

OPERATION EVALUATION

Zimbabwe, Protracted Relief and Recovery
Operation 200453 “Responding to Humanitarian
Needs and Strengthening Resilience to Food
Insecurity” (September 2012–March 2014)

Final Evaluation Report

September, 2014

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Commissioned by the
WFP Office of Evaluation

Report number: OEV/2014/07

Acknowledgements

The Evaluation Team would like to sincerely thank the staff of the WFP Country Office in Zimbabwe for facilitating and supporting the evaluation and affording their time and effort to provide the team with relevant information, as well as for the associated logistics support.

Our gratitude also goes to all respondents (from the government authorities, the donor community, the United Nations system, NGOs, civil society and beneficiaries at field level), who dedicated time to participate in useful and informative discussions and contributed significantly to the findings of the evaluation.

We thank also the Office of Evaluation (OE) in WFP Rome for their continuous support throughout and management of the consultancy contract.

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Operational Fact Sheet

OPERATION			
Type/Number/Title	Protracted Relief And Recovery Operations (PRRO)— Zimbabwe 200453- Responding to Humanitarian Needs and Strengthening Resilience to Food Insecurity		
Approval	19 February 2013 (Standard Project Report 2013)		
Amendments	There have been 4 amendments (Budget revisions (BR) to the initial project document. BR 1(November 2013) increased the budget (by US\$ 40.3 million) to meet the seasonal food needs of an additional 950,000 food-insecure people, due to the unfavourable weather conditions and high cost of crop inputs. BR 2 (November 2013) aligned the PRRO budget with the new Financial Framework, and BR 3 (February 2014)sought to revise Other Direct Operational Costs (ODOC) elements BR 4 ¹ seeks to revise beneficiary numbers as well as Direct Support Costs (DSC), Landside Transport Storage & Handling (LTSH) and capacity development and augmentation (CD&A) costs		
Duration	<u>Initial:</u> 24 months (May 2013–April 2015)	<u>Revised:</u> ² 24 months (May 2013–April 2015)	
Planned beneficiaries	<u>Initial:</u> 1,230,000	<u>Revised:</u> ³ 2,409 000	
Planned food requirements	<u>Initial:</u> In-kind food: 144,021 mt. Cash and vouchers: US\$ 1,540,000	<u>Revised:</u> In-kind food ⁴ : 104,507 mt. Cash and vouchers ⁵ : US\$ 16.8 million	
US\$ requirements	<u>Initial:</u> 206,091,593	<u>Revised:</u> ⁶ 246,473,894	
OBJECTIVES ⁷ AND COMPONENTS			
	Strategic Objective	Operation specific objectives	Activities
Millennium Development Goals: 1, 4, 5 and 6, UNDAF priorities 2 and 3	SO 1	Protect and promote livelihoods and enhance the self-reliance of targeted, vulnerable households in emergencies and during early recovery	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Seasonal Targeted Assistance (STA) (combination of food and cash transfer) for seasonally food-insecure vulnerable households • Health & Nutrition Promotion components for acutely malnourished HIV and TB patients, pregnant and nursing women and children under 5 at clinics • Food assistance to highly vulnerable households hosting moderately malnourished HIV or TB patients in the most food-insecure areas for the duration of the client’s treatment • Cash/Food for Assets to rural communities to gradually offset the need for seasonal food assistance.
	SO 2	Enhance communities’ resilience to shocks through safety-net or asset-creation components	
	SO3	Support the re-establishment of livelihoods, food security and nutritional well-being of communities and families affected by shocks	
		Support malnourished adults and children by helping them to regain their productive capacity	
PARTNERS			

² Source: Budget Revision-4

³ Source: Budget Revision-1


⁴ Source: Budget Revision-1

⁵ Source: Budget revision -1

⁶ Source: Budget Revision-1

⁷ While the operation’s logframe was realigned to the new Strategic Plan (2014-2017) and new Strategic Results Framework in September 2013, reference is made to the Strategic Objectives as per the Strategic Plan (2008-2013) as the 2013 Standard Project Report mainly reported against the indicators presented in the original project document.

Government	Ministry of Health and Child Care Ministry of Education, Sport and Culture Ministry of Agriculture mechanization and irrigation development Ministry of Local Government, Public Works and National Housing Food and Nutrition Council of Zimbabwe (FNC) Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Services Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee (ZimVAC) Civil Protection Unit Department of Agricultural Technical and Extension Services (AGRITEX) Department of Veterinary services
United Nations	Zimbabwe United Nations Development Assistance Framework (ZUNDAF) UNICEF FAO WHO IOM OCHA
NGOs	Adventist Development and Relief Agency, Africare, the Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere, Catholic Relief Services, Christian Care, GOAL, the Organization of Rural Associations for Progress, Plan International, Red Cross Society, Save the Children, the United Methodist Committee on Relief and World Vision International, Help from Germany, Hope for a child in Christ, Hlekweni, BHASO, Aquaculture, LEAD, MDTC, LGDA
Other agencies	Famine Early Warning System(FEWSNET) Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement



⁸ Resource Situation 01 May 2014 (Zimbabwe 200453 Single Country PRRO)




Figure C: % of beneficiaries by component / activity




Figure D: % of women/girls versus men/boys by component / activity




Figure E: % of total food requirements by component / activity

¹⁰ PRRO 200453 Project document (WFP/EB.1/2013/8-A/2) and Budget revision-1

¹¹ Food Distribution Report (May 2013-March 2014)

Figure F: Actual vs. Planned beneficiaries by Component ¹²






Figure G: Actual food tonnage distributed versus planned by year ¹³



¹² Source: Actual: Food Distribution Report provided by CO, Planned: Budget Revision 1

¹³ Source : Food distribution report (WFP Country Office)

Figure H: Actual amounts of cash transfers distributed versus planned by year¹⁴




Please see Annex 12 for summary of achievements against the logical framework

¹⁴ Source : Planned : PRRO Requirement Summary BR01 Actual: Food distribution report (provided by CO)

Map

Map of WFP Programme Coverage in Zimbabwe (Dec 2013)



Source: WFP Zimbabwe

Executive Summary

Introduction

1. WFP Zimbabwe's PRRO 200453 (May 2012- April 2015) was designed with the initial aim of protecting the livelihoods, enhancing resilience and addressing the malnutrition and transient food insecurity of 2.4 million beneficiaries in line with the 2008-13 Strategic Plan. The PRRO has four programmatic objectives: (1) to protect and promote livelihoods and enhance the self-reliance of targeted, vulnerable households in emergencies and during early recovery; (2) to enhance communities' resilience to shocks through safety-net or asset-creation activities; (3) to support the re-establishment of livelihoods, food security and nutritional well-being of communities and families affected by shocks; and (4) to support malnourished adults and children by helping them to regain their productive capacity.

2. These objectives were pursued by implementing activities under three main pillars: Productive Asset Creation (PAC¹⁵) – the creation of infrastructure such as irrigation schemes and cattle dips that promote resilience to climate change, Health and Nutrition Programming (H&N) – the provision of nutritional support to families of HIV and TB patients and other malnourished vulnerable groups such as pregnant women and children under five; and Seasonal Targeted Assistance (STA) – the provision of food to cover vulnerable households' acute food insecurity over the lean season. WFP Zimbabwe has made use of the Cash and Voucher (C&V modality) in all components.

3. This evaluation covers the period September 2012–March 2014. Fieldwork was carried out over a three week period in June 2014 encompassing all sub offices during which 37 FGDs were conducted with beneficiary groups and over 200 stakeholders were interviewed.

Context

4. Over the last three years, the level of food insecurity in Zimbabwe has progressively increased. The reasons for this are complex, and encompass a decade of poor governance, economic upheaval, economic sanctions, volatility in the maize market, and crumbling social services. The increasing prevalence of climatic shocks – mainly drought, but also floods – causes the most disruption to the livelihoods of the 70% of the population that relies on agriculture for a living (particularly the poorest of this group). The Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee's (ZIMVAC) predicted that at the height of the hunger season in 2013/14 about 2.2 million people (approximately 25% of the rural population) would be in need of food assistance.

5. Nutrition indicators have been poor over the last decades; even though the wasting rate has been under 5% since 2007 (and thus not alarming), since 2008/9 the stunting rate has been above the critical level of 30%¹⁶ as established by WHO; this indicates a serious chronic malnutrition problem. The country's health system, though once of excellent quality, suffers from lack of resources. Tuberculosis is still widely prevalent: in 2012 35,760 new and relapse cases were registered¹⁷. HIV is also a major health problem: in 2013, 8% of the female population and 12% of the male

¹⁵ PAC activities are referred to as Food / Cash for Assets Programmes in other WFP operations

¹⁶ Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee (ZimVac) Interim Rural Food Security Assessment May 2009

¹⁷ Millennium development goals progress report 2012

population were reported to suffer from HIV¹⁸, only half of whom have access to anti-retroviral drugs.

Question 1: How appropriate is the operation?

6. The evaluation team found that all PRRO objectives are relevant to the needs of the poor in Zimbabwe, particularly those living in the more drought prone areas. WFP rightly used the ZIMVAC vulnerability assessment to design its intervention along with other methods of data collection to triangulate and refine the data.

7. Overall the PRRO was found to be in line with WFP's strategic plan 2008-13 and, with its increased emphasis on conditional transfers and building resilience to climatic shocks, moving into step with the Government of Zimbabwe's new agenda regarding social transfers. WFP's approach and operations in country are generally supportive of those of other agencies, particularly as WFP is moving more towards delivering a resilience agenda – a donor priority and the objective of many other development actors in Zimbabwe.

8. **PAC approach:** with their emphasis in providing immediate food and the possibility of longer term income/ food, the assets created were appropriate to all the PRRO objectives, although not always to the needs of the poorest people - those who don't own cattle, for example. Requiring conditionality is consistent with Zimbabwe's approach on the provision of assistance. Assets included cattle dips and vegetable gardens and weirs, the general aim being to enhance resilience to food insecurity by reducing vulnerability to shocks like drought and disease outbreaks.

9. **STA approach:** the ZIMVAC indicated that a significant proportion of the population would experience food deficit over the lean season. This confirms the relevance of STA transfers intended to smooth food consumption for the poorest, labour constrained households over the peak hunger period.

10. **H&N approach:** H&N activities targeted pregnant and lactating women, children under two and HIV/AIDS and TB patients, who were found malnourished based on anthropometric measurements. The GAM rates for children of between 6 and 59 months were between 3 and 4%, with aggravating factors like high food insecurity and high diarrhoea prevalence, but at such a GAM rate usually MAM treatment is not considered relevant by international standards. No data was available for the prevalence of malnutrition in pregnant and lactating mothers. Within the HIV caseload, a GAM rate of 19% was found, which made MAM treatment highly relevant for this group. Since MAM treatment of all groups took place in the same medical centres, no other actors were addressing MAM and at the time of PRRO design food security was rapidly deteriorating, MAM treatment was still considered appropriate for all target groups.

11. The design of the PRRO did not address stunting, even though stunting rates at 32% was high at WHO standards. Recently, this has been acknowledged by WFP, and WFP has become involved in the UN Nutrition Flagship programme. Stunting will be addressed through a multisectoral approach between various UN agencies, where WFP will provide Super Cereal to children of 6-18 months from July 2014.

12. A pilot on school feeding was planned for primary schools to improve child nutrition by addressing micronutrient deficiencies and to provide a safety net for schoolchildren and vulnerable households. The micronutrient deficiencies in Zimbabwean children are still high, and fortified school feeding has been found to

¹⁸ UNICEF 26 December 2013

improve the micronutrient status of school children. Moreover, school feeding would have been appropriate as a safety net in view of the high poverty and food insecurity. The school feeding was not implemented though but will be replaced by support to GoZ in policy formulation.

Question 2: What are the results of the operation¹⁹?

13. The assessment of the PRRO activities and results, allows confirmation that overall, the PRRO targeting was accurate and outcomes for PAC and STA were over and above the targets set out in the programme document, but those for the H&N programme were not reached. Between May 2013 and March 2014 the PRRO succeeded in reaching 84% of the target number of beneficiaries and distributed 58% of the planned tonnage of food and 42% of the planned cash transfers. The main measures of food security used are food consumption scores and dietary diversity. In-house monitoring found that 93% of beneficiaries had an 'acceptable' food consumption score, although there is no quantitative way of attributing this to the WFP interventions. Anecdotal evidence would suggest that the longer term transfers provided under PAC had a significant impact on food security, while that of the shorter and smaller STA transfers was negligible. The programme aimed to ensure that 90% of beneficiaries reported a dietary diversity score of four food groups or more. In the event, monitoring found that in 2013 and 2014 respectively only 58% and 90% of beneficiaries reached this target, the upturn in 2014 most likely attributable to the good harvests at the beginning of the year.

14. 98% of the food and 20% of the cash planned for distribution under PAC was transferred to beneficiaries, and a total of 261,036 beneficiaries (104% of the planned total) were assisted. Where assets were completed, they were generally being used by community members or ownership groups. Whether the assets created will provide a sustainable benefit to people's lives depends on a number of things, including the quality of construction, and the ability and motivation of the management committee who have been left in charge. 324 assets were created by engaging communities in food (and cash) for asset creation

15. STA distributed 31,774MT of food (43% of the target), 1,407,917 (76% of planned) beneficiaries were assisted with food. An additional \$3.4m was distributed in cash to enable households to buy the grain component of their transfer under the Cash for Cereals (CFC system). While beneficiaries were grateful for the food they received, it was in too small a quantity, and for too short duration to make a quantifiable difference to household food security. In many cases household resorted to traditional coping mechanisms such as piece work and eating wild foods to get them through the lean season. The fact that a high number of STA beneficiaries reported engaging in casual labour as a coping strategy is a strong signal that they could have been included in cash / food for work schemes.

16. H&N programming distributed 17,068MT of food (90% of the target) and \$3m worth of vouchers (68% of target) to 500,198 beneficiaries (110% of the target achieved by shortening the duration of some transfers). Recovery rates were considerably lower than the planned target of 75% because of lack of exit strategy, the sudden end to the distribution and no interventions to address the other causes of malnutrition (such as poor hygiene, poor feeding practices and the general disease burden).

¹⁹ The School Feeding pilot project was not implemented and therefore not assessed.

Question 3: Why and how has the operation produced the observed results?

17. Internal factors negatively affecting the results of the PRRO include the size of the cash transfer being insufficient to purchase sufficient grain to cover households' missing food entitlements, insufficient communication with some partners, thereby precluding 'joined-up' programming, and relationships with cooperating partners that are actually more like contracts and devoid of risk sharing (e.g. having to pay staff even though no funds were received from WFP in the event of pipeline breaks). The in house monitoring system is sometimes burdensome to those who have to implement it and is not set up to answer questions about attribution.

18. By far the biggest external factor affecting the programme was the shortage of funding: only 34% of requested funds were received, resulting in pipeline breaks, halved rations and early termination of some programmes. The dire state of Zimbabwe's economy makes it more difficult for PAC beneficiaries to sell their produce, and procure inputs (e.g. fish feed). In some areas WFP is working in an environment where social norms dictated by religious doctrine countervail against attempts to improve nutrition, particularly that of children. This should be considered when establishing outcome targets.

Recommendations

All recommendations are intended for development and implementation by the CO and the RB, and recommendation 2 (M&E) intended also for the HQ.

1. **Increase focus on Resilience Programming (Strategic)** along the lines of current PAC interventions and ensure that WFP is with aligned with the priorities of government and donors, and indeed the needs of the poor in Zimbabwe. This is an immediate priority and momentum that was created by a strategic review that took place in May 2014 should be maintained.
2. **Retool M&E approaches to better demonstrate household and community resilience has changed (Strategic):** WFP Zimbabwe's ongoing realignment of its M&E framework to ensure compliance with the 2014-17 Strategic Results Framework (where building resilience is one of the vehicles for delivering on SO2), should involve a discussion of what output indicators and surveys are useful, and what can safely be discarded to make room for quantitative and qualitative approaches which more accurately demonstrate and attribute impact in this area. Lessons can be learned from other WFP Cos where progress has been made in the area (e.g. WFP Niger). This should be done soon to enable new tools to be tested and used in forthcoming programmes.
3. **Move towards longer term 'real' partnerships (Strategic):** WFP should work together with other member of the UN family to explore how it could bring its considerable resources to bear on the resilience agenda through a combined approach, in the same way that donors in Zimbabwe are doing. There are two main implications of this for WFP. The first will be that it will have to seek funding arrangements that make long term partnerships possible. The second implication is that WFP will have to re-define its role from that of a kind of donor. At present the term 'cooperating partners' is currently used, but in reality the balance of power and decision making lies with WFP. This relationship needs to be redefined as one where it really works in cooperation with partners, rather

than using them as sub-contractors who are to be haggled down on cost. This recommendation could be phased in incrementally over a number of years with a growing number of cooperating partners.

4. **Reconfigure STA to support household food production (Operational):** Draw lessons from other countries to reconfigure STA so that it has a greater impact - for example WFP's work in Kenya with IFAD and FAO, to graduate farmers from food deficit to food secure to surplus producers. A start on this trajectory would be to use STA resources to support the poorest farmers to work on their own farms at the critical stages of the crop production cycle. This should be piloted in the next PRRO.
5. **Enhance impact and resilience through integrated programmes (Operational):** An integrated approach focusing on a smaller number of wards may help increase the impact of the PRRO and reduce the operational costs of WFP. The approach should be integrated regarding availability of water, vegetable gardens and livestock facilities, but also combining PAC, food security/livelihood and nutrition interventions and linking these wherever possible. This recommendation should be implemented in the short term – in the next PRRO.
6. **Ensure PAC interventions are properly capitalised and make appropriate investments in asset management systems and structures (Operational):** Budgets for PAC interventions should properly reflect the cost of materials, appropriate technical support and management structure costs. This is a recommendation for any programme design that follows on from this PRRO.
7. **Improve impact of H&N programming (Operational):** A number of actions should be undertaken to address this issue. The in-depth study *to identify the low responsiveness to nutritional support interventions*, which is planned, needs to be conducted as soon as possible, and corrective actions should be undertaken, based on its findings.
8. **Understand and stay up to date with maize market (Operational):** Efforts to smooth food consumption should be done with full understanding of the behaviour of the maize market. As far as cash interventions go, the size of the transfer should be at least in some way linked to the prevailing grain price. All future cash-based interventions should integrate this recommendation.
9. **Conduct a cost benefit analysis of Cash transfers (Operational):** A full cost benefit analysis of cash transfers should be conducted, factoring in the multiplier effects to local businesses and agents (under EcoCash) and identifying at what price points the import and distribution of food in kind becomes preferable to cash. Social protection systems in other countries are increasingly switching to payments by mobile phones; one of the critical components underpinning these is a solid Management Information System and database to ensure that beneficiaries are not double-dipping from different social protection pots. WFP should work closely with other SP schemes in Zimbabwe – for example the Harmonised Cash Transfer Programme – to ensure that it's the foundations of such a system are created. The cost benefit analysis should be conducted

during the next occasion that WFP or one of its partner NGOs uses cash transfers in groups that have already benefitted from one round of transfers, so that set up costs do not distort the findings.

1. Introduction

1.1 Evaluation features

1. As part of a series of operational evaluations (OPEV) to be undertaken in 2013-2015, the Office of Evaluation of WFP (OEV) has commissioned DARA to conduct an independent evaluation of the "Zimbabwe PRRO 200453 Responding to Humanitarian Needs and Strengthening Resilience to Food Insecurity May 2013-April 2015)". This evaluation covers the period September 2012–March 2014

2. The external evaluation was guided by the ToR (Annex 1) and focussed on two over-arching themes: accountability – i.e. the extent to which the operation achieved its results, and learning – i.e. why certain results were obtained, in order to learn, ensure good practices and provide useful pointers for the future. The intended users of the evaluation are: (1) the WFP's Country Office (CO), its cooperating partners in decision-making related notably to programme implementation and/or design, country strategy and partnerships; (2) WFP's Regional Bureau of Johannesburg, given its core functions of strategic guidance, programme support and oversight; and finally (3) the Office of Evaluation (OEV) will use the evaluation findings to feed into an annual synthesis report of all OpEvs and will reflect upon the evaluation process to refine its OpEv approach, as required. Outside of WFP, the stakeholders with interest in the evaluation are the beneficiaries of the PRRO, the Government of Zimbabwe, the UN Country team, the NGOs, the donors and the private sector.

3. As indicated in the ToR *the evaluation has been timed to ensure that findings can feed into future decisions on programme design, notably a follow-up PRRO and a possible development project. The external evaluation will provide valuable insights on a number of innovative programmatic changes that the Zimbabwe CO has been recently implementing, including the gradual scale-up of market-based transfer modalities and the shift from unconditional to conditional assistance. As such, the evaluation will enhance internal learning especially.*

4. The evaluation process began in April 2014, with the inception package developed in May. Fieldwork in Zimbabwe took place over three weeks in June (Annex 2 shows the mission schedule).

5. In accordance with the ToR, the evaluation addressed the following three questions, further developed in the Evaluation Matrix (Annex 3):

- **Question 1: How appropriate is the operation? (Design and processes dimension of analysis)** Areas for analysis will include the extent to which the objectives, targeting, and choice of components and of transfer modalities were appropriate to the needs of the food insecure population, and were coherent with relevant stated national and WFP policies.
- **Question 2: What are the results of the operation?** Including an analysis of the level of attainment of the planned outputs, the extent to which the outputs led to the realisation of the operation objectives (effectiveness) as well as to unintended effects highlighting, as applicable, differences for different groups, including women, girls, men and boys; how different activities of the operation dovetail and are synergetic among themselves and what other actors are doing to contribute to the overriding WFP objective in the country; and the efficiency of the operation and the likelihood that the benefits will continue.

- **Question 3: Why and how has the operation produced the observed results?** This includes an analysis of the main internal and external factors affecting the various aspects of the operation.

6. To address to the Evaluation Questions, the team has used and based the analysis on international agreed evaluation criteria: appropriateness, relevance, coherence, coverage, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability.

7. The evaluation approach (explained in more detail in Annex 4: Methodology) involved a comprehensive literature review of secondary data (background documents received from WFP and additional documents collected by the team, etc.), and a three-week programme of field visits encompassing all sub offices during which 37 FGDs were conducted with beneficiary groups and over 200 stakeholders were interviewed (Annex 5. List of People interviewed and FGD). The evaluation used a mixed- method approach, though due to budget and time constraints, major quantitative data collection through surveys was not possible, therefore the approach is mainly qualitative grounded on quantitative secondary data. Themes of interest were investigated from different angles in order to triangulate findings – through FGDs with beneficiaries, and interviews with programme staff and local government stakeholders. Where it was felt necessary females were interviewed separately from males, but this wasn't often necessary, and in any case, many of the beneficiaries were women anyway, so segregation was not necessary. Zimbabwe is a big country and WFP's activities are widely spread: as such, time was an issue, especially as the team was reduced from four to three evaluators shortly before the mission commenced. It was difficult, however, to get access to recent documentation and consistent figures on output tonnages and beneficiary numbers, but the team members were supported in the tasks to a high level by WFP Zimbabwe and cooperating partners.

1.2 Country context

8. **Political and demographic.** In 2012 Zimbabwe's population was estimated at 13.72 million, and is now growing at a rate of 4.38% a year, reversing a steady decline in the birth rate that began in the early 1980's. Zimbabwe was ranked 172nd out of 187 countries on the 2013 Human Development Index²⁰, a reflection of the fact that nearly 75% of the population lives in poverty. Of the 21 Millennium Development Goal (MDG) targets, only four are likely to be met by 2015²¹. The country was ruled by a Government of National Unity from February 2009 until July 2013, when ZANU PF won a majority, and now an uneasy truce prevails between ZANU and the main opposition MDC. There is currently a lot of uncertainty about the future direction of Zimbabwe as various factions jockey for advantage in the coming succession.

9. **Economy.** Zimbabwe's GDP was estimated at \$9.802 billion in 2012, and its GDP growth rate was 4.4%²². A multi-currency regime based largely on the US dollar was initiated in 2009, alleviating the rampant inflation caused by macro-economic mismanagement, but liquidity and cash flow problems are still prevalent; a situation not helped by depressed prices of minerals and a slump in tourism, and unclear laws regarding business ownership and Foreign Direct Investment.

²⁰ Human Development Report, UNDP, 2013

²¹<http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/MDG/english/MDG%20Country%20Reports/Zimbabwe/MDGR%202012final%20draft%208.pdf>

²² Data.worldbank.org; accessed 30 may 2014

10. Zimbabwe requires approximately 2.07 million tonnes of grain per year for its human, livestock, industrial and strategic needs. In recent years only 70% of national grain requirements were produced in-country and the trend for this product is deteriorating. Over the last three years, the level of food insecurity has progressively increased due to climatic shocks, the high cost of fertilisers and poor post-harvest handling. In 2011 12% of the population required assistance during the peak hunger period; this rose to 19% in 2012/13, and 25% in 2013/14.

11. Agriculture is the backbone of Zimbabwe's economy, providing employment and livelihoods for approximately 70% of the population, 15-20% of the country's GDP and 40-50% of exports. Tobacco has for some years been the major cash and export crop, and good prices in 2012/13 (an average of \$5 per kilo) combined with a poor domestic market for maize encouraged a 21% increase in the hectareage used in the 2013/2014 cropping season. In 2013/14 the price dropped to about \$2.50 per kilo, which led to problems for farmers, who had switched to tobacco production. Cotton is another widely cultivated cash crop, but prices of this commodity are also low at around \$0.40 per kilogramme, meaning that the average yield per farmer of about 600kg brings in just \$240.

12. The inefficient maize market that prevails in Zimbabwe - resulting in differences in price of over 100 percent between the post-harvest and lean season - impacts domestic supply and availability. Fertiliser subsidies in Zambia and Malawi enable farmers to produce maize far more cheaply than those in Zimbabwe²³, and the reduction in the capacity of the Grain Marketing Board (GMB), which used to be a guaranteed buyer, has dampened the incentive to grow maize as a commercial crop.

13. **International aid.** International assistance to Zimbabwe is guided by the "Policy on Operations on Non-Governmental Organisations in Humanitarian and Development Assistance" under the Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Services (MoPLSS) and totalled around \$715 million in 2011, equivalent to 8.3% of Gross National Income. During the last 12 years, the Official Development Assistance was lowest in 2004 (US\$ 228m) and highest in 2009 (US\$ 798m) (World Bank).

14. The current development agenda is articulated in the Zim-Asset (Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation) Plan (October 2013 – December 2018). The plan aims to grow the economy by an average of 7.3% per year over the five year period through a focus on Food Security and Nutrition, Social Services and Poverty Eradication, Infrastructure and Utilities and Value Addition and Beneficiation.

15. **Food Security.** After the 2nd round crop estimates in early 2013, FEWSNET estimated that the country would face a cereal deficit of 695,552 MT. By June, this had been revised downwards to 681,554 MT, after considering opening stocks (320,000 MT) and imports at the time (163,996 MT) (Table 1: **Estimated cereal balance sheet, June 2013**). The deficit was 37 percent higher than the previous year's shortfall and amounted to 34 percent of the national requirement.

²³ Fertiliser is about \$50 per bag in Zimbabwe, while subsidised fertiliser in Zambia is about \$7 per bag (MoA officer, personal comment)

Table 1: Estimated cereal balance sheet, June 2013


Description		MT
A	Human Requirement*	1,725,516.46
B	Livestock and other Uses	350,000.00
C	Total Annual Requirement (A+B)	2,075,516.46
D	Opening Stocks**	320,000.00
E	Production	909,965.00
F	Imports to Date***	163,996.96
G	Total Available Cereal	1,393,961.96
H	Deficit (G-C)	(681,554.50)

* Cereal requirement based on 133kg/person/year 2012 preliminary census
 ** Opening stocks based on estimates from grain millers and GMB
 *** Imports based on ZIMSTAT formal imports April – May 2013

Source: FEWSNET

16. The prevalence of food insecurity is clearly alarming (see map in Figure I: Prevalence of Food Insecurity 2013/14 below) and unsurprisingly one of Zim-Asset’s main focuses is a strategy to reduce dependence on food aid by requiring that conditional assistance is prioritised over free food hand-outs. The objective is to ramp up the approach already used by WFP and NGOs whereby communities are engaged in building assets and infrastructure that promote drought resilience, access to clean water and livelihood diversification.

Figure I: Prevalence of Food Insecurity 2013/14




Source: ZIMVAC

17. **Health and Nutrition.** Nutrition indicators have been poor over the last decades; even though the wasting rate has been under 5% since 2007 and thus not alarming, since 2008/9 the stunting rate has been above the critical level of 30%²⁴ as established by WHO; this indicates a serious chronic malnutrition problem (Figure J: Nutrition Indicators in Zimbabwe 1999 - 2011).

²⁴ Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee (ZimVac) Interim Rural Food Security Assessment May 2009

18. Reasons for poor nutrition indicators include poverty, food insecurity and low dietary diversity, as well as inadequate child care and WASH practices and childhood diseases. The Districts with high prevalence of diarrhoea for instance coincide with the Districts with a high prevalence of stunting and wasting (see map in Section **Error! Reference source not found.**).

Figure J: Nutrition Indicators in Zimbabwe 1999 - 2011



19. Zim-Asset recognizes the importance of improving human capability by reducing stunting from its current level of about 1/3rd of children²⁵ through improved nutrition and sanitation. The task is considerable: the Zimbabwe Humanitarian Gap report estimated that more than 690,000 people were at risk in 2013 from acute malnutrition, disease outbreaks and other public health emergencies. However, good progress has been made on wasting rates, which have declined steadily from 8% in 1999²⁶. A rapid nutrition assessment carried out in November 2012 revealed a global acute malnutrition (GAM) of less than 3 per cent in five of the ten most affected livelihood zones, while four zones had GAM rates between 3 and 4 per cent²⁷.

20. The country's health system, though once of excellent quality, suffers from lack of resources. Tuberculosis is still widely prevalent: in 2012 35,760 new and relapse cases were registered²⁸. HIV is also a major health problem: in 2013, 8% of the female population and 12% of the male population were reported to suffer from HIV²⁹, only half of whom have access to anti-retroviral drugs. HIV/AIDS related deaths topped 49,605 in 2013 leaving at least 1,008 542 orphans in its wake³⁰. The MDG goal of enabling all HIV/AIDS sufferers access to ARVs is unlikely to be achieved by 2015³¹. Malaria incidence has dropped though, from about 5.8% in 2009 to 2.5% in 2011³², which is under the Abuja target of 68 per 1,000 people. 27% of all at-risk households have at least one insecticide-treated net³³.

21. **Gender.** Zimbabwe's Gender Inequality Index ranked 116 out of 148 countries³⁴. In 2013, 35% of parliamentary seats were held by women. There is gender parity in literacy rates but gender disparities in the level of education still

²⁵ From a public health point of view, WHO considers values above 30% to be high

²⁶ ZIMVAC 2013

²⁷ UNICEF 26 December 2013

²⁸ Millennium development goals progress report 2012

²⁹ UNICEF 26 December 2013

³⁰ Millennium development goals progress report 2012

³¹ Millennium Development Goals Progress Report 2012

³² Millennium development goals progress report 2012

³³ Millennium Development Goals Progress Report 2013

³⁴ Human Development Report 2013

exist; 48.8% of adult women had reached a secondary or higher level of education, compared to 62% of their male counterparts. For every 100,000 live births, 960 women³⁵ died from pregnancy related causes in 2011. Maternal health-related issues are responsible for the death of 12% of women aged 15-49 as of 2010–2011. Female participation in the labour market was 83% in 2012 (89.5 for men).

22. **Climate change.** Over the last decades of the 20th century, climate change began to impact Zimbabwe in a serious way, manifesting in unpredictable rainfall, shorter rainy seasons and higher mean temperatures. As rain fed agriculture becomes increasingly precarious, people look for other sources of income, some of which result in environmental degradation: the country is estimated to be losing 300,000 ha³⁶ of forest cover per annum, due to firewood and charcoal sales and tobacco curing causing soil erosion, further depleting soil structure and nutrients.

23. Changes in climate have resulted in more arid environments for agricultural production, and Zimbabwe's five main agro-ecological zones (or 'natural regions') (see Annex 6– Zimbabwe's Agro-Ecological Zones) have shifted. Natural region I has reduced in size, natural region II has shifted further east and natural region III has shifted to the north. Overall, the climate in Zimbabwe is regionally differentiated, but is generally becoming warmer, with more erratic rainfall patterns.

24. **Disaster Risk Management (DRM).** Zimbabwe has committed itself to the five priorities of the Hyogo Framework and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), Disaster Risk Management (DRM) Strategy 2012-2015. Dealing with the effects of climate change at a District level falls under the remit of two main committees – the District Drought Relief Committee and the Civil Protection Committee. Recently Food and Nutrition Committees have been established at District level, to address stunting, affecting many parts of the country.

25. **Safety nets.** Zimbabwe does not have a comprehensive social security system. Autonomous safety nets are under pressure, unable to cope with the multiple shocks of HIV/AIDS, repeated climate shocks and economic collapse. In 2012 the GoZ disbursed US\$4.8 million to over 18,000 poor families under its Harmonised Social Cash Transfer Programme³⁷, but this programme has as yet not been rolled out in all Districts.

1.3 Operation overview

26. The duration of PRRO 200453 (approved in February 2013) is from May 2013 until April 2015 with a likely continuation until the end of 2015, and has four objectives:

- i. Protect and promote livelihoods and enhance the self-reliance of targeted, vulnerable households in emergencies and during early recovery
- ii. Enhance communities' resilience to shocks through safety-net or asset-creation activities
- iii. Support the re-establishment of livelihoods, food security and nutritional well-being of communities and families affected by shocks
- iv. Support malnourished adults and children by helping them to regain their productive capacity

³⁵ Ministry of Health and Child Welfare. Zimbabwe's E-Health Strategy 2012-2017

³⁶ Millennium development goals progress report 2012

³⁷ Zimtreasury.org.zw

27. With an aim of reaching 2,409,000 beneficiaries (raised from 1,230,000 after BR1), the PRRO aims to deliver its objectives through three approaches:

- i. **Asset Creation and Resilience:** Partnering with NGOs and GoZ stakeholders to create or rehabilitate assets that will contribute to household and community resilience to food and nutritional insecurity. So far these have included dams, weirs, irrigation schemes, dead-level contours, road repairs, cattle dips and vegetable gardens through *Productive Asset Creation (PAC)*.
- ii. **Health and Nutrition Promotion:** WFP's health and nutrition activities are included in the ZUNDAF Nutrition Flagship Programme. Under the PRRO WFP provides Super Cereal to moderately acutely malnourished HIV and TB patients, pregnant and lactating women (PALW) and children under 5. A food package or voucher is distributed to families of HIV and TB patients, if they are identified as food insecure. Support is delivered through clinics, which also provide counselling and education, and contribute to data-gathering in partnership with the Ministry of Health and Child Care (MoHCC).
- iii. **Disaster Response and Risk Reduction:** Seasonally affected food-insecure households are assisted through targeted cash and food transfers during the lean season through *Seasonal targeted Assistance (STA)*.

28. WFP Zimbabwe has made use of the Cash and Voucher (C&V modality) in all components:

- In urban areas where cooperating partners (supermarkets) have sufficient capacity the Health and Nutrition Programme uses a paper voucher modality assisting the malnourished clients under Anti-retroviral Therapy (ART), Pre ART, Tuberculosis (TB), and Prevention of mother-to-child transmission (PMTCT) treatment.
- In some areas both STA and PAC beneficiaries received cash, either by design or because pipeline breaks meant that food was not available. Under the Cash for Cereals (CfC) component STA beneficiaries received cash to buy the grain component of their food entitlement (WFP provided oil and beans because it was cheaper to buy these in the international market rather than locally). In some pilot areas this cash was delivered through EcoCash – a payment system that operates through mobile phones, an option that was cheaper than delivery by armed escort, but obviously subject to the limitations of mobile phone coverage and handset ownership.

29. Beneficiaries were selected from among the most vulnerable households in locations with the highest food insecurity as identified by cross-referencing the ZIMVAC report with additional information from WFP's monitoring and evaluation unit. Selection of beneficiaries was done by communities. For the STA the beneficiaries were mainly the elderly headed households, orphans, widows, disabled and the very poor. For the PAC it was vulnerable households who were not labour constrained and 10% were to be vulnerable households who are labour constrained. For the H/N, the beneficiaries were malnourished people on ART, Pre-ART, under nourished lactating mothers, under nourished pregnant women, malnourished children under 5.

30. STA and PAC interventions were focussed on Districts in natural region 4 and 5, these having poor soils and unpredictable rainfall patterns. Some provinces like Matabeleland South in the West and Masvingo in the South have the majority of their Districts in these natural regions.

31. Both local and international cooperating partners were utilized with varying levels of quality of the interventions. The international partners generally had extra backing from their own resources which allowed them to provide more manpower which was a great advantage over local partners, though in some cases the local partners showed better commitment to the projects. Table 2. PRRO Provincial presence and cooperating partners below shows the provinces targeted, the cooperating partners and the number of Districts with WFP presence (see Annex 7 for full list of NGOs and operational areas).

Table 2. PRRO Provincial presence and cooperating partners

WFP provincial presence	Cooperating Partners	Number of Districts covered
Matabeleland South	DPF, EI, CESVI, MISEREOR, PADT, SAFIRE, TROICAIRE, CHRISTIAN AID, ACDI/VOCA, WFP	7
Matabeleland North	SC, CHRISTIAN AID, DPF, EI, HFG, HOCIC, CADEC, KWA,	5
Masvingo	SAFIRE, TROICAIRE, KWA, CESVI, CARE, CADEC, FACT, NPA, PLAN,	7
Manicaland	AFRICARE, FfF, KWA, PLAN, PRACTICAL AID, ROL, TDHIT,	6
Mashonaland East	FfF, KWA, ROL, ACDI/VOCA, CADEC, MAVAMBO, HWOT,	2
Mashonaland Central	TDHIT, IFRC, ACDI/VOCA,	4
Mashonaland West	LEAD, SC, IFRC	3
Midlands	AFRICARE, ADRA, DPF, MISEREOR, OXFAM, WA, CARE, ACDI/VOCA,	4

32. The PRRO received funding from international donors the main funding partners being USA (34%), UK (14%) and Japan (5%). With the continued upward budgetary revisions³⁸ however caused by the weather patterns, only 33% of the requirements were met which led to strategy revisions midway through the implementation period.

2. Evaluation Findings

2.1 Appropriateness

2.1.1 Relevance of activities to needs of the population

33. WFP used the Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee's (ZIMVAC) vulnerability assessment to design its intervention. The ZIMVAC estimated that 1.5

³⁸ Original budget = \$206,091,594; BR1 increase of \$40,352,300; BR2 increase of 742,286; BR3 increase of 2,088,640; BR4 increase of 3,615,401. Final budget \$252,920,219 (21% increase overall)

million people would be in need of assistance between October and December 2013, rising to 2.2 million in the lean season between January and March 2014.

34. There was not universal acceptance of these figures though: Ian Scoones (Zimbabwe 2013) identified underreporting of income, limited sales of livestock to compensate for food deficits, the use of previous year remittances and the fact that the ZIMVAC model takes no account of early cropping (for example the harvesting of green maize) may have led to a too high estimation of food insecurity levels. Scoones (and some donors) also implied that the high figures suited WFP because it justified their call for a large response budget. Certain key informants interviewed over the course of the evaluation also voiced reservations about the methodology, mentioning, for example, that the survey sampled the better-off Wards in some Districts.

35. The massive data collection effort behind the ZIMVAC (involving 10,797 household interviews and 887 community FGDs), means that it does probably represent the best estimate of food insecurity available, and WFP was therefore right to make use of it as their main data resource, along with other methods of data collection to triangulate and refine the data. The thoroughness of the approach and triangulation of information by using various sources of data indicate that context analysis was thorough and targeting decisions were supported through the consideration of a range of data sources.

36. The ZIMVAC survey also probed respondents about their development priorities and needs. This questioning revealed that the top four priorities in order of importance were: roads and infrastructure (mentioned by 15.9%) water and sanitation (14.5%), irrigation and dam rehabilitation (14%) and health infrastructure and development (9.1%). Interestingly community gardens were ranked last out of 13 priorities (1.4%) although 4.5% of respondents reported that they needed 'income generating projects', which arguably includes vegetable gardens.

37. When water and sanitation is removed from the list (this falling under the remit of UNICEF) it would appear that the PRRO's objectives are fairly well aligned to the priority needs of the poor: Enhancing communities' resilience to shocks through asset creation (op objective 2) and supporting the reestablishment of livelihoods (op objective 3) through road and dip tank rehabilitation and water resource management structures is clearly supportive of the expressed need for roads, infrastructure and irrigation. PRRO's objectives 1³⁹ and 4⁴⁰ are arguably in line with a perceived shortfall in general healthcare provision. Furthermore, many of the projects delivered under PAC had an income generation objective, the requirement for which was clearly expressed by a small but significant proportion of those interviewed in the ZIMVAC survey.

38. The appropriateness of the various approaches to contribute to WFP's PRRO's objectives is discussed in turn below. Though the modalities were used in a relevant manner, no in-depth gender analysis has been conducted, although anecdotal evidence from women's groups interviewed found no major problems.

2.1.1.1 Productive Asset Creation – PAC

39. In theory, the use of food and cash to support communities to create 'productive' assets went some way to achieving all four objectives to a greater or

³⁹ protect and promote livelihoods and enhance the self-reliance of targeted, vulnerable households in emergencies and during early recovery

⁴⁰ support malnourished adults and children by helping them to regain their productive capacity

lesser extent, bearing in mind that the households in the targeted communities had different wealth profiles and have different priorities in terms of assets requirements. However, assets such as cattle dips are useful in protecting livestock assets from disease, and water catchment facilities enhance resilience to climatic shocks. Supporting the establishment of vegetable gardens arguably assists households build livelihoods and the provision of food – or cash to buy food – makes an immediate contribution to the prevention of malnutrition. In some cases the assets created were not always of use to the poorest in the community, even though they were the direct beneficiaries of the work and food distributed.

2.1.1.2 Seasonal Targeted Assistance

40. Seasonal targeted assistance aims to contribute to the achievement of objectives 1 and 4 – protecting and promoting livelihoods by removing the necessity to sell assets) and supporting malnourished adults by smoothing food consumption over the lean period. In principle the approach is logical – the provision of food over the lean season will improve consumption and remove the need for distress sales.

2.1.1.3 Health and Nutrition Programme

41. According to the Global Nutrition Cluster⁴¹, **MAM** treatment by targeted supplementary feeding is considered relevant, if Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) rates among children between 6 and 59 months are above 8%, or between 5-8% if aggravating factors exist⁴². A GAM rate under 3% was found in five livelihood zones, whilst four zones had GAM rates between 3 and 4%⁴³. Aggravating factors existed in the fact that infant mortality rate was 57/1,000 in 2010/2011 and that rates of diarrhoea and pneumonia among children were high⁴⁴. Geographical targeting through ZIMVAC placed many of the H&N activities in areas with high and medium food insecurity (Annex 8), which is considered an aggravating factor. Furthermore, as a result of drought in 2011 and 2012, rural food insecurity at the start of the PRRO in 2013 was projected to be 7 percent higher than in 2012, which could also have had consequences for the GAM rates. Still, at the time of design of the PRRO, the GAM rate below 5% might have favoured the inclusion of activities targeting prevention rather than treatment for children under 5.

42. No reliable data were available reflecting the malnutrition rate in pregnant and lactating mothers. In general, treating malnutrition in pregnant women contributes to breaking the intergenerational malnutrition cycle, as underweight women have a bigger risk of having underweight children⁴⁵.

43. 18% of the female population and 12% of the male population are reported to suffer from HIV, and cross-infection with TB is widely prevalent. Malnutrition diminishes the working of anti-retroviral drugs and may increase the risk of contracting TB⁴⁶. Moreover, malnourished people living with HIV have a 2 to 6 times higher probability to decease during the first 6 months of treatment⁴⁷. Among HIV

⁴¹ Global Nutrition Cluster, IASC, July 2012. Moderate Acute Malnutrition (MAM), a guideline for emergencies

⁴² High levels of food insecurity, infant mortality rates above 1/10.000/day, strong prevalence of diarrhoea and respiratory diseases.

⁴³ UNICEF 26 December 2013

⁴⁴ http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/zimbabwe_statistics.html, accessed 31-8-2014

⁴⁵ UNSCN 2010. UNSCN 6th Report on the World Nutrition Situation. Chapter 3: Maternal nutrition and the intergenerational cycle of growth failure

⁴⁶ Burke SJ et al. Increased Incidence of Tuberculosis in Zimbabwe, in Association with Food Insecurity, and Economic Collapse: An Ecological Analysis. PLoS ONE, 2014; 9 (2): e83387 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0083387

⁴⁷ WHO. UNAIDS. 2011 Technical Guidance Note for Global Funds HIV proposals.

patients, GAM rates of 19%⁴⁸ were found, which is a high risk rate according to international standards. Many HIV patients shared in interviews⁴⁹, that the food provided by WFP enabled them to better fend for themselves and decreased their level of food insecurity.

44. Strictly speaking, related to international standards, treatment of MAM was very relevant for HIV/TB patients, but less so for the other vulnerable groups. At the point in time that the PRRO was designed though, deterioration of food security was to be expected and no other actors were active in treating MAM. Furthermore, MAM treatment could be offered to all vulnerable groups from the same health centres, and the aim was for the government to take over at a certain stage. The intervention was therefore judged appropriate.

45. The **stunting** rate in Zimbabwe was 32% in 2011⁵⁰, which is high according to WHO standards⁵¹ and warrants intervention. Though the MAM treatment may have indirectly contributed to battling stunting, because there is a link between acute malnutrition at young age and stunting⁵², there was no direct intervention foreseen to prevent stunting in the design of the PRRO.

46. WFP Zimbabwe has in the meantime acknowledged the importance of addressing stunting, and additional to MAM treatment, a start has been made to enhance the efforts. Following an assessment mission in April 2014, as part of the UN Nutrition Flagship programme, WFP will address stunting through providing Super Cereal to children of 6-18 months from July 2014. The baseline will start soon and selection of 15 Districts has already been done by VAME.

47. Prevailing research shows, that a multisectoral and integrated approach to malnutrition achieves better impact than food or nutritional supplement distributions⁵³. The partner UN agencies UNICEF, WHO and FAO will be involved in the Programme and instrumental in addressing prevention of stunting through such a multisectoral approach. The UN Nutrition Flagship programme aims at reducing stunting to 25% in children under 5 by the end of 2015. Based on the above observations, introducing this programme under the PRRO was found relevant.

48. A pilot on **school feeding**⁵⁴ was planned for primary schools to improve child nutrition by addressing micronutrient deficiencies⁵⁵ and to provide a safety net for schoolchildren and vulnerable households. School feeding has been identified as a good opportunity to assist governments in rolling out productive safety nets as part of the response to the current global crises⁵⁶. As a result of high poverty and food insecurity rates, the need for social safety net programmes in Zimbabwe is still high.

⁴⁸ WFP monitoring data, 2011

⁴⁹ No reliable disaggregated data are available for MAM in Pregnant and Lactating Women (PLWs) and HIV/TB patients.

⁵⁰ ZIMVAC 2013

⁵¹ World Health Organization, 1995; see: www.who.int/nutgrowthdb/en

⁵² HPN Human Practice Network, May 2013. Managing acute malnutrition at scale. A review of donor and government financing arrangements

⁵³ World Bank. July 2013. Improving nutrition through multisectoral approaches

⁵⁴ The Project Document of the PRRO does not refer to enrolment or other education indicators typical of School Feeding projects, and thus, these are not considered in the assessment of appropriateness

⁵⁵ Evidence-based interventions for improvement of maternal and child nutrition: what can be done and at what cost? [http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736\(13\)60996-4/fulltext#back-bib130](http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(13)60996-4/fulltext#back-bib130)

⁵⁶ WFP, World Bank. Bundy D et al. 2010. Rethinking School Feeding. Social Safety Nets, Child Development, and the Education Sector

49. Moreover, research has shown that food items fortified with multiple micronutrients improve the micronutrient status in school age children⁵⁷. Micronutrient deficiencies are widespread among Zimbabwean children^{58,59}. The school feeding pilot would have been relevant both in providing a safety net and in addressing micronutrient deficiencies, but unfortunately the pilot has not been implemented. Instead, WFP will support GoZ in policy formulation.


2.1.2 Appropriateness of the mix of activities to achieving the PRRO objectives

2.1.2.1 Geographical targeting

50. Taken at face value the figures indicated that a significant proportion of households, particularly those in the south, the west and pockets of the north would face high levels of food insecurity during the lean season in 2013/14 (as already shown in Figure I: Prevalence of Food Insecurity 2013/14).

51. Stunting rates have remained at over 30% for decades; according to WHO classification prevalence between 30 % and 39% is ‘high’– and the risk of malnutrition is particularly high for PLW and People Living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHIV). The prevalence of stunting and wasting does not always coincide with high levels of food insecurity, which has been taken into account in WFP’s targeting. The map presented in Figure K shows that stunting is most prevalent in the East and North of the country, while the highest levels of food insecurity are found in the South and the West. The needs of ART patients are high, and among this group there is also a considerable number of orphans, children under-5 using (pre)ART and pregnant and lactating women; these categories of beneficiaries are doubly at risk.

Figure K: Estimation of Number of Stunted Children <5 Years Old



⁵⁷ Can multi-micronutrient food fortification improve the micronutrient status, growth, health, and cognition of schoolchildren? A systematic review; by Cora Best, Nicole Neufingerl, Joy Miller Del Rosso, Catherine Transler, Tina van den Briel and Saskia Osendarp

⁵⁸ <http://www.wfp.org/stories/food-fortification-tackle-hidden-hunger-zimbabwe>

⁵⁹ Gadaga TH et al. Status of Micronutrient Nutrition in Zimbabwe: A Review. African Journal of Food Agriculture Nutrition and Development, Vol. 9, No. 1, Jan, 2009, pp. 502-522

52. WFP used the ZIMVAC report to guide its response, but as Table 3: PRRO Operational Districts by level of Food Insecurity, Stunting and HIV / AIDS (derived from a complete table presented in Annex 8) shows, PRRO activities were implemented in eight Districts⁶⁰ with low food insecurity, three Districts with 'low' levels of stunting⁶¹, and 10 Districts⁶² in the lowest category of HIV/AIDS prevalence.

Table 3: PRRO Operational Districts by level of Food Insecurity, Stunting and HIV / AIDS

	Food Insecurity			Stunting			HIV/AIDS		
	High	Medium	Low	35 - 48%	28 - 35%	21 - 28%	18 - 21%	16.5 - 18%	13.4 - 16%
STA/PAC operational Districts	13	15	8						
H&N operational Districts				11	9	3	10	3	10

53. WFP has used additional information to refine decisions on the deployment of resources, including longitudinal data on STA ward prioritization between 2006-2014, classifying wards as chronic or acutely food insecure (selection map in Annex 9); GoZ crop and livestock assessments, as well as data collected in-house by WFP (through the Community Household Surveillance tool), and the views of the District Drought Relief Committee⁶³. Based on the extensive use and cross reference of primary and secondary data sources, WFP's geographical targeting was appropriate, but the method has not been sufficiently documented and was not shared into detail with most of the donors and other development partners.

2.1.2.2 Appropriateness of transfer modalities

54. Assistance was delivered using a number of modalities depending on the type of programme – PAC, STA and H&N. For PAC, the assistance was conditional – in line with the GoZ's new policy in this area. For STA and H&N, assistance was unconditional because it was assumed that beneficiaries were labour constrained and because in many cases the (STA) transfers were of too short duration to warrant organising conditionality. Assistance was delivered in two forms – in cash or vouchers and in kind.

55. In kind transfers and vouchers worked well as they were linked to a quantity of food rather than a cash value, but volatile cereal prices had a serious impact on cash transfers' effectiveness in enabling beneficiaries to procure their calorific needs. The use of a flat rate cash transfer not linked to seasonal maize prices was not consistent with the findings of the vulnerability analysis, which indicated clearly that the prices of maize could be expected to rise significantly in the lean season. As such it is worth examining grain price behaviour over recent years in more detail.

56. WFP reported that cash was used in areas where market assessment showed that cereals were available, beneficiaries are assured of obtaining their supplies, and markets were judged to continue to function competitively and had the capacity to absorb extra demand created by distributing cash, while food was distributed in areas where the cereal supply was precarious and markets were not assured to

⁶⁰ Nkayi, Bulawayo, Bubi, Mutare, Mutasa, Mbire, Mtoko, Kwekwe, Zvishavane

⁶¹ Gwanda, Beitbridge, Chiredzi

⁶² Chiredzi, Gutu, Chipinge, Buhera, Mutare, Mutasa, Harare, Mount Darwin, Hurungwe, Kariba

⁶³ Bulawayo sub-office report and interviews with various stakeholders and other sources.

function efficiently. However, it appeared that in some instances cash was distributed simply because breaks in the food pipeline meant that food was not available rather than as a result of market analysis. As will be seen below, the cash transfer was certainly not enough to enable recipients to procure sufficient grain.

57. As Annex 10 shows, over the last four years, the price of maize in rural and urban areas has followed a reasonably predictable trajectory, falling after the harvest in March, before steadily rising again from July onwards. In 2014 the difference in post-harvest and lean season price was particularly significant – practically doubling between May and September alone. ZIMVAC predicted this increase – an assumption of the 2013 report being that cereal prices would average at \$0.77 per kilo in cereal deficit Districts. Cash transfers on the cash for cereals programme were however pegged at a price of \$0.35 per kilo.

2.1.3 Coherence with WFP global strategy

58. The 2014-17 Strategic Results Framework is the backbone of this PRRO. While the operation's logframe was realigned to the new Strategic Plan (2014-2017)⁶⁴ and new Strategic Results Framework in September 2013, reference is made to the Strategic Objectives as per the Strategic Plan (2008-2013) as the 2013 Standard Project Report mainly reported against the indicators presented in the original project document.

59. The objectives of the PRRO are in line with Strategic Objectives 1, 2 and 3 (which comprises two objectives). Strategic objective 1 was to save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies. It was pursued by using STA to support seasonally affected food insecure households.

60. Strategic Objective 2 was to prevent acute hunger and invest in disaster preparedness and mitigation. Measures to achieve this objective focused on the use of PAC, and involved the use of food and cash payments to beneficiaries and the provision of non-food items for asset creation in disaster prone rural areas.

61. Strategic Objective 3 was to restore and rebuild lives and livelihoods in post – conflict, post disaster or transition situations supporting the health and nutrition component, providing nutritional support to ART, TB and Malnourished lactating mothers. These were coherent with MDG 1 (eradicate extreme poverty and hunger), MDG 4 (reduce child mortality), MDG 5 (improve maternal health) and MDG 6 (combat HIV/AIDS and other diseases).

62. Vouchers and cash were used under this PRRO to support STA and the Health and Nutrition Programme, proving to be both cost efficient and effective ways of making transfers. The distribution of cash and vouchers was guided by WFP's Policy on Voucher and Cash Transfers as Food Assistance Instruments (October 2008, updated in 2011). Both modalities have been incorporated in a coherent manner to pursue Strategic Objectives.

63. The objectives of the WFP Gender Policy (2009) envisage the integration of the gender approach into food security and nutrition policies and programmes. Gender equality is addressed through ZUNDAF and it is mainstreamed into all programme activities. The approach appears to have been successful: women and children had equal access to food assistance programmes and their specific nutrition needs were taken into account, and women were included in leadership positions on

⁶⁴ It was originally formulated on the basis of the 2008-13 Strategic Plan

food distribution and PAC management committees. The Department of Women's Affairs was involved at Ward level to ensure the equal participation of women. Gender indicators were incorporated in the log frame in line with the new Strategic Plan 2014-2017.

64. The PRRO is partly coherent with the WFP Nutrition Policy (February 2012); it has a major focus on nutrition, where it strives to protect and treat MAM through support to children under 5, pregnant and lactating mothers and ART/TB patients. The prevention of chronic malnutrition (stunting) is not yet addressed, but this is planned as a major component of the UN Flagship Programme which will start imminently. Food fortification is not part of the PRRO, as food fortification legislation has not been launched in Zimbabwe yet; currently, the Government is working on a draft, supported by WFP. Strengthening the focus on nutrition in programmes without a primary nutrition objective is not clearly part of this PRRO, except in the establishment of vegetable gardens under PAC.

65. The PRRO is coherent with WFP's Policy on Disaster Risk Reduction and Management (Building Food Security and Resilience – October 2011). Through the geographical and community based targeting, the most vulnerable people and communities are reached with STA to alleviate their immediate food needs and PAC focuses on building their resilience and enhancing their livelihoods. The food support serves both to address immediate food needs as well as increase resilience.

66. The PRRO was found coherent and aligned with other WFP policies and strategies Guidelines for food distribution such as the Safety Nets Policy 2012, the Food Aid and Livelihoods in Emergencies 2010, and the Humanitarian Protection Policy 2012.

2.1.4 Coherence with national policy frameworks

67. WFP's main government counterpart is the Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Services (MoPSLSS), and it is from this ministry that possibly the most important policy directive with regard to humanitarian programming over the last few years has emanated - the National Social Transfer Policy. The policy promotes a move away from free food distribution (e.g. STA) towards conditional assistance – i.e. food or cash for work programmes. One of the main aims of the policy is to mitigate the impact of future drought through rehabilitation and construction of appropriate assets.

68. An analysis of the way that WFP's operation has evolved over the years shows that WFP has gradually been moving from blanket feeding to a more targeted and conditional approach favoured by the National Social Transfer Policy even though STA remains an important feature of the current PRRO. The previous PRRO (2001-2012 May 2011-April 2013), was based on STA and H&N Programmes for Anti-Retroviral and tuberculosis patients, and Social Safety Net Programmes for returnees and highly vulnerable households. The operation also included some first steps towards the use of cash and vouchers and public asset creation. Under the current PRRO the PAC and cash and voucher approaches were significantly scaled up, and there was a broader and stronger emphasis on H&N with more target groups and a planned focus on stunting. Thus, a gradual but clear alignment with Zimbabwe's policy with regard to social protection can be observed - from an unconditional to a conditional approach which tries to address resilience to drought - can be observed.

69. Despite the new agenda for conditional transfers, the GoZ acknowledges that there is still a role for unconditional social protection through the 2010 the Food

Deficit Mitigation Strategy and the National Action Plan for Orphans and Other Vulnerable Children. The strategy clearly states that it is the responsibility of the GoZ to provide social protection to its citizens with the support of international organizations and NGOs.

70. The evaluation found the GoZ to be very positive about the cooperation and co-ordination of WFP, and shared that especially in the last three years, a good level of cooperation was achieved. They acknowledged the role that WFP plays in providing a safety net considering that many beneficiaries are the most vulnerable, to be found in the communities in which WFP works. Although WFP is commended for its field presence – the best of any UN agency –it was reported that cooperation at field level could sometimes be improved. An example of this was the way that designs and budgets for PAC assets were sometimes made without consideration of GoZ capacity constraints, sometimes not making provision for the costs of enabling technical staff (engineers etc.) to visit field sites. It was also mentioned that in some cases beneficiaries received support from both WFP and MoPSLSS, probably because of lack of information sharing or a joined-up Management Information System (MIS) at the local level.

71. WFP has been instrumental in developing a number of policies and approaches, including the Food Security and Nutrition Policy (launched May 2013), and technical support for methodology, sampling and data collection to ZIMVAC and the yearly Livestock and Crop Assessments (pre- and post-harvest). It was generally recognised that while the Food and Nutrition Security Policy was a good document, not enough had been done to activate it, although, to be fair, this is not only the responsibility of WFP.

72. The Food and Nutrition Council is currently developing the Food and Nutrition Monitoring System, which is a follow up of the ZIMVAC and will collect data on a quarterly basis. The National Nutrition Strategy will be published around August 2014 and will be an important document for WFP to align its future operations to, including the participation the UN Flagship Programme. WFP's VAME unit has also developed a system to support the Nutrition Council's analytical processes.

73. The Government's National Gender Policy (2013 -2017) seeks to eradicate gender and race inequities and improve the role women play in governance. WFP targeting and project governance have acknowledged this, by emphasizing to cooperating partners the need for 50-50 representation of women in project committees and an equal balance of men and women among beneficiaries.

74. The Department of Nutrition and the Department of HIV and TB of the MoHCC are partners in the H&N activities. Focus on the nutritional aspects of TB patients, PLHIV, pregnant women, lactating mothers and children under five in the PRRO enhances the impact of the National Health Strategy and the Zimbabwe National HIV and AIDS strategic plan.

2.1.5 Coherence with interventions by other stakeholders

75. WFP enjoys cordial relations with MoPSLSS, and has extended its experience in humanitarian work to provide technical support in food distribution. Before the de-activation of the clusters in 2013, WFP was an active leader of the food cluster and participated across other relevant clusters. WFP still coordinates the humanitarian aspects of the UN country team and currently chairs the UN operation management team.

76. The UN agencies cooperate within the UNCT in supporting the ZUNDAF. The Nutrition Flagship Program's work on stunting is a good example of such cooperation working: WFP focuses on moderately malnourished children and PLW, and nutrition education, WHO and UNICEF emphasize severely malnourished children and PLW, and FAO drives the nutrition sensitive agricultural activities. All agencies take responsibility for elements of technical support to GoZ, for strengthening Food and Nutrition Security teams at national, provincial and District level, for developing the national food fortification strategy and plan of action and for firmly integrating nutrition into their key activities.

77. On the health and nutrition front, WFP works closely with MoHCC and other development partners. WFP's interventions in health and nutrition and PLHIV are carried out with the support of government and council health centres. UNICEF and WFP have built capacity in terms of training and provision of equipment for anthropometric data collection - namely scales, measuring tapes and height measuring boards, which are used for screening in beneficiary selection. WFP is also providing technical support for micronutrient and fortified food strategies through the MOHCC nutrition division.

78. The envisaged duration of the Flagship Program was 2012-2015 but the originally planned amount of US\$ 48,320,000 has as yet not been fully funded, so agencies have only worked at the policy and planning level, whilst the 30 Districts to be targeted in the start-up phase has been scaled down to 15. It is planned that the programme will be part of the PRRO as soon as it is rolled out and all participating agencies will ensure that their activities (for instance WASH and health) are aligned to be implemented in the same locations.

79. Zimbabwe was one of the 'early riser' countries in the Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) movement⁶⁵. The Government still has not officially approved the movement for Zimbabwe though. WFP has supported the administrative setup and participation of a civil society network, but not as part of the current PRRO. Donors and academic institutions have yet to get on board. Progress reports are no longer produced, which gives rise to fear that the initiative is stalling.

80. WFP has provided both financial and technical support for the ZIMVAC, whose results feed into PRRO targeting of beneficiaries. Technical assistance is geared towards instrument creation, methodology and primary data collection. Financial assistance is offered for provision of transport for the data collection exercise. The WFP's VAME reports are generally recognised by all informants as being reliable and of high quality and will be used for the forthcoming Food and Nutrition Monitoring System quarterly reports.

81. Coordination with Ministry of Agriculture, Mechanization and Irrigation Development (MoAMID) is less concrete at higher levels although communication is on-going on the subject of Purchase for Progress (P4P). Still, the PAC activities are for the most part agricultural based and Agritex is almost always involved in planning and provision of follow up support to the activities, such as mapping out vegetable gardens, crop establishment, irrigation, use of pesticides, business management and marketing of products. Technical assistance by and cooperation with FAO on production and productivity have not yet been incorporated, but may also add value to the PAC activities. The veterinary section has been at the forefront

⁶⁵ The SUN movement aims at scaling up evidence-based cost-effective interventions to address undernutrition through a multi-sectoral multi-stakeholder approach, building on Individual country nutrition strategies and programmes, while drawing on international evidence of good practice.

of supporting new and rehabilitated dip tanks, supplying chemicals and advising beneficiaries on livestock management. There are also tentative initiatives around using GMB facilities for storage of grain under a type of warehouse receipt system, but this is still at the planning stage. In general though, more effective collaboration at the field level is stymied by capacity constraints within the various departments, including a freeze on recruitment and practically no funds for transport.

82. The Ministry of Women Affairs, Gender and Community Development, though not directly involved with STA and PAC activities, also supports gender mainstreaming by ensuring women participate in decision making and share in control of productive assets. They operate at District level and participate in community mobilization, information dissemination and are present at times at food distribution points.

83. FEWSNET is a monitoring programme focussing on livelihoods and humanitarian policy and assistance and they cooperate with WFP on several fronts, including on market price monitoring, which has an effect on budgeting for humanitarian interventions. Both agencies collaborated in a joint food security assessment in March 2014 marking a relationship which could become stronger. FEWSNET's data collection system and FAO's IPC are used by WFP to double check targeting information for PRROs. Though the government has not indicated intentions to take full ownership of FEWSNET, there is room for development of a Food Security network with WFP and other relevant partners to collect and avail of credible food security information, and moves have been made in this direction with the VAME unit's recent development of a system to support the FNC in its work.

84. WFP's gradual shift in approach towards resilience and targeted assistance is in line with the approach of most other development actors in Zimbabwe. WFP is working with other members of the UN family on a resilience building strategy (as are a number of donors), and the WFP PRRO has been well aligned with the ZUNDAF. Out of the seven priority areas, WFP addresses mainly priority 3 (To support food security at household and national level), 5 (To support access to and utilisation of quality basic social services for all – especially nutrition services) and 6 (To support universal access to HIV prevention, treatment, care and support). To a lesser extent priority 2 (To support pro-poor sustainable growth and economic development – specifically improved generation and utilisation of data for policy and programme development and implementation) and 7 (To support women's empowerment, gender equality and equity) are also addressed.


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88. **Figure L: UN Agencies intervention areas in Zimbabwe** demonstrates how various UN agencies target areas of intervention and support, though often with different activities. Resilience building has a central place, as highlighted by ZUNDAF.

Figure L: UN Agencies intervention areas in Zimbabwe



Source: Prepared by Evaluation Team

89. The UN agencies in Zimbabwe cooperate through the UN Country team, which ascribes to the accepted principles and guidelines of the United Nations Development Group. UN partners reported that WFP’s contribution to the Programme Management Team and the UNCT was valuable, particularly with regard to the vulnerability monitoring and mapping information they are able to provide. The UNCT reports in a coordinated manner on a yearly basis on the UN supported national development results linked to the ZUNDAF, included those supported by WFP.

90. Donors to the PRRO have regular meetings with WFP and are satisfied with the quality and frequency of information provision, but this was not always the case with cooperating partners and UN agencies, who reported some concerns over WFP’s information sharing; some, for example, claiming that they were not even aware of the major components of WFP’s PRRO.

91. At capital level FAO did not seem fully aware of WFPs efforts, claiming that more could have been done to coordinate PAC interventions, but future cooperation is planned through the forthcoming District Food and Nutrition Committees – an area of cooperation made easier now that FAO has established a field office in Bulawayo. It is anticipated that the requirement for a multi-dimensional approach to malnutrition will foster stronger working relationships between UNICEF, UNDP, FAO and WFP, each bringing their relevant expertise to the table. It is recommended that WFP looks at cooperation models being rolled out in other countries, for example the Kenya Cereal Enhancement Programme under which the Government of Kenya, FAO, WFP and IFAD all work together to support farmers from food insecurity to subsistence to surplus producers.

92. The Food and Nutrition Council (FNC), which has the mandate of coordinating the food and nutrition security programs in Zimbabwe and chairs the ZIMVAC, is in the process of setting up District Food and Nutrition Security Committees. Ten have been established with the support of ECHO, and 20 more are planned by the end of 2015; the remaining will follow in the year after that. The Committees are chaired by MoAMID, co-chaired by the MoPSLSS and the secretariat is in the hands of the MoHCC. These committees will be responsible for the assessments and identification of problems in the field of food and nutrition security. Within MOHCC, WFP works with the HIV and the Family Health Department; and with the Food and Nutrition Council. There are diverging opinions with the nutrition department on micronutrient powders; the department is against home fortification.

93. The FNC emphasises the importance for WFP to incorporate the 10 Districts, where committees are already established, into their targeting. It should be noted that even though the technical capacity and knowledge of the FNC are considerable, their capacity in quantity of human resources is currently insufficient. FNC's monitoring has important linkages to the Vulnerability Assessment and Monitoring and Evaluation (VAME) system.

94. WFP cooperates with IOM on returnees and with UNHCR on refugees under their global agreement. Returnees (generally people who migrated for economic reasons) from South Africa and Botswana are targeted in two Districts of Matabeleland South, where they are provided with one meal, ; spend one day and are escorted home. Until recently, IOM provided the transport costs. Even though the costs of the meal is relatively low, WFP has to transport the food to the location and pay the distribution team.

95. Since the number of refugees in the Tongagara Camp has surpassed 5,000 (it is around 6,500 and growing), WFP is supposed to take over the food distribution responsibility from UNHCR under the terms of its global agreement with UNHCR in this regard. Up to now, this has not happened, and WFP awaits the report of the Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) of May 2014. WFP and UNHCR have agreed on joint fund raising for this subject. Currently, UNHCR is facing a fund shortage and the failure of WFP to undertake its role up to now has added to that problem; the yearly overall budget of UNHCR is only US\$ 5 million. In the camp, there is only need for food aid since, according to UNHCR, there is no malnutrition.

96. WFP played a major role in designing the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) and in the Food Security Cluster and the Nutrition Cluster, when they were still functional (they were deactivated at the end of 2013). Coordination of food security interventions now takes place through the Food Security Working Group and the UN Country Team (UNCT), in both of which WFP plays an important role. Food has always played an important role in the CAP, making up about 85% of the requirements. In 2014, after consultation with the Government, a CAP was not launched. OCHA is considerably downsizing their operation to remain with a small group of people at the end of 2014. The ECHO Country office has closed in December 2013.

97. MOPSLSS reported other important donors to the food assistance programme, such as USAID with their Food for Peace Programme (through World Vision and CRFA); DFID with a new support of US\$ 20 million and the World Bank supporting Plan. MOPSLSS coordinates all these efforts including the PRRO of WFP

and ensures complementarity, interaction among partners and absence of duplication.

Summary of Appropriateness

Geographic targeting was guided by the ZIMVAC and other historical data collected by WFP's VAM unit over previous years; this meant that some ostensibly food secure districts received assistance because they contained pockets of food insecurity at the Ward level. Activities were concentrated in agricultural zones IV and V, these being the areas most affected by food insecurity.

The PRRO's objectives - especially those related to infrastructure development, water resource management and health promotion - were largely appropriate to the needs of the target population as reported in the section of the 2013 ZIMVAC report that focuses on development needs and challenges. The 2013 ZIMVAC survey found that top development priorities were infrastructure development, water and sanitation, and water for production.

PAC, with its emphasis on providing immediate food and the possibility of longer term income / food through the assets created were in principle appropriate to all of the PRRO's objectives, although not always to the needs of the very poorest people – those who don't own cattle, for example. Many of the interventions were focussed on increasing the availability of water for livelihoods purposes: this is a high priority for nearly all households in the drier areas of Zimbabwe, so from a design point of view this was sound. Furthermore, requiring conditionality is consistent with Zimbabwe's approach on the provision of assistance.

The ZIMVAC indicated that a significant proportion of the population would experience a food deficit over the lean season. Coping with this usually requires a household to sell productive assets, so provision of food transfers at the period of greatest shortage could prevent this negative coping strategy, thereby enhancing resilience (operational objective 2).

The provision of food either in kind or through vouchers under the H&N programme went some way to supporting malnourished adults to regaining their productive capacity, but the fact that it was not complemented by an exit strategy or linked to PAC activities at a strategic level meant that it was not appropriate to clients' longer term needs.

Generally speaking the use of cash was not appropriate to achieving the PRRO's objectives because the transfer size was not linked to the volatile price of maize

The overall programme was consistent with WFP's overall policy frameworks and Strategic Objectives, but the considerable use of unconditional transfers put the operation at odds with emerging GoZ policy on social transfers, which encourages conditionality wherever possible. It should be noted, however, that WFP's operations in Zimbabwe have been making increasing use of conditionality.

WFP's approach and operations in country are generally supportive of those of other agencies, particularly as WFP is moving more towards addressing malnutrition more strongly and delivering a resilience agenda – a donor priority and the objective of many other development actors in Zimbabwe.

2.2 Results of the Operation

98. Results of the PRRO can be broken down into four broad categories: i) targeting, which involves the way households and individuals were selected and who

actually benefited from the intervention; ii) outputs – basically the quantity of cash / vouchers / food distributed and the numbers of people who benefited; iii) Outcomes cover the intended and unintended changes in certain indicators recorded over the period of the intervention (though it should be noted that these cannot always be attributed to the intervention, but only contribution of PRRO action can be claimed); and iv) efficiency, which is an analysis of whether activities were cost efficient and delivered on time and whether outcomes could have been achieved in a different way. These issues are explored in relation to the three components of the PRRO below.

2.2.1 Productive Asset Creation

2.2.1.1 PAC Household Targeting

99. Households to participate in the PAC initiative were selected at Ward level. Once Wards had been selected for a PAC intervention (section 2.1.2), communities themselves were responsible for selecting households who would receive STA or participate in PAC by constructing their own vulnerability criteria and listing households who qualify – a process which is most thorough and accurate when the village register⁶⁶ is used to verify names and ensure that no-one has been overlooked.

100. While there were general complaints from beneficiaries that there were more people in need of food support than there were spaces on the programme, the evaluation team found little evidence that the targeting procedure had been manipulated or hijacked by any one person or group of individuals (although in a number of cases PAC workers were from villages not benefiting from the asset being created, and they also were in need of food support).

101. WFP attempts to maintain oversight of the selection process through the use of a ‘Registration Monitoring’ questionnaire, applied to a minimum of 10% of sites. Experience from other humanitarian response programmes though (notably the cash response to the Somalia famine in 2011 [ODI 2013]) shows that it is unrealistic to expect quality information about biased selection processes. More often than not, if rigging does occur it is controlled by powerful elites or factions who quash all dissent through threats and intimidation. Informal networks or anonymous phone lines take more time and effort to set up, but work better than interviews where there is the prospect of being seen as a ‘whistle-blower’. Nevertheless, putting in place systems to prevent political meddling is justified and a particular concern of the larger donors in Zimbabwe.

2.2.1.2 PAC Outputs

102. Under PAC WFP planned to work with 25 international and Zimbabwean NGO partners in 30 Districts, but due to funding constraints ended up working with nine partners in 15 Districts (Annex 7). The partners are responsible for distributing the food and guiding the asset creation and the activities such as beneficiary selection, the Community Level Participatory Planning (CLLP) process and the setup of asset management committees. Between May 2013 and March 2014 WFP distributed 98% of the tonnage of food planned in the PRRO, reaching just over 100% of the planned 250,000 beneficiaries. However, only \$721,710 (20%) of a planned \$3,600,000 cash / voucher distribution was completed because of funding constraints (Table 4: **PAC Outputs - Planned & Actual**).

Table 4: PAC Outputs - Planned & Actual May 2013 – March 2014

⁶⁶ A continuously updated record of all people living in the village kept by the head man

Output Indicator	Planned (1)	Actual (2)	Percentage of planned reached
Food Tonnage (mt)	11,816	11,611	98%
Cash and Vouchers - US\$	3,600,000	721,710	20%
Male Beneficiaries	120,000	124,324	104%
Female Beneficiaries	130,000	136,712	105%
Beneficiaries Total	250,000	261,036	104%

Source (1) PRRO Document /Budget revision 1; (2) Food Distribution report (provided by CO).

103. 324 assets were created including dams and water conservation bodies, dip tanks, cattle pens, vegetable gardens and fish ponds (Annex 11), but of these 56 (17%) were uncompleted at the time of the evaluation.

104. The number of working days per PAC per person varied from 60 to 90; the number of workers per asset roughly varied between 60 and 300. Workers on PAC were paid a monthly ration of 50kg cereal, 10kg pulses and 4 kg vegetable oil – suitable for a family of five. Since many PAC related food distributions took place before the end of 2013, only a minority were affected by the pipeline breaks, but in November 2013, food was replaced by cash, thereby making households vulnerable to the inflation in cereal prices.

105. Works management committees – established with oversight of cooperating partners - were found functional in most cases with transparent selection in terms of village representation, and establishment and management of work norms. The executive committee is made up of village heads, who are all men. The supervisory committee consists of both men and women and in many cases the women were in the majority. The beneficiaries expressed satisfaction with the participation of women in the supervisory committee. However, not all committees have experience in carrying out management related tasks, and this could have an impact on the viability of the asset as discussed in the section on outcomes below.

106. The food provision is supposed to match the duration of the labour, but that did not always happen for various reasons, including capacity issues with local builders and constructors, underestimation of the amount of work required to complete the asset and disagreements between various GoZ departments. A good example of this is the access road built at Nduka in Mutare District. The project required close coordination with District Development Fund and District staff, but this did not happen, resulting in delays in the delivery of materials and sections of the road being washed away before it could be completed. In this case the work was completed due to the fact that beneficiaries continued working without pay. Indeed, in most cases where the food ran out before the job was finished, beneficiaries were sufficiently committed to see the work to completion, even though some of them had to forego other income generating activities.

2.2.1.3 PAC Outcomes

107. At an output level the programme aimed to ensure that over 85% of beneficiaries achieved an ‘acceptable’ food consumption score; in the event in-house monitoring recorded that over 93% of beneficiaries had a score which was acceptable or better (Annex 12). It is highly unlikely that these effects can be fully attributed to the programme (monitoring does not attempt to discern the reasons for improving or worsening FCS), but the food provided and the assets created will definitely have gone some way to improving household food security. Interestingly surveys of

beneficiaries found that the targets for dietary diversity were never reached. Again, there is no in house data to explain this trend, but it would seem to indicate that a large proportion of households were too poor to buy any food other than the basic staple food stuffs.

108. As well as enabling households to earn food or cash, the other key objective of the PAC approach is to increase participating households' resilience to climatic shocks, demanding the question: were the assets created relevant to the circumstances, livelihood strategies and capacities of the most food insecure and vulnerable households? Based on the sites visited during the field visit, assets created can be grouped into three categories: assets which are not appropriate to beneficiaries' needs, assets that are currently inappropriate to needs but will become so, and assets that are appropriate to beneficiaries' needs. For reasons of space, these are presented in more detail in Annex 13.

109. In most cases, assets were found appropriate to beneficiaries' present or future needs, and a membership and management structure was usually in place, capable of generating the cash necessary for maintenance and continued supply of inputs. Payment in food addressed transient household food shortages, but cash payments' size was not matched to prevailing prices.

110. It is too early to fully evaluate PAC assets' contribution to household resilience. Some assets are not directly relevant to the poorest (non-cattle owning) portion of the population, although they will help the slightly better off.

111. The evaluation found little evidence of unintentional outcomes as a result of PAC activities other than, in a few cases, reports by market traders that the food distribution depressed demand for their goods. In most cases it was too early to tell what the long term environmental impact of interventions will be, but in one there was concern that drawing water for a cattle dip would exhaust the water from an already well-used well.

2.2.1.4 PAC Efficiency

112. PAC was used to create assets, selected per priority of the community; workers from the community were provided with food items as payment for their work. At each site work norms were established that required each beneficiary to work four hours per day for a five day week. This enabled workers to perform household chores and, if necessary, commit to other paid casual labour. Distribution of food items was conducted monthly with a package comprising 50kg maize grain, 10kg beans and 4 litres of oil: this being sufficient to provide an average sized household with their minimum monthly calorific requirement.

113. Unlike transfers made under the STA component, the size of the food package was not linked to household size. In cases where pipeline breaks meant that food was not available, beneficiaries were given \$55 cash instead: unfortunately food price inflation meant that in many cases this fell about 30% short of being enough to replace the 'normal' food basket (

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116. **Table 5: Difference in price of food basket in post-harvest (Mar / Apr) and hunger months (Nov / Dec).** This price inflation was not unexpected – as the ZIMVAC report states: ‘2013/14 maize prices will average at around US\$0.53/kg nationally, US\$0.36/kg in the staple cereal surplus Districts and US\$0.77/kg (over \$12 for a 17kg bucket) in the cereal deficit Districts’, but resource limitations presumably factored heavily in the decision not to index link the size of the cash transfer to maize prices.

Table 5: Difference in price of food basket in post-harvest (Mar / Apr) and hunger months (Nov / Dec)

	Maize 50kg	Beans 10kg	Oil 4 litres	Total Cost
Price - post harvest \$	17.5	30	8	55
Highest recorded price - peak hunger months \$	34.2	30	8	72.2
% Difference in price	195%	0%	0%	131.2%

117. Furthermore, households incurred considerable opportunity costs in travelling long distances to actually find grain for sale. In Mount Darwin, for example, the evaluation team found that the price of maize increased from \$5 to \$12 for a 17.5kg bucket, and was only available about 20km away from the targeted communities.

118. WFP has to consider two critical questions when setting the work norms and remuneration level: a) is the transfer enough to achieve the programme objectives? – in this case cover an average household’s missing food entitlement and, b) will the transfer distort existing labour markets or make the programme attractive to food secure households who would not normally be interested if the payment rate was lower?

119. In terms of the first question – transfer appropriateness to achieve the programme’s objectives – the answer is ‘yes’ in the cases where food was provided and where cash payments were sufficient to buy the food entitlement. Unfortunately the food pipeline breaks tended to coincide with the months when the price of maize was highest, so beneficiaries found themselves in receipt of a transfer which was insufficient to buy the food basket that they had previously been receiving for the same work.

120. With regard to the second issue – distorting local wage markets - anecdotal evidence would suggest that the monetised PAC package (about \$2.75 per day) is fairly consistent with the ‘local’ wage rate for casual labour - averaging about \$2.50 per day, although this varies depending on the time of year and the type of job (it can be as low as \$1 per day, or as high as \$5 per day when labour is in particularly short supply). Given the similarity in rates, it is unlikely that PAC remuneration rates negatively influenced local labour markets to any noticeable degree. Gender differences are not assessed or addressed; payment to women and men was equal.

2.2.2 Seasonal Targeted Assistance

2.2.2.1 STA Household Targeting

121. Households were targeted using the same community based approach as that to select PAC beneficiaries, but committees were instructed to focus more on households who were particularly affected by labour constraints as well as using their community defined criteria. The evaluation found that the most vulnerable households were registered – but some informants reported that they found the system whereby transfers were linked to household size resulted in limited resources available being cornered by fewer larger families (this was addressed by the introduction of capping). Many of the STA beneficiaries were Female Headed Households – evidence of the fact that communities recognise the particularly vulnerable status of these households.

2.2.2.2 STA Outputs


122. The STA covered the hungry season, starting in September and continuing until March; by that time most of the beneficiaries had access to food from their own or the community’s land. Thus, the STA addressed food insecurity combined with a decreasing purchasing power. The PRRO planned to assist 1,863,200 beneficiaries; in the event 1,407,907 (76%) were actually reached. Between May 2013 and March 2014 43% of the planned tonnage for STA was distributed (Table 6), the difference in tonnage and beneficiary percentages being attributable to the fact that rations were halved in many cases because of funding constraints While the recipients of food were grateful for what they received, in most cases beneficiaries complained that the half rations were too small and only lasted to the second week of the month – an quantity that was not sufficient to register much difference in their nutritional status.

Table 6: STA Outputs - Planned & Actual May 2013 – March 2014

Output Indicator	Planned (1)	Actual (2)	Percentage of planned reached
Tonnage (mt)	73,640	31,774	43%
Cash and Vouchers - US\$ Distributed	8,886,000	3,405,144	38%
Male Beneficiaries	895,200	658,774	74%
Female Beneficiaries	968,000	749,143	77%
Beneficiaries Total	1,863,200	1,407,917	76%


Source (1)PRRO Document /Budget revision 1; (2) Food Distribution report (provided by CO).

Figure M: STA Outputs Tonnage - Planned & Actual (mt)




Source: WFP Food Distribution Report (WFP CO)

Figure N: STA Outputs Beneficiaries - Planned & Actual



Source: WFP Food Distribution Report (WFP CO)

Figure O: STA Value of Cash and Vouchers Distributed (US \$)



Source: WFP Food Distribution Report (WFP CO)

2.2.2.3 STA Outcomes

123. The objective of STA is to protect and promote livelihoods and enhance the self-reliance of targeted vulnerable households in emergencies and during early recovery.. Food consumption scores collected on a regular basis by WFP show that the target of over 85% reporting an acceptable score was reached (Annex 12), but it is highly unlikely that this can be fully attributed to the food distributions as they were of limited duration and size and many STA beneficiaries were engaging in casual labour in order to cover their missing food entitlements. Furthermore, the relatively good harvest in the early months of 2014 will have skewed findings. It is possible, though, that the transfer may have enabled households to avoid selling productive assets, but as there was no qualitative component to the in-house M&E system, it was not possible to measure this.

124. Unlike the PAC food package, which was of fixed size, the size of the STA transfer was linked to the size of the recipient household (although this was eventually capped at five people because of resource constraints, diluting impact and making it difficult to measure quantitatively). As already mentioned, in some areas STA beneficiaries were provided with cash which was meant to enable them to buy the cereal component of their food entitlement. However, because the cash figure was fixed on a post-harvest grain price, while the price of grain increased by up to 100% in the lean season, cash transfer households ended up worse off than those receiving assistance in kind.

125. As a result of funding constraints, pipeline breaks were a major issue, with distributions stopped entirely or incomplete baskets or half rations were provided. Distributions were stopped in different months and rations were not changed or halved to the same extent in all target Districts – making measurement of impact in a quantitative way practically impossible. It is not clear to some staff in Regional Offices, on what basis Head Office made decisions to halt or continue STA.

126. Strategies to make up the deficit involved piecework, gathering wild food or catching fish for consumption and sales, or illegal gold panning. Some households reported borrowing food from neighbours, which they had to repay from their (sometimes again halved) next ration. If the worst came to the worst, they would decrease their portion size “or just drink water”.

127. The main question facing STA, particularly in the current policy climate⁶⁷, concerns its efficiency as a means of ensuring food security. While there is no doubt that a significant proportion of the population of Zimbabwe faces seasonal food deficit, this evaluation found that many of those receiving STA could have probably worked for their food in the same way that PAC beneficiaries did. Indeed, as already mentioned, many reported that they performed casual labour to manage their household's missing food entitlements. Of course, PAC interventions are more costly to deliver, requiring supervision and payment for materials and labour, but they are consistent with the principles of sustainability and self-dependence that the Government is trying and, given current circumstances, bound to promote.

128. However, involving the significant proportion of STA beneficiaries who are physically able in productive activities rather than handing out food aid need not cost as much as typical PAC interventions do. One of the main determinants of a reasonable harvest is early land preparation and planting and good crop management⁶⁸. Many food insecure households cannot do this because they are compelled to work on others' farms to earn food before they start work on their own: they are constantly behind the seasonal activity curve. Designing a programme that utilises STA resources to pay households to work on their own land in order to improve their food security could be a way of reducing dependence on free food and using resources more efficiently.

129. The evaluation found no unintended effects of the STA. Rather the size and duration of the transfer were insufficient to have any measurable impact.

2.2.2.4 STA Efficiency

130. STA was delivered in two ways in the programme: in kind (entire transfer in food), or under the Cash for Cereals (CFC) scheme whereby beneficiaries received beans and oil and a cash payment that was supposed to enable them to buy the cereal component of their food entitlement. Within this CFC component, transfers were made either through the EcoCash⁶⁹ mobile phone payment system, or in cash (delivered by cash in transit companies).

131. Before discussing the modalities, it is worth remembering the object of STA is to maintain a minimum level of food consumption over the lean period. Clearly, providing households with food is an appropriate way of delivering on this objective, but the provision of a cash transfer not linked to the price of grain is less effective in ensuring a minimum level of food consumption is maintained. As was the case with PAC beneficiaries who received cash in lieu of food, households receiving cash under the CFC modality (no matter how it was delivered) were vulnerable to massive fluctuations in the price of maize, and found themselves with less food than those who received in kind. As such, it can be stated that the cash payments were not as appropriate as food transfers, simply because they did not reflect the price of the food basket and resulted in recipients consuming fewer calories. Indeed, cash appeared to be used more as a means of dealing with an unreliable supply of grain imports rather than ensuring that responses were appropriate to market behaviour.

132. With regard to cash transfers, most CFC households received cash delivered through an armed transit company. This delivery modality was considerably more expensive than delivering through mobile phones, but obviously was more

⁶⁷ GoZ is encouraging a movement towards conditional transfers

⁶⁸ Application of fertiliser and timely weeding

⁶⁹ part of the Econet mobile phone company

appropriate in areas where mobile network coverage was non-existent, and as it turned out, less prone to the teething troubles experienced with the EcoCash pilot.

133. Cash transfers through mobile phones were piloted by ADRA in Gweru. ADRA, felt that they should have spent more time familiarising beneficiaries with the new technology, and eventually returned to making some transfers through the cash in transit system. The fact that beneficiaries had to share handsets meant that there was often confusion over which SIM card belonged to whom, and the continual swapping of cards in the handset increased the frequency with which cards were lost. Furthermore, in the initial stages of the pilot, 47% of beneficiaries forgot their PIN number (EcoCash / ADRA estimate). Other problems included the cards or handsets becoming locked as a result of children playing with them, and the inordinate amount of time required to register people for SIM cards – national protocols requiring various forms of identification that most people do not have to hand. Providing each beneficiary with a handset and increasing the amount of support at the early stages would have gone some way to addressing these problems.

134. As beneficiaries collected cash from local agents who receive a small commission, the scheme had the additional ‘multiplier’ benefit of increasing the circulation of cash in the local economy. Local ‘Econet Ambassadors’, who were paid \$1 for every new line they registered, also benefitted. EcoCash were extremely supportive of the pilot, seeing it as an effective way of rolling out their coverage and winning new clients: they charged ADRA \$0.40 per \$20 transferred rather than the normal \$0.60. Considering that other operators were asking for a commission of around 25% of the transfer, this service commission represented good value for money.

135. Given the cost savings and economic multipliers of payments through phones compared to cash in transit, EcoCash would appear to be a more appropriate way of delivering cash, as long as the area in question has network coverage, and the transfer cycle lasts for long enough to justify the cost of the handsets and the training sessions needed to ensure beneficiaries understand the system (i.e. more than a couple of months). Unfortunately innovations in transfer modality had no bearing on impact on household food security – households still suffer the effects of grain price inflation. The price rises were predicted by ZIMVAC, so could have been budgeted for. A more innovative approach could have been to use the savings made through the use of EcoCash to increase the size of the transfer relative to the spot price of grain at the time of the transfer.

136. In another element that falls under the STA umbrella, although it operates all year is the way in which WFP works with IOM, in supporting Zimbabwean returnees from various South Africa. The returnees are offered overnight accommodation, wet feeding for one meal through WFP and escorted to the nearest town by IOM. Under the PRRO it was planned that 5,000 returnees would be supported, but the actual number appeared much larger at 31,348, though the reason is unknown. Of this number, 79% were men, though an almost equal number of men and women were planned originally. The returnees were assisted with wet feeding for one meal and WFP also provides salaries for IOM’s Food Distribution Assistant and general hand.

137. Though this response is appropriate for unaccompanied minors, the returnees are on the whole economic migrants who crossed the border without proper documents, and now are often in a poor condition because they have not earned money for some time rather than exposure to climatic shocks. IOM has decided to

stop subsidizing transport costs and start supporting more developmental projects in the surrounding communities.

2.2.3 Health and Nutrition

2.2.3.1 H&N Targeting

138. The nutrition component focuses on the treatment of MAM of TB, ART and Pre-ART patients, PLW and children between 6 and 59 months. In June 2013 the country office was implementing the programme through 408 health centres in 19 districts. By November 2013 the health and nutrition programme had extended to 516 health centres in 23 districts.

139. The targeting in the H&N programme was found relevant: through the health facilities by anthropometric measurement, malnourished people from these categories were identified.

2.2.3.2 H&N Outputs

140. Table 7: H&N Outputs - Planned & Actual shows the actual versus planned tonnages and beneficiary numbers achieved by the H&N Programme: the commodity target fell about 10% short, but between May 2013 and March 2014 the programme reached 110% of its target for beneficiaries assisted, largely due to significantly exceeding the targets for registration of PLW and children under 2 years old. The reason for this is that PLW and children under two are easily reached since they attend the mandatory growth monitoring at the health facilities. It has appeared much more difficult to reach the children between 2 and 5 years of age. Even though the actual targets for beneficiary numbers were exceeded, resource shortages meant that not all received the transfer for the full intended duration, contributing to the high relapse rate.

141. The PRRO was successful in programming about \$3m of the \$4.4m planned for distribution through cash and vouchers.

Table 7: H&N Outputs - Planned & Actual May 2013 – March 2014

Output Indicator	Planned (1)	Actual (2)	Percentage of planned reached
Tonnage distributed (mt)	19,051	17,068	90%
Cash and Vouchers - US\$ Distributed	4,400,000	3,008,045	68%
Male Beneficiaries	214,800	209,604	98%
Female Beneficiaries	240,700	290,594	121%
Beneficiaries Total	455,500	500,198	110%
Children under five beneficiaries	32,000	28,065	88%
HIV/TB Patients	59,000	52,100	88%
Pregnant / Lactating Women beneficiaries	8,000	15,269	190.86%

Source (1) PROO Document /Budget revision 1; (2) Food Distribution report (provided by CO).

142. Apart from the MoHCC for the screening and referral, WFP works with 16 national and international NGOs who perform the food (and voucher) distribution, collect data and analyse the results. In addition, WFP has supported the development of nutrition related policy components and strategies of GoZ; including a study of the importance of nutrition for HIV patients. Currently, GoZ works on developing food fortification legislation supported by WFP.

143. In the rural areas, nutrition beneficiaries were provided with 10 kg Super Cereal per month throughout the year, provided no pipeline breaks occurred (in urban areas a voucher scheme [described in section 2] was used). Their households received a ration for up to 5 members, if they were found food insecure (a full ration consists of 10 kg cereals, 2 kg pulses and 750 gram vegetable oil per household member). The cooperating NGO checks whether the family is food insecure, which was almost always the case, since the public hospitals are primarily used by the most vulnerable population. A clear explanation and guidance on the use of Super Cereal is given when patients get their first ration, and that has contributed to its high acceptance.

144. There have been several pipeline breaks, most of them caused by a funding shortfall, from November onwards. From March 2014 there was no Super Cereal at all, but in general, the distribution had returned to full rations from May 2014, however, as prepositioned stocks are limited, it is unsure yet how long this will last – for example, in Bulawayo, in May 2014 there was no Super Cereal provided by CRS since they had not settled their contract with WFP yet, and in Kwekwe the entire nutrition support was stopped in February 2014 because of lack of food.

145. In the case of serious pipeline breaks (for instance March 2014), food distribution was done on a first-come-first serve basis, because the NGO partners as well as WFP believed and hoped that the food would still arrive. This was not the case, and a number of patients had to forego their entire ration for a month, some of them travelling to the clinic or hospital several times only to find out there was no food. Food also arrived late at some distribution points late in April 2014. No analysis has been conducted into the possible effect of one month shortage on the nutritional status.

146. In some of the hospitals in the West of the country staff reported that iron tablets for pregnant women and Plumpy Nut for SAM patients were not available. Some of the SAM patients reportedly ended up among the MAM patients, which then had a negative influence on the recovery rate, since a year is generally too short to cure SAM patients with the help of Super Cereal.

2.2.3.3 H&N Outcomes

147. In Table 8 below, H&N related outcomes are displayed. Annex 12 shows all of WFP's planned and attained outcomes as reflected in the SPR 2013. In the table it becomes clear, that recovery rates are very low, well below the corporate target of 75% (as reported in SPR 2013). Most of the recovery rates were found below 60%, dropping even below 30%⁷⁰. The children under 5 show the best recovery at 58%, pregnant and lactating women slightly lower at 48% on average); ART and TB patients perform worst (41% and 45%). The non-response rates are very high for all four target groups, well above the targeted 15% with rates between 40% and 50%.

Table 8: Planned and attained nutrition related outcomes

⁷⁰ According to WFP sub-office M&E data, under-5 recovery rate Bulawayo October 2013 27%; Masvingo December 2013 28%

Strategic Objective 2: Support malnourished adults and children by helping them to regain their productive capacity				
Outcome 2.1: Adequate food consumption maintained over assistance period for targeted households				
	Baseline	End 2013	Most recent 2014	Target
Household food consumption score =>borderline	99% ⁷¹	79/79 (100%)	178/189 (94%)	>85%
Daily average dietary diversity: households consume =>3 food groups	-	50/79 (63%)	98/189 (51%)	90%
Outcome 2.2: Reduced undernutrition, including micronutrient deficiencies among children aged 6-59 months, pregnant and lactating women, and school aged children				
Recovery rate	ART 49%	U5 58%, PLW 48% ART 41%, TB 45%	U5 50%, PLW 42% ART 42%, TB 47%	>75%
Default rate	<15%	1.4%	2%	<15%
Non response rate	44% (ART)		U5 46%, PLW 40% ART 50%, TB 43%	< 15%
Number of institutional sites assisted (e.g. health centres) as a % of planned	-	80%	89%	100%

148. Various reasons were brought up by stakeholders, but none of them have been researched in-depth. Pregnant mothers have been found to share part of their rations with the children. HIV patients (many TB patients also suffer from HIV) suffer from opportunistic infections, which delay their nutritional recovery; moreover, they are often severely malnourished when they are admitted into the MAM treatment group for lack of other opportunities. The effective rates for ART patients are probably in reality even lower than reflected in the table, since the same patients are often re-enrolled into the programme after relapse.

149. The rates under this PRRO are far lower than usually found in similar programs. WFP is in the process of developing a questionnaire together with the partners, to assess in-depth the possible causes. Reasons suggested by health staff and others include, apart from the occasional admission of SAM patients, high rates of diarrhoea, coughs, malaria and fevers, lack of behaviour change communication, but also the occurrence of pipeline breaks and premature end of the food distribution, the high carbohydrate content of Super cereal and the sharing of Super cereal with household members. In the agriculture season, parents take their children to their fields and defaulter rates are higher than usual. According to H&N partners, the lack of adequate behaviour change communication during food provision also contributes to the risk of relapse after the target BMI is reached and nutritional support stopped. Furthermore, according to cooperating partners, the food was at times withheld from the patient by their family, to ensure a continuation of the food support for the patient. It should be noted however, that by providing the Highly Vulnerable Household rations alongside the food support for the patient, WFP has made a good effort to deter intra-household sharing of curative food.

150. There are a couple of options that could be tried in order to slow the 'revolving door' of admission-recovery-readmission. The first is to use a higher exit BMI than that use for entry, and a second, mentioned by many of the clients interviewed as part of the evaluation, is to train and equip those leaving the programme with some

⁷¹ Dec-2010, Community Household Surveillance (CHS), WFP survey

kind of some kind of skill – for example poultry production or vegetable gardening. In urban areas these could be done more intensively, using grow bags or spare land allocated by the Council.

151. The supplementary feeding mortality rate was 1.91%, and thus the outcome indicator (below 3%) was attained. The cohort of June-November showed a considerably higher rate (2.51%) than the average since December 2012 (1.37%) since support was given in new areas, where ART patients often had not received treatment before, and a relatively high percentage of SAM cases were incorporated.

152. The adherence of ART patients to treatment was high in the same period at 98.69%, however, since only roughly 12% of the ART patients are eligible for nutrition support, this adherence can only be partly attributed to the WFP support. The same conclusion holds true for the TB patients, where the treatment success rate was high at 98.31%; the value of these outcome indicators to measure results of the H&N activities is therefore questionable. There is a strong relation between TB and HIV anyhow, since more than 80% of TB patients are cross-infected by HIV, which adds to the relevance of targeting both groups of patients and enhances impact.

153. The sustainability of the H&N interventions from an institutional point of view is limited. The health facility staff know how to tackle malnutrition among various target groups, but it is unlikely that the government will be able to make the food items available to address this condition. The fact that nutrition is incorporated into various policies and strategies makes an increased future government focus on nutrition at least more likely, provided these policies are actually implemented. The development of the food fortification legislation may contribute to combating malnutrition from another angle.

2.2.3.4 H&N Efficiency

154. Beneficiaries being considered for admittance are weighed or measured through Mid-Upper Arm Circumference (MUAC) once a month. There are different admission criteria for each client group: for adult TB and (pre-)ART patients it is a BMI below 18.5 (in some places below 18.4); for PLW it is a MUAC of under 23; and for children under 5 and children 5-18 with ART/TB it is a weight for height of between -3 and -2 SD of BMI for age. Also in a number of locations, a larger than average weight loss between two consecutive visits triggers enrolment into the nutrition program.

155. Patients at first registration can remain in the programme for 6 months if needed, but they will be discharged if their status moves out of the enrolment criteria limit during two consecutive visits. If their nutritional status has not improved after three months, they will be offered additional medical assistance. If after 6 months they are still eligible for nutrition support, they will at the same time be referred to a medical practitioner. The assistance ends in general after 12 months even in cases of 'no cure', but in exceptional cases patients can continue receiving nutritional assistance. ART patients were found to be readmitted to the programme regularly and intermittently if their situation deteriorates. Anthropometric measures are conducted by staff of the health facility and the data are collected and analysed by WFP's cooperating partner at the time the beneficiaries come to collect their food.

156. Under the H&N programme, assistance was delivered in kind in rural areas and, in Harare, Bulawayo and Gweru, through a voucher redeemable for the grain / oil / beans portion of their entitlement at participating supermarket chains (Corn Soya Blend (CSB) was distributed directly in all cases). The targeting matched with

needs as found in various assessments and covered the needs to the extent possible, based on the available budget.

157. The ration for ART patients (which allows feeding of the household not just the individual) is appropriate, because often their household members, though they have a Body Mass Index (BMI) above 18.5, also are on ART and have high nutritional needs. While resources allowed, individuals who were pregnant or lactating and/or suffering from HIV/AIDS or TB were registered on a six-month long nutrition support programme if their BMI fell below the critical threshold of 18.5. This entitled them to a monthly package of maize, beans, oil and Super Cereal, linked to the size of the client's household⁷². The fact that there is practically no other system of nutritional support for clients targeted under the H&N programme serves to heighten its relevance.

158. Recipients of directly distributed food reported no major issues with the distribution process (other than in many cases they were no longer receiving the transfer because of lack of resources). The distributions witnessed by the evaluation team proceeded in an orderly and well organised manner.

159. The voucher system – managed by Redan Mobile – is partly electronic, but scratch cards are also used. Reconciliation is automatic and the retailer can use a mobile phone to enter data. In Harare, beneficiaries of nutrition support receive “real” electronic vouchers for food items. Registration of beneficiaries is done through the internet in health centres.

160. Redan Mobile has worked with WFP since 2010 and has recently adapted the system entirely to the demands of WFP; now it also captures all sorts of monitoring data related to food security. The system was seen to work well, seemed very secure and well protected, and health and NGO staff, the beneficiaries as well as the shop managers and staff shared their positive observations. Beneficiaries were observed obtaining their goods at the supermarket within half an hour after their visit to the clinic. The database system is linked to the stocks of the cooperating NGO and helps to manage the stocks and the WFP fund flow.

161. The system is helped by the fact that 80% of the beneficiaries own a mobile phone⁷³; for the food distribution, they receive two pin codes, one for the Super Cereal, which is distributed in-kind, and the other for food and cash. The phoneless 20% of patients follow the same procedure through use of a scratch card with two codes. The vouchers may be redeemed for 30 days but in fact they are mostly redeemed immediately after receipt.

162. WFP agrees the price for the commodities at the start of each month with the supermarket. On a country wide scale, Redan has contracts with 15 shops including OK supermarket. In the case of OK - it receives 500 - 700 nutrition patients per month (out of a total of 130,000 clients) but the individual spend is considerable at around \$50 per client. The clients have a choice from five brands of goods, all local or regional. The prices are the same as those paid by regular customers.

163. The biggest challenge mentioned was working when the internet or the mobile network were dysfunctional, which has happened less frequently since the beginning of 2014. When the internet connection does not work, the process can continue working through mobile internet; the mobile network is rarely down. In rural

⁷²hiv

⁷³ Urban area only; the figure for cash transfer beneficiaries in rural areas was less than 10%

regions, these problems do still occur, especially in remote areas. In Bulawayo, WFP installed an ADSL line to solve similar problems; since the internet quality overall is improving though, this may not be necessary in other areas in future.

2.2.4 School feeding

164. The pilot on school feeding, which had been planned under the PRRO, has not taken place; it could not yet be ensured that the Ministry of Education would integrate it into national plans for School Feeding and the Ministry itself requested a stakeholder forum. School Feeding had already been supported since 2004 including by WFP and a more comprehensive approach was warranted. The pilot was removed in BR 4 and instead, the planned 10,000 school feeding pilot beneficiaries were replaced by 18,000 under-two beneficiaries and 24,000 additional food insecure households hosting malnourished HIV patients under the Health and Nutrition promotion programme.

165. WFP's intervention will now be geared towards supporting GoZ in policy formulation. A visit to the Brazil Centre of Excellence by the Ministry of Education in the 4th quarter of 2014 is planned. Yet, partners and head masters in schools opined that definite need and scope for school feeding – in schools where it takes place children's attendance and focus is better.

166. In terms of overall impact as measured by WFP, 93% of the households had a Food Consumption Score (FCS) which was borderline or better, which is well above the target of 85%. The achievements regarding dietary diversity are well below the target of 90%, namely 58% in 2014 and 83% according to the latest measurements in 2014. The indicator is questionable though, since this PRRO only contributed to dietary diversity through vegetable gardens under PAC and perhaps to a minor extent through nutrition education. Moreover, the indicator was only introduced into the PRRO in 2014. Annex 12⁷⁴ presents the actual outcomes and outputs (as far as they were available), and how they compare to the targets (if a target was set).

Summary of Results of the Operation

The assessment of the PRRO activities and results, allows to confirm that overall, the PRRO targeting was accurate from a geographical and household perspective and that outputs in all three components were on the whole below what was planned because of funding shortfalls. Outcomes for PAC and STA were over and above the targets set out in the programme document, but those for the H&N programme were not reached.

Both PAC and STA used community based targeting methods to select beneficiaries. These methods were generally accepted as being fair and transparent by the communities, and were most thorough when village registers were used to ensure all community members were considered. H&N beneficiaries were malnourished (BMI<18.5) as well as belonging to categories of people classed as vulnerable.

The PAC programme distributed 98% of the planned tonnage and assisted 261,036 beneficiaries (104% of the planned target). In-house monitoring indicates that over 85% of beneficiaries reported an acceptable FCS, some of which can probably be attributed to food distributed under PAC or assets created. Assets created by PAC fall into one of three categories: those that are not relevant to beneficiary circumstances (e.g. incomplete or substandard assets); those which are not immediately relevant to

⁷⁴ This is incomplete pending complete set of figures from WFP

beneficiary circumstances, but may be in the future (e.g. cattle dips [only 40% of the population own any cattle]); and those that are immediately relevant and appropriate to beneficiaries' needs (vegetable gardens, for example). Most of the interventions fell into the latter two categories. Sustainability of the asset will depend on a number of factors including: group cohesion, clear membership and use rules, no requirement for a high level of communal action, effective asset management structures, consideration of the difficult economic environment, good cooperating partners and handover of a fully functioning asset.

STA distributed 31,774MT of food (43% of the programme target). 1,407,917 beneficiaries were assisted with food and cash. Funding constraints meant that only \$3.4m (38%) of a planned \$8.8m in cash transfers to enable households to buy the grain component of their transfer was distributed under the CFC system. While beneficiaries were grateful for the food they received, it was in too small a quantity, and for too short duration to make a quantifiable difference to household food security. In many cases households resorted to traditional coping mechanisms such as piece work and eating wild foods to get them through the lean season. The fact that a high number of STA beneficiaries reported engaging in casual labour as a coping strategy is a strong signal that they could have been included in cash / food for work schemes.

H&N programming distributed 17,068MT of food (90% of the target) and \$3m worth of vouchers (68% of the target). A total of 500,198 beneficiaries were assisted with food or cash/voucher transfers, representing 110% of the target – an output made possible by very high numbers of PLW and infants registered. Recovery rates were considerably lower than the planned target of 75% because of lack of exit strategy, sudden end to the distribution and no interventions to address the other causes of malnutrition.

The school feeding pilot did not take place.

2.3 Factors Affecting the Results

2.3.1 Internal Factors Affecting the Results

2.3.1.1 Size of Cash as a Transfer

167. As already mentioned, the fact that the cash transfers were not big enough to purchase the quantity of cereal that households would have received had they been given assistance in kind seriously affected impact. Pegging the size of the transfer at the post-harvest price rather than the lean season price meant that households were only able to purchase about half of their entitlement, hence reducing the impact. Of course, the food they did buy was better than nothing, but the impact was less than intended. In effect, all beneficiaries who were shifted from food to cash in the peak hunger season took an enforced pay cut. Although there was little WFP could do about it due to resource constraints, the switch to cash payments based on an unrealistic calculation of the cost of the food basket at the height of the hunger period was not appropriate to achieving the objectives of the PRRO.

2.3.1.2 Communication

168. There are two areas of communication that deserve mention. The first is WFPs communication internally – from the main office to the Sub Offices. On a couple of occasions the evaluation team detected a perception amongst staff in the sub-offices that information tended to flow one way – from the bottom to the top – and the

reasons for important decisions were not communicated in a timely way or sometimes at all (e.g. suddenly halting the H&N programme in Manicaland Province). This issue has more of an impact on morale than programme impact, but without the full picture and knowledge of the decision making process, staff on the front line cannot be expected to accurately convey information to stakeholders and beneficiaries, and WFP runs the risk of appearing disorganised and disunited.

169. The second concerns communication with stakeholders and beneficiaries: Communication about changes in distribution times was sometimes late. On a number of occasions it was only when the beneficiaries had already arrived at the distribution centre, that they were informed that food was not coming or rations downsized. In the case of nutrition support, beneficiaries had to come to the clinic or the supermarket, since they could not afford a phone call, to find out whether food was available (March 2014). Sudden halting of a support package that some of them have been receiving for months, and have come to rely on without any exit strategy can cause terrible hardship. The evaluation team found one group of women in Mutare who, since their food rations were abruptly halted without warning, now scavenge for food in the bins of a local school.

170. Overall communication could be improved in order to improve staff morale and to minimise wasting the time of partners and beneficiaries.

2.3.1.3 Increase synergies between programme components

171. Impact could be increased, particularly for the H&N clients, by increasing the synergy between different programme components. For example, enabling people to graduate off the H&N programme into something like a vegetable garden scheme would probably go some way to reducing the high relapse rate. This requires a longer term investment in group dynamics and capacity building though, and, as already noted under the section on PAC, this is not currently a key area of strength or priority for WFP.

2.3.1.4 Co-ordination with Cooperating Partners

172. WFP works with 15 international NGOs and 9 national NGOs terming them 'cooperating partners'. This arrangement can work very well – as a true partnership – as exemplified by the nature of the relationship between Plan and WFP in Mutare and Care in Masvingo. The combination of WFPs logistical strength and close working relationship with the GoZ and the NGOs long term-presence in an area and ability to link WFP interventions with its other on-going programmes serves to add value. Creating such a mutually advantageous working relationship probably owes a fair amount to the establishment of strong working rapport between key individuals in both organisations, and both sides' ability to be flexible with regard to rules and budgets.

173. The integrated approaches appeared to create a much larger impact than singular interventions in different wards. In UMP for example, PAC interventions supported by UMCOR were focused on a smaller number of wards and located in such a way that dip tanks, water bodies and vegetable gardens could be rehabilitated at the same time, enabling the community to use the water for their cattle, dip tank and for the vegetable garden, thus impacting their food security from various angles. Manure of the livestock was used for the gardens.

174. In other cases, though, this relationship does not seem to have developed and the system in place can more accurately be described as a subcontract rather than a

partnership. WFP by their own admission bargain quite hard on price and overheads with partners, so budgets are generally extremely tight. It is no surprise that interventions that are more successful tend to be implemented by NGOs (such as Care, UMCOR and Plan) who are not wholly dependent on WFP for funding and can bring additional resources to the table.

175. In the contracts with NGOs issued under this PRRO, NGO partners are allowed to budget a certain amount of fixed cost, as well as a rate per MT distributed. Problems arose when pipeline breaks meant that there was no food for the NGOs to distribute, so they were not paid their fee linked to tonnage. However, they had already incurred considerable costs setting up in expectation of a four or five month programme – renting offices, hiring staff (who can only be terminated with three months’ notice, etc.). The NGO bears no responsibility for the pipeline break, but shoulders a large part of the risk. For smaller NGOs with limited cash flow this arrangement is untenable. The issue of contracting should be looked with a view to sharing the risks associated with pipeline breaks more fully or reducing them by adopting more flexible staffing arrangements.

176. The local NGOs are usually involved in one or two activities under one sub-office (

177.

178. **Table 9: Involvement of NGO partners in number of activities and Sub-Offices**), whereas the international NGOs more often work under two or three sub-offices and cover all three activities. Since each NGO is entitled to a certain amount of fixed costs per contract, it is cheaper for WFP to work with a lesser number of partners and the number has therefore decreased reflecting the funding constraint.

Table 9: Involvement of NGO partners in number of activities and Sub-Offices

NGOs implementing 1 activity	7
NGOs implementing 2 activities	10
NGOs implementing 3 activities	7
NGOs operating under 1 Sub Office	18
NGOs operating under 2 Sub Offices	4
NGOs operating under 3 Sub Offices	2

Source: Prepared by evaluation team

179. In 2013, the planning and involvement of partners on PAC started too late, and a number of NGO partners faced problems in completing the activities within the period most suitable for the beneficiaries (May-September). Bargaining over contracts as well as the process of sourcing and importing food took time, and the inevitable issues with construction also delayed the process. In 2014 the planning was started earlier, but WFP had to stop the activity before its planned end date due to lack of funding so at the beginning of June no start had been made yet..

180. In terms of technical support to NGOs, budget verification teams composed of programme and admin/finance WFP staff support partners with budget development, compliance of WFP rules and check field level implementation. These teams contribute to an efficient and effective administrative management of the contracts and payments. The NGO partners were usually positive about this form of support.

181. The evaluation also found that coordination with other UN partners could be better. FAO, for example have a country-wide programme of livelihood asset construction – including dip tanks and vegetable gardens, but officers at the central level reported that there had been no coordination between them and WFP on the siting of WFP's efforts under PAC. As has already been mentioned, addressing malnutrition requires a multi-sectoral approach, and working more closely with UNICEF at a field level would be a positive step in this direction.

2.3.1.5 Monitoring and Evaluation

182. Regular monitoring (PDM, Food Distribution Monitoring and Registration Monitoring) is done by Field Monitoring Assistants and Programme Assistants. Furthermore, Monthly Food Security Monitoring, Bi-weekly Market Monitoring and Bi-Weekly Price Monitoring are conducted (Annex 14). The MoPSLSS and the MoHCC contribute to monitoring at field and District level.

183. Partner NGOs perform daily routine monitoring and exit monitoring jointly with WFP. They are also involved in monthly PDM. Though a fair amount of outcome indicators are available, these have not been incorporated in the SPR 2013. Some partners reported that even though they have to hand in extensive spreadsheets with data with regard to the H&N activities, they do not get feedback reports or results of analyses of these data from WFP.

184. Data on nutrition reflected in official Government reports are sometimes outdated; stunting data at District level often date back to 2010. There appear to be many data available but none of the organisations has made an effort to aggregate and analyse the entire body of data.

185. The Strategic Results Framework for 2014-17 is the basis of current results and performance monitoring. The biannual Community Household Survey is the main tool for measuring this; the latest one conducted in April 2014. There appears to be limited qualitative data collection and analysis that would allow better understanding of changes in behaviour and attribution of impact to WFP or other externalities. Even though NGO partners reported that activities like STA and PAC have an impact on the nutrition status, this was actually never measured and in the case of STA, highly unlikely. As such, there is little quantitative evidence of impact and sustainability. Even data on outputs is sometimes conflicting, as evidenced by the difficulty the CO had in providing the evaluation team with final figures on tonnages distributed per activity for the evaluation period.

186. Even though COMET will officially only be rolled out by mid-June 2014, WFP Zimbabwe is already making use of it and most of the staff has been trained. As WFP's work begins to encompass resilience agenda as articulated in its latest strategic plan, it will be vital to re-orientate its M&E collection schedule and focus to enable collection of impact in this area.

187. A good starting point for WFP Zimbabwe would be to look at the progress other WFP COs have already made in measuring resilience. In Niger, for example,

historical data on hh coping strategy indices, food consumption scores and cereal stock duration in non-crisis years have been averaged to derive a baseline value against which resilience can be measured⁷⁵. Findings from countries that have used this approach indicate that recovery can take longer than expected, even when a bumper harvest follows a period of food insecurity. This has implications for both programming (working with affected communities for longer) and M&E (tracking change in targeted communities to ascertain impact over a number of years rather than just one season). Understanding trends and fully attributing the impact of WFP and external variables on resilience will also require the collection of qualitative data from households and communities – or at least the use of ranking and scoring tools that require more skill on the part of the interviewer than simply administering a questionnaire. These more qualitative approaches will also be necessary to measure group sustainability and capacity – an issue which is unquantified at present, but something that is core to achieving WFP’s objectives.

188. As the data collection burden is already quite heavy (especially for smaller NGOs who do not get the benefit of using the electronic data capture devices as used by WFP itself), a revamp of the M&E system will entail discarding some of the process indicators which have been proven to have limited value. WFP corporate guidance is clear that certain indicators (for example meal frequency and dietary diversity) must be collected and it is beyond the scope of this evaluation to determine which indicators should be dropped. However, it is envisaged that the process would involve looking at all survey questions and asking ‘do we actually use this information?’, ‘in what cases would we use this information?’ and ‘if it is needed, could it be collected in a different way?’

189. If and when mobile phones are increasingly used to make cash transfers more use could be made of mobile telephones for collecting monitoring data and reporting of grievances.

2.3.2 External Factors Affecting the Results

2.3.2.1 Funding

190. Acquiring sufficient funding is the major constraint for this PRRO. At the time of the evaluation, only 34% of required funds had been received (Operational Factsheet) and donors do not seem to be willing to increase their contribution (a position backed by the perception that WFP over-estimate their requirements in anticipation that they will only receive a fraction of their request, and frustration that the new government does not seem to prioritise a more inclusive growth agenda). Also, some donors (e.g JICA) require that the Government declares a State of Emergency before funds can be released. A plethora of emergencies in other countries have diverted donor money away from Zimbabwe, and it is unlikely that a State of Emergency will be declared this year, further constraining traditional funding sources. Furthermore, recognising that simply distributing food is unsustainable, many donors are no longer willing to fund humanitarian support, even though a number of donors and other UN bodies still believe that WFP’s assistance should be mainly humanitarian. WFP is trying to transition to resilience and even development, but faces a challenge in recasting itself as a major player with

⁷⁵ A resilience score is derived from a combination of the recovery rate (hh situation one year post-shock) and recovery time (time required to return to pre-crisis baseline value) for the three indicators.

something to offer in this role, particularly when there are numerous large NGOs in Zimbabwe who can target and programme resilience funds with lower overheads.

191. Pipeline breaks caused by funding shortfalls were compounded by the complications involved in complying with GoZ rules regarding GMO crops. The GoZ rejects genetically modified maize and therefore maize can only be procured from certain countries. CSB, although produced in Zambia has to be tested to ensure it does not contain GM content in South Africa, since Zambia does not have sufficient testing capacity; this testing process adds to the length of the procurement duration – reported to be 4-6 weeks from acquiring funding to delivery of food.

192. As a result of the resource constraints, WFP had to narrow their focus regarding the number of targeted Districts, refrained from renewing service agreements and fixed term contracts, closed storage facilities in Mutare and partly in Bulawayo, decrease size and duration of food distributions, cap the size of households (at 5) and reduce the number of vehicles. The Bulawayo staff was decreased from 30 to 20 in April, but since the workload was also lower this was not a major problem for the remaining staff. Other efforts to plug the gaps have been met with some resistance: In November 2013, WFP needed US\$ 2 million from the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) to close an emergent pipeline break; simultaneously, approximately US\$ 200,000 had to be funded from the Emergency Response Fund (ERF) to fund transport costs. This funding was heavily contested by a number of cluster members, since the ERF is meant for small and medium-size projects.

193. Though the Regional Bureau provides input to the CO in the form of strategic support for procurement, guidelines for security and training on various subjects, they do not support resource mobilisations or problems faced in this regard, even though the latter is currently a very important issue.

2.3.2.2 Economic Crisis

194. The wider economic crisis in Zimbabwe – caused by a combination of bodged land reform, reckless fiscal policy, hostile investment climate and western sanctions and manifested in an acute lack of liquidity, particularly in the rural areas - has had a significant negative impact on beneficiaries ability to take advantage of interventions which were designed to give them a marketable surplus, for example vegetable gardens. At the time of the evaluation there was very little cash circulating around in rural areas, so people were either left with a lot of unsold produce, or had to resort to bartering goods – not an ideal option when paying for school fees or medical bills.

195. Clearly there is little that WFP can do about this issue, but, as it would appear that the return to any national currency is some time off, so liquidity constraints are likely to become the norm, WFP and its partners should consider that macro-economic instability is one of the factors along with drought etc. against which resilience must be built. Options may include the processing of food stuffs to enable longer storage.

2.3.2.3 Countervailing Social Norms

196. It is well known that malnutrition is multi-causal; in Zimbabwe some of these causes are rooted in socio-cultural contexts and religious practices which actively undermine efforts to reduce stunting and other nutrition related disorders. A good example of this is the practices of the Apostolic Sect which is pre-eminent in the East of the country. Adherents are forbidden from

vaccinating their children, and reportedly spend so much time involved in religious activities that they are not able to manage their crops properly. Some of those registered on STA or PAC refused the (clearly labelled) palm oil provided, believing that it was pork fat because it had solidified in the cold weather. Such challenges should be taken into consideration in the design of the operation and local partnerships should be sought to promote behaviour changes.

Summary of Factors Affecting the Results

Internal factors negatively affecting the results of the PRRO include the size of the cash transfer being insufficient to purchase sufficient grain to cover households' missing food entitlements, insufficient communication with some partners, thereby precluding 'joined-up' programming, and relationships with cooperating partners that are actually more like contracts and there was no sharing the financial that occurred as a result of pipeline breaks (having to pay staff even though no funds were received from WFP). In-house M&E is also an issue – some cooperating partners found it burdensome, and the system does not enable the reasons for the changes in beneficiaries' food security status to be attributed or improved resilience to be measured.

By far the biggest external factor affecting the programme was the shortage of funding – only 34% of requested funds were received, resulting in pipeline breaks, halved rations and early termination of some programmes. The dire state of Zimbabwe's economy makes it more difficult for PAC beneficiaries to sell their produce, and procure inputs (eg fish feed). In some areas WFP is working in an environment where social norms dictated by religious doctrine countervail against attempts to improve nutrition – particularly that of children. This should be considered when establishing targets.

2 Conclusions and Recommendations

2.1 Overall Assessment

3.1.1 Relevance, Coherence and Appropriateness

197. The PRRO was designed to respond to the estimate that, at the height of the lean season, about 2.2 million people would face food insecurity. In response to this estimate 2,409,000 million food insecure people were targeted, of which 84% were reached by March 2014. Donors were reluctant to fund the full cost of the PRRO, resulting in resource constraints meaning that a considerable downscaling of operations had to take place. Some programmes were halted entirely, while the scope of others was curtailed (e.g. capping household size for some H&N distributions, and distributing half rations) and cutting costs on PAC.

198. The intervention – with its substantial focus on building household and community resilience through conditional transfers - was relevant to Zimbabwe's new policy direction regarding social transfers. However, had resources for NFIs been available, the use of conditionality could have been expanded to cover some of the beneficiaries that were registered to receive STA.

199. All interventions were found to be relevant to the population's needs – which were basically to cover a food deficit. In the case of H&N this was particularly true as these households had literally nowhere else to source their missing food entitlements from, whereas on the whole STA beneficiaries were able to do casual labour (and many reported doing so). PAC interventions were all relevant to the livelihoods in drought prone areas – focussing on investments to improve agricultural productivity and the health of livestock. However, workers on PAC schemes were not always the direct beneficiaries of their labour, and in some cases the assets created (cattle dips for example) were not always relevant to the needs of the poorest members of the community.

200. Most beneficiaries expressed a preference for food over cash, which was provided by WFP in order to enable households to buy their grain entitlement under the 'Cash for Cereals' scheme. While this was on the face of it a sensible attempt to create some movement in local grain markets and to sidestep the delays associated with importing grain, the size of the transfer was not big enough to enable recipients to buy the same amount of grain as they would have been given had they received the transfer in kind. Increases in the price of grain of over 100% were predicted by ZIMVAC, so pegging the size of the transfer at the post-harvest rate appears to have either been a strategy to hit output targets or an error in the fixing of the maize price: either way it had a negative effect on impact.

3.1.2 Efficiency

201. Geographical targeting was done using the ZIMVAC survey plus additional longitudinal data captured by the VAM unit. Efforts were made to ground-truth targeting decisions by involving local stakeholders at the District and Ward level. At a household level community based targeting was used. Both targeting mechanisms were acceptable, although WFP would be well served by clarifying its use of secondary data to augment the ZIMVAC analysis, which it has to be said, has a fair number of detractors for reasons including its failure to consider remittances properly and its sampling strategy.

202. The cost of STA, estimated at 80\$/MT, is considerably lower than the cost of PAC at 300\$/MT because of the non-food items and management involved in the latter. Although it is not possible to conduct a cost benefit analysis with the information available⁷⁶, it is likely that a well-designed and managed PAC intervention is more efficient than STA because of the long term returns it delivers to beneficiaries. There will continue to be a role for STA in the future – as a safety net for those households who simply cannot work – but under this PRRO a significant number of STA beneficiaries were able to perform work and could have engaged in PAC activities if the resources had been there to support the NFI components.

203. In the future overall efficiency could be improved by supporting STA beneficiaries to prepare their own fields at the start of the rainy season and perform the necessary crop management tasks throughout the season. Payment could be made in a combination of cash and food, enabling them to cover their missing food entitlements and buy inputs. Interventions of this sort would be cheaper than PAC – requiring tools only – and while still not sustainable, would at least have a longer term impact than STA. PAC interventions could be made more efficient by investing more in fewer assets – to ensure they are fully functional, and in the capacity of the management committees, so that they are fully equipped to run the assets in a sustainable way.

204. Funding was the most important constraint faced. The fact that the PRRO received only 34% of what was considered necessary led to premature ending or decreasing of food rations in STA and H&N (just 58% of planned tonnage of food and 42% of cash was distributed). While efforts were made to maintain the number of planned beneficiaries by halving rations, the decrease in planned support affected the achievement of outcomes and impacts. Although as already mentioned some savings were made by closing storage facilities and reducing the number of staff in the Bulawayo office, the organisation remained near full capacity until June 2014, when the HR department began to look at staff retrenchment as a way of saving money.

3.1.3 Effectiveness

205. WFP's objectives in Zimbabwe are to: Save lives, protect livelihoods and enhance self-reliance among vulnerable households in response to seasonal food shortages (Strategic Objective 1)⁷⁷; Improve the well-being of anti-retroviral therapy (ART) and tuberculosis (TB) clients in order for them to recover their productive capacity and stabilize or reduce under-nutrition among children and mothers (Strategic Objective 2)⁷⁸; and support highly vulnerable, food insecure households by strengthening their resilience to shocks and reducing disaster risks through food and nutrition assistance (Strategic Objective 3)⁷⁹.

206. The evaluation found that the PAC interventions were on the whole effective in meeting the objective of strengthening resilience to shocks, and STA went some way into reducing exposure to food and nutritional insecurity over the lean period (evidenced by the food consumption scores), but other non-programme related factors such as casual labour were likely just as important considering the small size

⁷⁶ WFP Zimbabwe were unable to provide a full breakdown of numbers of beneficiaries per intervention at the time of the evaluation

⁷⁷ Strategic Objective 1: Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies.

⁷⁸ Strategic Objective 2: Support or restore food security and nutrition and establish or rebuild livelihoods in fragile settings and following emergencies.

⁷⁹ Strategic Objective 3: Reduce risk and enable people, communities and countries to meet their own food and nutrition needs.

and limited duration of many of the STA transfers. The STA and H&N interventions and some of the less-well designed PAC projects will not yield a sustainable impact on food security because they provide nothing in which beneficiaries can build once the transfers cease.

207. . Objective 1: all components of the PRRO have contributed to objective 1; STA has contributed most to the immediate saving of lives, whereas PAC has contributed more to strategic objective 3.

208. Output 1.1, which is used for all three PRRO objectives and relates to targets for food distribution was not achieved in all cases.

209. The achievement of objective 2 concerning the H&N activities has been confirmed by ART patients regarding their increased productive capacity; quite a number of them indeed reported to have become able again to generate income as a result of the WFP nutrition support. The malnutrition rate of PLW and children has probably been stabilized but the low recovery rate makes a considerable reduction unlikely. It is probable that recovery rate targets were set too high, and expecting impact with the type of programming delivered (i.e. without direct supervision of consumption or a multi-sectoral approach) was unrealistic.

210. Outcome 2.2 - reduced under-nutrition, including micronutrient deficiencies, was not achieved as micronutrient deficiencies were not focused at in this PRRO. Since no supplementation or fortification was conducted, it is unlikely that micronutrient deficiencies would decrease by the consumption of Super cereal only.

211. The main component of objective 3 is the PAC, which enables people to provide for themselves in the long run; many beneficiaries confirmed that this was indeed the case, that their access to livelihoods had improved making them better prepared to shocks and that they expected a positive effect for many years to come. target of 80%.

212. The STA has in a way also contributed to the achievement of Objective 3; the food support in the lean seasons has better enabled vulnerable people to overcome this difficult period without having to rely on detrimental coping strategies. The sudden reduction of food available through STA though has seriously affected the extent of this contribution.

213. Before deciding on a change in or continuation of approach, WFP should assess to what extent each of the forms of decreasing STA (halving of rations, shorter duration, targeting less beneficiaries or premature ending) has affected the food security and nutrition situation of the affected population – almost certainly changes in food security status are difficult to measure with existing tools. Even though it seems that their situation has not seriously deteriorated, no in-depth assessment has been conducted

214. Though the H&N activities address a dire need, the low recovery rates dampen the success. WFP is already planning an in-depth assessment. The findings should be used to adapt the programme and increase its rate of success. A multi-sectoral approach including hygiene and more focus on behaviour change communication may contribute to the solution. Also, more focus on stunting is needed, which will only partly be addressed by the UN Flagship Programme.

3.1.4 Impact

215. The PRRO's contribution to WFP's broader Strategic Objectives (2008-13) was mixed. The evaluation found that the operation did protect livelihoods by providing food over the lean period that prevented the sale of assets and through the provision of infrastructure that protects assets (cattle dips), even if these were not beneficial to the very poorest. It also enabled people to benefit from new livelihood opportunities (vegetable gardens and fish ponds) that will enhance their food security in the future.

216. Where these interventions were longer (for example food distributions over a five month period rather than a half ration for a couple of months) they also contributed to the objective of preventing acute hunger.

217. It is arguable that the H&N programme contributed towards the objective of saving lives as H&N clients really had no other options. However, the impact of the STA and PAC programmes in this regard, are likely minimal, as most beneficiaries were able to access their food needs elsewhere. In the case of STA beneficiaries, they had to because of the small size and limited duration of the transfers.

218. Where the programme was probably most successful was in building disaster preparedness and mitigation, through the better planned and fully equipped PAC interventions, although this aspect has yet to be tested.

Cooperation and coordination with other UN family members could be better and an improvement would probably result in greater impact. Even though UNICEF is addressing malnutrition together with WFP, there is little cooperation on the ground: linking up to use their experience in WASH could improve impact in this area. In the PAC implementation, there is ample scope to involve FAO with their knowledge and expertise on agriculture, since many of the PACs are on irrigation and vegetable gardens, and tap into their experience of developing market linkages to achieve further impact. The collaboration with IOM on returnees works well, but the system is open to abuse by returning economic migrants, and it might be prudent to tighten the screening by concentrating on unaccompanied minors, making more efficient use of resources in this area.

3.1.5 Sustainability

219. Neither the STA nor the H&N programmes could be categorised as being sustainable in the long term, nor are they designed to be: the transfers have a humanitarian and basic services objective and do nothing to address the underlying causes of food insecurity or malnutrition. PAC interventions, however, are likely to have a long term sustainable impact on beneficiaries' livelihoods, as long as the management committee is functional and the asset was built to the right standards and completed and communities continue to receive the support of relevant government departments such as veterinary services and Agritex.

220. The move away from unconditional transfers represents an alignment with Zimbabwe's policy on social transfers and is generally welcomed by all – including beneficiaries themselves, but it does raise questions about future funding streams as WFP is entering a market crowded with agencies who are offering resilience programming and will need to emphasise the added value they can bring, such as scale, good relations with Government stakeholders and expertise in logistics, if indeed that is what is required.

221. Both WFP and MOPSLSS use ZIMVAC for targeting of support; as a result, in some Districts the same beneficiaries were targeted and received double support. More cooperation is needed with GoZ to reach to ensure longer term sustainability, although, they are unable to operate without external support given the resource constraints they currently face.

3.1.6 Gender

222. It was evident that gender issues were considered – particularly with regard to the way that FHH are usually the most vulnerable households (targeting) and women’s work-loads (in the setting of work norms). Considerable evidence was also found of the involvement of women in asset management committees and in the supervision of work. All M&E data can be disaggregated by gender of beneficiary. It is arguable that some of the assets (cattle dips) did not directly address women’s needs; even within a household cattle are often owned by men, and few female headed households owned cattle. On the other hand, women appeared to be the main users of other assets – such as vegetable gardens.

3.2 Lessons learned

223. The PRRO provided ten valuable lessons which should be used to inform future programming: -

1. **Resilience programming is key to the future of small holder agriculture in Zimbabwe:** Poor households in Zimbabwe are increasingly vulnerable to climatic variation. The PRRO showed that activities that increased households’ resilience to climatic and other shocks (i.e. most PAC interventions) are the most sustainable and most accepted by beneficiaries and stakeholders. Even though a recent strategic review of WFP Zimbabwe identified resilience as the way forward, there is still a perception in many quarters (inside and outside the UN) that this kind of programming is somewhat outside WFP’s core mandate. Experience from other countries, however, shows that building resilience requires a multi-sectoral approach and WFPs size, strength in logistics and certain programming approaches, and solid relationships with GoZ stakeholders mean that it has a lot to offer in this area. In the Zimbabwe context resilience is about more than just drought – households also need to build resilience to the liquidity crisis that is affecting the country. This is not to deny the need for a social safety net, to protect the very poorest, but it is estimated that the proportion of the population that require this type of assistance is just 8% (DFID 2014).

2. **Different M&E tools are required to measure impact and to equip WFP for the greater focus on resilience programming:** There is an overly heavy focus on collection of output metrics (and even these are not always ready to hand or used). Some data collected is not relevant, the answers to the question having been proved in other surveys by WFP and other agencies in Zimbabwe and elsewhere. The collection of the mass of output data leaves limited space and time for the collection of more detailed and useful information on impact, attribution, and the strength and sustainability of institutions formed– issues which will be particularly important in the move towards resilience programming. Modern data collection methods, including electronic data collection platforms linked to cloud-based data repositories, and directly contacting beneficiaries via mobile phones (possible given the relatively high levels of literacy in rural areas) would improve the efficiency of M&E. The Zimbabwe VAME unit is strong, as is the MIS unit: given freedom to innovate with new approaches and the right resources it is likely

that they would be able to build a system that would deliver as per WFP's emerging M&E needs.

3. PAC assets must be fully functional to have outcomes and long-term impact: There is no point constructing an asset to 95% completion or to minimum standards acceptable: in the early stages of usage user groups have practically no resources to complete the job or pay for repairs. If anything, assets should be built to a higher standard than usual because of the constraints faced by the end users. This has implications for budgeting – ensuring that there are sufficient funds for materials and the correct level of technical oversight. Expecting GoZ staff to play a role without remuneration is unrealistic given the constraints they currently face.

4. The success of PAC interventions is about systems as well as physical assets: The success and efficiency of PAC interventions depends on a range of factors, including group cohesion, the effectiveness of the management structure, the quality of the asset and the appropriateness of the asset to the intended beneficiaries. The strong focus on completing the physical side of assets needs to be matched by an equally strong emphasis on ensuring the management structures and 'soft systems' that ensure asset sustainability are in place. The Ministry of Small and Medium Enterprises specialises in this area, and should be considered as a partner. In the spirit of 'if it get measured it matters', ensuring that group capacity and sustainability is measured and included as an outcome in programme log-frames will create the impetus for activity and focus in this area.

5. Interventions create multipliers when clustered together: In order to hit output numbers there is a temptation to spread assets far and wide in different communities. While this will result in high beneficiary numbers (by output), it does not translate in to high impact (outcomes). Rather it results in what is termed 'thin blanket syndrome' – where everyone gets a bit of coverage, but no one gets enough to actually make any real difference (keep warm!). Grouping assets such as dams, cattle dips and vegetable gardens together create multipliers which benefit the community in more than one way. The same principle applies for H&N beneficiaries. One of the main reasons for the high relapse rate was the lack of any kind of exit strategy for clients leaving the supplementary feeding programme. Providing some kind of exit package, or facilitating access to PAC assets where appropriate may be a way of denting this.

6. True partnership, delivers the best results: Significant value can be added when WFP works together with other members of the UN family – given the multi-dimensional nature of poverty. Joined-up thinking and programming also sends the right signal to donors, who sometimes accuse the UN of operating in silos. With regard to cooperating partners, the PAC interventions are most effective when executed by NGOs who have a long-term presence in the area, have good relationships with local stakeholders, and who are able to bring additional resources to play in the construction of assets. Driving down NGOs on costs is a false economy. Partnership in its true sense also involves the sharing of risks. Under current arrangements it is the NGOs who shoulder the financial ramifications of pipeline breaks – for example having to honour the contracts of staff who have nothing to do because food has not arrived in country.

7. Many STA beneficiaries are able to work: Anecdotal evidence from the field indicates that most STA recipients engage in casual labour as a coping

strategy over the lean season, indicating that they would easily be able to participate in PAC-type interventions; indeed, they expressed a willingness to do so. Early planting and appropriate crop management is key to improved food production, interventions which support this could be of more benefit than purely unconditional assistance.

8. H&N programming is not as effective as it could be: Recovery rates are low in the H&N programme are low among all patient categories and relapse is a frequent problem indicating that more attention must be paid to the multi-dimensional causes of malnutrition, including education on safe feeding practices, improving dietary diversity and tackling poor hygiene and access to clean water. The way H&N operations are currently funded (from emergency budgets) means that sustainable impact is highly unlikely.

9. An understanding of the behaviour of the maize market is critical: The maize market in Zimbabwe is highly inefficient, but past price trends give some indication of the way the price is likely to change seasonally. The PRRO did not take account of ZIMVAC's reasonably accurate prediction on maize price trends in 2013/14, meaning that cash transfers were not sufficient to cover recipient household's missing food entitlements. This again feeds into the 'thin blanket' trap – many people received cash, but the difference it made to people's lives was too small to measure.

10. Cash transfers could be used more widely and could be delivered more efficiently given the correct conditions: The use of cash to support food security may not always be able to compete on a cost basis with the import of cheap grain from Zambia or elsewhere (given the volatile maize market in Zimbabwe), but it does create local multipliers and goes some way to creating a local market to which traders respond. As the country is increasingly served by the mobile phone network, delivering cash via mobile phones becomes increasingly viable, and offers great savings over the use of cash transit companies. Experiences in this PRRO found however, that proper preparation is very important: factoring in the correct lead in times and equipment costs is vital.

3.3 Recommendations

224. The nine recommendations made below follow from the lessons identified above. All are for the attention of the Country and Regional offices, and recommendation 2 for the particular attention of HQ – particularly the Monitoring and Programme and Policy Divisions. It important to note, that it is the view of this evaluation that simply looking for more funding to support operations under the current modus operandi will not be fruitful. The key will be increasing effectiveness and demonstrating improved impact by making improvements and changes in the key areas of the operation, as indicated below.

1. Increase focus on Resilience Programming (Strategic): resilience programming – along the lines of current PAC interventions but more appropriately targeted at the needs of the poorest 60% of the population (i.e. giving them an asset that is immediately relevant to their livelihood strategy), linked with sufficient investments in management structures will improve impact, and ensure that WFP is aligned with the priorities of government and donors, and indeed the needs of the poor in Zimbabwe. In Zimbabwe, resilience will include the ability to withstand economic and political as well as climatic shocks, and this will involve investments in crop storage, processing and marketing. This is an

immediate priority and momentum that was created by a strategic review that took place in May 2014 should be maintained.

2. Retool M&E approaches to better demonstrate impact and provide information on household and community resilience (Strategic): WFP Zimbabwe's ongoing realignment of its M&E framework to ensure compliance with the 2014-17 Strategic Results Framework (in which building household and community resilience is a core issue), will involve a discussion of what output indicators and surveys are useful, and what can safely be discarded to make room for quantitative and qualitative approaches which more accurately demonstrate and attribute impact, particularly in the area of resilience. Other WFP COs (e.g. Niger) have already made progress in developing approaches to measuring resilience, and learning from their experience would be a good starting point. The success of PAC interventions relies on the cohesiveness of groups and the effectiveness of management systems: these factors should continue to be measured, after the asset has been completed, and qualitative data gathered to provide lessons on why management structures endure or disintegrate. Collection of qualitative data, even in its simplest forms, requires a different skill set to that used for collecting output data, so time and resources will have to be found to build this, possibly necessitating paring back the collection of output data. This should be done soon to enable new tools to be tested and used in forthcoming programmes.

3. Move towards longer term 'real' partnerships (Strategic): The UN Flagship Programme could serve as an example of good strategic partnership with a long term goal and addressing prevention of malnutrition. A multi-sectoral approach is vital to resilience programming, so WFP should work together with other members of the UN family to explore how it could bring its considerable resources to bear on the resilience agenda through a combined approach, in the same way that the donors are doing. At a cooperating partner level, the contracting arrangement should be redesigned to share the risks resulting from pipeline breaks more evenly, and to recognise that lowest cost doesn't always equal best value and the mutual benefits of longer-term and more flexible partnerships.

There are two main implications of this for WFP. The first will be that it will have to seek funding arrangements that make long term partnerships possible. This may involve entering consortia in partnership with NGOs or other development actors in order to secure long term funds (in the same way that FAO has recently partnered with NGOs to secure long-term DFID resilience funding). The second implication is that WFP will have to re-define its role from that of a kind of donor. At present the term 'cooperating partners' is currently used, but in reality the balance of power and decision making lies with WFP. This relationship needs to be redefined as one where it really works in cooperation with partners, rather than using them as sub-contractors who are to be haggled down on cost.

This recommendation could be phased in incrementally over a number of years with a growing number of cooperating partners.

4. Reconfigure STA to support household food production (Operational): Draw lessons from other countries to reconfigure STA so that it has a greater impact - for example WFP's work in Kenya with IFAD and FAO, to graduate farmers from food deficit to food secure to surplus producers. A start on this trajectory would be to use STA resources to support the poorest farmers to

work on their own farms at the critical stages of the crop production cycle. As the production of maize becomes increasingly precarious in the drier parts of the country, the resources could be used as incentives to promote the production of small grains and drought tolerant root crops and legumes. This should be piloted in the next PRRO.

5. Enhance impact and resilience through integrated programmes (Operational): An integrated approach focusing on a smaller number of wards may help increase the impact of the PRRO and reduce the operational costs of WFP. The approach should be integrated regarding availability of water, vegetable gardens and livestock facilities, but also combining PAC, food security/livelihood and nutrition interventions and linking these wherever possible. It should be ensured that the most vulnerable regions, provinces and wards are selected and the selection processes and the triangulation should be well documented. A higher impact rate may help raise future funding and branch out the approach to other wards. NGO partners are not all equally able and willing to use such an approach based on guidelines provided after they have been selected, such an approach should be made mandatory already at the stage of tendering. The guidelines of the Calls for Proposals should stipulate that only interventions using such integrated approach (listing a minimum number of activities to be selected from a list) should be eligible for WFP partnership. This recommendation should be implemented in the short term – in the next PRRO.

6. Ensure PAC interventions are properly capitalised and make appropriate investments in asset management systems and structures (Operational): Budgets for PAC interventions should properly reflect the cost of materials and appropriate technical support. Cutting costs to achieve output targets negatively impacts on the achievement of outcomes. It is better to have one fully working asset than two completed to 80% because the recipient communities don't have the resources to complete the job.

Effective, motivated and properly trained management structures are critical to the success of the physical assets created. As such it is critical to bring the appropriate – long term – support. In many cases the GoZ Ministry of SMEs has the ability to support groups, but, as with many government entities in Zimbabwe, they need support to fulfil this role. Ensuring that there are resources in PAC budgets to support this input is critical in moving towards greater group sustainability. Measuring group cohesion and effectiveness in the longer term will also be important in demonstrating what works and how success can be replicated. This is a recommendation for any programme design that follows on from this PRRO

7. Improve impact of H&N programming (Operational): A number of actions should be undertaken to address this issue. The in-depth study *to identify the low responsiveness to nutritional support interventions*, which is planned, needs to be conducted at the earliest possible time and corrective actions should be undertaken, based on these findings. More focus needs to be put on behaviour change communication to be conducted together with food provision. PLHIV may need to be transferred after discharge into an appropriate livelihood programme to keep them healthy and to reduce chances of relapse. To reduce relapse, a dual system of criteria may be considered, for example an entry level BMI of 18.4 and an exit level of 18.7. Thus, more time will pass until the patient needs to be enrolled again and “managing the weight” will be discouraged. To improve the

reliability of the recovery rate, SAM patients and their BMI achievement should be documented and analyzed separately from TB and PLHIV beneficiaries. The changes required to enhance impact in this area are significant and should be addressed at a strategic level. This is a recommendation for any future PRRO or specific nutrition programming in Zimbabwe.

8. Understand and stay up to date with maize market (Operational):

Efforts to smooth food consumption should be done with full understanding of the behaviour of the maize market. Longitudinal data exists on cereals prices, and ZIMVAC's predictions on this issue proved accurate. As far as cash interventions go, the size of the transfer should be at least in some way linked to the prevailing grain price. In the longer term, attempts to smooth the supply could involve the establishment of inventory credit schemes under PAC – possibly starting with pre-existing groups formed under previous interventions and using GMB infrastructure. All future cash-based interventions should integrate this recommendation.

9. Conduct a cost benefit analysis of Cash transfers (Operational):

A full cost benefit analysis of cash transfers should be factoring in the multiplier effects to local businesses and agents (under EcoCash) and identifying at what price points the import and distribution of food in kind becomes preferable. Social protection systems in other countries are increasingly relying on payments by mobile phones; one of the critical components underpinning these is a solid Management Information System and database to ensure that beneficiaries are not double-dipping from different social protection pots. WFP should work closely with other SP schemes in Zimbabwe – for example the Harmonised cash transfer programme – to ensure that it's the foundations of such a system are created. The cost benefit analysis should be conducted during the next occasion that WFP or one of its partner NGOs uses cash transfers in groups that have already benefitted from one round of transfers, so that set up costs do not distort the findings

Annex 1: Terms of Reference**EVALUATION QUALITY ASSURANCE SYSTEM**

Office Of Evaluation
Measuring Results, Sharing Lessons

[FINAL, 28/02/2014]

TERMS OF REFERENCE**OPERATION EVALUATION**

ZIMBABWE PROTRACTED RELIEF AND RECOVERY OPERATION 200453
“RESPONDING TO HUMANITARIAN NEEDS AND STRENGTHENING
RESILIENCE TO FOOD INSECURITY”

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Acronyms.....**Error! Bookmark not defined.**

1. Introduction

1. These Terms of Reference (TOR) are for the evaluation of the Zimbabwe protracted relief and recovery operation (PRRO) 200453 “Responding to Humanitarian Needs and Strengthening Resilience to Food Insecurity”. This evaluation is commissioned by the WFP Office of Evaluation (OEV) and will take place from March to August 2014. In line with WFP’s outsourced approach for operations evaluations (OpEvs), the evaluation will be managed and conducted by an external evaluation company amongst those having a long-term agreement with WFP for operations evaluations.
2. These TOR were prepared by the OEV focal point based on an initial document review and consultation with stakeholders and following a standard template. The purpose of the TOR is twofold: 1) to provide key information to the company selected for the evaluation and to guide the company’s evaluation manager and Team throughout the evaluation process; and 2) to provide key information to stakeholders about the proposed evaluation.
3. The TOR will be finalised based on comments received on the draft version and on the agreement reached with the selected company. The evaluation shall be conducted in conformity with the TOR.

2. Reasons for the Evaluation

2.1. Rationale

4. In the context of renewed corporate emphasis on providing evidence and accountability for results, WFP has committed to increase evaluation coverage of operations and mandated OEV to commission 12 Operations Evaluations (OpEvs) in 2013; 24 in 2014 and up to 30 in 2015.
5. Operations to be evaluated are selected based on utility and risk criteria.⁸⁰ From a shortlist of operations meeting these criteria prepared by OEV, the Regional Bureau (RB) has selected, in consultation with the Country Office (CO) the Zimbabwe PRRO 200453 “Responding to Humanitarian Needs and Strengthening Resilience to Food Insecurity” for an independent evaluation. In particular, the evaluation has been timed to ensure that findings can feed into future decisions on programme design, notably a follow-up PRRO and a possible development project.
6. The external evaluation will provide valuable insights on a number of innovative programmatic changes that the Zimbabwe CO has been recently implementing, including the gradual scale-up of market-based transfer modalities and the shift from unconditional to conditional assistance. As such, the evaluation will enhance internal learning especially.

2.2. Objectives

7. This evaluation serves the dual and mutually reinforcing objectives of accountability and learning:
 - **Accountability** – The evaluation will assess and report on the performance and results of the operation. A management response to the evaluation recommendations will be prepared.
 - **Learning** – The evaluation will determine the reasons why certain results occurred or not to draw lessons, derive good practices and pointers for learning. It will provide evidence-based findings to inform operational and strategic decision-making. Findings will be actively disseminated and lessons will be incorporated into relevant lesson sharing systems.

⁸⁰ The utility criteria looked both at the timeliness of the evaluation given the operation’s cycle and the coverage of recent/planned evaluations. The risk criterion was based on a classification and risk ranking of WFP COs taking into consideration a wide range of risk factors, including operational and external factors as well as COs’ internal control self-assessments.

2.3. Stakeholders and Users

8. **Stakeholders.** A number of stakeholders both inside and outside of WFP have interests in the results of the evaluation and many of these will be asked to play a role in the evaluation process. Table one below provides a preliminary stakeholders' analysis, which will be deepened by the evaluation team in the inception package.

Table 1: Preliminary stakeholders' analysis

Stakeholders	Interest in the evaluation
INTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS	
Country Office (CO)	Responsible for the country level planning and operations implementation, the CO is the primary stakeholder of this evaluation. It has a direct stake in the evaluation and an interest in learning from experience to inform decision-making. It is also called upon to account internally as well as to its beneficiaries, partners for the performance and results of its operation.
Regional Bureau (RB) in Johannesburg	Responsible for both oversight of COs and technical guidance and support, the RB management has an interest in an independent account of the operational performance as well as in learning from the evaluation findings to apply this learning to other country offices.
Office of Evaluation (OEV)	OEV is responsible for commissioning OpEvs over 2013-2015. As these evaluations follow a new outsourced approach, OEV has a stake in ensuring that this approach is effective in delivering quality, useful and credible evaluations.
WFP Executive Board (EB)	The WFP governing body has an interest in being informed about the effectiveness of WFP operations. This evaluation will not be presented to the EB but its findings will feed into an annual synthesis of all OpEvs, which will be presented to the EB at its November session.
EXTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS	
Beneficiaries	As the ultimate recipients of food assistance, beneficiaries have a stake in WFP determining whether its assistance is appropriate and effective. As such, the level of participation in the evaluation of women, men, boys and girls from different groups will be determined and their respective perspectives will be sought.
Government	The Government has a direct interest in knowing whether WFP activities in the country are aligned with its priorities, harmonised with the action of other partners and meet the expected results. Issues related to capacity development, handover and sustainability will be of particular interest. Various ministries including the Ministry of Agriculture, Mechanisation and Irrigation Development, Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare, Ministry of Health and Child Care, Ministry of Labour and Social Services, are partners in the design and implementation of WFP activities.
UN Country team	The UNCT's harmonized action should contribute to the realisation of the government developmental objectives. It has therefore an interest in ensuring that WFP operation is effective in contributing to the UN concerted efforts. Various agencies, including FAO, UNICEF, WHO, are also direct partners of WFP at policy and activity level.
NGOs	NGOs are WFP's partners for the implementation of some activities while at the same time having their own interventions. The results of the evaluation might affect future implementation modalities, strategic orientations and partnerships. See table 2 (Main partners) for more details.
Donors	WFP operations are voluntarily funded by a number of donors. They have an interest in knowing whether their funds have been spent efficiently and if WFP's work has been effective and contributed to their own strategies and programmes. See table 2 (Top five donors) for more details.
Private sector	Under a voucher pilot project for the health and nutrition activities, WFP has

	contracted a service provider responsible for retailer management and voucher redemption in urban areas. The results of the evaluation might influence future implementation modalities for voucher-based interventions.
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9. **Users.** The primary users of this evaluation will be:

- The CO and its partners in decision-making related notably to programme implementation and/or design, country strategy and partnerships.
- Given RB's core functions of strategic guidance, programme support and oversight, the RB is also expected to use the evaluation findings as well as the office responsible for support to RBs under the Chief Operating Officer.
- OEV will use the evaluation findings to feed into an annual synthesis report of all OpEvs and will reflect upon the evaluation process to refine its OpEv approach, as required.

3. Subject of the Evaluation


10. Zimbabwe is a low-income, food-deficit country ranked as one of the world's 15 least developed countries at 172 out of 186 on the 2012 UNDP Human Development Index. Approximately 72 percent of Zimbabwe's 12.9 million citizens live below the poverty line on less than US\$1 a day. In recent years, food production in Zimbabwe has been devastated by a number of factors including natural disasters and economic and political instability. Recurrent drought, a series of poor harvests, high unemployment (estimated at more than 60%), restructuring of the agriculture sector and a high HIV/AIDS prevalence rate – at 14.7 per cent, the fifth highest in the world - have all contributed to increasing levels of vulnerability and acute food insecurity since 2001. This situation has necessitated large-scale humanitarian food relief operations in the country.
11. According to the 2013 Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee (ZimVAC) rural livelihoods report, 2.2 million people will be unable to access sufficient food during the peak hunger period, January – March 2014. This is the highest level of food insecurity since 2009. WFP is responding with a Disaster Risk reduction (DRR) -Seasonal Targeted Assistance programme to help food-insecure households in the worst-affected areas. The rising food insecurity levels are due to a combination of factors, including weather conditions, the high cost or lack of availability of fertilisers and seeds, and rising food prices due to another poor harvest.
12. Meanwhile, WFP continues to implement its year-round Health and Nutrition programme which supports malnourished HIV/AIDS and TB patients and their households; pregnant and nursing mothers; and children under five. WFP is also implementing Food Assistance for Assets (FFA) whereby community members receive food or cash while creating assets – water source development, dip tanks; nutrition gardens, rehabilitation of agriculture and grazing land; solar boreholes - that help their ability to cope with recurrent drought and other such shocks.
13. In support of the PRRO's long-term handover strategy, WFP also aims to enhance the Government of Zimbabwe's ability to assess, plan and coordinate resilience-building programmes for food security and nutrition. Examples of capacity development efforts include the support of the Government in implementing a National Food and Nutrition Policy as well as the provision of a training for local authorities in livelihood-based programming.
14. The project document including the project logframe, related amendments (Budget revisions) and the latest resource situation are available by clicking [here](#).⁸¹ The key characteristics of the operation are outlined in table two below:

⁸¹ From WFP.org – Countries – Zimbabwe – Operations.


Table 2: Key characteristics of the operation

Approval	The operation was approved by the Executive Board in February 2013.	
Duration	Initial: 24 months (May 2013 – April 2015)	Revised: N/A
Amendments	<p>There have been 3 amendments to the initial project document.</p> <p>BR 1 (November 2013) resulted in an overall budget increase of US\$41.1 million.</p> <p>BR 2 was technical in nature and did not have any impact on the budget.</p> <p>BR3 (February 2014) resulted in a total budget increase of US\$2.1 million and aimed to i) increase the costs related to the delivery of C&V transfers following the expansion of cash and voucher activities in rural areas; and ii) budget for new activities intended to enhance the Government’s capacity to assess, plan and coordinate resilience- building programmes for food security and nutrition.</p> <p>A fourth revision is underway.</p>	
Planned beneficiaries (yearly maximum)	<u>Initial</u> : 1,230,000	<u>Revised</u> : 1,971,000
Planned food requirements	<u>Initial</u> : In-kind food: 144,021 mt of food commodities Cash and vouchers: US\$31.5 million	<u>Revised</u> : In-kind food: 175,769 mt of food commodities Cash and vouchers: US\$35.4 million

Planned % of beneficiaries by activity*



Planned % of food requirements by activity*



* As per original project

Main Partners	Government: Civil Protection Unit Food and Nutrition Council Ministry of Agriculture, Mechanisation and Irrigation Development, Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare, Ministry of Health and Child Care, ZimVAC Grain Marketing Board, Provincial and district drought-relief committees	United Nations agencies: FAO, UNAIDS, UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF, WHO	NGOs: Famine Early-Warning System Network, Adventist Development and Relief Agency, Africare, CARE, Catholic Relief Services, Christian Care, the Organization of Rural Associations for Progress, Plan International, Save the Children, the United Methodist Committee on Relief, World Vision International, the International Federation of Red Cross and Crescent Societies (IFRC) and others.
US\$ requirements	Initial: US\$206.1 million	Revised: US\$249.3 million	
Contribution level (by 12 Feb 2014)	The operation received US\$78,546,375 i.e. 31.5% of the total project requirements.		
Top five donors (by 12 Feb 2014)	USA (36% of total contributions); United Kingdom (15%); Japan (5%); and the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) (3%); and Canada (2%).		

15. Table three below summarizes the operation's specific objectives and corresponding activities:

Table 3: Objectives and activities

	Corporate Strategic objectives*	Operation specific objectives	Activities
MDGs 1, 4, 5, and 6, UNDAF outcomes 2.3, 3.1, 5.1, 5.2, 5.3 and 6.2	Strategic Objective 1	Outcome 1: Improved food consumption over assistance period for seasonally-affected food-insecure households	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Seasonal targeted assistance Asset creation and resilience (food and cash for assets) Support to households hosting malnourished clients Treatment of moderate acute malnutrition (MAM) for malnourished pregnant and lactating women, ART/TB patients and children under 5 Pilot school feeding project
	Strategic Objective 2	Outcome 2.1: Adequate food consumption over assistance period for target households at risk of acute hunger	
		Outcome 2.2: hazard risk reduced at the community level in target communities	
	Strategic Objective 3	Outcome 3.1: Adequate food consumption over assistance period for households at risk of calling into acute hunger; malnourished members benefit from care and treatment programmes	
Outcome 3.2: Improved nutritional recovery of anti-retroviral therapy and TB patients			

* While the operation's logframe was realigned to the new Strategic Plan (2014-2017) and new Strategic Results Framework in September 2013, reference is made to the Strategic Objectives as per the Strategic Plan (2008-2013) as the 2013 Standard Project Report mainly reported against the indicators presented in the original project document.

4. Evaluation Approach

4.1. Scope

16. **Scope.** The evaluation will cover PRRO 200453 including all activities and processes related to its formulation, implementation, resourcing, monitoring, evaluation and reporting relevant to answer the evaluation questions. The period covered by this evaluation is September 2012–March 2014, which captures the time from the development of the operation until the start of the evaluation.

4.2. Evaluation Questions

17. The evaluation will address the following three questions:

Question 1: How appropriate is the operation? Areas for analysis will include the extent to which the objectives, targeting, choice of activities and of transfer modalities:

- Are appropriate to the needs of the food insecure population, including the distinct needs of women, men, boys and girls from different groups, as applicable.
- Are coherent with relevant stated national policies, including sector policies and strategies and seek complementarity with the interventions of relevant humanitarian and development partners.
- Are coherent with WFP strategies, policies and normative guidance.

Question 2: What are the results of the operation? While ensuring that differences in benefits between women, men, boys and girls from different groups are considered, the evaluation will analyse:

- The level of attainment of the planned outputs (including the number of beneficiaries served disaggregated by women, girls, men and boys);
- The extent to which the outputs led to the realisation of the operation objectives (effectiveness) as well as to unintended effects highlighting, as applicable, differences for different groups, including women, girls, men and boys;
- How different activities of the operation dovetail and are synergetic among themselves and with what other actors are doing to contribute to the overriding WFP objective in the country; and
- The efficiency of the operation and the likelihood that the benefits will continue after the end of the operation.

Question 3: Why and how has the operation produced the observed results? The evaluation should generate insights into the main internal and external factors that caused the observed changes and affected how results were achieved. The inquiry is likely to focus, amongst others, on:

- Internally (factors within WFP's control): the processes, systems and tools in place to support the operation design, implementation (including delivery modalities particularly for cash, voucher and combined cash and in-kind transfers as well as implementing models through partners), monitoring/evaluation and reporting; the governance structure and institutional arrangements (including issues related to staffing, capacity and technical backstopping from RB/HQ); the partnership and coordination arrangements; etc.
- Externally (factors outside WFP's control): the external operating environment; the funding climate; external incentives and pressures; etc.

18. Throughout the evaluation and in making recommendations, the team should make forward considerations and identify best practices to inform the design of the next PRRO giving due consideration to: i) the integration of WFP's various interventions; ii) conditionality of assistance; iii) the increased focus in Zimbabwe and Southern Africa on designing interventions that contribute to communities' resilience-building; and gender and nutrition mainstreaming. The CO is particularly interested in assessing the appropriateness, efficiency and effectiveness of various innovative interventions and identifying the opportunities for scaling up some of those initiatives. Those include:
- Use of cash, voucher and combined food and cash transfers;
 - Planned shift from unconditional to conditional assistance;
 - Policy support and capacity development initiatives (local food fortification; food security analysis and implementation of Food and Nutrition Policy); and
 - Planned support to small-holder farmers through local purchase.

4.3 Evaluability Assessment

19. Evaluability is the extent to which an activity or a programme can be evaluated in a reliable and credible fashion. The below provides a preliminary evaluability assessment, which will be deepened by the evaluation team in the inception package. The team will critically assess data availability and take evaluability limitations into consideration in its choice of evaluation methods. In doing so, the team will also critically review the evaluability of the gender aspects of the operation, identify related challenges and mitigation measures.
20. In answering question one, the team will be able to rely on assessment reports, minutes from the project review committee, the project document and logframe, evaluations or reviews of ongoing and past operations,⁸² as well as documents related to government and interventions from other actors. In addition, the team will review relevant WFP strategies, policies and normative guidance.
21. For question two the operation has been designed in line with the corporate strategic results framework (SRF) and selected outputs, outcomes and targets are recorded in the logframe. Monitoring reports as well as annual standard project reports (SPRs) detail achievement of outputs and outcomes thus making them evaluable against the stated objectives.
22. However, answering question two is likely to pose some challenges owing in part to: i) the absence of some baseline data for the activities, which will need to be reconstructed using findings from various assessment reports and ii) data gaps in relation to efficiency.
23. For question three, the team members will have access to some institutional planning documents and is likely to elicit further information from key informant interviews.
24. Another evaluability challenge is linked to changes in some of the outcome indicators during the course of the implementation of the PRRO as the operation's logframe was realigned to the new SRF (2014-2017) in September 2013.⁸³

⁸² A country portfolio evaluation covering WFP operations in Zimbabwe between 2006 and 2010 was completed in May 2012.

⁸³ The following indicators were dropped with the realignment of the logframe to the Strategic Plan (2014-2017): Nutritional recovery rate for antiretroviral therapy and nutritional recovery rate for TB treatment. The following new indicators were introduced for the Health and Nutrition Promotion component: i) MAM treatment mortality rate; ii) Proportion of children consuming a minimum acceptable diet; iii) Proportion of target population who participate in an adequate number of distributions. A new indicator was introduced for the Asset Creation and Resilience component: Percentage of communities with increased asset score.

4.4. Methodology

25. The methodology will be designed by the evaluation team during the inception phase. It should:
- Employ relevant internationally agreed evaluation criteria including those of relevance, coherence (internal and external), coverage, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, sustainability (or connectedness for emergency operations);
 - Use applicable standards (e.g. SPHERE standards);
 - Demonstrate impartiality and lack of biases by relying on a cross-section of information sources (e.g. stakeholder groups, including beneficiaries, etc.) and using mixed methods (e.g. quantitative, qualitative, participatory) to ensure triangulation of information through a variety of means. In particular, the sampling technique to select field visit sites will need to demonstrate impartiality and participatory methods will be emphasised with the main stakeholders, including the CO.
 - Be geared towards addressing the key evaluation questions taking into account the evaluability challenges, the budget and timing constraints;
 - Be based on an analysis of the logic model of the operation and on a thorough stakeholders analysis;
 - Ensure through the use of mixed methods that women, girls, men and boys from different stakeholders groups participate and that their different voices are heard and used;
 - Be synthesised in an evaluation matrix, which should be used as the key organizing tool for the evaluation.

4.5. Quality Assurance

26. OEV's Evaluation Quality Assurance System (EQAS) defines the quality standards expected from this evaluation and sets out processes with in-built steps for quality assurance, templates for evaluation products and checklists for the review thereof. It is based on the UNEG norms and standards and good practice of the international evaluation community (DAC and ALNAP) and aims to ensure that the evaluation process and products conform to best practice and meet OEV's quality standards. EQAS does not interfere with the views and independence of the evaluation team.
27. At the start of the evaluation, OEV will orient the evaluation manager on EQAS and share related documents. EQAS should be systematically applied to this evaluation and the evaluation manager will be responsible to ensure that the evaluation progresses in line with its process steps and to conduct a rigorous quality control of the evaluation products ahead of their submission to WFP. OEV will also share an Orientation Guide on WFP and its operations, which provides an overview of the organization.
28. The evaluation company is ultimately responsible for the quality of the evaluation products. If the expected standards are not met, the evaluation company will, at its own expense, make the necessary amendments to bring the evaluation products to the required quality level.
29. OEV will also subject the evaluation report to an external post-hoc quality assurance review to report independently on the quality, credibility and utility of the evaluation in line with evaluation norms and standards.

5. Phases and deliverables

30. Table four below highlights the main activities of the evaluation, which will unfold in five phases.

Table 4: Activities, deliverables and timeline by evaluation phase

Entity	Activities	Key dates
	PHASE 1 – PREPARATION	February/March
OEV	Desk review, consultation and preparation of TOR	07-17 Feb
CO / RB	Stakeholders comments on TOR	18-25 Feb
OEV	❖ Final TOR	28 Feb
OEV	Evaluation company selection and contracting	03-19 March
	PHASE 2 – INCEPTION	March/April
OEV	Management hand-over to the EM (including briefing on EQAS, expectations and requirements for the evaluation).	24 March-7 April
EM	Evaluation team briefing on EQAS, expectations and requirements for the evaluation.	
ET	Desk review, initial consultation with the CO/RB, drafting of the Inception Package (including methodology and evaluation mission planning)	08-21 April
EM	Quality Assurance of the Inception Package	22-26 April
EM	❖ Final Inception Package	28 April
	PHASE 3 – EVALUATION MISSION	May/June
CO	Preparation of the evaluation mission (including setting up meetings, arranging field visits, etc)	04-18 May
ET	Introductory briefing	19 May
ET	Interviews with key internal and external stakeholders, project site visits, etc	19 May-06 June
ET	Exit debriefing / workshop	09 June
ET	❖ Aide memoire	09 June
	PHASE 4 – REPORTING	June/August
ET	Evaluation Report drafting	10 June-14 July
EM	Quality Assurance of draft Evaluation Report	14-21 July
EM	❖ Draft Evaluation Report	21 July
CO/RB/OEV	Stakeholders comments on Evaluation Report	21 July – 4 August
EM	❖ Final Evaluation Report + comments matrix	5-19 August
	PHASE 5 – FOLLOW-UP	Varies
RB	Coordination of the preparation of the Management Response	
	❖ Management Response	
OEV	Post-hoc Quality Assurance	
OEV	Publication of findings and integration of findings into OEV's lessons learning tools.	
OEV	Preparation of annual synthesis of operations evaluations.	

31. **Deliverables.** The evaluation company will be responsible for producing as per the timeline presented in table 4 above the following deliverables in line with the EQAS guidance and following the required templates:

- **Inception package (IP)** – This package focuses on methodological and planning aspects and will be considered the operational plan of the evaluation. It will present a preliminary analysis of the context and of the operation and present the evaluation methodology articulated around a

deepened evaluability and stakeholders' analysis; an evaluation matrix; and the sampling technique and data collection tools. It will also present the division of tasks amongst team members as well as a detailed timeline for stakeholders' consultation.

- **Aide memoire** – This document (powerpoint presentation) will present the initial analysis from the data stemming from the desk review and evaluation mission and will support the exit-debriefing at the end of the evaluation phase.
- **Evaluation report (ER)** – The evaluation report will present the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation. Findings should be evidence-based and relevant to the evaluation questions. Data will be disaggregated by sex and the evaluation findings and conclusions will highlight differences in performance and results of the operation for different beneficiary groups as appropriate. There should be a logical flow from findings to conclusions and from conclusions to recommendations. Recommendations will be provided on what changes can be made to enhance the achievements of objectives. Recommendations will be limited in number, actionable and targeted to the relevant users. These will form the basis of the WFP management response to the evaluation.

32. These deliverables will be drafted in English.

33. The evaluation TOR, report and management response will be public and posted on the WFP External Website (wfp.org/evaluation). The other evaluation products will be kept internal.

6. Organization of the Evaluation

6.1 Outsourced approach

34. Under the outsourced approach to OpEvs, the evaluation is commissioned by OEV but will be managed and conducted by an external evaluation company having a long-term agreement (LTA) with WFP for operations evaluation services.

35. The company will provide an evaluation manager (EM) and an independent evaluation team (ET) in line with the LTA. To ensure a rigorous review of evaluation deliverables, the evaluation manager should in no circumstances be part of the evaluation team.

36. The company, the evaluation manager and the evaluation team members will not have been involved in the design, implementation or M&E of the operation nor have other conflicts of interest or bias on the subject. They will act impartially and respect the [code of conduct of the profession](#).

37. Given the evaluation learning objective, the evaluation manager and team will promote stakeholders' participation throughout the evaluation process. Yet, to safeguard the independence of the evaluation, WFP staff will not be part of the evaluation team or participate in meetings with external stakeholders if the evaluation team deems that their presence could bias the responses.

6.2 Evaluation Management

38. The evaluation will be managed by the company's evaluation manager for OpEvs (as per LTA). The EM will be responsible to manage within the given budget the evaluation process in line with EQAS and the expectations spelt out in these TOR and to deliver timely evaluation products meeting the OEV standards. In particular, the EM will:

- Mobilise and hire the evaluation team and provide administrative backstopping (contracts, visas, travel arrangements, consultants' payments, invoices to WFP, etc).
- Act as the main interlocutor between WFP stakeholders and the ET throughout the evaluation and generally facilitate communication and promote stakeholders' participation throughout the evaluation process.

- Support the evaluation team by orienting members on WFP, EQAS and the evaluation requirements; providing them with relevant documentation and generally advising on all aspects of the evaluation to ensure that the evaluation team is able to conduct its work.
- Ensure that the evaluation proceeds in line with EQAS, the norms and standards and code of conduct of the profession and that quality standards and deadlines are met.
- Ensure that a rigorous and objective quality check of all evaluation products is conducted ahead of submission to WFP. This quality check will be documented and an assessment of the extent to which quality standards are met will be provided to WFP.
- Provide feedback on the evaluation process as part of an evaluation feedback e-survey.

6.3 Evaluation Conduct

39. The evaluation team will conduct the evaluation under the direction of the evaluation manager. The team will be hired by the company following agreement with OEV on its composition.

40. **Team composition.** The evaluation team is expected to include 3 to 4 members, including the team leader and 2-3 international and national evaluators. It should include women and men of mixed cultural backgrounds and at least one Zimbabwean(s). Past WFP experience would be an asset.

41. The estimated number of days is expected to be in the range of 45-55 for the team leader; 25-40 for the evaluators.

42. **Team competencies.** The team will be multi-disciplinary and include members who together include an appropriate balance of expertise and practical knowledge in:

- Disaster Risk Management and emergency response;
- Food security, Livelihood and resilience building
- Market-based delivery modalities (Cash and vouchers);
- Public health and nutrition (with a focus on nutrition support to PLHIV);
- Institutional support and capacity development; and
- Gender expertise / good knowledge of gender issues.

43. All team members should have strong analytical and communication skills; evaluation experience and familiarity with the country or region.

44. The team members need to be fluent in English, both orally and in writing.

45. **The Team leader** will have technical expertise in one of the technical areas listed above as well as expertise in designing methodology and data collection tools and demonstrated experience in leading similar evaluations. She/he will also have leadership and communication skills, including a track record of excellent English writing and presentation skills.

46. Her/his primary responsibilities will be: i) defining the evaluation approach and methodology; ii) guiding and managing the team during the evaluation process; iii) leading the evaluation mission and representing the evaluation team in meetings with stakeholders; iv) drafting and revising, as required, the inception package, aide memoire and evaluation report in line with EQAS; and v) provide feedback to OEV on the evaluation process as part of an evaluation feedback e-survey.

47. **The team members** will bring together a complementary combination of the technical expertise required and have a track record of written work on similar assignments.

48. Team members will: i) contribute to the design of the evaluation methodology in their area of expertise based on a document review; ii) conduct field work; iii) participate in team meetings and meetings with stakeholders; iv) contribute to the drafting and revision of the evaluation products in their technical area(s) and v) provide feedback on the evaluation process as part of an evaluation feedback e-survey.

7. Roles and Responsibilities of WFP Stakeholders

49. **The Country Office.** The CO management will be responsible to:

- Assign a focal point for the evaluation to liaise with the OEV focal point during the preparation phase and with the company evaluation manager thereafter. Andrew Odero, Head of Vulnerability Analysis Monitoring and Evaluation will be the CO focal point for this evaluation.
- Provide the evaluation manager and team with documentation and information necessary to the evaluation; facilitate the team's contacts with local stakeholders; set up meetings, field visits and the exit briefing; provide logistic support during the fieldwork; and arrange for interpretation, if required.
- Participate in a number of discussions with the evaluation team on the evaluation design and on the operation, its performance and results. In particular, the CO should participate in the evaluation team briefing and in various teleconferences with the evaluation manager and team on the evaluation products.
- Organise two separate debriefings at the end of the field mission - an internal one (possibly done in the form of a workshop) and a subsequent one with partners.
- Comment on the TORs and the evaluation report.
- Prepare a management response to the evaluation.
- Provide feedback to OEV on the evaluation process as part of an evaluation feedback e-survey.

50. **The Regional Bureau.** The RB management will be responsible to:

- Assign a focal point for the evaluation to liaise with the OEV focal point during the preparation phase and with the company evaluation manager thereafter, as required. Silvia Biondi, Regional M&E Adviser will be the RB focal point for this evaluation.
- Participate in a number of discussions with the evaluation team on the evaluation design and on the operation, its performance and results. In particular, the RB should participate in the evaluation team debriefing (possibly done in the form of a workshop) and in various teleconferences with the evaluation manager and team on the evaluation products.
- Provide comments on the TORs and the evaluation report.
- Coordinate the management response to the evaluation and track the implementation of the recommendations.
- Provide feedback to OEV on the evaluation process as part of an evaluation feedback e-survey.

51. **Headquarters.** Some HQ divisions might, as relevant, be asked to discuss WFP strategies, policies or systems in their area of responsibility and to comment on the evaluation TOR and report. These include: Operations Department (OS), Policy, Programme and Innovation Division (OSZ), Emergency Preparedness (OME), Procurement Division (OSP), Logistics Division (OSL), Government Partnerships Division (PGG).

52. **The Office of Evaluation.** OEV is responsible for commissioning the evaluation and Julie Thoulouzan, Evaluation Officer is the OEV focal point. OEV's responsibilities include to:

- Set up the evaluation including drafting the TOR in consultation with concerned stakeholders; select and contract the external evaluation company; and facilitate the initial communications between the WFP stakeholders and the external evaluation company.
- Enable the company to deliver a quality process and report by providing them with the EQAS documents including process guidance and quality checklists as well as orient the evaluation manager on WFP policies, strategies, processes and systems as they relate to the operation being evaluated.
- Comment on, and approve, the evaluation report.
- Submit the evaluation report to an external post-hoc quality assurance process to independently report on the quality, credibility and utility of the evaluation and provide feedback to the evaluation company accordingly.

- Publish the final evaluation report on the WFP public website and incorporate findings into an annual synthesis report, which will be presented to WFP's Executive Board for consideration as well as in other lessons-learning platforms, as relevant.
- Conduct an evaluation feedback e-survey to gather perceptions about the evaluation process and the quality of the report to be used to revise the approach, as required.

8. Communication and budget

8.1. Communication

53. Issues related to language of the evaluation are noted in sections 6.3 and 5, which also specifies which evaluation products will be made public and how and provides the schedule of debriefing with key stakeholders. Section 7 paragraph 52 describes how findings will be disseminated.

54. To enhance the learning from this evaluation, the evaluation manager and team will also emphasize transparent and open communication with WFP stakeholders. Regular teleconferences and one-on-one telephone conversations between the evaluation manager, team and country office focal point will assist in discussing any arising issues and ensuring a participatory process.

8.2. Budget

55. **Funding source:** The evaluation will be funded in line with the WFP special funding mechanism for Operations Evaluations (Executive Director memo dated October 2012). The cost to be borne by the CO, if applicable, will be established by the WFP Budget & Programming Division (RMB).

56. **Budget:** The budget will be prepared by the company (using the rates established in the LTA and the corresponding template) and approved by OEV. For the purpose of this evaluation the company will:


- Use the management fee corresponding to a medium operation.
- Take into account the planned number of days per function noted in section 6.3.
- not budget for domestic travel.

Please send queries to Julie Thoulouzan, Evaluation Officer:

Email: Julie.thoulouzan@wfp.org

Phone number: + 39 06 65 13 35 04

Annex 1: Map



Annex 2: Mission Schedule

Team	Date	Travel	Overnight	Activities
1 & 2	26 May	Home location - Harare	Harare	
	27 May-1 June		Harare	Stakeholder interviews Harare, H&N
1	1 June	Harare - Bulawayo	Bulawayo	
	2 June	Bulawayo – Mfanyana vv	Bulawayo	Data collection Bulawayo, Umguza, Mandlutsha Dam, dip tank
1a	3 June	Bulawayo – Insiza vv	Bulawayo	Data collection Insiza, Siwaze Irrigation, Nkankezi Dam, H&N
1b		Bulawyo – Plumtree vv		Data collection Plumtree, returnee camp, Ndiweni STA
1	4 June	Bulawayo – Victoria Falls	Vic Falls	Data collection Vic Falls, Chisuma Clinic and Victoria Falls Hospital H&N
	5 June	Vic Falls – Mwanze - Songwa - Binga	Binga	Data collection Binga, Siangwemu Dam, Makwa Irrigation, Songwa STA
	6 June	Binga - Bulawayo	Bulawayo	Data collection Binga, Ndumechenga Dam, Mupambe dip tank, STA, H&N
	7 June	Bulawayo - Harare	Harare	Preliminary analysis
	8 June		Harare	Preliminary analysis
	9 June	Harare – Marondera/UMP	Murewa	Data collection Murewa
	10 June		Murewa	Dam, dip tank, cattle pen, vegetable garden
	11 June	Murewa - Harare	Harare	Stakeholder interviews Harare
2	1 June	Harare - Bindura	Bindura	Preliminary analysis
	2 June	Bindura- Nyamahobogo vv	Bindura	Data collection, H&N
	3 June	Bindura – Mt Darwin valley wards vv	Bindura	Data collection, dip tank, water conservation, water harvest
	4 June	Bindura - Harare	Harare	Data collection Bindura
	5 June	Harare - Mutare	Mutare	Data collection Mutare, H&N
	6 June	Mutara - Tanganda	Tanganda	Data collection Chipinge H&N
	7 June		Tanganda	Visit Nyamakamba dip tank, Rukangare garden, Bwerudza Irrigation
	8 June	Tanganda - Masvingo	Masvingo	Data collection, Ngaone road rehabilitation
	9 June	Masvingo – Zaka, Bikita vv	Masvingo	Data collection, Zumbuze Irrigation, Mamvuramashava dip tank
	10 June	Masvingo – Dzingazhara, Chiredzi - Mwenezi	Mwenezi	Data collection, visit Dzingashara fish pond, Chilonga Clinic, H&N
	11 June	Mwenezi - Harare	Harare	Data collection, visit Nkotami Damm and garden, Matande garden
1&2	12-13 June		Harare	Stakeholder interviews Harare
	14-15 June		Harare	Data analysis; development presentation
	16 June		Harare	Debriefing internal and external
	17 June	Harare – Home location		

Annex 3: Evaluation Matrix

Sub Question	Indicator	Main Sources of Information	Data Collection Methods	Data Analysis Methods	Evidence quality
Key Question 1: How appropriate is the operation? Areas for analysis include objectives, targeting, choice of activities and of transfer modalities					
RELEVANCE					
1.1. Are the objectives, targeting, and choice of activities and of transfer modalities appropriate to meet the needs of the food-insecure population in Zimbabwe?	<p>1.1.1. Are the PRRO's objectives and interventions appropriate to the immediate needs of the food-insecure population of Zimbabwe, including the specific needs of women, men, boys and girls?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Quantitative evidence that targeting at a national level was consistent with needs identified in national needs and vulnerability analyses and that transfers took account of the predicted food shortfall in calorific / cash terms - evidence that WFPs procurement systems – both in country and externally – were able to ensure delivery of the required tonnage and quality of commodities to beneficiaries in a timely manner and within budget - Evidence that interventions are supported by a coherent Theory of Change which links inputs to desired outcomes - Evidence that targeting at a household level was carried out in a transparent way using criteria that ensured that the most food insecure households were selected as beneficiaries - Evidence that labour constraints of vulnerable (and other) households were considered when PAC interventions were designed and implemented - Quantitative evidence that the specific nutritional needs of vulnerable household types (FHH, HIV, OVC, elderly) have been considered in the planning of interventions and transfer content - Evidence that transfer modalities and distribution schedules were suited to and had the flexibility to be modified to suit beneficiaries - Evidence that seasonal labour requirements were considered when timings of PAC interventions were planned - Evidence that prevailing livelihood strategies were considered during the selection of asset creation interventions - Evidence that market efficiencies and supply-side issues for specific food types were considered during the design and implementation of cash and voucher interventions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Beneficiary Communities - Documents and diagnostic studies on the food security situation – particularly ZIMVAC, crop surveys, etc. - Internal Project Documents – particularly livelihood baselines and needs assessments - Annual Reports (SPR) - District Dev Cttes - Market price surveys from FAO and GoZ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Literature review and secondary data - Semi - structured interviews, cluster meetings and questionnaires - Observation and Focal Groups 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Triangulation of the results from the mentioned sources - Contribution analysis 	Reasonable to good

Sub Question	Indicator	Main Sources of Information	Data Collection Methods	Data Analysis Methods	Evidence quality
	<p>1.1.2 Are the PRRO's objectives and interventions appropriate to the evolving and future needs of the food-insecure population of Zimbabwe, including the specific needs of women, men, boys and girls?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Evidence that PAC interventions were selected, designed and implemented in a participatory way - considering the livelihood strategies and priorities of targeted communities - Evidence that interventions were designed to address and mitigate the main reoccurring hazards faced by beneficiary households – drought, labour shortages, poor market access, etc. - Evidence that management structures for PAC infrastructure were established and equipped to ensure that assets continue to function for the households and purpose for which they were designed 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - District Dev Cttees - Beneficiary Communities - Implementation Partners - Civil Defence Department 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Literature review and secondary data - Semi - structured interviews, cluster meetings and questionnaires - Observations, Focus Groups 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Triangulation of the results from the mentioned sources - Contribution analysis - Nominal baseline and visioning exercises 	Reasonable to good
	<p>1.1.3. Are the PRRO's objectives and interventions appropriate to and coherent with the operational capacity and approach of their implementation partners (NGOs, government partners, and market traders)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Evidence that the design of the PRRO activities (including targeting, distribution and M&E systems) were developed in consultation with other stakeholders? - Evidence that partners' best practice – particularly with regard to targeting, distribution, establishment of grievance procedures and M&E – was sought and used in the design and execution of activities - Evidence that effectiveness of interventions to support nutritional needs of HIV / TB patients was maximised by consistent and adequate availability of necessary drugs and other non-food support. - Evidence that Implementation partners were able to establish work norms and standards to ensure asset creation interventions were conducted on time and to budget - Evidence that privately contracted elements of asset creation interventions were properly tendered and funds managed correctly - Evidence that Implementation Partners were able to manage and enforce conditionality with regard to asset creation interventions - Evidence that M&E systems were designed to track and give timely feedback on partners' operational effectiveness - Evidence that market traders had sufficient capacity (liquidity, storage space, record keeping) to efficiently manage voucher based components of PRRO - Evidence that wider market dynamics were consistent and stable enough to ensure uninterrupted supply of commodities at a predictable price. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - WFP's partners - GoZ and technical service suppliers (distribution) - M&E templates and methodologies / guidelines - Market traders - Hospital / clinic staff - IP documentation, including tender documents and guidelines. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Semi - structured interviews, cluster meetings and questionnaires - Request for documentation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Review of documentation 	Reasonable to good

Sub Question	Indicator	Main Sources of Information	Data Collection Methods	Data Analysis Methods	Evidence quality
	<p>1.1.4 Are the PRRO's interventions targeted on the geographical areas of Zimbabwe that are most in need?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Evidence that decisions on targeting of food and other assistance was made on the basis of population's need / vulnerability rather than tribal or political affiliation - Evidence that WFP had the capacity to use geographical / satellite information to assist with targeting decisions - Evidence that targeting and food distribution within areas traditionally seen as antipathetic to the ruling regime was made on the basis of household need and not their supposed political affiliation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - ZIMVAC report - Crop Assessment reports - FEWSNET Reports - Report from Civil Protection Department - Informants at the above agencies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Desk Review - Interviews with key staff and stakeholders 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Quantitative assessment of response proportional to need 	Good
COHERENCE					
1.2. Are the objectives, targeting, choice of activities and transfer modalities coherent with relevant stated national policies and strategies?	<p>1.2.1. Is the PRRO coherent and consistent with relevant national policies (food security, nutrition, education, protection, health and others?)?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - PRRO is consistent with national policies like the gender policy, Zimbabwe's National HIV/AIDS policy and Zimbabwe's Food and Nutrition security policy and the PCW policy. - PRRO objectives consistent with those of projects and programs at a District level, particularly the District Development Plan and other long-term programming guidance strategies - Relevant GoZ officials are aware of and in agreement with WFP's approach and objectives under the PRRO and consider that funds d are being used in the correct way and efficiently - Key informants are able to articulate the objectives of WFP's interventions and those of other national and local level programmes and strategies. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Informants at national and local government level and with Donors - Documents and plans at national and local level 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Interviews and FGDs - Document review 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Triangulation 	Good
	<p>1.2.2. Does the PRRO seek complementarity with the interventions of relevant humanitarian and development partners for Zimbabwe including clusters coordinating humanitarian & development aid?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Staff from donor agencies aware of and in agreement with WFP's approach and objectives under the PRRO and consider the funds they contributed used in the correct way and efficiently - WFP staff contribute to and work in concert with cluster mechanisms and coordination platforms? - Complementarity and alignment with other humanitarian / development interventions in Zimbabwe duplication - Cooperation and coordination related to UNCT 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Key informants in cluster mechanisms - Donors – especially DFID and USAID 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Interviews - Document review 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Triangulation 	Good
	<p>1.2.3. Does the PRRO seek complementarity with other WFP programmes in Zimbabwe and the region?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Key informants in CO 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Interviews - Document 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Triangulation 	

Sub Question	Indicator	Main Sources of Information	Data Collection Methods	Data Analysis Methods	Evidence quality
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Are the activities of the PRRO consistent with WFP interventions in the similar areas in the regions - Are the activities of the PRRO consistent with other WFP interventions in the country? 	- Documentation	review		
1.3. Are the objectives, targeting, the choice of activities and transfer modalities coherent with WFP strategies, policies and normative guidance?	<p>1.3.1. Are the activities in this PRRO coherent with the WFP policy framework and available normative guidance regarding:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Guidelines for food distribution - Safety Nets Policy 2012 - Nutrition Policy 2012 - Policy on DRR 2011 - Food Aid and Livelihoods in Emergencies 2010 - Capacity Development and Hand-over 2009 - Gender policy 2009 - Vouchers/cash transfers, 2008 - Humanitarian Protection Policy 2012 - Strategy for Resource Mobilization (2014) - Sustainability through the WFP handover strategy 2012 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Key informants in CO - Documentation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Interviews - Document review 	- Triangulation	
	<p>1.3.2. Are the activities in this PRRO coherent with WFP Strategic Results Framework 2008-2013? (or later?) Are there also elements within the PRRO which absolutely are not coherent with the strategic outcomes?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Evidence of coherence of the various components in the PRRO with the WFP Strategic Results Framework 2008-2013 (objectives, indicators, targeting, choice of activities, transfer modalities) - Evidence that the PRRO is likely to achieving the outcomes articulated in these documents 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Key informants in CO - Documentation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Interviews - Document review 	- Triangulation	- Good
<p>Key Question 2: What are the results of the operation? While ensuring that differences in benefits between women, men, boys and girls from different groups are considered, the evaluation analyse:</p>					
<p>EFFECTIVENESS</p>					
2.1. What is the level of attainment of planned outputs for the various components in the PRRO? (including the number of	<p>2.1.1. Do Actual outputs per year for the various components and correspond with annual plans 2013 and 2014 (geographical targeting, types of interventions, no. of beneficiaries) all disaggregated by HH type:</p> <p><u>SO 1: General Food Distribution Indicators</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - C&V: Number of beneficiaries receiving a combination of cash transfers and food (#beneficiaries) - Number of days rations were provided (days) 	- Distribution reports	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Desk review of documentation 	- Quantitative analysis	- Good
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Desk review of 		

Sub Question	Indicator	Main Sources of Information	Data Collection Methods	Data Analysis Methods	Evidence quality
beneficiaries served disaggregated by women, girls, men and boys)?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Tonnes of commodities distributed - Percentage of commodities / transfers received by FHH, vulnerable HH, OVCs, - Number of refugees fed at feeding centres - Number of school children fed through school feeding <p><u>SO 2 Food For Assets Indicators</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Hectares of agricultural land benefiting from new irrigation schemes (including irrigation canal construction, specific protection measures, embankments, etc). – against targets - Hectares of agricultural land benefiting from rehabilitated irrigation schemes (including physical soil and water conservation measures – against targets - Hectares of cultivated land treated with stabilization or agro forestry techniques – against targets - Hectares of gully land reclaimed as a result of check dams and gully rehabilitation structures – against targets - Kilometres of feeder roads rehabilitated (FFA) and maintained (self-help) - Value of tools and other assets handed over to beneficiary communities through PAC interventions <p><u>SO 3: HIV/TB: Care and Treatment Indicators</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - C&V: Number of beneficiaries receiving a combination of cash transfers and vouchers beneficiary - Number of ART clients who received both individual nutritional food supplement and household food assistance client - Caloric value of food / cash transferred through C&V programming 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Baselines - Discussions with target communities - Planning documents - Community maps - Aerial photographs / satellite imagery (if exist) - Nominal baseline (if quant. BL not available) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Baselines - Discussions with target communities - Planning documents 	<p>documentation</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Desk review of documentation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Quantitative analysis <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Quantitative analysis 	
2.2. To what extent have the outputs realized led to realisation of the operation objectives (effectiveness) as well as to unintended effects?	<p>2.2.1 Achievement of planned results (' outcomes ') for each component of the PRRO , and in each zone and country (results) level</p> <p>2.2.1.1 Beneficiaries' perceptions on: -</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Targeting – transparency, fairness, opportunities for voicing grievances - Increase in number of meals eaten per day - Increased purchasing power because of cash transfers - Increase in dietary diversity - Increase in Food Consumption Scores - Level of preparedness achieved for sustainable handover - Extent to which community resilience to shocks was enhanced by safety net and asset creation activities - Extent to which interventions re-established the food and nutritional 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Baselines - Discussions with target communities - Nominal baseline (if quant. BL not available) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Interviews with beneficiaries - Document review 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Quantitative and qualitative analysis 	Partly based on perception Documents good

Sub Question	Indicator	Main Sources of Information	Data Collection Methods	Data Analysis Methods	Evidence quality
	<p>security of communities and families affected by shocks</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Extent to which interventions supported malnourished adults and children - Coordination with other development initiatives in area - Opportunity costs of involvement in PAC and / or collection of transfers <p>2.2.1.2 Non beneficiaries perceptions on: -</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Targeting – transparency, fairness, opportunities for voicing grievances - Benefits from food / cash / vouchers distributed (eg sharing) - Benefits from infrastructure / assets created <p>2.2.1.3 Evidence from Cooperating Partners’ on: -</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Improved food consumption over assistance period for seasonally-affected food-insecure households - Percentage of households with acceptable / borderline / poor Food Consumption Score - Adequate food consumption over assistance period for target households at risk of acute hunger - Hazard risk reduced at the community level in target communities - Risk Reduction and disaster mitigation assets increased - Improved nutritional recovery of anti-retroviral therapy and TB patients - TSF Nutrition Recovery Rate - TSF Mortality Rate - ART Adherence Rate (%) - TB Treatment Success Rate (%) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - IPs evaluation reports - Discussions with IPs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Desk review 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Quantitative 	
	<p>2.2.3. Listing of any unintended effects that occurred for activities under the various components in the PRRO:</p> <p>Perceptions of Beneficiaries / non-beneficiaries and IPs on</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Impact on the socio-economic conditions of the host population - The social structure in sites (including gender issues) - The coexistence of refugees and the local population - Impact on prices in the local market for food , firewood , other items - Access to other services - Changes in gender equality and empowerment of women - Reduction of risks to vulnerable populations - Inflation due to distribution of cash transfer or local procurement by WFP - Labour shortages at critical periods due to PAC interventions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Discussions with beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries and IPs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Interviews and FGDs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Qualitative 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Based on perception

Sub Question	Indicator	Main Sources of Information	Data Collection Methods	Data Analysis Methods	Evidence quality
2.3. How have the different activities in the PRRO dovetailed and are they synergetic with other WFP interventions in Zimbabwe as well as with what other actors are doing to contribute to the overriding WFP objective in the country?	2.3.1. How have the different activities under the PRRO converged with other WFP operations and programmes in Zimbabwe? Are there any other synergies beyond the level of targeting the same beneficiaries? (PRRO, CP, EMOP) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Geographical convergence between the activities under the PRRO and other WFP activities in Zimbabwe? - Coordinated timeframes for phasing in and phasing out of the various components of interventions of WFP in Zimbabwe - Evidence that communities were involved in prioritisation, timing and content of the interventions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Discussions with CO - Desk review of documents 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Interviews 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Qualitative 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Based on perception - Depending on availability and quality of information in reports
	2.3.2. Links and synergies between the different activities in the PRRO and interventions by other actors in Zimbabwe? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Evidence that interventions planned with full consideration of other interventions in the area and household's labour constraints and other priorities? - Stakeholders' perceptions of synergies between interventions - Strength of relations and coordination between the PRRO activities and objectives and the overall UNDAF framework for Zimbabwe - Evidence of links and synergies between activities under the PRRO and food security and nutrition interventions of other actors in the same regions / Districts / communities - Evidence that PRRO interventions were fully incorporated into District and Community Development plans and consistent with any DRR plans which are in place 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Stakeholders including CO staff, GoZ, Donors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Interviews 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Qualitative 	
EFFICIENCY					
2.4. Has the PRRO been implemented in an efficient way and against acceptable costs levels?	2.4.1. Smoothness and timeliness of the implementation of the PRRO as compared to the annual operational plans: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - planning processes (WFP, CPs) - food logistics - prepositioning; occurrence of pipeline breaks (WFP, CPs) - distribution systems (CPs) - financial/narrative reporting (CPs) (was cash disbursed on time) - overall administration (WFP) - Smoothness and timeliness of the implementation of various components in the PRRO as compared to the operational plan: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Targeted SFP - SFP – PLHIV, PLW, U-5, TB - Aligned TFD - Seasonal GFD 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Documentation including monitoring and progress reports - Perceptions of key stakeholders 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Desk review - Interviews 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Qualitative and quantitative 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Based on perception - Depending on availability and quality of information in reports

Sub Question	Indicator	Main Sources of Information	Data Collection Methods	Data Analysis Methods	Evidence quality
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - FFA / CFA - Cash & Vouchers - School feeding 				
	<p>2.4.2. Can costs per beneficiary reached by the PRRO rated to be acceptable and in line with the result achieved</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The costs per beneficiary reached by activities under the PRRO are rated as acceptable and in line with results achieved, including: - <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Targeted SFP o SFP – PLHIV, PLW, U-5, TB o Aligned TFD o Seasonal GFD o FFA / CFA o Cash & Vouchers o School feeding o Alpha values 	- Budget analysis	- Desk review	- Quantitative	- Depending on detail level of financial information
IMPACT AND SUSTAINABILITY					
<p>2.5. What is the likelihood that the benefits of the PRRO will continue after the end of the operation?</p>	<p>2.5.1 Beneficiary and community perceptions of likelihood of sustainability of interventions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Achieved / perceived level of resilience and protection of households / communities against new shocks: - Achieved / perceived level of empowerment of the targeted communities (e.g. FFA availability of functional dip tanks for survival of the livestock obtained) - Changed level of availability and access to food items - Changed level of access to food for TB and ART patients and effect on treatment compliance and health status - Changes in market functioning - Any negative effects from the PRRO such as market disturbance, changes in price level, food habits, aid dependence - Change in nutritional status of PLW, children 6-59 months and ART/TB patients <p>2.5.2. What is the likelihood activities will be continued after the PRRO has phased out?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The likelihood of continuation of nutritional support to various target groups - The likelihood of School Feeding being provided by the Government once pilots have been brought up to scale 	- Beneficiaries, IPs and local government staff	- Interviews and FGDs	- Qualitative	- Based on perception

Sub Question	Indicator	Main Sources of Information	Data Collection Methods	Data Analysis Methods	Evidence quality
Key Question 3: Why and how has the operation produced the observed results? The evaluation generates insights into the main internal and external factors that caused the observed changes and affected how results were achieved.					
EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS					
3.1. What are the main internal factors that explain which results have been achieved and how they have been achieved?	3.1.1 WFP Zimbabwe has an <u>efficient organizational structure</u> with clear institutional arrangements, including issues related to staffing, capacity and technical backstopping from RB/HQ <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The rational division of tasks and responsibilities incl CO and SOs) - A clear communication and reporting of past recorded and projected activities? (incl. other institutions and UN agencies) - Clear for operational decision-making mechanisms? - Links with systems monitoring and evaluation? - Sub- offices and warehouses located in the correct places? - Reasonable corporate governance framework - Human resources necessary for the proper management 	WFP Regional Bureau Staff WFP CO and SO staff Organogrammes and TORs	Literature review Semi -structured interviews Key informant interviews Observation	Qualitative analysis Triangulation of findings and Contribution analysis from mentioned sources of information	Partly based on perception Good when based on documents
	3.1.2. Have CO and Regional Bureau and the SOs been sufficiently involved in the PRRO and shown ability to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Adapt the design of the when necessary ?Achieve a rigorous beneficiary selection process? - Regularly update registration lists and handle newcomers? - Reach a good coverage of the components of the PRRO? - Effectively implement the activities of the PRRO in collaboration with Country Partners? - Monitor / evaluate sufficiently the outputs, the results (outcomes) and the impacts of the PRRO based on the logical framework? - Maintain good quality coordination with other actors? 				
	3.1.3 How was the quality of partnership involved in support of PRRO implementation of the various activities: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Targeted SFP - SFP – PLHIV, PLW, U-5, TB - Aligned TFD - Seasonal GFD - FFA / CFA - Cash & Vouchers - School feeding 	WFP CO and SO staff Staff of cooperating partners Government staff Progress reports partners and WFP Monitoring reports FLAs			Partly based on perception Partly depending on quality reports

Sub Question	Indicator	Main Sources of Information	Data Collection Methods	Data Analysis Methods	Evidence quality
FLEXIBILITY					
3.2. What are the main external factors that explain which results have been achieved and how they have been achieved?	<p>3.2.1 What are the main external factors that explain which results have been achieved and how they have been achieved?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - How were the monitoring and evaluation system and capacities? - In how far have adaptive measures been taken or additional positive effects secured related to the following (if and when occurred)? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Natural environment, climate and / or infrastructural conditions in Zimbabwe leading to obstacles in the operation? o Political and security conditions in the zones covered by the PRRO constraining implementation of activities of the PRRO? o Economic conditions positively or negatively affecting the implementation of the activities of the PRRO? o Sociocultural characteristics of groups of population having a positive or negative impact on the activities of the PRRO? - Have other (Govt, UN, NGOs) programs in surrounding sites affected the results of PRRO? - Were there unsatisfied non-food needs, or other non-achieved (Govt, UN, NGOs) commitments that have affected the results obtained by the PRRO? - Were there other factors at regional and international levels that have influenced the results of the PRRO? <p>3.2.2. Are their regional or international factors influencing the PRRO and have there been adaptations?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Evolution of the PRRO funding over time in size and donor base - Factors at regional and international level that influenced PRRO results (incentives or limitations caused by socio-economic, climatic, political, and technical factors) 	<p>WFP Staff Government, UN family NGOs Donors and bilateral/multilateral organisations Background documents Monitoring reports Planning documents M&E framework</p>	<p>Key informant interviews Desk review</p>	<p>Qualitative and quantitative Comparison and triangulation</p>	<p>Based on perception even in background documents Depending on quality planning and M&E reports</p>

Annex 4: Methodology

1. Methodological Approach

The methodological approach of the evaluation was consistent with the TOR and was developed guided by the EQAS tools, in particular the Operation Evaluations Content Guide and the Checklists. The products and process was quality assured by the Evaluation Manager and the additional Quality Assurance expert from DARA, Soledad Posada. The methodological approach had the following characteristics:

- An utilisation focus approach, that takes into consideration the “*primary/intended uses*” for the “*primary/intended users*” (CO and CP, RB and OEV) of the evaluation. The CO and the Regional Bureau were involved as much as possible during the evaluation process: (1) in the clarification of the evaluation approach and scope expectations (2) in the selection of the sites to visit and sampling; (3) as key informants of the evaluation (4) in the discussion of preliminary findings and recommendations.
- The use of a program theory based approach. This approach allowed to identify the Project (design), how the implementation was developed, the the outputs and outcomes, and how the external and internal factors that influenced the results.
- Contribution analysis: the evaluation sought to understand the causal linkages between the PRRO inputs and outputs to observed outcomes and the extent to which the latter could be attributed to the PRRO or whether the PRRO is considered as a contribution to achieving them.
- The team incorporated an organizational analysis as a means for understanding internal factors influencing the Project (question three in the evaluation Matrix). The organizational analysis looked at the structure and design of the WFP CO and how they influenced the delivery of outputs⁸⁴.
- A commitment to impartiality and lack of bias based on a cross referencing of information sources (eg, groups of stakeholders, including beneficiaries, etc.) and the use of mixed methods (example quantitative, qualitative, participatory⁸⁵) for the triangulation of the data (collection/analysis) through a variety of means which are specified in the following section 2 “Data collection/analysis and tools”.
- Use of an evaluation matrix as a key tool for the organization of the evaluation. In addition to this key evaluation tool, checklists meetings with key informants, and a questionnaire for focus group discussions were used.
- The use of a purposeful (qualitative) sampling strategy (see section 3)

The evaluation took into consideration gender issues during the design, implementation and analysis phases of the evaluation.

- Triangulation: Wherever possible, data was validated by triangulation. In the process of analysis (during the field phase and during the report phase), the team cross-validated the information gathered through desk review to the extent possible using as a variety of sources available and relevant. Evidence was also triangulated

⁸⁴ Already mentioned guidelines: Lusthaus, C., Adrien, M. H., Anderson, G., & Carden, F. (1999).

over time and between geographical zones. Additional information was sought whenever gaps or discrepancies emerge.

2. Data collection/analysis and tools

The data collection for the evaluation was done using a set of complementary tools and approaches that ensure triangulation of findings. The main tools are:

- **The literature review of secondary data** (background documents received from WFP and additional documents collected by the team, etc.). Documents revised are mainly: as programme and project documents, progress reports, assessments and evaluations, output monitoring reports, partner reports, strategy and policy documents and reports and assessment from stakeholders working on similar issues.
- **Semi -structured interviews:** the team conducted over 200 interviews with a range of key informants in the capital Harare, and at the field level in the work sites. Informants included staff from WFP, other UN agencies, government institutions especially those involved in the evaluation sectors, major international donors, WFP’s cooperating partners. To do this, the evaluation used a common checklist. The questions are drawn from the evaluation matrix, and were grouped by type of stakeholder. This approach facilitated cross- comparisons between different groups of respondents.

all sub offices during which 37 FGDs were conducted with beneficiary groups and over 200 stakeholders were interviewed

- **Observation and Focal Groups:** During the sites/field visits a total of 37 Focus Groups Discussions were held with representative groups of the communities and beneficiaries. The focus groups were intended to be divided into subgroups attending at the type of beneficiaries (including women, young, elder). In order to ensure that women’s views are adequately captured in each site, the team will conduct at least 1 focus group with women. However time limitations meant that conducting separate interviews for male and female groups was not always possible, although the team that comprised two evaluators was able to do this with more frequency than the single man team. In the event however, the subject matter under discussion was not highly gender sensitive, and it was not felt that the presence of mixed groups prejudiced the findings in any way. Interviewees’ names were not recorded to protect confidentiality, but again the subject matter was not of a sensitive nature and the evaluators found that both men and women were ready to express their views throughout the evaluation exercise. During site visits the team will also applied observation to verify outputs and outcomes of the activities.

3. Site selection

Based on the desk review and the understanding of the PRRO operation and on a series of discussions with the CO, the Team proposed and the CO agreed on the following criteria for site selection:

Criteria
Provinces with WFP presence (Sub offices) and availability of WFP sub-offices to host the evaluation
Multiple/ complementary WFP PRRO components (ACR, STA, and HN) and their corresponding activities (example: in the case of ACR interventions the team will visit at least one of the

following: irrigation schemes, conservation agriculture, dip tanks).
Representativity of the following characteristics: (1) agro-ecological regions (specially for ACR ⁸⁶ and STA);; (2) Urban and (3) Rural areas (remote vs. less remote)
Good representation of cooperating partners for each modality (ACR, STA, HN)
Covering specific cases by intervention (ACR, STA, HN): At least 1 site as example of success ⁸⁸ and 1 site as example of failure for all 3 components ((ACR, STA, HN);

- (*) vouchers schemes require time because they generally involve more stakeholders (at least one day for the places where they are operational)

Taking into consideration the mapping site that reflected WFP operations and the criteria selection outlined above, the following sites were proposed and visited during the field mission:

WFP provincial presence	Potential sites (sites to visit and partners to visit)	Agro-Ecological region (1)
Matebeleland South	Insiza (PAC/STA) ⁸⁹ , Partner/s, World Vision	Agro-ecological region 5
Matebeleland North	Hwange (PAC, H&N, STA), Partner/s, ORAP, Save the Children Binga (PAC, STA) ⁹⁰ , Partners Save the Children	Agro-ecological region 5
Masvingo	Chiredzi (PAC, STA, H&N), Partner/s, Plan International, Christian Care Mwenezi (STA, PAC), Partner/s, BHASO, CARE, Aquaculture Gutu (H/N), Partner/s, Christian care	Agro-ecological region 4/5
Manicaland	Chipinge (PAC, STA, H&N), Partners, Plan International, Christian Care, Johanniter Buhera (PAC, STA, H&N), Partner/s, Africare Mutare (PAC ⁹¹ , STA, H&N), Partner/s, Plan international	Agro-ecological region 1/2

86 ACR: The design and choice of assets will be appropriate to dry areas prone to shocks with little rainfall and high rainfall variability, corresponding to agro-ecological regions IV and V.17

87 Why do we find ACR interventions in zones 1, 2 and 3

88 1) cash, voucher and combined food and cash transfers (*);

(2) shift from unconditional to conditional assistance ;

(3) policy support and capacity development initiatives (local food fortification; food security analysis and implementation of Food and Nutrition Policy) AND Planned support to small-holder farmers through local purchase

(4) The integration of WFP's various interventions;

(5) Interventions that contribute to communities' resilience-building; and gender and nutrition mainstreaming

⁸⁹ PAC and STA were done in the last cycle although STA ended prematurely in January 2014. Half rations were distributed in the months of implementation.

⁹⁰ PAC, STA and HN implemented during the last cycle in Hwange. PAC and STA in Binga, district is the priority district, and was affected by half ration in the last month of March. Budgets being finalized for PAC Binga and HN Hwange to start possibly this month.

⁹¹ PAC in region 1 / 2 ? not under WFP criteria

Mashonaland East ⁹² ((interest of CO)	UMP (PAC ⁹³ , STA) ⁹⁴ , Partner/s, UMCOR, Marondera	Agro-ecological region 2/3
Mashonaland Central (1) (interest of CO & high WFP presence)	Mt. Darwin (PAC ⁹⁵ , STA, H&N) ⁹⁶ , Partners, World Vision Bindura, Partner/s IFRC	Agro-ecological region 2/3
Midlands	Gweru (PAC, STA, H&N), Partner/s, ADRA	Agro-ecological region 4/5
Harare (interest of CO & high WFP presence)	Rutsanana clinic/Harare Hospital, PLHIV, Partner/s, ADRA	
Bulawayo	Mpilo Hospital, TB, Partner/s, Help Germany, CRS	

The field-work component of the evaluation was conducted over the first three weeks of June by a team of three consultants split into two sub teams. One team covered the West of the country and the other the East.

4. Evaluability assessment and potential limitations:

Given the size of the country and the distances required to reach the various location, together with the fact that the team was reduced from four to three evaluators shortly before the mission commenced, time could have been a constraint to cover all the sites selected. However, it is the opinion of the evaluation team that this did not happen, given the wide ranging quality of activities and components observed.

Generally speaking, the biggest challenges faced were:

- Many of the data provided by the CO (included ZIMVAC data) are not recent or refer to the same data sources, which makes comparison or estimation of quality of data difficult.
- Some data supplied by the CO – for example that describing outputs- was contradictory.
- Attribution and contribution: the PRRO 200453 is composed of complex activities involving many actors, sites and subjects. In addition, the activities take place in contexts where many other development/humanitarian interventions are implemented. This means that WFP is not the only agency responsible for final results in terms of "outcomes". The implication for the evaluation is that the focus should rather be on the "contribution" than "the attribution".

However, it is not thought that these issues affect the integrity and validity of the findings presented in this report.

⁹² High extension to cover

⁹³ PAC in region 2/3? not under WFP criteria

⁹⁴ there are no running programmes in May)

⁹⁵ PAC in region 2/3? not under WFP criteria

⁹⁶ This, being a post STA period, only focus group discussions with a few beneficiaries will be possible

Annex 5: Lists of People Interviewed and Focus Group Discussions

People Interviewed

Date	Time	Organisation	Name	Position
Harare				
27 May	8:15-9:30	WFP	Godfrey Macheke	Security Assistance
	9:30-10:00		Sory Ouane	Representative & Country Director
	10:00-11:30		Andrew Odero	Head of VAM
			Donna Favorito	Head of Finance & Admin
			Marta Fontan	Programme unit, C&V
			Ahmareen Karim	Head of Programme
			Sayaka Maeda	Consultant, C&V
			Kopano Mhlope	OIC, Bulawayo SO
			Herbert Matsikwa	Head of Mashonaland SO
			Esther Muchadakuenda	National Admin Officer
			Kudzai Akino	Programme Officer, M&E
			Ricky Kufa	Head of Masvingo SO
			Magnus Nilsson	Head of Mutare SO
			Tony Randall	Head of Logistics
			Abdurrahim Siddiqui	Deputy Country Director
			Tafara Ndumiyana	Nutrition, HIV, gender
			Caroline Mhike	Senior Finance Asst
	Joy Achayo		UNV, Programme Unit	
	11:30-13:30		Andrew Odero	Head of VAM
			Magnus Nilsson	Head of Mutare SO
			Kopano Mhlope	Ag. Head of Bulawayo SO
			Ricky Kufa	Head of Masvingo SO
			Herbert Matsikwa	Head of Mashonaland SO
			Tony Randall	Head of Logistics
	13:45-14:45		Donna Favorito	Head of Finance & Admin
			Irene Atindehou	UNV
			Caroline Mhike	Senior Finance Asst
14:45-15:45	Esther Muchadakuenda	National Admin Officer		
	Balmine Quattara	IT Officer		
	16:00-16:30	Kudzai Akino	Programme Officer, M&E	
Rudo Sagomba		Senior Programme Assistant, Database and GIS		
Rumbidzayi Machiridza		Intern		
Brendz Zvinorova		Senior Programme Assistant, M&E		
Andrew Odero		Head of VAM		
28 May		9:30-13:00	MoH	F. Manomo
	C. Kaseke			SIC Mat
	S. Murira			ASIC FITS
	RMT	M. Masaka		
		Tyler Cornish		
	ADRA	C. Chingwaru		
		C. Mutenbabzamera		

Date	Time	Organisation	Name	Position
		WFP	Sherita Manjilea	
		OK Shop	Francis Magadzine	Branch Manager
			Mawis Chakwizira	Beneficiary
	15:00-16:00	MoLSS	Mr Chinhengo	Deputy Director
	16:00-17:00	MoAMID	K Nyamwena	Principle Agricultural Economist
		MoAMID	C T Bwenje	Director – Economics and Markets
MoAMID		C Kabudura	Deputy Director – Trade and Markets	
29 May	9:00-10:00	WFP HQ	Annalisa Conte	Chief of Innovation, Policy, Programme & Innovation Division
			Niels Balzer,	Policy Programme Officer, Policy, Programme & Innovation Division
			Guilia Baldi	Programme Officer, Policy, Programme & Innovation Division, Nutrition & HIV Unit
		WFP RB	Sarah Longford,	Senior Programme Advisor, OMJ
		WFP CO	Andrew Odera	Head of VAM
			Abdurrahim Siddiqui	Deputy Country Director
			Ahmareen Karim	Head of Programme
	10:00-11:00	UNDP	Victoria Sukhandia	Programme Officer
			Jennifer Msimbo	Community Services Associate
			Bwan Mapenzanswa	Database Admin
	11:00-12:00	UNHCR	Sirak Gebrehiwot	Communication Specialist
			Ingrid Sandnaes	Coordination Officer
	12:00-13:00	Embassy of Japan	Colin Bell	
			Yoshitake Tsuzuki	Counsellor
	14:00-15:00	USAID	Laureen Reagan	
	15:00-16:00	ADRA	Pansi Katenga	Programmes Director
	15:00-16:00	UMCOR	Tendai Maternadombo	Program Coordinator
			Daniel Tripp	Head of Mission
Erina Mawino			M&E Manager	
	16:00-17:00	Africare	Admire Micorera	Project Engineering
			James Machikicho	Officer in Charge / Livelihoods Manager
			Toendepi Kamusewu	Health and Wash Programme Manager
	16:30-17:30	UNICEF	Jane Muita	Deputy representative
30 May	9:00-10:00	FNC	George Kembo	Director
			Dorothy Mauhiri	Strategic consultant FAO/FNC

Date	Time	Organisation	Name	Position	
	9:00-10:00	SDC	Manuel/Mkuli Ngwenya	Mike	
	10:00-11:00	World Bank		Mike	
	10:00-11:00	OCHA	Modibo Traore	Head of Office	
			Thandie Mwape-Villadsen	Humanitarian Affairs Officer	
	11:00-11:30	FAO		Mike	
Bulawayo					
1 June	8:30-9:30	Bulawayo SO	Kopano Mhlope	Acting OIC	
			Vusumuzi Soganile	Programme Assistant H/N	
			Alice Mataga	Senior Logistics Assistant	
	10:30-10:45	Mpilo Hospital	Dr Ndebele		Clinical Director, Acting CEO
	11:00-12:30	CRS Bulawayo	Buhlebenkosi Maphosa		Project Assistant
			Mandlenkosi Moyo		Project Assistant
			Tirivanhu Madondo		Registered Nurse MOHCC
			Rejoice Mpofo		Project Assistant
			Abigail Mguni		Intern (Lupane University)
	12:45-13:30	OK Express	Betty Geysler		Branch Manager
			Simbarashe Dhliwayo		Branch Accountant
	14:00-15:00	GoZ	Dr. Parenda		Provincial Administrator
			D. M. Nyonj		Agritex PAED
			E. Katiruzza		Health Provincial Nutritionist
			Addmore Chikohwa		Div. of Livestock Production
	14:00-17:00	HOCIC	Melusi Ngwenya		Programme Manager
			Sibonisine Mujari		Programme Assistant
		Goz	Sipho Moyo		Veterinary clerk
			Mercy Chivi		Agritex
Siduduzile Dube			Agritex		
WFP		Malama Ndlovu		Programme Assistant PAC	
3 June	8:00-8:30	UNICEF	Nicholas Moyo		Head of Office Bulawayo
	10:30-12:00	World Vision	Smanga Ndebele		Program coordinator
		GoZ	M Thembo		District Officer Agritex
			A. Mutezo		Police Officer DA
	14:00-15:30	Ms. Naibe		District Administrator Insiza	
		Phanankosi Ndimande		District Officer Agritex	
		Siinino Ncube		Supervisor Agritex	
		Shelton Ndiovu		Chairperson Irrigation	
		Danisa Ncube		Chairperson PAC	
	8:30-9:30	WFP	Edward Makumbe		Field Monitor
	9:45-11:00	IOM	Mavis Muleya		Senior operations Assistant
11:15-12:00	MOPSLSS	Aubrey Chitambire		Case Management Officer	
12:30-14:00	ORAP	Girlie Gandawa		Commodity Distribution Assistant	
Victoria Falls					

Date	Time	Organisation	Name	Position
4 June	14:30-15:00	Victoria Hospital	Dr. Kabamba	District Medical Officer
	15:00-16:00		Sandra Malinga	Nutritionist
			Sithabile Moyo	Nurse
	13:30-14:30	Chisuma Clinic	Cecelia Likubo	Nurse in charge
Hwange				
5 June	10:00-16:00	ORAP	Siphiwe Dube	Project Coordinator
			Paballo Mathibela	ME officer
			Paul Moyo	Hwange District Coordinator
		GoZ	Zimhlope Ndlovu	Agritex Officer
			Hector Chizanga	Agritex Intern Midlands State University
6 June	8:00-9:00	GoZ	Witness Kufa	Assistant DA Binga
			Levy Mombe	Binga District Agritex officer
			Emelia Mupambe	Ward Agritex Extension Officer
			Francis Mdimba	Veterinary Services Officer
Marondera/Uzumba Maramba Pfungwe				
9 June	9:30-10:00	GoZ	Mr Munakira	Acting Provincial Administrator
			Mr Barara	Provincial Social Services Officer
			Ms Madzara	Provincial Extension Specialist (Training)
	14:00-15:30	UMP/DD RC	Mr Chikanya	Assistant District Administrator
			Phida Dhliwayo	Veterinary services
			Webster Tigere	Agritex
			Farai Chisvo	Department of Irrigation
			Nyasha Chevo	Department of Social Services
			Phideuis Svosve	CDO
			Martin Mushate	Ministry of Health
			Lavinia Kapfunde	District Development Fund
	15:45-16:30	UMCOR	Farai Mutambatywisi	District Council department of social services
			Raphael Chidakwa	Field Officer
		Emmanuel Kasvosve	Monitoring and Evaluation Officer	
10 June	10:00-11:00	UMCOR	Brighton Chirinda	Field Officer ward 1/2
	11:40-13:00	GoZ	Ernest Tawani	Agritex Officer
			Stanford Gambahaya	Dip tank attendant
11 June	11:38-12:30	FEWSNET	Godfrey Kafera	National Technical Manager
			Alycan Mashayabasa	Assistant Technical Manager
	14:00-16:00	Save the children	Patience Chikandwa Hoto	Programme Officer Hoto
			Patience H Matambo	Advisor-Child Protection
			Ezra Moyo	Coordinator Grants - Partnerships
		Angeline Itai Matereke	Manager Emergencies	

Date	Time	Organisation	Name	Position
			Tsitsi Nyoni-EMLog	Manager Logistics
			Amos Chinyama	M&E Manager
			Levy Mandiwanzira	Food Security and Livelihoods Manager
12 June	9:00-9:45	UNRCO	Natalia Perez	Transition and recovery specialist
		DFID	Anthea Kerr	Livelihood adviser
			Oliver Magwaza	Livelihood adviser
	10:00-11:00	USAID	Rebecca Goldman	Acting Country Director FFA Zimbabwe
			Laureen Reagan	Deputy FFP Zimbabwe
			Thabisani Moyo	Food security and livelihoods specialist
			Fanuel Gumanzala	Food security and livelihoods specialist
	11:30-12:15	Help from Germany	Christoph Laufens	Country Director
14:30-15:30	WFP	Paulette Umutoni	Human Resources Officer	
13 June	15:00-1530	MOHCC	Dr Tsitsi Apollo	Deputy Director HIV/AIDS & STIs
Mashonaland North, Mutare and Masvingo Sub Offices				
			Mr Chikera	Acting DA Mount Darwin
			Ms A Chinyomba	District Nursing Officer
			Dr Mapira	District Medical Officer
			Gerald Mano	world vision communications officer
			Jimmie Jammaine	world vision AM&E officer
			Chrisopher Singende	Provincial Social Services Officer Mashonaland
			Gloria Muina	Mechanisation Technician Mashonaland
			Blessard Chendinya	Irrigation Department Mashonaland
			Derek Kunyavapa	Irrigation Department Mashonaland
			Kimberly Magosha	Local Governemnt Intern
			Stanglae Tapererwa	Agritex Mashonaland
			W Nkoma	Local Government Mashonaland
			George Mahulanza	Min of Health Mashonaland
			Mr Coslas Chiringa	District Administrator and Acting PA Mutare
			Titus Matembe	Plan International
			Nerin Mvulu	Johanniter
			Andre Goka	Plan International
			Webster Mbila	Christian Care
			Mark Garinda	Christian Care
			Betina Nyumda	Plan International
			Binde Hano	District Nutritionist Mutare District

Date	Time	Organisation	Name	Position
			Ernest Marembo	Social Welfare Department Mutare
			Sister Muriga	Marange Rural Hospital
			Sister Manyumwae	Bailey Bridge Clinic – H&N
			Mr Edgar Seenza	District Administrator Chipinge
			Mr Makukutsi	Department of Social Services Chipinge
			Mr Mahlatini	District Nutritionist Chipinge
			Mr Mhandu	Agritex
			Mr Mavisa	Deputy District Administrator
			Mr Dhliwyo	Agritex
			Paul Nhera	M&E officer MDTG
			Gumiso Ntuli	Field Monitoring Assistant, Mutare Sub Office
			Ricky Kufa	Head of Masvingo Sub office
			Peter Nyenya	Head of Operations
			Farai Mukwende	M&E officer / PAC point person
			Mr Goza	provincial Irrigation Engineer Masvingo province
			Mr Mpumbate	Ministry of Health Masvingo Province
			Mr Ondagwa	Admin Officer Masvingo Province
			Thabson Chavanga	District Administrator Zaka District
			Mr Sambuko	Department of Civil Service Bikita District
			Mr Shinonnye	Veterinary Extension worker Bikita
			Mr Vurayai Zvarevashe	Aquaculture Officer Masvingo District


Focus Group Discussions

Date	Location	Site	Background	# of persons	Male/Female
28 May	Harare	Rutsanana Clinic	H&N Children under 5	20	Female
2 June	Bulawayo	Mpilo Hospital	PLWs on ART	7	Female
2 June	Bulawayo	Mpilo Hospital	Children on ART	5	4 Female, 1 Male
2 June	Bulawayo	Mpilo Hospital	ART/TB Patients	5	3 Female, 2 Male
2 June	Mfanyana	Dip tank	PAC Participants	6	Male
3 June	Nkankezi	Dam	PAC Participants	20	Female
3 June	Nkankezi	Dam	PAC Committee	5	Female
3 June	Siwaze	Irrigation Scheme	PAC Participants and Committee	12	7 female, 5 male

Date	Location	Site	Background	# of persons	Male/ Female
3 June	Ndiweni	Dam	PAC Participants and Committee	25	11 female, 14
4 June	Victoria Falls	Victoria Falls Hospital	ART Patients	17	12 female, 5 male
4 June	Victoria Falls	Chisuma clinic	ART /TB Patients	15	10 female, 5 male
5 June	Makwa	Irrigation	PAC / food beneficiaries	14	11 female, 3 male
5 June	Makwa	Irrigation	Other farmers using plots	13	10 female, 3 male
5 June	Makwa	STA	Beneficiaries of STA	11	9 female, 4 male
5 June	Songwa	STA	Beneficiaries STA distribution	47	33 female, 14 male
5 June	Ndumechenga dam	PAC	Beneficiaries of PAC	84	43 female, 41 male
6 June	Siangwena	Dam 2012/13	Beneficiaries/builders former cycle	30	12 female, 18 male
6 June	Siangwena	STA	Beneficiaries	20	16 female, 4 male
6 June	Mupambe	STA	Beneficiaries of STA	30	17female, 13 male
6 June	Mupambe	Dip tank	PAC food beneficiaries and committee	25	13 female, 12 male
10 June	Chipinda	Nutrition Garden	Committee members	12	7 female, 5 male
10 June	Nyakasoro	Nutrition Garden	Committee members	7	4 female, 3 male
10 June	Chipinda	Dam rehabilitation	Committee members	5	3 female, 2 male
June	Chisecha Mt Darwin District – World Vision 3rd June 2014	Dip Tank	Beneficiaries and staff		
June	Kapunda Weir	water harvesting	Beneficiaries and staff		
June	St Joseph's Hospital, Mutare	H&N	Beneficiaries and staff		
June	Marange Hospital	H&N	Beneficiaries and staff		
June	Bailey Bridge Clinic –	H&N	Beneficiaries and staff		
June	Simpowaneta	Vegetable Garden	Beneficiaries and staff		
June	Mukuyu 2 Village	Cash for Cereal Intervention	Beneficiaries and staff		
June	Bwerudza	Irrigation Scheme	Beneficiaries and staff		

Date	Location	Site	Background	# of persons	Male/ Female
June	Zumbuze	Irrigation Scheme	Beneficiaries and staff		
June	Mamvuramashava	Dam,	Beneficiaries and staff		
June	Dzingazhara	Fishpond	Beneficiaries and staff		
June	Nkomati	Dam and vegetable garden	Beneficiaries and staff		
June	Matande	Veg garden and Weir	Beneficiaries and staff		
June	Gweru	cash for cereals	Beneficiaries and staff		

Annex 6: Zimbabwe's Agro-Ecological Zones



Source: OCHA, 2009

Annex 7: Cooperating NGO partners including details


NGO	Int/Ntl	Sub-Office				Activity		
		Bulawayo	Mashonaland	Masvingo	Mutare	STA	H&N	PAC
ADRA*	Int			X		X	X	X
Africare	Int			X	X	X	X	X
Aquaculture	Ntl			X				X
Bhaso	Ntl			X		X		X
CARE	Int			X		X		X
CC	Int		X	X	X	X	X	X
CRS	Int	X				X	X	
CTDO	Ntl		X			X		
GOAL	Int		X		X	X	X	X
HFG	Int	X					X	
Hlekweni	Ntl	X				X		X
HOCIC	Ntl	X				X		X
IFRC	Int		X			X	X	
LEAD	Int		X			X		
Johannitter	Int				X		X	
LGDA	Ntl		X			X		X
MDTC	Ntl			X			X	
ORAP	Ntl	X				X	X	
Plan Aus	Int			X		X	X	X
Plan Can	Int	X			X	X	X	X
SAT	Ntl			X				X
SC	Int	X	X	X		X		X
UMCOR	Int		X			X		X
WVI	Int	X	X			X	X	X

*ADRA also conducts H&N in Harare

Annex 8: Activities and status of food security, HIV/AIDS and wasting per target Districts

Province	Districts	Agro zones	Activities	ZIMVAC FS zones	Activities	Stunting	HIV/AIDS Prevalence
Matabeleland North	Hwange	4	STA, PAC,	High	H/N	28-35%	18-19,5%
	Victoria Falls	4	STA, PAC	High	H/N	28-35%	18-19,5%
	Binga	5	STA, PAC	High		28-35%	18-19,5%
	Lupane	4	STA, PAC	Medium		28-35%	18-19,5%
	Tsholotsho	4	STA, PAC	High		35-40%	18-19,5%
	Umguza	4	STA, PAC	High		35-40%	18-19,5%
	Nkayi	4	STA, PAC	Low		40-48%	18-19,5%
	Plumtree	4	STA, PAC, Returnees	High		35-40%	18-19,5%
Bulawayo	Urban	4		Low	H/N	28-35%	18-19,5%
Matabeleland South	Insiza	4	STA, PAC,	Medium	H/N	28-35%	19,5-21,2%
	Gwanda	5	STA, PAC	High	H/N	21-28%	19,5-21,2%
	Beitbridge	5	PAC	Medium	H/N	21-28%	19,5-21,2%
	Bulilima	4	STA, PAC	High	H/N	35-40%	19,5-21,2%
	Umzingwane	4	STA, PAC	High	H/N	28-35%	19,5-21,2%
	Mangwe	4	STA, PAC	High	H/N	35-40%	19,5-21,2%
	Bubi	4	STA, PAC,	Low	H/N	28-35%	18-19,5%
Masvingo	Bikita	4	STA, PAC	Medium		28-35%	13.4-15%
	Chiredzi	5	STA, PAC	Medium	H/N	21-28%	13.4-15%
	Mwenezi	5	STA, PAC	High		28-35%	13.4-15%
	Zaka	4	STA, PAC	High		28-35%	13.4-15%
	Chivi	4	STA	Medium		28-35%	13.4-15%
	Gutu	4	STA	Medium	H/N	35-40%	13.4-15%
Manicaland	Chipinge	3	STA, PAC	Medium	H/N	35-40%	13.4-15%
	Buhera	4	PAC	Medium	H/N	28-35%	13.4-15%
	Mutare	4	PAC	Low	H/N	40-48%	13.4-15%
	Mutasa	2/3	PAC	Low	H/N	40-48%	13.4-15%
Harare	Harare	2/3		Low	H/N	28-35%	15-16.5%
Mashonaland Central	Guruve	2/3	PAC	Medium		35-40%	13.4-15%
	Mt Darwin	2/3	PAC	High	H/N	35-40%	13.4-15%
	Rushinga	3/4	PAC	Medium		28-35%	13.4-15%
	Centenary	3/4	PAC	Medium		35-40%	13.4-15%
	Mbire	4/5	STA, PAC	Low		35-40%	13.4-15%
Mashonaland East	UMP	3/4	STA/PAC	Medium		21-28%	13.4-15%
	Mutoko	3/4	STA	Low		28-35%	13.4-15%
Mashonaland West	Hurungwe	2/3		Low	H/N	35-40%	13.4-15%
	Kariba	2/3		Low	H/N	28-35%	13.4-15%
Midlands	Gweru	3/4	STA, PAC CfC	Medium		28-35%	13.4-15%
	Kwekwe	3/4	STA-CfC/	Low	H/N	40-48%	16.5-18%
	Zvishavane	4	STA	Low		28-35%	16.5-18%
	Shurugwi	4	STA/CfC	Medium		28-35%	16.5-18%
	Gokwe North	3/4		Low	H/N	28-35%	16.5-18%
	Gokwe South	3/4		Low	H/N	35-40%	

Annex 10: Price of Maize May 2011 – July 2014



Source: Markets Monitoring Data (WFP Zimbabwe Country Office)

Annex 11: PAC interventions by Sub Office

PAC interventions and number of beneficiaries per sub-office

Sector	Activity	Mashonaland	Bulawayo	Masvingo	Mutare[bl]	Total
Water Source Development	Small dams (weirs & earth dams)	21	27	39	5	92
	Borehole Rehabilitation		1			1
	Water Harvesting Tanks		13			13
	Deep wells	8		2		10
	Water Canal/pipeline	1	1	2		4
Crop Productivity	Nutrition gardens	19	8	23	2	52
	Conservation agriculture plots		2 (wards, total 240 plots)		1 (ward, total 150 plots)	3
	Dead level contours		8 (wards, 281 hectares)			8
	Orchards			1		1
	Irrigation Schemes	8	15	19	2	44
Livestock Productivity and Fisheries	Dip Tanks	8	27	12	22	69
	Sales Pen Rehabilitation	1	1			2
	Rangeland rehabilitation	1		3		4
	Fish ponds			11		11
Market Access	Road Rehabilitation	3	1		5	9
	Income Generating Activities (IGAs)				1	1
	Total number of assets	70	104	112	38	324
	Total number of workers	6,460	10,967	18,823	5,758	42,008

Source: WFP

Annex 12: Summary of Achievements against Strategic Objectives and Logical Framework

Table 1. Summary of Achievements against 2008-13 Strategic Objectives (incomplete due to unavailable data)

Strategic Objective 1: Save Lives and Protect Livelihoods in Emergencies				
Outcome 1: Improved consumption over assistance period for seasonally affected food insecure households				
	Baseline	End 2013	Most recent 2014	Target
Household FCS =>borderline	99% ⁹⁷	294/314 (93%)	184/197 (93%)	>85%
Daily average dietary diversity: households consume =>3 food groups	-	184/314 (58%)	165/197 (83%)	90%
<i>Output 1.1 Food, nutritional products and non-food items, cash transfers and vouchers distributed in sufficient quantity and quality to targeted groups under secure conditions</i>				
Number of women, men, girls and boys receiving food assistance	-	113%	88%	100%
Quantity of food distributed, as percent of planned distribution			89%	100%
Food	-	69.5%	89%	100%
Cash		34.1%	90%	100%
Vouchers	-	70%	93%	100%
Quantity of non-food items distributed, as percent of planned distribution	-			80%
Proportion of women in leadership positions of management committees		80%		60%
Strategic Objective 2: Prevent acute hunger and invest in disaster preparedness and mitigation measures				
Outcome 2.1: Adequate food consumption maintained over assistance period for targeted households at risk of acute hunger				
Household food consumption score =>borderline	99% ⁹⁸	79/79 (100%)	178/189 (94%)	>85%
Daily average dietary diversity: households consume =>3 food groups	-	50/79 (63%)	98/189 (51%)	90%
Outcome 2.2: Hazard risk reduced at community level in target communities				
Community Asset Score ⁹⁹				
<i>Output 2.1 : refer to output 1.1</i>				
Strategic Objective 3: Restore and rebuild lives and livelihoods in post conflict, post disaster or post transition situations				
Outcome 3.1: Adequate food consumption over assistance period for households at risk of falling into acute hunger, malnourished members benefit from care and treatment programmes				
Household Food consumption score				
Outcome 3.2 Improved nutritional recovery of antiretroviral therapy and TB patients				
Recovery rate	ART 49%	U5 58% PLW 48% ART 41% TB 45%	U5 50% PLW 42% ART 42% TB 47%	>75%

⁹⁷ Dec-2010, Community Household Surveillance (CHS), WFP survey

⁹⁸ Dec-2010, Community Household Surveillance (CHS), WFP survey

⁹⁹ Community Asset Score (as formulated in LogFrame) not provided

Default rate	<15%	1.4%	2%	<15%
Non response rate	44% (ART)		U5 46% PLW 40% ART 50% TB 43%	< 15%
<i>Output 3.1 : refer to output 1.1</i>				
Number of assets restored or maintained by targeted communities and individuals		324 assets created/rehabilitated	Projects implementation starts in June	80%

Table 2. Logical Framework

Results	Performance indicators	Assumptions
Strategic Objective 1: Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies Component: DRRR		
Outcome 1 Improved food consumption over assistance period for seasonally-affected food-insecure households	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Household food consumption score Target: Score exceeds 21	Capable cooperating partners available for implementation. Government and donor support forthcoming.
Output 1.1 Food and non-food items, cash transfers and vouchers distributed in sufficient quantity and quality to targeted groups under secure conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ No. of people receiving food, non-food items, cash transfers and vouchers, by category, activity, transfer modality and as % of planned Target: 100% <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Tonnage of food distributed, by type, as % of planned Target: 100% <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Quantity of non-food items distributed, by type, as % of planned Target: 100% <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Total cash transferred to beneficiaries Target: 100% of planned <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Total food/cash equivalent of vouchers distributed Target: 100% of planned	Capable cooperating partners available for implementation. Government and donor support forthcoming. Continuity of delivery.

Results	Performance indicators	Assumptions
Strategic Objective 2: Prevent acute hunger and invest in disaster preparedness and mitigation measures Component: Productive asset creation		
Outcome 2.1 Adequate food consumption over assistance period for target households at risk of acute hunger	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Household food consumption score Target: Score exceeds the threshold of 35	Capable cooperating partners available for implementation. Government and donor support forthcoming.
Outcome 2.2 Hazard risk reduced at the community level in target communities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Community asset score Target: Risk reduction and disaster mitigation assets increased	Ability of cooperating partners and Government to deliver on commitments. Adequate staffing levels/capacity for risk reduction and disaster mitigation assets.
Output 2.1 (See Output 1.1 for distribution of food and non-food items, cash transfers and vouchers)		
Strategic Objective 3: Restore and rebuild lives and livelihoods in post-conflict, post-disaster or transition situations Component: Health and nutrition promotion		
Outcome 3.1 Adequate food consumption over assistance period for households at risk of falling into acute hunger; malnourished members benefit from care and treatment programmes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Household food consumption score Target: Score exceeds 35	Capable cooperating partners available for implementation. Government and donor support forthcoming.
Outcome 3.2 Improved nutritional recovery of anti-retroviral therapy and TB patients	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Nutritional recovery rate for anti-retroviral therapy Target: >75% <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Nutritional recovery rate for TB treatment Target: >75%	Drugs and other medical supplies available. Resources such as health staff, anthropometric equipment and facilities available for growth monitoring. Clinical partners available for development of integrated nutrition rehabilitation, including assessment, education and counselling.
Output 3.1 (See Output 1.1 for distribution of food and non-food items, cash transfers and vouchers)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ No. of health centres assisted Target: 100% of planned	

Annex 13: Factors affecting success and failure of PAC interventions

1. The asset is not relevant to their circumstances. The few (based on the evaluation team's visit) PAC activities that fall under this category provided no benefit to some / most workers other than increased food security for the duration they worked on the scheme and received food payments. They were inappropriate because they either created or rehabilitated assets which were inaccessible or unusable by the most vulnerable households. An example of this type of intervention is the de-silting of the Bwerudza irrigation scheme, where workers were simply engaged to de-silt irrigation channels of a large scheme which benefited other farmers, and where there was no prospect that they would be able to secure irrigated plots.

2. The asset is not appropriate to their circumstances, but there is some prospect that it will be appropriate in the future. A good example of an intervention that falls under this category is a cattle dip or other structures which cater for people owning livestock – of which the PAC created many. 60% of the population of Zimbabwe do not own any cattle at all, so a cattle dip is of no immediate use to them – just the better-off 40% who own animals. However, livestock ownership represents livelihood diversification, and livestock is often one of the first things that poorer households invest in if they secure the necessary funds. Dips are a highly appropriate way of reducing the risk of losing this investment to disease – currently accounting for 45% of livestock mortality. One of WFP's partners in Masvingo calculated that the mortality rate for cattle dipped under poor conditions (tanks without roofs, proper drying areas, etc.) is 6%, while that for cattle dipped under good conditions (tanks built to GoZ specifications) is 2%. Considering that the tanks created in Masvingo serve at least 1,200 cattle, valued at around \$300 each, an improvement in dipping conditions yields a saving of \$14,400.

3. Another example that could fall into this category (or the first one) are aquaculture projects, such as the Dzingazhara aquaculture scheme in Masvingo. While this impressive scheme involved 280 people in its construction, only 23 households were selected to play a role in the management of the fish ponds and share in the profits from fish sales once they are actually produced. The asset is highly appropriate to addressing household's need for additional income and reducing their dependence on rain-fed agriculture, but as things stand, about 90% of the people who worked on pond construction will see no returns on their labour other than the food they earned. Having said that, in Zimbabwe there is definitely a need to demonstrate the how livelihoods can be diversified into non-traditional areas, and this kind of asset, as long as it is complemented by outreach and education activities, fulfils this role well.

4. The asset is appropriate to their circumstances, and there is a strong likelihood that it will continue to be appropriate to them in the future. The most appropriate PAC interventions are those which offer immediate benefit to a high proportion of vulnerable households who worked on their creation and do not require an abnormal amount of cooperation between participating households. The many vegetable gardens created under PAC provide a good example of this: once created they present users with an opportunity to earn income from sales and bolster their household's food and nutritional security, and each household is responsible for their own patch – communal action being limited to maintenance of the fence

surrounding the whole plot and observance of water usage limits. Unlike animal husbandry, vegetable gardening does not require specialist knowledge, a relatively large capital investment, or additional labour, and losses are fragmented; as such it is ideally suited to the circumstances of poorer households. Furthermore, Agritex officers have a denser presence on the ground than livestock and veterinary officers, so technical support is more readily available. The evaluation found many examples of PAC created vegetable gardens which were yielding benefits in terms of income and nutrition to their new owners.

5. On the evidence available to the evaluators it appears that large majority of the 187 PAC interventions constructed under this PRRO fall into the second two categories mentioned above. It should also be noted that in many cases non-livestock owning households who worked on dip construction mentioned that they appreciated the asset because, even though they did not own animals, some of their relatives did, and they occasionally benefitted tangentially.

6. Sustainability is another important aspect of the effectiveness of PAC investments – funds will have been wasted and benefits will rapidly fade if the asset cannot be maintained without external help. In this regard, WFP and other agencies are affected by the legacy of the past in Zimbabwe, whereby irrigation schemes, cattle dips and other agriculture infrastructure were essentially viewed as public goods and, to a greater or lesser degree, operated on a subsidised basis by the state. Beneficiaries held no real sense of ownership over the asset because they were not wholly responsible for its maintenance. Since the country's economic collapse, however, it has been impossible to continue with this modus operandi, and instead there has been a greater focus on trying to assure sustainability by instilling users with a sense of ownership and endowing them with the organisational skills and structures to maintain an asset.

7. Sustainability requires good management, and, given that many of the people expected to take on these responsibilities have little or no management experience, building the systems necessary to ensure sustainability is no easy task. Based on the observations of this evaluation, WFP's success in this area has been mixed. Characteristics of assets where there does seem to be a good chance of sustainability include: -

8. Good group cohesion which is strengthened by collaboration in other activities such as church attendance, savings and credit, etc. The Matande vegetable garden established in Masvingo is a good example of this. The group works together, sings together and prays together building a bond which is stronger than simple economic interest. The user group comprises 220 people, 2/3rds of whom are women. Each member contributes \$1.50 per month to the kitty to buy seeds and pesticides and pay for any necessary repairs to the irrigation system and fence, and each reckons to make about \$10 per month from vegetable sales.

9. Discrete access to and use of the asset by a 'closed membership' group is important. Again vegetable gardens are good example of this principle: there are only a certain number of plots available, membership can be controlled and non-performers expelled. It is therefore easier to collect funds and maintain some sort of group cohesion. Cattle dips, on the other hand, do not allow for this closed access model because it is in the interest of all livestock owners that all livestock are dipped – even those of people who cannot or refuse to pay. This encourages free-riders – a

phenomenon often resulting in the asset falling into disrepair because of lack of maintenance funds.

10. Assets that do not require an unrealistic level of communal action to function (e.g. vegetable gardens) are more likely to endure than those which require a high level of cooperation. It should be remembered that the fundamental unit of economic production in Zimbabwe, as in many other parts of Africa, is the household. Households will collaborate together on occasion to overcome labour constraints or where the benefits of joint action are mutual (e.g. land clearing for a vegetable garden), but on a day to day basis, decisions on the organisation of labour and allocation of resources is made at a household level. For this reason, assets which require only specific and time-bound communal activity are more likely to be sustainable than those which require continuous collective action unless very strict and well managed membership norms are established and enforced. To illustrate this point, consider the example of a vegetable garden again. After the initial land clearing and fence erection, members are free to do what they want with their patch, as long as they pay their membership fees. If they neglect their beds it is of no consequence to anyone other than themselves. Compare this with an aquaculture scheme, the success of which is based on a production model that necessitates the division of labour (constant management and maintenance of the water supply, procurement of fingerlings, production of feed, feeding, guarding etc.) and it is clear to see how a vegetable garden is more resilient to group disharmony or disintegration. Of course, this does not imply that assets that require a higher level of collaborative action are not viable, just that the necessary investments must be made in management structures, and there was some evidence that this was being done when the Ministry of Small and Medium Enterprises was involved in the Dzingazhara fish pond.

11. As implied in the previous point, investing in the establishment of management structures and norms are vital to the sustainability of an asset. Groups in which management systems appeared to be stronger had generally benefited from the input and support of the Ministry of Small and Medium Sized Enterprises, whose speciality is assisting with the establishment of by-laws and training committee members in key functions such as accounts keeping, chairing meetings etc. This is a time intensive rather than capital intensive process, which is possibly why it does not always attract the same amount of attention as the construction of the asset itself: in most cases. Interaction with the community halted once the budget period finished.

12. Interventions which take full consideration of the difficult economic climate currently prevailing in Zimbabwe – specifically very limited liquidity in rural areas, and difficulties with supply of some inputs - are more likely to succeed than those where this is not factored in. Vegetable farmers growing a huge amount of perishable produce (e.g. Zumbuze irrigation scheme in Zaka) are unlikely to find a market, especially if they live far away from urban areas or facilities which can be guaranteed to provide a reasonably consistent level of demand (e.g. police posts, hospitals, hotels and schools), and aquaculture schemes that rely on a consistent supply of manufactured feed are highly exposed to the collapse of the industrial sector¹⁰⁰. Of course, in both cases, a certain amount of surplus production can be consumed in the

household, yielding nutritional benefits, but this does not provide the cash critical to purchase external inputs necessary to maintain good yields such as fertiliser, feed, seeds, and pesticides.

13. It is in this area of market linkages, but other aspects too that the importance of cooperating partners present locally comes to the fore. The evaluation found that PRRO's objectives were more likely to be achieved where their cooperating partner had good local presence (i.e. acceptance by communities and relationships with local government staff), and the ability to bring additional cash and technical resources into play when necessary. By the same token, where the partnership is seen more as a contract, problems that arise subsequent to the project cycle are less likely to be addressed. In Hwange District the irrigation tank rehabilitated by one partner was found to be leaking in several places. According to the beneficiaries, even after the repair it had never stopped leaking, but the partner did not feel accountable as they had already left the District which, in any case, they had only worked in for the purpose of the WFP PRRO.

14. A final critical factor in asset sustainability is ensuring that whatever is handed over to the beneficiary group is fully functional and ready to use. This evaluation found many cases where WFP and partners had ensured full functionality of an asset before it was handed over – for instance the vegetable garden at Zumbuze (Zaka District) which involved a relatively complicated water delivery infrastructure for irrigation. However, enough sites were visited to indicate that this practice was by no means universal. Two examples serve to illustrate the point. In Mt Darwin the weir constructed at Kapunda was non-functional because substandard construction resulted in the water leaking out. Furthermore, the basin was too small to hold water for anything more than a few months or to create the pressure of water necessary to feed a planned vegetable garden. A management committee had been formed, but they had nothing to manage, and certainly no resources to make the necessary repairs to the scheme themselves. In all likelihood, the committee will dissolve as members pursue other activities which offer the better prospects of a return on their time. A second example, Chisecha dip tank, can also be found in Mt Darwin. The tank is certainly a priority for the area and reportedly services over 2,500 cattle, but it is in danger of becoming defunct because it was under capitalised and / or build shoddily. The community management fund has already been exhausted strengthening the dip tank uprights, and the tank's water supply had not been properly thought through: it relies on a local shallow tube well which is already insufficient to supply villagers' needs and dries up in the dry season, meaning the tank will in all likelihood not be useable in October / November – a particularly crucial time for dipping as ticks are in their larval stage, and easier to kill with dipping. Apparently original plans included a proposal to sink a borehole beside the tank, but there was not enough money in the budget.

15. Considering that the beneficiary communities will, initially at least, have limited resources to pay for maintenance, it is particularly important that the asset is constructed to a high standard – at least in compliance with GoZ specifications. The evaluation found two main reasons for below par construction – under capitalisation and poor supervision. One asset visited – Nkomati Dam and vegetable garden – serves to exemplify both issues. The budget for rehabilitation of the dam was not sufficient to repair the two large pumps required to lift water from the dam to a holding tank in the garden itself. A smaller pump is being used, but it cannot supply the amount of water necessary for all farmers. To make matters worse, the holding

tank in the garden had, on the instruction of an inexperienced GoZ engineer, been constructed on the highest spot in the garden - a termite mound. When a more experienced engineer visited the site he recognised that the tank would collapse if it was filled with water, so it stands empty. Unsurprisingly, community interest in the garden appeared to be dwindling. Another example of resource constraints impacting on the sustainability of assets includes dams not being fenced off, meaning that the shores will become rapidly degraded by cattle.

16. For some of these non-functional assets there is talk of a 'second phase' of funding to make repairs. Given the apparent difficulties in securing resources for current programmes, the prospects that a 2nd phase will transpire are uncertain, but until that happens, communities' main benefit from these assets has been the food / cash they received during their construction.

Annex 14: M&E Matrix

Monitoring	Sampling	Frequency	Content
Registration Monitoring	Minimum of 10% of registration points or 2 sites under each District whichever is higher (done only during actual registrations)	Once-off (start of programme or during up-scaling)	Check fairness/transparency of the selection & registration process
Verification Monitoring	Done when there are reports of improper selection/registration (10 beneficiary and 10 non-beneficiary households per village)	As required	To ascertain any inclusion/exclusion errors
Post Distribution Monitoring	4 x random villages (in a District where we had more than 40 FDPs). 10 beneficiary households in each village (minimum of 10% of distribution points or 2 sites under each District whichever is higher)	Monthly post distribution	Adequacy and efficiency of WFP assistance Satisfaction with quality, type, selection, registration and nutritional screening of assistance Check on short to medium term outcome and impact of the assistance Women participation in the management activities and decision making during utilisation of food entitlements Food utilisation and adequacy of ration For health and nutrition programme-we assess other factors that might have an impact on the nutritional status of the client
Food Distribution Monitoring/Exit Survey	Minimum of 10 % distribution points or 2 sites per District whichever is higher (10 beneficiary households randomly sampled)	Monthly	Timeliness/efficiency/adequacy of the distribution process Recipient knowledge of food basket Quantity received vs planned-adequacy of food ration received (involves through comparing food actually received by recipient through weighing) Opportunity cost to beneficiaries Presence and functionality/utilisation of complaints mechanism (Help Desk)
Food Distribution process monitoring	Administered on the distribution partner, (minimum of 10% of the distribution points or 2 sites under each District, whichever is higher)	Monthly	Adequacy of commodities/cash brought to FDP in planned quantities Delivery of food and stay at FDP Community and CP participation in distribution process Condition of food on receipt and during distribution Compliance of beneficiary information records Women participation in the

Monitoring	Sampling	Frequency	Content
			<p>management activities and decision making during distribution</p> <p>Check whether food is distributed to intended beneficiary</p> <p>Information dissemination to beneficiaries on cash amounts, food commodity type and entitlements through public address or IEC material (banners)</p> <p>Adequacy of crowd control measures to guard on loss during distribution</p> <p>Adequacy/appropriateness of scooping/weighing equipment</p> <p>Regular checks by CP on food received vs planned</p> <p>Opportunity cost to beneficiaries (timeliness of the process)</p> <p>Appropriateness of the FDP</p>
Food security monitoring	2 sites per District (2 wards & 2 villages: there is a rotation of villages), the wards are in 2 livelihood zones	Monthly	<p>Food availability/affordability/accessibility & utilisation</p> <p>Current livelihood coping mechanisms</p> <p>current income generating activities options</p> <p>Current consumption coping strategies</p> <p>Prevalence of barter activities in the area</p>
Markets monitoring	2 sites per District, purposive sampling depending on market size, significance and performance	Every 2 weeks	<p>Prices and availability of grain and maize meal</p> <p>Food sources and stocks</p> <p>Trend analysis</p>
Community household surveillance	15 sites per sub office, 20 hh per site (10 beneficiaries and 10 x non-beneficiaries)(though sites are always guided by the size of programme at the time)	Bi-annual,(Start of STA (Nov) and end (April))	<p>Detects immediate outcomes of WFP assistance through a comparison of food consumption and stress levels of households by beneficiary and non- beneficiary status.</p>

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Acronyms

ADRA	Adventist Development and Relief Organisation
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
ART	Anti-Retroviral Therapy
BMI	Body Mass Index
BR	Budget Revision
C&V	Cash and Vouchers
CAP	Consolidated Appeals Process
CC	Christian Care
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund
CfC	Cash for Cereals
CHS	Community Household Surveillance
CLPP	Community Level Participatory Planning
CNFA	Citizens Network for Foreign Affairs
CPIA	Country Policy and Institutional Assessment
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
CSB	Corn Soy Blend
CZI	Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries
DA	District Administrator
DDRC	District Drought Relief Committee
DFID	Department for International Development
DRM	Disaster Risk Management
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
DRRR	Disaster Response and Risk Reduction
ECHO	Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection department of the European Commission
ERF	Emergency Response Fund
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FCS	Food Consumption Score
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GMB	Grain Marketing Board
GNU	Government of National Unity
GoZ	Government of Zimbabwe
H&N	Health and Nutrition
HFG	Help from Germany
HDI	Human Development Index
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HOCIC	Hope for a Child in Christ
ICT	Information and communications technology
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
IPM	Integrated Pest Management

LGDA	Lower Guruve Development Association
MAM	Moderate Acute Malnutrition
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MDTC	Mwenezi Training Development Center
MoAMID	Ministry of Agriculture Mechanization and Irrigation Development
MoHCC	Ministry of Health and Child Care
MoPSLSS	Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Services
MOSS	Minimum Operating Security Standard
MT	Metric Ton
MUAC	Mid-Upper Arm Circumference
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NSSA	National Social Security Authority
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ORAP	Organization of Rural Associations for Progress
OVC	Orphans and Other Vulnerable Children
P4P	Purchase for Progress
PAC	Productive Asset Creation
PDM	Post Distribution Monitoring
PLHIV	People Living with HIV
PLW	Pregnant and Lactating Women
PMCTC	Prevention of Mother-to-Child Transmission
PRRO	Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation
ROZ	Republic of Zimbabwe
RTUF	Ready to Use Food
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAM	Severe Acute Malnutrition
SAT	Sustainable Agricultural Technology
SC	Save the Children
SD	Standard Deviation
STA	Seasonal Targeted Assistance
SUN	Scaling Up Nutrition
TB	Tuberculosis
UMCOR	United Methodist Committee on Relief
VAM	Vulnerability Assessment and Mapping
Vit	Vitamin
UNCT	UN Country Team
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VAME	Vulnerability Assessment and Monitoring and Evaluation
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation
WVI	World Vision International

WHO World Health Organisation
ZIMVAC Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee
ZNASP Zimbabwe National HIV and AIDS Strategic Plan
ZUNDAF Zimbabwe United Nations Development Assistance Framework

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