

OPERATION EVALUATION

Kenya, PRRO 200174, Food Assistance to Refugees:
An Evaluation of WFP's Operation (2011-2013)

Evaluation Report

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Table of Contents

| | |
|---|-----------|
| Operational Fact Sheet..... | i |
| Map | vi |
| Executive Summary | vii |
| 1. Introduction | 1 |
| 1.1. Evaluation Features | 1 |
| 1.2. Country Context..... | 3 |
| 1.3. Operations Overview..... | 6 |
| 2. Evaluation Findings | 7 |
| 2.1 Appropriateness of the Operation | 7 |
| 2.2. Results of the Operation | 18 |
| 2.3. Factors Affecting the Results | 37 |
| 3. Conclusions and Recommendations..... | 43 |
| 3.1. Overall Assessment | 43 |
| 3.2 Recommendations | 46 |
| Annexes | 50 |
| Annex 1: Terms of Reference | 50 |
| Annex 2: List of Persons and Institutions Consulted..... | 64 |
| Annex 3: Tools..... | 67 |
| Annex 4: Population: Dadaab and Kakuma Camps, by Year..... | 76 |
| Annex 5: Logical Framework | 77 |
| Annex 6: Fieldwork Schedule | 81 |
| Annex 7: Evaluation Matrix | 85 |
| Annex 8: Bibliography..... | 91 |
| Acronyms | 95 |

List of Tables

| | |
|--|----|
| Table 1: Summary of nutrition beneficiary targets and achievements, by year and activity | 22 |
| Table 2: School meal beneficiaries, by year and activity | 25 |
| Table 3: Summary of PRRO outcome indicators for SO1..... | 28 |
| Table 4: Performance of TSF indicators in 2013 | 31 |
| Table 5: Summary of PRRO outcome indicators for SO2 and SO3..... | 32 |

List of Figures

| | |
|--|----|
| Figure 1: Country office operations map | vi |
| Figure 2: Trends in GAM in Dadaab refugee camp 2011-2013 | 30 |
| Figure 3: Trends in anaemia among children under 5 in Kakuma | 33 |

Operational Fact Sheet

| |
|--|
| Country: KENYA |
| Food Assistance to Refugees Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation 200174 |
| Time frame: Three years (October 1, 2011 - September 30, 2014) |
| Budget revisions: There have been five budget revisions (BR) to the initial project document; a sixth is being planned to extend the duration of the PRRO. ¹ The purpose of each revision and major changes are briefly described below: <ol style="list-style-type: none">i. BR 1² (approved November 2011) increased the number of relief beneficiaries to 604,000 (October to December 2011) and to 616,000 (January 2012 to October 2014). It also modified and introduced new nutritious products to the food basket; expanded blanket supplementary feeding (BSF) and target supplementary feeding (TSF); and increased the landslide, transport, storage and handling (LTSH) rate from US\$127/mt to US\$152/mt for a total increase of 21 percent. New budget: US\$408,752,411.ii. BR 2³ (approved June 2012) accommodated commodities that were received in-kind and increased the LTSH rate by 17.5 percent from US\$152/mt to US\$178/mt which increased the value of the total operation by 2 percent. New budget: US\$417,574,294.iii. BR 3⁴ (approved September 2012) increased the LTSH rate from US\$178.70/mt to US\$198.51/mt and provided additional funds to implement a biometric (fingerprint) identity-check system in Dadaab and Kakuma camps for a total increase of 4 percent. New budget: US\$433,876,561.iv. BR 4⁵ (March 2013) allows for a proposed fresh food voucher (FFV) pilot programme for pregnant and lactating women (PLW) and their households in the Dadaab refugee camps in order to improve dietary diversity and access to fresh nutritious foods. The total increase of 0.6 percent resulted in a new budget of US\$436,407,058.v. BR 5⁶ (approved October 2013) adjusted the budget to reflect the acquisition of 306 mt of dates (with accompanying handling costs); decreased the LTSH rate by 7 percent from US\$198.51/mt to US\$184.59/mt; and technically aligned the direct support cost (DSC) and other direct operational cost (ODOC) budget lines according to the actual expenditures and changed plan, and increased the DSC to cover United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) security costs. New budget: US\$435,201,576. |

¹ WFP (OEV). 2013.

² WFP Kenya. 2011a.


³ WFP Kenya. 2012a.

⁴ WFP Kenya. 2012b.

⁵ WFP Kenya. 2013a.

⁶ WFP Kenya. 2013b.

Operational Fact Sheet continued



Other on-going WFP operations:

Country programme 100668.0 (2009-2013) objectives are (i) support for the education of vulnerable children in food-insecure areas; and (ii) food and nutrition support for vulnerable populations affected by HIV/AIDS.⁷

PRRO 200294 (2012-2015), building on PRRO 106660, aims to (i) assist emergency-affected households in reducing the impacts of shocks by addressing their food needs; (ii) reduce acute malnutrition among children under 5 and PLW in crisis-affected areas; (iii) enhance community resilience to shocks through asset-creation and increase government capacity to design and manage disaster-preparedness and risk-reduction programmes; and (iv) support and re-establish livelihoods and food and nutrition security aftershocks.⁸

Special Operation 106810 Humanitarian Air Service in Support of Relief Operations in Somalia and Kenya: provides safe and reliable air transport to humanitarian personnel to deliver humanitarian assistance to the affected population. Special Operation 106810 also ensures the capacity for medical/security evacuations and responds to the needs of the affected population in an efficient and flexible manner, namely, to reach the remote Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camps in northern Kenya.⁹

⁷ WFP, 2008.

⁸ WFP, 2012.

⁹ WFP, N.D.

Operational Fact Sheet continued

| Objectives | | |
|--|--|---|
| Corporate Strategic Objectives | Objectives Operation Specific Objectives | Activities |
| Strategic Objective 1: Saving lives and protecting livelihoods | Meet the food consumption needs and minimum nutritional requirements of refugees. | General food distribution |
| | Manage moderate acute malnutrition and prevent severe acute malnutrition in PLW and children under 5 through supplementary feeding | Targeted supplementary feeding for malnourished children under 5 and pregnant and lactating women |
| Strategic Objective 3: Restore and build lives and livelihoods | Improve access to micronutrients among PLW and children aged 6–23 months. | Blanket supplementary feeding for pregnant and lactating women and children 6-23 months age group |
| | Increase adherence to treatment and meet the nutritional needs of people living with HIV Tuberculosis patients and people with chronic diseases. | Institutional feeding |
| | Maintain enrolment and attendance and reduce the gender disparity in primary schools in the camps. | School meals Take-home rations |
| | Increase enrolment and attendance among disenfranchised young people in training centres. | Food for training |
| Strategic Objective 2: Prevent acute hunger and invest in preparedness and mitigation measures | Increase the capacity of host communities to meet their food needs. | Food for assets |

Main Partners

Government:

The Department of Refugee Affairs (DRA) was responsible for the registration of refugees, security and camp management. The Ministry of Finance waived duty on food and other items for PRRO 200174. WFP worked with the Kenya Roads Board to improve access roads. The Ministry of Water and Irrigation, and the Office of the President (through the Arid Lands Resource Management Project, supported by the World Bank) provided training and non-food items asset creation in host communities.

Operational Fact Sheet continued

International and Local NGOs:

Cooperative Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE); Lutheran World Federation (LWF); German Agency for International Cooperation (GAIC); Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC); The International Rescue Committee (IRC); Médecins Sans Frontières – Switzerland (MSFCH); Médecins Sans Frontières – Spain (MSFS); Don Bosco; Food for the Hungry Kenya; St. Claire of Assisi Homecraft Centre Kakuma; National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK); Kenya Red Cross Society

UN Agencies:

UNHCR, UNICEF, UNDP

Resource Level

\$Dollar value of operation:¹⁰

Requirements:

Initial: US\$338,275,507

Revised: US\$435,201,577

Received: US\$341,003,637

Percent against appeal: 78.7 percent of total US\$ requirements; shortfall of 21.3 percent.

Main donors, resource level

and percent share: The current share of the operational requirements is distributed among 27 donors. The main donors, in addition to carryover from previous operations and miscellaneous income, are listed below:


- USA: US\$150,331,292 (34.69 percent)
- Germany: US\$37,469,896 (8.65 percent)
- Multilateral: US\$27,679,116 (6.39 percent)
- UK: US\$26,140,633 (6.03 percent)
- Canada: US\$19,393,296 (4.48 percent)

All other donors (60.24 percent): Australia, Austria, Brazil, Carryover, European Commission, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Israel, Japan, Norway, OPEC, private donors, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Switzerland, UN CERF, Zambia, carryover, miscellaneous income

¹⁰ WFP. 2014.

Operational Fact Sheet continued


Resource contribution by donor



Map

Figure 1: Country office operations map

ANNEX III



The designations employed and the presentation of material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the World Food Programme (WFP) concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its frontiers or boundaries.



Executive Summary

1. The present evaluation of the Kenya Protracted Relief and Rehabilitation Operations (PRRO 200174) began in December 2013 and is primarily based upon intensive field visits to Nairobi and Kakuma and Dadaab camps. The evaluation covers the three-year period of the operation (2011-2014) and is structured around three questions: (1) how appropriate is the operation; (2) what are the results of the operation; and (3) what factors generated the results. The scope of this evaluation is broad and embraces all stakeholders directly and indirectly affected by the different assistance components of the overall operation. A multi-tool qualitative methodology employed key informant interviews, focus group discussions, focused observation, and a comprehensive document review to triangulate the analysis of the data set and adequately address the questions.

2. According to UNHCR registration figures in early 2014, Dadaab had 403,000 refugees, the vast majority from Somalia, in five sub-camps. Kakuma had 132,000 refugees, the majority from South Sudan and Somalia, in four sub-camps. Under the Government of Kenya 2006 Refugees Act, the residents are prohibited from undertaking wage-earning employment. There is also an encampment policy that directs refugees to stay within the camps. Instituted in 1991, the camps have increasingly assumed the characteristics of a semi-urban social unit whose economy is fuelled by food, donor activity, and remittances. Host communities have grown immensely around the two camps. In the case of Kakuma, the hosts are from a separate and distinguishable ethnic group, the Turkana. However, in the case of Dadaab, refugees share the same ethnicity with the host community and are mostly indistinguishable in terms of physiognomy, culture, and language. It is impossible to tell exactly how many non-refugees reside in Dadaab camp and share rations, but many families have non-refugee guests or relatives.

3. The initial operational period of PRRO 200174 was from 1 October 2011 - 30 September 2014, with initial funding of US\$338 million. Subsequent amendments have yielded a six-month extension and a revised budget of US\$435 million. The programme is comprised of six general components: general food distribution (GFD), blanket and targeted supplementary feeding (BSF/TSF) for vulnerable groups, school meals and take-home rations (THR), a fresh food voucher pilot (FFV), food for training (FFT), and food for assets (FFA) among the host community residents.

4. The Evaluation Team (ET) found that the overall operation in the two camps is appropriate with respect to addressing the food security and nutritional needs of the population, targeting the appropriate beneficiary set, and creating partnerships with the Government of Kenya Department of Refugee Affairs, UNHCR, and cooperating partner (CP)s. For the most part, the design of the interventions has been built upon solid analysis of available data from multiple internal and external sources, and the operation incorporates a strong commitment to gender equity, inclusion, and protection.

5. With regard to those interventions that promote food and nutritional security, GFD is the most prominent. It provides a daily diet of 2100 Kcal/person during biweekly distributions at five food distribution points (FDPs) in Dadaab and three in Kakuma. In 2014, the planning figure is for 520,000 refugees to receive GFD (350,000 in Dadaab and 170,000 in Kakuma). GFD is a complex logistical challenge that WFP manages with great effectiveness. Last year, a biometric system of

monitoring food distribution was introduced to assure more control over targeting, and the result was a beneficiary list reduced by 55,200 between October - December 2013, on top of the reduction in inclusion error achieved through the UNHCR verification exercise organized earlier that year.

6. To contribute to WFP's learning in relation to using new transfer modalities, to strengthen markets, and to improve WFP's business processes, a fresh food voucher initiative was introduced for PLW to purchase vegetables and meat in local markets. This pilot programme has 9,000 pregnant and lactating women (PLW) participants and has demonstrated implementation success, although impacts have not been rigorously assessed. The FFV is the first initiative under the PRRO to explore transfer modalities other than food distribution. This is particularly relevant given the consistent monetization of food rations.

7. A snack of porridge (445 Kcal) is provided mid-morning to students in grades 1-8 and to pre-schoolers in the national early childhood development programme. Children in grades 4-6 study morning and afternoon, thus the snack allows them to stay at the school all day. The activity serves 113,000 students in the two camps. The school meal activity is relevant to the needs of children attending primary school, as it improves the overall education experience. However, there is no conclusive information that the meal is directly related to improved enrolment and attendance rates, as stated in the PRRO specific objectives. In addition, there are many non-food constraints to education, such as lack of teachers, classroom infrastructure, and latrines.

8. The team questions the appropriateness and effectiveness of the THR and FFA interventions. The THR programme served 38,000 girls in 2013 but the link between the THR and female education is unconfirmed. In general, the FFA interventions target 7,200 host-community participants providing monthly rations to build natural resource community assets (water ponds for animals, soil conservation, etc.). These are relevant to increasing the food security resilience of host communities in a semi-arid landscape; however few of the project goals were achieved. The ET cannot make a satisfactory determination of the appropriateness of these activities in the absence of a clear statement of perceived needs and targeting decisions.

9. The FFT activity follows the same rationale as school feeding. To date, a meal has been provided annually to around 1,500 young adults attending vocational training. It improves the overall education experience in an under-resourced setting, and is therefore relevant. Students are trained in vocational skills for which they receive nationally accredited certificates.

Overall Assessment and Conclusions

10. Over the long life of the refugee camps in Kenya, WFP has established a longstanding internal system that is highly effective and efficient at providing food security to the camps. The system is highly complex and dynamic, demonstrating the flexibility to adjust to changes in internal and external context and to derive innovative solutions processed from the regular flow of information. The WFP innovations team, responsible for the design, piloting, and start-up phases of new initiatives, is an example of the dynamic problem-solving capabilities that support this operation.

11. Based on interviews and focused observations in the camps and a detailed review of available data sources, the ET concludes that the operation is relevant,

internally and externally coherent, and appropriate. The evidence reveals an overall set of outcomes that has maintained the food and nutritional security of camp residents, promoted livelihoods within Government of Kenya constraints, cultivated healthy relationships with the host communities, carefully adapted the operation to an external policy context that has great influence over the well-being of the refugees, not allowed surrounding insecurity to affect the distribution of food and benefits, and effectively mainstreamed the principles of gender equity, gender parity, and gender sensitivity in the design and implementation of the operation.

12. In terms of partnerships critical for an effective operation, WFP and UNHCR have demonstrated the value of collaboration in the successful rollout of the biometric verification system, and such collaboration could generate further benefits in other relevant areas, such as educational planning. WFP partnerships with the Government of Kenya, namely the Department of Refugee Affairs and the district office, have enabled an efficient response to refugee flow changes and security issues in implementing the operation, particularly GFD.

13. Not all the interventions demonstrate appropriateness, effectiveness and sustainability, and the ET has sought to point out where readjustments in the upcoming programming cycle would be advised. Most of these changes seek to solve ambiguities in the actual intent of some activities, to gather and process relevant information more effectively within a constrained security environment, to improve implementation processes, and to enhance participatory governance in the camps throughout the programming process.

Recommendations

14. Within the reality of possible resource decreases, it is essential that WFP begin contingency planning for this new pipeline reality to avoid uninformed and last-minute ration cuts. The programming challenge is now how to achieve priority goals with fewer resources. In this spirit, the ET offers a set of specific recommendations for WFP – strategic (informing the programmatic priorities) and operational (informing the implementation process) – that need to be implemented prior to the start of the new PRRO or in the first year of PRRO implementation.

Strategic Recommendations

15. Recommendation 1: In preparation for the following programming cycle, we recommend that WFP conduct a well-designed and rigorous vulnerability assessment of the two camps. The purpose of this assessment would be to understand the patterns and drivers of vulnerability within the camp populations. It would further identify existing livelihood strategies and their distribution. In acknowledging the sensitivity of such an activity in Dadaab camp, it is recommended that the camp leaderships (including clan leaders) be consulted regarding the necessity to understand camp vulnerability for the next programming cycle, and to elicit their participation in implementing the activity (e.g., identifying enumerators and reviewing the tools). This is a critical first step to the design of the follow-up operation. Security permitting, this recommendation should be implemented in 2014.¹¹

¹¹ Such a needs assessment was a primary recommendation of the JAM 2012 report.

16. Recommendation 2: WFP should eliminate the take-home ration for girls. Collaborate with education sector partners to identify alternative and non-food incentives that promote girls' enrolment and attendance. It is important to note here that WFP does not have the comparative advantage to play a key role in implementing a non-food alternative, thus a partnership agreement will be necessary.

17. Recommendation 3: WFP should significantly redesign the FFA interventions and, if they must remain within the refugee PRRO (for reasons unclear to the ET), the interventions should be based on clear, transparent objectives and upon a comprehensive needs assessment. The FFA intervention should be supervised by the WFP Garissa and Lodwar sub-offices to ensure FFA activities are integrated in County Integrated Development Plans. Supervision from the county level allows WFP to plan with communities' and counties' line services. At the same time, the ET recommends a more robust design process that sets out an appropriate long-term theory of change for target communities and indicates clearly how the PRRO will contribute to the overall goal of food security resilience, including appropriate indicators for monitoring. As part of the design, WFP should consider not only community infrastructure, e.g., for improved water management, but provide more tailored support to livelihood diversification that addresses adaptive deficit. This could include introducing livestock herds and converting invasive mesquite forests into charcoal production sites.

18. Recommendation 4: The ET feels well justified (by its review of experiences with school feeding in ASAL Kenya and elsewhere) that food should be provided to students, especially those who spend the entire day at school. WFP should design the next school meals intervention as part of a broader collaboration with UNHCR, UNICEF, and the CPs to implement existing camp-wide educational strategies that effectively increase net enrolment and primary completion rates. The ET suggests an "Education Working Group" (including parents, teachers, and camp leadership) at sub-camp level as an appropriate governance structure to effect measurable change in education. As an implementation component of this recommendation and if school feeding is to be continued, it is important to explicitly state the objectives of the intervention and the expected impacts. If net enrolment and attendance are the objectives, the impacts need to be rigorously assessed.

19. Recommendation 5: Based on rigorous market assessment, WFP should expand the experience of FFV to substitute food vouchers, on a pilot basis, for the commodities that are most monetized, i.e., cereals and oil.¹² The reduction in the ration size and composition would be supplemented by FFV, which would allow beneficiaries to purchase their desired food items.

Operational Recommendations

20. Recommendation 6: WFP should maintain the BSF and TSF interventions but with an improved implementation strategy. Greater emphasis should be given to the "soft" side of the intervention, i.e., a more focused nutrition orientation for mothers, including information provision and counselling on food utilization. This could include a community outreach component in which nutritional staff or

¹² The ET notes that at the time of the evaluation report review, WFP Kenya is undertaking a market assessment for cereals.

community health workers visit the blocks to carry out public counselling sessions with beneficiary mothers and children. Such a community component is crucial for the success of nutrition programmes for follow-up of clients at home and for defaulter tracing in order to reduce cases of relapse. Quality supervision of the community services is an integral component of nutrition programmes. Thus, this recommendation will require a great emphasis on CP staff training and more effective supervision of these field workers.

21. Recommendation 7: We recommend, prior to a new programme cycle, a reflective review of the monitoring and evaluation system. As stated above, it appears that the detail and effort of data collection are not commensurate with the utility of the reports produced. Such a review would identify a limited number of input, output, and impact indicators for the new PRRO (complementary to the mandated FSOM system) and would issue reports more frequently and with more impact detail than the SPRs. Such a review of the M&E system for the new PRRO would also give careful thought to quality, particularly to construct validity and internal validity in order to reduce sampling bias and sampling error.

22. Recommendation 8: Important decisions will be made in the event of anticipated reduced pipelines. In this event, WFP should fully incorporate the formal camp leadership and the informal clan leaders from each sub-camp into decision-making relative to the GFD ration in terms of size, composition, and targeting, as well as the supplementary feeding strategy for those most vulnerable. The biometrics success has offered a good example of how participatory decision-making can go beyond just negotiating the acceptance of a decision made in Nairobi to a more integrated problem-solving process during the decision-making that precedes actual programming.

23. Recommendation 9: WFP should explore the possibility of an alternative distribution site for super-cereal for the BSF for children 6-23 months old in Dadaab. One of the proposals made by the agencies is that the distribution of the super-cereal continue at GFD sites but only children who have been taken for growth monitoring promotion at the health posts qualify to get the food. This approach would be more efficient than transferring the distribution to the health post. Nonetheless, this will require additional staffing to conduct anthropometric measurements and nutrition education. This could first be tried on a pilot basis in one of the camps and if successful expanded to the other camps. A suggestion made by the ET is for the programme to explore the possibility of providing a ready-to-use food (RUTF) that is nutrient- and energy-dense to replace the super-cereal. There is less likelihood of sharing of such foods at the household level even if distributed with the general ration. RUTFs are regarded as therapeutic and therefore not for consumption by the entire household.

24. Recommendation 10: Building upon the technical success of the biometrics experience, we recommend the expanded use of electronic information to improve coherency and targeting in the entire food assistance programme in the two camps. Such a system could track children flagged during the nutrition monitoring process and identify the more vulnerable households.

1. Introduction

1.1. Evaluation Features

25. The scope of the present evaluation of the Kenya PRRO 200174 is the three-year period of the PRRO since October 2011. The evaluation was begun in December 2013; it is primarily based upon intensive field visits to Nairobi, Kakuma, and Dadaab refugee camps during 6-24 January 2014. The evaluation was conducted by TANGO International, and was composed of a three-person team that combined expertise in livelihood and food security, food assistance and biometrics, and mother and child health and nutrition (MCHN). The evaluation is structured around three evaluation questions: (1) how appropriate is the operation; (2) what are the results of the operation; and (3) how and why has the operation produced the observed results. This evaluation has particular timeliness for WFP Kenya, since the current operation (in its last year) has been extended for one year and activities are now in place to design the next PRRO that will guide WFP programming in these camps beyond 2014. Moreover, the needs of the two camps are often dependent upon external factors, such as refugee flows, resource availability, national host policy, and are thus subject to change over time. Finally, in Kakuma and Dadaab, a major shift in targeting strategy occurred with the introduction of the biometrics verification system, and this evaluation provides an opportunity to assess the impacts of this initiative.

26. The evaluation sought to engage all stakeholders directly and indirectly affected by the different assistance components of the overall operation. The evaluation stakeholders include (1) camp participants, including, to the extent possible, beneficiaries from particularly vulnerable groups, such as women and orphans; (2) non-refugee residents in the host communities, including those who interact more closely with refugee operations as employees or service providers, (3) host-community residents who are more or less integrated in the camp economy, and those who live within the radius affected by the camp (e.g., due to natural resource extraction by camp residents); 4) WFP staff in Nairobi, where operation strategies are designed, monitored, and evaluated; (5) WFP staff in the field where operation interventions are carried out, supervised, and documented; (6) CPs—both international and local non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and church and other civil society organizations; (7) United Nations agency partners, particularly the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); (8) Government of Kenya counterparts in Nairobi as well as local Government of Kenya representatives responsible for refugee registration and camp security; and (9) donors, who were extensively consulted and debriefed (including representatives from the Department for International Aid, UK (DFID), the European Commission (ECHO), Germany, and Switzerland).¹³ Each of these stakeholder groups plays a role in the complex skein that defines a successful PRRO, and the Evaluation Team (ET) systematically consulted each of these groups. It must be added that the regional WFP office and WFP/Rome were both consulted as major partners in this evaluation.

27. With regard to content and design of the methodology, the ET approached the PRRO as an integrated system of programme decisions that reaches horizontally across stakeholder groups, and vertically from the administrative and technical apex in Nairobi, where major intervention strategies are articulated with national counterparts then implemented through a development chain comprised of sub-office staff, CP counterparts,

¹³ For a more complete list of donors and beneficiaries consulted please refer to Annex 2.

and beneficiaries. At the beneficiary level, the ET adopted a household livelihoods framework and sought to understand the inherent variability in the beneficiary population in terms of livelihood assets, strategies, and outcomes.

28. To achieve these goals under the constraints of time and resources, the methodology was a structured, qualitative one that used individual interviews, focus group discussions (FGDs), comprehensive focused observation, and document review as the key data collection tools. Over 20 semi-structured interviews were conducted in Nairobi, and 50 key informant interviews and FGDs were conducted during 10 days of fieldwork in the two camps. The sampling of respondents was purposive in the sense that participants from all stakeholder categories were included. In Kakuma camp, the ET interviewed additional respondents during random walks, but security concerns precluded the use of this conventional tool in Dadaab camps. Under this methodological approach, key informant interviews were conducted with those whose contribution is primarily focused in the programmatic and strategic design of the PRRO and in the assessment of input and outcome monitoring indicators. From these stakeholders it is possible to understand the underlying logic of the project design; the nature of critical partnerships in the implementation process, such as with UNHCR and implementing NGOs; and the prominent issues that have characterized the project. FGDs proved the most effective tool at the camp level for both field staff (e.g., implementing NGO staff and local partners), beneficiary groups—both men and women, young and old, vulnerable and protected populations—and host-community groups. The ET incorporated a gender lens by conducting separate FGDs with men and women and by focusing on gender equity and gender equality as contextualized interview topics. This included addressing questions of gender inequality in primary schools, the targeting of GFD beneficiaries, the role and participation of women in governance structures, and the overall gender mainstreaming in the programme. The list of key informants and FGDs is found in Annex 3.

29. The ET would like to emphasize focused observation as one of the most effective data collection tools used to triangulate the information from the interviews and FGDs. Focused observation entails first-hand presence in all PRRO interventions and even direct participation, following the same process as beneficiaries in some of the key interventions, such as GFD and blanket supplementary feeding (BSF). Through direct participation, the method provides a deep richness to the interpretation of interviews and a concrete check on the validity of some interview material. Such triangulation allows the team to evaluate the value of a particular interview and to further pursue the issue in subsequent sessions.

30. The ET benefited from open access to the majority of stakeholders, particularly WFP staff, partner NGO staff, and cooperating partner (CP) staff (e.g., Don Bosco). The methodology, however, was limited by access to the beneficiary community and, to some extent, to the host community. The ET followed strict security protocols that limited mobility: the tight security situation in Dadaab camps and the surrounding host communities precluded any direct contact with beneficiaries in their residential blocks, and consequently all FGDs and key informant interviews were conducted in neutral spaces, such as the food distribution points (FDPs), clinics, and schools, where little observation of the day-to-day reality of the refugees was possible. The team was not able to move freely within the five sub-camps of Dadaab, nor when traveling between the sub-camps, a restriction that significantly affects the analysis of livelihood variability and our understanding of the

dynamics of camp life. In Kakuma camp, team mobility was less tethered and the team was able to visit residential blocks for brief periods.¹⁴

31. Regarding time constraints, ET proposed a reorganized schedule to WFP to maximize time in the camps. It optimized time with beneficiaries by strategically splitting the team to be able to conduct more interviews, and held structured ET briefings and debriefings at the beginning and end of each day to share findings and observations. To address limitations regarding turnover that would affect institutional knowledge, and to triangulate data from field interviews, the ET consulted Nairobi Regional Bureau staff for clarifications.

32. While various studies and documents from WFP contributed to the design of the methodology, inherent limitations tied to the security situation in the camps may have impacted the reliability of data from those secondary sources. Nonetheless, data from these sources were triangulated with the data collected by the ET during the visits to the camps.

33. The substantial interviewing experience from the ET members ensured that bias was minimized through smart questioning, and that neither leading questions nor expressions of judgement on any response from the interviewees were made. During debriefing, interviews were synthesized to get a second opinion on any bias that may have been introduced in the interview. For an additional summary of limitations please refer to Annex 3.

1.2. Country Context

34. Kenya, a largely arid and semi-arid country, is considered a low-income food-deficit country ranking 142nd of 187 countries in the human development index (HDI).¹⁵ Food insecurity affects an estimated 5.3 million people in Kenya (1.3 million in rural areas and between 3.5 and 4 million in urban areas), leaving over 30 percent of the population undernourished.^{16,17,18} However the populations of the arid regions that constitute two-thirds of the national area are significantly worse-off in terms of most livelihood indicators, including economic output, food and nutritional security, education, and health. Compared to the central and western parts of the country, livelihoods in the arid lands are predominantly pastoral and vulnerable to the vagaries of nature such as drought, thus indicators of food security are more volatile.

35. An understanding of the historical and current contexts of both Kakuma and Dadaab camps and of the food security situation is critically relevant to adequately capture the results of this PRRO and the effectiveness of its implementation strategies. Both Kakuma and Dadaab camps were created in 1991 to receive the victims of conflict in neighbouring Sudan to the west and Somalia to the east; the population of the camps has varied with levels of conflict and environmental shocks.¹⁹

36. Kakuma camp is located about 120 km from the South Sudan border in Turkana County, roughly halfway between the town of Lokichogio and the county capital of Lodwar. Kakuma sits within Kenya's arid Northwest region and its environment is harsh. The

¹⁴ It should be acknowledged that restricted access due to security concerns also affects the quality of the monitoring and evaluation process which may impact the tools (e.g. the Food Security Outcome Monitoring, FSOM, for the camps), which accounts for certain inconsistencies in the subsequent reports.

¹⁵ UNDP. 2011. *Human Development Report*; Kenya HDI=0.509

¹⁶ FEWS NET, 2009 as cited in Food Security Portal – Kenya. 2012. Data from 2008.

¹⁷ FAO, 2013 as cited in Food Security Portal – Kenya. 2012.

¹⁸ UNICEF Kenya Statistics.2013.

¹⁹ A table of the variation of refugee numbers in both camps over the last 15 years is provided in Annex 4.

pastoral Northwest region has the highest poverty rate compared to other provinces in the country (94.3 percent for 2005-2006 time period).²⁰ The food security in this area is typically affected by a number of factors including poor rainfall seasons, above-average food prices, livestock and crop diseases, and market disruptions, placing most of the area in the Stressed Phase as characterized by the Kenya Food Security Steering Group (KFSSG).²¹ The principal livelihood in the county is pastoralism, the traditional mainstay of the ethnic Turkana people, but the presence of the camp has created a wider, non-pastoralist service economy that provides labour and goods to the camp. While in the past the camp was comprised mostly of South Sudanese, the majority of ethnic groups at the current time are Somali (40 percent) and South Sudanese (37 percent), and there are smaller numbers of Ethiopians, Congolese (Democratic Republic of Congo), Sudanese, Burundians and others. At the time of the field visit, emergent inter-tribal conflicts in South Sudan had resulted in a new flow of refugees to Kakuma, increasing the population to around 132,000 refugees; this number is now closer to 150,000. Around 45 percent of the Kakuma refugees are female and more than half the population is under 18 years of age.

37. Dadaab camp, located in Garissa County about 100 km from the Somali border in Kenya's Northeast region, is comprised of five sub-camps (Hagadera, Dagahaley, Ifo, Ifo2, and Kambios) spread out over some 50 km² of arid rangeland. The food security situation in the Northeast region, like that of the Northwest region, is also affected by poor rainfall and livestock disease as well as by poor road infrastructure, conflict and insecurity, and human-wildlife conflict.²² In addition, the North Eastern Province experiences the highest prevalence of global acute malnutrition (GAM) rates (at 10.7 percent) while the North Eastern and Eastern Provinces experience the highest acute and chronic malnutrition levels in the country (19.5 and 42 percent respectively).²³ Also, gender parity is less advanced in the northern and eastern counties of the country. Female education in terms of primary school completion rates and secondary school enrolment are decidedly below the national averages. Female educational attainment in the North Eastern Province falls below attainment levels in other provinces: only 2.4 percent of females completed primary school compared to 25.3 percent in the Central Province.²⁴ Residents of the arid regions follow more traditional cultural pathways where female genital mutilation is ritualized, early marriage is common, and women have marginal participation in public affairs.

38. Dadaab now hosts approximately 403,000 refugees, the vast majority (97 percent) from Somalia. There have been no new registrations of refugees in Dadaab since 2011. Hagadera, Dagahaley, and Ifo are the oldest camps (1991), and Ifo2 and Kambios were opened more recently to accommodate the refugees escaping the drought-related famine of 2011.²⁵ The Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) of 0.516 in Kenya's North Eastern Province, where Dadaab Camps are located, demonstrates a marked difference compared to the national MPI of 0.229.^{26,27}

²⁰ Kenya Open Data. 2014. Based on District Poverty Data from KIHBS, 2005/6.

²¹ Kenya Food Security Steering Group (KFSSG). N.D.a.

²² KFSSG. N.D.b.

²³ WFP. Kenya 2012c.

²⁴ KNBS. 2010.

²⁵ The FDP infrastructure at Kambios was only opened in 2012.

²⁶ The MPI measures the incidence and intensity of poverty which encompasses deprivations across health, education, and living standards.

²⁷ OPHI Country Briefing. 2013.

39. There are five contextual factors that affect the outcomes of this PRRO and are particularly important in the case of Dadaab:

- a. Garissa County and the vast majority of the population surrounding Dadaab camp are ethnic Somali and virtually indistinguishable from the refugee population. Without identification cards, it is not possible to identify a refugee as such and there is great intermingling between host-community residents, registered camp residents, and de facto camp residents who are not registered, perhaps recently arrived from Somalia. Such factors make it difficult to determine with accuracy the exact numbers of people being fed on the bimonthly food ration or the exact number of residents in the camps. In Kakuma camp, such is not the case, since the refugees are more easily distinguished from the surrounding population.
- b. Under the 2006 Kenyan Refugees Act, those with refugee status are not allowed to set up residence away from the camps or to engage in livelihood activities located outside the camps. These restrictions effectively prohibit camp residents from legally being absorbed by the broader Kenyan society, and are being enforced with increasing rigor. Kenyan refugee policy limits not only refugee movement but also the opportunity to develop sustainable livelihoods, since the ultimate goal of the camps is to provide protection to official refugees until they are repatriated to their countries of origin or resettled in a third country.
- c. With the extended length of residence for so many, continued insecurity in countries of origin, and restrictions on outside residence and livelihood opportunities, the camps have become de facto cities unto themselves with their economies fuelled by the value of the distributed food assistance (up to US\$10 million per month), the direct and indirect resources injected through the extensive presence of the United Nations and CPs, and the unknown amounts that arrive in the form of remittances or are derived from informal economic activities including market activity, livestock raising, firewood collection, etc. This supports evidence from Kamau and Fox (2013) which indicates that refugees in Dadaab camps find causal labour opportunities (including as laundry workers and as sales people in food stalls). Refugees in Dadaab have stated that there is no person or family that can survive in the camps without some source of cash income or a livelihood strategy. One must purchase cloth and clothing, pay for firewood, and purchase preferred foods, so everyone participates, to some extent, in the market economy or receives these necessities from a neighbour or relative. The most vulnerable families sell part of their food and the least vulnerable families sell most of their food; others gather firewood for sale, have small businesses (especially among the Somalis), practice trade skills, contribute unskilled labour, etc. Consequently, there are uneven patterns of household vulnerability within the camps—that all can perceive, but which are not yet systematically documented.²⁸
- d. The camps also have internal systems of governance that parallel the formal elected governance structure mandated by the UNHCR Constitution for the camps. In the case of Dadaab, the underlying governance structure is built on membership in the clan systems that the refugees brought with them from Somalia. Clan elders bear tremendous influence in the basic decisions of the camps, including such things as indicating candidates for elected positions in the formal governance of blocks, and indicating persons for employment vacancies. The clan leadership is a key factor in

²⁸ Kamau and Fox. 2013.

maintaining overall camp stability and security, mediating disputes, and in the eventual success of the repatriation objective.

40. In this context of high vulnerability among the rural peoples of arid Kenya, Kakuma and Dadaab camps report relatively favourable situations in terms of food and nutritional security, access to education and health care facilities, and in female participation and gender equity. A study done in 2010 in Dadaab camps found that the price of basic commodities (including maize, rice, wheat, sugar, and cooking oil) was at least 20 percent lower compared to other rural areas in Kenya. In addition, the same study found that unskilled wage labour was between 50-75 percent higher in Dadaab than in comparable regions. In terms of maternal health, agency-run hospitals provide assistance for safe deliveries to prevent complications, a service that rarely exists in other arid areas in Kenya.²⁹

41. WFP's work toward addressing the root causes of hunger, malnutrition, and vulnerability are consistent with the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF 2014- 2019) and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The PRRO 200174 supports UNDAF priorities two and three and the MDGs one to five.³⁰ The operation also contributes towards the attainment of Kenya's national development plan Vision 2030 and Kenya's Medium Term plan (MTP 2013-2017). Launched in 2008, Vision 2030 is aimed at propelling Kenya into the global arena as a competitive player and a prosperous country with a high quality of life.³¹ It should be noted that these restrictions in the 2006 Kenyan Refugees Act effectively prohibit camp residents from legally being absorbed by the broader Kenyan society and are being enforced with increasing rigor. Kenyan refugee policy limits not only refugee movement but also the opportunity to develop sustainable livelihoods, since the ultimate goal of the camps is to provide protection to official refugees until they are repatriated to their countries of origin or resettled in a third country.

42. In addition to collaboration with the Government of Kenya, CPs, United Nations agencies and supporting donors provide valuable partnerships with WFP through various strategies and programmes. UNHCR, for instance, provides vital support towards the well-being and protection of refugees in the camps, facilitates basic services and infrastructure, and seeks to find durable solutions through strategic partnerships, including with the Government of Kenya and WFP.³² UNICEF provides assistance through response to sexual and gender-based violence, water and sanitation, nutrition and health, and education.³³

1.3. Operations Overview

43. The initial operational period of PRRO 200174 was approved in November 2011 for a planned duration of three years (1st October 2011 - 30 September 2014). Initial resource requirements were established at US\$338,275,507; with five subsequent BRs and a most recent revision and one-year extension stipulating a budget of US\$435,201,577. Main donors include the United States, Germany, multilaterals, the United Kingdom, and Canada. Please refer to the Operational Fact Sheet for more information.

²⁹ Royal Danish Embassy, Government of Kenya, and Norwegian Embassy. 2010.

³⁰ WFP. 2011a.

³¹ WFP Kenya. 2012c.

³² UNHCR. 2013b.

³³ UNHCR. 2013b.

44. The main components of PRRO 200174, their corresponding objectives and activities, and planned beneficiaries are:

- a. Protect lives and livelihoods: Maintain minimum nutritional requirements of refugees in order to save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies. Activities include GFD and targeted supplementary feeding (TSF).
- b. Nutrition and food security: Increase the capacity of host communities to meet food needs in order to prevent acute hunger and invest in disaster preparedness and mitigation measures. Activities include FFA.
- c. Rebuild lives and livelihoods:
 - i. Reduce malnutrition among refugee children under 5, pregnant and lactating women (PLW), and patients with special needs through health and nutrition interventions in order to restore and rebuild lives and livelihoods in post-conflict, post-disaster, or transition situations. Activities include BSF and institutional feeding. A notable aspect of this component is its use of fresh food vouchers.
 - ii. Increase enrolment and attendance and reduce gender disparity in camp schools in order to restore and rebuild livelihoods in post-conflict, post-disaster or transition situations. Activities include school meals, THR, and food for training (FFT).
- d. Planned beneficiaries increased from the original 556,000 to 616,000 following a sharp increase of arrivals to Dadaab in 2011. Please refer to Operational Fact Sheet for more information.³⁴

2. Evaluation Findings

2.1 Appropriateness of the Operation

45. This section describes evaluation findings and conclusions relating to the first evaluation question, “How appropriate is the operation?”³⁵

46. PRRO 200174 is the latest of a series of operations dating back to 1991 when the camps were established in Kakuma and Dadaab. The on-going challenge addressed by WFP, as expressed in its three strategic objectives (and the seven specific objectives of the PRRO document), has been to define a set of interventions that would assure the food and nutritional security of the refugee population, enhance and restore livelihoods, prepare for and mitigate shocks and stresses, and seek to reduce the negative impacts of the refugee camps upon the host communities and their environments. As the five budget revisions have demonstrated, this challenge has been tested over the life of the PRRO, with changes in camp populations, population needs, and security situations. WFP, in the opinion of the ET has, for the most part, designed the appropriate intervention set to meet the operation objectives. Together with its CPs, and particularly its partnership with UNHCR, WFP has demonstrated the flexibility to adjust to changing circumstances, to set up the data monitoring systems (and indicators) necessary to identify shifts in population needs, and to introduce improvements in targeting – capacities that have successfully enabled WFP to ensure the appropriateness of the operation over time. Moreover, the intervention set and its respective outputs have been consistent with and sensitive to WFP corporate strategy and the Government of Kenya’s broader development guidelines and refugee policies. This

³⁴ WFP Kenya. 2013a.

³⁵ WFP (OEV). 2013.

section explores and justifies these findings in depth with regard to the PRRO's appropriateness to needs and coherence with WFP corporate strategy, Government of Kenya policies, and partners, respectively.

2.1.1. Appropriateness to needs

47. The needs of a large refugee population are multiple and diverse, and subject to change due to internal and external factors. The role of WFP in meeting refugee needs is to provide adequate levels of quality food to all registered refugees, to meet the specific nutritional needs of vulnerable refugee groups (children under 59 months, PLW, and malnourished children and adults), and to use food as a means of enhancing and building livelihoods. WFP has used information from multiple sources to design an integrated intervention set according to documented needs and to monitor the necessary indicators that have allowed the operation to adjust to changes. In this regard, PRRO 200174 as a whole has been sensitive to and appropriate for meeting the food security and nutrition needs of the refugee population, and has increased the food security resilience of host communities. The design demonstrates good complementarity of the individual interventions, whereby the contribution to the overall wellbeing of the refugee population in both camps exceeds the direct results of the WFP activities. This section details the ET's assessment of appropriateness to needs in terms of operation design, operation objectives, and geographical targeting.

Operation design

48. This section reviews whether the operation design was based on adequate context analysis and analytical work. It analyses the extent to which the design reflects appropriate choices of transfer modalities, activities, and targeting.

49. Overview. PRRO 200174 is the latest programming output of a series of operations dating back to 1991 when the camps were established. Over this time period, WFP/Kenya has developed a system of data collection and analysis that forms the basis of strategic decision-making and response. The design and implementation of PRRO 200174 has been based on a context analysis derived from multiple sources: VAM reports, Joint Assessment Missions (JAMs) (2006, 2010, 2012) focusing on food security, the Kenyan household survey (Kenya DHS 2008-09), in-house monitoring and evaluation systems, and NGO partner consultations were all used to assure that the PRRO design was based on an adequate evaluation of the changing ground reality. The numbers of refugees registered in the camps (thus the demand for food) are provided by UNHCR and, since the Kenyan Refugee Act (2006), by the Government of Kenya Department of Refugee Affairs (DRA). In the area of nutritional security, monthly monitoring activities assure that the population's nutritional status is assessed in a timely fashion, and the BR process is used to adjust to crises, as occurred in 2011. Regarding targeting, the introduction of the biometric system was informed by the flow of comprehensive field data. The design of PRRO 200174 also reflects the final review and recommendations of previous PRROs (e.g., PRRO 102583) and the 2010 WFP Kenya portfolio review (2011), e.g., the recommendation to introduce a biometric targeting system. The ET finds that, taken in its entirety, an adequate and appropriate system of needs assessment has driven the design of the operation. The remainder of this section organizes discussion of context analysis and design choice by main intervention area, including design aspects relative to gender equity and women's empowerment principles.

50. GFD: The primary transfer modality for PRRO food assistance is GFD, which is set up to achieve universal coverage of all eligible refugees. Recognized refugees and asylum seekers who are registered and residing in the camp, and those refugees or asylum seekers who are legitimately temporarily outside of the designated area as per the 2006 Kenya Refugees Act, are entitled to receive food assistance in accordance with the criteria set by UNHCR and WFP.³⁶ All refugees receive the same rations, regardless of age.

51. The context analysis driving GFD design and implementation comes from multiple sources. The numbers of food recipients comes from UNHCR, which is responsible for registration of refugees. Regular market surveys track sale of GFD commodities and helped inform the introduction of a biometrics system to increase GFD efficiency. Targeting adjustments associated with the roll-out of biometrics were recommended by the 2010 WFP Kenya portfolio review (2011), and significant analysis and preparation for the introduction of biometrics was contained in BR3. Here various consultations were conducted to solicit external experiences with biometrics, and a similarly complex process of prior consultations was initiated with stakeholders, CPs, and camp leaders. The 2012 JAM report identified the need for an additional FDP in Kambios camp (residents had to go to Hagadera to receive their rations), and as a result the FDP was established. Given the relevance and in-depth nature of data-based analysis and the extensive consultations undertaken, the ET deems the context analysis appropriate to directing GFD targeting adjustments.

52. BSF/TSF/Fresh food vouchers (FFV): BSF, TSF, and FFV are nutritional interventions that target particularly vulnerable populations: children under 59 months (BSF); children under 24 months and PLW, children with signs of moderate malnutrition and children with signs of severe malnutrition (TSF); and all PLW (FFV). These interventions were introduced under BR1 as a result of the alarming increase in global acute malnutrition (GAM) rates that occurred in 2011 with the large influx of refugees from Somalia. The ET considers this intervention set well substantiated by multiple data sources and context analyses. First of all, WFP, through its CPs, maintains a monitoring system in both camps that uses globally accepted indicators based on weight for height, weight for age, and middle upper arm circumference (MUAC). These data are collected by CPs, compiled in Nairobi, and disseminated through the annual SPR. In addition, two major nutritional studies of Kakuma and Dadaab (2012)³⁷ provided compelling evidence, especially in Dadaab, for the need to address critically elevated GAM levels³⁸ and anaemia in children and PLW. The choice of the BSFP intervention was in line with Sphere standards (2004) and WHO guidelines³⁹ for management of malnutrition in areas with high GAM levels, as was the case during the 2011 emergency in the camps. In addition to the BSFP, in 2011 WFP introduced TSF to treat acute malnutrition among children 6-9 months old. Again, this is a standard intervention in accordance with Sphere standards for the management of malnutrition in emergency situations. The ET finds the WFP selection of BSF and TSF interventions to be well justified in that they are based on solid evidence and are well-established as effective preventative measures for the respective targeted vulnerable populations.

³⁶ UNHCR. 2013a.

³⁷ Due to technical problems with the survey methodology, Dagahaley camp in Dadaab was re-surveyed, with the results published in 2013.

³⁸ Above the emergency threshold of 15 percent.

³⁹ WHO. 2000.

53. In December 2012, WFP introduced a small-scale FFV pilot programme in Dadaab for all PLW attending ANC, with the overarching objective to contribute to WFP’s learning in relation to using new transfer modalities⁴⁰ to mainstream nutrition into food security programmes, to strengthen markets, and to improve WFP’s business processes. It is intended to address low diet diversity (as reported in the FSOMs), which may contribute to high levels of anaemia.

54. The pilot was well thought out and based on several studies: nutrition surveys in Dadaab and Kakuma repeatedly highlight that refugees’ diets lack diversity needed for adequate nutrition, particularly affecting nutritionally vulnerable groups.⁴¹ A 2012 market study found that a FFV programme in the camps would be feasible, particularly in Dadaab where markets have proven capable of providing a steady and growing supply of nutritious foods, financial services are available, and a good foundation of related evidence and experience has been built by NGOs like Action Contre La Faim (ACF) and Save the Children UK (SCUK).⁴² There is also evidence that vouchers can increase participation in nutrition and other health programmes.^{43,44} The choice of PLW as FFV beneficiaries was appropriate for several reasons. First, the pilot complements BSF for PLW: FFV has proven to be an effective way to improve dietary diversity for nutritionally vulnerable groups. Second, the numbers involved enabled universal targeting while keeping the size manageable and within a suitable scale for a pilot. Finally, linking eligibility for FFV conditionally to women’s attendance at ANC provides an incentive for women to enter the programme earlier in their pregnancy, and contribute through integrated programming to an overall improved health and nutrition status of pregnant women.⁴⁵ Moreover, monetization⁴⁶ of GFD rations in Dadaab and Kakuma provided a strong rationale to explore an alternative modality through which beneficiaries could acquire preferred goods not in the ration basket, while eliminating the transaction costs of monetization. In sum, the ET finds the choice of FFV as a transfer modality to be well-substantiated through the contextual analysis undertaken, and appropriate in this context.

55. Institutional feeding. Institutional feeding, in the form of supplementary rations for PLHIV, TB patients, and people with chronic diseases, is deemed an appropriate intervention choice because such supplementation is considered to help patients meet their nutritional requirements. In the case of PLHIV specifically, it is widely accepted that nutritional health is essential to maximize the period of asymptomatic infection, to mount an effective immune response to fight opportunistic infections, and to optimize the benefits of ART.⁴⁷

56. School feeding/take-home ration: Between 40-45 percent of all residents in the two camps are of school age. In a report that summarizes information from Dadaab CPs,

⁴⁰ There are three transfer modalities for food assistance - cash, vouchers and food. These may be used in combination to achieve a variety of different objectives and to maximise cost-efficiency and effectiveness. WFP.2011b.

⁴¹ WFP. 2013e..

⁴² From 2007-2012, ACF and SCUK implemented implementing a small-scale FFV programme in Dadaab camps targeting on average 9,000 children 6 to 11 months of age with a voucher for fresh fruits, vegetables and eggs.

⁴³ ACF International. 2012b.

⁴⁴ ACF International. 2012a.

⁴⁵ WFP. 2013e..

⁴⁶ *Monetization* in this report refers to as the sale of food rations by beneficiaries for the purpose of acquiring cash resources: the rations function as a tradable currency. Refugees sell their rations to purchase fresh foods, firewood and non-food items (NFIs), which are not provided in sufficient quantities. In Dadaab, the main monetized items are cereals (sorghum and maize); in Kakuma, they are wheat flour and CSB. Sale of oil is common in both camps.. There is no reliable data on the extent of monetization in the camps but CO and ET estimates are less than 10 percent, which can be considered “normal” for refugee assistance programs.

⁴⁷ Marston and Cock. 2004; Fawzi et al. 2004

only 25 percent of school-aged children (primary and secondary) are in school in Dadaab.⁴⁸ It is widely acknowledged that education is the pathway to livelihood success, to individual human fulfilment, and to social stability. Nevertheless the educational situation in the camps is of great concern and complexity. A study of school feeding in the ASAL regions (and urban slums) of Kenya (WFP 2010) showed that in the primarily pastoral regions, net enrolment in primary school is very low and even lower for girls, and primary completion rates are dramatically low. The Joint Assessment for Education in Dadaab—a multi-stakeholder exercise—found net enrolment rates of 52 percent for boys and 43 percent for girls in Dadaab. One of the cited reasons for such low rates was poverty and “not enough food” (2010:6). On the other hand, the Joint Strategy for Education in Dadaab (2011), while acknowledging the low enrolment and retention rates, does not mention school meals in its strategic recommendations. A similar education strategy for Kakuma camp (2013) has identified similarly low net enrolment levels in primary school (around 42 percent) and a strong gender imbalance with lower enrolment and retention rates for girls. This document recommends school meals and take-home rations (THR) for girls as “incentives” to attend school. There is wide agreement that refugee school-aged children have the “right to education,” but the fact that so few children actually attend and finish primary (let alone secondary school) suggests the need for a multi-faceted coordinated plan. The ET adheres to the position that all children—in or outside of a refugee camp—should have access to a meal/snack during the day. This position is supported by a multitude of studies and the impact of school meals on student concentration and improved learning has been demonstrated globally (viz. WFP 2010 evaluation of the Kenya school feeding program). A major justification for the daily snack⁴⁹ is that many children come to school without breakfast and most four to eighth grade children cannot return home for lunch. In light of the support for the school feeding in the literature and the camp context, the ET considers the school meal to be appropriately designed in terms of nutritive value, transfer modality, and targeting.

57. On the other hand, the ET could find little evidence to support the “need” for sugar rations to draw girls to school. The take-home ration (THR), meant to correct the lack of gender parity in education, provides 500 gm of sugar to girls in primary school who maintain an 80 percent attendance rate. While acknowledging the cultural role of sugar in Somali diets, the ET does not find the sugar THR to be an appropriate design element to increase levels of female participation in school. It is essential to address the underlying socio-cultural causes that act as a barrier to girl’s education, as opposed to treating the problem’s symptoms with a ration of sugar. At the same time, it is important that WFP engage with education sector partners working in the camps to explore alternative incentives to promote participation that focus on quality of education, i.e., improving student to teacher rations, ensuring sufficient school materials are available, and constructing more schools. Such alternatives are beyond the direct responsibility of WFP but would make any food assistance provided through schools more appropriate.

58. FFT: The FFT component is designed to build livelihood skills of young camp residents. FFT targets “disenfranchised youth” by providing food for a lunch for adult students⁵⁰ who spend the entire day at vocation training centres: Youth Education Packs

⁴⁸ Kamau, C. and J. Fox. 2013.

⁴⁹ In the camps, Early Child Development (ECD) preschool children in grades 1-3 spend a half day in school, while children in grades 4-8 study during the morning and afternoon. The operation provides a snack in the morning to children in primary school and in the ECD. The daily snack value for each child is 445 Kcals; it consists of a porridge made with CSB++ and dry skimmed milk.

⁵⁰ The lunch is provided to all students and teachers for 195 days a year and provides 667 Kcals of energy (11 percent protein).

(YEPs) and other vocational schools.⁵¹ Some schools in the host communities also provide student boarding, so the food is particularly valued. Other than the PRRO justification itself, the most insightful document available to the ET that offers a systematic analysis of the livelihood needs and the labour market for graduates of training programs is the Kamau and Fox study based on a sample of 300 household interviews and focus group discussions in Dadaab. The study shows that newer arrivals in Dadaab are more responsive to livelihood training opportunities than those who are more established or who suffer from a sense of dependence on assistance. The ET would suggest that Strategic Objective 2 (*Restore and build lives and livelihoods*) is adequate justification for this intervention, given the contextual constraints on mobility and employment outside the camp, the need for cash to complement food assistance (for refugees), and the desirability of providing productive livelihood skills to young people who might otherwise have highly limited options.

59. FFA: Food for assets activities directly target the host communities within a 50 km radius of the camps (as do some FFT activities).⁵² The majority of the participants are women; they engage in water and soil conservation projects that enhance environmental and rangeland quality and provide convenient water sources for animals and humans. The ET remains unclear with regard to the perceived need of this intervention set—whether it is to compensate host communities that have borne the brunt of natural resource degradation caused by the demands of the large refugee population for firewood, water, and pasture; to create a healthy relationship with host community leadership and reduce any tensions that might exist; or simply to assist a highly vulnerable population located in proximity of the camps. The ET was not provided and could not identify any specific document that verified the extent and nature of environmental damage. In fact, the JAM 2012 discusses the positive impact of the camps upon the host community, citing that the growth in population around the Kakuma and Dadaab camps reflects a growth in economic opportunities and the labour market. On the other hand, it is known that refugees make organized forays of several days away from the camp to acquire firewood. Also, available indicators on food security, education, and nutrition (derived from the FSOM reports on beneficiaries compared to non-beneficiaries) suggest that host community populations are comparatively disadvantaged. While in a general sense FFT interventions are appropriate to assist communities to “meet their food needs,” in the opinion of the ET, this intervention requires a more transparent needs assessment and targeting strategy. A clear statement of perceived needs would help determine the appropriateness of the intervention.

60. Gender: Each PRRO intervention demonstrates an understanding of and sensitivity to gender differences in terms of targeting, activity implementation, and monitoring. The gender-sensitive design is responsive to findings on gender issues in a number of sources, and in alignment with WFP commitments to gender equality. The UNHCR Global Report (2010) reports on incidences of gender-based violence for each camp; interventions such as FFA (water-pond building) and firewood distribution (through UNHCR) are therefore explicitly designed to offer protection to women and girls. GFD has demonstrated protection of girls and women and respect for cultural gender norms by organizing separate distribution lines for females with special attention afforded to females, especially the young and very old, by the ushers. The Joint Review of the Educational Sector in Dadaab Camp (2010) provides evidence of gender imbalance in education at all levels and has been cited as a justification for school meals and take-home rations as means of increasing the number

⁵¹ Some partner institutions in both Dadaab and Kakuma also provide training to host-community residents.

⁵² FFA provides a monthly food ration for 120 days based on 1766 Kcal/person/day (10 percent protein).

of girls in school. The explicit governance roles reserved for women in both camps further speaks to a commitment to gender equality. The PRRO 200174 document emphasizes gender sensitivity and inclusion of women in all activities and promotes women's participation in decision-making (WFP 2011:9). Gender analysis and gender concerns specifically also have a lineage in the past PRROs targeting refugee populations. Gender analysis, appropriately, is an on-going process within WFP and its CPss (e.g., Kamau and Fox 2013), and virtually all intervention outputs are differentiated by gender (viz. SPR 2013).

Operation objectives

61. This discussion reviews the extent to which specific operation objectives are reflective of population needs. It is organized per the sequence in which these objectives appear in the Operation Factsheet under WFP corporate Strategic Objectives (SOs) 1, 3, and 2.

62. Operation objectives under corporate SO1⁵³: The specific objective to “meet the food consumption needs and minimal nutritional requirements of refugees” is appropriate and relevant. Although composition of the food basket varies based on commodity availability, GFD consistently meets beneficiaries’ needs for a 2100+Kcal/person/day ration, and also consistently meets the minimum level of micronutrient intake, mainly though the inclusion of corn-soya blend (CSB).⁵⁴ The ration size and the length of time it has been maintained are high compared to other protracted refugee situations. However, in the case of Dadaab and Kakuma, the ration size is justifiable and appropriate within a rights-based approach when considering the strict encampment policy enforced by the Government of Kenya: focus group participants in both camps indicated that some income-generating activities do exist, i.e., incentive work or small-scale economic trade, however only a small proportion of refugees is involved in these activities. The majority are fully dependent on WFP food assistance to meet food consumption and nutrition needs.

63. The specific objective to “manage MAM and prevent SAM in PLW and children under five through SF” is also a relevant and appropriate response to population needs. The named target groups are considered nutritionally vulnerable because of the fast growth of children and the added nutritional demands of pregnancy and lactation. Stunting rates were below the Kenyan national average in both camps (KDHS 2008-09).

64. Operation objectives under corporate SO3⁵⁵: The specific objective “to improve access to micronutrients for PLW and children aged 6-23 months through BFS” is appropriate and in line with the corporate objective. The general food ration provided to refugees – even at full level as provided under this PRRO (Kcal 2,100 per capita) – does not provide the adequate nutrients to meet additional requirements of these target groups, especially in emergency situations where food insecurity is present. The 2011 famine emergency provided the opportunity to review nutritional status in the camps and to shift the programmatic focus to the prevention of malnutrition among these vulnerable groups.⁵⁶ The decision to shift to blanket feeding of these groups is solidly justified in terms of

⁵³ *Saving lives and protecting livelihoods.* Note that the “protecting livelihoods”: component of this strategic objective is not possible within the PRRO because refugees are not allowed to undertake livelihood activities under the Government of Kenya encampment policy.

⁵⁴ Minimum healthy food basket translates to 1509 Kcal/capita/day and is composed of 350g maize grain,75 grams dried beans, 150g cow milk, 20g vegetable oil,40g sugar,50g onion,775 grams ripe tomatoes and 25 grams goat meat. WFP. 2013b.

⁵⁵ *Restore and build lives and livelihoods.*

⁵⁶ Current anaemia levels among children under five and women of reproductive age are of concern (>40 percent) based on WHO guidelines.

nutritional best practices, Kenyan nutritional standards and policy, and WFP's commitment to maintain the food security of the refugee camp population. It is important to note that the PRRO also includes an FFV pilot that also targets PLW, which complements the BSF.

65. The school meals program and the take-home ration are consistent with corporate SO₃ and directly address the specific project objective to “maintain enrolment and attendance and reduce the gender disparity in primary schools in the camps” (PRRO 200174: p. 8). The ET generally supports the appropriateness of the school snack intervention for primary school children but is of the opinion that it is not, by itself, an inadequate intervention to meet this objective. While the specific objective is highly consistent with its needs analysis (see above), the intervention as a stand-alone activity cannot achieve its worthy objective. The ET further maintains that while gender parity is an objective fully justified by the needs analysis, the take-home sugar ration is not the inappropriate intervention.

66. The institutional feeding for PLHIV, TB patients, and people with chronic diseases is also consistent with SO₃. It achieves the specific project objective to increase adherence to treatment and helps meet the nutritional needs of in-patients. Qualitative findings from patient and health staff interviews show that this intervention improves the overall treatment experience in the health centres.

67. The FFT intervention is oriented by corporate SO₃ and the specific objective to “increase enrolment and attendance among disenfranchised young people in training centres.” The ET considers this objective to be adequate and appropriate, consistent with needs assessments. The vocational training centres (YEPs), which are supported by WFP, provide relevant professional training and meet a direct need of young people. Refugee youth have very limited access to any type of vocational training that can help them rebuild their livelihoods after they leave the camp. Interviews with YEP participants, indicate that the meals provided in the centres improve the overall training experience and aid in maintaining concentration throughout the day.

68. Operation objectives under corporate SO₂⁵⁷: The specific project objective to “increase the capacity of host communities to meet their food needs” was initially included under corporate SO₂ but subsequently combined under SO₃. This objective relates to FFA activities. The ET considers this very general objective to be consistent with the needs of the host communities, given their relatively disadvantaged food security situation compared to the refugee population. However, the 2013 SPR presents this objective as one designed to reduce “tension” between the host community and the refugees, and the ET finds this objective too vague and incomplete, as discussed above.

Geographical targeting

69. WFP's geographic targeting for this PRRO is determined by camp locations. The geographic location of food assistance activities for refugees within the camps is appropriate: FDP locations are spread out across the camps to minimize travel times and costs for food collectors. WFP food assistance to education and health services follows geographical distribution of such services, which are similarly distributed across the camp areas for efficient access by refugees. The only activities implemented outside of the camps

⁵⁷ Prevent acute hunger and invest in preparedness and mitigation measures.

are the FFA interventions (within a 50 km radius of the camps) and a limited number of FFT centres. The locations of FFA and FFT activities were determined in consultation with the Government of Kenya, and are in line with government policies and plans.

2.1.2. Coherence with WFP corporate strategy

70. The PRRO objectives and design are strategically situated within the WFP Country Strategy (2013-17)⁵⁸; they specifically address Priority 1 (*Emergency preparedness, response and coordination*) and Priority 3 (*Building resilience: livelihood diversification and markets strengthening*). The WFP corporate commitment is asserted several times throughout this document and is effectively summarized as achieving “A Kenya that is free from hunger and malnutrition where all Kenyans and refugees have access to safe and adequate nutritious food” (p. 1). The document reiterates WFP’s intention to work with the Government of Kenya and partner agencies to assure adequate levels of food and nutritional security for the refugee population and to support education and livelihood training. The WFP corporate strategy in this document, citing the Nairobi Declaration (2011), explicitly states its commitment to collaborate with UN partners in support of the host communities around the camps: “[There is]... a need for the international community to enhance support to refugee host communities through sustainable programmes for the host community to mitigate the impact of refugee influx on fragile ecosystems, education, water and sanitation, security, as well as energy (Nairobi Declaration, 2011, p. 6).

71. The PRRO and the WFP corporate strategy align broadly with the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF 2009- 2013), particularly with Priority 2 (*Investing in people and reducing poverty and vulnerability, particularly regarding security, peace-building, and conflict management as well as disaster management*). Based on these consistencies, the ET considers PRRO 200174 reflective of and integrated with the priorities of WFP Kenya and its UN partners.

2.1.3. Coherence with government policies

72. PRRO 200174 is consistent with the principal national development strategy, Vision 2030, which has set a goal of achieving middle-income status and assuring food security for its citizenry by 2030. The lines of alignment with Vision 2030 are most noted in priorities in food security, disaster preparedness, education, gender equality, and environmental sustainability. This PRRO has integrated programming principles of human rights and social protection (Kenya National Social Protection Policy 2011); of gender-based targeting, design, and implementation; and of environmental protection (viz. the Nairobi Strategy 2011). In a more operational sense, PRRO 200174 complies with Kenyan refugee policy (Kenya Refugees Act of 2006) which created the Department of Refugee Affairs, WFP’s principal Government of Kenya field partner. The educational system in the refugee camps follow the national curriculum established in the Ministry of Education, and the nutritional indicators and Sphere standards are consistent with national health practices. Provision of supplementary rations to PLHIV and TB patients is in alignment with the objectives of the Kenya National Food and Nutrition Security Session Paper 2011. Finally, WFP cooperates with the recent Tripartite Agreement that has initiated a strategy of voluntary refugee repatriation.

⁵⁸ WFP Kenya. 2012c.

2.1.4. Coherence with partners

73. The success of this PRRO is highly dependent upon the effectiveness of partnerships with the Government of Kenya, United Nations agencies, CPss, and local leaderships. The capacity of WFP to develop technical and implementation synergies with partner organizations is an important contributing factor to the results of the PRRO, as will also be discussed in Section 2.3. The operation has demonstrated effective collaboration with UNHCR at national and local levels, especially when strategic readjustments (e.g., biometrics) are introduced. The ET observed the close working relationship between field office management and the DRA, which has contributed directly to a safe and enabling operating environment for WFP food assistance in a complex protracted refugee setting. WFP works with a wide range of competent CPs to support field implementation of the food assistance activities. Roles and responsibilities among WFP and CPs are clear and based on demonstrated competencies, which contributes to efficient and effective strategic decision making and operations..

74. United Nations agencies: The planning and implementation of nutrition programs in both camps is conducted jointly through strategic partnerships between UN agencies and cooperating NGOs. WFP provides food for the supplementary feeding programmes and UNICEF provides it for therapeutic feeding; UNHCR provides support to the health organizations implementing health and nutrition programmes in the camps. The successful shift to biometrics in GFD is the result of more effective data sharing and a strong collaboration between WFP and UNHCR. This collaboration on biometrics design and the ongoing joint-implementation of the biometrics system is a starting point to explore additional channels for more effective data utilization for refugee assistance interventions, including food assistance but also potentially extending to other essential services.

75. Donors: In terms of alignment with donor strategy, the evaluation consulted a range of donors who support WFP operations. The ET noted that relationships with donors are fluid and depend upon resource availabilities, but found that WFP is considered to be very responsive to donor priorities and to seek to align activities accordingly. The majority of the donors concurred that the WFP Kenya PRRO is doing a good job in very difficult operating environments.

76. Non-governmental organizations: In Kakuma the health and nutrition interventions are implemented by The International Rescue Committee (IRC), and in Dadaab the CPss are IRC, MSF, Islamic Relief World-Wide, and the Kenya Red Cross. The school systems at the camps are run by NGO CPs, such as Lutheran World Federation, Islamic Relief, and CARE International. NGO CPs manage the FDPs: CARE and NRC in Dadaab, and NRC and World Vision in Kakuma. These partners assume the responsibility of constructing classrooms and supporting infrastructure (e.g., latrines and boreholes) hiring and training teachers, and providing supplies. The ET found that these CP relationships are very effective: collaboration builds on synergies in technical and implementation capacity; roles and responsibilities are clear with short lines of communication to facilitate adaptive management on the ground; and collaborations are frank and transparent. The ET finds that the WFP-CP partnerships have demonstrable capacity to deal with the myriad of implementation challenges that occur on a daily basis to ensure smooth implementation of food assistance and related activities.

Key Findings and Conclusions: Appropriateness of the Operation

The PRRO design is relevant to the food security and nutrition needs of the refugee population, which remains solely dependent on food assistance, and contributes to meeting the food security resilience needs of host communities. The design demonstrates good complementarity among the individual interventions, is aligned with relevant Government of Kenya policies and plans, and builds synergies with the technical and implementation capacity of UN partner agencies and CPs. The PRRO contribution to the overall wellbeing of the refugee population in both camps exceeds the direct results of the WFP activities.

- The PRRO design was based on a robust context analysis from multiple sources and adequate evaluation of changing ground realities. The PRRO follows through on recommendations from previous PRRO evaluations, e.g., the introduction of biometrics.
- The PRRO interventions are appropriate to achieve the specific operation objectives, which are reflective of population needs and consistent with corporate strategic objectives 1, 2 and 3.
- The choices for transfer modalities, activities and targeting for GFD, TSF, BSF, FFV, institutional feeding, school feeding (with the exception of THR for girls) and FFT were appropriate.
- The ET cannot make a satisfactory determination of the appropriateness of FFA activities to host-community needs, as a clear statement of perceived needs and targeting decisions is lacking.
- The PRRO interventions demonstrate an understanding of and sensitivity to gender differences in terms of targeting, implementation, and monitoring, and the design is responsive to findings on gender issues.
- Geographical distribution of food assistance activities, i.e., FDP locations within the camps, is appropriate and conducive to access by refugee beneficiaries. The location of activities outside of the camp, i.e., FFA and FFT, was determined in consultation with the Government of Kenya and is in line with government policies and plans.
- The PRRO is reflective of and integrated with the priorities of WFP Kenya and its UN partners, and Government of Kenya national development strategies, policies and plans. WFP also cooperates with the recent Tripartite Agreement that has initiated a strategy of voluntary refugee returns.
- The operation has demonstrated effective collaboration with UNHCR at national and local levels, especially when strategic readjustments (e.g., biometrics) are introduced. The ET observed the close working relationship between field office management and the DRA, which has contributed directly to a safe and enabling operating environment for WFP food assistance in a complex protracted refugee setting.
- WFP works with a wide range of competent CPs to support field implementation of the food assistance activities. Roles and responsibilities of WFP and CPs are clear and based on demonstrated competencies, which contributes to efficient and effective strategic decision-making and operations.
- WFP has developed a good working relationship with its donor partners. The majority of donors consider WFP to be responsive to donor priorities and concurred that WFP is doing a good job in a complex operating environment.

2.2. Results of the Operation

77. This section presents the major evaluation findings assessing the outputs of the intervention activities, including operation success in reaching intended beneficiaries at the intended scale; timeliness; and effectiveness and efficiency of intervention sets. The analysis is organized according to core intervention sets. The subsequent section assesses the outcomes in terms of meeting the needs of the population and the objectives of the operation.

2.2.1. Attainment of planned outputs

GFD

78. **GFD beneficiary selection:** As stated in Section 2.1, refugees and asylum seekers who are registered and residing in the camp, and those refugees or asylum seekers who are legitimately and temporarily outside of the camp, are entitled to receive food assistance. Until September 2013, this process was undertaken using food manifests based on the refugee registration system, proGres. Under this process, there was significant inclusion error. Refugees who left the camps illegitimately would sell or give their ration cards to people who would continue collecting the food. Cards would be kept active by the original cardholder who returned for UNHCR verification exercises, which were organized every two to three years and announced well ahead of time.

79. In September 2013, following a comprehensive design and test phase, WFP and UNHCR with support from donors instituted the use of biometric fingerprint checks to verify eligibility of the food collector during GFD in Dadaab and Kakuma camps. Proper procedures are in place to ensure data privacy and protection standards are not compromised. In February 2012, WFP and UNHCR signed a country-level agreement that gave WFP access to selected refugee identity information through a live link into the proGres database and a copy of the fingerprint database to implement identity checks during food distribution. The biometrics project was also guided by a new set of comprehensive food collection procedures developed jointly by WFP and UNHCR to ensure that everyone who is eligible gets food, and that vulnerable households are not disadvantaged by the new system. The biometrics system has improved beneficiary selection and equitable use of food resources. Since the biometrics system was introduced, the amount of food monetized has also decreased substantially.

80. Coverage of vulnerable households is ensured through procedures that allow households to designate an alternate food collector in specific situations. This includes households that have able members to authorize, an older person or single woman at risk with no household members to be authorized, a household composed of a refugee incentive worker with no household members to be authorized, and unaccompanied minors. UNHCR is still working on more detailed procedures for unaccompanied minors, so in the meantime the age filter in the system is not enforced in Kakuma camp where the problem is most pronounced.

81. The initial resistance by refugees to the introduction of biometrics was successfully addressed through an effective communications campaign organized by WFP, UNHCR and the CPs, combined with continuous dialogue with refugee leadership and representatives through a range of forums. A biometrics satisfaction survey undertaken in November-December 2013 shows high satisfaction among food collectors with the

biometrics procedures.⁵⁹ Qualitative data and direct observation confirmed the findings of the satisfaction survey.

- 82. GFD actual vs. planned:** In 2012 and up to the introduction of biometrics in September 2013, GFD covered close to 100 percent of beneficiaries holding ration cards. In October 2013, GFD covered 94 percent and 86 percent of eligible refugees in Dadaab and Kakuma respectively.⁶⁰ In November 2013, GFD covered 87 percent and 84 percent of eligible refugees in Dadaab and Kakuma respectively. The drop in coverage is likely attributable to the biometrics verification system and the fact that refugees can no longer collect food for others who may not be in the camp.⁶¹
- 83.** As of 15 December 2013, WFP was providing GFD rations to 105,925 people in Kakuma and 334,347 people in Dadaab. This is a reduction of 87,817 people receiving food as a result of biometrics between 15 September and 15 December 2013. As a result, 2,892 fewer tons of food was needed to feed the camps' populations in the last quarter of 2013, which would have cost US\$2.69 million for WFP to purchase, transport, and distribute.⁶² WFP data show that US\$680,498 was saved in Dadaab and US\$269,539 in Kakuma in November alone, and 946 mt of food were saved for both camps.^{63,64} In effect, the ET agrees with WFP that the beneficiary numbers under the biometric system have been correctly adjusted and that the current levels of planned and actual beneficiaries now accurately reflect food needs.
- 84. GFD timeliness:** GFD occurs at FDPs every two weeks. There are preparatory meetings with the Food Security Committees (the camp FDP governance groups) to share any new information regarding the upcoming distributions and to organize the process with the locally-hired staff. Although food shortages required ration cuts at the end of 2013, there were no breakdowns in the distributions, and generally the GFDs occurred smoothly, especially given the logistical complexities. In 2012 and 2013, GFD provided food for 100 percent of days that year, and scheduled distributions were 100 percent on time.
- 85. GFD efficiency/effectiveness:** The ET finds the food basket consistent with food security needs, although it may not fully meet cultural preferences of all refugees. The standard food basket is most commonly composed of two cereals (maize and sorghum), beans, CSB, vegetable oil and iodized salt. Basket composition varies slightly according to availability of specific foods. In general, refugees are satisfied with the food basket composition. However, qualitative findings in Dadaab camps strongly indicated that for Somali refugees (non-Bantu), sorghum is not a preferred food.⁶⁵ Furthermore, there were numerous complaints about the quality of recent sorghum rations, received from South Sudan, which discoloured when cooked. Somali refugees indicated that sorghum would be more acceptable if combined with a consistent wheat flour ration, which is a preferred food.

⁵⁹ UNHCR and MSFCH. 2013.

⁶⁰ The less than 100 percent coverage is due to eligible refugees who do not collect their food, e.g., because they have left the camp.

⁶¹ WFP. 2013b.

⁶² Communication from WFP Kenya.

⁶³ The calculation of actual vs planned takes into account the 20 percent ration reduction for the two cycles of November due to pipeline breaks.

⁶⁴ WFP. 2013b.

⁶⁵ Qualitative findings indicate that sorghum is a preferred food for Bantu Somali refugees. The ET has no accurate data on proportion of Bantu vs non-Bantu. However, qualitative data consistently confirms that the proportion of Bantu is smaller than the proportion on non-Bantu Somalis.

- 86.** WFP acknowledges the concerns around sorghum and consistently tries to maintain two different cereals in the basket within the conditions that in-kind donors apply and availability of funds to directly purchase alternatives in sufficient amounts. However, as of February 2014, sorghum will be the only cereal distributed because of cost-effectiveness decisions by in-kind donors: sorghum is cheaper, allowing more people to be fed for the same amount of money. A pricing overview provided by USAID for a US\$10 million pledge to the PRRO showed that wheat flour is almost three times more expensive than sorghum.
- 87.** The organization of the GFD follows WFP and UNHCR standards.⁶⁶ The GFD takes place biweekly through central FDPs and is organized by household size across a period of five to seven days, not including pre-positioning. The collection process usually takes around two hours, which is within WFP standards and can be considered relatively fast given the large volume of refugees fed each day. A main contributing factor to this is the effective lay out of the FDPs, i.e., width of corridors and extra waiting areas, which is conducive to effective food distribution and flow of food collectors. Rations are delivered to the Protection Zone for households/individuals who cannot travel to the FDPs for personal safety reasons.⁶⁷
- 88.** The FDPs are the right size and located across the camp areas for effective distribution: three FDPs in Kakuma and five FDPs in Dadaab. The FDPs are not utilized at full capacity, with the exception of the FDPs in Dagahaley and Hagadera sub-camps in Dadaab. The layout of the FDPs is conducive to a smooth GFD process, as will be described in detail in the results section. Several FDPs have recently been constructed, replacing older structures, and a temporary FDP was installed in Kambios camp (the newest in Dadaab) after extended negotiations with the Government of Kenya. NGO CPs manage the FDPs: CARE and NRC in Dadaab, and NRC and World Vision in Kakuma. All CPs are identified through a competitive bidding process, and have the necessary capacity and experience to successfully manage the FDP and GFD processes.
- 89.** Not all beneficiaries are physically able to visit the FDPs to receive their food. Qualitative findings and direct observation indicate that the designation of alternates is a complicated issue for those households comprised of elderly members, unaccompanied minors, single members, bed-ridden adults, etc. Essentially, this means that the sick and elderly have to physically present themselves at the FDP or they will lose their ration. While the age restriction has been temporarily removed in Kakuma camp, several key informants provided ideas to reduce the minimum age requirement from 18 to 15 for all food collectors, which would increase the number of eligible collectors per household and the number of eligible alternates.

BSF/TSF

- 90. BSF/TSF beneficiary selection.** The beneficiaries targeted under the nutritional security objectives vary according to the type of intervention.
- Blanket feeding for children 6-23 months old: the nutritional produce is super-cereal or CSB++, a nutrient-dense food that is enriched with milk, oil and highly fortified with micronutrients. Each child receives the equivalent of 200g of super cereal per

⁶⁶ WFP. 2006. Food Distribution Guidelines.

⁶⁷ Protection Zones are created within each camp to protect individuals or families who are in personal danger (such as in the case of internal feuds, marriage dispute, or blood vengeance situations).

day, which is distributed on a biweekly basis in both camps. In Kakuma camp, the distribution is conducted through the health facilities, whereas in Dadaab it is distributed together with the general ration because of the large number of children of this age in the camp and logistical constraints such as food commodity storage at the health facilities.

- Blanket feeding for pregnant women (from second trimester) and lactating women up to six months: these women receive 105g of CSB+ and 10g of oil per day, which translates into Kcal 508. This food is distributed monthly at health facilities.
- Targeted feeding for women: those PLW with MUAC < 23 cm received a daily equivalent of 25g of oil and 250g of CSB+, translating into Kcal 1,221/day. This food is distributed monthly at the health facilities.
- Targeted feeding for children under five: these children receive a daily dose of one sachet (92g) of plumpy sup, a supplement that provides Kcal 500/day; the plumpy sup is distributed on a biweekly basis. The admission criteria is weight-for-height >-3 and <-2 Z scores; MUAC >11.4 cm and <12.5 cm.
- All PLHIV and TB patients enrolled in the clinical programme receive supplementary food (CSB+ 140g and 10g vegetable oil) for as long as they remain enrolled.

91. The ET considers this targeting strategy to include the appropriate beneficiary set if GAM rates are to be maintained beneath critical levels and if cases of severe malnutrition are to be accurately monitored and corrected. There is concern, however, that anaemia levels are not addressed (this is happening only recently through the FFV) and not monitored more regularly.

92. BSF/TSF actual vs. planned: A summary comparison of programme targets and achievements for 2011, 2012, and 2013 is presented in Table 1. Over the three years documented here, there are significant differences between planned and actual beneficiary numbers – in most cases the actual beneficiaries falling short of the planned levels by around 30 percent. The explanations for these differences are not entirely clear. In the case of BSF, it is possible that such differences are due to transfer modality (in Dadaab, supplementary food is part of the GFD, whereas in Kakuma, mothers must go to a clinic to receive the supplements. Furthermore, beneficiary numbers are subject to change with fluctuations in the camp populations (including changes related to the introduction of the biometric targeting for GFD). In the case of TSF, the 2013 SPR suggests that the levels of moderate and severe malnutrition have indeed diminished, which would reduce the demand for food supplements. For PLW, FGDs at the clinics revealed that some women consider the waiting time and travel to the clinic to not compensate for the small amounts of supplementary food received. The ET does not consider these discrepancies in numbers to be of concern as long as the nutritional outcomes remain in acceptable ranges.

Table 1: Summary of nutrition beneficiary targets and achievements, by year and activity

| Beneficiary category | 2011 | | | 2012 | | | 2013 | | |
|--|---------|--------|-------------------------|---------|--------|-------------------------|---------|--------|-------------------------|
| | Planned | Actual | % actual versus planned | Planned | Actual | % actual versus planned | Planned | Actual | % actual versus planned |
| Children 6 to 23 months given food under supplementary feeding (targeted treatment for moderate malnutrition) | 3,300 | 2,219 | 67.2% | 5,600 | 6,347 | 113.3% | 6,400 | 4,834 | 75.5% |
| Children 24 to 59 months given food under supplementary feeding (targeted treatment for moderate malnutrition) | 13,200 | 8,877 | 67.3% | 9,400 | 6,363 | 67.7% | 9,900 | 6,093 | 61.5% |
| Children 6 to 23 months given food under BSF (prevention of acute malnutrition) | 35,000 | 31,634 | 90.4% | 35,000 | 45,000 | 128.6% | 35,000 | 27,009 | 77.2% |
| Children 24 to 59 months given food under BSF (prevention of acute malnutrition) | 54,000 | 45,563 | 84.4% | 73,000 | 45,386 | 62.2% | n.d. | n.d. | - |
| PLW given food under MCH/supplementary feeding | 27,500 | 16,705 | 60.7% | 26,000 | 16,671 | 64.5% | 1,500 | 805 | 53.7% |
| HIV/AIDS and TB beneficiaries | 2,400 | 3,107 | 129.5% | 2,400 | 3,396 | 141.5% | 2,400 | 1,575 | 65.6% |

Source: WFP Kenya, SPR 2011, 2012, and 2013

- 93. BSF/TSF timeliness:** BSF and TSF are distributed every two weeks on time and with predictability. At the health clinics, children and mothers are measured for signs of malnutrition and, if necessary, treated the same day. The major concern expressed to the ET by beneficiaries and CP staff is the length of waiting times and the long lines at the clinics.
- 94. BSF/TSF efficiency/effectiveness:** In light of the logistical challenges inherent in assessing nutritional status and distributing food, the ET has found the BSF/TSF intervention set to function efficiently except for the burdensome waiting at the clinics, particularly in Kakuma. Based on ET observations at the Kakuma clinics (during the distribution of the supplemental foods), the number of individual lines and tables appeared to be confusing and excessive. It would appear that a more efficient system would be desirable. With regard to effectiveness (in both camps), the ET nutritional expert noted that despite the long waiting times and the multiple measurements and data registration, CP staff communicated very little to the individual beneficiary mothers—either in terms of measurement outcomes or in terms of how to appropriately prepare and consume the food. Interviews with individual mothers revealed a lack of understanding with regard to how the food should be targeted to the malnourished family member. In the opinion of the ET, the effectiveness of this output process could be enhanced by taking advantage of these “learning moments.”

FFV

- 95. FFV beneficiary selection:** As of January 2014, around 14,000, or 100 percent, of eligible women attending ANC/PNC services at the UNHCR health clinics, were provided fresh food vouchers to be shared among household members, based on an estimated five individuals per household. On average, 8,000 PLW households have been served per month since the program began in August 2013.
- 96. FFV actual vs. planned:** In the pilot, all PLW regularly attending ANC/PNC at UNHCR health centres in Dadaab camp are eligible to receive the vouchers, including host community attendees.⁶⁸ Beneficiaries receive US\$12.60 worth of food vouchers every month; five meat vouchers (goat, camel) valued at approximately US\$9-10, and three vegetable vouchers (potato, onion, tomato, green leaf vegetable) valued at approximately US\$2-3. It is important to note that while the main beneficiaries are PLW, the composition and value are in line with emerging research on the minimum quantities necessary for improvements in dietary diversity of a five-person household.⁶⁹ Qualitative findings confirm that the fresh foods provided to PLW are shared equally among all household members, as per the design.
- 97.** Vouchers are registered in WFP’s FFV management information system before they are transported to the health partners for distribution through the health clinics. The health partner organizations stamp and date the vouchers to activate them as a currency, and scan the vouchers to link them to the food ration card of the recipient. Vouchers can then be traded for available meat and vegetables items at 68 registered traders within the five Dadaab camps that have been vetted by WFP. The traders submit the vouchers to the local bank, where they are scanned again to confirm they are legitimate before the cash deposit is placed in the trader’s bank account. For this service, the bank charges

⁶⁸ UNHCR health centres do not discriminate between refugees and host community members. Free services are provided to both.

⁶⁹ WFP. 2013e..

three Kenyan shillings per voucher. The FFV pilot was also selected by WFP as a priority site to test WFP's new corporate cash and voucher IT solution, and used the electronic voucher component of the new system. The pilot was developed and is currently being managed by the WFP Innovations Unit in Nairobi, but intentions are to shift responsibility to the PRRO coordination unit after the FFV evaluation in Q1 of 2014.

98. The ET's qualitative findings show high satisfaction levels with the FFV pilot among refugees and traders. It is very much perceived as an intervention that benefits the entire household, and non-beneficiary households are also very interested to be included. An initial review of the FFV pilot indicates several emerging issues that need to be considered in a future FFV programme at scale. Voucher recipients commonly trade in their vouchers at the same vendor. This would make it possible to replace the multiple food vouchers with only one per food group. Women reported feeling unsafe carrying the vouchers or expressed a fear of losing them. For this reason, they commonly deposit all the vouchers with the vendor at the same time, essentially creating store credit with that vendor. For the same reason, the vendor deposits the vouchers in the bank as soon as possible. WFP monitoring shows that vendors also provide other commodities to the voucher holders, particularly sugar, pasta, and milk. It will be difficult for WFP to enforce strict trade for only the selected voucher commodities, especially under the informal store credit system that has now emerged.

99. FFV timeliness: Meant to be used as a dietary supplement, the FFV is not bound by time limits but more by the availability of fresh vegetables and meat in local markets.

100. FFV efficiency/effectiveness: The pilot shows that the voucher system, including the electronic voucher component, is effective. All stakeholders – the voucher recipients, the vendors, the bank, CPs and responsible WFP staff – understand their roles. There have been minimal problems in setting up this system and at the time of the evaluation it was operating smoothly. There were some connectivity problems but making offline voucher registration possible has solved this. The FFV pilot has demonstrated a basic carrying capacity of the local market to provide fresh foods, at least for small numbers. Additional research on the effect of the increased demand on market prices will be required before considering further expansion of the program. It is important to note that, as part of the FFV pilot, WFP initiated improvements in its market monitoring system and expanded its indicators to better analyse the efficiency of its food assistance. A customer satisfaction survey and final evaluation are planned for early 2014.

SMP/THR

101. SMP/THR beneficiary selection: In 2013, WFP provided its mid-morning snack to 51 primary schools and early child development centres (ECDs) in Kakuma and Dadaab, up from 49 schools in 2012.⁷⁰ According to the information available to the ET, there are nine ECDs, 17 primary schools, and two secondary schools in Kakuma;⁷¹ in Dadaab the Joint Education Assessment (using 2010 data) reported 19 primary schools funded by UNHCR and 11 privately funded primary schools, however, the Dadaab Educational Strategy document reports 24 UNHCR primary schools as of 2011.⁷² This information suggests that WFP seeks close to full coverage of all ECDs and primary

⁷⁰ SPR 2012, 2103

⁷¹ Education Strategy, 2013-2016, Kakuma sub-office, UNHCR, 2013

⁷² Joint Strategy for Education in Dadaab, UNHCR sub-office, Dadaab, 2011

schools in both camps that are managed by CPs under UNHCR support. It is not clear whether the private schools receive WFP assistance, and none of the secondary schools are assisted. For the mid-morning snack, all children in school on a given day receive the snack. In the case of the THR, female primary students who have an attendance rate of 80 percent or above receive the 0.5 kg of sugar on a monthly basis.⁷³ Given MDG 3 and the fact that around half the school-age children in both camps do not attend school, this beneficiary targeting meets an egregious need.

102. SMP/THR actual vs. planned: The outputs of the school meals and THR interventions during the period 2011-2013 are summarized in Table 2. While the number of actual beneficiaries was less than planned in 2011, the numbers of actual beneficiaries increased significantly in 2012 and 2013, for both girls and boys, to a total of 113,358. Gender ratios during this time have remained stable at around 65 percent girls. The THR intervention for girls has experienced a similar pattern, increasing from 25,000 to over 38,000 in 2012 and 46,148 in 2013. According to WFP internal monitoring records, monthly attendance rates at these schools for 2013 averaged slightly above 90 percent.

Table 2: School meal beneficiaries, by year and activity

| Intervention | 2011 | | | 2012 | | | 2013 | | |
|------------------------------------|---------|--------|-------------------------|---------|--------|-------------------------|---------|---------|-------------------------|
| | Planned | Actual | % actual versus planned | Planned | Actual | % actual versus planned | Planned | Actual | % actual versus planned |
| School meals (total beneficiaries) | 70,500 | 61,634 | 87.4% | 71,000 | 96,825 | 136.4% | 71,000 | 113,358 | 159.7 |
| School meals (boys) | 41,000 | 37,388 | 91.2% | 41,500 | 58,567 | 141.1% | 41,500 | 67,210 | 162.0 |
| School meals (girls) | 29,500 | 24,246 | 82.2% | 29,500 | 38,258 | 129.7% | 29,500 | 46,148 | 156.4 |
| Take-home rations | 23,000 | 17,752 | 77.2% | 25,000 | 38,258 | 153.0% | 25,000 | 41,505 | 166.0 |

Source: WFP Kenya, SPR 2011, 2012, and 2013.

103. SMP/THR timeliness: As stated above, this mid-morning snack is designed to provide a healthy complement to the younger children (through Grade 3) who leave for home at midday and to meet the hunger needs of the older students who remain in school all day. The timing of the snack was of concern to students and teachers who requested that a second snack in the afternoon be provided to enhance attention and learning outcomes. If, as recommended, the aforementioned educational strategy for Dadaab were to shift to daily double sessions (the “two schools in one” option), the timing of the snack would have to be reconsidered.

⁷³ In 2013, 281 girls in secondary school also received the sugar THR.

104. SMP/THR efficiency/effectiveness: Each school has a kitchen, some better than others, in which the preparation of the school snack occurs daily. For the most part, fuel-efficient stoves are used, and the cooks are hired from among the refugee residents. Lines to the kitchen appear orderly and the feeding is conducted in an efficient manner. The children claim to enjoy the snack but in Dadaab (of course), they would prefer to have sugar added to the porridge – and to have a larger portion. The outcome effectiveness of this intervention is discussed below. The THR of 500g of sugar for the girls is distributed monthly and is exceedingly popular (or so expressed), although the school management committees would prefer to see the ration increased to 1.5kg per month.

FFT

105. FFT beneficiary selection: A small number (six) YEPs/vocation centres are assisted by WFP under an intervention that provides a hot lunch to students at these training centres. THE ET visited three of these centres (two in Kakuma and one in Ifo 1, Dadaab). The capacity of each centre varies from around 100 (St. Claire Assisi) to several hundred (Don Bosco). Beneficiaries self-select to the extent that there is an application process open to all young adults who qualify. The courses are designed to attract both male and female candidates from both the camps and the host communities. It is of interest to the ET that the stated objective of this intervention is to provide opportunities to “disenfranchised” youths. There is no indication that “disenfranchisement” is one of the criteria for selection.

106. FFT planned vs. actual: The support level for FFT has been mostly constant across the three years of the PRRO. In 2013, the operation planned to support 1,000 males and 1,000 females at six centres. The actual number of beneficiaries was 935 males and 448 females, a gender bias that reflects the underlying ratio of vocational opportunities for males relative to females.

107. FFT timeliness: The hot lunch is served around midday, which is appropriate for a group of students who spend the entire day at the school, many engaged in taxing, manual labour.

108. FFT efficiency/effectiveness: Each assisted centre has a kitchen and cooking staff, and most use fuel-efficient stoves. Meals are prepared and served efficiently and beneficiaries and teachers find the meal to be adequate. With regard to the training, each year produces a graduating class. For the most part, the centres are well-equipped and staffed, and the quality of the learning, in the opinion of the ET, is consistent with the livelihood goals of the operation.

FFA

109. FFA beneficiary selection: As suggested above, the ET finds this intervention to be inadequately designed and poorly documented. The principal community based-projects are water ponds (mostly for animal use), soil conservation, and reforestation, but it is not clear how these communities (and not others) have been selected. Within each community, a “food relief committee” selects the beneficiaries, mostly females, but the procedures for beneficiary selection were not available to the ET.

110. FFA planned vs. actual: In the PRRO design document, 36,000 beneficiaries are planned, all of whom are women.⁷⁴ In fact, in 2012 and 2013, 7,200 participants were planned for each year, and this goal was achieved. In terms of activities, the achievement levels of planned activities were very low (64 percent of water ponds for animals and two percent of 1000 ha of soil conservation structures).

111. FFA timeliness: Monthly rations were provided to each participant (see Section 2.1), and there were no breaks in the pipeline, as far as the ET is aware.

112. FFA efficiency/effectiveness: The ET visited two FFA sites, one in Kakuma and another in Dadaab. Both were water ponds primarily for animal consumption, and both were functioning effectively. The community members present during the visit were highly satisfied with this operation.

2.2.2. Achieving outcomes and objectives

113. This section discusses the extent to which the achievement of outputs and outcomes led to the realization of operation objectives. This includes analysis of the factors relating to effectiveness and efficiency that contributed to results, as well as the operation's contribution to higher-level development and humanitarian work. Table 3 shows the operation outcomes and objectives with available data over the course of the PRRO; discussion of these results by PRRO component follow the table.

⁷⁴ It is unclear if beneficiary refers to a participant in the FFA activity or the entirety of the participant's household.

Table 3: Summary of PRRO outcome indicators for SO1

| Outcomes⁷⁵ | | 2011⁷⁶ Base valu e | 2012⁷⁷ (1st roun d) | 2012⁷⁸ (2nd roun d) | 2013⁷⁹ End valu e | |
|------------------------------|--|---|---|---|---|------|
| SO1 | Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies | | | | | |
| | | Supplementary feeding death rate (%) | 0.03 | - | 1.0 | 0.0 |
| | | Prevalence of acute malnutrition among children under 5 (weight-for-height as %) – Hagadera Camp, Dadaab | 17.2 | - | 10.3 | 6.6 |
| | | Prevalence of acute malnutrition among children under 5 (weight-for-height as %) – Dagahaley Camp, Dadaab | 23.2 | - | 14.3 | 10.6 |
| | | Prevalence of acute malnutrition among children under 5 (weight-for-height as %) – Ifo Camp, Dadaab | 22.4 | - | - | - |
| | | Prevalence of acute malnutrition among children under 5 (weight-for-height as %) – Kakuma | 7.5 | - | 5.2 | 7.9 |
| | | Supplementary feeding recovery rate (%) | 88.5 | - | 87.0 | 95.7 |
| | | FCS: percentage of households with acceptable Food Consumption Score | 57 | 68 | 65 | 74 |
| | | FCS: percentage of households with borderline Food Consumption Score | 11 | 23 | 25 | 16 |
| | | Proportion of beneficiary household expenditures devoted to food (%) – Dadaab, FSOM | - | 91 | 92 | 89 |
| | | Proportion of beneficiary household expenditures devoted to food (%) – Kakuma, FSOM | - | 81 | 48 | 59 |

⁷⁵ Note: Data for all outcome indicators sourced from WFP Standard Project Report: Kenya unless otherwise noted as FSOM (Food Security Outcome Monitoring), derived from WFP In-depth food security analysis, Dadaab and Kakuma Refugees, September 2013.

⁷⁶ Base values from August to December 2011; values that were not available are indicated by a hyphen.

⁷⁷ Note: 1st round from May 2012; values that were not available are indicated by a hyphen.

⁷⁸ Note: 2nd round from August to December 2012; values that were not available are indicated by a hyphen.

⁷⁹ Note: End values from August to December 2013; values that were not available are indicated by a hyphen.


| | | | | |
|---|-----|----|----|------|
| Supplementary feeding default rate (%) | 3.5 | - | 6 | 1.3 |
| Coverage rate of supplementary feeding (%) | 90 | - | 63 | 96.6 |
| Coping Strategy: percentage of households experiencing shortage of food/applying some coping – Dadaab, FSOM | - | 61 | 84 | 71 |
| Coping Strategy: percentage of households experiencing shortage of food/applying some coping – Kakuma, FSOM | - | 91 | 87 | 76 |
| Food Security: percentage of households experiencing severe food insecurity – Dadaab, FSOM | - | 9 | 11 | 3 |
| Food Security: percentage of households experiencing severe food insecurity – Kakuma, FSOM | - | 37 | 35 | 32 |
| Dietary diversity: percentage of households able to feed infants and young children at least 4 food groups – Dadaab, FSOM | - | 17 | 48 | 23 |
| diversity: percentage of households able to feed infants and young children at least 4 food groups – Kakuma, FSOM | | 6 | 21 | 19 |
| Purchasing power: percentage of households with not enough income to purchase healthy food basket – Dadaab, FSOM | - | 99 | 80 | 70 |
| Purchasing power: percentage of households with not enough income to purchase healthy food basket – Kakuma, FSOM | - | 93 | 91 | 98 |

Achievements toward Strategic Objective 1

114. PRRO 200174 includes two specific objectives that together contribute to the SO1, “saving lives and protecting livelihoods”⁸⁰: to meet the food consumption needs and minimum nutritional requirements of refugees through GFD, and to manage MAM and prevent SAM in PLW and children under 5 through TSF. Table 3 provides available information for relevant outcome-level indicators. Based on this information, the ET finds that the PRRO was successful in meeting its specific objectives with direct attribution to the PRRO intervention, and made a positive contribution to the achievement of SO1. Food security indicators have improved and acute malnutrition has decreased. The indicators for monitoring and evaluation of the interventions were appropriate in assessing the achievement of the targets.

115. The 100 percent coverage of all eligible refugees and the consistent 2100 Kcal food basket that includes CSB has provided all refugee households with the food amount they need to meet minimum food consumption and nutritional requirements. There are several main contributing factors in meeting this objective. Food distribution across all camps is an effective process, which ensures refugees receive their rations regularly and on time. CPs demonstrated high capacity in managing the FDPs, and refugee leadership, through the block supervisors and the Food Advisory Committees, has a constructive engagement in the food assistance processes. Successful pipeline and logistical management by WFP has ensured an appropriate basket composition that maximizes dietary diversity, when possible. There has only been one pipeline break during PRRO 200174, which is commendable given the increasing demand for global food assistance in emerging humanitarian crises.

Figure 2: Trends in GAM in Dadaab refugee camp 2011-2013



Source: UNHCR 2011b; UNHCR and MSFCH 2013; WFP Kenya SPR 2012; UNHCR and MSFCH. 2013.

116. The Sphere standards and UNHCR and WFP guidelines measure a second indicator set for TSF.⁸¹ The performance indicators include coverage (>90 percent), recovery

⁸⁰ See Operational Factsheet in this report

⁸¹ UNHCR, 2011a.

(70 percent), death (<three percent) and defaulter rates (<15 percent)⁸² as illustrated in Table 4. As a whole, TSF performance was good in both Dadaab and Kakuma in 2013. The key programme indicator rates exceeded the established Sphere targets. The TSF programme coverage for the under-fives and PLW was above the Sphere target of 90 percent in Dadaab, but below target in Kakuma, indicating the need to better understand the underlying determinants of these differences.

Table 4: Performance of TSF indicators in 2013

| Indicators of M&E for TSF | Targets based on Sphere Standards | Dadaab | Kakuma |
|------------------------------|-----------------------------------|--------|--------|
| Recovery | >70 percent | 91.4% | 98.0% |
| Death rates | <3 percent | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Defaulter rates | <15 percent | 2.5% | 0.1% |
| Coverage of children under 5 | >90 percent | 100.2% | 88.7% |
| Coverage of PLW | | 95.8% | 65.9% |

Source: Forthcoming in final draft.

117. Qualitative data and direct observation indicated that the health partners carried out TSF effectively, although on-site information provision and counselling can be improved. This promoted regular attendance and adherence. In general, clients indicated a high level of satisfaction with the quality and frequency of services provided. The TSF intervention also had some unintended positive impacts: the health-seeking behaviour of PLW improved, leading to higher coverage of ANC and PNC services coverage.

Achievements toward Strategic Objective 2

118. PRRO 200174 includes one specific objective that contributes to SO2, “prevent acute hunger and invest in preparedness and mitigation measures”⁸³: to increase the capacity of host communities to meet their food needs. The corresponding intervention to meet this objective is the FFA programme.

119. Table 5 shows one indicator for SO2 and the related PRRO specific objective, for which there is no information available, so it is not possible for the ET to draw conclusions. However, feedback from government officials and FFA participants and other stakeholders indicates that the FFA has made an important contribution to food security in target host communities and that the infrastructure developed through the FFA community projects has increased food security resilience in target communities in the face of more extreme and frequent droughts. It is important to note here that through GFD, WFP is also preventing hunger among the eligible refugee population, as discussed in the section above.

120. The FFA community projects focus mainly on community-based assets designed to improve the productivity of a harsh, arid environment. The original intent of the PRRO was to use an asset index as an outcome indicator, but it has proven unrealistic to do so

⁸² Defaulters are those targeted for a treatment who do not follow up and actually submit to the treatment.

⁸³ See Operational Factsheet in this report

(see Table 5). For communities that depend upon livestock livelihoods (as these do), increased access to water and improved pasture are important outcomes, but it is impossible to say that these outcomes have been achieved. Visits to the FFA sites suggest that the capacity to meet food needs has certainly increased for surrounding communities; however, the ET considers it unlikely that these communities are on a pathway to further increase food security resilience. The scale of the intervention is too low for meaningful impact at scale. The number of projects is insufficient to meet the needs of the host community population in the designated 50km radius around the camp. Whether these FFA activities have enhanced engagement with host communities, reduced tensions, and promoted stability in WFP-host-refugee relationships, is impossible to determine from existing documentation.

Table 5: Summary of PRRO outcome indicators for SO2 and SO3

| Outcomes ⁸⁴ | | 2011 ⁸⁵ Base value | 2012 ⁸⁶ (1st round) | 2012 ⁸⁷ (2nd round) | 2013 ⁸⁸ End value |
|------------------------|---|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| SO2 | Prevent acute hunger and invest in disaster preparedness and mitigation measures | | | | |
| | CAS: percentage of communities with an increased Asset Score | 100 | - | - | - |
| SO3 | Restore and rebuild lives and livelihoods in post-conflict, post-disaster or transition situations | | | | |
| | Gender Ratio: ratio of girls to boys enrolled in WFP-assisted primary schools | 0.66 | - | 0.67 | 0.68 |
| | Attendance rate in WFP-assisted primary schools | 84 | - | 78 | 90 |
| | Enrolment: Average annual rate of change in number of children enrolled in WFP-assisted primary schools | - | - | 56 | 18 |
| | Prevalence of stunting among children under 2 (height-for-age as %) – UNHCR Survey, Dadaab Camps | 22.5 | - | 28.3 | 13.6 |
| | Prevalence of stunting among children under 2 (height-for-age as %) – Kakuma, UNHCR survey | 27.6 | - | 21.5 | 14.1 |
| | Prevalence of iron deficiency anaemia (IDA) among children under 5 (% Hb<110g/L) – Kakuma, UNHCR Survey | 44 | - | 34 | 46 |
| | Prevalence of iron deficiency anaemia (IDA) among children under 5 (%, | 49.1 | - | 48.9 | 45.1 |

⁸⁴ Note: Data for all outcome indicators sourced from WFP Standard Project Report: Kenya unless otherwise noted as FSOM (Food Security Outcome Monitoring), derived from WFP In-depth food security analysis, Dadaab and Kakuma Refugees, September 2013.

⁸⁵ Base values from August to December 2011; unavailable values are indicated by a hyphen.

⁸⁶ Note: 1st round from May 2012; unavailable values are indicated by a hyphen.

⁸⁷ Note: 2nd round from August to December 2012; unavailable values are indicated by a hyphen.

⁸⁸ Note: End values from August to December 2013; unavailable values are indicated by a hyphen.

| | | | | |
|--|----------------------------------|--|--|--|
| | Hb<110g/L) – Dadaab UNHCR survey | | | |
|--|----------------------------------|--|--|--|


Achievements toward Strategic Objective 3

121. PRRO 200174 includes four specific objectives that together contribute to SO3, “Restore and build livelihoods”⁸⁹: 1) improve access to micronutrients among PLW and children aged 6-23 months; 2) increase adherence to treatment and meet nutritional needs of PLHIV, TB patients and people with chronic diseases; 3) maintain enrolment and attendance and reduce the gender disparity in primary schools in the camp; and 4) increase enrolment and attendance among disenfranchised young people in training centres. Table 5 above shows that limited indicators and data are available to assess progress toward the four specific objectives, or to draw a conclusion regarding contribution to achievement of the strategic objective.

122. The ET finds that WFP has successfully improved access to micronutrients for children 6-23 months. The data show that BSF has decreased stunting significantly in both camps. Stunting rates in Dadaab and Kakuma are lower than the national rate at 35.3 percent.⁹⁰ No specific data are available to assess access to micronutrients for PLW.

123. An important factor that affects nutrition outcomes is the high level of anaemia, which continues to be a major challenge in both camps despite the improvement in prevalence rates from 2010 to 2013. The levels of anaemia among under-five children remain a public health concern (>40 percent) according to the WHO guidelines (Figure 3). The high levels of anaemia are attributed, in part, to the low dietary diversity that remains a challenge for most refugees who lack the resources to supplement the WFP ration with fresh foods. Therefore, the FFV for PLW is a highly relevant intervention.

Figure 3: Trends in anaemia among children under 5 in Kakuma and Dadaab camps



Source: UNHCR 2011b; UNHCR and MSFCH 2013; WFP Kenya SPR 2012; UNHCR and MSFCH. 2013; UNHCR and IRC. 2013.

124. There are no indicators or associated monitoring data to assess the increased adherence to treatment of PLHIV, TB patients and people with chronic diseases, and

⁸⁹ See Operational Factsheet in this report

⁹⁰ KNBS. 2010.

whether their nutritional needs are met. However, interviews with patients and health staff indicate that the institutional wet feeding provided by WFP is a critical component of the treatment and care in the health centres. Staff and patients both indicate that this promotes adherence and compliance to treatment. The ET finds that the institutional feeding intervention has made an important contribution to this specific objective.

125. Table 3 monitoring data show that enrolments in WFP-assisted schools have increased since 2011 and that attendance rates are at or above national levels. The gender ratio, favouring boys, has remained mostly constant, reflecting, again, the national patterns in northeastern Kenya. It is not possible to attribute increases in enrolment to the presence of the school meal, because all reliable data indicate little change in net enrolment rates (i.e., percentage of school-aged children actually in school). Absolute enrolment, as an indicator, may reflect the overall increase in the camp population after 2011. Thus, the ET considers enrolment (and even attendance) to be “weak” outcome indicators, and finds no significant causal relationship between the school meal and enrolment and attendance.⁹¹ As discussed below, there are multiple factors responsible for a severely low net enrolment in the camps, including a 68:1 classroom and teacher ratios, the lack of latrines, seven students per desk, and the low quality of the teaching staff. Food alone may attract a limited number of children to school, particularly the younger ones, but it cannot compensate the many negative factors that dissuade school enrolment.

126. The enrolment and attendance for girls also increased after the overall 2011 population surge in Dadaab camp, and there was a smaller (10 percent) increase in 2013 to 41,535; but, again, this difference cannot be attributed only to the presence of the ration. As stated above, sugar is highly valued by the household, and the THR could act as a moderate incentive to send girls to school, but the evidence of a direct linkage between female enrolment in school and the sugar subsidy is anecdotal. In one of the better-endowed schools in Dadaab, the difference in female enrolment since 2010 had been only ten percent, or around two-and-a-half percent annually. This school had a teacher-student ratio near the national standard and one female teacher to 20 males. If these numbers are indicative of a relatively better school, then the impact of the THR is very modest.⁹²

127. It is to be noted that the ET analysis does not discount the value of a school meal. On the contrary, based on previous studies, including the 2010 evaluation of school feeding in Kenya, there are multiple justifications, perhaps even a human rights imperative, to assure that children, especially those from food-insecure families, have a meal during the day at school. Furthermore, the ET does not agree that a 2100 Kcal/person/day ration provided at GFD is adequate to assure that a family can provide a school meal for its children. This analysis is revisited in the concluding sections.

128. The ET considers the FFT activity to directly contribute to SO3 by developing livelihood skills for which there are clear market opportunities both within the camp and in the host communities. Unfortunately, neither WFP nor the assisted centres monitor any outcome indicators of this activity, even graduation rates or egress employment data. Upon visits to three centres, the ET concluded that, contrary to the case of the

⁹¹ Much more robust indicators would be the net enrolment rate and primary completion rates, indicators used elsewhere by WFP in Kenya.

⁹² Also, observations of the classrooms (at another school in Dadaab) also confirm a national trend—namely, that the number of students who reach Grade 8 is far fewer than those in the first three to four years.

school snacks, the hot lunch itself is not considered to be the principal factor determining the size of each cohort; rather, the desire to gain livelihood skills and a formal vocational certificate provides adequate incentive to prospective students. WFP's important contribution is to enable these training centres to apply their scarce resources to other educational costs, such as infrastructure, tools and machinery, and teacher quality.

129. The ET was able to record several case studies of students who had finished at Don Bosco (Kakuma camp). One young man had completed the course in carpentry and returned to South Sudan where he was able to open his own shop until renewed violence erupted. At Ste. Claire Assisi, a girls training centre near Kakuma town, graduates of the programme documented their post-graduation employment careers as beauticians, dress-makers, and hotel and restaurant administrators.

2.2.3. Contribution across all activities

130. When considered in their entirety, the outcome indicators defend the argument that PRRO 200174 has largely met its strategic objectives even under the difficult circumstances of a changing population, limited refugee mobility, and – in the case of Dadaab – a highly precarious and worsening security situation. Particularly in seeking to assure food and nutritional security, there are multiple complementarities and synergies across the intervention sets. The ET is impressed by the extent to which the GFD and supplementary feeding and school snacks enhance the resilience of the refugee population. Overall, this integrated success is largely responsible for the dramatic growth of the host community population, which sees the camp residents at a comparative advantage in terms of food security and access to education and health care. This analysis is addressed in the concluding sections of the report.

Key Findings and Conclusions: Results of the Operation

Achievement of outputs. The combined PRRO interventions have largely achieved their output targets for the various food assistance activities. Overall implementation was timely and quality was satisfactory.

- GFD covered all eligible refugees in the camps and provided food for 100 percent of days on time. To address inclusion error, WFP worked closely with UNHCR to institute the use of biometrics to verify eligibility of food collectors. This new system is fully operational and has already improved the efficiency of GFD, resulting in substantial savings. The GFD food basket is consistent with food security needs but does not fully meet cultural preferences of all refugees. Food distribution through FDPs meets WFP standards and is effective.
- BFS and TSF interventions largely met output targets. Where targets were not met this was due to low attendance rates at clinics or distribution points. Qualitative findings showed that long waits at distribution sites, combined with small amounts of food distributed, discouraged some mothers from attending. The ET is concerned about the quality of nutritional outreach and counselling provided to mothers on proper food utilization.
- Through the FFV pilot, 100 percent of eligible women attending ANC/PNC services increased household dietary diversity through fresh foods. Beneficiaries and stakeholders, e.g., the traders and local bank, indicate a

high level of satisfaction with the FFV pilot. The pilot has demonstrated that the voucher system is effective and there is basic carrying capacity of the local market to provide fresh foods. Additional research will be required to assess the nutrition impacts and the effect on market pricing before considering expansion of FFV.

- In 2012 and 2013, WFP exceeded its targets for school feeding. The current size and composition is adequate. Targets for THR (sugar) for girls were also exceeded. Beneficiaries indicated that the amount of sugar was insufficient. School feeding is an organized process, which is effectively managed by school staff.
- The FFT intervention supports nearly 1,200 students, many of them girls, with a meal during vocational training. Students are satisfied with the size and composition of the meal.
- The FFA activities include construction of community assets for which participants receive a food ration. There are inconsistencies in output-level data regarding target and actual number of participants and number of community assets. The ET cannot assess the effectiveness of this intervention.

Achievement of specific objectives. Due to incomplete data, it is difficult to assess the achievement of planned outcomes. However, based on available information, the ET concludes that the combined PRRO interventions were successful in improving food security and nutritional status in the camps, and to varying degrees made contributions to achieving the corporate strategic objectives 1, 2, and 3.

- Food security indicators have improved and acute malnutrition has decreased as a result of PRRO activities.
- When measured against Sphere standards and UNHCR and WFP guidelines, TSF performance was good and key programme indicators exceed Sphere targets.
- The data show that BSF has decreased stunting in both camps. Stunting rates in Dadaab and Kakuma are below the national stunting rate. The high level of anaemia remains a concern.
- There are no indicators or associated monitoring data to assess increased adherence to treatment through institutional feeding, and whether nutritional needs are met. Qualitative findings do indicate a positive contribution to the quality of treatment and care in the health centres.
- Interventions like FFT and FFA lack meaningful outcome level indicators and cannot be meaningfully assessed. However, qualitative findings indicate that the FFA interventions made an important contribution to food security resilience in target communities.
- Monitoring data shows that attendance rates in WFP-assisted schools have increased. There are no reliable data on enrolment. There are no data that objectively assess attribution or contribution of increased attendance to the school feeding intervention.

2.3. Factors Affecting the Results

131. This section addresses the third evaluation question, “Why and how has the operation produced the observed results?”⁹³ While some of the factors affecting the results have previously been discussed by activity (Section 2.2), this section discusses the main structural or internal issues and external factors that affected the operation’s performance. Internal factors include WFP systems for resource mobilization, staffing and management, innovation and learning, M&E and quality assurance, logistics, ability to partner, and ability to incorporate gender issues. External factors relate to camp governance, refugee outlook, and refugee influx.

2.3.1. Internal factors

132. Financial and in-kind resources. To date, WFP has been able to mobilize the financial resources required to consistently meet the minimum food and nutrition needs of eligible refugees in Kakuma and Dadaab camps. WFP successfully maintained its financial pipeline through structured donor communication and internal lending with flash appeals as a last resort. WFP maintains active communication with its donors on food requirements through monthly updates with the six-month pipeline, quarterly Operational Updates with the six-month pipeline, and quarterly meetings with WFP. WFP proactively discusses new in-kind and financial contributions through formal and informal channels with its donor partners, and is flexible in updating the pipeline to take into account such opportunities and optimize resource allocation. For example, if an in-kind contribution emerges that can replace a previous financial commitment; such financial resources would free up to support other operation costs. In general, donor partners expressed high satisfaction with WFP’s communication and coordination strategy regarding PRRO resource needs.

133. Flash appeals are a last resort that is used when structured donor communication is not sufficient to attract the necessary funding. Regular reporting with forward-looking estimates does not trigger a consistent response from certain donors; some only respond when there are flash appeals ' or ration cuts. Donors and WFP agree that flash appeals should be a last resort and that face-to-face meetings are more effective for strategic collaboration to improve planning and avoid pipeline breaks, e.g., through at least two meetings a year that focus specifically on the pipeline.

134. A review of the commodity pipeline coordination system shows that the food supply chain, from donors to beneficiaries, is well managed and follows WFP standards.⁹⁴ The PRRO has been successful in ensuring sufficient and adequate food is available at the right place at the right time. There have only been two pipeline breaks in the last five years that have necessitated ration cuts: one in 2008 due to a supply shortfall due to extreme weather, and one in November 2013 due to a funding gap. The latter resulted in a 20 percent reduction in November ration sizes.

135. The FFV pilot cost around US\$2.6 million, largely funded through earmarked support from ECHO and DFID, which added two percent to the cost of WFP’s food assistance operations in Dadaab in 2013. A valid concern remains about the stability of the cash pipeline to support an expanded voucher program. The majority of donor contributions to

⁹³ WFP (OEV). 2013. Terms of Reference.

⁹⁴ WFP Kenya. 2002.

food assistance are in-kind. Cash contributions are generally low and not stable. Qualitative findings indicate that donors would be willing to explore more constant and possibly larger cash contributions if the FFV pilot proves effective and can replace part of GFD rations.

136. The ET finds that the current operational cost, valued at around US\$10 million/month, can be maintained for at least another year with existing donor commitments. However, there are strong indications from donors, as well as acknowledgement by WFP, that it will be increasingly difficult to maintain the current pipeline over the longer term in view of competing crises. A looming reduction in pipeline resources is a critical contextual fact to be incorporated into subsequent programming.

137. Staffing and management. A key contributing factor to the effective implementation of PRRO activities has been the overall quality and professionalism of WFP Kenya staff both at headquarters in Nairobi and at the sub-office level in Kakuma and Dadaab. The staff who manage this programme are highly efficient and dedicated and the result is an overall well-run program. However, as in any management system, horizontal and vertical integration are critical. WFP staff interviews indicate that coordination among the technical units in the WFP Kenya Country office in Nairobi is limited. While there are formal communication channels, there is limited opportunity for building consensus on strategic issues related to PRRO design and implementation.⁹⁵

138. There is regular formal coordination between sub-offices and WFP Kenya in Nairobi through structured reporting and face-to-face meetings. However, the ET finds that decision-making in Nairobi, including management response to issues raised by the sub-office, is not transparent to sub-office staff. Staff interviews indicate a common-held concern that sub-office staff are heard but not listened to. Within the sub-offices, the ET finds similar vertical integration problems. In both sub-offices, the ET was impressed by the participatory management styles of the sub-office leadership.

139. However, field monitors, as frontline staff, are under-utilized in terms of sharing the information on PRRO relevance and effectiveness they so assiduously gather on a monthly basis or in terms of incorporating their feedback systematically into strategic thinking. This is a widespread, organic characteristic of WFP management systems. For example, field monitors have direct insights into inclusion and exclusion errors in PRRO targeting but no way to properly report this through formal reporting requirements. At the same time, when such issues are reported, field monitors do not receive any feedback, and indicate limited management response to the issues they raise.

140. Innovation and learning. The Innovations Team in WFP Kenya is a unique unit that plays a critical role in driving institutional learning, especially around introduction of technologies to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of WFP food assistance. WFP has been performing its core functions in a similar manner over a long period. While WFP is encouraging learning, this does not always come easily for an organization of this size and with an ever-present high workload. In this context, the Innovations Team is pushing the envelope in food assistance by critically questioning existing practice and following through on the introduction of new technologies and ideas such as the FFV. The fact that the Innovations Team only handles the design, pilot and start-up phases of initiatives before

⁹⁵ WFP staff indicated differences in opinion around levels of importance of the various PRRO interventions and an expectation that the ET broker a consensus on such issues, however this is beyond the scope of work.

passing these off to programming units, ensures that the team does not get bogged down in programming issues where trade-offs need to be made, but can maintain a view to new opportunities.

141. M&E and quality assurance. WFP has built a strong support structure in its information management system; however, the ET feels that improvements can be made in the M&E system, particularly in a way that tracks impacts more effectively. Although the overall the M&E system together with VAM have provided the regular feedback necessary to make programme adjustments and to identify problem areas in a timely fashion, the ET finds a disconnect between the amount of effort expended in gathering large amounts of data (e.g., the monitoring of nutritional indicators during blanket feeding in Kakuma), and the quality and consistency of reporting. The ET acknowledges that M&E systems in large bureaucracies are process-driven and mostly mandated by corporate headquarters (e.g., FSOM), but the value of such reports appears to be *pro forma* and as routine obligations rather than reflective efforts to understand the performance of an intervention. For example, seldom in an FSOM is there an attempt made to explain why variation in an indicator through time has occurred...as if it is adequate just to register the variation. The concluding sections will return to the issue of M&E.

142. Logistics. The ET finds that effective logistics management is a major contributing factor to the effective implementation of the PRRO interventions. Commodities are consistently available when and where they are needed. Accurate daily stock management summaries and regular shortfall analyses enable effective forward planning, which is closely coordinated with WFP donor liaison activities.⁹⁶ Under-supply does not occur. In both Dadaab and Kakuma camps, warehouses hold a buffer stock of one to two months and the aim is to increase this to two to three months.

143. The ET found that commodities are handled systematically and professionally. Road transport from the forwarding facility in Mombasa to the camps takes two to three days and is considered viable, safe, and secure. Losses in transit due to theft or damage are minimal. One issue is that cereals are not fully dry when shipped, which results in minimal but consistent weight loss that is counted as a loss. Torn bags or leaking/damaged cartons of vegetable oil are identified, separated, and reconstituted in re-stitched bags to mitigate the loss. A claim is filed against the transporter for the quantity lost, even if the quantity is very small.

144. Warehouses are effectively managed and in good condition. Refugee incentive workers supervised by WFP staff do offloading and simultaneous stacking of stocks in interlocking fashion, not exceeding the maximum height for each commodity. The stack cards are updated with appropriate entries of receipt. The examined warehouse facilities have good lighting and are clean and secure. In both camps, some warehouses do not have cemented floors. Centralized procurement processes operated from Nairobi have delayed floor construction. Such floors could be more easily constructed through direct procurement with local contractors. Fire extinguishers are readily available. Security is good, with armed security guards deployed in the warehouse compound at night. No incidences of theft have been reported.

⁹⁶ Call forward for PRROs is based on allocations of multilateral and directed multilateral funds as they are confirmed.

145. Ability to partner. The ET finds the quality and quantity of strategic and implementation partnerships make a positive contributing factor to the PRRO results and effectiveness of activity implementation. In identifying and formalizing implementation partnerships, e.g., the CPs that manage the FDP operation, WFP follows appropriate internal standards and has demonstrated effective decision making in partner choice based on monitoring CP performance, e.g., based on avoidable losses during food distribution.

146. At the same time, the ET finds that the quality of implementation can be further improved if WFP allocates more resources to technical training and support of the CPs, especially in TSF and GFD. Technical training and institutional development are not sufficiently taken into account by CPs in their operational budgets for WFP. Options are for WFP to create room for inclusion of earmarked resources for CP capacity strengthening, or to facilitate capacity strengthening of CPs directly.

147. As discussed under financial and in-kind resources, the ET finds that WFP has developed strong strategic partnerships with donors and is committed to grow this relationship in a way that further strengthens the results of its food assistance activities. The ET also commends WFP Kenya for fostering a very positive relationship with UNHCR. The successful introduction of the biometrics system is the latest milestone in a relationship that is characterized by open and frank communication among the two organizations and a shared commitment to learning-by-doing. The ET finds the UNHCR-WFP relationship in Kenya to be a model for collaboration in a complex and protracted refugee setting.

148. Interviews with WFP and CP frontline staff, refugee leadership, and PRRO focal points indicate that WFP is perceived as a more distant partner than other UN agencies, like UNHCR and UNICEF. The ET finds that WFP does not sufficiently participate in regular refugee meetings and informal coordination outside of its primary food assistance work. As a result, WFP staff do not have a so-called “finger on the pulse” of refugee realities, including those that indirectly affect PRRO design and implementation. For example, WFP staff do not participate in informal weekly meeting with refugee leadership organized by UNHCR staff. During such meetings, CPs and refugees discuss recurring issues and problems. This continued engagement with refugees builds a common understanding that is helpful to address critical issues in a timely manner. It is important to note that the ET acknowledges improvements in engagement with refugee and host populations due to recent changes in sub-office management.

149. The ET finds that under this PRRO WFP has developed a good working relationship with Government of Kenya counterparts, in particular DRA officials who are directly responsible for overall camp operation. This relationship was further improved in the last year of the PRRO due to sub-office management changes. The good relationship with DRA has contributed to high quality security for PRRO operations, and to DRA support in dealing with complex stability issues involving refugees and host communities, e.g., the recruitment of host community members as incentive workers, and local procurement.

150. Ability to adequately take into account gender issues. With regard to internal factors, WFP at all levels has effectively mainstreamed gender factors into programming and implementation. Females exercise important positions at all levels of management in sub-offices and among the field monitoring staff. The design of operation activities has been informed by prior gender and cultural analysis, and gender equity is a key principle in targeting strategies. Separate lines for women at the FDP are supervised by female incentive workers. Women’s privacy and access to designated latrines are standard procedures. In

most interventions where women are the primary beneficiaries, they are served by female staff. Gender inclusion is also programmed into the camp governance structure, and although the informal leadership in the camp tends to be male, all governance committees – including food management and school management – have several women as active members. Finally, as part of an overall gender strategy, great emphasis is placed on female security and safety within the camp. Gender-based violence is reported and broadly condemned.

2.3.2. External factors

151. Camp governance. External factors that affect the results documented here are related in part to the contextual reality described in Section 1.2. One of the principal factors is the local governance structure. Under the camp constitution, representative leaders are elected formally at the block residential level; these leaders elect the participants at the second level of camp organization (section or zone), and these section or zone leaders elect the camp chairman and chair-lady. In addition, there are sectoral committees (water, education, sanitation, etc.) and WFP staff work directly with the food security committee regarding issues of food distribution. Underlying this complex structure are informal councils of elders who represent the ethnicities and clans. The ET found that this informal leadership, mostly male, is the true source of power, and in most cases, decisions are made within this traditional leadership structure. It is challenging for WFP and the other United Nations and donor agencies to navigate this system of governance because of its complexity. The introduction of the biometric system required a tremendous amount of negotiation with camp leadership. During FGDs, camp leaders sometimes appear convinced that the Government of Kenya and WFP are pressuring the refugees to return to Somalia, as for example when reductions in ration and changes in ration composition (e.g., sorghum) are discussed. This complicates WFP efforts to improve efficiency in its food assistance activities.

152. Refugee outlook. The other external factor is the lack of a clear public vision on the future of the refugees. The Government of Kenya has regularly associated the refugee issue with national security and the instability of the Somalia conflict. There is little expectation that the Dadaab refugees will be permitted to develop livelihoods within Kenyan borders, and some influential leaders have called for a faster and more hard-line approach to Somali repatriation. But for those refugees who have been in camp for 20 years and for the younger ones who have never known any other life, repatriation holds little attraction and much anxiety. To a Somali outsider, the camp offers great advantages with education and health care—better incentives than those remaining in Somalia or even in a host community—and the incentives to return to places of origin currently do not exist. So programmes designed to develop livelihood skills and acquire an education imply a sense of permanence in the camp (or in Kenya), which is discordant with refugee policy and its strict enforcement of encampment.

153. Refugee influx. Refugee influx has a significant impact on PRRO food assistance activities. In Dadaab, the nutritional situation worsened in 2011 because of the influx of the new arrivals seeking asylum from Somalia mainly due to famine. This offset nutrition improvements in GAM, which due to consistent efforts by WFP and CPs was below emergency threshold for the first time in 2010.⁹⁷ The GAM rates subsequently escalated to

⁹⁷ The nutrition situation of children under five years in Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camps improved from 2005, moving to below the emergency threshold level (Global Acute Malnutrition [GAM] <15 percent) in 2010.

rates much higher than the emergency threshold in 2011, with Dagahaley recording the highest GAM level (23 percent) and Hagadera the lowest (17 percent).

154. During the time of this evaluation (January 2014), there was an influx of asylum seekers from South Sudan. As a result, the nutritional situation in Kakuma where GAM rates have been relatively stable and below emergency thresholds can be expected to worsen, at least temporarily. This will require appropriate response by WFP and CPs.

155. Security. Due to ongoing security concerns, particularly in Dadaab camp, there are limitations on WFP staff mobility within camp blocks. Through the good collaboration with DRA, WFP has managed to minimize the impact on its food assistance activities but some negative impact on operations was unavoidable. In particular, the ability to undertake comprehensive vulnerability assessments and PRRO outcome monitoring has been compromised.

Key Findings and Conclusions: Factors Affecting the Results

The main internal factors affecting PRRO performance include WFP systems for resource mobilization, staffing and management, innovation and learning, M&E and quality assurance, logistics, ability to partner, and ability to incorporate gender issues.

- Through a combination of structured donor communication and internal lending, WFP has successfully mobilized the necessary financial and in-kind resources to meet the minimum food consumption and nutrition needs of eligibleNAN refugees in Kakuma and Dadaab camps. However, it will be increasingly difficult to maintain the current pipeline over the longer term in view of competing humanitarian crises. Donors are willing to work with WFP to support further efficiency improvements in the next PRRO.
- WFP staff capacity is high but vertical and horizontal integration can be improved, namely: horizontal integration among technical units; and vertical integration among WFP Kenya in Nairobi and the sub-offices, and among sub-office management and frontline field staff.
- The Innovations Team in WFP Kenya has played a critical role in improving food assistance by questioning existing practice, fostering partnerships for improvements, and following through on the introduction of new technologies and ideas.
- While the M&E system represents a major component of the overall operation, the ET perceives an inconsistency between the level of detail in the data collected, the quality of the reporting, and the use of the reports.
- WFP has demonstrated highly effective logistics management throughout the PRRO. Commodities are consistently available when and where they are needed.
- WFP follows internal standards in identifying and working with CPs. However, more effort needs to be made to enable capacity strengthening of CPs, especially as WFP is increasingly working to improve its operations. The partnership with UNHCR can be considered a model for

WFP-UNHCR collaboration. Despite recent improvement, the engagement with refugee leadership can be further strengthened. The partnership with DRA is good and supports PRRO implementation.

- WFP has effectively mainstreamed gender factors into PRRO design and implementation, where possible.

The main external factors affecting the operation's performance include government systems and staffing, camp governance, refugee outlook, refugee influx, and security.

- Camp governance is a complex web of formal and informal leadership that is difficult to navigate. This complicates WFP's work, in particular when seeking consultation and support for changes or improvements in PRRO activities.
- WFP contributions to improved livelihoods, education and health care are complicated by the lack of a clear outlook for the future of the refugee population and the camps.
- Refugee influx requires adaptive management of the PRRO and can set back food security and nutrition gains made in previous years.
- The ongoing security challenges, particularly in Dadaab camp, negatively affect the ability of WFP to undertake comprehensive vulnerability assessments to improve targeting or coverage and outcome monitoring for PRRO interventions.

3. Conclusions and Recommendations

3.1. Overall Assessment

156. This section summarizes the key findings and conclusions of the evaluation based on the evaluation criteria: relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, sustainability and connectedness, and gender.

Relevance, Coherence and Appropriateness

157. The PRRO is relevant to the food security and nutrition needs of the refugee population in Dadaab and Kakuma camps. As those needs have shifted (e.g., 2011 increase in refugee flow from Somalia), the operation adjusted the amount of food needed for general distribution and responded appropriately to increased malnutrition rates. The PRRO has an appropriate focus those with the highest nutritional needs, including PLWs, children under two, and in-patients with chronic diseases. The PRRO appropriately reflects the needs of school-age children and young adults to enhance the education and vocational training experience and to building livelihood skills. The PRRO also appropriately reflects the needs of host communities, as the presence of the camps presents both opportunities and challenges. The PRRO appropriately includes a focus on gender issues, especially improving girls' access to education.

158. The PRRO specific operation objective and the supporting interventions align with the strategic priorities of WFP at global and country office levels. The operation also demonstrates relevance, coherence, and appropriateness to the broader development strategies of the Government of Kenya, the Refugees Act, and WFP corporate commitments

to the refugee population. In effect, the Refugees Act and official statements such as the Nairobi Declaration are broader external realities that significantly influence programming strategies, and the design of the operation reflects this policy context.

159. The ET sees an overall coherence in the intervention set that reflects the complex needs of a large population residing in a mostly enclosed area. There is strong and appropriate complementarity between the nutritional interventions and GFD and school feeding (where some have suggested resource duplication), and the relatively low rates of malnutrition indicators within the camps demonstrating success of this complementarity. As an exception to this conclusion, the Food for Assets intervention, while appropriate to the needs of the host communities (as well as most communities in the ASAL region of Kenya), does not appear to “belong” to this PRRO *as it is currently stated*. If implicit objectives of FFA are to improve relations between refugees and host community residents, then a more transparent and needs-based design should be developed.

Efficiency

160. The ET concludes that PRRO 200174 has been a very efficient operation that has been implemented with high levels of dedication and professional skill. Interventions are implemented in a timely manner and resources are appropriately distributed across the interventions with the majority provided to GDF and supplementary feeding interventions. The biometric system significantly increased the efficiency of the GFD intervention and reduced inclusion error. The consequent decrease of food recipients in Dadaab camp has adjusted the amount of food more accurately to camp needs and generated significant savings to the operation, which supports pipeline stability. In contrast, for the BSF intervention in Dadaab camp, the efficiencies gained in combining BSF with general distribution appear to have reduced the effectiveness of the intervention, since mothers perceive the supplementary food as part of the overall ration basket and are not oriented properly on its intended use.

161. Food collection under GFD is a highly efficient process that is well within WFP standards. Recent improvements to the FDPs further increased efficiency of the food collection processes. The implementation of targeted nutritional components suffers a number of inefficiencies. The lines and waiting periods at clinic sites in both camps are long, and mothers (and children) must approach several desks during the process. This organizational inefficiency is a factor in the inability of the intervention to reach its planned targets. For school meals, THR, and FFT, the targeting strategies are efficient in that they are self-selecting.

162. The ET concludes that the costs currently incurred to implement the PRRO are realistic and that, within current capacity and operating constraints, the PRRO is an efficient operation. There remain further efficiencies to be gained through exploring alternative food assistance strategies such as replacing part of the food basket with vouchers and exploring improved targeting options. However, it is important to note that properly designing and implementing these options will require significant resources. WFP will have to consider whether efficiency gains outweigh the costs over the long term.

Effectiveness:

163. The combined PRRO interventions have largely achieved their output targets for the various food assistance activities and, to varying degrees, have generated the desired results. GFD and BSF/TSF yielded the most prominent PRRO results. GFD ration sizes and composition consistently meet the minimal caloric and nutritional needs of the population. Food security indicators have improved and acute malnutrition has decreased as a direct

result of PRRO activities, and key TSF programme indicators exceed Sphere targets. The effectiveness of BSF/TSF interventions is undermined by poor organization at distribution sites and concerns about the quality of nutritional outreach and counselling. This has negatively affected attendance rates.

164. The FFV pilot has demonstrated that the voucher system is effective and there is basic carrying capacity of the local market to provide fresh foods. Additional research will be required to assess the nutrition impacts and the effect on market pricing before considering expansion of FFV.

165. School feeding has exceeded output targets and is an organized process, managed effectively by school staff; however there is no demonstrable connection between the snack and enrolment numbers. The ET suggests that the appropriate indicators would be the new enrolment rate and primary completion rate. This being said, the ET advances that school feeding has contributed to an improved school experience, and children should have access to food during the school day (the ET does not agree that the GFD ration is large enough to preclude the need for a school meal). As PLWs can be seen to have additional nutritional needs, so does an 8-year child trying to concentrate on learning. Because of the deplorable net enrolment and primary completion (and secondary school transition) rates, WFP participate in a broader discussion of educational goals and educational strategies, which in the opinion of the ET, are poorly articulated and sorely needed THR targets were also exceeded (without any evidence of causality), but the ET questions the effectiveness of sugar rations in promoting girls' access to education without addressing underlying causes of low enrolment and attendance. Other more wholesome interventions (e.g. vouchers) could be used to meet the goal of gender parity.

166. The FFT and FFA interventions have partially achieved their output targets, but the ET cannot properly assess their effectiveness due to lack of outcome-level data. In particular, an important activity such as FFT could easily improve its effectiveness by monitoring program graduates and their marketability. After all, this intervention is meant to restore livelihoods.

Impact

167. The PRRO progress in achieving specific operational objectives through their corresponding interventions has contributed to achieving the corporate strategic objectives. In particular, the PRRO has made an important contribution to achieving Strategic Objective 1, "saving lives and livelihoods." The TSF and GFD interventions have reduced acute malnutrition and, in view of emerging crises, have kept malnutrition rates stable where they may have increased in the absence of an intervention.

168. The PRRO has made some contribution to achieving Strategic Object 3, "Restore and build lives and livelihoods." BSF has decreased stunting in both camps: stunting rates in Dadaab and Kakuma are below the national stunting rate. The ET cannot assess actual impact of the school feeding, THR interventions, and FFT. In general, the educational experience for students in camp schools is poor due to overcrowded classrooms, limited school supplies and too few schools to meet demand. In this context, the contribution that school feeding and THR may make to this experience and, subsequently, to increasing the potential of students to restore and build their livelihoods, is marginal. The impacts of the FFT activities should be measured in terms of the number of students entering and finishing the different programs in a year and the percentage of those students who have been able to develop viable livelihoods for themselves because of the skills learned in the

programme. For the most part, the YEPs and other vocational schools do not monitor these impacts.

169. Similarly, the contribution to achieving Strategic Objective 2, “Prevent acute hunger and invest in preparedness and mitigation measures,” cannot be adequately measured due to lack of data. However, qualitative findings do indicate that the FFA interventions are considered valued assets by the communities where they are executed.

Sustainability

170. The PRRO results will not be sustainable without continued financial support. Refugees are completely dependent on food assistance to meet their food consumption and nutrition needs. Achievements in reducing malnutrition are reversible in the absence of TSF and preventative BSF. Investments made in human capacity development will yield no returns unless there are opportunities to apply newly learned skills. This is not possible within the current Government of Kenya encampment policy. While FFA has contributed to the food security resilience of target communities, it is unlikely that these communities are on a pathway to further resilience improvements due to the limited scale and scope of the intervention.

171. Interviews with donors suggest that in the next programming cycle, the current level of food assistance will not be maintained due to the increasing number of competing crises. The ET finds it unlikely that the current composition of PRRO interventions can be maintained at the necessary levels with a reduction in resources. A reduction in resources would reduce the effectiveness of the operation. At the current time, WFP does not have adequate information about household livelihood patterns and resource allocation dynamics to make these strategic programming decisions.

Gender

172. This operation in terms of its design, implementation, partnering strategies, incentive worker hiring practices, and administration and management systems has demonstrated a commitment to gender parity, sensitivity, and inclusion. Every intervention is informed by a gender analysis, and the design of each activity seeks to promote gender equality and protection. Even though the refugee groups in both camps are culturally patriarchal and limiting of women’s roles in public affairs, the governance system has a strong and active female presence.

Connectedness

173. The ET interprets this criterion to speak to repatriation and the longer-term future of the camps. Under national government policy, the camps are managed as temporary solutions; government initiatives are focused on the process of voluntary resettlement to country of origin (or to a third country). In fact, Kakuma and Dadaab are complex social systems with internal dynamics, diversified economies, and traditional governance systems. To any Somali or South Sudanese looking from the outside, the incentives strongly favour residence in the camps over resettlement. Such incentives do not exist in Somalia or in South Sudan, and the reality of insecurity and conflict work against a programme of repatriation.

3.2 Recommendations

174. Within the reality of possible resource decreases, it is essential that WFP begin contingency planning for this new pipeline reality to avoid uninformed and last-minute ration cuts. The programming challenge is now how to achieve priority goals with fewer resources. In this spirit, the ET offers a set of specific recommendations for WFP – strategic

(informing the programmatic priorities) and operational (informing the implementation process) – that need to be implemented prior to the start of the new PRRO or in the first year of PRRO implementation.

Strategic Recommendations

175. Recommendation 1: In preparation for the following programming cycle, we recommend that WFP conduct a well-designed and rigorous vulnerability assessment of the two camps. The purpose of this assessment would be to understand the patterns and drivers of vulnerability within the camp populations. It would further identify existing livelihood strategies and their distribution. In acknowledging the sensitivity of such an activity in Dadaab camp, it is recommended that the camp leaderships (including clan leaders) be consulted regarding the necessity to understand camp vulnerability for the next programming cycle, and to elicit their participation in implementing the activity (e.g., identifying enumerators and reviewing the tools). This is a critical first step to the design of the follow-up operation. Security permitting, this recommendation should be implemented in 2014.⁹⁸

176. Recommendation 2: WFP should eliminate the take-home ration for girls. Collaborate with education sector partners to identify alternative and non-food incentives that promote girls' enrolment and attendance. It is important to note here that WFP does not have the comparative advantage to play a key role in implementing a non-food alternative, thus a partnership agreement will be necessary.

177. Recommendation 3: WFP should significantly redesign the FFA interventions and, if they must remain within the refugee PRRO (for reasons unclear to the ET), the interventions should be based on clear, transparent objectives and upon a comprehensive needs assessment. The FFA intervention should be supervised by the WFP Garissa and Lodwar sub-offices to ensure FFA activities are integrated in County Integrated Development Plans. Supervision from the county level allows WFP to plan with communities' and counties' line services. At the same time, the ET recommends a more robust design process that sets out an appropriate long-term theory of change for target communities and indicates clearly how the PRRO will contribute to the overall goal of food security resilience, including appropriate indicators for monitoring. As part of the design, WFP should consider not only community infrastructure, e.g., for improved water management, but provide more tailored support to livelihood diversification that addresses adaptive deficit. This could include introducing livestock herds and converting invasive mesquite forests into charcoal production sites.

178. Recommendation 4: The ET feels well justified (by its review of experiences with school feeding in ASAL Kenya and elsewhere) that food should be provided to students, especially those who spend the entire day at school. WFP should design the next school meals intervention as part of a broader collaboration with UNHCR, UNICEF, and the CPs to implement existing camp-wide educational strategies that effectively increase net enrolment and primary completion rates. The ET suggests an "Education Working Group" (including parents, teachers, and camp leadership) at sub-camp level as an appropriate governance structure to effect measurable change in education. As an implementation component of this recommendation and if school feeding is to be continued, it is important

⁹⁸ Such a needs assessment was a primary recommendation of the JAM 2012 report.

to explicitly state the objectives of the intervention and the expected impacts. If net enrolment and attendance are the objectives, the impacts need to be rigorously assessed.

179. Recommendation 5: Based on rigorous market assessment, WFP should expand the experience of FFV to substitute food vouchers, on a pilot basis, for the commodities that are most monetized, i.e., cereals and oil.⁹⁹ The reduction in the ration size and composition would be supplemented by FFV, which would allow beneficiaries to purchase their desired food items.

Operational Recommendations

180. Recommendation 6: WFP should maintain the BSF and TSF interventions but with an improved implementation strategy. Greater emphasis should be given to the “soft” side of the intervention, i.e., a more focused nutrition orientation for mothers, including information provision and counselling on food utilization. This could include a community outreach component in which nutritional staff or community health workers visit the blocks to carry out public counselling sessions with beneficiary mothers and children. Such a community component is crucial for the success of nutrition programmes for follow-up of clients at home and for defaulter tracing in order to reduce cases of relapse. Quality supervision of the community services is an integral component of nutrition programmes. Thus, this recommendation will require a great emphasis on CP staff training and more effective supervision of these field workers.

181. Recommendation 7: We recommend, prior to a new programme cycle, a reflective review of the monitoring and evaluation system. As stated above, it appears that the detail and effort of data collection are not commensurate with the utility of the reports produced. Such a review would identify a limited number of input, output, and impact indicators for the new PRRO (complementary to the mandated FSOM system) and would issue reports more frequently and with more impact detail than the SPRs. Such a review of the M&E system for the new PRRO would also give careful thought to quality, particularly to construct validity and internal validity in order to reduce sampling bias and sampling error.

182. Recommendation 8: Important decisions will be made in the event of anticipated reduced pipelines. In this event, WFP should fully incorporate the formal camp leadership and the informal clan leaders from each sub-camp into decision-making relative to the GFD ration in terms of size, composition, and targeting, as well as the supplementary feeding strategy for those most vulnerable. The biometrics success has offered a good example of how participatory decision-making can go beyond just negotiating the acceptance of a decision made in Nairobi to a more integrated problem-solving process during the decision-making that precedes actual programming.

183. Recommendation 9: WFP should explore the possibility of an alternative distribution site for super-cereal for the BSF for children 6-23 months old in Dadaab. One of the proposals made by the agencies is that the distribution of the super-cereal continue at GFD sites but only children who have been taken for growth monitoring promotion at the health posts qualify to get the food. This approach would be more efficient than transferring the distribution to the health post. Nonetheless, this will require additional staffing to conduct anthropometric measurements and nutrition education. This could first be tried on a pilot basis in one of the camps and if successful expanded to the other camps. A

⁹⁹ The ET notes that at the time of the evaluation report review, WFP Kenya is undertaking a market assessment for cereals.

suggestion made by the ET is for the programme to explore the possibility of providing a ready-to-use food (RUTF) that is nutrient- and energy-dense to replace the super-cereal. There is less likelihood of sharing of such foods at the household level even if distributed with the general ration. RUTFs are regarded as therapeutic and therefore not for consumption by the entire household.

184. Recommendation 10: Building upon the technical success of the biometrics experience, we recommend the expanded use of electronic information to improve coherency and targeting in the entire food assistance programme in the two camps. Such a system could track children flagged during the nutrition monitoring process and identify the more vulnerable households.

Annexes

Annex 1: Terms of Reference

Please refer to next page.



EVALUATION QUALITY ASSURANCE SYSTEM

Office Of Evaluation

Measuring Results, Sharing Lessons

FINAL, 06 SEPTEMBER 2013

TERMS OF REFERENCE - OPERATION EVALUATION KENYA – PRRO 200174 – FOOD ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES (2011– 2013)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | |
|--|-----------|
| 1. Introduction | 2 |
| 2. Reasons for the Evaluation..... | 2 |
| 2.1. Rationale..... | 2 |
| 2.2. Objectives | 2 |
| 2.3. Stakeholders and Users | 2 |
| 3. Subject of the Evaluation | 4 |
| 4. Evaluation Approach | 6 |
| 4.1. Scope | 6 |
| 4.2. Evaluation Questions | 6 |
| 4.3. Evaluability Assessment | 6 |
| 4.4. Methodology | 7 |
| 4.5. Quality Assurance..... | 7 |
| 5. Phases and deliverables | 8 |
| 6. Organization of the Evaluation..... | 9 |
| 6.1 Outsourced approach | 9 |
| 6.2 Evaluation Management | 10 |
| 6.3 Evaluation Conduct..... | 10 |
| 7. Roles and Responsibilities of WFP Stakeholders | 11 |
| 8. Communication and budget | 12 |
| 8.1. Communication..... | 12 |
| 8.2. Budget..... | 12 |
| Acronyms | 13 |

1. Introduction

1. These Terms of Reference (TOR) are for the evaluation of the Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO) 200174 – Food assistance to refugees in Kenya. This evaluation is commissioned by the WFP Office of Evaluation (OEV) and will take place from November 2013 to May 2014. In line with WFP's outsourced approach for operations evaluations (OpEvs), the evaluation will be managed and conducted by an external evaluation company amongst those having a long-term agreement with WFP for operations evaluations.
2. These TOR were prepared by the OEV focal point based on an initial document review and consultation with stakeholders and following a standard template. The purpose of the TOR is twofold: 1) to provide key information to the company selected for the evaluation and to guide the company's Evaluation Manager and Team throughout the evaluation process; and 2) to provide key information to stakeholders about the proposed evaluation.
3. The TOR will be finalised based on comments received on the draft version and on the agreement reached with the selected company. The evaluation shall be conducted in conformity with the TOR.

2. Reasons for the Evaluation

2.1. Rationale

4. In the context of renewed corporate emphasis on providing evidence and accountability for results, WFP has committed to increase evaluation coverage of operations and mandated OEV to commission 12 Operations Evaluations (OpEvs) in 2013; 24 in 2014 and up to 30 in 2015.
5. Operations to be evaluated are selected based on utility and risk criteria.¹ From a shortlist of operations meeting these criteria prepared by OEV, the Regional Bureau (RB) has selected, in consultation with the Country Office (CO), PRRO 200174 in Kenya for an independent evaluation. In particular, the evaluation has been timed to ensure that findings can feed into future decisions on programme design.

2.2. Objectives

6. This evaluation serves the dual and mutually reinforcing objectives of accountability and learning:
 - **Accountability** – The evaluation will assess and report on the performance and results of the operation. A management response to the evaluation recommendations will be prepared.
 - **Learning** – The evaluation will determine the reasons why certain results occurred or not to draw lessons, derive good practices and pointers for learning. It will provide evidence-based findings to inform operational and strategic decision-making. Findings will be actively disseminated and lessons will be incorporated into relevant lesson sharing systems.

2.3. Stakeholders and Users

7. **Stakeholders.** A number of stakeholders both inside and outside of WFP have interests in the results of the evaluation and many of these will be asked to play a role in the evaluation process.

¹ The utility criteria looked both at the timeliness of the evaluation given the operation's cycle and the coverage of recent/planned evaluations. The risk criteria was based on a classification and risk ranking of WFP COs taking into consideration a wide range of risk factors, including operational and external factors as well as COs' internal control self-assessments.

Table one below provides a preliminary stakeholders' analysis, which will be deepened by the evaluation team in the inception package.

Table 1: Preliminary stakeholders' analysis

| Stakeholders | Interest in the evaluation |
|--|---|
| INTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS | |
| Country Office (CO) | Responsible for the country level planning and operations implementation, the CO is the primary stakeholder of this evaluation. It has a direct stake in the evaluation and an interest in learning from experience to inform decision-making. It is also called upon to account internally as well as to its beneficiaries, partners for the performance and results of its operation. |
| Regional Bureau (RB) in Nairobi | Responsible for both oversight of COs and technical guidance and support, the RB management has an interest in an independent account of the operational performance as well as in learning from the evaluation findings to apply this learning to other country offices. |
| Office of Evaluation (OEV) | OEV is responsible for commissioning OpEvs over 2013-2015. As these evaluations follow a new outsourced approach, OEV has a stake in ensuring that this approach is effective in delivering quality, useful and credible evaluations. |
| WFP Executive Board (EB) | The WFP governing body has an interest in being informed about the effectiveness of WFP operations. This evaluation will not be presented to the EB but its findings will feed into an annual synthesis of all OpEvs, which will be presented to the EB at its November session. |
| EXTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS | |
| Beneficiaries (refugees and host communities) | As the ultimate recipients of food assistance, beneficiaries have a stake in WFP determining whether its assistance is appropriate and effective. As such, the level of participation in the evaluation of women, men, boys and girls from different groups will be determined and their respective perspectives will be sought. |
| Government | The Government has a direct interest in knowing whether WFP activities in the country conforms with its policies, are harmonised with the action of other partners and meet the expected results. Some government bodies are partners in the implementation of WFP activities. |
| UN Country team | The UNCT has therefore an interest in ensuring that WFP operation is effective in contributing to the UN concerted efforts to assist refugees. UNHCR, UNICEF and UNDP are also a direct partner of WFP for this operation. |
| NGOs | NGOs are WFP's partners for the implementation of some activities while at the same time having their own interventions. The results of the evaluation might affect future implementation modalities, strategic orientations and partnerships. |
| Donors | WFP operations are voluntarily funded by a number of donors. They have an interest in knowing whether their funds have been spent efficiently and if WFP's work has been effective and contributed to their own strategies and programmes. |

8. **Users.** The primary users of this evaluation will be:

- The CO and its partners in decision-making related notably to programme implementation and/or design, country strategy and partnerships.
- Given RB's core functions of strategic guidance, programme support and oversight, the RB is also expected to use the evaluation findings as well as the office responsible for support to RBs under the Chief Operating Officer.
- OEV will use the evaluation findings to feed into an annual synthesis report of all OpEvs and will reflect upon the evaluation process to refine its OpEv approach, as required.

3. Subject of the Evaluation

9. Eighty percent of Kenya is arid and semi-arid land where climatic shocks, food insecurity and poverty are pervasive. Of Kenya's 38.6 million people, 2 4.3 million live in arid and semi-arid areas, of whom close to a million receive WFP food assistance.
10. Since 1991, Kenya has hosted refugees in camps in the arid and semi-arid areas of Dadaab near the border with Somalia and Kakuma near the border with the Sudan and Ethiopia. Arrivals of asylum seekers in the past few years from both countries have increased competition for water, grazing land and firewood, sometimes resulting in conflict with the primarily pastoralist communities surrounding the camps. Kenya's 2007 Refugees Act prohibits refugees from engaging in economic activities outside the camps, which prevents integration into Kenyan society. While the Kenyan Government intends to hold a national conference on repatriation (Nov 2013), the prospects for repatriation or resettlement in a third country are limited.
11. Under PRRO 200174, WFP supports refugees in the Dadaab camps and in the Kakuma camp as well as vulnerable groups in the host communities. The PRRO 200174 project document including the project logframe, related amendments (Budget revisions) and the latest resource situation are available by clicking [here](#). The key characteristics of the operation are outlined in table two below; table three summarizes the operation's specific objectives and corresponding activities; and a map is presented in annex one.
12. Against the backdrop of an evolving Government stance on assistance to refugees, there have been developments in the WFP operation including: the rationalisation of food distribution mechanisms by introducing biometrics identification as a pre-requisite for receiving rations; beneficiary profiling based on assets owned as a means to enhance targeting; and the introduction of fresh food vouchers for pregnant and lactating women.

Table 2: Key characteristics of the operation

| | | | |
|----------------------------------|--|--|---|
| Approval | The operation was approved by the EB In November 2011. | | |
| Duration | <u>Initial:</u> Three year period (1st Oct 2011 - 30 September 2014). | <u>Revised:</u> (*) A fifth technical BR is being planned by the CO and a sixth one to extend the PRRO duration. | |
| Amendments | There have been 4 amendments (Budget revisions (BR)) to the initial project document. BR 1 increased the number of beneficiaries in Dadaab following a sharp increase in refugee arrivals in 2011 resulting from the drought and famine in Somalia. The other Budget Revisions were technical in nature. | | |
| Planned beneficiaries | <u>Initial:</u> Kakuma: 117,000 Dadaab: 439,000 Total: 556,000 (incl 36,000 host pop) | <u>Revised:</u> Kakuma: 117,000 Dadaab: 559,000 Total: 616,000 (incl 36,000 host pop) | |
| Planned food requirements | <u>Initial:</u> 344,179 mt of food commodities | <u>Revised:</u> 392,714 mt of food commodities | |
| Main Partners | <u>Government:</u> Department of Refugee Affairs, Kenya Roads Board, the Ministry of Water and irrigation and the Office of the President | <u>UN:</u> UNHCR, UNICEF UNDP | <u>NGOs: International:</u> WVI, CARE, NRC, IRC <u>National:</u> Don Bosco, KRC, GRP, TRP, Islamic Relief, etc |
| US \$ requirements | <u>Initial:</u> 338,3 million | <u>Revised:</u> 436 million | |
| Contribution | The operation received US\$261,9 million; i.e. 60% of the total US\$ requirements. | | |

² From WFP.org – Countries – Kenya – Operations or <http://www.wfp.org/node/3497/3770/32617>

| | |
|----------------------------------|--|
| level (by Sept 2013) | |
| Top five donor (by Sept 2013) | USA (41% of total donations); Germany (14%); UK (8%), Multilateral (7%), and Canada (6%) |

Table 3: Objectives and activities

| | Corporate Strategic objectives | Operation specific objectives | Activities |
|--|--|--|---|
| Millennium Development Goals 1-5 UNDAF priorities 2 and 3 | Strategic Objective 1 | Meet the food consumption needs and minimum nutritional requirements of refugees | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> General food distribution (GFD) Mother-and-child health and nutrition. (MCHN) Supplementary feeding for malnourished children under 5 and pregnant and lactating women Institutional feeding School meals Food for training. Food for assets. |
| | | Manage moderate acute malnutrition and prevent severe acute malnutrition in pregnant and lactating women and children under 5 | |
| | Strategic Objective 3 | Improve access to micronutrients among pregnant and lactating women and children aged 6-23 months | |
| | | increase adherence to treatment and meet the nutritional needs of people living with HIV (PLHIV), TB patients and people with chronic diseases | |
| | | Maintain enrolment and attendance and reduce the gender disparity in primary schools in the camps | |
| | | Increase enrolment and attendance among disenfranchised young people in training centres | |
| Strategic Objective 2 | Increase the capacity of host communities to meet their food needs | | |

% planned beneficiaries by activity

% Planned food requirements by activity

- General Food Distribution
- Mother and Child Health and Nutrition
- Malnourished children <5 and pregnant and lactating women
- Hospital feeding
- People living with HIV, Tuberculosis and chronic diseases
- School meals
- Take-home rations
- Food for Assets
- Food for Trainings

4. Evaluation Approach

4.1. Scope

13. **Scope.** The evaluation will cover PRRO 200174 including all activities and processes related to its formulation, implementation, resourcing, monitoring, and evaluation and reporting relevant to answer the evaluation questions. The period covered by this evaluation is mid-2011 until end 2013, which captures the time from the development of the operation until the start of the evaluation.

4.2. Evaluation Questions

14. The evaluation will address the following three questions:

Question 1: How appropriate is the operation? Areas for analysis will include the extent to which the objectives, targeting, choice of activities and of transfer modalities:

- Are appropriate to the needs of the food insecure population.
- Is coherent with the Government's obligations towards refugees and seek complementarity with the interventions of relevant humanitarian partners as well as with other CO interventions in the country.
- Are coherent with WFP strategies, policies and normative guidance.

Question 2: What are the results of the operation? While ensuring that differences in benefits between women, men, boys and girls from different groups are considered, the evaluation will analyse:

- the level of attainment of the planned outputs;
- the extent to which the outputs led to the realisation of the operation objectives as well as to unintended effects;
- how different activities of the operation dovetail and are synergetic with other WFP operations and with what other actors are doing to contribute to the overriding WFP objective in the country.
- The efficiency of the operation and the likelihood that the benefits will continue after the end of the operation;

Question 3: Why and how has the operation produced the observed results? The evaluation should generate insights into the main internal and external factors that caused the observed changes and affected how results were achieved. The inquiry is likely to focus, amongst others, on:

- Internally: the processes, systems and tools in place to support the operation design, implementation, monitoring/evaluation and reporting; the governance structure and institutional arrangements (including issues related to staffing, capacity and technical backstopping from RB/HQ); the partnership and coordination arrangements; etc.
- Externally: the external operating environment; the funding climate; external incentives and pressures; etc.

Throughout the assessment and in making recommendations, the team will ensure the inclusion of forward considerations to inform project design of the next phase of the PRRO giving due attention to the evolving context (including devolution and the proposed repatriation) and to possible programming options.

4.3 Evaluability Assessment

15. Evaluability is the extent to which an activity or a programme can be evaluated in a reliable and credible fashion. The below provides a preliminary evaluability assessment, which will be deepened by the evaluation team in the inception package. The team will notably critically

assess data availability and take evaluability limitations into consideration in its choice of evaluation methods.

16. In answering question one, the team will be able to rely on assessment reports, minutes from the project review committee, the project document and logframe, Joint Assessment Mission reports (JAMs) for 2010 and 2012 as well as documents related to interventions from other actors. In addition, the team will review relevant WFP strategies, policies and normative guidance.
17. For question two the operation has been designed in line with the corporate results framework (SRF) and selected outputs, outcomes, targets and baseline values are recorded in the logframe. Monthly output monitoring reports as well as nutrition monitoring reports (from partners); quarterly food security outcome monitoring reports and annual standard project reports (SPRs) detail achievement of outputs and outcomes thus making them evaluable against the stated objectives.
18. However, answering the efficiency aspect of question two is likely to pose some challenges owing in part to data gaps and granularity issues.
19. For question three, the team members will have access to some institutional planning documents and is likely to elicit further information from key informant interviews.
20. Furthermore, security issues in the Dadaab area will pose a challenge to field visits and the applicable security measures will be followed.

4.4. Methodology

21. The methodology will be designed by the evaluation team during the inception phase. It should:
 - Employ relevant internationally agreed evaluation criteria including those of relevance, coherence (internal and external), coverage, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, sustainability and connectedness;
 - Use applicable standards (e.g. SPHERE standards);
 - Demonstrate impartiality and lack of biases by relying on a cross-section of information sources (e.g. stakeholder groups, including beneficiaries, etc.) and using mixed methods (e.g. quantitative, qualitative, participatory) to ensure triangulation of information through a variety of means. In particular, the sampling technique to select field visit sites will need to demonstrate impartiality and participatory methods will be emphasised with the main stakeholders, including the CO.
 - Be geared towards addressing the key evaluation questions taking into account the evaluability challenges, the budget and timing constraints;
 - Be based on an analysis of the logic model of the operation and on a thorough stakeholders analysis;
 - Be synthesised in an evaluation matrix, which should be used as the key organizing tool for the evaluation.

4.5. Quality Assurance

22. OEV's Evaluation Quality Assurance System (EQAS) defines the quality standards expected from this evaluation and sets out processes with in-built steps for quality assurance, templates for evaluation products and checklists for the review thereof. It is based on the UNEG norms and standards and good practice of the international evaluation community (DAC and ALNAP) and aims to ensure that the evaluation process and products conform to best practice and meet OEV's quality standards. EQAS does not interfere with the views and independence of the evaluation team.

23. At the start of the evaluation, OEV will orient the evaluation manager on EQAS and share related documents. EQAS should be systematically applied to this evaluation and the evaluation manager will be responsible to ensure that the evaluation progresses in line with its process steps and to conduct a rigorous quality control of the evaluation products ahead of their submission to WFP.
24. The evaluation company is ultimately responsible for the quality of the evaluation products. If the expected standards are not met, the evaluation company will, at its own expense, make the necessary amendments to bring the evaluation products to the required quality level.
25. OEV will also subject the evaluation report to an external post-hoc quality assurance review to report independently on the quality, credibility and utility of the evaluation in line with evaluation norms and standards.

5. Phases and deliverables

26. Table four below highlights the main activities of the evaluation, which will unfold in five phases.

Table 4: Activities, deliverables and timeline by evaluation phase

| Entity responsible | Activities | Key dates |
|-------------------------------------|---|--------------------|
| PHASE 1 – PREPARATION | | |
| OEV | Desk review, consultation and preparation of TOR | August |
| CO / RB | Stakeholders comments on TOR | 1-13 Sep 2013 |
| OEV | ❖ Final TOR | 15 Sep 2013 |
| OEV | Evaluation company selection and contracting | 1 Oct 2013 |
| PHASE 2 – INCEPTION | | |
| OEV | Management hand-over to the EM (including briefing on EQAS, expectations and requirements for the evaluation). | 5 – 12 Nov 2013 |
| EM | Evaluation team briefing on EQAS, expectations and requirements for the evaluation. | 12 – 15 Nov 2013 |
| ET | Desk review, initial consultation with the CO/RB, drafting of the Inception Package (including methodology and evaluation mission planning) | 15 – 30 Nov 2013 |
| EM | Quality Assurance of the Inception Package | 30 Nov 2013 |
| EM | ❖ Final Inception Package | 13 Dec 2013 |
| PHASE 3 – EVALUATION MISSION | | |
| CO | Preparation of the evaluation mission (including setting up meetings, arranging field visits, etc) | Dec 2013 |
| ET | Introductory briefing | 6 Jan 2014 |
| ET | Interviews with key internal and external stakeholders, project site visits, etc | 6 -24 Jan 2014 |
| ET | Exit debriefing / workshop | 24 Jan 2014 |
| ET | ❖ Aide memoire | 24 Jan 2014 |
| PHASE 4 – REPORTING | | |
| ET | Evaluation Report drafting | 24 Jan – 28 Feb |
| EM | Quality Assurance of draft Evaluation Report | 3 – 8 March |
| EM | ❖ Draft Evaluation Report | 8 March |
| CO/RB/OEV | Stakeholders comments on Evaluation Report | 10-22 March |
| EM | Comments matrix | 25 – 27 March |
| ET | Revision of the Evaluation Report | 28 – 8 April |

| | | |
|----------------------------|--|----------------------|
| EM | ❖ Final Evaluation Report | 10 April 2014 |
| EM | ❖ Evaluation brief | 15 April 2014 |
| PHASE 5 – FOLLOW-UP | | |
| CO/RB | Preparation of the Management Response | 10 – 25 April |
| CO/RB | ❖ Management Response | 25 April |
| OEV | Post-hoc Quality Assurance | TBD |
| OEV | Publication of findings and integration of findings into OEV's lessons learning tools. | Upon completion |
| OEV | Preparation of annual synthesis of operations evaluations. | June 2014 |

27. **Deliverables.** The evaluation company will be responsible for producing as per the timeline presented in table 4 above the following deliverables in line with the EQAS guidance and following the required templates:

- **Inception package (IP)** – This package focuses on methodological and planning aspects and will be considered the operational plan of the evaluation. It will present a preliminary analysis of the context and of the operation and present the evaluation methodology articulated around a deepened evaluability and stakeholders' analysis; an evaluation matrix; and the sampling technique and data collection tools. It will also present the division of tasks amongst team members as well as a detailed timeline for stakeholders' consultation.
- **Aide memoire** – This document (powerpoint presentation) will present the initial analysis from the data stemming from the desk review and evaluation mission and will support the exit-debriefing at the end of the evaluation phase.
- **Evaluation report (ER)** – The evaluation report will present the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation. Findings should be evidence-based and relevant to the evaluation questions. Data will be disaggregated by sex and the evaluation findings and conclusions will highlight differences in performance and results of the operation for different beneficiary groups as appropriate. There should be a logical flow from findings to conclusions and from conclusions to recommendations. Recommendations will be provided on what changes can be made to enhance the achievements of objectives. Recommendations will be limited in number, actionable and targeted to the relevant users. These will form the basis of the WFP management response to the evaluation.
- **Evaluation brief** – A two-page brief of the evaluation will summarise the evaluation report and serve to enhance dissemination of its main findings.

28. These deliverables will be drafted in English. The evaluation TOR, report, management response and brief will be public and posted on the WFP External Website (wfp.org/evaluation). The other evaluation products will be kept internal.

6. Organization of the Evaluation

6.1 Outsourced approach

29. Under the outsourced approach to OpEvs, the evaluation is commissioned by OEV but will be managed and conducted by an external evaluation company having a long-term agreement (LTA) with WFP for operations evaluation services: TANGO.

30. The company will provide an evaluation manager (EM) and an independent evaluation team (ET) in line with the LTA. To ensure a rigorous review of evaluation deliverables, the evaluation manager should in no circumstances be part of the evaluation team.

31. The company, the evaluation manager and the evaluation team members will not have been involved in the design, implementation or M&E of the operation nor have other conflicts of interest or bias on the subject. They will act impartially and respect the [code of conduct of the profession](#)

32. Given the evaluation learning objective, the evaluation manager and team will promote a participatory evaluation process. Yet, to safeguard the independence of the evaluation, WFP staff will not be part of the evaluation team or participate in meetings with external stakeholders if the evaluation team deems that their presence could bias the responses.

6.2 Evaluation Management

33. The evaluation will be managed by Karin Fox from TANGO. The EM will be responsible to manage within the given budget the evaluation process in line with EQAS and the expectations spelt out in these TOR and to deliver timely evaluation products meeting the OEV standards. In particular, the EM will:

- Mobilise and hire the evaluation team and provide administrative backstopping (contracts, visas, travel arrangements, consultants' payments, invoices to WFP, etc).
- Act as the main interlocutor between WFP stakeholders and the ET throughout the evaluation and generally facilitate communication and promote the participatory evaluation process.
- Support the evaluation team by orienting members on WFP, EQAS and the evaluation requirements; providing them with relevant documentation and generally advising on all aspects of the evaluation to ensure that the evaluation team is able to conduct its work.
- Ensure that the evaluation proceeds in line with EQAS, the norms and standards and code of conduct of the profession and that quality standards and deadlines are met.
- Ensure that a rigorous and objective quality check of all evaluation products is conducted ahead of submission to WFP. This quality check will be documented and an assessment of the extent to which quality standards are met will be provided to WFP.
- Provide feedback on the evaluation process as part of a 360 assessment of the evaluation.

6.3 Evaluation Conduct

34. The evaluation team will conduct the evaluation under the direction of the evaluation manager. The team will be hired by the company following agreement with OEV on its composition.

35. **Team composition.** The evaluation team is expected to include 3-5 members, including the team leader. It should be composed of women and men of mixed cultural backgrounds including nationals of the country/region. The need for Somali/Sudanese interpreters should be considered.

36. **Team competencies.** The team will be multi-disciplinary and include members who together include an appropriate balance of expertise and practical knowledge in:

- Assistance to refugees - Experience with the use of biometrics identification (in refugee or other similar context would be valuable).
- Protection
- Nutrition, Livelihoods and school feeding in refugee contexts.

37. All team members should have strong analytical and communication skills; evaluation experience and familiarity with the country or region.

38. **The Team leader** will have technical expertise in one of the technical areas listed above as well as expertise in designing methodology and data collection tools and demonstrated experience in leading similar evaluations. She/he will also have leadership and communication skills, including a track record of excellent English writing and presentation skills.

39. Her/his primary responsibilities will be: i) defining the evaluation approach and methodology; ii) guiding and managing the team during the evaluation process; iii) leading the evaluation mission and

representing the evaluation team in meetings with stakeholders; iv) drafting and revising, as required, the inception package, aide memoire and evaluation report in line with EQAS; and v) provide feedback to OEV on the evaluation process as part of a 360 assessment of the evaluation.

40. **The team members** will bring together a complementary combination of the technical expertise required and have a track record of written work on similar assignments.

41. Team members will: i) contribute to the design of the evaluation methodology in their area of expertise based on a document review; ii) conduct field work; iii) participate in team meetings and meetings with stakeholders; iv) contribute to the drafting and revision of the evaluation products in their technical area(s) and v) provide feedback on the evaluation process as part of a 360 assessment of the evaluation.

7. Roles and Responsibilities of WFP Stakeholders

42. **The Country Office.** The CO management will be responsible to:

- Assign a focal point for the evaluation to liaise with the OEV focal point during the preparation phase and with the company evaluation manager thereafter. Abdi Farah, head of the refugee operation and Grace Igweta, head of M&E will be the CO focal points for this evaluation.
- Provide the evaluation manager and team with documentation and information necessary to the evaluation; facilitate the team's contacts with local stakeholders; set up meetings, field visits and the exit briefing; provide logistic support during the fieldwork; and arrange for interpretation, if required.
- Participate in a number of discussions with the evaluation team on the evaluation design and on the operation, its performance and results. In particular, the CO should participate in the evaluation team briefing and debriefing (possibly done in the form of a workshop) and in various teleconferences with the evaluation manager and team on the evaluation products.
- Comment on the TORs and the evaluation report.
- Prepare a management response to the evaluation.
- Provide feedback to OEV on the evaluation process as part of a 360 assessment of the evaluation.

43. **The Regional Bureau.** The RB management will be responsible to:

- Assign a focal point for the evaluation to liaise with the OEV focal point during the preparation phase and with the company evaluation manager thereafter, as required. Marianne Ward, Senior Regional Programme Advisor and Genevieve Chicoine, Regional M&E Advisor will be the RB focal points.
- Participate in a number of discussions with the evaluation team on the evaluation design and on the operation, its performance and results. In particular, the RB should participate in the evaluation team debriefing (possibly done in the form of a workshop) and in various teleconferences with the evaluation manager and team on the evaluation products.
- Provide comments on the TORs and the evaluation report.
- Coordinate the management response to the evaluation and track the implementation of the recommendations.
- Provide feedback to OEV on the evaluation process as part of a 360 assessment of the evaluation.

44. **Headquarters.** Some HQ divisions might, as relevant, be asked to discuss WFP strategies, policies or systems in their area of responsibility and to comment on the evaluation TOR and report. These include: Operations Department (OM), Policy and Programme Innovation Division (OSZ),

Emergency Preparedness and Response (OMEP), Procurement Division (OSP), Logistics Division (OSL), Government Partnership Division (PGG).

45. **The Office of Evaluation.** OEV is responsible for commissioning the evaluation and Claire Conan, senior Evaluation Officer is the OEV focal point. OEV's responsibilities include to:

- Set up the evaluation including drafting the TOR in consultation with concerned stakeholders; select and contract the external evaluation company; and facilitate the initial communications between the WFP stakeholders and the external evaluation company.
- Enable the company to deliver a quality process and report by providing them with the EQAS documents including process guidance and quality checklists as well as orient the evaluation manager on WFP policies, strategies, processes and systems as they relate to the operation being evaluated.
- Comment on, and approve, the evaluation report.
- Submit the evaluation report to an external post-hoc quality assurance process to independently report on the quality, credibility and utility of the evaluation and provide feedback to the evaluation company accordingly.
- Publish the final evaluation report (together with its quality assessment) on the WFP public website and incorporate findings into an annual synthesis report, which will be presented to WFP's Executive Board for consideration as well as in other lessons-learning platforms, as relevant.
- Conduct a 360 assessment (based on an e-survey) to gather perceptions about the evaluation process and the quality of the report to be used to revise the approach, as required.

8. Communication and budget

8.1. Communication

46. Issues related to language of the evaluation are noted in sections 6.3 and 5, which also specifies which evaluation products will be made public and how and provides the schedule of debriefing with key stakeholders. Section 7 paragraph 46 describes how findings will be disseminated.

47. To enhance the learning from this evaluation, the evaluation manager and team will also emphasize transparent and open communication with WFP stakeholders. Regular teleconferences and one-on-one telephone conversations between the evaluation manager, team and country office focal point will assist in discussing any arising issues and ensuring a participatory process.

8.2. Budget

48. **Funding source:** The evaluation will be funded in line with the WFP special funding mechanism for Operations Evaluations (Executive Director memo dated October 2012). The cost to be borne by the CO, if applicable, will be established by the WFP Budget & Programming Division (RMB). The total cost of the evaluation will be included in the final TORs

49. **Budget:** The budget will be prepared by the company (using the rates established in the LTA and the corresponding template) and approved by OEV. For the purpose of this evaluation the company will use the management fee corresponding to a large operation. Internal flight travel should also be budgeted for (at 150 USD each).

Please send queries to Claire Conan, OEV at Claire.conan@wfp.org 00 30 06 65 13 34 80.

Acronyms

| | |
|-------|---|
| BR | Budget Revision |
| ALNAP | Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action |
| CO | Country Office (WFP) |
| DAC | Development Assistance Committee |
| EB | (WFP's) Executive Board |
| EQAS | Evaluation Quality Assurance System |
| EM | Evaluation Manager |
| ER | Evaluation Report |
| ET | Evaluation Team |
| GFD | General Food Distribution |
| HQ | Headquarters (WFP) |
| IP | Inception Package |
| LTA | Long-Term Agreement |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organisation |
| MDG | Millennium Development Goals |
| M&E | Monitoring and Evaluation |
| Mt | Metric Ton |
| OEV | Office of Evaluation (WFP) |
| OpEv | Operation Evaluation |
| PSNP | Productive Safety Net Programme |
| RB | Regional Bureau (WFP) |
| TOR | Terms of Reference |
| TSF | Targeted Supplementary Feeding |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNCT | United Nations Country Team |
| UNEG | United Nations Evaluation Group |
| WFP | World Food Programme |

Annex 2: List of Persons and Institutions Consulted

List of partners who participated in the preliminary findings debriefing meeting

| No. | Name | Title/position | Organization |
|------------|---------------------|--|--|
| 1 | Kimani Mungai | Development Officer | Canadian HC |
| 2 | Thierry Vincent | Regional Health Advisor | French Embassy |
| 3 | Mr. Geoffrey Wafula | Head of protection | DRA |
| 4 | Andrea Siclari | Programme Officer | Switzerland (Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation) |
| 5 | Clara Van Praag | Programme Officer- | Switzerland (Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation) |
| 6 | Malte Locknitz | - | German Embassy |
| 7 | Ernest Achtell | Humanitarian Advisor | DFID |
| 8 | Morten R. Petersen | Technical Assistant | ECHO |
| 9 | Gary McGurk | Assistant Country Director | Care International |
| 10 | Maria Domarkaite | Technical Corporation | Brazil |
| 11 | Beate Bull | First Secretary (UN/Humanitarian Affairs/Gender) - | Norwegian Embassy |
| 12 | Lut Laenen | VVOB-representative Kenya | Flemish Association |
| 13 | Solomon Ngari | - | Australia |
| 14 | Nicholas Wasunna | Senior Advisor- | World vision |
| 15 | Thomas Tarus | Humanitarian Worker | |

List of partners consulted

| Name | Position | Organization |
|----------------------|--|---|
| Dr. Ndiragu | - | The International Rescue Committee (IRC) |
| Sam Chakwira | In Charge of Programme (Kenya) – | UNHCR |
| Dr. Burton | Senior Health Coordinator | UNHCR |
| Dr. Bosco | Health Coordinator - Kakuma | UNHCR |
| Anita Oberai | Program Specialist | USAID, East Africa |
| Irene Bosire | - | European Commission, Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO) |
| Malte Locknitz | Political Affairs Humanitarian Assistance, Human Rights | Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, Nairobi |
| Qurat-ul-Ain-Sadozal | Deputy Regional Director/Country Director Somalia-Kenya NRC-Horn of Africa | Norwegian Refugee Council |
| Massimo La Rosa | Food Assistance Expert | European Commission, Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO) |
| Mary Mertens, MPH | Regional Food for Peace Officer | USAID, East Africa |
| Kristin L. Alderman | Deputy Regional Refugee Co-ordinator | US Embassy, Nairobi |
| Ernest Achell | Humanitarian Advisor | Department for International Development, Kenya |
| Morten R. Petersen | Technical Assistant | European Commission, Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO) |
| Giancarlo Stopponi | Head of Implementation Unit- Programme | World Food Programme |

List of WFP country office staff consulted

| Name | Position |
|-----------------------------------|--|
| Paul Turnbull | Deputy Country Director |
| Abdi Farah | Head of Refugee Operation |
| Grace Igweta | Head of Monitoring and Evaluation |
| Sam Okara, Felix Okech | General Food Distribution, School Feeding, FFT, FFA Technical Unit |
| Yvonne Forsen | Nutrition, Health & Food Security Technical Unit |
| Cheryl Harrison | Biometrics Technical Unit |
| Ernesto Gonzalez, Josephine Muli; | Fresh Food Vouchers Technical Unit |
| Michelle Berg, Patricia Njoroge | Protection and Gender Technical Unit |
| Sjoerd Vandenheuvel | Supply chain, Resourcing, and Budgets Technical Unit |
| Ron Sibanda | Country Director - |
| Jecinta Abenyo | Programme Officer- |
| Hans Vikoler | Emergency Coordinator- |

Estimated number of beneficiaries consulted

| Refugee camp and surrounding area | PRRO intervention | Number | |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------------|--------|--------|
| | | Male | Female |
| Kakuma | GFD | 21 | 17 |
| Kakuma | TSF | 3 | 14 |
| Kakuma | BSF | - | 17 |
| Kakuma | Institutional feeding | 3 | 2 |
| Kakuma | School meals / THR | 22 | 27 |
| Kakuma | FFT | 23 | 34 |
| Kakuma | FFA | 6 | 2 |
| Dadaab | GFD | 27 | 39 |
| Dadaab | TSF | 4 | 17 |
| Dadaab | BSF | 2 | 16 |
| Dadaab | Institutional feeding | 5 | 8 |
| Dadaab | School meals / THR | 15 | 22 |
| Dadaab | FFT | 12 | 7 |
| Dadaab | FFA | 7 | 5 |
| Total | | 126 | 179 |

Annex 3: Tools¹⁰⁰

Topical Outline One: General Food Distribution

Type: Focus Group Discussions with beneficiaries of the General Food Distribution

Objective: These FGDs will include both men and women in the two camps who are receiving rations under the general food distribution component of the PRRO. FGDs will be held in each camp and, in Dadaab in the different sub-camps. The intent of the FGDs is to directly address Questions 2 and 3 in the Evaluation Matrix regarding the results of the intervention and the process by which it is implemented. The topic outline is meant to guide the FGD and to provide an organization framework for documenting the outcomes of the sessions.

Topics:

1. The process: how does the FGD work (from the perspective of the beneficiaries)—how are beneficiaries registered, how does the targeting work, the make-up of the Food Management Committee, how is the food distributed and then transported to home and stored, what concerns do the beneficiaries have regarding the process;
2. The quality of the ration: is the food quantity and mix adequate for the needs of the household, do any households experience food insecurity (and why), is the food of good quality (insect and disease-free, etc.), how is the food prepared, what supplementary foods are added to the diet (fresh foods, etc.), what concerns about food quality;
3. Distribution efficiency: pipeline breaks or reductions in ration size, how do families adjust;
4. Sale of food to purchase non-food items; what particular non-food items are sought out, how does the market for food sales (and purchases) function, how much sharing of food occurs;
5. Sources of income for camp families: what types of camp livelihoods, relationships with the host-communities;
6. Future aspirations: how do camp residents see their futures, futures of their children, do residents wish to return one day to their homes;
7. Recommendations for the improvement of the general food distribution.

¹⁰⁰ Please note, the topical outlines presented were used as guidelines for field data collection.

Topical Outline Two: General Food Distribution

Type: Focus Group Discussions and semi-structured interviews with WFP field monitors, WFP CO program officers, sub-office program officers, NGO technical staff and NGO field staff regarding the General Food Distribution

Objective: These FGDs and semi-structured interviews will trace the GFD intervention from design level (CO technical unit and M&E) to field level (NGO and WFP field monitors) in order to primarily address EM Questions 1 and 3, including relevance, appropriateness, coherence, effectiveness and efficiency, and flexibility.

Topics:

1. The FGD delivery system: how the FGD is organized (from the perspective of the technical staff and field staff) from registration and targeting to distribution and monitoring; how are the amounts adjusted to changes in the beneficiary population; how was the ration size determined; what is the role of the food management committee and how is it selected; what type of monitoring and evaluation is carried out for the intervention, including what indicators;
2. Challenges: What major challenges arise with this intervention and how are they addressed. From the perspective of the respondent(s), how do they assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the intervention;
3. Camp livelihoods: how do household manage their food rations and how do they complement the rations with other resources in order to meet other household needs.
4. How do camp residents interact with the host-community population; what kinds of labor opportunities are there either in the camp or in the host-communities. How are relations between camp residents and host-communities;
5. What is the internal (informal) leadership structure within the camps, particularly with regard to the Dadaab sub-camp communities;
6. Future aspirations: how do camp residents see their futures, futures of their children, do residents wish to return one day to their homes;
7. Recommendations for the improvement of the general food distribution.

Topical Outline Three: School Feeding (and Take-Home Rations)

Type: Focus Group Discussions and semi-structured interviews with WFP CO program officers, WFP field monitors, sub-office program officers, teachers, head masters, and parents

Objective: These FGDs and semi-structured interviews explore the school feeding intervention from design level (CO technical unit and M&E) to field level (teachers, parents, students, WFP field monitors) in order to address EM Questions 1, 2, and 3.

Topics:

1. The school feeding delivery and food management system: how the school feeding is organized (from the perspective of the technical staff and field staff), how food is obtained, stored, cooked, distributed to students, and how the program is monitored and evaluated; how is school feeding integrated with take-home rations and the general food distribution; do children come to school hungry;
2. What have been the results with regard to the standard indicators: net enrollment, attendance, completion (primary school) and continuation to secondary; what are the differences in gender and in terms of dropout rates for boys and girls; does the meal provide a sufficient incentive for children to stay in school
3. What non-food constraints and barriers are there to school enrolment, attendance, and performance; do girls feel comfortable in school, gender balance among teachers, physical infrastructure;
4. WFP and the Essential Package: are the components of the essential package present; are efficient cook stoves used, adequate latrines, water for drinking, de-worming and vaccinations;
5. School management committees: how much community participation in school management; how does the community perceive the school (as asset); how do parents evaluate education;
6. Future aspirations: how do students perceive their future opportunities; what is the perceived value of education; what opportunities do parents perceive;
7. Recommendations for the improvement of school feeding program.

Topical Outline Four: Food for Training/Food for Assets

Type: Focus Group Discussions and semi-structured interviews with WFP CO program officers, WFP field monitors, sub-office program officers, NGO field staff, host-community leaders, and beneficiaries

Objective: These FGDs and semi-structured interviews explore the outcomes and impacts of the FFT and FFA interventions. This information directly addresses EM Questions 1, 2, and 3.

Topics:

1. The FFT/FFA delivery and food management system: how the FFT/FFA is organized (from the perspective of the technical staff and field staff), how participants are targeted, the ration size and composition; how community projects are identified, selected, and monitored; what technical backstopping is needed; how the intervention is monitored and evaluation; how is the intervention integrated with other PRRO interventions;
2. Results: what have been the results as perceived by host-communities, by participating HHs, by staff; what indicators of success have been adapted; how is the impact of community assets measured;
3. What impacts does the FFT have on participants; what outcome indicators are used (e.g. employment opportunities, new livelihood options), how is training content decided; what strategies can be called best practices for these interventions;
4. What is the felt need for FFT and FFA activities; what are the expectations of WFP staff, camp leaders, community leaders;
5. Generally, how does FFT/FFA affect relationships between the camps and the host-communities
6. Recommendations for the improvement of FFT/FFA program.

Topical Outline Five: Targeting and Registration

Type: Focus Group Discussions and semi-structured interviews with WFP CO program officers, WFP field monitors, sub-office program officers, NGO field staff, host-community leaders, and beneficiaries

Objective: These FGDs and semi-structured interviews will trace the targeting/registration system from design level (CO technical unit and M&E) to field level (NGO and WFP field monitors) in order to primarily address EM Questions 1 and 3, including relevance, appropriateness, coherence, effectiveness and efficiency, and flexibility.

Topics:

1. Targeting and registration system: how the targeting/(de-)registration is organized (from the perspective of the technical staff and field staff); biometric tools, databases, standard operating procedures; synergy with other registration systems (Kenya ID / refugee ration card); how targeting is monitored and evaluated; how targeting is integrated with other PRRO interventions; flexibility and surge capacity of system; multiple registration and registration of Kenyan nationals; cross-referencing with other databases like the Kenyan biometric database
2. Targeting strategy: how participants are targeted, exclusion, degree of community participation in selection of activities, planning of implementation, targeting, food distributions and monitoring: implications of variables such as age-group and gender? Other variables which may have an impact?
3. Biometric registration system: appropriateness of hardware/software solutions, changes in systems, consistency of use, back-up/parallel systems, confidentiality and data security, use of biometric information for other purposes (criminality, resettlement), technical backstopping provided and required
4. Perceptions on identity checks and use of information by beneficiaries/staff
5. Unregistered population: reasons for non-registration, other documentation for unregistered (non-biometric) populations, potential /challenges for biometric registration
6. Results: what have been the results, opportunities, challenges as of the targeting/registration system perceived by participants, by staff at national, regional, global level; what indicators of success have been adopted
7. Recommendations for the improvement of targeting and registration.

Topical Outline Six: Food Assistance Process

Type: Focus Group Discussions and semi-structured interviews with WFP CO program officers, WFP field monitors, sub-office program officers, NGO field staff, camp leaders, and beneficiaries

Objective: These FGDs and semi-structured interviews will trace the food assistance process from design level (CO technical unit and M&E) to field level (NGO and WFP field monitors) in order to primarily address EM Questions 1 and 3, including relevance, appropriateness, coherence, effectiveness and efficiency, and flexibility.

Topics:

1. Food basket composition/ration scale: beneficiary preferences and eating habits.
2. WFP food delivery and distribution system / community-based management systems / (post-distribution) monitoring and strategic use of information.
3. Registration and biometrics: perceptions, hardware/software, consistency, coverage
4. Warehousing and transport facilities, supporting infrastructure.
5. Funding and food pipelines: pre-financing / erratic funding / invoicing and payment timing /pipeline breaks and bottlenecks
6. HR: adequacy of staffing (quality and quantity), appropriate adjustments commensurate with changes in the level of food assistance
7. Coverage / dropout rates
8. Unintended consequences of food aid: dependency syndrome, consequences for other interventions
9. Coherency with non-food item interventions
10. Relationship of general food distribution with other WFP initiatives: Food Management Improvement Program (FMIP), Targeted supplementary feeding (TSF), FFW/FFT/FFA, Food Management Improvement Program (FMIP)
11. Partnerships and level of coordination with CPss in food assistance (government counterparts at national/district levels, UN and other international agencies, NGOs).
12. Relationship between programme department and logistics
13. Contribution of WFP food distribution programs to capacity strengthening of government commodity management
14. Relationship of CO with Regional Bureau and WFP Headquarters.
15. Promotion of self reliance and durable solutions through food aid / complementarities with activities by other partners or other agencies for sustainability.
16. Alternative models of food assisted programming (complementary cash and voucher food access programming).
17. Recommendations for the improvement Food Assistance activities.

Topical Outline Seven: Health and Nutrition

Type: FGDs and semi-structured interviews with beneficiaries of selective feeding programs.

Objective: To solicit information from the design (objectives, implementation strategies, M&E) to field level. The respondents will include women, men, boys, and girls who are beneficiaries of WFP food assistance. The aim of information collected will be to address EM Questions 1, 2 & 3 and to include relevance/appropriateness, coherence with policies and guidelines, efficiency, effectiveness and impact of the programs.

Topics:

1. Trends in health and nutrition in the camps and the host communities from 2011 – 2013.
2. Beneficiary perceptions on underlying causes of malnutrition in the camp and the host community.
3. Implementation and appropriateness of Selective Feeding Programs: Supplementary feeding program (SFP), Outpatient therapeutic feeding (OTP), Stabilization Centre (SC) in-patient therapeutic feeding program), Institutional Feeding (for clients with TB and HIV/AIDS) and Maternal and Child health (MCHC).
 - What is the target population and rationale, ration size, other complementary services provided (nutrition education etc.); How is monitoring and evaluation undertaken.
 - Are these strategies appropriate in addressing the high malnutrition rates in the WFP areas of operation?
4. Efficiency and effectiveness of the program: In your view, is the program useful in terms of improving nutrition and health status of the beneficiaries?
5. Constraints and challenges to program implementation and how they could be minimized.
6. Recommendations for improvement of the program.

Topical Outline Eight: Health and Nutrition

Type: Key Informant Interviews with health, nutrition workers and those working in selecting feeding programs.

Objective: To solicit information from the design (objectives, implementation strategies, M&E) to field level. The respondents will include WFP (both CO & Sub-Offices technical group) as well as the CPSS both at headquarters and in the camps (Nairobi and Sub Offices). The aim of information collected will be to address EM Questions 1, 2 & 3 and to include relevance/appropriateness, coherence with policies and guidelines, efficiency, effectiveness and impact of the programs.

Topics:

1. Trends in the health and nutrition in the camps and the host community from 2010 – 2013.
2. Implementation and appropriateness of Selective Feeding Programs: Supplementary feeding program (SFP), Outpatient therapeutic feeding (OTP), Stabilization Centre (SC) in-patient therapeutic feeding programs), Institutional Feeding (for clients with TB and HIV/AIDS) and Maternal and Child health (MCHC).
 - What is the target population and rationale, admission and discharge criteria, foods given, ration size and how it was determined, other complementary services provided (nutrition education etc.), how is monitoring and evaluation undertaken including the indicators of outcome measure.
 - Are these strategies appropriate in addressing the high malnutrition rates in the WFP areas of operation?
3. Efficiency and effectiveness of the program: What have been the results of the interventions in terms of the outcome indicators; cure rate, coverage rate, defaulter rates, etc. (camp versus host community)? To what extent have the program activities contributed to the improvement of health and nutrition status of the target population listed above?
4. Constraints and challenges to program implementation and how they could be minimized.
5. Recommendations for improvement of the above mentioned programs.

Evaluation Limitations and Mitigation Strategies

| Limitation | Description | Mitigation strategy |
|--------------------------------|---|--|
| Time constraints | The team will have limited time in each of the camps to sufficiently address variance among camp beneficiaries | TANGO will limit analysis to the 2-3 main beneficiary strata in the camps and will organize field schedules to cover these groups with appropriate depth. These strata will be identified prior to field work through key informant interviews. |
| Institutional knowledge | Turnover will affect the level of institutional knowledge among WFP and partners staff | TANGO will organize follow up key informant interviews via phone/skype with individuals no longer involved in the program, as necessary and where current contact details can be obtained. |
| Accessibility | Security concerns may limit accessibility to beneficiary groups and key stakeholders in and outside of the camps. | In consultation with WFP, TANGO will identify alternative key informants who can provide an informed opinion on evaluation topics to replace primary key informants in cases where there is a reasonable risk that these cannot be reached. |
| Secondary data quality | Inconsistencies/gaps in documentation | TANGO is taking a structured approach to the secondary data review. Problems with data will be identified and resolved as part of the evaluation. |
| Integration of findings | Division of labour among team members may compromise integration of analysis | TANGO will use a structured data processing and analysis approach to triangulate data across multiple domains of inquiry, multiple stakeholders and multiple evaluators. |
| Unexpected events in the camps | Unexpected events will affect scheduling | Team members will be highly flexible in planning around unexpected events, where possible. Where necessary, additional time will be spent in the camps. Subsequent lost time in Nairobi will be made up through distance interviews. |
| Bias | Due to mobility limitations in the camps, there is a risk of positive response bias among accessible respondents | The TANGO team anticipates this risk and will use appropriate questioning techniques in interviews. Effective triangulation of data by team members will identify cases of positive response bias, which will then be resolved through additional purposive interviews |

Annex 4: Population: Dadaab and Kakuma Camps, by Year

| | Kakuma camp | Dadaab camps | Total |
|---------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| 1999 | 97,114 ¹⁰¹ | 110,000 ¹⁰² | 207,114 ¹⁰³ |
| 2005 | 86,276 ¹⁰⁴ | 138,129 ¹⁰⁵ | 224,405 |
| 2011 | 85,212. ¹⁰⁶ | 463,511 ¹⁰⁷ | 548,723 |
| Current | 147,612 ¹⁰⁸ | 232,596 ¹⁰⁹ | 380,208 |

¹⁰¹ According to the 1999 Kenya Census as cited in Kakuma News Reflector – A Refugee Free Press.

¹⁰² Approximate figure; mid 1999. As cited in Cris, J. 1999.

¹⁰³ Approximate figure.

¹⁰⁴ .Data from June 2005 UNHCR figures as cited in Dube, A. and Koenig, A. 2005.

¹⁰⁵ Data from August 2005 UNHCR figures as cited in.Dube, A. and Koenig, A. 2005.

¹⁰⁶ UNHCR. 2011c.

¹⁰⁷ UNHCR. 2011d.

¹⁰⁸ UNHCR. 2014a.

Annex 5: Logical Framework

Please refer to next page.



| ANNEX II: LOGICAL FRAMEWORK | | |
|---|---|--|
| Results | Performance Indicators | Risks, assumptions |
| Strategic Objective 1: Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies PRRO Objective 1: Maintain minimum nutritional requirements of refugees through GFD | | |
| Outcome 1: Reduced and/or stabilized acute malnutrition in children under 5 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Prevalence of acute malnutrition among children <5 (weight-for-height) Target: <15% (nutrition surveys, UNICEF) ➤ Supplementary feeding programme coverage, recovery, deaths and defaulters Targets: coverage >90%, recovery >70%, deaths< 3%, defaulters < 15% (HIS¹, UNHCR) | Assumption: Partners continue to reduce malnutrition, for example through complementary feeding Risk: Sanitation, care practices and disease are not addressed |
| Outcome 2: Reduced or stabilized mortality in children under 5 and adults | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Crude mortality rate Target: <1/10,000/day (HIS, UNHCR) ➤ Age-specific mortality rate for children <5 Target: <2/10,000/day (HIS, UNHCR) | Assumption: Adequate complementary health services in supplementary and therapeutic feeding Risk: Congestion leading to disease outbreaks and poor health behaviour |
| Outcome 3: Improved food consumption over assistance period for refugee households | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Household food consumption score Target: 80% of households with an acceptable food consumption score (FCS) (PDM, WFP) ➤ Coping strategy index Target: <0.2 (PDM, WFP) | Assumption: Distribution targets met, even during influxes Risk: Unregistered asylum-seekers share refugee rations |

¹ Health information system.



| ANNEX II: LOGICAL FRAMEWORK | | |
|---|--|---|
| Results | Performance Indicators | Risks, assumptions |
| Output 1.1/2.1/3.1 Sufficient distribution of food/non-food items | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ No. of beneficiaries receiving food /NFIs, as % of planned Target: 100% ➤ Quantity of food distributed, as % of planned Target: 100% ➤ Quantity of fortified foods, complementary foods and nutritional products distributed, as % of planned Target: 100% | Assumptions: Food distribution targets met, even during influxes; accurate population statistics provided by UNHCR; partners' NFI pipeline maintained Risk: Food/NFI pipeline breaks |
| Strategic Objective 2: Prevent acute hunger and invest in disaster preparedness and mitigation measures PRRO Objective 2: Increase capacity of host communities to meet food needs | | |
| Outcome 4 Adequate food consumption over assistance period for targeted households at risk of falling into acute hunger | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Household food consumption score Target: 80% of households with an acceptable FCS (PDM, WFP) ➤ Coping strategy index Target: <0.2 (Source: PDM, WFP) | Assumption: Host community accepts FFA approach Risk: Droughts and floods erode FFA impacts |
| Output 4.1 Sufficient distribution of food/non-food items | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ No. of beneficiaries receiving food/NFIs as % of planned Target: 100% ➤ Quantity of food distributed as % of planned Target: 100% ➤ Quantity of fortified foods, complementary foods and nutritional products distributed as % of planned Target: 100% | See 1.1/1.2/1.3 |



| ANNEX II: LOGICAL FRAMEWORK | | |
|---|--|---|
| Results | Performance Indicators | Risks, assumptions |
| Strategic Objective 3: Restore and rebuild lives and livelihoods in post-conflict, post-disaster or transition situations PRRO Objective 3: Reduced malnutrition among refugee children under 5, pregnant and lactating women and patients with special needs through health and nutrition interventions PRRO Objective 4: Increased enrolment and attendance and reduced gender disparity in camp schools | | |
| Outcome 5: Hazard risk reduced in targeted communities | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Households with increased asset score Target: 50% (Household Assets Survey, WFP) ➤ Communities with increased asset score Target: 50% (Community Assets Survey, WFP) ➤ Government provision of NFIs Target: 100% (FFA cooperating partner reports, WFP) ➤ Partner provision of non-food items by type Target: 100% of planned (FFA monitoring, WFP) | Assumption: Availability of technical input from government partners Risk: Insufficient government funding for NFIs |
| Output 5.1 Disaster-mitigation assets built or restored by targeted communities | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ No. of risk-reduction and disaster-mitigation assets created/restored Target: 36 annually (FFA monitoring, WFP) | Assumption: Land/inputs available for agricultural activities Risk: Inadequate government capacity to undertake implementation |

Annex 6: Fieldwork Schedule

| Date | Time | Stakeholder/ WFP Facilitator/ Location | Team Member(s) | Focus and Purpose |
|--------------------------|---------------|---|----------------|---|
| Sunday 5 January | | Tim Finan and Bruce Ravesloot arrive in Nairobi. Sophie Ochola in Nairobi. | TF, BR | |
| Monday 6 January | 08:00 – 08:30 | Arrival and security briefing; Security Unit | TF, BR, SO | Security |
| | 08:30 – 09:00 | Installation and Administration arrangements (Office, Gate Passes, IT connectivity and communication); Admin/IT/HR Units (Mary) | TF, BR, SO | Logistics / communications |
| | 09:00-09:30 | Introductory meeting with Country Office (CO) Management – expectations and guidance; Refugee Programme Unit (Abdi Farah/Sam Okara) | TF, BR, SO | Over view of operational parameters / challenges |
| | 09:30-12:30 | Bilateral briefing and meetings with CO relevant Units and Staff; Abdi Farah/Sam Okara/Grace Igweta | TF, BR, SO | Over view of operational parameters / challenges |
| | 13:30-14:30 | Meeting with Regional Bureau Snr Programme Advisor and M&E Advisor; Abdi Farah/Sam Okara /Grace Igweta | TF, BR, SO | Over view of operational parameters / challenges |
| | 14:30-16:00 | Bilateral briefing and meetings with CO relevant Units and Staff; Abdi Farah/Sam Okara /Grace Igweta | TF, BR, SO | Over view of operational parameters / challenges |
| | 16:00-18.00 | Team member meeting | TF, BR, SO | Integrated review of findings and adjust methodology/ schedule if necessary |
| Tuesday 7 January | 08:30-10:00 | Meeting with UNHCR: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Representative - - Deputy Rep, Assistants (Programme and Protection) Representative and Head of Technical Unit (Health and Nutrition)Abdi Farah/Sam Okara | TF, BR, SO | Courtesy Call followed by technical discussions |
| | 10:30-14:30 | Bilateral meetings with: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Commissioner, Department of Refugee Affairs (DRA) | TF, BR, SO | Courtesy Call followed by technical discussions |

| | | | | |
|--------------------------------|-------------|--|------------|--|
| | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - CARE, Country Director & technical staff - NRC, Country Director & technical staff - World Vision, Country Director & technical staff Abdi Farah/Sam Okara | | |
| | 15:00-16:30 | Additional bilateral meetings with CO relevant Units and Staff; Abdi Farah/Sam Okara/Grace Igweta | TF, BR, SO | Clarify remaining issues and finalize schedule in the camps |
| | 16:30-18:00 | Team member meeting | TF, BR, SO | Integrate review of findings and adjust methodology/ schedule if necessary |
| Wednesday 8 January | 6:00 | Depart Nairobi at 6:00am to arrive by air Lodwar at 07:20, and travel the same day by road to Kakuma; Sam Okara/Felix `Okech /Grace Igweta | TF, BR, SO | Meet critical stakeholders at Kakuma |
| Thursday 9 January | | From 8-11 January: Detailed schedule of meetings when in Kakuma to be prepared by WFP Sub Office [Guidance note: specific meetings with UNHCR + DRA + Programme Staff + Logistics Team + Thematic partners (GFD + Health & Nutrition + Schools Meals & FFA + FFA) + Refugees leaders + field visits to projects sites to be organized] ; Kakuma Sub Office | TF, BR, SO | Meet critical stakeholders |
| Friday 10 January | | Kakuma | | Meet critical stakeholders |
| Saturday 11 January | | Return to Nairobi via Lodwar; Sam Okara/Felix Okech/Grace Igweta | TF, BR, SO | |
| Sunday 12 January | | TANGO team work in Nairobi. | TF, BR, SO | Integrate review of findings and adjust methodology/ schedule if necessary |
| Monday 13 January | 6:00 | Depart Nairobi for Dadaab; Sam Okara/Felix Okech /Grace Igweta | TF, BR, SO | Meet critical stakeholders at Dadaab |
| Tuesday 14 | | (From 13-17 January: Detailed schedule of meetings while in Dadaab to be prepared by Dadaab Sub | TF, BR, SO | Meet critical stakeholders at Dadaab |

| | | | | |
|---------------------------------|-------------------|---|------------|--|
| Tuesday 14 January | | Office [Guidance note: specific meetings with UNHCR + DRA + Programme Staff + Logistics Team + Thematic partners (GFD + Health & Nutrition + Schools Meals & FFA + FFA) + Refugees leaders + field visits to projects sites to be organized] (detailed programme to be inserted in this table) ;Dadaab Sub Office | | |
| Wednesday 15 January | | Dadaab | TF, BR, SO | Meet critical stakeholders at Dadaab |
| Thursday 16 January | | Dadaab | TF, BR, SO | Meet critical stakeholders at Dadaab |
| Friday 17 January | | Return to Nairobi with UNHAS | TF, BR, SO | |
| Saturday 18 January | | TANGO team work | TF, BR, SO | Integrated review of findings and adjust methodology/ schedule if necessary |
| Sunday 19 January | | TANGO team work | TF, BR, SO | Integrated review of findings and adjust methodology/ schedule if necessary |
| Monday 20 January | | Bilateral meetings: - USAID/FFP - CIDA - DFID - ECHO (Abdi/Sam) | TF, BR, SO | Over view of operational parameters / challenges |
| | | Bilateral meetings with CO relevant staff and units, as required | TF, BR, SO | Clarification, emerging issues |
| Tuesday 21 January | | TANGO team work and bilateral meetings with CO relevant staff and units, as required; Abdi Farah/Sam Okara/Grace Igweta | TF, BR, SO | Clarification, preparation of presentations |
| Wednesday 22 January | Afternoon; TBD | Internal Briefing and presentation of the Aide Memoire for the CO Management and relevant Units/Staff; Abdi Farah/Sam Okara/Grace Igweta | TF, BR, SO | Presentation of the mission's main findings, conclusions and recommendations |
| Thursday | Morning; | External stakeholder meeting; Abdi Farah/Sam Okara/Grace Igweta | TF, BR, SO | Presentation of the mission's main findings, conclusions and |

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| 23 January | TBD | | | recommendations |
| Friday 24 January | | Bilateral meetings with CO relevant staff and units, as required; Abdi Farah/Sam Okara/Grace Igweta | TF, BR, SO | Final clarifications and consultations on any issues arising from the two presentations with the CO team |
| Saturday 25 January | | Departure from Nairobi | TF, BR | |

Annex 7: Evaluation Matrix

Key Question 1: How appropriate is the operation?

| Sub Question | Measure/Indicator | Main Sources of Information | Data Collection Methods | Data Analysis Methods | Evidence quality |
|--|---|--|---|--|---|
| 1.1 Are the objectives of the PRRO relevant to the needs of the food insecure population? | Base-line values for nutritional status in the camps (including stunting rates, GAM, MAM, SAM, anaemia, etc.) | Joint Assessment Mission (JAM)(2011) Joint Assessment Mission (JAM)(2012) | Review of secondary data Review background/project documentation | Qualitative analysis: content analysis of documents, consistency evaluation across sources, assessment of key informant interview and FGD data. Analysis disaggregated to capture inter-camp and intra-camp variation (e.g. among the 5 sub-camps in Dadaab. Analysis also disaggregated by PRRO objectives | Moderate to high...Confidence is built upon a process of triangulation of results at different scales (levels) and across the range of stakeholders |
| | Base-line nutritional status for pregnant and lactating women | Camp Nutrition Surveys (Dadaab and Kakuma) (2010) | Interviews with WFP CO, RB staff | | |
| | Base-line nutrition outcomes for HIV/AIDS patients and adherence to treatment | WFP Food Security Outcome Monitoring (FSOM) Reports (2010) | Interviews with key government stakeholders (Regional, local) | | |
| | Base-line primary school enrolment and attendance rates(disaggregated by gender) in camps | UNHCR Camp Population Statistics (2010) | Interviews with UNHCR and UNICEF staff Interviews with partner NGO staff | | |
| | Base-line enrolment and attendance of youth in training centres | Minutes from project review committee | FGDs with camp leadership and beneficiary population at different sites | | |

| | | | | |
|---|--|---|--|---|
| | <p>Base-line food consumption score in host communities</p> <p>Base-line patterns of access to other, complementary (non-WFP) food assistance</p> | <p>Project documents and logframe</p> <p>Kenya National Food and Nutrition Security Policy (2011)</p> <p>Kenya National Social Protection Policy (2011) Livelihood reports, VAM mapping information</p> | <p>Interviews with teachers and school directors</p> <p>FGDs with local host community leadership</p> | |
| <p>1.2 Are the targeting strategies of the PRRO effectively administering to the food insecure population?</p> | <p>Current total number of targeted beneficiaries</p> <p>Changes and trends in total number of targeted beneficiaries since project inception</p> <p>Number of beneficiaries by activity (disaggregated by gender)</p> <p>Transparency of targeting criteria for beneficiaries</p> | <p>Standard Project Reports (SPR) (2011,2012)</p> <p>Joint Assessment Missions (JAM)(2012)</p> <p>Camp Nutrition Surveys (Dadaab and Kakuma) (2013)</p> <p>WFP Food Security Outcome Monitoring</p> | <p>Review background/project documentation</p> <p>Interviews with WFP CO, RB staff</p> <p>Interviews with key government stakeholders (regional, local)</p> <p>Interviews with UNHCR and UNICEF staff</p> <p>Interviews with partner</p> | <p>Qualitative analysis:</p> <p>Analysis will relate changes in targeting strategies to changes in beneficiary numbers. Analysis will disaggregate by intervention activity and by camp (inter-camp and intra-camp variation)</p> <p>Moderate to high...Confidence is built upon a process of triangulation of results at different scales (levels) and across the range of stakeholders.</p> |

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| | Changes due to the introduction of the biometric registration -Consistence/coherence of targeting criteria with government refugee policy | (FSOM) Report (2012,2013) Project documents and LogFrame WFP Targeting Guidance Govt. of Kenya Refugee policy | NGO staff FGDs with food assistance beneficiaries FGDs with former beneficiaries no longer being served | | |
| 1.3 Are the PRRO intervention sets the effective and relevant means to achieve food security objectives and are they internally complementary and reinforcing? Do they incorporate gender considerations adequately? | Numbers of beneficiaries by intervention modality Share of beneficiary population receiving multiple interventions Level of food assistance diverted to local markets Gender distribution of beneficiaries | Standard Project Reports (SPR) (2011,2012) Joint Assessment Missions (JAM)(2012) Camp Nutrition Surveys (Dadaab and Kakuma) (2013) WFP Food Security Outcome Monitoring (FSOM) Report (2012,2013) Project documents and | Review background/project documentation Interviews with WFP CO, RB staff Interviews with key government stakeholders (Regional, local) Interviews with UNHCR and UNICEF staff Interviews with partner NGO staff FGDs with food assistance beneficiaries Interviews with | Qualitative analysis: Qualitative analysis will compare different intervention modalities from the perspective of household and livelihood security. One likely hypothesis is whether food incentives (e.g. for secondary school girls) are effective in homes already receiving rations. Analysis will disaggregate by camp and intra-camp communities | Moderate to high...Confidence is built upon a process of triangulation of results at different scales (levels) and across the range of stakeholders. |

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| | | LogFrame | beneficiaries, including those with multiple intervention benefits | | |
| | | Assessments of the viability of cash and voucher transfers | | | |
| | | Market analyses for Fresh Food Vouchers (2012) | | | |
| 1.4 Are the delivery modalities of the PRRO interventions effective and efficient? | Beneficiary perceptions of effectiveness of different transfer modalities | Dadaab Transfer Modality Review (2011) | Review background/project documentation | Qualitative analysis: Assess the information of the beneficiary and staff with regard to the two camps, intra-camp variation and, where relevant, the host communities | Moderate to high...Confidence is built upon a process of triangulation of results at different scales (levels) and across the range of stakeholders. |
| | Appropriateness of rations delivered | Fresh Food Vouchers Market Assessment (2012) | Interviews with WFP CO, RB staff | | |
| | Level of sales of food assistance | Dadaab Livelihood Study – IDC (2013) | Interviews with key government stakeholders (Regional, local) | | |
| | Cash needs for non-food items | SPRs (2011-12) | Interviews with UNHCR and UNICEF staff | | |
| | | | Interviews with partner NGO staff FGDs with food assistance beneficiaries | | |
| | | | FGDs with host community leaders | | |
| 1.5 Does the PRRO effectively support the | Government of Kenya Food and Nutrition | Kenya National Food and | Review background/project | Qualitative analysis: assessment of relevant | High |

goals of GOVERNMENT OF KENYA, donors, and UN sister agencies?

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|---|--|---|--|
| Security Objectives | Nutrition Security Policy (2011) | documentation | interviews by category (Government of Kenya, donors, CPs, UNHCR, UNICEF) |
| Strategic Objectives of contributing donors | Kenya National Social Protection Policy (2011) | Interviews with WFP CO, RB staff | |
| Strategic Objectives of CPs organizations | UN common planning tools | Interviews with key government stakeholders (Regional, local) | |
| | Cluster coordination minutes | Interviews with UNHCR and UNICEF staff | |
| | UNDAF | Interviews with partner NGO staff | |
| | External partner docs | | |
| | WFP Internal Project Documents | | |
| | WFP Kenya Strategic Plan 2008-2013 | | |
| | WFP Kenya Country Portfolio Evaluation (2011) | | |
| | WFP Kenya Country Strategy | | |

| | (2013-2017) | | | | |
|---|--|--|---|--|---|
| 1.6 Is the PRRO consistent with the WFP country strategy and with the UNDAF in terms of strategies, targets, and outcomes? | Coherence of objectives of the respective strategies Actions and interventions that reflect the respective strategies | WFP Kenya Strategic Plan 2008-2013 WFP Kenya Country Portfolio Evaluation (2011) WFP Kenya Country Strategy (2013-2017) UNDAF (2009-13) | Review background/project documentation Interviews with WFP CO, RB staff Interviews with key government stakeholders (Regional, local) Interviews with UNHCR and UNICEF staff Interviews with partner NGO staff | Qualitative analysis: Synthesis of interview data | Difficult to assess in high risk, fluid environment |
| 1.7. Does the PRRO provide a clear vision for the transition of the food insecure population to food independence? | WFP | PRRO 200174 | Interviews with CO staff, GOVERNMENT OF KENYA staff, CPs | | |

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Acronyms

| | |
|-------|---|
| <2s | Children under two years of age |
| <5s | Children under five years of age |
| ACF | Action Contre La Faim |
| ALNAP | Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action |
| ANC | Ante-natal clinic |
| ART | Anti-Retroviral Therapy |
| BR | Budget revision |
| BSFP | Blanket supplementary feeding programme |
| CARE | Cooperative Assistance and Relief Everywhere |
| CHW | Community health workers |
| CO | Country Office |
| CP | Cooperating Partner |
| CSB | Corn-soya blend |
| CSB+ | Corn-soya blend Plus |
| DAC | Development Assistance Committee |
| DIFID | Department for International Development, UK |
| DRA | Department of Refugee Affairs |
| DSC | Direct Support Cost |
| DSM | Dry Skimmed Milk |
| EB | Executive Board (WFP) |
| ECD | Early Child Development (pre-school program) |
| ECHO | European Commission, Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection |
| EM | Evaluation Manager |
| EQAS | Evaluation Quality Assurance System |
| ER | Evaluation Report |
| ET | Evaluation Team |
| FAC | Food Advisory Committee |
| FDP | Food distribution points |
| FFA | Food for assets |
| FFT | Food For Training |
| FFV | Fresh food voucher |
| FGD | Focus group discussion |
| FGM | Female genital mutilation |
| FSOM | Food Security Outcome Monitoring |
| GAIC | German Agency for International Cooperation |
| GAM | Global Acute Malnutrition |
| GFD | General Food Distribution |
| HQ | Headquarters (WFP) |
| ID | Identification |
| IR | Inception Report |
| IRC | The International Rescue Committee |
| JAM | Joint Assessment Mission |
| Kcal | Kilocalorie |
| KFSSG | Kenya Food Security Steering Group |
| Km | Km |
| LTA | Long-Term Agreement |
| LTSH | Landslide, transport, storage, and handling |
| LWF | Lutheran World Federation |

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| M&E | Monitoring and evaluation |
| MAM | Moderate acute malnutrition |
| MCHN | Mother and child health and nutrition |
| MDG | Millennium Development Goals |
| MSFCH | Médecins Sans Frontières_Switzerland |
| MSFS | Médecins Sans Frontières Spain |
| Mt | Metric Ton |
| MUAC | Mid-upper arm circumference |
| NCCK | National Council of Churches of Kenya |
| NFI | Non-food item |
| NGO | Non-governmental organisation |
| NRC | Norwegian Refugee Council |
| ODOC | Other Direct Operational Cost |
| OEV | Office of Evaluation (WFP) |
| OpEv | Operation Evaluation |
| PLHIV | People living with HIV |
| PLW | Pregnant or lactating women |
| PNC | Post-natal clinic |
| PRRO | Protracted Relief and Rehabilitation Operations |
| RB | Regional Bureau (WFP) |
| RUTF | Ready-to-use therapeutic food |
| SAM | Severe acute malnutrition |
| SGBV | Sexual and gender-based violence |
| SCUK | Save the Children United Kingdom |
| SF | School Feeding |
| SFP | Supplemental Feeding Programme |
| SO | Strategic Objective |
| TB | Tuberculosis |
| THR | Take Home Ration |
| TOR | Terms of Reference |
| TSF | Targeted Supplementary Feeding |
| UNCT | United Nations Country Team |
| UNDAF | United Nations Development Assistance Framework |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |
| UNDSS | United Nations Department of Safety and Security |
| UNEG | United Nations Evaluation Group |
| UNHCR | Office of the United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees |
| UNICEF | United Nations Children's Fund |
| VAM | Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping |
| WFP | World Food Programme |
| WHO | World Health Organization |
| YEP | Youth Education Packs |

Rome, date, report number

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