JOINT ASSESSMENT MISSION

Review and Re-assessment of the Situation of Central African Refugees in Southern Chad.

With the participation of CNAR, OCHA, FAO, UNICEF, WHO, OCHA, French Embassy AFRICARE, COOPI, Solidarite, Centre de Support en Sante Internationale (CCSI-ITS)

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) was jointly organized by UNHCR and WFP from October 15-20, 2009 to investigate the status of assistance to Central African Refugees in Southern Chad, overall nutritional status of refugees, level of self-reliance, additional needs and development strategies employed or to be employed into the future (next 12-18 months). U.N. agencies (UNICEF, FAO, OCHA, WHO), concerned donors (The European Commission and the Embassy of France), concerned international NGOs (ACT, AFRICARE, COOPI, CCSI and Solidarite) assigned representative members. Several other NGOs associated with the exercise in the field during certain segments of the work. The Government of Chad was represented on both teams by delegates of CNAR. The exercise was actually conducted by two distinct teams which carried out their work simultaneously (one team visited the five Gore and Maro camps, while a second team visited the isolated camps in Haraze and Daha).

It was not the intention of the team to collect detailed statistical information already gathered and documented in a number of surveys, investigations and assessments carried out by UNHCR, WFP, UN agencies and NGOs. With very limited time to visit camps located in three distinct parts of the board region with the C.A.R., the team only sought to validate and provide real-time context to available information. It also hoped to identify recent trends or tendencies, as well as capture key stakeholders’ perceptions of short and medium-term prospects.

Since the first arrivals of refugees from the C.A.R. in 2003 more than 65,000 have settled in 11 camps/sites along very close to the border in the vicinity of Gore, Maro, Haraze and Daha. The most recent arrivals have been in Haraze and Daha (early to mid 2009) and in Moula and Dosseye (mid 2008). Fortunately, they have found relative security and access to land for settlement and farming/grazing among a Chadian host population that shares cultural/linguistic ties with them.

In the case of the earlier arrivals to the Gore and Maro camps, refugees are progressing continuing toward food and livelihoods security. For the most part, their nutritional status is within acceptable international levels. Though they have progressed notably in developing their productive capacity, most households are still not fully food self-sufficient (able to produce or purchase sufficient food from their own means) and are still dependent to varying degrees on external food assistance.

International and non-governmental organizations have set up an array of recovery and development support programmes for the refugees and, increasingly, for the neighboring Chadian communities. On the basis of that programming, there is unanimous belief that prolonged free relief assistance will only serve to reinforce attitudes and practices of dependency and prove counter-productive to developing capacities for self-reliance and self-sufficiency. There is strong commitment to phasing down and phasing out general food distribution in a responsible manner, in favor of modalities that more directly contribute to building productive capacities for sustained livelihoods.

There is also broad commitment to design programmes to integrate refugees into the socio-economic programmes of their host communities as a means of ensuring peaceful co-existence and
cooperation. To this effect, local authorities and actors on the ground voiced encouragement that development assistance should be also extended to neighboring Chadian communities.

Finally, refugees expressed that continued insecurity in northern C.A.R. precludes them from considering the return to their villages/towns of origin in the near future. They are monitoring development associated with up-coming elections and will only repatriate when they feel they will be safe. Therefore, refugee populations will require some form(s) of assistance for at least the next 12 months.

**ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

The mission extends sincere thanks to colleagues in WFP and UNHCR who provided the team with logistical, organizational and information support. Without the cooperative and creative air support of UNHAS, AIRSERV and MINURCAT the mission would not have been able to cover the territory required.

UNHCR, WFP, NGO field staff at camps were invaluable in organizing informative meetings with representatives of beneficiary populations. Special thanks are extended to all local authorities and NGO colleagues who gave the team their valuable time for briefings and insights.
1. INTRODUCTION

Rationale and Objectives

Between 2003 and early 2009 more than 78,000 refugees have fled the Northern part of the Central African Republic (CAR) to the southern and south-eastern part of Chad in the wake of civil conflict in that country. These refugees reside in five refugee camps located in the vicinity of Maro (Yaroungou and Moula Camps) and Gore (Dosseye, Gondje, Amboko Camps) as well as Haraze Mangueigne (Daha and Haraze Camps). While some of those refugees have spontaneously returned to the C.A.R., more than 65,000 still remain in the seven camps. Recent influxes over 20,000 persons from mid-2008 until mid-2009, which have been settled principally in the Moula, Haraze and Daha camps, have put an additional strain on WFP and UNHCR, which were already assisting older caseloads in the south as well as large numbers of refugees and IDPs in eastern Chad.

Refugees from the C.A.R. are fortunate to have settled in areas inhabited by a host population which is, for the most part, of the same ethnic/linguistic group and which provide favorable climatic conditions that favor agro-pastoral production. With a generous reception by the host population, most refugees are able to implement multi-form productive mechanisms that provide them with varying degrees of self-reliance for their food and livelihoods needs.

While the Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) conducted in September 2008 found most refugees had only become partly self-sufficient, it did conclude that conditions existed to permit a continued phase-down and phase-out for general relief assistance to most refugees settled around Gore and Maro.

Annual assessments are recommended by the WFP/UNHCR Memorandum of Understanding especially in ever changing situations. The JAM is jointly organized by UNHCR and WFP with the participation of UNICEF, OCHA, Government of Chad, donors and implementing NGOs. This JAM mission was tasked with investigating the status of assistance to Central African Refugees in Southern Chad, particularly in light of their overall nutritional status, level of self-reliance and special needs. Findings were to form the basis for fine-tuning and re-orienting on-going operations as well as developing strategic interventions for 2010-2011, particularly concerning self-reliance and phasing down and/or phasing out strategies for food and non-food related assistance.

The mission was also to take into account the efficiency of cooperation between humanitarian activities and the LRRD activities that are designed to bridge the phasing out of the free assistance toward a recovery activities in-line with the LRRD objectives.
**Methodology**

The list of mission’s core/associated members and itinerary, as well as persons/organizations met, are found in Appendices 1-3, respectively.

With very limited time, broad geographic dispersion of C.A.R. refugees along the border region and the difficult logistics associated with visiting the Haraze and Daha camps it was necessary to organize two separate mission teams, with one assigned to the five camps around Gore and Maro, and the other to Haraze and Daha. This arrangement was also justified in light of the fact that the latter two settlements are very recent and still very much in a humanitarian relief mode, while the former more advanced toward a transition from relief to development, thus requiring a different line of analysis.

The Gore-Maro team was guided by a list of issues/questions organized into three sector areas which spoke with refugees organized into focus groups as follows:

- Protection, SGVB, Gender, Education, and Community Services;
- Food Security, Livelihoods, the Environment and Food Distribution.

However, with extremely limited time available in each of the five camps, the lists represented guides rather than check-lists. The discussions did not attempt to gather detailed information that had already been reported on in secondary sources such as institutional monitoring reports, assessments and investigations. Rather, they sought to confirm information offered in those sources as well as accounts of the extent to which respondents’ basic needs were being met, particularly through self-reliance.

Gore-Maro Team members split up into the three sector sub-teams so that focus groups could be conducted simultaneously to take advantage of time. The respondents at each meeting were members of camp management committees and other community organizations concerned with the topics to be discussed. In addition, one team member from each sector group used the time allocated in each camp to perform a “walk about”, visiting random households to conduct informal interviews on the same topics being discussed in the focus groups. They also did visual observations of household as well as local market conditions.

The Haraze-Daha Team chose to use a standard JAM checklist in their separate conversations with respondents representing men, women and youth. Because refugees there are not settled in self among the host communities, the JAM team selected one site at each location where to conduct interviews.

Entry briefings and closing debriefings were organized with U.N. agencies and NGO partners in all locations. A final de-briefing of key findings and recommendations was provided to representative of stake-holder institutions in N’Djamena at the conclusion of field work.
Owing to the isolation of the Haraze and Daha camps, the still impassable roads resulting from a late conclusion of the rainy season and the general insecurity of the border area, the Haraze-Daha team was totally dependent on UNHAS, AIRSERVE and MINURCAT air support to move between its base in Goz Beida and the camps.

**BASIC FACTS**

**Refugee Numbers and Demography**

1. **Table 1: Gore and Maro Camps**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Camp/Age</th>
<th>0-4</th>
<th>5-17</th>
<th>18-59</th>
<th>60+</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amboko</td>
<td>1,538</td>
<td>6,085</td>
<td>3,856</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>11,697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gondje</td>
<td>1,670</td>
<td>5,407</td>
<td>3,984</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>11,204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dosseye</td>
<td>1,894</td>
<td>4,389</td>
<td>3,019</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>9,509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yaroungou</td>
<td>2,112</td>
<td>5,022</td>
<td>4,432</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>11,898</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moula</td>
<td>1,607</td>
<td>2,230</td>
<td>2,132</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>6,085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8,821</td>
<td>23,133</td>
<td>17,423</td>
<td>1,016</td>
<td>50,393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
<td>45.9%</td>
<td>34.6%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Yaroungou camp is the oldest, established in early 2003. A camp in Amboko was subsequently established in June 2003. The Gondjé and Dosseye camps were established in December 2005 and 2006, respectively. The youngest camp, Moula located in the department of Grande Sido, near Maro, was established in mid-2008. Moula is situated two kilometers from Yaroungou, the oldest camp.

In recent months, camp populations have remained relatively stable, except for some spontaneous out-migration from the camps back to the C.A.R. or perhaps one of the other nearby camps. However, present inhabitants of the camps stated that they have no intention to return to the C.A.R. in the near future, citing insecurity their as their reasons for staying.

2. **Table 2: Haraze and Daha Camps**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Site</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Haraze</td>
<td>Massambagne 1</td>
<td>2,253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Massambagne 2</td>
<td>486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Betimera</td>
<td>555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Koy</td>
<td>2,206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Total: Haraze</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daha</td>
<td>Daha 1</td>
<td>5,308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Daha 2</td>
<td>4,624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Total: Daha</td>
<td></td>
<td>9,932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>15,432</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

1 UNHCR data as of 31/10/2009
2 UNHCR as of 15/10/2009
The Haraze and Daha sites were established between the end of 2008 and mid-2009. Refugees in these camps have arrived from the C.A.R. villages of Acrosurba, Birkignan, Ngarba, Koundé, Ambassadina, Doum, among others, situated between 3 and 50 Km from the international border with Chad. The earliest arrivals tended to be public servants escaping from feared reprisals at the hands of occupying rebels. Further waves of civilians crossed the border starting in January 2009, during the advance of government forces sent to dislodge the rebels. Family sizes are small (3-4 persons), with females constituting 66% and 62% of the total population in Haraze and Daha, respectively.

During the rainy season, when internal conflicts in the C.A.R. tend to lull, the camp populations have been stable and even dropped. However, small groups of two to three persons have continued to arrive in the weeks before the JAM visit. It is assumed that with the upcoming dry season and general elections in C.A.R., a potential exists for renewal of armed confrontations which could result in the deterioration of the security and humanitarian situation and consequently new influxes of CAR refu.

The proximity of refugees camps to the Chad-CAR border, particularly those in Daha, has facilitated a degree of spontaneous mobility back and forth across the border with the C.A.R. Also, Chadians of the same ethnic group as the refugees are reported to have settled in camps, occupying places left behind by spontaneously departing Central Africans so as to access services and assistance available to refugees.

**General Context**

**Gore and Maro Camps**

Refugees are progressing toward levels of self-reliance thanks to a benevolent reception by the local population and the favorable climatic conditions in their area of settlement. Local authorities, humanitarian organizations operating in the region and the refugees themselves wish to move from depending on relief assistance to that which promotes and brings about sustainable livelihoods. At the same time, government policy seeks to integrate refugee communities with their host communities to mitigate and resolve conflicts that may arise as a result of the influx of a sizeable guest population.

The refugees in five camps in the areas of Gore and Maro:

- Have some levels of productive means for either producing their own food or earning income with which to buy food;
- Still cannot produce or buy enough food to be considered fully food secure;
- Have free (or subsidised) access to basic social services provided by humanitarian assistance, including primary health and potable water.

As is the case of communities throughout Chad, there are segments of the refugee population that are especially vulnerable and who require special humanitarian assistance.
The conditions are appropriate for the refugee population to be weaned from reliance on general food and non-food assistance distribution, by substituting developmental assistance designed to help them bring their levels of production/income to levels which allow them to meet their minimum livelihood needs. This is underway at present by UNHCR, WFP, UN agencies, NGOs and the technical departments of the GoC, but in a scale and scope which is still significantly inadequate to ensure sufficient full coverage in demographic and economic terms to consider the
problem solved so that general distribution can be discontinued. At the same time, there is a need to extend early recovery and developmental assistance to larger segments of the poor host population which, based on casual observance, shares many of the economic limitations of the refugee population which as benefited from social and economic safety nets.

In this regard, the European Union is financing a project designed to integrate refugees into the host communities by supporting livelihoods development and improvements in basic social services to all inhabitants of the Maro and Gore regions. Sub-projects will be implemented by COOPI, Africa Concern, CARE as well as through partnerships with several Chadian NGOs (BELACD, ACODE, ASDEC and COOPEC).

At present, hosts and refugees cohabit relatively peacefully. However, some tensions do exist between agriculturalists (host Chadians as well as refugees) and refugee herders who are principally settled in the Dosseye camp. Farmers accuse herders of allowing their animals to damage and destroy their crops as they graze.

**Haraze-Daha Camps**

Having, for the most part arrive less than one year ago, refugee households are not settled in specifically defined camps. Instead, they are settled in small groupings among the local population along between Haraze and Daha. They are settled in a remote area of the country where road infrastructure is very limited and poor. During the rainy season main transport routes are impassable and even communities are cut off from each other due to flooding. Under these conditions, providing humanitarian assistance has been difficult and complex.

**Health and Nutrition Situation**

**Gore and Maro Camps**

Health service is provided by COOPI, MSF-France, Mentor Initiative, AFRICARE and BELACD in conjunction with the Ministry of Health. UNHCR, UNICEF, UNFPA and UNAIDS provide technical backstopping and resource support.

Health services to refugees are generally acceptable. Health Centers in Dosseye and Beureh provide primary attention. The District Hospital in Gore provides second-level service. For refugees in the Maro camps, primary services are rendered at health centers located in Yaroungou and Moula. Secondary attention is provided at the district hospital in Danamadji, located approximately 30 kms. from Maro.

The health status of refugees is acceptable as evidenced by improved (from 2008) global mortality (0.2/1000/month), infant and child mortality (0.4), neo-natal mortality (2.7) and vaccination coverage (93.7%) rates recorded during the first semester of 2009 in Gore.

As is the case among the general population of the region, the main causes of death are diarrhea and respiratory infections. Morbidity is most attributed to malaria as well as respiratory and gastro-intestinal infections.
The last nutritional survey was conducted in September 2008 by ACF\(^3\). At that time, Acute Global Malnutrition among children of less than five years was considered stable and within normal limits except in Dosseye Camp. More up-dated statistics from the Gore camps were made available to the JAM from COOPI\(^4\). The particulars were as follows:

- Amboko and Gondje: 2.7%
- Dosseye: 7.7%
- Yaroungou: 4.7%
- Moula: 5.4%

Particularly in the case of Dosseye, monitoring is required so that extremely malnourished children can be referred to a therapeutic feeding center on a timely basis and that mothers and children can be enrolled in supplemental feeding administered in the health centers.

At this time all health services for all camps have been or are being integrated into the government health system and are being governed by national health policy, including the institution of partial cost recovery fees.

**Haraze and Daha Camps**

Health services are provided in health centers which function in Haraze and Daha. Haraze is managed by the Ministry of Health (with UNICEF financial support) while that in Daha is staffed and administered by the NGO, CSSI. Infrastructure and equipment in both centers is inadequate.

The health situation as it concerns mortality and morbidity is similar to that observed in the Gore and Maro camps. Nutritional screening is still irregular. Based on that, the percentage of children experiencing GAM was 11.7% during week 41 of the year (based on 170 children screened).\(^5\)

**Environmental Conditions**

As noted earlier, the refugees settle in Gore and Maro benefit from a climate that is favorable for agriculture and from a reasonably adequate provision of land for cultivation. However, refugee presence in the zone has contributed to deforestation and over-use of land without recourse to supplemental fertilization. The presence in livestock herders in the Dosseye camp has led to some competition for use of land between herders and agriculturalists. Most problems in this regard involve livestock damage to crops.

While the presence of refugees in Haraze and Daha is more recent than in Gore and Maro, their interest in beginning cultivation and their need for firewood will likely place the same pressures on the environment in terms of deforestation.

Fortunately in both locations water is reasonably abundant from rivers and aquifers. Needless to say, quality is an issue which will be discussed in more detail below.

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\(^3\) Nutritional and Anthropomorphic Survey. ACF. July-August, 2008

\(^4\) Progress Report: January-June 2009. COOPI. 14 October 2009

\(^5\) Data provided by health center personnel to the JAM team
2. FOOD SECURITY AND SELF-RELIANCE

Food Access and Use

Gore and Maro Camps

According to the last self reliance study conducted by WFP in June 2008\(^6\), more than 55% of the CAR households are farmers and have access to between 1.5 ha and 2.5 ha of farming land in Gorée and Maro respectively. To promote livelihoods self-reliance, various programmes are in place to assist refugee farmers with seeds, tools, some fertilizer, and plowing implements. During the 2009 campaign refugee farmers planted 1.7 hectares on average (as a point of reference, Chadian farmers in neighboring villages cultivated an average of 2.6 hectares). In this regard, refugee farmers reported that their capacity to cultivate is limited by a shortage of oxen and plows (approximately 50% of estimated need has been met – up from 22% at the time of the 2008 JAM). UNHCR and its partners report that 100% of seed and small tools distribution targets were met for the 2009 planting season. However, some farmers reported that seeds were distributed somewhat late, resulting in a shortfall in planting. Considering that some camps are not populated at full planned capacity, it is estimated that 49% of cultivatable land available to refugees is actually being exploited (up from 12% in 2008), leaving room for increases in production if the means are available.

According to calculations of grain production during the 2008 campaign, refugee farmers in the three Gore camps, farmers are developing means of self-reliance but have yet meet their grain needs from their own production, though households in Gondje are getting close.\(^7\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Camps</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Need (MT)</th>
<th>Production (MT)</th>
<th>Percent Covered</th>
<th>Variation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amboko</td>
<td>11,759</td>
<td>1,869.6</td>
<td>516.33</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>-1,353.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gondjé</td>
<td>11,153</td>
<td>1,773.2</td>
<td>1,628.00</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>-145.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dosseye</td>
<td>9,481</td>
<td>1,507.4</td>
<td>71.45</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>-1,435.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

WFP food assistance is filling the gap to varying degrees, depending on the ration size distributed at each camp (Amboko – 68.1 kg/p/year; Gondje – 90.8 kg/p/year; and Dosseye – 159 kg/p/year).

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\(^7\) Gore Inter-agency briefing to the JAM team in Moundou. October, 2009
Table 4: Cereal Production-Consumption Balance Factoring Food Aid – Refugee Camps of Gore

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Camps</th>
<th>Need (MT)</th>
<th>WFP Rations</th>
<th>Refugee Production</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amboko</td>
<td>1,869.6</td>
<td>800.8</td>
<td>516.33</td>
<td>1,317.1</td>
<td>-552.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gondjé</td>
<td>1,773.2</td>
<td>1,012.6</td>
<td>1,628.00</td>
<td>2,640.6</td>
<td>+867.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dosseye</td>
<td>1,507.4</td>
<td>1,507.4</td>
<td>71.45</td>
<td>1,578.85</td>
<td>+71.45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 2009 rains through August were approximately 44% below those recorded in 2008 will contribute to reduced yields to support food consumption and livelihoods going forward to the 2010 harvest. In addition, farmers in all camps report drops in yields due to deteriorating soil fertility. Refugee farmers have been farming the same plots without recourse to rotation or supplemental fertilization. The combination will set back farmers in their efforts to obtain food self-sufficiency.

Refugees carry out market gardening as well as raise small livestock as a source of food for consumption and income. These are still carried out on a limited scale owing to lack of access to means (seeds, tools, and animal stock) as well as technical assistance and veterinary services. Gardening assistance reaches only a small percentage of refugee households. Gardening and small animal husbandry are productive activities generally carried out by women and represent an under-exploited potential as part of an integrated farming approach.

Between their own production/purchase and external food assistance, the majority refugee households have food consumption levels that are acceptable.

Table 5: Household Consumption (% of households surveyed)8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Camp/Village</th>
<th>Poor</th>
<th>Borderline</th>
<th>Acceptable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amboko</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dosseye</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gondjé</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moula</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yaroungou</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp Average</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>72.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighboring Villages</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The availability of food aid has been key to maintaining reasonably acceptable levels of consumption. The lowest consumption scores were recorded in Yaroungou, where general food distribution was discontinued except for targeted distribution to vulnerable households. Household consumption seems to have suffered during the transition. Scores were also low among the households in Dosseye which, for the most part, are engaged in “prestige” livestock herding. In Yaroungou and Dosseye, members of the communities with whom the JAM spoke acknowledged

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that families generally consumed one meal per day. They do make efforts to ensure that young children eat twice per day.

**Haraze and Daha Camps**

Refugee families have been granted use of land for cultivation. For the most part, they have cultivated small plots of sorghum, millet, peanuts, and beans. While the current peanut and bean harvests are expected to be good, late access to and planting of sorghum and millet seed are expected to adversely affect yields this year. Also, unfavorable 2009 rains should negatively affect productivity.

There has yet to be a nutritional or food security assessment conducted among these refugees. However, the JAM team was informed that diets are based, for the most part, on grains accompanied by sauces. Fish, meat and some beans are consumed only occasionally.

Families report eating only one meal per day, while efforts are made to ensure that young children eat two meals.

**Food Aid Targeting, Distribution, and Monitoring**

**Gore and Maro Camps**

General Food Distribution (GFD) is provided to refugee households on the basis of their estimated capacity to achieve food self-sufficiency, generally associated with the amount of time they have been settled in their respective camps. In order to reduce the dependency on general food distribution, ration rates have been reduced to 1,200 Kcal/person/day in the more established camps of Amboko and Gondje. In the oldest camp of Yaroungou, GFD was discontinued in 2008, except to 2,000 persons deemed vulnerable and extremely food insecure. As a “shock absorber”, households in Yaroungou have been provided “seed protection” rations for three months. Full 2,100 Kcal/p/d rations continue to be distributed in the Dosseye and Moula camps.

Particularly in Yaroungou and Amboko, where the rations have been eliminated or rates have been reduced while nearby camps have remained unchanged, the rationale/basis seems not to have been understood or appreciated. This represents a source of misunderstanding, frustration and resentment. The Kcal/p/day formula is too abstract to be understood, particularly during the 3-6 month “lean season” just before the next harvest, when farm production has already been depleted by consumption and sale to meet other needs.

Refugees consistently reported that the ration size (even the full 2100 Kcal) was not enough to feed themselves for a full month. Given that households sell a portion of their food aid package in order to purchase other items to meet their needs, this is to be expected. Only by further developing livelihoods capacity will beneficiaries have the luxury of taking full advantage of food assistance for consumption until such time as they are fully self-sufficient.

In this regard, it was noted that WFP has not been carrying out Post-Distribution Monitory/Food Basket Monitoring (PDM) as a means of following up on what households actually do with their food aid rations and its impact on consumption and food security. WFP is in the process of planning for reactivating as system to commence as early as November, 2009.
As noted above, a three-month “seed protection” ration was provided to families in Yaroungou camp to off-set the elimination of GFD to all but select vulnerable persons. One respondent in that camp noted that his family consumed the seed he had saved from his last harvest because seed protection rations were distributed after his family’s grain stocks had been depleted (during June through August). It is impossible to conclude that such an isolated comment represents a general trend, though the timing of distribution occurred after planting should have occurred, thus possibly reducing the motivational effect. Also, households which also receive free seed donations would be less inclined to save seed thus eliminating the need for a motivational ration.

A limited amount of Food-For-Work/Food-For-Training (FFW/FFT) is programmed in WFP’s 2009 PRRO. However, the amount of FFW actually carried out up until the time of the JAM was very limited. No FFW had been carried out in the Gore camps, while some initiatives were beginning to be implemented in the Maro camps. The weak presence of partners with the requisite technical and managerial/financial capacity to plan and manage FFW projects represents a limiting factor for carrying out more of this type of programming.

UNHCR and its partner organizations working in the Gore camps, noted that monthly food distributions represent a significant burden on limited time and human resources that could be employed in camp management and livelihoods development. They also cited the time dedicated by refugees to collect rations at the distribution centers that could also be used for more productive activities. A suggestion was made to consider establishing a regime of bi-monthly distribution. Such a modality brings risks of poor consumption habits and a temptation to sell more commodities on the part of beneficiaries. However, the suggestion is worth assessing with care.

**Haraze and Daha Camps**

All duly registered refugees have been provided full (2,100 Kcal/p/d) GDF rations. However, all concerned admit that no one knows with certainty the exact number because they have settled in small groups, scattered in a wide area.

Though PDM has not been carried out during the early months of distribution, WFP has provided distribution partners with the tools and training for food aid distribution and utilization monitoring.

**Selective Feeding Programmes**

Supplemental Feeding (SF) and Therapeutic Feed (TF), and MCH are carried out to address cases of moderate and severe acute malnutrition among children 6-59 months, as well as to ensure adequate nutrition among pregnant and nursing women. COOPI is the operating partner of supplemental and therapeutic feeding centers which serve all five camps. Infrastructure, supplies and human resources for the management of the centers is adequate to meet programme needs.

During the first nine months of 2009 (though Moula distributions began only in June), a total of over 15,000 women and infants, 3,200 moderately malnourished children, and 370 severely malnourished children were assisted in MCH, SF, and TF centers, respectively.

Screening for malnutrition and admission into the selective feeding programme is carried out in local health centers as children are brought in for vaccination or for medical attention. Absent any
other form of systematic screening, the level of coverage of children found to be moderately malnourished and severely malnourished is low (Amboko/Gondje – 25.8%; Dosseye – 38.7%; Yaroungou – 14.3%; and Moula – 29.4%).

It should be noted that selective feeding programmes also serve the children from the host population that are referred to the health centers. A nutritional survey conducted among the neighboring local population has not been conducted. Therefore, a comparison of the overall nutritional status between the two populations cannot be made.

**Haraze-Daha Camps**

Nutritional activities for refugees settled in the Haraze camp are carried out at the UNICEF-supported health center which attends to severely malnourished children. The center is housed in temporary infrastructure constructed in non-durable, thatch material. A similar arrangement through local government health workers exists for severely malnourished children in Daha. Severely malnourished children from the local population are also admitted to therapeutic feeding. Screening is regularly carried out in Haraze, though it is irregular in the case of Daha. Supplemental feeding for children with moderately acute malnutrition and MCH assistance is not yet implemented in either camp.

Preparations are under way for the Ministry of Health and UNHCR’s operational partner, CSSI, with support from UNICEF will carry out in the near future a screening of children to identify those who should participate in the required supplemental feeding programme.

Infrastructure, materials and personnel required for selective feeding is very weak and insufficient. Neither health center is staffed by a nutritionist to manage supplemental feeding. Those implementing the program lack training in national protocols for implementation of supplemental and therapeutic feeding as well as good nutritional practices for the purpose of conducting training of mothers who participate in the feeding programmes.

In both camps, materials for the preparation of therapeutic pre-mix were noted to be in short supply. Neither were beds available to accommodate children and accompanying mothers at the TF centers, nor was food aid support made available to accompanying mothers which represent incentives to drop-out of the program before full treatment is provided.

**Food Supplies**

WFP has been able to reach 98% of their targeted beneficiaries with 96% of the targeted quantities of food in the Gore and Maro Camps during the last 12 months. Only in the case of salt, which experienced a pipeline rupture, was distribution suspended for approximately seven months. The pipeline has been re-established and distributions are set to resume in December. Distributions were made within 7 days of their targeted dates.

As the rainy season was winding down, stocks that were pre-positioned seem to be adequate to maintain planned distributions in anticipation of the arrival of stocks in the pipeline.

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Self-reliance Opportunities

Gore and Maro Camps

For the most part, the basis for self-reliance among refugees is agriculture, except for herders generally settled in the Dosseye camp. Production has been improving gradually since the refugees’ arrival. However, further increases will be constrained by diminishing soil fertility from overuse and a shortage of plowing implements (plows and oxen) with which to fully cultivate all available land.

Seeds and small tools are being distributed by aid organizations in appropriate quantities and variety. The challenge ahead is to begin weaning households from depending on free distributions, to be replaced by normal purchases in the local market based on their own revenue. In this regard, aid organizations are supporting an array of livelihoods development interventions designed to increase household income from diverse sources.

Refugees report that they carry out market gardening as well as raising small livestock as a source of food for consumption and income. Gardening and small animal husbandry are generally productive activities carried out by women and represent an under-exploited potential as part of an integrated farming approach. Those initiatives are effectively providing additional sources of income. These are still carried out on a limited scale owing to lack of access to means (seeds, tools, and animal stock) as well as technical assistance and veterinary services. According to 2009 mid-year reporting from AFRICARE, 17 ha. have been planted in market gardens in the three camps of Gore (Amboko – 6; Gondje – 6; and Dosseye – 5).

Aid organizations are also actively engaged in promoting and supporting the development of income-generating activities (IGA). These involve investments in awareness building, organization, technical training and organizational capacity-building. In addition, beneficiaries have received start-up capital either as in-kind donations or as micro-credit. Activities have focused on petty commerce, trades (carpentry, generator repair, bicycle repair, soap-making, yogurt and cheese production etc.). Market gardening is often categorized as an IGA, as well as a source of food for household consumption.

The success rate of entrepreneurial activities has not been consistent and generally less than expected. Respondents in all the camps reported cases of not being able to generate the anticipated income due to an inability to procure the required raw materials (cited by soap makers) or equipment, as well as a lack of anticipated market. Where success seems to be more consistent is in the area of petty commerce. Several respondents elaborated on admirable success rates in terms of sales, revenue and capitalization. Success, however, may often be a factor of a particular individual’s prior experience in and aptitude for petty commerce. Likewise, petty commerce generally require relatively low capital investment.

In Gore, CARE and AFRICARE have made significant investments in providing credit for IGAs. From 2005-2007 AFRICARE made approximately CFA 22 million (over US$47,000) in loans. Subsequently, CARE granted approximately CFA 30 million (over US$65,000) by way of 350 loans. Both AFRICARE and CARE report that repayment rates have been disappointing. Rates have been on a steady decline since 2005, averaging approximately 50%. In absolute terms,
restitution bottomed at 7.6% in 2007. Repayment in 2008 (the last year recorded) improved somewhat to 35.9% - still very unacceptable.\textsuperscript{10}

CARE and UNHCR have established a “red list” of delinquent loan recipients in order to put social pressure on delinquents to pay up by subjecting them to greater scrutiny when decisions are made in the provision of future credit and other non-humanitarian assistance. Only time and a conscientious assessment will show to what extent the tactic has achieved the desired results.

While there has not been a formal evaluation of the possible causes for such a poor rate of repayment, the partner organizations believe that they involve a “culture of impunity” (taking advantage of external assistance as a form of donation, rather than a loan to be re-paid), as well as weaknesses in the loan process (project analysis, loan approval criteria, follow-up and collection). In the opinion of the JAM team, weak or non-existent business plans (technical feasibility, cost-income analysis, and market analysis) are likely at the heart of the problem. The latter cause will require that partner organizations involved in IGA development and micro-credit assistance have the appropriate technical and managerial capacity to implement the program with the required rigor.

In Maro, the LRRD programme, implemented by COOPI and financed by the E.U., has taken the lead in granting credit to beneficiary groups engaged in IGAs. The programme channels credit through credit and loan associations. The programme, which commenced in March of 2009, grants credit to groups/associations. During its initial seven months, the programme been implemented in and around Yaroungou. So far, 295 persons have made deposits totaling approximately CFA 3.4 million (over US$ 7,000). An initial CFA 240,000 (US$ 520) in loans have been granted. There are no early reports on repayment rates.\textsuperscript{11}

\section*{Food and Self-reliance Strategies}

\textit{Gore and Maro camps}

Programmes are being implemented to help farmers improve soil fertility and to obtain improved seed. A pilot programme is underway to promote the planting of soil-enriching plants, Niebe and Moukouna, in nutrient-depleted fields. So far 10 hectares of extremely affected fields in Amboko are being treated. Also rice fields and market garden plots are being treated with organic and chemical fertilizer. In Gondje, a cooperative seed-multiplication project has planted 44 hectares in sorghum, corn, peanuts and sesame. The harvest should produce enough seed to plant 3,588 hectares, which will represent approximately 85% of the area planted in 2008 by farmers in the three camps of Gore.\textsuperscript{12}

The strategies being supported by aid organizations are properly aligned to promote and support an integrated household livelihoods approach. Refugees are receiving appropriate support with inputs (seeds, tools, credit) to assist them in developing productive capacities for self-reliance, though refugees felt that more assistance in the form of small ruminants and plowing equipment/animal is required.

\textsuperscript{10} Gore Inter-agency briefing to the JAM team in Moundou. October, 2009
\textsuperscript{11} Fiche du Programme LRRD. L’Union Européen. Mars 2009
\textsuperscript{12} Gore Inter-agency briefing to the JAM team in Moundou. October, 2009
On the other hand, investments in technical assistance (agricultural extension, small business management, etc.) are insufficient to meet demand and to ensure positive results/impact from the afore-mentioned investments. While aid organizations are providing animal vaccination service on a regular basis. A frequent request made by refugee respondents was for more veterinary services. These should be substantially increased to support refugees as well as local populations.

WFP has been pursuing a process of reducing the amount of food assistance provided in the form of general food distribution, in favor of more targeted food assistance through FFW, FFT, seed protection and selective feeding. However, the overwhelming view among concerned aid organizations is that the GFD modality still creates an attitude of dependence on free food aid and serves as an impediment to developing means of sustainable self-reliance among beneficiaries. So far, FFW is being employed on a limited scale, according to the availability of resources for project investments, as well as the capacity of partner organizations to plan, manage and monitor successful larger scale FFW projects.

As will be discussed later under Partnership, Planning and Other Issues, availability of resources, operational means to ensure significant beneficiary coverage and sufficient technical assistance are key to achieving sustainable impact in terms of self-reliance.

**The Environment**

**Gore and Maro camps**

Programmes are in place to promote protection and rehabilitation of the environment among refugees and neighboring local populations to off-set the effects of a relatively rapid and substantial in-migration in the region. The programmes involve awareness building, community organization through environmental committees (which act as conduits for awareness building in the communities at large), reforestation (including the establishment of tree seedling nurseries), fuel wood conservation (fuel-efficient stoves).

AFRICARE has set up tree nurseries that have produced more than 53,000 forest and fruit tree seedlings for planting in the Gore and Maro Camps (the number of surface covered has not been specified). Similarly, the LRRD programme has set up 2 nurseries which have produced 1,200 seedlings to date.13 The ultimate goal of the programme is to reforest 50 hectares of degraded land. So far, the scale and scope of reforestation efforts have been inadequate to achieve an appreciable level of environmental impact. No statistics were available to establish how many households are actually participating in reforestation initiatives and the scale of their involvement.

Significant attention has been paid to sensitization and promotion of fuel wood conservation, but adoption of fuel-efficient stoves (FES) is still low with approximately 40% of households in the Gore camps having adopted them. In the Moula camp, however, adoption rates have been high (>80%), but most stoves have deteriorated to the point of being unusable as a result of exposure to the elements (many in the open air) and/or defects in their materials or fabrication.

**Haraze and Daha camps**

At this early stage in their temporary settlement, refugees have very limited means from which to be self-sufficient in meeting their food and non-food needs. Some have been fortunate to find day

labor from time to time. Refugees have been able to obtain land on free loan from local authorities but have been unable to exploit it in any significant way. Refugees in Daha have not received any significant amounts of land on which to farm. At this late stage in the agricultural calendar, and considering the lack of a technically strong partner in the field of agriculture, putting in place a meaningful market gardens project during the present dry season is not likely. Consequently, both camps will be totally dependent on food aid for their minimal sustenance for the coming 12 months.

**Recommendations**

**Gore and Maro camps**

1.1 WFP, FAO and the Ministry of Agriculture should carry out a crop assessment and evaluation of food security among the refugees and neighboring host communities to estimate with precision expected levels of food self-sufficiency/insecurity so as to anticipate the length of the next lean period for food assistance targeting.

1.2 The existing interagency coordination mechanism for agricultural/livestock planning (including market gardening) should be further reinforced and to provide farmers with the necessary resources and technical assistance to maximize cultivation of available land and improve levels of productivity through an integrated farming approach. Appropriate soil fertilization should figure prominently in support to farmers. Coordinated programming should have as an objective significant beneficiary coverage of the population in need.

1.3 WFP, in close planning with partner organizations, should employ food assistance packages/approaches that directly support/compliment those partners’ programmes to increase farm production and income generation for the purpose of improving livelihoods. WFP should strive to convert free distribution to other modalities (FFW, FFT, and local procurement) and then reduce levels of food assistance in sync with verifiable achievements in increased productive capacity.

1.4 Partners implementing IGA promotion/support should consider focusing on activities that households are already familiar with and which are likely to produce resources for consumption and sale (market gardening, small animal husbandry, petty commerce) and should base support for activities that are supported by a reasonable business plan. Partners should reinforce their capacity to provide more and better technical assistance to prospective IGA participants and follow-up of those engaged in activities.

1.5 Partners involved in micro-credit should, in partnership, carry out a thorough assessment of underlying factors for poor loan repayment performance and develop appropriate approaches and robust systems and procedures for credit application analysis, risk assessment and portfolio management.

1.6 WFP should consider working with only one standard ration based on a per capita daily consumption requirement of 2100 Kcal/p/d. To compensate for differing and improving levels of food self-sufficiency in the various camps, WFP could adjust the number of months of distribution, timing them to occur during the lean period.
1.7 WFP should complete planning and approve resources to put in place a system of periodic PDM that covers random samplings of beneficiaries receiving GFD, FFW and Seed Protection food assistance in all the camps.

1.8 WFP and UNHCR should carefully study the viability of carrying out bi-monthly food distribution to reduce the workload on camp management and on refugees in the process of collecting rations monthly at distribution centres. Any eventual modification should be accompanied by sufficient capacity and awareness building among beneficiaries with regard to maintaining a balanced consumption plan of the food ration as well as close, effective PDM.

1.9 UNHCR and concerned partners, in concert with FAO and concerned government technical departments, should develop an environmental rehabilitation master plan for all camps and plan and implement forestation and other required environmental projects that will represent significant coverage to achieve environment impact.

1.10 Partner organizations involved in promoting FES should evaluate their projects and plan remedial actions/investments to rectify technical or social problems involved with the stoves’ durability. Lessons learned from the evaluation should be applied in a campaign to replace damaged stoves and seek greater coverage in FES use.

Haraze and Daha camps

2.1 UNHCR and WFP should plan continuing assistance to the estimated 15,000 refugees now in the camps. However resources should be planned for a contingency of 5,000 additional arrivals.

2.2 WFP should plan to provide free food aid distribution for at least the next 12 months along with supplemental feeding for malnourished children and pregnant/nursing women.

2.3 UNHCR, in concert with FAO and the Ministry of Agriculture, should seek out a partner organization and plan an agricultural assistance project to be up and running in time to provide timely assistance at the start of the next planting season.

3. HEALTH, NUTRITION AND WATER & SANITATION

Health

Refugees and neighboring populations are provided basic first level curative and preventive attention, as well as reproductive health at local health centers located in the vicinity of the camps. Vaccination services for infants/children as well as pregnant women are generally reaching the target population to obtain increasing levels of coverage.

The most important strategy being implemented is the integration of health centers which serve the refugee population into the national system, including observance of national policies as well as the transfer of management involvement to the government’s MPH. Already, MSF-France has transferred its responsibility for management of the Gore District Hospital to national health authorities. In the short-run, this will result in a serious reduction in personnel (approximately
33%) as the MPH tries to replace departing expatriate staff. COOP, too, is in the process of trying to progressively transfer management responsibility to local health authorities. Even as it accepts responsibility for managing more health centers, the government health service faces numerous human resource and material gaps at the level of district reference hospital and health centers. Cold chains are weak or lacking; chief doctors are in short supply at the district level; the provisioning of medicines to hospitals and Health Centers is weak; and the number of trained midwives is very low.

During visits to camp health centers, it was noted that insufficient personnel were on duty, supplies were limited and physical infrastructure (examination room, waiting area) was inadequate, resulting in delays in attention and overcrowding. Fuel was in short supply to maintain electricity.

Despite prior programmes to provide mosquito nets in the camps, these were lacking in the Beureuh and Dosseye camp health centers and were not seen in the few homes visited during camp walk-throughs. This latter shortage represents a serious gap considering that malaria represents the number one cause of morbidity and mortality among the camp population.

In this regard, cost-recovery, which in theory is supposed to provide some of the resources required to address these weaknesses is especially important and proving to be particularly problematic. The process is presently underway, with the Beureh health center now implementing cost-recovery while that of near-bye Dosseye still provides free services. Similarly in Maro, the health center in Yaroungou already implements cost-recovery that serving Moula still provides free service. In both cases, the availability of free service in relative proximity is making progress in achieving targeted levels of cost recovery very difficult. Those centers where free service is still provided note acknowledge that they are receiving patients who should have sought assistance from centers that implement cost-recovery payments. Less than 50% of patients make payments, citing an inability to afford the established fees.

While Health Mutuals could represent an important piece of the management strategy they are still slow in taking root. The FED and OMS must still reconcile/harmonize their systems and procedures on the matter.

Despite the efforts of aid organizations and investment in training for the organization and strengthening of Health Center Management Committees, they are still weak, generally lacking in motivation and not performing their assigned functions at the desired levels.

Whereas southern Chad has a higher prevalence of HIV/AIDS infection and those among refugees are higher than the local host population, attention to PLWHIV is weak. In the case of the Maro camps, Voluntary Testing Centers do not exist, though BELACD is in the process of establishing them. Only until then will infected refugees be able to benefit from ART and supplemental feeding, which up until now has only been available in Sahr (approximately 100 kms away).

**Haraze and Daha camps**

Free first level health service is provided to the refugee population and local population in both health centers. Already weak to begin with, they are very ill-equipped to provide adequate health care for the new influx of patients. The centers lack practically everything required: infrastructure (buildings, potable water, and electric generator), human resources (including midwives), equipment and essential medicines. In terms of infrastructure, most is constructed of temporary materials (thatch and tents) and of insufficient quantity. Waiting rooms, examination
rooms and birthing rooms are inadequate. Meanwhile, UNHCR does not have a partner to implement health services to refugees in Haraze.

Laboratory capacity for specific testing (STDs, HIV, Sugar levels, etc) is lacking. Though refugees are arriving from a country with a high prevalence of HIV, testing and treatment for HIV is not yet carried out in Haraze and Daha.

The standard Health Information System (SIS in French) of the Min of Health is not used in the Daha in the camp health center.

**Nutrition**

**Gore and Maro camps**

Nutritional screening is being carried out in all three camps. Cases of moderate and severe malnutrition are referred to Supplemental Feeding and Therapeutic Feeding Centers which operate out of the centers. In the case of Dosseye, however, staff at the center still have some confusion between the protocols associated with the two types of feeding centers.

While screening has confirmed that the nutritional status of refugee children has been progressively improving since the first arrivals, not enough is known about the nutritional state of children of the surrounding host population to obtain a point of reference to guide transitional food assistance programming that appropriately responds to the nutritional needs of the population.

**Haraze and Daha camps**

Supplemental nutritional assistance is provided to malnourished children at the two health centers which serve both the refugee population as the neighboring local population, through only for the severely malnourished through therapeutic feeding. Screening is still not consistent and protocols associated with addressing the three phases of attention to severe malnutrition are not systematically followed.

Cooking facilities and beds for the hospitalization severely malnourished children and their accompanying mothers are lacking.

Staff require training in treating both the severely as well as moderately malnourished. Training is also required in nutrition education/promotion associated with as changing poor nutritional practices through food preparation demonstrations.

**Water and Sanitation**

**Gore and Maro camps**

The provision of potable water through protected wells and the number of latrines are acceptable by SPHERE standards. However, the communal latrines have not been adequately maintained in all camps. Most have become unsanitary. Consequently, residents, for the most part, have not been using them.
Whereas water and sanitation committees have been organized in all camps, they have not fulfilled their duties – particularly with regard to latrines - with much effectiveness, for lack of motivation. Committees report shortages in products for latrine disinfection as well as proper protective gear (boots, gloves and masks) for those responsible for latrine maintenance.

It is generally expected that family latrines will be better maintained by their users than communal latrines. In this regard, CARE has begun to promote the construction of household latrines and assist families in their construction by donating platforms, while families perform the excavation of the pit and construction of the superstructure appropriate to the means of the household. In the case of Dosseye, camp members express a preference for brick over less permanent material and signal a shortage of bricks.

Similarly, camp water pump maintenance teams have sometimes been slow to maintain or repair wells, thus resulting in occasional long waits at the functioning wells. In Dosseye, more than 40% of the camp’s well pumps were not functional. In Gondje the figure was nearly 30%. As the committees and repair teams perform their community service on a voluntary basis, their motivation has been waning.

Camp respondents also reported cases of poor water quality, generally associated with discoloration. While the problem may be a seasonal occurrence involving sediment filtration during the rainy season, the problem may be caused by rusting galvanized pipe.

To sustain the purchase of maintenance materials/equipment and to offer some form of motivation to maintenance crews, residents of the Amboko camp have set up a monthly cost-recovery assessment of CFA 100 per family.

**Haraze and Daha camps**

Provision of water in the Haraze camps is from protected wells. The available quantity meets SPHERE standards. Daha camps are served by five wells equipped with 2 pumps. UNICEF has sponsored six more wells with one pump. 336 communal latrines are in use in the two camps (86 in Haraze and 250 in Daha). The number in Haraze does not meet SPHERE standard. Upkeep of the latrines is the responsibility of camp hygiene committees which are supervised by “cleanliness ambassadors”, designated by camp leadership. Trash disposal in both camps is under control.

The NGO, Solidarite, is responsible for overall management of water and sanitation in both camps. A designated staff of 8 also carry out awareness-building and education with regard to WatSan.

**Recommendations**

**Gore and Maro camps**

1.11 UNHCR and health center administrators should investigate the root cause(s) of the shortage of staff and material (poor budgeting, ineffective HR management, mismanagement, or low collection of planned income?) They should develop and implement an action plan to address the causes of the insufficiencies.
1.12 UNHCR, partner NGOs and local health authorities should reinforce awareness-building actions to impress upon refugee users the role cost recovery plays in providing continued service and the relative value they receive from their contributions. A cost recovery strategy in water and health for the Moula should also be envisaged.

1.13 UNICEF should coordinate with the Ministry of Public Health and other NGOs active in this area to carry out a rapid assessment/survey of the actual use of mosquito nets in refugee homes and what has happened to those already distributed. Similarly, the lack of nets in health centers should be investigated to determine what caused the shortage. All health centers should be furnished with an adequate supply according to their need.

1.14 UNHCR and WFP, in concert with local health authorities should facilitate and support BELACD’s expeditious opening of a VTCC in Maro and WFP should prepare to allocate HIV supplemental feeding to those participating in ARV treatment at the center.

1.15 A work plan should be implemented as soon as possible to complete coverage of family latrines in the camps, taking the necessary steps to ensure that the users participate in the construction and proper maintenance of their assigned latrines. Actions to sensitize and motivate the communities to maintain communal latrines already constructed in public places should be reinforced.

**Haraze and Daha camps**

2.4 UNHCR should take an inventory of insufficiencies with regard to health infrastructure and operating requirements, prepare a plan of action to implement remedial measures and obtain the necessary resources to implement the plan.

2.5 The SIS should be put in place and implemented in the Daha health center as soon as possible.

2.6 UNHCR should recruit a partner organization to manage health care and care to PLWH in Haraze.

2.7 WFP should set up Supplemental Nutrition Centers for moderately malnourished children and a MCH nutrition centers for the camps and local population. It should find and train a partner organization to manage the programme as well as provide nutrition training and nutritional cooking demonstrations.

2.8 UNHCR, in concert with UNICEF should establish the appropriate infrastructure in durable material for the implementation of MCH, Supplemental Feeding and Therapeutic Feeding centers that serve the acutely malnourished population.

2.9 UNICEF should provide the required materials/ingredients for effective therapeutic feeding.

2.10 UNHCR should implement a plan to increase the number of available latrines in Haraze in order to comply with SPHERE standards.
4. PROTECTION, EDUCATION, GENDER AND COMMUNITY SERVICES

Protection

Gore and Maro camps

The camps are being effectively managed by UNHCR and its implementation partners. Refugees have been registered and properly documented. However, the close proximity of the Gore camps to the international border, a certain amount of fluid movement back and forth across the border by members of the refugee community and the fact that refugees and local populations are of the same ethnic/linguistic group have made it difficult to keep camp records accurate and up-dated. This has led to suspicion that local Chadians may be posing as refugees to benefit from assistance. Complicating the matter is the fact that Chadian refugees returning from the C.A.R. may also be identifying themselves as refugees. Consequently the UNHCR data base is not entirely reliable.

Overall, the security of refugees settled in the camps is relatively good. Gendarme have been assigned to safeguard the security of refugees in all camps. The current management system of gendarmes assigned for camp security is not effective as they are not under the direct control of CNAR, but continue to be under a significant influence of the military battalion in their region. This arrangement is not conducive to maintaining quality control over the observance of international protection standards by the elements assigned to the camps. In addition, the number of the gendarmes assigned to the camps is insufficient, not all gendarmes speak the language of the camp residents, and none of the assigned gendarmes is female.

While no major incidents were reported in the camps, respondents did make reference to harassment by local police and gendarmes both inside and outside of the camps. A particular point of contention involves harassment on the roads for lack of appropriate documentation. Police and gendarmes do not always recognize the “Safe Passage” documents issued by UNHCR and CNAR as legitimate.

Inter-communal relations with are for the most part good. However, tensions have occurred between farmers and herders over damage done to crops by livestock which have not been properly attended to. Mixed refugee-host community committees are set up to settle disputes.

Refugees settled in the Maro camps are have been victims of road banditry (coupeurs de route) while moving outside of the camps en route to Danamadjî and Sido. This is a general problem in the area and not directly related to their status as refugees.

Haraze and Daha camps

The refugees, as well as the local population, feel secure in the environment. Because the camps are extremely close to the international border, certain movement of C.A.R. rebel elements are observed in the camps, fortunately without major incidents. Generally their presence is associated
with making purchases in Daha and/or visiting relatives who reside in the camps. Apparently, their presence is noted and tolerated by local authorities so long as they act peacefully. The fact that there are only six Chadian gendarmes permanently assigned to the area probably explains the flexible arrangement. Crime was not cited as a problem by those interviewed and refugees confirmed that they do not feel discriminated against or stigmatized.

Refugees have been registered by UNHCR and CNAR on a timely basis, with the exception of the most recent arrivals and a small number of children who have lost identifying bracelets before assistance tokens have been distributed. Births and deaths are reported on a timely basis by health authorities and duly registered.

It should be noted that movement back and forth across the border is common place among many refugees, though it was not cited as a major concern so far for the control of refugee registration control.

That said, however, the location of the two camps so close to the international border is not conducive to safeguarding the security of both refugee population as well as humanitarian aid organizations. To meet international standards, the camps should be located at a safer distance from the border.

**Education**

**Gore and Maro camps**

Primary and secondary education is provided to all refugee children whose parents chose to enroll them. Gross enrollment is still low at less than 50%. Absenteeism is also relatively high owing to children being taken from school to participate in income-generating tasks (especially planting, harvesting and tending livestock). Both enrollment and absenteeism is affected by older siblings being called upon to care for pre-schoolers and infants while parents are occupied with income-generating activities.

All camps reported a shortage of classrooms and teachers in relation to the number of children enrolled. In the case of the Maro camps, responsibility for the management and support of schools serving the refugee community has been passed fully from UNHCR to the Ministry of Education, while that of the Gore camps is still assigned to CARE in coordination with UNICEF and UNHCR. Education authorities have been slow to assign teachers, leaving a gap to be filled by parent associations. Teacher stipends have been reduced from levels once paid by UNHCR. This has affected morale and has resulted in the resignation of some teachers.

Infrastructure is not only in short supply but also lacking in up-keep and repair. In the case of Amboko, of 40 classrooms, only 5 were regarded as being in good condition.

UNICEF has provided school materials kits to all students, though provision of didactic materials from education authorities were reported to be insufficient.

UNHCR, in concert with “9 Million.org” with financing from the Government of France has organized school feeding at institutions serving refugees and host population around the Gore camps. The programme not only provides resources for school meals, but also promotes initial steps toward community sustainability by motivating communities to organize community farms.
that produce beans to supplement externally provided foods. This modality could represent a viable basis for a pilot partnership with WFP “Purchase for Progress” (P4P). The channeling of Food-for-Work (instead of GFD) to stimulate further expansion of community farms for school feeding (and perhaps even to jump start the capitalization of health mutuals to cover health center cost-recovery quotas) might also be evaluated for its potential viability.

It is worth noting that literacy training has been organized in each of the Gore camps camp. About 100 women have completed the first year of training. Further levels will be required for an adequate degree of literacy. However, given the high percentage of illiteracy among women and the total population of the camps, the initiative addresses only a very small fraction of the need. To represent appreciable impact, it will have to be continued and expanded to not only include more women but also progressively higher levels of training to achieve an appreciable level of impact.

**Haraze and Daha camps**

Refugee children have been absorbed into the host community schools which have received some support from UNICEF to expand their infrastructure to absorb the significant influx of refugees. Of the 840 children registered in the schools of Haraze and Daha, more than 700 are refugees. While most refugee children are registered to attend school, those who are not registered choose not to do so because they are unable to afford the proper uniforms, shoes and supplies. About 20% of children drop out each year, also for lack of resources.

School supplies have been provided by both the Chadian Ministry of Education and UNICEF. These, however, have proved to be insufficient.

In Daha, where the largest number of refugee children attend classes, educational infrastructure is precarious. The primary school counts on only two classrooms built with durable materials. For supplemental space, UNICEF has constructed twelve open-sided “hangars” out of wood and thatch. Without sufficient desks and chairs, pupils sit on the ground during class. The teacher-pupil ratio is very high for lack of sufficient teachers.

The school is served by one well and two pit latrines (one reserved for the teachers and one for the pupils).

**Gender**

**Gore and Maro camps**

The situation facing women and girls in the camps has not changed appreciably. Sexually-based violence, female circumcision, early pregnancies and arranged/forced marriage still occur at significant levels even after considerable investment of time and resources in continual awareness-building and education. This should not discourage organizations from continuing and even reinforcing efforts in this regard, since changing attitudes and practices is undoubtedly a long-term undertaking, particularly when there are cultural underpinnings.

Given the extremely sensitive nature of SGBV, respondents were reticent to provide many details that might serve to determine in which direction trends might be going. Because of the stigma that
is attached, not all cases are reported. Respondents did confirm that excessive consumption of alcohol is often a contributing factor.

Initiatives to curb female circumcision by attracting circumcisers away from the “profession” with aid to set up income-generating activities do not seem to have had any positive effect. Even when some circumcisers cease practicing, others readily take over the task owing to the deep cultural imperative felt by households to impose the traditional procedure on their girls.

“Centres d’Ecoute) have been set up UNHCR in the camps as a place where victims of SGBV can confidentially talk about their experience and to seek counseling. Unfortunately UNHCR has been unable to recruit and assign a local professional with the requisite psycho-social technical expertise to provide the required level of counseling.

**Haraze and Daha camps**

The situation is similar to that encountered in the Gore and Maro camps. As of September, only seven cases of SGBV and seven of female circumcision had been reported to UNHCR. Awareness-building and education is being carried out in both camps. Most households have had a family member attend such sessions, which are also open to the local population. Since only a short time has elapsed since the arrival of refugees, the topics have only been addressed at a general level so far.

**Community Services**

**Gore and Maro camps**

Considerable attention is paid to promoting participation of the refugees in the management of affairs in their camps. Various committees have been formed and exist to manage/oversee matters of importance in the camps (Camp Management, School Parents Associations, Water & Sanitation, as well as Conflict Resolution – sometimes referred to as an Elders Committee). Service in these bodies voluntary and no compensation is provided to the members. Consequently, some degree of diminishing motivation is occurring (particularly evident in latrine maintenance).

Women are encouraged to participate and are well represented in most committees. In the case of Yaroungou, women are under-represented to the point that several committees are composed only of men. There is only one woman on the camp management committee. According to respondents, women just are not offering themselves as candidates for election.

Committees are attempting to implement various forms of cost-recovery or community contribution fees for some services (CFA 250/pupil/year school fee; CFA 100/consultation health center cost-recovery fees). Their efforts are laudable, and represent an initial step toward sustainable services. In the face of limited livelihoods capacities, families are encountering difficulties in paying the established fees. Success on this front will have to be closely and directly linked with efforts to improve livelihoods.

Savings and loan associations are being formed under the auspices of the LRRD programme. Though growth as been modest during these early months of implementation, these organizations offer promise.
**Haraze and Daha camps**

Given the short time that refugees have been settled in the camps, most assistance has been of a humanitarian nature. There hasn’t been much time to promote and set up forums for community management of certain essential services. However, traditional elders have worked together in trying to resolve conflicts as they occur.

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**Recommendations**

**Gore and Maro camps**

1.16 UNHCR and the local authorities should keep reinforcing ongoing actions to identify Chadians registered as refugees in the camps and the refugees who have already departed spontaneously.

1.17 UNHCR and Government Authorities should issue formal I.D. cards to all valid refugees.

1.18 A revised management system should be negotiated and established to allow CNAR to have an effective control over the gendarmes. The number of gendarmes should be increased according to each camp’s requirements. At least two elements at each camp should be female and all elements should be adequately trained.

1.19 UNHCR should seek a partner(s) and funding to expand the present community-based school feeding programme implemented in Gore to the 2 camps and neighboring host population in Maro. In this regard, WFP should explore some innovative approaches to using resources at its disposal to be supportive of community-based approaches to school feeding. The programme could be jumped started using P4P, or FFW could be used as a motivational resources at the initiation of community agricultural production projects whose revenue is invested in community social infrastructure (school feeding, school fees, or health center cost recovery).

**Haraze and Daha camps**

2.11 UNHCR and CNAR should take the steps necessary to transfer the refugees to a camp(s) to an internationally acceptable safe distance from the border. The town of Am Timan, where infrastructure from ex-IDP sites is still present would be a likely first choice. At that time they should be definitely revalidated, registered and issued formal I.D. cards. Most subsequent recommendations will depend in some measure on resolution of this issue.

2.12 Even without certainty as to where the camps will be located in the very near future, UNHCR and UNICEF should launch an immediate campaign to provide adequate, desks/chairs, school materials wells and latrines for the number of pupils attending class.
5. LOGISTICS

The Pipeline

Food supplies are brought in through the Douala corridor. The first leg of transport is carried out by rail to Ngaoundere. The second is by private truckers into Chad and on to WFP warehouses in Amboko and Maro. GTZ provides transport from the WFP warehouses to the final distribution points inside the camps. Despite logistical complications and bottlenecks associated with the corridor, WFP has managed the pipeline adequately to ensure reasonably high levels of commodity deliveries against planned targets.

The main problem in 2009 occurred with salt which was unavailable for distribution from April until November for lack of supply. The unavailability was not due to logistical incapacity but rather to procurement.

While commodities were delivered according to plan, they were many times delayed by up to 7-10 days as a result of the poor condition of the roads (particularly during the rainy season), the unavailability of private transport capacity at given times and occasional fuel shortage.

Some commodities were diverted for emergency distributions in the east of the country. The amounts were relatively small and most affected the start-up of FFW activities.

Accessibility

Gore and Maro camps

Movement of staff and material for the Gore camps has been seriously hampered by the damaged/structurally-weakened state of a bridge on the outskirts of Gore on the road to Moundou, which is used to reach the three camps. Because U.N. security policy prohibits the use of the bridge for truck and light vehicle traffic, cars and trucks must take a 200 km. circuitous route through Doba to get to the camps (instead of the direct 6 km route if the bridge were passable). This forces all international aid organizations to lose valuable time and efficiency as well as incur significant financial costs each and every day.

Haraze and Daha camps

These camps are in an extremely isolated part of the country where the roads are very poor even during the dry season. During the rainy season they are impassable. Particularly in the case of Daha, whole areas are cut off by large amounts of standing water that can only be traversed by canoes throughout the rainy season. Consequently, a six-month supply of commodities must be prepositioned prior to the first rains.
Due to the relatively insecurity where the camps are located, all commodity and personnel transport must be carried out under escort. This creates added logistical constraints associated with efficiency and costs.

Finally, the fact that refugees are not settled in a rather compact, well-defined location, but rather in small clusters spread out along a band of road 90 kms along the international border, makes final distribution complicated and more costly.

Storage

Storage facilities in Amboko are adequate in quantity and quality. New Rubb Hall storage tents are functional in Maro at a location which also houses new WFP offices. However, the perimeter enclosure has not been constructed, thus delaying the use of the office facilities to remain in MOSS compliance. Needless to say, a perimeter wall is essential to safeguard the security of commodities stored in the warehouses.

Facilities in Haraze and Daha are very insufficient, especially in the case of Daha, where the majority of refugees are settled.

Commodity Quality Control

No issues were noted with regard to the quality of commodities stored and distributed by WFP.

Recommendations

1.20 UNHCR and WFP should lobby concerned authorities to commit to a plan/project to repair or replace the bridge at Gore as quickly as technically possible. If necessary, donors should be lobbied to provide financing to assist the government to implement the project.
6. PARTNERSHIPS, PLANNING AND OTHER ISSUES

Partnerships and Coordination

Gore and Maro camps

While the universe of humanitarian and development aid organizations responding to the southern refugee emergency is not nearly as extensive as that responding to needs in the east of the country, a respectable number of recognized international NGOs (ACT, AFRICARE, African Concern, CARE, COOPI) well as U.N. agencies and international organizations (most notably UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF, FAO,WHO, and GTZ) are present and implementing programmes of relief, recovery and development. Several reputable Chadian NGOs (notably BELACD, ASDEC, COOPEC, among others) are active in the region and coordinating with international actors to put in place sustainable community development services. ONDR and line ministries are and integral part of the relief and recovery to the host population and refugee communities.

Of particular importance to present and future programming is the initiation of the E.U. financed LRRD Programme (Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development) in both the Maro and Gore. This programme emphasized support for sustainable long-term solutions to the welfare and development needs of not only the refugee population but neighboring Chadian communities within a wide radius of the camps. Similarly, all aid organizations are fully committed to transitioning their assistance from general relief to recovery and development.

UNHCR has taken the lead to establish coordination mechanisms and tools at the policy and strategic levels, as well as throughout the different stages of the programme cycle. These fora involve the local authorities, state public services, NGOs, CBOs, UN agencies as well as beneficiary representatives. In addition to regular sector meetings, a multi-sectoral coordination body on promotion of self-reliance has been established in order to identify gaps, harmonize approaches, and maximize the results of coordinated actions.

While the operational presence and engagement of the UN agencies with programming and technical expertise in development is growing it still remains sporadic and ad-hoc. The active engagement of these organizations are essential for sustainable solutions for the backstopping and institutional strengthening that they will bring to concerned government line ministries responsible for developing and sustaining essential social and economic services upon which a successful transition from relief will rely.

Despite there being numerous projects having been or being implemented to develop the productive capacity of refugees and host population, as the basis for reducing/eliminating general relief assistance, precise information on their specific universe of action, their objectives and targets and the results achieved to date are scattered and difficult to aggregate. Judging by programme documents and progress reports reviewed in conjunction with the JAM, it would appear that monitoring and reporting of programme implementation lack geographic and demographic specificity. Monitoring and reporting tend to focus on activities and outputs instead of results and impact. There is no systematically established base line against which needs are
quantified or progress monitored with an eye toward analyzing gaps and the extent to which they are being addressed/filled.

**Haraze and Daha camps**

Unlike other parts of Chad, this area of refugee settlement is handicapped by a paucity of humanitarian actors. Only the international NGOs, Solidarite and CCSI are operational along side local line-ministries, and are supported by UNHCR, WFP and UNICEF. OCHA is active in organizing humanitarian coordination fora on the ground and from Abeche/Goz Beida. Isolation and poor/stretched communications infrastructure (telecommunications, roads, air operations) are challenges that coordination mechanisms must contend with.

On the ground, the technical/operational teams of the afore-mentioned organizations meet weekly to exchange information on implementation and evolving needs associated with protection, nutrition, identification and targeting of vulnerable groups and food aid utilization.

**Contingency Planning**

While the situation in the seven camps and surrounding area is relatively stable, social and political events leading up to up-coming national elections in the C.A.R. will have to be monitored closely. An escalation of violence associated with political events in that country could result in new arrivals of refugees.

In the case of the Haraze and Daha camps, the number of refugees settled in the camps at the time of the JAM had dropped by about 25% from the early highs, in part a reaction to the relative security afforded by the rainy season. There is concern in the area that insecurity to increase once again during the dry season, compelling at least a similar number of persons to cross the border into Haraze and Daha once again.

**Recommendations**

**Gore and Maro camps**

1.21 All organisations providing humanitarian and development assistance in the area should consider and use the results of a socioeconomic survey to be organized/conducted by CARE/UNHCR as the principal baseline of coordinated planning, monitoring and evaluation of their relief, recovery and development activities in the Gore area. A similar survey should be planned and conducted to promote a self reliance strategy for the refugees in the Maro area and their integration in the neighboring community.

1.22 Building upon existing mechanisms and tools put in place by the authorities and UNHCR, inter-agency coordination should be reinforced to ensure thorough needs analysis, harmonized programming, approaches, aligned targeting for effective geographic/demographic coverage.

1.23 Programming to improve livelihoods and basic services should be increasingly balanced between refugees and host populations.
1.24 More stable engagement of UN agencies specialized in Development should be sought through active advocacy at various policy levels, in order to assure a smooth phase-out of general relief and phase-in of development.

**Haraze and Daha camps**

2.11 UNHCR and WFP should plan continuing assistance to the estimated 15,000 refugees now in the camps. However resources should be planned for a contingency of 5,000 additional arrivals.
Appendix 1: Members of the Mission

TEAM MEMBERS
2009 Joint Assessment Mission to Southern Chad (Gore – Maro Team)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>E-mail</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**TEAM MEMBERS**  
*2009 Joint Assessment Mission to Southern Chad (Haraze – Daha Team)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>E-mail</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
# Appendix 2: Mission Itinerary

## ITINERARY

### 2009 Joint Assessment Mission to Southern Chad (Gore-Maro Team)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Activity</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15 Oct.</td>
<td>N’djamena – Moundou</td>
<td>* Meeting with the Sous-Prefet of</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>* General Briefing by UNHCR/WFP staff and partner organizations</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>* Overnight in Moundou</td>
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<tr>
<td>16 Oct.</td>
<td>Beureuh</td>
<td>* Welcome ceremony with local authorities and leaders of refugees and host populations</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Amboko Camp</td>
<td>* Sectoral Focus Group meetings</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gondje Camp</td>
<td>* Sectoral Focus Group meetings</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>* Camp “Walkabout”/discussions with random households by a sub-team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moundou</td>
<td>* Overnight in Moundou</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Oct.</td>
<td>Dosseye Camp</td>
<td>* Sectoral Focus Group meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>* Camp “Walkabout”/discussions with random households by a sub-team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Doba</td>
<td>* Meeting with the Governor of Logone Oriental Region</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Sarh</td>
<td>* Overnight in Sarh</td>
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<tr>
<td>18 Oct.</td>
<td>Maro</td>
<td>* Meeting with the Préfet of Grande Sido and local authorities.</td>
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<td>* General Briefing by UNHCR/WFP staff and partner organizations.</td>
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<td>Sarh</td>
<td>* Overnight in Sarh</td>
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<td>19 Oct.</td>
<td>Moula Camp</td>
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<td>* Camp “Walkabout”/discussions with random households by a sub-team</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Yaroungou Camp</td>
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<td>Sarh</td>
<td>* Overnight in Sarh</td>
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<td>20 Oct.</td>
<td>Sarh</td>
<td>Team meeting to analyze findings and establish recommendations</td>
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<td>Sarh – N’Djamena</td>
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<tr>
<td>22 Oct.</td>
<td>N’Djamena</td>
<td>Team meeting to finalize findings and recommendations</td>
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## MISSION ITINERARY
### 2009 Joint Assessment Mission to Southern Chad (Haraze-Daha Team)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 16/10/09 | *Travel Travel N'djamena Abéché (UNHAS)  
Meeting with team members in Abeché  
* Travel Abeché – Haraze- Goz Beida (AIRSERVE)  
Meeting with local authorities  
Sector briefings with staff/stakeholders  
Data collection  
* Haraze- Goz Beida (AIRSERVE)  
Overnight Goz Beida |
| 17/10/09 | *Travel Goz Beida – Daha (MINUCART)  
Meeting with local authorities  
Sector briefings with staff/stakeholders  
Data collection  
*Travel Daha- Goz Beida (MINUCART)  
Overnight Goz Beida |
| 18/10/09 | Goz Beida  
Team working session  
finalize findings and recommendations |
| 19/10/09 | * Travel: Goz Beida – Abéché-N’Djamena (UNHAS) |
Appendix 3: People/Organizations Encountered

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partner Organizations</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organization</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>1. COOPI</td>
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<td>2. ACT</td>
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<td>3. ARICARE</td>
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<td>4. CARE</td>
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<td>5. ACTED</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. World Vision</td>
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<td>7. GTZ</td>
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## Local Administrative Authorities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function/Title</th>
<th>Meeting Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Prefet of the Province of Logone-Occidental</td>
<td>Moundou</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 General Secretary of the Department of Nya-Pende</td>
<td>Beureuh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Governor of the Province of Logone Oriental</td>
<td>Doba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Prefect of the Department of Gran Sido</td>
<td>Maro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Prefect Haraze</td>
<td>Maro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Sous prefect Daha</td>
<td>Daha</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix 4: Review of Previous JAM Recommendations

### 2008 JAM JAP MATRIX REVIEW

**Assistance to Southern African Refugees in Southern Chad**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Required Action(s)</th>
<th>Responsibility</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Speed up the registration of the refugees in Moula</td>
<td>Carry out registration</td>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>Accomplished</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Standardize the targeting criteria for vulnerable people in all the camps.</td>
<td>Finalise the actual identification of vulnerable groups according to the codes in ProGres data base.</td>
<td>CARE/UNHCR</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Do the HRIT for the very delicate cases.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Reinforce assistance to refugees in related legal problems.</td>
<td>Sensitization campaigns on human rights and legal procedures</td>
<td>CNAR/UNHCR</td>
<td>Being carried out on a continual basis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Create a monitoring center for SGBV cases and assure Permanent psychosocial help.</td>
<td>Construction of the center</td>
<td>CARE/UNHCR</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Identification of partner for psychosocial interventions in the camps.</td>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mass campaign under the framework of ninemillion.org</td>
<td>CARE/UNHCR</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Develop ways to ensure the reconversion of genital mutilation attendants, by including them in some IGAs</td>
<td>Identify opportunities</td>
<td>CARE/UNHCR</td>
<td>Accomplished. Unfortunately IGAs identified as possible solutions are not having appreciable impact on dissuading “” from practicing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Discuss with “exiceuses”</td>
<td>CARE/UNHCR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Speed up the issuance of ID cards to CAR refugees</td>
<td>Liaise with local authorities to improve actual procedures.</td>
<td>CNAR/UNHCR</td>
<td>Not accomplished. Only “Safe Conduct” documents have been issued.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Reinforcement of the capacity of communities, for a better understanding of the right for the education and encouragement of teachers.</td>
<td>Training of APE (Parent-Teacher Association)</td>
<td>CARE/UNICEF/UNHCR</td>
<td>Carried out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Supply school materials</td>
<td>Increase the provision of school materials for the 2008/2009</td>
<td>CARE/UNICEF</td>
<td>Carried out on a regular basis. The amount of materials is still sited as</td>
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<td>9.</td>
<td>Expanded literacy programs should be extended, especially for girls.</td>
<td>Provision of motivational kits for girls.</td>
<td>CARE/UNHCR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Address the problem of the video – cinema in the camps.</td>
<td>Mass campaign to sensitize APE on the problem</td>
<td>CARE/UNICEF/UNHCR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Sensitization on sexual education and HIV/AIDS prevention.</td>
<td>Increase the sensitization on SGBV and HIV/AIDS using audiovisual Equipment.</td>
<td>CARE/COOPI/UNHCR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Reinforce and expand recreational and cultural activities for young refugees; As well as the welfare services for vulnerable and at-risk people.</td>
<td>Construction of sport fields and provision of sport equipment.</td>
<td>CARE/UNHCR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Maintain the monthly food distribution at a level of 1200 Kcal/p/d in Gondjé and Amboko; 2100Kcal/p/d in Moula and Dosseye; and GFD @ 2100 Kcal/p/d to 1800 vulnerable persons of Yaroungou.</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>CARE/WFP/UNHCR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Integrate the 2,000 vulnerable of Yaroungou into the distribution of Moula.</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>CARE/WFP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Start FFW and FFT activities in the camps and for the host population</td>
<td>Identify projects</td>
<td>CARE/WFP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Provide agricultural inputs, seeds, fertilizer and training in new sorts of agriculture.</td>
<td>Provide agricultural inputs, seeds, fertilizer and training in new sorts of agriculture.</td>
<td>AFRICARE/CARE/UNHCR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>Increase the funds granted to income generating activities</td>
<td></td>
<td>UNHCR</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
and expand the criteria for concession to the recipients for the micro-credit. Disappointing and economic impact of IGAs is questionable.

| 18. | Reinforce the health structures and the sanitary surveillance system, notably in Dosseye and Moula Camps that continue receiving new refugees. | COOPI/ACT/MSF-F/UNHCR | Some actions were carried out, though infrastructure and services are still considered insufficient to meet the demand. |
| 19. | Install a recovery system of the health expenses that is adapted to the refuge context. Start recovering 20%-30% from refugees | COOPI/UNHCR | Cost-recovery has commenced, but rates have been below targets. |
| 20. | Accelerate setting up of the CDV in the camps and to train the health agents. | COOPI/UNHCR |  |
| 21. | Enhance the capacities of the state-controlled health centers neighboring the refugee camps (CS of Beureh, Gorée and Maro) Start with Beureh and Timberi | District Sanitaire/UNICEF/UNHCR | Health centers are being phased-over to District Carried out on an on-going basis. |
| 22. | Maintain the complementary feeding programs (TFC, SFC and MCH) in favor of vulnerable groups notably the malnourished children under 5 and pregnant and lactating women, people affected by HIV/AIDS and physically handicapped persons. Provide training on community-based nutrition supervision | COOPI/WFP | Accomplished |
| 23. | Install a nutritional surveillance program in the camp of Dosseye. Provide training on community-based nutrition supervision | COOPI/UNHCR | Surveillance is carried out through health center agents when children are brought in for vaccination or with health issues. |
| 24. | Reinforce the training of health agents for the active screening and the transfer of malnourished children to the adequate structures. Provide training on community-based nutrition supervision | COOPI/UNHCR | System in place and training is an ongoing activity. No evidence that grow surveillance cards on the back of vaccination cards are not filled out, evidence that nutrition screening is still sporadic. |
| 25. | Carry out a nutritional survey Draft a project for the survey | WFP/UNICEF/District | Not accomplished. |
in the villages surroundings camps in order to know the nutritional state of the host population.

| 26. Repair and replace the filtering facilities of water systems with more lasting equipment (vergnet) | Sensitize water management committees on maintaining the existing pumps. | Sanitaire |
| 27. Accelerate the construction of Fuel efficient stoves in the camps. | AFRICARE/UNHCR |
| 28. Support the program of reforestation with tree planting activities. | AFRICARE/UNHCR |
| 29. Renew the GTZ fleet | UNHCR |
| 30. Increase food storage capacity. | WFP |
| 31. Support the government in road rehabilitation programmes. | WFP |
| 32. Set up of a formal coordination system for all stakeholders (NGOs, Authorities, and Donors) to ensure a better implication of the host community in LRRD projects. | UNHCR |

Replacement of ineffective pumps is still on-going. Maintenance of existing pumps is not keeping up with their breakdown.

Promotion of stoves was accelerated with nominal success in some camps. However the quality and care of those stoves has been inadequate and most are in disrepair and out of use.

In progress. Needs to be scaled up in order to achieve significant environmental impact.

Rubb Hall storage capacity has been increased, particularly at a new EDP in Maro.

Slow in being initiated. Scale is small.

Coordination for a and modalities are in place and being implemented.
Appendix 5: List of Abbreviations/Acronyms

ACF : Action Contre la Faim
Africare: American NGO
ACODE: (Chadian Micro Finance Organization)
ASDEC: Association pour le Developpement de l’Epargnes et du Credit (Chadian development and savings & loan NGO)
BELACD: Bureau de Liaison des Actions Caritatives et de Developpement (Catholic Church development organization)
CARE: American NGO
CCSI: Centre de Support en Sante Internationale (NGO)
CFA : African Financial Federation Franc
CNAR: National Commission for Assistance to Refugees
COOPEC: (Chadian Micro Finance Organization)
COOPI: Cooperazione Internazionale (Italian International Cooperation)
CSB: Corn Soya Blend
ECW: Enhanced Commitments to Women
EDP: Extended Delivered Point
EPI : Expanded Programme for Immunization
FBM : Food Basket Monitoring
FAO: U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization
FES: Fuel-Efficient Stove
FFT: Food for Training
FFW : Food For Work
GAM: Global Acute Malnutrition
GFD: General Food Distribution
GOC: Government of Chad
GTZ: Gessellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit
IDP : Internally Displaced Persons
IGA Income Generating Activity
JAM: Joint Assessment Mission
LRRD: Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (E.U. programme)
MCH : Maternal-Child Health and Nutrition
MINURCAT: United Nations Mission for the Central African Republic and Chad
MOSS: Minimum Operational Security Standards
MPH: Chadian Ministry of Public Health
MSF: Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders)
NGO: Non-Governmental Organization
OCHA : U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
P4P: Purchases for Progress (WFP local procurement from small producers)
PDM: Post-Distribution Monitoring
PLWHIV: People Living With HIV
SGVB : Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
SF: School Feeding
SIS: Systeme d’Information de Sante (Health Information System)
TF : Therapeutic Feeding
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCT</td>
<td>United Nations Country Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>U.N. Fund for Population Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHAS</td>
<td>United Nations Humanitarian Air Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>VAM</td>
<td>Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VTCC</td>
<td>Voluntary Treatment and Counseling Center (HIV/AIDS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
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