

OPERATIONS EVALUATION

Ethiopia, PRRO 200290, Responding to Humanitarian Crises and Enhancing Resilience to Food Insecurity: An Evaluation of WFP's Operation (2012-2013)

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Operation Fact Sheet


Operation Information

Country: World Food Programme (WFP) ETHIOPIA

Responding to Humanitarian Crises and Enhancing Resilience to Food Insecurity, Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations (PRRO) 200290

Timeframe: Initial: Two years (1 January 2012-31 December 2013), Revised: 3.5 years (18-month extension to 30 June 2015) Note: Evaluation includes formulation period of mid-2011.

Budget revisions: There have been six budget revisions (BRs) to the initial operation, which was estimated at US\$814,995,412 to reach 3,977,000 beneficiaries (yearly maximum, adjusted total). The BRs adjust beneficiary target numbers and supplies requirements based on the current context and assessment of humanitarian need. See the chart below for the evolution of the total number of beneficiaries and budget.



Description of BRs:

- i. BR #1 reduced the landside, transport, storage and handling (LTSH) rate (from US\$166.69/metric tonne (mt) to US\$142.54/mt) based on changes in transportation costs and in the logistics network. New budget: US\$790,909,461.
- ii. BR #2 increased the number of relief beneficiaries to 2.6 million people (80 percent WFP coverage),¹ which increased the adjusted total to 4,577,000 beneficiaries and food tonnage by 101,472 mt, increased direct support and operational costs, and added activities for food management and disaster risk management programmes, representing a total increase of 9.8 percent in the PRRO value. New budget: US\$868,440,287.
- iii. BR #3 again increased the number of relief beneficiaries to three million people based on the revised HRD (July-December 2012) and increased the nutrition target from 817,000 to 1,136,000 children and women to respond to increased malnutrition, with a new adjusted total of 5,228,000 beneficiaries. Other costs were adjusted accordingly for

¹ Based on the January 2012 Humanitarian Requirements Document (HRD), which indicated that 3.2 million people required food assistance in the first half of the year due to poor harvests and the 2011 drought. Source: Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and Humanitarian Partners (Joint Appeal). 2012. HRD.

a total increase of six percent in the PRRO value. New budget: US\$919,329,208.

- iv. BR #4 included the transfer modality of cash for 190,000 relief beneficiaries and increased costs to support the increased 2013 projections, for a revised 2013 adjusted total of 5,063,900 beneficiaries. This represented a 14 percent increase in the total PRRO value. New budget: US\$1,048,241,575.
- v. BR #5 decreased the number of relief beneficiaries from three to 1.9 million for March-June 2013 based on the revised HRD (February 2013) and associated costs. There was an increased response in Afar region, as well as for nutrition (to 1,087,000), for an adjusted total of 4,121,120² beneficiaries. This represented a seven percent decrease in the total PRRO value. New budget: US\$979,409,831.
- vi. BR #6 (November 2013) extended the operation by 18 months to align with the Government of Ethiopia's Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP), increased the total number of cash beneficiaries under relief to 300,000, and added cash transfers for 100,000 PSNP participants, for a new adjusted total of 4,307,000 beneficiaries. With necessary adjustments to other costs, the extension increased the budget by 52 percent. New budget: US\$1,488,010,735.

Other ongoing WFP operations:

- Country Programme 2012-2015 (CP 200253): aims to “i) increase the capacity of Ethiopia’s disaster risk management system; ii) enhance natural resource management in food-insecure communities and resilience to weather-related shocks; iii) support access to primary schools; iv) facilitate access to HIV care, treatment and support; and v) promote opportunities for livelihood diversification and improved access to food markets, especially for women.”³ Cross-cutting issues of the country office (CO) strategy include capacity development, gender and women’s empowerment, cost-efficiency and value added.⁴ The total CP budget as of December 2013 was US\$932.5 million, with the PRRO representing 66 percent of the annual portfolio.⁵
- PRRO 200365 (2012-2015) provides food assistance to Eritrean, Somali and Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia through supplementary feeding programmes.⁶
- Special Operations include provision of air services to the humanitarian community through United Nations Humanitarian Air Services (UNHAS) (200364, 2012), as well as constructing a humanitarian hub in Djibouti (200358) for logistics support for WFP operations and partners.⁷
- Other ongoing operations in the Somali region include: logistics augmentation (10721.1) and inter-agency passenger services (10713.0).

² Adjusted totals not provided in BR5; calculation by TANGO International.

³ WFP Ethiopia. 2011a. WFP/EB.2/2011/8/2.

⁴ WFP Ethiopia. ND. Country Strategy 2012-2015.

⁵ Based on APR 2013 data provided by CO.

⁶ WFP Ethiopia. 2012h. SPR.

⁷ WFP Ethiopia. 2012h. SPR.

Objectives		
Corporate Strategic Objective 1	PRRO Objectives:⁸	Activities:
<i>Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies</i>	Relief: Help emergency-affected households reduce the impact of shocks by addressing their food needs.	General food distribution (GFD) and cash transfers
	Nutrition/TSF: Support the most vulnerable and food-insecure households in reducing or stabilising moderate acute malnutrition among children under five and pregnant and lactating women.	Targeted supplementary feeding (TSF)
Corporate Strategic Objective 2⁹	PSNP: Support PSNP households and communities in improving food security, resilience and recovery from disaster.	Food for work (FFW), GFD, and cash transfers
<i>Prevent acute hunger and invest in disaster preparedness and mitigation measures</i>		Capacity development of government partners in disaster risk management programme (DRMP) and food management improvement programme (FMIP) ¹⁰
Main Partners		
<p>Government: Information drawn from the Terms of Reference (Annex 1) and Project Document unless otherwise noted.</p> <p>Ministry of Agriculture, Disaster Risk Management (DRM) and Food Security Sector (DRMFSS): The DRMFSS coordinates DRM and food security the federal and regional levels. The DRMFSS chairs the DRMFSS pillar of the Rural Economic Development and Food Security Platform, bringing partners together through oversight committees. WFP, along with other development partners, is part of the PSNP committees and the Donor Working Group. Additionally, food assistance and PSNP interventions at the federal level are coordinated through the Food Management Task Force chaired by DRMFSS. The DRMFSS also coordinates emergency nutrition activities; see below.</p> <p>Ministry of Health: While the Ministry of Health coordinates nutrition issues, the DRMFSS coordinates emergency nutrition responses, and the Donor Working Group coordinates other donors and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) working in nutrition. Reportedly, a group of development partners formed another, separate technical working group on nutrition.</p> <p>NGOs : Nine NGOs – Save the Children, Mercy Corps, MSF Spain, Islamic Relief, International Medical Corps, CONCERN, Care International, Plan International Ethiopia, Merlin Ethiopia</p> <p>United Nations agencies: United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)</p>		

⁸ According to SPR 2013, the PRRO objectives were revised to: 1) Relief: Help emergency-affected households reduce the impact of shocks by improving food security, resilience and recovery from disaster; 2) TSF: Support food-insecure households in reducing or stabilising moderate acute malnutrition among children six months to five years of age and pregnant and lactating women; 3) PSNP: Support PSNP households and communities to improve food security, enhance resilience and recover from disaster. The objectives have changes over the course of the PRRO. This evaluation covers the original objectives.

⁹ Revised November 2013 logframe changes this to SO3: Reduce risk and enable people, communities, and countries to meet their own food and nutrition needs. However, SPR 2013 provides outcome data listed according to SO2.

¹⁰ According to the PRRO Project Document, WFP is handing over the hubs-and-spokes logistics system to the government. This system was initiated in 2008 by DRMFSS and WFP in the Somali region and continues with support for preparedness and response capacity.

Resource level

Dollar value of operation: Data from Resource Situation, 11 May 2014.¹¹

Requirements: Initial: US\$814,995,412; Revised: US\$1,488,010,736


Received: US\$692,087,264 □

Percent against appeal: 46.5 percent of total US\$ requirements; shortfall of 53.5 percent¹²

Main Donors, resource level and percentage share:

The current share of the operational requirements is distributed among 18 sources. The main donors, in addition to carryover from previous operations, are listed below and in the chart to follow:

- USA: US\$166,836,298
- UK: US\$135,533,513
- Carryover: US\$111,298,692
- Canada: US\$107,910,029
- Germany: US\$57,690,570
- Multilateral: US\$39,229,727
- All other donors: African Development Bank, Belgium, European Commission, France, Japan, Mexico, Norway, private donors, Slovenia, United Nations CERF, United Nations Common Funds and Agencies, miscellaneous income



¹¹ The data provided to the ET for December 2013 are an excerpt from the APR 2013, reporting total PRRO annual value of USD\$615.7 million, of which US\$205.7 million was received, or 33.4 percent funding level at the end of the second year. The full APR 2013 was not available to the ET at the time this report was finalised, thus the May 2014 resource level is reported.

¹² It should be noted that while 46.5 percent of the full requirement is funded, the total value of the operation has a timeframe of 3.5 years. Current funding received based on to-date value of the operation (28 months, or US\$992,007,157) shows 69.8 percent funding against the appeal and 30.2 percent shortfall. Calculation by TANGO International.

Executive Summary

1. Responding to Humanitarian Crises and Enhancing Resilience to Food Insecurity Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations (PRRO) 200290 is a programme of World Food Programme (WFP) in Ethiopia. Its goals are to enhance food security, recovery from shocks, and resilience among emergency-affected and chronically food-insecure households. The programme is comprised of relief, nutrition, and productive safety net programme (PSNP) components, supported by activities in general food distribution (GFD), targeted supplementary feeding (TSF) to children under five and pregnant and lactating women (PLW), food for work (FFW) to build community infrastructure and assets, cash transfers, and capacity development of government partners in disaster risk management (DRM) and food management improvement programmes (FIMP). The initial operation was from 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2013, and it was extended for 18 months to June 2015. There have been six budget revisions to the initial operation, estimated at US\$814,995,412 to reach 3,977,000 beneficiaries.

2. Immediately preceding the PRRO, Ethiopia experienced the worst drought in 60 years, affecting 4.8 million people. The sustained impact of the drought left up to 3.8 million Ethiopians in need of food and non-food assistance in 2012. Pastoral areas (Somali, Afar, and Oromia regions) were hardest hit, though areas of Tigray, Amhara, and Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples Region (SNNPR) were also affected. The humanitarian situation improved in 2013, yet up to 2.7 million people still required relief assistance. As recovery began, flooding caused over US\$2 million in damage in Somali, Oromia, and SNNPR. The country is susceptible to repeated natural, economic, geo-political and climate change-related shocks – all of which contribute to acute and chronic food insecurity.

3. Ethiopia is one of the world’s poorest countries with a mostly rural population of smallholder farmers (including agro-pastoralists and pastoralists). The country has shown economic growth in recent years, mostly in the agricultural sector, yet the productivity of cultivated land is among the lowest in Africa. An estimated 15 million rural residents face food insecurity, and acute malnutrition among children often reaches “serious” and “critical” levels. Women play a critical role in farming, yet gender inequality is widespread. The main causes of food insecurity and malnutrition are poverty, lack of maternal and child healthcare, inadequate water and sanitation, and recurrent shocks. The Government of Ethiopia has made notable gains in many of these areas (e.g., the health extension system and education) and continues to promote strategies and policies to address food security, nutrition, and DRM.

4. The independent evaluation of the PRRO, commissioned by the WFP Office of Evaluation, took place in January 2014. The evaluation team (ET), comprised of TANGO International and national consultants, employed a mixed-methods approach to address the evaluation questions. The ET collected primary data via in-depth interviews with 75 WFP staff and stakeholders, focus groups with over 120 beneficiaries (men and women), and observation. The ET also conducted a desk review of over 250 documents. The fieldwork visits included Addis Ababa, Oromiya, Somali, and SNNPR. The limitations faced by the ET were: inconsistency in output data; inaccessibility of key documents; inability of the team to visit one region from the mid-term; and constraints on staff availability to do fieldwork during holidays.

Appropriateness of the operation (relevance and coherence)

5. The ET found the PRRO to be relevant to the needs of food insecure and emergency-affected households in target areas, particularly the Somali and Afar regions. Relief operations are appropriate to emergency food needs; however, the

relevance to needs during the hungry season in lowland areas is hindered due to unaligned timing of the Humanitarian Requirements Document (HRD). The new national guidelines and trainings on relief food assistance have yet to reach the *kebele* and community level. The pilot cash relief initiative is appropriate by virtue of its being implemented in food surplus areas. A mix of food and cash modalities could be explored. The ET finds the initiative promising and advises that WFP monitor markets closely to reflect current market prices in cash allotments.

6. TSF addresses malnutrition among vulnerable children and women. TSF is linked to relief, and the ET advises targeting both components at the *kebele* level. TSF for children is an appropriate response to moderate acute malnutrition (MAM), but other educational messages are needed to help ensure the non-recurrence of MAM. WFP is responding to the inclusion error through the pilot in 44 (highland) *woredas*; targeting criteria based on the pilot is needed in lowland areas.

7. The ET finds the food transfers with PSNP in Somali and Afar highly relevant given the context and very difficult operating environments. WFP could help strengthen programme linkages and applying a resilience strategy, especially in lowland pastoral areas, by ensuring that food security initiatives link to poverty reduction efforts, as well as to DRM and disaster response.¹³

8. The PRRO design and objectives are appropriately aligned with WFP Corporate Strategic Objectives 1 and 2 and with the country office strategic plan (2012-2015). The PSNP, for instance, aligns with the corporate vision for food assistance. The PRRO is externally coherent with government policies, such as the Growth and Transformation Plan, and with the United Nations Development Assistance Framework priorities. The TSF component supports the policies and programmes of government, United Nations Children's Fund, and non-governmental organisations.

Results of the operation (effectiveness and efficiency)

9. **Outputs:** In the face of recurrent drought, low crop and livestock production, climate shocks, and conflict, WFP successfully aided millions of households through the provision of food or cash. Women actively participate in all three parts of the programme. Outputs related to overall numbers of beneficiaries reached appear to be high; however, the quantity of food distributed and the total cash value of transfers distributed are low. The ET questions this inconsistency and the data quality.

10. Review of planned outputs shows that WFP has been responsive to the need for improvements in targeting and beneficiary selection, as demonstrated by the TSF pilot. The continuous nutrition screening system reduces inclusion error and should be closely examined to reach the most vulnerable people. In addition, it is not known what impact ration dilution through cultural sharing has on households, thus a targeting strategy is needed for lowland areas. There is potential for further improvement in targeting and efficiency by tailoring TSF allotments to the nutrient requirements of different groups, re-assessing the mid-upper arm circumference (MUAC) measurement, and utilising existing mobile clinics.

11. While substantial progress has been made in food delivery through Hubs and Spokes (H&S), the PRRO continues to face logistical and bureaucratic challenges to timely delivery of assistance. The ET considers the time lag between assessment and distribution is not acceptable. Timeliness of TSF is also hindered by pipeline breaks; strategies for prepositioning and securely storing food should be explored. The efficiency of the operations could improve for all three components, requiring

¹³ e.g., linking to USAID PRIME, PLI, ADB Resilience programme, and NGO programmes

capacity building among government partners and a coherent food management strategy of learning and experience from H&S, FMIP, and other initiatives. Further, the early warning system is not working well in lowland areas; community-level capacity to monitor, analyse and use data is needed.

12. The early warning system and assessment results are not always consistent with regional beneficiary numbers. This is an issue that requires greater advocacy by WFP in collaboration with other agencies. The early warning system is not working well in the lowland areas; shocks need to be identified more quickly.

13. Public works have been created that improve natural resource management (NRM) and access to social services. While PSNP has improved the frequency and mean number of payments, predictability and targeting are still key issues. Public works constructed under PSNP are now adjusted to consider the lowland context that includes three to four livelihood systems. The public works should be integrated into comprehensive regional plans, and the PSNP component tailored more appropriately to the pastoral and lowlands context in terms of the timing of the public works, types of public works, and who participates in the programme to reduce inclusion and exclusion error.

14. Outcomes and objectives: The PRRO has significantly contributed to WFP objectives in Ethiopia, reduced hunger in some of the most difficult contexts, and has a strategic role in higher-level development programmes. Some key outcomes have been achieved for all components. Relief rations have enabled households to overcome major food shortages; however, the gain is tenuous as coping strategies have increased since baseline. TSF met all outcome indicators in line with SPHERE standards, and it is a key part of the continuum for food security programmes. In the PSNP, the target for reducing coping strategies was achieved, and while progress was made toward improving community assets and food consumption for participants, outcome targets were not met to significantly improve food security. From the outcome targets, the ET feels that conclusions on the impact of household disaster preparedness cannot be made.

15. In light of the high cost of relief and the overlap in some areas between relief and PSNP households, such areas should be priority for inclusion in the expanded PSNP. In addition, the funding mechanisms in the newly designed PSNP will need to be significantly reviewed, as will the early warning capacity; WFP is in a good position to support such efforts.

16. Internal and external factors affecting results: The main internal factors affecting the operation's performance include: low levels of WFP staffing in relation to resources managed; low resource levels; inadequate capacity-building strategy for establishing sustainable government food management; lack of a strong M&E and quality control system; ongoing progress and challenges in food logistics; the lack of a lowland pastoral PSNP strategy informed by a resilience lens and experience with MERET; and the need for enhanced WFP strategic positioning. Ultimately, the main external factors affecting the operation's performance necessitate advocacy on the part of WFP related to government staffing and policy development.

Recommendations: strategic

17. WFP needs to design a capacity-development strategy with a results-based framework. This needs to be supported by a systematic capacity-building needs assessment at all levels, and development of related performance outcome indicators. The number of field monitors should be increased in line with the size of the programme, and WFP could adopt a sampling method that allows for a smaller yet

representative number of sites. Regular assessments should be made to determine if the disaster response of relief programmes are consistent with the early warning data using information gathered at the *woreda* and *kebele* levels.

18. WFP should develop a lowland strategy specific to lowland livelihood systems, focusing on the timing of assessments, appropriate public works projects, food resources management, and community-level targeting. The lowland strategy should incorporate a resilience lens to show how the components feed into strengthening the absorptive, adaptive and transformative capacities of households and communities to enable them to more effectively manage shocks and stresses.

19. WFP should develop a comprehensive approach to building resilience capacity across the PRRO components.

Recommendations: operational (short-term: one year)

20. Advocate with donors who stopped funding TSF by informing them of programme improvements and progress.

21. The National Nutrition Programme (NNP) is creating a better-coordinated anthropometric database. WFP should continue to be a part of this important improvement to ensure disaggregated demographic data for children under two, as the database should allow for a coordinated and sensitive surveillance system. Develop outcome measures for PLW.¹⁴

22. Scale up the TSF pilot programme, which uses the monthly distribution method with a robust M&E approach, provided that its evaluation shows a positive impact.

23. Strengthen M&E systems for all components, working closely with the government to further enhance its accountability framework. This includes developing an outcome evaluation framework for structures built through relief and for measuring the effectiveness of community-based NRM in reducing risk

Recommendations: operational (medium-term: two to three years)

24. Further strengthen government capacity for emergency response. This involves a number of specific measures, most importantly that WFP strengthen its own monitoring systems at all levels, increase the field staff it needs to adequately monitor and report on a timely basis, and rely on NGO partners for more monitoring support. WFP should ensure that *woreda* and *kebele*/FDC level staff are trained in and able to implement the new relief targeting guidelines. Also, the gains in logistics and supply chain management should be tracked to assess whether system improvements function as intended, that is, to help government implementing partners make the food supply chain more efficient and thus contribute to achievement of WFP outcomes.

25. Build on the gains made under the FMIP and Hubs & Spokes by developing a comprehensive food management system that can be institutionalized.


26. Integrate WFP's NRM technical expertise into the PSNP more explicitly by setting up an NRM technical support unit and engaging WFP NRM technical staff in planning the new PSNP strategy. Use PSNP resources in the PRRO to support NRM staff to engage in the PSNP technical support in Somalia and Afar regions.

¹⁴ TSF staff report that changes in MUAC are already being monitored in PLW, though not reported. While the CO follows the corporate M&E guidance, the ET does not see this as sufficient.

Map

Figure 1: Operation map

PSNP, Relief and TSF programs per woreda



1. Introduction

1.1. Evaluation Features

27. This independent evaluation is commissioned by the World Food Programme (WFP) Office of Evaluation (OEV) to address corporate objectives to provide accountability and learning (evidence) for programme results. Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO) 200290 has been selected for evaluation based on the criteria of utility and risk. The timing allows for evaluation findings to guide future programme design in 2014. The scope of the PRRO 200290 evaluation includes “all activities and processes related to its formulation, implementation, resourcing, monitoring, and evaluation and reporting relevant to answer the evaluation questions” from mid-2011 through the end of 2013.¹⁵

28. The direct internal stakeholders and primary users of the evaluation are the Country Office (CO), Regional Bureau (RB) in Nairobi, and the OEV. The results will be included in a synthesis report for the Executive Board (EB). The direct external stakeholders are the beneficiaries, as well as partners who have a stake in the results for country-level strategy and programming, including: the Government of Ethiopia (and its partners), non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the United Nations Country Team (UNCT), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and the donors.¹⁶

29. A mixed-methods approach was employed to collect primary qualitative data and secondary data to answer three key evaluation questions: 1) How appropriate is the evaluation? 2) What are the results of the operation? and 3) Why and how has the operation produced the observed results? The evaluation team (ET) developed an evaluation model that links each question to the strategic objectives and priorities of the CO, to WFP evaluation criteria, and to the PRRO components.¹⁷ The ET is comprised of five highly qualified TANGO International consultants with expertise in food security, nutrition, cash-based programming, livelihoods, and resilience. The evaluation has followed the guidance and standards of the OEV Evaluation and Quality Assurance System. To ensure data quality, the ET maintained its impartiality, independence, and transparency in the data collection process, with regular communication with WFP to ensure validity, consistency, and accuracy of the data.¹⁸

30. The fieldwork took place from 8-27 January 2014 and included visits to Somali, Oromia, and Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples Region (SNNPR) (see Annex 2 for the fieldwork schedule). Primary data collection methods included in-depth structured and semi-structured interviews with over 75 WFP staff and stakeholders, focus group discussions (FGD) with over 120 beneficiaries, observations, and other participatory methods (see Annex 3 for lists of persons and institutions consulted). TANGO also conducted an in-depth desk review of over 250 documents, such as WFP assessment and distribution monitoring reports and other pertinent internal and external literature on Ethiopia (see Annex 4 for full bibliography). Given the scale of the programme, priority for works cited was given to studies most relevant to the programme scope and components.

31. The sampling was based on consultations with the CO. The ET selected three (Oromiya, Somali, and SNNPR) of the four regions visited during the PRRO mid-term evaluation. This was to allow the team to assess progress on programme

¹⁵ WFP (OEV). 2013. Terms of Reference.

¹⁶ WFP (OEV). 2013. Terms of Reference.

¹⁷ See the Evaluation Matrix. WFP Ethiopia. 2013p. Inception Package.

¹⁸ WFP Ethiopia. 2013p. Inception Package.

components since the mid-term and to determine to what degree the mid-term recommendations have been implemented. The ET selected these regions because this allowed for the examination of individual programme components, the linkages between 1) relief and productive safety nets and 2) relief and nutrition, and the interface between government and NGO programmes. In addition, since a substantial part of WFP's portfolio is in pastoral areas, it was important to focus on lowland areas in Somali region and parts of Oromiya. A cash pilot was being implemented in Oromiya, which gave the team the opportunity to observe the cash distribution and to assess the role of the local market that determines the amount of the cash distribution. Information obtained by the ET was triangulated by cross-checking with direct stakeholders; e.g., feedback on the cash initiative for relief was received from beneficiaries, *woreda* staff, and WFP staff in the cash pilot areas, and input on the suitability of cash to other areas was obtained from relief beneficiaries, local government officials, and WFP staff working in more remote areas with limited access to markets. The ET consulted programme beneficiaries, senior government officials at the national level, government staff at the zonal, *woreda* and *kebele* levels, WFP staff at CO and field levels, and NGO field staff, and carried out its own observations during visits to field sites.

32. Information on gender perspectives was obtained by conducting separate FGDs with men and women, in part to verify the nature and extent of women's participation in WFP programmes. Key informants in WFP and government were also interviewed with regard to targeting and implementation methods to ensure that women are the primary recipients of WFP assistance.

33. One of four main limitations that the ET faced was obtaining consistent PRRO output data. The team was concerned about the quality of these data given that the numbers varied considerably across reporting formats. As a second limitation, multiple important documents and reports, including the Hubs and Spokes (H&S) evaluation, were not available to the team during the drafting of this report and before the evaluation was completed. This made it difficult for the team to fully consider the effectiveness of the programme in its second year. The third limitation was that the ET was only able to visit three regions where the PRRO is operating. Thus the ET could not gain a first-hand account of the work being carried out in Afar, Tigray, part of Amhara, and the Borana area. Finally, some key staff were not available during the field mission; unfortunately, the evaluation coincided with several Ethiopian holidays and staff were on leave.

1.2. Country Context

34. Ethiopia is one of the world's poorest countries¹⁹ with a mostly rural population susceptible to many shocks and hazards. Yet important strides in economic development have been made. The population of Ethiopia is over 90 million (2012 estimate)^{20 21} and most (83 percent) live in rural areas.²² World Bank data from 2011 show 30 percent of the population (2011) living below the national poverty line.²³ Compared to average annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, Ethiopia demonstrates good progress: Ethiopia experienced 7.8 percent growth in 2012 and 7.0 percent in 2013 compared to 3.5 percent and 4.7 percent

¹⁹ UNDP. 2013.

²⁰ World Bank. 2013.

²¹ Note: The medium variant population prospect by 2015 is 98,942,000. Source: UNPD. 2012.

²² Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, CSA. 2005.

²³ World Bank. 2013.

respectively for Sub-Saharan Africa. About half of Ethiopia's GDP comes from domestic and subsistence farming.²⁴ Steady agricultural sector growth in recent years is attributed to expanded land under cultivation, yet productivity is among the lowest in Africa. Large-scale land degradation resulting from population pressure, overgrazing, soil erosion, bush encroachment on rangelands, deforestation, and underdeveloped market systems and infrastructure significantly reduce the potential for sustainable improvements to agricultural productivity, and thereby to food security.²⁵

35. Food security relies largely on smallholder farmers (including agro-pastoralists and pastoralists), most of who farm plots of less than two hectares.^{26 27} An estimated 15 million rural residents face food insecurity, and acute malnutrition among children is often at “serious” and “critical” levels.²⁸ The main causes of acute and chronic malnutrition are poverty, lack of maternal and child healthcare, inadequate health services, unsafe water supply, lack of sanitation facilities, and recurrent shocks.²⁹ Women play a critical role in agriculture and household livelihoods, yet gender inequality remains widespread and women farmers have limited access to resources, land, and services. Ethiopia is ranked 118 out of 136 countries on the Gender Gap Index of 2013.³⁰ According to the national Demographic and Health Survey (DHS), women with less control or participation regarding their husband's earnings are more likely to be younger, living in rural areas, from Somali region, without education, and in the lowest wealth quintile (gender is part of the Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP), see below).³¹

36. Another factor related to food security is the country's susceptibility to drought, floods, disease, conflict, economic shocks, and the impacts of climate change.³² Recurrent drought coupled with ongoing military activity in Somali region form a complex emergency that affects two million people.³³ Apart from the recent drought (discussed below), in 2013 the country faced natural hazards related to heavy rains and flooding. Heavy rains in April caused flooding and US\$2.2 million in damage that affected more than 9,000 households in Somali region and 1,300 households across Oromia and SNNPR.^{34 35} Heavy rains in mid-August caused flash floods in the Oromia zone of Amhara region, killing nearly 40 people. Emergency response included provision of non-food items and shelter.³⁶ The government has recognized the need to address the impacts of climate change through the National Incident Management System and National Adaptation Programme of Action (2007), which improve the government's disaster response and identify priority adaptations to climate change vulnerabilities.

37. Despite these ongoing hazards and challenges, Ethiopia has recently made substantial gains in education, expanded the health extension system, and made notable achievements in combating HIV/AIDS. The Government of Ethiopia

²⁴ World Bank. 2013.

²⁵ Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, MoFED. 2010.

²⁶ The UNDAF Country Analysis (2010) reported that 95 percent of agricultural production is from smallholder farmers, yet less than one third (30 percent) of these farmers are net buyers of food.

²⁷ Dercon, S. and Zeitlin, A. 2009.

²⁸ WFP and FAO. 2010.

²⁹ Benson, T. 2005.

³⁰ World Economic Forum. 2013.

³¹ Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, CSA and ICF International. 2012.

³² EMDAT. 2013.

³³ WFP and FAO. 2010.

³⁴ UN OCHA. 2013b. Ethiopia: Floods Location Map.

³⁵ EMDAT. 2013.

³⁶ ACT Alliance. 2013.

continues to address the main issues of food security, nutrition and disaster risk management (DRM). The government's Food Security Programme has been established for over a decade, addressing chronic food insecurity through household asset-building, community investment, and resettlement programmes. In 2005 the government, together with WFP and humanitarian actors, established the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) to provide food and/or cash transfers to the chronically food-insecure population of nearly eight million people and to build more resilient livelihoods; the PSNP is the largest public works programme in Africa.³⁷ The WFP contribution to the PSNP has continued as a main component of the subsequent PRROs. WFP is also a member of the Pastoral Task Force to guide the implementation of the PSNP in pastoral areas.

38. In 2005 the Targeted Supplementary Feeding (TSF) component began as an agreement between the Federal Ministry of Health (MOH), the Disaster Preparedness Prevention Agency (now DRMFSS), UNICEF, and WFP. This component also continues through annually renewed Field Level Agreements (FLA) between WFP and the regional Disaster Preparedness and Prevention Bureaus (DPPB), with screening data coordinated through the Emergency Nutrition Coordination Unit (ENCU). In 2009 WFP established the Food Management Improvement Programme (FMIP) in order to build capacity in food distribution systems, and it has been integrated as an activity in the PRRO.³⁸

39. The PRRO contributes to Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 1) eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; 3) promote gender equality and empower women; 4) reduce child mortality; 5) improve maternal health; and 7) ensure environmental sustainability. Ethiopia is on track to reach or exceed by 2015 MDGs 1 and 4, with significant progress made toward MDGs 3, 5, and 7.³⁹

40. In 2011, the Government of Ethiopia launched its ambitious GTP 2011–2015, with the goal to become a middle-income country by 2025. The UNCT aligned the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for 2012–2015 with the GTP and enhanced coordination through the “Delivering as One” strategy.⁴⁰ To achieve the GTP, the government has also revised the National Nutrition Strategy and Programme (NNP) (2012-2015)⁴¹ and with partners developed its Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Plan (CAADP).⁴² ⁴³ The GTP national sectors relevant to the PRRO include poverty reduction, nutrition (also health and vaccination coverage), food security (including households graduating from safety-net programmes), livelihoods and agricultural sector growth, women's empowerment and gender equality, DRM, and preparedness.⁴⁴

41. The government monitors the humanitarian context with humanitarian partners – with the PRRO aligned accordingly – through the regular assessments of the Humanitarian Requirements Document (HRD).⁴⁵ The humanitarian situation immediately preceding the operational period included a significant food security emergency caused by the worst drought in 60 years, followed heavy rains, the effects of which lasted through 2012. By June 2011 an estimated 4.8 million Ethiopians were

³⁷ World Bank. 2009.

³⁸ WFP (OEV). 2010.

³⁹ United Nations (MDG). 2013.

⁴⁰ WFP Ethiopia. 2011d. WFP/EB.2/2011/9-C/2.

⁴¹ Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, MoH. 2012.

⁴² TANGO International. 2013.

⁴³ For more on the NNP and CAADP, see also Section 2.1 External coherence with government policies.

⁴⁴ Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, MOFED. 2013.

⁴⁵ For more on the HRD, see also Section 2.1 Operation design.

affected by the drought and high cereal prices.^{46 47} During 2012, poor harvests, delayed rains, and the sustained impact of the drought meant that 3.2-3.8 million people still required relief food and non-food assistance, mainly in pastoral areas, such as the Somali and Oromia regions, with substantial populations also in need in Tigray, Amhara, and SNNPR.^{48 49} With some improvements in 2013 (Somali region, in particular), 2.5-2.7 million people were in need of relief assistance, with food insecurity persisting and similar challenges in eastern Amhara and southern Tigray regions and in parts of Oromia.^{50 51} Projections for 2014 estimate 2.7 million people will require relief food and water assistance, which is the “mid-case” scenario, mostly in north-eastern Afar, south and south-eastern Tigray, and the lowlands of the southern pastoralist areas.^{52 53}

42. The political structure of Ethiopia is relatively stable,⁵⁴ however the geopolitical context of the East Africa region is fragile, and Ethiopia hosts an increasing number of refugees.⁵⁵ The Government of Ethiopia expects over 100,000 refugees to enter the country in 2014. Ethiopia currently hosts 430,000 refugees from Eritrea, Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan.⁵⁶ The operational period also included significant military and security-related activity domestically (in the Somali Ogaden, Oromia, and Afar regions)^{57 58} and in the East Africa region, particularly related to Kenyan and Ethiopian troops’ incursion into Somalia.^{59 60}

1.3. WFP’s Portfolio in Ethiopia

43. PRRO 200290 was initially planned for two years (1 January 2012-31 December 2013), with an 18-month extension to 30 June 2015. The resource requirements at design were US\$814,995,412 and revised most recently to US\$1,488,010,736, which is funded at 46.5 percent.⁶¹ The current share of the operational requirements is distributed among 18 donors. The main donors, excluding carryover from previous operations, are US, UK, Canada, Germany, and multilaterals. There have been six budget revisions (BRs) to the initial operation to adjust beneficiary target numbers and supplies requirements based on current context and assessments of humanitarian need. The purpose for each revision and major changes are briefly described in the Operation Factsheet (pp. i-iv).

44. The PRRO objectives align with WFP Corporate Strategic Objectives 1 and 2 and with the Government of Ethiopia and global strategies previously described in Section 1.2). The three main components of the PRRO, with their corresponding objective and activities, are the following:⁶²

⁴⁶ BBC. 2011.

⁴⁷ WFP Ethiopia. 2011d. WFP/EB.2/2011/9-C/2.

⁴⁸ WFP Ethiopia. 2012d. Budget Revision 3 PRRO 200290.

⁴⁹ WFP Ethiopia. 2012d. Budget Revision 3 PRRO 200290.

⁵⁰ WFP Ethiopia. 2013b. Budget Revision 5 PRRO 200290.

⁵¹ WFP Ethiopia. 2013b. Budget Revision 5 PRRO 200290.

⁵² WFP Ethiopia. 2011d. WFP/EB.2/2011/9-C/2, See para 43.

⁵³ Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and Humanitarian Partners (Joint Appeal). 2014. HRD.

⁵⁴ Economist. 2013.

⁵⁵ WFP Ethiopia. 2012h. SPR.

⁵⁶ Ethiopian News Agency. 2013.

⁵⁷ BBC. 2013.

⁵⁸ BBC. 2013.

⁵⁹ BBC. 2013.

⁶⁰ Voice of America. 2013.

⁶¹ It should be noted that while 46.5 percent of the full requirement is funded, the total value of the operation has a timeframe of 3.5 years. Current funding received based on to-date value of the operation (28 months, or US\$992,007,157) shows 69.8 percent funding against the appeal and 30.2 percent shortfall. Calculation by TANGO International.

⁶² According to SPR 2013, the PRRO objectives were revised to: 1) Relief: Help emergency-affected households reduce the impact of shocks by improving food security, resilience and recovery from disaster; 2) TSF: Support food-insecure households

- Relief: Help emergency-affected households to reduce the impact of shocks by addressing their food needs. Activities: general food distribution (GFD) and cash transfers.
- Nutrition/TSF: Support the most vulnerable and food-insecure households in reducing or stabilising moderate acute malnutrition (MAM) among children under five and pregnant and lactating women (PLW). Activities: TSF.
- PSNP: Support PSNP households and communities to improve food security and resilience and to recover from disaster. Activities: food for work (FFW); GFD and cash transfers; and capacity development of government partners through the DRMP and FMIP.

2. Evaluation Findings

2.1. Appropriateness of the Operation

45. This section describes evaluation findings and conclusions relating to the first evaluation question, “How appropriate is the operation?”⁶³ It addresses the appropriateness of operation objectives, design and coverage, geographic targeting, and the extent to which transfer modalities are reflective of population needs.

46. In all, the PRRO objectives and activities are appropriate to the needs of food insecure and emergency-affected households in the areas where WFP works. The PRRO objectives align with government, United Nations, partner strategies and policies, and are also internally coherent with WFP strategies and policies. However, the targeting strategies for PSNP and for TSF hotspots promote inclusion error, and the timing of the relief assessment is not suited to accurate analysis of lowland areas. (Beneficiary selection and timeliness are further discussed in Section 2.2). In all, WFP should continue to strengthen linkages across programme components so that the PRRO reflects the overall strategy to address the main food security and nutrition issues.

Appropriateness to needs

47. Operation objectives. Relief. The relief and TSF components of the PRRO address WFP Ethiopia’s Strategic Objective 1.⁶⁴ The relief programme operates in a context of recurrent drought and low levels of crop and livestock production rooted in population pressure, environmental degradation, extreme weather variations, price increases, and conflict.⁶⁵ The ET finds that providing relief assistance under these conditions is a relevant and appropriate response. Under the PRRO, WFP has successfully aided millions of households affected by transitory shocks by providing food or cash relief. FGD participants in Oromia stated that the relief food enables them to stay in their communities rather than migrate to other towns in search of work. Other beneficiaries noted that while they are not able to save money, relief assistance protects them from having to borrow money to buy food, thereby protecting assets.

48. TSF. Meeting the nutrition objective by providing TSF assistance also reflects population needs. Based on conversations with beneficiaries, local, regional, and

in reducing or stabilising moderate acute malnutrition among children six months to five years of age and pregnant and lactating women; 3) PSNP: Support PSNP households and communities to improve food security, enhance resilience and recover from disaster. The objectives have changed over the course of the PRRO. This evaluation covers the original objectives.

⁶³ WFP (OEV). 2013. Terms of Reference.

⁶⁴ WFP Ethiopia. 2013j. Logical Framework.

⁶⁵ WFP Ethiopia. 2013p. Inception Package.

national partners, the ET concludes that children become eligible for TSF due to one or more of three primary reasons: 1) there is not enough food at the household level, 2) the child becomes sick prior to being screened, and/or 3) mothers do not have enough knowledge of how to properly feed or care for the child.⁶⁶ Food supplementation in each of these cases is appropriate to population needs because it can help reduce MAM among children under five and prevent further deterioration of nutritional status.⁶⁷

49. PSNP. The PSNP component of the PRRO addresses WFP Ethiopia's Strategic Objective 2.⁶⁸ This component targets the chronically food insecure in the Somali and Afar regions. PSNP activities are appropriate to the needs of chronically food insecure households because they provide predictable transfers of food or cash to assure food consumption, and reduce risk by preventing asset depletion. Other outcomes expected from PSNP activities include the stimulation of markets, access to services, and the enhancement and rehabilitation of natural resources. The direct support component of the programme is a grant given to households with a labour deficit or with disabled or elderly members, children, and PLW. About one-fifth of the PSNP beneficiaries receive food as direct support. The public works component focuses on building community assets using community labour paid with food or cash. Eighty percent of the resources are dedicated to

50. Operation design. From the ET perspective, the PRRO reflects an overall strategy that correctly addresses the main food security and nutrition issues in the areas of relief, TSF, and PSNP. Improvements should be made in each of these components to increase their synergy and complementarity. Each component is discussed below.

51. Relief. The relief component design is based on WFP's own analysis and on a national government-led, multi-agency assessment that produces the HRD, a report on the numbers and locations of populations requiring relief assistance for that season. Two HRD assessments are conducted annually: one during the main national harvest in November-December (*meher*) and the second during the secondary harvest in May-June (*belg*). Between these seasons, assessments are conducted to provide early predictions of food security conditions to assist with planning and pre-positioning of resources. The results are published in summary form in the HRD, issued jointly by the government and its humanitarian partners. The main document, summarising food needs for 12 months and non-food needs for six months, is issued in January-February, with periodic updates as needed.⁶⁹ In addition to the analysis generated by the HRD, WFP uses historical data, price analyses, and rainfall projections to inform its own internal determination of relief requirements and related funding needs. The design of the relief intervention is appropriate for households affected by acute transitory food insecurity; it provides direct food assistance (or cash assistance in the pilot areas) to help meet short-term food needs and prevent the sale of assets. However, the timing of the HRD is based on the seasonal calendar of the highland areas and is not appropriate timing for an accurate

⁶⁶ ET discussions on site visits with WFP monitors, food distribution agents and local health post staff in Harari and Jijiga, ENCU coordinator and with WFP NES staff members in Addis Ababa.

⁶⁷ Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, MoARD (EWRD/DRMFSS) and Ministry of Health (ENCU). 2012. Guidelines for the Management of Moderate Acute Malnutrition in Ethiopia.

⁶⁸ Note: WFP Ethiopia. 2013j. Logical Framework revision changes this to SO3, "Reduce risk and enable people, communities and countries to meet their own food and nutrition needs." The ET feels this SO is more accurately aligned with the chronic hunger of the population and the PSNP activities to reduce and mitigate risk.

⁶⁹ National Guidelines on Targeting Relief Food Assistance 2011:42-43.

assessment of relief needs in the lowland areas, where the long dry season extends from January to April (see Annex 5 for the seasonal calendar).

52. The Government of Ethiopia plans to shift from a twice-yearly HRD assessment to an annual assessment supplemented by follow-up assessments to verify needs, though exact arrangements are not yet known. The ET concludes that to enhance the contextual analysis of population needs, WFP and other stakeholders need to engage with the government to ensure that follow-up assessments are done in a timely manner and at a time appropriate to local needs, particularly the needs of livestock-based livelihoods in the lowland areas.

53. Six BRs have allowed WFP to scale up the relief component to an estimated three million beneficiaries. The relief component was subsequently scaled down to 1.9 million beneficiaries in response to ongoing adjustments in the HRD and needs estimates during 2012-2013.⁷⁰ This adjustment was based on figures from regional and federal government final reports, reportedly due to resource constraints. As a result, the actual number of beneficiaries receiving relief in each region does not include all households eligible for relief, and in some areas households that receive rations get less than a full family ration. In 2012 the HRD estimated an increase from 3.2 to 3.8 million people in need of relief, and WFP GFD reached over three million beneficiaries during that year. In 2013, the HRD estimated 2.4 to 2.7 million people requiring relief assistance; WFP GFD reached approximately two million people.⁷¹ *TSF*. According to the HRD 2012-2013, WFP TSF coverage is 62-69 percent of total TSF targeted beneficiaries. The pilot test of TSF in 44 *woredas* is an appropriate response to decreasing inclusion error and developing a more responsive M&E system to measure its impact.

54. *PSNP*. The design of the PSNP component is based on appropriate contextual analysis of population needs. The PSNP was launched in 2005 by the government, WFP, and humanitarian actors to counteract a perceived failure of over 20 years of emergency response.⁷² What was needed most by chronically food insecure households was assistance that enhanced their resilience capacities. By bridging emergency response with development efforts, the PSNP appropriately attempts to enhance absorptive, adaptive, and transformative resilience capacities.⁷³ In 2012, WFP coverage was approximately 18 percent of countrywide PSNP participants (7.6 million),⁷⁴ and 16 percent in 2013 (of 6.9 million people in PSNP).⁷⁵

55. Geographic targeting. Relief. WFP's geographic targeting for relief (and PSNP) is based on the HRD report and discussion with the Government of Ethiopia (see previous discussion on operation design). The HRD prioritizes emergency relief needs based on the results of the vulnerability assessments as analysed by the DRM Technical Working Group, a multi-agency body chaired by the government and of which WFP is a member. Within *woredas* that receive relief, targeting of the most vulnerable households is done by *kebele* officials, normally in consultation with community representatives. As part of the government initiative to improve

⁷⁰ See resource level chart and budget revision summary in the Fact Sheet, p. iii.

⁷¹ According to HRD 2012-2013, the WFP (H&S) share was 35-37 percent of relief food delivered.

⁷² Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, MoARD. 2010. *PSNP: PIM*.

⁷³ Absorptive capacity refers to the ability to minimize exposure to shocks and stresses through preventative measures. Adaptive capacity relates to making proactive and informed choices about alternative livelihood strategies based on an understanding of changing conditions. Transformative capacity relates to the governance mechanisms, policies/regulations, infrastructure, community networks, and formal and informal social protection mechanisms that constitute the enabling environment for systemic change.

⁷⁴ WFP Ethiopia. 2012i. APR.

⁷⁵ WFP Ethiopia. 2012h. SPR.

targeting, *woredas* have compiled risk profiles that reflect needs and the likely impact of shocks as part of a process to prioritize areas in need of relief assistance. This bottom-up, multi-level approach to targeting is an appropriate system, and during field interviews, *woreda* and *kebele*-level government staff were quite knowledgeable about local needs as a result of the assessments. As noted, not all needs are met, reportedly due to resource constraints.

56. WFP assisted with the development of new national guidelines on targeting food relief assistance, which were issued in August 2011. The guidelines reflect a change in government policy from emergency response to disaster risk reduction and management. The government is actively promoting the new guidelines, and it is expected that the guidelines will reduce inclusion and exclusion error by reducing pressure to include those who do not qualify for relief. The Somali region has translated and tested the guidelines and is piloting them in five *woredas*. Training on the new guidelines is still underway at the regional and *woreda* levels in other locations visited by the ET. WFP is targeting *woreda* staff for training on the guidelines but faces financial constraints in reaching *kebeles* and communities: as a result, the number of days spent on training at both levels is shortened, potentially compromising content and quality. *Woreda* staff should train *kebele* officials and community-level food distribution committees (FDC), who have yet to be oriented to the new guidelines. In addition, the intent of the new guidelines was that the regions contextualize them to their operating environment. It appears to the ET that regions need assistance to do this. The regions would benefit from WFP support to ensure training is implemented per the suggested guidelines, which in turn would help WFP ensure that targeting is correctly carried out, especially at *kebele* and community level.

57. *TSF*. *TSF* targets moderately malnourished children under five years of age and PLW in food insecure geographic areas using “hotspot” criteria. Hotspot criteria are based on current increases in malnutrition prevalence and the potential for future malnutrition due to low food production. Three levels of hot spots are identified based on criteria in six areas: (1) health and nutrition, (2) agriculture, (3) market, (4) access to water for humans, (5) education level, and (6) other livelihood factors such as migration, socially demeaning coping strategies, and intensification of firewood collection and charcoal making.⁷⁶ *TSF* targets Priority 1 hot spots, described as such: “hazards of high damaging level have occurred and affected the lives and livelihoods of the population with very severe lack of adequate food security and may include excess mortality, very high and increasing malnutrition and irreversible livelihood asset depletion.”⁷⁷ Discussions with ENCU and WFP staff indicated that in addition to Priority 1 hot spots, some Priority 2 *woredas* are also targeted due to a history of food insecurity. Individual targeting of children and women is based on mid-upper arm circumference (MUAC). Given the hotspot and MUAC criteria, the ET finds that *TSF* addresses malnutrition among the most vulnerable populations and is linked to relief, with overlap between hotspots and relief *woredas*. However, *TSF* could be more efficient by putting procedures into place to decrease inclusion error, discussed in Section 2.2.

58. While relief targeting starts at the *kebele* level and is aggregated at the *woreda*, zonal, and finally regional level, which results in a systematic reduction of beneficiary

⁷⁶ Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, MoARD (DRMFSS). 2014. Draft Hotspot (Areas of Concern) Classification Guideline.

⁷⁷ Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, MoARD (DRMFSS). 2014. Draft Hotspot (Areas of Concern) Classification Guideline.

numbers, in contrast, TSF targeting is only at the *woreda* level. The ET believes that if relief and TSF initiatives both target at the *kebele* level it may benefit the coordination of programme components, e.g., by allowing the PRRO to serve more vulnerable children by assuring that corn-soy blend (CSB) for children is part of the relief package for all families who participate in relief or even as an additional ration for PSNP. The ET acknowledges the cost implications of this recommendation, though the value-added is also great.

59. Currently, families of children who are on TSF and live where relief is provided become beneficiaries of relief once a child is discharged from TSF. This makes sense but also relies on the continuation of a strong education programme that is partnered with TSF. If a *woreda* or *kebele* is reclassified to Priority 2 from Priority 1 it is reasonable to continue providing TSF until the next time hotspots are classified (~three more months), for three main reasons: (1) it would allow high risk children to accrue nutrient stores to prevent regression to a lower nutritional status; (2) it would ensure that the hotspot doesn't regress immediately; and (3) it would take advantage of a region's already developed workforce and distribution system, leading to a more efficient operation.

60. The pilot TSF programme includes *woredas* in the highlands. There are currently no plans to include the continuous enrolment method that reduces the inclusion error in the Somali region as it is difficult and costly to distribute supplemental food to a dispersed population. However, the current health system does use mobile clinics to provide health services in the region. There may be a way to utilise the mobile clinics to coordinate food distribution by directly providing it or by informing potential beneficiaries of planned TSF activities. Mobile clinics could identify beneficiaries and report this information and a system could be developed to distribute food. TSF is coordinated with the Government of Ethiopia's Enhanced Outreach Strategy (EOS) system, which distributes vitamin A supplements and deworming medicine every six months in lowland regions, specifically the Somali region. Although this is very good coordination, it may exclude children who would qualify for TSF if they become malnourished between the campaigns.⁷⁸

61. A separate TSF targeting strategy is needed for the lowland areas. Targeting, screening, food distribution, and monitoring can be different for pastoralists, agro-pastoralists, families that live in riverine areas, and families in makeshift towns who dropped out of pastoralism due to a loss of animals; moreover, different plans may be required for each group. More mobile systems are needed for the pastoralists and more stationary systems can be used in the lowlands.⁷⁹ Satellite distribution sites can be developed for pastoralists, with less frequent but a greater amount of food to offset the larger distribution costs at satellite sites.

62. Linking TSF to hotspots allows food to be distributed to two different populations: a population where MAM is greater than normal, and the most vulnerable in a geographic area where malnutrition may increase in the future.

63. *PSNP*. The PSNP began as a pilot in six *woredas* of the Somali region. WFP began to support PSNP beneficiaries in Somali and Afar regions in 2010. WFP currently covers 28 *woredas* (out of 68 *woredas*) in Somali region. Four other additional *woredas* are covered by NGOs. The PSNP targets *woredas* identified as chronically food insecure. Historical data on food aid distributions determines the

⁷⁸ WFP Ethiopia, 2011d. Project Document (WFP/EB.2/2011/9-C/2).

⁷⁹ ET discussions held in Jijiga with partners and WFP staff.

number of eligible beneficiaries in each *woreda*, and *woreda* administrators assign the number of PSNP beneficiaries allocated to chronically food insecure *kebeles*.⁸⁰ The Community Food Security Task Force is responsible for screening households for programme eligibility and for developing the list of beneficiaries.

64. The 2010 revised Project Implementation Manual (PIM) introduced the rule of full family targeting to prevent the dilution of transfers. The rule requires registration of all household members; therefore the amount of food distributed should correspond to the number of household members.⁸¹ While the full family targeting rule is in place, due to a cultural propensity in PRRO PSNP areas to share any resource distributed in a community, dilution still occurs. This is an issue because, due to resource constraints, the number of PSNP-eligible beneficiary households is limited, creating an incentive on the part of *kebele* officials (who want to demonstrate they are reaching high numbers of total households) to under-register the number of household members in order to serve more households with the same amount of resources. Thus, the ET finds that PSNP targeting at the *kebele* level should be refined to reflect the issue of dilution and limited resources in the context of the PRRO PSNP areas.

65. Transfer modality. Relief. The primary transfer modality for relief is food rations. In remote areas where food production is low and markets are inaccessible (e.g., parts of Somali and Oromia regions, and Afar) food relief is an appropriate choice for WFP assistance. However, research indicates that where local markets are well integrated, cash vouchers are a more cost-efficient means to provide assistance than food commodities.⁸² In line with the Ethiopian government's preference for cash assistance programmes, WFP is piloting cash relief in food surplus areas affected by transitory shocks. Since market conditions can fluctuate strongly due to seasonal and other factors, WFP is monitoring markets closely to ensure that cash allotments reflect current market prices, that markets are competitive, and that markets are able to meet the demand from relief cash.⁸³ The ET observed a cash pilot in North Shewa (Oromia region); based on feedback from beneficiaries and local officials, it appears to be successful in meeting needs and satisfactory to beneficiaries.

66. However, the majority of relief beneficiaries interviewed express a preference for a mix of food and cash as the best way to meet their needs, valuing different elements of each assistance modality. WFP should examine this further to determine whether a mix of food and cash is the most appropriate way to meet relief needs. For larger households, beneficiaries stated that food relief is more practical, as they cannot purchase enough food with cash relief to meet their needs. Relief beneficiaries also stated a preference over cash for the food basket they receive under the relief component, which includes grain, pulses, and oil. PSNP beneficiaries, who receive grain or cash only, stated that they prefer an expanded food basket but appreciate the reliability of the food ration they receive through their multi-year participation in PSNP.

67. Regional governments may authorise *woredas* to coordinate relief distributions with community works or other previously planned and properly organised activities.⁸⁴ Conditionality requirements for relief are the decision of the *woreda* and

⁸⁰ Ayala, F. 2013.

⁸¹ Ayala, F. 2013.

⁸² WFP Ethiopia. 2013k. Markets and cash transfers in Ethiopia.

⁸³ WFP Ethiopia. ND. Rapid Markets Assessment in North Shewa Zone.

⁸⁴ National Guidelines on Targeting Relief Food Assistance 2011:71

vary by area. Some *woredas* require labour contributions to public works; other areas encourage voluntary measures on one's own land (e.g., in parts of Oromia) and still others do not place any labour requirements on relief (e.g., in Somali region and parts of Oromia). Conditional relief requirements are consistent with government policy to move people from relief to development and to avoid dependency on relief. Optional conditionality requirements are appropriate to some areas where the tradition of contributing labour for public works is not well established, and thus the slow introduction of this system is appropriate to avoid misunderstanding and conflict. The ET finds that some donors also support replacing food relief with cash or PSNP, as the latter approaches are significantly less expensive to implement.⁸⁵ As noted above, this is appropriate in certain markets as long as the market dynamics are closely monitored.

68. PSNP. For PSNP, food transfers are most appropriate in the Somali and Afar regions due to the limited access to markets and limited opportunities to engage in crop production. Cash makes sense where there is good production along rivers and access to markets. WFP is exploring the potential use of cash in six *woredas* and will set up pilots in three. The determination of transfer modality also relates to how a lowland strategy must address different types of livelihoods, and riverine groups were identified during the evaluation as a specific type of livelihood or subgroup within the pastoral-agriculturists. The government has shifted from its insistence on a “cash first” principle to accommodate transfers where it makes more sense to distribute food. Food as a transfer modality should also reflect the preference of lowland households. The evaluation found that in the Somali region, some households are selling wheat to buy more preferred cereals such as sorghum or rice, and condiments. To address this issue, USAID is changing the cereal that is distributed to sorghum.⁸⁶

Internal coherence with WFP corporate strategy

69. Relief and TSF. Relief activities are consistent with UNDAF/WFP Outcome 1.1,⁸⁷ which corresponds to the WFP corporate strategy of “stabilised or improved food consumption over assistance period for target households.”⁸⁸ TSF activities align with UNDAF/WFP Outcome 1.2 and the corporate strategy for stabilised or improved undernutrition among children under five years and PLW: the corporate strategy supports a continuum of care ranging from community-focused interventions to therapeutic feeding for the most malnourished children, and TSF interventions fall within this continuum. TSF supports therapeutic feeding programmes by participating in discharge planning and is integrated into general relief, as children who recover from MAM may also be part of families that receive relief.⁸⁹

70. PSNP. The PSNP component addresses UNDAF/WFP Outcome 3.1,⁹⁰ as well as the WFP strategic results framework for “improved household and community access to livelihood assets to reduce risk of disaster and shocks to food security.”⁹¹ The PRRO work on PSNP is consistent with WFP's Strategic Plan (2014-2017), which reiterates the need for broad efforts to manage risks, to respond to shocks in ways

⁸⁵ WFP Ethiopia. 2013k. Markets and cash transfers in Ethiopia.

⁸⁶ WFP key informant interviews, January 2014.

⁸⁷ WFP Ethiopia. 2013j. Logical Framework.

⁸⁸ WFP. 2013d. WFP Strategic Plan (2014-2017).

⁸⁹ WFP, DRMFS & UNICEF. 2012. Memorandum of Understanding.

⁹⁰ WFP Ethiopia. 2013j. Logical Framework.

⁹¹ WFP. 2013d. WFP Strategic Plan (2014-2017).

that better link relief and development, and to build resilience to ensure long-term food and nutrition security. The strategic plan also identifies the need to support countries' plans to manage natural hazards and other risks in line with the Hyogo Framework for Action.⁹² The work of the PSNP is also consistent with the WFP corporate mandate to become a food assistance organisation, and at the CO level is aligned with pillar one of the WFP Ethiopia CO strategic plan for DRM and natural resource management (NRM).⁹³

External coherence with government policies

71. Relief. The PRRO assistance supports the overall aim of the Government of Ethiopia GTP 2011-2015 - to reduce poverty through economic growth - and by providing a safety net for destitute households. The GTP includes a provision for early response to emergency needs and improved disaster mitigation.

72. WFP's support to accurate and timely early warning systems is not only appropriate to country needs but also consistent with the priorities of the new, multi-sector and multi-hazard DRM Strategic Investment Framework (DRM-SIF) under CAADP Ethiopia. The framework represents the government's policy shift from reactive disaster response to disaster risk reduction, and it includes a DRM system that encompasses disaster response and recovery. It is a government priority to link DRM to PSNP, and to move people from relief to transformational development. WFP is supporting this through its cash pilots and capacity-building efforts. WFP continues to train and support *woreda* staff to strengthen their early-warning and assessment capability. WFP is also supporting the Livelihoods, Early Assessment and Protection (LEAP) mechanism, which makes an important contribution to providing a complete early warning picture. The ET finds that WFP could help strengthen programme linkages, especially in the pastoral and agro-pastoral areas, by ensuring that food security initiatives are linked to reducing poverty and to disaster response and risk reduction.⁹⁴

73. TSF. The TSF component is relevant to the government's NNP, policies, and mandates.⁹⁵ TSF is part of the routine nutrition assessment, counselling, and support services for PLW. It also addresses the NNP's focus on improving the nutritional status of children 0-24 months old with its focus on the early detection and management of malnutrition. Furthermore, as the NNP is taking a life-cycle perspective, the inclusion of children 2-5 years of age in TSF supports this focus for the early detection and treatment of MAM. TSF works with government agencies in health and agriculture with regards to using the hotspot designations. In SNNPR, Oromia, Tigray, and Amhara there is collaboration between TSF and UNICEF's community-based nutrition (CBN) programme through Child Health Days (CHD). In Somali and Afar these are not able to be coordinated due to the extreme rural nature of these areas. TSF and WFP staff also work closely with the MOH ENCU as an active participant in the Emergency Relief Task Force.

74. PSNP. The PSNP component is well aligned with the government's Food Security Programme (FSP), the national PSNP, and the Sustainable Land Management Platform. The main programme under the CAADP pillar for DRMFSS is the FSP, which is expected to reduce the number of Ethiopians suffering from extreme hunger, malnutrition, and poverty by addressing the main underlying causes

⁹² WFP. 2013d. WFP Strategic Plan (2014-2017).

⁹³ WFP Ethiopia. ND. Country Strategy 2012-2015.

⁹⁴ e.g., linking to USAID PRIME, PLI, ADB Resilience programme, and NGO programmes

⁹⁵ Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Ministry of Health. 2012. NNP.

of rural household food insecurity. PSNP has a focus on rehabilitation of the environment and promoting sustainable agriculture. The second pillar of the CAADP is implemented by the Ministry of Agriculture's Natural Resource Management Sector (NRMS), which leads the Sustainable Land Management Platform and has the mandate to ensure sustainable NRM in rural areas, manage climate risks faced by rural communities, and reverse land degradation.⁹⁶ Much of the work done under the MERET⁹⁷ programme has had a significant influence on the NRM approach used in PSNP; this finding was acknowledged by the National Director of PSNP during the evaluation. Additionally, WFP's work on PSNP contributes to the DRM-SPIF; the National Social Protection Policy and accompanying strategy, the NNP; and the Climate Resilience Strategy (CRS).

75. Further, WFP's engagement with PSNP aligns with the government's desire to reduce the emergency caseload through more predictable transfers. Based on the ET's key informant interviews, the government is very appreciative of WFP's support to Somali and Afar regions.

External coherence with partners

76. United Nations. Ethiopia is a Deliver as One Volunteer Country, and the United Nations coordinates all responses according to the strategic priorities of the government. This is reflected in the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF, 2012-2015), which is fully aligned with the government's priorities and timeframe. The four main pillars of the UNDAF, which are all relevant to the WFP PRRO, are: 1) sustainable economic growth and disaster risk reduction; 2) basic social services; 3) governance and capacity development; and 4) women, youth and children.⁹⁸ The ET finds that the PRRO is relevant to UNDAF because it develops government capacity to deliver a minimum package of social protection measures, systematically reduces disaster risks and impacts and improves food security; provides extensive support to DRMFSS staff at field level; and supports the development of improved logistics systems.

77. WFP also collaborates extensively with United Nations organisations working in food security and DRM (e.g., FAO, UNDP, OCHA, IFAD) and on nutrition (UNICEF and WHO). With regard to nutrition specifically, in March 2012 an MOU became official with WFP, the DRMFSS, and UNICEF to implement the TSF component of the PRRO.⁹⁹ The MOU established the guidelines for food distribution and the ability to pilot test different distribution methods to improve programme outcomes. This collaboration illustrates that these partner groups have coordinated TSF and jointly set a ration amount to meet the needs of food insecure households.

78. Donors. The ET consulted a range of donors who support WFP operations regarding alignment with donor strategy. The majority concurred that the PRRO is working in some of the most difficult areas, and they consider the operation to be doing a good job in very difficult operating environments. DFID and other donors consider the PRRO to be aligned with their objectives and priorities in relief and PSNP. The PRRO is viewed as coherent with the main objectives of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in relief but not the TSF and PSNP components. The TSF has had difficulty aligning with donor priorities due to past problems in implementation, which have since been addressed in the new pilot

⁹⁶ WFP Ethiopia. ND. Country Strategy 2012-2015.

⁹⁷ Managing Environmental Resources to Enable Transitions to More Sustainable Livelihoods

⁹⁸ UNDG (UNDAF). 2010.

⁹⁹ WFP, DRMFSS & UNICEF. 2012. Memorandum of Understanding.

programmes. Many donors feel that WFP participates in relevant government and donor coordination and planning but could be more strategic in their engagement in the new design of the PSNP by involving more of the MERET technical staff in the NRM discussions.

79. NGOs. Nine NGO partners¹⁰⁰ distribute TSF as part of the PRRO.¹⁰¹ WFP works with the Government of Ethiopia and—where requested by the government—with NGOs in *woredas* identified as hotspot Priority 1. In Priority 2 *woredas*, if the government endorses, NGOs implement TSF without WFP support. The ET finds that WFP and the NGOs coordinate and share knowledge effectively, allowing for more geographic regions to be targeted without overlap. For more discussion on partnerships see Section 2.3.

Key findings and conclusions

Appropriateness of the operation: The PRRO is relevant to the needs of food insecure and emergency-affected households in the areas where WFP works. There are large chronically food insecure populations in Somali and Afar regions where PSNP and TSF are implemented. However, the targeting strategies for PSNP and for TSF hotspots promote inclusion error, and the timing of the relief assessment is not suited to accurate analysis of lowland areas. In all, WFP should continue to strengthen linkages across programme components so that the PRRO reflects the overall strategy to address the main food security and nutrition issues.

- WFP has successfully aided millions of households affected by shocks and malnutrition by providing relief, and nutrition assistance in hotspot areas.
- The timing of the HRD assessment is not appropriate for lowland areas. WFP should advocate, with others, for a separate assessment in lowland areas to more accurately assess relief needs.
- WFP’s food support to Somali and Afar regions for PSNP is very relevant because these are regions where markets are weak and crop production is limited.
- WFP is piloting cash relief in food surplus areas and closely monitoring markets to ensure that cash allotments reflect current market prices. Mixing food and cash transfer modalities based on livelihoods should be explored further by WFP.
- New national guidelines on targeting food relief assistance were issued in August 2011, but training on the new guidelines is still underway at the regional and *woreda* levels due to financial constraints, and *kebele* officials and community-level FDCs have yet to be oriented to the new guidelines.
- TSF addresses malnutrition among vulnerable children and women and is linked to relief, but both could target at the *kebele* level to increase efficiency and coordination. Inclusion error should be decreased by revising criteria.
- WFP could help strengthen programme linkages, especially in pastoral and agro-pastoral areas, by ensuring that food security initiatives are linked to efforts in poverty reduction, disaster response, and disaster risk reduction.

The PRRO objectives align with the WFP strategic plan and policies.

- The PRRO components align well with the strategic priorities of WFP at the global and CO level.

¹⁰⁰ 9 NGOs: International Medical Corps, Save the Children International, Concern, Mercy Corps, Care Ethiopia, Islamic Relief Ethiopia, Médecines Sans Frontières Spain, Plan International, and Merlin.

¹⁰¹ WFP Ethiopia. 2013o. NGO tracking.

- The PSNP work aligns with WFP’s corporate vision of being a food assistance organisation that improves food security

The PRRO aligns with government strategies, and operation objectives are based on WFP’s coordinated and assessed contribution to national goals. The PRRO is also coherent and coordinated with United Nations and other partners.

- The PRRO components align well with government policy priorities and with the priorities of the Ethiopian UNDAF.
- WFP’s engagement with PSNP supports the government effort to reduce the emergency caseload by providing more consistent transfers, which increase the food security of vulnerable households.
- TSF is externally coherent with government policies and mandates and with UNICEF and NGO programming.

2.2. Results of the Operation

80. This section provides evaluation findings and conclusions regarding the second evaluation question, “What are the results of the operation?”¹⁰² It first discusses attainment of planned outputs by activity. This is followed with an assessment of achievement of outcome and objectives, with discussion of the factors affecting the results (Section 2.3 offers further discussion of structural factors), and the operation’s contribution to higher-level development and humanitarian results. See the box at the end of this section for key findings and conclusions.

Attainment of planned outputs

81. This section discusses the operation’s outputs, including the extent to which assistance was provided to the “right” beneficiaries, accounting for quantity, quality, and timeliness. The findings are organised by activity. In discussing outputs, it bears noting that there are inconsistencies in the 2013 output data provided to the ET. The ET finds it difficult to measure performance based on the output indicators without reliable data.


82. Overview. A review of planned outputs shows that WFP has been responsive to the need for improvements in beneficiary selection. However, the PRRO continues to face logistical and bureaucratic challenges to timely delivery of assistance, and to some extent, to meeting its targets for the number of beneficiaries reached. WFP exceeded or nearly met targets for relief food assistance in 2012 and 2013 and exceeded targets for relief cash assistance in 2013. Slightly more than three-quarters of beneficiaries targeted for TSF and PSNP were reached in 2012. In 2013, TSF achievement of targets remained the same while PSNP was able to reach slightly more beneficiaries than planned. However, for commodities distributed the quantity of food assistance distributed was less than one-third of planned distribution in 2014.

83. Operation outputs begin with the target to reach 100 percent of planned beneficiaries. Overall, 95.4 percent of planned beneficiaries were reached in 2012 and 94.0 percent in 2013 (Table 1). For GFD, 102 percent of beneficiaries (3,355,000) were reached in 2012 and 95.6 percent (2,112,500) in 2013; this includes some PSNP non-active members. FFW/A reached 77.7 percent of planned beneficiaries (337,200) in both 2012 and 2013, and 131.3 percent of planned

¹⁰² WFP (OEV). 2013. Terms of Reference.

beneficiaries (249,430) received cash and vouchers in 2013 (for both relief and PSNP). TSF activities reached 885,500 children under 5 and women in 2012 and 973,900 in 2013.

Table 1: Actual beneficiaries as percent of planned, by activity and year



Source: WFP Ethiopia. 2012. SPR; WFP Ethiopia. 2013. SPR. It should be noted that SPR values widely differ from other documents and figures provided by the CO, including BRs and WFP Ethiopia. 2013. M&E Plan and Actual Stock (See Annex 6).

*The 2012 and 2013 SPR figures for total planned beneficiaries do not align with BRs. These percentages of planned versus actual are pulled directly from the reports and are unclear if adjusted for 24 percent overlap with TSF beneficiaries; see Tango total calculation.

**This represents the totals based on the sum of beneficiary/activity categories of the SPRs and adjusted for overlap of beneficiaries, calculation conducted by TANGO International.

Note: The ET was not able to abstract beneficiary data by PRRO component because data are provided by the main activities, with both Relief and PSNP beneficiaries included in GFD and cash.

84. Table 2 shows the percentage of male and female beneficiaries reached by PRRO activity and year. Because the data show no variation by year, the ET concludes that the values are not reliable for discussion of output indicator measures. According to SPR 2013, WFP and DRMFS have conducted trainings in all three components to ensure more participation of women and gender sensitisation with regards to how gender equity can increase effectiveness. The PRRO does not report initiatives to reduce the risk of sexual and gender-based violence.¹⁰³

Table 2: Gender balance of beneficiaries, by activity and year

Activity	2012		2013	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Relief	50.4%	49.6%	50.4%	49.6%
TSF	38.5%	61.5%	38.5%	61.5%
PSNP	49.1%	50.9%	49.1%	50.9%

Source: Data provided by the CO. Percent calculations by TANGO International.

85. Operation outputs also aim for 100 percent of the planned quantity of food assistance. In 2012, 61.7 percent of planned food tonnage of the operation was distributed, and in 2013, 62.1 percent (see Annex 6).¹⁰⁴

¹⁰³ See Table 5 for more gender-related output indicators.

¹⁰⁴ It should be noted that TANGO did not find consistency between the planned food tonnage in the BRs and that reported in the 2012 and 2013 SPRs. In addition, the source: WFP Ethiopia. 2013. M&E Plan and Actual Stock cites 653,959 mt planned and 246,876 mt actual (37.8 percent).

Relief: Outputs

86. Table 3 lists all relief output indicators, by target and percentage of attainment. According to the data, the targeted number of relief beneficiaries was exceeded in 2012 and nearly reached in 2013. The target for equal representation of household food entitlements issued to women is also reported as reached, at 49.6 percent (Table 1). However the findings below are not consistent,¹⁰⁵ showing a high level of attainment for relief beneficiaries and a low level of actual food distributed in 2013 (27.8 percent).¹⁰⁶

Table 3: Summary of relief outputs attained, by year

Output ¹⁰⁷	Indicator & Target	% of output attained by year	
		2012	2013
1. Food and/or cash transfers distributed in sufficient quantity, quality and in timely manner to targeted beneficiary households.	No. of women, men, girls & boys receiving food assistance as percentage of planned. Target: 100%	102.3	95.6 ¹
	No. of women, men, girls and boys receiving cash assistance as percentage of planned. Target: 100%	N/A	131.3 ¹
	Quantity of food assistance distributed as % of planned. Target: 100% (No. days rations were provided as % of planned) ²	unk 88.9	27.8 92.6
	Total cash value (US\$) distributed as % of planned (Note: This is the PRRO cash total, incl. PSNP). Target: 100%	N/A	34.7
2. Women become the holders of food or cash entitlement; collectors of food or cash assistance at food or cash distribution points; and decision makers over the use of food or cash.	% of household food entitlements (on rations cards/lists) issued in women's names- GFD. Target: 50%	48.5	39.0 ³
	% of women who collected food or cash assistance at distribution points. Target: 70% (original target: 60%)	49.6	49.6 ⁴
	% of women who made decision over the use of food or cash assistance. Target: To be determined	N/A	N/A

Source: WFP Ethiopia. 2013j. Logical Framework; WFP Ethiopia. 2012h. SPR; WFP Ethiopia. 2013m. M&E Plan and Actual Stock; WFP Ethiopia. 2013x. SPR; see values in charts and tables in Annex 6.

Note: Output and indicator targets reflect the updated logframe (BR6), with grey-coloured cells representing original programme logframe indicators that cover most of the period covered by the evaluation.

Unk=unknown to the ET as of May 2014. N/A=not applicable because indicator is new or activity was not in effect

¹SPR 2013 data for GFD and cash and vouchers do not differentiate relief and PSNP beneficiaries.

²This SPR output indicator is not in the logframe but is listed in SPRs, which the ET has included due to lack of disaggregated commodity distribution data by component.

³SPR 2013 shows 39 percent planned target rather than the logframe target of 50 percent.

⁴SPR 2013 shows 49.5 percent planned target rather than the logframe target of 70 percent.

• Relief: Timeliness

87. Relief faces ongoing challenges to timely delivery of assistance. WFP typically dispatches seven rounds of relief in a year. Apart from the need for HRD assessments aligned with the lowland hunger calendar, at the beginning of the calendar year, dispatches cannot be made until the release of new HRD figures, which occurs during January-February. WFP's efficiency and timeliness is hampered because the funding cycles for WFP donors and the issuance of the HRD are not aligned. By the time the HRD is issued in the first quarter of the calendar year, donors have already

¹⁰⁵ This difference may be partially explained by conflicting data and should be explored further by the CO. Waiting for response from CO.

¹⁰⁶ WFP Ethiopia. 2013. M&E Plan and Actual Stock cites 653,959 mt planned and 246,876 mt actual (37.8 percent). For 2013, this output by component is 27.8 percent for relief, 73.8 percent for TSF, and 61.2 percent for PSNP.

¹⁰⁷ The original programme logframe also included: Output 1.1.3) Provide institutional support for partners for strengthening use of early warning information for timely and appropriate response. 1.1.4) Hotspot monitoring guidelines in place.

determined their budgets for the year. This affects the amount of funding available in the first half of the year.

88. Another related timeliness issue is that after the HRD is released, WFP requires four weeks to deliver food to affected areas – a substantial delay. WFP manages the supply chain for commodities from the port of entry, and delivers the commodities to the DRMFSS at pre-defined points. DRMFSS is responsible for final delivery and distribution of food (except in Somali region) while WFP assumes a monitoring role. Other delays were caused by port congestion and a shortage of delivery trucks. WFP is working to improve efficiency in these areas in several ways: it advocates with government for timely release of the HRD; it is strengthening the supply chain capacity and timeliness of government through FMIS; and it instituted H&S to improve the supply chain in Somali region.

89. WFP cash assistance reached 131.3 percent of beneficiaries. This is higher than originally planned because Somali region was subsequently included in the pilot. However, only 34.7 percent of the planned US dollar value of the cash was disbursed against the target. Delays in the start of the pilot resulted in only five out of seven planned cash distribution rounds being implemented. Cash transfers are more time and cost-efficient than commodity transfers and should only require a few days to implement if the financial transfer systems are functioning efficiently. The cash pilot showed that cash transfers through government structures took up to 20 days. A streamlined transfer process from the government could ensure more timely delivery. As the pilot programme is implemented and evaluated, opportunities for WFP to assist the government in developing a more efficient process may be available.

- ***Relief: Beneficiary selection***

90. The H&S operation has issued guidelines for relief distribution in Somali region. They outline a system of beneficiary selection based on input from FDCs; agreed distribution arrangements between WFP, local officials, and the FDC; and responsibilities for proper handling and reporting of food relief by local officials. While food relief is targeted according to the guidelines and available resources, in practice, food does not always reach the intended recipient because sharing food is a widespread cultural practice. In addition, food recipients may share with others who are eligible for relief but excluded due to resource limitations or because full family targeting is not applied. Some households interviewed reported that they shared one-third of their ration. WFP is aware of these challenges and has provided sensitisation to local officials and FDCs. WFP also recognises that the practice of sharing is socially important but possibly detrimental to households targeted for relief; however, there is no reliable study of the impacts of this practice.

91. Women comprise the majority of relief beneficiaries. Beneficiary FGDs in three regions confirm that women are the primary recipients of relief food or cash, and that women are specifically targeted because they are more considered more responsible in using the assistance to take care of household needs than are men. Male FGD participants agree with this modality for the same reason. Men and women agree that while they appreciate food relief, once the food is consumed the benefits are gone.

- **Relief: Early warning and assessment**

92. Government early warning systems are in place and are generally effective, though some aspects can be strengthened. The basis of the early warning system is to provide information on a wide range of indicators collected on a weekly and monthly basis at the *kebele* and *woreda* level. The intent is to identify shocks as they develop and to respond rapidly to sudden onset shocks. Government early warning staff stated that they also rely on cell phone communications in the case of emergencies to pass on information. However, *woreda* staff do not analyse the data they collect in order to understand local trends or to obtain information that can be used for programme management; rather, they transmit the data upward to regional staff for analysis. This is a missed opportunity for timely early warning and accurate targeting, as the staff closest to the communities need to conduct basic analysis of the data rapidly and thus strengthen their ability to react quickly to developing problems.

93. Under the current early warning system of DRMFSS, a complete early warning picture at *woreda* level requires a *woreda* profile combined with meteorological data from the LEAP mechanism and on-the-ground assessments. WFP has successfully devoted a great deal of effort in improving early warning and vulnerability assessments by training government staff to develop *woreda* profiles, improving the skills of government staff in assessment, and to providing support to LEAP. The DRMFSS places great importance on the *woreda* disaster risk profiles, which provide detailed analysis of the specific risks for each *woreda*. Profiles thus need to be reliable and of good quality, which is affected by the extent of staff turnover and the frequency of training. At the time of the evaluation, it was planned that *woreda* profiles would be available on the DRMFSS website by March 2014.

94. There are perceptions that WFP has influenced the DRMFSS on approaches to vulnerability analysis at the expense of building truly complementary approaches.¹⁰⁸ The DRMFSS is questioning the utility of the household economy approach. Other agencies question the value of the *woreda* disaster risk profiles and the utility of LEAP, which currently provides data at too high a level to be useful in predicting or monitoring localised disasters. The DRMFSS Strategic Programme and Investment Framework highlights the need for harmonisation of information systems into a more cohesive whole that would ensure early warning information systems work together rather than operate as separate silos.

95. Finally, one study found that the early warning system does not systematically act as a trigger for contingency budgets and risk finance mechanisms.¹⁰⁹ This indicates gaps in the structure set up to respond to early warning indicators, and the need to set up an M&E framework to measure relief outcomes. This should not require a new system, as the information currently gathered should be sufficient. The early warning data collected should be compared to the results of the response to determine whether relief has affected change. A particular concern is that the early warning system is not working well in the lowland areas. Additional attention will be required by WFP to closely monitor changes in the lowlands that may indicate an increase in food insecurity. USAID shifted its funding for early warning to a USAID-funded project but its early warning system is not yet operational.

¹⁰⁸ Donor meetings during site visits by the ET.

¹⁰⁹ Loveless, J. and Palacios, D. 2013.

- **TSF: Outputs**

96. Table 4 lists all TSF output indicators, by target and percentage of attainment. According to the data, the targets for TSF beneficiaries and supplemental food were not reached during either year of the PRRO. In 2012, TSF reached 885,500 beneficiaries against a target of 1.14 million, representing 77.9 percent. The planned number of beneficiaries for 2013 decreased to about 1.1 million, of which 865,870 beneficiaries were reached (79.7 percent).¹¹⁰ Both of these targets are greater than what was identified in the PRRO Project Document.¹¹¹ However, the percentage of women who were beneficiaries of TSF in 2012 and 2013 was unusually consistent at 32.0 percent for both years and was exactly equivalent to what was approved in the PRRO 200290, which raises questions about its accuracy.¹¹² The reasons why the targets were not reached could not be established; one possibility is that the increased target may have been too ambitious. Complicating the ability to analyse attainment accurately are data challenges and gaps, such as different data collection systems being used to monitor TSF. It is also possible that fewer children qualified in the hotspot areas than anticipated and that the significant pipeline breaks prevented supplement distribution.

Table 4: Summary of TSF outputs attained, by year

Output	Indicator & Target	% of output attained by year	
		2012	2013
Nutritious food distributed in sufficient quantity, quality, and in timely manner to targeted women, girls and boys.	No. of women, girls and boys receiving food, by category as % of planned. Target: 100%	77.9	79.7 ¹
	Quantity of food assistance distributed as % of planned. Target: 100%	unk	73.8
	No. of staff members/community health workers trained on modalities of food distribution as % of planned. ² Target: 100%	95.4	99.9

Source: WFP Ethiopia. 2013j. Logical Framework; WFP Ethiopia. 2012h. SPR; WFP Ethiopia. 2013m. M&E Plan and Actual Stock; WFP Ethiopia. 2013x. SPR; see values in charts and tables in Annex 6.

Note: Output and indicator targets reflect the updated logframe (BR6), with grey-coloured cells representing original programme logframe indicators that cover most of the period covered by the evaluation.

Unk=unknown to the ET as of May 2014. N/A=not applicable because indicator is new or activity was not in effect.

¹SPR 2013 cites 72.4 percent of planned children (6-23 and 24-59 months, boys and girls) and 126.2 percent of planned PLW.

²This SPR output indicator is not in the logframe but is listed in the SPRs.

- **TSF: Timeliness**

97. The ET finds two challenges related to the timeliness of food delivery. First, the general food management process is very long, taking an estimated 37 days at minimum:¹¹³ data compilation at *kebele* level and aggregation at *woreda* level (15-21 days); data compilation at zonal and regional level (17 days); and transportation of food to the *kebeles* once the request is made (11-16 days).¹¹⁴

98. Another timeliness issue was pipeline breaks, which resulted in delays and gaps in delivery and expired rations. For example, the most recent delivery missed the period of actual need in SNNPR (November-December screening): at the time of a site visit in late January, beneficiaries were awaiting a delivery that was overdue by

¹¹⁰ In other data compiled by the CO for 2013 (see Annex 2), the planned number of TSF beneficiaries for 2013 decreased to 1.087 million, of which there were 973,870 beneficiaries (89.6 percent).

¹¹¹ WFP Ethiopia. 2011d. WFP/EB.2/2011/9-C/2.

¹¹² This targeted ratio is appropriate between women and children as one would expect more children to be at risk.

¹¹³ WFP Ethiopia. 2014e. Quick Overview of TSF Process.

¹¹⁴ WFP Ethiopia. 2013q. Second Generation TSF.

37 days.¹¹⁵ Thus, the delivery missed the window of time when food was most needed. The arrival of the supplemental food will actually occur after harvest, when food supply may be adequate. These pipeline breaks may be occurring due to a lack of personnel (see Section 2.3) to track orders for supplements and not being able to contract transporters to deliver food to distribution sites.

- ***TSF: Beneficiary selection***

99. WFP has been responsive to concerns regarding inclusion errors and sharing of food within households by implementing the pilot TSF programme in 44 *woredas*¹¹⁶ and by continually screening children as part of the existing health care system. This may also reduce food sharing as less food is given at one time, and the connection to screening helps clarify that the food is intended for the malnourished child. However, donors and partners are concerned that there is still unacceptable inclusion error for children and women who become TSF beneficiaries. These concerns have prevented donors who withdrew funds in the past from re-establishing funding for TSF.¹¹⁷

100. Inclusion error is expected to be less with routine screening compared with CHD. Exclusion error is not apparent to the ET: it appears most children who qualify for TSF do, in fact, receive supplemental food. Nevertheless a more formal study using an existing M&E system should be done to assess the appropriateness of the current cut-off for MUAC. The inclusion errors may actually be including children with MAM who would otherwise be excluded with a MUAC cut-off of 12.0 cm (see Annex 8 for discussion of using MUAC to identify MAM). The use of proxy measures may help to monitor and reduce inclusion error, e.g., ratio of children in the Outpatient Therapeutic Programme (OTP) to TSF recipients, the ratio of women to children, and total numbers. Inclusion error can also be reduced by introducing quality control measures into monitoring, such as repeating measurements. In addition, as the TSF is being more integrated into the healthcare system, it is also recommended that child weight measurement be part of any M&E system.

101. The TSF approach is also used for children who are discharged from OTP. These children are eligible to receive two months of TSF rations at discharge. Most receive an initial one-month supply, and are able to obtain a two-month supply of ration or return to a TSF distribution site to obtain a second month of rations. According to TSF staff, multiple evaluations have shown that sharing rations may negatively impact child recovery; nevertheless, the ET found it would be useful to study the impact of sharing on households and communities when enough food is being provided, and to examine its relevance to community coping strategies as an isolated programme and in conjunction with relief.

102. The primary reasons children become eligible for TSF are that families do not have enough food, recent infection, and/or lack of appropriate child care and nutrition practices. These underlying factors also exist for the women in the programme. One important issue raised during meetings with partners was that all beneficiaries receive the same type and amount of ration in the TSF programme because it is too difficult to adjust by category (e.g., PLW, children under two and

¹¹⁵ ET site visit to SNPPR and initial discussions in Hawassa and Dara with WFP and Early Warning staff and then corroborated with WFP staff in Addis Ababa.

¹¹⁶ See Annex 7 for the pilot study model.

¹¹⁷ Donor meetings during site visits by the ET with ECHO, USAID, OCHA, CIDA.

children under 3-5 years), which is a nuanced issue that could potentially increase the impact of the programme as PLW may need additional supplement.¹¹⁸

103. Screening should be done by *woreda* health staff outside the community instead of a local health extension worker (HEW) to reduce community pressure on the screener to include ineligible children. The government wants to move to continuous screening; UNICEF supports this approach because it builds health system capacity for HEWs and integrates TSF with OTP through the ongoing screening.

- **PSNP: Outputs**

104. Table 5 lists PSNP output indicators by target and percentage of attainment. The PSNP in 2012 planned to reach 1,084,800 beneficiaries and was successful at reaching 843,000 (77.7 percent). In 2013, reach increased to 1,113,190 out of 1.36 million planned beneficiaries (82.1 percent). In both years, according to project documents, 50.9 percent of those reached were females.¹¹⁹ In 2013, in Somali – the only region for which the ET has data – WFP distributed 56,591 mt of rations to 629,675 beneficiaries in 28 *woredas*.¹²⁰ The quantity of food assistance distributed and total cash value distributed as percent of planned (61.2 percent and 34.7 percent, respectively) are not disaggregated for PSNP only (i.e. they include relief beneficiaries in the total), but nonetheless, substantially fall short of the target. For nearly all planned assets, the attained outputs increased for 2013, nearly meeting the target for all types of assets.

Table 5: Summary of PSNP outputs attained, by year

Output	Indicator & Target	% of output attained by year	
		2012	2013
1. Food or cash distributed in sufficient quantity, quality, and in timely manner to targeted women, men, girls and boys in PSNP-targeted <i>woredas</i> .	No. of women, men, girls and boys receiving food as % of planned. Target: 100%	77.7	77.7 ¹
	No. of women, men, girls and boys receiving cash as % of planned. Target: 100%	N/A	131.3 ¹
	Quantity of food assistance distributed as % of planned. Target: 100%	unk	61.2 ²
	Total cash value (US\$) distributed as % of planned (Note: This is the PRRO cash total, including relief cash pilot recipients). Target: 100%	N/A	34.7
2. Assets that reduce risk of disasters and shocks developed, built or restored by target communities. ¹²¹	No. of risk reduction and disaster mitigation assets built or restored, by type as % planned Type:		
	• Hectares of cultivated land treated	83.0	86.7
	• Hectares of gully land reclaimed	81.5	91.1
	• Kilometres of feeder roads built & maintained	92.3	81.1
	• No. of classrooms rehabilitated	86.0	92.0
	• No. of fish ponds constructed (2012)/ households receiving fuel efficient stoves (2013)	82.2	-
	• No. of shallow wells constructed	-	100
	• No. of water springs developed	88.0	92.0
• % of tree seedlings used for forestation	91.0	95.2	
	88.0	90.0	

¹¹⁸ Partner meetings by the ET with ENCU, UNICEF, and WFP staff.

¹¹⁹ One problem with these figures is that the numbers varied across different reporting formats. It was very difficult for the ET to determine the actual numbers with any degree of certainty.

¹²⁰ WFP Ethiopia. 2014d. Sub-office Brief (Somali).

¹²¹ Original Output 2.1.2: Community-based watershed development plan guidelines are used for planning public works.

	Target: 100%		
	% of public works plans based on community-based watershed development plan guidelines Target: 100%	Unk	Unk
	% of public works meeting satisfactory standards and sustainability rating. Target: 90%	Unk	Unk
3. Women become the holders of food or cash entitlement; collectors of food/cash assistance at food/cash distribution points; and decision makers over the use of food or cash.	% of women who collected food or cash assistance at distribution points. Target: 70%	50.9	50.9
	% of women who made decision over the use of food or cash assistance. Target: To be determined (TBD)	N/A	N/A
4. Gender, protection and partnership: ¹²² <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Gender equality and empowerment improved WFP assistance delivered in safe, accountable and dignified condition. Food or cash assistance interventions coordinated and partnerships developed. 	% of women project management committee members trained on modalities of food or cash distribution. % of women in leadership positions on food, cash, or voucher management committees ⁴ Target: TBD	84.4 ³ 45.3	40 40
	Proportion of food or cash assistance collectors who reported safety problems when going to or coming back from or at food or cash distribution sites. Target: TBD	N/A	N/A
	No. of United Nations agencies/international organisations that provided complementary inputs and services.	10	10
	Proportion of project activities implemented with engagement of complementary partners. Target: TBD	N/A	N/A

Source: WFP Ethiopia. 2013j. Logical Framework; WFP Ethiopia. 2012h. SPR; WFP Ethiopia. 2013m. M&E Plan and Actual Stock; WFP Ethiopia. 2013x. SPR; see values in charts and tables in Annex 6.

Note: Output and indicator targets reflect the updated logframe (BR6), with grey-coloured cells representing original programme logframe indicators that cover most of the period covered by the evaluation.

Unk=unknown to the ET as of May 2014. N/A=not applicable because indicator is new or activity was not in effect.

¹ SPR 2013 cites 77.7 percent of planned FFA beneficiaries, which does not include the non-active PSNP members receiving GFD, as well as citing 131.3 percent of cash and voucher beneficiaries, which is not disaggregated by relief and PSNP components.

² The SPR 2013 narrative refers to 54 percent of planned tonnage distributed due to resource constraints.

³ This value reported in SPR 2012 appears to the ET to be an outlier and may be an error.

⁴ SPR 2013 reports this output indicator but it is not included in the logframe. Targets still to be determined as of May 2014.

• **PSNP: Timeliness**

105. Timeliness is a stated output indicator for the PSNP activity. It is addressed via the H&S operation, launched by the DRMFSS and WFP in September 2008, whose main objective is to address logistical and implementation challenges in the Somali region in order to improve food deliveries and distributions to intended beneficiaries at the level of Food Delivery Points (FDPs). Prior to H&S, food distributions took several months to complete (only three to four distribution rounds within six months compared to the six rounds recommended in PSNP guidelines), food was delivered only to *woreda* capitals, and clans took care of distribution without targeting and registration of beneficiaries. Qualitative interviews and project documents indicate H&S has improved food delivery in the region with regard to the timeliness of distributions, beneficiary targeting, and by diminishing food misuse.¹²³

106. Additionally, there has been a major improvement in the frequency of beneficiary payments in the Somali region. The mean number of payments has increased from 2.9 to 5.0 within a six-month timeframe. There has also been an

¹²² This output and the indicators are newly added per the revised logical framework of 2013.

¹²³ WFP Ethiopia. 2013i. H&S Operations- Memo.

increase in payment amounts. In Somali region, the amount of per capita payments for public works has increased five-fold since 2010.¹²⁴ While H&S has introduced these improvements, a number of factors have led to delays in the distribution of resources. Security problems have restricted the movement of staff and food convoys, preventing timely distributions. Untimely resource delivery is also a result of routine delays by the partner to submit requests to WFP due to late completion and reporting of public work activities.¹²⁵

107. The PSNP is intended to support households to develop risk mitigation strategies. The timeliness and predictability of transfers are critical factors in reducing negative coping strategies: when transfers are late (two months or more) it is difficult to prevent households from using negative coping strategies such as selling assets. Evaluations carried out by IFPRI have shown that many *kebeles* in the Somali region do not receive timely transfers, making it more likely that households in those *kebeles* will make distress sales of assets.

108. Other challenges include insufficient local transport capacity, security escort requirements, poor road networks, limited access in the rainy season, and remote delivery points. External factors are further discussed in Section 2.3.2.

- ***PSNP: Community assets and infrastructure***

109. Output 2 relates to the appropriateness and quality of the community assets and infrastructure created through the programme. The most common public works reported by a recent study of programme performance in Afar and Somali regions¹²⁶ are road building, soil and water conservation infrastructure, construction of ponds, and school classrooms. Other reported activities relate to enhancements and rehabilitation of natural resources and the environment, the provision of drinking water, the construction of facilities to extend social services, and irrigation. Many of these activities reflect WFP's considerable experience from the MERET programme. The ET deems the component's contributions to increasing water availability, soil productivity, and income opportunities among participating households highly relevant to the needs of poor households: public works can be an effective instrument for disaster prevention; drainage systems prevent heavy rains from becoming floods; slope stabilisation and erosion control measures reduce flooding and increase land productivity; and water and sediment retention systems improve the storage capacity of aquifers, limiting the impact of drought.¹²⁷ Construction of public service infrastructure, such as clinics and schools, contributes to public health and education and can be used for disseminating DRM messages.

110. At the same time, a major problem facing the PSNP is the appropriateness of the public works models being introduced in the lowland areas. In 2010 when the PSNP started in the Afar and Somali regions, the public works models were copied from the highlands. According to interviewed stakeholders they were not appropriate for either region. This led to the poor construction of public works. Regional officials indicate that some of the design features of the PIM are more appropriate for the highlands and do not fit neatly with lowland contexts.¹²⁸ Another issue with the PSNP component is that as with the relief and TSF components, resource sharing is a characteristic feature of Somali communities: FGDs indicate that between 30-50

¹²⁴ Lind, J., et al. 2013.

¹²⁵ WFP key informant interviews, January 2014.

¹²⁶ Lind, J., et al. 2013.

¹²⁷ Loveless, J. and Palacios, D. 2013.

¹²⁸ Coo-Black, S., et al. 2013.

percent of the resources are shared.¹²⁹ In addition, the distribution calendar for the public works programme is not in sync with the hunger season calendar and migration patterns, which is another example of the need for a lowlands public works strategy.¹³⁰

111. Recently, new guidelines prepared for PSNP public works in pastoral areas¹³¹ have been introduced and are currently being distributed to government staff in the *woredas*. Based on key informant interviews with NGO and WFP staff, there are three to four different livelihood systems in the lowland regions that need to be taken into account in targeting and the selection of public works.

112. In order for PSNP to reach its full potential, the public works should be integrated into comprehensive region-wide plans. Addressing soil and water conservation as discrete community-based projects – rather than through watershed planning like MERET has done – will not lead to effective conservation measures. The impact of public works will also be affected by the implementation process: for instance, payments for unskilled labour are prioritised over spending resources on physical capital to construct the public works. Furthermore, work is undertaken for only six months in a year. This leads to the design, construction, and maintenance of public works being lower than the expected standard.¹³²

113. PSNP outputs 3-4 relate to women's empowerment and participation through PSNP assistance and activities; it should be noted that these output indicators were added in the revised logframe. Based on FGDs with women in the Somali region, women are actively participating in the public works activities promoted by PSNP. They have contributed to soil and water conservation measures and clearing mesquite, and participated in the construction of classrooms. The women interviewed were very enthusiastic regarding their involvement in PSNP.

- ***PSNP: Beneficiary selection***

114. According the 2010 PIM, the PSNP uses both administrative and community targeting approaches. Administrative targeting involves determining the number of PSNP clients in specific geographic settings (regions, *woreda*, *kebele*, etc.) Community-based approaches identify beneficiaries through the community Food Security Task Force (FSTF). The basic eligibility criteria for households to be included in the programme are membership in a community that has been chronically food insecure for the last three years, households that suddenly become food insecure as a result of severe loss of assets, and households with inadequate family support or other means of social protection. PSNP targeting procedures are also meant to reflect full family targeting and procedures for targeting polygamous households. Client cards are distributed to PSNP clients in Somalia region to ensure that there is continuity of transfers to households over consecutive years. They have not been distributed in Afar due to a shortfall in the administrative budget to cover printing costs.¹³³

115. Overall and taking the whole country into consideration, PSNP targeting is rated better than most social transfers in Africa.¹³⁴ However, based on the recent

¹²⁹ There is no empirical evidence that sharing dilutes food consumption on a year-round basis. This sharing may be contributing to the functioning of informal safety nets. WFP should consider conducting operational/action research to determine the true impact of dilution.

¹³⁰ WFP key informant interviews, January 2014.

¹³¹ Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, MoARD (DRMFSS). 2012. Guidelines for PSNP-PW in Pastoral Areas.

¹³² Loveless, J. and Palacios, D. 2013.

¹³³ Lind, J., et al. 2013.

¹³⁴ Coo-Black, S., et al. 2013.

study carried out by IFPRI¹³⁵ and on verification through key informant interviews in the Somali region, the PSNP is poorly targeted in the Afar and Somali regions. There is poor targeting and a manipulation of targeting in some communities, leading to high inclusion and exclusion error.¹³⁶ A high proportion of wealthy households is included, and many poor households are excluded. There is very little differentiation by wealth in terms of access to public works employment. This poor targeting has much to do with the weakness of the local FSTFs and the fact that most food insecure households are not registered.

116. Another problem facing PSNP implementation is that the translated Somali version of the PIM is just now being distributed to *woreda* officials. Government key informants felt that WFP could have been more engaged in providing training on the targeting guidelines.¹³⁷ The limited accessibility of proper guidance has led to a lack of awareness of the PSNP and has led beneficiaries to compare their food rations with the food basket received in the relief component, which leads to complaints to government officials.

117. Despite these targeting problems, there have been some positive improvements since 2010. This includes better understanding of full family targeting and proper treatment of polygamous households.¹³⁸ There is also recognition that PLW should be moved from public works to direct support.

Achievement of outcomes and objectives

118. This section discusses the extent to which the achievement of outputs and outcomes led to measurable changes and the realisation of operation objectives. This includes analysis of the factors relating to effectiveness and efficiency that contributed to these changes, including gender issues, as well as the operation's contribution to higher-level development and humanitarian work pursued by WFP in the country. It should be noted that internal and external factors affecting programme results are further discussed in Section 2.3.

119. One problem with determining whether WFP has achieved outcomes is that the reporting system is not systematic. Moreover, the values reported in the CHS are difficult to attribute to the activities of the PRRO and do not represent valid measures of project outcomes.

120. Table 6 shows the operation outcomes and objectives with available data from baseline to endline (discussion of these results by PRRO component follows the table). A review of outcome results at endline shows that some key indicators have been met for each component (these cells are highlighted in blue)**Error! Reference source not found.** The latest follow-up of FCS shows that 93 percent of relief households report borderline or acceptable food consumption, meeting the target; however, the use of coping strategies has increased since baseline due to logistics delays and lack of resources that may contribute to food insecurity. TSF met all three outcome indicators for recovery, death and defaulter rates, in line with the SPHERE standards; however, the death rate (1.4 percent) of malnourished children has doubled since baseline and should be investigated by WFP. For PSNP, progress has been made toward improving community assets and food consumption for

¹³⁵ Coo-Black, S., et al. 2013.

¹³⁶ WFP key informant interviews, January 2014.

¹³⁷ WFP has made considerable contributions to the design, development, and dissemination of the emergency food guidelines (DPPC 2000, DRMFSS 2011). Based on this experience, it is well positioned to provide training on the targeting guidelines for entry and exit (graduation) from PSNP.

¹³⁸ Coo-Black, S., et al. 2013.

participants, though outcome targets were not met. The CSI target was achieved. The ET finds that conclusions on the impact of disaster preparedness at the household level cannot be made based on these outcome indicators.

Table 6: Summary of PRRO outcome indicators

Outcomes		2011 Baseline	2012 Sept/Dec (1st round)	2013 June (2nd round)	2013 Nov/Dec Endline
KEY:		ACHIEVED	NOT ACHIEVED	NOT APPLICABLE	BASELI NE
Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies					
SO 1	Relief Outcome: National and sub national institutions and disaster prone communities have systematically responded to disasters, reduced impacts of disasters, and improved food security.				
	Households with at least borderline food consumption score (FCS) 90% ¹	61	88 ¹³⁹	85	93
	Coping strategies index (CSI) average scores are less than baseline (mean)	-	10.7	15.6	13.2
	Daily average dietary diversity	-			
	Assets depletion strategies	-			
	TSF Outcome: Food-insecure people, in particular women, children and vulnerable groups, will have access to emergency nutrition services.				
SO 1	Recovery rate for malnourished children 6-59 months, target: >75%	65.1	64.4	-	83.2
	Death rate for malnourished children 6-59 months, target: <3%	0.52	0.40	-	1.4
	Defaulter rate for malnourished children 6-59 months and PLW, target: <15%	1.2	1.5	-	1.2
	Proportion of eligible population participating in MAM treatment programme, target: >50%	-			
Prevent acute hunger and invest in disaster preparedness and mitigation measures.					
PSNP Outcome: National and sub-national institutions and disaster-prone communities have systematically reduced disaster risks and improved food security. ¹⁴⁰					
SO 2	Daily average dietary diversity	-			
	Disaster preparedness index ²	-	6	-	6
	Community asset score (CAS), target: 70% of communities have increased average CAS	-	50	-	65
	FCS, original target: >83% of households with acceptable FCS	46	69	57 ¹⁴¹	74
	Average CSI score is lower than the baseline (mean)	-	12.4	13.5	11.5

Source: WFP Ethiopia. 2012h. SPR; WFP Ethiopia. 2013d. CHS; WFP Ethiopia. 2013x. SPR.

Note: Outcome and indicator targets reflect the updated logframe (BR6), with grey-coloured cells representing original programme logframe indicators that cover most of the period covered by the evaluation.

Hyphen=Data not available as of May 2014 or not applicable because indicator is new or activity was not in effect.

¹ This indicator adds acceptable (36%, 57%, 61%, 70% respectively) and borderline (25%, 31%, 24%, 23%) FCS thresholds.

² SPR 2012 & 2013 report this outcome indicator but it is not included in the logframes. Targets unclear as of May 2014.

¹³⁹ According to WFP Ethiopia's 2012 SPR, this increased percentage of relief households in the acceptable threshold of FCS is due to the improved pipeline that allowed for distribution of full food baskets and ration size.

¹⁴⁰ Original logframe includes PSNP outcome indicator for household asset score (60 percent of households with increased average score).

¹⁴¹ According to WFP Ethiopia's 2013 CHS PSNP, "The deterioration of the FCS in the second round could be explained by the reduced terms of trade for herds, coupled with the increase in food crop prices, which have negatively affected the PSNP beneficiaries' ability to diversify their food consumption pattern."

121. Relief achievements. The objective of the relief component is to help emergency-affected households to reduce the impact of shocks by addressing their food needs. Feedback from government officials, relief beneficiaries and other stakeholders indicates that WFP has successfully assisted millions of people facing food insecurity under this PRRO. Outcome monitoring data show an improvement in the acceptable range of the FCS among relief beneficiaries from 36 percent of households at the start of the project to 70 percent of households as of November 2013. The percentage of households with borderline and poor FCSs has decreased. The average CSI for relief beneficiaries increased to 13.2 from 10.7 in the fourteen months leading up to November 2013. This is due to delays in the provision of assistance following the late release of the HRD after the *belg* and the *meher* seasons, and delays in WFP deliveries due to port congestion and a shortage of trucks.¹⁴² The ET concludes that relief has improved the food security of beneficiary households; however gains may be tenuous if coping strategies are not reduced.

122. In the second half of 2013, the relief cash assistance reached a higher number of beneficiaries than planned, though with a substantially lower amount due to delays (just 34.7 percent of planned). As previously noted, an assessment by WFP Ethiopia in 2013 states that: "Economic analysis confirms that cash or voucher transfers usually constitute a cost-efficient transfer mechanism in Ethiopia, compared to in-kind food aid. However substantial seasonal changes in local food prices, exchange rate variations and volatile international market conditions have a strong bearing on the cost efficiency of cash or voucher transfers."¹⁴³ The report also notes that a major shock to markets such as drought may make in-kind assistance more cost-effective than cash in the short run. The efficiency of cash transfers also relies on efficient bureaucratic and banking systems that can ensure timely transfers.

123. Discussion related to achieving this objective must consider the issue of how relief and PSNP target vulnerable families. First, there is not a consistent distinction between vulnerable families that meet the criteria for either the relief or PSNP components: a major donor contends that 80 percent of relief goes to PSNP *woredas* and that relief is used to address chronically food insecure areas not covered by PSNP and those suffering acute food insecurity.¹⁴⁴ Another targeting issue relates to the contingency fund that PSNP *woredas* have in their budgets to enable them to respond quickly to local crises, once relief needs exceed the resources allocated by the federal government, local officials can use the contingency fund to provide additional relief. Since only 300 of the 700 *woredas* in Ethiopia are covered by PSNP, this affects the spatial targeting of relief. As a result, many of the same *woredas* receive relief year after year, and relief assistance addresses acute episodes of food insecurity within chronically food insecure areas not covered by the PSNP. To address this, the government plans to convert relief areas to PSNP and to expand PSNP coverage to up to two million people.¹⁴⁵ The ET agrees that areas now receiving relief on a continuing basis should be priority candidates for inclusion under the PSNP expansion, which also relates to the cost-effectiveness discussion below. This is a specific area in which WFP can contribute to higher-level development results pursued in the country.

124. It is substantially more expensive to have a relief programme compared to a community-asset building approach like PSNP. If the PRRO move is consistent with

¹⁴² WFP Ethiopia. 2013x. SPR.

¹⁴³ WFP. 2013k. Markets and Cash Transfers in Ethiopia.

¹⁴⁴ Donor meeting, Addis Ababa, January 2014.

¹⁴⁵ Key informant interviews with donors and stakeholders, Addis Ababa, January 2014.

evidence from the DFID studies¹⁴⁶ and moves more toward productive safety net programming, the cost savings are significant. It makes sense to the ET that if the government is to expand PSNP and cut back on relief, there should be a value-for-money benefit.

125. Other factors affecting equitable and effective distribution for this component have been the misuse and diversion of food relief due to theft, pilferage, unauthorised payment of wages to community-level food handlers, and the offloading of food at unauthorised destinations by transporters who claim that FDPs are inaccessible. WFP documents all food misuse at local and federal levels, and reports that diversion declined from 11 percent in previous years to below one percent in 2012-2013. Numerous government officials cited the example of officials in one *woreda* being convicted and sentenced to long term imprisonment for a large-scale food diversion. DRMFSS stated that this is a major change in how diversion is handled – that as a result food deliveries are more secure—and hopes that people will learn from this incident. The government is launching a media campaign to raise awareness in communities about food diversions to encourage people to report abuses of relief assistance. Donors differ in their opinion about the ongoing level of diversion; some think that diversion is limited due to WFP’s systems and monitors, while others contend that substantial diversion is taking place in areas where WFP is not able to monitor consistently. With limited monitoring capacity, particularly in insecure areas, WFP is unable to absolutely certify its figures on losses in certain zones.

126. TSF achievements. TSF outcomes have contributed to achieving the nutrition objective and are in line with the SPHERE standards for humanitarian response.¹⁴⁷ More than 90 percent of the target population is within less than one day’s walk from the programme site for dry ration supplementary feeding. TSF coverage is over 50 percent in rural areas. The proportion of discharges from TSF programmes due to death is less than three percent, recovery is over 75 percent (when TSF distributions are received every month), and default is less than 15 percent.¹⁴⁸ All TSF outcome indicator targets have been met, though issues of cost-effectiveness and accuracy should qualify these results; the results are met at the potential financial cost of including children who were screened as false positives and potentially due to an inflated number of children at follow-up who did not have a low MUAC at the initial screening.

127. Short-term changes in nutritional status for children are easily measured by observing how MUAC changes over time and weight monitoring once children are in the programme. It is more difficult to measure the results of TSF for women. Positive medium- to long-term outcomes for women are expected based on numerous studies that show that improving the lives of children starting in-utero can improve child development and adult health status.¹⁴⁹ Additionally, supplemental food for children is an appropriate response to MAM, but other educational messages are needed to help ensure the non-recurrence of malnutrition.¹⁵⁰ FGDs with TSF participants in Dire Dawa, Fedish, and Jijiga indicated that beneficiaries consumed the CSB and oil

¹⁴⁶ Venton, C.C. et al. 2012.

¹⁴⁷ The Sphere Project. 2011.

¹⁴⁸ Data provided to the ET by WFP NES, Addis Ababa.

¹⁴⁹ Black, M.M. and Deway, K.G. 2014.

¹⁵⁰ Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, MoARD (EWRD/DRMFSS) and Ministry of Health (ENCU). 2012. Guidelines for the Management of Moderate Acute Malnutrition in Ethiopia.

using the recipe provided in a manner that would provide sufficient supplemental energy and nutrients to children and women.

128. A major concern regarding TSF is the sharing of a beneficiary's ration within the household. Each participant – whether a child under or over two years or a PLW – is provided the same amount of supplemental food even though the energy and nutrient requirements vary across these groups. Although these concerns were presented to the ET, the option of providing different amounts of food rations could be explored. Providing different amounts of rations may highlight that a child's ration is important for the child and the women's ration is important for the women – a differentiation that if understood, may increase chances that the rations are applied to the intended beneficiary. However, differences in food distribution among families could lead to conflict within a *kebele*. Furthermore, this approach may result in more time needed to distribute the food because different amounts will have to be measured out at the *kebele* level, and determining the amount of food to be sent to *woredas* would be more difficult.

129. Worth noting is that readmission rates to OTP were decreasing, but it is not clear if this was due specifically to TSF or because the prevalence of severe acute malnutrition (SAM) was decreasing nationally, since there appears to be less malnutrition in 2013 compared with the past two years.¹⁵¹ The coordination of TSF with CHD allows children to also receive anthelmintic medication and vitamin A. This combination of programmatic activities can increase the impact of TSF.

130. Partners and donors, even those who did not directly provide financial support to TSF and who had withdrawn funds in the past, consistently stated that TSF was an important part of the continuum of food security programmes in Ethiopia, which contributes to higher-level results pursued by WFP in the country.¹⁵² ¹⁵³ WFP also contributes to higher-level development and humanitarian planning through participation in the multi-agency nutrition task force (MANTF) that works to coordinate and provide greater synergy with higher level development and humanitarian activities.

131. PSNP achievements. The ET notes three main achievements toward the WFP PSNP programme objective. PSNP has helped communities build infrastructure that contributes to social services (e.g., school buildings) and more appropriately manage natural resources (e.g., via water management dikes). Second, food transfers are predictable, providing consistent access to food in chronically vulnerable areas. Third, the main outcome indicators (CAS and FCS) have shown improvement since baseline, though they did not reach the target. Weaknesses in the reporting system and difficulty attributing some measurements to projects lead to challenges in determining some achievements of PRRO outputs and outcomes. For example, a comment in the 2013 CHS report regarding PSNP beneficiaries registering deteriorated FCS in the second round was that it could be explained by accumulating factors: specifically, reduced terms of trades for herds and increased food crop prices. Both purportedly had a negative effect on the ability of PSNP beneficiaries to diversify their consumption pattern, yet this cannot be independently verified. Based on the numbers reported in the SPR and CHS reports, it appears that the PRRO PSNP has nearly missed the targets for the original indicators and has not achieved the proposed outcomes for CAS and FCS.

¹⁵¹ UNICEF, WFP and FAO. 2013. Joint UN Food Security and Nutrition Analysis, Ethiopia Update.

¹⁵² ET discussions with the ECHO, CIDA, and comments made during the final debriefing.

¹⁵³ ECHO. 2012. Evaluation of DG ECHO's actions in Ethiopia, Final Report.

132. While the outcomes show that some progress toward food security has been achieved, the ET agrees with findings from an IFPRI study¹⁵⁴ carried out in 2013 in the Afar and Somali regions, which indicates PSNP has had no significant impact on the food security of the beneficiaries. In terms of increasing livestock holdings, it found that participation in public works raises livestock holdings by a large amount in Afar (6.6 animals per household over the two years monitored) but has no impact on livestock holdings in the Somali region. The increases in Afar may be explained by poor targeting, whereby wealthier households are allowed to participate. When the sample is restricted to the poorest households, the food gap is reduced by 0.5 months in Afar and Somali, and participation in the public works programme raises livestock holdings for the poor by 14-27 percent. The pattern of the results among the poorer households, smaller impacts on food security, and higher impacts on assets are consistent with the findings from initial evaluations of PSNP in the highlands. These impacts could be explained by the fact that beneficiaries who are uncertain how long they will receive PSNP benefits save a larger portion of their transfers than had been expected.

133. Although PSNP graduation was never part of the PRRO objectives, it will be difficult for WFP to obtain medium- to long-term changes in peoples' lives to graduate them from PSNP¹⁵⁵ in the Somali and Afar regions because there are few complementary programmes available in these regions to increase income flows. The government acknowledges that graduation in pastoral areas will be delayed because there is no HABP, which is not promoted in these areas because there are few financial institutions to support it. Even when other development programmes are taken into account, food security initiatives similar to HABP only exist in 10 of 32 *woredas* in pastoral areas. Currently WFP does not link to these development programmes in any of the *woredas*.¹⁵⁶ By contrast, there are a far greater number of development projects in the highlands that PSNP can link with to facilitate graduation.

134. The contingency fund¹⁵⁷ and risk financing mechanism (RFM) are designed to scale up transfers in the event of sudden shocks in PSNP *woredas*. These mechanisms were triggered during the 2011 drought and many believe that these mechanisms averted a major humanitarian crisis. If the contingency fund and the RFM are to be used to replace humanitarian relief in the newly designed PSNP, the ET advises that these funding mechanisms be significantly reviewed and redesigned. In the lowland pastoral areas, several key informants stated that there is a need for the contingency fund and RFM almost every year, but the RFM is not triggered because the early warning information used to release the funds is not available or not credible.¹⁵⁸ Early warning capacity is a significant challenge in the region and the ET considers WFP to be in a good position to support these efforts. Other problems associated with the contingency fund include delays in delivery and transferring funds from the region to the *woredas*, and a shortage of warehouses for storing

¹⁵⁴ Hodinott, J. 2013.

¹⁵⁵ That is, skills such as the ability to cover 12 months of food needs and the ability to manage short term shocks with three months of food stocks.

¹⁵⁶ Other development interventions in the Somali region include CCI, USAID PRIME, ADB Resilience Programme, World Bank/IFAD PCDP, USAID PLI, and other NGO programmes.

¹⁵⁷ The Risk Financing Mechanisms are clear scaling up measures within the PSNP to deal with the first order levels of emerging hazards followed by the triggering of a cash reserve (the Contingency Fund) to quickly release funds against agreed contingency plans. The challenge is to develop a suite of interventions that can be triggered early enough to save lives and livelihoods.

¹⁵⁸ The early warning system in the Somali region was run by Save the Children for 15 years until recently. Mercy Corps is expected to take on this function but it is not clear whether this is up and running yet.

food.¹⁵⁹ Challenges with the fund most often cited by *woreda* officials include inadequate experience, awareness, and knowledge of contingency budgets; and staff turnover.

135. Finally, the PRRO PSNP is a critical component of higher-level development and humanitarian programmes pursued by WFP and partners in the country. In the past year, WFP has continued to build good working relationships with partners in the Somali region and especially with the regional government. WFP actively engages in transparent communication and tries to involve government partners as well as United Nations and NGO partners in assessments, surveys, review meetings, joint monitoring and provision of resources.¹⁶⁰ WFP acknowledges that more effort is needed to keep the regional presidents' offices engaged in the food security and livelihood efforts within the region. WFP is part of most Humanitarian Coordination Forums and co-chairs the H&S committee meetings. The ET thinks WFP needs to be more engaged in the development of the new PSNP, highlighting lessons learned from MERET in new PSNP NRM efforts.

Key findings and conclusions

Results of the operation: The level of attainment of the planned outputs was high for beneficiaries reached; however, the quantity of food and cash delivered against planned was low. WFP has been responsive to the need for improvement in targeting and beneficiary selection. The PRRO continues to face logistical and bureaucratic challenges regarding timely delivery of assistance, and to some extent, to meeting beneficiary targets. The efficiency of the operation could be improved in all three components.

- Overall, outputs related to total number of beneficiaries reached appear to be high; however, the ET questions the reliability of some of the output data.
- The cash pilot was successful, though processes could be incorporated to improve the efficiency and timeliness of disbursements.
- Government staff who collect early warning information are not responsible for analysing the data. This is a missed opportunity for more accurate and timely early warning. It is an area in which WFP can advocate with the government to improve the efficiency of the early warning system by training and empowering *woreda* and *kebele* staff to carry out analysis.
- It is not known what impact ration dilution due to sharing has on households. There is a need to study the impact of cultural sharing on household food insecurity and on relationships within the community, as well as on coping strategies employed by beneficiary and non-beneficiary households in areas receiving food relief.
- The early warning system is not working well in the lowland areas due to a shift in donor funding to a new project whose early warning system is not yet operational. Additional attention on the part of WFP will be required to strengthen the monitoring system for measuring change, including the disaster risk profiles.
- The ET considers the time lag between assessment and distribution for nutrition activities unacceptable. Timeliness is also hindered by pipeline breaks. Strategies for prepositioning and securely storing food should be explored.
- WFP has been responsive to concerns regarding inclusion error in TSF by initiating the pilot programme in 44 *woredas*. A targeting strategy is missing for lowland areas, including the Somali region, and for different livelihood groups. Utilisation of

¹⁵⁹ Lind, J., et al. 2013.

¹⁶⁰ WFP Ethiopia. 2014d. Sub-office Brief.

existing mobile clinics to coordinate TSF in these areas should be explored. The continuous screening system should be closely examined for the unintended consequence of not reaching the most vulnerable people.

- PSNP has improved the frequency and mean number of payments, yet predictability of transfers is still a critical factor. WFP could also be more involved in the trainings on targeting (PIM) guidelines.
- Public works constructed under PSNP are adjusted to consider the lowland context. This was not the case at the beginning of the project where highland models were used. The timeliness of PSNP dispatches is problematic, as is the targeting.
- Women are actively participating in all three parts of the programme. Based on FGD findings, women are very enthusiastic about the public works that they are building.

Key indicators that have been met for each component, based on a review of the outcome results at endline, include the following:

- Overall, the food consumption target has been achieved for relief households; however, coping strategies have increased since baseline due to logistics delays, food diversion, and lack of resources. TSF met all three outcome indicators for recovery, death and defaulter rates, in line with the SPHERE standards. For PSNP, reduced CSI of participants was achieved; progress was made toward improving community assets and food consumption for participants, though outcome targets were not met. The ET finds that conclusions on the impact of disaster preparedness at the household level cannot be made based on these outcome indicators.
- In light of the high cost of relief and the overlap in some areas between relief and PSNP households, such areas are priority for inclusion in the expanded PSNP. The cost-effectiveness of that shift needs to be considered.
- TSF has improved nutritional status among the most vulnerable populations in the PRRO coverage area, though at the potential cost of including children screened as false positives. The impact of TSF could be enhanced by providing food supplementation and educational messages, and further linking to CHD.
- Community FGDs indicate that food preparation and subsequent consumption provide adequate nutrition for women and children. However all food programmes need to reflect on how to adjust appropriately to account for food-sharing within the household. One option is to test base TSF allotments on the nutrient requirements of different groups and determine whether this affects food sharing.
- TSF may reach more vulnerable children through better coordination with relief and PSNP components. Informants indicate that TSF is an important part of the continuum of food security programmes.
- Despite WFP's limited impact on higher-level development in the Somali and Afar regions, the operation plays a significant role in reducing hunger for a significant portion of the population due to its size and strategic role. Funding mechanisms in the newly designed PSNP will need to be significantly reviewed, as with the early warning capacity; WFP is in a good position to support such efforts.
- There are challenges in transferring lessons learned from highlands public works models to lowland pastoral regions, which also have cultural dimensions that make it difficult to target beneficiaries. Taking these factors into account, WFP has made good progress in improving the logistics and food delivery through H&S, and has created some public works that improve natural resource management and access to social services. Nevertheless, evidence from the PRRO for the impact of public works on food and livelihood security and disaster preparedness is minimal.

2.3. Factors Affecting the Results

136. This section addresses the third evaluation question, “Why and how has the operation produced the observed results?”¹⁶¹ It discusses the main structural internal issues and the external factors that affected the operation’s performance. Internal factors include WFP systems for staffing, capacity building, M&E, logistics, internal synergy and learning. External factors relate to government systems and policies, partnerships, and the ability of WFP to be strategically positioned for advocacy.

Internal factors

137. Resources and staffing. Overall, funding and staffing levels for the PRRO are low. As an example, the NES at WFP that oversees the TSF programme consists of a head of the section, the team leader for TSF, and deputy team leader.¹⁶² Staff members are assigned to specific regions and cover all WFP programmes in their regions. The ET considers this is an understaffed office given the range of ongoing nutrition programmes in WFP Ethiopia. Similarly, in order to support both the relief and PSNP work effectively, the necessary human resources must be in place. Currently WFP does not have enough staff to monitor the delivery of the programme, nor to provide capacity building to government counterparts, which is discussed below.

138. Capacity building. This report has already identified a number of areas where government capacity is not sufficient. Although WFP has carried out considerable training to government counterparts on food management and on targeting in all programme areas, no capacity building strategy or benchmark measurements are in place to determine whether institutional capacity has been strengthened. WFP intended to synthesise the proposed capacity development aspects of its 2012 WFP Country Strategy into a coherent, systems-based design that considered capacities relevant to policy and planning, implementation, knowledge and learning, public awareness and resource mobilisation levels. Because this did not happen as planned, the ET thinks that WFP needs to develop a comprehensive capacity building strategy and benchmark capacity measurements in the near future.

139. Regarding relief and PSNP, discussion of staffing and capacity of government staff are found in Section 2.3.2.

140. Regarding TSF, food distribution agents (FDAs) focus on how to prepare CSB. During FGDs, TSF beneficiaries were able to properly report how to prepare CSB, which suggests that the FDAs are well trained.¹⁶³ This is consistent with a previous report on an analysis of TSF during a regular monitoring session in North Wollo. However, FDAs provide minimal nutrition education and focus on only a few messages. FDAs can help build capacity within the MOH by being part of training for HEWs, which is currently ad hoc by the regional health bureau or WFP staff. The HEWs deliver a set of 16 health messages that focus on sanitation, disease prevention and control, family health, and health education (with one message on nutrition). With joint efforts in training and nutrition messaging, FDAs could focus more on how to incorporate CSB into an overall diet. They could also promote the proper amount and timing of complementary foods for infants and the amount and diversity

¹⁶¹ WFP (OEV). 2013. Terms of Reference.

¹⁶² NES includes: Jutta Neitzel, Head Nutrition and Education Section; Tayech Yimer, Team Leader TSF; and Kemeria Barsenga, Programme Assistant and Deputy Team Leader, TSF

¹⁶³ Four focus groups were conducted by the ET in North Shewa, Dire Dawa, and Jijiga areas with more than 30 women who either had children that received TSF and/or were beneficiaries themselves.

of food that is needed for a nutritious diet for younger children and for PLW. According to CO staff, in the future TSF will be part of a bi-annual integrated refresher training of HEWs.

141. M&E and quality assurance. WFP staff state that they recognise that M&E information should be used to inform management decisions within WFP, to inform programme design, BRs, and SPRs, and to guide government decision-making where possible. The 2012 WFP Country Strategy states that WFP will work closely with the government to further enhance its accountability framework, including developing an evaluation framework. Currently, M&E systems implemented by WFP do not meet these objectives.

142. WFP Ethiopia has been using its Action-Based Monitoring system to monitor deliverables and programme processes. In the last year, WFP Ethiopia has begun aligning its M&E system with the WFP corporate M&E system. However there has not been systematic staff training on how to synthesise and analyse data, which would allow staff to produce M&E reports that are evidence-based. This lack of analytical capability means that data are being collected that do not feed into lessons learned, are not being used effectively to feed into programme design, and are not being used to mobilise resources from donors.¹⁶⁴ The ET concludes that WFP needs to strengthen its M&E capacity.

143. Monitoring and reporting is delayed because WFP field monitors have to travel long distances to reach distribution points. In addition, there is a need for more monitors to cover all regions: during 2012, only 60 percent of the food distributions were monitored.¹⁶⁵ Due to distance and understaffing, it still takes more than a month to get distribution reports. These delays are also due to delays by the government partners responsible for producing the reports. These findings were supported by donors interviewed during the evaluation, who stated that monitoring of food deliveries is poor.

144. Overall, while there is a desire to improve monitoring within WFP, WFP has limited monitoring capacity. While it is exploring alternate monitoring approaches, an increase in staff levels of field monitors across all components is needed to adequately oversee an operation of this size. If funding is a constraint for increasing staff, WFP can focus on fewer, more representative sites using a systematic random sampling technique such as lot quality assurance sampling (LQAS). This will enable monitors to spend more time at representative sites instead of visiting a large number of sites. Another alternative is to rely on NGO partners to help with the monitoring. Given the scale, complexity and geographic spread of the programme, either more staff or a more efficient way of using existing staff needs to be deployed.

145. Another possibility for improving M&E lies in the new computer tablets that are being used to start monitoring operations. The ET believes that depending on the software applications used for data collection, the tablets provide an opportunity for monitors to collect more information and could be used as part of the ongoing quality assurance system such as LQAS for sampling *woredas*.

146. Local community-based organisations could also be trained to carry out monitoring and distribution supervision, which would also make use of local capacities. However it should be noted that a significant rotation of the same people among government, WFP, and NGO employment was observed by the ET in Somali

¹⁶⁴ WFP Ethiopia. 2014d. Sub-office Brief.

¹⁶⁵ WFP Ethiopia. 2013i. H&S Operations- Memo.

region: the same local expert may occupy a similar post in several different agencies over the space of his or her career. While this can help preserve local expertise and enhance collaboration, this rotation of the same personnel among a few organisations can also impede staff ability to independently monitor activities of former colleagues and employers.

147. Detailed discussion of M&E related to the nutrition measurements and monitoring processes of TSF is found in Annex 8.

148. Logistics. WFP has instituted two major improvements to logistics operations in recent years. The first is the H&S delivery system, designed to meet the logistical challenges of delivering food to approximately 650 FDPs in the Somali region amid insecurity, poor road conditions, and widely scattered and remote communities. H&S established warehouses and logistics hubs in strategic locations to reduce the time it takes to deliver food to beneficiaries, uses private transporters to deliver food from hubs to end user points, and coordinates joint committees of government and WFP staff to oversee operations. Donors and government officials in Somali region acknowledge that the new system has greatly improved the timeliness of distributions, improved targeting, and reduced misuse. An external evaluation of H&S was conducted in 2013 but the results were not available at the time of this evaluation.

149. While there have been significant improvements to logistics in the Somali region, WFP acknowledges that challenges remain. This includes a challenge of timely reporting of distribution figures due to the limited number of WFP field monitors and difficulty in retaining staff, as previously discussed. Another challenge is insufficient capacity among local transporters to take food from WFP hubs to distribution points, and sometimes reluctance to go into insecure or remote areas. Truckers make more money with bigger consignments and do not want to go to remote food insecure areas. WFP addressed this by providing a fleet of 20 trucks to Somali region to cover gaps in local transport capacity. If this solution is successful, WFP will eventually transfer management to the regional government. Delayed deliveries due to congestion at Djibouti port from January to March/April remain a problem; WFP is addressing this by pre-positioning under the Forward Purchase Facility and constructing additional storage capacity at the port. In addition, WFP borrows food from the Emergency Food Reserve Authority during food delivery delays. Given the challenges of transport, monitoring, and staff retention, the ET believes that WFP needs to take a more systematic approach to strengthening the food management system operated by the government in the Somali region .

150. At the community level, the effect of weak food management systems has been repeat deliveries with little information about timing. For example, *kebele* officials in one location in Somali region reported that while they received six rounds of relief in a year, there might be a gap of two months between rounds and then they would receive two months of rations at once without advance communication. *Kebele* officials reported to the ET that they did not know when relief would be delayed.

151. The second initiative to improve logistics is the FMIP,¹⁶⁶ which WFP and DRMFSS began in 2010 to improve systems and skills in managing the supply chain that delivers food relief. FMIP has four major components. One component already implemented is a streamlined tendering process for transport, which is cited by WFP, government and field staff as effectively reducing transport delays. A second

¹⁶⁶ CO advises that FMIP is for government food systems and does not encapsulate WFP H&S areas.

component is a commodity management procedure manual – the first such guide specifically designed for government operations, with a comprehensive focus on field-level staff such as warehouse managers and storekeepers. The manual has been vetted by government and donors and is being translated into Amharic. A third component is a professional-level 18-month course in supply chain management that issues an internationally recognised certificate. The first tranche, with over 30 students from eight government agencies and NGOs, graduated in February 2014. The course is delivered by local institutes and private firms and is expected to build institutional and human capacity over the long term. The training programmes will be linked to the fourth component, a Commodity Allocation and Tracking System (CATS) that is due to be fully operational by mid-2014. The system is expected to help pipeline management, as it supports more accurate reporting.

152. For TSF in particular, prepositioning food is integral to the efficiency of TSF implementation,^{167 168} there is a need to provide food to vulnerable populations in a way that decreases the time lag between assessment and food distribution. Even a small delay is not acceptable, as rations should be available when a child is identified as being malnourished. Continuous distribution of food should decrease this time lag, as food can be pre-placed in anticipation of how many beneficiaries will require food - a figure that can be adjusted upward to account for additions. Any unused ration can be used during the second month of distribution or for additional children identified as malnourished during a clinic visit.

153. One consideration with prepositioning food is that appropriate storage space may not be easily available at the *kebele* level. In the TSF pilot, local partners had to develop innovative methods to store supplemental foods at the *kebele* level.¹⁶⁹ Storage locations include health posts, schools, and agricultural centres. However, not all of these areas are suitable for storing food and there is controversy regarding the appropriateness of using health posts for food storage.

154. Transportation of food rations is conducted separately for TSF and not always integrated with the distribution of food for relief or PSNP.¹⁷⁰ This is a larger structural question of the best way to do procurement—whether it should be based on the integrated programme or the type of food rations. The development of new guidelines in this respect is inhibited by donors’ regulations with regard to food transported together by multiple donors, which impede efficient and effective logistics and procurement of supplemental food.

155. Synergies and learning. The PRRO is clearly linked and complementary to other WFP interventions in the country, for the goal of developing Ethiopia’s capacity for resilience building.¹⁷¹ As mentioned throughout this report, MERET has had a significant influence on the NRM approach used in PSNP. Another clear synergy exists as WFP procures food directly from smallholder farmers through the Purchase for Progress (P4P) programme, which meant 28,000 mt of maize from P4P farmers in 2012 was contracted for delivery to food insecure households in the country. The school feeding programme is complementary to TSF in reaching vulnerable children that are school-aged and no longer meet the TSF target. The ET feels that the refugee programme could be better integrated with PRRO activities, particularly as the cash initiatives for both relief and the refugee response continue and expand.

¹⁶⁷ WFP. 2013c. Managing the Supply Chain of Specialized Nutrition Food.

¹⁶⁸ Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and Humanitarian Partners (Joint Appeal). 2013. HRD.

¹⁶⁹ ET site visit discussions at SNPPR and Somali Region, discussions with UNICEF and WFP staff.

¹⁷⁰ ET discussions with WFP logistics and procurement staff.

¹⁷¹ WFP Ethiopia. 2012i. APR.

Strengthened internal synergy combined with resilience strategy would work toward the goal.

156. Overall, the ET advocates that WFP be more strategic in the way it approaches its work in lowland pastoral areas.¹⁷² Such a strategy would take into account the timing of vulnerability assessments (being sensitive to seasonality – particularly of grazing resources – in lowland areas), the types of livelihood systems in the area, the types of public works that are appropriate to lowland areas, the management of food resources in the lowland context, and targeting approaches. More effort is needed to integrate the lessons learned from MERET in the approach to public works. Finally, the lowland strategy needs to use a resilience lens to show how the various components of the PRRO feed into strengthening the absorptive, adaptive, and transformative capacities of households and communities to enable them to more effectively manage shocks and stresses.

External factors

157. Government systems and staffing. Staff turnover in the government is high, and while the ET could not obtain actual numbers, the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Office in one region estimates it to be 10-15 percent annually. This undercuts efficiency in food distribution management and in early warning systems as trained staff leave. New staff lack specific training for their jobs and there is no systematic way of identifying the gaps in knowledge that result. In one *woreda* visited by the ET, the focal person for early warning had received no training in five years and other personnel were not aware of the new food aid targeting guidelines. The lack of funding for training in early warning stems in part from a government policy decision to separate food security and early warning functions. The food security staff that use the early warning data collected by other *woreda* staff have funds for capacity building while early warning staff do not. DRMFSS plans to do comprehensive needs assessment of capacity building needs. There is a potential opportunity here for WFP to advocate for more funds to be allocated for consistent training of early warning and food management staff.

158. Related to PSNP, there is a lack of capacity of the Bureau of Agriculture to monitor the programme effectively due to a lack of human resources, lack of vehicles, and high staff turnover at the *woreda* level.¹⁷³ Although WFP is doing a lot of training around food aid management, the quality of the cascaded training is not adequate at lower levels. Capacity is also negatively affected by high government staff turnover at all levels, which creates capacity gaps and disrupts programme continuity. In addition, the lack of communication infrastructure has made two-way communication between zonal and regional levels and the *woredas* very difficult.

159. Partnerships. WFP partners with DRMFSS for relief and PSNP, and for TSF there is a complementary partnership between WFP, UNICEF, the MOH and DRMFSS. WFP holds tripartite partnerships with NGOs with the critical field presence necessary for the TSF distributions, screenings, and monitoring. The ET heard comments that NGOs have the benefit of being able to add food security activities faster and with more ease and can integrate behaviour change into programming; such partnerships are an important expansion of WFP capacity. With UNICEF's focus on SAM and identifying hotspots there is a clear division of responsibilities, yet the ET found a problem related to differences in coverage.

¹⁷² WFP started to develop such a strategy two years ago but never completed the task.

¹⁷³ WFP key informant interviews, January 2014.

UNICEF coverage is different than WFP, thus, some SAM cases in non-UNICEF areas must be referred to government hospitals. Findings from key informant interviews varied by region, with mixed perspectives as to whether that partnership is functioning effectively.

160. Strategic positioning and advocacy. In early 2013, the government indicated its intention to continue the key elements of the FSP including the next generation of PSNP/HABP, and its openness to incorporating new ideas and approaches. The new programme will be designed to be in line with the government's National Social Protection Policy, the DRM Policy, and the Climate Resilience Green Economy Strategy. The ET believes that WFP needs to be engaged with this policy dialogue.

161. Key informant interviews indicate that WFP Ethiopia is well respected by government at all levels, by NGOs, and by donors for its ability to consistently deliver relief assistance under very difficult conditions. WFP is considered responsive to requests and provides valued training, supervision, and monitoring. Government officials recognise that they can continue to learn from WFP on food aid management. WFP meets regularly with government and other partners at the regional level and is a valued and trusted partner.

162. Several donors would like to see WFP advocate more vigorously with the government to address weaknesses in the relief program, though they acknowledge this carries some risk. Donors also stated that they would like to see WFP contribute more robust support to a unified donor voice on key issues. Finally, some donors would like to see WFP play a more active bridging role in bringing together the humanitarian and development communities in Ethiopia, a role that WFP is uniquely positioned to play. As part of this, donors and the ET assert that WFP should support the expansion of PSNP and its related contingency fund mechanisms to cover chronically food insecure areas, and ensure that humanitarian response resources are used only for acute transitory food insecurity.

163. Sustainability: According to the SPR 2013, WFP with government partners provided multiple trainings and workshops related to the new relief targeting guidelines, the primacy of food transfer, and the risks and challenges associated with implementation in pastoral contexts. For the TSF, government capacity is reportedly built through training, refreshers, and monitoring; WFP provided motorcycles and computers to improve monitoring data collection. Yet, in light of government and partner capacity at this time, it is not clear that the PSNP and TSF activities in the Somali and Afar regions would be sustained without WFP assistance.

Key findings and conclusions

Factors affecting the results: The main internal factors affecting the operation's performance include low levels of WFP staffing in relation to resources managed; inadequate capacity building strategy for establishing sustainable government food management capacity; the lack of a strong M&E system; ongoing improvements and challenges in food logistics; the lack of development of a lowland pastoral PSNP strategy; and the need to enhance WFP strategic positioning in future PSNP programming.

- Overall, the funding and staffing levels for the PRRO are low.
- WFP provides considerable support to capacity development of government in all programme areas, but needs to develop an overall capacity building strategy and performance outcome indicators that demonstrate that institutional capacity has

been established or strengthened.

- Although WFP Ethiopia has strong M&E staff, M&E systems should still be improved to strengthen monitoring capacity, report on outcomes, and strengthen programme design. WFP needs to expand the number of field monitoring staff in line with the size of the programme, rely on NGO partners to support where possible, and adopt a method of systematically sampling fewer, but representative sites.
- WFP should set up an M&E framework to measure relief outcomes using information gathered at *woreda* and *kebele* levels and to compare early warning data to the results of disaster response in order to gauge the effectiveness of the response.
- Increased coordination between the government, health bureau, and WFP monitoring staff may provide improved data for nutrition oversight. Capacity building can be enhanced by coordinating training and nutrition education of WFP and MOH workers. The ET also suggests that the NES, which provides oversight to the TSF programme, is understaffed.
- The ET advises various adjustments to the monitoring and quality control systems, including re-assessing the MUAC measurement used for TSF screening, developing an integrated data system, and closing specific gaps in monitoring data.
- Logistics and the timely delivery of food have improved significantly in the past several years but now should be institutionalised in government structures. As such, there is a need for a coherent food management strategy that combines the efforts under H&S, FMIP, and other initiatives to strengthen government capacity, thereby addressing transport, timeliness, and monitoring issues.
- WFP can be more strategic with a lowland strategy tailored to pastoral areas. Points to address include when assessments are done, how transfers are targeted, and how public works are designed; the strategy could be further informed by the MERET experience.
- The lowland strategy needs to use a resilience lens to show how the various components of the PRRO strengthen the absorptive, adaptive, and transformative capacities of households and communities to enable them to manage shocks and stresses more effectively.

The main external factors affecting the operation's performance and sustainability necessitate WFP advocacy related to government staffing and policy development.

- WFP can potentially advocate for more funding levels to enable consistent training and improve retention of early warning and food management personnel. WFP should highlight the benefits of the new pilot approach to TSF to encourage more donor support from those that stopped funding the programme in the past.
- WFP needs to advocate for government and development partner efforts to harmonise the early warning tools being used by the government.
- WFP needs to be engaged with the policy dialogue of the next generation of PSNP and PRRO operations and ensure the integration of the key lessons learned from the MERET programme.
- It is not clear at this time that PSNP and TSP activities carried out in the Somali and Afar regions would be sustained without WFP assistance.

3. Conclusions and Recommendations

3.1. Overall Assessment

164. The box below summarises the key findings and conclusions of the evaluation. It is organised by relevance, coherence, and appropriateness; efficiency; and effectiveness and corresponding sub-topics.

Relevance, Coherence and Appropriateness

Aligning with peoples' needs: The PRRO is relevant to the needs of the food insecure and emergency-affected households in the areas where WFP works. WFP has successfully aided shock-affected households through relief programming, individuals suffering from MAM through TSF, and chronically food-insecure households through PSNP. WFP support to Afar and Somali regions for PSNP is very appropriate because these are regions where markets are weak and crop production is limited – a context where food transfers make sense. However the targeting criteria in lowland areas for PSNP and TSF should be improved; early warning data needs to be collected and analysed at the woreda and kebele levels; and the timing of the relief assessment (HRD) needs adjustment to provide a more accurate analysis of that context.

Alignment with policy and programme context: The PRRO components align with the strategic priorities of WFP at the global and CO levels, with government policy priorities, and with the priorities of the Ethiopian UNDAF. WFP's engagement in PSNP supports the government's efforts to reduce the emergency caseload through more consistent transfers to increase the food security of vulnerable households. TSF is externally coherent with government nutrition policies and mandates and with UNICEF and NGO programming.

Overall relevance: The PRRO is very well aligned with the goals and strategies of the Government of Ethiopia to address food insecurity and malnutrition of vulnerable populations. WFP could do a better job of strengthening programme linkages and applying a resilience strategy, especially in lowland pastoral areas, by ensuring that food security initiatives are linked to poverty reduction, disaster response, and disaster risk reduction.

Efficiency

Efficiency of implementation: For relief and nutrition activities, the time lag between assessment and distribution is too long. Timeliness of TSF is also hindered by pipeline breaks. The seasonality of the HRD assessment is not appropriate for lowland areas. WFP should advocate for a separate assessment for lowland areas to more accurately assess relief needs. The timeliness of dispatches is also problematic in the PSNP public works distributions and in the government systems through which relief cash transfers are made.

Targeting strategy: The PSNP is poorly targeted in the Afar and Somali regions. This leads to high inclusion and exclusion error. A high proportion of wealthy households is included and many poor households are excluded. Part of this targeting problem relates to resource sharing, a characteristic feature of Somali communities. It is not known what impact ration dilution due to cultural sharing has on households. Inclusion error is also a problem with TSF in all regions, and the measurements used for screening should be re-assessed. The pilot TSP programme represents an effective response to inclusion error. The early warning system and assessment results are not always consistent with regional beneficiary numbers. This is an issue that requires greater advocacy by WFP in collaboration with other agencies. The early warning system is not working well in the lowland areas; shocks need to be identified more quickly.

Changes in efficiency resulting from internal and external factors: WFP has taken steps to improve efficiency by introducing H&S for the Somali region and through work carried out through FMIP. Efficiency is still negatively affected by fact that WFP is operating in one of the most difficult environments in Ethiopia (Somali and Afar) where government capacity is weak, few opportunities exist to link with other development initiatives, there is

on-going conflict and little infrastructure, and limited opportunities exist to link to markets or invest in agricultural production.

Funding and staffing levels for the PRRO are low. The ET feels that the TSF work is understaffed given the range of ongoing nutrition programmes. The human resources to monitor both the relief and PSNP work and to build the necessary capacity of government staff are insufficient. Similarly, WFP M&E systems are weak due to inadequate staffing and capacity. M&E systems need to incorporate outcome monitoring. The number of field monitors needs to be increased in line with the size of the programme, with more monitoring support from NGO partners.

Cost of the operation: The difficult operating environment makes the programme very costly. The resources needed to meet relief targets are insufficient. The TSF work is underfunded and pipeline breaks are common. Productive safety net approaches that build community assets are more cost-effective; some relief areas should be prioritised by including them in an expanded PSNP.

Effectiveness

Expected changes in targeted populations: The outputs related to overall total number of beneficiaries reached appear to be high, although the quantity of food and cash distributed appears to be low; the ET questions this inconsistency and the data quality. Some key outcome indicator targets have been reached for each component. While food consumption has improved for relief households, coping strategies have increased since baseline due to logistics delays, diversion, and lack of resources. TSF met all outcome indicators, in line with the SPHERE standards, and community FGDs indicated that food preparation and consumption are indeed providing adequate nutrition for women and children. In the PSNP component, coping strategies decreased and progress was made toward improving community assets and food consumption; however, the ET found that conclusions on the impact of household disaster preparedness cannot be made based on current data. TSF could reach more vulnerable children through better coordination with beneficiaries of the relief and PSNP components.

Impact: The PRRO has significantly contributed to WFP objectives in Ethiopia, reduced hunger in some of the most difficult contexts, and has a strategic role in higher-level development programmes. Relief rations have enabled households to maintain their assets and overcome significant food shortages. TSF has addressed malnutrition among the most vulnerable populations. However, enhanced impact for TSF would include food supplementation and educational messages. In terms of PSNP, impact studies carried out by IFPRI indicate that significant impact on food and livelihood security is still minimal. This is partially because programmes implemented in the Somali region do not have an opportunity to link to complementary income-enhancing programmes in most of the *woredas* where PSNP is operating.

Sustainability and connectedness: It is not clear at this time whether the PSNP and TSF activities in Somali and Afar regions would be sustained without WFP assistance. Similarly, the H&S programme has not built enough capacity within the government to enable it to take over the operation. For this reason, a capacity building strategy, such as the current one for increasing government capacity to manage a fleet of trucks, must be put in place to institutionalise the government food management system.

Gender: WFP has done a good job of incorporating gender considerations into the PRRO: women are actively participating in all programme components. This is apparent in targeting, in women's substantial involvement in distribution and oversight committees, and in women's active engagement in determining the types of public works that are built through PSNP activities.

3.2. Recommendations

Strategic recommendations

165. WFP needs to design a strategy and a strategic, results-based framework for its capacity development activities. This should include outcome indicators consistent with corporate indicators to measure institutional performance, and a commitment to monitor the indicators on a regular basis so that the results are available for programme management. The strategy should be supported by a systematic assessment of capacity-building needs at all levels instead of providing training on the basis of requests from partners.

166. WFP should develop a lowland pastoral strategy better suited to pastoralist livelihoods. The strategy would focus on the timing of assessments, types of livelihood systems in the area, public works projects appropriate for lowland areas, management of food resources in the lowland context, and targeting of communities rather than individuals.

167. WFP needs to develop a comprehensive approach to building resilience capacity in its programme. The approach should focus on where WFP can strengthen absorptive capacity (the ability to minimise exposure to shocks and stresses through preventative measures), adaptive capacity (making proactive and informed choices about alternative livelihood strategies based on an understanding of changing conditions), and transformative capacity (the governance mechanisms, policies/regulations, infrastructure, community networks, and formal and informal social protection mechanisms that constitute the enabling environment for systemic change). All of these components are currently in the PRRO; early warning support, community asset building in watersheds, and TSF are designed to prevent and mitigate risk (absorptive capacity), making livelihood systems more viable through public works; the P4P work linking smallholders to markets strengthens adaptive capacity. The work on food management systems and targeting guidelines, strengthening commodity management, and strengthening DRM and FS policies supports transformative capacity.

Operational recommendations: short-term (one year)

168. Advocate with donors who stopped funding TSF by informing them of programme improvements. Demonstrate to donors how TSF is moving forward and how it can be more integrated into the government health system.

169. The NNP is creating a better coordinated anthropometric database. This system should increase the use of existing M&E data on nutrition at *kebele*, *woreda*, zonal, regional, and national levels. Integrate the data into the MOH system so that TSF, OTP, and stabilisation centres are within one system. These systems need to break down the demographic characteristics of the beneficiaries so that children under two years of age become a distinct group for monitoring. Outcome measures for PLW need to be developed.¹⁷⁴ This is an important improvement that will allow for a coordinated and sensitive surveillance system.

170. Scale up the TSF programming approach using the monthly distribution method that was pilot tested – provided that its evaluation determines that it is

¹⁷⁴ TSF staff have reported that changes in MUAC are already being monitored in PLW, though not reported. While the CO follows the corporate M&E guidance for indicators, the ET does not see this as sufficient and advises that it is important to measure changes in other anthropometric indicators, such as BMI, weight for age, and weight for height to determine undernutrition and wasting.

feasible and has had a positive impact. Ensure that when it is scaled up it retains the robust M&E being used during the pilot programme.

171. Strengthen M&E systems for all components as WFP works closely with the government to further enhance its accountability framework. This should include developing an outcome evaluation framework for structures built through relief interventions, and for measuring the effectiveness of community-based NRM in reducing disaster risks.

Operational recommendations: medium-term (two-three years)

172. Further strengthen government capacity for emergency response. This involves a number of specific measures, most importantly that WFP strengthen its own monitoring systems, increase the field staff it needs to adequately monitor and report on a timely basis, and rely on NGO partners for more monitoring support. WFP should ensure that *woreda* and *kebele*/FDC level staff are trained in and able to implement the new relief targeting guidelines. The gains in logistics and supply chain management should be tracked to assess whether system improvements function as intended (e.g., the new transport tendering process, the CATS), that is, to help government implementing partners make the food supply chain more efficient and thus contribute to achievement of WFP outcomes.

173. Design a systematic approach to food management by building on the gains made under the FMIP and H&S, and develop a comprehensive food management system that can be institutionalised.

174. Integrate the natural resource technical expertise of WFP into the PSNP more explicitly: first, set up an NRM technical support unit. Second, engage WFP NRM technical staff in the planning of the new PSNP strategy. Third, use PSNP resources in the PRRO to support NRM staff to engage in PSNP technical support in Somalia and Afar regions.

Annexes

List of annexes

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Annex 7: TSF pilot study model

Annex 8: TSF monitoring and quality control findings

Annex 1: Terms of reference

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EVALUATION QUALITY ASSURANCE SYSTEM

Office Of Evaluation

Measuring Results, Sharing Lessons

FINAL, 15 SEPT 2013

TERMS OF REFERENCE - OPERATION EVALUATION
ETHIOPIA – PRRO 200290 – RESPONDING TO HUMANITARIAN
CRISES AND ENHANCING RESILIENCE TO FOOD INSECURITY
(2012 – 2013)

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1. Introduction

1. These Terms of Reference (TOR) are for the evaluation of the Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO) 200290 – Responding to humanitarian crises and enhancing resilience to food insecurity in Ethiopia. This evaluation is commissioned by the WFP Office of Evaluation (OEV) and will take place from November 2013 to May 2014. In line with WFP’s outsourced approach for operations evaluations (OpEvs), the evaluation will be managed and conducted by an external evaluation company amongst those having a long-term agreement with WFP for operations evaluations.
2. These TOR were prepared by the OEV focal point based on an initial document review and consultation with stakeholders and following a standard template. The purpose of the TOR is twofold: 1) to provide key information to the company selected for the evaluation and to guide the company’s Evaluation Manager and Team throughout the evaluation process; and 2) to provide key information to stakeholders about the proposed evaluation.
3. The TOR will be finalised based on comments received on the draft version and on the agreement reached with the selected company. The evaluation shall be conducted in conformity with the TOR.

2. Reasons for the Evaluation

2.1. Rationale

4. In the context of renewed corporate emphasis on providing evidence and accountability for results, WFP has committed to increase evaluation coverage of operations and mandated OEV to commission 12 Operations Evaluations (OpEvs) in 2013; 24 in 2014 and up to 30 in 2015.
5. Operations to be evaluated are selected based on utility and risk criteria.¹ From a shortlist of operations meeting these criteria prepared by OEV, the Regional Bureau (RB) has selected, in consultation with the Country Office (CO), PRRO 200290 in Ethiopia for an independent evaluation. In particular, the evaluation has been timed to ensure that findings can feed into future decisions on programme design. The current PRRO is due to end in June 2015, in tandem with the current phase of the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP), therefore, the Country Office will be re-designing a new PRRO phase in 2014, encompassing a new PSNP which will in turn impact humanitarian relief assistance since there are initial discussions to include all chronically food insecure caseloads (i.e. those that have received relief for the previous three or five years) in a new PSNP. These developments will then impact the parameters of a new PRRO post-June 2015.

2.2. Objectives

6. This evaluation serves the dual and mutually reinforcing objectives of accountability and learning:
 - **Accountability** – The evaluation will assess and report on the performance and results of the operation. A management response to the evaluation recommendations will be prepared.
 - **Learning** – The evaluation will determine the reasons why certain results occurred or not to draw lessons, derive good practices and pointers for learning. It will provide evidence-based

¹ The utility criteria looked both at the timeliness of the evaluation given the operation’s cycle and the coverage of recent/planned evaluations. The risk criteria was based on a classification and risk ranking of WFP COs taking into consideration a wide range of risk factors, including operational and external factors as well as COs’ internal control self-assessments.

findings to inform operational and strategic decision-making. Findings will be actively disseminated and lessons will be incorporated into relevant lesson sharing systems.

2.3. Stakeholders and Users

7. **Stakeholders.** A number of stakeholders both inside and outside of WFP have interests in the results of the evaluation and many of these will be asked to play a role in the evaluation process. Table one below provides a preliminary stakeholders' analysis, which will be deepened by the evaluation team in the inception package.

Table 1: Preliminary stakeholders' analysis

Stakeholders	Interest in the evaluation
INTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS	
Country Office (CO)	Responsible for the country level planning and operations implementation, the CO is the primary stakeholder of this evaluation. It has a direct stake in the evaluation and an interest in learning from experience to inform decision-making. It is also called upon to account internally as well as to its beneficiaries, partners for the performance and results of its operation.
Regional Bureau (RB) in Nairobi	Responsible for both oversight of COs and technical guidance and support, the RB management has an interest in an independent account of the operational performance as well as in learning from the evaluation findings to apply this learning to follow-on projects in Ethiopia as well as other country offices.
Office of Evaluation (OEV)	OEV is responsible for commissioning OpEvs over 2013-2015. As these evaluations follow a new outsourced approach, OEV has a stake in ensuring that this approach is effective in delivering quality, useful and credible evaluations.
WFP Executive Board (EB)	The WFP governing body has an interest in being informed about the effectiveness of WFP operations. This evaluation will not be presented to the EB but its findings will feed into an annual synthesis of all OpEvs, which will be presented to the EB at its November session.
EXTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS	
Beneficiaries	As the ultimate recipients of food assistance, beneficiaries have a stake in WFP determining whether its assistance is appropriate and effective. As such, the level of participation in the evaluation of women, men, boys and girls from different groups will be determined and their respective perspectives will be sought.
Government	The Government has a direct interest in knowing whether WFP activities in the country are aligned with its priorities, harmonised with the action of other partners and meet the expected results. Issues related to capacity development, handover and sustainability will be of particular interest. Various Ministries are partners in the design and implementation of WFP activities.
UN Country team	The UNCT's harmonized action should contribute to the realisation of the government developmental objectives. It has therefore an interest in ensuring that WFP operation is effective in contributing to the UN concerted efforts. UNICEF is also a direct partner of WFP for the TSF component.
NGOs	NGOs are WFP's partners for the implementation of some activities while at the same time having their own interventions. The results of the evaluation might affect future implementation modalities, strategic orientations and partnerships.
Donors	WFP operations are voluntarily funded by a number of donors. They have an interest in knowing whether their funds have been spent efficiently and if WFP's work has been effective and contributed to their own strategies and programmes.

8. **Users.** The primary users of this evaluation will be:

- The CO and the Government (and its partners) in decision-making related notably to programme implementation and/or design, country strategy and partnerships.
- Given RB's core functions of strategic guidance, programme support and oversight, the RB is also expected to use the evaluation findings as well as the office responsible for support to RBs under the Chief Operating Officer.
- OEV will use the evaluation findings to feed into an annual synthesis report of all OpEvs and will reflect upon the evaluation process to refine its OpEv approach, as required.

3. Subject of the Evaluation

9. Ethiopia has a fast-growing economy but is one of the world's poorest countries: it ranked 157th of 169 countries on the 2010 human development index, with 23 million people living below the national poverty line. The country is prone to weather-related shocks. Hazards include drought, floods, disease, conflict, economic shocks and climate change. Vulnerability to food insecurity is predominantly rural and linked to topography, land degradation and variability of rainfall: 15 million rural people are vulnerable to food insecurity, and acute malnutrition among children frequently reaches "serious" and "critical" levels in these areas.
10. WFP's intervention in Ethiopia is based on its country strategy (2012–2015) and the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (2012–2015), which support the Government's transformation agenda and its programmes focused on preventing food crises and enhancing resilience.
11. PRRO 200290 builds on its predecessor (PRRO 106650) and aims to enhance community resilience through its relief, Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) and targeted supplementary feeding (TSF) components. The national relief programme focuses on disaster response assisting acute food insecurity in either natural or man-made emergencies. The Productive safety net programme nationwide focuses on providing a predictable transfer for 7.5 million chronically food insecure households. The TSF component addresses moderate acute malnutrition in the most food-insecure districts. The PRRO also supports capacity development of the government through the Food Management Improvement Programme (FMIP) in enhancing the transparency and efficiency of its supply chain. FMIP is building systems coupled with manuals and trainings sessions to support the handover of commodity management. Additional WFP operations in the country include a Country Programme (2012 – 2015) and a PRRO to provide food assistance for Somali, Eritrean and Sudanese refugees. There are two Special Operations, the Djibouti compound and the provision of humanitarian air services.
12. The PRRO 200290 project document including the project logframe, related amendments (Budget revisions) and the latest resource situation are available by clicking [here](#)². The key characteristics of the operation are outlined in table two below, while table three summarizes the operation's specific objectives and corresponding activities:

Table 2: Key characteristics of the operation

Approval	The operation was approved by the EB In November 2011.	
Duration	Initial: 2 years (1 January 2012 to 31 December 2013)	Revised: 3.5 years (until 30/06/2015 (NB – 18 months extension in process)
Amendments	There have been 5 amendments (Budget Revisions BRs) to the initial operation and a sixth one is expected to be approved by the EB in November 2013. The revised data presented takes BR 6 into account. The various BRs resulted in either an increase or a decrease of beneficiary figures and related requirements depending on the assessed needs. In addition, BR 3 introduced	

² From WFP.org – Countries – Ethiopia – Operations or <http://www.wfp.org/node/3449/3342/130746>

	additional capacity development activities; BR 4 introduced cash as a transfer modality for 190,000 relief beneficiaries. Finally BR 6 will extend the operation by 18 months and increase the number of cash beneficiaries to 300,000 and introduce cash transfers for 100,000 PSNP beneficiaries.		
Planned beneficiaries	<u>Initial:</u> 3,977,000 (yearly maximum)	<u>Revised:</u> 4,382,000 (yearly maximum)	
Planned food requirements	<u>Initial:</u> (in-kind) 1,026,793 mt of food (cash) nil	<u>Revised:</u> (in-kind) 1,872,400 mt of food (cash) 45.8 million US\$	
Planned % of beneficiaries by component yearly		% of planned total food requirement by	
<p>Detailed description: A pie chart with three segments. The largest segment is blue, labeled 'Relief, 50%'. The second largest is green, labeled 'PSNP 34%'. The smallest is red, labeled 'TSF 21%'.</p>		<p>Detailed description: A pie chart with three segments. The largest segment is blue, labeled 'Relief 65%'. The second largest is green, labeled 'PSNP 32%'. The smallest is red, labeled 'TSF, 3%'.</p>	
Source: Project document			
Main Partners	<u>Government:</u> Ministry of Health, Disaster risk management and the Ministry of Agriculture.	<u>UN:</u> UNICEF	<u>NGOs:</u> 10 international NGO partners
US \$ requirements	<u>Initial:</u> US\$815 million	<u>Revised:</u> US\$1,488 million (BR 6)	
Contribution level (by August 2013)	The operation received US\$608 million; 62% of the total US\$ requirements. (*)		
Top five donors (by August 2013)	USA (24% of total donations); U.K (20%); Canada (17%) Germany (5%) and Japan (3%).		

(*) percentages based on pre-BR6 requirement figures.

Table 3: Objectives and activities

	Corporate Strategic Objectives*	Operation specific objectives	Activities
MDG1, 3, 4, 5 and 7	Strategic Objective 1	Help emergency-affected households to reduce the impact of shocks by addressing their food needs. Support the most vulnerable and food-insecure households in reducing or stabilizing moderate acute malnutrition among children under 5 and pregnant and lactating women.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> General food distributions (GFD) Targeted supplementary feeding (TSF) Food for Work. Capacity development on disaster preparedness and response. FMIP
	Strategic Objective 2	Support PSNP households and communities in improving food security, resilience and recovery from disaster.	

4. Evaluation Approach

4.1. Scope

13. **Scope.** The evaluation will cover PRRO 200290 including all activities and processes related to its formulation, implementation, resourcing, monitoring, and evaluation and reporting relevant to answer the evaluation questions. As such, the period covered by this evaluation spans from the PRRO 200290 formulation (mid-2011) until end 2013 when the start of the evaluation.

4.2. Evaluation Questions

14. The evaluation will address the following three questions:

Question 1: How appropriate is the operation? Areas for analysis will include the extent to which the objectives, targeting, choice of activities and of transfer modalities:

- Are appropriate to the needs of the food insecure population.
- Contribute to the realisation of the government objectives and seek complementarity with the interventions of relevant humanitarian and development partners as well as with other CO interventions in the country, if relevant.
- Are coherent with WFP strategies, policies and normative guidance.

Question 2: What are the results of the operation? While ensuring that differences in benefits between women, men, boys and girls from different groups are considered, the evaluation will analyse:

- the level of attainment of the planned outputs;
- the extent to which the outputs led to the realisation of the operation objectives as well as to unintended effects;
- how different activities of the operation dovetail and are synergetic with other WFP operations and with what other actors are doing to contribute to the overriding WFP objective in the country.
- The efficiency of the operation and the likelihood that the benefits will continue after the end of the operation;

Question 3: Why and how has the operation produced the observed results? The evaluation should generate insights into the main internal and external factors that caused the observed changes and affected how results were achieved. The inquiry is likely to focus, amongst others, on:

- Internally: the processes, systems and tools in place to support the operation design, implementation, monitoring/evaluation and reporting; the governance structure and institutional arrangements (including issues related to staffing, capacity and technical backstopping from RB/HQ); the partnership and coordination arrangements; etc.
- Externally: the external operating environment; the funding climate; external incentives and pressures; etc.

Throughout the assessment and in making recommendations, the team will give special consideration to the concerns of the evaluation users, notably of the CO, and ensure to include forward considerations to inform project design of the next phase of the PRRO giving due consideration to the evolving context (redesign of the PSNP, the new National Nutrition, DRM and social protection policies) and to possible programming options (notably for nutrition) in pastoral areas.

4.3 Evaluability Assessment

15. Evaluability is the extent to which an activity or a programme can be evaluated in a reliable and credible fashion. The below provides a preliminary evaluability assessment, which will be deepened by the evaluation team in the inception package. The team will notably critically assess data availability and take evaluability limitations into consideration in its choice of evaluation methods.
16. In answering question one, the team will be able to rely on assessment reports, minutes from the project review committee, the project document and logframe, evaluations of the previous PRRO as well as internal reviews (E.g. a review of TSF is planned to take place shortly) as well as documents related to government and interventions from other actors. In addition, the team will review relevant WFP strategies, policies and normative guidance.
17. For question two the operation has been designed in line with the corporate results framework (SRF) and selected outputs, outcomes and targets are recorded in the logframe. Monitoring reports as well as annual standard project reports (SPRs) detail achievement of outputs and outcomes thus making them evaluable against the stated objectives.
18. However, answering question two is likely to pose some challenges owing in part to: i) the absence of baseline data for the activities, which will need to be reconstructed using findings from various assessment reports and ii) data gaps in relation to efficiency.
19. For question three, the team members will have access to some institutional planning documents and is likely to elicit further information from key informant interviews.

4.4. Methodology

20. The methodology will be designed by the evaluation team during the inception phase. It should:
 - Employ relevant internationally agreed evaluation criteria including those of relevance, coherence (internal and external), coverage, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, sustainability (or connectedness for emergency operations);
 - Use applicable standards (e.g. SPHERE standards);
 - Demonstrate impartiality and lack of biases by relying on a cross-section of information sources (e.g. stakeholder groups, including beneficiaries, etc.) and using mixed methods (e.g. quantitative, qualitative, participatory) to ensure triangulation of information through a variety of means. In particular, the sampling technique to select field visit sites will need to demonstrate impartiality and participatory methods will be emphasised with the main stakeholders, including the CO.
 - Be geared towards addressing the key evaluation questions taking into account the evaluability challenges, the budget and timing constraints;
 - Be based on an analysis of the logic model of the operation and on a thorough stakeholders analysis;
 - Be synthesised in an evaluation matrix, which should be used as the key organizing tool for the evaluation.

4.5. Quality Assurance

21. OEV's Evaluation Quality Assurance System (EQAS) defines the quality standards expected from this evaluation and sets out processes with in-built steps for quality assurance, templates for evaluation products and checklists for the review thereof. It is based on the UNEG norms and standards and good practice of the international evaluation community (DAC and ALNAP) and aims to ensure that the evaluation process and products conform to best practice and meet OEV's quality standards. EQAS does not interfere with the views and independence of the evaluation team.

22. At the start of the evaluation, OEV will orient the evaluation manager on EQAS and share related documents. EQAS should be systematically applied to this evaluation and the evaluation manager will be responsible to ensure that the evaluation progresses in line with its process steps and to conduct a rigorous quality control of the evaluation products ahead of their submission to WFP.
23. The evaluation company is ultimately responsible for the quality of the evaluation products. If the expected standards are not met, the evaluation company will, at its own expense, make the necessary amendments to bring the evaluation products to the required quality level.
24. OEV will also subject the evaluation report to an external post-hoc quality assurance review to report independently on the quality, credibility and utility of the evaluation in line with evaluation norms and standards.

5. Phases and deliverables

25. Table four below highlights the main activities of the evaluation, which will unfold in five phases.

Table 4: Activities, deliverables and timeline by evaluation phase

Entity responsible	Activities	Key dates
PHASE 1 – PREPARATION		
OEV	Desk review, consultation and preparation of TOR	August
CO / RB	Stakeholders comments on TOR	1-13 Sep 2013
OEV	❖ Final TOR	15 Sep 2013
OEV	Evaluation company selection and contracting	1 Oct 2013
PHASE 2 – INCEPTION		
OEV	Management hand-over to the EM (including briefing on EQAS, expectations and requirements for the evaluation).	5 – 12 Nov 2013
EM	Evaluation team briefing on EQAS, expectations and requirements for the evaluation.	12 – 15 Nov 2013
ET	Desk review, initial consultation with the CO/RB, drafting of the Inception Package (including methodology and evaluation mission planning)	15 – 30 Nov 2013
EM	Quality Assurance of the Inception Package	30 Nov 2013
EM	❖ Final Inception Package	13 Dec 2013
PHASE 3 – EVALUATION MISSION		
CO	Preparation of the evaluation mission (including setting up meetings, arranging field visits, etc)	Dec 2013
ET	Introductory briefing	6 Jan 2014
ET	Interviews with key internal and external stakeholders, project site visits, etc	6 -24 Jan 2014
ET	Exit debriefing / workshop	24 Jan 2014
ET	❖ Aide memoire	24 Jan 2014
PHASE 4 – REPORTING		
ET	Evaluation Report drafting	24 Jan – 28 Feb
EM	Quality Assurance of draft Evaluation Report	3 – 8 March
EM	❖ Draft Evaluation Report	8 March
CO/RB/OEV	Stakeholders comments on Evaluation Report	10-22 March
EM	Comments matrix	25 – 27 March
ET	Revision of the Evaluation Report	28 – 8 April

EM	❖ Final Evaluation Report	10 April 2014
EM	❖ Evaluation brief	15 April 2014
PHASE 5 – FOLLOW-UP		
CO/RB	Preparation of the Management Response	10 – 25 April
CO/RB	❖ Management Response	25 April
OEV	Post-hoc Quality Assurance	TBD
OEV	Publication of findings and integration of findings into OEV's lessons learning tools.	Upon completion
OEV	Preparation of annual synthesis of operations evaluations.	June 2014

26. **Deliverables.** The evaluation company will be responsible for producing as per the timeline presented in table 4 above the following deliverables in line with the EQAS guidance and following the required templates:

- **Inception package (IP)** – This package focuses on methodological and planning aspects and will be considered the operational plan of the evaluation. It will present a preliminary analysis of the context and of the operation and present the evaluation methodology articulated around a deepened evaluability and stakeholders' analysis; an evaluation matrix; and the sampling technique and data collection tools. It will also present the division of tasks amongst team members as well as a detailed timeline for stakeholders' consultation.
- **Aide memoire** – This document (powerpoint presentation) will present the initial analysis from the data stemming from the desk review and evaluation mission and will support the exit-briefing at the end of the evaluation phase.
- **Evaluation report (ER)** – The evaluation report will present the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation. Findings should be evidence-based and relevant to the evaluation questions. Data will be disaggregated by sex and the evaluation findings and conclusions will highlight differences in performance and results of the operation for different beneficiary groups as appropriate. There should be a logical flow from findings to conclusions and from conclusions to recommendations. Recommendations will be provided on what changes can be made to enhance the achievements of objectives. Recommendations will be limited in number, actionable and targeted to the relevant users. These will form the basis of the WFP management response to the evaluation.
- **Evaluation brief** – A two-page brief of the evaluation will summarise the evaluation report and serve to enhance dissemination of its main findings.

27. These deliverables will be drafted in English. The evaluation TOR, report, management response and brief will be public and posted on the WFP External Website (wfp.org/evaluation). The other evaluation products (including the inception package and the aide memoire) will be kept internal.

6. Organization of the Evaluation

6.1 Outsourced approach

28. Under the outsourced approach to OpEvs, the evaluation is commissioned by OEV but will be managed and conducted by an external evaluation company having a long-term agreement (LTA) with WFP for operations evaluation services.

29. The company will provide an evaluation manager (EM) and an independent evaluation team (ET) in line with the LTA. To ensure a rigorous review of evaluation deliverables, the evaluation manager should in no circumstances be part of the evaluation team.

30. The company, the evaluation manager and the evaluation team members will not have been involved in the design, implementation or M&E of the operation nor have other conflicts of interest or bias on the subject. They will act impartially and respect the [code of conduct of the profession](#).

31. Given the evaluation learning objective, the evaluation manager and team will promote a participatory evaluation process. Yet, to safeguard the independence of the evaluation, WFP staff will not be part of the evaluation team or participate in meetings with external stakeholders if the evaluation team deems that their presence could bias the responses.

6.2 Evaluation Management

32. The evaluation will be managed by the company's Evaluation Manager for OpEvs (as per LTA). The EM will be responsible to manage within the given budget the evaluation process in line with EQAS and the expectations spelt out in these TOR and to deliver timely evaluation products meeting the OEV standards. In particular, the EM will:

- Mobilise and hire the evaluation team and provide administrative backstopping (contracts, visas, travel arrangements, consultants' payments, invoices to WFP, etc).
- Act as the main interlocutor between WFP stakeholders and the ET throughout the evaluation and generally facilitate communication and promote the participatory evaluation process.
- Support the evaluation team by orienting members on WFP, EQAS and the evaluation requirements; providing them with relevant documentation and generally advising on all aspects of the evaluation to ensure that the evaluation team is able to conduct its work.
- Ensure that the evaluation proceeds in line with EQAS, the norms and standards and code of conduct of the profession and that quality standards and deadlines are met.
- Ensure that a rigorous and objective quality check of all evaluation products is conducted ahead of submission to WFP. This quality check will be documented and an assessment of the extent to which quality standards are met will be provided to WFP.
- Provide feedback on the evaluation process as part of a 360 assessment of the evaluation.

6.3 Evaluation Conduct

33. The evaluation team will conduct the evaluation under the direction of the evaluation manager. The team will be hired by the company following agreement with OEV on its composition.

34. **Team composition.** The evaluation team is expected to include 3-5 members, including the team leader. It should be composed of women and men of mixed cultural backgrounds including Ethiopian nationals. The need for interpreters should be considered.

35. **Team competencies.** The team will be multi-disciplinary and include members who together include an appropriate balance of expertise and practical knowledge in:

- Livelihoods, resilience, safety nets, social protection
- Nutrition
- Pastoralist issues
- Capacity development

36. All team members should have strong analytical and communication skills; evaluation experience and familiarity with the country or region.

37. **The Team leader** will have technical expertise in one of the technical areas listed above as well as expertise in designing methodology and data collection tools and demonstrated experience in leading similar evaluations. She/he will also have leadership and communication skills, including a track record of excellent English writing and presentation skills.

38. Her/his primary responsibilities will be: i) defining the evaluation approach and methodology; ii) guiding and managing the team during the evaluation process; iii) leading the evaluation mission and

representing the evaluation team in meetings with stakeholders; iv) drafting and revising, as required, the inception package, aide memoire and evaluation report in line with EQAS; and v) provide feedback to OEV on the evaluation process as part of a 360 assessment of the evaluation.

39. **The team members** will bring together a complementary combination of the technical expertise required and have a track record of written work on similar assignments.

40. Team members will: i) contribute to the design of the evaluation methodology in their area of expertise based on a document review; ii) conduct field work; iii) participate in team meetings and meetings with stakeholders; iv) contribute to the drafting and revision of the evaluation products in their technical area(s) and v) provide feedback on the evaluation process as part of a 360 assessment of the evaluation.

7. Roles and Responsibilities of WFP Stakeholders

41. **The Country Office.** The CO management will be responsible to:

- Assign a focal point for the evaluation to liaise with the OEV focal point during the preparation phase and with the company evaluation manager thereafter. Hakan Tongul, head of Programme will be the CO focal point for this evaluation.
- Provide the evaluation manager and team with documentation and information necessary to the evaluation; facilitate the team's contacts with local stakeholders; set up meetings, field visits and the exit briefing; provide logistic support during the fieldwork; and arrange for interpretation, if required.
- Participate in a number of discussions with the evaluation team on the evaluation design and on the operation, its performance and results. In particular, the CO should participate in the evaluation team briefing and debriefing (possibly done in the form of a workshop) and in various teleconferences with the evaluation manager and team on the evaluation products.
- Comment on the TORs and the evaluation report.
- Prepare a management response to the evaluation.
- Provide feedback to OEV on the evaluation process as part of a 360 assessment of the evaluation.

42. **The Regional Bureau.** The RB management will be responsible to:

- Assign a focal point for the evaluation to liaise with the OEV focal point during the preparation phase and with the company evaluation manager thereafter, as required. Marianne Ward, Regional Programme Advisor, will be the RB focal point for this evaluation.
- Participate in a number of discussions with the evaluation team on the evaluation design and on the operation, its performance and results. In particular, the RB should participate in the evaluation team debriefing (possibly done in the form of a workshop) and in various teleconferences with the evaluation manager and team on the evaluation products.
- Provide comments on the TORs and the evaluation report.
- Coordinate the management response to the evaluation and track the implementation of the recommendations.
- Provide feedback to OEV on the evaluation process as part of a 360 assessment of the evaluation.

43. **Headquarters.** Some HQ divisions might, as relevant, be asked to discuss WFP strategies, policies or systems in their area of responsibility and to comment on the evaluation TOR and report. These include: Operations Department (OM), Policy and Programme Innovation Division (OSZ), Emergency Preparedness and Response (OMEP), Procurement Division (OSP), Logistics Division (OSL), Government Partnership Division (PGG).

44. The Office of Evaluation. OEV is responsible for commissioning the evaluation and Claire Conan, senior Evaluation Officer is the OEV focal point. OEV's responsibilities include to:

- Set up the evaluation including drafting the TOR in consultation with concerned stakeholders; select and contract the external evaluation company; and facilitate the initial communications between the WFP stakeholders and the external evaluation company.
- Enable the company to deliver a quality process and report by providing them with the EQAS documents including process guidance and quality checklists as well as orient the evaluation manager on WFP policies, strategies, processes and systems as they relate to the operation being evaluated.
- Comment on, and approve, the evaluation report.
- Submit the evaluation report to an external post-hoc quality assurance process to independently report on the quality, credibility and utility of the evaluation and provide feedback to the evaluation company accordingly.
- Publish the final evaluation report (together with its quality assessment) on the WFP public website and incorporate findings into an annual synthesis report, which will be presented to WFP's Executive Board for consideration as well as in other lessons-learning platforms, as relevant.
- Conduct a 360 assessment (based on an e-survey) to gather perceptions about the evaluation process and the quality of the report to be used to revise the approach, as required.

8. Communication and budget

8.1. Communication

45. Issues related to language of the evaluation are noted in sections 6.3 and 5, which also specifies which evaluation products will be made public and how and provides the schedule of debriefing with key stakeholders. Section 7 paragraph 46 describes how findings will be disseminated.

46. To enhance the learning from this evaluation, the evaluation manager and team will also emphasize transparent and open communication with WFP stakeholders. Regular teleconferences and one-on-one telephone conversations between the evaluation manager, team and country office focal point will assist in discussing any arising issues and ensuring a participatory process.

8.2. Budget

47. **Funding source:** The evaluation will be funded in line with the WFP special funding mechanism for Operations Evaluations (Executive Director memo dated October 2012). The cost to be borne by the CO, if applicable, will be established by the WFP Budget & Programming Division (RMB). The total cost of the evaluation will be included in the final TORs

48. **Budget:** The budget will be prepared by the company (using the rates established in the LTA and the corresponding template) and approved by OEV. For the purpose of this evaluation the company will use the management fee corresponding to a large operation.

Please send queries to Claire Conan, OEV at Claire.conan@wfp.org, 00 30 06 65 13 34 80.

Acronyms

BR	Budget Revision
ALNAP	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action
CO	Country Office (WFP)
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
EB	(WFP's) Executive Board
EQAS	Evaluation Quality Assurance System
EM	Evaluation Manager
ER	Evaluation Report
ET	Evaluation Team
GFD	General Food Distribution
HQ	Headquarters (WFP)
IP	Inception Package
LTA	Long-Term Agreement
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
Mt	Metric Ton
OEV	Office of Evaluation (WFP)
OpEv	Operation Evaluation
PSNP	Productive Safety Net Programme
RB	Regional Bureau (WFP)
TOR	Terms of Reference
TSF	Targeted Supplementary Feeding
UN	United Nations
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNEG	United Nations Evaluation Group
WFP	World Food Programme

Annex 2: Fieldwork schedule

Date/Time	Location	Eval. Team	Focus/Purpose	Institution/ persons	Confirmation Status
Wed 8 January 2014					
Arrival in AA					
10:00	WFP premises	ET	WFP Security Briefing	WFP Security	Confirmed
14:00	CD/DCD Room	ET	Meeting with Purnima	DCD office	Confirmed
14:30	WFP Conf room	ET	Meeting with Programme Unit	Programme Team	Confirmed
9-10 Jan					
	Addis Ababa	ET	Interviews with GoE, WFP and partner/donors	FSCD-DRMFSS	
				EWRD-DRMFS	
Thurs 09 Jan					
				CIDA	
14:00	US Embassy	ET	Sarah berry	USAID	Confirmed
14:30	UNOCHA office	ET	Mike McDonagh	UNOCHA	Confirmed
Fri 10 Jan					
10:00	WB office	ET	Matt Hobson & Mudris	World Bank	Confirmed
11:00	ECHO	ET	Johan Heffinck	ECHO	Confirmed
12:00	DFID	ET	Juliette Prodhan & Samuel Tenna	DFID	Confirmed
Sat 11 Jan					
		ET	Visit to Relief Cash Transfers Debre Libanos,	Hussein Hassen (0922309764), Fuad Adem 0911500290 (NSO WFP Staffs)	Confirmed
Sun 12 Jan					
	13:30	DD	Arrive to Dire Dawa		
Mon 13 Jan					
		DD			
(13 Jan- Birth day of the Prophet Mohammed)	7:00-8:00 AM		Breakfast		
	8:00-10:00 AM		Travel to Fedis woreda /Fechatu FDC		
	10:00 AM - 12:00PM		Visit Fechatu TSF/PSNP site/meet beneficiaries & TSF food distribution. Meet woreda officials		
	12:00 PM - 12:30PM		Packed lunch		
	12:30-2:00PM		Visit Belina Areba FDC ,TSF food distribution	Oromiya GoE Save the Children, CARE Eth, Merlin (Together)	
	2:00-2:30PM		Travel to Debene		
	2:30-3:30PM		Visit Debene TSF food distribution		
	3:30-5:00PM		Back to Dire Dawa		
Tues 14 Jan 14					
	7:00– 8:30 AM		Travel to Harar		
	8:30 – 9:30 AM		Discussion with the Health Bureau and DPPO staff		
	9:30 – 11:00 AM		Travel back to Dire Dawa		
	12:00 PM		Travel back to Addis		
	16:30		Meeting on relief & psnp	EWRD & FSCD/ DRMFSS	tbc
Wed 15 Jan					
	Travel to Jijiga by air	ET	Interviews with field WFP sub-office, GoE and partner staff		

Date/Time	Location	Eval. Team	Focus/Purpose	Institution/ persons	Confirmation Status
16-18 Jan	Jijiga and nearby areas up to Deghabur (?)	ET	Continue interviews in Jijiga and other areas. Focusing on relief and PSNP linkages and pastoral TSF issues.	Site to be identified Field GoE and Partners	
19 Jan (Sun) (Ethiopian Epiphany)	Fly back to Addis	ET	ET work on data entry		
Mon 20 Jan	Addis Ababa	ET	Conduct more WFP, GOE and partner interviews	FSCD-DRMFSS EWRD-DRMFSS	
	12:00 PM	ET	Meeting Care Ethiopia	Hilton	Confirmed
	2:00 PM	ET	P4p and FMIP briefing with Mauricio and Stephen	Hilton	Confirmed
	3:30 PM	ET	Meeting with Christopher	Canada Embassy	Confirmed (give a call to Christopher in front of Guard)
	4:30 PM	ET	Ato Berhanu	DRMFSS	Confirmed
	5:00 PM	ET	Save the children (Hilton	Confirmed
Tues 21 Jan	(AM)	ET	Interviews with field WFP sub-office, GoE and partner staff	ENCU-DRMFSS UNICEF	
	8:30 AM	ET	Meeting with Issack, ENCU	DRMFSS, ENCU office.	Confirmed
	10:30 AM		Drive to Hawassa	Process, Regional TSF Coordinator, Regional NCU, Rural Job Creation & Food Security Agency, UNICEF, SC International, BoH	
22-23	SNNPR	ET	Interviews and field visits in the SNNPR to explore the PSNP and relief interface and also nutrition activities	Woredas & Sites: --Mareko Woreda, Shrinto and Koshie sites (25-30km from Buthajira, overnight position) --Kedida Gamela Woreda, Dega Kedida and Abomissa Sites (some 172km from Buthajira, Overnight position) --Lanfuro Woreda, Archuma Gola and Wontie Doye sites (53 to 57 km from Buthajira, overnight position) Field GoE and Partners	
23 Jan 2014	Drive back to Addis Ababa	ET			
Fri 24 Jan					
	8:45-9:45 AM	ET	Meeting with Keton	Keton Office	Confirmed
	10:30 AM	ET	Meeting with Rebecca Samba	Rebecca office	Confirmed
	11:00 AM	ET	Meeting Sylvie Chamois, UNICEF office	UNICEF office (room 516)	Confirmed, vehicle arranged at 10:45

Date/Time	Location	Eval. Team	Focus/Purpose	Institution/ persons	Confirmation Status
	11:00 AM	ET	Teleconference with Klaus.Pfeiffer , KFW.de	+49 69 7431 8985	Confirmed
	12:00 PM	ET	Meeting with Jutta	Jutta Office	Confirmed
	01:00 PM	ET	Meeting with Purnima	Purnima Office	Confirmed (But if there is a change selam will update)
After Noon 24 Jan		ET	Prepare summary presentation		
25-26 Jan	Addis Ababa	ET	Prepare summary presentation		
Mon 27 Jan	Addis Ababa departure	ET	Presentation to WFP and exit interviews	GoE + WFP Partners	
	10:00 AM	ET	Debriefing meeting with Internal Senior Staff	Main conference Room	Confirmed
	3:00 PM	ET	Debriefing meeting with Stakeholders	Main conference Room	Confirmed

Annex 3: List of persons and institutions consulted

List of partners who participated in the preliminary findings debriefing meeting

No.	Name	Title/position	Organisation
1	Asfaw Ayelign	UNHAS	WFP
2	Kiyori Ueno	Donor Relations Officer	WFP
3	Netsanet Teklehaymanot	Relief and PSNP	WFP
4	Jutta Neitzel	Head, Nutrition and Education Section	WFP
5	Sarah McNiece	DRM Coordinator	USAID
6	Jason Taylor	Chief, ALT	USAID
7	Anna Fung	Assistant Desk Officer	German Embassy
8	Mike McDonagh	Head of Office	UNOCHA
9	Suvrat Bafna	Food Technologist	WFP
10	Borja Santos	DRMFSS/Advisor	WFP/DRMFSS
11	Saikar Saha	T2DF-DFAP	Save the Children
12	Segen Tewolde	PO (PSNP DCT)	World Bank
13	Wout Soer		World Bank
14	Tadesse Bekele	N.C	DRMFSS/EWRD
15	Betemariam Gebre	CHD	Merlin
16	Yohannes Regassa	Programme Officer	ECHO
17	Emebet Kebede	Hum Adu	DFID
18	Garth Van't Hul	CD	CARE
19	Abdulkadir Sulaiman	PM specialist	USAID
20	Endale Lomme	PM specialist	USAID
21	Rich Markoushi	CP	CRS
22	John Graham	CD	Save the Children
23	Sylire Chamois	Nutrition specialist	UNICEF
24	Joan Matji	Chief Nutritionist	UNICEF
25	Isaack Manyame	Team leader	ENCU/DRMFSS
26	Purnima Kahyap	Representative Country Director A.I.	WFP
27	Matt Hobson	DCT	World Bank

List of WFP country office staff who participated in the preliminary findings debriefing

No.	Name	Title/position
1	Delphine Dechaux	Head, Donor Relations & Reports
2	Asfaw Ayelign	UNHAS
3	Jutta Neitzel	Head, Nutrition and Education Section
4	Lionel Harra	Head, IT
5	Mechael Denis	Head, Procurement
6	Benjamin Ndyonmgenyi	HR
7	Eric Branckaert	Head, VAM and M&E Team and DRMFSS Activity
8	Keton Sankei	Head, Relief and PSNP Team
9	Stephen Cahill	Head, Logistics
10	John Corpuz	Head, Security
11	Kiyori Ueno	Donor Relations Officer
12	Mulugeta Arusi	Relief
13	Halake Bante	National Programme Officer
14	Yebeltal Fentie	P4P
15	Walid Besan	Logistics
16	Mesele Awake	Public Information
17	Netsanet Teklehaymanot	PSNP & Relief Team
18	Rebecca Ssambo	R'CE Management Analyst
19	Kemeria Barsenga	Programme Assistant and Deputy Team Leader, Targeted Supplementary Feeding
20	Gorgia Testolin	Head, Refugee Section
21	Suvrat Bafna	Food Technologist
22	Purnima Kahyap	Representative Country Director A.I.

List of persons and organisations consulted

No.	Name	Position/Organisation	Location/Place
Oromia Region			
	Moges Eshete	EW, Expert	North Shewa Zone
	Billion	Head, DPPO	North Shewa Zone
	Dechasa Damie	Head, Woreda Health office	East Haraghe Zone, Fedis woreda
	Tigist Lemma	Woreda Education Office	East Haraghe Zone, Fedis woreda
	Rawuf Mohhamed	Woreda DPO	East Haraghe Zone, Fedis woreda
	Dereji Alemayehu	Head, Woreda Water Development	East Haraghe Zone, Fedis woreda
	Fantahun Nurie	Head, WoFED	East Haraghe Zone, Fedis woreda
	Hoywwen Ahemed	Head, Road Construction	East Haraghe Zone, Fedis woreda
	Romedan Adem	Agriculture Office	East Haraghe Zone, Fedis woreda
	Abdulwassie Terfa	Woreda Administrator	East Haraghe Zone, Fedis woreda
	Hangato Mohammed	Deputy Head, Health Bureau	East Hararghe Zone, Harar
	Ahemed Aliye	Head, Family planning	East Hararghe Zone, Harar
	Million	EW Head	East Hararghe Zone, Harar
Somali Region			
	Amin Issa Abubeker	TA, PSNP Food Management (LCRDB)	Jijiga
	Amin Ahemed	TA, PSNP Food Management (LCRDB)	Jijiga
	Abldeklukri Omar	PSNP Coordinator	Jijiga
	Abdilelu Mardi	TSF Coordinator	Jijiga
	Mohammed Fatah	Head, DPPB	Jijiga
	Mohammed Yesuf	WFP, Senior Programme Assistant	Jijiga

	Harabif Dubad	DPPB, TSF Area Coordinator	Jijiga
	Hassen Adem	DPPB, Deputy Head	Jijiga
	Omar Ahemed	EW and Nutrition Coordinator	Jijiga
	Mohammed Hussien	Public Emergency Management	Jijiga
	Beshir Shek	A/head UNICEF	Jijiga
	Ahemd Hussien	ENCU Coordinator	Jijiga
	Ali Eid Abdirhuman	SC, Senior Programme Manager	Jijiga
	Tawfic Adem	SC, Field Office Manager	Jijiga
	Abdirhuman Arab	Mercy Corps	Jijiga
	Muktar Ali	Mercy Corps	Jijiga
SNNPR			
	Wondimu Redi	EW/TSF Regional Coordinator	Hawassa
	Samuel Tegegn	Food Security Coordinator	Hawassa
	Girmay Hailu	Expert, Food Security	Hawassa
	Samuel Negede	Food Security	Hawassa
	Woldu Kahsay	Expert	Hawassa
	Yacob Loha	Expert	Hawassa
	Nigusse Jenkere	Expert, Gender and Social Development	Hawassa
	Tenage Tamire	EW Expert	Sidama Zone, Boricha Woreda
	Babito Batisso	NRM Coordinator	Sidama Zone, Boricha Woreda
	Fekadu Demisse	Food Security Coordinator	Sidama Zone, Boricha Woreda
	Misrak Wegderesign	Food Security Expert	Sidama Zone, Boricha Woreda
	Shimeket Kebede	Food Security/PSNP PW Coordinator	Sidama Zone, Boricha Woreda
	Abebe Amalo	Rural Job Opportunity and Food Security Coordinator	Sidama Zone, Boricha Woreda
	Matews Mete	PW Coordinator	Sidama Zone, Dara Woreda
	Mersha Perro	Food Security Coordinator	Sidama Zone, Dara Woreda
	Dagim Mekonnen	Food Security Expert	Sidama Zone, Dara Woreda
No.	Name	Position/Organisation	Location/Place
	Saba Beyene	EW Expert	Sidama Zone, Dara Woreda
No.	Name	Position/Organisation	Location/Place
	Mifta Nur	Gender, HIV and Social Development Coordinator	Sidama Zone, Dara Woreda
	Mekonnen Dawit	Rural Job Creation and Food Security Coordinator	Sidama Zone, Dara Woreda
	Yesewdeg Alamir	EW Expert	Sidama Zone, Dara Woreda
	Gizat Abera	EW Coordinator	Sidama Zone, Dara Woreda
	Fikreyesus Ashenafi	Head of Agricultural Office	Sidama Zone, Dara Woreda
	Tariku Tadesse	Head of Health Office	Sidama Zone, Dara Woreda
WFP Country Office and Sub Office			
	Mohammed Jundi	National Programme Officer	WFP Dire Dawa SO
	Lishan Tsehay	Filed Monitor Assistant	WFP Dire Dawa SO
	Mekonnen Tekleab	Senior Programme Assistant	WFP Dire Dawa SO
	John Ssemakalu	Head of Office	WFP Dire Dawa SO
	Bashir Ali	Head of Office	WFP Hawassa SO
	Teshome Desalegn	Senior Programme Assistant	WFP Hawassa SO
	Tilahun Genene	Programme Assistant	WFP Hawassa SO
	Irkeno Waserro	MERET focal person	WFP Hawassa SO
	Wondifraw Abebe	Field Monitor Assistant	WFP Hawassa SO
	Abdurihm Garat	Programme Assistant	WFP Jijiga SO
	Mohammed Yesuf	Senior Programme Officer	WFP Jijiga SO
	Sahib Haji	National Programme Officer	WFP Jijiga SO
	Hussen Hassen	Field Monitor Assistant	WFP Nazareth SO

List of partners consulted

Name	Position	Organisation
Isaack Manyame	Team Leader	ENCU/DRMFSS
		CIDA
Tadesse Bekele	N.C.	DRMFSS/EWRD
Birhanu W/Michael	FSCD	DRMSS
Johan Heffinck		ECHO
Yohannes Regassa	Programme Officer	ECHO
Juliette Prodhan		DFID
Samuel Tenna		DFID
Sara Berry		USAID
		USAID
Mike McDonagh	Head of Office	UNOCHA
		UNICEF
		CARE
Matt Hobson	DCT	World Bank
Mudris		World Bank

List of WFP country office staff consulted

Name	Position
Purmima Kashyap	Representative Country Director A.I.
Hakan Tongul	Head, Programmes
Jutta Neitzel	Head, Nutrition and Education Section
Eric Branckaert	Head, VAM & M&E Team and DRMFSS Activity
Keton Sankei	Head, Relief and PSNP Team
Mulugeta Arusi	Senior Programme Assistant
Halake Bante	National Programme Officer
Netsanet Teklehaymanot	Relief and PSNP
Tesfaye Bekele	Senior Programme Assistant
Mulugeta Desalegn	Senior Programme Assistant
Kristina Juutinea	Programme Officer
Suvrat Bafna	Food Technologist

Estimated number of beneficiaries consulted

Region/Zone/Woreda/Kebele	Type of project	Number	
		Male	Female
Oromia/North Shewa/ Debre Libanos/ Sonnei	Cash Relief (pilot)	2	6
Oromia/North Shewa/ Debre Libanos/ Sonnei	PSNP	5	3
Oromia/North Shewa/ Debre Libanos/ Sonnei	TSF	5	3
Oromia/East Hararghe/ Fedis/ Fechatu	Relief	1	6
Oromia/East Hararghe/ Fedis/ Fechatu	PSNP	5	3
Oromia/East Hararghe/ Fedis/ Fechatu	TSF	-	8
Oromia/East Hararghe/ Fedis/ Belina	Relief	1	5
Oromia/East Hararghe/ Fedis/ Belina	PSNP	5	3
Oromia/East Hararghe/ Fedis/ Belina	TSF	-	13
Somali/ Shineli/Iysha/ Biokebede	PSNP/Relief	3	7
Somali/ Shineli/Iysha/ Biokebede	TSF	-	5
Somali/Shineli/Shineli/ Baraka	PSNP	5	6
Somali/Shineli/Shineli/ Baraka	Relief	8	11
Somali/Shineli/Shineli/ Baraka	TSF	-	4
	Total	40	84

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
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Annex 5: Agriculture seasonal calendar


SEASONAL CALENDAR FOR A TYPICAL YEAR



Source: FEWS NET Ethiopia

Annex 6: Additional figures and data

Actual food distributed (mt) of planned, by year



Source: WFP Ethiopia. 2012-2013. SPR;

¹ BR4 total programme food requirements (revised) is 1,302,301 mt (or 651,151 for one year).

² BR6 total programme food requirements (revised) is 1,912,444 mt (TANGO's sum of programme component requirements)

** WFP Ethiopia. 2013. M&E Plan and Actual Stock cites 653,959 mt planned and 246,876 mt actual (37.8 percent). For 2013, this output by component is 27.8 percent for Relief, 73.8 percent for TSF, and 61.2 percent for PSNP.

Note: All of the following tables and values have been compiled and provided by the country office, unless otherwise noted as adjusted by TANGO International.

**Detailed information on beneficiaries for PRRO 200290
for evaluation period (2012 - 2013)**

Planned and actual beneficiaries, by activity and year

<i>Activity</i>	2012		2013*	
	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual
Relief	3,008,000	3,186,400	2,000,000	1,892,100
PSNP	1,084,800	843,000	1,356,000	1,113,190
TSF	1,136,000	885,500	1,087,000	973,870
	5,228,800	4,914,900	4,443,000	3,979,160

Note:- These figures for 2013 are not yet cleared for 2013 SPR reporting. Therefore, there may be slight changes until SPRs are cleared. Note that some numbers may not add up to 100 percent.

Gender balance of beneficiaries, by activity and year

<i>Activity</i>	2012		2013*	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Relief	1,607,350	1,579,050	954,424	937,676
PSNP	413,750	429,250	546,360	566,830
TSF	340,900	544,600	374,896	598,974

Note:- These figures for 2013 are not yet cleared for 2013 SPR reporting. Therefore, there may be slight changes until SPRs are cleared. Note that some numbers may not add up to 100 percent.

Planned and actual beneficiaries, by age group and year

<i>Age group</i>	2012		2013*	
	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual
below 5 years of age	1,315,326	1,165,462	1,208,212	1,155,868
5 to 18 years of age	1,967,539	1,911,506	1,592,216	1,361,257
Adults (Above 18 years)	1,945,935	1,837,932	1,642,572	1,462,035
Total	5,228,800	4,914,900	4,443,000	3,979,160

Note: These figures for 2013 are not yet cleared for 2013 SPR reporting. Therefore, there may be slight changes until SPRs are cleared. Note that some numbers may not add up to 100 percent.

Note: There are discrepancies between these 2013 values and those presented in the SPR.

Planned and actual beneficiaries reached, by age, gender and activity (2013)

Beneficiary Category		Planned			Actual			% Actual v. Planned		
Activity	Age	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Relief	<5	163,600	170,000	333,600	151,500	157,400	308,900	92.6%	92.6%	92.6%
	5-18	469,600	431,800	901,400	434,800	399,800	834,600	92.6%	92.6%	92.6%
	>18	375,600	389,400	765,000	347,700	360,500	708,200	92.6%	92.6%	92.6%
Total		1,008,800	991,200	2,000,000	933,997 ¹	917,703 ¹	1,851,700	92.6%	92.6%	92.6%
TSF for children	<5	418,508	320,708	739,216	333,370	255,466	588,836	79.7%	79.7%	79.7%
TSF for PLW	>18 (or WRA?)	N/A	347,784	347,784	N/A	277,034	277,034	N/A	79.7%	79.7%
Total		418,508	668,492	1,087,000	333,370	532,500	865,870²	79.7%	79.7%	79.7%
PSNP	<5	110,920	115,260	226,180	91,100	94,600	185,700	82.1%	82.1%	82.1%
	5-18	318,389	292,760	611,149	261,400	240,300	501,700	82.1%	82.1%	82.1%
	>18	254,657	264,013	518,670	209,100	216,700	425,800	82.1%	82.1%	82.1%
Total		683,966	672,033	1,355,999	561,600	551,600	1,113,200	82.1%	82.1%	82.1%
2013 PRRO Total		2,111,274	2,331,725	4,442,999	1,828,967	2,001,803	3,830,770	86.6%	85.9%	86.2%

Source of values: WFP Ethiopia. 2013. M&E Plan and Actual Stock


Compilation and source of percent calculations by TANGO International

¹ Actuals by age are rounded values, but overall actuals by sex are exact.

² According to the NGO tracking 2013 spreadsheet provided to the ET, NGO partners reached 113,855 beneficiaries (or 13.2 percent of TSF beneficiaries) in Oromia, Somali, Afar, and Amhara regions.

*

Annex 7: TSF pilot study model



* Only those registered on the List will be

Eligible for food ration (no food with ration card only)

** **Role of Food Distribution Agents (FDAs):**

- Supplementary food distribution
- Promotion of nutrition messages
- Register new beneficiaries

Annex 8: TSF monitoring and quality control findings

Measurements: There is limited quality control regarding MUAC measurements within the initial TSF system, and systematic reporting and sharing of information on quality control is also limited. The monitoring system is set up to collect important programmatic information,¹⁷⁵ but it is not sufficiently analysed to determine the reasons that children and women become eligible for TSF beyond meeting the MUAC measurement test. It is not known on a regular basis what the inclusion and exclusion errors are related to participation.

MUAC by itself is a good screening tool for acute malnutrition. Its use for MAM is less well documented. Weight-for-height/length and weight-for-age (when age is known) should also be recorded for children who are screened. Increased sustainability may require that children go through a second screen and are admitted to TSF based on a weight measurement. This change in protocol cannot happen in the middle of a programme and would need to have a strong community outreach programme that precedes its implementation. Currently, weight values are being taken. These values should be recorded and analysed to determine the percent of false positives in the programme, and the differences in recovery rates for children receiving TSF based on initial MUAC and weight measurements.

Reporting of data for cured/recovered, defaulted, and death should be disaggregated by age for children. Additional criteria for measuring the impact of TSF on PLW should also be collected and reported separately. Developing a single and integrated data system will greatly assist with identifying appropriate benchmarks and outcome measures and subsequently tracking them. These outcomes could also provide information on neonatal deaths.

Good aspects of monitoring. Qualitative monitoring is strong, and debriefings occur after CHD when supplemental food is distributed. WFP works closely with work groups from the *kebele* to the national level to discuss nutritional issues, and to process issues of food distribution, including targeting and coverage.

Health and nutrition task force meetings (regional, zonal, *woreda* levels) are helpful for operations.¹⁷⁶ There need to be better guidance and ways to systematically analyse qualitative data. WFP is adopting tablets for collecting data, and if these data are entered directly onto tablets they can be analysed more quickly.

Gaps in data and monitoring. There are no current reports to verify whether children are consuming the supplemental food as directed. Information is not systematically collected and analysed that would provide information on whether the children are consuming all the food, or on how much is being shared among family members.

Readmission rates remain low for TSF and are well recorded. However, the reasons for readmissions are not known. A low rate of readmission may be due to the large proportion of ineligible children who were in the programme at the start. This is a reason that improved quality control for MUAC measurements is needed. It would be good to know if those who are readmitted were the same children who initially had lower MUAC measures. It is also not known how many participants of TSF eventually are admitted to OTP. It is assumed by many people that a reduction in OTP

¹⁷⁵ Source is an excel file provided to the ET: TSF FDC and Beneficiary Interview Checklist.xlsm

¹⁷⁶ MANTF. 2011, 2012, 2013. Meeting Minutes.

admissions is due to TSF, but a systematic study is needed to determine the programmatic effect of TSF on OTP admissions.¹⁷⁷

The OTP and TSF data sets are not combined and it is not possible to easily monitor who leaves OTP and enters TSF, and who leaves TSF and enters OTP.

There is a monitoring system for TSF with information on the number of beneficiaries participating, but this is not sufficiently analysed.¹⁷⁸ There is a need to further incorporate time for data entry into monitors' work load. This information should be available from the *kebele* level to the regional level with two-way vertical communication within the health infrastructure. The data also need to be systematically analysed, especially the responses to open-ended qualitative monitoring questions.

At a minimum, the monitoring should be done on a consistent basis with a sample of *kebeles*. A lot control quality assurance sampling system can be used to track a representative sample to determine whether there is a drop in OTP admissions in places where TSF is present compared with places where TSF is not present.

The Use of MUAC for identifying MAM

Jelliffe recommended that the arm circumference be measured for children suffering from acute and severe malnutrition in 1966 even in the presence of oedema. Soon after that declaration, a special supplement in *The Journal of Tropical Pediatrics* was edited by Patricia and Derrick Jelliffe in 1969 that included 20 papers from around the world. This is the publication that is often used to identify that MUAC is age independent and related to childhood mortality, but it was mostly based on severe malnutrition. The most cited study in this supplement on the age independence for MUAC was by Burgess and Burgess. They suggested that the 85 percent of the standard for the MUAC was about 13.5 cm for 1-2 year olds and 14.0 for 2-4 year olds and increased to 14.4 cm for 60-month-old children. In the same supplement, correlations between MUAC and weight-for-age standards ranged between 0.55 and 0.77 for children 13-48 months of age for three ethnic groups in Uganda (Rutishauser 1969). Similar correlations have recently been reported by Dasgupta et (2013).

The popularity for using MUAC took off after a report by Shakir and Morely in a *Lancet* article in 1974 using a tricolor cord. They proposed to use this method for screening because reliable scales were not available and birth dates were not known to calculate weight for age percentiles. During this early period, going back to the 1960s, MUAC was merged with height measures by Arnhold (1969) who was working with the Quaker Service team and they termed the adjusted values as the QUACK Stick also for concerns about not knowing the age of children and used height as a substitute for age.

A large validation study conducted by Sommer and Lowenstein using the QUACK Stick was reported in 1975. In this study, the category 1, smallest MUAC ratio (< 10th percentile) suggested that the relative risk was about 4.0 for mortality compared with children > 50th percentile. However, for children who were considered moderately malnourished the relative risk was only 1.6 for 1-4 year olds but confidence limits

¹⁷⁷ ET discussion with ENCU Director.

¹⁷⁸ Source is an excel file provided to the ET: Sample of Woreda Monthly for SNNPR.

were not reported and thus it is not known if this was of statistical significance or even practical significance. One shortcoming of these initial studies is that they had very small data sets, often less than 100 children.

More recently Mei et al (1997) have constructed a revised reference for MUAC for height based on work by on the WHO study to revise growth standards (WHO 2009). In a recent review of the implications of the revised WHO growth standards, Duggan (2010) addressed MUAC measurements. This review reiterates that MUAC is good for identifying SAM but this report did not show its effect on predicting mortality.

What appears to be consistent is if MUAC is to be used for MAM, increasing a cut point may be appropriate (Dasgupta et al 2013). A recent study in Nigeria (Dairo et al *Int J Biomed Sci* 2012) reported that MUAC had a poorer sensitivity with 13.5 cm cut-off value, compared with 15.5 cm. The greater value had a sensitivity of 0.80 and specificity of 0.54 in Nigeria when there was not much malnutrition. This need for an increased MUAC as a cut point is consistent with a multinational study that suggested a mid-upper arm circumference of 13.5 cm as the best cut point for the diagnosis of severe wasting based on the new WHO standards with a Youden index of 0.61 and had a proportion of false negatives of 15.5 percent (Fernandez et al 2010).

In terms of actually taking measurements, a recent study in Ethiopia by the Carter Center (Ayele et al *PLOS* 2012) reported that measurements of height and weight were more reproducible than MUAC and less reliable for smaller children when obtained by locally trained rural community members. This suggests that there will be more error when measuring MUAC even with well-trained individuals compared with weight and height in a community setting.

What does this all mean? The main conclusions are MUAC is very good for identifying children with SAM. It may not be the best for MAM and it may require a greater cut point in order to include all who have MAM. It should not be expected to relate to mortality when greater values are used. The purpose of TSF should not be to prevent mortality but it is to prevent SAM and OTP inclusion. Finally, most importantly, there should always be a monitoring programme joined with screening that includes weight. This is being done but this data should be part of a M&E system.

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Acronyms

BR	Budget revision
CAADP	Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Plan
CATS	Commodity Allocation and Tracking System
CBN	Community-based nutrition
CCI	Complementary Community Investment Programme
CFS	Coalition for Food Security
CSB	Corn-soy blend
CHD	Child Health Days
CHS	Community household surveillance
CO	Country office
CP	Country Programme
CRS	Climate resilience strategy
CSI	Coping strategies index
DHS	Demographic and Health Survey
DRM	Disaster risk management
DRMFSS	Disaster Risk Management and Food Security Sector
DRMP	Disaster Risk Management Programme
DRM-SPIF	Disaster Risk Management Strategic Programme Investment Framework
DPPB	Disaster Preparedness and Prevention Bureau
EB	Executive Board
ET	Evaluation team
ENCU	Emergency Nutrition Coordination Unit
EOS	Enhanced outreach strategy
FCS	Food consumption score
FDA	Food distribution agent
FDC	Food distribution committee
FDP	Food delivery point
FFW	Food for work
FLA	Field-level agreement
FMIP	Food Management Improvement Programme
FSP	Food Security Programme
FSTF	Food Security Task Force
GDP	Gross domestic product
GFD	General food distribution
GTP	Growth and Transformation Plan
HABP	Household Asset Building Programme
HEA	Household economy approach
HEW	Health education worker
HRD	Humanitarian Requirements Document
H&S	Hubs and Spokes
LEAP	Livelihoods, Early Assessment and Protection
LQAS	Lot quality assurance sampling
MAM	Moderate acute malnutrition
MANTF	Multi-agency nutrition task force
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MERET	Managing Environmental Resources to Enable Transitions to More Sustainable Livelihoods
MOH	Ministry of Health
MOU	Memorandum of understanding
Mt	Metric tonne
MUAC	Mid-upper arm circumference

NES	Nutrition and Education Section
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NNP	National Nutrition Programme
NRM	Natural resource management
NRMS	Natural Resource Management Sector
OEV	Office of Evaluation
OTP	Outpatient Therapeutic Programme
PIM	Project Implementation Manual
PLW	Pregnant and lactating women
PSNP	Productive Safety Net Programme
P4P	Purchase for Progress Programme
RB	Regional Bureau
RFM	Risk financing mechanism
SAM	Severe acute malnutrition
SNNPR	Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples Region
SPR	Standard Project Report
TSF	Targeted supplemental feeding
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WFP	World Food Programme

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