# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Executive Summary ........................................................................................................... 1

Background .......................................................................................................................... 3

Objective and Methodology ................................................................................................. 4

Context .................................................................................................................................. 6
  Displacement since 2011 ................................................................................................... 6
  Crisis since May 2014 ...................................................................................................... 6

Vulnerable Groups Characteristics ..................................................................................... 8
  IDPs and Returnees .......................................................................................................... 8
  Refugees/Asylum seekers ................................................................................................. 10
  Migrant Workers .............................................................................................................. 11

Humanitarian Situation ........................................................................................................ 12
  Income .............................................................................................................................. 12
  Expenditures .................................................................................................................... 14
  Access to market and services ......................................................................................... 16
  Food Security ................................................................................................................... 20
  Shelter .............................................................................................................................. 24
  Protection .......................................................................................................................... 26
  External Assistance .......................................................................................................... 28
  Priorities and future outlook ............................................................................................ 31

Conclusion and Recommendations ..................................................................................... 32

Annex: CARI Food Security Index computation steps

Bibliography
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The political crisis and escalation of violence in Libya since May 2014 has led to civilian casualties, massive displacement as well as the destruction of public infrastructure and the disruption of basic services and social protection systems. Humanitarian community estimates that two million people, a third of the Libya population, may have been affected, and close to four-hundred thousand people are displaced as a result of the conflict.

An interagency rapid assessment was carried out by IOM, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNSMIL and WFP from November to December 2014 in Libya to fill the critical information gap for the agencies to respond to the crisis. The assessment was implemented by JMW Consulting with its local partner Diwan Market Research. The overall coordination of the assessment was led by WFP. The assessment covered a total of six locations across the country, focusing on the population who have been directly affected by the conflict (IDPs, returnees), as well as vulnerable population (migrant workers, refugees/asylum seekers).

The crisis has had a significant impact on the lives and livelihoods among the affected population. Out of the total population of 6.25 million, close to 400 thousand people have been displaced as of November 2014. While many were displaced from September to November due to the escalation of the conflict, some have returned to their place of origin. The country hosts refugees/asylum seekers mostly from sub-Saharan Africa and in addition from Syria lately. As of July 2014, 37,000 refugees and asylum seekers are registered with UNHCR Libya. IOM estimates that there are more than 200,000 migrant workers in Libya, mostly from Egypt and sub-Saharan Africa.

The majority of IDP/returnee households reported a decrease of income. Many of them engage in skilled labour and salaried work, but they also rely heavily on kinship supports, remittances and own savings. Household expenditures have reportedly increased, mainly due to the hike of food prices. Prices of some food items have gone up by forty percent compared to the pre-crisis period. Markets are operational in general, and food commodities are available in market with acceptable level of quality and variety.

The population’s access to public health facilities is limited in some locations where insecurity is the issue. Lack of medical supply and/or the increased prices of medicine are cited among the major constraints. Children’s access to school varies from one location to the other, with major challenge cited as school closure. School closure is reported mostly from the eastern part of Libya. Children of those households that have been displaced for a longer period of time tend to have a better access to schooling.

The food security situation among the IDPs/returnees is the concern, especially among those who have been displaced for a longer period of time. The population meets the current level of food consumption at the expense of future productivity or capacity to cope – many spend savings and/or reduce non-food expenses on health and education. Fourteen percent of the assessed IDPs are classified as food insecure and in need of immediate food assistance, whereas eighty-four percent are vulnerable to food insecurity. If the crisis continues and the situation remains the same or deteriorates, many of the vulnerable population will become food insecure in the coming months. Those IDPs who are in public facilities and been displaced for a longer duration are likely to be more food insecure than the others, as those who remain in public facilities after a long-term displacement are the ones who cannot afford to move out.

Supports from the government, NGOs, and civil societies are not perceived to be sufficient, and many key informants question the sustainability of the current level of supports. The availability and access to supports vary by region and by population: in the eastern part of Libya government supports including the public distribution system, provision of food and non-food assistance are accessible compared to the other parts of the country; for those IDPs who are registered with local crisis committees, they reportedly have better access to shelter in public facilities and other supports.
The assessed population in general feel safe in their current environment, and no notable tension between residents and IDPs/returnees have been reported. The only exception is the refugees/asylum seekers who reported their perception about increased insecurity. They fear abductions and kidnapping, as well as clashes, shootings in the streets.

A vast majority of IDPs wish to return to their place of origin if the security situation permits. Their immediate needs are shelter, food and warm clothes and blankets to cope with the winter. For migrant workers and refugees/asylum seekers, they are looking to emigrate from Libya to Europe if the situation continues to be unstable in Libya.

The assessment captured a snapshot of the humanitarian situation in accessible locations in the conflict-affected areas. Some locations were not accessible due to insecurity, and therefore a caution is required in interpreting the findings as they are not representative of all the affected areas. The assessment captured the perspectives of the IDPs/returnees, refugees/asylum seekers and migrant workers on the humanitarian situation, but it did not look at a broader issue including the impact of the crisis on the population at large, and the state of basic services compared to pre-crisis standards. Given these limitations concerning the assessment, there remains a need for sector specific follow-up assessments in the future.
Libya is an upper middle income country, with an estimated population of 6.25 million. It is ranked 55 out of 185 Human Development Index (HDI) with a score of 0.784. Libya’s economy is primarily based on its extractive sector which accounts for 99 percent of its government income.

Since the Libyan revolution in 2011, successive transitional governance arrangements have been unable to establish a stable political and security environment and extend the full authority of the central government throughout the country. Political volatility has continued to characterise the country, with continued incidents and clashes between armed factions and groups organized along tribal and/or sectarian lines. Prior to the current conflict, more than sixty-thousand people had been displaced due to the 2011 conflict, according to UNHCR.

The political crisis and escalation of violence in Libya since May 2014 has led to civilian casualties, massive displacement as well as the destruction of public infrastructure and the disruption of basic services and social protection systems. UNHCR estimates, on the basis of the reports from local crisis committees that the total number of displaced population has risen to 393,420 persons as of November 2014. It is further estimated that 2 million people, almost one-third of the total population in Libya, may have been affected by the conflict, due to the disruption of basic supplies and services including food, fuel, water, and medical supplies, as well as electricity, gas, health care and public services.

Libya also hosts other vulnerable groups, especially migrant workers, asylum seekers and refugees. These groups have a precarious legal status in Libya, since many migrant workers are undocumented and the country does not recognize asylum seekers and refugees as Libya is not a signatory to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.

UN Humanitarian Country Team has released the 2014 Libya Humanitarian Appeal in September 2014, covering the period of September 2014 and February 2015. Due to the ongoing violence and highly volatile situation, humanitarian access has been extremely limited, as UN agencies, donors and international NGOs have evacuated staff to neighbouring countries, e.g. Tunisia and Malta.

Due to the access restriction and difficulties in conducting assessments, coupled with highly volatile and fluid situation, information available on the humanitarian situation in Libya has been limited to date. Against this background, an interagency rapid assessment was conducted with the participation of IOM, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNSMIL and WFP in order to fill a critical gap for the respective agencies to implement humanitarian assistance. The assessment was implemented by JMW Consulting with its local partner Diwan Market Research.
OBJECTIVE AND METHODOLOGY

The assessment aims to provide an update of the current humanitarian situation, its scale and severity and the future evolution to the extent possible. The information generated through the assessment is expected to fill a critical information gap to implement the Libya humanitarian appeal for the next three months.

The assessment focuses on the population directly affected by the conflict, specifically IDPs and returnees, and covers the areas where a significant number of IDPs and returnees has been reported. Refugees, asylum seekers, and migrant workers were also covered in certain geographical areas.

Six locations, namely Tripoli, al-Ajaylat, az-Zawiya, al-Ajdabiya, al-Marj, and Sabha, were covered during the assessment. These districts are selected based on the following criteria; i) a higher concentration of reported number of IDPs; ii) geographical spread; and iii) accessibility. Note that Nalut district was planned to be covered, which did not materialize due to insecurity and ongoing conflict. Nalut district has been replaced by az-Zawiya.

The assessment employed both qualitative and quantitative data collection instruments. In each district, key informant interviews were conducted with IDPs/returnees, refugees/asylum seekers, and migrant workers, as well as market key informants, using respective key informant checklists. Fifty households from IDPs or returnees were interviewed in each location using the household questionnaire. Key informant and household samples were selected purposively in the absence of the demographics of IDPs in Libya, and therefore the findings are indicative, and they are not representative of geographical areas or population groups.

Map: Assessed Locations

Table 1: Data obtained

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Household Survey</th>
<th>Key Informant Interviews</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IDPs/Returnees*</td>
<td>IDPs/Returnees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Refugees/Asylum</td>
<td>Migrant Workers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Market</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tripoli</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Ajaylat</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Marj</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Az-Zawiya</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Ajdabiya</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabha</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>300</td>
<td><strong>10</strong></td>
<td><strong>7</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The household sample included 18 Returnee households and 282 IDP households.
**Located in Benghazi, not in al-Marj
Key issues covered by the assessment include: population movement, shelter, access to services and their functionality, external assistance, livelihoods, food security, status of children and protection.

WFP led the coordination to carry out the rapid assessment. The assessment was outsourced to a private company “JMW Consulting”. The company has a national partner in Libya “Diwan Marketing Research”, and has carried out various socio-economic surveys in Libya using both quantitative and qualitative research methods. The assessment design, including the data collection instruments were developed by WFP in consultation with participating agencies. JMW Consulting implemented data collection, analysis and reporting with inputs and supports from participating agencies.

Data collection took place from the 17th November 2014 to the 10th December 2014. The quantitative and qualitative interviews were carried out by trained enumerators in each of the locations. The data collection tools were presented and discussed with the enumerators to ensure that the purpose of the assessment was understood and all questions were clear. In each location a team leader ensured the overall implementation of the interviews and performed quality assurance checks. Filled questionnaires/checklists were brought to Tripoli for final quality assurance by the data collection manager. The quantitative data was entered online using Survey Monkey, while the qualitative data was translated and input into pre-developed excel reporting formats.

The assessment period was marked by an intense fighting in Libya and therefore some areas with significant number of IDP populations were not accessible by the research team. This included, among others, Jabal Nafusa as well as Benghazi. Data collection was delayed due to a sudden spur of fighting in the locations selected for the assessment az-Zawiyia and al-Ajaylat. A number of logistical issues due to the volatile environment in Libya also hampered the data collection process: filled survey instruments had to be transported by ground transportation in the absence of flights between Benghazi and Tripoli; during the data collection the research team experienced complete cut off of electricity and communications in the eastern region.

Note that the assessment covered only accessible areas while some of the locations were not visited due to insecurity, and therefore a caution is required in interpreting the findings as they are not representative of all the affected areas, especially the areas where there are active conflicts. In addition, the assessment is limited in its scope, focusing on specific population groups, rather than looking at the impact of the crisis on the population at large. Regarding the state of basic services, the assessment captured the perception among the population groups of IDPs/returnees, refugees/asylum seekers and migrant workers, rather than objectively assessing the status in comparison to pre-crisis standards. Given all the limitations concerning the assessment, there remains a need for sector specific follow-up assessments in the future.
This section presents a brief overview of the situation of IDPs, migrant workers, and refugees/asylum seekers in Libya since the armed conflict in 2011.

**DISPLACEMENT SINCE 2011**

Due to the armed conflict in 2011, more than 550,000 Libyans were reportedly displaced, though most of them had returned to their areas of origin by December 2013. As of January 2013, the number of IDPs in Libya was estimated at 47,000, including the IDPs from the town of Tawergha who had been forcefully displaced and have since been hindered from returning to their home by armed militias. The majority of the Tawergha IDPs has lived in and around Tripoli or Benghazi. The conflict led to a mass exodus of foreign workers and an estimated 800,000 migrants reportedly fled the country in 2011.

**CRISIS SINCE MAY 2014**

Since May 2014 the crisis in Libya has flared up with the launch of “Operation Dignity” by ex-general Khalifa Haftar with the proclaimed aim of evicting Islamist militia groups from eastern Libya. After the June 2014 parliamentary election, which saw Islamist-leaning political parties losing a significant number of seats, the crisis gained more impetus. Islamist militias joined by militias from Misrata and other localized militias launched “Operation Dawn” and initiated assaults on the airport in Tripoli and other strategic areas in an effort to regain some of the power lost due to their election defeat.

In late August, the fighting escalated with airstrikes against the “Operation Dawn”, but the strikes failed to prevent “Operation Dawn” positions in and around Tripoli. Furthermore, the political polarization intensified as the General National Congress (GNC) was re-invigorated in Tripoli as “Operation Dawn” took control of the city, while the elected House of Representatives was operating out of Tobruk in the eastern part of the country. From September through November 2014, the fighting intensified in Benghazi and Jabal Nafusa, while relative calm returned to Tripoli. In the latest escalation of violence between rival factions for power, Tripoli’s Mitiga airport was bombed by commandeers linked to “Operation Dignity”.

The escalation of the conflict and the use of heavy weaponry in densely populated areas by all conflicting sides, particularly in the capital, resulted in scores of civilians killed and internal displacement whilst fleeing from the fighting. IDPs in Libya are scattered across 35 towns and cities. The conflict is centred on Benghazi and Derna in the east, Ubari in the south-east, and Kikla in the west. From late October to mid-November 2014, 56,500 people fled Benghazi, which included 2,500 already displaced Tawerghan IDPs. Unknown number of people fled from Derna, while 11,280 people fled fighting in Ubari and 38,640 people have been displaced due to the fighting in Kikla.

UNHCR estimates that the total number of IDPs has risen to 393,420 as of November 2014. This includes the IDPs from Tawergha who have been displaced since the 2011 conflict. The figure below presents the reported numbers of IDPs in Libya since May 2014. The numbers are based on estimates from the local crisis committees in Libya. The situation in Libya remains fluid and tracking the population movement has been extremely challenging. Many IDPs are not registered with the local crisis committees while some among the registered IDPs may have returned to their place of origin. According to the household survey data, sixty percent of IDPs are not registered with the crisis committee, while key informants indicated that they observed some return in October and November, especially in Tripoli and az-Zawiya.

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5 (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2014a)
6 (UNHCR, 2014a)
Figure 1: Reported numbers of IDPs since May 2014

IDPs remaining from 2011 revolution, January 2014 clashes in southern Libya

Clashes in eastern Libya centered on the city of Benghazi by Operation Dawn

Operation Dawn initiated with attacks on Tripoli and other strategic areas

Increased fighting in Jabal Nafasu Mountains, Ubari as well as ongoing fighting in Benghazi and Tripoli increases displacement

Fighting leads to increased displacement especially from Warshefana around Tripoli and Benina around Benghazi

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63,985 80,185 114,180 114,180 147,318 165,968 327,000 393,420

IDP figures collected from the following sources: (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2014a), (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2014b), (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2014c), (OCHA, 2014a), (OCHA, 2014b), (OCHA, 2014c), (UNHCR, 2014b)
This section presents the main characteristics of the vulnerable groups covered by the assessment, namely, IDPs, returnees, refugees, asylum seekers and migrant workers.

**IDPs AND RETURNEES**

The majority of the assessed IDP and returnee households have under five and school age children. Among returnees, almost 3 out of 4 households have elderly members while half of them reportedly have chronically ill or disabled household members.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2: IDP and Returnee household (hh) characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average hh size</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returnees</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Key Informant interviews, household survey data

According to the IDP key informants, most of the IDPs arrived in September and October 2014. In al-Ajdabiya, the IDPs came from Benghazi and Tawergha. In Sabha most of the IDPs are from Ubari, but there is also a sizeable group of IDPs that have come from Tawergha moving first to Al Heesha then Al Joufra and finally to Sabha. For some of the IDPs in al-Ajaylat the route went first to az-Zahra then on al-Azezeyia before ending up in al-Ajaylat.

The household survey data confirms the observation: two out of three among the assessed IDP households moved in September, October and November; sixty-nine percent of IDP households have moved only once, since being displaced.

The causes of displacement varies from location to location, but are mainly related to insecurity: for IDPs in Sabha many have been displaced in relation to the 2011 conflict; in al-Ajdabiya it is lack of security in Benghazi and the surrounding areas that has caused the displacement. Some of the IDPs in al-Ajdabiya have previously stayed in the camp in Gar-Younes, in the neighbourhood of Benghazi, but were forced to leave after it was set on fire. In az-Zawiyah IDPs have been displaced due to the clashes in the Warshefana area. According to the household survey data, the main reasons for displacement are cited as “area controlled by armed groups” and “insecurity”. Eighty-two percent of the IDPs have not left family members behind in the place of origin. It is worth noting that the presence of armed groups has a dual effect on the Libyan society: the groups are the cause for insecurity and the security provider at the same time. “Area controlled by armed groups” being cited as the main reason for IDPs leaving their place of origin is likely due to active involvement of the armed groups in the ongoing conflicts.
When they left their place of origin, IDPs were able to bring light items such as cash, clothing and identification documents.

Figure 4: Items brought from the Place of Origin

While the past months have been marked by a sharp increase in displacement in Libya, some IDPs have been able to return to their place of origin. According to the key informants, most of the IDPs from az-Zawiyah and around 40 percent of the IDPs from Tripoli were able to return in October and November. The household survey data indicates that of those who had returned to their place of origin, more returned in October, and fewer in November. Most of those who returned in October and November had been displaced for 3 months before being able to return.

Figure 5: Timing of return for Returnees

Source: Household survey data
**REFUGEES/ASYLUM SEEKERS**

Libya has not acceded to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, as such, UNHCR assumes its mandated responsibility to provide protection and assist refugees and asylum-seekers in Libya. As of July 2014, some 37,000 refugees and asylum-seekers are registered with UNHCR in Libya.

The refugee/asylum seeker key informants report that the number of refugees in Libya has not increased dramatically since the escalation of the crisis in July 2014. The key informants estimate that the number of refugees that have arrived since July 2014 is at 2,500, and that they are mostly of Syrian origin.

A total of 12 locations for refugee/asylum seekers was covered during the assessment, out of which eleven are located in and around Tripoli and the last one is in Sabha. The vast majority of the refugees/asylum seekers are males, while those of Syrian origin include a substantial number of children. Relatively few of the refugees/asylum seekers are elderly persons. This may be due to the fact that very few of the refugees/asylum seekers in Libya are from neighbouring countries and therefore the hardship of reaching the country may lead to only able-bodied family members making the trip, leaving family members behind in their country of origin.

Libya is a second or third country of asylum for most refugees. Key informants indicated that the primary concern of refugees/asylum seekers inside of Libya is safety and security, while seeking livelihood opportunities is a secondary priority.

Concerning the future, the refugee/asylum seeker key informants reported that some were planning to stay in Libya despite the unstable security situation. This is more likely the case among the refugees/asylum seekers from Ethiopia and Somalia in Tripoli, as the situation in their home land is too unstable for them to return. Among others, Syrian and Eritreans are looking to leave Libya with the primary destination being Europe.

### Table 3: Refugees/Asylum seekers sample characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Site</th>
<th>% of total refugee sample</th>
<th>% Male in site</th>
<th>% Female in site</th>
<th>% Children 0-17 yrs in site</th>
<th>% 5-17 yrs in site</th>
<th>% disabled in site</th>
<th>% elderly in site</th>
<th>% chronically/severely ill in site</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Janzour</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>Syrian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajoura</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>5%</td>
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<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>9%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>Ethiopian</td>
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<td>Al Swani Road</td>
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<td>83%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>7%</td>
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<td>10%</td>
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<td>80%</td>
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<td>40%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>0%</td>
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<td>10%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>Syrian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ain Zara</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>Syrian</td>
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<tr>
<td>Al Swani</td>
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<td>86%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>Syrian</td>
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<tr>
<td>Souq Al Joumaa</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>9%</td>
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<td>Al Kremeyia</td>
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<td>80%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>Somali</td>
</tr>
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<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>Somali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabha</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>Syrian</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Refugees/asylum seekers key informant interviews
MIGRANT WORKERS

Migration into Libya started several years ago with migrants aiming to gain a decent living and especially to seek out job opportunities. These migrant workers originate partly from North African countries such as Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco, and partly from Sub-Saharan Africa, primarily from Chad, Nigeria, Mali and Ghana. In Sabha, Tripoli, az-Zawiyah, Benghazi, and Ajdabiya, key informants reported that many new migrant workers had arrived in these locations since July 2014 despite the ongoing crisis. These newly arrived migrant workers originate mostly from Egypt and Sub-Saharan Africa.

A total of 8 locations for migrant worker populations was covered during the assessment. Migrant workers are primarily male with few children, elderly and ill persons.

As a consequence of the ongoing crisis, the majority of the migrant worker key informants reported to be considering to move out of Libya if the situation does not improve. Some are planning to flee from Libya and migrate into Europe. Most of the key informants indicated that they felt safe in their current location. It is worth noting that some of them had already fled from other parts of Libya into safer locations.

Table 4: Migrant worker sample characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Site</th>
<th>% of total migrant workers</th>
<th>% Male in site</th>
<th>% Female in site</th>
<th>% 0-5 yrs in site</th>
<th>% 5-17 yrs in site</th>
<th>% disabled in site</th>
<th>% elderly in site</th>
<th>% chronic/severely ill in site</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fellah (Tripoli)</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>Mali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Janzour (Tripoli)</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Mansheya (Sabha)</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>Chad/Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Az-Zawia</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>Egyptian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Az-Zawia</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>Tunisian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ajdabiya</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>Egyptian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ajdabiya (Ajaylat)</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>Tunisian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benghazi</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>Egypt/Morocco/Ghana</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Migrant workers key informant interviews
HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

This section presents the findings on the humanitarian situation for IDPs, returnees, refugees/asylum seekers, and migrant workers, based on the key informant interviews and the household survey.

INCOME

As the crisis has unfolded in Libya, income options for IDPs and returnees have reportedly been severely affected. For the displaced, many have had to give up their previous employment while they moved to another location. It is worth noting that key informants highlighted that job opportunities are available in the locations of displacement since many foreign workers had left Libya due to the ongoing crisis and therefore the demand for labour is high.

According to the key informants, IDPs are willing to take on any jobs in order to generate income. Findings from the household survey support these narratives: IDPs and returnees cited “salaries not being paid” and “banking system not functioning” as the main challenge rather than “lack of job opportunities”. The high response rate of “salaries are not being paid” may be attributed to the fact that a majority of Libyans are employed in the public sector and many public sector institutions have had to close due to the crisis, affecting the disbursement of salaries.

Despite the availability of jobs, the majority of IDP/returnee households reported a decrease in income compared to the pre-crisis situation.

Figure 6: Income Situation of IDPs and Returnees

Main income sources among IDPs and returnees are as follows, in order of significance: skilled labour, salaried work, and kinship supports/remittances. While the majority of IDPs and returnees obtain income from skilled labour or salaried work, roughly one-third of them cited kinship supports/remittances, or own savings.
as the main source of income. This is rather unsustainable as they deplete their savings or depend on unreliable sources of income. On average, skilled labour and salaried work contribute 33 percent and 21 percent of the share of household income respectively, while kinship supports/remittances account for 20 percent of the income share.

Figure 7: Average share of income sources among IDPs and returnees

In general, migrant workers support each other by all possible means - e.g. help each other to seek out job opportunities. Key informants indicated that the assistance from other actors is needed for migrant workers to obtain job opportunities, in addition to ensure personal security and housing.

The main challenge for refugees/asylum seekers, according to the key informants, is lack of legal system to support them. Refugee/asylum seekers’ key informants reported that it would not be possible for refugees/asylum seekers to find jobs due to the lack of access to residence permits. The key informants indicated that to find work is among the most pressing needs for the refugees/asylum seekers in Libya. Only a few have been able to find a job, and the work is mostly low-paid unskilled labour such as cleaners, agriculture labours and construction workers. The current crisis has made the situation even more difficult for refugees/asylum seekers to find a qualified job, and an increasing number of educated refugees/asylum seekers engage in work lower than their qualifications.

As they face challenges due to legal restrictions, refugees/asylum seekers heavily rely on each other for support within their community by providing gifts and donations, according to the key informants.

*Migrant workers* reportedly have faced challenges to generate income due to lack of job opportunities as a result of the ongoing conflict. According to key informants, migrant workers are employed primarily in agricultural, manufacturing and construction sectors. Manufacturing and construction work has been halted due to declining foreign investments in infrastructure projects, and therefore migrant workers are in need of jobs to earn income to buy food and to send money to their home.
Expended

- Household expenditures have increased mainly due to high food prices. Food prices have gone up more than forty percent for some of the food items compared to the pre-crisis period.
- IDP/returnee households spend more than half of their expenditure on food, which is considered to be high compared to the pre-crisis period.

The high share of expenditure on food can be attributed to a significant increase of food prices. According to the market key informants, food prices have sharply risen since the escalation of the conflict, and the trend is anticipated to continue. Prices of basic food items such as cooking oil, tomatoes, rice and wheat flour have gone up by more than 40 percent on average compared to the pre-crisis period. Compared to one-month ago, prices of onions and tomatoes have increased by 17 and 15 percent respectively.

Figure 9: Changes in retail prices of basic food commodities

Source: Market key informant interviews

The increase in food prices is the main reason why seventy-nine percent of IDP and returnee households have reportedly increased their expenditures compared to the pre-crisis period. The price increase of non-food items along with the decreased income are also cited as the challenges.
Figure 10: IDP/returnee household expenditures compared to pre-crisis situation

Major challenges related to expenditures

- Increase in food prices: 93%
- Increase in non-food prices: 68%
- Decrease of income/cash availability: 51%
- Less items to buy in market: 13%
- New expenditures (e.g., pay for rent): 41%

Source: Household survey data
Due to fighting and insecurity the delivery of a number of basic services has been disrupted. According to the IDP/returnee key informants basic services such as water, gas and electricity have been disrupted frequently. The degree of disruption varies from one location to the other. In Adjabiya, for instance, cooking gas has been out of stock for more than one month.

**ACCESS TO MARKETS**

Despite the unrest and insecurity, IDP/returnee key informants highlight that the access to markets has not been affected severely, as shops and markets have continued to operate. In Ajdabiya and al-Marj disruption of supply has been reported as the port of Benghazi is not fully functional. In az-Zawiyah and la-Ajaylat market key informants indicated that some shops have closed down due to lack of fuel and workers. In al-Marj it is reported that several shops had been closed during the summer of 2014, limiting the population’s access to market, but there have been some improvements in the market access since November 2014. Overall across the assessed locations markets are operational and the damage to infrastructure has been limited. Findings from household interviews confirm the statements: sixteen percent of households reported that they have experienced constraints in accessing markets within last 30 days, which is mainly due to insecurity and high food prices; at the time of the data collection, ninety-six percent of the households reportedly have access to markets.

**Access to market and services**

- Despite the disruption of basic services in some locations, the market remains functional;
- Access to public health facilities is limited in some locations where insecurity is the issue. Main challenges cited are the shortage of supply and/or the increased prices of medicine;
- The level of access to school varies by location, though in general children of IDPs/returnees have access to school.

Fighting and insecurity has reportedly affected retailers and vendors. According to market key informants, the insecurity has limited trade and commodity movements due to the fear of loss. In the east traders cannot travel to the main market in Benghazi to get goods. Supply chain has also been affected by the conflict with the delay of delivery due to road closures. In al-Ajaylat, Sabha and al-Marj limited availability of cash has been reported, which becomes the constraints for markets to fully function.
Despite these challenges, access to food in markets to some extent remains unchanged. Market key informants inTripoli, az-Zawiya and Sabha reported that they have been able to maintain the food supply at normal levels, while in Ajdabiya, al-Marj and Al-Ajaylat the supply has been disrupted. In Ajdabiya and al-Marj this is mainly due to the closure of the port of Benghazi, while in Ajaylat it is because of the road closure and lack of fuel to transport goods. Some items are reportedly short of supply such as chicken, cheese, milk, oil, fruits, vegetables, baby formula and cooking gas, though market key informants perceive that in general both quantity and quality of food items in stock is sufficient and similar to the pre-crisis period.

**Figure 12: Quality and variety of food available in the market**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quality of Food Compared to Pre-Crisis Situation</th>
<th>Variety of Food Compared to Pre-Crisis Situation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>Don't know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worse</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same</td>
<td>Less</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better</td>
<td>Same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>More</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This narrative is supported by the findings from the household survey. The majority of IDP/returnee households reported that the variety and the quality of food in markets remain comparable to the pre-crisis period.

Despite the current acceptable level of supply of food items, market key informants anticipate that the situation may deteriorate in the near future mainly due to the shortage of workers, increased prices of goods and the transportation cost.

**ACCESS TO HEALTH SERVICES**

Hospitals in the areas such as Warshefana (the Tripoli area) and Benghazi were under attack during the fighting in recent months. Furthermore hospitals have become over-crowded with patients while they have a reduced capacity, following the exodus of foreign workers. In conflict affected areas the movement of patients and health workers is difficult, and many hospitals have had to close due to insecurity. Furthermore, the shortage of medicines and medical supplies has been reported by WHO. Whereas these previous reports suggest that the access to health services is severely affected by the ongoing crisis, the household survey and key informant interviews suggest that the access is hampered to a lesser extent in the assessed locations.

IDP/returnee key informants highlighted the issues of accessing medicines due to the shortage of supply in some areas, as well as the increased prices of medicine. Access to hospitals and health service facilities is in general perceived to be less problematic, except az-Zawiya and Ajaylat where key informants indicated that the public health services were limited and private health facilities were too expensive. Findings from household survey confirm the observation: seventy-six percent of IDP/returnee households reportedly have no constraints in accessing to health services. Among those who have limited access, lack of money to pay for services or medicine is cited as the major constraint. Access to health care is viewed as being particularly difficult for vulnerable groups such as the elderly and the very sick – those groups are presumably in the greatest need of health care services.

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8 (Mustafa, 2014), (Suliman & Ali, 2014)
10 (WHO, 2014)
Figure 13: Access to health services

For **migrant workers** access to health services is reportedly more constrained. Migrant worker key informants in all the locations except Ajdabiya reported constraints and limitations. Key challenges are lack of resources to buy medicine and pay for health services. Migrant workers in the east reported that the access to public health service facilities is more constrained than to private facilities, and therefore they resort to private facilities.

For **refugees/asylum seekers**, about half of the interviewed refugee key informants reported that there are constraints in accessing health care services, mainly due to lack of money to pay for the services.

### ACCESS TO EDUCATION/SCHOOLS

Access to schools has remained relatively high among IDPs and returnees, despite the fact that many schools have reportedly been closed due to insecurity and fighting, and to accommodate IDPs. IDP/returnee key informants reported that schools are functioning in their areas and school-aged children are attending school regularly, except for al-Marj where the key informants reported that children do not attend school regularly due to the school closure. Schools have been open to let IDP children enrol in school programmes. Findings from the household survey supports these observation: twenty-one percent of the interviewed households with school age children do not attend school, with the main reason being cited as school closure. it is worth noting that the level of access to school varies from one location to the other.

Figure 14: Access to education among IDPs/returnees

11 (UNHCR, 2014a)
Despite the overall good access to education among school-aged children, there are important differences by type of IDPs. Recently displaced IDPs are less likely to have access to education for their children, compared to the IDPs that have been displaced for a longer duration. This is likely due to the fact that the latter group has had time to adjust and integrate in their new place of residence. In addition, access to education seems significantly lower in the east, where fifty-four percent of IDP/returnee households reported that school-aged children do not attend school.

**Figure 15: Access to education by duration of displacement and region**

While IDPs/returnees mostly report a high level of access to education, this is not the case for children of refugees/asylum seekers, with the major constraint being lack of resources to pay for tuition, books, etc. Consequently, only few refugee children attend school, according to refugee/asylum seeker key informants.
FOOD SECURITY

FOOD INSECURITY INDEX

The status of household food security is analysed applying the WFP’s standard methodology “Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security” (CARI). CARI looks at two domains, namely current status and coping capacity. For each domain, relevant indicators are employed: food consumption for current status; and share of expenditure on food as well as livelihood coping indicator for coping capacity. For each indicator households are classified into different levels of food insecurity to derive a food security index. See ANNEX for the detail computation process of CARI.

Food security

- A vast majority of IDP/returnee households are at risk of food insecurity;
- Minimum level of food consumption is mostly met among IDP/returnee households, at the expense of households’ coping capacity to withstand future shocks or continued instability;
- Those households who live in public facilities and have been displaced for a longer-term are more likely to be food insecure compared to others.
- IDP/returnee households acquire food primarily from markets, complimented by kinship supports and food assistance from government/NGOs.

Table 5: CARI Classification of IDP/returnee households

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Food Secure (1)</th>
<th>Marginally Food Secure (2)</th>
<th>Moderately Food Insecure (3)</th>
<th>Severely Food Insecure (4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Current Status</td>
<td>Food Consumption</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Food Consumption Group</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coping Capacity</td>
<td>Economic Vulnerability</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Share of expenditure on food</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Asset Depletion</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Livelihood coping strategy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>categories</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food Security Index Shares</td>
<td></td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Household survey data

Although the proportion of ‘food insecure (severely/moderately food insecure)’ households are relatively small at 14 percent, a vast majority of households of 84 percent are ‘marginally food secure’ and at risk of food insecurity. The ‘food insecure’ households typically have significant food consumption gaps and/or adopting severe coping strategies with their household budget stretched to buy food. The ‘marginally food secure’ households have managed to meet the minimum food consumption through adopting livelihood coping strategies.
Figure 16: Food security classification of IDP and returnee households

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Food security classifications</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food insecure</td>
<td>Extreme food consumption gaps, OR extreme loss of livelihood assets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severe food insecure</td>
<td>Significant food consumption gaps, OR marginally able to meet minimum food needs only with irreversible coping strategies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderately food insecure</td>
<td>Minimally adequate food consumption without engaging in irreversible coping strategies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marginally food secure</td>
<td>Adequate food consumption without engaging in typical coping strategies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food secure</td>
<td>Adequate food consumption without engaging in typical coping strategies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Household survey data

Whereas the ‘food insecure’ households call for an immediate response from humanitarian communities, the ‘marginally food secure’ households deserve an attention since they are likely to become food insecure in the near future if the crisis continues. The household survey data demonstrates that the proportion of food insecure households doubles among those IDPs who have been displaced for 3 months or longer, compared to the ones of less than 3 months.

IDP/returnee key informants report that vulnerable households remain in public facilities for a prolonged period of time due to inability to move to rented housings. The household survey data supports this descriptions: the food security situation is more precarious among IDPs in public facilities as well as those who have been displaced for a longer period of time.

Table 6: CARI Classification of IDP households

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IDP groups</th>
<th>Food insecure</th>
<th>Food secure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Residential arrangement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public facilities</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hosted by families</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rented house</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration of displacement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 3 months</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 months or longer</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region of displacement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>89%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Household survey data

FOOD CONSUMPTION

According to IDP/returnee key informants, households mostly have access to sufficient food. Exception was the informant in Ajdabiya who reported that there was no enough food available.

The Food Consumption Score (FCS) is computed based on the frequency and diversity of the food consumed over the past seven days. See ANNEX for the computation process.

Household food consumption, measured by FCS, is mostly acceptable among the IDP/returnee households, with 91 percent of the households having acceptable food consumption. Those households with poor or borderline food consumption have limited consumption of animal protein (i.e. milk and dairy products, fish/meat).
According to the IDP/returnee key informants, the main source of food for IDPs is market purchase, complimented by NGO/kinship supports though limited. Household survey results confirm this observation, with market purchase consisting of 84 percent of food consumed. For some of the food items such as cereals, oil, sugar and milk, gifts or food assistance from NGOs and government are cited as the secondary source following the market purchase.

Access to fortified blended foods for children is limited in some locations. IDP key informants from Sabha and Ajdabiya report that children under two have limited access to fortified blended foods, while this appears to be available in Tripoli and az-Zawiyah. In Ajaylat it is reported that only better-off IDP households are able afford fortified blended food for babies. It is worth noting that access to fortified blended food for children under two is important in the context of Libya: based on the pre-crisis data, the exclusive breastfeeding rate is estimated at 45% among the children at 3-month of age, and less than 25% at 6-month\(^2\).

**COPING STRATEGIES**

More than seventy percent of the interviewed IDP/returnee households have employed different coping strategies over the past 30 days due to lack of food or lack of money to buy food, which is an indication of a high level of stress experienced by the assessed households. Fifty-four percent of the interviewed households reportedly taken the measure of reduced spending on non-food expenses such as education, medicine and health services, and twenty percent of the households sold productive
assets or means of transport. These are considered to be severe and irreversible coping strategy, reducing future productivity including human capital formation. A large share of IDP/returnee households spent savings, or sold household assets. These strategies may be reversible but a prolonged displacement would lead to a reduced ability for households to deal with future uncertainties.

The excessive use of coping strategies is an indication of a high level of risk to food insecurity among IDP/returnee households.

**Figure 19: Coping strategies**

![Coping strategies chart](chart.png)

Source: Household survey data
**SHELTER**

In order to cope with the displacement, communities are using parks, schools and parking lots to shelter IDPs. With the coming winter months many of these shelters provide sub-standard protection from winds and rains. The quality of the shelter is in general perceived to be adequate by the IDP key informants, as those IDPs being hosted in public spaces have access to both cooking facilities and proper sanitation. In most places access to drinking water is limited and IDPs either have to buy water or receive from the host communities or organizations. This arrangement puts IDPs at risk of being cut-off from the access to water in the event of outbreaks of insecurity.

According to the IDP key informants, a better-off group of IDPs rents houses or apartments, while those who are worse off are either being hosted by their families or living in public spaces. The use of public spaces to house IDPs seems to be more prevalent in Ajdabiya, Ajaylat and Tripoli, according to the key informants. In Ajdabiya the Tawergha IDPs are staying in a camp where around 600 families are living together with some living in tents, some in rooms at the university and others are found in better quality buildings. While the shelter in public spaces is perceived to be adequate in general, IDP key informants asserted that it will not be qualified to live in during winter. According to the household survey 28 percent of the IDP/returnee households have found shelter in public facilities, while 42 percent have been able to rent a house or flat in their current area of residence.

A majority of 53 percent have not registered with the local crisis committee in their area of residence.

**Figure 20: IDPs shelter**

IDPs that have only been displaced for a few months are more likely to be hosted by families or community volunteers. The longer the duration of displacements IDPs are more likely to move into rented houses. However a significant group of 36 percent of the long-term displaced is living in public facilities, which is likely due to this group finding renting house or apartment to be unaffordable and the inability of their family members to host IDPs for a longer period of time. Furthermore there are important regional differences between the IDPs: the majority of the assessed IDP households in

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11 (UNHCR, 2014a)
the eastern region live in public facilities, while the rate is significantly lower in the west and the south. The option to live in public facilities or spaces seems limited to those IDPs who have registered with the local crisis committee. This may be due to the fact that it is the local crisis committees that are coordinating the allocation of shelter in public facilities for IDPs.

**Figure 21: IDPs shelter by duration of displacement, region and registration status with crisis committee**

For **migrant workers**, key informants reported that they are accommodated in rented houses with other families. In Benghazi, however, key informants report that some of the migrant workers are not able to rent housing and instead are accommodated in farms and police departments. While the migrant workers overall feel safe in their current locations, they are occasionally faced with the threat of being evicted from their houses. As reported by one of the key informants, migrant workers fear to be evicted from their houses because of their illegal migration status.

Concerning **refugees/asylum seekers**, the largest share lives in individual rented houses, and not with other families as the migrant workers. However one key informant for Somali refugees in Tripoli reported that fifteen refugees were sharing a single room. While most refugees are living in individual rented houses, the refugee key informants report that it is common that these families live under eviction threats. This is especially pronounced among the non-Syrian refugees, i.e. Somali, Eritrean and Ethiopian refugee key informants. However when the refugees stay in the community for an extended period of time, the eviction threat becomes smaller, according to the refugee key informants.
According to IDP key informants, IDPs generally feel safe in their current environment. The main security concern being reported is the spread of arms, as well as the fear of a further deterioration of the security situation, should the clashes grow in scale and magnitude. In the locations where armed groups are present, these groups are not perceived to be a threat to security, and instead they are considered to be the main provider of security. There are no notable differences reported among the key informants from different IDP groups such as Tawergha or regions for the issues related to protection.

In the event when there are disputes among IDPs, these are usually settled by the parties involved themselves. When things cannot be resolved between themselves, the issues are brought to the local tribal leaders to adjudicate the dispute.

The relationships between host communities and IDPs are reportedly amiable with no observed tensions. Families in the host communities themselves are affected by the crisis, while they host displaced family members. The situation of the host communities is perceived to be acceptable, as per the enumerators’ observation.

For children the situation is generally safe, with only one reported case of child abduction. As described earlier, children mostly attend school. Only one IDP key informant reported the cases of children who having been separated from their parents or caregiver and/or are living without a caretaker, with no services provided to the separated children. Furthermore in az-Zawiyah and Ajaylat there are reports that children below the age of 18 are associating themselves with armed groups. Services available for IDP children, such as help-lines and legal services, are very limited. In some of the localities communities are organizing activities for IDP children, but this is not the case for most of the localities. Almost all of the IDP key informants reported psycho-social concerns among children due to the crisis, while only limited services are being provided to deal with such cases.

Vital registration is reportedly functioning, and mothers and families do not face issues to register new-born children.

Gender-based violence is reportedly not among the significant issues among IDPs, according to the key informants. It is noted that there are limited support services or structure available for the victims, with health facilities and social workers being the main service providers.

The migrant worker key informants in Sabha, Tripoli, az-Zawia and Ajaylat reported that migrant workers in general feel safe in their current locations. It is noted that some of them have already moved from the previous location to a new location due to insecurity. Main security concerns include violent clashes that occur randomly, spreads of weapons as well as occasional abductions, robberies and kidnappings. These circumstances have forced migrant workers to move to more secure locations, leaving their jobs. In Benghazi and al-Ajdabiya, the migrant worker key informants report that migrant workers do not feel safe as they fear of attacks and robberies.

The refugee/asylum seeker key informants, in contrast to IDP/returnee and migrant worker key informants, report a low sense of security. The lack of security is reported to be the primary concern and challenge across the assessed locations, and refugees/asylum seekers feel increasingly unsafe to stay in Libya due to the ongoing crisis. The exception is found among the Syrian refugees in Tripoli who report to feel safe in their current location. Security concerns raised by refugee/asylum seekers key
Informants vary by location: the fear of abductions and kidnapping in Sabha; the fear of clashes, shootings in the streets in Tripoli.
According to IDP/returnee key informants, the population face a number of pressing issues that are to be addressed. The most vulnerable groups among IDP/returnee households that deserve a special attention are: the disabled, the elderly and individuals or households without proper shelter like the ones living in camps, tents or public facilities.

The immediate needs of the vulnerable groups, expressed by key informants, are blankets, warm clothes for winter as well as medications for certain chronic diseases. Furthermore between forty to sixty percent of the IDPs are in need of regular food assistance, according to the IDP key informants.

The key informants indicate that government institutions, NGOs, ad-hoc civil society groups and ordinary citizens provide assistance to IDPs. The government is reportedly providing food, money, clothes and in some instances shelters to IDPs. The availability and access to the assistance varies by location: key informants in Ajdabiya and Ajaylat reported that the government is not providing any supports to IDPs; in Ajdabiya IDPs both from Benghazi and Tawergha reported a lack of government support whereas Tawergha IDPs in Sabha reported that they received assistance from the government.

Local NGOs are supporting IDPs with provision of blankets and sheets, as well as local fundraising activities and cash distribution to IDPs. Ad-hoc civil society groups furthermore provide food and shelter, and conduct regular needs assessments. Ordinary citizens in communities donate essential items such as food, water, clothes and money, in support of IDPs.

Some of the key informants perceive that the quantity of support that has been provided is not enough to meet the population’s needs, while others highlighted the issue of lack of coordination and timeliness of assistance provided by various actors.

The public food distribution system (PDS) is reportedly functional in most of the locations and government subsidized food is being distributed through schools and mosques by social workers. While IDP key informants report that IDPs have access to subsidized food, the perception of the interviewed IDP/returnee households is somewhat different with less than one-third of them reportedly having had an access to the subsidized food after being displaced.

As with the subsidized food only 29 percent of IDP/returnee households have received food rations from government or non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the past three months. For non-food assistance, the rate is similar at 26 percent.
It is worth noting that there appear to be a significant difference across the regions for IDPs’ access to assistance. In the east close to a majority of IDP/returnee households have received food rations, had access to subsidized food and received non-food items, while in the west and the south the rates are much lower, especially in the south where only two percent have received food rations in the past three months.

Access to the assistance from the government and NGOs is reportedly limited among IDPs who are not registered with the local crisis committees. Less than ten percent of non-registered IDP/returnee households have had access to food rations and non-food assistance. The same applies for shelter in public facilities, with limited level of access among non-registered IDPs.
The perception among IDP key informants about the future availability of assistance varies by location: key informants from az-Zawiyah and Ajdabiya report that the assistance is not sustainable and the level of support will decrease if the situation does not change within the next weeks or months; in Tripoli and Sabha key informants expect the assistance to continue until the crisis is over.

*Migrant worker* key informants emphasize that migrant workers help each other to seek out job opportunities and to take care of their needs. Some reportedly receive assistance from civil society organizations.

For *refugees/asylum seekers*, according to the key informants, Libyan citizens and international organizations provide financial supports. There is also a support structure among the refugees with varying degree: the Somali refugee key informants and most of the Syria refugee key informants report that they help each other the best they can, through e.g. gifts and donations, whereas for the refugees from Ethiopia and Eritrea such support structures seems to be less developed or entirely absent.
PRIORITIES AND FUTURE OUTLOOK

In the short term the key priorities for IDPs, according to the key informants, are proper shelter, food, as well as warm clothes and blankets to cope with the winter. While the shelter is perceived to be adequate to date, the current arrangement is not sustainable and therefore it is listed among the priority needs to be addressed.

In the longer term a majority of IDPs wish to return home and key informants estimate that between 60 to 90 percent will return to their home when the security situation allows. This is supported by the household survey where 84 percent of IDPs are still undecided on how long time they plan to stay in their current area of residence, but 84 percent wish to return to their place of origin.

Priorities

- Short term needs of IDPs are food, shelter and warm clothes and blankets to cope with the winter. In the longer-term the vast majority of IDPs wish to return to their place of origin;
- For refugees/asylum seekers and migrant workers, job opportunities are among the primary needs to enable them to earn a stable income;
- Migrant workers and refugees are looking to emigrate to Europe if the situation remains unstable in Libya.

For Migrant workers their priority is to get assistance from external actors, so as to ensure security, get jobs and receive resources to make a living. It is worth noting that four out of five migrant worker key informants believe that the migrant workers in their community are possibly looking to leave Libya for Europe or their home country.

Refugees/asylum seeker key informants reported that they need more supports from the host government. The priority supports expressed by the key informants include the supports with paper work and permits, as well as a legal support system that offers them protection. In addition, they need supports to get livelihood opportunities. Some refugee/asylum seekers reportedly plan to stay in Libya, while others consider to return to their place of origin or to go elsewhere. For those who are planning to go abroad, the popular destination is reportedly Europe.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The assessment findings confirm that the current conflict has affected significantly the lives and livelihoods of the assessed population, including IDPs/returnees, as well as refugees/asylum seekers and migrant workers.

The assessment captured a snapshot of the humanitarian situation in the accessible locations among the affected area, while some locations were not accessible due to insecurity, and therefore the findings are not representative of all the affected areas. The assessment captured the perspectives of the IDPs/returnees, refugees/asylum seekers and migrant workers on the humanitarian situation, but it did not look at a broader issues including the impact of the crisis on the population at large, and the state of basic services compared to pre-crisis standards. This calls for a need to conduct sector specific follow-up assessments in the future to inform appropriate responses.

Recommendations

FOOD SECURITY

- Provide food assistance for IDPs. Those who reside in public facilities and have been displaced for a longer-term are to be given the priority;
- Provide optimal and nutritionally adequate food assistance to the vulnerable population, including young children, pregnant and lactating women, the elderly, migrant workers, refugees/asylum seekers. Consider to provide fortified foods for children in the areas where the population’s access to the commodities is limited;
- Establish mechanisms to monitor market and prices, building on the existing national system;
- Strengthen the capacity of the government and non-government organizations to provide timely and appropriate food assistance to the affected population;
- Consider to provide food assistance through cash and voucher scheme to the population at risk of food insecurity (including for the provision of fortified blended foods), which would eventually be integrated into the national social safety net and Public Distribution System.

EDUCATION

- Prioritized access to education for all children, regardless of their legal status, which includes IDPs, refugees, asylum-seekers, and migrants children.
- Psychosocial support and recreational activities for children

SHELTER

- Consider emergency shelter for vulnerable groups of IDPs that are living in tents and in public facilities.

PROTECTION

- Safeguard humanitarian principles and guarantee access by humanitarian organisations to IDPs. This includes safe and unimpeded access for refugees, asylum-seekers and migrants to humanitarian assistance by UNHCR and IOM.
- Conduct further research into possible linkages between displacement and other forms of violence or recruitment or association of children into armed conflict.
- Promote national reconciliation process so that IDPs’ views should be fully reflected regarding possibility of durable solutions – return to place of origin, local integration and settlement elsewhere taking to consideration that return should be voluntary or able to take place in conditions of safety and dignity.
- In consultation and with support from UNHCR, develop an asylum and migration policy to protect the rights of refugees and migrants, regularize their status so they may have access to the labour market, and protect them from exploitation on the labour market.
- Countries to allow all persons fleeing Libya access to their territories, as the situation in Libya remain fluid and uncertain.
MIGRANT WORKERS, REFUGEES/ASYLUM SEEKERS

- Emphasizing the provision of direct assistance to migrant workers such as health services, NFIs, food, and repatriation services;
- Provide access to health and education for all refugees and asylum seekers;
- Strengthen support structures to income resources for migrant workers through gaining a decent living and to seek out job opportunities;
- Migrant workers campaign focused on the rights of migrants and legal support channels.
The CARI is a method used for analysing and reporting the level of food insecurity within a population. When CARI is employed, each surveyed household is classified into one of four food security categories (see table below). This classification is based on the household’s current status of food security (using food consumption indicators) and their coping capacity (using indicators measuring economic vulnerability and asset depletion).

To construct CARI console, three indicators are looked at, namely food consumption score (FCS), share of expenditure on food, and livelihood coping strategies. These indicators describe two domains related to food security: current food consumption; and coping capacity (summary of economic vulnerability and asset depletion).

The overall food security classification is calculated with the following steps:

1) Outcomes of each console indicator are converted into a standard 4-point classification scale. The 4-point scale assigns a score (1-4) of each category, as shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4-point scale category</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food secure</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marginally food secure</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderately food insecure</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severely food insecure</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2) Construct the domain summary indicators each for current status and coping capacity by averaging the scores of indicators for each domain;

3) Average the scores of current status and coping capacity domains, which is rounded to the nearest whole number to derive the summary index of food security index (FSI).

The table below provides a description about the four categories belonging to FSI. The percentage of food insecure population is derived by summing the two most severe categories (severely and moderately food insecure).
Input indicators and their thresholds applied in this report are the followings:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Food secure</th>
<th>Marginally Food Secure</th>
<th>Moderately Food Insecure</th>
<th>Severely Food Insecure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Current Status</td>
<td>Food Consumption</td>
<td>Acceptable</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Borderline 28–42</td>
<td>Poor 0–28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Vulnerability</td>
<td>Share of expenditure on food</td>
<td>&lt;35%</td>
<td>35–45%</td>
<td>45–50%</td>
<td>≥50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asset Depletion</td>
<td>Livelihood coping strategy categories</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Stress strategies</td>
<td>Crisis strategies</td>
<td>Emergency strategies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Following section describes how outcomes the two indicators ‘Food Consumption Group’ and ‘livelihood coping strategy categories’ are derived.

**Food Consumption Group**

Food consumption score (FCS) is a proxy to measure the adequacy of household food consumption. FCS is calculated based on the frequency and diversity of food items consumed by households over the past seven days. The analysis is run on the frequency of consumption from one or more items from the following food groups:

- Cereals/pasta (e.g., wheat flour, bread, pasta)
- Pulses (e.g., beans, groundnuts)
- Meat (e.g., beef, goat, poultry, eggs, fish)
- Milk and dairy products (e.g., milk, cheese, yoghurt)
- Vegetables
- Fruits
- Oils/Fats
- Sugar

Households are grouped together to create 3 household food consumption groups: poor, borderline and adequate food consumption groups. Thresholds for separating these three groups were generated by using a weighted food score. Each food group is given a weight based on its nutrient density and then multiplied by the number of days a household consumed one or more items from that group. Table below provides a breakdown on each food group and associated weight.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Food items</th>
<th>Food Groups</th>
<th>Weight</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maize, rice, sorghum, millet, bread, pasta, and other cereals</td>
<td>Cereals and Tubers</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cassava, potatoes, sweet potatoes</td>
<td>Beans, peas groundnuts</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meat, fish, eggs, fish, goat, poultry</td>
<td>Meat/Fish</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milk, yoghurt, cheese</td>
<td>Milk and Dairy</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetables</td>
<td>Vegetables</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fruit</td>
<td>Fruit</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar and sugar products</td>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oils, fats and butter</td>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A rank is then given to each household depending on its total food score. The minimum score is 0 and the maximum score is 112. Note that the score is calculated weekly value. In this context:

- Households with poor food consumption have a food score of ≤ 28
- Households with borderline food consumption have a food score of 28.5 – 42
- Households with adequate food consumption have a food score of ≥ 42.5

**Food Expenditure Share**

Food expenditure shares measure household economic vulnerability. Households are categorized based on the share of total expenditures allocated to purchase food. It is
based on the premise that the greater the share of food expenditure, the more economically vulnerable the household is.

The share of food expenditure is converted into the CARI 4-point scale based on a set of thresholds. Global thresholds are set with 50, 65, and 75 percent. In the context of Libya, the country with predominantly cash economy, the thresholds have been adjusted. According to the Income and Expenditure Survey in 2008, share of expenditure on food by income quintile is the followings:

- Poorest Quintile: 47.8%
- 2nd Quintile: 45.0%
- 3rd Quintile: 42.3%
- 4th Quintile: 39.7%
- Wealthiest: 35.1%

The thresholds are adjusted accordingly. The table below presents both the global thresholds and adjusted thresholds adopted in the Libyan context.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Global thresholds</th>
<th>Adjusted thresholds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food secure (1)</td>
<td>&lt; 50 %</td>
<td>&lt; 35 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marginally food secure (2)</td>
<td>50 – &lt;65 %</td>
<td>35 – &lt;45 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderately food insecure (3)</td>
<td>65 – &lt;75 %</td>
<td>45 – &lt;50 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severely food insecure (4)</td>
<td>≥ 75 %</td>
<td>≥ 50 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Livelihood Coping Categories**

Livelihood coping strategies measure is a descriptor of a household’s coping capacity. Households are categorized based on the severity of livelihood coping strategies employed. The indicator is derived from a series of questions regarding the household’s experience with livelihood stress and asset depletion during 30 days prior to the survey. All strategies are classified into three broad groups of stress, crisis, and emergency strategies.

The coping strategies are ranked as followings in order of severity:

- Stress strategies, such as borrowing money or spending savings, are those which indicate a reduced ability to deal with future shocks due to a current reduction in resources or increase in debts;
- Crisis strategies, such as selling productive assets, directly reduce future productivity, including human capital formation;
- Emergency strategies, such as selling one’s land, affect future productivity, but are more difficult to reverse or more dramatic in nature.

The livelihood coping strategy indicator is used to reclassify households into the CARI’s 4-point scale based on the most severe coping strategy the household reported.


