

## OPERATION EVALUATION

Haiti, Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation  
200618, Strengthening Emergency Preparedness  
and Resilience: A mid-term evaluation of WFP's  
Operation (2014- 2017)

### Evaluation Report: Final

2 August 2016

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Commissioned by the  
**WFP Office of Evaluation**

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## **Disclaimer**

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## Acronyms and Glossary

Acronym	English	French
3PA	Three-Pronged Approach	
ACF (Fr.)	Action Against Hunger	<i>Action Contre la Faim</i>
ADESNO (Fr.)	Action for Development and the North West Health	<i>Action pour le Développement et la Santé du Nord Ouest</i>
AJAD (Fr.)	Association of Youth in Action for Development	<i>Association des Jeunes en Action pour le Développement</i>
ART	Anti-retroviral therapy	
ASCP	Multi-skilled Community Health Agent	<i>Agent de Santé Communautaire Polyvalent</i>
ASEBED (Fr.)	Relief Agency and Charity Children Deprived	<i>Agence de Secours et de Bienfaisance aux Enfants Démunis</i>
BMDPP (Fr.)	Minister Delegate for Promotion Peasantry	<i>Bureau de la Ministre Déléguée à la Promotion de la Paysannerie</i>
BND (Fr.)	Bureau of Nutrition and Development	<i>Bureau de Nutrition et de Développement</i>
BSF	Blanket Supplementary Feeding	
CADEP (Fr.)	Participatory Development Support Council	<i>Conseil d'Appui au Développement Participatif</i>
CAS	Community Asset Score	
CBO	Community-Based Organization	
CBT	Cash-Based Transfers	
CCVI	Climate Change Vulnerability Index	
CD	Country Director	
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women	
CFA	Cash for Assets	
CIN (Fr.)	National Identification Card	<i>Carte d'Identification Nationale</i>
CMAM	Community-based Management of Acute Malnutrition	
CNIGS (Fr.)	National Centre for Geo-Spatial Information	<i>Centre National d'Information Géo-Spatiale</i>
CNSA (Fr.)	National Coordination for Food Security	<i>Coordination Nationale de la Sécurité Alimentaire</i>
CO	Country Office – WFP	
CP	Cooperating Partner	
COMPAS	Commodity Movement Processing and Analysis System	
COPRODEP (Fr.)	Participatory Development Project Council (a precursor to the CADEP)	<i>Conseil de Projet pour le Développement Participatif</i>
CORE (Group)	Child Survival Collaborations and Resources Group: a membership	

	network organized around community-focused public health and nutrition development	
CSB	Corn-soy blend	
CSI (Fr.)	Strategic Framework for the United Nations Integrated Haiti	<i>Cadre stratégique Intégré des Nations Unies pour Haïti</i>
CSP	Country Strategic Plan	
C&V	Cash and Voucher	
DDA (Fr.)	Departmental Agriculture	<i>Direction Départementale Agricole</i>
DDG	Digital Data Gathering - Devises and software for capturing and transmitting quantitative data electronically	
DDS	Dietary Diversity Score	
DOTS	Directly Observed Treatment, short course	<i>Traitement sous supervision directe, Chimiothérapie de courte durée</i>
DPAG (Fr.)	Ministry of Women and Women 's Rights	<i>Direction de la prise en compte de l'analyse selon le genre (MCFDF)</i>
DPC (Fr.)	Civil Protection Directorate	<i>Direction de la Protection Civile</i>
DPCI	Disaster Preparedness Capacity Index	
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction	
DSA (Fr.)	Sanitary Directorate of Artibonite	<i>Direction Sanitaire de l'Artibonite</i>
DSNO (Fr.)	Sanitary Direction Northwest	<i>Direction Sanitaire du Nord-Ouest</i>
ECVMAS (Fr.)	Survey of Household Living Conditions After the Earthquake	<i>Enquête sur les Conditions de Vie des Ménages Après le Séisme</i>
EFSA	Emergency Food Security Assessment	
EMMUS (Fr.)	Survey Mortality, Morbidity and Use of Services	<i>Enquête Mortalité, Morbidité et Utilisation des Services</i>
ENA	Essential Nutrition Actions (framework developed by the CORE group)	
EPCI	Emergency Preparedness and Response Capacity Index	
EPR	Emergency Preparedness and Response	
EQAS	Evaluation Quality Assurance System	
ESASU (Fr.)	Evaluation of the Food Situation in Emergency Situation	<i>Evaluation de la Situation Alimentaire en Situation d'Urgence</i>

FAES ( <i>Fr.</i> )	Social and Economic Assistance Fund (a Haitian parastatal organization)	<i>Fonds d'Assistance Economique et Sociale</i>
FAM	Food Aid Monitor	
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization	
FBM	Food Basket Monitoring	
FCS	Food Consumption Score	
FENAC ( <i>Fr.</i> )	Community-Based Nutritional Exchange Approach	<i>Foyer d'Echange pour la Nutrition à Assise Communautaire</i>
FEWSNET	Famine Early Warning System Network	
FCS	Food Consumption Score	
FFA	Food For Assets	
FFP	Food for Peace (managing agency for United States Government PL480 Title II resources)	
FLA	Field-Level Agreement	
FONDEFH ( <i>Fr.</i> )	Foundation for the Development and Management of the Haitian Family	<i>Fondation pour le Développement et l'Encadrement de la Famille Haïtienne</i>
Fonkoze	A national micro-finance institution	
FOSAC ( <i>Fr.</i> )	Health Foundation and Community Advancement	<i>Fondation pour la Santé et l'Avancement Communautaire</i>
GBV	Gender-based violence	
GDP	Gross Domestic Product	
GEEW	Gender empowerment and equality of women	
GFD	General Food Distribution	
GMP	Growth Monitoring and Promotion	
GOH	Government of Haiti	
GPI	Gender Parity Index	
GRASOL ( <i>Fr.</i> )	Research Group on the Local Social Action	<i>Groupe de Recherche sur l'Action Sociale Locale</i>
GTSAN ( <i>Fr.</i> )	Technical Working Group on Food Security and Nutrition	<i>Groupe Technique sur la Sécurité Alimentaire et Nutritionnelle</i>
GTT	Technical Working Group	<i>Groupe Technique de Travail</i>
HDDS	Household Diet Diversity Score	
HDI	Haitian Deprivation Index	
HEB	High-energy biscuit	
HIS	Health Information System	
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus	
ICA	Integrated Context Analysis	
ID ( <i>Fr.</i> )	Development Initiative	<i>Initiative Développement</i>
IFDA	International Fund for Agricultural	

	Development	
IHSI ( <i>Fr.</i> )	Haitian Institute for Statistics and Information	<i>Institut Haïtien de Statistique et d'Informatique</i>
IMF	International Monetary Fund	
IPC	Integrated Phase Classification	
IPTT	Indicator Performance Tracking Table	
IRA	Immediate Response Account	
ITSH	Inland Transport, Storage and Handling	
IYCF	Infant and Young Child Feeding Practices	
KAP	Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices	
KII	Key Informant Interview	
LNS	Lipid-based Nutrient Supplement	
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation	
MAM	Moderate Acute Malnutrition	
MARNDR ( <i>Fr.</i> )	Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development	<i>Ministère de l'Agriculture des Ressources Naturelles et du Développement Rural</i>
MAST ( <i>Fr.</i> )	Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour	<i>Ministère des Affaires Sociales et du Travail</i>
MCFDF ( <i>Fr.</i> )	Ministry for Women's Affairs and Women's Rights	<i>Ministère à la Condition Féminine et aux Droits des Femmes</i>
MCHA	Multi-Disciplinary Community Health Agent (an MSPP commune-based service delivery position)	
MCHNTC	Maternal and Child Health and Nutrition Technical Coordinator (a position in the KL Programme)	
MCPE	Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation	
MDA	Multi-Disciplinary Development Agent (a GoH commune-based service delivery position)	
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation	
MENFP ( <i>Fr.</i> )	Ministry of National Education and Vocational Training	<i>Ministère de l'Éducation nationale et de la formation professionnelle</i>
MICT ( <i>Fr.</i> )	Ministry of Interior and Territorial Communities	<i>Ministère de l'Intérieur et des collectivités territoriales</i>
MJSP ( <i>Fr.</i> )	Ministry of Justice and Public Security	<i>Ministère de la Justice et de la Sécurité Publique</i>
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding	
MPCE ( <i>Fr.</i> )	Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation	<i>Ministère de la Planification et de la Coopération Externe</i>
MSPP ( <i>Fr.</i> )	Ministry of Public Health and Population	<i>Ministère de la Santé Publique et de la Population</i>



MT	Metric Tonne	
MUAC	Mid-upper arm circumference	
NCI	National Capacity Index	
NFI	Non-food item	
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization	
OCHA	Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs	
ODN (Fr.)	Northern Development Organization	<i>Organisation de Développement du Nord</i>
ODRG (Fr.)	Development Organization Goâve Region	<i>Organisation de Développement de la Région Goâvienne</i>
OEV	Office of Evaluation	
ONI (Fr.)	National Identification Office (Haitian government organization)	<i>Office National d'Identification</i>
ONPES (Fr.)	National Observatory on Poverty and Social Exclusion	<i>Observatoire National de la Pauvreté et de l'Exclusion Sociale</i>
PDLH (Fr.)	Local Development Program in Haiti (a CIDA-funded community development programme)	<i>Programme de Développement Local en Haïti</i>
PDM	Post Distribution Monitoring	
PDSH (Fr.)	Strategic Development Plan for Haiti	<i>Plan de Développement Stratégique d'Haïti</i>
P4P	Purchase for Progress	
PLHIV	People Living with HIV	
PLW	Pregnant and Lactating Woman	
PLWHA	People living with HIV/AIDS	
PMU	Programme Management Unit - A structure in the KL Programme	
PNCS (Fr.)	National School Feeding Programme	<i>Programme National de Cantines Scolaires</i>
PNGRD	National Plan for Risk and Disaster Management	<i>Plan National de Gestion des Risques et Désastres</i>
PNLS (Fr.)	National Programme of Fight against AIDS	<i>Programme National de Lutte contre le SIDA</i>
PNSAN	National Food Nutrition Security Plan	<i>Plan National de Sécurité Alimentaire et Nutritionnelle</i>
PRC	Programme Review Committee	
PSNM (Fr.)	Multisectoral National Strategic Plan (for HIV/AIDS)	<i>Plan Stratégique National Multisectoriel (for HIV/AIDS)</i>
PSUGO (Fr.)	Universal Free and Compulsory School Programme	<i>Programme de Scolarisation Universelle Gratuite et Obligatoire</i>
PTRA (Fr.)	Triennial Programme for Agricultural Renewal	<i>Programme Triennal de Relance Agricole</i>
RB	Regional Bureau	
RMS	Resource Mobilisation Strategy	

RUB (Fr.)	Unique Beneficiation Registry (a database managed by FAES in Haiti)	<i>Registre Unique de Bénéficiaires</i>
SAM	Severe Acute Malnutrition	
SBCC	Social and Behavioural Change Communication	
SHASSMEPPE (Fr.)	Haitian Society of Assistance School of Preventive Medicine and Environmental Protection	<i>Société Haïtienne d'Assistance en Scolaire, de Médecine Préventive et de Protection de l'Environnement</i>
SIKSE (Fr.)	Information Society in Social and Economic Communication	<i>Société d'Information en Communication Sociale et Economique</i>
SNGRD (Fr.)	National System for Risk and Disaster Management	<i>Système National de Gestion des Risques et des Désastres</i>
SO	Strategic Objective	
Sogexpress	A Haitian bank	
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures	
SPR	Standard Project Report	
SSPE (Fr.)	First Echelon of Health Services	<i>Services de Santé de Premier Echelon</i>
TSF	Targeted Supplementary Feeding	
TA	Technical Assistance	
UCPNANu (Fr.)	Programme Coordination Unit of Food and Nutrition	<i>Unité de Coordination du Programme d'Alimentation et de Nutrition</i>
UN	United Nations	
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework	
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme	
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund	
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Emergency Fund	
Unitransfer	A Haitian remittance bank	
USAID	United States Agency for International Development	
VA	Village Agent (a community-based volunteer who facilitates VSLA activities)	
VAM	Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping	
WB	World Bank	
WFP	World Food Programme	
WHO	World Health Organisation	

## Operational Fact Sheet

OPERATION			
Approval	The Executive Board approved the operation in February 2014.		
Amendments	There were no amendments to the initial project document in the period covered by this evaluation. Budget Revision 1 effective as of July 2016.		
Duration	Initial: three years (April 2014 – March 2017)	Revised: Unchanged	
Planned beneficiaries	Initial: 2,030,000	Revised: Unchanged	
Planned food requirements	Initial: In-kind: 52,178 MT of food commodities Cash and vouchers: US\$29,873,848	Revised: In-kind: Unchanged Cash and vouchers: Unchanged	
US\$ requirements	Initial: US\$118,561,950	Revised: Unchanged	
Other ongoing operations in Haiti	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Haiti DEV 200150: Support for the National School Meals Programme (1 January 2012 – 31 December 2017 as per Budget Revision 8)</li><li>• EMOP 200949: Emergency Response to Drought (15 March – 16 September 2016) to provide assistance to 1,000,000 people affected by the drought</li><li>• Immediate Response Account (IRA) for Special Preparedness Activity (17 April 2015); and IRA for Emergency Food Security Assessments in Haiti (16 November 2015)</li></ul>		
OBJECTIVES, OUTCOMES AND ACTIVITIES			
Contributes to MDGs 1, 4, 5, 6 & 7, and UNDAF pillars 1, 2, 3 & 4	Crosscutting results		
	Gender	Gender equality and empowerment improved	
	Protection	WFP assistance delivered and utilised in safe, accountable and dignified conditions	
	Partnership	Food assistance interventions coordinated and partnerships developed	
	Strategic Objective	Operation-specific objectives and outcomes	Activities
	SO1: Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies	Outcome 1.1: Reduced or stabilized undernutrition among children under 5 and PLW	Treatment of moderate acute malnutrition (MAM): children 6-59 months and PLW
		Outcome 1.2: Stabilized or improved food consumption over assistance period for target households	Immediate response (provision of high-energy biscuits) followed by relief response (provision of a full in-kind ration)
		Outcome 1.3: National institutions, regional bodies, and the humanitarian community are enabled to prepare for, assess and respond to emergencies	Capacity development / technical assistance
	SO2: Support or restore food security and nutrition and establish or rebuild livelihoods in fragile settings and following emergencies	Outcome 2.1: Adequate food consumption reached or maintained by targeted households	Food Assistance for Assets (cash-based transfers)
		Outcome 2.2: Improved access to assets and basic services including community and market infrastructure	
		Outcome 2.3: Capacity developed to address national food insecurity needs and respond to disaster and shocks	Capacity development

	<b>SO3:</b> Reduce risk and enable people, communities and countries to meet their own food and nutrition needs	Outcome 3.1: Improved access to livelihood assets has contributed to enhanced resilience and reduced risks from disaster and shocks faced by targeted food-insecure communities and households	Food Assistance for Assets (cash-based transfers)
		Outcome 3.2: Risk-reduction capacity of people, communities and countries strengthened	Capacity development
	<b>SO4:</b> Reduce undernutrition and break the intergenerational cycle of hunger	Outcome 4.1: Reduced undernutrition, including micronutrient deficiencies among children aged 6–59 months, PLW	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Preventive supplementary feeding: children 6-13 months and PLW</li> <li>• Preventive family ration</li> <li>• Social and behavioural change communications (SBCC) on good health, hygiene and nutrition practices</li> </ul>
<b>PARTNERS</b>			
<b>Government</b>	Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour (MAST), Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development (MARNDR); Ministry of Interior and Territorial Communities (MICT), <i>Direction de la Protection Civile</i> (DPC/MICT), Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation (MPCE), Ministry of Public Health and Population (MSPP); Ministry of Environment, National Coordination for Food Security Unit (CNSA), National Identification Office (ONI) under the Ministry of Justice and Public Security (MJSP), Ministry of Women's Rights ( <i>Ministère à la Condition Féminine et aux Droits des Femmes</i> [MCFDF]); decentralized structures of the government and entities such as: <i>Direction Sanitaire de l'Artibonite</i> (DSA/MSPP), <i>Direction Sanitaire du Nord-Ouest</i> (DSNO/MSPP) (partnership ended November 2014), MARNDR/Northern Development Organization (ODN); <i>Directions Départementales Agricoles</i> (DDA)		
<b>United Nations</b>	FAO, IFAD, IOM, MINUSTAH, UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA, UNHCR, FEWSNET, <i>ONU Femmes</i> , UN Environment Programme (UNEP)		
<b>NGOs</b>	<p><b>International NGOs (8):</b> <i>Action Contre la Faim</i> (ACF), <i>Agro Action Allemande</i> (<i>Welthungerhilfe</i>), CARE International, Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Food for the Poor, <i>Initiative Développement</i> (ID), Missionaries of Charities and World Vision International (WVI).</p> <p><b>National NGOs (12):</b> <i>Action pour le Développement et la Santé du Nord Ouest</i> (ADESNO), <i>Association des Jeunes en Action pour le Développement</i> (AJAD), <i>Agence de Secours et de Bienfaisance aux Enfants Démunis</i> (ASEBED), <i>Bureau de Nutrition et de Développement</i> (BND), <i>Centre d'Education Spéciale</i>, <i>Fondation pour le Développement et l'Encadrement de la Famille Haïtienne</i> (FONDEFH), <i>Fondation pour la Santé et l'Avancement Communautaire</i> (FOSAC), <i>Groupe de Recherche sur l'Action Sociale Locale</i> (GRASOL), <i>Mouvman Fanm Peyizan Gwos-Wòch</i> (MFPG), <i>Organisation de Développement de la Région Goavienne</i> (ODRG), <i>Société d'Etablissement Des Jardins</i> (SEJA), <i>Société d'Information en Communication Sociale et Economique</i> (SIKSE)</p> <p><b>Others:</b> Haitian Red Cross Society, <i>Organisme de Développement du Nord</i> (ODN, a governmental agency) and community-based organizations such as: <i>Konbit Ajisyen Pou la Vi Miyo</i>, <i>Nou Pa Ka Ret Konsa</i>, <i>Mouvman Fanm Aktif Kafou</i> (MOKFA), <i>Société Haïtienne d'Assistance en Scolaire de Médecine Préventive et de Protection de l'Environnement</i> (SHASSMEPPE)</p>		


## RESOURCES (INPUTS)

**Contribution received as of 14 July 2016:**  
US\$ 59,436,754

**Percentage against appeal:**  
50.1%

**Top 5 donors:**  
Private donors (USAID through Kore Lavi); multilateral funds; Canada, Switzerland; Germany.


**Figure 1 Contributions by donor as of 14 July 2016**



Source: WFP Resource Situation 14 July 2016

## OUTPUTS

**Figure 2 Percentage of total planned beneficiaries by activity**




Source: WFP Haiti PRRO 200618 Project Document

### Remarks - Percentage of beneficiaries by component / activity


The “preventive family rations” activity is linked to the “prevention first 1000 days” activity, whereby the same targeted 98,000 PLW and children 6-23 months are to receive a family ration in addition to their individual ration.

**Figure 3 Percentage of actual beneficiaries by activity in 2014**



Source: WFP Haiti PRRO 200618 SPR 2015


**Figure 4 Percentage of actual beneficiaries by activity in 2015**



Source: WFP Haiti PRRO 200618 SPR 2015

### Actual vs. Planned Beneficiaries

**Figure 5 Actual vs. planned beneficiaries per year**



Source: WFP Haiti PRRO 200618 SPR 2014 and 2015


### Remarks – Actual Beneficiaries

Before initiation of activities, the “Preventive family rations” category was re-allocated to the prevention of chronic malnutrition (also referred to as “first 1000 days”) beneficiaries. Hence, this category does not appear as a separate category in SPRs 2014 and 2015. There has been no funding for HIV/AIDS and TB activities since the start of the PRRO. The MAM treatment numbers encompass children 6-59 months and PLW, and the stunting prevention numbers encompass children 6-23 months and PLW. A Gender-based Violence (GBV) component, not included in the project document or SPRs, has been implemented. According to the MOU with UNHCR, assistance was to be provided to 40 victims of sexual abuse (women as well as lesbians, gays and transgendered) and 5 refugees/asylum seekers and their families taken care of in an outreach and accommodation centre put in place by UNHCR from 1 December 2014 until 31 December 2015. There is no documented information on the actual number of beneficiaries reached.

Proportions of actual beneficiary groups are presented separately for 2014 and 2015 in order to

highlight the differences between the two years, particularly for GFD and nutrition activities. There were no GFD or FFA/CFA activities in the first quarter of 2016 covered by this evaluation. Monthly figures of actual beneficiaries reached between January and March 2016 under the nutrition component are presented under the results section.

**Figure 6 Actual vs. planned capacity development and augmentation costs**



Source: WFP Haiti PRRO 200618 SPR 2014 and PRRO Budget 25 Oct 2013 revised 6 Nov 2013

**Remarks – Actual vs. planned capacity development and augmentation costs**


In 2014 WFP supported:

- The government in mapping all hazards that have affected the country over the past 30 years
- CNSA in strengthening its network, allowing IPC exercises twice in 2014
- DPC on improved early warning systems, through training and equipment supports
- MAST in the development of the vulnerability database through training sessions on collecting, handling, analysing, and managing databases
- MSPP (through Kore Lavi)

In 2015 WFP supported:


- CNSA to produce reports and analysis such as the IPC and EFSA, and strengthen their capacities
- DPC on improved early warning systems, through training and equipment supports
- MAST in the development of the vulnerability database through training sessions on collecting, handling, analysing, and managing databases
- MSPP (through Kore Lavi)

**Figure 7 Planned percentage of women/girls vs. men/boys by activity**



Source: WFP Haiti PRRO 200618 Project Document


**Figure 8 Actual beneficiary proportion by sex for all PRRO activities**



Source: WFP Haiti PRRO 200618 SPR 2014 and 2015



**Figure 9 Actual percentage of women/girls vs. men/boys by activity**




Source: WFP Haiti PRRO 200618 SPR 2014 and 2015

**Remarks – Percentage of women/girls versus men/boys by component/activity**


The number of planned beneficiaries under the 1000 days component includes 55,000 children: 28,000 girls (52%) and 27,000 boys (48%) and 43,000 PLW, hence the much higher proportion of women/girls vs. boys for this activity.

**Figure 10 Planned percentage requirements (in USD value) by activity**




Source: WFP Haiti PRRO 200618 Project Document

**Figure 11 Planned commodities (in MT), by component and by year**



Source: WFP CO spreadsheet

**Figure 12 Actual total food distributed, as a percentage of planned, by activity**



Source: COMPAS data


### Remarks – Inputs

As not all activities involve food (namely the CFA component) the total planned requirements are shown in USD (Figure 10).

Notes on Figure 11:

- The “preventive family rations,” shown in Figure 2, have been incorporated into the planned commodities for the 1000 days prevention beneficiaries as of 2015.
- Haiti was not affected by major hurricanes in 2014, which explains why less commodities were distributed than planned.

**Figure 13 Actual amounts of cash transfers (in USD) distributed vs. planned by year**



Source: WFP Haiti PRRO 200618 SPR 2014 and 2015

OUTCOMES				
Key	Attained			
	Not attained			
	Not measured			
	Not foreseen			
CROSSCUTTING RESULTS				
Performance Indicator	Baseline	Target	SPR 2014	SPR 2015
PROTECTION:				
WFP assistance delivered and utilized in safe, accountable and dignified conditions				
Proportion of assisted people (men) informed about the programme (who is included, what people will receive, where people can complain)	None	80	4	26
Proportion of assisted people (women) informed about the programme (who is included, what people will receive, where people can complain)	None	80	4	24
Proportion of assisted people (men) who do not experience safety problems travelling to, from and/or at WFP programme site	None	100	100	100
Proportion of assisted people (women) who do not experience safety problems travelling to, from and/or at WFP programme site	None	100	97	100
PARTNERSHIPS:				
Food assistance interventions coordinated and partnerships developed and maintained				
Amount of complementary funds provided to the project by partners (including NGOs, INGOs, civil society, private sector organizations, international financial institutions, regional development banks)	None	None	US\$ 197,256	US\$ 218,562
Number of partner organizations that provide complementary inputs and services		17	13	13
Proportion of project activities implemented with the engagement of complementary partners	25%	20%		
GENDER:				
Gender equality and empowerment improved				
Proportion of women beneficiaries in leadership positions of project management committees	42	50		
Proportion of women project management committee members trained on modalities of food, cash, or voucher distribution	37	60		
Proportion of households where females and males make decisions together over the use of cash, voucher or food	31	50	31	39
Proportion of households where females make decisions over the use of cash, voucher or food	31	50	59	56

OUTCOMES				
<b>SO1:</b> Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies	1.1 Stabilized or reduced undernutrition among children aged 6–59 months and pregnant and lactating women (PLW) (see 4.1)			
	1.2 Stabilized or improved food consumption over assistance period for targeted households and/or individuals			
	Diet Diversity Score (female-headed households)	5.15	5.5	5.15
	Diet Diversity Score (male-headed households)	5.15	5.5	5.03
	1.3 National institutions, regional bodies, and the humanitarian community are enabled to prepare for, assess and respond to emergencies			
	Emergency preparedness and response capacity index (EPCI) is increased from baseline	2	3	
<b>SO2:</b> Support or restore food security and nutrition and establish or rebuild livelihoods in fragile settings and following emergencies	2.1 Adequate food consumption reached or maintained by targeted households			
	Diet Diversity Score (female-headed households)	5.2	5.5	5.2
	Diet Diversity Score (male-headed households)	5.2	5.5	4.6
	Percentage of households with acceptable FCS (female-headed)	72	94.4 (80 in PD)	73.25
	Percentage of households with acceptable FCS (male-headed)	72	94.4 (80 in PD)	62.6
	Percentage of households with borderline FCS (female-headed)	18.9	3.78	17.57
	Percentage of households with borderline FCS (male-headed)	18.9	3.78	20.42
	Percentage of households with poor FCS (female-headed)	9.1	1.82	9.18
	Percentage of households with poor FCS (male-headed)	9.1	1.82	17.2
	Percentage of beneficiaries consuming at least 3 meals a day	None	80	11
	2.2 Improved access to assets and basic services including community and market infrastructure			
	Community asset score (increased over baseline)	0	80 (75 in PD)	13
	2.3 Capacity developed to address national food insecurity needs and respond to disaster and shocks			
	National Capacity Index (NCI): score for the Food Security Monitoring System (FSMS)	None	None	

<b>SO3:</b> Reduce risk and enable people, communities and countries to meet their own food and nutrition needs	3.1 Improved access to livelihood assets has contributed to enhanced resilience and reduced risks from disaster and shocks faced by targeted food-insecure communities and households				
	Same indicators as 2.1 and 2.2				
	Coping strategy index (reduced or stabilized, disaggregated by sex of household head)	None	100%		
	3.2 Risk reduction capacity of people, communities and countries strengthened				
	NCI: score for the establishment of a targeting system for the establishment of the Haiti Social Safety Net	None	None		
<b>SO4:</b> Reduce undernutrition and break the intergenerational cycle of hunger	4.1 Reduced undernutrition, including micronutrient deficiencies among children aged 6–59 months, PLW				
	MAM treatment performance rate (recovery, mortality, default and non-response rate)/nutritional recovery rate for ART, TB-DOTS				
	MAM treatment mortality rate	(SPR 2014 taken as BL value)	<3% (SPR 2015 value = PD value)	0.09% (taken as BL value)	0.24%
	MAM treatment recovery rate (%)	(SPR 2014 taken as BL value)	>75% (SPR 2015 value = PD value)	94% (taken as BL value)	69.26%
	MAM treatment non-response rate (%)	(SPR 2014 taken as BL value)	<15% (SPR value = PD value)	4.8% (taken as BL value)	18.42%
	MAM treatment default rate (%)	(SPR 2014 taken as BL value)	<15% (SPR 2015 value = PD value)	1.2% (taken as BL value)	12.08%
	Proportion of eligible population who participate in programme (coverage): prevention	(SPR 2014 taken as BL value)	70% (SPR value = PD value)	23% (taken as BL value)	95%
	Proportion of eligible population who participate in programme (coverage): MAM	(SPR 2014 taken as BL value)	64% (from SPR 2015; value is >70 in PD)	63% (taken as BL value)	99%
	Proportion of children consuming a minimum acceptable diet	7,7% (KL baseline study)	70% (SPR 2015 value = PD value)	12,6%	22%
	Proportion of target population who participate in an adequate number of distributions	(SPR 2014 taken as BL value)	66% (SPR value = PD value)	63% (taken as BL value)	71%

### **Remarks – Outcomes**

There are some inconsistencies in the type of indicators used and/or target values between the Project Document (PD), the PDM reports and the SPRs. The ET used SPR 2015 target figures in the table above, and indicates whether these differed from those of the PD either in the table or below.

- 1) Crosscutting indicators: these were not included in the PD; target values are corporate values (as per WFP Strategic Plan 2014-2017).
- 2) SO1 (Outcome 1.2) and SO2 (Outcome 2.1) – dietary diversity score amongst GFD beneficiaries. This table applies the SPR 2015 target value of 5.5 (note PDM mentions that the target should be “ideally” 6 or above). This indicator is not reported in SPR 2014.
- 3) SO1 (Outcome 1.3): the Emergency Preparedness Capacity Index (EPCI) was calculated for the first time in December 2015 through a consultation attended by participants from CNSA, DPC, National Meteorological Agency and OCHA (source: SPR 2015).
- 4) SO2 (Outcome 2.1 – food consumption score): the target of households with acceptable FCS was set at 80 percent in the PD and at 94, 4 percent in SPR 2015. This table applies the SPR 2015 target value. This indicator is not reported in SPR 2014.
- 5) SO2 (Outcome 2.1 – CFA beneficiaries consuming at least three meals a day): indicator not included in the PD, and not reported in SPR 2014. The target stated in SPR 2015 is 80 percent as per WFP’s Strategic Plan 2014-2017.
- 6) SO2 (Outcome 2.2): WFP Community Assets Score surveys conducted in 18 communities showed that only 13 percent of them have made progress, far from the target of 80 percent (source: SPR 2015). There is a different target figure for the community asset score in the project document (75 percent) and SPR 2015 (80 percent). This table applies the SPR 2015 target value.
- 7) SO3 (Outcomes 3.1 and 3.2): No activities have been undertaken due lack of funding, insufficient expertise of the CO in this area, lack of partners, and not the right environment with local authorities for longer-term/integrated activities (source: telecom with CO).

## Map of WFP intervention areas – March 2016



Source: WFP CO



## Executive Summary

- Evaluation features:** This independent mid-term evaluation of Haiti Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO) 200618 “Strengthening Emergency Preparedness and Resilience” was commissioned by the World Food Programme (WFP) Office of Evaluation (OEV) and conducted by TANGO International. Its purpose is to provide accountability, learning, and evidence-based findings for programme results and future action. The three key evaluation questions are: 1) How appropriate is the operation? 2) What are the results of the operation? and 3) Why and how has the operation produced the observed results? The intended audience includes internal stakeholders (WFP Country Office [CO], sub-office, Regional Bureau [RB], and OEV, and direct external stakeholders (donors, government, and Cooperating Partners [CPs])). The PRRO concludes on 31 March 2017, thus the timing allows evaluation findings to guide future programme design.
- Methodology:** The evaluation team (ET) used a mixed-methods approach to collect and analyse primary qualitative data and secondary quantitative data. Fieldwork took place from 18 April to 10 May 2016 in Port-au-Prince, Artibonite, Centre, North, Northwest, Northeast and West departments. The sample of communes was selected in consultation with the CO based on coverage, size of operations, type of CP and accessibility. Qualitative methods included in-depth structured and semi-structured interviews with over 129 WFP staff and stakeholders, focus group discussions (FGDs) with 357 women and 218 men representing different categories of beneficiaries and community members, and observation of project activities. Separate FGDs were held with men and women to explore the dynamics of gender issues and verify the extent of women’s participation in the PRRO. The ET triangulated existing internal and external data and information collected in the field to crosscheck and validate findings. Main constraints included: undocumented implementation strategy (no Standard Operating Procedures), inconsistencies in output data from different sources and absence of gender-disaggregated data for some output indicators.
- Country context:** More than six million out of a total of 10.4 million Haitians live under the national poverty line of US\$2.42 per day and over 2.5 million live under the national extreme poverty line of US\$1.23 per day. Haiti is highly disaster-prone and is regularly affected by severe storms and drought, resulting in decreased agricultural yields and soil and aquifer depletion. Shocks induced by climate change threaten over 500,000 Haitians every year. Haiti is currently experiencing the third consecutive year of one of the worst droughts in decades. A 2015 Emergency Food Security Assessment (EFSA) revealed that countrywide about 3.6 million persons are food insecure and 1.5 million are severely food insecure. In 2012, global acute malnutrition, chronic malnutrition and severe acute malnutrition were estimated at 5 percent, 22 percent and 1 percent, respectively. Social interventions have been fragmented, underfunded, and uncoordinated. Gender-based violence is a longstanding problem; the risk of violence and sexual exploitation against women and girls is exacerbated by poverty, poor security and a lack of awareness. Haiti's political situation is fragile.
- PRRO overview:** The PRRO pursues six objectives organized under four WFP Strategic Objectives (SOs): 1) support government interventions to support the most vulnerable and food insecure populations affected by natural disasters (SO1); 2) enhance government emergency preparedness and response (EPR) capacity (SO1); 3) encourage resilience-building efforts that facilitate recovery from natural disasters and mitigate their impact (SOs 2 and 3); 4) treat acute malnutrition in children <5 and pregnant and lactating women and support therapy adherence for people living with HIV and

tuberculosis (SO4); 5) prevent chronic malnutrition and micro-nutrient deficiencies through a focus on the first 1000 days (SO4); and 6) support the most food insecure by developing a targeting system for the national social safety net programme (SO3).

5. Some PRRO activities (objectives 4, 5 and 6) are funded under Kore Lavi (KL), a four-year project supported by the United States Agency for International Development with CARE International, Action contre la Faim (ACF) and WFP as consortium members. Under KL, ACF is the lead for nutrition (objectives 4 and 5) with WFP providing logistics support, whilst WFP is the lead for the sixth objective.

### **Main findings and conclusions**

6. **Appropriateness of the operation:** the six PRRO objectives and related activities are relevant given Haiti's chronic exposure to recurrent natural hazards and continuing food insecurity and malnutrition. No cohesive geographic targeting was developed for the PRRO but separate targeting approaches were adopted for each component using an appropriate combination of indicators. Transfer modalities are overall adequate, with the exception of CSB<sup>+</sup> initially provided by USAID for the nutrition component instead of CSB<sup>++</sup> or a lipid-based product as requested by WFP.
7. There is overall a strong relevance with national policies and strategies. The plan to integrate activities to promote gender equality in each PRRO component is relevant to gender issues in Haiti. Objectives, target groups and implementation modalities are globally coherent with WFP policies and normative guidance.
8. As to complementarity and synergies: coordination of nutrition activities with UNICEF could not be established due to lack of geographic convergence between UNICEF and KL. No funding was received for project proposals seeking partnerships with FAO and other stakeholders for resilience, however, one MOU was signed with FAO in 2016 for CFA activities in the Southeast. Due to its short timeframe and focus on restoring assets, the CFA recovery component did not lend itself to seeking synergies with the school feeding project. To avoid overlap with EMOP 200949 launched in March 2016, a budget revision effective July 2016 will reduce CFA under the PRRO.
9. **Results:** Overall, achievements vis-à-vis targets have been very low: 15 percent of planned beneficiaries were reached in 2014 and 38 percent in 2015. Under EPR, only 6 percent of the target was reached in 2014, as there were no major hurricanes, and 38 percent in 2015, in response to the persistent drought. In 2014, WFP targeted households through WFP-assisted schools but this approach, meant to create synergy, led to excluding equally eligible vulnerable households in the same communities. In 2015, the social safety net information system of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour (SI-MAST), supported by WFP under KL, was used to target households in KL project areas and proved useful as a targeting mechanism in slow-onset disasters. With readily accessible contingency stocks, distributions reached people promptly.
10. Under the CFA recovery component, achievements were very low (2 percent in 2014 and 14 percent in 2015) due to lack of funding and unrealistic planning figures. Overall, participant targeting was adequate with community involvement. Post Distribution Monitoring (PDM) showed low food consumption indicators. It is likely that the amount of cash distributed, though aligned with the MARNDR manual and coherent with the food basket price evolution, was not sufficient to offset increasing constraints on households subsequent to the prolonged drought. The quality of assets built varied greatly across CPs.

11. MAM treatment activities were below targets: 89 percent in 2014 down to 7 percent in 2015. Main constraints include weak ownership and capacity in nutrition of the Ministry of Public and Health and Population (MSPP) and disruptions in supplies. Achievements under prevention of chronic malnutrition improved but also remain well below the set target (from 24 in 2014 to 50 percent in 2015 for children 6 to 23 months). Factors that explain results include, among others, inconsistent communication between KL consortium partners at central and decentralized levels, gaps in outreach (slow start in community-based screening); changes and slow functionality of the beneficiary database; low reporting completion rate; and logistics (long lag times to add or drop beneficiaries from lists). Relevant corrective measures were adopted, but some design issues (e.g., no MAM strategy) remain unresolved.
12. WFP's support to build the technical and operational capacities of the Civil Protection Directorate (DPC), the National Coordination for Food Security (CNSA) and MAST yielded positive results. The capacity of DPC in preparing for and responding to natural disasters was strengthened. CNSA capacity to monitor and evaluate the food security situation and provide relevant, timely and gender-specific information on food security (such as EFSA 2015) improved. MAST staff was trained but no transition plan was developed to ensure staff retention.
13. Though no gender mainstreaming strategy was developed, gender has been adequately addressed in M&E guidance and tools. Frameworks for evaluating partners and for partners' technical reporting include adequate analysis of gender issues. Concrete measures were adopted to promote gender equity and women's empowerment under KL and CFA activities, and gender issues have been integrated into recent food security assessments. However, less attention was given to gender equity and empowerment though the various capacity-building activities.
14. **Factors affecting the operation:** The absence of a country strategy, the high turnover of senior staff in the CO, and having no country director for more than one year have hampered establishment of strategic partnerships and resource mobilization. Funds received are short of the estimated budget (50.1 percent as of 14 July 2016). Staff reductions and restructuring, which aimed at balancing programmatic needs, risks and funding availability, had mixed results: staff gaps in M&E and in key CO focus areas were only partially addressed; and M&E/oversight responsibilities of field staff were compromised by competing demands such as increased involvement in day-to-day commodity management under the nutrition component.
15. Inconsistencies in output monitoring data were noted, particularly for CFA. Guidance prepared by the M&E unit contributed to improving the quality of data gathering; however, it came very late in PRRO implementation. Joint cross-analysis of output and outcome indicators by respective CO entities, and consultation with field staff to inform operational decision-making remain insufficient. PDM surveys to monitor outcome indicators and crosscutting issues revealed poor accountability towards beneficiaries: complaint mechanisms are not properly designed or advertised.
16. WFP developed partnerships with local organisations. NGOs for GFD and nutrition were selected through a competitive open bidding process using well-defined criteria. For CFA, procedures to select, support and evaluate CPs were poorly followed by the CO initially, but a more rigorous approach has been applied since 2015.

### **Overall assessment and conclusions**

17. Through its six objectives, the PRRO rightly aimed at breaking the vicious cycle of environmental degradation, food insecurity and malnutrition through immediate

support to affected populations alongside activities addressing some of the underlying determinants of food insecurity (e.g., improved access to livelihood assets) and malnutrition (e.g., behaviour change). However, the size of the operation, geographic coverage and the scope of activities lacked prioritization (through an analysis of WFP's comparative advantages in different programmatic areas and of partnership potentials) and proved unrealistic with regard to capacities of WFP CO and government entities and to donors' interest.

18. Resilience activities were not implemented due to insufficient funding, lack of resilience expertise within the CO and lack of partners involved in resilience. CFA recovery activities yielded mixed output and outcome results. Moreover, the sustainability and replicability of assets built, their social benefits, and impact on natural disaster mitigation have not been sufficiently addressed. Long-term impact would require establishing strategic partnerships and implementing CFA through a resilience lens using the WFP three-pronged approach (3PA). The lack of clear institutional anchorage of nutrition activities under KL has not been conducive to MSPP ownership: the MOU between MSPP and MAST to clarify roles and coordination mechanisms has not yet been signed. Insufficient consultation with MSPP's Nutrition Coordination Unit and departmental nutrition focal points at the design stage coupled with weak capacity in nutrition at all levels hampered achievements. KL design and implementation modalities did not favour a synergistic and convergent approach to address the interconnectedness of the different forms of malnutrition and their root causes (e.g., complementarity/geographic convergence with UN agencies and NGOs and between nutrition-specific and-sensitive interventions). Support to SI-MAST proved useful for social safety net targeting as well as for targeting in slow-onset emergencies, however its sustainability is doubtful in the absence of a national social protection policy, and MAST's limited financial resources to retain trained staff. By the same token, capacity building of government counterparts was relevant and yielded positive results, but sustainability of achievements is a concern as WFP's support was not guided by comprehensive and gender-sensitive assessments of needs, and work plans with clear deliverables were not developed jointly with relevant counterparts.

## Recommendations

### Operational recommendations

19. **R1. Strengthen strategic and operational capacity of CO and sub-office/ antennas:** WFP HQ to appoint a country director as soon as possible; WFP CO, with continuation of support already provided by RB, to enhance internal working modalities; clarify processes and staff responsibilities within the CO (VAM, M&E and programme staff) in data compilation, analysis and decision-making; clarify the communication chain between CO and field staff; re-focus the role of sub-office and antenna staff on oversight/M&E. Who: WFP HQ and CO. Timeframe: Q3 2016.
20. **R2. Consolidate improvements in M&E for accountability, including accountability towards affected populations, and most importantly for programmatic purposes:** build the capacity of WFP's and counterparts' M&E at central and decentralized levels; maintain continuous feedback loops between Programme and M&E units to inform operational decision-making; review M&E reporting formats to ensure their alignment with logframe indicators; recruit an M&E officer to reinforce current efforts. Who: CO, with RB/HQ technical support. Timeframe: Q4 2016 – Q1 2017.

### Strategic recommendations

21. **R3. Conduct a national strategic review as a basis for developing a Country Strategic Plan (CSP) that enhances focus, coherence, effectiveness and synergy to better support national efforts to address food insecurity and malnutrition in Haiti:** prioritize geographic targeting through trends analysis/Integrated Context Analysis; ensure coherence with relevant national policies and strategies and complementarity with other United Nations agencies; size the operation based on resourcing trends and WFP human resources capacity; establish long-term partnerships and synergies between WFP operations and projects implemented by other stakeholders.

**Thematic areas and crosscutting issues to be considered in the CSP.**

22. **R4. Apply WFP's 3PA to resilience:** this entails multi-year programming, long-term partnership building, community anchorage and engagement, and asset quality and scale. Recruit a resilience expert in the CO to help define and set up this component and to start on a small scale, taking advantage of the ongoing consultations to develop the next United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for translating the global-level FAO/IFAD/WFP agreement on the 3PA conceptual framework into a joint multi-year funded pilot project, taking stock of experiences in other WFP COs and lessons learned from the PRRO and EMOP 200949, notably: taking into account land tenure, environment and gender issues and ensuring monitoring of outcomes. Who: CO with RB and HQ technical backstopping. Timeframe: Recruit a resilience expert before the end of the PRRO.
23. **R5. Support MAST in the finalization and official endorsement of a shock-responsive national social protection policy:** continue support to targeting/ vulnerability database; pilot safety net interventions integrating a gender perspective; sensitize the government on the necessity to widely promote and diffuse the new national social protection policy. Who: CO with RB technical support. Timeframe: starting Q4 2016.
24. **R6. Develop a WFP nutrition strategy for Haiti, clearly identifying institutional anchorage and multi-sector responsibilities and coordination mechanisms.** Support interventions reflecting coherence between WFP's and MSSP's nutrition programming guidance, geographical convergence with other United Nations agencies' support, presence of a qualified MSPP nutrition team at the department level and of NGOs with BCC experience and expertise, and capacity building of MSSP. The approach should combine nutrition-specific and nutrition-sensitive interventions in the same priority departments/communes, taking advantage of the UNDAF process and the presence of REACH facilitators to build partnerships and design a pilot community-based One-UN nutrition project. Who: CO with RB technical support. Timeframe: Q3 and Q4 of 2016 and Q1 of 2017.
25. **R7. Incorporate a gender-sensitive capacity development plan in each component/thematic area retained in the future operation, building on lessons learned.** For each component: assess government and local partners' capacity-building needs at central and decentralized levels that are not addressed by other humanitarian and development partners, including an analysis of gender gaps; jointly with government counterparts, develop a strategic framework for capacity development that is sustainable (national budget provisions to absorb positions supported by WFP or its partners) and focuses on outcomes where WFP has a comparative advantage. Who: CO with RB technical support. Timeframe: Q1 2017.

# 1 Introduction

## 1.1. Evaluation Features

1. In the context of renewed corporate emphasis on providing evidence and accountability for results, WFP mandated the WFP Office of Evaluation (OEV) to commission a series of Operation Evaluations in 2013-2016. From a shortlist of operations to be evaluated based on utility and risk criteria, the WFP Regional Bureau (RB) has selected, in consultation with the Country Office (CO), the Haiti PRRO 200618 “Strengthening Emergency Preparedness and Resilience” for an independent evaluation “to ensure that findings can feed into future decisions on programme implementation and design of the follow-up operation” (Annex 1, Terms of Reference [TOR]). Moreover, a mid-term evaluation (MTE) was already planned at the design stage of the PRRO.<sup>1</sup>
2. **Objectives and scope.** The primary objectives of this evaluation, as presented in the TOR, are accountability and learning, specifically: to assess and report on the performance and results of the operation (accountability); to determine the reasons why certain results occurred or not (learning); and to provide evidence-based findings to inform operational and strategic decision-making. The scope of this evaluation includes all activities and processes related to the PRRO necessary to answer the following key evaluation questions:
  - 1) How appropriate is the operation?
  - 2) What are the results of the operation?
  - 3) Why and how has the operation produced the observed results?
3. The evaluation matrix (Annex 2) presents specific areas of analysis related to these questions. The period covered by this evaluation captures the development of the operation (July 2013-March 2014) and the period from the beginning of the operation until the start of the evaluation (April 2014-March 2016).
4. **Stakeholders and users.** The primary internal stakeholders and intended audience are WFP CO and sub-office staff, who will directly act upon this information; WFP RB, which will use the findings to provide strategic guidance, programme support and oversight to the Haiti CO and apply learnings to other COs; and WFP OEV, which will continue to improve evaluation processes and compile the findings into an annual synthesis that will go to the Executive Board in 2017. The primary external stakeholders are beneficiaries, Cooperating Partners (CPs), bilateral donors, and Government of Haiti representatives.
5. **Methodology.** Data collection methods have included: document review, structured and semi-structured key informant interviews (KIIs), focus group discussions (FGDs), and direct observation (10 schools for general food distribution, 10 assets sites, seven health facilities and five stunting prevention food distribution sites). The document review consisted of a comprehensive analysis of various sources of information such as project monitoring data and other project documentation, WFP corporate guidance, and relevant national strategies and policies. Prior and during its visit to Haiti (18 April-10 May), the evaluation team (ET) held teleconference calls with WFP RB staff, WFP HQ staff who were working in Haiti during the design stage of the PRRO, and current WFP CO staff. KIIs were conducted among the WFP CO, Gonaives sub-office and Cap Haïtien antenna staff and external stakeholders at central and decentralized levels using interview guides developed for each type of stakeholder during the

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<sup>1</sup> WFP Haiti. 2014. PRRO 200618 Project Document.

inception phase (Annex 6, Interview Guides). The ET complied with the principles of the UNEG Code of Conduct,<sup>2</sup> which includes among others independence, impartiality, honesty and integrity.<sup>3</sup> Ethical safeguards for data quality and confidentiality were part of the quality control directed in the field by the team leader and additionally enforced by the EM. During each interview or FGD, the ET clearly communicated the purpose of the evaluation and the intended use of findings, respecting participants' wish not to be interviewed (one such case occurred), and assured those accepting the interview that confidentiality will be respected. The ET maintained impartiality and transparency in presenting and discussing results: justifying findings and conclusions and giving a balanced presentation of strengths and weaknesses.

6. In total, 129 persons were interviewed (see Annex 3). Twenty-six FGDs (see Annex 3) with beneficiaries were held to seek their perspectives on the relevance and effectiveness of inputs (food or cash and other non-food items, as relevant) and outputs to meet their immediate and longer-term needs. The ET conducted visits to sites in 18 communes in six departments: Artibonite, Centre, North, Northeast, Northwest and West (see Annex 7). Communes and sites were selected in accordance with the following criteria: proportionate volume of activities, range of partners and types of partnerships, and operational status (giving priority to active sites). More specific considerations and the list of sites visited are presented in Annex 4.
7. Gender mainstreaming was examined for each component of the PRRO: extent to which gender issues were addressed at the design stage and during implementation; disaggregation of beneficiary data by sex; and stakeholders' perspectives of gender issues. The ET organized separate male and female FGDs or provided special time for women to express themselves in mixed (male and female) FGDs to allow women to express themselves freely.
8. **Expertise and quality assurance.** The ET was composed of three highly qualified TANGO International consultants (two female international evaluators and one male national consultant). Combined team expertise includes food security, nutrition, resilience, emergency preparedness and response (EPR), gender and capacity development. The evaluation followed the OEV Evaluation and Quality Assurance System Standards (EQAS). The ET regularly communicated with the CO and stakeholders to ensure data quality, validity, consistency and accuracy. Interpreters assisted the two international team members throughout fieldwork. The TANGO evaluation manager advised the team on quality standards and reviewed the inception and evaluation reports to ensure compliance with these standards.
9. **Limitations.** During the inception phase, preparation and finalization of the agenda (such as drawing a definitive list of communes and sites to be visited) were delayed. This was partially due to the late availability of information regarding the food distribution schedule for stunting prevention. Additionally, there was uncertainty as to whether "active" General Food Distribution (GFD) and FFA/CFA activities would occur, given that the CO was developing an emergency operation in response to the drought.<sup>4</sup> Some key documents, such as Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) documenting processes, roles and responsibilities and timeframes, have not been developed for the PRRO.<sup>5</sup> Thus, information on the interface between the PRRO and the CARE/ACF/WFP KL project (see Annex 8) was not clear to the ET;

<sup>2</sup> <http://www.unevaluation.org/document/download/547>

<sup>3</sup> WFP Office of Evaluation. 2015. Evaluation Quality Assurance System – Guidelines for Operation Evaluations.

<sup>4</sup> See paragraphs 12 and 21.

<sup>5</sup> WFP RB/WFP CO Haiti. 2015. WFP Haiti CO Operational Review conducted by Regional Bureau Panama in collaboration with Haiti Country Office.

this hindered decision-making regarding which stakeholders to meet as well as which departments and communes to visit. Adjustments to the agenda and fieldwork schedule were made according to new information as it became available, and missing documents were gathered during the visit to Haiti.

10. There were some difficulties in obtaining reliable data for triangulating information from different sources and assessing performance vis-à-vis set targets, such as: beneficiary categories extracted from COMPAS did not correspond to those in the PRRO document and SPR; absence of gender-disaggregated data for some output indicators; inconsistencies between CO-compiled data and SPR data on CFA beneficiaries; unexplained changes in target figures; and lack of baseline values for some indicators. The ET addressed these difficulties through frequent exchanges with CO staff before, during, and after the visit to Haiti. CO staff was very responsive and made considerable efforts to provide and verify requested data. Specific unresolved problems are discussed in the relevant sections in this report.

## 1.2. Country Context

11. **Demographic, economic and political context.** The Republic of Haiti with its satellite islands has an estimated area of 27,750 km<sup>2</sup> and a population of 10,911,819 inhabitants (2015 estimate), of whom about half live in urban areas.<sup>6</sup> More than six million out of 10.4 million (58.5 percent) Haitians live under the national poverty line of US\$2.42 per day and over 2.5 million (24 percent) live under the national extreme poverty line of US\$1.23 per day.<sup>7</sup> Haiti's political situation remains fragile; the presidential election, which was scheduled in 2015, has not yet taken place; rescheduling is pending the conclusions and recommendations of the electoral verification committee.
12. **Environment, climate and natural disaster context.** Haiti is highly disaster-prone and regularly affected by severe storms and periodic droughts. This results in decreased agricultural yields, general soil degradation – e.g., erosion and desertification – and aquifer depletion. Haiti is one of the most deforested countries in the world, mainly due to charcoal production.<sup>8</sup> In turn, deforestation contributes to soil erosion, causing loss of soil fertility, river sedimentation and reduced recharge of aquifers. When intact, these resources reduce vulnerability to floods, landslides and storms; mitigate the effects of drought; and support food security through soil conservation and water availability. At national level, the Climate Change Vulnerability Index (CCVI) rates Haiti among the top 10 countries at “extreme risk” due to the depletion of its natural resources.<sup>9</sup> Shocks induced by climate change threaten over 500,000 Haitians every year.<sup>10</sup> In late 2014, a cold front caused an estimated 40 percent loss of agricultural production. This was followed by the El Niño weather phenomenon, which brought extremely warm and dry conditions that prevailed throughout 2015 with alarming impact on food security as shown by a joint WFP/National Coordination for Food Security (CNSA) Emergency Food Security Assessment (EFSA) conducted in 2015.<sup>11, 12</sup>

<sup>6</sup> IHSI. 2015. Population totale, population de 18 ans et plus, ménages et densités estimés en 2015.

<sup>7</sup> IHSI. 2012. *Enquête sur les Conditions de Vie des Ménages Après le Séisme* – ECVMAS.

<sup>8</sup> Rubenstein M. & Slagle T. 2012. Climate Change in Haiti. Columbia University General Earth Institute.

<sup>9</sup> Maplecroft. 2012. Climate Change and Environmental Risk Atlas.

<sup>10</sup> WFP. 2015. 10 facts about hunger in Haiti.

<sup>11</sup> CNSA. 2014. Synthèse des dégâts causés par le passage du front froid sur les départements du Nord, Nord-Est, du Nord-Ouest et des Nippes du 1 au 11 Novembre 2014.

<sup>12</sup> CNSA. 2015. Haïti Alerte à l'insécurité alimentaire.



13. **Food security.** Countrywide, about 3.6 million persons (700,000 households) are food insecure and 1.5 million persons (300,000 households) are severely food insecure.<sup>13</sup> Based on the EFSA results and the Government Response Plan, WFP will implement an emergency operation from March to September 2016.<sup>14</sup> Households have adopted emergency livelihood coping mechanisms involving the depletion of their assets and compromising their capacity to cope with future crises.<sup>24</sup> As agricultural production decreases due to drought, households rely more than ever on the purchasing of food, making them highly susceptible to price changes.
14. **Education.** Haiti has achieved parity between girls and boys in primary schools; however, there is a significant difference between sexes in the crude enrolment rate in secondary schools (boys 45 percent and girls 37 percent), as girls are often the first to be chosen for economic support (often as household helpers).<sup>7</sup>
15. **Health and nutrition.** Communicable infectious diseases are major health problems in Haiti. Cholera, which is closely related to inadequate access to sanitation and drinking water, is a significant health problem. After HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis (TB) is the country's greatest infectious cause of mortality in both youth and adults.<sup>15</sup> In 2012, Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM), chronic malnutrition and severe acute malnutrition (SAM) rates were estimated at five percent, 22 percent and one percent, respectively.<sup>16</sup> GAM prevalence rates were highest in the Northeast (6.7 percent), Southeast (5.8 percent) and North (5.5 percent) departments. The departments with the lowest prevalence were the South (1.9 percent), Central (2.4 percent) and Northwest (2.8 percent).<sup>17</sup> The same 2012 survey revealed that 65 percent of children were anaemic as compared to 61 percent in 2005-2006 and for women it rose from 46 to 49 percent; only 17 percent of children lived in a household consuming iodized salt, and 44 percent of children 6-59 months had received vitamin A supplements in the last six months. Malnutrition is the underlying cause of 45 percent of child deaths and results in a high rate of infections such as diarrhoea and pneumonia.<sup>18</sup>
16. **Social protection.** In spite of various initiatives, access to basic social services remains very limited in Haiti as social interventions have been fragmented, underfunded, and uncoordinated, limiting any real impact on the poor.<sup>19, 20</sup> The National Strategy for Social Protection (SNAS/*Ede pèp*) aims to protect the vulnerable population living in extreme poverty and offer opportunities to overcome extreme poverty conditions through the coordination and implementation of various programmes using a single beneficiary registry (*Registre Unique de Bénéficiaires – RUB*) put in place through KL.<sup>21</sup> The international conference “Social Protection in Haiti: Towards the Development of a New Policy?” (May 2015) called for the elaboration of a social protection policy in order to strengthen and expand social protection programmes.
17. **Gender.** Women represent 51 percent of the country's population and constitute 48 percent of the economically active population.<sup>22</sup> In 2012, about 41 percent of

<sup>13</sup> WFP and CNSA. 2016. Evaluation de la situation alimentaire en situation d'urgence (ESASU) Haïti.

<sup>14</sup> See paragraph 21.

<sup>15</sup> WHO. 2015. Haiti: WHO Statistical Profile.

<sup>16</sup> MSPP, IHE, and ICF International. 2013. Haiti Mortality, Morbidity, and Service Utilization Survey: Key Findings

<sup>17</sup> MSPP. 2012. Rapport de l'Enquête Nutritionnelle avec la Méthodologie SMART

<sup>18</sup> CNSA, USAID, FANTA, and FHI. 2014. La Malnutrition en Haïti. Fiche d'information sur la santé et la nutrition.

<sup>19</sup> World Bank. 2015. Haiti Overview: Context.

<sup>20</sup> Lamaute-Brisson N. 2015. Protection et promotion sociales en Haïti - La stratégie nationale d'assistance sociale, enjeux stratégiques et institutionnels.

<sup>21</sup> Republic of Haiti. 6 March 2013. Stratégie Nationale d'assistance Sociale: EDE PEP.

<sup>22</sup> PNUD. 2013. Assistance légale pour les femmes victimes de violence de genre en Haïti.

household heads were women as compared to 44 percent in 2005-2006.<sup>23</sup> Women remain severely disadvantaged in terms of their access to educational and health services. Gender-based violence (GBV) is a longstanding problem in Haiti, where the risk of violence and sexual exploitation against women and girls is exacerbated by poverty, poor security and a lack of awareness. The Haitian constitution recognizes equality between men and women, and the country has ratified a set of international legal instruments on women's rights, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), and the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women – *Belém do Pará*.

### 1.3. Operation Overview

18. The overall objective of the PRRO (15 April 2014-31 March 2017) is to strengthen emergency preparedness and resilience.<sup>24</sup> The project document outlines the six following objectives, organized in the project logframe under four WFP Strategic Objectives (SOs): 1) support Government interventions to save lives, meet food needs, and enhance food consumption and dietary diversity of the most vulnerable and food insecure populations affected by natural disasters (SO1); 2) enhance Government emergency preparedness and response capacity (SO1); 3) encourage resilience-building efforts that facilitate recovery from natural disasters and mitigate their impact (SO2 and SO3); 4) treat acute malnutrition in children under five and pregnant and lactating women (PLW) and support therapy adherence for people living with HIV and tuberculosis (SO4); 5) prevent chronic malnutrition and micronutrient deficiencies through a focus on the first 1000 days (SO4); and 6) support the most food insecure by developing a targeting system for the national social safety net programme (SO3).
19. Initial resource requirements were established at US\$118,561,950. The project is funded at 50.1 percent against total requirements on 14 July 2016. Some of the PRRO activities are funded under KL, a four-year project supported by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) through Food for Peace (FFP) Title II Development Food Assistance Programming and awarded to CARE International in August 2013, with ACF and WFP as Consortium members; their respective roles and geographic responsibilities are presented in Annex 8. The consortium agreement “establishes for the first time a unique new relationship between CARE and WFP for a Title II Development Programme where CARE is the Grant Awardee (Prime) and WFP is a sub-recipient to CARE.”<sup>25</sup> Based on this agreement, some PRRO activities, which were envisaged as WFP’s responsibility, have been assigned to CARE (e.g., geographic and beneficiary targeting) and ACF (technical lead leadership role on nutrition, e.g., nutrition counselling and capacity building), with WFP taking the lead role for commodity management. The implications of this division of responsibilities on the PRRO outputs and implementation strategy were not formalized through SOP.<sup>26</sup>
20. Neither the narrative of the PRRO project document nor a revised logframe mentions the ways in which the PRRO and KL projects interact. Furthermore the output of

<sup>23</sup> MSPP/Institut National de l’Enfance/ICF International. 2013. *Haiti Mortality, Morbidity, and Service Utilization Survey: Key Findings* (EMMUS V)


<sup>24</sup> Definition of resilience by IFAD, FAO and WFP : Ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions (<https://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/terminology>)

<sup>25</sup> CARE. 2014. CARE-WFP Agreements Attachment 5: WFP Scope of Work for the Kore Lavi Program.

<sup>26</sup> The WFP Haiti CO Operational Review conducted by a joint RB/CO team January 2015 noted the need for a PRRO BR and operational guidelines for each PRRO component.

objective 6 of the PRRO became less evident in the revised logframe as the indicator “establishment of a targeting system for the establishment of the Haiti Social Safety Net” (indicator of outcome 3.2) was removed. However, the revised logframe brought clarity regarding nutrition outcomes by adding outcome 4.2 relating to nutrition ownership and capacity strengthening (not included in the project document’s logframe). **Figure 14** presents the six PRRO objectives, outcomes and activities indicating their status of implementation (as discussed in the following paragraph) and responsibilities under the KL consortium as relevant.

**Figure 14: Planned PRRO activities, interface with Kore Lavi and status of implementation**



**Abbreviations:** CFA: Cash for Assets; GFD: General Food Distribution; KL: Kore Lavi

Source: Created by Evaluation Team

21. Regarding overall implementation status, the HIV/TB component was not implemented due to lack of funding, and there was no major shock that required emergency nutritional interventions under SO1. No CFA activities were implemented under SO3 toward resilience; WFP decided to allocate all funding for CFA to SO2. This is due to insufficient of funding of the PRRO, lack of expertise and experience within the CO to implement CFA from a resilience perspective, lack of partners in Haiti involved in resilience activities directed to food security, lack of involvement of MARNDR in resilience, and the design of the activity in the project document. Implementing SO2 CFA was especially relevant in the North, Northwest and Artibonite, as there was at that time reduced food consumption and accelerated erosion of livelihoods.<sup>27</sup> However, due to limited internal expertise on resilience perspectives, absence of solid partnerships and long-term planning, SO3 CFA

<sup>27</sup> CNSA and FEWS NET. Avril 2014. Panorama de la situation de l'insécurité alimentaire aiguë (IPC). Situation actuelle.

activities were not implemented whilst they could have been relevant in other regions, such as the West.

22. As of March 2016, PRRO emergency and recovery response components were stopped. These will remain inactive during the course of the Emergency Operation “Emergency Response to Drought” (EMOP 200949, March – September 2016), which aims to provide assistance to 1,000,000 people affected by the drought in the form of unconditional cash and food rations, followed by Cash for Assets (CFA) activities reaching 200,000 people under SO2 to create assets for watershed conservation and agriculture production.<sup>28</sup> This shift is justified from a funding and also from a programmatic point of view, in order to ensure coherence between activities targeting most the vulnerable people affected by drought.

## **2 Evaluation Findings**

23. Throughout this chapter, findings are grouped under four themes: emergency preparedness and response (EPR) (all SO1 outcomes); recovery and resilience (all SO2 outcomes plus Outcome 3.1 under SO3); nutrition (all SO4 outcomes); and national social safety net (Outcome 3.2).<sup>29</sup>

### **2.1. Appropriateness of the Operation**

24. This section describes evaluation findings and conclusions relating to the evaluation question, “How appropriate is the operation?” It addresses the appropriateness of operation design, objectives, activities, geographic targeting, the extent to which transfer modalities are reflective of population needs, internal coherence with WFP corporate strategy, and external coherence with government and partner policies and operations.

#### **2.1.1 Appropriateness to needs**

##### **2.1.1.a Operation Design**

25. **Overview.** PRRO 200618 was designed in the second half of 2013. The preceding year was marked by a long period of drought, tropical storm Isaac and Hurricane Sandy, which affected various departments to varying degrees, and had a negative impact on the livelihoods of households, especially in rural areas.<sup>30</sup> The food security and nutrition monitoring survey (ESSAN) conducted in 2013 showed a slight deterioration in the overall food security situation, with high and moderate food insecurity affecting 30 percent of households nationwide as compared to 29 percent in 2012.<sup>30</sup> It also revealed a deterioration of the Food Consumption Score (FCS) and a strong correlation between food insecurity and malnutrition: stunting and GAM rates of 26,6 and 9,4 percent respectively amongst households with high food insecurity as compared to 19,8 and 6,3 amongst moderately food secure households. The report called for increased vigilance and strengthening of social protection and nutrition programmes. The overall goal of PRRO 200618 to “strengthen emergency preparedness and resilience” is hence very relevant. Breaking the cycle of environmental degradation, food insecurity and malnutrition does indeed require immediate support to affected populations alongside interventions to address some of the underlying determinants of food insecurity (e.g., improved access to livelihood

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<sup>28</sup> WFP Haiti. 2016. EMOP 200949. Operation Document.

<sup>29</sup> Under Outcome 3.2, the ET limits its analysis to the database aspect of KL, i.e., “the targeting system for a national safety net.” Examination of other aspects of KL is beyond the scope of this evaluation.

<sup>30</sup> CNSA. 2013. ESSAN – Rapport d’Analyse.

assets) and malnutrition (e.g., behaviour change), and to build the capacity of relevant government institutions.

26. PRRO 108440 was not evaluated to inform the design of the current PRRO and interviews with national stakeholders suggest that relevant line ministries were not closely involved in its design. Lessons that could have been drawn from M&E such as Post-Distribution Monitoring (PDM) surveys were not used to make adjustments to the original PRRO as and when necessary (more amply discussed under internal factors). A comparison of the two operations shows a greater emphasis on capacity building (US\$4.7 million, compared to US\$836,500 in PRRO 108440), which was commended by WFP's Programme Review Committee (PRC).<sup>31</sup> The latter made design-related recommendations including, *inter alia*: clarifying the geographic locations of the relief, resilience and nutrition interventions; and reviewing the focus, scale and commodities of the nutrition component.
27. The remainder of this sub-section discusses the appropriateness of the outcome/objective, and of its corresponding activities, per each outlined theme.
28. **EPR.** Outcome 1.2 “stabilizing or improving food consumption over assistance period for target households” was and remains a relevant component of the project design, based on various survey findings (ESSAN in 2013 and EFSA in late 2015) and food security situation monitoring reports (such as FEWS NET bulletins), namely: (i) one household out of five classified as having poor food consumption; (ii) 20 to 25 percent household living in severe food insecurity; and (iii) much higher number of people living in food insecurity (severe and moderate) – an estimated 6.74 million people, compared to 3.81 million in 2011.<sup>32,33</sup> This outcome is appropriate with CNSA and its partners' recommendations to “improve access to food and support a recovery in agricultural production.”<sup>32</sup> FGDs with GFD beneficiaries conducted by the ET have also confirmed the appropriateness of food assistance after a shock. The activity employed to achieve this outcome, providing high-energy biscuits (HEB) followed by relief response (full in-kind ration) in the aftermath of natural disasters, is hence appropriate.
29. WFP supports the Haitian Government's readiness to deal with immediate humanitarian needs in the first 48 hours after a disaster hits and contributes to updating contingency and operational response plans, especially in advance of the hurricane season. Providing humanitarian assistance to affected households after a shock quickly requires, among other actions, establishing and maintaining contingency stocks, in line with the national contingency plan. Although agriculture is an important sector of Haiti's economy, the country fails to produce enough food: it imports more than 50 percent of food for its population's needs, and 80 percent of its main staple, rice.<sup>33</sup> Acquiring food locally is hence not feasible. On the other hand, the use of contingency stock raises some concerns in the absence of disasters, which was the case during the last three years in Haiti. A strategy to avoid loss due to expired commodities is needed, such as using stocks for school feeding and nutrition interventions. The CO may wish to consider the experience of emergency food security reserves in other countries to identify potential solutions to the issue of stock rotation, e.g., the Emergency Food Security Reserve Agency of Ethiopia.<sup>34</sup> However, the non-conditional nature of pre-positioned stock limits other potential alternatives

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<sup>31</sup> WFP. 2013. Note for the Record - Programme Review Committee (PRC) Meeting – 09 October 2013 Haiti PRRO 200618.

<sup>32</sup> WFP. 2013. Haiti 2010-2013 : Working toward sustainable solutions.

<sup>33</sup> WFP Website : <https://www.wfp.org/stories/10-facts-about-hunger-haiti>

<sup>34</sup> <http://www.food-security.nl/sites/default/files/resource/strategicgrainreservesinethiopia.pdf>

such as CFA. KIIs with government staff reaffirmed the need and importance of the pre-positioned stocks in most at-risk departments to enable fast emergency response.

30. The capacity-building outcome under EPR (Outcome 1.3) was to be achieved through training and technical assistance on early warning information systems, response activation and coordination mechanisms, food security and vulnerability analysis, emergency telecommunications and early warning and national disaster response planning.<sup>1</sup> According to the PRRO project document, the operational capacity of the Civil Protection Directorate (DPC), which is in charge of risks and disaster management (GRD) all over Haiti, remains weak, often requiring external partner support for logistics in the case of a major disaster. Indeed, DPC has received supports from humanitarian and development partners to address risk reduction and preparedness and response issues. Positive results have been observed; the 2014 flood in the North is an example. This outcome remains relevant, as there are still weaknesses in EPR capacity in updating contingency and operational response plans, evidence-based planning and coordination.<sup>35</sup> The result of the EPCI (score 2 out of 4) conducted for the first time in Haiti in 2015 confirmed the weakness in EPR capacity of the Government of Haiti and called for government improvements in order to be able to efficiently prepare for and respond to crises.
31. **Recovery and Resilience.** Restoring food security and rebuilding livelihoods following emergencies (WFP corporate SO2) and reducing risks and enabling people, communities, countries to meet their own food and nutrition needs (WFP corporate SO3) were to be achieved through: adequate food consumption (PRRO outcome 2.1); improved access to assets (PRRO outcomes 2.2 and 3.1) and development of national capacity (PRRO outcome 2.3). The objectives to support food consumption and access to assets at local levels are very appropriate to the needs of food-insecure communities and households in fragile settings or following emergencies. Indeed, there were three million food-insecure people in August 2013 in Haiti; it is the country most at risk from climate change; and extreme deforestation, soil erosion and flooding all reduce agricultural production and revenues while agriculture contributes to 75 percent of low-income employment.<sup>1</sup> The objective to build capacity on addressing food insecurity needs at national level is very relevant given the capacity gaps within national institutions and the need for them to take responsibility for food insecurity needs analysis.
32. The formulation of the outcomes under SO2.2 and SO3.1 does not explicitly describe the type of assets to be built under each SO.<sup>36</sup> Overall, the description provided does not differ from the CFA activities described in the WFP recovery response following the 2010 earthquake.<sup>37</sup>
33. CFA activities are relevant at successive stages of the response (recovery and resilience) as they support food consumption through a better access to assets. The type of assets to be built or rehabilitated can be the same, but the approach adopted needs to evolve accordingly from a rapid and stand-alone activity (recovery phase) to an integrated and community led activity (resilience phase). The 2015 Haiti chronic Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) identified several underlying causes of food insecurity: degradation of natural capital (soil erosion, loss of forest, dwindling of water sources), poor financial capital, poor access to cultivable land,

<sup>35</sup>United Nations. 2015. Haiti Transitional Appeal (TAP) 2015/2016. Executive summary.

<sup>36</sup> The CFA activities to be implemented under SO2 and SO3 are the same in the project document. It is the approach that should be different, but it was not described in the project document.

<sup>37</sup> WFP RB. Rovira L., Golay A. 2014. Rapport de Mission. Mission C&V pour un appui conceptuel et technique au bureau d'Haïti du 28 avril au 4 mai 2014.



dilapidated infrastructure, and low human capital.<sup>38</sup> The CFA activities to rehabilitate watersheds are relevant as they addresses underlying factors by reducing soil erosion, replenishing water tables, and increasing arable land surface, thus increasing agricultural production. Moreover, supporting watershed management reduces the risk of flooding and mitigates drought impacts by fostering rainwater seepage. The relevance of this activity has been validated through KIIs and FGDs with communities, partners and authorities, as well as demonstrated in a previous CFA mid-term evaluation report.<sup>39</sup> This report acknowledged the lack of the assets' sustainability. The current PRRO planned to address this issue by training partners and targeted communities on the assets to be rehabilitated or created, as well as by providing communities with inputs (such as building materials) to foster ownership.

34. CNSA, which is responsible, *inter alia*, for monitoring and evaluating the food security situation and disseminating relevant information on the evolution of food security to decision-makers in a timely manner, is another key player. With WFP and other partner supports, CNSA has the capacity to monitor and evaluate the food security situation and provide relevant information on food security. However, there is still a need to strengthen CNSA capacity to better address basic development challenges that result in persistent humanitarian needs and risks. The latest Haiti EFSA reiterated the need to support CNSA in providing more effective early warning, food security assessments and analyses.<sup>13</sup> KIIs with partners and government authorities confirmed the need to reinforce CNSA. WFP's support to CNSA is hence appropriate to needs and has the potential to increase government' capacity to prepare and respond to emergencies.
35. **Nutrition.** Outcome 4.1 "to reduce undernutrition including micronutrient deficiencies", which encompasses two of the PRRO's objectives "treat acute malnutrition" and "prevent chronic malnutrition and micronutrient deficiencies through a focus on the first 1000 days", was relevant at the time of design in terms of rationale given that in some departments, stunting and/or GAM rates exceeded national averages (such as Artibonite, North, Northeast, Northwest and Southeast) and anaemia prevalence was on the increase.<sup>16</sup> MAM treatment continues to be relevant in alignment with Haiti's Humanitarian Response Plan for 2016, which quotes a UNICEF nutrition survey conducted in December 2015 indicating that the caseload of children with acute malnutrition is increasing.<sup>40</sup> As pointed by the World Health Organization (WHO): "If moderately malnourished children do not receive adequate support, they may progress towards severe acute malnutrition (severe wasting and/or oedema) or severe stunting (height-for-age less than -3 z-score), which are both life-threatening conditions. Therefore, the management of MAM should be a public health priority."<sup>41</sup> Doubts raised by the PRC and more recently the RB<sup>42</sup> as to the relevance of WFP's support to MAM treatment in view of the relatively low prevalence rate were echoed by some interviewed international stakeholders, who expressed concerns mostly about MSPP ownership at decentralized level and capacity at all levels to carry-out/take over supplementary feeding interventions whether for treatment or prevention, rather than questioning the relevance of support to MAM treatment.

<sup>38</sup> CNSA and FEWS NET. 2015. Aperçu de la situation d'insécurité alimentaire chronique en Haïti.

<sup>39</sup> Groupe URD. Therry M.; Pierre D. 2013. Rapport d'évaluation à mi-parcours, Programmes Argent Contre Travail, dans les départements de l'Artibonite et du Sud-Est PAM HAÏTI.

<sup>40</sup> Humanitarian Country Team. 2016. Haiti Human Response Plan.

<sup>41</sup> [http://www.who.int/nutrition/topics/moderate\\_malnutrition/en/](http://www.who.int/nutrition/topics/moderate_malnutrition/en/)

<sup>42</sup> Chapman, R. 2015. KL mission's notes.

36. Supplementary feeding for MAM treatment was, and rightly so, to follow the national protocol for the management of malnutrition. The latter stipulates combining provision of the food supplement with other inputs such as nutrition and hygiene education, vitamin A supplementation and deworming, all under MSPP responsibility (with support from other partners).<sup>43</sup> It was also to be coordinated with UNICEF, which supports the management of SAM, hence ensuring the continuum of care. Providing nutritional support within comprehensive childcare and as part of a management continuum of different forms of malnutrition is relevant but was not implemented. Stakeholders pointed to the lack of geographical convergence between UNICEF support to the management of SAM and WFP/KL nutritional support to MAM. Individual nutrition counselling was witnessed in some health facilities, but disruption in supplies in micronutrient supplements and deworming drugs was repeatedly mentioned as a constraint. Activities for stunting prevention mentioned in the project document include supplementary feeding coupled with social and behavioural change communication (SBCC). Improving the quality of a child's diet, particularly through greater dietary diversity, is recognized by the international nutrition community to be among the most effective intervention for preventing stunting during the complementary feeding period. However, as stunting results from a combination of household, environmental, socioeconomic and cultural factors, direct nutrition interventions need to be implemented in tandem with nutrition-sensitive interventions (such as those aiming at improving child-care practices, access to safe water and adequate sanitation, availability and affordability of nutrient-rich foods).<sup>44</sup> By combining supplementary feeding with SBCC, the current PRRO thus partially addresses the underlying causes of chronic malnutrition in Haiti.
37. Nutritional support was to be provided to people living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA) and TB undergoing anti-retroviral therapy (ART) and direct observed treatment short course (DOTS), so that patients could optimize adherence to and effectiveness of treatment. As this activity was not implemented due to the lack of funding, and in view of time constraints, the ET examined the relevance of this activity only through a review of available documentation. That food and nutrition intervention programmes are needed to break the vicious circle of food insecurity, malnutrition and HIV is well-documented and recognized as a priority in Haiti, but results obtained under the previous PRRO show very poor performance, particularly in terms of nutritional improvement (only 4 percent nutrition recovery rate), and 75 percent adherence to treatment vis-à-vis a target of 90 percent.<sup>45</sup> Based on these findings, nutritional support to PLWHA and TB patients under treatment has not been effective in responding to needs.
38. Capacity building through policy advice and technical support to enhance management of malnutrition was foreseen. This support is indeed relevant in view of the weak capacity and lack of ownership of the nutrition programme by MSPP, which have been frequently mentioned in reports and in interviews as key constraints (e.g., without the support of donors and United Nations agencies such as UNICEF, no supplies would have been available for the management of SAM; MSPP staff considering nutrition activities as an overload of work rather than as an integral part of child health services). Responsibility for this outcome was assigned to ACF as the lead partner in the KL Consortium. Related activities have thus not been implemented by WFP.

<sup>43</sup> MSPP and UCPNANu. 2012. Protocole national de prise en charge de la malnutrition aigüe globale en Haïti.

<sup>44</sup> WHO. 2014. WHO Global Nutrition Targets 2025: Stunting Policy Brief.

<sup>45</sup> WFP Haiti. 2014. Haiti PRRO 108440 Standard Project Report (SPR) 2014.



39. **Targeting system for a national social safety net.** As mentioned in paragraph 20, Outcome 3.2 actually refers to KL SO1 “National systems for vulnerability targeting strengthened” and its associated activity “MAST-led equitable vulnerability targeting methodology developed, tested and implemented,” which falls under WFP’s responsibility and leadership within the KL framework. More specifically, WFP supports the development of a database hosted by MAST as a tool to identify how many vulnerable households are in the country and the geographic distribution and core characteristics of these households so as to allow decision makers to develop an appropriate frame of social assistance for future safety net interventions. This activity is in line with one of the priority interventions proposed by the Food Security and Nutrition Technical Group<sup>46</sup> “to implement a food safety net such as food vouchers, cash transfers or direct food distribution, targeting the most vulnerable households (10-15 percent of the population) to reduce vulnerability and improve resilience to shocks.”<sup>32</sup> WFP’s support is thus relevant as this database aims at establishing a rigorous and transparent selection of households for social protection interventions and hence better direct scarce public resources to the extremely vulnerable.

#### **2.1.1.b Geographic Targeting**

40. **Overview.** The PRRO document does not specify which departments will be covered, but states that the operation will be implemented in seven of Haiti’s ten departments “in the most food-insecure and disaster-prone areas,”<sup>47</sup> with a proviso that assistance could shift to other areas in the advent of hurricanes. Targeting was also planned to complement “WFP’s development project 200150 supporting school feeding, and the activities of the Government and partners.” In practice, no cohesive PRRO targeting was developed; separate targeting approaches were adopted for each component.
41. **EPR.** Geographic targeting was to be based on “DPC emergency assessments” and “rapid needs assessments led by CNSA.” Targeting was indeed collaborative and responded to the government’s appeals. CNSA and DPC are responsible for assessing geographic locations for WFP’s relief response. After a sudden shock, the DPC (departmental coordination) conducts a rapid assessment to provide a first estimate of locations and populations in need. WFP subsequently carries out another assessment to validate the initial estimate for food assistance. Finally, a multi-sectoral assessment is conducted to assess the magnitude of the shock, its potential impact on people and services, and possible scale of the response and the associated cost. Based on the success of these collaborative processes and the informed decisions they have enabled, the ET finds geographic targeting for EPR appropriate. In 2015, targeting of households affected by the drought in CARE KL areas was done using the vulnerability database, hence allowing its use during slow-onset disasters. Combining safety nets and emergency response proved quite a promising approach.
42. **Recovery and Resilience.** Discussions with the CO confirmed that targeting was based on national assessments as planned in the initial methodology, but also partly on project opportunities. Various food security assessments were well reflected in overall decisions regarding geographic targeting. ESSAN 2013 revealed that Northwest and North were the two most food-insecure departments, CNSA/ FEWS NET analyses of acute and chronic IPC<sup>48,49,38</sup> pointed out Centre and Southeast

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<sup>46</sup> Coordinated by CNSA

<sup>47</sup> As determined by “DPC emergency assessments,” “rapid needs assessments by CNSA,” and “CNSA vulnerability maps and food security assessments, including the IPC,” and designed to prioritise rural areas.

<sup>48</sup> CNSA and FEWS NET. Avril 2014. Panorama de la situation de l’insécurité alimentaire aiguë (IPC). Situation actuelle.

<sup>49</sup> CNSA and FEWS NET. Décembre 2014. Panorama de la situation de l’insécurité alimentaire aiguë (IPC). Situation actuelle.

departments, and the Haiti multi-hazard map<sup>50</sup> (Annex 9) shows the areas most prone to earthquake, storm, landslides, flood and drought. The project's targeting for CFA is in line with these analyses, e.g., communes targeted in the North and Northwest were among the most food-insecure and drought-affected areas. Moreover, village selections were conducted in collaboration with departmental agricultural entities (DDA), partners, and WFP. However, some communes in Southeast and Artibonite would have been more appropriate to target than the ones in West according to food security analysis and hazard mapping. Thomazeau is affected by drought and Arcahaie by floods, but Petit Goâve and Fond Verrettes do not seem specifically vulnerable to hazards or food insecure. Moreover, communes were selected for one round of CFA activities only (i.e., rather than implementing successive activities in the same locations), thus reducing the potential impact of assets built. An additional relevant targeting criterion, ensuring continuity in geographical targeting from relief to recovery assistance, was not strictly implemented. However, rural areas were selected as initially planned.<sup>51</sup> Prioritization of areas affected by hurricanes was also proposed. The emphasis on hurricanes in particular is too restrictive, as various types of natural disasters affect Haiti; the focus should have been the level of vulnerability to natural disaster rather than the specific type of hazard.

43. **Nutrition.** The selection of departments was decided within the context of KL based on a combination of chronic malnutrition rates (as per the Demographic and Health Survey – EMMUS 2012) and CNSA food insecurity indicators (Annex 8, Map).<sup>16, 52</sup> Within the selected departments, the food insecurity trend was the prime indicator for the selection of communes, whereby communes classified as extremely vulnerable (>50 percent food insecurity) or high (20-50 percent food insecurity) in two consecutive assessments (CNSA analyses of December 2012 and April 2013) were selected. No intra-commune selection was foreseen. Using a combination of malnutrition indicators and food insecurity trends as the basis for geographic targeting is coherent with the proposed objectives. These criteria were well applied and resulted in appropriate department and commune selections, e.g., in the five selected departments, stunting prevalence exceeded the national average of 22 percent, and most of the 21 communes selected within those departments fit the proposed food insecurity criteria (with the exception of Boucan Carre/Centre department and Port-de-Paix/Northwest department, with less than 20 percent). According to KL documents, the phasing-in of the of *Kore Fanmi* in 2015 was an additional criterion that lead to the inclusion of Boucan Carre, and the opportunity to test KL approaches in an urban setting justifies the inclusion of Port-de-Paix.<sup>53</sup>
44. **Targeting system for a national social safety net.** The selection of departments and communes to implement the safety-nets system is aligned with the context of the KL design. Sixteen communes in five departments were selected based on CNSA food security analysis. The data collection started in six communes (Thomassique, Boucan Carre, Anse à Pitre, Grand Gosier, Belle Anse and Baie de Henne) for the implementation of KL SO2 activities by targeting 2,847 extremely vulnerable households.<sup>54</sup>

<sup>50</sup> CNSA. 2014. Haiti multi hazard map.

<sup>51</sup> The PRRO states “recovery activities follow relief assistance in areas affected by shocks,” outlining the need to ensure effective succession of geographic targeting from relief (SO1) to recovery (SO2). This willingness to support affected areas at each consecutive stage of the response is also highlighted in the PRRO objective to “encourage resilience-building and asset-creation to facilitate recovery from natural disasters and of their impact.”

<sup>52</sup> CARE, ACF, and WFP. 2013. KL Project Document. Annex 17: Beneficiary and Geographic Targeting, revised July.

<sup>53</sup> Kore Fanmi is a pilot programme of the Haitian Government, implemented by the Economic and Social Assistance Fund (FAES) with World Bank financing, aiming to harmonize and improve the provision of basic services to poor and vulnerable families.

<sup>54</sup> CARE Haiti, 2014. Kore Lavi. Annual progress report. Kore Lavi FFP-A-13-00005 ARR Narrative 20141103

### 2.1.1.c Transfer modality

45. **EPR.** The in-kind ration – HEBs for two days as immediate response followed by a dry ration of cereals, pulses and oil for one month as relief response – address the challenges of accessing food following an emergency, as the prevalence of food insecurity and severe food insecurity, combined with crop crisis and the increase in food market prices, force rural populations to engage in negative strategies in the absence of other options. Additionally, the fragility of the ecosystem and the vulnerability of the environment of Haiti to climatic hazards have led to natural disasters that exacerbate problems of market access and food access. The in-kind transfer modality and composition are appropriate to this context. KIIs with government authorities and beneficiary FGDs recognized the importance of this transfer modality immediately after a shock (the in emergency period). This modality is not sustainable but helps to respond to immediate food needs and saves lives. It would be beneficial to examine the feasibility of local production of HEB and contingency stocks to boost the economy in places not affected by the disaster(s).
46. **Recovery and Resilience.** The project document states “cash transfers are preferred, but food transfers could be substituted if market assessments warrant it.” This preference expressed in the PD was not based on a documented rationale. The WFP Omega Value tool for cost-efficiency and effectiveness analysis to select transfer modalities (food, cash and/or voucher), which confirmed cash as being the most appropriate transfer modality, was computed after the start of the operation. The decision to implement Cash-based transfers (CBT), and the amount to budget for it, could have been analysed more deeply – and earlier in the project design stage.
47. The 2015 WFP CFA PDM found that 12.5 percent of households prefer a combination of food and cash, but the majority (75 percent) prefer cash, as also reported in the latest EFSA. According to communities, partners and authorities met during the mission, cash transfers are strongly preferred by all but some extremely vulnerable communes (e.g., Baie de Henne), which preferred a mix of food and cash. The ET considers it was very appropriate to continue CBT as access to food rather than food availability per se is the main cause of food insecurity (based on information from beneficiaries, authorities and partners as well as the follow-up by CO of food market prices); moreover, it stimulates local markets and lets households define their main priorities. However, a combination of food and cash transfer modalities should have been implemented in extremely vulnerable communes with no access to local markets, to avoid them spending most cash received on transport to markets to meet basic food needs.
48. The project document does not specify which distribution model to consider. Direct distribution of cash in envelopes was implemented, as under the previous PRRO. This was organised by a money transfer company at distribution points in the proximity of beneficiaries. This modality is suitable as it is well adapted to rural areas. CARE is implementing vouchers under the KL programme, but there is low follow-up on relevance and impact of this form of delivery; no information is available regarding whether vouchers are in fact more appropriate than cash. Moreover, in 2014, e-transfer was not available in Haiti; even now it is proposed by only two national agencies (Digicel and Natcom), but neither is capable of complete delivery (e-money points are not available everywhere). WFP will work with Digicel under the coming EMOP and support them in building their capacities. It should be noted that this e-transfer contract is only the second in the region for WFP, showing that this modality remains very innovative in the area. WFP should assess this

modality to inform the next operation and ensure that VAM officers validate beneficiary preference, cost-efficiency and effectiveness of transfer modalities.

49. **Nutrition.** The ration consists of an individual ration of CSB++ (or Super Cereal+) for MAM treatment, and Super Cereal for stunting prevention together with a ration of cereals, pulses and vegetable oil intended for consumption by household members, to minimize sharing of the Super Cereal and act as an incentive for women and caretakers to participate in care groups at community level. Providing 200g of Super Cereal is in line with the WFP recommended products for MAM treatment of children, and was found to be equally effective as lipid-based nutrient supplements (LNS).<sup>55</sup> However, the main disadvantages of CSB products are the lack of protein and micronutrients of animal origin, the absence of essential fatty acids and relatively high anti-nutrients (phytates) that limit the absorption of iron and other minerals, and finally the need for cooking in a context where iron deficiency is a problem of public health significance and access to clean water remains a problem for many households. For stunting prevention, WFP recommends LNS for children and CSB+ for PLW. However, the ration composition and scale initially chosen under the KL project did not adhere to WFP guidance and did not take into account the various communications relayed by the CO or RB.<sup>56</sup> CSB+ was provided for MAM treatment of children in 2014 based on USAID's available food basket, but was rightly replaced by Plumpy'Sup (known in Haiti as *Vita Mamba*), which was used in the prior PRRO. A RB mission recommended changing to either CSB++ or a locally/regionally purchased lipid-based product (e.g., a Plumpy Doz equivalent) should USAID be willing to provide funds for local/regional procurement for 2016 onwards; the need to support local production and procurement was also recommended by the strategic nutrition positioning mission undertaken in late 2013.<sup>57</sup> <sup>58</sup> The changes in ration composition for MAM treatment to align with WFP's guidance are appropriate.

#### **2.1.1.d Gender mainstreaming built into design**

50. The PRRO document recognizes that gender inequity and GBV are issues in Haiti, and states that gender equality will be promoted, from planning at national level to participation in decision-making at household level, and that partnerships will be established with programmes addressing GBV. The project document does not however reference any evidence or research base to inform these actions and is not explicit as to their implementation. The food security and nutrition survey conducted in 2013 by CNSA with WFP and other partners' support did not include a systematic gender-sensitive food security analysis, with the exception of one indicator, namely the interaction between food insecurity and malnutrition among women; otherwise none of the other indicators was disaggregated by gender. PLW were rightly targeted under the nutrition component, and more than half of all types of activities' beneficiaries were to be women. Measures have been indeed put in place to promote women's empowerment and monitor gender aspects through PDMs (to be discussed in greater detail under results), and a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed to support UNHCR's assistance to GBV victims. It should also be noted that the KL project was guided by a context-specific preliminary gender assessment which included FGDs with current programme participants of consortium partners (including WFP); KIIs with local women's organizations and MCFDF; and desk

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<sup>55</sup> WFP. 2012. Nutrition at the World Food Programme – Programming for Nutrition-Specific Interventions.

<sup>56</sup> CARE Haiti, WFP, and ACF. KL Project Document. Annex 28: Food ration composition and rationale.

<sup>57</sup> WFP Haiti. 2013. Rapport d'évaluation: Positionnement Stratégique du PAM dans le secteur de la Nutrition en Haïti.

<sup>58</sup> Chapman, R. 2015. KL Mission Report

review of current literature.<sup>59</sup> The KL mid-term evaluation noted that despite gender mainstreaming at design stage, some aspects have not been adequately addressed, such as the absence of gender-specific variables in the safety net targeting system and the late assessment of gender-related training needs of MAST staff. On the positive side, the ET notes a major improvement in the 2015 EFSA conducted jointly by WFP/VAM and CNSA, and which informed the formulation of the EMOP: all food security indicators have been analysed with a gender perspective.<sup>13</sup>

### 2.1.2 Coherence with national policies

51. **EPR.** Although there is currently no national EPR policy, WFP's support to EPR is in line with the national EPR strategy and guidance, e.g., the National Plan for Risk and Disaster Management (PNGRD) and the National System for Risk and Disaster Management (SNGRD). One of SNGRD's objectives is to strengthen national emergency response capacity in case of disasters such as planned under PRRO SO1 outcomes.
52. **Recovery and Resilience.** The PRRO supports CNSA to provide more effective early warning, food security assessments and analysis through capacity building and learning by doing. It is aligned with the CNSA plan of action and represents an important aspect of its responsibilities. Moreover, the PRRO helps to reinforce institutional recognition of CNSA. In addition, the MARNDR has expressed the need to support food- and cash-for-work programmes, stating that these programmes are in complete alignment with the current dynamics of agriculture production recovery for food security.<sup>32</sup> Finally, the National Food Security and Nutrition Plan recommends managing watersheds and strengthening social protection structures as part of its national model, and defines as specific objective 3, higher income by the creation of lasting employment.<sup>60, 61</sup>
53. **Nutrition.** The national nutrition strategic plan 2012-2017 emphasizes the importance of preventive actions during the first 1000 days, while maintaining the commitment to support quality management of malnutrition following the national protocol.<sup>62</sup> Specific national strategic priorities include *inter alia*: (1) prevention of malnutrition (mainly through the promotion of adequate Infant and Young Child Feeding (IYCF) practices, the enhancement of nutrition-sensitive agriculture, micronutrient supplementation and fortification, and promoting Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) activities); (2) nutritional management; (3) nutritional protection in emergencies; and (4) strengthening of human resources capacity in nutrition at both central departmental and community levels. Thus, the focus of the PRRO – prevention during the 1000 days, continued support to the management of MAM, and capacity building – is perfectly in line with the national nutrition strategy.
54. MSPP has developed a guide on the nutrition management of HIV, which focuses on counselling using local available foods with no specific reference to food assistance.<sup>63</sup> But the MSPP Master Plan 2012-2022 acknowledges the role of food assistance to improve adherence to treatment and includes an explicit target, namely “to increase the percentage of ART patients who receive nutritional support from 60 to 95 percent

<sup>59</sup> CARE, ACF, and WFP. 2013. KL Project Document. Annex 10 : Gender integration and analysis.

<sup>60</sup> CNSA. 2010. Interministerial Council for Food Security. National Plan for Food Security and Nutrition.

<sup>61</sup> This National Plan is currently under review, and better integrates the specific potential for regions, environmental considerations and focus on the operational side.

<sup>62</sup> MSPP and UCPNANu. 2013. La Nutrition au Cœur du Développement Durable en Haïti - Plan Stratégique de Nutrition.

<sup>63</sup> MSPP and UCPNANu. 2006. Guide National pour la Prise en Charge et le Soutien Alimentaire et Nutritionnel des PVVIH.

by 2022.”<sup>64</sup> Thus, nutritional support to PLWHA and TB patients under treatment is coherent with MSPP’s health strategy.

55. **Gender.** Under the purview of the Ministry of Women and Women’s Rights (MCDFD), Haiti has a national gender equality policy based on the principles of equality, equity, non-discrimination, social inclusion, coherence, and transparency.<sup>65</sup> Sector policies address gender issues to varying degrees. For instance, the National Food and Nutrition Security Plan (PNSAN) has defined actions to ensure gender equity in natural resources access and control; the MSPP master plan includes actions to address GBV; and MCFCF is a member of the Nutrition Technical Committee led by MSPP to strengthen gender mainstreaming in nutrition interventions. The PRRO is coherent with existing policies and guidance but more effort is needed to systematically collect sex-disaggregated data and use the data for taking relevant actions, if and when required, to improve targeting processes and outcomes such as women’s empowerment.
56. **Procurement.** The PRRO planned to promote locally produced food and improve commercial opportunities for smallholder farmers; this plan is well aligned with the national food procurement policy and the National Agricultural Development Policy.<sup>66</sup> WFP supports the MARNDR to strengthen local procurement in Haiti. However, support is still needed to align with the National Agricultural Development Policy objective to “implement interventions upstream and to assist producers such that they have better access to production, packaging, storage and quality control technologies.”

### 2.1.3 Coherence with WFP strategies, policies and normative guidance

57. **EPR.** PRRO SO1 is aligned with SO1 of WFP’s 2014-2017 strategic plan. The EPR actions are designed to enable WFP to: 1) quickly and adequately address food and nutrition security needs among the population affected by the crisis or disaster; 2) effectively carry out cluster-lead responsibilities; and 3) position the organization in advance of a crisis or disaster vis-à-vis government and partner agencies<sup>67</sup>. WFP globally plays a key role in responses to emergency in Haiti by providing immediate food assistance to affected households, supporting DPC to coordinate interventions and logistics and CNSA to monitor and evaluate the food security situation and provide relevant information on food security to target affected households in need. The PRRO’s objectives are coherent with WFP strategies.
58. **Recovery and Resilience.** The PRRO operation’s objective on recovery and resilience is related to SO2 and SO3 of WFP’s 2014-2017 strategic plan. The WFP’s Cash and Voucher Policy identifies six strategic priorities<sup>68</sup>: (1) ensure programming is based on assessments; (2) develop protocols and controls to scale up voucher and cash transfer programmes as appropriate; (3) technology, risk management and accountability; (4) strengthen management for results; (5) forge strategic and technical partnerships; and (6) ensure proper integration of cash transfer and voucher programmes with national social protection and safety net systems. The PRRO’s objectives and target groups are coherent with these priorities with the exception of partnerships: these have not sufficiently been forged at strategic and technical levels with CPs (discussed in greater detail under Sec. 2.2). The recently

<sup>64</sup> MSPP. 2013. Plan Directeur de Santé 2012-2022.

<sup>65</sup> WFP. 2012. WFP Nutrition Policy.

<sup>66</sup> MARNDR 2010. Politique de développement agricole 2010-2025.

<sup>67</sup> WFP. 2012. Emergency Preparedness and Response package.

<sup>68</sup> WFP. 2011. WFP Update on the implementation of WFP’s Policy on vouchers and cash transfers.



published WFP FFA Guidance<sup>69</sup> will be of great support for the coming programme to, *inter alia*, better set up participatory planning related to FFA, use the 3PA to operationalize FFA and strengthen the nutrition focus.

59. **Nutrition.** The PRRO nutrition-related objectives are amongst those recommended under SO4 of WFP's 2014-2017 strategic plan. WFP's Nutrition Policy and guidance identified five priority areas for WFP's support: (1) treating moderate acute malnutrition; (2) preventing acute malnutrition; (3) preventing chronic malnutrition (stunting); (4) addressing micronutrient deficiencies among vulnerable people; and (5) strengthening the focus on nutrition in programmes without a primary nutrition objective and, where possible, linking vulnerable groups to these programmes.<sup>70</sup> The PRRO's objectives and target groups are globally coherent with WFP's priorities. However, there has been no cost-effectiveness analysis as recommended in WFP guidance.<sup>55,65</sup>
60. **Gender.** WFP's gender policy adopted in 2015 aims at four objectives: adapting food assistance to different needs through gender-disaggregated situation analysis; promoting equal participation of women and men in food security and nutrition programmes; supporting women empowerment; and ensuring the safety, dignity and integrity of those receiving food assistance.<sup>71</sup> Overall, implementation of the PRRO is aligned with this policy. The PRRO aimed at equally targeting women and men (objective 2) of the policy. As discussed in paragraph 50, the EFSA 2015 demonstrates improvements as regards the PRRO alignment with the first objective, women's participation in decision-making is promoted (objective 3) and protection issues (objective 4) are monitored (see paragraphs 103).

#### **2.1.4 Coherence with relevant UN-wide system-wide commitments**

61. The PRRO aligns broadly with the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 2013-2016, which focused on institutional, territorial, economic and social rebuilding. Specifically, the PRRO contributes to UNDAF Outcome 2.3: "Capacities of institutions (national and local) and civil society strengthened for the prevention, management and response to risks and natural disasters"; Result 3.2, increasing agricultural productivity through the adoption of sustainable management practices of natural resources; and Result 3.2, increasing access to basic services including nutrition.<sup>72</sup>
62. In relation to bilateral inter-agency collaboration under the PRRO, FAO has not been a partner under the current PRRO for CFA activities, although it was a partner under the previous PRRO. The current PRRO was initially designed to include FAO as a key partner on CFA and with resilience-building. A joint WFP-FAO-IFAD proposal was prepared during PRRO implementation but not funded. Moreover at the time of the MTE, the CO was finalizing an MOU with FAO for conducting joint CFA activities in the Southeast.

#### **2.1.5 Synergy with other WFP ongoing operations**

63. **School feeding.** The WFP School Feeding Policy states school feeding should be linked to community development, asset creation and resilience initiatives.<sup>73</sup> The

<sup>69</sup> WFP. 2016. Food Assistance for Assets (FFA) for zero hunger and resilient livelihoods: a programme guidance manual.

<sup>70</sup> WFP. 2012. WFP Nutrition Policy.

<sup>71</sup> WFP. 2015. Gender Policy (2015-2020). Executive WFP/EB.A/2015/5-A. Executive Board Document.

<sup>72</sup> United Nations System/Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation. 2013. *Cadre Stratégique Intégré des Nations Unies pour Haïti*.

<sup>73</sup> WFP. 2013. Revised School Feeding Policy.

PRRO project document mentions complementarity with school feeding, without specifying how this will be achieved. Due to its short timeframe and focus on restoring assets, the PRRO's FFA/CFA recovery component (under SO2) did not lend itself to seeking synergies. CFA under SO3 (Resilience) was not implemented but several proposals with United Nations partners and NGOs were developed in order to increase the synergy with locally produced food for schools through CFA activities but funds were not received. Otherwise, there could have been good opportunities for synergy, such as linking food production under resilience with local food purchases for school feeding).

64. **EMOP.** EMOP 200949 was set up during the evaluation mission. The decision to launch an EMOP rather than expand the PRRO to embed the planned emergency activities was the subject of discussions between the RB and CO. The high planned number of beneficiaries (one million people), based on EFSA analysis and national and humanitarian institutions' capacities, was the main justification for the creation of a separate EMOP.<sup>74</sup> Targeted areas were discussed to avoid overlap. Budget Revision 1, effective July 2016, reduces CFA activities under the PRRO in order to ensure "CFA activities will begin following the general food distribution"<sup>75</sup> under the EMOP, thus ensuring coherence between both activities.


## 2.2. Results of the Operation

65. This section provides evaluation findings and analysis regarding the second evaluation question, "What are the results of the operation?" It begins with general findings for output attainment, followed by a discussion of results by activity. Specific analysis includes the extent to which assistance was provided to the "right" beneficiaries, and whether the assistance was timely and of sufficient quantity and quality. This is followed by an assessment of outcome and objective achievements.

### Overview.

66. As shown in **Figure 15**, which compares actual beneficiaries with operational planning figures, the proportion of planned beneficiaries reached increased in 2015, with the exception of MAM treatment. Overall, 15 percent of planned beneficiaries were reached in 2014 (April-December) and 38 percent in 2015. A similar pattern is observed in terms of tonnage of commodities distributed, with a significant increase in GFD commodities (**Table 1**). This table also includes commodities provided to 45 GBV victims housed in shelters under a WFP/UNHCR MOU (a category not included in SPRs).<sup>76</sup>

**Figure 15: Actual beneficiaries reached as a percentage of planned, by activity and year**



Source: SPR 2014 and SPR 2015

<sup>74</sup> CNSA and WFP. 2016. Haiti Emergency Food Security Assessment (EFSA) Haïti.

<sup>75</sup> WFP Haiti. 2016. EMOP 200949 Project Document.

<sup>76</sup> WFP and UNHCR. 2014. Memorandum of Understanding.



**Table 1: Actual tonnage distributed as a percentage of planned (operational), by activity and year**

	Total	GFD	MAM	1000 days	GBV
<b>2014</b>	21	5	104	45	4
<b>2015</b>	41	86	8	68	7
<b>2016 (Jan-March)</b>	24	-	<1%	80	-

Source: PRRO 200618 output monitoring databases 2014, 2015 and 2016. Calculations by ET (for 2016: total planned for the year divided by 4)


## 2.2.1 Attainment of planned outputs by component

### Prepare and Respond to Emergencies

67. **GFD beneficiaries and beneficiary selection.** In November 2014, heavy rains caused floods in Cap Haitian and surrounding areas, and in 2015 a persistent drought provoked by the El Nino weather phenomenon caused a major crop failure (with agricultural production estimated at 50 percent below a normal year).<sup>77</sup> The Ministry of Agriculture issued a food security alert, which estimated that between 300,000 and 560,000 people's food insecurity has reached crisis levels.<sup>78</sup>

68. WFP relief assistance was planned for 300,000 people (145,000 boys/men and 155,000 girls/women) each year based on the estimated number of severely food insecure households from relevant assessments.<sup>11 79 12</sup> In line with the national contingency plan, WFP prepared food stocks for up to 300,000 people in advance of hurricane season (June to November). The targeted number of beneficiaries was not reached for two consecutive

**Figure 16 GFD planned vs. actual beneficiaries by year**



Source: SPR 2014 and 2015

- years (2014-15). **Figure 16** gives a breakdown of actual vs. planned beneficiaries by year. In November 2014, the PRRO reached 16,720 beneficiaries (of whom 52 percent are women) (six percent of the target), in response to the flood in the North. Haiti was not affected by major hurricanes in 2014, which explains why fewer beneficiaries than planned were assisted with GFD. In 2015, the PRRO reached 114,573 beneficiaries (of whom 59,304 or 52 percent are women) or 38 percent of the target.
69. In 2015, WFP chose, for the sake of operational convenience, to target households for GFD through WFP-assisted schools, based on the assumption that the geographical coverage of the WFP-assisted school feeding project was pertinent.<sup>80</sup> The PDM conducted in October 2015 in the North, Northeast and Centre found that 90 percent of households had an acceptable Food Consumption Score (FCS) prior to food

<sup>77</sup> WFP. 2015. Executive Brief covering the period 01 to 31 January 2015.

<sup>78</sup> WFP. 2015. Executive Brief covering the period 01 to 30 November 2015.

<sup>79</sup> WFP and CNSA. Evaluation de la situation alimentaire en situation d'urgence (ESASU) Haïti. Avril 2016, données collectées en Décembre 2015.

<sup>80</sup> WFP Haiti. 2015. Enquête Baseline PDM-GFD – Distribution Générale de Vivres Sécheresse: départements du Nord, du Nord-Est et du Centre. 20 Oct. 2015 - 23 Oct. 2015.

distribution, and recommended that this targeting approach be discontinued. Community leaders, school directors and teachers and GFD beneficiaries were also of the opinion that choosing WFP-assisted schools for targeting excluded some vulnerable groups such as the elderly and disabled, and those who do not have children at school or have children in schools not assisted by WFP.

70. **Size, composition and duration of the ration.** The planned food ration for GFD consists of a family ration of five; the individual daily ration consists of 300g rice, 50g beans, 20g vegetable oil and 5g of iodized salt, and provides an estimated 1,415 kcal per person. This amount is approximately 70 percent of the recommended requirements of 2,100 kcal/person/day.<sup>81</sup> In 2014, beneficiaries received a daily HEB ration for the first two days, which ensured sustenance in the absence of cooking equipment. In subsequent days, households in shelters or that had lost most of their assets received the planned family ration except for salt.<sup>45</sup> In response to the drought in March 2015, WFP provided double rations of HEBs for one month (instead of 100g per day for two days as the product's expiry was drawing near) to 2,000 drought-affected households in the Southeast, while CARE gave US\$25 per month to the same households. In subsequent GFD distributions in the North, Northeast and Centre, a family take-home ration covering needs for 60 days included 100 kg rice, 15 kg beans, 6.82 kg vegetable oil and 2 kg of iodized salt, and was distributed to households with children in WFP-supported schools.<sup>82</sup> As per donor and government request, WFP did not provide assistance in areas where the population was already receiving food assistance through the KL project.<sup>83</sup> FGD participants reported being generally satisfied with the quality of the food except for complaints about rice quality. According to beneficiaries, some bags of rice had a bad taste after cooking.
71. **Timeliness.** With readily accessible stocks, distributions reached people in less than 24 hours from the warehouse to the distribution point. Additionally, WFP, in coordination with other actors on the ground, speedily delivered cooking utensils, stoves and fuel to families in order to prepare the food received. Some FGD participants reported not having been informed in advance regarding their entitlements and procedures to be followed during distribution. Logistic management training has been one of the needs raised by CPs during KIIs. FGD participants reported being generally satisfied with the distribution process (no long queues or long waiting times) and the choice of food distribution points.
72. **EPR capacity building.** WFP supported the government in preparing for potential natural disasters and strengthening the DPC's capacity to respond. WFP provided support in updating the national contingency plan through a series of three workshops, two simulation exercises involving DPC and other humanitarian organizations, and sharing experience and lessons learned during a study trip to Cuba. Four WFP staff from the main and field office were involved in the three-day simulation exercise that took place in one of the hurricane-prone southern departments. Four emergency radio communication centres were installed (Artibonite, Grand'Anse, North and West). Training of DPC staff on needs assessment and targeting, and equipment were provided to improve the DPC's telecommunication capacity and to render the early warning system more efficient, which resulted in data on disasters and their consequences reaching decision-makers twice as fast as in the past.

<sup>81</sup> UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, and WHO. 2004. Food and Nutrition in Emergencies.


<sup>82</sup> WFP. 2015. Enquête de suivi post-distribution PDM – Baseline, May 2015

<sup>83</sup> WFP Haiti. 2014. Haiti PRRO 200618 SPR 2014.

## Recovery and Resilience

73. **CFA beneficiaries and beneficiary selection.** The unreliability of data regarding the number of CFA participants and beneficiaries is a glaring problem. The CO compiled data following the evaluation mission because data reported in SPRs were not reliable (especially SPR 2014). **Figure 17** compares the number of actual beneficiaries provided in the SPR with the number provided in the consolidated table sent by the CO to the ET. The inconsistencies are significant: the CO-consolidated “actual” figure for 2014 represents only 11 percent of the figure reported in SPR 2014; for 2015, it is just 35 percent of the SPR-2015-reported value. This significant gap is a consequence of poor (almost non-existent in 2014) internal activity tracking (i.e., counting tier-one on distribution sites) probably due to the absence of a staff dedicated to CFA for the first 18 months of the project; the weak or absence of cross-referencing of data available (between the financial and programme departments) and weak follow-up of CPs. The M&E department was not in charge of this internal activity tracking as it was focusing on (i) fraud prevention/ detection; process and outcome monitoring (e.g. PDM) - for which RB/HQ had given a strong stimulus; and setting-up of a monitoring system for the school feeding project.
74. Regardless of data source referenced, actual participants of CFA activities fell short of planned figures, covering only 20.0 percent in 2014 and 40.7 percent in 2015 according to SPR data.
75. Consolidated data from the CO for the same period show only 2.2 percent achievement in 2014 and 14.1 percent in 2015. These achievement rates are measured against planned figures from the project document, because the PRRO was not amended, as well as data validated by the head of programme; however, the planned figure in SPR 2015 was reported as 180,000, with no reason given for this shift in planned beneficiaries. The low rate of attainment is due to much lower funding than expected for a very ambitious initial plan, and late receipt of funding in 2014.
76. Targeting of participants systematically involved local leaders, community-based organizations and partners. Team leaders, who are selected by local leaders, often took part in the selection process also. Criteria were different depending on stakeholders and were not systematically defined in the Field-Level Agreements (FLAs). Interviewed partners reported that candidates in forthcoming elections applied pressure to influence the selection process and managed to do so to some extent. The use of the database developed under KL for individual targeting minimized bias. In communes where the KL database was available, local authorities applied pressure to the programme to allow them to directly select at least 20 percent of beneficiaries, arguing KL had excluded some very vulnerable households, but partners and WFP did not concede.


**Figure 17: CFA beneficiaries – planned vs. actual from different sources**



Source: SPRs 2014 and 2015 and CO revised figures

77. Three types of participants were initially planned: worker, team leader and supervisor. In 2015, the supervisor status was eliminated WFP did not perceive supervisors to provide effective work or technical support, nor were they among the most vulnerable, while earning three times more than workers. The ET agrees that this was a rational and good decision. The project was designed to include one participant per household, with households estimated to comprise five members. Thus, the number of beneficiaries reported is equal to the number of participants multiplied by five.
78. Gender-disaggregated data on CFA participants and beneficiaries are not available in reports and documents provided. Partner interviews and FGDs highlighted that women were targeted at 50 percent or more under the category of workers. However, women were selected less often to fill the position of team leaders. There is a national policy that at least 30 percent of national public services employees should be women.<sup>84</sup> This lower standard (compared to WFP's 50 percent target) was often invoked to justify the lower rate of enrolment in team leader positions. When the WFP policy of targeting women and men equally was mentioned in FGDs, all women and a majority of men were very supportive.
79. **Duration of assistance/ participation.** In 2014, the RB estimated that one month of project participation did not have sufficient impact on households; participation was thus extended to two months.<sup>37</sup> Two months are still insufficient to reach adequate level of food consumption up to the next harvest<sup>85</sup>. Coverage is still inadequate: there are more vulnerable villagers in the targeted communes than the programme was able to accommodate.
80. **Cash transfer amount, timeliness and delivery.** The amount of cash distributed per participant is aligned with the MARNDR manual.<sup>86</sup>
81. The daily salary has remained the same since the beginning of the programme in coherence with the regular evolution of the food basket price, showing that it has remained below the initial price estimated in April 2014.<sup>86</sup> When looking at the amount of cash transferred to beneficiaries per year, it appears that the percentage achieved is equal to roughly half of the percentage of beneficiary numbers achieved. This is due

**Figure 18: CFA cash distributed vs. planned as compared with percentage of beneficiaries reached**



Source: SPR 2014, SPR 2015

<sup>84</sup> Haïtien Constitution haïtienne, articles 17.1 and 31.1.1

<sup>85</sup> The predictive assessment of 2014 agriculture harvest performance (October 2014) pointed out a deficit in cereal production of -41%; deficit in legumes production of -29%; deficit in tubers production of -51%, compared to previous year.

<sup>86</sup> MARNDR/CNSA. 2014. Food Basket and current conditions of Food Security. Bulletins 6 to 11.

to the decrease in the ratio of Haitian *gourdes* to US dollars, and for 2015, it is also a consequence of no longer selecting supervisors.

82. Sogexpress organized cash transfers in the presence of CPs and WFP. Delays of four to six weeks occurred, driving some lenders to take advantage of the situation and increase loan rates. Delays on site were also noted, with 20 percent of participants waiting four hours or more to receive their transfer.<sup>87</sup> Another issue was the high denomination of the 1000-*gourdes* banknotes transferred: participants encountered difficulty using these notes in the local market because merchants did not have sufficient change. The location of distribution sites was appropriate, with 69 percent of participants spending less than one hour to reach the site.<sup>87</sup> All participants were able to receive their transfer, according FGDs, discussions with WFP programme team and partners. Most participants (85 percent) were aware of the amount to be transferred.
83. The PDM on CFA<sup>87</sup> reports cash assistance is well adapted to community needs, with 75 percent of respondents preferring this modality, while 12.5 percent said they would prefer half food and half cash. KIIs and FGDs indicated that communities widely prefer to receive cash rather than food. However, in some extremely poor communes (e.g., Baie de Henne) where markets are poorly provisioned, receiving half of the transfer in food is requested and would be more appropriate. Cash transfers occurred in rural areas and the number of participants was still easily manageable under “immediate cash.”
84. **Assets: outputs, timeliness and quality.** Output indicators are presented in Annex 9. The indicators for 2014 (e.g., “kilometres of trail rehabilitated”) are different from those of 2015 (e.g., “hectares of land conserved”), so they cannot be compared. Local authorities selected sites, and based on interviews conducted during the mission, this has not created any tension in communities. Communities did not receive sufficient information regarding the advantages of managing watersheds to reduce risk of floods, refill aquifers, and rehabilitate soil. Because of this, some landowners refused to allow assets to be built on their land unless they were included as participants in the project.
85. Trees have been distributed to landowners of rehabilitated soil. According to partners, local leaders and focus groups, the majority of trees distributed have died, as they were not distributed during the appropriate season and were not planted in proximity to water points. In order to ensure trees receive the water and protection required, landowners interested in getting trees should pay a contribution. People adequately trained in proper techniques could produce trees locally.
86. The work period for each household was two months to allow for wider participation of vulnerable households in the community. However, FLAs were only for periods of 6 to 10 weeks, which is not sufficient to build, restore or maintain a watershed and set up a participative approach.<sup>88</sup> A strategic reflection regarding where to begin building assets for the whole watershed was requested for consideration, such as beginning building assets upstream. According to all interviews conducted, assets work has been well adapted to the physical condition of each participant; for example, women were asked to carry smaller stones while young men would carry big ones.
87. The quality of assets visited varies greatly across partners. Some local leaders have complained about partners’ absence and lack of technical support during construction,

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<sup>87</sup> WFP Haiti. 2015. M&E Department with support from Programme and sub-offices teams. Post-Distribution Monitoring on Cash for Assets on payment of July 2015 in the departments of Northeast and West. Period of investigation: 3 - 21 August 2015.

<sup>88</sup> ODRG from 16/11/15 to 31/12/15; DPC NE from 15/5/15 to 31/7/15; AJAD, SEJA, FOSAC from 8/6/15 to 15/8/15.

which negatively affected participants' mobilisation as well as the sustainability of the assets (see Annex 9 photos). Another point raised is the need to propose the construction of assets at an appropriate time for farmers according to the seasonal calendar, to ensure that construction does not compete with farming activities. Furthermore, more advance consultation with local communities is needed to allow for timely planning; projects were often done last minute, especially in 2014, as funds were expiring.


88. **Food Security Assessment (outputs 2.3 and 2.4).** WFP has continued supporting the CNSA under this PRRO through 1) organising trainings on IPC methodologies; 2) providing a national VAM officer based in the CNSA office; 3) conducting joint food security and nutrition monitoring; and 4) conducting joint national assessments. The IPC has been implemented since 2013 in Haiti and its quality has greatly improved. It has begun receiving recognition from national institutions as a key food security analysis tool, and WFP is said to have a strong role to play in advocating for IPC in order to ensure that CNSA will be able to support it in a sustainable way.
89. Several food security and nutrition monitoring and assessment studies have been jointly conducted: 1) one IPC in December 2014 (classification: acute food insecurity), of especially high quality<sup>83</sup> and one in 2015 (classification: chronic food insecurity) with its related CNSA/FEWS NET perspective report; 2) six studies regarding food baskets and current conditions of food security; 3) a rapid food security assessment in May 2015; and 4) an EFSA in April 2016.
90. One of the challenges for the coming years is to make the food security monitoring process by CNSA more efficient in terms of time and cost. To address this, the collection and transmission of data by departmental observatories is being considered. The integration of NGOs and local organisations would be an important additional component. Decentralized trainings need to take place; three trainings are already planned for 2016 in Northwest, Southeast and Artibonite. Coordination of partners during responses to emergencies is another challenge faced by CNSA.
91. **Resilience.** WFP has written several projects to obtain funds for resilience (e.g. one project with AAA on watershed management and sustainable wood production; another with the FAO and IFDA; and others), but without success so far. WFP also participated in the 'Resilience learning Initiative' launched by the German Government. WFP did not define in the beginning "an integrated cash and voucher intervention plan" for long-term assistance in relation to disaster risk reduction and resilience, as was suggested by the RB in April 2014.<sup>37</sup> This plan should have been based on an integrated and holistic approach, developed with strategic partners having strong capacities and community integration, with the support of an expert.
92. One constraint to the implementation of CFA through a resilience lens is related to the low budget allocation for this approach to the activity. In order for CFA to support building community resilience, a participatory approach should be adopted: communities need to be sensitized and trained, and local leaders should be fully engaged. These activities require a higher investment of time and resources. Even international NGOs stated an inability to apply this approach at current resource levels. Another constraint has been the high turnover of country directors (CDs), which did not allow for their taking the lead on strategic orientation at the governmental level.

## MAM treatment and stunting prevention

93. **Beneficiaries and beneficiary selection.** There are significant differences in actual beneficiary numbers reported in different sources within WFP, as shown in **Figure 19**.

94. Coding errors in COMPAS data entries have led to wrongful classification of beneficiary categories. The CO reviewed COMPAS data and provided the ET with revised figures, which still did not match those reported in SPRs. There are

**Figure 19 MAM treatment and stunting prevention: actual number of beneficiaries per year from different sources**




Source: SPR 2014, SPR 2015, COMPAS data

Note: MAM figures refer to children between the ages of 6 and 59 months, as the MAM treatment of 1,000 PLW was not implemented.

also differences between WFP and KL reports both in planned and actual beneficiary figures. The KL 2015 annual report quotes actual beneficiaries at 24,437 PLW (the KL target being set at 31,407, compared to 43,000 in the PRRO) and 37,016 for children 6-23 months (KL target of 40,152, compared to 54,500 in the PRRO).<sup>89</sup> This difference in target figures can be attributed to a lower geographic coverage than originally planned in the PRRO, which states that seven departments will be targeted (presumably the North, Northeast and West in addition to the four departments selected under KL).<sup>90</sup> No explanation could be found, however, for differences in actual numbers of beneficiaries. As presented in **Figure 20**, achievements are evidently low: the lower geographic coverage mentioned above partly explains the low proportion of actual beneficiaries vis-à-vis PRRO targets.

**Figure 20 MAM treatment and stunting prevention: beneficiary numbers and percentage of achievement per year**



Source: SPR 2014 and SPR 2015

<sup>89</sup> MAST, USAID, CARE, ACF, WFP, and WVI. 2015. Kore Lavi: Support to the National Food Security and Nutrition Program – Annual report October 2014 - September 2015.

<sup>90</sup> WFP CO Spreadsheet “Communes d’interventions”



95. As shown in Annex 9, between August 2014 and March 2016 there was a steady and significant increase in the number of beneficiary children under the 1000 days prevention component (from 8,084 to 23,527), a more modest increase in PLW (from 5,053 to 10,982), and a significant decrease in MAM children (from 2,559 in August 2014 to 245 in March 2016). The steady increase in beneficiaries under the prevention component is most likely the result of improvements and expansion of community-based screening. Indeed, reports and interviews pointed out to initial gaps in outreach: there was a slow start to the community-based screening in 2014, as it required the recruitment and training of Multi-skilled Community Health Agents (ASCP) in accordance with MSPP guidance, coupled with insufficient supervision of ASCP.
96. Based on interviews and consultation of various reports, other contributing factors embrace different areas of concern in terms of design and implementation:
  - a. Estimations of targets: the rationale for estimating planned beneficiary numbers, developed by the CO at the design stage with assistance from WFP HQ/RB, is straightforward and appropriate as it is based on population estimates at the commune level and takes coverage into account. However, coverage estimates (70 percent for PLW children between the ages of 6 and 23 months and 60 percent for MAM treatment) may have been set too high given the low utilization of prenatal care services and low coverage of growth monitoring (in 2013 prenatal care was reported to be around 50 percent; no MSPP data on growth monitoring or MAM treatment coverage exist, but SAM treatment coverage is estimated at 45 percent).<sup>91</sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.
  - b. Beneficiary registration database: this changed from an Excel document to an online system that is still not fully functional.
  - c. Reporting: there were delays in transmission of reports from partners to WFP and a low reporting completion rate.
  - d. Logistics: issues included delays in deliveries of commodities; long waiting times at crowded distribution sites, which are often unsuitable in terms of space and security considerations; and long lag times to add beneficiaries or drop them from distribution lists.
97. Information obtained through interviews and review of WFP and KL reports do not fully explain the reasons for the drastic reduction in MAM treatment from 89 percent to 7 percent in 2015. Arguments put forward include: total interruption of MAM treatment in the Centre Department, as health centre staff did not consider this activity to be part of the Package of Minimum Services (PMS) they are expected to deliver and subsequently demanded remuneration; irregular supplies of Plumpy'Sup; a lack of motivation among caretakers, who often have to walk long distances for a monthly ration they consider "too little" and who cannot afford to buy the prescribed medicines to treat concomitant health problems of malnourished children.<sup>92</sup>
98. All households in a selected commune that meet eligibility criteria – i.e., having a PLW or a child up to 23 months of age – are to be included in the 1000 days prevention activity. These criteria are clear and well understood by ASCPs and beneficiaries. The 2014 PDM showed that inadequate application of criteria was small: 4.5% of beneficiary children were either less than 6 months or over 23 months (this was not examined in the 2015 follow-up PDM). Health staff is not involved in the selection process, whose success is dependent on the functionality of the network

<sup>91</sup> MSPP. 2014. Rapport Statistique 2013.

<sup>92</sup> USAID. 2016. Kore Lavi: Support to the National Food Security and Nutrition Program. Mid-Term Evaluation Report.



of lead mothers and ASCPs. MAM children are either screened at the community level using mid-upper arm circumference (MUAC) and their status confirmed at the health facility level based on weight-for-height, or directly identified by health staff.<sup>93</sup> Established criteria have been respected, though community pressures to include ineligible children were reported by interviewed stakeholders.

99. **Size, composition and duration of the ration.** The initial composition of the ration<sup>94</sup> for MAM treatment was modified in the course of implementation: replacing CSB<sup>++</sup> by Plumpy'Sup, as recommended by WFP HQ and RB. Ration duration (three months) was respected, but interviewed health staff and ASCP reported frequent cases of re-admissions (these are not captured in the M&E system). A Food Basket Monitoring (FBM) survey conducted by the WFP CO M&E unit revealed that the MAM ration was globally respected, except for vegetable oil in the Centre Department (ration scale of stunting prevention of 1.35kg given instead of 0.92kg for MAM treatment).<sup>95</sup> Closer supervision and sensitization of CPs was recommended.
100. Baseline and follow-up PDMs have shown interesting results: a significantly higher number of households reported consuming the monthly ration in less than 10 days in 2015 (74 percent against 24.7 percent in 2014); drought may be an explanatory factor. Seventy-three percent of households reported sharing rations with other household members, against 51 percent in 2014. Nearly all households (98.7 percent) do not have a way to check quantities at the time of distributions (e.g., scales). Ninety-five percent of households do not know the procedure for filing complaints.<sup>96</sup>
101. **Timeliness.** Despite efforts of KL Consortium members to improve the planning of preventive rations distributions (timeliness in the establishment and sharing of the schedule) and their implementation (using trucks adapted to the topology of the area), problems persist. For instance whilst the proportion of households who waited less than 30 minutes for distribution increased to 31 percent, against 19 percent in 2014, the proportion of households who waited more than five hours rose to 25 percent against 10 percent in 2014.<sup>97</sup> Delays in truck arrivals to the sites were frequently mentioned during interviews and FGDs, and were witnessed by the ET during site visits.

### **Targeting system for a national social safety net**

102. As of the end of 2015, the MAST Information System (SIMAST) was operational and contained 150,000 vulnerable families. The algorithm of the Haitian Deprivation Index (HDI) was developed and integrated into SIMAST. WFP is working closely with MAST and building its capacity to foster its ownership of the system. The innovative capacity building scoring system developed in Haiti to assess progress in institutionalization showed that MAST scored 2.21 on a scale of 1 to 5 with a score of at least 4 required to reflect programme ownership (see Annex 9). However, positive achievements include: MAST staff (18) trained to manage the database, representing 120 percent of the target (15); implementation of vulnerability targeting methodology in 16 communes (100 percent of target); MAST led 61 activities (meetings, forums, recommendations given) to coordinate implementation of safety net and other social protection programmes (139 percent of target [44]); civil society organizations (21)

<sup>93</sup> KL Spreadsheet Indicator of Performance Tracking Table (IPTT) FY16-SO3\_ventilation par département and WFP CO Spreadsheet "NUT previsions\_2014.

<sup>94</sup> 200g of CSB<sup>++</sup> (or Super Cereal<sup>+</sup>) for MAM treatment of children and 100g for stunting prevention, and for PLW 200g CSB<sup>+</sup> (or Super Cereal) and 30g of vegetable oil for stunting prevention.

<sup>95</sup> WFP CO. 2014. Food Basket Monitoring Report

<sup>96</sup> See paragraph 103

<sup>97</sup> WFP Haiti. 2015. Enquête de suivi post-distribution-PDM/Suivi 1. Prévention de la Malnutrition (Nut/Prév): Zone opérationnelle de Kore Lavi© : départements du Nord-Ouest/Artibonite/Centre/Sud-Est. (période d'enquête : 12/10/2015 au 16/10/2015)

engaged in social audit processes (150 percent of target [14]); and MAST staff (15) trained to coordinate and monitor safety net and other social protection programmes (100 percent of target).<sup>98</sup> Nevertheless, the ET has some concerns about the capacity of MAST to take over the programme in the coming year, based on several factors. First, while MAST staff have been trained, it is difficult to retain these staff. Second, no transition plan has been developed to define MAST responsibility over the programme and ensure integration of temporary staff. Third, capacity-building activities are defined as a separate objective (instead of crosscutting). And fourth, capacity building remains insufficient vis-à-vis needs.

### **Crosscutting issues: protection and accountability**

103. Indicators on protection issues collected through PDMs show that reported cases of insecurity linked to WFP assistance were marginal (three percent of interviewed women in both 2014 and 2015). The proportion of beneficiaries informed about the programme (e.g., eligibility criteria) and about the mechanisms in place to voice complaints improved in 2015 but more needs to be done, as only one beneficiary out of four confirmed their acquaintance with the complaint mechanism. For the nutrition component, leaflets describing eligibility criteria and entitlements were produced in 2015 and widely distributed to enhance awareness. WFP established an anonymous complaint mechanism for the social protection database whereby community members can report abuse or erroneous targeting at any time. This mechanism is reported to have reduced inclusion (less than 8 percent) and exclusion errors (less than 16 percent).<sup>99</sup> For CFA, according to the CO, partners, and participants interviewed, complaint mechanisms have not been set up. No complaints were registered from the CO, partners, or beneficiaries regarding the delivery mechanisms selected. Moreover, no security issues were raised during KIIs and FGDs, and the PDM<sup>87</sup> noted that 100 percent of people interviewed said they did not face any security issues at the distribution site or on their way home.

#### **2.2.2 Achievement of outcomes and objectives**

104. This section discusses the extent to which the achievement of outputs and outcomes led to measurable changes and realisation of operation objectives.

#### **Prepare and Respond to Emergencies**

105. The average dietary diversity<sup>100</sup> was not measured during the PRRO. The overall Diet Diversity Score (DDS), which considers the number of different food groups eaten over the past seven days and gives an estimation of the quality of the household diet, remained similar from 5.15 at baseline (March 2014) to 5.10 at the most recent follow-up (July 2015), although changes were more pronounced for male-headed households (5.03 in 2014 vs. 5.15 in 2015) than for female-headed households (5.15 at both measurements) (Annex 9).
106. The 2014 national Disaster Preparedness Capacity Index exercise (DPCI), which related to both SOs 1 and 2, confirmed that CNSA and DPC were operational, even if national policies and procedures were not yet official, and highlighted the capacity of these agencies to coordinate actions with partners.<sup>83</sup> The floods in the North in November 2014 confirmed the capacity of the government to respond to disasters and coordinate actions with partners.

<sup>98</sup> CARE Haiti, 2015.- Kore Lavi FFP-A-13-00005; ARR Narrative 20151102

<sup>99</sup> WFP. 2015. *Standard Project Report 2015, Haiti: PRRO-Haiti-Strengthening Emergency Preparedness and Resilience in Haiti*. Single Country PRRO -200618.


<sup>100</sup> Average dietary diversity = percentage of targeted households consuming at least three food groups on average per day.

107. The EPCI was determined for the first time in December 2015, with WFP support. The score was 2 out of 4 (target = 3); it will serve as the baseline for the upcoming exercise for measuring improvements in the EPCI. The baseline result indicates that the government must still make improvements in order to efficiently prepare for and respond to crisis. In particular, the government needs to put in place protocols and policies, mobilize funds and reduce dependency on external sources, and enhance infrastructures such as shelters (e.g., by making renovations).<sup>101</sup>

### Recovery and Resilience

108. **Use of cash.** As reported in FGDs, cash earned from CFA is mainly used for education, clothes, food, debts, funerals and small livestock. Cash transfers have also stimulated local markets, to the great benefit of merchants and their families. However, participants stated that after an average of three months, all money earned from CFA had been spent, with very few sustainable incomes generated (except when participants bought livestock and subsequently bred the animals).
109. The household Food Consumption Score (FCS) baseline was defined only in 2014, but this did not interfere with measuring CFA results because the first cash transfer occurred at the beginning of 2015 (the first assets were built at the end of 2014). Data for this indicator are thus only available for 2015. **Figure 21** shows an increase in poor FCS (from 9 percent to 14 percent overall) and a decrease in acceptable FCS (from 72 percent to 66 percent overall), though female-headed households fared better than male-headed ones. It is worth noting that the PDM was conducted in the month following receipt of the first monthly cash, that the surveyed sample was small (280 households) and that the PDM did not include questions to probe these results. Hence, no explanation for these trends is provided in SPR 2015. The most likely explanation is that the cash received for one month of participation was not sufficient to counteract other household food consumption constraints in the context of a deteriorating food security situation subsequent to the drought.

**Figure 21: Household food consumption (percentage of households)**



Source: SPR 2015

110. In 2015, households had an average DDS of 4.86, much lower than the acceptable level of 6, with male-headed households scoring lower (4.6) than female-headed (5.2). The West district had a DDS of 4.4 while Northeast had a score of 5.1.<sup>87</sup>
111. **Reduction and mitigation of natural disasters.** Construction of assets visited by the ET is of variable quality. The main factors affecting quality were the CPs' technical capabilities and their capacity to mobilise communities and monitor assets built and

<sup>101</sup> WFP Haiti. 2015. Haiti PRRO 200618 SPR 2015.

works in progress. The need to integrate the community at the planning stage is perceived as essential: one very committed local leader strongly expressed his own and the whole community's frustration for not having been consulted. During FGDs in Caracole and Trou du Nord, the benefits of asset construction on reducing and mitigating floods were clearly felt, some interviewees stating that the aquifer has already risen in the Northwest (Môle St Nicolas), an area especially affected by droughts.

112. **Land use.** Stone and plant barriers have helped to reduce soil erosion and thus to preserve topsoil containing the most fertile elements and to improve access to land. Partnership with the FAO<sup>102</sup> or other partners involved with agricultural issues should be integrated from the start in order to ensure effective use of this land.
113. The Community Asset Score (CAS) indicator measures the improvement of community infrastructure. The baseline was measured in 2014 on a different population than the one targeted in 2015, so the data are not comparable. CAS was measured at 13 percent in 2015 (target: 80 percent). The CO is aware of the data usability problem and already took steps to improve this in 2016 by measuring baseline in 2015 using the targeted population for 2016.
114. **Capacity building.** Four trainings facilitated by the Global Support Unit and VAM officer posted at CNSA were organized to support IPC, mainly targeting CNSA and departmental observatories' employees. These trainings have been well appreciated. One negative aspect of these trainings was the extremely low participation of women (11 percent). Two national staff are now able to facilitate IPC training. Annex 9 presents information on training participation; it does not present the number of planned participants because these have not been defined.
115. CNSA's capacities have much improved over time, and WFP was recognised as playing a key role. CNSA is stronger on mobilisation and data collection, as proven during the last EFSA; however, potential improvements remain regarding capacity building on data analysis, interpretation and statistics. A VAM officer is seconded to CNSA. The ministry in which CNSA is housed has expressed its intention to retain this officer after programme phase-out if financial resources allow; this reflects WFP's positive contribution thus far in terms of capacity building, and bodes well for the future. All VAM support received from WFP was under the KL programme. WFP is recognised for its expertise regarding vulnerability and food security analyses, and Haiti has recurrent food insecurity emergencies. Thus it would be worthwhile for WFP to establish proper VAM expertise under the next programme.
116. The National Capacity Index for Food Security has not been measured.
117. **Indirect effects.** CFA has generated social cohesion among workers due to community mobilisation on common activities. It enabled people living in the same area (the area of the assets to be built) to meet and spend time together. Two months' time, however, seems to have been too short to develop strong and lasting relationships. Another positive effect is local market sellers have expanded their customer base, taking advantage of CFA by selling their products to CFA participants. These sellers are mainly women whose whole families have benefited from the increased business. None of the interviewees reported any negative impact of cash transfers on increasing local market prices, probably due to the relatively small scale of this intervention.

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<sup>102</sup> FAO was a CFA partner under the previous PRRO but not under this one.


118. Some people have duplicated the asset-building techniques on their own lands, improving upon techniques previously used. This practice seems to remain at a small scale among workers in the community. To increase the scope of adoption of these improved practices, more time on training and sensitisation, and engagement of community-based organizations, would be required.
119. While in some non-WFP projects there were instances of communities no longer dredging canals, expecting external support to do so, in a recent meeting held on aid in Haiti (reported by WFP CO) a large number of community leaders expressed their disagreement with this observation, arguing that community solidarity is very strong in Haiti and that communities do not wait for external assistance to address issues of major concern to them. There is also a risk that landowners will decide to take back their land after it is rehabilitated. Contracts should be agreed in advance to ensure that landowners will neither increase the rental rate nor decide to terminate their rental contract.

### MAM treatment and stunting prevention

120. Outcome indicators for MAM treatment are drawn from health centres' reports. **Figure 22** shows that in 2014 all results were achieved vis-à-vis set targets: 94 percent recovery rate (target >75 percent); default rate 3 percent (target <15 percent); death rate 0.2 percent (target <3 percent); non-response rate 2.7 percent (target <15 percent). Performance was poorer in 2015, particularly for recovery and non-response rates. It must be noted that the 2015 data refer to a much smaller number of beneficiaries (1,655 as compared 21,468 in 2014). Moreover, the representativeness of the data is questionable in view of low reporting completion, often mentioned during interviews. The lower recovery rate could also be partly attributed to shortages and pipeline breaks in Plumpy'Sup supplies and to ration sharing.

121. Some interviewees argued that LNS are presented and perceived as a "medicine" and hence more likely to be consumed by the intended beneficiary. However, the great majority of beneficiary women and caretakers reported that sharing among household members (whether LNS or blended foods) was such that the monthly ration was consumed in a few days (also reported in PDMs). The effect of this unintended practice is that the supplement is not used properly and therefore its full benefits do not reach the targeted recipients.

**Figure 22 MAM treatment performance**



Source: SPR 2013 and SPR 2014

122. For stunting prevention, PDM data on dietary consumption revealed that 78 percent of children 6-23 months do not have a minimum acceptable diet, compared with 85.6 percent in 2014. In terms of SBCC, 52 percent of households reported having participated in awareness sessions in 2015, against 86 percent in 2014. Programme coverage (proportion of eligible population who participate in programme) was to be calculated using national demographic statistics, which proved unreliable. It was hence

calculated on a pilot basis in the Southeast department. In 2015, MAM and stunting prevention coverage estimations indicate an improvement in coverage from 23 percent to 95 for stunting prevention and from 63 to 99 percent for MAM treatment. These results have to be interpreted with caution as they are based on data from a few health centres in one department. By way of comparison, the KL 2015 annual report states a low growth monitoring coverage figure of 14 percent (eligible children in a health centre catchment who are enrolled in growth monitoring). The CO did acknowledge the need to develop a methodology for calculating coverage indicators.

### 2.3. Factors Affecting the Results

123. This section addresses the third evaluation question, “Why and how has the operation produced the observed results?” While some of the factors affecting the results have previously been discussed by activity (Section 2.2), this section discusses the main structural or internal issues and external factors that affected the operation’s performance.

#### Internal Factors

124. **Resource mobilization.** Resource mobilization was hampered by the absence of a strategy and the high turnover of senior staff – three different heads of programme and long periods of interim CDs for over one year when there was no CD. The decision to undertake a joint RB/CO review to lay the grounds for the elaboration of a Resource Mobilization Strategy (RMS) thus met a crucial need. The review, which took place in March 2015, outlined concrete fundraising actions “taking into account the wider context of donor fatigue in Haiti and the CO’s limited capacity to undertake resource-intensive fundraising and donor communication activities”; enhancement of WFP CO communication and advocacy materials (such as Country Briefs); establishment of stronger partnerships with a variety of stakeholders; greater engagement of the CO at the policy level with the Government of Haiti; and building relationships with existing donors with a focus on results, transparency, accountability, and information sharing.<sup>103</sup> The CO took action in line with these recommendations: organizing donors’ visits to project sites, regularly sharing country briefs with donors, and recruiting in August 2015 a United Nations Volunteer to act as Communication/Donors Relations Officer. Interviews with donors confirmed more frequent interaction with the WFP CO, but indicated that information sharing regarding the PRRO’s progress was still insufficiently transparent regarding issues such as: use of contingency stocks in the absence of an emergency, whether activities such as CFA were meeting needs, and whether processes were established and applied to adjust the PRRO strategy in alignment with M&E findings.
125. **Governance structure: technical capacities within WFP CO vis-à-vis the focus areas of the operation.** The PRRO team includes a recently appointed a national Programme Policy EPR/DRR officer, one EPR Programme officer, one DRR officer Fellow, one national nutrition officer (as compared to two in 2013), and supporting staff.<sup>104</sup> Absence of expertise in resilience and lack of funding left the CO unable to implement CFA under SO3. There is no dedicated resilience/C&V specialist position, yet C&V is an important part of the PRRO. The Haitian context, which is marked by recurrent crises, necessitates VAM experts who can continuously assess and adapt to changing situations. However, the VAM unit was closed in 2013 due to budget limitations. There are currently two VAM officers under the KL Deputy Chief

<sup>103</sup> WFP RB/WFP CO Haiti. 2015. WFP Resource Mobilization Strategy 2015-2016.

<sup>104</sup> WFP Haiti. 2016. Haiti CO Organisational Chart.

of Party in the CO, but VAM expertise is also needed in non-KL areas given Haiti's continuing vulnerability and recurrent crises. Juggling competing priorities is among the key challenges for CO staff. For example, among other key responsibilities, the nutrition officer must oversee timely food distribution and participate in PRRO/Kore Lavi-specific meetings and workshops, as well as in more strategic meetings such as those with the Technical Nutrition Committee.<sup>105</sup>

126. **Governance structure: staffing levels and field presence.** In light of the CO's large budget deficit, an Operational Review (February 2015) and a staffing and structure review (March 2015) were undertaken with RB support.<sup>5</sup> This resulted in restructuring, as reflected in a new organisational chart.<sup>106</sup> Prior to the latter review, reductions in financial resources and volume of activities had already led to a significant decrease in total staff from 257 in 2013 to 205 in 2014.<sup>107</sup> The review led to a further decrease in total staff to 152 in 2016. This reduction was however coupled with positive actions such as the increased "nationalisation of the staffing structure for the sake of improved efficiency and programme continuity and sustainability," which was recommended by the Operation Review (the number of national officers indeed doubled from five in 2013 to 10 in 2016); and filling staff gaps in key CO focus areas such as the national Programme Policy EPR/DRR Officer, appointed in late 2015. Prior to that appointment, there was a focal point but no full-time staff exclusively devoted to EPR and in particular to recovery/GFD. Without the necessary human resources in place to balance the workload, it has been difficult to efficiently manage, implement, and monitor EPR operations, and CFA activities have been implemented as they were under the previous PRRO – without pursuing assets' longer-term impacts, stronger socio-economic considerations, strategic and technical partnerships.
127. The staffing review led also to drastic changes in sub-office presence and staffing: a reduction in staffing by more than half (from 78 in 2015 to 35 in 2016); and closure of sub-offices: Cap Haïtien (covering the North and Northeast) and Jacmel were reduced to antennas; the Cap Haïtien antenna went under the supervision of the sub-office in Gonaïves (covering Artibonite, North and Northeast), and the Jacmel antenna went under the supervision of the CO. The staffing and structure review rightly endeavoured to balance programmatic needs, risks and fund availability. Nevertheless the reorganization and reduction in field presence has had a negative impact on implementation, follow-up of CPs and communication: staff must keep up with monitoring and reporting obligations whilst taking on additional responsibilities such as increased involvement in day-to-day commodity management (in particular for the stunting prevention activity) or perform functions that were assigned to abolished positions (e.g., administration issues) without sufficient guidance, hence leaving little time for lesson learning and sharing. At sub-office and antenna level, staff, whose main role is to monitor and implement activities, acknowledged information sharing by the CO but felt they could be more involved in programme design and operational improvements. The ET findings confirm observations reported in the CO Operational Review on staff perceptions and on the need to improve regular communication within and between the different organisational entities.
128. **RB support.** Responses from the RB to ad hoc technical questions raised by CO staff were generally perceived as helpful and timely. As mentioned, the RB also provided support through various missions to Haiti such as to provide conceptual

<sup>105</sup> A coordination, information sharing, and contingency planning group chaired by MSPP and involving government representatives, donors and various key players.

<sup>106</sup> WFP Haiti. 2016. Organisational Chart.

<sup>107</sup> Data provided by WFP CO HR

and technical support on C&V (May 2014), the Operation Review in 2015, and joint missions with WFP HQ to review the overall strategic direction of WFP Haiti. RB staff also attempted to resolve disagreements regarding strategic and implementation issues, such as discussions with USAID regarding ration composition for the nutrition activities. Whilst none of the interviewees have questioned this support, the ET questions whether such key issues would have been better addressed by earlier action and follow-up by the CO under the leadership of a long-term CD and more leadership support from the RB, particularly during periods with no CD.

129. **Monitoring processes and systems.** The M&E unit has prepared guidance “tool kits” for each PRRO component, covering a wide range of topics: geographic and individual targeting based on eligibility criteria, description of activities, complaint mechanisms, and outcome monitoring mechanisms. These guidelines are clearly defined and the M&E team has made strong efforts to enhance the monitoring system. A specific guide was developed on the methodology related to CFA, including a detailed description of indicators for community assets score outcome indicators as well as targeting. Overall, this guidance has contributed to quality data-gathering; however, it comes very late in PRRO implementation and while useful for the end of the project and for its successor, it would have been more useful earlier.
130. No baseline survey was carried out prior to the launch of the PRRO. “Baseline PDMs” were conducted after the start of activities in lieu of a baseline survey. PDM surveys have been the main source of information on outcome indicators reported in SPRs<sup>108</sup> and on crosscutting issues.<sup>109</sup> They also include qualitative information on the utilisation of food assistance, level of satisfaction with the ration quantity and quality, socio-demographic data, and time traveling to or waiting at distributions. Since the start of the operation, the M&E team has conducted six PDMs and one FBM exercise to monitor the quantity and quality of commodities distributed. In order to monitor progress, the M&E unit plans conducting a first PDM to collect baseline data against which to measure progress through follow-up PDMs in the same area for the same activity. Because of budget constraints, only one PDM was conducted on CFA (concerning only two targeted departments), and only baseline PDMs were conducted for GFD and MAM treatment.
131. Programme staff monitor outputs while the M&E team monitors outcomes. The decision to have the M&E unit report directly to the Head of Programme, which was proposed by the operational review, was meant to enhance linkages between M&E and Programme. A tool called the Management Report was created in 2015 to enhance joint analysis. There was general agreement among CO staff that improvements were still needed and that joint analysis of output and outcome indicators is necessary in order to provide feedback into programme design and allow necessary adjustments.

## Partnerships

132. **EPR/DRR.** WFP developed partnerships with local organisations to develop and coordinate food assistance efficiently and sustainably. They were selected through a competitive open bidding process using well-defined criteria such as experience, community linkages, and human resource capacity. WFP has had agreements with local NGOs such as ASEBED, FONDEHF, ODRG and SIKSE since 2014 to support

<sup>108</sup> Dietary diversity score, percentage of children consuming a minimum acceptable diet, community asset score and food consumption score

<sup>109</sup> Gender, partnership and protection. The project document includes additional outcome indicators but these were not followed up: National Capacity Index, Coping Strategy Index, and percentage of beneficiaries consuming three meals a day.



achievement of WFP's EPR/GFD outcomes. KIIs with CO and NGO staff indicate a good and positive collaboration and mutual benefit for WFP and partners. However, there is still need to improve this collaboration: WFP can strengthen partners' capacity in two main areas: logistic management and an inclusive household targeting approach.

133. **Food Security / Resilience.** At the beginning of the PRRO, procedures to select, support, evaluate CPs were poorly followed by the CO. But since the end of 2014, the programme team, with the support of the M&E team, applied a more rigorous approach in evaluating each IP. FLAs for CFA have been signed with eight CPs: two sub-national government structures, five national NGOs and one international NGO. The main partnership issues are a lack of adequate planning (WFP searches for partners once money is available instead of forecasting partnerships); short-term contracts (two to three months, which does not allow time for sharing of information before implementation and proper consultation and sensitization at the community level); delays in payment (causing difficulties for local NGOs; WFP has begun to make some efforts in this area); and delays in providing documents to partners in a timely manner. The CO is aware of the need to build long-term and quality partnerships and has invited partners for a workshop in June 2016. Efforts should be made to select partners with strong community anchorage, develop strategic partnerships, and share lessons learned among them.
134. **Nutrition: NGOs as CPs.** Partnership arrangements have evolved. In 2014, FLAs were signed with national NGOs with a proven track record in nutrition and community linkages (such as ASEBED, FONDEFH and ODRG), and with whom WFP had already collaborated under the prior PRRO. These were selected through a competitive bidding process to undertake community mobilisation for the identification of beneficiaries, handle logistical aspects (such as receipt, storage, handling, and distribution of commodities to recipients), and monitor progress. These agreements were discontinued in 2015 due to the higher associated cost of pre-packaging beneficiary rations (a KL Consortium decision).<sup>110</sup> This is a drawback in terms of ownership and potential sustainability, in view of the strong ties that national NGOs usually have with the community.
135. **Nutrition: CARE/ACF/WFP Consortium.** The Kore Lavi setup poses a particular problem in terms of its clarity and consistency over time regarding allocation of responsibilities and lines of communication between the consortium partners' respective offices at central and decentralized levels. Apart from *ad hoc* exchanges and meetings, formal documented coordination and consultation meetings between Consortium partners were limited to two workshops in December 2015 and April 2016. In December 2015, the workshop aimed to review progress in implementation and make adjustments as required; review and standardize key implementation management and reporting tools; and establish a monitoring and supervision mechanism and appropriate tools. The second workshop tackled, albeit belatedly, key topics such as the need for a strategy to improve MAM management.
136. **Commodity management.** Various commodity management problems, documented in PDMs, CO field visits' reports and FAM's multi-project monitoring reports, have negatively affected efficiency in this area. The ET also observed some of these problems during visits to distribution sites for stunting prevention and verified them through interviews. These problems relate to the various stages of the workflow, from planning to implementation: (i) planning and follow-up of distributions (lengthy and cumbersome

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<sup>110</sup> According to CARE calculations, the cost of the monthly MAM ration is \$US14.57, of which 33 percent is operational cost.

system for establishing beneficiary lists; late sharing of pre- and post-distribution lists); (ii) transport (late arrival of trucks; trucks inappropriate for some distribution sites); (iii) food handling (mixing of commodities); and (iv) organization of distributions (inadequacy of space and security at some sites; need for improvements in relations between warehouse staff, food distribution agents, supervisors and recipients). Some of the required corrective measures are under the purview of WFP whilst others are the responsibility of ACF and CARE (e.g., redevelopment of sites, reactivation and creation of management committees, and using lists for previous months if the current list is not available on the 25th of the month).

137. The ET was unable to observe any GFD activities because there was no GFD during the mission period. Interviews with beneficiaries and CPs indicate major improvements in the distribution process, such as waiting time and information sharing with beneficiaries on the type and quantity of commodities before distribution day. Few problems were experienced and reported during the last GFD related to the drought at the end of 2015.
138. **Ability to adequately take into account gender issues.** There used to be one gender focal point in the CO; three additional ones have been designated in the past year. One gender focal point is based in the Gonaives sub-office and three are in the CO. The ET acknowledges the high percentage of women in leadership positions in the CO as a positive step toward gender equity in staffing.
139. As mentioned earlier, no operational guidance was developed for the PRRO to allow a comprehensive analysis of a gender accountability framework. Reviewing tools developed by the M&E unit, the ET notes CFA beneficiaries were to be selected based on socio-economic criteria as well as on secondary criteria such as female-headed households or single mothers. Indeed, according to FGDs the proportion of women workers was 50 percent or above, consistent with SPR figures of 51 percent for both 2014 and 2015, and female-headed households and single mothers were said to be well integrated. Moreover, the community asset score (CAS) was determined through focus groups comprising equal numbers of men and women.<sup>111</sup> The frameworks for evaluating partners and for partners' technical reporting, as well as the M&E monitoring guideline for CFA, all include adequate analyses of gender issues. However, as presented earlier in the report: i) women have not been selected as often as men for the position of team leader; ii) data have not been consistently disaggregated by sex; and iii) ICP training has mainly focused on men.
140. Gender equality and GBV are included in Kore Lavi training materials for community health agents and Lead Mothers and Fathers who are expected to deliver gender equality training and sensitization messages alongside their health, nutrition and breastfeeding messages.<sup>92</sup> Gradual changes in gender perceptions and practices (such as more involvement of men in child care) have been reported in FGDs. However, turnover of the Kore Lavi gender advisor position, turnover among MCFDF staff, and the absence of MCFDF representation on the Kore Lavi Steering Committee were reported to be constraints threatening the continuity of gender efforts.


### External Factors

141. **Donor support.** Funds received (voluntary donor contributions) were short of the estimated budget: as of 14 July 2016 50.1 percent of the estimated contribution of WFP had been received. As shown in **Figure 23**, the availability of funds improved in 2015. In 2016, some donors have chosen to divert their funding to the EMOP. Due to

<sup>111</sup> WFP, M&E Monitoring Guidelines for CFA. Haïti 2016.

lack of resources (and lack of internal and partners' expertise from the start), resilience activities were not undertaken. It was a sound choice in North, Northwest and Artibonite (see April 2014 IPC) but SO3 CFA could have been implemented in other regions with stronger internal expertise on resilience. Long time lags between some donors' expression of interest and official confirmation of funding strongly affected WFP's ability to plan and implement the activities on time.

**Figure 23: Funding trends**



Source: PRRO 200618 HAITI Budget 25 Oct 13 Rev 6 Nov Excel; Financial sections of SPR 2014 and SPR 2015

142. The RMS rightly re-affirmed the need for the CO to involve donors in the development of a Country Strategy for Haiti, to be based on an analysis of WFP's comparative advantages in different programmatic areas, partnership potentials, alignment with national strategies and donor support. This proposal meets interviewed donors' expectations for improved effectiveness, efficiency and accountability of WFP's operations in Haiti through more realistic sizing/ scale of WFP activities and budget forecasts.
143. **Political situation.** Haiti is marked by a long history of political instability, which has hampered WFP's ability to build long-term strategic relationships with the line ministries long before 2014. The CO faced difficulties in building stable and strategic relationships with line ministries as a result of frequent ministerial reshufflings between 2014 and early 2016.
144. **Food security and nutrition situation.** Throughout the life of the PRRO, Haiti suffered from drought compounded in 2015 by the El Niño phenomenon, leading to increased poverty and food insecurity. The drought has doubled the level of food insecurity: 1.5 million people were estimated to be severely food insecure in 2015. According to a joint UNICEF/MSPP assessment, acute malnutrition rates have increased above alert levels in several communes.<sup>112</sup>
145. **Government capacity and ownership: nutrition.** The national nutrition strategy does not include an explicit reference to the use of supplementary feeding for prevention of stunting, and does not specify how community involvement is to be strengthened. This lack of specific guidance should have led to consultation and strong involvement of the Nutrition Coordination Unit (UCPNANu) of the MSPP at

<sup>112</sup> <http://fr.wfp.org/nouvelles/nouvelles-release/haiti-le-nombre-de-personnes-souffrant-dinsecurite-alimentaire-severe-double-en-6-mois>

the design stage and thereafter on issues such as ration size, composition and duration of nutritional support for prevention purposes, and modalities to enhance community involvement, such as the “lead” mothers and care groups approach adopted by Kore Lavi. However, interviews unveiled very different viewpoints on the shortcomings of the consultative process itself and on UCPNANu/MSPP involvement and ownership. Some interviews pointed to weak national capacity in nutrition at central and departmental levels (e.g., departmental nutrition focal points holding different functions), while others identified insufficient will and determination of partners to initiate and pursue MSPP involvement. It is difficult for the ET to make a definitive judgment regarding responsibilities, but the fact remains that two years after the PRRO and Kore Lavi started, the MOU between MSSP and MAST, meant to clarify their respective roles and establish a coordination mechanism has not yet been signed.<sup>113</sup> Observations during field visits and interviews displayed a wide range of situations, from individual personalized counselling to caretakers of MAM children by health centre staff, to refusal of health centre staff to get involved in MAM treatment without a financial incentive.

146. **Government capacity and ownership: social protection/national system for vulnerability targeting.** The weak involvement of MAST at the design stage and lack of a strategy and roadmap, which was developed only in March 2015, have not been conducive to MAST ownership.<sup>114</sup> MAST did not appoint sufficient staff for the implementation and management of the database and information system, resulting in its weak integration into the structure and functioning of the ministry. The midterm evaluation of Kore Lavi pointed to the inadequacy of salaries as a primary difficulty in recruiting and retaining staff, the bulk of activities being undertaken by WFP staff.<sup>92</sup> Despite broad support within MAST at both the central and departmental levels, the absence of a social protection policy and strategy prioritising social protection in general, and more specifically the development of a national social safety net, have led to decision-makers’ limited involvement in steering the programme and motivating staff. MAST has made progress in its ability to supervise the programme, as evidenced by its active participation in field visits. However, there is a lack of joint planning of activities with MAST, and coordination duties are still assumed primarily by the Kore Lavi consortium staff.
147. **Government capacity and ownership: food security.** Unfortunately, there was no specific capacity building of governmental technical services on the quality and technical standards of assets to be built through CFA. Involvement of decentralized authorities in building assets was not as effective as expected, for example, with assets initially built in the lower catchment instead of the upper ones, and a lack of follow-up and support for the involvement of beneficiaries. However WFP strongly supports the CNSA through a WFP staff permanently based there, training sessions,<sup>115</sup> and joint assessments and monitoring on conducting IPCs, EFSA and evaluating agricultural campaigns. This has contributed to significant improvements in CNSA capacities.<sup>116</sup> WFP also provides support within GTSAN<sup>117</sup> and on defining the following National Plan for Food Security and Nutrition. These types of support have been indeed relevant but did not address gaps at the decentralized levels.

<sup>113</sup> The circulating draft was not available to the ET.

<sup>114</sup> MAST/USAID. 2015. Programme Kore Lavi. Base de Données et Système d’Information – Plan de Travail

<sup>115</sup> See details in annex 8

<sup>116</sup> See also Section 2.2.1, “Food Security Assessment.”

<sup>117</sup> GTSAN : Groupe de Travail Sécurité Alimentation et Nutritionnelle / working group on food security and nutrition

### 3 Conclusions and Recommendations

#### 3.1. Overall Assessment

##### Relevance, Coherence and Appropriateness

148. **Relevance to people's needs.** The PRRO relief component is relevant to the needs of people affected by the natural disasters that hit Haiti in 2014 and 2015. CFA for the rehabilitation of assets is very appropriate: mitigating flood risk and drought impact through restoring watershed assets is critical to build community resilience to those natural disasters, as well as to enabling conserving soil productivity. Geographic disparities in the nutritional situation did indeed warrant attention through support to MAM treatment and stunting prevention in departments where prevalence was a concern relative to the overall national situation. Transfer modalities – GFD, cash, supplementary feeding – were relevant to the respective needs of target groups under the different components. Capacity building through policy advice and technical support to counterpart national institutions has addressed identified capacity gaps.
149. **Alignment with policy and programme context.** There is overall a strong relevance with national, policies and strategies. Objectives, target groups and implementation modalities are globally coherent with WFP's respective policies and normative guidance.
150. **Overall relevance.** Overall the PRRO's conceptual framework, namely combining immediate response and recovery with longer-term interventions (resilience, stunting prevention and capacity building), are relevant given Haiti's chronic exposure to recurrent natural hazards and continuing food insecurity and closely associated malnutrition. However, the scope of activities and the initially proposed targets and geographic coverage lacked prioritization based among other things on lessons learned from the preceding PRRO (such as nutritional support to HIV and TB patients retained whilst its effectiveness under the preceding PRRO was not conclusive), and proved unrealistic with regard to capacities within the CO, government entities and CPs and to donors' interests (such as resilience).

##### Efficiency

151. **Efficiency of implementation.** The CO has initiated an important reorganisation for over a year to match costs with scarce financial resources, adjust the team to the project's specific needs and enhance internal communication. This very pertinent restructuring, which resulted in a necessary reduction in staff and field offices closure, nevertheless had a negative impact on implementation, supervision of CPs and communication.
152. **Targeting strategy.** Overall, the general principles of geographic targeting put forward in the project document were translated into adequate geographic targeting using a relevant combination of indicators for each component. WFP and government partners conducted timely assessments for the relief component, but household targeting was not as efficient. Whilst the choice of targeting households through WFP-assisted schools allowed a more rapid response, it led to the exclusion of equally eligible households. For the nutrition component, community-based screening of eligible children and PLW under the 1000 days prevention component required large investments under the KL project in recruiting, training and supervising ASCP by Consortium partners CARE and ACF.
153. **Resources and resource planning.** The PRRO has been underfunded. Resource mobilization was hampered by the absence of a strategy and the high turnover of

senior staff – three different heads of programme and long periods of interim CDs. There is a need for improved effectiveness, efficiency and accountability of WFP's operations in Haiti through more realistic needs assessments, an analysis of WFP's comparative advantages in different programmatic areas, partnership potentials, alignment with national strategies, donor support, and realistic budget forecasts.

### **Effectiveness**

154. Overall, achievements vis-à-vis targets have been very low: 15 percent of total planned beneficiaries were reached in 2014, and 38 percent in 2015. The percent of actual CFA beneficiaries is very low (2 percent in 2014 and 14 percent in 2015) due to lack of funding and unrealistic planning. Improvements and expansion of community-based screening has contributed to a steady increase in the number of beneficiary children under the 1000 days prevention component. In contrast, significant decrease in MAM children.

### **Impact**

155. WFP has been supporting nutrition interventions in Haiti for many years. The KL project was expected to offer an opportunity for WFP “to build a coherent evidence-based nutrition strategy supported by strong partnerships.”<sup>118</sup> However, the allocation of responsibilities amongst Consortium members, confining the role of WFP primarily to commodity management has not served that purpose, with a more likely negative effect on WFP's visibility and credibility amongst national and international stakeholders. The need for WFP to develop its strategy in the area of nutrition was already recommended in 2013 and continues to be relevant.
156. Providing cash through CFA activities allowed beneficiaries an increased access to food or any other priority needs they have. However, long-term impact requires implementing asset rehabilitation and building activities through a resilience approach using the WFP 3PA. Another support of WFP was in building capacities of national authorities, with a permanent staff being based at the CNSA, training sessions organized, and food security assessments systematically conducted jointly. This is part of a long process and has had positive effects. However, WFP has missed an opportunity to position itself on resilience issues. Few actors are involved in resilience but several donors are strongly interested.

### **Sustainability and connectedness**

157. Weak capacities and lack of adequate resources of line ministries (MAST, MSPP) prevent them from properly coordinating, overseeing and implementing their respective priority programmes. MSPP ownership of the PRRO nutrition activities has been weak due to inadequate consultation and involvement of its Nutrition Coordination Unit at the design stage coupled with insufficient financial resources and persistent weak human resources capacity in nutrition at central, departmental and health facilities levels. Sustainability of the 1000 days outcomes is highly dependent on outreach and SBCC, the two pillars of prevention, which are unlikely to be sustainable, as there is no guarantee that ASCPs currently under MSSP payroll with KL funding, will be integrated into the MSPP budget. Moreover, addressing the underlying causes of chronic malnutrition in Haiti requires combining nutrition-specific interventions with food security interventions such as agriculture and food systems aimed at improving incomes and dietary diversification of local production.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>118</sup> Prost M-A. 2013. *Positionnement Stratégique du PAM dans le secteur de la Nutrition en Haïti*. An Evaluation Report.

158. The absence of a national social safety net policy and the late elaboration of a roadmap for the establishment and maintenance of a MAST vulnerability information system, which was developed only in March 2015, have not been conducive to MAST ownership. WFP is working closely with MAST and building its capacity to foster its ownership of the system, but with no guarantee as to its sustainability in view of MAST's limited financial resources to retain trained staff.
159. WFP's support to CNSA has contributed to significant improvements in CNSA capacities in assessing and monitoring the food security situation. MARNDR has expressed its intention to retain the VAM officer seconded by WFP after the programme's phase-out if financial resources allow; this reflects WFP's positive contribution in terms of sustainable capacity building.
160. While CFA has contributed to resilience of target communities, it is unlikely that these communities are on a pathway to sustainable improvements due to the limited scale and scope of activities. It is important to situate CFA in a broader perspective by developing opportunities related to the transferred cash (e.g., supporting community savings and credit schemes); developing agricultural potential related to preserved soil (e.g., supporting agro-ecological techniques); and strengthening social aspects (e.g., sensitization on HIV issues, empowering women, and training on home-made fuel-efficient stoves). For the current PRRO, there is no further opportunity to develop resilience perspectives as CFA activities have been put on hold whilst the EMOP is in progress. A future programme requires the recruitment of expertise, building strategic partnerships, developing an operational plan, and capitalizing on lessons learned.

## **Gender**

161. The PRRO document recognizes that gender inequity and GBV need to be addressed at all levels, from national to household, but without explicit information on how gender equity and empowerment will be promoted. Success in gender mainstreaming has been uneven: the safety net targeting system does not include gender-specific variables. However, mainstreaming gender into food security and emergency assessments has significantly improved as evidenced by the EFSA conducted jointly by WFP/VAM and CNSA in 2015 with all food security indicators analysed with a gender perspective.

## **3.2. Recommendations**

162. Recommendations are grouped under operational recommendations aimed at feeding into decisions on programme implementation strategic ones meant to inform the design of the follow-up operation, and recommendations on key thematic areas and crosscutting issues that should be considered in the Country Strategic Plan.

### **Operational recommendations**

163. **R1. Strengthen operational capacity of WFP CO and sub-office/ antennas.** Appoint a CD as soon as possible. Enhance internal working modalities: clarify communication channels within CO and between CO and sub-office/antennas, organize regular coordination meetings and actively involve sub-offices in programme design and evaluations.<sup>119</sup> Clarify processes and staff responsibilities within the CO, namely the role of VAM in programming decisions, and respective roles of M&E programme staff in data collection, compilation, analysis and decision-making. Re-focus the role of sub-office and antenna staff on oversight/M&E versus commodity

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<sup>119</sup> As already recommended in the 2015 WFP Operational Review.

distribution under Kore Lavi by gradually engaging CPs in nutrition activities through a competitive call for NGO proposals.<sup>119</sup> Who: WFP HQ and CO. Timeframe: Q3 2016.

164. **R2. Consolidate achieved improvements in M&E for accountability, including accountability towards affected populations, but most importantly for programmatic purposes.** Build the capacity of WFP's M&E unit at central and decentralized levels, and government agencies, through training. Maintain continuous feedback loops between Programme and M&E units so that M&E is not limited to corporate reporting but used as a real-time feedback tool to track programme changes and inform operational decision-making. Review monitoring and reporting formats and revise as needed to ensure alignment with output and outcome indicators in the logframe and commensurate with the utility of the reports produced. Recruit an M&E officer to reinforce current efforts. Who: CO with RB/HQ technical support. Timeframe: Q4 2016 – Q1 2017.

### **Strategic recommendations**

165. **R3. Conduct a national strategic review as a basis for developing a Country Strategic Plan (CSP) that enhances focus, coherence, effectiveness and synergy to better support national efforts to address food insecurity and malnutrition in Haiti.** In developing the next operation, the following principles and processes should be applied in line with WFP's forthcoming Strategic Plan 2017-2021 and Policy on Country Strategic Plans:<sup>120 121 122</sup>
- a. Prioritization of departments/communes through trends analysis/Integrated context analysis (ICA): cross-analysis of data from different surveys to obtain a composite targeting indicator based on trends in food insecurity, exposure to recurrent natural hazards, malnutrition over the last five years and structural gender inequalities;<sup>123</sup>
  - b. Coherence with relevant national policies and strategies and complementarity with other United Nations agencies: high-level bilateral consultations with line ministries (ministers' level and heads of relevant departments) and heads of agencies and relevant technical staff followed by an inter-ministerial and interagency consultation workshop;
  - c. Sizing the operation based on an analysis of resourcing trends and human resource capacity within WFP Haiti: assessment of technical profiles required vis-à-vis focus areas of the interventions;
  - d. Long-term partnerships and synergies between WFP projects and with projects implemented by other (governmental, national, international) stakeholders (e.g., local purchasing by building partnerships with initiatives supporting Haitian agricultural and breeding production).

Who: Support requires RB and HQ technical backstopping and hiring of a consultant rotating between line ministries' premises (six months). Timeframe: Q4 2016 – Q1 2017.

### **Specific recommendations on key thematic areas and crosscutting issues that should be considered in the CSP**

166. **R4. Apply WFP's Three-Pronged Approach (3PA) to resilience.** Namely, adopt an analytical and consultative process at national, department and community

<sup>120</sup> WFP/Office of Evaluation. 2015. Operation Evaluation – Orientation Guide for Evaluation Companies: Key Facts about WFP and its Operations. See pages 25 to 27.

<sup>121</sup> WFP. 2016. WFP Strategic Plan (2011-2017). WFP/EB.A/2016/5-A. Executive Board Document. [SO1 End hunger by protecting access to food; SO2 Improve nutrition and SO3 Achieve food security]

<sup>122</sup> WFP. 2016. Policy on Country Strategic Plans. WFP/EB.A/2016/5-B\*. Executive Board Document.

<sup>123</sup> WFP. 2014. A WFP Approach to Operationalise Resilience



levels together with inter-sectoral partners to develop and design programme strategies that strengthen existing national plans and coordination structures.<sup>123</sup> Adopting this approach requires multi-year programming (including in the same localities); long-term partnership-building; integration of activities; community anchorage/engagement of communities and technical services; and asset quality and scale. It is recommended to start on a small scale (e.g., in one department), drawing on lessons learned under EMOP 200949, and taking advantage of the ongoing consultations to develop the next UNDAF for translating the global level FAO/IFAD/WFP agreement on the 3PA conceptual framework into a joint multi-year funded pilot project, taking stock of experiences in other WFP COs such as Sudan.<sup>124</sup>

<sup>125</sup> More specifically in the context of Haiti, attention should be given to the following:

- a. Strengthen technical capacities: (i) recruit a resilience expert in the CO to help define and set up this component and ensure a good overall understanding within the WFP team; (ii) build capacities of governmental technical services in the field of agriculture and environment related to CFA.
- b. Ensure that crosscutting elements of the 3PA framework namely gender and environmental issues, which are key concerns in Haiti, are implemented and closely monitored.
- c. Ensure that the following considerations are taken into account: (i) assets created to benefit the most vulnerable (land tenure issues); (ii) building on WFP's comparative advantage, complemented by those of partners'; (iii) base the choice of transfer modality on lessons learned from Kore Lavi SO2 component and EMOP CFA experiences and if cash is chosen, develop livelihoods diversification opportunities (e.g., income-generating activities, community savings and credit).
- d. Ensure availability of expertise and funds to conduct timely and representative PDM surveys.

Who: CO with RB and HQ technical backstopping support. Timeframe: Recruit a resilience expert before the end of the PRRO and define the whole process at the very start of the coming programme.

167. **R5. Support MAST in the finalization and official endorsement of a shock-responsive national social protection policy.** Continue support to targeting with possible support to pilot safety net interventions integrating a gender perspective intended to inform the forthcoming national policy/strategy. Sensitize the government on the necessity to widely promote and diffuse the new national social protection policy. Who: CO with RB technical support. Timeframe: Q2 2017.
168. **R6. Develop a WFP strategy in the area of nutrition in Haiti clearly identifying institutional anchorage and multi-sector responsibilities and coordination mechanisms.** More specifically:
  - a. Support nutrition-specific interventions, provided the following conditions are met: (i) coherence between WFP's nutrition programming guidance with those of the MSSP; (ii) geographical convergence of WFP's support to MAM treatment with support to the management of SAM (e.g., by UNICEF) to ensure the continuum of care; (iii) presence of qualified and dedicated MSPP

<sup>124</sup> IFAD/FAO/WFP. 2015. Strengthening resilience for food security and nutrition: A Conceptual Framework for Collaboration and Partnership among the Rome-based Agencies also submitted at the forty-second session of the Committee on World Food Security in July 2015 (<http://www.fao.org/3/a-m0280e.pdf>)

<sup>125</sup> FAO. 2016. Land and Water Days 2015 Synthesis Report (a joint FAO/IFAD/WFP three-days event held in Rome in November 2015, during which WFP Sudan presented its experience in applying the 3PA approach)

nutrition team (full-time nutrition focal point or part-time focal point with one assistant) at the department level and a network of ASCP on MSPP payroll; and (iv) presence of NGOs with experience and expertise in BCC and capacity building of MSSP.

- b. Combine nutrition-specific and nutrition-sensitive interventions in the same priority departments/communes, taking advantage of the UNDAF process and the presence of REACH facilitators to build partnerships and design a pilot community-based One-UN nutrition project bringing United Nations agencies expertise together to develop a multi-sectoral approach to address the root causes of malnutrition within a common geographic focus.


Who: CO with RB technical support. Timeframe: Q3 and Q4 of 2016 and Q1 of 2017.

169. **R7. Incorporate a gender-sensitive capacity development plan in each component/thematic area retained in the future operation, building on lessons learned from the Kore Lavi project.** More specifically, for each component/thematic area retained in the CSP:

- a. Conduct an assessment of government and local partners' capacity building needs at central and decentralized levels that are not addressed by other humanitarian and development partners, including an analysis of gender gaps.
- b. Jointly with relevant government counterparts, develop a strategic framework and roadmap that focuses on outcomes where WFP has a comparative advantage (such as at the level of policy/strategy, coordination and knowledge transfer in EPR, social safety nets and livelihoods/resilience; management, coordination and knowledge transfer in nutrition). The framework should be sustainable (national budget provisions to absorb positions supported by WFP or its partners) and promote gender equity and women's empowerment.

Who: CO with RB technical support. Timeframe: Q1 and Q2 2017.

## Annex 1: Terms of Reference

	<b>EVALUATION QUALITY ASSURANCE SYSTEM</b>  Office Of Evaluation <i>Measuring Results, Sharing Lessons</i>
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[FINAL, 9 FEB 2016]

### TERMS OF REFERENCE -OPERATION EVALUATION

#### HAITI PROTRACTED RELIEF AND RECOVERY OPERATION 200618 “STRENGTHENING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESILIENCE”

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## **1. Introduction**

1. These Terms of Reference (TOR) are for the evaluation of the Haiti protracted relief and recovery operation (PRRO 200618) “Strengthening Emergency Preparedness and Resilience”. This evaluation is commissioned by the WFP Office of Evaluation (OEV) and will last from March (start of the inception phase) to July 2016 (final evaluation report). In line with WFP’s outsourced approach for Operation Evaluations (OpEv), the evaluation will be managed and conducted by an external evaluation company amongst those having a long-term agreement with WFP for operations evaluations.
2. These TOR were prepared by the OEV focal point based on an initial document review and consultation with stakeholders and following a standard template. The purpose of the TOR is twofold: 1) to provide key information to the company selected for the evaluation and to guide the company’s evaluation manager and team throughout the evaluation process; and 2) to provide key information to stakeholders about the proposed evaluation.
3. The TOR will be finalised based on comments received on the draft version and on the agreement reached with the selected company. The evaluation shall be conducted in conformity with the TOR.

## **2. Reasons for the Evaluation**

### **3.3. 2.1. Rationale**

4. In the context of renewed corporate emphasis on providing evidence and accountability for results, WFP has committed to increase evaluation coverage of operations and mandated OEV to commission a series of Operation Evaluations in 2013 -2016.
5. Operations to be evaluated are selected based on utility and risk criteria.<sup>126</sup> From a shortlist of operations meeting these criteria prepared by OEV, the Regional Bureau (RB) has selected, in consultation with the Country Office (CO), the Haiti PRRO 200618 “Strengthening Emergency Preparedness and Resilience” for an independent evaluation. In particular, the evaluation has been timed to ensure that findings can feed into future decisions on programme implementation and design of the follow-up operation.

### **3.4. 2.2. Objectives**

6. This evaluation serves the dual and mutually reinforcing objectives of accountability and learning:
  - **Accountability** – The evaluation will assess and report on the performance and results of the operation. A management response to the evaluation recommendations will be prepared.

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<sup>126</sup> The utility criteria looked both at the timeliness of the evaluation given the operation’s cycle and the coverage of recent/planned evaluations. The risk criteria was based on a classification and risk ranking of WFP COs taking into consideration a wide range of risk factors, including operational and external factors as well as COs’ internal control self-assessments.

- **Learning** – The evaluation will determine the reasons why certain results occurred or not to draw lessons, derive good practices and pointers for learning. It will provide evidence-based findings to inform operational and strategic decision-making. Findings will be actively disseminated and lessons will be incorporated into relevant lesson sharing systems.

### 3.5. 2.3. Stakeholders and Users

7. **Stakeholders.** A number of stakeholders both inside and outside of WFP have interests in the results of the evaluation and many of these will be asked to play a role in the evaluation process. Table one below provides a preliminary stakeholders' analysis, which will be deepened by the evaluation team in the inception package in order to acknowledge the existence of various groups (women, men, boys and girls) that are affected by the evaluation in different ways and to determine their level of participation. During the field mission, the validation process of evaluation findings should include all groups.

**Table 1: Preliminary stakeholders' analysis**

Stakeholders	Interest in the evaluation
<b>INTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS</b>	
<b>Country Office (CO)</b>	Responsible for the country level planning and operations implementation, the CO is the primary stakeholder of this evaluation. It has a direct stake in the evaluation and an interest in learning from experience to inform decision-making. It is also called upon to account internally as well as to its beneficiaries, partners for the performance and results of its operation.
<b>Regional Bureau (RB) [based in Panama]</b>	Responsible for both oversight of COs and technical guidance and support, the RB management has an interest in an independent account of the operational performance as well as in learning from the evaluation findings to apply this learning to other country offices.
<b>Office of Evaluation (OEV)</b>	OEV is responsible for commissioning OpEvs over 2013-2016. As these evaluations follow a new outsourced approach, OEV has a stake in ensuring that this approach is effective in delivering quality, useful and credible evaluations.
<b>WFP Executive Board (EB)</b>	The WFP governing body has an interest in being informed about the effectiveness of WFP operations. This evaluation will not be presented to the EB but its findings will feed into an annual synthesis of all OpEvs, which will be presented to the EB at its November session.
<b>EXTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS</b>	
(See Table 2 for list of external stakeholders)	
<b>Beneficiaries</b>	As the ultimate recipients of food assistance, beneficiaries have a stake in WFP determining whether its assistance is appropriate and effective. As such, the level of participation in the evaluation of women, men, boys and girls from different groups will be determined and their respective perspectives will be sought.
<b>Government</b>	The Government has a direct interest in knowing whether WFP activities in the country are aligned with its priorities, harmonised with the action of other partners and meet the expected results. Issues related to capacity development, handover and sustainability will be of particular interest. The

	<p>following ministries are partners in the design and implementation of WFP activities: i) the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour (MAST) coordinates social assistance programmes; ii) the Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development (MARNDR), the Ministry of Environment and the Agriculture Departmental Directions (<i>Directions Départementales Agricoles</i> – DDAs) are involved in the selection of FFA projects; iii) the National Coordination for Food Security (CNSA) within the MARNDR is responsible for providing information on hunger, malnutrition and vulnerability to decision-makers; iv) the Ministry of Public Health and Population (MSPP) coordinates all nutrition interventions; v) the National System for Risk and Disaster Management (SNGRD) and its Civil Protection Directorate (DPC) under the Ministry of the Interior have developed a comprehensive contingency plan and simulation exercises; vi) and the Ministry of Women's Rights is responsible for promoting women's rights and ensuring that gender analysis is taken into account as a crosscutting theme by other government entities.</p>
<b>UN Country team</b>	<p>The UNCT's harmonized action should contribute to the realisation of the government developmental objectives. It has therefore an interest in ensuring that WFP operation is effective in contributing to the UN concerted efforts. Various agencies are also direct partners of WFP at policy and activity level.</p>
<b>NGOs</b>	<p>NGOs are WFP's partners for the implementation of some activities while at the same time having their own interventions. The results of the evaluation might affect future implementation modalities, strategic orientations and partnerships.</p>
<b>Civil society</b>	<p>Civil society groups work within the same context in which WFP operates and have an interest in areas related to WFP interventions (food security, nutrition, education, gender equity, etc.). Their experience and knowledge can inform the evaluation and they will be interested in the evaluation findings, especially those related to partnerships.</p>
<b>Donors</b>	<p>WFP operations are voluntarily funded by a number of donors. They have an interest in knowing whether their funds have been spent efficiently and if WFP's work has been effective and contributed to their own strategies and programmes.</p>
<b>Private sector</b>	<p>WFP works with logistics service providers for the transport of food commodities and with financial service providers for the implementation of cash-based programmes. The respective perspectives of these companies will be sought to assess the efficiency and sustainability of WFP's interventions. Future partnerships could be established with local companies producing specialized nutrition products.</p>

8. **Users.** The primary users of this evaluation will be:

- The CO and its partners in decision-making related notably to programme implementation and/or design, country strategy and partnerships.
- Given RB's core functions the RB is expected to use the evaluation findings to provide strategic guidance, programme support and oversight,
- OEV will use the evaluation findings to feed into an annual synthesis of all OpEvs and will reflect upon the evaluation process to refine its OpEv approach, as required.

### 3. Subject of the Evaluation

9. With a per capita gross domestic product (GDP) of US\$1,648 Haiti is the poorest country – and has the highest economic inequality – in the region. Seventy eight percent of the population lives on less than US\$2 a day and over 50 percent on less than US\$1 a day. Haiti ranks 163<sup>rd</sup> out of 188 countries in the 2015 United Nations human development index, with poor indicators for literacy, life expectancy, infant and maternal mortality, and gender equality. In rural areas, 88 percent of the population lives below the poverty line and basic social services are practically non-existent.
10. Political crises and recurring natural disasters have affected the economy for two decades. Haiti is the country most at risk from climate change, being subject to recurring natural hazards, including severe tropical storms from June through November. In recent months, a severe drought has caused this season’s agricultural production to be 50 percent below a normal year. This crop failure along with a steady rise in food prices will reduce vulnerable households’ access to food and cause food insecurity to rise. According to the projections of a recent report by the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET), in link with the continuing El Nino phenomenon, the number of Haitians facing food insecurity could reach 1,500,000 by March 2016.
11. Through its PRRO 200618, WFP aims to reach 2 million severely food-insecure people (770,000 beneficiaries planned annually) and support the Government to save lives, rebuild livelihoods and enhance resilience to shocks. Activities are concentrated in the most food-insecure and disaster-prone areas. In line with WFP Strategic Objectives 1, 2, 3 and 4, the operation’s objectives are to:
  - support Government interventions to save lives, meet food needs, and enhance food consumption and dietary diversity of the most vulnerable and food-insecure populations affected by natural disasters;
  - enhance Government emergency preparedness and response capacity;
  - encourage resilience-building to facilitate recovery from natural disasters and mitigate their impact;
  - treat acute malnutrition in children under 5 and pregnant and lactating women and support therapy adherence for people living with HIV and tuberculosis;
  - prevent chronic malnutrition and micro-nutrient deficiencies through a focus on the first 1,000 days; and
  - develop a targeting system for the national social safety net programme.
12. The country office also supports the Government’s National School Meals Programme, with the goal of facilitating a nationally-owned school feeding programme linked to local agricultural production by 2030. The development project DEV 200150 (2012-2017) targets 485,000 school children with daily school meals.
13. The project document including the project logframe, related amendments (Budget revisions) and the latest resource situation are available by clicking on the following [link](#).<sup>127</sup> The key characteristics of the operation are outlined in table two below:

**Table 2: Key characteristics of the operation**

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<sup>127</sup> From WFP.org – Countries – Haiti – Operations.

OPERATION			
Approval	The operation was approved by the Executive Board in February 2014.		
Amendments	There have been no amendments to the initial project document.		
Duration	Initial: 3 years (April 2014 – March 2017)	Revised: Unchanged	
Planned beneficiaries	Initial: 2,030,000	Revised: Unchanged	
Planned food requirements	Initial: In-kind food: 52,178 mt of food commodities Cash and vouchers: US\$29,873,848	Revised: In-kind food: Unchanged Cash and vouchers: Unchanged	
US\$ requirements	Initial: US\$118,561,950	Revised: Unchanged	
OBJECTIVES,OUTCOMES AND ACTIVITIES			
Contributes to MDG 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7, and UNDAF pillars 1, 2, 3 and 4.	Crosscutting Results		
	Gender	Gender equality and empowerment improved	
	Protection	WFP assistance delivered and utilised in safe, accountable and dignified conditions	
	Partnership	Food assistance interventions coordinated and partnerships developed	
	SO	Operation specific objectives and outcomes	Activities
	Strategic Objective 1	Outcome 1.1: Reduced or stabilized undernutrition among children under 5 and PLW	Treatment of moderate acute malnutrition (MAM) - Children 6-59 months and PLW
		Outcome 1.2: Stabilized or improved food consumption over assistance period for target households	Immediate response (provision of high-energy biscuits) followed by relief response (provision of a full ration – in-kind food)
		Outcome 1.3: National institutions, regional bodies, and the humanitarian community are enabled to prepare for, assess and respond to emergencies	Capacity development / technical assistance
	Strategic Objective 2	Outcome 2.1: Adequate food consumption reached or maintained by targeted households	Food Assistance for Assets (cash-based transfers)
		Outcome 2.2: Improved access to assets	




		and basic services including community and market infrastructure	
		Outcome 2.3: Capacity developed to address national food insecurity needs and respond to disaster and shocks	Capacity development
	Strategic Objective 3	Outcome 3.1: Improved access to livelihood assets has contributed to enhanced resilience and reduced risks from disaster and shocks faced by targeted food-insecure communities and households	Food Assistance for Assets (cash-based transfers)
		Outcome 3.2: Risk reduction capacity of people, communities and countries strengthened	Capacity development
	Strategic Objective 4	Outcome 4.1: Reduced undernutrition, including micronutrient deficiencies among children aged 6–59 months, PLW	Preventive supplementary feeding – Children 6-13 months and PLW Preventive family ration Social and behavioural change communications (SBCC) on good health, hygiene and nutrition practices
PARTNERS			
Government	Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour; Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development; Ministry of Public Health and Population; Ministry of Environment; Decentralized structures of the Government (such as DDAs).		
United Nations	FAO, IFAD, IOM, UNDP, UNFPA, UNHCR and UNICEF		
NGOs	<b>International NGOs: 6</b> (Action Contre la Faim, CARE International, Catholic Relief Services, Food for the Poor, Initiative Développement, Missionaries of Charities and <i>Welthungerhilfe</i> ). <b>National NGOs : 12</b> (including among others Action pour le Développement et la Sante du Nord Ouest, Agence de Secours et de Bienfaisance aux Enfants défavorisés, Bureau de Nutrition et de Développement, Centre d'Education Spéciale, Fondation pour la Santé et l'Avancement Communautaire (FOSAC) and Groupe de Recherche sur l'Action Sociale Locale (GRASOL). <b>Others :</b> Haitian Red Cross Society, Organisme de Développement du Nord (ODN - a governmental agency) and community-based organizations (Konbit Ayisyen Pou la Vi Miyo and Nou Pa Ka Ret Konsa)		
RESOURCES (INPUTS)			


**Contributions received  
(3 Jan 2016):  
US\$53,150,535**

**% against appeal:  
45%**

**Top 5 donors:**  
Private donors  
(USAID through  
CARE);  
Multilateral  
funds;  
Switzerland;  
Canada;  
Germany.



**% funded of total requirements**




**Top five donors**


\* Mainly consists of a USAID contribution to CARE for which WFP is a sub-contractor

## PLANNED OUTPUTS (at design)


### Planned % of beneficiaries by activity



### Planned % of women/girls versus men/boys by activity



**Planned % of food requirements by activity**



## 4. Evaluation Approach

### 3.6. 4.1. Scope

14. **Scope.** The evaluation will cover the Haiti PRRO 200618 including all activities and processes related to its formulation, implementation, resourcing, monitoring, evaluation and reporting relevant to answer the evaluation questions. The period covered by this evaluation captures the time from the development of the operation (July 2013-March 2014) and the period from the beginning of the operation until the start of the evaluation (April 2014 – March 2016).

### 3.7. 4.2. Evaluation Questions

15. The evaluation will address the following three questions:

**Question 1: How appropriate is the operation?** Areas for analysis will include the extent to which the objectives, targeting, choice of activities and of transfer modalities:

- Were appropriate at project design stage to the needs of the food insecure population including the distinct needs of women, men, boys and girls from different groups, as applicable, and remained so over time. In particular, have the vulnerability analysis studies conducted by the CO allowed an appropriate targeting at household level?

- Are coherent with relevant stated national policies, including sector and gender policies and strategies and seek complementarity with the interventions of relevant humanitarian and development partners. In this regards, the evaluation should consider changes in the political landscape leading to evolving government priorities since 2013 (when the operation was formulated) and assess the appropriateness of the PRRO strategy, activities and transfer modalities in this new context.
- Are coherent with WFP development project DEV 200150 “Support for the National School Meals Programme”, identifying complementary activities that would contribute to enhance synergies and further support government priority programmes (e.g. Purchase for Progress).
- Were coherent at project design stage with relevant WFP and UN-wide system strategies, policies and normative guidance (including gender<sup>128</sup>), and remained so over time. In particular, the team will analyse if and how gender empowerment and equality of women (GEEW) objectives and mainstreaming principles were included in the intervention design in line with the MDGs and other system-wide commitments enshrining gender rights.

**Question 2: What are the results of the operation?** While ensuring that differences in benefits between women, men, boys and girls from different groups are considered, the evaluation will analyse:

- The level of attainment of the planned outputs (including the number of beneficiaries served disaggregated by women, girls, men and boys);
- The extent to which the outputs led to the realisation of the operation objectives as well as to unintended effects highlighting, as applicable, differences for different groups, including women, girls, men and boys; how GEEW results have been achieved;
- How different activities of the operation dovetail and are synergetic with other WFP operations and with what other actors are doing to contribute to the overriding WFP objective in the country; and
- The efficiency of the operation and the likelihood that the benefits will continue after the end of the operation. In particular the evaluation should assess the cost-efficiency of the preventive nutrition interventions.

**Question 3: Why and how has the operation produced the observed results?** The evaluation should generate insights into the main internal and external factors that caused the observed changes and affected how results were achieved. The inquiry is likely to focus, amongst others, on:

- Internally (factors within WFP’s control): the processes, systems and tools in place to support the operation design, implementation, monitoring/evaluation and reporting; the governance structure and institutional arrangements (including issues related to

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<sup>128</sup> Relevant policies and normative guidance will relate to the following subjects: Gender, resilience building, nutrition, cash and vouchers, safety nets, WFP’s Role in Peacebuilding in Transition Settings, Humanitarian Protection, capacity development, targeting in emergencies, and disaster risk reduction and management. For gender, please see the Convention to Eliminate all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).

staffing, capacity and technical backstopping from RB/HQ); the partnership and coordination arrangements; etc.

- Externally (factors outside WFP's control): the external operating environment; the funding climate; external incentives and pressures; etc.

16. Throughout the evaluation and in making recommendations, the team should make forward considerations and identify best practices to inform the design of the next operation giving due consideration to the evolving context and political landscape.

### **3.8. 4.3 Evaluability Assessment**

17. Evaluability is the extent to which an activity or a programme can be evaluated in a reliable and credible fashion. The below provides a preliminary evaluability assessment, which will be deepened by the evaluation team in the inception package. The team will notably critically assess data availability and take evaluability limitations into consideration in its choice of evaluation methods. In doing so, the team will also critically review the evaluability of the gender aspects of the operation, identify related challenges and mitigation measures and determine whether additional indicators are required to include gender empowerment and gender equality dimensions.
18. In answering question one, the team will be able to rely on assessment reports, minutes from the project review committee, the project document and logframe, the evaluation of the DEV 200150<sup>129</sup> which looked at the synergies and complementarities between the previous PRRO and the school feeding DEV project. In addition, the team should refer to an evaluation of WFP's Portfolio in Haiti (2005-2010)<sup>130</sup>, as well as documents related to government and interventions from other actors. In addition, the team will review relevant WFP strategies, policies and normative guidance.
19. For question two the operation has been designed in line with the corporate strategic results framework (SRF) and selected outputs, outcomes and targets are recorded in the logframe. Monitoring reports as well as annual standard project reports (SPRs) detail achievement of outputs and outcomes thus making them evaluable against the stated objectives. The team will also be able to refer to the findings of an ongoing external evaluation on the USAID-funded activities (nutrition and capacity development), which is expected to be finalized early 2016.
20. However, answering question two is likely to pose some challenges owing in part to: i) the absence of baseline data for the activities, which will need to be reconstructed using findings from various assessment reports and ii) data gaps in relation to efficiency.
21. For question three, the team members will have access to some institutional planning documents and is likely to elicit further information from key informant interviews.

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<sup>129</sup> Evaluation d'Opération. Haïti DEV 200150 « Projet d'appui au programme national de cantines scolaires »

Rapport d'Évaluation Finale, December 2014. Available at the following link:

<http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/reports/wfp271239.pdf>

<sup>130</sup> Haiti: An Evaluation of WFP's Portfolio (2005-2010), November 2011, available at the following link:

<http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/reports/wfp241279.pdf>

### **3.9. 4.4. Methodology**

22. The methodology will be designed by the evaluation team during the inception phase. It should:

- Employ relevant internationally agreed evaluation criteria including those of relevance, coherence (internal and external), coverage, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability (or connectedness for emergency operations), giving special consideration to gender and equity issues.
- Use applicable standards (e.g. SPHERE standards; UNEG guidance on gender<sup>131</sup>);
- Demonstrate impartiality and lack of biases by relying on a cross-section of information sources (e.g. stakeholder groups, including beneficiaries, etc.) and using mixed methods (e.g. quantitative, qualitative, participatory) to ensure triangulation of information through a variety of means. Participatory methods will be emphasised with the main stakeholders, including the CO. The selection of field visit sites will also need to demonstrate impartiality.
- Be geared towards addressing the key evaluation questions taking into account the evaluability challenges, the budget and timing constraints;
- Be based on an analysis of the logic model of the operation and on a thorough stakeholders analysis;
- Ensure through the use of mixed methods and appropriate sampling that women, girls, men and boys from different stakeholders groups participate and that their different voices are heard and used;
- Be synthesised in an evaluation matrix, which should be used as the key organizing tool for the evaluation.

### **3.10. 4.5. Quality Assurance**

23. OEV's Evaluation Quality Assurance System (EQAS) defines the quality standards expected from this evaluation and sets out processes with in-built steps for quality assurance, templates for evaluation products and checklists for the review thereof. It is based on the UNEG norms and standards and good practice of the international evaluation community (DAC and ALNAP) and aims to ensure that the evaluation process and products conform to best practice and meet OEV's quality standards. EQAS does not interfere with the views and independence of the evaluation team.

24. At the start of the evaluation, OEV will orient the evaluation manager on EQAS and share related documents. EQAS should be systematically applied to this evaluation and the evaluation manager will be responsible to ensure that the evaluation progresses in line with its process steps and to conduct a rigorous quality control of the evaluation products ahead of their submission to WFP. OEV will also share an Orientation Guide on WFP and its operations, which provides an overview of the organization.

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<sup>131</sup> These are put into context of WFP evaluation in the OEV technical note on integrating gender in evaluation. Evaluation team will be expected to review this TN during the inception phase and ensure that gender is well mainstreamed in all phases and aspects of the evaluation.

## 5. Phases and deliverables

25. The evaluation will proceed through five phases. Annex two provides details of the activities and the related timeline of activities and deliverables.
26. **Preparation phase** (December 2015 – February 2016): The OEV focal point will conduct background research and consultation to frame the evaluation; prepare the TOR; select the evaluation team and contract the company for the management and conduct of the evaluation.
27. **Inception phase** (March 2016): This phase aims to prepare the evaluation team for the evaluation phase by ensuring that it has a good grasp of the expectations for the evaluation and a clear plan for conducting it. The inception phase will include a desk review of secondary data and initial interaction with the main stakeholders.

- **Deliverable: Inception Package.** The Inception Package details how the team intends to conduct the evaluation with an emphasis on methodological and planning aspects. The IP will be shared with CO, RB and OEV for comments before being approved by OEV. It will present an analysis of the context and of the operation, the evaluation methodology articulated around a deepened evaluability and stakeholders' analysis; an evaluation matrix; and the sampling technique and data collection tools. It will also present the division of tasks amongst team members as well as a detailed schedule for stakeholders' consultation. For more details, refer to the [content guide for the inception package](#).

28. **Evaluation phase** (April – May 2016): The fieldwork will span over three weeks and will include visits to project sites and primary and secondary data collection from local stakeholders. Two debriefing sessions will be held upon completion of the field work. The first one will involve the country office (relevant RB and HQ colleagues will be invited to participate through a teleconference) and the second one will be held with external stakeholders.

- **Deliverable: Exit debriefing presentation.** An exit debriefing presentation of preliminary findings and conclusions (powerpoint presentation) will be prepared to support the de-briefings.

29. **Reporting phase** (June-July 2016): The evaluation team will analyse the data collected during the desk review and the field work, conduct additional consultations with stakeholders, as required, and draft the evaluation report. It will be submitted to the evaluation manager for quality assurance. Stakeholders will be invited to provide comments, which will be recorded in a matrix by the evaluation manager and provided to the evaluation team for their consideration before report finalisation.

- **Deliverable: Evaluation report.** The evaluation report will present the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation in a concise report of 40 pages maximum. Findings should be evidence-based and relevant to the evaluation questions. Data will be disaggregated by sex and the evaluation findings and conclusions will highlight differences in performance and results of the operation for different beneficiary groups as appropriate. There should be a logical flow from findings to conclusions and from conclusions to recommendations.

Recommendations will be limited in number, actionable and targeted to the relevant users. These will form the basis of the WFP management response to the evaluation. For more details, refer to the [content guide for the evaluation report](#) and the [OpEv sample models for presenting results](#).

30. **Follow-up and dissemination phase:** OEV will share the final evaluation report with the CO and RB. The CO management will respond to the evaluation recommendations by providing actions that will be taken to address each recommendation and estimated timelines for taking those actions. The RB will coordinate WFP's management response to the evaluation, including following up with country offices on status of implementation of the actions. OEV will also subject the evaluation report to an external post-hoc quality review to report independently on the quality, credibility and utility of the evaluation in line with evaluation norms and standards. A feedback online survey on the evaluation will also be completed by all stakeholders. The final evaluation report will be published on the WFP public website, and findings incorporated into an annual synthesis report, which will be presented to WFP's Executive Board for consideration. This synthesis will identify key features of the evaluated operations and report on the gender sensitivity of the operations among other elements. Findings will be disseminated and lessons will be incorporated into other relevant lesson sharing systems.

**Notes on the deliverables:**

The inception package and evaluation reports shall be written in English and follow the EQAS templates.

The evaluation team is expected to produce written work that is of very high standard, evidence-based, and free of errors. The evaluation company is ultimately responsible for the timeliness and quality of the evaluation products. If the expected standards are not met, the evaluation company will, at its own expense, make the necessary amendments to bring the evaluation products to the required quality level.

The evaluation TOR, report and management response will be public and posted on the WFP External Website ([wfp.org/evaluation](http://wfp.org/evaluation)). The other evaluation products will be kept internal.

**Table 3: Key dates for field mission and deliverables**

Entity responsible	Phase	Activities	Key dates
EM/ET	Inception	Draft Inception Package	11 March 2016
EM/ET	Inception	Final Inception Package	29 March 2016
CO/ET	Evaluation	Evaluation field mission	19 April-10 May 2016
ET	Evaluation	Exit Debriefing Presentation	9 May 2016
EM/ET	Reporting	Draft Evaluation Report	13 June 2016



EM/ET	Reporting	Final Evaluation Report	12 July 2016
CO/RB	Follow-up	Management Response	12 August 2016

## 6. Organization of the Evaluation

### 6.1 Outsourced approach

31. Under the outsourced approach to OpEvs, the evaluation is commissioned by OEV but will be managed and conducted by an external evaluation company having a long-term agreement (LTA) with WFP for operations evaluation services.

32. The company will provide an evaluation manager (EM) and an independent evaluation team (ET) in line with the LTA. To ensure a rigorous review of evaluation deliverables, the evaluation manager should in no circumstances be part of the evaluation team.

33. The company, the EM and the ET members will not have been involved in the design, implementation or M&E of the operation nor have other conflicts of interest or bias on the subject. They will act impartially and respect the [code of conduct of the profession](#).

34. Given the evaluation learning objective, the evaluation manager and team will promote stakeholders' participation throughout the evaluation process. Yet, to safeguard the independence of the evaluation, WFP staff will not be part of the evaluation team or participate in meetings with external stakeholders if the evaluation team deems that their presence could bias the responses.

### 6.2 Evaluation Management

35. The evaluation will be managed by the company's EM for OpEvs (as per LTA). The EM will be responsible to manage within the given budget the evaluation process in line with EQAS and the expectations spelt out in these TOR and to deliver timely evaluation products meeting the OEV standards. In particular, the EM will:

- Mobilise and hire the evaluation team and provide administrative backstopping (contracts, visas, travel arrangements, consultants' payments, invoices to WFP, etc).
- Act as the main interlocutor between WFP stakeholders and the ET throughout the evaluation and generally facilitate communication and promote stakeholders' participation throughout the evaluation process.
- Support the evaluation team by orienting members on WFP, EQAS and the evaluation requirements; providing them with relevant documentation and generally advising on all aspects of the evaluation to ensure that the evaluation team is able to conduct its work.
- Ensure that the evaluation proceeds in line with EQAS, the norms and standards and code of conduct of the profession and that quality standards and deadlines are met.
- Ensure that a rigorous and objective quality check of all evaluation products is conducted ahead of submission to WFP. This quality check will be documented and an assessment of the extent to which quality standards are met will be provided to WFP.
- Provide feedback on the evaluation process as part of an evaluation feedback e-survey.

### 6.3 Evaluation Conduct

36. The ET will conduct the evaluation under the direction of the EM. The team will be hired by the company following agreement with OEV on its composition.

37. **Team composition.** The evaluation team is expected to include 3-4 members, including the team leader and 1-2 international and national evaluators. It should include women and men of mixed cultural backgrounds and Haitian nationals. At least one team member should have WFP experience.

38. **Team competencies.** The team will be multi-disciplinary and include members who together include an appropriate balance of expertise and practical knowledge in the following areas (listed in order of priority):

- Nutrition
- Disaster risk reduction (DDR), Climate Change Adaptation (CCA) and Resilience
- Emergency preparedness and response
- Cash-based transfers
- Capacity development
- Gender expertise / good knowledge of gender issues within the country/regional context as well as understanding of UN system-wide and WFP commitments on gender.

39. All team members should have strong analytical and communication skills; evaluation experience and familiarity with the country or chronic hunger fragile state prone to natural disasters contexts.

40. Oral and written language requirements include full proficiency in both English and French within the team. As specified in section 5, the Inception package and Evaluation report will need to be written in English.

41. The **Team Leader** will have good communication, management and leadership skills and demonstrated experience and good track record in leading similar evaluations. He/she should also have excellent English and French writing and presentation skills, technical expertise in one of the technical areas listed above as well as expertise in designing methodology and data collection tools.

42. Her/his primary responsibilities will be: i) defining the evaluation approach and methodology; ii) guiding and managing the team; iii) leading the evaluation mission and representing the evaluation team; iv) drafting and revising, as required, the inception package, exit debriefing presentation and evaluation report in line with EQAS; and v) provide feedback to OEV on the evaluation process as part of an evaluation feedback e-survey.

43. **The team members** will bring together a complementary combination of the technical expertise required and have a track record of written work on similar assignments.

44. Team members will: i) contribute to the methodology in their area of expertise based on a document review; ii) conduct field work; iii) participate in team meetings and meetings with stakeholders; iv) contribute to the drafting and revision of the evaluation products in their technical area(s); and v) provide feedback on the evaluation process as part of an evaluation feedback e-survey.

## 6.4 Security Considerations

45. As an 'independent supplier' of evaluation services to WFP, the evaluation company is responsible for ensuring the security of all persons contracted, including adequate arrangements for evacuation for medical or situational reasons. The consultants contracted by the evaluation company do not fall under the UN Department of Safety & Security (UNDSS) system for UN personnel.

46. However, to avoid any security incidents, the Evaluation Manager is requested to ensure that:

- Travelling team members complete the UN system's applicable Security in the Field courses in advance, print out their certificates and take them with them. (These take a couple of hours to complete.)
- The WFP CO registers the team members with the Security Officer on arrival in country and arranges a security briefing for them to gain an understanding of the security situation on the ground.
- The team members observe applicable UN security rules and regulations – e.g. curfews etc.

For more information, including the link to UNDSS website, see [EQAS for operations evaluations](#) page 34.

## 7. Roles and Responsibilities of WFP Stakeholders

47. **The Country Office.** The CO management will be responsible to:

- Assign a focal point for the evaluation. Wendy Bigham, Deputy Country Director and Cedric Charpentier, Head of Programme, will be the CO focal points for this evaluation.
- Comment on the TORs, inception package and the evaluation report
- Provide the evaluation manager and team with documentation and information necessary to the evaluation; facilitate the team's contacts with local stakeholders; set up meetings, field visits; provide logistic support during the fieldwork; and arrange for interpretation, if required.
- Organise security briefings for the evaluation team and provide any materials as required
- Participate in discussions with the evaluation team on the evaluation design and on the operation, its performance and results and in various teleconferences with the evaluation manager and team on the evaluation products.
- Organise and participate in two separate debriefings, one internal and one with external stakeholders.
- Prepare a management response to the evaluation recommendations.
- Provide feedback to OEV on the evaluation process as part of an evaluation feedback e-survey.

48. **The Regional Bureau.** The RB management will be responsible to:

- Assign a focal point for the evaluation. Jacqueline Flentge, Regional M&E Adviser, will be the RB focal point for this evaluation.
- Participate in discussions with the evaluation team on the evaluation design and on the operation, its performance and results. In particular, the RB should participate in the

evaluation debriefing and in various teleconferences with the evaluation manager and team, as required.

- Provide comments on the TORs, inception package and the evaluation report.
- Coordinate the management response to the evaluation and track the implementation of the recommendations.
- Provide feedback to OEV on the evaluation process as part of an evaluation feedback e-survey.

49. **Headquarters.** Some HQ divisions might, as relevant, be asked to discuss WFP strategies, policies or systems in their area of responsibility and to comment on the evaluation TOR and report.

50. **The Office of Evaluation.** OEV is responsible for commissioning the evaluation and Julie Thoulouzan, Evaluation Officer is the OEV focal point. OEV's responsibilities include to:

- Set up the evaluation including drafting the TOR in consultation with concerned stakeholders; select and contract the external evaluation company; and facilitate the initial communications between the WFP stakeholders and the external evaluation company.
- Enable the company to deliver a quality process and report by providing them with the EQAS documents including process guidance, content guides and templates as well as orient the evaluation manager on WFP policies, strategies, processes and systems as required.
- Comment on the draft inception package.
- Comment on the evaluation report and approve the final version.
- Submit the final evaluation report to an external post-hoc quality review process to independently report on the quality, credibility and utility of the evaluation and provide feedback to the evaluation company accordingly.
- Publish the final evaluation report on the WFP public website and incorporate findings into an annual synthesis report, which will be presented to WFP's Executive Board for consideration.
- Conduct an evaluation feedback e-survey to gather perceptions about the evaluation process and the quality of the report to be used to revise the approach, as required.

## **8. Communication and budget**

### **8.1. Communication**

51. Issues related to language of the evaluation are noted in sections 6.3 and 5, which also specifies which evaluation products will be made public and how and provides the schedule of debriefing with key stakeholders. Section 5, paragraph 30 describes how findings will be disseminated.

52. To enhance the learning from this evaluation, the evaluation manager and team will also emphasize transparent and open communication with WFP stakeholders. Regular teleconferences and one-on-one telephone conversations between the evaluation manager, team and country office focal point will assist in discussing any arising issues and ensuring a participatory process.

## **8.2. Budget**

53. **Funding source:** The evaluation will be funded in line with the WFP special funding mechanism for Operations Evaluations (Executive Director memo dated October 2012). The cost to be borne by the CO will be established by the WFP Budget & Programming Division (RMB).


54. **Budget:** The budget will be prepared by the company (using the rates established in the LTA and the corresponding template) and approved by OEV. For the purpose of this evaluation the company will:

- Use the management fee corresponding to a medium operation.
- Budget for internal flights between Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitien (estimated costs are US\$300 per flight per person).

Please send queries to Julie Thoulouzan, Evaluation Officer:

Email: [Julie.thoulouzan@wfp.org](mailto:Julie.thoulouzan@wfp.org)

## Annex 1: Map



## Annex 2: Evaluation timeline

[illegible]

## Acronyms

ALNAP	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action
BR	Budget Revision
CO	Country Office (WFP)
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
EB	(WFP's) Executive Board
EQAS	Evaluation Quality Assurance System
EM	Evaluation manager
ER	Evaluation Report
ET	Evaluation Team
GEEW	Gender empowerment and equality of women
HQ	Headquarters (WFP)
IP	Inception Package
LTA	Long-Term Agreement
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
Mt	Metric Ton
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OEV	Office of Evaluation (WFP)
OpEv	Operation Evaluation
RB	Regional Bureau (WFP)
TOR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNEG	United Nations Evaluation Group
WFP	World Food Programme



## Annex 2: Evaluation Matrix

No.	Evaluation Criteria and Sub-questions	Measure/Indicator	Main Sources of Information	Data Collection Methods	Data Analysis Methods	Evidence quality
<b>Key Question 1: How appropriate is the operation?</b>						
<b>1.1</b>	<b>Are the objectives, targeting, and choices of activities and transfer modalities appropriate to meet the needs of the food-insecure, malnourished and vulnerable (to disasters and economic shocks) population (women, men, boys and girls) in Haiti?</b>					
<b>1.1.1</b>	<b>Relevance</b>  Are the objectives appropriate?	Quality & adequacy of the food security (FS), nutrition & emergency needs assessments that informed the operation design & its objectives  Consistency between PRRO objectives & the findings & recommendations of these assessments	<u>Documents:</u>  PRRO project document/log frame PRRO activity guidelines Kore Lavi strategy documents FS, nutrition, emergency needs assessments, CO vulnerabilities analysis studies/ analysis reports available prior/during PRRO design & during its implementation, such as IPC, ESSAN, EFSA, <i>Evaluation prévisionnelle de la performance des récoltes des campagnes agricoles</i>  <u>Key informants:</u>  National: MARNDR, MAST, MSPP, MICT, MCFDF, etc. at central & departmental levels WFP: RB, WFP CO & sub-office UN: FAO, WHO, UNICEF, UNDP, UNEP Main donors: USAID, Canada, Switzerland Partner NGOs: CARE, ACF, Welthungerhilfe, FONDEFH,	Desk review Individual interviews FGDs with beneficiaries Internal & external debriefings	Content analysis  Thorough data analysis  Triangulation of the results from the mentioned sources	Average:  Operational maps for 2014 & 2015 not provided yet  MOUs with partners do not specify beneficiary selection process & criteria
<b>1.1.2</b>	<b>Relevance</b>  Does the targeting (geographic and individual) meet the needs? Any needs not addressed?	Consistency between PRRO targeting criteria with the findings & recommendations of relevant FS, nutrition & emergency needs assessments  Explicit consideration of the specific needs of women/girls/boys/men, disabled, old Extent of consultation with communities Existence and clarity of targeting criteria (department, village, programme site) and selection process  Transparency and dissemination of criteria and complaint mechanisms amongst Cooperating Partners (CPs) & beneficiary communities/targeted individuals  Existence of mechanisms for monitoring changes in the needs & adjustments in targeting				
<b>1.1.3</b>	<b>Internal coherence &amp; relevance</b>  Is the choice of activities appropriate?	Coherence between activities & outcomes  Consistency between selected activities with the findings & recommendations of relevant FS, nutrition & emergency needs assessments				

		<p>Extent of consultation with relevant national stakeholders (Q1.2.1) &amp; development &amp; humanitarian partners (Q1.4.2 &amp; Q1.4.3)</p> <p>Extent of consultation with communities (their priorities &amp; capacities)</p> <p>Existence and clarity of monitoring on context and changing needs evolution</p> <p>Extent of flexibility/adaptation vis-à-vis changing needs</p> <p>Extent to which the choice of activities was innovative (e.g., staff secondment in ministries &amp; capacity development work, environmental issues)</p> <p>Appropriateness of the food contingency stock to respond to emergency in the context of Haiti</p>	<p>CBOs</p> <p>Beneficiaries</p>			
<b>1.1.4</b>	<p><b>Relevance</b></p> <p>Are transfer modalities food vs. Cash &amp; Voucher (C&amp;V) appropriate?</p>	<p>Clarity &amp; quality of the decision-making process: Feasibility studies</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Relevant market analysis</li> <li>– Validation through participatory assessments</li> <li>– Consideration of the specific needs of women and protection issues</li> </ul> <p>Appropriateness of the transfer value vis-à-vis needs: food (composition &amp; nutritional value), cash (minimum wage)</p> <p>Appropriateness of the “distribution modality”: timing, location, travel time, safety</p> <p>Appropriateness of the transfer modalities (for CBT: cash versus voucher or food)</p> <p>Existence &amp; quality of markets &amp; food prices monitoring</p> <p>Existence of adjustments in terms of choice of transfer modality/transfer value in the light of changing needs &amp; context between 2012 &amp; 2015</p>	<p><u>Documents:</u></p> <p>PRRO project document</p> <p>Feasibility studies reports</p> <p>Food prices bulletins</p> <p>Haiti Omega Value</p> <p>PDM</p> <p><u>Key informants:</u></p> <p>National: MARNDR, MAST, MSPP, etc. at central &amp; departmental levels</p> <p>WFP RB, WFP CO &amp; sub-office</p> <p>UN: FAO, WHO, UNICEF</p> <p>Main donors</p> <p>Partner NGOs</p> <p>CBOs</p> <p>Beneficiaries</p>	<p>Desk review</p> <p>Individual interviews</p> <p>FGDs with beneficiaries</p> <p>Internal &amp; external debriefings</p>	<p>Content analysis</p> <p>Thorough data analysis</p> <p>Triangulation of the results from the mentioned sources</p>	<p>Average:</p> <p>Feasibility studies report not yet available</p>

1.2	Are the objectives, targeting and choice of activities and of transfer modalities coherent with relevant stated national policies, including sector and gender policies and strategies?					
1.2.1	<b>Coherence</b> Is the PRRO aligned with relevant national policies, strategies & normative guidance?	Clarity & quality of the consultation process with national stakeholders  Alignment with relevant national policies, strategies, programmes, & normative guidance in the areas of: agriculture, FS, nutrition, emergency preparedness & response (EPR), social protection and gender (Q1.2.2)  Decisions/actions taken by WFP CO in the absence of relevant national policy/guidance	<u>Documents:</u>  National policies, strategies, programmes, normative guidance <u>Key informants:</u>  Sector ministries: MARNDR/CNSA, MAST, MICT/DPC, MSPP/Nutrition	Desk review Individual interviews Internal & external debriefings	Content analysis  Triangulation of the results from the mentioned sources	High: (documents obtained by ET through web search)
1.2.2	<b>Coherence</b> Is the PRRO coherent with relevant national gender policies & strategies and with relevant gender-specific objectives of sector policies?	Existence of national gender policies/strategies  Existence of gender-specific objectives in relevant sector policies (FS, nutrition, etc.)  Coherence of PRRO with the national gender policy, and with the gender-specific objectives (if any) of relevant sector policies (FS, nutrition, etc.)	<u>Documents:</u> Gender policy 2014 – 2034, and other sector policies <u>Key informants:</u>  WFP CO  National: MARNR, MAST, MSSP & MCFDF			
1.3	Is the PRRO coherent with the ongoing WFP Haiti development project DEV 200150 “Support for the National School Meals Programme”, in particular Purchase for Progress (P4P)?					
	<b>Coherence</b>  Were complementarities between the PRRO & DEV 200150 sought at the design stage?	Geographic targeting  Activities: enhancing the local economy through P4P; inclusion of school feeding in WFP’s nutrition policy advice & technical assistance (TA)	<u>Documents:</u> WFP project documents  PRRO & DEV SPRs  <u>Key informants:</u> WFP CO	Desk review Individual interviews Internal & external debriefings	Content analysis  Triangulation of the results from the mentioned sources	Average: (PRRO project document not explicit)

1.4	Are the objectives, targeting, choice of activities and of transfer modalities coherent at project-design stage with relevant WFP and UN-wide system strategies, policies and normative guidance (including gender)					
1.4.1	<b>Coherence</b>  Is the PRRO coherent with relevant WFP strategies, policies & normative guidance?  How was the PRRO's design coherent with the WFP Gender Policy and other normative guidelines?	Alignment of with specific WFP sector policies & normative guidance relating to: capacity development, gender, resilience, safety nets, nutrition, HIV/AIDS, Disaster Risk Reduction & Management (DRR), GFD, CFA/FFA  Alignment of PPRO M&E indicators with WFP's corporate indicators	<u>Documents:</u> WFP policy, normative guidance, fact sheets on: capacity development, climate change, gender, resilience, safety nets, nutrition, HIV/AIDS, DRR, GFD, CFA/FFA, P4P  <u>Key informants:</u> WFP CO, RB	Desk review  Individual interviews  Internal & external debriefings	Content analysis  Triangulation of the results from the mentioned sources	High:  (Required documents available through OEV website)
1.4.2	<b>Coherence</b>  Is the PRRO coherent at project design stage with relevant UN-wide system strategies, policies & normative guidance (including gender)?	Alignment with UN agencies' strategies involved in Nutrition, Food Security & EPR in Haiti  Evidence of joint programming PRRO objectives, targeting, choice of activities & transfer modalities well known & endorsed by other UN agencies  Existence of any gap/overlap (e.g., between UNDP & WFP on DRR)	<u>Documents:</u>  PRRO project document,  <i>FAO Cadre de Programme Pays (CPP) 2013-2016; PNUD/Cadre stratégique Intégré des Nations Unies pour Haïti (CSI) 2013-2016; UNICEF Plan Stratégique de Nutrition 2014-2016</i>  <u>Key informants:</u>  WFP CO  FAO, UNICEF, UNDP			High:  (Required documents obtained by ET through website search)
1.4.3	<b>Coherence</b>  Is the PRRO coherent at project design stage with relevant humanitarian & development partners, policies & normative guidance (including gender)?	Extent to which PRRO strategy reflects explicit consideration of who else is responding & the extent of efforts to avoid duplication & fill gaps PRRO targeting defined through a participatory process with relevant stakeholders/partners/ beneficiaries to ensure ownership, as well as complementarity & synergies	<u>Documents</u> Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reports and bulletins  <u>Key informants:</u> WFP CO & sub-office National & international stakeholders			Will depend on quality of information obtained through interviews

<b>1.5</b>	<b>Was gender mainstreaming built into the design?</b>					
	<b>Relevance</b> Did assessments supported by WFP examine the differentiated needs of women and men? If specific needs were identified, did the PRRO respond to them and how? What gender-significant issues, if any, were not addressed by the operation's design? See questions under Q1.2.2 & Q1.4.1	Extent to which the analytical basis/needs assessments examined the differentiated needs of men & women Extent to which women's identified need led to explicit gender programming and budgeting <sup>132</sup> within the operation with clearly stated gender outcomes and indicators reflected in the operation document Extent to which the gender considerations stated in the gender policy for those activities are reflected	<u>Documents:</u> National policies, strategies, programmes, normative guidance <u>Key informants:</u> WFP CO & RB Sector ministries: MARNDR/CNSA, MAST, MICT/DPC, MSPP/Nutrition	Desk review Individual interviews Internal & external debriefings	Triangulation of the results from the mentioned sources	Good
<b>Key Question 2: What are the results of the operation?</b>						
<b>2.1</b>	<b>What is the level of attainment of the planned outputs?</b>					
<b>2.1.1</b>	<b>Effectiveness</b> Was the original geographic targeting respected? And did it change to adapt to the evolving context?	No. of departments & communes reached versus planned Number of institutional sites assisted (e.g. schools, health centres), as % of planned	<u>Documents:</u> WFP documents: SPR 2014 & 2015; output monitoring reports (Excel Sheets); Post Distribution Monitoring (PDM) reports;	Desk review Individual interviews FGDs with beneficiaries Direct observation Internal & external debriefings	Content analysis Thorough data analysis	Average: (Information on CFA in 2014 not yet complete;
<b>2.1.2</b>	<b>Effectiveness</b> What is the level of attainment of planned outputs (as defined in the PRRO log frame)?	<b>Implementation fidelity</b> No. (women, men, boys, girls) and % of planned, disaggregated, as relevant, by: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Beneficiary category (e.g. children, PLW),</li> <li>Activity (GFD, asset creation, nutrition treatment &amp; prevention), and</li> <li>Form of support: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Food (SO1, SO4)</li> <li>Cash (SO2, SO3)</li> <li>Nutrition messaging/counselling</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	Multi-activity monitoring reports CPs' reports <u>Key informants:</u> WFP CO & sub-office CPs	Internal & external debriefings	Triangulation of the results from the mentioned sources	CPs' reports not yet available)

<sup>132</sup> Explicitly stated strategies and activities related to gender, and where applicable stated resources for carrying out those activities;

		(SO1, SO4) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>TA for capacity building (SO1, SO2, SO3, SO4)</li> </ul> Quantity of food assistance distributed, disaggregated by activity as % of planned (SO1, SO4) Total amount of cash transferred to targeted beneficiaries, disaggregated by sex & beneficiary category, as % of planned (SO2 & SO3) No. of assets built restored or maintained by targeted households & communities, by type & unit of measure (SO2 & SO3) No. of technical assistance (TA) activities provided by WFP and number of ensuing results (e.g., number of reports)	CBOs  Beneficiaries			
<b>2.2</b>	<b>To what extent have outputs led to the realisation of the operation objectives as well as to unintended effects, highlighting how Gender Empowerment and Equality of Women (GEEW) results have been achieved?</b>					
2.1.1	<b>Effectiveness</b>  To what extent have outputs led to the realisation of outcomes?	<b>Targeted individuals/HHs</b> % of male and female-headed HH with adequate diet diversity score (DDS) and food consumption score (FCS) vis-à-vis set targets (SO1, SO2, SO3) Increase in Community Asset Score (CAS) over baseline (SO2, SO3) Reduced or stabilised (Food) Coping Strategy Index (CSI) (SO3) MAM treatment performance indicators (recovery, non-response, default, mortality rates) vs. set targets (SO1, SO4) Coverage of nutrition activities (SO4) <b>Capacity building</b> Progress towards set targets in: Emergency Preparedness and Response Capacity Index (EPCI) (SO1), Food security programmes National Capacity Index (NCI) (SO2, SO3), Nutrition NCI (SO4)	<u>Documents:</u> WFP documents:  SPR 2014 & 2015; Outcome monitoring reports (Excel Sheets); Post Distribution Monitoring (PDM) reports;  CPs' reports <u>Key informants:</u> WFP CO & sub-office  CPs  CBOs  Beneficiaries	Desk review Individual interviews FGDs with beneficiaries Internal & external debriefings	Content analysis  Thorough data analysis  Triangulation of the results from the mentioned sources	Average:  (some indicators not reported in SPR 2014)

2.1.2	<b>Effectiveness</b>  To what extent have GEEW results been achieved?	Evidence against what was intended as per analysis of Question 1.5 Any unintended positive or negative effect of PRRO activities on women				
2.1.4	<b>Effectiveness</b>  Were there any positive or negative unintended effects?	Politicization or misuses of CFA Effects on the environment Protection Gender				
<b>2.3</b>	<b>How do different activities of the operation dovetail and are they synergetic with other WFP operations; with what other actors is WFP working to contribute to the overriding WFP objective in the country?</b>					
2.3.1	<b>Effectiveness (Synergy)</b>  Were complementarities between the PRRO, DEV 200150 (ongoing since 15 September 2011) and the EMOP (being currently designed) established?	The extent to which WFP is successful in coordinating efforts to enhance complementarity and reduce overlap Evidence that complementarity considerations (Q1.3) have been implemented	Documents: WFP documents: PRRO, SPR 2014 & 2015; outcome monitoring reports CPs' reports Minutes of project PMT	Desk review Individual interviews FGDs with beneficiaries Internal & external debriefings	Content analysis  Thorough data analysis	Poor: (no information in SPRs)
2.3.2	<b>Effectiveness (Complementarity)</b>  How have different activities complemented/are synergetic with what other actors are doing to contribute to the overriding WFP objective in the country?  What is the gap between resources/expertise mobilized and resources/expertise required?  What is the performance of the Haiti PRRO?  What is the quality of the implementation partnership: - Appropriateness of criteria and processes to select partner/adherence to these criteria - Quality of support to	Extent to which WFP is successful in the partnerships and implementation arrangement including # of MOU, # of joint meetings and assessments and type of programme change to improve coordination Evidence of joint implementation (Q1.4.2) Types of inputs such as TA, Non-Food Items (NFIs) provided by partners WFP staff, partners, donors and GoH perceptions Procedures in place for administration, HR, finance Engagement with donors Support programme : training for WFP partners and GoH	Training programme for partners (type of training, frequency and # of trainees)  Key Informants: WFP CO & sub-office  UN Country team  Humanitarian cluster members  CPs  Government of Haiti  CBOs  Beneficiaries		Triangulation of the results from the mentioned sources	

	partners - Level of engagement, communication with, and decision-making by partners					
<b>2.4</b>	<b>How efficient is the operation?<sup>133</sup></b>					
2.4.1	<b>Efficiency</b> Extent to which resources (human, physical, financial, organizational & functional) were optimally used in project implementation?	Planned resources vs. resources actually used Extent to which resource forecast was accurate	<u>Documents:</u> WFP documents:  SPR 2014 & 2015; output monitoring reports (Excel Sheets); Post Distribution Monitoring (PDM) reports;  Multi-activity monitoring reports  CPs' reports <u>Key informants:</u> WFP CO & sub-office  CPs  Government of Haiti  CBOs  Beneficiaries	Desk review Individual interviews FGDs with beneficiaries Internal & external debriefings	Content analysis  Thorough data analysis  Triangulation of the results from the mentioned sources	Good
2.4.2	<b>Efficiency</b> Extent to which the operation has been implemented efficiently?	Management of distribution cycles & efforts to contain distribution costs (for all activities) Timeliness of food/cash distributions: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Average time between planning &amp; actual distribution</li> <li>– Adaptation to seasonal calendar</li> </ul> Alpha value compared to chosen modalities (comparing costs of cash transfers versus in-kind distributions) Existence of evidence showing resources were optimized to achieve best results Efforts to contain distribution costs (for all activities) Evolution of the breakdown of Direct Support Cost budget line (in particular staff budget line) Analysis of associated costs given to cooperating partners versus quality of services provided				
2.4.3	<b>Sustainability</b> What is the likelihood that the benefits will continue after the end of the operation?	Policy frameworks: existence of provisions (Q 1.2.2 & 1.2.2) Institutional: extent to which there are structures/systems in place				

<sup>133</sup> Sub-questions as per WFP's template for presentation of results



	What main factors affected sustainability of the results?	Resources: Budgetary processes/provisions Technical capacity: in the specific areas The extent to which activities under the PRRO increase capacity of key partners Partner perceptions of capacity to continue activities after the end of the project Number of existing strategies, trainings and related communication on sustainability with beneficiaries				
<b>Key Question 3: Why and how has the operation produced the observed results?</b>						
<b>3.1</b>	<b>Internal factors (within WFP's control)</b>					
3.1.1	<b>Internal factors</b> <b>(Systems &amp; processes)</b> Are processes, systems & tools in place to support the operation design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation & reporting?	Capacity for FS/needs assessment <sup>134</sup> Technical capacities within WFP CO vis-à-vis the focus areas of the operation) <sup>135</sup> Resource mobilisation strategy/capacity Monitoring processes & systems <i>(For the above, evidence of what is required versus what is available)</i> Quality of staff Effectiveness of communication between CO and field	<u>Documents:</u> WFP documents: WFP guidance & WFP Haiti tools SPR 2014 & 2015; output monitoring reports; Multi-activity monitoring reports CPs' reports	Desk review Individual interviews Internal & external debriefings Direct observation	Triangulation of the results from the mentioned sources	
3.1.2	<b>Internal factors</b> <b>(Capacity &amp; technical support)</b> Are the governance structure & institutional arrangements (including issues related to staffing, capacity & technical backstopping from RB/HQ) sufficient?	CO structure, field presence, staffing levels (evidence of required versus available) based on the operational requirements <sup>136</sup> Evidence of technical support needs & extent these were met from RB/HQ ( <i>perceived as well as actual needs</i> )	<u>Key informants:</u> WFP CO & sub-office WFP RB CPs Government of Haiti CBOs			

<sup>134</sup> Does current staffing set-up allow for required food security analysis work? If not, what strategies could be employed to address this shortcoming?

<sup>135</sup> Livelihoods, nutrition

<sup>136</sup> Checking whether the structure matches the strategy

			Beneficiaries			
3.1.3	<b>Internal factors</b> <b>(Partnerships)</b> Were partnership and coordination arrangements adequate?	Clarity & transparency of procedures for identification of CPs Selection based on competitive analysis (where relevant, such as with SOGEXPRESS) Existence of a system to evaluate CPs' performance in terms of: their management of food/cash/NFIs, monitoring of activities & reporting (quality and timeliness), promotion of protection & gender equity, and financial management (conformity with WFP procedures and timeliness) Analysis of associated costs given to cooperating partners versus quality of services provided Evolution of partnership arrangements over the operation life time	<u>Documents:</u> WFP documents: SPR 2014 & 2015; output monitoring reports; Multi-activity monitoring reports CPs' reports  <u>Key informants:</u> WFP CO & sub-office CPs Government of Haiti CBOs Beneficiaries	Desk review  Individual interviews with male and female WFP staff and beneficiaries Internal & external debriefings Direct observation	Gender analysis  Content analysis  Triangulation of the results from the mentioned sources	
3.1.4	<b>Internal factors</b> <b>(Gender mainstreaming)</b> How has the PRRO assured that gender balance is incorporated into the operation?  Internal factors helped or hindered the achievement of gender-related results?	Gender balance in WFP and CP staffing Presence or not of gender accountability framework Extent of technical expertise on gender within WFP country office staff Level of familiarity with WFP Gender Policy & any normative guidance				
3.1.5	What main internal factors affect sustainability of the results?	Policy frameworks: existence of provisions Resources: Budgetary processes/provisions Technical capacity: in the specific areas				
<b>3.2</b>	<b>External factors (outside WFP's control)</b>					
3.2.1	Effective (or lack therefore) of the partnership & coordination arrangement	Adequate partnership arrangements as envisaged in the operation strategy (operational & strategic) Procedures for identification of partners Evolution of partnership arrangements over the life of the operation Proportion of complementary arrangement	<u>Documents:</u> WFP documents: Budget docs	Desk review  Individual interviews Internal &	Budget analysis  Content	OK

		between WFP & partners (including NGOs, civil society, private sector organizations, international financial institutions & regional development banks)	Finance report  <u>Key informants:</u> WFP CO & sub-office  Donors	External debriefings	analysis  Triangulation of the results from the mentioned sources  Process and intuitional analysis	
3.2.2	External operating environment effects the operation, & how effectively has WFP responded to this?  How have challenges such as transport logistics, road and communication infrastructure, political crises and insecurity been managed so as to mitigate negative impacts?  What are the reasons that the EPR, DRR and resilience were not well funded/ implemented	Evidence in changes in external factors (those relevant to the operation) & WFP's response  Capacity to monitor external factors & respond  The extent to which market trends affected the deliverables				
3.2.3	Funding climate over the lifetime of the operation, including donor perceptions, & how effectively has WFP responded to this?	Funding levels (% funded for the elapsed time period) for PRRO as a whole and per component  Changes in donors & their focus (new?)  Timely adjustment of operation to changing contexts for PRRO as a whole and for each component				
3.2.3	Were there any external incentives and/or pressures?	Type of external incentive or pressure if any and their effects	<u>Key informants:</u> WFP CO & sub-office  Donors  Partners  GoH			
3.2.4	External factors helped or hindered the achievement of gender-related results?	The strength or weakness of government policies & frameworks on gender?  Extent of dialogue/engagement with other relevant actors working on gender in the country?	<u>Documents:</u> WFP documents:  SPR 2014 & 2015; output monitoring reports;			
3.2.5	What main external factors affect sustainability of the results?	Institutional: extent to which there are structures/systems	Partner reports			

		Policy frameworks: existence of provisions Resources: Budgetary processes/provisions Technical capacity: in the specific areas	<u>Key informants:</u> WFP CO & sub-office  Donors  Partners  GoH			
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**Annex 3: List of people interviewed and participants in internal and external debriefing sessions**

List of People Interviewed			
No.	Name	Title/position	Stakeholder
WFP HQ/RB			
1.	Regis Chapman	Senior Adviser	WFP RB
2.	Jacqueline Flentge	M&E Advisor	
3.	Byron Ponce Segura	Regional VAM Officer	
4.	Giorgia Testolin	Programme Officer	
5.	William Vigil	Regional Programme Adviser	
6.	Cecilia Garzon	Regional Nutrition Advisor	
7.	Antoine Renard	Head of Programme WFP Haiti CO in 2013	WFP HQ
Port-au-Prince			
WFP CO			
8.	Carlos Veloso	Acting Country Director	WFP CO office
9.	Wendy Bigham	Deputy Country Director	
10.	Cedric Charpentier	Head of Programme	
11.	Olivier Flament	Monitoring and Reporting Officer	
12.	Diona Antione	National Officer-EPR/DRR	
13.	Murielle Bonostro	National Nutrition Officer	
14.	Thomas Gabrielle	Database manager (Consultant)	
15.	Michaël Cazeau	Coordinator – Project “Forecast Based Financing”	
16.	Kokou Amouzou	VAM Officer – Referent SO1 Kore Lavy	
17.	Felix Veronneau	Assistant Director Kore Lavy	
18.	Josephine Fleurant	FAM School Feeding	
19.	Hamid Aboudou	Officer Finance	
20.	Nuru Jumaine	Head of Logistics	
21.	Harry Jerome	Senior Logistics assistant	
22.	Deles Bien Aimé	HR Assistant	
23.	Laury Georges	Logistic Assistant / Gender focal point	
Government			
24.	Pierre Ricot Odney	Planning Director	MAST
25.	Emmanuel Suy	Programmer	
26.	Jonès Pyram	SI Assistant Specialist	
27.	Roody Hilaire	Statistician	
28.	Pierre Desamours	Coordinator	CNSA
29.	Joseph Wilner Alix	National Technical coordinator	FEWS Net Haiti / USAID
30.	Jacqueline Marhon	Director	Nutrition /MSPP
31.	Alta Jean-Baptiste	Director	MICT/DPC
32.	Gerald Joseph	Logistic Coordinator	
33.	Moise Jean-Pierre	Consultant	
34.	Michel Chancy	Former Secretary of State of Animal Husbandry / Ex PAM State contact person (2008-16)	MARNDR

Donors			
35.	Marie-Eve Castomguay	First Secretary	Embassy of Canada
36.	Boris Maver	Coordinator of Humanitarian Aid	Swiss Embassy in Haiti /Office of Swiss Cooperation in Haiti
37.	Gardy Letang	National Programme Officer	Swiss Development and Cooperation Agency (SDC)
38.	Florence Cadet	Deputy Chif of FDHS	USAID
39.	Kenold Moreau	Food Security Monitoring Officer	
40.	Gerto Sainristil	Field Monitor	
UN agencies			
41.	Gianluca Gondolini	Project Coordinator - Adaptation Expert / Interim Country Director	FAO
42.	Aloys Nizigiyimana	Seed production and varietal selection specialist – Agricultural Projects Coordinator	
43.	Saidou Magagi	Monitoring and Evaluation / Food security thematic programme	
44.	Saintil Karl Luvenem	Monitoring and Evaluation assistant	
45.	Karl Arthur Daphnée	Operational Unit Officer	
46.	Benjamin Van Parys	Programme Analyst	UNDP
47.	Majorie Charles	National Expert in Disaster management	
48.	Emmanuela Blain Durandisse	Nutrition Officer, Chief Survival and Development	UNICEF
49.	Erline Mesadieu	Consultant	
NGOs			
50.	Afurika Juvenal	Chief of Party Kore Lavi	CARE
51.	Laurore Antoine	Safety-Net Coordinator	
52.	Serge Emmanuel	Safety-Net Officer	
53.	Jean ketlher Lorvinski	Executive Director	FONDFEH
54.	Stean Marcelin	Technical Advisor	
55.	Anne Rose Saint-Preux	Coordinator Nutrition Programme	
56.	Mathieu Vernusse	Deputy Country Director	ACF
57.	Delphin Sula	Head of Department Nutrition & Health	
58.	Gary Dossous	National Coordinator	GRASOL
59.	Eneck St Jean	Executive Director	ODRG
60.	Guy Joseph	Program manager	
61.	Gabriel Frederic	National Program coordinator	AAA
Artibonite Department: Gonaïves			
62.	Wilkerson Severe	Head	WFP Sub-Office
63.	Pauline Jean Louis	Senior Programme assistant	
64.	Mirano Lafortune	FAM	

65.	Noël Mirlande	FAM	Pont Gaudin Health Centre
66.	Ange Marie Lucie François	FAM	
67.	Marceline Guillaume	Chief Nurse	
68.	Rita Jean Baptiste	Community health worker	
Artibonite Department: Anse-Rouge			
69.	Mercedes Joseph Philogène	Coordinator Health/Nutrition Focal Point	DSA
70.	Marqueline Augustin	Food distribution agent	
71.	Etienne Watson	Food distribution agent	
72.	Jean Robert Philocies	Food distribution agent	
North Department: Cap Haïtien, Mombin Crochu, Pignon, Ranquite			
WFP			
73.	Denis Vincent	FAM – focal point CFA	WFP Cap Haïtien
74.	Paul Yannick	FAM	
75.	Degraff Paul	Logistician	
76.	Nelson Ulysse	Logistician Assistant	
77.	Jules Edgard R. Cinalien	Monitoring Agent	ASEBED
78.	Astrude Percinthe	Monitoring Agent	
79.	Jean Baptiste Syslveste	Director	Ecole communautaire Mombin Crochu
80.	Jean Baptiste Edence	Professor	
81.	Rene Thelusma	Director	Ecole Notre-Dame de la Delivrance
82.	Pierre Herode	Director	Ecole Episcopale Saint Benoit. Mombin Crochu
83.	Elmié Robelin Monfiston	Director	Ecole Nationale de La Victoire
84.	Suzanne Dumombrun	Professor	
85.	Presumé Eroll	Director	Ecole Nationale de Ranquite
Northeast Department: Caracole, Sainte Suzanne, Terrier Rouge, Trou du Nord			
86.	Valery Bony	Executive Director	SIKSE
87.	Danielle Lagueur	Administrator	
88.	Wilkiel Pierre	Cordinator	
89.	Emmanuella St Louis Nyrva St Martin	Monitoring Agent	
90.	Pierrecilus Joseph	Director	Ecole National de Colonie, Terrier Rouge
91.	Alex Jean	Director	Ecole Notre-Dame de Grand Bassin, Terrier Rouge
92.		Director	Ecole Capois La Mort
93.	Nejean Pelicot	Director (AM)	Ecole Nationale Colette, Ste Suzanne
94.	Dubois Jean Joseph	Director (PM)	
95.	Ivon Joseph	Director	Ecole Capois La Mort
Government			
96.	Joseph Ernst Dorcin	Priest	Commune : Trou du Nord / Section : Pilette
97.	François Minijule	MARDR Representative	BAC Caracole
98.	Pluviose Monge	Member	DPC Northeast

99.	Jean Louis Garry	Field Officer	ODN
Northwest Department: Bombardopolis			
100.	Stinfil Luzaine Larrieux	ASCP	DSNO
101.	Monde Claudette	ASCP	DSNO
102.	Steve Leach	Hospital Administrator: <i>Hôpital Evangélique</i>	MSPP/DSNO
103.	Fenièrè Molmé	Chief: <i>Mont des Oliviers-Desmoulins</i> dispensary	MSPP/DSNO
104.	Excéus Leonesse	ASCP: <i>Mont des Oliviers-Desmoulins</i> dispensary	MSPP/DSNO
105.	Michèle Guerda Simonis	Chief Nurse: <i>Bethel de Rochefort</i> dispensary	MSPP/DSNO
Government			
106.	Joseph Faustin	Coordinator	CASEC - Commune Môle Saint Nicolas / Section Côtes de Fer
107.	Cétoute Eludieu	Member	
108.	Dieuvance Jacques	Deputy Mayor	Bombardopolis City Hall
NGOs			
109.	Fedner Lesperance	Chief of Jean Rabel site	AAA
110.	Charelus Exzer	Technician – section Côtes de Fer	AAA
111.	Animzio Jeanite	Technical Officer Nutrition	ACF Bombardopolis Sub-Office
112.	Jeanite Pas	Supervisor	
113.	Mathilde Lanot	Supervisor	
Centre Department: Belladère, Hinche and Thomonde <sup>137</sup>			
114.	Winzeler Jean	M&E Officier	CARE
115.	Germain Falin	VSLA Supervisor	
116.	Jean Joseph Francoeur	Coordinator	
117.	Sheila Armand	Technical Officer Health and Nutrition	
118.	Florent Decamère	ASCP	MSPP
119.	Alfrance Fourrien	Director	Ecole Nationale de Terre Blanche, Belladère
120.	Albert St Jean	Profesor	
121.	Angé Monès	Director	Ecole Nationale Ray- Sec/ Belladère
122.	Mariella Romand	Profesor	
Centre West: Thomazeau			
123.	Reginal Direlus	Secretary General	AJAD
124.	Gernelus Amélie	Executive Secretary	
125.	Odanie Titome	Treasurer General	
126.	Lucienne Genelus	Deputy Treasurer	
127.	Paul Cherivane	Assistant Secretary	
128.	Rosvel N. Fénéus	Project Officer	

<sup>137</sup> Visits to 2 health facilities were planned but staff had left for the lunch break and because of security restrictions the team had to leave Thomonde to return to Port-au-Prince by 14:00 at the latest.



Focus group discussions				
Dept	Commune/ locality	F	M	Category
Nutrition				
Artibonite	Gonaives/Tarasse	8		SO4/Prevention: Beneficiary pregnant women
		6		SO4/Prevention: Beneficiary lactating women
			6	SO4/Prevention: Husbands/fathers of beneficiaries
	Anse-Rouge town	7		SO4/Prevention: Beneficiary pregnant women
		9		SO4/Prevention: Beneficiary lactating women/mothers of beneficiary children
Centre	Thomonde	9		SO4/Prevention: Beneficiary mothers of beneficiary children
Northwest	Bombardopolis/ <i>Hôpital Evangelique</i>	9		SO4/Prevention: Mothers of beneficiary children
		8		SO4/Prevention: Mothers of beneficiary children
		7	3	SO4/Prevention: Mothers and fathers of beneficiary children
CFA				
Northeast	Caracole	6	7	Workers (5 women) and team leaders (1 woman and 7 men)
	Trou du Nord / Section Pilette	About 50	About 30	Workers (about 55) and team leaders (about 15) – activity CFA
Northwest	Môle Saint-Nicolas / Section Côtes de Fer	8	3	Workers (6 women, 2 men) and team leaders (2 women, 1 man)
	Bombardopolis – Section Clénette Roulette	14	15	Workers (13 women, 10 men) and team leaders (1 woman, 5 men)
	Baie de Henne	13	29	Workers (13 women, 20 men) and team leaders (9 men)
West	Thomazeau / Section Grand Boulage	About 70	About 70	Activity CFA
GFD				
North	Mombin Crochu	10	5	GFD: Parents of beneficiary students
		6	3	
		12	8	
	Ranquite	10	3	
	La Victoire	12	7	
Northeast	Terrier Rouge	10	3	
		9	2	
		6	2	
	Ste Suzanne	20	6	
Centre	Belladère	25	11	
		13	8	

<b>WFP Staff Participants in Internal Debriefing</b>			
No.	Name	Title / Position	Organisation
1.	Julie Thoulouzan	Evaluation Officer	WFP OEV
2.	Vanessa Almengor	Cash-based Transfers	WFP RB
3.	Alan Brown	Resource Mobilisation	
4.	Francesca Deceglie	Social Protection	
5.	Alzira Ferreira	Regional Deputy Director	
6.	Jacqueline Flentje	M&E	
7.	Cecilia Garzon	Nutrition	
8.	Joachim Groder	Resource Analyst	
9.	Vera Mayer	Reports / Project Cycle	
10.	Alessio Orgera	School Feeding	
11.	Byron Poncesegura	VAM	
12.	Ana Touza	P4P	
13.	William Vigil	Disaster Management Team	WFP CO
14.	Carlos Veloso	Acting Country Director	
15.	Wendy Bigham	Deputy Country Director	
16.	Cedric Charpentier	Head of Programme	
17.	Olivier Flament	Monitoring and Reporting Officer	
18.	Kokou Amouzou	VAM Officer – Referent SO1 Kore Lavy	
19.	Wilkerson Severe	Head Sub.Gonaives Office	TANGO Evaluation Team
20.	Mirella Mokbel Genequand	Independent consultant	
21.	Blanche Renaudin	Independent consultant	
22.	Robert Philippe	Independent consultant	
23.	Monica Mueller		TANGO Evaluation Manager

<b>Stakeholder Participants in External Debriefing</b>			
No.	Name	Title / Position	Organisation
1.	Reginal Dorelus	Secretary General	AJAD
2.	Anne Rose Saint Pierre	Programme Coordinator	FONDEFH
3.	Gardy Letang	NPO-AH	DDC

## Annex 4: Methodology: selection of sites for field visits

1. PRRO 200618 is implemented in eight of the ten departments of Haiti: Artibonite, Centre, Nippes, North, Northeast, Northwest, Southeast and West.

### PRRO site mapping

2. **General Food Distribution (GFD)** has been implemented in 24 communes in seven departments: Artibonite, Centre, Nippes, North, Northeast, Northwest and West. Distribution has been done in 208 schools to 84,404 students in these departments. Half of all beneficiaries are in the Northeast, with 42,365 beneficiaries. Mombin Crochu is the commune with the highest number of beneficiaries (14,755). The Cooperating Partners (CPs) are WFP in Artibonite, Northwest and Centre, ODRG in Nippes, WFP and ASEBED in the North, SIKSE and WFP in the Northeast and FONDEFH in the West.

3. **Cash for Assets (CFA) activities** have been implemented in 12 communes in three departments: Northwest (2014), Northeast (2015) and West (2015). Based on SPR data, in 2014, CFA activities targeted 45,100 beneficiaries (9,020 participants)<sup>138</sup> while in 2015, 91,615 beneficiaries were targeted (18,323 participants).<sup>99</sup> The Northwest has the largest number of beneficiaries under the CFA activity, followed by the West and then the Northeast departments. The CPs are: Welthungerhilfe (Northwest); AJAD, SEJA, FOSAC, ODRG (West); and DPC Nord-Est (Northeast).

4. **MAM treatment and stunting prevention activities** have been implemented in 19 communes in four departments: Artibonite, Centre, Northwest and Southeast. In 2015, MAM treatment was implemented in 48 sites and prevention in 98 sites in Artibonite, Northwest and Southeast. Prevention beneficiaries are reached through a variety of health structures (health centre, hospital, dispensary) and non-health sites (church, school, private house). MAM treatment was discontinued in Centre in 2015 as departmental health authorities considered it as an additional activity and demanded financial compensation. MSPP-DSA is the CP in Artibonite whilst WFP staff conducts distributions in the other departments.<sup>139</sup>

5. The following table summarizes site mapping for all implemented activities.

<b>Table 2 Site mapping of PRRO main components and partners</b>			
	<b>SO1 GFD</b>	<b>SO2 CFA</b>	<b>SO4 Nutrition</b>
Artibonite	WFP		ACF/DSA
Centre	WFP		CARE
Nippes	ODRG		
North	ASEBED		
Northeast	SIKSE	DPC Nord-Est	
Northwest	WFP	AAA (Welthungerhilfe)	ACF
Southeast			CARE
West	FONDEFH	SEJA, FOSAC, ODRG, AJAD	

Source: SPR 2014, SPR 2015 and WFP CO spreadsheet "List of Operational Sites"

<sup>138</sup> WFP. 2014. *Standard Project Report 2014, Haiti: PRRO-Haiti-Strengthening Emergency Preparedness and Resilience in Haiti*. Single Country PRRO -200618

<sup>139</sup> In 2014, treatment of MAM was implemented in a total of 90 sites and prevention in 137 sites in four departments. CPs were DSA in Artibonite, ADESNO/BND and DSNO in the Northwest, RHASADE in the Southeast and FONDEFH in the Centre (Source: WFP CO *List of Operational Sites Spread sheet*)

## **Selection criteria for sites**

6. During the inception phase, the ET and the WFP CO agreed upon the following global criteria to select visits at the commune level:
  - Ability to view different PRRO components (Nutrition, GFD, CFA, EPR and Capacity Development) and school feeding (DEV 200150) in the same department in order to assess complementarity and synergies, as applicable;
  - Components implemented in 2014 as well as in 2015;
  - Size of the operations: the sample will focus on sites with higher numbers of beneficiaries reached and tonnage distributed, and on number of beneficiaries targeted relative to other sites in the PRRO;
  - Diversity, number and importance of CPs (by size of programme and number of different activities involved);
  - Type of hazard that impacted different areas and livelihoods and triggered a relief operation;
  - Accessibility: practical considerations for reaching sites within allotted days.
7. The above criteria were respected, with some exceptions as explained below.
8. For SO1 (GFD) the ET planned to visit at least three departments, each with a different CP: Centre (WFP), North (ASEBED), Northeast (SIKSE) and West (FONDEFH). The final choice was to be guided by the schedule of GFD distribution sites in order to observe the process and interview beneficiaries. Unfortunately, there was no GFD during the data collection period. The ET conducted visits in the departments and communes with the largest number of beneficiaries. Due to practical considerations (political situation and road security) and in order to conduct interviews with CARE sub-office staff in Hinche (Centre Department), Nippes Department was replaced by Centre Department.
9. For CFA, the ET conducted visits in all three departments where CFA activities were implemented in 2014 and 2015 so as to examine the impact and sustainability of the activity over time. The ET member was able to visit all targeted communes in Northeast and Northwest departments, but in view of accessibility and time constraints, only one commune was visited in the West. The selection of that commune was based on partner availability and the type of partner (a local NGO) hence ensuring that all three types of partners would be interviewed (international, local and governmental). There was no “active site” (i.e., cash transfer or asset building) during the time of the evaluation mission, but in each commune the ET member interviewed beneficiaries, communities, partners and / or local leaders and visited several assets built.
10. For SO4, the ET had originally planned to visit sites of nutrition activities in Artibonite (ACF and DSA), Northwest (ACF and WFP) and Southeast (CARE and WFP). Due to practical considerations (time and travel constraints) and in order to conduct interviews with CARE sub-office staff in Hinche (Centre Department), Southeast Department was replaced by Centre Department, both being covered by CARE. Prevention food distributions were planned by Kore Lavi partners simultaneously in all departments between 25 and 30 April. The ET drew a random sample of communes in Artibonite and Northwest departments from the schedule in order to attend as many “active” sites as possible.<sup>140</sup> Heading first to Artibonite

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<sup>140</sup> WFP CO Haiti. *Calendrier prévisionnel / Distribution préventive KL 25 au 30 avril.*

allowed conducting interviews with the WFP sub-office in Gonaïves at the beginning and end of field visits in Artibonite and Northwest.

<b>Table 3 Summary of criteria applied for selecting field visits sites by PRRO component</b>		
<b>SO1 / GFD &amp; EPR / DRR</b>	<b>SO2 / CFA /Resilience</b>	<b>SO4 / MAM treatment &amp; stunting prevention</b>
<p><b>GFD :</b></p> <p>Different CPs: at least three departments, each with a different CP: Centre (direct distribution by WFP staff) North (ASEBED), Northeast (SIKSE), West (FONDEFH)</p> <p>Visit to “active” GFD sites in order to observe the process and interview beneficiaries</p> <p><b>EPR and DRR:</b></p> <p>Different CPs: Northeast (DPC), West (FOSAC, AJAD)</p>	<p>Different CPs: at least two departments, each with a different type of CP: Northeast (DPC; governmental partner), Northwest (Welthungerhilfe; international partner), West (AJAD; local partner)</p> <p>Visits to “active” CFA communities, i.e., during cash transfer or while participating in community assets activities</p>	<p><b>MAM and nutrition prevention:</b></p> <p>Different CPs: Artibonite (MSPP-DAS), Northwest (direct distribution by WFP staff and field presence of ACF) and Centre (direct distribution by WFP staff and field presence of CARE)</p> <p>Different types of health institutions implementing MAM treatment: at least one of each different level of health institution (hospital, dispensary and health centre)</p> <p><b>Nutrition prevention:</b></p> <p>Visits to “active” stunting prevention distribution sites in order to observe the process and interview beneficiaries</p>

11. The ET conducted visits in a total of 18 communes in six departments: Artibonite (two), Centre (three), North (four), Northeast (four), Northwest (four) and West (one), as presented in the following table.

<b>Table 4 Sites visited by ET</b>			
<b>Department</b>	<b>GFD</b>	<b>CFA</b>	<b>Nutrition</b>
<b>Artibonite</b>			1 health centre, 3 dispensaries, 4 prevention distribution sites 5 FGD
<b>Centre</b>	2 GFD		1 FGD <sup>141</sup>
<b>North</b>	4 GFD		
<b>Northeast</b>	4 GFD	2 FGD, 4 Assets Sites	
<b>Northwest</b>		3 FGD, 5 Assets Sites	1 Hospital, 2 dispensaries, 1 prevention distribution site 3 FGD
<b>West</b>		1 FGD, 1 Assets Site	

<sup>141</sup> A visit to the hospital was planned, but could not take place because of time constraints (staff were on lunch break) and security instructions regarding travel time to return to Port-au-Prince

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