NOTE TO THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

This document is submitted to the Executive Board for consideration.

The Secretariat invites members of the Board who may have questions of a technical nature with regard to this document to contact the WFP staff focal points indicated below, preferably well in advance of the Board’s meeting.

- **Director, OEV***: Ms H. Wedgwood tel.: 066513-2030
- **Evaluation Officer, OEV**: Ms M. Sende tel.: 066513-2539
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Should you have any questions regarding availability of documentation for the Executive Board, please contact the Conference Servicing Unit (tel.: 066513-2645).

* Office of Evaluation
** Country portfolio evaluation
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The evaluation of WFP’s Democratic Republic of the Congo country portfolio covers the period 2009–2013. It focuses on: i) the alignment and strategic positioning of WFP’s operations in the country; ii) the drivers of strategic decisions; and iii) the performance and results of WFP’s operations. During the evaluation period the size, focus, management and resource situation of the portfolio underwent significant changes.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo has one of WFP’s largest portfolios. The country presents serious challenges with security and communications infrastructure for the humanitarian actors assisting large numbers of people affected by protracted conflicts and chronic food insecurity.

The evaluation found the portfolio broadly relevant and aligned with the needs of women and men and with government policies and priorities. The main components were all broadly appropriate but, with needs outstripping the capacity to supply them, the country office had difficulty in finding an appropriate balance among the components and did not always adapt to the dynamic environment or participate adequately in coordination mechanisms. While WFP is still considered an essential actor in the country, its strategic position in some areas deteriorated during the evaluation period. Recent measures have laid the basis for restoring stakeholder confidence.

WFP’s decision-making was affected by a vicious circle in which financial constraints limited the country office’s engagement in inter-agency coordination, strategic institutional mechanisms and the identification of creative solutions to challenges. The narrow range of technical expertise constrained WFP’s effectiveness, particularly in policy dialogue on the transition from emergency to development. WFP’s capacity to respond to needs on time and proportionately was also weakened by the absence of a strategy adapted to the volatile context, clear operational guidelines and flexibility, with negative effects on WFP’s positioning in some areas and on donor support.

The performance and results of the portfolio were measured mainly through output-level data and showed a heavy emphasis on relief assistance throughout the evaluation period. However, the profile of WFP activities changed over time, with school feeding increasing too much compared with other activities, particularly relief assistance in both protracted displacement and small-scale, frequent displacements. Throughout the portfolio period, only marginal use was made of the great potential for cash and vouchers. Despite their low coverage, nutrition interventions were found to be more effective and were reported to increase attendance at health centres. Most resilience activities were implemented in three provinces; the deteriorating security situation in late 2012 delayed WFP’s plans to shift towards recovery and resilience.

The evaluation identifies challenges and opportunities and makes eight main recommendations regarding the short-term humanitarian focus and the medium-term transition for increasing the effectiveness and sustainability of WFP programmes.
The Board takes note of “Summary Evaluation Report — Democratic Republic of the Congo Country Portfolio (2009–2013)” (WFP/EB.2/2014/6-C) and the management response WFP/EB.2/2014/6-C/Add.1, and encourages further action on the recommendations, taking into account considerations raised by the Board during its discussion.

* This is a draft decision. For the final decision adopted by the Board, please refer to the Decisions and Recommendations document issued at the end of the session.
INTRODUCTION

Evaluation Features

1. This country portfolio evaluation (CPE) covered all WFP activities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) from 2009 to 2013, with the exception of humanitarian air services. It focused on three main areas: i) the strategic alignment and positioning of the portfolio; ii) the quality of and factors informing strategic choices; and iii) the portfolio performance and results. CPEs serve the dual objectives of accountability and learning. The evaluation was conducted by an independent evaluation team with fieldwork in DRC during March and April 2014. The team complemented a data and document review with semi-structured interviews involving about 275 stakeholders, including donor representatives.

Context

2. DRC’s population is estimated at 75.5 million people. Despite its considerable natural resources and minerals, the country was ranked 186th – jointly with the Niger – of the 187 countries in the 2013 human development index and is both a low-income, food-deficit and a least-developed country. Over the last two decades, DRC has had two major wars linked to instability in North Kivu and South Kivu in the east of the country following the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and the arrival of approximately 1.2 million Rwandan refugees. Dozens of armed groups have sprung up in the region.

3. The 2009–2013 period was characterized by repeated movements and returns of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in North Kivu, South Kivu, Province Orientale and Katanga. More than half of the current 2.7 million IDPs are in North and South Kivu.

4. Lack of protection against violence is one of the main problems facing populations in the east. Armed groups and the Government’s armed forces have used sexual violence against civilians, particularly women, on a massive scale. The State apparatus is too weak to offer protection to IDPs, refugees and returnees.

5. Security constraints – including the targeting of humanitarian organizations by armed groups – and poor communications infrastructure have hampered access for humanitarian workers, particularly United Nations agencies.

6. The map shows regional variations in the food security situation. There was no major improvement between 2009 and 2013. In 2011–2012, 14 percent of DRC’s rural population was severely food-insecure. Food insecurity in the west is considered chronic because of its structural causes; in the east it is also the result of protracted conflicts.

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1. http://www.indexmundi.com/democratic_republic_of_the_congo/demographics_profile.html


3. FAO website, 2013 country list.


6. WFP Comprehensive food security and vulnerability analysis 2014; analysis of 2011–2012 data.
Integrated Food Security and Humanitarian Phase Classification in DRC, 2013

The designations employed and the presentation of material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the World Food Programme (WFP) concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its frontiers or boundaries.
7. The prevalence of global acute malnutrition (GAM) is high, varies considerably among provinces and residential areas, and is not always related to conflict. In six provinces, GAM rates exceed the World Health Organization (WHO) critical threshold of 10 percent. Stunting prevalence is more than 50 percent in 3 of the 11 provinces. Malnutrition is caused by structural factors, which are not all related to food insecurity and include poor health services, inadequate access to potable water and poor mother-and-child feeding practices.

8. About 2.5 percent of the population is HIV-positive. Only 12 percent of eligible HIV patients receive anti-retroviral treatment (ART), and participation in HIV screening and prevention of mother-to-child transmission activities is low. Nearly 52 percent of HIV patients admitted to ART are undernourished, with only 9.2 percent of these patients receiving nutrition support.

9. Nationally, the school gross enrolment rate increased from 64 percent in 2001 to 93 percent in 2010, but enrolment is hampered by prolonged conflict and population displacements, financial constraints and inadequate school infrastructure. In 2010, the school attendance rate was only 75 percent at the national level.

WFP’S PORTFOLIO IN DRC

10. DRC has one of WFP’s largest portfolios. From 2009 to 2013, WFP implemented three protracted relief and recovery operations (PRROs), including the ongoing PRRO 200540; five emergency operations (EMOPs), including an immediate-response EMOP; and two special operations for logistics augmentation. In 2013, activities were grouped under PRRO 200540 to provide WFP with greater flexibility in the use of resources in implementing its overall strategy.

11. Figure 1 shows the main events during the CPE period and WFP’s operational responses. Given the protracted humanitarian situation in the east, WFP focused on Strategic Objective 1. Activities implemented included general food distribution (GFD), in-kind and/or with cash and vouchers (C&V) (Strategic Objective 1); nutrition interventions (Strategic Objectives 1, 3 and 5); school feeding (Strategic Objectives 1 and 3); and asset creation (Strategic Objective 3). WFP also provided support through a Purchase for Progress (P4P) initiative, local purchases for programme activities and technical assistance in developing early warning policies and strategies (Strategic Objective 5). School feeding contributes to either Strategic Objective 1 as emergency school feeding under EMOPs, or Strategic Objective 3 under PRROs. The main emphasis in DRC was on school feeding’s function as a social safety net and its contribution to educational objectives (Strategic Objective 3).

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8 From the Strategic Plan (2008–2013), Strategic Objective 1 – Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies; Strategic Objective 3 – Restore and rebuild lives and livelihoods in post-conflict, post-disaster or transition situations; Strategic Objective 5 – strengthen the capacities of countries to reduce hunger, including through hand-over strategies and local purchase.
Figure 1: Main events and WFP responses during the CPE period, 2009–2013

- LRA* attacks in Orientale Province (2008-2010)
- Presidential and legislative elections (November 2011) in a tense political context
- Intensification of the conflict with the M23 in North Kivu between 2012 and 2013, with an offensive in Goma in November 2012
- Rebellions of the Kata Katanga and Mai-Mai militias in early 2013
- Change of mandate of the MONUSCO and creation of the MONUSCO Intervention Brigade in March 2013
- Fighting between FARDC**** and rebel groups in Oriental Province from August 2013

Key events in DRC

- Internal displacements (million)
- Tonnage distributed – (thousand mt)
- Beneficiaries reached – (millions)

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

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* Lord’s Resistance Army
** United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in DRC
*** United Nations Organization Mission in DRC
**** Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (Armed Forces of DRC)
Annual Humanitarian Action Plans (HAPs) provided the common strategic framework for humanitarian response during the CPE period. Annual contributions to HAPs declined and stagnated between 2008 and 2012, when the downward trend was reversed following escalation of the crisis in Kivu provinces. WFP received a significant 24–41 percent of total HAP funding in 2008–2012. In 2013, however, while the HAP was relatively well funded at 70 percent, allocations to WFP were only 26 percent of the total, including allocations for air services (Figure 2). WFP launched a Level 2 emergency response on 12 December 2013 to address a resources gap in meeting its programme needs.

**Figure 2: Humanitarian Action Plans and WFP allocations, 2009–2013**

![Chart showing contributions to HAP and WFP operations from 2009 to 2013](source: ReliefWeb, 7 July 2014).

**EVALUATION FINDINGS**

**Strategic Alignment and Positioning**

13. WFP faced difficulties in balancing its activities to meet needs. In line with its primary mandate, it prioritized relief activities in the east, which was affected by protracted and new conflicts, over interventions in western provinces, where food insecurity is chronic. It positioned itself firmly within the framework for humanitarian action aligned with the HAP, investing little in long-term planning mechanisms. As a result, its response was not proportionate to the nature and geographical distribution of food insecurity.

14. Limited opportunities for dialogue and weak engagement of national authorities hampered the prospects for partnerships. The Government is enhancing its role in leadership, as evidenced by the formulation of national policies, the establishment of coordination frameworks, such as sectoral thematic groups, and the launch of the National Framework for Humanitarian Coordination in February 2014 to enhance coordination with United Nations agencies. However, WFP faced difficulties engaging in thematic groups because other actors had clearer roles that allowed them to engage more effectively along the humanitarian to development spectrum.

15. WFP activities covered a significant proportion of the population targeted by the food security cluster, but as cluster co-lead, WFP did not meet expectations regarding coordination of the rapid response, information dissemination and development of innovative methods.
16. WFP plays a secondary role in the nutrition cluster, which is led by UNICEF, Cooperazione Internazionale and Action Against Hunger. Plans to collaborate with UNICEF on the integrated management of moderate acute malnutrition (MAM) through the health system⁹ were implemented only through specific agreements at the field level. WFP activities for addressing malnutrition were linked to either life-saving interventions (Strategic Objective 1) or a more development-oriented approach (Strategic Objectives 3 and 5). Given WFP’s long presence in DRC, and the structural challenges involved in tackling malnutrition, the latter approach was insufficiently developed.

17. WFP is the only organization involved in school feeding, which is a secondary priority for the education cluster; the number of beneficiaries targeted by WFP’s school feeding far exceeded the cluster’s targets. WFP did not systematically pursue complementarity with partners’ activities.

18. WFP leads the logistics cluster, which other cluster members consider to be a key forum in the very challenging logistics context. Recognized as one of the most active and efficient, this cluster enhances WFP’s visibility. However, coordination of logistics activities was complicated by the distances between provinces and Kinshasa, with the cluster coordinator based in Kinshasa while the cluster was active mainly in the east.

19. WFP has not adopted a strong position in development-oriented frameworks and actions, and opportunities for cooperation with other actors were underexploited. Several of WFP’s objectives are consistent with the 2013–2017 United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), but WFP’s only development activities were the P4P project, although its local purchases also contribute to agricultural development. Unlike other United Nations agencies, WFP does not seem to have explored opportunities for obtaining development funding.

20. Joint programmes within the humanitarian response framework included support to returning Congolese refugees with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), but there was scarcely any recovery-oriented joint programming with partners, even where it would have been highly relevant.

21. Until the 2013–2017 country strategy, which was widely welcomed, WFP was perceived as insufficiently transparent in its activities and pipeline and weak in communicating its roles and activities along the humanitarian-development spectrum.

22. The new PRRO 200540 has not received the expected support from donors, partly because humanitarian funds were requested for activities that address structural causes – particularly school feeding – while other pressing humanitarian needs faced funding shortages. WFP’s weak capacity to respond rapidly to acute needs and to identify and use the most appropriate GFD modality also deterred some of its principal donors from supporting its operations.

23. Although WFP’s objectives are consistent with international humanitarian principles and good practices, these were sometimes compromised by implementation strategies, particularly when geographic and household targeting was not sufficiently independent, compromising impartiality, and when armed escorts were provided by a party to the conflict, compromising neutrality, impartiality and independence. The reduction of ration sizes in response to pipeline breaks is inconsistent with Sphere standards. Recently, the country office has taken measures to improve protection, but has not thoroughly analysed or

⁹ WFP/UNICEF. Memorandum of Understanding of July 2005, updates and specific country-level agreements.
addressed such issues as extortion, corruption or obstacles preventing access to land in the east.

Quality of and Factors Informing Strategic Choices

24. The reassignment of critical management and mid-level staff for financial reasons in 2011 left the country office with inadequate technical capacity, hindering its engagement in institutional mechanisms at the strategic level and in seeking creative solutions to operational challenges. This had negative effects on WFP’s positioning in some areas.

25. WFP did not put in place the capacity to conduct rapid needs assessments at the onset of a new crisis and did not collaborate with the Réponse Rapide aux Mouvements des Populations (RRMP, rapid response to population movements (mechanism)). This undermined its rapid response capacity and led to unbalanced geographical coverage. Rather than to determine the most suitable modality for GFD, analysis was done to justify the use of C&V when already planned. As a result, some donors sought other partners for meeting food requirements.

26. The mechanisms for identifying nutrition or education needs did not provide WFP with an aggregate picture. Analysis of nutritional needs was incomplete and the scope of nutrition targeting was limited. WFP is not well equipped to identify educational needs.

27. Testing of C&V modalities in 2011 led to a scale-up plan, which was reduced in 2012 because of security issues, food price hikes in North Kivu, and human resources and management issues. This resulted in WFP losing momentum, while cooperating partners capitalized on the learning gained to refine their C&V approaches. Some donors transferred funding to non-governmental organizations (NGOs), causing confusion over WFP’s future role in C&V. The country office does not have a strategy for the foreseen increased use of C&V.

28. A monitoring plan and toolkit are in place, based principally on partners’ reports and field visits by WFP staff. Direct monitoring and supervision of cooperating partners is limited by access restrictions and staff and funding shortages. Timely data analysis is hampered by delays in transmitting reports to the country office. Third-party monitoring was tested on a small scale and identified as a promising option for the future, providing access is possible. It was unclear how monitoring information was used to improve implementation or guide planning, and recommendations from reports and missions were not implemented.  

Portfolio Performance and Results

29. During the CPE period, WFP assisted 3.5 million beneficiaries a year, distributing a total of 462,866 mt of food.

30. WFP’s emergency response was generally focused on areas of easier access and/or where international or local NGO partners were already operating, despite great needs in other areas. The absence of a strategy adapted to the volatile context, clear operational guidelines and flexibility weakened WFP’s capacity to respond quickly to needs. WFP deliveries

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10 Co-led by UNICEF and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).

arrived between 45 and 90 days after the first RRMP non-food items – when the acute phase was over.

31. Many of the stakeholders interviewed, particularly donors, considered that WFP did not give clear priority to emergency response following new population displacements and was unable to select and implement the most relevant operational modality.

32. Targeting based on household vulnerability in the Goma camps was not introduced during the evaluation period, although three surveys conducted between 2011 and 2014 found that 31–44 percent of IDPs living in the camps were not vulnerable. There is no medium-term strategy for this type of targeting. The targeting of vulnerable groups for health and nutrition interventions was satisfactory, although coverage was low compared with needs, except in North Kivu.

33. WFP provided in-kind GFD for 3.4 million people, or 82 percent of total portfolio beneficiaries, in 2009, dropping to 1.3 million, or 42 percent of the total, in 2012 and 2013. This reduction resulted from resource shortfalls affecting the pipeline. GFD was also affected by increases in other portfolio activities, particularly school feeding. WFP was able to reach more GFD beneficiaries than planned – averaging 143 percent – by reducing individual rations and calorie intake.

Figure 3: Planned and actual in-kind GFD

34. At 9 percent of GFD in 2013, the use of C&V was marginal compared with its potential; about USD 6 million was distributed through C&V programmes in five provinces. Although cost-effectiveness analyses (omega value) found that C&V could be more cost-effective than in-kind distributions, WFP did not conduct systematic cost-benefit analysis of the different options and was not always able to implement the most appropriate modality.

35. In 2011, the food consumption scores (FCS) of GFD and food assistance for assets (FFA) beneficiaries improved, indicating sufficient food availability and access at the household level. About 88.4 percent of GFD, FFA and C&V beneficiaries had acceptable or borderline FCS. However, FCS deteriorated for GFD and C&V beneficiaries when deliveries were delayed.

36. Most resilience activities were implemented in North and South Kivu and 46 percent in Katanga. Although FFA increased from 44,000 beneficiaries (1 percent) in 2009 to 296,000 (8 percent) in 2013, the deteriorating security situation in late 2012 prompted WFP to focus on relief, delaying plans to shift towards recovery and resilience (Figure 4).
According to internal stakeholders, WFP did not focus on resilience in DRC because it had not developed a clear vision of resilience in conflict situations. Several donor representatives considered it difficult to adopt a resilience approach in a context of recurrent conflict. United Nations agencies, including WFP, have recently drafted a joint response for stability, and WFP’s cooperating partners are developing resilience strategies and focusing on safety net schemes in areas of return.

**Figure 4: Planned and actual FFA beneficiaries**

Source: WFP standard project reports.

37. Nutrition interventions (Figure 5) appeared effective but their coverage was low, except in North Kivu. WFP opted for institution-based service models and provided insufficient support to community-based management. MAM treatment stabilized at approximately 300,000 cases per year, based on capacity rather than needs. The programme contributed to improved attendance at health centres by pregnant and lactating mothers, but improvements in malnutrition rates and other outcomes have not been documented.

38. WFP provided nutrition support to HIV patients undergoing ART, reinforcing their adherence to treatment and improving their nutrition status. Partners’ reports provide evidence of a direct relationship between pipeline breaks and default rates.

39. Addressing high GAM rates requires a structural approach, including better knowledge of the baseline and incidence factors. WFP supports the National Nutrition Programme and the *(Protocole National de Prise en Charge Intégré de la Malnutrition Aiguë)* (PCIMA, National Strategy for the Management of Acute Malnutrition) through health system structures, requiring a development approach to improve performance of the health system, in partnership with UNICEF. WFP’s efforts to improve local capacity would have been better placed in a development programme.

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Figure 5: Actual versus planned beneficiaries of nutrition interventions

BF = blanket feeding; MCH = mother-and-child health; TSF = targeted supplementary feeding.
Source: WFP Standard Project Reports.

40. The portfolio addressed challenges related to acute malnutrition but had very limited components for chronic malnutrition, which is recognized as a serious problem. The pilot envisaged in the current PRRO is to be commended, but extracting lessons learned and bringing the pilot up to scale will be challenging.

41. School feeding coverage grew to 3.5 times its original size during the CPE period, requiring additional resources. With less tonnage available, the ration size and number of feeding days were reduced.

42. School statistics and interviews with cooperating partners and school officials found that enrolment and retention rates for boys and girls improved in targeted schools. WFP encouraged national authorities to include school feeding in their education policies.

43. However, school feeding has grown beyond the parameters of an emergency intervention. The nature and costs of the current programme, which is based on a centralized approach and external procurement, are unsustainable. As WFP is the only actor in a weak institutional environment, integration into the country’s educational strategies is difficult, but central government’s awareness has increased and there are limited commitments at the provincial level.

44. Cross-cutting issues such as gender, SGBV, protection and security, the environment and do-no-harm were not consistently addressed.

45. Logistics support to WFP operations combined an appropriate structure with solid support from sub-offices and the regional fleet in Kampala, and the use of four supply corridors, a fleet of all-terrain trucks and the Forward Purchase Facility. As well as supporting WFP operations, WFP’s logistics services for the humanitarian community met genuine needs.

46. WFP’s capacity to fill gaps identified by the logistics cluster was facilitated by its role as cluster lead. Although cluster activities and WFP’s service provision complemented each other, the two entities would benefit from a clearer separation of roles and responsibilities.

47. To overcome pipeline disruptions and boost food production, WFP purchased 6,000 mt of commodities locally in 2013 – including 246 mt through P4P – meeting 11 percent of its needs. Despite numerous challenges, there was potential for more local purchases, and a clear medium-term strategy could have helped overcome most challenges.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Overall Assessment

⇒ Relevance, coherence and appropriateness

48. WFP activities were relevant and appropriate to the complex and difficult environment, but geographical coverage and allocations of resources were not always proportional to needs across regions or among activities. In particular, school feeding increased too much compared with other activities, especially given the importance of humanitarian assistance in both protracted displacement and small-scale, frequent displacements. This inconsistency was evidenced by WFP reaching more GFD beneficiaries than planned every year.

49. Portfolio objectives and activities were aligned with corporate objectives, DRC strategic frameworks and national policies. However, insufficient efforts were made to identify synergies with other actors, particularly in activities where integration would have improved results, and considering the structural factors and protracted nature of needs.

50. Most stakeholders considered WFP to be a vital player in DRC. Strategic discussions and priority setting in 2012, 2013 and early 2014, along with the related consultation and communication efforts should allow WFP to reposition itself more solidly in its areas of intervention and to restore donor confidence.

⇒ Efficiency and Effectiveness

51. Despite chronic underfunding, WFP appears to have implemented nutrition and school feeding activities effectively. The targeting of vulnerable groups for nutrition interventions, and programme effectiveness were satisfactory, but efficiency and effectiveness could be improved.

52. GFD activities would have benefited from systematic analysis of their relevance and costs versus benefits as a basis for selecting appropriate assistance modalities.

53. WFP’s capacity to respond to new needs on time and proportionately was weak because it lacked a strategy for adapting to volatile contexts, clear operational guidelines, flexibility and the capacity to seize opportunities for improving performance. This damaged WFP’s reputation and affected donor support. The slow introduction of targeting based on vulnerability assessments, particularly in the Goma camps, weakened the effectiveness and efficiency of GFD. A medium-term strategy for this type of targeting is needed.

54. Logistics support was relatively good. Development of the One UN approach should facilitate rationalization of logistics services. WFP is in a strong position to play a progressively larger role in inter-agency logistics services.

55. The monitoring system needs to be improved, with WFP exploring options such as third-party monitoring.

⇒ Connectedness and sustainability

56. There were relatively few opportunities for developing strategies with national authorities given the fragile institutional environment and WFP’s weak capacity to participate and position itself in recovery and development-oriented frameworks. The policies, dialogue and coordination frameworks now in place at the central and provincial levels improve WFP’s prospects for developing partnerships and synergies, particularly with UNICEF and FAO, to enhance the effectiveness and sustainability of programmes.
School feeding is not sustainable in its current form. The lessons learned from approaches developed in the provinces where local government showed interest could facilitate decentralized programmes.

Recommendations

The following recommendations, in order of importance, are coherent with priorities of the 2013–2017 country strategy and designed to reinforce the country office’s implementation capacities and prospects in DRC, including through enhanced partnerships and a more development-oriented approach to reinforcing sustainability.

Recommendation 1: By November 2014, the country office should develop a preparedness plan for emergency interventions, which can be adapted to different scenarios and which focuses on improving the rapid response capacity for emergencies and population movements – displacements and returns – in the east.

Recommendation 2: Greater use should be made of alternative food assistance modalities. The country office should develop a strategy and three-year implementation plan for 2014/15–2017 geared towards the balanced use of transfer modalities to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of food assistance. This would entail establishment of a steering committee for formulating the strategy, clear definition of internal roles and responsibilities and enhanced partnerships.

Recommendation 3: The capacities of the country office and area offices should be enhanced to facilitate the achievement of WFP’s Strategic Objectives in DRC:

 Recommendation 3a): WFP Headquarters, the Regional Bureau and the country office should collaborate better to fill gaps in human resources by assigning experienced and senior staff to key positions for increasing WFP’s performance and positioning, particularly in emergency coordination, nutrition, C&V and school feeding.

 Recommendation 3b): The country office should improve communications with donors regarding its plans, operations and operational involvement as it moves from a food aid to a food assistance strategy in DRC. WFP should develop and implement a strategy for fundraising from humanitarian and long-term funding sources.

Recommendation 4: The country office should begin the transition to a country programme to help WFP move away from a purely humanitarian approach towards one that is more development-oriented, focusing on activities and objectives that would benefit from long-term programmes and tools. This process will provide the basis for aligning country programme activities with the next UNDAF, 2018–2022:

 Recommendation 4a): The country office should formulate a development project for nutrition interventions that supports the integrated management of acute malnutrition – through the PCIMA and mother-and-child health and nutrition, HIV and tuberculosis programmes – in 2014–2017. Given the structural causes of malnutrition in DRC, it is recommended that the treatment of MAM follow a development approach with a strong community-based component that also addresses chronic malnutrition and micronutrient deficiencies.

 Recommendation 4b): The country office should review the school feeding programme, increasing the focus on a decentralized/regional development approach. The evaluation team recommends that school feeding be anchored on a multi-stakeholder platform where different objectives can coexist: school health involving the Ministry of Public Health and WHO; school gardens involving the Ministry of Agriculture and FAO; educational outcomes involving the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)/UNICEF and the Ministry of Education; nutrition outcomes involving the Ministry of Health, UNICEF and WFP; social safety nets involving WFP, the World Bank and the Ministry of Social Affairs; and gender/protection issues involving the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), UNICEF and WFP. This will require: i) WFP’s advocacy and persuasion; ii) a medium-term approach that will need development funding; and iii) investigation of the feasibility of different models in different regions. Building on a theory of change, or similar framework, an in-depth evaluation and strategic assessment of the programme are desirable for identifying and analysing programme variables, including costing in different provinces to ensure sustainability of activities.

63. **Recommendation 5:** The country office should improve the quality and use of performance monitoring while lowering the cost by: i) using ActivityInfo\(^{13}\) to derive a more accurate, real-time picture of how activities are being implemented throughout the country; ii) increasing activity monitoring at the outcome level, particularly for the management of acute malnutrition; and iii) establishing a system for registering, managing and monitoring the implementation of recommendations to ensure full use of recommendations from WFP missions and evaluations.

64. **Recommendation 6:** The country office should strengthen inter-agency logistics management, including by differentiating more clearly between WFP service provision and logistics cluster activities to improve understanding of respective roles and responsibilities. It would also be more appropriate to base the logistics cluster coordinator in Goma, which would strengthen links to the field, enhance coordination and harmonize ways of working among provincial clusters.

65. **Recommendation 7:** The country office should develop a clear, ambitious strategy for local purchases to improve the effectiveness and timeliness of food deliveries and support local production. The strategy should be linked to improving rapid response efforts by using WFP’s purchasing power to support the agriculture sector in achieving food security. Links to P4P should be reinforced.

66. **Recommendation 8:** Cross-cutting issues and measures – on gender and SGBV, “do no harm” and protection, safe access to firewood and alternative energy, the environment, and respect of humanitarian principles – should be better integrated throughout the project cycle, in line with WFP policies.

\(^{13}\) [https://www.activityinfo.org](https://www.activityinfo.org)
ACRONYMS USED IN THE DOCUMENT

ART  anti-retroviral treatment
C&V  cash and vouchers
CPE  country portfolio evaluation
DRC  Democratic Republic of the Congo
EMOP emergency operation
FAO  Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FCS  food consumption score
FFA  food assistance for assets
GAM  global acute malnutrition
GFD  general food distribution
HAP  Humanitarian Action Plan
IDP  internally displaced person
MAM  moderate acute malnutrition
NGO  non-governmental organization
P4P  Purchase for Progress
PCIMA National Strategy for the Management of Acute Malnutrition
(PROTOCOLE NATIONAL DE PRISE EN CHARGE INTEGRÉE DE LA MALNUTRITION AIGUE)
PRRO protracted relief and recovery operation
RRMP rapid response to population movements (mechanism)
(REponce RAPide AUX Mouvements des Populations)
SGBV  sexual and gender-based violence
UNDAF United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
WHO  World Health Organization