SUMMARY REPORT OF THE FAO/WFP JOINT EVALUATION OF FOOD SECURITY CLUSTER COORDINATION IN HUMANITARIAN ACTION (2009–2014)
NOTE TO THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

This document is submitted to the Executive Board for consideration.

The Secretariat invites members of the Board who may have questions of a technical nature with regard to this document to contact the WFP staff focal points indicated below, preferably well in advance of the Board’s meeting.

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Should you have any questions regarding availability of documentation for the Executive Board, please contact the Conference Servicing Unit (tel.: 066513-2645).

* Office of Evaluation
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This evaluation of food security cluster coordination mechanisms was jointly commissioned by the Offices of Evaluation of WFP and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations – the cluster’s lead agencies. It contributes to accountability and learning, as a pillar of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee’s Transformative Agenda. The evaluation focuses on the utility and effects of food security coordination at the country level.

Overall, the evaluation found that food security coordination had a positive effect on participating organizations. While performance varied among countries, the coordination mechanisms assessed made consistent, positive contributions by facilitating networking and helping to build trust; reducing duplication of efforts; enhancing reporting; and, in some cases, setting and disseminating standards. By avoiding duplication and enabling humanitarian organizations to redirect resources, food security coordination had a positive effect on the coverage of services provided, although no data are available to quantify this effect.

However, food security coordination also faced important constraints. Most country-level coordination mechanisms did not sufficiently address the operational needs of their members, especially in coordinating needs assessments, identifying and filling gaps in responses, using information to inform operations and learn from best practice, and enhancing contingency planning and preparedness.

The evaluation identified four main factors that explain these constraints: i) time-intensive, system-wide processes and demands, leading to neglect of the operational objectives of coordination; ii) limited inclusion and participation of governments, national and local organizations, and non-traditional humanitarian actors; iii) variable commitment and capacity of lead agencies, alongside inconsistent commitment and support to food security coordination from donors; and iv) insufficient clarity on roles, responsibilities and boundaries in the coordination system.

The evaluation concludes that effective food security coordination creates clear benefits for humanitarian organizations and the coverage of interventions. It is broadly supported by international humanitarian actors, which perceive investments in coordination to be largely worthwhile. However, constraints not only prevent coordination mechanisms from reaching their full potential, but also undermine their relevance to operations and put current achievements at risk. Addressing these constraints should be a priority for the lead agencies and the Global Support Team.

The evaluation recommends advocating with the Inter-Agency Standing Committee to reduce the demands of system-wide processes; clarifying roles and responsibilities in the coordination architecture; advocating for greater donor commitment to food security coordination; enhancing the lead agencies’ commitment to and capacity for food security coordination; strengthening the Global Support Team’s capacity to deploy experienced coordination staff; mentoring to promote operationally relevant coordination; and enhancing the involvement of national, local and non-traditional humanitarian actors.
**DRAFT DECISION**

The Board takes note of “Summary Report of the FAO/WFP Joint Evaluation of Food Security Cluster Coordination in Humanitarian Action (2009–2014)” (WFP/EB.2/2014/6-A) and the management response (WFP/EB.2/2014/6-A/Add.1) and encourages further action on the recommendations, taking into account considerations raised by the Board during its discussion.

* This is a draft decision. For the final decision adopted by the Board, please refer to the Decisions and Recommendations document issued at the end of the session.
INTRODUCTION

Context and Background

1. The Emergency Relief Coordinator and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) introduced the cluster system in 2005 as part of a wider reform of the humanitarian system. In 2010, the global food security cluster (FSC), co-led by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and WFP, was created to coordinate food security interventions in emergencies.

2. The global FSC has 47 members and a Global Support Team (GST), based in Rome with an average of 12 staff members and a cumulative budget of USD 7 million for January 2011 to January 2014.¹ Global humanitarian funding for food and agriculture over the same period was about USD 12.5 billion.² The GST facilitates coordination at the global level and supports both formal food security clusters and other food security coordination systems in more than 40 countries. Structures and resources for coordination vary widely, ranging from situations in which there are no dedicated resources for coordination, to those with coordination and information management teams at the country and hub levels, with direct costs of up to USD 1 million per year.

3. The global FSC supports country-level coordination mechanisms through surge and support missions, tools, guidance, training and information management. Food security coordination mechanisms at the country and local levels can support all stages of a humanitarian response, including preparedness, needs assessment and analysis, strategy formulation, implementation, reporting and learning. This coordination is expected to improve the capacity of humanitarian organizations to respond strategically and coherently, and to reduce gaps and duplications. Ultimately, it is expected to result in improved services to the populations affected by crises and emergencies.

Evaluation Features

4. The evaluation, commissioned by the Offices of Evaluation of FAO and WFP, aims to establish accountability and support learning. The evaluation team developed a theory of change (Figure 1) to show how the global and country levels are linked, what food security coordination is intended to achieve, and how. The theory of change, validated at a workshop with the GST, builds on the global FSC’s terms of reference, strategy and work plan and on IASC guidance.

¹ FSC Global Support Team overview of funding sources (unpublished).
Figure 1: Theory of change for food security coordination
5. Based on the theory of change, the evaluation examined the effects of food security coordination on humanitarian action, and the factors influencing effectiveness, at three levels:
   i) effects of country- and local-level coordination on humanitarian organizations and their activities;
   ii) effects of the global FSC on coordination at the country and local levels; and
   iii) potential effects on affected populations, evidenced by changes in the coverage of humanitarian services and the monitoring of effects on beneficiaries.

6. Conducted between September 2013 and May 2014, the evaluation used predominantly qualitative methods – country case studies and key informant interviews – complemented by survey, documentary and financial analysis. Data were triangulated and interpreted first for each country case study then at the aggregated level. The process involved interpretation by the evaluation team, workshops with key stakeholders and their comments on the draft report.

7. As the global FSC supports formal clusters and other coordination arrangements at the country level, the evaluation covered different types of coordination mechanism. Eight country case studies – Bangladesh, Chad, Kenya, Lebanon, Mali, Pakistan, the Philippines and Turkey (for the Syrian response) – were selected to cover different regions, coordination arrangements and humanitarian contexts. Four regional hubs in Amman, Bangkok, Dakar and Nairobi were visited to understand the regional aspects of coordination; and interviews were conducted with stakeholders in Rome, cluster partners and individual external experts. The evaluation team consulted 483 people, and an electronic survey was completed by 403 participants involved in food security coordination in 43 countries.

8. The evaluation was constrained by the limited availability of stakeholders with long experience of coordination mechanisms in the case study countries. Because of security concerns, only eight of the envisaged nine country case studies were implemented. Overall, however, the evaluation team does not believe that these limitations undermine the reliability or relevance of the evaluation’s findings.

**FINDINGS: EFFECTS OF FOOD SECURITY COORDINATION AT THE COUNTRY AND LOCAL LEVELS**

9. This section presents findings regarding whether food security coordination had the intended effects at the global and country levels as illustrated by the theory of change: improved needs assessment and analysis, standards and guidance, reporting and learning resulting in fewer duplications and gaps. The following section explains why these effects were or were not achieved.

10. The country case studies and survey results (Figure 2) show that the overall perceived effectiveness of food security coordination varied from country to country. However, the evaluation found that the benefits created by food security coordination and the limitations encountered were surprisingly similar across the different contexts.
Figure 2: Perceptions of overall effectiveness of food security coordination in countries

Source: Electronic survey conducted in 43 countries. Results from all countries with more than ten responses – a total of 297 responses – are shown. Differences among countries are significant (Chi-Square 87.163 df=48 p<0.001).

Relationships and Trust

11. Interviewees in all case study countries emphasized that food security coordination was useful in facilitating networking and enhancing trust among humanitarian organizations. Although this function receives little attention in formal guidance and procedures, it is valuable in facilitating cooperation among organizations and between them and their donors.

Needs Assessment and Analysis

12. The country case studies show that effective engagement of FSCs in needs assessment and gap analysis reduced the duplication of assessments, provided credible data for funding applications, promoted a fuller understanding of food security, and helped direct partners to underserved areas. In the Philippines, the cluster provided a highly appreciated service in coordinating assessments and disseminating assessment results. In Pakistan, cluster members jointly designed and implemented integrated food security and livelihoods assessments. In Bangladesh, the FSC implemented a joint assessment with the nutrition cluster, and cluster members did not conduct individual assessments.

13. However, in most case study countries, cluster partners and coordination teams stated that they implemented few, or even no, activities supporting needs assessments. This mismatch between the importance of coordinating needs assessment and the efforts to do so was reflected in the survey responses shown in Figure 3: about 90 percent of respondents – the outer line – saw activities related to needs assessment as very relevant, but well over half of them considered the activities offered as insufficient, shown in the middle line.
Strategy Formulation

14. By contrast, coordination teams and partners in most countries stated that they invested much effort in system-wide strategy processes such as consolidated appeals or strategic response plans. As a result, strategy processes were more inclusive and created documents that more fully reflected the approaches of participating organizations. However, the consultations, drafting, revision and monitoring related to these processes dominated the agendas of several of the coordination mechanisms assessed for many months. Interviewees at the country and local levels questioned whether this investment was worthwhile because system-wide strategy documents have little influence on their own decisions.

Standards and Guidance

15. In half the cases examined – Bangladesh, Kenya, Pakistan and the Philippines – coordination mechanisms provided standards and guidance, often drawing on materials from the global FSC, and achieved positive effects on the quality and consistency of the food security response. In the Philippines, a presentation of FAO’s work on fisheries and coastal resources highlighted the complexity of such interventions and led several cluster members to adapt their approaches. In Bangladesh, Kenya and Pakistan, coordination mechanisms provided technical guidelines and training in areas such as market analysis or livestock emergencies. In most cases, however, the guidance covered only a small proportion – and sometimes none – of the relevant issues. In addition, almost all of the coordination mechanisms assessed paid little attention to cross-cutting issues such as gender, age, disability or the environment.

Reporting and Learning

16. All teams and partners in internationally led coordination mechanisms indicated that collecting and managing information, especially for the “who does what, where and when” (4Ws) matrix, was a priority. With this information, the coordination mechanisms were able
to publish more consistent and reliable reports about the food security response, which were appreciated by donors and staff at organizations’ headquarters. In Turkey/northern Syrian Arab Republic, the introduction of an FSC-like coordination mechanism in the summer of 2013 led to more consistent reporting standards, enabling the working group to report that only 250,000 people had received the minimum ration, rather than that 2.5 million had received food assistance.

17. Beyond reporting, the evaluation did not come across any efforts by food security coordination mechanisms to strengthen monitoring and evaluation of effects on affected populations. There were also very few systematic attempts to facilitate learning, which could have had an effect on the quality and consistency of responses. Survey findings reflect this imbalance between strong information sharing and weak learning, as shown in Figure 4: the light-grey line shows that 73 percent of respondents believed that sufficient meetings for information sharing were offered, compared with 50 percent believing that information collection for the 4Ws matrix was sufficient, and only 25 percent that exchanges of good practices and lessons learned were sufficient.

**Figure 4: Gaps in activities for exchanging good practices and encouraging lesson learning**

**Preparedness**

18. IASC guidance foresees that clusters play a role in preparedness. The FSC in Bangladesh focused almost exclusively on preparedness, and showed promising results. The process adopted was highly participatory and created a strong sense of ownership and buy-in among cluster members. The resulting contingency plan was thorough, incorporated lessons from the last emergency and included a sector-wide response strategy, but has still to be tested in a large-scale disaster. In all the other cases examined, food security coordination mechanisms paid very little attention to preparedness, even failing to clarify which coordination arrangements would be activated under different scenarios.
Duplications and Gaps

19. All of the assessed food security coordination mechanisms led by international actors collected information for the 4Ws matrix and exchanged information during meetings, which helped avoid duplication. In Mali, two organizations agreed on the geographical distribution of intervention areas for food assistance after discovering duplications in their plans. In Pakistan, two organizations compared their beneficiary lists and eliminated 1,500 duplications. In the Philippines, two organizations were planning food distributions in the same area and agreed to alternate with each other in that area. In Kenya and Pakistan, coordination structures allocated intervention areas to organizations, thereby avoiding duplication. As humanitarian organizations were able to reallocate resources to other, underserved areas, these findings suggest that food security coordination had a positive effect on the coverage of services provided, although no data are available to quantify this effect.

20. Most of the humanitarian organizations interviewed indicated that they used 4Ws information to target comparatively underserved areas. However, food security coordination mechanisms did not eliminate all duplication because many local and non-traditional humanitarian organizations were not involved in coordination. Most mechanisms also did little to identify response gaps and organize ways of filling them. Ensuring comprehensive, regular and updated 4Ws information was a major challenge in most cases.

Cost-Benefit Analysis

21. The direct costs of food security coordination relate primarily to FSC staff and activities; the time required for participating in coordination generates additional, indirect costs. While a quantitative cost-benefit analysis of food security coordination is not possible, proxy indicators suggest that investments in food security coordination have been worthwhile overall: i) the direct costs of coordination were only a small fraction of the overall food security budget; ii) in the two cases with alternative, internationally led coordination systems – Lebanon and Turkey/northern Syrian Arab Republic – humanitarian organizations soon called for cluster-like systems with dedicated coordination capacity and more clearly defined roles, responsibilities and processes; and iii) a clear majority of survey respondents perceived food security coordination as a worthwhile investment (Figure 5). However, the bureaucratic processes involved in coordination, and the time required to comply with them were seen as excessive (see following section).

Figure 5: Perceptions on whether a food security coordination mechanism is a worthwhile investment

Source: Electronic survey conducted in 43 countries, with 395 responses. Responses weighted by country.
22. A more differentiated analysis shows that a certain level of dedicated funding was important. Countries without dedicated resources, including Lebanon and Mali, struggled to provide adequate and continuous coordination. The case studies and other examples also show that flexible coordination arrangements could generate cost savings, for example by supporting national institutions in their coordination role, as in Kenya; engaging national staff in coordination teams over the long term, as in Pakistan; and creating slimmer coordination structures with merged clusters and area-based coordination mechanisms at the hub and local levels, as in the Central African Republic compared with the Philippines.

**FINDINGS: FACTORS INFLUENCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF FOOD SECURITY COORDINATION**

23. This section analyses why food security coordination mechanisms did or did not achieve the intended effects.

**Focus and Priorities**

24. The country case studies, interviews and survey responses show that the focus and priorities set by the coordination mechanism, were one of the most important factors influencing effectiveness. However, especially where the cluster system was formally activated, coordination teams and partners were concerned that heavy system-wide demands for data, reports and inputs to broader processes at predefined moments made it difficult to address the needs of actors at the operational level, as stressed in existing guidance. In most country cases, for example, information management activities focused on gathering data and compiling sector-wide reports, but did little to analyse and use the data to guide operational decisions. In the Philippines, where the new, system-wide coordination protocols for Level 3 emergencies were applied, coordinators, cluster members and lead agency staff were unanimous in seeing the demands of these protocols as excessive. Interviewees engaged in other recent Level 3 emergencies, such as in South Sudan and the Central African Republic, shared this view.

25. The coordination team’s experience was a crucial factor. Experienced coordinators, especially those deployed by the GST, tended to have a better understanding of system-wide processes, requirements and timelines, enabling them to cope more easily with the demands. They also tended to have a clearer understanding of their own roles and the operational priorities of coordination, resulting in a clearer focus on the needs of cluster partners.

**Inclusiveness and Participation**

26. The evidence reviewed suggests that a second crucial factor affecting effectiveness is the level of inclusiveness and participation in the coordination mechanism. There were marked differences in inclusiveness among case study countries. In general, traditional, international humanitarian organizations were well represented. In Bangladesh, FSC members strongly identified with the FSC and thought of their activities as cluster activities. However, most food security coordination mechanisms – except the one in Kenya, which is led by the Government – struggled to achieve active involvement or leadership from governments and local authorities. There was little participation from local civil society organizations and non-traditional humanitarian actors in most cases, except in the Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhawa provinces of Pakistan, for example.
27. As a result of gaps in inclusiveness and participation, core coordination functions suffered severely in some contexts. Coordination mechanisms were unable to present a complete picture of the response, identify response gaps reliably, or eliminate all duplications. They also missed important opportunities for promoting standards, facilitating mutual learning and supporting transition and exit plans.

Support from the GST and Lead Agencies

28. A third important factor was the level of support provided by the GST and the lead agencies. While gaps persist, both the GST and the lead agencies made clear progress in providing adequate human resources for coordination. Most of the countries analysed had dedicated coordination teams, including coordinators and information managers at the national and, often, the subnational levels. The GST had a critical role in advocating with the lead agencies and standby partners for the deployment of teams with appropriate seniority and coordination experience. In the Philippines, the relatively long-term deployment of an information manager from a standby partner was very well received. The GST deployed its own members to fill gaps or address particularly difficult situations. The experience and skills of these people invigorated coordination mechanisms. As shown in Turkey/northern Syrian Arab Republic, the GST is also exceptional for its willingness and ability to find flexible ways of supporting coordination capacity at the country level.

29. However, the GST had insufficient capacity to extend support to all countries and to fill all important deployment gaps. The training that the GST provided to WFP and FAO staff has not had a major impact on country-level coordination because it focused on familiarizing broader groups of staff members with the FSC, and few trainees have been deployed. There were also gaps in the preparation of coordination teams. The commitment and capacity of the lead agencies’ country and regional offices in supporting food security coordination varied widely, as shown in the case studies. The strong commitment of lead agency staff in cases such as Bangladesh and Mali contrasted with concerns that engagement in coordination could distract from the lead agencies’ operations and practices, as in the Philippines, where the lead agencies did not adhere to some of the common positions agreed
in the FSC. This concern was confirmed by survey results showing that the lead agencies were comparatively sceptical about the effectiveness of food security coordination (Figure 6). Donors also did not always link their own decisions to cluster analyses and recommendations.

**Figure 6: Perceptions of effectiveness, by stakeholder group**

![Figure 6: Perceptions of effectiveness, by stakeholder group]

*Source: Electronic survey conducted in 43 countries, with 395 responses, all shown. Differences among countries are significant (Chi-Square 50.497 df=28 p<0.006).*

**Clarity of Roles, Responsibilities and Boundaries**

30. Compared with other, more informal coordination solutions, such as those in Lebanon and Turkey/northern Syrian Arab Republic, formal FSCs have the advantage of more clearly defined core roles and responsibilities. This clarity helps to avoid lengthy and counterproductive discussions about the coordination arrangements and scope in emergencies. However, several boundary issues are still insufficiently clear:

i) Most of the coordination mechanisms assessed lacked exit and transition strategies. They therefore contributed little to building national capacities and creating links with development actors.

ii) Most food security coordination mechanisms also overlapped with other areas such as nutrition, early recovery, livelihoods and cash and voucher programming, requiring further clarification of roles.

iii) The cluster system still lacks viable, standard solutions for moving from a full set of activated clusters, such as at the national level, to a smaller set of merged clusters, such as at the hub level, and to area-based coordination, such as at the sub-hub level.

**CONCLUSIONS**

31. This section summarizes the evaluation’s conclusions on the three main questions.

i) **What effects do food security coordination mechanisms at the country and local levels have on humanitarian organizations and their activities? How and why?**

32. Overall, food security coordination at the country and local levels has had a positive effect on participating organizations. Although performance varied among countries, the coordination mechanisms assessed made relatively consistent, positive contributions by
facilitating networking and helping to build trust; reducing duplication of efforts; enhancing reporting; in some cases, setting and disseminating standards; and supporting needs assessments. Because of these benefits, a clear majority of stakeholders saw investments in food security coordination as worthwhile. However, according to global guidance and stakeholder expectations, food security coordination has to improve in certain areas. Interviewees in the case study countries felt that food security coordination mechanisms could focus more on supporting needs assessments; contributions to system-wide strategy processes were too time-intensive and insufficiently aligned with operational needs; coordination mechanisms could do more to identify and fill response gaps; information management activities could be used more effectively to inform operations and support learning; and contingency planning and preparedness could be integrated more into food security coordination.

33. Having a clear agenda focusing on the operational needs of humanitarian organizations was an important factor for successful food security coordination mechanisms. Such a focus was threatened when the demands of system-wide processes dominate the agenda. Another crucial success factor was the level of participation in coordination mechanisms. The participation of governments, local authorities, local civil society organizations and non-traditional humanitarian actors was of particular concern.

i) What effects does the global FSC have on coordination mechanisms and humanitarian actors at the country and local levels? How and why?

34. The global FSC helped to improve the availability of dedicated staff for coordination and information management at the country and local levels. The GST played a critical role in mobilizing coordination teams and deploying its own, highly experienced members to fill gaps. Management of both the lead agencies articulated support for the food security coordination mechanisms in circulars and public statements, increasing the sense of responsibility for providing dedicated coordination capacity in both organizations. However, commitment and capacity for supporting food security coordination varied widely among regional and country offices. Human and financial resources were therefore not always adequate, and the lead agencies did not always adopt a coordinated approach in their own operations.

35. Creation of the global FSC has also had a positive effect on country-level coordination by defining standard arrangements and clearer roles and responsibilities for different stakeholders. This could help avoid lengthy discussions and friction. However, issues regarding the coordination architecture have yet to be addressed.

ii) Is there any available evidence on what effects coordination may have had on the food security situation of affected populations as evidenced by changes in the coverage of humanitarian services and changes in the monitoring of effects on beneficiaries?

36. In all the countries examined, there were clear examples of avoided duplications enabling organizations to use their resources to cover other, underserved areas. It can therefore be inferred that coordination has had a positive effect on the coverage of interventions addressing food security. However, there are no data for quantifying or statistically proving this effect. The evaluation also found no evidence that coordination was enhancing the evidence base by improving the monitoring of effects on the food security of affected populations.
37. The evaluation concludes that effective food security coordination creates clear benefits for humanitarian organizations and increases the coverage of humanitarian services. It is broadly supported by traditional, international humanitarian actors, which see investments in food security coordination as largely worthwhile. However, food security coordination also faces important constraints, which not only prevent coordination mechanisms from reaching their full potential, but also undermine their operational relevance and put their current achievements at risk. Addressing these constraints and strengthening activities that are relevant to operations should therefore be a priority for the lead agencies and the GST.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

38. The following strategic recommendations are presented in order of importance. They are supplemented by more detailed suggestions in Annex I of the full evaluation report, and are addressed to the GST, country coordination teams, cluster members, lead agencies, the IASC, humanitarian country teams and the OCHA.

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<tr>
<th>Recommendation 1: Advocate with and support the IASC in revising standard system requirements to make them less time-consuming and more operationally focused.</th>
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<td>• Provide the IASC principals and IASC working groups with feedback on experience of the coordination protocols for Level 3 emergencies, and help to make these protocols lighter, more realistic and more focused on operational benefits.</td>
<td>FAO and WFP senior management and emergency directors</td>
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<td>• Advocate with the IASC for revising the standard requirements for non-Level 3 emergencies.</td>
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<th>Recommendation 2: Enhance mentoring for and capacities of coordination teams in focusing on operationally relevant activities.</th>
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<td>• Ensure that coordination activities are based on demand, adopt a participatory approach, use adequate formats and have a clear agenda and purpose.</td>
<td>Coordination teams</td>
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<td>• Strengthen activities related to:</td>
<td>GST</td>
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<td>- analysis and use of data, including needs assessment and analysis, response analysis, gap analysis and filling gaps;</td>
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<td>- the normative role of food security coordination mechanisms, such as in setting standards, preparing guidelines, training and defining common approaches;</td>
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<td>- mutual/joint learning; and</td>
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<td>- facilitation of networking/trust-building.</td>
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<td>• Enhance mentoring and guidance for coordination teams at the country and local levels to help them cope with system-wide demands and focus on operationally relevant issues.</td>
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### Recommendation 3: Enhance the GST’s capacity and improve the preparation of deployed teams to strengthen coordination capacity.

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- Enhance the GST’s capacity and ability to mentor country coordination teams and deploy its team members to emergencies, by advocating for donor funding, dedicating lead agency core resources and mobilizing secondments from partner organizations.
- Systematically provide newly deployed teams with briefings and a starter kit for food security coordination.
- Reduce general training and strengthen mentoring, coaching and targeted training.
- Develop a stronger human resource strategy for food security coordinators and information managers.
- Deploy coordination team members for longer periods and increase the involvement of national staff members in coordination.
- Strengthen learning among coordination teams.

### Recommendation 4: Enhance nationally led coordination mechanisms and/or increase the involvement of government actors in food security coordination mechanisms to enhance national ownership and sustainability.

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- Strengthen the role of FSCs and lead agencies in preparedness, including informal assessments of government capacity and scenarios for scaling up coordination support.
- Use existing contacts between the lead agencies and government offices more effectively to facilitate links with the food security coordination mechanism.
- Engage in transition and exit planning early, regularly review coordination arrangements, and include capacity development activities for national institutions where necessary.
- In cooperation with humanitarian coordinators and humanitarian country teams, strengthen links with development actors and their activities, especially for capacity development.

### Recommendation 5: Engage national and local civil society organizations and non-traditional humanitarian actors more closely in food security coordination.

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- Strengthen outreach to non-traditional humanitarian actors at the headquarters and regional levels.
- Use the existing contacts of lead agencies and coordination mechanism members with civil society and non-traditional humanitarian actors more effectively.
- Adopt a more field-based, bottom-up approach to coordination, to identify relevant actors.
- Offer concrete, demand-based benefits to local civil society organizations and non-traditional humanitarian actors, and ask them for specific inputs or contributions.
- Adapt coordination formats and communication channels to the needs and preferences of local civil society and non-traditional actors.
**Recommendation 6: Take action to ensure more consistent commitment and capacity of lead agencies in supporting food security coordination, and advocate for enhanced donor commitment to food security coordination.**

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- Increase efforts to ensure that the regional and country offices of the lead agencies take responsibility for ensuring that adequate human resources are available for coordination and for adopting a coordinated approach in their own operations, for example by including these aspects more clearly in performance appraisals and including coordination in the agendas of regional and global retreats.
- Enhance FAO’s country and field presence in emergencies, including by developing or improving advance financing facilities where necessary.
- Advocate with donors to give more consideration in their decision-making to the analyses, priorities and standards developed by food security coordination mechanisms.
- Advocate with donors to provide financial support to food security coordination teams, flexible coordination solutions and coordination activities where required.
- Develop standard scenarios of coordination costs in different contexts.

**Recommendation 7: Work with the IASC, OCHA and other clusters to clarify roles and responsibilities in the coordination architecture, and promote more efficient coordination arrangements.**

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- Develop models for linking sector- and area-based coordination mechanisms, such as activation of clusters at the national level, a small number of merged clusters at the hub level, and integrated, area-based coordination at the local level.
- Continue to strengthen links between food security and nutrition coordination mechanisms, and with other clusters such as those for health and for water, sanitation and hygiene, and ensure that the information management tools of different clusters are compatible, such as the 4Ws matrix.
- Allocate responsibilities for coordinating livelihood activities and cash and voucher programming under different scenarios.
- Strengthen compliance with guidance on early recovery as a cross-cutting issue.
ACRONYMS USED IN THE DOCUMENT

4Ws who does what, where and when (matrix)
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FSC food security cluster
GST Global Support Team
IASC Inter-Agency Standing Committee
NGO non-governmental organization
OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs