



World Food Programme

A Report from the Office of Evaluation



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*Full Report of the Evaluation of IRAN
PRRO 6126 – “Food Assistance and Support
for Repatriation of Iraqi and Afghan Refugees
in Iran”*

(25 January – 19 February 2002)

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Acknowledgement

The evaluation team visited Iran between 25 January and 19 February 2002. This document was prepared by the mission team leader on the basis of the mission's work in the field.

The mission was very ably assisted by two interpreters contracted in Tehran by the Country Office (both women). The mission was accompanied by different CO members for each provincial visit including variously the Country Director and officers responsible for programming/gender, monitoring and logistics. When visiting refugee camps provincial BAFIA officials accompanied the mission.

On behalf of the team, the author wishes to extend thanks to all those who facilitated the team's work in the field and in Headquarters.

Responsibility for the opinions expressed in this report rests solely with the authors. Publication of this document does not imply endorsement by WFP of the opinions expressed.

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- The mission was accompanied by Ms. Dominique Hyde, WFP Resource Mobilization Officer (for one week)



Acronyms

BAFIA	Bureau of Aliens and Foreign Immigrants Affairs
CD	Country Director (WFP)
CO	Country Office (WFP)
COPR	Country Office Progress Report
COR	Country Progress Report
CTS	Commodity Tracking System
EDP	Extended Delivery Point
EMOP	Emergency Operation
EVI	Extremely Vulnerable Individual
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization (UN)
FDP	Final Distribution Point
FFW	Food for Work
FFT	Food for Training
GAP	Gender Action Plan
GIRI	Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran
INGO	International Non-Government Organization
IOM	International Office for Migration
IP	Implementing Partner (of WFP)
ITSH	Internal Transport, Storage and Handling
JFAM	Joint Food Assessment Mission (UNHCR/WFP/GIRI)
LTSH	Landside Transport, Storage and Handling
LOU	Letter of Understanding
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PRRO	Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation
SAT	Security Awareness Training (WFP)
SO	Sub-Office (WFP)
SOG	State Organisation for Grains
UNHCR	UN High Commissioner for Refugees
VAM	Vulnerability Assessment and Mapping
WFP	World Food Programme (UN)



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Executive Summary

Departures from design and policy

The Protracted Relief and Rehabilitation Operation (PRRO) was not implemented as designed and opportunities to strengthen important aspects of WFP's operations in Iran were consequently missed. The Country Office (CO) did not conduct the planned socio-economic survey, did not proceed with the PRRO strategy of targeting and adjusting rations within and between camps, and did not provide assistance to vulnerable refugees at large as planned. Instead the CO focused on improving the accountability of the use of commodities and putting in place screening procedures to limit additions to the camp caseload. The former was very positive but the screening procedures introduced a practice of excluding many children from rations, contrary to WFP and UNHCR policy, and introduced an unfair distinction between refugees who were part of the old caseload and new arrivals, while ignoring the broader targeting issues raised by the 1998 Joint Food Assessment Mission (JFAM).

The CO is in the position of having to return to these issues three years later to improve the efficiency with which scarce resources are utilised. It has been known for some years that WFP's food assistance in Iran does not accurately reflect the actual 'food gap' of many of the refugees concerned. The need to tackle these issues is accentuated by the fact that WFP's commitments will be substantially increased if the existing ration remains in place and approximately 15,000 refugees recognised by UNHCR but previously excluded are added as recommended herein.

WFP's guidelines provide that the food and nutrition situation of refugees should be systematically reviewed at least every 12 months but this has not been done in Iran for over three years (the first JFAM since 1998 commenced immediately after this evaluation). The challenge now is to establish more regular means of testing if the right amount of food is being provided to the right refugees and to gather the information about food security required to make adjustments and/or introduce targeting where necessary/appropriate.

The issue of providing foods assistance to non-camp refugees also deserves to be finally addressed given that only 3% of the estimated 2.65 million refugees in Iran are in camps and some of the non-camp refugees are suspected to be more food insecure than many of those in the camps. WFP assistance only reaches 1% of all Afghan refugees in Iran.

Meeting the basic food needs of refugees in camps

The main activity of the PRRO is continuing to provide food assistance to Iraqi and Afghan refugees in camps, since 1997 a uniform 1,680 kcal ration, set below a standard reference ration anticipating that refugees can secure 20% of their food requirements themselves. At the end of 2001 WFP was providing this ration to 62,200 refugees (60% Iraqi and 40% Afghan) out of a total encamped population of 78,000.

The operation was 78% resourced against assessed requirements for the camps up to the end of 2001. The deficit resulted in periodic commodity shortages, particularly in the first



nine months of the PRRO, and short supply to the refugees assisted. In caloric equivalents beneficiaries received an average of 1,257 kcals per person per day over eighteen months (75% of the 1,680 kcals planned). Afghan refugees, who are probably the most vulnerable to food insecurity, fared worse than the Iraqi refugees due mainly to larger overall supply deficits. In the absence of nutritional surveillance it is impossible to assess the impact of undersupply. Although Afghan refugee children appear to be doing less well than local Iranian children the evaluation mission did not see frank malnutrition.

Other activities

WFP introduced an oil incentive for girls' to attend primary schools in refugee camps in 1997, which has continued under the PRRO. This is a successful activity and steady progress has been made over the years, although the reduced target set for the PRRO of 7,000 girls enrolled was not quite achieved (83% of the target). There have also been problems with the delivery of the oil incentive to families – on average 71% of requirements have been met. It would be appropriate to review this component soon.

WFP has also continued to provide assistance in collaboration with UNHCR to Iraqis who repatriate. The planning figure for the PRRO is 12,000 but only 1,500 Iraqi refugees had been assisted by the end of 2001 (with 40 kgs of wheat flour each). In the case of Iraqi Kurds this is because the voluntary repatriation program was terminated by UNHCR when the government of Iraq insisted that they be repatriated at a border point that entered government controlled territory. In the case of Iraqi Arabs the main factor appears to have been poor communication between UNHCR and WFP.

In no other ways does the PRRO pursue recovery activities. Indeed the PRRO project document did not include a recovery (or phasing-down) strategy, and no effort was made to develop one, even though this is now a clear requirement of the PRRO guidelines.

Resourcing

The operation has had to rely heavily on (uncertain) multi-lateral contributions and this is the explanation given for the fact that it was only 78% resourced through to the end of 2001. As of January 2002 the PRRO was actually well resourced (over 97%), but this and the earlier figure (78%) are based on accepted caseloads which exclude 20% of encamped refugees recognised by UNHCR and make no allowance for assisting any refugees outside camps.

It should be possible to offset the recommended increase in coverage of encamped refugees with ration adjustments (discussed elsewhere) but assistance to non-camp refugees requires additional resources.

Management, accountability and operational efficiency

The CO's implementation of the PRRO in the period 1999/2000 was strong in terms of logistics/contracting and commodity control. These were matters that had to be addressed and the CO's considerable achievements in these areas offset to some extent other weaknesses in the implementation of the PRRO.

Operational efficiency was improved by using commercial transporters for all commodities in the food basket other than wheat/wheat flour. Unfortunately there have been chronic problems with the arrangement with the State Organisation for Grains (SOG) for the release of wheat flour to camps (the one area not commercialised). BAFIA has only partially been able to ameliorate this problem by borrowings. There have also



been some delays with wheat shipments, which have been dealt with effectively by the CO borrowing from the SOG.

Accountability for the use of food had been weak but was tightened up very significantly. The CO did this by gaining access to the camps and instituting a routine of quarterly camp visits. This was a leap forward compared to the prevailing situation. However, food security and impact monitoring is not yet in place and programming has been weak, reflected in an inadequate attempt to implement the PRRO as designed, the institution of practices that are clearly contrary to policy, and the indecisive handling of a number of issues including the question of assisting non-camp refugees.

Partnership and coordination

WFP's implementing partner, BAFIA, is very capable and has generally contributed positively to the implementation of the PRRO. WFP is respected for the continuity of its assistance. Relations with UNHCR have at times been fraught and collaboration has been weak as a result. There have been several occasions where UNHCR has requested WFP to provide food assistance and WFP has declined to do so. Some or all of these matters should have been addressed by HQ (in Rome and Geneva) given that they were not resolved in the field.

Relations between WFP and UNHCR were generally poor during the period evaluated. WFP and UNHCR do not have a Joint Action Plan for assistance to refugees in Iran as foreseen in the global MoU, and there is no tripartite agreement between WFP, UNHCR and BAFIA.

MAIN RECOMMENDATIONS¹

PRRO strategy and design

- The PRRO Guidelines should be reviewed to clarify ambiguity with respect to recovery strategy and components. In the mission's view that recovery should be a standard component in any PRRO, irrespective of whether it relates to a protracted relief or a protracted refugee situation.
- WFP should anticipate changes and the need for the revision of protracted relief and recovery strategies and planned outputs by developing a) mechanisms for reviewing and approving changes requested by the CO and b) review procedures to be applied at least annually to ensure that PRRO strategies and planned outputs are relevant and appropriate and reflect experience gained during implementation and changes 'on the ground'. In both cases, changes have to be documented to guide implementation. This probably requires drafting a revised PRRO project document (or some other document that can 'carry' the changes and guide implementation) and obtaining the approval of the Executive Board or its delegate if the nature of the changes is so fundamental to warrant it.
- If this broader recommendation is not accepted, the PRRO Guidelines should at least be revised to provide that no PRRO should be delayed in its implementation, or extended, for more than twelve months without being subjected to internal review and

¹ This is not an exhaustive list and some of the recommendations have been summarised – please refer to the body of the report.



the approval of changes in strategy and/or planned outputs at an appropriate level. As noted above, the agreed changes should be documented.

- The CO should document its current protracted relief strategies, given that they have departed fundamentally from the PRRO design document, and develop and document a recovery strategy in close consultation with UNHCR, including a broad strategy for promoting self-reliance and phasing down assistance where appropriate, and accompanied by discrete recovery activities.
- Every effort should be made to undertake some analysis of gender relations in the different refugee caseloads and the special needs of women to better address WFP's Commitments to Women in the next PRRO project document.

Assessment & targeting

- The CO should stop distinguishing between its 'old' caseload and 'newcomers'/'new' camps and assess the needs of all encamped refugees recognised by UNHCR on the same basis. The practice of excluding children under two years of age and restricting the number of children assisted to three per family should cease.
- The CO should develop a strategy for adjusting rations more closely to actual food needs to increase efficiency in the use of scarce resources. The evaluation mission's preferred approach is to institute a revised general ration to be adjusted to meet the food gap of the different refugee groups (Afghans, Iraqi Arabs and Kurds), supplemented with additional food assistance for the minority assessed as being unable to cope (or at risk of not being able to cope) on the general ration.
- WFP and UNHCR should consider supplementing the information provided by JFAMs by collaborating to establish a baseline and monitor food security and the impact of food assistance, with a focus on potentially marginalised groups in the camps and in any areas in which vulnerable at large refugees are assisted. An alternative may be to rely on periodic UNHCR/WFP/BAFIA rapid verification exercises focused on testing the assumptions underpinning rations and targeting (the 'mini-JFAMs' recommended earlier).

Logistics

- If no new information and no credible assurances on wheat supply are forthcoming from SOG, the CO should tender for a commercial alternative (requiring a budget revision to include ITSH). The CO should attempt to maintain a capacity to borrow wheat from the government in the event of a delay in shipment.

Assisting non-camp refugees

- Non-camp refugees should be assisted if their need for a general distribution can be cogently demonstrated. Otherwise, assistance should be limited to activities with a 'recovery' element and/or a linkage to repatriation focused on Afghans in areas where vulnerability is reported to be high. The CO should consider using VAM to identify where these activities should be established.

Management and Coordination

- Planning and decision-making in the CO should be structured as a more consultative process to encourage robust input from all national staff.
- WFP and UNHCR should conclude a Joint Action Plan for assistance to refugees in Iran incorporating a clearly enunciated strategy for camp and non-camp refugees, with linkages to the anticipated repatriation operation and including a phase-out strategy for assistance to the camps.



- Commitments to Women
- The CO needs to formulate a strategy for improving the status of refugee women and addressing their strategic needs. The CO should consider proceeding by raising the issue with the UNHCR office in Iran, suggesting that the gender focal points for the two agencies prepare a joint WFP/UNHCR gender strategy for refugees in Iran for discussion.

MAIN LESSONS

The revision of PRRO strategies and outputs

- WFP cannot effectively direct its operations if the CO is able to depart from strategies and outputs agreed by the Executive Board without oversight and approval at an appropriate level. Moreover, for as long as there is no procedure for generating an updated design document to reflect fundamental changes, COs will not have the benefit of this design tool during implementation, which will impact on the effectiveness of the operation. This represents a gap in Results Based Management.
- WFP's capacity to efficiently utilise resources
- The efficiency with which WFP utilises the resources put at its disposal is easily circumscribed by the unwillingness of the host government to review ration scales so that they more accurately reflect the actual 'food gap' of the refugees concerned. This suggests that WFP, with the support of the UN system, needs generally to invest much more in negotiating rational outcomes.



1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Evaluation objectives

The objectives of the evaluation were:

- To assess the efficiency, relevance, effectiveness, coherence and sustainability of WFP assistance under the PRRO in order to improve the implementation of the current operation and assist with planning the next phase;
- To assess the usefulness of the PRRO category both as a resource window and as a programming instrument; and
- To provide accountability to the Executive Board.

1.2 Scope of work

The evaluation is expected to:

- Review the PRRO's recovery strategy, assessing how it was formulated, how it has evolved over the life of the project and its relevance to the situation analysis.
- Assess the PRRO's component elements (protracted refugee, repatriation and incentives for girls education) to determine a) if the activities are taking place, outputs are being delivered and targets are being reached and b) if this is sufficient to achieve the stated objectives.
- Assess the systems and support (financial, staff, partnerships, etc.) underlying the PRRO and on a more general level the strategic linkages between the component elements to determine whether the PRRO has successfully seized opportunities for recovery.
- Examine the participation of implementing partners, sister agencies, and other stakeholders: first, to determine their contribution to meeting WFP's objectives; and second, to shed light on whether the PRRO has contributed 'to the process of transforming insecure, fragile conditions into durable, stable situations'.
- Consider how effectively the Commitments to Women have been integrated in the design of the operation, in broad terms assessing how well the consideration of gender relations have been mainstreamed into the operation's activities.

1.3 Method

The mission consisted of Bernard Broughton, Team Leader (consultant); Paolo Mattei, WFP Evaluation Officer, WFP HQ (for half the mission); Dominique Hyde, WFP Resources Mobilization Officer, WFP HQ (for one week) and Dr Masoud Kimiagar, Nutritionist (consultant). The mission was very ably assisted by two interpreters contracted in Tehran by the CO (both women). The mission was accompanied by different CO members for each provincial visit including variously the Country Director and officers responsible for programming/gender, monitoring and logistics. When visiting refugee camps provincial BAFIA officials accompanied the mission.

The evaluation was conducted in January and February 2002 and included 25 days in Iran, 17 of which were spent in the provinces. (See **Annex F, Mission Itinerary**). The mission visited four provinces and seven of the 29 refugee camps currently assisted by WFP (nearly one quarter). The camps are listed and the criteria for their selection given in **Annex A, Evaluation Methods**. The mission adopted a basic 'three day model' for the visit to each province, which included briefings and debriefings with BAFIA officials, and a basic model for each camp visit together with a checklist (see Annex A). The mission spent a minimum of five hours in each camp visited. The mission also visited some concentrations of refugees not living in camps. The persons interviewed are listed in **Annex D** and the documents reviewed are listed in **Annex E**.



As a preliminary exercise the Team Leader prepared a results hierarchy (the first column of a Logframe) to clarify the objectives and intended outputs and activities of the PRRO. This was to have been the basis of a self-evaluation by the CO but this was not conducted. An extensive file search was conducted in the CO.

To further identify the key issue (those in the ToR are generic) the Team Leader requested the CO and mission members to state what they saw as the five ‘burning issues’ for the evaluation. The issues put forward by the CO are included in Annex A. The evaluation subsequently included a SWOT analysis of the PRRO with the CO, conducted with the participation of the Country Director in West Azerbaijan Province.

The evaluation went well but was constrained by a number of factors. The Team Leader had not previously worked in Iran and a key member of the team, a second consultant, had to pull out due to medical reasons. UNHCR did not participate in the evaluation and indeed plan to conduct a separate evaluation. The UNHCR office in Tehran asked the CO if they could be involved in the evaluation, noting that this had been the case in recent evaluations and that it would lay the groundwork for the JFAM.² But this was not discussed at headquarter levels.

Given that various meanings, some of them inaccurate, are attributed to key concepts used in this evaluation (food insecurity, vulnerability and self-reliance) definitions are included in **Annex A**.

2. CONTEXT OF PROTRACTED CRISIS AND WFP’S PRRO

2.1 Background on the evolution of the protracted situation³

Iran borders Iraq on the west and Afghanistan on the east – two countries that have undergone considerable civil and military strife over the years generating large numbers of displaced people and refugees. The Islamic Republic of Iran has maintained a generally liberal approach towards refugees and has hosted a large number of refugees for many years – indeed more than any other country in the world.

The government carried out a registration of all foreigners in the country during February and March 2001 and the mission was informed that 2.65 million people were registered, 2.35 million of whom were Afghans, and that the actual number of foreigners is likely to be 2.8 million allowing for a minimum of 10% not registering.⁴

Only 3% of the 2.65 million refugees registered reside in camps (77,980 at the end of 2001 of which 49% were Iraqi Arabs, 10% were Iraqi Kurds and 41% were Afghans). The vast majority are ‘at large’, typically residing in the provinces bordering their country of origin and in major urban areas. Some rural settlements are mainly inhabited by refugees, especially in eastern Iran.

Of the 30 current camps, three were established in the 1970s (in the west), 15 in the 1980s (including nine in 1988) and 12 in the 1990s (all but two in the 1990-1992 period). The camps are managed by BAFIA and receive assistance from UNHCR. WFP currently provides food assistance to 29 of the camps.

WFP has been active in Iran for fifteen years now, providing food assistance to Afghan refugees since 1987 through one EMOP, nine PROs and now PRRO 6126 and to Iraqi refugees since 1988 through a series of three EMOPs, six PROs and PRRO 6126.

² See letter from Christopher Lee dated 14 August 2001.

³ Sources include key informants in Iran; WFP project documents (PRO 5950, PRRO 6126 and EMOP 10126); UNHCR documents (including the 2002 Country Operations Plan); and ReliefWeb.

⁴ Information from Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)



Afghans

The majority of Afghans in Iran took refuge during the Soviet occupation that commenced in 1979 and extended through the 1980s. At the peak of the Afghan War Iran hosted an estimated 2.9 million Afghans. By 1992/93, WFP food was reaching around 200,000 Afghan refugees in rural settlements established by the Government in Khorasan, Sistan-Baluchistan and Kerman Provinces. Although an estimated 1.4 million Afghan refugees remained in Iran most refugees from the rural settlements had been repatriated by 1994 following the fall of the Najibullah regime in 1992. WFP assistance was scaled down to 22,000 persons remaining in six formal refugee camps and this number has remained relatively stable ever since. It was still 22,000 when PRO 5950 commenced in April 1998, had risen to 24,250 by the time the PRRO commenced in mid-2000 and is now just under 24,700. Approximately 1,000 of the increased number were refugees accepted for assistance in an additional camp (Torbat-e-Jam in Khorasan Province).

The UN estimate of total Afghan refugees in Iran remained at 1.4 million from 1994 to April 1998 when PRO 5950 commenced, although the government presented higher estimates. As mentioned above, the government carried out a registration in early 2001, which put the number of Afghans at 2.35 million. This would appear to indicate a net increase since PRO 5950 commenced, despite the fact that there were periods when considerable numbers were repatriated, most notably through 2000. According to UNHCR approximately 50,000 Afghan refugees returned to Afghanistan from mid-July to the end of 1999 followed by more than double this number through 2000. During the first months of 2001 the number of Afghans entering Iran again increased significantly due to the consequences of the drought as well as continuing hostilities. By May the government acknowledged that a new influx of some 200,000 Afghan refugees had crossed its borders in recent months (UNHCR confirmed these estimates).

A major influx was expected in October 2001 following the intervention in Afghanistan but Iran closed its borders restricting the number that entered. Herat fell on 7 November and following the fall of the Taliban there was some spontaneous repatriation to Afghanistan (mainly Tajiks and mainly going initially to Herat). By 3 January 2002 some 45,000 had returned through Dogharoun according to UNHCR.

In early 2002 BAFIA announces that the widespread repatriation of Afghan refugees from Iran will start in Spring (from 21 March). UNHCR announced that its repatriation planning figure for 2002 was 400,000. Different opinions are expressed about whether the camp population will be the first or the last to go. It seems unlikely that they would be in the first phases of a voluntary repatriation programme.

Iraqis

Iraqi refugees consist of Arabs Shiites from government-controlled areas in the central and southern provinces of Iraq (representing the largest number of Iraqi refugees in Iran); Feilli Kurds (Shiites) who were denied Iraqi citizenship on the grounds of their Iranian ancestry; and Iraqi Kurds from the northern provinces. The Arab Shiites and Feilli Kurds initially fled to Iran during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) and following the chemical bombardment of Halebjah and other areas in 1988.

Iraqi Kurds came mainly in the period 1971-75 with a smaller influx over the period 1988-1991, including following the Gulf war in 1991. Many Kurds repatriated in the second half of 1991 after a general amnesty was announced by the Government of Iraq but around half of the total Iraqi refugee population remained in Iran, mainly for political and socio-economic reasons. There was an additional influx of Iraqi Kurds in the autumn of 1996 following hostilities between the Kurdish factions in northern Iraq but by mid-December 1996 almost all of these additional refugees returned to Iraq.

At the commencement of PRO 5950 in April 1998 there were an estimated 600,000 Iraqis in Iran. Of these, some 480,000 were refugees from the 1971-75 period and of the remaining 120,000 people some 65,000 were residing in camps and receiving WFP/UNHCR assistance. The government now estimates the total number of Iraqis living in Iran to be less than 300,000, mostly of Arab origin.



2.2 Food insecurity and poverty among those affected

Refugees in camps

There are noticeable differences in the general conditions between the different encamped refugee populations. The Iraqi Arabs generally have better housing and higher levels of self-reliance, followed by the Iraqi Kurds and then the Afghans who are the worst off. The mission's conclusions concerning relative self-reliance are based on statements of key informants and refugees in the camps visited, the household belongings of refugees interviewed, the way they utilise their rations, and what was on sale in the markets in the camps (e.g. chicken heads and feet in the Bardsir Afghan refugee camp in Kerman Province compared to full animal carcasses in butcher shops outside the Ziveh Kurdish refugee camp in West Azerbaijan.). However, the mission did not observe or gather any information that could effectively demonstrate different nutritional outcomes between the caseloads.

The apparent disparities in levels of self-reliance appear to be a function of the proximity of the camps to employment opportunities (including casual or seasonal labour) and special assistance delivered to Iraqi Arabs by various organisations based on ethnic/religious affinities. The Iraqi Arabs also appear to have access to better paid jobs, including employment with the military organisation Sepah Badr and with the municipality.

This is not to say that all Afghans, Iraqi Arabs and Iraqi Kurds are in uniform circumstances. There are marked differences between the condition of refugees in Rafsanjan and Bardsir Afghan camps in Kerman province, between Ziveh and Dilzeh Kurdish camps in West Azerbaijan Province, and between Jahrom and Sarvestan Iraqi Arab camps in Fars Province. The common denominator appears to be better access to employment in the first named camp in each province.

The PRO 5950 project document recorded that 30 percent of adult male refugees living in camps have been able to find some employment outside the camps and that of these 20 percent have permanent employment. Although the opportunities vary considerably from camp to camp, the evaluation mission believes that the proportion of male refugees finding work (including casual labour and seasonal work) is much higher than this. It is also noted that the ration that has been in place since 1997 is premised on (all) refugee households being able to earn enough money to provide at least 20% of their food requirements.

It is difficult for Afghan refugee women to leave the camps and they don't work. Kurdish refugee women on the other hand do leave the camps and seek casual and seasonal work, normally accompanied by another family member. The mission received reports of Iraqi Arab women participating in seasonal work (sorting fruit after harvest) but it seems they do not typically work.

It should be noted that in addition to the camps recognised by the UN there are a number of camps that do not receive assistance that could be described as 'detention' or 'transit' camps/centres. In March 2001 UNHCR informed WFP that they had found 'deplorable' conditions in such camps for new arrivals from Afghanistan.

Refugees 'at large'

For both Afghan and Iraqi refugees, those living outside the camps are largely considered self-reliant, earning their livelihoods in various types of employment, trades and businesses. The most common forms of employment mentioned to mission members were casual work in the construction industry and seasonal farm work (orchards, pistachio farms, etc). The daily labor rate is around 20,000 rials.

The PRO 5950 project document (December 1997) stated that only those unable to achieve self-reliance are accommodated in camps. The PRRO 6126 project document similarly stated that the most vulnerable refugees are 'preferentially settled' in camps by the government to ensure they receive assistance. Reporting for the second half of 2000 the CO maintained that 'WFP continued to assist the selected most vulnerable refugees'. Provincial BAFIA officials stressed to the mission that the most vulnerable refugees are in the camps and that refugees at large do not want to enter the camps.

It may be generally be true that the more vulnerable refugees are in camps but in the absence of survey data it is not possible to be sure that this is the case or that all refugees outside camps are coping. The



camps might have originally accommodated the most vulnerable, but given that the government seems to have more or less frozen the number of refugees in camps it is difficult to maintain that they continue to serve the function of accommodating those unable to achieve self-reliance.

The 1998 JFAM was informed that there were ‘pockets of destitute refugees’ outside the camps, noting however that no accurate data was available. The JFAM suggested that the number of vulnerable refugees outside camps had increased due to the downslide in the global oil price and its affect on the heavily subsidised Iranian economy and in turn work opportunities for refugees. There have also been three consecutive years of drought impacting on all sectors of the economy and wheat production was down for 2001. Nevertheless there is still no data because no studies or surveys have been undertaken. There is a lot of conjecture but little to guide programming.

The evaluation mission visited a concentration of reportedly vulnerable non-camp refugees in each of the four provinces visited. Although nothing alarming was witnessed during these brief visits (e.g. no destitution or signs of severe malnutrition in children) the mission cannot say that no problem exists. Access to employment is the key and the biggest threats are the possibility that the labour laws will be strictly enforced and that pressure will be put on refugees to repatriate.

2.3 National policies & priorities

As has been mentioned, Iran has taken a generally liberal stand in providing asylum to refugees. Some Afghans have been refused entry and others rounded up during certain periods and placed in detention centres, camps or settlements and sometimes deported. But this is not the norm. Refugee access to employment has generally been tolerated despite the labour laws, which is critical. Refugee camps are now ‘open’ and refugees can travel if they obtain a pass to do so, enabling men in the remoter camps to seek work elsewhere. Refugees at large generally have access to subsidised bread (like the rest of the population), they generally have access to health facilities (although payment is required), and some are able to send their children to Iranian state schools (if they are ‘legal’ and have a temporary pass). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs told the mission that in these and other ways Iran contributes US\$3 per day per refugee amounting to US\$3 billion per year. The Government does not however allocate land to refugees. UNHCR is providing some support to government education and health services in areas where there are high concentrations of refugees.

While the government continues to provide asylum to large numbers of refugees it has in recent years been stressing the financial burden on Iran and the need for greater international assistance (which it perceives to be deficient). The government’s policy has always been to repatriate refugees where conditions permit but through 2000 refugees were increasingly described as economic migrants, there was greater emphasis on their ‘temporary’ status, and there was more emphasis on repatriation.

It is not just about the financial burden. There is now a generally negative perception of refugees across the political spectrum and amongst the public and the government is under pressure to deal with refugees, particularly the Afghans. There is high unemployment in Iran and the mission was frequently told by officials that refugees are robbing jobs from Iranians, although some officials conceded that cheap refugee labour underpins sections of the economy and that Iran will need some ‘guest workers’ for a considerable time. There is also a widespread concern that refugees are involved in drug trafficking and smuggling and a belief by some that they are a public health risk.

In February 2001 the government communicated its concern regarding a rise in tensions between refugees and the local population. It was reported that in Yazd Province locals had demanded that refugees be expelled – at that time Yazd had a population of 750,000 and hosted 150,000 refugees. The government subsequently identified a ‘settlement’ for them but the UN declined to provide assistance.

In May 2001 the government stated that it would deport any new influx from Afghanistan if it did not receive international assistance and subsequently refused to allow Afghan refugees across its border and deported most of those intercepted. Two camps were formed on the Afghan side of the border with the assistance of some NGOs. The UN was prepared to assist the refugees if they entered Iran but declined to provide assistance on the Afghan side of the border. As a result of government policy the escalating crisis in Afghanistan through 2001 did not impact substantially on the PRRO because the influx was



(apparently) relatively small and those managing to enter Iran were not referred to the camps assisted by WFP.

Following the registration of both documented and undocumented refugees during February and March 2001, a new refugee law was adopted by the Iranian Islamic Consultative Assembly (the parliament) in April 2001 that came into effect on 23 June 2001. Article 48 requires that all foreign nationals not benefiting from a work permit (i.e. almost all refugees) must leave the country unless they would face 'physical threats' if returned. Article 48 is also associated with a stricter interpretation of the labour laws and the Ministry of Labour has made some moves to restrict the employment of refugees in the construction industry.

In April 2001 WFP reported that the overall policy of the government is to identify the refugee population in order to expel undocumented aliens and gradually place the documented ones in selected sites (camps/settlements) before embarking on a campaign for international assistance to aid these refugees.⁵

The events in September 2001 have intervened and the government is now seizing the opportunity to collaborate with the UN in the repatriation of Afghans, stressing that Afghanistan now has a recognised government and relative peace. Provincial BAFIA officials told the mission that the government does not want new camps or the expansion of the existing ones – the emphasis has shifted to repatriation. It remains to be seen what pressure the government will apply on refugees if a large-scale repatriation does not proceed.

The Bureau for Aliens and Foreign Immigrants Affairs (BAFIA), the agency responsible for refugees and WFP and UNHCR's implementing partner, informed the mission that all refugees currently in camps should continue to receive food from WFP and that these rations should be distributed equally (i.e. no targeting). Although provincial BAFIA officials seemed ambivalent about support for non-camp refugees, at the debriefing senior BAFIA officials requested that WFP proceed with assistance to non-camp refugees and specified that the ceiling should be 200,000, not the 40,000 planned for the PRRO.

In terms of the possibility of instituting food-for-work activities BAFIA remains negative and would only consider such activities in addition to the monthly care and maintenance rations.

2.4 Role of food aid and rationale for WFP assistance

WFP is the principal provider of food assistance to refugees in Iran although some assistance has been provided by the Iranian Red Crescent Society to the Be'Sat Iraqi refugee camp in collaboration with the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), and some local and international NGOs. UNHCR has provided assistance for care and maintenance support, including health, sanitation, water supply, educational infrastructure and (at least in the past) income generation activities.

The nature of WFP's operations has not changed substantially since 1994 although the oil incentive for girls' education was added in 1997 (discussed below). PRRO 6126 is in practice an extension of the PRO that preceded it with the same components and a similar caseload. The 1998 JFAM provided some 'new thinking' which was incorporated in the PRRO project document which provided that food assistance would be more targeted than before and (at the same time) that WFP should consider vulnerability irrespective of whether refugees are in camps or not (i.e. targeting within camps but the extension of assistance beyond the camps). This strategy was not put into effect and assistance has continued to be focused on the camps (with efforts made to freeze if not reduce the number assisted) and no progress has been made in targeting or phasing down this assistance.

⁵ WFP Emergency Report No 15 – 12 April 2001



The oil incentive for girls' education was added to reduce the gender gap between boys and girls attending primary schools in the camps. It was found that parents tended not to send their girls to school, especially in the Afghan camps and that the gender gap was wide: on average, boys registered at school accounted for 12 percent of the total camp population, while girls accounted for only five percent. The gap was found to be wider at higher grades, with girl students tending to drop out of secondary school.

2.5 Overview of the PRRO

WFP's Executive Board approved the Iran PRRO in May 1999 to cover the period from 1 July 1999 to 30 June 2000. Implementation was delayed for one year until 1 July 2000, according to the CO because a stocktake of commodities in government stores in May 1999 had revealed a significant balance requiring the extension of the preceding operation, PRO 5950.⁶ The commencement of the PRRO was then further delayed pending the conclusion of an LOU with BAFIA and finally commenced on 1 July 2000. The PRRO was subsequently extended by two budget revisions until 30 June 2002 and may now be further extended until the end of 2002.

The stated goals of WFP food assistance to Iran under PRRO 6126 are to:

- a) ensure that basic food needs for survival of the refugees are met, considering also that many camps are in remote areas;
- b) provide food to refugees outside camps, based on vulnerability criteria;
- c) through an oil incentive, encourage girls to attend camp schools set up by the Iranian Government, at the same time contributing to the household budget as well as to the household's food intake; and
- d) support UNHCR-assisted repatriation of refugees through the provision of a one-time wheat package of 50 kilograms upon departure, as a transitory ration until the repatriates find more regular supply systems in their home countries.

Under a) and b) the PRRO was to have provided food assistance to up to 84,000 located in refugee camps and 40,000 vulnerable refugees outside camps. Food assistance has continued to be provided to refugees in camps although the number in camps and the proportion assisted had declined by the time implementation of the PRRO commenced - approximately 62,200 were assisted from mid-2000 to the end of 2001. No assistance was provided to refugees outside camps other than 5,000 rations given to BAFIA each month for distribution at its discretion. (See further *Results of the PRRO*.)

The assistance referred to under c) and d) was to have included the provision of an incentive to 7,000 girls attending primary school in the camps and the provision of assistance to 12,000 Iraqis returning with official UNHCR assistance. The oil incentive component has been successful although the number of girls included in the programme had only reached 5,841 by the third quarter of 2001. The repatriation component has encountered changed circumstances and some communication difficulties with UNHCR and only 1,500 Iraqis had received WFP assistance by the end of 2001. (See further *Results of the PRRO*.)

UNHCR has supported various training courses and income generating activities over the years in cooperation with the relevant technical agency of the government. The training courses have engaged men in carpentry, electrical work and brick making and income generating activities for girls and women have included kilim and carpet weaving and clothes making. The activities appear to have come and gone over the years (perhaps reflecting project cycles) with mixed results. There have been problems with continuing to provide materials for income-generating activities and in marketing.

⁶ This does not seem to be a sufficient reason to extend the PRO – the commodities could presumably have been transferred to the PRRO.



In September 2001 the UN Secretary General launched a consolidated Inter-Agency Alert appealing to the international community to fund a six-month emergency operation to respond to deteriorating humanitarian conditions in Afghanistan. In response WFP launched regional EMOP 10126.0 *Emergency Food Assistance to Refugees and Vulnerable Populations in Afghanistan*. Afghan refugees formerly assisted under PRRO 6126 are to be assisted under this EMOP until 30 March 2002. As a result, the current planning figure for the PRRO is only 44,200 beneficiaries (37,500 of them Iraqi refugees in camps and the balance for the oil incentive for girls' education and repatriation).

3. QUALITY OF THE PRRO STRATEGY AND DESIGN

3.1 Assessment of the PRRO strategy⁷

Protracted relief

The different strategies included in the PRO 5950 and PRRO 6126 project documents, in both cases based on JFAM findings and recommendations, provided good foundations for strengthening WFP's operations over the relevant periods. But the CO departed from the strategies set forth in fundamental ways and developed its own based on its assessment of what could and should be done. Most significantly, the CO did not proceed with the new targeting strategy set out in PRRO 6126 and instead adopted a screening strategy to reduce growth in the number assisted (including the provision that newborns would only be added to beneficiary lists when they reached 2 years and only then if the number of children in the family did not exceed 3). On the other hand the CO concentrated on improving the delivery of commodities and accountability, with positive results, neither of which were foreshadowed in the project documents.

The departure from the stated PRRO strategy raises fundamental issue of coordination and authority for WFP. A lot of effort goes into JFAMs and the recommendations represent consensus between WFP and UNHCR. Changes in strategy should be mutually agreed and documented. More importantly, PRRO design documents contain key strategies and related outputs that are approved by WFP's Executive Board and they should in principle be pursued. Of course ROs and COs need some flexibility in the way operations are implemented. The problem is that WFP lacks procedures for ensuring that changes are reviewed and approved at an appropriate level. The risks in not having such procedures are underlined by the actions of the CO in limiting additions to beneficiary numbers by excluding newborns in the camps until they reach two years of age and restricting assistance to three children per family (contrary to WFP and UNHCR policy).

This is not to suggest that obstacles be put in the path of change. Strategic planning does not work well as a one-off exercise – it should be promoted as an ongoing process. Thus WFP needs to find a means of ensuring a) that COs and ROs engage with the strategies set out in project documents and b) that COs and ROs have an authorised means of revising strategies when it is necessary and/or appropriate to do so.

The alternative strategy adopted by the CO through 1999/2000 of introducing and maintaining screening procedures may have seemed prudent given resourcing difficulties but it did not constitute an effective targeting strategy and it would have been more effective to pursue the issue of the disparities within and between camps. (See further *Assessment & Targeting* below.)

⁷ The table of contents included in the TOR specify that this heading should be 'Assessment of the recovery strategy' however this has been broadened to encompass the protracted relief strategy and it is recommended that this be required in future evaluations.



Recovery

PRRO 6126 includes two recovery type elements, the oil incentive to encourage girls to attend schools in refugee camps and support for UNHCR-assisted repatriation of refugees. These are long-standing WFP activities continued under the PRRO. In no other respect does the PRRO project document include a recovery (or phasing-down) strategy and no mechanisms were established for developing one. The guidelines had not yet been released when the PRRO project document was drafted but the policy document 'From Crisis to Recovery' had been published several months earlier and once the guidelines were available a recovery strategy should have been developed.

There is a brief explanation in the PRRO project document that the government's policy of insisting on the 'temporary' status of refugees limited any institutional support to the implementation of recovery or income-generating activities. It is also observed that previous income-generating projects (undertaken mainly by UNHCR) had not performed well and that the government was not interested in substituting the general ration with any element of FFW (which remains the case).

WFP has been involved in care and maintenance operations in Iran for 15 years and the CO simply has to push the envelope and see what recovery strategies and activities it can come up with. This is never easy in the camp context, particularly where refugees don't have access to land, but this is not a new challenge for WFP (or UNHCR). In some other operations with a long-standing refugee caseload the WFP/UNHCR emphasis has been on increasing self-reliance while phasing down assistance. The CO should study other operations to see what could be adapted in Iran.

In terms of discrete recovery type activities, literacy training for women and support for health facilitators are possibilities, adopting a similar approach to the oil incentive for the attendance of girls in camp school. The CO could also consider expanding the oil incentive for girls into a school feeding programme for both camp and vulnerable non-camp concentrations. In the case of the camps it could compensate for a gradual reduction in rations (if this was undertaken) and in the case of vulnerable non-camp refugees it could be a means of targeting assistance while encouraging education with a focus on girls. However, this would be a big undertaking, it may not be possible to include it under the School Feeding Initiative, and the CO would have to first establish the need for the additional food (possibly by mobilising teachers to complete a questionnaire), and the priority for such a programme in the regional context.

It should be borne in mind that the ability of refugees to work in Iran has been the single most important factor in securing a high degree of refugee self-reliance and that their continued access to work is critical. It is also noteworthy that those working in the cities in construction and other semi-skilled roles have learned a trade that will stand them in good stead if and when they return home. If WFP could find a way of reinforcing access to work, particularly semi-skilled or skilled work, this would strengthen self-reliance and recovery in the country of origin of the refugees if and when they return. If a camp population remains WFP could explore access to work as a key component of a phase down/out strategy for food assistance. These are sensitive issues that would require the support/advocacy of the UN system. Any strategy concerning training and self-reliance should include access to work for women.

It is noted that although the guidelines clearly require a recovery strategy they do not clearly require that a PRRO include a recovery component: "Each PRRO programme may include one or more of three main components - protracted relief, protracted refugee and recovery". This is inconsistent with the requirement that a PRRO include a recovery strategy because a CO cannot seize opportunities for recovery when they arise if the recovery component has not been considered and activities have not been budgeted. In this respect the guidelines do not accurately reflect the policy paper approved by the Board in May 1998 "From Crisis to Recovery".

3.2 Assessment of the PRRO design

PRRO 6126 is in effect an extension of PRO 5950 and the two project documents have the same components and similar targets. The PRO 5950 project document provides more background



information and is better written, nevertheless the PRRO's objective statements are clear and the document is coherent. As a road map for implementation there are deficiencies in the level of detail about how some strategies are to be implemented, including the more targeted approach to be adopted under PRRO 6126. In particular, it was not made clear how the CO and its partner BAFIA would implement targeting within the camps other than that it would be based on self-reliance and more precise vulnerability criteria to be developed on the basis of data gathered from a socio-economic survey. The document is not clear if access to employment should be included or excluded as an indicator (the CO excluded it).

In one case a key JFAM recommendation was not clearly reflected in the PRRO project document - it was not made plain in the PRRO project document that the socio-economic survey was to be focused on presumed 'pockets' of vulnerability amongst the camp and non-camp refugee population i.e. it was not intended to be a general survey. This may have led the CO to conclude that the survey was impractical.

The PRRO was designed in early 1999 and was intended to be a one-year operation. Implementation was delayed for one year and will now run for two, possibly two and a half years. A design should not be expected to be that durable and it would be prudent to require that no PRRO should be extended by more than twelve months without an internal review, including a review of results to date and of the appropriateness of the PRRO's strategies. Changes should then be reflected in revisions to the PRRO project document (or some other document that can 'carry' the changes and guide implementation).

The general point is that WFP needs a dynamic design and review process to ensure that protracted relief and recovery strategies are relevant and build on experience gained during implementation and that revisions to strategies are properly documented. The current practice of extending an operation by budget revisions is inadequate in this respect. Even though a change in 'orientation' can be signalled by this procedure, it does not incorporate an effective review or redesign procedure.

The project document did not methodically address WFP's Commitments to Women or how the PRRO should meet them. (See further *Meeting the Commitments to Women.*)

Recommendations:

1. The PRRO Guidelines should be reviewed to clarify ambiguity with respect to recovery strategy and components. In the mission's view that recovery should be a standard component in any PRRO, irrespective of whether it relates to a protracted relief or a protracted refugee situation.
2. WFP should anticipate changes in and the need for the revision of protracted relief and recovery strategies and planned outputs by developing a) mechanisms for reviewing and approving changes requested by the CO and b) review procedures to be applied at least annually to ensure that PRRO strategies and planned outputs are relevant and appropriate and reflect experience gained during implementation and changes 'on the ground'. In both cases, changes have to be documented to guide implementation and this probably requires developing a revised PRRO project document (or some other document that can 'carry' the changes and guide implementation) and obtaining the approval of the Executive Board or its delegate if the nature of the changes is so fundamental to warrant it.
3. If this broader recommendation is not accepted, the PRRO Guidelines should at least be revised to provide that no PRRO should be delayed in its implementation, or extended, for more than twelve months without being subjected to internal review and the approval of changes in strategy and/or planned outputs at an appropriate level to ensure that it provides relevant analysis and documents agreed strategies. As noted above, the agreed changes should be documented in an appropriate way. This recommendation dovetails with the provision in the PRRO Guidelines that recovery strategies should be regularly revised.
4. The CO should document its current protracted relief strategies, given that they have departed fundamentally from the PRRO design document.



5. The CO should develop and document a recovery strategy in close consultation with UNHCR. It should focus on self-reliance and phasing down assistance, and include discrete activities (such as literacy training for women and support for health facilitators possibly adopting a similar approach to the oil incentive for girls' education). Any recovery strategy concerning training and self-reliance should include access to work for women.
6. Every effort should be made to undertake some analysis of gender relations in the different refugee caseloads and the special needs of women to better address WFP's Commitments to Women in the next PRRO project document.

PRRO IMPLEMENTATION

4.1 Overall efficiency

Operational efficiency was improved in the period 1999/2000. During the extension of PRO 5650, a decision was made to use commercial transporters for all commodities in the food basket other than wheat/wheat flour. This improved delivery to the camps (although pipeline breaks did interrupt supply) and the commercial arrangements worked efficiently during the implementation of PRRO 6126.

Nevertheless the maintenance of a uniform ration for all camps in Iran since 1997 has resulted in some inefficiency in the use of resources. There are significant differences in food needs within and between camps and some refugees are more self-sufficient than others and need less food than they have been receiving. The mission accepts that ration adjustments and targeting within and between camps are difficult agendas to pursue, but it can't be avoided if WFP's food assistance in Iran is to more accurately reflect the actual 'food gap' of the refugees concerned.

Iran is a food-deficit country and the prices of commodities in the domestic market have not generally been competitive with international purchases – indeed they are generally inflated. Nevertheless the CO was able to make a limited local purchase of lentils and vegetable oil for the PRRO.

WFP has been engaged in a care and maintenance operation for refugees in camps in Iran for fifteen years now. Although some recovery type opportunities have been identified and pursued (most notably the oil incentive to encourage girls to attend school and the assistance provided to Iraqi repatriation) these have been relatively marginal activities and do not constitute a transition from relief to recovery. Making progress on this front remains a challenge. The 1998 JFAM tackled the issue of targeting and this may have provided the basis for a phasing out of assistance to relatively food secure households, but it was not pursued.

4.2 Assessment & targeting

Food needs assessment

The food needs of refugees in camps in Iran were assessed in broad terms by JFAMs conducted in May 1997 and again in December 1998. The 1998 JFAM found that the existing refugee camp caseload required ongoing assistance and recommended the continuation of the existing (80%) ration and the PRRO did so. There was no re-assessment of food needs during the three-years 1999-2001, which included the (delayed) implementation of the PRRO from mid-2000. This is despite the fact that WFP's guidelines provide that the food and nutrition situation of refugees should be systematically reviewed at least every 12 months.⁸ A JFAM did however commence in February 2002 immediately after this evaluation.

⁸ Emergency Needs Assessment Guidelines, October 1999



The PRRO 6126 project document provided for the conduct of a socio-economic survey to further determine the household food economy and nutritional status of refugees, as recommended by the 1998 JFAM, but neither WFP nor UNHCR acted on this. The PRRO document also provided for 'periodic on-the-spot surveys and additional food impact studies' but these were not carried out either. The CO discounted the potential for utilising VAM. In short the CO did not gather any information that would have assisted in determining if the right quantities of food were being provided to the right refugees, or put in place any mechanisms to signal the need for targeting, ration adjustments or phasing down.

Nutritional assessment

UNHCR is responsible for determining the nutritional status of refugees under the global MoU but there is no record of a formal nutritional assessment of the refugees (i.e. weighing and measuring under 5s) ever having been conducted despite the fact that a nutrition survey was recommended by both the 1997 JFAM and the 1998 JFAM (as part of the socio-economic survey). In December 1999 the CO requested UNHCR to conduct a nutrition survey, pointing out that this was UNHCR's responsibility and that BAFIA had complained of malnutrition in the camps.

It has to be said on the other hand that no evidence of malnutrition has been put forward and there are no grounds for suggesting that the nutritional status of refugees is poor. In short, there does not seem to be a problem, but there is no data.

Refugees targeted for assistance

In Iran WFP has always directed its assistance to settlements (up to 1994) or camps established by the government. As has been mentioned, only 3% of the 2.65 million registered refugees in Iran reside in camps. The target or ceiling for PRO 5950, which commenced in April 1998, was set at 88,000 on the basis that in mid-1997 there were according to government statistics 87,189 refugees in camps (64,485 Iraqis and 22,704 Afghans). The total had not changed greatly since 1995. The target for PRRO 6126 was revised downwards slightly to 84,000 on the basis that when the project document was drafted in May 1999 there was reported to be 83,225 refugees in the camps (57,041 Iraqis and 26,184 Afghans).⁹ In addition PRRO 6126 provided for assistance to 40,000 refugees outside camps but this has not been acted on.

In the 14-15 months that intervened until the start of implementation in mid-2000 the number of refugees in recognised camps fell below 80,000¹⁰ due mainly to the repatriation of Iraqi Kurds in 1999. The total number in camps at the end of 2001 was 77,980.¹¹

For many years WFP was providing rations to all refugees in the camps assisted but this changed in 1999. The CO sought to restrain any possible expansion in the number assisted by agreeing to continue assisting the then existing caseload but insisting on certain criteria for accepting any additions. (It was put to the mission by a member of CO staff that leaving the caseload alone was a trade-off for gaining access to the camps and greater transparency.) The 'exclusionary' criteria applied to additional beneficiaries meant that WFP would only add:

- a) Newborn children when they turn two and only then if they are not the fourth or subsequent child in the family, henceforth limiting the number of children assisted in young families to three;
- b) New refugee families and individuals entering recognised camps who meet certain socio-physiological criteria – female headed households, the disabled, unaccompanied children and unassisted elderly over 60; and

⁹ In the PRRO document it is stated that 94,000 refugees were located in camps of which 10,000 were employed and could provide for their families and thus did not need assistance. This appears to have been a misunderstanding and it is more likely that the 10,000 were included in the 84,000.

¹⁰ Including Be'Sat which is not currently assisted by WFP

¹¹ UNHCR's figure which is very close to WFP's.



- c) Refugee families and individuals in camps that WFP subsequently agrees to assist who meet the above mentioned criteria. WFP has only added one camp during the PRRO, Torbat-e-Jam, although Be'Sat may soon be reinstated.

As a result of the CO's screening of additional refugees and the exclusion of certain children approximately 20%¹² of refugees in recognised camps now don't receive rations, or 9.7%¹³ if two atypical camps are put to one side.¹⁴ This has further reduced the percentage of refugees assisted by WFP out of the total (i.e. including non-camp refugees) to 2.3%¹⁵ and the proportion of all Afghan refugees assisted to just 1%.¹⁶

Of the 12,934 refugees screened/excluded in the 29 camps currently assisted by WFP (i.e. excluding Be'Sat):

- 46% are families and individuals in Torbat-e-Jam Afghan refugee camp that do not meet the criteria (5,952 refugees);
- 30% are children under 2 or the 4th or subsequent child (3,880 refugee children)¹⁷;
- 24% are additional families or individuals admitted to the camps by BAFIA that do not meet the criteria (3,102 refugees).

The exclusion of children is contrary to WFP policy and should cease. CO staff told the mission that they were uncomfortable with the practice and with the justification sometimes given to camp managers that it follows government policy in discouraging families from having more than three children. It is of concern to the evaluation mission that nobody in WFP or UNHCR objected to this practice.

The impact of excluding 82% of refugees in Torbat-e-Jam by the use of socio-physiological criteria warrants attention. It is possible that some, perhaps many, of those excluded are food insecure and require WFP assistance. Some of the refugees screened out were recent arrivals from Afghanistan picked up by the authorities and placed in the camp. Newly arrived refugees should probably be treated as *prima facie* vulnerable.

The exclusion of the Be'Sat (Iraqi Arab) camp also warrants attention although their needs may not be as great. It was excluded because a problem was uncovered with the diversion of rations allocated to Be'Sat in 1998 (see *Logistics/leakages*). Replenishment of the diverted food was set as the condition for re-admission. BAFIA requested in the mission's debriefing that the CO send a team to both Torbat-e-Jam and Be'Sat to assess needs.

Neither WFP nor UNHCR checked the consequences of applying socio-physiological criteria to screen refugees assisted. WFP and UNHCR should have tested the efficacy of the correlation between the criteria used and food insecurity to ensure that refugees were not being wrongly excluded. It needs to be better understood by the CO that vulnerability for WFP is vulnerability to food insecurity and that there are other determinants of food insecurity that should be considered even if they are not easy to apply (including lack of access to employment).

The process of applying for and approving additions to beneficiary lists is cumbersome. Camp managers told the mission that some children are three years old before they are added. A CO staff member told the mission that in Niatak Afghan refugee camp in Sistan-Baluchistan Province the camp manager prepared a list which includes new arrivals from Afghanistan. This list has remained with

¹² In December 2001 there were 77,980 refugees in camps recognised by BAFIA and the UN (UNHCR statistics) of whom 62,197 received a WFP ration

¹³ I.e. 67,487 refugees of whom 60,908 receive WFP rations

¹⁴ Torbat-e-Jam where 82% are excluded and Be'Sat which is not currently assisted

¹⁵ I.e. 62,197 out of 2.65 million

¹⁶ I.e. 24,698 out of 2.35 million

¹⁷ This figure has been extrapolated from WFP's statistics by assuming that any persons excluded other than those in whole families (taking an average family size of 5) must be children under 2 or the 4th or subsequent child.



BAFIA in Tehran for several months and has not reached WFP. This is of particular concern because Niatak possibly hosts the most vulnerable refugees in Iran.

Refugees assisted by the PRRO

The number of refugees in camps assisted by WFP remained fairly static from mid-2000 to end-2001 (commencing with 62,236, rising to 62,701 in the first quarter of 2001 and falling to 62,197 in the last quarter). The composition did not change markedly either with Afghans making up 37.4% of the caseload at the commencement of the PRRO and rising to 39.7% in the last quarter of 2001. The slight shift in composition was due to a small reduction in Iraqi refugees due mainly to repatriation and an increase in Afghans with the addition of some refugees in Torbat-e-Jam.

The apparent reduction from 84,000 to 62,000 refugees assisted under the PRRO is of considerable concern to the government, representing in a sense the 'bottom line'. BAFIA objected at the time and frequently thereafter to WFP's new policy and argued that lack of access to employment and/or destitution should be considered as a criterion in screening additional refugees, but the CO believed that this would encourage an expansion in the number of refugees in camps. This was an understandable concern although the government has not in practice sought to expand the number in camps and lack of food aid is unlikely to have been the determining factor. In any event excluding any consideration of income was inconsistent with the fundamental assumption on which the ration is based – that refugees have an income sufficient to meet at least 20% of their food requirements. The CO should have engaged the government on the central issue of self-reliance with a view to making incremental changes where and when appropriate to the general ration.

The need for targeting within and between camps

The role of food aid is to ensure that refugees are able to meet their basic needs taking into account what they are able to provide for themselves. WFP's job is essentially to bridge the food gap, ensuring as far as possible that rations approximate to the additional energy, protein and micronutrient requirements that need to be met by food aid. Achieving this is difficult when the caseload includes households with varying degrees of self-sufficiency and thus food needs, particularly *within* a refugee camp. It is unusual for WFP to target certain refugees in a camp and exclude others, or to provide different ration scales within a camp. It is difficult on several levels, not least getting refugees who have received uniform rations for many years to accept changes.

The most common way of approaching this problem is a two-pronged approach:

- General Food Distribution (GFD) comprising a general ration adjusted to meet the food gap of the majority, together with
- Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF) comprising additional assistance for the minority unable to cope on the general ration.¹⁸

This should probably be the approach adopted in Iran. It would involve redefining the general ration with particular attention to access to income from employment, which is the main determinant of self-sufficiency in the Iranian context, and defining a supplementary ration for those most vulnerable to food insecurity. Typical VGF criteria are very similar to the socio-physiological criteria used to screen refugees for assistance under PRRO 6126 (but here as elsewhere it is important to ensure the criteria correlate to actual vulnerability, i.e. to food insecurity).

If GFD+VGF is adopted it will almost certainly involve negotiating a reduction in general rations, at least for the Iraqi Arab camps, which would lead to applying different general rations to different camps

¹⁸ This is also described in some operations as blanket supplementary feeding ('blanket' because all members of nutritionally vulnerable groups are included)



according to their base levels of self-sufficiency. Two to three different scales would be more than enough to manage.

An alternative approach

An alternative to GFD+VGF is to institute an A and a B ration within camps. This would involve conducting an assessment of each camp relying on key informants and household interviews to determine what proportion of households are more food insecure (self-reliance is low) and the proportion that are relatively food secure (self-reliance is high). This could then be the basis of introducing different rations – ration ‘A’ for the food insecure (a food basket to be determined) and ration ‘B’ for those that are relatively food secure (perhaps bread only).

Once the proportions are established the BAFIA camp manager would have to sort households into one or the other category. A camp could end up with 70% of households on ration A and 30% on ration B, or vice versa. Sorting households against objective criteria would be a challenging task at first but after so many years the camp managers know their population very well and BAFIA has demonstrated by its compliance to the vulnerability criteria in use that they can implement targeting.

These rations would need to be set at the lowest level of food security in each category, which means building in some inefficiency in terms of targeting. But it would be an improvement on the current uniform ration. WFP would have to monitor the application and appropriateness of this targeting strategy by periodically interviewing a sample of households. The proportion of more and less food insecure households in each camp should be reassessed annually (complying with WFP’s guidelines).

Targeting strategies planned but not implemented

The PRRO project document set out a new targeting strategy for food assistance to refugees in camps involving developing selection criteria based on the ‘objective vulnerability’ of a household. The planned socio-economic survey was to have provided the basis for developing the vulnerability criteria. This strategy involved eliminating refugees ‘who have achieved a degree of financial stability’ from beneficiary lists.¹⁹ The mission suggests however that removing some refugees within camps from beneficiary lists entirely would be hard to negotiate and that it may be necessary to maintain a base ration at least of wheat flour if targeting within camps is adopted.

The 1998 JFAM recommended that until the socio-economic survey is conducted a step towards targeting would be to prioritise the camps in terms of vulnerability, tentatively allocating the highest priority to Afghan camps followed by Iraqi Kurds and Iraqi Arabs. The JFAM stated that this should be the basis for allocating the resources efficiently in time of short supply whether arising due to logistic, resourcing or any other operational constraint.

This recommendation was not followed and prioritisation proceeded on the basis of logistics considerations (including economies of scale according to the CO). As it happened, the Iraqi Kurds fared best overall in relation to the supply of commodities that WFP handled and could prioritise. The Afghans fared least well overall in relation to the supply of pulses and oil although better than the Iraqi Arabs in relation to rice and sugar. If all commodities are considered (i.e. including wheat flour) the Afghans fared least well in terms of average kcals per person.²⁰

Most importantly the 1998 JFAM recommended that in view of the fact that over 95% of the refugees were outside the camps and economic opportunities were decreasing WFP should refocus its assistance by targeting it on the most vulnerable refugee population *irrespective of whether the refugees were inside and outside the camps*. This was written into the PRRO project document. To implement the strategy it was recommended that GIRI, WFP and UNHCR agree on a common definition of vulnerability and conduct a socio-economic survey with a nutritional emphasis in ‘different refugees

¹⁹ See PRRO 6126 project document paragraph 16

²⁰ See further *Results of the PRRO*.



pockets outside and inside the camps' to provide further insight into vulnerability. It is unclear just what line the CO took with BAFIA and how negotiations unfolded but it seems the CO was unwilling to expand assistance beyond the camps and regarded the socio-economic survey as impractical and inappropriate. The issue of assisting non-camp refugees is discussed in detail under *Results of the PRRO*.

Defining a targeting strategy for the camps

The CO needs to examine the appropriateness of the manner in which food assistance is and is not targeted at present and determine, in consultation with BAFIA and UNHCR, how to deal with the big disparities within and between camps. Some of the targeting strategies discussed above may appear complex but a single ration for all camps with no supplement for the most vulnerable within camps leads to inefficiency because the ration has to be set high enough to meet the food gap of the vast majority. This has meant in the Iranian context that a substantial number of refugees receive more than they strictly need. It also means that the most vulnerable to food insecurity do not necessarily receive enough assistance.

The current system is not without complexity either, given its screening procedures, and in any case it would be unsatisfactory to continue to apply a targeting regime *only* to additions to the caseload. It results in anomalies like Torbat-e-Jam and those households excluded only because they came to the camps more recently. Although the introduction of vulnerability criteria in 1999 must have seemed like a victory at the time and although the CO has subsequently put a lot of energy into managing the screening process, little has been achieved by it in terms of targeting the needy and reducing assistance to more self-reliant groups or camps.

Whether or not it was possible for the CO to engage BAFIA in 1999 in reviewing needs and rations, this should now be the priority and a strategy for carrying this forward should be drafted as a matter of urgency. BAFIA's stated position is that all refugees in camps should receive the current standard ration, but this is unrealistic and changes will have to be negotiated. WFP and UNHCR could consider raising these matters with the government in the broader context of plans for repatriation i.e. look at the whole resourcing picture and the need to focus food assistance where it is most needed. In the end the government will probably continue to regard cooperation with the UN an imperative and accept changes in the rations. If this is accepted, BAFIA has the capacity to implement it even if it is a more complex system of determining eligibility and allocating rations within and/or between camps. The most sensitive issue may prove to be the level of overall assistance, not the ration.

If needs and rations can be reviewed and adjustments negotiated, the food and nutrition situation of refugees should then be systematically reviewed (and the rations adjusted) at least every 12 months, in accordance with WFP's guidelines.

Should the planned socio-economic survey finally be conducted?

Rations cannot be adequately determined in the absence of information about the capacity of refugees to provide food for themselves i.e. levels of self-reliance. This means assessing access to employment in general terms and subsequently developing targeting criteria to apply what is learned. There is no avoiding this and the information is needed to verify the appropriateness of rations and apply any of the targeting strategies discussed above. It may result in the inclusion of some or all of the vulnerability criteria currently in use. It will almost certainly involve the addition of some criteria. The question is: What is the best way of obtaining the information required?

JFAMs collect information on which to make recommendations about rations and targeting, but more information is needed to test the appropriateness of rations and develop targeting systems that reduce inclusion and exclusion errors. Food security and impact monitoring should ideally provide the feedback needed to accomplish this but it requires a monitoring capacity that the CO does not currently have. Thus the need for a socio-economic survey.

Such a survey would be valuable and could be conducted relatively efficiently by utilising VAM techniques to identify the most vulnerable areas and the most relevant information to be collected.



However, the information would become dated. The alternative, discussed also under *Monitoring Systems*, may be to rely on periodic UNHCR/WFP/BAFIA rapid verification exercises focused on testing the assumptions underpinning rations and targeting ('mini-JFAMs'). This is the approach adopted in Uganda in the context of a long-term caseload and a phase-down strategy, where the 'mini-JFAMs' are conducted between annual JFAMs.

Whatever approach is adopted, subsequent assessments should address the food needs of refugees not in camps. Increased assessment costs will have to be included in subsequent WFP and UNHCR budgets for operations in Iran.

This could be achieved by proceeding with the planned socio-economic survey of camp and non-camp refugees), or by undertaking additional WFP/UNHCR assessments (the 'mini-JFAMs').

Recommendations:

7. Socio-physiological criteria are useful proxy indicators of vulnerability to food insecurity but they should not be relied on in future for screening refugees for inclusion on beneficiary lists for a *general* ration.
8. The CO should stop distinguishing between its 'old' caseload and 'newcomers'/'new' camps and assess the needs of all encamped refugees recognised by UNHCR on the same basis. Until such assessments are made, all encamped refugees previously excluded by the CO should be provided with the uniform ration (including refugees in Torbat-e-Jam, and in Be'Sat if UNHCR still recommends that assistance be provided to that camp).
9. The practice of excluding children under two years of age and restricting the number of children assisted to three per family should cease and children previously excluded should be added to beneficiary lists.
10. The CO should develop a strategy for adjusting rations more closely to actual food needs to increase efficiency in the use of scarce resources. The evaluation mission's preferred approach is to institute a revised general ration to be adjusted to meet the food gap of the different refugee groups (Afghans, Iraqi Arabs and Kurds), supplemented with additional food assistance for the minority assessed as being unable to cope (or at risk of not being able to cope) on the general ration.
11. Rather than conducting a one off socio-economic survey, WFP should consider advocating periodic UNHCR/WFP/BAFIA rapid verification exercises focused on testing the assumptions underpinning rations and targeting ('mini-JFAMs'). Whatever approach is adopted, subsequent assessments and/or surveys should find a means of assessing the food needs of refugees not in camps.
12. The CO should meet with UNHCR to determine if it is necessary to conduct a nutrition survey in the refugee camps and in areas where vulnerable non-camp refugees are believed to be concentrated. The CO should also suggest to UNHCR that support be provided to health centres in camps to assure the appropriateness and quality of the data regularly collected. Consideration should be given to assisting the health centres collect weight for height anthropometric data.

4.3 Logistics/leakages

The commodity pipeline

There have been periodic supply shortfalls with some commodities due mainly to resourcing problems and this has presented one of the major challenges to the smooth functioning of the PRRO. (See further *Resourcing of the PRRO*). Resource shortfalls have been managed by prioritising the commodities purchased (wheat and oil) and distributing short rations (of rice, pulses and sugar). There have been some delays with wheat shipments to Iran that have been dealt with by borrowing from the State Organisation for Grains.



Compass

The CO had difficulties with the introduction of Compass in 1999. More initial training was needed and the logistics officer initially fell behind with data entry because had to go to the field for periods. The problem was finally addressed by recruiting a secretary and data entry clerk (on SSA). Compass information is not regularly updated because only quarterly progress reports on commodity utilisation are currently available.

Commercial arrangements for rice, pulses, oil and sugar

The handling, storage and transportation of rice, pulses, oil and sugar are a key strength of PRRO 6126. Up until 1999 all commodities were handled, stored and transported by the government. To overcome delays and losses the CO took over the handling, storage and transport of all commodities other than wheat. The commercial arrangements established have worked smoothly throughout the PRRO. Leakages are low and occasional losses are recovered. The current ITSH rate is \$37 per tonne (effective February 2001).

Arrangements with the SOG for wheat

The handling, storage, milling and transportation of wheat were left with the State Organization for Grains (SOG) because it is such an ideal arrangement, at least in theory. WFP delivers wheat to an Iranian port (Bandar Iman Khomeini) where it is received by the SOG and merged with its stocks. The SOG subsequently arranges for the delivery to 29 camps scattered around the country. The SOG usually has sufficient stocks in the provinces concerned but there are cases where SOG has to transport wheat stocks between provinces (e.g. to Sistan-Baluchistan). There is no ITSH and handling, storage, milling and transportation costs are covered (or supposed to be covered) by the SOG's retention of 20% of the wheat imported. (BAFIA only covers customs charges.)

In practice there have been chronic delays in the delivery of the wheat flour to the camps, said to originate in delays in SOG Tehran authorising its provincial offices to release wheat for milling and delivery. There is presently a serious delay of this nature in Kerman and Fars Provinces. It is not that SOG does not have the capacity – everyone seems to agree it is a bureaucratic problem.

Delays in the release of wheat have been ameliorated by the intervention of the provincial offices of BAFIA, which frequently obtain advances of wheat flour from the provincial SOG or a miller on the strength of the planned allocation. This imposes difficulties on the BAFIA offices and normally requires the intervention of the Governor of the province. In Fars Province BAFIA representatives said they have had to intervene 3-4 times since mid-2000 borrowing a total of 40-50 tonnes for Jahrom camp and 15-20 tonnes for Sarvestan. Without these borrowings the refugees would not have received wheat flour for the months concerned and it would never have been made up because WFP does not provide rations retrospectively.

WFP does not have an agreement with or communicate directly with SOG – BAFIA is the intermediary. Problems with the arrangement with SOG have been raised with BAFIA on many occasions and were highlighted in reports for the 4th quarter of 2000 and the 2nd quarter of 2001. The CD has seen several high-ranking officials in the Government but to no avail. The main factor appears to be that the 20% retained doesn't cover SOG's costs. It is said to be equivalent to \$31 per tonne based on the value of the wheat shipped (\$6 less than the current ITSH rate although less transport is involved).

The SOG also complains that it has had to pay demurrage because documents have not been received in time and that there are losses in removing the wheat from the ship requesting that the amount loaded at the port be the basis of WFP's calculations, not the surveyor's estimate of what is in the hold. There may be some other factors that are specific to the provinces because West Azerbaijan and Khorasan have not encountered the same delays in receiving authorisation as Kerman and Fars Provinces. There may also be some extraneous issues between BAFIA and SOG.

Whatever the reasons the arrangement with SOG is not working well and it seems doubtful that the SOG will accept a 20% retention rate in future (the arrangement will have to be renegotiated for a new



PRRO if not before). Thus the CO has to either agree to allow the SOG to retain a higher percentage of wheat or tender for a commercial alternative (the latter would presumably require a budget revision for the ITSH). The mission notes that WFP has been milling wheat landed at Bandar Abbas and transporting it to Afghanistan. One important factor that has to be weighed is making this decision is WFP's need to be able to continue to borrow wheat in the event of a delay in shipment.

Losses

The CO wrote to BAFIA in August 2000 noting 'alarming figures concerning wheat flour Post CIF losses' which seem to have occurred in camp stores and may have resulted from spoilage. WFP does not attend final distributions and it is not known what problems may occur at this stage. The weight of baked bread distributed in Afghan refugee camps is a long-standing concern (see *Results of the PRRO*). WFP's monitors were told that there was some tampering with weights by Kalantars (leaders) responsible for the final distribution of commodities to blocks in Rafsanjan (Afghan) camp. In the same camp it is apparent that some beneficiary households don't have ration books.

On the positive side there is excellent signage in the stores visited showing refugee ration entitlements and refugees seem to be well aware of the ration scales. Nevertheless, this form of self-monitoring cannot be very effective when short rations are being regularly distributed due to shortages in supply.

Refugees clearly sell some of their rations. Oil is often sold and cheaper solid oil purchased (which most refugees prefer). In Jahrom (Iraqi Arab) camp the mission was told that some refugees sell the rice provided to buy higher quality rice.)The sale of rations is not of itself wrong – WFP's 1999 guidelines recognise that food should be considered a resource transfer in long-standing refugee operations.

The Be'Sat Iraqi refugee camp was endorsed by UNHCR for assistance from 1991-1999 and commodities for Be'Sat regularly appeared as deductions from WFP's allocation to BAFIA. However, a member of the CO's staff found during a visit to Be'Sat in 1998 that no WFP food had been received for over seven years. This represented over 4,500 mts of commodities that could not be accounted for. Be'Sat was henceforth removed from the list of camps assisted by WFP.

It appears the food allocated to Be'Sat was used in other camps by BAFIA, possibly camps that WFP had not agreed to assist. This may have included Torbat-e-Jam, which was then regarded as a detention centre, because the CO found old WFP stocks in Torbat-e-Jam. The CO responded to this and perhaps other incidents by greatly improving the system for tracking WFP's commodities through 1999/2000.

Recommendations:

13. The CO should further analyse the processes involved in SOG authorising wheat to be released from its provincial stores to clarify where the problem lies. The CO could also consider raising the matter (again) with the Ministry of the Interior.
14. If no new information and no credible assurances on wheat supply are forthcoming from SOG, the CO should tender for a commercial alternative (requiring a budget revision to include ITSH). The CO should attempt to maintain a capacity to borrow wheat from the government in the event of a delay in shipment.
15. WFP should consider providing letters to camps when there are supply problems so that these can be posted in public notices. BAFIA camp managers said they would appreciate this.

4.4 Security

Insecurity has not been as significant a problem in Iran as it is in most other countries in which WFP operates. Security measures have been introduced in order to minimize the risk to WFP staff. Short wave and VHF radios were recently fitted to field vehicles (December 2001).

The mission notes however that routine journey monitoring has not yet been established. The mission travelled considerable distances in provinces neighbouring Iraq and Afghanistan but nobody in the CO or any other agency office was kept informed of the movement of the mission. On the day that the



mission made its longest journey by vehicle (6 hours travelling between Kerman and Shiraz on a Friday) the CO was unattended so nobody could have been contacted by radio if there had been a problem. On another occasion (not a holiday) a driver tried to contact the CO by radio but received no response. It appears the radio in the CO is in a corridor.

Some drivers are clearly unfamiliar with the radio equipment, preferring to rely on mobile phones when they are in range, and with the names and security coding of routes used.

Recommendations:

16. The CO should institute routine journey monitoring with drivers at least announcing when a field journey is commencing, giving the route and ETA, and announcing that the journey has been completed.
17. The CO should ensure that all drivers are able to satisfactorily operate their radio equipment and that they know the names and codes given to routes.
18. The CO should provide each vehicle with a copy of the authority obtained from the government for the use of the radio equipment in Iran.

4.5 Monitoring systems

Achievements

Under PRRO 6126 the CO relies on BAFIA to provide population and distribution data each quarter. The data is gender disaggregated. This is clearly fundamental information and the CO has a good record of camp populations and distributions. The data can be verified fairly effectively by inspecting ration books and stock cards (the CO pays particular attention to the latter) although it has to be stressed that WFP does not witness food distributions and there may be problems of which WFP is unaware.

CO monitoring staff conduct quarterly monitoring visits, which is the most that can be done with existing resources and represents a vast improvement on the lack of access and monitoring pre-1999. The 1998 JFAM noted that reports on commodity utilisation were a 'theoretical' exercise. Turning this around is a major achievement and reflects the very considerable efforts made by the CO in 1999/2000. But there are obviously limits to what can be verified in a two-hour visit to a camp each quarter. There is no physical monitoring of final distributions.

Food security and impact monitoring

There is no baseline data, no data on food security is being collected and there is no monitoring of the impact of food assistance or the exclusion of certain refugees from assistance. There is no monitoring of potentially marginalised groups. These matters need to be addressed to assist the CO determine if WFP is delivering the right amount of food to the right refugees and make adjustments and/or introduce targeting where necessary/appropriate. The CO should not assume it can rely solely on a JFAM mission for guidance.

Food security monitoring is not a new idea. The PRO 5950 project document stated that WFP monitors would, through rapid appraisal, monitor the food basket and the use of the food at the household level including the proportion consumed, traded or exchanged, and other sources of food. It also stated that WFP food monitors would review food security variables affecting the household's consumption of food additional to that provided by WFP, such as income from labour, food prices and physical access to the market. These requirements were not acted on and they were not repeated in the PRRO 6126 project document. The CO has developed a household survey format but it only deals with the receipt of



rations and it is not often used. It is noted that the Afghanistan Regional EMOP 10126.0 requires the use of the food security indicators.²¹

It is recognised that monitoring is constrained by the vast distances involved (over 10,000 kms to do one quarterly 'circuit' of the 29 camps). It is also unrealistic to expect both commodity control and food security monitoring to be undertaken in only two hours a quarter. The CO has requested funding to recruit a data entry clerk on SSA to assist the monitor, but realistically a second monitoring officer is also required. It is suggested that commodity control and food security monitoring should be split and that the existing monitoring officer continue to undertake quarterly visits while the food security monitor undertakes less frequent but longer visits to each camp.

The need for two monitoring officers will be accentuated if the CO proceeds with assistance to non-camp refugees.

An alternative to establishing a food security monitoring capacity may be to conduct periodic UNHCR/WFP/BAFIA rapid verification exercises focused on testing the assumptions underpinning rations and targeting (the 'mini-JFAMs' discussed above). This would involve blurring the distinction between food security monitoring and periodic assessment, which may be the most efficient approach given the difficulty of increasing the number of monitoring visits/activities in Iran's setting. It would still require a second Monitoring Officer to drive the alternative process.

UNHCR's role

Technically, UNHCR is supposed to organise regular nutrition surveys, maintain effective surveillance of the nutritional status of the refugees (global MoU, 7.2) and establish an effective monitoring and reporting system with special attention to qualitative information on the socio-economic status of refugees (7.3). These things are not done in Iran. Perhaps UNHCR occasionally inspected the weight for age data collected in the health posts in the camps, but based on the data gathered by the mission this may be faulty.

The omission is hard to understand in the case of Torbat-e-Jam refugee camp considering that UNHCR requested WFP to provide general assistance and was 'upset' (according to a member of UNHCR's staff) that WFP applied vulnerability criteria and excluded 82% of the refugees. It would also have been prudent to monitor the impact on large families of excluding the under 2s and 4th and subsequent children from rations.

Data presentation and reporting

The CO has established an Excel spreadsheet that records quarterly information *inter alia* on planned and actual deliveries of commodities to refugee camps. The tables for planned and actual deliveries are presented as separate sheets in the spreadsheet. The data could be enhanced considerably by combining the two tables in one sheet so that it is clear how WFP is performing from quarter to quarter in meeting assessed requirements. A column showing the percentage of requirements met by deliveries (in mts) could be inserted to illustrate this. Inserting a column showing performance in relation to caloric equivalents of the commodities delivered could further enhance the information. This will differ as a percentage from performance in terms of quantities delivered given that different commodities in the food basket have different kilocalorie values.

In its six-monthly reports the CO highlighted the impact of its 'strict policy of only assisting vulnerable of newly admitted' on beneficiary numbers when it has in fact only resulted in the exclusion of a relatively small number of refugees (a mere 3,102 refugees admitted to camps by BAFIA).

²¹ These include the use of food at the household level, food availability, food and livestock prices, levels of food stocks, wage rate and the availability of labour in the market, population movements, coping mechanisms, malnutrition rates, and crude mortality rates (CMR).



The reports to BAFIA are not transparent in so far as the tables attached do not show shortfalls in supply for the quarter (planned vs actual distributions).

Recommendations:

19. WFP and UNHCR should consider supplementing the information provided by JFAMs by collaborating to establish a baseline and monitor food security and the impact of food assistance, with a focus on potentially marginalised groups in the camps and in any areas in which vulnerable at large refugees are assisted. An alternative may be to rely on periodic UNHCR/WFP/BAFIA rapid verification exercises focused on testing the assumptions underpinning rations and targeting (the 'mini-JFAMs' recommended earlier).
20. The CO should further develop the spreadsheet it has developed to track planned and actual quarterly deliveries of commodities to camps by combining the planned and actual deliveries tables in one sheet so that it is clear how WFP is performing from quarter to quarter in meeting assessed requirements. A column showing the percentage of requirements met (in mts) should be inserted to illustrate this (i.e. actual deliveries divided by planned deliveries times 100). A further column should be inserted showing performance in relation to the kilocalorie equivalents of the commodities delivered (again as a simple %).
21. The CO should hire a second National Monitoring Officer and beneficiary data/commodity control and food security monitoring should be split, with one officer undertaking quarterly visits to continue to collect beneficiary data and commodity utilisation and the other undertakes less frequent but longer visits to each camp to monitor food security and the impact of assistance. If the alternative course of relying on 'mini-JFAMs' is taken, the additional Monitoring Officer would lead this process.

4.6 Management

The CO's implementation of the operation has been operationally strong both in terms of logistics/contracting and commodity control, but deficient in ensuring resources were available to meet commitments to refugees, and weak in terms of programming (reflected in the indecisive manner in which the component concerning assistance to non-camp refugees has been managed over the years). The weaknesses in programming highlight the need for an international programming officer.

This is not to suggest that members of the CO have been under-performing. The mission was impressed with the calibre of the staff and it has to be borne in mind that the CO was without a CD for seven months of the PRRO's implementation.²² One factor limiting greater productivity is that some national staff at least feel inhibited about expressing their views and contributing to decision-making. In this sense WFP is not getting the most out of the available human resources.

It should be recorded that although improving the accountability of WFP's operations in Iran was vital and stands as an accomplishment, the CD was too confrontational and provocative in his meetings and correspondence with BAFIA, and with UNHCR. It is possible that this thwarted WFP's chances of achieving better outcomes in its negotiations with BAFIA on key issues, including targeting. It certainly did not help relations with UNHCR. Relationships within the CO also suffered, staff turnover was unusually high and complaints were made. But despite the fact that WFP was aware of the CD's management style no decisive action was taken other than to send in a counsellor after the CD left to take up another post. This is a serious failing in staff management.

²² The former CD left in November or December 2000. A temporary replacement was posted on TDY for 2 to 3 months from some time in July until 3 September 2001. The current CD arrived on 19 September 2001.



At different times WFP has had sub-offices to help manage the provision of food assistance to refugee camps, but not during the implementation of the PRRO (the Kermanshah SO was closed in February 2000). The current arrangement (no SOs) appears adequate for the management of the operation.

The CO does not presently have the appropriate staff resources to properly implement and monitor PRRO activities. Resources need to be earmarked for an international programming officer as well as a second monitoring officer. Staff training has been undertaken in several areas but in some cases has been frustrated by problems obtaining visas for national staff to attend training at the Regional Office (in Cairo). Training on rapid appraisal methods for national staff, as planned under the PRRO, has not been carried out to date. BAFIA staff were sent on a study tour to Azerbaijan to develop skills in reporting and monitoring distributions of food and BAFIA indicated an interest in WFP conducting similar activities in future, and in WFP providing training for camp stores staff.

The refugee camps appear to be well managed by BAFIA. The stores are excellent and on the face of it commodity control is sound. The camps generally have acceptable infrastructure and services – shelter, water, and access to health and education facilities. The final distribution by BAFIA camps managers and staff is well organised and refugees are aware of their entitlements.

Recommendations:

22. Planning and decision-making in the CO should be structured as a more consultative process to encourage robust input from all national staff.
23. The CO should hire an International Programme Officer.

RESULTS OF THE PRRO

5.1 Component A: Meeting the food needs of refugees in camps

Purpose and planned outputs

The stated purpose of the main component of the PRRO is ‘to ensure that the basic food needs for survival of the refugees in camps are met, considering also that many camps are in very remote areas’. The two main outputs are:

- Baseline socio-economic data and vulnerability indicators on gender, employment and income, and health and nutritional status enabling WFP to enhance its vulnerability targeting within the camps.
- Efficient distributions of a balanced food basket equivalent to 1,900 kilocalories to a target of 84,000 beneficiary refugees.

Baseline data and vulnerability indicators


Baseline data was to have been gathered by conducting a socio-economic survey, the results of which were to have been available in the second half of 1999. The vulnerability indicators were to have been developed based on the results. It is evident from the project document that the vulnerability indicators were to have been used primarily to identify the non-camp refugees who were to be assisted under the PRRO, nevertheless the survey was to have included the camp population and the vulnerability indicators were to have been used to ‘sharpen the targeting of vulnerable families in camps’.

The socio-economic survey was not undertaken. As far as it concerned a survey of vulnerability within the camps it seems the CO raised the matter (and the closely related issue of targeting) with BAFIA but decided not to push it, instead agreeing to regard the existing camp caseload as generally vulnerable and to continue providing rations. In a letter to BAFIA the CO noted that because they had accepted this there was no need for a survey. However, this meant that no baseline information was ever collected on employment and income or the health and nutritional status of refugees in camps. The CO did however advocate (in 1999) that UNHCR conduct a nutrition survey in the camps to settle the question of malnutrition raised by BAFIA.



The PRRO ration

The ration used by WFP in Iran has not changed since 1997 and consists of 280 gms of wheat flour²³ (980 kcals), 100 gms of rice (360 kcals), 20 gms of oil (180 kcals), 30 gms of pulses (100 kcals) and 15 gms of sugar (60 kcals). The total kilocalorie value of the planned food basket is equivalent to 1,680 kcals, representing 80% of the 2,100 kcals standard reference full ration.²⁴



Both the PRO 5950 and PRRO 6126 project documents incorrectly state that the ration is equivalent to 1,900 kcals. The mission does not know if the original benchmark was the kilocalorie target or the ration so both are considered below.

Performance in delivering commodities

The performance of WFP (and for wheat flour the SOG) in delivering commodities to refugees accepted as beneficiaries is depicted in Table 1. This shows an overall performance of 78.8% in terms of the tonnage delivered against assessed requirements (11,798 mts out of 14,981 mts of commodities delivered over 18 months).

Table 1: Performance in delivering commodities mid-2000 to end 2001 (mts)

		Q3 2000	Q4 2000	Q1 2001	Q2 2001	Q3 2001	Q4 2001	Totals
Wheat Flour	Required	1568.3	1563.2	1580.1	1579.5	1567.9	1567.4	9426.4
	Provided	1436.2	1336.0	1414.9	1397.7	1552.4	1546.9	8684.2
	%	91.6	85.5	89.5	88.5	99.0	98.7	92.1
Rice	Required	560.1	558.3	564.3	564.1	560.0	559.8	3366.6
	Provided	308.7	36.5	6.7	548.1	326.4	288.8	1515.2
	%	55.1	6.5	1.2	97.2	58.3	51.6	45.0
Oil	Required	112.0	111.7	112.9	112.8	112.0	112.0	673.3
	Provided	95.3	112.3	111.3	105.4	85.9	109.0	619.2
	%	85.1	100.6	98.6	93.4	76.7	97.3	92.0
Pulses	Required	168.0	167.5	169.3	169.2	168.0	167.9	1010.0
	Provided	45.2	18.7	51.6	164.4	167.7	167.9	615.5

²³ Originally specified as 350 gms of wheat rather than its wheat flour equivalent.

²⁴ It is noted that 2,100 kcals is the standard for a reference temperature of 20 degrees centigrade and where the activity level is light. Some of the camps are covered in snow in winter and refugee men and some women undertake heavy casual and seasonal work.



	%	26.9	11.2	30.5	97.1	99.8	100.0	60.9
Sugar	Required	84.0	83.7	84.6	84.6	84.0	84.0	505.0
	Provided	6.3	58.2	83.5	83.8	80.6	51.4	363.8
	%	7.5	69.4	98.7	99.1	95.9	61.2	72.0

Overall

Required	2492.6	2484.3	2511.2	2510.3	2491.9	2491.0	14981.2
Provided	1891.7	1561.7	1668.1	2299.5	2212.9	2163.9	11797.8
%	75.9	62.9	66.4	91.6	88.8	86.9	78.8

Quarterly supply fluctuated considerably but performance has improved and was better overall in the second nine months of implementation (from 68.4% to 89.1%).

Wheat flour

In terms of individual commodities, WFP performed well (with BAFIA's assistance) in providing wheat flour to refugees in camps – 92% of requirements were met (based on the agreed ration and quarterly beneficiary numbers). There were however significant variations between camps – 7 camps received 100% or more of their requirements of wheat flour while 11 camps only received between 71% and 81% of their requirements.

Rice

The provision of rice, which is the second most important commodity in the food basket in terms of kilocalories, was the least satisfactory (45% overall). There was only one quarter in which supply was close to what it should have been (2nd quarter of 2001). Most camps received no rice at all for six months (4th quarter of 2000 and 1st quarter of 2001). Supply was approximately 50% overall in the most recent quarter (4th quarter of 2001). It appears the CO has discounted the importance of rice without appreciating the role it plays in making up the kilocalories in the ration (21.4%).

Oil and sugar

The provision of oil, an important element in the diet, was satisfactory overall (92%). For some reason there were supply problems in the 3rd quarter of 2001 at a time when all other commodities (with the exception of rice) were relatively well supplied. The supply of pulses was unsatisfactory overall (61%) particularly in the first nine months of implementation when supply averaged only 23% of requirements. Supply improved very considerably thereafter (nearly 98% over nine months), although query if the pulses purchased locally and remaining in camp stores until they can be cleaned are included in these statistics. The supply of sugar was well short of requirements overall (72%) but the main difficulty was in the first quarter of implementation (when only 7.5% of requirements were met). Supply has been satisfactory overall ever since.

Variations between camps

A full breakdown of commodities delivered to each camp from mid-2000 to end-2001, expressed as average monthly rations for each commodity and the kilocalorie equivalent of the rations is contained in **Annex H**. This data reveals some inexplicable variations in the fulfilment of ration requirements between camps. At the extremes there were variations:

- for wheat flour of 71.5% to 105.8% overall between two Iraqi Kurd camps,
- for pulses of 37.6% to 67.1% overall between two Afghan camps, and
- for sugar of 39.44% to 68.27% overall between two Iraqi Arab camps.

This may point to deficiencies in planning.



The 20% excluded

It was envisaged that WFP would assist all refugees in camps recognised by UNHCR but only approx. 62,200 out of 78,000 encamped refugees are currently assisted (i.e. 80%). It is not known what impact exclusion from beneficiary lists had on the households concerned but given that the children should not have been excluded and that socio-physiological criteria were used inappropriately it has to be presumed that it was to some degree negative.

Appropriateness and quality of food


The food basket is balanced but could be rationalised (the 2002 JFAM should be able to recommend how). There has been a debate for some time about providing baked bread vs wheat flour. Afghan refugees are clearly disadvantaged at present but this is because they are not receiving enough bread, not because it is an intrinsically bad approach. The bakeries represent a substantial investment, which BAFIA and its contractors may not wish to forego. A more important reason for not pushing for doing away with the bakeries is that gas ovens would have to be distributed to the refugees and maintained (wood ovens would be environmentally negative). The matter deserves further investigation before a decision is made.

By and large the commodities provided have been of good quality however there were some complaints about the quality of bread (some Afghan camps), rubbish mixed with pulses procured within Iran (but originating in Canada) and rice imported from Pakistan (not as high a grade as that previously imported from Thailand). Some sugar was damaged in transport (it had been wet and arrived in camps lumpy, off-colour and with a bad odour). Yellow split peas are not generally liked.

Performance in meeting ration and kilocalorie equivalents

Performance in providing rations and kilocalorie equivalents to camps by origin of refugee is illustrated in Figure 1 and described in more detail in Table 2.

Figure 1: Commodities delivered to camps expressed as a percentage of kilocalorie equivalents of planned rations



Overall, the commodities provided should have yielded an average 1,334 kcals per day per refugee (79% of the 1,680 kcal equivalent of the planned ration), however Afghan refugees receive bread from camp bakeries (rather than flour like the Iraqis) and there is evidence that the bread provided is consistently underweight. The weight of the bread appears to be 300 gms - this amount is clearly indicated on the planning chart in the offices of the camp managers – which is equivalent to 750 kcals, not 980 kcals.

Taking this into account refugees overall (Iraqis and Afghans together) received an average of 1,257 kcals per person per day (75% of the kcal equivalent of the planned ration). Afghan refugees who are the most vulnerable to food insecurity, fared worse overall, with larger overall supply deficits than the Iraqis, compounded by the short supply of bread mentioned above. They received an average equivalent



of only 1,108 kcals per person per day (66% of the kcal equivalent of the planned ration). All these percentages are lower if 1,900 kcals is taken as the reference (see following table).

Table 2: Rations & kilocalorie equivalents provided, mid-2000 to end 2001

Average ration and its kilocalorie value		Afghans	Iraqi Arabs	Iraqi Kurds	Overall
Wheat Flour	Av. mthly ration/ person	7.33 kgs	8.03 kgs	7.83 kgs	7.69 kgs
	% of 8.4 kgs planned	87.3%	95.6%	93.2%	91.6%
Rice	Av. mthly ration/ person	1.56 kgs	1.12 kgs	1.61 kgs	1.34 kgs
	% of 3 kgs planned	52.1%	37.2%	53.8%	44.6%
Oil	Av. mthly ration/ person	0.55 kgs	0.55 kgs	0.58 kgs	0.55 kgs
	% of 0.6 kgs planned	91.5%	91.1%	96.3%	91.4%
Pulses	Av. mthly ration/ person	0.50 kgs	0.55 kgs	0.70 kgs	0.54 kgs
	% of 0.9 kgs planned	55.8%	60.7%	78.3%	60.4%
Sugar	Av. mthly ration/ person	0.34 kgs	0.30 kgs	0.37 kgs	0.32 kgs
	% of 0.45 kgs planned	75.6%	66.6%	81.9%	71.5%
Kilocalorie equivalents	Av. daily kcals/ person	1,309	1,335	1,408	1,334
	As a % of <u>1,680</u> kcals	77.9%	79.5%	83.8%	79.4%
	As a % of <u>1,900</u> kcals	68.9%	70.3%	74.1%	70.2%

Taking into account lower ration received by Afghans due to weight of bread provided

Kilocalorie equivalents	Av. daily kcals/ person	1,108	As above	As above	1,257
	As a % of <u>1,680</u> kcals	66.0%	As above	As above	74.8%
	As a % of <u>1,900</u> kcals	58.3%	As above	As above	66.1%

The assumption underpinning the ration is that refugees have access to employment or other means of supplementing their WFP rations. This is generally the case thanks to the government's open camp policy and not (yet) strictly enforcing the labour laws, but the availability of work varies considerably from camp to camp and we should not underestimate the difficulties faced by many refugees. The above figures suggest that more is expected of refugees in this regard than had been thought – on average Afghan refugees in camps have to meet 34% of their food needs by their own efforts. This must be difficult when the work is seasonal and the one male worker in the household can only find work for 4-5 months of the year.

Nutritional outcomes

The undersupply of rations over the years does not appear to have resulted in frank malnutrition amongst refugee children and it was not suggested to the mission that it has. It should be stressed though that the mission relies on casual observation, interviews with health staff in the camps and health post data presented overleaf in coming to this general conclusion and in no way wishes to understate the importance of providing the agreed ration. Unfortunately, there is no weight for height data to refer to.

The data in Table 3 shows that even by the end of their first year refugee children are not performing as well as Iranian children in the province. It would have been preferable if weight for age data had been available for the end of the second year – this would have given a better indication of performance after weaning. Moreover, the data doesn't match the mission's perception of the differences between the camps visited based on household visits and what was on sale in the market. The data could be faulty,



suggesting the need for UNHCR/WFP to help the health centres review the data they are collecting and their techniques and provide assistance as appropriate.

Table 3: Percentage of children below the 3rd percentile of weight for age at the end of their first year in camps compared to Iranian children in the provinces²⁵

Camp / Population / Province	Refugee camp %	Provincial %
Bardsir / Afghan / Kerman	10	6
Rafsanjan / Afghan / Kerman	16	6
Sarvestan / Iraqi Arab / Fars	8	5.9
Jahrom / Iraqi Arab / Fars	17	5.9
Ziveh / Iraqi Kurd / West Azerbaijan	3	3.2
Dilzeh / Iraqi Kurd / West Azerbaijan	8	3.2
Torbat-e-Jam / Afghan / Khorasan	15	4.5

As mentioned earlier, in each province visited the evaluation mission visited a concentration of non-camp refugees said to be relatively vulnerable. Mission members did not stumble across anything alarming in relation to the health or nutrition of the children that were seen. MSF's office in Mashhad provided the only data for non-camp refugees, suggesting that there is less than 1% malnutrition (i.e. below 85% weight for height) amongst under 5 refugee children living in Mashhad, Khorasan Province.

The May 1997 JFAM reported that levels of malnutrition recorded in the refugee camps were not abnormally high relative to those prevailing in Iranian society, although some cases of moderate malnutrition had been recorded especially amongst expectant mothers and nursing mothers and infants. At that time the Ministry of Health advised the JFAM that cases of malnutrition tend to be the result of poor preparation of food. The December 1998 JFAM similarly found the refugee population in the camps to be in a generally satisfactory condition. This would still appear to be the case based on the mission's discussions and observations, although the mission notes that it did not visit Niatak Afghan camp in Sistan-Baluchistan Province which is said to have the neediest refugees. A closer study of nutrition is clearly desirable.

Recommendations:

24. The CO should clarify whether the ration and its 1,680 equivalent, or the 1,900 kcals mentioned in the PRRO project document, is the benchmark.
25. The CO should ensure Afghan refugees receive their full entitlement of bread from camp bakeries (i.e. 364 gms per person per day). The issue of whether or not refugees should receive baked bread or wheat flour should be independently assessed.
26. When procuring pulses the CO should consider replacing yellow split peas with an alternative preferable to the refugees in Iran.

5.2 Component B: Meeting the food needs of refugees *outside* camps

Purpose and planned outputs

The stated purpose of this component is 'to provide food to refugees outside camps, based on vulnerability criteria'. The outputs include:

- baseline socio-economic data and vulnerability indicators on gender, employment and income, and health and nutritional status,

²⁵ Collected by Dr Masoud Kimiagar



- verified vulnerable non-camp refugee lists,
- improved targeting of non-camp refugee women, and
- an effective distribution mechanism.

The component originated from the following recommendation of the WFP/UNHCR JFAM of December 1998:

“Realising that over 95% of the refugees are at large outside camps and considering decreasing economic opportunities available refocusing of assistance by targeting it on the most vulnerable refugee population inside and outside camps is recommended.”

When the PRRO was being prepared the Government requested assistance for over 150,000 refugees outside camps, but it seems had a list of only 40,000 at that time. WFP opted for this figure. One difficulty here is that BAFIA has always made it plain that WFP can only assist registered refugees, yet the unregistered refugees are likely to be the most vulnerable. This has not been tackled because the component has not been implemented, other than rations for 5,000 given to BAFIA to disperse.

Baseline data on vulnerable at large refugees was to have been gathered through a socio-economic survey and vulnerability indicators were to have been developed based on the results. The vulnerability indicators were to have been used to verify the eligibility for assistance of those included on the list initially presented by BAFIA (i.e. of 40,000). To develop a food distribution system the PRRO project document provided that a pilot food stamp scheme should be run in collaboration with the government.

Once assistance was underway the CO was to have conducted periodic checks to determine those refugees that were self-reliant and could be taken off the beneficiary lists. The vulnerability indicators were also to have been used to improve the targeting of vulnerable women outside camps and the CO was to have increased awareness on gender issues and to have demanded, to the extent possible, that vulnerable women refugees be targeted for food assistance outside camps.

The CO's reluctance to proceed

The CO did not undertake the socio-economic survey arguing that ‘at no time had the JFAM or the CO intended to undertake a socio-economic survey outside the camps’ (clearly false) and that ‘it was a task impossible to achieve and does not fall under WFP mandate and the Government is not aware of such an intention and would not endorse it’.²⁶ The budget provided for the survey under the PRRO was also clearly inadequate (only US\$5,000). Thus no data was collected on food insecurity and no indicators were developed to guide targeting.

It is clear that from the outset the CO was very reluctant to expand WFP's commitments beyond the camps. The mission was informed that this was due to resource constraints and prioritisation of the camps. Nevertheless when this component was being considered in 1999 resources were available, but the CO opted not to proceed and to make one year of resources stretch to two years. Resource constraints were subsequently encountered for the whole operation and perhaps the CO foresaw this. Indeed when the CO requested provision for the 40,000 in a budget revision in 2001 it was refused by HQ on the grounds that it was not a priority. But many of WFP's activities would never get off the ground and establish a funding base if too much was made of possible resourcing constraints further on and it seems lack of resources become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

It is also true that difficulties were encountered in identifying an NGO implementing partner (discussed below). But it is hard to escape the conclusion that the CO could have proceeded if it had the will to do so. The mission was informed that it was UNHCR that had advocated assistance to the non-camp population (through the JFAM), not WFP, and that the CO had never agreed with the idea even though it was written into the PRRO project document.

²⁶ Email from CD (Majed Fassih) to HQ (Beatrice Bonnevaux) 28 September 1999.



The course of events

On 21 September 1999 BAFIA presented a detailed proposal to the CO that could have been treated as a basis for negotiating a satisfactory programme. But the CO responded in writing (on 27 September) in a quarrelsome way over the eligibility criteria proposed by BAFIA (which were indeed too broad)²⁷ and other details instead of meeting and finding common ground. An opportunity was lost.

BAFIA had proposed that it conduct the identification, if need be involving the Imam Khomeini Relief Committee, the Mostazafan Foundation, welfare organizations and the local councils. BAFIA accepted that WFP would play a role in monitoring. The beneficiaries were to be in major centres (Tehran 10,000, Mashhad 12,000, Zahedan 13,000 and Awas 5,000). It was proposed that the refugees come to central stores to collect their rations.

All the approaches and inquiries that have been undertaken ever since have gone round in circles without a result and the CO is now back to the same point of having to find a way of scrutinising a list presented by BAFIA and identifying an implementing partners. Understandably the CO has favoured identifying international organisations and/or local organisations representing refugees as implementing partners and would prefer to have its implementing partners identify beneficiaries. The CO put this position to BAFIA in January 2000 but negotiations continued concerning BAFIA's choice, the Khomeini Relief Committee, until June 2000 when BAFIA wrote to the CO stating that as WFP could not agree with the Committee's proposed budget²⁸ WFP should conclude a bilateral agreement with BAFIA for the implementation of the proposed assistance by provincial BAFIA offices unless WFP could identify an NGO that could handle the project. In November 2000 BAFIA reminded the CO that the matter was outstanding.

In 2001 the CO proposed that WFP and BAFIA jointly select local NGOs for the identification of unattended children and women-headed households who needed food assistance. The CO sought proposals for consideration. One was received from Global Partners in October 2001 but there was once again a budgetary problem – they requested WFP to contribute US\$543,271. Later in October 2001 BAFIA presented a new list to the CO that includes 6,306 divorced women and widows and 18,399 children (a total of 24,705). The CO responded in writing on 22 November requesting 'the exact names, addresses and registration file numbers' of the listed refugees.

Rations provided to BAFIA

Some time in 2000 the CO agreed to give BAFIA 5,000 food rations a month to be distributed amongst most vulnerable refugees outside camps, apparently as a 'concession' to BAFIA. The commodities have been delivered to a BAFIA warehouse outside Tehran ever since but the CO has never requested or received a report on the utilisation of these commodities. This represents both a failure by the CO to properly account for commodities, and a missed opportunity to pilot assistance to non-camp refugees through BAFIA. It will also be hard to undo.

Confusingly, there is a lot of correspondence on file for 2001 concerning a pilot to be undertaken for 5,000 vulnerable refugees in and around Tehran in collaboration with BAFIA. The CO assures the mission that this is unrelated to the 5,000 rations earlier given to BAFIA. This pilot had been agreed with the Regional Office and BAFIA had been asked to provide a list of beneficiaries including women

²⁷ BAFIA proposed *inter alia* including employed people with 4 children or more on a monthly income of less than 250,000 rials. The CO rejected this stating that 'this description applies to all Afghans in and outside the county'. The CO proposed the following criteria:

- Pregnant women in need of food assistance, provided they are head of household
- Mothers with infants in need of food assistance if they are head of household
- Elderly people in need of food assistance provided they are over 60 and live on their own with no family support (BAFIA argued for 55)

²⁸ 317,900,000 rials per annum, the largest single cost being salaries of provincial staff in four provinces.



heads of households, unaccompanied children, disabled/handicapped and elderly people (over 60) in Tehran. But in May 2001 it was decided to leave the issue for the incoming CD to consider.

How should the CO proceed?

All in all, this component of the PRRO has been poorly managed and remains an outstanding issue for the operation, now further complicated by the upcoming repatriation operation.

In the mission's debriefing with BAFIA, officials stated that WFP should proceed with its plan to assist vulnerable refugees outside camps and indeed that the ceiling should be 200,000 (not 40,000). This is a large figure relative to the current commitments although it represents less than 8% of refugees outside camps (40,000 represents only 1.55%). The CO informed the mission that it wants to move forward quickly and provide assistance to vulnerable refugees outside camps as planned and that it is prepared to do so on the basis of lists provided by BAFIA provided they target female-headed households. Additional resources are available to do so because the PRRO's Afghan caseload has come under the Regional EMOP, although this is for a limited period.

The CO does not propose conducting a socio-economic survey as originally planned because it would further delay implementation (and there is little if any money in the budget for it). This would mean proceeding without solid evidence of food insecurity and with no better understanding of which groups and which types of households are food insecure and why. The mission accepts that the CO is under pressure to work with the lists recently presented by BAFIA, but it is far from an ideal starting point and should be reconsidered. There will be little time to properly verify the need for food assistance of those listed and it will be difficult to reject some or all of them. The CO will be inclined to accept those listed provided they comprise female-headed households, but this is an inadequate form of targeting. Even if WFP were to accept those listed, an NGO implementing partner might question the approach.

There are also the outstanding issues of finding a suitable implementing partner or partners and paying for the implementation of this component. NGOs will want and require support and the government will look to WFP to pay for transport, storage and distribution (an issue that was debated in the first half of 2000). Moreover, the practicalities of implementing the component have never been worked out. A food stamp system was put forward in the PRRO project document but it seems the idea now is to have refugees collect their rations from central stores. This raises the issue of access and transport money for vulnerable refugees living at some distance from the store. BAFIA indicated in the mission's debriefing that the government does not want to be involved in the distribution. There is also the issue of the CO's capacity to monitor assistance to non-camp refugees to be considered.

It is unfortunate that WFP has made so little progress in relation to this component after so many years and is in danger of proceeding for the wrong reasons— because it is in the LoU with BAFIA, it is an outstanding issue, the commodities are now available to proceed, and assistance to refugees outside camps might attract additional resources from donor. The CO should take stock before proceeding. Amongst many other things the CO needs to consider how to gain more information about the needs of the refugees outside camps, alternatives to working with BAFIA's lists, how such assistance would relate to the upcoming repatriation operation, regional priorities, and the value of distributing a ration for a limited period to refugees who presumably face long-term food insecurity.

The best strategy may to bypass the lists and pursue 'value-added' activities for Afghan refugees in geographically targeted areas such as school feeding for informal schools (e.g. in Mashhad²⁹) and literacy training for women in locations where vulnerability is reported to be high (e.g. in Sistan-Baluchistan). When assistance to informal Afghan schools was mentioned in the debriefing with BAFIA the officials present were receptive, although expressed concerns about arousing jealousy and criticism from Iranians in the same neighbourhood. These are not entirely new ideas – the 1998 JFAM suggested special programmes outside the camps, especially in Sistan-Baluchistan to alleviate the

²⁹ There are 6-8,000 children in such schools in Mashhad, Khorasan Province



conditions of working refugee children (e.g. in brick factories), and support for the informal schools in Mashhad. The additional challenge now facing the CO is to link assistance to repatriation (e.g. providing skills that will assist upon their return).

Having chosen an entry point for providing limited assistance to refugees at large the CO, in collaboration with UNHCR, should assess the circumstances and needs of those assisted. This will require additional resources, as will ongoing monitoring.

Recommendations:

27. Non-camp refugees should be assisted if their need for a general distribution can be cogently demonstrated. Otherwise, assistance should be limited to activities with a 'recovery' element and/or a linkage to repatriation focused on Afghans in areas where vulnerability is reported to be high. The CO should consider using VAM to identify where these activities should be established.
28. The CO should determine how the 5,000 rations provided to BAFIA for distribution at its discretion have been utilised to date and discontinue this assistance if targeting is unsatisfactory and adequate monitoring cannot be put in place.

5.3 Component C: Oil incentive for girls to attend school

Purpose

WFP introduced the 'oil-for-schooling' component in 1997. The stated purpose of the oil incentive under the PRRO is 'to encourage girls to attend camp schools set up by the Iranian Government, at the same time contributing to the household budget as well as to the household's food intake.'

Performance in increasing enrolment

The target for PRO 5950 was 8,500 girls enrolled, based on increasing enrolment to 10% of the camp population by 1998 (compared to 12% for boys). The peak enrolment achieved appears to have been 7,277 in 1997/98 but this fell to 5,000 through 1998/1999, due in large part to the repatriation of some Iraqi families. A lower target was set for PRRO 6126 - 7,000 by mid-2000. During the period when PRO 5950 was extended enrolment slipped further and by mid-2000 when the PRRO commenced 4,474 girls were enrolled (7.2% of refugees then in camps). By the 3rd quarter of 2001 enrolments increased to 5,841 (9.4% of refugees then in camps). The latter represents 83.4% achievement of the revised target of 7,000 girls enrolled.

Although this should be considered a successful component, enrolment has clearly not been in accordance with expectations. As mentioned, one factor is repatriation. The CO has also reported that a major constraint is school infrastructure. Another reason given during the conduct of the evaluation was the entrenched attitudes of parents.

The mission was told during household interviews in camps that the oil is not the reason why girls attend school, or it is no longer the incentive for families to send them. This does not necessarily detract from the value of the initiative, indeed it is a positive indication of the sustainability of the girls' attendance, but it should be borne in mind by the CO. Indeed it would be appropriate after so many years of implementing this activity to conduct a review to guide the CO in taking it forward.

Performance in providing incentives

The planned incentive is 4.5 kgs per month for the nine months of the school year (40.5 kgs per girl). Overall, the incentives actually provided have been an average 71.2% of what was planned and there has been a big variation between that provided to Iraqi Kurds and Iraqi Arabs (see the following table). The monthly distribution statistics provided by the CO also show that there have been big variations in the number of months of the year that camps have not been provided with oil. It should be 3 months (during the school holidays) but it has varied from 2 to 6.



The CO informed the mission that the amount of oil given each month has varied considerably due to the size of the containers of oil supplied.

Table 4: Average monthly incentive provided to girls over a nine-month period³⁰

Origin of refugees	Average monthly incentive	As a % 4.5 kgs planned
Iraqi Kurd	4.09 kgs	90.89%
Iraqi Arabs	2.96 kgs	65.83%
Afghans	3.22 kgs	71.62%
Overall	3.2 kgs	71.22%

It is not clear to the mission how the CO monitors attendance at school. It should be noted that there was a universal complaint that boys should also be given oil.

Recommendation:

29. The CO should review the oil incentive for girls' attendance at camp school to guide future programming.

5.4 Component D: Food support for repatriation of Iraqi refugees

Purpose and planning assumptions

The stated purpose of this component is 'to support UNHCR-assisted repatriation of refugees through the provision of a one-time wheat package of 50 kilograms upon departure, as a transitory ration until the repatriates find more regular supply systems in their home countries'. This is a continuation of similar assistance provided under previous operations.

The planning assumption for PRRO 6126 was that approximately 12,000 Iraqi refugees would return to Iraq in the first twelve months of the PRRO (planned for mid-1999 to mid-2000). It was also assumed that Iraqi Kurds returning to the north of Iraq would, within one month of arrival, be enrolled in a food distribution system established under the 'Food-for-Oil' scheme (established pursuant to a Security Council resolution) and that Afghans need not be included because repatriates would receive food assistance under the then ongoing PRRO in Afghanistan (now replaced by regional EMOP 10126.0).

Performance

Only 1,500 Iraqi refugees have been assisted (with 40 kgs of wheat flour) in 18 months of implementation. A total 7.5 mts of wheat flour has been utilised.

There are two caseloads to consider – the Iraqi Kurds and the Iraqi Arabs. In the former case the problem as reported to the mission is that UNHCR had to terminate its voluntary repatriation program for Iraqi Kurds due to the insistence of the Government of Iraq that refugees be repatriated at a border point that entered government controlled territory. UNHCR decided to terminate the voluntary repatriation program and instead Kurds have been 'deregistered' by UNHCR as they repatriate to Iraq through border points of their choosing. They have not been considered eligible for assistance and it was suggested to the mission that it is not a priority to provide the assistance.

In the case of the Iraqi Arabs repatriation has been low and for those that have returned there has been poor communication between UNHCR and WFP – basically WFP was not informed of repatriations in advance and thus no assistance was provided by WFP. If this is the case it is a problem that can be addressed.

³⁰ 4th quarter 2000 plus 1st and 2nd quarter 2001. School holidays occur in the 3rd quarter



Recommendation:

30. WFP and UNHCR should determine the need to continue food support in Iran for the repatriation of Iraqi refugees, particularly if the returnees can access rations once in Iraq. If the program is continued WFP and UNHCR need to agree on appropriate modalities to provide food assistance.

6. PARTNERSHIPS AND CO-ORDINATION

Partnerships

WFP's implementing partner, BAFIA, is very capable and has generally contributed very positively to the implementation of the PRRO. Despite the struggles that took place between the CO and BAFIA in 1999/2000 the relationship is cordial and business-like. WFP is respected for the continuity of its assistance.

One of the planned outputs for the PRRO was a new Letter of Understanding with BAFIA delineating responsibilities under the PRRO. This was concluded in March 2000 (during the extension of PRO 5950).

It was also envisaged that the CO would continue to explore collaborative arrangements with national NGOs such as the Imam Khomeini Committee and the Imam Bagher Foundation. This was explored but no partnerships resulted. WFP clearly needs implementing partners if it is to assist refugees outside camps. This is currently being pursued by the CO.

Beneficiary participation

There has been no attention by the CO to the consultation of refugees in the implementation of the operation and no efforts to ensure beneficiary participation. WFP and UNHCR requested BAFIA to set up Food Committees at the refugee camp level in 1996, to ensure beneficiary participation, particularly of women. But according to the 1997 JFAM the main influence remained with the traditional leaders, such as the elders and members of the clergy. No mention was made of Food Committees in the PRRO 6126 project document and no mention was made of them to the evaluation mission by CO staff or in the camps. They do not appear to be functioning.

In the Afghan camps the Kalantars are responsible for the final distribution within blocks. They are sometimes referred to as leaders, sometimes sheriffs. In any event they play the role of intermediaries between the camp management and the refugees. Their activities are clearly resented by some refugees.

Coordination with UNHCR

Relations with UNHCR were at times fraught over the period 1999/2000 and this weakened collaboration. There were several occasions where UNHCR requested WFP to provide food assistance and WFP declined to do so or severely restricted its assistance (e.g. Torbat-e-Jam, Be'Sat and detention centres). These differences were not resolved and as such should have been addressed by HQ (Rome and Geneva). The CO is now trying to improve the level of consultation between WFP and UNHCR. It is noteworthy that lack of consultation between the agencies was raised as an issue by the 1998 JFAM and one of the sub-objectives of the PRRO was to 'improve collaboration with UNHCR'.

The CO should advocate the development of a Joint Action Plan for UNHCR/WFP assistance to refugees in Iran (in conformity with the global MoU). The mission notes that the importance of Joint Action Plans featured at the top of the list of agreed action points resulting from the WFP-UNHCR High Level Meeting held in Rome in October 1999. A Joint Action Plan for Iran should incorporate a clearly enunciated strategy for camp and non-camp refugees including a phase-out strategy for assistance to the camps and linkages to the anticipated repatriation operation. The strategy should also address food security and nutrition assessment/monitoring.



Once a Joint Plan of Action is in place WFP and UNHCR should have regular structured meetings to review progress and developments. Heads-of-Agencies meeting could on occasion be a substitute if put on a regular footing.

It may be useful for WFP, UNHCR and BAFIA to conclude a tripartite agreement. The 1998 JFAM recommended one and the necessity of concluding such agreements with IPs responsible for food distribution at the field level was stressed in the aforementioned WFP-UNHCR High Level Meeting.

Coordination with other agencies/organisations

Several activities were included in the PRRO project document concerning coordination including contributing to monthly Food Aid Committee meetings which brought together BAFIA, WFP and UNHCR. These ceased in 1999. Liaison with the International Consortium for Refugees in Iran (ICRI) was also mentioned. This has taken place. The mission was unable to ascertain how regularly the CO meets with the heads of other UN agencies including UNDP.

Regional coordination

There needs to be more coherence and convergence in the manner in which the Regional EMOP is implemented. At present the EMOP is regarded by the Iran CO as a means of accessing additional resources, but it requires that a regional perspective be taken and this involves balancing competing needs. It also needs to be recognised by the CO that the Regional EMOP document imposes additional requirements (e.g. in relation to food security monitoring).

Recommendations

31. WFP and UNHCR should conclude a Joint Action Plan for assistance to refugees in Iran incorporating a clearly enunciated strategy for camp and non-camp refugees, with linkages to the anticipated repatriation operation and including a phase-out strategy for assistance to the camps. Once the plan is in place WFP and UNHCR should have regular structured meetings to review progress and developments. Heads-of-Agencies meeting could on occasion be a substitute if put on a regular footing.
32. The CO should consider advocating the conclusion of a tripartite agreement between WFP, UNHCR and BAFIA.
33. The Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan COs should work together to ensure there is coherence and convergence in the manner in which the Regional EMOP is implemented.
34. In consultation with UNHCR and BAFIA, the CO should address the issue of beneficiary participation and in doing so determine why the Food Committees established in 1996 do not appear to be functioning and if they should be resuscitated.

7. RESOURCING OF THE PRRO³¹

7.1 Budgets and financial resources

Based on the figures in the current and previous operations, the ratio of dollars spent per ton of commodities decreased from US\$225/ton under PRO5950 to US\$195/ton under the existing PRRO. The mission considers however, that the PRRO budget was inappropriate in relation to the social-economic survey, an important element in targeting assistance for both camp and non-camp refugees, which could not have been undertaken with the US\$5,000 allocated. The evaluation budget was also

³¹ The headings in this chapter of the required table of contents overlap considerably and should be reviewed.



inappropriate although a DSC budget revision in February 2001 rectified this (securing US\$75,000 to cover the costs of both the evaluation and the JFAM).

The PRRO has a very limited resource base and relies heavily on multi-lateral contributions, which are uncertain. From the outset, the operation has been hampered by the fact that WFP's largest donor is unable to support operations in Iran for political reasons. These factors have resulted in periodic commodity shortages.

As of January 2002 the PRRO was well resourced (over 97%), but this is based on the current caseload which excludes 20% of encamped refugees and makes no allowance for non-camp refugees. It may be possible to offset the recommended increase in coverage of encamped refugees with ration adjustments.

An international programming officer as well as a second monitoring officer should have been hired. The planned budget for the socio-economic survey was inadequate and would not have permitted it to be conducted. Sufficient resources should have been earmarked for the survey in order to test food needs and properly develop targeting criteria.

7.2 Flexibility of the PRRO budget

PRRO 6126 was planned to commence in mid-1999 but the CO delayed implementation as PRO resources remained and the LOU with the Government was only signed in April 2000. Implementation finally commenced in mid-2000 and was due to end in mid-2001.

The PRRO was then extended to end-2001 (budget revision of February 2001) to accommodate the evaluation and JFAM scheduled for end-2001. These were both postponed however due to the Afghanistan Emergency, causing a new PRRO to be delayed and a request for a further extension until end-2002, with an increased budget (budget revision of January 2002).

Upon the CO's request, a budget revision was made in May 2000 reducing DSC from US\$235,000 to US\$192,256. The CO took this unusual step having decided to appoint nationals and not recruit an international programme staff. The savings could presumably have been re-allocated if the CO had wanted.

In addition to requesting an extension, the budget revision of February 2001 sought an increase in tonnage to cover the non-camp refugees but it was refused on the grounds that this was not a priority.

The Afghan refugee caseload of PRRO 6126 was integrated into the regional EMOP 10126 for a six month period (October 2001 to March 2002), thus providing additional resources/savings to the Iran CO. The allocation under the regional EMOP includes a provision for non-camp refugees (the original PRRO planning figure of 40,000 beneficiaries).

The CO decided to provide food aid to camp managers and teachers, therefore transferring funds to assist unplanned beneficiaries.

7.3 Predictability and regularity of resources

The resource shortfalls discussed above resulted in periodic commodity shortages and short supply to refugees, particularly in the first nine months of the PRRO and this influenced the CO in seeking to decrease beneficiary numbers. The CO reported in the first half of 2000 that the transition from PRO 5950 to PRRO 6126 caused disruptions in the pipeline and that carry over commodities from 1999 and incoming 1999 supplies were insufficient to maintain the food basket. It is possible that the CO did not manage the transition as well as it should have and that it did not provide adequate warning to HQ about impending shortages. There have been some delays with wheat shipments, but these have generally been dealt with by WFP borrowing from SOG.

Wheat is an in kind contribution and supply has been the least affected (92.1% of planned distributions but a higher percentage landed). Other than a small in kind donation of sugar, the non-wheat commodities in the food basket were purchased, so the CO was in a position to manage shortages in



resources by prioritising the commodities purchased. Oil was evidently considered the highest priority because it was least affected by resource shortfalls (92% fulfilled against planned distributions). Rice on the other hand appears to have been considered the least important item in the food basket (45% fulfilled overall). BAFIA managed periodic shortages in rice, pulses, sugar and oil by distributing partial monthly rations.

7.4 Advocacy and donor perception of the PRRO

The current CO management has been very active in advocating the PRRO with donor representatives in Iran and mobilizing resources. One strategy being pursued is using donor trade relations with Iran as an incentive.

Local donors are pleased with the PRRO implementation and the combination of a relief and a recovery activity (the oil incentive for girls) had a positive impact in obtaining their support. The donors are more aware of WFP's assistance to the Afghan refugees than the Iraqi refugees.

The repatriation operation is likely to take attention and resources away from the care and maintenance of the refugees remaining in camps in Iran. UNHCR is focused on the repatriation operation and could place a lower priority on securing resources for refugees remaining in Iran. This needs to be pursued with UNHCR. Formally, UNHCR should support WFP's approaches to donors (global MOU) but the CD feels UNHCR has not to date been supportive enough.

The CO's report for the second half 2000 stated that: 'It is safe to expect that with the decentralisation and the responsibility of attracting donations falling on Country Offices we would witness improvements. Approaching donors through their embassies with close proximity to the actual situation would undoubtedly bring better results.'

Recommendations

35. Additional resources need to be earmarked for an International Programming Officer as well as a second National Monitoring Officer.
36. A realistic budget should be prepared to carry out additional food needs assessments.
37. Additional resources should be earmarked for assistance to non-camp refugees.

8. MEETING THE COMMITMENTS TO WOMEN

The PRRO design and the agreement with BAFIA

The PRRO design document does not include an analysis of gender relations or the special needs of female refugees, thus providing no guidance to the CO. This is compounded by the lack of a Gender Action Plan for WFP in Iran. Nor does the design methodically address WFP's Commitments to Women i.e. by taking each of the five areas of commitment and addressing each one, whether in one place or where appropriate throughout the document. Nevertheless some of the commitments are mentioned, including directing food to women (Commitment I) and collecting gender-disaggregated data (Commitment IV). The PRRO does not budget for a proportion of activities for women as now required by the Gender Guidelines (2000).

The planned socio-economic survey was supposed to have collected gender related data, enabling WFP to 'raise awareness on gender issues', but it was not conducted.³² Opportunities have not been sought during implementation to improve the status of women or to address their strategic needs.

³² PRRO project document, Paragraph 17



WFP's Commitments to Women are not adequately reflected in the LoU signed with BAFIA. The mission regularly asked BAFIA officials at all levels if they were aware that WFP had made commitments to improving the status of women and addressing their strategic needs and all replied with an emphatic 'no'.

Commitment I: Provide direct access to appropriate and adequate foods

The PRRO project document states that targeting vulnerable refugee households in camps 'will necessarily have to entail targeting and delivering food to the women of the vulnerable refugee households in order to comply with WFP's Commitments to Women.'³³ This is not strictly speaking required by the Commitments – the emphasis is on women's control of the family entitlement. In any event, rations have never been distributed directly to women and in practice, monthly distributions are either centrally organised, conducted by male store staff who dole out each household's ration, or decentralised to blocks and conducted by male leaders. The head of the household in the ration books is male. Men, women and adolescents variously line up to receive the household ration (there are usually separate male and female lines).

The mission was not able to ascertain the extent to which women control the family entitlement. This is a matter that deserves closer scrutiny by the CO. When the question concerning control of rations was put to women they expressed no concerns that men interfered, but this reveals little.

The mission considered the issue of giving rations directly to women and/or putting women in charge of the distribution system but did not come to a conclusion. The CO needs to consider if such measures would improve women's control of family entitlements and how they could be negotiated with BAFIA.

The CO uses the criterion 'female headed households' in screening households for assistance from those newly admitted to camps and in screening beneficiaries in camps newly accepted for assistance. The CO also intends to use the criterion to select non-camp refugees for assistance. The use of 'female headed household' as a proxy indicator for food insecurity is common and is viewed positively by WFP, but its efficacy needs to be tested in each context. If this cannot be done the criterion should at least be qualified with the rider that the female-headed households concerned are so food insecure or so vulnerable to food insecurity that they require external assistance in meeting their basic food needs.

Commitment II: Take measures to ensure women's equal access to and full participation in power structures and decision making; and Commitment III: Take positive action to facilitate women's equal access to resources, employment, markets and trade

The camp setting and its restrictions exacerbate the many disadvantages women already have to bear. In the vast majority of camps they can't go out to work and rarely leave the camp (the exception is the Iraqi Kurds) or face harassment when they do. Women are not involved in camp management and have few activities. Workshops and handicraft activities have come and gone due to a lack of materials and markets. In some camps women are engaged as health volunteers/facilitators. Some women attend government Literacy Movement classes in the camp (organised in the school in the afternoons).

The oil incentive provided by WFP for the education of girls' is a positive step, which will benefit the girls concerned and should facilitate gender equity. There are several other possibilities that could be explored. The CO could consider providing an oil incentive for women trained as health facilitators in the Afghan camps. It would help if some stalls in the camp markets could be earmarked for women. Small gardens for women's clubs may be a possibility. In the non-camp setting food for literacy and/or nutrition training (FFT) is a possibility.

The CO would first have to conduct some basic analysis and establish the need for food assistance amongst the target group, particularly if it was to be in addition to a general ration. There would then

³³ Paragraph 16



have to be an assessment of the likely impact of the assistance/incentive on women's empowerment, production, better health and sanitation, etc). WFP would need an implementing partner and training would be required to support some interventions (e.g. incentives to health facilitators).

The PRO 5950 project document stated that in 1996 WFP/UNHCR requested BAFIA to set up Food Committees in camps to ensure women's participation in the control of food distributions. These committees were not mentioned in the PRRO 6126 project document and do not appear to be functioning.

The CO employs a high proportion of women. which is positive (more than 50%).

Commitment IV: Generate and disseminate gender-disaggregated data and information for planning and evaluation

WFP's implementing partner, BAFIA, disaggregates population and distribution statistics for refugee camps and provides this information to WFP (collected during quarterly monitoring visits). This reveals the following profile of WFP's beneficiaries:

Table 5: Gender breakdown of refugees assisted in camps³⁴

Camps	Female	Male
Afghan	46.4%	53.6%
Iraqi Arab	48.7%	51.3%
Iraqi Kurd	49.5%	50.5%
Overall	47.9%	52.1%

The PRRO project document states that 'the collection of gender disaggregated data will assist analysing women refugees' specific conditions'.³⁵ The data has not been used for this purpose.

Commitment V: Improve accountability on actions taken

No action appears to have been taken to meet this commitment.

The need for a gender strategy

The CO needs a strategy for improving the status of refugee women and addressing their strategic needs. One way of proceeding would be to have the gender focal points of WFP and UNHCR work together to prepare a joint WFP/UNHCR gender strategy for refugees in Iran. This could then be presented to the respective COs for discussion. A subsequent step may be for WFP and UNHCR to visit a number of provinces to consult BAFIA, including camp managers. At some point women's representatives from the camps have to participate. In addition the CO needs to formulate a Gender Action Plan.

It is recognised that addressing the Commitments to Women raises a human resource issue for the CO.

Recommendations:

38. The CO needs to formulate a strategy for improving the status of refugee women and addressing their strategic needs. The CO should consider proceeding by raising the issue with the UNHCR office in Iran, suggesting that the gender focal points for the two agencies prepare a joint WFP/UNHCR gender strategy for refugees in Iran for discussion.

³⁴ Based on data available for five quarters from mid-2000

³⁵ Paragraph 30



39. In consultation with UNHCR, the CO should explore programming options for ensuring women's equal access to and full participation in power structures and decision-making (Commitment II) and facilitating women's equal access to resources, employment, markets and trade (Commitment III).
40. Consideration should be given to resuscitating the Food Committees in camps to ensure women's participation in the control of food distributions.
41. The CO should ascertain whether girls and women are receiving their proper share of rations through the distribution system and within the family. In doing so, the CO should ascertain who controls the family ration. On the basis of this information the CO should consider what changes if any are required to give effect to WFP's Commitments to Women, including whether or not to strengthen women's access to food and control within the family by putting women in charge of the distribution system and/or distributing rations directly to women. A strategy should be drafted for negotiating any changes with BAFIA.
42. WFP's Commitments to Women should be more adequately reflected in future agreements with implementing partners.
43. The CO should not continue to rely heavily on the criterion 'female headed households' to select beneficiaries without testing its efficacy as a proxy indicator for vulnerability to food insecurity in the Iranian context to ensure the criterion is used appropriately.

See also recommendation under *Quality of the PRRO Strategy and Design* and see **Annex B**, *Assessment of Activity Compatibility with the Commitments to Women*

ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES

No environmental issues or concerns are mentioned in the PRRO project document and none have been raised during implementation. The camps inevitably have an impact on the environment but this appears to be well managed by the government and UNHCR (e.g. by installing waste treatment).

When there have been large influxes into camps there have been occasions when fruit and other trees have been cut for firewood from surrounding farmland but with the stabilisation of the camps this problem has abated. Most encamped refugees use kerosene or gas for cooking and heating rather than firewood. No information is available on the impact of the 97% of refugees who are not in camps.

10. LESSONS IDENTIFIED

The revision of PRRO strategies and outputs

The CO's decision not to implement key PRRO strategies and related outputs and develop its own strategy and focus presents fundamental planning, management and authority issues for WFP. The mission suggests that WFP cannot effectively direct its operations if the CO is able to depart from strategies and outputs agreed by the Executive Board without oversight and approval at an appropriate level. Moreover, for as long as there is no procedure for generating an updated design document, COs that seek and have approved fundamental changes during implementation will not have the benefit of this design tool, which will impact on the effectiveness of the operation. This represents a gap in Results Based Management.

This is not to say that strategies should not be changed during implementation but that WFP needs to develop a mechanism for reviewing, approving and documenting changes.

WFP's capacity to efficiently utilise resources

The efficiency with which WFP utilises the resources put at its disposal is easily circumscribed by the unwillingness of the host government to review ration scales so that they more accurately reflect the



actual ‘food gap’ of the refugees concerned. This suggests that WFP, with the support of the UN system, needs generally to invest much more in negotiating rational outcomes.

Vulnerability criteria

Predetermined socio-physiological criteria are useful proxy indicators of vulnerability to food insecurity but the manner in which they may be used needs to be made clearer to COs. They should not be used for screening refugees for inclusion on beneficiary lists for a general ration and they should not be used uncritically i.e. without testing their correlation with actual food insecurity.



Annexes



ANNEX A - EVALUATION METHODS

Selection of camps

The camps were selected by the CO on the basis that they provide a cross-section of camps by population and province. A different set of camps was selected by the CO for the JFAM mission that followed the evaluation. The mission was satisfied with the CO's selection but added one camp, Torbat-e-Jam, which is unique because WFP only provides assistance to a small proportion of the refugees in the camp. The camps visited included:

Camp	Population	Province
Bardsir	Afghan	Kerman
Rafsanjan	Afghan	Kerman
Torbat-e-Jam	Afghan	Khorasan
Sarvestan	Iraqi Arab	Fars
Jahrom	Iraqi Arab	Fars
Ziveh	Iraqi Kurd	West Azerbaijan
Dilzeh	Iraqi Kurd	West Azerbaijan

Provincial visits

The mission adopted a basic 'three day model' for the visit to each province (excluding travel between provinces consisting of:

Day 1	Day 2	Day 3
Initial briefing with BAFIA and visit to first refugee camp (team leader travelling with BAFIA officials) Brief team meeting in the evening to adapt method if necessary and discuss findings	Visit to second refugee camp (the further of the two) Brief team meeting in the evening to discuss findings of household visits and content of debriefing to BAFIA	Visit to concentration of refugees living outside camps Debriefing with BAFIA (allowing 3 hours)

This model was adapted to fit in with travel between provinces (e.g. having the initial briefing with BAFIA on the afternoon of arrival in the province and departing on the afternoon of the 4th day. The visits to concentrations of refugees not living in camps was not part of the itinerary as initially conceived by the CO and was added during the evaluation.

Camp visits

The mission also adopted a basic model for the visit to each province which included splitting into three teams at certain points:



Team Leader	Team 2	Team 3
Introduction to BAFIA camp manager, agreement on method and random selection of refugee households to be visited		
Further discussions with camp manager	Visit school, women's activities like literacy classes, IGA workshops if functioning	Discussions with nutrition/health contacts
Visit stores and bakery where relevant	Focus group discussion (e.g. of women)	Visit health centres
Visit randomly selected households (interviews using checklist)	Visit randomly selected households (interviews using checklist)	Visit markets
Regroup to ask follow up questions of camp manager and staff and to discuss tentative findings and recommendations		

A minimum of five hours was spent in each camp. The foregoing model was adapted as appropriate, mixing and adding activities. Each of the three teams conducted a minimum of three household visits of 30 minutes duration each (minimum of nine in total). In practice the total number of households visited in each camp exceeded the minimum. As a control, each team visited at least one household that was not receiving rations from WFP.

Key concepts³⁶

Food insecurity

... is the ability of a household to produce or access at all times the minimum food needed for a healthy life. A household is described as 'food insecure' when it is unable to meet such needs at all times.

Vulnerability

... is the extent to which a household may be adversely affected and rendered more food insecure by possible future events. Households may be vulnerable to various risk factors (natural and 'human-made') and for various reasons (social, ethnic, economic and environmental).

This is very different from the 'traditional' concept of nutritionally 'vulnerable groups of individuals defined in physiological terms, such as young children, pregnant and lactating women, the disabled, etc.

Self-reliance

... is the ability of households to meet their basic needs for food and other necessities through their own efforts (i.e. excluding external food assistance). The degree (or level) of self-reliance is the proportion of its food needs which a household is able to meet through its members' own efforts, taking account of its other basic needs such as shelter, water, education and health care.

See also **Introduction** to the report, discussion of method.

³⁶Taken from Food Security and Food Assistance among long-standing Refugees: Issues relating to assessments, targeting, self-reliance and determining when and how to phase down and out food assistance among refugees in ongoing 'care and maintenance' situations, Ron Ockwell, November 1999



Checklist for refugee camp visits

Profile of the camp

- When was it established?
- How are food distributions organised and complaints dealt with?
- What proportion of families are headed by women?
- What differences in income and well-being are there between refugees in the camp?
- Are the refugees in the camp better or worse off than refugees at large?
- How and why are particular refugees processed into and out of the camp?

Access to food and the refugee economy

- WFP ration – adequacy, quality, regularity and amount received compared to entitlement.
- Any assistance from Government or another organization?
- What proportion of families have members labouring or in business? Are women employed in any way?
- Are the labour laws concerning refugees being enforced yet?

Targeting within refugee camps

- Is WFP's vulnerability criteria being applied to new arrivals? Is it acceptable/defensible?
- Could targeting be improved?
- Do any of those excluded by WFP's criteria receive rations upon distribution anyway?
- What proportion of families have children < 2 and > than 3 children? What rations do they receive?

Repatriation

- If any refugees have been repatriated, have they received WFP food assistance?
- Has the Government any repatriation program for these refugees? Are the refugees aware of it?
- Under what circumstances would they be willing to go home?

Oil incentive for girls

- Are families receiving entitlements? How do they utilise the oil?
- Does the oil really make a difference to the attendance of girls in school?
- Are they learning about their own language at all in school?

Recovery strategy

- What could be done to help refugees be more self-reliant while in the camp and when they leave?
- What is the Government or other organizations doing?
- What capacity and ideas do refugees have for recovery activities?
- What overall recovery strategy should WFP adopt for the next PRRO?

Gender

- What role do women play in the family, clan, camp? Are there any formal/informal women's groups?
- What could WFP do to increase women's food security and address gender inequalities?



Burning issues presented by the CO

Issue 1:

Too many (12) very small Iraqi Kurdish camps (not practical to maintain deliveries)

Recommend: Consolidation of 12 existing Iraqi Kurdish Camps into fewer, larger camps.

Issue 2:

Wheat as a strategic commodity:

- a) Major problems with State Organization for Grains (SOG) as the distribution mechanism for the conversion of wheat to wheat flour and delivery of wheat flour to the camps; SOG dragging its feet because it was committed to the LOU by BAFIA;
- b) Bread is being distributed in the Afghan camps instead of wheat flour; issue of refugees perhaps not receiving full entitlement

Recommend:

- a) Thorough (logistics) review of alternatives for the conversion of wheat and the distribution of wheat flour in the camps;
- b) Consider the distribution of wheat flour instead of bread in the Afghan camps

Issue 3:

Proposed socio-economic survey; need to assess vulnerability of both existing camp populations (especially Iraqis who tend to be less vulnerable) and proposed at large caseload; ties in to review of current vulnerability criteria (widows, handicapped, elderly); ties into issue that Iraqi refugees in Iran account for tiny percentage of total refugees whereas level of assistance to these camps is proportionally high; could tie into issue of introducing FFW activities & recovery component to the PRRO

Recommend: Go ahead with proposed survey provided funds can be secured;

Issue 4:

Failure to date to implement assistance to the 40,000 at large caseload; ties into issue of under-resourcing and need to secure resources before initiating involvement with potential NGOs

Recommend: Proceed with identification of most vulnerable from Government registration list of aliens & selection of suitable NGO implementing partners in Tehran, Sistan-Baluchistan & Khorasan;

Issue 5:

Oil for girls' education: currently we are assisting only girls in primary school;

Recommend: Extend assistance to girls in secondary schools in the refugee camps

Issue 6:

Need to review food basket, given difficulties in resourcing rice and sugar; sugar not seen as essential commodity in the food basket;

Issue 7:

Need to review monitoring system and determine how to bring monitoring to the "next level".

ANNEX B - CHECKLIST FOR MEETING THE COMMITMENTS TO WOMEN & MAINSTREAMING A GENDER PERSPECTIVE

Essential Elements of Commitments to Women and Gender Mainstreaming Policy	Detailed Observations	Level of PRRO Coherence With Commitments to Women and Gender Mainstreaming Policy			
		Very High	High	Low	Very Low
Commitment I: Provide Direct Access to Appropriate Food for Women					
◆ Does the PRRO make a real effort to get food into the hands of women, e.g. through women's ration cards?	No (although it is not suggested that food does not get to women)				X
◆ Do the PRRO activities address micronutrient deficiencies amongst women and children?	No (although it is not suggested that there is a problem)				X
◆ Do the PRRO activities consider local cooking and eating habits?	Yes, the ration includes five commodities and efforts have been made to replace yellow split peas (which are disliked) with lentils		X		
◆ Have women been consulted in determining the food basket?	Neither men or women were consulted				X
◆ Are female-headed households given special attention because of their greater poverty and time constraints?	Yes, but only in so far as FHH is one criteria for accepting additional beneficiaries			X	
◆ Does the PRRO make an effort to reduce the security and/or health risks women face when collecting food?	No (although it is not suggested that there is a problem)				X
Commitment II: Take Measures to Ensure Women's Equal Access to and Full Participation in Power Structures and Decision-Making					
◆ Does the PRRO address women's strategic needs, i.e., use an approach that challenges traditional gender roles and empowers women? Describe how.	No, the CO advises that BAFIA is not receptive to challenging traditional gender roles or empowering women in the context of the camps, and there can be little doubt that this is the case. Nevertheless the CO has not pursued the issue as vigorously as it perhaps could have and there is certainly no strategy in place for doing so				X
▪ Does it address gender relations? Does it bring men into the dialogue around the issues of women's status?	No, not in relation to beneficiaries. The office does however employ a high proportion of women and the women concerned have received recognition from colleagues and BAFIA				X

Essential Elements of Commitments to Women and Gender Mainstreaming Policy	Detailed Observations	Level of PRRO Coherence With Commitments to Women and Gender Mainstreaming Policy			
		Very High	High	Low	Very Low
Commitment III: Take Positive Action to Facilitate Women’s Equal Access to Resources, Employment, Markets and Trade					
♦ Are PRRO resources deliberately targeted to women and girls where there is a big gender gap, i.e. of 25%? ¹ What is done?	Apart from the oil incentive for girls attending primary school the PRRO does not include Commitment III activities			X	
♦ Does the PRRO have incentive programs to address the gender gap in primary education? What are they?	Yes, oil in provided to families sending girls to camp primary schools	X			
♦ Do women participate in FFW? As labourers or also as decision-makers? Do they control the assets created?	There is no FFW				
♦ Is there any opportunity in the PRRO for women to learn new skills through FFT for greater development sustainability?	There is no FFT				
♦ Does the PRRO engage in advocacy on behalf of women? For gender equity? To leverage resources for partnership work?	Only to a limited extent. WFP participates in the UN Gender Group which engages with the Iranian Center for Women Participation			X	
Commitment IV: Generate and Disseminate Gender-Disaggregated Data for Planning and Evaluation					
♦ Are the M&E systems used in the PRRO sensitive to gender? Explain how.	Only in so far as gender-disaggregated data is provided by BAFIA			X	
♦ Is qualitative information sensitive to gender also collected?	Limited			X	
• Does the PRRO look at inputs, outputs outcomes and impact from a gender perspective?	No evidence that this is the case.				X

¹ For information on the gender gap in your country, contact the Senior Gender Adviser, SPP at HQ.

Essential Elements of Commitments to Women and Gender Mainstreaming Policy	Detailed Observations	Level of PRRO Coherence With Commitments to Women and Gender Mainstreaming Policy			
		Very High	High	Low	Very Low
Commitment V: Improve Accountability of Actions Taken to Meet the Commitments					
♦ Are WFP staff managing the PRRO held accountable for meeting the Commitments to Women and mainstreaming gender? How?	No evidence that this is the case				X
♦ Is the Gender Focal Point given sufficient authority to influence decision making with regard to the PRRO? Support?	According to the GFP, she did not have any influence on the 1998 JFAM and subsequently suffered from a lack of authority, time and budget. It is perhaps indicative of the lack of emphasis given to gender issues that there has been no investment in a Gender Action Plan.			X	
♦ Are implementing partners held accountable for meeting the Commitments to Women and mainstreaming gender? How?	No, the CO advises that BAFIA is not receptive, which is likely to be the case. Nevertheless, the issue is not pursued by the CO. The Commitments to Women are not mentioned in the Letter of Agreement with BAFIA and Provincial BAFIA heads claim not to have been made aware of the Commitments to Women.				X

ANNEX C - DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

- WFP PRRO policy document: “From Crisis to Recovery” (WFP/EB.A/98/4-A)
- WFP, Guidelines for Preparation of a PRRO
- PRRO 6126 and PRO 5950 project documents
- WFP/RE resource summary table for the PRRO
- Afghanistan Regional EMOP 10026 document
- Programme Design Manual (2000)
- Cost Containment Study (2001)
- Emergency Needs Assessment Guidelines (1999)
- Supplementary Feeding Operational Guidelines (1998)
- Food aid in Emergencies (red book) Operational Procedures (1993)
- Food and Nutrition Handbook (2000)
- Gender Guidelines (2000)
- Gender Checklist (1999)
- Environmental Review Guidelines (1999)
- ALNAP Annual Review 2001 *Humanitarian Action: Learning from Evaluation*
- WFP/OEDE thematic evaluation “Recurring Challenges in the Provision of Food Assistance in Complex Emergencies”
- “Food Security and Food Assistance among long-standing Refugees”, (WFP/Ron Ockwell, Nov. 1999 – for refugee operations)
- Joint Food Assessment Mission report (December 1998)

ANNEX D - PERSONS INTERVIEWED

Tehran

MOFA

- Mr. Bozorgmehr Ziaran, Director General of the International Department for Economics and UN Specialized Agencies
- Mr Saeed Faryabi, Senior Adviser, International Department for Economics and UN Specialized Agencies

BAFIA

- Mr. Reza Rustami, Deputy Director General
- Mr. Golanreza Mashhadi, Director of the International Department

WFP

- Mr Marius de Gaay Fortman, Representative, WFP Iran
- Ms Shahrara Zahra Ajdari, Programme Officer, WFP Iran
- Mr Parviz Khakbaz, Assistant Programme Officer/Logistics
- Mr Dara Darbandi, Field Monitor, WFP Iran
- Ms Dominique Hyde, Resources Mobilization Officer, WFP HQ
- Ms Nancy Walters, Regional Programme Adviser and JFAM Mission Leader, WFP

UNHCR

- Mr Christopher Lee, Assistant Chief of Mission (programme), UNHCR Iran
- Mr Francois Marrillet, Programme Officer, UNHCR Iran

Donors

- Mr Sylvain Fourriere, First Secretary, Embassy of France
- Mr Kentaro Torii, Second Secretary, Embassy of Japan
- Mr Chris Brettingham-Moore, Second Secretary, Australian Embassy
- Mr Jonas Wendel, First Secretary, Embassy of Sweden
- Mr Guillaume Scheurer, Counsellor, Embassy of Switzerland
- Mr Peter Bates, First Secretary, Canadian Embassy

Other

- Ms Nazanin Kazemi, Representative, International Consortium for Refugees in Iran

Kerman Province

- Mr Amiri, head of BAFIA in the province (and staff)
- Mr Raeesi, head of logistics in the province for BAFIA
- Mr Nematollahi, manager of Bardsir refugee camp
- Mr Norouzi, manager of Rafsanjan refugee camp
- Mr Ebrahimi, office for Afghan refugees in the Governor's office, Rafsanjan
- Doctors, teachers, etc in Bardsir and Rafsanjan refugee camps
- Afghan refugees in Bardsir and Rafsanjan camps
- Afghan refugees on outskirts of Kerman city (brick factory workers)

Fars Province

- Mr Mahmoud Mousavi, head of BAFIA in the province (and staff)
- Mr Sotudeh, deputy head of BAFIA in the province and manager of Jahrom refugee camp
- Mr Ghasvarian, manager of Sarvestan refugee camp
- Mr Bahimi, specialist in BAFIA office dealing with Afghan refugees
- Mr Avelu, State Organisation for Grains Shiraz
- Doctor, health facilitators and teachers in Sarvestan and Jahrom refugee camps
- Iraqi efugees in Sarvestan (Arab Iraqis) and Jahrom (Arab and Kurd) refugee camps
- Afghan refugees on outskirts of Shiraz (scrap metal dealers)

West Azerbaijan Province

- Mr Abtahi, head of BAFIA in the province (and staff)
- Mr Hamid Posthar, Admin/Finance Assistant and OIC UNHCR sub-office Orumieh
- Ms Angelita Ghomghaleh, Repatriation Clerk, UNHCR sub-office Orumieh
- Mr Nabizadeh, manager of Ziveh refugee camp
- Mr Shami, manager of Dilzeh refugee camp

Khorasan Province

- Mr Mohammad Olama, Director General for BAFIA (and staff)
- Mr Toshiro Odashima, head of UNHCR sub-office in Mashhad
- Mr Ahmad Taheri Ghomi, Community Services Assistant, UNHCR Mashhad
- Mr Samuel Sawa, UNICEF Mashhad
- Mr Eskandari, manager of Torbat-e-Jam refugee camp
- Mr Farshid Salehi, Project Officer, Ockenden International
- Mr Shane Coledge, Global Partners (UK)
- Mr Jorik Vellehoop, Medicines Sans Frontieres, Mashhad
- Shohada Charity Institution of Afghanistan, Mashhad

ANNEX E - MISSION ITINERARY

Date	Activity
24 Jan	Mission leader and WFP Evaluation Officer arrived
25 Jan	WFP Resources Evaluation Officer arrived
26 Jan	Met with Nutrition Consultant. Team meeting Briefed by WFP CD and staff. Discussed key issues Meeting at Ministry of Foreign Affairs
27 Jan	Meetings at BAFIA and UNHCR Team flew to Kerman Province with WFP (Deputy)
29 Jan	Visited Bardsir refugee camp (Afghanis) accompanied by BAFIA officials including the provincial head and the head of logistics. Spent 5 hours in the camp. Met with camp officials including the manager. WFP (deputy) flew back to Tehran and WFP Monitoring Officer arrives.
30 Jan	Visited Rafsanjan refugee camp (Afghanis) accompanied by BAFIA officials. Spent 5 hours in the camp. Met with camp officials including the manager.
31 Jan	Visited BAFIA offices to inspect records gathered at recent registration of refugees and computer database. Subsequently conducted a debriefing for BAFIA WFP Evaluation Officer and WFP Resources Mobilisation Officer flew to Tehran.
1 Feb	Drove to Shiraz Province (6 hours) Team meeting in the evening
2 Feb	Meeting at BAFIA followed by visit to Sarvestan Iraqi Arab refugee camp (one hour). Spent 6 hours in camp.
3 Feb	Visit to Jahrom Iraqi Arab refugee camp (two hours). Spent 5 hours in camp.
4 Feb	Met officer from SOG Fars Province. Debriefing meeting with deputy head of BAFIA (3 hours)
5 Feb	Team brainstorming workshop in the morning. Flew back to Tehran in the afternoon.
6 Feb	Flew to Urumieh, West Azerbaijan Province. Met with BAFIA officials. Subsequent meetings with UNHCR sub-office and Iranian Red Crescent Society Team planning meeting in the evening
7 Feb	Visit to Ziveh Iraqi Kurd refugee camp (one hour). Spent 5 hours in camp.
8 Feb	Visited Dilzeh Iraqi Kurd refugee camp (two and a half hours). 3 and a half hours in camp.
9 Feb	Team workshop including Country Director
10 Feb	Flew from Urumieh back to Tehran Further file research at CO
11 Feb	Flew to Mashhad, Khorasan Province. Met with BAFIA officials and subsequently with head of UNHCR sub-office

12 Feb	<p>Visited Torbat-e-Jam Afghan refugee camp (two hours from Mashhad). Spent nearly 6 hours in the camp</p> <p>Met with two NGOs active in Mashhad in the evening.</p>
13 Feb	<p>Visited Gorghe on the outskirts of Mashhad where there is a large concentration of poorer non-camp Afghan refugees. Visited a community school and households.</p> <p>Met with more NGOs active in Mashhad. Debriefed BAFIA.</p> <p>Flew back to Tehran</p>
14 Feb	<p>Met the umbrella organization ICRI.</p> <p>Discussions with CO staff</p>
15 Feb	<p>Worked on notes for report</p>
16 Feb	<p>Worked on Aide Memoire</p>
17 Feb	<p>Debriefing with CO, UNHCR and JFAM in the morning. Joined by donor representatives.</p> <p>Debriefing with BAFIA and MOFA in the afternoon.</p> <p>Mission leader departed.</p>

ANNEX F – TERMS OF REFERENCE

Evaluation of Iran PRRO 6126

Food Assistance and support for repatriation of Iraqi and Afghan refugees in Iran

1. Background to the PRRO Category

The PRO category - covering Protracted Emergency Operations for Refugees and Displaced Persons - was first established by the CFA on the recommendation of WFP in May 1989 (WFP/CFA:27/P/7). The category responded to (i) the growth of migrant groups – both refugees and displaced people - as a result of civil strife, and (ii) the persistence of the problems, which led to their flight and the consequent perpetuation of their status over long periods. In short, a decade of civil conflicts had contributed to the same time, there was a need for an adequate and predictable funding base for refugees. By creating a subset of its “development” resources, WFP hoped to preserve the development and emergency resource bases for their original purposes while attracting additional net resources to deal with burgeoning needs in this new category.

In April 1998, WFP introduced a significant enhancement to the PRO category when it endorsed WFP’s policy proposals in the paper “From Crisis to Recovery” (WFP/EB.A/98/4). The new PRRO – Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation - brought two major modifications to the category. First, all protracted emergency operations – and no longer just refugee and displaced persons operations - would be transformed into PRROs and brought before the Board for approval, generally after two years. Second, the transformation of EMOPs into PRROs would be done based on the preparation of a recovery strategy that would provide the rationale for continued assistance and, to the extent possible, emphasize recovery activities in addition to ongoing relief needs and contribute to conditions for finding sustainable solutions to protracted crises. This emphasis on recovery was very much in line with international support for linking relief and rehabilitation work to longer-term development interventions. Refugee and displaced persons operations – the old PRO category – would remain a subset of the new category and would benefit from the introduction of a recovery strategy.

The new PRRO category also stressed two important resource dimensions:

- First, within a PRRO, WFP would have the flexibility to move funds freely between relief and recovery activities as the situation on the ground required - to seize opportunities for recovery, but to be prepared to meet unforeseen critical relief needs;
- Second, the new category called for longer-term financial commitments from donors – for predictability and planning as well as for building partnerships for recovery.

During its sessions in October 2000 and February 2001, WFP’s Executive Board considered issues related to the funding of PRROs and raised questions about the effectiveness of the new category. The Board endorsed a review of the PRRO category as a whole to be undertaken by OEDE based on the findings of 10 PRRO evaluations scheduled for 2001-2002.

Of particular interest to the Board are the following broad issues:

- What substantive improvements in the delivery of WFP assistance have been achieved as a result of the introduction of the policy *From Crisis to Recovery* and the resulting conversion of EMOPS and PROs to the new PRRO category?
- Is WFP identifying sustainable recovery activities through the PRRO category and is it attracting and investing adequate resources - resources that complement its traditionally strong base of relief funding - to implement those activities effectively?

2. PRRO 6126 - An Overview

WFP’s Executive Board approved the Iran PRRO in May 1999 to cover the period from 1 July 1999 to 30 June 2000 (then extended in time through June 2002). The PRRO provided food assistance to some 136,000 Iraqi and Afghani refugees broken down as follows: 84,000 located in refugee camps and

40,000 refugees located outside of refugee camps. This caseload represents only a small portion of the estimated two million refugees who currently reside within Iran. In 2002, Afghan refugees, formerly assisted under this PRRO, will be assisted under the new Afghanistan Regional EMOP 10026.

WFP food aid is targeted to needy refugees through the application of vulnerability criterion. Data for making these assessments comes from a socio-economic survey. Wheat has been provided to Iraqi refugees repatriating to Iraq, and oil is also provided to families of girls who attend schools in the camps.

The stated goals of WFP food assistance to Iran under PRRO 6126 are to:

- e) ensure that basic food needs for survival of the refugees are met, considering also that many camps are in remote areas;
- f) provide food to refugees outside camps, based on vulnerability criteria;
- g) through an oil incentive, encourage girls to attend camp schools set up by the Iranian Government, at the same time contributing to the household budget as well as to the household's food intake; and
- h) support UNHCR-assisted repatriation of refugees through the provision of a one-time wheat package of 50 kilograms upon departure, as a transitory ration until the repatriates find more regular supply systems in their home countries.

3. Objectives of the Evaluation of PRRO 6126

The objectives of the evaluation are:

1. To assess the efficiency, relevance, effectiveness, coherence and sustainability³⁷ of WFP assistance under the PRRO in order to improve the implementation of the current operation and assist with planning the next phase;
2. To assess the usefulness of the PRRO category both as a resource window and as a programming instrument; and
3. To provide accountability to the Executive Board.

4. Scope of Work

The evaluation of PRRO 6126 will review the PRRO's recovery strategy, assessing how it was formulated, how it has evolved over the life of the project and its relevance to the situation analysis.

Based on its recovery strategy, PRRO 6126 identified activities within the following component elements: *protracted refugee, repatriation and incentives for girls education*. The component elements will be assessed individually to determine a) if the activities are taking place, outputs are being delivered and targets are being reached and b) if this is sufficient to achieve the stated objectives.

On a practical level, this will include assessing the systems and support (financial, staff, partnerships, etc.) underlying the PRRO. On a more general level, the strategic linkages between the component elements will be assessed to determine whether the PRRO has successfully seized opportunities for recovery.

The evaluation will also examine the participation of implementing partners, sister agencies, and other stakeholders: first, to determine their contribution to meeting WFP's objectives; and second, to shed

³⁷ Standard evaluation criterion such as *efficiency, effectiveness, relevance, coherence* and *sustainability* used in these TOR are defined in *Guidance for Evaluating Humanitarian Assistance in Complex Emergencies* (OECD, Development Assistance Committee, 1999).

light on whether the PRRO has contributed “to the process of transforming insecure, fragile conditions into durable, stable situations...”³⁸.

The evaluation will also consider how effectively the Commitments to Women have been integrated in the design of the operation. In broad terms, it will assess how well the consideration of gender relations, which can be a major impediment to improved food security, have been mainstreamed into the operation’s activities.

5. Key Issues and Sub-Issues

The evaluation will address the following issues and sub-issues:

A. Relevance of the PRRO Recovery Strategy:

- A.1 When and how was the recovery strategy developed for the PRRO? In what ways does it differ from the strategy under its predecessor *EMOP* 5950? Has it been periodically reviewed or modified over the life of the operation?
- A.2 What resources were devoted to the development of the PRRO recovery strategy and what mechanisms for consultation, partnership and review were utilized?
- A.3 Does the recovery strategy adequately: provide the rationale for operating in the protracted situation; identify and justify the role of food aid; identify target areas and groups; and define assistance modalities?
- A.4 Is the recovery strategy aimed at creating conditions for a sustainable solution to a protracted situation?
- A.5 Does the recovery strategy identify the conditions under which the PRRO will move from relief to recovery?
- A.6 What risks to the PRRO were foreseen in the recovery strategy (e.g., the resurgence of violence, the influx of additional refugees, loss of donor support, lack of complementary inputs) and were appropriate contingency plans made?
- A.7 Does the recovery strategy include an exit strategy?
- A.8 How is the PRRO linked with the other multilateral or bilateral development strategy tools (e.g., the UN Country Strategy Framework, the World Bank Poverty Reduction Strategy Programme, etc.), the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP), and any contingency planning exercises?

B. Quality of the PRRO Design:

- B.1 Are the PRRO objectives clear, realistic and coherent in terms of collectively contributing to the achievement of the stated goal?
- B.2 Is the PRRO in line with the policy “From Crisis to Recovery”? If not, how and why not?
- B.3 Is the PRRO targeting the appropriate beneficiaries? Does the design include adequate needs assessment methods for moving to a more targeted approach as required?
- B.4 Have both the relief and recovery needs of the beneficiaries been accurately identified? Are the planned outputs and activities relevant and appropriate to the needs of target groups?
- B.5 Are the food rations and other WFP inputs appropriate in light of the desired outcomes?
- B.6 Were all relevant external factors affecting the implementation of the PRRO considered at the design stage?
- B.7 Has the operational context changed since the design? If so, are the PRRO’s stated objectives still relevant? Has the PRRO been adapted appropriately?

³⁸ “From Crisis to Recovery”, WFP 1998.

- B.8 Does the design of the PRRO adequately reflect the different roles played by men and women in the relief and recovery process? Are the Commitments to Women appropriately addressed in the design?
- B.9 Are the objectives and activities of the PRRO compatible with and complementary to those of other interventions currently being implemented by the CO? Have appropriate linkages been made with the recovery or development activities of other WFP interventions?
- B.10 Does the design of the PRRO adequately taken into account the policies and aims of the Government and other actors who are addressing similar issues? Are the activities and outputs of the PRRO consistent with the policies of the Government, other donors and organizations?

C. Efficiency of PRRO Implementation:

- C.1 Have opportunities been identified and pursued for making the transition from relief to recovery activities (in particular, restoring livelihoods) where appropriate? Has there been an effort to integrate developmental approaches as early as possible in relief and recovery activities and build effective partnerships for this?

Assessment & Targeting:

- C.2 How have food insecurity, vulnerability and beneficiary figures been assessed and subsequently adjusted as the operation has evolved?
 - At the country level? (e.g., FAO/WFP Food and Crop Assessments, WFP/VAM, GIEWS, FEWS, JFAMs, composite household surveys, camp registration)
 - At the community level? (e.g., RRA, PRA)
 - At the household level (e.g., women's organizations, relief committees)
- C.3 Are there mechanisms to signal the need (or provide guidance in the case of resource shortfalls) for further targeting, for ration adjustments, or for phasing down?
- C.4 Who selects beneficiaries and on what basis? Do women play a role in selection?
- C.5 Is there evidence that the targeted beneficiaries are being reached? Has the PRRO been effective at making use of UN Frameworks for ensuring access to beneficiaries?
- C.6 What is the share of female beneficiaries by distribution type?
- C.7 Is the cost of the assessment and targeting process reasonable? Has the use of an assessment method for targeting resulted in budgetary savings?
- C.8 What information on expected funding has been available during the formulation and implementation of the operation and how has this influenced targeting?
- C.9 Are the activities and outputs in line with local needs? Are the assets being created relevant for the beneficiaries in terms of the PRRO's intended results?
- C.10 What is the nature of the interaction between refugees and the local population and how has the operation addressed and weighed the needs of these groups?

Logistics:

- C.11 Has the pipeline been adequately maintained? In the case of resource shortfalls, have breaks in the pipeline been signaled beforehand and properly managed?
- C.12 How have outputs been affected by breaks in the pipeline and resource shortfalls? Has the move towards targeted approaches under the PRRO assisted with coping with such shortfalls?
- C.13 Was planning for logistics requirements adequate and what have been the major challenges to the smooth functioning of the PRRO?

Leakages:

- C.14 What is the extent of losses within the PRRO? What steps are being taken by WFP to avoid or minimize the level of diversion or taxation – through, for example, selection of delivery channels, supervised distributions and post-distribution monitoring?

Security

- C.16 In the context of the local security situation, have adequate and appropriate measures been introduced and adhered to in order to minimize the risk to WFP staff and implementing partners involved in the implementation of the PRRO?
- C.17 Are there significant security challenges to the smooth functioning of the PRRO?

Monitoring & Evaluation Systems:

- C.18 Is an appropriate and functioning monitoring and evaluation system supporting the implementation of the PRRO? Is it being used to advise management?
- C.19 Were baseline data collected and appropriate indicators identified at the outset for measuring results?
- C.20 What is the type and frequency of reporting for the operation, including periodic rapid participatory appraisals? Is the information analyzed and used to make decisions regarding the management of the PRRO?
- C.21 What are the constraints to monitoring – such as staffing, funding, access, security, manipulation of data – that affect the operation and how does the CO attempt to overcome these?
- C.22 Have monitoring criteria been established to signal when to shift activities from “relief” to “recovery”, and from “recovery” to “development”? If so, are these being applied effectively?

Management:

- C.23 Did the preparation and implementation of the PRRO (compared to the previous EMOP/PRO) result in management changes?
- C.24 Is there an adequate structure of sub-offices and field offices to manage the operation and maintain effective operational relationships with implementing partners?
- C.25 Do sub-offices and field staff have adequate authority to carry out their functions? Are reporting arrangements within the sub-offices and to the CO clear?
- C.26 Is appropriate training available to PRRO staff to enhance and maintain their skills, particularly in line with the programmatic objectives of the PRRO category?

D. Results of the PRRO:

- D.1 To what extent are the outputs of the different components contributing to achieving the desired PRRO outcomes?
- D.2 What have been the actual outcomes for the beneficiaries (men, women, children, IDPs), and what assets have been gained?
- D.3 What unexpected outcomes (positive or negative) have occurred?
- D.4 What are the prospects for the sustainability of each main PRRO activity?
- D.5 Have there been ration reductions or phasing out of “general” food assistance and transitions to targeted feeding approaches? If so, on what basis and to what effect?
- D.6 Has there been any added value to transforming long-standing refugee and IDP operations into a PRRO in terms of building linkages and improving the likelihood of sustainability?
- D.7 To what degree has WFP food aid contributed to promoting resettlement and food self-sufficiency, as applicable?

E. Effectiveness of Co-ordination and Partnerships:

- E.1 Are the capacities and comparative advantages of potential implementing partners (IPs) assessed by the Country Office prior to entering into partnerships and agreements?
- E.2 Are the number and nature of IPs under the PRRO adequate and appropriate for implementing the range of activities? Is there an appropriate balance between local, national and international IPs? Has there been a trend towards or away from using local implementing partners?
- E.3 Are WFP's policies and priorities (eg, gender and environment) reflected in MOUs with various IPs?
- E.4 Do agreements with IPs specify the need for gender disaggregated data? Are partners aware of gender issues, including WFP's Commitments to Women?
- E.5 To what extent have partnership arrangements successfully or negatively contributed to the implementation of the PRRO?
- E.6 Has preparing and implementing the PRRO broadened and improved coordination compared to the predecessor operations? If so, how?
- E.7 What are the mechanisms for coordination with government, donors, UN agencies (OCHA, UNHCR, FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, UNDP, etc.), NGOs, etc.? Are these being used to the PRRO's maximum benefit?
- E.8 Are appropriate and suitable mechanisms in place to ensure strategic co-ordination at the national policy level regarding relief and recovery issues?
- E.9 For regional PRROs and PRROs with cross-border operations (e.g., repatriation), has coordination between WFP country offices and with partners in different countries been effective vis-à-vis logistics, programming and implementation ?

F. Resourcing of the PRRO :

Budgets and financial resources for preparation and implementation

- F.1 Has the preparation of the PRRO resulted in a change in the ratio of dollars spent per ton of commodities delivered compared to the previous *PRO 5950* ?
- F.2 Does the Country Office have the resources required – staff and cash – to prepare and implement the PRRO as foreseen in the “Guidelines for Preparation of a PRRO”, including staff or consultants with a “combination of development and emergency experience, and strong background in planning, design and strategy formulation”?³⁹
- F.3 Is the PRRO budget appropriate in relation to its objectives/activities, and what factors (such as CO size, additional staff requirements for PRRO implementation) have affected individual budget items, and particularly DSC?
- F.4 What has been the overall resourcing result of presenting and tracking the PRRO budget by component elements (relief or recovery), including earmarking resources to particular components?

Flexibility of PRRO budget and shifts in activities and resources

- F.5 Have the contingency mechanisms intended to deal with setbacks, reversals and new emergency/disaster outbreaks – such as PRRO budget revisions – been employed?
- F.6 To what extent has the Country Director utilized his/her authority to transfer funds between components and geographic areas?

³⁹ Guidelines for the Preparation of a PRRO, section 3.3; the Guidelines suggest the establishment of a “planner post” for preparing a PRRO.

Predictability and regularity of resources and impact on PRRO

- F.7 To what extent have the resourcing requirements for the operation been met and how has the CO managed shortfalls? How predictably and regularly have resources been supplied to the PRRO?
- F.8 What have been the major resource constraints for the PRRO and have they changed as a result of the transformation of the operation from an EMOP to a PRRO?
- F.9 Has transformation to a PRRO resulted in longer-term (more than 1 year) financial commitments to the operation?
- F.10 How successfully has the PRRO resourced its non-food inputs and what, if any, have been the constraints?
- F.11 What role, if any, has resource availability and predictability played in building relief-recovery linkages?

Donor perception of the PRRO and advocacy with donors and partners

- F.12 What has been the extent and nature of Country Office advocacy for the PRRO with donors and other partners in the field? How do local donor representatives view the PRRO?
- F.13 What effect does having multiple and varied components within the PRRO (e.g., relief feeding and recovery FFW) have on WFP's ability to successfully obtain donor support?

G. Cross-cutting Issues:

Meeting Commitments to Women

- G.1 Are appropriate opportunities being sought during implementation to improve the status of women and to address their strategic needs? How is WFP trying to create a more gender equitable society?
- G.2 Has adequate effort been made to mainstream gender considerations?
- G.3 Are there any changes required in a future phase to ensure better compatibility with the Commitments to Women?

Environment

- G.4 Have environmental concerns been adequately addressed within the PRRO, particularly with regard to energy-related issues (e.g., cooking time) and the placement of IDP/refugee camps?
- G.5 *Effect of Relief Activities:* What effect have the camp sites had on the environment? What effect have rations and cooking requirements had?
- G.6 *Effect of recovery activities:* What has been the environmental impact of recovery activities within the PRRO? Are the PRRO activities helping to restore the natural habitat through rural infrastructure and reforestation schemes?

6. Notes on Methodology

6.1 Stages of the evaluation

The evaluation will be divided into three phases:

Phase I – Preparation and Desk Review (3 days):

Prior to the in-country mission, the team will review all relevant background documentation. Key team members may be assembled at WFP in Rome (or at the outposted Regional Bureau) for briefing prior to departure. Alternatively, some members of the team may review materials provided electronically and join the team directly in the field.

In order to help structure the evaluation and ensure a systematic examination of the project's effects, the evaluation team – with the assistance of the responsible OEDE officer - may wish to prepare a “mock” logical framework of the PRRO prior to arrival in-country. The logframe should first draw a link between the PRRO objectives and the situation analysis as presented in the project document.

Objectives should then be linked to each PRRO activity and its expected outputs and outcomes. Finally, the evaluation team should develop an explicit strategy for gathering information on the specific outputs and outcomes (e.g., statistical review at WFP Country Office, beneficiary interviews, etc.). A summary chart of the logframe may be used to structure the initial briefing with the Country Office and amended based on Country Office input.

Prior to the departure of the mission, OEDE and the Country Office should assemble key information. This includes:

Basic Documents to be reviewed:

- WFP PRRO policy document: “From Crisis to Recovery” (WFP/EB.A/98/4-A)
- WFP, Guidelines for Preparation of a PRRO
- PRRO project document
- WFP/RE resource summary table for the PRRO
- PRRO 6126 and PRO 5950 documents
- Afghanistan Regional EMOP 10026 document
- Country Strategy Outline and Country Programme (if exists)
- Programme Design Manual (2000)
- Cost Containment Study (2001)
- Emergency Needs Assessment Guidelines (1999)
- Supplementary Feeding Operational Guidelines (1998)
- Food aid in Emergencies (red book) Operational Procedures (1993)
- Food and Nutrition Handbook (2000)
- Gender Guidelines (2000)
- Gender Checklist (1999)
- Environmental Review Guidelines (1999)
- ALNAP Annual Review 2001 *Humanitarian Action: Learning from Evaluation*
- Previous evaluation summaries and full reports
- Country or operation case studies
- Documentation on UN CSF, CCA, UNDAF
- WFP/OEDE thematic evaluation “Recurring Challenges in the Provision of Food Assistance in Complex Emergencies”
- “Food Security and Food Assistance among long-standing Refugees”, (WFP/Ron Ockwell, Nov. 1999 – for refugee operations)
- Most recent JFAM mission reports (refugee operations); other assessment reports
- Most recent WFP/FAO Food & Crop Assessment reports
- Most recent Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) documents
- Any evaluations/reviews undertaken by implementing partners during last 2 years
- Mid-term review of the WFP Commitments to Women (if relevant)
- Country Gender Action Plan

Key information to be prepared by the WFP Country Office

- Basic country data
- Basic data on the country’s food balance, including its import and food aid requirement and local commodity prices
- Completed Part 1 (A and B) of the new Country Office Report (COR)
- Resource table for the PRRO with stock balance, information on losses and regularity of deliveries
- Management structure of PRRO: list of staff, equipment, etc. for the PRRO

- Outputs achieved vs. planned for PRRO (disaggregated)
- Relevant comparative data (budgetary, output) for PRRO and its predecessor *PRO 5950*
- Socio-economic status of beneficiaries broken down by gender, beneficiary category, location
- Local monetary value of the ration/per beneficiary category and relation to household income
- Description of logistics and security arrangements (maximum 5 pages each)

Prior to the mission, the Office of Evaluation (OEDE) should forward the TORs to the Country Office. A small task force of key stakeholders (composition to be determined by the Country Office) may be established to comment on the TORs and to host the debriefing at the end of the mission.

Phase II – The in-country evaluation (20 days):

To the extent possible, the evaluation team should meet with all relevant stakeholders, including beneficiaries, local and national government, key implementing partners and other development agencies involved in the UNDAF and with any of WFP's programmes.

Data collection will take place both in the offices of key stakeholders in the capital and in the field where the activities of the PRRO can be visited. Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA) techniques will be used whenever possible. The mission leader, together with the Country Office, will determine the optimum balance between mission time spent in the field and in the capital.

Key informant interviews to be carried out by the Team may be divided into different groups:

Group one: WFP full time and contract staff working on the PRRO;

Group two: Key institutional partners/actors involved at the national level in programming relief and recovery assistance. These may include:

- relevant government ministries,
- relevant UN agencies (OCHA, UNHCR, UNICEF, FAO, WHO, etc.)
- local offices of World Bank and regional development bank
- bilateral donors with a significant presence in relief and recovery assistance,
- NGOs with a mandate for relief and recovery assistance and a strong presence and reputation in food aid and/or food security

Group three: Institutional partners engaged in WFP activities

- national, provincial and local offices of agencies implementing PRRO activities
- staff of national and international NGOs involved in the delivery of WFP assistance within the PRRO
- staff of human service agencies supported within the PRRO such as nutrition rehabilitation units, MCH centres, etc.

Group Four: Participants and Beneficiaries

The mission members should visit households, and meet with key informants and groups which represent each category of PRRO beneficiary. Attempts should also be made by the team to make use of rapid rural appraisal techniques (RRA) as a means of gathering qualitative data from beneficiaries.

Phase III – Report writing (5 working days team members, 10 working days team leader).

The team leader is responsible for coordinating data collection activities, written inputs by team members and for preparing the Aide Memoire, evaluation summary and final report.

6.2 Timetable and Itinerary

Include in this section a tentative, detailed itinerary for the PRRO evaluation. An example:

Review/finalize evaluation TORs	14 December 2001
Planning/desk review	Prior to January 25, 2001(done by consultants independently – 3 days per consultant)
Briefing in WFP-HQ (for team leader only)	23 and 24 January 2002
Travel to Tehran	25 January 2002
In-country mission	26 January to 14 February 2002
Debriefing of Country Office and RO in Tehran	14 February 2002
Deadline for Final Evaluation Report	8 March 2002
Deadline for Evaluation Summary	15 March 2002

6.3 Organization of the Mission

Role of the Team Leader: Will finalize the methodology and key issues for the evaluation. This will be done in consultation with the OEDE Evaluation Officer. He/she will identify the role and input of each team member, including individual requirements for the Aide Memoire, Evaluation Summary and Final Report. With assistance from the WFP Evaluation Officer, the team leader will define any preparatory work required by the CO and/or local consultants prior to the mission (at least 4 weeks notice should be given to the Country Office). The team leader will assume overall responsibility for the mission, and will synthesize the inputs from all sources in order to produce the necessary outputs.

The Team leader is responsible for producing the following outputs :

- an **Aide Mémoire** for presenting the mission's early findings and recommendations at the final debriefing in Tehran;
- a **Final Evaluation Report**; and
- an **Evaluation Summary Report** for presentation to the Executive Board.

The team leader will present the team's findings at all debriefings and will ensure that all deadlines are met for the above outputs.

Role of the other team members : To provide technical expertise according to individual skill sets, and to provide written inputs to the Aide Memoire, Evaluation Summary and Final Report under the guidance of the Team Leader and WFP Evaluation Officer.

Role of the WFP Evaluation Officer : The Evaluation Officer will participate to the mission for the first week only. He will provide support to the overall evaluation exercise as necessary, which includes liaising between team members, relevant areas of WFP headquarters, UNHCR and the country office. He will also ensure compliance with the intended thrust of the evaluation, and that WFP HQ and the CO provide the necessary logistical support.

Role of the Iran Country Office : To advise on the timing of the evaluation to ensure that the evaluation outputs are available for the preparation of the next phase of the PRRO. To ensure that all necessary documents required to plan the evaluation and undertake the desk review are provided in a timely manner. To assist with the identification and hiring of local consultants as required. To ensure that any necessary preparatory work is undertaken in-country prior to the arrival of the evaluation team, and to facilitate the work of the team while in-country. Prepare and organize the mission in-country itinerary, and organize the PRRO evaluation briefing/debriefing.

6.4 Products of the Evaluation

- **Aide Mémoire** for debriefing the Country and Regional Offices (maximum 5 pages)
deadline: 14 February 2002
- **Final Evaluation Report**
deadline : 8 March 2002
- **Evaluation Summary Report** (maximum 5000 words)
deadline : 15 March 2002

All reports will be prepared in English and must be written in conformity with the outlines in Annexes 1 and 2. Draft versions of the Evaluation Summary Report and Final Report will be reviewed by the OEDE Evaluation Officer prior to being finalized.

The Evaluation Summary Report, technical reports and Final Evaluation Report must be submitted in hardcopy accompanied by an electronic version. If applicable, annexes should also be made available in WFP standard software (i.e., Microsoft package). For ease of processing, the Summary Report should be submitted as plain, unformatted text only (no paragraph numbering, limited bold, underline, etc.).

The mission is fully responsible for its independent full report.

The evaluation shall be conducted in conformity with these terms of reference and under the overall guidance of OEDE.

The Annexes to these Terms of Reference provide the evaluation team with some tools to be used in carrying out and reporting on the PRRO evaluation.

ANNEX G – PERFORMANCE STATISTICS BY CAMP

Delivery of commodities to camps from mid-2000 to end 2001 expressed as (i) an average monthly ration, (ii) a percentage of the planned ration, (iii) an average daily caloric value, and (iv) a percentage of planned kcals⁴⁰

	Wheat flour		Rice		Oil		Pulses		Sugar		Kilocalories	
Refugee Camps	Av. mthly ration/ person	% of 8.4 kgs planned	Av. mthly ration/ person	% of 3 kgs planned	Av. mthly ration/ person	% of 0.6 kgs planned	Av. mthly ration/ person	% of 0.9 kgs planned	Av. mthly ration/ person	% of 0.45 kgs planned	Av. daily kcals/ person	As a % of 1,680 kcals
Soltanieh	6.05	72.06	2.02	67.20	0.49	82.43	0.66	73.74	0.36	81.03	1218.85	72.55
Ziveh	8.23	97.93	1.18	39.50	0.55	91.61	0.78	86.70	0.41	90.36	1407.75	83.79
Dilzeh	8.44	100.42	1.36	45.44	0.60	100.35	0.74	82.68	0.39	85.98	1462.63	87.06
Bezileh	8.45	100.57	1.33	44.46	0.60	100.42	0.80	89.22	0.38	85.53	1466.96	87.32
Sara	6.33	75.38	2.85	94.98	0.62	102.73	0.41	45.93	0.32	72.17	1354.83	80.64
Varmahang	6.43	76.56	1.33	44.43	0.60	100.82	0.55	60.95	0.35	77.13	1198.93	71.37
Karimabad	6.49	77.22	2.78	92.57	0.59	98.75	0.89	98.89	0.34	75.78	1412.10	84.05
Dizli	6.01	71.50	1.56	51.92	0.60	100.26	0.50	55.91	0.32	71.87	1167.10	69.47
Bahram Abad	6.59	78.41	2.30	76.54	0.60	99.60	0.86	95.31	0.27	59.70	1354.43	80.62
Sefid Choga	8.89	105.81	2.26	75.47	0.62	103.93	0.79	88.26	0.31	69.70	1625.77	96.77
Kangavar	8.53	101.50	1.91	63.58	0.54	90.82	0.66	73.42	0.34	75.89	1506.05	89.65
Songhor	8.35	99.45	1.83	60.94	0.59	98.54	0.71	79.04	0.40	88.69	1503.64	89.50
Kurds overall	7.83	93.22	1.61	53.76	0.58	96.25	0.70	78.27	0.37	81.93	1407.74	83.79

⁴⁰ No adjustment has been made to take account of the lower rations received by Afghans due to receipt of less baked bread than they should receive

	Wheat flour		Rice		Oil		Pulses		Sugar		Kilocalories	
Refugee Camps	Av. mthly ration/ person	% of 8.4 kgs planned	Av. mthly ration/ person	% of 3 kgs planned	Av. mthly ration/ person	% of 0.6 kgs planned	Av. mthly ration/ person	% of 0.9 kgs planned	Av. mthly ration/ person	% of 0.45 kgs planned	Av. daily kcals/ person	As a % of 1,680 kcals
Abazar	7.86	93.59	1.59	53.15	0.59	98.67	0.78	86.43	0.30	66.48	1412.41	84.07
Jahrom	6.78	80.68	1.35	44.90	0.56	92.68	0.50	55.99	0.30	67.13	1215.42	72.35
Sarvestan	8.22	97.81	1.29	43.15	0.55	91.61	0.50	55.84	0.30	66.40	1374.43	81.81
Bani Najar	7.97	94.89	0.97	32.32	0.55	91.46	0.50	55.59	0.18	39.44	1290.13	76.79
Motahari	8.44	100.43	1.04	34.81	0.51	85.78	0.55	61.41	0.30	67.15	1365.63	81.29
Ashrafi Esfehiani	8.46	100.71	1.08	36.06	0.53	89.16	0.55	61.60	0.33	72.72	1382.47	82.29
Ansar	8.19	97.46	0.96	31.98	0.54	90.21	0.55	61.19	0.30	66.71	1333.86	79.40
Ibrahim Abad	7.52	89.49	0.80	26.55	0.62	102.58	0.45	50.41	0.31	68.27	1248.56	74.32
Arabs overall	8.03	95.57	1.12	37.17	0.55	91.13	0.55	60.73	0.30	66.61	1335.10	79.47
Mohajerin	6.75	80.35	1.59	52.86	0.60	99.97	0.50	55.52	0.30	66.16	1252.95	74.58
Dalaki	7.48	89.02	1.63	54.17	0.52	87.06	0.75	83.70	0.34	75.97	1353.41	80.56
Niatak	8.41	100.11	1.47	49.05	0.54	90.73	0.50	55.54	0.35	78.08	1423.38	84.72
Rafsanjan	7.37	87.69	1.60	53.23	0.53	88.89	0.50	55.56	0.35	77.78	1313.25	78.17
Bardsir	6.75	80.34	1.61	53.73	0.57	94.43	0.45	50.00	0.35	77.77	1247.34	74.25
Saveh	7.11	84.67	1.60	53.33	0.53	88.03	0.50	55.28	0.35	77.38	1281.88	76.30
Torbat-e-jam	6.60	78.55	1.04	34.79	0.48	80.42	0.34	37.60	0.27	59.65	1113.17	66.26
Afghans overall	7.33	87.29	1.56	52.08	0.55	91.52	0.50	55.80	0.34	75.61	1308.90	77.91
Benefic. overall	7.74	92.13	1.35	44.98	0.55	91.95	0.55	60.92	0.32	71.98	1334.43	78.94