REPORT

JOINT ASSESSMENT MISSION
WFP/UNHCR/GOVERNMENT /DONORS
Sudanese Refugees in Eastern Chad
23 October to 4 November 2004

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The mission members wish to thank WFP, UNHCR, the NGOs, the UN agencies based in N’djamena, the Government of Chad and WFP/UNHCR staff in N’djamena, Abeche and field offices of Iriba, Bahai, Guereda, Adre and Goz Beida for the extensive support provided. In particular, the team is grateful to those who provided the briefing materials, organized schedules, provided logistical support, briefed the team and participated in the numerous meetings.
INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY

The team conducted the Joint Assessment Mission in Chad from 23 October to 5 November 2004, and was comprised of eight members: three WFP staff, three UNHCR staff, an observer from the EC delegation in N’djamena and an observer from the Chadian Ministry of Home Affairs. The team spent a week in Abeche and visited 10 out of 11 refugee camps, and some surrounding villages. The work of the team was guided by the attached terms of reference (annex 1).

The mission members were organized into two groups, with each group assigned specific areas to review, as identified in the ToR. The specific means used to gather and review information were as follows:

- Review existing reports/studies/surveys;
- Meetings with WFP and UNHCR field offices, as well as the main implementing partners;
- Discussions with refugee leaders and separate meetings with women refugee leaders;
- Observation of food distribution activities during blanket feeding;
- Visits to Extended Distribution Points (EDPs), hospitals, supplementary feeding programmes (SFP), therapeutic feeding programmes (TFP), schools and water collection points;
- Visits to surrounding villages and meetings with local communities;
- Visits to the markets in the village/town and in the refugee camps;
- Household and community interviews with mainly refugee women;
- Observation of other refugee activities such as livestock holdings and gardening;
- Meetings with local authorities, traditional leaders and community representatives;
- Mission meetings at the close of each day.

Key sources of information included the reports of various missions that took place during 2004:

- WFP/UNHCR nutrition mission (August 2004);
- VAM reports for Chad (September and October 2004);
- Joint Chadian Government/UN agencies/NGO assessment of local population (September 2004);
- FAO/CILLS crop assessment (September 2004); and
- various documents from USAID FEWSNET.

The UN Country team has recently drafted a comprehensive CAP for 2005. Given the detailed nature of this document as far as the description of the situation and the

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1 An additional WFP staff member who had just been assigned to Chad joined the team in situ to assist with the field work.
economy of Chad is concerned, the mission did not review in detail issues related to these sectors. The present mission report attempts to complement information that has not been covered by the above documents.

PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE ASSESSMENT

The aim of the mission was to review and assess the situation of the Sudanese refugee population that has crossed the eastern Chadian border along a 600 km frontier region in the departments of Ouaddai and Wadi Fira (Biltine) over the last year and settled in 11 camps. The mission focused specifically on the food and non-food needs of the refugees and assessed the capacity of WFP and UNHCR to meet these needs with appropriate assistance. The mission also looked into other sectors that directly impact on refugee well being such as shelter, water, sanitation, health, domestic needs, community services, security and education. In addition, the mission attempted to identify the impact of the massive arrival of the refugees on the livelihood system of the host population. The mission examined the extent of the crisis faced by these populations and tried to put forward possible solutions that could be included in the framework of the refugee emergency response.
PART I
KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Both agencies have been facing a considerable challenge in responding to the needs of the 200,000 Sudanese refugees who entered Chad between April 2003 and October 2004. What began as a small influx into eastern Chad last year, quickly became a complex emergency involving considerable logistic challenge to settle and assist a population entirely reliant on external assistance in a remote and hostile environment. UNHCR and WFP together with implementing partners have struggled to expand programmes fast enough to meet the rapidly growing caseload.

However since September 2004, there have been several signs that the operation has shifted from an emergency mode to a consolidation phase enabling both agencies to plan and implement a more comprehensive assistance programme:

- There has been a decrease in population movements involving refugees crossing the border and members of host populations attempting to settle in the camps.
- The phenomenon of "spontaneous arrivals" who registered in camps and received a card entitling them to aid, has been brought under control. From now on refugees waiting at the border crossing will have to register when they choose to be transferred to the camps.
- It is planned that 10 out of the 11 camps will continue on a long-term basis. As a result, the normal care and maintenance programme can be deployed there gradually – community services, education and health. UNHCR is planning to relocate the remaining camp.
- The nutritional situation, as demonstrated by the results of camp nutritional surveys and screenings and observation of children in the camps, while still precarious has improved since June 2004 when the Centre for Disease Control (CDC) reported alarming rates of malnutrition.
- Mortality rates remain within acceptable norms (< 1/10,000).
- The improvement in the nutritional and health situation may be attributed to a more regular supply pipeline and to the blanket feeding implemented after the CDC survey results, but it may also result from improvements in the water and sanitation systems and from vaccination campaigns.

However if the refugee operation has progressed beyond the emergency phase, the situation of the local population has become critical. In addition to the pressure that refugee influxes had placed on local resources, local population has recently experienced difficult climatic conditions and a poor harvest. Most of the assistance so far has been targeted to the refugees with very little directed specifically to the local population.

The activities under the WFP CP have been seriously affected by the refugee crisis. On one hand, large amounts of food were initially borrowed from the CP, disrupting an already fragile pipeline. On the other hand the attention and priority given by the Government and the international community to the refugee operation has resulted in neglecting their regular activities for the local population.

2 Depending on the availability of the water
There is no durable solution such as repatriation that can be envisaged in the near future for the refugees. On the contrary, it is most likely that other refugees will continue to arrive into Chad. UNHCR is estimating that among the 300,000 displaced persons along the border in Sudan, 100,000 could cross the border to seek asylum during the course of 2005. Self reliance opportunities are also very limited. The environment and pressure on the available resources does not offer possibilities for agricultural activities or substantial cattle raising and it is most likely that refugees will rely on food assistance for a long period.

According to data made available to the mission, the food security situation of the local population is poor and even more precarious in the prefectures of Guereda, Iriba and Bahai, where 50% of the refugees are concentrated. There are also several indications that the nutritional situation of local populations is less satisfactory than that of the refugees.

In these circumstances a visible and immediate response to the problems of the local population should be envisaged along with the refugee operations. Such assistance assumes even greater importance today: the food situation and the tensions arising from increased pressure on natural resources – water, fuel-wood and grazing – are being viewed with growing concern by humanitarian agencies and the Government of Chad.

The following conclusions and recommendations summarise the strategies to be implemented in 2005 in order to respond effectively to the needs of the refugees and to mitigate the impact of their arrival on the local ecosystem and on the coping mechanisms of local populations.

1. **Planning Figure**

1.1 The food aid planning figure to be used up to June 2005 is 250,000 people, including 25,000 members of the host population. The figure will be aligned with UNHCR’s from July 2005 to take into account the results of a census and to reflect verification exercises and forecasts of a new exodus from Sudan into Chad. If the influx is of large-scale, the figures will be jointly reviewed.

1.2 The quality of refugee registration is a source of concern to both agencies and to the National Committee for Refugees (Comité nationale pour les refugiés [CNAR]). Efforts made to date to correct errors in the system will be complemented by implementing the recommendations made by the UNHCR census team, which completed its mission at the end of October. This includes a recommendation to undertake a refugee identification exercise as soon as possible. This is currently planned for the first quarter of 2005.

1.3 In order to correct irregularities and to create computerized census lists, we reiterate the recommendation made by the census team to perform a tent-by-tent verification by the end of the year with the participation of WFP.

1.4 UNHCR will involve WFP in the planning and implementation of the census and verification exercises. WFP will make staff available to participate in the exercises.

2. **Health and Nutrition Situation**

2.1 The monitoring system needs to be reinforced and implemented on a regular basis in order to track the nutritional situation properly. While there are signs of
improvement, nutrition is still precarious and at-risk. The health situation is also delicate; epidemiological surveillance should be strengthened.

2.2 In order to follow up on the CDC survey conducted in June to evaluate the need for blanket feeding and to review the present nutritional situation in the camps, the mission welcomes the UNHCR initiative in deciding to undertake a survey on all sites beginning in mid November 2004. Results of the survey are expected at the end of January 2005. Action contre la faim (ACF) has already been selected to undertake the survey using a single methodology to be defined for all camps. However, the mission also recommends that the survey be undertaken in consultation with partners that have already made ad hoc surveys – Médecins sans frontières (MSF) in the Iriba region and Cooperazione Italiana (COOPI) in Djabal and Goz Amir.

2.3 A survey conducted in the villages near the camps would produce valuable information on whether a need exists for programmes in favour of local communities. WFP and UNHCR should consult with UNICEF and ACF, which propose carrying out the survey, to establish a work programme, harmonize methodologies and assess the capacities of the actors involved. Also to be considered are the possible implications of the workload on local personnel involved in the surveys and the local capacity and availability of surveyors, trainers, etc.

2.4 Given the endemic nature of goitre in the region and in Darfur, and in the light of the limited diversity in the refugee food basket, which could lead to deficiency diseases such as scurvy (three declared cases), it is recommended that UNHCR in collaboration with WFP and UNICEF should organize a training programme for partners on screening for micronutrient deficiencies among refugees.

**Blanket feeding**

2.5 The decision to initiate blanket feeding was taken in light of the results of the nutritional survey undertaken by CDC and to prevent malnutrition among vulnerable groups. Blanket feeding should make it possible to (i) provide nutritional surveillance for children and (ii) increase the coverage of supplementary feeding centres (SFCs) and TFCs by systematically referring malnourished children to them after they have been identified. In order to improve screening of malnourished children, it is recommended that, as with the international NGO IMC in Guereda, all partners involved in the health sector be associated with the WVI screening during the next distributions.

2.6 To make blanket feeding distributions accessible to local populations, no system involving any form of discrimination, such as issuance of ration cards, should be introduced.

2.7 The mission considers that the number of beneficiaries is small enough to distribute food in one day. It therefore recommends that distributions take place on a one-time basis and should not last more than one day.
2.8 When the operation becomes stabilized, WFP and UNHCR’s operational partners should start to rationalize their human resources to avoid having staff idle outside the distribution periods.

Supplementary feeding programme

2.9 Increase the number of community health workers (CHW) in each camp to obtain a ratio of one community health operator per 500 refugees. CHW would be responsible for screening and follow-up of cases as well as for disseminating basic health information and providing the most vulnerable individuals with practical support.

Therapeutic feeding programme

2.10 Given the decrease in the numbers of those admitted to TFCs, the mission recommends that a joint operational strategy for opening and closing TFCs should be implemented with the partner, WFP and UNHCR on completion of the nutritional survey.

3. Composition of the food basket

3.1 Given the refugees’ total dependency on food aid, supply of a 2,100 kcal food basket should be continued through general distributions.

3.2 The food basket was reviewed in August 2004 at the time of the joint nutritional mission; its recommendations should be maintained. It is imperative that the refugees’ food habits be respected and that rations provide the type of cereals they normally eat – sorghum, millet and corn flour. Rice and corn grain are not acceptable in this context.

3.3 Given the high costs beneficiary families face if they mill their own cereal rations, it is recommended that flour is provided. WFP should explore the possibility of either milling the grain upon reception of commodities in Libya, N’djamena or Douala or, in collaboration with UNHCR, of providing refugees with mills in their camps.

3.4 It is recommended that a UNHCR/WFP/partner working group be set up to study the question of milling, to consider possible alternatives and to consider practical and economic solutions – for example setting up mills at camp level (UNHCR has five in their warehouse), deciding how they should operate in terms of management and collection mechanisms, and co-location with commercial mills already in the camps.

3.5 Otherwise, the recommendation of the joint nutritional mission should be implemented: increasing the cereal grain ration by 50 g in order to offset milling costs.

3.6 The joint mission’s recommendation to include a 25 g sugar ration should be implemented in future distributions.

3.7 The mission recommends that WFP and its partner provide target populations with information on various recipes and on the importance of corn-soya blend (CSB) as the sole source of vitamins and minerals in their rations.
4. **Food security in and outside the camps**

Refugees

4.1 The mission recognizes that the refugee populations in the camps are entirely dependent on food aid and have very few opportunities for providing for their own food needs.

4.2 Given the lack of any immediate durable solution for the Sudanese refugees, it is recommended that UNHCR examine the possibility of negotiating the allotment of arable plots for vegetable crops. Negotiations should be initiated with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) on the distribution of seeds and hand tools, which should also be offered to populations near the camps.

Host population

4.3 The local population’s food insecurity is such as to require an immediate and visible response. This should take account of needs in areas characterized by a subsistence farming economy and of agricultural calendars.

4.4 WFP and UNHCR currently have budgets for this purpose: a US$2.25 million budget in the form of quick-impact projects (QIPs) for UNHCR and US$3.5 million in the form of food aid for 25,000 people, equivalent to 3,424 mt for WFP. The agencies will keep each other informed of any increases and disbursements in these budgets. The programmes should be set up jointly and associate traditional development partners while taking advantage of the recent arrival of new partners providing refugee assistance. Different forms of food-aid activity may be envisaged in consultation with local communities and traditional development partners.

4.5 WFP should revitalize its school feeding programme by focusing its activities in eastern Chad where the refugees are concentrated. It should review the programme’s operational modalities in order to provide a better response to the present crisis, for example providing a food incentive for teachers. The programme should be implemented in coordination with UNICEF’s education programme. The food-for-work (FFW) component of the CP should also give priority to the refugee region and activities should be implemented in partnership with QIPs and UNHCR. Priority should be given to the water and environment sectors.

4.6 A working group headed by WFP should be set up in order to identify immediate intervention modalities. It would be responsible for developing a three-phase action plan: phase 1: December 2004 – February 2005, phase 2: March – July 2005; a third phase would emphasize longer-term development. The group would also be charged with obtaining the information needed regarding vulnerability, including the food deficit, and about existing programmes so as to target interventions and intervention mechanisms accurately (presence and capacity of partners).
5 **UNHCR care and maintenance programme**

**Water**

5.1 The problem of water in some camps continues to be a major source of concern. UNHCR is looking into the possibility of a study of how the Sudanese manage water in their home villages in order to determine what the refugees’ real water needs are in the camps. Given that water is a very scarce commodity in this part of Chad, UNHCR and its partners are giving priority to the search for water using scientific methods and ground surveys. As this kind of prospecting is very expensive, substantial support by the international community is needed.

**Sanitation**

5.2 In view of the fact that the refugee population has stabilized, family latrines should be provided to substitute for collective latrines.

**Environment**

5.3 Alternatives are in place by UNHCR to find a solution to the lack of firewood, for example improved stoves, kerosene stoves and wood-gathering by truck beyond the immediate neighbourhood of the camps. But these solutions are extremely expensive and donors must be made aware of the fact.

**Shelter**

5.4 In general, most of the families in the camps have received a tent. Given that the environment makes it impossible to build permanent shelters with local materials, additional tents should be provided for families of more than five.

6 **Programme management**

**Distribution**

6.1 With a view to guaranteeing equitable distribution, there should be a shift from the present system of group distribution to family distributions. The change should be effective in all camps by the end of the year.

6.2 Partners should pursue their efforts to reinforce their personnel and provide the means required for the new family distribution system to function properly, for example by constructing distribution sites, while making every effort to apply the gender criteria required by WFP and UNHCR.

6.3 UNHCR and WFP have already prepared and circulated directives to be circulated to partners. Training regarding the distribution system should be organized by UNHCR and WFP.

6.4 All distributions, including blanket feeding, should take place in the presence of WFP and UNHCR personnel.

6.5 Distribution reporting mechanisms are not clear; WFP needs to organize a training programme for partners and WFP staff on food management and monitoring.
**Coordination**

*At the field operations level*

6.6 As specified in the terms of reference, the mission will draw up a joint WFP-UNHCR action plan to be finalized by the end of the year.

6.7 Selection of operational partners charged with distribution should be undertaken jointly by WFP and UNHCR. Selection should be based on the means offered by partners, on their capacity to provide services and on the quality of their performance. These three elements should be specified in the tripartite letter of understanding (LOU) to be signed by WFP, UNHCR and the partner.

6.8 As provided under the MOU (signed in July 2002 between UNHCR and WFP), new camp sites should be selected in consultation with WFP so that it can evaluate the logistics aspects of transporting food.

6.9 The WFP and UNHCR offices should be established near the camps as long as security conditions permit. The concept of joint United Nations houses should be applied, especially in remote areas.

6.10 Communications difficulties have been noted regarding exchange of information about the pipeline, especially with regard to availability of food in the country and internal transport movements. It is recommended that such information be provided on a regular basis during the weekly coordination meetings.

*At the United Nations/Government level*

6.11 Sectorial groups provided for in the coordination framework set up by the National Monitoring Committee on Humanitarian Activities (Comité national de suivi d'action humanitaire [CNSAH]) and the Humanitarian Coordinator should identify any sub-groups of refugees and local populations so that their differences can be taken into consideration and any problems affecting local populations can be addressed from a long-term development perspective.

*At the regional level*

6.12 With a view to harmonizing their contingency plans for 2005, WFP and UNHCR should participate every two months in coordination meetings held alternately in Abéché (Chad) and El Geneina (Sudan). Topics could include: push/pull factors for refugees and IDPs (related to security, levels of assistance on both sides), contingency numbers, prospects for repatriation, and other coordination issues.

**Monitoring and evaluation**
Food-basket monitoring (FBM)

6.13 The precarious nature of the nutritional situation, the weakness of supervision of distributions and the presence of certain irregularities in the registration cards makes it all the more important to find out whether all beneficiaries are receiving their rations. The FBM system set up for that purpose two months ago with WVI needs to be continued in all camps.

6.14 Implementation of the activity, adherence to the methodology and quality of results produced have not been satisfactory so far. However, with a view to capitalizing on experience acquired to date and before considering selecting a new partner for this activity, UNHCR and WFP should continue working with WVI to improve the FBM system in terms of methodology, staff to be deployed, regularity and quality of reporting, communication with the partner responsible for distribution, etc.

6.15 The working group will evaluate the activity in March 2005 to decide whether to continue with the same partner.

Post-distribution monitoring (PDM)

6.16 Given the ongoing stabilization of the operation in terms of the population, assistance and nutritional situation, it is now possible to set up a proper PDM. This activity should be implemented before the end of the year.

6.17 PDM should be conceived both as a means of collecting information for monitoring operations and as a programming tool.

6.18 UNHCR and WFP agree on initiating a PDM pilot phase as soon as possible in camps in the Guereda area. WFP will lead the pilot phase and should be able to use WVI staff with a view to rationalizing their work and training them in this activity. WFP will form a working group to share the pilot methodology and its results in coordination meetings for the sector as the activity progresses.

6.19 PDM will be extended to all camps in light of results obtained and experience acquired during the pilot phase in the first quarter of 2005.

7. Logistics

    Access routes

7.1 During the 2004 rainy season, local authorities granted special authorization to the humanitarian community to enable their convoys to reach the refugee camps. Since humanitarian operations contributed significantly to damage the roads, especially in the Goz Beida area, authorities insist that the agencies involved contribute to repairing them. Unless this is done before the next rainy season, operations would be seriously disrupted or even blocked as early as June 2005. UNHCR and WFP are deeply concerned about the problem. The mission
therefore recommends that funds be sought to finance the repair of access roads to the camps without delay.

7.2 THW (part of GTZ) has already provided US$200,000 to repair landing strips. It is, however, essential that maintenance of the strips be organized by the international community and local authorities.

*Infrastructure (housing)*

7.3 Working and housing conditions for WFP staff in remote areas should be improved. Given the lack of any local housing structures, WFP should implement its agreement with SRSA, the Swedish programme that provided support to UNHCR during the initial development of the Guereda, Iriba and Goz Beida offices. During their second visit to Chad scheduled for November, their terms of reference should be widened to include providing WFP with support, and to allow UNHCR’s structures to accommodate other United Nations agencies in the field (WFP in particular) as much as space permits.

*Extended delivery points (EDPs)*

7.4 It was noted that construction of warehouses was almost complete in all camps. The mission noted that WFP manages these EDPs, at the request of UNHCR, as soon as they become operational.

7.5 WFP should make every effort to ensure that the food required is pre-positioned in the EDPs at least four days before the date set for distribution.

8 **Duration of the EMOP**

8.1 Given the volatile nature of the situation in Sudan and in view of the food crisis that local populations could face, some as early as January, the current WFP emergency operation should continue beyond June 2005 (the current termination date) for an additional 18 months, from June 2005 to December 2006.

8.2 In order to pre-position food by the next rainy season in June–October and given that the supply chain requires at least four months for the release of funds by donors, tender for the purchase of food, delivery by suppliers and ocean and land transport, WFP should be in a position to call the food forward from February 2005.
PART II  TECHNICAL REPORT

1. Demography and ethnic profile of the population

1.1  Trends and expected population movement

WFP and UNHCR’s emergency operations for assistance to Sudanese refugees in eastern Chad started in September/October 2003. The beneficiary numbers have steadily risen from an estimated figure of 60,000 in October 2003 to over 200,000 in October 2004.

The influx of Sudanese refugees accelerated between the months of December 2003 and January 2004 following the failure of the peace process in Karthoum and the intensification of the conflict, with the Sudanese army bombing the territory occupied by the rebels. Upon their arrival in eastern Chad, Sudanese refugees spread among different sites along a 600 km border line. The situation along Chad’s eastern border remains tense, with incursions of janjaweed into Chad reported over the past several months creating some security incidents, particularly among the local population. Recently the movement of refugees crossing the border has stabilized, as has the number of new arrivals in the camps.

The first camp, Farchana, began receiving refugees in January 2004. Eleven months later the 11 camps are housing some 190,000 refugees. Annex 1 shows the evolution of the transfers to the camps during 2004. In addition, some 6,000 refugees were still at the border in October 2004 waiting to be transferred, with another 7,374 saying that they prefer to remain at the border for the time being.

UNHCR has developed a contingency plan for an additional 100,000 refugees from Sudan who may flee the still insecure Darfur region and seek protection and humanitarian assistance in Chad. Provisions of NFIs for additional 50,000 persons have been made. UNHCR continues to closely monitor the border areas to keep informed about new arrivals.

The UNHCR planning figure for 2005 has been set to 300,000 refugees. WFP’s planning figure up to June 2005 is 250,000 people, including 25,000 from the local population. WFP will align its figure with UNHCR’s from July 2005 to take into account the results of the registration and to reflect verification exercises and forecasts of a new exodus from Sudan to Chad. If the influx is large-scale, the figures will immediately be jointly reviewed.

1.2  Demographic profile

To date, about 190,000 refugees are living in 11 camps. This figure includes some 4,000 spontaneous arrivals into Bredjing camp in need to be registered. A number of refugees along the border who have expressed the desire to enter the camps will be transferred to the newly constructed Treguine camp.

The refugee population (see Annex 2 for details on gender and age distribution by camp) is comprised of mainly women and children (about 85%) from two tribes: the Zaghawa tribe (mostly in the areas of Tine, Iriba, Bahai) which supported Chadian President Idis Deby during his quest for power, and the Massalite tribe (mostly in Adre and Goz Beida). There are also some smaller tribes among the refugees: Arenga, Assangor, For, Tama, etc. A large number of refugees were able to bring their livestock with them over to Chad.
With the exception of two camps that need to be relocated because of either water problems (Am Nabak) or proximity to the border (Oure Cassoni), the other 9 camps have now attained a level of development that allows for the effective delivery of basic assistance, thereby meeting agreed upon common standards. Special attention is given to women who represent over 53 per cent of the refugee population, as well as to adolescents. The camps north of Abeche show a higher ratio of women (up to 63% in Oure Cassoni), while the southern camps have a ratio of up to 56% women. Adult males represent less than 15% of the total refugee caseload registered in all the camps. UNHCR actively supports survivors of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) and is implementing preventive measures as well as sensitisation campaigns. An effort is being made by the implementing partners to hire more women for the food and non food items distributions.

1.3 **Refugee Registration**

Registration of Sudanese refugees in Chad is conducted by “Comite National pour les refugies” (CNAR) in different stages: (a) at the border for those wishing to be transferred to the camps (b) during the transfer as convoy manifest and (c) upon arrival into the camps. The first two registrations are only household level data collections, whereas at the camp an individual registration is taking place. Unfortunately CNAR staff was lacking experience, proper training, logistical resources and telecommunication facilities. Therefore recycling, fraud and registration of Chadian citizens is not excluded. For example in Am Nabak, the number of those registered exceeds the actual number of refugees in the camp.

Lack of computer facilities, in addition to the lack of appropriate human resources, made it impossible to enter the collected data into a database or a simple Excel spreadsheet. Computerised data and therefore food lists exist only in few camps. An effort is being made by CNAR in certain camps (such as Djabal) to verify the existing numbers by conducting household visits.

A major registration exercise is urgently needed in order to have better profiling of the refugee caseload living in the camps. A UNHCR registration assessment team visited Abeche from 20 to 24 September 2004 and presented several scenarios for the planning of the exercise. Efforts made to date to correct errors will be complemented by the implementation of the recommendations made by this team: (a) a tent-to-tent verification before the end of the year and (b) a refugee identification exercise for the first quarter of 2005.

According to the MOU between the two agencies, UNHCR should involve WFP in the planning as well as the implementation of both the verification and registration exercises. WFP will make staff available to participate in the exercises.
2. Refugee and Local Population Food Security

2.1 Refugees

2.1.1 Overview
While some assistance is being extended to the refugees in the border areas in terms of protection, it is only when they are transferred and registered in the camps that they are eligible for a comprehensive assistance package. A number of factors delayed both the relocation of refugees and the delivery of life sustaining services: a) given the difficulties in finding adequate water supplies, a number of sites had to be abandoned; b) the inaccessibility of certain areas during the rainy season, and c) the capacity of the camps being quickly overloaded by the influx of new refugees. In addition, not all the refugees relocated to the camps had immediate access to assistance. As a result, the majority of refugees initially survived without any outside assistance and had to depend on the generous welcome and support of the local population. The refugees who chose to remain in border areas are not receiving assistance and rely on their own coping mechanisms and the support of the local population to survive.

2.1.2 Extent of self-reliance
In spite of the fact that the Government seems to have an open policy for land allocation and settlement of the refugees, self-reliance opportunities are extremely limited in the 11 camps. The scarcity of water does not offer many possibilities for additional agriculture or livestock activities, but the conflicts over resources between refugees and locals around the camps makes it difficult to envisage any long term productive activities by the refugees. The possibility of allocating land to refugees for small-scale cultivation was raised during meetings with the Prefects (local administrative leaders at the departmental level). There was no open opposition to the possibility, although some expressed concern about the long distance that refugees would have to travel from the camp to reach available arable land. The mission noted that, in some camps such as Farchana, Treguine, and Bredjing, refugee representatives are resisting proposals for land allocation, seed distribution, and tree planting. The reasons given are that the refugees are only temporary residents, and a fear that if steps are taken toward “self-reliance”, agencies may begin reducing assistance.

In addition to the food assistance received in the camps, a small proportion of refugees have other sources of food or income, obtained primarily through small-scale commerce, cultivating vegetables, providing casual labour to local villages, or selling livestock and its products. The preliminary results of a VAM study in August 2004 indicate that only 10% of refugee families (of 438 surveyed) have a source of income, and only 3% have access to land for cultivation. While most refugees depend heavily on their livestock, a significant number of refugee animals died while fleeing Sudan, and most households have since sold one or two ruminants to buy food. As of October 2004, Oxfam estimates an average of four animals per refugee family (although there is no information on the average herd size prior to fleeing Sudan).
In conclusion, for the foreseeable future, the refugee population in the 11 camps will remain almost entirely dependent on WFP food rations.

2.2 **Local Population**

2.2.1 **Overview**

The villages in Eastern Chad which have been hosting the Darfur refugees are among the remotest areas with highest levels of poverty in Chad. The current WFP Country Programme (2001-2005) focuses on five regions in the Sahelian zone which are identified as chronically food insecure, with relatively high levels of malnutrition. These include the border regions of Wadi Fira and Ouaddai,\(^3\) which are presently hosting the Darfur refugees. These two border regions belong to two different food economy zones (see map on page 17). The rain fed cereals (millet and sorghum) food economy zone (Ouaddai and part of Wadi Fira) offers good opportunities for cross border livestock trade towards Sudan and in manufactured products from Sudan to Chad (rice, sugar, firewood, etc.). Cereal production is highly developed. Wealthy and middle-income households manage to meet 75 percent of their food needs through their own production and sell livestock in order to buy food for the rest of the year. Poor households cover less than 50 percent of their needs through their own production and make up the deficit by gathering wild plants and roots. They also work in the fields of the wealthy in exchange for food.

Wadi Fira region also belongs to the transhumance food economy zone. This zone is characterized by the transhumance of livestock. Camels, sheep and goats are major sources of revenue and food. Geographically speaking, the zone marks the start and end points of herders’ migration. Cereal farming represents only a small percentage of households’ annual food needs. Wealthy households purchase their annual supply of cereals and complement this with animal products. Poor households most often work for the wealthy and receive food in return. Middle-income households also often receive payment in kind (food) in return for lending out their transport animals.

2.2.2 **Impact of the refugee influx on local livelihood**

The massive influx of refugees and overpopulation in some camps has placed an additional burden on the local population and pressure on a fragile environment and resources such as water supply, grazing land and firewood. Conflicts over resources between refugees and local population have started to erupt and have the potential to become even more virulent if nothing is done to mitigate the pressure on these resources.

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\(^3\) The GOC is currently redefining the administrative boundaries, moving from 14 prefectures to 28 departments. This results in some difficulty when comparing past and present data. Unless otherwise noted, this report refers to the new structure of 28 departments.
PLEASE REFER TO CHAD MAP IN ATTACHMENT
It should be noted that it is not only the population surrounding the camps that has been affected but also and particularly the villages along the border which originally hosted the refugees. When referring to the “local population”, the mission uses this broader definition, given that all of these communities have and are being affected by the refugee influx.

The October 2003 WFP/UNHCR Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) noted that the arrival of the refugees (at that time, around 60,000) had already had a significant impact on the local population and economy, concluding that their “capacity to continue supporting the refugee population is essentially finished….and sooner or later, conflicts might arise between the local and refugee populations. Some towns….have more than doubled their population.” (p.6)

In August 2004, a joint GOC/United Nations mission noted increasing tension between the local and refugee populations, including some open conflicts. The main issues are competition for scarce resources such as grazing land, firewood, and water, and a perception that many refugees now have comparatively better living conditions due to the assistance of the numerous humanitarian agencies. The following table gives an indication of the resulting population pressure. In some departments the refugee population is almost equal to or exceeds the local population (Iriba and Ennedi Est).

### Table 1: Population Estimation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Chef-Lieu</th>
<th>2004 pop estimate (a)</th>
<th>Refugee Camps</th>
<th>Refugee Population (b)</th>
<th>% of local Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BET</td>
<td>Ennedi Est</td>
<td>Bahai</td>
<td>28 247</td>
<td>Oure Cassoni</td>
<td>22 023</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wadi Fira</td>
<td>Iriba</td>
<td>Iriba</td>
<td>44 681</td>
<td>Iridimi/Touloumi/Am Nabak</td>
<td>50 437</td>
<td>113%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guereda</td>
<td>Guerda</td>
<td></td>
<td>73 625</td>
<td>Kounoungo/Mile</td>
<td>27 891</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ouaddai</td>
<td>Ouaddai</td>
<td>Abeche</td>
<td>233 931</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assongha</td>
<td>Adre</td>
<td></td>
<td>160 007</td>
<td>Farchana/Bredjing/Trequine</td>
<td>64 567</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sila</td>
<td>Goz Beida</td>
<td></td>
<td>181 756</td>
<td>Goz Amer/Djabal</td>
<td>36 708</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>722 247</td>
<td></td>
<td>201 626</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: UNHCR and FEWSNET
(a) tentative estimates based on 1993 census data and annual population growth rate
(b) as of 2 November 2004 (includes 11 camps, spontaneously settled refugees and refugees at border areas)

### 2.2.3 Food Insecurity: Poor 2004 Harvest

Not only is the region chronically food insecure and experiencing additional pressure on resources, there are several factors indicating that the local population is facing a food insecurity crisis.

According to a preliminary CILSS/FAO/FEWSNET review of the 2004 cereal harvest 6, overall cereal production for Chad in 2004 will be 36% less than last

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Given that the last census was done in Chad in 1993, it is emphasized that the figures extrapolated for the local population for 2004 are indicative and should be used cautiously until a more accurate census is undertaken.

year, and 17% less than the previous five year average. This is attributed to poor rainfalls (including parts of Wadi Fira), the impact of the locusts on some regions (including BET and Wadi Fira), and the influx of refugees along the border area. 2004 cereal production for the regions hosting the refugees is estimated in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Chef-Lieu</th>
<th>2004 pop Estimate (a)</th>
<th>2004 cereal Harvest (mt)</th>
<th>as % of 2003 Harvest</th>
<th>as % of last 5 year average</th>
<th>Food Economy Zone (b)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BET</td>
<td>Ennedi Est</td>
<td>Bahai</td>
<td>28 247</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wadi Fira</td>
<td>Iriba</td>
<td>Iriba</td>
<td>44 681</td>
<td>10320</td>
<td>-71%</td>
<td>-56%</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Guereda</td>
<td>Guereda</td>
<td>73 625</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ouaddai</td>
<td>Ouaddai</td>
<td>Abeche</td>
<td>233 931</td>
<td>98107</td>
<td>-16%</td>
<td>-9%</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assongha</td>
<td>Adre</td>
<td>160 007</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sila</td>
<td>Goz Beida</td>
<td></td>
<td>181 756</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>722 247</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: FEWSNET
(a) tentative estimates based on 1993 census data and annual population growth rate
(b) refers to FEWSNET livelihood profile. See map on page 17.

The mission notes that, while the decline in cereal production is the most dramatic in Wadi Fira, this normally constitutes a relatively small part of family food needs. However, when viewed together with the population data, this region is experiencing significant pressure on its resources, having initially shared food reserves, and more currently in terms of sharing grazing lands and water sources for human and animal consumption. FEWSNET observes that, particularly in the northern areas, this situation is leading to the early sale of livestock at relatively low prices.

SECADVEV, an implementing partner which provides agricultural and other community services to and around Kounoungo camp, had just completed an agricultural survey of 560 local families when the mission visited the camp. Although the results had not yet been fully analysed, the SECADVEV agricultural officer estimated that only around 25% of the land cultivated would yield a harvest. He estimated that the most vulnerable families in the six surrounding villages would suffer a serious food shortage crisis from January 2005.

The price of basic necessities in the markets in eastern Chad (particularly Guereda, Iriba, and Bahai) is reported to have increased due to higher demand and the disruption of cross-border trade for security reasons. However, FEWSNET reports that the price of millet in the Abeche market (the main market serving eastern Chad) has remained relatively stable over the past few months and is only slightly higher than during the same period last year.

### 2.2.4 Malnutrition

Finally, the nutritional status of children in these regions is normally very precarious. A survey undertaken by FEWS in May 2002 indicated that 11.9% and 13% of the children are suffering from acute malnutrition in the departments.

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7 The mission has suggested that the Guereda field office obtain the survey report from SECADVEV when it is finalized in November.
of Biltine and Iriba respectively. In June 2004, almost one year after the arrival of the refugees, the CDC nutrition survey indicated that the malnutrition rate had reached an alarming level of 35% among the 11 villages around the refugee camps. While the report acknowledges that the population sampled does not represent a larger community, the GAM of 35% found among local population (compared to 38% in three refugee camps in Wadi Fira) was significant enough to justify specific nutrition interventions for the local communities. However, apart from the implementation of a blanket feeding programme for all children under 5 (accessible in theory by the local population), no other nutrition support took place and it is most likely that the condition of the children has thus not improved substantially and may still be at an alarming level.

2.2.5 **Response to the crisis so far**

Based on the above indicators, the mission concludes that a significant portion of the local population living in the two border regions will soon experience a severe food shortage. In some areas, this could occur as early as January 2005. However, in general, very limited assistance has been targeted to the local population. The original WFP EMOP 10327 included food for 12,500 affected Chadians through supplementary/therapeutic feeding, and FFW interventions. To date, 700 mt of food have been disbursed for FFW activities in the border area with an NGO “premiere urgence”. The planning figure for beneficiary host population was later increased to 25,000 in October 2004 (BR 04), equivalent to an amount of 3,400mt of food commodities that could be programmed for activities outside the camps. This food had not been programmed at the time of the mission.

While WFP has an active CP (school feeding and FFW activities) in the region, these activities were halted when food was loaned to EMOP10327. Now that the assistance programme for the refugees has been established, plans are underway to reinstitute the school feeding programme. Two hurdles, however, are that most implementing partners are now focusing on the refugee emergency, and many schools have lost their educated teachers to more lucrative positions offered by the agencies in the refugee camps.

A number of other initiatives have targeted the villages surrounding the refugee camps. FAO has collaborated with the GOC, SECAD, InterSOS, and Oxfam to provide emergency assistance in the form of agricultural tools (to 5700 host community families), seeds, and vaccinating animals. UNICEF is leading an immunization campaign which includes children from the surrounding villages, and Oxfam has provided sources of potable water.

To date, UNHCR has not launched any specific projects targeting the local communities. However, health, supplementary and therapeutic feeding centers, and the blanket supplementary feeding programme have been open to people from surrounding villages. Five percent of UNHCR’s 2005 budget has been earmarked for Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) targeting the host population (ie. US$2.5 million).

2.2.6 **Future assistance**

If outright conflict is to be prevented, more needs to be done to contain a further deterioration in the living conditions of the local population and to address the competition for resources. Visible and immediate action must be taken within an overall strategy to address the problems of the local population together with those of the refugees.
WFP is in a good position to lead this exercise given that it already has an established presence in the affected regions through its Country Programme. In collaboration with the GoC and other partners (UNICEF, FAO, etc), WFP should develop a phased action plan of assistance.

Some steps to be considered when developing the phased action plan are:

- Agree on a definition of the “local populations” to be targeted, considering the communities within the 600 x 50 km radius along the border
- Develop a 3 phase action plan. The “immediate” phase would be the first three months (Nov-Jan), phase two covering the next six months (Feb-July 2005), and a longer-term (developmental) phase. The matrix of interventions in eastern Chad which the Humanitarian Coordinator is consolidating could be then be fit into this phased plan.

Under the first phase, WFP should immediately lead a quick targeting exercise in November to programme the available 3,400 mt of food assistance for local communities, and identify/target any additional emergency food needs. The exercise would:

- Identify “cantons” (and villages) to be targeted and estimate populations in each requiring emergency food assistance
- Identify appropriate food distribution modalities (ex. Vaccination campaign, seed distribution, other). Preference should be given to modalities which target women.
- Identify implementing partners and realistically assess their capacity to implement quickly and effectively.
- Develop a timeframe taking into account the urgency of food needs, and IP and WFP capacity.

The second phase would focus on the development and implementation of quick impact projects (UNHCR QIPs) and on re-invigorating WFP’s Country Programme activities. WFP should revitalize its school feeding programme giving priority to Ouaddei, Biltine and BET. Consideration should be given to providing a food incentive for the teachers and cooks. The re-introduction of the SF programme should be done in close collaboration with UNICEF to ensure that the schools are functional and able to provide a minimum education to the children attracted by the feeding programme.

The food-for-work (FFW) component should also give priority to the areas which have or are hosting refugees. Where possible, activities should be combined with the UNHCR QIPs. Priority should be given to the water and environment sectors.

It is important that the action plan is accompanied by a communications strategy which targets both the refugee and local populations/authorities. The purpose of this strategy would be to adopt a transparent approach in order to diffuse tensions between the two communities.

Based on the prognosis for the affected food economy zones, the mission estimates that up to 150,000 people equivalent to about 20% of the estimated
number of local residents may require some food assistance before the next harvest. However, more precise beneficiary numbers, locations and the timing/duration of the assistance will be determined through the rapid local population targeting exercise recommended for November.

3. Health and Nutrition

3.1 Overview nutrition

The nutrition situation of Sudanese refugees, a population entirely dependant on external assistance, is particularly at risk in an environment where water is a problem, the camps are congested and health services are poor. While there has been some improvement in the overall nutrition situation since June 2004, all data collected since then indicate an alarming level of malnutrition.

- A survey undertaken by Médecins Sans Frontières-Belgium (MSF-B), among refugees around Daguessa, in March 2004 indicated moderate acute malnutrition rates of 18.3% and severe malnutrition rates of 5.0% among children aged 6–59 months.
- The International Rescue Committee (IRC) conducted nutritional screening in the Cariari and Bahai areas and found moderate and severe malnutrition rates of 34% and 2%, respectively among the same age group. (DATE ???)
- In June, nutrition survey conducted in three camps by the CDC found an even higher prevalence of wasting. Results showed that between 35%–39% of 6–59 month old children were found to have acute global malnutrition (GAM) in all three surveys, using weight for height z-scores (WHZ<2). Between 3.7%–6.4% of 6–59 month old children were found to have severe wasting when using weight-for-height z-scores (WHZ<–3). The survey took place in North east Chad (Bahai, indimi, Touloum and Kounoungo).

Main factors contributing to these high rates of wasting were a high rate of diarrhea, inadequate complementary feeding practices, low measles vaccination coverage, inadequate vitamin A supplementation, and an irregular pipeline. These factors have been addressed during the recent period (July to October) and some improvement in the nutrition and health situation is noted as indicated by recent nutrition surveys, by general observation of the population in the camps, and a decrease in the TFC admissions:

- The preliminary results of a MSF-B survey in October 2004 in the camps of Touloum and Iridimi, indicate a global acute malnutrition rate of 19.2% (WHZ < –2) and severe acute malnutrition rate of 2.9% (WHZ < –3).
- Similarly a survey conducted by COOPI in October 2004 in the camps of Goz Amir and Djabal, indicate a preliminary results of global acute malnutrition rate of 18% (WHZ < –2) and severe acute malnutrition rate of 2.4% (WHZ < –3).

Improvement may be attributed to: a more regular pipeline; the blanket feeding of under 5s; as well as a general improvement of the health and sanitation situations in the camps, including the measles and vaccination campaign which took place in July and covered about 80% of the population.
There is a need to have a clear overview of the nutritional situation (both for the refugees and for the local population) and it is planned to have a new nutrition survey in all camps starting from the second half of November with results expected by the end of January 2005. The result of the survey will also allow the two agencies to evaluate the opportunity to continue the Blanket Feeding Programme. ACF has already been selected to implement this program with a common methodology for all camps.

Very little data exist on micronutrient deficiencies. However, the region as well as Darfur in Sudan is known for their high prevalence of goiter. Some cases of goiter among women were observed (HCR Nutrition report of 26 August 2004) and 3 cases of scurvy were also reported during the mission in Kounoungou camp/ Guereda region. The only source of vitamin and minerals for the refugees is within the general ration and the fortified blended food. WFP salt is iodized but this is not the case for salt on the local market. Nutrition education should take place in order to encourage refugees to properly use the fortified food distributed to them.

3.2 Overview Health

Crude mortality and under-5 mortality rates, were sporadically above baseline (Above 1/10,000/day up to 1.6 /10,000/day) only for short periods in may to July 2004 in a few camps. It has now stabilized within the recommended standards in recent weeks. Morbidity in the same groups is caused mainly by watery and bloody diarrhea, malnutrition, and measles has also shown a marked improvement probably due to a decrease of malnutrition rates, an improvement of water and sanitation conditions, more effective health care, and improved screening, sensitization and education. Respiratory tract infections have been increasing in recent weeks with colder temperatures and increased dust and wind in the camps.

Since the beginning of June, an epidemic of Hepatitis E has affected the camps of Goz Amir and Djabal, causing 47 deaths. Some cases have also been notified in the surrounding villages and the risk of disease is a source of concern for the authorities. The epidemic is thought to be to due to poor hygiene and contaminated water. Measures have been put in place to treat the water and to distribute additional quantities of soap to the refugees and to the surrounding population. During the mission, 7 cases were detected in the camp of Bridging and Tredging

During the month of May, around 30 cases of Meningitis were recorded in the area of Iriba which was followed by a vaccination campaign by MSF-B and 3 suspected cases have been reported around Mile in the last few weeks. More Measles and Whooping cough vaccination campaigns are under way to increase coverage, in conjunction with a National Polio vaccination campaign.

Lack of qualified staff willing to work in such hard and remote conditions is a major problem for all implementing partners, limiting the availability and efficacy of care. Lack of staff and security restrictions allow only the camps of Oure Cassoni, Touloum and Iridimi to provide health care on a 24hr basis. IMC is also making arrangements to this effect.
3.3 **Nutrition activities**

3.3.1 **SFP and TFP**

While the coverage of both SFP and TFP is very low compared to the percentage of malnourished children in the camps, reports from the implementing partners have become more accurate and timely throughout the summer period. Data received show that with the exception of IRC, all partners have exit rates very close or above the 75% objective (figure 2). However, these programmes continue to have a high rate of default and only about 50% rate of the children are being cured (at least for SFP).

Table 3 – Total Admissions and exits from TFC period May-Sept 2004.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TFCs Indicators - Sudanese Refugees in Eastern Chad 2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSFB Iriba Camps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMC Guerida Camps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC Bahai Camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coop Gozbeida Amir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSF Bredjing Farchana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSF FADE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The high number of admissions by the MSF-B area of Iriba (Table 3) is due to more effective screening and during the worst period, but also the presence of only one TFC in the Iriba area, which receives all the severe cases from Touloum and Iridimi camps plus the refugees from the settlements outside of the camps in the Tine and Bahai areas.
Table 4 – Indicators of TFC as a percentage of total exits.

The trend in TFCs indicators (figure 2) clearly shows an increase in the percentage of cured from total exits and a decrease of the other indicators.

Table 5 – Total admissions and exits in SFCs for the period May-September.

However defaulting has been a major problem for both TFCs and SFCs (Tables 4,5). The default rates are particularly high from Bahai, Goz Amir, and Bredjing TFCs and from Iriba camps, Bahai and Goz Beida Goz Amir. Main causes have been the distance of the TFCs from the main camps and the other priorities a caregiver has, like collecting food, water and wood for the rest of the family, and not having the time to stay at the centre with the child. There are also the cultural challenges of a population not used to primary health care, removing a child from the program as soon as the condition has improved. There is also a lack of community workers to follow up mothers who abandoned the treatment. Education programs in child-care are trying to prevent this. Other activities to prevent defaulting have included: a
reduction of general distribution times to 3 days or less, strengthening of Community Health Workers to 1 worker per 500 refugees, detecting and following up cases, providing education and practical support to the most vulnerable, and feeding caretakers in TFCs and hospitals.

Table 6 – Indicators for SFCs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>No of distributions /camps</th>
<th>Premix in mt</th>
<th>Beneficiaries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>6 / 6</td>
<td>107,725</td>
<td>24,762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>10 / 9</td>
<td>182,156</td>
<td>46,495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>13 / 10</td>
<td>233,799</td>
<td>53,813</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first distribution took place in August and only 12 % of population was covered (instead of 30%). In September, two distributions took place and coverage improved to 24%. The distribution in October covered 28.4% of the population.

Although the program was intended to be non exclusive, since it would have interfered with the nature of the distribution, it is possible that participation of the local population might have been limited by the security accidents between refugee and local women at one distribution and the registration procedures adopted by WVI which included the issuing of a ration card. All registration

3.3.2 Blanket SFP

Following the recommendations of the joint WFP/UNHCR nutrition mission in August 2004 the decision was taken to implement a blanket supplementary feeding programme for all children under 5 and pregnant/lactating women. WVI was identified as a potential partner and modalities were discussed and agreed upon jointly with WVI. A planning figure of 55,000 beneficiaries was retained, which included 10,000 mothers and children from the local population.

WV has been faced with several difficulties in the implementation of the programme including: the logistical difficulty of covering all 11 camps, the planning of distribution taking into account delays in GFD, insecurity, accessibility of some camps during the rainy season and the limited availability of skilled human resources. However in spite of these difficulties a total amount of 506 Mt of premix (443 Mt of CSB, 43 Mt of oil and 21 Mt of sugar) has been distributed to an average of 43,000 beneficiaries in 4 distribution.
activities have been stopped and improved coordination and supervision should limit security concerns although further sensitization of local population is not recommended, since a major increase of this group attending the distribution within the camp could renew the logistical and security concerns. It is also noted that there has been little sensitization on the use of blended food (some quantities of blended premix being provided through distributions, has been found on the market at a very low price (the selling price of the premix is a third of the same amount of sorghum). Distributions have sometimes take place over a period of 1 day and this may have contributed to some cheating and duplication.

The blanket feeding was also an opportunity to screen all children and refer them to SFP or TFC resulting in an increase in the number of new cases in feeding centers and an increased coverage of these programmes. Nutrition screening during the distribution was also supposed to be a way to monitor the nutritional situation. However the screening took place only at the third round and has not been done so far according to a satisfactory methodology. However, over the last month, WV has strengthened their capacity through the employment of more staff and more in depth training and a smoother future implementation is expected. Implementing partner in charge of health and nutrition will also assist WVI in their nutrition screening.

It has been agreed that in view of the precarity of the nutritional situation (still estimated to be above 19% of GAM) and in spite of a noticed improvement in nutritional situation since June 2004, the blanket feeding has to continue. The ACF-planned nutrition survey will be instrumental for UNHCR and WFP to decide on the opportunity to continue this programme.
4. WFP assistance and food aid strategy

4.1 General food distribution

In accordance with international standards, WFP has planned and provided a food basket of 2,100 kcal per person from the beginning of the operation. This ration was then increased in August 04 by including an additional 25 gr. of sugar due to the normal food habits and preferences of the Sudanese population. Often refugees would sell or exchange their ration of cereal to procure sugar.

In spite of a constant increase in the population figures, logistical constraints and difficulty attracting resources for this operation, WFP has been able to resource an average food basket of 2,100 kcal. There has been no complaint about the food basket provided by WFP.

The current food basket composition is as follows: 425 gm of Cereal flour, 50 gm of CSB, 50 gm of pulses, 25 gm of Sugar, 20 gm of vegetable Oil and 5 gm of salt. It is clear that preferred cereals are sorghum, millet, maize or wheat flour. Rice is not being consumed extensively and is appreciated for its economic value as it is being exchanged for other items. Maize would not be acceptable.

The ration supplied by WFP continues to constitute the major source of food for the majority of the refugees living in the camps. As mentioned earlier, access to additional foods from the wild, agriculture, and livestock is, for a great majority of the refugees, negligible. There is very limited scope for refugees to grow food and find income opportunities for themselves in the context of a high and chronic food insecure region. The mission agreed, therefore, on the need to continue providing a full general ration of 2,100 kcal.

Milling of cereals (sorghum and maize) is currently done at the camp level, on individual initiatives. Families have to sell a substantial amount of cereal to pay for the milling cost; a supplement of 50 gr has therefore been added to the cereal ration when whole grain is being distributed. However since an additional 50 gr for 200,000 refugees represents an additional monthly 300 mt of cereal to be resourced (at an average cost of 700 US$ including transport cost) other options should seriously be looked at such as providing flour, or milling the cereal at port of entry or else by providing small mills units to the refugees. This issue has to receive priority attention and while WFP at regional and country level will look at the possibility of providing cereal flour, a working group composed of UNHCR and WFP with implementing partners in charge of distribution should review the different alternatives and propose some mechanisms to implement milling at camp level.

In order to ensure that the ration contains the necessary micronutrients, in addition to the blended food being provided, WFP should explore the possibility of providing fortified flour under the general distribution and to fortify the flour when milling is being considered at central level.

4.2 Targeted distribution

In view of the precarious nutritional and health situation, supplementary and therapeutic feeding programme should be continued with a view to increasing their effectiveness and coverage.

The ration under these programmes is adequate. However, further nutrition education on the use of blended food is required.
The blanket feeding has to continue until the nutritional status has fallen within acceptable standards. The levels remain alarming even if the trend is improving. It is not possible to envisage any school feeding programmes within the refugee camps for various reasons:

a) the school age group needs are well covered under the general ration and under the blanket feeding
b) attendance rates at the schools are above 100% with 50% of the students being girls
c) presently there are no cooking facilities at the school level
d) the school feeding programmes of surrounding villages have been halted and should be restarted before considering a special programme in the camps at the risk of creating more imbalances between the two communities.

4.3 **Duration of the Food aid assistance**

WFP should plan for another 18 months emergency operation beyond June 2005. The situation in Sudan is currently too volatile to preclude an additional influx of refugees. There is no possibility for a durable solution in the foreseeable future, such as repatriation or integration which would allow the consideration of a rehabilitation /transition programme. In addition, the situation of the local population suffering the impact of the refugee influx as well as affected by the recent drought has all the characteristics of a crisis requiring an emergency response. The recommendation on the duration is also closely linked with logistics considerations, as all food items for the period July-October should be prepositioned in June and hence resourced from the month of February.

5. **UNHCR’s care and maintenance strategy**

5.1 **Water and sanitation**

Lack of water continues to be one of the greatest concerns in the northern camps of eastern Chad. This amount includes animals’ water consumption. Most of the wadis that have been the main source of water for several camps and villages are quickly drying up due to the dry season. There is an urgent need for drinking water for the host community in the villages around the camps. The mission recommends that UNHCR consider providing bore holes as part of the QIPs in its 2005 budget. In order to decongest camps, UNHCR and its partners (OXFAM, NCA, Hydrotech) hydro-geophysicists are in the process of identifying locations where more water can be found. They are using satellite image interpretation technologies which are unfortunately very expensive methods. Therefore, more funds are needed to be able to achieve the objective of providing enough water to Sudanese refugees in eastern Chad.

UNHCR is also looking into the possibility of a study of how the Sudanese manage water in their home villages in order to determine what the refugees’ real water needs are in the camps.
5.2 Shelter
During the emergency and because of the unavailability of sufficient quantities of tents, families with less than 4 people were given plastic sheeting to construct their shelters. Those shelters are too small, hot and could easily be blown away by a storm. Also many large families have been allocated one tent which is creating now some tension between congested family members. As the environment in eastern Chad does not provide suitable construction material for more permanent shelters, especially in the northern camps, additional tents should be distributed to the large families and plastic sheeting should be replaced by a regular tent.

5.3 Environment, firewood
In the very fragile environmental situation in eastern Chad, one of the main problems is the supply of firewood to refugees and to the local population. It was noted that fuel wood will be compensated by the distribution of kerosene and 5,000 kerosene cooking stoves are being ordered for refugees in Oure Cassoni in Bahai. Also, UNHCR have signed a sub-agreement with an NGO called ACTED for collection and distribution of dead wood through refugees and local women and dispatching them to camps by trucks. Of course, these strategies will be very expensive for the operation.

6. Security, protection and relationship with local population

6.1 Relationship with Local Population
Relations between local population and refugees are deteriorating and have become a big concern. Despite the fact that it was noted by the mission that the presence of refugees has brought an increase in employment, disposable income and economic activity, they pointed out that prices tripled over the past six months (e.g. one 2kgs “koro in local dialect” went up from 75 to 400 FCFA (depending on the area). As far as the local population is concerned, there appears to be a feeling that, after having warmly received and provided food for refugees for almost 8 months before UNHCR and other humanitarian actors could come to provide assistance, not only they are not getting anything in return, but they are punished by having refugees competing for scarce resources and bringing new disease/epidemics such as hepatitis E, etc. To mitigate some tensions between the two communities (refugees and host population), and also to prevent the deterioration of the situation in the local community, the mission encourages the initiative of the humanitarian community in eastern Chad to continue providing some wells, seeds and tools to local communities in the villages surrounding the camps and at the border areas. More quick impact projects are required as soon as possible.

6.2 Security and Protection
As regards to refugee camp safety, UNHCR has signed an agreement with the Chadian government to provide security to refugee camps. Chadian gendarmes have been placed around the refugee settlements. Each team comprises of two
women (gendarmette). The ratio agreed of 2 gendarmes per 1,000 refugees should be met to make this strategy more effective.

During the meeting with refugees and the gendarmes protecting the camps, it was reported that refugee women are raped and beaten up when caught outside the camp looking for firewood and grass to feed the animals. Many other incidents were reported between refugees stealing cattle from locals and vice versa.

Refugees in most of the camps told the mission that when they leave the camps to trade, others to search for jobs or visit the local markets, they are often asked to produce identity papers by the local authorities and if they don’t have them, they have to pay or they get arrested and detained until a family member or friend can pay for their release.

In the absence of identification documents, refugees are limited or prevented to develop a coping mechanism to complement the assistance received in the camps, which doesn’t include clothes, fresh vegetables and fruits, milk, meat etc. The mission recommends that identity cards be provided to each refugee through the planned registration exercise as soon as possible, in order to facilitate refugee movements outside the camps.

7. Management issues

7.1 Distribution mechanisms

In all camps, distributions are carried out by the NGO managing the camp. Weaknesses were found in the way that the general distribution is executed. All camps, with the exception of Goz Amir and Djabal are distributing to groups of refugees. The size of the groups vary from camp to camp and are usually dependent on the packaging of the cereals received. However in some camps the size of the group is determined by the necessity of carrying out the distribution within three days. Groups of 16, 24, 33, 60 and even 80 have been noted. In the new camp of Treguine distributions by family are due to start in November.

The heads of each family constituting a group present their ration card to the distribution official. The ration card is marked and the members of the group move to an adjacent area where they divide the food amongst themselves. In the absence of accurate measures it is difficult to ascertain whether each family is really receiving the correct amount of food. However it should be emphasized that the division of food amongst the families in the groups is not a source of conflict. Rations are usually collected by women.

However, the present system does not offer guarantee of fair distribution among the different families and is prone to potential abuse. Distribution by family has been therefore recommended to ensure a better transparency. However this would involve scooping which would require the purchase of basins and measures. Distribution sites would have to be constructed in such a way as to protect the commodities from sand blown by the wind. Distribution sites still have to be constructed in many camps and should be done in consultation with UNHCR, WFP, the distributing partner and the Refugee’s Committee. At Am Nabak for example distribution is taking place outside the camp, approximately one and a half kilometres from the centre of the camp. This is because it was a temporary settlement and there was no other space in this settlement to accommodate general distribution. For the safety of the
commodities it is essential that distribution sites are located well away from the storage areas and that UNHCR through its partner GTZ ensures sufficient trucks are available on the day(s) of the general distribution.

7.2 **Co-ordination**

7.2.1 **At operational level**

a) **Plan of Action**

The revised MOU between UNHCR and WFP requires close collaboration and regular consultation on programming issues and planning of camp activities. The mission found that the two agencies work closely together, but noted the absence of a joint plan of action and observed a certain confusion regarding follow up on recommendations from the previous joint mission and decisions taken during sector meetings. The plan of action is an essential tool to a) follow up on recommendations from previous missions, b) agree on monitoring indicators and c) develop and implement a phase down strategy. The mission has drafted a plan of action that should be finalized by the two agencies before the end of the year.

b) **Exchange of Information**

Communication difficulties have been noted regarding the exchange of information about the pipeline, especially in terms of the availability of food in Chad and internal transport movements. It is recommended that such information be provided on a regular basis during the weekly coordination meetings. General weekly Coordination Meetings are taking place at all levels (N’Djamena, Abeche, Field Offices) between UNHCR, WFP and partners. Sectoral meetings are organized as well to discuss specific topics and activities such as nutrition, food distributions, water and sanitation. The main problem remains information sharing between different levels (from the field to Abeche, from Abeche to N’Djamena and back) creating more confusion, because each level is not systematically aware of decisions made by the other.

c) **Selection of Partners**

Most of the partners have been so far selected by UNHCR with limited consultation with WFP. This could partially be justified by the emergency situation, the difficulty of finding a partner in this remote area of Chad and the slow deployment of staff in Abeche. At present, all camps are now functioning, each of them with a partner in charge of camp management and the main activities of care and maintenance, including food distributions (general and targeted). However, reporting remains weak, especially in terms of commodity tracking and beneficiary figures.

While a big effort has been made during the last two months, the above situation has created an unbalanced role between the two agencies from a coordination point of view in terms of shared activities: partners reporting only to UNHCR, lack of WFP procedures, knowledge among IP’s, which is partly due to the high number of partners involved in food distribution activities, distributed per camp and not per activity and a weak WFP field presence.
The agreements between UNHCR and the IP in charge of food distribution and selective feeding programmes must include WFP as required by the UNHCR/WFP MOU. Tripartite agreements that clarify the roles and responsibilities of each agency should be prepared and signed before the end of 2004. Selection of future partners should be made jointly in the future. WFP will have to also reinforce its international presence at field Offices level in order to respond to IP and UNHCR demands and reach balanced coordination.

**d) Reporting**

To streamline WFP reporting lines, commodity tracking and procedures knowledge, a WFP international staff from the Sub Office should attend all meetings on the field at least twice a month in all Field Offices and Abeche. Training of WFP staff and IP’s could be done at the same time. WFP has to increase its number of staff at field level, and provide adequate training for its food aid monitors in order to be able to give better guidance to implementing partners.

**7.2.2 At the regional level**

With a view to harmonizing their contingency plans for 2005, WFP and UNHCR should participate at least every two months in coordination meetings held alternately in Abéché (Chad) and El Geneina (Sudan). Topics could include: push/pull factors for refugees and IDPs (related to security, levels of assistance on both sides), contingency numbers, prospects for repatriation, and other coordination issues.

**7.2.3 At the United Nations/Government level**

Sectoral groups established under the coordination framework set up by the National Monitoring Committee on Humanitarian Activities (Comité national de suivi d’action humanitaire [CNSAH]) and the Humanitarian Coordinator should identify any sub-groups of refugees and local populations so that their differences can be taken into consideration and any problems affecting local populations can be addressed from a long-term development perspective.

**7.3 Monitoring**

The lack of staffing and competent trained partners is preventing good monitoring of food distribution. Monitoring is required on three levels:

**7.3.1 WFP / UNHCR monitoring**

Both agencies have to monitor their activities and report. Guidelines already exist for each agency on the way to report, but are not necessarily implemented at field level, especially for WFP due to lack of training for staff and a lack of logistics and program staff. This situation creates communication problems between Field Offices and Sub Office. Information received from Field Offices is not always reliable and therefore it is difficult to take decisions and have planning strategies at Sub Office and Country Office level. This is particularly true in pipeline and project design. WFP will have to improve its monitoring system by doing the following:
• Hire more Food Aid Monitor to be based at Field Office level – at least one per camp – as planned in the WFP Chad organizational chart
• Hire enough logistics staff to be based at EDP level – warehouse managers, tally clerks – as planned in the WFP Chad organizational chart
• Train Program and Logistics staff before they reach their duty station, on WFP policies and procedures, through common and specific training sessions at Sub Office level

However, UNHCR’s structure is well established in most of the field Offices and their monitoring is effective.

7.3.2 Food Basket Monitoring (FBM)
Food Basket Monitoring is aimed at making sure that beneficiaries receive the ration they are entitled to receive. FBM should take place at distribution sites, during each distribution and has to be implemented by a different partner than the one in charge of GD. Taking into account the actual fragile nutritional status of beneficiaries in camps, the weaknesses noted in the supervision during GD and the discrepancies noticed in refugee figures between CNAR, UNHCR and WFP, it is even more important to make sure that each family receives the planned ration.

FBM has been set up through the IP WVI since two months in 10 camps out of 11 (only Bahai has no FBM because WVI is in charge of GD). In most of the camps the mission noticed that FBM implementation is not satisfactory and the results are unreliable and the whole exercise has been so far of little use. WVI’s own methodology is not implemented in each camp (different appreciation of the sample size, weighing is not always done at family level but sometimes at group level, …), there is little collaboration between WVI and the distribution partner in order to improve distribution efficiency.

Before deciding to change the partner for that activity, UNHCR and WFP have to work together with WVI in order for them to improve FBM implementation (streamlined methodology, increase staff number, timeliness and accuracy of the reports, collaboration with the GD partner in each camp, …)

7.3.3 Post Distribution Monitoring
Post Distribution Monitoring is aimed at monitoring the use and the suitability of the ration among beneficiaries. It is as well a continuous survey which should provide a lot of information about self reliance status, coping mechanisms in place, social organization aspects, etc. PDM should take place each month in each camp, between 14 to 21 days after the GD ends, through household surveys and focus group discussions.

Now that the situation has stabilized in the camps, PDM could eventually start and be usefully interpreted. UNHCR has so far identified WVI to take over this responsibility. However in view of the weaknesses already noted with this partner’s performance, it was agreed to differ this responsibility and in the mean time the possibility for WFP to start on a pilot basis a PDM in the Guereda camps was discussed.

8. LOGISTICS

8.1 Logistic constraints
The lack of infrastructure in eastern Chad in terms of roads, fuel, trucks, water, electricity and accommodation places serious constraints upon operations. In addition to the sandy terrain that makes transport particularly difficult, there are land mines in the north west of Chad as well as security problems. During the rainy season, from June to October, wadis (river beds) form within a couple of hours of rain, cutting off roads for hours if not days. This seriously affects access to the camps. The Ministry of Roads and Public works issues a decree valid from 30 June to 31 October officially closing many of the roads and setting up rain barriers where trucks and vehicles have to wait 12 hours. Exceptionally in 2004, the Government allowed the humanitarian community to continue trucking food and NFIs to the camps.

The UN agencies acknowledge that their vehicles have badly damaged many of the roads surrounding the camps and that operations during the next rainy season may be badly disrupted if some basic maintenance is not undertaken. In order to assess the magnitude of the problem an engineer needs to be appointed to identify which roads/sections of road are in need of maintenance so that the costs can be established and a Special Operation launched. This should be done in conjunction with the local authorities. The Swiss Government have already repaired the road from Abeche to Iriba and have a project to repair the road to Goz Beida.

In the light of all the above constraints, WFP’s logistics strategy will be to endeavour to pre-position sufficient commodities in the camps and intermediate storage locations close to the camps to cover the food needs during the rainy season.

8.2 Customs clearance, taxes and travel authorizations

Agencies and NGOs have experienced difficulties in clearing cargo, particularly with regard to telecommunications equipment. WFP also experienced problems importing sorghum from Nigeria when road taxes followed by Transport Union taxes were imposed on trucks entering Chad. Local road taxes are sometimes imposed on trucks inside Chad. If well administered, and if the humanitarian community were to pay local taxes for use of the roads to the camps, the funds could be used for rehabilitating the roads at the end of the rainy season. Some of these taxes, such as the Transport Union Tax seem to be negotiable. Another problem is the requirement to obtain travel authorizations to travel within Chad. The renewal process is often time consuming. It is recommended that a TPG mission could investigate these issues with a view to streamlining them.

8.3 Transport Strategies

8.3.1 Overland/External

WFP is now operating with two corridors. The traditional corridor for shipments has been through the port of Douala in Cameroon, rail to N’Goundere and then truck to either N’djamena or Abeche. (FAA with SAGA in Douala – agent in N’djamena STAT).

It is recommended that at least 60% of commodities be delivered directly to Abeche to save time and avoid double handling. A second corridor was opened via Libya in August 2004. Commodities are shipped to Benghazi in Libya. Libyan transporters then truck commodities in convoy across the desert to the Chadian border in the Erdi region where they are met by WFP, a commercial convoy company Elite Ventures and a military escort.
It is hoped that after the first few convoys that it will no longer be necessary for WFP to accompany the convoys which are expensive and monopolize the use of WFP vehicles and staff.
The advantage of the Libyan corridor, apart from being usable all year round, is that trucks are available to deliver directly to the refugee camps in the northern cluster (Oure Cassoni, Iridimi, Touloum, Am Nabak, Mile, Kounoungo) and to WFP contingency stocks in Iriba and Guereda. Cargo to the other camps is delivered to Abeche. After the November convoys from Benghazi a full analysis of delivery times and costs should be undertaken of both corridors to establish which corridor has the shortest delivery time and the real cost of deliveries from both ports. Should these corridors prove problematic there is also the possibility of using the Calabar and or Lagos corridors. Purchases of commodities in Northern Cameroon and Nigeria are currently delivered to N'djamena. For non-DDU deliveries, the RO is responsible for the forwarding of cargo to N'djamena and or Abeche.

8.3.2 Transport from N'djamena to Abeche
It is not envisaged that large quantities of commodities be delivered to N'djamena since Abeche has been established as the logistical base, being closer to the refugee camps.
There are a large number of transporters in N’djamena who transport regularly to Abeche. The possibility of transporting direct to the EDPs, avoiding double handling in Abeche, should be investigated. The CO is responsible for all contracting of in country transport. Shortlists should be updated and new RFO’s launched.

8.3.3 Secondary Transport – Abeche to EDPs
Trucks are available in Abeche. There are some 70 trucks available from the private sector. GTZ are currently managing a fleet of 38 trucks on behalf of UNHCR. They expect to receive a further 20 trucks shortly. They manage a garage in Abeche. IFRC also has a smaller fleet of trucks. WFP has 10 DAF trucks that are not yet in use.
Since GTZ received its fleet of trucks, WFP has not experienced any problems in contracting trucks from the commercial sector. Contracts are in place (and should be reviewed). These trucks should be used for transport to the EDPs.

8.3.4 WFP fleet management
WFP has a fleet of 10 4x4 DAF trucks with a ten-ton capacity. WFP should deploy its trucks to the field offices where there are no trucks available. As the strategy will be to pre-position as much food as possible close to the camps, there will be contingency storage available in Wiikhalls in Iriba, Guereda, Farchana and Goz Beida. The WFP trucks will be used to transport food from these centres to the camps and for ferrying small amounts from one camp to another, depending on pipeline requirements. 2 or 3 trucks should remain in Abeche for emergencies and to assist with the CP deliveries, particularly for the school feeding activities.
The absence of fuel in the field is a problem. WFP currently has a contract with a supplier in N’djamena who delivers fuel in drums to Abeche and the other field offices in drums. UNHCR on the other hand manages bladders. It is suggested
that WFP sets up its own fuel base in Abeche from where it can dispatch fuel to the field offices.

For maintenance and repairs of its truck fleet it is suggested that WFP enters into an agreement with GTZ. Should this not be possible there is a good garage in Abeche that currently maintains and repairs WFP’s light vehicles. It would be possible to use this garage to repair and maintain the trucks if WFP were to manage its own stock of spare parts. TPG are developing fleet management systems and Chad could eventually benefit from a TPG fleet management expert.

### 8.3.5 Air Operations

UNHAS is vital for the transport of humanitarian staff. Many of the airstrips need maintenance. THW (German government) has granted USD 200,000 for the repair of these airstrips. Maintenance, such as weeding and filling of small holes, is required on a regular basis and can be organized with small food for work projects, together with the local authorities.

In August/September the French military transported some 800 tonnes of essential supplies to the Goz Beida area. The French military base in Abeche supplies WFP/UNHCR with JET A1.

### 8.4 Management of EDPs and Intermediate Storage

Abeche has a capacity of 3500mt. Some repairs and upgrading of the warehouse site is required. WFP will shortly have completed its plan of erecting Wiikhalls in all the refugee camps. The current strategy of transporting directly either from Benghazi, N’djamena or Abeche to the EDPs managed by WFP and located within the camps should continue.

WFP’s current and planned capacity in the refugee sites as well as per intermediate storage is shown in the table below. In several camps UNHCR has made available rubhalls to WFP that had previously been used for NFIs.

### Table 7 – Storage Capacity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Monthly Mt</th>
<th>Capacity</th>
<th>Planned</th>
<th>UNHCR Rubhall</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Tonnage/ months</th>
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### Camp Storage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Capacity</th>
<th>Distribution</th>
<th>Standing</th>
<th>New</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Goz Amir</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>1,400</td>
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<td>1,750</td>
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<tr>
<td>Djabal</td>
<td>372</td>
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<td>500</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Treguine</td>
<td>392</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bredjing</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>1,050</td>
<td>500</td>
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<td>1,550</td>
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<tr>
<td>Farchana</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>1,050</td>
<td>500</td>
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<td>1,550</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kounoungou</td>
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<td>500</td>
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<td>Mile</td>
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<tr>
<td>Am Nabak</td>
<td>315</td>
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<td>Touloum</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>700</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iridimi</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>350</td>
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<td>700</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oure Cassoni</td>
<td>481</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>500</td>
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<td>1,000</td>
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### Intermediate Storage

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Capacity</th>
<th>Distribution</th>
<th>Standing</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iriba</td>
<td>1,050</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,050</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guereda</td>
<td>1,050</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,050</td>
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| Total     | 4,310    | 9,900        | 3,000    | 1,050 | 13,950 |

Capacity is now sufficient for two to three months in each camp and four months in Goz Beida, which are totally inaccessible during the rains. As and when the pipeline permits, additional commodities will be stored in intermediate storage located at the field offices. CP commodities can also be stored in these EDPs. It is essential that WFP reinforces its warehouse staff at all locations and improves its warehouse management. The lack of warehouse staff makes the policy of distributions all taking place on the same day difficult to achieve. Commodity handling will be improved by the supply of pallets and reconditioning materials. A policy of regular fumigation must be put into place. Termites are a serious problem in all of the Wiikhalls where they attack the plastic sheeting used as a floor, the pallets and the commodities. Spoiled commodities should be disposed (according to the local rules) in order to reduce infestation within the Wiikhalls.

### 8.5 Accountability and Compas

WFP procedures should be followed at all times. Commodities delivered onto UNHCR trucks for transport to the distribution site must be accompanied by a waybill indicating the SI number of the commodity. Implementing partners must include the SI number on their distribution reports. Distribution reports have not been received by WFP on a regular basis. At the end of the distribution, the Implementing Partner must return any bags not distributed to the WFP store, so that these “food returns” can be tracked. WFP should organize training for Implementing Partners as soon as possible.

Until such time as WFP has set up its field office with VSAT links, additional Compas staff must be based in Abeche. Distributions and food returns (when made) have not been tracked in Compas since the beginning of the EMOP and this will have to be done before the end of the year to complete the SPR report.

### 8.6 Pipeline
The pipeline is based on the new budget revision planning figures of 250,000 beneficiaries, including 25,000 beneficiaries amongst the local population (on a monthly basis). Reimbursements of commodities to the CP started in November and will continue in December. WFP will start to accumulate stocks in country for all commodities.

All commodities to be pre-positioned to cover the rainy season need to be in Chad by the middle of May 2005 for the southern and central camps. Given that the current EMOP is due to end in June 2005, there is a need to have a new EMOP approved by January 2005 for new resource contributions to be absorbed. The supply chain, from launching an RFO for the purchase of food until delivery to the camps, takes a minimum of four months.

8.7 **Infrastructure (Accommodation)**

Working and housing conditions of WFP staff in the isolated areas need to be improved. Given the lack of accommodation available in these areas, WFP should activate its agreement with SRSA. UNHCR has taken advantage of this program to set up the field offices in Guereda, Iriba and Goz Beida. SRSA are due to visit Chad in November and their terms of reference should include assistance to WFP as well as evaluating the extent to which the other agencies, particularly WFP could be incorporated into the UNHCR structure.

8.8 **Preparedness**

The situation in Eastern Chad is continuously evolving. Due to environmental problems and problems of overcrowding, some camps are due to be transferred. WFP has to have storage tents available and other logistics NFIs in order to be able to respond rapidly to the evolving situation.

Keeping some stocks of food in Abeche is also essential in order to be able to respond to any new influxes of refugees. However stocks will not be able to cater for large numbers and a contingency plan needs to be drawn up.

Rains in 2004 were considered to be below average. WFP should be prepared for greater difficulties and a more prolonged rainy season in 2005.
ANNEX 1

EVOLUTION DES EFFECTIFS DES REFUGIES SOUDANAIS DANS LES CAMPS À L’EST DU TCHAD

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Planning figure agreed with the Chadian Government and used by UNHCR and WFP is 200,000 beneficiaries taking into account some 15/20,000 pre-registered refugees who remain along the border areas.
### SUDANESE REFUGEES IN EASTERN CHAD CAMPS BY SEX AND AGE GROUPS
(Situation as at November 2004)

#### CAMP STATISTICS

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No detailed data is available for AMNABAK

*** spontaneous arrivals to the camp

The transfer of refugees to Treguine started 27.09.2004
**Annex 3**

**Eastern Chad: Local populations estimates, 2004 cereal harvest, and refugee populations**

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<th>Region</th>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Chef-Lieu</th>
<th>2004 pop estimate (1)</th>
<th>2004 cereal harvest (mt)</th>
<th>as % of 2003 harvest</th>
<th>as % of last 5 year average</th>
<th>Refugee Camps</th>
<th>Refugee Population (2)</th>
<th>% of local population</th>
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<td>44</td>
<td>10320</td>
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<td>50 437</td>
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<td>Guereda</td>
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<td>625</td>
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<td>Sila</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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Data sources: UNHCR and FEWSNET (preliminary data from FAO/CILSS/FEWSNET October 2004 mission)

(1) tentative estimates based on 1993 census data and annual population growth rate
(2) as of 2 November 2004 (includes 11 camps, spontaneous camps and refugees at border)
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<td>FEWSNET</td>
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<td>IFRC</td>
<td>31 Oct -16 Nov 2003</td>
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<td>Résultats de l’enquête effectuée du 11 au 19 septembre 2004 auprès des populations hôtes tchadiennes et des réfugiés soudanais installés dans les régions de Dagassa et Tissi, Sud du Ouaddaï,</td>
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<td>Analyse et cartographie des facteurs intervenants dans la vulnérabilité structurelle a l'insécurité alimentaire au Tchad</td>
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# List of Persons Met

## NDjamena

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<td>Dr. Bonaventure Traore</td>
<td>Regional Team Coordinator</td>
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<td>CNAR</td>
<td>Mahamad Nour Abdoulaye</td>
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<td>FEWSNET</td>
<td>Yacoub Abdelwahid</td>
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<td>Issa Khalil</td>
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## Abeche

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## Field

List all the prefets

- Abeche: Mr Haroune Saleh (Governor)
- Biltine: Dr Moctar Moussa (Governor)
- Iriba: Mr Issa moussa (Prefet)
- Bahai: Mr Hamat Abakar (Prefet)
- Guereda: Mr Moussa Outman (Prefet)
- Adre: Mr Daoud Ahmed Bechir (Prefet)
- Goz Beida: Mr Mahamat Daoud (Prefet)