Rapid Needs Assessment

in

The Forest Guinea Region of Guinea Conakry

and

Recommendations for a

Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation

David Bulman
Senior Regional Programme Advisor
WFP Regional Bureau for West Africa

9 April 2007
Rapid Needs Assessment in the Forest Guinea Region of Guinea Conakry 
and Recommendations for a PRRO

Purpose of the Mission

This mission was recommended after an initial review of a draft project document found insufficient information to justify the intervention proposed. Therefore, the objectives of this mission were to:

- review and synthesize assessment information from secondary sources;
- consult with key stakeholders;
- assess the food security situation in the concerned region;
- review the role which food aid can play in the recovery process; and,
- in light of the above, review the justification for the size of the proposed project and recommend to revise as needed.

1. The mission visited the Forest Guinea (FG) region from 2 to 6 April, and Conakry from 6 to 7 April. The mission discussed with a sampling of key informants and local communities (focus group discussions) in four of the region’s seven prefectures. The mission benefited from information from an ongoing household food security study being conducted by the WFP Country Office, part of an overall nation-wide needs assessment being undertaken by the UN system in Guinea following the January-February 2007 political crisis.
Review of Secondary Sources and Other Recent Assessment Material on the Forest Guinea Region

2. A review of secondary sources accessible over the internet was done by Ms. Heidi Haugen of the VAM unit in the WFP Regional Bureau for West Africa, and is attached as annex 2 of the present document.

3. The mission reviewed key assessment reports made available while in country. The primary documents were:

Concerning the UN joint programme for Forest Guinea:


Programme Conjoint pour la Relance du Développement en Guinée Forestière (draft dated 30 October 2006)

Programme Réhabilitation et développement en Guinée Forestière : Synthèse des études préliminaires (October 2006)

Programme Conjoint pour la Relance du Développement en GF : Cadre de suivi et évaluation (undated)

Concerning the ACF project to support villages near refugee camps:

Impact du rapatriement sur les villages autour des camps (December 2005)

Approche pratique pour limiter les impacts négatifs du rapatriement des réfugiés Libériens sur les communautés autochtones et contributions des communautés bénéficiaires à ce processus, (April 2006)

In preparation for the WFP PRRO

Baseline Assessment of Socioeconomic Conditions of Forest Guinea (January 2007)

Mission d’évaluation rapide de la sécurité alimentaire des populations autochtones, des réfugiés et des populations déplacées vivant autour des camps de réfugiés en Guinée Forestière (draft preliminary report, April 2007)

4. The review of these documents, along with the mission’s field work, generated a coherent understanding of the FG region, which is summarised below.

Historical Context: Shocks to the Population

5. The FG region has a population exceeding 2.3 million people. It was a prosperous breadbasket area for the country until it was hit by a number of shocks. Sharing a border area with Sierra Leone, Liberia and Cote d’Ivoire, FG received large numbers of refugees
over a period of 15 years, starting from 1990, and at the time of the mission continued to host a residual number of some 4000 from Cote d’Ivoire, more than 15,000 from Liberia, and a number of Sierra Leoneans who chose not to repatriate during the repatriation campaign. At one point, the refugees were 50% the number of the local population. This resulted in serious degradation of the environment, with important economic implications (this is elaborated in more detail below). Related to the insecurity in neighbouring countries, FG was also subject to rebel attacks in 2000/1, severely disturbing the economy of the region, as well as disrupting the lives and livelihoods of a significant portion of the population. Problems in domestic politics have also resulted in recurring disturbances to social and economic life, including the most severe strikes and protests to date in January 2007. In 2006, there was also a problem of insufficient rains resulting in poor harvests.

6. WFP has had a key role in supporting the refugee population. UNHCR’s repatriation programme of Sierra Leonean refugees is complete, and the repatriation programme for Liberian refugees is coming to term on 30 June 2007. UNHCR continues to work hard on its repatriation programme of Liberian refugees in an attempt to reduce to an absolute minimum the number remaining at the end of June 2007. Negotiations are still going on to define the modalities for reinstallation of refugees as residents of Guinea. However, it is clear that the Government does not wish to have Liberian villages: they want a real integration. This means that the vast majority of the Liberians will in fact be relocated and settled in Guinean communities.

7. While efforts have been made to assist the local population during the refugees’ extended stay, WFP is cognizant of the diminished prosperity of the FG region, and is turning its concentrated attention to the conditions of the local people in an effort to assist them to recover from the shocks to which they have been subject. Any such support will serve as well to assist refugees in their integration into Guinean society.

Food Security

8. The shocks encountered by the local population are presented in some detail below, and are linked to their impact on the economic livelihood of the inhabitants of FG:

- 1981-89: This is a sort of “baseline” period. At this time, FG was self-sufficient in rice production. This self-sufficiency was in part due to a World Bank project which provided fertilizer and improved seeds on a large scale to the whole region, as well as providing agricultural expertise to farmers. This project was eventually mainstreamed: the provision of fertilizers ceased, while the provision of technical support continued until the deteriorating macroeconomic conditions in the country led to deterioration in the provision of rural services by Government.
- 1990 onwards saw the arrival of refugees from Liberia and Sierra Leone. In some local areas, they by far exceeded the number of local people, but overall at peak the refugees were half the number of the local population in FG. They had a heavy impact on the environment and on reducing soil fertility through overuse. Their presence also resulted in positive development of road and market infrastructures, and to some extent improved health services, as the local population had access to refugee clinics.
• The heavy refugee presence led to over exploitation of natural resources, such as swamp rice farming areas, the forests, fishing, etc. leading to environmental degradation and depletion of soils
• One example was provided by village elders near a camp, who explained that refugees killed many productive palm trees through poor exploitation for production of palm wine.
• On a national basis, there was an overall deterioration of the macroeconomic context from 2000, consequently reducing provision of Government services, and therefore access to basic services, particularly in rural areas.
• The 1999-2004 rebel incursions and attacks in Guékédou caused displacement of population and loss of much of their assets, including tools. All livestock was lost as it was consumed by soldiers. In addition, the disturbances caused perturbation of markets in much of FG, and led to the movement of Liberian and Sierra Leonean refugees to areas further away from the border. Most of the displaced population eventually and gradually returned after two to three years, many in a weakened economic position.
• Guinea has been increasingly experiencing domestic political crises with regular flare ups, the latest one being in January 2007 with declaration of martial law, and a good deal of civil disobedience and destruction.
• There was poor rainfall in FG at the end of the 2006 production season leading to a poor harvest.
• The Government has forbidden export of foodstuffs, which caused problems, as exporters were eager to earn convertible currencies. It has been stopped (or slowed), and there is clearly still a cereals deficit.
• 30 June 2007: UNHCR has announced this as the deadline for repatriation of Liberian refugees. There has been a significant downsizing of the humanitarian funding going into FG.

9. The mission noted the presence of large amounts of imported rice in all prefecture-level markets: the Kissidougou market receives at least 40 tonnes every 2 weeks; the Guékédou market clearly had more and was receiving more frequent shipments as well. A quick walk through the market in Nzérékoré confirmed the same pattern. These importations of rice from Pakistan, Vietnam, Thailand, etc. are happening all year long. Clearly local production is not sufficient to meet local demand, whereas in the 1980s the FG region was producing rice and selling it to other regions of the country. Decline in soil fertility has led to a pattern of rice being brought from the Conakry port, and the trucks going back carrying firewood, bananas, palm oil and some other products.

10. It should be noted however that the imported rice is not penetrating systematically to local markets, neither the village level nor, as per reports received, the sub-prefecture level. At the level of the prefectural capitals, however, the problem is not of availability but of access for the poorer elements of the population. At the subprefecture and village level, effective demand and poor transportation preclude the ready availability of rice on the local markets, creating a combination of availability and access problems.

11. CONCLUSION regarding lack of cereals self-sufficiency: The fact that both the country and the FG region are deficit of the major cereal, and are in an overall cereals deficit, leads to the conclusion that this is a suitable environment for WFP to work in.
12. A cash assistance programme in place of food (e.g. cash for work) should not be excluded, but the mission does not recommend WFP pursuing it at this time partially because of practical difficulties in organising it, but more importantly because food is more suitable in achieving the desired effects than cash. Also, on the macro level, food aid reduces imports, in line with Government priorities. On the micro level, food rations attract the right people to FFW programmes and appropriately motivate them, whereas cash payments would be less effective in both of these functions. This is discussed further under the section “Role of Food Aid” below.

13. The departure of the refugees will also have an impact on food security and production. On the positive side, competition for land will decrease, as the local population had shared their land and their access to forest resources with the refugee population from when they first arrived; and labourers from the local population will face less competition in obtaining needed daily work. On the negative side, the foods previously available from refugee camps (including CSB for weaning young children) will no longer be available. Local landholders who had grown accustomed to hiring cheap refugee labourers will no longer have them available. Also, in the absence of significant numbers of refugees, certain markets will become much smaller or disappear; and with the closing of refugee camps, roads which previously provided access to the camps can be expected to fall into the same state of disrepair as other roads in the national grid. In addition, there is the risk that in the absence of cheap refugee labour, children will be removed from school to do work in the fields. A detailed analysis on the various ways in which the departure of the refugees impacts on the local population has been done by ACF.

14. Household Food Security: In its analysis of the overall situation in FG, the UN system includes a section on food security. “A food insecure region …

- 10% of households live in a situation of food insecurity;
- 18% are at risk of food insecurity;
- Only 25% are, to the contrary, food secure (national average 33%);
- 46% of children under 5 suffer from global chronic malnutrition (compared to a national average of 41%);
- 10.8% of children under 5 suffer from acute malnutrition;
- Households consume on average 1.7 meals per day, against a national average of 2.1.

Such a situation is paradoxical for a region rich in natural resources. Household food security depends largely on household revenue. However, FG has no industrial activity, has only a reduced service sector (banking, commerce), and a public sector in a disastrous state. Also, a large part of household revenue is more or less directly linked to local agricultural production.” (This is translated from the original French.)

15. The food security of households in FG is further described in Annex 1, which is a draft preliminary report of a rapid food security evaluation undertaken by the WFP Country Office in the context of the political crisis, strikes and state of emergency of January-February 2007. This report indicates that agriculture is the main income source for most households, that rice is the mainstay of their diet, that households are consuming less than the national average of rice consumption, and that household production is consumed in 6 months. Focus group discussions held by the mission indicated that families reduce consumption in order to best manage their rice stocks, and that after stocks are depleted...
they must find other means to access funds in order to buy food. Among the means for generating income are production of charcoal; harvesting palm nuts, processing and sale of palm oil; daily labour; and borrowing. Many families consume their seeds before the new planting season.

Agricultural production

16. Rice production takes place primarily during the rainy season, from April to September. A small but significant amount of swamp areas have water all year round, permitting a second crop.

17. With the influx of so many refugees, the demands for farming land skyrocketed. The local population generally shared their land, and as a result the exploitation of the land became more intense, soils gradually became less rich, and yields started reducing. Some local farmers benefited from the availability of inexpensive refugee labour, while local labourers suffered from the subsidised competition (the refugees received free food and other services). According to focus groups, the degraded forests have led to a lower availability of water (rivers have less water, and wells dry up more quickly.

18. Focus groups estimate production at 50-60% of “pre crisis” levels, citing such key factors as impoverished soil and reduced rain due to reduced forest cover. They say that before the arrival of the refugees, they were self sufficient, there was plenty of land, and that now the land is less productive. Focus groups consistently give examples of reduced yield. Some of the women explained that they must do daily work as the planting season approaches in order to have money to buy seeds, and this naturally reduces their availability for other productive work and for child care.

19. The area has lost its rice and cereals self-sufficiency. From 1985-1989, the FG region was rice self-sufficient, but it should be noted that at that time there was an active and substantial World Bank project providing fertilizers and improved seeds. In the interim period, population displacement has led to loss of assets including tools and farm animals, further aggravating production conditions.

20. Village rice-producing families consume part of their rice production, use some of it for ceremonies (marriages, etc.), and sell part of their crop to meet other needs, such as purchase of condiments and clothing, payments of school fees, etc. Rice is the most important source of income for most rural families, followed by the sale of palm oil and of wood.

21. Many rural families become indebted by borrowing to eat during the lean season. The debt is reimbursable in rice after the harvest, thus catching people in a debt cycle.

Environment

22. Villagers explained that forests are used as a source of lumber, traditional medicines, and for harvesting of wild yams, honey, mushrooms, and spices (“magi africain”). When someone is in economic difficulty he can also cut and sell large trees. Thus the forest is a source of multiple coping mechanisms for the local population. The forests have been
heavily damaged by the increased population in the region during the sojourn of so many refugees.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Vegetation</th>
<th>1981</th>
<th>1989</th>
<th>1995-97</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Light forest</td>
<td>162,383</td>
<td>117,365</td>
<td>54,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-dense forest</td>
<td>44,818</td>
<td>24,658</td>
<td>4,989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dense Forest</td>
<td>4,587</td>
<td>2,463</td>
<td>2,010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest around villages</td>
<td>16,922</td>
<td>19,392</td>
<td>17,450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>228,710</td>
<td>163,878</td>
<td>78,599</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


23. Some of the points made in focus group discussions included:

- The food insecurity of the local population accelerates the destruction of the forest as people turn to the forest to obtain food and income.
- People intentionally light bush fires to facilitate hunting of small animals and clearing of agricultural land.
- The closer to the refugee camp, the more intense the environmental destruction: wood, water, soil, fishing, etc. All parts of FG are affected, but some more intensely.
- The population notes that there is less water in streams, and a lot of wind bringing sicknesses. They state that they used to cut trees and clear the bush, but not burn the forest. The refugees introduced the practise of burning and making charcoal.
- Thinner forests and fewer large trees make the forest more vulnerable to fires.

Peace Building

24. The FG area is a key geographic zone in the Mano River countries in view of stability and peace building, having porous borders with Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire and other countries. It is described by some as a ticking time bomb with many ex-soldiers, with arms circulating; its stability is further undermined by a certain degree of volatility among its ethnic groups, and between locals and the large number of foreigners present from neighbouring countries. Some 5000 to 7000 ex-volunteers were demobilised after the Guékédo attacks, once the army no longer needed them, however they received no systematic support for reintegrating.

“The overflow of the Liberian and Sierra Leonean conflicts into Guinean territory in 2000 and 2001 left almost inerasable traces in the region. Beyond the physical destruction and the losses in human lives, the rebel attacks aggravated the social cohesion already affected by periodic ethnic conflicts. As well, this war left an unfortunate heritage consisting of an important presence of unemployed ex-combatants, and circulation of light weapons throughout the region. While awaiting an effective disarmament and the reinsertion into civil society of ex-volunteers, they constitute a might force of disturbance susceptible to being manipulated or falling to temptation for an adventure at the least opportunity.” (UN system, Analyse de la situation, 2006; translated from the original French)

25. In such a context, poverty and hunger clearly do not facilitate social stability.
26. While being far from sufficient to address the above problem, some people in FG comment on the influence of school canteens in stabilising communities and returning children and families to a condition of normalcy.

27. The UN system in Guinea chose to focus programming in the FG region during a transitional period because of the strategic importance of stabilizing this influential border zone. While the FG region is not considered to be the poorest region of Guinea, investment here will provide benefits to the entire country and contribute to social and economic recovery here and in the subregion.

Other Sectors

28. The health sector in FG is being progressively diminished in the areas of the refugee camps by the withdrawal of UNHCR and NGO support. Specifically, staff and materials can expect to be withdrawn when the refugee population is no longer present. (ACF reports). The infant mortality rate is 132 per thousand, the child mortality rate is 215 per thousand, and the HIV prevalence is 1.7%; all of these are higher than the national average. Epidemics, when they hit the various regions of Guinea, persist longer in FG owing to poor access to clean water, poor hygiene and poor treatment of illnesses.

29. The road infrastructure around the camps is similarly expected to degrade after the withdrawal of UNHCR and NGO supports (ACF reports). Interestingly, a headmaster in one village explained that when he arrived in the village, from 1994-99 not a single vehicle passed through the village. A refugee camp was then established close by, and now there are a number of vehicles that pass by each day, including trucks buying wood. The opening of some of these areas has had clear positive effects economically, but negative ones on the environment. Before the arrival of refugees and of the road, the local area had never known the making and selling of charcoal, and the consequent environmental destruction. With the closing of the camp, the villagers are eager that the road be maintained, but it is likely to fall into a similar state of disrepair as other roads on the national grid.

The Appropriateness of food aid

30. It is clear from preceding information that both on a national and FG regional level, there is a cereals deficit.

31. GTZ has views on the role of food aid in FG. GTZ has a food aid programme in Guékédou prefecture. Their funding allows them, but does not compel them, to use up to 70% of project funds for purchasing of food, and they choose to purchase foods (mostly imported foodstuffs on the local market). They have decided to work with food and not cash in their food for work and food for training programmes because according to their experience in food-insecure FG, food achieves the desired effect of providing motivation for people, and cash does not. They explained that while food enables people to do work which is useful to them and their communities, the use of cash would generate an attitude such that in the future they would not do that particular work unless they were to be paid to do so. In addition, the food commodities provide them with food for their families.
during times of crisis and times of food insecurity. The GTZ interventions include FFW, FFT and school feeding at both primary and secondary level. The interventions are carefully coordinated with those of WFP to avoid double targeting.

32. **Discussion**: In spite of GTZ’s views, the mission believes that cash for work interventions, in theory, could be designed to effectively work in areas in which the food markets are functioning effectively, meaning in and near prefectural capitals, and in other limited areas where markets are functioning well. The lack of effective demand and good rural roads is such that markets do not function that well in rural areas, or even at the level of sub-prefecture capitals. It could of course be argued that the injection of cash would facilitate the extension of the markets to these rural areas. This discussion, however, is only theoretical in the absence of a viable partner with well functioning programmatic and financial systems, and funding to put in place cash programmes. Moreover, the value added of such programmes and their cost effectiveness in comparison with food aid programmes is doubtful, given that participants would be purchasing food in small quantities and therefore at higher prices, though it could be argued that the benefit going to the “middle men” sellers is also injected into the economy. Lastly, it needs to be noted that purchasing on the local market does not support domestic production as imported rice would be purchased. In the end, the mission’s conclusion concords with that of GTZ: food aid is more appropriate in this context than cash assistance.

**Discussion of the interagency approach and of WFP’s approach to recovery; implications for when and how to phase out**

33. The common programming undertaken by the UN system does not refer explicitly to a definition of recovery; it does not give a clear indication of when the transitional recovery period would be finished or of indicators to measure progress. The UN team wished to work together on a joint programme, and FG was an obvious and productive choice, with a planning time horizon of 2011. Their situation analysis presents a context of transition from humanitarian towards development, citing four preoccupying factors:

- The refugee element;
- Internally displaced Guineans and Guinean refugees returning to FG and their integration; also the inadequate support provided to others that returned to FG after displacement;
- The “ex-volunteers”, those demobilised after having defended their country;
- The persistence of epidemics which, in a context of poor hygiene, inadequate potable water, and poor health care, simply do not stop.

34. Reading between the lines, the idea would appear to be that the UN system in Guinea does not at all wish to abandon the FG region after the departure of the refugee population but, to the contrary, wishes to accompany the population of FG for some time as their situation stabilises and as the region “gets back on its feet”

35. WFP’s approach to recovery is linked with its understanding of the nature of emergencies: a population is subject to a shock affecting its livelihoods and well being, and goes through a period of recovery until it returns to its previous condition. Applied in the context of FG, a succession of different shocks has had a broad impact on the population, and some people have been affected by more than one shock. The population’s pre-shock condition would probably be best seen as their condition in 1989 before crises in Sierra Leone and Liberia led to refugee influxes in FG.
36. However, in addition to the shocks experienced, the economic conditions of the country have evolved, and an important World Bank agricultural project in FG, providing seeds, fertilizers and technical support, no longer exists. It is difficult therefore to establish a baseline of the population’s pre-shock condition and to apply it in 2007 because it is difficult to imagine the condition of FG in 2007 if the refugee influxes and rebel attacks had never happened. In the absence of a clear baseline, using WFP’s concept of phasing out as a means of establishing a phase out strategy based on the pre-shock level of livelihoods, become a difficult and perhaps impractical exercise. The approach of simply accompanying the population of the region for a while is also unsatisfactory as it does not allow the development of a logical framework for intervening, and for eventually knowing when it is time to cease intervening. In the context of the joint programme with other UN partners, WFP needs to work on clarifying the logic of the framework of intervention in FG, from objectives to progress indicators to the phase out strategy. A common approach is needed for this type of common programme, and a “go-it-alone” approach from WFP would not be appropriate in the context of the joint programme for the UN in FG.

37. While waiting for this common approach to be developed, one of the areas of intervention provides a single objective and a single indicator which could act as a proxy and could be used for WFP’s overall planning and phase-out strategy for recovery and food security related activities in FG. The objective in question is the successful integration of remaining refugees, and the indicator is their degree of economic self-sufficiency. As the WFP intervention will include in its targeting priorities areas of integration of refugees, they can be expected to benefit from the assistance. However, the assistance is not targeted exclusively on the refugees, and measuring the progress towards self-sufficiency of the refugees can serve as well to measure the progress of the local population towards self-sufficiency. This indicator is not perfect as a proxy, since refugees will most likely have assets such as tools given to them through refugee integration training programs, that the local population does not have, giving them a slight advantage over the local population; and on the other hand integrating refugees may not have exactly the same resource use/access rights as the local population, putting them at a disadvantage.

**WFP areas of intervention**

38. *Focus group and key informant discussions* have generated suggestions for areas of intervention for WFP, and these have included:

- Rehabilitation of low lying swamps and irrigation structures for rice production and other measures that can increase production and income
- Palm tree plantations for palm oil production
- Planting seeds
- Provision of agricultural tools
- Reforestation
- Machines for decorticating rice
- Plantations of coffee and cocoa for generating cash income
- Fish farming
- Regular maintenance of rural roads
- Clean drinking water
39. Some youth identified their needs as draught animals for tilling more hectares in order to increase production; reforestation, and sports equipment.

40. Agricultural workers point to potential for greater use of irrigated swamp land for rice production, pig farming, fish farming, village greenhouses for seedlings and trees and awareness raising on destruction of the forest, production of compost at household level for enriching the soil.

41. The WFP rapid food security evaluation has recommended that WFP intervene as follows:
   - In support of food production through such programmes as seed protection programmes, improved rice production through rehabilitation of lowland swamp rice production, and fish farming.
   - Provision of meals to children in primary schools to reduce the burden on parents in feeding their children, and reducing the temptation to use the children merely as inexpensive labourers (in the absence of the depleted supply of cheap refugee labour).
   - Provision of rations to certain categories of vulnerable people under medical treatment to enable them to follow their medical treatment.

42. The main constraint in implementing viable food assisted activities is partnerships. In FG, WFP already has some recovery activities going on. There are excellent organisations running good quality programmes with which WFP has effectively partnered. The mission visited some project sites dealing with livelihood training, reinsertion of former soldiers, training of former sex workers in livelihoods and supporting them as they launch their new livelihoods, etc. Indeed, recovery of livelihoods must be seen as the key and pivotal support which WFP can provide in FG at this juncture. There are not, however, sufficient partners for the amount of food for work and food for training programming that is merited in FG.

43. WFP CO proposal: Based on feasibility, availability of partners, and capacity to implement, the WFP Country Office in Guinea Conakry has proposed the following number of beneficiaries and food tonnage for a 2 year WFP intervention (1 July 2007 – 30 June 2009) in their draft project document:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Intervention</th>
<th>Total Beneficiaries</th>
<th>Total Tonnage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Supplementary Nutritional Centers</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Therapeutic Feeding Centers</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>4,905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESF: Emergency School Feeding</td>
<td>105,000</td>
<td>6,176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESF: Dry rations for girls</td>
<td>7,175</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESF: Dry rations for cooks</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support DDR (demobilization)</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>1,256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food for Training</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>1,004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food for Work</td>
<td>148,000</td>
<td>10,881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL:</td>
<td>341,175</td>
<td>27,539</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
44. The largest listed intervention is in the area of FFW. Indeed, a larger intervention would be entirely justified if sufficient partner capacity were available; the most serious limitation on implementation is the limited number and capacity of partners to improve agricultural production, such as through the rehabilitation and establishment of irrigation in low land swamps which, if done well, could produce a superior rice yield year round; and the establish of fish farming ponds. The 148,000 beneficiaries include family members of project participants, so the real number of FFW participants would be 29,600 over a 2-year period, or 14,800 per year. The programme for supporting demobilisation and integration of ex-volunteers similarly would support some 2,000 participants. Along with the FFT programming, these 3 livelihoods programmes constitute 48% of the project’s food resources. Targeting of FFW and FFT programmes needs to be concentrated around the areas of former refugee camps, the areas where remaining refugees are being integrated into Guinean society, areas where ex-volunteers are located, and areas of most severe food insecurity.

45. The Emergency School Feeding component represents some 23% of the project’s food resources. The objective of this intervention is to support households’ food security, providing a food safety net for this young sector of the population; at the same time the school feeding will contribute to the normalisation of the pattern of life of FG society, and reduce the extent to which children are used as cheap, full-time agricultural labour. The school feeding needs to particularly target schools around the areas of former refugee camps, the areas where remaining refugees are being integrated into Guinean society, areas where ex-volunteers and their families are located, and areas of most severe food insecurity. Given the 15% difference in enrolment levels between boys and girls, a take-home ration in the 6th grade is recommended to motivate and improve attendance of girls and their completion of the primary cycle.

46. The programme for IDPs is a contingency for rapid response to future population displacement. The programme for refugees will provide food in transit camps, and also to the remaining caseload of Ivorian refugees.

47. The small interventions in the area of nutritional rehabilitation, and support to food insecure families affected by HIV, constitute 3.6% of the project’s food resources. These interventions, while modest, are essential insomuch as they reach some of the most vulnerable people in a region whose condition does not allow the Government or the local population to come to their aid. Moreover, WFP’s support for nutritional rehabilitation and for HIV-affected families will magnify the impact of cooperating partners’ interventions.

**General Conclusion on the Level of Programming**

48. The proposed level of programming and of resources is, in the view of the mission, entirely justified by the situation of food insecurity prevailing in FG, and by the magnitude of need. A larger intervention in the area of livelihoods rehabilitation would be recommended by the mission, except for the WFP Country Office having identified constraints with regard to implementation capacity of cooperating partners.
Annex 1: DRAFT

MISSION D'EVALUATION RAPIDE DE LA SECURITE ALIMENTAIRE DES POPULATIONS AUTOCHTONES, DES REFUGIES ET DES POPULATIONS DEPLACEES VIVANT AUTOUR DES CAMPS DE REFUGIES EN GUINEE FORESTIERE

Draft rapport de mission

I. Objectifs et méthodologie de l’évaluation

Dans la perspective de la mise en œuvre de la prochaine Intervention Prolongée de Secours et de Redressement (IPSR) en Guinée forestière, axée sur la réhabilitation des moyens de subsistance des populations qui ont accueilli pendant plus d’une décennie les réfugiés Sierra Léonais, Libériens, Ivoiriens et des populations guinéennes déplacées suites aux attaques rebelles de 2001, une évaluation rapide de la situation de sécurité alimentaire a été menée. Cette étude visait à fournir une image actualisée de la situation de sécurité alimentaire. Pour ce faire, des données ont été collectées à travers des questionnaires ménages, des focus groupes et des entretiens avec les informateurs clés (autorités locales, ONGs et services techniques du gouvernement). Ces différentes sources ont permis de croiser les informations.

Il est noter qu’une enquête approfondie de la sécurité alimentaire a été réalisée en 2005 en Guinée.

II. Contexte socioéconomiques et conditions antérieures à la crise dans les zones concernées (extrait du document de projet du PRRO 10553.0)

A low income food deficit country, Guinea was ranked 160th of 177 countries in the 2006 UNDP Human Development Index. With inflation on the rise and economic growth inferior to population growth; the per capita gross national income decreased from US$450 in 2000 to US$385.7 in 2004. As a result, the country presently faces a social and economic crisis.

Starting in the early 1990’s, instability in Liberia and Sierra Leone forced the displacement of people, including seeking refuge in neighbouring countries. Guinea hosted almost one million people during this period1, representing 50% of the total population in affected areas. FG continues to host more than 19,0002 refugees living in 3 camps.

The crisis in Côte d’Ivoire in 2002 and its resulting instability forced more than 100,000 Guineans and Ivorians to seek refuge in FG. Unable to access humanitarian support, some returnees and refugees sought shelter in local communities.

In response to repeated incursions of armed rebels in FG in 2001 and 2002, numerous “volunteers” were mobilized to fight rebels. Having abandoned their studies and/or informal economic activities in order to defend their country, the “volunteers” now encounter difficulties in acquiring a profession and/or source of income. 100,000 people were internally displaced during these incursions. 20,000 have yet to return to their place of origin.

The population increase has resulted in environmental damage, including: the overuse of arable land, the reduction of fallow periods, and the exploitation of marginal agricultural lands. Timber has been overexploited: according to the Government of Guinea (GoG) and

1 Global IDP Project, Guinée la crise oubliée du déplacement interne, février 2005, p.4.
2 On January 31st 2007, there were 15,097 Liberian refugees and 4,000 Ivorian refugees.
sister UN agencies, 200 000 ha of forest have been destroyed\(^3\) and the rehabilitation of degraded forest land is urgently needed.

Social indicators underscore the deterioration of living standards in FG. The acute malnutrition rate for children < 5 is 10.8\(^4\) for the region versus 9.4\(\%\) at national level (a significant increase from 1999 at 6.2\(\%\)). More than 86\(\%\) of children < 5 and 59\(\%\) of women suffer from iron deficiency compared to national levels of 77\(\%\) and 53\(\%\) respectively. Infant and child mortality rates of 132\(\%\) and 215\(\%\), respectively, are high compared to national rates of 91\(\%\) and 163\(\%\). At national level, 63\(\%\) of the children of school age suffer of worm infections (no data available specifically for FG).

HIV infection rates are high in FG; local rates are 1.7\(\%\) versus a national 1.5\(\%\) prevalence rate. Women are the most vulnerable with a prevalence rate of 2.2\(\%\) compared to 0.9\(\%\) national prevalence rate. Socio-economic and cultural practices also facilitate infection.

FG registers a gross primary school enrolment rate of 71\(\%\) versus 79\(\%\) nationally. Prefectures with difficulties accessing food and those which have been most significantly affected by population movement have the worst records: Beyla (64\(\%\)), Macenta (57\(\%\)), and Guékédou (43\(\%\)). Damaged schools have faced a sharp decrease in attendance rates for both boys and girls\(^5\). Families continue to give priority to boys’ education: gross enrolment rates for girls (65\(\%\)) remain lower than boys (76\(\%\)) and net enrolment is 38\(\%\) and 53\(\%\) respectively. As these are average rates for the region, the gap is higher than 15\(\%\) in many sub-prefectures of Forest Guinea.

A 2006 WFP/UNHCR Joint Assessment Mission in FG aimed to define the types of food and non-food assistance required for the residual refugee (including Ivorian) caseload, and to analyse the socio-economic and environmental impact of refugees’ presence on local communities. The mission recommended focus on the rehabilitation of socio-economic conditions of the host population in three areas: (i) education; (ii) health and nutrition; and, (iii) rehabilitation and improvement of basic and community infrastructure. The January 2007 Baseline Assessment of Forest Guinea Social and Economic Conditions carried out by WFP\(^6\), which addressed the impact of the refugee’s presence in FG, stressed the importance of the rehabilitation of infrastructure for the region.

The current political crisis which started in February 2006 and intensified in January 2007, paralysed the whole country and have already negative impact on the socio-economic and health conditions of the vulnerable groups.

According to the VAM unit’s comprehensive food security and vulnerability analysis survey\(^7\), 19\(\%\) of Guinean households in the FG are food insecure and 34\(\%\) are at risk of food insecurity. Once Guinea’s “granary”, the report underscores the dramatic deterioration of food security and basic social services in FG. “In 1994/95, that region was the only one with a poverty incidence of 32.6\(\%\) (40\(\%\) at national level). Nowadays, poor people represent 56.1\(\%\)\(^8\)...

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\(^3\) Ministère de l’Intérieur, SNU, ONGs ; Réflexion sur un plan d’action pour la réhabilitation, la réintégration et la réinsertion des populations affectées par les conflits (draft1), mars 2006.


\(^6\) Assessment funded by the French Trust Fund.

of its population” (49% at national level). Limited arable lands, reduced fallow times, the exploitation of unsuitable land, and the exploitation by refugees of arable land in surrounding villages, and limited access to water and sanitation contributed to the deterioration of household food security. 57% of households in FG do not have readily available potable water and 43% do not have toilets as compared to 62% and 26% nationally.

III. Impact général et démographique

Les localités enquêtées sont celles qui continuent d’abriter des camps de réfugiés ou qui en ont abrité depuis le début des années 90.


La déforestation, la forte pression exercée sur les ressources naturelles ont fortement affecté le rendement des sols, entraînant une chute des récoltes. Une dégradation marquée du couvert végétal est signalée : 2015 ha de tête de crête auraient été décoiffées et 280 ha endommagés par la présence des réfugiés seraient à restaurer dans la préfecture de Yomou.

Le village de Nonah (Yomou) compte 1600 habitants contre 12 000 Libériens (pendant 10 ans) et 3 000 Ivoiriens (pendant 2 ans) qui ont vécu dans le camp de transit de Nonah (à moins 5 Km du village). Les échanges entre les deux communautés auraient entraîné une nette augmentation des infections sexuellement transmissibles.

Avec la fermeture du camp de transit et le transfert des réfugiés ivoiriens de Nonah, l’accès aux soins de santé est devenu plus difficile. Aussi, la quasi-totalité des intervenants dans le domaine agricole ont cessé d’exercer dans les localités qui ont abrité les camps de réfugiés. Le manque de ressources financières en serait la raison fondamentale.

La visite au centre de santé de Pela a montré que les principales maladies diagnostiquées sont le paludisme, les IRA et les MST. Le manque de moyens y existant ne permet pas souvent la prise en charge efficiente de ces pathologies.

Cette année, la Guinée forestière a connu une baisse marquée de la pluviométrie : quatre mois sans pluie. Ceci a eu pour conséquence le retard des activités de préparation des champs ; certains paysans pourraient ne pas prendre part à la campagne en cours.

IV. Disponibilités alimentaires et marchés

Les marchés des sous-préfectures sont faiblement approvisionnés, bien que les récoltes de riz aient eu lieu il y a moins de trois mois. Les mouvements sociaux de janvier et février (doublé de l’Etat de siège) ont fortement perturbé les activités agricoles : impossibilité d’entretenir les champs, de mobiliser de la main d’œuvre pour les récoltes. En outre, la mauvaise pluviométrie enregistrée cette année pourrait avoir des conséquences importantes sur le niveau des récoltes et, conséquemment, sur la sécurité

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8 Ministère du Plan, Questionnaire sur les Indicateurs de Base du Bien être, 2002 (free translation).
alimentaire des ménages. Il est à noter que les cultures vivrières de subsistance constituent le socle des activités agricoles.

La mauvaise qualité des routes, les faibles capacités de stockage sont les obstacles majeurs à la promotion d’une autosuffisance véritable fondée sur l’amélioration des productions agricoles, et par conséquent des revenus des ménages ciblés. Les marchés dans les villages visités autour des camps sont très peu fournis en produits alimentaires importés, alors que les communes urbaines en regorgent suffisamment. Le pouvoir d’achat des paysans est faible.

Les voies d’accès aux camps de réfugiés créées ou réfectionnées ont contribué au désenclavement des sous-préfectures et les villages environnants. Toutefois, ces acquis sont à entretenir et à préserver avec le départ des humanitaires.

V. Moyens de subsistance et accès des ménages à la nourriture

Le séjour prolongé des réfugiés dans la région de la Guinée forestière a sensiblement affecté le système de vie des populations autochtones. En effet, les pressions sur les ressources naturelles à travers le déboisement, la pêche et l’exploitation abusive des terres cultivables ont considérablement réduits les potentialités agricoles dans la région. Cela se ressent sur la baisse de 50% de la production de riz et, conséquemment sur la disponibilité de riz per capita.

L’agriculture de subsistance constitue la principale source d’aliments des ménages. D’une manière générale, les ménages utilisent leur propre production jusqu’a épuisement du stock avant de recourir au marché pour s’approvisionner. Le riz importé coûte entre 140 000 et 150 000 francs guinéens (FG) le sac de 50 kg. Le revenu moyen mensuel calculé par ménage est de 278 000 (FG). Les ménages sont obligés de s’endetter auprès des usuriers pour survivre. Le remboursement se fait souvent immédiatement après la récolte à la défaveur des paysans qui doivent payer des intérêts et/ou céder leur production en deçà de la valeur du produit sur le marché.

Le manioc séché et de maïs grillé sont les aliments souvent cités dans la consommation actuelle des ménages après le riz.

VI. Consommation alimentaire, utilisation de la nourriture

La taille moyenne des familles est de 14 personnes dont quatre enfants de moins de cinq ans. Le riz reste l’aliment le plus consommé chez les ménages enquêtés. En moyenne, les ménages prennent deux repas par jour. La situation est la même pour les enfants, exceptés les enfants scolarisés dont le village bénéficie d’une cantine scolaire appuyée par le PAM.

La production moyenne de riz par ménage est estimée à 588 kilogrammes pour la dernière campagne agricole (2006-2007). De cette quantité, 387 Kg sont destinés à la consommation du ménage et 201 Kg sont vendus pour faire face aux autres postes de dépense du ménage : santé, vêtements, cérémonies, frais de scolarité, achat de pétrole, etc. Partant de là, la consommation journalière individuelle de céréales se situe à près de 155 g /personne/jour, soit une consommation annuelle individuelle de 57 kg (vs 90 kg/pers./an au niveau national).

Il est à noter que la production de céréales des ménages couvre entre 4 et 5 mois de l’année.

VII. Problèmes présents et futurs, et risques pour la sécurité alimentaire et les moyens de subsistance
La présence des réfugiés, la conjoncture économique difficile que traverse la Guinée, les mouvements sociaux consécutifs enregistrés depuis un an ont contribué à la dégradation des conditions de vie des populations. La mission a fait les constatations suivantes :

- A Nonah, un nombre relativement important d’enfants de moins de cinq ans et des jeunes filles enceintes sont observables en marchant dans le village ; une consultation de liste des patientes de la « case d’accouchement » indique que près d’une mère sur trois est élève ;
- Il est à noter que cette « case d’accouchement » construite par IRC au moment de la présence des réfugiés ivoiriens ne dispose d’aucun équipement approprié ; deux accoucheuses villageoises et une Assistante technique de santé (non qualifiée) y exercent. Les cas de complications à l’accouchement sont transférées à la sous-préfecture de Pela (à environ 10 Km) ; quand les moyens de transport (taxi brousse, moto) sont disponibles
- Recours aux produits traditionnels pour soulager les femmes en travail ;
- Faible accès aux soins de santé des populations villageoises depuis la fermeture du camp de transit de Nonah ; manque de moyens financiers pour se rendre au centre de santé de la sous-préfecture ; les gens préfèrent recourir à l’indigénat ;
- Quatre cas de décès de mères suite aux accouchements ont été signalés au centre de santé de Albadaria (Kissidougou) depuis la fermeture des camps (juin 2006). Exploitation excessive des bas-fonds et réduction de la jachère sur les coteaux ;
- Accès à l’eau potable difficile : certains forages réalisés par les ONGs sont abîmés par manque d’entretien ou du fait de leur vétusté ;

VIII. Option d’intervention et de ciblage

Afin de répondre de manière efficiente aux besoins identifiés et permettre l’amorce véritable d’une autosuffisance des populations des localités visitées, des interventions dans les domaines suivants sont proposées :

- Intervention dans le domaine de l’agriculture (formation en technique d’entretien et d’aménagement des superficies cultivables, particulièrement les bas-fonds. Toutes les actions entreprises dans ce sens seront des activités d’intérêt communautaire.
- Réduire les charges parentales liées à l’alimentation des enfants, notamment ceux scolarisés : le risque que ces derniers soient envoyés dans les champs pour augmenter la main d’œuvre reste élevé. Le départ des réfugiés ayant entraîné une augmentation du coût du travail journalier dans les villages. En plus, le difficile accès à la nourriture ne permet pas de leur garantir le déjeuner au retour de l’école.
- Renforcer la résistance aux chocs des groupes les plus vulnérables (malades, handicapés, femmes enceintes et allaitantes) au travers d’activités permettant une meilleure participation de ces groupes aux programmes de prises en charge médicales menées par certains partenaires dans la zone d’intervention.

IX. Recommandations et propositions de suivi

La mission recommande les activités suivantes :

- Appui à la relance des activités génératrices de revenus, particulièrement en faveur des femmes (activités maraîchères, saponification)
- Appui à la mise en valeur des potentiels hydro agricoles. L’appui alimentaire (Vivres Contre Travail) devra être accompagné d’une fourniture d’engrais et
autres intrants agricoles. La formation technique des paysans devra être au centre de ce processus.

- Maintien et renforcement de l’assistance alimentaire aux écoles primaires rurales
- Aider les groupes vulnérables (enfants de moins de 5 ans, femmes enceintes et allaitantes, personnes malades du VIH SIDA) à mieux résister aux chocs ;
- Evaluation approfondie de la sécurité alimentaire et de la situation nutritionnelle
- Mettre en place un système de suivi de la sécurité alimentaire et de la vulnérabilité impliquant les ONGs, le gouvernement et les agences du Système des Nations Unies.

**Annexes**

1. Carte de la région de la Guinée Forestière
2. Questionnaires et guides d’entretien utilisés
3. Liste des personnes rencontrées

   - Secrétaire Général de l’Administration, Préfecture de Yomou
   - Maire Adjoint, Commune urbaine de Yomou
   - Secrétaire Général des collectivités, Préfecture de Yomou
   - Sous-préfet de Nonah (Yomou)
   - Accoucheuse traditionnelle à la « Case d’accouchement » de Nonah (Yomou)
   - Trésorier de la Communauté Rurale de Développement (CRD) Nonah
   - Chef du centre de santé de la sous-préfecture de Pela (Yomou)
   - Préfet de Lola
   - Directeur Préfectoral du Développement Rural et de l’Environnement (DPDRE) de Lola
   - Sous-préfet de Bosou (Lola)
   - Président de la CRD de Bosou
   - Doyen des sages de Bosou
   - Président de CRD de Albadaria
   - Chef du centre de santé Albadaria
   - Chef de Base Action Contre la Faim à Kissidougou
   - Responsable volet agricole Action contre la Faim Kissidougou
   - Directeur Sous-préfectoral Adjoint Enseignement Élémentaire de Séréndou (Macenta)

4. Membres de la mission d’évaluation

Benali Camara, Assistant au Programme PAM N’zérékoré
Richard Sagno, Field Monitor PAM
Antoine Haba, Field Monitor PAM
Diallo Ibrahima, NO Programme Officer PAM
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Summary
This document was prepared as background for Guinea PRRO assessment. The conclusions drawn here are generally aligned with those of the Rapid Food Security Assessment March 2007:

Overall availability is not the main problem, but poor macroeconomic performance and high levels of poverty impede on access to food for large parts of the population. Limited purchasing power due to poverty – coupled with an increase in food prices relative to other commodities – has negatively affected food security in Guinea, and this is reflected in the increase in child malnutrition from 1999 to 2005.

The effects of the current crisis must therefore be evaluated against the backdrop of an already strained situation, which for many households has exhausted opportunities for adapting “normal” coping strategies and may force the employment of negative coping strategies.

Availability
Rice is the main staple in Guinea, closely followed by manioc, and with substantial regional variations in consumption patterns. Per capita consumption of rice is presently around 88 kg. About 80% of the country’s caloric needs are covered by national production, the rest by commercial or food aid imports (GoGUI 2006).

Agriculture
According to CILSS, the agricultural year 2006/2007 has generally been good, but with insufficient rainfall in the south-eastern and north-eastern corners of the country, as well as around Conakry. The diagram below shows an increase in production for important food types. There was a rise in per capita as well as absolute production during this period. The higher quantity produced can mostly be attributed to an enlargement in the area farmed rather than more productive farming methods. Between 2002 and 2003, for example, the increase in rice production was negligible, while a five percent greater area was cultivated in 2003 than the year before.

In 2006, the national level of self-sufficiency for rice, cooking oil and maize was 70, 43 and 99 percent, respectively.

Weak access to credit, low productivity of local varieties of animals and plants, lack of agricultural inputs, natural conditions and weak access to markets where the products can be sold are mentioned as key reasons for low agricultural productivity (GoGUI 2005).
Livestock
The production of livestock and poultry increased from 2002 to 2006 for all types of animals, both in absolute and per capita terms.

Food imports
Despite the relatively good harvest in 2006, more food was imported than during the previous year – rice imports increased by as much as 15%. As illustrated by the graph below, there has also been an increase in the import of other basic food products to Guinea in the period from 2001 to 2006. There was an increase in per capita terms for all products except wheat.
Access

Indicators for economic development have not had the same positive development as those for agricultural production. The November 2005 PRSP Progress report document that the targets set in the 2002 Guinea PRSP have not been reached for essential indicators such as:

- Poverty reduction
- GDP growth
- Inflation
- Mortality rates
- Transport infrastructure

A small increase in Guinea’s GDP since 2000 was largely offset by the 3% per year population growth. The Government of Guinean PRSP follow-up documents highlight serious corruption problems as a factor that severely hampers growth and entrenches poverty in Guinea.
**Rising overall poverty levels**

Access to food is severely hampered by the high levels of poverty in Guinea. Numbers from the 2002 PRSP indicated that more than half of the rural population lives in poverty, while the corresponding number for urban areas was 25% and 7.8% for Conakry. Both moderate and extreme poverty levels were higher in 2005 than ten years earlier (AfDB 2005).

**Geographical distribution of poverty**

Poverty is unevenly geographically distributed. Of the population in Haute-Guinée, 60% were counted as poor in the 2000 household survey, while similar numbers for Moyenne-Guinée and Guinée-Forestière are 50% and 40% respectively (AfDB 2005). In Basse-Guinée, 42% of households were poor. In the country as a whole, 68% of the poor live in rural areas, and on average they spend 62% of their household budget on food. In a document from 2003 prepared for the PRSP, the government of Guinea makes a list of factors leading to poverty in each region (see document in database). The map below shows high levels of poverty in certain districts in all four regions of Guinea (Basse Guinée, Haute Guinée, Moyenne Guinée, and Guinée Forestière).
Guinea poverty map 2002-2003
Inflation and increase in food prices

Guinea experienced several years of high inflation rates before the hyperinflation in the beginning of this year. While the high inflation rates influenced prices on all goods and services, the food prices increased faster than for most other products. From 2002 to September 2006, the global price index rose by 148%, while food prices increased by 214%. This implies that even if salary levels had kept abreast with the inflation, people's purchasing power for food commodities would have decreased.

As the demand for food is price inelastic, we can assume that the relative rise in food prices meant that people spent an increasingly large part of their income on food from 2002 to the end of 2006, i.e. the onset of the crisis. Even if the years of high inflation rates would have no effect on overall purchasing power, people increasingly cut down on other expenses to buy food, which means that by the time the crisis came, many no longer had this option, and would have to resort to negative coping strategies instead such as eating seeds or skipping meals.

Price index, Jan-Sept 2006

As the graph above illustrates, only transportation costs increased at a faster rate than food prices during 2006. The same holds true from 2002 to 2006. The high transportation costs contribute to an increase in regional variations in food prices in Guinea. The graphs below – showing the evolution of prices at local markets for local rice, imported rice, and maize – illustrate how the general price rise is coupled by an increase in regional price disparities.

Prices cooked local rice, imported rice, and maize, Jan-Sept 2006

Source: Stat Guinée 2006

Source: CILSS 2007
Return of IDPs altering access to land

In Haute Guinea, the return of IDPs has altered access to land in recent years. Tensions have built between local residents and their relatives who left the area, sometimes generations ago, but have returned to their places of origin after having been displaced from the south. Invoking customary ancestral rights, these IDPs now often claim what they consider their legitimate share of the family land, thus challenging the current distribution of land among local residents. The lack of arable land in Haute Guinea means that IDPs are often left with no other option than to occupy lands likely to be affected by floods (Global IDP Project 2005).

Utilization

The government of Guinea has not published recent data on access to clean drinking water and sanitary latrines – necessary for people to stay healthy and be able to absorb the food they eat. The latest PRSP progress assessment states that 64.3% of the population had access to clean water in 2002. The number of new water sources installed in the following year fell short of the target. The supply of safe drinking water stagnated in absolute terms from 2002 to 2005, and decreased per capita in the same period (GoGUI 2006).

A national evaluation of nutrition and poverty developments in Guinea concluded that measures to improve utilization were needed. Specifically, the government recognizes a need to strengthen nutritional education both in primary schools and at higher levels (such as among formal and informal health workers).

Exclusive breast-feeding for children under 6 months and prolonged periods of partial breast-feeding needs to be further promoted to improve the nutritional situation in Guinea. The proportion of babies under 6 months who are exclusively breastfed increased from 2002 to 2006, but was still as low as 27% in 2005 (GoGUI 2006).

Food security

In a 2002 household survey, 30% of the households responded that they had difficulties meeting their nutritional needs always or sometimes (AfDB 2005).

The table below shows that the nutritional situation in Guinea has deteriorated over the past years, and that there is more malnutrition in rural than urban areas.

### Nutritional status, children under 5, 1999 and 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Stunting (-3SD)</th>
<th>Stunting (-2SD)</th>
<th>Wasting (-3SD)</th>
<th>Wasting (-2SD)</th>
<th>Underweight (-3SD)</th>
<th>Underweight (-2SD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Urban</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999 2005</td>
<td>4.8% 7.5%</td>
<td>18.2% 22.6%</td>
<td>2.7% 1.5%</td>
<td>8.7% 8.7%</td>
<td>3.2% 4.0%</td>
<td>18.4% 18.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12.4% 17.6%</td>
<td>29.4% 38.4%</td>
<td>1.8% 1.9%</td>
<td>9.2% 9.6%</td>
<td>5.9% 8.0%</td>
<td>25.3% 28.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Source: DHS 1999; DHS 2005

### Nutritional status by province, children under 5, 2005

<table>
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<th></th>
<th>Stunting (-3SD)</th>
<th>Stunting (-2SD)</th>
<th>Wasting (-3SD)</th>
<th>Wasting (-2SD)</th>
<th>Underweight (-3SD)</th>
<th>Underweight (-2SD)</th>
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<td>Boké</td>
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<td></td>
<td>0.6 5.8</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conakry</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2.2 8.7</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faranah</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2.3 12.8</td>
<td></td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kankan</td>
<td>22.3 43.1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.3 10.4</td>
<td></td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>30.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kindia</td>
<td>11.2 34.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.8 8.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>25.2</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3.1 11.6</td>
<td></td>
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<td>27.6</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
The HIV/AIDS epidemic has not hit Guinea particularly hard, with 1.5% of the population infected, of which women constitute about two thirds (DHS 2005). HIV/AIDS is more common in urban than rural areas. Malaria is the most common cause of morbidity and death in the country (AfDB 2005).
girls varies between 8 and 18 percentage point in these regions. Guinea devotes a relatively small amount of available resources on education. On average, sub-sahelian African countries spend 4% of their GDP on education, whereas Guinea only spent 2.37% in 2004. The African Development Bank remarks that Guinea has serious problems with respect to the quality of their education (AfDB 2005). WFP should take into account the Government’s relatively low budgetary support to the education sector when contemplating interventions in this sector.