Mid-Term Review of the WFP Strategic Plan (2014–2017)

Draft decision*

The Board takes note of “Mid-Term Review of the WFP Strategic Plan (2014–2017)” (WFP/EB.1/2016/4-A) taking into account considerations raised by the Board during its discussion.

Note: The report has been prepared by an independent consultant. It has not been edited, therefore, some language may not conform to usual Board style and terminology but rather to the style and format of the author.

* This is a draft decision. For the final decision adopted by the Board, please refer to the Decisions and Recommendations document issued at the end of the session.

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I. THE FINDINGS

1. The mid-term review (MTR) of Strategic Plan (2014-2017) is designed to pave the way for a new Strategic Plan that will embody the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). It is intended to review the performance of WFP since the launch of the current Plan, and to raise a set of high-level considerations whose discussion could benefit the preparation of the next Plan.

2. The Review begins with an examination of the conceptual framework of WFP and finds that it would benefit from further refinement. Under the current Strategic Plan, WFP has sought to respond to range of different mandates: first, its own Mission Statement which dates back to 1994; second, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs); third, the United Nations Secretary-General’s Zero Hunger Challenge; and, fourth, the Strategic Plan (2014-2017).

3. The review finds that currently it is unclear whether the Strategic Plan is the sum of all these mandates or is an instrument that is additional and complimentary to them. In various interviews of WFP staff, several were of the view that the organization is primarily pursuing the Zero Hunger Challenge. The review also finds that currently the mandate of WFP sometimes widens rather than tightens as the Strategic Objectives are converted to goals, and as the goals are further defined under the Strategic Results Framework (SRF).

4. The review examines whether there has been continuity in the “historical shift from WFP as a food aid agency to WFP as a food assistance agency” as announced in Strategic Plan (2008-2011), under the dual humanitarian and development assistance mandate. Based on recent evaluation reports and the 2014 Annual Performance Report (APR), it finds WFP to be “an organization in transition.”

5. The review finds WFP’s role and extensive capacity in humanitarian logistics, which have led the organization to become the Lead Agency of the UN Logistics and Emergency Telecommunication Clusters, and which is a role that extends beyond food assistance, to be under-communicated to the broader public.

6. Based on all of the above the review recommends a tightening of WFP’s conceptual framework, using the transition towards the SDGs and the next Strategic Plan as the opportunity to do so; a consolidation of the transition from food aid to food assistance and an improved articulation of WFP’s comparative advantage in development assistance; and better communication of the full scope of WFP’s role to the public.

7. The Review examines the performance of WFP under the current Strategic Plan and finds that WFP has succeeded in accomplishing multiple humanitarian and development assistance objectives. In 2014, working with 1,100 non-governmental organizations, WFP emergency operations (EMOPs), protracted relief and recovery operations (PRROs), and development activities provided direct food assistance to some 80 million of the world’s most vulnerable people in 82 countries. Indirectly, the organization reached an even larger population.

8. However, the Review finds that while WFP has fulfilled its central role in emergency response and preparedness, and even exceeded expectations given the extraordinary surge in the number of emergencies around the globe, performance has varied on the longer-term Strategic Objectives. This has mainly stemmed from funding shortfalls, but is also evidence of a conceptual framework whose tightening, improved articulation, and communication could attract more funding.
9. The Review finds that WFP needs to continue to strengthen its core excellence in emergency response and preparedness. The organization, for the first time in its history, has had to contend with 6 concurrent Level 3 emergencies. Despite the extraordinary professionalism and commitment of its staff which is noted across countless internal and external assessments of WFP, this has stretched the organization’s capacity to the limit.

10. The Review examines how WFP optimizes its intervention measures in the field. It finds that while WFP interventions at regional and country levels are primarily based on need and dialogue with host country governments, there is merit in continuing to fine-tune methodologies for measuring the cost and reach of assistance. These methodologies could act as an aid to decision-making at corporate and national levels, and lead to improved performance assessment.

11. The Review finds that two important business model changes are continuing to take place in WFP; one is the increased use of cash-based transfers (CBTs) instead of direct food aid, and, two, is the rise in local procurement. It calls for continued reflection on what these changes mean for the long-term structure and function of WFP; i.e., the WFP of 2025 and beyond. It draws attention to the conversation likely to take place at the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) on the increased use of cash in humanitarian assistance, and WFP’s recent collaboration with other UN agencies in the creation of “common delivery platforms,” calling for reflection on the new roles that these developments could usher-in for the organization.

12. The Review finds that WFP must continue to build and strengthen the evidence base that would allow for more robust and conclusive corporate performance assessment reports.

13. Finally, the Review comments on the funding model of WFP, pointing to the multiple uncertainties that the current model creates – being based on voluntary contributions, the bulk of which are single-year and earmarked. The model impedes efficient financial planning and visibility and is one which all WFP stakeholders should strive to improve.
II. METHODOLOGY OF THE MID-TERM REVIEW

14. In the Executive Board Bureau Meeting of 3 September 2015, discussion was held on the launch of a new Strategic Plan one year ahead of schedule for alignment with the new SDGs, the outcome of the 2015 Paris Climate Conference, and the 2016 WHS.

15. Therefore, the MTR of Strategic Plan (2014-2017) has also been brought forward. As WFP transitions towards a new Strategic Plan anchored in the SDGs, this MTR seeks to guide the process through a high level review of the work of the organization from 2014 to date.

16. The MTR is based on a review of all of the following literature, issued during the course of the current Strategic Plan:

1) 2014 APR;
3) evaluation Reports;
4) audit reports;
5) annual reports of the Inspector General;
6) new policy documents;
7) new publications of WFP;
8) interviews of WFP senior staff.

17. On occasion, the MTR goes back further in time than 2014 to take a longer-term view on WFP’s transition from “food aid” to “food assistance” under its core dual humanitarian and development mandate. The MTR has also benefitted from some of the more recent external assessments of WFP, such as the assessment undertaken in 2013 by the Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN).

III. GLOBAL CONTEXT

18. WFP is the frontline United Nations agency in the global fight against hunger. Its operations are implemented in some of the most challenging environments around globe, ranging from countries thrust into violent conflicts, to others suffering from the after-shocks of serious natural disasters and climate change. Its presence and operations are concentrated in unstable and unpredictable environments.

19. The State of Food Insecurity in the World 2015 and Global Nutrition Report 2015 demonstrate that while significant progress has been achieved in reducing hunger and malnutrition under the MDGs, much work remains. On the positive side, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) Food Price Index demonstrates that food prices have fallen significantly since last year – a fall, however, that may be disrupted by the onset of the most recent El Niño.
Figure 1: Trends in Food Security, Nutrition and Food Prices

State of Food Insecurity in the World 2015: About 795 million people are undernourished globally, down by 167 million over the last decade, and 216 million less than in 1990–92. The decline is more pronounced in developing regions, despite significant population growth. However, in recent years, progress has been hindered by slower and less inclusive economic growth as well as political instability in some developing regions, such as central Africa and western Asia.

Global Nutrition Report 2015: Undernutrition and stunting in particular have profound implications for health, cognitive development, education, economic development and productivity. Significant progress has been achieved in reducing malnutrition in Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nepal, Rwanda, Tanzania, and nearly all of the Indian states. Progress, nevertheless, remains too slow and too uneven, with some forms of malnutrition, namely adult obesity, actually increasing.

The FAO Food Price Index – a food basket of cereals, oilseeds, dairy products, meat and sugar - averaged 156 points in September 2015, almost 19 percent less than one year ago. The FAO Cereal Price Index averaged 155 points in September, 13 percent down year-on-year.

20. Since the launch of WFP Strategic Plan (2014-2017), the organization has had to contend with a record level of six Level 3 emergency operations in 2014, and five in 2015. In 2015, the Central African Republic (CAR) was lowered from a Level 3 to a Level 2, whilst Yemen was declared a Level 3 by the United Nations. The breakdown of emergencies that WFP has addressed over the lifetime of the current Strategic Plan is as follows:

Figure 2: WFP Levels 2 and 3 Emergency Operations (2014-2017)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Level 3</th>
<th>Level 2</th>
</tr>
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</table>

21. In 2014, international humanitarian assistance rose for a second year to a record USD 24.5 billion, up by 19 percent from 2013. In response to the Arab Spring, international humanitarian assistance from donor governments in the Middle East increased by 120%.

22. There are now more displaced people in the Middle East than in Africa, and more displaced people in middle income countries than in low income countries. Today, more people are displaced than any time since World War II. Protracted displacement is becoming increasingly common; with the average period of displacement now close to 20 years - up from an average of nine years in the early 1990s. Moreover, conflicts have not only increased but have also become increasingly complex and protracted, with 24 African countries currently facing food crises - twice as many as in 1990.
23. Perhaps, the biggest of all threats is climate change, which acts as a multiplier of existing threats to food security, hunger and malnutrition. By 2050, the risk of hunger and child malnutrition could increase by up to 20 percent due to climate change. The most recent example of climate risk is the El Niño that has been active since March 2015 and is approaching maximum intensity. It could affect the food security of a large number of vulnerable people dependent on agriculture and livestock in Central America, Southeast Asia and most of sub-Saharan Africa.

24. As WFP transitions toward the new SDGs, its work will only gain in importance. It must continue to tackle acute and chronic emergencies, as well as assist the hungry and malnourished – the vast majority of whom now reside in the middle income countries.

25. Engagement in the major international conferences of 2015 and 2016 has and will allow WFP to better position itself in the humanitarian field. In 2015, the World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction, the Financing for Development Conference, the Summit for adoption of the Post-2015 Development Agenda, and the Global Climate Conference were all held. In 2016 the WHS and Habitat III are on the calendar. These conferences have, and will, set the stage for development aid and humanitarian assistance for the years to come, better defining the broader policy landscape in which WFP operates.

IV. DIRECTION SET BY STRATEGIC PLAN (2014-2017)

26. Strategic Plan 2014-2017 defined the mission of WFP as one of ending global hunger, ensuring that no children go to bed hungry, and that the poorest and most vulnerable, in particular women and children, would have access to the nutritious food they need.

27. The Strategic Plan offered a new approach to framing the work of WFP, creating the “3 Rs” of Respond, Rebuild and Reduce. WFP would prepare for and respond to shocks, restore and rebuild lives and livelihoods, and reduce vulnerability and build lasting resilience. It set four Strategic Objectives that the organization would pursue within this framework:

   “Respond”: Save Lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies (Strategic Objective 1);

   “Rebuild”: Support or restore food security and nutrition and establish or rebuilt livelihoods in fragile settings and following emergencies (Strategic Objective 2);

   “Reduce”: Reduce risk and enable people, communities and countries to meet their own food and nutrition needs (Strategic Objective 3); and

   “Reduce”: Reduce undernutrition and break the intergenerational cycle of hunger (Strategic Objective 4).

28. The Strategic Plan indicated that WFP would pursue its mission in accordance with international humanitarian law, and that it would strive to remain accountable, and to monitor and evaluate its impact through its Results Framework.

V. WFP’s CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
   A. The Mandate and the Transition to SDGs

29. From the beginning of 2014 to date, WFP has sought to respond to a number of different mandates. First, its own Mission Statement which dates back to 1994; second, the MDGs; third, the United Nations Secretary-General’s Zero Hunger Challenge; and, fourth, the Strategic Plan (2014-2017) and its four Strategic Objectives. In its next Strategic Plan, WFP will transition to the new SDGs.
30. Currently, it is unclear whether the Strategic Plan is the sum of all these mandates, or is an instrument that is additional and complimentary to them. In various interviews of WFP staff, several were of the view that the organization is primarily pursuing the Zero Hunger Challenge.

31. The multiplicity of mandates can act as a limiting factor on the organization’s ability to clearly articulate its priorities, its niche and comparative advantage relative to other food aid and development assistance organizations, and introduces complexity in results measurement.

32. Each of the different mandates to which WFP currently responds contains a different focus, and carries different implications for the role and functions of organization. For example, the Mission Statement still has “food aid” at its core, and primarily defines WFP as the “food aid arm of the United Nations system.” The Zero Hunger Challenge, on the other hand, calls for the pursuit of five different pillars that range from “zero stunted children less than 2 years of age” to making “all food systems sustainable.” While the Mission Statement certainly intersects with the Zero Hunger Challenge, the latter appears to be much broader. In addition, the four Strategic Objectives of Strategic Plan (2014–2017) go much beyond “food aid,” and are not easily or readily matched with the pillars of Zero Hunger. As WFP transitions towards the SDGs in its next Strategic Plan, this issue may need to be examined closely.

33. WFP’s mandate is articulated further in the context of the strategic planning process when each individual Strategic Objective is broken down into goals. These goals are then translated into outcomes within the organization’s SRF. However, WFP’s mandate appears to sometimes widen, rather than to tighten, as the SRF is reached, with this issue also requiring attention.

34. Figure 3 below takes Strategic Objective 2, and its respective Goals, as an example. Under Strategic Objective 2, the first goal states: “Support and restore food security and nutrition of people and communities and contribute to stability, resilience and self-reliance.” This one sentence at once refers to food security, nutrition, stability, resilience and self-reliance, which could be looked at as defining the mission of the entire WFP rather than lending precision to a particular Strategic Objective. The second goal states: “Assist governments and communities to establish or rebuild livelihoods, connect to markets, and manage food systems.” Once again, rebuilding livelihoods is itself a very broad concept, and when combined with connecting people to markets, and the relatively broad goal of managing food systems, it becomes questionable how much additional guidance it truly provides.

**Figure 3: Example of Strategic Objective 2 and its goals**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic Objective 2</th>
<th>Examples of “Goals” (1) and (2):</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Support or restore food security and nutrition and establish or rebuilt livelihoods in fragile settings and following emergencies | 1) Support and restore food security and nutrition of people and communities and contribute to stability, resilience and self-reliance  
2) Assist governments and communities to establish or rebuild livelihoods, connect to markets, and manage food systems |
| Example of “Outcome” under the SRF for SO2 Goal (2): |  
2.2) Improved access to assets and/or basic services, including community and market infrastructure |
35. Therefore, there is a need to clarify the intersection between the various mandates to which WFP responds; to clarify whether the Strategic Plan is designed to integrate these various mandates or to act as an additional tool; to update the organization’s Mission Statement; and to ensure that the mandate is tightened, rather than broadened, the further down it goes and until it reaches the SRF stage. The transition towards the SDGs would provide an ideal opportunity for such a review.

36. In addition, it may also be opportune, as per Strategic Plan (2008-2013), for each Strategic Objective in WFP’s next Strategic Plan to be immediately complemented with the types of activities (e.g. Nutrition or School Feeding) and modalities (e.g. CBTs or capacity development) that would support it. This would provide a clearer roadmap for how the organization intends to operationalize its stated aims. Strategic Plan (2014-2017) had disconnected the SOs from what it called the “Main Tools” for achieving them, and which came under a separate section of the report. More direct linkage would serve to articulate WFP’s mandate at operational level much more clearly.

B. Food aid to food assistance

37. Strategic Plan (2008-2011) announced a “historical shift from WFP as a food aid agency to WFP as a food assistance agency” under its core dual humanitarian and development mandate. This MTR examines whether there has been conceptual continuity in achieving this transition under the current Strategic Plan and what it means for the future.

38. Strategic Plan (2008-2011) did not define the term “food assistance” but presented WFP’s “overarching goal” as being “to reduce dependency and to support governmental and global efforts to ensure long term solutions to the hunger challenge.” To pave the way for this historic shift, the organization revisited its Strategic Objectives from those set under the previous Strategic Plan (2004-2007) so as to include, for example, the objectives of reducing chronic hunger and undernutrition, and strengthening governmental capacity to find home-grown solutions. Strategic Plan (2008-2011) was extended by the Executive Board to 2013.

39. In May 2012 the Office of Evaluation issued a report entitled Four Strategic Evaluations on the Transition from Food Aid to Food Assistance: A Synthesis. The Synthesis stated that the persistence of long-term hunger justified WFP’s continuing transition from food aid to food assistance. However, it called for a holistic approach to addressing “hunger,” and not an approach premised on a set of separate and independent short and long-term interventions.

40. The four Evaluations called for a clearer “conceptual framework” for defining the organization’s work in food assistance, a clearer articulation of its comparative advantage in ending long-term hunger, and a funding model consistent with this long-term view. They argued that WFP had not yet become a recognized development assistance player.

41. Looking at the overall performance of WFP through the entire suite of evaluations completed in 2014, Annual Evaluation Report 2014 observed that WFP’s shift from food aid to food assistance was still “work in progress.” It pointed to challenges in determining WFP’s efficiency, effectiveness and comparative advantages in new areas of its strategic and operational plans, such as resilience, nutrition and capacity building. The Evaluation Report called on WFP to continue to adjust its tools and services, funding and staffing strategies, and measuring and reporting practices, for a successful transition to food assistance.

42. Of note is that the aforementioned 2012 Synthesis evaluation found that the country strategy planning approach was assisting WFP in developing a more systematic and analytical approach to addressing the hunger challenge. In 2014, WFP has indeed developed and tested an improved
approach to the development of Country Strategic Plans (CSPs) based on strategic reviews undertaken in six countries. CSPs are intended to provide a more holistic view of the context in which WFP intervenes in a country, country needs, and the entire spectrum of what the organization may realistically achieve across its dual mandate. Their ultimate goal is to more strategically position WFP’s interventions at the national level.

43. WFP has recently adjusted part of its financial framework to respond to the significant changes that have taken place over the years to the way in which it does business; these changes are continuing to drive the next phase of the Financial Framework Review (FFR) from 2014 to 2016. The Review is intended to better align ‘resources’ with ‘results,’ providing a longer-term vision of organizational resources. In doing so, it is being seen as an essential complement to the new country strategic planning process.

44. In light of the above, there is a need to consolidate WFP’s transition from food aid to food assistance, with a clearer articulation of its comparative advantage in longer-term development. CSPs, which are still in their testing phase, present an opportunity for consolidating this transition. The FFR will strengthen CSPs by establishing a stronger linkage between financial, short, and long-term operational goals. A successful transition will, by definition, have to entail a reinforcement of WFP’s capacity development role—a topic discussed in subsequent sections of this report.

C. WFP does more than feed people

45. In addition to the critical role which WFP plays in tackling hunger, WFP’s expertise and extensive capacity in humanitarian logistics led the organization to become the Lead Agency of the UN Logistics and Emergency Telecommunication Clusters. While its role as Lead Agency of these two Clusters facilitates the access of vulnerable populations to food and directly contributes to the four Strategic Objectives of Strategic Plan 2014-2017, WFP’s involvement in these clusters goes beyond food.

46. For example, in the Ebola response, WFP supplied its logistics expertise to the wider humanitarian community in logistics planning, storage, procurement and transport, and the creation of main logistics hubs in or near the capitals of affected countries. Eleven Forward Logistics Bases were established across Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia. WFP managed the UN Humanitarian Air Service operating within and between the affected countries and regional hubs. Through the Emergency Telecommunications Cluster, WFP and its partners also provided internet and radio connectivity in 115 locations, giving reliable internet access to over 3,300 humanitarian staff. WFP also built over 30,000 square metres of facilities to house critical medical supplies and protection gear.

47. In addition, in 2014, and in view of WFP’s many years of collaboration with the Global Fund, WFP signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Fund to promote access to items such as anti-retroviral drugs and condoms through WFP’s storage, logistics, transport and shipping networks.

48. While the role that WFP plays in logistics and telecommunications is known amongst WFP staff, Members, the wider humanitarian community, and the broader public are largely unaware of this role. Furthermore, this role does not receive much coverage in Strategic Plans and the APRs do not report on Special Operations in any detail. WFP needs greater recognition for this critically important role in which it has emerged as a leader.
Recommendations

1) Tighten WFP’s conceptual framework in the next Strategic Plan, using the transition towards the SDGs as an opportunity to do so;
2) Better articulate WFP’s comparative advantage in development assistance;
3) Better communicate the critical service that WFP provides to the broader humanitarian community as the Lead Agency of the Logistics and Emergency Telecommunications Clusters;


A. Overall Performance as per APR 2014

49. In 2014, working with 1,100 non-governmental organizations, WFP emergency operations, protracted relief and recovery operations, and development activities provided direct food assistance to some 80 million of the world’s most vulnerable people in 82 countries. Indirectly the organization benefitted an even larger population.

50. In 2014, emergencies constituted the bulk of WFP operations as per Figure 4 below. Strategic Objective 1 represented 79% of the organization’s expenditures, 74% of its food distribution, 78% of its rations, and 55% of the beneficiaries it reached. Emergency work, therefore, is central to WFP operations. This said, SO2-SO4, represent significant areas of work in WFP in absolute value. Approximately USD 400 million were allocated to SO4 alone in 2014. In addition, approximately 45% of the organization’s beneficiaries were reached through its non-emergency functions. This means that WFP also assists a very large number of people through its non-emergency, or post-emergency, role.

Fig 4: WFP Operations in 2014 by Strategic Objective

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic Objective</th>
<th>Expenditure</th>
<th>Value (USD billion)</th>
<th>Food Distribution</th>
<th>Rations</th>
<th>Beneficiaries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SO1</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>3.35</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO2</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO3</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO4</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: APR 2014

51. In so far as “planned” versus “actual” food distribution can be taken as an important performance indicator, Figure 5 below demonstrates that whilst Strategic Objective 1 was fully accomplished (even exceeded), performance varied under the other Strategic Objectives. In 2014, actual food distribution exceeded the original plan under Strategic Objective 1 mainly due to the unprecedented surge in emergencies around the globe. However, the organization was only able to achieve 43-52% of its planned food distribution under Strategic Objectives 2-4. Underperformance on these Strategic Objectives was mainly attributable to funding shortfalls, underscoring the need for a more solid consensus on the organization’s development assistance role, and an adjustment of its funding model accordingly. As WFP Management Plan (2015-2017) stated “when funding is limited, managers prioritize life-saving activities under Strategic Objective 1 over other activities.”
Figure 5: Planned versus actual food distribution in 2014 by Strategic Objective (mt)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic Objective</th>
<th>Planned</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SO1</td>
<td>2206</td>
<td>2282</td>
<td>103%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO2</td>
<td>624</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO3</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO4</td>
<td>626</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2014 APR

52. Using project-level data, the 2014 APR provides an overall performance rating by Strategic Objective. Figure 6 below demonstrates excellent performance on Strategic Objectives 1 and 2, insufficient data on Strategic Objective 3, and further progress being required on Strategic Objective 4. Figure 6 broadens the insight into WFP’s performance by Strategic Objective by including elements in its assessment that extend beyond the food distribution indicator of Figure 5. It incorporates the organization’s assessment of, for example, whether or not projects have achieved their desired targets in areas such as nutrition programming, enhancing access to assets and services, expanding market opportunities for local food producers, and enhancing governmental capacity. Figure 6 points to a similar conclusion to Figure 5; i.e. one of clearer and stronger performance on WFP’s emergency and immediate post-emergency role.

Figure 6: Overall performance rating by Strategic Objective provided by the 2014 APR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic Objectives</th>
<th>Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SO1: Save Lives and Protect Livelihoods in Emergencies</td>
<td>Projects have either achieved their target or are on track to achieving their target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO2: Support or Restore Food Security and Nutrition and Establish or Rebuild Livelihoods in Fragile Settings and Following Emergencies</td>
<td>Projects have either achieved their target or are on track to achieving their target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO3: Reduce Risk and Enable People, Communities and Countries to Meet their Own Food and Nutrition Needs</td>
<td>Insufficient Data are available to be able to monitor progress throughout WFP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO4: Reduce Undernutrition and Break the Intergenerational Cycle of Hunger</td>
<td>Projects have made some progress but desired targets have not been met or progress towards desired targets has been deemed slow</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2014 APR

53. The 2014 APR demonstrates that extensive efforts were deployed by WFP under each Strategic Objective and that significant progress was made towards achieving WFP’s overall mission. In 2014, for instance, 74% of WFP food and 91% of CBTs were provided under Strategic Objective 1 – pointing to the rapid success which the organization has had in deploying CBTs in emergency contexts. In addition, activities in 32 operations in 18 countries were conducted to prevent nutritional deterioration and related mortality and support acutely malnourished people in emergencies. Activities to promote access to services and assets were conducted in 11 relief operations in 12 countries. A major focus was school feeding, which helped to increase enrolment and retention in schools.

54. The 2014 APR also demonstrates that under Strategic Objective 2, general distributions of food and CBT in post-emergency settings took place in 28 countries and that these were generally effective in improving the food security of vulnerable populations. Nutrition programming assisted 95 percent of targeted beneficiaries, and helped stabilize and reduce undernutrition in fragile contexts. Improvements in access to assets and services were comparatively modest. The mixed outcome-level performance under this objective was mainly attributed to funding cutbacks, which reduced deliveries of food assistance to 43 percent of planned levels.
55. The 2014 APR demonstrates that Strategic Objective 3 received the lowest level of resources, which affected the number of beneficiaries and the amount of food distributed. Gaps in outcome-level reporting prevented WFP from assessing overall performance under this objective. However, the APR nevertheless concluded that WFP helped increase market opportunities for local, national and regional producers and traders by procuring food products from them.

56. Similarly, the 2014 APR found that under Strategic Objective 4 resourcing constraints affected WFP’s delivery of outputs, particularly those related to capacity development. It demonstrated that WFP helped reduce malnutrition and improve access to education, but that results related to the enhancement of local and national capacities were inconclusive. Nutrition programming under this objective effectively reached eligible populations and treated beneficiaries with moderate acute malnutrition. School feeding supported 13.8 million children, almost double the planned figure, helping to increase retention in schools.

57. In addition, in 2014 under several Strategic Objectives, WFP continued to assist people living with HIV and Tuberculosis. In its 2011-2015 Strategy, the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) had designated 38 countries as high priority countries for assistance by co-sponsors as they accounted for 70% of the disease burden. In 2014, WFP assisted governments in addressing the food and nutrition needs of patients in 24 of these countries, initiating HIV-specific interventions in 19 of them and reaching approximately 0.8 million of beneficiaries. WFP also succeeded in expanding the use of vouchers in HIV and Tuberculosis programming in 2014, such as in Congo.

58. In being one of the largest programmes in WFP and a flagship of the organization, a comment is warranted on the School Feeding program. In 2014 it was implemented in 63 countries, reaching 16.7 million children. WFP adopted a revised school feeding policy in 2014 in which it maintained its partnerships with the World Bank and the Partnership for Child Development, and it also created a school feeding working group to discuss policy and programme issues with nine partner NGOs. To support government school feeding programmes, WFP rolled out the Systems Approach for Better Education Results (SABER) in 12 country offices and trained national staff in its use. In addition, 32 country offices implemented home-grown school feeding using locally produced food. In 2014, the use of CBTs in School Feeding continued to rise.

59. WFP has deployed its School Feeding program as a tool in transforming gender and social relations. In Yemen, for example, WFP continued its conditional School Feeding programme wherein household rations were linked to school attendance for girls. In Egypt, it continued to work with the Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and Statistics, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the International Labour Organization (ILO) to eradicate child labour through School Feeding. It deployed a conditional safety net whereby children received a snack in school and a take home ration upon achieving 80% attendance in school.

60. The Synthesis Report of 2014-2015 Operation Evaluations found that “School Feeding delivered well against coverage targets.” In fact, WFP’s experience in Honduras demonstrates how mainstreaming and capacity building were achieved through School Feeding, with the Honduran government now funding 85% of the program that was initiated by WFP 14 years ago.

B. General findings of recent evaluation reports on overall performance

61. Since the launch of the current Strategic Plan, two syntheses of evaluation reports of 28 WFP operations were issued. The Synthesis Report of Operation Evaluations (2013-2014), which was based on evaluations of 12 operations, found WFP to be “confident in its traditional strengths” but to very much be an “organization in transition.” It found WFP to have delivered broadly
relevant food assistance to its beneficiaries, with most operations being appropriate to national food security and nutrition needs, but at the same time cautioned against program ambitions exceeding the organization’s technical capacity to deliver.

62. The 2013 MOPAN assessment of WFP echoed these conclusions, stating that the organization has “built a strong reputation for responding quickly to emergencies, and documented evidence confirms the strength of its practices and systems for launching and sustaining humanitarian interventions.” But, it called for further work on WFP’s development assistance role.

63. The Synthesis Report of Operation Evaluations (2014-2015) demonstrated that important progress is now being made towards food assistance based on evaluations of 16 operations. It wrote: “WFP’s reorientation from implementer to enabler...appears to be gaining momentum. WFP has moved swiftly into policy spaces, acting as a convenor, modeller, information provider, leveraging actor, knowledge broker, and pilot tester of innovation to support nationally owned food assistance strategies.”

64. The Synthesis Reports call for continued attention to be paid to beneficiary targeting; gender mainstreaming; human resources management (in particular ensuring that staff have the requisite skillset); partnership; the strengthening of regional offices; sustainability; capacity building; expanding the evidence base; and building a theory of change. Several of these points are echoed in Annual Evaluation Report 2014, which adds that greater attention must be paid to how WFP engages the middle income countries. The Report calls for WFP to enhance its focus on strengthening national policies and systems within these countries, developing capacity and working in partnership.

65. At country or regional level, a number of Evaluation Reports have been undertaken since the launch of Strategic Plan 2014-2017. These include Country Portfolio Evaluations (CPEs) for the DRC, Indonesia, Uganda, and the United Republic of Tanzania, and the first ever regional portfolio evaluation - Evaluation Report of the Central America Regional Portfolio. Three common messages emerge from these evaluations:

(1) Evidence of persistent resource shortfalls. For example, the DRC evaluation found that “needs outstripped supply,” and the Indonesia evaluation found that the scale of WFP operations shrank considerably over the review period and that the “country office was operating in sub-survival mode;”

(2) Evidence of strong relevance of WFP interventions and alignment to national priorities. Most evaluations found WFP interventions to be aligned with national policies and complementary to government programs; with WFP having made useful contributions to nutrition in Central America for example, Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping (VAM) and School Feeding in Indonesia, and more.

(3) Evidence of country or regional strategies in need of sharpening or more faithful implementation. For example, the DRC evaluation found that the School Feeding expanded to 3.5 times its planned size, which was considered excessive by the evaluators relative to the relief assistance that was required in the country for displaced populations. This was explained by WFP having to focus its operations on areas which were easier to access. The United Republic of Tanzania evaluation found that there was “strategic drift” from some of the stated goals in the country strategy, recommending a fundamental reappraisal and justification of WFP’s comparative advantage and future role in the country. The Central America evaluation found that “there was no uniform WFP strategy across the region and no document clearly articulated how regional operations were complementary to or improved the coherence of WFP’s country-level efforts.” The Uganda evaluation
found that “the country office demonstrated mixed capacity for strategic decision-making” and that implementation was not always as coherent as the strategy.

C. Measuring the cost and reach of food assistance

66. Currently, the mix of WFP interventions at regional and country levels is primarily based on need and dialogue with host country governments. However, accurate methodologies for assessing the cost and reach of WFP food assistance would act as a critical tool for management and donors alike in assessing where the greatest value-for-money may lie in WFP operations, and lead to a more efficient choice of interventions in the field.

67. Despite the clarity which Figure 4 above provides on levels of expenditures by SO and percentage of WFP beneficiary reached, no immediate conclusions can be derived on where greatest “value-for-money” lies in WFP’s interventions by Strategic Objective or by specific program in the field (School Feeding vs. Food Assistance for Assets (FFA) for example).

68. At corporate level, an accurate cost-benefit analysis of WFP’s work remains difficult to undertake for the following reasons: (1) the term “beneficiary” being fairly broadly defined by the organization – “targeted persons provided with food assistance;” (2) the fact that methodologies are still being developed to capture the “indirect beneficiaries” of WFP operations; and (3) the fact that not all “rations” are comparable either in size or nutritional value. At country level, the application of a cost-benefit analysis methodology for deciding on the optimum intervention package would require “costs” to be assessed in relation to country context (the cost of delivering the same ration will be different in a country that is war-torn than it would be a more stable environment, for example).

69. The 2014 APR states that the number of “indirect beneficiaries” will be determined from 2015 onwards through a community-based participatory planning approach. WFP Management Plans have also signalled management’s intention to continue to refine its methodology for assessing the cost and reach of food assistance.

70. While methodologies for assessing the cost and reach of food assistance could never be the unique basis for decision-making in WFP because of the kinds of volatile environments in which the organization operates and the urgency with which it is often required to intervene, they should nevertheless become a growing component of the decision-making process at corporate and national levels.

71. Such methodologies would also facilitate performance assessment. The Synthesis Report of Operation Evaluations (2013 - 2014), for example, noted that while most outputs over the evaluation period had referred to the number of beneficiaries reached and transfers achieved against plans, “these metrics mask wide variations in type, quality and duration of assistance.”

D. Emergency settings

72. Since the launch of the current Strategic Plan, WFP has had to contend with an unprecedented number of concurrent Levels 2 and 3 emergencies (previously listed in Figure 2 above). In 2014, the organization responded to six concurrent Level 3 emergencies, four in countries affected by conflict, one in response to a typhoon, and one to address the outbreak of the Ebola virus disease. In addition, the organization responded to multiple serious and protracted emergencies such as the ones in Afghanistan, Mali, Myanmar, the DRC, the State of Palestine, Somalia, the Sudan and more.
73. The Ebola response required extraordinary effort on the part of WFP, creativity, and new forms of partnerships. To prevent a health crisis from becoming a food crisis, WFP and its partners rapidly reached affected communities in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. Also, as previously stated in this report, WFP as the Lead Agency of various UN Clusters lent critical support to the wider humanitarian community.

74. According to the 2014 APR, WFP’s emergency response model is based on the capacity to address two Level 3 emergencies and one rapid onset crisis simultaneously. However, the following main factors appear to have aided WFP in dealing with the aforementioned surge.

- First, the increased use of CBTs to a level not envisaged five years ago. In 2014, for instance, the CBTs modality targeted 2.7 million Syrian beneficiaries with a budget of USD 870 million.
- Second, improvements made to emergency preparedness since 2011. An example of this was the Internal Emergency Response Roster set up in 2014, which includes provisions to train all staff deployed as first and second-wave responders within three days of the declaration of an emergency.
- Third, robust advance financing and supply chain management. In 2014, the Executive Board established the Internal Project Lending (IPL) system to replace the Working Capital Financing Facility, raising its ceiling from USD257 million to USD 570 million; the USD350 million Forward Purchase Facility was renamed the Global Commodity Management Facility (GMCF) and strengthened; and corporate services financing, including the Capital Budgeting Facility, became a separate entity with a ceiling of USD70 million.
- Fourth, improved analysis of food security and vulnerability. Food security analyses and market assessments enabled WFP to select the optimum transfer modalities for its operations. There were 24 such reviews in 2014 with nine focused on markets and economic conditions, seven on crops and food security, three on food security baselines and five on emergency food needs; and
- Fifth, the reforms undertaken under the Fit-for-Purpose initiative, which have continued to shift the focus to country level, supporting improved programming, personnel management, and business processes.

75. An additional factor not cited in the Report, and which emerges from interviews with key staff, is that the organization’s ability to cope was largely due to the fact that many of these emergencies were spillovers from previous years, with programs already in place to address them. Had they all erupted simultaneously, the organization would have probably been unable to cope.

76. In fact, the organization has been so over-extended that this issue has featured in its internal Corporate Risk Register in 2015. Looking at the human resources front alone, in 2014, 600 staff were temporarily redeployed from Operations to deal with emergencies, often at a few days’ notice.

77. The scale of the conflict in Syria also stretched WFP in new ways; with the Syria portfolio coming to represent 26% of all WFP operations in 2014. In Syria, WFP reached an average of 4 million persons per month, despite the conflict seriously impairing humanitarian access. In partnership with the governments of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey, in 2014 WFP assisted up to 1.9 million Syrian refugees.
The Summary Evaluation Report on WFP’s Response to the Syrian Crisis found that WFP interventions had led to improvements in the humanitarian situation on the ground, were quickly scaled up, and that the use of electronic vouchers had reached unprecedented levels. The report nevertheless pointed to the perennial challenge faced by WFP of insufficient funding, calling for more “contingency planning” for funding shortfalls. This said, with a financial model mostly based on voluntary and directed multilateral contributions, it is not so clear how contingency planning would offer a long-term solution.

In general, the 2014 APR demonstrates strong delivery in emergency contexts by WFP, despite the tremendous internal challenges faced by the organization - whether on the human resources, the financing or other fronts; and external challenges - such as difficulty in accessing beneficiaries and ensuring the security of staff in highly unstable operating environments.

In 2014, WFP demonstrated its capacity to introduce important innovations in its handling of emergencies at national and regional levels. For example, as the Ebola outbreak raged in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, for the first time in history, WFP rolled out a mobile VAM (mVAM) simultaneously across the three countries to capture in real-time the evolving food security situation in quarantined areas. mVAM tools were fine-tuned in the process and are now used to monitor the situation of Malian refugees in Niger, the persons internally displaced by the Boko Haram crisis, and protracted refugee communities in Chad.

Other examples of innovation include the continued roll-out biometric food distribution procedures. After WFP and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) successfully rolled them out in two refugee camps in Kenya in October 2013 – a project that was the first of its kind globally and which had led to monthly savings of US$ 1.4 million in Kenyan operations – in 2014, agreement was reached to roll-out biometric ID checks across all East and Central Africa.

Of note is that the Synthesis Report of the Evaluations of WFP’s Emergency Preparedness and Response found that the WFP had made notable improvements in tackling emergencies. Its investment in United Nations Clusters was found to have been worthwhile, its reform efforts focussing on Level 3 emergencies had improved performance, and advance finance had enabled a speedier response by the organization. However, the Report nevertheless pointed to a number of areas requiring further improvement, such as human resources management, relationships with partners, the building of national capacity, and the more rapid deployment of cash-based transfers in emergency contexts. In addition, it cautioned against having Level 3 emergencies divert attention from lower level emergencies.

In addition, the 2015 Performance Audit Report on the Management of Corporate Emergencies drew attention to a number of areas in need of further work. The External Audit, for example, found an inconsistent application of WFP’s 2012 Emergency Response Activation Protocol. The Report also found that the internal management of emergencies, through the Strategic Task Force, requires strengthening, and called for a more systematic compilation of lessons learned after each emergency, as per the requirements of the Protocol.

A review of WFP’s assumptions for emergency preparedness is currently underway and will build on the most recent evaluation and audit reports. The 2014 APR detailed the actions currently being considered under the review, such as the simplification of the emergency preparedness and response package for use by country offices, the roll-out of training programs and more. Based on all the above, WFP should continue to strengthen its core excellence in emergency response and preparedness in light of the unprecedented number of emergencies around the globe.
E. Building blocks of WFP’s development assistance role

85. In May 1999, a key policy document entitled “Enabling Development,” was presented to the Executive Board. The document framed what would be WFP’s approach to development. It stated, for example, that WFP would only provide assistance when and where food consumption is inadequate for good health and productivity, it would use food assistance to encourage investment and to leave behind lasting assets, it would employ geographic targeting to concentrate food resources on food insecure areas. This document could assist WFP in further articulating its comparative advantage in development assistance.

86. Currently, WFP seeks to achieve development outcomes across all of its Strategic Objectives through activities such as capacity development, nutrition, disaster risk reduction, climate change preparedness, greater resilience, School Feeding, Purchase for Progress (P4P) and FFA. The section below reports on the progress made over the review period in several of these areas.

87. Going forward, there would be merit for the WFP to better identify the main building blocks of its development assistance role, and the precise development outcomes it seeks to achieve. Capacity development work which is mainstreamed across all Strategic Objectives, would in particular need to be stepped up if WFP is to succeed in enabling governments to themselves break the hunger cycle. Of note is that an evaluation of WFP’s Policy on Capacity Development will begin in early 2016.

i. Capacity development and South-South triangular cooperation

88. The 2014 APR characterized WFP’s performance in capacity-development as “mixed.” It found that all planned national assessments, and 91 percent of all planned nutrition trainings for government staff and technical advisory activities, to have been achieved. However, it also found that progress in improving national monitoring systems was modest, and the evidence base on the building of policies and regulatory frameworks to be insufficient to draw conclusions on WFP’s overall performance.

89. This said, the Synthesis Report of Operation Evaluations (2014-2015) which is based on a more recent set of data found that WFP’s shift from implementer to enabler had started to contribute to what it called “significant policy level achievements.” For example, in education, WFP’s involvement led to improved policy and accountability instruments for school feeding in Bangladesh, Ghana, Malawi, Mozambique, Tunisia and Zambia. In social protection, national protocols and implementation modalities established on the basis of WFP guidance were developed in Bangladesh, Mozambique and Zambia. WFP assisted Ghana, Malawi and Zambia in developing improved nutrition policy instruments aligned with international standards. WFP also contributed to the development and improvement of national planning and management instruments for DRR in Malawi, Mozambique, Pakistan and Zambia.

90. However, the Synthesis Report nevertheless cautioned against “piecemeal” approaches to capacity development, individual rather than systems-wide models, confusion between capacity development and capacity augmentation, and failure to deliver on commitments made at the design stage – which were issues that were found in five of the operations evaluations examined over its review period. Interviews of WFP staff also reveal concern over the existence of the right technical capacity within the organization to achieve an effective capacity building role, all the way from having the right staff skillset to having the know-how and the right frameworks.
91. In light of the above, a more holistic approach to capacity building appears to be required within WFP, with a clearer definition of the final outcome that this area of work seeks to achieve, and of the technical capacity and resources required for its successful execution.

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<tr>
<th>Capacity Building to Reduce Post-Harvest Loss in Uganda and Burkina Faso</th>
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<td>Between August 2013 and April 2014, WFP carried out an action research trial to reduce post-harvest losses for smallholder farmers in Uganda and Burkina Faso. The trial involved governments, NGOs and private sector partners and built upon existing programmes, Purchase for Progress (P4P) networks and work already done by FAO and IFAD to improve post-harvest practices at farm-level. The project focused on 400 farmers and applied proven practices from developed countries, recent learning from successful trials in other developing regions, and theoretical recommendations from research.</td>
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<td>WFP’s trial was successful, illustrating that post-harvest crop losses in developing countries can be dramatically reduced when appropriate capacity development and improved farming equipment are introduced. For all participating farmers, without exception, the new procedures and technologies enabled food losses to be reduced by more than 98 percent regardless of the crop and regardless of the duration of storage. The near-eradication of post-harvest food losses at the farm level was a very significant outcome in itself, and was further amplified by the additional benefits of augmenting household finances (as crops could be stored and sold during more favorable market conditions), improving family well-being (through increased nutrition and reduced exposure to food contaminations) and increasing the surplus of quality food available for community consumption. The technologies used also reportedly reduced women’s workloads as the time-consuming process of daily cleaning and shelling of cereals was eliminated. WFP has recently mounted a special operation to reach more farmers with the improved technologies and practices.</td>
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92. In this connection, CSPs could offer an important opportunity for WFP to step up its capacity building role, in particular through the strategic reviews that precede the development of the actual plans. They could offer a solution to the “piecemeal” approach criticized in evaluation reports.

93. A strategic review is an independent, consultative analysis of all the different challenges that a country faces in achieving zero hunger – such as gaps in the national policy framework and programmes, in public and private funding of the food security and nutrition sector, and in the implementation capacity of government institutions – with proposals on how WFP and its partners can support the country. The reviews are intended to allow WFP to craft CSPs that respond to the ensemble of country needs through a less fragmented approach. As these reviews are independent, nationally-led, and conducted in close collaboration with host country governments, they could in fact come to act as the first key step in WFP’s capacity building role.

94. In addition, South-South and Triangular Cooperation is another important dimension of WFP’s capacity building mission. It is premised on the understanding that many development countries already possess solutions to eliminate hunger and that the WFP could act as a facilitator of South-South cooperation to make these solutions more widely available.

95. In 2015, WFP’s first policy on South-South and triangular cooperation was also formulated and approved by Executive Board. Since its approval, WFP’s work on South-South cooperation has been advancing in two key areas: the preparation of a “How-to Guide” on South-South Cooperation for WFP Country Offices, and the preparation of a WFP Technical Assistance Strategy as an umbrella framework for WFP’s engagement of developing countries.
96. Based on the 2014 APR, important progress appears to have been made in this area of work. South–South or triangular cooperation was facilitated by 48 percent of country offices in 2014, with WFP working closely with regional and sub-regional institutions. The WFP Centre of Excellence against Hunger, which completed its third year of operations in 2014, engaged with 40 countries on South–South cooperation, and supported 34 developing countries in formulating policies and programs to address hunger and poverty.

   ii. Nutrition

97. An examination of WFP’s performance on nutrition in 2014 demonstrates that extensive efforts were deployed in this critical area of operations. During the course of the year, WFP implemented nutrition programmes in 53 countries, through 83 projects across all six regional bureaux. It reached more than 10.3 million young children and pregnant and lactating women in nutrition-specific programmes. Half of children 6-59 months of age reached by nutrition programmes were treated for moderate acute malnutrition, while the remaining 50% were reached with programmes to prevent undernutrition. The 2014 APR nevertheless states that resource constraints held back performance, in particular under Strategic Objective 4.

98. In 2014, WFP continued to invest in improving its capacity to implement nutrition prevention programmes and generate better programmatic evidence. The stunting prevention programme funded by the Child Investment Fund Foundation in Malawi, Right Foods at Right Time: Improving Nutrition of Children Under Two, continued to collect key pieces of programmatic data, at scale, in near real time to better inform and improve the programme’s operations (WFP implemented the program through various partners). The program has provided a learning opportunity for the rest of the organisation in improved evidence generation, monitoring and evaluation.

99. WFP continued to invest in new techniques for nutrition assessment. It operationalised the use of Nutrient Gap Analysis, including the increased use of the Cost of Diet Tool. This tool calculates the cost of the cheapest nutritious diet based on local market information and dietary patterns. It enables programmers to establish an understanding of the proportion of the community that cannot afford a nutritious diet, in addition to the size of the gap between the current average income and that required to meet the nutrient needs of the household.

100. WFP, in collaboration with partner agencies, governments, research institutions and the private sector worked to accelerate the momentum for rice fortification as a strategy to address micronutrient deficiencies. This was an important capacity building initiative. WFP’s Bangkok and Pacific Regional Bureaux in coordination with multiple partners hosted the first regional rice fortification workshop “Scaling Up Rice Fortification in Asia. The workshop brought together key stakeholder to discuss the latest policy and technical developments, the evidence base, exchange programmatic experiences and lessons learnt.

101. WFP demonstrated innovation in its nutrition programming at country level in 2014. For example, WFP and UNICEF initiated a joint nutrition scale-up plan for South Sudan. Since then, the two agencies have demonstrated that by working together, in collaboration with Nutrition Cluster and government partners, it is possible to respond to critical levels of malnutrition, even in the highly complex, insecure environment of South Sudan. As a result, the two agencies have treated far more children for acute malnutrition in the first half of 2015 than the whole of 2014.

102. In 2014, WFP also strengthened its partnerships on nutrition with key partners such as UNICEF and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), developing a multi-donor partnership for local production, and hosting the Scaling up Nutrition (SUN) Global Gathering. In early 2015, it was also agreed that the Renewed Efforts Against Child Hunger and Undernutrition (REACH)
partnership would become the United Nations Network for SUN secretariat. WFP is generally implementing its nutrition work in the context of the “Rome Declaration on Nutrition and Framework for Action,” i.e. the outcome of the 2014 Second International Conference on Nutrition.

103. The Synthesis Report of Operation Evaluations (2014-2015), which was based on 10 operations concerning nutrition, found that nutrition was on a “positive trajectory.” It cited a significant increase in beneficiary coverage through nutrition interventions since 2012, and stated at output level that “Performance was comparatively constant across operations – perhaps reflecting more realistic planning and/or growing donor confidence in WFP’s capabilities.”

104. The Summary Evaluation Report of the Nutrition Policy (2012-2014), which reviewed 38 operations globally, found WFP’s 2012 Nutrition Policy to be relevant and timely, and to be widely understood and accepted across the organization. However, it also found that dissemination of guidance to support policy implementation had not kept up with staff demand, and that nutrition programming had not been scaled up to the extent envisaged by the policy. The report made a number of recommendations, including embedding nutrition objectives in the next Strategic Plan, improving policy guidance for implementation, strengthening the monitoring and evaluation of nutrition operations, strengthening WFP’s own internal capacity in this area, and properly resourcing the implementation of the nutrition policy.

iii. Disaster risk reduction, climate change, resilience & food for assets

105. In the last five years, 40 percent of WFP’s operations as a whole have included activities related to DRR, resilience and climate change adaptation. In 2014, WFP launched the Food Security Climate Resilience Facility (FoodSECuRE), a replenishable fund for supporting communities in building resilience to climate risks. FoodSECuRE uses seasonal climate forecasts to trigger funding and action before shocks occur.

106. In 2015, the Executive Board approved WFP’s new policy on building resilience for food security and nutrition. In addition, the Rome-based agencies (RBAs) have jointly developed a conceptual framework to “Strengthen Resilience for Food Security and Nutrition.” Systematically incorporating a resilience approach to strategy and programme formulation will be facilitated by roll out of the new WFP CSPs.

107. In 2014, WFP continued to use its FFA program for disaster risk reduction, greater resilience and adaptation to climate change. Typical FFA activities have included rebuilding infrastructure, restoring the natural resource base, and enhancing water management. The Synthesis Report of the Evaluation Series on the Impact of Food for Assets (2002-2011) found that “WFP was effective in providing food and employment to people in underserved communities during periods of civil unrest and natural disaster, and built useful assets in the process.” It found women to be important beneficiaries of the FFA program, the “asset survival” rate to range from 40-90% based on the type of asset it examined, and the program to be contributing positively overall to WFP’s work on DRR and resilience.

108. However, the evaluation called for continued attention to be paid to the longer-term benefits of FFA on food security and dietary diversity, as well as the targeting of the poorest and most excluded groups, suggesting that stronger FFA design and planning could strengthen the program. It also called for adequate funding to be secured corporately. In 2014-15, therefore, WFP management strengthened the FFA’s programmatic guidance.
Recommendations:

4) Fine-tune methodologies for the cost and reach of assistance as an aid to performance assessment and decision-making at corporate and national levels;

5) Maintain, and strengthen as required, WFP’s core excellence in emergency response and preparedness in light of the unprecedented number of emergencies around the globe;

6) Reinforce WFP’s capacity development role within its established areas of expertise.

VII. BUSINESS MODEL CHANGES

109. Of note is that Strategic Plan (2014-2017) is being implemented as WFP continues to make important changes to its business model: (1) delivering food assistance through CBTs when appropriate, and (2) moving towards increased local rather than international food procurement. This transition is taking place in tandem with the change that the organization has itself seen in how it is funded. At the launch of the previous Strategic Plan, WFP received 18% of its funding in-kind, which today has fallen to exactly half (i.e. 9%). These business model changes should prompt reflection on what the WFP of the future will look like; i.e. the WFP of 2025 and beyond.

110. Local food procurement, of course, offers tremendous potential in stimulating local economies and contributing to WFP’s capacity building goals, whilst the increased use of CBTs positions WFP well for the conversation likely to take place at the 2016 WHS on the role and future of cash in humanitarian assistance.

111. However, both changes may have profound implications for the structure of WFP and how it operates, and necessitate continued review. For example, as will be explained below, under CBT, WFP has started uniting with other humanitarian agencies to establish “common delivery platforms.” What will these platforms imply for the future direction of humanitarian assistance, and the role of WFP? In addition, will the increased use of cash and local procurement have implications for the logistics capacity that WFP has developed over the years, the required staff skillset, monitoring and assessment tools in the field, and partnerships? These questions require in-depth brainstorming and analysis by WFP stakeholders.

A. Cash-based transfers

112. The option of CBTs gives WFP the flexibility to adapt its food assistance to the needs of beneficiaries, in particular in situations where in-kind food aid may not be optimal. Cash transfers and vouchers for food-insecure individuals and households has undergone rapid expansion over the years. In 2009, CBTs were used in 26 operations in 19 countries, and by 2013 had reached 72 operations in 53 countries. In 2014, CBTs reached 8.9 million people, with an approved budget of USD1.49 billion. This amounted to 21 percent of WFP’s operational costs for food assistance that year.

113. Figure 8 below shows the significant rise in CBT expenditure since 2009, in particular in emergency contexts. In fact, 91 percent of CBT were provided in an emergency context in 2014. The largest single operation involving widespread use of CBT was the Level 3 response to the Syrian refugee crisis, which targeted 2.7 million beneficiaries in 2014 with a budget of USD870 million.
114. WFP is currently introducing important changes to beneficiary targeting in the context, in particular, of CBTs. WFP country offices will, as part of their regular project design/review process and not later than the end of 2017, plan for the use of a system called SCOPE in CBT operations that would standardize beneficiary information and distribution cycle management processes. SCOPE is an online platform whose core features are to register beneficiaries with biometrics, creating distribution lists for partners, and exporting invoices for retailers. SCOPE will also be introduced to support in-kind operations in up to 15 large countries across all regions, as part of regular project design/review processes no later than the end of 2016.

115. In 2014, WFP worked extensively with UNHCR, UNICEF and other partners to establish “common delivery platforms” for CBTs in the State of Palestine, Jordan and Lebanon. These platforms are intended to allow beneficiaries to meet more than their food needs, giving them the possibility of purchasing other goods and services, such as shelter, health and education. They unite humanitarian assistance agencies in new ways, and are likely to form part of the discussion set to take place at the 2016 WHS.

116. The Summary Evaluation Report of WFP’s Cash and Voucher Policy (2008-2014) found that the policy was helping WFP achieve its strategic shift from food aid to food assistance, that no new policy was needed, but that a greater implementation focus was now required. It recommended the development of manuals and guidance documents, robust monitoring and evaluation systems, and the clarification of advance financing mechanisms in relation to this transfer modality so as to reduce implementation delays, in particular in emergency contexts.

117. Also of note is that the most recent Annual Report of the Inspector General of April 2015 has called for increased attention to be given to the risks associated with this new delivery modality, which is continuing to grow. The audit highlighted the opportunities for enhancing the control environment through, for example, continued improvements to beneficiary registration and verification processes - which is what SCOPE is set to do so.

B. Procurement and Purchase for Progress

118. WFP’s procurement function has the dual role of ensuring the timely purchase of food, goods and services at the best price, and using the organization’s purchasing power to help develop markets as mandated by the Executive Board in 2006. Each year, WFP procures approximately 2.2 million metric tons of food valued at USD1.2 billion and in 2014, goods and services procurement was valued at USD575 million. Currently, over 65% of WFP’s annual supply chain spending occurs in countries or regions where it operates, resulting in multiplier effects in local economies.
WFP has tested various ways of leveraging its local purchasing power through the P4P pilot. In 2014, 200,000 smallholder farmers were supported in improving crop quality and increasing sales to WFP and other buyers through P4P. Following the promising outcomes of the pilot, pro-smallholder market development activities are now part of WFP programmes in a total of 35 countries. The aim of WFP is to increase purchases from smallholder farmers to 10% of yearly procurement by 2017.

The Summary Report of the Strategic Evaluation of WFP’s Pilot Purchase for Progress Initiative (2008-2013) found that the program had enhanced the credibility of WFP as a “development partner” and should continue to be perfected. At farmer-organization level, the evaluation observed increased sales in almost all countries where data was available, however, at smallholder level it found no evidence that sales had led to increased incomes attributable to the program. It also found that the capacity building efforts directed at farmers’ organization and smallholder farmers to have been insufficient. It called for improvements in a number of areas, such as the development of guidelines for future P4P pilots, stating that some aspects of P4P were ready to be mainstreamed. Currently, recommendations from the P4P evaluation are being implemented and smallholder procurement mainstreamed in operations.

In 2014, WFP saved USD38 million on food purchases. Behind these savings were three key drivers: i) an improved ability to aggregate demand and therefore push down prices, ii) the introduction of innovative procurement contracts that allow suppliers to hedge their risk and therefore lower their sales prices, and iii) an optimization of food baskets that allows WFP to source the best priced commodity for the same nutritional impact, and to do so in line with local preferences.

More specifically Food Supply Agreements (FSAs) – which are innovative procurement contracts – were introduced in 2014, and have reduced lead time and cost. FSAs allow suppliers to plan ahead, to book their options when costs are low, and to pass the efficiency gains onto WFP. They have resulted in savings of approximately USD21 million for WFP in 2014. WFP’s USD350 million Global Commodity Management Facility (GCMF) also allowed country offices to purchase food in advance of need. In 2014, country offices purchased 800,000 mt of food valued at USD290 million through GCMF inventories, reducing the average lead time by 87 days.

In May 2014, the Report of External Auditor on Food Procurement in WFP called on WFP to make its procurement more strategic and less reactive, to ensure proper competition throughout its procurement processes and to minimize the use of waivers, to improve vendor management, to ensure the efficiency and timeliness of procurement operations, to continue to integrate P4P and forward purchasing platforms into procurement activities, and to pay due attention to food quality, in addition to other recommendations. As evidenced from the above, significant changes and improvements have already been made.

In addition, in 2015, WFP built on the results of the supply chain management review under the Fit-for-Purpose initiative, by establishing an integrated Supply Chain Management Division. Integrated supply chain management, which is several years old in WFP, has already demonstrated its benefits in Syria and in the tackling of the Ebola Virus Disease, for example, by significantly reducing the lead times and costs of the assistance provided.

The new Division will continue to promote a more holistic approach to the planning, sourcing and delivery of food using WFP’s different transfer modalities. By uniting procurement and logistical support, it will increase synchronization across the entire supply chain, eliminate redundancies, promote a more customer oriented approach, and better assist the UN Logistics Cluster. In addition, it will be better positioned to ensure food quality throughout the supply
chain through the existing Food Safety and Quality Management System (FSQMS). In fact benefits of the integrated supply chain approach already showed when, of the over 400,000 MT of food purchased for Syria in 2014, WFP lost only 0.17% to quality issues at supplier and port level.

Recommendations

7) Continue to reflect on the implications of business model changes for the structure and function of WFP.

VIII. MEASURING RESULTS

126. Several evaluation reports have noted that there is a need to strengthen the evidence base across the entire spectrum of WFP activities for more informed decision-making and improved results management. The 2013 MOPAN assessment also found that currently “the WFP’s corporate performance reports do not yet provide a holistic account of the organization’s results achievement, with the evidence base being too narrow to confidently demonstrate outcome-level change.”

127. A number of steps have been taken to address these issues. In the development of the 2014-2017 SRF a set of Key Outcome Indicators were defined. These are tracked and reported on annually in relation to baselines and targets. The organization also developed Standard Operating Procedures for project monitoring and a set of Minimum Monitoring Requirements setting expectations with respect to the frequency of monitoring, statistical requirements and data sources for each SRF indicator.

128. This suite of instruments, rolled-out across the organization in 2014 and 2015, comprises the Normative Framework for Monitoring. This Framework clarifies expectations for the conduct of monitoring across the organization. In addition, the COMET - which supports country offices in the design, planning, monitoring, evaluation and performance reporting of their operations – has also rolled-out as foreseen to the mid-term.

129. However, further work continues to be required in improving results measurement. The 2014 APR had itself noted that under Strategic Objective 1 that “outcome level evidence regarding WFP’s performance in supporting emergency preparedness was limited in 2014 because few projects reported sufficient data;” under Strategic Objective 2 that “WFP’s contributions to developing national food security capabilities could not be assessed given limited measurement at project level;” and under Strategic Objective 3 that “gaps in outcome-level reporting prevented WFP from assessing overall performance under this objective.” However, it should be mentioned that some of these reporting shortfalls may have been due to the fact that a new SRF was introduced, with some new indicators, to accompany the current Strategic Plan. The reporting rate can be expected to improve, therefore, in 2015 and beyond.

130. On the evaluation side, a UN system-wide assessment of the evaluation function in the UN was conducted in 2014. In line with its findings, and after extensive consultations by WFP management and the Office of Evaluation with Members, agreement was reached to shape WFP’s future evaluation function as a ‘centralized evaluation with demand-led decentralized evaluation’. This new approach has been reflected in the revised Evaluation Policy (2016-2021).
Recommendations

8) Continue to build the evidence base that would allow more robust and conclusive corporate performance assessment reports;

IX. INTERNAL REFORMS

131. Since the launch of Strategic Plan (2014-2017) WFP continued to conduct significant internal reforms largely on the foundation of the Fit-for-Purpose organizational strengthening program which was started in 2013. The main reforms brought to fruition since 2014 spanned the following four areas: human resources, business process review, organizational design and partnership.

132. With respect to human resources, WFP’s People Strategy was launched in 2014 and presents the blueprint for how WFP intends to strengthen its workforce. The four imperatives of the strategy are to reinforce a performance mindset, build WFP’s talent, shift the focus of investment to national staff, and equip high-impact leaders.

133. To reinforce a performance mindset, WFP extended its staff performance appraisal process to cover consultants, short-term staff and volunteers. In addition, it revamped its promotions policy to make it more objective and transparent. To build talent, it established clearer career paths within the organization that would give staff visibility on how their role could grow. It launched a review of all job profiles, in part, to ensure that the required staff skill-set is present. A new job profile was developed, for instance, for nutrition. It also launched a talent pool initiative to allow for faster recruitment; a capacity development initiative to enhance web-based learning, in particular to reach staff in the most remote locations; and an initiative called Inspire, to assist female staff in reaching leadership positions.

134. To shift of the focus onto national staff which represent 80% of the organization’s workforce, it has strengthened skills development activities targeting these staff, and transferred 3400 local staff into the FAO administrative framework for a more streamlined approach to the management of their salaries and benefits. In fact, the 2015 Global Staff Survey demonstrates a 10 percentage point increase in the number of national staff indicating that they are receiving the right training to meet their job requirements.

135. To equip high impact leaders, it created a Leading for Zero Hunger Programme – a programme specifically tailored to WFP – that is designed to enhance leadership and management skills. Currently, 35% of WFP staff enrolled in the programme are national staff. In addition, leadership promotion has been strengthened through a set of procedural changes and greater transparency.

136. Two key issues emerge in most evaluations with respect to WFP’s human resources model: (1) that certain skillsets are not readily found within the organization, in particular in the newer areas of WFP operations, such as nutrition and capacity building, and other mission critical areas such as monitoring and reporting; and (2) that the model is stretched to the limit by the onset of emergencies, with staff having to be redeployed with little notice.

137. Further effort will need to continue to be made with respect to the former, with several country offices continuing to report that they do not have the right talent. On the latter, in addition to the existing Internal Emergency Response Roster previously referred to which was launched in 2014, an External Emergency Response Roster is now being developed for 2016. Its goal is to place 300 pre-vetted external candidates within easier reach of WFP. Efforts are also underway to strengthen the Internal Roster by ensuring, amongst other things, that it includes staff with
the right profile (experience, skill-set, etc.). These two areas, flagged by evaluation reports, should be kept under review.

138. With respect to business process reforms under the Fit-for-Purpose initiative, accomplishments include the previously discussed supply chain re-engineering within the organization; and the launch CSPs and the FFR. On organizational design, in 2014 WFP continued to reposition country and regional offices as its centre of gravity, shifting greater financial and human resources towards them. Country offices are continuing to be repositioned as the frontline support to beneficiaries and regional offices as the frontline support to country offices. However, in light of the findings of the CPEs and the first RPE previously referred in this MTR, and which demonstrate persistent resources shortfalls in country offices and the need to reinforce their strategic focus, further efforts will need to be deployed. Finally, the outcome of Fit-for-Purpose in the area of partnerships is reported on in a subsequent section of this report.

X. CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES

139. Three “cross-cutting issues” were identified in SRF 2014-2017 which are (1) gender mainstreaming; (2) protection and accountability to affected populations, and (3) partnerships, which are reported below. Strategic Plan (2014-2017) had not itself identified any set of cross-cutting issues, and these issues diverge from the ones previously established under the Mid-Term Review (2008-2013) which were (1) social protection, (2) cash and vouchers, and (3) gender. As the conceptual framework for WFP’s work is clarified as per the previous discussion in this MTR, it may be useful that the cross-cutting issues also be re-examined. Several of these issues already find reflection under individual Strategic Objectives or their related Goals, and the merit of continuing to set them apart should be explored.

A. Gender Mainstreaming

140. Strategic Plan 2014-2017 committed the organization to a coherent, well-coordinated and gender-sensitive response to urgent food and nutrition needs. To advance with this approach and track results, WFP now requires the inclusion of a gender marker code in new projects. Of the 38 EMOPs, PRROs and country programmes approved in 2014, 30 received a gender marker code. The gender marker is intended to enable WFP to track planning and expenditure information by gender. WFP is sharing this best practice with other United Nations organizations to support coherence in the utilization and comparison of achievements in this important area of operations.

141. WFP also introduced the Gender Expenditure Analysis resource-tracking mechanism in 2014 to quantify gender activities, planning requirements and actual expenditure, along with a catalogue to identify gender-related activities in standard WFP operations and ensure consistency and common understanding. The Gender Expenditure Analysis showed that WFP’s projects utilized around 12 percent of all expenditure for gender-related activities in 2014, and helped to identify good practices.

142. In 2014 WFP renewed its commitment to gender equality and women’s empowerment in food assistance by engaging in a year long process to develop a new gender policy that is guided by the four WFP SOs and which complements other WFP policies. Summary Evaluation Report of the WFP Gender Policy (2008-2013) had declared the previous policy to not be fit-for-purpose. The WFP Gender Policy 2015-2020 is based on a comprehensive gender accountability framework; by the end of 2015, each regional bureau will have a regional gender strategy that should provide country offices with the vision and roadmap to formulate their own gender action plans.
143. WFP has also launched a pilot gender award initiative, in partnership with UNDP and with the assistance of three Country Offices (Myanmar, Peru and Republic of South Sudan). Gender mainstreaming has long been an important strategy in WFP to advance gender equality. The Award for excellence in Gender Equality is designed to scale-up work in regional bureaus and country offices on promoting good gender equality.

144. This project translates the WFP Gender Policy and system wide requirements into very concrete standards, focused around the work of country offices. A country office meeting those standards will be recognized and awarded. The award is based around evidence of gender mainstreaming and targeted action in programming, human resources, capacity development, partnership, knowledge sharing and results.

145. Despite 2014 achievements, however, gender remains an area in which significant progress is required in WFP as the outcome of recent evaluation reports shows. The Synthesis Report of Operation Evaluations (2013-2014) found that gender sensitivity across all operations was limited and in two instances operations were deemed gender blind. Several evaluations, particularly those in Chad, Mozambique, the Philippines and Tajikistan, noted the need to improve gender sensitivity at the design stage. Six evaluations reported under-achievement or non-achievement of outcome targets, mostly in school feeding and nutrition activities.

146. The more recent Synthesis Report of Operation Evaluations (2014-2015) found that gender results continued to be “mixed” and mostly quantitatively reported. For example, of the 16 evaluations examined in the Report, only four were assessed as being gender sensitive at the design stage. In light of the evaluation findings continued progress appears to be required in this critical workstream.

B. Protection and accountability to affected populations

147. The WFP Protection Policy was adopted by the Executive Board in February 2012 with the objective of ensuring safer, more dignified, and more accountable solutions to food insecurity and hunger. Under Strategic Plan (2014-2017), WFP committed to implementing its Strategic Objectives in accordance with international humanitarian law, respecting the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality.

148. In June 2014, WFP updated the Executive Board on the implementation of the Policy. Overall the update validated the approach set out in the policy, showed that WFP had made progress across all policy areas and indicated that no fundamental changes were required at that point. The update also highlighted a number of issues and lessons that will inform the future implementation phase of the Policy.

149. Between 2012 to date, some 1,800 staff and partners have been trained in Protection in 29 Country Offices. A preliminary study exploring the linkages between migration, violence and food insecurity in Central America was completed and launched in September 2015. Draft guidelines on Privacy and Personal Data Protection have been developed and will be ready for release by the end of 2015. Protection and accountability were recently integrated into the new WFP’s new Emergency Programming Framework.

150. According to the Accountability to Affected Populations Baseline Survey of February 2015, 49% of WFP country offices have established complaints and feedback mechanisms. The survey also shows that at least 67% of country offices base programmatic decisions on consultations with affected people, whenever possible. In addition, two protection and accountability-related indicators were integrated in the new SRF 2014-2017.
151. In general, the 2014 APR demonstrated relatively strong results on Protection and AAP. It stated that “safety incidents to beneficiaries travelling to and from WFP programme sites were largely mitigated, including in all Level 3 emergencies. The targets for informing people about programmes were met in more than 75 percent of reporting projects, but WFP needs to ensure that beneficiaries are correctly informed about food distribution modalities.”

C. Partnerships

152. A new Corporate Partnership Strategy was adopted in June 2014. It establishes a comprehensive framework and tools to select and facilitate partnerships that can deliver the greatest value. Implementation has focused on promoting a consistent and effective approach to partnering, supported by training, tools, guidance and partnership information management, including the launch of a Partnership Resource Centre in 2015. Part of the aim of the new Strategy has been to refine the concept of partnership in WFP in light of the transition from food aid to food assistance – i.e. to broaden the concept so as to generate the kind of engagement and support that the WFP of today truly needs.

153. Within the framework of this strategy, WFP offices have continued to work intensively with governments to create sustainable, long-term and effective partnerships, and to establish WFP as the partner of choice. WFP also continued to develop innovative partnerships with the private sector to raise resources and secure knowledge and expertise. For example, the partnership with Royal DSM provided WFP with expertise in the field of high nutrient products.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MasterCard – WFP Partnership</th>
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<tr>
<td>The MasterCard and WFP partnership aims to deliver innovative solutions to meet the needs of the world’s hungry and vulnerable populations. The partnership links MasterCard’s expertise in technology and payment systems to WFP’s expertise in delivering food assistance and is valued at over USD 7 million to date. The partnership includes:</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Digital Food</strong>: MasterCard helps WFP strengthen its delivery of “digital food” that comes in the form of e-cards so refugees and other vulnerable people can better access the food they need from local markets. MasterCard supported the roll out of e-cards to refugees in response to the Syria crisis in Lebanon and Jordan. Since January 2014, the cards have reached 244,000 Syrian refugees and vulnerable people in Lebanon and 195,000 in Jordan.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Integrated Giving</strong>: MasterCard uses its marketing and branding capacity to raise awareness and funds for WFP in key markets.</td>
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<tr>
<td>o Achievements 2014 - 2015: MasterCard engaged in 35 marketing campaigns to raise funds and awareness for WFP across 18 countries. In 2014-2015 MasterCard donated USD 2,244,128 to School Feeding with a particular focus on East Africa. This is equivalent to nearly 9 million school meals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o MasterCard launched the Priceless Causes platform in October 2014 with Italian bank, Banco Posta. The platform is the first of its kind and allows any MasterCard cardholder to donate to WFP every time they use their card. To date over 2,000 cardholders have joined the platform.</td>
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154. A dedicated engagement strategy with the NGO sector is currently being developed, consisting of three main building blocks: An ODI think piece on WFP’s future partnership with NGOs; efforts to simplify partnering in emergencies by putting in place an emergency field level agreement protocol; and a wholesale revision of WFP’s corporate guidelines for partnering with NGOs. The main goal behind the strategy is to expand vision for partnership with NGOs from pure implementation – i.e. from a purely transactional relationship, to a partnership in cooperation and advocacy. The aim is to also be able to track and measure the impact of NGO partnerships.

155. Of note is that the Synthesis Report of Operation Evaluations (2014-2015) characterised WFP partnerships in implementation as being “generally strong.” However, it nevertheless cautioned against the trend to sometimes “go-it-alone” at operational level, pointing to some opportunities that were missed, or design-stage promises that were unfulfilled. Six evaluations addressed in the report had found over-optimistic assumptions of partner capacity, both technical and financial, that had led to over-ambitious programming, whilst others found poor communication, and weak accountability. These issues will need to be reflected upon, in particular, as the new engagement strategy with NGOs is developed.

156. In January 2015, the Executive Director endorsed the first Advocacy Framework of WFP. The Framework, which will be subject to quarterly updates, articulates WFP’s key positions across a range of humanitarian and development topics under the umbrella of the Zero Hunger Challenge. It will enable all WFP staff, whether at headquarters, liaison offices, or the in the regions to better articulate the position of WFP on key issues, acting as ambassadors for the organization, and gradually expanding the political space for humanitarian assistance.

157. At global, regional and country level, WFP has continued to work alongside fellow RBAs, the FAO and IFAD, nurturing partnerships across all areas: from policy and advocacy to programming and administrative collaboration. The RBAs played a key role in supporting Member States in the process leading to Agenda 2030, particularly the articulation of SDG2. In addition, the RBAs jointly helped the Committee on World Food Security on the voluntary guidelines for responsible agricultural investment, the framework of action for food security and nutrition in protracted crises, and policy recommendations to reduce food losses and waste. The RBA resilience working group prepared a joint framework on resilience, which was adopted in 2015.

158. The RBAs also increased their collaboration at country level. The three agencies worked together in 11 projects in 10 countries in 2012, which rose to 21 projects and 18 countries by 2014. Almost 80% of WFP country offices have worked with one RBA or both in 2014. Of note, of course, is that WFP also works closely with FAO in co-leading the United Nations Food Security Cluster.

XI. RESOURCING

159. In 2014, WFP resources rose to USD5.38 billion, enabling the organization to address new and ongoing emergency needs. The top 10 donors in 2014 responded to the growing humanitarian crises with contributions totalling USD4.5 billion, an increase of USD925 million – or 26 percent – from 2013. WFP established a more stable donor base in the Gulf region over the review period. Host governments have also made their largest contribution in WFP history, providing USD210 million in 2014. WFP is continuing to seek an expanded and more diversified donor base.
160. The vast majority of organizational resources are now cash-based, while the in-kind contributions have remained relatively stable in recent years. The increased portion of cash-based contributions has provided WFP with the flexibility to ensure that the best possible delivery modality is used (food, vouchers or cash).

**Figure 6: Cash and In-Kind Resources**

![Cash and In-Kind Resources](image)

161. A significant and persistent challenge in WFP’s funding model has been the lack of flexible funding, with some funding streams being of a short-term duration, and others being directed to particular projects, activities or communities (directed contributions). Currently, only about 11 per cent of WFP’s funding is multi-year, which obliges WFP to request advance finance (repeat external appeals and internal project lending). In addition, un-earmarked contributions (multilateral contributions) which enable WFP to prioritize the greatest needs, have been declining since 2011. From a period high of 12 percent in 2011, the amount of multilateral resources has dropped to 8.1 percent in 2014. Restricted contributions constrain partnerships with governments and NGOs, create challenges in planning and implementing longer-term hunger solutions and contributing to capacity development, and constrain the measurement of impact over time.

**Figure 7: Directed vs Multilateral Contributions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Directed contributions %</th>
<th>Multilateral contributions %</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>90.6</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>88.0</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>89.4</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>91.1</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>91.9</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

162. Over the review period, a number of Evaluation Reports have pointed to the shortcomings of the organization’s funding model, and overall limited resources. Synthesis Report of Operation Evaluations (2013-2014) cited “funding limitations” as the second biggest constraint during the evaluation period on the organization’s operations.
163. Examples abound of the challenges created by this funding model. Over the review period, some examples include:

(a) The case of the Ebola Virus Disease, where funding was earmarked to specific activities or countries making it difficult to reallocate funds as needs changed. This resulted in overfunding of WFP operations in Liberia and underfunding of operations in Guinea. Moreover, requests to have funds reallocated to different countries or activities were sometimes denied, or activities delayed due to the time taken to waive the earmarking;

(b) The case of refugees in Cameroon, where the strict earmarking of funds to CAR refugees versus Nigerian refugees at the peak of the displacement period in the summer of 2015 acted as a major constraint on WFP’s ability to deliver life-saving assistance to all those in need;

(c) The case of nutrition activities in Uganda, where donor restrictions on the loaning of food across operations or countries has meant that some activities had to be suspended. As the delivery of supercereal stocks faced delays in Uganda, available stocks in neighbouring countries could not be transferred to this particular operation due to donor restrictions.

164. Access to thematic funds has continued to be very important for WFP, supporting the Strategic Plan to fund actions for climate change resilience, health, gender and agriculture support, which are critical to the organization’s mission. WFP also accesses a variety of pooled funds. However, the Summary Evaluation Report of WFP’s Use of Pooled Funds for Humanitarian Preparedness and Response (2009-2013) demonstrated that these funds too suffer from earmarking. It stated that “The earmarking of pooled funding for specific activities within WFP operations increases transactions costs, constrains the flexibility of response and does little to improve the quality of the response.”

165. As previously mentioned in this Report, the FFR is now underway. The FFR is piloting approaches that could transform project planning, provide access to funding at optimum times, facilitate cost efficiency and improve donors’ access to information. During 2015 and 2016, WFP will use the Review as an opportunity to restructure and integrate its financial framework with the SRF. Better alignment and more direct links between resources and results will improve decision-making capabilities, especially at the field level. These and other issues will need to be incorporated in a renewed WFP-wide resourcing approach, to ensure WFP has the funds it needs to partner with governments, improve its programs and emergency response, and continue to aim for long-term hunger solutions.

166. Finally, it should be noted that 2015 Annual Report of the Inspector General found that WFP has a “stable control environment,” which is a significant achievement given the size of the organization and the complexity of its operations.
Recommendation

9) Strive for a funding model better adapted to the agreed short and long-term mission of WFP.

XII. CONSOLIDATED RECOMMENDATIONS

Conceptual Framework
1) Tighten WFP’s conceptual framework in the next Strategic Plan, using the transition towards the SDGs as an opportunity to do so;
2) Better articulate WFP’s comparative advantage in development assistance;
3) Better communicate the critical service that WFP provides to the broader humanitarian community as the Lead Agency of the Logistics and Emergency Telecommunications Clusters;

Cost and Reach of Food Assistance
4) Fine-tune methodologies for the cost and reach of assistance as an aid to performance assessment and decision-making at corporate and national levels;

Operations
5) Maintain, and strengthen where required, WFP’s core excellence in emergency response and preparedness in light of the unprecedented number of emergencies around the globe;
6) Reinforce WFP’s capacity development role within its established areas of expertise;

Business Model Changes
7) Continue to reflect on the implications of business model changes – CBT and Local Procurement - for the structure and function of WFP;

Evidence base and Communication
8) Continue to build the evidence base that would allow more robust and conclusive corporate performance assessment reports;

Resources
9) Strive for a funding model better adapted to the agreed short and long-term mission of WFP.

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The purpose for which WFP was founded is reflected in Article II of its General Regulations and Rules. According to Article II, “The purposes and functions of WFP” are: (a) to use food aid to support economic and social development; (b) to meet refugee and other emergency and protracted relief food needs; and (c) to promote world food security in accordance with the recommendations of the United Nations and FAO. In order to achieve the foregoing purposes, WFP shall, on request, implement food aid programmes, projects and activities: (a) to aid in economic and social development, concentrating its efforts and resources on the neediest people and countries; (b) to assist in the continuum from emergency relief to development by giving priority to supporting disaster prevention, preparedness and mitigation and post-disaster rehabilitation activities; (c) to assist in meeting refugee and other emergency and protracted relief food needs, using this assistance to the extent possible to serve both relief and development purposes; (d) to provide services to bilateral donors, United Nations agencies and nongovernmental organizations for operations which are consistent with the purposes of WFP and which complement WFP’s operations.

WFP has responded to MDG 1, “Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger,” as well as MDGs 2-8, and will be transitioning to the SDGs. The most relevant SDG, SDG 2, states: “End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture.”

The pillars of the Zero Hunger Challenge are zero stunted children less than 2 years; 100% access to adequate food all year round; all food systems are sustainable; 100% increase in smallholder productivity and income; and zero loss or waste of food.

The Strategic Plan identified what it referred to as the “Main Tools” that would be used to achieve its Strategic Objectives, and which included the modalities for “Transfers” (general and targeted distribution; asset and human capital creation; and nutrition), “Operational Services” (analysis, procurement, logistics, ICT and engineering), and “Technical Assistance, Partnerships and Advocacy.”

Four Strategic Evaluations on the Transition from Food Aid to Food Assistance: A Synthesis, OE/2012/S002. The four Strategic Evaluations were: (1) WFP’s Role in Social Protection and Safety Nets; (2) WFP’s Role in Ending Long-Term Hunger; (3) From Food Aid to Food Assistance – Working in Partnership; and (4) An Evaluation of How Country Offices Adapt to Change.

WFP began piloting country strategies in 2009. A 2011 independent review of the country strategy process, and the Business Process Review under the Fit-for-Purpose initiative, concluded that while the country strategy document is a constructive approach, there was a need to better harmonize strategic and programmatic planning. WFP developed, refined and tested an enhanced approach in response to the recommendations, based on strategic reviews in six countries in 2014. The approach reflected the importance of high-level engagement with governments by partners, including WFP, and close alignment of their strategies with national and international hunger targets.

Based on work of WFP’s Beneficiary Counting and Cost Calculation Task Force in 2013.

See p. 100 of the 2014 APR.

Summary Report of the Joint Evaluation of the REACH Initiative (2011–2015) discusses the role REACH and the various ways it can be improved.

Summary Report of the FAO/WFP Joint Evaluation of Food Security Cluster Coordination in Humanitarian Action (2009-2014) makes a number of recommendations on how to improve the cluster coordination mechanism.