



World Food Programme

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*Full Report of the Evaluation of the
WFP ANGOLA Portfolio*

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The evaluation team visited Angola from 20 September to 11 October 2001. This document was prepared by the mission team leader on the basis of the mission's work in the field.

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Responsibility for the opinions expressed in this report rests solely with the authors. Publication of this document does not imply endorsement by WFP of the opinions expressed.

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Executive Summary

WFP has been actively dealing with the victims of civil war in Angola since the mid- 1970s. In the nineties WFP promulgated nine emergency operations and three PRO/PRROs involving 733,179 MT of food assistance, valued at US\$492.5 million, to an average of 1.2 million war affected persons. In this period WFP adjusted its programs to deal with two relatively peaceful periods, from 1990-1992 and from 1996-1998, while two periods of intense conflict countrywide, from 1993-1995 and from 1998 to the present, obliged WFP to use forward and backward linkages between emergency and recovery programs. No evaluation of WFP operations in Angola had been undertaken until this present mission.

PRRO 6159.01 is the second phase of a PRRO that started in January 2000. PRRO 6159.00 initially covered the period from January 2000 to end December 2000 and was essentially a converted EMOP, since recovery activities were not part of the PRRO strategy, given the high level of insecurity and uncertainty. PRRO 6159.01 introduces for the first time a recovery concept in the PRRO strategy. It has been a major achievement for WFP to define a recovery strategy in a vacuum, since neither the government nor the UN has defined a global recovery framework under which WFP could operate.

The Angola portfolio currently covers four main projects, as follows:

Type	Proj. Nr.	Title	Total Cost US\$
PRRO	6159.01	Assistance to war-affected people	167,671,644
SO	5857.02	Passenger air transport service	6,333,916
SO	5970.02	Non food items transport by air	3,672,746
QAP	6020.00	Food assistance to community infant programme	5,372,270

Two additional projects received no funding, namely:

SO	5887.02	De-mining in support of resettlement	1,792,067
SO	10027.00	Integrated voice and data communications	883,000

PRRO 6159.01 was able to meet its primary objective of saving the lives of people at risk of starvation by providing regular food aid to beneficiaries who would otherwise not have had access to food aid (newly arrived IDPs and resettled). Given security constraints and the logistical structure, the two transport operations (SO 5970.02, SO 5857.02) played a critical role in meeting not only the PRRO objectives but also those of the entire humanitarian community. The services are widely used by the implementing partner community across the country as well as by UN agencies and donors, in addition to WFP staff. The two air operations are directly linked to the effectiveness of the overall humanitarian response in Angola.

The recovery strategy was only partially able to meet its goals of promoting return and self-reliance, as resettlement was only possible on a limited scale in some areas. This is the result of changing assumptions and increasing instability and insecurity. Only a third of the planned resettlement was achieved, and recovery FFW figures represent 6.4% of the tonnage

versus a 30% projection (although counting indirect beneficiaries the figure rises to 15%). However the recovery strategy has the merit of providing a framework, which should be further refined to be applicable and sustainable in the current Angolan context.

The Quick Action Project (QAP) 6020 has provided pre-school education opportunities to poor children but more needs to be done by MINARS to ensure that children receive more than just free food and supervision. Many early learning centres (PICs) visited by the mission did not provide educational or health programmes as originally envisaged. While the QAP is certainly a justified project, it could also be included as part of the PRRO under a Food For Education (FFE) component. The rationale for not doing so was apparently to use the QAP as an additional funding tool in order not to confuse donor response to the PRRO.

The beneficiaries reached obtained according to the latest monthly figures are for September 2001:

<i>Assistance type</i>	<i>Beneficiaries</i>	<i>Numbers</i>	<i>Percentage of total</i>	<i>Total (MTs) commodities</i>
Emergency GFD	IDPs and returnees refugees	466,997		
sub-total		8,835 475,832	60.0%	6,115.86
Safety net Nutritional programs	feeding centers, families and QAP (PIC)	182,926 (of which PIC 76,115)		
other vulnerable groups		84,290		
sub-total		267,216	33.6%	2,499.07
Recovery FFW	IDPs, resident	51,092	6.4%	3,015.57
TOTAL		794,140	100%	11,630.50

Given the volatile security situation and the high numbers of newly arrived IDPs registered during 2001 (323,000 since January according to OCHA) due to military operations, a drop in beneficiary figures is unlikely even if refined targeting has led to lower figures. Influx of newly arrived IDPs is unpredictable. Therefore WFP must maintain its assistance capacity to meet the influx of newly arrived IDPs. The mission finds the planning figure of one million beneficiaries (20% above the current figures) realistic in the current context. The FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission of May 2001 reported 1.34 million IDPs still in need of food aid. Despite an improved harvest of 429,000 tons of maize, up 9% from last year's level, there is still a food deficit of 581,000 tons of cereals over the marketing year 2001/02 (April/March). Commercial imports are forecast at 405,000 tons, leaving 176,000 tons to be covered by food aid (as compared to 333,000 tons for the period April 2000/March 2001). OCHA's appraisal is that 1.21 million IDPs are still in need of food aid.

Three major challenges which remain for the next phase of the PRRO are :

1. *To determine the overall goals WFP wants to achieve and articulate program implementation guidelines accordingly.* In particular, targeting should be done on the basis of vulnerability to food insecurity as determined by VAM indicators. Although emphasis should continue to be put on increasing the relative importance of recovery activities (as compared to emergency activities) wherever possible, the use of specific percentages for each category as indicators of success should be dropped.

2. *To articulate a flexible and field-based recovery strategy with programmatic labels such as FFA (food for assets), FFI (food for infrastructure), FFS (food for skills), FFE (food for education) for all FFW activities to give greater emphasis to program objectives and highlight the achievements of self-reliance as a result of recovery FFW activities undertaken.* Self-reliance can be developed among temporary resettled IDPs even if permanent resettlement (returnees) on a large scale is not taking place. WFP should take the opportunity to define guidelines for the objectives of self-reliance which are not always well understood by all WFP staff, and apply FFW to meeting self-reliance objectives among the temporarily resettled, who are currently a majority of the resettled.

3. *To develop a flexible approach to allow for rapid increase of the recovery component, when/if security and military conditions allow, over the next PRRO's time-frame. Likewise, there should be a return to focusing on life-saving activities should security conditions further deteriorate and impede resettlement programs and other recovery activities from taking place.* Both emergency GFD and recovery activities can be undertaken simultaneously in some locations according to specific opportunities in each province. But the identification and feasibility of undertaking these activities should be determined on a provincial basis. Rapid assessments are the key to shifting programme activities.

Specific recommendations for the CO which were identified and discussed during the mission's debriefing in Luanda with WFP staff include :

A. The use of the logical framework for the next phase of the PRRO (in order to clarify goals of intervention, improve recovery strategy and develop an enhanced monitoring and evaluation system);

B. A dual PRRO strategy based on life saving and asset creation as its two strategic pillars; a wider concept of recovery to encompass the creation of human and physical assets within a population rather than focusing on FFW, all within a flexible framework with forward and backward linkages between emergency and recovery activities.

C. Capacity building appears to be a crucial priority for efficient recovery in Angola. This implies training of both WFP staff in Participatory Rural Appraisals (PRA) and Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA) techniques as well as training of partners (IPs and MINARS) at national and provincial levels. In addition specific training on FFW schemes is equally necessary. If resources and budgets allow, in some cases district level training might be useful where there is a high concentration of IPs operating in recovery activities.

The very limited technical capacity of IPs in recovery and the lack of a Government policy and technical capacity are a fundamental constraint, which has so far contributed to keeping recovery activities on a limited scale.

1. EVALUATION SCOPE AND METHOD

The objectives of the evaluation were:

- to assess the relevance, appropriateness, timeliness, efficiency, effectiveness and connectedness of WFP assistance in Angola;
- provide inputs and recommendations for the design of the next phase of the PRRO;
- contribute to an understanding of the usefulness of the PRRO category;
- provide accountability to the Executive Board.

The Terms of Reference for the evaluation are included in the Annex.

A five member team visited Angola from 20 September to 11 October 2001. The methods used included documentary evidence and data (in particular the internal reporting, the nutritional and morbidity surveys of implementing partners, and some synthetic studies), observational data on activities and living conditions in four Provinces (Huila, Malanje, Bie, Benguela), and interviews with primary and secondary stakeholders. The evaluation team spent extensive time in the field interviewing beneficiaries groups and individuals, in order to obtain first hand feedback from food aid recipients. The mission also held extensive interviews with WFP staff, Government counterpart officials, partner organizations and donors, also using a questionnaire for donors. At the end of the mission two mini-workshops including a SWOT analysis (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats) were held with WFP staff, including base managers, in Luanda to provide feed-back on mission findings and to discuss resulting recommendations.

2. CONTEXT OF THE CRISIS AND WFP'S PORTFOLIO

2.1 Background information and evolution

Since independence in 1975, Angola has been experiencing internal insecurity and warfare, alternating with periods of relative but uneasy peace. WFP has long been providing food aid to the country and in the 1990s alone provided almost one million tons of food aid for a total value of \$ 700 million. During the height of the war from 1993 – 1995 WFP provided food aid for as many as two million Angolans affected by the war.

Table 1: WFP's Emergency Response to Angola¹

Project no.	Type	Duration	Beneficiaries (no.)	Tonnage (MT)	Total WFP cost (US\$)
4531.00	E	02.11.90-01.02.91	721 939	29 183	18 344 171
4913.00	E	01.04.92-31.01.93	250 000	17 845	9 495 779
4945.00	E	01.07.92-31.12.92	758 000	69 213	39 803 219
5298.00	E	01.07.93-30.06.94	1 963 000	103 177	62 629 319
5298.01	E	01.02.94-30.06.95	1 936 000	158 510	80 919 819
5298.02	E	01.07.95-29.02.96	1 345 000	46 203	27 148 926
5698.00	E	15.01.96-14.11.96	255 000	27 155	14 932 912
5698.01	E	01.05.97-30.09.97	315 000	20 060	13 399 496
5602.00	X	01.03.96-28.02.97	1 300 000	84 822	53 435 588
5602.01	X	01.03.97-29.02.98	662 000	96 033	71 347 653
5602.02	X	01.03.98-31.08.99	539 500	79 840	63 377 585
6138.00	E	01.09.99-31.12.99	798 000	51 138	37 736 020
6159.00	X	01.01.00-31.12.00	1 544 900	277 074	207 687 931
Total				1 060 253	700 250 418

PRRO 6159.01 is taking place in a very changed context from the initial WFP response ten years ago. Following a three-year hiatus during which the Government of Angola and UNITA set out to implement the 1996 Lusaka Peace Accord, the civil war resumed in 1998. This latest civil war saw a shift in strategy from general warfare to guerrilla type activities by UNITA. Given the UN sanctions there is no official communication and negotiations with UNITA and no access to areas that are not determined by UNSECOORD as secure and under Government control. The single-sidedness of the operation has implications for WFP and for the security of staff and beneficiaries. Security is always relative in Angola, and the long list of security incidents and shrinking security perimeters highlight this aspect. The return to warfare has led to yet new and massive population displacements². The population has been assisted up to WFP's operational capacity, considering the available resources in Angola. Targeted food assistance was to be provided under PRRO 6159.01, foreseen for 1,040,000 beneficiaries (newly arrived IDPs and returnees, malnourished children in feeding centers and their families, children in communal kitchen) over a 15 months period (1.4.2001 until 30.6.2002) and a total tonnage expected to amount to 229,652 MT.

The consequence is that assistance is given only to population accessible to WFP and the international community in government areas, regardless of the nature and cause of displacement. Needs outside these areas are currently impossible to assess, although OCHA estimates that up to 500,000 people are in need of assistance but outside of reach. Because of security concerns and UN security rules, road access is very limited. Areas of access are essentially major cities and towns and district centers, around which the population has flocked, remaining within the established security perimeters, which are sometimes very limited. In most cases travel has to be done by air. The security map allows for a visual perception of the travel and access constraints (see point 6.2.1).

¹ E = Emergency

X = PRO

² OCHA August 2001 Monthly analysis estimates at 323,000 the number of new IDPs since January 2001.

PRRO 6159.01 was supported by two Special Operations for Non Food Item (NFI) Transport by Air and Passenger Air Transportation given security constraints regarding road use.

A special operation (SO 5887.02) to address de-mining was designed in support of food security and resettlement of IDPs for the year 2001. However, this operation never received any donor funding and was not implemented. Another special operation (SO 10027) was recently approved and is meant to support the entire humanitarian community in Angola with an Interagency Integrated Voice and Data Communications Network.

WFP's portfolio also includes an 18 months Quick Action Project (QAP) for food assistance to the Community Infant Program (PIC). The QAP was to provide two daily meals to over 60,000 pre-school age children between the ages of 2 and 5 coming from the poorest populations of urban areas. A total of 1,200 community volunteers were to receive food-for-work under this programme.

2.2 IDP figures in Angola

In terms of target population, OCHA estimated the number of IDPs as follows:

Overall numbers are close to 3 million IDPs since resumption of the war, of which 1.21 million have been confirmed by humanitarian partners. Some 257,000 IDPs live in camps and transit centres and remain dependent on humanitarian aid for survival. Additionally 393,000 IDPs are temporarily resettled in peri-urban areas and receive assistance aimed at achieving self-sufficiency. A remaining 562,578 IDPs are integrated into urban or peri-urban communities. Provinces with the largest concentrations of IDPs include Huila, Huambo, Bié and Malanje³.

2.3 Rationale for WFP assistance and role of food aid

2.3.1 Role of food aid

The main cause of vulnerability and food insecurity in the country has been the war. The VAM surveys note that, beyond the seasonal availability of food and the war-induced shortages, the country's potential for food availability remains good. Food aid consequently acts as a useful substitute for normal channels, and need is conditioned by the insecurity or degree of protection of the population. While this would normally in the long term be the responsibility of the Government, in this case the humanitarian agencies act as direct but indispensable structural substitutes.

In late 1998 there was a massive escalation of needs due to the upsurge in fighting, and the destruction of the *de facto* sanctuaries for displaced persons that the previous pattern of war had generated. This situation stabilised in mid-1999, and better harvests led to greater optimism for the future of food security. A consultancy fielded by WFP in mid-2000, and the planning context of the 2001 PRRO, based the upcoming strategy on this optimism, predicting more opportunities to resettle and gain self-sufficiency. Thirty percent of the assistance was to be for FFW to support resettlement.

However the situation in terms of vulnerability and displacement has remained more fluid than predicted. By early 2001 the optimistic assumptions made were shown to have been invalid. Insecurity had merely become less localised but at the same time more pervasive, and farming more precarious. Resettlement programmes have fallen short of expectations and general food distributions consumed the majority of WFP food assistance.

The resilience and continued efforts of the population have however been remarkable. Rather than dependency, there has been a diversification of the coping mechanisms. These naturally include

³ OCHA Humanitarian Situation in Angola, Monthly Analysis, August 2001

maximising aid benefits – but not to the detriment of other activities, which beneficiaries carry on in all situations. Trade in semi-urban settlements is strong. The evaluation did not observe any instances of large-scale commercial sale of food assistance, which would tend to show that it is used efficiently by the primary beneficiaries⁴. It would seem (from a limited visit) that the negative impact on the food economy is low. Close monitoring is required to ensure that food assistance does not become a disincentive to farming. The vulnerability assessments furthermore confirm that without the large volumes of food aid, the prices would be higher, exposing populations to much higher food insecurity.

The war is resulting in continued asset stripping and societal erosion in the rural population, particularly for nomadic shepherds. The preservation of relative food security over time will probably continue becoming more and more problematic. Durable changes in military tactics (see subsequent sections) mean that displacement will probably increase or surely continue. Problems of land tenure and the security of crops will not be addressed. Food aid will remain an important component of humanitarian assistance in Angola for the foreseeable future.

2.3.2 Rationale for WFP assistance to the PRRO, SOs and QAP

The rationale for PRRO, SO and QAP assistance are based on existing needs. Widespread vulnerability and a large portion of the population's incapacity to obtain self-sufficiency results in a combination of factors such as asset erosion, war, displacement, insecurity, logistical problems, weak Government investment into the social sectors and the overall difficult operating conditions in Angola. The PRRO provides entirely justified and needs driven food aid to targeted beneficiary population according to a three-fold approach. Given security constraints the PRRO would not be in place without the complementary air transport Special Operations (both for passengers and Non Food Items). While de-mining is an important and needed activity, it has received no donor funding. The mission feels that it should not be undertaken under WFP's umbrella. WFP has neither the technical knowledge nor provides any added value by managing de-mining programs. It should be left out to those agencies already doing de-mining in the country, notwithstanding the obvious need to coordinate de-mining activities in the areas of operation (road clearance, resettlement areas, etc.). The activities under QAP (pre-school feeding program or PIC) are essentially the result of an added opportunity to obtain extra funding in addition to the PRRO and SO. In essence the activities could have been undertaken under the PRRO but QAP was used as a window of opportunity. Given the reportedly low spending of the Government in the social sector, despite alarmingly high vulnerability indicators from the UN Human Development Report, and the high numbers of children covered (76,115 in September 2001 – 20 percent higher than planned) the needs for the program are not being questioned. Improvements are necessary, however (see point 5. achievements).

2.4 The Operating Environment - an overview of the current context and constraints in Angola


2.4.1 Productive Assets and the Movement of Goods

The country is characterised by an overlap of very different economies, quite unconnected in terms of logistics, consumption, and populations. These economies can be represented in simplified terms as the extractive industry (principally diamonds and oil), the food and domestic item traders, the aid agencies, and small subsistence trade. The large agro-industry sector, which existed into the eighties, is no longer as economically significant in most of the country.

⁴ This may be partly attributed to the fact that the visit of the mission occurred prior to the planting season, traditionally a lean period.

While this structure presents some opportunities for growth, in reality the trend is one of increasing segmentation. The benefits of the extractive industry are limited to a small elite or a few regions in the country, and the markets are very limited. However the movement of goods has improved dramatically since the late nineties. There are in most provinces continuous flows of goods, including established traders. The city markets are very well supplied. Food commodity prices are high compared to other countries in the region, but local and imported produce are usually found on the market, with the exception of areas inaccessible to trade.

Large parts of the country remain inaccessible to aid agencies. OCHA estimates that in August 2001 there were sixteen areas with high densities of population with suspected critical needs. This is additional to the generally poor condition of the population in non-government held rural areas. The rural population is generally exposed to predatory practices and the erosion of public and social services everywhere. Vulnerability is the norm. The map below, drawn from the WFP-VAM bulletin for August 2001, shows the critical areas, and those where no reliable information exists. Recorded vulnerability is highest in the central regions, where insecurity is greatest.



The continuation of the war over more than forty years has led to successive waves of displacement. Both the government and the population have however sought to preserve social structures and

cultural identities, and to a point traditional structures remain relatively strong (with the exception of the population in Luanda).

This process of change from war, economic stress, and state policies, is imposing particular pressure on women, who cumulate the roles of main breadwinner, child carer, and running the household. Family structures are under strain, mainly because of separation (for economic, security or personal reasons). The continuing years of war have also led to the reduction of the taboos concerning violence against women and children. Examples of rape and gratuitous violence, as well as forced military mobilisation, abound. There has been a corresponding multiplication of vulnerable groups. A large majority of households are women headed households, men being either drafted or recruited for strategic interests by either of the warring parties.

Against this backdrop the aid effort acquires a particular significance. It is estimated that between one quarter to one half of Angola's population has been displaced since the early eighties, while approximately 1.1 million have received some form of humanitarian assistance in 2001. WFP's figures mention almost 800,000 registered beneficiaries in September 2001. Overall the progress made by the aid agencies since 1999 in reaching affected populations has been carried through into 2001, although security risks are increasing. The Consolidated Appeal mentioned an estimated 525,000 persons in need in areas inaccessible to international agencies. Interestingly, from the point of view of the beneficiaries, food aid is one part of the large range of public efforts (it is seen as a Government/MPLA policy) to address the all-encompassing crisis.

2.4.2 Poverty and food insecurity

The war has a very heavy toll on the civilian population in Angola. As a result both food insecurity and poverty are widespread among both rural and urban population. Despite its wealth of natural resources, the civilian population in Angola remains desperately poor. Ranked at 160 out of 174 countries, according to the UN Human Development Index (2000), Angola has the second highest percentage of population without access to potable water (69%, only topped by Ethiopia with 75%), the fifth highest percentage of lack of access to health care (76%)⁵, the second highest child mortality rate (170 per 1000 live births) and under five mortality rate (292 per 1000 live births)⁶. Poverty is rampant and widespread, affecting both rural and urban areas. The lack of security outside the generally limited security perimeters around the urban areas further add to the difficulty of reaching an acceptable level of food security. Because much of the productive farmlands are outside of government control, food insecurity will likely remain a reality as long as no changes in the current war situation occur. Food insecurity is thus essentially a result of the war situation rather than other factors such as bad farming habits, lack of seeds and tools or poor soil composition.

When lasting peace is achieved in Angola enough land, agricultural means and knowledge to attain food security over the short to medium term exist. This should allow to rapidly phase out of food assistance (one to two agricultural seasons if permanent resettlement is feasible), but can only be achieved provided a permanent solution to the conflict is found. If not, investments realised will likely remain in jeopardy until peace is achieved.

2.4.3 National policies and priorities for relief, recovery and food security

The resumption of war in Angola in late 1998 has not led the way to a clear framework at national level under which UN agencies and other actors could intervene. As a result there is no clear actualized policy on relief, recovery and food security. For relief, the backbone of the operation is no doubt food aid and the WFP logistics and transport operations in Angola. Essentially, the Government

⁵ UNDP Human Development Report 2000, table 4

⁶ Ibid., table 9

is very satisfied with the food aid provided by WFP, although it does argue that needs are greater than WFP's current capacity. There is a clear sense that making food available to the target groups is the priority in terms of the relief operation. The government through MINARS has now finalized its newest National Emergency Plan (PNHEAH) with support from OCHA, which details some of the planned activities in a series of sectors for the period May 2001 to May 2002⁷. However it remains to be linked with the CAP and the funding mechanisms still need to be streamlined, as MINARS has no responsibility or capacity to allocate or dispose of the funds under the National Emergency Plan. The responsibility rests with the Ministry of Planning who apparently holds the purse's strings, and at province level with the Governors. However this is a first step towards a more comprehensive and integrated approach in addressing the humanitarian needs of the relief operation, and increased government efforts and participation should be encouraged and continue.

Land tenure is a major problem in Angola the responsibility of which rests with the Government. Newly arrived IDPs are resettled on plots of land which the mission found in most cases not to be adequately registered in the municipal cadastre; nor do beneficiaries receive any document which recognizes their *usus-fructus* right to exploit the land. As a result there is no guarantee given to resettled IDPs other than word of mouth.

Recommendation:

- WFP should encourage the Ministry of Agriculture, which is in charge of allocating plots of land for resettlement, to issue a right to exploitation title over the size of the land allocation, both in local dialect and in Portuguese. This should guarantee IDPs the right to land exploitation in both temporary and permanent resettlement areas.

3. PRRO STRATEGY AND DESIGN

WFP has had the difficult task of designing a recovery strategy in a country that has not yet determined a national framework for recovery. Neither the government nor the United Nations has come up with a recovery plan for Angola, while some donors are overtly sceptical regarding the feasibility of recovery in Angola today. This is partly the result of the intensification of the security incidents in the course of the year. WFP has had to operate in a vacuum. The need to design and have a recovery strategy appears quite justified in the opinion of the mission, despite its inherent limitations in terms of the limited areas where recovery activities can be applied and the extent to which recovery activities can be undertaken in Angola.

The current PRRO includes a recovery strategy, as a result of an assessment mission in May/June 2000, based on a two-fold approach: emergency/recovery via safety nets (communal kitchens, therapeutic and supplementary feeding centers for malnourished children and support to their families) and recovery/rehabilitation schemes via self-targeting food for work to reach food insecure families in areas at high risk of malnutrition⁸. But the bulk of the operation remains emergency response via free food assistance. Avoiding malnutrition is an important objective of the recovery strategy through the adequate targeting of food aid recipients in specific programs. At the same time a tighter and more rigorous, albeit imperfect, process of registration and targeting of free food beneficiaries initiated last year and still on-going allows for a improved accountability in numbers.

Other elements that have influenced the design of the recovery strategy have been that the PRRO is more the result of a rule to convert EMOP to PRRO than a real shift in the dynamics of the Angolan conflict allowing for recovery activities to be undertaken. Similarly a major donor was equally keen to

⁷ the sectors are : agriculture and food security, health and nutrition, resettlement and shelter, water and sanitation, mine action, protection, education, and coordination of humanitarian assistance

⁸ PRRO document, paragraphs 43 and 44.

see WFP involved in recovery activities. As a result despite lack of clarification as to what activities could be undertaken under a recovery component in Angola, WFP was still able to come up with a recovery strategy essentially aimed at treatment and prevention of malnutrition as well as developing self-reliance among permanently resettled. However permanent resettlement has only been possible on a very small scale, and the self-reliance recovery objective was not articulated in implementation and program specific terms, leading to a confusion over actual recovery objectives.

Considering logistics, technical and security constraints, the capacity of WFP to design a recovery strategy under these difficult conditions remains a major accomplishment. The VAM has played a key role in determining vulnerability mapping and analysis at country and province levels in order to determine food insecurity and malnutrition-prone areas.

3.1 Formulation of the relief and recovery strategy

A mission fielded in May/June 2000 was instrumental in identifying a series of criteria that were used to target specific categories to be assisted under the PRRO. The PRRO strategy was articulated through:

- 1) General Food Distribution (GFD) to newly arrived IDPs (post-October 2000) and returnees (emergency relief assistance);
- 2) Safety Net for supplementary and therapeutic feeding for malnourished in feeding centers (and their families), as well as communal kitchens for children under five at risk of malnutrition;
- 3) Self-targeting FFW in areas at high risk of malnutrition.

The relief strategy was based on moving away from GFD towards a more refined targeting approach, which should help WFP focus assistance on the most needy population category. This was done by identifying the two target beneficiary groups within IDPs as Newly Displaced Households (NDH) and returnees. The June 2000 mission identified a cut-off point for NDH as those households which had been displaced after October 2000, as this was supposed to reflect increased vulnerability as compared to other IDPs previously displaced, which under the new strategy were now considered as "resident population". The "returnees" were those who would be permanently resettled.

Contrary to the previous PRRO, that did not contain a well-developed strategy for recovery and was mostly an emergency operation, the current PRRO 6159.01 is based on a two-pronged recovery strategy consisting of safety net and FFW activities. Initially breakdown of activities was foreseen to be 40% emergency GFD, 30% safety net and 30% FFW.

3.2 Assessment of the relief and recovery strategy

Relief strategy

The new IDP category (i.e. those displaced post-October 2000) provides a cut-off point which is used to reflect vulnerability. Some of the beneficiaries interviewed felt that the October 2000 cut-off date used to target GFD beneficiaries was understood, but they did not deem it to reflect vulnerability or needs in all areas. In Huila province for example, several WFP implementing partners (MSF, CNR, Caritas) believed that the resident population (old IDPs) was more vulnerable than the newly arrived IDPs. Nevertheless, according to WFP/Luanda, Vulnerability Assessments invariably conclude that three out of the top four population groups most vulnerable to food insecurity are IDPs.

Recovery strategy

WFP's capacity to determine a recovery strategy in the Angolan context proved to be quite an accomplishment and should be commended. As an initial step towards recovery it is acceptable, but it

should be revised and fine-tuned for the future PRRO in order to ensure coherence and relevance of all WFP's activities. This requires several improvements.

At field level (province and district), the mission found beneficiary categories were confused by implementing partners and WFP staff, and the use of the nutritional Safety Net was questionable. The recovery strategy seemed to focus more on FFW as an end in itself than on the actual self-reliance it was meant to develop. Self-reliance objectives were not defined in terms of programs or did not rest on implementation guidelines. A large part of the recovery strategy was based on permanent resettlements in areas of origin (returnees), instead of including temporary resettlements in the recovery strategy. Doubts among some WFP field staff were raised regarding the objective of the FFW schemes.

The mission also came across projects submitted for recovery FFW which were clearly not identified using participatory community approaches (e.g. reforestation). Systematic questioning of beneficiaries on reforestation, a critical need in Angola, showed they were more concerned about their immediate needs (fuel wood) than long term investments (tree planting). FFW should be more gender sensitive, and priority should be given to women in the FFS and FFA schemes as compared to other labor intensive activities (e.g. road repair, land clearing). This can be easily applied for example in teaching improved cooking stove construction and utilization (up to 50% more fuel efficient) to all women under FFS.

Recommendations:

- Categories used as WFP beneficiaries in the PRRO including for emergency assistance should be revised by choosing either emergency needs (substituting for unavailable commodities) or food security (based on a combination of all VAM indicators leading to vulnerability to food insecurity).
- The next PRRO design should be done using the logical framework analysis and include criteria and indicators against which achievements can be measured.
- The recovery strategy should focus on skills and assets development for IDP communities. Dropping the generic FFW category and using specific labels according to achievements (FFA - assets, FFS - skills, FFI - infrastructure, FFE - education) may lead to improved monitoring and reporting
- Projects need to be identified through community participatory approaches and not by well-intending implementing partners or local administration officials. WFP field staff should check project proposals received with beneficiaries to ensure that the project is identified on the basis of expressed community needs.
- Scheme-specific implementation guidelines for recovery need to be established for FFE, FFA, FFS, etc.
- Self-reliance objectives should be articulated in terms of programs and/or supported by implementation guidelines
- Temporary resettlements should also be part of the recovery strategy

4. ACHIEVEMENT OF WFP'S PORTFOLIO OBJECTIVES

4.1 Overall achievements

PRRO 6159.01

Stated objectives:

"The goal of the PRRO is primarily to save the lives of people at risk of starvation as a result of war and to promote return and self-reliance. The objectives are to:

- *Through emergency food distribution, save lives and improve immediate household food security of the most vulnerable war-affected people (newly arrived IDPs) who have been cut off from any sources of food;*
- *Maintain and improve the nutritional status of groups identified as nutritionally at risks through safety nets, which include support to therapeutic/supplementary feeding centers, assistance to families of children attending the feeding centers, and support of communal kitchen for children under five;*
- *Contribute to the self-reliance of war-affected people through resettlement programs and rehabilitation schemes via food-for-work"*

Performance assessment

The total of food assistance for the latest projected distribution (September 2001) was 11,648.87 tons for 794,140 beneficiaries. This figure is below the estimated 1,040,000 as per project document but is mainly the result of logistical, access and security constraints as well as a cautious approach to registration, re-registration and verification of beneficiaries. The continued influx of newly arrived IDPs is likely to have an adverse effect and again raise the number of GFD beneficiaries in the coming months.

PRRO 6159.01 was able to meet its primary objective of saving the lives of people at risk of starvation by providing regular and continuous food aid to beneficiaries who would otherwise not have had access to food aid (newly arrived IDPs and resettled). This was done at country level by deploying a large network of WFP field offices to cover all provinces, and maintaining and operating a large and complex logistical apparatus. The emergency assistance has in general terms been a success over the past two years. The beneficiaries' numbers have experienced great variation over the last two years of operation as a result of a changed context brought about by security and military operations, re-registration and refined targeting. The size of the operation has remained enormous throughout and there are almost 800,000 people depending on WFP food assistance for survival, a large number of whom are new IDPs.

In Emergency General Food Distribution (GDF) WFP is using a sensible approach while limiting the time of GDF. This is done based on additional VAM assessments, thus verifying if additional assistance is needed due to bad harvests. In some instances the mission felt that the period for GDF could have been reduced.

Recommendations :

- GFD should be time-bound until the first harvest; exceptionally where the period of arrival or resettlement is inadequate for the first harvest GFD should be extended to the second harvest; continuation of GFD should only be exceptional and the result of a rapid needs assessment at community level; beneficiaries' incapacity to meet food needs should be covered under recovery activities (FFA/FFS schemes);

Beneficiaries appraisal

Rather than focusing on direct outputs such as past distribution figures over the last two years, the mission has preferred to focus on impact assessment by obtaining directly beneficiaries' perception of the food assistance received both by current beneficiaries under the PRRO's three modalities of food distribution as well as by past beneficiaries ("old" IDPs currently considered as resident population). In addition to providing impact analysis information, this approach also allows to collect first hand qualitative data on the PRRO operation. This is in the mission's opinion more illustrative than the average numbers of rations, beneficiaries or kilocalories. However the number of interviews is clearly not statistically significant and cannot be used as scientific evidence.

The interviews used a mix of techniques (PRA, RRA, structured, semi-structured, focus groups, individual) in the four provinces visited. In total some 210 groups of beneficiaries (both current and

past, of various composition, including gender specific groups) were interviewed and 13 individual household interviews were held in the four provinces visited.

The results were as follows:

- **quantity:** the food rations were generally considered as adequate and sufficient when the full food basket was distributed. Over the past two years this was not systematically the case as pipeline breaks and other operational constraints have led at times to lower rations or incomplete rations being distributed, placing beneficiaries under strain, given the difficulties to obtain additional food.
- **quality:** the quality was found to be acceptable, with specific and local complaints on certain items. The most common complaint is that certain types of beans required too long a cooking time and required much more firewood, which is often very toilsome to obtain. Other comments reported that a variety of commodities was not always adapted to the regional habits (e.g. in some areas maize was not the main food crop, but cassava, millet or sorghum). The mission noted that WFP had made some efforts to adapt the food basket in some regions as far as possible.
- **coping mechanisms** (from individual interviews only): on the average 10 to 20 percent of the rations were sold or traded for complementary goods. Often 5 kgs of maize (out of a 50 kgs bag), sometimes a part of oil, would be sold or traded to purchase mostly fish or soap. In certain instances where distribution was taking place at a distance from the households there was a transportation fee to be paid to the owner of the cart if the beneficiary was not physically able to carry the full ration (e.g. 5 kgs maize out of a 50 kgs bag). The most common source of income for the rural population is gathering firewood and/or burning it to obtain charcoal both of which are sold at the local market.
- **Indirect effects of food assistance:** In a minority but a significant number of IDP camps, beneficiaries did not feel that their safety was assured, as much of the population deserted the centres at night to go to the closest urban centre where most had relatives staying. This dual strategy is to maintain a presence in the camps to obtain food assistance and find a dwelling in urban or peri-urban areas to ensure security. It seems to be widespread in those resettlement areas which beneficiaries feel do not offer adequate security conditions and are within reasonable walking distance to urban or peri-urban areas.

Special Operations

Given security constraints and the logistical structure, the two transport operations (SO 5970.02, 5857.02) played a critical role in the delivery of humanitarian assistance to places of difficult access, and were crucial in meeting not only the PRRO objectives but also those of the entire humanitarian community.

These services are widely used by the implementing partner community nationwide as well as by UN agencies and donors, in addition to WFP staff. The two air operations are directly linked to the effectiveness of the overall humanitarian response in Angola.

Recovery activities

Recovery activities have often been hampered by the late arrival of seeds and tools, leading to missed agricultural opportunities and necessitating an extension of GFD. Ensuring provision of Non-Food Items (NFI) also proved to be a problem for a number of partners, which limited the amount of recovery activities undertaken. By far the largest drawback is the lack of locally available technical skills both among WFP and IPs and Government in recovery activities. Capacity building through training in PRA, RRA and FFW is a priority for WFP as well as for IPs and Government (MINARS).

De-mining

The mission confirmed that de-mining is a real need in Angola although the project received no funding. Several NGOs and donors are involved in de-mining in addition to other UN agencies (UNOPS). However, WFP is already working to full capacity and the mission sees no added value in placing de-mining activities within WFP's portfolio, notwithstanding the needs for WFP to share and coordinate information on mine clearing areas, especially for resettlement areas.

Integrated voice and data communications project

The other project which received no funding, the integrated voice and data communications project, addresses an important need while the existing system is able to ensure communications between the network of offices despite some difficulties in obtaining connections.

QAP/PIC

The mission visited a number of early learning centres, which were under the QAP infant feeding programme. WFP has effectively been providing its share into the project in terms of food supply. However, there are outstanding needs for improved management from both the Government and in some cases from the NGOs which are also supporting the project. Criteria for admission are not always rigorously applied and the project is not designed towards a sustainable solution providing an exit strategy to WFP and other supporting NGOs. As a consequence WFP is caught in a humanitarian dilemma: either to continue supporting the project since needs exist and the project rationale is entirely justified or to stop its support in order to pressure Government into accepting its own responsibilities. In the opinion of the mission WFP should continue its support conditional to the project incorporating a medium term hand-over strategy from WFP to Government. This requires a shift of focus from external assistance dependency to developing self-reliance through resource generation management techniques.

An evaluation of the QAP/PIC (Infant Community Feeding Programme) and of the PEC (Community Education Programme) was undertaken by the Angolan Institute of Economic and Social Research in August 2001. Among a SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats) analysis undertaken with two focal groups, the major weakness which clearly appears is the programme's total dependency on WFP for food assistance.

4.2 Specific achievements according to PRRO categories

4.2.1 Emergency General Food Distribution (GFD)

The PRRO's intervention approach focused on two categories of GFD recipients: newly displaced households and returnees.

- a) Newly displaced households were to receive free distributions for up to a maximum of two full agricultural seasons; after the end of the first agricultural season the VAM unit and the humanitarian community would carry out an assessment to determine the level of assistance required during the second agricultural season. The assessment should incorporate results of household food economy surveys amongst beneficiaries, regular monitoring of food security indicators at municipal and provincial levels and results of the May 2001 FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Mission. The assessment should be discussed with the provincial management team and its partners including MINARS and the NGOs and would be used as the basis for adjustments to the level of support to beneficiaries.
- b) returnees (i.e. people permanently resettled in their areas of origin) were to receive family rations for eight months to enable them to undertake permanent shelter construction and land preparation; half-rations (1,300 kcal) for further 12 months would be provided if necessary, based on an assessment by VAM Unit.

From a global perspective the approach was generally followed, although the number of community assessments remained much below what could have been achieved if WFP was better prepared to carry out rapid assessments. Rampant insecurity has led to a much more limited resettlement program than anticipated. Beneficiary figures have changed, sometimes substantially, on monthly basis given new registrations, verification exercises. Pipeline problems have also lead to lower distribution rations on some occasions.

Recommendation:

- Rapid assessments are key to shifting program activities and reducing the beneficiaries lists, while increasing more targeted recovery activities. To the extent that human and financial resources are available, WFP should attempt to introduce the systematic use of quick assessments by using a VAM designed assessment tool for targeting at community level. This could be based on its vulnerability indicators and a range of household economy techniques, RRA techniques, as well as analysis of nutritional/epidemiological data available.

4.2.2. Emergency/Recovery Safety Net Programs

Support was provided to four categories of beneficiaries using malnutrition as criteria according to three modalities. These were:

- a) Severely malnourished individuals in therapeutic feeding and moderately malnourished individuals in supplementary feeding centres (under fives and pregnant/lactating women);
- b) families of children attending the feeding centres (half rations for three to four months),
- c) other children at risk of malnutrition through self-targeting communal kitchens

WFP has in general provided adequate support to these categories in quantitative and qualitative terms, although there was some discussion on the need and efficiency of the communal kitchens. Most importantly, WFP's implementing partners (such as MSF) have requested that when pipeline breaks occur priority be given to ensuring that all commodities are available for the nutritional programs. Any change in the beneficiary's diet at this critical stage will negatively impact nutritional recuperation and be a threat to her/his health.

Recommendation:

- When pipeline breaks are anticipated, WFP should build contingency stocks in order to cover the gaps and assure that timely and complete rations are given in priority to nutritional program beneficiaries (therapeutic and supplementary feeding) given the critical importance of rations to improve their health condition.

5.2.3 Recovery schemes

The PRRO's intervention approach aimed at reaching food insecure families in areas at high risk of malnutrition and help communities sustainable assets through food for work projects. Together with the NGOs which form the Targeting Working Group, WFP identified a set of work norms for each of the following activities to be realized under the FFW recovery schemes:

- Community reforestation;
- Construction/rehabilitation of access roads;
- Construction/cleaning/rehabilitation of irrigation canals;
- Excavation of wells;
- Construction of schools and health posts;
- Rehabilitation of village markets;
- Land clearing for cultivation;
- Seed multiplication

The mission found that different FFW activities were receiving different food rations. There is therefore a series of standard FFW rations and not a single one as mentioned in the PRRO. Because intense physical activity requires more energy than low physical activity, it is normal that FFW rations be differentiated by activity type. However two elements should be kept in mind: 1) that women, and especially the large numbers of women headed households who have a higher degree of vulnerability, are to be primary beneficiaries of FFW activities. As such priority non-labour intensive activities should be developed in recovery schemes; 2) that a standard ration of 2,100 kcal is supposed to cover normal activities, not heavy physical activities which require a higher caloric input. (It being

recognised that FFW rations are usually established according to local values of the food basket and commodities compared to work norms per activity and not based on caloric values).

A number of implementing partners mentioned difficulties in either acquiring or ensuring timely supply of Non-Food Items (NFIs), an indispensable element of success for recovery activities. This also highlights the limited capacity of IPs to undertake recovery activities.

The mission also found that each of the provinces visited had different operating constraints and different recovery opportunities. It is important that FFW schemes be translated into province specific guidelines. The scope for recovery remains limited and allows for new approaches and for pilot projects to be tested.

Recommendations:

- Recovery activities undertaken using FFW should be reflected in the adequate caloric content of the rations;
- More gender specific recovery activities using low intensity labour should be identified and implemented;
- WFP should ensure the provision of NFIs for recovery projects; or at least ensure that implementing partners are able to provide NFIs in a timely fashion;
- Feasibility and timely availability of NFIs should be a selection criteria for recovery projects identified;
- Province specific guidelines should be developed for recovery FFW activities

Under the FFW recovery component, if the stated aim is to build up self-reliance as mentioned in the PRRO, it is the opinion of the mission that the activities for which FFW should be used should reflect increased livelihood strategies. Almost three fourth of beneficiaries interviewed had been displaced more than once in the past decade. A majority of them were displaced in the last two years. The very limited numbers of returnees who are permanently resettled also draws attention to being more aware of the recurring displacement needs. In the current pattern of multiple or recurrent displacement, only relative security can be achieved.

Thus the objectives of the FFW activities should initially give priority to developing skills and coping mechanisms rather than focus on infrastructures, as an initial stage of the recovery process and while insecurity remains a work norm in Angola. Of the PRRO activities, only seed multiplication is a skill that can be taken by the population wherever they may newly be displaced to. All FFW projects should be identified not by well intended implementing partners based on their own ideas but on the systematic use of community participatory techniques to ensure ownership and empowerment of the communities in the recovery process as well as project effectiveness and success. In this way the objectives of the FFW projects will be determined by the community itself, whether it be skills development or infrastructure building.

5.2.4 Malnutrition

In order to obtain nutritional data WFP is dependent on the work of its IPs. The Government has a very weak health structure and its capacity to carry out nutritional surveys is extremely limited. Thus the main source of information on nutrition comes from the surveys where IPs are actively working. Hereunder the results of the recent nutritional information received from the different provinces and IPs:

In Benguela province, CRS conducted a nutritional survey indicating that global and severe malnutrition rates *have decreased since February 2001*.

In Bié province, the nutritional situation of Cuito has stabilized. Since MSF-B opened feeding centers in Camacupa the *admission rates of the therapeutic and supplementary feeding in Cuito have dropped*. However in Camacupa the average global malnutrition rate of IDPs remains high at 12.5% according to MSF-B nutritional survey.

In Huambo province, *increased admission rates were reported* at several feeding centers, many of which are new arrivals.

In Huila province, a Ministry of Health screening in Cacula, Hoque and Chipacalassa indicated *13% of the 285 children surveyed to be seriously malnourished*.

In Malanje province, a joint Ministry of Health, MSF-H, Concern and UNICEF nutritional survey conducted in Malanje and Lombe indicated a global malnutrition rate of 3.2 percent and a severe malnutrition rate of 0.5 percent, *showing an improvement since December 2000*. In Cangandala, an MSF-H survey indicated that the nutritional situation remained stable, with a global malnutrition rate of 3.5 percent and a severe malnutrition rate of 0.2 percent.

Overall the nutritional status of the population has been improving in most of the above-mentioned areas, with the exception of the new arrivals who had no previous access to food aid. However, close monitoring is required and food assistance should continue given the precarious nutritional situation and the constant influx of new arrivals. WFP has thus contributed to an improved nutritional status given that since all these places have been receiving WFP assistance.

Recommendation:

- Malnutrition is the result of a combination of factors and not the result of food intake only. While it is likely that WFP has contributed to improved nutritional status of the IDP population, malnutrition should certainly not be taken as a factor to appraise WFP's success in food assistance and should not be part of PRRO's objectives given the multiple causality factors which lead to malnutrition

5. IMPLEMENTATION AND MANAGEMENT OF THE PORTFOLIO

5.1. Appropriateness of food rations

From beneficiaries' perspective food rations are generally considered adequate and sufficient when the full basket is distributed. Some complaints were received regarding the type of beans, as some varieties take an extraordinary amount of time to cook and are thus need much more fuel wood. Wood is the main source of income for new IDPs in rural Angola and an increasingly rare and valuable commodity. As maize is the main staple in Angola, the monthly food basket provided by WFP is in general appropriate: 14 kg of maize corn, 1.5 kg of beans, 1.5 kg of blended food, 1 liter of oil, 400 grammes sugar and 150 grammes salt. FFW rations provide 50 kg of maize corn, 5 kg of beans, 4 liters of oil and 1 kg of salt and are generally judged appropriate by beneficiaries for work compensation. There are nevertheless regional diet variations and preferences. For instance cassava is preferred over maize in Uige and beneficiaries were found to trade the maize for cassava. WFP reacted to this finding and added cassava to the food basket in the North. Local purchases are also used appropriately to purchase cassava, local maize, fish, salt and sorghum. In general the mission found that WFP was responsive to nutritional indicators and took action when needed.

The mission did not observe in any local market visited large quantities of WFP commodities on sale, although the evaluation took place during the planting season, normally a lean period. This would indicate that food absorption capacity exists for the commodities distributed.

There have been pipeline breaks resulting in the need to cut back. All in all WFP staff dealt well with these challenges even if it meant taking hard decisions regarding beneficiaries and ration distributions.

Due to the outbreak of pellagra in 2000,⁹ WFP adapted the food basket for Cuito and provided CSB, sugar and even dried fish for a few months. However, there was a pipeline break in December 2000 resulting in a dropping of the energy value of the ration from 2000 kcal/pers/day from June 2000 to February 2001 to less than 1500 kcal/pers/day from March to May 2001. The office is now considering grinding and fortifying flour locally with the assistance of UNICEF. This would address the pellagra crisis but at significant additional cost for the milling, although it appears to be the most feasible short-term solution. In addition, medium term strategies should promote a greater diversification of food crops (e.g. groundnuts).

Recommendation:

- Strive to provide the entire ration for distribution at the same time. Fragmented distributions (certain commodities at one time, others at another time) do not have the same nutritional impact on beneficiaries as the whole ration.

5.2 Implementation Constraints: Security, Access, Protection

Access to populations in need of assistance increased markedly since early 2000, and the frequent shelling of besieged cities that characterised the war up to 1996 has practically disappeared. However the problem of access has not disappeared. The period since the resumption of large-scale military operations in October 1998 has been characterised by a de-localisation of violence.

This has meant that populations are less liable to be cut off from all access to resources, but also that sudden displacement is more probable, and with it the process of asset loss which characterises mobile guerrilla war. This will affect both the populations which continue to reside in risk areas (resettled or not), and those who are returning to the homelands. The risk areas are spreading, and with it the pervasive importance of a large and flexible relief operation. The recovery scenarios identified in the PRRO and the UN Consolidated Appeal have not been verified.

The tactical importance of the geographical situation of population groups, and of attracting media attention and resources, has increased in this context. This has become a war of means of access and of positions. The probability of elections in the future has heightened the importance of promoting a sense of confidence and safety, or on the contrary a sense of breakdown and pressure, and hence geographical spheres of influence by both sides with an emphasis on forced displacement.

Forced displacement would be the primary area in which WFP could become involved in some form of protection. This could be achieved by refusing to distribute food in cases where there is evidence of forced displacement. This has been a difficult position for WFP particularly if the local implementing partner is keen to distribute and requires a system-wide approach, led by the Humanitarian Coordinator.

Humanitarian operations are now limited to government controlled areas. These are essentially urban centers and district towns with limited security perimeters (please refer to the UN security map enclosed). In terms of geographical coverage, the UN is only able to be physically present in a very small percentage of the country.

The one sidedness has security implications both for WFP staff and partners as well as beneficiaries. Security remains one of the key assumptions of humanitarian operations. The MINOPS (Minimum Operating Standards) have been integrated into Government policy with the 18 October 2000 decree "Norms for the Resettlement of IDPS" and a regulatory framework is being developed for its application. The MINOPS if applied correctly can become an important tool for protecting the rights of the displaced population. It could also give WFP a needed continuity of policy between locations

⁹ a disease caused by niacin deficiency in the diet, typically found in maize eating countries.

and over time, and increase the ability to withstand pressures, which place beneficiaries and staff at unnecessary risk.


Recommendations:

- Provide staff with a policy framework on which to lean when they feel aid has to be denied in certain situations where it is detrimental to the populations
- Base this policy on a translation into WFP terms of the MINOPS for all categories of beneficiaries.

5.2.1 Management of Security for the UN personnel

Security is a key assumption of the implementation of the PRRO and all WFP activities. Practically all the assistance provided by WFP has to pass through terrain with high security and safety risk levels. This assumption of security is highly dependent on the will of the parties, and on the prudent application of guidelines on the part of UN staff. This section analyses how this has been secured. It does not represent an audit of the security function.

The map below, elaborated by OCHA, indicates in red the areas accessible to aid agencies. This surface has shrunk by 20% between February and September 2001:



Staff security systems have developed extensively over more than 20 years of operation in Angola, with the benefit of experience gained elsewhere. Focal points and responsibilities are clear, extending to the Provincial level, and reporting detailed and perceived as a priority by most concerned. Security levels (refined with the introduction of green, yellow and red areas to describe levels of risk beyond the general Level 4 classification) are well coordinated between the field and Luanda, with balanced input from New York. Security plans are updated.

There is however little continuity in the historical transmission and analysis of information in this field within WFP and between WFP and the UN system. The evaluation was not able to obtain records on security events before the date of April 2001. The limited training of personnel in assessing security means that WFP is dependent on the cooperation of external actors for the quality of its assessments. These are primarily the government security bodies, and secondarily other aid workers.

The definition of safe areas is based on the frequency of security incidents. This is not always shared by many NGOs, and is much smaller than the areas defined by the beneficiaries in their coping strategies. It also presents the disadvantage of being limited in time at a time when the tactics have changed. There has recently been a deliberate attack tactic using surprise and multiple targets, as well as a possible loss of structures of command. This raises questions concerning the very geographically defined security assessments in the UN.

Staff safety responsibilities, and the smooth working of the operations, could justify that the UN system seek some guarantees from the UNITA forces, possibly outside the country. No formal contacts exist at this stage, and the close imbrications of UN humanitarian operations and government logistics could present a threat to overall security in a pervasive guerrilla war. Such a guarantee would not breach UN sanctions, but might reduce security risks. It clearly relates to general UN policy issues, beyond the remit of WFP.

5.2.2. Opportunities for the protection of beneficiaries, avoidance of unintended effects

Protection work is not usually associated with WFP. Yet WFP work is highly relevant to fundamental human rights in the social and economic sphere. This is in line with the UN's integrated rights-based programming approach described in the 2001 Consolidated Appeal. Access to food is a basic human right, which has been constantly violated in Angola.

For this reason the organisation concerns itself with the provision of the assistance, as well as with the ways this assistance could prejudice the wellbeing of the population. It has also sought to develop ways in which it could be used to promote protection. This protection is qualitatively different from the work undertaken by ICRC, or the reporting, advocacy, registration and processing done by the relevant United Nations bodies. It carries some very concrete consequences for beneficiaries and staff in the field however, in the form of better control of detrimental practices, and the control of access.

The evaluation has found a pattern of such detrimental practices throughout the four Provinces visited. They do not necessarily point to systematic violations by local authorities, but would indicate a possibility for it. Two scenarios exist by which WFP assistance may have had a detrimental effect on the protection of the population:

- Placing people in insecure areas by allowing Implementing Partners to distribute in new resettlement areas, while beneficiaries believe that they are highly exposed to attack and theft.
- The possibility that nutritional rates may be manipulated by victimising particular groups and so attracting food aid in particular locations.

Fear and the affirmation of spheres of influence are significant elements of the military strategies in the country. Similarly the symbolic importance of groups of people moving into a sanctuary and requiring assistance is great. In both cases food aid and agricultural rehabilitation come into play. This would require more attention on the part of the largest food distributor in the country.

The humanitarian aid agencies have developed a useful tool for dialogue with the governmental authorities in the form of Norms for the Resettlement of Displaced Populations. This sets minimal conditions to be respected for aid to be provided, and is leading to a government Regulation with force of law.

High levels of assistance can be used to put pressure on parties in a war to follow certain moderation, and not to involve non-combatant groups in the conflict. This however requires a high level of organisational unity and a readiness to interrupt distribution. It is difficult for WFP to justify promoting human rights, other than economic and social rights achieved through its assistance (this could be more forcefully articulated). It can however avoid unintended impact on protection, particularly through stronger internal guidelines.

5.3 Implementing Partners

Implementing partners are the pillars of WFP operations in Angola. It is to a large extent IPs who carry out the programmatic decisions taken on the PRRO and who undertake food aid transport and distribution from the WFP warehouses up to distribution points. In addition IPs implement the nutritional components in feeding centers, communal kitchen or FFW activities. WFP needs quality IPs to reach its objectives.

WFP has undertaken projects with over 200 different IPs, national and international NGOs. Such a wide range of implementing partners inevitably leads to different results according to skills and experience of each implementing partner. In terms of GFD, there has been unequal result in food delivery, distribution and reporting. In general terms the IPs report focused on quantitative data, with no qualitative analysis. For example, when food leaves WFP's warehouses, it is considered to have been distributed (without any transport or distribution losses). In some cases participatory techniques were used to distribute in bulk to the traditional chiefs despite being in contradiction with WFP's direct distribution procedures, even if beneficiary interviews by the mission did confirm their agreement to have the Soba centralize the food allocation received. In general terms IPs were able to undertake GFD in an fairly acceptable manner, although much more could be done to improve accountability.

Recommendations:

- Distribution guidelines and procedures for GFD must ensure a common approach by all WFP implementing partners
- Reporting requirements should include qualitative information

The shift towards increased recovery activity requires a very different level of management expertise and technical skills than those used for GFD. Particularly, community mobilization and participatory approaches are a key factor of success. Few implementing partners possess these skills. This is a major factor limiting the amount of recovery activities undertaken with WFP FFW. Provision of Non Food Items (NFI) is a critical element and needs to be guaranteed.

In implementing the recovery strategy WFP should use the focal NGO (or Lead NGO) concept, by which one of the implementing partners becomes the central focal point for all activities undertaken in the district or the camp. While this does not mean that the partner will implement all activities across all sectors to cover needs, it does mean however that the focal point will ensure that an integrated approach is being used to complete needs which have been inadequately fulfilled. This requires advocacy and resource mobilization from the focal NGO among donors, UN agencies and other NGOs in order to work together in an integrated approach under a pro-active stance. To some extent this is already going on in some areas (e.g. GVC in Malanje). The focal or lead NGO concept should not lead to increased costs or bureaucratic procedures. It is essentially building upon the NGOs skills and capacities to take full advantage of opportunities. In essence it is similar to what UNHCR or the IFRC have been using under the "Lead NGO" label in large-scale operations worldwide. This will greatly facilitate management, monitoring and supervision by WFP of the very high number of small projects being implemented by over two hundred NGOs countrywide. The idea is to streamline responsibilities and place greater accountability upon implementing partners, allowing more time and efforts for WFP staff to be dedicated to strategic planning and formulation of partnership agreements, implementing and reporting guidelines, monitoring and evaluation.

Recommendations:

- FFW training workshops should be held for all WFP staff and WFP's recovery implementing partners in the provinces, and should also include Government counterparts (MINARS).
- Criteria for selecting implementing partners should be established for recovery activities (e.g. level of participatory skills, ability to complement activities with the provision of NFIs and/or additional funding from donors).
- WFP should use the Lead (or Focal) NGO concept in order to reduce the enormous number of activities that need to be monitored by WFP. The objective is to have a qualified implementing partner acting as area coordinator for the sum of the identified needs. This approach has been successfully used by the UNHCR and the IFRC in other operations.

5.4 Monitoring and Reporting

In the absence of a logical framework analysis the current monitoring system functions in a vacuum. Monitoring activities focus on input and output monitoring. Little monitoring is undertaken beyond food distribution monitoring. Planned training on gender sensitive monitoring has not yet materialized and most food aid monitors lack the skills to undertake qualitative post distribution monitoring. Malnutrition surveys are undertaken by specialized NGOs such as MSF in some areas but this is not done systematically. Where done, the malnutrition surveys have proven to be instrumental for adjusting food aid and rations and for pointing out critical severe malnutrition occurrences. Apart from this the current monitoring and evaluation system does not live up to what was proposed in the project document. Although an M&E officer has been recruited the person has had little time to dedicate to overhauling the original M&E system as she had to cover the vacant reporting officer position.

WFP progress reports are mostly quantitative in nature and provide little information on qualitative achievements. Reporting from implementing partners is weak – both in quantitative as well as in qualitative terms. A number of the reports reviewed by the mission revealed deficient reporting and lack quality control and follow-up action by WFP sub-office staff. This may partially be the result of a proliferation of implementing partners (currently over 200) and the fact that current monitoring staff is stretched thinly.

There is scope to involve the expertise by VAM to develop more results-oriented monitoring systems. For instance, there is now a VAM monitor in most sub-offices and VAM has developed a province-level monitoring system of assumptions. The assumption monitoring system has proven to be a useful management tool for sub-office and head office alike.

Recommendations:

- M&E systems must be based on a logical framework planning process which identifies assumptions, criteria and performance indicators and allow for pro-active monitoring and evaluation activities to be developed as a result of the planning process;
- More systematic qualitative monitoring from the FAM, especially community-level post-distribution monitoring, is required

5.5 Coverage, Assessments and Targeting

5.5.1 Coverage

The mission found that WFP's strong efforts and motivation in supplying food aid to the needy resulted in achieving an overall good coverage of accessible areas throughout the country (e.g. latest figures 794,140 beneficiaries in the September 2001 distribution plan). However, WFP is working to

full capacity and has little room to stretch its coverage further unless additional resources are made available.

5.5.2 Appraisal of Target Group Differentiation and Selection

Due to the intermingling of causes and multiple dates of displacement, as well as to the breakdown of family support structures, the destruction of economic livelihoods, to generalised rent seeking, urban migration, the identification of the different levels of vulnerability of the population is highly problematic. Very different and isolated groups are equally entitled to aid, and relatively arbitrary exclusions have to be made by large relief organisations, in view of the finite aid resources.

Based on the PRRO scenario, WFP has developed a typology combining types of programmes (for example the “safety nets”), a chronology of displacement (those displaced after October 2000, or since the last planting season), and nutritional status. These categories are not easily recognisable by beneficiaries, who tend to exaggerate their entitlement to aid and adapt the categories to their own context. For example some families are believed to single out a child for malnourishment, so as to qualify for aid. In many of the notions of “safety net” and social programmes reflect a WFP heritage of assistance to certain groups rather than an analysis of food insecurity, and add another level of uncertainty about target selection.

The difficulty of focusing instead on food insecurity as the main determinant of food aid comes from the fact that it can only be understood as a web of problems faced by each household. Categories for targeting would for example be based on the quality of agricultural fields, or the ability of the father and mother to assume family roles, on opportunities for paid work, and morbidity/malnutrition. WFP has not been equipped to assess groups along these criteria, and is forced to compromise by creating more arbitrary and abstract target groups.

WFP has been balancing the constraints of refined selection (micro-level analysis requiring a clear identification of the households and institutions) with the risks of distributing food aid too broadly to populations who should be reaching self-sufficiency. This has led to considerable local variations in the criteria for registration, and to a considerable difficulty in eliminating fraud.

5.5.3 Targeting, selection and verification

Refined targeting was the central element of the PRRO strategy. The two identified beneficiary categories were: post-October 2000 IDPs (newly arrived IDPs), and returnees (permanently resettled). The chronological criteria, that was supposed to reflect vulnerability rather than being directly based on vulnerability or nutritional factors, provided an otherwise very difficult cut-off point for the first category, but the mission feels it is not adequately targeting the social field-based needs of the population. Rather than an opposition between displaced and residents, WFP would find it operationally more manageable to use VAM based indicators of vulnerability, identified through a quick assessment capacity.

Improved targeting is consequently necessary to increase WFP's performance, although the PRRO document declared that "Refined targeting will be the stepping stone of the PRRO". Verification of the identity of the beneficiaries by the evaluators often reveal much broader groups than the ones officially mentioned. This is not due to error, but the result of the difficulty mentioned above of reconciling internal and PRRO categories, but also local social field based categories.

Targeting also stumbles on the intrusion of contextual factors in programming. In many cases the pressure of media coverage, the loyalty of implementing partners to particular groups, or simply security concerns, prevail in targeting decisions. The WFP operation takes place in an environment of scarcity and multiple power systems, and is highly exposed to pressures. Furthermore the prevalence

of vulnerability in the general population, hard to target in a continuous way, is another complicating factor.

WFP has not developed guidelines for targeting other than the ones enumerated in the PRRO, and which are only loosely adhered to. Targeting should normally be underpinned by firm standards, such as non-distribution in cases where proper monitoring cannot be carried out. This absence exposes staff to pressure as decisions can easily be traced to a particular individual. It poses risks in terms of security, morale, and the uniformity of the WFP targeting.

Recommendations:

- Targeting should be done on the basis of vulnerability to food insecurity as determined by VAM indicators.
- VAM should provide an assessment tool for targeting at community level on the basis of its vulnerability indicators.
- Rapid assessment tools should then be applied by mobile teams working for programme monitoring. This requires a shift in the allocation of human resources, emphasising training and re-tasking of FAM.

A registration witnessed by the mission revealed insufficient control and screening of beneficiaries. Virtually anyone could have been registered. There was no WFP staff present at registration. Only two questions were asked in addition to the name of the person entering the room (date of arrival and breakdown of family members). One reason could be the lack of incentive from the implementing partners (MINARS, NGOs, Sobas) to lower the number of food aid recipients.

Tracking and verifying beneficiary numbers is a very difficult and complex exercise.

The population is also mobile and may actually move from camp to camp to be registered. Several attempts have met with limited success (e.g. re-verification in June 2001 in Cuito were team failed to map the hut locations and re-registered IDPs did not receive new ration cards). More can be done to improve verification.

Recommendation:

- WFP together with its implementing partners should determine a standard verification mechanism and envisage training a mobile verification team (comprising local WFP staff and that of implementing partners and Government counterparts) to systematically check beneficiaries numbers where necessary

Selection of target groups is the weaker elements of the WFP's ability to reach the population. This section concentrates on this selection process, defined as the identification of priority target populations for WFP assistance.

Selection is akin to a sedimentation process, with an overlay of different approaches. The VAM was introduced after the PRRO, and has not played a role in the selection of beneficiaries in the overall document. Yet it plays a fundamental role in the PRRO strategy, given that it is the reference for undertaking post-harvest assessments (including at household level) which are to be used to determine whether food assistance will continue to be necessary and if so, the type of rations to be delivered.

The evaluation found a considerable discrepancy between the categories of beneficiaries stated in the PRRO and the actual population. In many cases the beneficiaries of Food for Work Programmes were not the recently displaced seeking to be reintegrated into a new environment or newly resettled, but rather old IDPs, now considered as resident population. Similarly the safety nets provided support to educational institutions. In some cases the identification of vulnerable persons was a strategy of

selecting one person in every family to ensure sufficient rations in the medium term in case of pipeline breaks.

The result in terms of selection of beneficiaries reflects the uneasy link between results suggested by the Sub-Office assessments and the categories drawn up in the PRRO. The PRRO suggests a distinction between beneficiaries based on the chronology of displacement which is thought to reflect vulnerability, and adds particular groups which are generally seen as vulnerable. This bears a troubled relationship with the categories as they are understood in the Municipalities, and by extension, the implementing partners. This inapplicability of the categories imported from complex targeting efforts (the consultancy study of mid-2000 names no fewer than 26 recommendations in this field) results in contrived justifications of the actual targeting on the ground.

5.5.4 Assessments

Two types of assessments are made. The first is a comprehensive, quarterly vulnerability assessment by the VAM unit which reflects the multi-sectoral nature of vulnerability and provides updated information province by province on population movements, agricultural status and crops, markets, nutrition and health, sanitation, as well as the coping strategies developed by the population. The information is produced as a bulletin and is widely disseminated and appreciated by implementing partners, government and donors alike. It is felt to be providing a good consolidated vision of the overall vulnerability situation. VAM assessments are also used to adjust operations (food rations and/or number of beneficiaries). These assessments are very useful for understanding the situation and for planning of activities and should be continued and expanded as much as possible. Provincial VA groups include interventions to be implemented by partners with complementary or supplementary resources to those provided by WFP with food aid. As a result WFP has achieved a coordination role by framing the definition of beneficiaries. This should be further exploited by WFP, in particular by linking synergies into the integrated approach strategy using Lead NGOs.

At the community level, partners have undertaken a few household assessments. Neither WFP nor VAM do currently possess the resources to undertake household assessments or community assessments. As such, joint assessments (from sectoral working groups) comprising WFP staff and implementing partners and government are not part of a defined framework but could certainly be developed. The FAM (Food Aid Monitors) also monitor food aid, but there are no specific assessment guidelines. Capacity building by training in PRA and RRA techniques is necessary both for WFP staff, especially FAM, and IPs and Government (MINARS).

Various IPs such as FAO and SCF have expressed their interest in contributing to strengthening the VAM function, possibly by providing technical staff to reinforce the unit. This would certainly allow for WFP to work on vulnerability in an integrated fashion and would open the door to a system-wide vulnerability assessment, which can be the reference model for Angola. At the same time a stronger VAM should take the opportunity to define tools for community and household assessment with its relevant guidelines (both for rapid community assessment and for household food economy surveys) to be used for province specific program adjustments.

Recommendations:

- VAM to develop a standard tool for rapid assessment at community level and another tool for household assessment to be used by WFP and implementing partners and allow for province specific program adjustments;
- Strengthen and open VAM to integration by IPs in order to produce a referral model;
- Ensure systematic use of the rapid assessment tools and wherever necessary of the household assessment tools and supply adequate guidelines and training for their use.

The two main internal assessment tools which WFP has developed at the Sub-Office level are the Vulnerability Assessment Mapping method and the Food Monitor reports (personnel carrying it out

being called VAM and FAM staff respectively). Delivery reports and project reports complete the formats available for specific reporting on results. This primary programme type of reporting is completed by the Security Assessments, in which WFP Base Managers play the role of Area Coordinators, and the weekly Situation Reports. Quarterly analysis matches the planned deliveries against those actually done and identifies monitoring priorities for the discrepancies (making it more a food monitor tool than vulnerability assessment).

WFP also uses external reporting for the technically more specialised assessments. In the first place come nutritional (to a lesser extent epidemiological) surveys, produced by specialised NGOs, such as Médecins Sans Frontières, and the household food economy surveys produced by Save the Children. Advice is also received on a routine if informal basis from partners in the field, as well as from personnel based in Rome. Donors perform occasional field missions, but these are mostly very limited in scope.

The sources of information available to WFP are varied. There is a combination of direct observation, interviews with implementing partners, and internal reporting. WFP does not make frequent recourse to historical records. In cases where staff cannot access primary information, which is frequent because of limited capacities and considerable reporting workloads, it is highly dependent on its partners.

5.6 Coordination

5.6.1 With Government

Government has recently become a more active financial partner in the humanitarian response. The PNEAH (National Emergency Plan) spent over US\$55.5 million over the past two years, and additional US\$11.5 million was reported to have been released to flood victims. Regarding WFP operations the Government in 2001 has provided US\$3 million for the purchase of local food commodities (October 2001). In addition the tax exemptions (parking/landing fees for air operations) and fuel subsidies are estimated to amount to some US\$40 million savings to WFP. This is an unprecedented and much encouraged change of attitude. Greater commitment from the Government to meeting the needs of its people is still necessary, as highlighted in the February 2001 International Monetary Fund report on Angola, in particular as regards the insufficient spending allocation on social sectors. PNEAH should be tied to the CAP to ensure smooth coordination and streamlining and avoid risk of duplication.

MINARS (Ministry of Social Assistance and Reintegration, WFP's counterpart) staff have indicated substantial improvements in the relation with WFP. WFP is reported to act now much more in terms of partnership, and joint missions and field visits are undertaken as often as possible. Security and access limitation of WFP's operation are not always well accepted by MINARS who would like to see more food aid in remote areas where IDP population is resettled (e.g. Cuvalai, Camacupa).

At province level the budget of PNEAH is not controlled by MINARS but by the Planning Ministry and the Governor. MINARS has therefore no direct access to the financial resources under PNEAH to implement its programs.

Recommendations:

- Government should be encouraged to continue and increase its participation in humanitarian assistance, while simultaneously increasing its commitment to the social sectors. This requires an increase both of funding and of human resources within a capacity building approach;
- Norms for Resettlement of Displaced Population should apply to both temporary and permanent resettlement; strict adherence to these norms should be a requisite for WFP's involvement

5.6.2 Inter-agency coordination and integration

A number of technical working sub-groups have been created over the past two years. These meet regularly and seem to operate efficiently. This allows for Government Ministries, WFP, UN agencies and NGOs to discuss together technical issues and adopt adequate measures. Mechanisms now exist to ensure good coordination among the humanitarian community both at central and province levels.

In terms of integration, WFP has essentially been working on the food assistance programs with little capacity to build its operations as part of an integrated comprehensive approach towards fulfilling humanitarian needs. There is substantial room for improved integration with other donors and partners which have complementary activities to those undertaken by WFP.

Recommendations:

- Develop strategic integration partnerships with FAO, EURONAIID, EU (PAR, PARPA and PMR) for those activities which are in areas of joint operations, building upon the Lead NGO concept;
- Wherever possible look for possible synergies with implementing partners to ensure the complete range of humanitarian needs is being addressed

5.7 Management

The mission noticed that WFP has not been able to develop its assessment and operational capacity in recovery. As a result WFP's attention is essentially devoted to getting food out to the districts for distribution. This is especially critical for the recovery approach that requires more technical skills, planning, M&E, supervision and training than regular GFD. The high staff turnover emphasizes the emergency driven nature of operations. International staff tends to stay less than two years and there is no formal hand-over process and learning transmission process. Only a small number of Luanda-based program officers are nationals. Opportunities for learning are left to informal contacts between sub-offices. More exchange of approaches and techniques between sub-offices and head office could lead to significant improvements and reduce the feeling of some sub-office staff that they are left on their own when dealing with day-to-day implementation issues. An excellent initiative was a March 2000 PRRO workshop that was held centrally as well as in the provinces.

A decentralisation process is on-going, given a restructuring of the CO (as a result of a retreat in February 2001), and reportedly some progress has been made. As each province has a specific reality owing to different constraints and conditions decision-making should also be decentralised to the province level as much as possible.

WFP (and UNICEF) staff in the provinces were not aware of the MOU signed with UNICEF on the areas of collaboration regarding nutrition.

Recommendations:

- To the extent possible, WFP international staff should be contracted for the length of the PRRO to ensure ownership, empowerment and motivation of the PRRO objectives.
- The CO should seek to recruit a larger cadre of qualified national staff so as to reduce the high staff turnover and ensure more continuity of staff and expertise
- Continue the decentralisation process initiated by programs and extend it to procurement, logistics, finance and HR.
- In addition to the overall PRRO strategy, develop province-specific strategies and implementation guidelines allowing for improved integration and coordination of the humanitarian response with Government and implementing partners
- Improved information flow from Luanda to the field offices is necessary (e.g. MOUs signed at central level but unknown in the field).

5.8 Efficiency of Pipeline Management and Logistics Arrangements

Security is the critical factor conditioning all humanitarian operations in Angola. This limits the use of road transportation (40% despite security risks) and directly results in the necessarily high costs of the logistical operations by having to use air transportation for a very large portion of the programme (60%). Long haul road transport is very seldom utilized due to security constraints. In the last 3 months convoys from Lobito and Lubango to Huambo transported a total of almost 2,000 tons. Although the cost per ton can be considered high, it is at least 25% less than the cost by B-727 and 50% less than by Hercules L-100.

The mission feels that transformation from inputs to outputs is done adequately, although further cost reductions should be possible, especially in logistics. For example the B-727 is less expensive to operate and has a greater payload than the Hercules L-100, at the Hercules' currently mandated flying altitude, but is less sturdy. The lack of maintenance of the Cuito airstrip has led to interruption of the B-727 flights and has led to the use of the more expensive Hercules L-100. This situation highlights the need for strong advocacy of the entire international community on the Government to ensure adequate maintenance of essential airstrips for humanitarian operations is provided. Hiring experienced local staff in key logistical posts has in some cases (e.g. in Huila) proven to result in more cost-efficient operations, given the person's specific knowledge of the transport market conditions which led to a review of contracts with the railways company and truck owners.

Differentiated responses were given across the provinces when pipeline breaks occurred in order to minimise the difficulties encountered in an attempt to mitigate the effects of the breaks. For example In Cuito a minimum provision of food assistance was guaranteed by registering a minimum of one vulnerable person per family even if the person did not meet the established vulnerability criteria (over 55, 0-5 years old, pregnant and lactating women, disabled). This however most likely has led to a multiplication of single member family cardholder and a blurring of the vulnerability category.

Due to insecurity more cost-efficient means of delivering food aid - by surface transport - is often not possible in Angola. However, given that the main priority is to ensure timely and adequate delivery of food aid the current logistics operation may not always maximise the amount of food aid delivered for a set cost¹⁰. ITSH contracts also carry a provision to fund implementing partners' project related expenses beyond the transport, shipping and handling component, but it is not matched by a policy to determine the actual objective of this support. This leads to very different ITSH values to be applied among partners.

The Passenger Air Transport Service and the Non Food Item Air Transport Service are meant to serve all the humanitarian community. Without these services the movements in country of staff and goods would be severely hampered. These are essential and there appears to be no substitute for them in the near future.


WFP logistics operations are showing an adequate set up to respond to the actual needs of the PRRO. Port operations have been improved in all 3 ports. The level of losses and damaged cargo is extremely low. Payment of demurrage for vessels and containers is practically inexistent. The average waiting time for vessels to berth or start working is less than 1 day.


The logistical structure of the operation is highly dependent on air transport (60%), as roads are still considered unsafe. This has led to a self-running airlift, quite distinct from commercial flows. The map below highlights the national reach of WFP's operation, as well as grey areas which WFP does not reach.

¹⁰ in particular when air transport has to be used instead of land transportation, and when lack of airstrip maintenance (e.g. Cuito) leads to operating more costly planes

LOGISTICAL SITUATION AS OF SEPTEMBER 2001

WFP Warehouses capacity





NOTE: The boundaries and names shown on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

Warehousing and storage facilities

Warehouse facilities in main transit points are adequate and well managed (Lobito and Lubango) except in Luanda where the facilities need improvements. In the provinces visited the facilities seem adequate to local needs but the management needs to be improved and concrete recommendations have been formulated to this effect.

Excess of stocks of CSB and vegetable oil in Lubango should be addressed immediately to avoid future problems.

Reporting systems

COMPASS is a system, which, if fully functional, can become an important management tool. The system to date is only registering data on commodity movements within WFP direct control. The last control is the delivery of goods from WFP field warehouses to implementing partners. Without information on what happens in the last chain of distribution it is not possible to have a full report on the country post-CIF losses. This part of the system (Implementing Partner Screen) needs to be activated urgently.

The system does not cover all bases, the expansion is planned but it has to be implemented quicker. The system by itself is not sufficient, since an essential aspect is the degree of preparation of the staff that operates it. Despite the initial training, almost all staff need additional training (mainly ACCESS).

Neither Luanda nor field offices take advantage of COMPASS. A change in attitude has to be introduced but it will be the accuracy and update of the information that will best convince the potential users. It is equally important to introduce of a more user-friendly type of reporting system. The user should access the information directly, on-line and in a simple manner.

Recommendations:

- Develop a policy for support to implementing partners based on clear objectives and review existing ITSH contracts accordingly
- Advocacy of the entire humanitarian community is necessary to ensure road rehabilitation and airstrip maintenance is guaranteed, both of which are critical to humanitarian operations.
- Take full advantage of COMPASS for improved logistics reporting and management.

5.9 Leakages

Control over WFP food is good up to WFP field warehouses. Reporting from implementing partners is insufficiently qualitative and all commodities which leave WFP warehouse (the last place of control by WFP) is generally considered to have been distributed to beneficiaries. Therefore there is little indication as to leakages at distribution or during transportation to distribution points.

Regarding the high costs of the transport operations, the security component, e.g. paying to ensure the convoys are adequately protected, is included in the costs. Therefore delivery of food commodities upon arrival must match waybill quantities. Any lost, damaged or missing commodity is reconditioned (bags), reported and the real loss is paid by the transporter.

6. RESOURCING

6.1 Budgets and financial resources¹¹

PRRO is not necessarily an effective funding window in the context of Angola, where the feasibility of undertaking recovery activities is subject to a wide range of perceptions among the donor

¹¹ obtained from WFP resource mobilization service, 24 September 2001 resourcing update

community. Therefore it is essentially effective for donors who are financing recovery as part of their budget. It is not possible to extrapolate whether donor response would have been substantially different under an EMOP. In addition to personal interviews the mission also used a written questionnaire in meetings with donors¹². One question was the breakdown of funding according to the three categories : emergency, recovery and development. Out of the only four donors which filled the questionnaire, results regarding the breakdown in percentage of their 2001 budget are as follows :

Donor	Emergency	Recovery	Development
US	57%	33%	10%
France	40%	3%	57%
Sweden	90%	10%	0%
Spain	12%	0%	88%

This shows the difficulty of selling the PRRO strategy to all of the donor community, since not all donors are concerned about recovery in Angola. Seasonality of donor's contribution appears also to be an important factor affecting WFP funding.

The intended shift towards recovery activities has not yet been matched by an increase in human resources with the adequate background to ensure successful preparation and implementation of the PRRO, as foreseen in the "Guidelines for Preparation of a PRRO". However, recovery activities are technically more difficult and time-consuming than GFD and require more management and supervision per ton distributed.

Recommendation:

- WFP should organize a workshop with donors and Government for the preparation of the next PRRO to discuss the next phase based on a consolidated estimate of provincial field needs. This would allow to have a clearer perception of PRRO's funding capacity in the Angolan context and also allow for consensus building among the donor community on the need for a PRRO recovery strategy by actively advocating its advantages and value added to the operation (flexibility and forward and backward linkages between emergency and recovery)

The previous PRRO 6159.00 and its budget increased covered the period from 01/01/2000 until 31/3/2001 at a cost of US\$203 million for an anticipated 1.127 million beneficiaries. Funding was obtained for almost 70% of the total requirements. The major donors in terms of percentage of their PRRO contribution versus the total requirements were the following (ranked by order of importance):

¹² the questionnaire form and the four forms returned are attached as annex.

Donor/country	US\$ amount	% of total
USA	83,649,449	41.15
EU - DGD	22,488,983	11.06
Japan	7,646,154	3.76
Germany	4,451,596	2.19
Netherlands	2,991,861	1.47
Canada	2,796,641	1.38
France	2,696,197	1.33
Belgium	2,153,713	1.06
Italy	1,914,828	0.94
Denmark	1,573,583	0.77
Portugal	1,500,000	0.74
Switzerland	1,245,514	0.61
ECHO	1,192,660	0.59
Norway	967,233	0.48
Spain	629,331	0.31
Ireland	506,991	0.25
Finland	310,607	0.15
Australia	289,017	0.14
Sweden	214,082	0.11
Private donations	6,497	0.003
WFP special event	5,689	0.003
Multilateral	2,426,796	1.19
Total received	141,657,423	69.69

The shortfall was 30.31% of the total requirements.

In the current PRRO total requirements amount to US 167,671,644 for an estimated 1,040,040 beneficiaries for the period 1 April 2001 until 30 June 2002.

Resourcing to date remains at critical levels, although the PRRO time frame does not correspond to some donors funding cycle nor does it correspond to the CAP period. As a result there are still a large number of contributions outstanding.

As of 24 September 2001 the resourcing of PRRO 6159.01 amounted to a total of US\$ 52,781,742 or 31.48% of the total requirements, giving rise to critically low commitment levels. The breakdown of the pledges received were as follows :

Donor/country	US\$ amount	% of total
USA	36,597,287	21.83
France	3,041,404	1.81
Angola	2,999,695	1.79
Netherlands	2,526,776	1.51
Italy	2,002,591	1.19
Denmark	1,264,369	0.75
Germany	1,130,178	0.67
US Friends of WFP	1,007,935	0.60
Norway	877,193	0.52
Sweden (inc. multilateral)	647,304	0.39
Finland	462,478	0.28
Ireland	224,532	0.13
Total received	52,781,742	31.47

In terms of tonnage, only 34,03% of the requirements have been received. Additional food is urgently needed in order to avoid a breakdown in the nutritional situation countrywide. Severe problems are anticipated given the low level of response to the current PRRO and the continuing influx of newly arrived IDPs in various provinces which have recently been swelling the number of beneficiaries in need of food assistance.

6.2 Predictability and Regularity of Resources and Impact on the PRRO

WFP staff has tried as much as possible to minimize the impact of pipeline breaks and stock depletion with local variations per province (such as distribution of rations for at least one person per household in Cuito). At times food has been swapped (e.g. with EURONAIID) to avoid pipeline breaks.

Of special importance is the period considered by the PRRO. The current PRRO has a duration of fifteen months – three more than allowed under an EMOP. The mission judges this period to be too short as the lead time for presenting the next phase is almost nine months. This means that after only nine months of implementation of the current phase the CO has to return to the drawing board to prepare the next phase. It is also important for the time span of the PRRO to match it as closely as possible to the CAP cycle and the planned harmonisation of activities and programmes of UN agencies, beginning in 2004. Donor funding cycles, while disparate, are also important resourcing planning criteria.

Recommendation:

- The next PRRO should cover a 30 months time-frame from 1 July 2002 until 31 December 2004.

It has not been possible to assess whether the period covered by the current PRRO (1 April 2001 to 30 June 2002) is linked with the currently low amount of resourcing because:

- a) funding decisions are not necessarily taken by the donor office in Angola, but by their respective headquarters (this is especially the case of the smaller donor countries); in order to determine the causal relation with the PRRO a separate mission should be assigned to complete the February 2001 consultancy report commissioned by the Resources and External Relations Division (PRRO review) and determine what percentage (if any) of resources stem from the donor's in-country offices.
- b) none of the donors contacted used a funding cycle matching the PRRO period; it should also be useful to WFP to consider in its own planning cycle the cycle of its major donors, to ensure pipeline supply and availability of food commodities.

6.3 Donor perception of the PRRO and advocacy with donors and partners

It should be clear that this section relates to the *in-country perception* of the PRRO amongst donors and partners, since donor headquarters do not necessarily share the views of their Angola office. The TOR of the mission did not request consultations to be held at donors headquarter level, although a meeting was held in Washington D.C. between USAID and the senior evaluation officer of OEDE and mission member.

Information was collected through two main sources: a donor questionnaire¹³ only filled by a minority of donors but which served as guideline for consultation and discussions held with donor and/or government representatives.

¹³ included in the annex

In general terms, donor perception of the WFP operations in Angola and of the CD ranged from good to excellent. Overall donors recognized the tremendous effort WFP has put forward in order to ensure food aid across the country despite the tremendous constraints, both in terms of security and its spill-over effects on the logistics operation. There is no doubt that as far as getting food out to the districts, WFP is doing well. The air transport operation and air service operations were highly commended and are seen as the backbone of the humanitarian effort in Angola on which the international community was able to build its program. Without the Special Operations of air transportation for non food items and passenger service, the humanitarian response capacity would be severely amputated and the impact of humanitarian assistance be lessened. Thus air operations are critical to the success of the overall humanitarian response in Angola and are widely used by donors, UN agencies and NGOs. Air operations were also mentioned as having a psychological impact regarding security in the remote areas where flights are being operated. Some questions were raised regarding the limited use of road transportation as opposed to air cargo given the high costs of the latter. However the security constraints still are the single major factor conditioning the transport means utilized.

In terms of the PRRO, it should be pointed out that only some donors were aware of the PRRO contents (USA, EU, ECHO and Nordic countries), while some of the smaller donors were generally satisfied with the WFP program but without giving too much consideration on the program label used, meaning that the advantages and value-added of a PRRO were perhaps not known. It is important to note there is no general consensus among the donors in Angola regarding the feasibility of recovery and/or development activities.

In terms of advocacy almost all donors are quite willing to actively support WFP and be WFP's advocate vis-à-vis government. There was also a consensus on the need to place greater responsibility in the hands of government to fulfill its commitments towards its own people. In many cases WFP is seen to be stepping in where the main responsibility rests on government. However, the option of WFP not continuing to provide food aid at the current levels is likely to have dramatic consequences on the beneficiary population, given that :

- a) military operations cause a continuous influx of new IDPs into Government areas;
- b) food needs are real and food security not guaranteed throughout the country given security constraints;
- c) Government capacity to cover humanitarian needs remains extremely weak as the bulk of government spending is on defense and not on social or humanitarian needs.

While the security situation is deadlocked in guerrilla warfare type of activities from the UNITA side and that humanitarian activities are circumscribed in government held areas only, there is little room for phasing down of food assistance. But there is plenty of room for government to be more actively involved (both in terms of financial resources and at operational level) in fulfilling the humanitarian and social needs and for more active lobbying from the international community.

7. MEETING WFP'S COMMITMENTS TO WOMEN

7.1 In Design and Implementation

Women are the most deprived group in Angola as reflected by the low Gender Development Index and high maternal mortality rates (1.8%). The average female IDP met by the mission was the head of the household (in over 50% of the women interviewed). She was responsible for the family's food intake, most crop production activities, for collecting water and fire wood, walking to far away markets to sell produce and was unable to read or write. As fire wood collection is the main source of additional income apart from needing wood for cooking, women depend on venturing out significant distances into insecure areas and thus expose themselves to the risks of land mines, abduction and violence.

The PRRO design document while generally gender neutral in tone shows a commitment to tackling gender issues: *WFP's Commitments to Women will be an integral part of the implementation strategy*

of the PRRO. Women will continue to be actively involved in all aspects of the operation and will benefit from the assets created through food for work. As much as possible, food will be distributed directly to women, and they will be increasingly involved in the management and food distribution teams. They will participate equally in the decision-making process. Income-generating activities will be supported where possible to empower women and improve their economic situation.

In practice, complying with WFP's Commitments to Women has not yet achieved its fullest potential and the low ratings awarded in the annex reflect the urgent need to tackle gender concerns for all types of activities and at all levels of programming.

The 2000 Gender Survey (GS 2000) submitted by the Country Office, indicates that less than 50% of GDF food is given directly to women. The food distributions observed by the mission did hand out food to mostly women (about 70%). This was not because IP's were familiar with WFP's Commitments to Women, but rather a reflection of the fact that a high number of the households are female-headed and of the division of labor between men and women. Management and food distribution teams are typically composed of IP staff and Government and do not include IDPs other than the head of the community, the Soba, who is typically male. The new registration system now provides cards naming the woman as the head of household and gives a gender breakdown for the family but this does not yet make a difference at distribution sites where any member of the family may pick of the rations. In some cases it was also found that the Soba kept the cards of his community. Nevertheless this new system if implemented well may provide some help to women whose husbands have several families:

Angelina is 33 year old and, since late 1998, has lived in a straw hut in the Chissindo (Kuito) IDP camp with her 4-year old son. Her husband abandoned her to live with his other wife. The husband was given a card when living with his first wife, but took it with him when he left. Angelina usually gets food from relatives and was cooking cassava leaves as the only meal for the family when she was interviewed. Her son who appears stunted receives food from neighbours and is taken care of by neighbours when Angelina goes out to collect firewood; she can make as much as 40 kwanzas per day (\$1.75) out of this activity. Three years ago when she arrived at the camp, wood could be found closer – at 10 kms. She now needs to walk 20 kms to get firewood. She does not receive any food aid.

Security risks for women and men collecting food exist in those cases where distribution sites are not in the camp. In one off-camp distribution observed by the evaluation mission (Mukua, Huila province, Cuvalai resettled IDPs) the risks were minimized by the community appearing and leaving collectively.

The new registration procedures provide gender-disaggregated data and micro project application formats as well as implementing partner reporting formats require gender specific information. However, this data is not reported centrally at Luanda level and is not integrated into the existing databases. In addition, reporting by IPs has been less than ideal with IPs often omitting to provide a gender breakdown of beneficiaries or failing to update initial figures. IPs interviewed by the mission have stated they do not know why WFP is asking for gender breakdowns and what the use and purpose of the data is. The question on WFP's policy on gender or the term "Commitments to Women" mostly drew blanks. Monitoring is done for quantitative purposes and seems limited to food distribution and FFW outputs only. There is no apparent and systematic qualitative post distribution monitoring or follow-up done by food aid monitors or IP staff.

None of the education-related activities (QAP 6020) or the school feeding activities undertaken by the PRRO seek to increase the number of girl students. According to school teachers interviewed, the proportion of girls and boys seems to be more or less equal up to grade 4. Girls tend to increasingly drop out once they reach the age of 14 and get married.

In the absence of systematic gender-disaggregated data collection at Luanda level it is difficult to assess the proportion of women involved in FFW activities although by all appearances the figure should reach at least 25 percent. Women are involved in all types of activities: as cooks in community kitchens, therapeutic and supplementary kitchens; as assistant teachers and cooks in preschool programmes (PICs); as brick makers in construction activities; etc. It is important to note that resettled IDP families – whether male or female-headed – all receive the same amount of land for agricultural activity under *usus-fructus* entitlements. In Lubango province women were stating that the hard work of preparing the land was done by the men and that women who had received land would need to pay men to prepare their lands. This issue may need to be looked into when preparing recovery activities. FFW activities seem to follow a traditional mode, with an emphasis on employment schemes and construction activities. Few food-for-training activities have been initiated and seem to be outside the scope of the standard FFW package. More emphasis needs to be given to skills enhancement, literacy training and identification of additional income-generating activities. A FFW “package” for a newly resettled community may well include hard FFW activities requiring physical strength and endurance as well as FFT activities specially targeted to women, in particular those women and other vulnerable groups unable to participate in the hard FFW. FFW activities are usually identified and proposed by IP’s in consultation with the community *Sobas*. There is typically not a participatory consultative process with the entire community and a prioritisation of actions that may satisfy the needs of both men and women.

A complementary activity has been provided to some of the PRRO activities under the Gender Action facility – US\$44,000 for the implementation of a flour milling project to the benefit of the most needy women, predominantly female heads of household from the resident and IDP communities. 208 milling machines of Indian origins were purchased (176 manual, 22 fuel driven and 10 diesel driven air-cooled). These machines were handed over to IP’s who accepted the responsibility for distribution, use, repairs and servicing as well as for training and follow-up. Only the 10 air-cooled mills are apparently successfully functioning although with reduced capacity. The hand mills have proven ineffective – low and questionable outputs of 2.5kg/maize per hour and are now being used for individual family production only in select households. In Malanje all 32 machines have been recalled and are awaiting repair at the warehouse. All 22 water-cooled mills are out of order – some were never used as they arrived without a device for the cooling system. Most women associations abandoned the project quickly as the low outputs, the quality of the output and breakdowns of the mills did not provide them with enough income and customers. Despite the negative experience, there is scope for such activities in particular as it presents an income-generating activity, can reduce the need for fire wood and could be used to add micronutrients such as niacin to prevent pellagra (Kuito). They should only be implemented by experienced IP’s who can provide organizational and technical guidance.

7.2 Mainstreaming Gender Relations

Two GAPs have been prepared in the last two years with special focus on the PRRO. Gender focal points have been appointed in all sub-offices and report formats modified to require information disaggregated by gender. Apart from this, few of the gender actions have been carried out as intended. Gender awareness exists at the CO level and staff are in general knowledgeable about the CWs but this has not permeated to the sub-office level. Few sub-office staff were aware of the GAP and several FAMs and VAMs could not comment on the contents of WFP’s commitment for women other than vague statements about the need to hire more women. The GAP 2000 planned training for FAMs on gender analysis and qualitative, gender sensitive monitoring has yet to take place and this explains somewhat the current situation.

CO-level policy-making and monitoring pays little attention to gender issues. Gender was not raised as a key concern and area for improvement in the series of workshops held in Luanda and 10 of the sub-offices since May 2001. The VAM analysis is also held gender neutral and does not provide

opportunity to reflect on gender-related issues. The draft guidelines for FFW – a critical and strategic area for gender – do not address the special needs of female-headed households or women in general and are gender neutral in tone. While the document indicates that all FFW should “ensure equitable recruitment” this is defined as “participation of people from the identified priority target groups.” The document does encourage female participation on FFW committees stating that these should be “preferably integrated by women” but does not reflect on the special challenges this may pose and on this being an opportunity to promote women’s empowerment.

All vacancy announcements including those for drivers encourage the application of female candidates. Thirty-three percent of all staff (excluding drivers) are female while only 27 percent of staff holding management positions are female. Some of the sub-offices like Kuito and Malanje have reached almost gender parity in overall staffing while other sub-offices, such as Huambo and Luena are not balanced, with female staff ranging from 0% (Luena) to 18% (Huambo). Only thirty percent of food aid monitors/vulnerability assessment monitors are female – a ratio that certainly could be improved. The gender focal point’s MAP for 2001 includes the target of achieving gender mainstreaming into all aspects of operations by September 2001 but this has obviously not occurred, nor is it achievable in the near future. The focus seems to be exclusively on quantitative data – yet this quantitative data is only collected (and not analysed) at the sub-office level.

Recommendations:

The CO should ensure that gender concerns are reflected in all levels and types of programming and that all staff and implementing partners fully understand the need for gender mainstreaming:

- The CO should implement fully the 2000 and 2001 GAP which contain excellent activities that will contribute to achieving a more gender-sensitive implementation and reporting of the PRRO.
- Future GAPs should be developed jointly with sub-offices and should involve discussions with implementing partners.
- The CO should plan and organize training of field staff and key implementing partners in gender sensitive qualitative and quantitative reporting.
- CO and implementing partners should more systematically involve the IDPs in food distribution and management committees, including for FFW. When doing so, care must be taken to ensure adequate participation of women in decision-making positions (e.g. treasurer)
- CO staff should ensure that key CO policy documents, monitoring and guidelines contain appropriate reflection on gender issues
- WFP should incorporate gender concerns in the upcoming FFW consultancy to allow identification of gender-targeted activities within the FFW schemes

8. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT

8.1 Incorporation of environmental concerns into design

The design of the PRRO document (6159 and 6159.01) does not contain the required section on environmental impact as per PRRO guidelines and WFP’s 1999 Environmental Review guidelines. Consequently, neither in design or implementation do environmental concerns play a major role with the exception of a limited number of reforestation activities.

The major visible environmental impact of the protracted war and internal displacement of the population is the high degree of deforestation observed throughout the field visits of the mission. Wood has always been a key energy resource for the rural population but the protracted emergency situation has led to a change in traditional exploitation of forest resources (cutting off entire trees instead of cutting off branches) as well as an escalation in the speed and geographic coverage of deforestation. This is most visible in Malanje, where according to local information 6,000 hectares of woodland and 6 million trees have been depleted between 1993 and 1999 alone. The mission

observed that cutting trees was still a major commercial activity, resulting in a “landscape studded with tree stumps”. Many of the male and in particular the female IDPs interviewed reported that they walked between 15-30 kilometers roundtrip per day in order to collect fuelwood and that the time spent on collecting fire wood as well as distances to wooded areas have been increasing steadily. The collection and sale of wood and the production and sale of charcoal was mentioned by female IDPs as the number one coping mechanism and chief source of additional income.

A less visible impact of the war are the many land mines left by either side of the conflict throughout the country side, preventing the population from returning to their homes and to rehabilitate their farm lands and to use some of the forest resources.

Yet, at the PRRO workshop series held in mid 2001, environmental concerns were only raised by the Malanje sub-office. The proposed action was to increase the number of FFW reforestation activities.

8.2 Impact of Relief Activities

Environmental concerns seem not to have played a role in the selection of IDP camps nor a significant role in the identification and selection of FFW projects. Some camps have started tree planting nurseries in the hope of eventually producing some shade in an otherwise denuded area (e.g. Tchilepe/Makele, Kuito IDP camps). There are a number of reforestation FFW programmes but the mission was not able to visit these.

WFP’s composition of the food basket – other than the arrival ration - does not reflect fuel needs availability and the need to minimize energy used in cooking, such as using pre-cooked, blended or milled food. According to women IDPs, cooking beans can take between 3 - 10 hours depending on the type of the beans. IDPs at times sell part of their food ration in order to purchase fuel wood – in case they are not able to collect it. One IP makes it a requirement for each participant in a free feeding programme for the elderly to bring a large piece of wood to every food distribution – to cover the large amount of wood needed to prepare the meals.

8.3 Impact of Recovery Activities

The main selection criteria for the location of resettlement areas that all seem to agree on are suitable land, access to water and security but not environmental impact. Clearly any new resettlement area results first of all in a clearing of the land for agriculture and eventually in a depletion of the wood resources if present. The wait for the first harvest and worse-than-expected harvests and no other income alternatives have also contributed in various areas to an increase in deforestation.

FFW is presently focusing on agriculture, as cultivating the land is the top priority for both male and female IDPs. Irrigation is not a major concern as few resettlement programmes currently include irrigation schemes. Reforestation is mentioned by some partners but, in general, they do not have an expertise in this area, with some exceptions such as ADRA-Angola. Most reforestation activities focus on exclusively planting eucalyptus trees – a practice that has proven unsuitable in some environments elsewhere in the world.

In Malanje a local NGO was preparing a reforestation proposal for FFW for 8,000 beneficiaries who would be asked to tend to 2-3 eucalyptus trees each for the period of two years in return for FFW. While this example reflects a misunderstanding of the FFW scheme it also reflects a relatively low level of understanding of the dynamics and challenges of reforestation projects.

IDPs when asked whether they will participate in FFW reforestation projects are in general agreeable because of the food rations and not because they believe in restoring the depleted woodlands and in ensuring a longer-term supply of fuel needs. A group of resettled female IDPs in Benguela province

(Cubal) broke out in laughter when asked if they considered planting trees – they said this was inconceivable as they needed all their land for cultivation. Another factor that hampers potential reforestation activities is the transitory nature of most IDP settlements or resettlements. It takes five years for a eucalyptus tree to grow to maturity – way beyond the time horizon of IDPs who hope to go back as soon as the situation back home has become secure. It could be a viable option though for resident populations if accompanied with solid training, community organization and motivation and if diversified (e.g. inter-cropping with fast growing horticulture, planting a variety of trees to cover wood, fodder and food needs).

8.4 Mitigating the impact of relief and recovery activities

The issue of fuel wood should play a stronger role in the location of IDP camps, the composition of the food basket, the design and implementation of FFW activities as well as the provision of NFIs. For instance, in Cuito the ICRC has been constructing fuel-efficient wood-burning stoves for the community kitchens, reducing the need for firewood by at least one-third. The construction cost of such improved cooking stoves was between \$200-\$300 per kitchen and could be financed in part through FFW. While it may not be appropriate to develop community forestry projects for IDP camps, a sensitisation campaign could be included in education programmes for children and adults and small-scale pilot nurseries and mixed planting programmes undertaken. As deforestation also impacts the local resident population, FFW reforestation initiatives may be geared more towards the resident population – as long as they are well planned and executed by experienced IPs. Returnee and resettlement programmes where needed should also include reforestation and protection of watershed components. Any camp or resettlement assistance programme must include solid water and sanitation components.

Recommendations:

On a more macro scale, WFP must seek to mitigate the negative environmental impact of continuing internal population displacements and movements and incorporate environmental concerns and awareness building in PRRO activities whenever appropriate. The following actions should be undertaken:

- WFP to conduct an Energy Needs Assessment as part of the Food Needs Assessment to study the cooking requirements for beans and to seek to ensure to the extent possible that only beans with moderate cooking times are distributed.
- WFP to conduct an environmental review jointly with partners prior to the start-up of the next phase of the PRRO with the intention to identify possible sustainable mitigation and recovery measures
- Work with the Government to ensure that IDP resettlements are not located near fragile areas
- Work with Government and partners to ensure that IDP camps, resettlement area and returnee sites follow minimum environmental standards (including environmental health issues such as water protection and latrines)
- In collaboration with experienced IP's develop and offer specific FFW training programmes in IDP camps as well as resettlement areas for alternative income generation activities to reduce the over dependency on fire wood collection.

9. LESSONS

9.1 You can't evaluate something if you don't know what you want to achieve.

Evaluations are part of the management culture of an organisation and not a separate entity or department. The same as for gender and environmental concerns, evaluation requires a transversal focus which is present across the entire programming process from the inception of the design and planning of the strategy all the way across to implementation, as part of the project management cycle. If evaluation is not built into the program design or if adequate planning tools such as the logical

framework are not used to determine the objectives, criteria and indicators of success which must be applied to the evaluation, too much room for interpretation is left to the evaluation team. As such the evaluation becomes a reflection of the evaluator's own perception rather than being the application of the organisation's identified criteria and indicators of success for measuring outputs and outcomes. Evaluation must be integrated into the management culture of the organisation down to the country office level.

9.2 It is people, not systems, which make the difference. The right profile of motivated people in the right place at the right time is a major factor of success in any operation. Strategic planning, program, and evaluation reports are a no use if left on a desktop. Only if staff have the motivation, skills and willingness to use and apply the tools and systems are these relevant to meeting the objectives. The Human Factor is key to good performance and success. Good management of Human Resources is of paramount importance in creating conditions conducive to having the right people at the right place at the right time.

9.3 Having a clear sense of direction and projecting a vision is key to not working in isolation and ensuring linkages and integration with other partners in a confused and confusing environment. It further allows for consensus building on advocacy. While security, military and political aspects are part and often the main constraints in any operating environment, defining a medium-term vision based on a clear sense of direction provides the opportunity to determine an operating framework. Guidelines for implementing the framework allow to withstand external pressures and provide added security to WFP since decisions become a policy matter (corporate) rather than personal (individuals).

9.4 Countries in crisis have a higher risk of instability. Therefore tracking of planning assumptions (monitoring) is essential if organisational learning is to be achieved and lessons learned. Lessons (learned) are only useful if they are applied.

Annexes

Annex 1

Terms of Reference for the Evaluation of WFP's Angola Portfolio

1. BACKGROUND (TO THE PRRO CATEGORY)

The PRO category - covering Protracted Emergency Operations for Refugees and Displaced Persons - was first established by the CFA at the recommendation of WFP in May 1989 (WFP/CFA:27/P/7). The category responded to (i) the growth of migrant groups – both refugees and displaced people - as a result of civil strife, and (ii) the persistence of the problems which led to their flight and the consequent perpetuation of their status over long periods. In short, a decade of civil conflicts had created the need for an adequate and predictable funding base for refugees. By creating a subset of its “development” resources, WFP hoped to preserve the development and emergency resource bases for their original purposes while attracting additional net resources to deal with burgeoning needs in this new category.

In April 1998, WFP introduced a significant enhancement to the PRO category when it endorsed WFP's policy proposals in the paper “From Crisis to Recovery” (WFP/EB.A/98/4). The new PRRO – Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation - brought two major modifications to the category. First, all protracted emergency operations – and no longer just refugee and displaced persons operations - would be transformed into PRROs and brought before the Board for approval, generally after two years. Second, the transformation of EMOPs into PRROs would be done based on the preparation of a recovery strategy that would provide the rationale for continued assistance. To the extent possible, this would also emphasize recovery activities in addition to ongoing relief needs and contribute to conditions for finding sustainable solutions to protracted crises. This emphasis on recovery was very much in line with international support for linking relief and rehabilitation work to longer-term development interventions. Refugee and displaced persons operations – the old PRO category – would remain a subset of the new category and would benefit from the introduction of a recovery strategy.

The new PRRO category also stressed two important resource dimensions:

- First, within a PRRO, WFP would have the flexibility to move funds freely between relief and recovery activities as the situation on the ground required - to seize opportunities for recovery, but to be prepared to meet unforeseen critical relief needs;
- Second, the new category called for longer-term financial commitments from donors – for predictability and planning as well as for building partnerships for recovery.

2. ANGOLA COUNTRY PORTFOLIO - AN OVERVIEW

WFP has been actively dealing with the victims of civil war in Angola since the mid 1970s. In the decade of the 1990s alone, the Programme has promulgated and implemented nine emergency operations and three PROs/PRROs involving 783,179 MT of food assistance, valued at USD 492.5 million, to an average of 1,200,000 war-affected persons.

In this decade, WFP has adjusted its programme to deal with two periods of relative peace/recovery, in 1990-1992 and 1996-1998, and two periods of intense countrywide conflict, in 1993-1995 and 1998 to the present. And during all this period, no evaluation of WFP operations has been undertaken.

The current active portfolio in Angola involves the following projects:

- *(PRRO) Assistance to War-Affected People*

Approved originally in October 1999 and eventually extended through June 2002 this PRRO covers the basic food needs of approximately 1,1 million war-affected people with a total commitment of 277,477 tonnes. Beneficiaries include not only internally displaced persons but also those living in towns that have received massive numbers of displaced persons.

Specific objectives of PRRO 6159.01 are to:

- ✓ Maintain and improve the nutritional status of groups most at risk, including children below five, and pregnant/nursing women
- ✓ Improve immediate household food security of war-affected persons cut off from food sources
- ✓ Sustain other vulnerable groups (such as orphans, the elderly, the chronically sick and the disabled)
- ✓ Contribute to the self-reliance of war-affected persons through FFW projects (when possible)

To support the PRRO and humanitarian relief operations of WFP and other donors in Angola, several special operations have been developed by WFP:

- *SO 5857.02 Passenger Air Transport Service* (US\$ 6,333,916) –Passenger Air Transport Service – providing continued service of passenger aircraft to facilitate delivery of emergency assistance
- *SO 5887.02 Demining in Support of Internally Displaced Populations (Mine clearance of Feeder-roads and Farming Land)* (US\$ 1,792,067) – Demining in Support of Resettlement Activities
- *SO 5970.02 Transport Airservice*. (US\$ 3,672,746) providing continued service of cargo aircraft to facilitate delivery of emergency assistance to needy populations in Angola

In addition, one development activity is taking place through a quick-action project (QAP):

- *6020.00 (QAP) Food Assistance to the Community Infant Programme*

This project has a duration of one year and six months with a total commitment of 8/035 tonnes and is expected to end in October 2001. This project provides two meals per day to up to 60,000 children under five coming from low-income households in various urban and peri-urban areas and participating in community infant programmes.

3. OBJECTIVES OF THE EVALUATION OF THE ANGOLA PORTFOLIO

The objectives of the evaluation are:

- 1) Assess the relevance, appropriateness, timeliness, efficiency, effectiveness and connectedness of WFP assistance in Angola
- 2) Provide inputs and recommendations for the design of the next phase of PRRO 6159.
- 3) Contribute to an understanding of the usefulness of the PRRO category both as a resource window and as a programming instrument. Specifically, the evaluation will:
 - Assess the PRRO's recovery strategy and determine its relevance to creating conditions for sustainable solutions to the protracted situation;
 - Assess the extent to which the relief and recovery approach within the PRRO has been based on a flexible or a linear view of the process and whether actual conditions suggest that the approach used has been appropriate
 - Assess the effectiveness of the PRRO category as a resourcing window in building a more predictable basis for funding recovery operations and to assess its impact on other resourcing windows;
 - Assess the effectiveness of the targeting methods used in the PRRO to realise cost savings and containment for both relief and development;
 - Assess the added value of assisting the target populations through the PRRO in comparison with its predecessors (*Emop and PRO*); and
 - Determine whether the conditions set out in WFP's policy paper "From Crisis to Recovery" have been met within the PRRO and what extent they have proven relevant to project preparation and implementation.
- 4) Provide accountability to the Executive Board.

4. SCOPE OF WORK

This is an evaluation of the WFP portfolio in Angola. As such the evaluation will look at the entire range of activities in Angola, including the PRRO, the SO's and the QAP. The main focus and thrust of the evaluation, however, will be on PRRO 6159 being the largest and most significant project. The SO's and the QAP will be reviewed in their relation and contribution to the overall portfolio and as they fit into a country-wide WFP and donor strategy.

The evaluation of the Angola Portfolio will focus initially on the PRRO's recovery strategy¹⁴, assessing how it was formulated, how it has evolved over the life of the project and its relevance to the situation analysis.

The evaluation will also examine the strategic linkages with UN agencies, NGOs, donors and implementing partners: first to determine their contribution to meeting the objectives; and second to shed light on whether the PRRO has contributed "to the process of transforming insecure, fragile conditions into durable, stable situations..."¹⁵.

The evaluation will consider how effectively WFP's Commitments to Women have been integrated in the design of the PRRO and QAP. In addition, it will assess how well the consideration of gender relations, which can be a major impediment to improved food security, have been mainstreamed into the PRRO and QAPs' activities.

The evaluation will also review the PRRO within the context of the PRRO guidelines, the extent to which the PRRO complies with the guidelines and to what extent the guidelines are applicable and appropriate in the Angola context.

5. KEY ISSUES AND SUB-ISSUES

The evaluation will address the following issues and sub-issues:

1. Recovery Strategy and Design: Is the strategy well prepared and does it convincingly set the foundation for the activities of the PRRO? Are the objectives and activities coherent and do they reflect the PRRO strategy?

Formulation of the Strategy

- 1.1 At what point was the recovery strategy developed for the PRRO? Has it been periodically reviewed or modified over the life of the operation in order to maintain its relevance with changing circumstances?
- 1.2 What resources have been devoted to the development of the PRRO recovery strategy and what mechanisms for consultation, partnership and review have been utilized?
- 1.3 Is the content of the recovery strategy adequate in providing the rationale for operating in the protracted situation, identifying and justifying the role of food aid, identifying target areas and groups and defining assistance modalities?

Assessment of the PRRO Design and Strategy (relevance and coherence)

¹⁴ "From Crisis to Recovery" (WFP/EB.A/98/4-A) as well as the PRRO Guidelines ("Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations: Guidelines for the Preparation of a PRRO", WFP February 1999) call for the preparation of a "recovery strategy" as the base on which all PRRO's activities are designed. The strategy may or may not lead to "recovery" components within the PRRO, depending on the opportunities available within a particular country context.

¹⁵ "From Crisis to Recovery", WFP 1998.

- 1.4 Do the PRRO objectives reflect the situation analysis presented in the recovery strategy?
- 1.5 Are the activities and outputs appropriate to local needs and tailored specifically to achieve the objectives?
- 1.6 Are the PRRO's objectives coherent in the sense of collectively contributing to the achievement of the stated goals of the? ¹⁶
- 1.7 To what extent are the PRRO objectives still valid?
- 1.8 To what extent is the strategy and planned outputs and activities of the PRRO relevant and appropriate for the needs of the target groups?
- 1.9 What risks to the PRRO were foreseen in the recovery strategy (e.g., the resurgence of violence, the influx of additional refugees, loss of donor support) and have appropriate contingency plans been made?
- 1.10 Does the recovery strategy make clear those conditions for success under which the PRRO will move from relief to recovery?
- 1.11 Does the design of the PRRO adequately reflect the different roles played by men and women in the relief and recovery process? Are the Commitments to Women appropriately reflected in the design?
- 1.12 Is the PRRO in line with the policy "From Crisis to Recovery"? If not, how and why not? Has there been an effort to integrate developmental approaches as early as possible in relief and recovery activities – and build effective partnerships for this?
- 1.13 Has the design and implementation of the PRRO adequately taken into account the policies and aims of the Government and other actors who are addressing similar issues? Are other key partners and donors all working towards the same basic goals and objectives? Are the activities and outputs of the PRRO consistent in policy terms with those of the Government, other donors and organizations?

2 Resourcing of the PRRO

Have the resources made available been adequate and managed properly? Has the PRRO proven to be an effective funding window? Are there any funding problems inherent to the PRRO category? Are resource constraints affecting the PRRO's ability to seize opportunities for recovery within protracted emergency situations? Do the donors accept the rationale for the PRRO?

Budgets and financial resources for preparation and implementation

- 2.1 Did the preparation and implementation of the PRRO (compared to the previous EMOP/PRO) result in management changes?
- 2.2 How has the budget of the PRRO changed compared to its predecessor operations? Has the preparation of the PRRO resulted in a change in the ratio of dollars spent per ton of commodities delivered compared to previous PRO and EMOP? Has the use of an assessment method for targeting resulted in budgetary savings?
- 2.3 Does the Country Office have the resources required – staff and cash – to prepare and implement the PRRO as foreseen in the "Guidelines for Preparation of a PRRO", including staff or consultants with a "combination of development and emergency experience; and strong background in planning, design and strategy formulation"?¹⁷

¹⁶ Section 6, "Notes on Method", recommends that upon arrival in country the mission in collaboration with the Country Team discuss the initial and current logical framework for the PRRO in order to systematically assess objectives, activities and outputs.

¹⁷ Guidelines for the Preparation of a PRRO, section 3.3; the Guidelines suggest the establishment of a "planner post" for preparing a PRRO.

- 2.4 Is the PRRO budget appropriate in relation to its objectives/activities, and what factors (such as CO size, additional staff requirements for PRRO implementation) have affected individual budget items, and particularly DSC?
- 2.5 What has been the overall resourcing result of presenting and tracking the PRRO budget by component elements (relief or recovery), including earmarking resources to particular components?

Flexibility of PRRO budget and shifts in activities and resources

- 2.6 Have the contingency mechanisms intended to deal with setbacks, reversals and new emergency/disaster outbreaks – such as PRRO budget revisions – been employed?
- 2.7 To what extent has the Country Director utilized his/her authority to transfer funds between components and geographic areas?

Predictability and regularity of resources and impact on PRRO

- 2.8 To what extent have the resourcing requirements for the operation been met and how has the CO managed shortfalls? How predictably and regularly have resources been supplied to the PRRO?
- 2.9 What have been the major resource constraints for the PRRO and have they changed as a result of the transformation of the operation from an EMOP to a PRRO?
- 2.10 Has transformation to a PRRO resulted in longer-term (more than 1 year) financial commitments to the operation?
- 2.11 How successfully has the PRRO resourced its non-food inputs and what, if any, have been the constraints?

Donor perception of the PRRO and advocacy with donors and partners

- 2.12 In-country, what are donors views on the PRRO?
- 2.13 What has been the extent and nature of Country Office advocacy for the PRRO with donors and other partners in the field?
- 2.14 What effect does having multiple and varied components within the PRRO (e.g., relief feeding and recovery FFW) have on WFP's ability to successfully obtain donor support?

3 Implementation and Management of the Portfolio

Appropriateness of food rations

- 3.1 Is the food ration adequate and acceptable in light of the PRRO's objectives and targeting?
- 3.2 Are the nutritional objectives realistic and to what extent are they being achieved?
- 3.3. What has been the nutritional impact of WFP assistance on refugees, IDPs and other targeted vulnerable groups? How has that been assessed?
- 3.4. Have there been ration reductions or phasing out of "general" food assistance and transitions to targeted fedded approaches. If so, on what basis and to what effect?

Efficiency

- 3.5. Are quality outputs achieved in a timely manner and at reasonable cost?
- 3.6. What systems are in place for assuring programme quality (efficiency):
- workplanning and PRRO management
 - ensuring contributions from partners/communities
 - setting appropriate technical standards using local experts and partner agencies
 - training?
- 3.7. Has the operational context changed since design, and if so have the projects in the portfolio adapted effectively?

Efficiency of Pipeline Management and Logistics Arrangements

- 3.8. Has the pipeline been adequately maintained? In cases of resource shortfalls, have breaks in the pipeline been signaled beforehand and properly managed?
- 3.9. Was planning for logistics requirements adequate and what have been the major challenges to the smooth functioning of the portfolio?
- 3.10. What has been WFP's role as transport provider for all forms of humanitarian assistance, for the UN, Red Cross, IO and NGO organizations involved?
- 3.11. How are outputs affected by breaks in the pipeline and resource shortfalls? Has the move towards targeted approaches under the PRRO assisted with coping with such shortfalls?
- 3.12. How cost efficient is WFP's approach to logistics?

Leakages

- 3.13. What is the extent of losses of the current programmes? What steps are being taken by WFP to avoid or minimize the level of diversion or taxation through the selection of particular delivery channels, supervised distributions and post-distribution monitoring. What is the extent to which WFP food assistance may have been fed into the local war economy through diversion and taxes?

Portfolio Management

- 3.14. Is there an adequate structure of sub-offices and field offices to manage the portfolio and maintain effective operational relationships with implementing partners?
- 3.15. Do sub-office and field staff have adequate authority to carry out their functions? Are reporting arrangements within the sub-offices and to the CO clear?
- 3.16. Is appropriate training available to PRRO staff to enhance and maintain their skills, particularly in line with the programmatic objectives of the PRRO category?

Security

- 3.17. In the context of the security situation in Angola, have adequate and appropriate measures been introduced and applied so as to minimize the risk to WFP staff and implementing partners involved in the implementation of the Portfolio?
- 3.18. Are there significant security challenges to the smooth functioning of the PRRO?

Protection and Access

- 3.19. As WFP provides no guidance regarding protection activities has any activity of the portfolio been able to address in a successful manner “protection issues”? How are protection issues affecting programming and donor coordination/collaboration?
- 3.20. How is the issue of access to beneficiaries and regions under control by UNITA addressed by WFP and its partners and how is this affecting operations?
- 3.21. Has the PRRO been effective at making use of UN Frameworks for ensuring access to beneficiaries?

Coverage, Assessment and Targeting:

- 3.22. On what basis have beneficiaries been selected? Do women play a role in the selection? Is there evidence that the targeted beneficiaries are being reached?
- 3.23. Are the appropriate beneficiaries benefiting from the assets created? What is the share of female beneficiaries by distribution type?
- 3.24. Is targeting in line with WFP targeting guidelines or policies?
- 3.25. How expensive is the targeting process? Are the costs reasonable?
- 3.26. Are the activities and outputs in line with local needs? Are the assets being created relevant for the beneficiaries in terms of the PRRO’s intended outcomes and higher-level goals?
- 3.27. How have food insecurity, vulnerability and beneficiary figures been assessed and subsequently adjusted as the operation has evolved?
 - At the country level? (e.g., FAO/WFP Food and Crop Assessments, WFP/VAM, GIEWS, FEWS, JFAMs, composite household surveys)
 - At the community level? (e.g., RRA, PRA)
 - At the household level (e.g., women’s organizations, relief committees)
- 3.28. Are there mechanisms to signal opportunities (or provide guidance in the case of resource shortfalls) for further targeting, for ration adjustments, or for phasing down and/or exiting?
- 3.29. What is the nature of the interaction between IDPs and the local population and how has the operation addressed and weighed the needs of these groups?
- 3.30. What information on expected funding has been available during the formulation and implementation of the operation and how has this influenced targeting?

Monitoring & Evaluation Systems:

- 3.31. Are appropriate and functioning M&E systems supporting the implementation of the PRRO, Sos and QAP?
- 3.32. Was baseline data collected and were appropriate indicators identified at the outset for measuring progress and results?
- 3.33. What is the type and frequency of reporting for the operation, including periodic participatory appraisals? Is the information analyzed and used to make decisions regarding the management?

3.34. What are the constraints to monitoring – such as funding, access, disruption of activities, security, manipulation of data – that affect the operation and how does the CO attempt to overcome these?

3.35. Have criteria been established to signal when to shift activities from “relief” to “recovery,” from “recovery” to “development,” and vice versa in both cases? If so, are these being applied effectively?

Implementing Partners

3.36. What systems does the WFP Country Office employ to assess the capacities and comparative advantages of potential implementing partners (IPs)[Government and NGOs]?

3.37. Are WFP’s policies and priorities (e.g., those on gender and on the environment) reflected in MOUs with various Implementing Partners?

3.38. What has been the quality, timeliness and effectiveness of the Governments contribution (financial, human and in-kind resources)?

3.39. Are the number and nature of IPs under the PRRO adequate and appropriate for implementing the range of activities? Has there been a trend towards or away from using local implementing partners? What has been the evolving role of implementing partners?

3.40. What has been the effectiveness of counterparts at different levels (policy and operational at central as well as field level) in cooperating for the success of the PRRO)?

Coordination

3.41. Has preparing and implementing the PRRO broadened and improved coordination with partners (Government, UN, donors, NGOs) as compared to the predecessor operations?

3.42. What are the mechanisms for coordination with government, donors, UN agencies (UNHCR, UNOCHA, FAO, UNICEF, UNDP, etc.), NGOs, etc.? Assess their meaningfulness to the implementation of the PRRO.

3.43. Are appropriate and suitable mechanisms in place to ensure strategic coordination at the national policy level as regards relief and recovery issues?

3.44. Are the objectives and activities of the PRRO compatible with the policies/programmes of the Government of Angola (where relevant)? Compatible with the policies/programmes of major donors?

3.45. How is the preparation and implementation of the PRRO, EMOP and SOs linked with the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP), and any contingency planning exercises? Other donor and Agency strategic tools?

4. Results:

Are the expected outcomes feasible? To what extent are the expected outcomes of the PRRO being achieved? What have been the outcome/impact on gender relations and the environment?

Effectiveness and Connectedness (Sustainability) of the PRRO

Effectiveness:

4.1 To what extent are the outputs of the components contributing to achieving the desired PRRO outcomes?

- 4.2 What has been the actual outcome for the beneficiaries (men, women, children, IDPs) focusing on who has been fed, and what assets have been gained?
- 4.3 What unexpected outcomes (positive or negative) have occurred?
- 4.4 What have been the nutritional outcomes of WFP assistance on refugees, IDPs and other targeted vulnerable groups? How has that been assessed?

Achieving programme linkages and connectedness (sustainability)

- 4.5 Have there been ration reductions or phasing out of “general” food assistance and transitions to targeted feeding approaches? If so, on what basis and to what effect?
- 4.6 Has there been any added value to transforming long-standing IDP operations into a PRRO in terms of building linkages and improving the likelihood of sustainability?
- 4.7 What are the prospects for the connectedness of each main PRRO activity?
- 4.8 Have opportunities been identified and pursued for making the transition from relief to recovery activities (in particular, restoring livelihoods) where appropriate (follow-up to 4.11)?
- 4.9 To what degree has WFP food aid contributed to promoting resettlement and food self-sufficiency, as applicable?
- 4.10 Have the needs of the host populations and neighboring communities been addressed in a timely and effective manner?
- 4.11 What role, if any, has resource availability and predictability played in building relief-development linkages?
- 4.12 Are the objectives and activities of PRRO 5159 compatible with and complementary to those of the other interventions (SO 58557, 5887, 5970 and QAP 6020) currently being implemented by the CO? Have appropriate linkages been made with the development activities of other interventions?

5 Meeting Commitments to Women

- 5.1 Further to questions raised above under the design heading, are appropriate opportunities being sought during implementation to improve the status of women and to address their strategic needs?
- 5.2 Has adequate effort been made to mainstream gender considerations, to improve the status of women, and to move towards a more gender equitable society?
- 5.3 Are there any changes required in a future phase to ensure better compatibility with these Commitments?
- 5.4 How is WFP trying to improve the status of women and create a more gender equitable society?

6 Environment

- 6.1 Have environmental concerns been adequately addressed within the PRRO, particularly with regard to energy-related issues (e.g., cooking time) and the placement of IDP/refugee camps?
- 6.2 Impact of Relief Activities: What effect have the campsites had on the environment? What effect have rations and cooking requirements had?
- 6.3 Impact of recovery activities: What has been the environmental impact of recovery activities within the PRRO? Are the PRRO activities helping to restore the natural habitat through rural infrastructure and reforestation schemes?

7. Lessons:

Are there any lessons¹⁸ can be identified from the experience in designing and implementing the PRRO as well as the other portfolio activities?

(the final debriefing workshop could be used to identify/formalize lessons)

6. NOTES ON METHOD

A. Stages of the evaluation

The evaluation will be divided into three phases:

Phase 1 – Preparation and Desk Review (3–5 days):

Prior to the in-country mission, the team will review all relevant background documentation. The team leader will join the OEDE Evaluation Officer at WFP in Rome for a briefing prior to departure. The other team members will review materials provided electronically or by the Country Office prior to the beginning of the mission. At this point in time the team should attempt to outline a hypothetical skeleton logframe based on the approval documents.

The team leader will plan, in consultation with the Evaluation Officer and with organizational support from the CO, a logframe exercise to take place at the outset of the mission. This exercise will involve all WFP staff currently working on PRRO 6159. The purpose of the exercise is to help structure the evaluation and ensure a systematic examination of the project's effects. The output will be a logical framework for the current PRRO 6159.

Key information should also be assembled by the WFP Country Office, prior to the arrival of the mission and forwarded to OEDE Rome (preferably via email, if not by pouch). This includes:

Basic Documents:

- WFP PRRO policy document: "From Crisis to Recovery" (WFP/EB.A/98/4-A)
- WFP, Guidelines for Preparation of a PRRO
- PRRO 6159, 6159.01, SO 5857.00-02, 5887.00-02, 5970.0002, QAP 6020 project documents
- WFP/RE resource summary table for PRRO 6159, 6159.01, SO 5857.00-02, 5887.00-02, 5970.0002, QAP 6020 project documents
- Reports of any related evaluations/reviews/assessments undertaken
- Strategy paper for WFP Angola (if available)
- Programme Design Manual (2000)
- Cost Containment Study (2001)
- Emergency Needs Assessment Guidelines (1999)
- Supplementary Feeding operational Guidelines (1998)
- Food aid in Emergencies (red book) Operational Procedures (1993)
- Food and Nutrition Handbook (2000)
- Gender Guidelines (2000)
- Gender Checklist (1999)
- Environmental Review Guidelines
- ALNAP Annual Review 2001 Humanitarian Action: Learning from evaluation
- Report of the mission to review distribution strategies in Angola, Bruce Crawshaw et al, 06/2000
- Country or operation case studies
- Documentation on partner activities (UN, major donors, major NGOs)

¹⁸ A "lesson", in the context of evaluations, can be defined as an instructive generalization based on a learning. For more guidance on the formulation of lessons please see the OEDE lessons paper.

- WFP/OEDE thematic evaluation “Recurring Challenges in the Provision of Food Assistance in Complex Emergencies”
- “Food Security and Food Assistance among long-standing Refugees”, (WFP/Ron Ockwell, Nov. 1999 – for refugee operations)
- Most recent consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal
- Any relevant evaluations/reviews undertaken by implementing partners during the last 2 years

Key information to be prepared by the WFP Country Office one month prior to mission start-up:

- Basic country data
- Basic data on the country’s food balance, including its import and food aid requirement and local commodity prices
- Completed Self-Evaluation Report (SER) for PRRO 6159 – (form to be supplied by OEDE) and pages 1-2 of the SER for the QAP, S0s.
- Resource table for the PRRO with stock balance, information on losses and regularity of deliveries
- Management structure of country office and of the PRRO
- List of staff, equipment, etc. for the PRRO
- Outputs achieved vs. planned for PRRO (disaggregated)
- Socio-economic status of beneficiaries broken down by gender, beneficiary category, location
- Local monetary value of the ration/per beneficiary category and relation to household income
- Description of logistics and security arrangements (maximum 5 pages each)

Prior to departure for Angola, the Office of Evaluation (OEDE) will forward the TORs to the Country Office. These should be shared with key government focal points and implementing partners. Ideally, a small task force of key stakeholders (composition to be determined by the country office) may be established to review the TORs, act as liaison to the evaluation team during the mission, and host the debriefing at the end of the mission

Phase II – The in-country evaluation (3.5 weeks):

To the extent possible, the Team should meet with all relevant stakeholders, including beneficiaries, local and national government, key implementing partners and other development agencies involved with any of WFP’s programmes.

Data collection will take place both in the offices of key stakeholders in the capital and in the field where the activities of the PRRO can be visited. The mission leader, together with the Country Office, will determine the optimum balance between mission time spent in the field and in the capital.

Key informant interviews to be carried out by the Team may be divided into different groups:

Group one: WFP full time and contract staff working on PRRO 6159 and other relevant CO interventions (SO 5857.00-02, 5887.00-02, 5970.0002, QAP 6020)

Group two: Key institutional partners/actors involved at the national level in programming relief and recovery assistance. These may include:

- relevant government ministries and district administrations
- relevant UN agencies (OCHA, UNHCR, UNICEF, FAO, WHO, etc.)
- local offices of World Bank and African Development Bank
- bilateral donors with a significant presence in relief and recovery assistance,
- NGOs with a mandate for relief and recovery assistance and a strong presence and reputation in food aid and/or food security

Group three: Institutional partners engaged in WFP activities

- national, provincial and local offices of PRRO and QAP implementing partners
- staff of national and international NGOs involved in the delivery of WFP assistance within the PRRO and QAP
- staff of human service agencies supported within the PRRO and QAP

Group Four: Participants and Beneficiaries

The mission members should visit households, and meet with key informants and focus groups which represent each category of PRRO beneficiaries.

Phase III – Report writing (5 working days team members, 10 working days Team Leader).

During each phase of the PRRO evaluation, the team leader should confirm the duties and responsibilities of each team member. These can be organized around the subjects to be covered in the full evaluation report (see annex 1). Ideally, the team should seek to write a substantial part of their report obligations during the last week in Luanda.

The team leader is responsible for deciding on and co-ordinating inputs to the Aide Memoire, evaluation summary and final report. The team leader is responsible for the timely production of these reports.

B. The Evaluation Team

The evaluation team is composed of five members:

Team Leader: external consultant with experience in evaluation, relief/refugee situations, nutrition and logframes

Team members:

- Relief/IDP specialist
- Logistics Specialist
- M&E/gender specialist
- Sociologist/rural anthropologist with RRA expertise (locally-based consultant)

C. Timetable and Itinerary

Review/finalize evaluation TORs	June – September 2001
Planning/desk review	Prior to 17 September (done by consultants independently – 3 days per consultant)
Briefing at WFP Rome	17 September
Travel to Luanda	17 September
In-country mission:	18 September – 20 September: Luanda: round of initial meetings including logframe session
	20 September – 3 October: Field visits
	4 October – 7 October: team working session
	8 October – 10 October: follow-up meetings and preparation of debriefing workshop
	9 October: debriefing workshop for key WFP staff and key implementing partners, donors
	10 October: write-up of aide-memoire, etc.
Debriefing of GOA	11 October
Departure	11 October
Deadline for Final Evaluation Report	9 November
Deadline for Evaluation Summary	2 November

D. Organization of the mission

Role of the Team Leader: Will finalize the method and key issues for the evaluation. This will be done in consultation with the OEDE Evaluation Officer. He/she will also clarify the role and input of each team member, including individual requirements for the Aide Memoire, Evaluation Summary and Final Report. With assistance from the WFP Evaluation Officer, the team leader will define any preparatory work required by the CO and/or local consultants prior to the mission (at least 4 weeks notice should be given to the Country Office). The team leader will assume overall responsibility for the mission, and will synthesize the inputs from all sources in order to produce the necessary outputs.

The Team leader is responsible for producing the following outputs :

- an **Aide Mémoire** for presenting the mission's early findings and recommendations at the final debriefing in Angola and at HQ ;
- a **Final Evaluation Report**; and
- an **Evaluation Summary Report** for presentation to the Executive Board in May 2002.

The team leader will present the team's findings at all debriefings and will ensure that all deadlines are met for the above outputs.

Role of the other team members : To provide technical expertise according to individual skill sets, and to provide written inputs to the Aide Memoire, Evaluation Summary and Final Report under the guidance of the Team Leader and WFP Evaluation Officer.

Role of the WFP Evaluation Officer : The Evaluation Officer (EO) will participate as a full team member in the evaluation. In addition, the EO will provide support to the overall evaluation exercise as necessary, which includes liaising between team members, relevant areas of WFP headquarters, UNHCR and the country office. The EO will also ensure compliance with the intended thrust of the evaluation, and that the necessary logistical support is provided by WFP HQ and the CO.

Role of the Angola Country Office : To advise on the timing of the evaluation to ensure that the evaluation outputs are available for the preparation of the next phase of the PRRO. To ensure that all necessary documents required to plan the evaluation and undertake the desk review are provided in a timely manner. To assist with the identification and hiring of local consultants as required. To ensure that any necessary preparatory work is undertaken in-country prior to the arrival of the evaluation team, and to facilitate the work of the team while in-country. Prepare and organize the mission in-country itinerary, and organize the evaluation briefing/debriefing.

E. Products of the Evaluation

- **Aide Mémoire** for debriefing the Country Office and Government (maximum 5 pages) – the CO should be given enough time to have the AM translated into Portuguese.
deadline: last day of mission (11 October 2001)
- **Final Evaluation Report and Recommendation Tracking Matrix**
deadline: 9 November 2001
- **Evaluation Summary Report** (maximum 5000 words)
deadline: 2 November 2001

All reports will be prepared in English and must be written in conformity with the outlines in Annexes 1 and 2. Draft versions of the Evaluation Summary Report and Final Report will be reviewed by the OEDE Evaluation Officer prior to being finalized.

The Evaluation Summary Report, technical reports and Final Evaluation Report must be submitted in hardcopy accompanied by an electronic version. If applicable, annexes should also be made available in

WFP standard software (i.e., Microsoft package). For ease of processing, the Summary Report should be submitted as plain, unformatted text only (no paragraph numbering, limited bold, underline, etc.).

The mission is fully responsible for its independent full report, which may not necessarily reflect the views of WFP.

The evaluation shall be conducted in conformity with these terms of reference and under the overall guidance of OEDE.

The Annexes to these Terms of Reference provide the evaluation team with some tools to be used:

Annex 2

Evaluation Method and Issues

Three sources have been used in the areas of interface between the operations, the populations and the dynamics of conflict:

- Documentation (in particular the internal reporting, the nutritional and morbidity surveys of implementing partners, and some synthetic studies)
- Observation of activities and living conditions in four Provinces (Huila, Malanje, Bie, Benguela)
- Semi-structured interviews with 210 groups of beneficiaries with an approximate average of 15 minutes spent on each interview, and 23 of the 200 implementing partners. These groups were chosen in informal manner by visiting scattered sites. 13 individual household interviews were held with beneficiaries for an average of 30 minutes. Repeated visits, movements on foot, and prolonged interviews were used for the protection activities.

This information was then analysed by identifying patterns in the reporting of problems or in requests for further assistance. Discrepancies between reports and actual observation were also exploited. This information was compared to similar WFP operations, or other large humanitarian operations in similar circumstances.

The mission also used a wide range of techniques and triangulated as much as possible data obtained between the beneficiary population, implementing partner and government (using interview techniques), documentary evidence (both international WFP reporting as well as implementing partners and government reports). The mission also used of specific formats (donor questionnaires). Beneficiary interviews included focus groups and individual interviews. Household were chosen randomly from the different sections of the camps. Observational data was collected as well at all sites. The team always split into different groups to obtain the official (Soba, administrator, secretary, sekulu) version and the beneficiaries direct perception.

A SWOT workshop with WFP staff was held to discuss the mission findings and present recommendations for the next phase of the PRRO on the last two days of the mission.

Annex 3

Checklist for Meeting the Commitments to Women & Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective

Essential Elements of Commitments to Women and Gender Mainstreaming Policy	Detailed Observations	Level of PRRO Coherence With Commitments to Women and Gender Mainstreaming Policy			
		Very High	High	Low	Very Low
Commitment I: Provide Direct Access to Appropriate Food for Women					
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Does the PRRO make a real effort to get food into the hands of women, e.g. through women's ration cards? 	<p>Under the new registration system as of March 2001 ration cards are issued in the name of the wife rather than the husband. However, this alone does not ensure direct access to food as any family member may receive the food. Nevertheless the distributions observed by the evaluation team were received by 70-80 percent women. This is not due to an effort to place food in the hands of women as most partners were not familiar with the CWs but rather the result of a high percentage of female headed-households (over 50%) and the fact that women tend to attend the distributions.</p>			✓	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Do the PRRO activities address micronutrient deficiencies amongst women and children? 	<p>The supplementary feeding programming is targeting pregnant and lactating women as well as children. In Kuito where a Pellagra outbreak has been observed, additional Vitamin B has been provided by partners. Due to the high incidence of global and severe malnutrition WFP has added CSB, sugar and at times dry fish to the GDF rations.</p>		✓		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Do the PRRO activities consider local cooking and eating habits? 	<p>Yes – the rations seems to correspond to local cooking and eating habits, in particular in the central and southern regions. Manioc and Cassava are not included – those are standard food basket items in the Northern part of the country. Corrective action was taken when WFP noticed that maize was sold and traded for other food items. When purchasing food locally the PRRO does purchase locally produced and customary foods.</p>		✓		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Have women been consulted in determining the food basket? 	<p>N/a – not evident in project documentation. Food basket and availability seems to be rather determined by donor food availability. In general women beneficiaries expressed their satisfaction with the ration.</p>			✓	

Essential Elements of Commitments to Women and Gender Mainstreaming Policy	Detailed Observations	Level of PRRO Coherence With Commitments to Women and Gender Mainstreaming Policy			
		Very High	High	Low	Very Low
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Are female-headed households given special attention because of their greater poverty and time constraints? 	Although the PRRO document mentions that the number of FHHs has increased significantly and that these HHs tend to be poorer none of the activities observed did cater to FHHs and their special needs.			✓	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Does the PRRO make an effort to reduce the security and/or health risks women face when collecting food? 	Security issues during food collection were not mentioned to the evaluation team. Distributions were usually done in the IDP camp and security concerns seemed not an issue. In a case observed by the mission where the distribution was undertaken at 10kms distance of the resettlement the community came as a group and left as a group to ensure safety for all.				
Commitment II: Take Measures to Ensure Women's Equal Access to and Full Participation in Power Structures and Decision-Making					
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Does the PRRO address women's strategic needs, i.e., use an approach that challenges traditional gender roles and empowers women? Describe how. 	No. villages are headed by traditional leaders – the Soba's who are predominantly male. The PRRO has not yet set up any committee-type structures. Women are rarely involved in food management and distribution (exception of CARE distribution in Kuito).				✓
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Does it address gender relations? Does it bring men into the dialogue around the issues of women's status? 	No – little effort seems to have been made to date to address gender relations.				✓
Commitment III: Take Positive Action to Facilitate Women's Equal Access to Resources, Employment, Markets and Trade					
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Are PRRO resources deliberately targeted to women and girls where there is a big gender gap, i.e. of 25%?¹ What is done? 	The gender gap in Angola is significant. The supplementary feeding centers are including pregnant and lactating women and the same group is clearly identified as a vulnerable group. However, FFW resources are not deliberately targeted at women and girls.			✓	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Does the PRRO have incentive programs to address the gender gap in primary education? What are they? 	No. While schools are being constructed under FFW this is not done to address the gender gap. School feeding under the PRRO and in the QAP (PICs) are not set up to address the gender gap but rather seek to increase overall enrolment.			✓	

¹ For information on the gender gap in your country, contact the Senior Gender Adviser, SPP at HQ.

Essential Elements of Commitments to Women and Gender Mainstreaming Policy	Detailed Observations	Level of PRRO Coherence With Commitments to Women and Gender Mainstreaming Policy			
		Very High	High	Low	Very Low
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Do women participate in FFW? As labourers or also as decision-makers? Do they control the assets created? 	Yes, women do participate in FFW but are not decision-makers (this may not be as much a gender issue but rather the way FFW is currently decided upon). Part of the FFW is paid labor for community kitchens, PICs, TFC and SFC – in these cases the percentage of women laborers is high. As for assets created by FFW few assets are directly controlled by women.			✓	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Is there any opportunity in the PRRO for women to learn new skills through FFT for greater development sustainability? 	There are currently few FFT activities and little apparent attention by the PRRO on providing this type of opportunity. More could be done in this area in all camps.			✓	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Does the PRRO engage in advocacy on behalf of women? For gender equity? To leverage resources for partnership work? 	Few IPs and Government officials interviewed by the evaluation team at province levels were familiar with the CWs. Gender advocacy was not observed nor used to leverage resources for partnership work.			✓	
Commitment IV: Generate and Disseminate Gender-Disaggregated Data for Planning and Evaluation					
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Are the M&E systems used in the PRRO sensitive to gender? Explain how. 	The new registration cards ask for a gender breakdown of beneficiaries – but this is not systematically filled out. Partner reports do also not always provide a gender breakdown although reporting forms do require this information. With the new registration system the information on male and female beneficiary numbers has improved. FFW reports also require disaggregated data. However, the disaggregated data remains at the base level and reporting at Luanda level is not disaggregated. Regular monitoring does not appear to be gender sensitive and FAMs have not been trained on gender sensitive monitoring (as planned in the 2000GAP)			✓	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Is qualitative information sensitive to gender also collected? 	No – there is little qualitative information collected in general as the focus is on quantitative data collection				✓
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Does the PRRO look at inputs, outputs outcomes and impact from a gender perspective? 	Beneficiary numbers are disaggregated. The PRRO however does not have a gender perspective for input, outcome and impact monitoring and data collection/analysis			✓	

Essential Elements of Commitments to Women and Gender Mainstreaming Policy	Detailed Observations	Level of PRRO Coherence With Commitments to Women and Gender Mainstreaming Policy			
		Very High	High	Low	Very Low
Commitment V: Improve Accountability of Actions Taken to Meet the Commitments					
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Are WFP staff managing the PRRO held accountable for meeting the Commitments to Women and mainstreaming gender? How? 	No- most field staff interviewed were not familiar with the GAP or the need to focus on gender issues. The MAPs of staff and managers do incorporate gender targets.			✓	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Is the Gender Focal Point given sufficient authority to influence decision making with regard to the PRRO? Support? 	The gender focal point is a P2 programme officer whose MAP includes the achievement of gender mainstreaming by September 2001. It does not seem that the GFP has had authority and ability to influence decision-making beyond a promising start in the 2000 GAP.			✓	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Are implementing partners held accountable for meeting the Commitments to Women and mainstreaming gender? How? 	LTSH contracts do require gender disaggregated reporting but reporting forms reviewed by the team did not always adhere to this nor were the IPs held accountable. With the exception of one partner (CARE) IPs did not know the CWs nor of the requirement to mainstream gender.				✓



Annex 4

List of documents reviewed by the mission In addition to those mentioned in the TOR)

- 1) Republica de Angola, Governo da pronvinca do Bie, Plano de Acção provincial de emergência, September 2001
- 2) UNDP, Rapport Mondial sur le Développement Humain 2000
- 3) WFP Lubango, Malanje, Cuito, Lobito briefing packages prepared by the SO
- 4) Draft, GOA, Regulamento para a aplicação das "normas sobre o reassentamento das populações deslocadas", 17 August 2001
- 5) Fernando Pacheco "Para cá do petróleo : a agricultura angolana em questao", 28 november 1997 conference
- 6) MSF press release : "Angola : a negligencia das partes em conflito contribui para as situações de emegencia humanitaria", 2 July 2001.
- 7) MINADER, plano dos insumos agrícola palanificados para a campanha agricola 2001-2002, August 2001
- 8) AIP (Angola Instituto de Pesquisa Economica e Social), PIC (QAD) and PEC evaluation, August 2001
- 9) Memorandum of understanding between UNICEF/WFP Angola on nutrition, draft copy undated
- 10) WFP OHA, Lessons from Afghanistan, Burundi, Somalia and Southern Sudan, Draft, July 2001
- 11) United Nations Systems in Angola, Memorandum on the draft text of the interrim poverty reduction strategy paper (I-PRSP), 2 May 2001
- 12) Draft document "terms of reference for technical coordination unit MINARS/WFP", 2 August 2001
- 13) World Bank , Missão de Supervisão" projecto de reabilitação social pos-conflito, 13 to 25 May 2001, aide-mémoire
- 14) UNHCR rapid assessment team to Angola, 8-20 April 200, and mid-term sector report, September-October 2000
- 15) GVC-OCHA, Programa de Assistência socio-sanitario ao reassentamento de Lau, Malanje, 2001
- 16) UNDP, Poverty Alleviation Policy in Angola, Luanda 2000
- 17) Briefing notes for the UN IA Mission to assess the UN response to the government's request for assistance, undated draft received 4.10.2001
- 18) EU, note to the file, comments to the draft document I-PRSP, April 12, 2001
- 19) República de Angola, Ministério das Finanças, Informação sobre a execução do programa económico e social do governo para o ano de 2001 (1 semestre), July 2001
- 20) GOA, Benguela Provincial Government, Unidade Técnica Provincial, PNEAH budget, October 2001
- 21) IMF Mission Debriefing, 31 July 2001
- 22) Letter and request for assistance from the President of the Republic of Angola, José Eduardo Dos Santos, to the UN SG, Kofi Annan, dated May 15, 2001
- 23) DANIDA, evaluation of Angola humanitarian assistance operations 1992-98, T&B Consulting



- 24) OCHA Angola, Information pack, September 2001
- 24) OCHA Angola, Reference Brief for the Humanitarian Coordinator, September 2001
- 25) MINARS, Plano Nacional de Acção de Emergência, May 2001-May 2002
- 26) CRS, Avaliação nutricional dos noveos deslocados Cubal, July 2001
- 27) MSF-B/Epicentre, Food access assessment in Kuito, July-August 2001
- 28) WFP food and Nutrition Handbook
- 29) WFP school feeding handbook
- 30) WFP 1999 Angola IDP study



Annex 5

Mission Itinerary and persons interviewed

NB. Due to the September 11, 2001 events, the mission team leader had to be changed at the last minute, and the itinerary had to be adapted to the new timeframe at very short notice. As a result instead of an initial two days work with WFP staff in Luanda, the mission went directly to the provinces for the field evaluation.

21 September 2001: arrival in Luanda and departure to Lubango (subsequent road travel to Matala. Places where beneficiaries visits/interviews were realized: Mukua (ex km 9), Fazenda Tomba, Kavela (old IDPs), Cinhanha, Chilepe, until 24 September 2001.

24 September 2001 to 26 September 2001: Malanje and surroundings (Zella resettlement site, Quizanga PIC project, Cangandala IDP camp plus both nutritional centers run by MSF-H and Concern)

26 September 2001 to 28 September 2001: Cuito and surrounding camps (Cunhinga, Nharea, Cukema, Kulamuchito, Lau, feeding centers and hospital)

29 September 2001 to 2 October 2001: Lubango and Benguela, including one day plane trip to Cubal district and surroundings

3 October 2001 to 11 October 2001: Luanda

• Persons interviewed

19-20.9.2001: Rome

Susanne Frueh, OEDE Senior Evaluation Officer and evaluation team member
Annalisa Conte, VAM

Francesco Stippoli, Senior Humanitarian Adviser, OHA and former Angola CD
Michelle Barrett Resources Mobilization Officer, Michael Crostwaite, O.I.C., REA

Rita Bhatia, Senior Program Adviser, nutrition, SPP

Stephen Anderson, Program Officer, Mario Touchette, Program Clerk, ODP

Valerie Guarnieri, Senior Policy Analyst, SPP,

Robert Kopp, Program Officer

Anthony Tyrrell, Internal Auditor, OEDA

Thomas Keusters, Chief Logistics Officer, OTL

Kees Tuinenburg, Senior Liaison Officer, Fatina Nabulsi, Liaison Officer, ODY

21.9.2001: Luanda

WFP office: Oscar Sarroca, deputy CD

Meeting with program and logistics staff

21-23.9.2001

In Lubango

Paul Charitat, Head of Sub-Office, WFP

Patrizia Papinutti, WFP Head of Programme

Antonio Martins, VAM Monitor

Mario Enoque, FAM

Antonino Alfredo, Alberto Chilanda, Benjamin Chimdombe, Frederico Cipriano Sawanga, ADESPOV

Antonio Bekebrede, ZOA

Jon Tellum, Emanuel Pereira, NRC



Belchior Tchipala, AADDHHBO
Amelia Ojanguren, CARITAS
Manuel José Teixeira, Agostinho Tchivange Nungulu, FAO
Raul Bogalho, UNICEF
Jens Kristensen, OCHA
Pedro Ebo, MINADER
José Antonio Baltazar, Provincial Coordinator, OIKOS

Mukua

3 sobas, 1 sekulu, 1 secretary. Semi-structured interview. Food distribution.

Fazenda Tomba

1 woman soba and her husband, 1 secretary, five other IDPs. Semi-structured interview

Kavela

1 man 48 years old (old IDP)

Chinhanha

TChilepe (Chipindo and Kussava communities)

Daniel Tchiloia, Kussava soba

Eduardo, soba secretary

Daniel Dandula, soba from the Chipindo community

Mrs. Tereza, Mrs. Laurinda field social assistants

Activists from 7th Day Adventist Church

Matala

Ramon, nurse, MSF-S

Pietro Bonaudi, Katia Oppo, COSV

José Manuel, Project Coordinator, NRC

José Manuel, CNR

24-26.9.01 Malanje

Lynne Miller, WFP

Joao Kamboela, OCHA

Juliao Afonso, UNICEF

Sr. Roque, MINARS provincial director

Joao Mandonga, Felicidade Fisti, MINARS

Bimpa Dieudonné Lipanzula, GVC

Americo Silva Francisco, APDC administrator

Joaquim Fernandes, director Malanje, ADRA

Fernando Chidundo, Provincial Coordinator, World Vision

Abel Martins de Sousa, Provincial Director, MINADER

PIC Quizanga project

Zella, permanent resettlement in area of origin

Emilio Jacinto, soba

Cangandala

district administrator Marco Mena, Maurizio Fristche, MSF-H

Mr. Ilidio, OIKOS

Regedor (officials) from Banza Mussende and Banza Tamba communities



Cangandala IDP camp

1 focus group interview, two individual interviews with female headed households

26-28.9.2001 Cuito

Vice-governor Bie province

together with UTCAH director, Plan provincial director, MINARS provincial director Isabel Afonsoand

MINADER provincial director

Rui Possolo, WFP

Fernando Garcia, VAM

Dominique Delley, MSF-B

Daniel Scheiwiller, ICRC

Ahmed M. Ahmed, CARE regional director

Angelo Sossango, Angolan Red Cross

Iligiario dos Santos Moura, WHO

Luis Patissi, CARITAS

Florentino Joao Inacio, ADAC

Claudio Bartolomeo Lopes, OCHA

Catholic Bishop of Bie province

Alcedo Lino dos Santos, AFRICARE

Kinanga, health assistant, UNICEF

Francisca Santos, OXFAM GB

Alfredo Junior, MINADER

Chicala

Emilio Tavares, health staff

Tiago Simao, professor

Fernando Cavanga, Catholic Church member

Rosa Cassava, water and sanitation activist

Raimundo Andre, Luciano Trigo, Estevao Cassango, sobas

Cukema

Simao Kavanda Vicente, administrator a.i.

GVC staff

Father Antonio Moreiras, Catholic Church

29.9 - 2.10.2001 Lubango, Benguela and Cubal

Mr. Felizardo, vice-governor (and Provincial Director of Planning)

Abrantes Carlos, MINADER provincial director

Dr. Ines Leopoldo, Public Health Provincial director

Peter Rodrigues, WFP

Lisette Johnston-Paiva, Anabela Araujo, FAM

José Serras Pires, OCHA

Manuel Tuca, ADRA director

Luis Carlos Esquivera, UNOPS

Fabrizio Carboni, head of sub-delegation, ICRC

John Service, program manager, Francisco Eduardo, CRS

Oscar Braga, Benguela Bishop

Cubal

district administrator

Cathy Latek, CRS



SCF mission

UNECA (Huambo IDPs in urban area of Benguela)

3 - 11.10.2001 Luanda

- **Government**

MINARS Minister

Maria da Luz C. de Sá Magalhaes, Deputy Minister, MINARS

Nilsa de Fátima Pereira Batalha, National Director, MINARS

Pedro Walipi Calenga, Manuel Fernandes, UTCAH

Afonso Peddro Canga, National director, MINADER IDA

- **WFP office**

Ronald Sibanda, WFP Representative/CD

Oscar Sarroca, Deputy CD

Iain Macdonald, Head of VA and information systems

G. Lacost, Head of VAM

Carlo Scaramella, Senior program advisor

José Antonio Castillo, Head of Operations

Maureen Forsythe, M&E Officer

Malungo, program officer

Elise Benoit, head of technical unit

Manuel Heredia, Security Officer

- **donors**

Heather H. Evans, Information Officer, Alfreda Brewer, Dr. Jeffrey Ashley, Project Director, USAID

Nicola Bertolini, Economic Adviser, Pietro Magini, Food Security,

ECHO representative

Bjorg S. Leite, Ambassador, Thor Oftedal, Second Secretary, Norwegian Embassy

Harald Ekker, Adviser, NORAD

Julio Herraiz, First Secretary, Spanish Embassy

Jean-Michel Jordan, SHA coordinator (Switzerland), Arnold Fuhrer, technical assistant

Cecilia Gjerdrum, Adviser, Swedish Embassy

Jeremy Astill-Brown, Second Secretary, British Embassy

Gérard Sivilia, Head of Cooperation, French Embassy

Ambassador, Belgian Embassy

- **UN agencies**

Erik de Mul, UN Resident & Humanitarian Coordinator, UNDP Resident Representative

Anthony Hodges, UNDP program adviser

Lise Grande, Head of OCHA office

Guy Ouellet, UNHCR Representative

Sergio Guimaraes, Senior Program Officer, UNICEF

Marjolaine Martin, Head of FAO Emergency cell

Daniele Donati, FAO Senior adviser, Nairobi

Pierre Gence, FAO Representative

Jean-Luc Tonglet, IDP Monitor, OCHA

Anders Pedersen, Chief Human Rights Division, UNOA



- **NGOs**

Renator Sangiuliano, EURONAIID country manager
Luis Monteiro, ADRA general director
Ellen Dahl, Finances and Administration Manager, NRC
Jean-Luc Anglade, MSF-F Head of mission
Raquel Ayora, MSF-S Head of mission
Claudio Gabriel, Florian De launay, NPA
Marisa Astill-Brown, Deputy director, SCF UK
Manuel Quintino, Representative, OIKOS
Sibongikosi Mushapaidze, Operations Director, WV



Annex 6

Donor Questionnaire

- 1) Name of your organisation and / or government :
- 2) Annual (2001) budget allocated to Angola (specify currency and period) :
of which : _____ percentage through NGOs
of which _____ for international NGOs
_____ for national NGOs
_____ percentage through UN agencies
of which for WFP _____
_____ percentage through government
_____ others (specify)
- 3) percentage of the 2001 budget allocated to emergency and humanitarian aid : _____ and to recovery/transition : _____ and to development aid _____
- 4) sector allocation of recovery/transition aid :
- 5) Pledges to WFP in 2001 (allocated) : _____ as percentage of total aid budget: _____
- 6) Yearly allocations to WFP since 1998 and as percentage of budget :
1998 : _____ % of budget :
1999 : _____ % of budget :
2000 : _____ % of budget :
2001 : _____ % of budget :
2002 : _____ % of budget : (foreseen)
- 7) Reason for variation in the percentage of budgetary support (increase or decrease) from 2001 to 2002:
- 8) What is your rating of the WFP PRRO operation in Angola ?(1-5 : 1 minimum 5 maximum) :
Please justify your answer :
Strengths :
Weaknesses :
Suggestions and recommendations :
- 9) Please rank (1-5 or N/A for not applicable) the WFP PRRO in the following aspects:
targeting beneficiaries :
reducing food insecurity :
reducing malnutrition :
facilitating resettlement :
contributing to gender equality :
protection and security of beneficiaries :
environmental concerns :
Results of Food for work projects :
enhance beneficiaries livelihood strategies :
develop local capacities :
empowering local communities (i.e. participatory project identification)
developing governmental responsibility:
comments :
- 10) Strengths and weaknesses of the PRRO in Angola
- 11) What can be done to improve WFP's operation in Angola ?

Thank you for your time and patience.