REPORT OF THE JOINT ASSESSMENT MISSION
KENYA : 23 SEPTEMBER TO 9 OCTOBER, 2002

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Acknowledgements

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Introduction and Methodology

The team conducted the Joint Assessment Mission in Kenya from 23 September to 10 October 2002; four days were spent in Kakuma and five days in Dadaab. The team included representatives from WFP (Nairobi and Rome), UNHCR (Nairobi and Geneva), and the Ministry of Home Affairs, Heritage and Sports (MOHA). Representatives of USAID (Nairobi) and UNDP (Nairobi) accompanied the mission as observers. The mission work was guided by the agreed upon terms of reference (annex 1).

The mission members were organized into three groups, with each group assigned specific thematic areas to review, as identified in the ToR. The specific means used to gather and review information were as follows:

- Review existing reports/studies/surveys;
- Meetings with WFP and UNHCR staff members in the field offices, as well as staff of the main implementing partners;
- Discussions with refugee leaders and separate meetings with women refugee leaders;
- Observation of food distribution activities at the Final Distribution Point (FDP);
- Visits to Extended Distribution Points (EDPs), hospitals, supplementary feeding programmes (SFP), therapeutic feeding programmes (TFP), schools and water collection points;
- Site visits of various projects supported by NGOs, particularly Income Generating Activities (IGAs) and multistory gardens (MSG);
- Visits to refugee markets at the EDPs;
- Household and community interviews with mainly refugee women;
- Observation of other refugee activities such as livestock holdings and farming;
- Meetings with local authorities, traditional leaders and community representatives;
- Mission meetings at the close of each day.
The recent WFP/UNHCR gender study (May 2002) and WFP EDP management study (June 2002) served as reference tools for the mission. Given the detailed nature of both reports, the mission did not review in depth issues related to these sectors. The mission included recommendations specific to these sectors when not covered by the said reports.

The report is divided into five main sections:

Section I: An executive summary
Section II: Overall conclusions and recommendations
Section III: A detailed report of the Dadaab operation
Section IV: A detailed report of the Kakuma operation
Section V: Annexes (Terms of Reference and Itinerary)

Section I - Executive summary

1. Kenya’s refugee population amounts to 224,000 people and includes mainly Sudanese and Somali nationals. There are also other nationalities in smaller numbers such as Angolans, Burundians, Congolese, Eritreans, Ethiopians, Liberians, Rwandese, Ugandans and Tanzanians. The majority of refugees in Kenya live in two camps, Dadaab and Kakuma. Dadaab is located in Garissa district, in the northeast and Kakuma is in Turkana district, in the northwestern part of the country. The programme has been mainly focused on the provision of relief assistance rather than the promotion of self-reliance activities given the limited opportunities for durable solutions compounded by the Government of Kenya policy of encampment that prevents freedom of movement for the refugees and subsequently severely restricts access to economic opportunities.

2. The last JFAM (1999) proposed a set of recommendations to prepare the ground for a progressive shift to a targeted intervention. However, the mission found that no tangible progress had been made in the implementation of the recommendations pertaining to common planning, co-ordination, and specific programme activities (data collection, monitoring, sensitization of refugee group leaders to a targeted approach). Indeed, no concrete steps were taken by either WFP or UNHCR to move toward a programmatic approach to the provision of assistance.

3. As a result of inadequate resources, assistance to the refugees in Kenya has usually fallen short of meeting the standards for both food and non-food requirements. WFP rations have averaged only 1,760 kcal for the last two years, compared to the recommended daily figure of 2,100 Kcal. Non-food items are only available for new-arrivals while shelter material for the general population have not been replaced since

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1 Refugee population at the time of the mission
3 See the 1999 Household Food Economy Assessment Report published by SCF U.K.
1997 leaving a number of families in a critical housing situation. Only 35% of the household’s firewood needs are provided for by UNHCR while water installations seems to have not been efficiently maintained as the agencies responsible do not have sufficient financial resources to cover the cost of repair and maintenance. Security has improved, but the camps are still prone to insecurity and women continue to be exposed to rape and other forms of violence, especially while collecting firewood in the bush to complement UNHCR’s supply.

4. The situation in the camps is further aggravated by the fact that there are no foreseeable prospects for repatriation, as the security situation in southern Sudan and Somalia remains very volatile. Southern Sudan has not been able to receive returnees due to regular escalations in the internal conflict while intersectional fighting in Somalia continues. For example, following the recent influx of Somali refugees in Mandera last April, due to insecurity, there are still reports of looting over the border in Bulla Hawa. Fighting has also been reported in Baidoa and Bakol regions. This particular situation has resulted in a number of internally displaced people who may be tempted to cross the border as insecurity has, at times, prevented the delivery of food aid on the ground. The continued influx of refugees from these countries, and the potential transfer of up to 50,000 asylum seekers and refugees from Nairobi to the camps could contribute to a decline in the well-being of the overall refugee population given the prevailing poor condition in the camps and if additional financial resources are not acquired to cater for the new comers. The prevailing situation has left the refugees, for the most part, dependent on external assistance for their survival.

5. The burden of hosting a large refugee population for the past decade has impacted on the host communities. According to the local population, the camps have caused significant environmental degradation and have contributed to the exhaustion of natural resources. The competition for scarce resources such as firewood and water has led to the occurrence of incidents of insecurity and isolated acts of violence between the locals and the refugees. While assistance is being targeted to refugees living in the camps, few agencies provide assistance to the food-insecure local population.

Section II - Key Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations

Purpose and scope of the assessment

1. The aim of the mission was to review and assess the situation of the refugee population in the Kakuma and Dadaab camps. The mission focused specifically on the food and non-food needs of the refugees and assessed the capacity of WFP and UNHCR’s to meet these needs with appropriate assistance. In addition, the mission attempted to identify possible solutions to the long-standing problems faced by the refugees. The mission also looked into other sectors that directly impact on refugee well being such as shelter, water, sanitation, health, domestic needs, community services and education. WFP and UNHCR have agreed to use this assessment mission to: re-orient the programme in more decisive directions by moving progressively
away from a relief strategy in reducing the refugees complete dependency on external aid; and collect information which will assist donors to take decisive steps in terms of their own overall assistance strategy.

Overview

2. The protracted nature of the refugee situation and the consecutive funding constraints are the main characteristics of the Kenya operation. The lack of resources has negatively affected operations on the ground leaving the essential needs of the refugees (in terms of food and material assistance) only partially covered. Since the year 1997, the food pipeline has been irregular and on average WFP has been able to provide a ration of about 1,700 Kcal against the recommended 2,100 Kcal. All sectors supported by UNHCR have been adversely affected by dwindling donor support (complementary food, domestic/household needs, education, shelter, health, sanitation, water, firewood, environment etc).

3. The areas which host the refugees are amongst the most impoverished in Kenya and the Government’s encampment policy severely restrict movement of the refugees outside of the camps. Nevertheless, despite the prevailing poor condition in the camps, it is anticipated that even more refugees will cross the borders and continue to seek assistance in both Kakuma and Dadaab, as a result of continued insecurity in their home countries. Moreover, the GoK has recently stated that 50,000 asylum seekers and refugees settled in Nairobi should join the two refugee camps. As the number of refugees in the camps increases, the current level of assistance from the international community will be further diluted if additional resources are not made available by the donor community.

4. The overall situation of the refugees is aggravated by the limited possibilities for self-sufficiency. Both the Kakuma and Dadaab refugee camps are located in semi-arid areas and opportunities for sustainable agriculture are almost non-existent. There are no significant possibilities for employment and the Government maintains a restrictive policy toward refugees that prevents them from engaging in meaningful agricultural or economic activities. The majority of the refugees continue to depend entirely on external assistance. Despite this bleak picture, a limited number of refugees have developed certain coping economic strategies that allow them to complement, to various degrees, the free food assistance that is being provided to them. However, the harsh environment and government policy remain major obstacles to the expansion and achievement of any meaningful level of self-sufficiency in the camps.

5. The nutrition situation in both camps is precarious. Recent nutritional surveys conducted in the camps indicated that 70% of children hover at the borderline of malnutrition. These children could either recuperate quickly with sufficient levels of food or deteriorate rapidly in the event of food shortages or disease.

6. The level of anemia of pregnant woman in Dadaab has reached a startling 75%; this particular health situation in turn negatively affects the birth weight and increases the risk of maternal mortality. An IRC survey in Kakuma found 61.3% of the children were anemic. The irregular provision of the food basket is one of the contributing
factors to this fragile nutritional situation. However, disease also plays an important role, particularly malaria and diarrhea, the latter associated with a lack of hygiene and inadequate care practices.

7. The conclusions and recommendations that follow aim to reinforce support from the donor community for the Kenya refugee programme and suggest alternative strategies to assist the refugees to strengthen their own self-maintenance.

Planning figure

8. A planning figure of 230,358 refugees is adopted for the next phase of WFP assistance (October 2003 to September 2005). This figure accounts for the current population, prospects for new influxes and possibilities for repatriation and resettlement.

9. It is recommended to undertake regular revalidation exercises (Dadaab in March 2003 and Kakuma in April 2004), as a control mechanism for the fluid situation at the Sudanese and Somali borders.

10. Acknowledging the delays in updating departure and arrival data, UNHCR and WFP agree to jointly review the distribution list prior to its transmission to the Implementing Partner (IP) in charge of food distribution to ensure that it reflects the actual number of people in the camps.

WFP Assistance and Food Strategy

11. In accordance with international standards, WFP has increased the food basket from 1,900 Kcal to 2,100 kcal per person/day in the first quarter of 1998. However, since 1997, the full food basket has rarely been attained. In Kakuma, during the year 2000, WFP was able to provide only an average ration of 1,956 kcal. In 2001, WFP was able only to resource an average food basket of 1,733 kcal and in the year 2002, (figure available up to October) the situation did not improve with an average food basket of only 1,757 kcal.

12. The ration supplied by WFP continues to constitute the major source of food for the majority of the refugee living in the camps. As mentioned earlier, access to additional food from wild food, agriculture, and livestock is, for a great majority of the refugees, negligible. Not enough is currently known on the coping mechanisms of the refugees to decide on a different size and composition of the food basket. The mission agreed, therefore, on the necessity to continue providing a full general ration of 2,100 kcal.

13. In order to ensure that the ration contains the necessary micronutrients, it is recommended that WFP explore the possibility of providing fortified wheat flour under the general distribution.

14. In view of the high level of anemia and the risk of micronutrient deficiencies in both camps, UNHCR should ensure the provision of 50 gr. of complementary food items
under the general ration (green leaves, onions, tomatoes, chili) at least to the most vulnerable. In the absence of pulses in the WFP pipeline in June 2002, UNHCR did a local procurement of beans. The preference, however, is that UNHCR purchase fresh food items as a complementary food rather than provide items covered under the WFP food basket.

15. Milling of maize is currently done at the camp level, on individual initiatives. A supplement of 12.5% is added to the maize whole grain to compensate for the milling cost. However since a percentage of the maize ration is sold for purposes other than milling, this percentage could be reviewed and be based on a more accurate figure of quantity being actually milled. WFP will continue to investigate other milling options for the camps.

**Health and Nutrition**

16. The coverage of children by supplementary (SFP) and therapeutic feeding (TFP) should be increased, as there is a significant discrepancy between the planned and actual numbers. This can be achieved by increasing outreach activities that will identify malnourished children and provide information to caretakers. A follow up system at the household level should also be established to monitor the situation during and following treatment.

17. The case management of children in the supplementary feeding program in Kakuma and follow up at the household level, after their discharge from the program, should be strengthened.

18. The double ration of 225 g of CSB should continue to be given to the mothers of the children in the SFP to compensate for the sharing of the ration, which is likely to occur at home.

19. In view of the high anemia level, which affects birth weight and maternal mortality, SFP should also cover pregnant mothers in the second term of pregnancy as well as nursing mothers. UNHCR should also ensure that pregnant women receive iron supplements.

20. Inadequate care practices are an important factor contributing to malnutrition; it is therefore recommended to increase and reinforce Nutrition and Health Education activities.

21. The school-feeding programme (SF) should continue with the objective to improve the nutritional condition of school children. The agencies should also explore the possibility to strengthen pre-school activities in order to reach children less than six years.

**Level of Refugee Self- Support**

22. Self-support could be achieved if the Government of Kenya were to adopt a more flexible policy regarding local integration. The international community has to support the Government of Kenya for the enactment of the Refugee Bill, which will
accord freedom of movement and guarantee access economic opportunities.

23. All efforts should be made by Government of Kenya and UNHCR to ensure that ID cards are provided in a timely fashion to increase safe movement of refugees within Kenya, which will allow them to undertake income-generating activities and seek market outlets away from the camps.

24. The mission agreed that the impact of Income Generating Activities (IGAs) on the level of self-sufficiency of the refugees was negligible. The only potentially viable IGA would be in agricultural activities, provided land is allocated and expanded as well as supported by small-scale irrigation systems.

25. Although IGAs have a limited potential to supplement assistance received by the refugees, these activities should still be encouraged as they offer an opportunity for the refugees to learn a new skill, be active, boost their self-esteem while attempting to supplement their food ration.

26. Criteria for participation in IGAS should be standardised and harmonized between the operating agencies and UNHCR to avoid duplication.

27. Kitchen gardens and multi-story gardens cannot be considered as a means to attain self-sufficiency. However, promotion of these activities is a positive step towards improving the nutritional situation of the most vulnerable refugees. Despite the limited potential of these activities and their low cost, they should be thoroughly re-assessed in order to be improved before being actively encouraged.

**Targeting**

28. In spite of the complexities of targeting food aid resources in a refugee context, the mission agreed that there is some scope for a targeted approach provided reliable information is available and the requisite community support is acquired. The participation of refugee leaders in sensitization campaigns, aimed at the general refugee community, on targeting principles would be instrumental in ensuring that the message is disseminated and understood. A sensitization campaign should start immediately.

29. To minimize the impact of possible breaks in the food pipeline, which definitely effect the food ration, mechanisms should be put in place as quickly as possible, to ensure that new arrivals and vulnerable cases in the refugee population receive a complete and full ration.

30. Consultation with the refugee community should start immediately to identify refugees involved in major business activities, assess if the level of income is commensurate with agreed upon threshold of self-sufficiency and thus, propose a reduced food ration. Discussions should stress on the "savings" aspect of the proposed measure, savings that will be used to ensure a full ration for the most vulnerable. UNHCR and WFP should prepare registries of Incentive Workers, business and livestock owners with a view to target these groups for a reduced food ration.
31. A household survey to update data on the different levels of vulnerability amongst the refugee population should be implemented by Sept 2003. The assessment should identify different groups of beneficiaries and the modalities to actually implement successful targeting.

**Durable solutions**

32. Durable solutions are limited, despite the fact that refugees consistently expressed their desire to return home. Alternative solutions to repatriation have to be explored.

33. UNHCR should work with agencies operating in southern Somalia/Sudan to identify safe havens and explore possibilities of encouraging “go and see” visits to areas of tranquility, with refugees, for an eventual repatriation.

34. UNHCR should discuss with agencies operating in southern Somalia/Sudan the possibility of creating the necessary infrastructure and facilities related to basic services in order to render the safe havens attractive and act as a pull factor and the refugee camp a push factor. This may assist the refugees in their decision to return home.

35. The international community should endeavor to assist in resolving the crises in Somalia/Sudan in a durable manner.

**UNHCR Care and Maintenance**

36. UNHCR’s budget for care and maintenance was US$ 17 Million for the period under review. However, out of this budget only 14 Million was resourced. As a result, the provision of non-food item assistance fell critically short of established norms, especially with regards to complementary food, shelter and sanitation (UNHCR strategic planning workshop, February 2002).

37. The budget allocated for voluntary repatriation insufficient as well. While an estimated 10,000 refugees were repatriated and resettled in the period under review, the opportunities to repatriate even more refugees could not be realized due to funding constraints.

38. The quantity of firewood provided to the refugees is inadequate to cover the needs of a household. This has a direct impact on the environment and the food-basket as the refugee women have to provide additional quantity by collecting firewood in the bush or by selling part of their food ration to buy firewood. Issues of firewood and measures to mitigate environmental degradation as a consequence, have to be once more prioritized in the UNHCR budget (see detailed recommendation Kakuma section).

39. Shelter materials have not been generally distributed in the camps since 1997 and houses have remained temporary structures, which provide inadequate protection from the elements. Moreover, the collection of building materials (sticks, poles, thatching grass) is a considerable burden on the environment. UNHCR has to ensure that an adequate budget is sourced to maintain standards of shelter in the camps.
40. Considering that education is the only valuable and reliable asset the refugees have, the mission recommends that special attention be accorded to the education sector to ensure access of all refugee children to primary schools in the camps. This may involve the construction of additional schools and classrooms, the recruitment of more teachers and the procurement of additional education materials and equipment.

Programme issues

Co-ordination

41. The revised MOU between UNHCR and WFP requires close collaboration and regular consultation on programming issues and planning of camp activities. The mission found that the two agencies work closely but noted the absence of a joint plan of action. The team recommends reviving the preparation of a joint plan of action. A plan of action should be prepared for 2003 before the end of the year. The plan of action is an essential tool to a) follow up on recommendation from previous missions, b) agree on monitoring indicators and c) to develop and implement a phase down strategy.

42. The mission noted with concern the lack of co-ordination among the NGOs working in the camps and the lack of communication between the NGOs and the UN agencies on the ground. Although the co-ordination mechanism exists, there is a gap in information sharing and consultation between the NGOs and the UN agencies and among NGOs. The Planning of activities by each NGO is done in isolation with little or no consultation with others and the main UN agencies active in the camps. The mission understands that many of these activities are funded outside of what is supported by UNHCR and WFP. Information sharing and consultation between the NGOs and the UN agencies and among the NGOs should be strengthened and apply to all activities, studies and surveys as a means to avoid unilateral approaches, duplication and overlap.

43. The agreements between UNHCR and the IP in charge of food distribution and selective feeding programmes must include WFP as required by the UNHCR/WFP MOU. Tripartite agreements that clarify the roles and responsibilities of each agency should be prepared and signed before the end of 2002.

Monitoring

44. The two agencies should jointly monitor food distributions and carry out post distribution monitoring activities. A joint monitoring plan should be established and adhered to in the joint plan of action.

45. The current monitoring forms should be revised and standardized, for both camps. The data collected should be entered into a database in order to track trends over time.

Distribution mechanism

46. The bimonthly household distribution system, implemented since 95/96, targets food aid at household level and encourages women’s participation in the process (about
60% of the recipients at the FDP are women). The mission agreed that the current system be maintained although different degrees of efficiency were noted in its implementation between the two camps.

47. The management of food distribution by CARE in Dadaab should be strengthened, and Community Self-Management reviewed, in order to address the significant diversion of food by the refugees involved in the distribution system, scoopers and controllers. (see detailed recommendation, Dadaab section).

Security and relationship with local community

48. The burden of hosting a large refugee population for over a decade is resented by the local community and is of concern to the Government. While sympathetic to the plight of the refugees, the local authorities are concerned and allege that they have brought insecurity and crime into the areas where camps are located. The camps are also an important contributing factor to the fast environmental degradation especially through its exploitation of meager natural resources.

49. The local population complains about the lack of assistance they receive after bearing the burden of hosting the refugees for more than a decade. They request UNHCR, WFP and NGOs operating in the camps to alleviate this burden by providing some assistance to them as well (food, education, health, water, sanitation, environment, and livestock).

50. Recognizing the need to address the social and environmental implications of a growing refugee population and the burden it constitutes for the local community, UNHCR and WFP should actively seek partners in the field of development to initiate activities, which would be beneficial to the local community.

51. To harmonize relationships with the local community, agencies such as the UNDP should be encouraged to initiate or consolidate their intervention in the vicinity of the camps. Since the lack of schools was highlighted by the local community as a problem in Kakuma, it is recommended to use FFW activities to build additional school infrastructure. In Dadaab the possibility of common water harvesting structure could be envisaged.

Contingency plans

52. The joint contingency plan for Somali refugees should be updated and extended to cover potential influx

53. Plan of action should be developed for possible repatriation to Southern Sudan and Somalia

Section III – Analysis of the Operation at the Dadaab Camp

Demographic Profile and Characteristics of the Refugee Population
1. Dadaab is located in the northeastern district of Garissa, 100-km from the Somali border. The three camps (Ifo, Dagahaley and Hagadera) host a population of 138,948 refugees (UNHCR population figures, October 2002) of whom 97% are Somali. The profile of the camps shows that there are similar numbers of females (49%) and males (51%) in the camps, while an estimated 48% of the population are under five.

Demographic Breakdown by Sex and Age (October 2002)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age (in years)</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 – 4</td>
<td>10,838</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>10,004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 – 17</td>
<td>26,512</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>23,509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 – 59</td>
<td>32,000</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>33,305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 60</td>
<td>1,528</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>1,251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>70,878</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>68,069</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. During the period from June to August 2002, 11,500 Somali Bantu were transferred from Dadaab to Kakuma. The total population in the three camps should now stand at 131,659 refugees, (considering also the new arrivals of refugees from Mandera –see below). The data related to this transfer have not been deleted from the UNHCR database and, consequently, the distribution list provided to CARE continues to reflect inaccurate population data. UNHCR confirmed to the mission that all refugees transferred to Kakuma left their ration card behind.

3. Since 2001, UNHCR has stopped accepting Somali "prima facie" refugees and a screening process has been put in place; in 2002 about 2,709 people have been screened and registered. In addition, a new influx of about 11,000 Somali refugees arrived in Mandera town, close to the Somali border, in May 2002. Out of that total number, 3,408 refugees were sent to the Dadaab camps, at the Government’s request. UNHCR expects that in the coming years the influx in the camp will continue at an average rate of 250 refugees a month. The average birth rate has remained stable in recent years at 3% per year. It is expected that about 10,000 Somali refugees will opt for voluntary repatriation in 2003. However, another 10,000 asylum seekers are expected to be transferred to Dadaab from Nairobi (at an estimated rate of 3,500 per year).

4. As recommended by the last JFAM, a registration exercise took place in March 2000, followed by a "reinstatement exercise of about 6,000 persons not captured in the first verification round.” As a result, the registered population only decreased from 125,957 to 121,271. In 2001 a card exchange exercise took place, which did not result

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4 UNHCR Country Plan, 2003
in a significant difference in the total number of refugees. The revalidation exercise initially planned for July 2002 could not take place because of the planned general election in Kenya.

The following table summarizes the projection of the beneficiary figures for 2003 and 2004.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Initial Caseload</th>
<th>Arrivals &amp; Birthrate (3%)</th>
<th>Resettlement</th>
<th>Repatriation / Mortality</th>
<th>Nairobi Arrivals</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>132,659</td>
<td>9,643</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11,937</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>133,865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>133,865</td>
<td>9,685</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,761</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>145,290</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Recommendations**

5. Based on projections of new arrivals, repatriation, resettlement, and the growth population rate, the mission recommends that an average planning figure of 139,578 be adopted for the next phase of the operation, October 2003 to September 2005.

6. It is crucial to undertake a revalidation exercise rapidly in order to have an accurate idea of the number of people in the camps and plan assistance accordingly. The revalidation is planned for March 2003 and all efforts should be made to see that this date is maintained.

7. While data on departures and arrivals are being recorded in the main system, UNHCR should ensure that CARE distribution figures correspond to the actual number of refugees residing in the camps.

**Health and Nutrition**

8. There has been no significant change in the malnutrition rate for the last two years. The nutrition situation is characterized by a level of moderate malnutrition, which is of concern (11.7% <2 Z score and 6.6% <80% of the median, MSF survey February 2002) and by a relatively high level of severe acute malnutrition (4.5 % <2 Z score and 3.6% < 70% of the median), which requires monitoring. The level of anemia of pregnant woman has reached a high level of 74%, this in turn effects the birth weight and increases the risk of maternal mortality.

9. In general, the health situation appears to be stable with a crude mortality rate below 0.5/10,000 /day. The under five mortality rate is less stable with two peaks where USMR was higher than 1.0/10,000/day following the seasonal trend of malaria and RTI. (MSF 2001 annual report) Malaria and RTI are the most important prevailing pathologies in the camp. As mentioned above maternal and neonatal mortality rates
are relatively high and are associated with the problem of anemia. The low birth weight prevalence of 14% should be reduced.

10. The irregularity in the food basket is one of the contributing factors to this fragile nutritional situation. Relief food is the sole source of food for the great majority of the refugees and in a number of cases families who finish their entitlement before the next distribution cycle are forced to borrow food from other families or to adopt negative coping strategies such as skipping meals. It was observed that about 50% school children are not having breakfast before going to school in spite of the fact that such a meal is very important in the Somali culture.

11. The nutritional situation of the new arrivals requires attention as the malnutrition rate in this group seems (at first sight) to be higher that in the old caseload. As this group of refugees is located far from the distribution sites, their access to the different services in the camp should be facilitated. It would be useful to analyze the potential coping mechanisms of this group in order to assist them to supplement their ration.

Selective feeding Programmes

12. There is one SFP in the three camps and the number of beneficiaries is on average 1,600 per month (which represents about 80% of the malnourished population planned for in the current PRRO). Both SFP and TFP do not appear to be used at their full capacity. The programme does not cover pregnant and nursing mothers. In general, there is a tendency for the number of beneficiaries in SFP to increase when the ration distributed is low (two peaks in January 2001 and July 2001 when the kcal ration was 1,073 kcal and 1,294 kcal, respectively.) (MSF annual report 2001) The cure rate is about 94%, attendance rate is about 97.4% and the average length of stay is about 7.5 weeks.

Recommendations

13. The outreach system needs to be improved, and the implementing partner should undertake active case findings through periodic MUAC surveys. On the basis of the most recent nutrition data, the yearly-planning figure for children in the targeted feeding problem should be about 2000.

14. The mission recommends the introduction of growth monitoring activities in the MCH Department, using weight for age, in an effort to reach all malnourished children under five in the camps. This would be a tool to monitor the overall health and nutrition status and supplement data from other nutritional surveillance activities.

15. In order to compensate for the intrahousehold sharing, the current ration of blended foods (225 gr. of CSB) should continue and follow up at household level should be increased in order to ensure that ration is consumed by the targeted child.

16. In view of the high prevalence of anemia, pregnant (at the second quarter of pregnancy) and nursing mothers should be included in the system. Based on the
current population profile, the number of women to be included should be about 3,640 for a period of 9 months.

17. In view of the fragile nutrition situation of the population, it is recommended that UNHCR or WFP assign a nutritionist to strengthen this aspect of the programme.

18. Acknowledging the poor weaning, breastfeeding practices and short birth spacing, the mission strongly recommends to actively enhancing nutrition and health education through women’s groups.

19. School feeding in Dadaab should be linked with deworming activities for school children.

Durable solutions

Repatriation

20. Even though there were some attempts to repatriate people to areas of Somalia where there was relative tranquility, such as Puntland and Somaliland, only a few people could actually repatriate because peace was not sustainable in much of Somalia. The majority of the refugees are still living in Dadaab camp with very limited prospects for repatriation as the conflict in their country continues unabated.

Local integration

21. The GoK maintains a restrictive policy of encampment leaving no possibility for local integration. Officials, refugees have no freedom of movement, no access to economic opportunities, or possibilities for employment. Moreover, the refugees compete with the local population for limited and scarce natural resources. This constant competition, if not addressed, may result in hostility and conflict.

Resettlement:

22. Recipient countries establish criteria for resettlement. As per the established profile, resettlement remains very selective and only benefits a small portion of the refugee population. However, in the year 2002, UNHCR negotiated the transfer of 11,500 Somali Bantus, with the American government, to Kakuma for screening and further resettlement to the USA.

23. While all the refugees interviewed in Dadaab expressed the need and urgency to return home, durable solutions for refugees living in Dadaab camps are quasi-inexistant. Alternative solutions for the repatriation of the refugees have to be explored.

Recommendation:
24. UNHCR should work with agencies operating in southern Somalia and Sudan and explore possibilities of encouraging “go and see visits” for Somali and Sudanese refugees to areas of tranquility for an eventual repatriation.

**Level of self-support**

25. Self-reliance opportunities are limited in the Dadaab camps. Given current government policy towards the refugees, the focus has been on increasing partial self-support, since complete self-reliance is not viable for most of the refugees. It is extremely hard to assess the extent of self-reliance in quantitative terms given the lack of recent socio-economic survey. However as confirmed by the last household survey in 1999, the general impression is that access to alternative sources of income and food is limited.

**IGAs within the Dadaab Camps**

26. There is a distinction to make between those agency-initiated IGAs, which are small-scale and target vulnerable groups and the businesses that have been established from the refugee's own capital. Agency IGAs target specific groups, especially women headed households, the disabled, the elderly, rape survivors, vulnerable girls and boys, and large extended families but provides only a relatively small income. However their benefits go far beyond simply generating a small income, and include developing self-esteem; discouraging foraging for firewood and the associated risks and environmental damage; keeping potentially disorderly groups occupied during the day; and building up a sense of community. Currently all IGAs are taxed by the GoK.

**Recommendations**

27. In the absence of full work permits, agency IGAs and small self-starting IGAs should not be taxed by the GoK.

28. A full business register should be established of both types of IGAs

29. UNHCR loans for IGAs should be increased in order to encourage partial self-support.

30. More effective co-ordination should be implemented amongst all parties in order to maximize the use of existing resources and avoid duplication.

31. The issue of 10% interest (management fee) on credit based IGA was strongly questioned by the team and should be further assessed

**Incentive Workers**
32. Incentive workers salaries vary; senior workers earn an estimated 3,000 KSH per month or more. At this level, workers with a small family are self-reliant. However, wages are often shared with a larger group.

**Recommendations**

33. In consultation with the refugees, better off incentive workers should be identified and NGOs and agencies should advocate for a reduction in food rations to incentive workers (see targeting).

34. A full database of incentive workers should be maintained, together with salary levels.

**Trade and Refugee Movements**

35. There is some refugee movement within Garissa district. There are business connections with Somalia and Nairobi. Produce from Somalia is available on the camp market, including fabrics, sugar, and cosmetics. However, presently refugees cannot travel freely with the existing documents. The GoK will soon introduce ID cards, which will improve freedom of travel and enhance business and trading possibilities.

**Recommendation**

36. All efforts to be made to ensure that ID cards are provided in a timely fashion to increase safe movement within Kenya.

**Remittances**

37. Some families receive significant remittances from abroad and from Somalia although flows may have been temporarily reduced by the closure of El Barakat, following 11th September 2001. Remittance flows are almost impossible to monitor or quantify, so the degree of self-reliance or implications for targeting cannot be accurately assessed.

**Agricultural Production in the Camps**

38. Agricultural activities currently include a small number of kitchen gardens and multistory gardens in the camps (roughly 100 per camp), sponsored by WFP and GTZ, and shifting seasonal cultivation within and outside the camp perimeter, initiated by the refugees.

39. Shifting cultivation is not economically or environmentally sustainable and will cause increasing resentment among the local community predominantly pastoralist. It should not be encouraged, as the potential for environment degradation is high. The area, unsuitable for rain fed crop production, is likely to have very low yield and
would lead to a rapid loss of soil fertility.

40. On the other hand, kitchen gardens and MSG, which have only started recently, have considerable scope for expansion. Given the small scale of the activity, kitchen gardens and MSG can only supplement the ration in terms of intake of micronutrients, and cannot be considered a source of self-reliance. For poorer households it remains potentially the only source of food items that are not in the ration basket. Although no major constraints are foreseen in the short run, and there are additional sources of waste and tap spillage water that can be used, the long-term expansion will require additional water resources.

Recommendations

41. While refugee initiatives to provide for their own needs has to be encouraged, dry land farming and potential hostility of the local community must be controlled in order to avoid environmental degradation.

42. The host government should make more land available to the refugees in order to enhance their capacity to complement food assistance. It is recommended that the Dadaab camp radius be extended from two to five kilometers in view of the growing refugee population. This issue should be discussed at the Environmental Working Group (EWG) and the wish of the refugees to practice farming in enclosed areas up to 5 kms from the camps should be considered

43. Within the proposed 5 km perimeter, small-scale irrigation system should be developed. There is a need to develop lined and covered pans for rainwater and runoff harvesting, using cheap and labour-intensive technologies WFP could consider to expand its food for work project to include water harvesting structures in the vicinity of the camp under its regular programme and involving the local population to avoid imbalance and conflict

44. Given the enthusiasm among the refugees for the kitchen gardening MSG initiative, and its very low cost, it should be very actively encouraged.

45. Additional funds for MSG/kitchen gardening should be sought in Nairobi from non-conventional donors.

Production of NFIs in the Camp

46. Production of soap and sanitary towels is ongoing in the camps. Production does not currently meet demand, though there is additional labour capacity. Other opportunities exist for the production of NFIs including wheelbarrows, solar cookers, mats, and fuel saving cookers. Camp production of NFIs will lead to a reduction in transport costs and also helps to inject capital into the community.
Recommendations

47. Wherever viable, NFIs should be produced within the camp.

48. Any surplus production for marketing outside the camp will be liable to Kenya taxes. Internal production should be tax exempt.

Livestock Production

49. Livestock ownership is relatively common in the camp; refugees claim that most households possess on average one to three shoats and/or cattle. Most of the animals are female, for milking and reproduction.

50. Sizeable cattle herds were observed by the mission moving out of the camp for grazing early in the morning. According to refugees and local residents, the herds move large distances (sometimes over 50 km from the camp) in search of pasture and water. Most animals appear to be herded within the camps at night. Apparently, the issue of refugee livestock holdings has not yet created tension with the host community. However the environmental impact is potentially significant such as the overgrazing of grassland.

51. There are no accurate records of refugee livestock holdings. There is no information on the number of refugee livestock, their grazing and browsing patterns and their impact on vegetation and soil. There appear to be no measures for livestock disease control for the refugee animals.

Recommendations

52. Undertake a comprehensive study of livestock and develop a livestock registry in order to assess ownership patterns and management system. Registration would have to be done in consultation with the refugee community.

53. FAO or an agricultural NGO should be contacted to assess the livestock health conditions and risks of uncontrolled epidemics (which would also affect the host community stock) and to recommend measures for disease/vector control.

Targeting

54. The mission agreed that there is scope for targeting food aid to the camps. The understanding by the refugee community of the importance and need for targeting is an essential condition for any targeting strategy to be successful. While certain wealthier groups can be clearly identified and while it is clear that a certain percentage of the population is able to complement the ration from their own sources, there is a lack of socio-economic data on the remaining population. The majority of
refugees remain in a precarious food security situation, especially when the food basket is low. The mission has, however, identified new arrivals and social cases that are the most vulnerable group within the camp.

**Recommendations**

55. When the food basket falls short, a system should be established prior to the new PRRO, to ensure that the most vulnerable in the refugee population receive a complete and full ration, particularly those who are on the borderline of malnutrition.

56. The community and agencies must identify these vulnerable groups, based on agreed criteria.

57. The mission agreed that the new arrivals fall into the most vulnerable category, their food and non-food needs being higher than the old caseload. In the case of shortage in the general ration, this group should be given priority and should be ensured to receive the full basket.

58. Based on the proposed registries of Incentive Workers, business and livestock holdings, on an advocacy campaign and on detailed consultations with the refugee community, a gradual process of targeting these groups should be implemented.

59. This would imply three ration classes: reduced for wealthier, full for vulnerable; and variable for the rest.

60. Since implementing this approach would require full support from the refugee community and refugee leaders, a sensitization and information campaign should be planned.

61. The advocacy campaign should stress that the "savings" from reducing rations for better off groups will be used to ensure a full ration for the most vulnerable.

**School feeding**

62. In view of the precarious nutritional situation prevailing in the camps, and upon request from the community, WFP has agreed to provide an additional ration for school children under a schoolfeeding programme. This programme had just been initiated at the time of the mission visit; it is therefore premature to draw conclusions on the impact of the programme. However, the mission observed that some managerial aspects of the programme require strengthening.

63. The programme is currently managed by CARE, with minimal financial support from UNHCR. In the absence of adequate funding, WFP has provided support through the provision and sales of empty containers. In addition to the food component and the empty bags directly provided to schoolgirls to enhance their attendance at school, WFP contributed about 20% of the cost of the construction of classrooms and school latrines, through the provision of empty tins.

**Recommendations**
64. In view of WFP’s experience in school feeding and the presence of a large school-feeding programme in the country run by WFP, it is recommended that WFP manage directly this aspect of the operation under the new phase of the PRRO. In the transition period a tripartite agreement should be signed between UNHCR, WFP and the IP (CARE) to agree on the modalities of intervention, monitoring and management issues.

65. Under the current phase of the programme it is recommended that WFP, UNHCR and CARE agree to improve the following aspects:

- standardization of kitchen construction;
- standardization of provision of NFI (such as cups, bowls and cooking materials);
- establishment of attendance records in order to clearly differentiate between the enrollment and attendance and to analyze the reason for non attendance;
- Community (parents) participation (contribution to the provision of firewood, complementary food etc);
- preparation of guidelines on food preparation/distribution;
- timing of the feeding.

66. As per the MOU, modalities for WFP taking over the responsibility for distribution and management of that aspect of the programme will need to be agreed upon between WFP, UNHCR and the IP before the next phase of the PRRO

67. In order to measure the impact of the feeding intervention on the nutritional status of the children, prepare a baseline survey against which it will be possible to measure progress.

**Food Distribution and Related Monitoring Activities**

68. Following the Community Self-Management (CSM) system introduced in 1998, the general food distribution is managed by refugees on a voluntary basis. The mission consistently observed that refugees do not receive the ration they are entitled to and that there is a systematic under-scooping, which seems to benefit those directly involved in the distribution. This system of "taxation" by those involved in the distribution has been highlighted by all the households interviewed by the mission. The over and under-scooping is confirmed by MSF food basket monitoring (FBM) reports and by WFP PDM report (August 2002). Recourse mechanisms in light of the "underscooping" are almost nonexistent.

69. In addition, the vast majority of the beneficiaries seem to be unaware of their monthly
entitlement. Information on food distribution and entitlements is shared with refugee leaders prior to each distribution and it is their responsibility to ensure that this information is shared with the community. The mission observed that the structure for information sharing is weak and that lack of knowledge makes refugees more vulnerable to abuse.

70. The issue of incentives was discussed amongst the mission members. While the mission acknowledged the fact that incentives are used in the Kakuma distribution process, with few complaints from the refugees on the scooping, and that there is a “case” for standardization, it also recognized that the current problems in Dadaab are not solely related to the lack of incentives paid to the refugees. This is a well-established system that needs to be strongly addressed by the IP and UNHCR before considering any alternative to the free involvement of the refugees in the distribution system.

71. Other distribution management problems have been observed and need to be addressed:

- There has been little rotation since 1998 among the refugees who volunteer for distribution;
- Tables indicating family entitlements are not visible;
- Posters providing information on the food ration are not posted at the entrance to the food distribution site;
- CARE contracted logistics staff are few and only one to three staff are present at each distribution. In addition the CARE staff report having no authorization in their dealings with the refugee workers;
- Scoops are not standard, particularly for the wheat flour;
- A lot of food spillage takes place in the distribution site;
- UNHCR staff are not present during distribution.

Recommendations

72. More control by the IP CARE is required over the distribution process in order to ensure an equitable distribution of resources; this can be achieved by placing CARE contracted staff in key positions in the distribution line. Existing human resources within CARE could be used to reinforce the monitoring of the distribution process (It was noticed that CARE has the vast majority of its staff in each camp devoted to administration and education activities).

73. UNHCR to assign monitors to the distribution sites and coordinate distribution reports with WFP.
74. A recourse mechanism should be identified, to address irregular scooping.

75. WFP and UNHCR should share their monitoring reports and review them jointly.

76. Visible and clear boards should stand at the entrance of each distribution point where the scoops and individual entitlements are clearly drown. Loudspeakers may be used at the entrance of the distribution site to inform refugees on the ration and the timing of the distribution.

77. MSF and CARE to calibrate scales jointly prior to each distribution.

Water Supply

78. The water supply is adequate in term of overall availability; however, there is a problem of management, particularly with regards to access and distribution to this resource. In addition refugees have reported that each family has to provide a "contribution" to the water "tap manager" that consists of one to two kg of food or 10 KSH.

79. The existing installations suffer from a lack of adequate maintenance and some of the boreholes have closed down. UNHCR budget constraints make adequate maintenance of water points a real challenge.

Recommendations

80. In order to preserve the food ration, UNHCR and CARE should address the problem of "contributions" paid by refugees to the water point controllers as a matter of priority. Water point controllers should be requested to rotate regularly.

81. Donor support is urgently required by UNHCR, in order to properly maintain existing infrastructure.

Non-Food Items

Shelter

82. Lack of adequate shelter remains a serious challenge in Dadaab. Women are more affected by this problem as they have to look for construction materials outside the camps exposing themselves to risks of assaults and rape. Refugees live in "temporary" structures, very similar to those of local nomadic populations. These shelter are not resistant to heavy rains and not adequate to human settlements. The main protection from rain is the traditional UNHCR plastic sheeting, which have not been replaced since 1997. According to UNHCR, 32,500 shelters need to be repaired and funds are available for the repair of less than 5,000 of them in 2003.

Soap
83. Soap is distributed every two months to the refugees.

Firewood

84. The firewood distributed by UNHCR is intended to cover 35% of a family’s need. GTZ has confirmed that by using improved stoves the wood distributed covers almost 50% of daily needs. The distribution has become more regular and effective and a separate "wood for work" programme has been implemented to assist in the creation of the green belts. Moreover, separate distribution of wood to vulnerable cases and new arrivals is implemented.

85. Refugees have to complement the firewood they receive either by selling part of their ration or by fetching wood in the surrounding of the camps. There is a risk that in the long term the increased firewood collection will destabilize the wildlife ecology, increase the creation of feeders roads/path, and, finally, increase the conflict between refugee and local community around a scarce resource. Other energy supply devises exist and are presently explored by GTZ. They are generally expensive and need to be accepted by the refugee community.

Recommendations

86. UNHCR and its donors should provide the required attention and funds to the shelter sector, which is closely linked to refugees’ protection and general wellbeing.

87. The same strategy would apply to other essential NFI, such as plastic sheeting and soap, as a priority, and other eventually to other items such as cooking utensils and clothes.

88. UNHCR and its donors should agree to invest the necessary resources to find alternative and more sustainable solutions to the problems of dwellings and energy requirements for the households. Potential exists and researches and pilots are on their ways. A long-term vision is needed to invest in those initiatives, which are cost-effective in the long term.

Education

89. The camp offers primary, secondary and adult education. UNHCR has contributed to the construction of 16 schools where 28,000 children are enrolled, out of which 11,000 are girls. In the secondary school only 711 refugees are enrolled, out of which 69 girls. Some 50 local children attend the refugee schools. Because of the lack of schools and classrooms, only about 46% of school age children are actually enrolled.

90. At present there is one classroom per 175 children. In order to accommodate all school aged children in the camp, an additional 137 classrooms are required at a cost of US$169,000. There is one desk per 25 students (for lower primary schools), one
book per 8 children and one teacher per 80 students. Teachers are leaving their jobs because of the low wages and working in the private schools in the camps.

Recommendations:

91. UNHCR to explore the possibility of collaborating with UNICEF to improve the education system and contribute to the financement of the education programme. UNICEF assistance could mainly focus on teacher training, revision of the curriculum, provision of learning materials, construction of latrines and, if possible, construction of additional classrooms.

92. UNHCR should continue to mobilize resources (possibly exploring private donors funding) to support this programme.

Logistics

93. WFP has three EDPs in the Dadaab camps, which are located in each of the refugee camp closed to the FDP. CARE Kenya has been running the EDPs on behalf of WFP since the beginning of the operation. CARE is also the implementing partner for UNHCR for general food distribution. Currently management of the EDPs in Dadaab costs WFP approximately US$17 per ton, compared to US$6 in Kakuma, implemented directly by WFP. WFP is currently undertaking a cost benefit study to review implementation of the EDP by CARE. The mission noted that CARE is actively engaged in numerous activities and would benefit from streamlining their interventions in order to improve efficiency. Should WFP directly manage the EDP, this would allow CARE to concentrate on management of the general food distribution.

Use of empty containers

94. WFP has used empty containers in Dadaab mainly to promote girls’ attendance to school and to fund certain IGAs specifically targeted to vulnerable women. During the period from 2000-2002, WFP has provided 188,729 empty bags for implementation of IGA. Some have been provided in kind to the refugees, others have been sold by CARE to generate the equivalent of 1million Shillings.

95. WFP also provides empty sacks to CARE for direct use in their programme (construction of latrines and schools) or for them to sell and use the proceeds to fund IGAs. The funds are solely managed by CARE, but the financial reporting to WFP is weak, as these funds are not actually kept in a separate bank account.

Recommendation

96. Assess the possibility that the empty sacks and tins be sold on the open market by WFP and the funds transferred to a special imprest account to be managed by WFP. Proceeds should be used for activities that directly benefit women and have the
potential to improve their lives.

Section IV. Analysis of the Operation at Kakuma Camp

Demographic Profile and Characteristics of the Refugee Population

1. Kakuma refugee camp is located in Turkana district, in the Rift Valley Province (the north-western part of Kenya), at about 110 km from the Sudanese border. The registered population in the Kakuma camp was 81,356 (UNHCR population figures, October 2002), which represents a decrease of 7% since the 1999 JFAM. The refugee population in the Kakuma camp is mainly composed of people of Sudanese origin (72%). The remainder (26%) is composed of various nationalities such as, Burundians, Congolese (DRC), Ethiopians, Eritreans, Rwandese, Somalians, Ugandans and Angolans. The population in the Kakuma camp is characterised by a high number of adolescent males (12%) and children (18.2% against the norm of 12%) and by a low percentage of people over 60 (0.017% compared to the 7% norm). The profile of the camps shows significantly more men (60%) than women (40%). The total camp population can be broken-down as follows:

Demographic Breakdown by Sex and Age (October 2002)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age (in years)</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 – 4</td>
<td>7,606</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>6,637</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>14,243</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 – 17</td>
<td>15,463</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>10,080</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>25,543</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 – 59</td>
<td>12,741</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>5,022</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>17,763</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 60</td>
<td>10,750</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>9,663</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>20,413</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>46,560</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>31,402</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>77,962</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Registration problems such as the recycling of refugee cards are a recurring feature in this programme and remain of concern to both UNHCR and WFP. A revalidation exercise took place in Kakuma in March 2001 and resulted in a decrease of 23% in the total number of registered refugees in the camp (from 86,864 to 66,733). Therefore, prior to the revalidation exercise, the amount of food distributed by WFP exceeded the actual needs. Almost immediately following the exercise, this number began to increase subsequent to the acceptance of about 4,000 “appeal cases” and the progressive transfer of 11,500 Somali Bantu from the Dadaab camps, who are expected to be resettled in the US. It should also be noted that the distribution lists are not immediately updated by UNHCR to reflect population changes (particularly when there is a decrease in the population). The reason being that all pending and appeal cases need to be sorted out before the final revalidation figure is obtained.

3. UNHCR has established a transit center in Lokichoggio for the registration of new arrivals. This center hosts about 500 asylum seekers per month. There is an average
monthly rejection rate of approximately 200 cases following the interview process, while an estimated 300 people are registered, provided a ration card and transferred to Kakuma. However, the mission noted with concern the weak capacity of the transit center, which functions with one staff member and 4 security guards. According to the UNHCR staff met at the center, there is no provision for food, mattresses and blankets. Many of the refugees to stay there for long periods.

The following table summarizes the projection of the beneficiary figures for 2003 and 2004.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Initial Caseload</th>
<th>Arrivals &amp; Birthrate (3%)</th>
<th>Resettlement</th>
<th>Repatriation / Mortality</th>
<th>Nairobi</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>81,170</td>
<td>6,935</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>1,185</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>87,790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>87,790</td>
<td>7,134</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>1,347</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>93,371</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Recommendations**

4. Based on projections of new arrivals, repatriation, resettlement, growth population rate, the mission recommends that an average planning figure of 90,581 refugees be adopted for the next phase of the operation, October 2003 to September 2005, depending mainly on the evolution of the political and security situation in southern Sudan.

5. In view of the regular influx of new arrivals and the regular movement of young boys between southern Sudan and the camp, the next verification exercise in Kakuma should take place in April 2004.

6. The mission recommends that the capacity of the transit center be reinforced in order to respond to the needs of new arrivals.

7. In view of the volatile situation in Sudan, it is recommended that the transit center be equipped to receive an eventual influx of people fleeing conflict in southern Sudan.

**Health and nutrition**

8. The health status of refugees in Kakuma camp is stable. Crude and under-five mortality rates were on average 0.33 and 0.94/1000/month respectively in the first eight months of 2002. Average consultations per refugee per year were below three, a rate characteristic of a stable population.

9. The nutrition level is considered precarious based on recent nutritional surveillance data. According to the findings of the IRC nutrition survey of Sept 2002, acute global malnutrition among children was 14.3% <-2 Zscore (6.9% <80% w/h median), with
severe malnutrition of children 1.3% <-3 Zscore (0.5 % w/h median). The survey also found 61.3% of the children were anemic (<11gm/dl) and that iron deficiency was a wide spread problem.

Selective Feeding Programmes

10. The team noted that the number of children enrolled in the supplementary and therapeutic feeding centres at the time of the mission was considerably lower than the expected figure according to the global malnutrition rate. Out of 1,250 children expected, only 707 (57%) were in the feeding program by end of August 2002.

11. The length of stay of children in the SFP in 2002 ranged on average from 24-30 weeks, though the target is less than eight weeks. Given this extended stay, the success of the programme is questionable. A high rate of recidivism was also reported. One factor that might be contributing to the low impact of the program could be a sharing of the supplementary food with other family members at the household level.

12. The number of admissions in the TFC was also low. For example at end of August 2002, only 32 children were enrolled in the TFC against 200 expected.

13. The supplementary ration is also available to pregnant women and nursing mothers and again the number enrolled in the SFP is lower than the estimated potential beneficiaries in the camp.

Recommendations:

14. Given that the number of beneficiaries in the selective feeding program was considerably less than expected, IRC should re-examine their case-finding strategy. The mission recommends periodic MUAC screening and expanded outreach services.

15. While the mission commends IRC for the effectiveness of the therapeutic feeding centre, the case management of the children in the supplementary feeding program and follow up at the household level after their discharge from the program should be strengthened. The current double ration should continue to be provided to mothers of the children in the SFP to compensate for the sharing of the ration, which is likely to occur at home.

16. During the household visits, the mission learned that a significant number of pregnant women in the camp were not enrolled in the antenatal services. Distance to the clinics and lack of enough knowledge about the services has been identified as possible barriers. Therefore, the mission recommends that IRC review the coverage of the antenatal and postnatal programme in order to identify barriers to the utilization of the services offered. In addition, the level of coordination of the antenatal/postnatal services with the work of the traditional birth attendants in the sections and the linkage of the antenatal/postnatal activities with the provision of the supplementary food should be improved.

17. The mission recommends that a planning figure of 1,120 malnourished children and
2,240 pregnant and nursing mothers be retained for the yearly beneficiaries under the SFP in the PRRO.

**Durable solutions**

**Repatriation**

18. The civil war in southern Sudan is likely to endure in the year 2003. Despite efforts made by warring parties, negotiations have not yielded tangible and sustainable peace and security in southern Sudan. However, there seem to exist some ‘zones of tranquility,’ which benefit from a range of humanitarian and development assistance and which may provide opportunities for facilitated repatriation. “Go and see” visits could be organised to these areas to permit refugees to make an informed decision for return. Kenya could also expect even more refugee flows from southern Sudan as demonstrated by the current monthly influx averaging 500 persons a month.

**Local integration.**

19. The Kenya Government enforces a policy of encampment. All the refugees are required to reside in refugee camps. The freedom of movement is controlled and access to economic opportunities is only tolerated within the confines of the camps and there is no possibility for local integration.

**Resettlement**

20. The criteria for resettlement are determined by the recipient countries, selection is competitive. Resettlement presents very limited opportunities and cannot be relied on to absorb considerable numbers of refugees from the camps. Thus far only 11,500 Somali Bantus recently transferred from Dadaab are expected to be resettled in the United States of America in the near future.

**Recommendation:**

21. Promotion of voluntary repatriation to “zones of tranquility” in Southern Sudan should be prioritized and allocated the necessary financial resources in order to be effected smoothly. A contingency plan and related budget requirements for large-scale repatriation should be established.

**Level of Self-Support**

22. Although limited by the arid ecological environment and by the government policy that prevents refugee from settling land, the refugees have developed certain economic coping mechanisms that allow them to complement the food ration. The capacity of the different refugee communities within the camp to address their own needs differs according to their origin. For example, the vulnerability of the Sudanese community in Kakuma is greater than the Ethiopians.

**IGAs within the Kakuma Camps**

23. UNHCR supports 18 income-generating activities in Kakuma, which benefits 261
households. WFP supports seven IGAs (a total of 139 beneficiaries) through the provision and selling of empty containers. In addition different implementing partners (LWF, IRC) support a number of different activities with their own resource. (For details on these IGAS see the recent joint Gender study May 2002 page 50-60). There are a number of private shops owned by the refugees selling competitive goods at competitive prices.

24. The mission agreed that the impact of these IGAs on the level of self-sufficiency of the beneficiaries is negligible. The margin of profit that one can draw from these activities is minimal. The market is limited because it has not been expanded outside the camp. The potential clients (the refugee and/or the host community) have no substantial purchasing power.

25. There is clearly a lack of leading strategy in designing and implementing these IGAS among the different agencies. However, although they have a limited potential to raise substantially the income of the beneficiaries, they should still be encouraged as they offer an opportunity for the refugees to be active and respect their dignity.

26. The current selection criteria of the beneficiaries for IGAs is based on vulnerability criteria and focuses on disabled and women, at least for UNHCR and WFP. However, there is no common understanding about these criteria and beneficiaries of these activities tend to be selected on an adhoc basis. It seems also that the information about the possibility of participating in these IGAs does not circulate widely in the camp; most of the beneficiaries belong to the old caseload who appear to have better connections with the IP’s.

Recommendations

27. IGAs are not a long-term solution to self-sufficiency. Self-sufficiency objectives will only be achieved with flexibility in the Government refugee encampment policy. Donors and responsible Institutions have to strongly discuss and convince the Government on eligible cases (those who have demonstrated capacity to sustain themselves) in order to have them exempted from the prevailing policy and get them work permits.

28. The donors should strongly request that the GOK allow the extension of the existing kitchen gardens and the practice of agriculture in the refugee hosting areas.

29. Criteria for involvement/participation in these IGAS should be harmonised and standardized.

30. Greater efforts should be made to understand and distinguish between the various ethnic groups within the camp so as to identify their respective vulnerability levels and adapt the design of IGAs accordingly.

Incentive Workers

31. A number of refugees are engaged by the UN agencies and NGOs as incentive workers. They are employed as teachers, security guards, office clerks, and casual
labourers. The amount of the incentive received varies from 800 Ksh a month to 3,500 Ksh.

32. The exact number of people benefiting from these incentives is not known mainly due to the lack of clear communication and information sharing between the different agencies. This sometimes results in refugees holding two jobs simultaneously.

33. Employment by NGOs and UN agencies tend to benefit the less vulnerable and more educated people among the refugees. It is recommended that access to these jobs be streamlined. A register should be established listing all those who have such an employment. Later a house socio-economic survey will be undertaken by a qualified team to establish the level of income in the camp and agree with UNHCR and WFP on the threshold of self-sufficiency from which targeting could be undertaken.

34. At the distribution site, the incentive payments should be maintained for all workers, particularly for female scoopers. Participation on any advisory and consultative capacity should be voluntary, however.

Trade and Refugee Movement

35. In Kakuma a small percentage of Somalis and Ethiopians control the trade and market inside the camp. Turkana are engaged as shopkeepers. There are some flourishing businesses in the camp such as coffee shops, hotels, restaurants, photo studios, etc…These businesses are mainly the result of private initiative and have been established without the support of agencies but with refugees’ own money or family networks. The income of this trade has not been formally evaluated (Gender study in May 2002 refers to figures given by shop owners: petty trade to reach 100 to 500 a month while restaurants /hotel could reach 10,000 ksh /month.)

Recommendations

Same as in Dadaab.

Targeting

A similar strategy will be implemented in Kakuma, as in Dadaab, with the inclusion of the following recommendation.

36. The category of young men, aged 15 to 25 years, represents a potential source of insecurity within and outside the camp and requires special attention This is a category that is easily identifiable and could be targeted for some FFW or Food for training and sport activities.

School Feeding

37. In addition to the general feeding distribution, a school-feeding programme for primary and secondary school has been implemented in Kakuma since 1997. While this programme is functioning satisfactorily, the mission noted certain management issues:

38. There is a significant discrepancy between enrolment and attendance figures (about
63% of the enrolled children actually attend). In addition, the pattern for irregular attendance is more frequent among the boys (about 53%) than among girls (13%). The lower enrolment of girls, 30% of the total number of children enrolled, can partially be explained by the fact that boys represent the majority of children in the camp. Girls’ enrolment is particularly low at the secondary school level where there are only 300 girls as compared to 2,028 boys.

39. Several weaknesses in the implementation of the intervention are: a) food is provided at mid day instead of early morning to meet the needs of short term hunger, b) limited community involvement in general such as in the preparation of the meal and/or in the provision of eventual food complement, c) regular harassment of girls by older boys which contributes to girls’ drop out rate d) no water available for the children e) no attempt to link this programme with deworming and/or hygiene activities.

Recommendations

40. While the mission agreed to continue the school feeding activities, and the provision of 70 gr. of CSB as a complement for the students, it recommends that this intervention be revisited to have an approach more in line with WFP school feeding standards, particularly with regards to clarifying the objectives and the timing of the feeding.

41. In view of WFP’s experience in school feeding and the presence of a large school-feeding programme in the country run by WFP, it is recommended that WFP manage directly this aspect of the operation under the new phase of the PRRO. In the transition period a tripartite agreement should be signed between UNHCR, WFP and the IP (LWF to agree on the modalities of intervention).

Food Distribution and Related Monitoring Activities

Distribution

42. While distribution appears to proceed reasonably well, there are still some organizational problems that need to be addressed. In particular, insecurity and disorderly queuing at the distribution points needs to be reviewed as women consistently report that they are pushed to the back of the lines. The possibility is mooted of a separate distribution time for women. In addition, it appears that encouraging women to collect the ration directly adds to the numerous chores for which they are already responsible such as childcare and collecting firewood. Even pregnant women are to be seen collecting and transporting their ration and many women must carry their babies to the distribution site and wait long hours in the heat to collect their food.

Recommendations

43. The issue of women collecting rations needs to be studied further as it appears that this represents a major physical burden.

44. All scoopers should be provided with facemasks as protection against dust.
45. It is recommended that the security guards at the distribution points are representative of the ethnic composition of the recipients, to avoid preferential treatment.

**Water Supply**

46. The minimum standard is 15 to 20 l per person per day. The yield from the boreholes is sufficient but the distribution of water is uneven and in some sections of the camp water is very scarce. The availability of water in many of the schools is scarce.

**Recommendations**

47. The mission recommends that the distribution of water in the camp be improved so as to meet the minimum standards of 15 l per person per day. This will involve digging more boreholes and installing additional taps, with a particular emphasis on the situation of the Somali Bantus in Kakuma One.

48. The mission further recommends water taps to be installed in the schools and the number of latrines be increased to meet the minimum standards, with a particular focus on latrines for girls.

**Non-Food Items**

**Shelter**

49. Kakuma camp was established in 1992. At its inception it was foreseen that refugees would be able to quickly repatriate. Camp shelters were consequently planned as temporary structures. It is only in June 2000 that BO Kenya reoriented shelter assistance to longer term needs and galvanized iron sheets and mud bricks began to be used. About 1,759 shelters were constructed in this manner. However there are a total of 21,426 shelters in Kakuma camp and immediate needs are for 7,210 shelters (for those who have completely collapsed and those seriously damaged).

50. Sanitation is also critical, as funding constraints have resulted in an inadequate number of latrine facilities in the camp (one latrine for 49 refugees on average).

**Recommendation**

51. In view of the dim prospects for durable solutions, about 19,000 shelters need to be converted into more durable structures and sufficient funding should be made available for accommodation of new arrivals.

**Soap**

52. Soap is a critical issue given the difficult hygiene conditions in the camp. UNHCR procures and distributes sufficient amounts of soap to meet the needs of the refugees. UNHCR purchasing soap from the refugees is to be commended.

**Firewood**

53. A significant proportion of the maize ration is sold to purchase firewood to complement the existing UNHCR contribution, which currently only targets 35% of people’s needs. In fact, UNHCR has not been able to consistently meet the 35% target.
figure and reaches an estimated 32% of people’s needs only.

Recommendation

54. It is recommended that the target figure of the provision of 35% of the refugee’s firewood needs should be increased to provide 50% and accompanied by alternative measures to reduce firewood consumption. These measures will also increase food intake as a significant amount of food is currently being sold to purchase firewood.

Education

55. The mission noted that camp schools are congested and learning facilities are inadequate. In primary school, the teacher/pupil ration is about 1:54; the recommended ration is 1:40. The classroom/pupils ratio is: 1:79 while the recommended ratio is: 1:40.

56. 10% of children aged 4-6 years are not attending pre-school. The secondary school enrollment stands at 2,264 students among who 1,947 are male and 277 female. There is a low participation of girls in the education programmes. The majority of the teachers are not trained as professional teachers. There is a shortage of science and language teachers. The performance of camp schools in the national examination is below average. Somali Bantu children report that they do not currently have access to education services. There is a need for additional schools/classrooms, teachers, schools materials and equipments (text books, benches, laboratory equipments, blackboards, cemented school floors etc.)

Recommendation

57. The mission recommends that access to schools be given to all refugee children. This may involve the construction of schools in some of the camps.

Security

Security in relation with the local community

58. Relationship between the local and refugee community are stable with a security pattern that does not reflect peak of insecurity at given moment. Much of the hostilities between the two communities evolved around the problem of access to limited resource such as firewood and water.

59. The camp has been a main push factor for Kenyan to settle in Kakuma. The population of the Division has grown from 5,000 in 1991 to about 40,000 in 2002. The host community is having active trade activities with the refugees. Local labour has been common especially with the Somali and Ethiopian community. Turkana are employed to carry food, fetch water. This has also promoted good relationship between the host community and the refugees despite the harsh environment.

60. However the local community expressed concern that an increased number of young children working at the camp during the day, neglecting thereby schools and their
families. High unemployment rate in the district, which is also a national problem, has been identified as a source of frustration for the local population and a factor influencing insecurity.

61. While the schools are open in the camps to the local population, only a limited number is actually admitted. Illiteracy is considered as a main problem in the host community, one of the contributing factors being the lack of schools. The school-feeding programme implemented by WFP in the district was reported to be erratic.

Security in the camp

62. There have been numerous reports of harassment of girls in the schools, which is a significant disincentive to girls’ participation. The possibility of single-sex schools should be explored, as well as separate sessions for girls and boys. The large number of boys and young men in the camp represents a threat not only for girls but also for the others if these boys are idle and not kept busy.

63. The Somali Bantu resettlement case has recently created some tension with the other refugee community who also wishes that a durable solution such as resettlement be considered for them.

64. The total number of security incidents in the camp in Kakuma in 2002 did not exceed 20.

Recommendations

65. As already noted, activities in the camp should target the unaccompanied adolescent male.

66. In order to release some of the tension within the local community, possible assistance activities should be designed and undertaken for the local population in relation to their specific needs. It is recommended to use FFW activities to construct infrastructure.

67. GoK and UNHCR should continue to cooperate to protect refugees.

68. The mission encourages the GoK to issue work permits for those refugees that have demonstrated their ability to support themselves.

Logistics

69. WFP directly manages the EDP in Kakuma. Currently there are three logistics staff and 57 casual labourers, to assist with the offloading. There are 11 rubbhalls in Kakuma, each with a capacity of 440 MT of food, which brings the total storage capacity to 4,400 MT. In addition, LWF is in the process of erecting two additional wickhalls for WFP. The logistics unit is responsible for the reception and storage of food commodities, releasing and loading food for movement to the FDP, which is managed by LWF and keeps detailed records of food received and dispatched. The logistics unit is also responsible for data entry and reconciliation in the Commodity Tracking System (CTS).
Recommendation

70. No change required
SECTION V - ANNEX I

TERMS OF REFERENCE
JOINT WFP/UNHCR/GOK ASSESSMENT MISSION (JAM)

I. BACKGROUND:

The refugee influx to Kenya dates back to 1991 and has since been maintained by the recurrent civil unrest in neighboring countries. Currently, Kenya hosts an estimated 205,000 refugees (44% female and 56% male) of whom two thirds are Somali and the rest are mainly Sudanese. Out of this population 138,000 (67%) are located in Dadaab and 67,000 (33%) in Kakuma Camps.

Due to the fact that the camps are located in a harsh semiarid environment, the refugees are largely dependent on external assistance for sustenance. WFP has provided food assistance to the refugees in Kenya through protracted relief operations since 1991. The current PRRO 6226.00 started in October 2000 and will run for three years until September 2003. WFP food commodities are distributed by UNHCR through general, supplementary and therapeutic feeding. UNHCR is responsible for the overall maintenance of the refugee operation and specifically for protection and general care of the refugees. A number of local and international NGOs are involved in the provision of services in the camps. The Government of Kenya through the Ministry of Home Affairs, Heritage and Sports coordinates the refugee operation with support from other line Ministries and oversees policy and security-related issues.

The maintenance of a regular food pipeline for a totally dependent and ever increasing refugee population has been a major challenge for the Refugee Operation. Throughout 2001, PRRO food pipeline has been quite precarious and WFP has not managed to provide the required daily ration per person of 2100 Kilocalories.

The Joint Mission, in close consultation with representatives from donor embassies, will review the overall food supply situation of the refugees in Kenya and explore alternative and durable solutions to food aid. The mission will make recommendations, which will form part of the submission to the expansion of the next phase of the protracted Relief and Recovery Operation to the WFP Executive Board approval in May 2003.

II. TERMS OF REFERENCE:

The mission will undertake the following tasks:

1.0 FOOD & NUTRITION
1.1 Review the food and related non-food supply situation to the refugee population in Kenya. With donors and other partners, explore mechanisms for ensuring a more regular and adequate pipeline, including options for multiple year pledges and contributions from non-traditional donors.

1.2 Assess the adequacy of the food ration and the suitability of the current food basket (are items being resold) and the methods of food processing including milling and cooking habits, particularly with regards to CSB;

1.3 Review the nutritional and health status of the beneficiaries and the effectiveness of supplementary and therapeutic feeding.

1.4 Review issues affecting the size of refugee population and the impact on food needs, especially registration and revalidation.

1.5 Assess to what extent recommendations of the 1999 JFAM have been implemented;

2.0 SELF-RELIANCE AND DURABLE SOLUTIONS

2.1 Explore refugees’ access to alternative food and income sources and classify groups within the refugee community according to their coping mechanisms and levels of food self-sufficiency/dependency on free handouts. The analysis should consider non-relief livelihoods and the strategies refugees use to diversify diets.

2.2 Based on 2.1 assess the food security and practical implications of reducing free food distribution for the better off elements of the refugee society. Assess future food aid requirements taking into account population projections, sustainability and support activities undertaken by the refugees and alternative food assistance methods such as FFW schemes.

2.3 Explore alternative mechanisms for food provisioning for households with able-bodied adult members including FFW, food for training and schemes to prepare refugees with skills and tools for eventual repatriation. Identify possible areas for asset creation in the camps and surrounding areas

3.0 GENDER

3.1 Build on the WFP/UNHCR gender study and review women’s participation in distribution and management of food aid;

3.2 Based on the gender study recommendations Review the role of food in education and training and make recommendations on how food aid would
promote general literacy and skills development especially that of girls and women;

4.0 LOGISTICS

4.1 Review the efficiency of internal transportation including constraints such as road conditions, especially the Dadaab - Garissa road and possible ways of improvement;

4.2 Review quantity and quality of warehousing;

4.3 Assess the quality of food delivered noting areas of concern and suggest ways of improving quality standards;

4.4 Review the management of EDPs in Kakuma and Dadaab;

4.5 Assess the efficiency and cost effectiveness of food delivery.

5.0 PROGRAMME ISSUES

5.1 Review the role of WFP monitors in the camps, particularly in relation to the partner agencies (LWF, CARE, UNHCR), and make suggestions for more effective roles, if necessary.

5.2 Review the cost effectiveness of food distribution and the quality of monitoring at distribution points in both Kakuma and Dadaab camps, and recommend improvements.

5.3 Assess the guidelines and survey instruments for general food distribution monitoring and Post Distribution Monitoring and make recommendations for adjustments (if necessary) and modalities for implementation.

5.4 Review the current status of food security information on the refugees and, if inadequate, make recommendations for enhancing the information base through additional surveys and/or monitoring activities. Assess the coordination of food security information between partners and suggest improvements.

5.5 Explore the need to assist the most vulnerable members of the local community using development approaches such as food for work, school feeding;

6.0 SECURITY
6.1 Review HH food storage conditions and identify possible improvements in protection of these items

6.2 Review the security of refugee’s household food stocks and identify possible improvements in protection of these items.

The mission will consult WFP, UNHCR, donors, local NGOs and Government representatives in Nairobi. Donor representatives will be invited to join the mission as observers. The mission will also visit Kakuma and Dadaab refugee camps and hold discussions with WFP, UNHCR, implementing partners, and refugees, including women.

III. De-briefing & Report:

The mission will hold debriefing sessions in Nairobi with Government representatives, WFP, UNHCR and Implementing Partners as deemed necessary by WFP and UNHCR.

The mission will produce a report depicting the areas addressed in the terms of reference. The Mission will provide WFP and UNHCR with specific recommendations for the design and implementation of the next expansion of the WFP PRRO.

The draft report will be submitted to WFP and UNHCR Headquarters within 15 days of the ending of the mission. Based on the comments, the mission will prepare a final report.
ABREVIATIONS

CARE  Co-operative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere
DSM  Dried Skimmed Milk
EDP  Extended Delivery Point
FDP  Final Distribution Points
GDP  Gross Domestic Product
GoK  Government of Kenya
GTZ  Germany Technical Agency for Co-operation
HEB  High Energy Biscuits
IRC  International Rescue Committee
IP  Implementing Partners
JAM  Joint Assessment Mission
JFAM  Joint Food Needs Assessment Mission
LTSH  Landside Transport, Storage and handling
LOU  Letter of Understanding
LWF  Lutheran World Federation
MSF-B  Medicines sans frontières
MSG  Multi-story Garden
MOHA  Ministry of Home Affairs and National Heritage
SF  School Feeding
SFC  Save the Children Fund
TFP  Therapeutic Feeding Programme
SPLA  Sudanese People’s Liberation Army
PRRO  Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
USAID  United States Agency for International Development
UNHCR  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
WFP  World Food Programme
### ANNEX II

**JOINT WFP/UNHCR/ GoK ASSESSMENT MISSION**

**23rd SEPTEMBER TO 9th OCTOBER 2002**

**TENTATIVE ITINERARY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DAY &amp; DATE</th>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>ACTIVITY</th>
<th>VENUE</th>
<th>FACILITATOR</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monday, 23 Sept.</td>
<td>0900-1000</td>
<td>Review itinerary/documentation</td>
<td>WFP Conference Room (B222)</td>
<td>T. Pakkala</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1100-1300</td>
<td>Joint WFP/HCR meetings</td>
<td>WFP Conf. room</td>
<td>T. Pakkala ; C. Van ; D. Brown ; M. Qasim</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>1300-1400 Lunch Break</td>
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<td>1400-1500</td>
<td>Meeting with Govt – MOHA (PS)</td>
<td>Jogoo House A, Conference Room, 4th flr.</td>
<td>T. Pakkala ; C. Van ; D. Brown ; M. Qasim</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1530-1630</td>
<td>Meeting with Donors &amp; implementing partners (LWF, CARE, IRC, MSF-B)</td>
<td>UNHCR Conference Hall</td>
<td>T. Pakkala; C. Van; D. Brown; M Qasim</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tuesday, 24 Sept.</td>
<td>0630</td>
<td>Fly to Kakuma</td>
<td>Wilson Airport</td>
<td>B. Ezeibe</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Internal mission meeting in Kakuma &amp; field visit</td>
<td>Kakuma</td>
<td>K. Mable</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wednesday, 25 Sept.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Field visit</td>
<td>Kakuma</td>
<td>A. Ezeibe</td>
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<td>K. Mable</td>
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<td>Thursday, 26 Sept.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Field visit</td>
<td>Kakuma</td>
<td>B Ezeibe</td>
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<td>K. Mable</td>
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<tr>
<td>Friday, 27 Sept.</td>
<td>AM</td>
<td>Field visit &amp; Debriefing</td>
<td>Loki-Nairobi</td>
<td>B. Ezeibe</td>
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<td></td>
<td>PM</td>
<td>Fly to Nairobi via Loki</td>
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<td>K. Mable</td>
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<td>Saturday, 28 Sept.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Report writing and reviewing progress</td>
<td>Hotel - Nairobi</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sunday, 29</td>
<td></td>
<td>Rest</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sept.</td>
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<td>Fly to Dadaab</td>
<td>Wilson Airport</td>
<td>T. Awan &amp; D. Buruku</td>
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<tr>
<td>Monday, 30</td>
<td>AM</td>
<td>Meetings with Agencies and IPs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct.</td>
<td>PM</td>
<td>Field visit</td>
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<td>T. Awan &amp; D. Buruku</td>
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<td>Wednesday, 2</td>
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<td>Field visit</td>
<td>Dadaab</td>
<td>T. Awan &amp; D. Buruku</td>
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<td>Oct.</td>
<td>AM</td>
<td>Field visit &amp; debriefing</td>
<td>Dadaab to Nairobi</td>
<td>T. Awan &amp; D. Buruku</td>
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<td>Friday, 4</td>
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<td>Fly to Nairobi on UNHCR special flight</td>
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<td>Report writing</td>
<td>Hotel</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sunday, 6</td>
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<td>Report writing/rest</td>
<td>Nairobi</td>
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<td>AM</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct.</td>
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<td>Debriefing Govt.</td>
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