

## OPERATIONS EVALUATIONS

### MADAGASCAR, PROTRACTED RELIEF AND RECOVERY (PRRO) 200065 “RESPONSE TO RECURRENT NATURAL DISASTERS AND SEASONAL FOOD INSECURITY IN MADAGASCAR”:

#### AN EVALUATION OF WFP’S OPERATION JULY 2010 – NOVEMBER 2013

24 March 2014

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World Food Programme



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## Operational Factsheet

<b>Country: Madagascar</b>
<b>Title/ type/ number of operation: PRRO 200065: Response to Recurrent Natural Disasters and Seasonal Food Insecurity in Madagascar</b>
<b>Time frame:</b> Initial: 2 years (1 July 2010 – 30 June 2012) Revised: 4 years (01 July 2010 - 30 June 2014)
<p>Number of budget revisions: 5</p> <p>Brief description/ purpose:</p> <p><b>BR 1, BR2 and BR4</b> were mainly of a technical nature, adjusting various budget costs elements to reflect actual costs.</p> <p><b>BR 3 (June 2012):</b> Extension of project duration by one year (up to end June 2013), increase in food requirements (by 19,612 MT) and overall budget (by US\$16.4 million), and set of programmatic changes:</p> <p><u>Relief component:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Introduction of 20-days Food-for-Assets (FFA) projects after 5-days general food distribution (GFD) in drought-affected areas; continuation of 25-days GFD in cyclone-affected areas</li> </ul> <p><u>Early recovery component:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Hand-over of nutrition for pregnant and lactating women (PLW) component to the CP, continuation of targeted supplementary feeding for 90 days for treatment of moderate acute malnutrition (MAM);</li> <li>- Shift to 100-days FFA in lean season (instead of 60-days), and addition of a 25-days Cash-for-Assets (CFA) pilot project after each harvest season for 5,000 participants;</li> <li>- Addition of capacity development component aimed at supporting local authorities in collaboration with BNGRC (re-engagement with Government after elections), and technical support to farmers associations.</li> </ul> <p><b>BR 5 (July 2013):</b> Extension of project duration by one year (up to end June 2014), increase in food requirements (by 23,932 MT), the budget for cash transfers (US\$284,000), and overall budget (US\$18.2 million), revision of the composition of the daily food rations, and again some programmatic changes:</p> <p><u>Relief component:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Introduction of 10-days Food-for-Assets (FFA) projects after 15-days GFD in cyclone-affected areas, and increase in no. of FFA participants;</li> </ul> <p><u>Early recovery component:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Hand-over of MAM treatment to the CP (closure of nutrition component);</li> <li>- Shift to 140-days FFA (instead of 100 days) and increase in no. of participants, and continuation of the CFA pilot for 5,000 participants;</li> <li>- Addition of training on Emergency Food Security Assessments (EFSA) under the capacity development component.</li> </ul>

Other on-going WFP operations in the period July 2010 up to present:

**a) CP 103400 (2005-December 2014)**

Through Country Programme 103400<sup>1</sup>, WFP is addressing chronic food insecurity and stunting in the southern and south-eastern regions and urban areas in Madagascar through a set of three interventions:

- Support to basic education;
- Mitigation of natural disasters and environmental protection;
- Prevention of malnutrition through seasonal blanket feeding for children aged 6-23 months as well as support to tuberculosis patients and people living with HIV (PLHIV).

<b>Objectives</b>		
<b>Objectives:</b>	<b>Strategic Objectives (SOs*):</b>	<b>Activities:</b>
Reduced/stabilized acute malnutrition in children under 5 in targeted populations**	<b>SO 1</b>	<b>RELIEF</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Targeted SFP for moderately malnourished children aged 6-59 months and pregnant and lactating women<sup>2</sup></li> <li>• GFD</li> <li>• Low-tech FFA</li> </ul>
Improved food consumption for targeted emergency-affected households		
Reduced hazard risk at community level in drought- and cyclone prone areas***	<b>SO 2</b>	<b>DISASTER PREPAREDNESS AND MITIGATION</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• FFA</li> <li>• CFA</li> </ul>
Restore the livelihoods of food-insecure households	<b>SO 3</b>	<b>EARLY RECOVERY</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• FFA</li> <li>• CFA<sup>3</sup></li> </ul>
Help the Government in establishing sustainable mechanisms to respond to natural disasters****	<b>SO 5</b>	<b>CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Capacity development to local authorities</li> <li>• Technical support to farmers</li> </ul>
Increase marketing opportunities at national level through WFP local purchases		

\* The CO is in the process of realigning the logframe with the new Strategic Plan (2014-2018) and new Strategic Results Framework for the year 2014. However, given that this evaluation will cover the period 2010-2013, reference is made to the Strategic Plan (2008-2013) with its Strategic Objectives (SOs).

\*\* This objective was removed in the new logframe as part of Budget Revision 5 (July 2013).



\*\*\* The objectives were added in the new logframe (BR5, July 2013).

\*\*\*\* This component was added in the new logframe (BR5, July 2013).

<sup>1</sup>While the Country Programme initially was planned to cover a period of 5 years (2005-2009), the current programme has been extended various times because the enduring political crisis since 2009 does not allow planning of new medium-term interventions.

<sup>2</sup>The nutrition programme was intended to only to be started up when GAM levels were exceeding 8 percent. This situation did not occur in the period 2010-2012 so that no supplementary feeding has taken place as part of the PRRO.


<sup>3</sup>This element was added as part of Budget Revision 3 (June 2012) and further elaborated in Budget Revision 5 (July 2013).

Main Partners																					
<b>Government:</b> Bureau National de Gestion de Risques et Catastrophes (BNGRC), Cellule de Prévention et de Gestion d'Urgences (CPGU), Office National de Nutrition (ONN)																					
<b>NGOs :</b> International: CARE International, CARITAS, Reggio Terzo Mundo (RTM), Interaide, Welthungerhilfe (AAA), ; National: CARITAS, Manao, Tainy Maitso, ECAR Agex, Ampelamitraoke, Hiara Hampandroso, Multi-Action pour le Developpment Rural, Association Secours Organisation Sante																					
<b>UN Agencies:</b> UNFPA, FAO, IFAD, UNICEF																					
Inputs																					
<p><b>\$ Dollar value of operation:</b></p> <p><b>Requirements: US\$ 63.5 million</b></p> <p><b>Received: US\$ 29.0 million (27 Oct. 2013)</b></p> <p><b>% against appeal: 45.7%</b></p>	<p><b>Main Donors and % of contributions:</b></p>  <table border="1"> <caption>Main Donors and % of contributions</caption> <thead> <tr> <th>Category</th> <th>Value</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Received</td> <td>\$29,040,314</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Shortfall against requirements</td> <td>\$36,513,479</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>  <table border="1"> <caption>Breakdown of Contributions by Donor</caption> <thead> <tr> <th>Donor</th> <th>Value</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Multilateral</td> <td>\$10,620,051.00</td> </tr> <tr> <td>U.S.A.</td> <td>\$4,325,600.00</td> </tr> <tr> <td>France</td> <td>\$3,702,853.00</td> </tr> <tr> <td>UN CERF</td> <td>\$3,307,144.00</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Japan</td> <td>\$1,980,000.00</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Others</td> <td>\$5,104,666.00</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Category	Value	Received	\$29,040,314	Shortfall against requirements	\$36,513,479	Donor	Value	Multilateral	\$10,620,051.00	U.S.A.	\$4,325,600.00	France	\$3,702,853.00	UN CERF	\$3,307,144.00	Japan	\$1,980,000.00	Others	\$5,104,666.00
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## Outputs

**Actual vs. Planned Beneficiaries by Activity** (covering entire project duration):



### Key Observations:

Data for 2013 include distributions up to end September


GFD: In 2011 there was no major cyclone but Cyclone Giovanna in 2012. Cyclone Haruna in 2013 covered in separate EMOP

Actual vs. Planned on beneficiaries for FFW shows declining trend.

Tonnage moved in 2012 affected by serious budget constraints

For 2013 considerable volume of FFA in period October- December (first part of 'soudure')

**Actual vs. Planned Food Distributed** (in MT, covering entire project duration):




<b>Outcomes</b>					
	<b>Indicator:</b>	<b>Target value</b>	<b>2010 Baseline value</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>
<b>SO 1</b>	Prevalence of acute malnutrition among children under 5 (weight-for-height as %)*	Keep GAM below 10%	<b>5.4 – 8.1</b>	<b>7.4</b>	
	Household Food Consumption Score (FCS)	FCS >= 21.5 for >80% of targeted households	<b>27 - 42</b>	<b>18 - 51</b>	<b>3 - 51</b>
<b>SO 2**</b>	Community Asset Score (CAS)	Increased CAS in >= 80% of targeted communities			
	Level of community ownership of assets created	80% of assets created by FFA are managed and maintained by the communities on regular basis			
<b>SO 3</b>	Household Food Consumption Score (FCS)	FCS >= 35 for >80% of targeted households	<b>15 – 65</b>	<b>18 – 50</b>	<b>12 – 55</b>
	Coping Strategies Index (CSI)**	Decreased CSI for >= 80% of beneficiaries having high CSI			
	Community Asset Score (CAS)**	Increased CAS in >= 80% of targeted communities			
<b>SO 5**</b>	Percentage of food purchased locally	<b>&gt;= 20%</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>11.3</b>	<b>6.3</b>

\* Outcome indicator was removed from logframe attached to BR5 (June 2013)

\*\* SO 2 and SO 5 and two of the three outcome indicators for SO3 were recently added to the logframe (BR 5, June 2013)

# Operation Map



## Executive Summary

### Operations Evaluation of the Madagascar PRRO

1. Within the new WFP Operations Evaluation approach, IRAM conducted the evaluation of PRRO 200065 that aims to respond to food security and nutrition needs among the Malagasy population in relation to recurrent natural disasters (cyclones/floods and droughts). The evaluation process stretched from October 2013 to February 2014 and was based on three main questions: (a) How appropriate is the operation; (b) What are the results of the operation; and (c) Why and how has the operation produced observed results.
2. PRRO 200065 (including five Budget Revisions) is a 4 years operation (1 July 2010-30 June 2014) and covers the cyclone-prone Eastern coastal strip and the drought-prone Southern part of Madagascar. It combines a relief component for emergency assistance directly after the shock (SO1) with an early recovery component (SO3). New elements on disaster preparedness and mitigation (SO2) and capacity development (SO5) were added as part of the last Budget Revision (July 2013). As per the plan (incl. all Budget Revisions), the PRRO intended to reach 516,000 beneficiaries per year and deliver a total of 76,339 MT (total resource requirement US\$ 63.6 million). However, due to funding difficulties (contribution level by October 2013 was only 46%), achievements have been considerably lower. The PRRO is juxtaposed to the WFP Country Programme for Madagascar, and in 2013 an EMOP was launched in response to Cyclone Haruna.

### Key findings on appropriateness of the PRRO

3. The PRRO is in line with the WFP Strategic Results Framework 2008-2013, and incorporates the WFP indicators for vulnerability assessment and results monitoring. After the last budget revision, the PRRO covers the full spectrum from disaster preparedness to relief to early recovery. The PRRO also is in line with the WFP Nutrition Policy, the WFP Policy on DRR, the WFP Cash & Vouchers directive, and the WFP Capacity Development and Hand-Over Policy.
4. In term of linkage with national policies, the PRRO initial document (and the following budget revisions) mainly referred to the Madagascar Action Plan 2007-2012, the National Policy for Disaster and Risk Management (2003), the National Nutrition Policy (2004). Apart from some slight deviations, the PRRO generally is in line with these policies.
5. The 2009 political crisis in Madagascar has deeply affected possibilities of institutional and working coordination between the government and WFP CO. These constraints were addressed through developing partnerships with national and international NGOs. The presence of NGO networks at field-level is related to the existence of large EU and USAID programs (DIPECHO I+II, PASA, PRONUMAD, SALOHI). Coordination within all these actors is done by the regional clusters on Food Security and Livelihoods, led by FAO/WFP, with limited participation from GoM side.
6. The geographical focus within the PRRO is in line with the findings of the food security assessments over past years that identify regions regularly hit by cyclones (South-East, East) and drought-prone zones (South / South-West) to be in need of support. The thematic focus in the PRRO is on food security for vulnerable

households, a domain where WFP has institutional capacity (in particular GFD and FFA / CFA). However, the PRRO does not directly refer explicitly to policies on integrated rural development and adaptation/mitigation in relation to the impact of climate change on vulnerable rural population groups in Madagascar.

7. The approach in Madagascar still is primarily food-based which by beneficiaries is seen as appropriate during the lean season or after cyclones when households face difficulty to access food. The pilots on inclusion of cash-based approaches at selected times of the year are in line with the new WFP policies on food assistance. The most appropriate transfer mechanisms in the Malgache local contexts still need to be further studied.

8. WFP is increasingly focusing on preventive aspects and chronic malnutrition<sup>4</sup> which in Madagascar is taken up through the Country Programme. The nutrition component in the PRRO was not activated as outright nutrition emergencies did not occur in recent years. Some of the elements under this component slightly deviate from the national nutrition policy in Madagascar.

### **Key findings on the results of the PRRO**

9. By end 2013, the PRRO total tonnage distributed was 31,788 MT (41.6% of what is planned for total programme period), with variations in amounts per district and per zone. Due to increasing budget constraints, realization was particularly below-plan for 2012 and 2013. The PRRO response to cyclones is concentrated on littoral areas, where cyclones and flood are recurrent. WFP interventions, specifically on SO2 and SO3, are possible due to the NGOs partners positioning in these areas. However, cyclones might also strike hinterlands, where NGOs partners do not offer the same coverage, limiting possibilities of recovery and mitigation interventions.

10. As the National SAP system was discontinued early 2011, geographical targeting in the drought-prone South and South-West of Madagascar has mainly been based on non independent and primarily qualitative information provided by partner agencies and from the communities.

11. The PRRO primarily consists of Food-for-Assets projects. General food distribution has been rather low as no major droughts occurred and relief responses after cyclones were short. No work has been undertaken under the nutrition component in the PRRO, and WFP has not supported any nutrition surveillance activities.

12. Quality of FFA micro projects depends on NGO capacities (technical and managerial), and the presence of medium/longer-term interventions to that the PRRO micro-project can link up with. Targeting of FFA participants is based on vulnerability (combination of WFP and partner NGO criteria). Depending on the local context, food distribution might either be a factor of community strengthening or create tensions.

13. Field visits suggest short-term impacts and largest benefits for better-off households with strong asset base. Overall, M&E systems are rather weak for the PRRO. Monitoring on the impacts of the FFA projects on reducing vulnerability was introduced too late to be able to be conclusive at this point in time. Yet, the causality chain of vulnerability is not clearly established, and isn't used as reference to adapt

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<sup>4</sup> Stunting is mentioned in the CFSVA studies as the main nutrition problem in Madagascar (primarily affecting the Central Plateau), but this is a chronic problem to be addressed through the Country Programme.

and target FFA to maximize benefits to the most vulnerable socio-economic groups. From that point of view, certain types of projects are more favorable to vulnerable groups than to others (agricultural intensification techniques on tenancy, diversification, etc.).

14. The pilots with cash-based approaches that started in 2013 are highly relevant in both drought-prone and cyclone-prone areas of Madagascar. WFP is still in the process of identifying the most suitable approaches, e.g. in terms of distribution channels, and the required height of the cash ration if this is to serve as a substitute for food-based approaches with equal 'local value'.

15. Capacity building efforts toward local authorities and information system have been negatively impacted by the 2009 crisis. However, the PRRO supported the BNGRC (supply of computers and communication equipment, training on DRM conducted by the WFP regional office, in RSA), while NGO partners training has been conducted on a yearly basis. Limited information is available on NGOs capacities assessment, type and number, and results of trainings. Limited Local Purchase tonnage is supplied by FOs, through the intermediation of AROPA project.

### **Key findings on the factors that affected the PRRO results**

16. Internal factors that contributed positively to achievement of PRRO results are primarily related to WFP's strong corporate policies and tools on food security, nutrition and VAM. As a UN agency, WFP is well-placed for re-launching intensive collaboration with the new Government. The overall scale of operations and sustained presence in selected parts of the country, based on an adequate partners network, well-established logistics including the prepositioning approach for the South-East, has helped WFP to reach out to many communities.

17. Various internal factors appear to have limited the level of results achieved. These primarily fall in the domain of management procedures, project administration, sectoral technical expertise, and collective learning processes. To a large extent they are related to the difficult funding situation that forced WFP Madagascar to reduce the number of senior staff positions. But there also is the fact that the PRRO lacks clear vision on vulnerable groups targeting and the type of needed interventions that will improve their resilience. The PRRO portfolio is rather dispersed with high number of districts covered and a high number of partners. Capacity building of Government agencies has been added to the PRRO but without the financial means attached to have any real impact.

18. External context factors that enhanced the level of results achieved by the PRRO are the rather good rainfall in the past years. The presence of two main ports in the South has greatly facilitated logistics. The professionalism and the expertise of partner NGOs are key determinants in the final quality of the PRRO interventions in the field (can be in either positive or negative ways).

19. On the other hand, implementation of the PRRO obviously has been negatively affected by the difficult economic and political conditions in Madagascar in the past years which have affected everyone including the international aid community. Disaggregation of the National SAP system has been particularly negative, impacting on availability of food security and nutrition data to design, target, and monitor interventions. Due to the political situation, institutional hand-over strategies and actions have been limited to non-existent.

### **Recommendations**

### *Strategic Positioning*

- i. Once the new President and parliament are installed, WFP needs to expand its engagement with the Government of Madagascar at national and regional levels (food security early warning system, nutrition surveillance, overall coordination of FFA/CFA). Continue to engage with other international and national stakeholders on food security/social protection, with the explicit aim to go more into joint programming and carefully managed 'joint' implementation.

### *Future Programme Design*

- ii. WFP to reconsider re-incorporating nutrition activities in the follow-up PRRO, with focus on capacity building at central and regional levels for nutrition surveillance (GAM rates) and on how to implement treatment of moderate acute malnutrition so that quick scaling-up of such programmes is possible in case of emergencies (preparedness). It is suggested to WFP for the next PRRO to improve on targeting (clearer profiling based on vulnerability), objectives (more resilience-oriented), and the procedures for selecting partner agencies and types of projects.
- iii. The technical quality and the durability of larger-scale FFA/CFA projects needs to be enhanced (feasibility studies, more durable construction materials, and embedding of the FFA micro-project in more integrated approaches).
- iv. Approaches for CFA projects still need to be further defined (payment norms, most suitable financial service provider channels). More thought is needed as to what information should be produced by VAM to complement the existing early warning information and PDM data.
- v. It is suggested to WFP to consider a shift in the approach for the cyclone-prone areas in Madagascar towards harmonization with how the PRRO operates in the drought-prone zones. This implies an overall prioritization of resilience and food security improvement as main entry points for FFA activities across the disaster cycle. Prepositioning in cyclone-prone parts of the country should be maintained.

### *Programme Management Systems*

- vi. WFP Madagascar needs to improve programme management quality, and should ensure that the VAM unit and the Sub-Offices have sufficient resources in line with the geographic and quantitative ambitions.
- vii. A collective learning process should be implemented by WFP, in collaboration with the Cooperating Partners and the communities that are targeted.
- viii. A more proactive strategy focusing on local purchase should be pursued by WFP Madagascar, through both tendering procedures towards private companies and direct transactions with farmers' organizations (FOs). Options should be explored for integration of one or more 'local' commodities in the food basket that are part of traditional diets. Such activities would require a certain financial tolerance (accept cost prices slightly higher than international market prices), but will contribute to the farmers' vulnerability reduction.

# 1. Introduction

## 1.1. Evaluation Features

20. Within the new approach for a series of operations evaluations in the period 2013-2015, the evaluation of the PRRO 200065 (Response to Recurrent Natural Disasters and Seasonal Food Insecurity in Madagascar)” was outsourced to IRAM. The evaluation took place in the period from October 2013 to February 2014. The results of the evaluation are expected to feed into the process of decision-making on the follow-up programme after completion of the current PRRO by end of June 2014. The main intended users of this evaluation are WFP Madagascar and its partners, the WFP Regional Bureau in Johannesburg, and the WFP Office of Evaluation.

21. As stated in the Terms of Reference (see Annex 1), this external evaluation focuses on the PRRO<sup>5</sup> and is intended to serve two mutually reinforcing objectives:

- **Accountability** –Assessment of the performance and results of the operation, leading to a set of conclusions and recommendations.
- **Learning** – Determination of the reasons why certain results occurred or not in order to draw lessons, derive good practices and identify pointers for learning.

22. In line with the ToR, the evaluation methodology (see Annex 2) was based on:

- An **evaluation matrix** based on the key evaluation questions in the ToR (Annex 3);
- Application of the set of **standard OECD/DAC** evaluation criteria (relevance, coherence, coverage, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, and connectedness/sustainability);
- **Triangulation** through use of mixed-methods approach and wide range of information sources: document review (Annex 4), key informant interviews in Antananarivo (Annex 5), and visits to the East, South-East, South, and South-West of Madagascar that included meetings with Sub-Office staff and other key informants at regional level, observations during visits to project sites, and focus group discussions with beneficiaries (Annex 6);
- Respecting the UN Evaluation Group’s (UNEG) norms and standards;
- Regular **feedback sessions** with WFP Madagascar staff to discuss findings;
- Organization of **two debriefing sessions**: a session with WFP Madagascar staff focused on joint assessment of the preliminary findings, and a presentation to and discussion with key stakeholders consulted during the mission (Annex 7);
- Preparation of the **Evaluation Report** in line with EQAS guidance.

23. The following three main evaluation questions were addressed in the evaluation:

- **Question 1: How appropriate is the operation?**  
Analysis of the extent to which the objectives, targeting, and choice of activities and of transfer modalities are (a) in line with the needs of the food-insecure population, (b) coherent with relevant stated national policies, (c) coherent with

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<sup>5</sup> With regards to the complementarity and coherence of the PRRO some reference is made in the report to the other two programmes that were implemented by WFP in Madagascar in the same time period (Country Programme and Emergency Operation).



the WFP policy framework, and (d) complementarity with other humanitarian and development interventions (including the WFP country programme -CP-).

- **Question 2: What are the results of the operation?**  
Analysis of the level of attainment of planned outputs and level of realisation of the operation objectives. Assessment how the PRRO activities are linked with the WFP CP interventions and those by other actors. Review of the efficiency of the operation and the likelihood that the benefits will continue after the end of the operation.
- **Question 3: Why and how has the operation produced observed results?**  
Analysis of the internal factors within WFP's control and the external factors in the operating environment in Madagascar that affected the results that were achieved.

24. While overall the evaluation team has been greatly assisted by the Country Office and the Sub-Offices, in terms of limitations to the evaluation process, a number of remarks can be made:

- The team had to invest considerable time in collection of information from the WFP Country Office, and only got this information in bits and pieces, even during the report writing process. The efficiency of the evaluation could have been higher if more information had been available upfront.
- The CO appeared not to avail of a lot of summary information beyond the SPRs on coverage was achieved, involved partners agencies, number of beneficiaries, and output achievements.
- The PRRO primarily consists of FFA with a small element of CFA. These activities are complex to be evaluated as their added value needs to be assessed from a wider perspective, i.e., perceiving it as a contribution to a larger package of work that is undertaken by other agencies.
- Finally, it needs to be mentioned that Madagascar is not only a large country but also that it is highly complex, with difficult political conditions, security constraints, an enormous agro-ecological variety, and both quick-onset (cyclones) and slow-onset (droughts, harvest failure due to locusts) disasters.

## 1.2. Country Context in Madagascar

### **Geography and economy**

25. Madagascar is the fourth largest island in the world with a total population amounting to 22.0 million (2012). The country consists of geographically very distinct zones:

- a) The east coast has the highest rainfall in the country (up to 4,000 mm annually) and is notorious for destructive cyclones during the rainy season.
- b) The central highlands range from 800 to 1800 m in altitude and offer huge variety, from eroded hills and extinct volcanoes to frugal alluvial plains and marshes where irrigated rice is grown. The capital Antananarivo is on this "*Hauts Plateaux*".

- c) The west coast is more indented than the east coast and better sheltered from cyclones. Silting up of harbours is a grave problem here. The alluvial plains have great agricultural potential but are thinly inhabited and largely unexplored.
- d) The south west and south consist of plateaux and lower-lying arid regions, with as little as 330 mm rainfall annually.

26. The GNI per capita in Madagascar is a mere US\$ 430 (2012<sup>6</sup>). After a short period with slight economic growth (2007-2008), the past years were marked by a stagnating economy. About two-thirds of the population live in conditions of poverty. Over 80% of the population live in rural areas, most of them depending on subsistence farming. The main crops produced are paddy rice, sweet potato, cassava, maize and sugar cane. There also is substantial production of cow's milk, vegetables, and tropical fruits<sup>7</sup>.

27. In the 2013 UNDP Human Development Report<sup>8</sup>, Madagascar ranks as 151 out of 187 countries and territories in the HDI. While the life expectancy considerably since the early eighties (from 48.2 years in 1980 to 66.9 years in 2012), the mean years of schooling has been stagnating since the millennium change at 5.2 years<sup>9</sup>, and the Gross National Income has deteriorated<sup>10</sup>.

28. As a result of the low levels of dietary diversity among many Malagasy households, chronic undernutrition (stunting<sup>11</sup> in particular but also micronutrient deficiencies for Vitamin A and iron) has a high prevalence and affects large parts of the population.

### **Disaster occurrence**

29. Madagascar is exposed to several natural hazards, the most frequent ones being cyclones, floods, fires, locust invasion and drought. In 2007-2008, 4 tropical cyclones affected 525.000 persons with damage estimation of 333 USD millions. During the last 35 years, the country has known 46 natural disasters (cyclones, droughts, epidemics, floods, locust plagues) affecting cumulatively more than 11 million people and causing damage estimated to 1 billion \$US<sup>12</sup>.

30. According to BNGRC<sup>13</sup>, studies conducted in 2008 by the Malagasy Direction of Meteorology on climate changes forecast an intensification of cyclones and heavy rains occurrence in the South-West basin of the Indian Ocean.

<sup>6</sup> See: <http://data.worldbank.org/country/madagascar>

<sup>7</sup> Source: <http://www.fao.org/countryprofiles/index/en/?iso3=MDG>

<sup>8</sup> See: <http://hdrstats.undp.org/images/explanations/MDG.pdf>

<sup>9</sup> This is slightly above the average for Sub-Saharan Africa.

<sup>10</sup> Expressed in 2005 Purchasing Power Parity.

<sup>11</sup> Stunting affects 50% of the population. Source:

[http://www.unicef.org/madagascar/Madagascar\\_At\\_a\\_Glance\\_2012.pdf](http://www.unicef.org/madagascar/Madagascar_At_a_Glance_2012.pdf)

<sup>12</sup> United Nations (2011). Rapport de mission du Rapport spécial des Nations Unies sur le Droit à l'alimentation, juillet 2011.

<sup>13</sup> Repoblikan'i Madagasikara (2013) - Plan national de Contingence – Cyclones et inondations 2012/2013 – Ministère de l'intérieur – BNGRC

Timeline of Key Events	
Food Security & Humanitarian Situation	<p>Signing of the « <i>Feuille de route</i> » (16 Sept 2011)</p> <p><b>PRRO (start July)</b>      <b>BR 1 (Feb.)</b>      <b>BR 3 (June)</b>  <b>BR 2 (Aug)</b>      <b>BR 4 (Nov)</b></p> <p>Cyclone <b>Hubert</b> (March 2010)      Cyclone <b>Bingiza</b> (Feb. 2011)      Cyclone <b>Giovanna</b> + Tropical Storm <b>Irina</b> (Jan/Feb. 2012)</p> <p>Locust plague (start April 2012)</p>
	<p>Presidential elections (1st round 25 Oct 2013 2<sup>nd</sup> round 20 Dec 2013)</p> <p><b>BR 5 (July)</b> →</p> <p>Cyclone <b>Haruna</b> (Feb. 2013)</p>

### Political context

31. After civil strife following a contested access to power of the president Marc Ravalomanana in 2002 and its reelection in 2006, Madagascar enjoyed relative political stability, bringing the economic growth back on track.. The new political crisis in March 2009, resulting in the settlement of a non-recognized government by international community, opened another period of uncertainty and economic stagnation. Public services have been deeply affected by this context, resulting on capacity and working means degradation at all levels (national, regional, local). Under strong international pressure, presidential elections are taking place end of 2013<sup>14</sup> which are hoped to restore a legal, internationally recognized Government.

32. The core within the Government of Madagascar (GoM) policy framework is formed by the Madagascar Action Plan (MAP) that was launched in 2007 and frames the efforts to reach the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). However, achievement of the targets is rather distant as public services delivery systems have become more and more eroded. The situation has been further aggravated by exogenous shocks like the food and oil crisis in 2008/09 and a number of hurricanes<sup>15</sup>.

33. The main national policy framework in relation to nutrition are the National Policy on Nutrition (Politique Nationale de Nutrition, 2004) and the National Plan of Action for Nutrition (Plan National d'Action pour la Nutrition, 2005-2009; 2012-2015), that both aim to reduce malnutrition and mortality for children under 5 years old.

34. The main national policies in relation to food security are:

- a) The National Programme on Rural Development (« *Programme national de développement rural*, PNDR, 2005) that aims at integration of less favoured regions into the national market, establishment of regional growth centres, and promotion of viable market value chains aimed at export<sup>16</sup>. The Agricultural

<sup>14</sup>With the assistance of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), presidential elections are currently being held in Madagascar. The first round of voting took place 24 October 2013; a second round of polling is scheduled for 20 December.

<sup>15</sup> Source: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/madagascar/overview>

<sup>16</sup> Plan national pour le développement rural (PNDR) 2005. Primature. République de Madagascar.

Sector Programme (2008) is a (non-finalized) draft for modernization of the agricultural sector in Madagascar through a value chain approach and public-private partnerships. The National Action Plan on Food Security (“*Plan d’Action National pour la Sécurité Alimentaire*” (PANSA) is a framework with horizon until 2015<sup>18</sup>.

b) The National Land Rights programme (2004-2015) aims at ensuring land ownership and a system of decentralized Cadastre offices which facilitates immigration and investments.

35. Core policies in relation to Disaster Risk Reduction are as follows:

a) The national strategy on management of risks and disasters<sup>19</sup> (2001), and the National Policy on Risk and Disaster Management<sup>20</sup> adopted in 2003. No action plan exists that translates the strategic axes for risk and disaster management into concrete actions. Key actors on DRR in Madagascar are reunited in the CRIC<sup>21</sup>. The focus here is on coordination, capacity building, and (re-)installation of a disaster information system.

b) Since 2005, Madagascar takes part in the Hyogo Framework for Action<sup>22</sup>. The National Platform is managed by the “*Bureau National de Gestion des Risques et des Catastrophes*” (BNGRC<sup>23</sup>) placed in the Ministry of Interior and Administrative Reform, which assists the ‘*Comité Nationale de Gestion de Risques et Crises*’ (CNGRC).

c) Recently, BNGRC has developed two contingency plans, one on responding to droughts, the other on responding to cyclones<sup>24</sup>. In these plans, multi-sectorial plans are presented in case of crises at minor, moderate and very serious levels.

*Box 1: Monitoring Systems<sup>25</sup> in Madagascar*

**Food Security monitoring:**

- The **SAP** (*Système d’Alerte Précoce*) was a food security information system for South Madagascar financed by the EU and managed by GoM (from 2009 onwards by WFP). It focussed on annual assessment of needs for food aid. The system was established in 1995, and early 2011, the EU decided to discontinue financing this system, because GoM was not ready to take over financial and managerial responsibility plus some more technical issues.
- The **SIRSA** (*Système d’Information Rurale et de Sécurité Alimentaire*) was also financed by the EU. It was a project that was implemented in 2 phases (2004-2007 and 2008-2010) by the Belgian consulting firm AEDES. SIRSA I covered the whole south (9 regions, monitoring in 304 communes) and aimed to identify risks and short-term

<sup>17</sup> In 2009, the Strategy on Agricultural Services was launched aimed at stimulating household-level agricultural production through a combination of technical support services and establishment of a fund for agricultural development at regional levels. In 2012 a national Strategy was adopted on Agricultural Training.

<sup>18</sup> A new Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries Sectoral Programme has been signed recently (October 2013) which relates to the Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP).

<sup>19</sup> Stratégie Nationale sur la Gestion des Risques et des Catastrophes (SNGRC)

<sup>20</sup> Politique Nationale sur la Gestion des Risques et des Catastrophes (PNGRC)

<sup>21</sup> The ‘*Comité de Réflexion des Intervenants en Cataclisme*’ (CRIC) is a donor-level coordination mechanism in Madagascar. Another platform for exchange is the ICPM (‘*L’Initiative Commune pour le Plaidoyer pour la Réduction des Risques et des Catastrophes à Madagascar*’) that brings together the implementing partners that operate with funding from DIPECHO (CARE, ICCO, SAF/FJKM, MedAir, MdM, FAO).

<sup>22</sup> Cadre d’Action de Hyogo (CAH)

<sup>23</sup> See: <http://www.bngrc.mg/>

<sup>24</sup> Repoblikani Madagasikara (2013), Plan National de Contingence - Insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle dans le Grand Sud 2013-15

<sup>25</sup> Système d’Alerte Précoce (SAP)

support needs, and to monitor socio-economic conditions in order to provide information as input for planning and monitoring of rural development interventions. After hand-over of the system to the Ministry of Agriculture, it was discontinued.

- The **FSMS** (Madagascar Food Security Monitoring System) was implemented by WFP with funding from the Spanish Government. The system took off with a full set of Quarterly Bulletins in 2010, but then were only published occasionally. After the first quarter in 2012 no more Bulletins have been produced.
- The **SSSA** (*'Système de Suivi de la Sécurité Alimentaire'*) is the commune-level information system within the USAID-funded Salohi programme (under the Resilience / Disaster Risk Reduction Component) which has been integrated in the FAO Early Warning system. Salohi also facilitated the publication of a **FEWSNET** (Famine Early Warning Systems Network) special report on Madagascar in October 2013.

#### **Disaster monitoring:**

- The **SIRCat**<sup>26</sup> (*'Système d'Information sur les Risques et les Catastrophes'*) was an information system established in 2001 by the BNGRC, which evolved into the BASE system until 2009, and then CERVO since 2012. Due to lack of external funding however, there is no continuous flow of data collection and analysis.
- The **SNAP** (*Système Nationale d'Alerte Précoce*) was established in 2005 in line with the VAC (Vulnerability Assessment Committee) promulgated by SADC. This system was halted in 2009 due to the political crisis.

#### **International assistance**

36. Because of the political crisis, international assistance for Madagascar has shrunk considerably in recent years and mostly was limited to humanitarian assistance. Good donor coordination exists through the recently established '*Secrétariat Multi-Bailleurs*'. While referring to Annex 8 for more details on evolution of funding level over the past years<sup>27</sup>, a short overview is provided here:

- a) Implementation of the 2008-2013 United National Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF)<sup>28</sup> has been piecemeal.
- b) The World Bank continued with governance and public sector capacity development, and employment and competitiveness as the two main development themes for Madagascar. The strategy for the interim period stresses the need to stay engaged and to provide priority assistance to the health and nutrition sectors, urgently needed rehabilitation of infrastructure, and provision of safety nets. The World Bank presented a plan to support Madagascar during the transition period after the new President will be installed<sup>29</sup>.
- c) For the European Commission (10<sup>th</sup> EDF), the longer-term focus is on supporting transport and infrastructure, and rural development and food security mainly via call for proposals mechanisms targeting NGOs and private sector<sup>30</sup>.
- d) USAID concentrates on health, population and nutrition<sup>31</sup>, and humanitarian assistance in relation to cyclones, floods and droughts<sup>32</sup>.

<sup>26</sup>L'Unité Système d'Information sur les Risques et les Catastrophes

<sup>27</sup> Recently, the OECD labelled Madagascar, Bangladesh and Malawi as 'Aid Orphans' receiving the lowest amounts of aid per capita (e.g. for Madagascar in 2011 only US\$ 20 per inhabitant while the average for Africa is US\$ 54 per inhabitant). See: [http://www.oecd.org/dac/aid-architecture/Identification\\_and\\_Monitoring\\_of\\_Potentially\\_Under-Aided\\_Countries.pdf](http://www.oecd.org/dac/aid-architecture/Identification_and_Monitoring_of_Potentially_Under-Aided_Countries.pdf)

<sup>28</sup> Because of the continuing political crisis, the context was not conducive for development of a new UNDAF. The current one therefore was extended by one year up to end 2014.

<sup>29</sup> World Bank (2013), Madagascar, Organiser le Réengagement, Présentation a l'Equipe-Pays du Système des Nations Unies, Vendredi 29 novembre 2013.

<sup>30</sup> See: [http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/scanned\\_mg\\_csp10\\_fr.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/scanned_mg_csp10_fr.pdf)



### 1.3. Operation Overview

Table 1: Key Characteristics PRRO 200065

<b>Approval</b>	August 2010 (by the Executive Director)	
<b>Duration</b>	Initial: 2 years (07/ 2010 – 06/2012)	Revised: <b>4 years (01/2010 - 06/2014)</b>
<b>Project document and Amendments</b>	<p>This <b>PRRO</b> is undertaken with the aim to respond to natural disasters related food security and nutrition needs. This includes preparedness, emergency assistance directly after the shock, and early recovery activities. The current PRRO was preceded by another PRRO (2006-2009 - see Annex 9 for evaluation findings).</p> <p>As shown in the Map in Annex 10, the <b>PRRO</b> overlaps with the WFP <b>Country Programme (CP)</b>. The CP is geared towards addressing chronic food insecurity and covers food for education, prevention of malnutrition through seasonal blanket feeding and nutrition support to TB patients and people living with HIV, and a food-for-assets for environmental protection and longer-term recovery<sup>33</sup>. Part of the South was also covered by an <b>EMOP</b><sup>34</sup> after Cyclone Haruna had struck.</p> <p>As explained in the project document, the PRRO is composed of <b>two components</b>:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>⇒ <b>A relief component</b> to address needs in relation to shocks in the first three months after the disaster. Assistance is provided in the form of General Rations Distribution (GFD), low-technology Food-for-Assets (FFA) and nutrition rehabilitation<sup>35</sup>;</li> <li>⇒ <b>An early recovery component</b> to provide follow-up support during the consecutive period of three months through Food-for-Asset projects on land management, environmental conditions, roads and social infrastructure.</li> </ul> <p>There have been <b>5 budget revisions</b>:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>⇒ <b>BR 1</b> (February 2011), <b>BR2</b> (August 2011) and <b>BR4</b> (November 2012) for adjusting the budget to actual costs levels<sup>36</sup>.</li> <li>⇒ <b>BR3</b> (June 2012) and <b>BR5</b> (July 2013) presented operational changes including timeframe extensions, shortening of the number of days of GFD provision after a shock, expansion of the duration and increase in number of FFA beneficiaries, insertion of the Cash-for-Assets modality, closing the nutrition component<sup>37</sup>, and addition of a capacity development component (ref. Annex 11).</li> </ul>	
<b>Planned beneficiaries and food requirements</b>	Initial: 516,000 (per year) In-kind: 32,795 MT of food Cash and vouchers: -	Revised: <b>516,000 (per year)</b> In-kind: <b>76, 339 MT of food</b> Cash and vouchers : <b>US\$566,000</b>
<b>Requirements</b>	Initial: US\$24.9 million	Revised: <b>US\$63.6 million</b>
<b>Contribution level (as of 10/2013)</b>	The operation received <b>US\$29.0 million (45.7% of budget after BR5): Multilateral (37%); USA (15%); France (13%); UN CERF (11%), Japan (7%).</b>	

<sup>31</sup> Salohi, a five-year Food-for-Peace food aid programme through NGOs was started in 2009.

<sup>32</sup> See: <http://www.usaid.gov/where-we-work/africa/madagascar>

<sup>33</sup> The CO ensured the evaluation team that there is no geographical overlap of the FFA projects in the same communes and that the focus for the CP is more developmental, e.g. reforestation and not directly related to natural disasters.

<sup>34</sup> EMOP 200548 (April-June 2013): 1207 MT, 9087 FFA participants (84% Tulear, 16% Ambovombe).

<sup>35</sup> The Project document mentions in areas where GAM rates exceed 10%, targeted nutrition support should be provided to acutely malnourished children under 5 and pregnant and lactating women.

<sup>36</sup> BR1 was necessary to increase budget for partner costs as the intended agreement with the consortium of US NGOs on food security monitoring did not work out, and as WFP due to the political instability and the related diminished national capacity needed to depend more on international NGOs. BR2 included costs for the drought response in 2010 and shift to international purchase for pulses and CSB due to supply and costs limitations on the domestic market. BR4 was on reducing Land Transport Shipping and Handling (LTSH) costs.

<sup>37</sup> In BR3, the component of nutrition support to pregnant and lactating women (PLW) was taken out of the PRRO (support to PLW further to be covered by the CP through a more preventive approach, i.e. blanket coverage in the lean season from October through December). The threshold for starting up support to MAM treatment (Targeted Supplementary Feeding, TSF) was set at 8% plus aggravating factors. But also these conditions did not occur as GAM prevalence data provided by ONN showed consistently low rates. In BR5 the TSF programme in the PRRO then was closed, with the proviso that if the ONN nutrition surveillance system would indicate the existence of nutrition problems, the programme would be reactivated.

Table 2: Objectives PRRO 200065

Objectives:	Strategic Objectives (SOs*):	Activities:	Remarks
Reduced/stabilized acute malnutrition in children under 5 in targeted populations	SO 1 (Relief)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Targeted SFP for moderately malnourished children aged 6-59 months and supplementary feeding for pregnant and lactating women</li> <li>GFD</li> <li>Low-tech FFA</li> </ul>	This objective was recently removed from the logframe (BR5, July 2013)
Improved food consumption for targeted emergency-affected households			
Reduced hazard risk at community level in drought- and cyclone prone areas***	SO 2 (Disaster preparedness and mitigation)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>FFA</li> <li>CFA</li> </ul>	This objective was recently added to the logframe (BR5, July 2013)
Restore the livelihoods of food-insecure households	SO 3 (Early recovery)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>FFA</li> <li>CFA<sup>38</sup></li> </ul>	
Help the Government in establishing sustainable mechanisms to respond to natural disasters**** Increase marketing opportunities at national level through WFP local purchases*****	SO 5 (Capacity development)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Capacity development to local authorities</li> <li>Technical support to farmers</li> </ul>	This objective was recently added to the logframe (BR5, July 2013) but actually already existed also under the previous PRRO. Local purchase was introduced at the start of the current PRRO, based on a recommendation by the HQ formulation mission in January 2009

\* The CO is in the process of realigning the logframe with the new Strategic Plan (2014-2018) and new Strategic Results Framework for the year 2014. However, given that this evaluation will cover the period 2010-2013, reference is made to the Strategic Plan (2008-2013) with its Strategic Objectives (SOs).

37. Annex 12 provides an overview of the evolution of the planned number of beneficiaries and tonnage from the original PRRO project document, through Budget Revision 3 (June 2012) to Budget Revision 5 (July 2013).

## 2. Evaluation Findings

### 2.1. Appropriateness

#### 2.1.1. Relevance in relation to needs

38. The findings of the 2005 Comprehensive Food Security Vulnerability Assessment (CFSVA)<sup>39</sup> by WFP formed the main basis for elaboration of the PRRO project document. This study confirmed that the South of Madagascar was vulnerable to drought, but concluded that acute malnutrition was highest (around 10%) in the cyclone- and floods-prone North-East, South-East and the Western inland areas. The follow-up CFSVA study in 2010 (implemented jointly with

<sup>38</sup> The HQ formulation mission for this PRRO mentioned CFA as an option to be explored. CFA was added as a new activity in the PRRO as part of BR 3 (June 2012) and further elaborated in BR 5 (July 2013).

<sup>39</sup> Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis

UNICEF) identified a similar geographical pattern of vulnerability in relation to natural disasters, but now with global acute malnutrition (GAM) levels being highest (around 8%) in the West and South of Madagascar.

39. . Since the closure of the SAP system (see Box 1), WFP geographical targeting decisions have primarily been based on the findings of the annual Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission (CFSAM)<sup>40</sup> studies. However, this is not an ideal information base, as unlike the previous SAP system that was quarterly and down to district-level, the CFSAM reports are only prepared once per year and provide data up to regional level only. The nutrition data presented in these CFSAM reports is provided by ONN<sup>41</sup>. See Table 3 below for an overview of the results of the main needs assessment studies in past years.

*Table 3: Findings of the main food security needs assessment studies for Madagascar*

	<b>CFSVA 2005</b>	<b>CFSVA 2010</b>	<b>CFSAM 2010</b>	<b>CFSAM 2011</b>	<b>CFSAM 2013</b>
<b>Regions most vulnerable to drought</b>	South	South	South (Androy, Anosy)	South (Androy, Anosy, Atsimo Andrefana, Atsimo Atsinanana)	Erratic rainfall pattern in whole country
<b>Regions most vulnerable to cyclones and floods</b>	Western inland areas North-East South-East	South-East East	South-East (Hubert)	South-East (Bingiza)	North-East (Felleng) South-West (Haruna)
<b>Nutrition</b>	GAM (Global Acute Malnutrition) + 10% in South-East, North-East, and Western inland areas; South relatively better off Stunting highest eastern part of Central Plateau	GAM ± 8% in West and South; lowest on Central Plateau Stunting highest on Central Plateau	Androy / Anosy: GAM ± 7-9% in Nov. 2010 (was 11-14% in Nov. 2009)	GAM ± 7% in Atsimo Andrefana and in the South-West just after cyclone Bingiza	(no reporting on GAM rates)
<b>Other key findings on vulnerability</b>	The South, North-East, and central Highlands ± 20% of households are food secure	West and South-West relatively food insecure due to poverty	2010 year of generally good rainfall Lowest FCS in Androy and Vatovavy Fitovinany	Food security in 2011 better than in 2010 Increased cash crop production Need for more cash-based interventions when market supply of cereals and root crops is good	Locust invasion in South-West FCS lowest in South, South-West and South-East Overall, about 1/3 of rural households are food insecure.

40. It strikes the evaluation team that despite the considerable number of studies that have been undertaken, there is rather limited insight in the causes behind the food insecurity patterns in the various agro-ecological zones in Madagascar. It seems that most humanitarian actors (including WFP) do not avail of sufficient expertise nor resources for more detailed analysis and usually base themselves on the information from the various assessment studies (including the additional studies

<sup>41</sup> Office National de Nutrition



that are usually undertaken after cyclones and droughts<sup>42</sup>) combined with their own field-level insights. For WFP, presence of experienced partners is a key factor for allocation of tonnage over the various districts.

41. An additional source that recently has become available is the USAID-funded Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWSNET) special report on Madagascar<sup>43</sup> that indicates a need for food security support programmes in the South-West of the country because this region was hit by the combined impact of Cyclone Haruna, irregular rainfall, and serious locust plagues<sup>44</sup>. Otherwise, for the 2013/14 season FEWSNET rates the whole country to be in relatively normal food security conditions.

42. Finally, it is relevant to look the MDG monitoring study<sup>45</sup> recently undertaken by GoM together with a range of UN and other partners. The existence of high poverty levels across the country is stressed, together with the fact that there are relatively high levels of malnutrition (national GAM level of 8.6% with 1.4% SAM). It needs to be remarked that below-average GAM rates were found in the regions in the 'Grand Sud' where a large part of the PRRO is concentrated (Androy, Anosy) while high malnutrition rates occurred in some other regions of Madagascar (East/South-East, North-West, plus some parts of the Central Plateau). The regions on the East Coast also appear to have high proportions of the population with deficits in daily caloric intake.

43. Based on these findings WFP should possibly decide to increase its PRRO activities in the East / South-East, also beyond the typical response activities after major cyclones and more towards general food security / resilience support.

### 2.1.2. Coherence with WFP corporate strategy

44. The PRRO is well in line with the WFP corporate Strategic Results Framework (2008-2013). The PRRO project document incorporates two WFP Strategic Objectives (SOs) on relief and early recovery<sup>46</sup>. Through the recent PRRO Budget Revision in June 2013, two Strategic Objectives were added, one on disaster preparedness activities<sup>47</sup> and one on capacity building. Annex 13 gives an overview of the PRRO objectives, indicators and planned activities, and indicates to which elements in the WFP corporate policy framework they are related. A summary of main findings is given here:

- As per the WFP Nutrition Policy (2012), it is indicated that targeted treatment of moderate acute malnutrition should focus on areas with GAM >10% or with 5-9% when aggravating factors exist. The PRRO is in line with this policy: while the original project document used 10% GAM as threshold, this was changed to 8% GAM in BR 3 (June 2012) with the explanation that the target areas are affected by cyclones, floods and/or droughts, and that overall vulnerability is increased

<sup>42</sup> The WFP Country Office stated to the mission that they aim to cover about 45% to 50% of the needs after in relation to cyclones and floods.

<sup>43</sup> FEWSNET (2013), Madagascar Special Report, October 29, 2013.

<sup>44</sup> According to FEWSNET, this region will be stressed during the last quarter of 2013 (IPC classification phase 2) and be in crisis during the first quarter of 2014 until the new harvest in April (phase 3).

<sup>45</sup> Repoblikani Madagasikara (2013), Enquête Nationale sur le Suivi des Objectifs du Millénaire pour le Développement à Madagascar, Antananarivo, Novembre 2013.

<sup>46</sup> The SOs are taken from the WFP Corporate Strategic Results framework 2008-2013.

<sup>47</sup> This activity already has been there since the start of the PRRO; in BR5 it was incorporated in the logframe.

due to the deterioration of basic health services due to the political and economic crisis. The component within the PRRO on blanket feeding for pregnant and lactating women in areas with GAM rates exceeding 10% is in line with the WFP Nutrition Policy.

- In the WFP Policy on DRR (2011) it is stated that WFP will focus on food assistance to vulnerable households and communities during and after disasters, with emphasis on participatory approaches, partnerships with government and UN, and on generation of multiple outcomes. The PRRO is fully in line with this, as it combines activities under SO 1 (Save Lives and Protect Livelihoods in Emergencies), SO2 (Prevent Acute Hunger and Invest in Disaster Preparedness and Mitigation measures, added through BR5 (June 2013), and SO3 (Restore and Rebuild Lives and Livelihoods in Post-Conflict, Post-Disaster or Transition Situations).
- The WFP Cash & Vouchers directive (2011) states that these activities should be based on market assessment and the availability of financial systems, and should take into account the security conditions, implementation costs, expected impacts, and beneficiary preferences. The PRRO has followed the necessary steps: the CFA component has been developed in line with the findings of a feasibility study (Sept. 2011), and in the pilot approach various technological solutions and partnerships are being tested, including with the private sector. Cash-based approaches are used directly after the harvest when market supply with basic food commodities is good. Under the currently prevailing conditions in Madagascar, integration with national social protection schemes is still far-fetched.
- In the WFP Capacity development and Handover Policy (2009), the focus is on promotion of local purchase and hand-over strategies to national government. This should be accompanied by advocacy together with civil society to create an enabling environment, and strong partnerships with national governments. Since late 2011, the Resident Coordinator in Madagascar stimulates UN agencies to resume collaborative work at national levels. Through the PRRO, WFP indeed is engaged in doing so, particularly through collaboration with small-scale producer organizations for local purchase and through support to BNGRC for national-level management of disaster risk reduction interventions.

### **2.1.3. Coherence with GoM policies**

45. Due to lack of ministries coordination and withdrawal of donor support, the context was not favourable for sound policy-making processes in general. Coordination from Government side has been poor; policies were not finalized or only saw limited implementation.

46. In term of linkage with national policies, the PRRO initial document (and the following budget revisions) mainly referred to the Madagascar Action Plan 2007-2012, the National Policy for Disaster and Risk Management (2003), the National Nutrition Policy (2007) and the National Plan for nutrition (2007).

47. From a global point of view, the 2009 political crisis has deeply affected possibilities of institutional and working coordination between the government together with its Ministries in charge of food security, nutrition and disaster and risk reduction and WFP CO. While the situation affected all components within the PRRO, in particular it affected the implementation of activities on building of disaster response capacities of Government bodies (SO5).

### **Nutrition policies**

48. The nutrition component within the PRRO is in line with the national nutrition policies (Madagascar National Nutrition Policy<sup>48</sup> (2004); National Plan of Action on Nutrition (NPAN) 2005-2009<sup>49</sup>), though with some slight deviations:

- ⇒ The Targeted Supplementary Feeding (TSF) component within the PRRO forms a contribution to implementation of Axis 5 on reduction of the prevalence of acute malnutrition through improved coverage and performance of the “CRENI” and “CRENA”<sup>50</sup>. Although it would have been logical to do so, the PRRO does not contain any activities that link up with Axis 10 in the NPAN on preparation and response to nutrition emergencies.
- ⇒ Blanket feeding for pregnant and lactating women in areas where GAM rates exceed 10% is part of the PRRO while such an activity is not mentioned in the NPAN. However, it is to be noted that the PRRO project document refers to this activity as based on a recommendation by the national Nutrition cluster which thus is assumed to be in line with GoM preferences<sup>51</sup>.

49. It has been noted that the BR documents do not make reference to the new national Nutrition Policy 2012-2015<sup>52</sup> (NPAN 11) for Madagascar which was launched in July 2012. In this NPAN II, the new objective for Axis 3 is to bring GAM rates down to 5% prevalence, and it would be appropriate for WFP to indicate how this is approached given that the threshold in the WFP Nutrition Policy is 10% GAM prevalence. NPAN II offers another entry point for the PRRO under Axis 4 “*Urgences, réhabilitation et développement pour la réduction de risque de la malnutrition*”, in particular with regards to nutrition surveillance<sup>53</sup>.

### **Policies on rural development and food security**

50. Given the thematic areas covered by the PRRO, and especially with the introduction of SO2 in July 2013, it could have been relevant for the PRRO to seek coherence with national policies and strategies focusing on rural development, food security and adaptation and mitigation to climate changes, and as such to develop forms of coordination with some technical directions of the Ministries in charge of Agriculture, Livestock and Environment.

<sup>48</sup> Repoblikani Madagasikara Primature (2004), Politique National de Nutrition, April 2004.

<sup>49</sup> Repoblikani Madagasikara Primature (2004), Plan National d'Action pour la Nutrition 2005-2009, April 2004.

<sup>50</sup> CRENI (Centre de Réhabilitation Nutritionnelle Intensive) are for treatment of SAM ; they are located in the district hospitals in vulnerable zones. CRENA (Centre de Réhabilitation Nutritionnelle Ambulatoire) take care of MAM treatment and operate at commune level.

<sup>51</sup> It also is in line with the new WFP Nutrition Policy (first 1,000 days approach).

<sup>52</sup> In the new National Nutrition Action Plan 2012-2015 that places main emphasis on prevention of chronic malnutrition, but also has an axis on treatment of moderate and severe acute malnutrition in zones at risk, with the objective to keep GAM rates below 5%.

<sup>53</sup> The Axis 4 activity lines are on re-actualization of the contingency plan of the Food and Nutrition Security cluster, nutrition surveillance, treatment of acute malnutrition, and reduction of diseases related to water, hygiene and sanitation (WASH).

51. Nonetheless, even if the PRRO document does not mention any connection with any of these above policies, most of FFA activities implemented by the NGO partners in the framework of PRRO are coherent with them. PRRO actions on opening up of communities (bridges and rural tracks renovation or building), on crops and vegetable diversification, on reforestation and natural resources management fit with the objectives of the National Programme on Rural Development (PNDR, 2005), respectively the strategic axis 3.3 “To insure permanent and stable food supply”, the strategic axe 3.2 “Agricultural production and diet diversification”, strategic axe 4.2 “Sustainable management of Soil and Water” and strategic axis 4.3 “Sustainable management fo forest resources”. In the same way, the PRRO directly contributes to the National Action Plan on Food Security (PANSA, 2005) through actions pertaining to the priority policy axis n°5 “To guarantee food access to the most vulnerable”.

### **Policies on DRR and on adaptation / mitigation to climate changes**

52. Apart from the National Strategy on Management of Risks and Disasters (SNGRC, 2001), the National Policy on Risk and Disaster Manager (PNGRC, 2003), and the contingency plans recently elaborated on droughts and cyclones responses, no national action plan on risk and disasters management exists. However, the PRRO is fully in line with the contents of the strategic axis n°5 “Global reduction of risks and vulnerability” within the SNGRC which has two main priorities: (a) vulnerability reduction for the poorest; (b) integration of risks reduction in environmental programmes.

53. In the framework of SO<sub>2</sub> (disaster preparedness) and SO<sub>3</sub> (early recovery) and in connection with the National Strategy for adaptation and mitigation to effects and impacts due to climate change (2010), as well as the National Action Plan for Adaptation to Climate Change (2006), specific actions could have been explored together with the relevant technical directions such as the Climate Change Direction within the Ministry of Environment and the Transversal Working Group on Climate Change, to contribute to their mandate on compiling operational references on agricultural practices adaptation to climate changes.

#### **2.1.4. Coherence with interventions by other stakeholders**

54. In the areas of WFP interventions, several projects and programs coexist, among which the most important are SALOHI<sup>54</sup> (financed by USAID, Food-for-Peace II), DIPECHO<sup>55</sup> I+ II, PASA<sup>56</sup> and PRONUMAD<sup>57</sup> program (all financed by the European Union). See Annex 14 for an overview of the international assistance provided and interactions with PRRO.

55. SALOHI is the most important in terms of objectives amplitude (covering nutrition, rural development and DRR), duration (2009-2014) and budget (US\$ 85 million including value of in-kind transfers of US\$19,3 million equivalent to 27,168 MT food). Initially, PRRO and SALOHI were supposed to work closely in term of coordination and information on food security monitoring. As such, the SALOHI SSSA<sup>58</sup> was originally planned in conjunction with WFP and the Government. But

<sup>54</sup> Strengthening and Accessing Livelihood Opportunities for Household Incomes

<sup>55</sup> "Disaster Preparedness ECHO", the European Commission's Disaster Preparedness programme in the framework of humanitarian aid, implemented by the Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid - ECHO

<sup>56</sup> Programme d'Appui à la Sécurité Alimentaire

<sup>57</sup> Programme d'Appui à la Nutrition à Madagascar

<sup>58</sup> Système de Suivi de la Sécurité Alimentaire

this collaboration was not effective due to USAID restrictions on government collaboration, and contracting difficulties with WFP<sup>59</sup>. In term of project management, coordination within SALOHI and PRRO remained rather informal.

56. DIPECHO II (06/2010 – 12/2011) focused on DRR impact reduction and its objectives did not target specifically nutrition issue as the PRRO initially did. Its geographical areas of intervention in Madagascar covered the same area as PRRO, as well as North-East of the country. No coordination mechanism has been settled with the PRRO. Yet, DIPECHO intended to impulse a partners NGOs platform in order to share information and to support a best practice making process on DRR. However, the results were somehow limited. Due to lack of staffing, WFP could hardly participate to it.

57. WFP has established collaboration with AROPA project financed by IFAD in the framework of the “local purchases” sub-component. A Letter of Understanding for commercial partnerships for direct purchases to farmers Unions and Cooperatives supported by this project has been signed between AROPA and WFP in June 2010. WFP role is to take care of the packaging and transport operations at lower cost, while AROPA is in charge of the farmers support for production, post-harvest and products collect organization. Although the LoU was conducive enough to purchase a few hundred of MT of staple food, the collaboration framework is not perceived as very proactive mechanism, and depends mainly of AROPA ability and programing to facilitate such purchases.

58. At the regional level, the coordination on DRR among various partners (UN agencies like WFP, FAO and UNICEF, NGOs, and other actors like the FID and the Regional Office for Nutrition) is primarily ensured within the regional clusters on Food Security and Livelihoods, which are a translation of the national clusters led by WFP, FAO and UNICEF. Their analysis are based on data issued by various information systems, in particular the data issued by the FAO Coordination Unit for Emergency and Rehabilitation Agricultural Operations and the annual assessment mission on Crop and Food Security (CFSAM) undertaken by FAO and WFP, completed by the local knowledge of the NGOs in the region, (e.g. the SSSA implemented in the framework of the SALOHI project). It would be interesting to also involve technical services of civil engineering in rural sector, in connection with recovery and mitigation actions (as for example: rural tracks, bridges and irrigation schemes rehabilitation).

59. At the field level, projects (SALOHI, DIPECHO, FID, etc.) allowed the presence and the development of international and national NGOs in the Southern and the Eastern regions of Madagascar. As such, many of them are acting as partner agency to WFP.. These agencies have good knowledge of the local context, and in most cases acquired a lot of know-how on food distribution technics. However, in the case of SALOHI area of interventions (Ref. map in Annex 15), it might be difficult to differentiate between the PRRO value added from what is achieved through SALOHI, given the fact the geographic and thematic area of intervention are very similar.

#### **Summary of key findings on appropriateness of the PRRO:**

- The PRRO is fully in line with the WFP Strategic Results Framework 2008-2013, and

<sup>59</sup> According to WFP team, the tentative partnership on Food Security Information System issued by SALOHI was proposing to consider PRRO as a service provider to SALOHI program. As such, PRRO would have been subject to SALOHI audit and US legislation, which was impossible for WFP, as a UN agency.

is based on corporate indicators for vulnerability assessment and results monitoring. The PRRO now formally covers the full spectrum from disaster preparedness to relief to early recovery. The PRRO also is in line with the WFP Nutrition Policy, the WFP Policy on DRR, the WFP Cash & Vouchers directive, and the WFP Capacity Development and Hand-Over Policy.

- In term of linkage with national policies, the PRRO initial mainly referred to the Madagascar Action Plan 2007-2012, the National Policy for Disaster and Risk Management (2003), the National Plan of Action on Nutrition 2005-2009. . However, the PRRO document does not mention any connection with national policies and strategies focusing on rural development, food security and adaptation and mitigation to climate changes.
- The political crisis in Madagascar has deeply affected possibilities of institutional and working coordination between the government and WFP CO. These constraints have been surmounted by pursuing and developing numerous partnerships with national and international NGOs<sup>60</sup>. Coordination within all these actors is done by the regional clusters on Food Security and Livelihoods, launched by FAO/WFP, with limited participation from GoM side. Beside, in the framework of SO5, partnership has been established with IFAD (AROPA project) to facilitate local purchase. The geographical focus within the PRRO is in line with the findings of various food security assessments over past years which identify regions regularly hit by cyclones (South-East, East) and drought-prone zones (South / South-West) as regions in need of support. In the period 2010-2013 these areas did not encounter emergency levels of acute malnutrition however, and emergency nutrition interventions were not required.
- The thematic focus in the PRRO is on food security for vulnerable households, a domain where WFP can evidently contribute to through the modalities available (in particular GFD and FFA / CFA). However, direct reference within the PRRO to policies on rural development, and adaptation/mitigation of the impact of climate changes on vulnerable rural population groups is missing.
- The approach in Madagascar still is primarily food-based which by beneficiaries is seen as particularly appropriate during the lean season when many households have difficulty to access food. The pilots on inclusion of cash-based approaches at selected times of the year are fully in line with the new WFP policies on food assistance but the appropriateness in the Malgache locals contexts still needs to be further studied.

## 2.2. Results of the Operation


An overview of the overall outputs of the PRRO is presented below:

*Table 4: Overall outputs of PRRO 200063*

Key outputs (Entire PRRO duration, source: SPR)	Observations
<b>Actual vs planned beneficiaries</b>	Data for 2013 include distributions up to end September  GFD: In 2011 there was no major cyclone but Cyclone Giovanna in 2012. Cyclone

<sup>60</sup> Some of the working partnership having already been implemented in the previous PRRO.





### 2.2.1. Nutrition programme

Activity		Beneficiaries Actual (Planned)	Target	Baseline (CFSVA, Oct 2010)	Findings / Remarks / Unintended outcomes
SO1	Nutrition programme	2010: 0 (0) 2011: 0 (5,400) 2012: 0 (27,500)	GAM remains <10%	5.4 - 8.1	GAM rates presented in the PRRO Standard Programme Reports (SPRs): 2011: 7.4%; 2012: n.a.

60. No activities have been undertaken under the nutrition component in the PRRO:

- The PRRO project document mentions that it is intended to reach out to 27,000 nutrition programme beneficiaries (MAM cases and blanket coverage of pregnant and lactating women) in the zones where GAM rates exceed 10%. .
- In BR3 (June 2012) the blanket feeding of pregnant and lactating women component was shifted to the country programme. Also, the threshold for starting up WFP support to treatment of moderate malnutrition was reduced to 8% GAM rate plus aggravating factors. The expectation was thus that around 27,500 children would be reached per year. A new approach was adopted whereby WFP nutrition partners work through Government health centres and community outreach workers (no more parallel programmes).

- BR5 (June 2013) mentions that the GAM rates in drought-affected zones had remained below the threshold<sup>61</sup>, and that the targeted supplementary feeding programme will be removed from the PRRO<sup>62</sup>. However, a nutrition surveillance programme would remain in place, implemented by ONN and its regional antennas.

61. The SPRs for 2010, 2011 and 2012 indicate that no supplementary feeding activities were undertaken as GAM rates in the drought-affected zones stayed below 10% resp. 8%. The available nutrition information base is not strong enough to serve as basis for this kind of decision-making. For example, while for 2010 the SPRs still contained nutrition data for three regions in the South (information collected by WFP as part of the CFSVA), in 2011 data was presented for only one of these regions (SMART survey by ONN/UNICEF in April 2011 as follow-up to the CFSVA<sup>63</sup>), and for 2012 the SPR does not provide any nutrition figures at all. The Country Office stated that they receive nutrition monitoring updates from ONN<sup>64</sup> on informal basis during cluster meetings but that this is not in the form of formal and regular reports on GAM prevalence<sup>65</sup>. Also, the evaluators see it as a missed opportunity that GAM prevalence data are no longer used for outcome monitoring of the PRRO; they provide a good complementary source of information on achievements on the food security components in the PRRO (SO1, SO2, SO3, see below).

### 2.2.2. General Food Distribution / Food-for-Assets

Activity		Beneficiaries Actuals (Planned) <sup>66</sup>	Target	Baseline (CFSVA, Oct 2010)	Findings / Remarks / Unintended outcomes
SO1	GFD	<b>GFD:</b> 2010: 56,766 (50,200)	FCS>21.5 for 80% of targeted HHs	South: 35% E / SE: 73%	Small PDM sample
	low-tech FFA	2011: 34,698 (339,200) 2012: 70,308 (49,220)			
SO3	GFD	<b>FFA:</b> 2010: 68,301 (29,960)	FCS>35 for 80% of targeted HHs	South: 15% E / SE: 31%	Small PDM sample
	FFA	2011: 102,080 (53,960)	CSI decreases for 80% of targeted HHs	n.a.	Some info in PDM reports
		2012: 108,098 (87,856)	CAS increased for 80% of targeted communities	n.a.	Some info in PDM reports

<sup>61</sup> In BR5 reference is made to a UNICEF study published in November 2011 which showed that GAM rates in the drought-affected areas in Madagascar in past years had stayed below 5%, and that the weather shocks had not led to nutritional deteriorations.

<sup>62</sup> Reactivation is possible if recommended by the nutrition cluster (in case of nutritional emergency).

<sup>63</sup> Information is taken from BR5. It is mentioned there that this study was based on secondary data sources. The recommendations were to strengthen and follow-up and support maternal and children's nutrition in vulnerable communities (taken up by UNICEF).

<sup>64</sup> ONN undertakes community screening at sentinel sites as part of the Programme National de Nutrition Communautaire (PNNC). There is no contract between WFP and ONN on nutrition surveillance.

<sup>65</sup> In the update on 2012 achievements ONN reports on prevalence of chronic malnutrition and underweight only. The report states that overall in 2012 only 3,694 children with MAM were treated in Madagascar, and 7880 children with SAM. It can easily be calculated that overall (for all actors together) the coverage rates for acute malnutrition treatment are low to extremely low (around 20% for SAM, only 2% of the cases for MAM).

<sup>66</sup> The SPRs do not follow structure of the project document based on SOs but only provide information on totals per type of intervention.



<b>SO2</b>	FFA	(n.a.)	CAS increased for 80% of targeted communities	n.a.	Some info in PDM reports
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
### **Number of beneficiaries served and tonnage distributed**

62. The total tonnage distributed for the PRRO until end 2013 amounts to **31,788 MT**, which is a mere 42% of the total planned requirement of 76,339 MT (BR5). As shown in Table 5 below, cereals are by far the largest commodity group. The PRRO consists of 7 different types of food rations for GFD and FFA that are differentiated between relief and recovery phase, and between drought and cyclone responses. While cereals and pulses form part of all types of basket, vegetable oil and High-Energy Biscuits are only used as part of GFD.

*Table 5: PRRO 200065: tonnage distributed per year*

	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Cereals</b>	2,452	10,825	10,103	4,139	<b>27,519</b>
<b>Oil</b>	27	82	196	20	<b>325</b>
<b>Pulses</b>	338	1,468	1,354	584	<b>3,744</b>
<b>Blended food (CSB, HEB)</b>	51	12	31	106	<b>200</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,868</b>	<b>12,388</b>	<b>11,683</b>	<b>4,849</b>	<b>31,788</b>

63. In line with local preferences, rice was the commodity used in the food rations for the East and South-East (total of 10,020 MT). For the South and South-West, the cereals component was composed largely of maize (11,775 MT). Under the previous PRRO, sorghum (USAID in-kind donation) was introduced as another cereal as part of the food ration for the 'Grand Sud'. In the current PRRO, sorghum initially continued to be distributed in substantial amounts but later on a switch was made to maize only (total of 5724 MT sorghum distributed under this PRRO, of which 90% in 2011 alone)<sup>67</sup>.



*Figure 1: Total tonnage for PRRO 200065 by port of entrance by year<sup>68</sup>*

64. Figure 1 provides an overview of how the tonnage is divided over the three main ports of entrance used by WFP Madagascar. As in principle these ports each serve a different region, it also gives an indication of the volumes for the South-West

<sup>67</sup> Data taken from the COMPAS database that was made available to the evaluation team.

<sup>68</sup> Graph provided by WFP Madagascar

(served by port of Toliara), South (port of Ambovombe) and the East and South-East (Tamatave). As can be seen, there is considerable fluctuation from year to year, with the South-West getting very high tonnages in 2011 and also 2012, the South being a large recipient in 2011 but less so in 2012 and 2013, and the East and South-East being especially large in terms of coverage in 2012 (after Cyclone Giovanna). Overall, 2011 and 2012 have been the years with the largest tonnages. In 2010 the PRRO was starting up and only covered 6 months, in 2013 WFP Madagascar experienced major budget problems and has had to reduce its volume of work for both the Country Programme and the PRRO.

65. Figure 2 presents an overview of the planned vs. distributed tonnage per year<sup>69</sup>, indicating that achievements were particularly lagging behind the plans in 2010 and 2013, and least so in 2011. As explained above, for 2010 the tonnage was relatively small because it the PRRO started in July only. According to WFP, 78% of the planned tonnage was distributed in 2011. For 2012 the ambition was to substantially increase the tonnage but actuals were close to those for 2011 (57% realization of plans). For 2013 the ambition for the PRRO tonnage was kept at the same level as in 2012 but budgets were far from sufficient to realize this<sup>70</sup>. Alongside the PRRO, the South-West (and to a small extent the South) have been covered through additional FFA projects under a relief operation after Cyclone Haruna<sup>71</sup>.

66. Figure 3 provides coverage figures for the GFD and FFA modalities within the PRRO for the years 2010–2012. Most of the tonnage was distributed through FFW projects and the number of GFD beneficiaries is relatively small. Actually, the GFD category itself is a combination of two types of programmes: (a) free food distribution in the first period after major disasters have struck<sup>72</sup>, and (b) alongside FFW projects to serve vulnerable groups who cannot participate in the works<sup>73</sup>. For both GFD and FFW, women were slightly outnumbering men in all of the years. Based on the information from the SPRs, it was calculated by the evaluation team that the average amount per beneficiary in 2010 was a mere 0.72 kg per beneficiary<sup>74</sup>, while for 2011 resp. 2012 this was 22.73 and 21.62 kg per beneficiary, which is more realistic. The latter indicates that the FFW projects in these years on average lasted (slightly) over 40 working days<sup>75</sup>.

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<sup>69</sup> Graph is based on the SPRs for 2010, 2011 and 2012 plus information on 2013 provided by the CO.

<sup>70</sup> Note: the actually distributed tonnage that is presented in the graph includes all distributions up to end of September. Just like in other years, in 2013 a considerable volume of food has been distributed in the period October – December in order to cover the needs during the first part of the 'soudure'. These amounts are not reflected here.

<sup>71</sup> Relief support in relation to cyclone Haruna (February 2013) was mainly covered through the 3-month EMOP 200548 (April-June) through which a total of 1208 MT was distributed (84% in South-West, 16% in South).

<sup>72</sup> Five to ten days in case of cyclones, and a period up to two months in case of major droughts.

<sup>73</sup> In many of the communities visited by the evaluation team such free food distribution alongside FFA projects was not applied as the community did not want to create social tensions.

<sup>74</sup> The evaluation team questions the validity of the information presented in the SPR as it not logical that such low quantities would be provided per person (either through GFD and/or FFW projects).

<sup>75</sup> The GFD ration is smaller: 0.585 kg p.p. per day for max.10 - 15 days after major disasters (so in total 5.85 to 8.78 kg p.p.), or alongside FFW programmes for vulnerable people not able to participate in the work projects.




Figure 2: Beneficiaries for GFD and FFW, by sex by year (source: SPRs)

### **Coverage patterns in cyclone and drought-prone zones**

67. The analysis of PRRO coverage by district by year (see in Table 6 below) underlines that there is considerable between-year fluctuation at district and zone level, with varying proportional coverage of the population in the various districts. It is striking that there is a trend to increase the number of districts covered<sup>76</sup>; even in 2013 when the tonnage had gone down considerably.

- **Cyclone response:** Due to Cyclone Hubert in 2010, South-East had highest number of beneficiaries. Coverage in this zone stabilized at around 100,000 GFD / FFA beneficiaries in 2011 (Bingiza) and 2012 (Giovanna), and went up to 120,000 in 2013 (Haruna).
- **Drought response:** The South had high coverage in 2011<sup>77</sup>, but beneficiary figures were halved in 2012, and went down again by half in 2013. In the South-West, coverage increased in 2011 went further up in 2012<sup>78</sup> but reduced by two-thirds in 2013. Reasons for the increases in 2011 and 2012 are not completely clear<sup>79</sup>, for 2013 the decrease is primarily related to budget limitations.

68. For 2012<sup>80</sup><sup>81</sup>, the PRRO handled a total tonnage of 11,863 MT, distributed through 27 Cooperating Partners in 20 districts in total<sup>82</sup>. The South-West received the largest amount of food (38% of total tonnage), the South-East and the East both were average in size (24% resp. 23%), while the South handled the smallest quantity of food (15%). It is striking that the East and South-East were managed by the Country Office in Tana resulting in limited field presence of WFP Food Monitors despite the fact that these zones received nearly half of the annual tonnage. Most of

<sup>76</sup> The number of districts covered was 10 in 2010, 16 in 2011, 19 in 2012, and 18 in 2013.

<sup>77</sup> For Beloha district the 2011 coverage was over 100% of the population! This is even more striking as the 2011 SAP report did not indicate that this district was suffering from high food insecurity.

<sup>78</sup> In Betioky coverage nearly tripled from 2011 to 2012. However, the 2011 SAP report and 2012 ProESSECAL report identified parts of the district as highly food insecure but other parts as less affected.

<sup>79</sup> The Early Warning System (SAP) report indicates that the 2010/2011 harvest had been relatively good.

<sup>80</sup> Some more detailed analysis was done for the PRRO portfolio in 2012, see Annex 15

<sup>81</sup> 2011 and 2013 data not available

<sup>82</sup> In 2013, WFP has started to pilot direct distribution approaches in the South-West with the aim to reduce costs and improve operational efficiency.

the IPs in 2012 are local NGOs operating at commune/district-level, or local branches of national agencies (Caritas, SAF FJKM, ORN, AGEX), while partners for this PRRO are limited<sup>83</sup>. While most of the IPs handled relatively small quantities of food, a handful of agencies distributed large tonnages of around 1,000 MT or more: CARE and WeltHungerHilfe in the East; CDD, TAMAFa, and MMDS in the South-West.

*Table 6: PRRO coverage, by district (see explanation below)<sup>84</sup>*

WFP	Corridor	District	Population estimate (2012; by INSTAT)	2010 (No. Of beneficiaries)		2011 (No. Of beneficiaries)		2012 (No. Of beneficiaries)		2013 (No. Of beneficiaries)*	
				DFC	VCT	GFD	FFA	GFD	FFA	GFD	FFA
Covered from Tana	Nord-Est	Taomasina I + II	492,625								25,012
		Brickaville	183,070					22,666	48,380		7,810
		Vatomandry	136,199					5,700	36,847		10,362
		Mahanoro	232,148								7,452
		Antalaha	225,345			224	35,680				7,540
		Maroantsetra	215,117				19,980				
		Sub-Total				224	55,660	28,366	85,227	0	33,164
	Sud-Est	Farafangana	332,785		37,505	1,667	44,995	15,810	21,069		29,495
		Manakara Atsimo	355,744	23,663	33,905		5,800	4,511	15,185		61,990
		Mananjary	308,532				1,667	8,055			
		Mananara Avaratra	165,439			264	15,620				19,695
		Nosy Varika	235,040					2,775	6,340		9,625
		Vangaindrano	320,863		63,025	5,538	26,890	5,575	20,500		
		Vohipeno	148,301		21,900		6,500				
Midongy-Atsimo	44,603										
Sub-Total		23,663	156,335	7,469	101,472	36,726	63,094	0	120,805		
Mahajanga	Tana	Mahajanga I + II	290,253					515	3,125		
		Antananarivo						4,701			
SO Ambovo mbe	Grand-Sud	Ambovombe	340,409				23,745		5,860		
		Tsihombe	107,228	27,946		10,000	2,120		12,585		11,075
		Bekily	160,385	11,440	2,095		46,080		28,890		23,665
		Talanaro	264,674		9,130						
		Ambosoary / Atsimo	203,550	7,150		8,795	19,280		38,690		7,540
		Beloha	106,463				109,640		24,295		13,708
		Sub-Total		46,536	11,225	18,795	200,865	5,216	113,445	0	55,988
SO Tuléar	Sud-Ouest	Betioky Atsimo	199,891	12,855	8,340	1,395	49,795		131,615		22,205
		Ampanihy Ouest	301,954	46,240	86,780	6,565	118,900		125,125		4,770
		Toliary-I + II	409,854						74		39,392
		Sakaraha	110,084								11,965
		Morombe	114,070						4,665	8,000	13,935
		Morondava	117,281				14,960		13,475		
Sub-Total		59,095	95,120	7,960	183,655	0	274,954	8,000	92,267		
TOTALS			129,294	262,680	34,448	541,652	70,308	536,720	8,000	302,224	

Source: calculation from excel file "Distribution\_OEv\_241213"

## Cyclone-prone zones: GFD/FFA in the East and South-East

### Vulnerability and targeting: design and practice

<sup>83</sup> Next to their participation in the large USAID-funded Salohi programme on food and nutrition security in various parts of Madagascar, CARE in 2012 also was a very large partner to WFP for this PRRO with various projects in the East/South-East and in the South. The other three international IPs in 2012 (Welthungerhilfe, RTM and Interaide) all operate in the cyclone-prone districts in the South-East.

<sup>84</sup> Yellow stands for a coverage between 10% and 15% of the population, orange for coverage between 15% and 20%, and red for coverage of more than 20% of the population.

69. In Eastern and South-East regions, agriculture is very diversified, but generally with low agricultural yields, soil fertility degradation and growing erosion and deforestation. These regions are characterized by recurrent cyclones and floods, which often result in important crops losses and damages on productive infrastructures. Transport network is rather insufficient with important landlocked areas in the foothills and highlands zones.

70. For 2012<sup>85</sup> data, a comparison was made between planned and actual number of beneficiaries after Giovanna hit the East and South-East:

- In the Post-Giovanna & Irina needs assessment report prepared by the Food Security coordination cluster<sup>86</sup> it is indicated that a total of 62,500 people in the East, 315,200 people in the South-East and 124,900 people in the North-East were severely food insecure because of the losses in relation to the cyclones. However, WFP did not provide any relief assistance in the North-East. For the East WFP planned to reach a number of beneficiaries that closely matches the needs assessment (62,312), whereas for the South-East WFP planned to cover only 6.6% (20,903) of the people in need<sup>87</sup>.
- In the South-East four out of six partners were iNGOs, all involved in prepositioning for WFP. In the East, supplied from WFP warehouse in Tamatave harbour, most beneficiaries were served by CARE, while the other five local/national NGOs all handled much smaller caseloads. Collaboration with CARE (present in the region for implementation of the Salohi programme) apparently seen to be the best option to move most of the tonnage.





Figure 3: WFP Planned vs. Actual number of beneficiaries, post-Giovanna, 2012, South-East

Figure 4: WFP Planned vs. Actual number of beneficiaries, post-Giovanna, 2012, East

71. Vulnerable households are characterized by limited or no access to irrigated land, no cattle ownership and obligation to sell labor force on daily basis. Social capital and access to financial resources and technical knowledge is very limited.

<sup>85</sup> Information provided by the Country Office

<sup>86</sup> Cluster de Coordination SAMS (2012), Cyclones Giovanna & Irina, Rapport d'Evaluation Approfondie Madagascar, Juin 2012.

<sup>87</sup> According to the Country Office, the coordination between WFP and Salohi was primarily aimed at avoiding duplication: WFP support focused on other communes (or 'fokatany' within communes) than those covered by the Salohi programme.

72. FFA targeting criteria are based on vulnerability criteria such as access to production factors, and socioeconomic and nutrition parameters (women as head of family, household with pregnant or lactating women, or with children suffering of acute malnutrition).

73. Need assessments after cyclones or floods events are the result of a combination of information provided by stakeholders (NGOs feedback from the field, communes demand), food security sub-clusters diagnosis and if necessary WFP team visits in the field. However, due to absence of disaggregated tonnages figures for GFD and FFA in the SPRs and in the data made available during the mission (excel file “*Distribution\_OEv\_241213*”), it is impossible to calculate precisely during how many days GFD and FFA have been respectively distributed and to how many beneficiaries.

*Table 7: Number of beneficiaries and food tonnage in South-East regions between 2010 and 2012*

	2010	2011	2012
Nb of beneficiaries GFD	23 663	7 469	36 726
Nb of beneficiaries FFA	156 335	101 472	63 094
Total tonnage (MT)	1233	2072	5280

Source: calculation from excel file “*Distribution\_OEv\_241213*”

74. Targeting follows a complex process in which eligibility criteria, are appropriated and adapted by the local communities, through a management committee. Food distributions might strengthen or loosen social cohesion. In most cases, beneficiaries groups included both very vulnerable families and other families in order to respect and to preserve a certain social cohesion<sup>88</sup>. Sometime, at for heavy works (channel rehabilitation or tree hole digging), families sent young people from the extended family with whom shared the distributed food. Food delivery rhythm (every 6<sup>th</sup> day, after 5 working days) might exclude the most vulnerable persons who need to be paid on a daily basis in order to be able to buy their own food every day, while the age limit (59 years) which appear limitative for the beneficiaries who estimate that older men can still work.

75. Globally, the beneficiaries having participated to the focus groups during the field mission express clear satisfaction for the food distribution and the proposed mechanisms.

#### *Food prepositioning: relevance and appropriateness<sup>89</sup>*

76. A total of 515 MT of food is stored by 5 partners NGOs cyclone prone areas (103MT each). These quantities cover food assistance needs for 12 500 persons during 20 days per prepositioning site<sup>90</sup>. These 20 days allow to intervene directly

<sup>88</sup> In that sense, for example one of the partners usually just explains the targeting process and then let the communities choose the beneficiaries on their own while another partner aims at covering vulnerable people with a pre-eminence of agricultural livelihood conditions criteria.

<sup>89</sup> See Annex 19: Analysis of prepositioning strategy

<sup>90</sup> According to WFP CO, this figure is based on an average number of victims being in position to receive relief food aid (GFD, VCT low-tech) after a medium intensity cyclone. In addition, this estimation is also based on local storage capacity, partner capacities and storage risks (food deterioration) (WFP, 2013. Critères pour définir la quantité de vivres à prépositionner par site de prépositionnement 2013/2014).

right after a cyclone while road access are limited and offer a time lapse to organize further food relief operations..

77. However, a field evaluation has been conducted by FAO and the regional cluster SAMS in June 2012<sup>91</sup> in various parts in the country after the cyclones Giovanna (14/02/2012) and Irina (29/02/2012), both on category III. According to this study, 51 000 households in South-East were estimated to be severely food insecure<sup>92</sup>. Considering an average family size of 5 persons, that would represent a total of 255 000 persons, which is more than 4 times the relief intervention capacity of the 5 WFP pre-positioning sites in the same area. If we consider the hypothesis of delivering GFD during 15 days (government directives) for 0,460 kg per day and per person, that would represent a 17 595 tons of food, to be compared to 515 tons available in the 5 prepositioning sites. In fact, simulations based population estimates (see annex 20) show that on the basis of 0,46 kg of food distributed during 15 days, the 5 prepositioning stocks allow to support 74 638 people, that is 3,91% of the population living in the 6 South East districts .

78. This analysis suggests that :

- Immediate relief capacity is not adapted to large cyclones.
- Food distribution could be insufficient in some places, especially in remote areas.

*Outcomes: Immediate food security effects*

79. In line with the logframe for the PRRO, the central question is whether the PRRO has been effective to improve food consumption (SO1 and SO3), reduce vulnerability to cyclones and floods (SO2), and restore livelihoods (SO3).

80. The Food Consumption Score (FCS) is the only indicator that has been monitored across the years.


81. The graph below (based on information taken from the SPRs) suggest that food consumption improved throughout the PRRO life in the East / South-East. The target for the SO1 (relief) objective (over 80% of targeted households have a FCS higher than 21) was almost reached in 2010, exceeded in 2011 and confirmed in 2012. The target for the SO3 (early recovery) objective (over 80% of targeted households have a FCS of 35 or higher) was reached in 2012. PRRO monitoring on post Giovanna and Irina interventions (PDM, 2012) concludes at a link between the FCS results and the PRRO activities via a beneficiaries/non beneficiaries comparison<sup>93</sup>. However, little or no information in the other PDM documents is available on this point and more globally. Our assessment is that it is difficult to establish a causality link between these FCS results and the PRRO activities.

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<sup>91</sup> Cyclones Giovanna & Irina - Rapport d'évaluation approfondie - Madagascar - juin 2012 - Cluster de coordination Sécurité Alimentaire & Moyens de Subsistance

<sup>92</sup> In the districts of Vohemar, Brickaville, Manakara, Farafangana, Midongy Atsimo and Vangaindrano Besides, the most affected areas to be prioritized for agricultural recovery were Atsinanana region (especially Brickaville, Vatamandry, Mahanoro and Toamasina II districts) and Atsimo Antsinanana region (Vangaindrano district).

<sup>93</sup> WFP (2012), Post Distribution Monitoring - Activités PRRO Post Giovanna et Irina - Food For Assets / Vivre Contre Actifs Zones Est t Sud Est



*Figure 5: Food Consumption Score results for the East / South-East*

#### *Outcomes: livelihood impacts*

82. Monitoring of SO<sub>2</sub> and SO<sub>3</sub> only started in June 2013 (BR5) via the Community Asset Scores (CAS) and the Coping Strategies Index (CSI) whose results are therefore not yet available. Apart some general information on outcomes, no overviews are available that present the results of the FFA projects per region / district (amounts of works accomplished<sup>94</sup>).

83. The FFA livelihood impacts depend on the nature of created assets and their final users. However, FFA selection criteria do not specifically target improvement of livelihood and resilience of most vulnerable socio-economic groups. Indeed, the choice of FFA sites is largely oriented towards quick and easy works, rather than an on potential vulnerability impact. While it is assumed that most vulnerable would be enrolled in labor schemes and therefore benefit from short term impacts, asset rehabilitation (rural tracks, irrigation areas, etc.) are assumed to impact indirectly on vulnerable people through longer term benefits on local economy development. (See annex 18 for more appreciations on FFA projects visited in the East/South East.

84. Yet, actions on agricultural input supply (zucchini, yams, maize) are well adapted to most vulnerable populations. They provide households with no or little access to irrigated plots with opportunity to access incomes, improve diets and shorten the lean period. Agro-ecological intensification on tanety (contour line cropping, association with legumes, basket compost, fruit trees, etc.) as well as short cycle animal production (poultry, bee keeping, etc...) are alternative priority actions for households with no access to rice fields. Increasing vulnerable people access to irrigated land would clearly be beneficial, however, without initial diagnosis and specific monitoring; it is difficult to assess whether rice field expansion actually benefited to vulnerable households. Building or rehabilitation of transport infrastructures may have immediate impacts on living conditions (outlets, services access, etc.). Reforestation schemes could bring obvious benefits (e.g erosion protection), but require lengthy operations, specific technical expertise, and associated natural resources management institutions capacity-building for the benefits to be sustainable.

<sup>94</sup> In the SPRs overviews are given of overall “outputs” of the FFA projects. These are all presented under SO<sub>3</sub> while there also is FFA under SO<sub>1</sub>. In the SPRs, there is no disaggregation of works accomplished in the zones affected by drought vs. works accomplished in the zones affected by cyclones.



85. All in all, the quality of PRRO asset creation in areas where NGOs had no prior project actions is diverse. Resources are insufficient to allow for complex and long lasting operations. Projects such as developing waterlogged lowlands or irrigation areas/channels rehabilitation require preliminary technical studies, shall include a water catchment basin protection, and be monitored by technical experts. Lack of such technical support resulted in regular uncompleted or non-sustainable micro-projects. Yet, focusing the PRRO intervention on low tech operation such as rural track rehabilitation and irrigation channels delisting hardly allows for real long term / resilience benefits for the most vulnerable people.

### **Drought-prone zones: GFD/FFA in the South and South-West**

#### *Design and geographical targeting*

86. From early 2011 onwards, the national EWS has not been operational anymore. Hence data for targeting and assessing geographical coverage of FFA operations in past years is lacking. WFP primarily depends on partners perceptions of needs (usually generally described in project proposals to WFP) and the field-level information collected during field visits by WFP staff.

87. Timing of FFA projects is a sticky question. The prime function of FFA is to provide food to the most vulnerable when they have difficulties to access food<sup>95</sup>. FFA projects can then either transfer food when at times of limited labour opportunities (“*times of need for income*”) but when food availability is fine, or as a mechanism for offering a competitive alternative to regular daily labour when food prices are high and market supplies low (“*times of need for food*”; see also Annex 19 for a case study on Toliara).

88. An analysis of figures at district level district reveals that during the period 2010-2013 (see Annex 20 for graphs of distribution figures by district for 2010 - 2013), the South-West was the zone with the highest relative coverage. In some districts, figures are particularly high, with over 20% of the population directly benefiting from the projects in 2011 and 2012.


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<sup>95</sup> The other main function of FFA projects is to create/restore community assets that build resilience over time.

#### Box 4: Timing of Labour-Intensive works projects in Androy

FFA / CFA projects should ideally be scheduled when there is little agriculture work and when market food supplies are low. However, in practice these two criteria rarely match. The slack season in terms of demand for agricultural labour in Androy last from August to October while prices of food go up from November onwards until the green maize harvest comes in by end of February. This period fits fit high demand for daily labourers for field preparation, planting and weeding.

Agricultural Calendar for Bekily (elaborated as part of a community interview; green=sowing and growing, yellow=harvesting)



#### Outputs

89. The monitoring information suggests that operational achievements of the PRRO in 2012 in the drought-affected zones in the South and the South-West of Madagascar closely match to plans in terms of number of beneficiaries (see the two figures below). It is not clear however how this matches with information in the 2012 SPR which indicates that overall actuals for the PRRO were far below planned.





Figure 6: FFA Planned vs. Actual number of beneficiaries, 2012, South

Figure 7: FFA Planned vs. Actual number of beneficiaries, 2012, South-West

90. For beneficiaries targeting, Partners work in close coordination with community leaders<sup>96</sup>. Beneficiary selection usually is based on a dual approach: engaging members of vulnerable households<sup>97</sup> and members of households

<sup>96</sup> In some communities visited, FFA projects were said to be based on the Local Development Plan.


<sup>97</sup> This system allows a certain level of favouritism among the 'chefs de fokotany' while certain vulnerable groups 'without a voice in the community' tend to be excluded. See: Carimentrand A & K Patel. (2011), «Aide alimentaire dans l'Androy : l'épineuse question du ciblage au pays des épines», in Ballet J & M

benefiting from the works outputs. The most commonly targeted group were single women with large numbers of children<sup>98</sup>, and, in general, landless households. Yet, the approach to profile recovery caseloads in three main groups that was suggested by the HQ Formulation Mission for this PRRO was not adopted<sup>99</sup>.

*Outcomes: short term and livelihood effects*

91. As for cyclone prone areas, results measurement consists of assessing whether the FFA projects (and the small element of GFD) have led to improved food consumption (SO1 and SO3), reduced vulnerability to drought (SO2), and restored livelihoods (SO3).

92. The situation is that the Food Consumption Score (FCS) is the only indicator that has been monitored across the years. Obviously, no monitoring has taken place yet for the other indicators in this PRRO that were recently added<sup>100</sup>. The graph below (based on information taken from the SPRs) suggests that food consumption results were not very good in the South/South-West. The target for the SO1 (relief) objective (over 80% of targeted households have a FCS higher than 21) was reached in 2011 but the other years. The target for the SO3 (early recovery) objective (over 80% of targeted households have a FCS of 35 or higher) was not reached. It is difficult to reconcile these FCS results with that of the food and nutrition security assessments in the past years (see the table in section 2.1), even more so as PDM data collection is actually done directly after the main harvest which in terms of food security is the best period of the year. Yet, as for cyclone prone areas, our assessment is that it is difficult to establish a causality link between these FCS results and the PRRO activities.



*Figure 8: Food Consumption Score results for the South / South-West*

93. In the perception of the communities, effects of the projects are clearly positive and are twofold: short-term improvement of the access to food for

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Randrianalijaona (Eds). *Vulnérabilité, insécurité alimentaire et environnement à Madagascar*, Paris, L'Harmattan. pp. 41-55.

<sup>98</sup> Usually, there were many women among the project participants (over 50%).

<sup>99</sup> The three groups are: (a) households who are normally food secure but largely affected by major shocks; b) households that have seen their asset base sincerely reduced as a result of the last shock/emergency; and c) highly food-insecure households that require social protection (including both conditional and unconditional transfers) plus alternative livelihoods.

<sup>100</sup> Data on Community Asset Scores (CAS) and the Coping Strategies Index (CSI) is not available; these indicators were only added in June 2013 (BR5).

households benefiting from food transfers works during the lean season, and longer-term positive impacts for the whole communities but with varying degrees of benefits depending on the asset base at household level<sup>101</sup> (acreage under irrigation, number of livestock, means to pay for daily labour in order to expand area under cultivation, etc.). Yet, PRRO results are difficult to disaggregate as most communities had been supported by other projects, including man CFA micro-projects by the FID<sup>102</sup> as some areas were also covered by the EMOP after Cyclone Haruna early in 2013<sup>103</sup>.

As it is very important for this PRRO to be able to quantify achieved outcomes<sup>104</sup>, it is rated as a shortcoming that, apart from the more general information in the SPRs, no overviews are available that present the results of the FFA projects per region / district (amounts of works accomplished<sup>105</sup>).

### 2.2.3. Cash-for-Assets

Activity	Beneficiaries Actual (planned)	Target	Baseline (CFSVA, Oct 2010)	Findings / Remarks / Unintended outcomes	
SO2	CFA	(not present 2010-2012)	CAS increased for 80% of targeted communities	n.a.	No information available yet in relation to CFA projects
SO3	CFA	2010: 0 (0)	FCS>35 for 80% of targeted HHs	61% of HHs with FCS>35*	No information available yet in relation to CFA projects
		2011: 0 (0)	CSI decreases for 80% of targeted HHs	n.a.	27% of targeted HHs have elevated CSI*
		2012: 0 (12,500)	CAS increased for 80% of targeted communities	n.a.	No information available yet in relation to CFA projects

\* Figures taken from the Baseline study for CFA project by AAA in Farafangana, April 2013

94. Addition of the CFA component at BR3 (June 2012) was based on a thorough feasibility study in September 2011. The study recommended scheduling of cash-based approaches immediately after the harvest season (CFA in February/March and July/August), followed by FFA projects in the lean season (October/December to March)<sup>106</sup>. The study stressed that most vulnerable households should be targeted through Conditional Cash Transfers (e.g. cash-for-training micro-projects), and that WFP needed to closely coordinate these projects with the FID cash transfer

<sup>101</sup> See Annex 20 for more details on the feedback that the evaluation team collected through focus group discussions

<sup>102</sup> Usually, the WFP micro-projects were undertaken previous to or after the FID micro-projects, with good synergies between the two funding streams that could build on each other's results.

<sup>103</sup> The EMOP comprised GFD for a number of days followed by short-duration FFA projects.

<sup>104</sup> In the Notes for the Record of the WFP Programme Review Committee in April 2013 for endorsement of BR5 it is mentioned that the donors are not satisfied with the results achieved after so many years of investment.

<sup>105</sup> In the SPRs overviews are given of overall "outputs" of the FFA projects. These are all presented under SO3 while there also is FFA under SO1. In the SPRs, there is no disaggregation of works accomplished in the zones affected by drought vs. works accomplished in the zones affected by cyclones.

<sup>106</sup> The feasibility study was undertaken in various areas in the South and included discussions with Cooperating Partners and other stakeholders. The main arguments in favour of CFA were (a) that it offers greater freedom of choice to beneficiaries; (b) that demand strengthening is positive for local markets which directly after the harvest are well supplied with food; (c) that CFA is especially advantageous for beneficiaries in the period April to August when food prices on the market are relatively low; and (d) that cash-based approaches offer a possible foundation for future social safety net programmes by the Government.

projects<sup>107</sup>. The feasibility study also recommended that projects should provide 2,500 Ariary for a 5-hour work day<sup>108</sup>, and that regular market studies and household surveys<sup>109</sup> should be implemented. WFP Madagascar started off in 2013 with the shift to cash-based approaches in Madagascar through two series of CFA pilots, the first series with weekly distribution of cash by the partner agency, and the second series with distribution of electronic coupons. These pilot projects were to be closely studied to draw lessons on best practices across contexts. Yet, beyond a baseline study for one of the projects however, no monitoring or project reports were available to the evaluation team. A recent support mission from the Regional Office identified a number of challenges, like (a) limitations in terms of trained/dedicated staff on Cash and Vouchers both within the CO and the SOs, and among the Cooperating Partners; (b) lack of self-targeting as CFA is financially attractive for most of the rural households in Madagascar; and (c) challenges to access financial services for distribution of cash in rural settings. At community level, the views on cash-based vs. food-based approaches appear to differ widely between places. A community near Tulear expressed clear preference for food-based approaches because their families are in need of food consumption, while cash may be used for other purposes. In a community near Bekily most people favored cash as this enables them to buy clothes, medicine, soap and food items like sugar and salt. However, various villagers said that in the real ‘*soudure*’ months from October to February, food is better for them.

95. Another point that came up is the location where cash is distributed. The approach in the second phase has been to cash the coupons in the market towns and sometimes at community-level. Distributing larger amounts of money in market towns<sup>110</sup> brings more security risks, esp. for women. At the same time, the team agrees with WFP this enables beneficiaries to purchase larger items or at better prices. A suggestion in both communities visited was to involve local microfinance which would reduce travel time and risks and encourage saving

96. This evaluation intended to analyse the local cash value of the FFA food basket<sup>111</sup> in selected places and at different times of the year, to enable comparisons the value of cash transfers (2,500 Ariary per working day<sup>112</sup>) by CFA projects.

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<sup>107</sup> This refers to the PSAR (*Programme de Sécurité Alimentaire et Reconstruction*) programme that was established in 2008 and targets the communes with high food insecurity as identified by ENGRG (up to early 2011 by the SAP system). The beneficiary selection mechanism for the CFA component in the programme is well developed, targeting the most vulnerable. The cash injection in the selected communities is rather small as projects have a maximum of 150 participants and a duration of 4 to 6 weeks max. See: <http://www.fid.mg/index.php?mio=efsrp&lg=fr> (accessed 20/12/2013).

<sup>108</sup> Amount equals around US\$ 1.15 per working day (exchange rate November 2013). The level of payment is in line with the work norms for CFA programmes in Madagascar as defined in 2009 by the Ministry of Population and Social Affairs based on a recommendation of the food security and livelihoods cluster to set payment levels slightly above the minimum wage level. However, the norm since has not been changed and discussion on adjustment for inflation is on-going.

<sup>109</sup> Market studies are needed to assess whether the programme leads to any distortions in price trends on local markets. Process indicators to be assessed through household surveys are e.g. coverage rates among female-headed households and large-size households, and % of households that report timely receipt of the cash. Result indicators are changes in household Food Consumption Score, % of the cash that is reported to be used on purchase of food items, length of irrigation channel constructed, surface of irrigated fields that are rehabilitated, etc.

<sup>110</sup> In the second round payment was done after 20 days of work (more or less on monthly basis). This is

<sup>111</sup> The FFA ration in principle covers staple food needs for a family of 5 persons. It consists of 2 kg of rice and 0.3 kg of pulses per working day in cyclone-prone areas, and 2.4 kg of maize and 0.3 kg of pulses per working day in drought-prone areas.

<sup>112</sup> Recently, a need was identified to harmonize the various approaches for cash transfers in Madagascar. For the HIMO programme operated by the FID the focus is on provision of income support to the poor in critical times after natural disasters and during the agricultural slack season. Because of this objective, payment levels need to

Without primary information from WFP on food basket cost variation, this analysis couldn't be conducted<sup>113</sup>. FDGs suggested that value of the cash transfer is seen as more advantageous in the period directly after the harvest when prices are low while the food ration is preferred during the months of the 'soudure' when supplies are less and market prices are high.

#### 2.2.4. Capacity Development

	Activity	Target	Baseline (CFSVA, Oct 2010)	Findings / Remarks / Unintended outcomes
SO5	Capacity development local authorities in collaboration with BNGRC	n.a.	-	(No indicator on DRR strengthening)
	Technical support to farmer associations	>20% of food purchased locally	n.a.	2011: 18%; 2012: 14% <sup>114</sup>
	Development of inter-agency strategy and training plan on food security	n.a.	-	-
	Re-establishment of a system for food security monitoring in sentinel sites	n.a.	-	-

97. The annual reports of the PRRO present limited information on the SO5 component, so most of the analysis is based on project documents and discussions with the project team.

98. The « *Capacity development of local authorities in collaboration with BNGRC* » aspect has been strongly affected by the political crisis, which has limited possibilities of direct interaction with governmental authorities. WFP has maintained limited collaboration with BNGRC (supply of computers and communication equipment for data collection and processing) and the regional technical authorities. Yet, some BNGRC staff, as well as ORN and DRDR, have participated in 2013 to training on DRR conducted by the WFP regional office, in RSA.

99. The « *Technical support to farmer associations* » aspect mainly covers the promotion of local purchase. Local purchase rates (18% in 2011, 14% in 2012) quantitative achievements are close to the PRRO objectives. Additionally, provisional 2013 data indicate a total of 8 034 MT PRRO related purchases of which 2 611 are issued from local purchases, that is 32%<sup>115</sup>. Total WFP total purchases (covering for

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reflect costs of daily living, and need to be set at such a level that they will attract the poorer segments (i.e. should not be set too high as happened to be the case in 2005!). For WFP however the rationale is that the cash 'ration' needs to be more or less equal in value to the food ration based on local market prices. See: World Bank (2008), High Labour Intensive (HIMO) Public Works in Madagascar: Issues and Policy Options, Safety Nets Primer Notes, 2008, No. 27.

<sup>113</sup> A cost-effectiveness analysis (alpha-value) was undertaken as part of the CFA feasibility study in which it was assessed whether in terms of costs incurred, it is advantageous for WFP to engage in cash transfers or not. These calculations were only done once however, and not up-to-date with actual market prices.

<sup>114</sup> Data on local purchases on the SPRs were somehow confusing:

- there are no figures in the 2011 SRP on local purchases

- there are two different values in the 2012 SPR hence our confusion in the text: on p. 9, 18% for 2011 and 14% for 2012, and on p.10, 11,33% in 2011 and 6,25% in 2012.

After checking with WFP, data on p.9 have been considered.

<sup>115</sup> WFP (2014), Situation des achats locaux 2013. Internal working paper.

the CP, the PRRO and the EMOP), were 16 306 MT in 2012 and 23 740 MT in 2013, with respectively 17% and 18% of local purchases.

*Table 8: Food Purchases shares according to volume data in 2011 and 2012 SPR*

Year	Local purchase (MT)	Triangular Purchase (MT)	Other International Purchase (MT)	Total	% local purchase
2011	2 476	6 933	4 090	13 449	18%
2012	1 397	6 730	2 006	10 133	14%
Total	2 3873	13 663	6 096	23 632	16%

Source: Built with data issued from Food purchases tables (p10, SPR 2011 & p11, SPR 2012)

100. However, the majority of PRRO local purchases, have been done via private companies through tendering procedures at national level (approximately, purchases of 2 300 MT in 2011, 900 MT in 2012 and 2 400 MT in 2013 while local purchases from producer organizations are much smaller and mainly relied on partnership with the AROPA project in four districts of PRRO interventions areas, all in the South, (with approximate maize volumes of 175 MTs in 2011, 445 MT in 2012 and 218 MT in 2013), and marginally by FOs supported by GRET (23 MT of Sorghum in 2012 in Ambovombe / Anosy region) <sup>116</sup>. While local purchases at national level with private companies increased in 2013, FOs purchases fall following bad climatic conditions in the South with impacts on local prices rising, incompatible with WFP purchase prices.

101. NGOs expressed interest in 2012 and 2013 to be part of this local purchase scheme, proposing to ensure the intermediation between the WFP and the FOs: CARE, INTERAIDE, Agha Khan, ADRA, as well as other projects, such as IFAD PROSPERER<sup>117</sup>.

102. The local purchases activities have potential links with local capacities strengthening and food security improvement, and as such, should to be pursued. On one hand, private companies are getting used to adapt their offer to the WFP standards, which can have positive effects in strengthening capacities to access to other regional markets (RSA, La Réunion). On the other hand, support to farmers organizations to enable them to supply food to market (or WFP) standards on a contractual basis, requires commitment and careful strategizing to optimize effects and sustainability.

103. Few specific activities were conducted in the PRRO to strengthen the capacities of partners NGOs:

- Food stocks management and distribution: the Letter Of understanding between the partners NGOs and WFP trainings plans, this either for pre-positioned food management, or FFA projects<sup>118</sup>.

<sup>116</sup> Informations presented in:

- Local purchases report - WFP – November 2011, Programme monitoring.
- Local purchases report - WFP – December 2012, Programme monitoring.

<sup>117</sup> Programme de soutien aux Pôles de Micro-Entreprises Rurales et aux Economies Régionales

<sup>118</sup> LoU Pre-positionning and FFA - article 5 Obligation du PAM : « 5.6 fournir des avis et des indications sur l'entreposage et la manutention des produits; en cas de besoin, dispenser une formation aux membres du



- Some NGO partners received training to improve their capacity to manage rural infrastructure projects (water ponds, dams, etc.) according to suitable technical standards<sup>119</sup>. Others received trainings on project management and implementation, and on targeting practices<sup>120</sup>.
- Yet, the PRRO annual reports refers to these capacity-building mechanisms, but without providing details on the initial diagnosis of needs, existing requests from NGOs, the number and types of completed training, and results.

104. The “*Re-establishment of a food security monitoring system in sentinel sites*” aspect has been strongly affected by the political crisis. In the beginning of the project, the PRRO intended to work closely together with SALOHI project on a common information system linked to an institutional national body. Due to the 2009 crisis and the USAID withdrawal, the common system has not been implemented. When the EU ended their financial support to the SAP system early 2011<sup>121</sup>, the Government did not manage to take it over. The main remaining system is the CFSAM, functioning on an annual basis by compiling available data region by region, and funded by WFP. Regarding some specific areas of PRRO interventions, one can also mention the SSSA which is the own system of SALOHI.

#### **Summary of Key findings on the results of the PRRO:**

- By end 2013, the total tonnage distributed by the PRRO was 31,788 MT, with rather high fluctuations in amounts per district and per zone. Due to increasing budget constraints, realization was much lower than planned esp. for 2012 and 2013. Through the EMOP after Cyclone Haruna and additional 1208 MT of food was distributed in the ‘*Grand Sud*’ in the first half of 2013.
- The PRRO primarily consists of Food-for-Assets projects. General food distribution has been rather low as no major droughts occurred and relief responses after cyclones were short. The number of partners and districts covered by the PRRO shows an increasing trend. No work has been undertaken under the nutrition component in the PRRO as there was no nutrition monitoring data (GAM rates) that indicated the occurrence of a nutrition emergency. Overall, there are very few actors engaged in nutrition in Madagascar who support the Government, and there are major coverage gaps. WFP has not directly engaged in nutrition surveillance activities.
- Due to NGOs partners positioning, the PRRO response to cyclones is mainly concentrated on littoral areas, where cyclones and flood are recurrent. However, cyclones might also strike hinterlands or their access might be limited due to road and rural tracks destructions. As the SAP system was discontinued early 2011, geographical targeting in the drought-prone South and South-West of Madagascar has mainly been based on non independent and qualitative information provided by partner agencies and from the communities. FFA project implementation has become a sort of routine based on a rather limited menu of types of work. Anecdotal evidence confirms short-term impacts and largest benefits for better-off households with strong asset base. Overall, M&E systems are rather weak for the PRRO.
- Quality of FFA micro projects depends on NGO knowhow, adequate staff, and ability to coordinate various operations and funding, as well as its permanent presence or not in the intervention area (independently of the PRRO). Given the fact the PRRO

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personnel du Partenaire au sujet des pratiques de distribution, des rapports (y compris le système de suivi des produits du PAM) et l'entreposage »

<sup>119</sup> Standard Project Report 2010

<sup>120</sup> Standard Project Report 2011 and Standard Project Report 2012

<sup>121</sup> In addition, WFP contributed to the Early Warning System (SAP) in the South of the country aiming to monitor food and nutrition security in the most vulnerable regions.



resources are too limited to engage complex operation (reforestation, dam, irrigation scheme), it is preferable to promote low-tech interventions in the zones where NGOs are not permanently present. The choice of the FFA participants is generally determined by a plural process in which vulnerable criteria, as a combination of WFP and partner NGO criteria, are appropriated and adapted by the local communities. According to the local social context, food distribution might be therefore a factor of community strengthening, but some cases of crisis or exclusion might also be possible.

- The pilots with cash-based approaches that started in 2013 are highly relevant in both drought-prone and cyclone-prone areas of Madagascar. WFP is still in the process of identifying the most suitable approaches, e.g. in terms of distribution channels, and the required level of the cash ration.
- Monitoring on the impacts of the FFA projects on reducing vulnerability was of insufficient scale and quality, and introduced too late to be able to have analysis on this point at this stage. The chain of causality of vulnerability is not clearly established by PRRO, and it hardly constitutes a reference for FFA project selection criteria on the benefit of the most vulnerable socio-economic groups. From that point of view, certain types of projects are more favourable than other to these groups (agricultural intensification techniques on tany, diversification, etc.).
- Capacity building efforts toward local authorities and information system have been negatively impacted by the 2009 crisis. Training support towards NGOs partners have been done on a yearly basis (food storage and distribution techniques/procedures, projects implementation and management, technical advices for rural infrastructures projects to attain suitable technical standards). But limited information are available on NGOs capacities diagnosis, type and number of trainings, results. Local purchases are mainly done through tendering procedures towards private companies. Limited tonnage is also supplied by FOs, through the intermediation of AROPA project and marginally by GRET. A more proactive local purchase strategy medium term should be designed and operationalised, with expected positive impact in term of agricultural development.

## 2.3. Factors Affecting the Results

### 2.3.1. Internal factors

105. Factors within WFP's control The following is a listing of internal factors that have influenced the PRRO implementation process and the level of results achieved thus far in positive ways:

#### *Institutional Capacities*

106. The WFP policy framework fosters engagement in the full range of disaster management from preparedness to relief to early recovery, and to tackle food security and nutrition in a comprehensive way. The Strategic Results Framework 2008-2013 provides sound corporate indicators for vulnerability assessment and results monitoring on food security and malnutrition rates.

107. For the PRRO, WFP has been in contact with GoM bodies at national and regional levels, mainly through regular cluster meetings on food security and disaster risk reduction. WFP and other UN agencies were well-placed to gradually resume

working relationships with the Government once the Road Map to new Presidential Elections was agreed upon (end 2011).

#### *Coherence of WFP portfolio*

108. The co-existence of a PRRO and Country Programme in Madagascar facilitated a continuation of support to nutrition interventions. The approach however is different: in the PRRO the focus was on treatment of acute malnutrition (TSF) during emergencies while in the CP the focus is on preventive approaches and chronic malnutrition.

#### *Operational capacities*

109. Sustained presence in the arid zones of Madagascar where WFP and its partners has built up good working relationships with the communities is perceived as a strong feature of the PRRO. In cyclone-prone zones in the East and South-East, WFP has maintained and developed<sup>122</sup> a good NGO partner network. Some of the NGOs in the various zones have advanced strategic and technical capacities to implement FFA micro-projects in a coherent and efficient way.

110. Logistics is well adapted to transport infrastructures constraints in Madagascar and is well organised. Apart from some pipeline breaks due to funding problems end 2012, food movement and delivery seems to have been smooth. In addition, the acquisition of specific know-how for PRRO on that matter is part of a long term process, since the scheme put in place is the same that has been implemented with the previous PRRO 10442<sup>123</sup>: because the cyclone paths are unpredictable, some limited food stocks are prepositioned on 5 sites along the coast in the South-East (managed by partner NGOs) and larger stocks are kept in the 3 WFP warehouses. Areas selected for prepositioning are rightly chosen as the South-East is frequently affected and difficult to access in the event of cyclones and floods. The prepositioning allows immediate provision of relief assistance through distribution of balanced food rations and thus provides the time needed for the delivery of additional food if necessary.

111. On the other hand, there is a range of factors within the control of WFP that have had a negative effect on the results that have been achieved for the PRRO:

#### *Coordination*

112. Although regular coordination is taking place through national- and regional-level 'Cluster Meetings', effective collaboration with other UN agencies like FAO and UNICEF through joint programming or other mechanisms for ensuring optimal complementarity and synergies between the actions of the various agencies was not strongly embedded in the original PRRO document and the BRs that were adopted later on. Along the same lines, there is limited coordination with technical directions at regional levels (agriculture, environment, genie rural).

113. The rather large number of Cooperating Partners combined with a trend over the years to increase the number of districts covered by the PRRO has placed considerable stress on WFP staff at the Country Office and Sub-Office levels.

#### *Partnership management*

<sup>122</sup> With the new participation of the NGO Interaide

<sup>123</sup> Rapport d'évaluation de l'Intervention prolongée de secours et de redressement à Madagascar (IPSR 10442.0) - Aide pour faire face aux catastrophes naturelles récurrentes et à l'insécurité alimentaire saisonnière - (juillet 2006 - juin 2009). OEDE PAM - 11/2008.

114. Within the system for assessment of the quality of FFA proposals involves the Sub-Offices and Country Offices. However, in particular in relation to the larger contracts, it is seen as a weakness that this review does not entail structured analysis of food security conditions and needs (esp. since the SAP system was discontinued early 2011), an inventory of the interventions that take place in the communities through other relief and development actors and regular GoM services, the technical quality of the FFA proposal, and its complexity level with regards to the implementing NGO capacities and the FFA duration. Also, WFP has limited focus on the contribution FFA projects can make to disaster preparedness and how they could be linked to the Country Programme (nutrition, school feeding, resilience) and other development interventions.

115. Some of the partners NGOs happen to have insufficient strategic, financial and technical capacities to implement complex FFA micro-projects in a coherent and efficient way. This is a differentiation factor for FFA final quality projects, given the fact that WFP staff has very little capacity to back up NGOs to attain required quality standards for the intervention, especially in the East and South-East areas. For example, this finding is typical for a situation where FFAs are implemented by NGOs in zones where they intervene with stand-alone activities, more over if the project is technically complex, with no means to prepare and to sufficiently accompany the intervention, beyond the resources supplied by PRRO. Moreover, this is WFP's responsibility to select the right projects and the right partners according to the context, and, if they lack capacities, to build them.

116. Management of the partner network is mainly done through the Sub-Offices. In the South where the two Sub-Offices are located, WFP staff is regularly travelling to the field sites and maintains close contact with the partner agencies and the communities. However, there does not seem to be a system to track partner performance across the years which e.g. could inform staff at CO level. Mainly due to WFP understaffing and lack of logistics means in the East and South-East, the partners for the PRRO are not closely accompanied by WFP: contact with Field Officers is not very frequent and no joint meetings have taken place for coordination and mutual learning.

117. Various partners indicated that timeframes for FFA implementation are too rigid which does not allow them to spend sufficient time on project identification and preparation at community level.

118. There is no regular system for briefing and debriefings (e.g. bi-annual or at least annual) with the partner NGOs, aiming to take stock of the past activities, the current situation and the perspectives on various subjects (nutrition and vulnerability, FFA tools and methodology, mutual objectives of collaboration, working modalities, etc.).

#### *Program management systems*

119. The Program Unit, as the main body for program administration, doesn't seem to be closely enough following some issues. The filing system on contracts and Cooperating Partners for the PRRO is rated as rather disorganized. Program information streams (e.g. logistics data, monthly stock and food distribution reports provided by the partners, PDM results) are insufficiently managed and not reconciled with one another. For many of the projects under the PRRO in 2012 WFP appeared not to possess a final report from the partner agencies which is seen as a serious shortcoming. Moreover, very few of the available final reports account for

the full tonnage that according to the WFP commodity tracking system (COMPAS) was handed over to the Partner<sup>124</sup>! There is no system for producing regular portfolio implementation progress updates. The evaluation team had great difficulty to get hold of data beyond the information reported upon in the SPRs, as e.g. distribution data broken down by partner and by district. For the PRRO there is no mechanism to identify best practices and to compile results of FFA micro-projects implementation. Such a tool, shared and built with other partners (partner NGOs and other similar FFA programs), could help in the proposals selection process as well as for the PRRO staff capacity building and the backstopping to NGOs.

120. The M&E information generated is far from sufficient (just one round of PDM per year), and, apart from 2011, is not presented in the form of a report that can be read by the staff and shared with others. For the logframe indicators (Community Asset Score and Coping Strategies Index) that were added in BR5 (June 2013) baseline information is not available.

121. The importance of the M&E function within the CFA pilots is well-recognized by WFP Madagascar but nevertheless not sufficiently developed. Some studies were done during the start-up phase of this new element in the PRRO but a thorough analysis of the comparative value of food-based and cash-based approaches so far has been lacking.

### 2.3.2. External factors

122. Context conditions in Madagascar also have played a large role in terms of realizing results, both in positive and negative ways:

#### **Enhancing factors:**

##### *Favorable agro-climatic conditions in the PRRO timeframe and intervention areas*

123. As agro-ecological conditions in the cyclone-prone eastern lowlands of Madagascar are very favourable for (rain-fed) agriculture, FFA/CFA projects on expansion of acreage or intensification of cropping directly contributed to improved food security. Abundant rainfall patterns facilitate growing of a wide range of crops with good productivity, including a range of cash crops which enable many households to repair the damage caused by cyclones.

124. In the semi-arid lowlands in the South and South-West of Madagascar the FFA/CFA projects on (expansion of) irrigation farming are building on the opportunities offered by the presence of perennial rivers in the areas. Another suitable area which so far has not been considered by WFP as entry point to support food security in the area is support (small) livestock farming as there are vast grazing lands and population pressure is low. In general, the PRRO has benefitted from the good yields from rain-fed cropping in past years (last real drought in 2009/10) which helped communities in the 'Grand Sud' to get through the past years, and keep malnutrition levels relatively low.

##### *Accessibility of intervention areas facilitating logistics*

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<sup>124</sup> As shown in Annex 11, in about half of the cases for 2012 projects there is no final report available. Also only about 50% of the tonnage that is provided by WFP is accounted for in the form of a final report from the partner. These problems occur in all zones covered by the PRRO but the level of reporting is particularly low for the zones managed by Tulear SO. Final reports are also missing for some of the partners in the south that dealt with large tonnages up to 1,000 MT!

125. The logistics for serving drought-prone areas of Madagascar was facilitated by the presence of two main ports in the South (Tulear, Ambovombe). In terms of logistics, the cyclone-prone areas in the East and South-East are more difficult to serve, as they all have to depend on Toamasina as the main port of entrance for imported food.

#### *Synergetic programmes*

126. Quality of the FFA PPRO projects depends on NGO knowhow, adequate staff, and ability to coordinate various operations and funding, and their permanent presence in the area of FFA intervention. When FFAs are implemented by NGOs involved in other projects and funding (EU, WB, USAID, French Cooperation), then coordinators of various interventions is greatly facilitated. In these conditions, FFA micro-projects are designed and implemented in coherence the mainstream interventions with longer timeframes than the Field Level Agreement (FLAs) signed with WFP for the PRRO. Then, PRRO is used as a complementary mean to reach the goals that were already set<sup>125</sup>. This is a positive factor for the quality of the PRRO intervention and brings a clear value added to the whole process. On the opposite, FFA interventions may be implemented either in areas where NGOs are not permanently present or by NGOs with limited capacities. In that case, quality of interventions is generally lower.

#### **Limiting factors:**

##### *Political context*

127. Since the coup in 2009, the country has suffered from a political crisis which has brought foreign investment and international assistance to a near standstill. This has affected funding levels of all relief and development agencies in Madagascar including WFP (both for the PRRO and the Country Programme). Due to political crisis and impossibility for WFP to work closely with governmental bodies, all activities under the PRRO have been implemented with a very limited or inexistent process of dialogue with ministries, apart from limited coordination with BNGRC. The “*Help the government in establishing sustainable mechanisms to respond to natural disaster*” activities, although some interventions took place in 2013, overall have been very limited in scope. As a consequence, an institutional handover strategy was not possible.

128. More specifically, the political context has resulted in discontinuation in 2011 of the SAP food security information system (WFP’s main source of district-level food security data for planning of PRRO activities!), and very limited nutrition data collection.

#### **Summary of Key findings on the factors that affected the PRRO results:**

<sup>125</sup> For example, NGO – generally on its own resource - is able to prepare adequately a labour intensive action (on rural tracks building, dam or irrigation channel renovation, reforestation plots, innovative agricultural technics or species introduction, etc.) at both level:

- At the upstream level by initial diagnosis, population raising awareness and consultation, organisation,)
- At the downstream level by accompany the following phase downstream (for example, agro-technical advice to the farmers, strengthening of the Infrastructure Management Associations, conception of natural resources management plans.

- Internal factors that contributed positively to achievement of PRRO results are primarily related to WFP's strong corporate policies and tools on food security, nutrition and VAM. As a UN agency, WFP is well-placed for re-launching intensive collaboration with the new Government after the Presidential elections. The overall scale of operations and sustained presence in selected parts of the country, based on an adequate partner's network, well-established logistics including the prepositioning approach for the South-East, has helped WFP to reach out to many communities. This is an asset that the rolling out of cash-based approaches can build on.
- There are also various internal factors that appear to have limited the level of results achieved. These primarily fall in the domain of management procedures, project administration, sectoral technical expertise, and collective learning processes. To a large extent they are related to the difficult funding situation that forced WFP Madagascar to reduce the number of senior staff positions. But there also is the fact that the PRRO lacks clarity in terms of which population groups it wants to reach out to and what specific results are envisaged for the various groups. The PRRO portfolio currently is rather dispersed in geographical terms with high number of districts being covered and a high number of partner agencies. Capacity building of Government agencies has been recently added to the PRRO but without the financial means attached to have any real impact.
- External context factors that enhanced the level of results achieved by the PRRO are the rather good rainfall in the past years, coupled with the agricultural potential that exists in the South and South-West of Madagascar. The presence of two main ports in the South has greatly facilitated logistics for the operation. Of course, the professionalism and the expertise of partner NGOs are key determinants in the final quality of the PRRO interventions in the field (can be in either positive or negative ways).
- On the other hand, implementation of the PRRO obviously has been negatively affected by the difficult economic and political conditions in Madagascar in the past years which have affected everyone including the international aid community. In the area of food security, various key limiting factors can be mentioned: the damage caused by recurrent cyclones and the locust plagues, banditry and regular cattle thefts, limited availability of agricultural entrants, and lack of food security and nutrition monitoring data. Due to the political situation, institutional hand-over strategies and actions have been very limited to non-existent.

### 3. Conclusions and Recommendations

#### 3.1. Overall Assessment<sup>126</sup>

129. **Relevance:** WFP avails of the right mandate and instruments to provide food assistance to the disaster-prone areas in Madagascar that are affected by recurrent cyclones, floods and/or droughts. The PRRO is coherent with the priorities in national policies, programmes and plans on rural development and disaster management, but because of the political crisis context has limited engagement at national levels. The prime focus within the PRRO has been on community-level projects, most of them operated as stand-alone activities. Geographical targeting decisions for the projects were primarily based on field-level knowledge among WFP

<sup>126</sup> Extended version in annex 19

and partner staff in combination with regional-level information from food security assessments. Given that no major disasters occurred in past years, it was justified to discontinue the 'emergency nutrition' component in the PRRO although evidently continued nutrition monitoring is required. The approach for Food-for-Asset projects more and more has become a matter of routine; the evaluation has identified a range of areas where there is a need to increase appropriateness of the type of works to be undertaken, and the selection mechanism for participants in the works. Mechanisms for cash-based approaches are not yet fully developed. Overall, the food basket composition for FFA/GFD was in line with local preferences (rice for the East and South-East, maize and sorghum for the South and South-West).

130. **Efficiency:** There is considerable fragmentation in the PRRO portfolio, with many districts being covered and a large number of Cooperating partners. This has resulted in a very high workload for WFP staff (esp. at the level of the Country Office) which is compounded by the fact that systems for administrative organization and M&E in the programme unit are insufficiently developed. It was observed by the evaluators that in some cases local agencies are handling very large quantities (up to 1,000 MT per year) without enough supervision and control, and that some districts show extremely high coverage (40% up to 65%, in one case even >100% of the total population). It took WFP some years to start up a series of pilots on cash-based approaches.

131. **Effectiveness:** Through a combination of free food rations and Food-for-Work projects, the PRRO until end 2013 has distributed 31,788 MT (42% achievement against plan). The performance in terms of gender has been rather good. Because targeting is done in line with preferences of community leaders, there is a situation where exclusion and inclusion errors co-exist. Performance on results measurement for the PRRO has been very minimal, for a variety of reasons, of which the main ones are lack of a well-developed M&E system, attribution problems, dependability of food security on external factors like rainfall and access to agricultural inputs, incomplete sets of final reports prepared by the partners, etc. The Food Consumption Score is the only outcome indicator for the PRRO that has been monitored across the years and results are not very encouraging. Results of the pilots on Cash-for-Assets projects are not yet available.

132. **Impact:** Assessment of overall impacts is difficult for this PRRO, for the same reasons as mentioned above: (a) Variability of agro-ecological conditions (including cyclones); (b) the impact of the political crisis as a main confounding factor; (c) attribution problems as the WFP PRRO in most cases is not the only food security intervention in the community; (d) Lack of differentiation in short-term and long-term objectives for various levels of vulnerability among FFA/CFA caseloads; and (e) lack of/insufficient baseline and monitoring data.

133. **Sustainability and connectedness:** WFP's contribution to sustainable scaling-up of agricultural production is only effective if complemented by a larger package of support (fertilizers, improved seeds, agricultural extension services, etc.) alongside the FFA / CFA projects. This is currently happening to a limited extent only. Although the Sub-Offices actively engage in Food Security Sub-Cluster meetings in Tulear and Ambovombe, it is mainly about information exchange, less about joint planning. In the South-East, coordination in practice mainly relies on initiatives taken by the partner NGOs, FAO, and others. The contribution from WFP side is rather constrained (only one WFP Food Monitor based in Manakara). The relevance of PRRO interventions would be more substantial if WFP Madagascar and



its partners would undertake joint programming at district and community level with other main actors on food security (FAO, EU, Salohi, etc.).

### 3.2. Recommendations

#### Strategic Positioning

- i. Once the new President and parliament are installed, WFP should aim at further engaging with the Government of Madagascar at national levels, both in terms of capacity building but also for reestablishment of one single food security early warning system and for overall coordination of FFA/CFA interventions in the area of social protection and rural development.
- ii. Continue to engage with other international and national stakeholders on food security/social protection, with the explicit aim to go more into joint programming and carefully managed 'joint' implementation of project and programmes. The involvement of GoM regional technical directorates (agriculture, livestock, environment and waters and forests, health) and of regional/commune-level authorities in the process of consultation carried out within regional clusters should be encouraged.

#### Future Programme Design

- iii. WFP shall reconsider incorporating nutrition activities in the follow-up PRRO with the aim to support Government health services on preparedness and response to emergencies. It could be considered to address nutrition through capacity building (both in terms of equipment and training) of central and regional levels for nutrition monitoring (in particular on GAM) and as preparedness measure to be ready for quick scaling-up of treatment of moderate acute malnutrition if conditions require to do so.
- iv. WFP should rethink the objectives, indicators and approaches for the FFA / CFA labour projects in the next PRRO. Elements that need to be better defined/elaborated are: (a) rationale to be applied for population groups (vulnerability profiles) targeting and with what objectives (with specific indicators on resilience improvement) for each specific group; (b) capacity criteria to be applied for selection of partner agencies according to the type of interventions, level of complexity and the tonnage/budget they should maximally handle; (c) the type of projects that are eligible and what minimum quality criteria should be met, (d) amounts of cash and what financial service provider channels are best used for CFA projects; and (e) type of information to be produced by VAM (e.g. also more in-depth case studies to provide relief to early warning data streams).
- v. It is suggested to WFP to consider a shift in the approach for the cyclone-prone areas in Madagascar towards harmonization with how the PRRO operates in the drought-prone zones. This implies an overall prioritization of resilience and food security improvement as main entry points for FFA activities across the disaster cycle. Prepositioning in cyclone-prone parts of the country should be maintained in order to facilitate quick release of food for relief operations in case of disasters



during the cyclone season. Under this logic, it would be relevant to consider new selection mechanisms for FFA projects (e.g. NGO Calls for Proposals focusing on certain types of livelihood improvements that target specific categories of households like small livestock breeding, horticulture, cultivation of root crops and tubers, development of *tanety*).

- vi. The technical quality and the durability of the large-scale or complex projects (as such as irrigation infrastructure, reforestation, water catchment basins) will be enhanced if the funds allocated by the PRRO can include resources (i) to achieve adequate technical feasibility (especially if the infrastructures include bridges, slopes, embankments and channels building or rehabilitation), (ii) in some cases to support the purchase of specific materials (concrete, metal frame) to ensure the strength of the infrastructure put in place, or (iii) to provide means for complementary actions (vegetation cover for slopes above irrigation field, for example). WFP should ensure that the PRRO builds on and engages in local multi-annual planning (gathering local communities, WFP and NGO partners) for definition of such longer-term and more integrated approaches.

### **Programme Management Systems**

- vii. In order to ensure that available resources are used in the best way possible and to raise the profile of WFP among donors, there is a need for WFP Madagascar to improve programme management quality, and to ensure that the VAM unit and the Sub-Offices have sufficient resources to undertake the necessary studies and analyses to support programming and monitoring during implementation. Within the limits posed by the context of constrained financial resources, it is needed to adjust WFP technical and administrative capacities to the geographic and quantitative ambitions and sectors of intervention (nutrition, food security projects, local purchase, capacity building on policy making) that the PRRO covers.
- viii. A collective learning process should be implemented by WFP, combining development of best practices, regular consultations with partner NGOs, and regular review of interventions in a participative way with beneficiary communities. In the same perspective, it is suggested to consider establishing partnerships with NGOs with multi-annual frameworks in order to improve their capacity building and to contribute to the hand-over strategy. This should entail the various administrative, technical and financial aspects and should specify the support and capacity building by WFP to the partner.
- ix. A more proactive strategy focusing on local purchase should be pursued by WFP Madagascar, through both tendering procedures towards private companies and direct transactions with farmers' organizations (FOs). Regarding transactions with FOs, it would be necessary to prepare multi-annual letters of Understanding between WFP, the NGOs providing technical support to FOs, and possibly FOs themselves. Preferably, these LoUs should go beyond the type of LoU that currently exists between WFP and AROPA. In particular, it would be very helpful to provide some guaranteed outlets to farmers so that the technical support partners and FOs can settle medium-term strategies<sup>127</sup>. In this perspective, it also could be explored whether there are options to integrate one or more 'new'

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<sup>127</sup> The FLA should stipulate the type and quantity of products, the time schedule for delivery, the modalities for price fixation, the responsibilities and roles of each one of the signatories.

commodities in the food basket. The aim would be to use of more local products (for example, cassava, local cultivated species of dry beans<sup>128</sup>, maize) that are part of traditional diets, still taking into consideration nutrition, food safety and costs aspects). Implementation of these activities requires a certain financial tolerance (accept cost prices slightly higher than international market prices). These local purchases should be primarily implemented in the areas of intervention of the PRRO and as such would contribute to the farmers' vulnerability reduction.

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<sup>128</sup> Voanjobory (*Vuandzea subterranean*), Antaka (*Dolichos lablab*), Voanemba (*Vigna unguiculata*), Lima bean, or Madagascar bean (*Phaseolus lunatus*).

## Acronyms

ADRA	<i>Adventist Development and Relief Agency</i>
AFD	<i>Agence Francaise de Developpement</i>
ALNAP	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action
AROPA	<i>Appui au Renforcement des Organisations Professionnelles et aux Services Agricoles (IFAD)</i>
BDEM	<i>Bureau de Développement de l'Écar Mananjary</i>
BNGRC	<i>Bureau National de Gestion des Risques et des Catastrophes (Madagascar)</i>
BR	Budget Revision
BVPI SEHP	<i>Bassins Versants - Périmètres Irrigués Sud-Est &amp; Hauts-Plateaux (AFD)</i>
CAH	Cadred'action Hyogo
CARE	Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere
CARITAS	<i>Confédération des organisations catholiques d'urgence, de développement et des services sociaux</i>
CFA	Cash-for-Assets (WFP)
CFSAM	Comprehensive Food Security Assessment and Monitoring (WFP)
CFSVA	Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis (WFP)
CNGRC	<i>Comité Nationale de Gestion de Risques et Crises (Madagascar)</i>
CPGU	Cellule de Prévention et Gestion d'Urgences (Madagascar)
CO	Country Office (WFP)
CP	Country Programme (WFP)
CRIC	Comité de Réflexion des Intervenants en Cataclysme
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DIPECHO	Disaster Preparedness programme by DG-ECHO (European Union)
DRDR	Direction Régionale du Développement Rural
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction

EB	Executive Board (WFP)
EFSA	Emergency Food Security Assessment (WFP)
EQAS	Evaluation Quality Assurance System (WFP)
EM	Evaluation Manager
EMOP	Emergency Operation (WFP)
ER	Evaluation Report
ET	Evaluation Team
FFA	Food-for-Assets
FID	<i>Fonds d'Investissement pour le Développement</i>
FLA	Field Level Agreement (WFP)
FO	Farmers' Organizations
GAM	Global Acute Malnutrition
GFD	General Food Distribution
GoM	<i>Government of Madagascar</i>
GRET	<i>Groupe de Recherches et d'Echanges Technologiques</i>
HQ	Headquarters (WFP)
IP	Inception Package
LTA	Long-Term Agreement
LTSH	Land Transport, Shipping and Handling (WFP)
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
MAM	Moderate Acute Malnutrition
MAP	Madagascar Action Plan
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
Mt	Metric Ton
ODDIT	<i>Organe de Développement du Diocèse de Toamasina</i>
OEV	Office of Evaluation (WFP)
OpEv	Operation Evaluation

PANSA	<i>Plan d'Action National pour la Sécurité Alimentaire</i>
PASA	<i>Programme d'Appui à la Sécurité Alimentaire</i>
PLW	Pregnant and Lactating Women
PNDR	<i>Programme National de Development Rural</i>
PRNUMAD	<i>Programme d'Appui à la Nutrition à Madagascar</i>
PRRO	Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (WFP)
RB	Regional Bureau (WFP)
RSA	Republic of South Africa
RTM	Reggio Terzo Mondo
SADC	Southern Africa Development Committee
SALOHI	Strengthening and Accessing Livelihood Opportunities for Household Incomes (USAID)
SAP	Système d'Alerte Précoce (Early Warning System)
SIRSA	Système d'Information Rurale et de Sécurité Alimentaire (Madagascar)
SNGRC	<i>Stratégie Nationale de Gestion des Risques et des Catastrophes</i>
SO	Strategic Objective (WFP)
SPR	Standard Project Report (WFP)
SSSA	<i>Système de Suivi de la Sécurité Alimentaire (SALOHI)</i>
TOR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNEG	United Nations Evaluation Group
WFP	World Food Programme

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