**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

- The political crisis and escalation of violence in Libya since May 2014 has led to civilian casualties, massive displacement as well as the destruction of public infrastructure and the disruption of basic social services and social protection systems. The humanitarian community estimates that over 331,000 people are displaced and at risk. Meanwhile, the living conditions of an unknown number of other people in host communities and insecure areas have also been affected by the violence and insecurity.

- This Emergency Operation will address the food security needs of people most affected by the current crisis. Assistance is necessary for people who are unable to meet their food and nutritional requirements due to their displacement, loss of livelihood or loss of productive assets and capacity in the context of a general disruption of national and community social safety net mechanisms.

- Due to on-going fighting and insecurity, WFP and partners have been unable to carry out a comprehensive food security assessment, and have been mostly relying on secondary sources for information, including partner UN Agencies with a presence on the ground, the Libyan Red Crescent, as well as a number of local Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and civil society organizations. A joint humanitarian assessment is planned and will take place as soon as the security situation allows.
It is expected that the operating context will continue to be fluid and volatile in the coming months, with intermittent and sporadic humanitarian access. Therefore, WFP will work closely with national NGOs, civil society organisations, and other UN actors in the targeting of most vulnerable beneficiaries, as well as in the delivery and monitoring of assistance. WFP aims to reach 50,000 people in the first month and incrementally increase the number of people assisted to reach a monthly average of 115,000 people; with the necessary adjustments depending on the evolving situation, the emerging needs, as well as security and access considerations.

WFP’s phase out strategy is premised on the assumption that after the next five months the situation will stabilise and allow the most vulnerable households to be integrated into national social safety net programmes and assisted through a national cash and voucher scheme via the Public Distribution System. WFP will therefore closely monitor developments and prepare for a possible hand-over to national institutions and counterparts, in support of a functioning Public Distribution System that also includes people affected by the recent crisis. This will include the implementation of capacity development activities.

In delivering its assistance, WFP will build on experience and lessons learned from the 2011-12 WFP operations in Libya, ranging from direct food assistance to cash and voucher programmes and the eventual hand over to the Government. However, WFP will also take into account the fact that national and community institutions and cohesiveness may have further eroded and fragmented during the current crisis, providing an even more complex and polarized operational context, and requiring a new, context specific response strategy.

This operation will be launched in parallel with the planned closure by the end of 2014 of the Regional Emergency Operation for North Africa EMOP 200257: “Food assistance to vulnerable populations affected by conflict,” launched in April 2011 to assist Libyan internally displaced people (IDPs) and refugees and returning migrants in Tunisia and Egypt with no overlap. This operation had gradually phased out its operational activities by the end of 2012. However, after the closure of WFP offices in Libya, the Government requested WFP to continue to provide technical support and assistance for its national safety net and voucher programmes, and the EMOP was therefore extended with technical support provided by the WFP Regional Bureau in Cairo.

As the crisis escalated in mid-2014, WFP’s focus under the Regional EMOP was shifted again from providing technical assistance to prepositioning resources for emergency response efforts. Residual resources from the operation were used to procure 575mt of food supplies in Tunisia; and, in late September, WFP was able to send 75mt of food into Libya for 6,700 people as part of a joint humanitarian convoy.

This Emergency Operation was designed in line with the goals and plans of the Libya Humanitarian Country Team, as outlined in the 2014 Libya Humanitarian Appeal. The EMOP will address WFP’s strategic objective 1: to save lives and livelihoods and Millennium Development Goal 1: to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger.

Situation Analysis

1. Libya is an upper middle income country, with an estimated population of 6.2 million.\textsuperscript{1} It is ranked 55 out of 185 on the 2013 Human Development Index (HDI) with a score of 0.784.\textsuperscript{2} It is almost in the top five percentile of the Poverty and Hunger

\textsuperscript{1} World Bank, 2014 \url{http://data.worldbank.org/region/MNA}
\textsuperscript{2} UNDP, 2014 \url{http://hdr.undp.org/en/data}
Index, with only 1.8 percent of the population undernourished, 5.7 percent of children underweight, and a 1.6 percent under-five mortality rate.\textsuperscript{3} On the Gender Inequality Index, Libya is ranked 40 out of 151 countries and has a score of 0.2.\textsuperscript{4} The youth literacy rate is 100 percent for both boys and girls, and women outnumber men in tertiary education. Libya’s economy is primarily based on its extractive sector which accounts for 95 percent of its export earnings, 80 percent of its GDP (US$75.46 billion), and 99 percent of its government income.\textsuperscript{5}

2. Due to its hostile environment, Libya’s agricultural production is very limited as is the domestic production of staple food crops. As a result, 80 percent of the country’s food requirements are imported.\textsuperscript{6} Political stability and security are essential for Libya to maintain its relatively high levels of economic and social development and ensure its food security through regular trade and import of supplies from abroad.

3. Since the Libyan Revolution in 2011, successive transitional governance arrangements have been unable to establish a stable political and security environment and extend the full authority of the central government throughout the country. Political volatility has continued to characterize the country, with continued incidents and clashes between armed factions and groups organized along tribal and/or sectarian lines.

4. In May 2014, a breakaway faction of the Libyan armed forces launched a military assault against militant Islamist groups in and around Benghazi. The forces attempted to seize the parliament building causing the resignation of the Prime Minister. Parliamentary elections held in June 2014 resulted in increased votes for nationalists and independent candidates, with losses for the Islamic bloc that previously dominated the General National Congress. Since then, the conflict between nationalists and Islamic-backed militias, compounded by underlying tribal and regional allegiances and rivalries, led to the re-escalation of hostilities and violence in the capital Tripoli and surrounding areas.

5. The International Airport in Tripoli was seized on 24 August 2014 by Islamist backed militias, who proclaimed their own parliament and government. The officially elected House of Representatives denounced the attack as illegal and unconstitutional and have since been based in Tobruk, on the border with Egypt, 1,200km from the capital, Tripoli.

6. Therefore, Libya is currently governed by parallel and rival legislative and executive bodies: one is in Tripoli and consists of a coalition of armed groups from western towns and Islamists, while the other is in Tobruk, where the elected House of Representatives and a cabinet have convened. This is compounded by the presence of several other militia groups, operating in different areas, who may not always fall under the control or jurisdiction of the rival parliaments.

7. The use of heavy weaponry against civilians and civilian infrastructure, by all parties to conflict, has occurred, resulting in civilian casualties, death and displacement as well as the deterioration of living conditions.\textsuperscript{7} This includes shortages in food, fuel, water and electricity and cash. Significant damage and destruction to public infrastructure in Tripoli’s southern and western suburbs, including the international airport, the main oil depot, roads, bridges and hospitals, have been reported. Numerous reports have surfaced of abductions, looting, burning of homes, acts of revenge and an overall rise in criminality. Banking systems have been disrupted, restricting cash

\textsuperscript{3} IFPRI, 2013 http://www.ifpri.org/publication/2013-global-hunger-index
\textsuperscript{6} WFP, 2014 Operations Series – Libya, unpublished
\textsuperscript{7} UNSMIL, OHCHR 2014 Overview of the Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law during the ongoing violence in Libya
availability in the country. In addition, social security and social protection systems are not functioning to their full capacity and are not reaching people displaced by the recent conflict.

8. According to the latest estimates, the conflict resulted in the displacement of 287,300 people, mainly in and around Tripoli and Benghazi, and at least 100,000 Libyans crossing the borders into neighbouring countries. This is in addition to 56,500 protracted IDPs, displaced since the 2011 crisis, some of whom have been re-displaced, and 4,800 others displaced from tribal clashes in Southern Libya since January 2014. Tunisian and Egyptian authorities have restricted entry into their territories to their respective nationals and Libyans, while only enabling other nationalities to enter if they had proof of transit to another country. This also led to many third country nationals, migrants, refugees and asylum seekers to travel illegally to Europe by sea, some of whom lost their lives.

9. Third country nationals, migrants, asylum seekers and refugees who remained in Libya are believed to be amongst the most vulnerable. Most reside in areas heavily damaged by the fighting, and have either been displaced or are unable to leave to safer locations because of ongoing clashes. There are 37,000 refugees and asylum seekers registered with UNHCR in Libya, 50 percent of whom are Syrian, while the other half originate from 30 different countries. IOM estimates that there are around 2.2 million migrants in Libya from 22 different countries. Over 60 percent of them are Egyptians who might potentially desire to return home. Other governments evacuated their citizens from the country who were working in key sectors such as health, agriculture and petroleum. The departure of medical staff is of particular concern as the Ministry of Health estimates that 80 percent of health professionals are foreigners.

10. The international community, including diplomatic missions, UN Agencies and international NGOs were evacuated from Libya in mid-July 2014, and they are now based in Tunisia.

11. The United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) is spearheading international efforts to find a political solution to the crisis in Libya calling for an “immediate and comprehensive ceasefire, and for all parties to engage in a constructively peaceful political dialogue.” The new process of political dialogue between key parties to the conflict was launched on 29 September 2014 at a meeting in Ghadames. The process is also expected to reinforce the UN High-Level Meeting on Libya on 26 September 2014 that called on all parties to allow for immediate and unconditional humanitarian access to all areas.

The Food Security and Nutrition Situation

12. Since the escalation of the conflict, up-to-date information and data on food security, including access to markets, food stocks, and nutrition are limited and incomplete as WFP and partners have been unable to carry out assessments due to insecurity. WFP has been relying on reports from other humanitarian partners and sources on the ground for information. As the security situation will probably continue to be volatile with limited and intermittent access for international humanitarian actors, WFP will continue to monitor the food security situation through local partners. Rapid food security assessments are planned for whenever and wherever access permits.

13. A shortage of basic food commodities in Tripoli was reported by the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Society (IFRC) in August, as a result of

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8 UNOCHA 2014, Humanitarian Appeal for Libya September 2014 – February 2015
9 UNSMIL / UNCT, 2014 Draft Local Flash Appeal for Libya
10 IOM 2014, May: Number of Migrants in Libya
looting of major food stores and warehouses. It is also reported that food prices increased by up to 300 percent in August, but then reduced to 50 percent higher than pre-crisis levels in September; affecting the purchase capacity of the poorest and most affected citizens. It is estimated that a third of the population live below the national poverty line\textsuperscript{11}.

14. There is currently no comprehensive data on the level of food availability in the country. However, disruptions caused by insecurity and the closure of border crossings to Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt are affecting the food supply chain. This is compounded by the fact that fewer ships are docking at Libya’s ports due to the high risks and insurance premiums for delivering goods to the country. This has resulted in food being imported by land at a higher cost or into smaller ports at reduced quantities. Some estimates indicate that food imports into eastern Libya have declined by 60 percent since May 2014.\textsuperscript{12} As mentioned, 80 percent of Libya’s food requirements are imported, a figure that reaches up to 90 percent in the case of cereal consumption requirements.\textsuperscript{13}

15. In normal times, the food market in Libya is highly subsidized, with some food items subsidized at 90 percent of their market value, in particular for cereal grains and flour, the staple of the Libyan diet\textsuperscript{14}. The National Supply Company (NASCO) purchases food and processed commodities from privately owned business and market prices are regulated by the National Price Stability Fund (NPSF). The government also pays the difference between the market price and the subsidized price after the food is processed and distributed to retail outlets such as bakeries.

16. Since 70 to 85 percent\textsuperscript{15} of Libyans are employed by the public sector, most households depend directly or indirectly on a government salary to sustain their food security. The current phase of political turbulence and violence is affecting the ability of the state to regularly deliver its services. Moreover, while the most vulnerable groups in Libya rely on a social safety network system and charity from neighbours and organised groups (for example the Zakat system that levies an Islamic tax for redistribution to the poor), these networks were already partly disrupted during the crisis in 2011, leaving the vulnerable even more at risk.

17. Moreover, since the escalation of the crisis in 2014, some government offices, such as the Price Stability Fund that regulates food market prices and banks, have not been functioning at full capacity as many employees are not coming to work due to insecurity. As a result, there have been disruptions and delays in the system, with consequences for the overall food supply chain. It is also expected that the number of food insecure people may increase if the Government is forced to reduce subsidies or public services due to income losses from the oil sector, which the economy and Government income heavily depend.

18. Post distribution monitoring and vulnerability mapping following WFP’s operation in Libya in 2011-12 indicated that poverty rather than displacement were the major drivers of vulnerability to food insecurity. The most vulnerable people were the chronically urban poor who earned less than US$47 a month, female headed households, widows or orphans.\textsuperscript{16} This was followed by IDPs without local support networks and the means to borrow. The unemployed youth, without family networks

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid
\textsuperscript{12} WFP’s shipping agent in Malta, September 2014
\textsuperscript{13} FAO, GEIWS August 2014, Libya Country Brief
\textsuperscript{14} WFP, 2011 Emergengency Food Security Assessment – WFP Operational Series, Libya
\textsuperscript{15} CIA, 2013 World Fact Book
to rely on assistance or the ability to engage in casual labour were especially at risk. Lastly, conflict affected households and IDPs that lost one or more of the productive members, were unable to meet their basic needs. Third country nationals and undocumented migrant workers were also amongst the most vulnerable as they were unable to access the Government’s social safety network.

19. Despite significant progress over the past decades on infant/child mortality rates\textsuperscript{17}, infant and young child feeding practices in Libya are characterised by important rates of artificial feeding (from 5.7 percent to 40.3 percent), low mean duration of breastfeeding (47.9 percent of mothers breast-feed their infants for less than 1 month) and early introduction of other liquids (40 percent are mix-fed by the first month). All of these are believed to partially explain the high rate of obesity in children aged 5 or younger in Libya.\textsuperscript{18}

20. Available pre-crisis nutritional data (2008-2012)\textsuperscript{19} suggest that under-nutrition in Libya is a low to medium public health concern, according to WHO cut-off points: 4 percent of children under five were underweight, 4 percent with acute malnutrition (low prevalence) and 21 percent stunted (medium prevalence), and 22.4 percent were overweight. A national survey (2008-2009) revealed that 63.5 percent of Libyans adults were either overweight or obese. Obesity was almost two times more common among Libyan women than men (21.4 percent vs. 40.1 percent), probably due to a combination of factors including a more sedentary lifestyle, higher attendance to social gatherings associated with consumption of food and others.\textsuperscript{20}

21. There is very little updated data available on micronutrient deficiencies in both Libyan children and adults. Anemia in non-pregnant women (15-40 years old) was at 23.5 percent and 20.3 percent in children 0-59 months, in 2011; while the prevalence of Iodine Deficiency Disorders is considered mild in several countries of the region including Libya.\textsuperscript{21}

22. Although the pre-crisis nutritional data indicate very low levels of under-nutrition; the factors that contributed to Libya’s high level of food security have been affected by the 2011 Revolution and further disrupted by the current crisis in 2014. With all the factors considered: low agricultural production, high levels of imports, disrupted trade routes, possible loss of oil exports and government revenues, reduction in subsidies leading to higher prices, loss of employment and decreased income, and limited access to liquidity; indicate that should the situation of volatility and insecurity continue, the number of affected people in need of food assistance will increase. Food insecurity will not only affect displaced populations, but potentially populations stranded in conflict areas and other parts of Libya.

POLICIES, CAPACITIES AND ACTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT AND OTHERS

Policies, Capacities and Actions of the Government

23. In light of the existence of parallel and opposing power and administrative structures covering different parts of the territory, WFP will be guided by International

\textsuperscript{16} WFP, 2014 – WFP Operations Series, Libya
\textsuperscript{17} Under 5 mortality fell from 43 deaths per 1,000 live births in 1990 to 15 deaths in 2012; At a glance: Libya, UNICEF, http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/laj_statistics.html
\textsuperscript{18} Obesity in Libya: A review; Libyan J Med 2012, 7: 19086 - http://dx.doi.org/10.3402/ljm.v7i0.19086b
\textsuperscript{20} Obesity in Libya: A review; Libyan J Med 2012, 7: 19086 - http://dx.doi.org/10.3402/ljm.v7i0.19086b
\textsuperscript{21} Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2011, 8, 3637-3671
Humanitarian Law and the Humanitarian Principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence and will provide assistance based on need regardless of the prevailing political context. The Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) will initiate discussions with Libyan authorities, to ensure that the national government and local authorities participate and contribute to the activities outlined in the 2014 Libya Humanitarian Appeal, once the political context will allow for this to take place.

24. In a letter to the UN Secretary General, The Minister of Foreign Affairs (House of Representatives) formally requested for humanitarian support and the resumption of a UN humanitarian presence and activities in affected areas to alleviate the suffering of the impacted civilian population. In turn, the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General/ Resident Coordinator (DSRSG/RC) of UNSMIL/UNDP, formally requested WFP to resume its operations in Libya; stating that all assessments and local partners cited food security as the top priority.

25. UNSMIL and the HCT current key counterpart in the government is the IDP office in the Prime Minister’s Office (House of Representatives). A Crisis Committee was formed under the Prime Minister’s Office in order to address the humanitarian situation. However, due to the divisive political situation, parallel bodies were formed in some areas under local councils or at the initiative of civil society.

26. A unified and clear policy or actions of a national government towards food assistance and food security is unavailable. Prior to the crisis, the World Bank, UNICEF and WFP were supporting the Government in its food and fuel subsidy reform policy. In addition, WFP was providing capacity development assistance in support of the national Bureau of Statistics and the Institute of Economic Sciences in food security analysis. This included methodologies for conducting assessments, surveys and enhancing the targeting criteria for including people in the Public Distribution System. The current status and commitment to these reforms and initiatives are unknown, due to the on-going conflict.

27. As soon as possible, WFP will re-establish contact with line Ministries and humanitarian coordinating bodies. WFP will also look into supporting the government in re-establishing its social protection and safety net systems and reviving the pre-existing Public Distribution System, through which cash and vouchers were provided to the poorest households.

Policies, Capacities and Actions of Other Major Actors

28. Following the escalation of violence, international staff of UN Agencies, most international NGOs and diplomatic missions and multilateral institutions evacuated from Libya in July 2014. Most operations have been managed remotely from Tunisia and Egypt. Therefore, international humanitarian response is very limited, with low capacity and limited access to information.

29. Members of the HCT, comprised of UNHCR, IOM, UNICEF, WHO and UNDP, amongst others, who were active in Libya prior to the crisis were mainly focusing on development assistance. As the conflict escalated leading to mass displacements and arising humanitarian needs, the HCT shifted their focus towards the provision of humanitarian assistance and launched a humanitarian appeal locally in September 2014.

30. The 2014 Libya Humanitarian Appeal estimates that US$35.25 million will be required to assist people affected by the crisis over a six month period, by providing support to: food assistance, protection assistance for displaced and migrant
populations, restoring capacity of the healthcare system, education and psychosocial support, rehabilitation of key infrastructure, and the provision of shelter and non-food items. As the food security component comprises nearly half the overall needs outlined in the 2014 Libya Humanitarian Appeal, donors have expressed their intent to prioritise funding for this component.

31. The humanitarian response to date has mainly been provided by the Libyan Red Crescent (LRC), Local Councils, and Libyan NGOs. The LRC, International Medical Corps (IMC), the High Committee for Emergency Response, and Local Councils have been providing humanitarian support, including food assistance, to IDPs West of Tripoli, through local communities and charity organizations. However, these organizations are facing serious funding shortfalls, and will not be able to continue their support without further assistance. In a meeting with high-level UN officials, civil society and local actors strongly urged the UN to return to Libya and not only provide support in the provision of immediate humanitarian assistance, but also provide technical support for assessments and crisis management.

32. IOM and UNHCR are providing assistance to migrants, third country nationals, refugees and IDPs. In August, UNHCR, through its partner organizations IMC and Taher Al-Zawi Charity Foundation, sent a two trucks convoy with humanitarian aid from Tunisia into Libya, the first one since the beginning of the current crisis. The convoy included medical supplies, blankets, sleeping mats and hygiene items. A joint convoy was also sent in September carrying 75mt of WFP food and partners’ non-food items to assist 6,700 people.

Coordination

33. WFP will continue to participate and collaborate with various partners through the coordination architecture established by the humanitarian community, under the leadership of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General and Resident Coordinator (DSRDG/RC) of UNSMIL.

34. The Libya Crisis Network and National Crisis Cells, comprised of Local Councils, Libyan NGOs and LRC have been providing assistance to displaced populations. Coordination lead by the HCT has been on-going with all stakeholders. At the sub-regional level, an ad-hoc Libya Crisis Network has been established with the participation of UN agencies, IOM, LRC, and Libyan NGOs Coalition, to manage all potential humanitarian crises in Libya.

35. The Interagency Contingency Plan serves as a framework for operational planning for the HCT.

OBJECTIVES OF WFP ASSISTANCE

36. Under this operation, WFP will primarily focus on WFP Strategic Objective 1: Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies.

37. The objective of WFP’s assistance is to support the most affected and vulnerable people whose food security has been compromised due to their displacement, loss of livelihood and/or loss of productive assets and capacities, compounded by a parallel increase in food prices and disruption of national and community social safety net mechanisms. Should conditions allow, as a secondary objective, WFP will support national authorities in reviving the social safety net system and through the Public
Distribution System that provides cash and vouchers to poor and vulnerable households and resume its technical assistance activities.

**Beneficiaries and Targeting**

38. The EMOP plans to assist at least a third of the identified displaced population, vulnerable households and individuals at risk. Projections are based on the assumption that the security situation will continue to be volatile and that humanitarian access will be intermittent and sporadic. This will mean that the capacity of the humanitarian community at large will be limited in its ability to assess, identify and distribute to all people displaced or affected by the crisis. It is also expected that some people will be displaced several times or others may not be reached each month of the operation’s duration due to insecurity.

39. The number of people assisted is expected to fluctuate throughout the duration of the operation. WFP, in collaboration with identified partners, plans to assist 50,000 affected people in the first month, and gradually scale up as information becomes available and access and capacity increase, to reach up to 175,000 by the end of February; assisting an average of 115,000 people per month. WFP will prioritize the needs of the most vulnerable, such as groups who have been displaced multiple times, should the full amount of funding under this EMOP not be available.

40. WFP will ensure that it reaches people affected by the conflict throughout Libya and provide the necessary food assistance in a neutral and impartial manner. WFP will also closely monitor its cooperating partners to ensure that all beneficiaries are treated equally.

41. Available information on affected populations is detailed below. It is mainly based on indirect sources through the Libya Red Crescent, the local councils and the High Level Emergency Response Coalition (a conglomerate of national NGOs operational in Libya). They have identified and registered 287,300 newly displaced people since the crisis in May. This is in addition to 56,500 people displaced since the crisis in 2011 and 4,800 others displaced from tribal clashes in southern Libya in January 2014. In addition, IOM estimates that there are 200,000 migrant workers, of which at least 7,000 are believed to be vulnerable and in need of food assistance. UNHCR has registered 39,900 refugees and asylum seekers in Libya: 18,700 from Syria and 18,200 others from 30 different countries. Some 100,000 migrants, refugees and asylum seekers departed from Libya towards Europe by sea: 2,000 of which are believed to have lost their lives.

42. **IDPs in Western Libya (estimated 249,100):** most IDPs in Tripoli and surrounding areas have moved in with relatives and host communities in calmer areas and neighbouring towns. However, the number of families unable to seek shelter with friends and relatives is reported to be increasing, with significant numbers seeking shelter in Janzour and Zawiya Forests, schools and other public buildings provided by local councils in Tripoli.

43. **IDPs in Eastern Libya (estimated 38,200):** An estimated 38,200 IDPs were registered by local councils in Benghazi and surrounding areas since hostilities began in May 2014. The number of displaced families and humanitarian needs are expected to have increased significantly, as the local councils have stopped registering new IDPs since access and movement in the area has been restricted with the escalation of fighting.
44. **IDPs displaced since the 2011 crisis (56,500):** at least 56,500 people have been in protracted displacement since the 2011 conflict. Many of them were living in or around Tripoli and Benghazi and have been displaced again. This includes 40,000 Tawerghan IDPs and 9,200 IDPs from the Mashashya, Qawalish and Sian tribes who remained displaced in the Nafusa Mountains. Members of these communities have been accused of being supporters of the Qaddafi regime by armed groups and have been victims of retaliatory attacks. A particularly vulnerable group amongst the IDP population are the 7,000 people of the Tawerghan minority group, who are already living in displacement camps since 2011 and left the camps due to shelling and fear of abduction. Most local communities have been reluctant to provide accommodation to Tawergans for fear of retaliation by armed groups or out of the belief that Tawerghan IDPs are unlikely to return to their places of origin in the near future, unlike other displaced Libyans.

45. **IDPs from southern Libya (4,800):** In January 2014, armed clashes between the Tebu and Awlad Suleiman tribes in and around the southern city of Sebha caused the displacement of approximately 21,000 people. While most of the displaced returned home after a truce was called in February-March 2014, unconfirmed reports suggest that approximately 4,800 people continue to be displaced. Data have remained scant and unverifiable as access to the south has been severely limited.

46. **Affected Third Country Nationals: Migrants, Refugees, and Asylum Seekers (estimated 20,300):** IOM will assist the most vulnerable migrants and third country nationals, estimated at 7,000 inside Libya. Amongst the migrant population, the most vulnerable are the unaccompanied minors or those that have been victims of human trafficking, abuse and detainment. Meanwhile, UNHCR estimates that 36 percent or 13,300 of the refugees and asylum seekers continue to reside in Libya and may require humanitarian assistance.

47. **Other vulnerable households and individuals in areas affected by hostilities:** WFP will also target other vulnerable households and individuals in areas affected by the conflict, as findings from operations in 2011-12 indicate that poverty, rather than displacement alone, was a main factor of vulnerability to food insecurity. The most vulnerable households were headed by divorced, widowed and elderly women as well as orphans. Unemployed youth and third country nationals were also believed to be amongst the most the most vulnerable. A common factor amongst the most vulnerable populations, regardless of their displacement status, was their lack of family and community connections and their inability to borrow money and food.

48. The selection of beneficiaries will be determined alongside local committees in consultation with partners to identify those most vulnerable to becoming food insecure. It is possible that social welfare systems and community networks and cohesiveness may have eroded since the fighting erupted; therefore, information will need to be collected from a variety of sources and verified in order not to exclude vulnerable people and households who face discrimination. WFP will work with NGOs as well as hire local consulting firms to help provide information that will identify and target the most vulnerable households. WFP will also look into whether the Zakat system (Islamic charity welfare system) is still operational, and may use that as a basis for identifying the most vulnerable.

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22 OCHA, 30 April 2014.
23 IDMC interview, 9 September 2014.
49. The estimated number of beneficiaries is based on available information on displacement, and includes provisions for an unidentifiable number of vulnerable individuals and households in host communities and areas affected by hostilities. The breakdown by age and sex is based on Libya’s actual male to female ratio (51.2 and 48.8 percent, respectively) and percentage of population in each age bracket. A higher number of women is projected for the adult population (65 percent) since many of the vulnerable households will be headed by women; however, this will be counterbalanced by assistance to mainly male unemployed youth who are vulnerable to recruitment by armed militias. Most of the migrant workers and third country nationals are also male.

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**NUTRITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS AND RATIONS**

50. The proposed food basket consists of enriched pasta, chickpeas, tomato paste, fortified vegetable oil and sugar with a total of 1,560 kcal per person per day. This represents approximately 75 percent of a person’s daily nutritional requirement. The ration is based on the assumption that those assisted will have access to other sources of complementary food, cooking facilities, utensils and fuel from relatives, host communities and traditional social safety nets.

51. The food basket is also designed to enable the delivery of food simply and safely in an environment of high insecurity and low delivery and distribution capacity. The monthly rations will be packaged for a household of five people in two parcels. This will enable food to be distributed quickly and safely and for people to carry their rations easily. It also enables the distributions to cater for smaller or larger than the average households.

52. As more information becomes available, WFP may adjust the food basket accordingly, including specific needs for children. If information indicates that people do not have access to other sources of food, cooking facilities, utensils and fuel due to multiple displacements or shortages in the market, the food basket may be revised. This may include: increasing the daily kcal value, providing ready-to-eat rations, as well as mobilising other partners to include cooking utensils in non-food item packages.
53. During the first phase of the operation, a cash and voucher modality is not considered to be a feasible option due to the limited data on food availability and fluctuating prices in local markets. In the context of the remote management and security risks related to cash based interventions and time bound arrangements required for assessments or setting up the voucher interventions, it was decided not to consider a cash and voucher modality until more information is available and the situation is stable enough to implement such activities. WFP will continue to monitor the situation and revisit the possibility for assessing the feasibility of market based interventions based on the changing security situation in the country.

**IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS**

**Strategic and Operational Management**

54. Due to the sub-regional nature of the crisis and the absence of a country presence, the Regional Bureau (RB) in Cairo will be responsible for the operational and strategic coordination of the response. The RB will coordinate the overall response in liaison with the WFP office in Tunisia, until an office can be established within Libya. The RB will monitor the evolving humanitarian situation in Libya, identify and recruit international staff in Tunisia and national staff based in Libya to monitor the delivery and distribution of humanitarian cargo.

55. WFP will deploy an Emergency Coordinator to Tunisia to manage a team who will oversee the operational response into western Libya where over 80 percent of the needs are projected to be. Meanwhile the RB will be directly responsible for the procurement and transportation of food assistance into Eastern Libya, where 20 percent of the needs are projected to be. Working in close coordination with the RB, through a separate EMOP, the Egypt County Office would be responsible for supporting potential return movements of migrant workers to Egypt as needed.

**Partners and capacity**

56. Cooperating partner capacity for the identification of beneficiaries, transportation, delivery, distribution and monitoring of food assistance is extremely limited. WFP has not been present in Libya since 2012 and, therefore, has limited knowledge of the effectiveness and reliability of potential cooperating partners on the ground. Most international NGOs have left the country or are operating remotely from surrounding countries and regional offices. The neutrality of some national NGOs, who may be swayed by political and tribal affiliations, is an issue of concern to WFP. Therefore, WFP has established a Cooperating Partners Vetting Committee to vet any potential partners before any Field Level Agreements are signed. This information will be verified on the ground by national staff with previous WFP experience in Libya.
WFP recently signed a Field Level Agreement with Tahir Al-Zawi, a national NGO, for its first consignment of food since the crisis intensified in September 2014. WFP is currently finalising cooperation agreements with the Libyan Red Crescent and signing an agreement with the Danish Refugee Council covering three components: capacity development of the local partners, third-party monitoring and assessments.

WFP will conduct training sessions for any NGO or contractor involved in WFP operations or third party monitoring on WFP’s principles and modus operandi regarding the delivery and distribution of food. WFP partners should ensure that beneficiaries receive their food entitlements in a safe location with minimal exposure to risk.

As soon as feasible, WFP will revive its contacts with the Bureau of Statistics and national authorities responsible for the implementation of social safety net systems and the Public Distribution System in order to support the revival of these services and ensure the inclusion of people recently affected by the conflict.

**Procurement:**

60. WFP’s strategy is to source food in Egypt for deliveries to the east and from Tunisia or international markets for deliveries to the west.

**Logistics**

61. There are four options for the delivery of food into Libya: 1) by road from Tunisia; 2) by road from Egypt; 3) by sea to Libyan ports; and 4) by air. Due to the volatile security situation, the safest options at this time will be by road from Tunisia and Egypt. For the time being, use of Libyan ports is not planned due to lack of clarity regarding the jurisdiction of ports by competing government bodies, inadequate information on documentation requirements, high insurance premiums and higher risks of cargo losses. Delivery by air will be the option of last resort.

62. WFP will deliver food by road by contracting a transporter to transport food from warehouses in Tunisia or Egypt and deliver to a designated consignee or cooperating partner, using Libyan drivers, or outsourcing to a NGO which collects food in neighbouring countries and handles transportation, clearance and distribution in Libya. WFP will deploy logistics assistants to monitor the crossing of food consignments at the respective land borders. WFP will carry out and update logistics capacity assessments in Libya, Tunisia, Egypt and Malta. In case of a closure of Libya borders with neighbouring countries, some food deliveries will be made through Libyan ports.

63. The Global Logistics Cluster is monitoring the situation and ready to assist should the clusters be activated, including potential activation of the Humanitarian Air Service.

**Information Technology (IT)**

64. The ICT infrastructure is not available for the WFP staff to operate inside the country and will take time to be provisioned. Coordination with other agencies is already on going to make sure services can be provided to WFP staff and offices when required. However, for now, operations will be managed from the RB and supported from Egypt and Tunisia, therefore ICT services will be required in a number of locations to be able to support the operational needs.

65. Due to the nature of the operation, remote data collection from partners would be supported using mobile technologies and an assessment for possible usage and mapping of the business processes will be done including potential need for
Beneficiary Information Management system supported and developed by IT. WFP plans to develop a feedback mechanism with our main cooperating partner.

66. Emergency Telecommunications needs are being closely monitored and discussed with a number of agencies including UNDSS. An Emergency Telecommunications Clusters was also mentioned in the UN Libya Contingency Plan for potential activation when required.

Non-food inputs

67. WFP will collect information and monitor the availability of cooking facilities, utensils and fuel. In the event of multiple displacement, lack of shelter or loss of assets WFP will work with partners to ensure that food commodities are distributed alongside non-food items (NFIs), such as cooking utensils and stoves amongst other things.

Planning period

68. The EMOP is planned to cover the period 10 November 2014 to 31 March 2015. However, if the conflict continues and the situation is not conducive for a complete or partial handover of activities to national authorities, WFP will extend the operation for a few months. In this case, WFP will adjust the operation and re-programme activities to address the needs in the prevailing context until the situation stabilizes.

PERFORMANCE MONITORING

69. WFP will monitor outcome and output indicators as well as cross-cutting themes as described in the project logframe (See Annex II). The logframe is in line with the corporate Strategic Results Framework.

70. As humanitarian access is limited due to security challenges, WFP is in the process of contracting the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) to conduct Third Party Monitoring (TPM). A joint training with DRC and the cooperating partners, Tahir Al-Zawi, the Libya Red Crescent and other partners will take place in November prior to the first distribution. The DRC Accountability Officer will facilitate the collection of all Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) related data, including beneficiary feedback.

71. For outputs, monthly distribution reports by Cooperating Partners will be compiled and cross-checked. Data will include type and total quantity of food delivered to the beneficiaries and will be disaggregated by sex and age of household members and location whenever possible.

72. DRC will be responsible for monitoring distributions and conducting pre-assistance interviews with a sub-sample of households receiving food assistance for the first time to establish the baseline. To the extent possible, an Accountability Officer will be present during the distributions who will facilitate the collection of all Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) related data, including beneficiary feedback. To monitor outcomes and cross-cutting themes, DRC will follow-up with household visits and mobile phone calls. A joint WFP/DRC workshop is planned to take place in early 2015 to generate lessons learned and inform the way forward.

HAND-OVER STRATEGY
73. WFP will monitor the food availability and food security situation to determine when and how to phase out its operations in Libya. An appropriate handover strategy will be developed depending on how the security and political situation evolve and the ensuing impact on food availability and food security.

74. Based on WFP’s previous experience in Libya, it is likely that the operation will transition into a cash and voucher scheme for the most vulnerable households; which would eventually be integrated into the national social safety net and Public Distribution System. As part of the handover strategy, WFP will work to ensure that interventions under this operation are integrated into the national social safety net system. The handover strategy will also involve resuming WFP’s capacity development activities in food security analysis and improving targeting methodologies.

75. WFP is confident that the Government of Libya will be willing and able to fully restore the national social safety net system as soon as feasible.

**RISKS**

76. The challenges and risks of implementing this EMOP are multiple and high, including lack of access to intended beneficiaries, lack of cooperating partners and delivery capacity, limited resources, the diversion and politicization of food delivery, and potential security risks for beneficiaries and staff during and after distributions. Securing funding for the operation with other competing needs in the region and globally, will hamper the funding prospects as well as deployment of adequate staffing for operations in Libya. In addition, authorities in neighbouring countries could close the borders if insecurity persists resulting in reduced possibilities of transporting commercial and humanitarian goods into the country. Inadequate access to food would result in a deterioration of nutritional status of the people who may adopt negative coping strategies such as reducing the quantity and quality of food intake or selling their productive assets to buy food.

**Security Risk Management**

77. The security situation in Libya remains fluid and unpredictable. Fighting between armed groups, assassinations, carjacking, abductions, civil unrest and terrorism-related incidents remain likely to occur, given the absence of law and order, illegal armed groups, unresolved tribal disputes and various unresolved political issues.

78. WFP’s regional security unit has access to information from a wide range of sources which allows for an adequate analysis of the situation. The unit coordinates with various factions depending on the areas where beneficiaries would need to be reached. WFP tries to minimise the use of armed escorts; however, on a case by case bases, this option can be considered.

79. Currently, all airports except one in Tripoli have been closed, due to fighting. Mitiga International Airport, the smaller of the two in Tripoli, has been intermittently open in the last few weeks to allow for repatriation flights. In the case of widespread armed conflict, movements around Libya would be severely restricted, especially given that many ports and major cities are under militia control. In addition, deteriorating security along Libya’s borders, especially its eastern border with Egypt, may pose a significant barrier to operations in the area.

80. Before the deployment of United Nations staff to Libya, security assessment missions will be needed to identify accessible areas and the prevailing security environment.
Adherence to minimum operating security standards (MOSS) and minimum security telecommunications standards (MISTS) must be guaranteed. Armoured vehicles will be required.

RECOMMENDATION

81. The Executive Director and Director-General of FAO are requested to approve the proposed Emergency Operation Libya 200776.

APPROVAL

……………………………    …………………………….
Ertharin Cousin      José Graziano da Silva
Executive Director   Director-General of FAO
Date: … … … … … … …    Date: ………………………….
## PROJECT COST BREAKDOWN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Quantity (mt)</th>
<th>Value (US$)</th>
<th>Value (US$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Food Transfers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cereals</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pulses</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil and fats</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed and blended food</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>7,970</td>
<td>7,472,670</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Food Transfers</strong></td>
<td>7,970</td>
<td>7,472,670</td>
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<tr>
<td>External Transport</td>
<td></td>
<td>510,080</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTSH</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,527,682</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODOC Food</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,606,752</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Food and Related Costs</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11,117,184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C&amp;V Transfers</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C&amp;V Related costs</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cash and Vouchers and Related Costs</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capacity Development &amp; Augmentation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>205,140</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Direct Operational Costs</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td>11,322,324</td>
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<tr>
<td>Direct support costs (see Annex I-B)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,571,511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Direct Project Costs</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>13,893,835</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Indirect support costs (7.0 percent)
  ²                           |               |             | 972,568     |
| **TOTAL WFP COSTS**                  |               |             | 14,866,403  |

¹ This is a notional food basket for budgeting and approval. The contents may vary.
² The indirect support cost rate may be amended by the Board during the project.
** Costs to be included in this line are under the following cost elements: International Professional Staff (P1 to D2), Local Staff - National Officer, International Consultants, Local Consultants, UNV

** Costs to be included in this line are under the following cost elements: International GS Staff, Local Staff - General Service, Local Staff - Temporary Assist. (SC, SSA, Other), Overtime

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1 Reflects estimated costs when these activities are performed by third parties. If WFP Country Office staff perform these activities, the costs are included in Staff and Staff Related and Travel and Transportation.
### Annex II: Summary of Logical Framework of LIBYA EMOP 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cross-cutting results and indicators</th>
<th>Performance indicators</th>
<th>Assumptions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **GENDER:** Gender equality and empowerment improved; | • Women, men or both women and men who make decisions over the use of cash, vouchers or food within the household  
**Target:** >50%  
• Proportion of women beneficiaries in leadership positions of project management committees  
**Target:** >50%  
• Proportion of women project management committee members trained on modalities of food, cash, or voucher distribution  
**Target:** >60% | Training on food distribution includes a solid explanation for gender sensitive food distribution. Food management committees formulation ensure women are represented in these committees |
| **PROTECTION AND ACCOUNTABILITY TO AFFECTED POPULATIONS:** WFP assistance delivered and utilized in safe, accountable and dignified conditions; | • Proportion of assisted people who do not experience safety problems travelling to/from and/or at WFP programme sites  
**Target:** 80%  
• Proportion of assisted people informed about the programme (who is included, what people will receive, where people can complain)  
**Target:** 70% | No outbreaks or other crisis  
Security environment improved  
Regular access to distribution points is secured. |
| PARTNERSHIP: Food assistance interventions coordinated and partnerships developed and maintained; | Proportion of project activities implemented with the engagement of complementary partners | Availability of complementary partners
Appropriate complementary partners are selected for implementation.
Partners fund availability |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Proportion of project activities implemented with the engagement of complementary partners</td>
<td>Target: TBD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Amount of complementary funds provided to the project by partners (including NGOs, Civil Society, Private-Sector organizations, International Financial Institutions, and Regional development banks)</td>
<td>Target: TBD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Number of partner organizations that provide complementary inputs and services</td>
<td>Target: TBD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Objective 1: Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goals:</td>
<td>1 – Meet urgent food and nutrition needs of IDPs and vulnerable people and reduce under-nutrition to below emergency levels;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 – Protect lives and livelihoods while enabling safe access to food and nutrition for women, men, boys and girls</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Components: General food distribution for IDPs, due to conflict in and around Tripoli, who are located in the Western part of the country near the borders with Tunisia.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Outcome 1.2**  
Stabilized or improved food consumption over assistance period for targeted households and/or individuals  
**Linked output: A** | **Output A**  
Food, nutritional products, non-food items, cash transfers and vouchers distributed in sufficient quantity and quality and in a timely manner to targeted beneficiaries |  
• Food consumption score, disaggregated by sex of household head  
**Target:** Reduced prevalence of poor food consumption of targeted households/individuals  
Baseline: TBD  
Target: TBD  
• Diet diversity score, disaggregated by sex of household head  
**Target:** Increased diet diversity score of targeted households  
Baseline: TBD  
Target: TBD  
• Food based coping strategy index of targeted households is reduced or stabilized  
**Target:** Average CSI of targeted households is reduced or stabilized  
Baseline: TBD  
Target: TBD |  
Resources are available on time.  
Beneficiaries continue to accept food basket.  
IDP camps and districts with numerous IDPs are secure enough to enable timely access  
Appropriate partners are selected.  
No pipeline breaks occur.  
Partners’ commitments are honoured.  
WFP and partners respect agreements.  
WFP’s partners have adequate human resources capacity for planning, monitoring and accountability.  
Improved security  
Regular access to distribution points (security & rainfall)  
Regular availability of transport/escorts |
ACRONYMS USED IN THE DOCUMENT

CIA Central Intelligence Agency
DSRSG Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General
ETC Emergency Telecommunications Cluster
FAO Food and Agriculture Organisation
GDP Gross Domestic Product
HCT Humanitarian Country Team
HDI Human Development Index
HOR House of Representatives
IFPRI International Food Policy Research Institute
IFRC International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IMC International Medical Corps
IOM International Organisation for Migration
Kcal Kilocalorie
LRC Libyan Red Crescent
M&E Monitoring and Evaluation
MISTS Minimum Security Telecommunications Standards
MOSS Minimum Operating Security Standards
mt metric tonne
NASCO National Supply Company
NFIs Non Food Items
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
NPSF National Price Stability Fund
PDM Post Distribution Monitoring
RB Regional Bureau
RC Resident Coordinator
SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary General
TPM Third Party Monitoring
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Organisation Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNDSS</td>
<td>United Nations Department for Safety and Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commission for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Support Mission in Libya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organisation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>