Mission members: Getachew Diriba (WFP Cairo, Regional Programme Advisor), Dara Darbandi (WFP Tehran, Programme Assistant), Mojgan Darabi (WFP Tehran, Programme Assistant), Abandokht Sarakati (UNHCR, Community Services Assistant). Tehran, May 2006
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Locations of Refugee Camps in Iran, May 2006

Refugee Camps
Iraqi Kurdish Refugees Camp
Iraqi Arab Refugee Camp
Afghan Refugee Camp
Visited Camps
List of Acronyms

BAFIA: Bureau for Aliens and Foreign Immigrants Affairs
EPI: Extended Programme for Immunisation
GAP: Gender Action Plan
GTC: Grain Trade Company
IUD: Intensive Unit Delivery
JAM: Joint Assessment Mission
MOE: Ministry of Education
MOH: Ministry of Health
ORS: Oral rehydration salt
RLs: Rials (Iranian)
T.B: Tuberculosis
TBA: Traditional Birth Attendants
UNAMA: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNIDO: United Nations Industrial Development Organisation
WFP: World Food Programme
Executive Summary

WFP, under its current PRRO 10213.0 (January 2003 to December 2006) has been supporting encamped Afghan and Iraqi refugees. Activities include general relief distribution and food for education incentives. In early 2004 however, to encourage voluntary repatriation, UNHCR decided to suspend major camp services to refugees and WFP subsequently followed by suspending food assistance. Effectively, UNHCR’s assistance suspension was introduced in March 2004, while WFP’s food assistance continued through to the end of 2005.

To measure the impacts of suspension, a joint assessment mission (JAM) for Afghan refugee camps was undertaken by WFP, UNHCR and Bureau for Aliens and Foreign Immigrants Affairs (BAFIA) from 26 April to 8 May 2006. The Mission visited three refugee camps and conducted focus group discussions, interviewed individual households as well as visited service facilities including schools, health centres, garbage collection and bakeries. Focus group discussions were conducted with 101 persons (68 males and 33 females) in the three camps, and in-depth interviews with 25 families followed by house-to-house visits. The Mission met and discussed with BAFIA at National, provisional levels as well as BAFIA camp managers, and met with Global Partner, UNIDO, and United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan (UNAMA).

The refugees are living under extremely difficult conditions with the introduction of levies for all services provided in the camp and continued restrictions placed upon their movements. Job opportunities continue to be very limited, only a tiny proportion of the refugees reported seasonal jobs at a greater risk of various measures. In comparison to food security status reported in 2003, no improvements have been recorded, in fact in many cases the food security situations have deteriorated combined with absence of social services. Refugees have no work permits, and are at risk to fines or arrest for working outside of the camps. These conditions combined with suspension of food assistance as well as service facility provision to the camp population have worsened food security status for the camp refugees.

- The Mission recommends that **WFP resumes food assistance in Afghan refugee camps at full ration for a total of 26,500 refugees currently residing in 6 camps.** Existing ration standard of 350 grams of wheat, 100 gram of rice, 20 grams of vegetable oil, 30 grams of pulse and 15 grams of sugar will apply with a total of 1852.5 kcal per person per day. Targeting to a particular social and economic group among the refugee population is impractical given legal and operational limitations to job opportunities. School feeding programme for girls’ education should be resumed covering girls in primary schools in camps. Currently, there are 2,440 girls in all primary schools on the camps.
- **WFP’s food assistance should be linked to the UNHCR’s resumption of support to camp services:** health and education assistance to bring about
greater positive impacts on the welfare of refugees. WFP’s food assistance alone will not have the intended effect without simultaneous activation of health, education and camp management services by UNHCR.

- UNHCR in collaboration with BAFIA and MOH should continue to strengthen health service provisions to camp refugee population including medical and equipment supplies, sanitary material, dental care and health staff available at the health centres. Also, preventive health care services should be started: health education, HIV/AIDS awareness, and family planning services. Voluntary health workers should be reorganised and be trained to provide health education. **UNHCR in collaboration with BAFIA and Ministry of Education should provide educational supplies** such as textbooks, stationery and assist schools in the supply of sport facilities. Assistance should be considered for girls’ secondary school where not available on the refugee camps.

- WFP and UNHCR develop a **Joint Gender Action Plan aiming at increasing the role of women refugees in their communities**. Particular emphasis should be placed on access to education & skills training for refugee women & girls through food incentives. A greater role of women in the food distribution process should be encouraged in order to enhance women’s control over food supplies and strengthen their role in community matters.

- The prevailing delegation of camp management and excessive charges to the refugees have compromised their food security and access to social service facilities in the face of restricted job permits. **UNHCR/BAFIA should absorb camp management levies**, collaborate to remove legal limitations so that refugees are able to earn income in the labour markets.

- Limitations on repatriation such as the prohibition to export earned monies, electrical appliances, computer and motorcycles should be removed through discussions between UNHCR and BAFIA. Repatriation, as acknowledged by BAFIA and refugees themselves, is linked to improvements in security conditions in Afghanistan as well as recovery efforts undertaken in the country, particularly in rural Afghanistan where most camp refugees originate from; this includes access to health, education, land and basic support upon their return. One measure in support of repatriation and self-reliance options is **targeted skills training for the refugees in collaboration with NGOs and UN agencies**; and it should be linked to an expressed desire for repatriation and would thus support any exit strategy. Possibilities for targeted skills training should be explored with NGOs, such as Global Partners (INGO), who, however, not work in camps, and UN agencies (UNIDO) in Iran; and should be coordinated with Afghanistan recovery initiatives (Government of Afghanistan, UNAMA, NGOs) to ensure that the skills offered in Iran are relevant to the conditions and job demands in Afghanistan. To ensure effective selection of relevant training skills and useful participant, UNHCR should undertake an inventory of skills available among the refugees. Importantly, the inventory should identify priorities and interests among male and female refugee members. This is also an area where clear and coordinated efforts need to be established between Iran and Afghanistan.
1. Basic Facts

(i) General Context

WFP has been assisting Afghan and Iraqi refugees since 1987 in Iran. In 2003 Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO 10213.0) was prepared to assist 80,000 refugees in 29 camps. This number has significantly reduced since the start of voluntary repatriation, and currently some 26,376 Afghan refugees in 6 camps, 2,874 Iraqi Arabs in 4 camps and 2,125 Iraqi Kurds in 8 camps remain.

Since 2003, UNHCR has been engaged in major voluntary repatriation initiatives. According to UNHCR records, some 585,357 refugees repatriated of which 46,595 were camp-based. It needs to be noted that the majority of these were Iraqi refugees. In 2004 based on a strategy presented by UNHCR to WFP on 14 June and followed by communications to BAFIA thereafter, not least through the Tripartite Agreement 1 July 2004 - 30 March 2005, UNHCR suspended major camp services to refugees and WFP followed with suspending food assistance to Afghan refugee camps as per WFP letter to BAFIA of 14 December 2004. Effectively, UNHCR's assistance was suspended in March 2004, while WFP's food assistance continued until the end March 2005. However, the distribution of wheat flour from stocks held by Government Trading Corporation (GTC) through the Bureau for Alien and Foreign Affairs (BAFIA) has continued to date.

Suspension of assistance was initiated in order to create disincentives in the camps thereby encouraging a greater number of refugees to repatriate. BAFIA was faced with the responsibility to continue to provide camp management and some other services to the refugees in the camp. Evidently, it has never been the policy of Iran to absorb financial and service provision responsibilities for the refugees.

In June 2005, the Government of Iran (Director General of BAFIA and Iranian Ambassador to Italy) met with WFP Executive Director regarding suspension of assistance. BAFIA indicated that the remaining refugees in the camps are vulnerable and cutting off food aid programme to vulnerable people living in the camps is not appropriate. Following the meeting, initiatives were taken to undertake a Joint Assessment Mission to refugee camps as soon as possible; however, due to intervening circumstances, the intended assessment was delayed until April 2006. In early 2006, both WFP and UNHCR agreed to continue food assistance to camp refugees as indicated in the exchange of notes between the two agencies.

---

1 This includes 142,084 refugees repatriation in 2003; 377,564 in 2004; 63,674 in 2005 and 2,035 repatriated up to mid 2006.
2 In fact, existing stocks of wheat flour can last for another 21 months at the current refugee numbers in the 18 camps.
(ii) Objectives & Methods

A Joint Assessment Mission\(^3\) (JAM) for Afghan refugee camps was undertaken by WFP and UNHCR, and BAFIA participated at each camp from 26 April to 8 May 2006. The assessment mission was tasked to assess the food security and social impacts of suspension of humanitarian assistance since March 2004; identify measures that may be required to support long term solutions to repatriation and/or resettlement, and recommend modalities to ensure that refugees have access to adequate quantity and quality of food and services to meet their nutritional and social requirements, and determine UN phase-out strategies (see Annex 1 for details).

Both WFP and UNHCR agreed to undertake a reassessment of the refugee situation using the in-depth food security assessment carried out in 2003 as the basis to gauge changes in food security and service provision. Sample refugee camps visited by the Mission were selected by WFP & UNHCR offices in Teheran based on different status of the camps themselves. The camps selected only include Afghan refugees where assistance suspension took effect; the Mission notes that assistance was not suspended for Iraqi camp refugees. Also, it should be noted that the intended nutritional survey was not made possible at the time, and this was discussed at entry discussion with WFP and UNHCR. It was concluded that the Mission would make a recommendation of whether to conduct a full-scale nutritional assessment at the end of its assessment.

The Mission used combined primary data collection and secondary data review. The Mission reviewed and analysed secondary data: (i) refugee numbers and statistics obtained from UNHCR, and repatriation records; (ii) the 2003 Food Security and Livelihood Vulnerability Assessment is used the main reference of comparison on food security, social services and camp management; (iii) prevailing health, education, gender issues that influence refugee well-being and food security; (v) reviewed previous JAM reports (see Annex 2 for matrix summarising action taken from the recommendation). The Mission met with National, Provincial and local BAFIA authorities, BAFIA camp managers, Health Workers, School principals, Global Partner, UNIDO and UNAMA, WFP and UNHCR (see Annex 6 for list of persons contacted).

As part of its primary data collection, the Mission visited 3 out of 6 Afghan refugee camps: Bardsir, Torbat-e-Jam, and Naseri. In each of the camps focus group discussions were conducted, individual households interviewed, service facilities including schools, health centres, and garbage collection visited. Primary data was collected using focus group discussions covering 101 persons (68 males and 33 females) in the three camps. Individual

\(^3\) The Mission members consists of Getachew Diriba, Regional Programme Advisor, WFP Regional Bureau for Middle East, Eastern Europe & Central Asia; Dara Darbandi, Programme Assistant, WFP Iran; Mojgan Darabi, Programme Assistant WFP Iran; Abandokht Sarkarati, Community Service Assistant, UNHCR Iran.
household interviews covered 25 families including house-to-house visits. The total refugees in the three camps visited are 15,823 (8,165 male and 7,623 females), a total of 2,662 families, representing 60% of the total Afghan refugees in all camps. Focus group interviews were semi-structured and conducted with men and women to better understand opportunities and constraints to the health, education, and livelihood strategies employed by the refugees. Individual household interviews were carried to collect information on household food access, job opportunities and their individual perception for possibilities of repatriation.

(iii) Refugee numbers and demography

According to UNHCR records, as of March 2004, there were 31,908 Afghan refugees in 7 camps. This number is reduced to 26,376 refugees in 6 camps at the time of the Mission’s assessment. After the suspension of assistance one refugee camp in Sistan-Baluchistan was closed consisting of 4,526 refugees. In effect, the net repatriation from the remaining Afghan refugee camps stands at 503 persons since the suspension of assistance. During the same period, a total of 41,063 Iraqi camp refugees (Kurds and Arabs) have repatriated, and currently there remain about 4,999 refugees in 12 camps as shown in Table 1 (see Annex 3 for details by camp).

Table 1: Summary of Camp Refugee Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Kurd</td>
<td>7,143</td>
<td>5,018</td>
<td>2,125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Arab</td>
<td>38,919</td>
<td>36,045</td>
<td>2,874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan</td>
<td>31,908</td>
<td>5,532</td>
<td>26,376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>77,970</td>
<td>46,595</td>
<td>31,375</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNHCR Iran

According to UNHCR statistics, some 289,641 Afghans and 39,173 Iraqis totalling 328,814 refugees repatriated (spontaneous & assisted) during the course of 2004 & 2005. The number of refugees living in Iran, outside of camps is 716,355 (see Table 2).

Table 2 Total refugees in Iran

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Afghan &amp; Iraqi Population in Iran</th>
<th>Afghan</th>
<th>Iraqi</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>End 2003</td>
<td>834,699</td>
<td>150,196</td>
<td>984,895</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>end 2004</td>
<td>952,802</td>
<td>93,173</td>
<td>1,045,975</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>end 2005</td>
<td>662,355</td>
<td>54,000</td>
<td>716,355</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNHCR Iran
2. Food Security & Self-reliance options

(i) Food access and targeting

The primary source of food for refugees is WFP-supplied wheat flour, which continued to be distribution even during the suspension of assistance, due to considerable stocks available. Stocks of other food commodities, however, were exhausted by as of April 2005. The Mission noted that the continuation of wheat flour distribution has been an important food security buffer during the period of suspension of assistance.

Refugees have access to limited food sources through purchases such as sugar, rice and occasional pulses with irregular income from seasonal labour activities. During house-to-house visits it was noted that most households do not have stocks; they are entirely dependent on bread supplied through bakeries in the case of Bardsir and Torbat-e-Jam camps and their own bread baking in the case of Naseri. During group discussions, the most vulnerable members of camp refugees reported receiving food or financial gifts from some charities. However, charity gifts are limited and cannot be planned for. Refugees report that, since the suspension and/or reduction of food assistance, consumption habits of all camp population changed for the worse. Although there are differences between the camps, it was evident that the suspension of food assistance has had negative impacts on quantity and quality of food access for the population.

(ii) Coping strategies

Based on focus group discussions, individual household interviews and house-to-house visits, refugees reported using the following coping strategies in the face of suspension of assistance and constrained labour opportunities:

- Reduced intake of food by children and all members of the household; most children go to school without having breakfast; even lunch is often limited to potatoes, egg plant and sometimes noodles; children are more engaged in labour activities;
- Introduction of internal allocation of food to family members, for example, bread winner of the family may be fed while others have to skip meal, especially women and girls;
- In some cases, scavenging was reported as an extreme and degrading form of coping;

Consequently, since the suspension of assistance, health workers have reported more frequent low birth weight and poor growth performance of children. The continued wheat flour assistance tremendously helped maintenance of food security, however, the full benefit could not be realised.
because of the charges imposed upon it as will be discussed in the forgoing sections.

(iii) Household and camp differentiations

Refugees were asked to identify economic and social differentiation among them. They indicated the difficulty of differentiating economic groups among themselves. Nevertheless, it is noted that the most important differentiation is found in the ability of households’ engagement in shop keeping and petty trade activities on the camp itself, and those with more than one economically active member in the family. This group represents some 2% in Bardsir and 10% in Naseri. The rest of households are described as very poor and vulnerable, accounting for the vast majority of the refugees (approximately 90%). Some refugees reported owning 1 or 2 chickens, kept without permission, as this is not permitted on the camp by the camp management. Negligible number of families reported keeping sheep outside the camp, for example, in Naseri.

The refugees find it difficult to recommend an effective method of targeting given limited job opportunities and absence of discernable economic differentiation. They are of the position that assistance is extended to all members of the community, as everyone is vulnerable. See Table 3 for types and characteristics of refugee camps.

Table 3: Type and characteristics of refugee camps

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Camps visited</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Other similar camps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Bardsir</td>
<td>o extreme shortage of bread, some 200 persons without bread every day;</td>
<td>Dalaki</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(very poor housing</td>
<td>o tight control of refugee movement outside of the camp and very limited or minimal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>condition)</td>
<td>job opportunities in the area;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o large numbers of female headed households and elderly;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o poor sanitary and housing conditions;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Torbat-e-Jam</td>
<td>o Bread is available though with charges;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(good housing</td>
<td>o Refugee movement controlled although there are job opportunities in the area;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>condition)</td>
<td>o Sizeable female-headed and elderly households;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o Relatively good sanitary and camp conditions;</td>
<td>Rafsanjan, Semnan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Naseri</td>
<td>o Bread is prepared by the community; and no shortage of bread reported;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(average housing</td>
<td>o Refugee movement restricted while job opportunities available in the area;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>condition)</td>
<td>o Sizeable number of female-headed and elderly households;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o poor sanitary and camp conditions;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: JAM Mission 2006
In summary, the refugees are living under extremely difficult conditions with the suspension of assistance, levy charges for all services provided in the camp and continued restrictions placed upon their movements. Job opportunities continue to be very limited & irregular, on average for 10 to 15 days a month. Only a tiny proportion of the refugees reported seasonal jobs at a greater risk of various measures. In comparison to the food security status reported in 2003, no improvements have been recorded, in fact in many cases the food security situation have deteriorated combined with absence of social services. Refugees have no work permits, and are at risk to fines or arrest for working outside the camps. They are engaged in the lowest paid jobs, and have no legal recourse if they are not paid. These conditions combined with suspension of food assistance as well as service facility provision to the camp population have worsened the food security status for the camp refugees.

The Mission recommends that support to the camp services as well as food assistance be re-activated with immediate effect at full ration for all refugees. The monitoring of services and food distribution should be strengthened. The existing food basket\(^4\), consisting of wheat flour, rice, pulses, vegetable oil and sugar should be maintained (see Annex 4). Food for education programme, “vegetable oil for girls’ education”, is well recognised by schoolteachers, principals, and parents, who acknowledge the positive incentives for better attendance at school. The programme should be continued covering both primary and secondary schools in the camps.

A monthly total of 382.14 mt of mixed food is needed for general food distribution including vegetable oil for girls’ education as well as food for skills training. The CO reports an in-country stock of 6,972 mt of wheat flour, 57 mt of vegetable oil, 34 mt of pulses, and 24 mt of sugar at end of March 2006 (see Table 4 and refer to Annex 4 for ration standards applied). While the wheat stock is expected to last some 21 months, other commodity stocks are minimal and covers needs of Iraqi camps. Efforts must be made to resource commodities for Afghans at the earliest.

In order to cater for the food needs of refugees, a new PRRO document should be prepared covering at least two years period with periodic review of policies, and repatriation progress to adjust beneficiary numbers as necessary. During the interim period of assistance suspension, the stocks that were delivered to BAFIA (general distribution, oil for girls) were delegated to refugee council for distribution. As such formal distribution report has not been received and should be followed up to ensure accountability. Monitoring activities, with the resumption of food assistance, should be strengthened.

\(^4\) Historically two-cereal commodities have always been included in refugee food basket. It is noted that culturally bread constitutes part of the meal and rice the main staple food. For these reasons, BAFIA strongly argues that both wheat and rice be part of the food basket for the refugees.
Table 4: Food Assistance Requirements for 24 Months

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities³</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Food Requirements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Wheat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,899.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>71.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6,646.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7,906.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,985.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7,956.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>82.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>331.54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: JAM Mission 2006

(iv) Self-reliance & Exit strategies

(A) Repatriation Options

Repatriation for Afghan camp refugees is not taking place as initially anticipated. According to BAFIA, continued repatriation should be supported and linked to condition in Afghanistan with the help of NGOs and UN agencies. Cooperation between Iran and Afghanistan governments can help continued repatriation. Furthermore, BAFIA believes that security in Afghanistan is the main critical factor for repatriation. Afghan refugees continue to report that they cannot return without a stable security situation in Afghanistan.

Repatriation challenges are many according to the refugees themselves⁷. It must be noted that refugees are well informed about the political and economic conditions in Afghanistan. They regularly receive information about the security and recovery initiatives in Afghanistan through personal contacts, letters from relatives in Afghanistan, telephone calls, firsthand

⁵ Beneficiaries for food for education and skills training are provisional estimates & will be updated at the time of project preparation.

⁶ Stock balance in the country excluding wheat is only for Iraqi camps consumption, therefore, food requirements should be resources for Afghan camps.
information from individuals who have returned from Afghanistan, and media reports. Based on this information, they express the view that the conditions are insufficient to trigger a return to Afghanistan as there is no land, no water, not even tents, no job opportunities, no schools, and as such.

The refugees themselves describe the characteristics of those who repatriated as economically better off, originating from big cities and returning to big cities. However, those who remained in the camps originated from rural Afghanistan and do not have enough money, villages are often destroyed and without basic services, based on firsthand account of those who actually returned back to Iran after an initial repatriation.

Refugees indicate that repatriation is only possible if security situation improves, access to land is guaranteed and job opportunities are available including food and financial assistance. The refugees point out that an overriding decision of return is determined by peace, stability, and national disarmament. Many refugees indicated that they do not want to return under the present security condition in Afghanistan. The refugees state that although their conditions deteriorated in Iran, they will continue to stay in the camp because they have at least bread. When presented with the challenge of assistance being suspended fully, refugees indicated that even if assistance continues to be suspended, they will remain in Iran.

In summary, combinations of factors prevent the return of Afghan refugees.

- First, the refugees believe that the condition in Afghanistan have not improved to support their return even in the face of deteriorating assistance in Iran.
- Second, many of the camp refugees represent a particular social group such as female headed, the elderly, and poor economic and financial status that poses a major challenge to the expectation of re-establishment upon their repatriation. Even the young and physically able persons do not indicate the desire to repatriate, as they believe that job opportunities are limited or unavailable in their place of destination in rural Afghanistan.
- Third, the refugees are well informed about the conditions in Afghanistan in terms of peace and security, and status of recovery activities. For refugees originating from rural Afghanistan, they believe that neither security nor economic conditions are put in place to support their repatriation.

(B) Local Integration

The Mission has had extensive discussions with BAFIA authorities at all levels regarding possibilities of local integration and policies pertaining to it. BAFIA

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7 A joint press communiqué of 26 April 2006 between BAFIA and UNHCR anticipates that ‘up to 500,000 refugees and displaced persons who recently re-register under Amayesh II exercise may return voluntarily to their homeland’ in accordance with Tripartite agreement recently extended until March 2007.
is unequivocal in that the Government of Iran policy does not support refugee integration. As such, under the present policy regime, integration is not an option. This is an issue that need to be discussed between UNHCR and BAFIA as part of their policy dialogue.

(C) Job permits

Refugee employment opportunities are explored as a principal self-reliance option. Legally, refugees are not permitted to engage in any form of employment. However, in a limited and restricted fashion refugees continue to be engaged in various types of jobs in surrounding towns and farmlands. Jobs are mostly seasonal; and expose the refugees to variety of risks. However risky the options are, it is these employment options that have helped the refugees to pay for the numerous camp management levies imposed upon them.

Issuance of travel document involves payment of fees, which usually is valid for one month; yet, refugees are detained when found working even if they have a travel document, sometimes leading to deportation, and fines to employers of refugees. The enforcement of rules is not implemented in the same vigour.

The Government of Iran’s position is that there is no job for refugees with rising unemployment concerns for Iranian citizens. BAFIA maintains the view that those seeking employment should apply for visa after returning to their country, and work permit will be issued at the time. But, there is no possibility of easing employment restriction for the refugees.

(D) Skills training

Refugees themselves view skills training as a key opportunity for increased self-reliance option. However, refugees are not allowed to participate in some specific types of skills training, such as a driving license courses, as Iranian birth certificate is needed to be eligible for government provided training. Privately owned skills training centres are available; however, it is not affordable for most refugees.

Refugees express the need for training in carpet weaving, computer & language training, tailoring, nursing and midwifery, hairdressing, embroidery, welding, mechanics, construction, and farming activities. The desire of camp refugees for skills training differs for male and female. Male refugees express a greater interest in participating in skills training than female due to cultural reasons. Female indicated preference for computer training, language,
tailoring, nursing and midwifery, hairdressing, embroidery. On the other hand, male indicated preference for language, driving, computer/typing, carpentry, tailoring, welding and mechanics.

The Mission recommends that targeted skills training for the refugees should be undertaken in collaboration with NGOs and UN agencies and it should be linked to an expressed desire for repatriation, and this constitutes exit strategy. Possibilities for targeted skills training should be explored with Global Partner and UNIDO in Iran; and should be coordinated with Afghanistan recovery initiatives (Government of Afghanistan, UNAMA, NGOs) to ensure that the skills offered in Iran are relevant to the conditions and job demands in Afghanistan. To ensure effective selection of relevant training skills and participant identification, UNHCR should undertake inventory of skills training programmes in partnership with key NGOs and UN agencies. Importantly, the inventory should discuss priorities and interests among male and female refugee members. This is also an area where a clear and coordinated efforts be established between Iran and Afghanistan.

3. Non-food requirements and other related concerns

(i) Health

The mission visited health clinics of the three camps to review the level of health care services provided to refugees, in particular the quality of the services after the suspension of the UN’s assistance. The mission looked into the records of the health clinics, talked to health workers and patients.

Health care services are provided by the Ministry of Health (MOH) and include antenatal, postnatal care, immunization, family planning, child growth monitoring, in-patient service (except Bardsir), and Labour room service (except Naseri). Three refugee health workers, trained by MOH, are the main service providers since 2004 when UNHCR ended its assistance.

General ailments that used to be treated by physicians regularly and free of charge are now referred to out-of-camp medical centres on the days that camps do not have physician. Refugees have to pay between 11,000 to 14,000 Rls\(^8\) per consultation on the three days that camp health centre is attended by a physician and full cost of medication if the camp pharmacy is still in service which in most camps is not. This places a heavy financial burden on refugees, as they have to pay for transportation, medical consultation and medication. Many refugees forego treatment, as they cannot afford the medical costs outside camps or even inside camps. In addition, according to the health workers, the facilities are not equipped with necessary equipment and drugs (i.e. some camps do not have ORS or scales to weigh children). This programme also used to benefit from voluntary

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\(^8\) 1.00 USD = 9,155.87 Iran Rials
health worker system within the camps, but the system collapsed with the suspension of assistance. With suspension of assistance, BAFIA, MOH and UNHCR have reduced /withdraw assistance from camps that resulted in voluntary workers unwilling to continue volunteer services.

Looking through health records and discussions with health workers it was noted that most common diseases are skin diseases such as leishmaniosis, diarrhoea, worm infection, peptic ulcer/diseases, dysentery, urinary tract infection and gynaeocological issues. Observations of the mission, together with information from the health workers and BAFIA camp managers, poor sanitary conditions and lack of personal hygiene are considered possible causes of the ailments. TB patients are registered for DOTS therapy and are provided with daily treatment. However, it was felt that the screening of the patient was at a low level and there is a need to improve the case detection rate for TB. HIV/AIDS posters are posted at health centre but there have not been any awareness raising or education on HIV/AIDS in camps; some health workers reported some refugees approached for information. With the withdrawal of assistance, the system become user-pay-basis; as such health services become less accessible to the refugees in comparison to pre-2004 period where services were provided free to all camp refugees on a comprehensive basis.

Deliveries which used to be assisted by educated midwives free of charge now are handled by trained refugee midwives who should be paid by refugees. As a result, home deliveries with the help of TBA and its consequences have been increased. Complicated deliveries have to be referred to city hospitals. Ambulances are available and continue to function in the camps.

Family planning program has also been negatively affected since there are no educated midwives in the camps to take care of IUDs and progesterone ampoule. This also can be the result of not having voluntary health workers system, which has not been functional in the last six months. There is no health education program in the camps except at the times of national campaign such as bird flu or cholera. According to health workers, low birth weight and premature labour has increased after suspension of the assistance. Child growth monitoring records revealed that children’s growth rate as per the health charts has declined, especially after six month when supplementary feeding is introduced.

The routine follow up for the children with declining growth records is providing them with iron and multi vitamin drops and referral to physician; refugees cannot afford paying for the recommended medication. Breastfeeding continues to be a common practice in the camps and in very few exceptional cases MOH provides the formula milk. There is no distribution of sanitary material for women. Girls and women in productive age rarely afford sanitary napkins. Piece of clothing is usually used instead. Extended
Programme for Immunisation (EPI) is carried out according to MOH standards in terms of cold chain and vaccination protocols. All camp health centres reported high coverage of vaccination, almost 100% coverage. There is no dental care in camp health centres since 2004 when UNHCR suspended its assistance. The mission noted that reporting and record keeping system was not helpful in understanding a clear picture of health and nutrition status of the refugees.

The mission recommends that UNHCR’s health care services be activated to ensure that:

- Camp health centres are supplied with necessary medication and equipments. Dental care should be available through health centres.
- Medical and para medical staff be regularly available in the health centres to provide refugees with the services;
- Preventive health care services should be started. Health education with relevant educational material be provided in order to control diseases such as diarrhoea, skin infections and worm infestation and HIV/AIDS through community awareness. Current family size is estimated 6 with the tendency to early marriage for young girls, and thus efforts should be made to strengthen family planning services;
- Sanitary material should be distributed to all women in reproductive age. The sanitary napkins can be distributed through health centres;
- Voluntary health workers should be reorganised and trained to provide health education;
- TB case detection rate should be improved through staff training on WHO guidelines for the management of TB and active case detection by the health care providers;
- Establish a standard health information system for reporting and monitoring purposes.

(ii) Education

The mission visited three primary schools (2251 Students including 1099 girls) and discussed with school principals and teachers as well as students. It is noted that, according to school principals and teachers, students have less concentration at school and there are several cases of fainting during school hours since the suspension of oil for girls’ education. The Mission cannot ascertain if the reported fainting is solely due to suspension of food assistance or other reasons.

The general conditions of the schools vary from camp to camp. All camps have primary schools (grade 1 to 5) for girls and boys but secondary (grade 6-8) and high schools (grade 9-11) for girls are not available in most of the camps (only Torbat e Jam has high school for girls) and girls have to go to the city to continue their education. Students have to pay education fees for secondary & high school when not available on the camps. This situation
prevents girls from continuing education because it is not culturally accepted to send unaccompanied girls outside the camp, and the cost of education (transportation, registration fee, text book and stationery) is a burden to the families. Even in the camps that have secondary school for girls, net enrolment rate is low and most of the girls do not register for higher levels (some get married and some stay at home).

Students requested sport equipment such as footballs and playground. As indicated earlier, most of the children go to school without breakfast, and cases of fainting were reported due to absence of food. It is also reported that since suspension of food assistance, students concentrate less in the class. Boys’ dropout rates have increased as they have to contribute to family income through temporary jobs.

School principals reported that school-feeding programme (oil for girls’ education) had a positive role on the girls’ education and recommend its continued availability. It was noted that Ministry of Education has been providing a school snack in formal schools (milk and biscuits) for six months of a scholastic year (September to March). The principals reported that some students take the snack home to share with their family members.

Afghan refugees are excluded from pre-university grades (12th grade) as well as any institution of higher education since the introduction of Iranian policy on higher education in 2004. Since then, foreign nationals can only access higher education if they pay full tuition fees. Prior to 2004, Afghan refugees were admitted to higher education with the same condition as Iranians. Iran grants scholarship to foreign nationals, in which the scheme applies to both Afghan refugees and residents in Afghanistan. However, winner of a scholarship can only be awarded, in the case of refugees, if the refugee returns to Afghanistan, obtain passport and give up refugee ID card.

The Mission recommends that due priority should be accorded to higher education for Afghan refugees that will facilitate their self-reliance by offering opportunities for return to their country of origin. The Mission recommends that UNHCR in partnership with Ministry of Education and BAFIA provide educational and sport supplies such as textbooks, stationery, and assist girls’ secondary school education where not available on the refugee camps. Furthermore, WFP should continue oil-for-girls education in primary level and expanded to secondary level and provide health facilities for school children.

(iii) Protection issues

Some refugees raised a number of protection issues in focus group discussions and during individual household interviews. All camps have a refugee council, which decides on various crucial issues pertaining to the running costs of the camps in tandem with BAFIA camp managers. There were complaints in some camps that the refugee council does not represent
refugee interests and even some case of violence were reported as was the case in Bardsir.

Refugees cannot work, as permits are not granted by BAFIA. However their involvement in some activities such as construction or agriculture has been tolerated. Camp refugees have access to some seasonal labour if they can manage to get BAFIA permission and obtain travel document. Camp refugees reported unpaid labour especially amongst female refugees with no access to legal protection. The mission also noted some cases of detention with no specific legal justification. During individual household interviews, it was revealed that in some camps girls escape from the camps with no news of them; some have been arrested by police and forced to return to their families in camps. These girls do not benefit from any kind of consultation and are isolated from their friends and rest of the community. In one camp there was also deportation report.

During school visits, the Mission noted a few cases where authorities refuse to register students with corrected personal/family data during the second phase of Amayesh (the refugee registration exercise). Computerised school registration system does not recognize the corrected student record and these students are without educational records. Though most of the problems have been solved, with the help of BAFIA, it is a valid concern for those who still have the problem.

The Mission recommends that refugee council should be elected in an open and transparent manner and serve for a defined duration, and detention of refugees be avoided.

(iv) Gender

Gender issues cut across many areas such as health, nutrition, and education. Although in the past few years achievements have been made in the field of gender, especially in terms of literacy, education and health care, serious challenges remain in relation to women’s participation in the employment market, decision-making and political life in general.

Currently most of ration cards (over 90%) are in the name of men in all refugee camps and women have no decision-making role in food distribution process. Of course they can collect the rations at warehouse but they are not encouraged to participate in other arrangements. So far, the introduction of ration cards in the name of women and their involvement in the food distribution has been limited to only one pilot project in the Afghan camp of Torbat-e-Jam, which nevertheless has proven to be very successful.

Culturally, men have a greater desire to participate in social activities such as skills training, election procedure and ultimately the women’s presence in
society is less, and they have the minimum representation in refugee committees and decision-making positions. Afghan women are restricted to whatever income generating activity can be done at home as they are unable to leave the camp in search of work. Women have skills to make handicrafts, but lack of resources and market outlets have prevented them from doing so. In few camps, women are able to work and earn a daily wage such as shelling pistachios or weaving carpet.

Inability for students, particularly girls, to continue secondary and higher education is resulting in their not being able to find better-paid jobs hence limiting their contributions to the increasingly strapped household economy. Torbat-e-Jam is the only camp that has secondary and high school for boys and girls.

The Mission recommends that WFP/UNHCR develop a Joint Gender Action Plan (GAP) aiming at increasing the role of women refugees in their communities. Particular emphasis should be placed on:

- Promoting access to education & skills training for refugee women & girls through food incentives.
- Promoting a greater role of women in food distribution process to enhance women’s control over food distributions.
- Social awareness raising on issues of interest to women through public information campaign.
- Extend oil for girl education for both primary and secondary schools.

(iv) Camp management and levies

BAFIA continues to maintain coordination and management responsibility for the refugees. With the suspension of assistance programme, BAFIA introduced a levy system to manage the camps. These charges include 15,000 RLS per month for bakery service, 100,000 RLS per month for running cost of the camps, 15,000 RLS per medical consultation, 250,000 RLS per child delivery, 50,000 RLS per student per year for school stationery and 22,000 RLS for ID card permit to be able travel out of camp for duration of one month (see Table 5).

Table 5: Compulsory charges and levies on refugees camps

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of charges</th>
<th>Amount paid in RIALS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bardsir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bakery charge</td>
<td>100 per bread; 500 RLS per family per day; this translates to 15,000 RLS per family per month;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Running cost of camp</td>
<td>100,000 RLS per family per month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID card for movement out of camp</td>
<td>22,000 RLS per month per person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical consultation</td>
<td>15,000 RLS per visit; no longer physician;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delivery</td>
<td>250,000 RLS per delivery</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
School stationery | 50,000 RLs per student per year | 50,000 RLs per student per year | 50,000 RLs per student per year
---|---|---|---
Fuel and heating cost | N.A | N.A | N.A
Amayesh (resident permit fee) | 28,000 RLs per person (irregular payment) | 28,000 RLs per person (irregular payment) | 28,000 RLs per person (irregular payment)

Source: Mission Assessment, May 2006
These are excessive charges for the refugees and have compromised their food security and access to social service facilities in the face of restricted job permits.

In summary, it is noted that increasingly more financial and management responsibilities have been passed to refugees without there being sufficient conditions or means to pay for the levies. In the case of Bardsir refugee representatives are not elected and remain deeply unpopular. Also, because of legal limitations, refugees cannot be hired as drivers or maintenance service personnel; hence often Iranians are employed for these activities at a higher salary. There is no transparency in the refugee rights; for example, wheat flour distribution is tied to payment of camp charges in Naseri camp.

(v) Iraqi Camp consolidation

As indicated earlier, Iraqi refugee camps were not part of the initial sample included in the assessment. However, the Mission reviewed existing monitoring reports and discussed with WFP and NHCR staff regarding their conditions. It is noted that Iraqi refugees, in comparison to Afghan refugees, are better integrated into host communities due to cultural and language affinities. Historically, the Iraqi refugees who fled as an opposition force against Saddam Hussein, most of them repatriated with the fall of the regime, and very few remained in the camps. According to UNHCR records, only 4,999 refugees remain in 12 camps.

The repatriation of the residual Iraqi refugee cases are constrained by the political situation in Iraq and limited economic possibilities for the refugees themselves. Camp consolidation has been attempted by UNHCR and BAFIA with some achievements. UNHCR has conducted willingness survey of refugees for further consolidation of the remaining camps; however, UNHCR reports that the refugees are not willing to participate in a further camp consolidation. Existing 12 camps with 4,999 refugees present logistical difficulties to deliver food and associated services. The Mission recommends that BAFIA and UNHCR further review the situation of Iraqi refugees with the view to repatriate and/or integrate them into local economy.

4 – Logistics
WFP provides wheat grain to Grain Trade Company (GTC), a governmental company, which GTC mills the grain at extraction rate of 20%. It is then provided BAFIA at each refugee camp for distribution. BAFIA allocates wheat flour to different provinces through GTC delivery channels to refugee camps; when the instruction letter is not received from GTC central to provincial GTC, refugee camps run short of bread as we noted in Bardsir, a problem that is reported more often. With absence of other forms of assistance and income sources, the disruption of wheat flour supply presents a food access challenge to the refugees.

Accounting for wheat flour distribution has been rather difficult and no report has been received thus far. In the past, stock cards were monitored for each camp, but this system needs revisiting. Although previous JAM recommended cash payment for milling, system of in-kind milling continues in force. Pursuant to previous JAM (2002) recommendation, and continued paucity of information on milling and actual delivery of wheat flour to refugees, the Mission recommends a further revision of the agreement with GTC and BAFIA, leading to cash payment for milling instead of the prevailing practice of in-kind milling. The true account of food channelled through GTC and the actual quantity delivered/distributed to refugees through BAFIA should be reviewed and monitored.

5 – Partnership and Related Issues

(i) Partnership and Coordination

In view of the need for regular information exchange, the Mission recommends regular BAFIA, UNHCR and WFP coordination meetings at policy and operational levels to ensure a) current recommendations are addressed b) self-reliance measures including repatriation, integration and work permit issues are discussed and agreed upon c) milling arrangements agreed upon; c) possibilities of consolidating Iraqi camps into two (Iraqi-Arab and Iraqi-Kurdi) explored, or consider closure of camps once situation improves in Iraq.

Further partnership opportunities with UNIDO, Global Partner, and other NGOs should be explored regarding targeted skills training for camp refugees in Iran. Also, partnership should be established with key players in Afghanistan to ensure timely information sharing, identification and determination of skills training, and linking refugees to recovery progress in Afghanistan.

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9 For every 100 kg of wheat grain supplied by WFP, GTC delivers 80 kg wheat flour to BAFIA.
(ii) Wheat for repatriation

Food (Wheat) for repatriation that was part of PRRO 10213.0 is challenged by practical concerns of preparation of bread and handling at exit points. UNHCR is currently considering other mechanisms for promoting repatriation, such as a partial food package in Iran, and part inside Afghanistan. This will have to be discussed with the WFP and UNHCR Afghanistan offices in consideration of new of phase of refugee assistance programme.

(iii) Contingency planning

WFP and UNHCR should consider preparing contingency plan for the refugees related to refugee welfare and safety as well as in view of deteriorating security conditions in Afghanistan.

6 – Options and final recommendations

Food assistance resumption

1. After extensive review of refugee food access strategies, the Mission recommends that WFP resumes food assistance with immediate effect at full ration for a total of 26,374 Afghan refugees currently residing in 6 camps. Existing ration standard of 350 grams of wheat, 100 gram of rice, 20 grams of vegetable oil, 30 grams of pulse and 15 grams of sugar will apply with a total of 1677.5 kcal per person per day. Targeting food assistance is unpractical given legal and operational limitations to job opportunities. School feeding programme for girls’ education should be resumed. Currently, there are 2,440 girls in all of primary schools.

2. Distribution and post-distribution monitoring must be strengthened to ensure that WFP food assistance and services provided by UNHCR are in place to maximise the benefits of assistance resumption. WFP’s food assistance should be linked to UNHCR’s resumption of support to camp services, health, and education assistance to bring about greater positive impacts on the welfare of refugees. WFP’s food assistance alone will not have the intended effect without simultaneous activation of health, education and camp management services by UNHCR.

Camp management and provision of services

3. UNHCR in collaboration with BAFIA and MOH should strengthen health service provision to camp refugee population including medical and equipment supplies, sanitary material, dental care and health staff available at the health centres. Also, preventive health care services should be started: health education, HIV/AIDS awareness, and family
planning services. Voluntary health workers should be reorganised and be trained to provide health education. The health care providers should improve TB case detection rate through staff training on WHO guidelines for the management of TB and active case detection. Furthermore, a standard health information system for reporting and monitoring should be established and strengthened.

4. UNHCR in collaboration with BAFIA and Ministry of Education should provide educational supplies such as textbooks, stationery and assist schools in the supply of sport facilities (for example footballs). Assistance should be provided for girls’ secondary school where not available on the refugee camps. Since 2004, Afghan refugees are excluded from pre-university as well as university education opportunities. Iranian scholarship grant to foreign nationals, particularly the refugees, is tied to the return of a refugee to Afghanistan, giving up refugee ID card and obtain passport. Priority should be accorded to higher education for Afghan refugees that will facilitate their self-reliance by offering opportunities for return to their country of origin.

5. WFP and UNHCR develop a Joint Gender Action Plan aiming at increasing the role of women refugees in their communities. Particular emphasis should be placed on access to education & skills training for refugee women & girls through food incentives, promote greater role of women in the food distribution process to enhance women’s control over food in relief food distributions and community awareness raising.

6. Protection of refugee rights should be upheld at all times. For example, refugee council should be elected in an open and transparent manner and serve for a defined duration; and detention of refugees be avoided.

7. The prevailing delegation of camp management and excessive charges to the refugees have compromised their food security and access to social service facilities in the face of restricted job permits. UNHCR/BAFIA should absorb camp management levies until work permits and other legal limitations are removed and refugees are able to earn income in the labour markets.

**Self-reliance & exit strategies**

8. Limitations on repatriation should be recognised while maintaining continued efforts by UNHCR and BAFIA. Repatriation, as acknowledged by BAFIA and refugees themselves, must be linked to improvements in security conditions in Afghanistan as well as recovery efforts undertaken in the country, particularly in rural Afghanistan where most camp refugees originated. Priority should be accorded to access health, education, land and basic support upon their return.
9. Targeted skills training for the refugees should be undertaken in collaboration with NGOs and UN agencies and it should be linked to an expressed desire for repatriation as a key to self-reliance and exit strategy. Possibilities for targeted skills training should be explored with Global Partner and UNIDO in Iran; and should be coordinated with Afghanistan recovery initiatives (Government of Afghanistan, UNAMA, NGOs) to ensure that the skills offered in Iran are relevant to the conditions and job demands in Afghanistan. To ensure effective selection of relevant training skills and participant identification, UNHCR should undertake inventory of skills training programmes in partnership with key NGOs and UN agencies. Importantly, the inventory should identify priorities and interests among male and female refugee members. This is also an area where a clear and coordinated efforts be established between Iran and Afghanistan.

**Policy Level Coordination**

10. Regular coordination meetings among BAFIA, UNHCR and WFP should be strengthened to regularly review policy issues affecting the welfare of refugees, including integration into local economy; job permits, higher education, and targeted skills training for enhanced repatriation. It is through these concerted policy measures that lasting exit strategies can be formulated.
Annex 1: Terms of Reference
UNHCR-WFP-BAFIA Joint Assessment Mission

WFP and UNHCR Regional Directors agreed in August/September 2005 that a Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) to determine the primary causes for non-repatriation of Afghan refugees in camps and assess whether any major changes have occurred in the food security situation of these refugees over the past two years would be organized.

OBJECTIVES

• Assess the primary causes for non-repatriation of Afghan refugees in camps and determine prospects for voluntary return of refugees;
• Assess whether any major changes have occurred in the food security situation of Iraqi and Afghan refugees encamped in Iran since the December 2003 WFP Food Security and Livelihood Vulnerability Assessment of Afghan and Iraqi Kurd Refugee Households Encamped in Iran (report released June 2004);
• Determine how stopping care and maintenance programmes, including support to education and provision of medical services, in the Afghan camps since July 2004 has affected overall living conditions (including food security status) of Afghan refugees encamped in Iran;
• Determine what new measures, if any, may be necessary and what continuing assistance may be required to support long term solutions to repatriation and/or resettlement issues;
• Recommend modalities to ensure that refugees have access to an adequate quantity and quality of food to meet their nutritional requirements, as well as modalities to ensure that the needs for non-food supplies, services and protection to maintain nutritional health and avoid harmful coping strategies are met;
• Determine whether assistance to Afghan non camp refugees, suspended in April 2005, should be resumed;
• Outline an intervention strategy for next 12-18 months, including ways to promote voluntary repatriation;
• Determine a time frame for phasing out UN assistance to Afghan and Iraqi refugees encamped in Iran.

METHODOLOGY

The assessment mission team will use as a foundation for its assessment the findings of the WFP Food Security and Livelihood Vulnerability Assessment of Afghan and Iraqi Kurd Refugee Households Encamped in Iran. The mission will

• Review and analyze available reports in regard to (i) the numbers and current situation of the refugees in the various locations and any recent movements, (ii) their food security status (iii) the current health, nutrition and education situation and factors influencing food security (iv) security, protection and gender concerns (v) willingness to repatriate (vi) tripartite agreement signed on 30 June and (vii) previous JAMs conducted in 2002 and 2004;

10 WFP Food Security and Livelihood Vulnerability of Afghan and Iraqi Kurd Refugee Households Encamped in Iran, conducted in December 2003 (report issued in June 2004); supplemented by The Food Security Situation of Refugees Living in Iran, Final Report of Oxfam Food and Nutrition Consultant to WFP Iran, Mary Atkinson, May 2003.
• Meet with relevant national, provincial and local authorities, NGOs and other organizations working with the refugees;
• Visit refugee camps to
• Meet with site managers, the personnel responsible for food, health, water, sanitation or community services, and with refugee leaders and representatives involved in the implementation programmes;
• Meet with refugees – men, women and young people/adolescents – representing distinct socio-economic subgroups identified within the population;
• Inspect general conditions at the site, in household or communal shelters, in cooking areas, around water sources, in toilets/defecation areas, in storage areas on or near the site;
• Observe food and water availability and cooking arrangements in a sample of households, and informal discussions with women, men and children in the household;
• Visit clinics, schools and other community services; discussions with health workers, teachers and community service workers;
• Observe markets within the settlement and in the vicinity, and possibly interview some local traders to establish basic food market information.

Locations to visit include
• Tehran: BAFIA, WFP and UNHCR Offices
• Selected Afghan refugee camps (number and locations to be determined)

Analysis should:
• Document the progress of actions taken to implement the recommendations of the last assessment or review and the related Joint Plan of Action (including any amendments or addendums to it), including the reasons for lack of progress;
• Identify reasons/causes for non-return of Afghan refugee caseload in camps;
• Identify reasons/views of refugees in regard to ideas/plans for returning to the respective countries of origin;
• Assess (i) the extent to which different groups of refugees are presently able to meet the food needs of their families, (ii) how the level of their self-reliance based on current strategies can be expected to change during the immediate and medium term, and (iii) assess how vulnerable the respective self-reliance is to foreseeable risk factors.
• Assess the effects of reduced food assistance and care and maintenance programmes to Afghan refugees in camps;
• Identify ways in which food assistance could be linked to repatriation with the aim to promote self-sufficiency of the refugees, encouraging them to repatriate.
• Identify, through consensus building, mechanisms leading to an exit strategy of UN assistance to refugees encamped in Iran;

REQUIRED OUTPUT
The required output consists of a concise report that:
• summarizes the findings and analysis, specifying any uncertainties due to data limitations;
• highlights the changes that have occurred in the general situation since the last joint assessment/review;
• describes the extent to which previous recommendations have been implemented, the outcomes of those actions and/or the reasons for no action;
• describes the prospects for durable solutions and the probable scenarios for the immediate and medium term;
• recommends specific objectives and a strategic plan for food security and self-reliance for the next immediate and medium term, and the corresponding actions to be taken by the government, WFP, UNHCR and other partners, including determination of new measures that may be necessary and what continuing assistance is required over the immediate to medium term;
• specifies modalities and/or the need for continued food assistance and non-food assistance:
  o a planning figure for the number of persons to be provided with specific levels of food assistance during the immediate and medium term, and appropriate targeting mechanisms;
  o for food assistance, the types of food required, the ration (or rations for different groups), the total quantities of each commodity and the required delivery schedule;
  o how/by whom supplies will be received and distributed, and action to be taken to build capacity;
  o the related assistance (for example, utensils, water containers, cooking fuel, etc.) necessary to ensure that the food supplied can be efficiently used by the refugees;
  o cost/budget estimates
  o Identifies areas for further study (if required) including timelines.

Before finalizing the report, the mission will present the provisional conclusions and recommendations to the host Government, other concerned UN-agencies, the major donors and key NGOs in a specially convened wrap-up meeting.

The draft final report should be prepared following the format included in the UNHCR/WFP Joint Assessment Guidelines and be submitted to the UNHCR Representative and the WFP Country Director within 10 days of the wrap-up meeting at the end of the mission, with the report finalized within 30 days of the wrap-up meeting.

**TIMEFRAME AND DURATION OF MISSION**
The mission will be fielded from 26 April-6 May 2006.

**TEAM COMPOSITION**
The mission will be led by a senior team leader from WFP Regional Bureau in Cairo (Getachew Diriba) and would consist of nominated staff from UNHCR Iran, WFP Iran, and BAFIA) A nutritionist will also accompany the mission.

**BUDGET**
Each agency should cover the costs of its own staff/mission members (final budget to be determined). UNHCR will cover the cost of the nutritionist.
Annex 2: Matrix summarizing action taken on previous JAM recommendations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendations</th>
<th>Action taken, and when (Specify and explain any difference from the recommendation)</th>
<th>Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provide assistance only to those who meet eligibility criteria</td>
<td>General food distribution recommended by vulnerability study conducted in 2003</td>
<td>General food distribution carried out with eventual suspension of assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-camp hh food economy / vulnerability undertaken</td>
<td>Assessment was conducted in 2003 and results published in 2004</td>
<td>Remains important baseline information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR support training health post staff to collect WFH data collection</td>
<td>Growth monitoring chart for infants continues on all camps</td>
<td>Assistance suspended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food assistance to non-campus refugees, 40,000 &amp; incremental</td>
<td>Non-campus refugees were not assisted based on policy determination</td>
<td>Non-campus refugees not assisted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food assistance to vulnerable orphans</td>
<td>About 5000 orphans received general food distribution from October 2003 to March 2005.</td>
<td>Sistan-Baluchistan camp was closed in 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil for girls education (incremental coverage)</td>
<td>Continued for more than 2,400 girls in almost all primary schools.</td>
<td>Implemented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food repatriation: food assistance at exit border</td>
<td>Practical limitation of preparing bread or organising bakery at various exit points; UNHCR thinks it not feasible.</td>
<td>Not implemented at in full scope</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase out: regular coordination between WFP &amp; UNHCR</td>
<td>Information sharing started; repatriation has taken place; integration not an option</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint monitoring</td>
<td>Events of joint camp visits noted; however, no regular joint monitoring since assistance suspension. However, Iraqi camps joint monitoring visit took place at least 2 times a year.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent assessment of bread vs wheat flour</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milling in cash than in-kind</td>
<td>Remains in-kind milling</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp warehouse management responsibility</td>
<td>Noted that warehouses were empty; managed by BAFIA and refugee council in the case of Afghan refugee camps.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity building of BAFIA staff on project &amp; food management</td>
<td>CO reports conducting warehouse management workshop for all camp managers and Provincial BAFIA representatives in 2003.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formulate PRRO for 2 years</td>
<td>PRRO 10213.0 has been prepared &amp; implemented;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 3: Statistic of Camp Refugees in Iran (March 2006)

**Iraqi Arab Refugees:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Province (Covered by)</th>
<th>Nearest City</th>
<th>Camp Name</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Fars (SOA)</td>
<td>Jahrom</td>
<td>Jahrom (Sh.Dastgheib)</td>
<td>1,748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Lorestan (SOKMH)</td>
<td>Azana</td>
<td>Azna (Abazar)</td>
<td>935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Khuzestan (SAO)</td>
<td>Shushtar</td>
<td>Baninajjar (Gotvand)</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Khuzestan (SOA)</td>
<td>Andimeshk</td>
<td>Ansar</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>4 Camps</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,874</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Iraqi Kurdish Refugees:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Province (Covered by)</th>
<th>Nearest City</th>
<th>Camp Name</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Zanjan OREP</td>
<td>Sultanieh</td>
<td>Sultanieh</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Kermansh (SOKMH)</td>
<td>Kangavar</td>
<td>Kangavar (shohada Halabcheh)</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Kermansh (SOKMH)</td>
<td>Songhor</td>
<td>Songhor (Hejart 3)</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Kurdestan (SOKMH)</td>
<td>Kamyaran</td>
<td>Varmahang (kamyaran)</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Kurdestan (SOKMH)</td>
<td>Marivan</td>
<td>Marivan (Marivan)</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>W.Azarbaijian (FOO)</td>
<td>Orumieh</td>
<td>Ziveh</td>
<td>1,401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>W.Azarbaijian (FOO)</td>
<td>Sardasht</td>
<td>Bazileh (Sardasht)</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>W.Azarbaijian (FOO)</td>
<td>Piranshahr</td>
<td>Dilzeh (Piranshahr)</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>8 Camps</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,125</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Afghan Refugees:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Province (Covered by)</th>
<th>Nearest City</th>
<th>Camp Name</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Markazi (OREP)</td>
<td>Saveh</td>
<td>Saveh (shahid Naseri)</td>
<td>3,890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Semnan (OREP)</td>
<td>Semnan</td>
<td>Semnan (Ansar Mohajerin)</td>
<td>2,761</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Bushehr</td>
<td>Bushehr</td>
<td>Dalaki (Eqlal Dalaki)</td>
<td>2,080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Kerman (SOZ)</td>
<td>Rafasanjan</td>
<td>Rafasanjan</td>
<td>5,682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Kerman (SOZ)</td>
<td>Bardsir</td>
<td>Bardsir (shahid Chamran)</td>
<td>7,073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Khorasan (SOM)</td>
<td>Torbat-e-Jam</td>
<td>Torbat-e-Jam</td>
<td>4,890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>6 Camps</strong></td>
<td><strong>26,376</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Grand Total**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Province (Covered by)</th>
<th>Nearest City</th>
<th>Camp Name</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>18 Camps</strong></td>
<td><strong>31,375</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: BAFIA Tehran, 18 April 2006

**Annex 4: Ration scale and kcal per capita for camp refugees**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodities</th>
<th>Grm/day</th>
<th>Monthly ration</th>
<th>Calorie/day</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wheat flour</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>10.5 kg</td>
<td>1155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>3 kg</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veg oil</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>600 grm</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pulse</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>900 grm</td>
<td>100.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>450 grm</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>445</td>
<td></td>
<td>1852.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Annex 5: Mission Schedule

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Wednesday 26/Apr/06</th>
<th>Thursday 27/Apr/06</th>
<th>Friday 28/Apr/06</th>
<th>Saturday 29/Apr/06</th>
<th>Sunday 01/May/06</th>
<th>Monday 02/May/06</th>
<th>Tuesday 03/May/06</th>
<th>Wednesday 04/May/06</th>
<th>Thursday 05/May/06</th>
<th>Friday 06/May/06</th>
<th>Saturday 07/May/06</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>00:00</td>
<td>00:00</td>
<td>00:00</td>
<td>00:00</td>
<td>00:00</td>
<td>00:00</td>
<td>00:00</td>
<td>00:00</td>
<td>00:00</td>
<td>00:00</td>
<td>00:00</td>
<td>00:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02:45</td>
<td>Getachew -arrival to Tehran, pick up Abbas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 03:45 | | | | | | | | | | | Getachew, Mojgan Adelian to travel back to Tehran (by air)
| 12:00 - 13:00 | UN Resident Coordinator briefing | | | | | | | | | | |
| 13:00 - 14:00 | | | | | | | | | | | UNIDO briefing
| 14:00 - 15:00 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15:00 - 16:00 | | | | | | | | | | | JNAMA briefing
| 16:00 - 17:00 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 17:00 - 18:00 | 20:00 Travel Back to Tehran (by air) Getachew, Mojgan | 20:00 Travel Back to Tehran (by air) Getachew, Mojgan | 20:00 Travel Back to Tehran (by air) Getachew, Mojgan | 20:00 Travel Back to Tehran (by air) Getachew, Mojgan | 20:00 Travel Back to Tehran (by air) Getachew, Mojgan | 20:00 Travel Back to Tehran (by air) Getachew, Mojgan | 20:00 Travel Back to Tehran (by air) Getachew, Mojgan | 20:00 Travel Back to Tehran (by air) Getachew, Mojgan | 20:00 Travel Back to Tehran (by air) Getachew, Mojgan | 20:00 Travel Back to Tehran (by air) Getachew, Mojgan | 20:00 Travel Back to Tehran (by air) Getachew, Mojgan |
| 18:00 - 19:00 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 19:00 - 20:00 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 20:00 - 21:00 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 21:00 - 22:00 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 22:00 - 23:00 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 23:00 | | | | | | | | | | | |

### Specific Activities

- **03:45**: Getachew - arrival to Tehran, pick up Abbas
- **03:45**: Meeting with BAFIA, Kerman
- **07:00 - 08:00**: Adelian travel back to Tehran
- **08:00 - 09:00**: Assessment of Bardar
- **09:00 - 10:00**: Assessment of Bardsir, Assessment of Saveh
- **11:00 - 12:00**: Briefing in CO, Conference BAFIA, Mekane
- **12:00 - 13:00**: Briefing in CO, Meeting BAFIA
- **13:00 - 14:00**: UN Resident Coordinator briefing, UNIDO briefing
- **14:00 - 15:00**: JNAMA briefing
- **15:00 - 16:00**: JNAMA briefing
- **16:00 - 17:00**: Briefing in CO, Meeting BAFIA
- **17:00 - 18:00**: Briefing in CO, Meeting BAFIA
- **18:00 - 19:00**: Briefing in CO, Meeting BAFIA
- **19:00 - 20:00**: Briefing in CO, Meeting BAFIA
- **20:00 - 21:00**: Briefing in CO, Meeting BAFIA
- **21:00 - 22:00**: Briefing in CO, Meeting BAFIA
- **22:00 - 23:00**: Briefing in CO, Meeting BAFIA
- **23:00**: Travel back to Tehran (by air) Getachew, Mojgan
Annex 6: List of Agencies /Persons contacted

1. BAFIA: Mr. Ramezani (Camp manager), Torbat e Jam
2. BAFIA: Mr. Javareshkian (Provincial BAFIA representative), Torbat e Jam
3. BAFIA: Mr. Kalidar (Provincial BAFIA representative), Torbat e Jam
4. BAFIA: Ms. Nourani (School principle), Torbat e Jam
5. BAFIA: Mr. Khodaee (Health Worker), Torbat e Jam
6. BAFIA: Mr. Gholami (Camp manager), Saveh
7. BAFIA: Mr. Ghaleh Noei (ICT), Saveh
8. BAFIA: Mr. Ojaghi (Head of provincial BAFIA), Saveh
9. BAFIA: Mr. Asghari (School principle), Saveh
10. BAFIA: Mr. Bakhtiar (Health Worker), Saveh
11. BAFIA: Mr. Momeni (Provincial BAFIA representative), Bardsir
12. BAFIA: Mr. Nakhaee (Provincial BAFIA representative), Bardsir
13. BAFIA: Mr. Khorasani (Deputy of camp manager), Bardsir
14. BAFIA: Mr. Mohammad (School principle), Bardsir
15. BAFIA: Mr. Hoseini (Health Worker), Bardsir
16. BAFIA: Mr. Rostami, Deputy Director General of BAFIA,
17. BAFIA: Mr. Rostami Taresi, Head of International Cooperation department of BAFIA
18. BAFIA: Mr. Vali, BAFIA Expert, WFP Focal Point
19. BAFIA: Mr. Ghadamgahi, Head of Camp affairs, BAFIA
20. UNAMA: Dr. Bruce Koepke, Political Affairs Officer, Head of Liaison office in Iran, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
21. WFP: Mr. Robert Hauser, Representative
22. WFP: Mrs. Negar Gerami, Programme Officer
23. UNIDO: Mr. Jean-Luc Bernard, Representative, UNIDO
24. UNHCR: Mr. Sten Bronee, Representative, UNHCR
25. UNHCR: Mr. Melese Tegegne, Assistant Representative (Programme), UNHCR
26. UNHCR: Mr. Alessandro Bolzoni, Head of Sub-ofice, UNHCR, Mashad
27. Global Partners: Mr. Anderson da Silva, Deputy head office in Mashad
28. Global Partners: Shane Colledge, Head of Office in Mashad