

OPERATION EVALUATION

Mozambique, 200286 Country Programme: An
Evaluation of WFP's Operation (2012-2015)

Final Evaluation Report

May, 2015

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Disclaimer

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Operational Fact Sheet

OPERATION		
Type/Number/Title	Mozambique Country Programme (CP) 200286	
Approval	The operation was approved by the World Food Programme's (WFP) Executive Board (EB) In February 2012	
Amendments	<p>There have been 4 amendments (Budget revisions (BR)) to the initial project document:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • BR1 (10/05/2012): substituted cash and in kind food with vouchers, resulting in a budget decrease of USD1.5m. • BR2 (15/01/2013): Increased land-side transport, handling and storage costs resulting in a budget increase of USD1.1m. • BR3 (21/08/2013): Replaced in-kind food by cash and voucher transfers under component 2 and introduced other technical adjustments. This BR resulted in a decrease of USD0.9m • BR4 (18/07/2014): This BR resulted in a budget decrease of USD1.08m and a downward revision of the number of beneficiaries by 57,000 (72,000 beneficiaries less for the Moderate Acute Malnutrition (MAM) component and an increase of 15,000 in the school feeding beneficiaries) Increases were made to the Cash & Voucher (C&V) component and to budgets for technical support to national institutions while budget for treatment of Moderate Acute Malnutrition (MAM) – which was partly taken over by other partners – decreased 	
Duration	<u>Initial:</u> 4 years and 10 months (1 st March 2012 – 31 st December 2015)	<u>Revised:</u> Same dates have been maintained
Planned beneficiaries	<u>Initial:</u> 1,217,000 total (of which 829.884 girls/women, i.e. 68 percent)	<u>Revised (at BR4):</u> 1,264.300 (of which 791.690 girls/women, i.e. 63 percent)
Planned food requirements	<u>Initial:</u> In-kind food: 78,241 MT Cash and vouchers: USD6.7million	<u>Revised:</u> In-kind food: 19.105 MT Cash and vouchers: USD11,4million
USD requirements	<u>Initial:</u> USD 105 million	<u>Revised:</u> USD 104 million


OBJECTIVES¹ AND ACTIVITIES			
MDG / UNDAF Objective	Strategic Objectives (SO)	Operation specific objectives	Activities
Millennium Development Goals (MDG) 1–6 United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) Mozambique Outcomes 1 - 5	SO2	Hazard risk reduced at the community level in target communities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Food distribution.
		Early warning systems, contingency plans and food security monitoring systems put in place and enhanced with WFP capacity development support	
	SO4	Increased access to education in assisted schools	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Home grown school meals • Social Protection (SP) • Risk reduction • Market access (MA) • UNDAF Outcomes 1, 4, and 5
		Adequate food consumption reached over assistance period for target households	
		Improved nutrition status of target households	
		Increased adherence of adults and children with HIV after 6 months of Antiretroviral Treatment (ART)	
		Increased production capacity for fortified foods, including complementary foods and special nutritional products	
	SO5	Progress made towards nationally owned hunger solutions	
		Broader national policy frameworks incorporate hunger solutions	
		Increased marketing opportunities at the national level with cost effective WFP local purchases	
	PARTNERS		
Government	Ministry of Education (MOE), Ministry of Women and Social Action (MMAS), Technical Secretariat for Food and Nutrition Security (SETSAN), Ministry of Agriculture (MINAG), Ministry of Health (MISAU), Ministry of Trade		

¹ The CO has realigned the logframe with the new overall WFP Strategic Plan (2014-2018) which has four Strategic Objectives, and new Strategic Results Framework for the year 2014. However, given that this evaluation covered the period mid-2010 to October 2014, reference is made primarily to the former Strategic Plan (2008-2013). To measure progress for the period of January to October 2014 the ET used WFP's output reports for that period.

	and Commerce, National Directorate of Disaster Management (INGC)																						
United Nations	United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), UNDP, World Health Organization (WHO), International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), International Labour Organization (ILO), Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), United Nations Educational and Scientific Organization (UNESCO), United Nations Populations Fund (UNFPA), United Nations Humanitarian Settlements Programme (HABITAT), Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)																						
Others	Government of Brazil and the Brazil/WFP Centre of Excellence are key partners for the school feeding component																						
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)	<p>International (3 in total):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Red Cross, • World Relief, • Samaritan’s Purse <p>National NGOs (5 in total)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Profamilia • Conselho Cristão de Moçambique, • Associação Desenvolvimento Rural Mágoe, • Olhando Esperança, • Associação Moçambicana para o Desenvolvimento da Família (AMODEFA). 																						
INPUTS																							
<p>Contribution received (by December 2014): USD42,35 mill of a total of USD104 mill</p> <p>% against appeal: 41.1%</p> <p>Top 4 donors: United Nations (UN) Common Funds– 46 % Canada – 19% Belgium – 14% Multilateral – 10%</p>	<p>Figure 1. Donors to CP - Proportion of Overall Funds Contributed by September 2014</p> <table border="1"> <caption>Data for Figure 1: Donors to CP - Proportion of Overall Funds Contributed by September 2014</caption> <thead> <tr> <th>Donor</th> <th>Proportion (%)</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>UN Common Funds</td> <td>46%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Canada</td> <td>19%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Belgium</td> <td>14%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Multilateral</td> <td>10%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Private Donors</td> <td>5%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Miscellaneous</td> <td>4%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Switzerland</td> <td>1%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Japan</td> <td>1%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>USA</td> <td>0%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Denmark</td> <td>0%</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>Source: Standard Project Report (SPR) 2014</p>	Donor	Proportion (%)	UN Common Funds	46%	Canada	19%	Belgium	14%	Multilateral	10%	Private Donors	5%	Miscellaneous	4%	Switzerland	1%	Japan	1%	USA	0%	Denmark	0%
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USA	0%																						
Denmark	0%																						


OUTPUTS

Figure 2. Planned vs. Actual beneficiaries by component by year (2012 to 2014)




Source: SPR 2012, SPR 2013, SPR 2014 (draft)

Figure 3. Planned (operational) Versus Actual Tonnage 2012-2014



Source: Standard Project Report (SPR) 2012, SPR 2013, SPR 2014 (draft)

Figure 4. Proportion of male and female beneficiaries by actual versus planned by year (2012 to 2014)



Source: SPR 2012, SPR 2013, SPR 2014 (draft)

OUTCOMES

Table 1. Outcomes by Strategic Objective, against baseline and annual performance (2012-2014)²

SO	Outcomes	Target	Baseline	Previous	2014		
SO2 : Prevent acute hunger and invest in disaster preparedness and mitigation measures							
	CS: Coping Strategy Index (average)	<15	20	6	9		
SO3: Restore and Rebuild Lives and Livelihoods in post-conflict, post-disaster, or transition situations							
	FCS: percentage of households with borderline Food Consumption Score (female-headed)	< 30	38	41	32		
	FCS: percentage of households with borderline Food Consumption Score (female-headed)	< 30	30	35	30		
	FCS: percentage of households with poor Food Consumption Score (female-headed)	< 15	21	19	15		
	FCS: percentage of households with poor Food Consumption Score (male-headed)	< 15	15	11	8		
SO4: Reduce chronic hunger and undernutrition							
	Attendance rate boys in WFP assisted schools	Over 90%	0	89	89		
	Attendance rate girls in WFP assisted school	Over 90%	0	89	89		
	Drop out rate (boys) in WFP-assisted primary schools	< 7.5	10	7.5	6.5		
	Drop out rate (girls) in WFP-assisted primary schools	< 7	9.6	7.2	6.3		
	Average annual rate of change (increase) in number of boys in WFP-assisted school	>10	-0.1	9.5	4.4		
	Average annual rate of change (increase) in number of girls in WFP-assisted school	> 6.25	0.2	5.9	3.7		
	Pass rate boys in WFP assisted schools	> 65	51	83.2	83.2		
	Pass rate girls in WFP assisted schools	> 80	75	68.5	68.75		
	MAM (Moderate Acute Malnutrition) treatment default rate (%)	< 15	59.8	65	65		
	MAM treatment mortality rate (%)	< 3	2	0	0		
	MAM treatment non-response rate (%)	< 15	0	0	0		
	MAM non-response rate (%)	< 15	0	0	0		
	MAM treatment recovery rate (%)	> 75	25	0	18		
SO5: Strengthen the capacity of countries to reduce hunger							
	National Capacity Index (NCI): School Feeding	10	15	3	3		
	NCI: Food for Assets National Capacity Index	> 15	5	0	3		
	NCI Nutrition programmes	= 4	3	3	3		
Color Code Key:							
<table style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width: 50%; background-color: #d9e1f2; border: 1px solid black;">ATTAINED</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="width: 50%; background-color: #f4cccc; border: 1px solid black;">NOT ATTAINED</td> </tr> </table>						ATTAINED	NOT ATTAINED
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NOT ATTAINED							

Source: Data from SPR 2012, SPR 2013, and SPR 2014 (draft) as well as from CP document. CP document includes additional indicators but these are not reported on in the SPR's and are therefore not included in Table 1 above.

Other activities implemented by the WFP office

² Note: For 2014, the Evaluation considered the revised logframe.

In addition to the CP, the WFP office also implemented a Protracted Recovery and Relief Operation (PRRO) as well as several trust funds.

PRRO 200355 runs from March 2012 to 30th September 2015 and will have been largely terminated by the time this evaluation takes place. The PRRO is comprised of relief and early recovery activities for people affected by natural disasters; food assistance for refugees; and disaster management capacity development for national institutions. The PRRO objectives cover SO1, SO3 and SO5. The PRRO has responded to several climate-related shocks in Zambezia Province (cyclone), Sofala (drought), Gaza (floods), and Cabo Delgado (floods).

The Purchase from Africans to Africa Programme (PAA Africa) initiated in February 2012 as a joint initiative of the Brazilian government, United Nation's Food And Agriculture Organization (FAO) and WFP. PAA Africa seeks to promote food and nutrition security and income generation for smallholder farmers and vulnerable communities through local food purchase initiatives. The programme has supported home grown school feeding and its links with smallholders' farmers. The first phase ended in 2013 and a second 60-month phase will run to 2018.

Purchase for Progress initiative (P4P) was implemented between October 2008 and December 2013. P4P has focused on helping farmers' organizations and small and medium traders to develop their capacity to compete with larger buyers for smallholders' crops. The P4P has helped 20 small holder farmers' organizations and 6 small and medium traders in 5 provinces of central and northern areas of Mozambique

Accelerate Progress towards MDG1c in Mozambique (EU-MDG1c). This Trust Fund started in May 2013 and will last until April 2018. The project is being implemented jointly by FAO, IFAD and WFP, and will – to the extent possible - strengthen and expand on-going interventions in order to accelerate the attainment of MDG1. The WFP component focuses on improving smallholder linkages to existing markets, to obtain better prices in the long-term and contribute to poverty alleviation and household food and nutrition security. In addition WFP's support will focus on fortification of staple foods. The intervention includes a national component as well as targeted activities in Manica Province.

Bilateral Operation 200554 support to the Nutrition Rehabilitation Programme (PRN). The operation is funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Mission to Mozambique. WFP is responsible for planning, implementing and controlling the efficient, effective flow and storage of CSB+ from point of purchase until delivery at the health facility. It has two components: a) procurement and delivery of CSB+ to 132 district health facilities in five provinces; and b) capacity development/training of partners to ensure control of food products.

The pilot project "right food, at the right time" was approved in January 2013 by the donor (Child Investment Fund Foundation), aimed at prevention of chronic malnutrition using lipid-based nutrient supplements distributed at community level to children under 2 years of age, involved MISAU as main implementing partner plus 7 clinical NGOs, and had a budget allocation of 17 M USD over 5 years. The project was interrupted after one year (inception phase) because the donor was not in agreement

with the strategic re-adjustment of the implementation requested by both the Government and WFP and which would have increased the potential for scale up of the project.

Map

Figure 5 to Figure 11 present a consolidated operational map for the CP and individual maps for each CP component.

Figure 5. WFP Country Programme Priority Areas **Figure 6. WFP Country Programme Priority Areas**



Figure 7. WFP Country Programme Priority Areas



Figure 8. WFP Country Programme Priority Areas



Figure 9. WFP Country Programme Priority Areas



Figure 10. Estimated Prevalence of Chronically Food Insecure Households





Figure 11. Prevalence of Acute Malnutrition (2013)



Executive Summary

The evaluation of WFP's Mozambique Country Programme (CP) 200286 was commissioned by WFP's Office of Evaluation and covers the period from 2012 to 2014. The Evaluation was managed and conducted by an external evaluation company – Khulisa Management Services (Pty) Ltd, and was carried out between July 2014 and March 2015 by a team of independent consultants. The evaluation serves the purpose of accountability and lesson learning. It reports on results, reflects on the comparative advantage of WFP's CP operations, and aims to contribute to the design of the next country programme. Three key evaluation questions (EQs) guided the evaluation: 1) the appropriateness of the operation, 2) the results, and c) factors explaining the results. Fieldwork took place in the provinces of Tete, Gaza and Maputo City. Findings were systematically validated and triangulated using a combination of sources.

The primary internal stakeholders of this evaluation are also users of this report, and include: the Country Office (CO) and sub-office staff, who will use this information to inform decision-making; the Regional Bureau (RB), which will use the findings to apply learning to other COs; and the WFP Office of Evaluation (OEV), which will use this evaluation to better understand how to support COs in evaluation functions. The direct external stakeholders are beneficiaries, the Government of Mozambique, partners of WFP, United Nations agencies, and donors.

The CP started in March 2012, and planned to support just over 1.264.300 million beneficiaries (of whom 63 percent are women). It has two main objectives, namely: 1) support human and social development, through improved basic nutrition, scaling up of social action, and home-grown school meals; and 2) strengthen livelihoods by enhancing small farmers' access to markets and improving food security and information for disaster risk reduction. The five components of the CP are: school feeding, social protection, health and nutrition, risk reduction and market access.

Key findings on EQ1 - Appropriateness of the Operation

- Appropriateness of activities and transfer modalities – A thorough context analysis informed programme design. The composition of the CP was informed by lessons learned from the previous CP. As a result, objectives and activities were selected that appropriately sought to focus on families and households in the most food insecure districts of Mozambique.
- Geographical targeting was well executed. This was based on recommendations from the previous CP's evaluation to concentrate activities and exploit synergies.
- Beneficiary targeting was satisfactory and followed transparent criteria in line with education, food security, and nutrition indicators and guidance from the Government of Mozambique. OVC targeting was adjusted mid-way into implementation for better alignment with Mozambique's Social Protection Policy.
- The coherence of the CP was good. The design included coherence with WFPs strategic plan, WFPs guidance on capacity development and gender, and key component-specific policies. However, implementation fell short of guidance because of capacity, budgeting, and supervision constraints on the part of WFP and Government agencies with a lead role in supervision and implementation.

- External coherence of the CP design with Government policies and the UNDAF is strong. Coherence with the Government of Mozambique's policies has been helped by WFPs engagement in policy development in the areas of education and social protection. In the case of UNDAF, some areas of anticipated collaboration (e.g. school feeding) did not move beyond the planning stage.
- The lack of an in-built grievance/complaints procedure in SP was a serious oversight. In other areas of the CP, mechanisms for feedback on problems were also weak.

Key Findings on EQ2 - Results of the Operation

School Feeding

- This component envisaged the establishment of a Home-Grown School Feeding Programme in 179 schools, and the testing of different school feeding models in 12 pilot schools for possible future scale-up through the National School Feeding Programme (NSFP).
- School feeding has reached 51 percent of planned transition schools and 57 and 61 percent of both male and female beneficiaries respectively. Meals were provided at only half of the planned schools and, while school feeding covered most of the school year, it experienced a delay of 2-3 months. Data for schools show a correlation between school feeding and higher enrolment, participation and completion. Gender targets were met quantitatively, but attention to qualitative gender and equity issues was lacking.
- The pilot project started late in the CP period (September 2013) with considerable challenges. Only two months of school feeding took place in 2013 and two months in 2014, making it difficult to draw lessons. Despite the limited implementation, the component contributed to changed dietary practices by communities, and the establishment of a women's association which provides food to schools.
- The development of a National School Feeding Programme (PRONAE) with WFP support is an important achievement. The Government of Mozambique has committed human resources to school feeding, although funds have yet to be allocated.

Social Protection

- The CP's social protection component comprises of: i) Productive Safety Net Programme (PASP) - a conditional safety net with cash support for vulnerable households with the ability to work / Food for Assets (FFA), and ii) Direct Social Support Programme (PASD) - an unconditional safety net providing food vouchers/Super Cereal to highly vulnerable households unable to work.
- The PASD programme significantly contributed in improving the nutritional status of beneficiaries while the PASP has had some successes in improving household food consumption and building assets. Most direct beneficiaries of PASP and PASD were women. Work norms under PASP allowed women time to complete other household tasks.

- The PASD ration was appropriate to the objective of reducing chronic hunger and malnutrition and the FFA transfer goes a considerable way to filling a household's missing food entitlement, the PASP cash transfer was less effective in preventing acute hunger. Cash did, however, provide benefits that food transfer could not.
- The social protection component was not successful in achieving the targeted community asset, food consumption or coping strategy index scores. The size of transfers and the fact that assets often do not contribute to resilience limit 'graduation' from the programme – instead beneficiaries simply leave when the transfers end.
- Progress towards nationally owned hunger solutions was considerable, although the failure to quantitatively measure capacity development has made it difficult to accurately assess the progress. Assets created under PASP have not increased household resilience to climatic variability.
- The fact that social protection activities are now enshrined in Mozambican law should ensure that capacity gains over the course of the CP are sustained.

Nutrition

- Activities within this component aimed to support the National Nutrition Rehabilitation Programme (PRN) and enhance its effectiveness. The main elements of this component include the treatment and prevention of moderate acute malnutrition (MAM) in children, pregnant and lactating women, and adult HIV/TB patients, and is implemented through government health clinics.
- Although the prevention of chronic malnutrition was originally envisioned as one of the elements of the CP, it was shifted to separate trust funds at the implementation stage. The majority number of beneficiaries under this component (over 60 percent) were intended to be reached through this activity.
- Outcomes compared to original, overall targets were low. Rotation of trained staff in the health system affected results. The sharing of Super Cereal impacted on recovery rates.

Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) and Market Access

There were no specific quantitative outputs for either of these two components, which together received only five percent of the CP budget. DRR was intertwined with the Protracted Recovery and Relief Operation (PRRO) to strengthen food security information management for risk reduction. Together they raised awareness on disaster mapping, and supported the institutionalization of contingency planning for the rainy season. WFP contributed by producing and disseminating information on climatic and food security hazards through the Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping (VAM) unit. WFP and Government resource shortages played a large role in precluding the roll out of DRR activities more widely.

Market access supported the development of value chains to encourage development of marketing infrastructures. Three main findings stand out: local farmers benefited by being included in the supply chain for school feeding; defaulted tonnage for WFP purchases from both Farmers Associations (54 percent of the total) were significantly

higher than purchases from Mozambican traders (46 percent); and partnerships with UN agencies and NGOs allowed for complementarity and synergies at field level.

Findings on Factors Affecting the Results

- Resources (human and financial) did not match the design of the CP and adversely affected WFP's ability to reach its targets and conduct monitoring and evaluation. Some donors preferred to provide support via specific projects.
- Resource availability and duration of funding limited WFP's ability to commit funds long term and reduced its influence and voice in planning fora.
- Experimental / pilot activities were ambitious, lacked human and financial resources, and did not have exit/sustainability strategies. Lessons from previous evaluations were only partially acted on or internalized.
- Lack of funds affected WFP's ability to recruit and retain staff, and had a knock-on effect on the CP's ability to build capacity. A systematic approach to capacity development across components of the CP was lacking.
- Management and decision-making lacked efficiency contributing to late deliveries of inputs, including cash transfers, which affected all components and affected WFP's reputation in the field. Centralized decision-making processes meant that resolution of issues such as: support to pilot initiatives, field offices, registration of beneficiaries, and problems with bank accounts, took much longer than necessary.
- The challenges of working through Government as an implementing partner have been considerable and have affected the oversight and monitoring of the CP.
- A culture of sharing of resources distributed diluted the effect of support in the form of Super Cereal and transfers to a level that is not measurable.
- Higher food prices in rural areas diminished the purchasing power of the cash transfers to a level where their impact is not measurable with current M&E tools.

Conclusions

In terms of relevance, coherence and appropriateness, the CP has successfully aligned its activities with WFP's corporate objectives as well as those of the UN agencies in Mozambique and with the policies and strategies of the Government of Mozambique. The design of interventions was relevant to the needs of the target population and was based on a careful analysis of the nature of food insecurity in Mozambique. Interventions were appropriate to the needs of target populations as they were intended to reduce malnutrition, increase school attendance, address chronic malnutrition, increase households' resilience to climatic variability and build the capacity of farmers' groups and implementing partners, particularly the Government of Mozambique. The focus on capacity development of government institutions and on a gradual takeover by these institutions was entirely appropriate.

In terms of effectiveness, the CP has had some successes. A key achievement is that purchasing from local markets now constitutes 100 per cent of WFP's portfolio. On the whole, however, the CP fell short of reaching its ambitious targets. Resource and

capacity constraints on the part of Government presented real challenges during implementation. In addition, the lack of resources within WFP meant that fewer beneficiaries received assistance than originally planned, with pipeline breaks delaying transfer of funds to those households receiving assistance.

Efficiency was affected by difficulties in identifying local suppliers and by the rejection of a large consignment of maize in 2014. WFP's centralised decision making process has contributed to delays and further reduced efficiencies. Although the design of the CP was informed by previous evaluations, the lessons learned were not always taken on board during implementation.

The focus of gender targets has predominantly been on ensuring that quantitative targets are met, although, in some cases, these fell short of planned.

Recommendations

1. In providing support to the design of the next CP during the course of 2015, the RB should work closely with the CO to ensure that this evaluation's findings regarding WFP's areas of comparative advantage are used to inform decisions on priorities. Areas of comparative advantage identified in this evaluation include: school feeding where WFP has a strong field presence and a recognized model of support, strengthening the logistics capacity of government counterparts, continuing to support implementation of SP programmes under the joint UN programme and through WFP field presence, DRR, and assisting Government in developing its M&E. By building on areas of comparative advantage, the CP will likely increase its efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability, and resource mobilization.
2. In designing the next CP, the CO should ensure that the priorities and activities of each of the future CP's components is based on an assessment of government capacities in that particular sector/area, and on an assessment of realistically achievable change in this area, while considering the realistic timeframes needed for bringing about the envisioned change. The RB should work with the CO to ensure that the CP planning incorporates appropriate support within the CP (training, technical assistance, system development and corresponding budgets) to address gaps, and that targets and expectations are revised to realistically achievable levels (likely downwards). In terms of funding, the CO needs to encourage the allocation of adequate Government resources to enable a smooth and sustainable hand over.
3. In 2015, the CO should commission a national school feeding costing assessment, including a cost-benefit analysis. This could help define the cost of a national School Feeding programme and build an investment case for school feeding. The cost-benefit analysis would also be an important input into the next CP. The evaluation team suggests that this cost-benefit assessment be

planned as part of a System Approach for Better Education Results (SABER) exercise³, which has been influential in agenda setting in other countries.

4. The WFP CO should, in the course of 2015, work with other UN agencies (as part of the new UNDAF) to develop a capacity development strategy, and engage with key government partners as a critical input into the new CP. The strategy should include a baseline, clear and specific indicators to measure the envisioned changes at the individual, group, and institutional level, and periodic measurements of progress in conjunction with Government. The strategy will improve coherence of actions with other agencies, and maximize the use of scarce resources. Improved government capacity will contribute to the impact of the CP in the medium to long term. In order to strengthen its approach to capacity development, the CO should plan to second skilled staff to government to provide on-the-job-support to those whose capacity it's trying to build.
5. The next CP should include, for each of its components, specific mechanisms which would allow beneficiaries to provide feedback to Government and WFP on WFP supported programmes. This is a requirement for the social protection programmes (and will thus improve coherence with corporate policy) and a good practice for other areas of programming. It not only ensures that beneficiaries have a recourse but also constitutes a useful feedback mechanism which can feed into the efficiency of WFPs programme. Use and usefulness of these mechanisms should be monitored by the CO and the RB on an annual basis.
6. WFP RB should, in the first half of 2015 and in conjunction with HQ, review available corporate guidance for country offices on the standards that need to be met in planning and implementing pilot projects at field level. It is desirable that the WFP RB also conduct a joint review with the CO to identify changes that can be made under the current CP to meet these requirements, and how these efforts can be reflected in reporting. In planning for the new CP, the RB should support the CO in ensuring that pilot projects take account of the guidance and provide feedback to HQ on areas where corporate guidance could be improved.
7. At the country level, the CO management should ensure that recommendations from the recent Regional Office Monitoring Mission (October 2014) such as: ensuring adequate funding for M&E activities; collection of quantitative and qualitative gender data for regular monitoring of progress; conducting regular assessments of the utility of assets created, and setting up feedback mechanisms at all levels, are implemented and regularly monitored. This will provide ongoing feedback on progress and allow the CO to make appropriate changes to enhance the relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of the

³ The System Approach for Better Education Results (SABER) tool was developed by the World Bank and WFP and is a structured assessment of a country's School Feeding policy framework, system and programme. It leads to the development of a national action plan for School Feeding across the five dimensions: a) policy frameworks b) financial capacity; c) institutional capacity and coordination; d) design and implementation; and e) community roles.

programme. It will also provide valuable information to the CO and RB on areas of strength/progress that can feed into dialogue with government and raising funds from donors.

8. The CO should review and consolidate its M&E processes ahead of the new CP to strengthen: a) output monitoring given that accountability regarding the distribution of commodities and cash is central to WFP's credibility, and b) the assessment of the effect of capacity building activities on partner institutions. The ET experienced considerable difficulty in accessing a complete, accurate and consistent set of output figures, with data lacking coherence and presented differently in different reports and activities. Agreeing and adhering to a standard data reporting protocol for the CP would enhance understanding of output data and WFP's credibility in this area. Furthermore, given that WFP's role in Mozambique is likely to increasingly focus on capacity development, efforts to prioritize and institutionalize the regular use of capacity assessment tools are essential. This will assist WFP to better determine the effectiveness of its interventions and demonstrate accountability to its donors and partner institutions. Tools have already been developed for this purpose - these need to be used in a uniform and systematic way throughout the programme.
9. The WFP CO in Mozambique should continue to decentralize operational decision-making. This will allow the CO to capitalize on the strong and experienced staff it has at sub-office level and improve the efficiency of operations. Under current arrangements, sub-offices are disempowered and have little incentive to improve programme quality. As part of this process, the WFP CO should give sub-offices performance targets on an annual basis and support and incentivize them to meet these targets.
10. Taking into account the high levels of chronic malnutrition in Mozambique and the priorities of the Government of Mozambique which are to reduce the levels of chronic malnutrition, WFP should prioritize reducing chronic malnutrition in its next CP. In line with global guidance from WHO, decisions on targeting for MAM in the nutrition component of the next CP should be based on a careful analysis of inequalities among populations and focus on areas where there are clusters of large numbers of wasting children. Finally, in 2015, it should conduct – with external consultancy support and in coordination with other partners (government and UN) - an assessment to identify the reasons for the high levels of MAM default rates seen under the current CP and use the findings to inform the redesign of its interventions.

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Evaluation Features

1. The evaluation of the World Food Programme's (WFP's) Mozambique County Programme (CP) 200286 was commissioned by the WFP Office of Evaluation (OEV), and conducted by Khulisa Management Services (Pty) Ltd between July 2014 and February 2015. The team members combined expertise in nutrition, education, food security, market access, and social protection.
2. **Rationale:** This evaluation serves the dual and mutually reinforcing objectives of accountability and learning. It seeks to contribute to the formulation of the next CP (expected to start in 2016). The evaluation reports on, and assesses the CP's results, and the comparative advantage and positioning of WFP's operations in the Mozambique.
3. **Scope:** The evaluation focused on the Mozambique CP 200286 from 2012 through 2014. The CP includes interventions in the areas of school feeding, social protection (SP), nutrition, risk reduction and market access (MA). In the area of nutrition the scope of the evaluation was adjusted to consider only the appropriateness of the stunting prevention activities and not the results as the activities were implemented via a separate mechanism. For the CP's market access component, the analysis was extended to include the full scope of activities implemented under the CP as well as under the Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO)⁴. The fact that WFP's work in market access is important to school feeding, social protection, and nutrition necessitated a broader analysis.
4. The CP was guided by the evaluation Terms of Reference (ToR) and the evaluation Inception Report (IR). Central to the IR was the evaluation matrix which systematically linked evaluation questions from the ToR to detailed areas of inquiry, sources, and methods for data collection. The main points of reference for the approach were: the five *strategic objectives* from the WFP Plan 2008-2013; the four strategic objectives of WFP's Plan for 2014-2018; the outcomes across the *component areas*; the cross-cutting *themes* of the CP, and the *key evaluation questions* (EQ) from the ToR. The following criteria guided the evaluation: relevance, coherence, appropriateness, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability.
5. **Stakeholders:** the primary internal stakeholders in this evaluation are also users of this report, and include the Country Office (CO) and sub-office staff, who will use this information to inform decision-making; the Regional Bureau (RB), which will use the findings to apply learning to other COs; and the WFP Office of Evaluation (OEV), which will use this evaluation to better understand how to support COs in evaluation functions. The direct external stakeholders are beneficiaries, the Government of Mozambique (GoM), partners of WFP, fellow United Nations (UN) agencies, and donors.

⁴ The PRRO provides food assistance in support of emergency response and early recovery activities, targeting disaster-affected as well as a small number of refugees and asylum seekers who have sought refuge in Mozambique due to adverse conditions in the neighboring countries.

6. **The methodology and approach** were fine-tuned and agreed upon with the Mozambique CO during the inception phase. The evaluation used a mixed methods approach comprising a literature review, semi-structured key informant interviews (KII), focus group discussions (FGD) with beneficiaries, group interviews, field visits and observations. The evaluation findings were systematically triangulated through these different approaches allowing the team to validate the findings.
7. Fieldwork took place from mid-November to the first week of December 2014 in the provinces of Tete (Changara, Angonia and Cahorra Bassa districts) and Gaza (Manjacaze, Massingir and Xai-Xai districts) as well as the provincial capitals. The Evaluation Team (ET) selected the sample in consultation with the CO based on such criteria as coverage of the main components (in particular locations where different components worked side by side) as well as accessibility. Interviews were conducted with a wide range of stakeholders including WFP CO and sub-office staff, government staff at provincial, district and local level, implementing partners (including private sector partners), beneficiaries, and local level stakeholders. The team used a gender responsive methodology in the interview and data collection process with groups of women and men interviewed separately whenever appropriate.
8. A total of 155 KIIs and 18 FGDs were conducted. Initial evaluation findings were presented to the CO, RB, and OEV. The evaluation followed the OEV Evaluation and Quality Assurance System (EQAS) standards.
9. **Limitations:** Due to the difficult and time-consuming nature of travel to remote WFP-supported locations of Mozambique, the ET was unable to visit all possible locations and field visits were short and intensive. For most of the field work the team split up to work separately in order to increase efficiency. Furthermore, the turnover of staff in the CO meant that many former CO staff members who had played an important role during the 2012 and 2013 period were no longer in Mozambique. To mitigate this, the evaluation team telephonically interviewed a number of these staff members.
10. General weaknesses and inconsistencies in WFP monitoring and reporting also constrained the evaluation - this was particularly the case with regards to the limited outcome level data available. Additionally, output monitoring data are rarely disaggregated by sex or age, which further limits evaluability of the participation of men and women.

1.2 Country Context

11. Mozambique (a country with a population of 25 million) is the third most exposed country in Africa to climate effects, with several floods having hit parts in the last few years⁵, particularly in south and central Mozambique. Growing levels of

⁵ In 2007 and 2008, the country experienced severe floods, as a result of heavy rains in the neighbouring countries (Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi), resulting in the displacement of tens of thousands of people and large areas of affected crops. In January 2013, the floods in the Limpopo river basin impacted the province of Gaza, where an estimated total of 150,000 people were displaced, and had to be housed in temporary camps. In early 2015 floods hit Mozambique again.

deforestation – a direct effect of population growth and a strong reliance on firewood for cooking – have further exacerbated this problem. The strong concentration of population along the 2,700 km coastline further increases Mozambique’s vulnerability⁶.

12. Drought is the major reason for harvest losses and for the depleted income sources of vulnerable households. Droughts contributed to the death of an estimated 4,000 people between 1980 and 2000 (CFSVA, 2010). Poor and chronically food insecure populations are the most vulnerable to climate effects⁷. Poverty levels are high overall - depending on the dataset used and the statistical analysis applied, the national poverty rate is anything between 49.6 percent⁸ and 79.3 percent⁹. Most poor populations living in rural areas survive on less than USD1.25/day and lack basic services such as access to safe water, health facilities and education (National Household Survey-2008-2009)¹⁰. Poverty in Mozambique has a gendered impact with female-headed households more likely to be poor compared to male-headed households.
13. Over the last decade Mozambique has made impressive economic progress, driven by exploitation of natural gas, coal and minerals¹¹. This progress is reflected in the growing revenues and the average annual economic growth rate of 7.2 percent over the last decade¹². During this decade, Mozambique’s dependency on foreign aid has been substantially reduced. According to recent World Bank data, gross national income (GNI) increased by 106 percent between 1980 and 2012 (UNDP, 2014), and is currently USD470 per capita. However, this masks the skewed distribution of wealth reflected by the relatively high growth in income in urban areas, where the average per capita GNI is USD1,100 compared to only USD120 in rural areas
14. Mozambique has performed well in the 2013 Millennium Development Goal (MDG) assessment (UNDP, 2014) and ranks a high second among countries that

⁶ The fact that 60 percent of the population lives in the coastal zones makes them particularly vulnerable to rapid onset disasters like cyclones which occur between one and five times a year.

⁷ Food insecurity (acute and chronic combined) is most prevalent in the northern province of Cabo Delgado (39 percent), and in the southern provinces of Gaza (34 percent), and Maputo (28 percent). However, Tete (in the center of the country), and Zambezia, and Niassa Provinces (in the northern region) have the highest percentages of chronically food insecure households (44-45 percent) (WFP, 2010 accessed at: <http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/ena/wfp226896.pdf>)

⁸ 3rd National Poverty Assessment 2010

⁹ UNDP Multi-Dimensional Poverty Survey 2011

¹⁰ The 2009 assessment classified some 50 percent of the urban population as poor as compared to 57 percent of the rural population, while in 2003 this difference is even smaller: 52 percent poverty in urban area and 55 percent in rural area (van den Boom, 2011)

¹¹ “The main economic transformation in Mozambique has been the discovery over 2010 – 2012 of very large deposits of exploitable gas in the Rovuma Basin, off the coast of Cabo Delgado province. Anadarko Petroleum Corporation and the Italian company, ENI, who are leading the exploration work in this area have stated that there are known reserves in the Rovuma Basin alone in excess of 100 trillion cubic feet⁹, which would justify the construction of a Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) facility on the coast” (ITAD, 2014, p. 36).

¹² AfDB 2012:

<http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Mozambique%20Full%20PDF%20Country%20Note.pdf>

are showing accelerated progress¹³. However, much of the progress in its MDG poverty targets comes from economic growth in urban areas. Growth is a long way from being 'pro-poor'. Challenges persist, and are reflected in Mozambique's poor performance on the United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) Human Development Index (HDI) (UNDP, 2013) where the country is ranked 185th out of 187 countries.

15. Since the end of the war in 1992, the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) has continued to be the ruling party and has dominated the political space and decisions related to the country's growing economic wealth. The opposition Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) has (particularly since 2013) been operating a campaign of low-level economic disruption in an attempt to force concessions from the Government. The most recent elections were held in October 2014. Although there had been some concerns that a lack of consensus over the reform agenda would undermine political stability, the overall process has been peaceful.
16. Mozambique has made spectacular progress in increasing enrolment in primary education. Between 2004 and 2011, enrolment in the first five grades of primary education increased by 41 percent from 3.1 million to 4.4 million. In the last two grades of primary (EP2, or grades 6 and 7), enrolment increased by 78 percent from 489,000 to 870,000. However, progress has been less spectacular in the area of education quality. There has been a drop in grade 5 pass rates between 2007 and 2011 in all provinces. In some cases, this drop is more than 10 percentage points (such as is the case for Cabo Delgado, Nampula, Zambézia, and Gaza provinces). Overall dropout rates in primary level have increased between 2002 and 2011. The lowest dropout rate nationally was recorded in 2003 at 8% and the highest was 18% in 2010, with a slight drop to 17% in 2011. And while the gender gap in enrolment in primary school has been reduced to virtual parity, completion rates still show troubling differences: 80% among boys and 65.1% among girls (Visser, 2013).
17. In the area of education, public investment (funded to a large extent by donors) has focused on expanding access, reducing gender inequalities, improving quality, and building overall institutional capacity. Education is the most decentralized sector of government with school committees managing a portion of the funds allocated for their respective schools. Results have mainly been in the area of quantitative growth of the system accompanied by a narrowing gender gap in access and progression at primary level. However, data on educational performance highlight that quality challenges persist in the sector. A regional study on the learning achievements of children showed that Mozambique has amongst the lowest learning levels of children in the region (SACMEQ, 2009), and that quality issues are more severe as one moves up levels of the system. The Ministry of Education (MOE) and its partners have identified quality as a major area of focus in the coming period. The Education Sector Strategic Plan (ESSP) has identified school feeding as an important strategy for improving school

¹³ The only areas where accelerated progress is outstanding is 'forest cover', 'tuberculosis incidence', 'protected areas', 'safe drinking water', and 'basic sanitation' (UNDP, 2014)

retention and completion - particularly amongst girls. WFP support to school feeding dates back over more than two decades albeit on a limited scale.

18. Health facilities remain basic in rural areas. In 2008, the country had just three trained medical staff per 100,000 people. The incidence of diarrhoea, malaria and intestinal parasites continues to be high, and are some of the immediate causes of malnutrition. The prevalence of acute malnutrition (low weight for height or wasting) in children under five years of age is 7.9 per cent (SETSAN, 2013) and ranges from 14.1 per cent in Nampula to 2.8 per cent in Maputo City. Chronic malnutrition continues to be a major problem among this age group even though there has been a very slight decrease over the past five years. The prevalence of chronic malnutrition in children under five years of age reduced slightly from 44 percent (MICS 2008 and DHS 2011) to 43 percent (SETSAN 2013 and DHS and 2011) but the rate remains critically high (≥ 39 percent) according to the World Health Organization's (WHO's) scale. Mozambique's high malnutrition levels are not simply linked to food availability as is evidenced by the fact that malnutrition rates are higher in the north where food insecurity is generally lower. Factors contributing to the high malnutrition rates include disease, unsafe drinking water, poor sanitation, and poor infant feeding and care practices. Other factors include high rates of early marriages and childbirth and mothers' education levels.
19. Mozambique's vast area¹⁴ and generally fertile soil mean that the country has the potential to become self-sufficient in food production and even become a regional exporter. Agriculture contributes to 28 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Eighty percent (80 percent) of the population depend on agriculture for their livelihoods with smallholder farmers responsible for 95 percent of agricultural production. More recently, there has been an increase in commercial farming along the growth corridors of Maputo and Beira. However, the sector's output and productivity are still very low due to limited market access, post-harvest infrastructure, availability of credit and insurance mechanisms, as well as vulnerability to climate change
20. For the last four years Mozambique's annual food deficit has averaged 500,000MT (cereal equivalent) and approximately 60 percent of the country's annual cereal requirement of 890,000MT is imported¹⁵. Forty percent of the population faces food insecurity at some point every year¹⁶. Key events that have impacted on food security and livelihoods in the past four years include: irregular and below average overall rainfall patterns aggravated by cyclones which have affected crop performance and access to local livelihood options; seasonal river floods which cause some crop and livestock destruction; a combination of seasonal river floods and dry spells which have led to poor harvests and above-

¹⁴ The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) estimates that only 16 percent of available land is currently used.

¹⁵ (WFP, 2010 accessed at:

<http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/ena/wfp226896.pdf>)

¹⁶ (WFP, 2010 accessed at:

<http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/ena/wfp226896.pdf>)

average food insecurity, especially in the central and southern regions (FEWSNET, 2014¹⁷); and deteriorating terms of trade due to increased international food and fuel prices.

21. Although women make up the majority of the economically active population (55 percent), they are predominantly engaged in the agricultural sector with 90 percent of economically active women in household food production with limited surplus production. Women are primarily reliant on subsistence farming and may thus not be benefitting from the economic boom of the last decade, as commercial farming encroaches on their land use.
22. Social protection is an area that has recently gained increasing attention and importance in Mozambique. In 2007, the Mozambican government entered a new phase in its social-protection response by establishing a formal social safety net policy. The safety net has three-pillars: a) compulsory social security for employees in the public and private sectors; b) a basic social security programme for society's poorest and most vulnerable; and c) a complementary social security programme, at an extra cost, for those workers who are already members of the compulsory social security programme (both for public- and private-sector workers and the self-employed). In spite of increased emphasis, the social security system currently takes up less than 0.2 percent of GDP, and covers less than 8.3 percent of poor households¹⁸. The policy environment has been slow to develop. It took the government until 2009 to pass the regulation for implementing the basic social-security subsystem, and an additional year before a 2010 Ministerial Council Resolution (MCR) put in place a National Strategy for Basic Social Security (2010 – 2014). Various social protection pilots are currently underway to explore different delivery options for to eligible groups.
23. Mozambique has enjoyed broad support within the international donor community for its middle- and long-term development strategies. Mozambique has also been a leader in the harmonization and alignment of aid following the Paris principles (2005) and the various commitments (Accra (2008), Seoul (2011), etc.) that followed. The country's main poverty reduction strategy, the Poverty Reduction Action Plan (PARP), has a strong focus on agriculture. The government's performance as a whole is assessed according to a multiannual matrix of priority targets and indicators – the Performance Assessment Framework (PAF) - which measures progress on delivery of the PARP. The indicators in the PAF framework refer to sector priorities as well as cross-cutting issues and overarching themes (e.g. governance). The matrix also assesses the performance of external partners against a number of key indicators.
24. Donor programmes are expected to align with the overall PARP and the sector policies and strategies. Sector approaches have included Sector Budget Support (SBS), joint programmes as well as specific projects that are in line with the sector and country priorities. Mozambique has also been a major beneficiary of General

¹⁷ http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/MZ%20LHdescriptions%202013%20en2-7_o.pdf Accessed 15 September 2014

¹⁸ One of the key initiatives consist of an unconditional cash transfer to the vulnerable reaching out to about 150 thousand people

Budget Support (GBS). The recent evaluation (ITAD, 2014) of GBS draws positive conclusions with respect to the outcomes of GBS overall, citing increased funding to social sectors, as well as very good progress in education (including on gender issues) and, to a somewhat more limited extent, in governance.

25. Mozambique is also one of eight pilot-project countries for the UN's Delivering as One programme whereby all UN agencies (including WFP) contribute towards a United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) based on their comparative advantages. The UNDAF covers three main areas, i.e. improving social services, strengthening economic performance, and governance and seeks to ensure that environmental issues are taken into consideration in development planning. The UNDAF and its Action Plan are fully aligned with national priorities as outlined in the PARP and national sector policies. Both the PARP and the UNDAF have provisionally been extended into 2015 and are expected to continue being aligned.
26. Mozambique is also a leader country in the Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) movement, which aims at addressing nutrition issues through a scaled up multi-sectoral response. As a member of the SUN Movement, Mozambique has committed to: (a) ensuring that programmes in all sectors of government are sensitive to nutrition; and (b) increasing coverage of proven interventions that improve nutrition during the first 1,000 days of a child's life - from conception until the child's second birthday¹⁹.

1.3 Operation Overview

27. The CP falls within WFP's overall Country Strategy for Mozambique (2012–2015) which envisions a transition from food aid to food assistance, and supporting and enhancing government programmes to constitute sustainable national solutions to food insecurity.
28. The WFP CP operation was approved by WFP's Executive Board (EB) in February 2012, and started in March 2012. The project planned to support just over 1.2 million beneficiaries of which approximately 70 percent would be women. The project document outlined two objectives:
 - Support human and social development, through improved basic nutrition, scaling up of social action, and home-grown school meals; and
 - Strengthen livelihoods by enhancing small farmers' access to markets and improving food security and information for disaster risk reduction
29. These objectives were aligned to WFP's corporate 2008-2013 Strategic Objectives (SO) 2, 4 and 5²⁰. With the revision of WFP's Corporate Strategic Objectives for 2014-2018, a new logframe was developed for the CP, which resulted in new

¹⁹ <http://scalingupnutrition.org/about>

²⁰ The Strategic Objectives are: SO 1—save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies; SO 3—restore and rebuild lives and livelihoods in post-conflict, post-disaster or transition situations; and SO 5—strengthen the capacities of countries to reduce hunger, including through hand-over strategies and local purchase.

indicators being developed for the relevant objectives - Strategic Objectives 2, 3 and 4 of the new Strategic Framework.

30. The initial resource requirements for the CP (in March 2012) were estimated at USD 105 million; this was revised to USD 104 million in 2014. In total the CP has had four amendments through Budget Revisions (BR) to the initial project document, one in 2012, two in 2013 and one in 2014²¹. The main donors to the operation were UN Common Funds (46 percent), Canada (19 percent) and Belgium (14 percent).
31. The CP has been substantially underfunded over the period under review in the evaluation – in September 2014 the CP was funded at 41 percent of the planned amount, but by the end of 2014, funding levels had reached 60 percent.

Table 2. Funding Level of the CP for 2012-2014

Funding levels in USD		Percent of total
Funded	62,218,917	60%
Shortfall	41,900,485	40%
Total budget	104,119,402	

Source: SPR 2102, 2013 and 2014 (draft)

32. As a result of this shortfall, the CO introduced various cost saving measures in 2014 and intensified its strategy for resource mobilization. At the time of this evaluation, the CO was in the process of drafting a financial contingency plan, strengthening its fundraising efforts and introducing further cost-reduction measures.

The CP document included five interlinked components, namely:

33. **School Feeding:** This component foresaw the establishment of a Home-Grown School Feeding Programme, which would build on WFP’s experience and would be gradually expanded, with an increasing share of funding being contributed by Government. The component also envisioned testing of different models of school feeding (e.g. locally adapted food baskets, cash-based support, etc.) for later up-scale through the National School Feeding Programme (NSFP). The component included a transition phase which focused on strengthening the government’s institutional capacity to gradually take over the school feeding programme. This was to be accomplished through technical and financial support to the government in the areas of infrastructure development, training, and the development of a joint monitoring plan. In addition, the component also envisioned supporting the Government in developing and adopting a school

²¹ BR1 (10/05/2012): substituted cash and in kind food with vouchers, resulting in a budget decrease of USD1.5m. BR2 (15/01/2013): Increased land-side transport, handling and storage costs resulting in a budget increase of USD1.1m. BR3 (21/08/2013): Replaced in-kind food by cash and voucher transfers under component 2 and introduced other technical adjustments. This BR resulted in a decrease of USD0.9m. BR4 (18/07/2014): This BR resulted in a budget decrease of USD1.08m. Increases were made to the Cash & Voucher (C&V) component and to budgets for technical support to national institutions while budget for treatment of Moderate Acute Malnutrition (MAM) – which was partly taken over by other partners.

feeding strategy. The component planned to cover 227,700 school children, teachers and cooks, in three provinces (data as per fourth Budget Revision), and from 2016, the CP envisioned that the Government would fully fund its NSFP. Synergies to WFP's work in market access (through local purchases), social action (relief of food insecure households) and nutrition (prevention of chronic malnutrition by targeting adolescent girls) were envisioned in the design.

34. **Social protection:** Under this component, the CP planned to support the Government's Direct Social Action interventions, covering about 368,000 beneficiaries (177,853 male and 190,333 female)²² through the provision of food or, where feasible, cash or vouchers. The CP's social protection component comprised two interventions: a) a conditional safety net for vulnerable households with the ability to work, in the form of cash or Food For Assets through the Programa Acção Social Produtiva (PASP) programme, and b) an unconditional safety net for highly vulnerable households with low labour availability (households hosting tuberculosis (TB) patients, People Living With HIV and AIDS (PLHIV/AIDS), pregnant and lactating women (PLW), etc.), in the form of a food voucher and Super Cereal delivered through the Programa de Assistencia Social Directa (PASD) programme. Both components aimed to contribute to the CP's overarching objective, WFP SO5²³; while individually, the PASP focused on delivering against SO2²⁴, and the PASD on SO4²⁵. For both the direct and productive social action, WFP would follow Government selection criteria, quality standards, duration of support etc. Social action activities would be closely linked to curative nutrition (via referral mechanisms), prevention of chronic malnutrition (through improved sanitation), disaster risk reduction at local level (through productive social action interventions), and to agricultural and livelihood development.
35. **Nutrition:** The nutrition component planned to cover 668,400 beneficiaries in total, of whom 493,470 women. The component included planned curative nutrition support to clients enrolled in the National Programme for Nutritional Rehabilitation (PRN). The CP would adopt all patients in one clinic (clinics to be selected in consultation with the Ministry of Health (MISAU) within WFP focus areas) to avoid stigmatization of certain patient groups and to prevent excessive inclusion errors. In the area of prevention of chronic malnutrition (stunting), WFP planned to provide nutritional supplements and micronutrient powders to children below two years of age, assist the nutritional rehabilitation of PLW and offer micronutrient capsules to PLW. Another element of WFP's nutrition programme was linked to the school feeding component which included the provision of micronutrient powders to adolescent girls thus ensuring healthy and complete nutrition of potential young mothers.

²² BR4 figures

²³ SO5: Strengthen the capacities of countries to reduce hunger, including through handover strategies and local purchase

²⁴ SO2: Prevent acute hunger and invest in disaster preparedness and mitigation measures

²⁵ SO4: Reduce chronic hunger and under-nutrition.

36. **Market Access:** MA was to include WFP's Purchase for Progress (P4P) project as a component of the CP. The focus of this component was on providing support to increase market access by supporting the development of value chains which encourage development of marketing infrastructures, making the activities more visible through a more prominent engagement in the other components, and to ensure that the potential of strong synergies were capitalised on. The component would focus on capacity building of smallholder producers, and developing market information systems in support of smallholders and local entrepreneurs. An annual average of 30,000 farmers would benefit from WFP support through enhanced market opportunities, improved storage and aggregation facilities (such as community storage facilities as local assets), as well as training in post-harvest practices and quality assurance. The component would also support a high share of local purchases for all programme components, efforts to support fortification as an important contribution to the fight against chronic malnutrition, and strengthening of market information.
37. **Risk Reduction:** This component focused on strengthening food security information management for risk reduction by supporting two crucial Government institutions - the Technical Secretariat for Food Security and Nutrition (SETSAN) and the National Disaster Management Institute (INGC). The component would help establish knowledge and capacity preparedness, which would be reflected in district development plans, community adaptation plans etc. The component would also provide analysis and localised information to all CP components by increasing the national capacity to understand food security issues, map hunger and inform the preparation/ revision of national policies and programmes.
38. In terms of funding allocations, school feeding and social protection consumed most of the CP resources with 35 and 38 percent of the resources received respectively, followed by 23 percent for nutrition, and 2 percent each for the remaining two components. The evaluation ToR called for a particular focus on the first two components. This is reflected in the analysis in this report.
39. Finally it is important to note a number of assumptions that underpinned the CP, namely:
- CP components would be implemented not as independent WFP interventions, rather in direct support of specific national programmes
 - CP activities would contribute to national capacity of Government through strengthening of systems and structures
 - Interventions would focus on a limited number of districts in the central and southern provinces and, within these areas, a high degree of coverage and co-location of operations would be pursued to facilitate an envisioned Government scale up, improved possibilities for referral/synergies between the various components, increased potential impact of the interventions, and increased operational efficiency
40. Specific studies would establish the choice between cash or voucher-based modalities, and whether these were more cost-efficient than food-based support.

Efforts would be made under the market access component to promote/ support national production capacity.

41. With respect to hand-over, it is foreseen that after the CP, WFP's role would predominantly focus on providing technical assistance/capacity development for the continuation of the various components i.e. unless service provision was contracted directly by Government of Mozambique

2 EVALUATION FINDINGS

2.1 Appropriateness of the Operation

2.1.1 RELEVANCE

42. All five CP components aimed to contribute to the CP's overriding objective of strengthening Mozambique's to reduce hunger. The capacity development objective included a focus on handover strategies and local purchase capacity development (WFP SO5 under the 2008-2013 strategy²⁶ and a cross-cutting issue in the four SOs of the new 2014-2017 strategy). The five individual components of the CP, meanwhile, focused on delivering against SO2²⁷ and SO4²⁸.
43. Appropriateness of activities and transfer modalities – A thorough context analysis informed programme design. Evidence and lesson learning from the previous CP and was taken into account in decisions around the components of the CP. This led to objectives and activities that appropriately sought to address food insecurity and nutrition needs of families and households, and which focused on providing critical support to beneficiaries in need.
44. The **design** of the CP components was based on a high level of involvement of relevant government institutions. The MOE was involved in the design of the school feeding component while the National Institute of Social Action (INAS) provided key input in the design of the social protection component. The involvement of these institutions in the design (and delivery) of many aspects of the programme is highly appropriate to the achievement of WFP's capacity development objective (SO5), and also to the cross-cutting nature of capacity development articulated in the new WFP Strategy. The CP also clearly reflected successful capacity development strategies such as a focus on applying skills (i.e. "learning by doing") and providing on-going support to implementation.
45. Overall the **linkages between activities, outputs and outcomes**, was found to be logical and relevant in the case of school feeding, social protection, nutrition and risk reduction. However, in the case of the market access component, the ET found that the linkages between outputs and outcomes, were not obvious.
46. In terms of **geographical targeting**, the CP's geographical focus was determined by the share of the food insecure population in an area rather than overall number of food insecure people. In addition, WFP considered the

²⁶ SO5: Strengthen the capacities of countries to reduce hunger, including through handover strategies and local purchase

²⁷ SO2: Prevent acute hunger and invest in disaster preparedness and mitigation measures

²⁸ SO4: Reduce chronic hunger and under-nutrition.

presence of potential partners for each component as well as the importance of contributing to national capacity development to respond to shocks and increase food security.

47. The ET found that a systematic, logical and transparent approach was used in selecting operational districts. Geographical areas were identified through more than 20 consecutive assessments (February 2004 to August 2009) and resulted in an estimation of potential caseloads at risk of shocks and those who had experienced longer-term food insecurity (protracted caseloads). The selection process enabled WFP to present the Government of Mozambique with clear reasons for its geographical focus. School feeding districts for the transition programme were selected using criteria which combined the geographical priority areas with access and performance indicators in education. Selection of districts also considered the planned concentration of WFP's activities in order to maximize efficiency - a key recommendation of the evaluation of the previous WFP CP. However, the choice of 12 schools for the pilot phase was not informed by the same argument of concentration. Instead, a decision was made by Government to select schools in four different provinces, based on the rationale that this would provide a means of testing the school feeding model in different agro-ecological areas, covering different geographical zones. While logical in theory, in practice this approach created challenges of supervision and support (discussed later in this report), and did not follow the same cost-effectiveness principles that were behind the decision to concentrate the transition programme.
48. The CP's geographical focus sought to achieve synergies between the various components. As a result, the nutrition interventions were focussed in areas that met the food security criteria discussed above but which were not necessarily the most affected by malnutrition. The northern part of Mozambique has the highest levels of malnutrition but does not have the highest levels of food insecurity. However, the prevention of chronic malnutrition activities under the Nutrition component (originally part of the CP but implemented under a separate trust fund), were planned only for Tete Province which has a malnutrition prevalence rate of above 44 percent among children under five years of age (DHS, 2011).
49. **Beneficiary selection** is an important element/input of relevance. As noted above, school feeding focussed on selected districts for the transition programme, and on specific schools for the pilot. In the case of the transition programme, the most food insecure district in Tete Province was chosen in line with the geographical selection criteria where all schools in the district were covered. For the pilot programme, schools were selected in the food insecure districts using the sensible criterion of having previously shown promising management capacity. The selection of households under the social protection PASP was done by specifically established committees with the instruction that beneficiaries should be a) vulnerable and b) able to work. Testimony from the field visits found that these instructions were mostly followed. However, at the beginning of the programme in some areas (e.g. the district of Massingir), INAS staff registered

considerably more²⁹ people than there were spaces for on the programme. These people completed several months' worth of work before the problem was noticed and ended up not receiving payment for the work they had done. In terms of PASD, programme beneficiaries were only eligible if they were categorised as belonging to a highly vulnerable group³⁰, had a Body Mass Index (BMI) of less than 18.5, and had been referred by a clinic to INAS where the final decision was made whether to register the individual or not based on an assessment of their socio-economic circumstances. This categorical targeting system made it highly unlikely that non-eligible people were registered. The evaluation found no evidence of inclusion error; however, it was reported that a bug in the voucher software sometimes allowed beneficiaries to continue to receive vouchers after their second six-month cycle on the programme³¹.

50. The level and nature of support to Orphans and Vulnerable Children (OVC) changed over the course of the CP. From the start of the CP to August 2012, OVCs in all WFP districts were supported with a food ration³². From August 2012 to December 2013 support was provided to OVCs in WFP priority districts only. However, the expense of distributing small quantities of food to a widely dispersed caseload, plus difficulties with monitoring, led to the decision, in December 2013, to channel all OVC support through orphanages. This is in line with the Mozambican Government's current Social Protection strategy, which targets OVC-headed households for support, but not OVCs in general (i.e. those hosted by other households).
51. Criteria for Super Cereal supplementation through the PRN included: pregnant and lactating women with a Mid-Upper Arm Circumference (MUAC) of less than 22cm or those with insufficient weight gain during pregnancy; children between 6 and 14 years of age, with MAM, and adults with HIV/TB with MAM. These criteria appear to have been followed in the locations visited by the ET, and also informed the qualification of beneficiaries for the PASD under the social protection component resulting in a synergy between the nutrition and social protection components.
52. While the rates of serious acute malnutrition (SAM) and MAM are relatively low, these do have an impact on infant mortality. This makes the treatment of MAM important and highly relevant to prevent SAM and to avoid infant mortality. Reducing the rates of mortality of children under five is one of the main priorities of the Ministry of Health. Supplementation for PLW is similarly relevant because it contributes to the prevention of SAM and improves nutritional status in this way contributing to the prevention of chronic malnutrition of the foetus. The

²⁹ In Chipalalapa (Tete Province) informants reported that 1,500 more people than there was budget available for. These people also completed several months work – without payment.

³⁰ OVC, HIV/AIDS, Pregnant /Lactating, TB client

³¹ If clients' BMI had not exceeded 18.5 after two cycles of receiving food and Super Cereal they were deemed to be incurable.

³² A ration of cereals and pulses for the orphan only, up to a maximum of two orphans per household delivered by partner NGOs.

Multisectoral Action Plan for the Reduction of Chronic Malnutrition (PAMRDC) 2011-2015 mentions the activities of WFP in this area.

53. The activities considered for implementation under the sub-component - prevention of chronic malnutrition (stunting), although not implemented, were appropriate in that they reflected the multi-faceted nature of the causes of, and contributors to, stunting. Activities under this sub-component were intended to address maternal undernutrition, inappropriate infant and young child feeding and care practices, and health system limitations. Activities included distribution of LNS to children 6-24 months; IYCF BCC; support to on-going health system interventions; treatment of MAM in PLW (with CSB+). The activities under the nutrition component focusing on preventing chronic malnutrition targeted pregnant women and children under two years of age. This is relevant as the window of opportunity for preventing stunting is during the first 1,000 days – from conception to the age of two. The CP also sought to appropriately address the community and societal factors leading to stunting by supporting and strengthening provincial capacity in the coordination of the Multi-sectoral Plan of Action for the Reduction of Chronic Malnutrition (PAMRDC).

2.1.1.2 INTERNAL COHERENCE

54. This section of the report examines the coherence between the CP and compliance with key elements of WFP internal policies. Considering the extent to which many aspects of the design and delivery of the CP components were expected to follow Government established priorities and were implemented by government agencies, the relevance of this analysis is, in the opinion of the ET, somewhat limited. This is especially important given that Mozambique, as noted in the introduction of this report, has a strong track record in harmonization and alignment, and strongly encourages partners to have a supportive and funding role, rather than a leading one. Nonetheless in most respects, internal coherence of the CP (and of components of the CP) with WFP policies was fairly strong.
55. In this section we look at the CP's coherence with the WFP strategy for Mozambique, with overarching WFP policies on capacity development (WFP, 2009) and gender (WFP, 2009), and then briefly comment on adherence to WFP's component-specific policies, particularly in education and social protection, as the evaluation was focused on these areas.

2.1.1.2.1 Coherence with WFPs country strategy for Mozambique

56. The CP is well aligned with WFPs country strategy which focuses on WFP Mozambique's Country Strategy 2012 – 2015, which prioritises three areas: Human and Social Development, Market Access, and Disaster Risk Management. Key priorities of the strategy including capacity development of government and working to support policy development are reflected in the CP design and implementation.

2.1.1.2.2 Coherence with WFP's Capacity Development Policy

57. From a **capacity development perspective** - an important focus of this CP - the design of the various components and activities is relevant to WFP's own policy on capacity development. The CP's predominant focus in all components

was on developing Government capacity and this was evident through the Government's active involvement in the design and implementation of specific CP components (as well as decision making). Capacity development/training to enable take over by the Government was included at different levels.

2.1.2.3 Coherence with WFP's Gender Policy

58. The CP's approach to **gender**, while coherent with WFP's policy, is not comprehensive enough. Numeric targets were set across the CP components for participation of women and men in various activities and in decision-making bodies. But there was little evidence that the approach involved more than tabulating the statistics. For example, the design of the school feeding component sought to ensure adequate representation and participation of women in school feeding through school management committees. However, despite the design, there was little evidence of equal participation of women or that gender was being actively monitored in the field by WFP (beyond the numeric targets). For example school councils include a minimum of two women from the community and two female students (among a total of 10 to 12 members). However, in most cases women's participation in school management committees focussed on positions related to cooking and generally not those with strong decision making roles (e.g. treasurer, president of the committee, etc.). Likewise, in most locations visited, the rotational aspect of the responsibility for cooking (which was put in place to avoid overburdening women) was not respected. However, a number of important advances reflecting the new WFP's gender priorities should be noted. For example, the introduction of fuel saving stoves in schools was consistently cited as having reduced the burden for women and girls of fetching fire-wood. In one school in Gaza, WFP helped organize women into an association which produced vegetables for sale to the school (and to other clients), and this significantly contributed to women's income generation. Furthermore, awareness of gender issues was evident in the interviews that the ET conducted among men, providing a good basis for continuing to ensure the involvement of men in addressing gender challenges.
59. The design of both PASP and PASD - under the social protection component - was consistent with WFP's gender guidance. Most direct beneficiaries of PASP and PASD were women, and work norms under PASP were designed to allow women time to complete other household tasks. All beneficiaries interviewed in this evaluation reported that the work sites and distribution centres were free of violence or intimidation, but in the absence of a formal mechanism through which to launch complaints (a weakness across the social protection component) it is difficult to verify whether this was indeed the case.
60. In the case of nutrition, there were targets for both male and female beneficiaries. While beneficiaries of nutrition interventions are primarily selected based on anthropometric criteria, pregnant and lactating women are specifically targeted with many of the interventions under this component.
61. In terms of Market Access, the CP clearly stated a focus on women's economic empowerment through market activities. However, between 2012 and 2014, activities implemented to put these into practice were limited in terms of scope, audience, duration and resources. WFP did not address (either through direct

intervention or financing to Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO)) major areas such as institutional mechanisms fostering women participation, functional literacy or access to credit, and no dedicated monitoring, evaluation and reporting system was established. The ET found some level of awareness of gender issues among farmer respondents from Farmer Organizations (FO). However, none mentioned tangible changes resulting from WFP's or NGOs' interventions. Moreover, none of the FOs visited had organized meetings as a follow-up to WFP organised- or supported gender awareness sessions, and none had formulated a specific agenda for women empowerment (nor did they intend to do so).

2.1.2.4 Coherence with WFP's Component-Specific Policies

62. A notable omission in the coherence with WFP policy on Social Protection was the absence of a grievance procedure in the social protection component to allow beneficiaries to query issues such as delayed payments.³³ The component was also not entirely in line with the guidance on 'ensuring predictability' and fully 'taking account of context' as evidenced by the teething problems associated with acquainting a beneficiary group which is largely illiterate and totally alien to the world of banking to an Automated Teller Machine (ATM)-based cash distribution system. In other areas of the CP, mechanisms for feedback on problems were also found to be weak. Respondents across the CP components consistently raised issues that had been highlighted to superiors (of WFP or the Government) and where response had been lacking for weeks/months. This was the case for example in school feeding, as well as in nutrition. Coherence with other aspects of WFP component specific policies (on school feeding, nutrition, etc.) was found to be good.
63. The nutrition component of the CP is coherent with WFP's Nutrition Policy which recognizes the importance of adequate nutrition during the first 1000 days of a child's life, and prioritizes the prevention of chronic malnutrition as well as the prevention and treatment of MAM with a focus on children, pregnant and lactating mothers and other vulnerable people. The nutrition component is also coherent with WFP's HIV/AIDS policy which recommends that WFP "support the rehabilitation of moderately malnourished ART and/or TB clients through nutrition and food support."

2.1.3 EXTERNAL COHERENCE

2.1.3.1 External Coherence with Government of Mozambique Policies.

64. External coherence refers to the coherence between what WFP designed and the policies of the government and other partners. Overall the evaluation finds that the components of the WFP CP were well aligned with the Mozambican government policies and strategies at the time of CP design. The School Feeding component was found to be in line with the priorities in the National Education

³³ In Caia, for example, the total costs for one Cash for Assets (CFA) participant receiving cash transfers over a period of six months – including the cash grant itself, bank related transaction costs, salaries and overheads, as well as costs related to the signing of a Field Level Agreement with a local implementing agency – amounted to USD 185. Had the same person instead been provided food for the value of the cash grant and over the same period of time, the total costs would have arrived at USD 219 (WFP 2012)

Policy and Strategy, which identifies school feeding as an important strategy for improving access and participation in education. The support by WFP to the design of a NSFP during the CP period is important because it ensured appropriate coherence. However, the national school feeding policy is not costed, and this makes it difficult for the policy to move into practice. The evaluation also noted that there is a clear inconsistency between the CP's assumptions in terms of government take over and Government capacity to do so in the medium term.

65. In the area of Social Protection the evaluation also found high levels of coherence with policies and programmes of external institutions, particularly the organs of the Government of Mozambique responsible for implementing SP (Ministry of Women and Social Action, INAS and SETSAN). Given that the SP programme's core business is implementing two³⁴ of four elements of the Mozambique National Strategy for Basic SP through the UNDAF Joint Programme on Social Protection (JPSP)³⁵, and that WFP sits on the Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty (PARPA) Social Action Working Group³⁶, such high levels of coherence are to be expected³⁷. In implementation, however, the ET found that the CP has a record of patchy compliance with internal procedures and normative guidance, and has not been entirely consistent with the guidance provided by the Mozambican Government. However criticism of this must be tempered by the fact that there has been a strong commitment by the CO to synchronise the CP with the Government of Mozambique's school feeding and SP policies and assist with the roll out.
66. As noted earlier, the level and nature of OVC support changed over the course of the CP. Since the end of 2013, WFP has channelled all OVC support through orphanages, with a gradual phasing out so that NGOs and Community Based Organizations (CBOs) working with WFP could take over the support of the OVCs. While this is more limiting than WFP's typical support to OVCs in other CPs, it is in line with the Government of Mozambique's current Social Protection strategy. However, WFP has successfully advocated for a change of policy on this, and the Government of Mozambique's new Social Protection strategy will be explicit about the need to support all OVCs, not just those heading households. This is an important achievement for WFP as it provided key input into policy level dialogue as per its own priorities for engagement.
67. The market access component was found to be fully consistent with rural sector development objectives stated in the Government of Mozambique's Five Year

³⁴ PASD and PASP

³⁵ The UN Joint Programme on Social Protection was established in 2007 and includes three UN agencies: the WFP which handles implementation issues, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) which advocates for fiscal space for support of SP, and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), whose responsibility is policy development.

³⁶ The body in the Ministry of Women and Social Action (MMAS), INAS, bilateral and multilateral partners and civil society organisation are represented to collaborate and coordinate actions in the area of Social Protection

³⁷ In this context it is relevant to note that WFP was one of the first external agencies involved in implementing SP-type programmes in Mozambique, with its Community Safety Net Programme in 2002. Much of WFP's guidance for targeting, registration, setting of work norms and payment systems currently used by the Government of Mozambique were originally developed by WFP

Plan (PQG), Action Plan for the Reduction of Poverty (PARP II), Green Revolution Strategy (ERV) and Strategic Plan for the Development of the Agrarian Sector (PEDSA).

68. CP activities around the treatment of acute malnutrition are part of the acute malnutrition treatment protocol, which is the main government policy document with respect to nutrition. This has provided important guidance and been taken into account in the design of the CP's nutrition component. The CP is coherent with the Nutrition policy given that the policy emphasis that WFP will focus on designing and implementing programmes and operations in five domains: treatment of MAM, prevention of acute malnutrition, prevention of chronic malnutrition, addressing micro-nutrient deficiencies of vulnerable persons to reduce the mortality and improve health through fortification, and strengthening the focus on nutrition in programmes that do not have a primary nutrition objective. As the current CP includes components of treatment of MAM, prevention of acute malnutrition and prevention of chronic malnutrition it is coherent with this policy. Furthermore, the prevention of chronic malnutrition sub-component was coherent with the PAMDRC – Mozambique's multi-sectoral action plan for reducing stunting.

2.1.3.2 External Coherence with UN Agencies.

69. Planning of the CP included collaboration with UN agencies across a number of components, in the context of the UN "Delivering as One" pilot in Mozambique. School feeding was to include joint support to the transition schools in Changara (Tete Province) to strengthen educational quality in the form of inputs by other UN agencies (e.g. de-worming through WHO support, and UNICEF support for water and sanitation, as well as United Nation's Food And Agriculture Organization (FAO) supported interventions to strengthen the school garden initiative in schools - particularly in the pilot schools). The choice for Changara district was unanimously made by six UN agencies. However, the field visits by the ET revealed that only part of this envisioned collaboration took place. Deworming activities had taken place in all the schools visited by the ET. However, only one of the schools had received support from extension services for the school garden, and none of the schools had been supported with water and sanitation activities (even though many schools had serious problems in this area). This reflects a weakness of the UN inter-agency collaboration, and also highlights practical challenges in achieving inter-sectoral support to school feeding, and in achieving WFP's vision and the Government of Mozambique's school feeding policies.
70. In the case of social protection, a joint UN social protection programme is in place in which WFP has taken responsibility for the area of the Joint Programme that was most likely to encounter difficulties – delivering a new system on the ground through a partner with significant resource constraints. This has resulted in difficulties in implementation which will be discussed further in Sections 2.2 and 2.3. However, in the view of the ET and a number of donor agency representatives interviewed as part of this evaluation, it is fair to say that had the three roles of the UN agencies been switched, the situation would not be significantly different

than that currently realised and credit for successes and failures of the JPSP should be jointly shared.

71. The nutrition work was also consistent with UNDAF, given the focus that the nutrition component has on strengthening the capacity of health services in addressing chronic and acute malnutrition, with a particular attention to those who are most vulnerable and infected and affected by HIV and AIDS.
72. In the Market Access component the joint collaboration in implementation has shown some strong results. FAO (providing agrarian technical assistance), UN Women (gender assessment of the agricultural value chains), and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) (providing technical support on production and access to credit) were initially involved under a joint UN programme called “Building Commodity Value Chains and Market Linkages for Farmers’ Associations” (from 2008 to 2011)³⁸, and later within the context of P4P and CP. FAO and WFP also collaborated within the framework of the Purchase from Africans for Africa (PAA) initiative, which is funded by the Government of Brazil and aims to connect smallholders to WFP’s school feeding programmes³⁹.

2.1.3.3 Synergies

73. In line with the ToR the evaluation also examined evidence of synergies between the PRRO and the CP and between components of the CP itself. Synergies were included in the design of the CP.
74. The main area of synergy between the CP and the PRRO was in the area of DRR. Both the PRRO and the CP engaged beneficiaries in the construction of assets that were aimed at building to climatic shocks, although under the CP implementation was largely through the GoM in areas with high prevalence of chronic food insecurity, whereas the PRRO focussed on disaster affected populations and was implemented by NGOs.
75. The CP accorded particular importance to concentrating components in the same geographical area to exploit the possibility for synergies. In market access this included developing the potential for local production and purchasing of food with links school feeding. Some synergies were established in this area, although in practice there were some challenges in identifying and working with local producers due to capacity and quality constraints leading district procurement officers from education who were responsible for local purchasing to resort to local retailers instead. There were also challenges in providing the envisioned support to school gardens – with many pilot schools not receiving the envisioned assistance. Positive examples of synergies were also identified, for example with the market access component supporting a group of female farmers in setting up their own association to produce and sell food to schools in Gaza province.

³⁸ In 2013, FAO, IFAD and WFP in Mozambique were recognized for their collaborative efforts to improve food security. The first ever *Award of Excellence: Working Together in the Field* was awarded by IFAD’s governing council. Source: www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/169904/icode/

³⁹ Source: <http://paa-africa.org/countries-partners/mozambique/>

76. The PASP element of the SP component was designed to complement the CP's DRR objectives by facilitating beneficiaries to create assets that contribute to community resilience to climatic shocks based on DRR priorities contained in District Development Plans. In the event synergy was limited because of the difficulties in getting District Development Committees to prioritise DRR over other more politically visible interventions.
77. The nutrition component's main synergy with SP was through the PASD element: targeting was based on a client's nutritional status and the transfer was in the form of a food voucher and Super Cereal, the use of which resulted in improvements in beneficiaries' nutritional status for the period during which they received the transfers. Unfortunately, as there was no exit strategy, the incidence of relapse after graduation from the programme was high.

Summary of CP Appropriateness

- Geographical targeting was thorough and well executed. The CP followed recommendations in its design from the evaluation of the earlier CP to concentrate activities in fewer areas, and exploit synergies.
- Targeting of beneficiaries was satisfactory overall. It was based on transparent criteria which are in line with the key education, food security, and nutrition criteria. With respect to OVC the targeting was adjusted mid-way through the implementation of the CP in order to align it with the requirements of the Government of Mozambique's Social Protection Policy.
- Internal coherence of the CP is good. Important efforts were made to ensure coherence with WFP's guidance on capacity development and gender, and with the key component policy documents. However, in practice the ET finds that implementation has often fallen short of the official guidance because of constraints in terms of capacity, budgeting, supervision, and the leading role that Government agencies have in Mozambique with respect to implementation (which assigns most of the responsibility for implementation in their hands although requisite skills, capacities and resources to do so continue to be a challenge).
- External coherence of the CP design with Government policies and with the UNDAF has been strong. In terms of the coherence with policies of the Government of Mozambique this is also helped by WFP's strong engagement in policy support in areas such as education and social protection (to be further discussed in the next section). In the case of UNDAF, some areas of anticipated collaboration did not move beyond planning (school feeding), while there was progress in other areas (social protection and market access).
- Synergies with the PRRO and between CP components were built into the design of the CP. Synergies were established with the PRRO for DRR, and between selected components of the CP, but faced operational difficulties related to design and implementation realities on the ground.
- A serious oversight was the absence of an in-built grievance or complaints procedure in social protection which would have allowed beneficiaries to provide feedback on targeting decisions and late payments. In keeping with WFP's own

guidance in this area, having such a grievance mechanism is particularly important for a programme in its initial stages of operation when there are bound to be problems.

2.2 Results of the Operation

78. This section of the report presents the evaluation findings and analysis and addresses the second evaluation question, “What are the results of the operation?” Specifically, the evaluation sought to determine the level of attainment of planned outputs for each of the CP components; the extent to which the outputs have led to the realization of the operation objectives; and whether there have been unintended effects. This section also looks at how different components and activities of the operation are synergistic with what other relevant actors are doing to contribute to the overriding UN objective in the country. Finally, this section explores the likelihood of the benefits of the activities continuing after the end of the operation.
79. The CP started in March 2012, and planned to support just over 1.264.300 million beneficiaries (of whom 791.690 are women, corresponding to 63 percent). Figure 3 above shows that planned versus actual tonnage fell substantially short during the three years covered by the evaluation. The main reason for the difference between the two is the level of underfunding of the CP. In addition, in 2014 there were specific problems related to the rejection of a large order of locally purchased maize on the Mozambican market following quality control.

2.2.1 COMPONENT 1 - SCHOOL FEEDING

80. The focus of this component was to provide technical and policy support to strengthen the capacity of national and sub-national authorities to design a national School Feeding Programme, whilst providing implementation support for school feeding over the implementation period.
81. Table 3 below represents the outputs related to the school feeding programme for the period 2012 to 2014. The CP planned to provide school feeding to 227,700 beneficiaries per year (data from 2014 budget revision). In practice, school feeding assisted 58 and 61 percent of the originally planned number of male and female beneficiaries respectively between 2012 and 2014.⁴⁰
82. Performance levels of the component dropped considerably, from reaching almost all operationally planned beneficiaries in 2012 (97 and 96 percent of male and female beneficiaries respectively) to reaching 58 and 61 percent of planned male and female beneficiary numbers in 2014 (see Table 3 below).

⁴⁰ It should be noted that planned beneficiary numbers are based on the updated number of beneficiaries based on annual planning by the CO and as reflected in the CO database, as per footnote under Table 3.

Table 3. School Feeding Beneficiaries from 2012 – 2014

Year		Beneficiaries	Transition Schools - Pupils	Transition Schools - Adults	Cash Transfers - Pupils	Cash Transfer - Adults	Total
2012	Planned	Male	37,786	1,500	-	-	39,286
		Female	33,914	1,500	-	-	35,414
	Actual	Male	37,061	1,116	-	-	38,177
		Female	32,866	1,116	-	-	33,982
	Percentage achieved	Male	98%	74%	-	-	97%
		Female	97%	74%	-	-	96%
2013	Planned	Male	82,287	3,400	-	-	85,687
		Female	74,484	3,400	-	-	77,884
	Actual	Male	41,594	884	-	-	42,478
		Female	39,486	1,315	-	-	40,801
	Percentage achieved	Male	51%	26%	-	-	50%
		Female	53%	39%	-	-	52%
2014	Planned	Male	88,225	3,400	-	-	91,625
		Female	79,185	3,400	-	-	82,585
	Actual	Male	43,227	1,263	-	-	44,490
		Female	44,220	1,534	-	-	45,754
	Percentage achieved	Male	49%	37%	-	-	49%
		Female	56%	45%	-	-	55%
2012- 2014	Planned	Male	208,298	8,300	7,905	Not specified	224,503
		Female	187,583	8,300	7,905	Not specified	203,788
	Actual	Male	121,882	3,263	3,562	400	129,107
		Female	116,572	3,965	3,158	431	124,126
	Planned versus actual (%)	Male	59%	39%	45%	-	58%
		Female	62%	48%	40%	-	61%

Source Planned targets from CO database on cumulative planned beneficiaries; actuals for 2012 and 2013 from CO database on SPR beneficiaries, and data for 2014 from draft SPR.

83. Table 4 shows the CP performance against planned targets for the number of schools to be covered. The CP reached 51 percent of the planned schools, and 45 percent of the pilot schools (due to the late start of the pilot).

Table 4. School Feeding Outputs from 2012 – 2014


	2012		2013		2014		Average over 3 yrs
	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	
Schools transition programme	350	174	350	179	350	179	51%
Pilot schools	12	0	12	4	12	12	44%
Food tonnage	2,898	1,927	6703	2,058	6703	1,358	33%
Cash distributed	270,000	0	270,000	43,000	400,000	174,056	23%

Source: Budget Revision 2014, SPR 2012, 2013 and 2014 (draft)

84. In the CP document, WFP planned to distribute food on 194 days in each of the school years. Over the period 2012-2014, in the transition schools, meals were provided for most months of the school year, including during examination periods. However, in 2012 and 2014 most school feeding started late usually in March and April), as shown in Figure 12 below. Delays in distribution affected the

start of distribution. The figure also shows that 2014 was a particularly challenging year. This was related to the rejection of the maize consignment.

Figure 12. Operational Plan and Actual Food for School Feeding between 2012 (August) and 2014 (August)



Source: Graph received from CO

85. Both WFP respondents and managers at school level confirmed that the delay at the start of the school year was related to a combination of factors, including: difficulties with transporting the food to schools during Mozambique’s rainy season (particularly to the more remote schools), lack of storage facilities in schools to allow stocks to be kept over the holiday period, and pipeline breaks.
86. The school feeding pilot only started in September 2013 in Gaza province, leaving less than three months of school feeding in the 2013 school year. The late start of the pilot was related to the time it took to approve the National School Feeding Programme (PRONAE) (which the MOE wanted to ensure was in place prior to rolling out the pilot), delays in recruitment of the Brazilian consultants, and to delayed communication of bank account details by the education authorities which in turn affected the timeliness of cash transfer and purchasing of food. Given these delays the pilot has now been extended to 2015 in the latest WFP Budget Revision.
87. In 2014, the pilot was expanded to the remaining provinces using the same modality of local purchasing by the District Education Directorates. Fund transfers were again delayed and provision of school meals only started in May. Irregularities in financial reporting by District Education Offices in the four pilot provinces for the first tranche of 2014 funding led to the MOE’s decision to suspend the transfer of the second tranche to all 12 schools after two months of school feeding⁴¹.

⁴¹ In Changara district in Tete Province, and according to information provided by the MOE audit team, funds for the two pilot schools were embezzled through the presentation of false receipts, with schools receiving only three weeks’ worth of food. In the other pilot schools irregularities were due to

88. Focus groups with beneficiaries (pupils and cooks) confirmed that the meals provided in school were of sufficient quality and quantity across the transition and pilot schools. However, the monotony of the meals was a constant complaint in the transition schools. Conversely the variety and quality of the meals were appreciated in the pilot schools. In most schools visited by the ET, communities had contributed either food or certain critical ingredients (salt and oil) when these were in short supply.
89. Non-food items distributed to both transition and pilot schools included equipment for kitchens (fuel saving stoves, pans, plates) and responsibility for these was assigned to the MOE. Pilot schools received additional inputs for school gardens. However, much of the supplies arrived late, and without adequate support for installation. Visits to pilot schools showed that equipment was not in use, even though much of it was available and necessary for the programme – e.g. schools with big water tanks which were not connected to a water supply, schools with water pumps but without connection tubes, etc.
90. An important element of the pilot programme was the local production and local purchasing of food. General issues with respect to the local purchasing are discussed in the Market Access component of this report. School gardens were visited in six schools (three in Tete, and three in Gaza) and showed variable levels of success. Focus group discussions highlighted that managing school gardens takes up a considerable amount of time for teachers. In addition, the work that the children do in the school gardens occupies the entire period that should be allocated to the local curriculum in schools (10 percent of the curriculum). Pupils mentioned that the work was often hard and involves significant physical effort, although schools made arrangements for these activities to be age-appropriate.
91. **School feeding sought to bring about increased access to education in assisted schools** (outcome 1.1) which was to be measured by indicators related to the annual rate of change in the number of girls and boys enrolled, the attendance rate, pass rates and drop-out rates. Table 5 below compares planned and achieved outcomes.

Table 5. Planned and Achieved Outcomes in 2012 - 2014

Indicator	Target	Base-line	Previous measurement	Achieved (end 2014)
Attendance rate of girls	> 90	0	89	89
Attendance rate of boys	> 90	0	89	89
Average annual rate of change in the number of girls enrolled	> 6.5	0.2	5.9	3.7
Average annual rate of change in the number of boys enrolled	> 10	-0.1	9.5	4.4
Pass rate girls	> 65	51	83.2	83.2

non-compliance with procedures for procurement and invoicing which were considered sufficiently serious to warrant a further investigation.

Indicator	Target	Base-line	Previous measurement	Achieved (end 2014)
Pass rate boys	> 80	75	68.5	68.75
Drop-out rate girls	<7.5	9.5	7.5	6.5
Drop-out rate boys	=15	10	7.2	6.3
National Capacity Index (NCI)	10	15	3	3

Source: SPR 2012, SPR 2013, SPR 2014 (draft)

92. The data above confirm that there is a correlation between school feeding and increasing enrolment and attendance, and shows that in the schools that were assisted, these targets were achieved. In terms of pass rates, there was a significant increase in 2012 in schools assisted by WFP. Drop-out rates also improved.
93. No data was available to compare non-assisted versus assisted schools in neighbouring districts in Tete Province. Given the limited number of months that were covered by the pilot school feeding programme (two and a half months in 2013 in two schools in Gaza, and two months in the remaining 12 schools nationwide in 2014) the results for these indicators cannot be compared to performance of other schools in terms of enrolment, attendance and completion for boys and girls.
94. Anecdotal evidence from interviews with focus groups of pupils, parents, and community members highlighted the importance of school feeding as an incentive for children to go to school and stay in school, which was also confirmed by teachers. Teachers and school managers reported that the irregular pattern of school feeding impacted on participation of pupils in their schools, i.e. all schools reported drops in school attendance during the period of no school feeding.
95. In terms of unexpected/unanticipated outcomes, respondents reported that the pilot school feeding programme's focus on balanced meals had contributed to changing dietary habits in the communities around schools. For example in Gaza province, families now use the very nutritious leaves of the squash plant in soups and other dishes. Traditionally these leaves are only used as fodder for pigs. The integration of squash leaves into the diet also has the advantage that these leaves can be easily dried and stored providing a nutritious source of food in periods of scarcity.
96. **Sustainability:** The Government contributed to school feeding with staff time through the district level UGEA (Procurement Management Unit) which assumed responsibility for local purchasing. However, funding for food purchases was provided entirely by WFP, with no contribution by the Mozambican Government as had been anticipated in the CP. This poses a challenge to sustainability as ultimately, school feeding can only be sustained if it is included in the budget of the Mozambican Government.
97. The school feeding component also focused on creating capacity in the management of school feeding through training managers and implementers at district and school level (e.g. cooks, members of school management committees,

district officers, etc.). Training activities were undertaken in all the transition schools in 2012, reaching 100 percent of the target. The training focused on management and storage of food and non-food items, storage facility and kitchen construction, the proper use of fuel-efficient stoves, and community mobilization. In 2013, training was provided in food handling, school gardens, local food procurement, and nutritional education – primarily to the pilot schools. Targets for proportion of women on management committees and for percentage of women on management committees trained were set at over 50%.

98. In focus groups and individual interviews, beneficiaries expressed satisfaction with the quality and content of the training, although in most cases they felt the training was not long enough. Cooks reported learning about the preparation of nutritious meals, even though in Tete province they faced considerable challenges because the menus prepared by the MOE as guidelines were based on dietary habits and on ingredients from the south of the country and did not reflect local conditions.
99. School visits illustrated that in most cases basic instructions on storage for food were being followed. Hygiene is a major challenge though, given the chronic difficulties of access to water in most of the schools, and the absence of protective gear for cooks. None of the schools visited by the ET had requested health cards from the cooks providing the services, and none of the cooks had their health card available.
100. **In terms of progress made towards nationally owned hunger solutions (Outcome 2)**, WFP planned to support the drafting of the national programme for school feeding PRONAE. This was prepared by the MOE, with support from WFP, and was formally approved by the Council of Ministers in June 2013. Support for the development of PRONAE and the implementation of the school feeding component, included the Brazilian Agency of Cooperation (ABC) under a tripartite agreement between Brazil, the MOE and WFP. While the drafting of the PRONAE strategy represents an important policy commitment to school feeding, the fact that it has not been costed has meant that allocated funds by the MOE have been transferred to other priorities.
101. Unexpected outcomes included the formal establishment of an association of women farmers in one of the pilot schools in Gaza which is supplying the school with agricultural produce. The association has also started selling food to the local market.
102. **Sustainability:** The adoption of a national programme for school feeding represents an important step towards sustainability. However, while the programme provides a general outline with key principles, it still needs to be costed – a necessary first step to receiving funding commitments by Government and other partners.

Summary of School Feeding Results

- The school feeding component has not been able to reach its targets in terms of the number of schools providing school meals and the numbers of pupils reached. Funding constraints have limited the scope of the activities. In the 179 schools where WFP supports school feeding, school meals have been provided

for most of the school year, but often with a late start. Data on enrolment and participation for these schools show that school feeding is correlated with higher enrolments, participation and completion. Quantitative gender targets in terms of involvement of women from communities have been met.

- The pilot project for school feeding, started late in the CP period (September 2013). There have been considerable implementation challenges including delayed provision of funds and irregular financial reporting by district education authorities. Unexpected positive results include reported changes in dietary practices by communities and the establishment of a women’s association – with support from WFP – which provides food to schools.
- WFP’s support to the development of a National School Feeding Programme and capacity development at district and provincial levels has contributed to the sustainability of school feeding in Mozambique. The Government of Mozambique has committed human resources to the management of school feeding – a further important input into sustainability.

2.2.2 COMPONENT 2 - SOCIAL PROTECTION

103. This component underpins the implementation of the National Strategy of Basic Social Security and focuses on 1) Direct Social Action (PASD) that targets extremely vulnerable individuals including orphans and vulnerable children as well as the chronically ill through direct food assistance, and 2) Productive Social Action (PASP) that targets vulnerable families with labour capacity through food for assets and cash for assets.

104. Table 6 presents the level of achievement against asset creation targets for 2012 and 2013. In most cases targets have not been met, most likely because beneficiaries were engaged in activities not related to disaster mitigation – an issue that is discussed in more detail in Section 2.3 – and because fewer resources were received than anticipated.

Table 6. Planned vs Achieved Assets Created under PASP Programme 2012 – 2013

Assets created under PASP	Planned	Achieved	% Achieved
Area (in ha) of cultivated land treated and conserved with physical soil and water conservation measures	755	531	70.3
Area (in ha) of land cleared	95	29	30.5
Distance (in km) of feeder roads built and maintained	582	512	88.0
Distance (in km) of feeder roads rehabilitated and maintained	1,064	796	74.8
Number of communities with improved physical infrastructure to mitigate the impact of shocks in place as a result of project assistance	39	32	82.1
Number of classrooms rehabilitated	25	26	104.0
Number of excavated community water ponds for livestock use constructed	5	5	100.0
Number of fish ponds maintained and constructed	6	2	33.3
Number of latrines constructed / rehabilitated	95	92	96.8
Number of shallow wells constructed	55	53	96.4
Number of tree seedlings produced	6,000	4,585	76.4

105. **In terms of the reduction of hazard risk at the community level in target communities**, the Community Asset Score (CAS)⁴² is the main indicator used to measure the reduction in a community's hazard risk, and WFP aimed to achieve an increase of 80 percent over the baseline value of 98 (July 2012). The latest available score, from data collected in December 2013, is 174 – an increase of 77 percent from the baseline. However, the ET found that many of the assets created were not directly linked to increasing resilience to natural disasters, and that strengthening household or community resilience involves more than simply creating an asset for their use.
106. The CP design and the associated appraisal documents envisaged an approach based on the integration of several assets built over the entire CP period thus progressively increasing communities' resilience to climatic shocks. As per PASF guidance, work took place in the four months starting from July, as households are usually occupied with agricultural work during the lean season.
107. Largely because of WFP and INAS's differing visions of the role of Cash for Assets, asset creation did not take place as envisioned by WFP thus significantly limiting its contribution to the achievement of the SO. Despite district level workshops at the beginning of the PASP cycle to identify suitable assets, these assets were never fully incorporated into District Development Plans or fully supported by INAS. Instead, beneficiaries engaged in an array of work which, although useful in some ways, was in many cases totally unrelated to building resilience (e.g. construction of hospital waiting rooms and construction of speaking dais for visiting dignitaries). Even when an asset had relevance to disaster reduction, its utility was limited because it was unconnected to other complementary assets or because timing and management issues were not fully considered (for example planting crops in the dry season or planting trees) with no consideration of who would continue to water them after the end of the four-month period when people were paid to work ended.
108. **Sustainability.** The extent to which assets created will continue to yield benefits beyond the lifetime of the CP depends very much on the asset and its associated management structure. In the case of roads, communities reported that they were benefiting because vehicles found it easier to access their villages. Other assets – generally those that required continued maintenance after the end of the payment cycle – were found to have a less sustainable impact; indeed, in areas visited by the ET, many of the trees planted under the PASP scheme had died because communities had failed to continue to water them once they were no longer paid to do so.

⁴² “The Community Asset Score (CAS) is the tool developed and currently used by WFP for data collection on assets in the community, their level of functionality and the percentage of community members using or benefiting from the assets” (From Mozambique CP200286 Asset Monitoring - Bertelsbeck, F. (2013). Programme Advisor Cash and Vouchers. Market Access and Food Security Analysis/M&E.)

SO 4: Reduce chronic hunger and undernutrition

Output 2.2: Food and non-food items of sufficient quality distributed to target group

109. The work in social protection was targeted at distributing food and non-food items of sufficient quality to target groups (output 2.2). Table 7 presents the number of beneficiaries reached by the CP compared to the planned number.

Table 7 - Number of beneficiaries (including all household members) reached through the SP Component 2012 - 2014 (note: figures for FFA = participants)

Year		Beneficiaries	Food For Assets	Cash for Assets	OVC and Chron ill	PASD / Voucher	Total
2012	Planned	Male	18,720	18,041	40,334	-	77,095
		Female	20,280	19,545	42,066	-	81,891
	Actual	Male	20,380	18,220	20,833	5,657	65,090
		Female	25,495	19,560	21,858	6,129	73,042
	% Achieved	Male	109%	101%	52%		
		Female	126%	100%	52%		
2013	Planned	Male	27,360	24,864	21,888	-	74,112
		Female	29,640	26,936	23,712	-	80,288
	Actual	Male	29,960	22,695	6,449	11,520	70,624
		Female	32,460	24,205	6,743	12,480	75,888
	% Achieved	Male	110%	91%	29%		
		Female	110%	90%	28%		
2014	Planned	Male	71,195	41,013	22,540	-	134,748
		Female	74,105	42,687	23,460	-	140,252
	Actual	Male	36,220	24,877	2,326	16,435	79,858
		Female	37,695	26,593	2,529	17,805	84,622
	% Achieved	Male	51%	61%	10%		
		Female	51%	62%	11%		
2012-2014	Planned	Male	117,275	83,918	84,762	-	285,955
		Female	124,025	89,168	89,238	-	302,431
	Actual	Male	86,560	65,792	29,608	33,612	215,572
		Female	95,650	70,358	31,130	36,414	233,552
	Planned v Actual (%)	Male	74%	78%	35%		
		Female	77%	79%	35%		

Source: SPRs for 2012, 2013 and 2014.

110. As shown, the programme was able to progressively reach an increasing number of beneficiaries over the years, although the percentage of planned versus actual beneficiaries reached fell due to resource shortages. Over the programme period less than 100% of cash / commodities were distributed (Table 8). The difference between the percentage of households reached and quantity of cash / commodities distributed is explained by shortened transfer cycles and keeping the value of the cash transfers at MZN650 rather than increasing to MZN1,500 for PASD and MZN1,000 as per the GoM guideline and the intention in BR4 Beneficiaries interviewed in the course of the evaluation reported that food supplied through food distributions and obtained in exchange for vouchers at shops was of sufficient quality.

Table 8. Planned versus actual amount of cash, vouchers and food distributed through SP component 2012-2014

SP component	Output	Planned	Actual	% planned vs actual
PASP	food (MT)	8,845	7,033	80%
	cash (USD)	1,741,771	711,248	41%
PASD	vouchers (USD)	3,148,786	2,032,028	65%
OVCs / Chronically Ill	food (MT)	7,563	3,586	47%
Total	food (MT)	16,407	10,619	65%
	cash (USD)	1,741,771	711,248	41%
	vouchers (USD)	3,148,786	2,032,028	65%

Source: SPRs 2012, 2013 & 2014

Outcome 2.2: Adequate food consumption reached over assistance period for target households

111. A second outcome (2.2.) related to ensuring that adequate food consumption was provided over the assistance period for target households. Two metrics are used to measure the food consumption outcome – the Food Consumption Score (FCS) and the Coping Strategy Index (CSI). As outcome data for 2013 and 2014 (presented in Table 9) show, the CP has not been successful in achieving these targets yet, and does not appear to be on track to do so by 2015 as FCS for PASP beneficiaries overall have actually deteriorated.

Table 9. Food Consumption and Coping Strategy Index Scores for SP and PRRO Beneficiaries 2013 and 2014

Indicator	Group	2013	2014
Food Consumption Score is Acceptable	PASP (Food)	55%	45%
	PASP (Cash)	43%	59%
	Total PASP	55%	52%
	PRRO	-	80%
	Non beneficiaries	49%	60%
CSI Score	PASP (Food)	16	11
	PASP (Cash)	9	7
	Total PASP	12	9
	PRRO		11
	Non beneficiaries	11	10

Source: VAME Unit presentation, *Monitoring of Outcome Results*, 27th November 2014

112. In 2011, WFP carried out a systematic assessment of 19 of its target Districts to determine the suitability of cash as a transfer modality⁴³. However, seasonal price variability was not considered as part of this analysis and the calorific value of the food that beneficiaries have been able to purchase with the 650 MZN they

⁴³ WFP 2011, *Prioritizing Districts for Cash and Voucher Interventions in Mozambique*

received is less than that contained in the food basket given to PASD⁴⁴ beneficiaries⁴⁵. Thus while the PASD ration is appropriate to the objective of reducing chronic hunger and malnutrition, particularly if it is consumed mainly by the direct beneficiary, and the FFA transfer goes a considerable way to filling a household's missing food entitlement, the PASP cash transfer is less effective in preventing acute hunger. Cash did, however, provide benefits that a food transfer could not, such as paying school fees and medical expenses⁴⁶.

113. Cash was transferred to beneficiaries through banks. WFP partnered with a number of banks⁴⁷ who issued bank cards to beneficiaries. All cards were linked to sub accounts which were in turn linked to a WFP master account. In practice, for reasons presented in more detail in section 2.3, the process was beset with problems that resulted in payments being delayed.
114. In urban areas the Super Cereal PASD transfer was administered through a voucher system. Every month when being weighed, clients were given a voucher redeemable at a small number of participating retailers. By the time this evaluation took place, the system had been operational for a couple of years and was running smoothly, with both PASD clients and shop keepers involved in the distribution reporting high levels of satisfaction with the system. The fact that the voucher allowed for a nutritionally diverse food basket including fresh food to be distributed is highly appropriate to the specific nutritional needs of the PASD target group
115. In most cases, PASP beneficiaries were enrolled in the programme for a period of four years during which they engaged in CFA / FFA activities for four hours a day for four months each year. Working just four hours a day allows beneficiaries to pursue other work opportunities. Primary beneficiaries were allowed to nominate two proxies who could conduct the work if they were sick or unable to attend on a particular day. However there was some evidence to the evaluation team that the proxy worker system was being used by beneficiaries as a method of transferring membership of the scheme to other people on a permanent basis, in several locations over the programme period. This inappropriate design

⁴⁴ In Tete the voucher enabled beneficiaries to collect a ration of: 12 eggs or 2kg fish, 6kg rice, 9kg maize meal, 2kg groundnuts, 1 kg salt, 2 litres oil, 2kg sugar and 2 bars of soap. In addition clients were able to collect a monthly ration of 10kg Super Cereal (when available).

⁴⁵ For example, in Massingir (where beneficiaries received cash) the transfer was sufficient to buy about 35kgs rice⁴⁵ (equivalent to 680 calories per day [32 percent of requirement] per household member for a household of six). The transfer PASP FFA beneficiaries received contains about 917 calories per person per day (family of six), or around 43 percent of an adult's daily requirement

⁴⁶ This begs the question 'would it be sensible to increase the size of the transfer?' thereby enabling recipients to buy more food. The monthly transfer is certainly considerably lower⁴⁶ than casual labour rates, but simply raising wages would impact on overall costs and would make the programme more attractive to people who are less poor. Considering the high demand for places on the scheme, and the fact that the work is guaranteed for four months, the level of remuneration is considered by the ET to be sustainable, if not altogether appropriate to achieving food security objectives within the current market environment. To sustainably address acute food insecurity in rural Mozambique supply-side issues (production and market functionality) must be improved considerably, not just boosting demand.

⁴⁷ Standard Bank, Opportunity Bank Mozambique, BCI

feature added to the programme's significant administrative problems (explored in more detail in section 2.3).

116. Generally construction and other works were supervised by a member of staff from the Provincial or District office of the Ministry of Agriculture and the evaluation found no evidence of malpractice with regard to supervision, although in areas where payments had been delayed beneficiaries reported that they had received very limited follow up on when their money would arrive.
117. After a four-year period, beneficiaries are 'graduated' from the programme. In a small number of cases communities unilaterally, decided that new beneficiaries would be selected every year rather than every four years so as to share the benefits more widely: WFP mentioned that they were not aware of this practice, which points to a breakdown in communication. In other safety net programmes – for example the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) in Ethiopia – this churn of beneficiaries is not allowed because it would preclude an individual from accessing the sequenced package of work, training, grants and loans that the programmes theory of change identifies as a pathway to enable graduation out of poverty.
118. In the case of PASP, however, because there is no defined graduation strategy⁴⁸ or associated theory of change, it is less important that a beneficiary stays on the programme. As it is currently conceived, with cash / food transfers that do little more than fill a portion of a households missing food entitlement, and an asset creation programme that is not focused on creation of infrastructure that builds resilience, combined with the size of the poverty gap⁴⁹, the programme will never graduate anyone out of poverty – people simply leave the programme. By far the main value of the PASP to beneficiaries, whether they have been on the programme for four years or one year, is the immediate impact that cash or food transfers have on food security at the household level.
119. With regard to PASP, the ET found that work norms were appropriate to beneficiaries' circumstances, but that the length of time for which beneficiaries participate in the scheme is arbitrary and not connected in any way to a strategy that would prevent acute hunger in a sustainable way. The duration of the PASD transfers – six month plus six months (depending on BMI) – is as per international guidelines on this issue and is therefore appropriate.
120. **Sustainability.** Food and cash distributed under this component were never meant to result in an improvement in food consumption and coping strategies that could be sustained beyond the programme period: the PASP programme was designed to address seasonal hunger shortages, and was only partially successful.
121. In terms of building capacity and awareness through training, WFP's modus operandi for SP in the CP - working in partnership with the Government of

⁴⁸ The 3 year x 4 month x 4 hours per day appears to have been determined by budget factors and a need to apply some kind of time limits on an individual's participation in the scheme rather than a consideration of what is required to graduate out of food insecurity.

⁴⁹ The ET estimates that the cash transfer would need to be at least six times larger to bring the average-sized family up to the USD2 per day poverty line in the average District

Mozambique - has involved close cooperation with government staff, particularly INAS staff. Training and support has focused on targeting and registration of beneficiaries and building awareness of the role that cash FFA schemes can play in building resilience to climatic shocks. It is difficult to enumerate the level of training in terms of number of people trained, but WFP's impact in this area has been considerable: the fact that the Government's SP manual is based heavily on WFP protocols and procedures is evidence of this. There are certain elements of the PASP design, however, that fall short of internationally recognised best practice, including the aforementioned omission of a complaints procedure, and the failure to fully anticipate the difficulties faced with using commercial banks to transfer cash.

122. There are indications that communication was not as good as it could have been, however. The fact that several hundred people in excess of the number of spaces available were enrolled on PASP in Tete Province (and completed several months work without payment) would indicate that the programme approach had not been properly communicated to INAS staff.

Outcome 2.3: Progress made towards nationally owned hunger solutions

123. In line with the new strategic direction to focus on building national capacity (outcome 2.3), WFP has designed a National Capacity Index (NCI) tool. The aim in Mozambique is to attain a score of 15 by 2015. At the time of the evaluation, the tool had not been applied, so it is not possible to quantitatively determine progress that has been made in this area. Furthermore, the multi-agency nature of support to the Government means that disaggregating WFP's specific impact relative to that of other UN agencies is problematic.
124. **Sustainability.** The principle of SP has been enshrined in law in Mozambique and articulated in the National Strategy for Basic Social Security (ENSSB). Recent evidence, particularly the fact that in 2011 Parliament rejected the budget with the recommendation that the allocation to SP be increased, would suggest that this positive trajectory will be sustained, and WFP should be credited for the important role that they have played in making this happen.

Summary of SP Results

- The programme was not successful in achieving its targets with regard to community asset score, food consumption scores or reduction in coping strategy index scores. The size of transfers and the fact that assets built often do not contribute to resilience means that people will not 'graduate' from the programme – they will simply leave when the transfers end.
- Progress towards developing nationally owned hunger solutions was considerable, although the failure to measure capacity development in a quantitative way means that accurate measurement of progress against this target is not possible.
- While the PASD ration was appropriate to the objective of reducing chronic hunger and malnutrition, particularly if it is consumed mainly by the direct beneficiary, and the FFA transfer goes a considerable way to filling a household's

missing food entitlement, the PASP cash transfer was less effective in preventing acute hunger. Cash did, however, provide benefits that a food transfer could not.

- The fact that social protection activities are now enshrined in Mozambican law means that the gains in capacity achieved over the course of the CP are likely to be sustained.

2.2.3 COMPONENT 3 - NUTRITION

125. This component planned to support the MISAU Nutrition Rehabilitation Programme (PRN) for the treatment of moderate acute malnutrition (children, PLW, and HIV/TB adult patients). As noted earlier in this report, prevention of chronic malnutrition activities which were planned under this component were moved out of the CP and to separate implementation arrangements.⁵⁰ As a result, the planned targets for the prevention of chronic malnutrition activities, which are reflected in the CP document, are not reported against here.
126. The CP targeted support for a total of 668,400 beneficiaries (according to budget revision 2014), of whom 493,470 were women (74 percent) over the entire CP period (2012-2015). This number does not include the prevention of chronic malnutrition beneficiaries included in the original CP design.
127. Beneficiaries of the nutrition component's support to PRN include children, PLW and adult HIV/AIDS and TB patients with MAM. Under this activity, malnourished individuals are screened and registered at government health clinics and followed up and treated until they meet the exit criteria and are discharged.
128. Support focused on the distribution of Super Cereal+ to MAM patients (given that the MISAU did not have plumpynut) and included on-the job training for health personnel on screening, registering, following up, and reporting of malnourished patients. A daily ration of 333 g of Super Cereal per person (amounting to 10 kg per month), was to be provided to support the nutritional recovery of patients. The CP planned to reach approximately 18,000 beneficiaries per month). PRN beneficiaries would be provided with Super Cereal+ for a four month period after which they were expected to graduate off the programme.
129. Planned versus actual targets for the treatment of MAM presented in Table 10, show that while the programme achieved or exceeding its targets for ART clients and children under 5 years, it fell short of reaching its target for pregnant and lactating women.

⁵⁰ These activities were planned to be implemented through two separate programmes – the [Children's Investment Fund Foundation](#) (CIFF) (which did not reach the implementation stage) and the EU supported MDG 1 (which was being prepared at the time of the evaluation).

Table 10. Planned and Actual MAM Beneficiaries Reached (2012-2104)

Planned and actual figures by year		Beneficiaries	HIV/TB clients	PLW	Children < 5 and 5-15
2012	Planned	Male	18,963	n/a	16611
		Female	19,737	17,400	17289
	Actual	Male	24,991	n/a	18,481
		Female	26,012	17,088	19,235
	Percentage achieved	Male	132%	n/a	111%
		Female	132%	n/a	111%
2013	Planned	Male	20,580	n/a	7644
		Female	21,420	33,000	7956
	Actual	Male	16,346	n/a	14,046
		Female	17,014	17,322	14,619
	Percentage achieved	Male	79%	n/a	184%
		Femae	79%	n/a	184%
2014	Planned	Male	14,700	n/a	7644
		Female	15,300	10,500	7956
	Actual	Male	10,257	n/a	10,777
		Female	10,678	11,669	10,876
	Percentage achieved	Male	70%	n/a	141%
		Female	70%	n/a	137%
2012-2014	Planned	Male	54,243	n/a	31,899
		Female	56,457	60,900	33,201
	Actual	Male	51,594	n/a	43,304
		Female	53,704	46,079	44,730
	Percentage achieved over three years	Male	95%	n/a	136%
		Female	95%	76%	135%

Sources: Planned targets from CO database of cumulative planned beneficiaries, actuals for 2012 and 2013 from CO database of SPR beneficiaries, and data from the draft SPR for 2014.

130. While issues with distribution has affected the programme since its inception, the worsening situation in 2013 appears to have been a result of two factors: pipeline breaks relating to funding, and the transitioning of the responsibility for the Super Cereal logistics to the Provincial Directorates for Health which did not have the capacity to carry out the distribution.

Table 11 - Planned versus actual amount of food distributed through the Nutrition component 2012-2014

Year	Beneficiary category	Planned	Actual	% Achieved
2012	HIV/TB	1,834	1,112.82	61%
	Children	1,624	856.98	53%
	PLW/PRN	825	509.94	62%
	Sub total Year 1	4,283	2,479.74	58%
2013	HIV/TB	1,569	975	62%
	Children	1,389	674	48%
	PLW/PRN	706	495	70%
	Sub total Year 2	3,664	2,144	59%
2014	HIV/TB	1,217	864	71%
	Children	547	426	78%
	PLW/PRN	426	335	79%
	Sub total Year 3	2,190	1,625	74%
Total		10,137	6,249	62%

Source: Project and budget revision documents.

131. In terms of the quantity of food, a few beneficiaries who were interviewed by the evaluation team mentioned that the Super Cereal was shared within households. Thus, even when sufficient quantities of Super Cereal were distributed, the caloric value of the Super Cereal consumed by the intended direct beneficiary was often less than the amount required for adequate recovery rates. This partially contributed to beneficiaries staying longer on the programme than the envisaged four months (even up to 9 months or longer).
132. Factors contributing to the sharing of food supplements intended for targeted individuals, and which were highlighted during the evaluation team's interviews, include: food insecurity among families, lack of understanding of the importance of Super Cereal for rehabilitation (with Super Cereal often seen as "food" and thus available for sharing), and poor linkages between health units and the community. Follow-up monitoring by WFP also showed that health staff did not respect the programme's exit criteria, with beneficiaries receiving Super Cereal even when they no longer met the criteria for the programme. Poor data recording at the health unit level was a challenge with returning patients being recorded as new due to the absence of a system able to track individual patients enrolled in the programme. Almost no data was recorded for children ages 5-15 years or for PLW. Poor data capturing, particularly of PLWs, may have contributed to poor performance data. Although the main reason identified for the failure to meet beneficiary targets was the poor performance of Health Units, the WFP analysis did not explicitly identify to what extent these performance failures could have been related to insufficient or poor quality training, lack of supervision, follow-up, rotation of staff, or other factors.
133. The nutrition component reached over 95 percent of its target for HIV positive beneficiaries in 2014 in the WFP intervention sites. This suggests that the HIV

services are better able to reach and track their beneficiaries with nutrition support than are maternal and child health services.

134. A key indicator for supplementary feeding performance is improved nutrition status (outcome 3.1). In the first year, 2012, the data could not be reported due to serious problems with the quality and timeliness of reporting from health centres and deficiencies in analyses at the provincial level as reported by WFP in the 2012 SPR.
135. In 2013, WFP supported the creation of a nutrition database to capture data on children aged 6-59 months entering the PRN programme with MAM and adult HIV/TB patients with MAM and SAM, who received Super Cereal from January through to November 2013⁵¹. While information is not complete, WFP's follow-up study at the end of 2013 shows the recovery rates for MAM and SAM to be between 21 and 25 percent. This performance falls far short of the internationally acceptable recovery rate target of 75 percent or more⁵². The monitoring data also looked at recovery rates as shown in Table 12 below.

Table 12. MAM Treatment Statistics from Selected Health Units

Category	Rate%	
	Target	Actual
Children 0-59 months	>75	18
Adults with HIV/TB		
Pregnant and lactating women		
Default rate	<15	65
Death rate	<3	0*
Non-response rate	<15	0
Total		

Source SPR 2014 (draft): * Death rate and non-response rate is noted as zero as per SPR 2014 (draft) because this was not recorded by health centres

136. It should be noted in this context that the monitoring of MAM faces serious obstacles and that this affects the capacity of the health system to monitor progress and respond accordingly. MAM data is not included in the basic module of the Health Information System (HIS), and data is sent directly from the health unit to the provincial health department, and is not shared with the district health services. As a result, districts do not make use of the data or have a MAM database. WFP has been providing support to MISAU to address this problem, and the inclusion of MAM in the basic module is expected to be completed shortly.
137. WFP has identified serious issues with programme implementation at the Health Unit level. Low recovery rates were reported to be due to the high proportion of exits due to defaulting, compared to the exits due to recovery. Documented

⁵¹ Data used for this analysis were collected from 16 of the 95 health units in four of the eight provinces receiving WFP support (Maputo city, Maputo Province, Tete and Sofala).

⁵² It should be noted that, as this was the first year of implementation, the MISAU had set the low target of 30 percent. The World Health Organization considers 75 percent as an acceptable standard, and 50 percent as alarming.

evidence and interviews revealed that the high default rate is mainly a result of patients not returning to the programme and Health Unit personnel not conducting patient registration or follow up.

138. The performance indicator for increased adherence of adults and children with HIV (outcome 3.2) was adherence to antiretroviral treatment with a target of 79 percent of adults and children on antiretroviral (ARV) drugs adhering to their treatment and consuming 95 percent of their medication.
139. Respondents in health facilities who were interviewed by the evaluation team noted that providing Super Cereal to malnourished HIV/AIDS and TB patients increased their adherence to treatment, and had a positive effect on the health status of TB patients. However, this finding is based on a small number of interviews, and as WFP does not measure health status, it is not possible to attribute it to WFP's efforts.
140. An important activity planned under the CP was the transfer of logistical skills and capacity to staff within the health system. In line with this WFP provided training on logistics to Provincial Health Directorates and, in 2013, WFP tried passing on the responsibility for the distribution of Super Cereal from warehouse to health centres. However, this transition was accompanied by many challenges including stock out of Super Cereal bags and expired Super Cereal – partly due to health centres keeping their stock in warehouses and failing to distribute it on time.
141. As part of its capacity development efforts, WFP also ensured that Health Centres were supplied with the required MISAU instruments for data collection (monthly summary sheets). However the evaluation found that these were being inconsistently used in the Health Units and were therefore not as useful for monitoring as anticipated. WFP also supported MISAU in integrating the PRN data and indicators into the basic module of its new integrated information system. It is expected that this will improve the efficiency and regularity of data reporting at the district level (currently all analysis is done at central level with no feedback to local level thus limiting the use of data for improvement of services.).
142. In terms of making progress towards nationally owned hunger solutions (outcome 3.3), the CP indicators for this component include developing and adopting transition strategies and allocating national resources to programme implementation. The NCI for Nutrition was meant to measure progress in this area. This indicator improved by one point, from 10 at base line in 2011 to 11 in follow up monitoring in December 2013, indicating a moderate improvement.
143. Support to implementation of government policies included WFP assistance to the transition of responsibilities from the MISAU to INAS for livelihood support to vulnerable households with malnourished children, PLW, and HIV/AIDS on ART. The transition of these activities was not efficient as the criteria used for qualifying for assistance were not specifically nutritional in nature, but rather, socio-economic. The voucher system and referral mechanisms were subsequently revised to be in line with the new government policy. As part of the effort to ensure nationally-owned hunger solutions, WFP also supported MISAU in engaging with donors to acquire funds for the continuation of the PRN. In two of eight

provinces, USAID/President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) has committed funds, while WFP provided support in terms of logistical capacity.

144. In spite of these achievements, overall there have been considerable challenges to achieving the outcome of making progress towards national hunger solutions. The level of ownership for the programme at district and provincial levels remains low, and government capacity constraints are beyond the scope of what a programme of this kind can realistically address in a relatively short period of time.
145. **Sustainability.** In 2013, MISAU (with support from WFP) finalized and approved the protocol for guiding the treatment of acute malnutrition in adult patients. Due to high stocks of plumpynut, MISAU has decided to use this to treat SAM in PLW and Adult HIV/TB - hence finally starting the treatment of severe acute malnutrition in adults as per protocol II. While this sets the stage for a sustainable response, there is still a long way to go as the protocol has not been officially launched as part of the PRN for adults, indicating a lack of full Government ownership for this component. Overall, sustainability of the nutrition activities implemented with WFP support is doubtful as WFP does not have funds to continue supporting the treatment of MAM in 2015, and MISAU has made no effort to mobilize funds for this intervention.

Summary of Nutrition Results

- The nutrition component experienced considerable changes over the period. The prevention of chronic malnutrition, which was originally part of this component, was moved to a trust fund and never implemented under the CP.
- Outputs and outcomes compared to targets were low for the nutrition component overall. Numbers of beneficiaries were low (particularly PLWs), as were MAM recovery rates. A combination of low levels of funding to the CP, pipeline issues, capacity of the implementation partner (the government) and rotation of staff affected the results. The sharing of Super Cereal with other family members may have affected recovery rates.

2.2.4 COMPONENT 4 – DISASTER REDUCTION

146. The Disaster Reduction component WFP sought to support capacity development of INGC (National Institute for Disaster Management) and SETSAN (Technical Secretariat for Food Security and Nutrition) in risk analysis and mapping; and food and nutrition security analysis. The component was designed to contribute to the achievement of strategic objectives 2 and 5. Disaster reduction is a cross cutting issue, particularly linked to the PASP programme in the Social Protection Component.
147. A key envisioned output (output 4.1) was to put in place disaster mitigation measures through WFP capacity development support. At a grass roots level, the CP's main DRR focus was to try to ensure that assets built under the PASP component of the SP programme were oriented towards reducing community vulnerability to climatic shocks. As mentioned in the section on Social Protection, the CP achieved some success in this area, but also faced significant challenges in

getting districts to prioritise DRR in their District Development Plans because of differing views on the purpose of the productive works programme and the limited outreach of INGC staff in the Districts. In 2013, high frequency radios and emergency kits were also provided to INGC for use in the field.

148. The bulk of the remaining CP's DRR efforts were focused at the central level, building capacity of the Government of Mozambique – particularly SETSAN and INGC staff – to conduct Risk Mapping and District Food Security profiles, and in the preparation of the 2013 national contingency plan. Assistance was also provided in the collection of Malawi Vulnerability Assessment Committee (MVAC) data. From early 2013, when DRR activities were moderated because of resource shortages, the CP's main DRR output has been the production of the monthly rainfall and food security assessment during the period of the rainy season. This bulletin, which uses satellite imagery and other data to predict the onset of food security shocks, is only circulated internally, but some key findings are shared more widely with members of the DRR stakeholders.
149. In terms of outcome 4.1 - which focussed on developing early warning systems, contingency plans, and food security monitoring mechanisms – it is difficult to disaggregate WFP's individual contribution because support is structured through the one-UN system. However, the fact that the government now produces a contingency plan every year and that, where they are available, District Risk Maps are used to inform District Development Plans, indicates that progress has been made. Both SETSAN and INGC staff concurred that, in areas where risk maps had been produced, communities were better able to cope with the floods that occurred in January 2013.
150. In terms of increased capacity and awareness through WFP organized actions and training (output 4.2), there was a significant degree of joint programming between the PRRO and the CP – understandable as DRR was migrated to the CP from the PRRO in 2012. The recent evaluation of the PRRO (2014) found that 85 of the planned 100 people had been trained (the CP logframe does not specify targets for numbers of trainees). Of this group 21 were national government and partner staff trained in qualitative research skills for an Emergency Food Security Assessment/Analysis (EFSA) and in risk mapping; the majority (64) were enumerators trained to collect data for various surveys, including the CP baseline.
151. Three risk mapping / food security profiling training sessions were conducted with staff from SETSAN and INGC. Risk mapping was well accepted and used to good effect, but it was reported that uptake of the food security profiling approach by SETSAN has been slow, largely because of the staffing constraints they face, so of limited impact.
152. The CP proposed to measure progress on outcomes 4.1 and 4.2, which both concern capacity development, through two indices – the 'Disaster Preparedness Index' and the 'National Capacity Index'. Neither of these measurement tools have been applied within the CP, making it impossible to give a quantitative assessment of capacity developed by WFP (although such an assessment would most likely be very difficult given the multi-agency nature of support).

Outcome 4.2: Progress made towards nationally owned hunger solutions

153. Generally speaking, a moderate amount of progress has been made towards nationally owned hunger solutions (outcome 4.2) evinced by the facts that the Government of Mozambique now has a formalised system for contingency planning and realises the importance of risk mapping to disaster preparedness. There is a widely held perception, though, that more support from WFP and other actors is required at the district level rather than at the centre, and that, although training is useful, it does not address main constraints faced by INGC (and SETSAN) which is the lack of human resources and funds.
154. **Sustainability.** From a planning point of view, the gains that WFP and other development partners have made in mainstreaming disaster preparedness are likely to be permanent, as benefits are recognised by the government and systems have been institutionalised. There is still work to do in ensuring that DRR is mainstreamed in District Development Plans, and limited success in this area is likely linked to the relatively low level of human resources that WFP has been able to direct in areas outside the capital.

Summary of DRR Results

- The DRR component sought to orient the focus of PASP CFA activities towards constructing assets that would increase communities' resilience to climatic variability, and to build Districts' capacity to map risks and make contingency plans. Some successes were made in this area, but achievements were limited by the lack of enthusiasm of District Development Committees to prioritise 'resilience' assets over those that were more 'politically visible' and lack of staff and resources to mentor and train INGC staff.
- It is difficult to fully attribute the impact of the CP's DRR component for two reasons. First, DRR activities were conducted in concert with other inputs from the PRRO and other UN agencies, and secondly because the tools to measure impact – the 'Disaster Preparedness Index', and the 'National Capacity Index' – were never applied.
- Anecdotal evidence would suggest that whatever capacity building did take place was largely focused at central level – i.e. INGC headquarters.

2.2.5 COMPONENT 5 - MARKET ACCESS

155. The Market Access component focuses on promoting and developing marketing opportunities at national level with WFP local purchases through the provision of technical assistance and infrastructure support. The focus has been on linking smallholder farmers to Government of Mozambique's various programmes (in particular school feeding and social assistance) and ultimately to vulnerable people. Market access activities have been implemented under SO3 and under the cross cutting themes of gender and partnership. It has included WFP support the strengthening of the capacity of farmers' organizations to provide relevant food in adequate quantities and quality through its P4P project started in 2009 and CP Market Access component by providing training, skills development, and productivity-enhancing equipment as well as by providing market opportunities

to smallholders through local purchases. As noted in the introductory section of this report, as the CP component of Market Access comprised only 2 percent of expenditure, a decision was made to expand the analysis of this component to the full set of activities that were implemented, including therefore the activities that were funded with other resources outside of the CP. It is important to note that through these efforts, the CO has managed to increase local purchases from about 10 percent of its portfolio to 100 percent in 2012 and 2013. Table 13 below summarises the results that were obtained over the evaluation period in the Market Access Component.

Table 13. Outputs – Market Access

CP MA component Expected Results	CP MA component Performance indicators (Dec 2015)	MA component Effective results (P4P: 2012 -Dec 2014)
Result 1: Cross-cutting 1 (gender)	Indicator 1.1: 50% of women in leadership positions in to farmers associations boards in all locations	No actualized baseline Not documented
Results 2: Cross-cutting 2 (partnership)	Indicator 2.1: Number of partner organizations that provide complementary inputs and services in 5 provinces	5 partner organizations contracted by WFP provided services related with MA/P4P components 9 partner organizations collaborated with WFP on MA/P4P related issues All partner organizations operate in 5 target provinces
Result 3: Increased marketing opportunities for Region and Moz. traders and producers	Indicator 3.1: 60% of food distributed from Region and Moz. traders and producers	100% from Mozambique
	Indicator 3.2: 10% of food purchased from smallholders in P4P districts	54% from smallholders in P4P districts
Result 4: Increased WFP food purchases from Moz. smallholders	Indicator 4.1: Number of FOs trained in market access and postharvest handling skills	10 FOs
	Indicator 4.2 Number of WFP vendors that have adopted demonstrable pro-smallholder aggregation practices	No actualized baseline Not documented
	Indicator 4.3 Number of smallholder farmers supported by WFP	Around 500
	Indicator 4.5: Quantity of food purchased locally from pro-smallholder aggregation systems (expressed in MT)	1846 MT purchased from FOs (2012-2013) 1549 MT purchased from Mozambican traders (2012-2013)
	Indicator 4.6: Quantity of food purchased locally through Local and Regional purchases (expressed in MT)	

Source: WFP CP revised logframe and P4P logframe

Results by Indicators

156. Planned outcomes are generally appropriate to the overall context of MA components. However, as mentioned further above, the expected results that should contribute to the attainment of planned outcomes do not adequately match. They are disconnected with the outcomes and their performance indicators are either too general or not tracked well enough to inform possible achievement towards objectives. The lack of a fully articulated theory of change at the design stage of this component contributed to the challenges in M&E.⁵³

Result 1 - Gender equality and empowerment improved

157. **Indicator 1.1 (Women empowerment within FOs):** This indicator is not informed by WFP documentation (the most recent baseline data are reported in a 2011 WFP study but are from 2009). A survey was done in 2013 by an NGO contracted by WFP in order to profile FOs. The evaluation tabulated the number of women representatives and found that all FOs have women members of their board. However, the data does not take account of the total number of board members and/or the proportion of women within the board. The evaluation did not find evidence of any specific WFP interventions that were aimed at promoting the involvement of women in the FOs board, either directly or through its NGOs partners.
158. Few, if any, baseline, evaluation, or research data on issues related to gender and market access in Mozambique were available to inform the design and implementation of the CP. Furthermore, barely any gender-related data was collected or analysed by the CP. for the period 2012-2014. It has to be noted that only one gender related indicator is stated in the CP logical framework for Market Access component (“Proportion of women in leadership positions of project management committees”) – an indicator which does not reflect the vast scope of research, thinking and possible intervention areas mentioned in WFP’s own literature on gender issues. It also does not reflect the importance of ensuring that gender approaches need to address both women and men.

Result 2 - Food assistance interventions coordinated and partnerships developed and maintained

159. **Indicator 2.1 (Supply of complementary inputs and services):** WFP established relations with 15 NGOs operating in five provinces. A total of five NGOs organizations contracted by WFP provided services related with MA/P4P components.

⁵³ This was among the findings of the recent P4P strategic evaluation which looked at various country pilots, including Mozambique. Source: WFP (December 2014): WFP 2008 – 2013 Purchase for Progress (P4P) Initiative: A Strategic Evaluation. Commissioned by the Office of Evaluation. Accessed at: <http://docustore.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/reports/wfp271430.pdf>

Table 14. Partner NGOs

Locations (province)	Foreseen number of Partners (Dec 2015)	Existing Partners (Dec 2014)	
		With formal agreement	Without formal agreement
Tete	3	5	9
Sofala	1		
Nampula	4		
Zambezia	5		
Manica	2		
All	15	5	9

Source: Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between WFP and NGOs

160. However, these interventions focused on training and were quite limited in terms of duration, budget and inputs supply. Cooperative League of the USA (CLUSA) distributed 227 bicycles, five toolkits and 12 oxen. Tillers distributed 10 oxen, 12 oxcarts, 12 ploughs, 12 animal-drawn weeders and 12 veterinary kits. The Market Access component did not have a baseline or targeted number of partner organizations.

Result 3 - Increased marketing opportunities for producers and traders of agricultural products and food at the regional, national and local levels

161. **Indicator 3.1 (60 percent of food distributed from Region and Mozambican traders and producers):** According to WFP statistics 100 percent of the food distributed by WFP between 2012 and 2013 was purchased in Mozambique (data for 2014 was not available at the time of writing the report).

162. **Indicator 3.2 (10 percent of food purchased from smallholders in P4P districts):** 54 percent of the food distributed by WFP between 2012 and 2013 was purchased from smallholders, all being located in P4P districts. Other acquisition of food were done through Mozambican traders and it is most probable that these operators source their produces from Mozambican smallholders.

Result 4 - Increased WFP food purchase from regional, national and local markets and smallholder farmers.

163. **Indicator 4.1 (Training):** The MA component's logical framework does not contain precise indicators on training related results and activities. In practice, according to CP/MA documentation, between 2012 and 2014, around 500 farmers of 10 FOs were trained in agrarian practices, gender issues and entrepreneurship in the context of WFP direct support to partner NGOs. Following this support numerous training sessions were conducted by NGOs but these cannot be attributed as WFP outcomes directly⁵⁴.

⁵⁴ It has to be noted that P4P documentation released significantly higher figures in term of training audience and mentioned training activities that were implemented by partner NGOs or other UN agencies without WFP funding and out the MA component/P4P. P4P Quarterly report of April-June 2013 (p.5) mention a training conducted by FAO and indicates that "(...) training was conducted by a service provider, Kixiquila, who reported a total of 610 replications in four training modules (...) to 7

164. WFP did not conduct training efficiency and impact assessments, nor did WFP partners. Information released about training, either directly supported by WFP or organised by others, are merely factual and only provides indications on effectiveness. It is thus difficult to evaluate the quality of the training provided and to assess its relevance other than in theoretical terms.
165. **Indicator 4.2 (Pro-smallholder aggregation practices adopted by vendors):** We found no information about this topic in WFP documentation, either in term of definition or related activities and results. This indicator is problematic due to its lack of precision and absence of baseline information (the P4P baseline survey of 2011 do not cover this topic).
166. **Indicator 4.3 (Number of smallholder farmers supported by WFP):** WFP MA operations between 2012 and 2014 reached around 500 smallholders farmers grouped in five FOs through local purchases, training and inputs distribution. No baseline or target was stated and the nature of the foreseen support was not specified.
167. **Indicator 4.5 (Quantity of food purchased locally from pro-smallholder aggregation systems):** Between 2012 and 2013, WFP purchased a total of 1846 MT from FOs and a total of 1549 MT from Mozambican traders.
168. **Indicator 4.6 (Quantity of food purchased locally through local and regional purchases):** Same as indicator 4.6 as all food was purchased locally.
169. Neither indicator 4.5 nor 4.6 mentions baseline references or quantitative targets.

Sustainability

170. In terms of sustainability, the evaluation examined Farmers' Organizations (FOs) and Market Information System (MIS) from an institutional, organizational, technical, and economical perspective and also looked at the partners' capacities to continue MA activities on their own.
171. Institutional sustainability was reasonably good. However, serious organizational problems exist, including weak FOs' capacity to mobilize their members, slow reactivity to WFP purchase requests, uncoordinated supply to FOs warehouses, inadequate storage practices and deficient registering processes. Technical sustainability on the demand side was similarly found to be quite weak reflected in low maize productivity despite the use of improved seed varieties, significant post harvest losses due to deficient storage of maize, frequent bottleneck problems at the warehouse, poor gain sorting and cleaning capacity, and serious storage capacity issues in spite of WFP investments. Challenges were also evident in terms of economical and institutional/economic sustainability. Overall FOs have low absolute gross income, and many FOs do not retain any margin on the selling price which clearly undermines their economical sustainability. In

Farmers Organizations involving 10,571 farmers of which 7,081 are women". In fact, the USD 20,000 contract established between WFP and Kixiquila stipulates a training of trainer targeting 60 persons until end 2012. We deem that subsequent trainings done by Kixiquila should not be accounted as a results of WFP intervention, in particular due to the absence of contractual obligation and WFP monitoring.

addition nearly all of the FOs assets are financed through donations and none of the FOs had exit strategies.

Summary of Market Access Results

Two of four results for the MA component were achieved according to the stated indicators. Notably, Result 3 - Increased marketing opportunities for producers and traders of agricultural products and food at the regional, national and local levels - exceeded the target and probably generated a significant positive impact. We found no evidence that the gender related result was realized. In general, performance indicators were not sufficiently detailed or grounded on baseline data.

2.3 Factors affecting results

2.3.1 INTERNAL FACTORS

Existence of a tried and tested model for school feeding

172. The CP has successfully continued to provide school feeding to primary schools. While there have been difficulties in securing the required resources, and constraints in terms of ensuring that food is available on all school days, the evaluation found evidence of a relatively well organized low-cost system for provision of meals to children which reflects WFP's accumulated experience in this area.

Lengthy procurement processes

173. Key informants both within and outside WFP highlighted the fact that WFP's procurement process is slow, and appears to have worsened since 2012. The CO highlighted the impact of severe budget/cash flow management constraints on procurement. Additional causes of lengthy procurement processes cited by informants and identified by the evaluation team include: WFP decision-making delays; lack of suppliers in certain regions; supplier delivery delays, delivering sub-standard commodities, or not responding to tenders; climatic and storage conditions, and challenges associated with getting approval for maize quality. Despite these constraints, food procurement was not downsized; rather the evaluation found a pattern where contracts with partners were signed, but food was not delivered. In the case of FOs (for example those in Angonia), this resulted in demotivation of members and uncertainty with regards to future planning. Data provided by WFP for 2008 to 2010 show that, on average, 26 percent of the annual defaulted tonnage was caused by "WFP delays". In addition, in 2009 and 2010, between 50 percent and 65 percent of the defaulted tonnage is deemed to have been caused by "side-selling". It is probable that "WFP delays" demotivated farmers and encouraged them to supply other buyers.

Centralized decision-making processes

174. A culture of centralized decision making within WFP (an internal factor) was found to have further contributed to delays and produced inefficiencies, in particular because it was often combined with centralized decision making of partner ministries. For example in the case of social protection WFP and INAS centralized processes resulted in complications such as justifying the lists of

people registered on the programme with those who were to be paid and that cases had to be referred back and forth between the central and local levels before being resolved

175. Within WFP delays have been compounded by the policy whereby all travel authorizations are made in the Maputo office of WFP. Subsequently decisions were not always swiftly made leading to frequent alteration of travel/transport plans. It should be noted, however, that since August 2014 SOs have authority to approve trips that do not require overnight stays.
176. Centralized decision making is also evident from lack of involvement of WFP's field office in the monitoring of the school feeding programme. This was reportedly the result of a decision to centralize the supervision at MOE level. However it represented a missed opportunity to capitalize on the WFP field office accumulated experience in school feeding.

Limited viability of innovative implementation modalities in poorest areas

177. Beneficiaries' illiteracy and poor financial literacy also played a large role in the delays. Beneficiaries lost cards, forgot Personal Identification Numbers (PIN), and in some cases, gave the cards and PIN numbers to INAS staff, who then cleaned out bank accounts. The problems associated with introducing new technologies to populations who have had no previous exposure, and whose level of education does not equip them to rapidly assimilate new approaches is well documented, and it would appear that the programme paid insufficient attention to ensuring that beneficiaries were familiar with the cash distribution process.

Poor Choice of Assets Created under PASP

178. Assets created under PASP are supposed to contribute to building community resilience to climatic variability. WFP found it difficult to ensure that resilience-building assets were prioritised in District Development Plans as local leaders generally favoured more 'politically visible' structures such as speaking stages and hospital waiting rooms. Where resilience assets were created, they were sometimes done at the wrong time, or lacked the management structures to ensure sustainability (for example, planting trees which subsequently die once people were not being paid to water them). WFP staff noted that one of the factors contributing to the difficulty of assimilating their resilience objective into District Development plans is their inability to commit funds over a medium-term time frame (i.e. longer than a year or so). WFP's inability to make such funding commitments limited its role at the decision-making table.

Staffing and Staff Support

179. Insufficient staffing levels was evident across all components. Between 2012 and 2014, WFP's Market Access component had three staff operating at district level in five provinces. This number is considered insufficient by WFP Market Access personnel who indicated that they relied on NGOs to liaise with the farmers on a day-to day base and because NGOs are not formally bonded to WFP and consequently prioritize their own agenda. In the area of school feeding, the WFP office in Maputo in 2014 had just one local programme assistant in charge of the school feeding (before this there was also a JPO) supplemented with additional

time from an international officer. The ET finds this level of staffing insufficient in light of the component's complex design which includes various models of school feeding, a pilot programme, and a relatively wide geographical spread (particularly among pilot schools).

180. It is widely recognised in the WFP office that Mozambique's booming economy – fuelled by rapid development in the extractive industries and energy sector - has created a situation where a job with the UN is no longer as attractive as it once was. The lack of job security - particularly among local staff - is exacerbated by the funding challenges which the CO currently faces.
181. Funding constraints have contributed to staff shortages, and the ET found instances where members of staff were not replaced even though they performed important functions. For example, the officer overseeing cash and voucher programming left Mozambique in early 2014 but had not been replaced by the time of the evaluation (November/December 2014).
182. The lack of involvement of WFP field offices also affected the implementation of the CP. For example in school feeding, WFP field offices were initially told that supervision would be done by the government, and were thus not provided with information (such as quantities of food disbursed) which would have allowed them to check on this component's progress. And when visits were carried out to schools these often did not include checks on important qualitative issues such as the level of involvement in decision making of community members of school management committees and the effective representation and involvement of women in school committees.

Partnership Approach

183. According to respondents, the CO is considered transparent and responsive to requests for support, and as such, is well-respected by government at all levels, United Nations partners, and NGOs. These qualities contribute to stakeholders holding the CO in high regard, knowing that WFP can consistently deliver relief assistance under very difficult conditions. It would appear, however, that where WFP's role is more development oriented, the effectiveness of partnership faces some limitations.
184. Between 2012 and 2014, five formal agreements amongst WFP and NGOs in the context of Market Access component were established, four of them aimed at training farmers. In general, both time frame and funding of WFP agreements with NGOs was too narrow to significantly impact on farmers' performances.⁵⁵ The time required by WFP to set-up and manage these contracts is undefined but it is likely to have been a constraint considering the centralised nature of WFP's decision-making process. In this context, both effectiveness and efficiency of the current agreements amongst WFP and NGOs is questionable.

Learning and applying lessons

⁵⁵ The longest agreement corresponded with FOs membership mapping and lasted seven months. Budgets allocated to NGOs intervention ranged from USD8.830 to USD54.542. The maximum number of farmers reached in this context was 512.

185. A review of internal assessments and evaluations of elements of the programme indicates that WFP has sometimes failed to fully internalise and act on lessons learned from previous programmes. For example, the high quality review of the cash transfer programme conducted by WFP in 2012 contained a number of valuable recommendations regarding the timeliness of payments, financial literacy, the arrangements with partner banks, the choice of assets to be created under public works, the size of the transfer and communication of programme objectives, but this evaluation found that many of these issues remained unresolved, and in some cases had worsened (for example late cash payments). Failure to act on this information – particularly the issue of late payments – has, in some cases, led to beneficiaries having to sell assets and reduce consumption.

Nature of pilot projects

186. There is an internal lack of clarity about the nature of a ‘pilot’ scheme. On several occasions, the ET were told that elements of the SP programme were a pilot, although the design actually contained very few features that define a pilot programme – i.e. limited duration, high investment in tracking progress, learning, and an exit strategy. WFP’s official pilot, the CFA approach using ATM cards, finished in May 2012 (when it was reviewed). Referring to on-going operations as a pilot is inaccurate and could be interpreted as an attempt to pass off poor elements of design as something temporary when the evidence suggests that they are actually permanent features.
187. Along similar lines, the evaluation finds that the school feeding pilot is also unclear on a number of key issues. While there has arguably been a somewhat more consistent approach with respect to the design, this pilot has been poorly designed, suffered from lack of resources, and has not benefited from adequate tracking. The issues that have arisen during implementation have not been adequately assessed, and the model that was tested does not offer a good enough basis for deciding whether to proceed. In the view of the ET this means that decisions are being made about moving on to new models while the former models were not adequately implemented, supported or assessed.

Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) and Quality Assurance

188. This evaluation generally supports the findings of the PRRO with regard to M&E, and there is no need to repeat the findings of that thorough evaluation here other than to note that some of the recommendations made in that evaluation have been actioned. However, it should be noted that although output monitoring is done with reasonable efficiency, under the current reporting format, timeliness of food and cash delivery – arguably a key element of achieving food security objectives - is only reported on in the monthly output reports and does not constitute a key target of the CP like tonnage delivered and number of people reached. This was found to be the case across the different components of the CP.
189. An outcome monitoring dataset is gradually being established through various data collection modalities. While this allows the CO to assess changes in various areas, including food security and CSI scores of beneficiaries compared to a non-beneficiary group, a lack of the kind of qualitative data that makes it possible to attribute any changes observed to programmatic or external factors. Key contributors to this issue include lack of staff resources and the overall ‘one-size-

fits-all' nature of the WFP outcome monitoring system. These factors also affect the capacity of the CO to monitor and learn from the pilot work that it is doing. The CP does estimate its contribution to MDG1 and MDG2 by an analysis of the prevalence of food security and trends in the enrolment rate in primary education (both disaggregated by groups), but this remains an estimate and the lack of concrete evidence may be one of the reasons behind the reluctance of some donors to support the CP (and preference to implement activities through trust funds instead)

Capacity Development

190. Across the CP efforts have been made to address partners' (largely Government's) capacity gaps. However, the approach has been strongly focused on individual capacity development without much attention given to improving institutional capacity. There has also not been a systematic approach to follow-up and support trainees in applying what has been learnt and assess the extent to which the training is producing the desired results.
191. The overall WFP approach to implementing capacity development across the CP could be strengthened considerably by being more cognizant of acknowledged good practice in this area - particularly in terms of ensuring follow-up of in-service training participants (e.g. health workers). Much of the training was short in duration, and insufficiently focused on technical capacity. WFP has also not been able to transfer much of its recognized logistical capacity – and this caused serious problems in the delivery of some of the components (e.g. in nutrition and school feeding) when Government services took over some of this responsibility.
192. Despite the focus in the design of the CP on important gender aspects across the different components, and some efforts at gender training, no evidence was found of a comprehensive CO capacity development plan for enhancing capacities and competencies of partners for mainstreaming gender as is recommended in the gender policy. This was likely one of the factors behind the fact that in practice gender received less attention than was planned. The other important factor, according to respondents, and as referred to in the analysis above, relates to the financial constraints on the CP, which has led to cuts being made in the envisioned supervision and support.

2.3.2 EXTERNAL FACTORS

Cultural Norms

193. In addition to the transfers' insufficient size and frequent late delivery, an additional factor confounding the achievement of this objective is the culture of sharing and rotating membership prevailing in some areas. These serve to respectively dilute the size of the (already small) transfer and negate the year-on-year improvements that are intended by having a multi-year programme. These same issues were also identified in the school feeding and nutrition components of the CP. School meals are on occasion shared with siblings, and the ET established that in some cases part of the portion is taken home to share with family. The same was experienced with the Super Cereal rations where the sharing of rations was found to clearly have reduced the effectiveness and the impact of the intervention. Autonomous sharing and rotation is motivated by

strongly engrained culture, as well as the desire of some community leaders to make sure that as many people as possible get a share in some way from any resources coming into an area – particularly in the election years of 2013 (local) and 2014 (national). The resulting benefits from the programme are thus impossible to measure with existing M&E tools.

Working through Government of Mozambique

194. WFP's main implementation partner across the components of the CP is the Government of Mozambique, which is entirely in line with the expectations of the Government. Unfortunately, many of the government departments face serious staffing and budget challenges of their own – thus limiting the effectiveness of the partnership. For example, in the case of INAS, despite efforts on the part of the UN partners to build capacity, the department continues to be affected by resource constraints. Some of the districts where the CP was operational had no dedicated member of staff but instead relied on a 'focal point person'. This in turn affected many aspects of the SP component, from registration of beneficiaries to selection of assets for completion, and communication with beneficiaries about their payments.
195. A related dimension has been the fact that in line with its own policy, the Government of Mozambique has been strongly focused on assuming leadership of initiatives. While this is laudable from the perspective of ownership, it has put very real constraints on the implementation of activities and has restricted WFP's ability to be proactive and introduce corrections where necessary. Examples are the decisions to delay the start of the pilot project until PRONAE was officially approved and the suspension of school feeding in all pilot schools following the discovery of irregularities. This affected not only the schools where serious problems were identified but also other schools where irregularities were more related to procedural issues, and where perhaps it would have been feasible to go for an option that would have allowed the school feeding to continue while simultaneously addressing the irregularities. There was also the expectation that government takeover would be facilitated by using funding to Mozambique through the Global Programme for Education (GPE). However, the internal advocacy capacity of the department responsible for school feeding has been weak, and the department management insufficiently senior, to be able to pressure for change. In addition, the very late start of the school feeding pilot, and the challenges in its implementation have meant that there has not been a sufficiently convincing model for replication produced.
196. Nonetheless the evaluation also finds the implementation modalities of the various components have been different from the official Government of Mozambique's strategies and policies on execution modalities (which had been taken into account in the design of the WFP CP). Divergence between theory and practice was evident in implementation, and in particular in the case of the WFP Market Access component where the underfunding of the agrarian sector has resulted in an extremely low government capacity at the field level. In this context, international organizations such as WFP and NGOs targeting smallholders have mostly used their own implementation capabilities and used partnership strategies to deliver tangible services.

Working through Aligned and Harmonized Approaches

197. As documented in the evaluation report WFP worked closely with other UN agencies on the SP programme. This is an important example of a successful One-UN intervention. However, in terms of the division of responsibility WFP took responsibility for the most difficult part of delivery in the field. Criticism of the shortcomings of WFP's activities (e.g. delayed payments, delays in delivery, etc.) must be tempered with an appreciation that these efforts have been made to work within these frameworks. Having said that, the evaluation detected a strong perception amongst CO and Government of Mozambique staff that WFP's continued coherence with the development of a national SP programme in Mozambique is jeopardised for two reasons. The first reason concerns the rigid internal processes (particularly accounting systems) that prevent WFP from supporting the Government of Mozambique in the same flexible way that UNICEF does. Finances are also behind the second reason for doubt over WFP's future involvement. Put simply, SP programming requires a long term and predictable commitment of funds. Lack of predictability of funding which is due to WFP funding mechanisms (entirely based on voluntary contributions) is a main factor in this respect. Being an implementation agency itself (one with a reputation for delivering humanitarian relief) WFP is not in a position to do this; the Government of Mozambique does not include WFP promises of support in its budget projections, and the agency's influence at decision making fora is limited. As the national SP programme slowly gains traction and is rolled out, donors are likely, for reasons of cost and sustainability, to channel funds directly to the Government of Mozambique.

Resources

198. At the time of the evaluation, the CP had only secured 41 percent of its projected budget, a fact which had implications for staffing levels and the scale of activities. This has also led to existing resources being more thinly spread.

Food Prices

199. The size of the food and cash transfers in particular were not sufficient to defray the impact of price shocks. Food price information used by WFP is collected by the Government's System of Market Information (SIMA) and is accurate at the District level, but commodities become considerably more expensive once they are transported to the remote areas where PASP is operational. Because of this the cash transfer effectively amounted to a smaller amount of food. .

Summary of Factors Affecting SP results

- Resources (human and financial) have not matched design of the various components and have adversely affected WFP's ability to conduct M&E, particularly the qualitative aspects necessary to attribute impact.
- Experimental / pilot activities ambitious, complex, with no sustainability / exit strategies, and lessons from previous evaluations have not been internalised or acted on.
- Capacity development has lacked a systematic approach across components of the CP. In the case of Market Access, capacity building of FOs has been lacking

– an issue linked to the short duration and limited scope of partnership agreements as well as staff shortages.

- Late deliveries of inputs, including payments of cash transfers, have affected the programme and point to an incomplete understanding of context (including financial literacy, logistics and the speed at which partners operate). In the case of SP, it seriously affected beneficiaries' ability to plan expenditure and resulted in some negative coping strategies. It also diminished the reputation of WFP in the field.
- Assets created under PASP are often not conducive to increasing household resilience to climatic variability because they were not maintained after the work period, or were simply not related to resilience (e.g. public speaking stages for the elections).
- Centralised decision-making processes – both in WFP, Government of Mozambique and the Banks - meant that resolution of issues such as: support to pilot initiatives, field offices, registration of beneficiaries, and problems with bank accounts, took much longer than they would have had a more local system been in place.
- The Government of Mozambique's has capacity challenges, making targets more difficult to achieve.
- A culture of sharing and of local leaders' desire to include as many households as possible in resource distribution dilutes the effect of support such as Super Cereal and transfers to a level that is not measurable.
- Higher food prices in rural areas diminished the purchasing power of the cash transfers to a level where their impact is not measurable

3 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

200. This section of the report summarizes the conclusion of the evaluation based on the evaluation criteria: relevance, coherence and appropriateness, efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability and gender.

3.1 Overall Assessment

3.1.1 RELEVANCE, COHERENCE AND APPROPRIATENESS

201. The CP has successfully aligned activities with WFP's corporate objectives as well as those of the UN in Mozambique and the Government. From a design perspective, the interventions have objectives which are relevant to the needs of the target population and are based on a careful analysis of where food insecurity is most prevalent in Mozambique. Similarly, the programme was strongly coherent with internal UN and external Government of Mozambique policies. Interventions were, on paper, appropriate to the needs of target populations as they were intended to reduce malnutrition, increase school attendance, address chronic malnutrition, increase households' resilience to climatic variability and build the capacity of farmers groups and implementing partners, particularly the Government of Mozambique. The focus on capacity development of government institutions and on a gradual takeover by these institutions was entirely appropriate and in line with the Government of Mozambique's own priorities and the focus of other partners in the country (UN and donors).

3.1.2 EFFECTIVENESS

202. The programme has undoubtedly had some successes: school feeding has resulted in an improvement in retention rates and school attendance and local farmers have benefited by being included in the supply chain for school feeding; the PASD programme has had a significant impact on improving the nutritional status of those registered on the programme for the period during which they received food, and the PASP has had some successes in improving household food consumption levels and building community assets. Anecdotal evidence points to improvements in capacity of both grass roots level farmer organizations and partner departments within the Government of Mozambique. The WFP, working in partnership with other UN organizations, has also had a positive effect on the formulation of Government of Mozambique policy, particularly with regard to DRR, school feeding and SP. An important achievement that was consolidated over the CP period was the focus on purchasing from local markets, which now constitutes 100 per cent of the portfolio.

203. On the whole, however, the Programme fell short of reaching the ambitious targets stated in the CP logframe. There are several reasons for this: First, there were major changes in the overall funding environment over the period with donors reducing their overall support in Mozambique, and becoming more focused on results. This led certain donors to insist on separate and specific projects rather than funding through the CP (nutrition was particularly affected by this).

204. Secondly, resource constraints also meant that fewer households received assistance than originally planned, and pipeline breaks meant that those who

were assisted often received their transfers late or in part, as documented above for the school feeding, SP (PASP and PASD) and nutrition components. Household sharing Super Cereal also affected the effectiveness of the nutrition support as recovery rates were lower or it took longer to recover. Lack of funds also impacted in a major way on the ability to recruit and retain staff, which had a knock-on effect on the CPs ability to deliver its capacity building agenda and conduct elements of monitoring and evaluation. This resource issue means that WFP's ability to commit funds long term is stymied and reduces its influence and voice in planning fora at both the district and national levels. An example of this is the difficulties that the CO has had in persuading District Development Committees that assets created under the PASP should be focused on building resilience to climate change rather than just creating seasonal employment for the able bodied poor. Along similar lines, with respect to school feeding, the lack of consistency in support, and the failure to adequately implement the pilot, makes it difficult to present a convincing case to Government for take-over of this activity. In addition, when an acute emergency happens, staff are pulled from other activities to support the emergency until staff surge measures are in place, which also affects the implementation of regular activities.

205. A third factor is the capacity challenges of WFP's main partner - the Government of Mozambique. One of the CPs objectives is capacity development, but in many cases it could be argued that what was actually needed, in the context of delivering many of the CPs objectives, was capacity augmentation rather than just building the skills of the staff already in place. Even though the CP was successful in strengthening some vital aspects of capacity – for example rolling out monitoring tools and DRR planning procedures in some areas, resource constraints on WFP's side meant that this augmentation was not possible. In the context of the low capacity, it could be argued that WFP overestimated the capacity of not just its government partner but also beneficiaries. For example, the decision to use ATMs as the main method of delivery of cash transfers is not poor in itself, but the failure to ensure that there was sufficient oversight and support to a population with practically no previous knowledge of such technology and high levels of financial illiteracy is a significant oversight. Insufficient capacity and oversight also affected the implementation of the other pilot under the CP. The school feeding pilot did not get adequate support during implementation from the Government, and the capacity of the WFP field offices was underutilized. This contributed substantially to the implementation problems, including to problems in managing the local purchasing. Related to the capacity issue is also the fact that the CP clearly made overambitious assumptions about the capacity of the Government to take over the responsibility for activities, not only in terms of capacity but also in financial terms. The expected take-over of the school feeding by the Government was unlikely to happen in three years given the need to pilot and the fiscal constraints. While the CP managed to increase local purchasing to

a full 100 per cent of the programme, the reliance on local purchasing created considerable difficulties, which affected implementation⁵⁶.

206. It should be mentioned here that shortcomings in the CP's M&E system make it difficult to know exactly how effective the CP has been. Output monitoring has not been consistently implemented, and outcome monitoring, where it has taken place, makes assumptions about the causes of impact which do not stand up to closer analysis – for example attributing improved food consumption scores to transfers which only supply a small percentage of a household's food entitlements. Even though capacity development is one of the CP's main objectives, there has been no consistent approach to measure how capacity has been improved as a result of the programme.
207. Finally the CP did not consistently monitor and disaggregate gender data, making it difficult to understand how the programmes were impacting on gender issues.

3.1.3 EFFICIENCY

208. Four main factors impacted on efficiency: First, the centralised nature of decision making for both WFP and its implementation partners such as banks and the Government of Mozambique created bottlenecks that slowed activities down considerably. The centralization of decision making served to disempower sub-office staff, impacted on morale and reduced the incentive for initiative.
209. The second factor affecting efficiency is the lack of resources and unpredictable pipeline. Uncertainties related to the flow of funds and food made it difficult to programme activities, affected implementation (and lessons learning from pilot projects), and impacted on the recruitment and retention of staff.
210. Thirdly, the ET found some evidence that the CP did not take lessons from previous evaluations on board and did not ensure that lessons were adequately learnt during implementation. Many of the shortcomings of the CP – for example, delays in paying PASP beneficiaries, and the problems with ensuring that assets constructed are actually useful and sustainable were identified in previous evaluations, but appear not to have been acted on. The evaluation also found a tendency to label programmes as pilots, when in fact they contained few or none of the key features of pilots – for example a defined exit strategy and clear mechanisms for feeding back lessons learned into future improved programming. The pilot project in SP also lacked sufficient resources for, and attention to, monitoring of implementation.

3.1.4 SUSTAINABILITY

211. The area of the programme that will have the most sustainable impact will be the changes to Government policy that WFP, along with its UN partners, have managed to shepherd through. The CP can claim credit for the changes to school feeding, social protection (particularly with regard to the targeting of OVCs) and DRR policies. In addition, some practical elements of the programme will have a

⁵⁶ For example, in the case of school feeding, the locally purchased maize did not meet quality control standards and the WFP office had to shift stocks around from other areas of the programme to be able to supply schools.

lasting impact – for example, mainstreaming the use of the tools and methods to register beneficiaries and monitor outcomes under the nutrition and other components, the development of District DRR Plans in some areas and the establishment of school feeding councils and farmer marketing associations.

212. Much of the other changes – largely related to household food security - is likely to be more transient: the bulk of the benefit of the PASP programme has been the transfers received, rather than the assets created (many of which were not relevant to resilience, or have not been maintained) and the lack of any kind of exit strategy for PASD beneficiaries means that, on leaving, many will return to the same situation that they were in before they were enrolled on the programme.

3.2 Key Lessons for the future

213. WFP has proved through this programme that it is capable of designing a programme that is policy-consistent, both internally and externally, and indeed appropriate to the needs of food insecure households in Mozambique.
214. Delivery of the programme fell short of the high targets it set for itself. It was ambitious in what it expected to achieve considering the resources it was able to attract and deploy and the capacity of its implementation partners, particularly the Government of Mozambique. Either some fairly erroneous assumptions were made regarding capacity development, or there is an organizational blind spot regarding this issue. While it can be argued that the context overall was different at the time of the CP design, there were indications that funding might be a challenge. In addition, given that WFP had experience working with Government there should have been a more explicit and direct learning from that experience.
215. The second major lesson learned concerns the nature of partnership. In most countries WFP allocates resources to NGOs who execute elements of the programme to WFP's specifications. In Mozambique, WFP plays a role alongside the different ministries, INAS and other Government agencies in line with the principle of government ownership, and in support of the principle of Mozambique being a One-UN country. This means that WFP does not have the authority to demand certain levels of performance or delivery, while at the same time the nature of its funding arrangements (small and sporadic) limit that extent to which resources can be used as a lever. This leaves WFP in a kind of limbo: trying to deliver on objectives that have been set as if the partner is an international NGO, but actually working through structures that are not as efficient and over which WFP has little control. The tripartite agreement in education is an example of this. While a good idea in theory there were no mechanisms for enforcement of what was in the agreement and no ways of ensuring that what was done met standards of quality.
216. A third observation is that, in the case of this CP, WFP appears to be operating in areas and with modalities that are outside its comfort zone. The atypical nature of partnership between WFP and the Government described above is one of the reasons for this discomfort. A second is the difficulties associated with doing development-type programming under funding streams that are short-term and more suited to humanitarian interventions. As things stand many of WFP's systems are not set up for development work (an M&E system that focuses more on outputs rather than outcomes and impact is a good example of this). It is fair

to say that WFP is developing policies and approaches that are aimed at supporting development rather than humanitarian programmes, but is challenged in delivering this agenda because of internal systems that are not wholly compatible with this kind of work and because of the short term nature of its funding and its own financial and human capacity constraints.

217. Fourth, in a country the size of Mozambique, centralised decision making does not make for efficient programming. At a Government level – through necessity - there is a fair degree of decentralization, and it would appear that power will increasingly be devolved to the provinces. It seems odd, therefore, that WFP Mozambique has refrained from giving sub-offices more decision making power. Centralization has other hidden costs such as a negative impact on morale and speed of decision-making.
218. Finally, M&E systems are not good enough to serve as a tool of management and accountability. The fact that targets for timely delivery of food and cash under the PASP are not included in the logframe does nothing to encourage staff to address the huge problems of late delivery affecting the programme, even though delivery times are tracked through the logistics M&E system. Similarly, the indicators associated with the market component have very little to do with increasing farmers productivity, focussing instead on the outputs that WFP supplies. Much of this is the result of having to adhere to a centralized M&E structure of which many aspects are imposed from headquarters.

3.3 Recommendations

1. In providing support to the design of the next CP during the course of 2015, the RB should work closely with the CO to ensure that this evaluation's findings regarding WFP's areas of comparative advantage are used to inform decisions on priorities. Areas of comparative advantage identified in this evaluation include: school feeding where WFP has a strong field presence and a recognized model of support, strengthening the logistics capacity of government counterparts, continuing to support implementation of SP programmes under the joint UN programme and through WFP field presence, DRR, and assisting Government in developing its M&E. By building on areas of comparative advantage, the CP will likely increase its efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability, and resource mobilization.
2. In designing the next CP, the CO should ensure that the priorities and activities of each of the future CP's components is based on an assessment of government capacities in that particular sector/area, and on an assessment of realistically achievable change in this area, while considering the realistic timeframes needed for bringing about the envisioned change. The RB should work with the CO to ensure that the CP planning incorporates appropriate support within the CP (training, technical assistance, system development and corresponding budgets) to address gaps, and that targets and expectations are revised to realistically achievable levels (likely downwards). In terms of funding, the CO needs to encourage the allocation of adequate Government resources to enable a smooth and sustainable hand over.
3. In 2015, the CO should commission a national school feeding costing assessment, including a cost-benefit analysis. This could help define the cost of

a national School Feeding programme and build an investment case for school feeding. The cost-benefit analysis would also be an important input into the next CP. The evaluation team suggests that this cost-benefit assessment be planned as part of a System Approach for Better Education Results (SABER) exercise⁵⁷, which has been influential in agenda setting in other countries.

4. The WFP CO should, in the course of 2015, work with other UN agencies (as part of the new UNDAF) to develop a capacity development strategy, and engage with key government partners as a critical input into the new CP. The strategy should include a baseline, clear and specific indicators to measure the envisioned changes at the individual, group, and institutional level, and periodic measurements of progress in conjunction with Government. The strategy will improve coherence of actions with other agencies, and maximize the use of scarce resources. Improved government capacity will contribute to the impact of the CP in the medium to long term. In order to strengthen its approach to capacity development, the CO should plan to second skilled staff to government to provide on-the-job-support to those whose capacity it's trying to build.
5. The next CP should include, for each of its components, specific mechanisms which would allow beneficiaries to provide feedback to Government and WFP on WFP supported programmes. This is a requirement for the social protection programmes (and will thus improve coherence with corporate policy) and a good practice for other areas of programming. It not only ensures that beneficiaries have a recourse but also constitutes a useful feedback mechanism which can feed into the efficiency of WFPs programme. Use and usefulness of these mechanisms should be monitored by the CO and the RB on an annual basis.
6. WFP RB should, in the first half of 2015 and in conjunction with HQ, review available corporate guidance for country offices on the standards that need to be met in planning and implementing pilot projects at field level. It is desirable that the WFP RB also conduct a joint review with the CO to identify changes that can be made under the current CP to meet these requirements, and how these efforts can be reflected in reporting. In planning for the new CP, the RB should support the CO in ensuring that pilot projects take account of the guidance and provide feedback to HQ on areas where corporate guidance could be improved.
7. At the country level, the CO management should ensure that recommendations from the recent Regional Office Monitoring Mission (October 2014) such as: ensuring adequate funding for M&E activities; collection of quantitative and qualitative gender data for regular monitoring of progress; conducting regular assessments of the utility of assets created, and setting up feedback mechanisms at all levels, are implemented and regularly monitored. This will provide ongoing feedback on progress and allow the CO to make appropriate changes to enhance the relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of the programme. It will also provide

⁵⁷ The System Approach for Better Education Results (SABER) tool was developed by the World Bank and WFP and is a structured assessment of a country's School Feeding policy framework, system and programme. It leads to the development of a national action plan for School Feeding across the five dimensions: a) policy frameworks b) financial capacity; c) institutional capacity and coordination; d) design and implementation; and e) community roles.

valuable information to the CO and RB on areas of strength/progress that can feed into dialogue with government and raising funds from donors.

8. The CO should review and consolidate its M&E processes ahead of the new CP to strengthen: a) output monitoring given that accountability regarding the distribution of commodities and cash is central to WFP's credibility, and b) the assessment of the effect of capacity building activities on partner institutions. The ET experienced considerable difficulty in accessing a complete, accurate and consistent set of output figures, with data lacking coherence and presented differently in different reports and activities. Agreeing and adhering to a standard data reporting protocol for the CP would enhance understanding of output data and WFP's credibility in this area. Furthermore, given that WFP's role in Mozambique is likely to increasingly focus on capacity development, efforts to prioritize and institutionalize the regular use of capacity assessment tools are essential. This will assist WFP to better determine the effectiveness of its interventions and demonstrate accountability to its donors and partner institutions. Tools have already been developed for this purpose - these need to be used in a uniform and systematic way throughout the programme.
9. The WFP CO in Mozambique should continue to decentralize operational decision-making. This will allow the CO to capitalize on the strong and experienced staff it has at sub-office level and improve the efficiency of operations. Under current arrangements, sub-offices are disempowered and have little incentive to improve programme quality. As part of this process, the WFP CO should give sub-offices performance targets on an annual basis and support and incentivize them to meet these targets.
10. Taking into account the high levels of chronic malnutrition in Mozambique and the priorities of the Government of Mozambique which are to reduce the levels of chronic malnutrition, WFP should prioritize reducing chronic malnutrition in its next CP. In line with global guidance from WHO, decisions on targeting for MAM in the nutrition component of the next CP should be based on a careful analysis of inequalities among populations and focus on areas where there are clusters of large numbers of wasting children. Finally, in 2015, it should conduct – with external consultancy support and in coordination with other partners (government and UN) - an assessment to identify the reasons for the high levels of MAM default rates seen under the current CP and use the findings to inform the redesign of its interventions.

Annexes

Annex 1: Terms of Reference



EVALUATION QUALITY ASSURANCE SYSTEM

Office Of Evaluation

Measuring Results, Sharing Lessons

[FINAL, 24 JULY 2014]

TERMS OF REFERENCE

OPERATION EVALUATION

MOZAMBIQUE COUNTRY PROGRAMME 200286 (2012- 2015)

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1. INTRODUCTION

1. These Terms of Reference (TOR) are for the evaluation of the Mozambique country programme (CP) 200286 (2012-2015). This evaluation is commissioned by the WFP Office of Evaluation (OEV) and will take place from June 2014 to March 2015. In line with WFP's outsourced approach for operations evaluations (OpEvs), the evaluation will be managed and conducted by an external evaluation company amongst those having a long-term agreement with WFP for operations evaluation services.
2. These TOR were prepared by the OEV focal point based on an initial document review and consultation with stakeholders and following a standard template. The purpose of the TOR is twofold: 1) to provide key information to the company selected for the evaluation and to guide the company's Evaluation Manager and Team throughout the evaluation process; and 2) to provide key information to stakeholders about the proposed evaluation.
3. The TOR will be finalised based on comments received on the draft version and on the agreement reached with the selected company. The evaluation shall be conducted in conformity with the final TOR.

2. REASONS FOR THE EVALUATION

2.1. Rationale

4. In the context of renewed corporate emphasis on providing evidence and accountability for results, WFP has committed to increase evaluation coverage of operations and mandated OEV to commission a series of Operations Evaluations (OpEvs) in 2013-2015.
5. Operations to be evaluated are selected based on utility and risk criteria.⁵⁸ From a shortlist of operations meeting these criteria prepared by OEV, the Regional Bureau (RB) has selected, in consultation with the Country Office (CO) the Mozambique CP 200286 (2012-2015) to undergo an independent evaluation. This specific operation was proposed as it represented an interesting case of articulation/ implementation of WFP strategic plan in a Delivering as One UN country context.
6. The evaluation has been timed to ensure that findings could feed into future decisions on programme formulation and in particular into the design of the next country programme.⁵⁹

2.2. Objectives

7. This evaluation serves the dual and mutually reinforcing objectives of accountability and learning:
 - **Accountability** – The evaluation will assess and report on the performance and results of the operation. A management response to the evaluation recommendations will be prepared.

⁵⁸ The utility criteria looked both at the timeliness of the evaluation given the operation's cycle and the coverage of recent/planned evaluations. The risk criteria was based on a classification and risk ranking of WFP COs taking into consideration a wide range of risk factors, including operational and external factors as well as COs' internal control self-assessments.

⁵⁹ Originally expected to end in December 2015, the ongoing country programme may be extended until December 2016 should the UNDAF be extended for a year to be aligned with the revised government plan.

- **Learning** – The evaluation will determine the reasons why certain results occurred or not to draw lessons, derive good practices and pointers for learning. It will provide evidence-based findings to inform operational and strategic decision-making. Findings will be actively disseminated and lessons will be incorporated into relevant lesson sharing systems.

2.3. Stakeholders and Users

8. **Stakeholders.** A number of stakeholders both inside and outside of WFP have interests in the results of the evaluation and many of these will be asked to play a role in the evaluation process. Table one below provides a preliminary stakeholders’ analysis, which will be deepened by the evaluation team in the inception package.

Table 1: Preliminary stakeholders’ analysis

Stakeholders	Interest in the evaluation
INTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS	
Country Office (CO)	Responsible for the country level planning and operations implementation, the CO is the primary stakeholder of this evaluation. It has a direct stake in the evaluation and an interest in learning from experience to inform decision-making. It is also called upon to account internally as well as to its beneficiaries, partners for the performance and results of its operation.
Regional Bureau (RB) for Southern Africa (OMJ) based in Johannesburg	Responsible for both oversight of COs and technical guidance and support, the RB management has an interest in an independent account of the operational performance as well as in learning from the evaluation findings to apply this learning to other country offices.
Office of Evaluation (OEV)	OEV is responsible for commissioning OpEvs over 2013-2015. As these evaluations follow a new outsourced approach, OEV has a stake in ensuring that this approach is effective in delivering quality, useful and credible evaluations.
WFP Executive Board (EB)	The WFP governing body has an interest in being informed about the effectiveness of WFP operations. This evaluation will not be presented to the EB but its findings will feed into an annual synthesis of all OpEvs, which will be presented to the EB at its November session.
EXTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS	
Beneficiaries	As the ultimate recipients of food assistance, beneficiaries have a stake in WFP determining whether its assistance is appropriate and effective. As such, the level of participation in the evaluation of women, men, boys and girls from different groups will be determined and their respective perspectives will be sought.
Government	The Government has a direct interest in assessing whether WFP activities in the country are aligned with its priorities, harmonised with the action of other partners and meet the expected results. Issues related to capacity development, sustainability and handover strategies will be of particular interest. Various ministries are partners in the design and implementation of WFP activities, including Ministry of Health, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Women and Social Action, Ministry of Agriculture
UN Country team	The United Nations Country Team’s (UNCT’s) harmonized action framed in the One UN Action Plan should contribute to the realisation of the government developmental objectives. It has therefore an interest in ensuring that WFP operation is effective in contributing to the UN concerted efforts. Various agencies are also direct partners of WFP at policy and activity level.

NGOs	NGOs are WFP’s partners for the implementation of some activities while at the same time having their own interventions. The results of the evaluation might affect future implementation modalities, strategic orientations and partnerships.
Donors	WFP operations are voluntarily funded by a number of donors. They have an interest in knowing whether their funds have been spent efficiently and if WFP’s work has been effective and contributed to their own strategies and programmes.

9. **Users.** The primary users of this evaluation will be:

- The CO and its partners in decision-making related notably to programme implementation country strategy and partnerships.
- Given RB’s core functions of strategic guidance, programme support and oversight, the RB is also expected to use the evaluation findings as well as the office responsible for support to RBs under the Chief Operating Officer.
- OEV will use the evaluation findings to feed into an annual synthesis report of all OpEvs and will reflect upon the evaluation process to refine its OpEv approach, as required.

3. SUBJECT OF THE EVALUATION

10. Mozambique is a vast country endowed with rich natural resources. Owing to a prolonged and devastating civil war, these resources have not yet been fully exploited and, despite impressive economic growth in the last ten years, 54 percent of the population continues to live below the poverty line and more than one-third is food-insecure; almost half of all children are chronically malnourished. Natural disasters and low agricultural productivity have contributed to persistent poverty and food insecurity. Mozambique is ranked 185th out of 187 countries in the 2012 Human Development Report, and the average life expectancy is just 50 years. Progress towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals has been uneven.
11. Mozambique is a pilot country for the United Nations Delivering as One initiative, whereby all United Nations agencies, based on their comparative advantages, contribute towards a United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF). The UNDAF, its Action Plan and consequently WFP’s country programme and protracted recovery and relief operation (PRRO) are fully aligned with the national priorities as outlined in the Government’s five-year plan, the Poverty Reduction Strategy (2011–2014) and national sector policies.
12. WFP’s CP 200286 focuses on improving basic nutrition, scaling up social protection and transitioning towards a home-grown school meals programme, with an emphasis on enhancing capacity at the national and local levels, enhancing risk and vulnerability analysis and expanding market linkages for smallholder farmers. The CP is comprised of 5 components as follows:
 - Component 1 - Home-grown School Meals – provides a key safety net for children in vulnerable households in the most food-insecure areas.
 - Component 2 – Social Protection – addresses seasonal food gaps through unconditional and conditional food and cash transfers.
 - Component 3 – Nutrition – originally included both the treatment of acute malnutrition (wasting) and the prevention of chronic malnutrition (stunting). However, the stunting

prevention activities were implemented under a separate trust fund benefiting from a separate funding stream.

- Component 4 – Risk Reduction – provides capacity development support to the Government in risk analysis and mapping, early warning and food and nutrition security analysis.
 - Component 5 – Market Access – aims to facilitate access to markets and develop the capacity of small producers and processors.
13. WFP also implements a PRRO, which provides food assistance in support of emergency response and early recovery activities, targeting disaster-affected as well as a small number of refugees and asylum seekers who have sought refuge in Mozambique due to adverse conditions in the neighbouring countries.
 14. The project document including the project logframe, related amendments (Budget revisions) and the latest resource situation are available by clicking [here](#).⁶⁰ The key characteristics of the operation are outlined in table two below, while table three summarizes the operation’s specific objectives and corresponding activities:


Table 2: Key characteristics of the operation

Approval	The operation was approved by the Executive Board in February 2012	
Duration	<u>Initial:</u> 4 years and 10 months (1 March 2012 – 31 December 2015)	<u>Revised:</u> <u>N/A</u>
Amendments	<p>There have been 3 amendments to the initial operation.</p> <p>Purpose of budget revisions:</p> <p>BR 1: substituted cash and in-kind food by vouchers under Component 2. Resulted in an overall budget decreases of US\$ 1.5 million.</p> <p>BR2: increased the landside transport, storage and handling (LTSH) costs. Resulted in a budget increase of US\$1.1 million.</p> <p>BR3 (September 2013): Replaced in-kind food by cash and voucher transfers under component 2 and introduced other technical adjustments. Overall, this budget revision resulted in a budget decrease of US\$900,000.</p> <p>A fourth BR is currently under preparation.</p>	
Planned beneficiaries	<u>Initial:</u> 1,217,000	<u>Revised:</u> 1,283,528


⁶⁰ From WFP.org – Countries – Mozambique – Operations or <http://www.wfp.org/node/3528/3938/185894>

Planned food requirements	<u>Initial:</u> In-kind: 78,241 mt of food Cash and voucher: US\$6.7 million	<u>Revised:</u> In-kind: 70,816 mt of food Cash and voucher: US\$9.9 million
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Planned % of beneficiaries by component*



Planned % of food requirement by component*



Components 4 and 5 are technical assistance and capacity development activities that do not have food, cash transfer, external transport or landside transport, storage and handling cost components.

* As per original project document

***As per WFP guidelines on beneficiary counting, beneficiaries of capacity development activities are not accounted for.

Main Partners	<u>Government:</u> Ministry of Health, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Women and Social Action, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry	<u>UN agencies:</u> FAO, IFAD, ILO, UNAIDS, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNHABITAT, UNICEF and WHO	<u>NGOs:</u> International NGOs: 3 Cruz Vermelha de Moçambique (Red Cross), World Relief,
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	of Trade and Commerce Technical Secretariat for Food and Nutrition Security (SETSAN); National Directorate of Disaster Management (INGC)	<u>Others:</u> Government of Brazil and the Brazil/WFP centre of excellence are key partners for the school feeding component	Samaritan's Purse International Relief (SPIR). National NGOs: 5 Profamilia, Conselho Cristão de Moçambique, Associação Desenvolvimento Rural Mágoe, Olhando Esperança, Associação Moçambicana para o Desenvolvimento da Família
US\$ requirements	<u>Initial:</u> US\$105 million	<u>Revised:</u> US\$104 million	
Contribution level (as of June 2014)	The operation received US\$40.4 million - 39% of the total project requirements.		
Top four donors (as of June 2014)	UN Common funds and agencies (33% of total contributions); Canada (16%); Belgium (12%); Multilateral (8%) and Private Donors (4%).		

15. Table three below summarizes the operation's specific objectives and corresponding activities:

Table 3: Objectives and activities

	Corporate Strategic Objectives*	Operation specific objectives	Components/ Activities
UNDAF Outcomes: 1, 4, & 5	Strategic Objective 2	Reduce hazard risk at the community level in target communities. Put in place early-warning systems, contingency plans and food security monitoring systems and enhance with WFP capacity development support.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Social protection: Food/ cash transfers to targeted food insecure families, vulnerable people and people living with HIV • Home-Grown School Meals • Nutrition:
	Strategic Objective 4	Increase access to education in assisted schools. Reach adequate food consumption over assistance period for target households.	

		<p>Improve nutrition status of target groups.</p> <p>Increase adherence of adults and children with HIV on anti-retroviral therapy (ART).</p> <p>Increase production capacity for fortified foods, including complementary foods and special nutritional products.</p> <p>Increase marketing opportunities at the national level with cost-effective WFP local purchases.</p>	<p>Support to the Ministry of Health through coordination of the development of sustainable systems for integrating nutrition services into the national health system over the longer term and the implementation of activities under the National Nutrition Rehabilitation Programme (PRN)</p>
	Strategic Objective 5	<p>Contribute to the incorporation of hunger solutions in broader national policy frameworks.</p> <p>Make progress toward nationally owned hunger solutions.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Risk reduction: Strengthen the capacity of the INGC and SETSAN in risk analysis and mapping, early warning and food and nutrition security analysis. • Market access: Facilitate access to markets and develop the capacity of smallholder producers and processors, by increasing marketing infrastructure and market information and improving commodity quality.

* The CO has realigned the logframe with the new Strategic Plan (2014-2018) and new Strategic Results Framework for the year 2014. However, given that this evaluation will cover the period mid-2010 to August 2014, reference is made to the Strategic Plan (2008-2013).

4. EVALUATION APPROACH

4.1. Scope

16. **Scope.** The evaluation will cover the Mozambique CP 200286 including all activities and processes related to its formulation, implementation, resourcing, monitoring, evaluation and reporting relevant to answer the evaluation questions. The period covered by this

evaluation is 2010 to October 2014, which captures the time from the development of the operation until the start of the evaluation.

17. Components 1 and 2 (school feeding and social protection) form the core of the country programme and will require particular attention. Given that the stunting prevention activities envisaged under component 3 (nutrition) were not implemented under the CP but through a separate trust fund, the evaluation will focus on the first evaluation question related to the relevance of this activity and will not cover the second and third questions as outlined in section 4.2. The evaluation team shall fully cover component 4 (Risk reduction) and component 5 (market access), which provides the foundation for the handover strategy of component 1.
18. The stunting prevention activities under component 3 (nutrition) will be excluded from the scope of this evaluation as they will be implemented under a separate trust fund
19. While the evaluation will focus on the country programme, the team should be aware of and familiar with WFP broader portfolio of activities in Mozambique, including the PRRO and several trust funds such as the MDG 1 Trust Fund. The CO is particularly interested in the synergies/ possible overlaps between the CP and PRRO as well as the CP and separate trust funds.

4.2. Evaluation Questions

20. The evaluation will address the following three questions:

Question 1: How appropriate is the operation? Areas for analysis will include the extent to which the objectives, targeting, and choice of activities and transfer modalities:

- Are appropriate to the needs of the food insecure population.
- Are coherent with relevant stated national policies, including sector policies and strategies and seek complementarity with the interventions of relevant development and humanitarian partners as well as with other CO interventions in the country, such as the PRRO as well as separate trust funds. Particular attention should be placed on the appropriateness of i) pursuing the treatment of moderate malnutrition intervention under component 3 in light of the most recent health and demographic results and corporate Nutrition policy; and ii) targeting orphans and vulnerable children given the new directions set by the ministry of social action.
- Are coherent with the UN action Plan 2012-2015 and synergetic with other agencies' programme of work based of respective comparative advantages under the UN Delivering as One Plan.
- Are coherent with WFP strategies, policies and normative guidance.

Question 2: What are the results of the operation? While ensuring that differences in benefits between women, men, boys and girls from different groups are considered, the evaluation will analyse:

- the level of attainment of planned outputs;
- the extent to which outputs led to the realisation of operation objectives and unintended effects;
- how different components and activities of the operation dovetail and are synergetic with what other actors are doing to contribute to the overriding UN objective in the country.
- The efficiency of the operation, looking in particular at the implications of pursuing similar interventions under different operations; and the likelihood that the benefits will continue after the end of the operation;

Question 3: Why and how has the operation produced the observed results? The evaluation should generate insights into the main internal and external factors that caused

the observed changes and affected how results were achieved. The inquiry is likely to focus, amongst others, on:

- Internally: the processes, systems and tools in place to support the operation design, implementation, monitoring/evaluation and reporting (looking in particular at the outcome indicators for components 4 and 5 on capacity development); the governance structure and institutional arrangements (including issues related to staffing, capacity and technical backstopping from RB/ Headquarters (HQ)); the partnership and coordination arrangements; etc. Particular attention should be put on assessing WFP's capacity to further scale up cash and voucher transfers under component 2.
- Externally: the external operating environment including the political and security context; the funding climate; external incentives and pressures; recurrent natural disasters, etc.

4.3. Evaluability Assessment

21. Evaluability is the extent to which an activity or a programme can be evaluated in a reliable and credible fashion. The below provides a preliminary evaluability assessment, which will be deepened by the evaluation team in the inception package. The team will notably critically assess data availability and take evaluability limitations into consideration in its choice of evaluation methods. In doing so, the team will also critically review the evaluability of the gender aspects of the operation, identify related challenges and mitigation measures.
22. In answering question one, the team will be able to rely on assessment reports, minutes from the project review committee, the project document and logframe, past evaluations or reviews as well as documents related to government and interventions from other actors.⁶¹ In addition, the team will review relevant WFP strategies, policies and normative guidance.
23. For question two the operation has been designed in line with the corporate strategic results framework (SRF) and selected outputs, outcomes and targets are recorded in the logframe. Monitoring reports as well as annual standard project reports (SPRs) detail achievement of outputs and outcomes thus making them evaluable against the stated objectives.
24. However, answering question two is likely to pose some challenges owing in part to: i) the absence of baseline data for some activities, which will need to be reconstructed using findings from various assessment reports; ii) challenges in measuring progresses against baselines due to sampling issues; and iii) data gaps in relation to efficiency.
25. For question three, the team members will have access to institutional planning documents and are likely to elicit further information from key informant interviews.
26. Other evaluability challenges may include: i) Political context potentially limiting the level of engagement of government counterparts in the evaluation as general elections will be held in Mozambique on 15 October 2014; ii) Staff rotation: Both the country director and deputy country director have been re-assigned in 2013, which may pose some recall issues for questions related to the design of the operation, although national staff would be able

⁶¹ An external evaluation of the previous CP was conducted in 2008, covering mainly the school feeding component. In 2011-2012, a country office-led technical review of the voucher transfers and cash-for-assets pilot were conducted in addition to a government-led evaluation of the public works/cash for assets national programme (PASP). Additionally, several independent evaluations were undertaken for all the joint UN programmes (2008 – 2012) as well as the DaO evaluation (2012). An operation evaluation of the Mozambique PRRO was carried out in May 2014.

to provide key information on the design of the operation and earlier implementation phase.

4.4. Methodology

27. The methodology will be designed by the evaluation team during the inception phase and validated by the evaluation manager. It should:
 - Employ relevant internationally agreed evaluation criteria including those of relevance, coherence (internal and external), coverage, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, sustainability (or connectedness for emergency operations);
 - Use applicable standards (e.g. SPHERE standards);
 - Demonstrate impartiality and lack of biases by relying on a cross-section of information sources (e.g. stakeholder groups, including beneficiaries, etc.) and using mixed methods (e.g. quantitative, qualitative, participatory) to ensure triangulation of information through a variety of means. In particular, the sampling technique to select field visit sites will need to demonstrate impartiality and participatory methods will be emphasised with the main stakeholders, including the CO.
 - Be geared towards addressing the key evaluation questions taking into account the evaluability challenges, the budget and timing constraints;
 - Be based on an analysis of the logic model of the operation and on a thorough stakeholders analysis;
 - Be synthesised in an evaluation matrix, which should be used as the key organizing tool for the evaluation.

4.5. Quality Assurance

28. OEV's Evaluation Quality Assurance System (EQAS) defines the quality standards expected from this evaluation and sets out processes with in-built steps for quality assurance, templates for evaluation products and checklists for the review thereof. It is based on the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) norms and standards and good practice of the international evaluation community (Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and ALNAP) and aims to ensure that the evaluation process and products conform to best practice and meet OEV's quality standards. EQAS does not interfere with the views and independence of the evaluation team.
29. At the start of the evaluation, OEV will orient the evaluation manager on EQAS and share related documents. EQAS should be systematically applied to this evaluation and the evaluation manager will be responsible to ensure that the evaluation progresses in line with its process steps and to conduct a rigorous quality control of the evaluation products ahead of their submission to WFP.
30. The evaluation company is ultimately responsible for the quality of the evaluation products. If the expected standards are not met, the evaluation company will, at its own expense, make the necessary amendments to bring the evaluation products to the required quality level.
31. OEV will also subject the evaluation report to an external post-hoc quality assurance review to report independently on the quality, credibility and utility of the evaluation in line with evaluation norms and standards.

5. PHASES AND DELIVERABLES

32. The evaluation will proceed through five phases. Annex two provides details of the activities and the related timeline of activities and deliverables.

33. **Preparation phase** (Oct-Dec 2013): The OEV focal point will conduct background research and consultation to frame the evaluation; prepare the TOR; select the evaluation team and contract the company for the management and conduct of the evaluation.
34. **Inception phase** (26 June- 7 August 2014): This phase aims to prepare the evaluation team for the evaluation phase by ensuring that it has a good grasp of the expectations for the evaluation and a clear plan for conducting it. The inception phase will include a desk review of secondary data and initial interaction with the main stakeholders.

- **Deliverable: Inception Package.** The Inception Package details how the team intends to conduct the evaluation with an emphasis on methodological and planning aspects. The package will be approved by OEV and shared with the CO/RB for information. It will present an analysis of the context and of the operation, the evaluation methodology articulated around a deepened evaluability and stakeholders' analysis; an evaluation matrix; and the sampling technique and data collection tools. It will also present the division of tasks amongst team members as well as a detailed schedule for stakeholders' consultation. For more details, refer to the [content guide for the inception package](#).

35. **Evaluation phase** (17 Nov – 05 Dec 2014): The fieldwork will span over three weeks and will include visits to project sites and primary and secondary data collection from local stakeholders. Two debriefing sessions will be held upon completion of the field work. The first one will involve the country office (relevant RB and HQ colleagues will be invited to participate through a teleconference) and the second one will be held with external stakeholders.

- **Deliverable: Aide memoire.** An aide memoire of preliminary findings and conclusions (PowerPoint presentation) will be prepared to support the de-briefings.

36. **Reporting phase** (06 Dev 2014 – 18 Feb 2015): The evaluation team will analyse the data collected during the desk review and the field work, conduct additional consultations with stakeholders, as required, and draft the evaluation report. It will be submitted to the evaluation manager for quality assurance. Stakeholders will be invited to provide comments, which will be recorded in a matrix by the evaluation manager and provided to the evaluation team for their consideration before report finalisation.

- **Deliverable: Evaluation report.** The evaluation report will present the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation in a concise report of 40 pages maximum. Findings should be evidence-based and relevant to the evaluation questions. Data will be disaggregated by sex and the evaluation findings and conclusions will highlight differences in performance and results of the operation for different beneficiary groups as appropriate. There should be a logical flow from findings to conclusions and from conclusions to recommendations. Recommendations will be limited in number, actionable and targeted to the relevant users. These will form the basis of the WFP management response to the evaluation. For more details, refer to the [content guide for the evaluation report](#).

37. **Follow-up and dissemination phase:** OEV will also subject the evaluation report to an external post-hoc quality review to report independently on the quality, credibility and utility of the evaluation in line with evaluation norms and standards. A feedback online survey on the evaluation will also be completed by all stakeholders. The RB will coordinate WFP's management response to the evaluation.

Notes on the deliverables:

The inception package and evaluation reports shall be written in English and follow the EQAS templates.

The evaluation team is expected to produce written work that is of very high standard, evidence-based, and free of errors. The evaluation company is ultimately responsible for the timeliness and quality of the evaluation products. If the expected standards are not met, the evaluation company will, at its own expense, make the necessary amendments to bring the evaluation products to the required quality level.

The evaluation TOR, report and management response will be public and posted on the WFP External Website (wfp.org/evaluation). The other evaluation products will be kept internal.

Table 4: Key dates for field mission and deliverables

Entity responsible	Phase	Activities	Key dates
EM	Inception	Final Inception Package	7 Aug 2014
CO/ET	Evaluation	Evaluation field mission	17 Nov-6 Dec 2014
ET	Evaluation	Aide memoire	4 Dec 2014
EM	Reporting	Draft Evaluation Report	19 Jan 2015
EM	Reporting	Final Evaluation Report	18 Feb 2015
CO/RB	Follow-up	Management Response	9 March 2015

6. ORGANIZATION OF THE EVALUATION

6.1. Outsourced approach

38. Under the outsourced approach to OpEvs, the evaluation is commissioned by OEV but will be independently managed and conducted by an external evaluation company having a long-term agreement (LTA) with WFP for operations evaluation services.

39. The company will provide an evaluation manager (EM) and an ET in line with the LTA. To ensure a rigorous and objective review of evaluation deliverables, the evaluation manager should in no circumstances be part of the evaluation team.

40. The company, the evaluation manager and the evaluation team members will not have been involved in the design, implementation or M&E of the operation nor have other conflicts of interest or bias on the subject. They will act impartially and respect the [code of conduct of the profession](#).

41. Given the evaluation learning objective, the evaluation manager and team will promote stakeholders' participation throughout the evaluation process. Yet, to safeguard the independence of the evaluation, WFP staff will not be part of the evaluation team or participate in meetings with external stakeholders if the evaluation team deems that their presence could bias the responses of the stakeholders.

6.2. Evaluation Management

42. The evaluation will be managed by the company's Evaluation Manager for OpEvs (as per LTA). The EM will be responsible to manage within the given budget the evaluation process in line with EQAS and the expectations spelt out in these TOR and to deliver timely evaluation products meeting the OEV standards. In particular, the EM will:

- Mobilise and hire the evaluation team and provide administrative backstopping (contracts, visas, travel arrangements, consultants' payments, invoices to WFP, etc.).
- Act as the main interlocutor between WFP stakeholders and the ET throughout the evaluation and generally facilitate communication and promote stakeholders' participation throughout the evaluation process.
- Support the evaluation team by orienting members on WFP, EQAS and the evaluation requirements; providing them with relevant documentation and generally advising on all aspects of the evaluation to ensure that the evaluation team is able to conduct its work.
- Ensure that the evaluation proceeds in line with EQAS, the norms and standards and code of conduct of the profession and that quality standards and deadlines are met.
- Ensure that a rigorous and objective quality check of all evaluation products is conducted ahead of submission to WFP. This quality check will be documented and an assessment of the extent to which quality standards are met will be provided to WFP.
- Provide feedback on the evaluation process as part of a 360 assessment of the evaluation.

6.3. Evaluation Conduct

43. The evaluation team will conduct the evaluation under the direction of the evaluation manager. The team will be hired by the company following agreement with OEV on its composition.

44. **Team composition.** The evaluation team is expected to include 3-4 members, including the team leader and 2-3 international and national evaluators. It should include women and men of mixed cultural backgrounds and nationals of Mozambique.

45. The estimated number of days is expected to be in the range of 50 for the team leader; 40 for the national evaluators.

46. **Team competencies.** The team will be multi-disciplinary and include members who together include an appropriate balance of expertise and practical knowledge in:

- School feeding
- Livelihoods/resilience/safety nets/social protection.
- Nutrition
- Gender
- Capacity development
- Cash and voucher transfers
- Local procurement

47. All team members should have strong analytical and communication skills; evaluation experience and familiarity with the country or region.

48. The Team Leader should speak fluently and write in English and Portuguese (to work in the field and be able to read/understand all the documentation and write the evaluation report), while local consultants may speak only Portuguese, plus additional local languages if required.

49. **The Team leader** will have technical expertise in one of the technical areas listed above as well as expertise in designing methodology and data collection tools and demonstrated experience in leading similar evaluations. She/he will also have leadership and communication skills, including a track record of excellent Portuguese writing and presentation skills.

50. Her/his primary responsibilities will be: i) defining the evaluation approach and methodology; ii) guiding and managing the team during the evaluation process; iii) leading the evaluation mission and representing the evaluation team in meetings with stakeholders; iv) drafting and revising, as required, the inception package, aide memoire and evaluation

report in line with EQAS; and v) provide feedback to OEV on the evaluation process as part of a 360 assessment of the evaluation.

51. **The team members** will bring together a complementary combination of the technical expertise required and have a track record of written work on similar assignments.

52. Team members will: i) contribute to the design of the evaluation methodology in their area of expertise based on a document review; iii) conduct field work; iv) participate in team meetings and meetings with stakeholders; v) contribute to the drafting and revision of the evaluation products in their technical area(s) and vi) provide feedback on the evaluation process as part of a 360 assessment of the evaluation.

7. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF WFP STAKEHOLDERS

53. **The Country Office.** The CO management will be responsible to:

- Assign a focal point for the evaluation to liaise with the OEV focal point during the preparation phase and with the company evaluation manager thereafter. Ute Meir, Deputy Country Director will be the CO focal point for this evaluation.
- Provide the evaluation manager and team with documentation and information necessary to the evaluation; facilitate the team's contacts with local stakeholders; set up meetings, field visits and the exit briefing; provide logistic support during the fieldwork; and arrange for interpretation, if required.
- Participate in a number of discussions with the evaluation team on the evaluation design and on the operation, its performance and results. In particular, the CO should participate in the evaluation team briefing and debriefing (possibly done in the form of a workshop) and in various teleconferences with the evaluation manager and team on the evaluation products.
- Comment on the TORs and the draft evaluation report.
- Prepare a management response to the evaluation.
- Provide feedback to OEV on the evaluation process as part of a 360 assessment of the evaluation.

54. **The Regional Bureau.** The RB management will be responsible to:

- Assign a focal point for the evaluation to liaise with the OEV focal point during the preparation phase and with the company evaluation manager thereafter, as required. Silvia Biondi, Regional Monitoring and Evaluation Advisor, OMJ will be the RB focal point for this evaluation.
- Participate in a number of discussions with the evaluation team on the evaluation design and on the operation, its performance and results. In particular, the RB should participate in the evaluation team debriefing (possibly done in the form of a workshop) and in various teleconferences with the evaluation manager and team on the evaluation products.
- Provide comments on the TORs and the evaluation report.
- Coordinate the management response to the evaluation and track the implementation of the recommendations.
- Provide feedback to OEV on the evaluation process as part of a 360 assessment of the evaluation.

55. **Headquarters.** Some HQ divisions might, as relevant, be asked to discuss WFP strategies, policies or systems in their area of responsibility and to comment on the evaluation TOR and report. These include: Operations Department (OS), Policy, Programme and Innovation Division (OSZ), Emergency Preparedness (OME), Procurement Division (OSP), Logistics Division (OSL), Government Partnerships Division (PGG).

56. **The Office of Evaluation.** OEV is responsible for commissioning the evaluation and Julie Thoulouzan is the OEV focal point. OEV's responsibilities include to:

- Set up the evaluation including drafting the TOR in consultation with concerned stakeholders; select and contract the external evaluation company; and facilitate the initial communications between the WFP stakeholders and the external evaluation company.
- Enable the company to deliver a quality process and report by providing them with the EQAS documents including process guidance and quality checklists as well as orient the evaluation manager on WFP policies, strategies, processes and systems as they relate to the operation being evaluated.
- Comment on, and approve, the evaluation report.
- Submit the evaluation report to an external post-hoc quality assurance process to independently report on the quality, credibility and utility of the evaluation and provide feedback to the evaluation company accordingly.
- Publish the final evaluation report (together with its quality assessment) on the WFP public website and incorporate findings into an annual synthesis report, which will be presented to WFP's Executive Board for consideration as well as in other lessons-learning platforms, as relevant.
- Conduct a 360 assessment (based on an e-survey) to gather perceptions about the evaluation process and the quality of the report to be used to revise the approach, as required.

8. COMMUNICATION AND BUDGET

8.1. Communication

57. Issues related to language of the evaluation are noted in sections 5 and 6.3, which also specifies which evaluation products will be made public and how and provides the schedule of debriefing with key stakeholders. Section 7 describes how findings will be disseminated.

58. It should be further noted that to enhance the learning from this evaluation, the evaluation manager and team will emphasize transparent and open communication with WFP stakeholders. Regular teleconferences and one-on-one telephone conversations between the evaluation manager, team and country office focal point will assist in discussing any arising issues and ensuring a participatory process.

8.2. Budget

59. **Funding source:** The evaluation will be funded in line with the WFP special funding mechanism for Operations Evaluations (Executive Director Memo dated October 2012) and the cost to be borne by the CO, if applicable, will be established by the WFP Budget & Programming Division (RMB).

60. **Budget:** The budget will be prepared by the company (using the rates established in the LTA and the corresponding template) and approved by OEV. For the purpose of this evaluation the company will:

- Use the management fee corresponding to a medium operation.
- Take into account the planned number of days per function noted in section 6.3.
- Not budget for domestic travel to the exception of internal flights.

Please send queries to Please send queries to Julie Thoulouzan, Evaluation Officer:


Email: Julie.thoulouzan@wfp.org

Phone number: + 39 06 65 13 35 04

ANNEX 1: MAP



WFP Country Program Priority Areas



ACRONYMS

BR	Budget Revision
ALNAP	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action
CO	Country Office (WFP)
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
EB	(WFP's) Executive Board
EQAS	Evaluation Quality Assurance System
EM	Evaluation Manager
ER	Evaluation Report
ET	Evaluation Team
HQ	Headquarters (WFP)
IP	Inception Package
LTA	Long-term agreement
NGO	Non-governmental organization
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
Mt	Metric ton
OEV	Office of Evaluation (WFP)
OpEv	Operation Evaluation
RB	Regional Bureau (WFP)
TOR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNEG	United Nations Evaluation Group
WFP	World Food Programme

Annex 2: Methodology

Evaluability Assessment


1. Evaluability is the extent to which an activity or a programme can be evaluated in a reliable and credible fashion.
2. With respect to the first evaluation question - **appropriateness of the choices made** - the evaluation team used available government policy and strategy documents, external context analysis, reviews done at sector and supra sector level (e.g. SBS and GBS evaluations and reports), internal assessment reports, minutes from the project review committee, WFP project documents, project documents from WFP partners working in the same areas, WFP logframes, and WFP and other partners' past evaluations. In addition, the team reviewed relevant WFP strategies, policies and normative guidance. These documents were procured in the period leading up to the field work and contained a sufficient amount of qualitative and quantitative information to allow for a comprehensive response to question one. Wherever applicable, information from these secondary sources was complemented with selected interviews with key government, WFP, donor, and Civil Society (CS) stakeholders.
3. The second evaluation question focused on the **results of WFP operations**. The team used WFPs corporate strategic results framework (SRF) as a reference, as well as selected outputs, outcomes and targets as recorded in logframes to examine results. This was complemented by monitoring reports, as well as annual standard project reports (SPRs) which provide details on achievement of outputs and outcomes against planned targets, which the team used to compare results with stated objectives. However, the evaluation anticipated and found some challenges due to: i) the absence of baseline data for some activities; ii) challenges in measuring progress against baselines; iii) the realignment of the logframe to the new SRF as of end 2013 which required deciding on which indicators would be used to assess the results for the year 2014; and iv) data gaps in relation to efficiency of operations evident in the documentation. To the extent possible, the team endeavored to reconstruct baselines from data obtained at local level during field work. Questioning of respondents (using individual and group interviews) included measures of perception changes from the start. In addition, the team used various internal and external assessment reports to reconstruct findings where necessary. The team experienced a challenge in terms of gender disaggregated data; as was noted in the recent PRRO evaluation (OEV/2014/05) "overall, implementing partners (IP) rarely provided WFP with sex-disaggregated output data, limiting the evaluability of men's and women's equal participation, and the ET found no evidence of measures to ensure gender sensitivity in programme implementation" (Verduijn et al., 2014, p. xi). The team endeavored to address this limitation by complementing outcome analysis with qualitative data gathered during field visits.
4. With respect to the factors that explain the results, the objective of evaluation question 3, informant interviews (individual and group interviews) as well as planning and reporting documentation (as mentioned above) provided the information needed.

5. Challenges that affected the evaluability of the CP to a greater or lesser extent included:
- General elections that took place in Mozambique in mid-October and delayed the onset of the evaluation.
 - The considerable staff rotation in the period covered by the evaluation (particularly in 2012 and 2013) making it necessary to interview former staff who were involved in selected components of the CP.
 - The fact that schools were closed for exams and summer holidays during the field work period. The evaluation team mitigated this challenge by having the local consultant conduct selected school visits prior to the collective field work. This allowed the team to have at least some view of school feeding in action.

Proposed Approach and Methodology

6. The main points of reference for this evaluation which constituted the logic of the operation included:
- The five *strategic objectives* set out in the WFP strategic plan 2008-2013, of which three were of particular relevance to the operation evaluation
 - The five *components of the operation*
 - The *cross-cutting themes of the operation* - gender and capacity development
 - The three key *evaluation questions* (EQ) examine the: a) appropriateness of the operation; b) the results; and c) internal and external factors that contributed to these results
 - The UNDAF outcomes 1, 4 and 5
7. The manner in which these key points of reference fit together provided a framework for reference as shown below.
8. The component areas covered by the operation included: i) social protection; ii) school feeding with a focus on home grown responses; iii) nutrition; iv) risk reduction; and v) market access.
9. Three of WFPs five Strategic Objectives (SO2, SO4, and SO5) are of relevance to the WFP operation in Mozambique as shown in the diagram above.
10. The two main components of the operation – social protection and school feeding – are linked to SO2 and SO4 respectively. These were considered particularly important in the Evaluation ToR because they “form the core of the country programme” (Evaluation ToR, p.8). The evaluation team thus paid particular attention to these two themes.
11. The nutrition component (component 3) is also linked to SO4. Components four and five of the portfolio are related to capacity development for risk analysis and early response, as well as to the capacity of local producers to respond to nutrition needs and fall under SO5.

Figure 13. Evaluation Model for the Operation Evaluation Mozambique (against the initial logframe)



12. Across these five component areas, the evaluation team examined how the two key cross-cutting themes – gender and capacity development - were taken into account, and contributed to the overall goals of the programme.
13. Key capacity issues within the overall context were examined systematically, both as a component in its own right and as an issue that cuts across all components. WFP’s capacity development policy⁶² was used as a reference in considering both organizational and institutional capacity as well as in the capacity building of individuals.
14. Gender was similarly addressed systematically as a cross-cutting issue. The four dimensions of WFP’s gender policy (gender mainstreaming in operations, capacity development, accountability, and partnerships, advocacy and research) provided a relevant framework for assessing WFP Mozambique’s performance in relation to gender.
15. WFP’s performance in Mozambique with regard to food and nutrition security was assessed in terms of the three main evaluation questions as follows:
 - With reference to **Question 1 (how appropriate were the choices?)**, the evaluation explored the policy, institutional, and programmatic context in the country, how these evolved, and how these shaped the choices by WFP and the

⁶² <http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/reports/wfp216450.pdf>, accessed 15 September 2014.

manner and ways in which WFPs activities responded (or failed to respond) to them.

- Referring to **Question 2 (what were the results?)**, the evaluation looked at the quality of WFPs analysis of the challenges and opportunities; its ability to deploy appropriate technical expertise; the skill with which it optimised its own contribution through partnerships; the extent to which it engaged in learning and adaptation; and the sophistication of its analysis of optimal strategies for the country and for WFP in the areas which it supported.
- In the context of **Question 3, (why and how the programme produced results?)** the evaluation assessed the efficiency, effectiveness and (to the extent feasible) the impact of WFP activities.

Data Collection Methods and Tools

16. The evaluation team used a mixed methods approach in addressing the evaluation questions.
17. They carried out separate FGDs, interviews, and observations with both men and women. This assisted in understanding the nature and dynamics of gender equity, gender discrimination, and power relations between males and females, and contributed to verifying the nature and extent of women's participation.

Triangulation and Complementarity

Methods can be combined in different ways:

'Triangulation': confirming and corroborating results reached by one method with other results reached by another method. For instance, when beneficiaries of a project's services state that they judge it good (or bad); this can be cross-checked by collecting quantitative data on coverage and accessibility of the service.

'Complementarity': results obtained by a method help better understand those obtained by another method. In-depth theory-based approaches may help understand reasons why a project led to unexpected results; qualitative methods may help clarify concepts and define variables; and large-scale data sets may be analysed by multivariate and case-based methods.

Source: Stern et al, 2012

18. By understanding *how* WFP and its partners expected to achieve results, the evaluation team was able to assess the quality and credibility of the WFP portfolio, drawing on international evidence of what works, and international standards of good practice, to supplement evidence on direct outputs and outcomes of the CP in Mozambique.
19. The evaluation matrix was a key resource for the triangulation of information. The team used the evaluation matrix as a template for systematically recording the main findings of the evaluation against each of the detailed evaluation questions, and the sources these were drawn from (e.g. interviews, documentation, and data analysis).

The main sources used for data collection were:

20. **Document/ literature review.** The bibliography was drawn from a much larger e-library of documents gathered with the support of OEV and the Mozambique CO. The documentation was systematically reviewed to feed into the analysis of the overall context, to identify elements that fed into decision making, to understand how progress was monitored, and to identify what results were recorded from the various interventions
21. **Review of secondary data.** The e-library includes a comprehensive collection of WFP's internal data, including SPRs and annual work plans, together with country-level data. The team systematically reviewed earlier studies, including previous evaluations or assessments, and used existing data, as necessary to strengthen the findings of the evaluation. Where necessary and feasible, the team collected additional primary data, for example, through rapid surveys during field visits.
22. **Key informant and stakeholder interviews** were the main primary data collection methods. The list of persons interviewed is included as an annex to this report (Annex 5). Because of Mozambique's size and wide geographical spread of the CP, the team had to select field visit sites based on an assessment of their representativeness or whether the area contained examples of all the CP components. Interviewees were selected opportunistically from beneficiary groups with assistance from WFP and partner-organization staff. The main limitation of this approach was that large areas of the CP were not visited, but findings from the fieldwork were discussed with CP staff at the CO level to assess their representativeness of the programme as a whole.
23. A number of interviews took place with key informants via telephone prior to the field phase. These interviews were mainly with key individuals who were no longer with the WFP CO, with relevant staff from WFP HQ in Rome, and with staff from other agencies/partners no longer based in Mozambique.
24. **Group discussion.** The evaluation team conducted an initial briefing with the CO team as well as two exit feedback briefs using PowerPoint presentations. A workshop session to present the exit brief was held for the internal WFP stakeholders (WFP CO, with telephone link with RB & OEV), scheduled on the penultimate day of the evaluation field mission. A subsequent debriefing – on the last day of the field mission - was held for core stakeholders drawn from government and aid agencies, and identified in consultation with the CO.
25. The team used the available documentation and preliminary consultations with the WFP country office to gain an in-depth understanding of the portfolio and context, and to complete the relevant sections of the evaluation matrix with preliminary answers.

Evaluation Data Collection Tools

26. Interviews with stakeholders in Maputo (WFP, Government Institutions, Development partners, and Civil Society Organizations) were conducted using a semi-structured interview guide which covered the evaluation's main areas of inquiry. The specific questions in the interview guide were adapted based on the informants or areas of the evaluation matrix requiring additional attention.

Challenges for this Evaluation

27. In order to strike the right balance between “macro” and “micro” perspectives, the team examined the portfolio by key component areas of interventions, and by cross cutting-themes. This was then used to determine the contribution to WFP’s SOs as well as to the overarching goal of food and nutrition security.
28. Evaluation Resources - The evaluation team sought to maximise the utility of the evaluation by:
- Building as much as possible on available documentation and studies. A framework for analysis of the existing documentation (both internal and external WFP) was developed during the period between the inception phase and the start of field work. This was used to analyse the available documentation in detail and identify gaps in the data which needed to be addressed during field work.
 - Conducting in-depth analysis of the key component areas and of the cross cutting themes for the evaluation (gender and capacity development) while ensuring that the focus and priority of this analysis remained on using this information to adequately respond to the three evaluation questions, and ultimately to the overarching goal of promoting food and nutrition security.
29. As noted above, and in order to make the evaluation report (ER) as useful as possible for the planning of the next country programme and strategy, the evaluation focused on determining the relevance and effectiveness of the school feeding and social protection programmes as well as drawing out strategic ideas and lessons learnt from WFP’s experience with these programmes. This focus was guided by the fact that these two programmes have been identified as key areas of focus for the upcoming country programme.

Annex 3: Evaluation Matrix

Sub Question	Indicator	Main Sources of Information	Data Collection Methods	Data Analysis Methods	Evidence quality
Key Question 1: How appropriate is the operation? Areas for analysis include objectives, targeting, choice of activities and of transfer modalities					
RELEVANCE					
1.1. Are the objectives, targeting, and choice of activities and of transfer modalities appropriate to meet the needs of the food-insecure population in Mozambique?	<p>1.1.1. Are the Programme’s objectives and interventions appropriate to the immediate needs of the food-insecure population of Mozambique, including the specific needs of women, men, boys and girls?</p> <p>Quantitative evidence that targeting at a national level was consistent with needs identified (in a National Needs and Vulnerability Analyses) and that transfers took account of the predicted food shortfall in calorific / cash terms</p> <p>Quality evidence that the inclusion of stunting targeting children under 2 in the CP (which later became part of a separate trust fund) was in line with the needs of the target population.</p> <p>Qualitative evidence that interventions are supported by a coherent Theory of Change</p> <p>Qualitative and quantitative evidence that the most food insecure households were targeted in a transparent way.</p> <p>Quantitative evidence that the specific nutritional needs of vulnerable household types (FHH, HIV, OVC, elderly) have been considered in the planning of interventions and transfer content</p> <p>Qualitative evidence that transfer modalities and distribution schedules were flexible and suitable.</p> <p>Qualitative or quantitative evidence that market efficiencies and supply-side issues for specific food types</p>	<p>Beneficiary Communities</p> <p>Documents and diagnostic studies on the food security situation – particularly VAC, crop surveys, etc.</p> <p>Internal Project Documents – particularly livelihood baselines and needs assessments</p> <p>Annual Reports (SPR)</p> <p>Market price surveys from FAO and GoM</p>	<p>Literature review and secondary data</p> <p>Semi - structured interviews, group meetings</p> <p>Observation and Focus Groups</p>	<p>Triangulation of the results from the mentioned sources</p> <p>Contribution analysis</p>	<p>Reasonable to good</p>

Sub Question	Indicator	Main Sources of Information	Data Collection Methods	Data Analysis Methods	Evidence quality
	were considered during the design and implementation of cash interventions				
	<p>1.1.2 Are the Programme’s objectives and interventions appropriate to the evolving and future needs of the food-insecure population of Mozambique (including the needs of women, men, boys and girls)?</p> <p>Qualitative or quantitative evidence that interventions were selected, designed and implemented in a participatory way - considering the livelihood strategies and priorities of targeted communities</p> <p>Qualitative or quantitative evidence that interventions were designed to address and mitigate reoccurring hazards faced by households – drought, labour shortages, poor market access, etc.</p>	<p>District Development Committees</p> <p>Beneficiary Communities</p> <p>Implementation Partners</p> <p>School staff</p>	<p>Literature review and secondary data</p> <p>Semi - structured interviews, group meetings and questionnaires</p> <p>Observations, Focus Groups</p>	<p>Triangulation of the results from the mentioned sources</p> <p>Contribution analysis</p> <p>Nominal baseline and visioning exercises</p>	<p>Reasonable to good</p>
	<p>1.1.3. Are the Programme’s objectives and interventions appropriate to and coherent with the operational capacity and approach of their implementation partners? (NGOs, government partners, schools and market traders)</p> <p>Qualitative evidence that the design of the Programme activities (including targeting, distribution and M&E systems) were developed in consultation with other stakeholders?</p> <p>Qualitative evidence that partners’ best practice – particularly with regard to targeting, distribution, establishment of grievance procedures and M&E – was sought and used in the design and execution of activities</p> <p>Quantitative evidence that wider market dynamics were consistent and stable enough to ensure uninterrupted supply of commodities at a predictable price</p>	<p>WFP's partners: GoM and technical service suppliers (distribution)</p> <p>M&E templates and methodologies / guidelines</p> <p>Market traders</p> <p>Hospital / clinic staff</p> <p>Implementing Partner (IP) documentation, including tender documents and guidelines.</p> <p>School staff, district education officers</p>	<p>Semi - structured interviews, group meetings</p> <p>Request for additional documentation as necessary</p>	<p>Review of documentation</p>	<p>Reasonable to good</p>

Sub Question	Indicator	Main Sources of Information	Data Collection Methods	Data Analysis Methods	Evidence quality
	<p>1.1.4 Are the Programme's interventions targeted on the geographical areas of Mozambique that are most in need?</p> <p>Qualitative and quantitative evidence that decisions on targeting of food and other assistance was made on the basis of population's need / vulnerability rather than tribal or political affiliation</p> <p>Qualitative and quantitative evidence that WFP had the capacity to use geographical / satellite information to assist with targeting decisions</p> <p>Qualitative and quantitative evidence that targeting and food distribution within areas traditionally seen as antipathetic to the ruling regime was made on the basis of household need and not their supposed political affiliation</p>	<p>VAC report</p> <p>Crop Assessment reports</p> <p>FEWSNET Reports</p> <p>Informants at the above agencies</p>	<p>Desk Review</p> <p>Interviews with key staff and stakeholders</p>	<p>Quantitative assessment of response proportional to need</p>	<p>Good</p>
COHERENCE					
<p>1.2. Are the objectives, targeting, choice of activities and transfer modalities coherent with relevant stated national policies and strategies?</p>	<p>1.2.1. Is the Programme coherent and consistent with relevant national policies (food security, nutrition, education, protection, health, disaster risk reduction, and others)?</p> <p>Quantitative evidence that the Programme is consistent with national policies like the education policy, Mozambique's National HIV/AIDS policy, Mozambique's policies regarding food security and nutrition and in the case of stunting, with the priorities of country (as expressed in the Multi-Sectoral Action Plan to Reduce Chronic Under-nutrition - MAPRCU)</p> <p>Qualitative and quantitative evidence that the Programme objectives are consistent with those of projects and programs at a district level</p> <p>Qualitative and quantitative evidence that the relevant GoM officials are aware of and in agreement with WFP's approach and objectives under the programme and</p>	<p>Informants at national and local government level and with Donors</p> <p>Documents and plans at national and local level</p>	<p>Interviews and FGDs</p> <p>Document review</p>	<p>Triangulation</p>	<p>Good</p>

Sub Question	Indicator	Main Sources of Information	Data Collection Methods	Data Analysis Methods	Evidence quality
	<p>consider that funds are being used in the correct way and efficiently</p> <p>Qualitative evidence that the key informants are able to articulate the objectives of WFP's interventions and those of other national and local level programs and strategies</p>				
	<p>1.2.2. Does the Programme seek complementarity with the relevant humanitarian interventions and development partners for Mozambique, including clusters coordinating humanitarian & development aid?</p> <p>Qualitative evidence that staff from donor agencies aware of and in agreement with WFP's approach and objectives under the Programme and consider the funds they contributed used in the correct way and efficiently</p> <p>Qualitative and quantitative evidence that WFP staff contribute to and work in concert with cluster mechanisms and coordination platforms, including to UN delivering as one</p> <p>Qualitative and quantitative evidence of complementarity and alignment with other humanitarian / development interventions in Mozambique</p>	<p>Key informants in cluster mechanisms</p> <p>Donors</p>	<p>Interviews</p> <p>Document review</p>	<p>Triangulation</p>	<p>Good</p>
<p>1.3. Are the objectives, targeting, the choice of activities and transfer modalities coherent with WFP strategies, policies</p>	<p>1.3.1. Are the priorities and activities of the CP coherent with the WFP Strategic Plan 2008-2013?</p> <p>Are the priorities and activities of the CP in line with the new Strategic Plan (2014-2017)?</p> <p>Are the activities in this Programme coherent with WFP Strategic Results Framework? Are there also elements within the Programme which are not coherent with the strategic outcomes?</p>	<p>Key informants in CO</p> <p>Documentation</p>	<p>Interviews</p> <p>Document review</p>	<p>Triangulation</p>	

Sub Question	Indicator	Main Sources of Information	Data Collection Methods	Data Analysis Methods	Evidence quality
and normative guidance?	Quantitative evidence of coherence of the various components in the Programme with the WFP Strategic Results Framework (objectives, indicators, targeting, choice of activities, transfer modalities) Qualitative and quantitative evidence that the Programme is likely to achieving the outcomes articulated in these documents				
	1.3.1. Are the activities in this Programme coherent with the WFP policy framework and available normative guidance regarding: Guidelines for food distribution, nutrition guidelines and C&V manual Safety Nets Policy 2012 Nutrition Policy 2012 Policy on DRR 2011 Food Aid and Livelihoods in Emergencies 2010 Capacity Development and Hand-over 2009 Gender policy 2009 Vouchers/cash transfers, 2008 Humanitarian Protection Policy 2012 Strategy for Resource Mobilization (2014) Sustainability through the WFP handover strategy 2012	Key informants in CO Documentation including the WFP Orientation guide and hyperlinked WFP corporate documents	Interviews Document review	Triangulation	
Key Question 2: What are the results of the operation? While ensuring that differences in benefits between women, men, boys and girls from different groups are considered, the evaluation will analyse:					
EFFECTIVENESS, efficiency, impact and sustainability of main components of programme					
2.1. What is the level of attainment of planned outputs?	Number of women, men, girls and boys receiving food and non-food items, by category, and as percentage of planned figures? Timeliness of distributions? Quality of distributions? Were the rations sufficient to meet population needs? School feeding:	Monitoring/output reports Other quantitative data sources (e.g. records kept at school level)	Desk review Field visits	AT Triangulation Analysis by programme component, disaggregation	Medium- as this relies on accuracy of CO Monitoring /output reports and

Sub Question	Indicator	Main Sources of Information	Data Collection Methods	Data Analysis Methods	Evidence quality
	<p>Enrolment rates (girls and boys separately)</p> <p>Days that school feeding is provided versus school calendar days</p> <p>Absenteeism from school by pupils (girls and boys separately) and teachers (male and female) compared to district averages, and if available, before and after school feeding comparisons.</p> <p>Completion and drop-out rates compared to district averages, and if available, before and after school feeding comparisons.</p> <p>Social protection –</p> <p>Community asset score</p> <p>Number of productive assets created</p> <p>Quality and functionality of assets created</p> <p>Household food consumption score</p> <p>Capacity of counterparts (for handover)</p> <p>Nutrition</p> <p>Recovery rate</p> <p>Increased government funding and commitment</p> <p>Handover strategy</p> <p>Risk reduction</p> <p>Disaster preparedness index</p> <p>Increased government funding and commitment</p> <p>Market access</p> <p>% increase in production of fortified foods</p> <p>% of food purchased locally</p> <p>Planned versus actual number of women and men trained in different areas? Perceived relevance and quality of the training provided?</p>	Beneficiary perceptions		by women, girls, men and boys	of data that is kept at field level

Sub Question	Indicator	Main Sources of Information	Data Collection Methods	Data Analysis Methods	Evidence quality
2.2. To what extent did the outputs lead to the realization of objectives, and to any unintended effects?	<p>Beneficiary, staff, and government perception of the level of which the CP contributed to achieving progress in the different component areas of the programme</p> <p>Beneficiary, staff and government perception and understanding of unintended effects in different component areas and of the programme as a whole</p>	Beneficiary, staff, government perceptions	Qualitative data, assessment reports	FGDs with beneficiaries, interviews with WFP staff, and government Direct observation	To be determined
2.3. What synergy exists between the different components of WFP's CP, with other activities by WFP, and with programs implemented by other partners?	<p>References made to other programs in programme documentation (complementarity) and to joint planning, implementation and/or monitoring</p> <p>Evidence of changes to programming and/or approaches to improve coordination and enhance synergies over the life of the CP</p> <p>Complementarities or possible overlaps of the CP with other WFP operations in Mozambique (PRRO and the Trust Funds) to establish whether the rationale for pursuing similar interventions under different operations is still valid</p> <p>The extent to which WFP actively participates in and uses existing coordination mechanisms to improve synergy of activities with that of other programs/partners</p>	<p>Primary qualitative data</p> <p>Country strategy</p> <p>Project document</p> <p>CP, PRRO, and other internal WFP planning and reporting documents</p> <p>Interagency coordination documents (e.g., logistics cluster meeting minutes)</p> <p>Documents from other donor and government sources</p>	<p>Interviews with WFP staff</p> <p>Interviews with external partners (donors, INGOs)</p> <p>Interviews with Government at centralized and decentralized levels</p> <p>Desk review</p>	Qualitative assessment - triangulation of primary and secondary data	To be determined
2.4. How efficient is the operation?	<p>Efficiency has the pipeline/supply chain management been?</p> <p>Efficiency has WFP operated with respect to the management of distribution plans?</p> <p>Average length between the planning of activities and the actual implementation and have the delays been acceptable given the internal and external context?</p>	<p>Perceptions of staff and stakeholders on efficiency (cost, systems, staff, alternatives, etc.)</p> <p>Internal data on pipeline</p>	<p>Interviews with WFP staff</p> <p>Desk review of data that WFP has at CO and global level</p>	Quantitative assessments	Good

Sub Question	Indicator	Main Sources of Information	Data Collection Methods	Data Analysis Methods	Evidence quality
	<p>Efficiency of the food procurement strategy, in particular the costs of imported versus local food purchases, and taking into account time-frames for delivery and acceptability of increased costs and delays in light of the anticipated results?</p> <p>Updates of the alpha value (food costs on international versus local market)</p> <p>Evidence of analysis and containment of distribution costs</p> <p>Evolution of Direct Support Cost Budget Line (including staff budget time) versus operational costs?</p> <p>Associated costs paid to cooperating partners (including for M&E versus quality of services provided)</p>	<p>management, distribution costs</p> <p>Food price data and analysis</p> <p>Contracts with cooperating partners</p> <p>Performance Monitoring system refined</p>			
<p>2.5 Sustainability - What is the likelihood that that any benefits accrued in different component areas will continue after the end of the CP?</p>	<p>Extent to which activities in component areas increased capacity of key partners?</p> <p>Partner perceptions of capacity to continue activities on own?</p> <p>Existence of exit strategies for different component areas?</p>	<p>Interviews</p>	<p>Interviews with WFP staff, implementing partners, government of Mozambique staff, UN partners</p> <p>Interviews with beneficiaries, local officials</p>	<p>Analysis disaggregated by component area</p> <p>Qualitative assessment - triangulation of primary and secondary data</p>	<p>Good, assuming that a sufficient number of interviews are done</p>
<p>Key Question 3: Why and how has the operation produced the observed results? The evaluation generates insights into the main internal and external factors that caused the observed changes and affected how results were achieved.</p>					
<p>EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS</p>					
<p>3.1. What internal factors caused the observed changes, and have affected whether or not</p>	<p>Factors within WFP control include:</p> <p>Pipeline integrity</p> <p>Quality of monitoring and evaluation, including in tracking and giving timely feedback on partners'</p>	<p>SPRs</p> <p>Other internal reporting</p>	<p>Desk review</p> <p>Interviews with WFP staff, implementing partners,</p>	<p>Process evaluation, qualitative institutional analysis,</p>	<p>Good, assuming sufficient number of</p>

Sub Question	Indicator	Main Sources of Information	Data Collection Methods	Data Analysis Methods	Evidence quality
results were achieved?	<p>operational effectiveness, and flexibility in adjustment to available information from monitoring and assessments</p> <p>Reporting</p> <p>Quality of staff</p> <p>Effectiveness of communication and coordination between different parts of WFP, including between HQ, RB, CO, and Field Office</p> <p>Extent to which WFP is successful in the partnerships and implementation arrangements? (e.g. appropriateness of criteria and processes to select partners, adherence to these criteria, quality of support to partners, and quality of dialogue between WFP and its cooperating partners)</p> <p>Quantitative evidence that privately contracted elements of interventions were properly tendered and funds managed correctly and that Implementation Partners were able to manage and enforce conditionality</p> <p>Institutional mobilization capacity (resource mobilization and optimization, staff, procedures, internal control mechanisms)</p>	<p>WFP component evaluations</p> <p>Primary qualitative data</p>	<p>government of Mozambique staff, UN partners</p> <p>Direct observation</p>	<p>Analysis disaggregated by component objectives</p>	<p>interviews are done</p>
3.2. How has gender balance been integrated in the implementation of the CP?	<p>Gender balance in staffing (WFP and implementing partners)</p> <p>Equitable roles, responsibilities, and opportunities for male and female staff working within different programme components?</p> <p>Equitable inclusion of men and women in activities under the CP?</p> <p>Active participation of women in the food management committees?</p>	<p>WFP reports, including SPRs</p> <p>Primary qualitative data</p>	<p>Desk review</p> <p>Interviews and FGD with male and female WFP staff and beneficiaries (e.g., food management committee)</p> <p>Direct observation</p>	<p>Gender analysis</p>	<p>Medium – not all data available is disaggregated by activity, area, etc.</p>

Sub Question	Indicator	Main Sources of Information	Data Collection Methods	Data Analysis Methods	Evidence quality
<p>3.3. What external factors caused the observed changes, and have affected whether or not results were achieved?</p>	<p>Existence of external challenges and how these have had a positive or negative effect on component areas, including those related to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Transport logistics, road and communication infrastructure, safety and security for transportation and operations, lack or delays in funding Natural environment, climate and / or infrastructural conditions Economic conditions Sociocultural characteristics of population groups <p>Extent to which other (Govt., UN, NGOs) programs in surrounding sites have affected the results of Programme</p> <p>Extent to which non-food needs, or other non-achieved (Govt., UN, NGOs) commitments have affected the results obtained by the Programme (e.g. Qualitative or quantitative evidence that effectiveness of interventions to support nutritional needs of HIV / TB patients was maximised by consistent and adequate availability of necessary drugs and other non-food support)</p> <p>Capacity to adapt and mitigate external factors, including adaptation to financial opportunities and risks?</p> <p>Evidence of efforts to manage and mitigate negative impacts of challenges?</p>	<p>WFP reports, including SPRs</p> <p>Primary qualitative data</p> <p>Budget adjustments</p>	<p>Desk review</p> <p>Interviews with WFP staff, implementing partners, government of Mozambique staff, UN partners</p>	<p>Process and institutional analysis</p>	

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Annex 5: People Interviewed

Area of Focus	Interviewee Name	Designation	Organization
General	Daisy Vasconcelos	Consultant School Feeding	MOE
General	Manuel Rego	Director of Planning	MOE
General	Marisete Soares de Araujo	Nutritionist School feeding	MOE
General	Ute Meir	Deputy Country Director	WFP
General	Hitesh Kanakrai	Head of Sub-Office and Senior Programme Assistant	WFP
General	Neema Mkomawanthu	Programme Assistant	WFP
General	Jacinto Sixpense	Senior Programme Assistant	WFP
General	Francesco Slaviero	Head, VAM/M&E Unit	WFP
General	Lara Carrilho	VAM Officer	WFP
General	Elsa Mambo	Programme Assistant	WFP
General	Julio		WFP
General	Eusebio	Monitoring Officer	WFP
Local Procurement and Market Access	Mr. Oscar Siduna	Project coordinator	BAGC (Beira Corridor Initiative)
Local Procurement and Market Access	Mrs. Helena Francisco Bene	Supervisor	CLUSA
Local Procurement and Market Access		Chicondano Association (" United")	Farmers' Association Chicondano
Local Procurement and Market Access		Association Agro - Livestock Chiguirizano ("United ")	Farmers' Association Chiriguizano
Local Procurement and Market Access			Farmers' Association Fonte Boa
Local Procurement and Market Access			Farmers' Association Tilimbique
Local Procurement and Market Access	Gersdane Nunes	SDAE Angonia	SDAE Angonia

Area of Focus	Interviewee Name	Designation	Organization
Local Procurement and Market Access	Florencio Alves	Focal Point at provincial level	SETSAN
Local Procurement and Market Access	Mrs. Fazila Gomes	Market analyst	SIMA Maputo
Local Procurement and Market Access	Fernando Assane	Chief of SPER	SPER Tete
Local Procurement and Market Access	Claudia Santos	Programme Officer (Market Access)	WFP
Local Procurement and Market Access	Ana Touza	Former WFP Head of Unit In charge of X	WFP Head of Unit X
Nutrition	Yuna Conforme	Responsável de (CCR, CPN, CPP) - SMI	Centro de Saúde de Xitima
Nutrition	Dra Maria Elisa	Director	CS Carmelo
Nutrition	Dr Ruben	Doctor	CS Carmelo
Nutrition	Dra Ana	Doctor	CS Carmelo
Nutrition	Tomás Eusébio	Manager of Super Cereal Stocks	CS Carmelo
Nutrition	Eduardo Cavanga	TB Officer	CS Carmelo
Nutrition	Vasco Luís Simbine	Head of Pharmacy	CS Massingir
Nutrition	Albertina Maulumane	MCH (Maternal and Child Health) nurse	CS Massingir
Nutrition	Láura Afonso	Director	CS Sede
Nutrition	Anacleta Mandlate	MCH (Maternal and Child Health) Nurse Child Consultation at Risk (CCR)	CS Sede
Nutrition	Sandra Vilanculos	Pharmacist	CS Sede
Nutrition	Elsa António	SMI Nurse Prenatal Consultation	CS Sede
Nutrition	Esperança Janeiro	SMI Nurse Prenatal Consultation	CS Sede
Nutrition	Didier Manuel	Medical Technician (ART)	CS Urban
Nutrition	Albino Augusto António	Responsible for the US	CS Urban
Nutrition	Cristina da Conceição	SMI Nurse (CMG)	CS Urban

Area of Focus	Interviewee Name	Designation	Organization
Nutrition	Alberto Zimbulane		Cupulumussana Association
Nutrition	Fernando Manuel Caetano	Nutrition Programme Officer	DPS
Nutrition	Isaias	DPS, Gaza	DPS Gaza
Nutrition	Inocente	HIV Advisor	DPS Gaza
Nutrition	Francisco Chauque	Operations Coordinator	EGPAF
Nutrition	Técnico Hilário	Clinical HIV (ART)	Health Center Songo
Nutrition	Arina Fernando	Director	Health Center Songo
Nutrition	Dra. Elisa Guchanda	Director of Hospital	Health Center Songo
Nutrition	Rabeca Foloma	ESMI	Health Center Songo
Nutrition	Santos antónio Matolino	TB Programme Officer	Health Center Songo
Nutrition	Eulentério Araujo Henriques	Clinical Director in charge of ART	Health Center Xitima
Nutrition	Pai da beneficiaria (Lavo Mó)	Beneficiaries of Super Cereal	Matilde Lavo Millstone
Nutrition	Marcelo Almeida	Chief Medical	SDSMAS
Nutrition	Guilhermina	District Director	SDSMAS
Nutrition	Ana Sambo	District Director	SDSMAS
Nutrition	Manuel Leandro	District Officer TB	SDSMAS
Nutrition	Caldécio Milton	HIV Officer	SDSMAS
Nutrition	Kodak Maroda	Nutrition Officer	SDSMAS
Nutrition	Evaristo Maurício	TB Officer	SDSMAS
Nutrition	Alex Bertil	Medical District Chief and Director of the Health Center Headquarters	Serviço Distrital de Saúde, Mulher e Acção Social (SDSMAS),
Nutrition	Koen Vanormelingen	Unicef, Representante	UNICEF
Nutrition	Ivelina Nunes	Head of Logistics Unit	WFP
Nutrition	Mohamed Razak	Logistics Officer - Operations	WFP
Nutrition	Manuel Obejuana	Programme Assistant	WFP
Nutrition		Provincial-level staff	WFP

Area of Focus	Interviewee Name	Designation	Organization
Nutrition	Paula Machungo	REACH	WFP
Nutrition	Filippo Dibari	Programme Officer (Nutrition)	WFP
Nutrition	Fátima	Patient on ART and TB treatment	
Nutrition	António Dramaúce	Supervisor	
Nutrition	Miguel Juliásse		
Nutrition	Gefiace Chiel		
Nutrition	Isabel Mário		
Nutrition	Rosinda Valente		
Nutrition	Helena Mainato		
School Feeding	Basilio Isaque	Chefe de Reparticao de producao e alimentacao	DPEC Reparticao de Producao e Alimentacao/ Isaque e Gento
School Feeding	Antoino Macaje Gento	Coordenador do Programma de Alimentacao Escolar em Changara e Caborra Bassa	DPEC Reparticao de Producao e Alimentacao/ Isaque e Gento
School Feeding	Paulo Vasco Rupia (Magoé)	Implementing Partner	ADMR
School Feeding	Marcelino Matola	Tecnico Departamento de Alimentacao escolar	Auditors for School Feeding Pilot
School Feeding	Alfredo Gomez	Tecnico Departamento de Alimentacao escolar	Auditors for School Feeding Pilot
School Feeding	Tiago Vilanculo	Implementing Partner	Conselho Cristao
School Feeding	Beneficiaries	Also 6 cooks (all female)	EPC de Changara Sede
School Feeding	Mr. Francisco Dazia Mbeue	Director	EPC de Changara Sede
School Feeding	Ms. Rosa Domingos Banderia	Pedagogical Director	EPC de Changara Sede
School Feeding	Mr. Domingo Chetega	Pedagogical Director	EPC de Changara Sede
School Feeding	Mr. Jose Alfaçe	President of the School Council	EPC de Changara Sede
School Feeding	Paulo Nhazilo	Adjunto Pedagogico	EPC de Chimbondzane

Area of Focus	Interviewee Name	Designation	Organization
School Feeding	Luiza Mabanze	Cook and member of the school council	EPC de Chimbondzane
School Feeding	Nelson Zulo	Gestor	EPC de Chimbondzane
School Feeding	Antoinio Francisco Langa	School Director	EPC de Chimbondzane
School Feeding	Armando Jose Panuca	Teacher	EPC de Chimbondzane
School Feeding	Joaquim Joao Mondogo	Director of the school	EPC de Timondzane b
School Feeding	Jamberi Fernando Bateu	Gestor do PRONAE	EPC de Timondzane b
School Feeding	Admina Mario Souto	Head of the OMM	EPC de Timondzane b
School Feeding		District Administrator	Mandjacaze
School Feeding		District Director Education	Mandjacaze
School Feeding	Sr. Aderito Junior Chemane	Ponto focal	PRONAE
School Feeding	Sonia Fidelia Manica	Subtitute of DPE	PRONAE
School Feeding	Reis Sales Bre	Implementing Partner	SDAE de Zumbo
School Feeding	Sr. Gildo Simbine	Gestor no SDEJT	SDEJT of Mandjacaze
School Feeding	Sr. Manuel Jose Madede	Responsavel Financeiro no SDEJT	SDEJT of Mandjacaze
School Feeding	Sra. Flora Nhazilo		SDEJT of Mandjacaze
School Feeding	Delfina Cristos	Logistics Assistant (Tete sub office)	WFP
School Feeding	Steven	Assistente de aramazem	WFP
School Feeding	Mr	District Director for Education	
School Feeding	Ana Taju	Head of Sub Office (Xai Xai)	WFP
School Feeding	Angelo	Field Office Staff	WFP
School Feeding	Sr. Sardinha	Responsavel for the School Feeding Programme	WFP
School Feeding	Nicolas Babu	Programme Officer (Field Support)	WFP
School Feeding	Elsa Mambo	Programme Assistant (School Feeding)	WFP

Area of Focus	Interviewee Name	Designation	Organization
School Feeding	Hitesh Kanakrai	Head of Sub Office (Tete)	WFP
School Feeding	Sinelo Guidio Machangane		
School Feeding	Joao Atanasio		
School Feeding	Afonso Henrique Timoteo		
School Feeding	Celieta Machavane		
School Feeding	Ernesto Macamo	District Education Director	
School Feeding	Antonio Chiose	Focal Point for PRONAE at the SDEJT	
School Feeding	Gracina Macamo	Permanent Secretary for the District	
Social Protection Gaza	Victor Bungaria	World Relief PASP point person	Gaza
Social Protection Gaza	Pinto George Mabunda	Agronomist with DoA	DoA
Social Protection Gaza	Elisa Maningue	INAS Chokwe	INAS
Social Protection Gaza	Joana Viago Macuacus	INAS Chokwe	INAS
Social Protection Gaza	Cidalia Romo	Focal Point MMAS (Xai Xai)	MMAS
Social Protection Gaza	Paulo Bieron	Provincial Director MMAS	MMAS
Social Protection Gaza	Dekada De Vitoria	Massingir	
Social Protection Gaza	AM	PASD beneficiary Chokwe - female	
Social Protection Gaza	BN	PASD beneficiary Chokwe - male	
Social Protection Gaza	AC	PASD beneficiary Chokwe - female	
Social Protection Gaza	Aghostino Antonio Malhouvo	SDPI Massingir	
Social Protection Gaza	Christina Do Campo	Secretary of the District	
Social Protection Gaza	Olinda Irene Facicoto	Shop owner (PASD voucher programme) Chokwe	
Social Protection Gaza	Beneficiaries	Machingching Village Massingir	
Social Protection Gaza	Beneficiaries	Ringane Village Massingir	
Social Protection Maputo/Overseas	Litos Raimondo	Country Director	HelpAge International
Social Protection Maputo/Overseas	Chico Almajane	Chef de Departamento de Desenvolvimento	INAS

Area of Focus	Interviewee Name	Designation	Organization
Social Protection Maputo/Overseas	Antonio Paulo	Director of Information Services	SETSAN
Social Protection Maputo/Overseas	Dr Kuen Vanormelingen	Country Director	UNICEF Mozambique
Social Protection Maputo/Overseas	Deolinda Pacho	Programme Officer Social Protection	WFP
Social Protection Maputo/Overseas	Lusungu Kaunda	Customer Relations Officer	Opportunity Bank Mozambique
Social Protection Maputo/Overseas	Rueben Villanueva	Social Protection Specialist	World Bank
Social Protection Tete	Erasmus Donito	Bank manager	BCI Bank Chitima
Social Protection Tete	Horacio Jose Piano	Permanent INAS Chitima	INAS
Social Protection Tete	Dina Jacinto		Nutrition Support Programme
Social Protection Tete	Regina Armando		Nutrition Support Programme
Social Protection Tete	Bintu Changambika		Nutrition Support Programme
Social Protection Tete	Beneficiaries	Changara group	PASP (food)
Social Protection Tete	Beneficiaries	Chipalapala Village, Caborra Bassa District	PASP (food)
Social Protection Tete	Beneficiaries	Chitima, Caborra Bassa District	PASP (food)
Social Protection Tete	Beneficiaries	Cushamano Village, Changara (females)	PASP (food)
Social Protection Tete	Azevedo Pulaze Bene	Chef of the Cty, Changara	
Social Protection Tete	Domingos Rouson	Chef of Department, Social Protection	
Social Protection Tete	Anapaula Ferreira	Director Social protection, Tete Province	
Social Protection Tete	Torres Famela Fato	Social Action of technical Changana	
Social Protection Tete	Siebren Wilschut	Ex WFP Mozambique Programme Officer	WFP

Acronyms

ABC	Brazilian Agency of Cooperation
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
AMODEFA	Associação Moçambicana Para O Desenvolvimento Da Família
ART	Antiretroviral Treatment
ARV	Antiretrovirals
ATM	Automated Teller Machine
BMI	Body Mass Index
BR	Budget Revisions
C&V	Cash and Voucher (pg. 7)
CAS	Community Asset Score
CBOs	Community Based Organizations
CFA	Cash For Assets
CIFF	Children's Investment Fund Foundation
CLUSA	Cooperative League of the USA
CO	Country Office
CP	Country Programme
CS	Civil Society
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
EB	(WFP's) Executive Board
EFSA	Emergency Food Security Assessment/Analysis
EM	Evaluation Manager
ENSSB	Estrategia Nacional De Segurança Social Básica / National Strategy for Basic Social Security
EQ	Key Evaluation Questions
EQAS	Evaluation And Quality Assurance System
ER	Evaluation Report
ERV	Green Revolution Strategy
ESSP	Education Sector Strategic Plan
ET	Evaluation Team
EU-MDG1c	Accelerate Progress towards MDG1c in Mozambique
FAO	United Nation's Food And Agriculture Organization

FCS	Food Consumption Score
FFA	Food For Assets
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FO	Farmer Organization Field Organizations
FRELIMO	Frente De Libertação de Moçambique
GBS	General Budget Support
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GER	Gross Enrolment Rates
GNI	Gross National Income
GoM	Government of Mozambique
GPE	Global Partnership for Education
HA	Hectares
HABITAT	United Nations Humanitarian Settlements Programme
HDI	Human Development Index
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HQ	Headquarters
IFAD	International Fund For Agricultural Development
ILO	International Labour Organization
INAS	National Institute of Social Action
INGC	National Disaster Management Institute
IR	Inception Report
JPSP	Joint Programme on Social Protection
KG	Kilogram
KII	Key Informant semi-structured Interviews
KM	Kilometers
LNG	Liquefied Natural Gas
LTA	Long-term agreement
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MA	Market Access
MAM	Moderate Acute Malnutrition
MCR	Ministerial Council Resolution
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MIS	Market Information System

MOE	Ministry of Education
MINAG	Ministry of Agriculture
MISAU	Ministry of Health
MMAS	Ministry of Women and Social Action
MT	Metric Tonne
MUAC	Mid-Upper Arm Circumference
MVAC	Malawi Vulnerability Assessment Committee
NCI	National Capacity Index
NGOS	Non-Governmental Organizations
NSFP	National School Feeding Programme
OBM	Opportunity Bank Mozambique
OEV	WFP Office of Evaluation
OpEv	Operation Evaluation
OVC	Orphans And Vulnerable Children
P4P	Purchase For Progress
PAA	Purchase From Africans For Africa
PAF	Performance Assessment Framework
PAMRDC	Plano De Acção Multisectorial Para A Redução Da Desnutrição Cronica
PARP	Poverty Reduction Action Plan
PARPA	Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty
PASD	Direct Social Support Programme
PASP	Programa Acção Social Produtiva
PEDSA	Strategic Plan For The Development of The Agrarian Sector
PEPFAR	President's Emergency Plan For AIDS Relief
PIN	Personal Identification Number
PLHIV	People Living With HIV and AIDS
PLW	Pregnant and Lactating Women
PQG	Government Of Mozambique's Five Year Plan
PRN	Programme For Nutritional Rehabilitation
PRONAE	National School Feeding Programme
PRRO	Protracted Recovery and Relief Operation
PSNP	Productive Safety Net Programme

RB	WFP Regional Bureau
RENAMO	Resistência Nacional Moçambicana
SABER	System Approach for Better Education Results
SAM	Severe Acute Malnutrition
SBS	Sector Budget Support
SDAE	Serviços Distritais de Actividades Económicas
SETSAN	Technical Secretariat For Food Security And Nutrition
SIMA	System Of Market Information
SO	Strategic Objectives
SP	Social Protection
SPR	Standard Project Report
TB	Tuberculosis
TOR	Terms Of Reference
UGEA	Procurement Management Unit
UN	United Nation
UNAIDS	Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEG	United Nations Evaluation Group
UNESCO	United Nations Educational And Scientific Organization
UNFPA	United Nations Populations Fund
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	United States Dollars
VAM	Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping
VNA	Vulnerability Nutrition Assessment
WB	World Bank
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

Office of Evaluation
www.wfp.org/evaluation



World Food Programme