala province and resultant high transport costs, than those in Brazzaville where the operation cost US\$73 per beneficiary (see Table 23 and Table 24 in Annex 15 for more details).

Factors explaining the results

123. Much of WFP's humanitarian programming has been in a very inaccessible province. WFP has struggled to maintain its pipelines of food and fuel (interviews

⁵⁴ Most households said that they sold part of the ration to buy soap, to pay school fees or in order to have some variety in their diet.

⁵⁵ 75% of a 2100kcal requirement per day was the aim for PRRO 200147 as refugees were considered to have additional sources of livelihood with which they could supplement their ration.

with CO, with WFP and UNHCR staff in Likouala)⁵⁶ to the region. There have been repeated pipeline breaks from 2009-2012 as sufficient stock to last through the dry season (December to June) has not been transported during the wet season (interviews with WFP staff, SPRs for the period refer to this but do not quantify). The Oubangui River is only passable by barges during the wet season (June to November); hence the need for a prepositioning of six months to occur. The management of procurement and transportation of stock is centralised in Brazzaville so field staff had little control over this process although they reported suffering the consequences of breaks in supply. When the evaluation team visited Betou there was enough stock to last until April 2013 whilst the river would only be adequate for transportation by June/July, suggesting there would again be a pipeline break⁵⁷. Communication with beneficiaries also seems to have been poor and has created confusion concerning the reasons for reduction in rations.

124. Shortages of stock have resulted in rations being reduced in terms of commodities and quantities (see Table 21 in Annex 15 for recent 2012/2013 examples). There have also been problems with the quality of the ration. Refugees complained of infestation with insects, seemingly a result of long storage under poor conditions. Field visits by the evaluation team showed that the warehouses in Betou appeared to be well managed⁵⁸ but due to the lack of concrete flooring there was evidence of rats burrowing in the floor and some stock was clearly infested with insects.

125. Within EMOP 200408, it seems that various problems resulted in significant changes made, in terms of planned targets, between design (as per project document) and implementation (see Annex 15, Table 22). Although the project document originally estimated 25,000 in need of assistance, WFP served 17,866 people in camps (and not in host communities). The SPR states that "beneficiaries received half of the planned food ration ... on an irregular basis" (WFP, 2013f: p.5). Reasons given appear contradictory: the food procured internationally is reported as having arrived too late "close to the end of the project and after government had closed the camps and given cash packages to affected families", whilst the SPR indicates that government food distributions made original estimates of the rations needed surplus to requirement. It is difficult to ascertain from the limited reporting⁵⁹ what the beneficiaries actually received and the reasons for the changes to the project implementation.

126. Whilst WFP tried to respond quickly to the explosion in Brazzaville they were in fact dependent upon government for beneficiary lists. This limited WFP to targeting only those in the IDP camps, and not those with host families (who presumably are less visible). Caritas and ARREC (the two NGOs implementing for WFP) however report having also carried out distributions to the IDPs in host families, but using food provided by the Government. Although this is not mentioned in the WFP project reporting, it could explain the non-reaching of host populations by this operation (as well as expenditures against it, see below).

127. Financing has been problematic for the refugee operations (see Annex 15). The EMOP (200095) and the PRRO (200147) were only funded at 35.6% and 45.5%,

⁵⁶ Fuel procured in Likouala Province is more expensive in Brazzaville or CAR. Most UN agencies procure fuel and transport it to Likouala. This may also provoke breaks in supply.

⁵⁷ Funding was also a reason given by field staff for delays.

⁵⁸ Stock was neat and orderly and staff had a good idea of the amount of stock in the warehouse.

⁵⁹ The only reporting (internal and/or donor) found by the evaluation mission for this operation is the recently published 2012 SPR.

respectively. Low levels of funding led to WFP ending contracts with NGOs and carrying out distributions itself, affecting continuity in the provision of rations. EMOP 200408 was, however, almost completely funded (98.2%), as was the SO 200413. Although the project distributed a very low percentage of the planned food (18.3%), 90% of the budget was spent. The SPR 2012 does not provide a reason for the level of spending although there is a possibility that it was due to government providing food bilaterally to WFP partners⁶⁰.

2.3.2 Health and Nutrition

Effectiveness: beneficiaries

128. Table 5 summarizes actual versus planned beneficiaries over the CPE period 2009-2012. The table shows that planned beneficiaries have deviated from beneficiaries actually reached across operations and target groups. Nutritional support to PLWHA on ART and TB patients on Directly Observed Treatment (DOTS) has been the main nutrition-specific activity in the portfolio. In the case of HIV/AIDS and TB patients, planned figures were exceeded, but absolute numbers of beneficiaries reached decreased over the evaluation period.

Table 5 Actual vs Planned Beneficiaries in Nutrition Programmes

| | 2009 | | 2010 | | 2010 | | 2011 | | 2012 | |
|---|---------------|-----------|---------------|-----------|---------------|-----------|---------------|-----------|---------------|-----------|
| | PRRO 103121 | | PRRO 103121 | | EMOP 200095 | | PRRO 103121 | | DEV 200211 | |
| | Target number | % reached |
| Malnourished Children | 1,700 | 0 | | | 3,500 | 0 | | | | |
| Pregnant women through PMTCT | 600 | 58.2% | - | - | | | | | | |
| HIV/AIDS patients supported for AR | 5800 | 60.5 | 6,000 | 65.9 | | | 3,530 | 100.9 | 956 | 164.7 |
| TB patients to complete DOTS | 200 | 85.0 | 1,000 | 75.0 | | | 450 | 100.0 | 100 | 492.0 |
| Vulnerable pregnant/lactating women to attend clinics | | | | | | | | | 506 | 68.2 |

Sources: SPRs for PRRO 10321; EMOP 200095; and DEV 200211

129. Significant differences were noted between planned and implemented activities. The foreseen support to malnourished children under the relief component of PRRO 203121 in 2009, and through EMOP 200095 in 2010, did not materialize and none of the 5,200 planned beneficiaries from Likouala province were reached. The evaluation established from interviews and documentary evidence that this was also largely because of the lack of partner NGOs.


130. Actual beneficiaries fell short of plans in the PMTCT component of PRRO 103121 (with 58.2% of the 600 target being reached), which foresaw food rations to food insecure mothers and children enrolled in PMTCT. However, a review of the national potential caseload statistics suggests this target was not realistic (see section

⁶⁰ It may be that costs of distribution of the GoC commodities were in fact borne by WFP (through its partners who also assisted with the distribution of government food), although this is not mentioned within the operation's SPR.

2.1.1). The activity was discontinued in 2010, because the partner NGO closed down its activities⁶¹.

131. Percentage of PLWHA reached versus planned (Figure 5) increased over the evaluation period, although absolute numbers dropped significantly. Reduced achievements were attributed to serious resourcing shortfalls (SPRs 2009 and 2010), and shortage of resources was given as an explanation for the lower target in 2011.


Figure 5 Actual vs. target PLWHA on ART receiving nutritional support



Source: SPRs 2009-2012

132. Although TB patients were not initially mentioned among targeted beneficiaries of PRRO 103121 (2007) varying numbers of TB patients under DOTS received food as shown in Figure 6.

Figure 6 Nutritional Support to TB patients



Source: SPRs 2009-2012

133. A total of 506 households – 100 with pregnant or lactating women and 406 with children under two identified as malnourished – were to receive vouchers under the safety net operation. This benefit was conditional on their attendance at integrated health centres to follow prenatal services, deliver their babies, and access growth monitoring and vaccination for children under two and/or attendance at scheduled clinic visits for ART and/or TB-DOTS. In 2012, 345 pregnant/lactating women were reached (68.2% of planned).

⁶¹ The CO could not provide further information on the PMTCT as PRRO103121 data were lost when computers were changed and hard copies of reports such as those of NGO “Keto Mwana” are nowhere to be found after office move.

134. Malnourished children under five were to receive supplementary feeding under PRRO 103121 and EMOP 200095. In the PRRO the ration (1570 Kcal/day) was to be provided for two months. In the EMOP, the ration's duration was not specified. Pregnant or nursing women enrolled in PMTCT and PLWHA on ART programmes were to receive a family ration for one year. Under the safety net programme, PLWHA and TB patients would be given an individual daily ration of Ready-to-Use-Foods (RUF) for 6 months in addition to the voucher (see Table 6).

Table 6 Planned Ration Composition, Size and Duration

| Ration Composition, Size and Duration | | | | | | | | | |
|---------------------------------------|-----------------------------|--------|-----|-----|-------|------|-----|-------------------------|-----------|
| Beneficiary | Ration composition and size | | | | | | | Energy value/person/day | Duration |
| | Rice | Pulses | CSB | Oil | Sugar | Salt | RUF | Kcal | Months |
| PRRO 103121 | | | | | | | | | |
| Children | | | 200 | 60 | 60 | | | 1570 | 2 |
| PMTCT & ARV | 1750 | 500 | 100 | 150 | 50 | 25 | | 2000 | 12 |
| EMOP 200095 | | | | | | | | | |
| Children | | | 200 | 20 | 20 | | | 1009 | Not given |
| DEV 200211 | | | | | | | | | |
| PLWHA & TB | | | | | | | 276 | 630 | 6 |

Source: SPRs 2009-2012

135. Data on planned/distributed commodities were not disaggregated by activity and/or beneficiary category in SPRs and the mission did not have access to the PRRO database to undertake analysis of commodities separately for the nutrition component. Data on planned and distributed commodities for all categories of beneficiaries under PRRO 103121 are summarized in Table 7. Planned tonnage figures have not been achieved for all commodities between 2009 and 2011. Furthermore, achievements have been uneven, suggesting that rations distributed to beneficiaries were incomplete (for example, no vegetable oil in 2011). Wide variations can be observed as shown in Figure 7 for corn-soya blend (CSB). In 2012, 55 out of 98 tons of RUF (56%) were distributed to almost double the number of beneficiaries (2067 PLWHA and TB patients reached as compared with 1056 planned i.e. 195.7% of planned caseload).

Table 7 Planned and distributed commodities PRRO 102121 for all beneficiaries

| Commodities | 2009 (tons) | | | 2010 (tons) | | | 2011 (tons) | | |
|---------------|-------------|-------------|----|-------------|-------------|----|-------------|-------------|-----|
| | Planned | Distributed | % | Planned | Distributed | % | Planned | Distributed | % |
| Rice | 4489 | 2862 | 64 | 6458 | 1882 | 29 | 3682 | 279 | 8 |
| Pulses | 1203 | 640 | 53 | 1782 | 348 | 20 | 933 | 263 | 28 |
| CSB | 162 | 22 | 14 | 216 | 29 | 13 | 108 | 108 | 100 |
| Vegetable oil | 402 | 98 | 24 | 518 | 93 | 18 | - | - | - |
| Iodized salt | 88 | 29 | 33 | 128 | 23 | 18 | 74 | 22 | 30 |
| Sugar | 81 | 23 | 28 | 108 | 17 | 16 | 54 | 7 | 13 |


Source: PRRO 103121 SPRs 2009-2012 (WFP, 2010l;WFP, 2011m;WFP, 2012v;WFP, 2013j)

Effectiveness: attainment of objectives

136. For PMTCT, the related SPR (2009) does not report on the outcome indicators from the logframe matrix. WFP CO staff mentioned that the NGO implementing partner had submitted a report (hard copy) that was lost during WFP's office relocation.


137. For HIV patients on ART, outcome indicators have changed over the life of the same operation in alignment with the new WFP strategic framework (PRRO 103121). ART treatment adherence rate was used in 2009; two additional indicators were added in 2010: survival rate and nutritional recovery rate. Adherence to treatment was very high at 98% between 2009 and 2011 (Figure 8). Nutritional recovery improved from 90% (2010) to 95% (2011). HIV survival rate at 12 months improved from 75% to 80% between 2010 and 2011.

Figure 7 CSB – Tons distributed versus planned in PRRO 103121



Source: PRRO 103121 SPRs 2009-2012 (WFP, 2010l; WFP, 2011m; WFP, 2012v; WFP, 2013j)

Figure 8 PLWHA Outcomes



Source: SPRs 2009-2012

138. TB outcome indicators also changed over the life of the PRRO project: successful completion of treatment in 2009; an additional indicator "TB adherence rate" was added in 2010. Successful completion of TB treatment was very high between 2009 and 2011 (95% in 2009; 98% in 2010 and 97% in 2011), as well as adherence to TB treatment (97 and 98 in 2010 and 2011).

139. In 2012, 88% of supported pregnant women (base value 50%) received at least 4 antenatal check-ups during pregnancy as recommended in the national safe motherhood protocol, and 80% of supported lactating women received a post-natal check-up (base value 15%). The base values are quite low given this national health statistics. The recent EDSC-II confirmed that prenatal consultation coverage is very high in the Congo: 96% of women in Brazzaville and 98% in Pointe Noire reported consulting a health professional at least once during their pregnancy. In practice, the conditionality of health visits was not enforced under this pilot programme and none of the beneficiaries were excluded for not complying.

140. No databases were available to the mission to do any crosschecking or further analysis such as disaggregation by gender and by geographic area.

Effectiveness contribution to national humanitarian/development changes

141. Between April 2008 and March 2009 there were 37 public, private and faith-based centres providing medical care for PLWHA throughout the country, and active cases numbered 11,626 of which 8,856 (76.8%) were under ART (IMF/Ministry of Planning & Territorial Development, 2010). Between 2009 and 2011 (that is under PRRO 103121 implementation) WFP provided nutritional support through 18 health facilities (SPR 2009) representing nearly half of existing facilities in the country and reached an average of 3665 PLWHA per year, or about 40% of the estimated active cases under ART.

Factors explaining results

142. When WFP started its support to PMTCT, national guidance was still under development (e.g. training of midwives had just started) and there was only one NGO with the necessary technical expertise for PMTCT. So WFP's support to PMTCT was discontinued when the INGO closed down as no other appropriate partner was present.

143. Supplementary feeding was implemented for one year under PRRO 103121 and never implemented under EMOP 200095. In both cases, supplementary feeding was most likely proposed in compliance with UNHCR/WFP joint guidance on selective feeding, but was found not to be required.

2.3.3 Education

Effectiveness: beneficiaries, coverage and tonnage

144. Table 8 summarizes the actual versus planned beneficiaries, schools and school feeding days (the three output indicators consistently monitored). Other output indicators were inconsistently monitored⁶², and no conclusions could be drawn about progress against them.

⁶² Output indicators that were inconsistently monitored include: number of schools with latrines (only 2009) = 66.7%; number of schools with food stores and kitchens = 80.6% (only 2009); number of teachers or cooks assisted by WFP = 692, or 49.4% (only 2010); government contributions towards WFP-run school feeding activities = 86.7% (2011 only).

Table 8 Number of beneficiaries education 2009 -2012

| | 2009 | | 2010 | | 2011 | | 2012 | |
|-----------------------------------|---------------|-----------|---------------|-----------|---------------------------|------------|---------------|-----------|
| | PRRO 103121 | | PRRO 103121 | | DEV 200144 (PRRO 103121)* | | DEV 200144 | |
| | Target number | % reached | Target number | % reached | Target number | % reached | Target number | % reached |
| School children male | 35,000 | 48% | 35,000 | 54% | 22,500 (35,000) | 127% (56%) | 28,000 | 99% |
| School children female | 35,000 | 39% | 35,000 | 46% | 22,500 (35,000) | 121% (50%) | 28,000 | 94% |
| Total no. of school children | 70,000 | 43% | 70,000 | 50% | 45,000 (70,000) | 124% (53%) | 56,000 | 96% |
| Number of schools | 270 | 55% | 187 | 68% | 350 (350) | 99% (57%) | 350 | 99% |
| Percentage of school feeding days | 100% | 55% | 100% | 50% | 100% | 66% (67%) | 100% | 77% |

* For 2011, the table reflects the number of beneficiaries targeted under DEV 200144 in that year, with in brackets the targets and actual figures from the PRRO 103121 which covered the first half of the year. DEV 200144 presented more conservative figures of what was planned and implemented in the PRRO which covered the first half of the year.

145. The WFP school feeding programme specifically targeted areas of poverty, with poor food consumption, and with the lowest levels of enrolment and retention over the evaluation period: Cuvette, Lekoumou, Plateaux and Pool regions. Under DEV 20144 school feeding included a target to reach 8000 indigenous children (between 2011 and 2013). Numbers on indigenous children reached are not included in WFP CO level reporting, but separate reported information supplied by the sub-office in Nkayi showed that in 2012 the school-feeding programme reached 631 ethnic minority children⁶³, or 1% of all the pupils who received school feeding during the 2011-2012 school year (WFP, 20120). In addition, numerical evidence on enrolment and attendance in selected schools visited by the evaluation team, triangulated with interviews, showed that there had been a marked increase in enrolment by indigenous children in WFP-supported schools.

146. Data on planned/distributed commodities were not disaggregated by activity or beneficiary category for PRRO 103121. The mission could not obtain information to undertake analysis of commodities separately for school feeding under the PRRO. Table 9 therefore only reflects commodities planned and distributed under DEV 200144.

⁶³ Representing 8% of the project document's target for indigenous children.

Table 9 Planned and distributed commodities for DEV 200144

| Commodities | 2011 tons | | | 2012 tons | | |
|---------------|------------|-------------|--------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|
| | Planned | Distributed | % | Planned | Distributed | % |
| Beans | | | | 0 | 37 | |
| Canned fish | 174 | 51 | 29.3% | 302 | 95 | 31.5% |
| CSB | 135 | 17 | 12.6% | | | |
| Iodised salt | 11 | 14 | 127.3% | 40 | 12 | 30.0% |
| Maize meal | 0 | 10 | | | | |
| Rice | 405 | 251 | 62.0% | 1512 | 936 | 61.9% |
| Split Peas | 108 | 108 | 100.0% | 403 | 127 | 31.5% |
| Vegetable oil | 41 | 42 | 102.4% | 151 | 58 | 38.4% |
| Total | 874 | 493 | 56.4% | 2408 | 1264 | 52.5% |

Source: SPR 2011, 2012 (WFP, 2012q;WFP, 2013h)

147. Table 9 illustrates that for this operation actual distribution of commodities was just over half of what was planned. SPR reports and field visits showed that lack of transport capacity resulted in quantity of food distributed being less than planned (i.e. schools received food late). In 2012 a number of schools did not receive food at the start of the school year pending investigation of irregularities in stocks by WFP. With 77% of school feeding days and 52% of food distributed in 2012 this suggests that in addition to rations not being received on a quarter of the school days, rations were not complete for part of the period that they were distributed.

148. Statistics and internal reporting, field work, and an external evaluation (WFP, 2009i) highlighted difficulties in providing consistent supplies for schools, in particular in the early part of the evaluation period. Overall, data show that the number of feeding days per school year has gone up over the evaluation period, from 55% in 2009 to 77% in 2012, also comparing favourably with the previous period when the number of school feeding days was only 32% (WFP, 2009i). School managers, Parents and Teachers Associations (PTAs), parents and pupils confirmed an increase in the number of feeding days as well as in other indicators (reliability of supplies and fewer stockouts of certain products) under DEV 200144.

149. Under DEV 20144, 2056 PTA members were trained (95% of the target). In 2012, WFP initiated training of school inspectors. A total of 47 inspectors were trained (94% of target). DEV 20144 also targeted having 100% of PTAs headed by women, with at least 50% female members. WFP's internal reporting for 2011 and 2012, informs that the first indicator has been achieved. However, in the nine schools visited by the evaluation team none of the PTAs were headed by women, and female participation was uniformly below the 50% target.

150. Community participation has been an important feature of the school feeding model. Children bring wood and water to schools in exchange for a meal. Parents participate through the PTA and food preparation is done by women from the community. The evaluation field visits and interviews underscored that overall community participation is in evidence in all the schools, but with significant variations. Stronger involvement was noted in schools that have been part of the school feeding programme for a longer period. The community is encouraged by WFP to bring local vegetables and fruit to school in order to complete the food basket

for their children. This has however come up against resistance from communities as education is free of charge and communities therefore are of the opinion that they should therefore not have to pay for/contribute to education.

151. The biggest contribution by communities to the school feeding programme is provided by the women cooks who provide one full day of voluntary work per week. School visits highlighted issues around the selection/coercion of the women into participating, calling into question the voluntary nature of their participation, as well as issues related to the abolition of the food ration⁶⁴ that was provided to them until the beginning of 2012/2013 school year, which has affected motivation. School directors and community leaders expressed concerns about hygiene and health issues because of the rotational nature of the involvement of women who are not trained in elementary hygiene, and are not given adequate medical check-ups/attention. Women cooks themselves complained about difficult working conditions due to close proximity to the open fires used for cooking.⁶⁵

152. Beneficiaries (pupils and parents) interviewed through SSIs and FGD in nine schools by the evaluation team uniformly expressed appreciation for the school feeding programme and highlighted its benefits in supporting families and improving participation in schools. For most children interviewed the school meal (provided at lunch time) was their first meal of the day, and in some cases their only meal or only warm meal. Beneficiaries also underscored that WFP was the only organization with a field presence in remote areas. However, meals were noted to be monotonous, reflecting that WFP relies on donated food⁶⁶. More recently WFP has engaged in work (as a pilot) to include local palm oil and cassava flour.

Effectiveness: attainment of objectives

153. At the outcome level, three indicators have been consistently monitored by WFP: enrolment, gender parity, and attendance. Enrolment in WFP assisted schools increased on a year-by-year basis, from an enrolment increase target of 6% in 2010 (earliest SPR to include enrolment targets) to 25.7% in 2012. Follow up monitoring from Lekoumou (92 primary schools covered by WFP) further showed that enrolment increased sharply among ethnic minority children. Over a period of three months there was a 44% increase in enrolment by ethnic minority children from 352 pupils to 631 (Source: WFP, 2012o).

154. School feeding has targeted male and female pupils equally, but has sought to increase the enrolment of girls. There has been an increase in the ratio of girls to boys in the targeted schools, from 0.90 (2008) to 0.95 in 2012 (national gender parity index was 0.9 in 2009).

155. Attendance rates, the third outcome indicator, were consistently high throughout the evaluation period – 95% at base line in 2009 and also in 2012.⁶⁷

156. Review of reporting documentation shows inconsistent use of and reporting against outcome indicators, which affects the extent to which the evaluation could

⁶⁴ Under the previous PRRO the cooks were receiving a full Family ration via FFW. This was discontinued under the DEV 201144.

⁶⁵ At the time of the evaluation the CO was in discussion with UNDP for the construction of safe/fuel efficient stoves in project schools.

⁶⁶ Pupils in the IPHD School visited by the evaluation team were also very positive about the school feeding programme. In this school, however, two menus existed which were alternated from one day to the next, so as to provide more variety. We were told this was part of IPHDs strategy for school feeding.

⁶⁷ For the new schools, which started in 2011, a longer follow-up period would be necessary to assess changes in attendance. In addition, some of these schools were taken over from IPHD and therefore already had school feeding in place prior to WFP's intervention.

form a judgement on other outcome areas. For some indicators there are no baselines recorded in the SPRs: various indicators were added over the evaluation period, and others were dropped. In addition, there is no project (CO specific) indicator for measuring participation of indigenous children, one of the key goals of the DEV 200144.

157. The improvement in school feeding days over the evaluation period is an indicator of increasing efficiency. However, schools have not implemented other key elements of the essential package⁶⁸, reportedly because of the lack of partners. No evidence was found in the school visits, monitoring reports, and interviews that the support to schools had impacted on latrines, water provision, or health visits, with the exception of a 2010 deworming campaign in schools in coordination with IPHD. None of the schools visited had fuel-efficient stoves.

158. The following intended positive outcomes were reported by parents and teachers interviewed through SSI in four of the nine communities/schools visited by the evaluation team:

- With increasing numbers of indigenous children coming to school, villages that were previously seasonally abandoned have seen more activity, as parents tend to stay closer to the schools to be with their children. There are potential opportunities to work with these indigenous communities on income-generating activities that could be explored by WFP.
- Women involved in the preparation of meals reported being recognized within communities for their contribution to the welfare of the children. This has given them self-esteem and increased their status within the community.

Effectiveness: contribution to national humanitarian/development changes

159. Adding up totals of school children per year shows that school feeding reached 174,900 school children over the four-year period, out of a target of 241,000, representing 72% of the pupils targeted. The number of schools assisted by WFP increased from 180 (55% of planned target) in 2009 to 342 (98%) in 2012, covering an important number of schools and children. In 2009, the school feeding programme represented 36% of all primary schools in the four regions covered, over a quarter of the primary school pupils in these regions, and 5% of all primary school pupils in the country. In 2012, the programme covered just under half (43%) of all schools in the four regions and 8% of the school population in the country⁶⁹.

160. The later part of the evaluation period has included a focus on policy strengthening (section 2.2.2). Government staff at national level underscored the importance of this engagement, and of the exchange with Brazil, to the emerging school feeding policy and strategy.

⁶⁸ The Essential Package includes: 1) basic education; 2) food for education; 3) promotion of girls' education; 4) potable water and sanitary latrines; 5) health, nutrition and hygiene education; 6) systematic deworming; 7) micronutrient supplementation; 8) HIV and AIDS education; 9) psychosocial support; 10) malaria prevention; 11) school gardens; and 12) improved stoves (WFP & UNICEF, n.d).

⁶⁹ In comparison, the IPHD school feeding programme covered 30,000 pupils in 118 schools in 2012. The GoC contribution to the IPHD school feeding programme was USD 6 million.

Efficiency

161. In terms of efficiency, the school feeding results were achieved at higher than average costs globally. Cost was \$80 per pupil per year⁷⁰ in 2012, or double the global average cost (Galloway *et al.*, 2009), and three times or more compared to Mozambique (\$30/year/pupil), Malawi (\$20/year/pupil) and Tajikistan (\$25/year/pupil). These costs are at least partly explained by specificities of the Congo context, including high costs of importing food and of transportation.⁷¹

Factors explaining results

162. A key explanatory factor for the results is the school feeding model that is used by WFP. This model has evolved from previous experience. Changes have been introduced to provide training and develop guidance manuals that have built capacity and contributed to strengthening roles and responsibilities of different intervening partners. This has been reflected in better organization at school level, greater involvement of education staff, improved accountability, and greater ownership. The model has key elements that could make it a sustainable programme (government ownership, involvement, and funding).

163. The higher outputs in the later period (numbers of pupils reached, number of schools, and school feeding days) are explained by higher levels of funding – the DEV 200144 was fully funded in 2012 (SPR 2012), against funding levels of 50% in the first two years (see Table 3 and Table 8) – as well as by improved targeting/planning with more realistic caseload targets under DEV 200144. The substantial GoC contribution-in-cash facilitated improved planning and procurement processes.

164. Converting lesson-learning into operational changes has been challenging. Two main factors have intervened: insufficient WFP staffing for monitoring and support, and the lack of operational partnerships to put in place complementary elements of a basic package.

165. At an operational level, funding challenges were a considerable barrier to reaching targets. The lack of capacity by the private transporters, poor road conditions, and the remoteness of many schools affected the organization and timeliness of the distributions. In addition, the foreseen additional staff supplement for the DEV 200144 was not put in place, which further stretched the WFP capacity. These limitations in technical and operational capacity by WFP, combined with the aforementioned lack of partners, have had implications for the efficiency of operations.

166. Work has been initiated in the last two years of the evaluation period (DEV 200144) on local purchasing (WFP, 2013h) and will require time to go to scale given the challenges of a country where very little food is produced. This will require a longer-term engagement in conducting thorough market analyses to inform initiatives to support local produce, quality standards, and the purchasing of market surpluses. Local purchases would respond to one of the key principles of the WFP school-feeding policy. The model has so far not included cash for schools to purchase locally available produce (an alternative to home grown school feeding), although these elements are now being looked into by the WFP CO.

⁷⁰ Based on the SPR 2012, with expenditures of USD 4,301,372 against a caseload of 53,970 children.

⁷¹ The evaluation's attempts to obtain information from IPHD on costs per pupil were not successful.

Education conditionality in DEV

167. The safety net programme included a conditionality that beneficiaries with children should ensure school attendance/enrolment in an apprenticeship programme in order to qualify for the voucher. Field monitors recorded information on enrolment based on beneficiary responses during routine monitoring visits. The evaluation found no evidence of any follow-up with schools to verify actual attendance by either MASAHA or WFP. A review of records shows that none of the beneficiaries of the nine months pilot have so far been excluded based on this conditionality.

168. Interviews with beneficiaries indicated that the vouchers have made a difference in sending children to school (see section 2.3.4). However, the design and base line study for this operation appears not to have drawn sufficiently on the school feeding experience which could have drawn attention to the additional costs for families associated with sending children to school (and which, in this evaluation of the safety net intervention, emerged as a significant issue for families). In both study locations (Brazzaville and Pointe Noire), a number of the families interviewed reported that they would likely not keep their children in school when they no longer receive the vouchers because of the costs.

2.3.4 Social Protection

169. During the period under review, WFP supported food-based elements of emerging national social protection policy and programmes through school feeding activities (primarily DEV 200144) and through the voucher system for food supplies (DEV 200211), piloting conditional transfers to specified vulnerable groups. The school feeding components of social protection in the WFP country portfolio are assessed in section 2.3.3. This section considers the newer interventions aimed at enhancing various vulnerable groups' access to food through the provision of vouchers. These interventions were still at an early pilot stage during the evaluation period.

Effectiveness: beneficiaries

170. During the evaluation period, the pilot safety net project was only operational for nine months, making its first transfers to beneficiaries in April 2012. Project outputs and outcomes reported by the 2012 SPR are reproduced below in Table 10 and Table 11. As portrayed in Table 10 project reporting on actual beneficiaries repeats the project design approach and multiplies the number of (direct) beneficiaries in the relevant categories by six – the average household size – to report on the total beneficiaries reached by the project.

171. The social protection pilot project reached all the intended categories of beneficiary, although Table 10 shows that targets were exceeded in some cases and not reached in others. There was shortfall in reaching the planned number of beneficiary families with children out of school, and of vulnerable households with pregnant/lactating women or malnourished children under two. Possibly because of the easier access to target populations via the health clinics, better efficiency was achieved – and target exceeded – in reaching malnourished beneficiaries on ART or TB-DOTS treatment. However, only 56% of the intended distribution of 98 mt of RUF was achieved (WFP, 2013e: np), due partly to a three month suspension in deliveries (see below).

172. Accurate reporting in WFP's 2012 SPR with regard to the gender of beneficiaries is undermined by the approach taken of multiplying by six the direct beneficiaries to derive the total caseload reached. Separate data obtained from the CO for this evaluation in March 2013 showed that 83% of beneficiaries were female. Programme targeting was partially skewed towards women, and the gender imbalance was increased by men's reluctance to engage with the medical and social services that might lead to their registration for social transfers.

Table 10 DEV 200211 Outputs, 2012

| Output | Unit | Planned | Actual | % Actual vs Planned |
|---|--------------------------|-----------|---------|---------------------|
| SO 4: HIV/TB: Care and Treatment | | | | |
| Number of ART clients who received both individual nutritional food supplement and household food assistance | Client | 956 | 1,575 | 164.7% |
| Number of TB treatment clients receiving individual nutritional food supplement and household food assistance | Client | 100 | 492 | 492.0% |
| SO 4: HIV/TB: Mitigation and Safety Nets | | | | |
| C&V: Number of beneficiaries receiving cash transfers | Beneficiary | 6,336 | 12,402 | 195.7% |
| C&V: Total amount of cash transferred to beneficiaries | US\$ | 1,651,840 | 239,064 | 14.5% |
| SO 4: Nutrition: Prevention of Acute Malnutrition | | | | |
| Number of pregnant/lactating women assisted | Pregnant/lactating woman | 506 | 345 | 68.2% |
| SO 4: School feeding | | | | |
| C&V: Number of beneficiaries receiving cash transfers | Beneficiary | 1,200 | 788 | 65.7% |
| SO 5: Capacity Development: Strengthening National Capacities | | | | |
| Technical Assistance: #of technical assistance projects conducted by WFP to strengthen the national capacity | Project | 1 | 6 | 600.0% |
| Technical Assistance: WFP expenditures for technical assistance to strengthen national capacity | US\$ | 190,000 | 154,000 | 81.1% |

Source: WFP, 2013c: np.

173. Table 10 shows that, for HIV and TB beneficiaries, only 14.5% of the planned amount of funds was transferred during 2012. This represented USD 19.28 per beneficiary, 7.4% of the planned USD 260.71 per beneficiary. (The number of beneficiaries was almost twice that planned.) Internal records provided by the CO show that, for the project as a whole, including all beneficiary categories, USD 414,935 was transferred in 2012. This was USD 18.55 per beneficiary (multiplying by six, USD 111.30 per direct beneficiary). The data in section 1.3 show the number of beneficiaries (or households) registered, not whether they received their planned transfers each month. Two of the nine monthly transfers following the delayed start in April 2012 did not take place because of technical and reporting problems and delays in transferring funds between WFP, private sector partner MTN and MTN's bank, Ecobank⁷². Transfers were not made up in arrears in a subsequent month, and the seven subsequent ones were below the value transfer planned⁷³, with all transfers made representing 14.5% of the planned value. Operational and

⁷² According to interviews with WFP staff, MTN, one of the Congo's two best-established mobile phone companies, was selected without competitive bidding for the safety net pilot, possibly (there is no direct evidence) because of its strong corporate responsibility profile and proactive attitude towards engagement in such activity – although, as MTN and WFP staff acknowledged during interviews, its mobile banking service was less well developed than that of its principal competitor. It levied a service charge on each cash transfer, but its MTN Foundation donated the simple mobile phones given to beneficiaries and the company provided field staff to facilitate transactions at the participating shops (while also marketing the new 'mobile money' product). While the pilot was probably not profitable for MTN at this early stage, it clearly had the potential to provide longer-term benefits to the company.

⁷³ Voucher transfer value was established during the feasibility study for the safety net pilot (WFP, 2010d).

logistical problems during the pilot period include mobile phones not working well; notification of transfers not reaching beneficiaries on time; beneficiary fear of stigma and suspicion of witchcraft; long delays in production of identification cards for beneficiaries; a three month suspension of RUF deliveries; and complex accounting and reporting difficulties between WFP, MTN, Ecobank, MASA's local service centres, schools and health facilities (WFP, 2013c: np). Although there are no data on how many beneficiaries in each category received how many transfers over the period, it is clear that most suffered a number of interruptions, did not begin receiving transfers at the start of the period, or both.

174. Interviews with beneficiaries showed that they remained uncertain, in early 2013, about whether each month's transfer would actually happen, when, or for how long the transfers would continue. They generally viewed the benefits as welcome, probably temporary, and not without strings, given that they had to pay the costs (school uniforms, clinic fees etc.) associated with the conditionalities of the voucher scheme.

Effectiveness: attainment of objectives

175. Given that WFP's direct engagement with the implementation of social protection programmes (outside school feeding) in the Congo was less than a year old at the end of the evaluation period, no substantive findings can be offered on the attainment of the desired medium- to longer-term changes in beneficiaries' lives. Such changes were defined in the design of DEV 200211 through the specification of outcomes related to the conditionalities: that pregnant women would undergo check-ups, with beneficial results for them and their babies; that HIV positive people and TB patients would adhere to and benefit from treatment; and that children of poor families would attend school and be educated.

176. Despite the early stage of pilot project implementation, the 2012 SPR for DEV 200211 did report on some outcomes with reference to WFP Strategic Objectives, as in Table 11. The table appears to show encouraging progress with regard to the direct conditionalities and results for beneficiaries, although (probably because of incomplete monitoring) it omits information about school attendance, and the population covered by the 'health centres report' supplying the baseline data is not clearly stated. Interviews revealed that beneficiaries, and a number of MASA and other officials, saw the benefits received as temporary, and anticipated a relapse into total poverty and poorer nutrition once they ceased. They pointed out that the project did not include measures to help achieve resilient and sustainable livelihoods. In other words, while there was some assurance of outputs (subject to the vagaries of inconsistent monthly delivery performance), there was little confidence about meaningful outcomes. Although conditionalities were an appropriate approach to the social protection measures instituted by the pilot, the concept was not being applied during the review period, threatening the design logic of the intervention.

Table 11 DEV 200211 Outcomes, 2012

| Outcome | Base Value | Latest Follow-up |
|---|------------|------------------|
| Strategic Objective 4: Reduce chronic hunger and undernutrition | | |
| Percentage of supported lactating women who received a post natal check up | | |
| Base value: Jan-2012, Health Centres Report, Programme monitoring. Latest Follow-up: Dec-2012, Monthly monitoring report, Programme monitoring | 15 | 80 |
| Percentage of supported pregnant women who received at least 4 ante-natal check-ups during pregnancy | | |
| Base value: Jan-2012, Health Centres Report, Programme monitoring. Latest Follow-up: Dec-2012, Monthly monitoring report, Programme monitoring | 50 | 88 |
| ART Adherence Rate (%) | | |
| Base value: Jan-2012, Health Centres Report, Programme monitoring. Latest Follow-up: Nov-2012, Monthly monitoring report, Programme monitoring | 65 | 97.88 |
| TB Treatment Nutritional Recovery Rate (%) | | |
| Base value: Dec-2011, Health Centres Report, Programme monitoring. Latest Follow-up: Dec-2012, Monthly monitoring report, Programme monitoring | 62 | 93.57 |
| ART Nutritional Recovery Rate (%) | | |
| Base value: Jan-2012, Health Centres Report, Programme monitoring. Latest Follow-up: Dec-2012, Monthly monitoring report, WFP survey | 71 | 98.18 |
| TB Treatment Success Rate (%) | | |
| Base value: Dec-2011, Health Centres Report, Programme monitoring. Latest Follow-up: Dec-2012, Monthly monitoring report, Programme monitoring | 58 | 93.57 |
| TB Treatment Adherence Rate (%) | | |
| Base value: Dec-2011, Health Centres Report, Programme monitoring. Latest Follow-up: Dec-2012, Monthly monitoring report, Programme monitoring | 68 | 99 |
| Strategic Objective 5: Strengthen the capacity of countries to reduce hunger | | |
| Percentage increase in government's funding for hunger solution tools in national plans of action (based on local currency) | | |
| Base value Dec-2011, Government 2011 Budget document, Secondary data. Latest Follow-up: Sep-2012, Government 2012 Budget document, Secondary data | 0 | 60 |

Source: WFP, 2013e: np.

Effectiveness: contribution to national humanitarian/development changes

177. The preliminary nature of WFP's safety net pilot in the Congo during the evaluation period limited its impact on humanitarian and development changes. As noted in section 2.3.1, the design of the intervention focused on short-term benefits that would conventionally be defined as 'humanitarian', rather than on longer-term 'development' outcomes in terms of progress towards sustainable livelihoods for the beneficiaries – as interviews with beneficiaries themselves pointed out.

178. However, at the level of national social protection policy, this intervention and its preparation made a significant contribution to emerging national commitment and strategy. Close collaboration between WFP and MASA – and, to a lesser extent, with other development partners – helped build a framework of policy consensus and direction within which the major challenges of capacity and systems could begin to be tackled.

179. The synergistic links between the CO and MASA ensured that the latter felt ownership of the safety net pilot from the outset (see section 2.2.2).

Factors explaining results

180. The primary factor explaining the direct results of the social protection work summarised above was the preliminary, pilot nature of the implementation, undertaken only during the last nine months of the period under evaluation. WFP and its partners were near the bottom of a learning curve.

181. With that caveat, positive factors can be identified on relevance and policy (see section 2.2.2). Negative factors lie more in the fields of efficiency and capacity.

182. As explained in section 2.2.2, the vigour and enterprise with which the WFP CO built this programme, in the context of strong domestic budgetary resources, meant that, at the strategic level, WFP was well placed to make a relevant contribution with strong potential for enhancing the livelihoods of the poor and vulnerable.

183. Operationally, WFP and its government and private sector partners did not have the human resources or the systems to implement nor assess results of an inevitably complex conditional social transfer programme, even on a pilot scale. The multi-level, three-way system of collaboration, resource transfers, monitoring and reporting between WFP, MASAH and the private sector partner was bound to encounter operational problems / degrees of inefficiency at the pilot stage – which is all that the evaluation period covers. Inefficiency in the field was combined with weaknesses in the strategic management and assessment of the pilot effort by both the CO and government, which meant that there was insufficient and poorly structured learning from this effort. The only documentary evidence of such learning is the draft report of a mid-term evaluation commissioned by the CO (WFP, 2013a), which, according to interviews with senior CO staff, and corroborated by the evaluation team's own assessment of the report, performed poorly (poorly written, focused on operational detail, and lacked the strategic insight and recommendations that review of a pilot activity should generate). No final report was submitted (see section 2.2.4). The pilot was thus not building adequately strong foundations for immediate scaling up. While some operational lessons were being learned and some enhancements achieved from month to month, the evaluation period ended with neither demonstration of adequate operational capacity to match the strong relevance and policy achievements, nor an assessment of what had to be done to achieve such capacity.

3. Conclusions and Recommendations

Overall Assessment

Alignment and strategic positioning

184. WFP's operations were well aligned with the humanitarian and development needs of the people of the Congo including the way these were evolving over the period (section 2.1). The initial focus on humanitarian operations was strategically adjusted to include recovery operations as well as newer, longer-term development priorities, through the expansion of the school feeding and a pilot project on safety nets.

185. WFP aligned well with the broad emerging policy frameworks of the Government as formulated in the NDP and the PRSPs and with sectoral strategies where these existed (section 2.1.2). This is reflected in the close correspondence between the GoC and WFP priorities and in the Government becoming the most important funder of WFP's activities. In education and social protection WFP strategically engaged with the Government to support on-going processes of policy development. The CO also initiated exploratory work on market analysis and local purchases.

186. Overall, the portfolio focus aligned well with WFP's corporate objectives and policies, including the shift to food assistance. In the humanitarian and nutrition component areas specifically, WFP did not consistently follow specific guidance provided by WFP.

187. WFP's operations were appropriately targeted geographically and to specific groups of people (section 2.1.1). Across the portfolio WFP strived to provide levels of food and non-food assistance that were commensurate with the needs of geographical areas and of the target groups that were most food and nutrition insecure.

Strategic decision-making

188. The evaluation period saw entrepreneurial decision-making, in particular in light of the CO's limited resources and the absence of a corporate strategy for engagement with MICs. Strategic decisions took internal and external constraints and opportunities into account (section 2.2.6), although operational constraints were not sufficiently acknowledged. These included, the evolving context in the country, the reducing donor funding, the Congo's MIC status and GoC funding for development activities. Strong leadership was an important factor in the shift that the CO and its portfolio experienced over the evaluation period.

189. Programming in the humanitarian area followed a 'standard' GFD template rather than updating analysis in conjunction with other partners, and programming accordingly. It did not sufficiently consider broader humanitarian response approaches, in particular disaster management and mitigation (see section 2.1.4).

190. WFP enhanced the pertinence of its engagement by supporting the Government in working towards strengthening national policies in school feeding and social protection. For the Government, WFP's status as a UN agency, its international reputation, and its perceived technical capacity were of high value (section 2.2.2).

191. The CO had only limited human resources and technical expertise, not commensurate with the size and evolving nature of the portfolio or to the context (section 2.2.3). WFP's focus on capacity development of the Government (an important governmental priority) emerged in the latter part of the evaluation period. These efforts were modest compared to the needs, and focused mainly on humanitarian and/or project implementation, rather than technical capacity-building.

192. WFP's engagement with the GoC in strategic areas built its credibility as a strong dialogue and implementation partner. WFP did not succeed in establishing strong links/synergies with other development partners, for whom WFP's engagement with development work was not coherent with its core (humanitarian) mandate, who have limited field capacity and were themselves competing for funds from the Government (section 2.2.5.).

193. WFP used available studies and data to inform decision making and supplemented this with its own analysis. These studies, while relevant, missed out on selected aspects (section 2.2.4). This was reflected, amongst others, in WFP's gender approach where sensitivity to specific gender constraints/issues of target groups was superficial. Monitoring systems, while in place, were weak. WFP's reporting systems were reasonably effective in measuring outputs, but less consistent in follow-up on

outcomes and on comparing these to inputs. This affected decision-making by WFP and by counterparts in Government.

Efficiency

194. WFP reacted rapidly and was efficient in the initial response to emergencies. Its long-standing experience in the Congo was an important asset, as was its ability to quickly establish operational presence. WFP was able to draw on expertise from the region and from HQ. Targeting of WFP interventions was adequate. WFP focused on geographical areas that had nutritional and food security needs, and in the case of education the main educational challenges (section 2.3.3).

195. Across the portfolio the evaluation found weaknesses in design, planning, implementation and monitoring, which resulted in beneficiaries receiving irregular or incomplete entitlements (sections 2.3.1, 2.3.3 and 2.3.4).

196. A major constraint on WFP's achievement of outputs was that its ambitious evolving agenda was not matched with adequate resources for implementation. In the earlier part of the evaluation period, a serious constraint on efficiency was the chronic under-funding of the portfolio. As the portfolio moved to development interventions, funded mostly by the Government, constraints persisted when funding was not transferred in a timely manner. The changing needs of the portfolio and the context of working closely with Government in a MIC context (section 2.2.6) were not matched by the skill set necessary in light of these changes (technical level and profile of expertise of staff, balance of international and local staff). In the new social protection area, in spite of the CO's efforts, WFP could not be objectively judged at the end of the evaluation period as fully capable of managing the relatively small-scale pilot (section 2.3.4.). WFP had established a comparative advantage in this new area, but this consisted mainly of having gained initial operational experience to implement a pilot, while other organisations were just beginning to develop strategic contributions.

Effectiveness

197. WFP, whilst faced with considerable internal and external challenges, provided food assistance, at first exclusively using the traditional food modalities, then, in the latter part of the evaluation period, diversifying its tool-box and including provision of non-food assistance through the pilot safety net programme. Internal challenges related to capacity and systems. External constraints were due to difficult operating conditions (inaccessibility of locations, poor road network, lack of operational partners). There were recurrent pipeline breaks during the evaluation period, reflecting the constraints (section 2.3.1).

198. WFP's principal benchmark at output level for effectiveness is the number of beneficiaries reached (and – in relation to the caseload actually reached – the related tonnage delivered in cases of food assistance modalities and transfer value in the case of cash/voucher modalities). In terms of these benchmarks, WFP in the Congo performed below expectations in its humanitarian, school feeding, and social protection interventions (for the latter in light of the cash value transfer), with fewer beneficiaries reached than planned for most operations. Consistently across operations the planned tonnage figures were not achieved by a considerable margin for all commodities. Monetary transfers for beneficiaries of the safety net programme also fell short of plans. However, beneficiary targets were not always realistic or properly assessed (sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.3). Shortfalls in funding were a major

constraint to achieving beneficiary numbers and metric tonnage with some improvement in the second half of the evaluation period (section 2.3.1 and Figure 7).

199. A second dimension of effectiveness is the extent to which WFP's interventions achieved their objectives. WFP's monitoring systems were reasonably effective in measuring outputs (as can be seen from reports on beneficiary numbers), but less consistent in terms of outcomes, and on comparing these to inputs. This makes it difficult to offer a complete assessment of effectiveness. In the humanitarian domain improvements in nutritional status of refugee populations were recorded but it was not possible to establish attribution to WFP, given other actors in the environment and lack of base-line (section 2.3.1). There is evidence that nutritional support brought about improved nutritional recovery and HIV survival rates for PLWHA, and that it has been associated with higher TB treatment adherence and completion (section 2.3.2). However, no data were available for other nutrition-related work (PMTCT and attendance at health clinics by pregnant or lactating women). In education, WFP-supported schools saw an increase in enrolment and an improvement in gender parity (section 2.3.3, Table 8), compared to baselines. However, the overall effectiveness of school feeding could have been greater if the approach had included a more comprehensive Essential Package (including school health and nutrition interventions to reinforce basic education). The evaluation also noted concerns with the respect to the participation of women (section 2.3.3). In the safety net intervention it is too early to make an informed assessment of effectiveness (section 2.3.4).

Impact and sustainability

200. WFP used food security assessments (household food consumption) to assess the impact of its humanitarian operations. These showed improved consumption at household level, but were indicative of a range of contributing factors (not just WFP programme interventions). Programme design did not include disaster mitigation or preparedness (section 2.3.1.).

201. WFP did not consistently carry out baseline studies⁷⁴, nor did it consistently follow up the same outcome indicators. This made the team's reliable assessment of progress difficult (section 2.3). Key areas of the portfolio (namely gender and capacity assessment) have not seen any in-depth thematic independent assessment/evaluation, which could have provided insights into outcomes and impact. Where independent assessments were carried out – as in the case of the safety net evaluation – these were not of good quality, which reduced the extent to which lessons could be drawn to inform future programming (section 2.3.4).

202. As a result of shortcomings related to its analysis work (no consistent baselines, changes of monitoring indicators, inconsistent outcome monitoring, gaps in key areas of analysis – see section 2.2.1), WFP had only a partial understanding of the contribution of food assistance to the food and nutrition status of the population in the Congo, and a limited understanding of the strategies and interventions that worked best, and what made them work. Nonetheless, overall the close alignment of WFP's operations with government priorities, the increasing government involvement in programming and implementation, and the expanded funding by the Government of WFP's operations constituted important steps toward sustainability. These received attention during the evaluation period and were part of a deliberate strategy by the CO (section 2.1.2).

⁷⁴ Sometimes an assessment study would be carried out but no baseline established.

Main Lessons for the Future

203. This section identifies lessons from the evaluation period that may be of relevance to the next period of engagement as well as to programmes in other countries with similar characteristics, and to WFP more broadly.

- Small offices in MICs where funding from host countries may be possible have a potential for innovating and piloting new approaches, that can feed into the wider organizational knowledge base.
- Progress at the policy level must be substantiated by solid operational performance. In the context of MICs, decisions on objectives need to be balanced with considerations about staffing needs and other inputs that will determine the quality and quantity of outputs. As a major funder, the Government may require more evidence of effectiveness and efficiency of operations. Current weaknesses in relation to WFP's monitoring and reporting (and related implications for evaluation) would not allow WFP to provide such evidence consistently.
- Over the past years, WFP has produced a number of policies that are of substantial and direct relevance to the portfolio. In practice, these have not been effectively reflected in country strategies and translated into implementation. This highlights the need for better coordination between corporate policy making and support given to the implementation of country portfolios to ensure that policies receive attention in design and, particularly, in implementation. Attention should also be given to allowing field implementation to feed back into policy (re)formulation.
- The experience of the safety net programme in the Congo, set up without a strategy for phasing out and/or providing beneficiaries with continuity, underscores broader issues of programme design for WFP: developing efficient and effective social protection programmes requires consistent, well managed effort for much longer than 12 months (duration of the pilot project). Operational complexities, the length of the learning curve and the need for technical skill and effective coordination should not be underestimated. From the beneficiary perspective, social protection should build long-term resilience into livelihoods, not just provide short-term support. This is also true of WFP's humanitarian programming which should place greater emphasis on livelihoods and disaster preparedness and mitigation.

Recommendations

204. The findings and conclusions presented in this report led the evaluation to propose the following recommendations, which follow from the analysis in this report and from a mapping, in Annex 16, of findings and conclusions against key areas of recommendation.

205. **Recommendation 1:** Conduct an independent formative evaluation of the safety net programme to inform the planned scale-up and identify priorities and strategies for continued support to this area as one of the main components of the new CSD. (Country office with support from regional bureau and Headquarters)

206. Given that social protection is a government priority, the independent evaluation, which will also provide input to recommendation 7, should identify how

the safety net programme can be effectively adjusted and set out the monitoring and evaluation plan.

207. **Recommendation 2:** As part of the immediate implementation of school feeding, the country office, in collaboration with partners, should identify elements of the Essential Package that it is realistic to roll out in the current programme on a pilot basis, in line with corporate guidance, and to roll out progressively to all WFP-supported schools within the new CSD period. (Country office)

208. School feeding is a government priority and will continue to be a major component of the CSD. Ensuring attention is given to school health, nutrition and other aspects of the Essential Package will enhance the effectiveness of these interventions and ensure that school feeding is aligned with corporate WFP policy.

209. **Recommendation 3:** Before the 2013/14 school year, the country office, in cooperation with the Government and the International Partnership for Human Development, should review the current approach to community cooks and ensure that appropriate compensation is provided in line with WFP school feeding policy, harmonized among partners and proposed for inclusion in the Government's school feeding strategy. (Country office)

210. The involvement of community members is an essential aspect of the school feeding strategy. Partners for school feeding have followed different approaches in providing compensation for food preparation. This is not always understood by communities and the amount of time volunteered – 2–4 full days per month – puts a substantial burden on women in poor communities. A harmonized approach would respect the principles of community participation and fair compensation.

211. **Recommendation 4:** Ensure the humanitarian assistance component under the new CSD includes capacity development of the Government and operational partners, especially in the area of disaster mitigation and preparedness. (Country office)

212. In line with the sharper focus on development in the evolving context of the country, the new CSD should ensure stronger links between the humanitarian and development components of the portfolio through the inclusion of specific strategies for capacity development in disaster mitigation and preparedness.

213. **Recommendation 5:** The new CSD, while addressing both humanitarian and development needs, should prioritize capacity development and knowledge transfer; include a transition road map for further increasing government responsibility and takeover of funding; and contain explicit commitments and strategies for enhancing coordination efforts by the Government. (Country office with support from regional bureau and Headquarters)

214. Paving the way to sustainability, a medium- to long-term transition/hand-over plan with set milestones should be agreed upon with the Government. The new CSD should include explicit commitments to: i) support the Government in developing policy and coordinating the activities and inputs of its development partners, and ii) play a prominent role in structures and processes for coordination among United Nations agencies in the country, in areas where WFP has an

established and emerging comparative advantage: humanitarian assistance, school feeding and social protection.

215. **Recommendation 6:** Develop a joint WFP–Government capacity development plan for the priority areas in the new CSD and ensure its inclusion in the detailed planning for component implementation. (Country office with support from regional bureau)

216. This capacity development plan should outline priorities across the component areas and clearly indicate where WFP will provide inputs. The priorities identified should be included in WFP's internal planning process (recommendation 7), and in the implications for funding to be discussed with the Government (recommendation 10).

217. **Recommendation 7:** Under the framework of the annual performance plan, develop an implementation plan in 2014 for each area of the new CSD that maximizes alignment with WFP and government policies; identifies partners, strategies and targets; strengthens monitoring, and specifies appropriate human resource and funding needs. (Country office with support from regional bureau and Headquarters)

218. This exercise should provide the basis for the implementation of the portfolio and allow for planning of resource needs (recommendations 8 and 10). For each component, it should:

- build on the findings of the present evaluation, in particular with reference to gender, social protection and capacity development, and seek to improve alignment with WFP policies;
- include strategies and targets for both policy and operational aspects of the portfolio;
- identify opportunities for partnerships and strategies to optimize these, giving specific attention to technical, non-logistical areas;
- formulate strategies that allow for streamlining and improving the monitoring systems; and
- identify implications for staffing and resource needs.

219. This process should be carried out with the involvement of the Government and implementing partners, and the recommendations should be reflected in country office programming.

220. **Recommendation 8:** Conduct a review of country office staffing needs in light of the CSD priorities in social protection, market analysis, and disaster preparedness and mitigation. (Headquarters, regional bureau and country office)

221. Draw up a staffing plan for the CSD period that will allow the country office, within each of the component areas, to: i) adequately respond to requirements; ii) increase effectiveness and efficiency; and iii) play a stronger technical assistance/advisory role in its engagement with the Government. This should equip the country office with a fit-for-purpose team and adequate staffing level to analyse strategic opportunities, while achieving efficient performance in the conventional management functions. Attention should be given to securing the appropriate skills

sets in the team, both national and international, in core component areas of the portfolio, which are:

- social protection, including education/school feeding;
- market analysis for local purchases and urban vouchers; and
- humanitarian response and disaster preparedness and mitigation.

222. This would allow WFP to provide more substantial input to national dialogue and coordination, and support the implementation of the portfolio through strong technical input in appropriate areas. Outputs from recommendations 6 and 7 would contribute to the staffing profile.

223. **Recommendation 9:** Before the implementation of the new CSD, conduct a comprehensive review of the country office monitoring and reporting practices, based on the new Strategic Results Framework, to strengthen links between data collection, analysis and use of data for decision-making. (Country office with support from regional bureau)

224. This should include: i) redoubling efforts to make sure all monitoring is done comprehensively and accurately to generate full data sets; ii) ensuring that all project monitoring is done in partnership with the Government and/or NGOs; and iii) planning and implementing external evaluations at appropriate times in project cycles.

225. **Recommendation 10:** Draw up a funding strategy from 2014 onwards to support advocacy with the Government as to the funding of operations and staff in line with the agreed CSD and transition plan. (Country office with support from regional bureau)

226. The strategy for continued and scaled-up funding of WFP operations by the Government should be in line with the agreed transition road map (see recommendation 5) so that by the end of the CSD period the bulk of the technical positions are funded by the Government. The plan should be based on the detailed planning for components (see recommendation 7) and staffing needs (see recommendation 8). It should also identify how the monitoring of operations – outputs, outcomes and achievements of the programme – will be reported back to the Government to provide the rationale for continued support (see recommendation 9).

Annexes

Annex 1 QA Team Profiles

Stephen Anderson has 26 years of international experience as an analyst and facilitator of complex reform processes. He has designed and reviewed both donor and government policies, strategies, and programmes. He has in-depth expertise in food security and livelihoods, social protection, Disaster Risk Reduction including early warning, and humanitarian interventions. He is very familiar with WFP's work. In 2010 he led a series of country strategy design missions for WFP in Cambodia, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Ethiopia, and led the design of a capacity development strategy for WFP Ethiopia. Central to these missions was an analysis of the overall aid context and strategies for positioning WFP for greater impact. In Ethiopia he facilitated and coordinated the \$1.5 billion multi-stakeholder Productive Safety Net Programme over a two year period. He designed Rwanda's social protection strategy and co-developed a pro-poor national social protection programme combining safety nets with productive credit-based interventions. In 2007, with ODI, he undertook a global analysis, which analysed the link between emergency assessments and decision-making for WFP. In 2011 he was a core member of the Mokoro team that evaluated the WFP school-feeding policy, and led on the country studies for Mozambique and Tajikistan. He has recently provided QA support for the WFP Timor-Leste CPE.

Stephen Lister is a founder member of Mokoro and leads its evaluation work. His original training in economics is complemented by an MBA and he has over 30 years' consultancy experience in many countries of Africa, Eastern Europe, Asia and the Pacific. He has specialised in the management of aid and public expenditures, and has led or participated in several recent studies and evaluations of aid at the country level and of aid modalities. He has led evaluation teams both for assessments in individual countries and for very large-scale and high-profile cross-country studies. He recently led the global evaluation of WFP's School Feeding Policy, and he is Project Director for the Mokoro/Valid/FEG LTA with WFP. He is very experienced in developing and using evaluation frameworks, and has often provided quality support both within evaluations he has led and as external support. He has recently led the WFP Timor-Leste CPE.

Annex 2 Terms of Reference

COUNTRY PORTFOLIO EVALUATION – REPUBLIC OF CONGO (2009-2012)

[FINAL] TERMS OF REFERENCE

WFP - COUNTRY PORTFOLIO EVALUATION - REPUBLIC OF CONGO 2009-2012

Background

1.1. Introduction

1. Country Portfolio Evaluations (CPE) encompass the entirety of WFP activities during a specific period. They evaluate the performance and results of the portfolio as a whole and provide evaluative insights to guide strategic and operational decision-making, and help the Country Offices in the preparation of Country Strategies providing lessons that can be used in the design of new operations.

2. The purpose of these terms of reference (ToR) is to provide key information to stakeholders about the proposed evaluation, to guide the evaluation team and specify expectations during the various phases of the evaluation.

1.2. Country Context

3. The republic of Congo has a relatively small (estimated at 4 million in 2010)⁷⁵, highly urban (63% urban) and young (over 50% are under 20 years of age) population ; a significant endowment of oil and natural resources, and a strategic location in Central Africa with a deep-sea port in Pointe-Noire that could become a gateway to the sub-region. Congo has been, over the years, a host nation for refugees fleeing armed conflict from neighbouring Rwanda, Angola and, more recently in 2009, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)⁷⁶. *See Annex 1 for a map of the country.*

4. Congo is classified as a low-income food deficit country by FAO and a lower-middle income country by the World Bank. It ranks 137 on the 2011 UNDP Human Development Index, placing Congo in the “medium human development” group. Congo’s economy is heavily dominated by the oil sector and its GDP per capita in 2011 was \$3,563 – high compared to that of neighbouring countries. Since 2000 the republic of Congo is at relative peace, and its economy, based on extraction of timber and petroleum, has grown significantly since 2008, its Gross Domestic Product expanding by 8.8 per cent in 2008 (7.5% in 2009, and 4.5% in 2011). In 2010, the Congo reached the completion point under the Enhanced Indebted Poor Countries Initiative, greatly reducing debt servicing budgetary constraints.

5. Poverty: Despite this recent strong economic performance, the country continues to face fundamental development challenges, and inequalities remain important, with 50% of the population living below of the national poverty line⁷⁷, as it faces governance and institutional capacity challenges in the reallocation of the oil revenues to the benefit of the agricultural and social sectors. Unemployment is widespread (especially amongst youth); chronic malnutrition affects 26% of children under 5; 60% of the population suffer from micro-nutriments’ deficiencies.

⁷⁵ World Bank, *Indicators, Data and Statistics* (2010)

⁷⁶ Over 115,000 DRC refugees were hosted in the republic of the Congo in 2011.

⁷⁷ World Bank. *Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2008-2012* (2008)

6. Health and Nutrition: The Congo is amongst the five countries world-wide where under-five child mortality increased in latest years (to 128 deaths per 1,000 live births in 2009)⁷⁸. Some 65% of children under five, 70% of pregnant women, 60% of lactating mothers (and 54% of all women of reproductive age) are anaemic⁷⁹, whilst 60% of the population does not have access to health care. Planned budget allocations to this sector, like other social sectors, remain however low (circa 6%)⁸⁰. A current priority of the Government is to enhance access to the essential health package through a decentralised health system, a reform receiving support from the World Health Organisation (WHO).

7. Agriculture: Only 2% of the country's arable land is productively put to use, and food imports represent 70% of the national food needs, making poor households highly vulnerable to market price increases. Agriculture, which occupies 40% of the active population, contributes only 6% of the GDP⁸¹, and remains of a subsistence nature.

8. Education: 52% of the school-aged children do not have access to education. Net enrolment in primary education is 59%, and the retention rate stands overall at 70% with wide geographical (and ethnical, with the indigenous Pygmy at disadvantage, rather than gender) disparities. Nonetheless, public expenditure in the education system, as other social sectors, remains low at circa 10% of the total budget expenditures⁸² in 2007/2008, furthermore not necessarily focused on the primary sector. *See Annex 2 for main social indicators for the country.*

9. Policy Framework: The national policy framework in Congo is supportive of most international development trends and objectives. In 2007, the Government engaged in a transition phase, adopting a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP 2008-2012), aimed at poverty reduction, improved access to social services, diversified food production, and mitigation of HIV&AIDS. In 2008, the Government a National Food Security Policy, which remains to be operationalized, and a national decree on fortification has been adopted, with technical support from UNICEF. Furthermore, the current national context seems favourable to developing a national social-protection framework for the most vulnerable groups of the population, with active support from UNICEF⁸³.

10. Official Development Assistance (ODA): Congo signed the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2009. A middle-income country, Congo's share represents 1% of the overall 2000-2010 ODA to the African continent⁸⁴. Congo received some \$2,880 million of ODA from 2007-2012, with its largest bilateral donor being France. ODA to Congo shows a marked increase in 2010 compared to previous years, with the largest bilateral ODA sector being debt-servicing. The value of ODA compared with Gross National Income ranges from 5% (2008) to 15% (2010). *Figure 2* shows the trends from 2007-2012 as well as the share of humanitarian aid within the overall ODA.

⁷⁸ UNICEF. *Child Mortality Report: trends and challenges* (2010)

⁷⁹ UNICEF/Ministry of Health, *Demographic and Health Survey* (2005)

⁸⁰ World Bank. *Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2008-2012* (2008)


⁸¹ Republic of Congo, Ministry of Technical and Professional Education. *Plan décennal 2008-2017 de redressement et de développement de l'enseignement technique et professionnel*, Brazzaville (2008)

⁸² Ministry of Education, *2007-2008 Statistics* (booklet, 2009). Note: UNESCO recommends that education budget expenditures be a minimum of 20% of the total budget expenditures

⁸³ Hodges, Anthony & all. UNICEF/OPM Paper *Développement de la politique nationale d'action sociale – Premier Rapport d'état des lieux de l'action sociale au Congo: amélioration des dépenses publiques des secteurs sociaux pour les enfants et les femmes en république du Congo* (avril 2011)

⁸⁴ Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) website, *Statistics at a Glance, by region*

Figure 1 – ODA trends for the Republic of Congo (2007-2012)



Source: OECD-DAC and UN-OCHA

Reasons for the Evaluation

2.1. Rationale

11. Congo has been selected for an independent evaluation managed by the Office of Evaluation (OE) as part of its on-going series of CPEs providing systemic evaluation coverage of WFP's country presence. Countries are selected on objective criteria including regional balance, portfolio size, range and previous evaluation coverage. While an independent evaluation of PRRO 10312.1 was conducted in 2008⁸⁵, there has been no comprehensive portfolio evaluation. Demand and evaluation's potential for contributing to future programming decision and practice is also important for selection. In the case of Congo, both the CO and Regional Bureau have requested a CPE, in order to inform Country Strategy Document, which outlines present and future CO orientation and priorities. This document is expected to be completed by third quarter of 2013 and timing of this CPE has been planned to contribute to the debate, and will be presented to November 2013 Executive Board session.

2.2. Objectives

12. Evaluations serve the dual objectives of accountability and learning. As such, the evaluation will:

- assess and report on the performance and results of the country portfolio in line with the WFP mandate and in response to humanitarian and development challenges in the republic of Congo (accountability);
- review the comparative advantage and positioning of WFP Congo operations vis-

⁸⁵ WFP/EB.2/2009/6-G. *Summary Evaluation Report republic of Congo PRRO 103121 – Assistance to Populations Affected by Conflicts and Poverty* (2009)

à-vis the situation on the ground, the priorities and strategies of government and other actors, good practice in humanitarian response, and working in transition and middle-income states , as well as determine the reasons for observed success/failure and draw lessons from experience to produce evidence-based findings to enable the CO to make informed strategic decisions about positioning itself in the republic of Congo, form strategic partnerships, and improve operations design and implementation whenever possible (learning).

2.3. Stakeholders and Users


13. The primary user of this evaluation will be the WFP CO and its partners in designing future WFP operations, country strategies and partnerships, and possibly adjusting current ones. The list of stakeholders at project level is available in Annex 3 while their interest in the evaluation is summarised in Table 1 below.

Table 1 – Preliminary review of stakeholders’ interest

| Stakeholders | Interest in the evaluation |
|--|--|
| Internal stakeholders | |
| Country Office | Primary stakeholder in this evaluation. Responsible for the country level planning and operations implementation, it has a direct stake in the evaluation, and will be a primary user of its results to complete its CSD and its CO positioning in the context of RoC. |
| Regional Bureaux and Senior Management | Interest in the learning from the evaluation results in regards to WFP positioning in middle-income countries. |
| WFP Executive Board | Presentation to the November 2013 session to inform Board members about the performance and outcome of WFP activities in RoC, and consider the effectiveness of WFP approach to handover and exit. |
| External stakeholders | |
| Government (mainly Ministry of Planning, Min of Primary Education, Min of Humanitarian & Social Affairs, Ministry of Agriculture, AARR, etc.) | The Government of RoC (also a contributor to WFP supported activities) has a direct interest in knowing whether WFP activities in the country are aligned with its priorities and meet the expected results. Furthermore the extent to which WFP has effectively built capacity of Government ministries in programme management and implementation, namely within the school feeding activity, the voucher programme / social protection and logistics capacities, and thereby contributing to preparing an exit strategy for WFP will be of interest. Various Ministries are direct partners of WFP activities at project level. As a donor, the Government also has another vested interest into this evaluation. |
| Beneficiaries (mainly urban food insecure, primary school children, refugees, HIV-AIDS patients) | As the ultimate recipients of food assistance, beneficiaries have a stake in WFP determining whether its assistance is appropriate and effective. They will be consulted during the field mission. |
| NGO's (mainly Caritas, MSF-F, MDA, IPHD, etc.) | NGOs are WFP partners for most of its operations in the country while at the same time having their own activities. The results of the evaluation might affect the future strategic positioning and programme orientations and therefore affect the partnerships. |
| Donors (mainly RoC, Japan, USA, EU, UN-CERF, etc.) | WFP activities are supported by a number of donors. They all have an interest in knowing whether their funds have been spent efficiently and whether WFP's work is effective in alleviating food insecurity of the most vulnerable. |
| UN Country Team (mainly UNICEF, UNHCR, FAO, OCHA, UNDP, WHO) | WFP is partnering with various UN Agencies, in particular UNHCR (refugee programme), FAO (food security), UNICEF (nutrition and social protection), and implements jointly with FAO an EU food security project. |

14. Internal stakeholders include the CO management team, the regional bureau in Nairobi (RB) and WFP technical units, as well as the WFP Executive Board (EB). External stakeholders include donors, Government, UN Country team, NGO partners and beneficiaries themselves. The Government of Congo may have a special interest in the process, being furthermore an important donor to WFP Congo operations. *See Table 2 on relative importance of Government of the republic of Congo's contributions by projects (2007-2012).*

Table 2 – Contributions Government of the republic of Congo versus other donors by project (2007-2012)⁸⁶:



15. WFP collaborates (varying from interaction to joint implementation) with several of multilateral stakeholders active in the areas of WFP interventions such as education, health and nutrition (UNICEF, WHO, the African Development Bank), agricultural production and food security (FAO, IFAD, the European Union (EU), and the World Bank). WFP closely cooperates with 3 specific UN agencies (UNICEF, UNHCR, FAO) for project implementation, including jointly implementation of an EU food security intervention with FAO, and UNICEF in 3 departments⁸⁷. There are a limited number of capable cooperating partners in Congo, and WFP funds a few national and international NGOs (CARITAS, MSF-France, MDA, IPHD) for implementation. The WFP governmental counterparts at national level include the Ministry of Planning, the Ministry of Primary Education, the Ministry of Humanitarian Action and Social Affairs, the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, and the Agency for the Assistance to Refugees and Repatriated (AARR).

16. It is important that a thorough stakeholder analysis (*see Annex 3 for preliminary details on stakeholder analysis*) is done at the inception phase of the evaluation. Understanding the key strategic and operational partners, the priority issues and the various interests at stake will be fundamental to answering some of the evaluation questions.

⁸⁶ Other donors include: USA, UK Japan, Congo, Brazil, Canada, France, Sweden, UN CERF, UN Common Funds and the European Union. No records are shown for IR-EMOP 200093 as this operation was funded through an Immediate Response Account (IRA).

⁸⁷ The CONGOSAN Project, in Likouala, Sangha and Pool

Subject of the Evaluation

3.1. WFP's Portfolio in the Republic of Congo

17. WFP has been present in Congo since 1964 (total of 30 operations), with the most significant investments coming however since 2009, with the influx of over 115,000 refugees from the neighbouring DRC in the North-East of the country. Given the civil strife and conflict in sub-region, most of WFP's interventions since the 1990's have focused on emergency needs in response to influxes of refugees.

18. More recently, in 2007, WFP initiated a relief and recovery operation (PRRO 10312.1) covering a range of transition and development oriented activities. The main WFP activities of the 2007-2012 portfolio, which constitutes a total of 9 operations (3 EMOPs, 2 PRROs, 2 SO and 2 DEV), continue to be General Food Distributions (GFD) to refugees and School Feeding, with the earlier years' emphasis being with the emergency components focused on refugees from DRC, however with a notable shift since 2011 towards development oriented initiatives. See Table 3 for a graphic depiction of the portfolio's operations since 2007, and Table 4 for distribution of activities by Strategic Objectives). See Annex 4 on WFP 2008-2013 Strategic Plan and Objectives.

Table 3 – Timing and funding of republic of Congo portfolio (2007-2012):

| Operation | Title | Time Frame | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | | | | | | |
|--|---|-----------------|--------|--------|--|---|--------|--|--------|---------|--------|---------|--|--|
| SO 200413 | Strengthening Logistics Capacity of the Government of the Republic of Congo to Support the Emergency in Brazzaville | May 12 - Oct 12 | | | | | | Req: \$450 thousand Contrib: \$425 thousand | | | | | | |
| IRA-EMOP 200408 | Emergency Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons | Mar 12 - Aug 12 | | | | | | Req: \$ 1.5 | | | | | | |
| DEV 200144 | Support to Primary Education (in Cuvette, Lekoumou, Plateaux, and Pool Regions) | Oct 11 - Dec 13 | | | | | | Req: \$14.2 Contrib: \$9.8 | | | | | | |
| DEV 200211* | Development Operation Republic of Congo 200211 - Safety Net Programme | Jul 11 - Apr 13 | | | | | | Req: \$3.6 Contrib: \$3.1 | | | | | | |
| PRRO 200147 | Assistance to Congolese Refugees from DRC in the Likouala Province of the Republic of the Congo | Mar 11 - Dec 12 | | | | | | Req: \$33.9 Contrib: \$13.2 | | | | | | |
| EMOP 200095 | Food Assistance to Congolese Displaced in Likouala Province | Jan 10 - Feb 11 | | | | Req: \$37.7 Contrib: \$18.1 | | | | | | | | |
| SO 200140 | Provision of Humanitarian Air Services in Congo | Jan 10 - Dec 10 | | | | Req: \$ 2.1 Contrib: \$ 482 thousand | | | | | | | | |
| IR-EMOP 200093 | Displaced Population from DRC in the Likouala Region | Nov 09 - Feb 10 | | | Req: \$499 thousand Contrib: \$413 thousand | | | | | | | | | |
| PRRO 10312.1 | Assistance to Populations Affected by Conflict and Poverty | Jun 07 - Jun 11 | | | Req: \$29.1 Contrib: \$16.6 | | | | | | | | | |
| Food Distributed (MT) | | | 2,475 | 3,497 | 3,673 | 8,358 | 7,917 | -- | | | | | | |
| Direct Expenses (US\$ millions) | | | 2.8 | 3.4 | 4.5 | 11.6 | 11.7 | -- | | | | | | |
| % Direct Expenses: Congo vs. WFP World** | | | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | -- | | | | | | |
| Beneficiaries (actual) | | | M | F | M | F | M | F | | | | | | |
| Total of Beneficiaries (actual) | | | 30,884 | 38,636 | 29,804 | 41,711 | 31,463 | 39,941 | 62,959 | 102,139 | 76,982 | 145,044 | | |
| | | | 69,520 | 71,515 | | 71,404 | | 165,098 | | 222,026 | | | | |

Source: last SPR available, Resource Situations, APR 2006 - 2011

Requirements (Req.) and Contributions (Contrib.) are US\$ millions

* Project did not start in 2011

** Absolute figures are too low and not captured by the %

Table 4: Distribution of the 2007-2012 portfolio activities by WFP Strategic Objectives and activities

| Activities by operation and beneficiaries proportion by activity | | | | | | | |
|--|-----|-----------|-----------|-----|-------------|------------------|---------------------------|
| Operation \ Type of activity | HIV | Education | Nutrition | GFD | FFW/FFT/FFA | Cash and Voucher | Strategic Objectives (SO) |
| IR-EMOP 200408** | | | | X | | | 1 |
| DEV 200144 | | X | | | | | 4 |
| DEV 200211* | X | X | X | | | X | 4, 5 |
| PRRO 200147 | | | | X | | | 1 |
| PRRO 10312.1 | X | X | X | X | X | | 1, 2, 3, 4 |
| EMOP 200095 | | | X | X | | | 1 |
| IR-EMOP 200093** | | | | X | | | 1 |
| Planned % of beneficiaries | 13% | 40% | 2% | 43% | 3% | – | |
| Actual % of beneficiaries | 13% | 32% | 0% | 53% | 2% | – | |

Source: Dakota, PD's, SPR's 2007-2011

*Project did not start in 2011, beneficiary figures are not included in the graph

**No reporting figures available for IR-EMOP's 200408 and 200093

19. Current on-going operations include: two development programmes [DEV] – one focussing on school-feeding in rural areas, the other being an urban voucher programme, and; one protracted relief and rehabilitation operation [PRRO] - focussing on GFD to refugee populations and support to repatriation:

- PRRO 10312.1 (implemented 2007-2011) included activities ranging from GFD to vulnerable host populations to supplementary feeding to malnourished children, nutritional support to HIV&AIDS patients, food-for-work/asset, and school-feeding in rural primary schools;
- EMOP 20093 and EMOP 200095⁸⁸ (implemented from 2009-2011), addressed through GFD, needs of the DRC Congolese refugees. The latter are currently addressed through PRRO 200147 (from 2011 onwards), including support to the repatriation process initiated in 2012;
- DEV 200144 (20011-2013) is continuation of the previous school-feeding component under PRRO 10312.1, targeting food insecure rural areas;
- DEV 200211 (2011-2013) is a new urban safety-net initiative, using a voucher transfer modality, and aims to enhance the Government's capacity to reduce hunger through the implementation of a safety net programme;

⁸⁸ SO 200140 was in support to EMOP 2000095

- IR-EMOP 200408 and SO 200413 (2012), two short-term emergency operations, were launched in response to the March 4th explosion in Brazzaville to provide short-term emergency assistance to the affected populations and immediate logistical capacity-development national counterparts.

20. The top five donors who contributed to the portfolio operations are : Japan, United States of America, EU, UNCFERF and the republic of Congo. It should be noted however that requirements were overall not well met over the period in review (see Table 5).

Table 5 – WFP Portfolio 2007-2012 by Programme category and Funding levels

| | No. of operations | Requirements (US\$ million) | % of require by project type | Actual received (US\$ million) | % Requirements vs Received |
|-----------------------------|-------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------------|
| Emergency operations (EMOP) | 3 | 39,687,982 | 32% | 18,557,999 | 47% |
| Relief and Recovery (PRRO) | 2 | 62,973,648 | 51% | 29,724,006 | 47% |
| Country programme (CP) | 2 | 17,821,186 | 15% | 12,934,242 | 73% |
| Special Operation (SO) | 2 | 2,601,326 | 2% | 907,945 | 35% |
| Total | 9 | 123,084,142 | 100% | 62,124,192 | 50% |

Source: SPR, The Factory, Resource Situations

3.2. Scope of the Evaluation

21. The evaluation will cover the period 2009 – 12, focusing on the portfolio as a whole rather than the evaluation of each operation individually. The evaluation will cover a total of 7 projects implemented between 2009-2012: 2 PRRO, 2 EMOP, 2 DEV and 1 SO. It will also take into account follow up to the 2009 operation evaluation of PRRO 10312.1, an operation which corresponded to a quarter of the portfolio. The geographic scope includes all areas covered by the portfolio. However, the field work will necessarily focus on a sample of project sites, to be determined during the inception mission.

57. The Immediate Response EMOP 200093, initiated in response to the 2009 refugee influx, and which was then followed by the EMOP 200095 will be out of scope to this evaluation, given its short implementation period and overall marginal weight on the portfolio, as well as SO 200140 (poorly funded airlift operation strictly in support of EMOP20095). The latest 2012 operations, in response to the Brazzaville explosion, will be within the scope of this evaluation despite their recent implementation, given the objective related to strategic positioning of the CO in Congo (and the SO's objective of the Government), and potential learning in regards to the coherence and connectedness criteria for humanitarian operations.

22. The analytical work done by WFP during the time period is also covered by and forms part of the evidence base for, the evaluation including inter alia: the draft Country Strategy Document and underpinning analysis prepared by the CO in 2010 (not yet validated by the RB); a recently CO commissioned portfolio evaluation in May 2012, for which a preliminary report exists; any recent missions reports on strategic and programmatic issues of relevance, as well as; M&E system, secondary data, support to national data collection systems, etc.

Key Questions

23. Following the established approach for OE CPEs, the evaluation addresses three main evaluation questions covering strategic alignment, strategic decision-making and overall results and performance, which will be further detailed in an evaluation matrix by the evaluation team during the inception phase. Collectively,

the questions aim at highlighting the key lessons from the WFP country presence and performance, to inform future strategic and operational decisions.

24. **Question 1:** *What has been the strategic alignment of the WFP portfolio, including the extent to which:*

- its main objectives and related activities are *relevant* to people's humanitarian and developmental needs, including in terms of operational responsiveness and coverage of interventions;
- its strategies, objectives and programming have been *aligned* with those of government and coherent with the stated national agenda and policies, including sector policies, systems and capacities;
- its strategies and operational plans been *aligned* with other partners (multilateral, bilateral and NGOs) in order to achieve complementarity of interventions and maximise CO effective comparative advantage at policy and operational levels;
- its main objectives, strategies and implementation maximise organisational comparative advantages with the broader external context;

25. **Question 2:** *What have been the factors driving strategic decision-making, including the extent to which WFP:*

- has analysed the national hunger, food security, livelihoods, nutrition, social protection and gender context, and appropriately targeted its interventions using this analysis;
- has contributed to placing these issues on the national agenda, to developing related national or partner strategies and to developing national capacity in the context of transition towards development and national ownership;
- has sufficient technical expertise (either internal or through partnerships) to strategically manage the different interventions under the portfolio;
- has developed and implemented appropriate monitoring and evaluation systems to support strategic decision-making;
- has entered into and managed appropriate operational partnerships;
- has been driven by internal and external factors in making strategic choices and/or alterations to portfolio over the period.

26. **Question three:** *What have been the performance and results of the WFP portfolio, including:*

- the level of *efficiency* and *effectiveness* of the main WFP programme activities and explanations for these results (including factors beyond WFP's control);
- the level of synergy and multiplying effect between similar activities in different operations and between the various main activities regardless of the operations, and with partners at operational level (internal / external *coherence* and *connectedness*);
- the potential contribution to *impact* and *sustainability* of the main WFP programme activities, and explanation for those results.

Evaluation Approach

5.1. Evaluability Assessment

***Evaluability** is the extent to which an activity or a programme can be evaluated in a reliable and credible fashion. It necessitates that a policy, intervention or operation provides: (a) a clear description of the situation before or at its start that can be used as reference point to determine or measure change; (b) a clear statement of intended outcomes, i.e. the desired changes that should be observable once implementation is under way or completed; (c) a set of clearly defined and appropriate indicators with which to measure changes; and (d) a defined timeframe by which outcomes should be occurring.*

27. The relief, recovery and development operations implemented during the evaluation period are designed with specific outputs and outcomes. These are detailed in the planning and reporting documents for each operation and catalogued in WFP data-systems available at both the country and headquarters' levels. To this extent, these operations are evaluable against stated outcomes. A challenge to the evaluation relates to available data, in terms of reliability for the older operations, as well as their comparability with that of the new 2008-2013 WFP Strategic Framework which will be used as reference and basis for discussions.

28. However, the intention of the country portfolio evaluation to provide an assessment of the portfolio as a whole (going beyond operational divide) does not closely match WFP's working model, which remains operations-focused. As such, an approach of looking at groups of "main activities" across a number of operations rather than at individual operations should be adopted, corresponding to the perception of communities, donors and partners, and found useful in evaluation of strategic alignment, positioning, partnership and outcome achievement.

29. An important challenge faced by the CO in achieving transition towards development and assisting the government in enhancing governance and social reforms during the period under review relates to funding, also linked to donor's perception on WFP's role. The evaluation may face some difficulties in meeting *in loco* with donors, as most are located in DRC, where their focus lies. Hence, alternative approaches (teleconference, visit to Kinshasa) may have to be looked into.

5.2. Methodology

30. The evaluation will employ relevant internationally agreed evaluation criteria including those of relevance, coherence (internal and external), efficiency, effectiveness, impact, sustainability and connectedness.

31. The methodology will be designed by the evaluation team and validated by OE during the inception phase. The methodology should:

- Demonstrate impartiality and lack of biases by relying on a cross-section of information sources (e.g. stakeholder groups, including beneficiaries, etc.) and using a mixed methodological (e.g. quantitative, qualitative, participatory) to ensure triangulation of information through a variety of means. In particular, the sampling technique to select field site visits and stakeholders to be interviewed should be specified and demonstrate impartiality;

- Build on the logic of the portfolio and on the common objectives arising across operations and on a thorough stakeholder analysis;
- Be geared towards addressing the key evaluation questions taking into account the evaluability challenged as well as budget and timing constraints;
- Be synthesised in an evaluation matrix, which should be used as the key organising tool for the evaluation.

5.3. Quality Assurance

32. WFP's evaluation quality assurance system (EQAS) is based on the UNEG norms and standards and good practice of the international evaluation community (ALNAP and DAC). It sets out processes with in-built steps for quality assurance and templates for evaluation products. It also includes quality assurance of evaluation reports (inception, full and summary reports) based on standardised checklists. EQAS will be systematically applied during the course of this evaluation and relevant documents provided to the evaluation team. The OE evaluation manager (EM) will conduct the first level quality assurance, while the OE Director will conduct the second level review. This quality assurance process does not interfere with the views and independence of the evaluation team, but ensures the report provides the necessary evidence in a clear and convincing way and draws its conclusions on that basis.

33. The evaluation team will be required to ensure the quality of data (validity, consistency and accuracy) throughout the analytical and reporting phases. It is expected that the evaluation report shall be written in an evidence-based manner such that all observations, conclusions, recommendations are supported by evidence and analysis.

Organization of the Evaluation

6.1. Phases and Deliverables

34. The evaluation will be implemented over a 10 month period in 2012/2013 and is structured into five separate phases (*see Annex 5 for a detailed breakdown of activities and the projected timeline on deliverables for all the phases, including preparation and support to coordination of management response activities which rest with the WFP EM*).

35. Design phase (October – December 2012): OE will conduct background research and consultation to frame the evaluation, prepare the ToR, put together a library of key documents, select and hire the evaluation team. To facilitate communication with stakeholders, OE will summarise the ToR and translate the summary in French.

36. Inception phase (January 2013): This phase aims to prepare the evaluation team by ensuring that it has a good grasp of the expectations for the evaluation and develop a thorough and common understanding of the ToR, as well as a clear plan for conducting it. The inception phase will include a review of secondary data; a briefing of the team leader; and a one week inception mission in the republic of Congo of the team leader and EM and other relevant members as relevant.

- **Deliverable - Inception report:** this report will detail how the team intends to conduct the evaluation with an emphasis on methodological and planning aspects. It should include an evaluation matrix and proposed tools to get the missing data. The report will be approved by OE and shared with the CO for information and reference. *Due date: 08 February (preliminary) / 24 February (final)*

37. Evaluation Field mission phase (March 2013): The fieldwork will span over a two to three week period and will include project sites visits as well as primary and secondary data collection from local stakeholders. Two debriefing sessions will be held upon completion of the field work. The first one will involve the CO (relevant RB and Head Quarters (HQ) colleagues will be invited to participate through a teleconference) and the second one will be held with external stakeholders at country level.

- **Deliverable – Aide-memoire:** An aide-memoire of preliminary findings and conclusions (PowerPoint presentation) will be prepared to support the debriefings [in French]. *Due date: 22 March*

38. Reporting phase (April – July 2013): The evaluation team will analyse the information and data collected during the field work, conduct additional consultations with stakeholders as relevant, and draft the evaluation report. It should be noted that in order to shorten the evaluation process and limit the iteration of requests for comments, the executive summary of the full report will constitute WFP’s official summary evaluation report presented to the Board. It will be 4,500 words and is intended to be a stand-alone summary reflecting accurately each section of the main report, including the recommendations.

- **Deliverables - Evaluation report (full and summary):** There will be one full evaluation report, which will meet OE’s quality standards as per EQUAS and will include a stand-alone summary which presents the main features of the evaluation, including findings, conclusions, and recommendations. *Due date: 26 April (draft) / 9 August (final)*

39. Follow-up phase – report presentation and dissemination (August-October 2013): During this phase, the WFP EB Secretariat edits and translate the summary evaluation report for submission to the EB; the Results Management and Performance (RMP) division will coordinate inputs to and finalise the WFP management response to the evaluation recommendations; and the OE and RMP directors will respectively present the evaluation report and management response to the EB at its November 2013 session.

40. In addition, the EM will prepare a short evaluation brief and will disseminate the evaluation findings notably through the AER and other OE systems for sharing lessons. The CO might, at its own initiative, conduct a follow-up workshop to discuss recommendations and determine follow-up actions with its partners.

Note on the deliverables:

The inception report and evaluation reports shall be written in English or French⁸⁹. It is expected that the evaluation team, with the team leader providing quality

⁸⁹ This flexibility regarding the requirements for the evaluation’s outputs was discussed and cleared with the CO, as it mitigates obstacle to identify the best qualified evaluation team for this CPE.

control, produce written work that is of very high standard, evident-based, and free of errors.

The reports will follow the EQAS templates⁹⁰ and will be submitted to the EM after internal quality assurance as per the Long-Term Agreement signed with the contracting firm for second-level quality assurance. Stakeholders will be invited to provide comments, which will be recorded in a matrix by the EM and provided to the evaluation team for their consideration before report finalisation.

The evaluation report (full and summary) will be public documents and will be made available on the WFP website. The inception report will remain an internal document.

6.2. Evaluation Team

41. The evaluation will be conducted by a team of independent consultants with relevant experience and expertise for the WFP Congo portfolio. The evaluation team will consist of a team leader with technical expertise in one area and overall team leadership and management duties. The team leader will be responsible for the deliverables, including organising the team such that sufficient data and contribution to those deliverables is made. In addition to the team leader, technical specialists will be required to address all relevant areas of the evaluation.

42. The evaluation team will include both international and national consultants, be gender-balanced, and should combine between its 3-4 members the following competencies/technical expertise in the following fields: understanding of Congo's context, partnership building and strategic planning, food security and livelihoods, urban safety net/social protection and governance, nutrition, and market issues related to cash transfer projects. The team should also have humanitarian response / programme management / monitoring and programming expertise, including in relations to targeting, design, delivery, and M&E of food assistance programmes.

43. Although the deliverables might/shall be produced in English, field work and substantial documentation shall be conducted and provided in French to the team, hence a working level of French is required by the team leader and the team members.

44. The team leader will combine at least one of those areas with expertise in evaluation (including designing methodology and data collection tools) and demonstrate experience in leading evaluation teams. Although the overall responsibility for the evaluation's deliverables will rest with the team leader, it is expected that s/he will take specific accountability for addressing the strategic questions. Team members should have strong analytical and communication skills, and experience of evaluation (within the UN preferably) and/or familiarity with the republic of Congo.

45. The following specific qualifications are required for the team leader:

- Post-graduate degree in a relevant area with demonstrate knowledge and experience in programme design and implementation;
- At least 10 years of experience managing research and evaluation (including complex evaluations);

⁹⁰ The CPE report templates are available on WFP Evaluation website www.wfp.org/evaluation

- Demonstrate skills (through prior work, professional education or accreditation) in evaluation methodology;
 - A track record of publication and excellent English language writing and presentation skills.
46. The following specific qualifications are required for the team members:
- At least 5 years of demonstrated expertise (through work experience and education) in at least one of the specified areas;
 - At least 3 years of experience in research or evaluation;
 - A track record of written work on similar assignments.

6.3. Roles and Responsibilities

47. This evaluation is managed by OE. Elise Benoit, OE Evaluation Manager, has been appointed as EM. The EM has not worked in the country or team of the subject of evaluation in the past. She is responsible for drafting the ToR; selecting and contracting the evaluation team; preparing and managing the budget; setting up the review group; organizing the team briefing in HQ; assisting in the preparation of the field missions; conducting the first level quality assurance of the evaluation products and consolidating comments from stakeholders on the various evaluation products. She will also be the main interlocutor between the evaluation team, represented by the team leader, and WFP counterparts to ensure a smooth implementation process.

48. WFP CO is expected to provide information necessary to the evaluation; be available to the evaluation team to discuss the portfolio, its performance and results; facilitate the evaluation team's contacts with stakeholders in the republic of Congo; set up meetings and field visits, organise for local languages interpretation if required and provide logistic support during the fieldwork. To ensure the independence of the evaluation however, WFP staff will not be part of the evaluation team or participate in meetings where their presence could bias the responses of the external stakeholders.

49. Other relevant internal (HQ technical units, RB) and external stakeholders are expected to be available for interviews and meetings with the evaluation team' to participate in the evaluation de-briefing and to comment on the evaluation reports. A detailed consultation schedule will be prepared at the inception phase by the evaluation team and stakeholders informed accordingly.

6.4. Communication

50. In order for this evaluation process to be an effective learning process, the evaluation management and team will emphasize transparent and open communication with stakeholders. Although main deliverables might be produced in English, field level communications will be carried out in French. The evaluation ToR and relevant research tools will be summarised to better inform stakeholders about the process of the evaluation and what is expected of them. OE will assist in translation of summary documents as needed, including summary of ToR, aide-memoire, summary evaluation report, etc., in order to facilitate dissemination to stakeholders. The evaluation team will have to plan for English/French interpretation services and translation of data collection tools, as required.

51. OE will make use of data sharing software to assist in communication and file

transfer with the evaluation team and the WFP CO. In addition, regular teleconference and one-to-one telephone communication between the evaluation team, manager and the WFP CO focal-point will assist in discussion any particular issue.

52. All significant documents related to the evaluation progress will be posted on OE's internal website in the "evaluation in progress" section⁹¹. The final evaluation report will be presented to the WFP EB, along with the management response and posted on the WFP internet (internal and external) and incorporated in the OE annual report. In addition, the EM and CO will produce appropriate dissemination products, such as summarised presentations, lessons learned briefs or other products that could be extracted from the collected data, such as case studies.

6.5. Budget

53. The evaluation will be financed from OE's Programme Support and Administrative budget. Based on the team composition presented in section 6.2., the associated remuneration (daily fees), the cost of international and domestic travel, etc., the total cost of the evaluation is expected to be US\$ [194,612].

54. The WFP CO has agreed to support the costs of in-country to evaluation team's travel and security arrangements as required during the field work in the republic of Congo. The exception to this would be the costs borne by a local research/evaluation firm that organises its own logistics for data collection.

⁹¹ <http://go.wfp.org/web/evaluation/evaluations-in-progress>

Annex 3 Evaluation Matrix

| Area of enquiry | Issue/Specific Questions | Indicators | Main sources of | Collection Methods |
|--|--|--|--|---|
| KEY QUESTION 1: What has been the strategic alignment of the WFP portfolio? | | | | |
| Strategic positioning | a) To what extent are the main objectives and related activities relevant to the people’s humanitarian and developmental needs, including in terms of operational responsiveness and coverage of interventions? | | | |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Were WFP’s strategic objectives, operations and resources consistent with the needs of the population of the Congo? | WFP humanitarian and development operation objectives respond to priorities in national needs analysis | Food & nutrition security reports (VAM, EFSA, CFSVA, SMART, etc), Millennium Development Goal (MDG) & progress reports, UNDAF/CCA, CAP, etc Interviews (internal and external) WFP strategy documents, project documents, evaluations, policy statements | Synthesis from key WFP documents Synthesis from key GoC documents Synthesis from interviews (internal and external) |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Was the balance of humanitarian and developmental operations appropriate? Did it take account of the changing context? | Balance of WFP humanitarian and development operations reflects national needs analysis and policy choices of The GoC as these changed over time, as well as contributions by other partners | VAM, MDG reports WFP SPR UNDAF documents and reporting Stakeholder interviews (internal and external) | Synthesis from key WFP documents Synthesis from key GoC documents Synthesis from interviews (internal and external) |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Was the targeting - geographical, time wise, and beneficiaries (including gender and ethnicity) relevant to the needs and priorities? | WFP’s targeting plans reflect priority target groups and criteria (e.g. geographical priority) in national analysis/policy documents | Food and nutrition country specific studies (VAM, MDG, etc) WFP Project documents, programme implementation & operational guidelines, M&E reports Stakeholder interviews (internal and external) | Synthesis from interviews (internal and external) Synthesis from key WFP documents Synthesis from key GoC documents |
| | b) To what extent have WFP’s strategies, objectives and programming aligned with those of Government and been coherent with the stated national agenda and policies, including sector policies, systems and capacities? | | | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ To what extent has the Government has provided a clear and comprehensive framework to align with at national and at sectoral levels? | Existence and quality of national policy and strategy documents and of relevant sector strategy documents and/or operational plans of action Coherence of national policy and strategy documents with sector strategies Existence of national and sectoral coordination mechanisms | Policy and strategy documents & operational plans of sector policies WFP Projects’ Operational plans with The GoC, UNDAF, PRSP Coordination mechanisms | Synthesis from key documents | |

| Area of enquiry | Issue/Specific Questions | Indicators | Main sources of | Collection Methods |
|--|---|---|---|---|
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Did the WFP portfolio conform with policies/guidelines of government authorities, including alignment with The GoC's agenda & policies (humanitarian & development)? | WFP priority areas of action over time reflect and support, within the WFP mandate, the strategic priorities of the Government | National policies, PRSP Sector policy papers Progress reports on MDG/UNDAF WFP project documents WFP corporate strategies and policies | Synthesis from key national, sector and WFP HQ documents |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Has WFP taken into account of the stated capacity constraints in humanitarian and development and sought to address these? | WFP strategy documents specifically highlight capacity constraints and have capacity building objectives | Sector policy papers Past evaluations (and management responses) WFP policy documents and prodocs and operational plans for implementation | Synthesis from documents |
| c) To what extent have WFP's strategies and operational plans been aligned with other partners (multilateral, bilateral and NGOs) to achieve complementarity of interventions and maximize CO effective comparative advantage at policy and operational levels? | | | | |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Is the WFP Portfolio well aligned to contribute to the UNDAF? | Evidence of WFP role in on UNDAF1 and UNDAF2 compared Evidence of the extent to which WFP has followed UNDAF | UNDAF reports, including meeting documents and minutes WFP strategy documents Internal and external interviews | Synthesis from UNDAF and WFP documents Synthesis from internal and external interviews |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ For the various partnerships (donors, NGOs, etc) were partners <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Aware of WFP's objectives? ○ Selected transparently? ○ Consulted in design of WFP operations? | Knowledge of WFP objectives and interventions by partners as expressed in interviews Quantity and quality of consultations between WFP and other partners during design phase | Interviews with external partners | Synthesis from internal and external interviews |
| d) To what extent have WFP's main objectives, strategies and implementation maximized organisational comparative advantages with the broader external context? | | | | |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ How well has WFP worked with UN agencies and donors, in terms of strategy, implementation, and M&E? | Number and type of partnerships (Cooperating Partners and/or /Field Level Agreements) as compared to the needs of the programme | Local MoU / LoU with partners, FLA Interviews and perceptions of The GoC, UN agencies, NGOs, donors | Synthesis from MoU/LoU docs Synthesis from interviews (external) |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ What degree of complementarity/overlap is there between WFP and other partners (UN, bilateral, multi-lateral, INGOs) within the different areas where WFP Congo works? | Review of the CHAP & CCA sections of the CAP and UNDAF documents Comparison of UNDAF1 versus UNDAF2 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assessment on needs • Objectives and strategies | OCHA CAP, UNDAF reports, including meeting memos WFP strategy documents, annual plans & reports Strategic agreements with partners (local MoUs/LoU) | Synthesis from documentation |

| Area of enquiry | Issue/Specific Questions | Indicators | Main sources of | Collection Methods |
|-----------------|---|--|---|---|
| | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Responsibilities and roles | | |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Is there consensus about WFP's comparative advantage? Do the COs partnerships help WFP maximise this? | Level of expressed agreement between partners of WFP's comparative advantage and of its engagement in partnerships | Interviews with key stakeholders of The GoC, UN agencies, NGOs, donors, and of WFP CO Management; Review of the UNDAF & CAP documents and attributed roles for WFP | Synthesis from documentation Synthesis from interviews |

| Area of enquiry | Issue/Specific Questions | Indicators | Main sources of | Collection Methods |
|--|---|---|--|---|
| KEY QUESTION 2: What have been the factors driving the <i>key strategic decisions</i>, which have oriented the portfolio? | | | | |
| Strategic decision making | a) To what extent has WFP analysed the national hunger, food security, livelihoods, nutrition, social protection and gender context and appropriately targeted its interventions using this analysis? | | | |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> What analysis related to the portfolio priorities (as above) has WFP done over the evaluation period? | Amount and type of analytical work undertaken directly by WFP or in collaboration with partners e.g. VAM | Reports of WFP analytical work Interviews with WFP CO staff Operational guidelines for project design and implementation | Synthesis from documentation Synthesis from interviews |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Did WFP analyses complement and strengthen the analysis done by other actors? Did this include attention to gender issues? | Comparison of obvious analytical gaps with efforts made to address these, including by commissioning additional work on identified gaps | Recent strategic reviews / papers (internal & external to WFP) Analytical reports, feasibility studies, VAM reports Stakeholder interviews (internal & external) | Synthesis from documentation Synthesis from interviews |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> What use did WFP make of other assessments conducted by other humanitarian actors? Are the main findings from these assessments reflected in WFP's strategic decisions and operational design? | Reference in WFP documents to analytical basis, relevant data (hunger, food security, nutrition, etc.) and to relevant surveys and assessments done by other partners M&E country specific system and programme operational guidelines reflect use of situation analysis | Documentary analysis of WFP strategy documents, WFP project documents and SPR WFP risk register, APP risk sections, risk/assumptions in project document logframes country specific M&E indicators Programme operational guidelines | Synthesis from documentation |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Did the WFP adequately analyse issues of gender and ethnicity of rural and urban food security and taken these into account in the design of transfer mechanisms (including with respect to acceptability of these mechanisms)? | References to gender and ethnicity issues in WFP analytical, strategy and project documents M&E system allows to monitor relevant programme indicators trends with a sensitivity to gender and ethnicity | Documentary analysis of WFP strategy documents, WFP project documents and SPRs, WFP risk register, APP risk sections, risk/assumptions in project document logframes | Synthesis from documentation |
| | b) To what extent has WFP contributed to placing these issues on the national agenda, to developing related national or partner strategies and to developing national capacity in the context of transition towards development and national ownership? | | | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> To what extent are mechanisms for dialogue, coordination and for mutual accountability in place and have these contributed to national | Existence and frequency of coordination meetings between UN, other development partners, and development partners and The GoC | Reports of meetings (UNDAF, etc.) Stakeholder interviews with coordination groups (e.g. UNDAF, Ministry of Planning) | Synthesis from documentation Interviews (external) | |

| Area of enquiry | Issue/Specific Questions | Indicators | Main sources of | Collection Methods |
|--|---|---|---|--|
| | <p>and partner strategy development?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ What has been WFP's contribution to strategy development and related capacity building? What has been its added value? | <p>Number and quality of joint strategies between partners</p> <p>Analysis of documentary record for WFP participation and participant perceptions of WFP role.</p> <p>Comparison of UNDAF 1 and UNDAF 2</p> <p>Explicit acknowledgement by stakeholders that WFP has played a role in policy and strategy formulation, and of WFP's role in both</p> | <p>Key informant perceptions (external), including The GoC, donors in main sectors, NGOs</p> <p>Meeting with senior CO staff, and with former staff</p> <p>Strategy documents by The GoC and sector ministries, WFP internal documentation</p> | <p>Synthesis from interviews (internal and external)</p> |
| c) To what extent has WFP had sufficient technical expertise (either internal or through partnerships) to strategically manage the different interventions under the portfolio? | | | | |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Is the available technical expertise (internal and external) sufficient to cover key aspects of the portfolio including strategic engagement, planning, implementation, M&E etc.? | <p>Mapping of technical expertise (internal and external) against what is required for strategic engagement, given evolution of the portfolio</p> <p>Assessment of quality of key WFP documents</p> <p>Degree of recognition by stakeholders of WFP's technical capacity</p> | <p>Stakeholder interviews (WFP CO and WFP RO & external stakeholders)</p> <p>WFP CO reporting, including minutes of external meetings, SPR, M&E (plans, tools and reports), etc.</p> <p>Regional office plans and reports on training and capacity building</p> <p>Operational guidelines for projects</p> <p>Staff Review Exercise (SRE)</p> | <p>Synthesis from interviews</p> <p>Synthesis from key documentation</p> |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ As the portfolio has shifted to development type operations, has the staffing of the CO and the nature of partnerships adapted? | <p>WFP staffing and training plans reflect appropriate changes to ensure relevance to the strategic priorities of the portfolio</p> <p>WFP partnership strategy (explicit or implicit i.e. from interviews) reflects clear understanding of the type of partnerships needed to ensure appropriate complementary expertise</p> | <p>SPR partnership data</p> <p>Partnership agreements (LoU, MoU, FLA)</p> <p>Stakeholder interviews (WFP CO and WFP RO as well as partners)</p> | <p>Analysis from interviews (internal and external)</p> <p>Analysis from key documentation</p> |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Have sufficient efforts been made to provide training of staff in key areas? Has this adequately filled any capacity gaps? | <p>Staff training plan versus actual training, and compared to obvious gaps in capacity</p> <p>Review the content for quality and relevance of any local (country specific) training to staff and partners</p> | <p>Annual plans and reports with respect to staff / partners training and capacity building efforts</p> <p>Any training material used by CO for partners</p> <p>Use of funds for training: ODOC for</p> | <p>Analysis from interviews (internal and external)</p> <p>Analysis from key documentation</p> |

| Area of enquiry | Issue/Specific Questions | Indicators | Main sources of | Collection Methods |
|--|---|---|---|--|
| | | | training; use of grants' funds; use of SO 200413 funds for capacity-building | |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> To what extent is WFP able to draw on external technical expertise to fill any gaps? | <p>Number and relevance of technical support missions by RB and HQ on analytical work</p> <p>Number and relevant of external consultancies compared to obvious gaps</p> | <p>Mission reports from RB and HQ</p> <p>Reports of consultancies undertaken</p> <p>Interviews with WFP staff</p> | <p>Analysis from interviews (internal and external)</p> <p>Analysis from key documentation</p> |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Did WFP have sufficient field presence to interact with government, local authorities and partners? | <p>Number and type and location of staff corresponds to the scale of the operations</p> | <p>WFP- SPR & prodocs, organogrammes, HR staff list</p> <p>Interviews with WFP staff</p> <p>Interviews and observations with partners and stakeholders in the field</p> | <p>Analysis from interviews (internal and external)</p> <p>Analysis from key documentation</p> |
| d) To what extent has WFP developed and implemented appropriate monitoring and evaluation systems to support strategic decision-making? | | | | |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Does WFP have an effective monitoring system (including reporting)? Has an appropriate level of M&E taken place across all activities/ operations of the portfolio, including of gender issues? | <p>Compliance with WFP M&E standards</p> <p>Existence versus use of quality monitoring guidelines, gender-sensitive tools & checklists</p> <p>Frequency of monitoring of all aspects of the portfolio</p> <p>Number and relevance of evaluation reports, monitoring documents, assessments, and their timing compared to key moments of decision making</p> | <p>WFP operational guidelines on M&E by activity</p> <p>CO operational guidelines by activity (for staff and/or partners)</p> <p>CO & SO monitoring plans / tracking of monitoring plans</p> <p>CO monitoring reports</p> <p>CO reporting formats for M&E for cooperating partners by activity</p> <p>CO checklists for monitoring by Food Aid Monitors and WFP staff by activity</p> | <p>Analysis from key documentation</p> |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Has WFP used findings from M&E to feed into operational planning and implementation? | <p>Evidence from documented/reported changes in programme implementation guidelines and/or M&E procedures and systems that changes of practice took place over the period of the evaluation and reflected the key findings from M&E</p> | <p>Analysis of WFP strategy and planning documents</p> <p>Interviews with WFP staff</p> <p>Interviews with external stakeholders</p> | <p>Analysis from interviews (internal and external)</p> <p>Analysis from key documentation</p> |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Has WFP had sufficient staff capacity and resources to implement the monitoring system and to use it? | <p>Comparison of staff and expertise of WFP versus M&E requirements monitoring and evaluation over the full portfolio period</p> | <p>Mapping of dedicated staff time over the portfolio period</p> <p>Perceptions from interviews with WFP staff</p> | <p>Analysis of staff time use</p> <p>Analysis from interviews (internal and external)</p> |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Have partners been involved in | <p>Regular feedback provided to partners on</p> | <p>Perceptions from interviews with partners</p> | <p>Analysis from interviews</p> |

| Area of enquiry | Issue/Specific Questions | Indicators | Main sources of | Collection Methods |
|-----------------|--|--|--|--|
| | M&E of operations & informed about results/outcomes? | results and outcomes of WFP operations | staff | |
| | e) To what extent has WFP entered into and managed appropriate operational partnerships? | | | |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> How do partnerships complement and fill capacity and implementation gaps that WFP has? What is the capacity and added value of these partners? | Clearly formulated rationale for partnership engagement which is linked to an explicit identification of gaps in capacity, evident from WFP strategy | UNDAF and other cross agency planning documents Project/activity proposals of partners (annexes of FLA) Project Review Committees (PRC) notes for records | Cross check with responses to 2 c) Analysis from key documents |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Do the arrangements/agreements that are in place ensure that operational partnerships function effectively? | Decision-making on partnership engagement over the period has been responsive to changing needs of the portfolio | Perceptions from interviews with WFP staff and interviews with partners | Analysis from key documents |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Do partnerships arrangements (LoU/MoU and FLA) reflect a specific focus on complementary technical expertise? | Relevant mentions of technical inputs by partners in documents of LoU, MoU, and FLA. | ODOC expense plans / tracking sheets by operation | Analysis of key documents |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Does the CO review the effectiveness of its partnerships periodically and make adjustments as needed? | Existence of a mechanism for reviewing partnership agreements and functioning in which partners can input | Interviews with WFP internally and with partners FLAs FLA/Country Program (CP) partners evaluation system | Analysis from interviews (internal and external) Analysis of key documents |
| | f) To what extent has WFP been driven by internal and external factors in making strategic choices and/or alterations to the portfolio over the period? | | | |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> What principal external factors have influenced operational choices and decisions between 2009 and 2012? | Mapping of key decisions and external and internal factors that influenced these decisions | Documentation of decisions on programme design and implementation Reports of other agencies on the Congo Key informant interviews (internal and external) Group discussions with WFP staff to reconstruct influences at play in WFP decision making | Analysis from interviews (internal and external) Analysis of key documents Analysis of group discussions |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> How have these factors affected the overall performance and results of the portfolio over the | Assessment of portfolio achievements against outputs | Project documentation Stakeholder interviews (internal & external) | Analysis from interviews (internal and external) Analysis of key documents |

| Area of enquiry | Issue/Specific Questions | Indicators | Main sources of | Collection Methods |
|---|--|--|---|---|
| | evaluation period? | | | |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Overall how well has WFP Congo made the right choices? | Assessment of portfolio achievements against outcomes | Project documentation Stakeholder interviews (internal and external) | Analysis from interviews (internal and external) Analysis of key documents |
| KEY QUESTION 3: What have been the performance and results of the WFP portfolio? | | | | |
| Performance and results | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> What has been the level of efficiency and effectiveness of the main WFP programme activities and explanations for these results (including factors beyond WFP control)? | | | |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> To what extent have WFP interventions achieved their intended outputs? What factors explain the outputs? What has been the impact on female beneficiaries? | Comparison of outputs and outcomes vs planned (for each component area) Reporting provides quality insight into impact on female beneficiaries Reporting explicitly includes analysis of factors that contribute to outputs | WFP SPR and monitoring reports The Congo and other available data on programme delivery/results. Interviews and FGDs, observation during field work (including women) Interviews with partners & stakeholders | Analysis from interviews (internal and external) Analysis of key documents Analysis from field work observations and FGD |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> To what extent have WFP interventions (successfully) targeted the most vulnerable? | Quality of definition of selection criteria and adherence by WFP, comparison between beneficiaries targeted and reached by WFP, adherence to national guidelines, compared to evidence from studies on needs in the relevant areas of focus | Data on programme coverage from SPR, M&E reports Interviews and FGDs, and observation at field sites Interviews with partners and stakeholders | Analysis from interviews (internal and external) Analysis of key documents Analysis from field work observations and FGD Analysis of key documents |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> How efficient has WFP been in terms of logistics, systems and delivery and the degree to which this represents value for money? | Analysis of selected unit costs Analysis of commodities distributed vs actual quantities received Comparison of cost, quality and timeliness to other actors and/or WFP in other settings Analysis of Pipeline Use of partners/systems/procurement | WFP records from CO and HQ systems. Available comparative data. COMPAS, stock reports, pipeline reports, commodity programming system Funding levels of operations Interviews with partners and stakeholders as relevant | Analysis from documentation Analysis from interviews (external) |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Have there been any unintended outcomes (e.g. on domestic food markets, on The GoC capacity, on beneficiaries)? (Positive or negative & macro or micro) | Comparison of expected outcomes with the reported outcomes Reporting (written and or verbal) highlights unintended outcomes | WFP Congo SPR, monitoring reports (staff field monitoring reports, post distribution and/or food basket monitoring reports, etc.), WFP-VAM reports, CFSVA data Interviews/FGD with WFP staff, partners, stakeholders & beneficiaries | Analysis from documentation Analysis from interviews (external) |

| Area of enquiry | Issue/Specific Questions | Indicators | Main sources of | Collection Methods |
|---|--|--|--|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> What has been the level of synergy and multiplying effect between similar activities in different operations and between the various main activities regardless of the operations and with partners at operational level (internal/external coherence and connectedness) | | | | |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> To what extent have there been synergies between different operational activities? | Mapping of various activities over time and regions | WFP records and M&E from CO and HQ systems, planning documents Interviews with WFP staff, partners and stakeholders | Analysis of documentation Analysis from key interviews (internal and external) |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> How coherent and connected have activities been both internally and externally (across activities within the same operation and between operations)? | Clearly expressed logic of the portfolio component areas, and the portfolio as a whole (including relationship with external partners) in evidence from strategic document and reporting. Theory of Change (ToC) of the portfolio shows evidence of linkages | Review of WFP programme activities across the broader spectrum of other partners' needs and interventions Data and existing analyses/reports on sectors in which WFP is engaged. Reconstructed ToC for the portfolio Interviews (internal & external) | Analysis of documentation Analysis from key interviews (internal and external) |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> To what extent have there been linkages and lesson learning between WFP's humanitarian work and the engagement in development interventions? Between WFP projects? | Evidence of explicit follow-up from evaluations of WFP operations. Quality and depth of analysis and reporting on lesson learning Improvements / fine-tuning of programming & implementation | 2009 PRRO 10312.1 evaluation report Other evaluations Prodocs, programme operational guidelines , operational plans, Food Assistance Monitor (FAM) checklists, etc. Interviews and Focus Group Discussions (FGD) with informants | Analysis of documentation Analysis from key interviews and FGD (internal and external) |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> What has been the potential contribution to impact and sustainability of the main WFP programme activities and explanation of results? | | | | |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> What are the main areas of impact over the evaluation period? | Documented progress in achieving outcome and impact level indicators for the component areas of the portfolio | Analysis of M&E data on outcomes by operation Field study data for triangulation per component area Interviews and FGDs with beneficiaries | Analysis of documentation Analysis from key interviews, FGD (internal and external), and field observations |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> What evidence is there that the positive impact of the main WFP activities will last? | Impact remaining from those operations that have finished. Programme design includes sustainability | Project documentation Explanatory factors – field study reports, and interviews with key partners at local level as well as with key stakeholders nationally | Analysis of documentation Analysis from key interviews, FGD (internal and external), and field observations |

Annex 4 Evaluation Methodology

*Methodological Approach*⁹²

1. The main points of reference for this evaluation which constitute the logic of the portfolio were

- The *five strategic objectives* set out in the WFP strategic plan 2008-2013
- The *principal outcomes across the component areas and the cross-cutting themes* (and by extension those of the 7 operations which the portfolio is examining)
- The *key evaluation questions* (EQ) which relate to: a) strategic alignment; b) actors driving strategic decision-making; and c) the performance and results of the portfolio

2. The component areas that were covered by the portfolio included: i) humanitarian assistance, ii) education; iii) health and nutrition; and iv) social protection. Both education and health and nutrition have a strong social protection focus, and are closely linked into this component area.

Evaluation Matrix

3. The evaluation matrix (see Annex 3 above) was a key tool for the evaluation and ensured that the team explored the interconnections between different component areas and cross-cutting themes of the portfolio. For each key Evaluation Question (EQ) the matrix included relevant sub-questions, together with the indicators, data sources and data collection methods. The EQs and the evaluation matrix were designed to ensure balance between the three overarching key evaluation questions as well as an intuitively logical sequence of enquiry.

4. Table 12 below summarises the main sources of analyses for each of the evaluation questions, and details the data sources that the team planned to use.

Table 12 Main Evaluation Questions, Type of Analysis and Principal Sources of Data

| Key Evaluation Issues | Type of Analysis | Principal Sources of Data |
|--|--|--|
| Strategic Alignment of the WFP Congo Portfolio | Primarily qualitative analysis, with some quantitative analysis | WFP documents; other policy and strategic documents from the GoC; individual and group interviews (WFP Congo CO, the GoC partners/ministries, UN agencies, donors, NGOs) |
| Factors Driving Strategic Decision-Making | Principally qualitative analysis with some quantitative analysis | WFP documents, VAM and UNICEF assessments; internal (WFP) interviews and workshop; external interviews with the GoC partners, UN agencies, donors, NGOs |

⁹² The overview of the methodology provided here is drawn from the IR which had a more detailed chapter on methodology.

| Key Evaluation Issues | Type of Analysis | Principal Sources of Data |
|-------------------------|---|--|
| Performance and Results | <p>Analysis of output and outcome indicators</p> <p>Additional triangulation/understanding to be derived from qualitative and quantitative information from interviews and field visits</p> | <p>WFP documents including VAM & monitoring reports; external interviews with The GoC partners, UN agencies, donors, NGOs; FGD and interviews with beneficiaries; observations and field sites; additional data collection in field as pertinent</p> |

Data Collection Methods

5. The evaluation team used a pragmatic mixed methods approach in addressing the evaluation questions. This section explains the different instruments that the team set out to employ and the approach to triangulating evidence from different sources. It also provides details on the sampling approach.

6. The team sought both triangulation and complementarity between methods. Assessment of data availability showed that the coverage and quality of much key data is very weak.⁹³ Moreover, some of the key issues for the evaluation did not easily lend themselves to quantitative assessment. This reinforced the case for careful combination of methods, linked to an elucidation of the theories of change underlying the different main interventions in which WFP had been involved. By understanding *how* WFP and its partners expected to achieve results, the evaluation team sought to assess the quality and credibility of the WFP portfolio, drawing on international evidence of what works, and international standards of good practice, to supplement the limited evidence that was available on direct outputs and outcomes in the Congo.

7. The evaluation matrix was a key resource for the triangulation of information. It was used as a template for systematically recording against each of the detailed evaluation questions, what the main findings of the evaluation were and what sources these were drawn from (e.g. interviews, documentation, data analysis). The record of the findings was linked back to the interview notes, documentation, and other sources, so that each of the team members could trace from where they originated, and what the sources were. In this manner, as the evaluation progressed the team was able to begin to identify what the emerging findings were, and importantly, in what areas further triangulation might be needed (i.e. where insufficient sources exist) in order to ensure that the findings – and ultimately the conclusions and recommendations – were based on a solid evidence.

⁹³ Many of the assessments that would usually be found at national level do not exist in Congo e.g. comprehensive study agricultural context is being planned by FAO for 2015. The CFSVA report carried out by WFP in 2009 (WFP, 2010h), was the first of its kind. Monitoring and evaluation has also been found to be a weakness of the CO by previous evaluations (Gervais et al, 2008).

8. The main instruments that were used for data collection were:
- (a) **Document/ literature review.** Documentation was systematically analysed to feed into the analysis of the overall context, to identify elements that fed into decision making, to understand how progress was monitored, and to identify what results were recorded from the various interventions. Records of lessons learnt from interventions was also an important area of focus.
 - (b) **Review of secondary data.** The e-library included a comprehensive collection of WFP's internal data, including SPRs and annual work plans, together with country-level data. The team drew systematically on earlier studies, including any evaluation work that had been done. We also used existing data to do additional analysis
 - (c) **Key informant and stakeholder interviews** were the main form of primary data collection. Group interviews, on the other hand, provided helpful insights into retrospectively understanding the processes of decision-making (which had often not been systematically recorded) as well as the implementation processes (where participants together identified what elements fed into decisions, and how the implementation process took place over time). The evaluation thus used a combination of individual and group interviews across the different elements of the portfolio to obtain the necessary information. By default, interviews were treated as confidential. They were systematically written up by team members using a standard template and shared through a compendium in a confidential section of the e-library. The compendium enabled interview notes to be easily searched by topic, and facilitated triangulation of different interviewee recollections and perspectives. The interview notes also included a section on issues to be further explored and this allowed team members to keep a focus on areas that needed further information/understanding as the data collection progressed. Interviewees were also systematically asked for additional key documents and data sources and these were included under a "follow-up" section in the interview notes which had been assigned to one of the team members. In line with good evaluation practice, the evaluation will sought to minimize the burden of the evaluation on stakeholders through careful organisation (in coordination with the CO and the EOV).
 - (d) **Field visits.** During the inception mission, the evaluation team undertook a half-day field visit to selected locations where the safety net programme had been implemented in Brazzaville. This was helpful in getting an insight into the planning of the field work, including with respect to such aspects as locating and interviewing beneficiaries, using translation, involving other stakeholders (government, etc.). The field visits took place for the main evaluation mission were identified in such a manner that they covered the main elements (in terms of components and operations) of the WFP portfolio, as well as different geographical regions of the country. Field visits were used to gather more interviews and focus group discussions (see below) and also, where necessary and as feasible, to mitigate some of the known gaps in available data. They also helped in the assessment of capacity issues, not least through observation of service delivery at local level, and in the further understanding of gender issues.

- (e) **Focus group discussions (FGDs).** The fieldwork included focus group discussions with beneficiaries (with separate groups for women as necessary) and with WFP, The GoC and other staff involved in delivering programmes. To gain the opinions and views of as many members of the focus group as possible, a participatory approach was used using where appropriate participatory tools. For example, in order to reconstruct an order of events and how this impacted, participants in a FGD were asked to represent on a piece of paper or simply on the ground (using symbols/sticks, drawings) how a particular situation changed over time, e.g. schools without school feeding, and schools with school feeding. The detailed choice of the approach to the focus group discussion was done in-country in consultation with the national consultant, WFP staff and other field workers.
- (f) **Workshops/group discussion.** The inception mission held two group meetings with staff drawn from all sections of the CO. At the end of the fieldwork visit, two exit briefs, were organized in the Congo, done in a PowerPoint form, that provided a brief summary of the team's work done, shared first impressions and preliminary findings, and provided a forum for the evaluation and country teams/stakeholders to clarify issues and identify next steps. A first workshop session was held for the internal WFP stakeholders (WFP CO, with telephone link with RB & OE). A subsequent debriefing – on the last day of the field mission - included core stakeholders from government and aid agencies. An additional feedback event – not initially foreseen in the TOR of the evaluation process took place in Rome on the 5th April 2013 after the field visit and shared the more consolidated findings as well as the preliminary recommendations of the evaluation team. All these events sought to strengthen the team's understanding of the programme and promote CO ownership of the evaluation, ensured engagement with core stakeholders, and sought to contribute to enhancing utility of the evaluation process. The additional information feedback session also sought to ensure that the evaluation fed back into the timing of the preparatory process for the WFP Country Strategy for the Congo

9. Detailed annexes were drafted to the IR with details on the approach to evaluating the sub-components of the portfolio, namely humanitarian assistance, health and nutrition, education, and social protection, as well as for the overall theme of food security. This included a detailed sampling approach for each of these components. The focus of the sampling was to have an illustrative selection of the main activities, beneficiary groups and stakeholders that were covered by the portfolio. Table 13 below outlines the sampling approach for each of the main component areas of the portfolio. The team planned to visit four of the Congo's nine regions during the field-work.

Table 13 Details of sampling for the evaluation field work

| Area of portfolio | Universe | Sampling | Target groups |
|----------------------|---|--|--|
| Health and nutrition | DEV 200211 project document and SPR 2011 do not provide the target # of health centres and clinics for voucher (MCHN) and voucher plus RUF (HIV and TB) components and there is also a discrepancy between geographical areas in the prodoc and the SPRs. To be further verified at start of field work | A random sample of 3 clinics each in Brazzaville and Pointe-Noire (6 in total) from the list of clinics currently participating in the HIV and TB and MCHN components of DEV 200211 2 clinics previously involved in support to HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis beneficiaries under PRRO 10312.1 | Beneficiaries Staff |
| Social protection | The main suburban areas of Brazzaville and Pointe Noire (from which it was planned to target 23,000 vulnerable people under DEV 200211). Details on number of schools in targeted areas to be verified at start of field work | Two randomly sampled schools currently attended by some of the interviewed project beneficiaries' dependents, each in Brazzaville and/or Pointe Noire [in addition to those mentioned within the education area] 3 CAS areas in Brazzaville and Pointe Noire, involving at least 20 randomly selected CAS beneficiaries drawn from CAS lists 1 randomly sampled clinic in either Pointe Noire or Brazzaville (overlap with the health nutrition above) | Management, education staff, parents National level stakeholders (Government ministries, NGO, WFP, MTN, etc.). For the locations selected: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CAS beneficiaries • CAS staff • Retailers • MTN community level staff • Persons receiving nutritional supplements • Clinic staff |

| Area of portfolio | Universe | Sampling | Target groups |
|-------------------------|--|---|--|
| Education | <p>PRRO 10312.1 covered 200 (planned 350) schools in south of Cuvette, Plateaux and Pool regions</p> <p>DEV 200144 targets 400 primary schools in the regions of Cuvette, Lekoumou, Plateaux and Pool</p> | <p>Purposive sampling of primary schools in two regions (Lekoumou and Pool) to provide a reasonable geographical coverage, which will focus on:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 3-4 schools initiated under PRRO 10312.1 • 3 -4 schools covered under DEV 200244 • 1-2 IPHD schools for comparison purposes • 1-2 schools that does not receive school feeding for comparison purposes <p>3.1</p> <p>3.2 The selected schools will be chosen to reflect average size and average location characteristics (different degrees of accessibility)</p> | <p>Main national level stakeholders (Ministry of Education, WFP, IPHD).</p> <p>In each region:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Education district offices • Local government authorities • School management (director, pedagogical director) • Parents representatives who are members of the PTA • Women involved in food preparation • Beneficiaries (children grade 5 and above) • WFP staff of sub-office • IPHD staff |
| Humanitarian assistance | <p>Likouala Province</p> <p>The districts of: Betou, Enyelle, Dongou, Impfondo and Liranga (under PRRO 200147 & EMOP 200095)</p> <p>Brazzaville (the communes of Poto Poto Ouenze Talangai) under SO 200414</p> | <p>One site/community assisted by /EMOP 200095</p> <p>Two sites/community assisted by PRRO 200147</p> <p>Individuals/community assisted by EMOP 200408</p> <p>Site visit to site of warehousing provided under SO 200413</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Groups of beneficiaries • Community leaders • UNHCR officials in the camps • Local population • Person in charge of managing stocks • Partners who have carried out distributions or M&E (CARITAS, ACTED, ARRAC, IPHD, AAAD) • Government officials (MASAH) who have helped with M&E |

Annex 5 Component areas and Operations in the CPE

Table 14 Component areas and operations under the Congo WFP Portfolio

| Component areas/ Operations | Health and Nutrition | Humanitarian Response | Education | Social Protection |
|--|---|--|---|---|
| <i>Key expected outcomes to be reviewed by the evaluation</i> | | | | |
| DEV 200144 Support to primary education (SO4 – Reduce chronic hunger and undernutrition) | Improved children’s learning capacities and micro-nutrient status through school feeding for girls and boys | Not applicable | Increased primary education attendance, retention, completion and learning capacity for girls and boys | Protect against social shocks, and provide protection over the longer term |
| DEV 200211 Safety net programme (SO4 & SO5 – Strengthen capacities of countries to reduce hunger) | Improved ART adherence, improved success of TB treatment, and increased attendance to MCHN activities | Not applicable | Improve enrolment and school attendance in urban areas of Brazzaville and Pointe Noire for children 6-12 years of age | Protect against shocks and provide protection over the longer term |
| PRRO 200147 Assistance to Congolese Refugees from DRC in Likouala Province (SO 1 – Saving lives & protect livelihoods in emergency situations) | - | Improved food consumption over assistance period for target households | Not applicable | Improved food consumption providing protection against immediate shocks |
| EMOP 200095 Food assistance to Congolese Displaced in Likouala Province (SO 1 Saving lives & protect livelihoods in emergency situations) | Reduced or stabilized acute malnutrition in children under five Reduced or stabilized mortality in children under five and adults Improved food consumption for women, children and men under severe conditions | Improved food consumption over assistance period to target households Support to repatriation back to DRC | Not applicable | Improved food consumption and enhanced resilience providing protection against immediate shocks |

| Component areas/ Operations | Health and Nutrition | Humanitarian Response | Education | Social Protection |
|--|--|---|--|---|
| <p>PRRO 10312.1</p> <p>Assistance to populations affected by conflict and poverty</p> <p>(SO3 – Restore and rebuild lives and livelihoods in post-conflict, post-disaster or transition situations, & SO4)</p> | <p>Reduced and/or stabilized acute malnutrition among the targeted population</p> <p>Reduced and or stabilized mortality among the targeted population</p> | - | <p>Increased attendance, particularly among girls, in WFP assisted schools through food for education activities</p> | <p>Improved food security & enhanced resilience to shocks for vulnerable groups in posted conflict-affected areas through Food for Work</p> |
| <p>EMOP 200408</p> <p>SO 1</p> | <p>Food assistance to prevent deterioration of nutritional situation</p> | <p>Emergency response to avoid deterioration of nutritional and food consumption status of affected populations</p> | Not applicable | <p>Deterioration of food security of affected persons prevented through immediate food assistance, especially women and children</p> |
| <p>SO 200413</p> <p>Links to SO5</p> | Not applicable | <p>Improved logistics capacity of government to respond to crises after the explosions on the 4th of March 2012.</p> | Not applicable | |

Annex 6 Evaluation Visit Team Timetable

| Day | Muriel Visser | Anthea Gordon | Mirella Mokbel | Stephen Turner |
|----------------------------------|--|---|---|---|
| Sat 2nd March | Arrival | | Arrival | Arrival |
| Sun 3rd March | Team work | Arrival Team work | Team work | Team work |
| Mon 4th March | <p>Travel to Kinkala</p> <p><u>Kinkala 1:</u></p> <p>Visit to Mindongo Primary School (observed school feeding. Interviews with: women preparing food, school director, teachers, children grade 3 and 5, school inspector. Visit to storage area)</p> <p>Visit to Ntari Ngouri Primary School (interview with school director)</p> <p>Travel to Mindouli</p> | <p>Travel to Impfondo</p> <p><u>Impfondo:</u></p> <p>Interview with UNCHR-Impfondo</p> <p>Interview with Caritas</p> <p>Interview with CEMIR</p> <p>Field visit to refugee site at Yoi-Na-Yoi (focus groups with refugee committee and village leaders)</p> <p>Interview with WFP sub-office head in Impfondo</p> <p>Interview with MDA</p> <p>Interview with IPHD</p> | <p>Technical brief with staff in Brazzaville</p> <p>Interviews with WFP staff – country office</p> <p>Evening: travel to Pointe Noire</p> | <p>Technical brief with staff in Brazzaville</p> <p>Interviews with WFP staff – country office</p> <p>Evening: travel to Pointe Noire</p> |
| Tues 5th March | <p><u>Nkayi:</u></p> <p>Departure for Nkayi</p> <p>Interview with head of WFP</p> | <p>Interview with French Red Cross</p> <p>Visit to Impfondo warehouses</p> <p>Travel to Betou (by boat) via:</p> | <p><u>Pointe Noire</u></p> <p>Interview with Ministry of Health - PN</p> <p>Interview with Ministry of</p> | <p><u>Pointe Noire</u></p> <p>Interview with Ministry of Health - PN</p> <p>Interview with Ministry of Social</p> |

| Day | Muriel Visser | Anthea Gordon | Mirella Mokbel | Stephen Turner |
|---------------------------------|---|---|---|---|
| | <p>sub-office</p> <p>Visit to Loudima Gare school (a school without school feeding) – interview with director</p> <p>Visit to IPHD school – Sibiti Centre (Interview with the woman in charge of the kitchen, with 5 cooks, with two teachers, and 4 pupils)</p> | <p>Visit to Bobonzo refugee site (focus groups with refugee committee and village leaders)</p> <p>Visit to Liboko refugee site (focus groups with refugee committee)</p> | <p>Social Affairs- PN</p> <p>Interview with Unité Départementale de Lutte Contre le SIDA (UDLS), Pointe Noire</p> <p>WFP staff</p> <p>Interview with AFTC Pointe Noire</p> <p>RENAPC</p> | <p>Affairs- PN</p> <p>Interview at RENAPC</p> <p>Interview with AFTC Pointe Noire</p> <p>Interview with Unité Départementale de Lutte Contre le SIDA (UDLS), Pointe Noire</p> |
| Wed 6th March | <p>Meeting with Department Director of Education</p> <p>Visit to Primary school of Boudouhou (interviews with Director of the school, President of the Management Committee, with two teachers, 4 pupils and one of the women who prepares the food.)</p> <p>Visit to Primary school of Makoto (interview with Director)</p> <p>Visit to Primary school of Mayeye Centre (Interviews with school director, 2 committee members, 4 female cooks, 4 pupils, and the school inspector)</p> | <p><u>Betou:</u></p> <p>Visit to 15 avril refugee site (focus groups with refugee committee)</p> <p>Interview with Major's office</p> <p>Interview with AARREC</p> <p>Interview with MSF</p> <p>Meeting and discussions with all staff from Betou WFP sub-office</p> | <p>Interview at Anti TB Centre, Pointe Noire</p> <p>Field visit to Loandjili: interview with MASA agents called “tuteurs” from Loandjili</p> <p>Visit to general hospital interviews in Infectious Diseases section</p> | <p>Visit to port to see WFP logistics</p> <p>Interview with Transit Maritime Congolais</p> <p>Field visit to Loandjili: interview with shop-keeper, CAS, beneficiaries focus group</p> <p>Visit to general hospital interviews in Infectious Diseases section</p> |

| Day | Muriel Visser | Anthea Gordon | Mirella Mokbel | Stephen Turner |
|-----------------------------------|--|--|--|--|
| | for the whole region) | | | |
| Thurs 7th March | <p>Travel back to Brazzaville via:</p> <p>Primary school of Monte Mounkala (located at Makombou)</p> <p>Mantumbou primary school – remote school</p> | <p>Interview with Association for the Prevention of Malnutrition</p> <p>Interview with sub-prefecture Betou</p> <p>Interview with MDA Betou</p> <p>Visit to WFP warehouses – control of stock – interview with warehouse manager</p> | <p>Field visit to Tie Tie (safety nets project). Interviews with CAS, tuteurs, shopkeeper focus group with 2 groups of beneficiaries, WFP storekeeper</p> <p>Interview with MTN Pointe Noire</p> <p>Interview with WFP staff Pointe Noire sub-office</p> <p>Pm - Return to Brazzaville</p> | <p>Field visit to Tie Tie (safety nets project). Interviews with CAS, tuteurs, shopkeeper focus group with 2 groups of beneficiaries, WFP storekeeper</p> <p>Interview with MTN Pointe Noire</p> <p>Interview with WFP staff Pointe Noire sub-office</p> <p>Pm - Return to Brazzaville</p> |
| Fri 8th March | <p><u>Brazzaville:</u></p> <p>Interview with World Bank, Brazzaville</p> <p>Interview with CEMIR</p> <p>Interview with AAREEC</p> | <p>Travel to Impfondo and then on to Brazzaville (delay in DRC)</p> | <p><u>Brazzaville:</u></p> <p>Interview with CNLS</p> <p>Interview with Centre Traitement Ambulatoire (CTA)</p> <p>Interview with head of TB programme, Brazzaville</p> <p>Interview with nutrition coordinator Unicef</p> | <p><u>Brazzaville:</u></p> <p>Interview with World Bank, Brazzaville</p> <p>Interview with head of CAS</p> <p>Interview with Director General of Agriculture, Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock</p> <p>Interview with MTN, Brazzaville</p> |
| Sat 9th March | | Arrived back in Brazzaville | | |
| Sun 10th Mar. | | Anthea departure | | |

| | Muriel | Alessandra | Mirella | Stephen |
|-----------------------------------|--|--|---|---|
| Mon 11th March | Interview with Alice, WFP CO Interview with Unicef education specialist | Brazzaville | Interview with Angele Ayenoue (WFP staff, CO) | Interview with WFP head of programmes, CO Interview with WFP consultant CO Interview with WFP staff involved in safety net programme |
| Tues 12th March | Further school visits in Kinkala to 3 primary schools and meeting with school inspectors. | Interview with head of IOM, Congo | Interview with Ministry of Planning Field visit to safety net programme: focus groups with beneficiaries at Makelekele, Quartier Mator, Tour d'eau; interview with shopkeeper at Tour d'eau and shopkeeper at Makelekele | Interview with Ministry of Planning Field visit to safety net programme: focus groups with beneficiaries at Makelekele, Quartier Mator, Tour d'eau; interview with shopkeeper at Tour d'eau and shopkeeper at Makelekele |
| Wed 13th March | Interview with US Ambassador Interview with Logistics Officer, WFP CO Interview with UNESCO representative Meeting with Adama Diop and Brenda (RB JHB) Meeting with MoE Director | Interview with DG humanitarian, Ministry for Social Affairs Interview with UNDP Interview with ACTED Brazzaville Interview with Caritas Brazzaville | Interview with Unicef HIV, mother and child health and nutrition specialists Interview with Advisor HIV/AIDS/Tuberculosis and infectious diseases at WHO | Focus group with CAS tuteurs Makelekele Interview with US Ambassador |

| | Muriel | Alessandra | Mirella | Stephen |
|------------------------------------|---|---|---|---|
| | General for preliminary debrief | | | |
| Thurs 14th March | Interview with Deputy [Acting] Resident Representative UNDP 3pm internal debrief | 3pm internal debrief | 3pm internal debrief | Interview with Deputy [Acting] Resident Representative UNDP 3pm internal debrief |
| Fri 15th March | Am – external debrief ⁹⁴ Pm – team work Depart | Am – external debrief Pm – team work Follow-up visits to WFP CO and interviews with DRC WFP | Am – external debrief Pm – team work Depart | Am – external debrief Pm – team work Depart |

⁹⁴ With external partners GoC, UN agencies and NGOs.

Annex 7 Interviews conducted for the Congo CPE

Table 15 Summary of SSIs and FGDs carried out by sector area

| Stakeholders consulted | Humanitarian Assistance | | Health and Nutrition | | Education | | Social Protection | |
|--|-------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|-------------|-----------------------|-------------------|-----------------------|
| | Respondents | Data collection tools | Respondents | Data collection tools | Respondents | Data collection tools | Respondents | Data collection tools |
| National staff | 9 | SSI | 13 | SSI | 10 | SSI | 14 | SSI |
| HQ/regional staff | 3 | SSI | - | SSI | 3 | SSI | 3 | SSI |
| WFP staff total | 12 | | 13 | | 13 | | 17 | |
| The Congo national level | 5 | SSI | 3 | SSI | 4 | SSI | 17 | SSI |
| The Congo decentralized levels | 3 | SSI | 9 | SSI | 4 | SSI | 3 | |
| Total GoC | 12 | | 12 | | 8 | | 20 | SSI |
| UN Partners | 4 | SSI | 10 | SSI | 4 | SSI | 6 | SSI |
| INGOs/NGOs | 17 | SSI | 4 | SSI | 2 | SSI | | SSI |
| Total partners | 21 | | 14 | | 6 | | 6 | |
| Total other | 3 | SSI | 4 | SSI | 1 | SSI | 4 | SSI |
| Implementers local level (e.g. PTA, school management, shop keepers) | N/A | - | | FGD | 30 | SSI/FGD | 36 | SSI/FGD |
| Beneficiaries | 6 large groups | FGD | 33 | SSI/FGD | 17* | FGD | 23 | SSI/FGD |
| Total community/beneficiary level | 50+ | | 33 | | 47 | | 59 | |

*just includes children who are the recipients

This table does not include all the interviews carried out as some were general background or important for the country context. The number of people consulted by interview is greater than the number of interviews as frequently more than one person was involved in the interview at the same time. The table provides an estimate as it is impossible to cleanly split interviews between some of the thematic areas, for example, those who were interviewed in conjunction with the safety net programme often had relevance to both social protection and health and nutrition.

Table 16 Details of planned and actual targets for site visits & data collection

| Area of portfolio | Sampling as planned | Actual |
|-------------------------------------|--|---|
| Nutrition | A random sample of 3 clinics in Brazzaville and Pointe-Noire from the list of clinics currently participating in the HIV and TB components of DEV 200211 | Visited 1 clinic in Brazzaville and 4 in Pointe-Noire. |
| Food security and social protection | <p>Two randomly sampled schools in Brazzaville and/or Pointe Noire</p> <p>2 CAS areas in Brazzaville and Pointe Noire, involving at least 20 randomly selected CAS beneficiaries drawn from CAS lists</p> <p>1 randomly sampled clinic in either Pointe Noire or Brazzaville</p> | <p>Visits to the following neighbourhoods where FGD and SSIs were carried out with beneficiaries, shop owners, and CAS staff:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tie Tie, Pointe Noire • Loandjili, Pointe Noire • Makelekele, Brazzaville • Matour, Brazzaville • Tour d'Eau, Brazzaville |
| School feeding | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 3 schools initiated under previous CP • 3 new schools • One IPHD school • 1 school that does not receive school feeding | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 4 schools initiated under previous CP • 3 new schools • One IPHD school • 1 school that does not receive school feeding |
| Humanitarian assistance | <p>One site/community assisted by EMOP 200093/EMOP 200095</p> <p>One site/community assisted by PRRO 200147</p> <p>Individuals/community assisted by EMOP 200408</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Visited 4 refugee camps/communities in Likouala Province (assisted by EMOP 200093 and PRRO 200147) • Visit to site of warehousing for SO 200413 |

Table 17 Interviews and focus groups carried out as part of the CPE

| Name | Affiliation | Date of interview |
|--|--|--------------------------|
| Interviews during HQ briefing: | | |
| Deborah Saidy | Deputy Regional Director ODN, WFP | 14th January 2013 |
| Abdirahman Meygag | Senior Regional Programme Officer ODN, WFP | 14th January 2013 |
| Rosie Bright | Country Strategy focal point ODN, WFP | 14th January 2013 |
| Josephine Etima-Ocilaje | Evaluation focal point ODN, WFP | 14th January 2013 |
| Robin Landis | Knowledge Management/Evaluations focal point ODN, WFP | 14th January 2013 |
| Brenda Barton | Deputy Regional Director ODJ, WFP | 14th January 2013 |
| Philippe-Serge Degernier | Regional Programme Adviser ODJ, WFP | 14th January 2013 |
| Jacqueline Flentge | Regional Programme Officer ODJ, WFP | 14th January 2013 |
| Kartini Opposunggo | Programme Advisor, Performance & Accountability Management Division RMP, WFP | 14th January 2013 |
| Shanoo Saran | Donor Relations Officer ERD, WFP | 15th January 2013 |
| Ken Crossley | Chief Hunger Solutions HS, WFP | 15th January 2013 |
| Lara Fossi | Programme advisor, Programme Innovation Division | 15th January 2013 |
| Elisabeth Faure | Programme Design Service, ODXP, WFP | 15th January 2013 |
| Adeyinka Badejo | Programme Officer Programme Design Service, ODXP, WFP | 15th January 2013 |
| Marc Regnault de la Mothe | Policy Officer School Feeding Policy PSS, WFP | 15th January 2013 |
| Simon Clemens | Programme Officer Cash for Change Service ODXC, WFP | 15th January 2013 |
| Jean-Martin Bauer | Food Security Analysis Service, ODXF, WFP | 15th January 2013 |
| Helen Wedgwood | Director OE, WFP | 15th January 2013 |
| Interviews before Inception Mission | | |
| Helena Geerard | Consultant, led previous WFP evaluation in the Congo | 21 January 2013 |
| Alix Loriston | Previous Country Director WFP | 21 January 2013 |

| Name | Affiliation | Date of interview |
|---|--|--|
| Cynthia Jones | Deputy and Senior Policy Officer, WFP Centre of Excellence Against Hunger - Brazil | 23 January 2013 |
| Interviews during the Inception Mission (26th January – 1st February): | | |
| Adama Diop-Faye | Director and Country Representative for WFP in the country | 28 th and 29 th January 2013 |
| Ludovic Yvon Mayala | Finance and Admin Officer, WFP Congo | 28 th January 2013 |
| Emily Doe | Programme Officer, WFP Congo | 28 th January 2013 |
| Angele Ayenoue | Programme Officer, WFP Congo | 28 th January 2013 |
| Edouard Corneille Oko | Programme Officer, WFP Congo | 28 th January 2013 |
| Meldace Wonga | Logistic Officer, WFP Congo | 28 th January 2013 |
| Andree Nicole Mathurine Ngoussou Boudzeki | Staff Assistant, WFP Congo | 28 th January 2013 |
| Xenia Argys Dalhia Nkouah-Mackyta Yalabo | HR Focal Point/ Senior Staff Assistant, WFP Congo | 28 th January 2013 |
| Anastasia Otsangatsama | General Director for solidarity, Ministry of Social Affairs, Solidarity and Humanitarian Affairs (MASAH) | 28 th January 2013 |
| Felicite Dimoneka | Project Manager, Safety Nets –MASAH | 28 th January 2013 |
| Marianne Flach | Unicef Country Representative | 28 th January 2013 |
| Christine Nare Kabore | Deputy Representative UNICEF | 28 th January 2013 |
| Tony Louppe | Nutritionist – consultant UNICEF | 28 th January 2013 |
| G Mallandah | Health Officer UNICEF | 28 th January 2013 |
| Thomas Bradley Onusaka | Head of Programmes, IPHD | 28 th January 2013 |
| Rachel Bradley Onusaka | Head of School Feeding, IPHD | 28 th January 2013 |
| Dieudonne Koguiyagda | FAO, Representative | 28 th January 2013 |
| Adboulaye Balde | Programme Officer, UNHCR | 28 th January 2013 |
| Bokar Keita | Associate Program Officer, UNHCR | 28 th January 2013 |
| Adelaide Goma Niangui | Program Associate, UNHCR | 28 th January 2013 |
| Henri-Vital Eka | General Director for Basic Education, Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education (MoE) | 29 th January 2013 |
| Alexandre Magania | Focal point school feeding primary, MoE | 29 th January 2013 |

| Name | Affiliation | Date of interview |
|---|---|---|
| Eloi Lulcherie Okouya | Focal point school feeding pre-school, MoE | 29 th January 2013 |
| Dr Edmond Malalou | Coordinator Cadre Stratégique National de Lute Contre le VIH/SIDA (CNLS) | 29 th January 2013 |
| Dr Patrice Miakassissa | In charge of monitoring projects in the fight against HIV/AIDS, Presidents Office | 29 th January 2013 |
| Michel Elenga Ekobo | Director General, National Donors, Ministry of Economy, Finance and Planning | 29 th January 2013 |
| Laurent Ngampio Laurent | Director of Programmes, Aid in kind (link person between WFP and Ministry of Finance and Planning) | 29 th January 2013 |
| Anasthasie Ossa Ngatsama | Director General for Humanitarian Action , MASAHS | 29 th January 2013 |
| Yvon Ludovic Mayala | Head of Finance and Admin, CO WFP | 30 th January 2013 |
| Emily Doe | Head of Programmes, CO WFP | 30 th January 2013 |
| Meldace Wonga | Head of Logistics, CO WFP | 30 th January 2013 |
| Brunelle Seholo | Head of sub-office, Kindamba, CO WFP | 30 th January 2013 (by telephone) |
| Alice Loumpangou Bitsindou | Food aid monitor, CO WFP | 30 th January 2013 |
| Rodolphe Okombo-Imongui | Programme Assistant , CO WFP | 30 th January 2013 |
| Angèle Ayenoue | Programme Officer (focal point VAM), CO WFP | 30 th January 2013 |
| Bruno Bindoumou | Head of sub-office, Nkayi, CO WFP | 30 th January 2013 |
| Pujols Ambou | Head of sub-office, Pointe-Noire, CO WFP | 30 th January 2013 |
| Thibaut Ackondjo (informal conversations on field visit) | Food monitoring assistant, CO WFP | 31 st January 2013 |
| Gertrude | social worker for the CAS (Circonscription Action Sociale) – Château d'Eau, Brazzaville | 31 st January 2013 |
| Nadia NITOUSSANOU | social worker, for the CAS Makalele/ – Chateau d'Eau, Brazzaville | 31 st January 2013 |
| Josephine | Beneficiary of safety nets programme Brazzaville | 31 st January 2013 |
| Virginnie | Beneficiary of safety nets programme Brazzaville | 31 st January 2013 |

| Name | Affiliation | Date of interview |
|---|--|----------------------------|
| Alphonse Ngantsui | Chef de CAS, Mfilou | 31st January 2013 |
| Juslin | social worker, for the CAS – Mfilou | 31st January 2013 |
| Marcelline | Beneficiary of safety nets programme Brazzaville | 31st January 2013 |
| Filippo Fossi | National Consultant, CO WFP | 1st February 2013 |
| Edouard Corneille Oko | Programme Officer, CO WFP | 1st February 2013 |
| Simplice Ngassaki | Mobile Money Manager, MTN | 1st February 2013 |
| Thomas Bienvenu Malonga | Manager for Distribution, Brazzaville and Zone North, MTN | 1st February 2013 |
| Oscar N'Gambou | Responsible for Mobile Money banking, MTN | 1st February 2013 |
| Interviews during evaluation visit to the Congo (4-15th March 2013) | | |
| Interviews during field visit to Betou and Impfondo, Likouala Region | | |
| Jean Rodrigue (Coordinator), Xavi Bockabe (Logisticien), Basile Dibebe (Accountant), Abou Olandzobo | Coordinator, Logisticien, Accountant, Distribution – Caritas Impfondo | 4 th March 2013 |
| Jean Baptiste (Head of Office), Malanda Makala Nkondi (Head of logs), Desire Ouadiabantou (Distribution supervisor). | CEMIR, Likoula | 4 th March 2013 |
| Daniel Martin | UNHCR office, Head Office, Impfondo | 4 th March 2013 |
| Jean Clotaire Matamolongo (Head of village), village committee, refugee committee. | Village of Yoi-Na-Yoi, typical refugee site built by HCR | 4 th March 2013 |
| Fred Alyf Ngouya | Chef du bureau Impfondo , WFP | 4 th March 2013 |
| Victoire Ntsimba | Head of Office, IPHF, Impfondo | 4 th March 2013 |
| Chef de Zone, Chef du village and Refugees | Bobonzo field visit | 5 th March 2013 |
| Refugee Committee (6 men present – including President and Secretaire) | Second Largest Refugee site, field visit, Liboko (covered by Betou) | 5 th March 2013 |
| Julian | French Red Cross | 5 th March 2013 |
| Jean-Claude Loukalamon | Chef du Bureau, MDA, Impfondo | 6 th March 2013 |

| Name | Affiliation | Date of interview |
|--|--|----------------------------|
| Refugee Committee, group of women, group of men | Field Visit, Site 15, Avril, Betou | 6 th March 2013 |
| Mazel Akoli Opina | General Secretary, Town Hall Betou | 6 th March 2013 |
| Nicole Huby (nursing), Stephanie Meneghani (Logistics) | MSF, Betou | 6 th March 2013 |
| Beatrice Koyabasso | Head of Association de la Lutte Contre La Malnutrition, Betou | 7 th March 2013 |
| Gedeon Nijimbere | UNHCR Betou | 7 th March 2013 |
| Dr Jean Didier Batomanitu Dr Tony Mayawula | MDA Hospital Betou | 7 th March 2013 |
| Gilbert Kimeye | Secrétaire General du District de Betou, sous-préfecture | 7 th March 2013 |
| Patrick Mpandou Banzouzi (Pointeur), Gildas Pierre Mouhouelo (Field Monitor Assistant), Jean-Baptiste Mananga (Assistant Logistic et Head of Office | WFP sub-office staff in Betou | 7 th March 2013 |
| Interviews during field visit to Pointe Noire | | |
| Jean-Pierre M. Dzondault | Director, Ministry of Health, Pointe Noire | 5 th March 2013 |
| Marie Thérèse Loemba | Departmental Director, Ministry of Social Affairs, Humanitarian Action and Solidarity | 5 th March 2013 |
| J.P. Kouandalou (Coordinator), Jean Claude Bassoumba (M & E Specialist) | Unité Départementale de Lutte Contre le SIDA, Pointe Noire | 5 th March 2013 |
| Pujols (HoSO), Didier (logistics), Josias (safety net), Etienne (driver) | WFP Pointe Noire | 5 th March 2013 |
| Secretary | Secretary, AFTC | 4 th March 2013 |
| Octave Théophile N'zilla (Coordinator), President | Coordinator and President, RENAPC | 4 th March 2013 |
| 13 women and 1 man | Beneficiaries, Circonscription d'Action Sociale de Loandjili, Loandjili, Pointe Noire | 6 th March 2013 |
| Shop Keeper | Loandjili, Pointe Noire | 6 th March 2013 |
| Patrick Pietrobelli | A senior manager, Transit Maritime | 6 th March 2013 |

| Name | Affiliation | Date of interview |
|---|--|----------------------------|
| | Congolais, Pointe Noire | |
| 4 women | CAS Loandjili Beneficiaries, Pointe Noire | 6 th March 2013 |
| 1 man and 5 women | MASAH agents called “tuteurs”, CAS Loandjili | 6 th March 2013 |
| Dr Michel Mankou (Médecin Chef), Ms Jeanette Bakala (Secrétaire charge ARV) | Médecin Chef and Secrétaire chargée ARV, Hospital Section of Infectious Diseases | 6 th March 2013 |
| Gaetan Biantoari | Co-ordinator, MTN Mobile Money programme, Pointe Noire | 7 th March 2013 |
| Pujols Ambou (Sub office Head), Didier Mbedi (Logistics officer), Josias Massamouna (Food Monitor). | WFP office, Pointe Noire | 7 th March 2013 |
| Joseph | Proprietor, DF Productions shop, Tie Tie, Pointe Noire | 7 th March 2013 |
| 1 man, 11 women | 6 HH with children out of schools; 4 were PNW and 1 PLWHA | 7 th March 2013 |
| Mme Mabilia Batiako Catherine | Chef de Service, Circonscription d’Action Sociale (CAS) | 7 th March 2013 |
| 1 man, 10 women | Tutors, Tie Tie, Pointe Noire | 7 th March 2013 |
| Interviews during field visit to Pool Region | | |
| Women preparing food | Midongo Primary School, Kinkala | 4 th March 2013 |
| School Director | Midongo Primary School, Kinkala | 4 th March 2013 |
| 2 Female Teachers | Midongo Primary School, Kinkala | 4 th March 2013 |
| Grade 3 and Grade 5 children | Midongo Primary School, Kinkala | 4 th March 2013 |
| Inspector | Kinkala | 4 th March 2013 |
| School Director | Ntari Ngouri Primary School, Kinkala | 4 th March 2013 |
| Bruno | Nkayi Sub office, Kinkala | 5 th March 2013 |
| Woman in charge of the kitchen, with 5 cooks, with two teachers, and 4 pupils | IPHD School, Sibiti Centre | 6 th March 2013 |
| Coordinator (Felix), Animatrice (Laure) | IPHD | 6 th March 2013 |
| Mr. Henri Emil Moussa | Department Director for Education | 6 th March 2013 |

| Name | Affiliation | Date of interview |
|---|--|-----------------------------|
| Director of the school, President of the Management Committee, with two teachers, 4 pupils (2 girls and 2 boys), and one of the women who prepares the food | Primary school of Boudouhou | 6 th March 2013 |
| Jean Marie Mikabou | Director, Primary school of Makoto | 6 th March 2013 |
| School director, 2 committee members, 4 female cooks, 4 pupils, and the school inspector for the whole region. | Primary school of Mayeye Centre | 6 th March 2013 |
| Interviews in Brazzaville | | |
| Angele Ayenoue | National Programme Officer, WFP | 4 th March 2013 |
| Oko Corneille Edouard | Senior Programme Assistant, WFP | 4 th March 2013 |
| Dr Edmond Malalou | Coordinator, CNLS | 8 th March 2013 |
| Dr Merlin Diafouka (Director); Ms Mpassi Veronique (Social Worker); Mr Axel Mamene Keti (Tutor) | Centre Traitement Ambulatoire | 8 th March 2013 |
| Louani Mahamat Goadi | Senior Human Development Specialist, World Bank Country Office | 8 th March 2013 |
| Nadhya Nitoussanou | Collaboratrice de la chef de CAS, Makelekele, Brazzaville | 8 th March 2013 |
| Simon Dieudonné Savou | Director General of Agriculture, Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock | 8 th March 2013 |
| Simplice Ngassaki | Mobile Money Manager, MTN | 8 th March 2013 |
| Dr Ongouo Hermann | Chef, Programme National de la Lutte contre la tuberculose/Direction de l'Epidémiologie et de la maladie | 8 th March 2013 |
| Tony Louppe | Consultant, UNICEF | 8 th March 2013 |
| Jean Romain Badinga | AAREC | 8 th March 2013 |
| Paulin Miere | Coordinator of CEMIR | 8 th March 2013 |
| Angèle Ayenoue (Programme Officer, WFP); Thibault Ackondjo (M&E, Safety net project); Adele Man-Ho Guidita (Safety net project) | WFP | 11 th March 2013 |

| Name | Affiliation | Date of interview |
|---|---|-----------------------------|
| Angèle | WFP | 11 th March 2013 |
| Alice | WFP | 11 th March 2013 |
| Bakary Diawara | UNICEF | 11 th March 2013 |
| 3 Male, 7 female beneficiaries | HIV beneficiaries, La Source Centre, Makelekele | 12 th March 2013 |
| 4 female beneficiaries | Beneficiaries, Quartier Matour, Makelekele, Brazzaville | 12 th March 2013 |
| 2 young women beneficiaries, each with baby | Beneficiaries, Quartier Tour d'Eau, Makelekele, Brazzaville | 12 th March 2013 |
| M. Nganga | Shop Keeper, Quartier Tour d'Eau, Makelekele, Brazzaville | 12 th March 2013 |
| M Mboungu Gilbert | Chef de bureau OIM au Congo Brazzaville | 12 th March 2013 |
| Michel Elenga Ekobo | Ministère du Plan | 12 th March 2013 |
| Suzanne Diandanga | Shop keeper, Quartier Matour, Makelekele, Brazzaville | 12 th March 2013 |
| Mme Meldace | WONGA Logistics Officer | 12 th March 2013 |
| Mbemba Moutounou Guy Michel | Advisor HIV/AIDS/Tuberculosis and infectious diseases, WHO | 12 th March 2013 |
| Emily Doe | Chief of Programme, WFP | 13 th March 2013 |
| Filippo Fossi | Consultant, WFP | 13 th March 2013 |
| Christopher Murray | U.S. Ambassador | 13 th March 2013 |
| M. Elenga | Directeur de la promotion de la solidarité – DG de la solidarité MASAHS | 13 th March 2013 |
| Mathieu Mpassi | Directeur Départemental de l'Action Humanitaire de BZV - MASAHS | 13 th March 2013 |
| Mme Meldace | WONGA Logistics Officer | 13 th March 2013 |
| 8 female, 3 male | CAS Tutors (safety net project) | 13 th March 2013 |
| Jean Kaseya (Chef de Section Survie, Nutrition & VIH/SIDA) ; Dr Godefroy Mallandah (Spécialiste Santé Mère et Enfant) ; Martin Iwana (Spécialiste VIH/SIDA) | UNICEF | 13 th March 2013 |
| Abdourahamane Diallo (Resident Representative); | UNESCO | 13 th March 2013 |

| Name | Affiliation | Date of interview |
|---|---|-----------------------------|
| Franck Carel Nkaya (Programme Assistant) | | |
| Eloi Kouadio IV | Deputy [Acting] Resident Representative, UNDP | 14 th March 2013 |
| M. Tsagao Traoré | Conseiller à la Coordination et des Agences Non Résidentes, Points focal de la Déclaration de Paris | 15 th March 2013 |
| Chevallier Maguelonne | Directrice Pays, ACTED Brazzaville | 19 th March 2013 |
| Alain Robert Moukouri | Secrétaire général CARITAS Congo | 19 th March 2013 |
| M. Roger Toulouka | Expert de bases de données au niveau logistique | 21 st March 2013 |
| M. Pembe | VAM team PAM RDC | 22 nd March 2013 |
| M. Denis Gravel | Chef cluster logistique PAM RDC | 25 th March 2013 |
| M. Jean-Didier Mbedi | Storekeeper PAM PN | 16 th April 2013 |

Annex 8 The Congo Timeline

| WFP Country Portfolio Evaluation 2009-2012 | | | | | | |
|--|--|-------------|--|---|--|--|
| | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | |
| WFP and UN operations | PRRO 10312.1 | | | | | |
| | IR - EMOP 200093 | | | | | |
| | | EMOP 200095 | | | | |
| | | SO 200140 | | | | |
| | | | PRRO 200147 | | | |
| | | | | DEV 200144 | | |
| | | | | SO200413 | | |
| | | | | IRA - EMOP - 200408 | | |
| | | | | | DEV 200211 | |
| | Oct: Launch of WFP school feeding policy | | January: UNICEF response to refugees in Likouala delivery of 19.8 tonnes of nutrition kits, tents, prescription drugs, School-in-a-Box and recreation kits | Joint assessment mission (JAM for 2011) did not take place due to lack of funding. As a result no reliable malnutrition data was available to WFP | Global survey by WFP of school feeding. | |
| | Nov.: UNICEF/ UNHCR/WFP rapid assessment of refugees situation in Likouala Province | | April: WFP conducted an emergency food security assessment in the Likouala province | Dec: WFP directive on cash and vouchers published mainstreaming the use of cash and vouchers across all WFP operations. | March: UN Disaster and Assessment Coordination team (UNDAC) deployed to Brazzaville to conduct site assessment | |
| | Nov - Dec: In depth emergency food security assessment carried out by WFP, UNHCR, UNICEF, AARREC and MDA | | June: Tripartite agreement signed between UNHCR and the governments of the Congo and DRC, to allow refugees to be repatriated | | March: launch of WFP capacity development toolkit. | |
| | | | July: Evaluation of food security and vulnerability (WFP/GoC/EU) | | April - May: CO commissioned Country portfolio Evaluation WFP | |
| | | | October: UNHCR/WFP/Government joint assessment mission (JAM) in Likouala province | | July: Country Director Alix Loriston left replaced by Adama Diop-Faye | |
| | | | October - launch of WFP's HIV and AIDS policy | | | |

| | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 |
|------------------------|--|--|--|---|--|
| Historical information | <p>July: Elections held. President Denis Sassou-Nguesso was re-elected with 78.6% of the vote</p> <p>October: Mass movement of refugees from DRC into the department of Likouala in Northern Congo</p> | <p>January: Congo recognised as a Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) by the IMF</p> <p>November: WHO announced that there had been a polio outbreak in Congo affecting 201 people and causing 104 deaths in 2 weeks. The government declared an emergency and announced plans to vaccinate the entire population</p> | <p>June: The leaders of Congo and Guinea agreed to boost the current "low level" of bilateral exchange. The leaders agreed to hold a second session in 2012 of a joint commission that last met in 1978, in a bid to "revive" ties</p> <p>June: Cholera outbreak. By August, 20 people died and 341 infected</p> | <p>March: Weapons depot caught fire, killing 223 people, wounding over 1300 and forcing 10,000 to flee their homes</p> <p>July: Elections were held for a new parliament. The Congolese Labour Party of President Denis Sassou Nguesso retained its dominance in the first round</p> <p>December: Torrential rain kills 13 and displaces hundreds in south Brazzaville</p> | |
| | Food Security Analysis | | <p>To limit imports and improve food security, Congo launched in US\$26 million project to build "new agricultural villages". So far the project has halved the import bill for eggs. By producing 6.6 million eggs in 2011 (imports are estimated at 13 million eggs per year).</p> | <p>Global food prices increased by 30.1% in 2011 (Congo relies heavily on imported food).</p> <p>Congo leased 180,000 hectares of arable land to a group of South African farmers who have planted 1,200 hectares of maize</p> <p>Congolese authorities have with help from the international satellite data group Collecte Localisation Satellites (CLS), based in Toulouse, France put in place a satellite surveillance system. The system monitors all the fishing boats operating in the country's maritime waters and will help curb illegal fishing in Congolese territorial waters to ensure the survival of fishery resources and boost food security.</p> | <p>FAO reported sharp rises in the price of staple food and fuel prices in Congo since the beginning of 2012. A 25-litre tin of vegetable oil which sold in Jan 2012 for \$32, by November was going for \$50, while less than 5kg of cassava has gone up from \$1 to \$2.6.</p> |

Annex 9 Alignment of the Congo Portfolio with WFP Policies

This annex looks at the extent to which the Congo's portfolio is aligned with WFP policies. For each of the thematic areas the portfolio has been reviewed in terms of the most relevant WFP policies.

1. PART 1 - WFP's guiding standards on humanitarian response

Within the sector of humanitarian aid WFP draws on numerous international standards as well as some internal policies. The most relevant to the aspects of humanitarian aid covered in this portfolio are the food distribution guidelines (WFP, 2006) and the policy on disaster risk reduction and management (WFP, 2011i). Whilst this evaluation as a CPE does not seek to evaluate individual projects the table below looks across the operations classified as humanitarian (EMOP 200095, EMOP 200408, SO 200413 and PRRO 200147) to assess WFP's adherence to internal standards across its humanitarian work in the Congo.

As in all humanitarian programming both of the EMOPs were designed quickly to respond to a crisis which was happening. In both cases the project documents were based on a rapid assessment and external capacity was brought in (from WFP DRC) to provide necessary capacity for the design phase. The logistical sides of both EMOPs seem to have preoccupied WFP Congo and perhaps as a result some of the more strategic work around standards was squeezed out. However, the PRRO 200147 which has run for most of the evaluation period (from 2010 – present) highlights that many of the lessons learnt in the earlier EMOP (200095) had not been integrated into project design and even in longer term programming many key elements of WFP's standards were not applied. Disaster risk reduction and management is not mentioned in the project documents (except SO 200413 where it is mentioned briefly), SPRs or the assessments but should be an important part of programming in this sector. Humanitarian training or experience seems to be lacking in the CO both in Brazzaville and in the field offices operating in this sector. Although WFP has been rapid in its response to crises it has not invested enough in its internal capacity to respond well to emergencies and has only done limited capacity building with the Government. In a context with very few INGOs, and hardly any operational partners this is a missed opportunity.

| Key elements of WFP's standards | Progress in 2009-2012 | WFP Congo performance and results ⁹⁵ |
|--|-----------------------|---|
| WFP Policy on Disaster Risk Reduction and Management (WFP, 2011i) | | |
| WFP must continue to invest in emergency preparedness to maximize the effectiveness of its emergency response activities. Increasingly this has to include | * | Good work done on The Congo logistical preparedness in Brazzaville under SO 200413. However, scope for much more both at |

⁹⁵ Overall assessment by evaluation team members based on assessment of all sources FGD, SSI and other data.

| Key elements of WFP's standards | Progress in 2009-2012 | WFP Congo performance and results ⁹⁵ |
|---|-----------------------|---|
| developing national and regional capacities to prepare for and respond to food crises, and ensuring inter-agency preparedness for humanitarian emergencies.(p.16) | | national level with the Gouvernement but also at regional level particularly in Likouala where WFP are working. This is particularly important in the Congo due to the weakness of national NGO partners and the few INGOs present. |
| WFP supports governments in the development of national disaster risk reduction policies, plans and programmes related to food security, including through capacity development activities. WFP country strategies and activities must be developed to support national policies and plans, reflect national and local contexts, and be aligned with United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and common country assessment processes. | ** | WFP Congo have sought to be aligned to UNDAF. Coordination and increasingly over the evaluation period have sought to support national policy and plans. Capacity development activities have included: those under the SO 200413. The Government is keen to build its capacity in humanitarian work particularly with reference to food security analysis so there are more opportunities for WFP here. |
| WFP emphasizes participatory approaches to disaster risk reduction at all levels, working with governments, partners and communities to foster effective links among national, local government and community plans and priorities. (p.17) | * | Disaster risk reduction has not been an obvious part of WFP's programme design and planning in the Congo. WFP is not well linked in with other agencies operating (except to some extent UNHCR). As a result it is not always able to plan collaboratively and opportunities are missed. |
| WFP seeks to generate multiple outcomes from its programmes and to maximize their impact and sustainability by integrating disaster risk reduction principles into all stages of programming, and identifying opportunities for reducing disaster risk while improving food security.(p.17) | - | The integration of disaster risk reduction was not evident in project documents nor in conversations with staff or partners. |
| WFP must identify outcomes, scale and timeframe clearly, to ensure that its programmes are designed to deliver effective results. (p.17) | * | More focus is definitely needed on this – currently WFP Congo seems to be struggling to deliver on its humanitarian outcomes. It maybe that the scale at which it can operate needed to be |

| Key elements of WFP's standards | Progress in 2009-2012 | WFP Congo performance and results ⁹⁵ |
|--|-----------------------|--|
| | | reassessed in order to produce a more realistic timeframe and achievable outcomes. |
| Food Distribution Guidelines (WFP, 2006) | | |
| <p>Impartiality. WFP's assistance will be guided solely by need and will not discriminate in terms of ethnic origin, nationality, political opinion, gender, race or religion. In a country, assistance will be targeted to those most at risk from the consequences of food shortages, following a sound assessment that considers the different needs and vulnerabilities of women, men and children. Quantitative and qualitative monitoring will demonstrate efforts and successes at fulfilling needs with impartiality (p.5).</p> | * | <p>Some concerns were raised as to whether WFP's to target just refugees (not host communities) and just IDPs (not host families) in its GFDs were the right ones (by other partners and WFP staff). Sound assessment of needs of host populations missing.</p> <p>Better attention needs to be paid to monitoring in the Congo so that WFP can demonstrate impartiality.</p> |
| <p>Respect. WFP will respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of the state in which it is working. WFP will respect local customs and traditions, upholding internationally recognized human rights. WFP will act in accordance with the United Nations Charter and with international humanitarian law and refugee law. It will design food distributions that preserve the dignity and self-respect of every beneficiary and that minimize inconveniences and hardship.</p> | * | <p>Beneficiaries (interviewed in FDGs in 4 sites) complained about:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -in one site about the attitude of one WFP's partner NGO towards refugees; -refugees had been expected to travel long distances (to centralised distribution points) to pick up food – this was a major inconvenience and this had reportedly caused the death of a child who had drowned en route – this practice has changed as a result. -Irregularity of distributions (and lack of explanation concerning this) has not minimized inconvenience and hardships for refugees. -Size of ration and duration of ration for IDPs following the explosion was reduced between the Project Document and the project implementation data |

| Key elements of WFP's standards | Progress in 2009-2012 | WFP Congo performance and results ⁹⁵ |
|--|-----------------------|--|
| | | received from WFP (no internal report documents were available from CO staff). Reasoning/analysis to explain change missing in terms of reduction in ration size to those IDPs in camps and fewer distributions than planned. |
| <p>Self-reliance. WFP will provide humanitarian assistance with the primary objective of saving lives, in ways that support livelihoods, reduce vulnerability to future food scarcities and support durable solutions. Food aid should not undermine local agricultural production, marketing or coping strategies, disturb normal migratory patterns or foster dependency. WFP's programmes will be planned and implemented in ways that facilitate the link from relief to development.</p> | * | <p>More could have been done by WFP to ensure that livelihoods were supported or not negatively affected in Likouala. The large influx of refugees has put great pressure upon local livelihoods. Refugee's coping strategies when WFP distributions have been irregular or lacking have placed further pressure on local food security.</p> <p>More thought at operation design phase needed in order to make sure humanitarian programming links into developmental activities.</p> |
| <p>Participation. WFP will involve women and men beneficiaries as much as possible in all activities and will work closely with governments at the national and local levels to plan and implement assistance.</p> | ** | <p>Beneficiaries claimed in Likouala Province that they lacked information about why distributions didn't happen or why quantities of ration were changed.</p> <p>Refugee committees did include both men and women – although the evaluation found (in 4 sites visited representing 7 refugee committees) no women in leadership positions (contrary to the SPR data).</p> <p>Need for WFP to work more closely with host communities in situations where refugees are so closely integrated with local populations.</p> <p>WFP has worked closely with the Government to plan initial assistance in both Brazzaville and Likouala.</p> |
| <p>Capacity-building. Within its own capacity and resources, WFP will strengthen the capacity of affected</p> | * | <p>WFP Congo has drawn on humanitarian expertise in WFP DRC to train GoC staff</p> |

| Key elements of WFP's standards | Progress in 2009-2012 | WFP Congo performance and results ⁹⁵ |
|---|-----------------------|---|
| <p>countries and local communities to prevent prepare for and respond to humanitarian crises. WFP will ensure participation by women's organizations and will integrate a gender perspective in capacity-building activities.</p> | | <p>in logistics.</p> <p>If WFP Congo capacity was higher in this area there would be more opportunities for capacity building</p> <p>Operation design and implementation could be strengthened if there was more capacity in gender and if capacity development was considered in every operation.</p> |
| <p>Coordination. WFP will provide assistance with the consent of the affected country and, in principle, on the basis of an appeal by the affected country. All States Members of the United Nations or Members or Associate Members of any specialized agency or of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are eligible to submit requests for consideration by WFP. WFP may also provide emergency food aid and associated non-food items and logistics support at the request of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. WFP will work within the established United Nations coordination structures at the global and field levels. This will include working with other humanitarian actors such as donors and cooperating partners including local and international organizations. WFP will initiate and lead Food Aid Committees and will link food aid to other types of aid.</p> | <p>**</p> | <p>Coordination in the Congo is weak. WFP does work within the UN coordination structures in the Congo.</p> <p>However, it provides little leadership on humanitarian food security either nationally or locally in the Provinces in which it works. In fact few other partners were aware of WFP's aims or objectives (of those partners interviewed in Betou and Impfondo).</p> |
| <p>Accountability. WFP will keep donors, host country governments and beneficiaries informed of its activities and their impact through regular reporting. WFP will establish food committees for discussion/complaints, conduct</p> | <p>*</p> | <p>Refugee committees have been established and were met with however, none mentioned their role in accountability. Some felt that their role at distributions took a lot of time and should be compensated.</p> <p>No evidence of reporting to local or</p> |

| Key elements of WFP's standards | Progress in 2009-2012 | WFP Congo performance and results ⁹⁵ |
|--|-----------------------|---|
| monitoring, communicate its responsibilities and strive to fulfil them, minimize losses and diversions, ensure responsible behaviour of staff, and respect the Standards of Accountability. See : Standards of Accountability | | national government (according to interviews with GoC staff). Beneficiaries unclear about longevity of operations or reasons for changes made in the past. |
| Professionalism. WFP will maintain the highest standards of professionalism and integrity among its international and national staff to ensure that its programmes are carried out efficiently, effectively, ethically and safely. All staff will adhere to the Standard Code of Conduct for the International Civil Service and the Secretary-General's Bulletin on Sexual Abuse and Exploitation in Humanitarian Crises and Other Operations. | ** | Staff complained that the short term contracts they were on (sometimes for several years with poor terms and conditions) reduced their motivation to work professionally on what were time intensive and sometimes stressful humanitarian situations. Staff had also received little or no training to fulfil their role. |


Legend: * little progress over the evaluation period; ** good progress over the evaluation period; *** substantial progress over the evaluation period

2. PART 2 - WFP's guiding standards on Health Nutrition

WFP HIV and AIDS Policy (2010) states: WFP will address its obligations under the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) Joint Outcome Framework (JOF) by:

- Ensuring nutritional recovery and treatment success through nutrition and/or food support; and
- Mitigating the effects of AIDS on individuals and households through sustainable safety nets.

Overall Portfolio HIV activities in line with two above objectives, in particular SO1.



In practice, their design, in particular the safety net programme does not fulfil most of WFP's guiding principles. Under its primary objectives, WFP will support governments in implementing HIV and AIDS programmes in line with the following principles:

| HIV and AIDS Guiding Principles | Progress in 2009-2012 | Observations/Explanations |
|--|-----------------------|--|
| Know your epidemic, know your response. Every programme response should be tailored to the epidemiological and socio-political context. | * | No evidence that WFP took account of epidemiological data when designing their support to HIV and AIDS. ON the contrary the fact that they did not consult /collaborate with "CNLS - Conseil National de Lutte contre le SIDA, suggest that they did not design a programme « tailored to the epidemiological and socio-political context» |
| Keep in mind the –Three Ones and national ownership. WFP is committed to the Three Ones: its HIV and AIDS activities should respond to national programmes to reinforce national ownership of responses. | * | No much in terms of reinforcing national ownership as far as Ministry of Health and CNLS are concerned. It might be even the contrary as WFP chose to work with MASAHA rather than Ministry of Health; causing discontent/frustration among health staff at all levels who used to be involved with the previous project (PRRO103121) |
| Integrate food and nutrition into comprehensive responses. Food and nutrition interventions should be integrated into health and social welfare programmes; they should not be stand-alone activities | *** | Yes in DEV 200211 |
| Implement evidence-based, cost-effective programmes with sound M&E. Food and nutrition | * | Not enough emphasis in M&E on information that can guide and improve interventions and to provide accountability |

| HIV and AIDS Guiding Principles | Progress in 2009-2012 | Observations/Explanations |
|---|--------------------------------------|---|
| interventions in HIV and TB programmes should be based on the latest evidence; a sound M&E system is necessary to guide and improve interventions and to provide accountability. | | |
| Incorporate collaboration and partnerships. WFP should choose partners with comparative advantages. It should continue to cooperate with UNAIDS Cosponsors to respond as one and work with partners such as GFATM and PEPFAR, civil society, faith-based initiatives, universities, and the private sector organizations. | * | WFP did not establish any of the suggested partnerships under the safety net programme, although it did work in close collaboration with government and a private sector partner. |
| Include community participation and ownership, including PLWHA. Civil society has a critical role in HIV and AIDS response: the involvement of PLWHA in WFP's HIV and AIDS programming should be increased. | *** PRRO103121 * DEV2200211 | WFP did include participation of PLWHA associations in PRRO103121 (up till closure of PRRO 103121); patients trusted and felt less stigmatized. PLWHA associations organized gatherings/meals once a week: an opportunity for IEC |
| Buy food locally. Local procurement of food is one way to achieve sustainability and to stimulate economies. | *** | The cash transfer modality contributes to the local economy, although much of the food supplied by participating local traders, like the rest of the national food supply, is imported. |
| Maintain predictable and reliable funding. This is necessary for scaling up and support programmes: nutrition and food assistance must be part of government planning and budgeting, and should depend on short-term financing only in emergencies. | ** | Nutrition and food assistance must be part of government planning: The nutritional needs of PLWH are indeed acknowledged as a priority in various national strategies, and ongoing funding from government social protection commitments is likely. |
| Consider gender. WFP will use gender analysis to understand the social aspects of gender relations and gender-based norms in addition to laws as they relate to HIV. WFP will continue | ** | Gender was considered in design of the safety net intervention. Less attention was given to HIV/AIDS in the feasibility study, but affected vulnerable groups were included in the pilot project. Stigma issues did arise, but were addressed with at least |

| HIV and AIDS Guiding Principles | Progress in 2009-2012 | Observations/Explanations |
|--|------------------------------|--|
| to integrate gender aspects into HIV food and nutrition activities. Do no harm. HIV and AIDS responses must not make a bad situation worse, for example by contributing to stigma, creating situations in which HIV can be transmitted, diverting resources, or drawing healthcare staff away from other programmes. | | some sensitivity by field personnel and were being overcome in most cases. |

Legend: * little progress over the evaluation period; ** good progress over the evaluation period; *** substantial progress over the evaluation period

3. PART 3 - WFP's guiding standards on Education – school feeding

| Key elements of WFP standards | Progress in 2009-2012 | Observations/Explanation |
|---|------------------------------|---|
| Sustainability | ** | The transition to sustainable national programmes requires school feeding to be mainstreamed in national strategies and to be part of national budgets (WFP school feeding strategy, 2009, p.7). Significant progress has been made on both accounts. The GoC is likely in between stage 2 and stage 3 of the stages of transition to sustainability. There is no transition strategy in place, however (WFP, 2009, p.18) |
| Sound alignment w/ national policy frameworks | *** | Although no official framework in place, real progress has been made with a strong WFP contribution towards developing a legal framework, policy, and strategy |
| Stable funding and budgeting | *** | Important improvement, increasing government funding in future likely, funds are part of The GoC budget |
| Needs based, cost effective, quality programme design | ** | Design based on needs and includes important quality and relevance elements (gender focus, local production, monitoring, etc.) but key design elements not implemented. Cost-effectiveness has not yet been established (The GoC intends to do a study in the near future) but initial data suggests high costs. |
| Strong institutional arrangements for | ** | Institutional arrangements have been put in place and gradually strengthened, but still need major |

| | | |
|---|----|---|
| implementation, monitoring, and accountability | | investments. Monitoring and accountability have been improved but are still in practice weak. Implementation has not followed on key design issues. Accountability is weak. |
| Strategy for local production and sourcing | * | A strategy has been put in place. Attempts in y3 and y4 to purchase locally. Quantities are still very small but expected to increase. Further market analyses would strengthen the approach to local production and sourcing. |
| Strong partnerships and inter-sectoral coordination | ** | Partnerships with government is strong, but not with other major partners. Little evidence of inter-sectoral coordination (=missed opportunity), although now envisaged through the policy framework which foresees participation of major ministries (health, agriculture, etc.) |
| Strong community participation and ownership | ** | Strong community participation in evidence, but with room for improvement/strengthening |

Legend: * little progress over the evaluation period; ** good progress over the evaluation period; *** substantial progress over the evaluation period

4. PART 4 - WFP's guiding standards on Social Protection

As a CPE, this review does not undertake evaluation of individual projects. In WFP's Congo portfolio, social protection was supported through two activities during the period under review: school feeding and the recent pilot safety net project. Adherence to organisational standards on school feeding is assessed in section 2.3.3. Without attempting an evaluation of DEV 200211 specifically, this annex offers comments on WFP's adherence to standards in its safety net work to the end of 2012.

WFP has no overarching policy or guiding standards on social protection. As its title implies, the organisation's 2008 review of opportunities and challenges with regard to the use of vouchers and cash transfers as food assistance instruments (WFP, 2008f) assesses issues and options rather than setting a clear framework of performance standards with which country-level interventions should comply.

For the purposes of this CPE, the most relevant standards are those set out in the organisation's policy update on safety nets (WFP, 2012p). This lengthy and discursive statement includes two sections that effectively set standards for WFP operations. The first summarises 'principles and lessons learned'. The second outlines 'priorities and implications'.

| Key elements of WFP standards | Progress in 2009-2012 | Observations/Explanation |
|--|-----------------------|---|
| Principles (references are to WFP, 2012p: 6-9) | | |
| Understand the context | ** | The safety net pilot was based on a good understanding of the challenging context, although forgivably optimistic about what could be achieved in the face of significant institutional, technical and logistical constraints. |
| Assess what is available and build on what works | ** | WFP's approach in the Congo (in close consultation with government) was "fiscally and politically sustainable". It was difficult to "build on what works" when so little did work and a wholly new system was being launched. |
| Ensure coordination and predictability | * | Only limited progress was made in ensuring the required "high level of institutional coordination" between public and private sector partners. "Predictable support for addressing long-term challenges" was not yet in place. |
| Focus on the most vulnerable | *** | Good, gender-sensitive targeting choices were made, although it was naturally not possible at the pilot stage to support all members of vulnerable groups in the target (urban) areas. |
| Be system-oriented | ** | With strong political support, good foundations were laid for an ultimately national, government-owned system, although progress towards this was only rudimentary during the period under review. |
| Be accountable and open to learning | ** | While WFP staff certainly recognised the need to learn from the pilot activity, management capacity constraints in the CO and government restricted the extent to which systematic learning and refinement were undertaken during the review period. A mid-term evaluation was commissioned, but was of inadequate quality and was not finalised. |
| Strengthen owner-ship and social contracts | * | It is probably premature to comment on the extent to which WFP was contributing to a national sense of ownership and social contract with regard to safety nets. The social and political context did not facilitate the emergence of a rights-based social contract, although government itself had a clear and strong commitment to developing this sort of support to the poor and vulnerable. |
| Promote inclusive development pathways | ** | Work during the review period was not focused on promoting positive spinoffs for the broader economy, although some such impact was likely for participating traders and the mobile phone company. Beneficiaries argued that direct cash transfers that they could use in local markets would enable them to buy more food. Such an approach would be a more direct stimulus to local trade. |
| Priorities and implications (references are to WFP, 2012p: 25-27) | | |

| Key elements of WFP standards | Progress in 2009-2012 | Observations/Explanation |
|--|------------------------------|--|
| Providing technical support and practical expertise for safety nets | ** | While the CO was well supported by WFP in developing the pilot safety net project, its own practical expertise and ability to provide technical support were limited, with all staff learning on the job as the pilot was launched. |
| Ensuring that food and nutrition security objectives are embedded in safety nets | *** | The pilot intervention was explicitly designed around the food and nutrition security requirements of the targeted vulnerable groups. |
| Supporting governments in building systems of safety nets | *** | WFP's work in the Congo was explicitly developed in partnership with government, supporting the latter's initial steps to launch a safety net system. |
| Helping to strengthen institutional mechanisms | ** | While the safety net pilot supported the early process of strengthening institutional mechanisms, the focus was on the operational challenges of starting a complex logistical process rather than on institution building. |
| Ensuring that safety nets are informed by solid and context-specific evidence | ** | A detailed feasibility study survey was done, but it had weaknesses (not referring to HIV/AIDS or considering vulnerability in the Congo's second city, Pointe Noire). During the review period, the preoccupation with making the logistics work meant that insufficient progress was made with starting to generate "rigorous evidence on the appropriateness, effectiveness and efficiency of safety nets". There was no clear plan for a comprehensive evaluation of the pilot project, following the unsatisfactory mid-term one. |
| Forging strategic partnerships for safety nets | ** | WFP established a sound operational partnership with government and a mobile phone company (although there was some concern that the best private sector partner had not been chosen). Links with development partners active in social protection – notably UNICEF and the World Bank – were too loose. |
| Mobilising resources | *** | In this MIC with a government committed to building and funding social protection programmes, WFP did not have a problem mobilising resources. |
| Strengthening internal decision-making | ** | The design of the safety net pilot was basically sound. But there was insufficient evidence of comprehensive advisory support from RBs or headquarters, and the CO lacked the capacity to build a sustainable social protection programme on its own. |

Legend: * little progress over the evaluation period; ** good progress over the evaluation period; *** substantial progress over the evaluation period

Overall, WFP's initial safety net work in the Congo was a strong strategic start, well in line with what the organisation was trying to do globally in this sector. However, the early months of pilot operations that are covered by this CPE were understandably preoccupied with initial logistical challenges and did little to address

the bigger strategic and institutional picture. Support from RBs and headquarters in the design of the pilot safety net intervention resulted in a technically sound project. But the CO was inadequately equipped to address even the multiple operational challenges arising during the pilot, let alone the broader sectoral and policy issues with which WFP's global standards are primarily concerned. Fundamental questions therefore remained about national institutional and systems capacity, the lessons that were being learned from the pilot and how and when these could and should best be applied to operations at a larger scale.

Annex 10 Contributions made by WFP operations to national capacity

| Operation | Training planned and provided | Focus of training | Evidence of strategic knowledge transfer |
|--|---|---|--|
| IRA-EMOP 200408 – Emergency Assistance to IDPs in Brazzaville | No training provided as part of this EMOP but relevant training provided through SO 200413. | - | - |
| SO 200413 – strengthening the logistics capacity of the Government | <p>25 government staff participated in a week long training course (according to SPR). But no evidence of these 25 provided by CO. Staff talked of 7 people completing the training (seems that most of those trained were contractors rather than civil servants).</p> <p>The planned training on coordination and management of logistics in disaster situations did not take place due to lack of French speaking trainers and the unavailability of government staff.</p> | Improve government capacity in warehouse, storage and inventory management to increase the efficiency with which food and non-food items were handled. | <p>Staff in the CO mentioned a test following training but no evidence of this is mentioned in the SPR. Staff in the CO say it was carried out but only for 5-7 people.</p> <p>The GoC requested further training in the form of an Emergency Preparedness Response Package.</p> |
| DEV 200144 – support to primary education | <p>1,368 (of a planned 1,400) PTA members were trained in 2011 at the start of the operation A further 352 PTA members were trained in 2012 (against target of 400)</p> <p>47 government staff of the planned 50 total (mostly school inspectors) received training in 2012</p> | <p>School feeding management or implementation</p> <p>Procedures and responsibilities for implementing the school feeding programme</p> | <p>None detailed in the SPR</p> <p>Beneficiaries of training cited examples of usefulness of training (see 2.3.3 of report) and how they had used the knowledge and skills Main observation was that training should have been longer, and not just focused on programme implementation aspects.</p> |
| DEV 200211 – safety net programme | Government teams from the Ministry of Social Affairs and from the Social Action Centres were targeted for capacity building activities. A number of refresher trainings were also provided. The planned technical assistance package with various components was split into six training sessions (SPR). | <p>Training aimed to strengthen the capacity of the Government to reduce hunger by providing training and capacity-development support to government staff in implementing safety-net programmes in the main suburban areas of Brazzaville and Pointe Noire.</p> <p>Training included monitoring and reporting,</p> | <p>Staff from the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Social Action Centres are implementing the project.</p> <p>No evidence in SPRs of knowledge transfer</p> |

| Operation | Training planned and provided | Focus of training | Evidence of strategic knowledge transfer |
|---|---|--|--|
| | The training provided consisted of brief operational sessions for government staff on how to make the voucher system work (field interviews). | data processing, and targeting for the safety net programme. | |
| PRRO 200147 – Assistance to Congolese refugees Likouala Province | No training provided | - | - |
| EMOP 200095 - Assistance to Congolese refugees Likouala Province | No training provided | - | - |
| PRRO 10312.1 – Assistance to populations affected by conflict and poverty | The Project Document planned "WFP will also build capacities within the Government to enhance their ability to manage these projects. The Government's "Direction d'aides en Nature" will participate in WFP training workshops. Hands-on training will also be provided through joint M&E missions. WFP will provide a vehicle and a computer to be used in preparing reports to be submitted to the WFP country office" | Evidence from SPRs: One out of 3 planned workshops for PTA training on school feeding in 2008. SPR 2010 mentions a focus on capacity development of PTAs but no detail given. SPR 2011 "Government staff were involved in the monitoring of activities. Parents and teachers associations received training in order to manage school feeding activities" | "Teacher-parent associations were active in the management of school canteens. The Government is requesting WFP support in designing a national school feeding programme, thus ensuring the sustainability after project closure." (SPR, 2009) |

Source: SPRs 2009-2012, Project Document for PRRO 10312.1

Annex 11 Supplementary information on capacity development for EQ2

1. The CO reportedly faced challenges in terms of capacity for humanitarian operations. In March 2013 none of the staff in the field offices implementing the programmes had a speciality in humanitarian interventions. Instead they "learnt on the job"⁹⁶. When training was provided to government officials, technical support was brought in from DRC. The CO was, however, able to draw on the technical expertise of the WFP team in DRC and in the region (although language was a problem).

2. Over the period under evaluation, the WFP CO had one national nutrition officer. A field monitor is also a nutritionist, but was not hired for specific nutrition work. This level of capacity proved insufficient expertise to strategically manage (plan, consult, coordinate and inform) health and nutrition interventions and other staff with nutrition training/experience were not being used for tasks in this area. Whilst nutrition is an area of expertise for WFP globally, in the Congo the organisation had little involvement in this sector and it was not prominently reflected in its programming.

3. MASAH tutors who implemented the safety net programme when interviewed by the mission, were found to have limited knowledge and technical capacity in the nutritional management of HIV and TB. WFP conducted a 2-day training of social workers (one day on food logistics and M&E and the other one on nutrition, mainly body mass index (BMI) measurement/calculation, but this was clearly insufficient.

4. In school feeding, the CO was able to draw on expertise from the regional office and from HQ. However, interviews with IPHD, MoE officials, WFP CO and sub-office staff, inspectors and school directors, highlighted that the available WFP staff were not able to guarantee the level of field supervision and support that a well-functioning school feeding programme requires. Comparing the WFP school feeding programme with that of the other main implementing partner in the Congo – IPHD – demonstrated the lack of WFP staff and the key differences in set up and monitoring. IPHD has one monitoring officer for approximately 36 schools. The officer visits each school at least twice a month; links with local partners (government and others) on issues such as hygiene, community mobilisation, etc., and provides training. This close monitoring and support has allowed IPHD to put in place a holistic model of school feeding with a strong focus on complementary health and development interventions (for deworming, malaria, school gardens, etc.). Following WFP's 2011 expansion of support to school feeding, the number of WFP monitoring staff stayed constant, in spite of a doubling of the number of schools covered by the WFP school feeding programme. Schools are visited once every two or three months, sometimes very briefly. The WFP field monitor responsible for schools in the Pool in March 2013 had 130 schools under her responsibility, was based in Brazzaville, had a larger distance to cover in order to reach the schools, and had other duties within the WFP CO. Similar situations were reported by other field monitors. During the evaluation period there were no school feeding training activities for staff. Instead staff reported learning through self-study and interactions with colleagues. There was also no specific technical assistance in this sector, or external reviews of progress.

⁹⁶ Interviews with staff in Brazzaville and in sub-offices in Betou and Impfondo.

5. For social protection, technical expertise for implementation (for example in the operation of urban voucher systems via mobile phone banking) was particularly important as key strategic progress needed to be made and systems put in place for the pilot. Although some support was available from the RB and from HQ this could not reduce the need for in-country capacity to coordinate and monitor implementation of the safety net pilot in 2012. Following the feasibility study, a year of local consultancy support was brought in to help co-ordinate the launch of the safety net programme and prepare an implementation plan (WFP, 2013a), but overall the programme lacked the breadth and depth of technical support that its innovative nature required. In 2012, the CO redeployed two personnel to take lead field responsibility for the safety net pilot in Pointe Noire and Brazzaville respectively. While this was a positive development, the staff and the relevant WFP project manager had no specific expertise in this field, and interviews indicated that no training in social protection was provided to them during the evaluation period. This evaluation's assessment of the capacity that the CO had managed to develop by the end of evaluation period, and interviews with relevant personnel showed that staff were learning by doing, rather than applying previous experience or receiving training from WFP. This limited the extent to which WFP could maximise its comparative advantage in this field.

Annex 12 Staffing assessment 2009 compared with staffing in 2012

| Section | Staff Category | 2009 staff | Staffing Dec 2012 | Observations |
|--------------------------------------|---|------------|-------------------|----------------------------|
| Management | Country Director | 1 | 1 | |
| Programme | Head of Programmes | 0 | 1 | |
| Programme | (N) Officer programme/VAM | 1 | 2 | |
| | Programme Assistant | 2 | 2 | 1 based in the SO in Nkayi |
| | Food aid monitor/ Field Monitor Assistant | 0 | 8 | 6 based in SO |
| | National consultant | 0 | 1 | |
| Total technical staff | | 4 | 15 | |
| Admin/ finance | | 1.5 | 4 | |
| Logistics | (N) Officer | 1 | 1 | |
| Logistics | Assistants | 4 | 6 | 5 in sub offices |
| ICT/Air Ops | Assistant | 0 | 3 | |
| HR/secretarial | | 1 | 2 | |
| Total logistics/admin | | 7.5 | 16 | |
| | Clerk | 2 | 0 | |
| Cleaner/ driver | | 5.5 | 10 | 6 in sub-offices |
| Total support staff | | 7.5 | 10 | |
| Total all staff | | 19 | 41 | |
| Number of operations on-going | | 1 | 3 | |

Source: WFP, 2009i, (*) as per this source), 2009 & 2012 as per staffing data collected during inception visit based on HR CO organograms and HR staff lists

Annex 13 Supplementary information on training for EQ2

1. WFP was responsive to calls from government to intervene in humanitarian crises and as a result is seen by government its key humanitarian partner. However, contrary to WFP initiatives following the 2012 explosion (SO200413), no capacity-building support was provided in Likouala Province following the 2009 refugee influx. Furthermore, WFP staff confirmed that the organisation had not employed staff locally (i.e. from the Province), a fact criticised by the local authorities, who felt it was a missed opportunity. In 2012 in Brazzaville, WFP did work with government officials in Brazzaville to build their logistical capacity and this special operation (200413) was well received by government. Twenty-five government staff were trained in warehouse management. This training increased capacity in Brazzaville but the Standard Project Report (SPR) for SO 200413(WFP, 2013g) acknowledges that much more needs to be done to ensure expertise nationally.

2. Within the nutrition area, responsibilities for food distribution and M&E were initially given to NGOs under PRRO 103121 (see sections 2.2.5 and 2.3.2) but later assigned to social workers under the safety net programme. PLWHA and TB patients were systematically reached through the national health system and WFP assistance expanded between 2009 and 2011 as larger number of health facilities became progressively equipped by the MoHP to provide treatment for PLWHA and TB patients⁹⁷. Health and social workers were also involved in the selection and health/nutritional follow-up of beneficiaries. Interviews of NGOs and MoHP staff previously involved with PRRO 103121 and social workers involved in the on-going safety net programme have received training on nutrition (BMI calculation) and project implementation (monitoring and evaluation requirements and procedures).

3. In WFP's support to education, capacity development included training of school inspectors and PTAs, which became an explicit part of the school feeding approach in DEV 200144. Beneficiaries of training events highlighted the relevance of these activities and provided various examples of how the resources, knowledge and skills acquired had contributed to their work, but training sessions were considered too short and too much focused on process (programme implementation) issues. In a notable exception to other capacity development efforts, the Brazil Centre of Excellence visit contributed to broader sectoral capacity development. Senior GoC education officials underscored that the continuing capacity constraints (in terms of planning, logistics and supervision), and the desire of the GoC to further scale up the school feeding programme, imply that further efforts on capacity development will be needed in the coming years⁹⁸.

4. Within the component of social protection, WFP took limited steps and a narrow approach towards addressing capacity constraints strictly in the context of the safety net pilot project's implementation. Interviews highlighted that the pilot undertook short training events focused on ensuring that MASAH staff had the operational capacity to fulfil their roles in the pilot safety net project. Interviews also revealed that staff consider the safety net project implementation work to be a project-funded supplement to their job descriptions, rather than integral to their social work function (a perception reinforced by the project's provision to pay MASAH staff an extra monthly allowance of XAF 20,000 to liaise with and support

⁹⁷ In 2012, under the safety net programme less health facilities/beneficiaries are covered than under the PRRO as it is a pilot.

⁹⁸ At the same time the GoC will continue its explicit strategy of relying on external partners for implementation. In this context the GoC expects to substantially increase its financial contribution through WFP and the other main school feeding partner, IPHD, in the coming years.

beneficiaries). This attitude was linked to their low basic salaries, which may constrain motivation, and caused operational problems for the project.

5. The CPE mission visits to health facilities in Pointe Noire and Brazzaville, and interviews of health officials at national and sub-national levels, observed unclear responsibilities between health staff and MASAH staff posted in HIV and TB ambulatory treatment centres, in terms of selection of food aid/voucher beneficiaries and their monitoring (nutritional /treatment success or adherence rate). Again - as highlighted in interviews with MoH and MASAH staff, and confirmed by interviews with WFP sub-office staff - little was done on the development of integrated capacity and systems for longer-term delivery by government. Only MASAH health workers were given training by WFP on WFP reporting requirements and how to calculate BMI for beneficiary selection.

Annex 14 WFP's Partnerships in the Congo & types of agreements

| Component area | Partner | Operation involved in | Local MoU or Field Level Agreement (FLA)? (date) |
|--|---|--|---|
| Humanitarian Assistance | The Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development (ACTED) | EMOP 200095 | FLA(01/02/2010-31/12/2010) |
| | Caritas Congo | EMOP 200095 PRRO 200147 EMOP 200408 | FLA(01/02/2010-28/02/2011) FLA(01/03/2011-31/12/2012) FLA (05/03/-31/08/2012) |
| | The Assistance Agency for Repatriates and Refugees in the Congo (AARREC) | EMOP 200095 PRRO 200147 EMOP 200408 | FLA(01/02/2010-28/02/2011) FLA(01/03/2011-31/12/2012) FLA (05/03/-31/08/2012) |
| | International Partnership for Human Development (IPHD) | EMOP 200095 PRRO 200147 | No FLA(01/03/2011-31/12/2012) |
| | UNHCR | EMOP 200095 PRRO 200147 EMOP 200408 | None |
| | Ministère des Affaires Sociales et de l'Action Humanitaire (MASAH) | EMOP 200095 PRRO 200147 EMOP 200408 SO 200413 | None |
| Health and Nutrition | Association Femmes Intégrées pour le Développement et la lutte contre le SIDA (FIDEL) | PRRO 103121 | FLA (01/04/2009-30/06/2011) |
| | Association Aide et Assistance aux Démunies (AAAD) | PRRO 103121 | FLA (01/04/2009-30/06/2011) |
| | Association Vie Sante et Sida (AVSS) | PRRO 103121 | FLA (01/04/2009-30/06/2011) |
| | Réseau National des Associations des positif du Congo (RENAPC)- MASAH | PRRO 103121 DEV 200211 | FLA (01/04/2009-30/06/2011) MOU (16/01/2013) |
| | Centre de Traitement Ambulatoire (CTA) | DEV 200211 | FLA (01/01/2011-31/12/2013) |
| | Ministère de la Santé et de la Population (MSP) | DEV 200211 | None |
| | Service des Maladies infectieuses et Parasitaires (SMIP) | DEV 200211 | FLA (01/01/2011-31/12/2013) |
| | Education | IPHD | DEV 200211 |
| Ministère de l'Enseignement Primaire et Secondaire charge de l'alphabétisation (MEPSA) | | PRRO 103121 DEV 200144 | MOU (01/04/2009-) MOU (01/04/2009) |
| Local procurement | | DEV 200144 | None |
| Social Protection | MASAH | DEV 200211 | MOU (16/01/2013) |
| | Mobile technology Network Congo (MTN) | DEV 200211 | MOU (21/02/2012) |

Annex 15 Additional information on portfolio performance – humanitarian

Table 18 Planned versus actual activities for operations in Likouala Province

| | EMOP 200095 Assistance to Congolese Displaced in Likouala Province (Jan 2010 to Feb 2011) | | PRRO 200147 Assistance to Congolese Refugees from DRC in Likouala Province (March 2011 to Dec 2012) | |
|---|--|--|--|--------------------------------|
| | | % actual vs planned^b | | % actual vs planned |
| Rice (g) | 450 | 24.6 | 300 | 30.4 |
| Pulses (g) | 30 | 25.8 | 100 | Beans -257 Peas -29.2 |
| CSB (g) | 20 | 18.0 | - | - |
| Vegetable oil | 25 | 43.9 | 20 | 34.1 |
| Sugar (g) | 15 | 23.8 | - | - |
| Iodized salt (g) | 10 | 43.9 | 5 | 13.8 |
| Energy value (Kcal) ^a | GFD - 2100 SPR - 1,009 | 61.9 | 1607 | 48.8 |
| Actual food distributed vs planned | 2010 | 25.8 | 2011 | 34 |
| | 2011 | 25.6 | 2012 | 30.1 |
| Planned beneficiaries | -GFD –target 84,000 displaced Congolese (HCR lists) and 10,000 vulnerable | Total: 2010 – 91.9% 2011 – 88.6% | -GFD: 115,100 refugees in 2011 and 95,100 in 2012. -Support to repatriation:20,000 | 2011 - 87.4% 2012 - 107.8% |

| | | | | |
|-----------------------------------|--|--|---|--|
| | <p>people from the host communities (poorest households through community based targeting). It was estimated that c. 6.5% of the local population would receive some assistance.</p> <p>-Targeted supplementary feeding programme will also benefit 3,500 malnourished children 6-59 months. (From Unicef's Therapeutic feeding centre + others eligible)</p> | | <p>repatriating refugees in 2011, and 30,000 in 2012.</p> <p>-25,698 mt will be distributed to refugees for 22 months.</p> | |
| Planned activities | <p>GFD – monthly distributions in most populated sites (those from other sites will travel to get ration)</p> <p>SFCs to those children that leave the Unicef TFC and other malnourished children aged 6-59 months.</p> | | <p>-Monthly food ration covering 75 percent of average daily food requirements will be distributed to refugees registered by UNHCR. (In all 5 districts)</p> <p>-Refugees repatriating to DRC will receive a two week ration while in transit</p> | |
| Planned M&E/indicators | <p>-Prevalence of acute malnutrition among children under 5 below 10 percent (weight for height as %)</p> <p>-Crude mortality rate below 2 percent</p> <p>-Household food consumption score</p> <p>-9,307 mt of food distributed under general food distribution, 50 mt of food distributed under supplementary feeding programme</p> <p>-94,000 beneficiaries reached under general food distribution disaggregated by sex; 3,500 beneficiaries reached under supplementary feeding</p> | | <p>-Household food consumption score.</p> <p>-Number of women, men, girls and boys receiving food by category as a % of planned figures.</p> <p>-Quantity of food distributed by type as a % of planned distribution.</p> <p>M&E by Ministry of Planning and MASAH Local committees (50% women) – consultation with beneficiaries</p> | |

| | | |
|--------------------------|--|---|
| | programme disaggregated by sex. | |
| Actual activities | <p><u>SPR 2011</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Rations incomplete (61% of calories planned) – due to delays in food arriving -Distributions irregular especially in the first 6 months of 2011 (50% of distributions occurred as planned – 3 out of 6 planned) -SFC element of project was not implemented as global malnutrition rates had stabilised (SPR, 2011) -JAM planned for April 2011 did not take place due to lack of funding – resulted in lack of follow-up data. | <p><u>SPR 2011</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Only Likouala District -Rations incomplete (34% of planned) – distributed cereal, pulses, vegetable oil, Super Cereal, sugar and salt. (No maize, Maize meal, sugar, CSB) – due to lack of funding -Reached more refugees so monthly ration reduced to 15 days per family -No repatriation |
| Other | Noted under lessons learnt: "In order to improve planning of distributions, it is important to take into consideration the variability of seasons in Likouala Department as transportation of food during the dry season is difficult due to the level of water in Ubangui river" (SPR, 2011: p.9). | Said they would consider cash if market links improved. This PRRO is based on the assumption that 20,000 refugees would return in 2011 and 30,000 in 2012. |
| Partners | AARREC will be responsible for the management of the EDPs, the transportation of food from the EDPs to the distribution sites and final distribution to beneficiaries. ACTED to do SF – MSF, MDA to screen children | Caritas, AARREC, ACTED, IPHD, MSF France, Médecins d’Afrique (MDA) |

Source: Project documents for EMOP 200094 and PRRO 200147 and SPRs 2010, 2011 and 2012, plus information gained from field work.

^a Only one ration and energy value are given in the project document for PRRO 200147 as there was only one modality (GFD) and one type of beneficiary refugees (although of course within this category there were men, women and children)

^b SPR 2011.

Table 19 Aims and results of operations in response to the 4 March disaster

| | IR-EMOP 200408: Emergency Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons | SO 200413: Strengthening the Logistics capacity of the Government to Support the Emergency in Brazzaville |
|--------------------------|--|---|
| Planned timeframe | Mid-March – Mid-June 2012 (3 months) | 1 st May – 31 st October 2012 (6 months) |
| Actual timeframe | 8 March – 31 August 2012 (extension in time without additional cost approved from 7 June au 31 august 2012) | Interviewees mentioned 2 month extension to form a crisis cell but no documentation |
| Cost | US\$ 1,484, 080 (planned cost per beneficiary = US\$56.36) | US\$ 450,000 |
| Objective | 1249 Mt Three months food ration (daily ration of 2100 kcal) to be given to 25,000 of the most vulnerable persons among the affected population located in camp settings (5 sites identified by Government) and in host families. A budget revision of the Safety Net project will be done to include this additional caseload of affected population and to allow continuation of assistance where necessary. | Aim was to increase the logistics capacity of the Government to respond to the current crisis. Through: -Establishment of a system of warehouse, storage and inventory management including training of Government counterparts (MSAHA) in Logistics Management. -Increase storage capacity – WFP will deploy six mobile warehouses with a total capacity of 2,700mt. -Improvement of road transport – WFP will improve capacity for road transportation by using private carriers. |
| Expected Results | Project document stated that operation would "prevent deterioration of the nutritional situation and food security of affected people, especially women and children" (paragraph 10). | -Warehouse, inventory and storage capacity improve -Government personnel receive training in coordination and management of logistics activities. |
| Performance | No analysis or reporting provided. From interviews: -No mention of how women and children were targeted -MASAH wanted WFP to support IDPs in camps until a list of those in host families was established. Host families were served in the end by other partners. -Distributions were carried out by Caritas and AARREC in all the IDP sites. | No analysis or reporting provided. Results obtained (according to interviews with staff and partners): -Accompaniment/ training by WFP logistics staff from DRC and Pointe Noire – 6 staff trained (4 for management of stock and 2 for the database). In September these 6 people passes an evaluation test. -4 temporary warehouses were put in place increasing storage capacity by |

| | IR-EMOP 200408: Emergency Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons | SO 200413: Strengthening the Logistics capacity of the Government to Support the Emergency in Brazzaville |
|--|---|--|
| | See Table 17 below for further details. | <p>1,700 tonnes</p> <p>-Lorries were hired to help with transport of stock in Brazzaville between IDP sites.</p> <p>Some of the unutilised funding from this operation was used to buy 2 lorries for the SF programme.</p> |

Source: Project Documents, Budget Revisions

Table 20 Planned vs actual beneficiaries in humanitarian programmes 2009-2012

| Year | | 2010 | | 2011 | | 2011 | | 2012 | | 2012 | | 2012 | |
|---|--------|---------------|-----------|---------------|-----------|---------------|-----------|---------------|-----------|---------------|-----------|---------------|-----------|
| WFP operation | | EMOP 200095 | | EMOP 200095 | | PRRO 200147 | | PRRO 200147 | | SO 200413 | | EMOP 200408 | |
| | | Target number | % reached |
| Number of children under 5 years | Male | 9,976 | 55.1% | 9,976 | 54.8% | 5,525 | 103.2% | 4,565 | 137.5% | - | - | 3,675 | 49.7% |
| | Female | 21,199 | 58.8% | 21,199 | 55.9% | 12,523 | 108.4% | 10,347 | 60.2% | - | - | 5,365 | 74.3% |
| | Total | 31,175 | 57.6% | 31,175 | 55.6% | 18,048 | 106.8% | 14,912 | 83.9% | - | - | 9,040 | 64.3% |
| Children 6 to 23 months given food under blanket supplementary feeding (prevention) | Male | 2,170 | 0% | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| | Female | 1,330 | 0% | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| | Total | 3,500 | 0% | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Number of children aged 5-18 years | Male | 11,971 | 76.6% | 11,971 | 76.2% | 9,208 | 102.5% | 7,608 | 226.8% | - | - | 4,725 | 78.1% |
| | Female | 25,439 | 70.5% | 25,439 | 66.9% | 18,002 | 109.1% | 14,874 | 117.7% | - | - | 3,335 | 90.0% |
| | Total | 37,410 | 72.4% | 37,410 | 69.9% | 27,210 | 106.8% | 22,482 | 154.6% | - | - | 8,060 | 83.0% |
| Total Refugees/ IDPs (for EMOP 200408) | Male | 36,704 | 99.9% | 39,904 | 91.4% | 36,832 | 106.8% | 30,432 | 132.6% | - | - | 10,500 | 73.6% |
| | Female | 77,996 | 99.9% | 84,796 | 87.3% | 78,268 | 106.8% | 64,668 | 66.1% | - | - | 14,500 | 69.9% |
| | Total | 114,700 | 99.9% | 124,700 | 88.6% | 115,100 | 106.8% | 95,100 | 87.4% | - | - | 25,000 | 71.5% |
| Pregnant or lactating women given food under MCH/ supplementary feeding | | 109 | 0% | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Government staff trained | | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 30 | 83.3% | - | - |

| Year | | 2010 | | 2011 | | 2011 | | 2012 | | 2012 | | 2012 | |
|---|--------|-------------|-------|-------------|-------|-------------|--------|-------------|--------|-----------|-------|-------------|-------|
| WFP operation | | EMOP 200095 | | EMOP 200095 | | PRRO 200147 | | PRRO 200147 | | SO 200413 | | EMOP 200408 | |
| Total number of beneficiaries | Male | 39,904 | 91.9% | 39,904 | 91.4% | 36,832 | 104.9% | 30,432 | 132.6% | - | - | 10,500 | 73.6% |
| | Female | 84,796 | 91.9% | 84,796 | 87.3% | 78,268 | 107.1% | 64,668 | 66.1% | - | - | 14,500 | 69.9% |
| | Total | 124,700 | 91.9% | 124,700 | 88.6% | 115,100 | 106.8% | 95,100 | 87.4% | 30 | 83.3% | 25,000 | 71.5% |
| Sources: SPRs for EMOP 200095, PRRO 200147, SO 200413 and EMOP 200408 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

The table below summarises the distributions carried out under project PRRO 200147 from January 2012 – February 2013 in the refugee sites visited by the evaluation.

Table 21 Distributions in 2012-2013 in refugee sites visited by the evaluation team

| Date | Total no of beneficiaries | Total tonnage distributed (mt) | Rice | Peas | Oil | Salt | Planned rations* x actual beneficiaries |
|---|---------------------------|--------------------------------|--------|-------|-------|--------|---|
| Yoi-na-Yoi | | | | | | | |
| Jan 2012 | 1482 | 12.737 | | | | | 629.85 |
| April 2012 | 1480 | 14.087 | | | | | 629 |
| Sept 2012 | 1326 | 16.906 | | | | | 563.55 |
| Dec 2012 | 1301 | 16.587 | | | | | 552.925 |
| Bobondzo: * distribution took place in Impfondo and beneficiaries had to travel to get ration. | | | | | | | |
| Mar 2012* | 1,214 | 11.679 | | | | | 515.95 |
| May 2012* | 1,179 | 7.793 | | | | | 501.075 |
| Oct 2012 | 1,093 | 13.935 | | | | | 464.525 |
| Liboko | | | | | | | |
| Feb 2012 | 3,443 | 27.930 | 15.518 | 5.169 | 1.037 | 21.724 | 1463.275 |
| Mar 2012 | 3,448 | 21.732 | 15.528 | 5.169 | 1.035 | 0.000 | 1465.4 |
| June 2012 | 3,128 | 15.082 | 9.445 | 4.692 | 0.945 | 0.000 | 1329.4 |
| Aug 2012 | 2,895 | 18.297 | 13.066 | 4.356 | 0.875 | 0.000 | 1230.375 |
| Oct 2012 | 2,701 | 28.383 | 20.197 | 6.783 | 1.064 | 0.339 | 1147.925 |
| Nov 2012 | 2,436 | 25.309 | 20.197 | 6.783 | 1.064 | 0.339 | 1035.3 |
| Feb 2013 | 2,372 | 24.533 | 20.593 | 2.272 | 1.356 | 0.312 | 1008.1 |
| 15 Avril – site in Betou town | | | | | | | |
| Feb 2012 | 1,882 | 15.303 | 8.483 | 2.847 | 0.563 | 11.893 | 799.85 |
| Mar 2012 | 1,869 | 11.810 | 8.430 | 2.818 | 0.562 | 0.000 | 794.325 |
| June 2012 | 1,929 | 9.214 | 5.784 | 2.859 | 0.571 | 0.000 | 819.825 |
| Aug 2012 | 1,903 | 11.992 | 8.564 | 2.855 | 0.573 | 0.000 | 808.775 |
| Oct 2012 | 1,571 | 16.499 | 11.757 | 3.946 | 0.631 | 0.165 | 667.675 |
| Nov 2012 | 1,583 | 16.316 | 11.873 | 3.958 | 0.287 | 0.198 | 672.775 |
| Dec 2012 | 1,552 | 13.343 | 11.598 | 1.551 | 0.000 | 0.194 | 659.6 |
| Feb 2013 | 1,430 | 15.311 | 12.950 | 1.369 | 0.792 | 0.200 | 607.75 |

Source: Data obtained from sub-offices in Betou and Impfondo during field visits – WFP M&E reports.

*Planned ration as per Project Document was 425 grams per person per day.

Table 22 EMOP 200408 planned vs actual tonnage and rations

| a) Project Document : ration, beneficiaries and planned tonnage (PRODOC) | | | | | | |
|---|--------------------------------|---------------|--|--------|--|-----------------------------|
| Composition of Ration | Ration / day / person in grams | Beneficiaires | Ration/day for total number of beneficiaries | | Number of days of rations planned (over 3mths) | Total food necessary (tons) |
| | | | Planned | Grams | | |
| Rice | 400.00 | 25,000.00 | 10,000,000.00 | 10.00 | 90 | 900.00 |
| Peas | 120.00 | | 3,000,000.00 | 3.00 | | 270.00 |
| Oil | 30.00 | | 750,000.00 | 0.75 | | 67.50 |
| Salt | 5.00 | | 125,000.00 | 0.13 | | 11.25 |
| | | | | | | 1,248.75 |
| Total: | 555.00 | | 13,875,000.00 | 13.88 | | 1,248.75 |
| Lines of food needed for actual number of beneficiaries and actual distribution days (CO data given to) | | | | | | |
| | | Actual | Grams | Tonnes | | Total food needed (mt) |
| Rice | 350.00 | 17,866.00 | 6,253,100.00 | 6.25 | 127 | 794.14 |
| Peas | 120.00 | | 2,143,920.00 | 2.14 | | 272.28 |
| Oil | 30.00 | | 535,980.00 | 0.54 | | 68.07 |
| Salt | 5.00 | | 89,330.00 | 0.09 | | 11.34 |
| | | | | | | 1,145.84 |
| Total: | 505.00 | | 9,022,330.00 | 9.02 | | 1,145.84 |
| Number of days of distribution with tonnes of food distributed and actual number of beneficiaries (SPR) | | | | | | |
| | | Actual | Grams | Tonnes | | Actual food distributed |
| Rice | 350.00 | 17,866.00 | 6,253,100.00 | 6.25 | 30 | 187.59 |
| Peas | 120.00 | | 2,143,920.00 | 2.14 | | 64.32 |
| Oil | 30.00 | | 535,980.00 | 0.54 | | 16.08 |
| Salt | 5.00 | | 89,330.00 | 0.09 | | 2.68 |
| | | | | | | 270.67 |
| Total: | 505.00 | | 9,022,330.00 | 9.02 | | 270.67 |

Sources: Project Document for EMOP 200408, SPR, 2012 for EMOP 200408 and data gained from Country Office during evaluation visit

For EMOP 200408 the project document planned a rice ration of 400g/per person/ per day. When it came to implementation of the project the rice ration was dropped to 350g/per person/ per day no reason was given for this change. It is possible that rations were supplemented with food received in donations by the Government although the SPRs do not state this.

There was also inconsistency concerning the number of beneficiaries in need. In the WFP rapid evaluation 15,525 beneficiaries were quoted (WFP, 2012k). In the EMOP 200408 project document 25,000 beneficiaries were said to be in need and this number was used to calculate the overall tonnage required (17,866mt). No explanation is given for this increase in the numbers of beneficiaries.

The total number of days worth of food to be distributed was planned as 90 days (project document). However, if a calculation is done using the actual number of beneficiaries served (17,866), the ration given to each beneficiary (505 grams pppd) and the number of the days the Country Office data claimed to have covered. The amount of food distributed is enough to feed this number of beneficiaries for 127 days. But the total tonnage of food needed to provide 17,866 beneficiaries with 127 days of rations is higher than the tonnage planned (1248.75mt) or the actual tonnage distributed (270.67mt). There is therefore a mismatch between the number of days

covered by the distributions and the food available or the number of days on which the beneficiaries were recorded as fed is incorrect.

When a calculation is done using the actual number of beneficiaries fed, the actual tonnage of food distributed. The number of days of ration provided is only enough for 30 days of food for 17,866 beneficiaries. However, the 2012 SPR reports that the number of planned days of ration was 180 compared to 150 days achieved.

Table 23 Funding in humanitarian sector as compared to development

| Operation | Total Budget | Amount Received | Extent Funded |
|---|--------------|-----------------|---------------|
| Humanitarian Operations: | US\$ | US\$ | % |
| SO 200413 – Strengthening logistics Capacity of The Congo to support emergency in Brazzaville | 450,000 | 421,414 | 93.6 |
| EMOP 200408 – Emergency Assistance to IDPs, Brazzaville | 1,464,091 | 1,438,526 | 98.2 |
| EMOP 200095 – Food Assistance to Congolese Displaced in Likouala Province | 37,688,334 | 13,417,895 | 35.6 |
| PRRO 200147 – Assistance to Congolese refugees from DRC in the Likouala Province | 33,827,940 | 15,386,859 | 45.5 |
| Developmental Operations: | | | |
| DEV 200211 – Safety net programme | 3,579,405 | 3,119,405 | 87.1 |
| DEV 200144 – Support to primary education | 14,241,781 | 9,894,570 | 69.5 |

Source: SPRs 2012

Table 24 Cost per beneficiary in humanitarian programming

| Operations | EMOP-200095 | PRRO 200147 | EMOP 200408 | |
|--------------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|-------------|
| Number of actual beneficiaries | 114594 | - | - | 2010 |
| Project expenditure (US\$) | 10940315 | - | - | |
| Cost per beneficiary (US\$) | 95.47 | - | - | |
| Number of actual beneficiaries | 110520 | 122977 | - | 2011 |
| Project expenditure (US\$) | 1452516 | 8529387 | - | |
| Cost per beneficiary (US\$) | 13.14 | 69.36 | - | |
| Number of actual beneficiaries | - | 83081 | 17866 | 2012 |
| Project expenditure (US\$) | - | 4198084 | 1315477 | |
| Cost per beneficiary (US\$) | - | 50.53 | 73.63 | |

Source: SPRs for 2010, 2011 and 2012 for EMOP 200408, EMOP 200095, PRRO 200147

Annex 16 Mapping findings, conclusions and recommendations

| Section of report | Findings | Conclusions | Recommendations |
|---|---|---|--|
| EQ1 - Strategic Alignment of the WFP portfolio in the Congo | | | |
| <i>Sub question 1: Whether the portfolio's main objectives and related activities were relevant to people's humanitarian and developmental needs, including in terms of operational responsiveness and coverage of interventions</i> | | | |
| 2.1.1 | <p><i>In the current development context the people of the Congo continue to have food security challenges. WFP's portfolio evolved to respond to both development and humanitarian needs. Geographical and beneficiary coverage matched the main needs in the humanitarian and development domains. In line with the national priorities and policy choices of the Government, in the humanitarian domain, with the changing situation, WFP did not shift from emergency feeding for saving lives towards food assistance in support of livelihoods.</i></p> | <p>WFP's operations were well aligned with the humanitarian and development needs of the people of the Congo. Across the portfolio WFP strived to provide levels of food and non-food assistance that were commensurate to the needs of geographical areas and of target groups that were most food and nutrition insecure.</p> <p>WFP's interventions appropriately evolved over the period from a start at the beginning of the evaluation period (mainly in the north) to a recovery operations as well as newer, longer-term development interventions.</p> <p>Targeting of WFP interventions was adequate. WFP focused on geographical areas and specific population groups that</p> | <p><u>Recommendation 5 (CO with support from RB and HQ):</u> <i>The new CSD, while addressing both humanitarian and development needs, should: prioritize capacity-development and knowledge transfer; include a transition roadmap for further increasing Goevernement's responsibility and takeover of funding; and contain explicit commitments and strategies for enhancing coordination efforts by the Government</i></p> |

| Section of report | Findings | Conclusions | Recommendations |
|---|---|---|----------------------------------|
| | | reflected nutritional and food security needs, and in the case of education that reflected educational challenges. | |
| Sub- question 2: Whether WFP's strategies, objectives and programming were aligned with those of government and coherent with the stated national agenda and policies, including sector policies, systems and capacities | | | |
| 2.1.2 | <i>The overall policy environment of the GoC evolved with a new National Development Plan (NDP), PRSP and a number of sector specific policies and plans, but was fluid over the evaluation period, with key policies remaining to be formally defined and/or approved. WFP's activities corresponded to the priorities expressed in national and sector policies and plans during the evaluation period, as well as with emerging/unwritten policy statements by the GoC. In addition, in education and social protection WFP strategically engaged with the Government to support on-going processes of policy development in these areas. For the GoC WFP has been a privileged dialogue partner</i> | <p>WFP aligned well with the broad emerging policy frameworks of the Government as formulated in the NDP and the PRSPs and with sectoral strategies where these existed.</p> <p>WFP enhanced the pertinence of its engagement by supporting the GoC in working towards strengthening policy frameworks. In education and social protection WFP strategically engaged with the GoC to support on-going processes of policy development in these areas. For the GoC WFP's status as a UN agency, its international reputation, and perceived technical capacity were of high value. WFP has been a privileged dialogue partner.</p> <p>The evaluation period saw bold entrepreneurial decision making, in</p> | Recommendation 5 as above |

| Section of report | Findings | Conclusions | Recommendations |
|--|--|--|--|
| | | particular in light of the reality of the CO's limited resources and the absence of a corporate strategy for engagement with MICs. | |
| Sub-question 3: Whether its strategies and operational plans were aligned with other partners in order to achieve complementarity of interventions and maximise CO effective comparative advantage at policy and operational levels | | | |
| 2.1.3 | <i>Alignment at UN level was sought through the UNDAF. WFP project documents and UNDAF included plans for alignment with UN as well as other partners. However, for the most, plans have not been implemented in practice. The small number of development partners, capacity constraints of partners and WFP, weak/ineffective UNCT/The GoC coordination and vision, lack of funding and lack of incentives for alignment have been key limiting factors.</i> | WFP did not succeed in establishing strong links/synergies with other development partners, for whom WFP's engagement with development work was of questionable coherence with its core (humanitarian) mandate and who had limited field capacity and were themselves competing for funds from the Government. | Recommendation 5 as above |
| Sub-question 4: Whether WFP aligned with relevant corporate policies | | | |
| 2.1.4 | <i>In education and social protection, the CO followed key aspects of corporate guidance. In education and social protection, the CO followed most of the key aspects of corporate guidance, although school feeding did not include the introduction of an essential package and in</i> | Overall, the portfolio focus aligned well with WFP's corporate objectives and policies, including with the shift to food assistance. In the humanitarian and nutrition | <u>Recommendation 7 (CO, with support from RB and HQ):</u> <i>Under the framework of the annual performance plan, develop an implementation plan in 2014 for each areas of the new CSD that</i> |

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| | <p><i>social protection there was no capacity assessment or gender analysis. In the humanitarian and nutrition component areas selected design and implementation guidance was not consistently followed. In humanitarian response there was no shift to DMR. In nutrition insufficient account was taken of epidemiological data, ensuring adequate levels of ownership, quality M&E, and putting in place partnerships.</i></p> | <p>specifically, but also in other areas of the portfolio WFP did not consistently follow specific guidance provided by WFP's policies.</p> <p>WFP had only a partial understanding of the nutritional needs of PLWHA.</p> | <p><i>maximizes alignment with WFP and Government policies, identifies partners, includes strategies and targets, strengthens monitoring, and specifies appropriate human resource and funding needs. This plan should form the basis for annual reporting during the strategy period.</i></p> |
| <p><i>Sub-question 5: Whether its main objectives, strategies and implementation maximised organisational comparative advantages with the broader external context</i></p> | | | |
| 2.1.5 | <p><i>WFP's comparative advantage in school feeding and humanitarian response has come from its strong field presence and capacity to reach remote areas. In emergency situations WFP also had the capacity to respond quickly. With the reorientation of the portfolio to development work, WFP endeavored to build comparative advantage in the field of social protection, but its innovative role in this area was not matched with technical and operational capacity. Overall, WFP is still perceived as a primarily humanitarian organization, with less comparative advantage in development sectors.</i></p> | <p>The core strengths of the CO over the evaluation period have been the rapid humanitarian response, and comparative advantage in school feeding, as well as innovation with limited means.</p> <p>Strategic decisions took internal and external constraints into account although operational constraints were not always adequately acknowledged.</p> | <p><i>Recommendations 5 and 7 as above</i></p> |

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| EQ 2 - Factors and Quality of Strategic Decision Making | | | |
| <i>Sub-question 1: Extent to which WFP analysed the national hunger, food security, livelihoods, nutrition, social protection and gender context, and appropriately targeted its interventions using this analysis</i> | | | |
| 2.2.1 | <p><i>The country context is characterized by few studies and a lack of accurate up-to-date information. WFP conducted analysis both at the overall context and at thematic levels to feed into its choices. Gender was included in most analysis, but lacked depth in some reports/lines of inquiry. Across the portfolio a number of key recommended studies/evaluations have not been implemented. Humanitarian assessments focused on food security and followed standard guidelines, but were not systematically followed up in design and implementation. Existing data from other sources were used to inform decisions on targeting in school feeding, where no studies were specifically commissioned, with the exception of the work on local procurement (cassava and palm oil). In social protection and nutrition, various studies were done by WFP, however these studies missed out on a number of key lines of inquiry. WFP did not carry out a study on HIV to better understand the nutritional challenges facing PLWHA.</i></p> | <p>WFP used available studies and data to inform decision making on priorities and programme content, and supplemented this with its own analysis through studies. These studies, while relevant, missed out on key aspects, which affected coherence in design and implementation. This was reflected, amongst others, in WFP's gender approach where sensitivity to specific gender constraints/issues of target groups was superficial.</p> <p>Where independent assessments were done – as in the case of the safety net evaluation – these were not of good quality, which reduced the extent to which lessons can be drawn to inform future programming. In the case of the safety net programme the pilot period is ending without an adequate assessment on which to base further engagement in</p> | <p><i>Recommendation 7 as above</i></p> <p><u><i>Recommendation 1 (CO with support from RB and HQ):</i></u> <i>Conduct an independent formative evaluation of the safety net programme to inform the planned scale-up and identify priorities and strategies for continued support to this area as a main component of the new CSD.</i></p> <p><u><i>Recommendation 2 (CO):</i></u> <i>As part of the immediate implementation of school feeding, the CO should – in collaboration with partners – identify elements of the Essential Package that can realistically be rolled out on a pilot basis in the current programme in line with corporate guidance, and progressively rolled-out to all schools supported by WFP within the new CSD period.</i></p> |

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| | | this area. | |
| Sub-question 2: Extent to which WFP contributed to placing these issues on the national agenda, to developing related national or partner strategies and to developing national capacity in the context of transition towards development and national ownership | | | |
| 2.2.2 | <p><i>WFP worked closely with the Government to help build the national social protection agenda. In education, WFP supported the GoC efforts to develop a legal framework and guidance on school feeding and the visit to the Brazil Centre of Excellence contributed to broader sectoral capacity development. Overall national capacity development was a minor, but growing, component of the portfolio and covered all four component areas. It was not informed by a specific analysis of capacity constraints.</i></p> <p><i>WFP's focus on capacity development of the Government (an important governmental priority) only emerged in the latter part of the evaluation period.</i></p> | <p>WFP enhanced the pertinence of its engagement by supporting the Government in working towards strengthening national policies in specific priority areas of development – school feeding and social protection. The engagement with the Brazil Centre of Excellence contributed to broader capacity development in the sector.</p> <p>The capacity constraints had implications at operational level in terms of efficiency and effectiveness (see EQ3).</p> | <p><u>Recommendation 8 (HQ, RB and CO):</u> <i>Conduct a review of CO staffing needs in light of the CSD priorities in social protection, market analysis and disaster preparedness and mitigation.</i></p> <p><u>Recommendation 9 (CO with RB support):</u> <i>Before to the implementation of the new CSD, conduct a comprehensive review of the CO monitoring and reporting practices based on the new Strategic Results Framework to strengthen links between data collection, processing and use of data for decision-making.</i></p> <p><u>Recommendation 6 (CO with support from RB):</u> <i>Develop a joint WFP-Government capacity development plan for the priority areas in the new CSD and ensure its inclusion in the detailed planning for the component areas.</i></p> |

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| Sub-question 3: Extent to which WFP had sufficient technical expertise (either internal or through partnerships) to strategically manage the different interventions under the portfolio | | | |
| 2.2.3 | <i>Over the evaluation period, WFP expanded from a humanitarian and recovery- oriented portfolio to one with a strong development focus. An increase in WFP's staffing – technical and operational - took place to compensate for gaps that were identified at the start of the evaluation period. However, WFP human resource increases for the growing portfolio - with two new development operations from 2011 - did not meet the needs of a growing portfolio, in spite of human resource achievements being larger than planned. The planned involvement of NGOs to support implementation of these programmes did not materialise.</i> | <p>A major constraint on WFP's achievement of outputs was that its ambitious evolving agenda was not matched with the resources for implementation.</p> <p>The CO had only limited human resources and technical expertise.</p> <p>These were not commensurate with the size and evolving nature of the portfolio or to the context.</p> | <p>Recommendation 8 (HQ, RB and CO): <i>as above</i></p> <p>Recommendation 10 (CO with RB and HQ support): <i>Draw up a funding strategy from 2014 onwards to support deliberate advocacy with the Government for funding of operations and staff in line with the agreed CSD and transition plan.</i></p> |
| Sub-question 4: Extent to which WFP developed and implemented appropriate monitoring and evaluation systems to support strategic decision-making | | | |
| 2.2.4 | <i>Across the portfolio component systems to collect monitoring data were put in place and provided a range of mostly output-related data. WFP did not consistently carry out baseline</i> | WFP's monitoring systems were reasonably effective in measuring outputs (as can be seen from reports on beneficiary numbers), but less consistent | Recommendation 9 <i>as above.</i> |

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| | <p><i>studies. Analysis of monitoring data was done at an operational level to feed into reporting, but the link between this information and decision-making was not consistently made, within WFP and within government. Information on outcomes was collected inconsistently, further hampering analysis of effectiveness over time. In the area of education and social protection, government staff were involved in monitoring and did not consistently supply all the required data.</i></p> | <p>in terms of follow-up on outcomes, and on comparing these to inputs. The link between M&E and decision-making was not consistently made, within WFP and within government. While the GoC personnel were appropriately involved in some monitoring tasks, training, motivation and co-ordination of these inputs were inadequate, so that data flows were inconsistent and incomplete. These weaknesses make it difficult to offer a complete assessment of effectiveness.</p> | |
| <p><i>Sub-question 5: Extent to which WFP entered into and managed appropriate operational partnerships</i></p> | | | |
| 2.2.5 | <p><i>Opportunities for partnership were generally scarce over the evaluation period given the paucity of partners to work with. Operational partnerships were entered into across different portfolio components, involving government, the private sector (in social protection), the UN (humanitarian) and NGOs (for humanitarian and nutrition work). Partnerships predominantly focused on logistical support for the delivery of food and services. The later part</i></p> | <p>WFP operated in a constrained context as far as partnership opportunities was concerned. However, there were missed opportunities to rigorously identify partners in the early part of the evaluation period, and to engage in partnerships that went beyond engagement at the level of logistics and distribution.</p> | <p><i>Recommendation 7 as above</i></p> |

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| | <p><i>of the evaluation period saw the establishment of partnerships with government in social protection and education that had a more technical focus. It proved difficult to develop substantial partnerships due to staff constraints at the CO, and of the limited partnership culture in the Congo. The latter part of the evaluation period saw some effort to undertake partnership reviews and assessments.</i></p> | | |
| <p><i>Sub-question 6: Extent to which WFP was driven by internal and external factors in making strategic choices and/or alterations to the portfolio over the period</i></p> | | | |
| 2.2.6 | <p><i>External factors that affected the portfolio included logistics constraints, the MIC context, the shift from humanitarian to development context, little capacity for partnerships, refugees from DRC and unforeseen events (4th of March explosions). On the internal side factors included considerable shortfalls in funding, the entrepreneurial leadership of the CO, WFP corporate strategies, and CO capacities and constraints.</i></p> | <p>It remains essential for WFP to maintain its capacity for rapid and effective humanitarian interventions.</p> <p>The evolving country context requires a commitment to food assistance and livelihood security interventions that moves beyond traditional humanitarian skills and resources into challenging new areas of skills, systems and delivery that have a much longer-term focus. However, the changed focus of the portfolio and the demands of working closely with Government in a MIC context were not matched by the skills set (technical level and profile of</p> | <p><i>Recommendations 10 and 8 as above</i></p> |

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| | | expertise of staff, balance of international and local staff) that was necessary in light of these changes. In spite of these challenges the CO was a pioneer in securing government commitment and funding. | |
| EQ3 - Performance and Results | | | |
| <i>Sub-question 1: The level of efficiency and effectiveness of the main WFP programme activities and explanations</i> | | | |
| <i>Sub-question 2: The level of synergy and multiplying effect between similar activities in different operations and between the various main activities, and with partners at operational level</i> | | | |
| <i>Sub-question 5: The potential contribution to impact and sustainability of the main WFP programme activities and explanation for those results</i> | | | |
| 2.3.1 | <p><u>Humanitarian</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Overall, over 80% of planned beneficiaries were reached, with the exception of EMOP 200408. -Across operations there have been discrepancies between planned and reached beneficiaries, usually because of changes in the type of beneficiary. - Distributions were not regular, nor did they consistently fulfil the planned 30-day ration | <p>WFP reacted rapidly in the case of emergencies, and overall was efficient in the initial response to such situations.</p> <p>However, across the portfolio the evaluation highlighted weaknesses in design, planning, implementation and monitoring, which together resulted in beneficiaries receiving irregular or incomplete rations, or in the case of the safety net project incomplete payments.</p> | <p><i>All recommendations as per above and specifically</i></p> <p>Recommendation 4 (CO): <i>Ensure the humanitarian assistance component under the new CSD includes capacity development of the Government and operational partners, especially in the area of disaster mitigation and preparedness</i></p> |

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| | <p>(both in terms of food basket and total calories).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - There have been regular pipeline breaks from 2009-2012. - Whilst WFP tried to respond quickly to the explosion in Brazzaville they were dependent upon government for beneficiary lists. MASAH wanted WFP to support IDPs in camps until a list of those in host families was established, as there were problems with people pretending to have been affected. - Financing has been problematic across the humanitarian operations. | <p>In the humanitarian domain improvements in nutritional status of refugee populations were recorded but it is not possible to establish to what extent these are attributable to WFP, given other factors in the environment.</p> | |
| 2.3.2 | <p><u>Health and Nutrition</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Planned beneficiaries have deviated from beneficiaries actually reached across operations and target groups. Planned support to malnourished children under two different operations did not materialize due to the lack of partner NGOs. - Safety net programme - the conditionality of health visits was not enforced under this pilot and none of the beneficiaries were excluded for | <p>There is evidence that nutritional support brought about improved nutritional recovery and HIV survival rates for PLWHA, and that is has been associated with higher TB treatment adherence and completion. However, no data were available for other nutrition related work (PMTCT and attendance at health clinics by pregnant or lactating women).</p> | <p><i>All recommendations as per above</i></p> |

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| | <p>not complying.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Furthermore, achievements have been uneven suggesting that rations distributed to beneficiaries were incomplete. <p>Across the portfolio the evaluation highlighted weaknesses in design, planning, implementation and monitoring, which together resulted in beneficiaries receiving irregular or incomplete rations.</p> | | |
| 2.3.3 | <p><u>Education</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Schools with school feeding have seen an increase in enrolment on a year-by-year basis, from a target of 6% in 2010 to 25.7% in 2012. - The ratio of girls to boys in the targeted schools has increased from 0.90 (2008) to 0.95 in 2012 (national gender parity index was 0.9 in 2009). - Attendance rates at schools with school feeding have been consistently high throughout the evaluation period - School feeding programme has resulted in increased enrolment by indigenous children. | <p>In education, WFP-supported schools saw an increase in enrolment and attendance and an improvement in gender parity, compared to baselines. However, the overall effectiveness of school feeding could have been greater if the approach had included a more comprehensive Essential Package (including school health and nutrition interventions to reinforce basic education). Gender issues need addressing.</p> | <p><i>Recommendations 2 as above and</i></p> <p><i>Recommendation 3 (CO):</i> <i>Before the 2013/2014 school year, the CO –in cooperation with the Government and IPHD – should review the current approach to community cooks and ensure that appropriate compensation is provided (in line with WFP school feeding policy), harmonised among partners, and proposed for inclusion in the school feeding strategy of the Government.</i></p> |

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| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The number of feeding days has gone up over the evaluation period. However, in 2012 on a quarter of the school days no rations were distributed, and when distributed rations have not always been complete. - The school feeding intervention has been narrowly focused on provision of meals and has not included most of the elements of an Essential School Feeding Package as defined by WFP/UNICEF. - Issues were noted around selection/coercion of women into providing 'voluntary' participation as cooks, as well as issues of motivation related to the abolition of the food ration that was provided to them until the beginning of 2012/2013 school year - These school feeding results were achieved at what have been higher than average costs globally | | |
| 2.3.4 | <p><u>Social Protection</u></p> <p>-The social protection pilot project reached all the intended categories of beneficiary, although targets were exceeded in some cases and not</p> | <p>In the safety net intervention it is too early to make an informed assessment of effectiveness.</p> <p>WFP's nutrition and safety net interventions focused on particularly</p> | <p><i>All recommendations as per above and specifically recommendation 1</i></p> |

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| | <p>reached in others.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Programme targeting was partially skewed towards women, and the gender imbalance was increased by men’s reluctance to engage with the medical and social services that might lead to their registration for social transfers. -Only 14.5% of the planned amount of funds was transferred during 2012. Two of the nine monthly transfers that should have occurred following the delayed start in April 2012 did not take place. -Numerous operational and logistical problems arose during the pilot period. - Interviews revealed that beneficiaries, and a number of MASAHS and other officials, saw the benefits received as strictly temporary, and anticipated a relapse into total poverty and poorer nutrition once they ceased. They pointed out that the project did not include measures to help achieve more resilient and sustainable livelihoods. -The synergistic links between the CO and MASAHS ensured that the latter felt ownership of the safety net pilot from the outset. | <p>vulnerable groups (women, children and PLWHA) within the urban population where the majority of the poor people live.</p> <p>WFP made a significant and valued contribution to the development of the GoC policy and practice in the field of social protection, although this remains work in progress.</p> <p>In the key new area of engagement in social protection, in spite of the CO’s efforts, WFP could not be objectively judged at the end of the evaluation period as fully capable of managing the relatively small-scale pilot social protection programme, let alone anything larger.</p> | |

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| | <p>-WFP achieved a strong profile with regard to social protection in the Congo by identifying an area of strategic development that was highly relevant to the needs of the largely impoverished population.</p> <p>- Operationally, WFP and its government and private sector partners did not have the human resources or the systems to implement this activity adequately, even on a pilot scale.</p> | | |

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Acronyms

| | |
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| AARREC | Agency for the Assistance of Refugees and Repatriated |
| ADB | African Development Bank |
| AEO | African Economic Outlook |
| AER | Annual Evaluation Report |
| AIDS | Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome |
| ALNAP | Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action |
| ART | Antiretroviral Therapy |
| BMI | Body Mass Index |
| CAS | Social Action Centres |
| CERF | Central Emergency Response Fund |
| CFSVA | Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis |
| CNLS | Conseil national de lutte contre le VIH/SIDA |
| COMPAS | Commodity Movement, Processing and Analysis System |
| CO | Country Office |
| CP | Country Programme |
| CPE | Country Portfolio Evaluation |
| CSB | Corn-soya blend |
| CSD | Country Strategy Document |
| DAC | Development Assistance Committee (of the OECD) |
| DEV | WFP Development Project |
| DFID | Department for International Development (UK) |
| DOTS | Directly Observed Treatment, Short-course |
| DRC | Democratic Republic of Congo |
| EB | Executive Board |
| ECOM | Congolese household survey |
| EDSC | Enquête Démographique et de Santé du Congo |
| EFSA | Emergency Food Security Assessment |
| EIU | Economist Intelligence Unit |
| EM | Evaluation Manager for OEV unit |
| EMOP | WFP Emergency Operation |
| EQ | Evaluation Question |
| EQAS | Evaluation Quality Assurance System |
| EU | European Union |
| FAM | Food Assistance Monitor |
| FAO | Food and Agriculture Organization |
| FFA | Food for Assets |
| FFT | Food for Training |
| FFW | Food for Work |
| FGD | Focus Discussion Group |
| FLA | Field Level Agreement |
| GDP | Gross Domestic Product |

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| GFD | General Food Distribution |
| GHI | Global Hunger Index |
| GIEWS | Global Information and Early Warning System |
| GoC | Government of the Congo |
| HDI | Human Development Index |
| HDR | Human Development Report |
| HIV | Human immunodeficiency virus |
| HQ | Headquarters |
| IDP | Internally Displaced Person |
| IEC | Information, Education and Communication |
| IFPRI | International Food Policy Research Institute |
| ILO | International Labour Organization |
| INGO | International Non Governmental Organization |
| IMF | International Monetary Fund |
| IPHD | International Partnership for Human Development |
| IR | evaluation Inception Report |
| IRA | Immediate Response Account |
| JAM | Joint Assessment Mission |
| M&E | Monitoring and Evaluation |
| MASAH | Ministry for Social Action and Humanitarian Affairs |
| MCHN | Maternal and Child Health and Nutrition |
| MDG | Millennium Development Goal |
| MEPSA | Ministère de l'Enseignement Primaire et Secondaire chargé de l'Alphabétisation |
| MIC | Middle Income Country |
| MoAL | Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock |
| MoE | Ministry of Education |
| MoHP | Ministry of Health and Population |
| MoP | Ministry of Planning |
| MoSA | Ministry of Social Affairs |
| MSF | Médecins Sans Frontières |
| MT | Metric Tonnes |
| MTN | Mobile Technology Network |
| NAEC | Nutrition Assessment, Education and Counselling |
| NDP | National Development Plan |
| n.d. | no date |
| NFSP | National Food Security Policy |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organisation |
| NNP | National Nutrition Policy |
| NNS | National Nutrition Strategy |
| ODA | Official Development Assistance |
| OEV | Office of Evaluation |
| OECD | Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development |
| PAP | Priority Action Plan |

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| PLW | Pregnant and Lactating women |
| PLWHA | People Living With HIV/AIDS |
| PMTCT | Preventing Mother-to-Child Transmission |
| PNDS | National Plan for the Development of Health |
| PNLT | National Programme against Tuberculosis |
| PRRO | Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation |
| PRSP | Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper |
| PTA | Parent-Teacher Association |
| RB | Regional Bureau |
| RC | Resident Coordinator |
| RENAPC | Réseau National des Associations des Positifs du Congo |
| RoC | Republic of Congo |
| RUF | Ready-to-Use-Food |
| SER | Summary Evaluation Report |
| SO | Special Operation |
| SPR | Standard Project Report |
| SSI | Semi structured interview |
| STD | Sexually Transmitted Disease |
| SUN | Scaling Up Nutrition |
| TB | Tuberculosis |
| TBC | to be confirmed |
| ToC | Theory of Change |
| ToR | Terms of Reference |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNAIDS | Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS |
| UNCT | United Nations Country Team |
| UNDAF | United Nations Development Assistance Framework |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |
| UNEG | United Nations Evaluation Group |
| UNESCO | United Nations Education Scientific and Cultural Organization |
| UNFPA | United Nations Population Fund |
| UNGASS | United Nations General Assembly Special Session |
| UNHCR | United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees |
| UNICEF | United Nations Children's Fund |
| UNOCHA | United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs |
| USA | United States of America |
| USAID | United States Agency for International Development |
| VAM | Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping |
| VIH | Virus de l'immunodéficience humaine |
| WB | World Bank |
| WFP | World Food Programme |
| WHO | World Health Organisation |

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