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# EVALUATION REPORTS

Agenda item 7

*For consideration*



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## SUMMARY EVALUATION REPORT ZIMBABWE COUNTRY PORTFOLIO

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## NOTE TO THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

**This document is submitted to the Executive Board for consideration**

The Secretariat invites members of the Board who may have questions of a technical nature with regard to this document to contact the WFP staff focal points indicated below, preferably well in advance of the Board's meeting.

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Zimbabwe once had a thriving economy and was a net exporter of agricultural products, but between 2000 and 2008 its macroeconomic conditions steadily declined, culminating in the collapse of the economy in 2008. In early 2009 the dollarization of the economy, the liberalization of markets, the Global Political Agreement and other factors began to turn around the economy and the food security situation.

The evaluation covered WFP operations in Zimbabwe between 2006 and 2010. From 2006 to 2008 the country office provided a massive food aid response to almost 7 million beneficiaries, while starting in 2009 it shifted to a more flexible, market-driven approach.

The evaluation focused on three issues: i) how well WFP positioned itself strategically and how well it aligned with government and partner strategies; ii) how well WFP made strategic choices; and iii) how the portfolio performed, including what results were achieved.


The evaluation findings related to WFP's alignment with government policies and strategies, United Nations agencies and the WFP Strategic Objectives were generally positive in spite of a turbulent context. While there was good synergy with other United Nations agencies on strategic decisions with respect to the Government, there was potential for greater synergy on most activities, especially food for assets, cash for assets and nutrition support for anti-retroviral therapy.

The main drivers of response strategies were political and economic shocks and changes in national policies. The country office used evidence strategically and efficiently to develop new programmes and adjust existing ones. It complemented internal capacity with expertise from the regional bureau and Headquarters, which helped generate additional evidence for designing and implementing new instruments such as cash transfers, cash for cereals and e-vouchers. As a leader in analysing national hunger and food security issues, the country office used information effectively to make programme decisions and influence strategic decisions of the Government and other stakeholders.

The evaluation concluded that the portfolio performed generally well against the criteria of relevance, efficiency and effectiveness. However, the performance and results of nutrition support for anti-retroviral therapy was limited by factors such as lack of functioning equipment, inadequate training of partners' medical staff and absence of an effective exit strategy. The impact was more difficult to assess because outcome indicators were not systematically collected and activities such as food for assets and cash for assets were introduced relatively late in the period under review. The evaluators found that the recently introduced activities could potentially have a positive impact provided some design problems were addressed. Most of the portfolio was a response to a food security emergency and not expected to result in a sustainable outcome. However, those activities intended to be sustainable – for example health and nutrition support for people infected with HIV or tuberculosis – made limited contributions to sustainability.

The evaluation made eight recommendations, divided into strategic and operational.

## DRAFT DECISION\*



The Board takes note of “Summary Evaluation Report Zimbabwe Country Portfolio” (WFP/EB.A/2012/7-B) and the management response in WFP/EB.A/2012/7-B/Add.1 and encourages further action on the recommendations, taking into account considerations raised by the Board during its discussion.

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\* This is a draft decision. For the final decision adopted by the Board, please refer to the Decisions and Recommendations document issued at the end of the session.

## INTRODUCTION

### Evaluation Features

1. The Zimbabwe country portfolio evaluation, conducted in September 2011, examined the strategic and operational role that the WFP played in Zimbabwe from 2006 to 2010 when the portfolio comprised one regional and one national protracted relief and recovery operation (PRRO) and a Special Operation. It focused on three issues: i) how WFP aligned and positioned itself strategically; ii) the driving forces behind the choices made in programming activities; and iii) the portfolio's performance and results. It was timed so that its findings would contribute to the country strategy document and to the Zimbabwe United Nations Development Assistance Framework (ZUNDAF), both scheduled to be drafted in 2012.

### Context

2. Zimbabwe ranks 151<sup>st</sup> of 177 countries on the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) human development index, significantly lower than in 2002, when it ranked 71<sup>st</sup>, and in 1989, when it ranked 35<sup>th</sup>. It once had a thriving economy and was a net exporter of agricultural products, but between 2000 and 2008 macroeconomic conditions steadily declined, culminating in the collapse of the economy. The agriculture sector employs 70 percent of Zimbabweans; it has declined continually since the late 1990s when forced land redistribution and the collapse of markets contributed to an average negative growth of -9.9 percent, reaching -39.3 percent in 2008. High levels of HIV and tuberculosis (TB) infection have had negative impacts on livelihoods. Political instability and violence peaked in 2008 in the context of hyperinflation, a cash crisis and restricted access to food-insecure rural areas.
3. In early 2009 the dollarization of the economy, the liberalization of markets and the Global Political Agreement (GPA) stabilized underlying macroeconomic conditions and led to an impressive economic turnaround in 2009 and 2010. Access to vulnerable communities, and collaboration between the humanitarian community and the Government, improved significantly. The presidential elections scheduled for 2012 could result in renewed political instability; the future is precarious in spite of improved macroeconomic conditions and food security for most Zimbabweans.

### WFP's Portfolio in Zimbabwe

4. From 2006 to 2010, WFP implemented one regional PRRO (10310), one national PRRO (10595) and one Special Operation (10822). The portfolio covered two distinct periods. From 2006 to early 2009, WFP provided a massive food aid response targeting 7 million beneficiaries. When the macroeconomic recovery and political stabilization in early 2009 provided the conditions to pilot innovative approaches, the country office shifted from providing general food assistance to using more flexible, market-driven instruments. The portfolio activities included vulnerable group feeding (VGF) such as school-based feeding and support for mobile vulnerable populations; nutrition support for people living with HIV (PLHIV); food/cash for assets; a cash transfer pilot; and e-vouchers. The country office also implemented technical expertise transfer activities intended to enhance government capacity to reduce hunger. The Special Operation supported the humanitarian community and Government response to the 2008 cholera outbreak, ensuring an uninterrupted supply of relief items along with logistics coordination of the humanitarian community.

## EVALUATION FINDINGS

### Alignment and Strategic Positioning

5. It was a complex undertaking to work within the government policy and operational framework during the turbulent period under review. The evaluation found that the WFP country portfolio is generally well aligned with government policies and strategies. The country office worked diligently within a very difficult operating environment of hyperinflation, political confrontation and poor governance to comply with the alignment requirement and implement its programmes. This required developing practical operational guidelines to be able to work effectively and move beyond rhetoric. The challenges to working within central government processes and structures included inadequately trained government staff; insufficient funding; the politicization of public service; weak leadership; and limited ability within key ministries to implement activities. WFP had more success working with local government, although local government staff members were not adequately funded, equipped or trained.
6. The WFP country portfolio was well aligned with United Nations agencies<sup>1</sup> at the broad conceptual level, and consistent with mandates. There was good alignment at the policy/strategy/technical level – for example the operational guidelines for food for assets (FFA) and management of acute malnutrition – but weaker alignment at the implementation level.
7. There was good synergy with other United Nations agencies on strategic discussions with the Government. WFP worked collaboratively within the United Nations coordination mechanisms, including the ZUNDAF, clusters and the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP). There was potential for greater synergy with most programmes, most notably food/cash for assets and nutrition support for clients on anti-retroviral therapy (ART) as complementary support for attaining sustainable livelihoods.
8. The portfolio was well aligned with the WFP Strategic Plan (2008–2013). Vulnerable group feeding, school-based feeding and support to mobile and vulnerable populations (MVPs) were clearly aligned with Strategic Objective 1.<sup>2</sup> Food/cash for assets and cash transfers were aligned with Strategic Objective 2 and Strategic Objective 3. The activities to provide nutrition support for ART clients and TB patients were aligned with Strategic Objective 4.

### Making Strategic Choices

9. The country office was a leader in the compilation and analysis of data on hunger and food security issues in Zimbabwe, using the information to make programme decisions and to influence the strategic decisions of the Government and other stakeholders. There are strong ties among the vulnerability analysis and mapping (VAM), the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) and the programme units, which ensures that information is shared and used. The country office complemented internal capacity with external expertise to

<sup>1</sup> UNDP, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS).

<sup>2</sup> Strategic Objective 1 – Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies; Strategic Objective 2 – Prevent acute hunger and invest in disaster preparedness and mitigation measures; Strategic Objective 3 – Restore and rebuild lives and livelihoods in post-conflict, post-disaster or transition situations; Strategic Objective 4 – Reduce chronic hunger and undernutrition.

generate additional evidence used to guide the design and implementation of new instruments: cash transfers, cash for cereals (CFC) and e-vouchers.

10. The main driver of country office responses were political and economic shocks and changes in national policies. WFP did an excellent job of identifying how the situation on the ground was changing, and used evidence to develop new programmes and adjust existing ones. During 2009 and 2010 in particular, the country office worked with partners to analyse government policies and strategies, and better understand how to align with them. WFP selected the correct programme categories during the period, including adding a Special Operation to support the logistics response to the cholera outbreak.
11. The country office did an excellent job of coordinating internal operations and programme activities, ensuring that programmes were very well articulated, managed and implemented. This was owing to good leadership, especially in the programme, logistics and VAM units. One area noted for improvement was the coordination of beneficiary targeting across WFP programmes and between WFP's programmes and those managed by other agencies such as UNICEF, FAO, the Department for International Development (DFID) and Promoting Recovery in Zimbabwe (PRIZE) and the Government.

## Portfolio Performance and Results

⇒ *Overview of assistance provided to beneficiaries*

12. The portfolio comprised two PRROs, which assisted as many as 7 million beneficiaries in 2008, and one Special Operation. The regional PRRO had a global funding ratio<sup>3</sup> of 85.5 percent and assisted people in seven southern African countries that were vulnerable to food insecurity and the impact of AIDS; Zimbabwe received 41 percent of food delivered. The national PRRO had a funding ratio of 71 percent and provided 449,865 mt of food mostly through VGF, with a smaller safety net component. The Special Operation received 51 percent of requested funds, applying them to enhance the logistic capacity of humanitarian organizations to contain a cholera outbreak.
13. Overall, the evaluation team found that the assistance provided was relevant and that its timing and level were appropriate to the food security conditions. The country office appropriately adjusted the volumes of food assistance, the targeting of beneficiaries and the choice of activities to meet the changing circumstances, and incorporated learning from experience in the field and pilots. The actual numbers of beneficiaries of VGF were generally in line with the planned numbers; in late 2008 and early 2009 actual numbers of beneficiaries greatly exceeded planned figures, reflecting significant increases in the number of highly food-insecure people. For the health and nutrition activities, differences between planned and actual beneficiaries reflected programme adjustments – for example, a shift from home-based care to support for ART clients – and available resources. For the food/cash for assets activities, the difference between actual and planned beneficiaries was owing to programme adjustments necessitated by government policy changes. For the cash transfer activities, WFP increased the number of beneficiaries to 58,886 from a planned target of 19,000 when additional resources became available.

<sup>3</sup> Total funding received as a percentage of total funding requested for the regional PRRO; data was not broken down by country.

⇒ *Assessment of assistance provided by activity*

14. **Vulnerable group feeding.** The VGF activity achieved the objective of saving lives and protecting livelihoods. There was no significant break in the pipeline and the country office was able to shift the amount of assistance up or down as conditions changed. WFP's ability to adjust to changing conditions, especially during the period from 2006 to early 2009, resulted in a significantly larger number of beneficiaries than planned, and thus mitigated any potential emergency. Effective geographic targeting resulted in assistance being provided where it was needed.
15. **School-based feeding.** School-age children in food-insecure areas received food regardless of whether they attended school. Using schools as a feeding site was critical in providing this assistance, which made a particularly positive contribution in late 2008 and early 2009 when needs were highest.
16. **Health and nutrition activities.** The health and nutrition activities performed well and achieved the desired results. However, the nutrition support for ART clients activity faced limitations such as insufficient measurement equipment, inaccurate measurements – including body mass index (BMI) – and the use of BMI as a single entry/exit criterion. Food consumption scores improved significantly owing to the country office's distribution, as verified by post-distribution monitoring; there remained few scores of "poor". Although providing incentives for voluntary HIV testing was not an objective of WFP programming, food assistance provided through this activity helped to increase voluntary testing, and the impact should be recognized: voluntary testing almost doubled from 2007 to 2009. This is important because the co-infection rate between TB and HIV is between 60 and 80 percent. The activity guidelines stated that support should last 6 months, but the average duration of participation was longer. Beneficiaries reported improved well-being; one cooperating partner provided evidence that clients had gained weight.
17. **E-vouchers.** These were introduced late in the period under review and represent a small part of the portfolio, but they were assessed to be a secure and efficient system. The activity virtually eliminated fiduciary risk and provided convenience and confidentiality. Stigma was greatly reduced but not eliminated, given that only food brands associated with HIV infection were available in exchange for the vouchers.
18. **Food/cash for assets.** Although it was too early to evaluate the longer-term impact of FFA and cash-for-asset (CFA) activities, the evaluation team inferred from other FFA activities implemented in Zimbabwe – the Consortium for the Southern Africa Food Security Emergency and the PRIZE Consortium – that households could graduate from chronic food insecurity and reliance on food aid to greater self-reliance. The FFA/CFA activities were well received by beneficiaries, with most beneficiaries investing more than the required four hours per day. The evaluation team identified some important gaps in the design of FFA/CFA projects. While the objective was to create productive community assets, May to October was too short a period to complete the work, and only in chronically food-insecure districts was there any year-to-year continuity. For other districts, the lack of consistent effort undermined the work required to build productive assets. In addition, there were too few FFA/CFA activities reaching too few beneficiaries in relation to Zimbabwe's development needs.
19. **Cash transfers.** The cash-transfer pilot targeted three districts eligible for VGF during 2009/10. WFP increased the number of direct beneficiaries from 19,000 to 58,886 owing to availability of resources. The ration was estimated to cover 80 percent of a household's monthly food needs; the cash equivalent was based on local prices and was adjusted monthly. The evaluation team found that the learning objective was a success, but cash had

a limited effect on dietary diversity compared with food only or cash and food. Distributing cash without nutrition messages reduced the potential impact of the programme promoting cash for cereals and in-kind provision of oil and pulses. The evaluation found that the results of the pilot were used by the country office to inform the design of a cash-for-cereals intervention implemented in 2010 and 2011.

20. **Mobile and vulnerable populations.** The objective of providing emergency assistance to MVPs was achieved. WFP provided assistance to four types of displaced persons: i) former commercial farm workers displaced by land reforms; ii) people affected by Operation Restore Order; iii) migrants deported from South Africa; and iv) members of households affected by flooding. The mobility of MVPs, especially those in urban areas, made it difficult to keep beneficiary registries up to date. By early 2007, cooperating partners stopped registering new beneficiaries with a view to lowering the risk that food aid would become an incentive to migrate to urban areas. Assistance provided to MVPs resulted in their having greater food security and better nutrition indicators than host populations; this created pressure to include the very poor living near internally displaced person camps. Urban people uprooted by Operation Restore Order lost their possessions. While food assistance helped them, in peri-urban areas it was not complemented with durable solutions and was insufficient for rebuilding livelihoods; it may have created some dependency. One challenge faced by cooperating partners was that the exit point for MVPs was not linked to livelihood recovery nor to resolving the drivers of illegal displacement.
21. **WFP response to the 2008/09 cholera outbreaks.** WFP also played an important role as the emergency logistics cluster lead, especially during the cholera outbreak. With virtually no additional staff and at very short notice, WFP organized a logistics cluster cell in Harare that offered the humanitarian community and the Government logistic services that included warehouses, consolidation of humanitarian cargo, information management, facilitation of transport, delivery of supplies from WFP hubs to cholera treatment centres and access to WFP's contingency fuel stock. The entire humanitarian community acclaimed the logistics expertise and leadership of WFP, which was provided even though the Special Operation received 50 percent of required funding.

⇒ *Factors explaining results*

22. The main factors explaining the results were the extreme and changing economic and political conditions, and the responsiveness the country office demonstrated in navigating them. While 2006 to early 2009 was a period of occasionally extreme political and economic instability, the period of early 2009 through 2010 was a period of macroeconomic stability. The country office exhibited strong leadership, technical and managerial competence, effective use of evidence in decision-making and great flexibility.

## CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### Overall Assessment

23. The evaluation team's overall assessment of the Zimbabwe 2006–2010 country portfolio was positive. The high quality of the country office staff and strong leadership allowed WFP to navigate through two very distinct and difficult periods, and the portfolio activities were relevant and adjusted appropriately. Through early 2009 the focus was on responding to the food crisis by assisting highly food-insecure households, while taking advantage of improvements in the economic and political conditions. The country office maintained operational excellence in delivering food assistance. It also maintained effective dialogue with the Government and other stakeholders, which improved coordination and yielded

such tangible results as operational guidelines for FFA/CFA activities and field-level agreements. Useful and timely support from the regional bureau and Headquarters helped ensure success in adjusting some programmes – notably health and nutrition – and developing others, such as cash transfers.

24. Several issues need to be addressed. Although the Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee (ZimVAC) rural assessment played a critical role in geographic targeting, its effectiveness for WFP was limited because its results are statistically reliable only at the district level, while WFP requires them to be reliable below that level. The nutrition support for ART clients was limited by such factors as unavailability of functioning equipment, inadequate training of clinic and hospital staff, and lack of an effective exit strategy.

## CONCLUSIONS

25. **Relevance.** The portfolio's activities were relevant to the needs of the Zimbabwean people. From 2006 to early 2009 the main activity, VGF, was the most appropriate response given the impact of political and economic shocks. WFP did a good job of adjusting the assistance levels based on evidence. Food assistance provided through the MVP activity to urban dwellers made homeless by Operation Restore Order, and through the school-based feeding activity to children, was relevant given the needs. In the period from early 2009 through 2010, the country office seized opportunities provided by increased economic and political stability to pilot or expand FFA/CFA and cash transfer activities, which served the dual objectives of assisting food-insecure populations and supporting market mechanisms. Nutrition support for ART clients and chronically ill people was extremely relevant in Zimbabwe given the high numbers of PLHIV and TB patients. Complementary nutrition support provided the opportunity for many patients to adhere to treatment, regain weight and lead productive lives; it also encouraged voluntary testing. E-vouchers were a relevant delivery mechanism.
26. **Efficiency.** The evaluation concluded that portfolio activities were efficiently run. The large share of regional and local procurement – 95 percent – contributed greatly to the portfolio's efficiency, reducing transport costs while supporting local and regional economies. The food assistance delivered under PRRO 10310 cost US\$534 per mt, which was 25 percent below corporate WFP's average cost; under PRRO 10595 it cost US\$815 per mt – 11 percent below the average cost. Pipeline breaks were rare, but did occur during the second quarter of 2009 with the increase in the world market costs of cereals and corn-soya blend. Alternative financing channels and stringent austerity measures made it possible to maintain core programme activities. Activities such as FFA, CFC, and e-vouchers were introduced towards the end of the period under review, and so it was not possible to measure their efficiency, output or outcomes.
27. **Effectiveness and Impact.** The effectiveness of the portfolio was generally positive. Impact was difficult to assess because outcome indicators were not systematically collected and some activities were introduced relatively late. The impact of FFA/CFA and CFC was potentially positive, although some issues needed to be addressed to achieve them. E-vouchers appeared to be an effective delivery mechanism. Assistance delivered in the VGF, school-based feeding, and support to MVP activities was effective. The food assistance package was appropriate, well targeted geographically, and delivered to the right people using the right mechanisms. Gauging the effectiveness of the nutrition support for PLHIV is complex. The assistance provided had good results in terms of providing incentives for voluntary testing and improving dietary diversity. Technical issues related to

the entry and exit criteria require review to understand their impact on the activity. A study by *Médecins sans frontières* indicated that for the TB activity, nutrition support improved treatment rates and decreased default rates, irrespective of the beneficiaries' BMI. The effectiveness of the FFA and CFA activities could not be ascertained because the activities were recently introduced, the assets involved were small-scale and there was limited availability of complementary inputs.

28. **Sustainability.** The portfolio had an appropriate mix of short-term activities and longer-term activities intended to have a sustainable outcome. VGF, the largest activity of the portfolio, aimed to improve the diets of highly vulnerable food-insecure households. The FFA/CFA, health and nutrition support for PLHIV and TB patients, and CFC activities were not very sustainable owing to the limited availability of complementary inputs, weak government systems or limited integration with livelihoods interventions.

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## RECOMMENDATIONS

### Strategic Recommendations

29. **Recommendation 1: The country office should continue to leverage its experience, expertise, credibility and strategic position for the development and implementation of a national social protection framework.** The country office recognizes that the Government of Zimbabwe needs a comprehensive and operational national social protection framework that responds to current needs and capabilities, and includes operational guidelines and a process to raise awareness at the provincial and district levels. Implementing a social protection framework will require various levels of coordinated dialogue with all stakeholders, including members of the United Nations country team and sectoral ministries.
30. **Recommendation 2: The country office should incorporate in the next country strategy document (CSD) a plan for a transition from humanitarian assistance to development, while maintaining the capacity to scale up if the political or economic situation significantly deteriorates.** There have been several positive economic and political developments since 2009, but there is a chance that Zimbabwe could become unstable again. The country office must maintain the flexibility and capacity to scale up VGF if a crisis does occur. The CSD process should assess opportunities for synergy between activities such as FFA and CFA so that WFP resources build on those of other organizations. The CSD process should assess and develop the capacity of the Government and other stakeholders for planning, coordinating and implementing activities as part of a hand-over strategy.
31. **Recommendation 3: The country office should expand its operational relationships on nutrition support for PLHIV and FFA/CFA beneficiaries with UNICEF, FAO and other United Nations agencies, donors and cooperating partners, including joint planning of activities.** The success of the nutrition support for PLHIV and FFA/CFA activities requires synergy between WFP and partners. It can be accomplished only if the country office works closely with its partners and leverages its reputation and the goodwill it has generated.
32. **Recommendation 4: The country office should consider increasing the share of market-based instruments in its portfolio.** The country office should explore scaling up e-voucher, cash-transfer and other market-based interventions in line with the Purchase for Progress principles. Scaling up market-based instruments could create synergies through increased donor and government support for smallholder agricultural productivity and

capacity development of agro-dealers. Expanding the use of cash and e-voucher instruments would provide greater flexibility to beneficiaries and increase programme effectiveness.

### Operational Recommendations

33. **Recommendation 5: The country office should continue to support the ZIMVAC annual rural assessments, but should advocate with partners for significant changes to the method and process.** Several issues related to capacity, method, procedure and structure limit the usefulness of the assessments for WFP targeting and beneficiary selection below the district level. The country office should continue to support the development of a food and nutrition security policy – including by strengthening the Food and Nutrition Council – and with partners should advocate for a comprehensive and independent review of the methods and process.
34. **Recommendation 6: The country office should continue to provide food assistance to malnourished chronically ill people, but the activity should be reviewed before it is expanded.** Anthropometric equipment and training should be put in place; an in-depth study should be conducted of client compliance and nutritional well-being above and below the targeting criteria of BMI 18.5; using nutritional status as the main enrolment and exit criterion should be reviewed; a more robust and replicable indicator of household vulnerability should be developed; and an improved discharge process based on improved nutritional status should be devised that includes complementary livelihood activities.
35. **Recommendation 7: The country office should increase efforts to synchronize the registration of beneficiaries of WFP and others' programmes to ensure proper coverage and maximization of synergies.** The country office should increase efforts to combine humanitarian with development assistance. The discussions with the United Kingdom's Department for International Development Protracted Relief Programme, for example, could result in the harmonization of efforts on the FFA, CFA and livelihood interventions for households with members exiting the nutrition support for ART clients programme.
36. **Recommendation 8: The country office should streamline the negotiation and completion of field-level agreements to facilitate decision-making and accelerate commencement by cooperating partners.** A streamlined process and longer-term agreements would benefit all stakeholders, by avoiding distracting discussions.

## ACRONYMS USED IN THE DOCUMENT

ART	anti-retroviral therapy
BMI	body mass index
CAP	Consolidated Appeals Process
CFA	cash for asset
CFC	cash for cereals
CSD	country strategy document
DFID	Department for International Development (United Kingdom)
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FFA	food for assets
GPA	Global Political Agreement
M&E	monitoring and evaluation
MVP	mobile and vulnerable population
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PLHIV	people living with HIV
PRIZE	Promoting Recovery in Zimbabwe
PRRO	protracted relief and recovery operation
TB	tuberculosis
UNAIDS	Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
VAM	vulnerability analysis and mapping
VGf	vulnerable group feeding
ZimVAC	Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee
ZUNDAF	Zimbabwe United Nations Development Assistance Framework