

FINAL EVALUATION

Mozambique, Protracted Relief and Recovery
Operation 200355, Assistance to Vulnerable Groups
and Disaster-affected Populations in Mozambique:
An evaluation of WFP's Operation (2012-2014)

Evaluation Report

August 6, 2014

Evaluation team: René Verduijn, Team Leader; Laurie Starr, International Evaluator; Lourdes Fidalgo, National Evaluator

Evaluation Manager: Monica Mueller

Commissioned by the
WFP Office of Evaluation

Report number: OEV/2014/05

Acknowledgements

The evaluation team acknowledges the valuable assistance received from many colleagues at World Food Programme (WFP) in Mozambique, particularly Abdoulaye Balde (Country Director), Ute Meir (Deputy Country Director and Country Office focal point for this evaluation), Nicolas Babu (Head of Operations), Ana Taju (Head of suboffice, Xai Xai), Luis Hamido (Senior Programme Assistant, Xai Xai), Amandio Fumane (Senior Programme Assistant, Beira), and Albina Francisco (Senior Programme Assistant, Beira). In addition, we thank Gilbeiro Ononadi (Concern Emergency Coordinator, Quelimane) and Ana Scattona Ferreira (UNHCR Associate Protection Officer, Nampula), who extended their support and hospitality to the team and assisted us with our many requests. We extend our appreciation to João Ribeiro (INGC General Director) and Marcela Libombo (SETSAN Coordinator) for the information and insights they provided to the evaluation team.

We thank Julie Thoulouzan (Evaluation Officer, WFP), Grace Igweta (Evaluation Officer, WFP), and Monica Mueller (Evaluation Manager, TANGO) for their support to the inception and completion of this evaluation, Karyn Fox (Evaluation Manager, TANGO) for assembling the evaluation team, and Carrie Presnall (Research Associate, TANGO) for assistance with annexes.

We also extend our appreciation to PRRO implementing partner staff and donors who provided valuable feedback. We wish to acknowledge the generosity and hospitality of the provincial and local government staff who took their time to explain how they carry out their jobs and the major issues they were confronted with. Finally, we wish to thank the communities and households who explained their lives to us and patiently answered question after question. It is our sincere hope that the people with whom WFP and the Government of Mozambique work will benefit from this evaluation, and experience positive gains in their lives and livelihoods as a result of the implementation of the evaluation's recommendations.

Disclaimer

The opinions expressed are those of the evaluation team and do not necessarily reflect those of the World Food Programme. Responsibility for the opinions expressed in this report rests solely with the authors. Publication of this document does not imply endorsement by WFP of the opinions expressed.

The designation employed and the presentation of material in the maps do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of WFP concerning the legal or constitutional status of any country, territory or sea area, or concerning the delimitation of frontiers.

Evaluation Commissioning

WFP focal points: Julie Thoulouzan and Grace Igweta

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Operational Fact Sheet	iv
Maps	ix
Executive Summary	X
1 Introduction	1
1.1 Evaluation Features.....	1
1.2 Country Context.....	3
1.3 Operation Overview.....	6
2 Evaluation Findings	7
2.1 Appropriateness of the Operation.....	7
2.2 Results of the Operation.....	13
2.3 Factors Affecting the Results.....	31
3 Conclusions and Recommendations	36
3.1 Overall Assessment.....	36
3.2 Recommendations.....	41
Annexes	44
Annex 1: Terms of Reference	44
Annex 2: Evaluation matrix	61
Annex 3: Stakeholder analysis	70
Annex 4: Documents reviewed	73
Annex 5: Fieldwork schedule	81
Annex 6: Selection criteria for sampled sites	86
Annex 7: List of stakeholders interviewed	87
Annex 8: Qualitative topical outlines	91
Annex 9: Team composition	106
Annex 10: Logical frameworks for PRRO 200355	107
Annex 11: Geographical targeting for Mozambique Country Programme	112
Annex 12: Additional tables and figures	115
Annex 13: Planned rations and nutritional values versus field observations	120
Annex 14: Additional detail for recommendation 4	122
Acronyms	124

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Actual tonnage distributed as a percentage of planned (operational), by activity and year	14
Table 2: Summary of relief outputs attained, by year	14
Table 3: Summary of GFD assistance (no refugees), by year	15
Table 4: Summary of early recovery outputs attained, by year	18
Table 5: Summary of refugee assistance, by year	22
Table 6: Summary of PRRO outcome indicators.....	26
Table 7: Expanded summary of relief outputs attained, by year.....	117
Table 8: Expanded summary of early recovery and capacity development outputs attained, by year	118
Table 9: Summary of PRRO outcome indicators, results reported by Country Office in SPRs and during final evaluation.....	119
Table 10: Original and adjusted GFD ratios	120
Table 11: Planned versus observed FFA ratios	121
Table 12: Planned versus observed refugee ratios, Maratane camp	121

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Actual beneficiaries reached as a percentage of planned (operational), by activity and year	13
Figure 2: Actual 2013 GFD, beneficiaries and tonnage.....	15
Figure 3: 2013 food distribution to refugees	23
Figure 4: Beneficiaries by component, as a percentage of all beneficiaries 2012-2014	115
Figure 5: Tonnage by component, as a % of all tonnage 2012-2014	115
Figure 6: Actual versus planned (operational) food tonnage distributed, by activity and year	116

Operational Fact Sheet

OPERATION			
Type/Number/Title	PRRO 200355 Assistance to Vulnerable Groups and Disaster-affected populations in Mozambique		
Approval	The Executive Director approved the operation in March 2012.		
Amendments	There have been three amendments to the initial project document. Budget revision (BR) 1, approved in December 2012, resulted in a budget increase of US\$563,000. It increased the external transport and landside transport, storage and handling and indirect support costs. The second BR was technical and did not affect the budget. BR3, approved in May 2014, resulted in an increase of US\$4,626,392. The revision added CSB as a standard item in the relief GFD ration in order to better meet minimum food requirements of disaster-affected persons. BR3 also includes include a capacity development and augmentation tool in order to provide further technical support to the national institutions in disaster risk reduction, emergency response, and food security monitoring in Mozambique.		
Duration	<u>Initial:</u> March 2012–December 2014	<u>Revised:</u> n/a	
Planned beneficiaries	<u>Initial:</u> 253,000 (yearly maximum)	<u>Revised:</u> n/a	
Planned food requirements	<u>Initial:</u> In-kind food: 35,921 mt Cash and vouchers: n/a	<u>Revised:</u> In-kind food: n/a Cash and vouchers: n/a	
US\$ requirements	<u>Initial:</u> US\$29,580,130	<u>Revised:</u> US\$34,769,582	
OBJECTIVES AND ACTIVITIES			
	Corporate Strategic Objective(SO) Adopted by the PRRO as project-specific objectives	Operation outcomes	Activities
Millennium Development Goals/ UNDAF priorities 2 and 3	SO 1: save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies	Outcome 1.1: Improved food consumption over assistance period for targeted emergency-affected households	General food distribution assistance to relief beneficiaries, vulnerable refugees and newly arrived asylum seekers
	SO 3: restore and rebuild lives and livelihoods in post-conflict, post-disaster or transition situations	Outcome 3.1: Adequate food consumption over assistance period for targeted households and communities	Food for assets assistance
	SO 5: strengthen the capacities of countries to reduce hunger, including through hand-over strategies and local purchase	Outcome 5.2 Progress made towards nationally-owned hunger solutions	Capacity development in emergency preparedness
PARTNERS			
Government	<p>The National Disaster Management Institute (INGC) is responsible for raising public awareness on disaster prevention, coordinating early warning systems, and mobilizing relief activities during and after shocks.</p> <p>The National Institute for Refugee Assistance (INAR) works with WFP and the UNHCR to implement operations in Maratane refugee camp.</p> <p>The Technical Secretariat for Food Security and Nutrition (SETSAN) coordinates with WFP to conduct emergency needs assessments after shocks and follow-up food security surveys.</p>		

<p>United Nations</p>	<p>UNHCR and WFP jointly provide assistance to residents of Maratane refugee camp. Other United Nations partners (FAO, UNAIDS, UNDP, UN-Habitat, UNHCR, UNICEF, UN Women, WHO, Humanitarian Country Team Working Group [led by IOM], OCHA) coordinate with WFP on the Delivering as One initiative and implementing the United Nations Development Assistance Framework Action Plan (2012-15).</p>
<p>Non-governmental organisations (NGO)</p>	<p>International NGO implementing partners: Concern Worldwide, Samaritan's Purse International Relief, and World Vision International. National implementing partners: Comusana and Kukumbi The role of both international and national partners is to distribute GFD and FFA rations and to oversee FFA activities.</p> <p>Food Security Cluster (FSC) members: Save the Children, Oxfam, Kulima, Comité Ecuménico para o Desenvolvimento Social (CEDES), and World Relief. The FSC collaborates with WFP and SETSAN to conduct emergency food security assessments following a shock. WFP co-leads the FSC to coordinate technical and implementation strategies in response to food insecurity.</p>

RESOURCES (INPUTS)



Contribution received (by 11 May 2014):

US\$16 million

% against appeal: 53 percent





Top 5 donors:

Strategic Resource Allocation Committee (SRAC) multilateral funds, USAID Office of Food for Peace, Immediate Response Account (IRA), Canadian International Development Agency, Germany



Source: WFP Mozambique Country Office. PowerPoint presented at interactive session with evaluation team. May 12, 2014


OUTPUTS

OUTPUTS																					
Planned (per operational figures)	Actual																				
<p>% of beneficiaries by component / activity 2012 and 2013</p>																					
 <table border="1" style="margin: 10px auto; border-collapse: collapse;"> <caption>Planned % of beneficiaries by component / activity</caption> <thead> <tr> <th>Component / Activity</th> <th>Percentage</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>GFD only</td> <td>59.6%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>GFD & FFA</td> <td>24.6%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>FFA only</td> <td>8.9%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Refugee</td> <td>6.9%</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Component / Activity	Percentage	GFD only	59.6%	GFD & FFA	24.6%	FFA only	8.9%	Refugee	6.9%	 <table border="1" style="margin: 10px auto; border-collapse: collapse;"> <caption>Actual % of beneficiaries by component / activity</caption> <thead> <tr> <th>Component / Activity</th> <th>Percentage</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>GFD only</td> <td>64.8%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>GFD & FFA</td> <td>23.7%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>FFA only</td> <td>5.4%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Refugee</td> <td>6.1%</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Component / Activity	Percentage	GFD only	64.8%	GFD & FFA	23.7%	FFA only	5.4%	Refugee	6.1%
Component / Activity	Percentage																				
GFD only	59.6%																				
GFD & FFA	24.6%																				
FFA only	8.9%																				
Refugee	6.9%																				
Component / Activity	Percentage																				
GFD only	64.8%																				
GFD & FFA	23.7%																				
FFA only	5.4%																				
Refugee	6.1%																				
<p>% of tonnage distributed by component / activity 2012 and 2013</p>																					
 <table border="1" style="margin: 10px auto; border-collapse: collapse;"> <caption>Planned % of tonnage distributed by component / activity</caption> <thead> <tr> <th>Component / Activity</th> <th>Percentage</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>GFD</td> <td>59.3%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>FFW</td> <td>24.4%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Refugees</td> <td>16.3%</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Component / Activity	Percentage	GFD	59.3%	FFW	24.4%	Refugees	16.3%	 <table border="1" style="margin: 10px auto; border-collapse: collapse;"> <caption>Actual % of tonnage distributed by component / activity</caption> <thead> <tr> <th>Component / Activity</th> <th>Percentage</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>GFD</td> <td>62.5%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>FFW</td> <td>28.8%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Refugees</td> <td>8.7%</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Component / Activity	Percentage	GFD	62.5%	FFW	28.8%	Refugees	8.7%				
Component / Activity	Percentage																				
GFD	59.3%																				
FFW	24.4%																				
Refugees	16.3%																				
Component / Activity	Percentage																				
GFD	62.5%																				
FFW	28.8%																				
Refugees	8.7%																				
<p>Source: PRRO 200355 output monitoring databases 2012,2013,2014. Calculations by TANGO International</p>																					


% of women/girls versus men/boys by component/activity

The ET concludes, in agreement with the CO, that existing data do not allow for a sex- or age-disaggregated summary.

Percentage of operational planned beneficiaries reached, by activity and year



Percentage of planned (operational) tonnage distributed, by activity and year



Key observations

A high influx of refugees to Maratane camp resulted in the PRRO exceeding planned beneficiary numbers in 2012.

The numbers of people affected by the 2013 Gaza flooding resulted in the PRRO exceeding planned beneficiary numbers for GFD and FFA.

In 2012, the PRRO reached 37 percent of planned FFA beneficiaries and delivered 37 percent of planned tonnage. The only planned FFA activities were triggered late in the year (December) in response to drought in Sofala Province. Funding delays did not allow the project to meet the annual target. Notably, FFA targets were exceeded in Sofala in January 2013.

Despite exceeding or meeting planned numbers of refugees, actual tonnage delivered to refugees was only 50 percent of planned 2012 tonnage and 40 percent of planned 2013 tonnage. Reasons include lack of donor funds and difficulties in supply chain and on-site food distribution management.

Source: PRRO 200355 output monitoring databases 2012,2013,2014. Calculations by TANGO International.

OUTCOMES

Summary of PRRO outcome indicators


Outcomes	Target	2012 Baseline	July 2013 ^a Gaza response only	
SO 1	<i>Outcome 1.1 Improved food consumption over assistance period for targeted emergency-affected households</i>			
	Household food consumption score	% of HH with score \geq 21	no valid data	92
SO 3	<i>Outcome 3.1 Adequate food consumption over assistance period for targeted households and communities</i>			
	Household food consumption score	% of HH with score > 35	no valid data	70
	Coping Strategy Index	Decrease from baseline	no valid data	12
SO 5	<i>Outcome 5.2 Progress made towards nationally owned hunger solutions</i>			
	National Capacity Index	16	10	Not tracked

^c Government of Mozambique and Food Security Cluster. 2013. Emergency Food Security Assessment in Gaza Province.

Key observations

- The ET concludes that there are no valid baseline values for PRRO indicators.
- Outcome values reported in SPRs 2012 and 2013 are not representative of populations in the PRRO operational area. The data source is the CP baseline, and the sample did not include the vast majority of shock-affected districts in the PRRO's three main operational provinces.

Maps



Executive Summary

1. **Evaluation features:** This independent final evaluation of the Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO) 200355 “*Assistance to Disaster Affected and Vulnerable Groups in Mozambique*” was commissioned by the World Food Programme (WFP) Office of Evaluation (OEV) and conducted by a team of consultants from TANGO International. Its purpose is to address corporate emphasis on providing accountability and evidence for programme results and learning for future action. The primary objectives are therefore accountability balanced by learning. The three key evaluation questions are: 1) How appropriate is the operation? 2) What are the results of the operation? and 3) Why and how has the operation produced the observed results? The intended audience includes internal stakeholders (Country Office [CO], suboffices, Regional Bureau [RB], and OEV) and direct external stakeholders (donors, government, and implementing partners). The PRRO concludes in December 2014, thus the timing allows for evaluation findings to guide future programme design.

2. **Methodology:** The evaluation team (ET) used a mixed-methods approach to collect and analyse primary qualitative data and secondary quantitative data. The fieldwork took place from 5-30 May 2014 in Maputo, Gaza, Zambezia, and Nampula Provinces. The ET selected the sample of districts in consultation with the CO, based on criteria agreed to by the ET and CO that included coverage of the main programme components, size of operations, IPs, type of hazard, and accessibility. Details of selection criteria and a discussion of representativeness are outlined in Annex 6. Qualitative methods included in-depth structured and semi-structured interviews with over 110 WFP staff and stakeholders; focus group discussions (FGD) with 205 women and 185 men, representing beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries, local disaster risk management (DRM) committee members, and local leaders; and direct observation. To understand the nature and dynamics of gender equity, gender discrimination, and power relations between males and females, and to verify the nature and extent of women’s participation in the PRRO, the team carried out separate FGDs with men and women. During analysis, the ET triangulated information from existing internal and external data sources and qualitative data collected in the field to cross-check and validate findings. A key limitation to the methodology was an absence of quantitative data necessary to measure PRRO outcomes. The ET mitigated this challenge by basing outcome analysis on qualitative research carried out during this evaluation mission.

3. **Country context:** With a population of 25.2 million (2012), Mozambique is the fourth-most-populated country in the South African Development Community. The most densely populated provinces are Nampula and Zambezia, both within the purview of this PRRO. More than 60 percent of the population lives along Mozambique’s coastline, increasing its vulnerability to the effects of cyclones and flooding. Of all African countries, Mozambique ranks third-most-exposed to weather-related risks such as drought, cyclones, and flooding. Several geographic and environmental features contribute to frequent flooding: the country is not only positioned downstream of nine international river basins, it also lies in the path of tropical cyclones, which hit land three to four times per year.¹

4. **Operation overview:** The duration of the PRRO is March 2012-December 2014. The operation is comprised of relief and early recovery activities for people affected by natural disasters; food assistance for refugees; and disaster management capacity development for national institutions. These components align with WFP global

¹ Global Facility of Disaster Reduction and Recovery. n.d. Economic Vulnerability and Disaster Risk Assessment in Malawi and Mozambique. Accessed April 1, 2014. http://www.preventionweb.net/files/15520_gfdrrcon.vulnerabilitydrmalawimoz.pdf

Strategic Objectives 1, 3 and 5, which the PRRO has adopted as specific objectives to guide the operation.² The PRRO has responded to several climate-related shocks including cyclone Funso and tropical storm Dando in January 2012, which damaged homes and crops in Zambezia Province. Prolonged dry spells in December 2012 catalysed a government request for WFP assistance in Sofala Province. To date, the largest PRRO response was to the January 2013 floods in Gaza Province, which affected close to 270,000 people: flooding destroyed crops, damaged assets, and negatively impacted household income sources. In February 2014, the PRRO assisted populations impacted by flooding in Cabo Delgado Province. Since March 2012, the PRRO has supplied general food rations to residents of Maratane refugee camp.

Main findings and conclusions

5. Appropriateness of the operation: Appropriate context analysis and an evidence base informed programme design, leading to objectives and activities that appropriately address acute food insecurity needs of households affected by natural disasters. Collaborative post-shock assessments with government and other partners led to appropriate geographic targeting. The PRRO's effort to strengthen national institutions' disaster management capacity is appropriate given Mozambique's high vulnerability to the effects of climate change and low degree of readiness to respond to and mitigate recurrent natural disasters.

6. The ET finds the food rations modality to be appropriate and relevant to population needs in all PRRO components. Markets were not fully functioning and local staple prices were high following emergencies. During the second round of food for assets (FFA) in Gaza Province, six months after the flooding, most markets were operational, so cash and vouchers could have been considered if proper feasibility studies had been carried out in risk-prone areas and if contracts, technology, and hardware were in place and ready to implement in an emergency. Although GFD is found to be an appropriate modality for refugees, as it helps to safeguard their human rights and well-being, regular shortfalls in the quantity and quality of refugee rations warrant a review of alternative transfer mechanisms.

7. Results of the operation: WFP exceeded planned operational outputs for relief beneficiaries, as emergency and refugee needs were much greater than anticipated. The PRRO did not reach relief tonnage targets, particularly for the refugee component. FFA output targets (beneficiaries and tonnage) were surpassed in 2013 but were not reached in 2012. Overall, implementing partners (IP) rarely provided WFP with sex-disaggregated output data, limiting the evaluability of men's and women's equal participation, and the ET found no evidence of measures to ensure gender sensitivity in programme implementation.

8. Qualitative findings show that relief and early recovery rations saved lives during the aftermath of hazards. Beneficiaries in the Gaza response were highly satisfied with GFD and FFA rations and distributions were considered timely and of an appropriate duration. Beneficiary satisfaction was lower in the smaller Zambezia GFD response, with concern about timeliness and duration of distributions—in some cases a one-off delivery. While WFP's support to residents of the Maratane refugee camp has provided an important lifeline, problems with quantity, quality, and timeliness of refugee rations raise concerns of humanitarian principles regarding their right to food.

² The project document outlines two objectives, which are well-aligned to corporate 2008-2013 Strategic Objectives (SO) 1, 3, and 5; however, in all subsequent project documents, the PRRO has not referenced these two objectives, and has instead adopted the three corporate SOs as specific objectives. OEV, the CO, and the ET agreed to align the analysis in this evaluation to the three corporate SOs.

9. Exclusion error and inclusion error are potentially high in FFA projects and an unintended consequence of community-based targeting. A culturally ingrained ethos of sharing results in a rotation of benefits among all households regardless of eligibility. The goal of improving food consumption for the most vulnerable was compromised because households only received one ration instead of the planned six rations.

10. The PRRO met or exceeded targets for all types of planned assets. FFA activities helped populations affected by shocks to rehabilitate their physical surroundings, but only marginally contributed to rebuilding lives and livelihoods or improving absorptive and adaptive resilience capacities. Assets created under FFA are not selected through a community process, are of low quality and are not sustainable. Finally, when drought follows flooding, an increasing occurrence in recent years, the number of people who are unable to recover during the short duration of PRRO response is potentially large, yet the PRRO does not support transition to ongoing safety nets implemented by the CP or government.

11. Finally, WFP efforts have improved national capacity for contingency planning and food security and emergency assessment, although the sustainability of these improvements is a concern: the ET found no multi-year capacity development plan within government institutions to disseminate knowledge shared by WFP.

12. **Factors affecting results:** Effective and efficient and supply chain management is the PRRO's strongest asset and directly resulted in the operation saving lives, improving food security, exceeding planned GFD beneficiary targets, and ensuring that the majority of GFD emergency rations were delivered in a timely manner. The CO is considered by key partners as a responsive and well-respected partner who will consistently deliver relief assistance under very difficult conditions.

13. The low capacity of the National Institute of Refugee Assistance (INAR) has resulted in problems with the quantity, quality, and timeliness of food distributions. Field observations found the INAR-managed warehouse was not clean and contained spoiled wares. INAR has also had problems reconciling stocks with distributed foods for monthly output monitoring reports.

14. Underfunding compromised the achievement of FFA beneficiary targets in 2012, and 2013 GFD tonnage targets (mainly under the refugee component). The PRRO was critically understaffed due to insufficient funding and high turnover. This affected management and implementation, caused an unwieldy workload for existing staff, and contributed to weaknesses in the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system. There is little evidence of gender mainstreaming via trainings for staff and partners, or use of operational guidance on promoting gender equality. This affected the PRRO's ability to design, implement, and monitor gender-sensitive programmes.

15. M&E for the PRRO is weak, evidenced by limited process, outcome, and performance monitoring. The ET finds the PRRO rarely uses WFP M&E systems (including the Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping [VAM] unit) to measure PRRO results beyond the output level. The CO has been using CP data for outcome monitoring; however these data are not representative of PRRO beneficiaries, and thus reported baseline and endline values for outcome indicators are not valid. There is no appropriate beneficiary feedback mechanism to understand the quantity and quality of food distributed, cultural-acceptability of foods, and exclusion and inclusion error. Weak monitoring affects the ability of the PRRO to attribute any improvements in food security levels to programme activities, and precludes accountability to beneficiaries, donors, and WFP itself.

16. **Recommendations:** The recommendations are developed with a view to promote strategic change. All have implications in the short term, particularly as preparations for a new programme cycle will start by mid-2014. Most recommendations have strategic elements that are further developed with operational guidance.

Recommendations for implementation within one year:

17. **R1: Comprehensively address chronic and acute food insecurity by using a resilience lens.** The ET recommends that WFP develop a discussion note on enhancing resilience to food insecurity and malnutrition in the context of recurrent climatic shocks to guide the design of the new Country Strategy. This note should show how WFP will strengthen the absorptive and adaptive resilience capacities of households and communities, and the transformative resilience capacities of national institutions. The ET recommends that the Government of Mozambique and United Nations partners and Humanitarian Country Team members be included in the formulation and review process. The resulting Country Strategy must identify specific processes to scale up CP efforts, such that the CP can absorb PRRO beneficiaries who are unable to recover during the operation, and address new cases of chronic food insecurity (through social protection) and malnutrition (through therapeutic supplementary feeding) resulting from emergencies. The Country Strategy should outline the flexible use of financial and human resources between the PRRO and CP.

18. **R2: Maintain the PRRO as a programming mechanism in the context of recurrent natural disasters in Mozambique.** The ET recommends that the PRRO be maintained in the CO portfolio because it is a valid programming mechanism in the context of recurrent natural disasters. A new PRRO should focus on the full Disaster Risk Reduction/ DRM cycle of prevention, mitigation, preparedness and response to shocks. A new PRRO should calculate separate planning figures to respond to drought-affected areas and reserve an annual budget to implement this response. This will provide the PRRO with a set of activities that directly addresses need (owing to the compounding negative impact of flooding followed by drought) and potentially promotes additional funding streams.

19. **R3: Enhance PRRO M&E.** WFP must strengthen and use its M&E systems (including the VAM unit) to monitor the PRRO's outcomes, processes, and performance. WFP should scale up regular internal reviews and joint real-time evaluations to monitor performance of selected implementation modalities; these should be done in close collaboration with the government, non-government partners and affected people. WFP should increase the number of VAM and M&E staff during relief and early recovery operations. Finally, WFP must hold IPs accountable for providing sex-disaggregated output data.

20. **R4: WFP must ensure that monitoring data are representative of PRRO beneficiaries.** To ensure the representativeness of data, refugee assistance should be measured separately from assistance to communities impacted by natural shocks. In collaboration with UNHCR, the PRRO should draw a representative sample within Maratane camp to collect baseline data within a few months of beginning a new PRRO. The identical sampling strategy should be used to collect endline data. To measure change as a result of GFD and FFA to shock-affected communities, several options are available (Annex 13). Most importantly, and applicable to all options, is that the PRRO separately measure the effectiveness of each emergency response, rather than use the current method of aggregating different geographic areas that have been impacted by very different levels of shock, and that experience very different levels of food security in normal times.

21. R5: Enhance strategic linkages and implementation of FFA activities. It is critical that the PRRO place emphasis on the linkages between social protection and DRR plans when designing post-shock FFA activities, specifically those between FFA projects and national resilience-building plans supported by the Ministry of Agriculture, and linkages to social protection schemes implemented by the CP, the government, or other stakeholders. Operationally, the PRRO should place greater focus on FFA as a mechanism to build community assets that contribute to DRR, resilience-building, and the promotion of self-reliance for poor communities. The PRRO must ensure that communities use participatory approaches to select FFA projects and that gender considerations are taken into account. Additionally, FFA projects must be more closely monitored by WFP and IP staff.

22. R6: Increase effectiveness and efficiency of support to refugees. WFP should engage UNHCR and INAR more actively, addressing the weaknesses observed in the food distribution management cycle in Maratane refugee camp through capacity development and increased number of WFP staff at the camp. Specifically, WFP and UNHCR should conduct a nutritional survey and JAM before the end of 2014. These surveys would assess food security status of Maratane camp residents and look at coverage of health and nutrition services to understand if and how malnutrition treatment services are being accessed, and how service delivery can be enhanced. The ET encourages WFP to complete its cash and voucher review, and if findings warrant this modality, to implement it as soon as possible.

Recommendations for implementation within one – two years:

23. R7: Strengthen WFP's rights-based and gender-sensitive approaches to programming. WFP should conduct training in rights-based approaches (recognizing human beings as right-holders and establishing obligations for duty bearers, with a focus on marginalized and discriminated groups) for the CO, suboffices, and INGC staff. WFP should use participatory approaches and gender analysis to inform equity-based and gender-sensitive programming. This requires sensitization of staff and engagement with target communities about the validity of developed approaches and activities. WFP should also introduce feedback mechanisms such as hotlines that affected people can call via mobile phone; calls can be plotted in real time so that feedback is mapped, monitored, and addressed.

24. R8: Improve internal strategic and operational capacities for resource mobilization, information exchange, documentation, and organizational learning. The CO should recruit dedicated communications and advocacy staff to fill the current identified gap in human resources, and develop a corresponding resource mobilization strategy for the general public and donors. Frequent, transparent engagement with donors is needed to improve the PRRO's resource base and ensure that WFP Mozambique is viewed as a CO with competent staff and solutions to comprehensively address the negative effects of recurrent natural disasters. WFP is encouraged to pursue this strategy in close collaboration with the RB and United Nations partners.

25. R9: Design an overall strategy and plan for PRRO capacity development activities These should include a clear vision for institutional strengthening within the INGC and SETSAN and is supported by a systematic assessment of capacity-building needs at all levels. The progress indicators should focus on the outcome level and be consistent with corporate indicators to measure institutional performance. The strategy should contain a commitment to monitor the indicators on a regular basis so that the results are available for programme management.

1 Introduction

1.1 Evaluation Features

1. This independent final evaluation is commissioned by the World Food Programme (WFP) Office of Evaluation (OEV). The purpose is to address corporate emphasis on providing accountability and evidence for programme results and learning for future action. Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO) 200355 “*Assistance to Disaster Affected and Vulnerable Groups in Mozambique*”³ was selected for evaluation by the Regional Bureau (RB) in Johannesburg, in consultation with the Country Office (CO) and OEV, from a shortlist of operations prepared by OEV that meet the criteria of utility and risk. The PRRO concludes in December 2014, thus the timing allows for evaluation findings to guide future programme design.

2. The primary objectives of this evaluation are accountability and learning, specifically: to assess and report on the performance and results of the operation (accountability), to determine the reasons why certain results occurred or not (learning), and to provide evidence-based findings to inform operational and strategic decision-making (accountability and learning). The following criteria guided the evaluation: relevance, coherence, and appropriateness; efficiency; effectiveness; impact; sustainability and connectedness; and gender).⁴ The scope of this evaluation includes all activities and processes related to the PRRO⁵ necessary to answer the following key evaluation questions: How appropriate is the operation? What are the results of the operation? And, why and how has the operation produced the observed results? Specific areas of analysis related to these questions are presented in Annex 2.

3. Stakeholders and users: All primary internal stakeholders in this evaluation are also users of this report. They are: the CO and suboffice staff, who will use this information to inform decision-making; the RB, which will use the findings to apply learning to other COs; and the OEV, which will use this evaluation to better understand how to support COs in evaluation functions. The direct external stakeholders are beneficiaries, the government, implementing partners (IPs) and donors.⁶ Annex 3 outlines stakeholders’ interest and involvement in the evaluation.

4. Methodology: The evaluation team (ET) used a mixed-methods approach to collect and analyse primary qualitative data and secondary quantitative data. The rationale for using secondary quantitative data rather than primary, was available time and resources. The evaluation began with an in-depth desk review of over 140 documents, such as WFP Standard Project Reports (SPR), output databases, Emergency Food Security Assessments (EFSA) and other pertinent internal and external literature (see Annex 4 for the full list of documents reviewed). The fieldwork took place from 5-30 May 2014, commencing with an interactive session with the CO and a stakeholders’ workshop, and ending with two formal debriefs to present preliminary mission findings.⁷ Data collection took place in Maputo and in a wide geographic spread of locations: Bilene Macia, Chokwe, Guija, and Xai Xai Districts in Gaza Province; Mangaja da Costa, Namacurra, and Quelimane Districts in Zambezia Province; and the Maratane refugee camp in Nampula Province (see Annex 5 for the fieldwork schedule and site listing). The ET selected this sample in consultation with

³ From this point forward, the ET refers to PRRO 200355 simply as the PRRO.

⁴ WFP. Office of Evaluation. 2014. Content guide for the Evaluation Report.

⁵ Although the Terms of Reference state that the refugee component is not a main focus of the evaluation, during in-country planning sessions, the Country Director and Deputy Country Director requested that the ET adequately represent the component in the final evaluation.

⁶ Page i of the Operational Fact Sheet shows a list of PRRO partners who have a stake in the results for country-level strategy and programming.

⁷ The first with CO, RB, and OEV, the second with stakeholders.

the CO. Selection criteria included coverage of the main programming components, size of operations, IPs, type of hazard, and accessibility. Details of selection criteria and a discussion of representativeness are discussed in Annex 6.

5. Qualitative methods included: in-depth structured and semi-structured interviews with over 100 stakeholders (WFP, government, IP staff, and donors); 33 focus group discussions (FGD) with 205 women and 185 men (390 total), representing beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries, local disaster risk management (DRM) committee members, and local leaders; and direct observation (see Annex 7 for lists of persons and institutions consulted). To understand the nature and dynamics of gender equity, gender discrimination, and power relations between males and females, and to verify the nature and extent of women's participation in the PRRO, the team carried out separate FGDs with men and women. The ET assured confidentiality to, and obtained informed consent from, all persons interviewed. Annex 8 provides the topical outlines that guided interviews. During analysis, the ET triangulated information from existing internal and external data sources and primary qualitative data collected during the evaluation mission. Using multiple sources and methods allowed the team to cross-check and validate findings.

6. Three highly qualified TANGO International consultants (one a Mozambique national) comprise the ET. Combined team expertise includes food security, nutrition, resilience, gender, early recovery, refugee operations, DRR, and capacity development. Annex 9 provides details on team composition. The evaluation followed the OEV Evaluation and Quality Assurance System standards. The ET maintained impartiality and transparency during data collection, and regularly communicated with the CO, suboffices, and stakeholders to ensure data quality, validity, consistency, and accuracy. The two international team members were assisted throughout fieldwork by interpreters.

7. **Limitations:** A key limitation to the methodology was an absence of quantitative data necessary to measure PRRO outcomes and outputs. First, PRRO monitoring and reporting consists primarily of monthly outputs, limiting an understanding of project outcomes. Additionally, output monitoring data are rarely disaggregated by sex or age, which limits evaluability regarding equal participation of men and women. (M&E limitations are discussed at length in Section 2.3.) The ET mitigated this challenge by basing outcome analysis on qualitative research carried out during this evaluation mission. Three additional limitations may affect data validity or evaluability. First, GFD and Food for Asset (FFA) operations in Gaza and Zambezia provinces ended six to 24 months prior to the evaluation. Data validity may have been affected by poor beneficiary recall, and the ET could not directly observe food distribution or FFA activities. Many staff members who were directly involved with 2012 and 2013 operations were no longer readily available for interviews, potentially limiting the scope of KII data. The CO and suboffices greatly helped to mitigate this challenge by contacting former staff (WFP and IPs) who were directly involved in the PRRO, and encouraging them to be available for ET interviews. Second, due to security restrictions the ET could not visit Sofala, which limits the discussion of FFA initiatives to those carried out in Gaza in 2013, and limits the evaluability of the PRROs response to slow-onset shock (drought). The ET tried to gain insight on the Sofala operation through project documents and key informant interviews (KII) with WFP staff, without much success due to the previous two limitations (limited process and outcome monitoring and weak institutional memory). Third, the political environment may have introduced a positive bias to some FGD data. The team's effort to host separate FGDs with Gaza leaders was successful in some localities; however, in most,

neither the ET nor IP representatives were able to convince authorities to let the ET randomly select participants. This challenge did not exist in Zambezia Province or Maratane camp.

1.2 Country Context

8. **Overview:** With a population of 25.2 million (2012),⁸ Mozambique is the fourth most populated country in the South African Development Community.⁹ While 69 percent of the population live in rural areas, urban population growth rates exceed rural growth rates (3.1 versus 1.9 percent annually).¹⁰ The most densely populated provinces are Nampula and Zambezia, both within the purview of this PRRO. More than 60 percent of the population lives along Mozambique's 2,700 km coastline, increasing its vulnerability to the effects of cyclones and flooding.¹¹ Those most susceptible to the impact of natural hazards are poor and chronically food insecure populations. As climate variability and exposure to regular, simultaneous, and consecutive adverse events increases, so does the population's vulnerability to shock.

9. **Climate risk:** Of all African countries, Mozambique ranks third for being most exposed to weather-related risk such as drought, cyclones, and flooding.¹² Drought and flooding occur in the central and southern regions with greater frequency and severity compared to other regions.¹³ Several geographic and environmental features contribute to frequent flooding. The country is not only positioned downstream of nine international river basins: it also lies directly in the path of tropical cyclones formed in the Indian Ocean, which hit land three to four times per year.¹⁴ Deforestation, due primarily to reliance on forest wood for heat and cooking by a majority of the population (80 percent), also exacerbates the frequency and intensity of flooding during heavy rainfall.¹⁵ While widespread drought occurs less often than flooding, rainfall in areas classified as semi-arid or arid is seldom adequate for agricultural productivity, even during average years. Drought often has a greater impact than flooding, reducing agricultural productivity (crops and livestock), and subsequently increasing food insecurity. A typical drought also accounts for greater mortality than a single flood or cyclone, which have a deeper economic impact.¹⁶ Additionally, following drought, flash floods can occur when heavy rain cannot penetrate dry, hard ground.

10. Mozambique is highly vulnerable to the effects of climate change.¹⁷ Coastal areas are likely to experience increased precipitation in summer/autumn; rates of warming are expected to increase towards the interior. Increased climatic variability combined

⁸ The World Bank. 2014. Mozambique|Data. Accessed March 28, 2014 at <http://data.worldbank.org/country/mozambique>

⁹ MEASURE DHS/ICF International. 2013. MOÇAMBIQUE Inquérito Demográfico e de Saúde 2011. Instituto Nacional de Estatística Ministério da Saúde. Maputo.

¹⁰ United Nations. 2014. Undata\country profile\Mozambique. Accessed July 31, 2014.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Global Facility of Disaster Reduction and Recovery. Country Program Update. Accessed May 3, 2014. <https://www.gfdr.org/CountryPrograms>

¹³ World Food Programme. 2014. Terms of Reference. Operation Evaluation. Mozambique PRRO 200355 "Assistance to Vulnerable Groups and Disaster-affected Populations in Mozambique"

¹⁴ Global Facility of Disaster Reduction and Recovery. n.d. Economic Vulnerability and Disaster Risk Assessment in Malawi and Mozambique. Accessed April 1, 2014. http://www.preventionweb.net/files/15520_gfdrrecon.vulnerabilitydrmmalawimoz.pdf

¹⁵ UNICEF. 2014. UNICEF Mozambique- Humanitarian response. Accessed April 2, 2014. http://www.unicef.org/mozambique/humanitarian_response_11982.html

¹⁶ The United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR). PreventionWeb.Disaster Statistics-Mozambique. Accessed April 11, 2014. <http://www.preventionweb.net/english/countries/statistics/?cid=117>

¹⁷ The Global Adaptation Index . University of Notre Dame. Mozambique |ND-GAIN Index. Accessed April 1, 2014. <http://index.gain.org/country/mozambique>

with a low readiness score,¹⁸ indicate a great need for investment and action related to improving the population's capacity to absorb and adapt to climate-related shocks.

11. Mozambique's National Institute of Disaster Management (INGC) is responsible for raising public awareness on disaster prevention, coordinating early warning systems (EWS) and mobilizing relief activities during and after disasters. Within the INGC, three national emergency operational centres located in the Inhambane, Zambezia, and Nampula Provinces are activated when disasters occur. At the sub-district level, local committees for disaster risk management (CLGRC) are responsible for all community activities and serve as a link between the communities and authorities. To date, 760 CLGRC have been established, but not all have been trained and fewer have been equipped. In December 2012, the government endorsed a new DRM strategy, with key pillars focused on preparing and enabling people, capacity-building and institutional coordination, communication and information, and building resilience in partnership with the private sector.¹⁹

12. The PRRO has responded to several climate-related disturbances including cyclone Funso and tropical storm Dando in January 2012, which damaged homes and crops in Zambezia Province. Prolonged dry spells in December 2012 catalysed a government request for WFP assistance in Machanga District, Sofala Province. To date, the largest PRRO response was to the January 2013 floods in the Limpopo river basin, which affected close to 270,000 people in Gaza Province: it destroyed crops before the green harvest, damaged household and community assets, and negatively impacted household income sources.²⁰ Most recently, (February 2014), the PRRO assisted populations impacted by flooding in Cabo Delgado Province.

13. Economic growth: Despite steady economic growth and declining poverty in recent years,²¹ Mozambique remains one of the least developed countries in the world²² – 79.3 percent of the population live in multidimensional poverty.²³ In 2009, 54.7 percent of the population lived below the national poverty line,²⁴ with lower incidence of poverty in the northern region (46.5 percent), compared to the central and southern regions (59.7 and 56.9 percent).²⁵ The Poverty Reduction Action Plan (PARP) (2011-2014) aims to reduce the incidence of poverty from the 2009 level to 42 percent by 2014. Key objectives of PARP are to increase agricultural and fishery productivity; to promote employment; and to foster human and social development.²⁶

14. Political context: Since June 2013, tensions between the Frelimo government and the Mozambican National Resistance Movement (Renamo) have increased fears of another civil war. Much of the related political violence has been concentrated in Sofala Province—security travel restrictions were in place during this evaluation. General elections will be held in Mozambique on 15 October 2014.

¹⁸ Readiness refers to those portions of the economy, governance, and society that affect the speed and efficiency of absorption and implementation of climate adaptation projects. The Global Adaptation Index . University of Notre Dame. Mozambique [ND-GAIN Index. Accessed April 1, 2014. <http://index.gain.org/country/mozambique>

¹⁹ INGC. 2012. Responding to Climate Change in Mozambique. Phase II Synthesis Report.

²⁰ Government of Mozambique and Food Security Cluster. 2013. Emergency Food Security Assessment in Gaza Province.

²¹ The World Bank. 2014. Global Economic Prospects. Accessed April 9, 2014. <http://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/global-economic-prospects/regional-outlooks/ssa>.

²² Ranking 185th out of 187 countries on the 2012 Human Development Index. UNDP. 2013. Human Development Report 2013. The Rise of the South: Human Progress in a Diverse world. Mozambique.

²³ Based on the Human Development Report Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI), which identifies multiple deprivations in the same households in education, health, and standard of living.

²⁴ The World Bank, 2014.

²⁵ WFP. 2010. Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis. Republic of Mozambique.

²⁶ Republic of Mozambique. 2011. Poverty Reduction Action Plan (PARP) 2011-2014. Approved at the 15th Regular Session of the Council of Ministers May3, 2011.

15. Gender equality: Long-standing gender inequities persist in Mozambique. Among the poor and marginalized, women are more likely than men to experience social and economic marginalisation. Recent assessments in the Feed the Future Zone of Influence,²⁷ which includes the PRRO's operational provinces of Nampula and Zambezia, show that less than half (48.9 percent) of female primary decision makers have achieved empowerment.²⁸

16. Food security: While food availability and access are expected to be adequate through September of 2014,²⁹ 34 percent of the population is chronically food insecure and at least one quarter of the population suffer from acute food insecurity at least once a year.³⁰ Food insecurity (acute and chronic combined) is most prevalent in Cabo Delgado (39 percent), Gaza (34 percent), and Maputo (28 percent) Provinces. Tete, Zambezia, and Niassa Provinces host the highest percentages of chronically food insecure households (44-45 percent).³¹

17. Although agricultural production is expanding, Mozambique is still a net food importer. Subsistence farming provides food for over 70 percent of the country. Droughts and erratic rainfall dramatically impact these small farms, and are key factors affecting food security and nutrition.³² During stable weather conditions, food prices for staple commodities (maize, wheat flour, rice, cowpeas and beans) tend to fluctuate seasonally and vary regionally depending on what is being harvested. Climate-related hazards often result in food price increases, rendering an already precarious population more vulnerable to food insecurity. The National Food Security Strategy (ESAN II) does not have guidelines for food rations in emergencies,³³; however, INGC recommendations state that during the acute phase of an emergency, household rations should be supplemented with enriched foods if the household has children 6-59 months old, pregnant and breastfeeding women, or elderly people.³⁴

18. Health and nutrition: Extreme weather conditions compromise the health and well-being of the affected population, especially children and women who are already vulnerable. In children under five, the chronic malnutrition rate is 43 percent, wasting is six percent, and the mortality rate is 90 per 1,000 live births.³⁵ For the 11 percent living with HIV/AIDS, inadequate nutrition due to weather-related shocks further aggravates their symptoms. This, in turn, leads to decreased productivity given that the most able-bodied segment of the population, 15-49 year olds, has the highest rate of HIV infection.³⁶ In May 2014, the government expanded the National Food Fortification programme (launched in 2012) to include vitamin A fortified oil and fortified wheat in rations. The programme is targeted to vulnerable populations.

19. Refugees: On average, 8,000 refugees (or persons of concern³⁷) reside in Maratane camp, located in Nampula Province, where WFP and the United Nations High

²⁷ The 20 districts in which USAID implements Feed the Future initiatives.

²⁸ USAID. 2013. Feed the Future Mozambique. Zone of Influence Baseline Report.

²⁹ FEWS NET. 2014. Mozambique-Food Security. Accessed June 16, 2014. <http://www.fews.net/southern-africa/mozambique>

³⁰ WFP. 2010. Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis.

³¹ Ibid.

³² UNICEF. 2014. UNICEF Mozambique- Humanitarian response. Accessed April 2, 2014.

http://www.unicef.org/mozambique/humanitarian_response_11982.html

³³ SETSAN. 2007. Food Security and Nutrition Strategy (ESAN II) 2008 -2015

³⁴ Republic of Mozambique. 2013. Ministry of State Administration, Disaster Management Coordination Council, Rainy and Cyclone Season Contingency Plan – 2013-2014.

³⁵ The World Bank. 2014. World Development Indicators: Mozambique.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ "Person of concern" is the collective term used by UNHCR that covers refugees, asylum seekers, and new arrivals. So as not to confuse the reader, the ET has complied with WFP practice of using the term "refugee" rather than "POC." Consequently, note that under the heading of "refugees," new arrivals who are in fact economic migrants are included. Many of these individuals only stay for a short duration and do not attain formal refugee status.

Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) jointly provide assistance. Maratane camp is the only location where humanitarian assistance is offered and interviews for refugee status are conducted. In mid-2011, Maratane camp experienced a rapid influx of refugees who were fleeing conflicts and famine in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa. The camp normally accommodated 5,500 long-term residents, but the influx caused the camp population to grow to over 10,000, catalysing a humanitarian crisis and triggering assistance from United Nations agencies and international organizations. The swell of refugees continued through mid-2012, but has since subsided. The 1991 Refugee Act No. 21/91 is the national legal framework for the protection of refugees and outlines procedures for granting refugee status in Mozambique.³⁸

1.3 Operation Overview

20. WFP launched PRRO 200355 in March 2012 for a 34-month duration to support populations who become transiently food-insecure as a result of recurring seasonal shocks. The project document outlines two objectives,³⁹ which are well-aligned to corporate 2008-2013 Strategic Objectives (SO) 1, 3, and 5. However, in all subsequent project documents⁴⁰ the PRRO has not referenced these two objectives, and has instead adopted the three corporate SOs as specific objectives. For this reason, OEV, the CO, and the ET agreed that the ET will align the analysis to the corporate SOs. They are: SO 1—*save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies*; SO 3—*restore and rebuild lives and livelihoods in post-conflict, post-disaster or transition situations*; and SO 5—*strengthen the capacities of countries to reduce hunger, including through hand-over strategies and local purchase*. The four main components of the PRRO are:

- **Relief:** GFD to disaster-affected households (SO 1)
- **Early recovery:** FFA in the form of low-technology, labour-intensive activities to rehabilitate productive assets and enable households to recover and maintain food security until the following harvest (SO 3)
- **Refugee assistance:** GFD to refugees at Maratane refugee camp (SO 1)
- **Capacity development:** strengthening of technical and managerial capacity for government stakeholders (SO 5)

21. The Operational Fact Sheet presents the alignment of 2008-2013 corporate SOs, operation specific outcomes, and PRRO activities. The Terms of Reference (Annex 1) ask the ET to base this evaluation on the original logical framework (2012), which was relevant to 2012 and 2013 activities; however, the CO recently realigned the logframe to WFP’s new Strategic Results Framework (2014-2017). Annex 10 presents both frameworks for reference. At the time of fieldwork, the PRRO was not actively measuring progress using the revised logframe, but has recently begun to do so.

22. The resource requirements in March 2012 were US\$29,580,130, revised in December 2012 to US\$30,143,190. The PRRO is funded at 53 percent (based on December 2012 figure) and represents 17.7 percent of the country portfolio (US\$177.6

³⁸UNHCR.Refworld|Mozambique. Mozambique: Act No. 21/91 of 31 December 1991 (Refugee Act) [Mozambique], 13 December 1991, Accessed July 25, 2014. <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b4f62c.html>

³⁹ “Save and protect the lives and livelihoods of food-insecure populations affected by recurrent natural disasters and population movements, through relief and early recovery assistance” and “Strengthen the surge capacity of national institutions for disaster management to more effectively manage emergency response, so that the national structures will be able to have a coordinated, timely and predictable approach to humanitarian response by 2015”. WFP. 2011. Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation – Mozambique PRRO 200355. Project Design Document. Page 23.

⁴⁰ For example, 2012 and 2014 logframes, SPRs, and the ToR for this evaluation.

million).⁴¹ A third budget revision (BR) was approved in 2014 to add corn soya blend (CSB) to relief rations. Multilateral funds, USAID Office of Food for Peace, WFP's Immediate Response Account (IRA), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and Germany are the main sources of funding.⁴²

23. Page (x) presents four maps that outline hazard-prone areas in Mozambique, PRRO intervention areas in 2012 and 2013 by component, and current and planned PRRO intervention areas for 2014, by component.

2 Evaluation Findings

2.1 Appropriateness of the Operation

24. This section describes evaluation findings and conclusions relating to the evaluation question, "How appropriate is the operation?" It addresses the appropriateness of operation objectives, operation design and coverage, geographic targeting, the extent to which transfer modalities are reflective of population needs, internal coherence with WFP corporate strategy, and external coherence with government and partner policies and operations. It further reviews the appropriateness of the PRRO as a programming mechanism for dealing with recurrent natural hazards, a key question of the CO.

Operation objectives

25. **SO 1—save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies**—supported by the relief and refugee components — strongly reflects population needs. The relief component, proportionally the largest (Figure 4 and Figure 5, Annex 12), operates in the context of recurrent natural hazards, which destroy lives, crops, livestock, community and personal assets and displace large numbers of people. The refugee component of SO1 also directly reflects population needs for food assistance. The population of Maratane refugee camp increased following a surge of refugees from Central Africa and the Horn of Africa in 2011. This led UNHCR to ask WFP for support in food assistance per the agencies' Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)⁴³ by which WFP provides food assistance when the number of people in need surpasses 5,000. A local MOU signed in 2011 identified 8,000 refugees needing food assistance. This MOU has been updated every six months. The current MOU is under revision, as a tripartite agreement is sought that includes the National Institute for Refugee Assistance (INAR).

26. **SO3—restore and rebuild lives and livelihoods in post-conflict, post-disaster or transition situations**—is supported by the early recovery component and an appropriate objective for people who were negatively impacted by flooding in Gaza Province, tropical storms in Zambezia Province, and drought in Sofala Province, because homes, crops, and assets were damaged and the populations were in need of support to restore their lives and livelihoods.

27. **SO5 – strengthen the capacities of countries to reduce hunger, including through hand-over strategies and local purchase** is supported by the PRRO's capacity development component. In the context of Mozambique's high vulnerability to the effects of climate change, low degree of readiness,⁴⁴ and government request that

⁴¹ In addition to the PRRO, the Country Portfolio includes the Country Programme, procurement and delivery services for the Ministry of Health, and four trust fund operations.

⁴² The Operational Fact Sheet presents funding levels.

⁴³ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Memorandum of Understanding between the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the World Food Programme (WFP), 1 July 2002, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3d357f502.html> [accessed 17 June 2014]

⁴⁴ University of Notre Dame. Mozambique |ND-GAIN Index. Accessed April 1, 2014. <http://index.gain.org/country/mozambique>

“know-how transfer” be a key pillar of the 2015 Framework for DRR,⁴⁵ WFP’s support to INGC and Technical Secretariat for Food Security and Nutrition (SETSAN) is appropriate to needs and has the potential to be a strong enabler for nationally-owned hunger solutions, including DRR/DRM systems.

Operation design

28. *Overview.* WFP based the operation design on appropriate context analysis. Although lessons from PRRO 10600 (2008-11) could not be integrated because the operation was not evaluated, the new Country Strategy (2012-15) informed the design of PRRO 200355, providing the appropriate context analysis and justification for the pairing of the PRRO and Country Programme (CP) 200286 (2012-2015). The PRRO and CP are thematically clearly defined: they address different food security conditions (acute [PRRO] versus chronic [CP]) and target different geographic areas. The PRRO generally operates in productive but risk-prone low-lying districts, while the CP targets districts with the highest incidence of food insecurity. Only the capacity development component of the PRRO directly overlaps the targeted intervention group for the CP’s DRR efforts.

29. The original PRRO planning figures for relief and early recovery were determined by analysing ten years of Vulnerability Assessment Committee (VAC) assessment data. The CO calculated the PRRO planned caseload in coordination with CP geographic targeting, accounting for seasonal variation in shocks and stressors. While exact locations and severity of impacts of natural disasters can never be predicted, the CO estimated the average population at risk of becoming transiently food insecure to be drought (426,200), floods (313,200), and cyclones (36,900).⁴⁶

30. An EFSA conducted by SETSAN and Food Security Cluster (FSC) members in May/June 2013, following the Gaza floods informed stakeholders of the food security status of the people in the affected districts after four to five months of GFD relief assistance. This EFSA showed about 90,000 people experiencing high food insecurity and advised the continuation of FFA activities for another three months based on needs.⁴⁷

31. *Relief.* The design of the relief component alluded to the national register of disasters that shows emergency food assistance was necessary every year in the past decade. Outside assistance has been requested whenever need exceeds the Government of Mozambique’s response capacity. The various emergency responses supported by the PRRO in 2012-2014 justify the appropriateness of the PRRO and confirm the need to prepare for sudden-onset emergencies.

32. The PRRO design did not include specific nutrition interventions (to prevent and treat Moderate Acute Malnutrition [MAM]), based on analysis that showed that global acute malnutrition (GAM) and MAM rates remain below critical levels in disaster-affected areas.⁴⁸ Although evidence is inconclusive, qualitative findings suggest that the design may not have adequately addressed the needs of people with specific vulnerabilities such as pregnant and lactating women (PLW), children under five, or people living with HIV (PLHIV). Findings suggest that specific nutrition interventions would have been helpful, especially PLHIV on antiretroviral treatment and PLW. An example where the CO has properly addressed a design weakness based on new analysis is evident in the important

⁴⁵ Republic of Mozambique. 2014. Statement by H.E. Ambassador Pedro Comissário. Geneva, 14-15 July 2014.

⁴⁶ More information can be found in Annex 11, a PowerPoint Presentation that explains the various steps involved in geographic targeting for the Mozambique CP, which were used for the PRRO as well.

⁴⁷ FSC. Republic of Mozambique. 2013. Emergency Food Security Assessment in Gaza Province. Executive Summary.

⁴⁸ WFP. 2011. Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation – Mozambique PRRO 200355. Project Design Document.

decision in 2014 (through BR3) to change the ration content and include CSB as a standard item.

33. *Early Recovery.* Early recovery is realized through FFA initiatives. Triangulation of qualitative evidence and secondary literature indicates that the food insecurity of the affected populations was largely related to various shocks, rather than the result of other underlying factors, which is an appropriate situation for the FFA mechanism. Food assistance is used to help households recover from transitory food insecurity and as an income transfer mechanism to prevent sales of assets. By design, work activities under FFA cover low-technology, labour-intensive activities generally lasting four months and oriented towards the rehabilitation of productive assets, such as by cleaning drainage systems and excavating water channels. However, the design of the early recovery component is not fully aligned with PRRO objectives of restoring and rebuilding livelihoods, as there is little in the design linked to livelihood types, seasonality, or livelihood strategies. Proposed FFA activities do not include measures to solve long-standing problems that may have contributed to a crisis in the first place, such as the creation or improvement of disaster-mitigating assets. The design does not offer an efficient transition from early recovery to development and does not fit a framework that addresses strengthening of absorptive and adaptive resilience capacities of households and communities to food insecurity and malnutrition.

34. *Refugees.* The design of the refugee component is based on good contextual analysis. A UNHCR/WFP Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) was conducted in 2011 and preliminary results were made available to inform the PRRO design and implementation modalities.⁴⁹ UNHCR, with support from WFP, conducted a nutritional survey in 2012 that showed that GAM rates were very low, further supporting the rationale that the rations for the long-term population could be kept at 50 percent of daily needs.

Geographic targeting

35. Geographic targeting for relief and recovery activities has been appropriate because it is collaborative, transparent, and responds to government request. The INGC is responsible for assigning geographic locations for WFP's relief response and WFP is respectful of the government's decisions that mandate where to go and what to do. When sudden-onset shocks occur, the INGC provides the first assessment of where assistance is needed and how many are in need and provides the written estimate and request to WFP. Next, the multi-sectoral technical council of disaster management (CTGC) carries out a rapid assessment to validate the initial estimate.⁵⁰ Maps that show affected areas and estimates of number of people affected are generated to assess the magnitude of the shock, its potential impact on people and services, and possible scale of a response. SETSAN is responsible for the conduct of a rapid (qualitative) emergency needs assessment shortly after the event, while a quantitative EFSA is planned when access to affected areas is restored. Geographic targeting of refugees is straightforward and appropriate as Maratane refugee camp is the only refugee camp in Mozambique.

Transfer modality

36. *Relief.* The ET finds uniform agreement among key stakeholders (government, IPs and affected people) that relief in the form of food rations is among the first basic humanitarian needs that should be addressed in disasters in the Mozambique context. The ET and almost all interviewed stakeholders agreed that a cash or voucher transfer modality would be less appropriate for the relief component due to the collapse of

⁴⁹ UNHCR-WFP Joint Assessment Mission Report for Food Assistance to Maratane refugee camp (2012)

⁵⁰ Stakeholders include the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Planning, the police department, WFP, and INGC.

infrastructure and consequent inaccessibility to markets and shops, and drastic increases in food prices for at least three months after a shock.

37. *Early recovery.* Based on a triangulation of data from programme documentation, FGDs, KIIs, and observations by the ET, the choice of food transfers through FFA in Gaza the initial three months (June - August) was appropriate as accessibility to shops and markets had not yet been fully restored and local staple prices were still high.⁵¹ The transfers were also well appreciated – particularly by women, who say they have a greater say over the use of food than they expect they would with cash, which may be diverted by men for non-essential consumptive purposes. During the extension period (September – November), backed by proper research and experience from the CP, cash and vouchers could have been considered as an effective transfer modality for FFA as markets were operational again, although the ET concludes that the use of food rations was not inappropriate during this period, particularly in light of women’s comments about control over rations. While WFP has successfully piloted cash and vouchers under the CP, interviews with the INGC indicate mixed opinions regarding the use of cash transfers and vouchers, with some staff against and some strongly for integrating this modality. Importantly, interviews with INGC delegates suggest most do not fully understand the voucher modality.

38. *Refugees.* Food rations are appropriate for refugees residing in Maratane refugee camp, although alternatives to the distribution of food rations have been discussed since 2011. UNHCR funded one feasibility study on a cash and voucher scheme in 2011 but the results were inconclusive.⁵² The assessment results from a May 2014 WFP mission on the feasibility of cash and vouchers were not finalized at the time of writing. The problems observed affecting an efficient and effective distribution of food rations (discussed under Sections 2.2 and 2.3), should add impetus to the review of alternative transfer mechanisms such as vouchers.

Internal coherence with WFP corporate strategy

39. As noted in paragraph 20, the operation’s SOs are coherent with WFP corporate SOs 1, 3, and 5. The PRRO is not coherent with WFP corporate gender policy and strategy or corporate guidance related to the implementation of FFA activities.⁵³ There is no evidence base to show that gender was adequately integrated into the PRRO design beyond simple output measures, which ultimately were not tracked. WFP also did not prioritize coordinated efforts to mainstream gender equality and sensitivity in implementation of PRRO activities. The critique presented in paragraph 33 that discusses deviation in the design of FFA activities and the objective to rebuild livelihoods, is also valid here, and thus is not repeated.

40. ***Appropriateness of the PRRO mechanism.*** The ET reviewed the appropriateness of the PRRO as a programme mechanism in the context of recurrent natural disasters in response to questions from CO staff as to whether an ongoing programme mechanism is the best way to respond to emergencies and promote DRR activities, especially when DRR is part of the CP design, and thus the PRRO is somewhat redundant. In theory, based on past support provided, INGC and SETSAN should be able to respond to small-shocks without external support. This would guide the CO’s portfolio to comprise the CP complemented by Emergency Operations (EMOP) and Special (logistical) Operations only on an as needed basis, more in line with the corporate stance

⁵¹ WFP. 2013. Review of the Evolution of Basic Food Prices in Mozambique. June 2013 and July 2013.

⁵² UNHCR. 2012. Cash and Voucher Feasibility Study, Mozambique (unpublished)

⁵³ WFP. 2011. Food for Assets Manual. Modules A-E.

on the use of EMOPs and PRROs. This point was also raised during the PRRO review in Rome,⁵⁴ before the recommendation for approval was made to the Executive Director.

41. Despite this concern that the PRRO may be redundant, the ET finds the justification provided in the project document remains valid.⁵⁵ The PRRO is a flexible programming mechanism that augments the CO portfolio. In the context of Mozambique, where recurrent shocks can be classified as assumptions due to frequency, the PRRO allows for quick scale up and a more timely response than an EMOP would, and it would be difficult for the CP to have the flexibility to quickly target new populations who face acute food insecurity following a shock. EMOPs also do not have the ability to build resilience capacities, yet the PRRO, when efficiently implemented, can potentially strengthen prevention, preparedness, and mitigation and response capacity of government and communities, making optimal use of WFP's deep field presence.

Advantages of PRRO identified through KIIs:

- Implementation arrangements are in place that can be easily scaled up when WFP is requested to respond;
- More timely response for addressing smaller emergencies that may not warrant a full EMOP but where assistance is requested;
- Helps to hedge against risk and improves operational flexibility, including ability to draw on direct support costs; and
- Allows WFP to seek donor funding specifically for protracted relief and recovery activities that may otherwise not be carried out.

External coherence with government policies

42. Generally, the PRRO objectives and operations are well-connected to government strategies. The PRRO design is directly linked to the Disaster Management Master Plan for the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Calamities (2006-16). Both aim to enhance national and local actions for vulnerability reduction and emergency response.⁵⁶ In 2012, the PRRO locally purchased 71 percent of total commodities; in 2013, that amount was 51 percent.⁵⁷ This commitment strongly aligns to government prioritization of local procurement.⁵⁸ The short duration of GFD in the PRRO, with a re-evaluation of needs prior to implementing any FFA distribution, supports the Government of Mozambique aim of reducing dependency on food assistance for prolonged periods.

43. The 2013-14 National Rainy and Cyclone Season Contingency Plan states that during the acute phase of an emergency, household rations should be supplemented with enriched foods if the household has: children 6-59 months, pregnant and breastfeeding women, and elderly people. People living with chronic illness (e.g., PLHIV) should also be considered for supplementation.⁵⁹ This has not consistently been a part of the PRRO's GFD process (see paragraph 32), although the PRRO's BR 3 addressed an important part of this gap by introducing CSB into all relief rations.

44. One area where coordination between the PRRO and government could be stronger is risk mitigation through the promotion of early-maturing crops. INGC favours this strategy, stating that the use of these varieties reduces risk of loss by allowing farmers to harvest their main crop earlier in the year (January), before flooding occurs. Similarly, the use of early-maturing varieties allows farmers to plant and harvest rice/maize as a secondary crop by August/September. The ET recognizes that seed-

⁵⁴ WFP PRC minutes Review of new Mozambique PRRO proposal (December, 2011),

⁵⁵ Also supported by findings from a Summary Report of the Thematic Evaluation of the Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations (PRRO) Category" (WFP/EB.1/2004/6-A). in: WFP's Programme Category Review (WFP/EB.A/2010/11/Rev.1).

⁵⁶ WFP Mozambique Country Strategy 2012-15

⁵⁷ WFP. Standard Project Reports. 2012 and 2013.

⁵⁸ It is important to note that Mozambique does not produce sufficient food to feed its population year round. Imports will be necessary from time to time until this is resolved.

⁵⁹ Republic of Mozambique. 2013. Ministry of State Administration, Disaster Management Coordination Council, Rainy and Cyclone Season Contingency Plan – 2013-2014.

distribution is not traditionally a part of FFA. However, coherence could be enhanced between this strategy and FFA activities to restore livelihoods through advocacy to and enhanced coordination with other stakeholders (e.g., FAO).

External coherence with partners

45. Document review and KIIs reveal the technical and implementation strategies and coordination principles of PRRO and key partners are highly unified. There is strong coherence with the United Nations Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) and cluster system, particularly the FSC, the Information, Communications and Technology Cluster (ICTC), and Logistics Cluster. WFP co-chairs the HCT and FSC and leads the ICTC and Logistics Cluster. WFP collaborates with non-governmental organisations (NGO) mostly through the cluster system. HCT activities have been integrated into the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) economic area in order to achieve more strategic responses and better prioritization of available resources toward national development.⁶⁰ In case of emergencies that exceed the government's response capacity, the United Nations system provides complementary humanitarian relief to the most affected communities by activating its humanitarian clusters, which are integrated into the four National Centre for Emergency Operations (CENOE) sectors (information and planning, communication, social, and infrastructures).⁶¹ WFP works closely with UNHCR regarding support to refugees in Nampula, and with the UNDP as the cluster lead for early recovery.

46. The design of the WFP's Country Strategy (2012-15) – and by extension the CP and PRRO – aligns very well with the Mozambique UNDAF (2012-15). The UNDAF Action Plan distinguishes between three programmatic areas: economic, social and governance. The economic area focuses in part on improving natural resource management and DRM at national and sub-national levels, including risk reduction, mitigation, emergency response and early recovery efforts (the area supported by the PRRO). The social area supports government to improve essential social services for vulnerable groups such as social protection, health and education (the area supported by the CP). This a marked change from PRRO 106.000 (2008-11), which was built around the four pillars of social protection: 1) protection; 2) prevention; 3) promotion; and 4) transformation and included typical programme activities that are now categorized under the CP.

Appropriateness: Key findings and conclusions

PRRO as a programming mechanism: The PRRO is a relevant and flexible programming mechanism, given Mozambique's high vulnerability to the effects of climate change and low degree of readiness to respond to recurrent natural disasters.

Objectives and activities: The PRRO objectives and activities of relief (including refugees) and early recovery are appropriate in addressing acute food insecurity needs of households affected by recurrent natural disasters in Mozambique. The PRRO's effort to strengthen the capacity of national institutions for disaster management is appropriate to expressed needs.

Operation design: Appropriate context analysis was undertaken for the pairing of the PRRO and CP under the Country Strategy (2012-15). The early recovery component is not fully aligned with PRRO objectives of restoring and rebuilding livelihoods, as there are few linkages to livelihood strategies, seasonality, or building resilience to future shocks. The operation is not based on a sound gender analysis.

⁶⁰ United Nations (2012). Mozambique UNDAF 2012-15 Action Plan.

⁶¹ Ibid.

Appropriateness: Key findings and conclusions, continued.

Geographic targeting has been appropriate because it is based on collaborative assessments (WFP, government partners, and CTCG) that assess the magnitude of the shock, its potential impact on people and services, and the possible scale of a response.

Transfer modality: Overall, food rations were appropriate and relevant to population needs in all PRRO components; however, problems observed with ration distribution for refugees warrants a review of alternative transfer mechanisms. In relief operations, rations were appropriate because markets were not fully functioning and local staple prices were high. Supported by necessary context-specific research, cash and vouchers could have been considered for the second round of FFA as markets were operational again.

Coherence: For the most part, the PRRO shows coherence with WFP corporate strategy. Deviations include not integrating gender into the design. The PRRO aligns well with government policies and strategies related to disaster management, local purchase, and reducing dependency on food assistance. Strong synergies exist between the PRRO and partner efforts, including the “Delivering as One” United Nations initiative, the UNDAF Action Plan (2012-15), and the United Nations HCT and cluster system.


2.2 Results of the Operation

47. **Overview.** This section provides evaluation findings and analysis regarding the second evaluation question, “What are the results of the operation?” It begins with general findings for planned output attainment, followed by a discussion of results by activity. Specific analysis includes the extent to which assistance was provided to the “right” beneficiaries, and whether the assistance was timely and of sufficient quantity and quality. This is followed by an assessment of outcome and objective achievements.

48. The section compares operational planned figures to actual figures and thus the results differ from those reported in the SPRs, which compare project planning figures to actual figures. The ET opts to present operational planning figures because they represent a more accurate current analysis of actual needs resulting from recent natural hazards, while project design planning figures are estimated based on historical trends.

49. Overall, 96 percent of operational planned beneficiaries were reached in 2012, 163 percent in 2013 (needs were much greater than initially planned for), and 99 percent in the first quarter of 2014 (Figure 1). In 2012, 90 percent of total operational planned food tonnage was distributed, in 2013, 86 percent, and 81 percent in the first quarter of 2014. (Table 1). The key reason the PRRO exceeded beneficiary targets but did not attain tonnage targets in 2013 is disruption in the ration delivery for refugees, explained

Figure 1: Actual beneficiaries reached as a percentage of planned (operational), by activity and year



Source: PRRO 200355 output monitoring data bases 2012, 2013, 2014. Calculations by TANGO International

in detail in the forthcoming section on refugee outputs.

Table 1: Actual tonnage distributed as a percentage of planned (operational), by activity and year

	Total tonnage	GFD	FFW	Refugees
	% of planned tonnage distributed			
2012	90.0	118.7	36.6	50.3
2013	85.8	83.2	104.7	42.2
2014 (Jan-April)	81.2	97.8	93.6	61.9

Source: PRRO 200355 output monitoring data bases 2012, 2013, 2014. Calculations by TANGO International

Attainment of planned outputs, by component

Relief

50. Outputs: Table 2 lists relief output indicators, by planned target and percentage of attainment by year. Based on operational planning figures, the targeted number of relief beneficiaries was reached for all years (2012-14). Table 7, Annex 12, includes a breakdown of outputs for specific commodities, by year.

51. In 2012, the PRRO reached almost 58,000 relief beneficiaries, responding to the emergency caused by cyclone Funso and tropical storm Dando in Zambezia Province. Another 14,000 refugees and asylum seekers received food relief for a total of 71,300 relief beneficiaries or 109 percent of output attained compared to operational planning figures. A total of 3,100 metric tonnes (mt) of food (cereals and pulses) were distributed, which accounted for slightly more than 90 percent of operational planning figures.

Table 2: Summary of relief outputs attained, by year

Output 1.1: Food and non-food items distributed in sufficient quantity and quality to target groups of women, men, girls and boys under secure conditions (Relief beneficiaries, vulnerable refugees, and new arrivals)			
Output 1.1.1 Number of women, men, girls and boys ⁶² receiving food and non-food items, by category and as % of planned figures			
	2012	2013	2014 ⁶³
# of people receiving rations (Relief beneficiaries, vulnerable refugees, and new arrivals)	71,324	266,664	21,225
% of output attained compared to project planning figures <i>Target: > 60 % of planned figures</i>	28.2	116.7	265.3
% of output attained compared to operational planning figures	109.0	168.2	96.8
Output 1.1.2. Tonnage of food distributed, by type, as % of planned distribution ⁶⁴			
Metric tonnage of food distributed	3100	6133	420
% of output attained compared to project planning figures <i>Target: > 80 % of planned figures</i>	39.4	114.4	86.1
% of output attained compared to operational planning figures	92.1	77.4	74.7

Source: PRRO 200355 output monitoring databases 2012, 2013, 2014. Calculations by TANGO International

52. In 2013, the PRRO reached the highest number of relief beneficiaries (overall) compared to other years as it responded to the Gaza floods in southern Mozambique. More than 260,000 people received food rations in February under output 1.1, based


⁶² The ET is unable to determine the source of values for sex- and age-disaggregated data reported in SPR 2012 and 2013 and thus does not report them. Please see paragraph 133 for details.

⁶³ Analysis for January – April only.

⁶⁴ Calculations by TANGO International based on data in Mozambique PRRO 200355 output databases 2012, 2013, and 2014.

on the largest single response requested by the government under this PRRO. The number of relief beneficiaries quickly decreased during the months of March and April (see Figure 2), when WFP and the INGC put considerable effort into clearing the lists and prioritizing displaced populations. Overall, in 2013 the PRRO attained

Figure 2: Actual 2013 GFD, beneficiaries and tonnage



Source: PRRO 200355 output monitoring data bases 2013. Calculations by TANGO

168 percent of the operational planning figures for beneficiaries, and 77 percent of the operational planning figures in tonnage. As mentioned, a key reason the PRRO exceeded beneficiary targets but did not attain tonnage targets in 2013 is disruption in the ration delivery for refugees, explained in the forthcoming section on refugee outputs. Additionally, pipeline difficulties resulted in lower than planned emergency rations in April and June. Qualitative data from various sources indicate that both sexes were equally represented on GFD beneficiary lists (please see paragraphs 7 and 130 for details on limitations to quantitative sex-disaggregated data).

53. In the current operational year (2014), relief has been provided mainly to Cabo Delgado (Pemba city) with more than 20,000 people benefiting from food rations. WFP provided a one-off supply of food rations for one month, following an urgent request by INGC made during a CTGC emergency meeting in Maputo. The response was based on initial planning figures provided by INGC in Pemba, and revised on the basis of a rapid assessment conducted one week after the cyclone. The rapid assessment was conducted by a team of HCT members, including WFP, which provided technical and substantial logistics support for the assessment. Most stakeholders interviewed felt the initial planning figures were overestimated. The high output percentages for 2014(Table 2) can be explained in that project planning figures only accounted for GFD for 8,000 refugees.

54. Table 3 removes data on support provided to refugees provides additional information on Output 1.1: it presents data on GFD in response to natural disasters alone. It shows that the PRRO has assisted at least 100 percent of its planned figures for emergency relief beneficiaries. Leaving out the refugee component better demonstrates success relative to general GFD assistance.

Table 3: Summary of GFD assistance (no refugees), by year

	2012	2013	2014 ⁶⁵
Number relief beneficiaries receiving food	57,654	258,637	13,495
Relief beneficiaries receiving food as % of planned (operational) figures	101.1	172.3	100.0
Metric tonnes of food distributed to relief beneficiaries	2,441	5,660	196
Tonnage of food distributed to relief beneficiaries as % of planned (operational) distribution	118.7	83.2	97.8

Source: PRRO 200355 output monitoring data bases 2012, 2013, 2014. Calculations by TANGO International

⁶⁵ Analysis for January – April only.

55. Beneficiary selection: By design, household targeting criteria were based on assets and harvest losses, with priority given to households with either a high dependency ratio, or headed by females, or hosting chronically ill members and orphans.⁶⁶ In practise, household targeting criteria were not applied, as the GFD approach included all households in targeted communities or in relief camps.

56. The PRRO has depended to a large extent on the capacity inside the communities (local authorities and community leaders) for targeting, without conducting much independent monitoring on its own. Food monitors have overseen some food distributions, but post-distribution monitoring (PDM) has been largely absent. This has led to some inclusion error (often unaffected or less-affected host community members who are not a part of the blanket targeting) reported by key informants and FGD participants. This inclusion error was mostly referred to as minimal or acceptable given the scale of the response and the limited resources available. It is difficult to assess the real extent of this inclusion error as PDM and process monitoring was generally absent. The high numbers of beneficiaries in the immediate aftermath of the Gaza floods - 270,000 beneficiaries in February 2013 – was followed by an immediate drop by more than half in March when WFP and the INGC cleared the lists. This shows seriousness of efforts to update the people in need of food assistance but also an awareness of the importance of reducing potential inclusion error.

57. The only exclusion error reported to the ET concerned delays in adding new arrivals in relief camps to the food distribution lists. As lists were continuously updated, new arrivals would only receive food during the second or third (weekly) food distributions after their arrival. Ration sharing was said to be common. As the camps grew quickly in the first couple of weeks and food supply was limited, initial food distributions covered needs for a few days only. The food distribution frequency was gradually decreased to weekly and then monthly intervals.

58. FGDs further suggested that affected people were generally content with the distribution process, food distribution point (FDP) and the transparency during the actual distribution. By design, persons with specific needs (elderly, chronically sick, etc.) received their rations first and did not have to queue up and wait for long periods. Some beneficiaries who returned from the relief camps to their own communities were so pleased with the distribution process they had experienced in camps, that they insisted it be done in the same manner in their communities.

59. A few points of criticism raised during FGDs were that, prior to distribution, some IPs did not provide sufficient information to communities on items and quantities to be distributed and on procedures to be followed during distribution. Often no banners were used to communicate key messages per SPHERE requirements. Various sources suggested that limited communication about procedures and rations resulted in people not understanding what to expect from the response, and may have contributed to a few reported crowd management problems at distribution sites, where trucks were stormed and food was taken. Food distribution teams had to retreat in those instances and return with police escorts to ensure orderly distributions.

60. Key informants as well as relief beneficiaries commend the efforts of WFP and IPs to distribute food during the immediate aftermath of the Gaza floods. The qualitative data suggest that WFP staff were considered knowledgeable, effective, and efficient during the food distribution. Some criticism is directed to IPs for depending too much on newly-hired staff who were not familiar with WFP or SPHERE guidelines for food

⁶⁶ WFP. 2011. Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation – Mozambique PRRO 200355. Project Design Document.

distribution management, including logistics (transport and warehouse management), registration, food distribution, PDM, and communication. It is no surprise then that WFP was called upon when communities felt ill-treated or were confused. While WFP or IPs have not made a special hotline available for complaints, as reported in KIIs and FGDs community leaders were said to stop the distribution process, call WFP and ask the food monitor to visit and help sort out the problem. WFP responded in those cases with good measure. Evidence on the frequency of such actions cannot be found due to the absence of PDM and process monitoring.

61. Duration: The duration of GFD has been kept within the 90 days stated in the design. In the case of the relief response to the Gaza floods, the three months of food rations were sufficient as shops and town centres were said to be back in business by April/May, assisted by the clean-up work supported by WFP FFA activities.

62. Timeliness: Relief was generally observed to be timely by various stakeholders close to the operations (Government of Mozambique, HCT members), particularly in dealing with the large Gaza relief effort in 2013. Timeliness was critical given that during the first three months after the flooding, roads, markets and shops were inaccessible. WFP's expertise and experience in food distribution management in difficult circumstances, reaching far-off communities, was praised by all stakeholders. It took time for the floodwater to recede, towns to be cleaned up and shops to open again. Shops were said to be open again by late April/May in areas such as Chokwe and Chibuto (Gaza Province). In 2014, WFP also responded in timely fashion to the INGC's urgent request to provide relief to Cabo Delgado.

63. However, triangulated data from FGDs of affected people and KIs show WFP and IPs responded less timely to a smaller emergency in Zambezia Province, when a cyclone hit Maganja da Costa in January 2012. It reportedly took WFP two-and-a-half months to process the INGC request for assistance. The delay was exacerbated by IP procurement challenges to hire transporters in a timely manner. As a result, food sat in the warehouse and communities did not receive relief until late May.

64. Relief rations: In the initial PRRO, the planned food ration for GFD provided an estimated 1,081 kcal. This amount is approximately 50 percent of the recommended requirements of 2,100 kcal/person/day.⁶⁷ The rationale for ration size was that shock-affected populations in Mozambique could access part of food requirements through family members not affected by localized shocks. The covariate nature of the Gaza flooding offered evidence that this assumption did not hold. In response, the CO increased the original rations in 2013 to provide 2,034 kcal and oil was introduced into the relief rations for the first time, as indicated in Table 7, Annex 12. Even with the adjustment, the GFD ration is still below recommended levels.

65. Findings from fieldwork in Gaza and Zambezia Provinces (Table 10, Annex 13) indicate that the actual GFD ration did not reach the level of the adjusted ration, and in the case of Zambezia was even below the initial planned ration of 1081 kcal. The smallest rations were found in two communities in Maganja da Costa: 378 kcal/person/day in one case and 818 kcal/person/day in the other. In Gaza the rations varied from 1057 kcal/person/day to 1,432 kcal/person/day. WFP referred to pipeline issues as the main reason for shortfalls in rations, in particular with securing cooking oil and maize.

⁶⁷ UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, WHO. 2004. Food and Nutrition in Emergencies.

66. The GFD ration is made up of maize grain, dried beans and occasionally oil and/or CSB+. There were a number of issues raised in the focus groups about the quality and acceptability of the food. For households who lost their domestic utensils (including their maize pounder) in the floods, the whole maize grain was unwelcome. As the women were unable to process the maize at home, they would have to take the maize to a miller, who charged for milling,⁶⁸ which resulted in a loss of food to the household because resources were diverted to milling. In addition, a number of communities complained about the quality of the beans provided as part of the ration, both in terms of taste and cooking time.

67. WFP staff members informed the ET that they had recognised that a ration consisting of only maize and pulses met neither macro- nor micronutrient minimum requirements.⁶⁹ Therefore, using a third BR, WFP aligned the GFD ration with the FFA ration so that it now consists of fortified maize flour, fortified cooking oil, and CSB+. Screening for extremely vulnerable people during the acute phase of the emergency has not been undertaken, and there is no supplementation for these groups. Nevertheless, the addition of CSB+ is likely to have addressed some needs of these groups, particularly of children under five, pregnant and lactating women, and PLHIV.

Early recovery

68. **Outputs:** Table 4 lists early recovery output indicators by year and percentage of attainment for project planning figures (which correspond to indicator targets), and by percentage of attainment compared to operational planning figures. As mentioned, the latter figures offer a more accurate picture based on actual needs resulting from recent natural hazards. Therefore, the ET elects to focus the early recovery output analysis on actual results as they compare to operational planning figures. Table 8, Annex 12 includes a breakdown of specific commodity outputs, by year, as well as indicators not monitored by the PRRO.

Table 4: Summary of early recovery outputs attained, by year

Output 3.1 Food and non-food items distributed in sufficient quantity and quality to target groups of women, men, girls and boys under secure conditions			
Output 3.1.1. Number of women, men, girls and boys ⁷⁰ receiving food and non-food items, by category and as % of planned figures			
	2012	2013	2014⁷¹
Number of people receiving food through FFA activities	5,200	98,745	37,830
% of output attained compared to project planning figures <i>Target: > 60 % of planned figures</i>	10.6	44.8	19.1
% of output attained compared to operational planning figures	36.6	144.8	100.0
Output 3.1.2. Tonnage of food distributed, by type, as % of planned distribution			
% of output attained compared to project planning figures <i>Target: > 80 % of planned figures</i>	5.0	49.1	15.1
% of output attained compared to operational planning figures	36.6	104.7	93.6

Source: PRRO 200355 output monitoring data bases 2012,2013,2014. Calculations by TANGO International.

⁶⁸ The charge is usually in-kind as people don't have cash.

⁶⁹ Even if the ration size is met in the future, there will still be a shortfall in macro- and micronutrients.

⁷⁰ The ET is unable to determine the source of values for sex- and age-disaggregated data reported in SPR 2012 and 2013 and thus does not report them. Please see paragraph 130 for details.

⁷¹ Analysis for January – April only.

69. In 2012, the PRRO planned to reach 14,200 FFA beneficiaries in Sofala Province and successfully reached 5,200 (35.6 percent). In 2013, reach greatly surpassed (144.8 percent) the 68,195 planned beneficiaries, with FFA rations provided to 98,745 beneficiaries in Gaza and Sofala provinces.⁷² Approximately 23 percent of the maximum number of GFD beneficiaries in Gaza⁷³ were served by the FFA component (60,475). The Sofala drought response, serving 14,200 beneficiaries, did not follow an emergency GFD initiative. As of April 2014, the PRRO had reached 100 percent of the 37,830 planned for beneficiaries in the first quarter of the year. The few data that were tracked by sex of beneficiary for 2012 and 2013 show that the number of male and female beneficiaries was close to equal, with more women than men in some cases, and more men than women in other cases. Qualitative data from various sources, including beneficiaries themselves, indicate women's level of participation in FFA is relatively equal to men's.

70. In 2012, the PRRO fell substantially short of the tonnage target, distributing only five percent of the planned 131 mt to Sofala FFA beneficiaries. The project achieved operational targets in 2013, distributing 3688 mt (104.7 percent) of the 3523 planned tonnage to beneficiaries in Gaza and Sofala Provinces. Output data for the first quarter of 2014 also indicate high achievement: 276 mt of the planned 296 mt (93.6 percent) was distributed in Sofala Province.

71. Beneficiary selection: Targeting criteria for early recovery activities mirror GFD criteria, with priority given to households that have either a high dependency ratio, are headed by females, or are hosting chronically ill members or orphans.⁷⁴ The ET finds that targeting criteria described in the project design were not applied. Beneficiary selection for FFA was undertaken by local authorities who did not follow these criteria, resulting in significant inclusion error in all communities, as well as exclusion error in larger communities. The most commonly reported practise was to rotate rations and related work obligations (four days per week, four hours per day) across all households, a number of whom do not meet targeting criteria. As a result of rotation, each household typically received one month of rations, instead of six months of rations, and worked for one month instead of the planned six months. Output data show that 60,475 beneficiaries (Table 4) were served by the FFA component however in reality, given rotation, it is likely that five to six times that number received just one month of rations. People affected, and some IP KIs, claimed that many more people were in need of assistance, and wondered why there was not enough food to support a full six months of participation in FFA activities. Factors contributing to the prevalence of rotation are discussed in Section 2.3.

72. The project design document states FFA activities will be sensitive to gender issues and will enable the participation of labour-constrained households (e.g., PLHIV). In most of the communities visited by the ET, a practise set up by local leaders under the rotation plans ensured that elders and people too ill to work received a one-month ration but did not have to perform the work. The ET finds no evidence that such gender considerations are taken into account.

73. Early recovery rations: Calculated FFW rations in Gaza were maize (2,67g/per person/day) and beans (40g/per person/day), and oil (13 g/per person/day). The total kcal value is 1,198 kcal/person/day. As shown in Table 11, Annex 13, households report

⁷² Calculations based on a maximum of 60,475 FFA planned beneficiaries in Gaza Province (June) and 7,720 planned beneficiaries in Sofala Province.

⁷³ The maximum number refers to February, when 272,837 people were reached during the height of the emergency. That number dropped to between 132,000 and 144, 000 in subsequent months.

⁷⁴ WFP. 2011. Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation – Mozambique PRRO 200355. Project Design Document.

they received the planned ration and in some cases slightly above the planned amounts. This finding corresponds to data in Table 4, which show actual tonnage slightly exceeded (105 percent) planned amounts.

74. Timeliness of rations: Output databases and qualitative data indicate timely and predictable deliveries of FFA rations (frequency was one delivery per month). The ET could not directly observe FDPs, as operations had ceased in sampled districts; however, there was consensus among all FGs that FDPs were in open areas and were within one hour of walking for most households, which is well within SPHERE standards.⁷⁵

75. Duration of rations: The duration of the FFA rations in response to drought in Sofala was two months (December 2012- January 2013), falling short of the planned three-month programme.⁷⁶ In Gaza, the FFA response directly followed three months of GFD. An initial three months of FFA, from June to August 2013, was extended by another three months based on the May/June 2013 EFSA, which recommended that the most vulnerable populations in the affected districts would be food insecure through the March 2014 harvest.⁷⁷ A follow-up rapid assessment in October recommended the same.⁷⁸ Contrary to recommendations, early recovery support in Gaza Province ended in November. WFP staff rationalize the decision to end FFA by stating that activities should not compete with the peak labour season (October through February). However, this period is also typically the lean season in years without any shock to cropping systems. In years of shock, the lean season can extend from August to the next March, or even longer. Input from most FGDs in Gaza suggests that 2013 was a particularly difficult year where they faced a combination of aggravating factors. While some affected households were able to harvest second crops, planted soon after floods receded, and others harvested vegetables and fruit by August, most interviewed beneficiaries shared that they had significantly struggled with the impact of the flood followed by unpredictable rain, which resulted in second harvests much lower than anticipated.

“If we have rain, we have food. We can’t even say when lean season is because every year is different for rain. We used to be able to predict the hungry months of November and December. Now it is impossible.”
Female FGD Tiwonkuine

76. The concern expressed by WFP regarding the overlap of FFA with agricultural labour needs was validated by some beneficiaries in Gaza with respect to the timing of the second FFA cycle (September-November); however, from the perspective of most beneficiaries, extra work was not a problem. In the words of one beneficiary, “It is more problematic to have nothing to eat than to have too much work.” The ET asserts that rotation of benefits is another reason there was not critical competition between labour pledged to FFA projects and household obligations. Because households only received one month of food, their labour obligation was also only one month, instead of six.

77. FFA activities: Output 3.1.4 (Table 8, Annex 12) relates to the number of community assets and infrastructure created through the PRRO. The project met or exceeded targets for all types of planned assets. The percentage of outputs attained compared to planned figures is: 166.7 percent of planned hectares of land cleared; 110.2 percent of planned kilometres of feeder roads built through FFA and maintained through self-help; 100.0 percent of planned number of communities with improved physical infrastructure to mitigate future shock impact; 400.0 percent of planned

⁷⁵ The Sphere Project. 2011. ‘Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response. Geneva.

⁷⁶ Mozambique PRRO 200355 2012 and 2013 output databases.

⁷⁷ Government of Mozambique and Food Security Cluster. 2013. Emergency Food Security Assessment in Gaza Province.

⁷⁸ Food and Nutrition Security Working Group. 2013. Regional Food and Nutrition Security Update. October/November 2013.

number of bridges rehabilitated; and 100 percent of planned number of latrines constructed or rehabilitated. While the number of assets may denote level of effort and scope of activities, of key importance in an early recovery programme aiming to restore and rebuild livelihoods, is the relevance, quality, and sustainability of the assets. There are no indicators in the PRRO 2012 logframe to measure these aspects of the early recovery component; therefore, the ET offers a qualitative assessment of these factors.

78. Initial FFA improvements in Gaza involved cleared debris, cleared drainage ditches, and repair of interior roads by hand. Qualitative findings indicate these activities are relevant to immediate population needs; however, once debris are cleaned up, there is little evidence to indicate that ongoing activities have contributed to DRR, strengthened absorptive and adaptive resilience capacities of households and communities to future shocks and stressors, or promoted self-reliance for poor communities. Exceptions to this finding were efforts to irrigate vegetable patches and sand-banking to prevent further road damage. The most commonly reported FFA activities were cleaning public spaces (e.g., cemetery, roads), building structures (offices for community leaders, schoolteacher homes, mudding school walls), and cutting grass. Some communities, however, report their FFA labour was used to clean the administrator's house and to clean an IP's warehouse.

79. Of note are the scheduled 2014 FFA activities in Zambezia. The ET cannot comment on actual achievement because activities are not yet underway, however as described by WFP staff, planned activities to promote irrigation, drainage canals, and seed multiplication schemes look promising as a means to rebuild livelihoods and resolve long-standing problems that increase risk.

80. Participatory approaches to ensure validation in the design and implementation of FFA initiatives appear virtually non-existent. In all but one community, projects were reportedly selected by local leaders and assigned to community members. Key informants state that IPs come to agreement with local authorities on what work must be done and how it will get done, however there is no clear relationship between the amount of work carried out and the number of days it will take to complete the work. The exception is Tiwokuine, where male and female beneficiaries report that community members were routinely involved in the selection of activities.

81. Quality and sustainability of assets. The quality and sustainability of assets created or repaired through FFA activities is inadequate. Quality is reduced by lack of physical resources (construction materials and tools) and no technical assistance. Difficult jobs such as canal cleaning or road building are completed by hand without tools—often household and community tools were lost in the flood. People affected complained that their dependence on pure manual labour and absence of power tools and machines, such as tractors, prevented them from implementing sustainable improvements to community infrastructure such as drainage systems. Schools, schoolteacher homes, and latrine screens are built of cut reed; this alone contributes to fragile, risk-prone structures. The lack of resources to purchase the wire or travel considerable distances to where wire is available further limits the quality and sustainability of the structures: the ET witnessed a latrine screen, less than one year old, already demolished by wind. WFP field monitors and IPs reportedly visit FFA activities, but offer no technical oversight. All supervision of work relies on local authorities, who place greater focus on whether work is done than the quality of work. Finally, many communities report difficulty maintaining the work, which impacts sustainability. Competing necessary tasks take priority over maintenance when no food is available as an incentive to carry out the work. Overall, poor quality and

unsustainable assets reduce communities' absorptive and adaptive resilience capacities to future shocks.

82. Output 3.1.5 (Table 8, Annex 12) should report the number of women and men trained in livelihood-support thematic areas; however, the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system does not track this indicator and the ET found no evidence that livelihood-support training is implemented by the PRRO.

Refugees

83. **Outputs.** Table 5 provides a summary of food assistance to refugees in Maratane refugee camp by year, including refugees receiving food as percentage of planned figures. The figures produce a rather multifaceted story, with numbers of refugees receiving food decreasing from 13,670 (2012) to 8,027 (2013) and to 7,730 (2014). Food assistance in tonnage follows a similar decreasing trend from more than 650 mt in 2012, to 472 mt in 2013 and only 224 mt in 2014. This gradual decline follows a rapid influx in 2011 that saw UNHCR asking for WFP's assistance. The tonnage of food distributed to refugees as a percentage of planned (operational) distribution, shown in Table 5, shows clear deficits in all years.

Table 5: Summary of refugee assistance, by year

	2012	2013	2014⁷⁹
Number refugees receiving food	13,670	8,027	7,730
Refugees receiving food as % of planned figures	162.2	95.2	91.7
Metric tonnes of food distributed to refugees	659	472	224
Tonnage of food distributed to refugees as % of planned (operational) distribution	50.3	42.2	61.9

Source: PRRO 200355 output monitoring data bases 2012, 2013, 2014. Calculations by TANGO International

84. **Beneficiary selection.** As per the latest data,⁸⁰ there are 2,344 refugees and 5,363 asylum seekers in Maratane refugee camp, a total of 7,707 refugees.⁸¹ On the camp outskirts, there are an additional 2,805 asylum-seekers and 718 refugees. UNHCR recognizes that some of those numbers may include some refugees who despite being registered as residents in Nampula, may no longer live in the province or even in the country. It is a recognized (first) challenge to identify the genuine asylum-seekers from economic migrants amidst mixed migration flows. Many migrants from other African (and Asian) countries travel in the hope for economic opportunities in South Africa, or even in the mining sector in Mozambique.⁸² They travel alongside other migrants, mainly from Central and Eastern Africa, who may qualify as refugees with a right to international protection under the 1951 Refugee Convention.

85. A second factor that may affect targeting in the refugee component is the open policy of the camp that allows camp residents to move freely in and outside of the camp and to seek employment. Mozambique has a positive attitude towards asylum seekers and allows them—once registered—to work. The majority of the refugees and asylum seekers carry out casual work, petty trading in the city or work as labourers on the farms surrounding the camp in order to survive. Others also find their way to cities like Maputo. The mobility of the economic migrants in and out of the camp, together

⁷⁹ Analysis for January – April only.

⁸⁰ INAR December 2013

⁸¹ UNHCR Briefing Note for WFP Visit to Nampula (May 2014)

⁸²Ibid.

with the in-and-out movements for work, makes it difficult to monitor individual eligibility for food assistance in the refugee population.

86. This evidence points to possible inclusion error that could be taken advantage of if eligibility of long-term camp residents is not verified. UNHCR has conducted regular verification exercises to confirm the actual size of the population through house surveys and spot checks in 2013. A downward trend in camp population is clear from Table 5 and is proof of such efforts.

87. At the same time, UNHCR advocates for a self-reliance policy for camp residents, promoting agriculture and income-generating activities. Together, they formed the rationale for providing 50 percent rations to all Maratane residents who reside there for more than six months. The self-reliance policy has not been very successful. Credit schemes, introduced a few years ago by INGOs, failed. Low soil fertility was mentioned as an important obstacle for growing crops. Participating refugees had difficulties in accessing more fertile land that they have to rent from Mozambicans. District-level line ministries support activities in agriculture, health and education, but have limited funds. Not surprisingly, many camp residents question the large assumption that all residents have the means to acquire the additional 50 percent of their food rations.


88. During the first five months of 2014 there was an exclusion error due to problems with the maintenance of the main refugee database, *proGress*. From mid-December 2013 till mid-May 2014 no new cases could be entered, so these were excluded from the printed lists of beneficiaries to receive rations. This was repaired just before the ET visited the camp in May. This has had serious implications for those new arrivals and asylum seekers who as a result, did not have access to food through rations. Their fellow countrymen in the camp often assisted them. Explanation of this problem includes the lack of funding for UNHCR (and WFP) and limited technical capacity of INAR staff. WFP has had presence in the camp to help the food distribution management, but manages the 2014 operations remotely.

89. **Timeliness/ frequency:** There are considerable irregularities in terms of food distribution to refugees. UNHCR and INAR have not been able to distribute food to beneficiaries in a timely fashion. Camp residents complained about the unreliability of food distributions, which do not arrive every month at around the same week of the month. This unpredictability makes it difficult to plan ration use; they may have to last for four or up to eight weeks. Affected people also mentioned that whole month rations were not delivered. This is supported by data presented in Figure 3 and Table 10, Annex 12. They said this reduction put a lot of stress on their families. In this regard, it

needs to be mentioned that in two FGDs, prostitution was mentioned as a coping strategy for some households. This could not be further verified through other sources.

90. The delays are caused by a lack

Figure 3: 2013 food distribution to refugees



of donor funds, as well as difficulties in monthly reconciliation of distributed food and stocks by UNHCR and INAR. This has resulted in subsequent delays in output monitoring reporting to WFP that are required before the next transport can be cleared. Once WFP receives a (new) request, the purchase order for transport only takes about one week.

91. **Rations:** Planned rations for the “at-risk” and newly arrived asylum seekers are: maize 400g, beans 60g, oil 20g, and CSB 50g,⁸³ giving a total of 2,190 kcal/person/day. This amount is given during the first six months. After this residents are considered long term, and rations are halved to 900 kcal/person/day, provided for 365 days a year. At present there are 4,500 recently arrived asylum seekers and 3000 long-term refugees.⁸⁴ There are also 500 extremely vulnerable new arrivals who are considered nutritionally at risk (elderly and chronically sick, including PLHIV).

92. The actual quantities of food provided to the refugees do not comply with the planned quantities mentioned previously. They also do not cover the minimum dietary requirements for the refugees. The actual ration provides approximately 80 percent of daily requirements in the first six months and 40 percent thereafter. Although no sale of rations was reported, the ET observed both maize and beans being offered for sale in the camp market.

93. There were issues with food quality. For example, monthly rations of maize were reported spoilt on more than one occasion⁸⁵ and there are complaints about the quality of the beans, which ⁸⁶take a long time to cook. Camp residents add bicarbonate of soda to speed up the cooking process.⁸⁷

94. Many of the refugees are also culturally not familiar with maize as a staple food, and swap the maize grains/flour for spaghetti or goat meat. The maize grains also need to be milled, so the refugees must pay a proportion of their maize for the milling service. In 2013, UNHCR and WFP agreed to add another two kg of maize to compensate for these milling losses, but no reference was made to this measure in any of the FGDs. The gaps in supply would have prevented the implementation of this measure. Recently maize grain distribution has been substituted by fortified maize flour. This product is greatly appreciated by the refugees, as the quality is better and they do not have to pay to process the maize grains.

95. In years past, all refugees received wet rations (hot meals) during the first month in the camp, before the distribution of cooking equipment and utensils. However, when the numbers of refugees increased (2011), the camp administration was not able to provide the wet rations, and hot meals were reserved for the most vulnerable refugees and those arriving in the camp in a debilitated state. These individuals were provided with a wet ration for a month.

96. For the refugees who continue to be extremely vulnerable (orphans, widows, elderly, chronically ill, disabled and malnourished children), UNHCR and INAR are working with the National Institute for Social Action (INAS). INAS provides supplementary support to 983 refugees, of which 100 are Mozambican nationals from the host community. The support provided by INAS is not standardized and depends

⁸³ There was an initial agreement that WFP would provide the maize and beans for the ration and UNHCR the oil and salt.

⁸⁴ The authorities are currently updating their database by carrying out a camp census.

⁸⁵ This is thought to involve one transporter that has changed good maize for bad maize, taking a few days longer to arrive. This has been investigated and action is taken to prevent this from happening again.

⁸⁶ The type of beans provided through the ration is also believed to affect sexual performance and the refugees will swap the beans for other types of beans whenever possible.

⁸⁷ This is a serious concern as it refers not only to cooking time but the quantity of firewood needed to cook the beans.

on specific referral through the national health system. For example, infants who cannot be breastfed by their mothers may be provided with a substitute milk powder and commercial weaning foods. INAS received CSB+ from WFP in 2011 to support this programme, but has not received more since that date.

Capacity development

97. Output 5.1.1 reports the number of people (WFP, government and partner staff) trained on EFSA, emergency nutrition assessment, emergency telecommunications cluster, and emergency response (Table 8, Annex 12). Data from 2012 and 2013 show the PRRO has trained 85 of the planned 100 people. Of this group 21 were national government and partner staff trained in qualitative research skills for an EFSA and in risk mapping; the majority (64) were enumerators trained to collect data for various surveys, including the CP baseline. Among the enumerators, 22 appear to be part of the targeted group (WFP, national government and partner staff) outlined in the logframe, although 18 are not, and the affiliation of 24 people is not stated. While the inclusion of non-targeted persons may slightly inflate outcome figures, the ET believes that the PRRO may also be slightly under-reporting some trained government staff (e.g., contingency and relief planning, or hands-on dispatch and warehouse management) and this would balance out any over-reporting.

98. Interviews with KIs indicate that WFP does indeed develop capacity through actions and training, and that capacity development efforts are well-targeted, responsive to INGC and SETSAN priorities, and are based on specific needs. At the national level, WFP supports annual contingency planning exercises conducted by the INGC, and WFP was credited with playing a significant role in helping the government to develop the last national contingency plan. WFP has also helped to develop the INGC's geographic information system capacity. This includes analytical capabilities to generate maps of affected areas with added layers of physical and socio-economic attributes such as population and infrastructure (population affected, roads, information and community technology infrastructure, markets, warehouses, etc.). KIs based in Maputo state the skills learned have proven effective in the preparation of risk profiles, contingency planning, identification of needs, and relief planning.

99. At the provincial level, according to KIIs, capacity development for the INGC has been "hands-on" rather than via structured trainings. This includes learning better methods for analysing the extent of food insecurity by participating in EFSA or SETSAN follow-up assessments (subsequently discussed), as well as "hands-on" training on planning, dispatch, and warehouse management during emergencies. Qualitative data suggest an untapped opportunity at the provincial level, particularly in Zambezia Province, where the INGC delegate welcomes WFP contributions to improving food security and emergency assessment skills, and digital mapping at the district level.

100. WFP's capacity development efforts are greatly appreciated by members of SETSAN, with whom it has shared tools and methodology expertise for food security assessments, including recent changes that will allow SETSAN to disaggregate data by sex and by rural and urban households. SETSAN leads the VAC to carry out the early post-shock assessments that inform all stakeholders about the extent of food insecurity in disaster-affected regions. SETSAN also conducts assessments to determine the targeting and use of FFA initiatives following GFD distribution, with technical support from WFP. KIIs state that the knowledge gained from WFP training has helped SETSAN to improve the quality of its assessments.

101. WFP also supports capacity development efforts to improve EWS. This includes early warning simulation activities with the INGC in Maputo, as well as the provision of emergency kits for CLGRC, whose training is financed by the UNDP, the Danish International Development Agency, and other stakeholders. Kits carry a price tag of 130,000 metical (US\$4,355)⁸⁸ and include items such as bicycles, stretchers, lanterns, torches, megaphones, whistles, and flags. CLGRC members/staff who have received the kits greatly value the asset and state it strengthens their capacity to warn people of impending emergency, facilitate evacuation, and ultimately reduce the loss of human life.

Achievement of outcomes and objectives

102. This sub-section discusses the extent to which the outputs led to the realisation of PRRO objectives and the medium to longer-term changes in people's lives brought about by PRRO assistance, including gender issues and unintended outcomes. This includes analysis of the factors that contributed to these changes, or hindered success. As mentioned, the M&E system faced serious constraints during the life of the PRRO. It is therefore difficult to attribute the values reported for outcome indicators to PRRO activities, and for reasons described below, impossible to assess planned versus actual outcomes for each objective. Thus, outcome analysis is based on qualitative research carried out during this evaluation mission.

103. Table 9, Annex 12 shows the operation outcomes indicators over the course of the PRRO, as reported by WFP staff in SPR 2013 (SO1) and during the evaluation mission. Table 6 is the ET's analysis of outcome indicators. Reasons for discrepancies between the tables are subsequently described.

Table 6: Summary of PRRO outcome indicators

	Outcomes	Target	2012 Baseline	July 2013^a Gaza response only
SO 1	<i>Outcome 1.1 Improved food consumption over assistance period for targeted emergency-affected households</i>			
	Household Food Consumption Score(FCS)	% of HH with score \geq 21	no valid data	92
SO 3	<i>Outcome 3.1 Adequate food consumption over assistance period for targeted households and communities</i>			
	Household FCS	% of HH with score > 35	no valid data	70
	Coping Strategy Index	Decrease from baseline	no valid data	12
SO 5	<i>Outcome 5.2 Progress made towards nationally owned hunger solutions</i>			
	National Capacity Index	16	10	Not tracked

^c Source: Government of Mozambique and Food Security Cluster. 2013. Emergency Food Security Assessment in Gaza Province.

104. It is very difficult for WFP to accurately report on logframe outcome indicators because the unpredictable nature of shocks complicates standard baseline data collection processes. To attempt to mitigate this challenge (and due to budget constraints that limited data collection exclusive to the PRRO), the CO used the CP baseline, a follow-up CP survey, and the June 2013 EFSA as sources for outcome indicators (CO-reported values in Table 9, Annex 12). This strategy is problematic because the samples for the CP baseline and follow-up study are not statistically representative of populations in the PRRO operational areas: the samples do not

⁸⁸ Based on conversion for June 1, 2014. Accessed June 30, 2014. <http://www.oanda.com/currency/converter/>

include the vast majority of shock-affected districts in the PRRO's three main operational provinces (Gaza, Sofala, and Zambezia),⁸⁹ nor any of the refugee population in Nampula. Additionally, there are noted differences between CP operational areas and PRRO operational areas (e.g., levels of food security during normal times and WFP's longer-term presence in CP districts). In addition to this significant sample design challenge, it is also unclear how the CO calculated the reported baseline values for Outcome 1.1 and 3.1. Data from the CP baseline indicate that in the three districts where there is geographic overlap with the PRRO, 70 percent of the population had an acceptable food consumption score (FCS), not 20 as reported by the CO (Table 9, Annex 12). Mean coping strategy index in the three districts with geographic overlap ranged from 32-38, not 20, as reported by the CO (Table 9, Annex 12). Attempts by the ET to clarify the discrepancies in reported data were unsuccessful. The ET concludes that there are no valid baseline values (2012) for any of the PRRO outcome indicators. Consequently, the evaluability of PRRO outcomes based on indicators is compromised.

105. July 2013 data from the Gaza EFSA, appear to be reliable; however, they represent only the Gaza response (beneficiaries from Zambezia, Sofala, or Maratane refugee camp are not represented), and thus cannot constitute endline indicators for the overall PRRO. Although the CO reports a value of 72 for the Outcome 1.1 FCS indicator (Table 9, Annex 12), based on the CO's own description of how the PRRO calculate this indicator,⁹⁰ using the Gaza EFSA the ET calculates this value to be 92 percent (22 percent borderline plus 70 percent acceptable).⁹¹ The ET presumes that the target is an increase from baseline, although this is not well-articulated in the logframe.

106. M&E staff state that the outcome indicator for SO5, the National Capacity Index (NCI), is not tracked because the government does not provide the necessary data (e.g., the INGC budget). The ET does not doubt that this critical budget information is missing, but also asserts that the consultative, qualitative processes between WFP and government partners (outlined in the NCI methodology as the means to assess quality benchmarks that feed into the index),⁹² are not adequately taking place.

107. **Achievements toward Strategic Objective 1:** SO1 *Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies*⁹³ has played an important role in addressing needs of transiently food insecure people affected by natural disasters such as the Gaza floods in 2013 and refugees registered in Maratane refugee camp.

108. SO1-supported relief and refugee components strongly reflect population needs. The relief component operates in the context of recurrent natural hazards. GFD is used in the immediate aftermath of a sudden-onset emergency (e.g., floods and cyclones) to save lives via food assistance. The exclusion error is found to be minimal.

109. Achieving adequate food consumption was compromised initially by a GFD food ration that amounted to only 50 percent of the recommended requirements of 2100 kcal/person/day. In 2013, the CO recognized that it did not meet minimum requirements and consequently increased the ration to provide 2034 kcal. However, in practise the ET found that the revised planned rations were not distributed in Gaza

⁸⁹ The CP baseline does include three PRRO operational districts (Chibuto, Chokwe, and Xai Xai) in the sample.

⁹⁰ By summing the percentages of households with a borderline (>21 and < 35) FCS and those with acceptable (>35) FCS.

⁹¹ Government of Mozambique and Food Security Cluster. 2013. Emergency Food Security Assessment in Gaza Province. English Executive summary.

⁹² WFP. n.d. Methodology for National Capacity Index.

⁹³ Also described under this PRRO as Outcome 1.1: Improved food consumption over assistance period for targeted emergency-affected households (relief beneficiaries and vulnerable refugees and new arrivals)

and the quantities reportedly received per household were more in line with the non-revised ration of 2012.

110. WFP's support to residents of the Maratane refugee camp, has provided an important lifeline with 100 per cent ration for new arrivals and vulnerable refugees and 50 percent rations for remaining residents. The last nutrition survey of 2012 indicates low levels of GAM. Since then however, there have been problems with frequency of distribution, quantity and quality of food, and food distribution management, including timely submission of output monitoring reports by UNHCR and INAS, which led to a delay in updating food lists and thus to exclusion error.

111. The self-reliance strategy promoted by UNHCR and the Government of Mozambique is observed to operate without many resources. This merits the question as to whether Maratane residents have sufficient access to means of food production or additional income-generating opportunities to complement their 50 percent ration. It should be useful to query if nutritious food is available locally, and to review consumption patterns of refugees, if purchasing nutritious food is a priority.

112. Achievements toward Strategic Objective 3: The ET finds that the early recovery component has attained varied levels of achievement toward SO3, *restore and rebuild lives and livelihoods in post-conflict, post-disaster or transition situations* and the related Outcome 3.1 *Adequate food consumption over assistance period for targeted households and communities*.

113. Early recovery efforts have played an important role in assisting transiently food insecure people to restore their lives and livelihoods. During the first few months of FFA activities in Gaza, the rehabilitation of community assets was sorely needed. Many beneficiaries had recently returned to lowland homesteads from relocation camps. Debris was prevalent and roads were destroyed. Communities needed to carry out labour-intensive low-tech activities as a first step to getting their lives back in order. Additionally, FFA rations were critical and helped beneficiaries to access food in the three to nine months after the shock, when many people report they were still experiencing substantial food deficits.

114. Attaining adequate food consumption was however, compromised by the ubiquitous rotation of FFA benefits among households. While FGD findings show that in most cases beneficiary communities do not view the situation as problematic, as the practise is consistent with cultural norms (subsequently described in Section 2.3), it is likely detrimental to improving food security. WFP and IPs are aware of this challenge and have attempted to sensitize local officials about the importance of using community screening tools to ensure that only those who meet the targeting criteria actually receive benefits.

115. The ET finds that early recovery activities are making only marginal progress toward the portion of SO3 that aims to rebuild lives and livelihoods, and are not building long-term resilience. Using FFA to make quick and necessary repairs to damaged community assets is a prerequisite for rebuilding of livelihoods, but it is not sufficient. A logical sequence of interventions is needed to restore essential infrastructure, particularly that which can reduce future risk to recurrent shocks. The ET found ample opportunity, yet limited linkages, between FFA and national policies and plans that might contribute to "resilience-building" activities. Examples include tree planting and irrigation programs supported by the Ministry of Agriculture, and seed distribution programs or early-maturing varieties promoted by the INGC.

116. To effectively and efficiently rebuild lives and livelihoods, and advance long-term resilience the quality of assets created and repaired must be good and sustainable. This is not true of the majority of assets observed by the ET. As mentioned (paragraph 81), lack of construction materials and tools combined with lack of technical oversight results in poor quality of assets and limited sustainability. Additionally, the capacity of IPs to implement effective FFA programmes does not appear to be clearly assessed by WFP prior to negotiating MoUs for FFA. In the opinion of the ET, despite systems designed to review the strengths and weakness of partners as they relate to project activities,⁹⁴ WFP is not critically analysing partner implementation capacity beyond their history and relationship with WFP related to GFD. Partner responsibilities and expectations regarding FFA activities are not clearly spelled out in MoUs,^{95,96} which tends to limit IP accountability to food distribution alone. Indeed, interviews with partner KIs suggest they view the focus of FFA to be food distribution rather than providing an efficient transition from recovery to development. Some IPs believe they have the capacity to implement more robust activities, but express concern that the budget does not sufficiently support stronger FFA efforts.

117. Achievements toward Strategic Objective 5: The ET finds that the capacity development component makes valuable contributions toward reaching SO5 *strengthen the capacities of countries to reduce hunger, including through hand-over strategies and local purchase* and the related Outcome 5.2 *Progress made towards nationally owned hunger solutions*, despite difficulties in ascertaining that progress observed can be directly attributed to PRRO activities. The lines are somewhat blurred in the analysis of achievement toward SO5, as it is difficult to distinguish PRRO capacity development efforts from those of the CP. The primary targets of both programs are INGC and SETSAN, and PRRO/CP staff are essentially one and the same. It is also difficult for INGC KIs to directly attribute any skills gained by staff to WFP effort, as many United Nations stakeholders assist the agency and there is overlap of capacity building efforts.

118. The attribution challenge aside, WFP's efforts to develop capacity and awareness are credited by KIs with substantially contributing to the most recent national contingency plan, improving food security and emergency assessment skills, and enhancing analytical capacity, all of which indicate progress toward nationally-owned hunger solutions. There is considerable room for improvement however: as noted by numerous KIs, SETSAN capacity has grown, but is reportedly not where it needs to be in order to reliably inform the hunger solutions of national decision makers.

119. One factor that appears to hinder progress toward Outcome 5.2 and SO5 and pose challenges for handover and sustainability is that very few people within SETSAN or INGC are directly exposed to on-the-job technical or managerial training. With so few trained, and no noted plans within the institutions themselves to disseminate the knowledge, new skills are often instilled in people, rather than systems. This severely limits capacity development at the institutional level. High turnover within government agencies exacerbates this challenge.

120. Achievement across all activities: Finally, the PRRO is a critical component of higher-level development and humanitarian programmes pursued by WFP and partners in Mozambique. Since 2012, WFP has continued to build good working

⁹⁴ WFP. n.d. Cooperating Partner Profiling and Rating Tool.

⁹⁵ WFP. 2013. Agreement between the World Food Programme and Samaritan's Purse International Relief regarding the implementation of a WFP assistance program.

⁹⁶ WFP. 2013. Agreement between the World Food Programme and World Vision regarding the implementation of a WFP assistance program.

relationships with multi-level stakeholders with common goals and complementary efforts to save lives and improve food security. WFP is a trusted partner in the United Nations “Delivering as One” initiative and HCT. WFP leads the ICT and Logistics Cluster and co-chairs the FSC together with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). WFP has played a critical role in the logistics (mainly transport, storage and customs clearing) of food and non-food relief items during emergencies for other United Nations agencies and NGOs. In summary, WFP’s efforts under the PRRO have been highly appreciated and keep WFP at the forefront of informing nationally-owned solutions to hunger problems, particularly in context of recurrent natural disasters.

Results: Key findings and conclusions

Outcomes: Relief in the form of food rations saved lives during the aftermath of hazards such as the 2013 Gaza floods. Early recovery rations under FFA were critical and helped beneficiaries to access food in the three to nine months after the shock, when many people report they were still experiencing substantial food deficits. Work carried out under FFA helped populations affected by shocks to restore their physical surroundings, but have made only marginal progress to help households rebuild lives and livelihoods or improve resilience capacities. WFP’s support to residents of the Maratane refugee camp has provided an important lifeline. There are considerable irregularities in terms of food distribution, and issues with quantity, quality, and timeliness of food distributed to refugees.

WFP efforts have contributed to improved national capacity for contingency planning and food security and emergency assessment.

PRRO outcomes cannot be determined using logframe indicators. Validity of baseline data is questionable and the sampling design for all outcome monitoring is not representative of PRRO beneficiaries.

Outputs: Within the relief component, WFP effectively reached planned operational outputs for beneficiaries, but did not reach tonnage targets, particularly under the refugee component. Factors affecting missed targets include lack of donor funds and difficulties in the supply chain and on-site food distribution management. FFA output targets (beneficiaries and tonnage) were surpassed in 2013; 2012 targets were not reached due to insufficient funding.

Rations: Pipeline breaks caused rations distributed under the GFD programme to have a much lower nutritional value than the planned value. There is no monitoring evidence on whether this had a detrimental impact on the affected populations.

Beneficiary satisfaction with GFD and FFA rations in the Gaza response was high. Distributions were considered to be timely and provided for an appropriate duration. Beneficiary satisfaction was not as high in the Zambezia GFD response, with expressed concerns about the timeliness, quality, and duration of distributions, which in some cases were a one-off delivery.

Targeting criteria described in the project design were not applied. GFD often targeted all households in the camps or communities. Community-based targeting for FFA was complicated in practise by rotation among all households regardless of eligibility. Both factors lead to inclusion error. Exclusion error appears to be minimal for GFD operations and for FFA activities in small communities; exclusion error within FFA is potentially significant in larger communities.

Results: key findings continued

Quality of FFA assets: Assets created under FFA are seldom selected through a community process, are of low quality, and are not sustainable.

2.3 Factors Affecting the Results

121. This section addresses the third evaluation question, “Why and how has the operation produced the observed results?” It discusses the main structural internal issues and the external factors that affected the operation’s performance.

Internal factors

122. **Supply chain management** is a key contributing factor to effective and efficient implementation of PRRO activities. Various partners see WFP’s readiness and timely response to emergencies as its strongest asset. Expertise in (local) procurement, logistics, and a can-do mentality were mentioned as keys to WFP’s success. WFP has a strong organizational reputation in Mozambique to respond to emergencies in a timely fashion, with surge capacity available in-country using own national staff from areas not affected by the disaster, and WFP experts from outside the country. This has showed its merit during the Gaza flood response, when WFP was responsible for food distribution during the immediate aftermath without IP support.

123. **Transparency and responsiveness:** According to KIs, the CO is considered transparent and responsive to requests for support, and as such, is well-respected by government at all levels, United Nations partners, and NGOs. These qualities contribute to stakeholders holding the CO in high regard, knowing that WFP can consistently deliver relief assistance under very difficult conditions. The trusted relationship with multi-level stakeholders directly feeds into WFP’s capacity to partner, discussed next.

124. **Capacity to partner:** WFP is a trusted partner in the United Nations’ “Delivering as One” initiative and HCT. WFP leads the ICT and Logistics Cluster and co-chairs the FSC together with FAO. WFP has played a critical role in the logistics (mainly transport, storage, and customs clearing) of food and non-food relief items during emergencies for other United Nations agencies and NGOs. This commitment is greatly appreciated by all partners interviewed by the ET and has contributed to an efficient and effective distribution of emergency relief items.

125. **Resources:** Factors contributing to timely relief response in the context of resource constraints include flexibility in the use of budgets, using stock advances from the CP to assist PRRO operations –and to a lesser extent vice versa. Similarly, the CO has shown initiative for seeking funding opportunities, internally (via IRA) and externally (via CERF), to respond to immediate needs, especially in response to the 2013 Gaza floods. Of note, however, is that as the CP trends toward cash and voucher support, the buffer to borrow and repay food stocks decreases. Consequently, the need to assure donor contributions, a challenging area for the PRRO, is heightened.

126. Despite a fairly well-articulated resource mobilization strategy,⁹⁷ the CO did not manage to mobilize sufficient funding. WFP staff interviewed mentioned this area did not receive enough attention or dedicated (human) resources. Most evidently, the financial resources required to meet the PRRO’s refugee and 2012 early recovery targets were insufficient. This has affected the quantity and quality of the rations distributed and the programme’s coverage capacity, most obvious under the refugee component.

⁹⁷ WFP. 2011. WFP Mozambique Resource Mobilization Strategy 2010/2011. Draft 1.

127. **Staffing:** The PRRO has been critically understaffed for the duration of its operation. In fact, no staff are exclusively devoted to the PRRO: all are part of other projects. Without the necessary human resources in place to balance the workload, it has been difficult to efficiently manage, implement, and monitor operations. This challenge is not unique to the PRRO, as the entire CP also struggles with staffing levels. During the Gaza flooding, staff had to make the CP a second priority, which reportedly affected CP implementation during January and February 2013. Additionally, a critical M&E position was vacant for eight months. The position was partially filled in August 2013 with the arrival of an international VAM/M&E officer. The ET asserts that the eight-month gap with no staff and the competing M&E obligations of the new staff member are key contributors to M&E challenges outlined in paragraphs 129-133.

128. One internal contributing factor to understaffing is high turnover. KIs report Mozambique's booming economy (e.g., the energy sector) has increased the external demand for experienced staff, affecting critical WFP management support roles, such as finance and administration. An important push factor in turnover that is within WFP's control is the short-term duration of contracts. Many long-term staff have been on six-month renewable contracts for years. Senior management is aware of this challenge and is addressing it in the ongoing round of recruitment and contract renewals.

129. **M&E and quality assurance.** WFP staff state that they recognise the need for M&E information to inform management decisions and be accountable for one's actions to government, donors and people affected. The PRRO document alludes to performance monitoring that will pursue: 1) process and output monitoring; and 2) performance monitoring – capturing programme outcomes and impact, and also used to evaluate cost-effectiveness. It states that outcome-level results will use a bi-annual quantitative household survey and qualitative assessment using the improved Community and Household Surveillance (CHS) design.⁹⁸ Currently, PRRO M&E systems implemented by WFP meet very few of these objectives, as discussed below.⁹⁹

130. *Output and process monitoring.* The programme regularly collects data on tonnage and number of beneficiaries reached, which is reported in the SPRs. Although the SPRs for 2012 and 2013 report data disaggregated by sex and age, output monitoring data are rarely disaggregated by sex or age and there is no other evidence that disaggregated data are tracked by the PRRO. Thus the ET is unable to determine the source or validity of SPR values. Process monitoring is completely absent. Elements of process monitoring that are not sufficiently implemented include distribution site monitoring (no ration monitoring) and PDM. This prevents any evidence to be generated on the effectiveness of community targeting and selection of households. Some KIs suggested there were too few WFP food monitors to review the IPs' performance in the field. The absence of process monitoring has not allowed the PRRO to track changes over time or to report on the success of the programme, particularly whether GFD in combination with FFA has protected households against hunger and negative coping strategies. This in turn limits the reporting to external stakeholders, including donors, which KII findings imply have negatively affected the CO's ability to raise funds locally and abroad.

131. *Performance monitoring.* The ET finds the PRRO is not utilizing WFP M&E systems (including the VAM unit) to track results beyond the output level. Little or no

⁹⁸ WFP. 2011. Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation – Mozambique PRRO 200355. Project Design Document.

⁹⁹ It must be noted that WFP only recently (2013) prioritized strengthening M&E capacity in the organization – as evidenced for instance by M&E Officers being stationed in RBs. Consequently, capacity development activities are ongoing.

data are collected on the proposed outcome indicators to provide an evidence base for attributing any changes to food security status (pre- and post-shock) to WFP operations. The M&E team depends primarily on CP surveys or large VAC assessments undertaken by SETSAN and other FSC members to monitor PRRO outcomes. Budget constraints are the primary reason the CO uses CP data, but as detailed in paragraph 104, results of CP surveys are not representative of PRRO implementation areas. SETSAN assessments are highly informative for the government and WFP, but should not replace the independent function of M&E at programme level. For one, the VAC surveys do not focus on the beneficiaries of WFP's interventions, so attribution or even contribution to the PRRO is difficult, if not impossible, to assess. Second, WFP does not have full control over the content and timeframe of government-led surveys, which further undermines their use as a data collection strategy to inform outcome attainment under the PRRO. For instance, in the past two years, SETSAN has cancelled planned assessments due to other survey priorities.

132. At the time of the evaluation, the CO was in the process of analysing data from the improved CHS; however, results were not finalized at the time of this writing, and KII with staff suggest that this survey too, was sampled to represent the CP operational area, rather than the PRRO. The ET wonders why the improved CHS has not been implemented to inform performance of the PRRO as suggested by a technical team that evaluated the CHS in 2011. Lack of funding is the main reason offered by the CO; however, the ET asserts that this challenge goes beyond funding. Beyond the output level, accountability—to WFP, donors, and especially the affected people—is limited. For example, the M&E plan does not include a feedback mechanism, a feature which would accord with a rights-based approach and enhance WFP's ability to learn of stakeholders' and beneficiaries' needs and concerns. Such a mechanism would include, for example, PDM to understand the quantity and quality of food distributed, cultural acceptability of foods, exclusion and inclusion error, and participatory approaches to ensure validation in the design and implementation of FFA initiatives.

133. The ET understands that in the past years, the responsibilities for data collection on output and outcome indicators have been fragmented among different units, which somewhat explains lack of effective oversight. Programme officers were responsible for output monitoring, the VAM unit was responsible for all outcome monitoring, and PDM was the responsibility of the M&E unit, a unit that has not been staffed for more than 18 months. Senior management recognizes the problem and has reorganized the unit so that a VAM officer oversees all M&E efforts (in addition to VAM) and reports directly to the Deputy Country Director. The M&E unit has an equal number of staff as the VAM unit as the need for sufficient M&E capacity has been recognized. Combining these intelligence functions into one unit is justified due to synergies, especially if sufficient resources will be made available for the development of a detailed M&E plan early on, and the execution thereof.

134. Finally, although target indicators are set to project planning figures, reporting a comparison of actual outputs to project planning targets, rather than actual to operational planning figures under-represents achievement, and puts the PRRO at a disadvantage when advocating to donors. The RB reports that other COs have the same challenge and that WFP is in the process of resolving the problem in 2014 through several initiatives including development of two key information systems.¹⁰⁰

¹⁰⁰ Standard Project Reports Intelligent Next Generation and Country Office M&E tool

135. **Synergies and learning.** Limited synergy and learning between technical sectors of the CO and the PRRO has affected the extent to which PRRO activities contribute to rebuilding lives and livelihoods. The CO has staff members with solid expertise on designing FFA activities that build longer-term resilience and link to social protection programs (including cash and voucher modalities); yet these staff were not integrated into the PRRO team, nor even consulted about effective implementation schemes. The ET views this as a significant missed opportunity.

136. While there has been some effort to implement gender trainings, it has not been sufficient to inform program design and implementation. The CO employs a devoted and professional gender lead. Key staff were trained in gender mainstreaming in 2011 and suboffices were trained soon after. Budget limitations have prevented refresher trainings, a critical need considering high turnover. As a result, there is little evidence of learning related to gender mainstreaming on the part of WFP, INGC, or IP staff. This hinders progress by the PRRO toward analysing gender differences, designing services to meet the needs of all, addressing gender-based risk, enhancing women's control of food, and ensuring equal and active participation by men and women in activities.

External factors

137. **Government capacity.** In the past 15-20 years, concerted capacity development efforts by many United Nations partners have led to core capacity inside INGC and SETSAN at the national and provincial levels. INGC is able to coordinate the emergency response, while SETSAN collects intelligence that informs needs for relief and subsequent early recovery programming in Mozambique. As INGC's capacity in emergency response has increased, WFP's own role has become more reactive than proactive. The PRRO as a programme mechanism has proven helpful to INGC collaboration as some working arrangements are in place and can be called upon or scaled up quickly.

138. The capacity of the government to support the Maratane camp operations is low and has affected the quality of PRRO activities. The provision of basic services to refugees is the responsibility of various government ministries with financial support from UNHCR. According to many KIs interviewed, the local district officials are not always ready to provide full services. On inspection, the INAR-managed warehouse was not clean, and spoiled wares were stored there for weeks. INAR has had problems with managing the UNHCR *proGress* database, and reconciliation of stocks with distributed foods for monthly output monitoring reports do not match. If anything, INAR has overstretched as to what it can deliver by taking on responsibilities such as overall camp management, protection, including refugee status determination procedures, registration and documentation of people of concern, water and sanitation, security, shelter, maintenance of camp infrastructure, roads and food distribution.

139. **Government assessments:** Following an emergency, INGC delegates typically conduct an immediate qualitative rapid assessment to estimate the number of people affected. The ET understands that it is important for WFP to respond in a timely fashion to government requests for emergency assistance but WFP should be aware that political efforts to please constituencies may result in overestimations (such as with the 2014 Cabo Delgado response (paragraph 53)). Therefore, WFP should maintain its independence by ensuring that all requests they respond to, are indeed supported by sufficient evidence.

140. **Community roles in distribution:** The roles played by the local authorities, community leaders, and relief committees proved an important asset to distributing large quantities of food during the immediate aftermath of disasters. This includes

relief camp settings (Gaza response), where movements in and out of the camp draw heavily on their capacity to monitor the effectiveness of the distribution.

141. **Cultural norms** have affected WFP's ability to target FFA benefits to the most vulnerable populations. Many community leaders saw greater benefit in rotating monthly food rations among all households rather than narrowly focussing on the most vulnerable households. This illustrates an unintended outcome of community-based targeting: in this case, while community leaders' decisions were honoured, the goal of improving food consumption for the most vulnerable was compromised because households only received one ration instead of the planned six rations.

142. Qualitative interviews reveal two key factors that contribute to the prevalence of rotation. In many cases, authorities want to please their constituency, particularly in election years (2013 was a local election year), and therefore ensure that through rotation everyone in the community receives a portion of the benefit. Additionally, cultural norms that promote sharing benefits equally among the community appear prevalent in Gaza. In smaller communities, the practise of rotation was widely approved of by community members, as all were able to participate in FFA for at least one month. In larger communities, however, beneficiary selection seemed to be the "luck of the draw" and resulted in inclusion and exclusion error: selection practises ranged from "first come first served" to rotating rations based on a listing of quarters (lowest administrative level) beginning with Quarter 1 and ending whenever FFA programming ended. As a result, many quarters in larger communities did not participate in FFA. Vulnerability levels within the populations in these quarters were mixed, including the most vulnerable, elders, PLHIV, and people who were relatively better off.

143. **Donor support:** In 2013, the PRRO was well-funded, which considerably and positively affected the scope of the Gaza response. In contrast, donor resources to support the PRRO in 2012 were less than expected. This primarily affected the early recovery and refugee components and partially explains the underperformance of some of the indicators for these components. Another funding issue affecting PRRO performance is the length of time it takes to receive funds after an initial commitment is received: long delays limit how they can be spent. In the Gaza response for example, by the time some funds for relief were received, the relief component was already complete. In this case, KIs report that donors did not agree to transfer the funding originally allocated to relief to early recovery efforts, purportedly because the donors did not deem proposed early recovery efforts to be sustainable.

Factors affecting results: key findings and conclusions

Operations, logistics, procurement: Effective and efficient supply chain management is the PRRO's strongest asset: it directly resulted in the operation saving lives and improving food security, exceeding planned beneficiary targets, and ensuring that GFD emergency rations were delivered in a timely manner. The CO is considered by key partners as a trusted and responsive partner who will "get the job done"—consistently delivering relief assistance under very difficult conditions.

M&E and quality assurance is the weakest leg of the PRRO, evidenced by limited process, outcome, and performance monitoring. This critical gap negatively affects the ability of the PRRO to attribute any change in food security levels to programme activities, and precludes accountability to beneficiaries, donors, and WFP itself. KIIs with donors indicate that the poor M&E system is an underlying reason that the PRRO has not been adequately funded by some donors.

Factors affecting results: key findings and conclusions, continued

Donor support: Underfunding has compromised achievement of beneficiary targets, particularly in the refugee and FFA components, and led to low staffing levels. Low funding levels have also impacted the ability of the PRRO to provide essential capacity development for staff, such as in gender and M&E.

Staffing: The PRRO has been critically understaffed due to limited funding and high turnover. This factor affects management and implementation, and causes an unwieldy workload for existing staff. Contributing factors within WFP's control include short-term contracts that do not incentivize key staff to stay with the CO.

Gender: There is little evidence of gender mainstreaming, sensitization trainings for staff and partners on gender issues, or operational guidance on key actions to promote gender equality. This factor affects the PRRO's ability to design and implement gender-sensitive programs.

Government capacity: INAR capacity needs strengthening. Low capacity has affected the quality of humanitarian assistance for refugees, resulting in issues with quantity, quality, and timeliness of food distributions.

Cultural norms: a culturally ingrained ethos of sharing undermines WFP's efforts to target rations to the most vulnerable and compromises efforts to improve food consumption.

3 Conclusions and Recommendations

3.1 Overall Assessment

144. This section summarizes the conclusions of the evaluation based on the evaluation criteria: relevance, coherence, and appropriateness; efficiency; effectiveness; impact; sustainability and connectedness; and gender.

Relevance, Coherence and Appropriateness

145. **Relevance to people's needs:** The ET concludes that the PRRO is relevant to the acute food insecurity needs of households affected by recurrent natural disasters in Mozambique and to the needs refugees and asylum seekers in Maratane camp. The CO conducted appropriate context analysis and an evidence-base (e.g., national VAC assessments, EFSA, JAM) supported the analytical work to inform programme design. A close and responsive working relationship with the INGC and other country partners contributed to appropriate geographic targeting for all activities.

146. The PRRO used a transfer modality relevant to population needs for both the relief and early recovery components. Relative to other relief modalities, food rations were a relevant choice given the operating context: relief food rations were desperately needed following the loss of crops and infrastructure damage in Gaza and Zambezia; early recovery rations were needed when shops and markets had not yet been fully restored and local staple prices were still high. In the case of Maratane refugee camp, nutritional assessments in 2012 showing low GAM levels support the conclusion that food rations were relevant. While cash and vouchers may have been appropriate during the extension period of FFA in Gaza and for refugee populations, evidence does not suggest that this modality would have been more appropriate than food rations.

147. In the context of Mozambique's high vulnerability to the effects of climate change and low degree of readiness,^{101,102} WFP's support to INGC and SETSAN is highly relevant to needs and has the potential to be a strong enabler for nationally-owned hunger solutions.

148. Alignment with policy and programme context. The PRRO components are largely coherent with the strategic priorities of WFP at the global and CO levels. Exceptions include the early recovery component, which by design does not provide an efficient transition from recovery to development, as there are few linkages to livelihood strategies, seasonality, or building resilience to future shocks. Additionally, contrary to WFP strategic priorities, the operation is not based on a sound gender analysis.

149. The PRRO aligns well with government, United Nations, and partner strategies and policies. Key examples include the Government of Mozambique's Disaster Management Master Plan for the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Calamities (2006-16), the Mozambique UNDAF (2012-15), and the efforts of the FSC.

150. Overall relevance: In the context of Mozambique, where natural disasters can qualify as project assumptions due to their frequency, the ET finds that the PRRO can be a relevant and flexible programming mechanism that fills a gap between an EMOP and CP. Its value is in linking emergency response to a full DRR/DRM cycle - engaging in prevention and mitigation measures and building people's resilience capacities to withstand shocks. Regarding the latter, the ET deems the PRRO a more suitable tool given that the CP's focus of social protection networks - and addressing chronic food insecurity - would not provide the required flexibility needed.

Efficiency

151. Efficiency of implementation: The ET concludes that within current capacity and operating constraints (limited funding and understaffing), PRRO 200355 is a fairly efficient operation that has been implemented with high levels of dedication and professional skill. The PRRO's immediate response to various shocks (e.g., Gaza and Cabo Delgado flooding) is highly respected by varied stakeholders, including beneficiaries. Ongoing relief and FFA distributions are generally considered timely by beneficiaries affected by disasters, although experiences by affected people outside the main Gaza response include less-timely deliveries. At the same time, UNHCR and INAR have not been able to distribute food to refugees in a timely fashion. Refugees mentioned, and output databases confirm, that whole-month rations were not delivered during 2013. The delays are caused by the lack of donor funds, as well as difficulties in the supply chain and food distribution management on site.

152. Targeting strategy: The PRRO's targeting strategy could be more efficient. While the operation makes good use of available resources, such as technical working groups to assist with district-level vulnerability mapping and local leaders to assist with community-level targeting, community screening tools are not in place to ensure that only those who meet the targeting criteria actually receive benefits. The ET found inclusion error to be common in GFD and FFA operations. The extent of exclusion error could not be determined. The mobility of the economic migrants in and out of the camp, together with the in and out movements for work, make it difficult to monitor the numbers of the "refugee" population individual eligibility for food assistance.

¹⁰¹ As stated earlier, readiness refers to those portions of the economy, governance, and society that affect the speed and efficiency of absorption and implementation of climate adaptation projects.

¹⁰² University of Notre Dame. Mozambique |ND-GAIN Index. Accessed April 1, 2014. <http://index.gain.org/country/mozambique>

153. Changes in efficiency resulting from internal and external factors: Funding and staffing levels are low. The human resources to monitor the relief and early recovery work and to build the capacity of government staff are insufficient. Similarly, WFP M&E systems are weak due to inadequate staffing (see paragraphs 127 and 133) and capacity (see paragraphs 130-132). IPs are not held accountable for providing adequate monitoring support to WFP, as evidenced by the absence of sex-disaggregated data and their own PDM and process monitoring reports – responsibilities outlined in their MoUs.^{103 104}

154. Cost of the operation: The financial resources needed to meet refugee and early recovery targets are insufficient. Cost efficiency could be enhanced through exploring different transfer modalities, such as replacing part of the food basket with vouchers and improving targeting. However, it is important to note that properly designing and implementing these options will require significant resources. WFP will have to consider whether efficiency gains outweigh the costs over the long term.

Effectiveness

155. Generating expected changes in targeted populations: The combined PRRO interventions have largely achieved their output targets for the food assistance activities, but the ET cannot properly assess effectiveness of the effort due to lack of outcome-level data and PDM. This is because the CO relies on CP outcome monitoring data that are not representative of targeted populations under the PRRO. The analysis of effectiveness is based on output data and qualitative data collected for this evaluation.

156. WFP reached planned operational outputs for beneficiaries, but did not reach tonnage targets, particularly under the refugee component. For populations affected by natural hazards, achieving adequate food consumption was initially compromised by a food ration that amounted to only 50 percent of the recommended requirements of 2100 kcal/person/day. In 2013, the CO recognized that it did not meet minimum requirements and has consequently increased the ration to provide 2034 kcal. WFP's support to residents of the Maratane refugee camp provided an important lifeline with 100 percent ration for new arrivals and vulnerable refugees and 50 percent rations for remaining residents. However, there are considerable irregularities in terms of food distribution, namely with quantity, quality, and timeliness of refugees rations.

157. Early recovery output targets (beneficiaries and tonnage) were surpassed in 2013; 2012 targets were not reached due to insufficient funding. FFA rations in 2013 helped beneficiaries to access food in the three to nine months after the shock, when many people who were affected by the Gaza floods reported they were still experiencing substantial food deficits. Attaining adequate food consumption was, however, compromised by the ubiquitous rotation of FFA benefits among households—a practise instituted by local leaders. Moreover, despite the timely monthly deliveries by WFP and IPs, individual households received one month of rations rather than the planned-for six months of rations. Finally, there is not sufficient evidence to claim that FFA rations helped as an income transfer mechanism to prevent sales of assets or other negative coping strategies.

Impact

158. The ET concludes that through the relief component, the PRRO made a significant contribution to SO1 *Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies*. Qualitative

¹⁰³ WFP. 2012. Agreement between WFP and World Vision, regarding the implementation of a WFP assistance programme(Mozambique PRRO 200355).

¹⁰⁴ WFP. 2013. Agreement between WFP and Samaritan's Purse International Relief, regarding the implementation of a WFP assistance programme(Mozambique PRRO 200355).

interviews revealed uniform agreement among stakeholders, including affected people, that food rations saved lives during the aftermath of shocks, such as the flooding in Gaza and Zambezia Provinces. The PRRO also played an important role in addressing the needs of refugees registered in Maratane camp.

“We would have died.”

Focus group response to ET question: would your life be any different if you had not received [WFP] assistance after the floods?

159. The ET concludes that the PRRO contributed to SO3, *restore and rebuild lives and livelihoods in post-conflict, post-disaster or transition situations*; however, there is ample room to make a stronger contribution to this objective. Although early recovery efforts played an important role in assisting transiently food insecure people to restore and clean areas within their communities affected by shocks, FFA activities made minimal progress to help households rebuild lives and livelihoods or improve resilience capacities. Assets created under FFA are not selected through a community process, are of low quality and are not sustainable. The early recovery component currently does not provide an efficient transition from recovery to development, nor any linkages to ongoing safety nets, such as cash and voucher activities implemented by the CP or government-led safety nets.

160. The ET determines that WFP, through PRRO and CP activities made valuable contributions to SO5—*strengthen the capacities of countries to reduce hunger, including through hand-over strategies and local purchase*. Although it is not possible to attribute positive change directly to one programme or the other, representatives from INGC and SETSAN, as well as many other stakeholders praise WFP overall for making a significant contribution to the most recent national contingency plan, greatly improving food security and emergency assessment skills, and enhancing analytical capacity.

161. **The broader effects of the operation.** Finally, the PRRO is a critical component of higher-level development and humanitarian programmes pursued by WFP and partners in Mozambique. Since 2012, WFP has continued to build good working relationships with multi-level stakeholders with common goals and complementary efforts to save lives and improve food security.

162. It would be opportune to see how the PRRO and CP could work in greater complementarity, particularly in areas affected by natural disasters, by using a clear entry and exit strategy for beneficiaries who are transiently or chronically food insecure. This seems to fit the intention expressed in the PRRO’s handover strategy: WFP’s support to the national nutritional and social protection programmes through the CP is expected to strengthen the flexibility and surge capacity of those programmes to address additional needs that may result from localized emergencies.¹⁰⁵ While the uptake of people who have become chronically food insecure as a consequence of recent shock has not taken place, this is clearly an area that WFP cannot address alone: it fits into the broader United Nations support to the Government of Mozambique for establishing national social safety nets and raising primary social services to vulnerable population groups.

Sustainability and Connectedness

163. **Sustainability:** The sustainability of assets created or repaired through FFA activities is inadequate. Lack of physical and financial resources prevents communities from constructing sustainable assets. Field monitors from WFP and IPs reportedly visit FFA activities, but offer no technical oversight. All supervision of work relies on

¹⁰⁵ WFP. 2012. PRRO Project document.

local authorities, with greater focus on whether work is done than the quality of work. Finally, many communities report difficulty maintaining the work after the end of programme, which impacts sustainability of the assets created or repaired: competing, and necessary tasks take priority over maintenance when no food is available as a work incentive.

164. A limitation to the PRRO's progress in capacity development is that very few people within SETSAN or INGC receive training and within the institutions themselves, the ET found no multi-year capacity development plan or knowledge management system to disseminate knowledge shared by WFP. This external factor poses concerns related to effective handover and the sustainability of skills strengthened through WFP's efforts.

165. **Connectedness:** PRRO objectives and operations are well-connected to government and partner strategies. In 2012 the PRRO purchased locally 71 percent of total commodities; in 2013, 51 percent.¹⁰⁶ This commitment strongly aligns to government prioritization of local procurement. The PRRO's short duration of GFD, with a re-evaluation of needs prior to implementing any FFA distribution, supports the government's aim to reduce dependency on handouts for prolonged periods. Capacity development efforts align to the government's Disaster Management Master Plan for the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Calamities (2006-16). The PRRO design aligns very well with the Mozambique UNDAF (2012-15), and there is a strong connection with the strategies of the United Nations HCT and cluster system, particularly the FSC, ICT Cluster, and Logistics Cluster, which are co-led by WFP. The refugee component has shown a relief programme that is linked to a self-reliance strategy implemented by UNHCR together with various ministries. Unfortunately, low funding levels have prevented major income-generating initiatives to be established in recent years.

Gender

166. As noted (paragraph 130), absence of sex-disaggregated beneficiary data limits the evaluability of men and women's equal participation. However qualitative data from various sources, including beneficiaries themselves, indicate women's level of participation in the relief and early recovery components is similar to men's. The few data that were tracked by sex of beneficiary for 2012 and 2013 show that the numbers of male and female beneficiaries are close to equal for GFD and FFA, with more women than men in some cases, and more men than women in other cases. The few sex-disaggregated data available from Maratane camp show that generally, a greater number of men participate compared to women.

167. Beyond being reflected in simple output measures, gender issues were not a cross-cutting theme in the PRRO design. WFP did not prioritize coordinated efforts to mainstream gender equality and sensitivity in programme implementation. Given the long-standing gender inequities that exist in Mozambique, WFP must enhance the M&E system such that it can assess whether any impact from PRRO assistance is similar for women and men. In an example of how the PRRO should integrate gender into design, as the CO considers whether cash and vouchers are appropriate transfer modalities, it is critical that programme design staff gain and apply a deep understanding of power relations between men and women in PRRO operational areas.

¹⁰⁶ WFP. Standard Project Reports. 2012 and 2013.

3.2 Recommendations

168. The following recommendations are developed with a view to promote strategic change. The ET believes the recommendations present plausible options for improvement with sufficient detail to guide their implementation. The recommendations are sequenced in order of priority as to timing of proposed action(s). All recommendations have implications in the short-term, particularly as preparations for a new programme cycle will start by mid-2014. Almost all recommendations have strategic elements that are further developed with operational guidance.

Recommendations for implementation within one year:

169. **R1: Comprehensively address chronic and acute food insecurity by using a resilience lens.** The ET recommends that WFP develop a discussion note on enhancing resilience to food insecurity and malnutrition in an environment of recurrent natural disasters to guide the formulation of the new country strategy. This note should be an expansion on the note produced by the CO outlining the scope of PRRO and CP in Mozambique based on a distinction between chronic and acute food insecurity. This note should show how WFP will strengthen the absorptive and adaptive resilience capacities of households and communities, and the transformative resilience capacities of national institutions. The ET recommends that the Government of Mozambique and UNCT and HCT members be included in the formulation and review process. The resulting Country Strategy must outline specific processes to scale up CP efforts, such that the CP can absorb PRRO beneficiaries who are unable to recover during the PRRO operation, and address new cases of chronic food insecurity (through social protection) and malnutrition (through a TSF modality, including PLHIV) resulting from local emergencies. The strategy should also show linkages between PRRO and CP regarding the flexible use of financial and human resources.

170. **R2: Maintain the PRRO as a programming mechanism in the context of recurrent natural disasters in Mozambique.** The ET recommends that the PRRO be maintained in the CO portfolio because it is a valid programming mechanism in the context of recurrent natural disasters. A new PRRO should focus on the full DRR/ DRM cycle of prevention, mitigation, preparedness and response to shocks and trends such as flooding, cyclones and drought. A new PRRO should calculate separate planning figures to respond to drought-affected areas and reserve an annual budget to implement this response (which may require separate fundraising). This will provide the PRRO with another stream of regular activities that directly addresses need (owing to the compounding negative impact of flooding followed by drought); potentially promotes a consistent funding stream; and should enhance operability throughout the year, which would allow the CO to hire staff who are exclusively devoted to the PRRO.

171. **R3: Enhance PRRO M&E system.** WFP must strengthen and use its own M&E systems (including the VAM unit) to monitor the PRRO's performance and consider using the CHS (recently improved and used to monitor the CP) in a scaled-down form as the basis for outcome monitoring and reporting. WFP should consider regular internal reviews or joint real-time evaluations of large operations, such as the Gaza flood response, for performance reviews of selected implementation modalities; these would be done in close collaboration with partners, namely the government, non-government partners and affected people. WFP should increase the number of M&E and VAM staff—the latter responsible for the data collection and analysis—during relief and early recovery operations. The PRRO should use operational planning figures to reflect true output achievements in specific operations. Finally, WFP must hold IPs accountable

for providing sex-disaggregated output data so that the PRRO is able to measure men's and women's participation in activities.

172. R4: WFP must ensure that monitoring data are representative of PRRO beneficiaries. To ensure the representativeness of data, refugee assistance should be measured separately from assistance to communities impacted by natural shocks (Outcome SO1.1 in the 2014 logframe). In collaboration with UNHCR, the PRRO should draw a representative sample within Maratane camp to collect baseline data within a few months of beginning a new PRRO. The identical sampling strategy should be used to collect endline data. To measure change as a result of GFD and FFA to shock-affected communities, several options are available. Most importantly, and applicable to all options, is that the PRRO separately measure the effectiveness of each emergency response, rather than continue the current method of aggregating different geographic areas that have been impacted by very different levels of shock and that experience very different levels of food security in normal times. Space limitations preclude detailing these measurement options in the main report; however, the ET offers detailed information in Annex 14.

173. R5: Enhance strategic linkages and implementation of FFA activities. The ET agrees with CO technical staff that it is critical that the PRRO emphasise the linkages between social protection and DRR plans when designing post-shock FFA activities. Specific linkages include those between FFA projects and national resilience-building plans, such as tree planting and irrigation programs supported by the Ministry of Agriculture, and linkages to social protection schemes implemented by the CP, the government, or other stakeholders. FFA activities to restore livelihoods could be enhanced through advocacy to and enhanced coordination with “Delivering as One” partners, such as FAO, to promote early-maturing crop varieties, in line with INGC favoured DRR strategy. Operationally, the PRRO should place greater focus on FFA as a mechanism to build community assets that help prevent, protect, and mitigate vulnerable population's sensitivity to recurrent floods, strong winds, and drought. Once debris is cleared after emergencies, activities must contribute to DRR, resilience-building and the promotion of self-reliance for poor communities. The PRRO must ensure that communities select FFA projects using participatory approaches and that gender considerations are taken into account. The capacity of IPs to implement effective FFA projects must be clearly assessed prior to negotiating an MOU—reliable logistics and capacity to implement GFD following an emergency do not necessarily equate to the capacity to implement quality FFA projects. Additionally, FFA projects must be more closely monitored by WFP and IP staff.

174. R6: Increase effectiveness and efficiency of support to refugees. WFP should engage UNHCR and INAR more actively, addressing the weaknesses observed in the food distribution management cycle in Maratane refugee camp through capacity development. Specifically, WFP and UNHCR should conduct a nutritional survey and JAM before the end of 2014 to assess food security status of Maratane camp residents. They may also look at coverage of health and nutrition services to assess if and how malnutrition treatment services are being accessed, and how service delivery can be enhanced, conducting coverage surveys with appropriate methodologies such as SQUEAC or SLEAC. Any assessment should look at both children and adults (women) and also look at food consumption and infant young child feeding practices. WFP should increase its staff capacity in Maratane camp, assess strategic needs regarding food distribution management, and – together with UNHCR and INAR – create a capacity development strategy that targets a handover of responsibilities to the

Government of Mozambique in two to three years' time. The ET recommends that WFP assist UNHCR in securing support from food security cluster members to provide livelihood support activities to refugees to supplement food rations. The ET encourages WFP to complete its cash and voucher review, and if findings warrant this modality, to implement it as soon as possible.

Recommendations for implementation within one to two years:

175. R7: Strengthen WFP's human rights-based and gender-sensitive approaches to programming. The ET recommends that WFP strengthen its capacity in rights-based approach - recognizing human beings as right-holders and establishing obligations for duty bearers, with concerted focus on discriminated and marginalized groups. The ET recommends that WFP conduct training in rights-based approaches for the CO, suboffices, and INGC staff. WFP should use gender analysis and participatory approaches to inform equity-based and gender-sensitive programming for the next PRRO. This requires sensitization of staff and engagement with target communities about the validity of developed program approaches and activities. WFP should also introduce feedback mechanisms such as hotlines where affected people can call in via mobile phone; calls can be plotted on a map in real-time so that complaints can be mapped, monitored and addressed.

176. R8: Improve internal strategic and operational capacities for resource mobilization, information exchange, documentation, and organizational learning. The CO should recruit dedicated communications and advocacy staff to fill the current identified gap in human resources and develop a corresponding resource mobilization strategy for the general public and donors. Frequent, transparent engagement with donors is needed to improve the PRRO's resource base, and ensure that WFP Mozambique is viewed as a CO with competent staff and solutions to comprehensively address the negative effects of recurrent natural disasters and climate change. WFP is encouraged to pursue this strategy in close collaboration with the "Delivering as One" United Nations team in Mozambique as well as the RB in Johannesburg.

177. R9: Design an overall strategy and plan for PRRO capacity development activities. This strategy and plan should include a clear vision for institutional strengthening within the INGC and SETSAN and be supported by a systematic assessment of capacity-building needs at all levels. The progress indicators should focus on the outcome level and be consistent with corporate indicators to measure institutional performance. The strategy should contain a commitment to monitor the indicators on a regular basis so that the results are available for programme management.

Annexes

Annex 1: Terms of Reference



EVALUATION QUALITY ASSURANCE SYSTEM

Office Of Evaluation

Measuring Results, Sharing Lessons

[FINAL, 18 FEBRUARY 2014]

TERMS OF REFERENCE

OPERATION EVALUATION

MOZAMBIQUE PROTRACTED RELIEF AND RECOVERY OPERATION 200355 “ASSISTANCE TO VULNERABLE GROUPS AND DISASTER AFFECTED POPULATIONS IN MOZAMBIQUE”

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Introduction	2
2. Reasons for the Evaluation	2
2.1. Rationale.....	2
2.2. Objectives.....	2
2.3. Stakeholders and Users	3
3. Subject of the Evaluation.....	4
4. Evaluation Approach	7
4.1. Scope	7
4.2. Evaluation Questions.....	7
4.3. Evaluability Assessment	8
4.4. Methodology.....	8
4.5. Quality Assurance.....	9
5. Phases and deliverables	9
6. Organization of the Evaluation	11
6.1 Outsourced approach.....	11
6.2 Evaluation Management.....	11
6.3 Evaluation Conduct	12
7. Roles and Responsibilities of WFP Stakeholders	12
8. Communication and budget	14
8.1. Communication	14
8.2. Budget.....	14
Annex 1: Map	15
Acronyms	16

1. Introduction

1. These Terms of Reference (TOR) are for the evaluation of the Mozambique protracted relief and recovery operation (PRRO) 200355 “Assistance to Vulnerable Groups and Disaster Affected Populations in Mozambique”. This evaluation is commissioned by the WFP Office of Evaluation (OEV) and will take place from March to July 2014. In line with WFP’s outsourced approach for operations evaluations (OpEvs), the evaluation will be managed and conducted by an external evaluation company amongst those having a long-term agreement with WFP for operations evaluations.
2. These TOR were prepared by the OEV focal point based on an initial document review and consultation with stakeholders and following a standard template. The purpose of the TOR is twofold: 1) to provide key information to the company selected for the evaluation and to guide the company’s Evaluation Manager and Team throughout the evaluation process; and 2) to provide key information to stakeholders about the proposed evaluation.
3. The TOR will be finalised based on comments received on the draft version and on the agreement reached with the selected company. The evaluation shall be conducted in conformity with the TOR.

2. Reasons for the Evaluation

2.1. Rationale

4. In the context of renewed corporate emphasis on providing evidence and accountability for results, WFP has committed to increase evaluation coverage of operations and mandated OEV to commission 12 Operations Evaluations (OpEvs) in 2013; 24 in 2014 and up to 30 in 2015.
5. Operations to be evaluated are selected based on utility and risk criteria.¹⁰⁷ From a shortlist of operations meeting these criteria prepared by OEV, the Regional Bureau (RB) has selected, in consultation with the Country Office (CO), the Mozambique PRRO 200355 “Assistance to Vulnerable Groups and Disaster Affected Populations in Mozambique for an independent evaluation. In particular, the evaluation has been timed to ensure that findings can feed into future decisions on programme and design.

2.2 Objectives

6. This evaluation serves the dual and mutually reinforcing objectives of accountability and learning:
 - **Accountability** – The evaluation will assess and report on the performance and results of the operation. A management response to the evaluation recommendations will be prepared.
 - **Learning** – The evaluation will determine the reasons why certain results occurred or not to draw lessons, derive good practices and pointers for learning. It will provide evidence-based findings to inform operational and strategic decision-making. Findings will be actively disseminated and lessons will be incorporated into relevant lesson sharing systems.

2.3 Stakeholders and Users

¹⁰⁷ The utility criteria looked both at the timeliness of the evaluation given the operation’s cycle and the coverage of recent/planned evaluations. The risk criteria was based on a classification and risk ranking of WFP COs taking into consideration a wide range of risk factors, including operational and external factors as well as COs’ internal control self-assessments.

7. **Stakeholders.** A number of stakeholders both inside and outside of WFP have interests in the results of the evaluation and many of these will be asked to play a role in the evaluation process. Table one below provides a preliminary stakeholders' analysis, which will be deepened by the evaluation team in the inception package.

Table 1: Preliminary stakeholders' analysis

Stakeholders	Interest in the evaluation
INTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS	
Country Office (CO)	Responsible for the country level planning and operations implementation, the CO is the primary stakeholder of this evaluation. It has a direct stake in the evaluation and an interest in learning from experience to inform decision-making. It is also called upon to account internally as well as to its beneficiaries, partners for the performance and results of its operation.
Regional Bureau (RB) based in Johannesburg	Responsible for both oversight of COs and technical guidance and support, the RB management has an interest in an independent account of the operational performance as well as in learning from the evaluation findings to apply this learning to other country offices.
Office of Evaluation (OEV)	OEV is responsible for commissioning OpEvs over 2013-2015. As these evaluations follow a new outsourced approach, OEV has a stake in ensuring that this approach is effective in delivering quality, useful and credible evaluations.
WFP Executive Board (EB)	The WFP governing body has an interest in being informed about the effectiveness of WFP operations. This evaluation will not be presented to the EB but its findings will feed into an annual synthesis of all OpEvs, which will be presented to the EB at its November session.
EXTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS	
Beneficiaries	As the ultimate recipients of food assistance, beneficiaries have a stake in WFP determining whether its assistance is appropriate and effective. As such, the level of participation in the evaluation of women, men, boys and girls from different groups will be determined and their respective perspectives will be sought.
Government	The Government has a direct interest in knowing whether WFP activities in the country are aligned with its priorities, harmonised with the action of other partners and meet the expected results. Issues related to capacity development, handover and sustainability will be of particular interest. Various Ministries are partners in the design and implementation of WFP activities.
UN Country team	The UNCT's harmonized action under the "Delivering as One" initiative in Mozambique and the 2012-2015 United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) should contribute to the realisation of the government developmental objectives. It has therefore an interest in ensuring that WFP operation is effective in contributing to the UN concerted efforts. Various agencies are also direct partners of WFP at policy and activity level.
NGOs	NGOs are WFP's partners for the implementation of some activities while at the same time having their own interventions. The results of the evaluation might affect future implementation modalities, strategic orientations and partnerships.
Donors	WFP operations are voluntarily funded by a number of donors. They have an interest in knowing whether their funds have been spent efficiently and if WFP's work has been effective and contributed to their own strategies and programmes.

8. **Users.** The primary users of this evaluation will be:

- The CO and its partners in decision-making related notably to programme implementation and/or design, country strategy and partnerships.
- Given RB's core functions of strategic guidance, programme support and oversight, the RB is also expected to use the evaluation findings as well as the office responsible for

- support to RBs under the Chief Operating Officer.
- OEV will use the evaluation findings to feed into an annual synthesis report of all OpEvs and will reflect upon the evaluation process to refine its OpEv approach, as required.

3. Subject of the Evaluation

9. Despite having made some impressive strides forward in recent years, Mozambique remains one of the poorest countries in the world, ranking 185th out of 187 countries in the 2012 Human Development Index. A quarter of the population suffer from acute food insecurity at least once a year. Among African countries, Mozambique is the third most affected by weather-related hazards such as drought, floods and cyclones, which regularly cause major damage, disrupt economic growth and exacerbate food insecurity.
10. WFP’s interventions in Mozambique are embedded in the “Delivering as One” initiative and in the 2012-2015 UNDAF. As such, they are fully aligned with national government priorities. PRRO 200355 was launched in March 2012 for a 34-month duration to support populations that become transiently food-insecure as a result of recurrent seasonal shocks. Emergency and early recovery activities target disaster-affected households, as well as refugees and asylum seekers. WFP also aims to strengthen the capacity of the Government to mount emergency responses when shocks occur, by building emergency preparedness and response capacity at provincial and district levels. WFP implements other operations in Mozambique, including a country programme (2012-2015), through which WFP supports the Government to address the needs of chronically food-insecure populations by strengthening social safety net systems, developing capacity in disaster risk reduction, and supporting national nutritional strategies and school feeding. WFP has also been recently implementing various special operations providing logistics augmentation and coordination support to the humanitarian community's response to various natural disasters. Finally, under a bilateral operation (BIL 200554), WFP provides procurement and logistics services as well as capacity development support to the Nutrition Rehabilitation Programme (PRN) established by the Government of Mozambique.
11. The project document including the project logframe, related amendments (Budget revisions) and the latest resource situation are available by clicking [here](#).¹⁰⁸ The key characteristics of the operation are outlined in table two below:


Table 2: Key characteristics of the operation

Approval Duration	The operation was approved by the Executive Director in March 2012	
	Initial: 34 months (March 2012 – December 2014)	Revised: N/A
Amendments	There have been two amendments to the initial project document. Budget revision (BR) 1, approved in December 2012, resulted in a budget increase of US\$563,000. It adjusted upwards the external transport and landside, transport, storage and handling (LTSH) costs. A second BR was technical in nature and did not affect the budget. A third BR is currently under preparation.	
Planned	Initial:	Revised:


¹⁰⁸ From WFP.org – Countries – Mozambique – Operations.

beneficiaries	253,000 (yearly maximum)	N/A
Planned food requirements	<u>Initial:</u> In-kind food: 35,921 t of food commodities	<u>Revised:</u> In-kind food: N/A Cash and vouchers: N/A

Planned % of beneficiaries by



Planned % of food requirements by



Main Partners	Government: Technical Secretariat for Food and Nutrition Security (SETSAN), National Disaster Management Institute (INGC), National Institute for Refugee Assistance (INAR).	United Nations agencies: FAO, UNAIDS, UNDP, UN-Habitat, UNHCR, UNICEF, UN Women, WHO	NGOs: International NGOs: CARE, Concern Worldwide, COSACA (consortium), Samaritan's Purse International Relief (SPIR), Save the Children Fund (SCF), World Vision. National NGOs: various.
		Others:	
US\$ requirements	Initial: US\$29.6 million	Revised: US\$30.1 million	
Contribution level (by 27 Jan 2014)	The operation received US\$14.2 million, i.e. 47% of the total project requirements.		
Top five donors (by 27 Jan 2014)	Multilateral Funds (32% of total contributions); USA (24%); Germany (12%); UN CERF (11%) and Canada (7%)		

12. Table three below summarizes the operation's specific objectives and corresponding activities:

Table 3: Objectives and activities

	Corporate Strategic objectives*	Operation specific objectives	Activities
MDG 1 and 7, UNDAF Economic Area Outcome 3	Strategic Objective 1	Outcome 1: Improved food consumption over assistance period for targeted emergency- affected households	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> General food distributions Assistance to vulnerable refugees/newly arrived asylum seekers
	Strategic Objective 3	Outcome 3.1: Adequate food consumption over assistance period for targeted households and communities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Food for work Assistance to long-term refugees
	Strategic Objective 5	Outcome 5.2: Progress made towards nationally-owned hunger solutions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Capacity development in emergency preparedness and response

* The CO will realign the logframe with the new Strategic Plan (2014-2018) and new Strategic Results Framework for the year 2014. However, given that this evaluation will cover the period 2012-2013, reference is made to the Strategic Plan (2008-2013)

4. Evaluation Approach

4.1 Scope

13. **Scope.** The evaluation will cover PRRO 200355 including all activities and processes related to its formulation, implementation, resourcing, monitoring, evaluation and reporting relevant to answer the evaluation questions. The period covered by this evaluation is end-2011 – end 2013, which captures the time from the development of the operation until the start of the evaluation.
14. The refugee component represents a small part of the operation; issues around the design and implementation of this component have been discussed at length with UNHCR and the Government. Hence, it should not be the main focus of this evaluation.

4.2 Evaluation Questions

15. The evaluation will address the following three questions:

Question 1: How appropriate is the operation? Areas for analysis will include the extent to which:

- a) the operation design is appropriate given the objectives of the intervention (of providing life-saving support in case of unpredictable shocks) and other WFP operations being implemented in parallel;
- b) the objectives, targeting, choice of activities and of transfer modalities:
 - Are appropriate to the needs of the food insecure population, including the distinct needs of women, men, boys and girls from different groups, as applicable.
 - Are coherent with relevant stated national policies, including sector policies and strategies and seek complementarity with the interventions of relevant humanitarian and development partners as well as with other CO interventions in the country.
 - Are coherent with WFP strategies, policies and normative guidance.
 - Relevance of the recovery component.

Question 2: What are the results of the operation? While ensuring that differences in benefits between women, men, boys and girls from different groups are considered, the evaluation will analyse:

- the level of attainment of the planned outputs including the number of beneficiaries served disaggregated by women, girls, men and boys;
- the extent to which the outputs led to the realisation of the operation objectives as well as to unintended effects highlighting, as applicable, differences for different groups, including women, girls, men and boys;
- how different activities of the operation dovetail and are synergetic with other WFP operations (in particular the country programme) and with what other actors are doing to contribute to the overriding WFP objective in the country.¹⁰⁹
- The efficiency of the operation and the likelihood that the benefits will continue

¹⁰⁹ FFA and capacity development activities have been implemented under both the CP and PRRO. The evaluation should assess potential complementarities or duplications between those interventions and identify ways to enhance synergies between them.

after the end of the operation, notably of the recovery component;

•
Question 3: Why and how has the operation produced the observed results? The evaluation should generate insights into the main internal and external factors that caused the observed changes and affected how results were achieved. The inquiry is likely to focus, amongst others, on:

- Internally (factors within WFP's control): the processes, systems and tools in place to support the operation design, implementation, monitoring/evaluation and reporting; the governance structure and institutional arrangements (including issues related to staffing, capacity and technical backstopping from RB/HQ); the partnership and coordination arrangements; etc.
- Externally (factors outside WFP's control): the external operating environment; the funding climate; external incentives and pressures; etc.

Based on efficiency and effectiveness considerations, the evaluation should formulate recommendations that will help inform decisions on the most appropriate design for relief and early recovery assistance to communities affected by recurrent natural disasters in Mozambique.

4.3 Evaluability Assessment

16. Evaluability is the extent to which an activity or a programme can be evaluated in a reliable and credible fashion. The below provides a preliminary evaluability assessment, which will be deepened by the evaluation team in the inception package. The team will notably critically assess data availability and take evaluability limitations into consideration in its choice of evaluation methods. In doing so, the team will also critically review the evaluability of the gender aspects of the operation, identify related challenges and mitigation measures.
17. In answering question one, the team will be able to rely on assessment reports, minutes from the project review committee, the project document and logframe, evaluations or reviews of past operations, as well as documents related to government and interventions from other actors. In addition, the team will review relevant WFP strategies, policies and normative guidance.
18. For question two the operation has been designed in line with the corporate results framework (SRF) and selected outputs, outcomes and targets are recorded in the logframe. Monitoring reports as well as annual standard project reports (SPRs) detail achievement of outputs and outcomes thus making them evaluable against the stated objectives.
19. However, answering question two is likely to pose some challenges owing in part to: i) the absence of baseline data for the activities, which will need to be reconstructed using findings from various assessment reports and ii) data gaps in relation to efficiency.¹¹⁰

¹¹⁰ No baseline data was collected prior to the start of the operation given that the targeted areas are identified only when an emergency occurs. However, two consecutive emergency food security assessments (EFSAs) were conducted in February 2013 and May/June 2013 following the floods and may allow the team to measure the results of the relief intervention. In addition, the results from a national annual

20. For question three, the team members will have access to some institutional planning documents and is likely to elicit further information from key informant interviews.
21. Other evaluability challenges include limited access due to insecurity as well as language issues.

4.4 Methodology

22. The methodology will be designed by the evaluation team during the inception phase. It should:
 - Employ relevant internationally agreed evaluation criteria including those of relevance, coherence (internal and external), coverage, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, sustainability (or connectedness for emergency operations);
 - Use applicable standards (e.g. SPHERE standards);
 - Demonstrate impartiality and lack of biases by relying on a cross-section of information sources (e.g. stakeholder groups, including beneficiaries, etc.) and using mixed methods (e.g. quantitative, qualitative, participatory) to ensure triangulation of information through a variety of means. In particular, the sampling technique to select field visit sites will need to demonstrate impartiality and participatory methods will be emphasised with the main stakeholders, including the CO.
 - Be geared towards addressing the key evaluation questions taking into account the evaluability challenges, the budget and timing constraints;
 - Be based on an analysis of the logic model of the operation and on a thorough stakeholders analysis;
 - ensure through the use of mixed methods that women, girls, men and boys from different stakeholder groups participate and that their different voices are heard and used; and
 - Be synthesised in an evaluation matrix, which should be used as the key organizing tool for the evaluation.

4.5 Quality Assurance

23. OEV's Evaluation Quality Assurance System (EQAS) defines the quality standards expected from this evaluation and sets out processes with in-built steps for quality assurance, templates for evaluation products and checklists for the review thereof. It is based on the UNEG norms and standards and good practice of the international evaluation community (DAC and ALNAP) and aims to ensure that the evaluation process and products conform to best practice and meet OEV's quality standards. EQAS does not interfere with the views and independence of the evaluation team.
24. At the start of the evaluation, OEV will orient the evaluation manager on EQAS and share related documents. EQAS should be systematically applied to this evaluation and the evaluation manager will be responsible to ensure that the evaluation progresses in line with its process steps and to conduct a rigorous quality control of

vulnerability analysis conducted in November 2013 should be available in March 2014. Three Joint Assessment Missions (JAM) focussing on the refugees have been carried out in collaboration with UNHCR in 2006, 2008 and 2011.

the evaluation products ahead of their submission to WFP. OEV will also share an Orientation Guide on WFP and its operations, which provides an overview of the organization.

25. The evaluation company is ultimately responsible for the quality of the evaluation products. If the expected standards are not met, the evaluation company will, at its own expense, make the necessary amendments to bring the evaluation products to the required quality level.
26. OEV will also subject the evaluation report to an external post-hoc quality assurance review to report independently on the quality, credibility and utility of the evaluation in line with evaluation norms and standards.

5. Phases and deliverables

27. Table four below highlights the main activities of the evaluation, which will unfold in five phases.

Table 4: Activities, deliverables and timeline by evaluation phase

Entity responsible	Activities	Key dates
PHASE 1 – PREPARATION		January-March
OEV	Desk review, consultation and preparation of TOR	January
CO / RB	Stakeholders comments on TOR	31 Jan – 7 Feb
OEV	❖ Final TOR	18 February
OEV	Evaluation company selection and contracting	10 Feb-7 March
PHASE 2 – INCEPTION		March/April
OEV	Management hand-over to the EM (including briefing on EQAS, expectations and requirements for the evaluation).	17-21 March
EM	Evaluation team briefing on EQAS, expectations and requirements for the evaluation.	
ET	Desk review, initial consultation with the CO/RB, drafting of the Inception Package (including methodology and evaluation mission planning)	24 March -4 April
EM	Quality Assurance of the Inception Package	4-11 April
EM	Final Inception Package	13 April
PHASE 3 – EVALUATION MISSION		May
CO	Preparation of the evaluation mission (including setting up meetings, arranging field visits, etc)	
ET	Introductory briefing	5 May
ET	Interviews with key internal and external stakeholders, project site visits, etc	5-23 May
ET	Exit debriefing / workshop	26 May
ET	❖ Aide memoire	26 May
PHASE 4 – REPORTING		May/June/July
ET	Evaluation Report drafting	27 May –23 June
EM	Quality Assurance of draft Evaluation Report	24-30 June
EM	❖ Draft Evaluation Report	30 June
CO/RB/OEV	Stakeholders comments on Evaluation Report	30 June-14 July

EM	❖ Final Evaluation Report + comments matrix	28 July
	PHASE 5 – FOLLOW-UP	TBC
RB	Coordination of the preparation of the Management Response	
	❖ Management Response	
OEV	Post-hoc Quality Assurance	
OEV	Publication of findings and integration of findings into OEV's lessons learning tools.	
OEV	Preparation of annual synthesis of operations evaluations.	

28. **Deliverables.** The evaluation company will be responsible for producing as per the timeline presented in table 4 above the following deliverables in line with the EQAS guidance and following the required templates:

- **Inception package (IP)** – This package focuses on methodological and planning aspects and will be considered the operational plan of the evaluation. It will present a preliminary analysis of the context and of the operation and present the evaluation methodology articulated around a deepened evaluability and stakeholders' analysis; an evaluation matrix; and the sampling technique and data collection tools. It will also present the division of tasks amongst team members as well as a detailed timeline for stakeholders' consultation.
- **Aide memoire** – This document (powerpoint presentation) will present the initial analysis from the data stemming from the desk review and evaluation mission and will support the exit- debriefing at the end of the evaluation phase.
- **Evaluation report (ER)** – The evaluation report will present the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation. Findings should be evidence-based and relevant to the evaluation questions. Data will be disaggregated by sex and the evaluation findings and conclusions will highlight differences in performance and results of the operation for different beneficiary groups as appropriate. There should be a logical flow from findings to conclusions and from conclusions to recommendations. Recommendations will be provided on what changes can be made to enhance the achievements of objectives. Recommendations will be limited in number, actionable and targeted to the relevant users. These will form the basis of the WFP management response to the evaluation.

29. These deliverables will be drafted in English.

30. The evaluation TOR, report and management response will be public and posted on the WFP External Website (wfp.org/evaluation). The other evaluation products will be kept internal.

6. Organization of the Evaluation

6.1 Outsourced approach

31. Under the outsourced approach to OpEvs, the evaluation is commissioned by OEV but will be managed and conducted by an external evaluation company having a long-term agreement (LTA) with WFP for operations evaluation services.

32. The company will provide an evaluation manager (EM) and an independent evaluation team (ET) in line with the LTA. To ensure a rigorous review of evaluation deliverables, the evaluation manager should in no circumstances be part of the evaluation team.

33. The company, the evaluation manager and the evaluation team members will not have

been involved in the design, implementation or M&E of the operation nor have other conflicts of interest or bias on the subject. They will act impartially and respect the [code of conduct of the profession](#).

34. Given the evaluation learning objective, the evaluation manager and team will promote stakeholders' participation throughout the evaluation process. Yet, to safeguard the independence of the evaluation, WFP staff will not be part of the evaluation team or participate in meetings with external stakeholders if the evaluation team deems that their presence could bias the responses.

6.2 Evaluation Management

35. The evaluation will be managed by the company's Evaluation Manager for OpEvs (as per LTA). The EM will be responsible to manage within the given budget the evaluation process in line with EQAS and the expectations spelt out in these TOR and to deliver timely evaluation products meeting the OEV standards. In particular, the EM will:

- Mobilise and hire the evaluation team and provide administrative backstopping (contracts, visas, travel arrangements, consultants' payments, invoices to WFP, etc).
- Act as the main interlocutor between WFP stakeholders and the ET throughout the evaluation and generally facilitate communication and promote stakeholders' participation throughout the evaluation process.
- Support the evaluation team by orienting members on WFP, EQAS and the evaluation requirements; providing them with relevant documentation and generally advising on all aspects of the evaluation to ensure that the evaluation team is able to conduct its work.
- Ensure that the evaluation proceeds in line with EQAS, the norms and standards and code of conduct of the profession and that quality standards and deadlines are met.
- Ensure that a rigorous and objective quality check of all evaluation products is conducted ahead of submission to WFP. This quality check will be documented and an assessment of the extent to which quality standards are met will be provided to WFP.
- Provide feedback on the evaluation process as part of an evaluation feedback e-survey.

6.3 Evaluation Conduct

36. The evaluation team will conduct the evaluation under the direction of the evaluation manager. The team will be hired by the company following agreement with OEV on its composition.

37. **Team composition.** The evaluation team is expected to include two to three members, including the team leader and one or two international or national evaluator(s). It should include women and men of mixed cultural backgrounds and nationals of the country.

38. The estimated number of days is expected to be in the range of 45-55 for the team leader; 25-40 for the evaluators.

39. **Team competencies.** The team will be multi-disciplinary and include members who together include an appropriate balance of expertise and practical knowledge in:

- Emergency preparedness and response (specifically for food assistance interventions);
- Food for Assets interventions in the context of resilience building;
- Institutional capacity development in Disaster Risk Reduction and Emergency preparedness;
- Robust knowledge of WFP; and
- Gender expertise / good knowledge of gender issues.

40. All team members should have strong analytical and communication skills; evaluation experience and familiarity with the country or region.
41. The team leader should speak fluently and write in English and Portuguese (to work in the field and be able to read/understand all the documentation and write the evaluation report), while local consultants may speak only Portuguese, plus additional local languages if required.
42. **The Team leader** will have technical expertise in one of the technical areas listed above as well as expertise in designing methodology and data collection tools and demonstrated experience in leading similar evaluations. She/he will also have leadership and communication skills, including a track record of excellent English and Portuguese writing and presentation skills.
43. Her/his primary responsibilities will be: i) defining the evaluation approach and methodology; ii) guiding and managing the team during the evaluation process; iii) leading the evaluation mission and representing the evaluation team in meetings with stakeholders; iv) drafting and revising, as required, the inception package, aide memoire and evaluation report in line with EQAS; and v) provide feedback to OEV on the evaluation process as part of a 360 assessment of the evaluation.
44. **The team members** will bring together a complementary combination of the technical expertise required and have a track record of written work on similar assignments.
45. Team members will: i) contribute to the design of the evaluation methodology in their area of expertise based on a document review; ii) conduct field work; iii) participate in team meetings and meetings with stakeholders; iv) contribute to the drafting and revision of the evaluation products in their technical area(s) and v) provide feedback on the evaluation process as part of a 360 assessment of the evaluation.

7. Roles and Responsibilities of WFP Stakeholders

46. **The Country Office.** The CO management will be responsible to:
 - Assign a focal point for the evaluation to liaise with the OEV focal point during the preparation phase and with the company evaluation manager thereafter. Ute Meir, Deputy Country Director will be the CO focal point for this evaluation.
 - Provide the evaluation manager and team with documentation and information necessary to the evaluation; facilitate the team's contacts with local stakeholders; set up meetings, field visits and the exit briefing; provide logistic support during the fieldwork; and arrange for interpretation, if required.
 - Participate in a number of discussions with the evaluation team on the evaluation design and on the operation, its performance and results. In particular, the CO should participate in the evaluation team briefing and in various teleconferences with the evaluation manager and team on the evaluation products.
 - Organise two separate debriefings at the end of the field mission - an internal one (possibly done in the form of a workshop) and a subsequent one with partners.
 - Comment on the TORs and the evaluation report.
 - Prepare a management response to the evaluation.
 - Provide feedback to OEV on the evaluation process as part of an evaluation feedback e-survey.
47. **The Regional Bureau.** The RB management will be responsible to:

- Assign a focal point for the evaluation to liaise with the OEV focal point during the preparation phase and with the company evaluation manager thereafter, as required. Silvia Biondi, Regional M&E Adviser will be the RB focal point for this evaluation.
- Participate in a number of discussions with the evaluation team on the evaluation design and on the operation, its performance and results. In particular, the RB should participate in the evaluation team debriefing (possibly done in the form of a workshop) and in various teleconferences with the evaluation manager and team on the evaluation products.
- Provide comments on the TORs and the evaluation report.
- Coordinate the management response to the evaluation and track the implementation of the recommendations.
- Provide feedback to OEV on the evaluation process as part of an evaluation feedback e-survey.

48. **Headquarters.** Some HQ divisions might, as relevant, be asked to discuss WFP strategies, policies or systems in their area of responsibility and to comment on the evaluation TOR and report. These include: Operations Department (OS), Policy, Programme and Innovation Division (OSZ), Emergency Preparedness (OME), Procurement Division (OSP), Logistics Division (OSL), Government Partnerships Division (PGG).

49. **The Office of Evaluation.** OEV is responsible for commissioning the evaluation and Julie Thoulouzan, Evaluation Officer is the OEV focal point. OEV's responsibilities include to:

- Set up the evaluation including drafting the TOR in consultation with concerned stakeholders; select and contract the external evaluation company; and facilitate the initial communications between the WFP stakeholders and the external evaluation company.
- Enable the company to deliver a quality process and report by providing them with the EQAS documents including process guidance and quality checklists as well as orient the evaluation manager on WFP policies, strategies, processes and systems as they relate to the operation being evaluated.
- Comment on, and approve, the evaluation report.
- Submit the evaluation report to an external post-hoc quality assurance process to independently report on the quality, credibility and utility of the evaluation and provide feedback to the evaluation company accordingly.
- Publish the final evaluation report on the WFP public website and incorporate findings into an annual synthesis report, which will be presented to WFP's Executive Board for consideration as well as in other lessons-learning platforms, as relevant.
- Conduct an evaluation feedback e-survey to gather perceptions about the evaluation process and the quality of the report to be used to revise the approach, as required.

8. Communication and budget

8.1 Communication

50. Issues related to language of the evaluation are noted in sections 6.3 and 5, which also specifies which evaluation products will be made public and how and provides the schedule of debriefing with key stakeholders. Section 7 paragraph 48 describes how findings will be disseminated.

51. To enhance the learning from this evaluation, the evaluation manager and team will also emphasize transparent and open communication with WFP stakeholders. Regular teleconferences and one-on-one telephone conversations between the evaluation manager, team and country office focal point will assist in discussing any arising issues and ensuring a participatory process.

8.2 Budget

52. **Funding source:** The evaluation will be funded in line with the WFP special funding mechanism for Operations Evaluations (Executive Director memo dated October 2012). The cost to be borne by the CO, if applicable, will be established by the WFP Budget & Programming Division (RMB).

53. **Budget:** The budget will be prepared by the company (using the rates established in the LTA and the corresponding template) and approved by OEV. For the purpose of this evaluation the company will:


- Use the management fee corresponding to a small operation.
- Take into account the planned number of days per function noted in section 6.3.
- Budget for Internal flights to Nampula province (at US\$700 each).

Please send queries to Julie Thoulouzan, Evaluation Officer:

Email: Julie.thoulouzan@wfp.org

Phone number: + 39 06 65 13 35 04

Annex 1: Map



Acronyms

BR	Budget revision
ALNAP	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action
CO	Country Office (WFP)
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
EB	(WFP's) Executive Board
EQAS	Evaluation Quality Assurance System
EM	Evaluation Manager
ER	Evaluation report
ET	Evaluation team
HQ	Headquarters (WFP)
IP	Inception package
LTA	Long-term agreement
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
mt	Metric tonne
OEV	Office of Evaluation (WFP)
OpEv	Operation Evaluation
RB	Regional Bureau (WFP)
TOR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNEG	United Nations Evaluation Group
WFP	World Food Programme

Annex 2: Evaluation matrix

No.	Sub-questions	Measure/Indicator	Main Sources of Information	Data Collection Methods	Data Analysis Methods	Evidence quality
Key Question 1: How appropriate is the operation?						
1.1	<p>Relevance (addressing existing needs): Is the PRRO design appropriate given the objectives of the intervention (of providing life-saving support in case of unpredictable shocks) and other WFP operations being implemented in parallel (CP).</p> <p>Specifically, is a PRRO the most valid approach in the context of seasonal emergencies?</p>	<p>The extent to which problem analysis and WFP normative guidance were used to guide the PRRO design.</p>	<p>Logical framework</p> <p>Project document PRRO 200355</p> <p>WFP normative guidance (e.g. emergency preparedness and response, refugee operations)</p>	<p>Review of secondary literature</p> <p>Review background/project documentation</p> <p>Interviews with WFP CO, RB staff</p> <p>Interviews with key government stakeholders (Regional, local).</p>	<p>Qualitative analysis: content analysis of documents, consistency evaluation across sources, assessment of key informant interview and FGD data.</p> <p>Analysis disaggregated by PRRO objectives</p>	<p>High</p>
	<p>Are the objectives, targeting, and choice of activities and of transfer modalities appropriate to the needs of the food insecure population, including the distinct needs of women, men, boys and girls from different groups, as applicable?</p> <p>Specifically, is the use of in-kind food the most appropriate transfer modality or is there evidence to support the use of cash & vouchers as a more effective transfer modality?</p> <p>Is the recovery component relevant to population needs?</p>	<p><u>Objectives:</u> The extent to which the WFP corporate strategic objectives 1, 3, 5 are relevant to target populations.</p> <p><u>Targeting:</u> The extent to which beneficiary groups and geographical targeting are in line with the spatial pattern of food insecurity following natural hazards; and address inclusion/exclusion error.</p> <p><u>Activities/ transfer</u></p>	<p>WFP CFSVA, DHS, HDI, and other country assessments</p> <p>FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to Mozambique.</p> <p>WFP/UNHCR JAM</p> <p>Food price assessments</p> <p>Qualitative data</p> <p>SETSAN VA-reports</p>	<p>INGC, SETSAN, INAR</p> <p>Interviews with UNHCR and UNICEF staff</p> <p>Interviews with partner NGO staff</p> <p>FGDs with beneficiaries</p> <p>Direct observation</p> <p>Review of secondary data</p> <p>Review background/project</p>	<p>Qualitative</p>	<p>TBD</p>

		<p><u>modalities</u></p> <p>Ranking of appropriateness of GFD/FFA by beneficiary groups</p> <p>Coherency with recommendations from earlier PRRO evaluation</p>	Assessments	<p>documentation</p> <p>Interviews with WFP CO, RB staff</p> <p>Interviews with key government stakeholders (Regional, local). INGC, SETSAN, INAR</p> <p>Interviews with UNHCR and UNICEF staff</p> <p>Interviews with partner NGO staff</p> <p>FGDs with beneficiaries</p> <p>Direct observation</p>	assessment - triangulation of primary and secondary data	
1.2	<p>Relevance (external coherence) Are the objectives, targeting, choice of activities and of transfer modalities coherent with relevant stated national policies, including sector policies and strategies?</p> <p>Do they seek complementarity with the interventions of relevant humanitarian and development partners as well as with other CO interventions in the country?</p>	<p>The extent to which the PRRO aligns to:</p> <p>Government of Mozambique Food and Nutrition Security Objectives; Refugee Policy; Emergency Humanitarian Clusters (FS, N and Refugees)</p> <p>UNDAF and Delivering as One.</p>	<p>Project document PRRO 200355</p> <p>SPHERE guidance</p> <p>OCHA CERF and Cluster reports</p> <p>UNDAF 2012- 2015</p> <p>National Poverty Reduction Action Plan (PARP)</p>	<p>Review of secondary data</p> <p>Review background/project documentation</p> <p>Interviews with WFP CO, RB staff</p> <p>Interviews with key government stakeholders (Regional, local).</p>	Qualitative assessment - triangulation of primary and secondary data	High

			Ministry of Agriculture. Strategic Plan for Agricultural Development – PEDSA (2010-2019). CAADP 2011	INGC, SETSAN, INAR Interviews with UNHCR and UNICEF staff Interviews with partner NGO staff		
1.3	Relevance (internal coherence) Are the objectives, targeting, choice of activities and of transfer modalities coherent with WFP strategies, policies and normative guidance?	The extent to which the PRRO aligns to WFP strategies, policies and normative guidance.	Project document PRRO 200355 WFP Country Strategy and CP reports WFP normative guidance (e.g. emergency preparedness and response, refugee operations, FFA manual, implementing capacity development)			High
Key Question 2: What are the results of the operation?						
No.	Sub-questions	Measure/Indicator	Main Sources of Information	Data Collection Methods	Data Analysis Methods	Evidence quality
2.1	Effectiveness- Achievements of outputs and Outcomes What is the level of attainment of the planned outputs, including the number of beneficiaries?	# of women, men, girls and boys receiving food and non-food items, by category and as % of planned figures Tonnage of food distributed, by type, as a % of planned distribution	Monitoring/output reports EFSA reports 12	Desk review	Analysis by programme component, disaggregation by women, girls, men and boys.	Medium- relies on accuracy of CO Monitoring/output reports

		<p>Quantity of fortified foods, complementary foods and special nutritional products distributed, as % of planned distribution</p> <p># of women and men trained in livelihood-support thematic areas</p> <p>#of people trained on EFSA/ENA/ETC, and emergency response (WFP, national government, and partner staff)</p>				
	<p>How timely were distributions of WFP deliverables? What was the quality? Were GFD/ FFA rations of sufficient quantity to meet population needs?</p>	<p>Staff and beneficiary perceptions</p>	<p>Qualitative data</p> <p>SPRs 2012-2013</p> <p>Assessment reports</p>	<p>FGDs with beneficiaries and staff</p> <p>Desk review</p>	<p>Analysis disaggregated by PRRO objectives</p> <p>Qualitative assessment - triangulation of primary and secondary data</p>	<p>TBD</p>
2.2	<p>Effectiveness: Achievement of Objectives</p> <p>To what extent did the outputs lead to the realisation of the operation objectives, as well as to any unintended effects?</p> <p>Specifically, are recovery activities building long-term resilience?</p>	<p>Beneficiary, staff, and Government perceptions of the level to which PRRO interventions have contributed to household food consumption, coping strategies, and the National Capacity Index.</p>	<p>Qualitative data</p> <p>Secondary data in SPRs 2012-2013, specifically outcome values reported at baseline and follow up surveys in Feb and July 2013.</p> <p>Assessment reports</p>	<p>FGDs with beneficiaries, interviews with WFP staff, and government / INGC participants in the PRRO's capacity development efforts.</p> <p>Direct observation</p>	<p>Disaggregated by PRRO objectives, and noting differences for different groups, including women, girls, men and boys, as applicable.</p>	<p>TBD</p> <p>Relies on CO delivery of output values and methods of computation</p>

				Desk review		
2.3	<p>Coordination and collaboration What synergy exists between the PRRO and other WFP operations (in particular the country programme, and FFA and capacity development activities)?</p>	<p>The extent to which WFP is successful in coordinating efforts to enhance complementarity and reduce overlap.</p> <p>Types of programme changes to improve coordination.</p> <p>References made to other programmes in program documentation (complementarity)</p>	<p>Primary qualitative data</p> <p>Country strategy</p> <p>Country programme 200286 document</p> <p>Project document PRRO 200355</p> <p>Interagency coordination documents (e.g., logistics cluster meeting minutes)</p> <p>Strategic Review Committee Meeting minutes</p>	<p>Interviews with WFP staff (country programme and PRRO, technical sector leads)</p> <p>Desk review</p>	<p>Qualitative assessment - triangulation of primary and secondary data</p>	TBD
	<p>What synergy and complementarity exists between the PRRO and the efforts of other actors to contribute to the overriding WFP objective in the country?</p> <p>-Delivering as One (UN Country Team)</p> <p>- Humanitarian Clusters on Food Security, Nutrition, Logistics and Refugees</p> <p>What is the gap between resources/ expertise mobilized and resources/ expertise required?</p>	<p>The extent to which WFP is successful in the partnerships and implementation arrangements:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ # of MOUs, ○ # of joint meetings and assessments, ○ types of programme changes to improve coordination. 	<p>Primary qualitative data</p> <p>UNHCR-WFP Joint assessments</p> <p>Partner MOUs</p> <p>Cluster coordination minutes</p> <p>Cluster reviews</p> <p>FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission</p>	<p>Interviews with WFP staff , implementing partners, Government of Mozambique UN Country Team Humanitarian Cluster members</p> <p>Desk review</p>	<p>Analysis disaggregated by PRRO objectives</p> <p>Qualitative assessment - triangulation of primary and secondary data</p>	High, assuming adequate number of interviews

	<p>- what is resource mobilization capacity? - what is level of donor satisfaction towards WFP?</p> <p>What level of resource optimization has been undertaken/ was required? - Evidence available</p> <p>What is the performance of WFP MOZ - CO plus other offices? -Decision-making/ HR/ coordination and communication</p> <p>What is the quality of implementation partnerships? - Appropriateness of criteria and processes to select partners/ adherence to these criteria - quality of support to partners - level of engagement, communication with, and decision-making by partners</p> <p>What is the capacity to adapt and mitigate external factors? - adaptation to financial opportunities and risks - ability to monitor and make changes</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • WFP Staff, partners and donors' and GOM perceptions • Staff lists WFP and partners • Procedures in place for administration, HR, finance • Engagement with donors • Budget revisions undertaken • Support programmes (including training for WFP partners and GoM) 	<p>to Mozambique.</p> <p>Minutes of project management team</p> <p>Project progress reports and minutes of meetings</p> <p>Annual performance reviews</p> <p>Trainings programmes for partners- type of training and frequency, number of trainees, etc.</p>			<p>Medium assuming adequate number of interviews plus supporting documentation available.</p>
--	---	---	--	--	--	---

2.4	<p>Efficiency: Achievements</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -How efficient is the operation? - How efficient is the PRRO in geographic targeting and identification of most vulnerable groups? - How efficient is M&E generating regular information from community and household surveys, etc. - How transparent (accountable) is WFP in the operations? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Perceptions of staff and stakeholders on efficiency (cost, systems, staff, alternatives, etc.). ○ Performance Monitoring system refined ○ Improved VAC estimates (SETSAN) ○ Frequency and depth of data disseminated from community and household surveys. ○ Partner in 3-4W websites – accessible to general public 	<p>SPRs 2012-2013</p> <p>Output databases</p> <p>Primary qualitative data</p> <p>Interviews with various stakeholders (SETSAN)</p> <p>OCHA</p>	<p>Interviews with WFP staff, implementing partners, government of Mozambique staff, UN partners</p>	<p>Disaggregated by PRRO objectives, and noting differences for different groups, including males and females.</p> <p>Qualitative assessment - triangulation of primary and secondary data</p>	<p>High, assuming adequate number of interviews</p>
2.5	<p>Sustainability and connectedness</p> <p>What is the likelihood that that any benefits accrued by the PRRO will continue after the end of the operation? (notably any benefits of the recovery component?)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The extent to which activities under the PRRO increased capacity of key partners. ○ Partner perceptions of capacity to continue activities on own. ○ # of exit strategies, trainings and related communications on sustainability with beneficiaries. ○ Options for connectedness of emergency response to national emergency preparedness and response policy and program/ social safety net ○ 		<p>Interviews with WFP staff, implementing partners, government of Mozambique staff, UN partners</p> <p>Interviews with beneficiaries, local officials</p>	<p>Analysis disaggregated by PRRO objectives</p> <p>Qualitative assessment - triangulation of primary and secondary data</p>	<p>Medium to high, assuming adequate number of interviews</p>

Key Question 3: Why and how has the operation produced the observed results?						
No.	Sub-questions	Measure/Indicator	Main Sources of Information	Data Collection Methods	Data Analysis Methods	Evidence quality
3.1	<p>Discussion of impact (internal) What internal factors caused the observed changes and affected how results were or were not achieved?</p> <p>Factors within WFP control include the processes, systems and tools in place to support the operation design, implementation, monitoring/evaluation and reporting; the governance structure and institutional arrangements (including issues related to staffing, capacity and technical backstopping from RB/HQ); the partnership and coordination arrangements; etc.</p> <p>-How did the CP 200286 influence the success of the PRRO</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Pipeline integrity ○ Quality of monitoring and evaluation reporting, ○ flexibility in adjustment to available information from monitoring and assessments, ○ quality of staff, ○ effectiveness of communication between CO and field 	<p>SPRs 2012-2013</p> <p>Primary qualitative data</p>	<p>Desk review</p> <p>Interviews with WFP staff, implementing partners, government of Mozambique staff, UN partners</p> <p>Direct observation</p>	<p>Process evaluation; qualitative institutional analysis</p> <p>Analysis disaggregated by PRRO objectives</p>	<p>Medium to high, assuming adequate number of interviews</p>
	<p>How has the PRRO assured that gender balance is incorporated into the program?</p>	<p>Gender balance in staffing (WFP and implementing partners);</p> <p>Equitable roles, responsibilities, and opportunities for male and female PRRO staff.</p> <p>Equitable inclusion of men and women in PRRO activities.</p> <p>Active participation of</p>	<p>Primary qualitative data</p> <p>SPRs 2012-2013</p>	<p>Desk review</p> <p>Interviews and FGD with male and female WFP staff and beneficiaries (e.g., food management committee)</p> <p>Direct observation</p>	<p>Gender analysis</p>	<p>Medium –all data are not disaggregated by activity, area.</p>

		women on the food management committees				
3.2	<p>Discussion of impact (external)</p> <p>What external factors caused the observed changes and affected how results were or were not achieved?</p> <p>How have external challenges such as transport logistics, road and communication infrastructure, insecurity, funding been managed so as to mitigate negative impacts?</p> <p>- What are the reasons that the Recovery component (FFA) was not well funded?</p> <p>- Were differences between PRRO and CP well communicated to donors?</p>	<p>The extent to which the PRRO resource situation is reflective of the larger funding trends.</p> <p>The extent to which market trends affected the deliverables.</p> <p># of security incidents with WFP staff and partners during operational period.</p> <p>Timely adjustment of project to changing circumstances</p>	<p>Primary qualitative data</p> <p>SPRs 2012-2013</p> <p>Budget amendments</p>	<p>Desk review</p> <p>Interviews with WFP staff, implementing partners, government of Mozambique staff, UN partners</p>	<p>Process and institutional analysis</p>	<p>High</p>

Annex 3: Stakeholder analysis

Stakeholder	Interest in the Operation	Involvement in Evaluation	Who
Internal (WFP) stakeholders			
Mozambique country office management (CO) Responsible for the overall management, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation of the PRRO, as well as for the associated Country Program.	Direct interest in how the operation evaluation affects the design of a successor operation to the PRRO, its links with the country programme, and other future operations.	<p>Provided input on the overall PRRO evaluation scope, evaluation questions, and strategies. The focal point is the primary liaison between the evaluation team and the country office, providing key documentation and facilitating implementation of the evaluation.</p> <p>Staff contributed perspectives on all PRRO components that will help to answer the three main questions in the evaluation matrix.</p>	Ute Meir, Deputy Country Director and CO focal point for this evaluation Abdoulaye Balde, Representative & Country Director Nicolas Babu: Head of Operations Procurement : Narciso Chongo Finance and Administration Unit
WFP country office technical units	Direct interest in how the operation evaluation affects future operations.	Provided critical information on the design, implementation, and monitoring of PRRO activities.	Francesco Slaviero : VAM and M&E Officer ICT: Benedito Januario Staff in logistics; GFD; FFA; refugee affairs; gender; supply chain, resourcing
Sub-offices Responsible for implementation at district level. Xai-Xai, Beira	Direct interest in how the operation evaluation affects future operations.	<p>The sub-office staff organized meetings and visits to key facilities and facilitated introductions to communities.</p> <p>Staff contributed perspectives on all PRRO components that will help to answer the three main questions in the evaluation matrix.</p>	Sub-office management teams of relevant operational provinces, programme officers, programme assistants, field monitors, reception supervisors.
Regional Bureau (RB) (Johannesburg)	Interested in an independent account of operational performance as well as	The RB provided feedback on design (and coordinate management response to the draft	Sarah Longford, Senior Regional Programme

Stakeholder	Interest in the Operation	Involvement in Evaluation	Who
Responsible for both oversight of country offices; technical guidance and support	application of lessons learned from evaluation findings to other country offices.	report), participated in discussions and debriefing, will track operationalization of recommendations, and give process feedback to OEV.	Advisor Silvia Biondi, Regional M&E Advisor and RB focal point for this evaluation
Office of Evaluation (OEV) (Rome)	OEV is responsible for commissioning OpEvs over 2013-2015. As these evaluations follow a new outsourced approach, OEV has a stake in ensuring that this approach is effective in delivering quality, useful and credible evaluations. OEV is interested in learning how OEV can better support offices in evaluation functions. This evaluation will feed into an annual synthesis report that the OEV prepares.	Management of WFP-TANGO contract, share Evaluation Quality Assurance System guidelines and templates and WFP orientation guide, facilitate initial communications between TANGO and WFP stakeholders, approve evaluation products; report dissemination and follow-up	Julie Thoulouzan and Grace Igweta, Evaluation Officers, are the OEV focal points for this evaluation.
WFP Executive Board (EB)	The WFP governing body has an interest in being informed about the effectiveness of WFP operations. Final user of the evaluation report.	This evaluation will not be presented to the EB but its findings will feed into an annual synthesis of all OpEvs, which will be presented to the EB at its November 2014 session.	Not applicable
External stakeholders			
Beneficiaries	Directly impacted as the recipients of food assistance in this PRRO.	Contributed perspectives on the relevance, appropriateness, and effectiveness of PRRO assistance.	Men, women, boys and girls who are direct beneficiaries of the PRRO, and those who represent these groups and assist in the process, such as the food management committees.
Government partners	Partners in both designing and implementing WFP activities. Direct interest in the alignment of operations with national priorities and coordination between actors and results. Interest related to capacity	Contributed perspectives on all PRRO components, specifically progress made toward nationally-owned hunger solutions and capacity development for EFSA, ENA, ETC and emergency response.	INGC, SETSAN, SIMA (MINAG), MINAG/DCAP, INAR

Stakeholder	Interest in the Operation	Involvement in Evaluation	Who
	development, handover and sustainability. Government partners will also use the findings for decision-making.		
UN Country Team		<p>UNHCR will contributed perspectives on the refugee component.</p> <p>Other UN stakeholders offered a perspective on the level of complementarity that exists between the PRRO and UN efforts.</p>	<p>UNHCR UNICEF</p> <p>FAO (Food Security Cluster co-lead)</p> <p>Humanitarian Country Team Working Group (led by IOM)</p> <p>UNAIDS, UNDP, UN-Habitat, UN Women, OCHA</p>
National and international NGO partners	NGOs directly partner with WFP to provide rapid response and implement some WFP activities. They have a direct interest in how the OpEvs affect future operations and partnerships.	<p>Contributed critical perspective on all three main questions in the evaluation matrix.</p> <p>Specifically contributed to understanding successes and challenges of GFD and FFA components.</p>	World Vision International; Samaritan's Purse for International Relief, Concern Worldwide, Comusana, Kukumbi (implementing partners) Save the Children, Oxfam, Kulima, ISAAC, CEDES, World Relief (Food Security Cluster members)
Donors and international agencies	Interest in the efficiency of spending and if the work was effective, providing a value add for using a PRRO to respond to emergency operations, which may influence future funding decisions.	Contributed critical perspectives on funding patterns for the PRRO.	FEWSNET, representatives of donor agencies of main government donors US (USAID), Canada and Germany; CERF Resident Coordinator

Annex 4: Documents reviewed

The European Union's European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO). 2013. *Single form for humanitarian aid actions*. Donor Report.

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome (FAO) & World Food Programme, Rome (WFP). 2010. *Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to Mozambique*. Posted at: <http://www.wfp.org/food-security/assessments/crop-food-security-assessment-mission>

FFA & Programa das Nações Unidas para a Alimentação. 2007. *Manual Sobre Comida Por Bens: Um Guia de Abordagens, Métodos e Gestão De Actividades de Comida por Bens (CPB) na África Austral*

Food and Nutrition Security Working Group (FNSWG) (Southern Africa). 2013. *FNSWG - Southern Africa. Monthly Update*. Issue 5/2013.

———. 2013. *FNSWG - Southern Africa. Monthly Update*. Issue 4. March 2013.

———. 2013. *FNSWG - Southern Africa. Monthly Update*. Issue 2. January 2013.

Food Security Cluster & Republic of Mozambique Ministry of Agriculture Technical Secretariat for Food and Nutritional Security (SETSAN). 2013. *Relatório Avaliação Quantitativa da Situação de Segurança Alimentar (EFSA) Nos Distritos da Província de Gaza Afetados Pelas Cheias e Tendências Até*. Executive Summary. (Final version). March-April 2013.

Government of Mozambique. 2013. *Rainy and Cyclone Season Contingency Plan –2013/2014*. Ministry of State Administration - Disaster Management Coordination Council. Approved 12 November 2013.

Government of Mozambique. 2013. *Mozambique Floods 2013 – Response and Recovery Proposal*. Humanitarian Country Team. 31 January 2013. Maputo.

Government of Mozambique National Institute of Disaster Management (INGC). 2014. *Relatório Final da Avaliação Rápida Multi-Sectorial das Cheias*. Cheias de Cabo Delgado. 5-7 April 2014.

Government of Mozambique National Institute of Disaster Management (INGC) & SETSAN. 2007. *Zambezi Flood Mozambique - Multi Agency Initial Investigation*. 18-21 February 2007.

Instituto Nacional de Gestão das Calamidades (INGC). 2011: *Main Report: Disaster Risk Assessments in Mozambique: Data and Information on Risk Assessment*. [Pereira, Inocência José João Francisco; Mavume, Alberto Francisco; Afonso, Felisberto (eds.)], INGC, Mozambique.

Republic of Mozambique. 2014. Statement by H.E. Ambassador Pedro Comissário, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Mozambique to United

Nations and Other International Organizations in Geneva to the First Session of the Preparatory Committee of the World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction. (Geneva, 14-15 July 2014).

Republic of Mozambique Ministry of Agriculture Technical Secretariat for Food and Nutritional Security (SETSAN). 2013. *Infoflash: Informação sobre Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional em Moçambique. A situação de Insegurança Alimentar e Nutricional é Preocupante nas Zonas afectadas pela Cheia de 2013.* 20. February.

———. 2012. *Mozambique Food Security Assessment Report 2012-2013.* December 2012.

———. 2012. *Relatório da Mónica da Situação de Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional em Moçambique.* November 2012.

———. 2012. *Relatório da Mónica da Situação de Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional em Moçambique.* February 2012.

———. 2012. *Mozambique Food Security Assessment Report.* November 2012.

———. 2012. *Relatório da Mónica da Situação de Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional em Moçambique.* Version 3. July 2012.

———. 2010. *Relatório de Avaliação da Situação de Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional em Moçambique.* August 2010.

United Nations Assistance Development Framework (UNDAF). 2011. *UNDAF Action Plan - Mozambique (2012-2015).*

United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF). 2013. *Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator Report on the Use of CERF Funds - Mozambique Rapid Response Floods.* Jennifer Topping, Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator.

United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). 2014. *Flood Update.* 12 March 2014.

United Nations Development Group (UNDG). 2013. *Mozambique Lesson Learned Summary Report.* Maputo. 29 May 2013. José Caveirinha.

United Nations Government and Food Security Cluster. 2013. *Rapid Emergency Food Security Assessment of Chókwé, Guijá and Chibuto districts affected by floods in Gaza Province, Mozambique conducted by /HCT.* March 2013.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 2012. *Cash Feasibility Study.* Draft 1. Mozambique. November 2012.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Children’s Fund. WFP & World Health Organization. 2004.*Food and Nutrition Needs in Emergencies*. Posted at:
<http://www.unhcr.org/45fa745b2.html>

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) & WFP. 2012. *UNHCR–WFP Joint Assessment Mission for food assistance to Maratane Refugee Camp. Joint Assessment Mission Report*. Joint Assessment Mission Report.

United States Agency for International Development (USAID). 2013. *Quarterly Programme Performance Reports*. APS No.FFP-FY-10-001 – USAID FFP/Emergency Food Security Program. Donor Report for Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation 200355.

World Food Programme (WFP). 2014. *WFP Strategic Results Framework*. (2014–2017). Implementation Version.

———. 2014. *Evaluation of WFP’s 2009 Gender Policy. This Time Around? Evaluation Report*. (OEV/2013/008).

———. 2014. *March Executive Brief Mozambique*. Last Updated: 17/03/2014

———. 2013. *Implementing Capacity Development. WFP’s Approach to Hunger Governance and Capacity Development*. (Revised Edition).

———. 2013. *Bilateral Consultation with the Government of Belgium. Food Security and Nutrition Programme in 6 Districts in Gaza Province*. Presentation. 2 December 2013.

———. 2013. *Resource, Financial And Budgetary Matters Agenda Item 6: Report Of The External Auditor On Use Of Cash And Vouchers*. (WFP/EB.A/2013/6-G/1) Executive Board Annual Session. Rome, 3–6 June 2013.

———. 2013. *Standard Project Report 2013, Mozambique: Assistance to Vulnerable Groups and Disaster Affected Populations in Mozambique*. Single Country PRRO - 200355.

———. 2012. *Emergency Preparedness and Response Package*. First Edition.

———. 2012. *Mozambique Protracted Relief And Recovery Operation: 200355*. Project design document.

———. 2012. *Mozambique WFP Country Programme 2012-2014 Food Security Baseline/Beneficiary Profiling*.

———. 2012. *Standard Project Report 2012, Mozambique: Food support for protection of lives and livelihoods of the most vulnerable people in Mozambique*. Single Country PRRO - 10600.0.

- . 2012. WFP Programme Review and Support Branch. 2012 *EMOPs versus PRROs: When an EMOP or a PRRO is more appropriate for addressing acute needs?* ODXPS 6 June 2012. Unpublished.
- . 2011. *Factsheet – Moçambique: Vigilância Comunitária e dos Agregados Familiares/Monitoria Pós-Distribuição (CHS-PDM). Estratégias de Sobrevivência.* Ronda 16. October 2011. Eds: G. Muai & Carrilho, L.
- . 2011. *Food Assistance for Assets. Module A. The Rationale for FFA – The Bigger Picture on Why We Do FFA.* Programme Design and Support Division. Version 1.
- . 2011. *Food Assistance for Assets. Module E. Monitoring and Evaluation of FFA.* Programme Design and Support Division. Version 1.
- . 2011. Programme Review Committee (PRC). 2011. Note for the Record. 19 December 2011 meeting. Mozambique Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO) 200355. Unpublished.
- . 2011. *Standard Project Report 2011, Mozambique: Food support for protection of lives and livelihoods of the most vulnerable people in Mozambique.* Single Country PRRO - 10600.0.
- . 2010. *Standard Project Report 2010, Mozambique: Food support for protection of lives and livelihoods of the most vulnerable people in Mozambique.* Single Country PRRO - 10600.0.
- . 2009. *Standard Project Report 2009, Mozambique: Food support for protection of lives and livelihoods of the most vulnerable people in Mozambique.* Single Country PRRO - 10600.0.
- . 2008. *Standard Project Report 2008, Mozambique: Food support for protection of lives and livelihoods of the most vulnerable people in Mozambique.* Single Country PRRO - 10600.0.
- . 2007. *Projects For Executive Board Approval: Protracted Relief And Recovery Operation Mozambique 10600.0.* (WFP/EB.2/2007/9-C/2) Executive Board Document. Second Regular Session. Rome, 22–26 October 2007.
- . 2006. *Country Programme Mozambique 10446.0 (2007-2009).* (WFP/EB.2/2006/8/6). Executive Board Document Agenda Item 8. 24 July 2006.
- . 2002. *Emergency Field Operations Pocketbook.*
- . n.d. *Annex II: Logical Framework – Mozambique PRRO 200355.* Internal report, unpublished.
- . n.d. *Gender Policy and Strategy. Promoting Gender Equality and the Empowerment Promoting Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women in*

Addressing Food and Nutrition of Women in Addressing Food and Nutrition Challenges. Presentation, unpublished.

———. n.d. *Methodology For National Capacity Index (NCI)*. Unpublished.

———. n.d. *The WFP Mozambique CO articulated plan of action, on DRR*. PRRO 200355. Internal report.

———. n.d. *Mozambique - Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis*. Internal report, unpublished.

WFP Mozambique. 2014. *WFP Mozambique Contributions Summary 2014*. Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation 200355.

———. 2014. *WFP Mozambique Donors Summary 2014*. Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation 200355.

———. 2014. *Output database 2014 Jan - December-breakdown, Corrected*. Mozambique PRRO 200355. Unpublished data.

———. 2014. *WFP Pipeline Activity Schedule*. Internal report. 200355

———. 2013. *WFP Pipeline Activity Schedule*. Internal report. 200355

———. 2013. *WFP Xai Xai Organigram*. Internal report. 200355

———. 2013. *Agreement between the World Food Programme and Samaritans Purse International Relief Regarding The Implementation Of A WFP Assistance Programme*.

———. 2013. *Agreement between the World Food Programme and Samaritans Purse International Relief Regarding The Implementation Of A WFP Assistance Programme*.

———. 2013. *Budget Summary (WFP support to INGC - Capacity Building)*. 17th May, 2013. Internal document, unpublished.

———. 2013. *Output database 2013 Jan - December-breakdown, Corrected*. Mozambique PRRO 200355. Unpublished data.

———. 2013. *Review of the Evolution of Staple Food Prices in Mozambique*. Food Price Monitoring, September 2013. Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation 200355.

———. 2013. *Review of the Evolution of Basic Food Prices in Mozambique*. Food Price Monitoring, July 2013. Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation 200355.

———. 2013. *Review of the Evolution of Basic Food Prices in Mozambique*. Food Price Monitoring, June 2013. Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation 200355.

- . 2013. *Review of the Evolution of Basic Food Prices in Mozambique*. Food Price Monitoring, May 2013. Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation 200355.
- . 2013. *Review of the Evolution of Basic Food Prices in Mozambique*. Food Price Monitoring, April 2013. Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation 200355.
- . 2013. *Review of the Evolution of Basic Food Prices in Mozambique*. Food Price Monitoring, March 2013. Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation 200355.
- . 2013. *Review of the Evolution of Basic Food Prices in Mozambique*. Food Price Monitoring, February 2013. Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation 200355.
- . 2013. *Review of the Evolution of Basic Food Prices in Mozambique*. Food Price Monitoring, December 2012 and January 2013. Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation 200355.
- . 2013. *Works as a Safety Net - The need for Asset Monitoring beyond the Community Asset Score Indicator (CAS)*. Mozambique Country Programme 200286 Asset Monitoring. Proposal. 17 January 2013. Unpublished.
- . 2012. *Agreement Between World Food Programme (WFP) And World Vision Regarding The Implementation Of A WFP Assistance Programme (Mozambique PRRO 200355)*. Internal document, unpublished.
- . 2012. *Agreement Between World Food Programme (WFP) And Concern Worldwide (Partner) Regarding The Implementation Of A WFP Assistance Programme (WFP Project 200355)*. Internal document, unpublished.
- . 2012. *Budget Revision 1 to Mozambique Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation 200355. Budget Plan*. Final. 21 December 2012. Unpublished.
- . 2012. *Budget - Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation 200355*. Unpublished.
- . 2012. *Budget Revision 1 to Mozambique Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation 200355. B/R No: 01. Narrative*. Regional Bureau Cleared 21 December 2012. Unpublished.
- . 2012. *Mozambique Annual Report 2011*. Digital Edition. Posted at: [www.wfp.org/sites/default/files/WFP Mozambique Annual Report 2011 email version ENG.pdf](http://www.wfp.org/sites/default/files/WFP_Mozambique_Annual_Report_2011_email_version_ENG.pdf)
- . 2012. *Mozambique Map*
- . 2012. *Output database 2012 Jan - December-CORRECTED*. Mozambique PRRO 200355. Unpublished data.
- . 2011. *WFP Mozambique Resource Mobilization Strategy 2010/11*. Draft 1. 5 April 2011

- . 2011. *Country Strategy Mozambique (2012-2015)*. May 2011.
- . 2011. *Note for the Record: Strategic Review Committee Meeting - Mozambique Country Strategy (2012-2015)*. 14 April 2011.
- . 2011. *Country Programme Mozambique 200286 (2012-2015)*. (WFP/EB.2/2011/7/2). Executive Board Document. Agenda Item 7. Draft.
- . 2007. *Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations 10577.0. Proposed Draft*. 24 October 2011.
- . n.d. *Budget Revision 3. Mozambique Country Programme 200286 – Beneficiaries and Tonnage by Districts*
- . n.d. *Discussion of the Geographical Targeting for Mozambique CP*. Presentation. Unpublished.
- . n.d. *Logframe 0.1 for the project 200355: Assistance to Vulnerable Groups and Disaster Affected Populations in Mozambique*. Internal report.
- . n.d. *Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation 200355*. Internal report, unpublished.
- . n.d. *Projected Direct Support Costs PRRO 200355: July-December 2012, January-December 2013, May-December 2014*. Unpublished.
- . n.d. *Monthly Expenditures per category and Income 2012 and 2013*. Unpublished.
- . n.d. *Budget Staff Direct Support Costs. Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation 200355*. Unpublished.
- . n.d. *Resource Situation (2012-2014) Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation 200355*.
- . n.d. *Training materials for programas de Promoção e Protecção de Meios de Vida*. Unpublished.
- . n.d. *Mozambique Country Programme 200286 Logical Framework*.
- . n.d. *WFP Mozambique All units Organigram*. Internal report. 200355
- WFP Mozambique Food Security Cluster. 2013. *Meeting Memo*. 24 JANUARY 2013.
- WFP Mozambique Logistics Cluster. 2014. *Meeting Minutes*. Mozambique, Maputo, 20 January 2014, unpublished.
- . 2013. *Mozambique Logistics Cluster – Lessons Learned*. Mozambique, Maputo, October 2013, unpublished.

———. 2013. *Meeting Minutes*. Mozambique, Maputo, 24 January 2013, unpublished.

———. 2013. *Meeting Minutes*. Mozambique, Maputo, 12 February 2013, unpublished.

———. 2013. *Meeting Minutes*. Mozambique, Maputo, 01st October 2013, unpublished.

———. 2013. *Meeting Minutes*. Mozambique, Maputo, 23 December 2013, unpublished.

———. 2013. *Meeting Minutes*. Mozambique, Maputo, 9 February 2012, unpublished.

WFP, VAM unit. n.d. *Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Assessment – República de Moçambique*.

WFP & Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, Germany (BMZ). 2011. 1. *Towards Action-Oriented Food Security & Outcome Monitoring*. Joint VAM/M&E Mission to Mozambique. 21-27 August 2011.

WFP & Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. *Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to Mozambique - Special Report*. 12 August 2010.

WFP & Food Security Cluster. 2013. *Emergency Food Security Assessment in Gaza Province (Southern Mozambique)*

———. 2013. *Emergency Food Security Assessment in Gaza Province*. Executive Summary. August 2013.

WFP & UNHCR. 2011. *Bilateral Agreement between WFP and UNHCR on the Distribution of WFP and UNHCR Supplied Food Commodities: July-December 2011*.

Annex 5: Fieldwork schedule

Date	Time	Item	Person interviewed	Team member	
Maputo 12.05-23.05					
Sunday 11.05	9:40	<i>Arrives in Maputo</i>		Rene	
	20:10	<i>Arrives in Maputo</i>		Laurie	
Monday 12.05	a.m.	Courtesy call on Country Director		All	
		Interactive session with the CO / discussion of mission schedule, practical arrangements		All	
	p.m.	Interviews	Nicolas (GFD, Refugee affairs, resourcing)		Rene and Laurie
			Punam (Supply chain, resourcing)		Rene and Laurie
			Elsa, Ana (Gender)		Laurie
		DCD (CO focal point for evaluation)		Rene, Laurie	
Tuesday 13.05	9:00-12:00	Stakeholder workshop		All	
	p.m.	Interviews	Mohamed/ Alcides (Logistics)		Rene & Lourdes
			Siebren (cash and vouchers)		Laurie
			Benedito (ICT)		Rene
			Narciso, Patrick (Procurement)		Rene
			Filippo & Nadia (Nutrition and HIV)		Lourdes
			Deolinda, Siebren (FFA)		Laurie & Lourdes
		Aquino (Finance, Admin)		Rene	
Wednesday 14.05	a.m	Security briefing at UNDSS		Rene& Laurie	
	p.m	Interviews	Jerónimo Toveló; Former WFP staff		Laurie
			SETSAN		Laurie & Lourdes
			UNICEF Emergency coordinator & nutritionist		Rene & Lourdes
			Francesco, VAM/M&E		Rene& Laurie
			UN-HABITAT		Rene
		International Organisation on Migration		Rene	

Date	Time	Item	Person interviewed	Team member
			Abdoulah Balde, Country Director	Rene & Laurie
Thursday 15.05	All day	Interviews	INGC delegate; General Director	Laurie & Rene
			Canadian High Commission	Lourdes
			UNAIDS	Lourdes
Friday 16.05	All day	Focus group	Food security cluster	Rene & Lourdes
		Follow up interviews/ clarification	WFP staff	Laurie
Saturday 17.05		Preliminary analysis of KKI data		All
GAZA PROVINCE - 18-23 MAY 2014				
Sunday 18.05	p.m	<i>Travel to Xai Xai</i>		All
Monday 19.05.14	a.m	Introductory meeting with WFP suboffice		All
		<i>Travel to Chibuto</i>		All
		Interviews	Permanent Secretary	Rene, Lourdes
			WVI Director	Lourdes
			WVI food distribution supervisor	Laurie
	<i>Travel to Chongoene</i>		All	
	Interview	Bungane community leaders	All	
	p.m	Bungane FFA observation: (i) Rehabilitation of social infrastructure (ii) cassava field		All
		Bungane focus groups	Male and female beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries.	All
		<i>Return to XaiXai City</i>		All
Interviews		Suboffice staff ; director, finance, field officer.	All	
Tuesday 20.05.14	08.00-09:00	<i>Travel to Bilene-Macia</i>		All
		Interview	District Permanent Secretary	All
	10:00	<i>Travel to Chokwe/ Guija</i>		All
	a.m.	Interviews	Guija District Permanent Secretary	Rene
	Former SPIR programme manager		Lourdes	

Date	Time	Item	Person interviewed	Team member
	p.m.		SPIR logistics, human resources	Laurie
		FFA observation		All
		Canicado focus groups	Male and female beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries.	All
Wednesday 21.05.14	a.m.	Focus groups	7th April Community leaders	All
		7th of April/ FFA observation		All
		Focus groups	Male and female beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries.	All
	a.m.	Acordos de Lusaka focus groups	Male and female beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries.	All
		Acordos de Lusaka / FFA observation		All
	p.m.	Chivongoene focus groups	Male and female beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries.	All
		Chivongoene interviews	Leaders	Laurie
Interview		WFP former food monitor	Rene	
Thursday 22.05.14	a.m	Chihaquelane FGDs	Male and female beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries.	Rene & Lourdes
	p.m	Chihaquelane FFA observation		Rene & Lourdes
	p.m	Guija focus group	DRR committee	All
	09:00-14:00	Travel to Xai Xai / interview / return travel	Xai Xai INGC delegate	Laurie
Friday 23.05	a.m.	Interview	Technician of Medicine ,Chockwe Health Center	Lourdes
			INAS Delegate , Chockwe	Lourdes
		Tiwokuine FGDs	Male and female beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries.	Laurie & Rene
			Leaders	Rene
p.m	Tiwokuine FFA observations i) Rehabilitation of the road ii) Recostruction of primary school		Laurie & Rene	
Saturday 24.05	a.m	<i>Return to Maputo by car</i>		All

Date	Time	Item	Person interviewed	Team member
	p.m	Preliminary analysis field data		All
Sunday 25.05	a.m	Preliminary analysis field data		All
	p.m	Interview	Lara Carilho (WFP M&E)	All
		<i>Travel to Quelimane</i>		All
Zambezia and Nampula Provinces 25.05- 29.05				
Monday 26.05.14	a.m	General meeting with key stakeholder in Zambezia	WFP suboffice; INGC, Concern, WVI	All
	p.m	Interviews	Concern emergency coordinator	Lourdes / Rene
			INGC delegate and staff; WVI DRR	Laurie
	23:00	Return to Maputo		Lourdes and Rene
Tuesday 27.05.14	6:00	<i>Travel to Nampula</i>		Lourdes and Rene
	7:00	<i>Travel to Mangaja da Costa</i>		Laurie
	a.m	Interviews	Maganja da Costa district authorities	Laurie
			Maratane Camp administration	Lourdes and Rene
			UNHCR, Nampula	Lourdes and Rene
			DPA agricultural officer	Lourdes and Rene
			Head of DPMAS	Lourdes and Rene
		Focus group	Camp leaders	Lourdes and Rene
Wednesday 28.05.14	All day	Nampula FGDS	Refugees	Lourdes and Rene
		Mangaja da Costa FGDS	Male and female beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries/ DRR committee	Laurie
	Evening	<i>Return to Maputo</i>		Rene
Thursday 29.05.14	All day	Preparation of Aide Memoire in Maputo		Rene
	8:00	<i>Return to Quelimane</i>		Laurie
	10:00-14:00	Interviews	Kukumbi director	Laurie
			Concern DRR	Laurie
			WFP suboffice program manager	Laurie
14:20	<i>Return to Maputo</i>		Lourdes	

Date	Time	Item	Person interviewed	Team member
	17:30	<i>Return to Maputo</i>		Laurie
Maputo 29.05- 01.06				
Friday 30.05	09:00- 11:00	Debriefing with the CO,RB and OEV		All
	11:30-1:00	Stakeholder workshop to present mission findings (aide memoire)		All
Saturday 01.06	14:20	<i>Depart Maputo</i>		Laurie
	15:40	<i>Depart Maputo</i>		Rene

Annex 6: Selection criteria for sampled sites

- Coverage of all PRRO components (GFD Relief, GFD Refugees, FFA and capacity development);
- Ability to view different operations in one location (district);
- Size of the operations: population targeted and planned tonnage;
- Number and importance of implementing partners (by size of programme and number of different operations involved);
- Type of hazard that impacted different areas and livelihoods and triggered a relief operation;
- Duration of WFP food assistance;
- Accessibility: quality of infrastructure (roads/ markets, etc.), good versus difficult access;
- Historical spread of operations over 2012, 2013 and 2014; and
- Practical considerations for reaching sites within 21 days, e.g., accessibility and within budget.

Using these criteria, in consultation with the CO, the ET purposively sampled five operational districts (including past and present operations) for FGDs and KIIs . The yellow highlighted cells in Table XX below designate these PRRO operations. Additionally, the ET conducted KIIs in Bilene Macia and Xai Xai districts. The orange highlighted cells in Table XX designate these PRRO operations.

With exception of Sofala Province, where security restrictions precluded ET data collection (see limitations section), the sample represents all PRRO operational provinces, and all districts where FFA activities have taken place. Sampled districts represent two of seven PRRO operational districts in Zambezia Province and three of seven operational districts in Gaza Province. With exception of the INGC, who implemented GFD in Gaza for two months in 2013, the sample represents operations carried out by all implementing partners. Chokwe and Guija districts represent the largest portion of PRRO GFD and FFA operations to date, an opportunity to evaluate response to 2013 flooding and the quality of implementation by WVI and SPIR. Maganja da Costa District represents an opportunity to review GFD in response to cyclone damage (2012) and flooding (2013) – implemented by WVI and Concern – in a relatively inaccessible setting. Additionally, the GFD in Maganja da Costa was linked to seed distribution in 2013 (Concern). Namacurra District represents GFD in an easily accessible region. Finally, Maratane camp in Nampula represents refugee operations and the quality of implementation by partner UNHCR. The ET sampled three of seven 2012 operational districts; and, seven of 13 2013 operational districts. Visits to Maratane refugee camp and Zambezia province represented 2014 operations: the PRRO is gearing up 2014 FFA operations in Zambezia Province with a new local partner, Kukumbi in response to flooding. Finally, Xai Xai and Bilene Macia (Gaza) and Quelimane (Zambezia) Districts (non-operational) were visited to engage with WFP and local partners in suboffices and partner country offices, district officials, and INGC representatives.

Annex 7: List of stakeholders interviewed

List of WFP staff consulted

Name	Position
Country Office	
Abdoulaye Balde	Country Director
Ute Meir	Deputy Country Director, Focal Point for this evaluation
Nicolas Babu	Head of Operations
Ana Touso	Gender Specialist
Aquino Nhampossa	Finance, Administration
Benedito Janeiro	Head Information and Communications Technology
Deolinda Pacho	Program Officer Protective Safety Net Programme
Domingos Reane	Output monitoring reporting
Elsa Mambo	Gender Specialist
Fillipo Dibari	Nutrition Unit
Francesco Silvieri	Monitoring and Evaluation
Ivelina Nunes	Logistics
Lara Carilho	Monitoring and Evaluations WFP - SETSAN representative
Marta Guivambo	Senior Assistant of Programs, Maputo Province and City of Maputo
Mohamed Razak	Logistics
Nadia Osman	Nutrition Specialist
Narciso Chango	Procurement
Patrick Nemeye	Procurement
Punam Chandulal	Supply Chain, Resourcing
Seibren Wilschut	Program Officer Protective Safety Net Programme
Biera suboffice	
Armandio Fumane	Sub-office Director
Albina Francisco	Program Manager
Xai Xai suboffice	
Ana Taju	Sub-office Director
Hamida Angelo	Senior Programme Assistant
Lucas Matavele	Finance
Bartolomeu David	Field Monitor
Regional Bureau, Johannesburg	
Silvia Biondi	Regional M&E Advisor
Former WFP staff	
Helder Amaral	Former Food Monitor Gaza Flood Response
Lola Castro	Former Country Director
Jeronimo Tovela	Former Country Office Public Information and Communication

List of government stakeholders consulted

Name	Organization/Position (if available)
Maputo	
Aderito Amado	INAS, Technician of Development Programme - PASP
Dalila Tuzine	INAS, Delegate
Herculano Sitoi	INAS, Information Technology
Malaquias Miguel	INAS, Responsible for PASD
Elisa Macaringue	INAS, Administration and Finance
João Ribeiro	INGC, General Director
Marta Manjate	INGC, Director of DARIDAS, Maputo
Esilina	Head of Mitigation Assessment Logistics, Maputo
Maria Madelena Luciano	INGC Delegate, Zambezia Province
Paolo Luis Tomas	INGC, Internal Chief of Technical Department, Zambezia Province
Barbosa da Silva	INGC, Training Lead, Zambezia Province
Amancio Augusto Mueto	INGC Delegate, Gaza Province
Manuel Afonso Maxlhaieie	INGC Technical Lead, Gaza Province
Marcela Limbobo	SETSAN, Coordinator
Dino Buene	SETSAN
Marcelino Sisenado	SETSAN
Samuel Bombe	DPS, Technician of Medicine
Lurdes Luis	DPMAS, Head of Department of Social Services and Women's Affairs
Gaza Province Officials	
Flavio Christiano	Bilene Macia District Permanent Secretary
João	Xai Xai Assistant Program Manager
	Xai Xai District Permanent Secretary
Zambezia Province Officials	
Americo Jeremia Chivale	Provincial Director, Zambezia
Honorio Vaz	Secretary of Data, Zambezia
Pedro Sapage	Namacurra District Administrator
Agusto Biera	Nante, Administrative post

List of additional stakeholders consulted – by district

Maputo	
Name	Organization/Position (if available)
Jerónimo Macuacua	ARA (Associação Rural Africana)
Guillaume Legros	Canadian High Commission, Development Officer
Luisa Sheila	CEDES, Official of Disaster Risk Reduction
Andrew Mattick	FAO
Claudia Pereira	FAO
Andrew Linde	IOM, Officer in Charge
Albino Monteiro	ISAAC Moçambique
Alcides Tumu	KULIMA, Logistics
Domenico Liuzzi	KULIMA, National Director
Fenias Sitefane Siteo	LWF (Lutheran World Federation)
Salomão Tembe	OXFAM, Humanitarian and Food Security Official
Demere Seyoum	Samaritan's Purse
Tania Loforte	Samaritan's Purse, HIV/AIDS National Manager
José Enrique Bonila	UNAIDS, Country Coordinator
Manuela Mwangi	UNDP
Michel Le Pechoux	UNICEF , Emergency Coordinator
Sonia Khan	UNICEF, Nutrition Specialist
Titos Bonde	UNICEF
Fernando Ferreira	UN HABITAT , DRR
Isabel Marquez	UNHCR
Claudio Eugenio Jamal	World Vision International
Isidro Fote	World Vision International
Gaza Province	
Martinho Manhique	Samaritan's Purse, Manager of Food Programme
Roberto Mutisse	Samaritan's Purse, Logistics and Human Resources
Anastasio Pedro Quaria	World Vision, Director of Gaza Province
Philippe Moiane	World Vision, Food Distribution Supervisor
Zambezia Province	
Marianne Byrne	Concern, Country Director
Michael Hanly	Concern HQ Desk Officer (Ireland)
Gilberio Ononadi	Concern, Emergency Coordinator
Angelo' Amaro	Kukumbi, Country Director
Noila Williams	Kukumbi, Development Official
Israel Muba	World Vision, DDR Coordinator
Maratane Camp, Nampula Province	
Alberto Cassimo	Camp Logistic Assistant
Januario M.Mendes	Camp Food Assistant
Jose Alberto dos Santos	Camp Agriculture Officer-DPA
Patria do Rosario Cassamo	Camp Administrator
Ana Scattone	UNHCR, Associate Protection Officer
Rocio de Miguel	UNHCR, Service Officer
Ruth Monjane	UNHCR, Field Assistant

Focus group discussions				
District	Locality	Females	Males	Category
Xai Xai	Bungane		9	Beneficiary
Xai Xai	Bungane	10		Beneficiary
Xai Xai	Bungane	5	6	Non-beneficiary
Guija	Canicado	12		Beneficiary
Guija	Canicado	12		Beneficiary
Guija	Canicado	3	4	Non-beneficiary
Guija	7th of April	1	4	Leader
Guija	7th of April		4	Leader
Guija	7th of April	1	2	Leader
Guija	Toumanine	8	4	Non-beneficiary
Guija	Toumanine	5		Beneficiary
Guija	Toumanine	19	5	Leader
Guija	Toumanine		10	Beneficiary
Guija	Acordos de Lusaka	2	6	Beneficiary and non-beneficiary
Guija	Acordos de Lusaka	6	5	Non-beneficiary
Chokwe	Chihaquelane	15	6	Beneficiary
Chokwe	Chihaquelane	17	3	Beneficiary
Chokwe	Tiwokuine		11	Beneficiary
Chokwe	Tiwokuine	20		Beneficiary
Chokwe	Tiwokuine	1	3	Leader
Nampula	Maratane	2	11	Camp leader
Nampula	Maratane		10	Long-term refugees
Nampula	Maratane	10	20	Beneficiary
Nampula	Maratane		11	Asylum-seeker beneficiary
Nampula	Maratane		8	Refugee beneficiary
Namacurra			6	Beneficiary
Namacurra		15		Beneficiary
Mangaja da Costa		11	7	Non-beneficiary
Mangaja da Costa		9	3	Beneficiary
Mangaja da Costa		12		Beneficiary and non-beneficiary
Mangaja da Costa			15	Beneficiary and non-beneficiary
Mangaja da Costa			3	Leader
Mangaja da Costa		9	9	DRR committee
		Females	Males	
Total		205	185	390
Total FGDs	33			

Annex 8: Qualitative topical outlines

Questions for WFP Country Office and Sub-Offices

The Evaluation Team will elicit the views of WFP staff on the following topics: Context, Relevance, Appropriateness; Results; and Processes that lead to Results

CONTEXT

1. Recent developments in Mozambique's food security situation and impact of regional and global trends.
2. What is the portfolio of WFP operations in Mozambique? How do they relate to national priorities, policies and programmes?
3. Relations with GOM, UN agencies, state of Delivering as One, UNDAF, etc.
4. What social safety net programmes exist in Mozambique in relation to the PRRO and CP?
5. What are the underlying factors of acute and chronic malnutrition in Mozambique and specifically in WFP's areas of operation? Is there a good evidence-based understanding of these?
6. Staff situation internally and with partners (GOM, UN and NGOs) – level of training in SPHERE standards, etc.
7. Level of collaboration between UN and GOM as part of UNDAF and Delivering as One.

APPROPRIATENESS/RELEVANCE

8. Relevance and appropriateness of the WFP PRRO to the food security situation in Mozambique.
9. Relevance and appropriateness of the WFP PRRO versus rest of CO program (CP, etc.) in the current economic and social development trends/ context?
10. Relevance and appropriateness of the PRRO as a vehicle for early recovery activities – by design versus actuals?
11. What has WFP done to ensure programme synergies between the PRRO and the CP?
 - What opportunities exist for strengthening program linkages to achieve greater synergy of food assistance activities?
 - Is there any form of competition between the two programmes?
 - Is there a history of difficulties in finding funding for early recovery activities?
12. What is your impression of the appropriateness and impact of WFP interventions in the areas of:
 - General food distributions (GFD) to disaster affected populations and refugees
 - Food for assets
 - Capacity development on disaster preparedness and response
 - Refugee camps
13. Relevance of current PRRO to the needs of the most severely food insecure, with regard to:
 - Different target groups (disaster relief beneficiaries, FFA beneficiaries)
 - Age-groups;

- PLWHA
 - Disabled
 - Gender-based needs (e.g., Manifestations of gender inequality)
 - Region- and zone-specific food security situation; and
 - Geographic location of target group
14. Coherence of PRRO with WFP Strategic Framework and national and local level priorities.
 15. How are gender issues mainstreamed into the PRRO, per United Nations' UNDAF and donor mandate and policies? Is the knowledge on implementation of those policies sufficient among own staff and cooperating partners?

RESULTS

Overall

16. Extent to which the PRRO has attained planned outputs and whether/how these outputs are expected to lead to realization of operation objectives and/or unintended effects.
 - GFD Emergency Response
 - GFD Refugees
 - FFA
 - CD
17. Efficiency and effectiveness of implementation arrangements for the various programmes, specifically:
 - Partnerships and level of coordination with implementing partners (government counterparts at national/district levels, UN and other international agencies, NGOs).
 - Level of connectedness: implications for design of future programmes?
 - Quality of intelligence used for geographic targeting
 - Targeting of individual communities and households
 - Monitoring the implementation for accountability purposes

DETAILS OF IMPLEMENTATION BY COMPONENT

Food Assistance (GFD)

18. Assessment of needs (both quantity and quality - nutrition)
19. Food basket composition/ration scale: beneficiary preferences and eating habits.
20. WFP food delivery and distribution system / community-based management systems / (post-distribution) monitoring and strategic use of information
21. Involvement of beneficiaries in design, implementation, monitoring and feedback mechanisms
22. Registration and biometrics: perceptions, hardware/software, consistency, coverage
23. Warehousing and transport facilities, supporting infrastructure
24. Funding and food pipelines: pre-financing / erratic funding / invoicing and payment timing / pipeline breaks and bottlenecks
25. HR: adequacy of staffing (quality and quantity), appropriate adjustments commensurate with changes in the level of food assistance
26. Coverage / dropout rates
27. Unintended consequences of food aid: dependency syndrome, consequences for other interventions

28. Coherency with non-food item interventions
29. Relationship of general food distribution with other WFP initiatives and other Clusters Partnerships and level of coordination with implementing partners in food assistance (government counterparts at national/district levels, UN and other international agencies, NGOs).
30. Relationship between programme department and logistics and pipeline monitoring and reporting.
31. Contribution of WFP food distribution programs to capacity strengthening of government commodity management
32. Relationship of CO with Regional Bureau and WFP Headquarters.
33. Promotion of self-reliance and durable solutions through food aid / complementarities with activities by other partners or other agencies for sustainability
34. Alternative models of food assisted programming (Cash & Vouchers)
35. Recommendations for the improvement Food Assistance activities.

GFD – Refugees

In addition:

36. Camp livelihoods: how do households manage their food rations and how do they complement the rations with other resources in order to meet other household needs.
37. How do camp residents interact with the host-community population; what kinds of labour opportunities are there either in the camp or in the host-communities. How are relations between camp residents and host-communities;
38. What kind of self-reliance activities exist for refugees and what is their potential for reducing the need for food assistance?
39. Future aspirations: how do camp residents see their futures, futures of their children, do residents wish to return one day to their homes;
40. Recommendations for the improvement of the general food distribution.

FFA

What have been the challenges to programme implementation?

41. How has targeting been conducted in FFA activities? What is the coverage? What has been successful and where have there been bottlenecks?
42. Are there synergies between the different activities of WFP's portfolio and how do programmes work together?
43. Relationship of FFW/FFW with other WFP initiatives and other Clusters Partnerships. Level of coordination with government counterparts at national/district levels, UN and other international agencies, NGOs.
44. What specific activities by cooperating partners or other agencies complement present PRRO activities to enhance prospects for longer-term sustainability? Are these sufficient?
45. What is the composition of the food basket that is provided for FFA activities? Are there linkages with other WFP programmes such as supplementary feeding?
46. How are priorities for improving infrastructure through FFA activities identified and selected in Mozambique? Are there constraints on what activities can be supported?

47. Describe the quality and impact of infrastructure created through FFA for its beneficiaries. How could infrastructure development be improved to increase the quality and impact on household food and livelihood security? (CO)
48. Is infrastructure built under FFA sustainable? What influences sustainability?
49. What steps does WFP CO in Mozambique take to promote community-based management of food for assets programs? Are there monitoring reports in place?
50. What documentation exists on the impact of FFA activities and their quality?
51. What dialogue is there between WFP and stakeholders to link FFA to national social safety net programmes?

Capacity Development

52. To what extent has WFP contributed to capacity development of government counterparts in terms of material and human capacity? What are the constraints?
53. What have been the primary successes and challenges in building capacity of institutional partners on disaster preparedness and response?
54. How effective has the PRRO been in building the capacity of government counterparts on commodity management, DRM and FSN analysis?
55. To what extent has WFP CO Mozambique's approach to identifying gaps in capacity among institutional partners influenced the effectiveness of PRRO implementation?

PROCESSES THAT LEAD TO RESULTS (INTERNAL)

WFP Internal Coordination / Logistics

56. How has the performance of the PRRO been influenced by changes to funding levels and number of beneficiaries addressed through multiple budget revisions (BR)?
57. What is the role played by the CO Mozambique in securing and allocating funds for the PRRO?
58. Funding: who is monitoring the pre-financing arrangements? Has the pipeline suffered from erratic funding?
59. Is the relationship between the programme department and logistics optimal? How might it be improved?
60. Describe the adequacy of WFP staff dedicated to the PRRO (administrative, project management, logistics, and field staff). Is the HR department in a position to provide comprehensive accounting of staff? Have staffing levels been adjusted and kept commensurate with changes in the level of food assistance provided?
61. How effectively has WFP utilized monitoring data to improve design and implementation of the PRRO?
62. Describe the extent of management and technical support provided by the Regional Bureau and WFP Headquarters. What influence has this support had on the efficiency and effectiveness of the PRRO?

Food Security Situation Analysis and Early Warning

63. What are the underlying factors of food insecurity and poverty—is there a good understanding and statistical proof of the main causes of food insecurity?
64. What reliable data are available on outcome indicators for food security?
65. Is WFP involved in communication of these findings and if so, how?

66. Are additional data available on income, agricultural production, non-agricultural activities, remittances, and other transfers?
67. What constitutes the working relationship between WFP CO Mozambique and SETSAN?
68. What kind of support is received from SADC REWS/PMU and/or IPC Regional Coordinator, GFSC, etc.?
69. What trigger indicators are used for early warning? What are the response thresholds? How are they monitored and at what levels (local, province, national)? Any that are more difficult to monitor than others?
70. How is the EW translated by government and WFP into targeting of the most affected areas?
71. How effective/ efficient is communication regarding triggered response thresholds? What works well? What needs strengthening?
72. Has release of resources been timely? Why/ why not? Implementation of activities been timely following response thresholds?
73. What are the greatest challenges to implementing annual contingency plans?

Monitoring and Analysis

74. How are the projects monitored by the institutional partners, government field experts and by WFP? Suggestions for necessary improvements in the M&E system?
75. To what extent has information provided through monitoring and evaluation exercises led to adaptations/improvements in PRRO design and implementation?
76. To what extent do beneficiaries participate in monitoring the effectiveness of PRRO activities?
77. How well are records kept by institutional partners (accuracy, timeliness, completeness)? What are the challenges with accurate and timely reporting? Is adequate support received?
78. What are the opportunities to strengthen the institutional arrangements and coordination of collection, analysis and dissemination of data in WFP-led food security surveys and food security monitoring systems?
79. How could the participation in (and ownership of) government at different levels be improved related to monitoring of markets and cash transfer values?

Capacity Development

80. What are the opportunities to further strengthen implementation cooperation with governmental and non-governmental partners?
81. What are the opportunities to strengthen the institutional arrangements and coordination of collection, analysis and dissemination of data in WFP-led food security surveys and food security monitoring systems?
82. What opportunities exist for enhancing the participation/and ownership by government counterparts at various levels in WFP cash transfers under relief activities?
83. What exit strategies have WFP designed into its PRRO? How effective have they been?
84. Is the support received from RB in Johannesburg sufficient? What areas could be improved?

Communication & Advocacy

85. How are the PRRO activities perceived by the Government, the Ministries, the parastatal bodies, the NGOs and the general public?
86. How does WFP CO Mozambique communicate with its stakeholders? How might communication with various stakeholders be improved? Who communicates with beneficiaries?

External Coordination

87. How has the relationship with GOM and donors affected level of funding for PRRO?
88. Has the relationship with UNCT had influence on the operations?
89. How have the relationships/ joint efforts with e.g. OCHA, FAO, UNICEF, UNHCR (all cluster leads) have contributed to the PRRO results
90. Why were donors hesitant to fund early recovery (and DRM) activities;

Questions for UN Partners and Bilateral Donors

The Evaluation Team will elicit the views of UN Partners and Bilateral Donors on the following:

CONTEXT

1. The situation in Mozambique pertaining to cyclical occurrence of natural disasters and emergency responses by GOM and international partners
2. WFP Operations in country and the use of the PRRO as framework for responding to emergencies
3. Success of PRRO
4. Linking this PRRO to other programmes in relief and early recovery
5. WFP's role in UNCT and success as to capacity development among local partners

APPROPRIATENESS/RELEVANCE

6. Relevance and appropriateness of the current WFP PRRO to:
 - Current social and economic development trends in Mozambique;
 - Food security situation in Mozambique;
 - Needs of the food insecure population, taking into account: Different target groups (disaster relief beneficiaries, FFA beneficiaries, refugees); age-groups; manifestations of gender inequality;
 - Regional specific food security situation;
7. Coherence of WFP PRRO in respect of:
 - Poverty Reductions Strategy (PRS)
 - Humanitarian Clusters (FS, Nutrition and Refugees)
 - UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and Delivering as One

Effectiveness and Efficiency

8. Extent to which the PRRO has attained planned outputs and whether/how these outputs are expected to lead to realization of operation objectives and/or unintended effects.
 - GFD Emergency Response

- GFD Refugees
 - FFA
 - CD
 - What were the challenges for this programme?
 - Do you have suggestions to improve operations in future
9. Do you feel WFP is sufficiently accountable for its actions, including in selecting modus of intervention (food versus cash & vouchers)
 10. How well do the WFP programmes mainstream gender issues according to the United Nations' and donor mandate and policies? Is the knowledge on implementation of those policies sufficient among cooperating partners?

Partnerships and Coordination

11. Partnerships:
 - Is the number of partners cooperating in the implementation of PRRO adequate?
 - Is the capacity of institutional partners to provide sufficient complementary inputs, required material and logistical support to implement the programmes adequate?
 - Sufficient complementary activities by other partners or other agencies to complement WFP activities to enhance prospects for sustainability?
 - Opportunities to strengthen implementation cooperation with governmental and non-governmental partners?
12. Are the programmes adequately monitored by the institutional partners, government field experts and by WFP?
13. How much has your organization been involved in the design of PRRO activities?
14. What food security, nutrition and health and rural development programmes is your organization involved with and how are you coordinating with WFP?
15. What changes would you propose for future WFP programmes in your field of activities?
16. What opportunities exist for strengthening program linkages to achieve greater synergy between WFP and partner institution food assistance activities?
17. Are the donor countries organised to guarantee a sustained funding for food assistance activities targeting PRRO beneficiaries?
18. What is the nature of the relationship between WFP and partner UN agencies?
Contributions/role of WFP to Humanitarian Clusters, UNDAF and Delivering as One.

Questions for Government Counterparts

The Evaluation Team will elicit the views of Government counterparts on the following:

CONTEXT

1. The situation in Mozambique pertaining to cyclical occurrence of natural disasters and emergency responses by GOM and international partners
2. WFP Operations in country and the use of the PRRO as framework for responding to emergencies and early recovery activities
3. Opportunities of linking this PRRO to other programmes and social safety nets

4. WFP's role in UNCT and success as to capacity development for GOM in DRM and Emergency Preparedness and Response, etc. Challenges to capacity development for GoM.

APPROPRIATENESS/RELEVANCE

5. Relevance and appropriateness of the current WFP PRRO to:
 - Current social and economic development trends in Mozambique;
 - Policy priorities and programmes set out by GOM;
 - Needs of the food insecure population, taking into account:
 - i. Different target groups (disaster relief beneficiaries, FFA beneficiaries, refugees)
 - ii. Age-groups;
 - iii. Manifestations of gender inequality;

Effectiveness and Efficiency

6. Do you view this PRRO to be successful?
 - What aspects were successful and which not so?
 - What were the challenges for this programme?
 - Do you have suggestions to improve operations in future
7. Specific role/involvement of your ministry/government institution in PRRO implementation and monitoring?
8. Regarding this PRRO, is there a gap between resources/ expertise mobilized and resources/ expertise required? What is WFP's resource mobilization capacity? How satisfied are you with WFP?
9. What changes have been made to the original PRRO design? Do you know the reasons behind changes?
10. What is the performance of WFP MOZ CO and decentralized offices? How inclusive is the CO regarding decision-making/ human resources/ coordination and communication internally and with important partners like yourself?
11. What is WFP's capacity to adapt and mitigate external factors such as financial opportunities and risks? How effective is WFP's ability to monitor and make changes?

Partnerships and Coordination

12. How much has the GOM been considered in the design of the PRRO?
13. What are the relevant coordination structures where you work with WFP?
14. What changes would you propose for future WFP programmes in your field of activities?
15. What opportunities exist for strengthening program linkages to achieve greater synergy between WFP and partner institutions food assistance activities?
16. What is the quality of implementation partnerships? How appropriate are criteria and processes to select partners/ adherence to these criteria?
17. What is the quality of support provided to partners? How would you qualify the level of engagement, communication with, and decision-making by partners?

Capacity Development

18. Are you pleased with capacity development received from WFP? What does this support encompass?
19. Level of coordination between various government institutions involved in implementation of the PRRO?
20. Does the current PRRO contribute to addressing and mitigating Mozambique's food security problem? How?
21. How are projects monitored by the institutional partners, government field experts and by WFP? Suggestions for necessary improvements in the M&E system?
22. Capacity-building initiated by WFP: in line with national priorities? Actual capacity building requirements of national/local partners?
23. Appropriateness of food ration commodities and ration scale, including their appropriateness regarding beneficiary food preferences and food preparation.
24. How efficient is the targeting for GFD and the cash voucher program under relief?
25. What is government involvement in design and implementation of cash voucher under relief activities, and what is the government plan for future support of these activities?

Logistics/Communication

26. Does the Government of Mozambique consider itself well informed of the activities WFP has conducted under the PRRO?
27. Has the Government offered warehousing and transport facilities? Did WFP approach the Government on these issues?
28. Have the Government and WFP jointly reviewed the road infrastructure? Has the possibility for joint ventures been explored between Govt., WFP and other UN agencies to rebuild, rehabilitate, upgrade certain road sections, or bridges?
29. Has the Government been consulted when WFP is designing its capacity building programme for Mozambique? Are the priorities defined and agreed upon?
30. To what extent is the GOM in a position to facilitate programme convergence/synergy among different UN Agencies and with respect to Government policies?
31. What mechanisms are in place between WFP and the GOM to monitor the food situation in the country and act upon the findings?
32. What is the attitude of the GOM toward local NGOs? Do they receive support from the Government? Is the Government involved in the selection of NGOs?
33. Is the Government taking active interest in the functioning of the UNCT, IASC? As partner? As facilitator?
34. What is the exit strategy for WFP? Is the subject open for discussion? Is it on the agenda of WFP? Of the Government? Of both?

Infrastructure (FFA)

35. How are priorities for improving infrastructure identified and selected in Mozambique? Are there constraints on what activities can be supported? What dialogue is there between WFP and stakeholders to promote the selection of effective and sustainable programs to be supported by FFA?
36. Is there any documentation on quality and impact of FFA activities?

Questions for Non-Governmental Organizations

The Evaluation Team will elicit the views of Non-Governmental Organizations on the following:

CONTEXT

1. The situation in Mozambique pertaining to cyclical occurrence of natural disasters and emergency responses by GOM and international partners
2. WFP Operations in country and the use of the PRRO as framework for responding to emergencies and early recovery activities
3. Opportunities of linking this PRRO to other programmes and social safety nets
4. Specific role/involvement of your NGO in the current WFP programme.

APPROPRIATENESS/RELEVANCE

5. What is your impression of the appropriateness and impact of WFP interventions in the areas of:
 - General food distributions (GFD) to disaster affected populations and refugees
 - Food for assets
 - Capacity development on disaster preparedness and response
 - Refugee camps
6. Relevance of current PRRO to the needs of the most severely food insecure, with regard to:
 - Different target groups (disaster relief beneficiaries, FFA beneficiaries)
 - Age-groups;
 - PLWH
 - Disabled

EFFECTIVENESS & EFFICIENCY

7. Does the current WFP operation contribute to addressing and mitigating malnutrition?
8. Appropriateness of food ration commodities and ration scale, including their appropriateness regarding beneficiary food preferences.
9. Degree of community participation in selection of activities, planning of implementation, targeting, food distributions and monitoring: can this be further strengthened, taking gender specific and age-group differences into account?
10. What kind of complementary inputs/activities (indicate type) that cannot be provided by WFP as per its mandate are being provided by your organization? Which additional institution/partner/donor could feasibly provide as well support?
11. Are regular discussions with your organization and WFP held to harmonize the food security and rural development interventions done by different organizations?

12. Describe the nature of your organization's participation in the design of PRRO activities.
13. What kind of changes would you propose for future WFP programmes in your field of activities?
14. Regarding this PRRO, is there a gap between resources/ expertise mobilized and resources/ expertise required? What is WFP's resource mobilization capacity? How satisfied are you with WFP?
15. What changes have been made to the original PRRO design? Do you know the reasons behind any changes?
16. What is the performance of WFP MOZ CO and decentralized offices? How inclusive is the CO regarding decision-making/ human resources/ coordination and communication internally and with important partners like yourself?
17. What is WFP's capacity to adapt and mitigate external factors such as financial opportunities and risks? How effective is WFP's ability to monitor and make changes?

Partnerships and Coordination

18. What is the quality of implementation partnerships?
19. How appropriate are criteria and processes to select partners? Does WFP adhere to these criteria?
20. What is the quality of support provided to partners? How would you qualify the level of engagement, communication with, and decision-making by partners


Logistics

21. Describe the selection process leading to your organization's involvement in the PRRO. Have you experienced the selection process as open and fair? Both for national and international NGOs? What were the main criteria for retaining the services of your NGO?
22. Explain how WFP assessed the capabilities and the technical know-how of your NGO?
23. Did your NGO encounter problems when negotiating the field-level agreement (FLA) and the practical modalities of the services you were expected to provide? Was the FLA automatically extended once expired?
24. Did you receive guidance and assistance when working out your budget? Was an agreement easily reached on fixed and variable costs? Are you satisfied with the rates agreed upon? Are the rates realistic?
25. How are the operations planned between your NGO and WFP?
26. Explain the procedure for submitting your invoices with supporting documents to WFP?
27. How long does it take for your invoices to be approved by program, logistics and finance departments inside the WFP? To be paid in your bank account? In case of

dispute are disputes solved in a fair and expeditious way? Any claims outstanding between your NGO and WFP?

28. Have you benefited from initial funding or were you given equipment on hire, on lease, on deposit: vehicles, IT equipment, communication facilities?
29. Have you suffered from pipeline breaks? How often? How long? For what commodities? Were you notified in advance?
30. Have you benefited from short or long term capacity building or training programmes provided by WFP or other UN agencies. Were the programmes useful? Have these programmes strengthened your organization?
31. Is your NGO involved in post-distribution monitoring exercises? Are you conducting these monitoring exercises on your own, in association with WFP? With other UN agencies?
32. Describe your experience with WFP commodity management practices. How might commodity management be improved for the current PRRO?
33. Have you experienced any staff poaching? By other NGOs? By WFP?
34. How you characterize your institution's relationship with WFP? Is it driven by trust? Common views on assisting beneficiaries?
35. Has WFP extended security services to your staff? For your office compound? For your warehouses and storage facilities?

Infrastructure (FFA)

36. How are priorities for improving infrastructure through FFW activities identified and selected in Mozambique? Are there constraints on what activities can be supported? What dialogue is there between WFP and stakeholders to promote the selection of effective and sustainable programs to be supported using FFW?
 37. Is there any documentation on impact of FFW activities and their quality?
- 

Questions for Communities and Beneficiaries

General (all communities)

1. What change have the WFP activities brought about in your community? Have these been positive or negative? Please explain.
2. What can be changed to improve the implementation of these activities?
3. Do you receive food or cash assistance?
4. Is the food provided by WFP adequate and appropriate? What suggestions do you have to improve the assistance provided by WFP?
5. Are you familiar with cash voucher programs? If so, do you believe a cash voucher programme would meet your needs? Describe perceived advantages and disadvantages.
6. Have you been involved in selection of activities, planning of implementation, targeting, food distributions and monitoring: can this be further strengthened, taking gender specific and age-group differences into account?
7. What inputs/activities not provided by WFP are also needed (indicate type)?
8. What are the challenges currently faced by your community that require assistance by Government, the United Nations, donors, or NGOs? How often have you received support in the past 5 years?
9. What is the situation with regard to production of crops and livestock in your area? Has the food security situation in your area changed in the last 5 years, if so in what way?
10. What are the main causes of food insecurity in your area? What causes effect you most?
11. How many meals do you eat per day, for how many months of the year?
12. Have you had to sell any of your assets in the last year and not been able to replace them? What is your impression of the appropriateness and impact of WFP interventions in the areas of:
 13. General food distributions (GFD) and food for assets (FFA)
14. From your point of view what are the most pressing issues in your community in food security, agriculture, and rural development?

GFD target communities (relief and refugees)

15. *The process*: how does the GFD work (from the perspective of the beneficiaries)—how are beneficiaries registered, how does the targeting work, the make-up of the Food Management Committee, how is the food distributed and then transported to home and stored (sick and elderly), what concerns do the beneficiaries have regarding the process;
16. Do you consider the WFP procedure for the selection of beneficiaries fair and correct?
17. Are the scoops, measures and gauges calibrated/validated at regular intervals?

18. Is there a way you can report problems related to food distributions (e.g., misuse, threats)
19. *Distribution efficiency*: pipeline breaks or reductions in ration size, how do families adjust;
20. Do you have the possibility to check your ration on departing from the FDP area? Weighing scales?
21. Are the households visited by WFP monitoring officers? Post distribution monitoring?
22. The quality of the ration: is the food quantity and mix adequate for the needs of the household, do any households experience food insecurity (and why), is the food of good quality (insect and disease-free, etc.), how is the food prepared, what supplementary foods are added to the diet (fresh foods, etc.), what concerns about food quality;
23. Sale of food to purchase non-food items; what particular non-food items are sought out, how does the market for food sales (and purchases) function, how much sharing of food occurs;
24. Recommendations for the improvement of the general food distribution.

For refugees in camp:

25. How is the registration of refugees conducted and what role does WFP play in this? What (case) information management system has been implemented?
26. Sources of income for camp families: what types of camp livelihoods, relationships with the host-communities;
27. Future aspirations: how do camp residents see their futures, futures of their children, do residents wish to return one day to their homes;

FFA

28. Why were you selected to receive food rations through the FFW activity? Who can participate? Who cannot? (What were the criteria for selecting people to receive food rations?)
29. Do you consider the WFP procedure for the selection of FFW participants fair and correct? Why? Why not?
30. Are there any factors that make it easier for some people to participate compared to others? Describe? How many women are included in the activities? Are women with small children able to participate in FFA projects? Why / why not?
31. Are PLWHA or their HHs engaged in the activities? How are they accommodated?
32. Which specific period of the year did you participate in FFW? What other activities do you normally do during that period?
33. Quality and size of ration? Is the food quantity and mix adequate for the needs of the household, do any households experience food insecurity (and why), is the food of good quality (insect and disease-free, etc.), how is the food prepared, what

supplementary foods are added to the diet (fresh foods, etc.), what concerns about food quality.

34. Do people sell food to purchase non-food items? Which non-food items are sought out?
35. Is there a need for FFW community projects in this area? What type of projects are/ would be most beneficial?
36. How are community projects identified, selected, and monitored; do any groups have more input than others? Who?
37. Do the activities selected meet the needs of the community?
38. What benefits in this community are the result of FFA projects? Any problems as a result of FFA activities?
39. Has the community required/received technical assistance on infrastructure construction? Who provided the assistance, and what type? What technical assistance is needed to ensure community improvements last a long time?
40. What changes do you see as a result of FFA activities?
41. Has the entire community benefitted from FFA interventions? How? What were the gains?
42. Were there negative effects from FFA activities?
43. Have FFA activities helped the community reduce disaster risks? How?
44. Have FFA activities reduced any negative impact on environment?
45. How is infrastructure maintained? How are funds raised to operate and maintain infrastructure?
46. Are people willing to maintain infrastructure built with FFA without rations in the future?
47. Recommendations for the improvement of the food for assets activities.

Annex 9: Team composition

Team Members	Primary Role	Specific tasks within the Evaluation
René Verduijn International evaluator	Team leader Component focus: relief and refugee; Provide support to early recovery and capacity development components	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Lead the evaluation mission – Overall guidance and coordination of the evaluation team – Design evaluation approach methodology – Oversee data analysis, aide memoire and evaluation workshop, and evaluation report
Laurie Starr International evaluator	Component focus: Early recovery, gender, Government of Mozambique capacity development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Conduct desk review – Contribute to methodology design/data collection tools – Participate in exit debriefing – Contribute to final report: early recovery and capacity development components; gender overview
Lourdes Fidalgo National evaluator	Focus: Nutrition; Provide support to relief, recovery, and refugee components	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Conduct desk review – Participate in exit debriefing – Contribute to final report, relief, recovery, refugee components

Annex 10: Logical frameworks for PRRO 200355

Logical framework 0.0 that informed the design of PRRO 200355		
Results Chain	Performance Indicators	Risks, Assumptions
Strategic Objective 1: save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies		
Outcomes 1.1 Improved food consumption over assistance period for targeted emergency-affected households (<i>Relief beneficiaries & Vulnerable Refugees + New Arrivals</i>)	1.1.1 Household Food Consumption Score <i>Target: percentage of households with food consumption score 21/42 in 100% of targeted households</i> <i>Source: annual survey</i>	National strategies will seek integrated approaches allowing expanded recovery and social-protection programming for disaster response. The political and economic environment have a direct impact on Government priorities and budgets and therefore on the ability of WFP to hand over the management of all emergency response and early recovery activities to INGC and government structures. The ability and willingness of the Group of 19 Direct Budget Support Donors (G19) to create one common fund to respond to emergencies is critical. Reliability of WFP's contribution to joint programme opportunities with Government, civil society and other United Nations agencies may be impaired by resource and food supply limitations.
Outputs Output 1.1: Food and non-food items distributed in sufficient quantity and quality to target groups of women, men, girls and boys under secure conditions	1.1.1. Number of women, men, girls and boys receiving food and non-food items, by category and as % of planned figures <i>Target: above 60%</i> 1.1.2. Tonnage of food distributed, by type, as % of planned distribution <i>Target: above 80%</i>	
Strategic Objective 3: restore and rebuild lives and livelihoods in post-conflict, post-disaster or transition situations		
Outcomes 3.1 Adequate food consumption over assistance period for targeted households and communities. (<i>Early Recovery Beneficiaries & Old caseload Refugees</i>)	3.1.1 Household food consumption score <i>Target: percentage of households with food consumption score that exceed 35/42</i> <i>Source: annual monitoring/survey data</i> 3.1.2 Coping Strategy Index <i>Target: Coping Strategy Index decreased from base level</i>	The political environment, strategic priorities and budget allocations support hand-over of management of food-based support programmes to government counterparts.
Outputs Output 3.1 Food and non-food items distributed in sufficient quantity and quality to target groups of	3.1.1. Number of women, men, girls and boys receiving food and non-food items, by category and as % of planned figures	

Logical framework 0.0 that informed the design of PRRO 200355

Results Chain	Performance Indicators	Risks, Assumptions
women, men, girls and boys under secure conditions	<p><i>Target: above 60%</i></p> <p>3.1.2. Tonnage of food distributed, by type, as % of planned distribution <i>Target: above 80%</i></p> <p>3.1.3. Quantity of fortified foods, complementary foods and special nutritional products distributed, by type, as % of planned distribution <i>Target: above 60%</i></p> <p>3.1.5 Number of women and men trained in livelihood-support thematic areas <i>Target: 50/year</i></p>	
<i>Strategic Objective 5: strengthen the capacities of countries to reduce hunger, including through hand-over strategies and local purchase</i>		
<p><u>Outcomes</u></p> <p>5.2 Progress made towards nationally owned hunger solutions</p>	<p>5.2.1 National Capacity Index <i>Target: 16 (Agreement signed with GoM/ INGC with flexible strategy to absorb emergency recovery needs by 2013)</i></p>	
<p><u>Outputs</u></p> <p>Output 5.1: Developed capacity and awareness through WFP-organized actions/training</p>	<p>5.1.1. Number of people trained, disaggregated by gender and category on Emergency Food Security Assessment (EFSA) / Emergency Nutrition Assessment (ENA); Emergency Telecommunications Cluster (ETC) and emergency response (WFP, national government and partner staff). <i>Target: 100 people trained</i></p>	

Logframe 0.1 for the project 200355: Assistance to Vulnerable Groups and Disaster Affected Populations in Mozambique

The PRRO will provide food assistance in support of response and early recovery activities, targeting disaster affected as well as displaced persons who have sought refuge in Mozambique due to adverse conditions in the Horn of Africa. WFP will also take steps to strengthen the capacity of the Government to take over the operational elements of such interventions. Specifically, WFP will assist the Government to strengthen the surge capacity of the National Institute for Disaster Management (INGC) to realise a more timely and effective response to emergencies by providing capacity development support in the area of emergency preparedness and response, especially at provincial and district levels.

LOGICAL FRAMEWORK		
Results	Performance indicators	Assumptions
Cross-cutting indicators		
Cross-cutting result 1 GENDER: Gender equality and empowerment improved	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▸ Proportion of assisted women and men (together) who make decisions over the use of cash, voucher or food within the household <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Target: > 50 (Dec 2014) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Location: Zambezia ◦ Activity: FFA • Target: > 50 (Dec 2014) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Location: Gaza ◦ Activity: FFA • Target: > 50 (Dec 2014) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Location: Sofala ◦ Activity: FFA • Target: > 50 (Dec 2014) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Location: Maputo ◦ Activity: FFA • Target: 50 (Dec 2014) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Location: Nampula ◦ Activity: FFA 	
Cross-cutting result 2 PARTNERSHIP: Food assistance interventions coordinated and partnerships developed and maintained	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▸ Number of partner organizations that provide complementary inputs and services <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Target: 1 (Dec 2014) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Location: Zambezia ◦ Activity: FFA • Target: 3 (Dec 2014) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Location: Gaza ◦ Activity: FFA • Target: 1 (Dec 2014) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Location: Sofala ◦ Activity: FFA • Target: 2 (Dec 2014) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Location: Maputo ◦ Activity: FFA 	

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Target: 1 (Dec 2014) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Location: Nampula ◦ Activity: GD 	
SO1: Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies		
<p>Outcome SO1.1</p> <p>Stabilized or improved food consumption over assistance period for targeted households and/or individuals</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ FCS: percentage of households with poor Food Consumption Score (female-headed) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Target: > 0 (Dec 2014) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Location: communities and districts affected by natural disasters ◦ Source: Secondary data ◦ Notes: % of assisted households with poor food consumption ▶ FCS: percentage of households with poor Food Consumption Score (male-headed) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Target: 0 (Dec 2014) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Location: communities and districts affected by natural disasters ◦ Source: Secondary data ◦ Notes: % of assisted households with poor food consumption 	<p>National strategies will seek integrated approaches allowing expanded recovery and social-protection programming for disaster response. The political and economic environment have a direct impact on Government priorities and budgets and therefore on the ability of WFP to hand over the management of all emergency response and early recovery activities to INGC and government structures. The ability and willingness of the Group of 19 direct budget support donors (G19) to create one common fund to respond to emergencies is critical.</p>
<p>Outcome SO1.2</p> <p>National institutions, regional bodies and the humanitarian community are enabled to prepare for, assess and respond to emergencies</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ EPCI: Emergency Preparedness and Response Capacity Index <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Target: 15 (Dec 2014) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Location: National level ◦ Source: Secondary data 	<p>National strategies will seek integrated approaches allowing expanded recovery and social protection programming for disaster response</p>
<p>Output SO1.1</p> <p>Food, nutritional products and non-food items, cash transfers and vouchers distributed in sufficient quantity, quality and in a timely manner to targeted beneficiaries</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Number of women, men, boys and girls receiving food assistance (disaggregated by activity; beneficiary category, sex, food, non-food items, cash transfers and vouchers) as % of planned ▶ Quantity of food assistance distributed, as % of planned distribution (disaggregated by type) 	<p>National strategies will seek integrated approaches allowing expanded recovery and social-protection programming for disaster response. The political and economic environment have a direct impact on Government priorities and budgets and therefore on the ability of WFP to hand over the management of all emergency response and early recovery activities to INGC and government structures. The ability and willingness of the Group of 19 direct budget support donors (G19) to create one common fund to respond to emergencies is critical.</p>
<p>Output SO1.2</p> <p>Emergency management capacity created and/or supported</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Number of people trained (disaggregated by sex and type of training) ▶ Number of technical assistance activities provided by type 	

SO2: Support or restore food security and nutrition and establish or rebuild livelihoods in fragile settings and following emergencies		
<p>Outcome SO2.1</p> <p>Capacity developed to address national food insecurity needs</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ NCI: Food security programmes National Capacity Index <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Target: 15 (Dec 2014) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Location: National level ◦ Source: Secondary data 	<p>The political and economic environment have a direct impact on Government priorities and budgets and therefore on the ability of WFP to hand over the management of all emergency response and early recovery activities to INGC and government structures.</p>
<p>Output SO2.1</p> <p>Policy advice and technical support provided to enhance management of food supply chain, food assistance, nutrition and food security systems including food security information systems</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Number of technical support activities provided on food security monitoring and food assistance, by type ▶ Number of national assessments/data collection exercises in which food security and nutrition were integrated with WFP support 	

Annex 11: Geographical targeting for Mozambique Country Programme

Fighting Hunger Worldwide

WFP
World Food Programme
wfp.org

Discussion of the Geographical Targeting for Mozambique CP

1

Fighting Hunger Worldwide

WFP
World Food Programme
wfp.org

Focus of 2012-2015 CP Building resilience and reducing risk

Risk and vulnerability equation

Exposure to Hazard

*

Vulnerability to Hazard

→

Risk Analysis

Process it prioritise areas:




- Identify areas with greatest exposure to different shocks
- Prioritise areas with highest average percentage of people affected

2

Fighting Hunger Worldwide

WFP
World Food Programme
wfp.org

Step 1 Frequency of Hazards and Geographic Prioritisation

3 Main types of shocks – repeating 1-3 times in the last eight years

Number of times districts affected by the different types of shocks (droughts, floods, cyclones)

3

Fighting Hunger Worldwide

WFP
World Food Programme
wfp.org


Step 2 Food Security Geographic Differentiation FEWSNET Outlooks – 2007 to 2009:

District classification area based on 21 FEWS Food Security Updates

- Generally Food Secure:** Districts that we continually classified as food secure over the 2 years
- Generally Food Security with Seasonal Deterioration:** Areas that were classified as food secure except for 2-3 reports
- Moderately Food Insecure with Seasonal Improvement:** Areas that were typically classified as being food insecure with less than 10 reports classifying the areas as food secure
- Moderately Food Insecure:** Areas that were consistently classified as food insecure

Limitation

- Unable to determine number of people affected




4

Step 3 – Seasonal Variation in Food Security Geographic Differentiation FEWSNET Outlooks – 2007 to 2009



Using the same classification describe in the previous slide, seasonal changes in district food security mapped

- Southern region**
 - Generally Food Secure or Generally Food Security with Seasonal Deterioration between April and September
 - Moderately Food Insecure with Seasonal Improvement or Moderately Food Insecure between October and March
- Central region**
 - Generally Food Security with Seasonal Deterioration or Moderately Food Insecure with Seasonal Improvement between July to September and January to March
 - Moderately Food Insecure with Seasonal or Moderately Food Insecure between April to June



- Limitation**
- Unable to determine number of people affected

Fighting Hunger Worldwide


5

Step 4 – Severity of Food Insecurity VAC Assessments 2004 to 2009 :



Based on the findings of the 20 VAC Assessments between 2004 and 2009

- Number of people classified as food insecure by VAC seasonal assessments
- This number was then average over the total five years to identify areas of an average higher number of affected people



- Limitation**
- Districts with higher populations exposed to the same hazard will have a higher number of people affected

Fighting Hunger Worldwide


6

Step 5 – Relative Severity of Food Insecurity VAC Assessments 2004 to 2009 :



Based on the findings of the 20 VAC Assessments between 2004 and 2009

- The percentage of the population affected for each of the assessments was calculated
- The percentage of the population affected was averaged over the 20 VAC assessments



- Limitation**
- Districts with low populations but greater recurring vulnerability/ higher percentage of the population affected are ranked higher

Fighting Hunger Worldwide

7

Step 6a: Estimated Population Caseloads



Average Percentage of Population Affected	Number of Districts	Average Number of People Affected	Estimated Number of Chronically Vulnerable and Food Insecure People	Estimated Emergency Caseload (Surge)
<1 %	82	117,636	54,817	6,142
1%	11	71,532	49,518	23,591
2 %	10	107,330	53,476	93,590
3 %	6	60,912	26,809	61,621
4 %	2	10,971	3,182	16,689
5 %	4	42,201	17,834	51,211
6 %	6	65,186	32,382	67,057
7 %	2	33,502	8,951	59,011
9 %	2	16,566	5,649	23,027
10 %	2	14,125	3,823	21,805
11 %	3	58,592	21,571	81,885
12 %	8	103,559	24,566	152,239
16 %	3	35,147	11,719	57,255
17 %	2	21,792	7,113	27,207
18 %	1	4,885	867	6,804
23 %	1	7,617	3,323	6,367
Grand Total	145	771,553	329,000	755,502

Fighting Hunger Worldwide

8

Step 6b: Estimated Population Caseloads



Explanation of Columns

- **Number of Districts** – Number of districts with the indicated average percentage of the population affected
- **Average Number of People Affected** – The sum of the average of the number of people affected between 2004 and 2009 based on the VAC's assessments
- **Estimated Number of Chronically Vulnerable and Food Insecure People** - The sum of the average percentage of the population **repeatedly/chronically** affected by hazards multiplied by the District's population
- **Estimated Emergency Caseload (Surge)** – The sum of the estimated number of people that are potentially at risk of being affected by a hazard (include caseload above)


Recommendations for Operations



- **Priority Areas**
 - Red and Orange Districts – 72,982 people
- **Secondary Areas**
 - Yellow – 64,816 people
- **Surge/PRRO caseload**
 - Estimated average population at risk of becoming food insecure during a hazard (based on average historical caseloads between 2004 and 2009 in areas affected 2-3 times in the past 8 years)
 - Drought – 426,188
 - Flood – 313,193
 - Cyclone – 36,898


Annex 12: Additional tables and figures

Figure 4: Beneficiaries by component, as a percentage of all beneficiaries 2012-2014



Source: PRRO 200355 output monitoring data bases 2012,2013,2014. Calculations by TANGO International

Figure 5: Tonnage by component, as a % of all tonnage 2012-2014



Source: PRRO 200355 output monitoring data bases 2012,2013,2014. Calculations by TANGO International

Figure 6: Actual versus planned (operational) food tonnage distributed, by activity and year




Table 7: Expanded summary of relief outputs attained, by year

Output 1.1: Food and non-food items distributed in sufficient quantity and quality to target groups of women, men, girls and boys under secure conditions (Relief beneficiaries, vulnerable refugees, and new arrivals)			
Output 1.1.1 Number of women, men, girls and boys¹¹¹ receiving food and non-food items, by category and as % of planned figures			
	2012	2013	2014¹¹²
# of people receiving rations <i>(Relief beneficiaries, vulnerable refugees, and new arrivals)</i>	71,324	266,664	21,225
% of output attained compared to project planning figures <i>Target: > 60 % of planned figures</i>	28.2	116.7	265.3
% of output attained compared to operational planning figures	109.0	168.2	96.8
1.1.2. Tonnage of food distributed, by type, as % of planned distribution			
Metric tonnage of food distributed	3100	6133	420
% of output attained compared to project planning figures <i>Target: > 80 % of planned figures</i>	39.4	114.4	86.1
% of output attained compared to operational planning figures	92.1	77.4	74.7
Type of Commodity	% of output attained compared to operational planning figures.		
<i>Cereals</i>	97.4	73.7	77.1
<i>Pulses</i>	58.5	91.1	71.0
<i>CSB+</i>	-	-	94.7
<i>Oil</i>	-	44.9	56.7
<i>Salt</i>	19.4	70.6	0
Source: PRRO 200355 output monitoring data bases 2012,2013,2014. Calculations by TANGO International			

¹¹¹ The ET is unable to determine the source of values for sex- and age-disaggregated data reported in SPR 2012 and 2013 and thus does not report them. Please see paragraph 133 for details.

¹¹² Analysis for January – April only.

Table 8: Expanded summary of early recovery and capacity development outputs attained, by year

Output 3.1 Food and non-food items distributed in sufficient quantity and quality to target groups of women, men, girls and boys under secure conditions			
3.1.1. Number of women, men, girls and boys¹¹³ receiving food and non-food items, by category and as % of planned figures			
	2012	2013	2014¹¹⁴
Number of people receiving food through FFA activities	5200	98,745	37,830
% of output attained compared to project planning figures <i>Target: > 60 % of planned figures</i>	10.6	44.8	19.1
% of output attained compared to operational planning figures.	36.6	144.8	100.0
3.1.2. Tonnage of food distributed, by type, as % of planned distribution			
% of output attained compared to project planning figures <i>Target: > 80 % of planned figures</i>	5.0%	49.1	15.1
% of output attained compared to operational planning figures	36.6	104.7	93.6
Type of Commodity	% of output attained compared to operational planning figures.		
<i>Cereals</i>	36.8	104.9	92.0
<i>Pulses</i>	35.3	106.6	100.0
<i>CSB+</i>			
<i>Oil</i>	-	76.2	-
<i>Salt</i>	None planned		
3.1.3. Quantity of fortified foods, complementary foods and special nutritional products distributed, by type, as % of planned distribution <i>Target: > 60 % of planned figures</i>	No planned distribution		
3.1.4. Number of community assets restored by targeted communities and individuals, by type and unit of measure	2013		
Asset	Planned	Actual	% of output attained compared to planned figures
<i>Hectares of land cleared</i>	21	35	166.7
<i>Kilometres of feeder roads built (FFA) and maintained (self-help)</i>	215	237	110.2
<i># of assisted communities with improve physical infrastructure to mitigate the impact of shocks, in place as a result of project assistance</i>	80	80	100.0
<i># of bridges rehabilitated</i>	13	52	400.0
<i># of latrines constructed or rehabilitated</i>	17	17	100.0
3.1.5 Number of women and men trained in livelihood-support thematic areas. <i>Target: 50/year</i>	Not monitored or reported		
Source: PRRO 200355 output monitoring data bases 2012,2013,2014. Calculations by TANGO International. Source of data for Output 3.1.4 is SPR 2013.			

¹¹³ The ET is unable to determine the source of values for sex- and age-disaggregated data reported in SPR 2012 and 2013 and thus does not report them. Please see paragraph 133 for details.

¹¹⁴ Analysis for January – April only.

Table 8, continued. Expanded summary of early recovery and capacity development outputs attained by year		
Output 5.1: Developed capacity and awareness through WFP-organized actions/training		
	2012	2013
5.1.1. Number of people trained, disaggregated by gender and category on EFSA / ENA); ETC and emergency response (WFP, national government and partner staff). <i>Target: 100 people trained</i>	32	53
Type of training		
<i>EFSA</i>		29
<i>Emergency Nutrition Assessment</i>	0	0
<i>Emergency telecommunications cluster</i>	0	0
<i>Emergency response</i>	0	0
<i>Risk mapping</i>	8	8
<i>Outcome monitoring</i>		24
<i>Enumerators for CP baseline</i>	24	0
Source: Word document supplied by CO, 7.22.2014 titled "People trained in 2012 and 2013".		

Table 9: Summary of PRRO outcome indicators, results reported by Country Office in SPRs and during final evaluation					
Outcomes		Target	2012 Baseline^a	Feb 2013^b	July 2013^c
SO 1	<i>Outcome 1.1 Improved food consumption over assistance period for targeted emergency-affected households</i>				
	Household FCS	% of HH with score \geq to 21	20	20	72
SO 3	<i>Outcome 3.1 Adequate food consumption over assistance period for targeted households and communities</i>				
	Household FCS	% of HH with score $>$ 35	20	20	72
	Coping strategy index	Decrease from baseline	20	16.5	12
SO 5	<i>Outcome 5.2 Progress made towards nationally owned hunger solutions</i>				
	National capacity index	16	10	Not tracked	
^a WFP. 2012. Mozambique WFP Country Programme. Food Security Baseline/ Beneficiary Profiling.					
^b Source unknown. Presumably an August 2013 midterm review of the Country Programme.					
^c Government of Mozambique and Food Security Cluster. 2013. Emergency Food Security Assessment in Gaza Province.					

Note: the ET does not find reported baseline data to be valid. Please see paragraphs 103-106 for an explanation.

Annex 13: Planned rations and nutritional values versus field observations

Table 10: Original and adjusted GFD rations				
Program	Planned rations	Nutrition value of planned ration	Changes to planned ration (2013)	Nutrition value of modified ration (2013)
GFD 90 days per year	Person /day 267 g Maize 40 g Beans No oil	1081 kcal	Person/Day 400 g Maize fortified 60g Beans 25 g Oil fortified 50 g CSB +	2034 kcal
Sources: WFP. 2011. Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation – Mozambique PRRO 200355. Project Design Document. WFP. 2014. Budget revision 3: Narrative, Mozambique Project No.200355				
Observations in the field regarding food distribution		kcal value of ration distributed per day per person	Nutrition value of food distributed	
Gaza (general) Month/Family Maize - 40 kg ¹¹⁵ Beans- 5 or 6 kg		1081 kcal or 1057	Maize- 40kg (267g) kcal/day/person -945 kcal Beans-6kg (40g) kcal/day/person-136kcal (considering 6 kg) TOTAL= 1081 kcal Or Maize 267g kcal/day/person -945 kcal Beans (calculated with 5kg) Kcal/day/person 33g- 112 kcal TOTAL= 1057 kcal	
Gaza/Guijá/7 de Abril Maize – 50 kg Beans – 6 kg Oil - 2 l Salt – 2 kg (not all received)		1432 kcal	Maize – 50 kg (333g) kcal/day/person- 1179 kcal Beans 6kg (40g) kcal/day/person- 136 kcal Oil- 2l(13g) kcal/day/person- 117kcal TOTAL=1432kcal	
Gaza /Guija/ Caniçado Maize – 40 kg Beans – 6 kg Oil – 2 l Salt – 2 kg (not all received)		1198 kcal	Maize- 40 kg (267g) kcal/day/person -945 kcal Beans 6kg (40g) kcal/day/person- 136 kcal Oil- 2l(13g) kcal/day/person- 117kcal TOTAL=1198 kcal	
Gaza/Guijá / Chivongoene the ration was: 36 kg Maize 5 kg beans 3 l of oil 3 kg of CSB		1218 kcal	Maize-36kg (240g) kcal/day/person- 850 kcal Beans (calculated with 5kg) kcal/day/person 33g- 112 kcal Oil- 3L (20g)- 180 kcal CSB- 3kg (20g) kcal/day/person- 76 kcal TOTAL= 1218 kcal	

¹¹⁵ In Guijá,(7 de Abril community) various cereals were distributed over the course of WFPs response (maize, maize flour and rice). The calculations are based on kcal for maize as this was most commonly received cereal. There no significant kcal differences between maize flour and rice kcal/ 100 g, respectively 354 and 353.

Table 10, continued: Original and adjusted GFD rations

Zambézia/Maganja da Costa ¹¹⁶ Month/family Maize - 10 kg- 20 kg (source varies) Beans - 1 cup – 2 cup (200 g)	378 kcal	Maize- median 15kg (100g) Kcal/day/person- 354 kcal Beans (200g)- 7g kcal/day/person- 24 kcal TOTAL= 378 kcal
Zambezia/Maganja da Costa Maize 25 kg Beans 10 kg (one month only)	818 kcal	Maize-25 kg (167g) kcal/day/person- 591kcal Beans-10kg (67g) kcal/day/person- 227kcal TOTAL= 818 kcal
Zambezia/Namacurra/Bacio (one month only) Maize 40 kg Beans 6 kg	1081 kcal	Maize- 40kg (267g) kcal/day/person -945 kcal Beans-6kg (40g) kcal/day/person-136kcal (considering 6 kg) TOTAL= 1081 kcal

Source: Focus group discussions and implementing partners. 2014.

Table 11: Planned versus observed FFA rations

Planned FFA rations- per household 3-6 months	Average reported in field – per household One month only
GAZA	
Maize – 40 kg Beans- 6kg Oil – 1 litre 1198 kcal/day/person	Maize – 40 kg Beans- 6kg Oil – ½ litre 1108 kcal/day/person
SOFALA	
Maize – 40 kg Beans- 6 kg 1081 kcal/day/person	No field data

Sources: WFP. 2011. Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation – Mozambique PRRO 200355. Project Design Document. Focus group discussions and implementing partners. 2014.

Table 12: Planned versus observed refugee rations, Maratane camp

Program	Planned ration	Nutrition Value	Changes / rationale	Nutrition Value	Average reported in field – per household	Nutrition Value
Refugees Nutritional at risk and new asylum seekers 360 days per year	Person/Day Maize 400 g Beans 60 g Oil 20 g CSB 50 g	2190 kcal	none	-	Maize 12.5 kg Beans 1.8kg (ii) (CSB Only 1 time in 2011)	1679 kcal /day/person
Assistance to long term refugees/ asylum seekers 360 days per year	Person/Day Maize 200 g Beans 30 g Oil 10 g	900 kcal	none	-	Maize 7 kg Beans 0.9 kg	840 kcal/day/person

(i) Beneficiaries referred to rations received in 2013 - 2014

(ii) Beneficiaries stated that they received 1.5kg. However, after verifying the measuring instruments of UNHCR the evaluators were satisfied that they received 1.8kg of beans.

Source: Focus group discussions and interviews with implementing partners. 2014

¹¹⁶ A median was calculated for the food ration received: maize (10 -20 kg), beans (1 cup (200g)-2 cups (400g))

Annex 14: Additional detail for recommendation 4

Recommendation 4: WFP must ensure that monitoring data collected are representative of PRRO beneficiaries.

1. Several options would allow WFP to more accurately measure change as a result of GFD and FFA for shock-affected communities. Most importantly, and applicable to both options, is that the PRRO separately measure the effectiveness of each emergency response, rather than the current method of aggregating different geographic areas that have been impacted by very different levels of shock and that experience very different levels of food security in normal times. The final operation evaluation would then carry out a meta-analysis of the baseline/endline results for all emergency efforts, to determine overall PRRO achievement.

2. Option 1: Given the noted budget constraints, the ET believes that the most reasonable option to measure change as a result of GFD and FFA for shock-affected communities, is to build on the current use of quantitative EFSA following a shock, and to ensure they take place within one to two weeks of the shock. In addition to measuring current FCS, recall questions should be added to the EFSA questionnaire to understand levels of pre-shock food security. Recall data would inform FCS baseline values and logframe targets for individual PRRO responses. At minimum, the PRRO should aim to restore the FCS to pre-shock levels. The ET recognizes the inherent risk of recall bias, but asserts that even with this risk, because of the short time interval (implementing an EFSA within one to two weeks of a shock), the PRRO will be able to obtain more accurate baseline values with recall data than those currently obtained using CP data. Endline data would be collected using a sampling strategy identical to that used for the EFSA. If budget constraints exist, the questionnaire need not be a comprehensive EFSA; the only critical data will be those necessary to inform endline indicators (theoretically, current FCS). These data should be collected within a month of completion of each PRRO response.

3. Option 2: Another option to more accurately obtain data that are representative of PRRO beneficiaries aligns to the PRRO's new 2014 logframe and its intention to measure the FCS using secondary data. Measuring the FCS this way could suffice for baseline values if WFP has access to the secondary databases, or, if the secondary data are representative at the district level; however, using secondary sources will not be sufficient for endline measurement because WFP does not have control over where and when data will be collected by government entities or others.

4. If WFP elects to use national secondary data for PRRO baseline values, the following strategy will allow for improved representativeness of beneficiary populations. First, WFP should define risk-prone districts (using the 10 years of historical data that informed the design of PRRO 200355). Then, using the national data set, WFP should aggregate data from these risk-prone districts into a risk zone (for example, risk zone 1 might be all flood-prone districts in Gaza Province; risk zone 2, all flood- or tropical storm-prone districts in Zambezia Province; risk zone 3, all flood-prone (or drought-prone) districts in Sofala Province). Although levels of accuracy (confidence and error) of such a sample may slightly decrease, the representativeness of a such a sample to PRRO beneficiaries will be much greater than the current sampling design, which targets CP beneficiaries: these beneficiaries live in districts seldom affected by natural hazards and districts that generally have higher levels of food insecurity than risk-prone districts.

5. One month after individual emergency responses end (e.g., the 2013 Gaza response, or the 2012 Zambezia response), WFP should conduct an endline study that allows it to measure relevant outcome indicators. WFP would need to use the same risk zone selected for baseline as its sample frame (i.e., every district in the agreed-upon risk zone, regardless of whether PRRO operations took place in all districts). This option will likely require more resources due to the logistics required to cover the entire risk zone, and a sample size that could be larger than that needed for Option 1, above.

6. Option 3: The last option offered by the ET also allows for the use of secondary data for PRRO baseline values. Given the recurring nature of natural shocks in Mozambique, and the CO's close relationship with SETSAN, the INGC, and other likely sources of secondary data that would be used for a baseline, WFP could encourage the government agencies to use a sampling strategy that, in addition to being representative at the provincial level, is representative of a risk zone (multiple agreed-upon districts, in one or more provinces that are risk-prone). This avoids the significant cost increase necessary to collect data representative at the district level, but improves the ability of WFP and other stakeholders to accurately measure change as a result of assistance to disaster-affected areas. The endline measurements would be captured in the same manner as those described in Option 2.

Acronyms

BR	Budget revision
CEDES	Ecumenical Committee for Social Development
CENOE	National Centre for Emergency Operations
CERF	Central Emergency Relief Fund
CHS	Community and Household Surveillance
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CLGRC	Local committees for disaster risk management
CSB	Corn-soya blend
CSB+	Supercereal (plus)
CTGC	Technical Council of Disaster Management
CO	Country Office
CP	Country Programme
DHS	Demographic and Health Survey
DRM	Disaster risk management
DRR	Disaster risk reduction
EFSA	Emergency Food Security Assessments
EMOP	Emergency Operation
ET	Evaluation team
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FCS	Food consumption score
FDP	Food distribution point
FFA	Food for assets
FGD	Focus group discussion
FSC	Food Security Cluster
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
IRA	Immediate Response Account
JAM	Joint Assessment Mission
g	Grams
GAM	Global acute malnutrition
GFD	General food distribution
ICT	Information, communications and technology
INAR	National Institute for Refugee Assistance
INAS	National Institute for Social Action
INGC	National Disaster Management Institute
IOM	International Organisation on Migration
IPs	Implementing partners
KII	Key informant interviews
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
MAM	Moderate acute malnutrition
MOU	Memorandum of understanding
mt	Metric tonne
NCI	National Capacity Index
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (United Nations)
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OEV	Office of Evaluation
PARP	Poverty Reduction Action Plan

PDM	Post-distribution monitoring
PLHIV	People living with HIV
PLW	Pregnant and lactating women
PRRO	Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation
RB	Regional Bureau
SETSAN	Technical Secretariat for Food Security and Nutrition
SO	Strategic objective
SPIR	Samaritan's Purse International Relief
SPR	Standard Project Report
SRAC	Strategic Resource Allocation Committee
UNAIDS	Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UN-Habitat	United Nations Human Settlements Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UN Women	United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VAC	Vulnerability Assessment Committee
VAM	Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping
WFP	World Food Programme
WVI	World Vision International



World Food Programme

Office of Evaluation
www.wfp.org/evaluation