Reclaimed land in Rwanda with Food For Work support

Meals prepared for Burundian returnees in a transit camp in the North of Burundi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The WFP/FAO/UNHCR Joint Needs Assessment (JNA) was undertaken at the request of the WFP Executive Board (EB) at its Second Regular Session in November 2005. The continuation of the Great Lakes Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO) was to be informed by a robust needs assessment. This assessment was complemented by a review of coordination and management mechanisms and by a food production and market analysis to address key issues raised by the EB regarding the implementation of the regional PRRO and opportunities for local and regional procurement.

The massive movement of almost three million people triggered by the conflicts in Rwanda and Burundi in the early 1990s are still affecting the human and social condition of refugees living in camps in Tanzania, Burundi and Rwanda. The conflicts also impacted the resident population confronted by increased levels of poverty and food insecurity. Recently, the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi have made progress towards national reconciliation and economic recovery, although not at the same pace. Burundi has achieved political transition while Rwanda has advanced further, making rapid progress towards a post-recovery situation focusing on development activities. Tanzania still carries the burden of hosting the largest refugee caseload in Africa. WFP should adjust its programmes to changing needs.

In Burundi, a further shift is required from relief assistance for displaced people (refugees, internally displaced persons [IDPs] and returnees), malnourished children and severely food insecure people, to recovery activities for those whose livelihoods are affected by the enduring social and economic consequences of the conflict. According to the Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis (CFSVA), between 20 and 30 percent of households in some provinces of the North and North West are severely food insecure. These households, who barely consume one staple food per day (and oil and vegetables once or twice a week) and produce or have the means to purchase only 1,300 kilo calories per day, are highly dependent on food purchases. Their income comes from daily labour that permits them to purchase only 3,500 kcal for the entire family. There is also a high prevalence of wasting (8 percent) and very high prevalence of stunting (51 percent) among the children of these households.

WFP Burundi should focus on activities that primarily address the needs of severely food insecure people in four priority zones affected by chronic food insecurity and acute crises such as recurrent droughts and plant diseases (mainly Cassava Mosaic Disease). Relief interventions serve essentially as safety nets to avoid any further deterioration of the household food security and nutrition situation. They should be complemented by recovery activities that contribute to the sustainable improvement of community and household assets, including education. Approximately 500,000 people should receive a relief ration twice a year during the lean seasons. Relief is also to be provided to malnourished children and their families. Similar numbers of people require support through Food For Work (FFW), school feeding and Mother and Child Health (MCH) activities. In terms of resources, the proportion of relief should decrease from 42 percent in 2007 to 33 percent in 2008 (for a yearly total tonnage of approximately 75,000). The food security situation will be monitored regularly and the relief component may be scaled up in case of emergency.

In Rwanda, although economic recovery is clearly underway, the needs of the most vulnerable are not yet effectively addressed as reflected in progress made towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) regarding poverty, hunger, child mortality and maternal health. Major factors affecting the most food insecure groups include: limited access to land, seasonal food insecurity associated with reliance on subsistence agriculture, recurrent drought and a lack of buffer stocks (cassava has almost disappeared in some areas because of disease). Preliminary results of the Comprehensive Food Security Vulnerability Assessment (CFSVA) show that in the most food insecure districts, one third of people ate one daily meal while half of the children ate two meals or less (a quarter had one or no meals) the day before the survey. Single headed households with less than 0.1 ha of land or more than six family members are most prone to food insecurity.

In addition to humanitarian assistance to be provided to 42,700 refugees from DRC and Burundi (this will decrease as over 12,000 refugees repatriate in 2007 and 15,000 in 2008), WFP Rwanda should focus on protecting and strengthening livelihoods in the most food insecure households. Food For Work interventions are recommended in areas where cash interventions are not appropriate because of market access constraints and limited food availability, or when relevant funding is not available. Based on the
vulnerability criteria, WFP has estimated that approximately 210,000 people need Food For Work in 14 priority food insecure provinces. The CFSVA results will be used to confirm and/or refine the intervention modalities, the number of beneficiaries and the targeting. The resource requirements are projected to decrease from 16,600 tons in 2007 to 13,700 tons in 2008.

In Tanzania, if the repatriation process for Burundian refugees takes off by mid-2006 and the outcome of the DRC elections is positive, the following repatriation planning figures may materialize: 110,000 will leave the camps in 2007 and 100,000 in 2008 with approximately 101,000 refugees remaining by 2009. These returnee movements will be closely monitored. Refugee mobility in Tanzania is restricted and refugees are not officially given access to land, labour or income generating activities outside the camps. They are therefore limited in their abilities to be self-reliant, which does not allow for the phasing out of food and non-food assistance. Host communities should continue to receive support for access to water and sanitation, health, nutrition and education- services that are made available to the refugees. The total requirements will decrease from approximately 50,000 tons of commodities in 2007 to approximately 28,000 tons in 2008.

Overall, this JNA recommends clearly targeted interventions to geographic areas and food insecure households and a shift from relief to recovery as refugees repatriate. As compared with the last Regional PRRO for the Great Lakes, the needs and resource requirements have been adjusted according to the changing context, and social and economic progress will determine WFP exit strategies and shift to development interventions in the medium-term.

In regards to local and regional procurement, the Great Lakes region has experienced recurrent drought periods resulting in reduced food production and substantial price increases. Recommendations are based on past trends and prospects.

Burundi has experienced a per capita food production decrease of 24 percent since 1993 due to household reduction in access to land and deteriorating productivity due to lack of inputs and technical support. Food stocks are inadequate, markets are not well integrated and food commodity prices have increased substantially since 2003. It is therefore not recommended to undertake local procurement beyond the 500 to 800 tons of palm oil purchased in the past. A more in-depth-market analysis will be done to inform potential for non-food interventions including cash responses.

Rwanda has also faced an unusual situation as erratic rains resulted in a deficit of 175,000 tons cereal equivalent after the last harvest of 2006. Markets are well integrated however, and when production and price levels for maize and beans are reasonable (and below import parity prices), local procurement could be carried out at the same level as in past years, i.e. 2500 tons. This can be increased as production and availability improves.

Though Tanzania is self-sufficient in staple crops of maize during normal years, drought occurred in most regions this year and production decreased by 50-70 percent in some parts of the country. The cereal deficit (mainly maize, sorghum, millet and rice) is nearly 400,000 tons. Surplus markets are not adequately supplying deficit regions, probably because of slack demand and high transport costs. Food prices have therefore been increasing steadily in those areas, while the supply situation has been exacerbated by exports to neighbouring countries. Still, Tanzania is a major regional food commodity supplier to WFP and once production and availability have recovered, WFP procurements in Tanzania should reach past levels of 40,000 tons/year.

The review of the management structure of the regional project approach concluded that, on balance, there were no net benefits in maintaining a regional approach. The situation has changed since 1995 and the particular context in each country now calls for separate country-based interventions. The flexibility afforded by a regional approach, particularly with regard to resource allocation, is no longer called for now that the environment in each country is more stable and movement of people across borders can be better planned and managed. Any future need to move resources can be readily accommodated within country-based projects. The majority of programmes in Rwanda and Burundi do not target refugees and returnees. They are instead focused on relief and recovery interventions for the resident population.
For future support requirements, donors tend to prefer high impact country specific projects over more general regional projects. The benefits of having a central management and technical support function in a regional project are not as evident and any efficiency gained is overridden by the benefits that would accrue from enhancing in-country capacities.

Recent political developments now call for a stronger collaboration with Government in the three countries, ensuring greater State ownership of interventions and strategies. Within each country, different challenges need to be addressed and both the Government and donors have moved into more coordinated strategic frameworks. A country-based approach in line with Government and donor priorities is therefore preferable.

Overall, separate country-based approaches are recommended, with the Regional Bureau moving towards its normal function: To provide strong and effective support and guidance rather than project management.
ACRONYMS

ARV   Anti-Retro Viral
CARE  Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere
CCA   Common Country Assessment
CFSVA Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis
CFAM  Crop and Food Assessment Mission (Rwanda)
CFSAM Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission
CFSNAM Crop, Food Supply and Nutrition Assessment Mission (Burundi)
CHW   Community Health Worker
CO    Country Office
CSB   Corn Soya Blend
CTC   Community-Based Therapeutic Care
CRS   Catholic Relief Service
DHS   Department of Health Survey
DOC   Direct Operational Costs
DRC   Democratic Republic of Congo
DSC   Direct Support Costs
EDPRSP Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
EFSA  Emergency Food Security Assessment
EMOP  Emergency Operation
FSIT  Food Security Information Team
FSMS  Food Security Monitoring System
FFT   Food For Training
FFW   Food For Work
GTZ   Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (German Technical Cooperation)
GVC   Grupo Volontario Civile
IDP   Internally Displaced Person
IFAD  International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFPRI International Food Policy Research Institute
IGA   Income Generating Activities
IMC   International Medical Corps
IRC   International Rescue Committee
ISC   Indirect Support Costs
JNA   Joint Needs Assessment
LBW   Low Birth Weight
LTSH  Landside Transport Storage and Handling
MHA   Ministry of Home Affairs
MDG   Millennium Development Goal
MUAC  Middle Upper Arm Circumference
ODO   Office of Associate Director of Operations
ODK   Operations Desk (Regional Bureau) in Kampala (WFP)
ODMP  Programming Service (Programme Management Division)
ODOC  Other Direct Operational Costs
OEDE  Office of Evaluation
PRRO  Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation
PRSP  Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PSA   Programme Support and Administration
QUIBB Questionnaire des Indicateurs de Base du Bien-être
RB    Regional Bureau
RWF   Rwandan Franc
SFP   Supplementary Feeding Programme
STD   Sexually Transmitted Disease
TFP   Therapeutic Feeding Programme
TSh   Tanzanian Shilling
UNDAF United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNIDO United Nations Industrial Development Organization
<table>
<thead>
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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VAM</td>
<td>Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WINGS</td>
<td>WFP Information Network and Global System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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SECTION 1. ASSESSMENT OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY

1.1 Background

The Great Lakes Regional PRRO 10062.2. was submitted to the Executive Board for approval in November 2005. This operation, comprising WFP Programmes in Burundi, Rwanda and Tanzania, supports food insecure and vulnerable populations, including refugees, returnees, IDPs and undernourished women and children. The Executive Board approved the operation for one year and requested WFP to undertake a Joint Needs Assessment (JNA) with UNHCR and other interested United Nations agencies and donors as the basis for planning assistance beyond the initial period covering 2006. The overall objective was to assess the need for, and scope of future food security programming in the Great Lakes region. It was carried out jointly with FAO and UNHCR. The findings and conclusions of the assessment inform the needs based interventions to be presented to the Executive Board at the Second Regular Session in November 2006.

The specific objectives of this JNA were to analyse the food security situation and identify needs on the basis of a review, verification and synthesis of the available information on:

- The current food security and nutrition situation in Burundi, Rwanda and Tanzania from regional and country-level perspectives;
- The estimated number of food insecure and malnourished people requiring food and non-food assistance;
- Identification of appropriate interventions, their timing and how they complement other non-food interventions; and
- Opportunities for recovery and long-term improvement in food security and nutritional status.

This assessment addressed the main issues as identified by the Executive Board: To assess WFP implementation strategy including transitional activities; clarify understanding of the condition of the affected populations, including the number of food insecure people; address resource implications and clarify proposed exit strategies.

1.2 Methodology

The JNA was carried out in three phases: Secondary data analysis, JNA field missions and Data Synthesis. Specific approaches were applied to each of them:

1.2.1 Secondary Data Analysis (Desk review)

The objective of the desk review (undertaken prior to field trips) was to analyze and consolidate available data and identify information gaps on the food security and nutrition situation of populations affected by post-conflict economic decline, structural changes in production patterns, crop failure and displacement in Burundi, Rwanda and Tanzania. Programme implementation issues were also reviewed to draw lessons learned for response options, targeting and programme recommendations.

The desk review provided inputs to issues to be addressed by the JNA during the field visits and key informant interviews with local authorities, United Nations agencies, donors, partners and beneficiaries.

As mentioned in the approved Great Lakes Region PRRO 10062.2, a number of documents and reports were prepared in order to assess the food security and nutrition situation of people affected by displacement, economic decline and drought in Burundi, Rwanda and Tanzania. The review and analysis of available information was based on policy and technical reports by relevant government ministries and analyses, surveys and assessments undertaken by WFP, other United Nations agencies and their partners. The detailed list of main documents consulted is attached in Annex 5.

It should be noted that during the desk review, the relevance and reliability of the information was critically assessed with regard to the level of confidence in the reports, the relevance of the methods used to collect and analyze the data, the geographic coverage and the variables and indicators used for the food security and nutrition analysis.
1.2.2 WFP/FAO/UNHCR JNA Mission

In accordance with the size and complexity of the programme and the availability of data, the duration of field work was determined by the Country Offices jointly with the Regional Bureau: eight days in Burundi, five days in Rwanda and three days in Tanzania. During the visits, substantial time was devoted to meeting with all relevant stakeholders. This included briefing and debriefing with WFP’s major donors, United Nations agencies (UNHCR, FAO, UNICEF and OCHA), national authorities at ministerial level, international aid planning and coordinating entities, technical line ministers and NGO cooperating partners in agriculture, food security and nutrition.

Considerable time was also dedicated to meeting with Programme and Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping (VAM) staff. Discussions with staff covered document review, lessons learned from implementation of various interventions, and existing or potential collaboration with partners to provide complementary technical and non-food support. They were used to formulate recommendations on targeted geographic zones, population groups, number of beneficiaries, food and non-food response options and interventions.

In each country, between one and one and a half days were dedicated to field visits and key informant interviews of refugees in camps, returnees during repatriation exercises, participants in FFW schemes, farmers, and staff and patients in nutrition centres in addition to discussions with local authorities and partners. A detailed programme of sites visited and persons met is attached in Annex 4.

1.2.3 Synthesis assessment report

The information from the secondary data analysis, the review of documents during the country visits, the interviews and meetings with stakeholders, key informants and technical staff was triangulated and cross-checked. This allowed the team to determine the impact of different factors (e.g. displacement, economic deterioration, recurrent drought and structural problems related to land access, agriculture inputs and services) on household income, expenditure structure, purchasing power and nutrition status.

Based on the desk review and field visits in each country, findings were shared with donors in Burundi, Rwanda and Tanzania and at regional level in Nairobi. A draft report was written for further review and finalization in order to inform the design of the next project phase.

1.3 Parallel reviews

As recommended by the Board, complementary reviews were undertaken to address issues on the management and coordination mechanisms at regional level and provide more detail on local and regional procurement opportunities.

1.3.1 Food production and market analysis

A food production and market analysis was undertaken in conjunction with the JNA. The findings and recommendations on local and regional procurement from this analysis are integrated in this report. This analysis was conducted jointly by the Regional Bureau and FAO. Available data and literature on agricultural production, consumption, trade, prices and marketing patterns of major cash and food crops were reviewed. The analysis focused on marketing policies, inflation and exchange rates and their relationship to the macro economy.

Information was collected through semi-structured interviews with key informants, (producers, traders, processors and agriculture authorities). Stakeholders in food procurement such as WFP, NGOs, government officials, traders and farmers were consulted. In addition to providing recommendations on local and regional procurement, the analysis determined the feasibility and implications of cash responses as safety nets for food insecure people in the three countries.

1.3.2 Review of coordination and management mechanisms

The coordinating role of the WFP Regional Bureau was also evaluated by a management review. This exercise was intended to confirm the validity of the management and coordination structure proposed in the project summary and evaluates options for decentralizing operational management.
This review was based on two evaluations of the PRRO undertaken in 2001 and 2005, lessons learned as well as key informant interviews with government authorities, United Nations partners and WFP staff in Country Offices and the Regional Bureau. Specific issues addressed included: Management flexibility, optimization of support, allocation of resources, advocacy, funding, consistency of the regional model and coherence with in-country strategies. The review was led by the WFP Operations Department. The findings and recommendations from this review are presented in this report.
SECTION 2: JOINT NEEDS ASSESSMENT IN BURUNDI

2.1 Background

Since 1992, the Great Lakes Region has been marked by major conflicts in Burundi, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo. In Burundi, the democratic process initiated by President Buyoya, with a new constitution and multiparty system, led to general elections in 1993. Melchior Ndadaye won the election with the support of the Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi (Frodebu). However, the Burundian army staged a coup and killed the President in October 1993. This was the starting point of a conflict that caused the death of up to 100,000 people. More than 500,000 Burundians fled to Tanzania. A power-sharing agreement between the Government and opposition in September 1994 was rejected. These events led to 12 years of continuous internal ethnic conflict.

The decade-long civil war has had a detrimental impact on the economy. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita fell from $180 in 1993 to $110 in 2003. According to the latest United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Human Development Report for 2004, Burundi is ranked as the third poorest country in the world. About 60 percent of the population lives below the poverty line (on less than $1 per day). Adult literacy is 59 percent and net primary school enrolment was estimated at 57 percent in 2002, lower than the 70 percent estimate from the late 1980s. Health expenditures are among the lowest in the world (US$19 per person per year). Conflict, displacement and increasing poverty has negatively affected access to medical care and increased malnutrition and economic vulnerability.

In 2005, the total population was estimated at 7,636,884 persons. This is an increase of one million people since 2001. Burundi has the second highest population density in Africa - about 250 inhabitants per square km. This figure rises to more than 400 inhabitants per square km on arable land. Average farm size is only about 0.7 ha, while forty percent of households in the central plateau have access to only 0.4 ha. Population density results in strong competition for natural resources, mainly on arable land upon which most people rely on for their livelihood: over 90 percent of the population depend on subsistence farming, which contributes to less than half the total GDP.

Economic policy is guided by a programme of action for the period 2005-2010, complemented by an emergency plan that is designed to assist vulnerable groups to overcome the impact of the crop failures in 2006. As of 2007, a Poverty Reduction Strategy Plan (PRSP) will aim to reduce poverty by stabilizing the economy and promoting recovery, by raising the GDP growth in real terms by a minimum of 5 percent per year and reinforcing or improving access to public services.

The Arusha Peace process initiated in Tanzania in 2000, led to a political transition that culminated in August 2005 with the election of Pierre Nkurunziza, leader of the former main Hutu rebel group CNDD-FDD (Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie – Forces pour la défense de la démocratie). These elections were supported and supervised by the United Nations and the donor community. The fact that this party dominates the government, the National Assembly and Senate, contributes to political stability.

Another rebel faction, the Forces Nationales de Libération (FNL) rejected the legitimacy of the Government however, and sporadic fighting continued around the capital, Bujumbura and in surrounding provinces. A peace agreement between the FNL and the Government was achieved recently with Tanzanian mediation. It will now have to be enforced.

2.2 Population movement

Table 1: Burundi Refugee/ IDP figures 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>10,000 Congolese refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19,000 Rwandan asylum seekers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>117,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundian Repatriates (2002-2005)</td>
<td>368,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Source : “Projet d’appui à la Politique Nationale de Population” (PNP).
2.2.1 Refugees, migrants and repatriation

As of April 2006, Burundi hosts around 10,000 Congolese refugees living in two camps (Gasorwe and Gihinga). They originate primarily from South-Kivu. If the elections take place as foreseen in July 2006, UNHCR plans for the repatriation of 2,000 Congolese refugees in 2006. The prevailing situation has left the refugees dependent on external assistance for their survival as access to agricultural activities and other economic opportunities are limited.

Beside the Congolese, Burundi hosts about 19,000 Rwandese asylum seekers mainly from the Butare district in Rwanda who have crossed the border. The initial influx in early 2005 may have been prompted by political misinformation, a politically sensitive environment including a unity/reconciliation process using open-air village courts and reactions of mistrust in a context of economic reforms applied with insufficient information. In terms of the later arrivals in 2006, food insecurity due to drought that affected the season 2006A\(^2\) harvest may be one additional reason for the influx. The refugee status determination undertaken by UNHCR and the Burundian Government is under way but is a lengthy process, which will not be finalized before end of 2006 or beginning of 2007. The results so far have shown that less than 10 percent of the caseload may be eligible.

2.2.2 Returnees

Positive political developments in Burundi contributed to the return of some 300,000 refugees mainly from Tanzania between 2002 and 2004 through facilitated repatriation supported by UNHCR. In 2005, over 68,000 Burundians repatriated, though the pace slowed down before June, prior to the presidential elections and then increased again in August.

Table 2: Estimated Refugee, returnee and asylum seeker caseloads for Burundi (2006-2008)\(^3\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assisted Caseloads</th>
<th>01/2006 Departures (Voluntary repatriation)</th>
<th>01/2007 Departures (Voluntary repatriation)</th>
<th>01/2008 Departures (Voluntary repatriation)</th>
<th>01/2009 Departures (Voluntary repatriation)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Congolese refugees in camps</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwandan Asylum Seekers</td>
<td>19,000</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundian Returnees</td>
<td>55,000</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.2.3 Internally displaced persons

The number of internally displaced people (IDPs) decreased substantially from over 145,000 in April 2004 to 117,000 in April 2005, the number of IDP sites also decreasing from 170 to 160. Almost 60 percent of the displaced population is settled in the North and Central provinces and half of those households are headed by women. Over 90 percent rely on agriculture while 74 percent still have access to their own land, though the plot size and yield are insufficient to ensure self-sufficiency. Only one third of the IDPs were willing to return to their places of origin, mainly those coming from the Southern provinces. Security is the main issue for the IDPs and most of those settled in the Central and Northern provinces have decided to remain on the sites where they have lived for over 10 years. Security also determines the time spent in the fields.

Agriculture remains their main source of income although disparities exist between IDPs in the Central and Northern provinces who have insufficient income to cover their basic needs as compared to those settled in the South who rely on various activities, including cash crops and trade. Though the IDPs do not receive specific attention anymore, they may be targeted for assistance based on their vulnerability.

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\(^2\) September-November 2005.

\(^3\) These figures do not take into account population growth. Repatriation figures have to be taken with caution, in particular for 2008. They will be adjusted to actual population movements.
2.2.4 Refugee food access
As a result of inadequate resources, assistance to the refugees did not meet recommended food and non-food requirements, though their situation was better than for other groups assisted with food in the country. WFP rations have averaged 1,994 Kcal/person/day for a recommended ration of 2,100 Kcal. A lasting solution is still on hold as there are no immediate foreseeable prospects for facilitated and/or organized voluntary repatriation while the security situation in DRC remains volatile.

Notwithstanding the distribution of a 2,000 kcal/person/day ration, the general food security situation of refugees within the camps continues to be a problem. About 5-15 percent of refugees in Gihinga and 20-30 percent of refugees in Gasorwe remain food insecure and/or chronically vulnerable.

Various means of sustaining livelihoods within the camps were implemented but due to management problems and lack of resources, most attempts were unsuccessful. Livestock ownership has been reduced and agricultural production activities in areas surrounding the refugee camps seem to have declined. Access to land constitutes a serious problem for the local population and returnees and there are no possibilities to obtain land for refugees from the private owners surrounding Gasorwe camp.

Except for refugees belonging to food secure households (around 10 percent of households) who have access to contract work with NGOs, engage in petty trading and other income generating activities, the main source of income is the sale of food aid. Vulnerable households (almost a third) rely on this, while the most food insecure have no alternative sources of income. They are fully reliant on food aid for their food source/consumption.

2.2.5 Repatriation: Provision of a returnee package
Upon arrival, Burundian returnees receive a package containing 3-month food ration per person. The UNHCR monitoring process has reported several times that the food component is usually shared with the host family or community pending their settlement and does not last more than a month. The 3-month food ration meant to allow the returnees to catch up with the next harvest season -if they come during the lean season- does not therefore seem to be sufficient. The needs of the returnees should be re-assessed in order to adjust the support they require for their integration process and to ensure the sustainability of the repatriation.

UNHCR assists the returnees with shelter and housing materials. Forty five thousand returnee households benefited from seeds and fertilizer from FAO during the 3 harvest seasons in 2005 but have been negatively affected by the erratic rains and drought experienced in the north and east of the country towards the end of the year. Support was also provided in swamp rehabilitation and for income generating activities, such as fishing.

2.3 Food availability and markets

2.3.1 Food production and supply

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Food Production and Supply in Burundi is characterised as follows:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• From 1993-2005, annual production of cereals (maize, sorghum, rice and millet), and legumes and pulses decreased by 10-13%. Roots and tubers production increased by 11%. This resulted in a decline in the quality of diet, as toots and tubers have lower nutritional value;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Per capita food production has decreased by 24% since 1993;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Levels of food stocks are inadequate;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• CFSNAM forecasts a national deficit of 388,000 metric tons of cereal equivalent for the current marketing year.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While aggregate food production has slightly increased since the 1993 conflict, the overall composition of the commodities has changed significantly. The increase in production of roots and tubers is mainly due to the expansion in sweet potato production. Cassava production has declined due to outbreaks of the cassava mosaic virus.

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The population has increased by 24.5 percent or nearly 2 million between 1993 and 2005. With decreasing cultivable land sizes, per capita food production declined by 24 percent since 1993. Per capita production of legumes, pulses and cereal decreased by about 40 percent, while outputs of roots, tuber and banana dropped by 20 percent (Figure 2).

The shift in the composition of the food economy can be attributed to several factors: the effects of the conflict and recent droughts, exacerbated by other factors such as poverty and HIV/AIDS. Poor technology, lack of appropriate inputs, particularly high yielding seed varieties and fertilizers, weak agricultural support services and government policy has not been supportive to food production and has led to low productivity and declining soil fertility.

Crop pest and disease prevalence (cassava mosaic disease and taro fungus) has increased since 2003, significantly reducing crop production, particularly in northern Kirundo and Muyinga provinces. The impact
of this on food security is important due to the major role that cassava plays in the diet of the population\(^5\). Moreover, recurrent erratic rainfall (quantity and distribution) has reduced crop yields of cereal and pulses. The low altitude Bugesera and Moso agro-ecological zones have been most affected by erratic rainfall. Another recurrent climatic hazard is hail. Hail has affected season A over the past 4-5 years, while season B production has been quite stable over the same period.

Since 1999, the Government of Burundi, jointly with FAO, WFP, UNICEF and other organizations has regularly carried out Crop Food Supply and Nutrition Assessment Missions (CFSNAM) twice a year. CFSNAM data indicates a steady increase in the food gap\(^6\) since 1999, reflecting stagnant domestic food production and high population growth. Although food gap projections during CFSNAMs may be overestimated, especially as the significant informal cross-border trade with DRC and Tanzania is not considered, the steep increase in estimated uncovered deficit may indicate a drop in per capita food consumption in recent years (Figure 3). The 2006A assessment predicted a national deficit of 388,000 metric tons of cereal equivalent for the current marketing year.

![Figure 3: Burundi Food Gap](image)

Source: Ministry of Agriculture

In addition to weather conditions, the development of the cassava mosaic virus will determine the food security in Burundi in the next 2-3 years. The Government with FAO, the Catholic Relief Service (CRS) and several other partners, launched a CMD-resistant cassava-cutting program in 2004/05. The objective of the program is to distribute a new resistant variety to all farmers by September 2008. Until then, the food security situation for the most vulnerable will remain fragile.

### 2.3.2. Markets and food price developments

Markets and Food Prices in Burundi have been characterised by:

- Poorly integrated markets due to high transaction costs, poor infrastructure and insecurity contribute to food shortages;
- Lower market demand due to high food prices and inflation rates and hence low purchasing power over the last two years;
- Slow market turnover and thin markets;
- Food prices higher compared to last two years due to decreased production and supply.

\(^5\) Cassava accounts for about 60-70 percent of Burundian diet and 27 percent of calorie intake, according to the last CFSNAM report.  
\(^6\) In general, food gaps are calculated using one of the following two consumption targets: 1) maintaining base per capita consumption, or status quo, which is the amount of food needed to support average level of per capita consumption in previous years, and 2) meeting nutritional requirements, which is the gap between availability and food needed to support a per capita nutritional standard. The Burundi CFSNAM uses the nutritional benchmark of 2100 kcal a day.
High transaction costs and poor road infrastructure result in the poor integration of Burundi's food markets. The country has been exposed to periodic food shortages since 1993. Inaccessibility due to insecurity in some regions, especially Bujumbura Rural Province, has further aggravated the inefficient functioning of markets. Market demand tends to be unpredictable but is generally low because of reduced rural income due to insufficient food production. During the first quarter of the year, the majority of markets were experiencing slower turnover and volumes of food were less than normal (according to trader interviews). The low purchasing power may be offset in part by income from the coffee harvests soon to occur.

Market prices show strong regional variations. Prices of beans, sweet potatoes and cassava increased steadily since 2003, and more than doubled by 2005 in the provinces of Ngozi, Kirundo, Muyinga, Gitega and Ruyigi. In Bujumbura where commodity prices are more stable, prices have shot up since October 2004. For example, the price of cassava flour, which has been stable around 450 Burundian Francs (FBU) per kg from July 2002 to September 2004, increased steeply and reached 650 FBU per kg by December 2005. The map below shows the major markets in Burundi and the production catchment regions that they serve. Burundi can be categorized into five major crop production zones: millet/cassava; rice/cassava; sorghum/cassava; wheat/cassava; and wheat/maize/cassava.

**Figure 4: Map of Major Markets in Burundi**
Kirundo, Muyinga and Cancuzo markets serve the northeastern sorghum/cassava-growing zone. Most of the sorghum and cassava produced in this region is marketed within this region and to the neighboring millet/cassava region.

A strip from the north to central and southern parts is the millet/cassava growing zone. This zone borders Rwanda in the north and Tanzania towards the southeast. Major markets in this zone are Kayanza and Ngozi in the north and Karuzi, Gitega and Ruyigi in the central and southeast. In addition to local trade within Burundi, there is cross-border trade with Tanzania (imports of beans, rice, fish, sorghum and salt and exports of maize and palm oil) and with Rwanda (cassava flour from Uganda that transits via Rwanda).

Two disjointed areas (a strip from the northwest to central Burundi and a smaller strip in the south) form the wheat/cassava-growing zone. The markets of Citiiboke, Bubenza, Muranvya and Mwaro markets serve the northern strip whereas the southern strip is served by Rutana and Makamba markets. There is local and cross-border trade with Rwanda and Tanzania.

The western and central wheat/maize/cassava growing zone has Bururi as its major market. This zone borders Lake Tanganyika and DRC Congo.

The final zone is the rice/cassava zone that forms a small strip in the west and borders Lake Tanganyika and DRC Congo. The major markets in this zone are Bujumbura, Bubenza and Citiboke. There are imports of palm oil, fish, bananas and cassava from DRC Congo to this region that continue on transit to the rest of Burundi.

The price differential between Bujumbura and the interior of the country suggests poor market integration. Higher purchasing power and effective demand in Bujumbura means that markets are better supplied with domestic produce (the bulk of food supply) and imports from DRC and Tanzania. Beans and rice from Tanzania, cassava flour and bananas from DRC, and cassava flour and maize from Uganda, transported through Rwanda, has been observed by the JNA mission in several markets across the country. According to traders interviewed in Gitega, Ngozi, Ruyigi and Bujumbura, the prices of most staples were still high compared to the same period last year, in spite of the Government decision to reduce taxes on food imports and the recent strengthening of the Burundian Franc.

**Figure 5: Major Food Prices in Burundi (October 2005)**

![Price of major food commodities in October: Average for Ngozi, Kirundo, Ruyigi, Muyinga and Gitega markets](source-image-url)

Source: Ministry of Agriculture
Burundi has experienced high inflation over the past three years due mainly to the decline in domestic food production. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, consumer price inflation (driven mainly by the price of food commodities) shot up from -1.4 percent in 2002 to 16 percent in 2005 (Table 1). This has led to significantly lower purchasing power for the majority, particularly those most food insecure.

Table 3: Burundi Inflation Rates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Inflation (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Economist Intelligence Unit

2.3.3 Options for food procurement

The analyses of food production, supply and markets and price developments have indicated that production of cereals and legumes has decreased. The analyses have shown that there are inadequate levels of food stocks. Current forecasts show a national deficit of 388,000 metric tons of cereal equivalent for the current marketing year.

Additional assessments on storage, transport facilities and capacity of traders to provide food of required standards for procurement were carried out. Key findings have shown that adequate storage and transport facilities are available. Milling facilities are limited to only one plant with the capacity to process 100 tons/day.

A commodity that has gained importance since 1972 is palm oil. Palm is grown during the two seasons of April to June and September to January mainly in southern and some northern parts of the country. Annual production of palm oil is 21,000 MT (metric ton) out of which only 15-20% is transformed (extracted/refined) industrially. Most of the oil is extracted traditionally. Industrial extraction rates are about 18-21% whereas traditional means extract 14-15%. Though overall production has increased, yields have decreased from 20 tons to 6 tons per acre in the period 1986-2006, due to conflict, lack or limited use of fertilizers, poor preservation of plantations, outbreak of crop diseases such as the Ganoderma fungus, poor irrigation facilities, and farmers’ inability to purchase imported seedlings.

2.3.4 Recommendations

- Given the national food deficit and that markets are not functioning well, market interventions are not recommended in Burundi for the next two years except for the purchase of palm oil;

- Food availability analyses indicate a deficit of 338,000 MT of cereal equivalent in the current marketing year. While higher because of drought, this follows a consistent pattern of deficits in Burundi. Local purchase of cereals and beans is therefore not recommended. As the supply of cereals and legumes is not likely to increase in the foreseeable future, any purchase of maize and/or beans in a normal harvest season will require careful review;

- Palm oil could be purchased locally in incremental amounts each year, reaching between 500-800 MT by the second year. Further studies would be needed before expanding beyond this recommended amount, as WFP should take care not to overstretch the capacity of producers nor displace their commercial market. The procurement tendering process will require that there be at least three producers meeting the following conditions: palm oil must be fully refined and produced as per WFP specifications, and prices should be competitive to import parity prices and international purchases.

- Improved communication and deliberate collaboration and cooperation with government and other organizations involved in local food procurement is recommended, so that market interventions can be appropriately managed and monitored.
2.4 Household food access and livelihoods

2.4.1 Household chronic food insecurity aggravated by recurrent drought
Conflict-related violence is no longer the main cause of household food insecurity in Burundi, with the exception of few pockets in Bujumbura Rural and surrounding provinces where insecurity remains a concern.

Other factors, including persistent levels of extreme poverty, limited livelihood alternatives, high reliance on domestic production, decreasing yields due to insufficient inputs and recurrent climatic and plant disease related shocks affecting food production, result in continuous food insecurity.

Profile of a Severely Food Insecure Household in Burundi:
- Barely consume a staple food per day
- Mean production and purchase capacity is around 1,300 kcal per person per day (CFSVA)
- Over 50 percent of children are stunted
- High dependency on temporary work and manual labour for income
- As a response to shock these households are the most likely to modify their eating habits or work for food
- High dependency on food purchases
- Current daily labour wage purchases < 3,500 kcal (less than half of family food needs)
- High disease burden worsens food security status

The analysis of food access is another important component of the food security analysis. Most available data that allowed the analysis of food access at household level are derived from the 2004 CFSVA. Provisional data from the first rounds of the FSMS are also available.

2.4.2 Diversity and frequency of food consumption
According to the 2004 CFSVA, staple foods most frequently consumed (more than 5 days/week) by households are pulses, oil, cassava, and sweet potatoes/tubers. Other commonly consumed foods are cassava leaves, fish, vegetables, corn, and rice. It appears that many households in Burundi rely on a variety of starch staples, mainly coupled with pulses, followed by other foods, particularly fish in areas near Lake Tanganyika.

A Principal Components Analysis was used to classify households into homogeneous food consumption typologies. The following variables were analysed:

i. frequency of consumption of staple and non-staple foods such as pulses, meat, vegetables and fruits;
ii. sources of each food item consumed (e.g. purchased, own production, food aid, etc.);
iii. share of household expenditure for food and other basic needs (e.g. health, education, etc.); and
iv. share of expenditure for individual food items.

Based on this methodology, six distinct groups of households were identified and characterized by their food consumption level, source of food and livelihood patterns:

The following recommendations apply to all three countries:
- WFP should consider making direct purchases from farmer groups;
- Increased communication and information sharing on procurement with government and other organizations (international and local institutions);
- Communicate with donors on the status of markets in terms of prices and food availability and provide recommendations for local purchases;
- Conduct detailed local market surveys on prices and availability prior to purchase.
The resulting findings indicated that sixteen percent of the population sample were experiencing poor dietary diversity and had difficulties in meeting their needs at the time of the survey. Their access to income and agricultural production was limited. They were the most severely affected by food insecurity;

Other population groups were characterized by various levels of borderline food security and vulnerability to shocks in decreasing order of significance (three consumption groups representing respectively 19, 32 and 17 percent of total sample);

16 percent of the total household sample was defined as food secure.

2.4.3 Household income
Despite the importance of the agriculture sector, food production is not the only source of income for a large part of the population. The sale of cash crops contributes 65-70 percent of the household total income, and is commonly mentioned as the primary income source. Most common cash crops are coffee and palm oil. Rice, cassava, sorghum and banana (for beer brewing) are also commonly grown for commercial purposes. One-third of the households rely on only one source of income indicating their reduced capacity to handle shocks. The highest percentages are found in the provinces of Kirundo and Muyinga.

In addition, a number of households rely on activities that are likely to provide irregular income throughout the year. Thus, in Karuzi, Kirundo and Muyinga provinces, households tend to rely on temporary work for more than 80 percent of their total income.

2.4.4 Food and non-food expenditures
The largest household expense is spent on food, about half of the total monthly expenditure. Debt servicing and health care are other expenditures, with health care being a major burden to poor households.

Food Security Monitoring data indicate that households rely less on the market as a source of food (compared to the 2004 baseline data). Due to the sharp rise in nominal prices, however, nominal values of purchases have driven expenditure on food as a ratio/percentage of total expenditure to a higher level. This suggests that there are access problems for some groups.

Other factors influencing household food access include the asset base (household, land, livestock), and availability of labour related to household composition including the gender of the head of household (one quarter of the households in the chronically food insecure group are headed by a woman). These are areas for further investigation.

2.4.5 Coping strategies
A great proportion of the sample households experienced one or several shocks, which required them to implement coping strategies. Diet modification was the most common measure followed by decreasing expenditures and searching for temporary work. In addition, the mean CSI composite score was highest in the sample for the households categorized into the more food insecure group. The highest scores were found in the provinces of Kirundo, Muyinga and Karuzi.

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7 The coping strategies index (CSI) is calculated using information from a series of questions where the households are asked to name the frequency in which they use different coping strategies related to access and consumption of food. These coping strategies are then assigned weights, depending on the perceived severity of the coping strategies. The frequency of use is multiplied by the severity of each strategy and added together to give a composite score.
2.4.6 Geographical targeting

WFP interventions focus on the most food insecure and vulnerable areas. Four zones have been identified with high levels of household food insecurity by combining indicators on underweight children, levels of food consumption, levels of income, reliance on temporary work, share of monthly expenditures on food, exposure to shocks, coping strategy index and migration (see above map). These zones were also informed by results from the previous 2004 Consumption Food Security and Vulnerability Survey (CFSVA).

- Zones 1 and 2 have an average of 25 percent severely food insecure households (zone 1 is also affected by drought and crop disease).
- Zones 3 and 4 have an average of 10-15 percent severely food insecure households (zone 3 is also affected by drought). In addition;
- High returnee rates are found in zones 1 and 3.
Zone 5, with the exception of pockets of insecurity in Bujumbura rural, there are better prospects in terms of livelihoods and food security and food insecure households are found in smaller numbers.

As per the Nutrition survey done in 2005, the Kayanza, Ngozi, Kirundo and Muyinga provinces have the highest prevalence of underweight children. Furthermore, Ngozi and Kirundo provinces have the highest prevalence of stunting among children under five (56.7 percent and 53 percent).

The Food Security Monitoring System (FSMS) set up in June 2005 pointed to a steady worsening of food security indicators (higher share of monthly expenditures on food, poorer food consumption, higher exposure to shocks and higher coping strategies index and increased migration) in the northern region (Kirundo and part of Ngozi and Muyenga provinces).

Finally, Karuzi, Kirundo and Muyinga have received large numbers of returnees (from Tanzania) since 2002.

According to the FSMS, the southern zone consisting of Makamba province as well as some communes of Bururi and Rutana, appear to be better-off areas in terms of food security, as they are the only areas where there has been a steady improvement of food security indicators.

2.5 Food utilization and nutrition

Food insecurity, poor dietary diversity, inappropriate feeding practices, as well as high prevalence rates of diseases underlie the causes of malnutrition in Burundi. There has been a progressive decrease in the overall prevalence of global acute malnutrition since 1997, when the country experienced a nutritional emergency.

Currently, the nutritional situation has stabilized to well below 10 percent nationally - although there are provincial and seasonal differences. From available information, the prevalence of acute malnutrition is less than what are considered emergency thresholds, however Kwashiorkor - a very severe form of malnutrition - comprises over 50 percent of those children identified as severely malnourished.

The prevalence of chronic malnutrition is a major cause for concern, with rates well over 30 percent, indicating much longer-term public health and nutritional problems. Chronic malnutrition reaches 60-70 percent in some areas. High stunting rates are most often reported in northern and north-eastern provinces.
Figure 7: Stunting Rates in Burundi

Table 4: Nutritional Status of Children Under-five⁸ in Burundi

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nutrition Indicators</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chronic Malnutrition / Stunting</td>
<td>44.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Acute Malnutrition/ Wasting</td>
<td>6.47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Underweight</td>
<td>32.95%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: UNICEF/ WFP 2005)

The health situation is generally very poor as shown by the related following indicators for Children and Women’s Health⁹:

---


Table 5: Infant and Maternal Mortality Rates in Burundi

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rate Type</th>
<th>Rate Description</th>
<th>Emergency Threshold</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crude Mortality Rate</td>
<td>1.2 – 1.9/10,000/day</td>
<td>1/10,000/day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under-five Crude Mortality Rate</td>
<td>2.2 – 4.9/10,000/day</td>
<td>2/10,000/day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant Mortality Rate</td>
<td>114/1,000 live births</td>
<td>Compared to 91/1,000 live births for Sub-Saharan countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under-five Mortality Rate</td>
<td>190/1,000 live births</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maternal Mortality Ratio</td>
<td>855/100,000</td>
<td>Compared to 940/100,000 for the African continent (WHO)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: UNICEF/WHO 2005)

Nutrition surveillance activities conducted in Burundi include once or twice yearly surveys and the systematic collection of output and outcome indicators by the Supplementary Feeding Programmes (SFPs) and Therapeutic Feeding Centres (TFCs). Nutrition surveys are, however, not collected at the same time of the year by all partners and there is increasing concern that the classic 30x30 sampling technique is insufficiently sensitive to pick up children residing in extremely vulnerable ‘Collines’. There is some evidence to support the hypothesis that areas experiencing a high prevalence of malnutrition are more likely to be confined to specific smaller sites rather than over larger geographic areas.

Seasonal peaks in rates of admission to SFPs and TFCs occur from October to November and from March to May each year. Trend data indicates that the peaks in some areas are higher this year due to the cumulative impact of drought over the past two to three years.

Other available data indicated elevated mortality rates, although this was contradicted by more recent data. High mortality rates, when observed, are a possible indication that illness is a major contributing factor to malnutrition. The physical infrastructure for delivery of health services exists in terms of buildings throughout Burundi but there are huge deficits in trained medical personnel to run these services. The poor pay structure offered by the Ministry of Health is a further disincentive to work in this area.

The above factors are difficult to untangle especially in those areas where food insecurity is common. It is likely a combination of food insecurity and poor dietary quality, linked to (the lack of) availability of micronutrient diverse foods, and diseases which contribute to continuing malnutrition.

2.6 Response options: Prospects for recovery

2.6.1 Acute shocks in addition to chronic food insecurity

Due to recent climatic changes (and trends in rainfall patterns) and given the predominance of rain-fed agriculture and poor farming practices, harvest failure is likely to happen in future. The severity of the impact of such events on households’ food security will depend on their capacity to cope and to rely on complementary off-farm activities.

The spread of Cassava Mosaic Disease is expected to decline as resilient varieties are gradually introduced through seed multiplication programs. It is probable that the situation will only normalize by the end of 2008, however. Cassava plays a ‘buffer’ role during lean seasons that mitigates the impact of drought. Until 2008, however, food aid is needed to address humanitarian needs and protect livelihoods.

Other problems affecting household food security such as the limited access to land, low yields and soil erosion will require longer-term interventions. Food assistance will have a limited role and should be combined with appropriate rural development interventions.
There is a need for strengthened **food security monitoring** to inform acute needs and programme adjustments.

### 2.7 Programme approach and exit strategy

#### 2.7.1 Transition from relief to recovery

WFP should shift from **targeted relief to recovery**, while reinforcing synergies between programme categories in concert with partners’ interventions following the Government poverty reduction and development priorities and the specific national programme for food security and nutrition, still to be developed.

The spectrum of interventions (16 in total) of the former programme has been too wide and insufficiently focused in terms of geographic targeting and beneficiary groups; their impact has been difficult to measure. The programme review conducted in February/March 2006 recommended that the 3 major components of the programme build around relief, humanitarian assistance to refugees and returnees and recovery interventions covering 10 different activities. This recommendation is endorsed by this assessment. Each of the interventions should have clearly defined objectives and address the needs of targeted groups in determined areas of the country grouped in 4 zones according to levels of food insecurity. Recommended interventions should have a clearly established role for food assistance and be combined with non-food support to agriculture, nutrition and education sectors.

**Relief aid** should only be used to relieve temporary and severe food-insecurity situations. In the short-term and as an immediate response to acute food insecurity, there will be a need for **food aid**. To address chronic food insecurity in the long-term, there is a need to augment rural incomes and increase production.

During the political transition period, NGOs have taken the lead in the coordination of humanitarian assistance at regional level and are WFP partners in planning and implementing activities. These NGOs include CARE, World Vision, Catholic Relief Service, International Rescue Committee, Grupo Volontario Civile, Cordaid, Solidarités, International Medical Corps and Action Contre la Faim.

Collaborative opportunities should be further explored. The World Bank is funding major projects such as the PRASAB (Project de Rehabilitation de l’Agriculture et de la Securité Alimentaire au Burundi), a public works project with a labour intensive programme (HIMO – **Haute Intensité de Main d’Oeuvre**). Some projects are in the pipeline to support the education sector with the building of infrastructure and the provision of learning materials for national community development. Consultation with the World Bank should enable WFP to determine the possible role of food aid in reinforcing achievements and ensuring technical and financial support to WFP supported FFW activities. Other major initiatives are the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) funded PRDMR (Programme special de Reliance et de Développement du Monde Rural) on improved food security and food production and the PCAC (Programme Cadre d’Appui aux Communautés) funded by UNDP aiming at supporting the reintegration of returnees and IDPs.

The political, economic and social context remains fragile as the political transition phase is consolidated. Economic and social development is in its infancy while the Government is launching major institutional reforms, including the restructuring of its administration and the decentralization of services. The Government decentralized services at regional and district levels are not yet operational and are not able to provide community level safety nets. Capacities in project identification and monitoring are weak. WFP should support the building of these capacities. Government commitment, however, seems to be strong.

The Government has started to reinforce its coordination capacity. The CNCA (Comité National de Coordination de l’Aide) has become operational and is establishing its collaboration with the Ministère de la Solidarité, in charge of humanitarian assistance. It intends to create thematic groups with the donor community and line ministries, including a group devoted to the food security sector. The Government has expressed interest in being better informed on WFP activities and resource requirements so that it can be supportive to strengthening coordination, reinforcing complementarities and mobilizing funds.
An interim PRSP was launched in 2003 and the complete strategy confirming earlier priorities is being finalized to start in 2007. Economic policy objectives are to reduce poverty by stabilizing the economy, promoting recovery, raise real GDP growth to a yearly 5 percent and renew public services. A Government Trust fund for emergencies was launched in February 2006 to bridge the assistance in 2006. The United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) cycle will end in 2008 and the harmonized cycle for all United Nations agencies will start in 2009.

These development programmes will guide the better management and monitoring of social and economic progress. By 2008 WFP will be in a position to redefine its modes of intervention, including a shift to development activities that WFP envisages in the medium-term.

2.7.2 Repatriation as the only durable solution for refugees

Refugees are unlikely to be integrated into local communities, as the Government is not envisaging integration at this stage. Economic opportunities are not available to them, and they are thus unlikely to be able to meet their minimum requirements on their own. The only durable solution is their return to their country of origin.

The repatriation of the 10,000 Congolese currently settled in camps will depend on the outcome of the presidential elections to take place possibly in July 2006. The development of the peace process, the restoration of security and indications of social and economic recovery in the Kivu provinces, in particular South Kivu, where most of the refugees come from, will be determining factors. An initial repatriation of 3,000 Congolese in 2007 will leave some 5,000 people in the camps by 2008.

2.7.3 Cash based interventions

As markets do not appear to be functioning well, and since the country has been experiencing a steady increase in the food gap since 1999, cash based interventions should be considered with caution and piloted carefully. It is to be noted that the EU is financing cash for work programmes. The following points need careful consideration when considering cash based interventions:

1. Adequate capacity for effective and timely delivery of cash based interventions;
2. An effective system could be that food be provided during the hungry period and cash provided following harvests when grain is available10;
3. Harmonization of processes for food and cash responses and clear and transparent guidelines would be required (ibid);
4. Contingencies in place for food responses if and when cash responses do not address food insecurity (for example if there are no adequate food supplies, or markets are unable to respond);
5. Careful targeting is required as cash may attract people that food does not, and the possibilities of “inclusion” errors will need to be addressed;
6. Modalities for selection of beneficiaries of cash based intervention to be need-based in order to avoid corruption as cash is more fungible than food;
7. Regular monitoring of markets and prices to study the impact of cash based interventions on demand and prices. Cash interventions will likely increase effective demand and hence push up price levels;
8. Gender dimensions on the use of cash versus food: men usually handle cash and may use it for other purposes in addition to food, whereas women usually handle food and use it for the household.

2.8 Recommendations for WFP Burundi programming

Though there are serious threats to food security in Burundi, improvements have been observed over the last year, exempting Northern provinces. Underlying causes for food insecurity strongly suggest that it is essentially chronic. Issues of seasonality, timing, duration and severity need to be examined. Seasonal variations in food security based on the agricultural calendar are important in influencing the time frame and type of responses (see Annex 6).

10 World Food Programme, Burundi: Strategic Review of PRRO 2006
2.8.1 Geographically targeted assistance

Food aid through targeted emergency distributions (relief) is still needed in those areas that in addition to facing structural problems (extreme poverty, limited land holding, high population density) are severely affected by CMD, experience high numbers of returning refugees and are prone to poor weather hazards. The recommended targeting of the beneficiary population in zone 1 is 20 percent for relief and 5 percent for recovery activities.

In zone 2, the underlying causes of food insecurity suggest a strong chronic component and recovery interventions are needed. However, there is a need to keep a relief component due to the severity of the problem. Therefore, the recommended targeting of the beneficiary population in zone 2, is 10 percent for relief and 15 percent for recovery activities.

In zone 3, targeted emergency distributions are still needed for 10 percent of the population in 2007.

In zone 4, a combination of food/cash-for-work is the appropriate response option though at present, there is limited scope and availability for cash programmes. Pilot programmes to build capacity are encouraged once the market functions have improved and prices have stabilized.

Please see figure 8 below for further information on zone location.

Figure 8: WFP Target Zones in Burundi
In 2008 and whenever possible, a gradual shift to more recovery-type interventions should be considered. The tables below indicate the total population numbers requiring relief and recovery assistance through Food For Work activities for each zone.

**Table 6: Population requiring Relief/ FFW 2007**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zone</th>
<th>Relief (targeted food distributions)</th>
<th>Recovery (FFW)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zone 1</td>
<td>283,897</td>
<td>70,974</td>
<td>354,871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zone 2</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>170,710</td>
<td>256,064</td>
<td>426,774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zone 3</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>36,496</td>
<td>18,248</td>
<td>54,744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zone 4</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>145,169</td>
<td>145,169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>981,558</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 7: Population requiring relief/ FFW 2008**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zone</th>
<th>Relief (targeted food distributions)</th>
<th>Recovery (FFW)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zone 1</td>
<td>212,922</td>
<td>141,948</td>
<td>354,871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zone 2</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>170,710</td>
<td>256,064</td>
<td>426,774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zone 3</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18,248</td>
<td>36,496</td>
<td>54,744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zone 4</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>145,169</td>
<td>145,169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>579,677</td>
<td>981,558</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**2.8.1.1 Community based targeting**

Geographic targeting should be complemented by community-based targeting, through the identification and application of appropriate criteria for selection of the most vulnerable households in these communes. This includes households with limited assets (household assets, land, livestock), limited labour capacity (female headed, illness, incapacitation), and presence of malnutrition among children.

**2.8.1.2 Timing**

The assistance for Food For Work activities should coincide with identified lean periods (Oct-Nov, and March-April/May).

**2.8.2 Humanitarian assistance to refugees and returnees**

The JNA mission recognizes that the majority of refugees rely on food aid either as their main source of food or as source of income. Though UNHCR will ensure the provision of the required non-food items and services and revitalize the Income Generating Activities (IGA) programme, it recommends the continuation of the distribution of a full ration of 2100 Kcal/person/day.

The forthcoming 2006 Joint Assessment Mission will determine the number of refugees requiring food aid, review the progress made towards their self-reliance and recommend the provision of non-food assistance. According to the planning figures, the caseload of refugees to be assisted will be decreasing to 8,000 in 2007 and 5,000 in 2008.

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11 If the peace talks with FNL are not successful, the insecurity related problems around Bujumbura rural will continue affecting a number of people that will have to be determined in 2007. Figures of affected population requiring food assistance will be adjusted accordingly.
Refugee populations have impacted on the host communities. According to the local population, the camps have caused significant environmental degradation and have contributed to the exhaustion of natural resources such as grazing areas, firewood and water. This problem could lead to violence between the local population and the refugees. UNHCR is addressing this matter by allowing the host communities to benefit from some of the facilities open to the refugees and engaging the local authorities in constant dialogue.

According to UNHCR, 80,000 Burundians will be returning in 2007 and 55,000 in 2008. Beyond the initial 3-month repatriation package, emphasis will be put on their reintegration through interventions that will reinforce household or community assets or protect their livelihoods, depending on their profile. The extension of assistance and targeting shall be informed by a needs assessment to be undertaken jointly with UNHCR.

2.8.3 Nutrition rehabilitation

2.8.3.1 Supplementary and therapeutic feeding centres
Supplementary and therapeutic feeding centres have benefited from being run by international NGOs over the past number of years. The effectiveness of the TFCs is high in terms of recovery rates and other indicators used to evaluate such programmes. Classic treatment protocols are being implemented and while this allows for good treatment and recovery, the centres tend to be overcrowded and coverage is likely to be poor for many reasons, not least the opportunity costs for the mothers who must remain with their children during the treatment period of 30 days.

New community-based approaches can achieve similar results without significant in-patient facility requirements. They are pertinent in a country where capacity and staffing levels have deficits. The Community-Based Therapeutic Care (CTC) approach will be piloted in one district in the near future and its costs and benefits will be evaluated.

Monitoring indicators available for SFPs show that they do not meet internationally agreed standards for effectiveness or efficiency. Likewise, coverage of those identified as malnourished is presumed to be low. Therefore population level impact on prevalence of malnutrition is limited. Recently the SFPs have been integrated into Government service provision, which has caused a further weakening of the approach due to lack of personnel, although in some cases International NGOs continue to supervise. Nationally there is an inequitable distribution of these services with some districts un-served by NGOs. SFPs need to continue however, as the number of malnourished children in Burundi remains high.

- To provide equitable access to nutritional services, the geographic coverage of SFPs and TFCs should be expanded;
- To have an impact on malnutrition at the population level, active case-finding and referral of malnourished individuals in the community through Community Health Workers is required;
- Consideration should be given to re-instating a family ration in Muyinga and Kirundo (the most food insecure provinces) to accompany the SFP ration to minimize its inevitable dilution through sharing.

2.8.3.2 Mother and child health
The MCH programme started as a pilot in 2005 as an attempt to encourage women to attend post and anti-natal services and to reduce low birth weight (LBW). This project will be expanded in 2006 to cover three districts. Admission criteria based upon anthropometry (MUAC) should be established and it is understood that the ration will benefit all pregnant women from the second trimester and for six months post-delivery.
The project is justified given the high levels of chronic malnutrition in Burundi. The ration proposed will not impact greatly on the nutritional status of the mothers however, as they are basic rather than fortified commodities.

- WFP needs to link with UNIFEM and UNICEF to ensure complementarity of action in this sector;
- The rations should comprise fortified commodities –WFP has evidence that providing Corn Soya Blend (CSB) can reduce the prevalence of LBW;
- Indicators to be collected should include besides number of visits etc., the prevalence of LBW and anaemia to measure the outcomes of this project;
- WFP should explore the possibility of having part of the fortified flour produced and procured in Burundi from locally available ingredients –sorghum, maize, soya or beans. Small-scale production of a similar product “Farine Composée” (blended flour) is already produced but is unaffordable to most. A possible partner in this enterprise is United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO).

The Government is committed to nutrition programming but its involvement is currently minimal because it lacks capacity to lead the process. The only existing coordinating structure for nutrition rests in the monthly food security and nutrition meetings hosted by UNICEF, which the Government does not attend. These meetings are more information sharing sessions than meetings for strategy development or policy setting. The timing is optimal to instigate a Government-led dedicated technical nutrition group in order to improve services in the country and phase out emergency services.

Some issues that need addressing include:

- Gaps in capacities and provision of services;
- Methodologies for conducting surveys/ a nutrition surveillance system;
- Protocols for therapeutic feeding including the possibility for reorientation of TFPs towards a CTC approach as a potential exit strategy.

The planned beneficiary figures for the SFP, TFP and MCH interventions are 127,270 children under five and 61,800 pregnant and lactating mothers with supplementary feeding, and the provision of a monthly 10 kg maize allocation to families of 105,996 malnourished children.

2.8.3.3 School feeding programme

The literacy rate of the adult population is very low at 59 percent with an even lower rate for women at less than 52 percent\(^\text{12}\). According to UNICEF, net enrolment rates in primary schools are 50 percent for girls and 62 percent for boys while girls represent only 44 percent of children in primary schools.

The government of Burundi is committed to the World Declaration on Education for All and has developed an Action Plan in 2002 which was reviewed in 2005 and confirmed priority areas to achieve Education for All in 2010. These include the improvement of enrolment and attendance in primary schools while at the same time reducing gender and geographical disparities. The education sector represents 15 percent of the state budget but only 4 percent of the investment budget.

A pilot project was launched in 2001 covering 21 schools in the province of Karusi. An evaluation in 2003 recommended the expansion of the programme to additional 5 districts (Kirundo, Makamba, Rutana, Cankuso and Ruyigi), which had very low attendance rates, higher gender gaps and high drop-out rates. Kirundo and part of Karusi provinces are amongst the most food insecure areas. Rutana, Makamba, Ruyigi and Cankuso had to reintegrate many returnees from Tanzania and former IDPs.

A technical review of the school feeding programme is planned in June 2006. It is expected that after the first expansion phase implemented in 2005 and 2006, the programme will be expanded further in 2007 and 2008 from 180 primary schools and 200,000 schoolchildren to 250 schools with approximately

300,000 schoolchildren. It should target the most food insecure areas in the North of the country and increase the number of schools assisted in each district while avoiding increased geographical coverage beyond the food insecure areas.

WFP is also planning to assist TEP schools (Teacher Emergency Package – for the reinsertion of dropout students). The planning figures for 2007 and 2008 are for 12,000 schoolchildren.

2.8.4 Burundi: Beneficiaries and food resources

Table 8: Beneficiaries and food resources for 2007/2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Targeting Feeding (GFD)</td>
<td>491,100</td>
<td>18,564</td>
<td>401,900</td>
<td>15,192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Supp. and Therapeutic Feeding</td>
<td>127,300</td>
<td>4,125</td>
<td>127,300</td>
<td>4,125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 Supp. Feeding Family Ration</td>
<td>106,000</td>
<td>1,060</td>
<td>106,000</td>
<td>1,060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Relief</td>
<td>724,400</td>
<td>23,749</td>
<td>635,200</td>
<td>20,377</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 2. Refugees and Returnees       |                     |      |                     |      |
| 2.1 Refugee Feeding             | 8,000               | 1,526 | 5,000               | 954   |
| 2.2 Returnee Package            | 80,000              | 3,816 | 55,000              | 2,624 |
| 2.3 Asylum Seekers              | 10,000              | 1,908 | 5,000               | 954   |
| Total Refugees                  | 98,000              | 7,250 | 65,000              | 4,532 |

| 3. Recovery                     |                     |      |                     |      |
| 3.1 Food For Work               | 490,500             | 18,776| 579,700             | 22,191|
| 3.2 Food For Training           | 24,500              | 939   | 29,000              | 1,110 |
| 3.3 School Feeding              | 267,000             | 18,138| 317,000             | 21,765|
| 3.4 Mother Child Health         | 61,800              | 5,500 | 61,800              | 5,500 |
| Total Recovery                  | 843,800             | 13,353| 987,500             | 50,566|

Total 1,666,200 74,352 1,687,700 75,474

2.8.5 Follow-up assessment and food security monitoring

The information provided by the 2004 CFSA needs to be properly updated in line with the shift from emergency to post-conflict. A first step will be to perform additional analyses based on available datasets from the World Bank Questionnaire des Indicateurs de Base du Bien-être (QUIBB) and DHS surveys by UNICEF. Additional analyses will link indicators from the two surveys, identify and undertake analyses on indicators related to food security. The complementary analysis will enable WFP to identify existing gaps in its food security knowledge. The analyses will also guide the CO in determining the need, if any, for the collection of additional food security information through the existing WFP-led food security monitoring system (FSMS). Special emphasis on migration and casual labor dynamics should be considered given the

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13 Total food requirements, which may be slightly adjusted, were calculated on the basis of:
- Targeted relief distributions: 120 days/315g (200 g cereals, 85 g pulses, 25 g vegetable oil and 5 g salt totalling 1200 kcal);
- FPW: 66 working days/580g (350 g cereals, 200 g beans, 25 g vegetable oil and 5 g salt totalling 2116 kcal);
- SFP and TFP: 120 days/240 g of CSB and 30 g of oil;
- MCH programmes: 360 days/200 g of oil and 5 g of iodized salt;
- Family rations for children in SFP in Muyinga and Kirondo of 10 kg maize per month;
- School feeding rations: 270g/22 days/9 months. Take home ration is 3.6 kg of oil per month (for 9 month) and cooks will receive 330g/30 days/3 pers/9 months. The beneficiaries’ number includes schoolchildren, children attending TEP and cooks;
- Refugees’ caseload is expected to be 8,000 beginning of 2007 and 5,000 by beginning of 2008. The planned returnees will be 80,000 in 2007 and 55,000 in 2008. The planned figures for asylum seekers are 10,000 in 2007 and 5,000 in 2008. They should then be integrated in the refugees’ caseload, if at all. The tonnage is calculated on the basis of a ration of 530 g provide 360 days/year.
importance of these factors to rural livelihoods. More integrated food security and nutrition analysis is required as well as stronger linkages with programming;

- Data collected during the first year of the food security monitoring system should be consolidated to allow for trend and seasonal analyses. Based on lessons learned, the system should be strengthened and further integrated with the existing Food Security Early Warning System (SAPSA). Regular dissemination of results should be ensured through existing SAPSA bulletins. Close collaboration with FAO and the Government is required;

- FAO and WFP together with other partners (OCHA, UNICEF and the Government of Burundi) should continue to undertake regular Crop and Food Supply Assessments. The country food availability analysis should be supplemented by additional market information, in particular on cross-border trade;

- A market profile should be undertaken as it will provide a useful baseline information for regular market analysis as well as provide more in-depth-market analysis to inform potential for non-food interventions including cash responses;

- A study on the integration of returnees should be considered in close collaboration with UNHCR.
SECTION 3. RWANDA JOINT NEEDS ASSESSMENT

3.1 Background
The genocide of 1994, the result of deeply rooted socio-cultural problems, was triggered in part, by the failure of the Arusha Agreement to settle the conflict between Tutsi refugees located in Uganda, and the Hutu-led Government. After the death of President Habyarimana in April 1994, the planned genocide of Tutsis and moderate Hutus led to the killing of 800,000 to 1 million people in approximately 100 days. By taking over the control of Kigali in July 1994, the Tutsi led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) ended the acute crisis and caused the mass movement of over two million Rwandans to Zaire, Tanzania and Burundi.

As a low-income, food deficit country, Rwanda ranks 159th out of 177 countries in the 2005 Human Development Report with an annual GDP per capita of US $220. After the genocide, GDP fell by 50 percent and almost all economic sectors collapsed. The new Government managed to quickly stabilize the economy and ensure rapid growth (70 percent from 1994 to 1997), which was largely driven by the post-conflict resumption of economic activity and reconstruction.

The Government successfully implemented a broad programme of economic reforms, including the privatisation of some State enterprises, public sector reform and private sector development. For the last ten years, GDP growth, mainly driven by agriculture and construction, has remained high (between 6 and 9 percent yearly), inflation has been broadly contained, and the exchange rate has been relatively stable. Delivery of social services, while still weak, has improved. One of the key reforms to be completed in the coming period and which is essential for agriculture development is to secure land tenure.

The economy faces significant problems, however. High population density and a lack of intensive farming practices continue to put pressure on land and natural resources. Access to land is very limited with an average of 0.69 ha per household with the smallest plots being found in Ruhengeri (0.36 ha) and Gisenyi (0.39 ha). Agriculture continues to suffer from a lack of irrigation and water storage systems and as such remains highly vulnerable to the pattern of rain. Indeed, the agriculture season 2006A with bad rains resulted in a poor harvest, high food imports and inflationary trends resulting from rising food prices. This has serious implications for poverty reduction in Rwanda since close to 90 percent of the population depends on the land for their livelihoods. Food and asset vulnerabilities remain widespread in rural areas, with some regions subject to food shortages.

The Government has launched a second PRSP in 2006 to achieve rapid and sustainable labour-intensive and poverty-reducing growth. The PRSP targets are at least 5 percent real GDP growth, macro-economic and price stability, higher rural incomes and improved public services within a process of political decentralization. When considering progress made towards the MDGs however, Rwanda is not doing well on eradicating hunger, reducing child mortality or improving maternal health. For example, 62 percent of the population are classified as poor and 42 percent are extremely poor with the overwhelming majority living in rural areas.

Nevertheless, Rwanda has come far in a relatively short time. The period between 1994 and 2003 when the new Constitution was introduced, represented a transition period. Stability and security increased and a shift was witnessed from short-term emergency to reconstruction and medium term development planning and institutional development. Rwanda is now in a post-recovery phase. Nevertheless, major political and development challenges remain. The peace and stability of Rwanda continues to be threatened by the evolving situation in DRC and Burundi. The prevailing civil unrest and militia group fighting in eastern Congo/Kivu fuel political tension. Recurrent droughts and plant and animal diseases affect agriculture production and food prices.

Independent Evaluation Of Rwanda’s Poverty Reduction Strategy 2002-2005
3.2 Population movements

Table 9: Refugees, IDPs and Returnees in Rwanda as of end-2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Refugees</th>
<th>43,000 Congolese</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3,700 Burundians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A few families from Uganda, Ethiopia, Somalia and Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>180,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returnees (since 2002)</td>
<td>70,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.2.1 Refugees, returnees and asylum seekers

By the end of 2005, Rwanda was hosting about 46,700 refugees i.e. 43,000 Congolese and 3,700 Burundians, living in three large camps. There were also a few Ugandans, Ethiopians, Somalis and Angolans. Depending on the regional security situation, UNHCR plans to repatriate 2,000 Congolese and 2,000 Burundians in 2006.

Since 2002, over 70,000 Rwandans have returned, with the highest numbers in 2002 and 2004 (respectively 24,700 and 22,500). In 2005, over 9,600 Rwandans repatriated. The majority of the returnees have come back from DRC (8,048) and Uganda (1,438) and returned to Gisenyi (31 percent), Ruhengeri (17 percent), Kibuye (18 percent) and Cyanngu (10 percent). Major issues with regard to returnees are access to land and socio-economic reintegration.

According to the statistical overviews provided by UNHCR country offices, the residual caseload remaining abroad is in the region of 50,000 (with the major caseloads being 15,600 refugees in Uganda, 10,000 in DRC and 4,700 in Congo Brazzaville). 19,000 Rwandan asylum seekers have sought refuge in Burundi since March 2005.

3.2.2 Internally displaced persons

Approximately 650,000 people were displaced in 1998 and 1999 in the north-western prefectures of Ruhengeri and Gisenyi during an ethnic-based insurgency. Their IDP status has not been recognized since December 2000. The situation has stabilized through a durable solution consisting mainly in the National Habitat Policy or “villagisation” providing for the relocation of Rwandans in Government created villages.

The Government is still calling for international support for 180,000 households living in inadequate shelter, of which more than 100,000 are settled in Ruhengeri and Gisenyi prefectures. People have less access to land than they had before their displacement. The Government states that “villagisation” will result in increased productivity and reduced poverty, though to date there is no evidence for this. In many instances, available land is insufficient and far lower than the country average and does not allow for food self-reliance or to generate sufficient income for education or health related expenses. These resettled people are therefore vulnerable according to various household livelihood studies.

3.2.3 Refugee access to food

As with Burundi, the refugees in Rwanda have no access to land for agriculture. Few income generating activities are undertaken in the camps as no additional provision for them was made in 2005 by UNHCR due to lack of funds. Small-scale gardening activities have started in two camps. There is also evidence that a small number of refugees earn money or obtain in kind payments through casual labour (often farming) outside the camps or paid work inside the camps. Some receive remittances from DRC, receive gifts or barter their food or non-food items (food, clothing and housing materials).

Food rations were distributed regularly except for in April and May 2005 when the ration was reduced by 30 percent due to lack of resources. Non-food items such as clothes and soap were distributed regularly. Firewood could not be provided as planned and caused some security incidents for the young boys and girls involved in firewood collection.
Of the total of 6,000 Burundian refugees, 4,000 were repatriated in 2005 and 2,000 are planned to return in 2006. The numbers now repatriating have dwindled. A residual caseload may remain in 2007 but the issue of their integration has not been addressed as yet.

Prospects in DRC that would allow the Congolese to return are uncertain, though there are some hopes that if the elections go smoothly, the situation may progressively improve. International pressure on DRC is essential in this process. All the refugees are from Kivu where recent reports indicate that there may be up to 700,000 internally displaced persons.

Depending on the DRC elections, repatriation may be facilitated during the second half of 2006 though no tripartite agreement between the Governments of DRC and Rwanda exists as yet. The refugees are very reluctant to return at this point in time. The Rwandan Government is not willing to allow their integration.

Table 10: Estimation of refugee/returnee movements in Rwanda (2006 to 2008)\textsuperscript{16}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assisted Caseloads</th>
<th>01/2006 Departures (voluntary repatriation)</th>
<th>01/2007 Departures (Voluntary repatriation)</th>
<th>01/2008 Departures (Voluntary repatriation)</th>
<th>01/2009 Departures (Voluntary repatriation)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Congolese refugees in camps</td>
<td>43,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>41,000</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundian Refugees</td>
<td>3,700</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwandan Returnees</td>
<td>50,673</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>40,673</td>
<td>7,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.2.4 Returnee packages

In October 2002, UNHCR changed its policy of repatriation of Rwandan refugees from ‘facilitation’ to ‘promotion’. This change was underwritten and formalized in Tripartite Agreements signed between UNHCR, Rwanda and countries of asylum where Rwandan refugees reside\textsuperscript{17}.

Since 2002, the number of repatriated Rwandans has progressively decreased. A major problem faced by those who did not leave family members behind, is access to land. A new land reform law and policy addresses issues of property, allocation of reclaimed and donated land but has no component regarding the resettlement and integration of returnees.

In order to evaluate the sustainability of the repatriation process and the restoration of national protection, UNHCR has been conducting a returnee monitoring programme. In 2005, activities focused on issues such as land and housing access, security, the position of the returnees with regard to “Gacacas” (village courts) and the situation of women and children.

The main problems for returnees continue to be linked with socio-economic difficulties, peace building and reconciliation among local communities. UNHCR has developed a reintegration project to enhance the self-sufficiency of returnees through the promotion of income generating activities. This has to be complemented by the Government’s awareness raising programme on unity and reconciliation. The needs of returnees will have to be addressed in the next Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy.

\textsuperscript{16} These figures do not take into account population growth. Repatriation figures have to be taken with caution, in particular for 2008. They will be adjusted to actual population movements.

\textsuperscript{17} Tripartite agreements were signed so far between UNHCR, the Government of Rwanda and the Governments of Zambia, Congo-Brazzaville, Uganda, Malawi, Namibia, Zimbabwe Mozambique and recently Kenya (March 2006).
3.3 Food availability and markets

3.3.1 Food production and supply

Rwanda’s Food Production and Supply are characterised as follows:

- Agricultural productivity is sluggish;
- Farm sizes are small due to population pressure;
- There are current food deficits of 175,000 tons and annual food imports of 142,000 tons.

Rwanda has made a remarkable transition from the 1994 genocide to peace and development over the last 10 years. The performance of the agricultural sector remains inadequate however, in spite of increased production of rice and vegetables, promoted by the Government.

Productivity has remained constant for major food staples and the average farm size has declined. Although the land area under agriculture has slightly increased since 1993, population growth and subsequent land subdivision has led to smaller farm sizes. According to the last agricultural survey, average farm sizes decreased from 0.82 ha in 1990 to 0.69 ha in 2005.

Figure 9: Rwanda - Land Use for Agriculture/ Per Capita Agricultural Productivity (1980-2004)

Food availability and supply have improved in recent years. The total food production increased appreciably, although the cassava production has been affected adversely by the spread of Cassava Mosaic Disease (CMD). In 2005, food production was overall 18 percent higher than the 8-year average with an increase of 58 percent for fruits and vegetables, 32 percent for cereals and 15 percent for roots and tubers. Banana and pulses production grew only slightly by 6 and 1 percent, respectively.

Erratic rains occurred during the 2006A season when the bulk of beans were produced. This together with the reduced production of cassava will likely have a negative impact on the food security of rural households, in particular the poor due to the important role of both products in their diets.
According to the food balance sheet produced by the Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources (MINAGRI), production decreased from 923,000 tons in season 2005A to 884,000 tons in season 2006A cereal equivalent. Based on domestic food requirements, the deficit amounts to 175,000 tons of cereal equivalent. After expected private imports of 142,000 tons, the food deficit still remains at 33,000 tons cereal equivalent with some one million people in need of urgent food aid assistance for 6 months until the next harvest in June 2006.

Rwanda is a structurally food-deficit country which imports annually at least 130,000 tons of food, mainly cooking oil, wheat, sugar, rice, beans, maize, cooking banana and dairy products. Prices of domestic crops and livestock products are structurally higher than in neighbouring countries, because: (a) Rwanda is a high-cost producer with land scarcity; (b) it is a landlocked country, with high transport costs for food imports; (c) high import parity prices because of market protection (import substitution policy of the
Government); and (d) domestic supply cannot satisfy domestic demand\(^{18}\). Although these high price levels help most Rwandan farmers to survive on their tiny plot of land, it has negative implications for access to food by poor farmers with a limited level of self-consumption.

### 3.3.2 Markets and food price developments

**Rwanda’s Markets and Food Prices are characterised as follows:**
- Relatively well functioning integrated markets with efficient marketing chains
- Food prices have been on the increase since 2002
- Competitive bean markets (whole sale prices lower in Kigali compared to Ugandan and Tanzanian markets)
- Passion fruit, banana and vegetables exports to Uganda and DRC

Markets appear to be functioning well with relatively efficient domestic marketing chains and good spatial market integration. As there are 2 to 3 harvests stretched over the year and reasonable seasonal price fluctuations, the role of speculative storage is limited. Producer prices have been favourable (Figure 12). The implications for interventions are that cash responses can be considered as alternatives when prices and availability permit and funding is secured. Beans, potatoes and passion fruit are the only commodities for which the country is competitive and limited amounts are exported. However, some local purchase of beans could be considered as conditions allow (normal production and reasonable prices).

#### Figure 12: Rwanda, Annual Urban Consumer Price Levels for Key Commodities

![Figure 12: Rwanda, Annual Urban Consumer Price Levels for Key Commodities](image)

Source of Data: PASAR

Although food prices have increased significantly since 2002 reflecting the effects of unfavourable growing conditions, inflation was not as alarming as in Burundi (Table 7), suggesting higher imports (mostly cross-border trade) due to stronger currency and overall higher prices in Rwanda compared to neighbouring countries, notably DRC, Tanzania and Uganda.

#### Table 11: Rwanda: Consumer Price Index 1998-2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1998</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CPI</td>
<td>91.0</td>
<td>106.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>102.0</td>
<td>108.0</td>
<td>108.0</td>
<td>114.0</td>
<td>125.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.3.3 Options for food procurement

The Government of Rwanda supports and encourages local food procurement as it has the potential to increase local production and boost the economy. There is adequate capacity with respect to storage facilities, transport and milling facilities. Existing corn-soybean blend production plants are functional and have sufficient production capacities.

The Government also encourages a warehouse receipt system (WRS) by providing storage facilities directly to farmer groups. A strategy for the setting up of WRS is under way with joint efforts by the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce and the private sector. The Government has also set up the commodity support program to buy food through co-operatives. They provide commodities such as maize, beans and rice.

The current price level for maize price is US$250/MT (end March 2006), but there are very little stocks available and the bulk of it is imported from Uganda and DRC (interviews with suppliers). The price of maize is forecast to be US$350/MT by the end of April 2006. After harvests, maize and bean prices usually decrease to US$175/ton and US$150/ton, respectively. The Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWSNET) gathers unprocessed food prices twice a month.

Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (German Technical Cooperation - GTZ) a WFP NGO Partner, buys maize, beans and oil (imported) through newspaper tenders after conducting a market analysis.

3.2.3 Recommendations for local WFP food procurement in Rwanda

- Analyses of historical data for the last five years show that WFP purchases locally on average up to 2,500 tons of food per year. The current assessment indicates that the country had food surpluses between season 2002A and 2005B. After season 2006A however, Rwanda had a food deficit amounting to 175,000 tons. After deducting commercial imports planned at 142,000 tons of cereal equivalent, 33,000 tons of food aid were still required. Local food procurements shall remain at average levels of 2,500 tons, should the situation normalize. This recommendation will be reviewed and local purchase levels revised against updated data on food availability and markets;

- Some local purchase of beans could be considered as conditions allow (under normal production and reasonable prices)

The following recommendations apply to all three countries:

- Direct purchases from farmer groups are highly encouraged;
- Increased communication and information sharing on procurement with government and other organizations (international and local institutions) is supported;
- Communicate with donors on the status of markets in terms of prices and food availability and provide recommendations for local purchases;
- Conduct detailed local market surveys on prices and availability prior to purchase.
3.4 Household food access and livelihoods

3.4.1 Factors determining household food insecurity and vulnerability

Factors affecting the food security situation in Rwanda at regional and household level:

- The seasonal pattern of food insecurity as the population mainly relies on subsistence agriculture;
- Recurrent rain and crop failures;
- The lack of buffer mechanisms and crops during lean seasons (pest and crop diseases affecting banana and cassava);
- The resort to some coping mechanisms which have been restricted due to their environmental impact, could have a negative effect on household food security;
- Household access to food is ensured through own production for 60 percent. The remainder comes from purchases;
- High poverty rate in the country (over 60 percent) and limited economic opportunities available to households in rural areas to ensure sufficient income to cover basic food and non-food needs;
- The factors above disproportionately affect vulnerable groups such as women or minor headed households representing 36 percent of households. A third of farming households are headed by women (as compared to 22 percent in 1984) while 40,000 households are headed by children (100,000 people according to 2002 statistics).

Accurate and reliable food security data and analyses were not available at the time of the assessment. As a result, the mission could only rely on partial and very qualitative information collected by a number of partners. A nation-wide comprehensive food security and vulnerability analysis (CFSVA) was carried out since the mission however, and finalized in time for inclusion in this report.

In addition, there were indications that a food crisis was prevailing in the southern part of the country. An Emergency Food Security Assessment (EFSA) was undertaken in April 2006 – shortly after the current JNA. The EFSA was conducted in five districts of south Rwanda: Bugesera, Gisagara, Huye, Kayonza and Kirehe.

These districts belong to the most chronically food insecure areas of the country and there is a consensus among stakeholders that these districts are mainly those requiring assistance. Preliminary results of the EFSA were used to complete the partial household food insecurity and vulnerability analysis done on the basis of qualitative information available at the time of the JNA.

The information on food access has been collected during the EFSA and reflects the situation of an acute crisis. They therefore should be interpreted with caution when attempting to understand structural aspects of household food insecurity. This information will be reviewed and refined on the basis of the CFSVA results.

The worst-off households in Rwanda are those who combine various vulnerability factors:
- Little or no access to land;
- Households headed by a woman, an elderly person or an orphan;
- Large households with limited manpower.

3.4.1.1 Food consumption

According to preliminary CFSVA results, 2 percent of adults in the five districts had not had a meal the day before the survey, 30 percent had one meal, 61 percent had two meals and only 3 percent had eaten three times. Almost 25 percent of children had less than 2 meals, including 10 percent who had not eaten at all and 14 percent who had eaten once. About half of the children had taken two meals, and only

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19 Additional areas of the country might present food insecurity patterns such as the Congo-Nile Ridge zone (“Crète du Nil”), which is another deficit area due to limited cultivation (steep slopes and erosion). However, these regions have not been identified as requiring particular attention at the moment due to the availability of additional livelihoods opportunities. The CFSVA once finalized will provide updated information on the regional food security status of the country.

20 A partial analysis was performed on the data of 5 districts in the chronically food insecure areas.
25 percent had taken 3 meals. About 75 percent of the households indicated that this pattern was unusual, reflecting the severity of the crisis.

3.4.1.2 Expenditure, income and asset ownership
According to the EFSA, the main source of household income at the time of the survey was daily labour (41 percent). A smaller proportion of households (21 percent) were able to obtain an income from the sale of agricultural produce (bananas, cassava) and 18 percent had received gifts from relatives or neighbours. The corresponding proportions of income during the same period of the year in "normal" times were 38 percent, 29 percent and 11 percent, reflecting better access to agricultural produce for sale and lower dependence on external support.

According to the CFSVA, the total average amount that was borrowed by the households in the 5 Districts in the last year was RWF 49,470 (US$90). This amount is high as it represents 58 percent of the average monthly household cash expenditure and 170 percent of monthly food expenditure. In terms of household assets, a limited number own livestock (11 percent cattle, sheep or goats and 22 percent poultry).

3.4.1.3 Coping strategies
In the 5 Districts, drought was the main shock mentioned by 85 percent of the households. To compensate for the difficulties it caused, a quarter of the households consumed less preferred foods. Around 10 percent either sold small animals, reduced the number of daily meals, or worked for food. Few households rented out land (4 percent) or consumed seed stocks (3 percent), spent their savings (3 percent) or borrowed money (3 percent).

Only 5 percent of the households felt that their coping mechanisms had enabled them to recover from their losses, and 19 percent believed that they had only been partially efficient.

The EFSA found that for the 2006B agricultural season, the self-sufficiency capacity of the neediest households was very low. Less than one third will harvest maize and sorghum and only two thirds will produce beans due to lack of inputs and/or failing rains. Because of their limited access to land and income, these households will face serious obstacles to ensure adequate food consumption throughout the year. This will be aggravated by a context where two thirds of the households have to repay debt.

3.4.2 Main findings
The following information is to be treated with some caution as it does not reflect the normal situation but a drop in people’s livelihood due to two consecutive rain failures in localized areas of the country.

The rapid assessment (EFSA) determined that ‘severely food insecure’ households combine 3 or 4 vulnerability factors and ‘moderately food insecure’ combine 2 or 3 vulnerability factors:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vulnerability Factors determining Food Insecurity:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elderly (woman or man) single-head of household with less than 0.1 ha, or with more than 6 members;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult woman single-head of household with less than 0.1 ha and more than 6 members;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elderly married-head of household with less than 0.1 ha and more than 6 members;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult man single-head of household with less than 0.1 ha and less than 6 members, or with more than 0.1 ha and more than 6 members;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult (woman or man) married-head of household with less than 0.1 ha and more than 6 members.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Given their characteristics, most of the households severely (4 percent) and moderately (23 percent) food insecure are chronically food insecure in “normal” times. The current crisis due to successive crop failures has aggravated their status and caused acute food insecurity in both groups.

Other households are vulnerable to food insecurity in “normal” times and thus can be transitorily food insecure in bad years (45 percent). It is highly probable that due to the prevailing circumstances they are currently in a phase of food insecurity, though less acute/severe than the former two groups. However,
this group has better prospects for recovery and should not require food assistance in normal times. These households should benefit from longer-term interventions that aim at reducing their vulnerability.

**Chronic food insecurity** is a long-term or persistent inability to meet minimum food consumption requirements that lasts for more than 6 months of the year.

**Transitory food insecurity** is a short-term or temporary inability to meet minimum food requirements (indicating a capacity to recover). A limited time-frame (usually 2-3 months) usually characterizes transitory status.

(See EFSA Technical Guidance Sheet No.6: Distinction Between Chronic, Transitory and Vulnerability to Food Insecurity in an EFSA)

When applying 4 of the 5 vulnerability factors mentioned above (excluding the elderly single-headed household that have special needs), **15 percent of the households** in the 5 food insecure provinces studied by the EFSA and the additional 8 provinces identified by the Prime Minister’s Disaster Management and Coordination Unit cumulate vulnerability factors of ‘severe’ and ‘moderate’ food insecurity.

### 3.5 Food utilization and nutrition

#### 3.5.1 Overview

The most recent overview of the nutritional situation is contained in “Rwanda - Enquête Démographique et de Santé” published in 2005. The results of the survey reveal chronic malnutrition levels of 45 percent, and acutely malnourished or wasted children at 5 percent. The level of emaciation is highest (9 percent) for the children from 12 to 23 months, corresponding to the period of weaning and greater exposure to childhood disease. The DHS survey also indicated that infant mortality is at 152 deaths per 1,000 live births. Approximately one child in seven dies before reaching five years of age. These estimates also indicate that almost half of all infant deaths take place in the first year of life.

The level of chronic malnutrition in Rwanda is above the threshold generally considered to be of public health significance and is indicative of long term health and nutrition problems. Poor caring practices are just one cause for children’s inadequate nutritional status. The DHS survey shows that children whose mothers have no education are almost twice as likely (48 percent) to be affected by stunting than those whose mothers have secondary education or higher (26 percent). The heavy workload on women, often during pregnancy, leads to health problems for both women and children. This is compounded by men’s lack of involvement in childcare. All these factors contribute to low birth weight, complications in delivery and breastfeeding, and inadequate childcare provision.

The DHS report provided much useful information but also reflects the situation at the time. In general, there is little current reliable nutrition or food security information that can serve for food security early warning and emergency response. This constraint is important when food insecurity threatens large numbers of people in some areas of the country and a costly assessment needs to be launched to determine the extent and severity of the crises. Examples of such studies are sited below:

- In February 2006, UNICEF conducted a rapid nutrition survey in two of the most drought-affected sectors of Bugesera District (Ngenda and Gashora), using Mid Upper Arm Circumference (MUAC) among under-5 children as an indicator of nutritional status\(^\text{21}\). It was found that 6 percent of the children were severely and 17 percent moderately malnourished. Including oedema, almost one in four of the children were screened as malnourished.

- Alarming results were obtained from a nutritional survey done in February 2006 (by the Millennium Project) at the Mayange health centre of Bugesera District\(^\text{22}\). Among 500 children attending the


\(^{22}\) Hunger crisis in the Bugesera region of Rwanda, 21 February 2006 - The Rwanda Millennium Villages Project
health centre, 18 percent had oedema and other signs of kwashiorkor, 8 percent were severely malnourished and 27 percent were moderately malnourished. These levels are higher than the national averages reported by the 2005 DHS.

- A WFP-supported nutritional centre in Bugesera District indicated in February 2006, an increased number of admissions of under-5 children and adults (460 persons compared to an average of 250 at the same period in 2005). The centre staff reported complaints of adults reluctant to leave after recovery, due to lack of food at home\textsuperscript{23}. However, visits to Rilima nutritional center (Bugesera District) and Gisagara nutritional center by a USAID mission at the same period did not reveal significant changes in the levels of attendance, morbidity or mortality due to lack of food however\textsuperscript{24}.

The contradictory nature of the above studies highlights the urgent need for an early warning and nutrition surveillance system to capture information more quickly. Constraints in data gathering are only one reflection of weak government systems however. Programmes to support improvements in nutrition are also patchy in their quality. As mentioned earlier, it is unlikely that the MDG targets for halving hunger, reducing child mortality and improving maternal health will be met. WFP has reduced support to nutrition centres over the last few years, concentrating on those centres that meet certain standards of staffing and infrastructure.

WFP supports SFP through MCH programmes in 96 centres. A decision was made several years ago to target only those health structures that had an adequate infrastructure and capacity to manage the programmes. Currently there are 96 such centres that fulfill WFP criteria. These programmes function well. Entry and exit indicators are respected and rations supplied are in line with corporate standards. In addition the centres are an important safety net in areas currently affected by drought, though their outreach is limited. Ten to twelve thousand beneficiaries are assisted each month through this modality including just under three hundred refugees.

### 3.5.2 Mother and child health

Mother and child health issues are characterized by high levels of fertility, maternal mortality and STD infection rates, and by low levels of contraceptive use. Men are poorly sensitised and usually do not allow their wives to use contraceptives. In food insecure zones, there is no special diet for pregnant/lactating women and child malnutrition is common. Special childcare is difficult because the mothers are busy working on the land, or collecting fuel and water. The 2005 DHS survey reports that 33 percent of the women suffer from anaemia of whom 3 percent have severe anaemia.

The vulnerability analysis baseline carried out in 2003\textsuperscript{25}, reported limited access to health services and medicines because most people cannot afford medical fees and/or transport costs to the health centres or hospitals. There is a reported increase in malaria and malnutrition. The “mutuelle” or health insurance system is not affordable for many vulnerable households.

### 3.5.3 HIV/AIDS

According to latest UNAIDS estimates, the national HIV/AIDS prevalence rate is at 5.1 percent, based on antenatal surveillance. The difference in prevalence between rural (4 percent) and urban (11 percent) is high. The national prevalence rate of 5.1 percent is considerably lower than previous estimates (ranging between 8 and 13 percent). The DHS 2005 survey shows that at the national level the prevalence is 3 percent (confidence interval from 2.6 to 3.4). Women, with a rate of prevalence of 3.6 percent, are infected more than men with 2.3 percent.

Access to HIV/AIDS treatment has improved. HIV/AIDS is now fully integrated into the programmes of the Ministry of Health. Access to PMTCT (Prevention of Mother to Child Transmission) steadily increased from 53 sites in 2003, to 121 in 2004. The trend in the proportion of adherent HIV-infected pregnant women

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\textsuperscript{23} Visit to Bugesera District, 23 February 2006 – WFP Field report
\textsuperscript{24} Humanitarian Assessment in Rwanda - USAID report, February 2006
\textsuperscript{25} 2003 Rwanda Vulnerability Baseline Report by WFP, Government of Rwanda and FEWSNET.
receiving a complete course of Anti-Retro Virals has increased from 67.7 percent in 2003 to 72 percent in 2004\(^26\).

WFP supports three different activities related to HIV, divided between the Country Programme and the PRRO. Two thousand beneficiaries are supported under the PRRO and approximately 4,500 under the Country Programme.

### 3.6 WFP programme approach and exit strategy

The main factors determining household access to food are similar to those in Burundi, though possibly not of the same magnitude and severity.

In view of the overall macro-economic context, growth rates, the progress made on sectoral policies and their implementation, the Government could be in a position in the medium term (in possibly two years) to take responsibility for early warning, emergency response and social safety net provision. The WFP programme includes a number of activities to support the strengthening of Government capacities in crop and food security assessments, food security monitoring and nutrition surveillance. The CFSVA study was the first step towards a more systematic collaboration on matters related to household food security.

The Government has embarked on major administrative restructuring and has decentralized most services to district and cell levels. It is expected that while this is a positive move, this exercise will require some time to become fully operational.

#### 3.6.1 Enhancing capacities for post-recovery

After the election of President Kagame in August 2003, a major institutional restructuring of central and local government authorities to decentralize to district and cell levels took place. This process will take one to two more years to finalize and will require capacity building support.

The Government needs to improve the quality of its information collection and analysis as a basis for decision-making. Better methodologies to ensure the availability of quality data will provide stronger evidence for allocating scarce resources. United Nations agencies have undertaken a sectoral Common Country Assessment (CCA) type exercise (agriculture, water, education) on the status of the most vulnerable groups. It will feed into the EDPRS (Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy) and attainment of the MDGs.

Early warning, disaster management and emergency response capacities will have to be strengthened. There is not yet strong leadership and coordination of food security related matters. UN humanitarian agencies, NGOs, ICRC and the Office of the Prime Minister have set up a Disaster Management Task Force. A contingency planning working group is coordinated by UNHCR and includes refugee and population movements. Other sub-working groups on natural disasters, food security (led by FAO and WFP) and avian flu (led by WHO) have been established.

The first PRSP is under review and the EDPRS will start in 2008. The WFP Country Programme was extended to phase into the UNDAF as part of the EDPRS. Donors such as the World Bank and DFID have aligned their country programmes to the EDPRS. No CCA is required as the PRSP evaluation will be used as a background document for development programming for the United Nations Agencies.

To avoid the further deterioration of the food security situation, WFP supports a twin-track approach consisting of long-term development and a safety net component including Food For Work and nutritional support. This assistance is recommended until Government decentralization is completed. It is expected that this process will require two years, allowing the social protection and common development funds to become fully operational to respond to emergencies.

#### 3.6.2 Repatriation as a durable solution

The Government of Rwanda will not consider integrating refugees and is not in a position to provide sustainable means for their self-reliance. The only durable solution is their return to their country of origin. Promoted repatriation is already underway for the Burundian refugees.

For the refugees from DRC, conditions are still not conducive to promote repatriation. Of the 46,700 Congolese who remain in camps in 2006, approximately 2,000 may be repatriated in 2006, 12,000 in 2007 and 15,000 in 2008 which leaves approximately 6,000 Congolese refugees behind in 2009. By then the cessation clause of refugee status could possibly be declared.

### 3.6.3 Cash based interventions: Opportunities

As markets appear to be functioning well, with relatively efficient domestic marketing chains and good spatial market integration, cash based responses could be considered and piloted. The type of cash or voucher interventions (cash relief and cash for work) will need to be carefully selected drawing from lessons learnt from other programmes.

Cash based responses need to be linked and supported by responses already being piloted such as the NGO cereal banks, in particular CARITAS, and the Government. The cereal banks have the objective of improving village food reserves and building the capacity of communities to manage their own stocks.

### 3.7 Recommendations for WFP intervention

#### 3.7.1 Protecting Livelihoods

The chronic nature of household food insecurity in Rwanda suggests that longer-term interventions are required in most cases within a twin-track approach to provide a safety net to the most vulnerable. The identification of such interventions will be facilitated by the CFSVA\(^{27}\). In the meantime, a working hypothesis was built based on the EFSA findings.

It is expected that chronically food insecure people will require support through income transfers in the form of **Food For Work or Cash-For-Work** during the lean seasons in the coming years to protect or possibly enhance their livelihoods and food consumption. These transfers will function as a safety net to avoid any deterioration of their situation.

The households that lack able-bodied members (such as elderly single-head of households) will need **social security schemes** or other forms of social safety net not requiring a contribution.

When applying 4 of the 5 vulnerability factors mentioned above (excluding the elderly single-headed household that have special needs), **15 percent of the households** in the 5 food insecure provinces studied by the EFSA and the additional 8 provinces identified by the Prime Minister's Disaster Management and Coordination Unit cumulate vulnerability factors of ‘severe’ and ‘moderate’ food insecurity. When applying this percentage to the total population in the given areas, approximately 420,000 people require assistance to overcome the lean seasons. Assuming that for half of them food aid by WFP would be the right response (household preference and limited market availability or high prices), the planned figure for **food aid beneficiaries will be 210,000 persons**.

This estimate has to be refined with CFSVA data on access to markets, income sources, expenditure structure and nutrition status. Capacities for implementing Food For Work and Food For Cash schemes, as well as their funding, also need to be addressed. This working hypothesis provides an order of magnitude. It should be taken with caution and should only be considered as indicative figure subject to refinement based on CFSVA results.

#### 3.7.2 Nutrition rehabilitation

WFP supports SFP through MCH programmes in 96 centres. Ten to twelve thousand beneficiaries are assisted each month through this modality including just under three hundred refugees. Six thousand five hundred beneficiaries are supported via 3 HIV Project activities.

- In addition to the 96 centres cited above, efforts should be made to include MCH centres in the most chronically food insecure areas into the programme. This will improve coverage in

\(^{27}\) These provisional considerations will therefore be adjusted based on the CFSVA findings that are expected to be available by end July 2006.
vulnerable areas and assist in serving as sentinel sites for early warning. Capacity development, including clear guidance on admission criteria, should be conducted jointly by UNICEF and WFP.

- Given that Rwanda is no longer in an emergency situation, the current MCH programmes could eventually be integrated into the Country Programme.
- The HIV/AIDS component in Rwanda is small, totalling 6,500 beneficiaries split between the Country Programme and PRRO. All of these activities should be mainstreamed through the Country Programme as the beneficiaries were never part of the original PRRO caseload.
- The rationale for the food baskets provided under the HIV umbrella needs to be reviewed and a standardized approach is recommended. A more coherent basket in line with those proposed by the Ministry of Health should be provided.

3.7.3 Humanitarian assistance to refugees and returnees
Refugees should continue to receive a full ration of 2100 Kcal and benefit from SFP and TFP. UNHCR provides health, education, water supply and sanitation, firewood, domestic items, shelter and legal protection services. Over 80 percent of refugee children are enrolled in primary education.

As stated above, income generating activities in the camps are very limited. The Joint Assessment Mission to be undertaken this year will review the level of refugees’ self-reliance, their nutrition situation and planning figures for repatriation.

The number of refugee beneficiaries is based on repatriation as planned by UNHCR. This should be closely monitored as the figures may need revision according to political developments in DRC.

In addition to a 3-month food ration, returnees receive a package of non-food items and a cash lump sum of US$100 per adult and US$50 per child. The main challenge for the returnees is access to land. Land disputes and compensation are addressed by the Government. Returnee projections are for 10,000 persons in 2006 and 5,000 in 2007 and 2008, leaving approximately 30,000 Rwandans still outside their country of origin by 2009.

3.7.4: Total projected WFP beneficiaries and food resources for 2007 and 2008

Table 12: Rwanda Beneficiaries and food resources for 2007/2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>January 2007</th>
<th>Average 200728</th>
<th>January 2008</th>
<th>Average 2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Congolese29 refugees</strong></td>
<td>41,000</td>
<td>28,500</td>
<td>23,000</td>
<td>17,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Burundian refugees</strong></td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tonnage (incl. SFP/TFP)</strong></td>
<td>6,500</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,900</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Returnees30</strong></td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tonnage</strong></td>
<td>476</td>
<td></td>
<td>288</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SFP/TFP/MCH</strong></td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>8,500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tonnage</strong></td>
<td>2,570</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,294</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FFW/FFT31</strong></td>
<td>210,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>210,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tonnage</strong></td>
<td>7,273</td>
<td></td>
<td>7,263</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total tonnage</strong></td>
<td>16,619</td>
<td></td>
<td>13,745</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

28 Assuming that the repatriation pace is equal all over the year, the average number of Congolese refugees to be assisted for each respective year has been calculated on a monthly repatriation of 1,000 in 2007 and 830 in 2008. A 3 percent yearly growth of the population has also been applied.
29 Ration of 605 g/day/360 days
30 Ration of 850g/day/90 days
31 Ration of 524 g/day/66 days
3.7.5 Follow-up assessment and food security monitoring

- The CFSVA should provide a reference for review and planning of operational activities, in particular the Food For Work component. The suggested priority zones and targeted households given by this assessment should be verified and refined. The CFSVA has been undertaken in collaboration with the National Statistics Bureau. This contributes to capacity building statistical services while providing more reliable quality information;

- The Government has recently approved a project to establish an agriculture production and food security information system. It is unclear whether the EC funding available in 2005 can still be used. The system could be built on specific food security indicators used in the CFSVA;

- The system above should link to the nutrition surveillance system financed by the Canadian Trust Fund to be established by WFP jointly with the Ministry of Health and UNICEF;

- The Government is regularly undertaking agriculture and animal production assessments with logistics support from FAO and WFP in data collection. The analytical framework and methodology could be strengthened for the data analysis, establishing the food balance and determining numbers of food insecure people in need of emergency food aid or other support. WFP and FAO are willing to provide technical support in reviewing the assessment approach according to the latest developments on the CFSAM guidelines and Government information needs and capacities;

- A regional training should be carried out on JAM in Rwanda, and used as a practical exercise to conduct the joint assessment. WFP, UNHCR and partner staff could join the training from Burundi and Tanzania in order to review assessment methodologies and integrate approaches and responses.
4.1 Background
Tanzania can be regarded as a stabilizing country in the Great Lakes region, with the Government keen to maintain security and stability while carrying a major refugee burden. Tanzania hosts the largest refugee population in Africa, many of whom have lived for more than 30 years in the Kigoma and Kagera regions, among the poorest in the country. Currently there are over 195,000 Burundians and 150,000 Congolese receiving assistance in twelve camps.

By national standards, Kagera region is considered to have good food supplies but has the lowest per capita GDP with a 3.9 percent contribution to the national economy. It had a GDP per capita of Tanzanian Shillings (Tsh) 150,000 in 2001, compared to Tsh550,000 for Dar es Salaam, whereas Kigoma had Tsh155,000. In Kagera, 29 percent of all households live below the basic poverty line (HBS 2001/2)\(^{32}\), while 38 percent live below the poverty line in Kigoma. The agriculture sector is dominant in both regions contributing to about 13 percent of the country’s total food production.

The following information on food security in the Kigoma and Kagera regions is drawn from the preliminary findings of a recently conducted and as yet unpublished CFSVA. The mean duration that agricultural production will sustain the household in Kagera is the lowest (3.7 months) in the entire country (mean duration in Kigoma is 6.7 months). Just over half of all income is spent on food, with households from Kagera spending a little more money on food than those in Kigoma. Almost a third of all households in Kagera are classified as food insecure (twice as many as Kigoma), and Kigoma shows the highest number of households (approximately 2 in 5) being vulnerable to food insecurity. Only around 2 in 5 households in both regions have been found to be food secure.

Refugee camps in Tanzania are located where household livelihoods are based on food crop production, mainly cereals with some lake fishing. Food production provides only between a quarter and half of household consumption per year. In these regions, there are little labour opportunities, poor market integration (low market prices are primary constraints to sale of produce in Kagera, and long distances to selling points, insufficient buyers, and lack of transportation to markets are experienced by around half of the communities in both regions) and access. The specific needs of host communities affected by the presence of numerous refugees have therefore, to be considered.

4.2 Population movement

Table 13: Tanzania Refugees (2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Refugees</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>150,000 Congolese</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>195,000 Burundians</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>345,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.2.1 Refugees, migrants and repatriation

The success of the mediation between the FNL and the Burundi Government is being brokered by the Tanzanian Government, which has exercised pressure to bring both parties to the negotiation table. There is confidence that the negotiations will come to a resolution, thereby enabling the more repatriation of Burundian refugees. The outcome of these negotiations however is only one factor that will contribute to the success of repatriation.

Currently, there are 195,000 Burundians in the camps. Burundian refugee planned repatriation figures for 2006 is 50,000 people, less than the repatriation figure in 2005 (62,000) and the peak of the repatriation experienced in 2004 (82,000). The pace of repatriation decreased drastically by end 2005 and early 2006 due to the combined effect of the protracted drought that struck the north-east of the country. The drought triggered a flow of 12,000 migrants into Tanzania (who since returned). Other structural factors such as access to land, health and social infrastructure, education, housing, and the overall economic prospects in the medium term influence repatriation.

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\(^{32}\) HBS – Household Budget Survey 2001
In March 2006, the Tanzanian and Burundian government and UNHCR held a tripartite meeting in Dar es Salaam and agreed to launch Burundian repatriation as of June 2006. Part of the promoted repatriation exercise is to facilitate groups or leaders to go on “go and see” missions in Burundi, so they can return and inform the other refugees in the camps of the conditions in the place of origin. The successful repatriation of Burundian refugees is unlikely to be linked to the returnee package, but rather to the medium term support that they require in order to make a sustainable subsistence on return.

Of the 150,000 refugees from the DRC, approximately 90 percent originate from South Kivu province, particularly Fizi as well as a small number from Uvira. The first Tripartite agreement was signed in January 2005, and a meeting of members in September recommended that repatriation begin the following month (October 2005), based on improved conditions and reports that refugees were spontaneously repatriating in unsafe boats across Lake Tanganyika.

UNHCR began assisted voluntary repatriation for DRC refugees and between October 2005 and the third week of March 2006, 15,000 persons returned home. It is unknown how many have repatriated without registering themselves with UNHCR.

Assisted voluntary repatriation began to slow down in March 2006. The demographics of the refugees that have already repatriated seem to be imbalanced, with the majority being elderly or young children under school age. This suggests that the younger families with school age children and productive adults are more willing to remain behind. Other reasons cited for a decrease in current voluntary repatriation levels is that people are waiting for the DRC elections results to be released in July/August and that reports being sent back to family members by those that have already repatriated state that conditions are difficult in the DRC.

Table 14: Estimation of refugee/returnee movements in Tanzania (2006 to 2008)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assisted Caseloads</th>
<th>01/2006 Departures</th>
<th>01/2007 Departures</th>
<th>01/2008 Departures</th>
<th>01/2009 Departures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burundian</td>
<td>195,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>145,000</td>
<td>70,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congolese refugees</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>115,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.2.2 Refugee access to food

By law, the local authorities in Tanzania enforce a total restriction on refugee movement outside the camp without proper authorization. Passes to leave the camps are issued for a maximum of 14 days, after which the refugee must apply to the authorities for a pass extension. This law is not consistently applied but is left to the discretion of local authorities. This implies that refugees can in fact leave the camp, yet if they are caught working or farming, this is construed as illegal.

In some sites, land outside of the confines of the camp seems to have been made available to refugees for farming. Although enforcement is inconsistent there is no protection for refugees caught violating the restrictions. If caught, they will be subjected to a six-month imprisonment term. Movement is strictly restricted in areas with security issues between the refugee and host communities.

Burundians are perceived to be agriculturalists and kitchen gardening projects have been successful, though they only produce enough food to allow for petty trade or diet diversification. Host communities have been employing Burundians for low wages (approximately 10 percent of the wage paid to a Tanzanian, or US$0.10 per day) during cultivation and harvesting seasons and sometimes pay the refugees with food rather than cash.

The livelihoods of the DRC refugees seem to be oriented towards petty trade. In Lugufu Camp, NGOs find it difficult to raise interest in agricultural/ kitchen gardening projects. In the same camp, trade is thriving.

These figures do not take into account the population growth. Repatriation figures have to be taken with caution, in particular for 2008. They will be adjusted to actual population movements.
however. When NGOs provide loans via micro-credit schemes, small businesses are immediately established and loans are repaid.

Two types of markets are used by refugees for trade: a daily market within the camp and another bi-weekly ‘common market’, located outside, though they are not found in every camp. Large transactions take place in the common market. At one common market in Lugufu, host communities truck goods to the camp border and sell wholesale goods to refugee traders for cash. Refugees then sell the goods at minimal profit margins in the common market. Any unsold goods are bartered, or traded for other commodities. As refugees are not allowed to leave the confines of the camp, they request host community traders to bring in specific goods.

Given the distance to the lake from the camps and restrictions on movement, fishing for subsistence or trade does not seem to be an option. The fish being sold in the market is brought in by the host community in bulk and sold to retailers.

Livelihood opportunities for refugees are tenuous at best. Although they attempt to engage in business they remain reliant on host populations and aid agencies.

4.2.3 Non-Food Support
UNHCR provides non-food support in various sectors: health, education, water and sanitation, domestic item provision, community services, legal assistance and income generating activities. An average of 22 litres of potable water is supplied per person/day in all camps except Nyaragusu. Support is also provided to build and maintain shelters of mud brick in order to reduce deforestation around the camps. In 2005, 7.5 percent of the refugees were involved in non-agricultural income generation and 10 percent of them received support in gardening in the camps.

4.2.4 Host Communities
The high number of refugees residing in Kigoma and Kagera regions has both positive and negative effects on host communities. Positive aspects include services gained from the international community and benefits from economic opportunities created by the refugee presence such as the availability of cheap labour, particularly in the agricultural sector. Adverse consequences include environmental pressure on natural resources and security problems (such as increased crime and robbery).

Host populations have access to health and water facilities in the camps and get assistance though a number of WFP interventions: school feeding, home based care, Food For Training and institutional feeding. Around 2 percent of the PRRO resources are channelled through projects for host communities and since 1995, approximately US$25 million has been spent by UNHCR on projects for host communities.

4.3 Food availability and markets

4.3.1 Food production and supply

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tanzanian food availability and markets are characterised as follows:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>▪ Tanzania has been self-sufficient in its staple crop of maize during 'normal' years with food surpluses in 2003/04 and 2004/05;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Assessments and predictions for the 2006 season indicate that drought in over 85 percent of districts has severely affected food and cash crop production for the 2005/2006 agricultural season;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Crop production has significantly decreased by between 50 - 70 percent in some drought affected parts of the country;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ The National Cereal Balance sheet indicates a deficit of major cereals totalling nearly 398,000 MT between October 2005 and May 2006.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

34Some common markets have been closed around the Burundian camps as the authorities suspect they are used for the sale and trade of small firearms.
Tanzania is usually self-sufficient in maize during normal years but food shortages have recurred in many parts of central and north-eastern regions over the past decade due to a series of poor harvests caused by drought and flooding. Although the situation improved significantly in the 2004-2005 seasons, these regions remain susceptible to climatic and economic shocks.

**Figure 13: Total Production of Cereals, Pulses, Roots and Tubers and Banana in Tanzania (1999-2005)**

The Food Security Information Team (FSIT), composed of Government members, International Agencies and NGOs was established in May 2002. It is coordinated by the Disaster Management Department of the Office of the Prime Minister and the National Food Security Division of the Ministry of Agriculture. According to FSIT, aggregate food production decreased by 16 percent in 2002-2003 but increased by 17 percent in 2003-2004 and 9 percent in 2004-2005 due to slight increases in cereal, roots and tubers production (see figure 13, above). Production of pulses has been relatively stable. Production growth resulted from good rainfall in the 2003-2004 season compared to 2002-2003 that was drought affected. Tanzania’s population growth rate has been at 2% for the last 5 years with a total of over 37 million persons.

**Table 15: Tanzania Population Figures**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Series</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population Growth (Annual %)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Population</td>
<td>34,762,710</td>
<td>35,486,280</td>
<td>36,204,930</td>
<td>36,918,880</td>
<td>37,626,920</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: World Development Indicators database

Assessment predictions for the 2006 season by the FSIT in January 2006 indicated a near total failure of the short rains (vuli) in the bimodal rainfall areas and below normal and poorly dispersed ongoing long rains (msimu) in the unimodal rainfall areas. This severely affected food and cash crop production for the 2005/2006 agricultural season. Over 85% of all districts in Tanzania are experiencing tight food supplies due to drought. The FSIT further notes that all major staple foods (maize, millet, sorghum, banana and cassava) have been adversely affected by drought thus limiting the “food options” for poorer households in the affected areas.
Crop production has significantly decreased by between 50-70% in drought-affected parts of the country. The National Cereal Balance sheet indicates a deficit of major cereals, notably maize, sorghum, millet and rice totalling nearly 398,000 MT for 2005/2006.

**Figure 14: Tanzania Food Balances (1999-2005)**

![Graph showing food balances](image)

Source: Food Security Information Team (FSIT)

**Table 16: Tanzania Cereal Balances 2005/06**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>‘000 MTs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Cereal Production</td>
<td>5,403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opening Stocks</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anticipated Imports</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Domestic Cereal Availability</strong></td>
<td>5,505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Requirement</td>
<td>5,867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGR Replenishment</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Domestic Cereal Utilization</strong></td>
<td>6,017</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Deficit 398

Source: VAM – WFP Tanzania

**4.3.2 Market and food price developments**

Markets and Food Prices in Tanzania are characterised as follows:

- Markets in surplus and deficit regions of Tanzania are not well integrated due to high transaction costs;
- Recent trends in food prices have shown a steady increase in the drought affected areas since October last year;
- Extensive border trade between Tanzania and neighbouring food insecure countries (Kenya, Malawi and DRC) has further exacerbated the situation in Tanzania by pushing up cereal prices.

Markets in surplus and deficit regions of Tanzania are not well integrated due to the high transaction costs involved in moving food. Absolute spatial marketing margins are quite high in Tanzania and these margins can only be decreased through infrastructure improvement and rural transportation policies that reduce transportation costs.

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As a result of the current drought, recent trends in food prices have shown a steady increase in the affected areas since October last year (Figure 15). Cross border trade with food deficit areas of Kenya has also contributed to the increase in wholesale prices for maize in Arusha. In addition to the transactions costs of trade, the low purchasing power of the drought-affected populations meant that demand is not able to attract movement of food to these areas.

The extensive border trade between Tanzania and neighbouring food insecure countries, Kenya, Malawi and DRC, has further exacerbated the situation by pushing up cereal prices, with some places recording increases as high as 85% above normal prices for staple foods. The demand from neighbouring regions has raised cereal prices significantly.

According to a 2004 study by International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)\(^\text{36}\), rice is largely a tradable\(^\text{37}\) in Tanzania, and world rice prices have a positive influence on Tanzanian rice prices. Maize, on the other hand, the primary food crop in the country, behaves like a tradable in well-connected markets and like a non-tradable for isolated markets. In isolated markets, maize prices are influenced only by regional and national production in the most recent harvest. This further stresses what is currently observed in Tanzanian markets related to the influence of maize prices by supply and price levels in neighbouring, easily accessible countries/regions. The same study shows that fresh cassava in both isolated and well-connected markets behaves as a non-tradable.

**Figure 15: Tanzania Wholesale Prices for Key Commodities (Jan 2004-Mar 2006)**

Livestock prices have significantly decreased since 2005. The prices of cattle have dropped by nearly 75%, resulting in a deterioration in terms of trade between livestock and food crops.

A marginal food surplus from the 2004-2005 seasons amounting to 103% of Strategic Grain Reserve (SGR) was concentrated in the “grain basket” regions of southern Tanzania. These surpluses were not transported in large quantities to the central and northern regions, due to high transaction costs and low levels of purchasing power in the deficit areas. Instead, a large proportion of this surplus was exported to neighbouring Malawi, Zambia and the DRC, where demand has been high following the current acute food


\(^{37}\) A staple is said to be tradable when movements in its domestic price would be largely determined by movements in world prices for the good in question and the market exchange rate, through either changes in imports (for importables) or changes in exports (for exportable). Conversely, a staple is said to be a non-tradable when its price will be determined primarily by the local and national supply of the good.
shortages in these countries. The Government of Tanzania made it attractive for private traders to import grain by removing import tariffs for an initial period of three months (January-March 2006).

In response to the recent drought as well as in normal years, cereal imports have been used to avert price spikes in coastal urban areas and in those areas where food is fully tradable. In addition, the Government has used subsidized food to keep food prices lower than they would be otherwise in cash crop zones thus protecting the livelihoods of many small-scale farmers who depend on cash crops and rely on purchased food.

4.3.3 Options for food procurement

WFP purchased food items locally as per table 10 below. The main items purchased between 1999 and 2006 were maize (84% of total purchases), beans (11% of total purchases) and salt (5% of total purchases). In 2005, 37,582 MT of food (maize, beans, and salt) were purchased, out of which 90% were used in-country and 10% for operations in the region.

Table 16: Tanzanian Local Food Purchases (1999-February 2006) in Metric Tons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodity</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>8,779</td>
<td>33,400</td>
<td>36,853</td>
<td>29,330</td>
<td>32,493</td>
<td>16,726</td>
<td>33,303</td>
<td>1,374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beans</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>3,415</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>5,257</td>
<td>7,124</td>
<td>567</td>
<td>3,323</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salt</td>
<td>1,260</td>
<td>2,210</td>
<td>1,586</td>
<td>2,171</td>
<td>1,625</td>
<td>1,569</td>
<td>956</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sorghum</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize meal</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>11,039</td>
<td>39,025</td>
<td>42,939</td>
<td>37,244</td>
<td>42,087</td>
<td>18,862</td>
<td>37,582</td>
<td>1,374</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.3.4 Key findings

- The country has current imports of about 150,000 MT of Mexican/USA maize and 10,000 MT from Uganda, under official and relaxed trade regulations. Another 30,000 MT of maize has been imported from Uganda through informal cross border trade;

- Traders normally purchase 80 percent of maize directly from farmers and the balance from small traders;

- There is export from Tanzania’s maize producing regions to the neighbouring countries of Zambia/Malawi, Burundi and Kenya due to the easy access of these countries compared to the food deficit regions of Tanzania. The neighbouring countries also offer higher prices as they face a maize deficit;

- Currently the government will not restrict trade within the country but restricts international exports;

- Suppliers could only commit to provide 500-800 MT/tender/contract before the next harvest;

- The price of imported and locally produced maize is the same at US$310/MT. The prices will stabilize within this range until the next harvest (interviews with suppliers). It is predicted that prices in the coming harvest will range between US$150-180/MT for maize;

4.3.5 Recommendations

- Results from the assessment of food availability and markets have indicated that Tanzania currently has very limited stocks of locally produced maize and beans due to insufficient rainfall during the short rainy season and extensive cross-border trade with neighbouring countries that
are also drought affected. Recommendations on possible local procurement will be based on estimates of local production by the FSIT in June 2006.

The following recommendations apply to all three countries:

- Direct purchase from farmer groups are highly encouraged;
- Increased communication and information sharing on procurement with government and other organizations (international and local institutions) is encouraged;
- Communicate on the status of markets in terms of prices and food availability and provide recommendations for local purchases;
- Conduct detailed local market surveys on prices and for quantities available prior to purchase.

4.5 Nutrition and food utilization

WFP food assistance appears to be the most stable and sustainable source of food for the refugees, and as recommended by the JAM mission of 2004 and reiterated in 2005\(^\text{38}\), the individual daily ration has been set at a nutritional value of 2,100 Kcal per day per person as a way to cover the nutritional needs of the population. A nutritional survey to determine the status of under-five and school children, lactating and pregnant women was conducted in September 2005 in all camps as a part of the nutritional surveillance system put in place to follow up the health status of the refugee population.

The main objective was to describe the nutritional status of the refugee children and associated factors, as well as to assess vaccination and breastfeeding coverage. It was also meant to determine the prevalence of anaemia and worm infestation among school children, pregnant and lactating women.

4.5.1 Refugee nutrition overview

Table 18: Refugee Nutritional Status in Tanzania

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indices</th>
<th>Severe</th>
<th>Global</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WASTING</td>
<td>0.3% (CI 95%: 0.1-0.4)</td>
<td>2.8% (CI 95%: 2.4-3.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDERWEIGHT</td>
<td>2.7% (CI 95%: 2.2-3.3)</td>
<td>22 % (CI 95%: 20.9-23.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STUNTING</td>
<td>9.9% (CI 95%: 9.1-10.7)</td>
<td>36.2% (CI 95%: 34.9-37.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anaemia prevalence under five</td>
<td>40.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anaemia prevalence Pregnant Woman</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anaemia prevalence lactating woman</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anaemia prevalence school children</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children at risk of Underweight</td>
<td>40.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children at risk of wasting</td>
<td>18.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Acute malnutrition is due to a combination of lack of food, poor micronutrients, and ill health that particularly affects children under five. Underlying causes include inappropriate care practices, poor environmental health such as water/sanitation, weak health infrastructure and insufficient or inappropriate foods.

The results, as presented in the above table, show a stable nutritional situation in relation to acute global and severe malnutrition within the normal acceptable international threshold. However, it shows very high rates of stunted and underweight children.

\(^{38}\) WFP/UNHCR Joint Assessment Mission, Great Lakes Region – Tanzania, 8-14 November 2005.
There is a clear linkage between morbidity incidence and nutritional status: children with diseases such as diarrhoea, acute respiratory infections (IRA) and malaria are significantly more wasted, underweight and stunted. They have lower mean Z-scores than those who were not ill.

A striking problem is the level of anaemia. The values are higher than the acceptable international values with 40.1 percent for children under five and 30 percent for pregnant women.

There are differences in nutritional status between camps. This raises an important issue to be further investigated.

In protracted refugee situations where the population is dependant on humanitarian and food assistance, the value of the food will greatly determine nutritional status. It is essential that the refugee populations be given sufficient macro and micronutrients to support growth and development. The following is the recommended general ration for the refugees:

**Table 19: Recommended refugee ration**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product</th>
<th>Quantity (g)</th>
<th>Kcal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cereal (grain)</td>
<td>410 (or 380 g cereal meal)</td>
<td>1435 (1368)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pulses</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>399.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSB</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>150.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salt</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>2,162 (2095)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Given the high prevalence of anaemia, particular attention is to be given to ration quality, in particular regard to iron content. The refugee ration provided covers 90 percent of the daily recommendation in the best case scenario when 100 percent of the ration is distributed. In host communities where the prevalence of anaemia is extremely high, the food rations provided in the vulnerable feeding programme is limited in iron content and only covers between 50-70 percent of the daily recommended amount.

**4.5.2 Care practices**

The survey results show a high coverage of breastfeeding with 90.4 percent for the age group of 6-11.9 months and 76.7 percent in the age group of 12-23.9 months having been breast fed the day before the survey took place. Unfortunately, practices on the introduction of complementary foods were not properly covered and therefore difficult to assess. There are many cultural practices that prevent exclusive breastfeeding during the first six months of life. Water and sugared water are often given within the first few days of life and other foods are introduced very early. During the visit, health workers in the camps acknowledged that there was little or no knowledge regarding infant feeding practices and cultural practices on complementary feeding to young children.

**4.5.3 Host community nutrition**

The host community are worse off than the refugees with extremely high prevalence of anaemia (almost double the rate of the refugees at 66.7 percent). Anaemia, particularly in the under five population, is a major public health issue. WHO states that levels ≥ 40 percent should ideally result in the mass distribution of iron supplements. This is, however, difficult to implement in the given context. It is therefore essential to target the high-risk groups within the host population as well as those groups in the refugee camps.

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39 Values in parenthesis relate to cereal meal.
40 Nutrition survey results in refugee camps in western Tanzania, September 2005 – A joint survey conducted by UNHCR, UNICEF and WFP in collaboration with Health Implementing Partners.
4.6 Programme approach and exit strategy

4.6.1 Repatriation

It is unlikely that the Government will allow the refugees to be integrated into the local community and therefore prospects of refugee self-reliance are limited. Although some income generation and small scale agricultural activities are being conducted, these are mostly illegal. As such, food assistance to refugees must continue. The only durable solution to their food security is repatriation.

As with the refugees in Rwanda, the outlook for the repatriation of Burundian refugees is positive, whilst uncertainty surrounds the repatriation of the DRC refugees.

The Tripartite meeting that took place in Dar es Salaam in March will lead to promoted repatriation as of mid-2006. An increase in repatriation is therefore expected, which will correspond to the end of the school year and the Season B crops in Tanzania, two factors impacting the willingness to return.

Currently, there are 195,000 Burundian refugees in the camps. If UNHCR planned repatriation figures of 50,000 people in 2006, 75,000 in 2007, and again 30,000 by 2008, then the number of Burundian refugees to be assisted would drop to 149,000 (including 3 percent population increase) by the end of 2006 and 76,000 by the end of 2007, allowing for a final phase out possibly by end 2009. However, these are tentative figures and will depend on the success of the planned promoted repatriation. Current repatriation figures are lower than expected, and so these planned figures have to be taken with caution.

The 150,000 refugees from the DRC will also require continued food assistance in the camps. Given that repatriation at the moment is voluntary, and that the ability to facilitate this repatriation by UNHCR is logistically constrained to 35,000 in 2006, at best, assistance could be reduced to feeding 118,000 refugees in camps by the end of 2006 (including 3 percent population increase). Logistical constraints need to be overcome to increase repatriation figures should more people indicate a willingness to return to the DRC in future. Still, with repatriation planning figures of 35,000 Congolese in 2007 and 30,000 in 2008, a caseload of 55,000 will remain in Tanzania by beginning of 2009.

4.7 Recommendations for WFP intervention

4.7.1 Food aid assistance to refugees

The JAM undertaken in November 2005 with the participation of the Government of Tanzania, ECHO, UNICEF and representatives of the governments of France, Germany, Belgium, USA (incl. USAID/FFP) and Finland, recommended that WFP continue to distribute a 2,100 Kcal ration in 2006.

The mission also recommended a study be undertaken on the contribution of self-reliance (IGA) activities to the food security of refugee households to inform the next JAM at the end of 2006.

Despite the fact that WFP food rations for most of 2005 were below the recommended level of 2,100 Kcal, the nutritional status of the refugee population seems to be stable as reported by the September 2005 nutritional survey. Still, a number of improvements in nutrition interventions are recommended:

- Improve the quality of the ration to address micronutrient deficiencies (iron deficiencies) through supplementation or fortification of the ration;
- Strengthen and expand the MCH programme at the camp level in order to improve the promotion of appropriate complementary feeding practices at community based centres;
- Strengthen health and nutrition education activities at the community level;
- Include underweight children in SFCs;
- Improve the quality of the ration distributed to the host communities in accordance with the level of micronutrient deficiencies.

UNHCR non-food support and services will be continued.

In view of the fact that refugees sell a part of the distributed commodities (usually cereals) and considering market supply, a food voucher programme could be piloted for the purchase of preferred staple foods. It
could be combined with a self-reliance programme including the provision of labour to refugees for services in the camps and for the host communities, such as for environmental rehabilitation or agriculture labour intensive activities (such as multiplication and replanting of mosaic resistant cassava, or environmental restoration).

In order to better understand the constraints on the return of the refugees, especially from the DRC, an assessment in the place of return may be linked back to the household survey to be undertaken in camps in Tanzania. The return package that includes food aid for 3 months may need to be adjusted.

4.7.2 Host communities

Over the period 2005-2007, a joint FAO/ UNDP/ UNICEF/ UNIDO/ WFP human security project funded by Japan is supporting human security surveillance and the reduction of circulation of small arms. It is contributing to farmers’ food security by reducing post-harvest losses, as well as contributing to basic complementary education, HIV/AIDS awareness, environmental protection and improved water and sanitation services. It aims to strengthen host community capacity to cope with the refugee presence. During 2006-2007, UNHCR will also join the programme.

4.7.3 Beneficiaries and food resources

Table 20: WFP Tanzania Beneficiaries and Food Resources 2007/ 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burundians</td>
<td>195,000</td>
<td>149,000</td>
<td>118,000</td>
<td>76,000</td>
<td>59,000</td>
<td>46,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congolese</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>118,000</td>
<td>105,000</td>
<td>85,000</td>
<td>64,000</td>
<td>55,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total refugees</td>
<td>345,000</td>
<td>267,000</td>
<td>223,000</td>
<td>151,000</td>
<td>123,000</td>
<td>101,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Host population</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>233,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>130,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonnage (incl. TFP and SFP)</td>
<td>50,328</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>28,080</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.7.4 Follow-up surveys and assessments

- The JAM recommendation to undertake a household food security survey of refugees is reiterated to better understand their self-reliance and the linkages between household coping mechanisms and the level of food security and nutritional status;
- If technically feasible, this survey may be combined with the yearly nutrition survey;
- Equally an in-depth nutritional survey in which care practices and health services are better evaluated can be suggested as a part of this study. This information should be available to the next JAM in order to inform recommendations on ration size for 2007;
- Actual repatriation figures will have to be closely monitored in order to adjust food requirements and ensure that funding and food pipeline reflect the changes.

41 Assuming that the repatriation pace is not equal all over the year, the average number of Burundian refugees to be assisted for each respective year has been calculated on a monthly repatriation of 4,500 for the first 6 month of 2007 and monthly repatriation of 8,000 for the last semester of the year. Similarly, the figures of 600 monthly repatriates for the first semester of 2008 and 4,400 for the second half of the year were used. A 3% yearly growth of the population has also been applied. For the Congolese refugees, the same approach was used with figures of 1,300 monthly repatriates for early 2007 and 4,500 for the second half of the year, and figures of 1,800 and 3,180 for the two semesters of 2008.

42 Ration of 600g/pers/360 days
SECTION 5: REGIONAL MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE REVIEW

5.1 Background to the review
During the discussion on the proposed PRRO in the November 2005 session of the Executive Board (EB.2/2005), concerns were raised regarding the management arrangements of the project and whether it was still appropriate that overall coordination should continue to rest with the Regional Bureau (RB). The proposal was not clear on how it was to be managed at regional level nor on the advantages of the regional model over country based approaches. The Board therefore requested a review of the management structure.

Simultaneously within WFP, the regional management framework for intervention was being questioned. In the Operations Review (carried out by OD in 2005) Country Offices (COs) raised concerns and called for clarification on how regional projects fit within the WFP approach to decentralisation, particularly with regard to delegating authority to COs and roles and responsibilities of the RBs. Moreover, more clarification was called for on the circumstances under which regional approaches were appropriate, and when to move to other strategies. In addition, questions of accountability became an issue with the regional model.

These issues are relevant to past Great Lakes PRRO evaluations. The March 2005 PRRO Evaluation recommended a comprehensive review of coordination and management mechanisms. The 2002 Evaluation also raised questions regarding accountability and management and indicated that, despite having been established for seven years, roles and responsibilities between the COs and the RB were not well articulated or understood.

It was decided to review the regional approach in this PRRO in concert with the JNA, specifically focusing on key issues important to the comparison of regional and country-based approaches. The aim was to determine whether the regional approach remained justified as an intervention structure to address the needs of the Great Lakes Region. A secondary aim was to examine lessons learned regarding more generic questions raised on the utility of regional operations.

The key issues (and assumptions) for special focus were distilled out of previous evaluations as well as the 2005 Operations Review. These fell within the following broad areas:

- Flexibility (and allocation of resources);
- Optimisation of Support (efficiency);
- Advocacy/resource mobilization;
- Funding;
- Logistics;
- Consistency of Model, and;
- Coherence of the regional approach with in-country strategies.

During the review consultation took place at all levels. WFP staff were consulted at HQ, at the Kampala RB (known as the Operations Department Kampala or ODK), at each CO and in a number of key sub-offices. Key donor representatives were consulted in Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi as well as at regional level (Nairobi). Consultations were held with Government officials, other UN partners and with some NGOs in all three countries. Apart from various in-country debriefings there were also two important round up debriefings with key donors in Nairobi, and with ODK and CO representatives. In both of these debriefings, preliminary findings were presented for comments and feedback.

5.2 A history of intervention
A regional approach has been applied in response to relief and recovery needs in the Great Lakes Region since 1995. It began initially as a regional Emergency Operation (EMOP) covering six countries and then progressed to the current PRRO covering Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi.
Table 21: WFP Projects in the Great Lakes Region (1995-2007)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Start date</th>
<th>End date</th>
<th>Period months</th>
<th>Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EMOP 5624.00</td>
<td>01/04/1995</td>
<td>30/04/1996</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMOP 5624.01</td>
<td>01/05/1996</td>
<td>29/01/1997</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMOP 5624.02</td>
<td>01/12/1997</td>
<td>31/05/1999</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMOP 5624.03</td>
<td>01/10/1998</td>
<td>31/12/1999</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRRO 06077.00</td>
<td>01/08/1999</td>
<td>31/07/2001</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRRO 10062.00</td>
<td>01/08/2002</td>
<td>31/01/2003</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRRO 10062.01</td>
<td>01/02/2003</td>
<td>31/01/2006</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRRO 10062.02</td>
<td>01/02/2006</td>
<td>31/01/2007</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Over this 11-year period the situation evolved and the operational context changed. While refugees and IDPs are still present in all three countries, they no longer represent the majority of the project’s targeted beneficiaries in Rwanda or Burundi. While in Tanzania, refugees are the main project focus representing around 97 percent of the beneficiaries, they are not in Rwanda (11 percent) or in Burundi (1 percent). Both DRC and Uganda have separate projects covering refugees and IDPs and are no longer part of the regional project.

Congolese refugees make up a significant proportion of the current refugee caseload in this PRRO representing 42 percent of the refugee caseload in Tanzania, nearly 100 percent in Burundi (not counting asylum seekers) and 94 percent in Rwanda. As the DRC was not part of the project, clearly the flexibility principle of ‘food following people’ is not applicable here. With regard to the DRC, expansions or reductions in these numbers have to be handled through separate country programme adjustments. The donors and the respective governments all questioned this inconsistency. In addition, Rwandan and Burundian refugees are located in many other neighbouring countries, for instance some 50,000 Rwandan refugees residing in camps in 11 countries, with the largest group in Uganda (15,600), and DRC (10,000), yet these are handled outside this PRRO.

5.3 Flexibility

A major rationale given for implementing a regional PRRO was to ensure that in times of turmoil, food would be readily available to refugees and that the ‘food would follow the people’ when returning home. It was often cited that the regional approach provided much greater flexibility for the movement of resources under these circumstances. This was a major founding reason for the regional approach being adopted for the Great Lakes PRRO.

5.3.1 Flexibility with regard to resources

The principle of flexibility in the provision of resources has not generally provided the advantages that were originally envisaged.

Overall, the majority of the resources donated to the project have been earmarked towards the respective specific countries and were not available for flexible use. The provision of directed resources is a common trend amongst donors, with many having policies to this effect, and this has been a constant feature of this project. During the last two years, approximately 86 percent of the resources provided were country-directed leaving little potential for such flexibility.

This was also noted in the 2002 Evaluation which reported ‘the PRRO’s regional design, although intended to enhance flexibility for shifting resources between countries as and when circumstances
require, has not been able to do so’ (Office of Evaluation – (OEDE)/2002/17, page 7, September 2002). The 2005 Evaluation came to the same conclusion; noting that the majority of resources for the PRRO tended to be donor directed to a respective country, thus restricting flexibility.

5.3.2 Changed conditions may no longer require flexibility

In the initial period when the conditions were changing quickly and were uncertain, the regional approach was seen as essential in addressing the problem. However now, in the current circumstances, the rationale for such flexibility is not as evident and it appears that COs can adequately accommodate any need for change required. For instance, recent refugee movements are orderly allowing the planning and accommodation of resource movements within country projects or by use of budget revisions when necessary.

5.3.3 Flexibility in allocation

For those resources that were non-directed and flexible, the mission looked at whether the regional approach provided some advantages. A brief description of the processes involved in the allocation of such donations is presented in the following box.

**Allocation of resources**

With non-directed donations, the allocation approach tends to be based on pipeline projections and breaks. In general, if such donations are made available these are allocated to the respective country operation in a similar way to general multilateral resources. [In fact it was difficult to fully discern whether the ‘non-earmarked’ donations to the regional PRRO were actually multilateral in nature and broken down into such ‘sub-multilateral’ directed donations or were specifically provided by the donors to the ‘regional’ PRRO as a regionally directed donation]. Nevertheless, if such a donation were available in either form, ODMP (Programme Management Division) in HQ would identify it for the PRRO and would seek advice from the bureau pipeline officer on its allocation by country. For programming of both types of earmarked and non-earmarked resources and for the allocation of the Direct Support Costs (DSC) / Other Direct Operational Costs (ODOC) and Landside Transport Storage and Handling (LTSH) this was necessary regardless.

In most cases, the bureau pipeline officer proposes the breakdown in allocation of such donations on the basis of pipeline estimates and projections, although these are periodically adjusted following consultations with COs. This worked reasonably smoothly in the past when there was adequate resources but became problematic as shortages of resources meant that the pipeline could not be maintained and each CO had its own case for prioritisation. There were no set criteria for allocation under these circumstances.

Overall, the processes for allocating non-directed, i.e. flexible, resources between the countries within the regional PRRO were not discernibly different from that applied to non-regional programmes and projects. In either case, the same processes were followed with the regional pipeline officer together with ODMP consulting on allocations in concert with the COs. RB pipeline officers were the focal point on behalf of the COs in presenting all the RB country needs. Overall there were no major advantages provided by the regional approach that could not be accommodated within normal allocations procedures.

5.3.4 Cross-country subsidization

The potential for cross-country subsidisation was one rationale for a regional PRRO both for the reallocation of food resources and also for funds. This aspect has proved to be continuously contentious as the Regional project model was never able to do this satisfactorily. Generally, as the COs were either short on resources, uncertain of future donations, and working on very short budget planning horizons, they rarely felt that they had sufficient ‘spare capacity’ in terms of food, cash or people to allow them leeway to subsidise other countries.
One CO indicated that given the uncertain resourcing situation they only had a three-month certainty period as a realistic budgeting horizon. In response they would normally protect staffing capacities as an essential priority. This was hardly conducive to allow resources to move to other countries.

All COs longed to have a longer-term liquidity position with cash and food but found it difficult to build up a reserve. Some CO staff saw the fact they were working within a regional project as making this more complex – they would not be able to build up their ‘investment capital’ with regional resources given that these would be channelled to fill the most immediate needs in other countries. They thought that this would be less the case and more under their control if they were using a country-based approach.

Another issue related to cross-country subsidization was the question of whether a regional project was the most appropriate vehicle for this type of model. Many COs in WFP need both technical and programme support that is supposed to be provided within the current decentralised framework. Both RBs and key HQ units have as their primary function to provide support with the aim of strengthening COs with less capacity and resources. Prioritising bureau support to those areas where it was most needed was seen as a normal function of the bureau and not necessarily only available within a regional PRRO.

5.3.5 Loans and borrowing
The regional approach did not provide any additional flexibility over what would normally be available in lending and borrowing processes. While loans and borrowing took place between the respective countries in the PRRO, these processes were not dependent on the regional project structure. The COs approached borrowing outside their country the same way whether it was for their activities under the regional PRRO or for country based projects. To address critical shortages in any of their activities each CO tended to look to the wider pool than just the PRRO countries to seek borrowing opportunities, particularly from much larger programmes with potentially more available stocks. For example, recent loans have been arranged for their shortages in the regional PRRO with the Sudan (Southern) and Somalia COs.

5.3.6 Funding flexibility
This issue is dealt with in the next section. However there has been considerable and long standing debate amongst generations of CO staff who grapple with different approaches to allocating funds in this regional approach, especially with regard to DSC and LTSH funds. In 2006 they have returned to a standard DSC allocation for each country on a per ton basis, as per their project budget, for the resources they received. This, in essence, has moved more towards the equivalent of a CO project based approach.

5.3.7 Flexibility to make budget revisions
In the management of change the regional approach does not provide substantive additional flexibility over those available in separate country approaches. Changed circumstances still require Budget Revisions whether related to a change in activities within each country or for movement of resources across borders, and this could just as easily be managed within a country-based approach. A country-based Budget Revision process is also a clearer way to manage such change as it requires the COs to provide proper justification and holds them more accountable. Under the regional PRRO umbrella, this has not always been the case, a point highlighted in previous evaluations. These evaluations indicated that Budget Revisions were not done systematically nor promptly, and that the management of change within each CO was not as efficient as it should have been.

5.3.8 Flexibility to expand
Other problems complicating the allocation approach have come when considering whether to address natural disasters such as drought within the PRRO. COs could not see clearly how a regional PRRO would accommodate this, especially as to the boosting of DSC and how this would be shared between countries. As a result, COs preferred to see it dealt with in a separate operation.

In summary:
- On balance, there are now no major gains in flexibility in the regional approach;
- Majority of resources are directed, cutting down on flexibility advantages;
- The large and unpredictable population movements are no longer a feature;
- Flexibilities can still be adequately achieved within country-based approaches.
5.4 Efficiency and optimization of support

Another justification for the regional approach are the efficiencies it provides in having staff and resources at RB level so that services can be optimised in providing technical support and backstopping to the COs. It was also argued that centrally managed funds would allow resources to be more efficiently used where needs were greatest.

This review assessed; (a) the extent to which such efficiencies existed over and above the normal support roles of the bureau and (b) the net value added by the regional approach as compared to a country based approach.

5.4.1 Current structure

In the current project DSC funding is determined on the basis of separate budgets for each country and the bureau, which are then combined to represent the total DSC requirement. Under the project proposal put to the Executive Board, this totalled US$42.8 million and was split proportionally as follows (a proportional split applicable to the current 12-month approved programme):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 22: DSC Funding Proportions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ODK Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total DSC share:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[These proportions represented DSC budgeted amounts against total project DSC budget]

5.4.2 The funding allocation approach

A key feature of this regional approach that is not found in country-based approaches is that project funds are made available to the Regional Bureau (ODK) for both staff and non-staff costs in addition to the country offices for their project costs. The breakdown of this arrangement was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 23: 3-Year Budget Breakdown (ODK budget as a % of PRRO Budget)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total 3 Year DSC budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Staff + related costs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Officers</td>
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<td>Local GS Staff</td>
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<td>Int. Consultants</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Recurrent Costs</td>
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The capacities that this funding support provided to the RB were significant. For instance the PRRO provided funding support for 6.5 international posts in the bureau (an increase of 33 percent over the bureau’s standard Programme Support and Administration (PSA) biennium budgeted numbers). It also provided for an extra 5 National Officers (a 52 percent increase over PSA budget) and 25 General Service posts (100 percent increase).

Within the recurrent costs budget, the largest contribution went to the RB rental costs of $419,769 (about $140,000 per annum or 26 percent of the total PRRO rental budget). The added direct costs planned for use in the Bureau added about 2 percent to the total project’s Direct Operational Costs (DOC) charges for each metric ton.

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In interviews with finance staff and many Country Directors, both past and present, they all highlighted that the management and allocation of DSC funds within the regional approach proved a contentious issue that absorbed much RB, CO and HQ staff time in arriving at compromise. Extensive efforts were made to ensure that this problem was addressed in a collaborative manner, efforts that could have been better employed elsewhere. Previous evaluations also refer to this issue.

For example, in the previous project extension, DSC was allocated on the basis of total budgeted DSC percentages irrespective of which country received the donation. ODK retained a portion to fund international staff costs and then each country was allocated sufficient funds for their staff as per the approved budget. The remaining balance was distributed between COs and the RB according to the percentage formula based on respective CO/RB budgeted DSC as percentage of the total project budget. This allocation approach was the outcome of considerable and lengthy negotiations between the COs, RB and involved the HQ finance people, yet it still proved problematic. Its major drawback was that funds were de-linked from the country food allocation and therefore did not reflect real costs/workload associated with managing the resources in country (the basis for WFP's current direct costing approach).

Due to the problems above, this approach has now been abandoned. From March 2006, DSC is allocated to each country on the basis of their respective budgeted DSC rate per MT for the food allocation they receive. DSC was determined with each donation at the overall project's DSC rate (the general one) and then provided to the country at that country's rate, which, depending on whether it was higher or lower, provided an overall project surplus/deficit balance to cover bureau requirements and future project deficits.

The COs felt this was clearer and helped to address some earlier problems, but they were still uncomfortable with the funding arrangements to cover bureau costs (see below). The feature of having a centrally managed fund for surpluses and for bureau costs was still seen as problematic. Similar concerns remained over clarity with regard to the funds, what the balances were over time, how they would be used, and on the processes for prioritisation when resources were limited, both for in-country activities as well as for centrally funded services.

Overall, far from providing improved efficiencies, the fund allocation approach probably added further layers of confusion and has been a continuing major problematic in the use of the regional approach.

5.5 Value added: Is the regional approach efficient?

The planned PRRO DSC budget to cover Bureau costs, if fully funded for the 2006/2007 period, will represent nearly one third of the ODK total budget (biennium PSA plus PRRO funds). This significant contribution to the RB budget is the result of early requirements to address the Great Lakes emergency, and the subsequent establishment of the RB.

Many reasons used in the past for establishing central funding have been subsumed into the normal roles and responsibilities that bureaux are expected to provide in supporting COs and this has made it difficult to justify the need to have 'extra' benefits. In the RB, apart from a Senior Programme Advisor who was appointed with the Great Lakes PRRO as his primary responsibility, most key bureau support units confirmed that they could not differentiate between support provided to the ODK regional countries from that provided to the three Great Lakes PRRO countries; all were treated equally. All agreed that the extra funding did not transfer directly into an equivalent level of extra attention and support for these three countries. Even the benefits in consolidated reporting, budget revisions, and advocacy, seen as being an ‘extra’ central service provided for the three PRRO countries, did not necessarily provide greater efficiencies than would be the case for country-based approaches with the bureau performing a normal role.

For instance, while there were advantages in providing consolidated documents, COs were still required to provide the country based inputs. In other words, the COs still had to maintain the inputs. Also, with more bureau management there were some negative consequences, especially when CO staff left responsibility for the document with the RB and responsibilities became blurred. Also, with RB staff drawn into operational CO management tasks this tended to deflect them from working on more regional support functions.
The provision of a Senior Programme Advisor as a bureau focal point to help coordinate the regional aspects of the PRRO was seen as a useful arrangement. This person was appointed to the bureau in August 2005. However, most COs saw this as a ‘desk officer’ role, one whereby they had a focal point in the bureau for follow up. Many indicated that they were fortunate that the particular individual had skills and experience that were proving useful. It was acknowledged, however, that this was not a strong rationale for maintaining a regional approach as this was to some extent seen as a role that a regional programme advisor should be performing anyway.

Many were surprised, including CO and RB staff, when advised on the extent to which the PRRO funded the Bureau. In this regard, the accountability for ‘outcome’ for PRRO resources was raised as a concern. It was felt that CO staff were effectively responsible for project outcome but under such funding arrangements had no control over the bureau-funded resources. A similar concern was identified in the 2005 evaluation, which recommended that some outcome indicators be developed for measuring RB services. The point was also raised that the funds were provided centrally to ‘enhance efficiency’ in implementing activities in the field but that the operational staff were not in a position to determine this. In general, all felt that if the funds were provided to the COs they could be better managed.

**In summary:**

- The extra efficiency provided by regional approach is not apparent.
- The extra capacity that the funding brought to the bureau was a benefit shared across the ODK region as a whole. It did not match the far greater benefits that would have accrued by using these funds to boost in-country capacities.
- There is no evidence to show that centralising funds is more efficient.
- This funding approach is inconsistent with WFPs decentralisation approach and the concepts behind current direct costing theory.
- The regional approach led to extra ‘layers’ of management that proved problematic for the allocation of DSC. It blurred lines of direct control over outputs expected from these central funds.

### 5.8 Resource mobilization

The mission examined whether the regional project helped to attract resources by presenting a ‘clustered package’.

The following were some of the issues related to this question:

- Most donors did not see the regional nature of the project as a motivating factor in directing resources. Some felt that the regional aspect may have been relevant in the beginning but was no longer the case. Others were worried that because the Great Lakes projects were presented as a package the less acceptable aspects of the project could tarnish the whole. Conversely, one donor indicated that they could donate to a regional package but were unlikely to provide directly to certain individual countries, in this case Rwanda, which was not a priority country for their aid programmes. They had no problem with the regional donation then being directed to Rwanda.

- Some donors may have been attracted to the ‘regional’ package simply because it was there, however, these resources would have been made available to the ‘region’ anyway even if directed to country operations.

- Overall, it seems that it was not necessary to have a regional project to attract resources. If faced with cross-border issues, the packaging of the regional approach can be presented in requests for donations without the necessity for a regional project.

- COs felt that that the country-based project aspects as well as in-country promotional efforts were factors that mobilised most donor resources. Some COs expressed concerns that efforts made in this regard could work against them in a regional project when their in-country efforts and resulting
benefits went elsewhere. Most did not see the RB as playing a significant role in advocacy and fundraising, other than what would normally be expected as part of the bureau role.

- Donors indicated that they tended to be guided more by what was happening in the respective countries than by a regional approach.

- Donors also foresaw some problems with providing even directed support to a regional project knowing that some of the funds would not be used in-country. Some were reluctant to provide ‘flexible’ support as they were not convinced by specific country programmes, i.e. some donors were not willing to support ‘recovery’ programmes but would support ‘humanitarian’ interventions.

**In summary:**

There may be good reasons to maintain a ‘regional package’ when attempting to seek support but the benefits of the strategy should be clear.

It was not evident that the regional project approach provided significant benefits in this regard nor that there would be less opportunity to obtain resources in separate country based approaches. Overall, most resources are directed. Donations that are not directed may still remain available for use in country-based approaches.

5.9 Transparency and ownership

During the management of the PRRO issues of transparency and ownership were observed.

**5.9.1 Lack of transparency**

At the CO level, staff were not clear on how the funds generated in the bureau were used. CO staff found the mechanism and arrangements in the project unclear, especially in relation to what was available for them to use and the roles and responsibilities of RB staff. This was especially the case for new CO and RB staff.

Donors were also concerned about transparency. A number of major donors questioned the RB role in terms of accountability and transparency and were not convinced that project funds used to support the RB were the most efficient or appropriate use of money. A number of donors also indicated that they had less problems funding in-country aspects as these were in evidence with clear activities, unlike the RB activities in this project, which were more obscure.

Transparency was an issue with Governments as well. This concern was highlighted for example by a senior Burundian Government official in charge of aid coordination when he requested to know exactly what amount of donor pledges were actually coming into the country. In a recent pledging conference donors had indicated to the Government the amounts they were providing to Burundi and advised that much of it was being channelled through WFP. The Government wanted more information on the process as well as how much money was actually being spent in Burundi. This was not clear to them in the current PRRO.

**5.9.2 Lack of in-country ownership**

Senior Managers in the COs expressed concern that they did not feel they had full management responsibility over the PRRO even though they were responsible for implementation. There was a lack of clarity in terms of funding arrangements and authority/responsibility levels both with the central (i.e. regionally managed) DSC and with even some aspects of LTSH. It was seen as a cumbersome arrangement. They felt that a country-based project would provide clearer management responsibilities.

Ownership of the process was also an issue. With regard to PRRO design, the COs tended to see this as a RB role with COs only providing inputs. This perception appears at odds with WFP’s decentralisation policies whereby the COs are responsible for project design (with bureau support). The regional approach had the advantage that the RB was more heavily involved in the design and in the provision of support,
but the potential disadvantage that the implementers (i.e. the CO) were not held fully responsible for the design of the approach in-country. There was therefore less of a sense of ownership within the COs. One senior CO staff member indicated that an advantage of the regional approach was that it involved only one document and saved them from having to prepare a separate one.

Of particular interest were the views of respective Governments with regard to project ownership. Each one was at a different point on a continuum of asserting its role in governance and in internal management of the country’s development and humanitarian aid. All the officials met indicated a need to have a clearer country-specific project in which the support coming to their respective country could be better discerned. It was clear that the regional project did not do this adequately and they were not at all familiar with either the PRRO details or design. They all felt that at the geopolitical level there was still a role for regional problem solving but that a framework for intervention had to be a country-based approach. This was especially important now that they were attempting to coordinate aid within their own country-based priorities and strategies. It was therefore evident that the government officials did not especially like regionally managed projects.

In summary:
- The 2002 Evaluation warned that regional-level accountability was a problem. It reported concerns that the approach lacked transparency and that roles and responsibilities were not clear.
- The regional approach tended to reduce CO management ownership and continued to compound confusion over management authority and accountability despite efforts to address them over the past few years. The COs felt that separate country-based projects would address this problem and provide clearer lines of responsibility and management accountability.
- Many donors questioned the approach and also saw problems of accountability and a lack of transparency.
- Governments questioned the relevance of the approach to their own strategic approaches and their need to manage and coordinate aid.
- There is a strong need for WFP to address these concerns. This would be achieved by moving to country-based interventions, which would at least provide a more relevant focus and bring greater ownership and fuller accountability to the appropriate level.

5.10 Logistics issues
The RB logistics staff see their role as helping to strengthen the CO logistics capacities and coordinating their cargo movement through transit countries. In this role there is no distinction between countries or projects and no special attention paid to regional PRRO requirement over other projects.

Most logistics arrangements that include the Great Lakes PRRO countries are managed within a recently established ‘corridor co-coordination mechanism’ which covers Kenya, Somalia, Sudan (South), Uganda, DRC, Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania. This appears to be an excellent system of coordination that operates very effectively. Every month ‘cargo prioritisation’ tables are prepared by the ODK logistics and pipeline staff taking into account the CO needs in each of the two corridors fed respectively from Dar es Salaam and Mombasa. These tables are reviewed in a regular monthly conference call with all key staff at the ports, the transit points and the countries in the corridors in order to reach an agreement on deliveries and identify and solve any logistics problems. The CO staff in the Kenya and Tanzania offices then manage food deliveries as per agreed priorities. For this purpose the cost of running the logistics offices in the main transit points is shared amongst all the countries fed by the corridors on the basis of estimated tonnages expected over the year.

For example, Kenya, Southern Sudan, Uganda, DRC, Rwanda and Burundi share the cost of managing the Kenya logistics section (Mombasa Port and the Nairobi Logistics officer). Uganda, DRC, Rwanda and Burundi share the cost in Uganda for managing surface transport contracts and regionally purchased commodities. DRC, Rwanda, Tanzania and Burundi share the costs of the Dar es Salaam logistics officer.
The cost sharing for 2006 involves funding international posts: a D1 Port Captain in Mombasa and a P3 Logistics Officer in Nairobi; a P3 Logistics Officer in Uganda and a P3 Logistics Officer in Dar es Salaam. For the Mombasa Port office the total office budget of US $1,291,300 (for 2006) is shared with $302,300 (including the international post) coming from DSC and the remainder from LTSH.

In addition, a WFP trucking fleet is in operation in the region, which is managed by a Fleet Manager who is based in the Uganda CO. His costs are shared by Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda where the fleet is operated.

Overall, the three countries within the regional PRRO were pleased with these arrangements and felt that the system ran well. The role of the RB was clear and it was considered to be very supportive. All staff in the COs and at the RB level agreed that these arrangements applied for all projects and countries equally and there were no logistical advantages in having a regional PRRO to achieve this. It was also an arrangement that took place whether countries were in the regional project or not.

**In summary:**
- For logistics management the regional project approach did not provide any distinctive added benefits.
- Logistic needs were efficiently met within general regional wide collaborative arrangements, independent of project modes.

5.11 In-country coherence

In reviewing whether to maintain the regional approach it became apparent that the regional model appeared inappropriate for the new conditions in each country. All COs presented their respective operations in the PRRO as country-specific and each country case was distinctively different. The regional situation has changed considerably since 1995.

In each country, there was a strong drive for greater governance, greater coherence between activities and a more strategic approach towards aid coordination.

In Tanzania, there is strong Government direction, good donor support mechanisms, and aid coordination is considered to be at quite an advanced level. The PRSP process has moved into a mature stage and a number of bilateral donors now offer budgetary support. In addition, though the PRRO is essentially a refugee operation, there is strong Government and aid community attention on minimising negative impacts. Strategies and donor funds were devised within the PRSP framework to address this issue.

Rwanda is in a post-recovery phase with an assertive Government. The Government has stabilised the economy, successfully initiated a range of reforms and is into its second PRSP. Aid mechanisms have evolved and a number of major donors are looking at direct budgetary support. In this context the regional approach was seen as inappropriate as ‘a remnant of the past’ as one donor described it. A number of donors indicated that too many institutions and NGOs work in the old mode with minimal Government involvement and where the main focus is on emergency assistance.

In Burundi the situation is less stable but similar issues arose. A newly elected Government is in early stages of development. The key focus for WFP has been to ensure basic conditions of household food security to ensure a conducive development environment. The first PRSP aimed at reducing poverty, stabilizing the economy and promoting recovery is to commence in 2007.

**In summary:**
- The regional approach is not an appropriate mechanism for integration into Government strategies as it was devised for a different operating environment;
- Each country presents distinctive situations requiring separate project intervention approaches with Governments that have development strategies calling for specifically tailored intervention support.
5.12 Recommendations

1. It is recommended that separate country-specific PRROs replace the Great Lakes Regional PRRO.

2. The respective country PRROs should be designed to commence at the end of the 12-month period of the current Regional PRRO. The timeframe for each new PRRO should be specifically tailored to meet individual country strategic requirements.

   For Tanzania, the approach will be determined by refugee caseload estimates for which two years appears to be a reasonable estimation horizon according to UNHCR.

   For Rwanda the PRRO should be a transitional bridge to incorporate longer-term activities into a new country programme, which is planned to harmonize with the UNDAF/PRSP framework commencing in 2008.

   For Burundi the PRRO would focus on providing a vital stabilizing role required for at least a two-year period.

   These separate PRROs should be presented to the Executive Board for approval and information.

3. Regional issues should be accommodated through inter-country office communication and contact and facilitated by the RB as part of their normal role. Regional advocacy for CO resources can be continued if appropriate.

4. The dismantling of the Regional PRRO will have serious implications for the RB. Many of the current capacities that provide support benefits for the region as a whole are boosted by the PRRO funds. The proposed changes will entail moving these capacities to the COs. The loss of significant funding support to the RB will reduce current capacities, which will have implications for its ability to provide current levels of support to the ODK region as a whole. RB capacities should be reviewed and possible additional PSA budgetary support may be needed, especially as PRRO budget support was a factor when determining the 2006/07 biennium PSA budget allocations.

5. In the preparation of country-based project budgets, the COs should consider sharing costs if necessary. As discussed above, this approach has been successfully adopted for regional logistics. Examples include sharing VAM and Procurement Officers. This would allow cross-country coordination and be guided by CO Senior Managers. As with logistics, the Officers do not need to be located in the RB but can be posted in a specific CO.

6. COs should work more directly with each other, with RB facilitation if needed, to communicate on cross-border issues.

7. Budget Revisions should be used more efficiently as the primary tool for any changes in project conditions. They need to reflect true conditions and COs should be held responsible for their justification.

8. The RB should continue to consider provision of a focal point officer for Great Lakes issues, to include DRC and other countries with refugee movements.
Annex 1: Terms of reference of the Joint Needs Assessment

WFP/FAO/UNHCR Joint Needs Assessment Mission
Great Lakes: Burundi, Rwanda & Tanzania - March/April 2006
(Version of 13 March 2006)

The Great Lakes Regional PRRO 10062.2. was submitted to the Board in November 2005 for its approval. This operation, comprising Burundi, Rwanda and Tanzania, aims at supporting food insecure and vulnerable populations, including refugees, returnees, IDPs and undernourished women and children. Although the political situation in the region has evolved and is relatively more stable, these countries are still experiencing the consequences of large-scale movements of populations. People are fleeing from political violence and unrest in the region, including DRC, and or are facing poor food production conditions. Overall, these factors deepened poverty. Many households and individuals are therefore exposed to severe food insecurity or have become vulnerable. The current transition period, which involves on-going peace processes calls for relief as well as recovery activities and longer-term investments, based on the assessment of needs.

The Board approved the operation for a one-year duration and requested WFP to undertake a joint needs assessment with UNHCR and other interested UN agencies and donors as the basis for planning assistance beyond the initial period covering 2006. The overall objective of this exercise would be to assess the need for, and scope of future programming in the Great Lakes region.

Based on the findings and conclusions of the assessment, a revised Great Lakes PRRO will be presented to the Executive Board at the Second Regular Session in November 2006.

The specific objectives of this joint needs assessment are to review, verify and synthesize the available information on:
- The current food security and nutrition situation in Tanzania, Burundi and Rwanda from a regional and country-level perspective;
- The estimation of the number of food insecure people requiring food and non-food assistance;
- Where food aid is an appropriate response, the most appropriate interventions and their timing, and how these complement related non-food programmes; and
- Opportunities for recovery and longer-term food and nutrition security.

This assessment will therefore address the main issues identified by the Board members, which are:
- the implementation strategy including transitional activities;
- a clear understanding of the condition of the affected populations, including numbers of food insecure people and resources implications;
- drawing from lessons learned;
- the planned exit strategies and
- recommendations on local and regional procurement.

The role of the WFP Regional Bureau in coordinating the operation will be handled by a separate, parallel management review. This exercise will be lead by Malcolm Duthie.

Methodology – The assessment will be carried out in 3 phases and will apply a specific approach to each of them:
- Secondary data analysis: analysis of available secondary information on food security and nutrition and identification of data gaps through a desk review. Baseline and assessment information is already available or is currently being collected in the 3 respective countries and shall be completed prior to the beginning of this exercise. The desk review will allow determining further information requirements that will be collected and analysed by the assessment team.
Simultaneously to the field visit, a market analysis will be done in the 3 countries that will address the regional and local procurement capacities and possible cash interventions;

- **Joint assessment mission**: regional and in-country field visits with all relevant stakeholders including beneficiaries, local and national authorities, major donors, collaborating partners and other UN agencies based on additional information needs. The data collection will be done through key informant interviews and possibly focus group discussions. The results will be triangulated with the secondary information;

- **Synthesis assessment report**: the report writing will be undertaken after a thorough de-briefing done to the stakeholders on the basis of an aide-memoire, and will include their feedback.

**Assessment team composition** – The assessment team managed by ODAN will be composed of:

- A team leader with a strong conceptual background on food security and leadership skills (ODAN)
- A regional assessment officer (ODK)
- A nutritionist (PDPN)
- A UNHCR representative
- An agro-economist from FAO (GIEWS)

Observers: Some of the major donors who have expressed interest in this assessment such as Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Scandinavian countries, the USA and the EC could participate in the exercise as observers. However, if they are not available, they will in any case be closely consulted during the assessments at regional and country level.

**Timeline** - The Joint Needs Assessment is scheduled to start beginning of March with the desk review for two weeks. The field visits will be undertaken from 18 March to 7 April for three weeks, according to the additional information requirements. The assessment team will present preliminary findings prior to departing from each country, and provide a general debriefing in Kampala to colleagues of the Regional Bureau and interested donors. The assessment report should be completed by end of April 2006.

The assessment will be preceded by advance preparation exercises from January until early March, particularly in Burundi and Rwanda to complement secondary data on food security baseline and monitoring. Below is a detailed timeline:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Lead</th>
<th>Timeframe</th>
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<tr>
<td>Finalize TORs for joint assessment (including consultation with partners)</td>
<td>ODAN in consultation with ODK</td>
<td>By 14 March 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finalize TOR for market assessment</td>
<td>ODK in consultation with ODAN</td>
<td>By 14 March</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finalize TORs for management review</td>
<td>OD consultation with ODAN</td>
<td>By 14 March</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis of secondary data analysis for 3 countries</td>
<td>ODK with support of ODAN/PDPN</td>
<td>9 March – 17 March</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Draft synthesis report of secondary data analysis</td>
<td>ODK with support of ODAN/PDPN</td>
<td>By 17 March</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market Assessment Mission</td>
<td>ODK</td>
<td>22 March – 5 April</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Assessment Mission</td>
<td>ODAN in collaboration with ODAN/PDPN</td>
<td>18 March – 7 April</td>
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Debrief by Assessment team (inc. market) in Kampala

Deadline for final draft Market Assessment Report (to be annexed to final assessment report)

Management Review Mission

Deadline for final draft Joint Assessment Report

Deadline for final Joint Assessment Report

Tasks – In close collaboration with all stakeholders, the assessment mission should:

1. Undertake a thorough review of available secondary data in all three countries and identify remaining information needs and gaps;

2. Verify secondary data by means of short field visits in all three countries; time spent in each country will differ, reflecting the size and complexity of programme as well as the availability of secondary data (Burundi: 8 days; Rwanda: 5 days; Tanzania: 4 days);

3. Assess the extent and possible impact of worsening climatic conditions, particularly the threat of widespread drought in the southern, east, and Great Lakes region, on local markets, prices, and people’s access to food and their nutritional status;

4. Determine to what extend structural changes such as access to land and other livelihoods, higher dependency on markets and labour, and agriculture diseases contribute to chronic food insecurity;

5. Address security concerns (i.e. elections, civil conflict and related political uncertainties) and their potential effects on the food security and nutrition situation in the region, including a gender analysis; review the recovery potentials within a transition context; provide recommendations regarding necessary actions to be taken in order to address people’s severe food insecurity and vulnerability;

6. Assess the number and categories of people (IDPs, refugees, host communities and resident population) that are in need of food aid, determine where they are located, and estimate their food requirements providing clear justifications;

7. Analyse the comparative advantage of food and non-food response options to alleviate food insecurity in the region and establish agreement on whether current programming channels, i.e. relief and recovery are being utilized in line with evolving circumstances, absorption capacity and institutional constraints in all three countries;

8. Identify opportunities for self-reliance and durable solutions for refugees; assess non-food requirements for effective nutrition interventions; review the feasibility of cash interventions;

9. Identify clear linkages of food insecurity and nutritional issues with targeting and programme approaches and ensure to reach consensus in the approach with the major stakeholders on board;

10. Provide detail on possible local/regional procurement of food and indicate their feasibility and practicality;
11. Recommend exit strategies in view of the identified needs and perspectives on populations recovery and food security in each country;

12. Brief/debrief donor representatives and international agencies who did not directly participate in the assessment mission on the findings and recommendations of the Mission;

13. Prepare a joint technical report on findings and recommendations to be issued to the international community and used for the revision of the Great Lakes PRRO.
Annex 2: Terms of reference of Regional and Local Procurement Review

A Review of Food Production and Food Markets in Tanzania, Burundi and Rwanda

Introduction and Background

The GLR of Tanzania, Burundi and Rwanda are conducting a Joint Needs Assessment (JNA) for PRRO 10062.2 that runs through November 2006. The PRRO is for support to Refugees, IDPs and returnees. The JNA will be used as a basis for the revision of the PRRO.

A food markets assessment that would identify potential food procurement options for WFP was requested to form part of the JNA.

Objectives of Review

The objectives of the markets review are:

- To provide a review of agricultural production, consumption, and trade patterns of major food crops in the three countries that would provide useful data and information for formulating strategies for WFP’s programs
- To provide a useful background on food markets that would be a basis for formulation of policy on food purchases and procurement

Key Assumptions

- Recognizing that the scope of the study is large, the basis is that all or most of the data required for the market assessment is available within countries with minimal gaps to be filled and verifications done during mission visits
- Local resource persons will be identified who will contribute to the markets assessment. Use of local resource persons is crucial as they have the local expertise and builds on capacity within the countries and region

Methodology

Both secondary and primary data collection techniques and analyses will be used for this review. Specifically the review will consist of the following:

- There will be desk reviews of available data and literature on each country’s agricultural production, consumption, trade, prices and marketing patterns of the major food crops. Relevant marketing policies, inflation and exchange rates will also be reviewed as they relate to the macro economy.
- There will be semi-structured interviews with key informants including agricultural officials, traders and processors of major food commodities on food market systems, markets structure, seasonal marketing and quality & standards.
- Interviews will also be conducted with stakeholders interested in food procurement (WFP, NGOs, Government Authorities, Traders, Farmers) on the different programs, magnitude and food procurement patterns.
- There will be the analyses of available secondary data and interviews for reporting

Expected Outputs

The review on food production and food markets is to lead to the following expected outputs:

- Findings on key production, consumption, trade and marketing patterns for Tanzania, Burundi and Rwanda
- Recommendations on local and regional food procurement options
- Recommendations on potential implications for cash interventions

Team Composition for Food Markets Review

- Regional Assessment Officer (Markets)
- Regional Procurement Officer
- Economist, FAO, Rome
- Identified Resources Person(s) in the Countries
- Country Office VAM Officers
Annex 3: Terms of reference of the Management and Coordination Review

REVIEW OF COORDINATION AND MANAGEMENT MECHANISMS
FOR GREAT LAKES PRRO

Problem Analysis

- November 2005, EB raised concerns regarding the role of WFP Regional Office “With overall coordination resting with WFP’s regional bureau in Kampala the role of this office in managing the PRRO and providing support to respective country offices needs to be more thoroughly discussed in the document”.
- PRRO document is not clear on how it is managed at the regional level and on the advantages of maintaining a regional approach.
- Recommendation of March 2005 Evaluation of PRRO that there needs to be a: “comprehensive review of its coordination and management mechanism for an effective future regional programme”.
- In the Operations Review concerns were raised regarding regional operations.
- Growing awareness that Regional Operations – especially ones that are maintained over time – raise concerns regarding accountability.

Issues for Follow Up

- EB (major donors) will want strong substantiation to support the management approach/structure proposed in the revised document. OD will have to present the case well for the revised approach.
- Need to ensure that the process of assessment as well as the final arrangements proposed are understood and accepted by all (last time two out of the three countries preferred to move to national operations and not maintain current strategy – see Evaluation of PRRO 10062.1, March 2005, p. 14).
- Review has to be more than just a standard Joint Needs Assessment – management approach for the PRRO will have to be reviewed. Look at what the options are for decentralising the approach.
- Review approach will need to look at what works well and how to optimise this. Also how to improve on the problems identified in the 2005 and 2003 evaluations. And what will the longer term approach be.

Methodology

The Management Review will be part of a Joint Assessment as a parallel process to the EFSA.

Specific Approach: Review the basis for either maintaining a Regional PRRO or for proposing separate country based PRROs. Help to provide substantiation for the management and coordination mechanisms to be proposed to the board.

In the context above, address the following issues:

- **Flexibility.** Does a regionally managed PRRO provide greater flexibility than a country based approach? The two most recent evaluations point out that this objective has not been realised – donor earmarking for particular countries was one of the reasons cited.
- **Optimisation of support.** To what extent has a Regional PRRO provided benefits that may not be available with country based projects. How is this consistent with WFP’s decentralisation approach and the maintaining of normal roles of the Bureaux in provision of support?
- **Allocation of Resources.** What are the advantages in maintaining a regionally managed PRRO in the allocation of resources? Clarify the advantages compared to a country level approach and show what a country based approach would loose?
- **Advocacy.** Clarify whether a ‘regionally managed’ PRRO has clear advantages in improving advocacy or whether the same result would still be achievable with country based approaches and the RB resuming its normal role. It would be useful to outline approaches, issues and benefits – and consistency in relation to WFP’s normal approach/role with Country Offices, Regional Bureau and Headquarters in this regard.
- **Funding.** Regional management of central fund and allocation. Determine how this has functioned, its efficiency, effectiveness and what have been the issues of having a central fund versus a country based one. What would be the advantages of either approach? Look at issues related to accountability of funds.

- **Logistics.** Review benefits of regional versus country management in ensuring effective logistics support to the country operations.

- **Consistency of Model.** Clarify the basis for having and maintaining a continuous regionally managed PRRO rather than moving to Country based projects. Review the rationale for determining when to decentralise such an approach – especially when the situation becomes longer term.

- **Coherence with in-county strategies.** Determine the appropriateness of the management approach to promote effective partnership support and backing in-country.

Review will involve assessment of all appraisals and evaluations and include visits to the Bureau and respective Country Offices to consult staff and relevant collaborating partners, government agencies and donors. This would be done to the extent possible with the Needs assessment mission and would ideally involve attending the appropriate de-briefing exercises.

Outcome would be to provide options for the management approach for the PRRO in the future. It would be used to provide the basis for a project/strategy to be presented to the November 2006 EB.
Annex 4: Documents consulted for the desk review

Tanzania
- World Food Programme, October 2005. Tanzania Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis Secondary Data Review
- Ministry of Agriculture Food Security and Cooperatives, February 2006. The Rapid Vulnerability Assessment (RVA) of Food Insecure Districts in Tanzania Mainland for the 2005-06 Market Year
- Household Budget Survey; 2000/01
- WFP/UNHCR Joint Assessment Mission, Great Lakes – Tanzania, 8-14 November 2005
- The Nutritional Status of Under-five and Schoolchildren, Lactating and Pregnant Women: Nutrition Survey Results in Refugee Camps in Western Tanzania, UNHCR, UNICEF and WFP, September 2005
- The Coping Strategy Index Follow-up Survey, Assisted Refugees in Western Tanzania, WFP 2005
- Rapid Vulnerability Assessment of Food Insecure Districts in Tanzania Mainland for the 2005-2006 Market Year, Food Security Information Team, Prime Minister’s Office and Ministry of Agriculture, February 2006

Rwanda
- Economic Intelligence Unit, 2005, Rwanda Country Report
- Economic Intelligence Unit, 2005, Rwanda Country Profile
- Ministry of Agriculture, Agricultural Policy
- Rwanda Demographic and Health Survey, 2005
- FEWSNET, February 2006 Rwanda Food Security Update
- FEWSNET, January 2006 Rwanda Food Security Update
- Crop And Food Assessment (CFAM) 2005 B, Ministry of Agriculture
- International Monetary Fund Washington, D.C, MINECOFIN, 2005
- 2003, Rwanda Vulnerability Baseline Report, WFP, Government of Rwanda and Fewsnet
- Macro International Inc. October 2001, Nutrition of Infants and Young Children in Rwanda
- UNDP, 2005. Human Development Report,

Burundi
- CVSFA, WFP 2004
- WFP, Burundi: Strategic Review of PRRO, March 2006
- WFP, Burundi: A Strategic Review of the Nutrition Portfolio of activities, March 2006
- Burundi: Rapport de l’enquête nationale de nutrition de la population, Ministère de la Santé Publique, PAM, UNICEF 2005
- Enquête sur les populations déplacées au Burundi, 2004 and 2005, OCHA
- Economic Intelligence Unit, 2006, Burundi Country Report
- Economic Intelligence Unit, 2006, Burundi Country Profile
- Cabinet du Président, Programme du Gouvernement du Burundi 2005-2010
- Joint WFP/UNHCR mission report, June 2006
- Burundi UNDAF 2005-2007
- Burundi Interagency Health and Nutrition Needs Assessment, May 2004
Annex 5: Key Informant Interviews

**Burundi, 29 March to 5 April 2006**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee</th>
<th>Position/Agency</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thacien Nzeyimana</td>
<td>National Director, Ministry of Solidarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pierre Clavier Rurakamvye</td>
<td>Permanent Secretary, CNCA (Conseil National de la Coordination des Aides)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moise Bucumu</td>
<td>Governor, Province of Ruyigi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selemani Mossi</td>
<td>Governor, Province of Gitega</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>François Sungayimiheto</td>
<td>Governor of kirundo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohamed Feruzi</td>
<td>Governor of Muyinga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alassane Sow</td>
<td>World Bank Resident Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mustafa Cassama</td>
<td>FAO Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean-Pierre Renson</td>
<td>FAO, in-charge of emergency programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaba-Guichard Nayaga</td>
<td>UNHCR Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valentin Tapsoba</td>
<td>UNHCR Deputy Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adama Basse</td>
<td>UNHCR Head of Office, Muyinga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basile Koukoui</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laurent Dufour</td>
<td>Officer for Humanitarian Affairs, UNOCHA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean-Sébastien Munié</td>
<td>Programme Coordinator, UNOCHA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nora Zicherman</td>
<td>CARE</td>
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<tr>
<td>Duncan Barker</td>
<td>World Vision</td>
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<tr>
<td>Isabelle Roubeix</td>
<td>ACF</td>
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<tr>
<td>Diane Holland</td>
<td>Concern</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sonya van Osch</td>
<td>IMC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bernd Schwenk</td>
<td>AAA (Agro-action allemande - German Agro-Action)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebecca Blackledge</td>
<td>CRS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrick Bukasa</td>
<td>GVC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balise Nzeyimana</td>
<td>CARITAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sylvain Duhau</td>
<td>Solidarités</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gilbert Ndayiragije</td>
<td>COPED</td>
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<tr>
<td>David Kigozi</td>
<td>Tearfund</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Rwanda, 23 - 28 March 2006**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee</th>
<th>Position/Agency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jean Damascente Ntawukuriruyayo</td>
<td>Minister of Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panos Mountzis</td>
<td>UNHCR Country Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kevin Mullally</td>
<td>USAID, Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ryan Washburn</td>
<td>Team Leader, USAID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ernest Rwamuco</td>
<td>Ministry of Economic Planning and Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elisabeth Balem</td>
<td>FAO Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Augustin Kampayana</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture, Director of Planning and Social Protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laurent Kayitare</td>
<td>Fewsnet Country Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bintou Keita</td>
<td>UNICEF Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gertjan Tempelman</td>
<td>Embassy of the Netherlands, Deputy Head of Mission,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gianluca Rampola</td>
<td>Head of Unit, UNDP/Aid Coordination Team,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hubert Ziegler</td>
<td>Ambassador, Embassy of Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marc Gedopt</td>
<td>Ambassador, Embassy of Belgium,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atanase Murekzi</td>
<td>Minister of Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmed Toure</td>
<td>World Bank Country manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Julie Fournier</td>
<td>Second Secretary, Embassy of Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colin Kirk</td>
<td>Director, UK/DFID Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protais Rukeramihigo</td>
<td>German Agro-action</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Tanzania, 19 – 22 March 2006

Dar Es Salaam

John Brahim  Assistant Director of MHA Refugee Services
Naoko Akiyama Emergency Coordinator UNICEF
Roy Trivety Deputy Director DFID
Tony Brennan High Commissioner DFID
Mr. Peter Maddens Ambassador Belgium Embassy
Mary Jane Meierdiercks-Popovic Senior Progr.Officer UNHCR

Kigoma/Lugufu

Godfrey Mbaruku Regional Medical Officer, RC’s Office.
Ephacian Chokola Assistant Zonal Coordinator, MHA, Zonal Office.
Penina Munoru Head of Sub-office, UNHCR Kigoma.
Charles Karokola Camp commandant, MHA Lugufu
Diana Lorenzana Field Officer, UNHCR Lugufu
Felician Majuva Team Leader, Tanzania Red Cross Society, Lugufu
Sarah Masoy Team Leader, World Vision Tanzania
Rhoda Nganda Health Coordinator, Tanzania Red Cross Society, Lugufu
Deusdedit Kiiza Team Leader, Relief to Development society
Gervas Chiza Field Officer, CARE International.
Annex 6: Agriculture season calendars for Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi

**Tanzania**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bimodal Rainfall</th>
<th>Unimodal Rainfall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dry Spell</strong></td>
<td><strong>Masika Rains</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>Feb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dry Spell</strong></td>
<td><strong>Msimu Rains Continue</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Vuli/Short rains** | **Masika/Long rains** | **Unimodal**
- **Rainy Season** | October - November | February/March | November
- **Harvest** | late January/February | July/August | May - July

**Rwanda**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Season B (long rains)</th>
<th>Season A (short rains)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Planting</strong></td>
<td><strong>Harvesting</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>Mar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Planting</strong></td>
<td><strong>Harvesting</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Season C (marshlands)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Season B** Sorghum is sown from December
- *Adapted from FEWSNET

- **Rainy season** | **Season A** | **Season B** | **Season C (swamps)** |
- December | September-January | February-July |
- **Harvest** | June | October

**Burundi**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Season A</th>
<th>Season B</th>
<th>Season C (swamps)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rainy season</strong></td>
<td><strong>Season A</strong></td>
<td><strong>Season B</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
- September –November | February-May | June-November |
- **Harvest** | February | June | October
Annex 7: Maps of Refugee Sites
Annex 8: Map on CMD in Burundi
Annex 9: Map of new administrative boundaries in Rwanda